Dominance and state power in modern India: Decline of a social order [2] 9780195622614, 0195622618

Citation preview

DOV n NANCE AND STATE POWER IN MODERN INDIA Decline of a Social Order Volume II

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Digitized by

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

DOMINANCE AND STATE POWER IN MODERN INDIA Decline of a Social Order VOLUME II

Editors FR A N C IN E R . FR A N K EL M. S. A . R A O

DELHI

O X FO R D U N IV ERSITY PRESS BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS 1990

Original from Digitized by

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

L)?0 -SH Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford 0 X 2 6DP Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Pooling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Melbourne Auckland and associates in Berlin Ibadan

© Oxford University Press 1990

SBN 0 19 562261 8

Typeset at Taj Services Ltd., Noida Printed at Rekha Printers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 110020 and published by S. K. Mookerjee, Oxford University Press YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110001

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Contents List o f Maps, Tables and Appendices

vi

Preface

xi

Notes on Contributors

xxvu

The Thousand Year Raj: Regional Isolation and Rajput Hinduism in Rajasthan before and after 1947 IQBAL NARAIN a n d P. C. MATHUR

1

Caste Sentiments, Class Formation and Dominance in Gujarat GHANSHYAMSHAH

59

Caste, Class and Dominance: Political Mobilization in Maharashtra 115

JAYANTLELE

The Evolution of a Counter-Ideology: Dalit Consciousness in Maharashtra JAYASHREE B. GOKHALE

212

Pattern of Politico-Economic Change among Tribals in Middle India 278

SACHCHIDANANDA

Gass, Caste and Dominance in a Backward State: Orissa MANORANJ AN MOHANTY

321

From Elite Activism to Democratic Consolidation: The Rise of Reform Communism in West Bengal ATUL KOHLI

367

Religious and Ethnic Politics: Political Mobilization in Punjab PAUL WALLACE

416

Conclusion Decline of a Social Order FRANCINE R. FRANKEL

482

Appendix I Note on the Class and Caste Structure of India’s Agricultural Economy

519

Appendix II Number of Agricultural Labourers in India by State

532

Appendix III Economic Growth and Structure of the Economy

534

Appendix IV Social Background of Indian Corporate Executives SANTOSH GOYAL

535

545

Index

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

List of Maps, Tables and Appendices REGIONAL ISOLATION AND RAJPUT HINDUISM IN RAJASTHAN Map I. Rajasthan: Agricultural Regions II. Rajasthan: Cropping Patterns in the Former Princely States III. Rajasthan: District Divisons Table 1. Decadal Variations in Population since 1901 2. Trends in Per Capita Income: India and Rajasthan (19S5-56 to 1980- 81) 3. Indicators of Development: India and Rajasthan 4. Growth Rate of Major Cities 5. Per cent Distribution of Rural Households according to Mode of Ownership and Type of Tenancy 6. Number and Area of Operational Holdings according to Size (per cent) 7. Size Distribution of Operational Holdings by Regions in Rajasthan 1981- 82 (per cent) 8. Regional Productivity and Average Holding Size: 1970-71 9. Operational Holdings with Irrigation Facilities 10. Social Composition of Literacy Rates, 1981 (Rajasthan) 11. Caste Composition of Assembly and Society (in percentage)

4 30 44 3 5 6 7 8 11 12 13 14 16 51

CASTE SENTIMENTS AND CLASS FORMATION IN GUJARAT Map I. Territorial Divisions under Colonial Rule

60

Table 1. Distribution of Castes (1931 Census) 2. Changes in the Number of Holdings of all Categories of Cultivators between 1947-48 and 1954-55 3. Number of Tenants by Status and Caste 4. Number of Operational Holdings and Area Operated by Size Group of Operational Holdings in Gujarat 1970-71 5. Occupation, Landholding and Caste in Rural Gujarat 6. Percentages of Votes Polled and Seats Won by Political Parties in Gujarat Assembly Elections, 1952-80 7. Caste Composition of tlje MLAs in the Assembly from 1957 to 1985

63 80 83 84 85 90 107

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN MAHARASHTRA Map I. Political Boundaries of the Marathi-speaking Region in the Colonial Period II. The Kingdom of Shivaji, 1680 III. The Maratha Confederacy IV. Maharashtra State, 1960

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

122 134 136 170

vii

L ist o f MapsP Tables and Appendices Table 1. Distribution of Population: Maharashtra 2. Distribution of Population in Bombay Deccan, Konkan and Vidharba in Selected Caste Groups (1931) 3. Distribution of Population in Marathwada (Hyderabad State) by Caste/Community (1931) 4. Percentage of Scheduled Tribes and Castes, Nav-Baudhas and Agricultural Labourers in 1981 3. Congress Party Membership in Maharashtra, 1935-38 6. Factory Employment in 1962,1974,1981 7. Percentage of Gross Cropped Area, 1978-79 8. Number of Co-operative Sugar Factories in Maharashtra on 20 September 1983 9. Some Indicators of Regional Economic Imbalance in Maharashtra State 10. Maharashtra: Percentage Distribution of Number of Operational Holdings and Area Operated by Size Groups, 1980-81 11. Land Owned by Gtizens belonging to the Maratha-Kunbi Caste O uster, 1985 12. Caste Composition of Cabinet Ministers: Maharashtra 1961-86

116 120 121 123 161 172 173 174 176 178 179 205

DALIT CONSCIOUSNESS IN MAHARASHTRA Map I. Distribution of Scheduled Castes in Maharashtra

214

PATTERN OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN MIDDLE INDIA Map I. Middle India Table 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

282

Tribal Population Scheduled Tribes: Rural/Urban Population, Literacy, Cultivations Inflow of Immigrants into Chotanagpur Restoration of Alienated Land Distribution of Surplus Land Percentage of Expenditure on Tribal Development in the Five-Year Plans Post Matric Scholarships Enrolment of Tribal Children (1978-79) Enrolment of Tribal Children (1978-79) Representation in Central Services Representation in Public Sector Undertakings

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Appendix I. Percentage of Tribal Population in Middle India II. Tribal Majority Districts in Middle India III. Distribution of Benefits by Classes in Five Villages in Gujarat

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

279 279 288 2% 297 299 300 301 301 302 302 318 319 320

viii

List o f M aps, Tables and Appendices

CLASS, CASTE, DOMINANCE IN A BACKWARD STATE: ORISSA Map I. Orissa: Changes in Administrative Boundaries, 1936-61 Table 1. Landowners by Caste and Religion: Balasore 1900 2. Population of Cuttack, Puri and Balasore by Caste, 1931 3. Population of the Orissa Division and Princely States of Orissa by Caste, 1931 4. Population of Depressed Gasses of Orissa State, 1931 5. Population of Selected Tribes of Orissa Division and Orissa State, 1931 6. Size of Landholdings in Orissa, 1976-77 7. Indices of Underdevelopment 8. Social Indicators by Coastal and Inland Districts 9. Performance of Parties in Assembly Elections. 1952-85 10. Castes of Congress MLAs, 1961—85 11. Caste Analysis of Ministries of Orissa, 1937-85 12. Castes and Occupation of Non-Congress MLAs

324 331 333 334 335 335 341 344 346 348 352 354 355

THE RISE OF REFORM COMMUNISM IN WEST BENGAL Map I. West Bengal

406

Table 1. Seats won by the Major Political Parties in West Bengal Assembly Elections, 1952-87 2. Percentage of Votes Polled by the Major Parties in 1977 and 1982, West Bengal Assembly Elections 3. Religion and Caste of West Bengal Cabinet Ministers According to Parties, 1952-82 4. Changing Caste Composition of West Bengal Cabinets, 1952-82 5. Changes in Tenancy in West Bengal, 1953-71 6. Poverty and Inequality in Rural West Bengal 7. Some Basic Demographic Data on West Bengal 8. Distribution of Land in West Bengal by Size G ass of Operational Holdings, 1953-72 9. Political and G ass Profile of the Members of Gram Panchayats 10. The Impact of Operation Barga: Household Survey of Registered Share-croppers 11. Distribution of Castes in Bengal 12. Proportionate Distribution of the Population by Divisions on a Social and Religious Gassification, 1931: Bengal and Sikkim

372 373 374 374 376 377 378 379 381 383 390 390

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN PUNJAB Map I. Punjab before Partition II. Punjab 1956 III. Punjab 1966

Digitized by

Google

420 420 420

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

L ist o f M aps, Tables and Appendices

ix

T a b le 1. Regional, Community and Rural-Urban Distribution by District, 1961 2. State-wide Rural-Urban Distribution within each Community, 1961 3. Hindu and Sikh Rural-Urban Distribution in Central Plains, 1961 4. Major Hindu, Sikh and Muslim Castes, 1931 5. Christian Increase in Punjab, 1881-1921 6. Percentage of Community Literate in Punjab, 1911 and 1921 7. SGPC Budgets, 1964-80 8. Formula for Community Recruitment to Government Services, 1925-45 9. Punjab Assembly Election Results, 1952-62 10. Congress Ministry by Religion, Caste, Rural-Urban, 1956 11. Congress Ministry by Religion, Caste, Rural-Urban, 1957 12. Congress Ministry by Religion, Caste, Rural-Urban, 1962 13. Punjab's Population by Religion, 1971 and 1981 14. Punjab Assembly Election Results, 1967-85 15. Punjab's Green Revolution in Wheat and Rice 16. All India Per Capita Foodgrains Production 17. Per Capita (Rural) Incomes from Agriculture: Average of 1976-77 to 1978-79 18. Punjab's India-leading Indicators in Comparison with Other States 19. Additional Economic and Social Indicators 20. Percentage Distribution and Number of Holdings in Punjab, 1970-71 and 1980-81

422 423 424 426 431 432 434 436 439 441 442 443 445 447 467 468 469 470 472 473

APPENDIX I Numbers of Size of Operational Holdings and Area Operated in 1976-77 and 1980-81 by State

521

APPENDIX II Number of Agricultural Labourers in India by State

532

APPENDIX III Distribution of Labour Force in India Basic Economic Indicators in India Structure of Production in India

534 534 534

APPENDIX IV T a b le IV . 1. Showing Growth of Companies in India (1956-57 to 1983-84) IV . 2. Distribution of Employees by Sex IV. 3. Distribution of Employes by Religion

Digitized by

Google

535 537 538

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

L ist o f Maps, Tables and Appendices

X

IV. 4. Distribution of Employees by Caste and Sector IV. 5. Caste Distribution of Employees by Executive Positions IV. 6. Distribution of Employees by Caste and Education IV. 7. Distribution of Employees by Caste and Area of Operation (Numbers) IV. 8. Distribution of Employees by Age and Position IV. 9. Relationship of Employees to Management by Position IV. 10. Relationship of Employees to Management by Caste

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

539 540 541 542 543 544 544

Preface The Brahmanical pattern of 4homo hierarchies’, identified by Dumont as the hallmark of the Hindu social order, has become deeply embedded in the cognitive processes through which scholars study social change in modem India. Most contributors to this volume found striking differences from this pattern in ‘their* region. A few tended to assume they were studying a deviant case. As these chapters show, outside the northern Aryan heartland, the caste system was for less sanskridzed, both in social stratification and in cultural ethos. Not only might local hierarchies bear little resemblance to the Sanskritic varna order, but the boundaries of jati and /afz-clusters could be remarkably fluid. Brahmanism was severely contested as the hegemonic ideology by the Kshatriya ethic of ‘Rajput Hinduism*, by sectarian social reform movements within Hinduism and by rival egalitarian religions. The chapters in Volume I have drawn attention to the attenuated varna structure of Brahman, Shudra and untouchable, characteristic of most regions of south India. This reflected the virtual absence of jatis belonging to the twice-born vamas, with the exception of small concentrations of brahmans. The absence of a varna barrier between the dominant landowning castes and those of lesser wealth and status provided some openings to rising land-controlling and mercantile groups for social and ritual mobility. Similar opportunities, however, were not available to jatis whose traditional occupations incorporated the degraded ritual status of untouchability. Notwithstanding the spread in the south of devotional bhakti cults, Brahmanism continued to enjoy its hegemonic position in providing religious legitimation for politico-economic dominance—except in the Kannada speaking region where Lingayatism won a significant victory, and in localized communities of Muslims and Christians. This southern linkage with the Brahmanism of the north was apparent in the special relationship struck between brahman priests and Shudra kings, brahmans and dominant land-controlling castes, and the institutionalization of the role of brahmans as arbiters of claims by rising social groups to higher ritual status through the south Indian temple honours system. Although the pattern delineated above for south India has considerable resonance in the regions discussed in Volume II, the identity of Hinduism with Brahmanism appears markedly weaker. As in south India local hierarchies were arranged in different configurations from the Brahmanic­ al varna order. But in contrast to both the Aryan heartland and the south, social prestige was more frequently associated with martial values and military skills of Kshatriya status than with religious knowledge and ritual

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

XU

Preface

skills of Brahman status. Caste boundaries displayed a flexibility that in part reflected the social mobility of ‘fighter* castes, and in part the practice of hypergamy by warrior clans of Rajputs, Marathas and Jats. Beyond this, within Hinduism, social reform movements emerged which challenged Brahmanism and caste distinctions, in the Marathi-speaking region from the thirteenth century, and in Orissa and Bengal from the sixteenth century. In addition, in Punjab and Bengal, challenges to Hinduism by egalitarian religions of Islam and Sikhism enjoyed remarkable success in converting low caste Hindus. Over significant areas of the subcontinent brahmans did not consolidate their hegemony over other social classes. Rajput Hinduism As might be expected, Kshatriya cultural values and ritual forms were most pronounced in the princely states, especially in the kingdoms of the Rajasthan area and the Saurashtra region of Gujarat. Rajput princes, who successfully established their genealogical purity as Kshatriyas, dispensed with the services of brahmans in performing purificatory Vedic rituals to legitimate their right to rule. In areas corresponding to the contemporary states of Maharashtra and Orissa, warrior land-controllers of Shudra and tribal origins, seeking* recognition as Kshatriyas, used their political and military power to set the terms of the bargains they struck with brahman priests who legitimated their claims. While low caste and tribal kings had an obvious interest in receiving the imprimatur of brahmans to vouch for their god-like qualities, brahmans could be no less desirous of sanctioning the divine right of princes to rule. The very access of brahmans to the patronage of kings—for land grants, temple building and appointments to ministerial and other high offices— confirmed their superior rank. Outside the northern Aryan heartland or south India, brahmans rarely functioned as arbiters of the social ranking system. More frequently, they acted as rubber stamps for the social order established by politico-military power. Such a distinction may seem abstruse. Yet, comparisons of caste structures across regions suggesting a similarity with the vama order can be misleading. A striking example in these volumes is provided by the congruence between the caste structure of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh on the one hand, and of Gujarat and Bihar on the other. In Rajasthan, as in Uttar Pradesh, (using 1931 Census figures as a reference), brahmans accounted for a relatively large share of the population at 8 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectively; as did Rajputs at 9.2 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. Vaishyas were better represented in Rajasthan at 7 per cent than in Uttar Pradesh at 2.5 per cent. A similar pattern of rough social equivalence can be shown for Gujarat and Bihar. In these two states, brahmans accounted for 4 per cent and 4.7 per cent of the population respectively; Rajputs for 4.8 per cent and 4.2 per cent

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

X lll

respectively, and Vaishyas for 3 per cent in Gujarat and a fraction of one per cent in Bihar. Yet, as Narain and Mathur argue, the social and cultural configuration of Hinduism in the princely states of Rajasthan was so distinct that it needs to be qualified as 'Rajput Hinduism*. Whereas in the Aryan north, local dominance structures corresponded roughly to the vama hierarchy, and were legitimated by Brahmanical ideology; and in south India, dominant landed castes held sway within the truncated vama order in a special relationship of alliance with brahmans, in Rajasthan, the conquering Rajput clans incorporated within themselves the dual sources of power: secular politico-military superiority, and religious legitimacy. The Rajputs established their power through military conquest; and they retained it by parceling out land among themselves, while standing in readiness to defend their territories with force of arms against rivals. The use of military force by warrior-clans to establish their power as dominant landed castes was hardly peculiar to the Rajputs. What did mark them as unique was their success in establishing their racial purity as Kshatriyas without the ritual intermediation of brahman priests. They did this through the construction of genealogies that traced their ancestry to Vedic deities or to legendary rulers celebrated in ancient epics. Rajput kings paid tespect to brahmans and offered them protection, but they were not driven to emulate Brahmanical ritual and cultural norms as a means of establishing their. Kshatriya status. On the contrary, Kshatriya standards of behaviour emphasizing martial values and military prowess, rather than Brahmanical norms of spiritual purification and self-denial became the model for social emulation by other caste groups. Rajput rulers, in their local kingdoms or regional states, practised what Narain and Mathur call 'a type of secularization* of politics and society. This may be taken to mean that Rajput princes were free to pursue political goals with all means available, even when such means had the effect of violating standards of Brahmanical purity in intermarriage, or overturning the Sanskritic ranking system in the social order. Narain and Mathur discuss Rajput practices which had these effects at some length and they need only be briefly mentioned here. Rajput rulers ignored Brahmanical notions of the Muslims as mllechas in striking marriage alliances with Muslim and Mughal rulers to enhance their power. Among themselves they practised hypergamy, a custom that resulted in a social structure of ranked clans and sub-clans of very large endogamous groups. The most important clans engaged in continuous rivalry and warfare, preventing the Rajputs from uniting politically as the regionally dominant 'caste*. At the same time, political calculations led Rajput princes to cement relations with tribal leaders in their own territories, resulting in a higher social status for tribals than in other parts of India. Some Rajput princes went to the extent of inviting anterior tribal rulers, but not brahmans, to

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XIV

perform royal coronation ceremonies. Political status also prevailed over ritual rank in the relations of equality observed by Rajput princes toward the rulers of Bharatpur and Dholpur who were Jats. In addition, the financial compulsions of constant warfare dictated a close alliance between Rajput princes and wealthy Vaishyas, whether Marwaris or Jains. Accordingly, the financial and mercantile communities enjoyed much higher social prestige under Rajput Hinduism than in the northern Aryan heartland. All of this produced an alternative model of social stratification and cultural values within Hindu society. Rajputs, occupying the apex of the social order, ruled in an alliance with wealthy Vaishyas and Jains. The predominant cultural values were those of personal valour and military skill, which Vaishyas and even brahmans sought to emulate. Brahmans retained their ritual supremacy within the domain of Sanskritic religious orthodoxy, but this was robbed of its cultural authority. In Rajasthan, the bulk of the peasantry lived in villages without resident brahmans. A similar pattern can be seen in Shah’s sketch of peninsular Gujarat which until 1948 retained its historical configuration of a diversity of princely states ruled by predominately Rajput land-controllers. Shah, in describing this social structure, comments much like Narain and Mathur, that ‘unlike other parts of the country, in Gujarat vanias (Vaishyas, including Jains), have overshadowed brahmans in economic and political arenas for several centuries*. Similarly, well into the twentieth century, castes regarded as Shudras by brahmans pursued upward mobility within the traditional order by claiming Kshatriya or Vaishya status. Kshatriyanizadon and Social Mobility As Lele’s chapter on Maharashtra shows, the Marathi-speaking cultural area of the Deccan was neither completely Brahmanized nor transformed along the lines of Rajput Hinduism. In this region, Shudra kings also sought legitimacy for their rule by patronizing brahman priests, and adopting Brahmanical rituals at their courts. They did not succeed, however, in establishing a Brahmanical hierarchy of twice-born Brahmans and Kshatriyas, Shudras and untouchables in the villages, or legitimating social inequalities between vama groups by invoking Sanskritic orthodoxy. In the Marathi-speaking area, Brahmanical ideology was present as a thin overlay on the indigenous culture which contained patriarchal and patrimonial elements of community, and opportunities for social mobility through military service. Lele’s analysis suggests several reasons for this outcome. The brahmans were the only representatives of the twice-born vamas and accounted for about 4 per cent of the population. Jatis corresponding to the Vaishya vama were absent, and inter-regional trade from the sixteenth century came to be controlled by immigrant gujar and Marwari merchants from

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

xv

Preface

Rajasthan who remained outsiders within the regional setting. At the same time, reminiscent of south India, a division was recognized along the dimension of purity and pollution between jatis described as savama (within the vama order) and jatis which were asprushya (untouchable). Several important differences between western India and south India may have prevented brahmans from becoming the arbiters of ritual and soda1status through the establishment of institutions of worship analagous to the temple honours system. As Lele points out, the local or deshastha brahmans who accounted for most of the brahman population, were indistinguishable in features and customs from the Deccan peasantry. Many engaged in cultivation, local trade and moneylending, and did not enjoy the exalted status of brahmans whose origins could be traced to the northern Aryan heartland. Although in the villages brahman kulkam is (accountants), and at the districts brahman despandes (revenue offidals), commanded considerable prestige and power, at each level they were usually surpassed on both counts by maratha pools (village headmen) and maratha deshmukhs (regional administrators). The padls of cultivating maratha lineages in all parts of Maharashtra enjoyed revenue-free vatan lands in the best arable areas, which made them the most powerful men in the villages. Similarly, at the supra-local level maratha desmukhs, who co-ordinated the administration of several villages and had direct links with regional kings, enjoyed rights to substantia] incomes as tax-collectors of large and fertile lands. Viewed from this perspective, the assodation of maratha patils and brahman kulkam is in the villages, and maratha deshmukhs and brahman despandes in supra-local arenas, may be better understood as an arrangement for shared secular power than an alliance through which maratha economic and political power was legitimated by the spiritual power of brahmans. Such an interpretation is consistent with Lele’s argument that in the villages, the legitimating ideology for hierarchy and inequality relied less on Brahmanism than on the mutual obligations exacted by kinship and community with its inter-yaft* and intra-jati ties. The patriarchal and patrimonial elements of this community ideology, expressed in the balutedari system of hereditary occupations and rights, helped to mitigate exploitation by vatandars of service jatis incorporated in the village—albeit excluding untouchables who lived 'outside the village walls’. Brahmanical ideology, by contrast, was invoked at the level of the regional kingdom by rulers who wished to establish Kshatriya status and who patronized brahmans and projects for temple-building, at least partly to legitimize their claims for a growing share of the agricultural surplus. Since higher taxes had to be extracted from peasantry by maratha deshmukhs and patils, Brahmanical orthodoxy appeared to conflict with the caring aspect of the community ideology. In Maharashtra, therefore, although dynastic rulers completed the adoption of Brahmanical ritualism by the thirteenth century, vocal sections of the peasantry and low castes

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XVI

perceived the trend toward Aryanization as a rationalization for a more exploitative social order. In Maharashtra, as in Rajasthan and Gujarat, force of arms and control over land played the primary role in upholding local structures of dominance. The term maratha, used from the twelfth century to connote an elite of fighters and commanders linked to ruling families and dynasties was qualified as maratha-kshatriya to distinguish the dominant social strata from ordinary maratha-kunbi peasants. However, unlike the Rajputs in Rajasthan and Gujarat, maratha warrior clans failed to establish their Kshatriya status. An indication that the Shudra vama of elite marathas remained unchanged was the maratha practice of hypergamy which permitted inter-marriage with rising peasant kunbi lineages, and created a hierarchy of maratha kuls, whose boundaries were flexible enough to incorporate, by the twentieth century, most of the kunbi population. Other evidence that the jati-vatan-balutedari structure and community ideology which pervaded it, persisted at the village level despite efforts of ambitious kings to Aryanize the social structure and culture, is provided by the powerful Varkari critique of Brahmanism. The Varkari movement, launched by folk poets as early as the thirteenth century, was similar to bhaktism, but went beyond it. Its leading sant poets came from among peasant and lower artisan castes, including the untouchable mahars. Some of these sants made a direct connection between the promotion of Brahmanical orthodoxy by ruling dynasties and the increase of economic exploitation practised by them. The Varkari movement attracted a popular following throughout the Marathi-speaking region and raised a direct challenge to the legitimacy of brahman and maratha-kshatriya dominance. The movement, moreover, remained strong until the mid-seventeenth cfentury when it was blunted by the rise of Shivaji. His deft blending of Brahmanical ritualism on the one hand, and politico-military curbs on the power of rapacious jagirdars on the other, helped deflect popular anger from the maratha-kshatriya elite. According to Lele, Shivaji’s claim of descent from the royal Rajput lineage of Udaipur, and his decision to import brahmans from Varanasi to perform the Vedic coronation ceremony for a Kshatriya king, may have been directed primarily at reassuring other maratha-kshatriya deshmukhs that his overlordship would not undercut their own claim to Kshatriya status. Within Shivajfs core domain, the court acted more within the framework of the community ideology than that of Brahmanism. Shivaji recruited ordinary kunbi peasants for his army, promoted them to senior ranks, and assimilated them to maratha-kshatriya status through hypergamous marriages. Once his successors (the Bhonsle kings) became the virtual captives of their chitpavan brahman peshwas, who denigrated marathas as Shudras, Brahmanism once again provoked profound hostil­ ity. By the time the Maratha Confederacy was defeated in 1803, the brahmans stood isolated from the most powerful maratha landed groups.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XVII

Further, as Gokhale shows, even though the marathas in the villages themselves invoked the same Brahmanical norms to enforce the social and economic sanctions of untouchability against mahars, mangs and chamars, the more numerous and relatively privileged mahars, whose community enjoyed rights to a share of village produce and village lands, rebelled against their subordinate status whenever economic and political opportu­ nities permitted them to do so. The unique privileges of the mahars, who claimed to be the original inhabitants of Maharashtra, apparently instilled in them a sense of self-respect that could not be extinguished by servitude to village leaders. Most important in setting them apart was their history of military service in the armies of the Maratha Confederacy spanning the rule of Shivaji through that of the Peshwas. Evidence, cited by Gokhale, from the period of the Peshwas, reveals numerous appeals by mahars to the rulers of the state on issues concerning their ritual privileges, which suggest a tendency by them to question the entire system of vama. Sachchidananda describes another variant of the relationship between secular and religious authority in his study of the tribals of middle India who were farthest removed from Brahmanical culture. Although the tribals remained outside the Hindu social system, the dual sources of politico-economic power and spiritual power could be encompassed within their own local communities. Among the Mundas, for example, the village headmen, both the secular and sacerdotal, were chosen from the descendants of the original settlers who arranged authority in the villages without regard to the state. As powerful chieftains arose who claimed overlordship over large regions, they awarded jagirs to their kin and loyal supporters. They also followed practices familiar to those of non-tribal chieftains anxious to enhance royal revenues and establish their legitimacy. Tribal rulers invited more skilled agriculturists from Hindu cultivating castes to settle on unoccupied lands; and as opportunities for commerce grew, they also allowed to enter a variety of artisan and trading castes, thereby replicating the Hindu social structure inside their own territories. The example of the Raja of Chotanagpur is especially arresting. By the seventeenth century, he had adopted the style of a would-be Kshatriya king and went to the extent of building temples to attract brahman priests to his court. In Orissa, as Mohanty’s analysis reveals, brahmans made major concessions to the power wielded by warrior kings, both of Shudra and tribal origins who wished to acquire Kshatriya status. Within the Aryanized coastal districts, kings initially conferred large tracts of land upon brahmans in return for their priestly services. But as local brahmans took up cultivation, they came to be considered inferior to brahmans from the A ryan heartland. As early as the eighth and ninth centuries, Utkal kings invited brahmans from Varanasi to settle down in concentrations known as shasans, to hold ministerial office, maintain records, and act as

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XV111

specialists in priestly functions. The influence of these 'imported* brah­ mans did not extend much beyond the settlements close to the court they served. Certainly, this thin top layer of Brahmanism did little to transform the local social hierarchy along the lines of the vama order. In Orissa, the boundaries between the various castes were extremely flexible. Soldiers who fought in the armies of local kings were recruited from the ‘fighter* caste of khandayats who received land grants for their services and took up cultivation and trade in peacetime. The origins of the karans y an upper caste of scribes and record-keepers in the service of both Hindu and tribal rulers, were uncertain. An Oriya proverb suggested that those who precipitated upward from the ranks of khandayats took to the pen and became karans; and those who slipped down became ordinary peasant cultivators or chasas. Whatever the origin of the karans, no hard social division appears to have existed between khandayatsf karans and chasas. Similarly, there were few rigidities with respect to caste occupa­ tion. Members of the Vaishya vama carried out sea trade, at the same time as they occupied important positions in the army and at court. The decline of the sea trade from the seventeenth century reduced the occupational and ritual status of Vaishyas to that of Shudras; so that modern business opportunities were taken up later by Gujarati and Marwari traders. The one unmistakable impact of Brahmanical ideology on the social structure of Orissa was the presence of castes engaged in scavenging and cremation duties, and condemned to untouchable status. Brahmans made the greatest accommodations to power while serving at the courts of tribal rulers whose hilly inland regions remained outside the Hindu social order. Many tribal chiefs coveted the status of Kshatriya presumably in the belief that it strengthened their divine right to rule. They pursued this status through matrimonial alliances with neighbouring princes or with royal Rajput families of north India. Within their territories, they also sought legitimation for their ritual claims through arrangements that suggested a special relationship with brahmans. Tribal kings invited brahmans from the Varanasi area to settle in their territories, and brahmans accepted these invitations. Many received generous tax-free grants of land, and were designated tax-collectors by the king. In return, brahman priests joined the king*s court, and presided over the Sanskritic rituals which legitimated the king’s status as Kshatriya. This process has been described as the kshatriyanization of the medieval kings of Orissa, but the flow of influence was not one-sided. This is clear from Mohanty’s description of the tribal origins of the Jagannath cult first adopted by the king of Puri, and subsequently imitated by other local rulers. The wooden idols of worship resembled African totems rather than Hindu gods; and tribal priests retained a role secondary to that of brahman pandas in performing rituals at the Puri temple. The eclectric practices simultaneous­ ly preserved the authority of brahman pundits versed in Sanskrit scripture to interpret Hindu customs, sanctioned interdining with non-Brahmans

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

xix

Preface

during temple festivals, and barred untouchables from entering the temple precincts. Egalitarian Religions Within Bengal and Punjab, the two other regions with which this volume is concerned, Hinduism encountered formidable challenges from rival egalitarian religions which brahmans were unable to circumvent. Kohli reminds us that Buddhism survived longer in Bengal than in other parts of India; and that even when it was supplanted by Hinduism, the caste structure was much less rigid than in the Aryan heartland. Bengali society, which counted no indigenous Kshatriyas or Vaishyas, had a thin upper layer of brahmans who constituted less than 3 per cent of the population and historically were considered (just another ja tf. Other Hindu upper castes, the kayasthas and vaidyas were also a tiny minority and of uncertain origins. It is, moreover, doubtful, whether Sanskritic ranking systems held much meaning for the cultivating peasant castes, some of whom were considered unclean Shudras by brahmans but controlled substantial landholdings in the villages and enjoyed significant prestige in local hierarchies. While brahmans zealously guarded their position at the pinnacle of the Hindu ritual ladder, mass conversions of low caste Hindus to Islam during the Middle Ages, and additional defections from Brahmanism to egalitarian sects such as Tantrism and Vaishnavism indicate that large numbers of Bengalis rejected the inferior status sought to be imposed upon them by Brahmanism. It has become commonplace that nowhere was the vama order and the caste system weaker than in Punjab. Judging by the 1931 Census, however, this cannot be explained by the absence of caste groups from the twice-born vamas. Brahmans accounted for 3.7 per cent of the population; Rajputs for 8.3 per cent, and merchant groups of Vaishya rank, another 5.8 per cent. One obvious reason for the limited impact of Brahmanical culture was the success of rival religions, first Islam and then Sikhism. Beyond that, perhaps facilitating the rise of these religions, as Wallace shows, was the tribelike character of the dominant agricultural community of Jats in Punjab. The Jats, as the largest single group at 21 per cent of the populatioh, followed egalitarian intra-group relations of the type associ­ ated with tribes, and on occasion intermarried with Rajputs, as well as with members of Shudra castes. More remarkable, Jats retained a primary identity that transcended religion. In undivided Punjab, the largest number of Jats were Muslims, followed by those who belonged to the Sikh, and the Hindu religions. Deference shown to Jats by non-Jats reflected their superior economic standing rather than their ritual position. Yet, Jats, whether Hindu or Sikh, did not transcend the prejudice of caste Hindu society toward social groups who traditionally filled the occupations of untouchable castes.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

xx

Preface

Reassessing the Brahmanical Tradition Outside the northern Aryan heartland, major vamas of the Brahmanical social structure were weak or absent, and sanskritized cultural norms under attack, apparently for centuries "preceding British rule. The simplifying generalization that the Brahmanical tradition underpinned the cultural unity of India's social order needs to be refined. Variations by region were of considerable importance. The medieval bhakti movements in south India, by making the knowledge of Sanskrit texts available in the vernacular, and by emphasizing the path of devotion over religious rites and ceremonies, facilitated the emergence of a sat-shudra elite who believed they enjoyed an alliance of equals with brahmans through their participation in the temple honours system. Further afield, in areas such as Rajasthan, where Rhjput Hinduism prevailed, or whereas in Maharashtra and Orissa, military service provided an avenue of social mobility for peasant castes, or as in Bengal and Punjab where egalitarian religions eroded the hold of Hinduism over low castes, the cultural impact of Brahmanism was seriously circumscribed. Among Hindus, brahman priests were accorded the highest religious status, but their ritual superiority was insufficient to impose Brahmanical deference patterns on social relations. In these areas, brahmans could not enforce Brahmanical precedence of rank within the twice-born vamas, or a vama divide between the twice-born castes and dominant landed or rich mercantile castes characterized by brahmans as Shudras. At the same time, it cannot be doubted that the pervasive religionism of virtually all communities in the diverse regions of the subcontinent tempted dominant groups within them to try and sanctify their power by extending royal patronage to brahmans. In the Indo-Aryan north, where social, economic and political dimensions of power were concentrated in castes of twice-born rank, dominance could be more easily upheld by Brahmanical ideology, which came to have the character of the hegemonic ideology. In south India, where the dominant landed castes did not enjoy twice-born standing, and where bhakti movements weakened the brah­ mans' monopoly over access to the Vedic texts, brahmans nevertheless enjoyed a sufficiently elevated status to preserve their privileged standing as arbiters of social rank. In other parts of the subcontinent, reaching from the Marathi-speaking areas of western India, across tribal middle India to the Oriya and Bengali regions in the east, Brahmanism was never more than a thin overlay on local society and culture. Still, Brahmanical ideology could prove attractive to a variety of warrior-chiefs, regional rajas and dynastic rulers as the most accessible means for investing raw power with sacral legitimacy. It is probably too simple to see in this phenomenon only an exercise of political cynicism. Such an interpretation cannot explain why would-be Kshatriya rulers, both Hindus and tribals, across regions, perceived in brahman

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

xxi

Preface

priests indigenous to the Aryan heartland a resource of religious purity that could be appropriated to sanctify their rule. It does not explain why such rulers extended invitations to brahmans from the Varanasi region to settle near the royal court, and to act as their priests, advisers, ministers, and record-keepers. Equally intriguing, it leaves in question why numerous brahmans were willing to migrate over considerable distances, and to accommodate power in the ways required of them. Yet, it was this interaction between secular and religious elites that helped to create the stratified linkages across regions, among those who wielded political power and those who exerted spiritual power, which gave some semblance of reality to the notion of an underlying Brahmanical cultural unity. In addition to this unifying tendency perceptible at the level of ruling elites, the Brahmanical concept of purity and pollution spread across regions and down social strata with respect to the most extreme form of inequality expressed in the phenomenon of untouchability. Even in areas where reform movements or egalitarian religions severely undermined vama ideology, the pollution barrier was hardly razed in social relations between caste Hindus and groups traditionally defined by Brahmanism £s engaged in defiling occupations. At the same time, at intermediate levels of the social order, it is questionable whether any comparable perceptions of a subcontinental cultural unity existed. Those facets of Brahmanism most pervasive in the popular culture accentuated social division. Foremost among them was the localized nature of caste hierarchies and the widespread practice of endogamy among jatis, sub-clans and tribal lineages, which reinforced distinctive cultural practices. So long as these caste, clan and ethnic identities remained primary in defining social roles, movements within Hinduism and even egalitarian religions could never completely break down secular inequalities. This was an essential limitation of bhaktism, for example, which allowed some non-Brahmans to assert spiritual equality with brahmans by seeking salvation through devotion; but was useless to them in achieving secular equality to the extent that caste identity remained the basis for allocating occupations and other sources of wealth and prestige to individuals in society. Impact o f the Colonial State The impact of the colonial state on such regionally diverse societies was inevitably uneven, but nonetheless profound. As the chapters in this volume show, the broad trend identified in the Aryan heartland and south India (volume I) also emerged in other major regions: that of separation between relations of secular power and sacral legitimacy, and the drawing together of dominant social groups and officials who commanded state power. The military victories of the British over Rajput princes and other

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

xxii

Preface

Indian rulers, which reduced them to subordinate allies, effectively extinguished a vital Kshatriya model of Hindu society with its ethos of personal courage and military skill. British paramountcy also destroyed an important means for peasant castes to achieve social mobility through military service within the caste system. The Indian rulers, who remained princes in name only, unable to fulfil their dharma of protecting their territories, but themselves ‘protected’ in their privileges by the Raj, eventually came to be considered the preeminent bulwark of British rule. So far from providing an autonomous source of legitimacy for ambitious local commanders, the very status of ‘Kshatriya’ or fighter could no longer be determined by genealogies establishing descent from Vedic deities or Sanskritic rites performed by brahman priest?. Rather, fighting communi­ ties were defined according to the policy of the British state, which from the end of the nineteenth century, based recruitment to the army on their list of the Indian races or classes believed by tradition or climate to possess martial qualities. This major change was obscured by the facade of royal privileges erected and upheld by the British, and the minimal impact of the British presence within the princely states on dominance relations or economic backwardness. Growing linkages between dominance and state power were more obvious in regions where Brahmanical ideology had provided a thin veneer for power relations resting on force of arms and land control, and where British troops also were able to displace local rulers on the ground. As Shah demonstrates, over large areas of Gujarat, the enforcement of a Permanent Settlement enabled the government to collect taxes directly from Rajput chiefs and their girasias, as well as from cultivating peasants. This political intervention sapped the economic strength of the Rajputs at the villages, and also dissipated their social privileges. Indeed, in mainland Gujarat, the local power structure was gradually transformed by the colonial state. The British were able to penetrate the villages by appointing paid revenue officers, thereby also undercutting the wealth and power of traditional brahman desais. At the same time, they encouraged middle and rich patidars to take up commercial farming in relatively backward areas, so that local kolis and tribals were reduced to landless labourers. According to Lele, in the Marathi-speaking region where the colonial administration introduced ryotwari settlements and maratha patils and brahman kulkam is became salaried functionaries of the Raj, rural elites themselves recognized the importance of strengthening links with the state to maintain their economic and political dominance. Elites of the maratha-kunbi patil lineages, who continued to hold property rights in the largest and most productive portions of land, directed their efforts to ensuring privileged access to state resources for expanding commercial agriculture, and to filling lucrative new roles as contractors, traders and commission agents. Intervention of the colonial state by no means led only to improvement

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XXM1

in the status and wealth of the cultivating castes. Frequently, colonial policies transformed local dominance relations in favour of upper castes who paradoxically came to owe their privileged position to the secular advantages they achieved through close collaboration with the colonial state. The chapters by Sachchidananda, Mohanty and Kohli illustrate variations on this pattern. The most striking social transformation under British rule, as outlined by Sachchidananda, occurred in the tribal areas. British military conquests over tribal chieftains, despite the numerous large-scale uprisings launched by them, paved the way for sweeping dislocation. The establishment of British administration with its panoply of district officers, magistrates and lawyers was combined with zamindari land settlements that vested ownership rights in jagirdars and village headmen. These interventions paved the way for an influx of grasping plainsmen or dikus including Hindu moneylenders, traders, shopkeepers, and the especially hated thikedars or rent collectors of local landlords, all of whom enjoyed close connections with the colonial administration. The result was large-scale transfers of land through unpaid mortgages by defaulting tribals to non-tribals. By the end of the colonial period, out-migration of landless tribals to tea estates in Bengal and Assam made the tribals an oppressed minority within their own areas. The impact of state intervention on social relations in the Oriyaspeaking area was also pronounced. As Mohanty shows, in the inland region, after the British reduced tribal kings to their feudatories, they strengthened the social control of primarily brahman gauntias—traditional tax collectors for the royal court—-by conferring on them powers to evict defaulting tenants, distribute wasteland and mediate transfer of land. Within the coastal districts, where the British put an end to centuries of warfare engaged in by rival local kings, and invading Marathas, Afghans and Mughals, the effect, as in other areas influenced by kshatriyanization, was to freeze opportunities for social mobility of peasant castes who had previously been incorporated in the ‘fighter’ khandayats through military service in the armies of local kings. Under the Temporary Settlements made by the British, brahman and karan zamindars outnumbered khandayats, and khandayats fell further behind as brahmans and karans acquired a virtual monopoly over educational opportunities and govern­ ment jobs. The better known impact of British policies in the Bengali cultural area, reviewed by Kohli, was cut from essentially the same pattern. The defeat of the Muslim nawabs allowed the British to create the Bengali elite of upper caste brahman, vaidya and kayastha zamindars, many of whom had been revenue collectors for local rulers. This bhadralok intelligentsia, centred in Calcutta, and generally aloof from the locally dominant agricultural castes who supported their life style with large payments of rent, ultimately produced the political leaders who made the first demands on the British for greater Indian participation in governance.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XXIV

The impact of British conquest on local relations between superior and subordinate caste and ethnic groups had a contingent quality because of regional diversities in social structure with which the British only slowly became familiar. By contrast, the policies they adopted toward the major religious minorities were contrived to maximize their loyalty to the Raj. Too much has been written about the British role in creating the conditions for an emergent Muslim political identity, particularly the establishment of separate electorates starting in 1909, in response to demands by the Muslim League, to bear repetition here. British policy toward the Sikhs, however, a community located in the strategic northern border area of Punjab, and preeminent among the 'martial classes* deserves special mention. As Wallace points out, it was the interest of the British state in ensuring the loyalty of this community that influenced the government to recognize the authority of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Commit­ tee (SGPC) over the management of Sikh temples or gurdwaras, thereby 'legitimiz(ing) and accommodat(ing) the institutionalization of a Sikh community within Punjab*. The incipient relationship during the colonial period between the privileges of locally dominant elites and the patronage of the state administration did not necessarily result in reciprocal flows of influence. Even though the policies of the colonial state variously strengthened existing land-controllers or encouraged the emergence of new agrarian classes, advantages conferred on locally dominant castes were easily converted by them into independent sources of power in the villages. Such advantages, combined with relatively high social status, could provide strong insulation from unwelcome intrusions by the same colonial government in local affairs. State policies were much more critical in shaping the close interaction between the British Government and emergent national classes which were no longer rooted in the village social order. The commercial and business classes, dominated by Marwari capital, with strong Gujarati and Parsi representation, acquired a set of common economic interests by the First World War. Indian industrialists who remained weak relative to foreign, British interests well into the 1930s, depended upon the colonial state for a wide array of purposes: construction of infrastructure facilities; permission to start factories; orders for industrial products; access to railways and ports; and not least, police power to suppress militant communist-led trade unions that threatened industrial peace. Not surprisingly, the Indian capitalist class 'function (ed) in the economic realm in a close relationship with the government’, while the British administration, in turn, ‘followed the policy of giving it timely concessions* to preserve larger imperial interests of limiting financial support of the business classes for the nationalist movement (Chandra, 1979: 155-6).1 1 This point is illustrated in the chapters of Maharashtra and Gujarat and is consistent with the genera) analysis of the Indian capitalist class made by Bipan Chandra in Nationalism and Colonialism in M odem India (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1979).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

xxv

Preface

The relationship between the Indian middle classes and the colonial state was more complex. A unique product of British educational policy, the middle classes constituted an urban elite of government civil servants, lawyers, teachers and other professionals whose prestige, income and power were primarily dependent upon gaining and increasing access to the educational, bureaucratic and representative institutions that were the instruments of British rule. Failure of the British to press forward more rapidly with promised political reforms, turned an initially collaborative relationship into one marked by conflict as prominent leaders arose from middle class ranks to take up the nationalist cause. Although it has often been noted, as seen in these volumes, that the middle classes were mainly drawn from among the literaticastes, primarily brahmans, with disproportionate numbers of the tiny kayastha communi­ ties of Bihar and Bengal, discussions of their constituent characteristics have focused more on intellect and achievement than on social back­ ground. Yet, it does not disparage their accomplishment to point out the political importance of the dual origin of the Indian middle classes in upper caste privileges conferred by the traditional social order and in meritorious recruitment into modem educational institutions, the professions and the administrative services. Certainly, from the perspective of non-Brahman elites, it appeared that the hegemony brahmans had failed to achieve within the traditional social order would fall into their hands through domination over secular institutions spawned by the colonial state ensuring economic success and political power. Of equally great significance, a predominately brahman national, and later nationalist, elite identified their purpose in secular terms of displacing the British and wielding power in a modernizing nation-state. This ironical transposition of the sacred and secular basis of brahman power played a major role in the politicization of the small educated sections among the low castes and untouchables who attacked Brahman­ ism. As education and wealth opened up alternative means of achieving social prestige and political power outside the caste system, non-Brahman movements led by educated members of Shudra and untouchable castes focused on gaining access to British schools, administration and repre­ sentative political bodies. Two strands of these movements, traced by Washbrook for Tamil Nadu and by Lele and Gokhale for Maharashtra often intersected. Leaders of Forward non-Brahman castes, while speaking in the name of all backward communities, promoted an "mix-brahman Brahmanism' aimed merely at displacing brahman power in the state with their own, and preserving existing dominance relations in society. Other social reformers from lower caste backgrounds meant to strike more deeply at the roots of the caste system. Phule’s Satyashodak Samaj mounted an attack on Brahmanical ideology that challenged the legitimacy of all caste disabilities, including untouchability, and also repudiated the inequality of women. Ambedkar, preeminent among educated untouch­ ables, and deeply influenced by Phule, went further in rejecting the Hindu

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Preface

XXVI

belief system as a rationalization for the enslavement of untouchables and led his followers outside the Hindu social order through conversion to Buddhism. The counter-ideology that gained ground among the tiny educated elites among Shudras and untouchables before Independence was qualitatively different from the bhaktism that had previously characterized religious reform within Hinduism. Its goal was not to achieve spiritual equality for low castes within this religious tradition, but to break the hold of false Brahmanical beliefs on popular thinking in order to transform secular inequalities in society. Moreover, it superceded the major limitations of bhaktism to the extent that educated elites who provided leadership had themselves escaped from the villages and were no longer dependent for their livelihood on the traditional political economy. Equally striking, the organizational methods adopted by leaders of non-Brahman movements were meant to force concessions not from religious authorities but from state officials. They alone had the power to grant reservations in educational institutions and government posts to backward communities whose members, crippled by caste disabilities, could not succeed within a competitive system. Such eminently political goals were an important factor in the enormous proliferation of caste associations among cognate groups across regions, both as self-help associations that strengthened the competitiveness of talented individuals and as lobbies that presented the case for compensatory treatment of the community at large to the British Government. While the British encouraged these movements by responsive adminis­ trative actions on reservations in the late nineteenth century in Bombay, at the turn of the century in Madras, and at the all-India level under the 1935 constitutional reforms, they did not need to fabricate them as part of the policy of divide and rule. The transition from localized jati units of operation to regional associations of actual or fictive cognate groups represented a gradual process of political awakening in response to the secular opportunities for social advancement introduced by the colonial state. English-educated Shudras and untouchables themselves redefined their disabilities in terms of the educational and economic backwardness inflicted upon them by the upper castes; and they constructed the new categories of non-Brahman, Backward non-Brahmans and Depressed Classes in whose name they pressed demands for preferential treatment on the administration. Toward the close of the colonial period, all strata of the educated classes, those who wished to preserve existing dominance relations, as well as those who wanted to sweep them away, recognized that access to the patronage and power of the modem state had become a potent new basis of privilege in society. Francine R. Frankel

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Notes on Contributors F r a n c in e R. F r a n k e l is Professor of Political Science and South Asia

Regional Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. She has held visiting research appointments at the University of Delhi, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and the Centre for International Studies, Princeton University. Her publications include India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs, and India's Political Economy 1947-77: The Gradual Revolution. She is currently at work on an interactional analysis of U.S.-India relations since Independence. JAYASHREE B. G o k h a l e is currently completing her studies for a law degree at Columbia University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from McGill University and has taught at the University of Delaware. Her articles have appeared in the Journal o f Asian and African Studies, Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, and Journal o f Asian Studies. She is author of From Concessions to Confrontation: The Politics o f an Indian Untouchable Community (forthcoming). SANTOSH P a h w a G o y a l has written extensively in the field of human geography as member of the Geography Panel of the National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi, and as researcher on the three year study of the 'Social Geography of Arunachal Pradesh', conducted by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research, New Delhi. Currently, she is analysing data on corporate elites in India as part of the Indo-Dutch Programme on .Alternatives in Development. She maintains an ongoing association as Visiting Professor at the Royal Institute of Management, Thimpu, Bhutan. A t u l K o h u is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. He is the author of The State and Poverty in India, and the editor of The State and Development in the Third World, and India's Democracy: An Analysis o f Changing State-Society Relations. His current research is on the crisis of govemability in India. JAYANT L e l e is Professor of Political Studies and of Sociology in Queens University, Canada. He has been President of the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute and Resident Director in New Delhi. He is co-author of Language and Society: Steps Toward an Integrated Theory, and the author of Elite Pluralism and Class Rule: Political Development in Maharashtra; Local Government in India, and Bhakti Movements in India. He is currently carrying on research on language and society in India. P. C. MATHUR is Research Associate of Political Science at the University of Rajasthan, and editor of the Political Science Review. He has contributed numerous articles to scholarly journals, and is editor of •

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

XXVU1

Notes on Contributors

Government and Politics in South Asia, and author of Social Bases o f Indian Politics. M a n o r a n ja n M o h a n t y is Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi. He has directed major research projects on Orissa, and on politics in China. He has been a visiting scholar at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the University of California, Berkeley, Beijing University and Oxford University. He is the author of Revolutionary Violence: A Study o f the Maoist Movement in India, and the Political Philosophy o f Mao-Tse-Tung. IQBAL N a r a in is Vice-Chancellor of the North-Eastern Hill University in Shillong, Meghalaya. He previously served as Member-Secretary of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi. He has held the posts of Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan, and ViceChancellor, Banaras Hindu University, and has served as Convener of the Political Science Panel of the University Grants Commission, and member of the governing board of the ICSSR. He is the editor of State Politics in India, Literature, Social Consciousness and Polity, and Social Sciences and the Government; co-author of Panchayati Raj, Planning and Democracy, Fourth General Elections in India, and Social Sciences and the Government, and author of From Dyarchy to Self-Government, and Twilight or Dawn: Political Change in India, 1967-71. He is currently at work on studies of India's educational system. S a c h c h id a n a n d a is Professor of Sociology at the A. N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna, which he has also served as Director. He is a member of several national Advisory Committees and Panels, and the recipient of the R. P. Chanda Medal for outstanding contributions to Anthropology by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He is the author of numerous articles and several books including The Harijan Elite, The Changing Munda and Electricity and Social Change. G h a n sh y a m S h a h is Senior Fellow of the Centre for Social Studies, Surat, and a former Director of the Centre. He is co-author of Building from Below, A n Experiment, and author of Caste Association and Political Process in Gujarat, Politics o f Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and Protest Movements in Two Indian States—Study o f Gujarat and Bihar Movements. P a u l W a l l a c e is Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri, Columbia, and has served as Director of the Center for International Studies and Programs. He has been Chairman of the Research Committee on Punjab for the North American scholarly organization, and is on the editorial boards of Asian Survey and the Punjab Journal o f Politics. He is editor of Region and Nation in India, and co-editor of The Political Dynamics o f Punjab, and The Punjab Press: 1880-1905. His articles have appeared in Asian Survey, and Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, the Indian Journal o f Political Science, the Punjab Journal o f Politics, and as chapters in several books.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

THE THOUSAND YEAR RAJ: REGIONAL ISOLATION AND RAJPUT HINDUISM IN RAJASTHAN BEFORE AND AFTER 1947 IQ B A L N A R A IN and P. C. M A TH U R

Rajasthan’s distinctive culture1 has evolved over several centuries12 in a region marked by a rather desolate ecology. Agricultural operations are severely handicapped, while its mineral, horticultural, silvo-pastoral and forest resources cannot be harnessed without great physical efforts.3 All these natural barriers could, conceivably, have been overcome, after the introduction of modem technology. But the geo-political region, now known as Rajasthan, remained virtually cut off from the mainstream of politico-economic changes, emanating from Mughal as well as British capitals.4 For almost one thousand years the princely states of Rajasthan maintained their political identity and politico-economic isolation from the 1 Our claim for the ‘distinctiveness’ of Rajasthan’s culture is based upon a mixture of experience and empirical data and draws on our studies which span nearly three decades. 2 For some glimpses of Rajasthan’s history see: Government of Rajasthan, 1966; Choudhry, 1968; Sharma, 1970; Khan, 1977; Sharma, 1978; and Vashisth, 1978. 3 Even fragmented histories of the separate princely states which have been merged together to constitute the present Rajasthan are not yet available. Monographs dealing with individual persons who ruled some of the princely states with great valour and wisdom at different points of time during the last one thousand years have now started coming out but only a tiny segment of the dynastic and diplomatic records have been analysed so far. Fortunately, the directions in which researchers should proceed have been spelled out with great understanding by Dr Suzanne Rudolph and Dr Lloyd 1. Rudolph who have been studying Rajasthan’s history from a comprehensive social science perspective since the mid-1950s. For a-convenient collection of their articles see: Rudolph and Rudolph, 1984. For details see Mishra, 1967. Also see Sharma, 1971 and Mathur, 1981: 47-59. 4 The impact of the Mughals on Rajput-ruled states of Rajasthan has been the subject of a number of works by historians, but they deal mainly with political relations and not with the social, economic or cultural impact of these interactions. The British did, of course, consciously try to promote a number of politico-constitutional reforms in the princely states but, as a general rule, the princes and jagirdars offered stiff resistance to these innovations and took special pride in sticking to their own traditions and customs. Once again the historians have only just begun the process of tapping the vast amount of archival data which could substantiate this generalization.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

2

NA RA IN a n d M ATH UR

rest of India, and were able to stem the tide of techno-economic as well as politico-constitutional changes emanating from outside the region.5 Except for remote geological times, when the legendary Saraswati was said to flow through at least two-thirds of present-day Rajasthan, the state has been an arid and semi-arid tract characterized by recurrent famines and severe scarcities of water, food and fodder.6 Even the establishment of India-wide networks of railways and highways under British rule could not mitigate the agricultural stagnation, nor could the exploitation of the extremely hostile semi-arid tropic climatology be expanded. This had been so at least partly because quite a few princes stoutly resisted the introduction of modernized means of transport and communication until the eve of India's Independence in 1947. True, the whole of Rajasthan is not a desert, but the forest-clad south-east regions of Rajasthan do not constitute ready-made watersheds for fertile agriculture and have been inhabited by people whose life-styles and social organizations entitle them to be categorized as tribals. Most of these people have, in fact, been classified as Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution of India. They constitute nearly 12 per cent of the total population (For details see Mathur, 1970: 155-61). It is noteworthy that, even after the establishment of pax britannica in the surrounding regions, the population of Rajasthan actually declined by 6.20 per cent between 1911 and 1921 (to a total of 10.4 million) (Census of India, 1981). Geo-physical variables are not explanatory determinants of all the patterns of social life in Rajasthan: irrigation works in Rajasthan, for example, which are already in progress, have given ample indication of the socio-economic transformation that can be brought about even in an ecology which is not otherwise conducive to productivity (Mathur, 1980). After all, it is the same ecology in Rajasthan which, after having provided for a very sparse population for several centuries, now supports a higher population level. In retrospect, the fall in the total population in the decade 1911-21 was an aberration. Subsequently, Rajasthan registered growth rates higher than the growth rates for India as a whole over the successive decades of the century (see Table 1). Rajasthan's long economic slumber punctuated by destructive armed warfare is clearly a thing of the past. As a constituent unit of India, it has absorbed its own quota of economic development and political change.7 5 The history of techno-economic modernization of the princely states under British auspices after 1803 (when the process of signing formal treaties of alliance and protection between the princely states and the British Governor-General began) and the resistance of the princes to the changes is not, as yet, available in book-length studies or even well documented articles. However, for a vignette drawn from the south-eastern region see Saxena, 1975. 6 For details sec Joshi, 1956. Also refer to Perspective Plan for Development o f Rajasthan, 1980. 7 The issue of the extent to which ‘change-chains' emanating from the rest of India have penetrated into Rajasthan raises complex questions of a conceptual as well as methodological

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

3

The Thousand Year Raj T able 1

Decadal Variations in Population since 1901 Percentage variations Year

India

Rajasthan

1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981

Base Year + 5.75 - 0.31 + 11.00 + 14.22 + 13.31 +21.51 +24.80 +24.75

Base Year + 6.70 - 6.29 + 14.14 + 18.01 + 15.20 +26.20 +27.83 +32.38

The question that we are seeking to answer here is: what is the pattern of dominance in the political governance of this state and to what extent can it be regarded as being different from other states of the country? Our answer to the question refers back to the basic premise that history and ecology have bequeathed a distinctive pattern of socio-economic and socio-political life to the people of Rajasthan, which makes it very difficult to apply Brahmanical models of dominance to the region. Although Rajasthan is a part of India, it requires social science analyses from perspectives which are different from those found valid in other regions of the country. The socio-economic patterns of dominance and development in this part of India have been appreciably determined by its own political history, ecological handicaps and socio-cultural values which have shown a remarkable continuity for nearly a thousand years.8 Economic and Social Roots o f Political Tranquility Rajasthan, according to the 1981 Census, accounts for a little more than 10 per cent of the total area of the country (the actual area being 342,239 square kilometres) but only 5 per cent of India's total population (683.4 million). The spatial density of population per square kilometre was only 100 in 1981 as against 200 for the country as a whole. Out of the total state population recorded in 1981 (34.1 million), 27 million (79 per cent) persons nature. A pioneering analysis of tbe nature and structure of India’s cultural modernization has been attempted by Singh, 1973. See also M athur, 1986. 8 Apart from the evidence provided in the following sections, see the following writings on state politics in India that are relevant to the configurations in Rajasthan. See: Narain and Mathur, 1983: 194-206; Narain and Mathur, 1984: 225-72; Narain (ed.), 1967,1976; Narain, 1969; and M athur, 1984.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

4

N A R A IN a n d M A TH U R

Digitized by

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

5

The Thousand Year Raj T able 2

Trends in Per Capita Income: India and Rajasthan (1955-56 to 1980-81) Per Capita Income at Current Prices (Rs) Year a)

India (2)

Rajasthan (3)

1955-56 1960-61 1965-66 1972-73 1979-80 1980-81

247 323 451 923 1481 1727

260 284 373 826 1011 1227

.

Per cent of Col. (3) to Col. (2) (4) 105 88 83 89 68 71

Source: M. M. Jain: 'Rajasthan's Economy in 1980s: Challenges and Potentialities' Rajasthan E conom ic Journal, 6(2), July 1982, 59.

resided in rural areas, while 7.14 million (21 per cent) were distributed over 201 urban centres, out of which eleven recorded a population of over one lakh each; only one (Jaipur) being in the million-plus range (Hooja, et al. 1981). Ecology and political history have combined to make Rajasthan one of the least developed states with a per capita income of Rs 233 in 1954-5 which rose to Rs 314 during 1962—3 to 1964-5 and Rs 583 during 1973-4 to 1975-6. As Table 2 shows, Rajasthan's per capita income in current prices not only remained much below the all-India average between 1955-6 to 1980-1, but significantly declined as a proportion of the national level. Rajasthan has, in fact, lagged behind most other states with regard to all the major indicators of economic development (Table 3).9 The dismal state of Rajasthan’s economy just after it became an integral part of India can be seen from the simple fact that in 1950-1 Rajasthan’s entire output of electricity was eight megawatts (against 1700 megawatts in 1984-5) and only 42 villages in all were electrified compared to 20,000 or so in 1984-5 out of its nearly 33,000 villages. The total number of registered factories in Rajasthan was only 240 in 1952 and in 1969 the Pandey Committee recommended to the Government of India that the entire state be declared industrially backward. Even in 1984-5, four out of its twenty-seven districts were designated as ‘No Industries Districts' by the Government of India. Moreover, in most other districts, "industrialization’ was confined to small-scale industries: the entire state possessed very few medium-scale or large-scale manufacturing establishments even after the completion of six five year plans. 9 The statistics collated here are based upon snippets of data taken from various sources including: Saxena, 1982: 27-36; Jain, 1982.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

N A RA IN a n d MATH U R

6

Table 3

Indicators o f Development: India and Rajasthan Indicators

Period

Unit

Per capita Income Irrigated area to total cropped area Consumption of fertilizers per hectare of cropped areas Per capita value added in manufacturing sector Work force engaged in manufacturing Literacy Villages covered by safe drinking water supply scheme Localities electrified Per capita consumption of electricity Road length per 100 sq. kms.

1980-81

Rs.

1977-78

SOURCES:

Rajasthan

India

1227

1608

per cent

18

31

1978-79

kg-

8

29

1976-77

Rs

94

194

1981

per cent per cent

6.6 24

14.78 1978 1976-77 1976

per cent per cent kWh kms.

9 32 83 12

—

9.4 36 17 39 119 42

(i) D raft Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85 and A nnual Plan 1981-82 (R ajasthan), Government of Rajasthan (G.O.R.), 17-19. (ii) Pravin Visaria and Leela Visaria, 'Indian Scene after 1961 Census', E conom ic and Political W eekly, Annual Number, 1961.

One of the main reasons for the slow take-off of industrial enterprises is the low level of infrastructural development, the state ranking eighteenth out of the twenty-one states in 1981-2 in this respect. In 1980-1 only 5,287 villages of a total of nearly 33,000 were connected by pucca roads and as many as five district headquarters towns—Banswara, Bundi, Sirohi, Jh alawar, and Tonk are not as yet (in 1987) connected by railways. Further, nearly 95 per cent of Rajasthan’s 5,638 kilometres of rail-track is metre-gauge. Not even its capital, Jaipur, is served by broad-gauge, which connects all the metropolitan cities of India and provides the main artery for movement of vital agricultural and industrial goods all over the country.101There also has been a large gap between Rajasthan and most other parts of India in indices of human development. Rajasthan ranked twenty-second in terms of literacy rate and twenty-first in terms of drinking water and medical facilities in 1984-5.11 The ecological factors in Rajasthan’s economic backwardness also are reflected in regional disparities within the state. Most districts, lying in the 10 The Chief Minister of Rajasthan narrated these dismal indicators of Rajasthan's economic backwardness in his presidential remarks at the fourth annual function of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Jaipur on 13 June 1985. 11 Gupta, 1982: 71-8. Also sec Adams and Bumb, 1973: 5-22. For detailed analysts of the socio-economic developments in the ecologically handicapped districts of Western Rajasthan see Menshing and Sharma, 1984.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

7

The Thousand Year Raj

arid and semi-arid zones of the Thar desert, lag far behind, while districts with assured irrigation are beginning to forge ahead in agricultural production. The economy as a whole remains basically non-industrial. Seventy-nine per cent of the population live in rural areas: agriculture contributes nearly 60 per cent to the State Domestic Product (SDP), and animal husbandry makes an additional contribution of nearly 12 per cent. Further, most of Rajasthan's urbanization can be characterized as ‘pre-industrial*. The growth of the urban population has been concentrated in the towns and cities which enjoyed prominence in the pre-1947 era. Capitals of the major erstwhile princely states are not only the major population centres, but also enjoyed high growth rates during 1961—71 as well as 1971-81 (See Table 4). According to the 1981 Census, Rajasthan had eleven class I urban units (cities which had a population of 100,000 and above). It is also noteworthy that 46.5 per cent of Rajasthan's total urban population was concentrated in these eleven units which experienced a growth rate of 57 per cent during 1971-81. Among them, only Kota, Alwar, and Jaipur have seen sizeable investment in large-scale and medium-scale industries. The capital cities of the erstwhile princely states continue to maintain their preeminence as urban centres, thereby reinforcing the century-old pattern of rank ordering of these princely states. The only major deviation from the past has been the substantial industrial investment in Kota. This may lead, in the years to com e, to a reordering of the traditional perceptions regarding the ranking o f the princely states, in which Udaipur was clearly at the apex. While Rajasthan has yet to register marked strides on the industrial front, its agrarian economy has undergone a major structural change. Obviously, this transformation refers to the momentous decision to abolish the jagirdari system and confer hereditary property rights upon millions of tenants and tenants-at-will. These cultivators used to till the land which T able 4

Growth Rate o f Major Cities Growth Rate Urban Centre Kota Jaipur Udaipur Jodhpur Alwar Bikaner Ajmer RAJASTHAN (Urban population)

Digitized by

Google

1961-71

1971-81

77.0 52.2 45.1 41.3 38.1 25.3 14.3 38.47

62.9 57.1 42.5 55.4 39.5 30.4 41.6 57.1

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

8

N A RA IN a n d M ATHUR

sustained, not only the luxurious life-styles of the jagirdars, but also enabled the rulers of the erstwhile princely states to engage in military encounters almost continuously for nearly ten centuries. With a low population density and an extensive arid and semi-arid .and mass, rural Rajasthan after the abolition of the jagirdari system in 1955, poses a number of questions for students of political economy. More than 4.2 million people received khatedari rights. This made Rajasthan a land of owner-cultivators with only a very small number of agricultural labourers. According to National Sample Survey (NSS) data, about one-fourth (24.9 per cent) of the total number of rural households (2.74 million approximately) in Rajasthan were classified in 1953-4 as landless, whereas in 1970-1 the percentage of landless households declined to less than three out of a total of approximately 30.3 million households. The full structural portrait of the changes in Rajasthan's rural economy between 1953-4 and 1970-1 can be seen in Table 5. The 1981 Census and the 1980 Agricultural Census revealed that the percentage of landless households increased after 1970-1. But the fact nevertheless remains that, during the two decades after 1947, Rajasthan remained virtually free from the problems of landlessness which triggered a number of political agitations in other parts of the country. The same NSS data also revealed that the percentage of pure leasing-out households (who might be classified as ‘absentee landlords') was very small in Rajasthan (4.7 per cent in 1953-4), even before the 1955 jagirdari abolition. Their percentage remained very small thereafter with only 5.5 per cent (out of T able 5

Percent Distribution o f Rural Households according to Mode o f Ownership and Type o f Tenancy NSS 8th Round 1953-54

NSS 26th Round 1970-71

Landless Households out of which (a) landless not operating land; and (b) landless operating land Landowners not operating Landowners owning and operating land Operating own land plus leasing in Operating own land and leasing in as well as leasing out Total leasing in households

24.9

2.9

13.2 11.6 4.7

2.3 0.6 5.5

71.4

78.5

NA

12.9

NA 13.6

0.1 15.6

Total households (’000)

2740

3035

Category

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

9

The Thousand Year Raj

the total 30.3 million) rural households being classified as non-operating landowners in 1970-1. The foregoing data, taken from a detailed study by Professor Kanta Ahuja and Dr Vidyasagar (1983:199) show that the economic structure of rural Rajasthan does not have two potential generators of political tensions, namely landless agricultural labourers and absentee landlords whose juxtaposition often produces explosive rural unrest. Thus, apart from very small pockets such as the canal irrigated lands in Ganganagar and Kota districts, where the profitability of new modem inputs has resulted in some tension between large landowners and tenants, the political issues of economic entitlement lie only in the distant future. Today, there are only muted demands for improved technologies from the rural population scattered into thousands of small villages located at great distance from each other in the arid and semi-arid ecology of Rajasthan. The absence of disquiet over availability of developmental inputs like fertilizers and rural credit is, in fact, another indicator as well as a contributor of the ‘civility’ of politics in Rajasthan. Despite meagre capital investments by the Centre or the numerous all-India financial institutions like NABARD (National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development), IDBI (Industrial Development Bank of India), and UTI (Unit Trust of India), Rajasthan maintained a low profile with regard to centre-state as well as inter-state disputes or tensions.12 Rajasthan's economic pyramid is, thus, flat at the apex as well as at the base as compared to states where landless agricultural labourers constitute a sizeable proportion of the rural population. Moreover, the percentage of rural population living below the ‘poverty line' is lower than the all-India average as calculated by the Planning Commission. Against the all-India percentage of 48.13, only 33.76 per cent of Rajasthan's population is estimated to be living below the poverty line. This has not been entirely a matter for rejoicing by the state's top policy-makers. The Chief Minister was provoked to demand a revision of the figure, as according to his estimate at least 50 per cent of Rajasthan's households are living below the poverty line.13 While refinements in the methodology for measuring poverty may 12 Full length studies of Centre-State relations in the context of Rajasthan's economic development are not available either from the economists or other social scientists. However, for a pioneering effort- from the political science perspective see Narain and Mathur, 1965: 82-113. 13 During the course of the address at the IDS function referred to earlier (fn. 10) Harideo Joshi pointedly expressed surprise at the Planning Commission's data regarding the low percentage (33.76 per cent) of people living below the poverty line and categorically stated his conviction that Rajasthan was a poor state where, generally speaking, more than 50 per cent of total households were living below the poverty line. He also disclosed that he had addressed several communications to the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, arguing there was a fundamental mistake in the methodology employed for assessment of poverty, and requesting revised estimates for the incidence of poverty in Rajasthan. K. R. Narayanan, State Minister for Planning, Government of India, was present on the occasion.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

10

NA RA IN a n d M ATH UR

conceivably lead the Planning Commission to enhance its estimates of the population living below the poverty line in Rajasthan/4 there is consider­ able evidence to suggest that the people of Rajasthan in general and residents of its rural areas in particular are not in the grip of dire poverty. Apart from the fact that landlessness was virtually abolished as a result of the 1955 tenancy reforms, another factor that must be taken into account is the high nutritional value of the staple food of the people of rural Rajasthan, namely jawar and bajra. These foodgrains are richer in terms of proteins (as well as calories) than either rice and wheat and can be grown plentifully even in the arid and semi-arid ecology of the western districts of the state (Hooja and Pathak, 1980: 45-53). The coarse grains, which constitute the staple diet of the rural Rajasthani, provide an inexpensive source of nutrition which raises the consumption standard even though per capita income is low and other social amenities like schools, roads and hospitals are not available on the same scale as in other states. This hidden asset of the rural people of Rajasthan, however, is gradually being lost in the welter of all-India policies and programmes of agricultural development which are focused on rice and wheat. The result is that Rajasthan's production of coarse grains like bajra and jawar has actually been declining since 1947, with the per capita availability of jawar in Rajasthan going down from 54 grams in 1970-1 to 29 grams in 1976-7, while the corresponding figure for bajra was 250 grams (in 1970-1). The total per capita calorie intake per day has, indeed, declined from 2673 to 1894, while the protein and fat values of the intake have also gone down respectively from 88.7 grams-and 16.4 grams per capita per day in 1970-1 to 62.5 grams and 8.2 grams in 1977.” The policy planners in Rajasthan have now awakened to this nutritional loss and even the Government of India have revised the priority accorded to production of coarse grains which requires specialized dry-farming technology. However, the point that deserves to be noted is that the rural people of Rajasthan have no effective means to articulate their grievances at the all-India down-grading of their nutritionally rich diet. Whatever corrective measures have been taken by the various all-India agencies have mainly emanated from technocratic experts and advisory agencies and not from the platforms of national political parties which dominate the policy-making processes at the state and national levels.145 14 We are making this statement essentially out of deference to the economists’ expertise in poverty studies. Our non-expert judgement (based on daily interaction with hundreds of rural young men who enroll themselves for study at the University of Rajasthan, together with intensive field studies in connection with panchayati raj institutions and voting behaviour) is that it is very difficult to see poverty in rural areas of Rajasthan. A veteran economist like M. V. Mathur who vividly recalls his days as a young man traveling about in various parts of Rajasthan in the twenties and thirties, also argues that whatever statistical data may show, one can see that the incidence of poverty has declined greatly in rural Rajasthan during his own lifetime. Arora and Mathur (ed), 1986. 15 d o . 22: 50 (Table 3 and Table 4).

I 1

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

I

The Thousand Year Raj

11

The foregoing profile of Rajasthan which documents the low level of overall economic development and social welfare services also suggests that disparities of the magnitude witnessed in other parts of India are not to be found in the state, making its politics less prone to rural unrest and tensions. Land being the major productive asset in the rural economy, this statement can be substantiated by data regarding the distribution of landholdings, taking into account the ecology of economic disparities. The distribution of operational holdings by size-class as shown in Table 6 is misleading when considered on its own. The table shows that operators of large landholdings account for nearly half (52.2 per cent in 1976-7, 49.9 per cent in 1980-1) of the cultivated area. However, it would be facile to jump to the conclusion that the operators of these large landholdings must wield substantial economic and political clout in Rajasthan. This economic logic must be tempered by the ecological reality that most of the large landholdings in Rajasthan are concentrated in the arid and semi-arid districts of the state. By contrast, the agriculturally productive areas are characterized by the predominance of marginal and small categories of landholdings as can be seen from Table 7. As shown in Table 7, large landholdings are mainly in the western districts of Rajasthan, which are characterized by low rainfall and arid geo-physical conditions. In the other districts landholdings are much smaller, the actual average holding size being 8.92 hectares in the case of the western districts. In the other regions, it is much lower, namely 1.74 in the southern districts, 2.64 in the north-east and 3.00 in the south-east regions. T able 6

Number and Area o f Operational Holdings According to Size (per cent) 1976-77

1980-81

Category

No.

Area

No.

Area

Marginal (up to 2.5 acre*) Small (2.5-5 acres) Semi-medium (5-10 acres) Medium (10-25 acres) Large (above 25 acres)

30.2

2.8

29.4

3.2

18.3

5.7

19.6

6.4

19.9

12.2

20.4

13.1

20.0

27.1

19.7

27.7

11.6

52.2

10.9

49.9

SOURCE: India, Ministry o f Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation (Agricultural Census Division), AH India Estimates o f Provisional Holdings and Area Operated: 1980-81, A gricultural Census B ulletin, No. 21.8: 12

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Digitized by VjOOQLC

Size Distribution o f Operational Holdings by Regions in Rajasthan 1981-82 (percent)

Size

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

r

T able 7

Marginal (Up to 2.5 acres) Small (2.5 - acres) Semi-medium (5-10 acres) Medium (10-25 acres) Large (above 25 acres) So u r c e :

Western (Banner, Bikaner Churu, Ganganagar, Jaisalmer, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagpur, Pali and Sirohi)

Southern (Banswara, Dungarpur, and Udaipur)

Holdings

Area

Holdings

Area

Holdings

Area

Holdings

Area

11.3

6.7

47.7

12.2

36.2

6.5

30.3

5.2

11.0

1.9

23.9

19.4

22.8

12.3

23.9

14.8

18.0

5.9

18.9

29.9

21.4

23.1

24.0

22.5

30.8

22.6

8.8

29.1

15.7

35.7

18.3

40.9

28.8

68.9

1.0

9.3

3.9

22.4

3.4

16.6

North-east South-east (Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, (Bundi, Chittorgarh, Jhalawar Bhilwara, Jaipur, Jhunjhunu, and Kota) Sawai Madhopur, Siker and Tonk)

Adapted from Vidyasagar and Abuja. 1987: 44-5. The original table also contains comparable data for 1970-1 and 1976-7 and shows a remarkable stability of the co­ efficient of concentration for all the four regions spanning a decade.

The Thousand Year Raj

13

The economic salience of regional disparities in the context of prevailing land distribution can be grasped from the fact that while in 1970-1 the western districts of Rajasthan had the highest index of holding size (341) it also had the lowest index of productivity (40). The details are shown in Table 8. These data clearly show that most large-size land operators in Rajasthan generate too little productivity to exercise economic and political domina­ tion in a state where productivity is much higher in regions characterized by the greater prevalence of smaller landholdings. To be sure, large landholdings do exist in areas with a more favourable agro-economic environment, some of which (for example Ganganagar district) have also received the benefits of massive canal irrigation projects. But, as yet, it is very difficult to discern any correlation between political power and the distribution of landholdings in Rajasthan as a whole mainly because the economic potential of large landholdings is yet to be realized. These conclusions do indeed set Rajasthan apart from some other states of India. They suggest that the extremely low temperature of political passions can be partly accounted for by the lesser degree of effective inequality in landholdings. Inequalities in holdings of assets still prevail in Rajasthan as elsewhere and are, in fact, increasing on account of sub-division and fragmentation.16 T able 8

Regional Productivity and Average Holding Size: 1970-71

Region I (Ajmer, Pali, Sirohi & Tonk) II (Alwar, Bharatpur, Jaipur and Sawai Madhopur) III (Banswara, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Dungarpur) IV (Bundi, Jhalawar and Kota) V (Ganganagar) VI (Banner, Bikaner, Chum and Jaisalmer). VII (Jalore, Jhunjhunu, Jodhpur, Nagpur and Siker) RAJASTHAN

Average holding size (hectares)

Index holding size

Productivity Index

3.46

63

107

2.85

52

155

2.57 3.90 3.90

47 71 71

187 134 134

18.3

341

40

8.10 5.46

148 100

61 100

SOURCE: Adapted from Ahuja and Vidyasagar, 1987: 46.

16 Ahuja and Vidyasagar (1983) have also highlighted the fact, as revealed by NSS data, that the number of small and marginal (i.e., less than one hectare) holdings in Rajasthan nearly doubled between 1953-4 and 1971-2 and increased, as revealed by Agriculture Census

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

14

*

NA RA IN a n d M ATH UR

However, the point that deserves to be noted is that rural Rajasthan is not characterized by severe disparities either in terms of distribution of land and other assets like livestock and irrigation. Data collected in 1960 by the National Sample Survey, 16th round, shown in Table 9, is suggestive on this point. As Table 9 shows, it was not unusual for size holdings in the range between 0.5 acres and 30 acres to have about the same percentage of their holdings under irrigation. The data reveals that when the percentage of small and large holdings under irrigation is roughly the same, the average irrigated area makes up a relatively larger part of the small than of the large holdings. Furthermore, the percentage of holdings with irrigation facilities in the highest size group is comparatively smaller than in any but T able 9

Operational Holdings with Irrigation Facilities Per cent holdings Per cent holdings reporting reporting irrigation irrigated facilities area

Size class acres Up to 0.49 0.50- 0.99 1.00- 2.49 2.50- 4.99 5.00- 7.49 7.50- 9.90 10.00-14.99 15.00-19.99 20.00-24.99 25.00-29.99 30.00-49.99 50.00 & above All sizes

29.62 47.61 48.90 48.64 48.60 47.37 46.89 43.93 45.32 47.19 42.76 37.67 45.81

28.27 44.79 47.32 47.94 47.64 46.64 46.97 46.29 48.25 47.95 45.58 39.58 44.89

Average area with irrigation facilities (acres)

Average irrigated area (acres)

0.32 0.56 1.22 2.24 3.50 4.47 5.91 7.40 8.63 8.96 11.80 19.49 3.09

0.35 0.52 1.18 1.96 2.96 3.99 5.00 6.38 7.43 7.71 10.09 13.74 2.73

SOURCE: Data collected in the 16th round of N.S.S. on operational holdings, July 1959-June 1960, miroeo., 3.

data, by another 40 per cent between 1970-1 and 1976-7. This amounts to a three-fold increase in the number of such holdings in the three decades after 1947 (178). While this evidence of a spurt in disparities in asset holding must be taken into consideration, inequalities on this account may have been less marked before 1947. Moreover, this evidence, refers only to disparities and not poverty: pre-1954 Rajasthan was a region characterized by poverty but when nearly all people in a society are equally poor, political tensions are bound to be lower than in societies sharply divided by wealth. True, the Rajput ruling elite must have extracted their incomes and wealth from the large mass of agriculturists and other sections of rural communities but the long history of Rajasthan furnishes very few examples of peasant revolts against the Rajput durbars and/or jagirdars.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

15

The Thousand Year Raj

the lowest size group. Since there is an unusually large area operated in holdings above 25 acres in Rajasthan (no doubt because of the unfavourable ecology) the egalitarian trend of asset distribution in rural Rajasthan appears to be quite pronounced. Ahuja and Vidyasagar categorically state: T h e share of marginal and small farmers in net irrigated areas is more than their share in cultivated area’ and that 'this share has recorded improve­ ments between 1970-1 and 1976-7.’ Great inequalities still prevail in Rajasthan between the cultivator households on the one hand and non-cultivator households such as artisans and agricultural labourers on the other. But, as already stressed, over 90 per cent of the total rural households in Rajasthan fall in the category of owner-cultivators. Artisans and agricultural labourers together did not form even 5 per cent of the total population of Rajasthan in 1971. Although this figure had gone up by 1981, their population percentage has not yet acquired a two digit dimension. There are differences amongst the owner-cultivators in rural Rajasthan which have been duly noted by economists. But these inter-class disparities have yet to manifest them­ selves on the political stage in a significant way, making it very difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about the pattern of dominance prevailing in the state. The lower incidence of absolute poverty and lesser intersectoral differences in property ownership do not, of course, mean that the people of Rajasthan can be regarded as enjoying the best possible life/ On the contrary, for several centuries, the economic standards of living in most parts of Rajasthan have been very low with a lot of material resources locked up in wasteful investment on forts, armaments and other instruments of warfare. As of the mid-1980s, the Rajasthan economy remained backward or underdeveloped with Marwaris who mostly operate out of the state being treated as exceptions here. Moreover, the improvements in the quality of life were still modest. In 1981 Rajasthan had a literacy rate of 24 per cent compared to 36 per cent for India as a whole. Although 24 per cent represented a distinct improvement over the 3.47 per cent recorded in 1901, or even the 8.02 per cent of 1951, break-up of the data by sex revealed a glaring discrepancy in the social structure. Compared to the overall literacy rate of 24.05 per cent, the male literacy rate in 1981 was 35.82 per cent whereas the corresponding female literacy rate was as dismayingly low as 11.31 per cent. The sorry state of Rajasthan’s society is further revealed by rural-urban differentiation with regard to literacy, the data being as shown in Table 10. Thus, in 1981, Rajasthan had achieved a rural female literacy of 5.41 per cent only; for one of its districts, Jaisalmer, which occupies an area larger than many a sovereign entity in Asia, Africa and Europe, this was as low as 1.64 per cent, while it was 1.68 per cent in the case of the adjacent district of Banner. The highest rate was recorded in Ajmer which was not under

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

16

N A RA IN a n d M A TH U R

10 Social Composition o f Literacy Rates, 1981 (Rajasthan) T able

Rural

Urban

Males

Females

Males

Females

29.24

5.41

60.02

34.24

Source: Government of Rajasthan, Directorate of Census, Census of India 1961. Rajasthan Facts and Figures (Jaipur).

direct princely tutelage for several centuries and benefited in full measure from whatever limited efforts at Modernization’ were made in India under British auspices during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Choudhry, 1968). Rajasthan’s long economic depression also allowed perpetuation of a number of social pathologies like female infanticide, child marriage and excessive addiction to opium. Attempts to eradicate these were made only after the advent of Residents and Agents of the governors of British India whose campaigns for 'social reforms’ achieved only limited success on account of stagnation on the economic front and political segmentation of the princely states of Rajasthan. Thus, even today, one comes across well-publicized cases of sati which take place, despite general (all-India) social opprobrium of and frantic police efforts to curb a practice which has practically disappeared from other parts of India. Not only do new cases of sati continue to occur in Rajasthan, but new and old self-immolation sites continue to attract thousands of devout pilgrims whose 'offerings’ out-rank the intake of temples devoted to orthodox deities of the great tradition of Hinduism. It may be significant to add that most of the women who have committed sati in recent years belonged to Rajput families. The Traditions o f Rajput Domination: Toward a Kshatriya Model o f Sanskritization Students of Rajasthan’s society, economy and polity work under the handicap of a surfeit of dynastic history, while materials on socio-economic processes and social structures are rather scarce. Those who study Rajasthan’s history suffer from the additional disadvantage that not much is known about the period preceding, say, the Muslim conquest of Sind in the seventh century after which the region seems to have begun to loom large on the politico-historical consciousness of the people of India. Thus, despite Dashrath Sharma’s valiant efforts to trace Rajasthan’s history from the Vedic period, we begin on the assumption that the political history of the region is synonymous with the political ascendancy of the Rajputs. They have continued to play a dominant role in the political life of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

17

The Thousand Year Raj

Rajasthan even after the distinct political identity of the ‘princely states' was abolished.17 The bulk of people residing in Rajasthan are Hindus and the non-Hindu population has perhaps never exceeded 10 per cent of its total. But the fact remains that the classical behavioural norms associated with the Hindu Dharmashastras have flourished only to a very limited degree in the princely states of Rajasthan. The rulers and the people of Rajasthan frequently faced the brunt of foreign invasions and fought many a war against the military incursions of Muslim rulers without becoming militant fanatics in the cause of Hindu orthodoxy. The political domination of Rajputs in the princely states of Rajasthan ensured not only their regional segmentation but also resulted in a type of secularization of politics and society unknown in other parts of India, where, broadly speaking, Brahmanical values enveloped the minds of elite and masses alike. The Rajput rulers of Rajasthan regarded themselves as Hindus. They accepted the classical pantheon of Hinduism and some of them personally acquired a great deal of familiarity with Hindu classics. From time to time, they also made conscious efforts to safeguard Hindu places of worship (temples) and provided sanctuaries to many deities when they were made to leave their original home (like Brindavan in modem Uttar Pradesh) mainly because of indirect and (sometimes) direct threats by pre-Mughal as well as Mughal rulers. Finally, the people as well as the princes and jagirdars contributed generously towards the upkeep of Hindu pilgrimagecentres (like Pushkar in Ajmer and Varanasi and Hardwar in Uttar Pradesh) as well as places of worship, schools and maths located all over India. The basic commitment of the people and princes of Rajasthan towards Hinduism is, in other words, not in doubt. Yet, even while the religious values of Hinduism flourished, Hindu rituals were observed in.a manner which hardly conformed to forms, let alone the norms, prevalent in other parts of India. Thus, for over a thousand years the people of Rajasthan did not look up to the brahmans as cultural models, nor did they adopt brahmanical customs and life-styles to advance their ritual status. The people of Rajasthan did try to emulate the cultural norms and ritual forms adopted by their respective princes and jagirdars. For example, the surname Singh, which was originally associated with Rajputs, has, over a period of several centuries of acculturation, been appropriated by different Hindu castes as well as Jains who are mostly traders. This appropriation of an essentially Kshatriya symbol by those in professions and occupations classifiable under the Vaishya vama is, indeed, a striking facet of Rajasthan society and it extends even to some elements of Shudra castes. The appropriation of Rajput norms was not just a gesture of symbolic 17 For details of the story of the accession and integration of the princely states see Menon, 1956.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

18

N A RA IN a n d M ATH UR

imitation. The political tensions prevalent in the midst of ceaseless warfare made it imperative for all those closely associated with political affairs, whether in the court of the princes or of jagirdars, to learn to bear arms. The countless stories of the military skills and bravery of Vaishyas of the princely states of Rajasthan have been recorded by the contemporary British compilers of the gazetteers of these states. In fact, there are examples, spread over the thousand years we are talking about, of brahmans, mahajans and people of practically all the other castes taking up warrior-roles. The Rajputs of Rajasthan, clearly, developed an ‘ideal-type’ of cultural behaviour which was socially practised by the elite as well as the non-elite—a phenomenon scarcely noticed in regions of India marked by Brahmanical cultural domination. The attitude of Rajput ruling houses towards Hindu religious beliefs and rituals is not merely of antiquarian interest; it is of great immediate relevance in a country groping its way towards secularism. One of the prime requisites of secularism is, for example, maintenance of intercommunal harmony. The princely states of Rajasthan provide a very long history of Hindu-Muslim harmony even amidst political and military conflicts between rulers professing these different religious beliefs. The extraordinarily long spell of Rajput Kshatriya monopoly of political power in the princely states of Rajasthan is, in fact, a major socio-cultural pattern in Indian history. Unfortunately, the material that Rajasthan provides has not been developed to project kshatriyanization as a full-blown alternative to sanskritization. Who were the Rajputs? The early beginnings of Rajput ascendancy are lost in the midst of legends and, even in relatively recent cases where Rajput dynasties cannot claim history of political rule for more than five hundred years or so, the elements of mystery and divinityjcontinue to elude scholarly scrutiny. Irrespective of their social origins and political power in the ancient past, substantial evidence is available to show that most of the areas now constituting Rajasthan had come under the domination of Rajput warrior-clans nearly one thousand years ago. Bappa Rawal, the founder of the Guhilot dynasty in the Mewar region, in the eighth century AD is generally recognized as the first Rajput to rule in this part of India (Tod, 1920).18 Once Rajput clans established separate political power over the 18 The praise lavished upon the Rajputs by Col. Tod played an important part in rekindling Indian interest in their existence and exploits, but very little is known about the methods and motives which prompted a British dvil servant to compile the tales, myths and anecdotes detailed by the charans. Although the charans cannot be, by and large, faulted for deliberate fabrication of truth, they certainly took a great deal of poetic licence and it is, as yet, not clear to what degree Col. Tod was interested in sifting fancy from facts. For a pioneering attempt in discerning Tod’s motives sec Vashistha, 1970. For example. Tod uncritically repeated the popular legend which ascribes the origins of Rajputs to the Agnikula ceremony performed at Mount Abu by Brahman sages, after which the Rajput warriors emerged to safeguard them against the disturbances and degradations of anti-sodal elements.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

19

The Thousand Year Raj

areas under their control, they assiduously guarded their territories against encroachments emanating from power-centres located in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and the like. Even before the consolidation of the Delhi-based Mughal empire, the Rajput rulers of the princely states in Rajasthan had established a reputation for bravery and chivalry (Ahluwalia, 1978) and even mighty Mughals like Akbar and Aurangzeb found it very difficult to subdue them. It has been argued (and very carefully documented by A. R. Khan, 1977) that some of the princely states of Rajasthan acquired their 1947-eve dimensions only after the sixteenth century and the consolidation of the Mughal empire. Irrespective of their significance, the Mughals always referred to the Rajput rulers as zamindars\ this has resulted in a controversy about the rank and sovereign status of these rulers. Regardless of Mughal perceptions, there is little doubt that at least some of the rulers in effect enjoyed sovereignty over the areas in their jagir jurisdiction and could not be regarded as mere landlords’, performing the function of revenue collection on behalf of the Mughal overlords.19 It is a fact that some of the princes regularly attended the Mughal court and were also assigned a slot in the mansabdari system of ranking in terms of nobility. The Mughal emperors also claimed to have assigned to them jagirs over the territories which they ruled, but our reading of this little-researched area of Rajasthan’s history has left the impression that such imperial claims were purely nominal, if not entirely fictitious, with regard to most of the Rajput rulers of the princely states. This is almost certainly the case with respect to pieces of territory known as watan jagir which, as a rule, remained the Rajput rulers’ patrimony, not subject to the imperial rights of the Mughal emperors. They were, therefore, set apart from other jagirdars whose authority and functions (even survival) rested upon imperial policy which often resulted in reassignment as well as extinction. (Saran, 1941; Sharma, 1951; Chandra, 1959; Ali, 1966).20 The Rajput rulers of Rajasthan were neither jagirdars in the standard Mughal imperial system nor was the jagirdari system prevalent inside these Dr J. N. Asopa, (1976), by contrast, has come to the conclusion that Rajputs are descendants of Brahmans who strayed outside the canonical fold in wartime emergencies and were not re-accepted. For a review of Asopa, 1976 see Mathur, 1977. 19 This proposition is based upon a non-specialist judgement of this controversy arising from publication of S. Numl Hasan’s celebrated article analysing the amount of autonomy enjoyed by different types of chiefs and chieftains in the sprawling Mughal empire. (See Nurul Hasan, 1964: 107-19.) Although by no means the final word on this theme, this article has sparked a new assessment of the Mughal concept of ‘Paramountcy’ which their British successors also claimed to exercise vis-d-vis the princely states. 20 Most of the literature on the Mughal empire is centre-oriented and not peripheryoriented. A ‘reluctant periphery’ like the ‘Rajput States* is given even less importance except in so far as individual high-ranking Rajput nobles like Jaswant Singh (Jodhpur) and Jai Singh and Man Singh (Jaipur) are concerned. Similar remarks apply to works dealing specifically with the relationship between individual Rajput States and the Mughals such as G. N. Sharma, 1951 and Bhargava, 1970.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

20

N A RA IN a n d M ATH UR

princely states a replica of it. According to the Venkatachar Committee Report, jagir, in the context of Rajasthan, may be defined as (the assignment of revenue conditional on future service*.21 The committee’s authoritative pronouncement in this context deserves attention: The Jagir system as it evolved in Rajasthan ... has characteristics which differentiate it on the one hand from the Jagir as an institution developed in modem India and on the other from the later landlordism during the British period (Venkatachar Committee Report, 1950: 11-12). Rajput hegemony over the princely states in Rajasthan was established by warriors who conquered these areas which were mostly sparsely populated and ecologically handicapped. The original bands of Rajput warriors were able to parcel out large chunks of land among themselves. They originated a new variant of the jagirdari system in which the jagir holders not only had kinship with the king but also physically contributed to the establishment of the new kingdoms. With the passage of time, the lands were divided and sub-divided and inherited among families branching off from conquering clans, but the jagirdars in the princely states never accepted the kings* direct interference in the internal affairs of their jagirs. The result was that the jagirdari system in Rajasthan became a system of graded rights over land among a small number of Rajput families with rulers exercising only limited authority in the internal management of the jagirs. Although the jagirdari system virtually extinguished the land-rights of the non-Rajputs who were in control before the advent of such Rajput clans as Ghilots, Chauhans, Kacchwahas, Rathors and Bhatis in different princely states, the manner in which the jagirdari system arose also ensured that the darbar (or the ruler) was obliged to respect the jagirdars* autonomous jurisdiction over their estates. However, the subordination of the rights and privileges of the non-Rajput agriculturists to the needs and directives of the Rajput rulers and jagirdars was a slow-maturing process, the squeeze of which was not felt for a long time in an economy characterized by stable stagnation. The inevitable non-Rajput backlash against the jagirdari system did surface in the twentieth century.22 However, for several centuries previous to its eruption, the political legitimacy of Rajput hegemony remained unquestioned, even though Rajputs as a whole never constituted more than 10 per cent of the total population. 21 Government of India, 1950, hereafter referred to as Venkatachar Committee Report after its Chairman, C. S. Venkatachar. 22 For details of agrarian unrest and other agitations against the Rajput hegemony see Saxena, 1972. The study of agrarian agitations against the excesses—administrative, social and economic—committed by the jagirdars of Rajasthan has, unfortunately, become overladen with the nationalistic passions associated with India’s freedom struggle. This has resulted in all manifestations of peasant unrest in the princely states being treated as part and parcel of India’s ’freedom struggle’, making an objective assessment of the quantum and intensity of rural unrest all the more difficult, conceptually, inethodologycally, and also in evaluative terms.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Thousand Year Raj

21

Rajput-ruled princely states with a well-entrenched jagirdari system flourished in Rajasthan for over a thousand years. All these princely states were not equal in size nor were they all equally ancient. Indeed, not all were even fully sovereign throughout this long period but all of them maintained a substantial degree of independence from surrounding rulers, including the British, with whom they ultimately entered into treaty agreements (Mehta, 1930; Batra, n.d.; and Bhattacharya, 1972). Their exact political status (encompassed in the term Paramountcy) remained an enigma till 1947, the puzzle being unsolved till today. Nevertheless, the distinct identities of the princely states have been merged in just one unit and the rights and personal privileges of the rulers of the princely states do not any longer exist. The last act in the drama was the abolition of privy purses23 which refurbished Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's socialistic image during the 1970 Lok Sabha polls. This measure has yet to produce any dramatic changes in the economic clout enjoyed by the ex-princes of Rajasthan. No doubt, the privy purses represented, in all-India terms, a sizeable annual income, but for most of the ex-princes of Rajasthan they amounted to only a small fraction of their total pool of resources. More­ over, according to the original agreement, the privy purse amounts were designed to wither away according to a graduated slab system on the death of successive descendants of the rulers who were on the gaddi in 1947. The political impact of the abolition of the privy purses and de­ recognition of the personal privileges of the princes proved to be more substantial. In the 1971 Lok Sabha polls, the Indian National Congress made a dent in the vote-pool of Smt Gayatri Devi (Jaipur), and neutralized the adverse impact of the entry of Bhagwat Singh of Udaipur. But so fragile have been the roots of Congress dominance in Rajasthan that only a decade later Indira Gandhi had to sound out several ex-princes of Rajasthan about accepting her party's ticket during the 1980 Lok Sabha elections. This round of wooing of the ex-princes followed upon the humiliation inflicted upon Smt Gayatri Devi during the Emergency (June 1975 - March 1977), when she was detained in most uncomfortable quarters of the Tihar Jail at Delhi on trivial charges which were never formally pressed. The very fact that even such 'punishment' failed to break Smt Gayatri Devi's political back testifies to the depth of the ex-rulers' grip over the political allegiance of the people of Rajasthan which even a shrewd national politician like Indira Gandhi failed to gauge. In the long run, the abolition of privy purses may certainly have their effect, but at least in Rajasthan the erosion of the political charisma of the princes will take a long time. 23 As mentioned above, the princely states of Rajasthan were merged into India without much friction, but the terms and conditions on which the princes had agreed to the merger became a matter of controversy when the Government of India sought to abolish their 'Privy Purses* and other privileges and the President issued an executive order de-recognizing the ex-rulers. Mankekar, 1974.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

N A RA IN a n d M A TH U R

22

Although we have so far talked of Rajput princes and Rajput-ruled princely states only, there were small pockets of non-Rajput-ruled territories as well. First, there were Ajmer-Marwar territories which, after being the citadel of powerful Chauhan Rajput rulers in pre-Mughal times, passed out of Rajput control and were incorporated into British India. Secondly, there was Tonk, a princely state created by the British as a result of a treaty with Amir Khan, an Afghan military adventurer, who in 1812 commanded a formidable army of 60,000 Pindari freebooters. These rampaged and looted the princely states of Jodhpur and Jaipur but could not match the British army. Under the treaty of 1817, the British gave Amir Khan a sum of Rs 300,000 in cash and confirmed his possession of Tonk and Rampura, although before this treaty control over the region had been keenly contested among Jaipur, Holkar and Sindhia (Ram, 1970). Further, there were two non-Rajput princely states in the eastern sector adjacent to the Brij region of United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh). These were Bharatpur and Dholpur which had come into independent existence during the eighteenth century. Rulers of both these princely states were drawn from Jat clans whose kinsmen living in other princely states were almost entirely agriculturists occupied in eking out a living from the arid and semi-arid soils of western Rajasthan (Pande, 1970). With these major exceptions, the entire region, now known as Rajasthan, was under the politico-economic dominance of Rajput rulers and their clansmen and kinsmen organized under the jagirdari system. Again, except for the fact that Tonk, Bharatpur and Dholpur did not have Rajputs as rulers, it has not been possible to differentiate these states from the other princely states of Rajasthan either in terms of authority structure, economic processes or socio-cultural profiles. Ajmer-Marwara, being under direct Mughal and British rule for more than five hundred years, did, of course, undergo a somewhat different pattern of development because of its exposure to all the politico-economic changes introduced under British rule. Although even today its assimilation into Rajasthan is far from complete, there are no sharp discontinuities in terms of ecology and economy between it and the surrounding districts of Rajasthan. Given the foregoing caveats, present-day Rajasthan constitutes the only . unit of India composed primarily of twenty-two princely states. As is well known, on the eve of Independence, Congress leaders were confronted with the problem of the ‘Indian States’ which numbered well over five hundred and which ranged from tiny land parcels to large welladministered units like Hyderabad, Mysore, Jammu and Kashmir, Gwalior, Indore and Travancore-Cochin. As far as Rajasthan was concerned, at least five princely states stood out as prominent candidates for continued separate existence, though most of the rest did not fulfil the ‘viability’ criterion to the same extent. In fact, the ‘viability’ criterion had been revised several times by

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

23

The Thousand Year Raj

Congress leaders acting through their associated organization known as the All India States Peoples Conference (AISPC). These revisions were made precisely to reduce the eligibility of the number of princely states able to claim this status. Thus the AISPC in its sixth session in 1939 had adopted as criteria a population of 20 lakhs and a revenue of Rs 50 lakhs for viability but, as the prospects for India’s Independence grew brighter, it revised these standards upwards. In its seventh session held in April 1947, the standard of a population of 50 lakhs and an annual revenue of Rs 8 crore (Mathur, 1984) was adopted. The jump in the annual revenue criterion was, indeed, phenomenal—a 16-fold increase from Rs 50 lakhs to Rs 800 lakhs. It was a clear signal of the Congress’ determination to efface as much of India’s princely past as it could. The original geographical identity of the pre-1947 princely states survived only for a decade in free India. The States’ reorganization which took place in 1956 reshaped the politicoadministrative map of India from which even the largest princely states of Hyderabad, Mysore and Bhopal disappeared as separate entities. Howev­ er, the memory of at least the major princely states has survived in Rajasthan and continues to cast a shadow upon the political and administrative processes. Thus, the five ex-princely states of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Udaipur (in alphabetical order) have continued to exist as distinctive components of (intra-state regionalism’ making Rajasthan’s political and administrative integration fragile even at the elite-level, though very few Rajputs occupy important positions in the state. Even though the social base of political domination has undergone a sea-change, regional loyalties have yet to break out of the moulds evolved over several centuries. A vivid example of the continued vitality of pre-1947 loyalties was provided in the conflict over the choice of the capital of the new state and the subsequent agitation over the location of a High Court bench at Jaipur. It is worthwhile to remember that the people of Rajasthan have not only been insulated from the change-chains initiated by the Mughal and British rulers of India but have also remained isolated from developments taking place within other princely states, even if their boundaries happened to be common. Despite the interpenetration of elite kinships (the rulers of Rajasthan’s princely states regularly entered into matrimonial alliances with each other and disapproved of alliances outside Rajasthan), most of the princely states developed not only as distinct political units, but also evolved distinguishable cultural identities in terms of life-styles, dialects and folk-ways. Very little differentiated the techno-economic base of, say, Bikaner from the techno-economic profile of Jodhpur and both were ruled by offshoots of the same Rajput clan. Yet, Bikaner and Jodhpur are even today treated as different politico-cultural identities in the minds of the residents of these ex-princely states. Similarly, the princely states of Jaipur, Kota and Udaipur developed their own stable identities around which grew peoples’ loyalties which, in turn, have survived more than three decades of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

24

NARA1N a n d M ATH UR

socio-economic changes and politico-constitutional transformations at the national level. The economic base of the erstwhile princely states was not only small, but also stagnant and subject to regular depletion as their rulers indulged in constant warfare with each other as well as with the Delhi-based imperial rulers, the sultans of Malwa and Gujarat and the Marathas. Yet, the rulers of these princely states of Rajasthan were able to maintain a high degree of political legitimacy over an extremely long period. Despite signs of a slow but stealthy emergence of an over-arching identity of Rajasthan which has tended to transcend earlier territorial loyalties, even today Rajasthan retains a special identity in the context of India—an identity largely based on its historic past of princes, palaces, pageantry and warfare in which the people participated in full measure. The political systems of these princely states were not democratic. But it would be equally wrong to characterize them as despotic, or to depict the large number of distinguished rulers as autocrats, milking the ecologically limited surplus to enjoy a life of personal luxury and wasteful expenditure on court ceremonies. Most of the ruling houses of Rajasthan did, of course, deploy a large percentage of public revenues on arms and warfare, but most durbars and jagirdars hardly had any time for undertaking ostentatious expenditure, except during the one hundred and fifty years, following the establishment of pax britannica at the turn of the nineteenth century. Available evidence (especially the post-1947 electoral popularity of the princes) seems to suggest that the bonds which prevailed between the rulers and the ruled in the various segments of Rajasthan were not those of coercion, intimidation or arbitrary exercise of executive power.24 The general proposition that the monarchs of the princely states of Rajasthan were not despots is likely to generate vehement denials in Rajasthan itself, especially from the section of political elite which acquired public domination after 1947. The jagirdars and their function­ aries did, indeed, extract large sums from the rural populace in various princely states, but it is questionable that their exactions merit description as squeezing the peasantry to the ‘last drop of their blood’.25 In any case the farmers of Rajasthan had developed a number of well-tested protest mechanisms against cases of expropriation. The human (and livestock) population of rural Rajasthan, not only continued to flourish, but an overwhelming majority of the people were ready to offer military support to their durbars and jagirdars even when they indulged in petty warfare for selfish gains. Generally speaking, the political system in the princely states was dominated by a king belonging to the Rajput clan which had conquered a particular territory. In theory, the prince was an absolute ruler who 24 For a brief and general discussion see Mathur, 1976:12-24. Also refer to Mathur, 1973. 23 Mehta, 1980: 1-23. The words placed by us within quotation marks occur on page 3 of an otherwise scholarly analysis of empirical data.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

25

The Thousand Year Raj

exercised executive, legislative and judicial powers. In practice, ail the R ajput princes exercised their authority with the 'consent and advice’ of a small coterie of noblemen who were invariably the leading jagirdars of the realm.26 Further, there is documentary evidence to show that the kings consulted a growing number of office-holding advisers whose status and functions strongly resembled present-day civil and military administration, although there is no evidence that full-time well-paid civil servants were recruited through an examination-based merit selection system. Eloquent testimony regarding the pattern of relationship between the princes and the people was provided by none other than the leaders of the States People’s Conference and their mentors, the stalwarts of the Congress. It was they who gave recognition to the status and legitimacy enjoyed by the erstwhile rulers in devising a new office (Maharajapramukh) to accommodate Bhopal Singh of Udaipur, who was unwilling to take up the burden of the office of the Rajpramukh, fashioned in the image of the office of the Governor, as it prevailed in part ‘A’ states. Rajasthan’s categorization as a part ‘B’ state under the 1950 Constitu­ tion, marked it as a backward region, requiring the Centre’s direct tutelage. This was warranted by the fact that the administrative systems of the different princely states functioned at varying levels of efficiency; and most parts of the government apparatus had not undergone the type of administrative development that British India had experienced. No doubt, some princes had tried to modernize their governmental machinery, but most of these attempts were made when the twilight of the British empire began to be clearly perceived. Changing Structure o f Rajasthan Politics Who were the political elite who displaced the one thousand years of Rajput hegemony in Rajasthan after 1947? In political terms, the answer is fairly simple: with the end of British paramountcy and the accession of the princely states to India, political power was acquired by the leading activists belonging to the Indian National Congress, which had relied upon its local offshoots of the All India States People’s Conference (AISPC), known as Praja Mandals and Lok Parishads. These organizations were largely confined to the urban areas and were dominated by high caste young men who had acquired some familiarity with western-style educa­ tion mostly in institutions located outside the princely states. Given the centuries-old cultural legitimacy of the Rajput ruling houses, the higher 26 O f course, the durbar could, and regularly did, call upon the jagirdars to render military service but, except for ceremonial courtesy calls on the occasion of births, deaths and marriages, the jagirdars tended to remain aloof and never allowed the princes or their courtiers to interfere in the day-to-day administration inside their individual jagirs or thikanas. For a perceptive study (which, however, focuses only upon the twilight years of the British era) in this regard sec Rubin, 1983.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

26

NARA1N a n d M ATH UR

caste Rajputs rarely participated in the Congress struggle against British rule, even though AISPC affiliates made it a point to stress their loyalty to the existing political regimes and up to 1946-7, rarely made an open appeal for the extinction of dynastic rule in free India. The practical result was that the AISPC units were led and manned by brahmans and vaishyas, while a few Harijan activists also acquired some prominence, particularly after the ‘Quit India* movement of 1942. The Congress affiliates had to face, in many cases, heavy-handed repression by the rulers of the princely states. This was all the more so because British style laws protecting life, liberty and property were not introduced in full measure in princely India before 1947. Indeed, very few people could conceive of the possibility that the princely states would collapse, despite all the great agitations led by Congress in the rest of India. The Congress affiliates (for example Praja Mandals), operating in the princely states, typically had a small membership which placed a great premium on formal education as this was the major source of political awakening. University and college-level educational institutions being practically non-existent in most of the princely states of Rajasthan during the twenties and thirties, all those desirous of advanced education had to go long distances for this purpose. Since this urban educated strata provided an overwhelming majority of the Praja Mandat activists, political leadership in the princely states came to acquire an over-representation of brahmans, even though many prominent non-Brahmans also occupied leading positions in the various Praja Mandate. One aspect of the great change brought about by India's Independence in 1947 is clear: the brahmans in Rajasthan acquired political prominence after the Rajput polity had been dismantled at the Durbar as well as jagirdar levels. The fragility of their political base was evident from the fact that they had to share their newly-acquired power with activists drawn from a number of social groups including the Rajputs, who made a triumphant re-entry into state politics almost simultaneously with the adoption of the new Constitution. The brahman leadership was unable to control the intense factionalism which resulted in the ouster of Rajasthan’s first two chief ministers, Hira Lai Shastri and Jai Narayan Vyas, from office. More important, the Congress could never fathom, let alone master, Rajasthan’s multi-caste political spectrum of brahmans, Hindu and Jain votehyas, Rajput Kshatriyas, as well as sections of politically mobilized agricultural castes, all of whom competed almost on an equal footing. Right from the first Vidhan Sabha elections, the political process, in macro-structural terms, acquired a distinct bi-centric or bi-focal character. The bi-polarity of Rajasthan’s political system is evident from the fact that, while the Congress enjoyed comfortable majorities in nearly all the Vidhan Sabhas in India during 1950-67, the political base of the Congress in Rajasthan remained unstable. Its political leaders made frantic efforts to

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Thousand Year Raj

27

enlarge the party’s social base by incorporating Rajput political activists within its fold. As detailed later, this strategy of accommodating the political opposition was successful to some extent (22 Rajput MLAs were inducted into the Congress after 1950-2; the Rajput ex-ruler of Jhalawar was given a cabinet berth after 1957). It certainly made political competition in Rajasthan more pluralistic than in other parts of India in social as well as political terms. The process of management of political competition became much more a political phenomenon, inasmuch as no single social segment could hope to acquire a predominant status either inside the Congress or the state as a whole. Consequently, the Government of India had to play a special role in supervising the complex processes of merger and integration of the different accounting, administrative and personnel systems, and bringing the unified system at par with those prevailing in the rest of India. Challenging as the task was, the absence of administrative rigidities and the flexibility provided by the opportunity to create new systems proved to be a blessing in disguise, enabling Rajasthan to undertake many administra­ tive innovations with which even the ex-British provinces were reluctant to experiment (Mukherji, 1982). Facets o f Segmentation and Secularization: Past and Present In the long section entitled Traditions of Rajput Domination’ we have attempted to portray, in terms of "ideal-type’ generalizations, the salient features of decentralized polity and administration in the princely states of Rajasthan spanning over a thousand years. Obviously, there were periodic fluctuations in the quantum of authority and legitimacy that the Rajput durbars of these princely states wielded. One can, in fact, discern two long-term phases. The first is clearly marked by great autonomy enjoyed by the newly-settled Rajput conquering clans during the pre-Mughal era. The second is characterized by a great deal of centralization as the durbars were successful in changing the clan basis of the durbar-jagirdar relationship to one obtaining between a superordinate and his subordin­ ates. Two sub-phases can be identified in the second phase—one coinciding with the long period of Mughal domination during which the Rajput durbars made an effort to replicate the Mughal polity in their respective domains; and the second post-British treaty sub-phase in which the British Governor-General made serious efforts to enhance the status and authority of the durbars in relation to the jagirdars.21 The British concern centred on those jagirdars who began to see a vision of 27 For a detailed study of the British policy of strengthening the authority of durbars vu-A-vis their jagirdars following the conclusion of treaties with them see Vashistha, 1968. The author has observed: 'The rulers of Rajputana could never have dared to adopt oppressive and tyrannical attitudes towards their chiefs but for their newly acquired sense of security under the British. During the Mohammedan and the Maratha supremacy, on the contrary, the rulers had made all out efforts to propitiate the chiefs'! (137).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

N A RA IN a n d M ATH UR

28

independence during the chaos created by the rapid decline of the authority of the Mughal emperors and the frequent assaults by the Marathas on the sovereignty of durbars in Rajasthan. The military and economic exhaustion that they faced, on account of mounting Maratha demands, was, indeed, one of the major causes impelling the Rajasthan durbars into an unequal embrace with the British,28 although the durbars and their political courtiers and historical chroniclers even today maintain that they had entered into treaties with the British as equals and not as subordinates.29 The thousand year Raj of the Rajputs of Rajasthan has left several legacies, many of which are fast fading, but some of which continue to motivate present-day political behaviour. What follows is a brief account of social tendencies which have a direct impact on the nature of conflict and cohesion in the political arena of modem Rajasthan. The princely states which were merged to constitute Rajasthan remained highly segmented over long periods of history. This segmenta­ tion was essentially regional and had two dimensions: externally, all the princely states put together were insulated from the socio-economic changes taking place outside the region; and, internally, each princely state was parcelled out into smaller sub-regions which claimed a great deal of politico-administrative autonomy. The advent of British Paramountcy in the early nineteenth century did witness a sustained assault on both these forms of regional segmentation. However, not much headway could be made in this regard, at least up to the first quarter of the twentieth century. More recently the segmental cleavages were reflected in the peculiar pattern of political instability which resulted in as many as six persons occupying the office of the Chief Minister within the five to six years immediately after the formation of Rajasthan. The roots of instability can be directly traced to the mutual distrust prevalent among the ruling houses for several centuries. Jaipur-based Congress leader Hiralal Shastri found it difficult to work with Udaipur-based Congress leader Manikyalal Verma and Jodhpur-based Congress leader Jai Narayan Vyas. An earlier section has drawn attention to special features of (Rajput Hinduism* which prevailed in the princely states of Rajasthan. The political correlate of this type of society was that the people as well as the political elite of Rajasthan’s princely states evolved a code of secular conduct in socio-economic and political spheres. They did this even while continuing to profess Hindu religious beliefs and taking the lead in laying 28 The literature on Maratha raids into Rajasthan's princely states is rather limited but some idea of the havoc wrought by them can be had from Parihar, 1968. 29 The Maharanas of Mewar (Udaipur) even issued coins bearing the legend ‘Dosti London’ signifying that the London-based King-Emperor was a ‘dost’ i.e. friend, but in actual practice, the British used their treaty relations to become gradually masters, not friends, strenuous efforts made by the rulers to maintain the myth of their sovereignty notwithstand­ ing. For documents regarding the treaties see Aitchision. 1892 and 1932.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

29

The Thousand Year Raj

down their life and possessions in resisting the military campaigns of rulers not professing Hinduism. Historical evidence as well as observation in today's Rajasthan clearly indicate that the Rajput Kshatriyas of the princely states evolved their own ritual norms which were much more secular than the religious orthodoxy customarily practised in other parts of the country where Kshatriyas were not dominant. In fact, there is hardly any other comparable tract where Kshatriyas have been so dominant for so long a time at all levels of society, economy and polity. To begin with there is the problem of the vama classification of the Rajputs: they were Hindus, but were they Kshatriyas also? The question is of purely academic interest because the court chroniclers of the princes had long ago provided them with genealogies going back to legendary Kshatriya rulers of such ancient Hindu epics as the Ramayana. As rulers in a Hindu environment, the Rajputs had no problem in donning the mantle of Kshatriya-hood. From time to time, they encountered difficulties in sustaining this claim, especially because not all Rajputs were warriors by occupation. Quite a substantial number of Rajputs were hereditarily engaged in agriculture, while scions of such an agriculturist caste as the jots occupied the rulers’ gaddi in princely states like Bharatpur and Dholpur. Rajputs who personally engaged in agricultural operations, like ploughing and harvesting, are today a reality in Rajasthan and were well known in earlier periods as bhomiyas or bhumiyars. The power-wielding Rajputs princes and jagirdars were, however, able to devise social mechanisms for differentiating themselves from the cultivators and were able to project themselves, successfully, as Rajputs and Kshatriyas. Land-owning Rajputs taking up agriculture as a vocation were accepted as Kshatriya even though they were accorded a lower rank which in a sense was natural in times of constant wholetime agriculturists, but their claim to being Rajputs was never questioned, although the higher ranking Rajputs often turned a Nelson’s eye towards their problems. A vivid example of this tendency surfaced in the early fifties when the laws abolishing jagirdari were extended to include all Rajput landowners, some of whom possessed only tiny parcels as bhomiya lands. Although technically categorized as Rajput jagirdars, many of these families were bound to be ruined by the new land legislation; yet, to their utter dismay, they found that the bigger jagirdars were indifferent to their fate. Even an ex-ruler like Man Singh (who was in a position to articulate their legitimate grievances as Rajpramukh) was not as sympathetic to their cause as they wished. As a result, they decided to forge a new political identity, that is, bhooswanti, and adopt agitational methods which certainly paid greater dividends. All-India leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant agreed that their cases should be de-linked from those of the big estate-holders. They granted to them a number of concessions regarding

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

NARA1N and MATHUR

30

Princely States

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

31

The Thousand Year Raj

the quantum of compensation, and the mode of assistance for rehabilita­ tion in the wake of resumption of their bhomiya lands. One can certainly detect some signs of tension between caste and class among the Rajputs in this story, but its cultural moral is clear: the small bhomiya land-operating Rajputs certainly enjoyed a lower status, but they were accepted as Rajputs. The emergence of a class-like cleavage between bhooswamis and their more illustrious caste fellows, enjoying higher jagir statuses, has been duly noted by several scholars. Still, it is not possible to determine with any great amount of clarity whether this tension produced a long-lasting crack in Rajput solidarity. In any case, such cracks would hardly be of direct interest to those seeking to understand the macro-structure of political domination in contemporary Rajasthan. This is so for the reason that even if all the Rajputs displayed an extraordinary amount of political solidarity, their combined electoral might would hardly be noticeable in any of the 200 Vidhan Sabha constituencies, let alone the Lok Sabha constituencies. Many Rajput political activists have successfully acquired pivotal statuses in the electoral politics of Rajasthan since 1950-1, but they have hardly done so as Rajputs qua Rajput, mobilizing Rajput vote-banks. The upper strata of the Rajput elite (like the ruling princes and the leading jagirdars) were well known for engaging in intense rivalries with each other. The idea of caste solidarity for the sake of gamering mere electoral support seems unacceptable even today if it means giving up traditional animosities and antipathies towards other Rajput families, sub-clans and even clans as a whole. The Rajputs of Rajasthan, in other words, were never politically dominant as a ‘caste’. Rajput traditions are full of tales of fierce social and political rivalries erupting into fratricidal violence {vair being the traditional term to designate such eruptions) which continue to fragment, albeit with declining intensity, the political solidarity of Rajputs. The social base of Rajput political domination, by contrast, was and continues to be very wide, spreading across caste groups and sectional loyalties. Political Roots o f Rajput Secularism Within Hinduism, Hindu karmakanda (ritual and ritualistic observances which mark practically every significant activity in human life) is a powerful instrument of Brahmanical hegemony because every religious ritual requires the intermediation of brahmans as purohits. Since the early days of the establishment of princely states in this part of India, Rajput princes and nobles always paid respect to brahman purohits. In none of the princely states, however, did the brahmans as a caste come to acquire the same degree of religious and temporal authority as in other parts of India. It was this peculiar character of the Rajput polity which gave it its distinctive ‘secular’ orientation. The Rajputs were interested in ruling: to

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

32

N A RA IN a n d M ATH UR

them Brahmanical purity-pollution rituals were secondary and, indeed, could be subordinated to political goals. Thus, even while engaging Muslim rulers on the battlefield, the Rajputs never subscribed to the orthodox Brahmanical stereotype of Muslims as being mUechas not worthy of social intercourse. Rajput princes* matrimonial alliances with the Mughals (and even pre-Mughal Muslim rulers) are, of course, well known. A much more powerful manifestation of secular outlook among the Rajputs is provided by their theory and practice of the sharan doctrine toward Muslims to whom they extended their protection. In many cases this enraged other Muslim rulers (against whom such sharan was being sought) and sometimes even jeopardized their own political rule. It must have required much more than nerves of steel to extend sharan to such persons as Khusro (later known as Jahangir) and Khurram (later known as Shahjahan) who were potential political enemies against whom norms of religious orthodoxy could have been convincingly invoked. The Rajput princes of Rajasthan had, in fact, developed to its logically absurd extreme the almost-forgotten Hindu concept of sharan. This was the doctrine asserting that a ruler must give protection to anyone who seeks it, irrespective of any other consideration and totally unmindful of the consequences of providing such protection. In its basic formulation the doctrine can be found in ancient Hindu epics. Adherence to it, when protection-seekers (sharangat) happened to be rebellious sons of the Mughal emperors like Akbar, Jahangir, Shahjahan and Aurangzeb, not only brought the protection-givers into military conflict with the mighty Mughal armies, but also invited the danger that the same scions of the great Mughals would later deploy all their military forces against the persons with whom they had sought shelter and security in times of their own personal adversity. Yet, unmindful of the consequences, Rajput princes provided shelter, security and even military support to potential Mughal emperors after their unsuccessful revolts against their regnant fathers. The Rajput doctrine of sharan, in fact, provided a ready-made ‘safety-net’ for rivals engaged in internecine warfare at the courts of Muslim rulers of Delhi because, as a matter of record, the Muslim rulers were much more prone to patricide and fratricide in matters of political succession than Hindu rulers.3031 It should, therefore, not be surprising if 30 Most scholars are content to rely on Mughal records for evidence on this subject, thus restricting the period examined to the reign of the Great Mughals. Rajput-Muslim matrimonial alliances took place before as well as after this era: such alliances took place in large numbers as late as one hundred years ago in Jaisalmer where Bhati Thakurs made strenuous efforts to check this practice by calling upon the caste panchayats to declare such Sodhas as outcastes. Chundawat, 1971: 334-41. 31 Political violence for personal ends was not totally alien to Rajput ethics and several examples of patricide and fratricide can be cited from the dynastic history of the various princely states of Rajasthan. But, in general, the incidence of such cases was much less than that obtaining in the capitals of Muslim-ruled states, especially the Delhi-based Muslim (including Mughal) dynasties which dominated the Indo-Gangetk plain.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

33

The Thousand Year Raj

wave after wave of Muslim princes and nobles came to Rajasthan seeking 'protection*. Moreover, there is not a single recorded instance of its being denied on grounds of either ethics or expediency, although many a time it resulted in avoidable military repercussions. By itself sharan is not devoid of the Hindu religious ethos. But its continuous practice with regard to Muslim nobility imparted secular overtones to the political life in the princely states which helps explain the widespread cultural norms of inter-religious harmony. Such norms prevailed in all the princely states of Rajasthan even as their rulers were taking to arms against invasions mounted by Muslim kings and emperors, at least some of whom looked askance at the religio-cultural beliefs of the Hindus. The contemporary relevance of the sharan doctrine is evident from the fact that Rajasthan has been, comparatively speaking, free from the type of communal conflicts which periodically erupt in the neighbouring territories of Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. The princely states of Alwar and Bharatpur did witness some tragic encounters between Hindus and Muslims on the occasion of India's partition in 1947.32 This blemish apart, Rajasthan has been singularly free from communal tensions, even though political parties like the Ram Rajya Parishad, Hindu Maha Sabha and Jan Sangh have polled a sizeable number of votes in different elections and a Jan Sangh stalwart, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, has been a chief minister in the state. The main reason for this has been the domination of Rajputs in general and ex-rulers in particular of the non-Congress opposition, including the Ram Rajya Parishad and Vishwa Hindu Parishad which, in other parts of India, have championed revivalistic interpretations of Hindu orthodoxy. Even such reformist social movements as the Arya Samaj met with a cool reception at the hands of the princes and jagirdars in Rajasthan,33 not to mention the obscurantist doctrines propounded by organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) whose members have yet to acquire an upper hand in the Rajasthan unit of the Jan Sangh or Bhartiya Janata Party.34 32 The people of Rajasthan gave an eloquent demonstration of their basic secular outlook by remaining calm at a time when adjacent regions were feeling the tremor of religio-cultural hysteria following the assassination of Indira Gandhi. For details see P. C. Mathur, (forthcoming). 33 Vashistha, 1970., The advent of the Arya Samaj in Rajasthan did place a strain upon Hindu-Muslim cordiality. This was magnified as a result of Swami Dayanand’s death at Ajmer on 30 October 1883. His death was suspected to have been caused by a poison administered at the behest of Nanijan, a Muslim courtesan at Jodhpur whose association with the Maharaja was deprecated by Swamiji. The Maharaja had paid little heed to Swamiji’s advice, but the courtesans were certainly alarmed, and the further spread of Arya Samaj activities in Rajasthan was thus checked. 34 It is worth noting that the Rajasthan unit of the Jan Sangh was the first among its various units in the country to sponsor a Muslim as a candidate in the Vidhan Sabha elections. It also had the shattering experience of being totally wiped out at the polls in one of its emergent urban bastions when an ex-Maharaja accused it squarely of harbouring anti-Muslim sentiments. For a detailed study of this rare confrontation between secular Rajput traditions and the Jan Sangh see Bhambhri and Mathur, 1964: 70-88.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

34

N A RA IN a n d M A TH U R

The Rajput princes and jagirdars developed a secular outlook, not only in the context of the sharangat doctrine, but also in connection with such religious ceremonies as coronations. Many Rajput dynasties adopted the practices of the key rajyabhishek ceremony but the rituals were performed not by a brahman priest, but a representative of the aboriginals, the anterior rulers of their territories. Originally, the practice might have been a diplomatic symbol of political alliance between the conquerors and the vanquished. The fact remains that the rulers of Udaipur and Jaipur, the two most important princely states of Rajasthan, maintained the custom over a period of a thousand years, thereby not only cementing their political alliance with the tribal population but also elevating their ritual status to unprecedented heights. Thus Meenas, Bhils and other tribals residing in the various princely states enjoy a much higher social status than in other parts of India. The depth of the bond was vividly demonstrated in several Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections held after 1951-2, particularly in Jaipur, where the ex-rulers and members of their family were able to sweep the Scheduled Tribe constituencies with ease, leaving the Congress virtually voteless in villages with a sizeable tribal population. The foregoing account of the political relations between Bhils and Meenas on the one hand and the Rajput rulers on the other suggests that members of these tribes (which after 1947 came to enjoy the status of Scheduled Tribes) did not suffer from any severe social disabilities. Many Meena families were employed as watchmen and security guards (called chowkidar Meenas), by the durbars and jagirdars. Their counterparts among agriculturists (collectively designated as zamindar Meenas), also did not suffer from any social stigma on account of their tribal ways of life. This was less true with regard to the members of the Scheduled Castes who constituted roughly 17 per cent of Rajasthan's total population in 1981. However, even the Scheduled Castes did not have to face the rigours of untouchability to the same extent as did their counterparts in other parts of India. Several sumptuary restrictions on ornamentation (including the prohibition of the use of silver and gold as body decorations) were imposed on the chamars (who constitute nearly 45 per cent of the total Scheduled Caste population) and on meghwals and balais (who make up roughly 9 per cent each of the Scheduled Castes). Despite the fact that members of these three castes were closely associated with handling of dead animals and their hides and skins, they were not subjected to the severe deprivations which one comes across even today in neighbouring regions of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. Several members of Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste communities have occupied high political office in post-1947 Rajasthan. Meenas, in particular, have made their presence felt even in the competitive examinations for the all-India administrative services and other prestigious educational institutions like the Indian Institute of Management and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

35

The Thousand Year Raj

Indian Institutes of Technology. The Congress has provided the maximum opportunities for their mobility in the political arena but the availability of a non-Congress option led by the ex-princes has, in fact, given a boost to their political importance. In contrast to other parts of the country where the Congress took voters from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for granted, the Rajasthan unit has been kept on its toes. Some Rajput princes of Rajasthan went a step further in secularizing Hinduism by taking over the role of head-priest, and personally perform­ ing the puja rituals in temples dedicated to their family deities, which became regular places of worship for the masses. Normally, priestly roles are monopolized by brahmans and it is extremely rare to find nonBrahman priests in temples visited by members of the twice-born castes. The Maharanas of Mewar, however, saw no incongruity in leading prayers personally at the famous Eklingiji temple, while the Maharajas of Bikaner chose to worship a strange female deity, Kami mata, which had supposedly helped the founders of the Bikaner royal dynasty with her magical powers. Elsewhere, in most parts of rural Rajasthan, an overwhelming majority of the people worshipped a host of folk heroes who had been deified as Pabuji, Tejaji, Gogaji, Jamboji and the like. In strict theory, the status of folk deities can be reconciled with the traditional hierarchy of the Hindu pantheon but, in practice, it also means that the people who repose their faith in such local deities are neither aware nor bound by the complex panopoly of the Hindu religious orthodoxies of Vaishnavism, Shaivism or Shaktism. The dominance of folk-customs and folk-beliefs in the rural areas of Rajasthan contributed a great deal towards lessening and/or loosening of the ritual bonds of religious orthodoxy. Finally, the constant military warfare in which the people and the rulers of Rajasthan were almost continuously immersed for nearly ten centuries also produced a secularizing impact on the cultural milieu. It is worth noting that in the Rajput style of warfare, fortified towns played a major role. Many times the entire population of such forts were wiped out—the males going out boldly to die in the face of overwhelming odds and the women committing jauhar i.e., immolating themselves en masse in huge funeral pyres. There are several such instances of defenders of forts like Chittorgarh and Ranthambor (to mention only two) fighting literally to the last man, woman and child against Muslim assaults. What is even more important but less well known is the fact that all this political violence never gave rise to communal bitterness against Muslims under whose command such military encounters took place all over Rajasthan. The Rajput princes and jagirdars, not only chose to repose their religious faith in gods and goddesses unfamiliar to the classical Hindu texts, but also showed no fervour in propagating shastric ideals. A visitor to the princely states of Rajasthan would notice the absence of big and well-built temples except those constructed to provide sanctuary to idols displaced from Brindavan and sustained mainly by non-Rajput devotees. Every

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

36

N A RA IN a n d M A TH U R

Rajput prince conferred muafi jagirs upon brahman priests attached to the temples, and even assigned land revenues acquired from nearby villages for the upkeep of such temples. Nevertheless, their general indifference towards religious customs resulted in the poor maintenance of the temples because the revenue grants were rarely revised to meet mounting expenses. Moreover, given the escalating costs of military budgets, the rulers of princely states were, by and large, indifferent towards the construction of temples. Even today, outside the cities and towns which were the capitals of the various princely states, one hardly comes across any major temples. Rural Rajasthan is dotted only with rough-hewn buildings dedicated to local folk heroes or lesser folk-deities like Ramdevji, Pabuji and Bhairon, whose niche in the Hindu pantheon is rather indeterminate.35 What is more important is that most villages in Rajasthan have no resident brahmans; only a handful of affluent families can even now afford to call for a brahman, and most people make do with non-Brahman priests. The bulk of the rural masses in Rajasthan, therefore, have no or very little contact with living embodiments of Hindu religious values and brahman priests. It is not strange then to find them more interested in local folk-beliefs and superstitions than the nuances of complex Hindu doctrines, or with the detailed and minute prescriptions of Hindu karmakanda. Other evidence of the de-Sanskritized culture is the high esteem in which the 'mercantile castes’ were held in Rajasthan. Detailed studies of the ritual status attributed to the merchants, traders and financiers operating in various princely states are not as yet available. But all political historians are agreed on the important role played by leading families belonging to various mercantile castes of the Vaishya vama. Whereas orthodox texts rec­ ognize the importance of the economic role of the Vaishyas, in practice, the 'mercantile castes’ were hardly visible in most parts of post-Harsha India (i.e. sixth century a d onwards). By contrast, in Rajasthan they occupied a prominent place on the public stage, although some of them could do so only after becoming Jains. The rulers of the princely states were constantly engaged in warfare and were always in need of cash-loans to defray the costs of military operations. Consequently, they accommodated their creditors, even though the prevalent ethos of the times had made the latter render unquestioning obedience to their rulers. The alliance of Rajput princes with wealthy vaishyas took a secular twist because many of the leading plutocrats of Rajasthan happened to be Jains.36 For centuries the 35 By way of contrast, all cities and towns of Rajasthan are dotted with exquisite Jain temples displaying great architectural beauty like the famous Dilwara temple at Mount Abu and the Ranakpur temple in Sirohi district, both of which are at least five hundred years older than any major Hindu temple in Rajasthan, such as the Shri Nathji temple at Nathdwara. The Nathdwara temple is a major Vaishnavtie shrine, but most of its devotees are drawn from outside Rajasthan. 36 The only study which deals with the Marwaris at some length is Thomas Timberg’s Ph.D. thesis (1980), but it focuses on the last hundred years or so (during which the Marwari

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

37

The Thousand Year Raj

Marwaris, based in their original homes in various princely states of Rajasthan, played the dominant role in public finance as well as private trade and commerce. During the period of the Great Mughals (15251707), they even began to establish semi-permanent settlements outside Rajasthan. The Jagat Seth house (Marwari Oswals) became bankers to the Nawabs of Bengal and played an important role in court politics in Delhi (Rau, 1930 and Bhattacharya, 1954). Not enough, however, is known about the pressures which compelled the Marwari traders to migrate outside the princely states where they had enjoyed great social prestige. It is likely that the dismantling of the Mughal empire, coupled with debilitation of the princes under the paramountcy of newly-ascendant British rulers, played an important part in convincing various Marwari communities to extend their activities. The new avenues of trade and commerce introduced into India by European traders in general and the English East India Company in particular must have provided com­ plementary pull-factors. But it is worth speculating that even the semi-permanent migration on the part of the Marwaris may have had some secular roots in their cultural orientation. Travelling and settling down in a strange environment were not compatible with the life-style of orthodox Hindus who placed a high premium on ritual purity and avoidance of pollution at all costs.*37 The social prestige enjoyed by the mercantile castes of Rajasthan produced a secular spin-off in modem times. Nowhere else in India does one come across a large number of persons from mercantile castes and sub-castes well-entrenched in the public bureaucracy. Some of these castes professed Jainism, while others were Hindus; it was difficult to discern any outward differences between the two. Unlike other parts of India, where the brahmans were the first to take to Western education, the lead in Rajasthan was taken by members of various Hindu and Jain mercantile castes and sub-castes like Agarwals, Oswals, Guptas, Mehtas, Bhandaris and Maheshwaries. The Rajput-dominated polity, society and economy of the princely states was unchanging or changing slowly for nearly one thousand years. A t the same time, the domination of Rajput durbars and jagirdars was felt merchants turned into industrial entrepreneurs) and hardly touches upon their role—political or economic—in post-1947 Rajasthan. Also refer to Mathur, 111-21. 37 The Marwaris were able to meet some of the requirements of ritual purity by allowing only the able-bodied males to undertake semi-permanent migration, while their wives, female kin and other members of the family remained in their original homes. Even then, Marwari males must have had to make compromises with Brahmanical norms in their semi-permanent bases as well as during their travels between their homes and work-places. Moreover, their business transactions necessitated daily contacts with Muslims and Christians. It is not surprising that the Calcutta-based Marwaris were in the forefront of social reform movements during the twenties and thirties and even evinced a keen interest in the eradication of untouchability. Ghanshyam Das Birla (who had emerged as one of the wealthiest Marwari merchants before World War I) took a keen interest in a wide range of social reforms. For details see Jaju, 1984.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

38

NARA1N a n d M ATH UR

most strongly in the political realm of defence and/or armed warfare; the princes seldom enjoyed long enough stretches of peace to consolidate their command over economic resources. The Rajput rulers d id extend their political domination to the socio-cultural domain by appropriating some of the brahm ans' ritual functions. However, they left the business of trade and commerce alone as long as their fortifications, armaments and other equipment of warfare were available to them. There is little evidence to document the pattern of relations between Rajput princes and Marwari financiers, and it is therefore impossible to be precise about the terms and conditions under which they raised the funds required from private money-lenders and bankers. Nor is much known about the reasons which motivated the Hindu as well as Jain Marwaris to lend economic support to their rulers’ military campaigns. What can be safely asserted is that there is no kn o w n example of Marwari financial and/or commercial interests triggering off the Rajputs’ military campaigns. Contrary examples, however, can be cited of leading merchants placing all their wealth at the disposal of the Rajput princes. Bhamashah, whose gesture of this type revived Maharana Pratap’s sagging morale in his resistance to Akbar’s armies, is remembered with great reverence even today all over Rajasthan. W4hile the apex of the Rajput polity was certainly reserved for the Rajput, Hindu as well as Jain mercantile castes also enjoyed great social respect, in addition to their economic leverage, and together with the brahm ans occupied the upper ranges of the social pyramid. The elite pluralism of the social structure resulted in a distinctive pattern of domination in which the upper three varnas were all accommodated. Thus in Rajasthan, the political elite were socially differentiated from the economic magnates (m ahajans ) who controlled whatever little surplus was generated by agriculture and animal husbandry, and culturally differenti­ ated from the religious elite (brahm ans ) who were traditionally ranked at the apex of the Hindu caste hierarchy. The question of the ritual status and politico-economic position enjoyed by the peasantry in this pluralistic system is rather vexing. It is difficult to believe that a peasantry impoverished by ecological handicaps as well as economic hardships caused by ceaseless warfare, could have wielded much local power. But one thing is clear: peasant castes as a whole were not marked by indelible signs of social inferiority. This is borne out by the acceptance of ja t ruling houses of Bharatpur and Dholpur as peers by the Rajputs claiming Kshatriya-hood. To that extent, the ja t peasant castes were able to enjoy a symbolic share of political power in pre-1947 Rajasthan. A large majority of ja tsy of course, were agriculturists living in non-yaf ruled princely states. However, they may have derived reflected glory from their fellow castemen sitting on the thrones at Bharatpur and Dholpur. Certainly, their Rajput overlords must have been conscious of the fact that in these states, ja t rulers enjoyed overlordship over Rajput jagirdars.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

39

The Thousand Year Raj L a n d and the Political Pyram id

Several novel features played a role in the structure of agrarian relations in Rajasthan. First, the land was neither very fertile nor conducive to large-scale settlement. Secondly, the jagirdari system placed a large proportion of the cultivating peasantry under the jurisdiction of auton­ omous jagirdars who, after meeting their military obligations, brooked no interference from the durbars . This enabled the jagirdars , if they so chose, to exploit the primary producers to a much greater extent than the durbars whose writ only formally ran over a larger jurisdiction. In fact, the jagirdars’ pre-1947 excesses in this regard proved to be an electoral bonus to the ex-princes who were able to approach their former subjects with cleaner hands, and even make reference to their moderating influence over some particularly rapacious jagirdars. Third, information about the actual systems of revenue extraction prevalent in these princely states is limited to the Gazetteers compiled by British officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These accounts seem to have been influenced by the exaggerated stories of atrocities and excesses circulated by the early torch-bearers of the nationalist movement. Most commentators failed to realize that as much as 40 per cent of the total area (and nearly 50 per cent of the total villages) was not held under jagirdari tenure, but was khalsa land under the direct jurisdiction of the State. At least since the dawn of the twentieth century, the ex-rulers enacted a number of progressive and protective laws modelled on the lines of comparable legislation in British India. At the time of Independence, the Indian National Congress was committed to abolition of all intermediaries between the tiller and the State. This goal had already been endorsed during the 1920s and 1930s by the AISPC, Praja M andals and L o k Parishads operating inside the princely states. Once the Congress came to power it was called upon to translate this principle into practice. The Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952 (hereafter called Jagir Resumption Act) was drafted and approved within two to three years of the consolidation of the state. The actual work of resumption of jagirs started in June 1954: out of a total of 279,179 jagirs as many as 258,964 were resumed by May 1966. While the Rajasthan Revenue Laws Commission considered this ‘a notable achievement’,38 others pointed to various loopholes and laxity shown by local-level administrators in allowing jagirdars to evade the full force of the law (Singh, 1964). Among methods used were anticipatory transfer of land by way of sale, gift or otherwise; and artificial manipulation of the records M Government of Rajasthan, 1966. The following evaluation (page 571) was made by the Commission regarding the effect of jagirdari abolition: The abolition of the jagirdari system in one sense meant regeneration of the jagirdars. The advantages of abolition of the jagirdari system to the jagirdars themselves have now begun to crystallize. The bulk of the jagirdars have taken up the occupation of agriculture seriously and they find that they are better placed in life than they were before (571).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

40

N A RA IN a n d M ATHUR

to inflate the quantum of land retained as khudkhasht i.e. ‘land cultivated personally*. Whatever the actual extent of evasion, however, rights sanctioned over hundreds of years ago were extinguished in less than three decades. The direct cost of jagirdari abolition was in the area of Rs 70 crores—by no means a large sum even for an underdeveloped state like post-1947 Rajasthan. The tx-jagirdars were compensated not in cash but in long-term bonds, which many of them had to sell below face-value in order to raise liquid assests to meet their current needs. The impact of implementation of other land reform laws enacted during the 1947-57 decade is even more difficult to assess. While successive Congress governments have taken credit for having brought about a veritable revolution in tenancy law and other related matters, their opponents continue to emphasize the inadequacies of the ceiling laws which remain imperfectly implemented. At a minimum, full legal ‘ownership* has been conferred upon the erstwhile tenants-at-will cultivat­ ing khalsa and jagir lands resumed by the state government. Some further consideration of the issue of ceilings, that is legal limits upon the land that an individual may ‘own’, will not be out of place here. The state government of Rajasthan appointed a committee to go into the entire question, under the Chairmanship of Mohan Lai Sukhadia (who remained Rajasthan’s Chief Minister for 17 years including 14 years after the submission of the committee’s report in September 1957). The ceilings committee found that the average size of holding in Rajasthan was 16.2 acres. While 91.7 per cent of land holdings were below 50 acres, the remaining 8.3 per cent were more than that size. Although abolition of jagirdari tenures could be achieved by a stroke of the pen, translating the ceilings’ committee’s ideas into legislation proved to be much more difficult. Neo-land-rich owner-cultivators* representa­ tives, lobbies and spokesmen contested each and every provision of the proposed enactment, which, after tortuous passage through several Select Committees, was approved by the Vidhan Sabha only in 1963. The framing of the necessary rules under the law took even longer. More troubles and tension sprang up when the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act, 1963 was sought to be implemented. A new law, passed in 1973, gave rise to considerable administrative complications as both the 1963 and 1973 Acts continued in force concurrently. Some of these legal conundrums were sorted out during the Emergency when Indira Gandhi laid special emphasis on resumption of land in excess of the ceilings. But, on the whole, neither the Congress party, nor its principal opposition—the Janata, Lok Dal and BJP—has been as enthusiastic about imposing ceilings on land holdings as they were interested in chipping away at the privileges of the ex-princes and the tx-jagirdars. In fact, the various ceiling enactments have been more effectively administered against this section of landowners, including an enactment put into effect in 1971 specifically to deal with the resumption of landholdings of the ex-princes and members of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

41

The Thousand Year Raj

their families. By contrast, the imposition of ceilings upon other sections of owner cultivators has been only perfunctory. The prospects of strict enforcement of ceilings legislation appear to be rather bleak. Rural lobbyists have argued against the inequity of land ceilings, as long as there are no comparable restrictions on ownership of other forms of property. The Emergence o f Elite Pluralism The dissolution of the princely states, abolition of the jagirdari system, and extinction of the privy purses and other personal privileges of the ex-rulers resulted in a vacuum in the political system of post-1947 Rajasthan. A few of the displaced power-holders managed to remain on the new political stage for some time by mobilizing the votes of their former subjects. Over the longer term Rajasthan’s polity became more ‘open’ to political competition and possibilities of alternative political mobilization than perhaps any other state in India. The coexistence of the centuries-old dominant Rajput elites with the newly emergent political elite had far reaching implications for the institutionalization of the new democratic order in post-1947 Rajasthan. It is indeed questionable whether (or to what extent) the system of Rajput dominance was replaced by any other equally institutionalized pattern of political power after the princely states were incorporated into India. In theory, the de-thronement of the Rajput elite (who constituted less than 10 per cent of the total population) from all the executive, administrative and adjudicative structures which they had dominated for several centuries should have resulted in a takeover by hitherto excluded castes, ethnic groups and classes. But, in actual practice, Rajasthan's post-1947 politics has been characterized by a type of ‘elite pluralism'. We have already referred to the deliberate efforts made by the British to shore up the sagging political authority of the princes. An equally deliberate 'hands off policy was adopted by the Indian National Congress which restricted its arena of agitational activities to British India, leaving the subjects of the princely states to evolve their own organizations and methods of struggle against their rulers. The long-term effects of the Congress’ hands-off policy were manifest in the overall weakness of the party in all the electoral constituencies falling within the ex-princely states. In the case of Rajasthan this policy resulted in repeated electoral defeats and political setbacks. The resulting pattern of electoral competition made Rajasthan's post-1947 political system much more 'open'. No single caste or political coalition has been able to command the stable allegiance of a substantial or even sizeable percentage of the electorate which has grown from 7,500,000 in 1951-2 to 21,200,000 in 1985. There is no doubt that an overwhelming majority of Rajputs viewed their interests and identities as being synonymous with those of the durbars and jagirdars. Consequently, even though many ex-rulers like Ganga Singh (Bikaner), Rajendra Singh (Jhalawar), Bhopal Singh (Udaipur) and Jai

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

42

N A RA IN a n d M ATH UR

Singh (Alwar) harboured deep nationalistic sentiments (vis-d-vis the British) the Rajputs qua Rajputs could hardly be expected to join the fledgling Praja M andals which began to gather momentum after the First World War (1914-19). At a purely ideological level and in formal terms, the Congress or its Praja M andal type outgrowths were not hostile to Rajputs. In actual practice, the Praja M andate ’ sympathy for 'all-India* demands of national independence made most Rajputs feel threatened by the prospect of the loss of power and privileges, whenever the Congress succeeded in overthrowing the yoke of British imperialism. The fear of the political demise of the Rajputs was kept alive, despite repeated protesta­ tions by individual Praja M andal leaders that they were not interested in the abolition of the institution of hereditary monarchy as it prevailed in the princely states, by the activists* support for wide ranging social, economic and political reforms. One of the salient features of post-1947 Rajasthan, therefore, was that Rajput qua Rajputs were politically arrayed against the Congress whose Rajput members and sympathizers were virtually non­ existent during the heyday of the princely states. The dismantling of the political apparatus of the princely states installed in seats of legislative and executive power a new coalition of the urban educated middle classes assembled under the bandwagon of the various Praja M andate . The new political elite, unlike their counterparts in British India, had no previous experience of participation in local institutions of self-government or in elected legislatures which had been established in some princely states as a response to the growing momentum of the freedom struggle in British India.39 Whereas the Congress’ ‘one-party dominance* was challenged in other parts of India on a substantial scale only after twenty years of Independence, the party came perilously close to being toppled from power in Rajasthan in the very first Vidhan Sabha State Assembly elections held in 1951-2. A similar precarious hold over the voters was revealed in the 1962 and 1967 polls. The resilience shown by the ex-rulers in adapting to the new norms of electoral competition ensured the survival of the R ajputs as a political force, and also made it possible for independents and newly-founded political parties to challenge the Con­ gress in electoral terms. The net outcome has been the secularization and pluralization of Rajasthan politics.. The fact that a number of cx-m aharajas, members of their families, and leading jagirdars , could secure massive electoral mandates in Rajasthan had great significance for caste as a factor in political mobilization. The Rajputs, as a whole, constituted roughly 6 per cent of the total electorate: out of these the number enjoying top positions in the pre-1947 princely states must have been substantially smaller. Yet, Rajputs were able to win 39 In the Third Vidhan Sabha (1962-7), there were only 6 (out of 176, that is, 3.4 per cent) MLAs who had previous experience of membership in the Legislative Assemblies of the pre-Independence period, the number being 13 (out of 184, that is 7.03 per cent) in the Fourth Vidhan Sabha (1972-7). See Ali, 1978: 82.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

43

The Thousand Year Raj

the electoral support of voters belonging to a number of different castes with varying ritual statuses. The impressive political performance of the Rajputs contributed a great deal towards making voting behaviour a 'caste-free' activity in Rajasthan, one in which the electors made autonomous choices that were not a mere reflex of the social structure. In very few other states have numerous candidates won a substantial number of votes in constituencies where their caste fellows constitute a tiny minority (Mathur, 1971: 195-212). The most visible evidence of the continuing impact of the political traditions of the princely states in post-1947 Rajasthan was provided in the first Vidhan Sabha election (1951-2). The Congress party—the main vehicle of India's freedom struggle—polled 39.8 per cent of the votes and won only 74 out of the 153 contested seats: seven uncontested returns gave it a bare majority of 81 seats in a 160 member legislature (Government of Rajasthan, 1954). The Congress’ near political debacle was masterminded by an ex-ruler, Hanuwant Singh of Jodhpur, who in direct contest humbled the redoubtable freedom fighter, Jai Narain Vyas, despite his close personal relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru. Not only did Hanuwant Singh humble Jai Narain Vyas, but his campaigning also resulted in the Congress losing 31 out of 35 seats in Jodhpur division—an area roughly coterminous with the erstwhile princely state of Jodhpur over which Hanuwant Singh had previously ruled. Since the Congress fared well in other parts of Rajasthan, no other political party was in a position to challenge its slender majority. Moreover, the MLAs elected with Hanuwant Singh's support fell into disarray on the very day the poll verdict was announced, after receiving news of the sudden death of their leader. The Congress thus faced no trouble in forming the government under the leadership of Tika Ram Paliwal who was a stop-gap choice until Vyas could be brought back to the legislature. Another result of Hanuwant Singh's premature death was the gradual bridging of the political gap between the Rajput MLAs elected on various non-Congress tickets and the Congress. In 1954, Vyas was able to induct as many as 22 Rajput MLAs, most of whom had been leading jagirdars and thikanedars into the Congress fold. This initiative created resentment among the jats, but significantly enlarged the social base of the Congress party, which* had put up only two Rajput candidates in the first Vidhan Sabha elections compared to 57 Rajput candidates fielded by different parties, and as independents. In other words, while the Congress contested the 1951-2 elections virtually as a non-Rajput political platform, the drubbing its candidates received at the hands of Rajput princes and jagirdars made it ready to absorb them within its fold. This attitude of political accommodation made political competition much more 'open' in social terms (Sisson, 1972). The Congress approached the 1957 Vidhan Sabha polls under the new-style leadership of Mohan Lai Sukhadia who had been able to oust

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

NARAIN to d MATHUR

44

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

45

The Thousand Year Raj

Vyas from the Chief Minister's gaddi in 1954 by a small margin in a vote o f non-confidence in the Congress legislature party. Although the Chief Minister was a young man without the martyr's halo of those who had been major leaders in pre-1947 political agitations, he led the party to a resounding victory with 114 seats, in addition to five uncontested ones, out of the total of 176 seats in the Vidhan Sabha. The 1957 poll verdict marked a watershed in political, but not in social terms: the basic Vyas strategy of incorporating Rajputs into the Congress fold was not abandoned, despite great resentment from the jot faction which had helped Sukhadia topple Vyas. Symbolic of this, in 1960, an ex-ruler, Harish Chandra, was inducted as a cabinet minister. Sukhadia’s political dynamism (as shown by his capacity to balance social groups and political factions), and his administrative prowess notwithstanding, the Congress nearly went out of power during the 1962 polls. The major damage, once again, was inflicted by the consort of an ex-ruler, Smt. Gayatri Davi, wife of Man Singh of Jaipur (Varma et al., 1965). Unlike 1957, when the Congress secured as many as 67.6 per cent of the seats and 45.2 per cent of votes, it could win only 50 per cent of the seats (88 out of 176) while its share of votes plummetted to 1952 levels at 40.4 per cent. Sukhadia became Chief Minister again, but only to carry the Congress to the brink of disaster in the 1967 polls when it secured only 89 seats out of a total 184. This made its claim to form the council of ministers a controversial game of numbers, based on its assertion of having secured the support of three more MLAs.40 In the 1967 polls, the main challenge to the Congress was posed once again by Rajput notables such as Harish Chandra and Smt Gayatri Devi. But unlike 1952 and 1957, the blue-blooded Rajputs joined hands with low-born jot peasant leaders like Kumbha Ram. The latter, just a few years back, had put pressure on Mohan Lai Sukhadia to withhold greater political weightage from the Rajputs; earlier, he had helped Sukhadia overthrow Jai Narain Vyas after he inducted Rajput jagirdars into the Congress. The political alliance forged in 1967 may not have been an enduring one, but it had long-term social significance because of its moderating influence on yaf-Rajput tensions. The moderation was essential in the wake of extensive land reforms in the fifties and early sixties, which abolished intermediaries and provided security of tenure to newly titled khatedars. Indeed, following the green revolution of the seventies, those at the lowest rungs of the hierarchy (and those nearest to the soil) were beginning to exhibit some upward social mobility, while some of those formerly at the social and political apex started to slide down the economic pyramid. In Jaipur, Rajput-jat alliances indicated the ability of the political 40 For details of the political and constitutional controversies amid which Mohan Lai Sukhadia managed to retain the Chief Ministership after (seemingly) failing to secure a majority, see Sinha, 1967: 137-44.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

46

N A R A IN a n d M ATHUR

elite to transcend social antagonisms and to sustain a new type of elite pluralism free from the traditions of caste stratification. Political Salience o f Social Traditions

For the first two decades in post-Independence Rajasthan, the tide of politics flowed against the Congress which could not acquire even a semblance of the ‘one party dominance' that it enjoyed at the all-India level. The Congress, however, managed to hold the reins of government mainly because the members of the erstwhile ruling houses could not mount a united onslaught against it by cutting across the traditional rivalries which governed their inter-personal relations in the pre-1947 era. Congress leaders also consciously exploited the traditional antagonisms between the erstwhile princely states and their ruling houses to prevent them from launching a combined political offensive. For example, the Maharaja of Udaipur and the Maharaja of Jaipur were won over by being appointed as Maharajapramukh and Rajpramukh respectively, thus effectively preventing them from openly joining the anti-Congress band­ wagon. Similarly, the opposition mounted by Kami Singh of Bikaner was skillfully deflected by the simple expendient of not putting up a candidate against him, while Kami Singh, on his part, played it safe by contesting Lok Sabha elections and not exerting all his political weight in the Vidhan Sabha poll. The politics of accommodation left only the ruling house of Jodhpur out of the reckoning. It was precisely the failure of Jai Narain Vyas to conclude a mutually satisfactory agreement with Hanuwant Singh which had led to the latter’s anti-Congress blitzkrieg and the party’s first electoral debacle in Jodhpur region. A series of similar hits-and-misses led to the alienation of the Jaipur ruling house, but in this case it was not the ex-ruler himself but his consort, Smt Gayatri Devi, who openly challenged and routed the Congress in the 1962 and 1967 polls in the Jaipur division, even as the party was regaining the ground it had lost in the Jodhpur division. Another sequence of behind-the-scene skirmishes resulted in Bhagwat Singh of the Udaipur ruling house coming out in opposition to the Congress and posing a formidable challenge in Udaipur division in the 1971-2 election. But the important point to note is that the three leading ruling houses of Rajasthan, Jodhpur, Jaipur and Udaipur, confronted the Congress at different points of time, and a fourth, Bikaner, chose to plough a lonely furrow, making it possible for the party to contain the ex-rulers’ opposition to manageable proportions. The Congress party’s vulnerability to electoral assaults by ex-rulers could not be easily understood either by political activists or political analysts outside or inside Rajasthan. Thus, the election victories of Smt Gayatri Devi and Smt Krishna Devi (in Jodhpur), both consorts of erstwhile rulers of princely states, imparted an aura of mystery to the political behaviour of the rural masses of Rajasthan, who seemed to be

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

47

The Thousand Year Raj

ever-ready to respond to the call of their former masters. In caste terms, these ex-rulers could hope to appeal only to the Rajput community. Their own traditions of rivalry over rank-hierarchy made it almost impossible for them to enlist the support of their peers in status terms. Moreover, having been at loggerheads with the leading jagirdars and thikanedars of their princely states, most of the members of the erstwhile ruling houses had to face overt or covert hostility of their own ex-subordinates, thereby ruling out an election campaign based on appeals to Rajput solidarity. Beyond this, none of the ex-rulers or their family members who chose to enter the electoral arena in Rajasthan even campaigned in terms of ascriptive appeals. The massive turn-outs at their election speeches, as well as the high percentage of votes polled by them seems to suggest that they mobilized a multi-caste political base, imparting an element of 'seculariza­ tion* to the political process in Rajasthan. The proposition that the electoral triumphs of the ex-rulers were political (and not rooted in primordial loyalties) is supported by the fact that, after two bewildering assaults at the hands of Hanuwant Singh (1951-62) and Smt Gayatri Devi (1962 and 1967), the Congress party quickly devised effective antidotes. After 1967, Congress inflicted defeat upon Smt Gayatri Devi who lost a Vidhan Sabha contest (1967), and routed her son in a Lok Sabha contest from Dausa (1969). Congress leaders were also successful in eroding Smt Gayatri Devi's popular base in the 1971 Lok Sabha poll and in containing the onslaught launched by Bhagwat Singh in the erstwhile princely state of Udaipur. In yet another instance of its political reinvigoration, the Congress could think, at least, of putting up a candidate against Kami Singh in 1971, an ex-ruler who had hitherto enjoyed a cake-walk into the Lok-Sabha. The ex-rulers* second innings in Rajasthan politics contributed a great deal towards deparochialization and even secularization of electoral competition. One example of this was the Jaipur ex-rulers* direct assault on the Jan Sangh when some of its national leaders attempted to use the communal virus in the Jaipur municipal election in 1964 (Bhambhri and Mathur, 1964). However, the peculiar structure of Rajasthan politics saped as it is by a long history of cultural secularism and political segmentation has never been properly understood by all-India political parties, even when they sought political alliances with the ex-rulers. Thus, even though the Swatantra Party managed to build advantageous links with some members of the pre-1947 ruling houses, it is doubtful whether its stalwarts fully realized the social significance of the ‘princely’ factor in terms of its potential for de-linking politics from the social structure. Again, Indira Gandhi herself continued to hold political negotiations with ex-rulers and other members of the ruling houses whenever Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections took place, in spite of her election-winning manifestoes which proclaimed achieve­ ments like the abolition of privy purses and other personal privileges of ex-rulers.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

48

NARA1N a n d M ATH UR

Post-1947 Rajasthan's politics further reveals the virtual depoliticization of the Marwaris and other m ahajan traders and moneylenders, compared to their previous indirect influence on the ruler's policies and politicoeconomic programmes at the durbar or at the jagirdar levels, Even after the role of Vaishya and Jain military financiers had become unimportant, the durbars and jagirdars continued to depend upon this class of wealthy men to meet their consumption expenditure. During the 150 years or so of the treaties between the princely states and English East India Company, and the British ‘transfer of power' to independent India in 1947, the financial health of the ruling houses had steadily deteriorated. By contrast, this was the period in which the Marwaris and other m ahajans of Rajasthan's princely states had begun to accumulate vast fortunes through their internal and international trading activities outside Rajasthan. Because of cultural traditions demanding unquestioning loyalty towards their durbars and jagirdars , the neo-rich Marwari traders continued to pay the customary deference to them, although they took care to keep most of their capital stocks and income flows outside the boundaries of princely states. Essentially a class of traders, the newly-affluent Marwaris did not, naturally enough, contemplate the possibilities of undertaking industrial investments in Rajasthan. This tradition was followed after Independence, although many leading Marwari business houses made a transition from mercantile operations to industrial entrepreneurship and some of them (e.g., the Birlas and Singhanias) own substantial industrial capital in different parts of India.41 Whether the reasons were techno-economic (after all Rajasthan's ecology offered very limited industrial opportunities) or politico-administrative (British India offered a much more congenial climate for trade, commerce and industrial production), the fact remains that the leading sections of the Indian bourgeoisie rarely participated in the politico-economic life of Rajasthan where they maintained their families. However, on account of their frequent travels to their family bases, the migrant Marwari merchants maintained cordial relations with political and administrative officials. Even today leading members of the Bifta family make it a point to pay customary deference to the sx-jagirdprs of Nawalgarh from where they hail. But when a junior member of the family sought to contest a by-election from the area in 1965 he met with failure (Muni, 1967: 116-17). It may be re-called in this context that several ex-jagirdars have, by contrast, regularly won elections from the Jhunjhunu 41 According to the Monopolies Enquiry Commission data, Marwaris controlled industrial assets worth Rs 7.5 billion out of a total Rs 19.6 billion. See Monopolies Enquiry Commission Report, 1964. But Thomas Timberg’s detailed studies of several Marwari 'Great Firms' shows that Marwaris took up industrial investment only in the second quarter of the twentieth century and even at the end of the thirties their industrial stakes were generally outside the princely states of Rajasthan. Nearly forty years after India’s Independence the Birlas ’returned' to Rajasthan with a 700 crore gas-based fertilizer plant which they hope to set up soon at Sawai Madhopur.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Thousand Year Raj

49

district which is the original family home of a large number of leading Marwari businessmen. The fact that Rajasthan-bom Marwaris and other mahajans have emerged as industrial magnates owning huge enterprises has not produced visible ripples in the political life of their home state. They are not known to have exerted political pressures for economic favours (such as land allocations or financial subsidies or other concessions). And they have yet to make their presence felt in the legislative or executive institutions at the state, district or local levels. In sharp contrast, several leading Marwari businessmen successfully contested Lok Sabha elections from 1951-2, and K. K. Birla made strenuous efforts to get the Congress (I) nomination for a seat in the Rajya Sabha, succeeding only after being once rejected in favour of an unknown social worker from Kota district. The Marwari businessmen's discovery that Rajasthan provided favourable constituencies for their entry into the Lok Sabha encouraged non-Manvari business tycoons and industrialists also to contest Lok Sabha elections from Rajasthan. The electoral success of such candidates, not only enabled otherwise weak all-India political parties like the Swatantra Party, to make their presence felt in Rajasthan but further lessened the importance of the caste nexus in the political choices of the average voter. The Marwari businessmen and industrialists who contested elections to the Lok Sabha from Rajasthan have exerted only a marginal political impact in the state. Most of them entered politics on non-Congress tickets, which effectively barred them from playing an active part in the cut and thrust of political life. The electoral success of Marwari businessmen in the Lok Sabha polls, however, certainly contributed towards making Rajas­ than's political system even more ‘open’, with the electorate becoming quite accustomed to the idea of ‘outsiders' contesting from the state. The migrant Marwaris, who are now using Rajasthan's open political system merely as a stepping-stone, could start to play more penetrative roles in political affairs in the years to come. Political disturbances in Assam, West Bengal, and Orissa on the one hand, and sons of the soil movements spearheaded by the Shiva Sena of Bombay and the like on the other, may drive back the Marwaris to their home towns in Rajasthan. However, it would take a long time for them to develop political roots, especially because even today Rajasthan offers very few ready made opportunities for remunerative industrial or agro-industrial investments. Rajasthan never had (and is not likely to have in the forseeable future) a substantia] proletariat class either in the industrial or in the agricultural sector to sustain viable left or left-of-centre political movements. Although some towns in the Ajmer-Marwar territory of British India had developed cotton textile processing capacity, the total number of registered factories in the princely states was very small. While this number has multiplied manifold, the total industrial work-force constitutes only a tiny fraction of the total population, while even the agricultural labour-force is in the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

50

NA RA IN a n d M ATH UR

vicinity of seven to eight per cent. Socialist and communist activists have tried to circumvent this ‘objective’ obstacle to the spread of leftist ideology by taking up the cause of the small-holder peasantry, the forest-dwelling tribes and other sections of the ‘toiling masses’, but the fact remains that, in the absence of economic modernization, Rajasthan offers very few genuine opportunities for leftist ideologies. Hence, barring small pockets, where individual communist and socialist activities have been able to attract the electoral loyalties of the people, most voters belonging to the poorer strata have voted either for the erstwhile princes or for Congress candidates. Class consciousness has been further diffused in several constituencies by the rise of agriculturist lobbies which have been successful in appealing to small farmers in caste terms. This phenomenon is most clearly visible in the /ar-dominated constituencies of districts like Jodhpur, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, Sikar, and Chum. The Lok Dal regularly polls heavily in these constituencies as the latest incarnation of the political party founded in the sixties by Charan Singh, whose brief term as Prime Minister gave a tremendous impetus to the power-drive of the jats. Such sentiments of caste solidarity have made it particularly difficult for political parties like CPI(M) to make ideological appeals to the rural poor amongst the jats. Politics and Social Structure A very important feature of Rajasthan society strengthens our conclusions about the nature of the relationship between politics and social structure in pre-1947 as well as post-1947 Rajasthan. As shown in the 1931 Census, no single caste, with the exception of omnibus categories like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes—created by the Constitution of India in 1950— constitutes more than 10 per cent of the total population, with at least four castes enjoying approximate numerical parity as can be seen from the following table. The foregoing data clearly bring out the ‘pluralizing’ impact of the social divisions within the Rajasthan electorate. The percentage of Rajput MLAs dramatically declined within little more than a decade, from 44 (in the 1951- 2 elections) to 20 (in the 1962 elections). Beyond this, agriculturist castes, most notably the jats obtained more than their proportionate share amongst the MLAs right from the very first Vidhan Sabha elections. Taking the whole of Rajasthan, the data reveal substantial social dispersion: the 200 MLAs in the third Vidhan Sabha were almost equally divided into four social groups, brahmans (17 per cent), Rajputs (20 per cent), jats (16 per cent), and Scheduled Castes (16 per cent), with two near-equal groups, mahajans (11 per cent), and Scheduled Tribes (13 per cent) also enjoying substantial numerical strength. Apart from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which are guaranteed proportion­ al representation by the constitutional provision for reservation of seats,

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

51

The Thousand Year Raj T a b l e 11

Caste Composition o f Assembly and Society (in percentage) Caste

Brahman Rajput Mahajan Peasant Jai Other Peasant Castes* * Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Others***

State Population

First Assembly (1951-57)

8 6 7 18

N=126 17 44 9 11

N=166 15 19 11 18

(9)

(id

(id

N=176 17 20 11 18 (16)

11 4 4

(7) 16 13 8

(2) 16 13 5

(9) 14 11 35

Second Assembly Third Assembly (1962-67) (1957-62)

•• Other peasant castes are: Sirvi, Vishnoi, Gujar, and Ahir. ••• The category includes Muslims, Kayasthas, and Sikhs. Source : Sisson and Shrader, 1972: 9.

the data clearly highlight a situation of elite pluralism with as many as four caste groups vying for political domination. The plurality of social bases for political mobilization in Rajasthan is reflected in the top political leadership which has been drawn from a number of castes, although not from the most affluent strata of each caste-group.42 Nine persons (Hiralal Shastri, Jai Narain Vyas, Tika Ram Paliwal, Mohan Lai Sukhadia, Barkatullah Khan, Harideo Joshi, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, Jagan Nath Pahadiya and Shiv Charan Mathur) occupied the Chief Minister’s gaddi during the thirty-eight years after 15 August 1947. Only one, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat who headed a Janata government, was a non-Congressman, while Harideo Joshi had two stints in this office, the first during 1973-7 and the second from February 1984. The most remarkable feature, of course, is Mohan Lai Sukhadia, who occupied the Chief Ministership for almost as long as all the rest put together, that is seventeen years. Sukhadia’s long tenure, stretching from 42 The ex-rulers and members of their families seem to be a major exception to this generalization, but in terms of command over tangible productive resources, even they cannot be considered to be really rich. Many of them have begun to sell family heirlooms to generate cash income, and only a few have the necessary commercial skills to make remunerative investments. Many ex-rulers and cx-jagirdars of Rajasthan have sought a new lease of economic life by converting their palaces into hotels and catering to foreign travellers. But even such commercially viable enterprises need not necessarily imply economic security—as the ex-Maharaja of Jaipur discovered when he was left with no choice but to hand over the management o f his very popular Rambagh Palace Hotel to the experienced hands of the •Itzll ibay-based Parsi business house of the Tatas.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

52

N A RA IN a n d M ATH UR

1954 to 1971, was a momentous period in the history of modem Rajasthan, one in which the foundations of many sound administrative policies were laid. Sukhadia’s long occupancy of the office also left a deep imprint on the strategies and conventions of governance which none of his successors have been able to erode. In harmony with the social dispersal of political elites in democratic Rajasthan, the caste background of the Rajasthan Chief Ministers has been varied and does not seem to fall into any pattern: Barkatullah Khan was a Muslim; Jagan Nath Pahadiya was a member of a low-ranking Scheduled Caste community; Shiv Charan Mathur was from the kayastha community; Bhairon Singh Shekhawat was a Rajput belonging to the chutbhaiya strata of rural Rajputs, that is, the bhoosw am i group of jagirdars for whom the state government had to make special concessions while implementing jagirdari abolition. Four brahm ans , Hira Lai Shastri, Tika Ram Paliwal, Jai Narain Vyas and Harideo Joshi, occupied the office but none of them belonged to the top-ranking strata of the community either in terms of ritual status or economic assets. About the caste background of Mohan Lai Sukhadia we must confess our total ignorance as even intensive enquiries have proved to be unilluminating. All that is known is that he started his working life as a trained electrician at his family shop retailing electrical goods. Whatever caste vestiges Sukhadia did start with could hardly have survived his marriage to the daughter of a Muslim courtesan and this is amply reflected in the couple's choice of life partners for their sons and daughters. In terms of economic wealth, none of these nine political leaders were affluent. Most of them can be regarded as belonging to Rajasthan's urban middle class but even this categorization fully fits only half of them in terms of origins, although in terms of later (personal) achievements it can be regarded as fairly accurate. The data do not throw much light on the support base of the Chief Ministers. Moreover, as in other states, after 1971, Chief Ministers were catapulted into, and continued in office mainly with patronage from above by respective Prime Ministers. Mention has already been made about Sukhadia's remarkable ability to forge a political balance among various social and political factions. The only non-Congress Chief Minister, Shekhawat, also successfully employed a multi-caste strategy to maximize political support among different factions and social strata. A word about the might-have beens of Rajasthan’s Chief Ministership is not out of place, especially since this consideration of the counter-factual illuminates the emerging pattern of political and social stratification in Rajasthan. Thanks to the electoral shake-up of the 1977 and 1978 polls, a Rajput was catapulted to Rajasthan's highest elective office. But discern­ ing readers might have noticed that no jo t has, as yet, occupied the office even though the jots constitute one of the four near-equal numerically dominant caste groups. The numerical strength of the jots is, moreover, buttressed by their political militancy and emerging economic prosperity as

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

53

The Thousand Year Raj

modem techniques and inputs of agricultural production are being disseminated into rural Rajasthan. The sturdy peasant jots are a wellknown social group in the history of north India, but all their agricultural dynamism has yet to produce a clear imprint on the diffracted political life of Rajasthan. The fact of the matter is that their ‘middle-caste* status has yet to be converted into middle-class prestige in which educated urbanities still outweigh more numerous and prosperous agriculturists. A vivid example of the built-in social limits of the jat power-drive was provided in the wake of Barkatullah’s sudden death in 1973, when Indira Gandhi strongly hinted to Ram Niwas Mirdha that he return to Rajasthan and explore his chances of becoming Chief Minister. A highly educated and sophisticated politician, Mirdha, was at that time a junior minister in the Union Council of Ministers. Despite his formidable social credentials (his father, Baldeo Ram Mirdha being a notable social activist among the jat community of north-western Rajasthan) and previous political experience (as an ML A and Speaker of the Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha), he refused to enter the contest for Chief Ministership. Such restraint was all the more unusual since Indira Gandhi had followed a regular policy of placing her own nominees at the head of state cabinets after her remarkable victory in the 1971 Lok Sabha polls. Without considering the specific personal and political motives which may have operated in this case, it still can be said that a general prejudice seems to prevail among the political elite of Rajasthan regarding the unsuitability of jats as political rulers, even though several jats have occupied key posts in the Council of Ministers as well as state-level committees of the Congress party. Names like Kumbha Ram, Nathuram Mirdha and Paras Ram Madema, indeed, are spoken with great deference whenever the administrative performance of individual ministers is discussed. But the fact remains that most urban-educated members of the administrative and political elite still view the jats as rough-hewn agriculturists unfamiliar with middle-class graces and the niceties of social intercourse. Such attitudes of 'urban bias' are quite likely to be swept away by the emergent economic momentum of the rural 'middle castes' like the jats, making Rajasthan’s political pyramid even more pluralist in the future. It may perhaps be worthwhile to dilate a little further upon the political prospects of the agricultural castes by noting that 'agriculture' is still a primitive and underdeveloped enterprise in Rajasthan. It is even more important to remember that the tenancy reforms implemented in 1955 virtually satisfied the highest economic ambitions of the impoverished peasantry. They have so far shown little interest in the acquisition of power at the district or state-level, and are mainly concerned that the develop­ ment apparatus of the state and Union governments delivers technical inputs, such as irrigation, seeds, and fertilizer. The day when the placidity and civility of Rajasthan politics will be rocked by the ‘power-drive’ of the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

54

NA RA IN a n d M ATH UR

agricultural castes, while bound to arrive, is difficult to predict. Its most well-organized spearhead, the jats (who are numerically and socially best suited to claim dominant castehood’) are concentrated only in eight to ten districts of Rajasthan. This in-built regional limitation upon their political consolidation, ensures that the total strength of the jats in the Vidhan Sabha can never be sufficient to dominate state-level politics, even if the entire jat electorate in Rajasthan could be mobilized as a solid bloc. Rajasthan is, today, ruled by a political elite drawn from a number of castes that are incorporated into the urban middle classes, with some rural-based agriculturists, especially jats moving up the political ladder. Even so, nearly one-third of the electorate remains in a state of dormancy, despite the lesser magnitude of civic disabilities imposed upon them than in other states of India. Rajasthan, to us, appears to be an enclave whose ecology and political history have combined to ‘freeze’ relations between society and polity in shapes that might appear anachronistic within the wider networks of polity, society and economy. Rajasthan is moving into an era of change, but towards change in the context of its history. In the future, perhaps, there will be more change than continuity because Rajasthan is bound to march in step with the rest of India. Social scientists would do well to treat Rajasthan as a rare ‘social laboratory’ where irresistable forces of change—democratization and economic modernization—are likely to be in intense interactive confrontation with social objects (peoples, technoeconomic endowments and socio-cultural traditions) which have remained practically immovable for several centuries.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

55

The Thousand Year Raj REFERENCES

Adams, John and Bumb, Balu. 1973. T h e Economic, Political and Social Dimensions of an Indian State: A Factor Analysis of District Data for Rajasthan’, Journal o f Asian Studies, 33 (1), November. Ahluwalia, M. S. 1978. Muslim Expansion in Rajasthan: The Relations o f Delhi Sultanate with Rajasthan 1206-1526 (Delhi: Yugantar Prakashan). Abuja, Kanta and Vidyasagar. 1983. ‘Structural Change in Rural Rajasthan* (Jaipur: Department of Economics, University of Rajasthan), mimeo. ------------. 1987. Rural Transformation in a Developing Economy (Jaipur: Kumar & Co.). Aitchison, C. V. (comp.), n.d. A Collection o f Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India, Vol. Ill, 1892 to 1933. Ah, Athar, 1966. The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb (Bombay). Ali, Shum Shum Nisa. 1978. ‘Legislative Control over Administration in Rajasthan*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Rajasthan. Arora, Ramesh and Mathur, P. C. 1986. ‘Prof. M. V. Mathur: A man for all ideas* in Ramesh Arora and P. C. Mathur (ed.), Development Policy and Adminis­ tration (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House). Asopa, J. N. 1976. Origins o f the Rajputs (Delhi: Bhartiya Publishing House). Batra, H. C. n.d. The Relations o f the Jaipur States with the East India Company (1803-1858). Bhambhri, C. P. and Mathur, P. C. 1964. ‘Elections to the Jaipur Municipal Council’, Political Science Review, 3(1), January-March. Bhargava, V.S. 1970. Mewar and the Mughal Emperors (Delhi). Bhattacharya, S. 1954. East India Company and the Economy o f Bengal 1704-1749 (London). ----------- . 1972. The Rajput States and the India Company: From the Close o f the Eighteenth Century to 1820 (Calcutta). Census of India, 1981. Rajasthan, Series 18, Paper 1 of 1981, Supplement, Provisional Population Totals (Jaipur). Chandra, Satish. 1959. Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court (Aligarh). Choudhry, P. S. 1968. Rajasthan between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Agra: Sri Ram Mehra and Co.). Chundawat, Laxmi Kumari. 1971. Rajput Raj-Gharon ki Parinay-Parampara (Jaipur: Anima Prakashan). Government of India. 1950. Report o f the Rajasthan-Madhya Jagir Enquiry Committee (New Delhi). Government of Rajasthan. 1966. Report o f the Rajasthan Revenue Laws Commis­ sion (Jaipur: Revenue Department). Government of Rajasthan, n.d. Draft Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85 Annual Plan 1981-82 (Rajasthan). Government of Rajasthan, Bureau of Statistics, 1954. The Statistical Study o f the General Elections, 1952 (Jaipur). Government of Rajasthan State Archives. 1966. Rajasthan through the Ages, Vol. 1, From the Earliest Times to 1316 AD (Bikaner). Gupta, J. P. 1982. ‘Identification of Inter-District Disparities in Rajasthan*, Rajasthan Economic Journal, 6(2) July. Hasan, Nurul S. 1964. ‘The Position of Zamindars in the Mughal Empire’, Indian Economic and Social History Review. 1(4) Hooja, B. and Pathak, M. 1980. ‘Production and Availability of Foodgrains in

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

56

N A RA IN and M ATH UR

Rajasthan during the Seventies', Rajasthan Economic Journal 4(2), JanuaryJuly. Hooja, Meenakshi, Singh, Sankar and Haider, Wali (comp.). 1981. Rajasthan and India: Some Demographic Facts (Jaipur: Government of India, Director of Census Operations). Jain, M. M. 1982. 'Rajasthan's Economy in the 1980s: Challenges and Potentiali­ ties*, Rajasthan Economic Journal, 6(2), July. Jaju, Ram Niwas. 1984. Marubhoomi ka Voh Megh (New Delhi: Rajpal and Sons). Joshi, J. M. 1956. ‘Economic Conditions in Rajasthan', Ph.D. thesis, University of Rajasthan. Khan, A. R. 1977. Chieftains in the Mughal Empire during the Reign o f Akbar (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study). Mankekar, D. R. 1984. Accession to Extinction: The Study o f Indian Princes (Bombay). Mathur, P. C. 1970. ‘Tribals of Rajasthan: An Overview’ in Hari Mohan Mathur (ed.), Development Administration in Tribal Areas (Jaipur: HCM State Institute of Public Administration). ----------- . 1971. ‘Levels and Limits of Casteism in Indian Politics', Indian Journal o f Political Science, 32, April-June. ----------- . 1973. ‘Ecology of State Administration in Rajasthan* in Ziauddin Khan et al. (ed.), State Administration in Rajasthan (Jaipur: Asha Publishing House). ----------- . 1976. ‘Democratization of Political Life in Rajasthan after 1947’, Political Science Today, 2(1). December. ----------- . 1977. ‘On Becoming Rajput*, Indian Book Chronicle, 16 October. ----------- . 1980. ‘Social Science Research in Rajasthan, Canal Command Area: A Trend Report’ (Jaipur: University of Rajasthan), memeo. ----------- . 1981. ‘Resource Development (including Infrastructure Development)’ in Report o f the Seminar on Development o f Desert and Drought Prone Areas (Jaipur: H. C. M. State Institute of Public Administration). ----------- . 1984. Social Bases o f Indian Politics (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers). ----------- . 1986. ‘Notes Towards Socio-Scientific Study of Politics in South Asia’ in P. C. Mathur (ed.). Government and Politics in South Asia: The External Scene, Vol. II (Jaipur: Printwell Publisher). ----------- . n. d. ‘National Integration Reconsidered: Pre-Theoretic Reflections on Rajasthan's Response-Restraint Regarding Anti-Sikh Communalism in India’ in Moin Shakir (ed.), Religion, Politics and Society in India (forthcoming). Mishra, V.C. 1967. Geography o f Rajasthan (New Delhi: National Book Trust). Mathur, V. D. 1984. States' Peoples Conferences Origin and Role in Rajasthan (Jaipur: Publication Scheme). Mehta, B.C. 1980. ‘Exploitation in Rural Rajasthan', Rajasthan Economic Journal, 4(2), January-July. Mehta, Mohan Singh. 1930. Lord Hastings and the Indian States (London). Menon, V. P. 1956. Story o f the Integration o f Indian States (Bombay: Orient Longmans). Menshing, Herst G. and Sharma, R. C. 1984. Resources Management in Drylands: The Rajasthan Example (New Delhi: Rajesh Publications). Monopolies Enquiry Commission Report. 1964. Mukerji, Mohan. 1972. ‘Management Recruitment in the Indian Private Sector: The Problem of Economic Casteism*, Indian Journal o f Politics, Vol. 6, no, 1, January-June.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

57

The Thousand Year Raj

------------. 1982. Administrative Innovations in Rajasthan (New Delhi, Associated Publishing House). Muni, S. D. 1967. ‘Politics of Symbol: R. K. Birla’s Election in Jhunjhunu*, Political Science Review, 6(1), January-March. Narain, Iqbal and Mathur, P. C. 1965. ‘Union-State Relations in India—A Case Study in Rajasthan* in S. P. Aiyar and Usha Mehta (eds.), Essays on Indian Federalism (Bombay: Allied Publishers). Narain, Iqbal, (ed.). 1967 and 1976. State Politics in India (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan). ------------. 1969. Twilight or Dawn (Agra: Shivlal Agarwal). ------------. 1983. ‘India* in William G. Andrews (ed.), International Handbook o f Political Science (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press). ----------- . 1984. ‘India* in Takeo-Uchida (ed.). Political Science in Asia and the Pacific States. Report on Teaching and Research in Ten Countries (Bangkok: UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia and the Pacific). Pande, Ram. 1970. Bharatpur up to 1826: A Social and Political History o f the Jots (Jaipur). Parihar, G. R. 1968. Marwar and the Marathas 1724-1843 a d (Jaipur). Perspective Plan fo r Development o f Rajasthan, 1980. 2 vols. (New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research). Ram, Maya. 1970. Rajasthan District Gazetters (Jaipur). Rau, B. R. 1930. Present Day Banking in India (Calcutta). Rubin, Barnett R. 1983. Feudal Revolt and State-Building: The 1938 Sikar Agitation in Jaipur State (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers). Rudolph, Suzanne H. and Rudolph, Lloyd I. 1984. Essays on Rajputana (New Delhi: Concept Publishing House). Saran, P. 1941. Provincial Government o f the Mughals (Allahabad). Saxena, H. C. 1982. ‘Rajasthan Economy: Challenges and Potentialities*, Rajas­ than Economic Journal, 6(2), July. Saxena, K. S. 1972. Political Awakening in Rajasthan (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co.). Saxena, Malti. 1975. Impact o f British Sovereignty on the Economic Conditions o f Rajasthan (Jaipur: Research Publications in Social Science). Sharma, G. N. 1951. Mewar and the Mughal Emperors (Agra). ------------. 1970. Rajasthan Studies (Agra: Laxmi Narain Agrawal). Sharma, Ghanshyam. 1978. Rajput Polity (New Delhi: Manohar Publications). Sharma, M. L. 1971. Rajasthan (New Delhi: Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India). Sharma, S. R. 1951. Mughal Government and Administration (Bombay). Singh, Dool. 1964. Land Reforms in Rajasthan (New Delhi: Research Programme Committee, Planning Commission). Singh, Yogendra. 1973. Modernization o f Indian Tradition (Delhi: Thompson Press). Sinha, V. M. 1967. ‘Governor’s Invitation to Form the Government: The Rajasthan Case*, Political Science Review, 6(1), January-March. Sisson, Richard. 1972. The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California Press). Timberg, Thomas A. 1980. The Marwaris (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House). Tod, James. 1920. Annals and Antiquities o f Rajasthan, 2 vols. (London). Varma, S. P., Bhambhri, C. P. and Mathur, P. C. (eds.) 1965. A Report on the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

58

NARA1N and MATH U R

T hird G eneral Election (Jaipur: Department of Political Science, University of

Rajasthan). Vashistha, V. K. 1968. ‘British Policy towards the Proscribed Thakurs of Rajputana during the Hegemony of East India Company’, Proceedings o f the Rajasthan H istory Congress (Jaipur). ----------- . 1970. T od’s Role as Political Agents in States of Rajputana’, The Proceedings o f the Rajasthan H istory Congress (Bikaner).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

CASTE SENTIMENTS, CLASS FORMATION AND DOMINANCE IN GUJARAT G H A N SH Y A M SHAH

This chapter examines the nature of political dominance in Gujarat in the context of caste mobilization and class differentiation during the colonial and the post-Independence periods. Some conceptual clarifications are necessary at the beginning of this analysis. The term ‘economic stratum', although easy to operationalize, does not signify the same meaning as does the term ‘class’, which connotes the social relationships determined by the mode of production. Class also has a subjective dimension for its members: it influences value judgements as well as social behaviour. Moreover, the notion of conflict is implicit in the term class, whereas stratum is a descriptive category and does not help us much in understanding the dynamics of socio-economic change. I use the term class with all its limitations, which has the same meaning as, and in certain contexts, something more than, economic stratum. One faces similar difficulties in using the term caste. Hierarchy, endogamy, or marriage circle and social commensality together form the main principles of caste. It is relatively easy to identify caste groups, the members of which are bound together by roti and beti vyavahar, at a village level. Their status in the village social hierarchy can also be identified. However, not all castes are endogamous. Sometimes the levels of hypergamy are so many that one finds it difficult to decide where one caste ends and the other begins. The difficulties are also enormous when one attempts analysis at the level of the state as a whole. Those who claim to be members of the same caste but reside in different parts of the state, do not enjoy the same social status in the different villages in which they reside. They also do not necessarily share the same social customs, occupation and lifestyle. In fact, from the point of view of social characteristics, they may be closer to the members of other caste groups of the same locality than to those of their caste members living in different areas. The problem is resolved here by focusing on the political dimensions of caste, rather than on its social characteristics. The political dimensions imply that the members identify themselves as belonging to one caste and share the same nomenclature of caste as against the members of other castes for purposes

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

GHANSHYAM SHAH

60

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

61

of political action. In some cases they may even invent a new name to encompass various caste groups. I use the term ‘caste sentiments’ to indicate the subjective sense of caste members (caste for itself)* who feel a sense of ‘we-ness’ as against the members of other castes. This sense of identity may be based on a real, or an imaginary, common historical heritage. It retains the connotation of ‘status’ involving the principles of purity and pollution, which has however become less relevant in recent years (G. Shah, 1984). The main themes of this chapter’s exploration of politico-economic dotninance in Gujarat are that economic differentiation tends to develop classes within castes; caste ideology or a sense of the same social status of the members based on the principle of pollution and purity, attempts to blur the differentiations and to invoke a sense of common (or shared) identity among the members. The dominant political elite of each caste by and large come from, or have the support of, the upper economic strata. In * order to gain the support of caste members in the political sphere, the elite appeal to caste sentiments and invoke caste consciousness so that harmony among the members is maintained despite economic differentiation. The questions that we ask are the following. What is the nature of the alliances among castes and classes: are alliances formed to maintain or challenge political and economic dominance? Are these alliances ad hoc so that they get reshuffled from issue to issue: or are they stabilized in new organizational structures? Has the politico-economic dominance of the upper caste-class become stronger or weaker under capitalist economic development and a competitive polity? What efforts have the lower exploited castes-classes made to challenge the dominance of the upper propertied castes-classes? What pattern of politico-economic dominance is emerging in contemporary Gujarat? Gujarat: The Background The present state of Gujarat in western India came into existence in 1960, as a result of the bifurcation of the erstwhile Bombay state. The extent as well as the limits of Gujarat as a political territory have changed from time to time under different kingdoms, but the entire region was never ruled as a separate unit by a single political authority during the last several centuries. The state may be broadly divided into two sub-regions on the basis of its historical and sodo-cultural heritage as well as its physiological features. One is mainland Gujarat and the other peninsular Gujarat. Mainland Gujarat consists of twelve districts: a large part of this region, except north Gujarat, Gaekwad state in central and south Gujarat, and a few principalities in the hilly region in the eastern border, was ruled by the British before Independence. It was a part of Bombay Presidency, and after Independence, till 1960, the region was part of Bombay State. Peninsular Gujarat consists of Kathiavad, known as Saurashtra and the Kutch area. Prior to 1948, Kutch was a princely state and Saurashtra was

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

62

G H AN SH Y A M SHAH

fragmented into as many as 499 politico-administrative units which included states, estates and jagirs (see Map 1). In a number of cases, the territories of the states were not contiguous but were scattered and interspersed with wide areas under other rulers. For example, the Salute States of Nawanagar, Gondal and Junagadh had nine, eighteen and twenty-eight separate islands of territories respectively. Thus the 449 units divided Saurashtra into 860 different areas. All these areas were integrated into the Indian union in 1948. They formed a separate ‘B’ state called Saurashtra. Kutch was a centrally administered 4C’ state.1As a result of the reorganization of the states, along with mainland Gujarat, Saurashtra and Kutch became a part of the Bombay state in 1956. Gujarat has 6 per cent of the total area of the Indian Union, with an area of 195,986 square kilometres. According to the 1981 Census, the total population of the state was 33.% millions. There are 255 towns and other urban agglomerations. Thirty-one per cent of its population, as against 23.7 per cent of the total Indian population, live in urban areas. It also has a higher rate of literacy (43.75 per cent) than that of India as a whole (36.17 per cent). The per capita income of Gujarat was Rs 1623 as compared to India's per capita income of Rs 1267 in 1979-80 at current prices. Caste Structure In Gujarat, there are many sub-sub divisions in each caste, and it is often difficult to distinguish between the main caste and the units or sub­ divisions. Sometimes castes are divided in such a way that the total number of divisions is high, but some of the divisions are very small, confined to a few families. Caste enumeration from the census data is not available for the last fifty years, and in order to delineate a broad pattern, we have to depend upon the 1931 Census. Brahmans, vanias and Rajputs—together 12 per cent of the total population—belong to the upper castes. The brahmans form 4 per cent and the vanias 3 per cent of the population: there are about 80 main divisions among the brahmans and 40 among the vanias. (This includes the vanias who follow Jainism.) Many of the divisions of each caste are further divided into two or three sub-castes. Brahmans and vanias are spread throughout the state. Traditionally, vanias were merchants and moneylend­ ers: a large number are still engaged in these occupations. Some are whitecollar employees and a few are cultivators. Brahmans, besides following their traditional occupations as priests, are found in white-collar jobs. A few of them are also in business and agriculture. Unlike other parts of the country, in Gujarat vanias have overshadowed brahmans in economic and political arenas for several centuries. 1 The First Schedule of the 1950 Indian Constitution classified the units of the Indian Union into four categories namely A. B. C and D. Under Part A were included the former British Indian provinces; part B included bigger princely states or the union of such states; parts C and D were centrally administered states, through the President.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentiments and Class Formation in Gujarat

63

Table 1

Distribution o f Castes (1931 Census) Caste

Total

Percentage

Upper Caste brahman vania Rajput Others Middle Caste patidars artisan mali bhat, barot kharva koli bharwad machhi bhoi Others Lower Caste Depressed and untouchables Other backward castes Others Aboriginals Muslims Christians Parsis Others Total

289,7% 208,739 345,727 80,321

4.06 2.% 4.85 1.13

868,030 437,762 8,669 23,549 13,792 1,729,039 143,477 39,382 26,992 309,670

12.16 6.13 .12 .33 '.19 24.22 2.01 .55 .38 4.34

511,866 161,381

7.17 2.26

1,260,374 609,304 52,940 15,086 3,283

17.65 8.53 .74 .21 .05

7,139,179

100.00

Literally, Rajput means son of a ruler. Members of the caste belong to, or are related to, the ruling families who enjoyed political power at one time or other in the past. Unlike the brahmans and the vanias, the Rajputs are not endogamous. The Rajput hierarchy had many levels below the level of the royal families of the large and powerful kingdoms: ruling lineages of the smaller and less powerful kingdoms; lineages of owners of large and small ‘fiefs* variously called jagir , giras, thakarat, thikana, taluka and wanta; lineages of substantial landowners under various land tenures having special rights and privileges; and lineages of small landowners. (A. M. Shah, 1982: 10-11).

Rajput kingdoms and privileged tenures were abolished after Independ­ ence. Although a majority of Rajputs are now landholders, some are in white-collar jobs and a few are in business. Paddars used to be known as kanbis, a name they are still known by in some parts of Saurashtra and north Gujarat. The change of name is a result of a marked improvement in their status:

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

64

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Whereas other castes are by tradition associated with relative ease with one of the four varnas of classical literature, when we come to the Kanbi we are immediately faced with claim and counter-claim. Those brahm ans who have had no dealings with them and are not therefore dependent on their goodwill have categorized them as sudras. They themselves in the past and still today make varying claims now to kshatriya and now to vaishya status (Pocock, 1972: 56).

The patidars constitute around 12 per cent of the population. The main divisions among them are the leuva, kadva, anjana and matiya. Each of them is further divided into several branches: there are 52 divisions of the kadva patidar. Each division had its panch, that is, caste council and cus­ toms for social commensality. With the exception of the leuvas, they form endogamous marriage circles consisting of a cluster of villages called ekada. The patidars are the second largest caste in the state, and are somewhat unevenly dispersed with the lowest concentrations in south Gujarat. In addition to agriculture, patidars are also entering business and industry, and taking to white-collar jobs. Among the migrants from Gujarat to Africa, Europe and America, patidars form the largest single group.' All patidars do not enjoy the same status: the leuva patidars of the Charottar area—Anand, Borsad, Nadiad and Petlad taluks of Kheda district—enjoy the highest status among the patidars. The kolis, spread throughout the state, form the largest caste cluster in Gujarat, constituting around 24 per cent of the population. Today some of them call themselves kshatriyas in central and north Gujarat, and patels in south Gujarat. On the whole, however, the kolis of south Gujarat prefer to be called kolis. Broadly, the kolis are divided into coastal kolis and mainland kolis. The main social divisions among them are not clear-cut endogamous groups. The kolis are cultivators—small and big landowners—farm labourers, fishermen and sailors. In the past, a few principalities in north Gujarat and Panch Mahals were ruled by koli chieftains. Scheduled Castes or ex-untouchables constitute 7 per cent of the population. They are spread throughout the state. Besides being small and marginal farmers and landless farm labourers, they carry out traditional functions such as sweeping the streets, carrying carcasses and weaving. In urban areas, many of them are factory workers and white-collar employees. They are divided into several social groups such as chamar, bhangl, shenama, venkar, mahyavanshi, garoda and dhed. Like other castes they are further divided for marital purposes. Unlike the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, who constitute 14 per cent of the population of the state (according to the 1981 Census), are concentrated in a few districts of eastern and south Gujarat. The majority of them are small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers. According to the 1981 Census, only 7.3 per cent of them live in urban areas. A large number are casual workers and a few are employed in factory and white-collar jobs. The Muslims form 8 per cent of the population. Like the Hindus, they

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

65

are also divided into several social groups such as the sayads, the shaikhs, the pathans, the mughalSy the memanSy the boharas, and the khojas. Spread all over the state, they are cultivators, petty traders and industrial workers. The Parsis are refugees from Persia, settled in south Gujarat since the eighth century. They constitute less than half a per cent of the population. They are agriculturists or businessmen, and a large number of them began migrating to Bombay in the early nineteenth century. The Colonial Period The British established their rule in large areas of Gujarat during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, even though their connection with the region had begun as early as 1608. They captured Surat, an important town of Gujarat, in 1759, and thereby acquired territorial footing in the region. Gujarat was then ruled by Muslim nawabs, Marathas and a number of local chieftains. The nawabs, for the most part, were semi-independent from the Mughal Emperor in Delhi. The Marathas enjoyed paramountcy over Gujarat between 1752 and 1818, though they did not rule the whole state directly. Rajput principalities mainly in Saurashtra and Kutch, recognized the paramountcy either of the Mughals or the Marathas—whichever could extract tribute from them. Neither the Marathas nor the Mughals inter­ fered in the internal administration of the villages over which they had direct authority or which were ruled by the Rajput and the koli chieftains. They were solely concerned with land revenue or tribute which they used to collect through the rulers, or the brahman, kanbi .and paddar landlords. Of the Rajput chiefs, Colonel Walker wrote in the early nineteenth century: The power of life and death, and the administration of justice within their respective villages, are possessed by all, and it was never thought necessary to make reference to the authority of the superior government residing at the Kushah of the pergunnah (or principal town of the district) in order to obtain leave for the punishment or to avert the effects of having punished a criminal or disobedient ryot. And also, in the event of a crime against government being committed, it was usual to demand of the grassia whose ryot might have committed the act, that he should take the necessary measures for punishing the same. . . It is generally admitted that the payment of a tribute does not deprive the tributory of his independence. (Forbes, 1973: 570).

On the eve of British rule, the Rajputs held political power over nearly half the area of Gujarat. Competition for seizing territory among them was sharp, which resulted in frequent wars among the Rajput rulers. Internal quarrels and family feuds over political power were a fairly common feature of most of the states. Some Rajputs received a number of villages for rendering military services, and some added to the territory under their jurisdiction by forcibly seizing areas. Forbes noted, ‘where no central government existed, and where public and domestic war continually raged around them, the cadets, such especially of them as were themselves “good Rajpoots” , frequently found opportunity for increasing their inheritance at

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

66

GHANSHYAM SHAH

the point of the sword’ (1973: 567). By increasing their land and their authority, some Rajputs acquired enough power to enable them to break away from the parent state and become independent. Colonel Walker found during his settlements (1804-7) that many small chiefs and even many b h a y a ts had full control over their villages. Land was considered the property of the rulers. They received tribute from the k a n b is and the k o lis who cultivated it. The amount of tribute varied and was often a sum arbitrarily decided on by the landholders. Besides the share in crops, the rulers used to levy several taxes on the cultivators whenever the former needed money for social or administrative purposes. Sometimes the Rajput or the k o li chieftains plundered the villages and robbed the cultivators of their farm produce and cattle. In order to collect revenue regularly and to increase its rate, the British administration found it necessary to establish law and order. As a result, priority was given to the elimination of predatory activities which hampered commercial transactions. Colonel Alexander Walker enforced a permanent settlement on the local rulers of Saurashtra and Kutch with a view to stabilizing the collection of tribute. He dealt with small proprietors who had freed themselves from the control of their overlords as separate tributaries. Others were treated as g ira sia s subordinate to one or the other of the principal chiefs, and were included in the tribute arrangements made with their lords. Thus the position of each of the g ira sia s , small proprietors and rulers was defined and fixed in the hierarchy. The Rajasthani court was established in 1873 to settle differences between the chiefs and their subordinate g ira sia s. This minimized family feuds and the frequent battles among Rajput rulers. This settlement effectively ended the incursion of the tax gathering m idukgiri armies, fixed the rulers from whom responsible conduct would be expected and enforced, and bound them by treaty and oath from attacking one another. It fixed the jurisdictional boundaries of the internal authorities. In short, it fixed the responsibilities for law and order on specific local rulers and, by recognizing them, validated their claims to specific land. (Spodek, 1976: 37).

Like the rulers of Saurashtra, the g ira sia s of the m e w a si villages2 of the Presidency were harassing their subjects, seizing land under one pretext or another, and collecting all kinds of taxes. They often supported bandits against the neighbouring states. The Court of Directors wrote in 1810: ‘It is not to be tolerated that a sovereign, let him be prince or gracia {g ira sia s ), should protect bands of freebooters, upon the pretence of their being his subjects, or that he should convert this State into one asylum of robbers and assassins’ (Choksey, 1958: 67). The British rulers ultimately extracted a written assurance from the g ira sia s that they would abide by the 2 The Mughal administration classified villages into two categories: (1) rasti (peaceful or loyal) and (2) mewasi (turbulent). The rulers of the latter, mainly Rajputs or kolis, asserted their independence from any higher authority, and paid revenue only when forced to do so.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

67

law of the land. This restriction reduced the political authority of the girasias , who were also prohibited from collecting taxes from the villagers directly. Instead, the government collected revenue from the cultivators: the girasias were assured of their annual payment as a proportion of the revenue claim on the villages from the government treasury, on condition of good behaviour. Their other demands on the villages were rejected ‘out of hand as illegal and unsubstantiated’ (Bates, 1981: 774). This policy had considerable effect in reducing the status of the girasias and in encouraging a new class of cultivators. Collector Lely of Ahmedabad wrote: Since 1814 the relations between proprietors and tenants have greatly changed. I have heard (1878) an old Girasia complain bitterly of his loss of position. . . Formerly if a Kanbi, or even a Vania, trimmed his whiskers or tied his turban in martial Rajput fashion, or if he wore an ankle ring or a sword he would have had his clothes pretty soon tom off his back and himself probably well kicked. Now one does not know a Vaghri from a Kanbi, or a Kanbi from a Sipahi, and a Dhed may twist his mostachios and swagger about with the sword of a Girasia (A h m ed a b a d G azetteer , 1879: 151).

In the pre-colonial period, merchants were organized in m ahajans or business guilds, and their head in each town was known as the nagarsheth. They enjoyed the political leverage which came from financing the rulers in their needs. They did not hesitate to support any ruler, whether he was a Rajput, a Muslim or a Maratha, as long as their business interests were protected. During the fourteenth century, vania merchants supported Turkish rulers when they found Rajput rulers unable to protect their business interests. S. C. Mishra noted, ‘Evidently, the Turkish rulers were able to establish cordial relations with the influential Jain community even while the struggle with the Rajputs was still on. In fact, the initiative was taken by the Jains themselves and the Turks had merely to respond, to meet half-way, an open invitation’ (1963: 70). This autonomy of the merchant community was again illustrated in their dealings with the Portuguese in the seventeenth century. Pearson observed, At the end of 1614 the Gujarat merchants, who had suffered from the usual Portuguese raids in the Gulf of Cambay, acted independently to try to get peace. They offered to pay to Jahangir the value of the goods seized by the Portuguese, hoping that thus the dispute could be forgotten and they could resume trade. Peace was finally concluded in 1615, and was quickly ratified by the Portuguese viceroy. As far as the Gujarati merchants were concerned, this was enough. Jahangir, in fact, never ratified the treaty, but the merchants started trade at once, and with enthusiasm. (1970: 120).

They also provided the British with political services in the early seventeenth century, acting as intermediaries between the native princes and the European traders. Their main concern was that they should be able to carry out their business with a minimum of obstruction: they asserted

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

68

GHANSHYAM SHAH

their power and resorted to collective action against the authorities only when their interests were at stake. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the economic condition of Gujarat deteriorated. Foreign exports of textiles and indigo, in which vanias were engaged, declined. The industries which flourished under the Mughal regime gradually faded under the Marathas.3 Political strife and dislocation set in with the fall of the Muslim power: under the Marathas, disorder grew apace. In fact, in many cases the local administration itself engaged in predatory activities. Though some of the big merchants kept personal armies to protect their businesses, they lived in a constant state of tension. The internal strife among the merchants, and the means used to deal with competitors, aggravated the situation. Ashin Das Gupta (1975) observed that in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Surat (which was a prosperous city in the seventeenth century) was struggling for its existence; and by the early nineteenth century, it had lost its commercial importance. The vania and the Muslim merchants found it difficult to compete with European traders in sea trade. Consequently, their dominant position suffered. Slowly, they improved their share of internal trade as under British rule the political system stabilized, and the infrastructure— railways and roads linking rural areas with the urban market—developed. A section of the vanias and Parsis gradually immigrated to Bombay from the end of the seventeenth century. They collaborated with the British in various spheres such as export of opium, credit and ship building, in the first half of the nineteenth century (Pavlov, 1979: 335). They welcomed British rule which provided them with the secure conditions essential to the pursuit of their trade. In Bombay, they brought raw cotton from Gujarat for export to China, and cotton piece-goods from Gujarat to be sent to Arabia and the Persian Gulf. They were also shroffs and brokers (Dobbin, 1972). A Parsi, Kavasji Devar, in 1854, collaborated with vania merchants to establish the first textile mill on the joint-stock principle in Bombay. During this period, the weaving industry in Ahmedabad began to produce machine made yam and introduced innovations in production methods. In the 1840s, under the guidance of British officers, vania merchants of Surat planned to start a textile mill which however did not materialize. Shortly after, in 1850, the British planter, James Landon, set up two steam engines for cleaning and pressing cotton in Bharuch: after five years, he also established a cotton spinning mill (Mehta, 1982). By this time, Ranchhodlal, a nagar brahman and an ex-govemment servant, was contemplating establishing a textile mill in Ahmedabad. With the guidance of British officers and the financial support of vania bankers, 3. ‘Under the Marathas (1755-1817) the silk, taxed as it passed through each process, and again taxed when raw, taxed when ready for sale was so weighted . . . that its manufacture ceased to pay and almost died out’, Ahmedabad Gazetteer, 1879: 135.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

69

Ranchhodlal started the first textile mill in 1861. The second textile mill was started by Bechardas Laskari, a kanbi patidar whose father was a banker. After 1818 the kanbi, khatri and Muslim weavers of central and north Gujarat began immigrating to Ahmedabad. ‘With the revival of the indigenous weaving industry, the kanbis began to gain in prosperity and some of them took to trading and moneylending.* (Mehta, 1982: 10). Vanias (Jains and Hindus), who entered the textile industry by the late 1860s, however, dominated it. Of the twenty-six textile units in 1898, vanias controlled twenty-two, brahmans two and patidars and Parsis one each. In order to maintain unity among the millowners and protect their interests against the government and the workers, the millowners formed the Ahmedabad Millowners Association (AMA) in 1891. In 1899, the textile industry in Ahmedabad employed arouitd 16,000 workers—dheds, vankars, kanbis, khatris and Muslims, mainly from the neighbouring area of Ahmedabad. In 1888 the average wages of mill workers in Ahmedabad were 7-10 rupees a month, as against 3-3V£ annas a day (or 5 rupees a month) for common labourers. They were paid by the piece. Compensation for injury was slight, when given at all, and medical care was occasionally provided in the form of a first-aid-box. . . the workers were heavily in debt. . . The housing of the workers, at first in huts, then in squalid chawls (blocks of single-room tenements with common facilities) was generally deplorable. (Gillion, 1968: 103) There were a few instances, particularly in the 1890s, of confrontation between the workers and the management. In 1891, women workers demanded shorter work hours. In 1895, about 8000 workers went on strike demanding weekly rather than fortnightly wages. The strike continued without success for eight days. ‘In subsequent years there were strikes in individual mills, generally over wages, but no serious trouble until the later years of the First World War*. (Gillion, 1968: 156). The vania merchants, who dominated trade in urban Gujarat, also had links with the countryside. They collected and marketed the produce of the peasantry and the artisans, particularly the weavers. Along with the brahmans and Rajputs they had also enjoyed a predominant position in local administration before Maratha rule. The desais or the heads of the parganas (sub-district), created by the Mughals for the purpose of land revenue collection, were recruited from these castes. T h e. Marathas however, at some places, appointed influential kanbis, instead of brah­ mans and vanias, to collect revenue. This elevated the position of the kanbis and brought them so-called patidar-rights. Under the arrangement, the kanbis as a group were made responsible for the payment of a previously fixed amount of land-taxes for a specific village. Each member of the group, who had a part or pati, was called .a-patidar. However, in south Gujarat, the anavil brahmans continued to hold the posts of desais throughout the Maratha period, and in fact improved their economic and political position. Their share of the taxes collected from the cultivators

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

70

GHANSHYAM SHAH

was their main source of income. In addition to being revenue officers, they were also police officers, and enjoyed almost absolute power over the people. In central Gujarat, it was the kanbis who gradually rose to a position of dominance during the Maratha period. They acted as middlemen between the government and the cultivators, collecting land revenue from the latter. As revenue collectors, they enjoyed political power and exacted the most ingenious and crushing taxes from the peasants. Their influence increased with the growth of commercial agriculture. They themselves produced indigo, cotton and tobacco, and became a wealthy cultivating caste by the end of the nineteenth century (A. M. Shah, 1964). As soon as British administration began operating at the district level, the officers encountered the almost omnipotent position of the kanbi and anavii desais in central and south Gujarat respectively. They realized that the desais were swindling the Company of large sums of revenue. In 1812, the collectors of the various districts reported that the traditional officers, i.e., the desais, were not co-operating with them in obtaining information on resources. The British therefore decided to introduce a uniform administrative system in all the districts of the Presidency under the ‘direct management* of the Europeans (Rabitoy, 1975). They appointed paid talatis or revenue officers in the villages and began registration of all alienated land. The wealthy and ‘respectable* cultivators in villages were thus encouraged to cultivate waste lands directly under the collector. This affected the very basis of the power and wealth of the desais and majumdars belonging to the patidar and the brahman castes. The desais of Nadiad, in Kheda district, resisted the government's attempts to register all alienated lands in that pargana, and tried to mobilize the kanbi paddars to oppose the government policy. The patidar leaders of different villages resolved to refuse to enter into revenue contracts with the British as long as the new talati system operated. They also decided to ostracize anyone who broke this resolution. But the leaders did not receive the support of the patidar peasantry, probably because the new government policy adversely affected only a handful of paddars; and these had prospered at the cost of other patidar cultivators. In fact, the peasants were chafing under the autocratic rule of the desais and talukadars—whether they were paddars, brahmans or Rajputs. The cultivators therefore ‘welcomed the new controls of the bureaucratic order’ (Hardiman, 1981: 16). Despite the efforts of the British administration, it proved impossible to establish uniform machinery throughout the Presidency to collect revenue directly from the cultivators. For instance, in the Surat collectorship, the majumdars continued to perform their duties and the desais were completely superseded, while in Kheda both officers continued to play their traditional roles, subject to greater checks by the collector (Rabitoy, 1975). Until the 1860s, at several places the government depended upon local moneylenders, landlords and rich peasants to collect

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

71

revenue from the landholders. Consequently, many of the rich patidars who held the position of desais during the nineteenth century, continued to possess large estates. The situation was similar in the Gaekwad territory located in mainland Gujarat. On the whole, however, the condition of the anavil desais gradually deteriorated: many of them were deprived of their principal source of income. Moreover, as they retained their habits of indolence, ‘leaving the actual work for the most part to their dependents, and refusing to lower the scale of their expenditure many of them (were) said to have sunk into a position of extreme indebtedness* (quoted by van der Veen, 1972:11). On the other hand, the middle and rich patidar peasants4 were encouraged to take up plots in what were relatively backward areas at the time. These enterprising cultivators pushed the local inhabitants—mainly kolis and tribals—into the jungle or the hills, or converted them into agricultural labourers. The great famine of 1899, known as the chhapaniyo dukar made the condition of koli and tribal fanners desperate. They sold their land at throwaway prices to the kanbis and subsequently worked as labourers. The kanbis of Kheda extended their landholdings in the district, and in Sabar Kantha and Banas Kantha districts; the kanbis of Surat ac­ quired land in the tribal area of Bharuch district. Thus their estates ex­ panded and their prosperity increased, occasionally leading to conflict be­ tween the patidar landholders and koli or baraiya labourers. David Hardiman notes: Within a decade, the northern part of Kheda changed from being an area of poor low caste subsistence cultivators to one of large estates with high caste landlords and low caste agricultural labourers. The low castes did not submit without protest; in 1916-17 there were widespread agitations by the Baraiyas of the area against so-called lot-wallahs*. The British threw their support behind the landlords and within a month the movement was crushed and the Baraiyas forced back to labour for their new masters (1981:18). The development of transport facilities and the improved law and order situation encouraged the cultivators to link agriculture with the market and sell their product at a profit. Moreover, the American Civil War between 1860 and 1865 boosted the prosperity of the wealthy patidar cultivators as the price of cotton shot up. Though the boom period ended in 1865, trade in cotton continued to meet the requirements of the British textile factories in England. Besides cotton, tobacco and groundnut cultivation increased, replacing food crops. Before 1860 the food crops played a more important part in the agricultural economy of Gujarat than at the end of the British rule. The area under commercial crops, viz., cotton and tobacco grew steadily especially the former, 4 I use the term ‘middle* and ‘rich* peasant in a relative sense to indicate that the middle peasants do not own large holdings. At the same time, they do not hire out labour though they work on their farms. lik e big lamfoolders, they employ labourers.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

72

GHANSHYAM SHAH

at the expense of the food-crop. Cotton displaced rice and jowar. The percentage of net cropped area under food crops had fallen to 54 per cent and the area under non-food crops had risen to 45 per cent (Chokse, 1958: 87-8). The market oriented agriculture helped the patidars, particularly those in central Gujarat, to improve their economic condition. The patidars not only made a dent in trade and industry; their rise in the field of education was striking. Thirty-five per cent of the brahmans and 44 per cent of the vanias as against only one per cent each of the kolis and kanbis were literate in 1901. Two kolis and thirty kanbis, against 3306 vanias out of a one lakh sample were literate in English. By contrast, only thirty years later, in 1931,31 per cent of kanbis were literate (Census o f India: Bombay Presidency, 1931. Government Press, 1931). In Saurashtra, however, the condition of the kanbis did not change substantially under British paramountcy. Except for a few states such as Gondal, Bhavnagar, Junagadh and Jamnagar, the tillers did not acquire permanent occupancy rights to the land and land revenue for the most part was collected in kind until Independence (Spodek, 1976). The Nationalist Movement With a measure of tranquillity in the state, educational activities flourished. The British established the Bombay Education Society in 1815 to manage the Christian school started by missionaries to educate the children of European officers serving in the East India Company. The government appointed a Committee in 1820 to prepare text books in native languages. On the Committee’s recommendation, the Native School Book and School Society came into existence in 1823, renamed the Bombay Native Education Society in 1827. This society began a school in both Surat and Bharuch districts. By 1841, twenty-seven schools were opened in different districts of Gujarat, with an enrolment of 1469 pupils. The number of schools increased to 733 with 47,781 students (44,085 boys and 3,696 girls) during 1867-8. Elphinstone College in Bombay was established in 1827 for higher education; the Gujarat College in Ahmedabad in 1882. Bombay, however, remained the centre of intellectual activity till the end of the nineteenth century. The students of Elphinstone College organized the Gujarati Gyan Prasark Mandali (Society for the Spread of Knowledge) in 1849. Another institution called the Buddhi Vardhak (enhancing intelligence) was founded outside the college. Almost simultaneously, the Gujarat Vernacular Society (GVS) was established in Ahmedabad in 1848 due to the efforts of the British officer, Forbes. The GVS opened schools in Gujarat and also provided a platform to urban educated Gujaratis for an exchange of views. The first Gujarati newspaper Mumbai Samachar started publishing from Bombay, and by the 1860s, about ten journals and four dailies were published from various cities including Surat, Broach, Ahmedabad and Rajkot. Soon after, some

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentiments and Class Formation in Gujarat

73

brahman and vania leaders protested against certain social customs of their castes such as child marriage, restrictions on widow-marriage, the pitiable condition of widows, and restrictions on foreign travel. They organized meetings and published journals to propagate the need for social reforms (Parekh, 1976). With the spread of education and the beginning of the social reform movement, urban upper castes expressed their grievances on a variety of issues such as the decline of handicrafts in competition against machinemade products, the land revenue system, and taxation levies in urban areas (Parikh, 1965). The press was a convenient medium for criticizing the government. TTie Gujarat Sabha, established in 1884, collected petitions and forwarded them to the authorities concerned for remedies. By the beginning of this century, a small group emerged around the Gujarat Sabha, which protested against malpractices in administration. There was also a coterie of extremists who advocated direct terrorist activities against the British government. Gujarat hosted two Con­ gress sessions in the first decade o f this century, the first in 1902 in Ahmedabad, and the second in 1906 in Surat. The political leaders, active in these various groups, belonged mainly to the brahman and vania castes; a very small number were patidars. They were urban based, and did not enjoy much mass support. By and large, Bombay remained the centre of political activities till Gandhi established his ashram in Ahmedabad in 1915. Although by the beginnipg o f this century, the economic condition of the farmers—particularly those belonging to the upper strata—had improved, prices of essential commodities increased sharply between 1914 and 1917. In order to win over the peasants, Gandhi took up their issues related to land revenue collections and harassment of farmers by the administration. The first Political Conference held at Godhra in 1917 passed resolutions condemning abuses in the land revenue administration. One of the resolutions observed: Farmers without adequate means are put on extreme hardships because of the general practice of collecting revenue dues in one instalment instead of two and are obliged to sell their means of livelihood to pay the dues. This Conference therefore requests the government to see that the revenue dues are always collected in two instalments and to fix the time for the collection of instalments with due regard to the crop situation. (Gandhi, 1965: 70). In order to mobilize the peasants for nationalist activities, Congress workers moved into the villages, and wherever possible, party units were formed at village and taluka levels. On Gandhi’s advice, some of the workers settled in rural areas to carry out 'constructive’ programmes. They launched welfare activities among the tribals and Harijans, and opened nationalist schools. The Congress organized several satyagrahas, such as those in Kheda, Borsad, Bardoli, Dandi, and individual civil disobedience. They took up issues against increased land revenue, taxes on essential

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

74

GHANSHYAM SHAH

commodities, and punitive police taxes. The first satyagraha, which was launched in Kheda district in 1918, did not mobilize a large section of the peasantry: only 70 out of 510 villages refused to pay revenue. Two and a half months later, the satyagraha petered out with neither side gaining an obvious victory’ (Hardiman, 1981: 100). But the momentum gradually increased. The Bardoli satyagraha of 1928 paralysed the administration for two months, compelling the government to yield to the peasants’ demands. Vallabhbhai Patel, who served his apprenticeship in Kheda, emerged as the sardar, i.e., the leader, in Bardoli. Although both Gandhi and Patel believed in the caste system, they did not use caste structure and ideology in mobilizing the peasants in the first Kheda satyagraha. Yet, within a couple of years, they started to appeal to caste sentiments for purposes of political mobilization. For instance, Gandhi exhorted the vanias in 1920 to do their duty as good Vaishnavites in boycotting the courts and schools run by the British government which was akin to ravanraj. He asked: ‘Would a devout “vaishnava” ever send his or her children to the schools of an irreligious government?’ (Hardiman, 1981: 119). Such appeals couched in caste ideology were fully exploited in the Bardoli satyagraha by Vallabhbhai Patel and his associates. Patidar peasants were asked to stop paying land revenue to the government and to ‘raise the prestige of the patidars’. Appealing to the Rajputs in the name of their warrior spirit, Patel said, ‘You must have seen the sword as you are Rajputs. But if you have not seen it and remained cultivators, never mind. But now 1 want you to behave like the Kshatriyas, and you should support the Satyagraha’. (G. Shah, 1974:100). Similarly, brahman leaders attempted to persuade fellow brahmans that by remaining in the fore­ front of the movement they would prove their worth as a caste of the highest status. In the beginning, the nationalist movement in Gujarat was dominated by the brahmans and vanias. In Saurashtra, their dominance continued till Independence. They opposed the oppressive rule of the Rajputs and tried to mobilize the peasantry in rural Saurashtra. But some states prohibited the entry of vanias and brahmans in the villages under their rule: they were also asked to leave the states. In Limdi, the state dismissed its vania employees and stopped their pensions. Their property was looted in a systematic manner. Gandhi wrote in 1939: The heaviest blow has been aimed at the hated Bania, who was at one time the State’s friend, favourite, and the main supporter. But he was to be crushed because he dared to think and talk of responsible government, dared to go amongst the peasantry and tell them what was due to them and how they could get it. (Quoted by Spodek, 1976: 58) In mainland Gujarat, as the nationalist movement spread to rural areas, kanbi patidars assumed a dominant position under the leadership of Vallabhbhai Patel, who remained the President of the Gujarat Congress

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

75

from 1921 to 1946. They formed the single largest caste group which participated in the Congress party and various satyagrahas. Local level patidar leaders who were supporters of the Congress were persuaded by district and provincial level Congress leaders to call caste panchayats and pass resolutions approving the satyagrahas. For instance, the patidar gob of some villages in Borsad taluka passed a resolution asking caste members to refrain from paying a police-punitive tax, and to support the Borsad satyagraha in 1923. The caste council also fined those members who paid the tax. During the Bardoli satyagraha non-supporters were ostracized by the caste panchayats (G. Shah, 1974). Similarly, during the Civil Disobedi­ ence movement of 1930-1, twenty-one village punches of the patidars of Kheda district passed the following resolution: Resolved that henceforth any member of our panchayat who pays up the land revenue, either out of fear of being beaten or going to prison will be outcaste forever. Likewise anybody who is found creating disunity or a split among our caste panch members will be declared guilty by the panchayat and will be outcaste. Also, anybody keeping any relations with the above mentioned ostracized will be liable to severe punishment (Hardiman, 1918: 217). Such sanctions generally worked most effectively on the poorer strata of patidars. The landlords and some rich patidars did not comply with the caste panchayat directives. For example, rich tobacco farmers of some patidar villages, ignored the caste panchayat resolutions of nine village gob, and paid revenue during the no-revenue-tax campaign of 1930-1 (Hardiman, 1981). Most of the landlord patidars did not abide by caste panchayat resolutions supporting the Civil Disobedience movement. One case involving twenty-one village gob illustrates how intra-caste economic differentiation was manifested and worked in favour of economically dominant strata. The gol consisted of thirteen villages located in British Kheda and eight villages in Baroda state territory. The gol leaders resolved to support the Civil Disobedience movement and decided that any patidar from the gol who paid revenue would be excommunicated by the caste members. Consequently, a meeting of the gol was held to decide action against those who had paid the land revenue. The patidars of Baroda took a firm stand that they could not take the risk involved in the non-payment of their revenue. They threatened to leave the gol rather than to refuse to pay revenue. Eventually, an agreement was reached that Baroda State members need not refuse to pay their revenue (Hardiman, 1981). Thus the patidars who were in the forefront of the nationalist movement between 1917 and 1947, invoked caste sentiments to develop horizontal unity at the level of ideology among patidars of different social status. At the same time, those who were conscious about protecting their economic interests, particularly the landlords and a section of rich peasants, did not obey the directives of the caste. And the caste panchayats—except in a few

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

76

GHANSHYAM SHAH

cases—did not take any action against them. The poor patidar peasants, on the other hand, feared great hardship because of the price rise during 1900 to 1930. Therefore, ‘they had good economic cause to give fervent support to the no-revenue campaigns of that period' (Hardiman, 1981). Along with the patidars, middle peasant kolis from south Gujarat participated in the nationalist movement: some of the villages, almost en bloc, supported the Dandi salt satyagraha in 1930. Fifty-six people from Olpad and Choryasi taluka and ninety-one kolis from Navsari taluka alone courted arrest in the movement during 1930 to 1942. However, the kolis from central and north Gujarat in general, and those from patidar dominated villages in particular, were not as active in the movement as their counterparts in south Gujarat. This was because their rivals and exploiters, rich and middle patidar farmers, controlled the Congress party and the freedom struggle was identified as 'a patidar movement’ (Hardiman, 1981). In urban Gujarat, industrialization, especially the textile industry, slowly advanced along with the nationalist struggle, between 1901 and 1947. The Swadeshi movement of 1904-8 and the Civil Disobedience movement of 1921 and 1932-3 boosted the fortunes of the industry. In Ahmedabad, the number of textile mills rose from twenty-seven to sixty, between 1901 and 1947, and the number of workers from 15,947 to 130,061 respectively. Besides Ahmedabad, textile mills were also estab­ lished in many other towns and cities of Gujarat: the number of mills increased from fifteen to twenty-seven between 1911 and 1950 (Acharya, 1961). Most of the millowners were vanias (both Hindu and Jain). Eighty per cent of the labourers in the textile mills in Ahmedabad were drawn from within 50 miles of the city in 1929. The workers were dheds, venkars, kolis, wagharis, patidars and Muslims. ‘Before about 1923, labour was not plentiful and the jobbers would go to the villages to recruit labour; they would, for instance, enter into contracts with parents of Dhed boys for their services for two or three years’ (Gillion, 1968: 102). The relationship between the workers and employers was not smooth. There were 205 strikes in Ahmedabad between 1917 and 1939. The strikes during 1917 and 1923 were widespread affecting almost all the mills, whereas the strikes after 1923 were largely confined to one or two mills. The period 1917-23 was crucial and formative in influencing the labour-employer relationship in subsequent years. The condition of the workers was quite deplorable: they were required to work for 13 hours a day; the wages in Ahmedabad were lower than those in Bombay. The workers occasionally protested and resorted to strikes against the harsh working conditions and demanded higher wages. The 22-day strike launched in February-March 1918 was the most important strike in the history of the textile industry in Gujarat. Ahmedabad had been engulfed by plague in 1917 and some workers left the city to go back to their villages to avoid infection. But because of the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

T7

First World War, it was a boom period for the industry, and workers, particularly wrappers and weavers, were not available in sufficient numbers; hence factory owners could hardly afford to lose them. The millowners gave plague bonus to the workers to dissuade them from leaving the city. As the plague disappeared in early 1918, the millowners withdrew the bonus and instead increased wages by 20 per cent. The net effect was a substantial loss in wages, which the workers could not afford amid rising prices and scarcity. They demanded a 50 per cent wage increase, causing the millowners to anticipate a large scale strike. One of the industrialists persuaded Gandhi to intervene and prevent the undesir­ able consequences of such a work stoppage. Gandhi felt that ‘Ambalalbhai’s (the industrialist) apprehensions were justified and so he decided to take measures to prevent developments which might endanger the peace of the city of Ahmedabad’ (M. H. Desai, 1940). The Collector of Ahmedabad also pleaded with Gandhi to intervene, and Gandhi persuaded the workers and millowners to settle the matter by arbitration. Although both the parties had agreed to arbitration, workers in a few mills struck work. Thereupon, the millowners took the opportunity and withdrew from the arbitration. They feared that once the workers, particularly wrappers, ‘succeeded in securing their demand for an increase in their wages and for the bonus, their next step would be to get the hours of work substantially reduced, a step which, if accomplished, would put the Ahmedabad mill industry in an unfavourable competing position with Bombay and other textile centres.’ (The Times o f India, 20 March 1918). The millowners declared a lock-out before the workers went on strike. Gandhi actively guided the strikers and successfully persuaded them to ask for a 35 per cent raise in wages instead of 50 per cent. On 11 March, the millowners withdrew the lock-out and expressed their willingness to take back workers who were ‘willing to accept 20 per cent increase’ (Gandhi, 1965: 248). The strike continued, and Gandhi went on a fast on 15 March till a settlement was reached. Urban middle class public opinion was sympathetic to the strike because of Gandhi’s involvement; Gandhi had by that time emerged as the nationalist leader. Moreover, the millowners could ill-afford to close the factories in a book period. On 17 March, they once again accepted arbitration and the strike was withdrawn. Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel and Ansuyaben, a social worker who started reform-work among industrial workers in 1917 and the sister of an industrialist, represented the workers on the Board of Arbitration. The workers’ success boosted their morale, and various sections went on strike, with some indulging in violence. The spurt of strikes and violent disturbances led some Gandhian leaders, who were active among the workers, to form an organization of workers to negotiate effectively with the millowners. Millowners who were sympathetic to Gandhi’s philosophy of maintaining harmony between capital and labour also extended their support to Gandhian workers in forming the Textile

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

78

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Labour Association (TLA), known as the Majur Mahajan, in 1920. The TLA was based on Gandhi's philosophy of collaboration between capital and labour and the method of panch, i.e., arbitration for resolving conflict between the two:5 it was structured as a federation of craft-based unions. Under Gandhi’s influence both the workers and millowners participated in the 1921 Civil Disobedience movement, but unrest among the workers continued and a spurt in strikes occurred during 1921-3 affecting most of the mills. This time the millowners adopted a stiffer attitude and narrowed down their internal differences. Also, the industry was facing an economic crisis, and in December 1922, the Ahmedabad Mill Owners Association (AMA) passed a resolution endorsing a wage cut of 20 per cent, which led the workers to declare a strike. The strike, which continued for three months, fizzled out and the workers had to accept a 15 per cent cut. The AMA leaders asserted that ‘. . . the primary duty of a labour organisation is not so much wild talk of bonuses and profits as inculcating a sense of discipline among its members. . . (a) labour organisation. . . (would) be inimical to our interests because our interests as well as theirs have but one ultimate aim, namely efficient production’ (S. Patel, 1987: 61-2). The millowners had succeeded in controlling the TLA and ensuring that it played the role which the AMA wanted it to play. Sujata Patel concludes that ‘the 1923 strike and defeat had washed away all the perceptible gains that the movement had made during the last five years. . . the millowners took a unilateral decision to stop the yearly bonus, given since 1918, from 1923 onwards, a decision on which TLA did not even register a protest’ (1987, 62). After 1923 the TLA concentrated on social welfare activities among the workers. The workers however continued to support the nationalist movement; the industrialists also supported the nationalist movement, but their support was not constant. They preferred constitution­ al reforms, and during the depression in 1936, they were inclined to collaborate with the colonial government to protect their business interests (S. Patel, 1987). However, the urban middle classes as a whole, whose numbers grew with the expansion of education actively participated in the nationalist movement. The Post-Independence Period The Congress party came to power after Independence in Saurashtra, Kutch and Bombay state of which mainland Gujarat was a part. It ruled the region for nearly three decades except for a few years in the 1970s. From the beginning, the party emphasized the need to develop the industrial as well as agricultural sectors. In the agricultural sector, the government relied on two policy thrusts—institutional changes and s Punch is an old institution known as mahajan or guild. The main function of the panch was to maintain harmony among the various business groups.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

79

technological development. The first aimed at eliminating feudal land relations by abolishing intermediary tenures, and the second related to the development of infrastructure to increase productivity. Soon after Independence, the Congress government initiated the process of territorial integration. By 1948 all the princely states were merged with the Indian union and the rulers were granted privy purses. The rulers of thirty-nine states of Gujarat received privy purses. The amount of the purse varied from Rs 2,560 to Rs 2.5 million per year according to the previous annual revenue collected in the respective states. The integration of states reduced the income as well as the political power of the former rulers. Having merged the states and formed new ones, the government proceeded to bring about changes in traditional land relationships. There were three types of land tenure system in Saurashtra: occupancy, girasdari and barkhali. Land was held by the cultivator directly from the state under occupancy tenure. Except in a few principalities the cultivators did not possess ownership rights in the land. Under the other tenures, there were intermediaries between the cultivators and the states. The girasdars—including the talukadars, the bhagdars, the bhayats, the mulgirasis and the barkhalidars—were among these tenure holders. They were landlords who enjoyed property rights in land and collected their shares of the agricultural product from the cultivators. This system was also prevalent in mainland Gujarat. On the very first day of the formation of Saurashtra state in April 1948, the new government, having displaced the rulers and being dominated by vanias and brahmans granted occupancy rights to the cultivators in unalienated (khalsa) villages without compensa­ tory payment. For the first time, the cultivators received rights to transfer and inherit land. The government also abolished veth and begary i.e., forced labour which girasdars had been extracting from those who cultivated the land. With regard to other tenures, the situation was complex: there were as many as 51,278 girasdars, barkhalidars and other landlords in 1,726 villages. As a first step, the government of Saurashtra promulgated the Saurashtra Protection of Tenants of Agricultural Lands Ordinance in May 1948, which dealt with arbitrary evictions. According to the Ordinance, no landlord could obtain possession of land held by a tenant except under the order of the government; the landlord could terminate tenancy, however, by giving six months* notice in writing expiring on 31 March 1949, stating therein the reasons for such termination and whether the landlord required the land for bonafide personal cultivation. A subsequent Ordinance, called the Saurashtra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Land Ordinance, July 1949, allowed the landlords to take possession of land held by tenants only for personal cultivation. In response, the landlords formed the Girasdar Association and agitated against the Ordinance. They

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

80

GHANSHYAM SHAH

evicted the tenants in the name of self-cultivation, and the Kutch, Kathiawar, Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha (later knwon as the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha), a caste association organized in 1947, supported the cause of the girasdars. On the recommendation of the Agrarian Reforms Commission appoint­ ed by the Government of India, the government of Saurashtra enacted the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951, and the Saurashtra Estate Acquisition Act, 1952. The Acts aimed at abolishing all intermediary tenures and giving occupancy rights to the tillers; they made all landholders equally liable to pay land revenue in cash. These Acts were immediately implemented. As a result, the landlords became cultivators on lands in their direct possession and lost the other parts of their landholdings. According to a sample survey, in 1947-8, only 357 girasdars actually held some land for self-cultivation; the number increased to 3% girasdars, who had gharkhed land in 1954-5. This means that forty-three girasdars, who did not cultivate land themselves prior to the reforms, began cultivating land personally (Mishra, 1961). In effect, some girasdars evicted their tenants and began tilling land themselves: these girasdars included many who had never visited their farms earlier. Moreover, the pattern of landholdings also changed. Table 2, based on a sample survey, lists changes in the number of holdings of all categories between 1947-8 and 1954-5. It shows that the number of holdings in the T able 2

Changes in the Number o f Holdings o f all Categories o f Cultivators between 1947-48 and 1954-55 Period 1954--55

1947--48 Size of Holding (acres) Nil 0-05 5-15 15-25 25-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 100-150 150-200 200 & above So u r c e :

Digitized by

Mishra.

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

129 371 994 965 1207 745 291 123 112 8 12

2.6 7.5 20.0 19.5 24.4 15.0 5.9 2.5 2.2 .2 .2

98 404 1250 1147 1215 573 175 51 33 6 5

2.0 8.1 25.2 23.1 24.5 11.5 3.5 1.0 .7 .2 .1

1961.

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

81

upper category above 40 acres of land declined, and the number increased in the lower category, particularly between 15 and 25 acres. Howard Spodek computed the Gini Index of inequality for Saurashtra and its neighbouring states, and found that Saurashtra, post-land reforms, had ‘one of the most even distributions of landholdings of any regions of India* (1976: 77). The girasdars launched an agitation against the reform: some resorted to dacoity which was responsible for 80 to 85 deaths, and lakhs of rupees were looted in a series of some twelve major crimes between 1949 and 1952. Daniel Thomer (1956: 42-3) observed: If the intermediaries of Saurashtra had had their way, things in the State would have gone much the same as in Rajasthan (where no substantive change took place). Led by the girasdars (a group of specially favoured intermediaries), the landlords of Saurashtra conducted what virtually amounted to a rebellion against the Saurashtra intermediaries* abolition laws. They caused a wide breakdown of law and order, committed many dacoities and murders, and intimidated the potential beneficiaries of the land reforms among the peasantry. Some of the girasdars perhaps dreamed of causing the downfall of the Saurashtra government . . . and restoring the rule of the princes. The girasdars, however, overestimated their strength; when the Government arrested a prince’s brother—who had been associated with India’s most notorious dacoit, Bhupat—and later led him through the streets in chains, the rebellion collapsed. The Bombay state government also passed Acts between 1949 and 1955 abolishing various girasdari tenures which existed in some parts of the state. These Acts conferred occupancy rights on the inferior holders paying assessment, registered occupiers or occupants and permanent holders, without charging occupancy price. Once Rajput and koli talukdars of Gujarat, like their counterparts in Saurashtra, lost land to the tenant cultivators, their power over the villagers declined. Out of compulsion a few of them began cultivating land but they lacked the training and aptitude for agriculture. A Rajput of Ahmedabad district said in the early fifties: It was painful, naturally, because we will not be able to live in the same manner as we have been living so far. So the feelings are hurt . . . (to what extent?). These feelings are such that a man can never forget. (Can you describe them?) Ah! for example, if Kasandra management goes into the hands of others, we cannot have the same power over farmers and others which we had before. And also, the whole group will be unable to maintain the kind of living which we have had so far because of the decrease, the reduction in income. So I feel two things: loss of power and loss of income. (Steed, 1955: 138) Simultaneously, the government enacted comprehensive land legisla­ tion called the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Among other benefits, it gave tenants fixed tenure and protection from eviction. Later the Tenancy and Lands (Amendment) Act of 1956 gave land to the tillers, so that on a particular day (1 April 1957) all tenants were deemed to have come in possession of the land they cultivated as tenants. Unlike the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

82

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Girasdari Abolition Acts of Saurashtra, the Tenancy Acts were not rigorously implemented in Gujarat. This was partly because patidar, vania and brahman landholders, who would have been adversely affected by the Act, dominated the ruling Congress party and administration. At the same time, however, the Act was not totally unsuccessful. M. B. Desai (1971: 123) who carried out a sample survey in sixty-five villages observes: The results of tenancy abolition, however, were not as expected. About half the area previously under tenancy passed into the ownership of their respective erstwhile tenants. About 12 per cent of the land held by nine per cent of the tenants continued under recognised tenancy. A little over two per cent of the lands of tenants slipped from them in default of payment of compensation amounts. The rest were cases in which the tenants either were denied tenancy, surrendered their lands to the landowners or kept away from the hearings of the tribunals and, therefore, missed of their own volition to be owners of the land they cultivated on lease. Thus a sizeable tenantry escaped ownership under tenancy abolition. There is no data to identify the caste of the tenants who became owners. However, two facts should be noted. One, nearly half of the tenants be­ longed to lower castes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (M. B. Desai, 1971). Since they were poor and less exposed to the outside world, they found it difficult to understand the intricacies of law, and to raise their voice against the landowners of the dominant castes. Thus they were more likely than the upper caste cultivators to surrender tenancy. They either did not declare themselves as tenants or did not present themselves before the tribunal to prove their claim. Many of them did not have the confidence that they would be able to pay instalments to the landowners. Second, among the tenants as many as 63 per cent were owner-tenants. Their number was larger among the upper and the intermediate castes than among the lower castes. Status and caste data on the tenants (Table 3) and our own observations suggest that a larger number of tenants belonging to the upper and intermediate castes took advantage of this act. They often obtained land at the expense of members of their own castes who had moved on to urban areas and did not wish to take to cultivation. The tenants belonging to the lower castes rarely got land from the high caste absentee landlords. Concealed tenancy in different forms has continued. In order to provide land to the landless and lessen inequality in the landholding pattern, the government introduced the Land Ceiling Act in 1960. The Act was amended in 1974 which further lowered the limit of the ceiling. But this legislation was not effectively enforced: the government received only 43,721 acres of land. Most of this land was of inferior quality, thereby further weakening the effect of'the law. Thus, although various land reforms led to the redistribution of land to some extent, they did not change land relationships in terms of caste or class.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

83

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat T able 3

Number o f Tenants by Status and Caste Caste Upper Caste Hindu Intermediate Caste Lower Caste Hindu Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe Muslim Christian Parsi Total NOTE: Figures SOURCE: M. B.

Owner-cumTenants

Pure Tenants

Total

84 (66.14) 1428 (72.68) 776 (62.53) 54 (52.22) 363 (46.12) 101 (43.92) 6 (42.86) 3 (50.00) 2853 (62.74)

43 (33.86) 536 (27.32) 465 (37.47) 86 (47.78) 424 (53.88) 129 (56.08) 8 (57.14) 3 (50.00) 1694 (37.26)

127 (100) 1962 (100) 1242 (100) 180 (100) 787 (100) 230 (100) 14 (100) 6 (100) 4547 (100)

in the brackets are percentages to the total across. Desai. 1971.

According to the 1981 Census, 61 per cent of the workers in Gujarat are engaged in agriculture as the principal source of earning; 38 per cent are cultivators and 23 per cent agricultural labourers. By 1970-71 about 60 per cent of the cultivators owned less than three hectares of land (Table 4). On the other hand, 1.35 per cent of households held more than twenty hectares of land. The government identified 130,000 small and marginal farmers in the state by the end of March 1973. In terms of caste, patidars, Rajputs, kolis, Scheduled Tribes and brahmans were the main landowning groups. According to the sample survey carried out by the Centre for Social Studies, Surat, one third of the patidars, and one-fourth of the brahmans and artisans, were rich peasants (Table 5). A majority of the cultivators—kolis, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes—were small and marginal farmers. However, there were proportionately fewer landless labourers among the patidars, the brahmans and the vanias, than among the kolis, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, artisans and the Rajputs. The majority of the vanias, and other upper castes such as brahman-kshatriyas and luhanas were engaged in business. The upper castes (except the Rajputs) also contributed relatively larger numbers to white collar jobs and the professions.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

84

GHANSHYAM SHAH

T able 4

Number o f Operational Holdings and Area Operated by Size Group o f Operational Holdings in Gujarat 1970-71 (Figures in ’OOOs) Size group (hectares)

No. of holdings

Below 0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-4.0 4.0-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0-20.0 20.0-30.0 30.0-40.0 40.0-50.0 50.0 & more

284 295 464 325 229 176 424 201 27 1 1 1 2412

So u r c e :

Per cent share Cumulative in total percentage

Agricultural Census:

11.7 12.1 19.1 13.4 9.4 7.2 17.4 8.3 1.1 0.3 Neg. Neg. 100.0

11.7 23.8 42.9 56.3 65.7 72.9 90.3 98.6 • 99.7 100.0 — — —

Area Per cent share Cumulative (hecin total percentage tares) 79 220 621 802 704 790 2987 2708 621 151 44 122 9999

0.8 2.2 6.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 29.9 27.1 6.2 1.5 0.4 1.2 100.0

0.8 3.0 9.8 17.8 25.8 33.7 63.6 90.7 96.9 98.4 98.8 100.00

1970-71. 1975: 32.

As mentioned earlier, the farmers of Gujarat had been producing commercial crops since at least the seventeenth century. Cotton was then the main cash crop: subsequently, they began cultivation of tobacco and groundnut. Gradually, between 1910 and 1940, the area under food crops declined and the area under non-food crops increased. This process accelerated further during the last decades as infrastructure facilities improved. The irrigated area increased more than four-fold from 1950 to 1981. Canals watered only 3.4 per cent of the irrigated area in 1951-2, which increased to 17 per cent in 1970-1. The number of oil-engines, electric motors and pump-sets and tractors increased four to five-fold during the 1960s and 1970s. The use of various types of chemical fertilizers (NPK) shot up from 17,000 tonnes in 1960-1 to 403,000 tonnes in 1982-3 (Economic Intelligence Service). Credit facilities to the farmers from co-operative societies and banks expanded considerably. The All-India Rural Credit Review Committee pointed out that Gujarat stood second only to Maharashtra in the whole country, in the matter of borrowings by cultivator households from co-operatives, and the propor­ tion of cultivator households which reported borrowings from co-operative societies to total cultivator households. In each district, a District Central Co-operative Bank, and agricultural credit societies were functioning at the village level, or at the level of a group of villages. By the end of June

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Digitized by

Table 5

Occupation, Landholding and Caste in Rural Gujarat Occupation

VjOOQLC Original from

UNIVERSITY OF Ml

O >

TOTAL

Unemployed, Professionals Service Business Agric. A Cultivators Retired other labour Brahman Vania Rajput Other Upper Castes Patidar Artisans KoU Other Backward Castes Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Muslims Others

16 14 7 15 6 8 8 7

2 1 •

7 4 7 17

• # •

1 1 1 • #

—

11 5 2 9 3 3 2 2

3 45 1 31 1 1 •

2 1 2 9

• *

1

9 3

Others

Less than 5 acres

Landholding 5 to 15 15 acres acres and more

N

4 5 15 13 7 36 24 33

52 30 72 26 81 48 62 45

12 — 2 4 1 3 3 12

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

41 55 42 46 25 42 66 43

32 24 35 42 42 33 23 41

27 21 23 12 33 25 11 10

298 114 1963 68 1923 854 3091 1644

39 21 35 38

43 67 44 30

8 5 3 3

100 100 100 100

69 77 36 66

26 21 45 17

5 2 19 17

1692 3272 685 66

* Less than 0.5 per cent. SOURCE: The data vat oolected by me from one hundred vflafn of Gujarat k 1963-4.

86

GHANSHYAM SHAH

1976, 97.4 per cent of the 18,275 villages in Gujarat were covered by the operations of primary agricultural credit societies. With these inputs, the average output of a number of crops increased during the last three decades. At the same time, the average area under foodgrains tended to decline during the period from 1961—2 to 1977-8, from 48.3 lakh hectares to 44.8 lakh hectares, while that under nonfoodgrains increased from 53 lakh hectares to 59.1 lakh hectares. Also, the growth rate in agriculture was not stable: the considerable fluctuation in output both of food and non-food crops in the seventies compared to the sixties was ‘not very encouraging’ (Sharma, 1983). As elsewhere, the economic condition of most of the small and marginal farmers did not improve because they were unable to take advantage of technological development in agriculture. They failed to receive adequate credit and inputs when they needed them. The condition of agricultural labourers also deteriorated and their number increased during the period from 1951 to 1981. Real wages of agricultural labourers and the total period during which they found employment did not increased, forcing them to join the army of unorganized urban labourers or live below subsistence level. Agricultural labourers, by and large, have not organized to assert their interests, although clashes between landowners and labourers are increasing in different parts of the state. Occasionally, agricultural labourers refuse to work and demand higher wages or the use of village common land for house sites, or grazing their cattle and protest against the rape of their women by the landowner. The landed class has responded by employing rakhas or watchmen to protect crops in the fields. In some cases, labourers were not only manhandled and beaten but also murdered, and their huts set on fire. Labourers also retaliated, though many of the clashes were localized and sporadic, continuing for a day or two. A few of the clashes continued for many days and affected a number of villages. For instance, a militant Dalit agricultural labour leader was mercilessly beaten and set on fire by patidar landowning youths in Jetput, a village near Ahmedabad, in December 1980. This infuriated the local labourers as well as the Dalit leaders of Ahmedabad city, adding fuel to the fire already simmering because of the anti-reservation riots spearheaded by urban upper caste, middle class students (Yagnik, 1981; Desai, 1985). Through its control over the media, the higher castes portrayed the confrontation as a caste conflict, and to some extent incited, although not with much success, poor cultivators and labourers from other backward castes to attack members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Shah, 1987). Similarly, the confrontation in 1981 between tribal labourers and the Rajput and patidar landowners in Valia, Bharuch district, continued for several days. In such situations, the state has invariably come to the rescue of the propertied classes and failed to provide protection to the labourers. Confrontations between agricultural labourers and landowners were

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

87

frequent in the 1960s and early 1970s in south Gujarat, although there were only nineteen unions of agricultural labourers with less than one lakh members, barely 4 per cent of the total number of agricultural workers. One of the most important organizations of agricultural workers is the Halpati Seva Sangh (HSS), an organization of the halpatis—a Scheduled Tribe of agricultural labourers—and an off-shoot of Gandhian activities among the tribals in south Gujarat. It came into existence in 1961, and advocated implementation of the Minimum Wages Act, which played a catalytic role in encouraging militancy among the labourers. The leaders of the HSS, however, themselves intervened when the labourers resorted to strikes, to minimize tension and reach compromise agreements. Jan Breman (1974: 494) observed, ‘Self-respect and class consciousness are not taught. On the contrary the organization does not aim at making the Halpatis able to stand up for themselves, aware of their exploitation and oppression, but envisages their adjustment to the social system without any fundamental change in their dependence.' The HSS undertakes a number of welfare activities for the halpatis; and whatever minor role it played in organizing strikes for the labourers in its early phase has now diminished. In fact, the leader of the HSS recently joined hands with the Khedut Samaj, an organization of rich and middle farmers, who were at one time arch enemies of the labourers’ union. The Majur Mahajan, the Gandhian Textile Labour Association (TLA), established the Khet Majur Mahajan Sangh in 1976, and by 1981 had members in ten districts. Some Congress leaders established the Khet Vikas Parishad in 1975. The Parishad raised the issue of the implementa­ tion of the Minimum Wages Act when the Janata Party was in power between 1977 and 1980. However, it did not mobilize agricultural labourers after Congress returned to power in 1980, though it took up the grievances of individual labourers, and exerted its influence on the government to raise wages under the Minimum Wages Act. The Minimum Wages Act, in fact, was revised in 1982, from Rs 5.50 paise to Rs 11 per day but except in Saurashtra agricultural labourers rarely get the prescribed wages. (Minimum Wage on Paper’, The Hindu, 25 September 1984). The government appointed 115 officers to enforce the law, but they rarely visited the villages, expecting the labourers to come and report low wages at their offices, something which normally does not happen. Also, the Act required farmers to keep records of wages paid, but such records were rarely maintained. ‘When farmers are big and powerful, they don’t allow the officers to perform their duties by using political pressure’ (The Hindu, 25 September 1984). It has been reported that at least two deputations of MLAs visit the state Labour Minister every month and request his intervention in preventing action against farmers. Occasionally the officers prosecute the farmers for violation of the labour laws, but the court seems to be lenient towards the landowning class. In 1981,1982 and 1983, the total amount of fines imposed by courts for violation of labour

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

88

GHANSHYAM SHAH

laws, such as non-maintenance of records, were Rs 31,785, Rs 92,897 and Rs 2.06 lakhs. (The Hindu, 25 September 1984). The agricultural workers' unions and other organizations such as the HSS, the Khet Vikas Parishad, and the Majur Mahajan prefer to avoid direct confrontation between the agricultural labourers and the landed classes. Thus they undertake a number of welfare activities which are designed to provide supplementary income to the labourers' families. In the 1970s, an increasing number of voluntary groups supported by the government, foreign funding agencies and business houses, have initiated rural development programmes. These programmes are not economically viable: at the most they provide a dole and contain the prevailing tension in rural Gujarat (Shah and Chaturvedi, 1985). Because of welfare program­ mes, the activities of the Khet Vikas Parishad, the rhetoric of garibi hatao (remove poverty) and the sympathetic attitude of some Congress leaders towards the downtrodden, the agricultural labourers by and large support the Congress (I) in elections. By contrast, the rich and middle cultivators have built up active organ­ izations to protect and advance their economic interests. Organizations such as the Cotton Growers Association, the Tobacco Growers Associ­ ation and the Vegetable Growers Association enroll members, maintain their offices and publish newsletters giving information about market trends and government policy to their members. Their publications are also vehicles for articulating their grievances against the government. They ap­ point part-time public relations officers based in Ahmedabad and Delhi who deal with the state and central governments. Their job is to apply pressure on the government to encourage export of their products, protection of the prices of their crops, and greater distribution of inputs at subsidized rates to boost production. Such organizations are not directly associated with any one political party, and finance different non-left parties for elections. Besides these, the rich and middle farmers have formed organizations under different banners from time to time. Bhailalbhai Patel of Kheda district organized a political party, the Khedut Sangh, in 1951, to oppose tenancy legislation. He believed that the Act, which provided land to the tiller, would create conflict between the tenants and landholders. According to him, The simple truth that the interests of all people working on land such as artisans, tenants, labourers are one and the same like a welded whole is not known; these interests do not conflict; they should be maintained in an integrated manner which can be done by considering the family of those working on land with the farmer as the head (Amin, 1963: 17-18). Patel felt that the government was encouraging communism by taking away land from large landholders (Bhalani, 1966). The Khedut Sangh put up its candidates for eleven Assembly seats in

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

89

Gujarat and four in Saurashtra. It won only one seat in Saurashtra, and one from Gujarat (Table 6). Bhailalbhai himself was defeated and most of the other candidates lost their deposits. One reason was that a majority of the small farmers, marginal landholders and tenants did not see any reason to oppose land reforms. At least, theoretically, the reforms were in their favour. Second, rich and middle peasants were not organized in one party. Moreover, many of them believed that they should not oppose land reforms as in practice they were advantageous to a large number of farmers. They were also apprehensive of losing the support of the majority of peasants if they opposed the reforms: they felt more confident about protecting their interests by remaining with the party which had a mass base, namely the Congress. Bhailalbhai Patel and other leaders of the Khedut Sangh later took the initiative in the formation of the Swatantra party in Gujarat in 1959. They received support from some ex-rulers and girasias who had been adversely affected by land reforms. The party also succeeded in attracting a section of the middle and rich farmers of the patidar caste, who had improved their economic conditions in the 1950s. But Bhailalbhai was aware that rich and middle peasants, girasdars and ex-rulers, were not numerous enough to win elections, and that they needed the support of a large section of the peasantry. The strategy developed ‘was one of a caste alliance between the kshatriyas and the patidars: this was accomplished by winning over some leaders of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha. The leaders of the Sabha appealed to the kshatriya masses to support physically, intellectually and monetarily all the candidates of the Swatantra party’ (Shah, 1975). In 1967, the Swatantra party gave an impressive performance by winning 66 seats in the Assembly of 168 seats (Table 6), and the proportion of kshatriya MLAs doubled from 10 to 20 per cent between 1962 and 1967 (Table 7). But the Congress retained its majority in the Assembly as neither kshatriya nor patidar leaders succeeded in mobilizing the larger sections of the poor in their own castes in favour of the Swatantra party. In the course of time, a rift developed between the kshatriya and patidar leaders within the Swatantra party and the party was finally dissolved in the 1970s. The bitter lesson seemed to be that no party could survive indefinitely on the sole basis of caste ideology and alliance: and that the poor strata would not subscribe to the ideology of free enterprise and opposition to land reforms over a sustained period. As the interests of the rich and middle farmers cut across party boundaries, the leading farmers of the Swatantra and Congress parties organized the Khedut Mandal outside their parties in 1968. Later, in 1972, the Khedut Samaj, under the leadership of Dayaram Patel of south Gujarat, Vallabhbhai Patel of Saurashtra and Ambubhai Patel of north Gujarat was organized to oppose the Land Ceiling Act and other laws related to land. The Samaj worked as a pressure group within and outside

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

T able 6

Percentages o f Votes Polled and Seats Won by Political Parties in Gujarat Assembly Elections, 1952-80

o "

vq

ry

m’ a

.

Seats

cr

< m 73 CO o j |:

1957

1952

0>

Congress Congress (O) Swatantra Lok Paksha* KMLP BLD Jan Sangh Hindu Mahab Sabha Socialist6 MGJP Communist” Other Parties Independents Total

%of votes

Seats

% of votes

1962 Seats %of votes

57 56 101 113 (Came into existence after 1969) (Founded in 1959) 26 2 12 (Founded in 1974) (Founded in 1974) — + 1

141

3 4 9 3 (Founded in 1956) 29 + 1 10 19 157 100 133

+

—

4 31

7 1

+

—

+ 7 100

7 154

51

93

46

-

-

-

24

66

38

1972 Seats % of votes 140 16

51 24

—

—

1975 Seats %of votes 75 56* 2

41 24

11 1 9

—

— —

— —

— -

— —

— —

1

1

2

3

9

12 2* 18*

1 8 4

—

—

—

-

—

3

3

1

2*

1

— —

+ +

— — —

—

—

— —

+

+ 10 99

O 9L

"H = o* =* 3 n

1967 Seats %of votes

Percentages are rounded, and therefore the totals do not add up to 100. + Less than 0.S per cent votes. a. This included The Khedut Sangh, Krahikar Lok Paksha and Praja Paksha in 1952. b. H as included The Ram Rajya Parishad. c. This indudes SP, SSP and PSP. d. This indudes CPI and CPM. e. 7 Independents were supported by the Janata Morcha. k. Janata Party l. Bharatiya Janata Party * Coalition Partners in the Janata Morcha.

5 168

+ 10 99

1 —

8 168

1 1 12 101

1 1* 15* 12 181 . 100

1980 Seats

% of

votes 141 21k

50 22

—

—

-

-

9*

13

— — -

10 181

— — -

+ 2 10 97

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

91

the political parties, and the State Assembly. On occasion, it openly confronted the govemmeh| and launched struggles to protect the interests of the rich and the middle cultivators. The following instances are just two illustrations of its working and influence. In 1973, the Khedut Samaj opposed the Land Ceiling Act, and organized demonstrations and satyagrahas. Under its auspices, teenage sons and daughters of farmers marched in New Delhi and submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister, demanding protection of minors' rights in land. The farmers were successful in pressuring the government to neutralize the implementation of the Land Ceiling Act. Barring four or five members, all Congress legislators favoured raising the ceiling limit. The government rejected a suggestion of an ML A, belonging to the treasury benches that agricultural land be taken over from ‘the so-called farmers’ whose non-agricultural annual income was more than Rs 15,000. The government also rejected even the simple suggestion of forming a watchdog committee to observe the implementation of the bill (The Times o f India (Ahmedabad), 13 November 1973). While the government took no steps to gear up the administrative machinery to implement the Act, the farmers took a pledge in public that surplus land would not be surrendered to the government for distribution among the landless under the Land Ceiling Act. A leader of the Khedut Samaj audaciously said at a public meeting that the Act was not going to be implemented as ‘the Congress Governments do exactly the opposite of what they profess’. (Gujarat Mitra (daily, Surat), 25 November 1973). In the same year, the Khedut Samaj also opposed the levy of paddy imposed by the government under the 1973 Levy Act. Under this Act small farmers with one acre of land or less were exempted from the levy payment which was progressively applied, so that the bigger farmers had to contribute a larger share of paddy than the smaller farmers. For instance, in Surat district, out of 70,000 farmers, only 27,000, that is, 39 per cent, had to pay levy at differential rates. The farmers organized demonstra­ tions, manhandled the Congress leaders working for agricultural labourers and took the law into their hands, disrupting the levy collection operation. They stopped the supply of milk and vegetables to the cities for two days. They organized a satyagraha; and two leaders of the Samaj were arrested. Following the arrest of the leaders, disturbances took place in the taluka towns of south Gujarat such as Bardoli, Navsari and Buhari. Meanwhile, rioting broke out in urban centres against corruption and rising prices. The urban middle classes and students demanded the resignation of the patidar Chief Minister, Chiman Patel. Though the leaders of the Khedut Samaj opposed the levy, they were not against the Chief Minister, and went to the rescue of the khedut putra (son of a peasant) Chiman Patel. Opposing the demand of resignation, Vallabhbhai Patel, a leader of the Samaj, said that the Central government was responsible for corruption and price increases. ‘When the state is engulfed by food riots and the Chief Minister, son of the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

92

GHANSHYAM SHAH

peasant, is in trouble, the farmers have not to think anything but to compromise with the Government for the larger interest (Khedut Vani (fortnightly, Bardoli) Vol. I, no. 15, 1 January 1974).’ They compromised with the government and their leaders were released; they withdrew the agitation, and even declared that the farmers would give more pady in levy than the amount demanded by the government. In fact, some leaders from Saurashtra and south Gujarat toured the villages to collect the levy (Shah, 1977). Later the Samaj supported the Janata Morcha, as the non-Congress and non-communist United Front in the 1975 elections (Table 6). The Congress party and the Janata Morcha formed the government, which scrapped the Levy Act. The Khedut Samaj is dominated by patidars: more than 80 per cent of its office-bearers are drawn from this caste. However, the leaders do not speak in terms of patidars from the platform of the Samaj. They use the term khedut, or farmer. At the same time, however, various caste associations and journals of the patidars, use the term patidar synonymous­ ly with khedut. Like the Khedut Samaj, the caste journals Jagtat (protector of land) and Dharti (land) address themselves to the problems of the farmers, such as irregularity of irrigation and electricity, scarcity of fertilizers and seeds, and price protection for agricultural crops. The general stance of the caste journals is one of opposition to land reforms. They advocate large holdings on the grounds that small holdings are uneconomical.6 Such demands are irrelevant to the small and marginal farmers who are in any case unable to make productive use of improved infrastructure facilities. In fact, the opposition to land reforms is against the interests of most patidar cultivators, since the majority are small and marginal farmers. Some of them are aware of being used by the big farmers of their own caste: a small patidar farmer from a village in south Gujarat is one example: The farmers are unnecessarily blaming the government for their problems of irrigation, fertilizers, electricity or labour. Actually, the big farmers themselves are to be blamed. They accumulate and aggrandise like an insatiable hungry giant. Big farmers are like big fish, they simply disregard the small varieties. And when they want support for this or that issue, they come up to us in the name of farmers’ fraternity, solidarity and unity. For instance, the issue of electricity for pumping water into fields. It is said that the richer, big and more powerful farmers of Bardoli are influential in changing the course of power distribution. They go and bribe the power-grid people. Similarly, about the irrigation waters too. The stronger the lobbying is, the greater are the rewards. In such a situation, who really cares or bothers about the small farmers? (P. Patel, 1982).

Paradoxically, like many other small patidar farmers, this cultivator also supports the Khedut Samaj for a variety of reasons. Small farmers feel that 6 Sec for example the caste journal Kadava Patidar Parivar, published from Rajkot.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentiments and Class Formation in Gujarat

93

their interests are not in sharp conflict with those of rich and middle peasants, and hope that if government concedes the demand of middle or rich farmers and lowers the prices of agricultural inputs, they will also derive some benefits. Second, no political party or organization has concentrated on organizing the small and marginal farmers around their grievances. If any leader (even of the ruling party) raises the difficulties of the poorer strata, he is immediately accused of creating ‘class struggle’, which is considered to be against ‘Indian culture’. Third, caste organiza­ tions and their leaders repeatedly emphasize the unity of the patidars as a necessity for the development of the community. Any attempt to divide the community in terms of classes, they argue, would lead to conflict and give opportunities to communism which would turn ‘individuals to animals without any freedom’.7 Fourth, the small and marginal farmers of the patidar caste, like the members of any other caste, imbibe prejudices against other communities and thus create cultural barriers to their unity across castes. The small patidar farmer who is critical of rich patidar cultivators (quoted above) also expressed strong prejudices against the dublas, namely, the halpatis, who are agricultural labourers. Of them he says: The Dublas are destined to remain poor and backward. The processes of civilization are strenuous and require hard labour and skill. We Cherotarias (Patidars from central Gujarat) have created wealth wherever (we have) gone. (Why?) Because we are hardworking and our living is cultured. Whereas, these Dublas have none of these traits. They are the laziest (people) in the world. They do not educate themselves. Their habits are bad and they live immorally. They drink limitlessly and cause strife in their families. Their concepts of life and living style are different (from) ours. . . The politically ambitious people have instigated them against us. We, who have taught them living, are now declared their enemies. They talk in terms of class enemies and class conflict etc. The younger Dublas are hot-headed elements. They are wooed by the leftists and given promises of retrieving their “lost** lands by snatching it away from us. But the land always belonged to us and the records show that (P. Patel, 1982).

The Khedut Samaj has secured support against the imposition of land ceiling and paddy levy from the koli, the Rajput, the bareeya and the adivasi middle and rich peasants. During the elections, several leaders use their personal influence in mobilizing patidar farmers for the parties of their choice. Thus, the support of patidar farmers is divided among different parties, and the result is stress within the Khedut Samaj. The Industrial Sector Gujarat occupies a prominent position on the industrial map of India. In 1976-7, it had 9,722 factories, or 12 per cent of the total factories in the country registered under the Factories Act. They generated Rs 3531 crores worth of output, accounting for a 10 per cent share of industrial 7 Some of the articles published in various caste journals such as Dharti, Jagtat, Kadava Patidar Parivar express such views.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

94

GHANSHYAM SHAH

production. In terms of capital income generated in manufacturing activity, Gujarat stood second, next to Maharashtra. In 1976-7, Gujarat generated Rs 322 per capita against the all-India average of Rs 194. Among the 200 giants of India, 24 are located in Gujarat: two are in the co-operative sector. Two fertilizer plants, one at Kalol and another at Kandla, run by the Indian Farmers’ Fertilizer Co-operative Ltd. (IFFCO), are the largest single producers of chemical fertilizers in the country. The second co-operative giant, the Kaira District Milk Producers’ Union Ltd. (AMUL), is the country’s largest unit in the dairy industry with sales of its various products aggregating to Rs 58 crores. Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Ltd. is one of the largest joint sector projects in the country with sales of Rs 89 crores. Another major industry in Gujarat is textiles. Chemical and engineering factories have been established since the beginning of the century. After the formation of Gujarat state in 1960, the industrial structure of Gujarat changed considerably so that by 1977, the share of the textile group in the factory labour force dropped sharply from 76 per cent to 48 per cent, whereas the shares of the chemical industries and the engineering industries have more than doubled* to 19 per cent and 18 per cent respectively (N. Shah, 1979). The vanias enjoy dominance in the industrial sector. In 1964, there were seventy-two textile mills, run by sixty-two companies in Ahmedabad. Some companies owned more than one mill. Out of sixty-two mill companies, as many as fifty-two companies were owned by vanias, eight by patidars and two by non-Gujaratis (Spodek, 1965). The patidars, who entered the industry as early as-the 1860s, now compete with the vanias for the ownership of big and small industries. Rich and middle patidar peasants who prospered in agriculture have diverted their surpluses to industry, and invested in agro-based industries. The first sugar factory in Gujarat was started in 1957: no new factory was added till the end of the 1960s. During the last decade seven more factories were opened on a co-operative basis. Similarly, most groundnut oil mills are owned by patidars. They also dominate AMUL .and most of the other direct level milk dairy co-operative societies such as SUMUL in Surat, Sagar in Mehasana, Abad in Ahmedabad, and Sabar in Sabarkantha. Moreover, rich cultivators have invested their surpluses in the industrial sector by buying company shares and debentures. Since a few industrialists have emerged from the patidar caste and still own land in their native villages, they are concerned with agricultural development and divert some of their earnings for that purpose. For example, the Federation of Gujarat Mills Industries (FGMI), Baroda, carried out rat and other pest control programmes, provided assistance to the farmers in securing a variety of agricultural inputs, in drilling wells and in marketing during the sixties. Various industrial houses formed as many as fifty-five rural development organizations during the early 1980s. They provided technical and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

95

management know-how for agricultural production and marketing, and also carried out welfare programmes for small and marginal farmers. Thus they also developed the rural market for their industrial output and increased the availability of foodstuffs in the urban area. It should be emphasized that caste consciousness is relatively weak among businessmen and industrialists compared to the peasants, thanks to their relationship with technological development, a competitive market and their linkages with all-India and international houses. Although there is a tendency to help their caste-fellows, the members of the different castes belonging to the same business or industry meet and carry out business transactions freely. There is cut-throat competition even among the members of the same family or caste engaged in business or industry, so that industrialists of the Makarpura Industrial Estate, Baroda, hailing predominantly from the patidar caste, dissociated themselves from the FGMI, which is also dominated by patidar industrialists, and formed a separate organization. There are ten Chambers of Commerce. The Gujarat Vepari Maha Mandal operates at the state level, and none function at regional and sub-regional levels. The three industry-owners’ organizations, the Ahmedabad Mill-Owners Association; the Federation of Gujarat Mills and Industries; and the Saurashtra Mill-Owners Association, were established in 1891, 1918 and 1942 respectively, and are not affiliated to any political party. However, individual businessmen or industrialists are closer to one or the other non-left parties. They are in considerable agreement on political matters irrespective of their party affiliations. Congress and non-Congress party members were critical of the labour policy, tax structure, and licence policy of the Congress party through the 1970s. Erdman observes, M

In comparing formal affiliation and economic orientation, however, virtually the only discernible difference between supporters of Congress and non-Congress (both independents and Swatantrites) was the more frequent mention of general notions of ‘social justice* on the part of the former. Yet this was offset by the fact that the most vehement FGMI critics of the economic policies of the Congress were not Swatantrites but Congressmen. For example, no Swatantra member even remotely approached the vehemence with which FGMI Congressmen attacked the 1964 resolution on social control of banking as well as the party’s labour policies (1971: 36).

During the 1970s, the Southern Gujarat Chamber of Commerce elected only persons who were affiliated to the party in power at the state level. They elected a Congressman president when the Congress was in power, and a Janataman when the Janata came to power (J. Parekh, 1982). They were interested primarily in maintaining and protecting their interests, regardless of the party in power, or the caste affiliation or groupings involved. Individual industrialists and their organizations play a very important

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

96

GHANSHYAM SHAH

part in local and state politics. The leading members of the business community have been associated with several government committees at the district and state levels. They customarily make financial ‘contribu­ tions* during and in between elections to different non-left political parties as well as to their office-bearers and MLAs. Through their informal contacts with the political elite, the business elite have achieved a ‘private understanding* with the ruling party to get their work done (Dandekar, 1972; Kochanek, 1974). They have also built up strong connections with the bureaucracy—including the police—at all levels. Although they do not always succeed in preventing the introduction of legislation which may hamper their business interests, they more often than not succeed in sabotaging such legislation at the implementation level. There are more than three million workers in non-agricultural establish­ ments, including industrial and white collar workers. A few micro-studies suggest that a large number of them come from Scheduled Castes, the koli, patidar and artisan castes, and the Scheduled Tribes. Forty-two per cent of the workers in Ahmedabad are immigrant workers from different states such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Maharashtra. Although it is not possible for any factory owner to employ only his caste fellows for skilled and unskilled work and supervisory jobs, many middle and small factories, especially those owned by patidars, show preference for the members of their own caste in their recruitment policy. (The vanias cannot adopt this policy because they do not get sufficient numbers of workers from their own caste). The reason for this prefer­ ence lies not so much in loyalty to the caste but because, as a workshop superintendent in a factory explained, ‘the stress on social links provides an insurance against any activities harmful to the production and general discipline of the factory* (Sheth, 1968: 77). The workers in the large organized sector are relatively better paid with security of tenure compared to workers in small scale industries and the unorganized sector. Even in many large scale industries, particularly the textile, yarn and pharmaceutical industries, not all workers enjoy job security. Quite a large number have been employed as temporary or shift workers for more than fifteen years: hence they do not enjoy the benefits of organized workers. The workers in small scale industries are unorga­ nized and get their wages on piece work. To use Hein Streefkerk*s phrase, they get ‘too little to live on, too much to die on* (1981). Most of the workers still work for 12 hours a day, with one unpaid holiday in a week. They do not have any security of tenure, sick leave, provident fund or insurance. Factory owners of small scale industries defy government rules and regulations and buy over government labour officers who are supposed to protect the interests of the labourers. Newspaper reports occasionally reveal that the factory owners or their henchmen beat the workers and compel them to work for longer hours. Child labour is also prevalent. In many ways, Engels’ description of industrial workers in England in the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

97

nineteenth century can still be compared with that of the workers in the unorganized sector and small scale industries in contemporary mills— thirteen in Ahmedabad and eight in other cities have been closed down, relegating 40,000 workers to the status of the unemployed and compelling them to return to the village or opt for casual work whenever available, or just starve (Jani, 1984). The TLA is the largest and dominant trade union in Gujarat. It had 134,621 members out of the workers totalling 150,000 in the textile industry in Ahmedabad in 1981. It also sponsored its sister organization known as the Laghu Udyog Kamdar Mahajan, or small industry labour organization, covering the chemical, engineering, pharmaceutical, brick kiln and other industries in 1961. It has 16,500 members in Ahmedabad. The TLA in Ahmedabad is a craft based federation of twelve craft unions such as those of weavers, throstles, winders, engineers, mechanics and clerks. Since 1923 the TLA has concentrated on welfare activities including co-operative banks, dispensaries, maternity homes, sewing classes, and relief work during calamities. It is ‘the only union in the country which has been carrying on such extensive welfare and educational work for its members and their families1(Kamik, 1978: 109). Although there are a few trade unions led by the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party, and even fewer led by non-party leaders, their ideology and functioning are not substantially different from those of the TLA. Hein Streefkerk writes, ‘For a number of union leaders the promotion of the workers1 interests were neither their primary, nor their only, priority. The union is their chief means of support, for them managing a union is like managing business, for which they must be on good terms with both the bosses and the workers1(1981: 775). There are a few socialist and communist trade unions but their influence has been insignificant. Although the number of industrial disputes has increased in Gujarat, industrial relations are still more peaceful than in other states: Gujarat ranks lowest among the various states of India ‘in relation to all available indicators of industrial conflict such as the number of workers involved per dispute, the proportion of workers involved per dispute, the proportion of workers involved in disputes to the total employment in industry and the number of man days lost in industrial production per employee1 (Sheth, 1983: 494). The Middle Class With the growth of the public sector, private enterprise and urban centres, the size of the urban middle class engaged in white-collar jobs has increased during the post-Independence period. We do not have statistical data to quantify its size: it is sufficient to indicate that the workers employed in organized and unorganized sectors have increased from 8.9 lakhs in 1966 to 14 lakhs in 1982. A large part of the middle class is drawn from among the vania, the brahman and the patidar castes. Members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, the artisan castes and other backward castes

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

98

GHANSHYAM SHAH

have also joined the middle class, though their proportion is small. The middle classes are more educated than the members of the working class, are mobile and fired by high aspirations. They are vocal and sensitive, played an important part in the freedom movement, and also led the Maha Gujarat movement in 1956-7, demanding a separate linguistic state. In 1974, the middle classes under the leadership of students and teachers launched a movement against skyrocketing prices, food scarcity and corruption. But under the shrewd guidance of interest groups and parties, the economic issues were sidetracked while the political movement succeeded in ousting the Chief Minister and dissolving the State Assembly. The leaders of the movement, moreover, maintained unity among the various castes and communities (G. Shah, 1977). But on other occasions, the middle classes have divided along caste and religious lines. The anti-reservation agitations in 1980-1 and 1985 are cases in point. As mentioned above, in terms of caste, the middle class is not homogenous. The spread of education has not been even among all castes, although the relatively upper strata of the lower castes have begun taking advantage of the educational opportunities available to them. A survey of rural Gujarat shows that the gap in illiteracy is wide between the upper castes, including patidars', and backward castes, including kolis, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Only 6 per cent of the patidars and 8 per cent of the brahmans, as against 47 per cent of the Scheduled Caste families were illiterate. Regarding college education, the vanias, the brahmans and other upper castes, excluding the Rajputs, are better placed than the lower castes. The patidars, the artisan castes and the Scheduled Castes are almost at par in college education. At least one person from each 7 per cent of households from these castes has received college education. The rise of higher education among the Scheduled Castes, who are traditionally considered to be at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, is conspicuous. Besides several other factors, this increase can be attributed to facilities specially made available to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by the government, particularly the reservations in educational institutions and the administrative services. The Scheduled Castes have used the opportu­ nities offered to them: the proportion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Class III positions increased from 4.8 and 4.4 per cent in 1971 to 10.7 and 8.9 per cent respectively in 1978 (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission Report, 1980), and has probably increased further since then. That is, there are more than 40,000 clerks and typists from among these communities. This has obviously meant a curtailment in ‘white collar’ jobs available to the upper and middle castes who had previously monopolized government services. Their condition has deteriorated further as a result of increasing unemployment. Between 1971 and 1982, the number of unemployed persons registered in the Employment Exchange rose by more than three times—from 154,000 in 1970 to 528,000 in 1982. Among the unemployed, as many as 59 per cent were educated.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

99

The middle class of the upper and middle castes, who were adversely affected by the increase in educated unemployment blamed their inability to find jobs on the reservations for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The presence of persons from these communities as colleagues, as well as their relatively quick promotion under the roster system, upset upper and middle caste employees who harboured deep-seated prejudices against the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and considered themselves superior to them. Moreover, in 1980, the government recognized eighty-two caste/community groups as Socially and Educa­ tionally Backward Gasses (SEBC), and granted them 10 per cent reservations in government jobs.8 All of this reduced the share of the cake available to the middle class of the upper and middle castes. The students belonging to the middle and upper classes of the vania, brahman and patiddr castes opposed the reservation policy of the government, and in December 1980, they launched an agitation against the policy of reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in post-graduate studies in medicine. Later on, they demanded the abolition of reservations in government jobs as well as in admission to professional courses. The agitation continued for three months. Clashes broke out between students from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in general, and Scheduled Castes in particular, and the upper castes in Ahmedabad, Nadiad, Vadodara, and some other cities. The riots touched the villages of Kheda, Mehasana, Ahmedabad and Surendranagar districts where Sche­ duled Castes have improved their conditions and have become more militant than their caste fellows in other parts of the state (Bose, 1985). Huts belonging to the Scheduled Castes were set on fire in several villages and several individuals were beaten up. More than one dozen Harijan youths lost their lives and several hundreds lost their huts and other belongings. The lower castes which benefitted from the reservations for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes, did not support the Scheduled Castes against upper castes although a few provided shelter to the affected Harijan families. At the same time they did not allow themselves to become instruments of the upper and middle castes in attacking the Scheduled Castes. The government ultimately gave certain concessions to the agitating medical students, although the reservations were not abolished. Thus in this agitation, the middle class was divided into upper and backward castes. 8 The Government of Gujarat appointed the Commission under the Chairmanship of Justice A. R. Baxi in 1972 to identify socially and educationally backward castes, races or tribes who deserve special treatment and grants of special concessions similar to those being granted to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Commission identified eighty-two castes/ classes/groups as socially and educationally backward. The Commission submitted its report in 1976 when the Congress party was in power. The government of Janata Morcha accepted its recommendations and provided reservations in government jobs and admissions in educational institutions to the eighty-two castes/communities in 1978.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

100

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Once again the middle classes of the upper castes resorted to direct action for more than four months in 1985 when the government raised the quota of reservation for the SEBC from 10 per cent to 28 per cent in January.16 This time government employees belonging to the upper and middle castes as well as the Backward Gasses other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, joined the fray by demanding abolition of the ‘roster system’ which provides relatively rapid opportunities for promotion to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe employees. The anti-reservation agitation, which was confined to urban areas, continued for more than four months. It took a toll of more than 200 lives and property worth several million rupees. The state was completely paralysed. Consequently, the government not only withdrew the 18 per cent increase in the reservation for the SEBC, but also conceded the demand of the agitators to review the reservation for the eighty-eight castes/communities which are considered SEBC. In both agitations, the middle classes of the upper and middle castes had an edge over the middle classes of the lower castes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The former were bigger in size and more united than the latter. They were also more articulate and dominated the mass media. Moreover, whereas the middle classes of the upper and middle castes enjoyed the moral support of the rich among their castes, the middle classes of the Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were alienated from their poorer caste fellows who did not expect to benefit from reservations in their own lifetime. Therefore, the poor strata of the Backward Gasses, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes remained indifferent to the agitations. Furthermore, the Backward Gasses who still followed the path of sanskritization to upward social mobility, looked down upon the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. They therefore hesitated to make common cause with them. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes actually did not participate initially, because they believed that the agitation was directed against the SEBC for whom government had raised reservations quotas. The employees of the SEBC on the other hand joined the agitation that was raised against the roster system since it did not benefit them. 16 After the introduction of the reservation for eighty-two SEBC in 1978, members of some of those castes which were not considered by the Baxi Commission to be socially and educationally backward, made representations to the government for consideration of their cases. The Congress government therefore appointed a second commission in 1981 ‘to consider whether, there were any other castes/communities/classes which fell in the category of socially and educationally backward classes'. Justice C. V. Rane was its Chairman. The Commission rejected caste as a measurement of backwardness. It adopted income and occupation as criteria to determine ‘backwardness’. It recommended 28 per cent reservations for occupational groups which are considered backward. The Commission submitted its report in 1983. The government rejected the major recommendations of the Commission on the ground that they were beyond ‘the terms of reference of the Commission’, in 1983. At the same time the government accepted the recommendation of the reservation quota, and in January 1985, it raised the quota.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentiments and Class Formation in Gujarat

101

+

Notwithstanding the intra-caste differences among themselves, the Hindu middle classes of different castes did unite against the Muslims in times of communal riots. The number of communal riots increased in Gujarat from thirty-one in 1980 to eighty-four in 1982. The Hindu middle classes instigated the Hindu working class against the Muslims in the 1969 riots in Ahmedabad and the 1982 riots in Vadodara (Patel, 1984). The anti-reservation stir of 1985 often turned into communal riots in Ahmeda­ bad, Vadodara and other cities of Gujarat. However, it is very difficult to say at this stage what role the middle classes of the SEBC, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes played in the 1985 communal riots when faced by the onslaught of the upper and middle castes. Caste Organizations Along with the growth of secular organizations and increased economic stratification within different castes, almost all the upper and middle castes, and many of the low castes, have organized their own formal caste organizations which have been registered under the Societies Act. Of 3445 registered organizations, 635, or 18 per cent are caste organizations in south Gujarat. There are many more unregistered caste organizations. A review of the list of voluntary associations suggests that caste organizations of the lower castes are a more recent phenomenon than those of the upper and middle castes. Some castes have several hundred organizations: each organization remains independent of the others and functions at a specific level—marriage circle, endogamous group, city, region or caste cluster level. For the purpose of our analysis, we can divide caste associations into two categories—social organizations and political organizations. The former deal with matters such as marriage, educational activities and welfare programmes. They do not discuss political matters (in a narrow sense), such as those dealing with political parties and elections; though they take a stand on issues concerning such social and religious matters as the Hindu Code Bill, the Muslim Personal Law, and cow slaughter. Some of these associations categorically declare that they have nothing to do with political matters fearing that diversity of political affiliations would create disharmony in the caste organizations. On the other hand, the second type of caste association aims to influence caste members in elections, and their leaders are politically active, and associated with some political party. The caste associations, political or otherwise, strengthen caste ties and inculcate a sense of fraternity among the members. One of the caste journals advises its members: i t is the duty of each caste-member to consider all the members of the caste as their brothers and he should help them . He should be proud of his caste and should have reverence for his own caste (Jagtat vol. 3 no. 3 (Posh Savant 1977), 1953).’ Unemployed migrants in the city, for instance, need both material and social support at times of crisis: such needs lead them to form caste organizations. Some

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

102

GHANSHYAM SHAH

castes also form organizations to receive benefits from the government on the basis of their ‘social and educational backwardness'. As many as 140 castes submitted memoranda to the Socially and Educationally Backward Class Commission, appointed by the Government of Gujarat, to demons­ trate their ‘backwardness' and request inclusion in the category of ‘backward class’. The upper strata of these castes assumed the leadership role in forming caste associations by emphasizing caste consciousness and caste unity among the members. For instance, the leaders of one such caste appealed to their castemates: We heartily appeal to all those who have been bom in this caste, in whose veins the blood of Prajapati is flowing. You should be proud of yourself and your caste. You should organise ‘Prajapati Mandal’ in the area where you are staying and get united all such organisations at the district level. All such persons should physically, mentally and financially cooperate and assist to build united strength. Let us forget all differences between small and big, rich and poor, gol and social divisions and strengthen ourselves. (Pipaliya, 1982: 45) Contemporary caste organizations—those of the upper castes as well as those of the lower castes—do not emphasize the principle of purity and pollution. They no longer struggle to raise or maintain the traditional status of their castes in the hierarchy, and some lower castes which earlier attempted sanskritization no longer see this as a means to the end of a higher status. But even while the struggle for status in the traditional caste hierarchy is becoming irrelevant to sections of the urban population, caste as a unit of social interaction has not been rejected. The principles of primordial loyalty to and harmony within the castes are upheld for the sake of economic development of its members. Caste organizations undertake welfare programmes which include the running of schools and hostels, and the distributions of scholarships, loans, textbooks and notebooks. They conduct vocational training courses, run co-operative societies (especially for women) for the production and marketing of goods which generate income, provide medical facilities and financial assistance to needy caste members. They compile directories of caste members, with details regarding occupation and education. These directories have two uses—the dissemination of business opportunities as well as marital possibilities. Of course, not all caste associations carry out these programmes because they do not command the necessary resources. It is the relatively prosperous vania association which stands out because of contributions from vania businessmen and industrialists. While social caste organizations are important for understanding the changing caste system, they do not have a direct bearing on the present parliamentary politics of Gujarat. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that they strengthen caste senti­ ments which ultimately support the status quo. This emerges from an exa­ mination of the caste organizations of two castes—those of the patidars and the kshatriyas—which play an important role in the politics of Gujarat.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentiments and Class Formation in Gujarat

103

The patidars do not have a caste organization at an all-Gujarat level covering all their sub-sub-divisions. Like other castes, they have a number o f organizations, both traditional (caste panchayat) and modem (caste associations), confined to sub-divisions, regions or marriage circles. These organizations were founded by non-traditional caste leaders who were involved in the anti-imperialist movement, and who combined social reform and political activity. One such organization was the Patidar Yuvak Mandal (PYM) of Surat district founded in 1908 by Kuvarji Mehta, a Congress freedom fighter. Mehta felt that reformist activities and caste organizations were the safest means to mobilize support for the freedom movement. The objective of the PYM was ‘spreading education among the Patidars ,. . . doing social reforms ,. . . abolishing harmful customs and traditions in the caste for mobilising and cultivating public opinion for protecting the interests o f the farmers' (Bhatt, 1970: 302, italics mine). The interchangeable use of the words patidar and farmer took care of the social and economic interests of the members. Although it became defunct after independence, the PYM took an active part in the freedom movement. Most of the patidar caste panchayats, dominated by middle peasant patidars, supported the various Gandhian struggles. After Independence, a section of middle and rich peasant patidars opposed the land reforms introduced by Congress in Bombay state. But those middle and rich patidars who remained in Congress enjoyed positions of dominance in the party till the 1960s. To develop their patronage network, they favoured caste members in the distribution of party and government positions, and other benefits, but they did not use caste organizations to support any political party. Those political leaders who tried to use the platforms of their caste organizations to appeal to voters on their parties’ behalf were vehemently opposed by other leaders belonging to different parties. Some of the patidar associations categorically stated that under no circumstances would the organizations participate in politics. Patidar middle and rich peasants worked through a Khedut Samaj to protect their economic interests. However, their recent loss of strength in the state cabinet and state Assembly has given rise to a desire for unity. Attempts are being made, so far without success, to unite various patidar caste associations into one unified organization. Unlike the patidars, the kshatriya leaders succeeded in forming a Gujarat level caste association called the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha (GKS) in 1948, although it was mainly active in central and north Gujarat. On the eve of Independence, the Rajput girasdars keenly felt the threat posed by land reforms to their economic interests and power, and formed a caste organization, which widened their social base by including various koli castes such as the bareeya, thakarda and the patanvaidya. During the early 1950s, the Sabha used traditional symbols like the saffron-coloured turban and the sword to mobilize the lower kshatriya

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

104

GHANSHYAM SHAH

masses. 'Kshatriya consciousness and unity* were fostered by invoking a feeling of a common culture and a glorious past; this elated the ego of the poor kolis, particularly those of central and north Gujarat. These kolis felt closer to the Rajput leaders of the Sabha because the latter were hostile to the patidars who were also their exploiters. Moreover, the bareeya and other kolis of this region had no direct conflict with the Rajputs. On the other hand, the kolis of Saurashtra, Panch Mahals and south Gujarat were not attracted by the Sabha*s gesture of brotherhood because they had been tyrannized over and exploited by the Rajputs, and they did not have any particular animosity towards the patidars. The same circumstances applied to the kolis of Panch Mahals and south Gujarat. In order to strengthen the bonds of the kolis of central and north Gujarat with the caste organization, the Sabha demanded the inclusion of kshatriyas in the list of Backward Classes, so that the kshatriya masses could get certain privileges regarding jobs and education. The Sabha passed resolutions about the problems of poor cultivators, tenants and labourers, and also raised its voice against the patidar landowners who ill-treated bareeya labourers; but it ignored similar behaviour by the Rajput landowners against the bareeyas. The Sabha did not organize the bareeya labourers against the landowners as a class, but its leaders became actively involved when the Rajput landlords* interests were in danger. For instance, the Sabha opposed the Zamindari Abolition Acts and pressured the government in favour of the Rajput girasdars in 1948. Besides working as a pressure group on such issues, the Sabha supported the Congress in the 1950s and the Swatantra party in the 1960s. In the 1952 elections, the leaders of the Sabha told the kshatriyas that it was their dharma or duty, to support the Congress party. In 1962, they asked them to support the Swatantra party. During these and subsequent elections, a number of kshatriya leaders opposed the Sabha*s decision and worked against the Congress in 1952 and against the Swatantra party in 1962 as well as in 1967. In the course of its interaction with political parties during three decades, the leaders of the Sabha became divided among different political parties. After a while, the Sabha lost its political appeal as the organization of the kshatriyas, and some of its leaders, powerful at one time, faced defeat in the predominantly kshatriya constituencies. The organization has since become almost inactive except for issuing state­ ments to newspapers. At present, some prominent leaders of the Sabha are aligned with the Congress party. Other kshatriyas affiliated with the Bharatiya Janata Party formed another state-wide organization called the Gujarat Kshatriya Sangh, and organized two kshatriya conferences. The kolis of central and north Gujarat also formed new organizations confined to the bareeyasy thakardas and patanwadiyas. The leaders of these organizations similarly bargained with political parties for party tickets. Consequently, the lower kshatriya strength in the State Assembly increased from 11 per cent in 1960 to 18 per cent in 1980. The situation

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

105

remained more or less the same in the 1985 Assembly elections. The Kshatriya Sabha came out openly in support of the present Chief Minister, a kshatriya, during the 1985 anti-reservation agitation. Thus, along with class-based organizations, various caste associations incorporating several sub-castes have come into existence during the last three decades. More often than not, the initiative for such organizations have come from the upper strata of the caste groups who are interested in maintaining their hegemony in the socio-economic and political fields. They evoke caste sentiments to maintain solidarity among members. Most of the caste associations do not participate directly in electoral politics, partly because they do not have a large membership, and partly because their members are divided among various political parties. At the most they appeal to the voters at the constituency level. The Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha however participates directly in electoral politics by bargaining with political parties and forming factions within the parties. Other caste asociations also tacitly induce its members to form factions within class-based organizations and political parties. Caste, Class and Politics As a short cut to power, political parties have evolved a strategy of caste arithmetic, wooing the leaders of the numerically large castes in order to win elections. As elsewhere in the country, the party organization of the Congress had been weakened in Gujarat by the late 1960s. Party discipline and commitment have been increasingly replaced since the early 1970s by individual factional loyalty, command over physical and financial re­ sources, and manipulative political skill. Party leaders have no inhibition in using caste or religious sentiments. The Congress and other non-left parties including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is considered disciplined and ideologically committed, have increasingly succumbed to caste pressures in successive elections. In the 1950s, the Congress party gave more weight to party commitment and party work than to the candidate’s caste in distributing party tickets. At that time the majority of party members who could lay claim to party commitment and longer political experience belonged to the upper and middle castes as they had better chances of recruitment into the political arena in the first place. Also the main competitors were small in number and caste differences among them were not striking. With their numerical strength, however, patidars began gaining an edge over brahmans and vanias. Moreover, the Swatantra party changed the caste dimensions of politics in the 1962 elections. Bhailalbhai Patel, the leader of the Swatantra party, had evolved a ‘grand strategy* known as the Pksha, 4F io i patidar and ‘ksha’ for ksdatriya—an electoral alliance between the kshatriyas and patidars. The Swatantra party openly allied itself with the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha and gave party tickets to the kshatriyas generously.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

106

OHANSHYAM SHAH

The Congress party also hobnobbed with the GKS since 1952, but did not concede all its demands. But when the party lost a majority of the Assembly seats for the first time in 1962 from the GKS stronghold, Kheda district, it realized that it could no longer take the support of the kshatriya peasantry for granted. After 1962, the party became even more liberal in offering political positions to the kshatriyas. As the GKS was allied with the Swatantra party, the Congress recruited influential local kshatriyas into the party, and sponsored a parallel kshatriya organization particularly of the koli kshatriyas, attacking the GKS at its most vulnerable point, the cleavage between the Rajputs and the kolis. As against seven in 1962, fifteen kshatriyas (kolis and Rajputs together) from central and north Gujarat were given assembly tickets by the Congress party in the 1967 elections. Two parliamentry seats were also allotted to them. Consequent­ ly, the kshatriyas split between the Congress and the Swatantra party, which however could not keep the kshatriya and the patidar power-seekers united for long. The majority of the kshatriya leaders left the Swatantra party in 1971. By that time, the Congress party also split into the Congress (R) and the Congress (O). As elsewhere in the country, the Congress won a sweeping majority in the Assembly, 140 out of 180 seats. Some prominent kshatriya leaders who contested on the Congress (O) ticket were defeated for the first time in their election career in 1972. In fact, the kshatriya strength in the state Assembly was reduced from twenty-nine in 1967 to twenty-four in 1972 (Table 7). In 1974 Gujarat witnessed an unprecedented protest movement against the Congress party, the Navnirman Andolan, dominated by the urban middle classes (G. Shah, 1977). As the Congress lost its popularity in the country, it lost power in Gujarat in the 1975 elections for the first time. The United Front (UF), later named the Janata Party, came into power. In terms of caste, the United Front was dominated by the patidars. The Congress, which already had a support base among the kshatriyas and deprived social groups, formed the alliance called KHAM—an alliance between the kshatriyas (K), the Harijans (H), the adivasis (A) and the Muslims (M)—and distributed party tickets and positions in the party among the members of these castes in the 1980 elections. It continued to indulge in the rhetoric of garibi hatao started in 1971, and declared itself the messiah 6f the poor. The Congress leaders, particularly those who worked among the tribals and Harijans, depicted Mrs Gandhi as garib-ni-ma or mother of the poor. The party conspicuously excluded patidars from its leadership and also from the Ministry. The number of kshatriya Congress MLAs in the state Assembly increased from 11 per cent in 1967 to 24 per cent in 1980, whereas the strength of the upper castes—the vanias, the brahmans and the patidars—was reduced from 60 per cent to 28 per cent during the same period. The Chief Minister between 1980-5 was a kshatriya from Kheda district. And for the first time, as many as five kshatriyas against three patidars held a cabinet rank position. Such

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

107

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

T able 7 Caste Composition o f the M LAs in the Assembly from 1957 to 1985 First 1957-62

Second 1962-67

Third 1967-72

Fourth 1972-75

Fifth 1975-80

Sixth 1980-85

18 (16.35) 19 vania (17.27) patidar 26 (23.64) 13 kshatriya (Rajput & koli) (11.82) 4 Muslims • (3.64) Scheduled Castes 10 (9.09) Scheduled Tribes 15 (13.64) O ther Backward Castes 5 (4.55)

25 (18.38) 16 (11.77) 37 (27.21) 14 (10.39) 9 (6.62) 11 (8.09) 21 (15.44) 3 (2.20)

20 (14.08) 21 (14.79) 32 (22.54) 29 (20.42) 3 (2.81) 11 (7.75) 22 (15.44) 3 (2.12)

17 (12.32) 17 (12.32) 35 (25.36) 24 (17.39) 3 (2.37) 11 (7.79) 22 (15.94) 9 (6.53)

14 (7.73) 26 (14.36) 49 (27.07) 32 (17.69) 5 (2.17) 14 (7.73) 27 (14.92) 14 (7.73)

20 (10.9) 13 (98) 37 (20.3) 39 (20.9) 11 (6 0 ) 13 (7.1) 29 (159) 16 (8.9)

Caste brahman

N.A.

22

18

16

30

1

—

Total

132

154

168

168

182

182

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage. SOURCE: F o r th e first to fifth assem b lies (B . C . S h a h , 1982).

discrimination against the patidars alienated their political leaders from the Congress party. A similar pattern also emerged at district levels, particularly in the jilla panchayats. Of the forty-five members of the district Local Boards in Kheda district, 26 per cent were from the koli-kshatriya caste cluster in 1949. Their percentage rose to 54 in 1983. However, those members of the state Assembly and jilla panchayats who belonged to low castes were not drawn from the economically poor strata of their castes. In 1983, for instance, out of thirty-three kshatriya jilla panchayat members in Kheda district, nineteen (57 per cent) owned ten acres of land or more and seven (21 per cent) owned between two and nine acres; three members were professionals (lawyers) and four members did not disclose the amount of land they owned. Though we do not have the data for other districts and the state Assembly, there is no reason to believe that Kheda district is an exception. Moreover, the Congress (I) has so far not fully succeeded in transferring political power to the members of the low castes at the village level. For instance, in Anand talukay Kheda district (a stronghold of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha) where koli kshatriyas constitute 55 per cent of the population as against 34 per cent patidars, the latter held the position of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

108

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Sarpanches in 37 per cent of the village panchayats, as against 34 per cent of kshatriya Sarpanches in 1984. It is also noteworthy that while a few persons belonging to the low castes initially gained political positions in panchayats, they lost ground subsequently for two reasons. First, the upper castes and classes succeeded in co-opting defectors among the low caste leaders. Second, although the members of the low castes gained political positions, they remained economically dependent on higher caste middle or rich cultivators. In a few cases, affluent low caste leaders offered stiff resistance to high caste leaders: they had behind them the numerical strength of their castes, and they were not economically dependent on the high castes. Pravin Sheth observes, In this village (Boriavi) the Baraiya Sarpanch is a seasoned and articulate leader. In both the panchayat elections under the panchayati Raj, he had managed to retain Baraiya majority in the village panchayat. In both the elections, offices of Sarpanch and upa-Sarpanch went to the Baraiya and their allies. It may also be noted that the Baraiyas of this village enjoy some economic independence which has made the leader Sarpanch bold enough to challenge the Patidars. (1976: 247) Thus the elite of the low castes who are economically better-off can compete successfully with high caste elites in the power game. The Congress has selected as party candidates for the state Assembly or jilla panchayats mainly those kshatriya power seekers who enjoy a relatively better economic position than the majority of their caste members, enabling them to bear at least a part of the election expenses and to command influence in the caste. Ironically, the GKS failed to bring together all the so-called kshatriyas under its fold, but the Congress succeeded to some extent in uniting as a bloc the koli MLAs of the party in the Assembly against the upper caste members. The different social groups of kshatriyas, however, have not been able to unite at the grassroots level for political purposes. Animosity between the Rajputs and kolis in Saurashtra has not been overcome by the politics of caste alliance; the kolis are still closer to the patidars as far as their economic and political interests are concerned. A Congress MLA from the koli caste from south Gujarat may support and identify himself (as (we’) with other koli MLAs of central Gujarat within the party against other factions, but his followers in the constituency do not share similar sentiments with the kolis of other parts of Gujarat. Such a caste based strategy of the Congress has created an odd class combination within the party of ex-feudal lords and poor peasants who acquired political office, on the basis of their numerical strength, but without economic resources which are controlled by the upper castes and classes—the vanias, the brahmans and patidars. The discrepancy between political power and social dominance has come to the surface in Gujarat. Not only trade and industry, but the co-operative sector which generates wealth and distributes resources are dominated by the patidars, the vanias and the brahmans. Although

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

109

political power has 'satisfied the ego’ of the Rajputs and koli kshatriyas, it has not improved their economic conditions. In fact, the main public sectors of the state such as the Gujarat Fertilizer Corporation, the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, the Gujarat Housing Development Finance Corporation and the State Transport Corporation, are headed by the members of the upper castes. This has led to frustration. The conflict between the Rajputs and the patidars in Saurashtra is a glaring example of this contradiction. As the Congress supported the Rajput ex-landlords and rulers in Saurashtra, it alienated the patidarst ex-tenants and new owner-cultivators, and the kolis, the owner-cultivators and labourers. When, in the 1950s, the Congress liquidated feudal interests, the Rajputs became alienated. They still suffer from the hangover of the past and consider the present rule of a kshatriya Chief Minister to represent the re-establishment of their earlier rule over the patidars. But their economic condition has, in fact, deteriorated. On the other hand, the patidars have improved their conditions significantly. The Rajputs are Ministers, MLAs and MPs and also presidents of jilla panchayats: but the co-operative banks, co-operative sales and purchase societies, co-operative oil mills and co-operative milk societies are controlled by the patidars, who have the required investment and managerial skill. The patidars who enjoy dominance in this field try to control the Rajputs, which the latter resist by using their political power. Hence there are furious clashes between the two communities which frequently lead to several murders in both communities in broad daylight. The political elite of some of the low castes like the kalis or the adivasis have an edge over others as far as numerical strength is concerned. After gaining office they try to strengthen their power base by providing patronage to the members of their castes. But their patronage is confined to government jobs and welfare programmes; even in the distribution of government aided programmes they face several handicaps. They cannot provide government jobs to all their caste fellows because of open competition and the shrewd connivance of upper caste bureaucrats. The administration, which is dominated by upper castes, implements welfare programmes half-heartedly. Also, the welfare programmes have inherent limitations which prevent them from improving the economic conditions of the deprived strata in a competitive market economy. On the other hand, the political leaders of the low castes are primarily interested in strengthening their own economic interests as well as those of their class. As most of these leaders belong to the middle peasant or the urban middle class, they support policy measures which protect and advance their interests, thus competing against as well as joining hands with the leaders of the upper castes belonging to their own class. We have already mentioned a case of rich and middle adivasi peasants who allied with the patidars against the ceiling and paddy levy. The kshatriya leaders who hold positions in the Kheda district panchayat and the state have done very little

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

GHANSHYAM SHAH

n o

to improve the economic conditions of the small and marginal farmers and landless labourers of their own caste cluster. They did not implement the Minimum Wage Act which promises to provide at least a subsistence level to the landless labourers, the majority of whom belong to the kshatriya caste cluster. As for tribal elites, they are interested in seeing a middle or rich cultivator or an educated person from among themselves as a cabinet minister in the state, to get more reservations in white collar jobs, and to organize co-operative banks which can support adivasi enterpreneurs to get irrigation facilities, fertilizers, improved seeds, and so on. They make these and other demands in the name of the adivasis, but in practice, their concern for the ordinary adivasi is not only secondary but also instrumental. These elites bank upon caste support to bargain with political parties for political power and for the protection of their class interests. If caste comes in the way of their economic and political interests, they ignore or split it. Concluding Remarks Merchants and zamindars dominated the social life of Gujarat before the establishment of British rule in the early nineteenth century. Along with them and as their offshoot, a class of rich peasants and industrialists emerged by the turn of the last century. In the course of time, the zamindars have either disappeared or turned into rich peasants or industrialists during the post-Independence period, and in contemporary Gujarat the business class (of merchants and industrialists) and rich peasants enjoy dominance. Together they form the dominant power elite group, even though they do not hold formal positions of power. During the elections, their political support is divided among the non-left parties. They support, financially, MPs and MLAs, and also patronize bureaucrats at all levels. No cabinet can afford to antagonize them and also remain in power for a long period. There is competition and rivalry within and among business houses, businessmen, industrialists and rich peasants to protect individual or group interests and to accumulate larger profits than the rival groups. At the same time, they are relatively well organized at the level of a particular business or industry and also collectively as producers (in the case of rich peasants), businessmen and industrialists at district and state levels. They close their ranks when their collective interests as perceived by them are at stake against the government, consumers or working class. They often play a decisive role in the formulation of state policies which affect their interests directly. They also openly violate and sabotage various laws which hamper their interests at the level of implementation. In terms of caste, the businessmen and rich peasants belong mainly to the upper and the middle castes, the vanias, the brahmans, the Rajputs and the patidars. The latecomers in the dominant group are the patidars, who rose to political eminence after the mid-nineteenth century. However,

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

111

these and other castes are not homogeneous. As many as 47 per cent of the Rajputs are agricultural or non-agricultural labourers and poor cultivators. On the other hand, 15 per cent of the various artisan castes and 8 per cent of the kolis are rich cultivators. Economic differentiation and a competitive market economy and polity have gradually dismantled the caste based hierarchy. The principles of pollution and purity on which the caste system is supposed to rest have become obsolete. At the same time, the dominant groups, the government and the relatively upper strata of the lower castes (co-opted by the dominant elites to organize caste associations), invoke caste sentiments to gain political positions or to maintain their dominance in the political field. In order to sustain caste sentiments, welfare programmes are sponsored by the well-off strata of their respective castes, and in return they seek the political support of the poorer sections of their own castes. This strategy has worked to an extent, as the class-based organizations of the industrial workers, agricultural labourers and poor cultivators are either non-existent or weak; and very little effort has been made by the state and the elite to develop class consciousness as opposed to caste consciousness. In fact, the dominant socio-political ideology in the state negates the ideology of 'class consciousness’ as 'dangerous’ for the development of society. Neverthe­ less, the poor and exploited strata of society are increasingly becoming conscious of their economic interests. They have often undermined directives of the dominant strata of their respective castes, and resisted caste sentiments when their economic interests have been threatened. They protest and revolt against exploitation and injustice. More often than not their agitation is sporadic and spontaneous, though occasionally it is widespread and organized. These agitations are crushed by the state machinery and dominant elites and/or their leaders are co-opted into the power structure. Welfare programmes are launched to pacify the simmer­ ing dissatisfaction of the exploited poor. Thus the social situation in Gujarat is not quite clear. Caste as a social organization based on the principles of pollution and purity is crumbling, though not disappearing. At the same time caste sentiments prevail in the intra-class conflicts among the poor farmers, agricultural labourers and industrial workers as well as the rich peasants and business class. While different classes cutting across caste boundaries are being formed, class consciousness as such is yet to develop. This situation works in favour of the upper classes of the dominant castes in perpetuating their hold over society. REFERENCES Ahmedabad: Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, 1879. vol. 4 (]• I M I bay: Government Central Press). Amin, R. K. 1963. ‘Rural Renaissance and Sri Bhailalbhai’, Dr. Bhailalbhai Patel 75th Birth Souvenir (Vallabh Vidyanagar: Charotar Vidya Mandal).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

112

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Bates, Crispin. 1981. 'The Nature of Social Change in Rural Gujarat: The Kheda District 1818-1918’, Modem Asian Studies, (Cambridge) vol. 15, no. 4, October. Bhalani, Asmita. 1966. Karma Yogi Bhaikaka (Gujarati) (Vallabh Vidyanagar: Charottar Gramodyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd.). Bhatt, Anil. 1970. ‘Caste and Political Mobilisation in Gujarat District’ in Rajni Kothari (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics (Delhi: Orient Longman). Bose, Pradip Kumar. 1985. ‘Social Mobility and Caste Violence: A Study of the Gujarat Riots’ in Caste, Caste Conflict and Reservations, Centre for Social Studies (Delhi: Ajanta Publications). Breman, Jan. 1974. ‘Mobilisation of Landless Labourers: Halpatis of South Gujarat’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Bombay) vol. 9, no. 6-8, February. Choksey, R. D. 1958. Economic Life in the Bombay Gujarat 1800-1939 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House). Dandekar, V. 1972. ‘Next Step on the Socialist Path’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Bombay), vol. 7, August. Das Gupta, Ashin. 1975. Indian Merchants and the Decline o f Surat (Wiesbandon: Franz Stenier Vering). Desai, I. P. 1985. ‘Anti-Reservation Agitation and Structure of Gujarat Society’ in Caste, Caste Conflict and Reservations, Centre for Social Studies (Delhi: Ajanta Publications). Desai, M. B. 1971. Tenancy Abolition and the Emerging Pattern in Gujarat (Bombay: MS University). Desai, Mahadev H. 1940. A Righteous Struggle (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Pub­ lishing House). Dobbin, Christine. 1972. Urban Leadership in Western India (London: Oxford University Press). Economic Intelligence Service, Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy. 1938. Vol. 2, States (Bombay: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy). Erdman, Howard. 1971. Political Attitudes of Indian Industry: A Case Study of the Baroda Business Elite (London: University of London). Forbes, Alexander K. 1973. Ras Mala: Hindu Annals of Western India (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers) (first published in 1878). Gandhi, M. K. 1965. Collected Works, vol. 14 (Delhi: The Publication Division). Gillion, Kenneth L. 1968. Ahmedabad: A Study in Indian Urban History (Ahmedabad: The New Order Book Company). Gopal, Surendra. 1975. Commerce and Crafts in Gujarat: 16th and 17th Century (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House). Hardiman, David. 1981. Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat (Delhi: Oxford University Press). Jani Manishi. 1981. Berkar Milmajdoor, Behai Milmajdoor (Gujarati) (Ahmeda­ bad: SETU). Karaik, V. B. 1978. Trade Union Movement and Industrial Relations (Bombay: Allied Publishers). Kochanek, Stanley A. 1974. Business and Politics in India (Berkeley: University of California Press). Kothari, Rajni and Sheth, Tarun. 1967. ‘Extent and Limits of Community Voting: The Case of Baroda East* in Kothari et al., Party Systems and Elections Studies (Delhi: Allied Publishers).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Caste Sentim ents and Class Formation in Gujarat

113

Kothari, Rajni and Shah, Ghanshyam. 1967. ‘Caste Orientation or Political Factions* in Kothari et a/., Party Systems and Election Studies (Delhi: Allied Publishers). Mehta, Makrand. 1982. The Ahmedabad Cotton Textile Industry (Ahmedabad: New Order Book Co.). Mishra, R. R. 1961. Effects of Land Reforms in Saurashtra (Bombay: Vora and Co.). Mishra, S. C. 1963. The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat (Bombay: Asia Publishing House). Parekh, Jayshree. 1982. Vepar one Rajkaran (Gujarati), Unpublished PhD thesis, Centre for Social Studies, Surat. Parekh, Hiralal T. 1976. Arvachin Gujaratnu Rekha Darshan (Gujarati) (Ahmeda­ bad: Gujarat Vidhan Sabha). Parikh, R. D. 1965. The Press and Society (Bombay: Popular Prakashan). Patel, Sujata. 1987. The Making of Industrial Relations: The Ahmedabad Textile Industry 1918-1939 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Patel, Priyavadan. 1982. ‘Impact of Irrigation on Power Relationships in a Village: A Case of Tundi* (Surat: Centre for Social Studies), mimeo. ---------- . 1984. ‘Communal Riots in Baroda’ (Surat: Centre for Social Studies), mimeo. Pathak, D. N., Parekh, M. G., Desai, K. D. and Sheth, P. N. n.d. ‘Dimensions of Political Behaviour in Gujarat* (Ahmedabad: Gujarat University), mimeo. Pavlov, V. I. 1979. Historical Premises for India's Transition to Capitalism (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House). Pearson, M. N. 1970. Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal). Pipaliya, L. P. (ed.) 1982. Gujaratna Prajapatio: Ek Abhyas (Gujarati) (Baroda: Jaldhar Society). Pocock, David. 1972. Kanbi and Patidar. (London: Oxford University Press). Rabitoy, Neil. 1975. ‘System V. Expediency: The Reality of Land Revenue Administration in the Bombay Presidency 1812-1820*, Modem Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 4 (Cambridge). Shah, A. M. 1964. ‘Political System in Eighteenth Century Gujarat*, Enquiry, vol. 1, Spring. ---------- . 1982. ‘Division and Hierarchy: An Overview of Caste in Gujarat*, Contributions To Indian Sociology, (NS) vol. 16, no. 1, January-June (Delhi). Shah, B. C. 1982. ‘Evolution of Gujarat Vidhan Sabha*, Journal of Political Studies, (Jullunder) vol. 15, no. 2, September. Shah, Ghanshyam. 1974. Traditional Society and Political Mobilization: The Experiences of Bardoli Satyagraha (1920-1922)’, Contributions to Indian Sociology (NS) no. 8 (Delhi). ---------- . 1975. Caste Association and Political Processes in Gujarat (Bombay: Popular Prakashan). -. 1977. Protest Movements In Two Indian States (Delhi: Ajanta Publica­ tions). 1984. ‘Caste in Contemporary India*, Mainstream, 10 March. ----- . 1985. ‘Caste in Contemporary India*, Caste, Caste Conflict and Reservations, Centre for Social Studies (Delhi: Ajanta Publications). 1987. ‘Middle Class Politics: Case of Anti-Reservation Agitations in Gujarat*, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. xxii, nos. 19, 20, 21, Annual May Number.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

114

GHANSHYAM SHAH

Shah, Ghanshyam and Chaturvedi, H. R. 1985. Gandhian Approach to Rural Development (Delhi: Ajanta Publications). Shah, Narottam. 1979. Some Facets of Industrial Development of Gujarat (Bombay Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy). Sharma, Usha. 1983. ‘Performance and Prospects of Gujarat Agriculture' in D. T. Lakdawala (ed.), Gujarat Economy: Problems and Prospects (Ahmedabad: Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social Research). Sheth, N. R. 1968. The Social Framework of an Indian Factory (Manchester: Manchester University Press). ---------- . 1983. ‘Industrial Relations in Gujarat* in D. T. Lakdawala (ed.), Gujarat Economy: Problems and Prospects (Ahmedabad: Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Soda! Research). Sheth, Pravin. 1976. Patterns of Political Behaviour in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: Sahitya Mudranalaya). Spodek, Howard. 1965. ‘The “Manchesterisation" of Ahmedabad’, Economic Weekly (Bombay), 13 March. ---------- . 1976. Urban-Rural Integration in Regional Development (Chicago: The University of Chicago). Steed, Gitel. 1955. ‘Notes on an Approach to A Study of Personality Formation in a Hindu Village in Gujarat', American Anthropologist (Washington), vol. 57, no. 3, June. Streefkerk, Hein. 1981. Too Little To Live On, Too Much To Die On: Employment in Small Scale Industries in Rural Gujarat*, Economic and Politicd Weekly, (Bombay), vol. 14, no. 15-17, 11, 18 and 25 April. Thomer, Daniel. 1956. The Agrarian Prospect in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press). Van der Veen, Klaas W. 1972../ Give These My Daughter, Aseen Van Gorcum Company, NV. Yagnik, Achyut. 1981. ‘Caste Violence in Gujarat’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Bombay), 28 March.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

CASTE, CLASS AND DOMINANCE: POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN MAHARASHTRA JA Y A N T L E L E

In Maharashtra the contemporary pattern of politico-economic dominance is widely understood as that of the marathas as dominant caste. The usual explanatory formula: pre-colonial brahman and upper caste dominance, colonial secularization through the rise of a cash economy, the consequent rise of non-Brahman or anti-brahman movements and the establishment of lower caste dominance, is often applied to Maharashtra. Contemporary maratha dominance is portrayed, not as a modern reassertion of a traditional hegemonic rulership, resting in the control of the means of production, but as a new and secularly-guided manifestation of lower caste-class consciousness. The numerical strength of the caste cluster, in combination with the economic power gained during the colonial period, are seen as an adequate explanation. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the salient features of the history of Maharashtra in order to establish the nature of continuity and the dynamics of resilience and change in the patterns of dominance in the state. Even though the dominant caste thesis (Mandelbaum, 1970: 358-86) correctly describes some contemporary facets of the maratha caste cluster (substantial and better quality agricultural land control, ritual rank, numerical strength and a willingness to use that strength to assert dominance), it fails to examine the dynamics of mobilization of that numerical strength in the face of substantial internal disparities of wealth, power and status and thereby to recognize the class character of the dominant caste. The ruling elite of the so-called dominant caste maintain their dominance over the unprivileged members of their own caste, and other subordinate castes, by manipulating established political institutions and regimes and, if necessary, by changing them so as to conform to their interests. This chapter proposes to show that in today’s Maharashtra the structures of pluralist democracy have remained relatively intact and that this is so because of their desirability for the maintenance of the privileges of class rule, of which the elite of the maratha caste cluster have a major share, and because of the capacity for resilience and change, displayed throughout the known history of the state by the latter.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

116

JAY ANT LELE

The Social Structure o f Maharashtra The British administrators, given their limited and indirect contact with and understanding of the local population, grouped the entire peasantry, along with all major artisan jatis, into a category of intermediate castes. By contrast they included brahmans, the trading communities of banias or vanis, sonars (artisans working with precious metals) and kayasthas (traditional scribes) in the category of Advanced’ castes, reflecting the economic and social reality only partially, and only as it obtained at the time of the Census of 1931 (Table 1). In Maharashtra, the brahmans are a numerically small cluster of jatis (about 4 per cent of the total population), further divided into a large number of endogamous groups. The most prominent among them are the deshastha brahmans who are the largest in

T able 1 Distribution o f Population: Maharashtra, 1931 Population Total Population Twice-born Castes brahmans kshatriyas vaishyas Upper Shudras agri ahir kurub bhoyar darzi gowari gujar hajam gurav hatkar kharva koti koshti mahratta and kunbi kasar mana mehra pardhan waddar marwari sonar telega sutar yadava

Digitized by

Google

Percentage to Total Population

20,918,503

100.00

815,930 211,204 354,481

3.90 1.00 1.69

246,535 9,278 231,015 19,045 82,949 126,675 7,115 108,474 10,513 40,177 18,287 243,636 136,222 6,526,173 10,924 51,914 998,887 68,119 13,160 32,487 99,193 47,130 92,997 151*518

1.17 0.04 1.10 0.09 0.39 0.60 0.03 0.51 0.05 0.19 0.08 1.16 0.62 31.19 0.05 0.24 4.77 0.32 0.06 0.15 0.47 0.22 0.44 0.72

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

117

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

T able 1 (Contd.) Population Lower Shudras kumbhar kammar teli bairagi bedar be Idar vanjari bahai binjhwar dhimar kalar nai juiahi kalal

136,739 127,159 317,609 18,281 6,102 40,137 143,555 68,257 4,154 157,808 68,222 17,728 37,196 15,975 2,370,555 3,445330 1,229,875

O thers Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Muslims Christians Others SOURCE:

1,486,382 280,196 243,205

Percentage to Total Population

0.65 0.60 1.51 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.23 0.32 0.01 0.75 0.32 0.08 0.17 0.07 11.33 16.47 5.87 7.10 1.33 7.10

Census of India 1931 , Central Provinces and Berar. Nizam’s Dominions and Bombay Presidency Vol. XII, XXII and VIII respectively. Part II.

size and as their name indicates, are native to all regions of Maharashtra (except Konkan). Karve speculates that they must have been the oldest brahman inhabitants of Maharashtra and points to the fact that they were predominantly the brahman vatandars (deshpande and kulkarni) in pre-colonial and early colonial Maharashtra (Karve, 1951: 125). Of the other major brahman jatis, the saraswats, the karhadas and the chitpavans are all originally from the west coast and have their own districts of concentration. Chitpavan brahmans are, for example, concentrated in Ratnagiri district. Unlike the deshastha brahmans, most of whose customs and physical features are indistinguishable from those of the predominant Deccan peasantry, chitpavan brahmans are distinct in both respects. On their arrival in Desh they became administrators, diplomats and soldiers (whereas in the Konkan they were cultivators, priests and traders) and remained concentrated in towns (Johnson, 1973: 56). Karve estimated their number at ‘a little over a hundred thousand' in 1968 (p. 18). In comparison the karhada and saraswat brahmans are numerically small. Some of the karhadas migrated eastwards along with the neighbouring chitpavans while the saraswats became a significant force in the intellectual and commercial life of early colonial Bombay city. The other significant

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

118

JAYANT LELE

jatis that have traditionally followed white collar occupations are the prabhus (kayastha and pathare). They are also predominantly concentrated in the Bombay region. The artisan castes make up about 10 per cent of the population. Lumped together with the peasantry as ‘intermediate castes’ in the 1931 Census, most of them were part of the traditional baluta system which prevailed under the village-yari mode of production. By and large those jati groups which were involved in providing services directly linked to production were widely dispersed as no more than one or two lineages could thrive in any single village. They were described variously as karu or balutedar and were distinguished from the others as naru or balutedar. The latter are sometimes found in much larger concentrations and frequently in or near the urban trading centres (Atre, 1959; Karve, 1960). Dhangarsy who are also grouped with the ‘intermediate castes’, were once a group of predominantly nomadic sheep-herders who have become more and more ‘an adjunct of farming’ (Kosambi, 1970: 42). Although there is a small community of traditional petty-traders along the west coast of Maharashtra (vaishya vani) there have not been any distinct jatis which would conform to the received interpretation of the Vaishya varna. Traditionally, maratha-kunbis and deshastha brahmans had functioned as traders and moneylenders, strictly at the local level. Beginning with the seventeenth century, a number of marwari and gujar merchants entered the arenas of inter-regional trade and subsequently penetrated the countryside in large numbers during the colonial regime. Although the basic ideology of the jati mode of production was, as I shall argue in a later section, that of community and kinship with its patrimonial (inter-jati) and patriarchal (intra-yatt) dimensions governing the caring aspects of inequality and hierarchy, that description when used as a basis of analysis by itself, fails to explain the most controversial aspect of the jati-system, namely, the exclusion of a number of jatis from the physical parameters of the community, through their location outside the village walls. They were described in the 1931 Census as the ‘depressed castes’ and include primarily the mahars and the mangs. Since the colonial period they are often described as asprushyas (untouchables) and are contrasted with the rest of the yo/x-system which is described as savarna (within the boundaries of the varna order). Since the 1931 Census describes the asprushyas as the ‘depressed castes’, the modernists within these jatis have taken the Marathi equivalent for the phrase, Dalits, as the more acceptable nomenclature. In the rest of the chapter 1 shall, therefore, refer to them as Dalits. Among the Dalits, the mahars are the most numerous. In the medieval village system they served as messengers, watchmen, and arbitrators of field and village boundaries. A distinction between their role as the village servant (and hence as vatandars) and the personal chores demanded of them by the patriarchal village officials was difficult to draw. At times it

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

119

involved manual labour on private farms. The errands for the village ana those for the patil (village headman) could not be easily distinguished and this made the mahars often liable to demands of corvee (veth-begar). They were also expected to remove the carcasses of dead animals (dead of natural causes) and were entitled to the flesh of those animals. In addition they were expected to provide wood for the funeral pyre and perform several other duties that came to be seen as impure and polluting. What is more surprising in the light of this most servile and denigrated social status, at least as seen through modernist eyes, is the fact that the mahars have a history of a strong sense of self-consciousness and rebelliousness. This contrasts clearly with a sense of passive inclusiveness that one ordinarily found among most other service castes. The mahars’ strong sense of self-identity was matched by equally strong and often vitriolic expressions of prejudice against them by the brahmans. That hostility predates the contemporary militancy of the mahars and hence calls for a very sensitive historical analysis. Some clues for such an analysis may be found in the controversy over the origins of the name Maharashtra. In 1857 Molsworth speculated, in the preface to his Marathi-English dictionary, that the name Maharashtra is probably traceable to the early inhabitants of the regions, who, he believed, were mahars. He was supported in this by the well-known orientalist John Wilson (1975: xxiii). These suggestions were rejected by Marathi intellectuals such as Bhandarkar and Kane. However, Dr S. V. Ketkar, a highly regarded scholar, revived the notion and argued (1935: chs. 3-5) that the name Maharashtra arose out of the union of two jati names: mahar and ratta. Tulpule (1983: 642) quotes a line from a Mahanubha text (Lilacaritra) that seems to support the notion that the name Maharashtra may in fact be associated with its being the ‘land of mahars'. This also indirectly lends support to the notion that mahars were the early inhabitants of the Deccan. It is possible that they were subjugated by the later settlers and were turned into village servants but without a corresponding place within the jati-system. It is said that the boundary of Maharashtra is coterminous with the spread of the mahar caste (Pandit, 1979: 426). Without any ideological and material stake within the village community, the mahars were the first to go away in search of opportunity whenever the old order slackened under crisis. First during the regime of the peshwas and then under Company rule they entered the various armies, began to work in the textile mills of Bombay and Nagpur, became coolies on the docks and railways or joined the police force. The mangs who were traditional rope, broom and basket weavers as well as executioners and castrators of bullocks, have mostly remained tied to the village system and have often taken up the defiling chores abandoned by the more conscious mahars. Mahars form about 11 per cent of the total population of the state whereas the mangs and other Dalits together constitute about 4 per cent of the population.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

120

JAYANT LBLB

The varied tribal population of the state lives on the periphery of the jati system, and geographically, in the peripheral hill areas of the districts of Thane, Nasik, Dhule and Chandrapur. They were traditionally dependent on forest resources and practised shifting cultivation. With the enclosures of the forests by the British they lost that economic base. They first turned to peasant cultivation but were soon pauperized by moneylenders and traders who arrived to serve the needs of a colonial economy. This led to the displacement of the tribals by experienced kunbi cultivators in many cases (Upadhaya, 1980). Many of the tribals sank to the level of bonded labourers. Others were reduced to cultivating marginal hilly tracts and to supplementing their income by working as agricultural labourers. Regional Differences The general picture of the social composition of Maharashtra holds for all regions but there are some significant differences. They are in part a consequence of the political, economic and administrative history of the last several centuries. In turn they have had an impact on the subsequent political development of the state. The caste composition of Marathwada and western Maharashtra was roughly similar in 1931, and probably

T able 2 Distribution o f Population in Bombay Deccan, Konkan and Vidharba in Selected Caste Groups (1931) (Percentage to total peculation in the region) Caste konknastha brahman deshastha brahman Total brahmans vani sonar C.K.P. maratha kunbi mail dhangar koli Artisan castes* lingayat mahar mang chambhar Total Depressed Castes

Konkan

Deccan

Vidaibha

1.8 0.5 4.2 — 1.1 0.4

0.6 2.3 3.9 1.1 0.9 0.1

N.A. N.A. 3.2 1.8 1.0 0.1

38.7 0.5 0.7 2.5 4.3 — 6.1 — 0.9 7.2

36.9 3.7 3.8 2.0 5.7 1.5 7.6 2.0 1.7 12.0

23.0 5.4 — — 10.7 — 15.1 0.8 1.1 18.0

• Indudes shimpi, pant, nhavi, koshti, sutar, lohar and teli. S o u r c e s : (1 ) Census of India, 1931, vol. XH1, Bombay Presidency, Part Q, Tables. (2) Census of India, 1931, vol. XII, C. P. Berar. Part Q, Tables.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

121

remains approximately the same to this date. However the proportion of mahars as well as that of the other Dalits such as mangs and chambhars (called mochis, perhaps as a result of the Islamic impact of the Nizam’s rule) was larger than that in Bombay Deccan in 1931 (Tables 2,3). Brahme and Upadhyay (1979) attribute this difference to the fact that Marathwada land is much more fertile and that civilization had flourished in the region for a much longer duration (beginning from 300 b c ) . The presence of the urban centres, and of larger agricultural surpluses probably allowed for a greater growth of artisan and trading activities in the region (1979: 38). There is some evidence to suggest that a substantial amount of land had passed into the hands of ‘non-cultivating classes’ during the first decades of the twentieth century thus creating demand for an influx of landless agricultural labour into Marathwada. As part of the Nizam’s state (Map 1) the region was politically separated from the emerging urban centres in the Bombay Presidency. The dispossessed balutedars, especially the mahars of Marathwada, were less likely to have moved away to major urban centres. In addition the system of landholding in the Nizam’s territories had retained the deshmukh vatandars in control of large tracts of fertile land in contrast to the ryotwari settlements of the British Presidency. Absentee

T able 3 Distribution o f Population in Marathwada (Hyderabad State) by Caste!Community (1931) Percentage of population

Caste brahman lingayai kom b marwari rajpul maratha Iambi hatkar hah koh dhangar bhoi gurav beldar vadar, vathal banjara sonar SOURCE: C en su s

3.68 5.62 1.38 0.94 0.86 30.95 1.42 1.05 2.31 1.04 4.70 1.32 0.35 0.62 0.47 1.16 0.91 of India,

Digitized by

1931,

Percentage of population

Caste suiar lohar teU kasar kasab kumbhar dewang shimpi dhobi nhavi rangari mahar mang-mochi O ther Hindu Castes Tribals Muslims O ther Non-Hindus

0.42 0.46 0.83 0.33 0.28 1.01 1.07 0.35 0.54 0.81 0.26 10.16 6.45 3.17 1.97 11.12 0.81

vol. XIII, Hyderabad State, Part II. Tables.

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

JAYANT LELE

122

Map I. Political Boundaries of the Marathi-speaking Region in the Colonial Period

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

123

Political M obilization in Maharashtra T able 4

Percentage o f Scheduled Tribes and Castes, Nav-Baudhas and Agricultural Labourers in 1981 Percentage to Total Population Scheduled Tribe

Scheduled Caste

NavBaudhas*

2

3

4

Total Cols. (2)+ (j> + w 5

1.02 21.16 12.80 1.50

4.84 2.50 1.16 2.14

4.76 2.51 4.41 5.55

10.62 26.17 18.37 9.19

0.06 4.90 5.31 2.82

Konkan** Nashik Dhulc Jalgaon Ahmednagar Pune Satara Sangli Solapur Kolhapur

13.61 23.45 40.53 8.25 6.93 2.81 0.64 0.85 1.98 1.09

2.20 6.21 4.11 5.89 10.62 7.53 6.21 11.16 14.39 12.07

3.71 5.10 1.73 4.64 2.55 5.06 5.78 2.95 1.75 0.78

19.52 34.76 46.37 18.78 20.10 15.40 12.63 14.% 18.12 13.94

4.36 12.75 15.94 16.61 11.88 4.53 6.85 7.65 11.17 6.07

Western Maharashtra Aurangabad Parbhani Beed Nanded Osmanabad

9.36 3.11 4.30 0.90 10.19 2.33

8.65 6.18 5.82 11.47 11.30 15.45

3.49 8.15 11.49 2.69 9.66 4.04

21.50 17.44 21.61 15.06 $1.13 21.82

10.11 11.78 17.54 12.59 14.05 14.65

Marathwada Buldhana Akola Amravati YavatmaJ Wardha Nagpur Bhandara Chandrapur Vidarbha

4.08 4.40 6.28 12.98 21.30 15.35 13.65 16.22 26.73 14.89

9.93 6.27 5.51 6.16 4.88 3.98 7.05 9.75 6.53 6.45

7.21 12.27 16.14 13.40 9.21 14.35 14.54 13.01 10.44 12.91

21.22 22.94 27.93 32.54 35.39 33.68 35.24 38.98 43.70 34.25

13.39 20.52 21.59 21.22 24.65 20.65 9.37 12.39 12.71 17.08

9.19

7.14

6.47

22.80

10.36

10.43

7.48

6.20

24.11

11.92

District 1 G reater Bombay Thane Raigad Ratnagjri

Maharashtra State M aharashtra State**

Agricul­ tural Labourers 6

* Based on 1971 Census. " Excluding Bombay.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

124

JAY ANT LELE

landlordism and cultivation through hired labour were far more common in Marathwada than in western Maharashtra. Marathwada became a major cotton growing region in the late nineteenth century, thus increasing the demand for agricultural labour (Pavier, 1981). Whereas the percentage of maratha-kunbis in western Maharashtra and Marathwada was approximately the same (41 per cent in western Maharashtra in 1911, 33 per cent in Marathwada excluding the hatkars and 37 per cent including them, in 1931) their percentage in Vidarbha was considerably lower (26 per cent). The mahars were about 15 per cent of the population and the other Dalits about four per cent. Like Marathwada, the number of Dalits in Vidarbha is substantially higher while that of maratha-kunbis is considerably lower. In 1961 Dalits formed about 18 per cent of the population of Vidarbha and 17 per cent of Marathwada. The proportion for the state as a whole was about 12 per cent. Like Marathwada, Vidarbha has been a major cotton growing region from the early period of the region’s incorporation into the colonial-industrialcapitalist system. The disproportionately large presence of Dalits in these regions represents their incorporation into the capitalist wage labour system. More recent data on the proportion of agricultural labourers among Dalits bears witness to this fact (Table 4). The Pre-Colonial Origins o f Maratha-Brahman Dominance The origins of maratha-kunbi caste dominance are lost in ancient history. It is generally agreed that the basis for a cross-regional Marathi identity was laid somewhere around 600 b c when several waves of migration from the north seem to have occurred. For several subsequent centuries, scattered agrarian settlements occurred in various parts of Maharashtra. Those who took the leading role in both migration and settlement were already in or soon assumed leadership roles in the newly settled communities. Their leadership functions would have initially included the organization of agricultural activities directed towards production and enhancement of surplus. They also took control of its collection and distribution. The organization and supervision of human labour for production was, once established, governed by tradition and custom under normal conditions. The leaders of the village communities were required to take initiative in maintaining a high level of productivity under changing social and natural conditions. Because of the vagaries of the monsoons, the villages experienced frequent crop failures. The consequent outward migration under conditions of scarcity and famines brought special responsibilities for amelioration of distress and the rehabilitation of those who had arrived in search of better opportunities having abandoned their own settlements. Resettlement of abandoned villages after return to normalcy also became a challenge. The rights and responsibilities which came with this leadership role became hereditary and were symbolized in clearly defined privileges which

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

125

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

later came to be described as vatan. Having a vatan meant having ensured income from agricultural land which was recognized as free of any tax claims and other encumbrances (badharahit). The village leaders, who were earlier described in Sanskrit or Prakrit as gramkut or chaudharikamagavund later came to be known as patils in Marathi. Their vatan land was usually the largest and the best in the village. In addition they had several other ritual privileges and income sources which together point to the central leadership role of the village patils. Almost as important but undoubtedly subordinate to the maratha-kunbi patil, in wealth, power and privilege, was the brahman village official (with vatan) called kulkarni (or pande) who has often been described as the village accountant. He was actually much more than that since he controlled all the secular knowledge vital to the production process which was not directly accessible from the everyday experience of cultivation.. Other village officials also held vatans on a much smaller scale. The central relations of production were those of the cultivation of land, including all the processes up to the harvesting of the produce. For the proprietary peasants (later called mirasdars and thalkaris) that is, the kunbis, these processes were the way of life (vrtti). The peasantry was at the centre of the village as the unit of production. Village patils were the leading patriarchs of these peasant lineages. The other inhabitants of the village, hereditary village servants and artisans (balutedars) contributed through their labour and skills to the production process and received, in return, shares of the village produce. They were also similarly organized as lineages with hereditary skills, occupations and rights within the organized political economy of the village. While their own patriarchs participated in corporate decision-making there could not have been any doubt as to who the pre-eminent members were. The cultivating lineages were able to put their own stamp on the socio-cultural idioms of village life from those early days. The Marathi villages, with their institutions of jati, balutedari and vatandari, were total and internally integrated basic units of economic, political and socio-cultural activity. According to Panse, 'since village and vatan are inseparably linked together from their times of origin, the institution of vatan (vatandari) is as ancient as the institution of village (gramasansthay (1963 : 75). The vatandars were the links between the village and the larger regional political units. The earliest of these regional links were likely to have been based on the principles of kinship and kinship alliances governed by the rules of exogamy and endogamy. The major village vatandars (patU and kulkarni) were paralleled at the regional level (consisting of a set of villages) by deshmukhs and deshpandes. The regional links were further extended through the rise of several dynasties between 300 b c and a d 500. By and large these seem to have been established by some of the traditional regional leaders through the conquest of territories and communities outside their area of traditional control.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

126

JAY ANT LELE

The first known of these dynasties, the Sathavahans, ruled over major parts of the region between 230 b c and a d 225. They were followed by the Vakataks, Abhirs, Chalukyas and Yadavs, each with a different part of the Marathi region as its core and an empire extending over substantial parts of Maharashtra. As to their origins we have only their own claims about their high Kshatriya or Brahman pedigree. This and similar evidence has led two eminent historians to come to contradictory conclusions about the relationship of the kings to their subjects. Thapar (1966) claims that these dynasties served the cause of rapid Aryanization of the region and that they imposed upon their subjects the Sanskrit language and ‘the Aryan cultural pattern' which was alien. Raj wade, on the other hand, came to the conclusion that these Kshatriya rulers and their brahman legitimizes were forced to abandon Sanskrit and to accept the language of the people (quoted in Bedekar, 1947: 15). A possible way to reconcile these contradictory conclusions based on different sets of evidence is to realize that the regional ru les attempting to extend their authority beyond their circle of traditional jati and kinship ties must have faced a difficult problem. Many of them had to remain at the mercy of local chieftains in distant areas whose loyalty could not be taken for granted. In order to reduce the sting of forced demand for a share in the surplus which must have seemed patently unreasonable to both the local leaders and their subjects, the distant kings sought legitimacy in varnashramdharma. They claimed for themselves Kshatriya status and awarded special patronage to the priestly brahmans and their temples in the alien territories and at their courts and cities (Omvedt, 1976: 51). In the areas in which they could claim natural legitimacy on traditional grounds many of these kings became patrons of the literature in the local dialect and of local folk art and culture. Sathavahana inscriptions and coins show their organic links with their own subjects. Their court language was Maharashtri, a prakrit precursor of Marathi. One of the Sathavahana kings, Hala, assembled a monumental anthology of folk verses in the first century (Sahastrabudhe, 1979). It speaks for the deep roots of these kings in the local soil which could only have been possible as a consequence of kinship and jati ties to the people of the village settlements. The kings of this period were simultaneously engaged in advancing the process of Aryanization of the larger region while encouraging the emergence of a rich and distinct culture in the core region. The pattern was carried into the days of the Yadav dynasty ( a d 1187-1318) where an early Yadav (Bhillam) king was the patron of the eminent Marathi poet, Mukundraj (around the 1180s) and had even become converted to the heretical and radically anti-vamashram faith of the Mahanubhavs. It seems reasonable to conclude that the tension between community and oppression, between remaining local leaders and becoming imperial rulers, was at the root of the apparent paradox in the relationship between the kings and their subjects in early medieval Maharashtra.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

127

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

This tension between the emerging folk tradition rooted in the material conditions of the village-vaian-/aft‘ mode and the pan Indian vamashram ideology had some significant consequences for the pattern of integration of Maharashtra’s society and culture in the subsequent era. Kings in early medieval Maharashtra were not really conspiring against their subjects in order to force Aryanization against their will, nor were they the minority Kshatriyas yielding to the majority by abandoning Sanskrit to adopt prakrit. They were most probably acting within the traditional patriarchalpatrimonial idiom, at least within their core regions, while extracting additional surplus from the regions of the empire. Some of the dynasties emerged out of rebellions by local chieftains against these less than legitimate external overlords. They competed with each other as well as with their previous masters for the control of territories beyond the core region. Through their activities of administration and warfare the various dynasties made a very substantial contribution to the rise of a common language and culture around the shared material reality of vUlage-vatan-jati based agrarian production. The roots of what is commonly described as maratha caste dominance lie in the agrarian social order that came into existence in the early centuries of the Christian era and continued in its essential form into the colonial period. New settlements produced leaders at the local level who had regional and imperial links. Their leadership rested not only on their early pioneering activities leading to new settlements but also on shouldering ongoing responsibilities in order to keep those settlements highly productive. Because of the vagaries of the monsoons these settlements experienced regular cycles of scarcity and famines and the consequent outward migrations by the inhabitants. Patils and deshmukhs had to regularly involve themselves in efforts at resettlement of aban­ doned villages and ensure that normalcy returned to the region or that the distressed inhabitants were rehabilitated at other, more fortunate locations. With the privilege of vatans9therefore, went major responsibili­ ties towards the settled populations under the control of the vatandars. Along with the incorporation of villages into regions came not only a regional consciousness and the caring chieftains and kings but also the ambitious ones with .a desire to extend their domain of control beyond established kinship and other shared cultural boundaries. Some of them at least may have been motivated by a desire to increase the well-being of their subjects by augmenting the surplus through the conquest of more fertile and productive regions. By fostering Aryanization they did not seem to have gained the loyalty of the far flung regions; instead, at times, they managed to alienate their own subjects, by distancing themselves from the shared traditions. The most striking example of this seems to be that of the Yadav dynasty. The founders of the Yadav dynasty had once been the local leaders of their region, under the overlordship of an (alien* king. Their territories com­

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

128

JAYANT LELE

prised the present Khandesh, Nasik and Ahmadnagar districts. Yadavs themselves traced their descent to Lord Krishna of Mathura but those claims seem more of an attempt at seeking wider legitimation across the new re­ gions of conquest. Although no direct references are to be found in the sources to the castes of the local and regional leaders of pre-Yadav and Yadav periods, scholars have assumed that by at least the twelfth century most of them belonged to what was later on clearly identifiable as the maratha-kunbi caste cluster. The structural conditions for a distinction between the rulers and the sub­ jects had emerged in terms of distinct patil and deshmukh lineages, and the ground for a distinction between marathas and kunbis had been prepared by the twelfth century. In the Mahikavati Bakhar of Keshavacharya (with its disputed date of a d 1448), the term maratha is used but it includes the elite marathas (referred to only in terms of their Rajputlike clan organization into ninety-six kuls), along with other kunbis as well as the normal balutedars and some tribals (Bedekar, 1947:15). Rajwade refers to the predominant caste-clusters of this period, ‘Maratha-Kshatriyas, Maratha-Kunbis, Sudra-Kunbis and Nagavanshi-Mahars’, as the consti­ tuents of the maratha regional community (quoted in Bedekar, 1947: 15). This means that these distinctions had in fact come into being, although they had a degree of fluidity and flexibility. The rules of hypergamy among the self-conscious elite marathas must have evolved out of this fluidity. They continued to provide the same kind of necessary flexibility of boundaries as had obtained earlier. In the post-Yadav period marathas who were linked to the ruling families and dynasties and had turned into fighters and commanders in the period of imperial campaigns must have begun to think of themselves as being different from the ordinary kunbi peasants. Even though they were still linked to each other through kinship ties, the successful warriors and commanders must have sought to restrict their subsequent kinship alliances to those with similar wealth and status. Having claimed Kshatriya status for legitimizing their new authority role they must have become progressively more distant from their peasant kin. The presence of the armies of the kings from distant parts of Maharashtra, their demands for loyalty and tribute, their use of the varna ideology to legitimize overlordships must also have had considerable impact on those deshmukhs and patils who did not become feudatories and chieftains in the struggles for empire. A desire for seeking kinship links with the wealthy and powerful overlords made some of them ready accomplices, thus separating them also from their natural leadership links and organic kinship ties with the kunbi peasantry. In either case the distinctions never seem to have reached a stage of total exclusion. In fact the answer found by the elites to the problem of alienation was that of a hypergamous hierarchy of the kuls, leaving the periphery open for selective inclusion of the more successful ones from below. The imposition of Aryanization must have proceeded apace, but not

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

129

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

without resistance. Its impact was eased because of the dual relationship of the empire makers to the people of their homeland and to those of the other regions. Thapar’s claim that the Maharashtrian kings treated local dialects with contempt is only partially valid even for the Yadavs (1966: 122). In fact they not only used both the local dialects and the Brahmanic Sanskrit but also equally glorified them. That evenhandedness towards the folk tradition seems to have deteriorated in favour of total Aryanization by the time of the last of the major Yadav kings, Ramdeorao (1271-1309). It was a period of severe economic crisis and of an accompanying crisis of legitimacy of the ruling classes. Ramdeorao was the patron of Hemadri, a brahman who produced a compendium of two thousand religious vows, observances, festivals and feasts. This work epitomizes the worst in the ritualism associated with the vamashram social order. Hemadri’s glorification of ritualism bears testimony to the crisis of legitimacy (Lele, 1984). Levels of oppression and unreasonable surplus extraction must have risen as the elites of the society, according to Raj wade, 'concentrated all their attention on living luxurious­ ly in the name of spiritual devotion’ (quoted in Gadgil, 1979: 285). The most outstanding literary masterpiece of this period, written in Marathi and representing the best in the folk tradition, Dnyaneshwari, was written, not by a court poet but by a santy whom the anti-Brahman Varkari movement recognized as its inspirer-founder. It was written during the tottering regime of Ramdeorao Yadav and is like a counterpoint to Hemadri’s Chaturvargachintamani. In essence it was a critique of the uncaring rulers and their self-serving brahman legitimizes. The Yadav empire fell under the onslaught of the invasions of the Northern Muslims (Khiljis) beginning in a d 1320. It had become untenable from within because of the alienation between the ru les, including many of the descendants of the once natural leades of the village and regional communities, and the people. That alienation was reflected in the use of Brahmanic ritualism by the ruling classes. The popular resistance to this maratha-kshatriya and brahman dominance took the form of two major 'cultural revolts’ (Omvedt, 1976: 53-4) of the Varkari and Mahanubhav panths (movements). Both of them attacked orthodoxy and its oppressive material consequences. While the Mahanubhavs contracted into a state of quarantined deviance, the Varkaris continued to present a popular and immanent critique of a once caring social order that had turned oppressive (Lele, 1981b). The ideas and practices of the Varkari sants had gained widespread acceptance among the working classes, peasants and artisans, including many of the Dalits. All the Varkari sant poets of this period came from the lower artisan and peasant castes including the mahars. The only exception was Dnyaneshwar who was the son of an excommunicated brahman. They, and their thousands of followers, were spread over all of Maharashtra. They reaffirmed its socio-cultural unity and consciousness in the face of shifting political and administrative boundaries.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

130

JAY ANT LELE

The ostensible cause of the downfall of the Yadav dynasty was the massive invasions by the powerful northern Muslims. Neither Varkaris nor Mahanubhavs can be claimed to have produced the overthrow from within. ‘Modem’ assessments of these two movements treat them as merely religious and cultural revolts without radical, revolutionary theory and practice. The Varkari panth has been specially singled out for a critique as an inadequate passive response to Brahmanism which essentially upheld the dominance of that ideology (Lele, 1981b). This is a patently functionalist view of social history in which potentialities are judged exclusively in terms of outcome. I have argued elsewhere that if we were to set aside functionalist blinders and try to understand the message of these movements within their historical context, they become unmistakably authentic revolutionary challenges to the maratha-kshatriya and brahman dominance which had generated during this era an unprecedented level of social oppression (Lele, 1984). The conjuncture of prior internal dis­ satisfaction and alien invasions further exacerbating the impact of oppression was quite unforeseen. The invasion effectively shifted popular attention from the intrinsic causes to the external Muslim invaders who were, as aliens, far more visible. The indigenous elites exploited this opportunity to deflect the critique away from their own unreasonable privileges. The use of the term brahman-maratha dominance is perhaps not appropriate until after the end of the Yadav dynasty, since it was not part of the vocabulary of the actors. However, Aryanization, connoting Brahman-Kshatriya dominance, probably was nothing else, in terms of the real social relations. The overt use of the maratha-kunbi distinction began to occur once the northern Muslims had established their regime over most of Maharashtra beginning in 1318. During the declining years of the Yadav kingdom, when the regime was weak, and in the early years of the Delhi Sultanate when the regime was young, the jagirdars had taken to plundering the labouring classes. As mediators between the totally alien Muslim rulers and the locally rooted village elites and masses their political power increased substantially during this period. In 1347 the Turkish governor of the Delhi Sultanate in the Deccan revolted and established his Bahamani dynasty. This was in keeping with the practice of the times in which local governors could conveniently shift their allegiances when it became feasible to do so, in terms of the degree of strength or weakness of the armed power of the overlords. In this case there was no question of popular support to the old or the new regimes; neither made any sense within the world-view of the village-based peasant society. The Varkari movement remained strong during this period and perhaps influenced the unusually enlightened relationship between the first Bahamani ruler and his subjects. Many of the maratha deshmukh lineages which came into greater

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

131

prominence in the next three hundred years, were already in ruling position during the Bahamani period. Rajwade cites the names of Nikam, Rane, Shirke, Sawant, More and Ghorpade as deshmukhs who had quietly accepted the claims of the new rulers. All of them belonged to the inner circles of maratha hypergamic clans. Once these maratha jagirdars had accepted Muslim kings as legitimate rulers, even the semblance of a caring order must have disappeared from the legitimacy claims based on Hindu vamashram ideology. At the same time, the ravages of famines and unreasonable revenue demands by alien rulers and their jagirdars, tax collectors and army commanders, continued to plague the population. This was the period during which Maharashtra experienced one of the worst famines in history. It lasted for twelve consecutive years. It was also the period during which a Russian traveller noted the fact that while the jagirdars had fattened themselves with wealth, the sons of the soil were mired in sorrow and poverty (Cambridge History, vol. 3, 432). The use of the term maratha for the name of a caste rather than the entire people of the region became common during this period. It was used by the jagirdars of the maratha-kunbi caste cluster to distinguish themselves from the ordinary peasant kunbis. Those who had 'made it’ by participating in the campaigns into the territories beyond Maharashtra found it convenient to be recognized exclusively by the designation which the foreigners were normally apt to use to refer to any of the inhabitants of the maratha country. One aspect of this separation of identity was the increased Islamization of the jagirdar lifestyle and the Persianization of their Marathi. Consequently, the maratha chieftains who had served themselves well by serving the alien rulers must have become further alienated from their local subjects. The thrust of this evidence is that the rise of Brahman-Kshatriya dominance as a form of brahman -maratha dominance occurred at those moments in history during which the communal, caring aspects of the village-vato/i mode of production and surplus appropriation were seriously threatened by the political turmoil at the regional level. The critical response of the masses took the form of potentially revolutionary cultural revolts which contributed to the emergence of a mass-based sociocultural national consciousness with those denied caring aspects of community as its core. Some of the kings, affected by the power of appeal of this critique, tried to introduce some semblance of a just political order but were frustrated in this effort by the state of aggressive competition between the local jagirdars or the Muslim feudatories. Even though the brahmanmaratha hegemony did come under serious doubt and critical scrutiny by the intellectuals of the masses, in the context of the anarchic times, this internal challenge merely helped perpetuate the otherwise untenable alien kingdoms despite their mutually destructive warfare. However, the dynamics of challenges to the communal world view and of the responses to these, worked so as to adapt the village-vatan-jati relations of production

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

132

JAYANT LELE

to the changing demands of the larger polity without destroying the core of the relations. Shivaji: The Politics o f Accommodation The period between 1500 and 1650 was characterized by a combination of a rise in ritualistic orthodoxy and the economic plunder of the masses. These were counterpointed by the second major thrust of the Varkari critique of brahman-maratha dominance. The new Varkari sants Eknath (1553-66) and Tukaram (1601-50) were even more explicit and incisive in their condemnation of the inauthenticity of the prevailing social order and its Brahmanic legitimation. Ordinary events in the lives of these sants, as they exposed the falsehood of orthodoxy, acquired legendary and mythical proportions in the folklore of the masses. Given the nearly total political anarchy of this period (Bedekar, 1960), even the second upsurge of the Varkari critique merely reinforced the stalemate. Shivaji was born in 1627. In 1630-1 all of Maharashtra was engulfed in a severe famine which the people of the region were to remember for a long time to come. The universalistic notions of community and caring, the benign face of the communal ideology, had been developed and transmitted to the masses by the Varkari poet saints through their words and actions. The counter-factuality of that community was experienced by the masses, in its utmost severity, during the famine. Shivaji capitalized on their heightened sensitivity to the denial of community in everyday life. His genius lies in the fact that like some of the Bahamani rulers he brought the competition among the maratha jagirdars under control. Shivaji (1627-80) was typically a product of his own times, a member by birth and achievement, of the ruling class of jagirdars. Like most other maratha jagirdars, his father, Shahaji Bhosle, had alternately served three different Muslim powers in the service of his own interests (Sahastrabudhe, 1979: 275-82). Himself a son of a jagirdar whose career was an example of shifting loyalties, Shivaji's intentions were naturally suspected by his fellow feudatories. His pedigree itself was brought into doubt by the fact that his grandfather had risen from the ranks to noble status. His attempts to make many of the deshmukhs accept him as a deshmukh (he came from a patil lineage), and their overlord, and to enforce the proposed reforms in revenue collection practices were strenuously resisted by the older and more established ones. Shivaji accomplished a near miracle in subduing their revolts within his own lifetime. His strategy had four major dimensions. In the first instance Shivaji turned to the common folk within his jagir area in order to build a loyal army of regulars. He recruited from the kunbi peasantry (known as mavle in the hilly areas) a large number of those who had fought in the battles of their chieftains as occasional soldiers. He promoted many of them rapidly to higher ranks in the army on the basis of their valour and performance. As they rose in wealth and achievement

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

133

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

some of them became accepted into the ranks of the now distinct marathas, often through convenient marriages. A minimally equipped army of dedicated soldiers who could stand their ground for months in the hilly tracts against the large and well equipped armies of the emperor and his local allies among the village elites was Shivaji’s greatest asset in subduing the recalcitrant deshmukhs. He enhanced the legitimacy of his regime beyond his own drought-prone and poor jagir area by consciously attempting to provide a just and caring administration and exemplary personal conduct. He warned the deshmukhs as well as his own appointed officers to end the harassment of the kunbis. The first two actions gave Shivaji an unmatched advantage over his enemy from the north. The Mughal emperor Aurangzeb who incessantly pursued the empire’s interest in the Deccan was exasperated by the enthusiastic collaboration of the peasantry with the maratha ‘robber’ (Ranade, 1974: 48; Habib, 1963: 350). In the end most of the rebellious jagirdars also accepted the necessity of collaborating with an upstart overlord. The new Mughal challenge, with Aurangzeb’s religious zealotry, was threatening their long term interest and dominance. In Shivaji’s swarajya they had first seen a threat to their dominance: later they came to see it as a vehicle for its stabilization and enhancement. Shivaji reassured them of his commitment to the old order by insisting on full Brahmanic legitimization of his achievements. While getting himself crowned as a Kshatriya (‘kshatriya kulavatansa’) chatrapati (‘the lord of the protective parasol of his subjects’) he also gave himself the title of ‘the protector of the cow and the brahman’ (‘go-brahmana pratipalak’). Correspondingly he provided a material basis for his patriarchal claims over his subjects through aggressive campaigns into the more prosperous neighbouring territories and secured for himself new rights of tax collection with which he enriched his treasury and ensured the well-being of his armies. Shivaji tried to fabricate a political nation out of the socio-cultural legitimacy derived from his conscious use of the communal ideology fostered among the masses by the Varkari sants. He curbed the autonomy of jagirdars at home and gave protection and stability to the daily life of his subjects. He recruited into his army peasants (kunbis) and artisans impoverished by the recent famines. Some of them rose to an elite maratha jagirdar status on acquiring power and wealth just as Shivaji’s own grandfather had done in his own time. Through aggressive campaigns into other territories he provided sustenance to his armies and additional revenue for his treasury. By aggressively asserting his Kshatriya status through the intervention of imported brahmans, by becoming a titled protector of their rights and privileges, by appointing a number of them to high positions within his administration, Shivaji reinstated brahmanmaratha dominance; at the same time, by defining and scrupulously obeying the cultural boundaries of a just and caring administration within his domain, he blunted the Varkari critique of orthodoxy and oppression.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

134

ja

Ya n t

lele

M ap II. The Kingdom of Sivaji, 1680

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

135

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

In an apparently paradoxical way Shivaji’s efforts were both a challenge and a response to the challenges which had been pressed against maratha-brahman dominance. By exploiting the flexible boundaries of the maratha-kunbi caste cluster he defused the increasing exclusiveness of the maratha gentry and thus enhanced its legitimacy among the masses. By controlling the competition among deshmukhs he gave it a semblance of a caring social order without adversely affecting the competitive deshmukhi system itself. His attempts to make himself an emperor were first seen as a threat by the established local brahman-maratha elites. The brahmans who had all along been the natural allies of the deshmukhs insisted that Shivaji was a Shudra and not a Kshatriya and hence could not be crowned through a proper chatrapati ritual. In this they were echoing the fears of the established deshmukhs whose own claims to Kshatriya status had a somewhat longer standing than Shivaji’s. Even though the actual area of Maharashtra under Shivaji's direct control remained quite small during his own lifetime (Map 2) the centre of the maratha-brahman dominance shifted decisively to western Maharashtra during this period. While Shivaji's armies often invaded and made exorbitant revenue demands on the deshmukhs in Vidarbha and Marathwada, the core of the traditional maratha gentry (deshmukhs) in both these regions was not directly affected in the same way as in Shivaji's swarajya with the influx of the kunbi nouveaux. In the future, it would become the coveted reference group of the more active but less pristine maratha deshmukhs of western Maharash­ tra. Soon after Shivaji's death the struggle for succession between his daughter-in-law (on behalf of her infant son) and his grandson Shahu caused a serious split within the maratha army. Until then and for sometime after, the spirit of nationhood permeating his forces and his subjects sustained a tenacious war effort against a formidable Mughal onslaught. As a result, Aurangzeb died in Marathwada, tired and frustrated by the tenacity of the maratha soldiers and the peasantry. Eventually, the internal factionalism between Shivaji's descendants led to the depletion of loyal and competent generals and administrators on both sides. In the end Shahu appointed Balaji Vishwanath Bhat, a chitpavan brahman from the Konkan region, as his peshwa (Chief Minister) in 1713. Since loyalty was a scarce commodity among the more established, senior and experienced generals and administrators, and since loyalties were divided between the two claimants of the royal house, Shahu's choice of a relative upstart, with a lot of ambition and little else to go on, does not seem surprising. It did, however, provoke the ire of the established deshastha administrators who had dominated Shivaji's administration (Gavali, 1982). Later, the peshwa's ambition and his chitpavan caste came to be seen as a threat to the maratha dominance by the elites of that caste as well.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

136

Digitized by

JAYANT LELE

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

137

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

The Peshwa Interlude Throughout the preceding period the core institutions of Maharashtrian society, jadt vatan and village, remained strong across all regions, despite the many upheavals and shifts in control and authority of different kingdoms and feudal estates over different parts of the country. Cultural movements spanning all of Maharashtra had emerged out of the shared experience of village life. The regions of Vidarbha and Marathwada and parts of north Maharashtra were heavily contested for control by the various Muslim kingdoms including the Mughals. The same pattern continued even after the peshwasy with their unusual drive and initiative, were able to extend their claims much farther into the north. However, they were not able to add any of these regions to the swarajya. Instead they created a Confederacy (Map 3), of a number of powerful, autonomous feudatories who ruled over their domains like independent monarchs. Their links with the peshwa as the minister of the maratha chatrapati were mostly formal and limited to the recognition of the suzerainty of Shivaji’s successors through the payment of a tribute. The ideology of swarajya was often invoked by the peshwas but the confederators responded to it only when it suited their interests. In addition to the maratha jagirdars in the north (Shinde of Gwalior, Holkar of Indore, Gaikawad of Baroda, Pawar of Dhar and Bhosle of Nagpur), the peshwas created a large number of feudal estates for their loyal chitpavan associates. Most of these were located in southern Maharashtra, surrounding the shninken directly ruled territories of one of Shivaji’s successors with his capital at Kolhapur. The relations between that king and the peshwas had deteriorated over time and the stronger among the peshwas had hoped to contain the possible initiatives on behalf of the king by surrounding him with several chitpavan chieftains (Garge, 1968). As it was demonstrated vividly during the days of decline, loyalty to the peshwa regime, even among the chitpavan feudatories, was strictly a matter of functional interest. It was generally believed that most of the peshwas were prone to set the members of the Confederacy against each other and hence they were not to be trusted. Within the swarajya territories the peshwas introduced a structure of supervisory administration consisting of mamlatdars and subhedars. In order to make this new, parallel hierarchy loyal to themselves, they brought in numbers of their fellow chitpavans from the Konkan. Even under the most ambitious and effective of the peshwas, the entire local power structure, consisting of the major maratha stalwarts of the Confederacy at the top, down to the smaller maratha deshmukhs and patilsy as well as the deshastha kulkarnis and deshpandes, had only reluctantly accepted the rule of the peshwas. The resentment was the strongest among the loyal supporters of the maratha king of Kolhapur. It was matched by a long standing distrust of the peshwa*s intentions among the far-flung aristocracy of the Confederacy. Within the long established

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

138

JAY ANT LELE

traditional political economy of Maharashtra the peshwas and the chitpavans had arrived as alien upstarts. The established maratha princes never allowed them to forget that fact. During the hundred odd years of the peshwa regime, the older village structure persisted rather tenaciously. In western Maharashtra the power and prestige of the deshmukhs and deshpandes was threatened by the parallel system of revenue administration (Fukazawa, 1983:177-206). The attack on the old system was very ‘modern’ in its conception. It used mamlatdars to keep a watch on and to reduce the traditional authority of the deshmukhs. At the same time deshmukhs were used to spy on the mamlatdars. The peshwas were not willing to trust either of them. The communal ideology of swarajya and its elites, no matter how oppressive it may have become at times, had a shared quality and hence had its own redeeming features. By pitching one set of functionaries against another, the peshwas’ instrumentalism brought into serious doubt the occasionally real and often fictitious caring quality of the old state. The regime of the peshwas prepared western Maharashtra for a relatively smooth British takeover. It brought into the open the often hidden conception of the state whose legitimacy is primarily dependent on the efficient delivery of a modicum of well-being to its citizens. The norms arising from shared world views, which Shivaji had tried to cultivate during his short but effective rule were replaced with an attitude of bargaining and competitive power play between the rulers and the dominant elites, something that the representatives of ‘the nation of shop-keepers’ were to find much easier to live with. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peshwas were paid in their own currency by their chitpavan and maratha sardarsy once the cement of power and patronage had dissolved during the incompetent reign of Bajirao II. While the peshwa interlude and the special advantage it conferred on the members of their caste is generally known, scholars describing subsequent attempts at the political mobilization of non-Brahmans have not fully explored its significance. There has been a tendency to exaggerate the extent of brahman domination of rural Maharashtra and to misunder­ stand their traditional place in the socio-polity of the region in rigid vamashram terms. The peshwas contributed significantly to the later tension between chitpavans and the local maratha-kunbi elites. They also placed the deshastha-brahmans in a dilemma by trying to gain their loyalty through grants and privileges for the display of Brahmanical erudition. On the whole it led to the widening of the gap between all brahmans together and all the others who were summarily lumped together as Shudras in the peshwai elite’s conception. By far the most damaging legacy of the peshwas, and the one that contributed the most to the resentment of the local and regional maratha elites towards the brahmans (primarily chitpavans), was the decay of a cultural tradition that had been shared by the masses across caste

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

139

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

boundaries. During the peshwa regime the leadership of the Varkari tradition was taken over by brahman organizers and its message was reinterpreted and delivered by brahman mendicants and story-tellers (katha and keertan performers). It was employed to encourage fatalism and to justify varnashram hierarchy. Even before the peshwa rule, Ramdas’ (1608-81) militant political nationalism had become a vehicle of the glorification of maratha-brahman dominance. Through the exercise of state power, it was also nurtured effectively by Shivaji. Ramdas declared the varnashram order divine and hence eternally valid. The authenticity and robustness of the Marathi sant literature, characteristic even of Ramdas, declined and was replaced during peshwai, through official encouragement, with an artificially Sanskritized idiom and hollow acroba­ tics of pandit poetry. The peshwas were unable to hold the more fertile and wealthy territories of Vidarbha and Marathwada for any consistent period of time. Both under the Nizam and the peshwas, the regional jagirdari arrange­ ments remained far stronger than they were in western Maharashtra on the eve of the defeat of the Maratha Confederacy in 1803. Later these differences had an impact on brahman-maratha dominance. The swarajya deshmukhs, weakened in terms of power, prestige and legitimacy, were easily pensioned off by the colonial regime. They were absorbed back into the rich elite stratum of the maratha-kunbi peasantry. While the more privileged core retained the illusion of supremacy gained in medieval times, the amalgamation of the less privileged along the flexible caste boundaries into the patil lineages eased the way for the later non-Brahman movement. Even after the de facto inclusion of Vidarbha into the British dominions (1853) and of Marathwada into the Indian Union (1953), deshmukhs in those two regions retained their distinctive identity, primarily on the basis of their large holdings of fertile lands. Development o f Maratha-Brahman Dominance: The Colonial Period O ver a period of one hundred and fifty years, colonial rule brought about some major changes in the society. The response of the indigenous population to the inroads of the capitalist economy was complex and full of mixed patterns of resilience, continuity and change. In many ways the transition was slow. It gave the old order an opportunity to adapt gradually to the new world. In the rural areas, despite cataclysmic changes for some, the ruling class was able to retain the fiction of the community while the jati-vatan-vi\\age social relations of production were yielding to the new administrative arrangements. The rise of cash-crop farming, mainly cotton for the world market, had its impact on the production of subsistence crops and on the social structure of rural India. So did the new land revenue systems, the rise of the administrative and marketing towns and the introduction of administrative-judicial institutions. The entire colonial

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

140

JAYANT LELE

experience can be divided into three distinct periods, the first marked by company rule. Like the preceding peshwa period. Company rule was also a period of transition towards full incorporation into the world capitalist system. The peshwa territory was not a major hinterland for the Company’s export out of Surat and Bombay. Not much was to change in that respect during the first phase of colonial expansion. As Stokes points out, the purpose of the Company regime ‘remained mercantilist, to using surplus from the Indian revenue sufficient to purchase its annual investment of Indian goods and . . . supply the silver required by the Canton treasury for the China tea trade’ (1978: 28). To ensure regular collection of land revenue the new administrators set out in earnest to make their land settlements*. Under the influence of utilitarianism, the ryotwari settlement was introduced in the ex-peshwa territories. In parts of Konkan a form of zamindari settlement was made with the khots. After some initial mistakes and misinterpretations of the precolonial revenue systems, reasonable revenue demands were intro­ duced, starting with the Indapur taluks (1836-7), and were fully implemented across the Presidency by the mid-1860s. The effects of these settlements could be seen in the substantial increase in the land under cultivation. For example, between 1840 and 1850 the land under cultivation in Pune, Sholapur, Dharwad and Ahmadnagar districts increased by a million and a half acres (Sovani, 1960: 394). Prices of food grains rose after 1837 and contributed to the increase in cultivation. The two major settlement systems in Nagpur-Vidarbha (amongst a bewildering variety that emerged over the colonial period) were the malguzari system (Nagpur districts) and the khalse or ryotwari system (Berar districts) (for details see Nanekar, 1968). The ryotwari settlement did not come to Marathwada districts until after Sir Salar Jung became the Chief Minister of the Nizam in 1853. The new revenue system with its formal, legalistic management by Company officials did produce some difficulties. It took away the safety mechanism of the old informal system of adjusting revenue demands to the specific problems of each case. The already weakened role of deshmukhs was further marginalized and the ryots were left with no trustworthy intermediaries through whom they could air their grievances. At the same time more people were being forced back onto the lands after the armies of many of the feudatories had been reduced or abolished with the acceptance of protection to be given by the troops maintained by the English Company. The major members of the Confederacy were forced to reduce their troops drastically. Incomes generated by military campaigns against more prosperous neighbours were also drastically diminished while the pressure of the population on land continued to grow. In the absence of other avenues, local discontent culminated in a number of revolts (for example the Ramoshi Rebellions of 1826 and 1844 and the Koli revolts of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

141

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

1830 and 1836). The British were able to crush them without serious difficulty. In spite of these unintended consequences due to the change of the regime the basic structure of dominance in the village society remained. In the ryotwari areas the brahman (kulkarni)-maratha (patil) link with the regional state was accepted by the Company through its own intermediary officials. It was only subsequently transformed from hereditary rights into salaried functions. Even that was done without disturbing violently the older structure of land control and the associated communal world view. The elites of the dominant maratha-kunbi caste cluster belonging to the patil lineages still held property rights to the largest and the most productive parcels of land. To them deshmukhs were added as somewhat more pre-eminent members of the class of rich peasants. In various parts of Maharashtra (especially in the southern maratha region) the chitpavan feudatories retained their extensive land holdings. Some of the chitpavan officials also became big landowners. Even though some of the once prosperous maratha-kunbi landholders lost their land or became impover­ ished due to increasing pressure on land, the predominant pattern of traditional maratha elites commanding the loyalty of the smaller, less illustrious, maratha-kunbi and other cultivators and service castes, including the untouchables, changed slowly. Absentee landlords and rich cultivators had been in the practice of engaging field labour or leasing part or all of their land to tenants. They were able to absorb much of the new labour-force. After the Nizam’s victory over the marathas in 1803, the fertile Berar districts were farmed out for revenue collection to the various creditors of the Nizam. The British, Marwari and Parsi financial interests became involved in the region as revenue farmers. The last of these, Pestonji and Co., became the major exporter of Berar cotton through Bombay. Both in Marathwada and Berar excessive demands due to revenue farming and the presence of Arab paramilitary personnel of the Nizam, acting as loan sharks to fleece the peasantry, made the regime a pure enterprise of plunder. Deshmukhs and deshpandes who had little choice but to make common cause first with the invading marathas and later with the Nizam’s troops and officers continued to act as intermediaries. The socio-emotional distance between them and the traditional village elite, the patils, continued to grow. The state under the Bhosle regime in the Nagpur districts was somewhat less ruthless. However since many of the regional maratha elites in Nagpur were recent arrivals from western Maharashtra there had already existed a strong sense of differentiation between them and the local kunbis, including the village elites of the patil lineages. Although the ideas of development and modernization, of how to fit India’s political economy into the British system of world capitalism, began to emerge soon after the conquest of the Deccan, little structural change was attempted until the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite big

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

142

JAYANT LELE

controversies, official statements and grand pretensions, the logic of industrial capital, in terms of its demands for freely penetrating the Indian countryside, and as an open market for raw materials and British products, was not allowed to govern Company policies. During this period even though industrial capitalism and free market ideology were on the rise in England, they broke into the new markets of India with all the old fashioned weapons of earlier mercantilism. In Maharashtra, except for some streamlining of the revenue administration and consequent efficient and enhanced tax collection by the treasury, nothing substantial was attempted in terms of capitalist development. In the city of Bombay, however, it was a different story. The decline of demand for Surat goods in Europe led to the eventual fall of that port city. Bombay, being purely a trading centre, began to thrive. The shift to raw cotton and other exports and the end to the Company's trade monopoly brought more and more traders to the town. The annexation of the peshwa territory allowed its wealth to be directed to the rapid development of this commercial port city into the political capital of western India. Its administrative, marine and mercantile establishment was quickly and visibly spruced up after 1818. With its new role as the administrative centre of the Bombay Presidency, its need for an educated and disciplined cadre of men to work at the lower and middle levels of the state apparatus was immediately felt. Both the state and the Christian missionaries (who were permitted to be openly active in the city after 1814) responded. Several educational institutions emerged between 1815 (for example the Bombay Native Education Society) and 1850, leading in 1857 to the establishment of the University (Kosambi, 1980). Unlike other British factory towns Bombay’s rulers had been forced to attract merchants and workers from Surat, on their own terms, during the early period of its growth. The openness and somewhat egalitarian interaction between the English, the merchants of various castes and faiths and the new professionals were perhaps responsible for the type of enlightened reformism that first arose in Bombay. It was led by men of different castes and faiths who had been exposed to western education and Christian criticism of their ideas. Since Elphinstone had chosen to continue to foster traditional learning in the rest of the Presidency (mainly to placate the deshastha and chitpavan orthodoxy), the more ambitious chitpavans began to seek entry to the English educational institutions of Bombay (Masselos, 1974). They became the carriers of new reformism to the rest of the Presidency. The most significant feature of this reformism was a strong reflexive-hermeneutic orientation to religion. The impact of British rule and the attempts by Christian missionaries to spread their faith was felt simultaneously. A fusion of ideas about a new normative and political order surfaced. The reformists refused to merely accept or reject the old or new political-economic and social order out of expediency or emotion. They tried to develop a critical re-understanding of the past. Out of that

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

143

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

attempt emerged a dream of all-encompassing, humane religion and a just society. These universalistic tendencies which guided the early Marathi intellectual enlightenment were later misrepresented and misunderstood (Bedekar, 1977a). As a poor chitpavan without a place in the traditional jati hierarchy, M. G. Ranade (1842-1902) symbolized the new breed of brahman intellectuals during the early colonial capitalist penetration of Maharash­ tra. These ‘new brahmans' now had the difficult task of explaining the benefits of colonial rule to the people and to themselves, as agents of alien forces that had begun (by 1850) to restructure the economic and political order. In that coming restructuring the early intellectuals expected to play an active role. With English higher education restricted to a small group they saw themselves as interpreters and transmitters of European thought and knowledge to their countrymen. This was also what the British had expected of them at this stage. With training in a variety of disciplines such as literature, law, medicine and civil engineering they hoped to be able to occupy most of the crucial positions in the state. They would thus set the direction for the modernization of the entire nation. The brunt of British racism and the compulsions of the crisis of British capitalism had yet to hit the political economy of India with full force. Ranade’s universalistic reinterpretations of the past were an outcome of the optimism of a chitpavan alienated from the society which men of his caste had once ruled with impudence. A counterpoint for that inter­ pretation, equally universalistic in its intentions but with an authentic appeal to those at the receiving end of Brahmanism’s oppressiveness, was provided by Jyotiba Phule. During the second phase of colonialism both these critical impulses were re-appropriated by the rising urban petit bourgeoisie and the established maratha-kunbi peasantry for their own self interest. The Colonial-Parliamentary Raj The first phase of colonialism ended with the end of the Company raj. The second phase started with the Government of India becoming directly responsible to the Queen of England. This in a sense marked the triumph of industrial capital in England. During the first half of the nineteenth century, as Britain gained unmatched supremacy in capitalist industrializa­ tion and commercial growth, her empire underwent substantial expansion. The conquest of the peshwa and allied territories was only a small and somewhat insignificant piece in that complex overall development. In terms of the economic demands of England’s capitalism. Raw cotton, instead of manufactured textiles, had become one of the major import items by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The growing English textile industry depended on American raw cotton and until 1846, when the failure of the cotton crop in America alerted it to the instability of that

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

144

JAY ANT LELE

source, there had been little interest in systematically organizing the widely scattered cotton production and trade in Maharashtra. Between 1850 and 1890 many changes occurred in the political economy of Maharashtra. The railways connected the major cotton tracts to the ports by 1870. The trade boom which lasted from 1861 to 1865 because of the American Civil War provided an impetus for some industrialization. More importantly, it led to a rapid spread of the area under cotton. With the associated demands of inputs and marketing, the need for credit and working capital also led to a rapid expansion in the activities of traders and moneylenders. The increase in area under cash crops meant an increase in demand for and the prices of land. Substantial increase in land transfers occurred as a result, from small peasants to larger landholders and moneylenders. The changes brought about in the social relations of production by the shift to raw cotton exports were complex. The decline in the acreage under grain cultivation in the cotton tracts, the growth of population in the cities like Bombay, Poona and Nagpur and the emergence of many district and talukf towns as small trade centres contributed to the commoditization of food grains and other produce. All the accelerated economic activity resulted in growing regional demand for the latter. Thus the core districts of the Deccan such as Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara were affected because, according to Wingate, the 'grain crops in the arid climate of those collectorates pay better than cotton or other importable products’ (quoted in Banaji, 1978: 359). The larger villages and talukas and district towns became the centres of accumulation and distribution for the intra-and interregional trade in staples. This njust have been true, as much in Vidarbha and Marathwada, as it was in western Maharashtra including the Konkan. Most of the big traders and moneylenders resided in these centres and acted as intermediaries between the major local wholesale markets and the peasantry with marketable surplus. The entire state thus became incorporated, both directly and indirectly, into the world capitalist system. As shown earlier, the revenue settlements which had been started during the period of the Company Raj were in full and reasonable opera­ tion in all points of Maharashtra by 1860. Basically modelled on two main patterns—ryotwari and zamindari—they were freely adapted to the complexities and variations of local practice and custom. In the Marathi districts of the Bombay Presidency (except for Konkan), in most of Marathwada and in the Berar districts of Vidarbha, locally adapted forms of ryotwari prevailed, while in the Nagpur districts a variation on the zamindari system, called malguzari, had been introduced. In the case of the ryotwari system the purpose had been to create a class of substantial peasant cultivators, while the zamindari system was expected to create a class of progressive, improvement-oriented landlords. However, with rapid commercialization of agriculture, which accompanied this process of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

145

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

rent stabilization, a complex set of social relations of agricultural production developed in the different parts of Maharashtra. Despite many claims to the contrary (see, for example, Omvedt, 1976: 73), 1 would like to suggest that the expectations about the ryotwari areas were fulfilled although in a somewhat distorted manner. The creation of a class of substantial peasant cultivators in the context of rapid commer­ cialization had to mean that many of the small producers would lose their land to those with greater economic and political power. This is indeed what happened. Available evidence from at least some of the districts suggests that there were large scale land transfers. But the claim that most of these were necessarily made in the direction of alien (rather than indigenous) and non-cultivating moneylenders and traders is not easy to support. Charlesworth argues that this probably occurred, but mainly in small towns or in the larger villages which were on the verge of becoming towns and trading centres (1972). Most of the alien traders and moneylenders seem to have gravitated to such centres, by the middle of the nineteenth century. In the majority of smaller villages, a great deal of differentiation within the peasantry occurred. Even though the incidence of indebtedness was massive, Charlesworth points out that this was nothing new in the Deccan villages. Among those who controlled credit in these villages there were many traditional village and regional leaders such as the deshmukhs, deshpandes, patils and kulkamis. Depending on their initial level of wealth, their past involvement in the commercial and financial activities of a village or a taluka and their contacts with the bureaucracy outside the village, peasants responded to the challenge of commercializa­ tion in different ways. Among those who became the losers of land there were some marathas, the traditional elites, but the likelihood of most of them having survived the ruthless onslaught of land transfers, involving borrowing, mortgaging, litigation and loss, was far greater than that of the ordinary kunbis. Banaji’s study of contemporary records shows that in the Bombay Presidency, among those who lost their lands there were some patils, but there were patils and kulkamis among those whose wealth and power had steadily increased and hence were at the receiving end of the land transfers. Given the long history of a privileged status in the village community the bulk of the maratha local elites were probably to be found in the categories of big peasantry and small peasantry, whereas the poorer kunbi peasants and the lower caste vatandars with small patches of land, such as the mahars, probably belonged to the 'semi-wage labour peasantry1 in large numbers (Banaji, 1978: 397). * In the ryotwari areas of Berar and Marathwada, cultivation of cotton spread very rapidly during the mid-nineteenth century and 'as the registered occupant need not always and necessarily be the actual cultivator . . . sub-tenancies grew.’ (Brahme and Upadhyaya, 1979: 492). As in the other parts of the ryotwari settlement in Hyderabad state (e.g. Telengana), the former regional leaders, the deshmukhs, who had also

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

146

JAY ANT LELE

been the revenue collectors for the Muslim state, were given land in compensation. The size of their holdings was often very large: ‘the deshmukhs often owned thousands of acres’ (Pavier, 1981: 4). The Berar districts which were first leased from the Nizam of Hyderabad and later annexed by the British, had their own share of deshmukhs, who were pensioned off in 1860 after the ryotwari was introduced. Almost 30 per cent of the villages were given to jagirdars (Omvedt, 1976: 81). Although the deshmukhs and the deshpandes had no official duties in the ryotwari areas their families continued to enjoy certain allowances which were charged on the land revenue. In addition many of them had ‘large quantities of inam land—whole villages sometimes—in their possession’ (Baden-Powell, 1974: vol. 3, 376). At the same time, with the establishment of the ryotwari system, the village patils newly acquired a measure of power and prestige that had once been the privilege of deshmukhs as regional tax collectors. According to Baden-Powell ‘they were retained and much employed under the Muhammadan governments and some of them rose to considerable importance’. In the minds of the local kunbi peasantry and its natural leaders, deshmukhs thus came to be associated with alien rulers. In times of wars, famines and anarchy, their wealth and their continued surplus extraction must have led to a strong sense of alienation between them and the peasantry. Their status as tax collectors was substantially diminished during the peshwa regime when parallel kamavisdars were appointed and their revenue rights were completely abolished in 1860. However since they were able to retain substantial land holdings they became the major beneficiaries of the commercialization of agriculture. In many of these cases, their ancestors had come into the region as administrators after Shivaji had been granted a jagir in Berar by Aurangzeb, in 1666. In contrast, most deshmukhs and patils of western Maharashtra, particularly in the areas of Shivaji’s direct jurisdiction (swarajya), had been part of the history of the region without any discontinuities. In Vidarbha and Marathwada, where the cultural and social relations typical of all of Maharashtra had first developed, that continuity disappeared after the Bahamani kingdom had broken up into five. Later, the influx of Muslims, marathas, Marwaris and brahmans from outside the region prepared the groundwork for a continued alienation between the deshmukhs and the peasants. Growing wealth and income disparities accompanying cash crop cultivation stabilized the distance. After ryotwari was introduced in western Maharashtra, distinctions between deshmukhs and patils, and between vatandar marathas and non-vatandar kunbis did not completely disappear. They remained important in terms of the kinship rules of preferred marriage alliances. But the disparity in wealth was not as sharp as in Marathwada and Vidarbha. The peasants in Vidarbha continued to think of themselves as kunbis and as distinct from those propertied deshmukhs, many of whom were later arrivals from western Maharashtra. Even when the designation of maratha was accepted as a signifier of higher

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

147

status, under the influence of newer and later ideologies, the distinction between patils and deshmukhs remained materially significant and potent in Vidarbha and Marathwada. This remained true even after their merger into the state of Maharashtra, and became an important component of factional loyalties within later democratic politics (Bhatt, 1963; Carras, 1970, 1972). In the absence of detailed ethnographic studies it is difficult to accurately assess the impact of the massive changes in the agrarian structure on the communal idiom of elite maratha dominance. There are some indications, however, that the nature of differentiation, described above, contributed substantially to the retention of that ideology. As Omvedt points out ‘richer peasants were also threatened by bad years and by continual pressures from moneylenders and courts; and they retained family and caste ties with many of the poorer peasants' (1976: 91). In this case the manner in which the land passed from the hands of the poor peasants to that of the rich must have been radically different from the way in which the Marwari gujar moneylenders effected their claims. Indebted­ ness, lending of money or grain to the less fortunate during lean seasons and years, was part of the patriarchal-patrimonial ethos of rural society, long before commercialization occurred. The relationship between the patils and the kulkarnis on the one hand and the peasants and landowning artisans on the other, must have changed only gradually. Even though commercialization of agriculture did necessarily entail extraction of surplus value from the peasant and even though expropriation of mortgaged lands was a necessary aspect of it, the impact of these transactions in villages outside deshmukhi and jagirdari tenures, was undoubtedly buffered by the capacity for resilience, change and caring of the maratha elite in the maratha-kunbi caste cluster. The rich peasantry, even though threatened often enough by droughts, moneylenders, lawyers and the courts, was able to withstand and repel the pressures with greater success than the middle peasantry, the bulk of the village population. None of them found the presence of these alien forces very endearing even though many had learnt to cope with and counter them successfully. They looked upon the local, traditional moneylenders and employers, patils, kulkarnis and, in western Maharashtra, even deshmukhs, more as allies than enemies in contrast to the Marwari and gujar moneylenders and brahman bureaucrats and lawyers (many of them chitpavans). When their dissatisfaction did boil over, during the famous Deccan riots of 1875, The Marwari and Gujar sowkars were almost exclusively the victims of the riots, and in villages where sowkars of the Brahmin and other castes shared the money lending business with Marwaris it was usual to find the latter only were molested (Deccan Riots Report, cited in Charlesworth, 1972: 410).

In the cotton tracts of Marathwada and Vidarbha an early alliance

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

148

JAY ANT LELE

between rich, cotton-growing deshmukhs and trader-financier Marwaris had emerged and was not disturbed until it received its first challenge after the new kind of interest group politics was introduced into these regions by the prospects of electoral politics (Baker, 1979). At the same time the maratha deshmukhs in the cotton tracts showed no inclination to become traders or moneylenders (Pavier, 1981) and thus did become direct competitors of the emerging rich and middle peasantry of the kunbi caste. The Social and Cultural Impact During these years the general expansion of educational institutions had taken place largely out of the voluntary efforts of brahman elites. More and more young men, mostly brahmansy were now seeking employment with the government and in industry where some additional employment (white collar) opportunities had emerged with expansion. With the growth in textile industries, many of the impoverished kunbis began migrating to the urban centres. In agriculture this period was marked by a sustained rise in the area under cultivation and by absolute and relative increase in the area under cash crops. This pattern of growth remained steady until the middle of the 1880s when a crisis occurred. Mukherji (1977: 129) offers three inter-related reasons: firstly, tapering off of railway construction, secondly, rise in supply prices of the principal exportable goods and the consequent difficulty in maintaining an export surplus, and thirdly, consequent deflationary monetary policies and innovations by the state. Before the crisis, with the rising tempo of economic growth and opportunity, new aspirations had emerged in the growing class of educated Indians. By 1890 the prospects for their fulfilment had substantially declined. Only the lower and middle ranks of public service were open to Indians at this stage. The benign view of the role of the state now became more and more difficult to sustain. Earlier, sustained economic growth had brought with it greater differentiation of interests. The impossibility of their being fulfilled by the colonial state was becoming more and more obvious to the proponents. The intellectuals of the subsequent generations thus realized that it was time to turn the state into an open arena where the free interplay of a plurality of competing interests could force the state to produce an optimal solution. Whether an alien, colonial regime could transform itself into such an arena became a serious question. Most political events of this period reinforced the doubt. The view of the colonial state held by the early intellectuals had provoked them to advocate major social reforms under state auspices. They had also spoken of the role of the state in promoting the interests of the rising entrepreneurial classes but had expected this to happen without inflicting any hardships on the working population. This all-inclusive view of the state and of society conflicted with the facts of life. Without massive state intervention, accompanied by rapid expansion of economic opportu­ nities for all new and vocal interests (on a scale equivalent to the one that

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

149

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

emerged only after Independence) even a semblance of an acceptable, pluralist state-society could not have been created. The existing arenas of opportunity were clogged and shrinking. The state had to be seen either as an adversary or as an institution amenable only to sustained pressure from outside. The crisis that hit colonial Maharashtra in the 1880s was part of the General Depression in Europe. Although Britain still continued to lead in terms of the production of coal and steel, a relative decline against the United States and Germany had already begun. Britain from this point became more and more dependent on specific political arrangements (such as preferential tariffs), with its old and new colonies in order to sustain its outdated and declining industrial system. The threshold of rising expectations and declining opportunities in Maharashtra was symbolized by the transition of leadership to the white collar professionals and small town businessmen, from the likes of Ranade to those of Tilak. The transition from Ranade to Tilak and from the view of the colonial state as the vanguard of reform to an arena of pressure politics has to be understood in the light of the major changes that had occurred, in the meantime, in Maharashtra’s political economy. During the first colonial phase, because of the status quo orientation of the Company’s regime under Elphinstone, Poona, once the capital city of the peshwas and a haven of the chitpavan courtiers, had declined while Bombay had thrived. During the second phase Poona regained its importance as the centre of the culture of Brahmanism. A large number of educational institutions were established, mostly by brahmans, in the hope of finding employment in the expanding public sector and the professional fields. Tilak founded the Fergusson College in 1885. In contrast to the naturalistic humanism and monotheism of men like Lokhitwadi (1823-92), Ranade’s humanism grew out of a new interpreta­ tion of Marathi tradition. That interpretation had to be consistent with his times and with his own structural position in society. Ranade was attracted by the universalistic and radical humanistic impulses of the Varkari tradition (Lele, 1978). He also explored the role of Shivaji in Maratha history and of the subsequent rise to power of the peshwas. Instead of being sensitive to the contradictory tendencies of the two events Ranade concluded that the rise of Maratha power was a glorious political culmination of the socio-religious enlightenment experienced by the Maratha people under the inspiration of the Varkari sants. His dream of a slow advance to a rational and humane nation-society, guided by the values that had been rediscovered from the saint-poets and had been partially actualized by Shivaji, was shattered towards the end of the nineteenth century. Ranade himself became a victim of the suspicious state authorities and their racism, because of his outspoken criticism of the state. Yet he remained committed to that dream. Ranade’s theory of the state came under severe criticism during the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

150

JAY ANT LELE

second phase of colonial history. Tilak pointed to the importance of the position taken by the early intellectuals and argued that this was why they were calling on the colonial state to initiate societal transformation. He claimed that the futility of their efforts to seek mass support was demonstrated by the ineffectiveness of their institutions (Bedekar, 1977a: 101). By 1890 Tilak’s views had been in ascendance among the new intellectuals and Ranade’s influence had declined. Ranade’s class of intellectuals had grown up during the period of ascendancy of the industrial bourgeoisie in England. Tilak’s followers grew up to witness its colonial aftermath. First of all, the extension of English education had vastly expanded the number of educated Indians (Misra, 1961: 283-4). Most of the graduates of these institutions could seek entry only into the lower and middle ranks of public service. The higher posts were still largely filled by English imports. If the problem of employment itself was not yet critical, the problem of upward mobility for new graduates certainly was. In addition, a large category of ‘drop-outs* had emerged whose prospects for employment were bleak (Martin, 1969: 6-7). In 1840 the new intellectuals were a small group, exploring new avenues of activity in the public sphere. Ranade, himself a son of a poor brahman, had risen from the lower ranks in civil service to the judgeship of the Bombay High Court. In the 1890s such mobility had become an impossible dream for most of the newly educated. Their situation required, instead, that they confront the state with specific demands and bolster them with some independent sources of power. Tilak succeeded in widening the base of the nationalist movement beyond large cities and into the towns. His followers included brahman (ideshastha and chitp&van) clerks and lawyers, Hindu (non-Marathi) merchants and moneylenders and an increasing number of artisans who had become dissociated from the traditional village economy or princely patronage, and had become part of the cash economy. No more contained within the old patriarchal-patrimonial world view, their material interest had become linked to the state’s initiative in education, jobs and markets. Tilak’s Hindu symbolism and his militant advocacy of their interests made him extremely popular amongst them. No matter how much separated they were by their changing social contexts, both Ranade and Tilak were chitpavan brahmans. While Ranade had placed his faith in the revolution­ ary potential of tradition and in the humanism of the enlightened intellectuals, Tilak wanted to use tradition as a way to organize the masses in order to squeeze greater action out of the state. During the period of Tilak’s popularity in the towns a new cleavage emerged in Maharashtra. It pitched the interest of the monied capital, trading and professional classes along with the white collar petit bourgeoisie in the towns and cities against the differentiated peasantry in the villages, which was strongly dominated through communal (patriarchal-patrimonial) ideology by elite marathas. Given his own social situation and his understanding of the social reality

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

151

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

Tilak emerged as the spokesman of only the urban petit bourgeoisie. Tilak’s Hindu revivalism was similar to, and at times closely linked with, the nation-wide Hindu revivalist tendencies. Its consequences were also similar. Similar movements were developing at the same time in Indian Islam. Both of them contributed to the unification of privilege and deprivation, of the elites and the masses in each community and to the drifting apart of the two from each other. Even though the Muslim population of Maharashtra was small, tensions were generated by militant revivalism in cities with substantial Muslim concentrations. In Bombay, Poona and Yeola they led to riots. Hindu revivalism helped camouflage the emerging cleavages between the privileged and the unprivileged sections of the urban Hindu society. The Islamic reaction bridged the gap between disparate Muslim communities, such as in Bombay, of different economic, linguistic, sectarian and regional backgrounds (Masselos, 1974: 160-3). In both cases this form of aggregation and articulation of interest effectively blunted the edge of potential working class movements in urban Maharashtra. Tilak became directly involved in the problems of the urban proletariat at one stage but like most Swadeshi proponents he stood for conciliation between indigenous capital and labour and against confronta­ tion (Sarkar, 1983:132-5). His attempts to bridge the gap between the urban brahmans (including the other white collar upper castes) and the marathas through an appeal to Shivaji did not succeed (Cashman, 1975). Neither the maratha princes nor the maratha-kunbi ryots (in spite of his Famine Campaign of 18%) were available for the mobilization offered by chitpavan brahmans. The memories of the peshwa regime were still rather vivid at this stage and the hold of community ideology strong. In any case, at least as far as the peasantry was concerned, Tilak's particular interpretation of the meaning o f Hinduism made it impossible for him and his associates to build bridges through appropriate institutions (Omvedt, 1976: 182-3). The quest for new institutions could not go on without finding new meanings for the old. R anade’s theories of the state were attacked. Both Ranade and Tilak spoke of Maharashtra as a nation but with opposite meanings. Ranade used Ramdas’ idea of ‘Maharashtra Dharma’ (the Maharashtrian way) and interpreted it in terms of the universalism and humanism of the Varkari poets. He saw Shivaji as the culmination of those inherently human universalist forces. For Tilak, on the other hand, Shivaji was a unique lead er of society because he had been able to mobilize large numbers into an intensely active nationalist organization against alien rulers (Karmakar, 1956: 60,62,107). One delicate question for Tilak, however, was how to re­ pudiate the foundations of Ranade’s philosophy, the Varkari principles and practice, without alienating the oppressed classes for whom they were still meaningful. Tilak’s solution was a reinterpretation of the Bhagavad Gita on w hich Jnanesvar had rested his case. Tilak raised both duty or moral practice (karm a) and absolute knowledge (jnana) to the state of ultimate unity of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

152

JAY ANT LELE

theory and practice (nistha) and reduced bhakti (devotion in life) to a mere method, an easy practice meant for the ignorant and illiterate women and peasants. He was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the Varkari im­ pulse had remained alive only in the routinized, unreflected practice of the rural poor. Ranade’s resurrection of it as universal humanism struck Tilak as hollow idealism. Even then he was always careful enough to praise the liter­ ary contributions of Varkari poets in his popular writings. Tilak’s position on Varkari tradition, revealed most clearly in Gitarahasya, set the tone for similar postures by other brahman intellectuals. Rajwade, the outspoken historian, called the sants, ‘cymbal bangers’. Others were more careful. They made every effort to^ncorporate Varkari poets, especially Jnanesvar, into the mainstream of Brahmanical orthodoxy. Thus Ranade’s ‘universalistic-humanist monotheism’ was attacked and replaced with a strong, conservative upholding of varnashram orthodoxy. Ranade’s insights into the universalistic appeal of the Varkari sants and its spon­ taneous acceptance by the peasantry were dismissed. The nationalists of this period also realized that the colonial state was bent on implementing a ‘di­ vide and rule’ policy. Paradoxically their political response contributed further to the creation and deepening of divisions along religious, sectarian and caste lines (Bedekar, 1960:199-205, and 1977,91-129). The reinterpretations of Ranade’s ideas on tradition helped the aggregation of diverse interests of the Hindu petit bourgeoisie and, to an extent, the urban working classes. Similarly, the Muslim reaction consoli­ dated the alliance of another universalistic interpretation of the past. Against this, the consolidation of maratha hegemony over the differentiated peasantry and the rural labouring classes encountered another obstacle. Jyotirao Phule (1827-90), a lower caste mali%in language reminiscent of Tukaram, had announced his mission of saving ‘lower castes from hypocritical brahmans and their opportunistic scriptures’ (in Heimsath, 1964:103). The focus of his critique was on Brahmanism and its consequences: the all pervasive stranglehold of brahman political and administrative power. Not unlike the several civic-political organizations that sprang up in urban Maharashtra and India at the time, Phule’s Satyashodhak Samaj (1873) was an attempt to institutionally aggregate a common purpose out of the rapidly differentiating sectors of the colonial society. It was within the tradition of universal humanism of Ranade but whereas Ranade saw continuity in Varkari-Shivaji-pes/iH'a Confederacy periods of history, Phule saw peshwai as a rupture. Phule was negatively influenced by the passive appearance of the Varkari message. He had nonetheless felt within him the spontaneous response it had evoked among the masses. Hence his akhand version of the abhang, the poetic form used by the kunbi santy Tukaram (Vaidya, 1974: 245-56). Initially, Phule’s sympathies were with reformers who were waging battles against the outdated and oppressive orthodoxy of traditional brahmans. Eventually, the impotence of these reformist brahmans, arising

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

153

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

out of their rootlessness in Maharashtrian society, seems to have alerted Phule to the all-pervasive and subterranean ideological and practical deadliness of Brahmanism. His attacks on brahman ideological hegemony were simple and forthright. He and his associates also tried to organize peasants against the moneylenders and landlords (Omvedt, 1976:139-41). Phule was equally opposed to the hegemonic claims of maratha estate holders and to the moral and social superiority claims of the brahmans. A critique of brahman-maratha hegemony was implicit in his anix-brahman stance. However, he rarely criticized the political impact of maratha landlordism and failed to investigate their role in the economic oppression of the kunbisy the various service castes and the untouchables as landless labourers. In the end he left behind ‘a heritage of social revolution unfulfilled1 (Omvedt, 1976: 121). During his lifetime, the Satyashodhak Samaj took root in the cities and villages of the Poona-Bombay region. Later on it spread across Maharashtra as a socio-religious reform organization concentrating on symbolic challenges to Brahmanism such as the elimination of brahman priests from weddings. There came about a gradual transition of Phule’s universalistic anti-Brahmanism. It deterio­ rated into a new orthodoxy that attacked the brahmans and not Brahmanism. A maratha (kshatriyanism’ emerged which was no more than a reversal of Brahmanism on its own grounds, as shown by Omvedt in her seminal work on the Satyashodhak movement (1976). Not unlike that of Ranade by Tilak, Phule’s impulse was appropriated and put to use by his maratha successors. They began to speak of a generalized 'peasant1interest at a time when the peasantry was becoming more and more differentiated along class lines. This mode of aggregating potentially conflicting interests and presenting them in a garb that made them appear to be shared was an antagonistic reaction to the urban petit bourgeois nationalism of Tilak’s Congress. It came fully into its own only during the third phase of colonialism. It is important to remember that the non-Brahman movement gathered momentum in Maharashtra under the conditions of ascendance and reassertion of dominance by the maratha elite, and not as a consequence of rising consciousness among oppressed groups. Earlier Phule had attempted to mobilize all the backward classes with a view to establishing a society based on sarvajanik dharma. That goal now shrank to that of reasserting maratha hegemony and fulfilment of elite maratha interests. Slome of Phule’s major goals were rejected. His attack on inequality and on all casteism, his battle aghinst untouchability, his active promotion of women’s equality and his opposition to the oppressive social practices of child marriage, neglect or oppression of widows and orphans, were mainly forgotten. The transformed Satyashodhak movement, as a non-Brahman movement, received the blessings and patronage of Shahu, the Maharaja of Kolhapur (1874-1922). While some of Shahu’s efforts contributed substantially to social development among other non-Brahmans and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

154

JAY ANT LELE

untouchables, his greatest contribution was to the self-consciousness of the marathas (Omvedt, 1976). It is not my intention to deny the enormous zeal and sincerity with which some of the Satyashodhak workers pursued the cause of raising consciousness, of exposing many blindly followed rituals, and of reinterpreting Maratha social history, nor should we ignore the positive impact they generally had on the rural scene. In balance, all this has to be evaluated in terms of the social context within which they became effective and the type of mobilization they were able to bring about. The best way to sum up the transition from Phule to Shahu is perhaps to say that it was a transition from a universalistic humanism, of which anti-Brahmanism was a part, to replacement of anti-Brahmanism by anti-brahman Brahmanism. While Phule had sought to eliminate all intermediaries in wedding ceremonies, Shahu and his elite maratha followers insisted that they had the right, as Kshatriyas, to demand priestly services. They reinstated all the details of Vedic ritualism and substituted brahman priests with non-Brahmans when the brahmans refused to co-operate. They systematically avoided any association with the urban nationalists and devoted their attention to nurturing the links with the state. Given the continuity of their hegemony, despite the growing differentiation of the peasantry under colonial rule, anti-brahman Brahmanism effectively prevented radical movements from taking roots among the dispossessed (maratha-kunbi) semi-wage labour peasantry, the artisans and Dalit workers. The effectiveness of the patriarchal ideology— in relation to the kunbis—was symbolized by their widespread rejection of the kunbi designation in western Maharashtra between the two Censuses of 1921 and 1931. The non-Marathi (English, gujar, Marwari, Parsi and Muslim) bourgeoisie in the textile industry and in overseas commerce, and the Marathi and non-Marathi petit bourgeoisie from a variety of upper and intermediate castes in Bombay, Poona, Nagpur and the small towns, the primarily Marathi urban working class in the milltowns like Bombay, Nagpur, Sholapur, the differentiated peasantry, the landless proletarian workers and the tribals, were the major classes of the society in Maharashtra during the second phase of colonialism. In concrete terms their interests were often contradictory and in competition with each other if not in direct conflict. The most interesting fact of the political mobilization of this period is that none of them came to be articulated in those objective terms. There seems no better way to describe the political scene of this period than in terms of the familiar idiom of the interest group pluralism of contemporary political science. The essentials of such a political practice were in place in India by the end of the nineteenth century. The British policy, despite internal differences between London and Calcutta, bears witness to the view that what was emerging in India was interest group politics. The Indian Councils Act of 1909 introduced the principle of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

155

elections, of greater power of budget discussion by elected members, and of representation of various interests such as the ‘professional classes, the landholders, the Mohammedans, European commerce and Indian com­ merce*. In recognizing these interests and not others, in introducing differential income qualifications for Hindus and Muslims and in ensuring that ‘government servants, pensioners and landlords* had an easier access to the political arena than radicalized professionals, the state was also consciously fostering certain modes of political mobilization over others (Sarkar, 1983: 137-40). The interaction between the imperial interest and the emerging interests of the indigenous privileged classes became clearer in the third phase. In the end, during that phase, the indigenous dominant interests came to prevail over those of the internally weakened imperial power. The Third Phase Britain emerged out of the Great War substantially weakened. In relative terms its productivity was far lower than that of the USA and Germany, even in the economic sectors of the first industrialization (coal, metallurgy and textiles) which had been the backbone of British industrial capital during its ascendance. The problem became more serious for Britain with the growth of second generation industries, a product of successful transition to monopoly capital in the USA and of a technological revolution in Japan. As its only alternative, it came to rely heavily on the initial political asset which had been at the base of its first industrialization: its colonies and dominance. Through the Imperial Conference of 1926 and the Ottawa Conference of 1932 it established a framework of ‘special responsibilities*, ‘equality in foreign policy’ and ‘reciprocal preferences’ with its empire, now designated ‘the British Commonwealth*. Britain gave tax immunity to most of the products of its Commonwealth ‘partners’, while the latter gave preferential tariffs to English products (Beaud, 1983). In the twenties Britain also gave its white dominions virtually complete independence in return for a desperately needed economic interdepend­ ence. In India also the early post-war years saw attempts at constitutional reforms which created, for some time, an impression that Britain was ready to make a deal similar to the ones finally made with its white dominions under the Statute of Westminister of 1931. But the twinning of the two imperial interests of racism and economic exploitation, produced a very distorted collaborationist state governed by a ‘neo-colonial interest group pluralism*. The paramount imperial concerns—‘financial devolution and need for a wider circle of Indian collaboration* (Sarkar, 1983: 167)—were, it is now generally recognized, the only ones guiding the 1919 reforms. The metropolitan economic interests needed protection from the encroachment of Indian capital. The reforms were therefore aimed at deflecting possible coalescence of various anti-imperialist interests for which the objective conditions had sufficiently ripened during the war years.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

JAY ANT LELE

156

In Bombay and other cities of Maharashtra the indigenous merchant capital derived from foreign trade, had gone into the modern textile mills by the mid-nineteenth century. Its links to British capital (due to dependence on technology, expertise and machinery) had been strong because of the Managing Agency system. During the war years and during the short post-war boom (1919-20 and 1921-2) there had been a substantial industrial expansion. For the first time Indian textile produc­ tion surpassed Lancashire imports (Bagchi, 1972). Even though compul­ sions of wartime and post-war fiscal demands and the need for minimum economic self-sufficiency had led to the policy of 'discriminating protec­ tion’ (Dewey, 1978) in practice it often meant long delays (Sarkar, 1983: 238). Here again, as Dewey suggests, competing interests had to battle in the political arena. However, as the case of Walchand Hirachand’s battles again Lord Inchape’s steamship empire shows, whenever there was a real conflict of interest the dice were heavily loaded against the Indian bourgeoisie. Thus a combination of increasing business self-confidence coupled with a strong sense of a bottleneck was driving at least a major section of Indian capital in the direction of a nationalist coalition. Growth in industry also meant growth in the industrial working class and the rise of a trade union movement (Bagchi, 1972). In 1926, there were more than eighty mills in Bombay alone and they employed 125,000 workers, a quarter of the city’s working population (Kooiman, 1981: 1807). In that year, the Bombay Textile Labour Union was organized by N. M. Joshi and R. K. Bakhle, two among the many moderate middle class men active in the labour areas. Most of the Bombay workers had come from the Konkan districts and in somewhat lesser numbers from the Deccan districts. Given their continuing strong links with their villages, through kin and land, their settlements and interaction patterns continued to reinforce primordial ties and produced highly localized caste associations. Not only the regional distinctions but also elite-mass distinction along the marathakunbi lines was reproduced. In the lives of the workers, jobbers played a very important role as witnessed in the 1919 strike (Newman, 1971; Kooiman, 1977). This claim has been subsequently challenged, but with minimal evidence (Lieten, 1982). Even if one accepts the claim that the communists who played an active role in that strike had overcome the limitations of primordiality, subsequent fractions of the labour movement speak for the temporary nature of that phenomenon. Because of unwise capitalization of the industry after the post-war booms, leading to overproduction and the rise of Japanese competition, Bombay’s textile industry went through a serious economic crisis between 1924 and 1930. The workers responded, in the form of a prolonged strike, to the pressure of wage cuts in the name of rationalization. The communist-sponsored Girni Kamgar Union took the lead. However, as Kooiman shows in his detailed study of the 1934-7 period, the creation of the Labour Office and other concerted efforts by the government and the capitalists led to a split

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

157

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

in the labour union movement. In the end various different unions emerged which were seen by workers as at best a temporary expedient for mediation or relief (Kooiman, 1981). The strategy of divide and split worked well and the emergence of a strong radicalized working class movement was aborted. The 1929 strike had been ‘massive, total and peaceful’ (Sarkar, 1983: 271). While the colonial state retaliated with vindictive measures, Leiten suggests that the Congress party, on account of its class coalitionist position, wanted to defeat the strike. Given its antagonistic posture against the colonial government and its positive association with the national bourgeoisie it accomplished its goal by creating a rival organization. As Omvedt points out, a significant destructive role was also played by ‘an effective, conservative, coopting response by non-Brahmin leaders’ (1976: 263). Even though it never recovered from these divisive beginnings the labour movement had become a force to reckon with in Bombay and in other industrial towns. The various attempts by the colonial regime to foster the interest group style of politics, in which it could act as both a manipulator and an arbitrator, were seen as attempts to ‘divide and rule’. However, the Congress party in Maharashtra was in no position, in the early twenties, to counter that strategy with one based on interest aggregation and articulation. The differentiation of society on which the colonial policy had come to rely provided responses to the proposed constitutional reform which the government had hoped for. For example, small groups of educated elites of various intermediate castes began to sponsor caste conferences and to organize caste associations. This occurred at the same time as the leadership of the Satyashodhak movement passed into the hands of maratha-kunbis. Even if they were really kunbis and not clan-conscious marathas, as Omvedt insists, they were most anxious to ‘call themselves “ Marathas” and “ Kshatriyas” ’ (1976: 148). Thus even when they spoke in the name of non-Brahmans in general and referred to them as the masses (bahujan samaj) their view of these masses was still guided by the patriarchal-patrimonial idiom in which each jati has its own distinct place in the community of producers. As the traditional controllers of the means of production, marathas and kunbis wanted to retain their distinct position as the leaders of the masses. The racist orientation of the colonial officers was reflected in their interpretations of the ‘caste system’ and in their policy of nurturing its distortions through active encouragement. Their ideology and self-interest were in full correspondence. With the prospects of major constitutional reforms on the horizon, the need to organize support bases for group pressure was clearly seen by the newly educated elites of various castes. These caste associations were to play little or no significant role in the subsequent years. The so-called reforms amounted to very little, in fact. In the absence of meaningful devolution of power and resources and without significant urban concentrations, the caste associations did not become viable avenues of elite activity. They are,

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

158

JAYANT LELE

nonetheless, examples of doubts about the legitimacy of the marathaAed non-Brahman organizations. These caste associations were active only in the urban centres. In fact during the first part of this period, up until 1930, the leaders of the Satyashodhak Samaj and of other maratha-led non-Brahman parties claimed to speak, primarily, in the name of a diffuse ‘peasant interest’. They juxtaposed it to the nationalist interest whose major constituency in all parts of Maharashtra was distinctly urban and petit bourgeois (iteli-tamboli). Tilak’s followers remained very suspicious of Gandhi’s activities during these early years. Many of them were chitpavan brahmans. Gandhi’s attempts at mobilization failed in Maharashtra, except perhaps in the agitation of Mulshi peasants led by a group of brahman Gandhians from Poona against Tata’s encroachment on their lands. In Vidarbha also, Tilak’s swarajists were in charge of the Congress, led by Khaparde, a deshastha brahman. However, one of his chitpavan associates broke ranks to join Gandhi’s satyagraha movement. He became associated with Bajaj, a Marwari millionaire. Together they appear to have managed to mobilize some sectors of the population of various district and taluka towns including Nagpur. By 1930, the Gandhians as an alliance of chitpavan brahmans and Marwaris, came to dominate the Congress. In Marathwada, where feeble attempts at a Swadeshi movement had been severely crushed in the earlier part of the century, later, equally feeble attempts by the urban, Marathi brahmans (like Wamanrao Naik) to establish a Congress Committee were also greeted with hostility and repressed (Baker, 1979; Brahme and Upadhyaya, 1979). The maratha elites in all parts of Maharashtra concentrated their efforts on maintaining economic and political dominance through a policy of collaboration with the state. The intervention of the state in the agricultural sector, after the Deccan Riots, had not only redressed their economic grievances; it opened, for many of the cash crop and marketoriented rich and middle peasants, novel opportunities for gaining access to the resources that the state was now ready to make available for rural development. The Tagai loan schemes, the new co-operative societies and banks, the improvements in agricultural technology, however meagre they may appear by contemporary standards, were working towards ensuring a direct and positive link between the state and the dominant rural elite. At the same time a number of maratha elites and entrepreneurs had, along with some of the service castes, reaped the benefits of the newly commissioned public works such as roads, railways, canals and public buildings. Many became contractors, commission agents andtraders. This was really an extension of maratha reassertion of hegemony in the domains of politics, administration and economy. The initial brahman advantage in these domains was now seen as a major obstacle. In their quest for a competitive advantage over the entrenched brahmans, the maratha elites displayed historic resilience and flexibility.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

159

They advocated and accepted ‘the inclusion of “ Kunbis” and “Marathas’’ coupled with a high-status “ Kshatriya” identification of Marathas1 (Omvedt, 1976: 187), in the two major ‘interest group’ organizations spawned by the temptations of constitutional reform. One of them (the Maratha League) asked for seats for marathas as such while the other (Deccan Ryat Samaj) asked for communal electorates for ‘educationally backward classes’. In either case, assured of their predominance in rural society once the kunbis had been made part of the electorates, the maratha elite in western Maharashtra were ready to apply their traditional local dominance to the emerging competitive politics at the local and regional (evels. In Vidarbha one of the early exponents of the non-Brahman movement was Nimbalkar, a close associate of the royal house of the Bhosles. He and other maratha deshmukhs extended support to the Satyashodhak Samaj and attended many of the non-Brahman political conferences in the 1920s. Given the substantial disparities between the wealth of the deshmukhs and the maratha-kunbi peasants, the nonBrahman movement in Vidarbha showed a strong tendency for the emergence of small factions led by individually powerful deshmukhs and supported by chains of their tenant, labourer and artisan clients in the villages under their control. Alliances or competition between these deshmukhs did little more than give a certain fluidity to the struggles within the nationalist movement: between the Gandhians who wanted to create a mass organization outside the legislatures and the ‘responsivists’ who wanted to enter them. In the 1930s, as in the rest of Maharashtra, the Vidarbha leaders of the non-Brahman movements, including many deshmukhs and some patils, also joined the Gandhi-dominated Congress party in large numbers (APRSU, 1982: 122). Before they entered Congress politics in large numbers, the elite marathas had found it impossible to dominate or influence the provincial legislatures in any significant way. The Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces and Berar and the princely state of Hyderabad each included large non-Marathi regions. Thus in the 1920s, by following a strategy of collaboration with the colonial regime, the elite marathas had to remain satisfied with the control of local boards and co-operative institutions. Brahmans, Marwaris and Gujaratis from Maharashtra and other regions remained in control of the provincial councils. However, in the local councils and the co-operatives, the maratha elites had tasted the rewards of privileged access to the resources of the state through active collaboration. Although meagre in comparison with post-Independence development, they were instrumental in keeping the elite marathas in charge of the rural polity. Towards the end of the 1920s, there was a remarkable decline in the rewards that collaboration with the government had initially produced. Soon after the initial advantage, gained through rising prices, increased area of cultivation and rising productivity, the growth impact had peaked

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

160

JAY ANT LELE

by the mid-1920s. The co-operatives had been milked to the maximum extent that the government was willing to allow by overlooking the extent of arrears and overdrafts. (A colonial government could not be expected to go very far in this respect.) The biggest ever depression had already begun to show its effects. The increasing numbers of the educated among the non-Brahmans also saw their interests being thwarted through the attempts of the government to tax or control their activities, or by the fact that there was not going to be a rapid expansion of employment opportunities. At the same time, the nationalists under Gandhi were able to demonstrate more clearly than ever that the limits to the prosperity for the privileged had been reached and that no greater progress was possible without political change. After this the gap between the claims of the state to mass loyalty and its ability to deliver jobs, development efforts or political responsibility was going to become wider and wider. These economic compulsions along with recognition of the limits of a colonial state, arose simultaneously among the younger brahman intellec­ tuals and the non-Brahman leaders. Out of this new awareness emerged a heightened realization that pressure for increased political power was going to yield results, however slowly, so that some of the leaders of the non-Brahman movement began to look upon the nationalist movement more favourably. In fact they were merely echoing the rising pragmatic realization among the widespread rural maratha elite. Whether the leaders of the non-Brahman movement took this instrumentalist view or not is immaterial. They would not have received the whole-hearted support of those who were in control of the rural economy had they decided to act otherwise. The colonial-capitalist context of the changing fortunes of the Britishelite maratha alliance must not be forgotten. Given the interest of the world capitalist system, of which the colonial state was the agent, in fostering the production of primary products and cash crops (cotton and sugar in particular), it is not surprising that the state had responded immediately to the demands for amelioration from the rich peasantry in the 1880s. Prior rebellions of tribal groups had been ruthlessly crushed. They had stood in the way of the march of capitalism. In establishing a direct alliance with the dominant land-owning groups, the colonial state also won a faithful ally against the disgruntled urban professionals and intellectuals who had taken control of the nationalist movement in Maharashtra. Similarly, in keeping with the principle of pluralist politics, the British rulers did all they could to foster the religious and ethnic idioms of interest articulation. Although the English strategy of 'divide and rule* had become a household word among the nationalists, the objective conditions were such that no universalizing ideology, encompassing all competing interests, could emerge to counter that strategy. This situation changed rapidly during the inter-war years. The decline of England as an industrial power within the capitalist system and its

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

161

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

second-class status in the era of finance capitalism played a crucial role. Earlier, various factions in Maharashtrian society, including the so-called militant nationalists, had treated the state as the object of pressure. Their efforts to enlarge their constituencies of popular support were predicated on the assumption that the louder they spoke the bigger their piece of pie would be in what seemed, for a while, like an ever-expanding economy. The limits of colonial state power dawned on all of them. Industrial capital, rich peasantry, urban intellectuals and even the Muslim elites began to see that a new place for India, independent of Britain, had to be carved out within the world capitalist system. The appeal of Gandhi's pragmatic universalism and the metamorphosis of the Indian National Congress into a ‘world fair’ (where every interest could have a pavilion), makes sense within this context of the changing relations of production. In Maharash­ tra, brahmans and maratha elites joined hands with many industrial capitalists and the petit bourgeoisie in demanding freedom for India. They also harnessed the energies of the urban proletariat and the rural poor with promises of socialist transformation and Ram rajya. In fact the postIndependence state produced strong socialist slogans along with weak and sporadic welfare measures. Between 1930 and 1947 the elite marathas who had earlier shunned the nationalist movement joined the Congress party in large numbers declaring it to be a party of the masses (bahujan samaj) (Table 5). In this case the leaders were, for the most part, following their followers. The latter had seen the writing on the wall by 1937. Many of them, local leaders in talukas and districts, had already turned anti-Brahmanism into a competition for positions on local bodies (district and local boards). These had been installed by the British, explicitly to give a foretaste of competitive pluralism to the maratha gentry (Tinker, 1954). Funds involving access to public resources were meagre at the outset, as with the co-operative societies (Catanach, 1970). But with the establishment of the new Legislative Councils (1937), transfer of political power was within sight and Congress seemed to be rather well placed to receive it. The Quit India movement of 1942 provided the maratha elites with a singular opportunity to test their ability to mobilize support from a broad spectrum of kunbis using the ideology of independence for the masses, that is, independence

T able 5 Congress Party Membership in Maharashtra, 1935-38 Year 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38

Rural

Urban

Total

16,578 29,516 126,598

11,680 16,399 37,128

28,258 45,925 163,880

So u r c e : P h a d k c . 1982: 163.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

162

JAYANT LEI JR

for the entire peasantry. Much of the agitation was centred in western Maharashtra where the maratha-kunbi linkage has always been the strongest and had been well-nurtured under the non-Brahman movement. The various ‘mass’ activities during this period (1937-47) worked towards further consolidation of maratha-kunbi structures of loyalty captured by the former Satyashodhak leaders in the term bahujan samaj. This interpretation of events is not to be confused with an elite maratha conspiracy theory. Many of the leaders of the Satyashodhak movement had a genuinely radical orientation to an inarticulately defined interest of the entire ‘peasantry’. The young brahmans from the nationalist movement who joined them in the Congress party also had strong leftist leanings. Their alliance was facilitated by the fact that ill Poona and in most of the district towns, a militant brahman leadership had emerged to carry forward Tilak’s legacy of Hindu conservatism through the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. The new Congress brahmans were, therefore, distinctly different and hence desirable allies for the militant peasant leadership. While the peasantry in Maharashtra was a highly stratified formation from within, in the minds of leaders like Jedhe and Gadgil, it stood for a class exploited by urban capital and bureaucracy. The local elite saw the term peasantry as referring only to the maratha-kunbi caste cluster. This was not something that would be self-evident to those who had learnt to make social distinctions only along brahman-non-Brahman lines. Post Independence Patterns o f Dominance In 1947, Maharashtra was still split into the three political divisions of Bombay, the Central Provinces and Hyderabad. The non-Brahman movement had seen its greatest strength in western Maharashtra which was part of the Bombay province, along with parts of Gujarat and Karnataka. The Congress leadership of the province and within western Maharashtra was still urban and mostly brahman. Even though the Congress party won handsomely in rural Maharashtra because of the support of the marathas, and even though the latter had a strong representation within the party organization, they were given only a small representation, after a great deal of protest, in the Congress ministry of 1937. The same story was repeated when a Congress government was elected to power in 1946. On both occasions older and more established urban Congress leaders were unwilling to entrust complex affairs of the state to the new, rural and somewhat more radical elites. That Brahmanic arrogance was, however, hidden behind an explanation that emphasized the necessity to share power equally with Congress leaders from the other linguistic and cultural regions. The two, brahman dominance of the party and the predominance of non-Marathi elites in the province, forced the maratha elite to oppose the die-hard Congress leadership from outside and to demand a unified state of the Marathi-speaking people. As a consequence the period between 1947 and 1960 became significant for two major events: the formation of the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

163

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

Peasants and Workers Party (PWP) and the rise of a strong movement for the creation of Samyukta Maharashtra. In Vidarbha the Nagpur districts which had earlier been the principality of the Bhosles were integrated into the Central Provinces in 1861. The Berar districts had been leased by the Company from the Nizam and British officials were responsible for land revenue collection since 1860 but the area was formally annexed only in 1903. In 1933 the Nizam expressed a desire to take back the districts under his domain and thus precipitated an early interest among the elites in the creation of a separate state in order to forestall such a prospect. At the same time changes were occurring in the political consciousness of the Hindi speaking regions of the Central Provinces which, between 1919 and 1939, led to the displacement of the Marathi elites from the dominant position in provincial politics (Baker, 1979). As in western Maharashtra, the leaders of the non-Brahman movement in Vidarbha had stayed away from the Congress until the 1930s. They were active in the local government and co-operative institutions and as they began to gain power in the local councils they also saw the limitations posed by a multi-lingual province to the aspirations of regional dominance. The desire for a separate Marathi state of Vidarbha began to gather more and more support among the rural elites from deshmukh as well as non-deshmukh villages and talukas. It is impossible to reproduce here the chequered career of the Nag-Vidarbha movement, its eventual dissipation and the integration of Vidarbha into Maharashtra. The differences in the social structure of the regions of Nagpur and Vidarbha, as discussed earlier, played an important role during the different stages of the agitation. Elite marathas and brahmans (deshmukhs and tx-malguzars), kunbis {patils and ordinary peasants), and artisans with their own caste organizations in major urban concentrations (koshtis, telis, halbas) contributed in different ways to the currents and cross-currents of the agitation. In the end it was the decision by some of the influential Berar deshmukhs, who decided to join hands with their western Maharashtrian kin, that tilted the balance in favour of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement. But whether it was Nag-Vidarbha or Samyukta Maharashtra, the decisive factor in the mobilization of the maratha elites was their fear of increasing domination by the non-Marathi people in provincial politics (Baker, 1979). This fear brought the various factions of the privileged communities together. In the 1920s the non-Brahman movement had greater impact in Berar than in Nagpur (Phadke, 1979). The deshmukhs of Berar were predominantly elite marathas whereas in the Nagpur districts 'Brahmins were the predominant landholding caste and were mostly absentee landlords living in towns like Nagpur and Bhandara. The next most important were Kunbis... Less prominent but still with significant holdings were Marathas...’ (Harnetty, 1988: 98). Despite their rivalries and disagreements in the political arena, the deshmukhs of Berar were

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

164

JAYANT LELE

unanimous on the question of separation from the Central Provinces. Most of the maratha non-Brahman leaders had joined the Congress party in the 1930s. Long before adult franchise and general electoral politics came to the region, the politics of factions and shifting alliances was already part of the political culture of Vidarbha (Stern, 1970). Leadership of the Congress party, in legislative councils and in local governments, kept changing with shifting alliances between groups of marathas, brahmans, non-marathas y non-Brahmans and non-Maharashtrians. In the 1930s and the 1940s complex sub-regional and cross-regional alliances, between marathas and Marwaris and brahmans and Marwaris, from Berar districts and from Nagpur districts, kept passing the control of Congress back and forth. Despite these manoueverings, when a conference was arranged in Jalgaon to discuss the prospects for a unified Marathi state, major Congress leaders from all regions participated. One of the major stated concerns of Vidarbha leaders at this stage was the fear of reintegration with the Muslim princely state of the Nizam. If that fear could be removed without having to use further interregional collaboration to enlarge the pressure group, most Vidarbha elites would have preferred a separate state. Prospects for enhapcing their own dominance would have been greater. A commitment to relative autonomy from the other parts of the state was the next best option if they had to live within the larger Marathi state. The famous Akola Pact signed in order to assuage the fears of Vidarbha elites, accepted both these alternatives as almost equally desirable. Most of the signatories were either brahmans, Marwaris, deshmukhs or patils. No Dalit leader became party to it (Pendse, 1965). In Marathwada there was little resistance to the idea of a united Marathi state. All Marathi elites, continuously stifled by the policies of an autocratic Muslim regime, were in fact anxious to join in (Pendse: 1965, 103). The leadership of the region, primarily brahman or deshmukh, within the Congress party, was also debilitated by internal cleavages often reaching up to the provincial and national divisions. Thus in the usual Congress pattern, which became common nationwide, one of the groups supported Nehru at the Centre while the other supported and depended on Patel as the mentor (in 1948). In both cases the leadership had come primarily from brahmans and other upper class elites. Even though the dominance of the marathas at the level of the village, where the jati mode of production had placed them in a central role, was essentially the same in all regions, the ability of the maratha elites to develop regional dominance had varied between different regions. In all of them, however, it was particularly thwarted by the structure of the provinces. Power had to be shared with the various dominant nonMaharashtrian elites. Hence, despite internal rivalries, there was a general desire for the reorganization of the provinces. However, in the prevailing atmosphere in the nation, before and soon after Independence, such a demand would have been thought of as deflecting from the nationalist

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

165

struggle (and later from national unity). The intensity of the demand, therefore, grew only slowly and after a prolonged experience of relative deprivation. Since the existing situation seemed to offer a variety of options along the same lines, involving differential possibilities of dominance for different elements, a concerted movement for a united Maharashtra emerged fully and, for a long time, both within and outside of the Congress because of strong opposition from the central leadership. The ruralization of the Congress party in western Maharashtra had occurred only after the maratha-kunbi support had swung away from the non-Brahman movement. This was symbolized by the shift of the vocal non-Brahman leadership to the Congress. These men had expected to find commensurate representation for themselves within the new Congress government. When this was denied they decided to start a new political party. They believed that they had once delivered the support of maratha-kunbis to the Congress and hence they could take it away. Although the rhetoric now was that of general issues, of claiming that the Congress regime had not been of value to the peasants and workers, the real question was that of seats in the state legislature: of privileged access to public resources (Phadnis, 1978: 14). The disgruntled state leaders did not realize that the local maratha elites, who had shifted their allegiance towards the Congress, had no intention of being led into the political wilderness. Keshavrao Jedhe (1896-1951) came to symbolize the new dilemma of the enlightened leaders of the non-Brahman movement. He had joined the Congress party around 1929, because of the emerging radical orientation among the new brahman elites represented by men like N. V. Gadgil. Jedhe became the Vice-President of the Congress party in 1932. He was joined by Shankarrao More (1899-1966) who was, perhaps, even stronger in his radical commitments. The inevitability of the Congress party advancing towards national independence under Gandhi’s astute lead­ ership had not escaped the attention of the hegemonic maratha elites in the rural districts of Maharashtra. Jedhe’s early disillusionment with the ‘anti-mass’ policies of the Congress notwithstanding, they could not be prevented from staying within the Congress fold. Despite Jedhe’s positions as the President and Vice-President of the Maharashtra Congress, it continued to be dominated by traditional Gandhians, who were for the most part, brahmans. Jedhe and his supporters had been unhappy with the choice of a chitpavan Bombay brahman (Kher) as the Premier of the Congress government in 1937. They also felt that rural Maharashtra had not been adequately represented in the Cabinet. This feeling of being bypassed was reinforced when Kher formed his second cabinet in 1946 without consulting Jedhe. Their response was to form an intra-party ginger group. It consisted primarily of elite maratha leaders of the non-Brahman movement, a few other non-brahmans and some left-of-centre brahmans. This effort was similar to the efforts across India by many other dissatisfied

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

166

JAYANT LELE

interest groups in the Congress party. The party high command responded by banning such groups. The non-Brahman leaders were thus forced to leave the Congress. They did so to form the Peasants and Workers Party in June 1948. Any illusion that the non-Brahman movement had been a genuinely all-encompassing movement of the 'middle castes’ is difficult to sustain in the light of the subsequent performance of the Peasants and Workers Party. The party did poorly in the general elections of 1952. Some of the lesser lights of the non-Brahman movement became Congressmen; leaders like B. S. Hirey and Y. B. Chavan, having realized that its real base was among elite marathas, had stayed with the Congress. Chavan later explained why PWP had failed so miserably in gaining voter support in the elections in 1952. According to Chavan: ‘Ours was a party in power, we could . . . try to help them (people) in difficult matters’. What he meant was that the Congress party had the power of patronage (Lele, 1981a: 53-4). If he was not totally convinced of the futility of walking away from the Congress fold in 1937 (Omvedt, 1976), Jedhe found it to be true when he actually did quit the Congress in 1948, only to return to its fold in 1954. While internal bickerings and personality conflicts undoubtedly played their part, it is my contention here that the hegemonic consciousness permeating the elite maratha community was essentially responsible for the incorporation of the non-Brahman movement. Leaders such as Jedhe and More merely symbolized the pragmatic orientation of those whom they were supposed to have led. The subsequent failure of the Peasants and Workers Party, under the leadership of More and other stalwarts of the movement, is also indicative of the flexibility of the maratha elites towards ideological perspectives. The most telling evidence that the non-Brahman movement was not genuinely a mass movement comes from Ambedkar’s (1891-1956) decision to dissociate from it and to launch an independent Dalit movement. His perceptive and trenchant critique of the leaders of the non-Brahman movement (‘selfish, short-sighted, arrogant bullies, second rate brah­ mans') came from a life experience of paternalism which he shared with the most illiterate and inarticulate Dalits in rural Maharashtra. In his early years Ambedkar was helped by the two major maratha princes of Kolhapur and Baroda. He soon realized that when it came to demanding justice and equality, and when the traditional privileges or even the symbols of dominance were threatened, the once sympathetic maratha leaders were the most vehement opponents of the claims of Dalits. However, Ambedkar belonged to the same tradition as that of Ranade and Phule (Lele and Singh, 1987). When Javalkar, one of the radical non-brahman leaders whose thinking was closest to Phule’s was prosecuted by the colonial government, Ambedkar defended his case and won an acquittal. This is not the place to discuss in detail the significance of Ambedkar’s Dalit movement. In the light of our analysis of the non-Brahman

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

167

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

movement and of the subsequent takeover of the Congress by the dominant marathas, Ambedkar’s decision to dissociate from both and to confront them for their hypocrisy makes good sense. It is also a sad commentary on the nature of the Maharashtra polity that in spite of his courageous struggle, with total support from nearly all the more conscious of the Dalits, the mahars, he failed even to initiate changes in the existing patterns of dominance. Ambedkar saw Gandhi’s defence of the essentials of the Hindu social order as a defence of Brahmanism. Thus he opposed the Civil Disobedience movement of the 1930s because it offered no pros­ pects for radical social change in the fortunes of the Dalits. He recognized the nature of the emerging polity in the 1930s and asked for separate electorates for Dalits. He had to yield to the savarna pressure against this demand exerted in the form of Gandhi’s ‘fast unto death’. He was forced to accept a worthless compromise to stave off savarna anger. Here again the numbers of savarna folk and the intensity of their involvement, had been aroused to a fury by Gandhi’s Brahmanic technique. The Samyukta Maharashtra Movement The rise and fall of PWP symbolized the hegemonic orientation of elite marathas in western Maharashtra to the problem of provincial politics between 1947 and 1957. In Vidarbha and Marathwada the problem of hegemonic reassertion took different forms. In both cases the existing provincial arrangements were seen as temporary. In western Maharashtra, a recognition had come during this period among maratha (and brahman) elites, both inside and outside the Congress, that in the final analysis none of the various interests in Maharashtra could be fostered fully while power was being shared with leaders from Gujarat, Bombay and Karnataka. A brahman-maratha all party alliance had begun to work to promote the creation of a united Maharashtra. Contacts were made with leaders, mostly Congressmen, in Vidarbha and Marathwada. The Congress leadership in Marathwada along with the leaders from the other two regions of Hyderabad state (Andhra and Karnataka) were unanimous in the view that the administrative existence of the former Nizam’s state was artificial and hence it should be dissolved. As in western Maharashtra the leadership of the Congress at this stage was a mixture of old Gandhians (often brahmans) and the new elite maratha entrants, mostly deshmukhs. All sections of the elites with the exception of the Dalit leadership, were united in their expectation that a united Marathi state would advance their interests, political and economic, far better (Phadke, 1979: Ch. 9; Teerth, 1967). In Vidarbha the two possible options of a separate Vidarbha state and a united Maharashtra with Bombay as its capital were equally attractive to most of the elites and hence a great deal depended on how and with whom the best bargain could be struck. Bombay capitalists, Gujarat separatists. Nagpur petit bourgeoisie, Berar deshmukhs and lawyer brahmans, and many other groups had a stake in the outcome. It was

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

168

JAYANT LELE

Berar deshmukhs who dominated the bargaining process (Phadke, 1979). Given the fact that various relatively powerful interests were pushing the decision-makers at the national level in a number of different directions, the central leadership came forward with a typical Congress solution. It created a new bilingual state comprising Bombay, Gujarat, western Maharashtra, Vidarbha and Marathwada, in 1956. (For a partial interest group analysis of the movement, see Stern, 1970). During the general elections which followed in 1957, a united front (of which PWP was a member) called Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS) defeated the Congress party (113 seats to 43) in western Maharashtra. The latter won by a large margin in Vidarbha and Marathwada and did reasonably well in Gujarat. The desire of the elites of Marathwada to leave the isolation of a second-class citizenship in a repressive state was fulfilled in the new bilingual state. This was only the second best solution in their view and like everyone else they did not expect the bilingual state to be a permanent solution (Teerth, 1967). In Vidarbha also the view was that the bilingual solution could not be permanent. It did leave open the possibility of a single Maharashtra or a separate Vidarbha. However, for all those who had argued on either side of the choice the bilingual solution seemed adequate. This was reflected in the electoral performance of the Congress party. In both Marathwada and Vidarbha, the easily distinguishable maratha elites (distinguishable by their very substantial wealth and their self-con­ sciousness as Kshatriyas) made common cause with the older Congress leadership because it was in their interest to do so. In western Maha­ rashtra, the maratha elites were far more dispersed and historically more flexible in caste boundaries for the reasons discussed in earlier sections. Even though they refused to follow their leaders into ascetic opposition, away from access to governmental power and in the name of global issues and Marxist principles of the PWP, the same local maratha elites showed a canny willingness to temporarily abandon the Congress in order to join the cause of a united Marathi state. Only because of its success outside western Maharashtra, was Congress able, in 1957, to form the government. When the question of Chief Ministership came up, however, the maratha elites were faced with several options including B.S. Hirey, the senior-most maratha Congress leader and a staunch vocal supporter of Samyukta Maharashtra, and the senior Gandhian Morarji Desai. In the complex string of events which followed, Y. B. Chavan was elected over Hirey after Morarji had withdrawn from the contest. Chavan had clearly chosen his option of preferring his links with the national Congress and hence with the powerful central government over his association with the cause and proponents of Samyukta Maharashtra. He won by a big margin, primarily with the votes of the Gujaratis. But most of the Vidarbha legislators voted for him including some of the major deshmukhs and their supporters. The rival deshmukhs, of course, voted for Hirey. Chavan also won many votes from the core maratha area of western Maharashtra: Satara, Kolhapur and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

169

Political M obilization in Maharashtra

Sholapur as well as Khandesh. Even in Marathwada Chavan is reported to have received some five (out of 28) votes. These came from ‘Congress MLAs who belonged to the maratha caste-cluster’ (Phadke, 1979: 197). Among them were some of the new village level elites (patils) who were to begin to pose a challenge to the dominant deshmukhs in the coming years. These pieces of evidence suggest that choice of loyalty of the elite marathas in all the three regions was indeed guided by the prospects for privileged access to the state’s resources. Chavan managed to retain his job as the Chief Minister of the new state. However, the agitation for the unilingual state continued in various forms. It was the only issue on which a massive consensus emerged between elites of the various castes in western Maharashtra. The maratha elite joined hands with brahmans, and the communists with Hindu nationalists. Chavan kept claiming publicly that under the bilingual state, for the first time in history, all the Marathi­ speaking people had come together (Phadke, 1979). Privately he was convinced that this could not be the final solution. Having recognized the basic contradictions between the developmental aspirations of the ruling elite of Gujarat and Maharashtra he persuaded the national Congress leadership to reconsider its stand. In the end Chavan’s way of presenting and winning the demand for the unilingual state ensured the continuity of smooth elite maratha access to the resources of the government. After the inauguration of the new state on 1 May 1960, he and the Congress party were well rewarded for this achievement in the subsequent elections (1962). Chavan’s astute management of the bilingual state and his act of interest management also ensured the political integration of the elites of Vidarbha and Marathwada into the new state of Maharashtra (Map 4) (Lele, 1982). The Political Economy In terms of many of the standard, aggregate economic indicators, Maharashtra is a relatively more developed state then most. Its per capita income is substantially higher than the national average (33.5 per cent over that of India in 1982-3). Its contribution to the national income is also considerably higher than its proportion of the population. It is more urbanized than the rest of the country and it has established a secular trend for increases in per capita income over the last two decades. Much of the rapid growth is to be attributed to the industrial sector, manufacturing in particular, in which substantial diversification has gone hand in hand with increasing volume and rising productivity of investment. In 1982-3, with less than 10 per cent of the population of the country it had 11.2 per cent of the nation’s factories, 16.9 per cent of the energy production, 17 per cent of industrial capital, 25 per cent of the gross industrial product and 17 per cent of the total employment. Average productivity per worker in the state was Rs 94,000 in comparison with Rs 68,000 for India as a whole (Hardikar and Dastane, 1984).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

| Digitized by V ^ jO O Q L C

MADHYA PRADESH

v _____

*.

v - *. :

* •

JALGAON */*■

• ;*BULDANAl.

1

•

/

....

•

:

___

____

* • • ..

.

;/• • • • '

CHANDRAPUR

AHMADNAGAR • ••• •

*.

. . . .. .

-A;.

™E VV / r•*. 7/ *s* *.. : V \ ....... r r

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

\




Distribution o f Land in West Bengal by Size Class o f Operational Holdings, 1953-72 1953-54 Size class of household operational holding (in acres) ‘Landless’1 0.005-1.0 1.0-2.5 2.5-5.0 5.0-10.0 10.0-20.0 20.0 and above

Per cent of households 0.89 47.66 16.61 17.52 12.15 4.14 1.03

48.55

1971-72

1961—62 Per cent of area operated

Per cent of households

3.90 10.49 23.27 31.38 20.78 11.18

33.9 14.7 16.90 19.70 12.40 3.80 0.70

Per cent of area operated

48.6

23 11.50 27.90 32.20 19.10 6.60

Per cent of area operated

Per cent of households 30.94 19.80 22.42 15.77 8.92 1.87 0.25

SOURCE: Government of India. National Sample Survey. 8th Round for 1953-4, 17th Round for 1961-2 and 26th Round for 1971-2.

1 The drastic change in the numbers of the ‘landless* between 1953-4 and 1961—2 reflects a change in survey procedure.

50.74

4.34 20.45 28.94 31.05 12.32 2.90

380

A T U L K O H LI

to who supports and who benefits from the regime. This is because the party line and not social background is the primary determinant of elite behaviour at the highest level. The intermediate level elite, however, are not likely to be as close followers of the party line. Social background of these elite is more important for understanding the nature of the regime’s social support. Below the level of old cadres in control of party and government are the intermediate level party elite, often elected to local government positions as party-sponsored candidates. The CPM regime allowed political parties for the first time in India to compete for local government positions. Well aware of its new popularity, the CPM hoped that its own candidates would be successful. The strategy paid off. Eighty-seven per cent of the seats at the district level, 74 per cent at the block level, and 67 per cent at the village level were captured in 1979 by those running on the CPM ticket. The 1983 panchayat elections were a near repeat performance. Survey results reveal that the majority of these new office-holders are party sympathizers rather than party members; a large majority are small landholders and teachers; and, therefore, from rural lower-middle income groups (Table 9 and Kohli, 1983: 791-5). This pattern is significant for two reasons. First, never have local governments in West Bengal or, for that matter in much of India, been so free of the domination of landlords and rich peasants. The CPM has therefore done what no other Indian political force has been able to do: penetrate the countryside without depending on large landowners. The CPM regime, along with the newly created local governments, thus represents two interlinked patterns of political change: an organizational penetration by the ‘centre’ into the ‘periphery’, and a simultaneous shift in the class basis of institutional power. A second aspect of the panchayat officials’ background, however, also reveals something interesting about the CPM: the CPM is dominated by the lower-middle income rural groups and is not really a party of the poor. This assertion of course needs to be understood in the limited sense in which it is meant. As I will argue, the CPM is electorally supported by the poor, and in turn, some government policies do benefit the agrarian lower classes. In this sense, the CPM is a party of the poor. Nevertheless, neither the bulk of the party membership, nor party supporters having access to electoral offices, are the rural poor. Some of the CPM regime’s anti-poverty programmes also deserve attention. While I have discussed these in detail elsewhere (Kohli, 1987: Ch. 3), a brief recapitulation of the argument is in order. The CPM has utilized its newly consolidated position to initiate rural reforms. As discussed above, the bulk of the rural poor in West Bengal are share-croppers and landless labourers, and the programmes have been aimed primarily at these groups, especially the share-croppers (bargadars in Bengali). Tenancy in the past has been based largely on informal arrangements. As a consequence, laws designed to reduce the amount of

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Digitized by VjOOQLC Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MIC O >

T able 9 Some Indicators o f Regional Economic Imbalance in Maharashtra State

Division/ District

Greater Bombay District Bombay Division excluding Greater Bombay Poona Division Aurangabad Division Nagpur Division Maharashtra State

Percentage of population

Percentage of male workers

Percentage ofnonagricultural workers

Percentage Percentage of of workers in manufacturing factory activity workers

Percentage Percentage Percentage of of commercial of joint electricity bank credit stock disbursed companies consumption

(1971)

(1971)

(1971)

(1971)

(1971)

(1971)

0971)

(1971)

11.84

14.74

34.76

50.20

59.41

68.94

87.10

87.56

23.19 25.82

21.59 24.52

18.25 21.39

18.07 19.53

16.21 16.05

13.50 6.29

1.93 8.29

2.00 6.31

15.98 23.17 100.00 50412235

15.92 23.23 100.00 13603032

8.37 17.23 100.00 5757568

2.91 9.29 100.00 1704645

1.52 6.81 100.00 997675

1.34 9.93 100.00 7088 million kWh

0.62 2.06 100.00 15371

Source: (1) Statistical Abstract of Maharashtra State, 1962-3,1970-71. (2) Maharashtra, Facts, Figures and Opportunites, Maharashtra Economic Development Council, Bombay, 1972. (3) Banking Statistics 'Basic Statistical Returns’, voJ. 1, Reserve Bank of India, December 1972.

0.41 3.72 100.00 Rs 6889 million

Road length in km. per 100 sq. kilometres (1961-62) (1970-71) —

—

20.6 19.0

30.6 31.4

4.8 7.6 12.8

12.9 12.2 21.2

ATUL KOHLI

382

the crop that the share-cropper must hand over to the landowner, and laws to increase security of tenure, have been ineffective. To alter this situation, the CPM regime has undertaken a concerted effort legally to register the share-croppers, in the hope that this will improve their incomes and provide them greater security. One of the early acts of the CPM government was to amend the land-reform laws so as to transfer the burden of proof of land-sharing arrangements from the share-cropper to the landowner. With this law on the books, the government undertook a special drive called Operation Barga to facilitate rapid registration of the share-croppers. Teams of bureaucrats and/or party members, activists and Kisan Sabha members were sent out to the countryside to announce the laws and to register the share-croppers on the spot. The Operation has had considerable success. While over the previous three decades, mostly under Congress party rule, fewer than 60,000 share-croppers were registered in the areas where the CPM is now operating, in its first five years the CPM succeeded in registering over 1.2 million. Compared to the past performances of Congress and other regimes in the area, therefore, the CPM’s current success is spectacular. Given the size of the problem—there may be close to 2 million families of share-croppers in West Bengal—much, of course, remains to be done. Nevertheless, the CPM has taken an impressive first step toward improving the living conditions of the share-croppers. As the survey data in Table 10 indicates, a majority of the registered share­ croppers now only pay their legally stipulated shares—25 per cent—to the landowners. This amounts to a significant—as much as 50 per cent— improvement in the access of share-croppers to the crops they cultivate. What explains the CPM’s success in registering so large a number of share-croppers? The mere legal act of registration challenges class relations in the countryside, for it is aimed at reducing the landowner’s control of his property and the income from it. The act, therefore, is bound to provoke considerable opposition. The share-croppers are generally afraid to participate in the process without the support of forces outside of the village community. And it is this crucial ‘outside support’ that the CPM regime has provided. The power of both the party and the government is being utilized to improve the condition of the share-croppers. The role of the party has been especially significant. Operation Barga has thus the greatest success in those parts of Bengal where the party is strongest. The critical variable has been party-initiated politicization. As a consequence of sustained party activity, the share-croppers have come to understand the laws, trust the party, and take the final and important step of registration. This act of defiance against the traditional patron perhaps does more to help implement the share-cropping laws than the refinement of the laws themselves. Modest increases in income and greater security for the share-croppers have been the short-run consequences of registration. In order to further

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

383

T able 10 The Impact o f Operation Barga: Household Survey o f Registered Share­ croppers* Question

Tabulated Answers

1. How much sharecropping land did you register?

Below 1 acre

1-2 acres

2-5 acres

66%

25%

9%

No

Yes

2. Do you own any land Under 1 acre other than the land 37% 49% held under a sharecropping agreement? 3. Where does the In or around the village landowner live? 19% Before registration 4. Did the landowner provide any inputs?

Yes

No

14% 86% Before registration1

5. How is the output shared? 6. Have you taken out a loan?

More than 1 acre 14% Elsewhere 81% After registration Yes

3% 97% After registration1

50-50

60-40

50-50

87%

13%

32%

Yes

No

60-40 2% No

36% Family Maintenance

64% Investment

28%

72%

7. If yes to No. 6, how did you use the loan?

75-25 66%

* Based on a survey of 300 households in the districts of Twenty-four Parganas, Burdwan, and Midnapore. The surveys were carried out in Ji’ly-Sept. 1983.1 would like to acknowledge the valuable help of Dr Sajal Basu in supervising the surveys in Burdwan and Midnapore. I did the survey in Twenty-four Parganas. 1 The first share figure refers to the share of the share-cropper. For example, *60-40’ refers to 60 per cent of the share belonging to the share-cropper and 40 per cent to the landowner. SOURCE:Kohli (1987), ch. III. Table 3.9,130.

improve land productivity and incomes of the registered share-croppers, the CPM regime is striving to channel credit to them. The government has negotiated with the commercial banks and secured an agreement ‘in principle*, that banks will lend money not only against land but also against the share of the crop. Furthermore, the government has promised to subsidize the labour-intensive aspects of the banking costs. The partycontrolled local governments will prepare the lists of registered share­ croppers and identify their legal share of the crop. This information will be provided to the banks and will save them considerable labour costs. The banks will then offer loans—part in cash and part in vouchers—for agricultural inputs. The government will also subsidize the interest the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

384

ATUL KOHLI

share-croppers must pay. The programme is a novel one, and it is too early to judge whether it will succeed or fail. If the offering of credit can be sustained and expanded, it will demonstrate how a well-organized left-of-centre government can imaginatively and systematically intervene in a private enterprise economy so as to strengthen the position of the lower classes. In addition to the programme for the share-croppers, the CPM’s efforts have been aimed at providing extra employment and better wages for the landless agricultural labourers. The Food for Work Programme (FWP)—a public-works oriented, employment-generating scheme, in part supported by the wheat/rice grants from the centrally controlled surplus—has been implemented with considerable effectiveness in West Bengal. The pro­ gramme has tended to generate about one month of extra employment for one-third of all landless households. Considering that most of the landless usually get no more than four months of employment per year, the increment is by no means insignificant. The implementation of the programme has been facilitated by the party-controlled local governments. Much of the money is channelled through these ‘red panchayats’. In consultation with the local party cadres, the panchayats decide which projects will be undertaken, choose who will be employed, and administer the funds. As the political fortunes of the CPM are closely tied to the success of such distributive schemes, sustained pressure through the party has minimized the typical problems of corruption and maladministration of rural employment schemes in other states. Party-initiated wage struggles have been the other ‘non-governmental’ mode of increasing the incomes of landless labourers. As a party in power, however, seeking to maintain broad-based political support, the CPM has not devoted a great deal of effort to organizing union-supported agitation in the countryside. Moreover, socio-economic conditions are harsh. With a massive labour supply, only during the peak employment season, do labourers enjoy a favourable bargaining position. Nevertheless, in some parts of West Bengal, where the party organization is strong, unionization has led to a modest increase in wages. My own interviews revealed that wage levels in the unionized Blocks tended to be somewhat higher than in the non-unionized ones. The overall success on this front, however, has been minimal. The CPM finds it difficult to hold together an alliance between the landless labourers and the middle peasants who often employ these labourers. Increased wages will put pressure on the politically crucial middle peasantry, thus weakening one of the legs on which the CPM stands. For now, therefore, the CPM has mainly concentrated its energies on improving the lot of the share-croppers and in supporting the middle peasants. The poorest of the poor have not gained much from CPM rule. To summarize this section, political and social dominance has come to be separated in contemporary West Bengal. While traditional socio­ economic privileges are mostly intact, and the Congress party remains a

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

385

considerable force, the economically powerful have failed to translate their position and resources into political power. Governmental power is rather being exercised by a well-disciplined, reformist political party. The party draws its cadres primarily from middle and lower-middle income groups. Party-sponsored reforms, however, do benefit segments of the rural poor. How has this relatively rare politico-economic situation emerged in West Bengal? How is it that political power has been successfully wrested from the socially powerful by a reform-oriented, ideological party? Some themes which form the larger answer to these questions have already been touched upon: elite radicalism; regional nationalism; significance of party organization; and weakness of caste and class dominance. As one would expect, such cultural and structural traits do not emerge in decades; they rather reflect centuries of distinctive history. It is to a more detailed historical analysis, therefore, of the factors explaining some of the exceptional tendencies in contemporary Bengali politics that I now turn my attention. Historical Roots o f Bengali Political Exceptionalism: Elite Activism The exceptional and interrelated tendencies of Bengali politics which I have chosen to analyse in this chapter are: weakness of the Congress party, elite militancy, and the slow but steady rise of an electorally based communist party to power. As one takes a long look at the modem socio-political history of Bengal in search of an explanation for these tendencies, three factors stand out: the nature of the Bengali educated elite; certain peculiarities of the social structure, and traditions of terrorist political organization. I analyse here each of these factors in the hope of elucidating the changing patterns of domination and opposition in India’s Bengal. One important caveat should be noted. While seeking the roots of the present in the past, there is a danger that one may recreate the past so as to make the present an inevitable outcome of that past. This would certainly be fallacious. The present was no more certain yesterday than the future is today. The weakness of Congress and the emergence of a moderate communist government, to put it differently, was by no means an inevitable outcome of Bengali social and political conditions. And yet certain forces and tendencies have given rise precisely to such an outcome. The analytical task is to identify these conditions. If this was mainly an historical essay, I would make an attempt to do greater justice to the past by also identifying contradictory conditions that could have influenced processes of change in other directions. If the recreated past appears occasionally to lead inevitably to the present in the discussion that follows, it is only because of the manner in which the problem has been posed here. By the turn of this century, Bengal had experienced the rise of an intelligentsia—the Bengali bhadralok. As a leading historian of Bengal has convincingly argued, the members of this group formed a status and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

386

ATUL KOHLI

cultural elite (Broomfield, 1968: 5-6). While initially rooted in high caste and landed backgrounds, the defining characteristics of group membership were generally acquired through British-introduced education. The 'charmed circle*, therefore, though initially rather closed to upper class brahmans, lost some of its class and caste exclusiveness and, over time, came to incorporate educated and cultured members of intermediate social backgrounds, especially members of such land controlling clean castes as the kayasthas. Many of the Bengali bhadralok went on to make important contributions in the fields of literature, music, art and religion. Our interest in this social group, however, is limited to their political role. As a self-defined and accepted societal elite, Bengali political leadership, including radical leadership, has originated from this background. Chang­ ing beliefs and attitudes of the politically inclined bhadralok are thus of considerable significance, especially if one keeps in mind that much of modem Bengali politics has been elite politics. The political consciousness and behaviour of the Bengali bhadralok were decisively conditioned by colonialism. As a cultured elite within a colonial setting—a product of that setting first, and then confronting it as 'second class citizens*—the bhadralok found their society backward and wanting. Around the turn of the century, two questions tended to dominate the thinking of the Bengali elite: how to reform or get rid of British rule; and how to reorganize Bengali—or for that matter Indian— society so as to make it respectable and competitive by European standards. The attitudes toward these two issues of anti-colonial nationalism and social reorganization changed over time. Prior to Independence, national­ ist themes were dominant. The agitation over Bengal's first partition transformed a sizeable minority of the questioning and moderate elite into militant nationalists. From here on, even when militancy was on the wane, the bhadralok were more or less permanently divided between the 'moderates* and the ‘extremists’. The differences here were primarily of political tactics; socio-economic outlooks of these groups were essentially elitist and conservative. The moderates slowly lost ground, not initially to the extremists, but to Bengali Muslims, who forged alliances with lower caste Hindus by promising progressive legislation. After Independence and the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim leadership departed. West Bengal was thus left with a political vacuum. The moderates under Congress leadership tried to regain the initiative, but for reasons to be specified, never really succeeded. The traditional weakness of Congress in Bengal was never really overcome. Instead, the old extremists, many by now turned communists, slowly but surely gained political prominence and support. Ironically—or may be not so ironically—the more powerful these communists became, the more moderate they tended to be in practice. Those seeking 'recipes for the Indian renaissance* in the first half of the nineteenth century tended to concentrate on issues of religious and social

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

387

reform (Bose, 1960 and Kopf, 1979). The major figures within Bengal, and these were also major figures of India at the time, were such individuals as Rammohan, Ramakrishna and Vivekananda. Paralleling the debates within the Russian intelligenstia of the same period, the conflicts tended to be rather tame by later standards. The main conflict was between those who wanted to reform and revive Hinduism so as to find virtue in the 'greatness* of India's past, and those who found the 'evils of Hinduism* intolerable enough to want to embrace Western secularism and emerging liberalism. Eradication of social evils was in either case seen as dependent on the spread of education. The British, however, came to be perceived as obstructing this and other reformist developments. What began as the perceived need for social reforms in those days, easily and often got translated into political demands: if Indians only had greater access to the political arena, they could help improve Indian conditions. By the second half of the nineteenth century, therefore, many in Bengal were demanding political representation in some form, as well as government jobs for the educated Bengalis. While self-serving, these demands were also seen as the means of achieving a desired goal: eradication of Indian social ills. Failure of the British to offer any substantial concessions tended only to intensify the demands for reforms. By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, the tone of the argument within Bengal was already quite distinct in comparison to the rest of India (Majumdar, 1978A: 482-537). Many Bengali revolutionaries have noted the profound impact that the writings of Bankim Chandra's Anandamath had in propelling them to action (see ‘interviews’ in Chattopadhyay, 1970). Aurobindo was already criticizing Congress as a 'rich man’s club’ and preaching the formation of secret terrorist societies as a mode of launching attacks on the British (Majumdar, 1978B: ch. I). While these were clearly minority voices at this point, the fact that they were there at all, and beginning to be well received among some of the Bengali bhadralok, was an early indicator of what was to come. What finally transformed the scattered voices—some demanding social reforms, others political representation and greater access to decision making, and yet others militant action to undermine British power—into a widespread and increasingly militant nationalist movement, was the growing agitation over Bengal’s partition. For the purposes of this study, numerous historical details of the anti-Partition agitation and the accom­ panying Swadeshi movement are not important. What is crucial rather is an understanding of two issues: why the movement took on an intense militant quality; and what the consequences were of the movement for future political developments. Several factors help explain the increasingly militant nationalism within Bengal. First, there is the readily understandable issue of injured Bengali pride. Political division of an area deemed to be culturally unified was aimed at and was perceived as a conscious British ploy to 'divide and rule’

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

388

ATUL KOHL1

(Sarkar, 1973: ch. 1). Bengali opposition was natural. Second, the bhadralok had the most to lose from the partition; it was their sphere of influence—greater Bengal—which was about to be carved up into pieces (Broomfield, 1968). BhadralokA&d opposition to Bengal’s partition, moreover, had its own internal dynamics. The British policy of ‘carrot and stick’, instead of arriving at a compromise solution, actually back-fired. It legitimized the opposition’s goal—reunification of Bengal—without in the early stages delivering on that demand. And nothing radicalizes an oppositional movement like widespread acceptance of the goals sought, and a failure to make concessions necessary for the achievement of these goals. While the above factors were clearly at work, no explanation of early Bengali militancy would be complete without references to the values and the cultural milieu of the Bengali bhadralok. After all, many of the conditions suggested above could be found in other parts of India during the colonial period, but without similar outcomes. There was, in other words, something distinctively Bengali about the anti-partition militancy. A glance at the works of Aurobindo and Bipin Chandra Pal, for example, reveals the Bengali cultural mood of the period: an unmistakable romanticization of violence. The use of religious symbolism to invoke political acts, moreover, made the leaderships’ appeals popular and meaningful. We thus find Aurobindo preaching terrorism against the British in the name of Kali: ‘Kali, Goddess of destruction, mother of strength, created by Gods to destroy the demons who had usurped their kingdom’ (Broomfield, 1968). Others also, including Bipin Chandra, glorified revolution as a religious duty. The goal was to revenge the insult to ‘Amar Sonar Bangla’ (our Golden Bengal); the means required self-sacrifice as expressed through courting danger—including endangering one’s life—aimed at a higher good. Even those not directly involved in militant acts were influenced. Political violence was not to be condemned. On the contrary, it highlighted the selflessness of the participants and therefore invited admiration. This focus on ‘culture’ and ‘mood’ should be qualified in two ways. Firstly, it is difficult to estimate in any precise sense how many of the bhadralok really shared these political values or the extent of their political commitments. A sizeable minority of the educated Bengalis, after all, remained entrenched in government services and in the professions. They had little to do with politics and political activism. I am, therefore, not suggesting that the bhadralok as a whole turned to militant politics; only that a significant minority did. And secondly, as an analytical principle, one should not overemphasize the independent significance of cultural conditions—culture always requires material conditions to be sustained. What is significant about cultural conditions, however, is the fact that once values become deeply embedded in a society, they are a social force in their own right. It would therefore be a mistake to underestimate the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

389

significance of the Bengali view of political violence as an act of self-sacrifice and therefore worthy of admiration; giving up of one’s self for the sake of a principle was held to be a political act of the highest order. Given this belief, it is plausible to propose that such a cultural mood, legiti­ mated and therefore facilitated the spread of militant tactics for the pursuit of nationalist goals. The anti-partition agitation and the eventual reunification of Bengal had far reaching consequences on Bengali political psychology (Broomfield, 1968; and Majumdar, 1978B: ch. I). First, it created considerable distrust of the British and of constitutional methods of change. This, in turn, helps explain the reluctance of many Bengali elites to participate in Britishcontrolled legislative councils. Second, the success of the movement encouraged a belief in the efficacy of militant tactics. Many who had participated in the movement joined underground terrorist organizations with the aim of continuing militant nationalist agitation. Related to both of these consequences was a third one, namely, a permanent division of Bengali nationalists between Moderates’ and ‘extremists’ (for a refined exposition of these simplified divisions, see Sarkar, 1973). The moderates continued to hold that the British could be opposed through electoral means, via participation in legislative councils. The majority were, however, attracted to ‘extra-parliamentary’ methods; these varied from boycotting of British goods to attacks on the British garrison. While none of these nationalist groups were social radicals at this point—on the contrary, social values were often religious and conservative—tactical divisions would eventually thrust the extremists away from the national political main-stream, and towards more radical political ideologies. British response to nationalist militancy was to forge an alliance with Bengali Muslim elites and the more moderate bhadralok, aimed at isolating the extremists. Many of the moderates were, however, reluctant to participate in legislative councils, lest they be labelled collaborators. Muslim leadership, by contrast, accepted the British invitation and came to dominate Bengal’s electoral politics from the 1930s until the formation of Pakistan. The discussion so far has focused exclusively on the political strains among the bhadralok, who were primarily a Bengali Hindu elite. Over half of Bengal’s population in the first half of this century, however, was Muslim (Table 11). If nothing has been said about the Muslims so far, it is mainly due to the focus of this essay on political trends in today’s West Bengal, which were areas of Hindu concentration in the past (Table 12). Far less is also known about the political history of Bengali Muslims (as exceptions, see Rahman, 1974; Sarkar, 1973: ch. VIII; and Gallagher, 1973). No understanding of bhadralok politics and the eventual weakness of the Congress within Bengal, however, can be complete without some reference to the role of the Muslims. Bengali Muslims were never as enthusiastic about the anti-partition and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

390

ATUL KOHLI

T able 11 Distribution o f Castes in Bengal, 1931 Caste Category

Percentage of Total Population

Twice Born brahman Rajput Upper Shudras vaidya kayastha mahishya Others Lower Shudras sadgop saha adi-kaibartta Others Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Muslims

3.13 2.83 0.30 14.37 0.21 3.04 4.66 6.46 5.19 1.11 0.82 0.68 2.58 15.09 3.00 54.00

SOURCE: Census o f India, 1931, vd. V, Part U Tables’.

T able 12 Proportionate Distribution o f the Population by Divisions on a Social and Religious Classification, 1931: Bengal and Sikkim Area

Primitive Tribes

1 Bengal Burdwan Division Presidency Division Rajshahi Division Dacca Division Chittagong Division Bengal States1

Hindus Brahman Depressed Gasses

Muslims

Others

Total Hindus

2

3

4

5

6

7

3 7 1 6

3 7 4 1 2 1 1

14 27 21 5 13 6 3

25 45 26 25 13 15 60

42 79 51 61 28 22 47

54 14 47 62 71 76 35

—

3 20

SOURCE: Census o f India , 1931. (Burdwan and Presidency Divisions became part of India’s West Bengal after Partition, and Dacca and Chittagong Divisions became part of Pakistan. The districts of Rajshahi Division were divided up between India and Pakistan). 1 Includes Cooch Bihar. Tripura and Sikkim.

Swadeshi movements as were the Hindu bhadralok (Rahman, 1974: chs, 2-4). The Muslims viewed with suspicion the Hindu revivalist tendencies among the Gita-swearing, Hindu bhadralok. The primary concerns of the Muslim elite were greater access to higher education and those of the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism9 in West Bengal

391

Muslim tenants in the east, protection against Hindu landowners. It was not difficult, then, for the Muslims to view Hindu elites as blocking the progress of their community. The Muslims had hoped to ally with the British so as to enhance the oportunities available to them. Even if the partition of Bengal was only one such possible route, for both reasons of religion and socio-economic interest, the Muslims were not ready to accept Hindu leadership. The early alienation of some of the Muslims from bhadralok politics found institutional expression in the 1920s in the Krishak Praja Party of Fazlul Huq (Gallagher, 1983). Interestingly, Muslim leadership was able to forge alliances between lower caste Hindus and Muslims on the basis of promises to reform conditions of rural indebtedness and insecure tenancy. The Huq ministry in the late 1930s was thus probably the last opportunity for communal collaboration, which was opposed both by the majority of the Bengali Hindu bhadralok on the one hand, and by the Muslim League of Jinnah on the other. It was during these crucial years also, that the moderate Hindu bhadralok became increasingly isolated from the Bengali political mainstream and that a sizeable minority of the extremists embraced communist ideology. It is important at this point to divert our attention to the interaction of Bengali politics with Indian national politics. Bengal’s attitude towards the emergence of Congress from the very beginning was lukewarm. Bengalis considered themselves politically advanced, and as early as the 1890s criticized Congress as ‘three day’s fun’, ‘rich man’s club’, ‘sentimental braggarts’ and 'a debating forum for the brown sahibs’ (Majumdar, 1978A: 536-7). Gandhi’s leadership also failed to capture the imagination of Bengali bhadralok. Broomfield has suggested that Gandhi was too much of a social radical for the conservative Bengali bhadralok (Broomfield, 1968). Whether this was so or not, the elitist orientations of the bhadralok have been well documented. The historian John Gallagher (1983), for example, has traced the weakness of Congress in Bengal during the crucial 1930s to the elitist isolation of the bhadralok. The upper caste bhadralok dominated Calcutta but had relatively few links with the districts, especially the eastern districts. Within Calcutta, moreover, the bhadralok were deeply enmeshed with business and landed interests. When the electorate was enlarged, therefore, the Hindu political elite found themselves in a very difficult situation. In order to build support, the bhadralok would have had to leave the comfort of Calcutta life-styles, forge alliances with the Muslim majority, and adopt social policies antithetical to their zamindari interests. As none of these changes were forthcoming, the Hindu elite became more and more isolated. The Muslims filled the political vacuum and thus came to dominate state politics. The national Congress was, in any case, working at cross-purposes with the Bengal Congress. Gandhi had a national vision. By supporting the Khilafat movement, Gandhi wanted to incorporate the Muslims within the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

392

ATUL KOHL1

Congress. Concessions made to the Muslims at the national level, however, often translated into policies weakening the Hindu Congress elite within Bengal (Gallagher, 1983). The bhadralok, therefore, continuously remained ambivalent towards the Congress. In addition to issues of political and economic interest, there was the persistent cultural issue of the distrust of the Bengali elite of domination by Hindi-speaking India. Gandhi was the quintessential representative of Hindi-India from which the Bengali elite wanted to disassociate. Even from the standpoint of political experience, Bengalis felt they had already tried out ‘non-cooperation’ as a strategy during the anti-partition agitation. Bengalis, in other words, considered themselves politically developed and therefore natural leaders of India’s nationalist movement; even when they did not aspire to national leadership, they were not about to follow Gandhi with the same degree of enthusiasm as the rest of India. The refusal of the Bengali elite to be absorbed by a Hindi leadership was and has remained a central theme in Bengali politics. This, of course, is not to suggest that no important Bengali leaders came under the sway of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. It is rather to suggest that the Bengali cultural identity and the related distrust of Hindi-India has proven to be a political disadvantage to Bengal’s moderate leadership. Moderates identifying with Gandhi often lost support to those willing to ridicule Gandhi’s non-violence as ‘tactical weakness’. Bengali nationalism was also on the side of the extremists’ refusing to accept Gandhian leadership. And finally, given the intense communal sentiments, Gandhi was often viewed as appeasing the Muslims. For all these reasons, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress never held the centre stage in Bengal’s political drama. Even such well-known Bengali Congress leaders as C. R. Das maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Gandhi’s leadership, eventually leaving the Congress to form an independent political party. After Das’ sudden death in 1925, even the modicum of support the Congress had enjoyed vanished. When the dust settled after the communal violence of the 1925-37 period (Broomfield, 1982: ch. 9), it was Fazlul Huq’s Krishak Praja Party which formed a government. The Congress party, as it turned out, never formed a government in undivided Bengal. Throughout the two or three decades prior to Independence then, Hindu moderates in Bengal—the most likely candidates for spearheading the Gandhian movement—remained divided and weak. Electoral politics came to be controlled by those Muslim leaders who were first part of the Congress, later part of Fazlul Huq’s party, and eventually supported Jinnah’s Muslim League. It was during this time also that many of the former extremists and terrorists, then in jail, slowly embraced commun­ ism. Why were a small but significant number of the political elite attracted to communism in Bengal, but not in most other parts of India? The answer

Digitized by

Google

Original from

- UNIVE-RSffY OF MICHIGAN-

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

393

is complex and is rooted both in Bengal’s elite politics and social conditions. Elite attraction to socialism and communism was first related to prevailing socio-political values. Even though in practice the Bengali elite were quite conservative, populist themes were central to Bengali culture. Social issues, especially those concerning the position of the poor, were important and integral to the lively Bengali intellectual milieu. Addressing the bhadraloky influential intellectuals like Bankim Chandra Chatterjee argued that ‘the downtrodden masses have as much right to happiness on earth, as you have*. Even Tagore had socialistic sympathies: 4Socialism seeks to equally distribute wealth among all—I do not know whether that is practicable or not. If it be totally impossible, then I say, mankind is extremely unfortunate* (quoted in Chattopadhyay, 1970: 14). While such 'populist* sympathies were far from a coherent communist ideology, they nevertheless highlighted the general intellectual drift. And such a situation is consistent with the following generalization: if a social setting is dominated by the intellectuals, and if a substantial number of the intelligentsia concern themselves with social issues, it is virtually inevitable that some would actually be attracted to communism (Mannheim, 1936: ch. III). Using Gramsci’s terminology of traditional’ intellectuals—men of learning, not directly connected with the production process—Sumit Sarkar has similarly explained the political leanings of the bhadralok: the English educated 'traditional* intelligentsia of Bengal responded readily, even if superficially, to world ideological currents of liberalism, national­ ism and eventually socialism (Sarkar, 1983: 513-14). This general socialistic drift of the Bengali intelligentsia was reenforced by the coming of the Russian revolution. First, some radicals went abroad, came in direct contact with Bolsheviks and their supporters, converted to communism, and returned to Bengal with Moscow’s blessings to carry on political work. More important, many nationalists within Bengal, especial­ ly those in prisons, greeted the Russian revolution as a great 'anti­ imperialist’ event. Interviews with those who embraced communism during this period (Chattopadhyay, 1970) make it clear that the attraction of the Russian revolution was not only or not even primarily communism; the Russian revolution was interpreted as a victory of 'progressive’ forces against western imperialism. The Russian revolution fed the political ethos of Bengali extremists directly: militancy, heroism and nationalism. Bengali militant nationalists thus came to be attracted to communism via a route followed by many other Third World communists, namely, the route of radical nationalism. Neither sympathies towards socialistic values, nor towards the Russian revolution, however, fully explain why any set of political activists embrace communism. After all, Nehru and others in India’s nationalist movement also had similar sympathies but were not communists. The additional condition operative in Bengal, therefore, was the position of ‘counter-elite’

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

394

A T U L K O H LI

that most Bengali extremists came to occupy in regional politics. Having refused to be absorbed within the Gandhian mainstream, many of the Bengali militant nationalists can be thought of as oppositional elites in search of an ideology. Theirs was a political battle, not only against the British, but also against what they perceived as Hindi-domination. In order to distinguish themselves from the nationalist-reformist stance of the Congress, Bengali extremists as political competitors had only two options: radical right or radical left. Both of these options were tried in Bengal. That the communist elite remained urban-oriented and isolated from peasant majorities well into the 1960s, highlights the elitist nature of Bengali communism. That the communists have turned reformists upon acquiring power, while maintaining a strong tone of Bengali nationalism, further supports the contention that communism was viewed primarily as an alternate route to power. Political preference for communism within Bengal was thus moulded by the prevailing societal values and by the structural position of political Outsiders’ that a sizeable minority of the Bengali bhadralok came to occupy within India’s national politics. It is important to distinguish this line of argumentation from that conceptualizing Bengali communist leaders as ’frustrated bhadralok’ (Franda, 1972). The so-called bhadralok were a rather diverse social group with divergent political preferences (Gordon, 1972: 342). Any conceptualization which treats them as ’frustrated’ en masse is likely to be inadequate. I have, therefore, first sought to emphasize the political diversity of this group and then attempted to explain why some members of the intelligentsia were attracted to communist ideology. This shifts the analytical focus to the element of choice: a segment of the Bengali political elite chose to disassociate themselves from India’s centrist political mainstream. Having made this choice, but still seeking positions of power, these elit^ were drawn to radical ideologies. Many who turned to communism in Bengal were militant activists first and communists later. Most ideological conversions occured in prisons during the 1930s. Not much is known about how many initially joined a Communist party; the historical origins of the Communist party in India are itself murky (Overstreet and Windmiller, 1959). I will further discuss the mechanics of these conversions within the framework of terrorist organizations. What is important to note here is that Bengali political culture and the position of many militants as political ’outsiders’—at least in part by choice—facilitated the move of a significant minority among the more ‘extremist’ of the politically active bhadralok toward communism in the 1930s. After Independence, and the exodus of the Muslim leadership to East Pakistan, this communist elite formed the major opposition to a divided and weak Congress party.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

395

Bengali Exceptionalism: Caste and Class Structure A militant elite is only one variable in a long and complex chain of historical causation leading up to the fact that the Congress has been a relatively weak political force within West Bengal and that the state is now ruled by a communist patty. Elites need followers to transform their ideological inclination into a significant political force. Bengali communists have found such mass support: first, only sporadically in labour union militancy and scattered peasant rebellions; and of late, in seemingly more stable electoral majorities. The next question for analysis is, what aspects of Bengal's social structure help explain the political difficulties of the moderate and the conservative political leaders on the one hand, and the successes of the radicals on the other. The relative insignificance of caste in contemporary West Bengal politics is rooted deep in Bengal's history. While old historical records are meagre, the best known history of the area suggests that in ancient times Bengal was outside the zone of Aryan culture (Majumdar, 1971: 25-7, 414-535). Brahmanical Hinduism and related caste structures, therefore, did not sink as deep roots in this region as those to the west and north. The more egalitarian Buddhism survived in Bengal considerably longer than in other parts of India, especially at the intermediate and the bottom end of the social scale. Even when Hinduism took over, Bengal's caste system was less rigid. Around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries several distinctive social traits were observable within Bengal: Bengali brahmans could eat fish and meat; inter-caste marriage and dining were not uncommon; all non-Brahmans (about thirty-six castes) were considered Shudras and were not further subdivided into rigid categories; and the untouchables could eat with members of cleaner castes. Mass conversion to Islam during the middle ages further highlights the weakness of caste domination in the area. Those who changed religions were often lower caste Hindus seeking better life chances (Majumdar, 1973: 189-90). Members of lower castes perceived their social situation as unjust and when given an alternative, many took it. Historically, this alternative was religious protest; later, a similar process found an outlet in secular protest with considerable political consequences. Muslim domination and Islamic conversion within Bengal gave rise to numerous Hindu reform movements. What had existed of Brahmanical Hindusim in mass society was further attacked by new religious develop­ ments. Tantrism, for example, emphasized worldly pursuits and romanti­ cized physical prowess and even violence. The worship of Kali, for example, with bleeding, decapitated heads as her garland, is rooted in Tantrism—but was also egalitarian in that all castes could become Tantrics. Chaitanya's Vaishnavism was explicitly and radically anti-caste and egalitarian. Sahajivas preached sexual equality and freedom. While the influence of these sects would rise and wane, there can be no doubt that

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

3%

ATUL KOHL1

their collective impact was to further weaken the ideology legitimizing rigid caste division and domination, namely, Brahmanical Hinduism. What is important to recognize about all of these trends chipping away at the Brahmanical ideology, is that their impact was probably more significant on the lower castes than on the higher ones. The higher castes benefited from Brahmanism and were not about to let go of a social system which served them well. It was the lower castes, therefore, who often embraced Islam or experimented with Tantrism and other reform religions. The reaction of the upper castes to ideological erosion fluctuated between pioneering reform and reimposing orthodoxy, often with a vengeance and militancy characteristic of a threatened elite. Caste Hinduism thus generally came to have less legitimacy for the lower castes within West Bengal. A large percentage of non-Hindu lower social strata—Muslims and tribal groups still aconstitute more than a quarter of contemporary West Bengal's population—further reduced the significance of Hinduism for legitimizing the inegalitarian social structure. By contrast, however, those towards the top seem to have held on tenaciously to Brahmanism. One is tempted to speculate that this tenacity increased in direct proportion to the ideological erosion at the bottom of the scale. Bengali caste structure has certain other characteristics which are important for understanding the limited role of caste in later Bengali politics. There are, for example, no indigenous Kshatriyas or Vaishyas in Bengal (Table 11). The brahmans moreover, constitute a small per cent of the population—much smaller, for example, than in Uttar Pradesh. Historically, the brahmans were considered just another jati (Sanyal, 1981). Kayasthas and vaidyas,—which rank just below the brahmans—are considered clean Shudras in so far as brahmans will take water from them. Other intermediate castes like the sadgops and the tUis have historically experienced considerable upward mobility in the ritual hierarchy (Sanyal, 1981). The unclean Shudras and the untouchables, who constituted in 1931 about 40 per cent of the Hindu population (Table 11), complete the hierarchy of Bengali Hindu society. The monopoly of brahmans over socio-economic privileges within Bengal has never been complete. While the brahmans have clearly been at the pinnacle of the social ladder, control over land has historically been shared by other intermediate castes. Regional diversity at the village level has been especially significant. Ratnalekha Ray, for example, notes in the following reference to pre-British Bengal: Each village had its own peculiar caste structure; and while it may appear that in the province as a whole the Brahmans, Kayasthas, and Vaidyas were the privileged caste, in each village there might be a dominant agricultural caste rated quite low in the provincial ritual ranking. In areas of high-caste concentration there were, of course, Brahman and Kayastha villagers who participated in agriculture and controlled the production of their villages. But

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

397

more typically such controlling groups came from locally dominant agricultural castes. In the villages of Midnapur, they would quite likely be Kaivartas and Sadgops; in Burdwan, Sadgops and Aguris; in Rangpur and Dinajpur, Muslims; in Kuch Bihar, Rajbanshis; in Jessore, Faridpur, and Bakarganj, Muslims and Namasudras; in Bishnupur, Brahmans (Ray, 1979: 52-3). Above the village level, where the rights to a portion of agrarian revenue resided, such rights were often shared mainly by brahman and kayastha zamindars but also by some vaidya and Muslim ones (Ray, 1979: ch. 1). The early introduction of education in Bengal by the British opened opportunities for these land-owning castes. While the brahman zamindars were the earliest to ‘arrive’ upon the scene as the bhadralok, by the turn of the century, there were among the Calcutta bhadralok large numbers of kayasthas and vaidyas. The 1931 census, for example, reported that while 14.3 per cent of the brahmans were literate in English, so were 13.2 per cent of the kayasthas and 28.1 per cent of the vaidyas (Franda, 1968: 263). Since both access to land and educational opportunities have historically been shared by a number of castes, this may be one reason why political movements within modem Bengal have not precipitated along caste lines. The communal conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims, in any case, provided such a major cleavage in the first half of this century that there was probably little energy left for further intra-Hindu caste conflict. The diversity of dominant castes at the village level, moreover, created a situation in which there were no state-wide dominant castes. After Zamindari Abolition in West Bengal, therefore, another reason why caste politics did not emerge, has had to have been the absence of any statewide dominant agricultural castes whose members may have consolidated political and economic privileges. To summarize this discussion on caste in Bengal, the Bengali caste structure did not follow the Brahmanical division into four vamas. A small brahman minority at the top was followed by numerous gradations of clean and unclean Shudras, with the untouchables as usual at the bottom. The Brahmanical ideology came under repeated attacks historically, especially from Islam, but also from other religious offshoots of Hinduism. The impact of these challenges was probably to weaken the legitimacy of Brahmanism in the eyes of the knyer castes. At the top of the pyramid, by contrast, the social elite held on to Brahmanism tenaciously well into the twentieth century. Even at the top, however, land ownership was not a monopoly of the brahmans. Village level control was exercised by numerous castes, often lower in ritual hierarchy. Members of several upper castes were able to take advantage of educational opportunities. This process truncated the top of the caste pyramid. When competitive politics arrived upon the Bengali scene, therefore, unlike in other parts of India, caste issues were not the major issues of politics; an element of ‘caste pluralism’ and diversity towards the top and weak caste identification at

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

398

A T U L K O H LI

the bottom, may well be the important reasons why caste issues did not arise as the most significant issues for political mobilization in Bengal. Private property as a legal right was only introduced to Bengal by the British (Baden Powell, 1982: V. I, Bk. 1, ch. IV). Even prior to that, however, control over land revenues, though not necessarily land, was clearly identifiable. When the British came to Bengal, much of the land revenue was controlled by Hindu zamindars. The latter had been relative newcomers on the scene, having supplanted a mostly Muslim aristocracy in the early eighteenth century. What is of interest from our perspective is the fact that the Hindu zamindars did not have deep roots in the land; they had acquired lands either as court favourites, or as effective revenue collectors, or as military lords in control while the Mughal empire disintegrated. Revisionist historians like Ratnalekha Ray have suggested that the sphere of zamindaris lay, not in the economy, but in the polity, implying that the pre-British Bengali zamindars were essentially revenue collectors with established authority rather than landed aristocrats in the English pattern (Ray, 1979: ch. 1). These zamindars of the eighteenth century were predominantly of brahman and kayastha castes. They often controlled large areas, many of which equalled what today are districts. Ray suggests that (at the time of the British occupation nearly 60 per cent of the land revenue of Bengal was paid by 15 large zamindaris comprising 615 parganas out of 1,256 in the province’ (Ray, 1979: p. 27). It was these zamindars who were well positioned to take advantage of the Permanent Settlement made by the British. The zamindars owed a share of the revenue they collected to the Nawabs, who occupied the pinnacle of the pre-British Bengali political economy. Real control over land, however, resided below the zamindars at the village level. The village 'landlords’—the jotedars—were formally tenants of the larger zamindars. In practice, the zamindars were seldom in a position to bypass totally the local and entrenched village level authority of the jotedars. These jotedars controlled substantial lands, acted as money-lenders and grain dealers, and generally dominated village life. One early survey in 1808 found ‘that 6 per cent of the cultivating population, enjoyed 36.5 per cent of the land leased by raiyats (read jotedars) from the zamindars, whereas 52.1 per cent of the agricultural work force had no land at all and worked for the rich farmers as hired labourers or sharecroppers’ (Ray, 1979: 64). As noted above, the caste origins of these village level ‘czars’ in Bengal was quite diverse: it of course included the upper clean castes of brahmans and kayasthas, but often rested in the hands of such cultivating lower Shudras as the sadgops, namasudras, aguris and kaivartas, as well as some Muslims. To simplify a complicated historical picture, prior to the arrival of the British in Bengal, just below the Nawabs, existed a layer of mostly

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

399

brahman and kayastha zamindars who exercised political-administrative authority, especially revenue collecting authority, over a collection of villages. At the village level itself village headmen, belonging to a diverse set of locally dominant castes and communities, exercised the real control over land. And finally, below these jotedars, existed the low caste and Muslim cultivators in the form of small raiyats, share-croppers and landless labourers. The staying power of this historical pattern has been considerable, especially at the village level. Once again, to simplify a complex history of 'change without change*, the British, in time, replaced the Nawabs, buttressed the authority of zamindars by legal and political changes, but did not alter the pattern of village level domination in any substantial manner. The Congress government in independent India eventually eliminated the zamindars, but even they could not supplant the power of the village level jotedars. On the contrary, Congress governments reinforced the power of the jotedars by incorporating them as the key intermediary figures in patron-client networks of electoral mobilization exchanged for governmental benefits. Finally, the Communists have sought to isolate the village level jotedars. While jotedars still control sizeable village lands, the Communists have sought to build political alliances directly with groups below the jotedar. Efforts to incorporate the smallholders have so far been much more successful than the attempts to channel benefits to those who, throughout history, have been at the bottom of the heap—the landless labourers. To return to the historical narrative, when the British introduced the Permanent Settlement the consequence was anything but anticipated. Hindu zamindars turned neither into a British style country gentry, nor into productive yeoman farmers. The results were rather two-fold: first, a rapid turnover in landownership as those with 'settled' lands often failed to pay their dues to the colonial powers; and second, as ownership stabilized, a tendency to lease and sub-lease land resulting in numerous layers of tenancy and 'interests' on 'settled' lands. The conventional view of Bengal's history (as in the Cambridge Economic History o f India, for example) has suggested that rapid turnover in zamindaris brought a spate of Calcutta businessmen on the agrarian scene, thus slowly but surely supplanting a traditional aristocracy by a more money-minded agrarian class, with far-reaching detrimental con­ sequences to the agrarian life of Bengal. Revisionist historians (Ray, 1979) have carefully documented that this was not the case; some of the distressed zamindaris were bought by the better-established, existing zamindars, and other were only made to look as if they had changed hands. What was changing hands, in any case, was not land but title. Given that the real control over land was entrenched at the village level, change in zamindari titles led primarily to a change in those who had access to land revenue rather than to an actual circulation of land. The elites who lived

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

400

ATUL KOHLI

off the land circulated and their numbers actually grew, but the structure of village level control over land did not alter significantly. The real consequences of the Permanent Settlement were thus to further entrench and enlarge the type of dominant groups—the uppercaste zamindars—which had already existed at the top of the social pyramid in pre-British India. The British buttressed the powers of the zamindars with the coercive machinery of the modem state, in the form of collectorates and the accompanying law and order forces. This enabled the 7 zamindars to squeeze larger surpluses from the land but only at the expense of losing traditional legitimacy. The enlarged surpluses, in turn, supported not only British rule, but also the growth of a high caste literati . with landed connections, manifest as layers of absentee tenants’, living in Calcutta and the district towns. Historical evidence also suggests that the burden of increased land revenue was borne primarily by the tillers of the soil rather than by the village level jotedars. The jotedars, nevertheless, continuously experienced pressures from the zamindars for enhanced revenues. In this conflictual relationship created by the Permanent Settlement lies an important explanation of the political trends in British-governed Bengal. The Bengali bhadraloky whose connections to the zamindars by both caste and land wealth were considerable, came to spearhead the nationalist struggle. The jotedar class of the namasudras and the Muslims, the sadgops and the aguris, and also some brahmans and kayasthas, were rather reluctant to join these bhadralok-led struggles. The economic interests of those in Calcutta and district towns were often at odds with those who dominated villages; they often also did not share caste identities. That the bhadralokAed Congress never formed a government in undivided Bengal, whereas the Muslim and the namasudra alliance of rich tenants succeeded under Fazlul Huq, thus becomes a little more comprehensible. The Permanent Settlement was also of far-reaching economic and sociological consequence. From an economic standpoint, layers of tenancy created a situation in which no one had any interest in improving lands. Returns on investment were shared so many ways that agricultural investment suffered, and so did agricultural growth over prolonged periods. As a consequence, Bengal, one of the most fertile parts of India, and with relatively high yields in the nineteenth century, was by the middle of the twentieth century producing considerably less from a unit of land than many other Indian regions. Widespread tenancy has also probably continued to depress agricultural performance in post-Independence Bengal. From a sociological standpoint, those connected with land, but not agriculture—members of high castes with access to land revenue—became Bengal's leisured and cultured classes. Eschewing manual work, these ^ classes indulged themselves in matters of mind and spirit. Land revenues thus provided the material base for the growth of a value system deriding

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

401

work and the entrepreneurial ethos, but holding artistic and cultural achievements in high esteem. So powerful was the hold of these values that even when the land connection was weakened, the Bengali elite continued to view active pursuit of profit, technical skills or manual labour with disdain. The best Bengali minds thus devoted themselves to music, poetry, literature, art, philosophical concerns, social criticism and even radical politics. The culture of the Bengali elite also kept them from exploiting new economic opportunities. Calcutta, as the capital city, offered plenty of chances for the enterprising. As indicated, however, most of these opportunities were availed of by non-Bengalis: British, Marwaris and Parsis. These non-Bengalis were either not interested, or found it difficult to make themselves an integral part of Bengali society. Within Britishruled Bengal, then, urban industry came to be dominated by non-Bengalis, agriculture was ignored as a productive sector and* exploited by all for sustenance, and Bengali bhadralok pursued the arts, culture, and of course, politics. Aspects of Bengali social structure provide one set of insights into why the Congress did not develop a stronghold in British Bengal and why other political forces found a more ready hearing. The Hindu educated elite of Bengal, the bhadralok, spearheaded Bengal's nationalist movement. They were the natural Congressmen of Bengal. For reasons analysed earlier, these bhadralok, often due to their own political values and leanings, tended to be attracted to militant tactics. They remained ambivalent towards Gandhi's Congress. Within Bengal, moreover, both the caste and class positions of the bhadralok made it difficult for them to forge alliances below the district level. Village level politics was dominated by diverse land-controlling castes. These rich 'tenants', the Bengali jotedars, maintained sometimes co­ operative and sometimes conflictual relations with the high caste bhadra­ lok of Calcutta; they, in any case, did not form; long lasting political alliances with the Congress leadership. On the contrary, jotedars of certain districts actually threw their weight behind other political parties, which were anti-zamindar, and which promised ‘tenancy reforms’. The jotedars were, however, too diverse a social group to throw up their own party. The Congress thus remained weak, but alternate ‘centrist' parties also did not find it easy to forge lasting alliances. The jotedars were often of intermediate caste status. Their domination was not easily legitimated by Brahmanical ideology. Repeated reform movements, including Islamic conversions, had also weakened the impact of Brahmanical Hinduism. When the jotedars felt pressured to squeeze the village level peasantry further, therefore, sometimes lower class rebellions resulted, and at other times, the jotedars themselves opposed such demands. It was not easy to forge cohesive and consensus-based political movements in such settings.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

!

^ ■ -

4

'

ATUL KOHLI

402

Patterns of caste and class domination thus often differed in Bengal from those in other parts of India. The social structure was generally more conflict-ridden at all levels. The issue of elite militancy has already been mentioned and is further discussed below. Instances of conflict around socio-economic interests were also numerous. While examples of lower class rebellion can be mustered from the nineteenth century—such as the 1857 revolt of the indigo planters and the 1860 Howrah railway workers strike—the significant revolts belong to the twentieth century. The most important of these are the instances where nationalist rebellion quickly turned into class rebellion within Bengal. What started in 1920 as a series of strikes against British-owned factories and plantations—strikes against trade and rule as the two pillars of imperialism—grew into a general strike by 1921 (Majumdar, 1978B; Chattopadhyay, 1970). Led by left-leaning Bengali Congressmen, the strike invoked the serious wrath of Marwari businessmen. Not only did Marwaris request Gandhiji, who obliged, to intervene on behalf of 'ahimsa', but they also withdrew money from ‘Swaraj funds', and provided armed assistance to the police in dealing with the 'violent strikers'. , Bengal's left-leaning leaders had a heyday publicizing the 'MarwariKhadi-British’ link as the link of 'exploiting profiteers’ against 'Bengal’s working class'. It is also not surprising that communist-led trade union organizations continued to grow in the aftermath, especially in the 1930s and the 1940s. Gandhi, partly in order to direct attention away from the urban strikes, launched a rural movement against some tax policies. Bengali villagers took over the movement enthusiastically and soon, as in the Midnapur district in 1922, refused to pay all taxes. Gandhi again had to withdraw the movement lest it became too radical. Movements also broke out against the zamindars. These were often led by relatively well-off occupancy tenants. Examples of these include the already mentioned militancy of the namasudras, who often controlled village-level lands in eastern districts, but who resented their low status as chandals in the ritual hierarchy. Similar struggles between land-controlling Muslim raiyats and the Hindu zamindars also fed communal movements, first encouraging the Krishak Praja party and later the Muslim League. Below these levels, we may also recall the famous Tebhagha movement (Alavi, 1965). This was a movement of share-croppers against jotedars for altering the share of crop from 50-50 to 66-33. Led by urban Communists, the movement originated among the middle peasants against 'oppression' of jotedarsy referring generally to some illegal exactions. The success of the radicals in winning concessions later encouraged share-croppers in Dinajpur and neighbouring districts to join the leadership of Bhowani Sen in demanding alteration in the share of the crop. Share-croppers of several districts, mainly of tribal and Muslim origins, rapidly joined the movement in 1946, right after the great Bengal famine. Soon, however, the Muslim

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

403

League government of Bengal unleashed state repression. Many of the middle peasants also withdrew support, mainly because they often leased out lands to share-croppers and stood to loose. And as the demands for Pakistan gained momentum, the Hindu communist leaders and their Muslim followers suffered split loyalties, further weakening the class movement. The Tebhaga movement collapsed in 1947, but left a legacy highlighting traditions of peasant radicalism in parts of Bengal. All of this suggests that there was considerable lower and lower-middle class rebelliousness in Bengal during the first half of the twentieth century. The primary cause of this was rooted in the historically conditioned caste and class structure of Bengal. Radical elites could not only transform structural conditions into lower class rebellions, but lower class rebellious­ ness was itself an encouragement to the radical elites. Nothing boosts elite radicalism like responsive lower classes. Peculiarities of the Bengali caste and class structure, and of the militant elite thus mutually reenforced each other helping to explain both the weakness of Congress and a small but growing leftist force within pre-Independence Bengal. Bengali Exceptionalism: Organizational Traditions A n important factor in the contemporary success of left forces within West Bengal has been a relatively effective, centralized political party. What historical factors are responsible for the emergence of such a political force? In a part of the world where personalities, factions and fragmented parties dominate the political scene, what helps explain the existence of a relatively cohesive political organization? In addition to the obvious role of radical political leaders in organizing Leninist or democratic-centralist parties, it is also important to take account of the Bengali terrorist past. By the turn of the century, many of the militant nationalists, utilizing terrorism as a mode of political activity, organized themselves into highly secretive and disciplined groups. The earliest and the best known of these was the Anusilan Samiti. The Samiti had both a secretive and an open existence. The relatively open activities revolved around periodic political discussions. The issues of concern were the plight of colonial countries— especially India and Bengal under the British—the lives of such important militant leaders as Mazzini and Garibaldi, the revolt of the American colonies against the British, and the struggles of various European peoples against oppression and for independence (Majumdar, 1978B: ch. V). Those convinced of the fact that the British were responsible for India’s sufferings and that the British were not likely to leave voluntarily—that they would have to be pushed out by militant tactics—joined these secret organizations. The process of acquiring organizational membership was, however, elaborate. Members had to pass through various stages, proving their skills and trustworthiness. At each stage, members had to take a different vow. Majumdar (1978B: ch. V) has traced three such vows and they are worth quoting in full:

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

ATUL KOHLI

404

First vow

I shall never disassociate myself from the Samiti; I shall always conform to the rules of the Samiti, shall obey without question the orders of the authorities, shall always speak the truth to the leaders and shall never suppress anything.

Intermediate

I shall never communicate the internal matters of the Samiti to anybody; I shall never quit my place of work without informing the leader, shall immediately intimate to him any information about a conspiracy against the Samiti and shall try to meet the situation as directed by him.

vow

F inal vow

I shall not leave the organization "til the objective is achieved. Love of parents, brothers and sisters and attraction for home shall not make me neglect my duties or falter in the execution of the directions of my leader; if I violate this vow, may I be destroyed by the curse of Brahmins, of my parents and of the patriots of all countries.

Conformity to these principles was imposed by more than just the ‘curse of the brahmins' . In many instances, Samiti members committed political murders to punish what was conceived to be a breach of membership principles. And all this before Lenin’s ideas of democratic centralism had reached this part of the world. Such secretive and disciplined organizations reflected in part the security needs of carrying on terrorist activities against the British, and in part a Bengali tradition of secretive organization of social dissent. The activities of the Tantrics in the past, for example, when fearing religious persecution at the hands of mainstream Hindus, had for a long time been shrouded in mystery and secretiveness. Militant nationalists developed the art of such organizational principles further. As a result, those attracted to terrorism and militancy within Bengal adopted an organizational ethos stressing discipline, secretiveness, respect for hierarchy and self-sacrifice as the political act of highest virtue. It is also important to stress that cohesion was not always easy to maintain. Factionalism has been a powerful ingredient of all Indian political subcultures. It was difficult to contend with even inside highly disciplined organizations. The Anusilan Samiti split into two over issues of leadership personalities and differences on the role of terrorism. The splinter group, Jugantar party, attracted those favouring greater militancy. From our perspective, however, what is important to note is that both groups were organized along the principles noted above. The programmes of the terrorist organizations were primarily nationalist—anti-British. Their social philosophies tended to be highly variable. In the early years, prior to the 1920s, anti-Muslim and conservative sentiments were pronounced. During these early years, religious appeals were used for political purposes (Sarkar, 1979: ch. 9). Slowly, many of the terrorists were attracted to socialism and communism. The role of the foreign-retumed, Bengali communists was quite significant

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

T h e R ise o f R e fo rm C o m m u n ism in W est B engal

405

in this process. M. N. Roy had received Moscow’s blessing and was sending his emissaries to Bengal. Individuals such as Nalini Gupta and Abani Mukherjee (an anti-Roy emissary with German connections) came from abroad and were often protected from arrest by terrorist organiza­ tions. For example, Nalini Gupta lived at various terrorist headquarters upon his return from the Soviet Union (Chattopadhyay, 1970). Leaders of terrorist parties were not necessarily attracted to communist ideology. Their interest in the foreign emissaries was primarily the prospect of securing arms and money from the Bolsheviks. These contacts, however, put the returning communists in close touch with intermediate leaders and even the rank and file of the terrorist organizations. Foreignreturned communists had all the necessary ingredients to facilitate ideological conversions: intellectual sophistication; anti-imperialism; blessings of the greatest revolutionary leaders, the Bolsheviks; and most of all, individuals risking their lives, and courting danger for some higher social good. Foreign-returned communists, as well as the ideas inspired by the Russian revolution, had the impact of converting many members of the Anusilan and Jugantar Samitis to communism. When jailed in the 1930s, often in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the committed communists further converted other jailed terrorists to communism. Such were the beginnings of the original conversions to communism in Bengal. Some of these early converts later became leaders of India’s Communist Party. For example, Pramode Das Gupta, Hare Krishna Konar and Binoy Chowdhury, all hailed from old terrorist revolutionary backgrounds, who converted to communism, and then devoted their lives to building the communist movement in Bengal. The point of this discussion has been to delineate the organizational characteristics of the terrorist groups, and to stress the link between these groups and the later Communist party. A significant minority of Bengali political activists already understood the importance of disciplined organizations when they were introduced to communism. Having embraced the new ideology, the organizational principles of democraticcentralism came relatively easily to this group. Discipline, hierarchy, and party before all else, were values integral to the terrorist political sub-culture. In all probability, these political cultural traditions facilitated the growth of relatively cohesive parties within contemporary West Bengal. Of course, this is not to ignore the legendary factionalism and sectarianism on the Indian left. Nevertheless, the CPM in West Bengal stands out today as one of the more cohesive political forces in ail of India. Long traditions of disciplined organizations are, at least in part, responsi­ ble for this political characteristic. From Congress to Communist Rule Having examined the historical record, it is clear that by the time of Independence, Congress was not a very strong force in West Bengal and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

406

ATUL KOHL1

----- ----- ■ l a t f n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r y

-------------- r•

SIKKIM BHUTAN

b o u n d a ry

V.

- D is tric t b o u n d a ry

NEPAL •

%

'

l I

JALPAIGURI

J A U r A lV J U IU

,__ A *

m

r ...... - v-j ASSAM v

*

V

n

,,-O iWEST^. . ‘ DINAJPUR-^

BIHAR

MURSHIDABAD / / C*** . BANKURA :I .A ( HOOGHLY / h o w r a h : Ca lcu tta HOyVRAHrTWENTY .

ORISSA

t FOUR MIDNAPORE :•4.PARGANASV KVNTTD

M a p I. W est B e n g a l

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

407

that radical politics had already established strong roots in the area. A significant number of the political elite had embraced communism, and the lower classes—workers and peasants—had indicated ample susceptibility to radical appeals. The two did not always come together as the communist leadership either remained urban-oriented under Moscow's influence, or eschewed mobilizational work due to its own elitist orientations. The political traditions of the area had, however, enabled the radical elite to organize a small but disciplined party, which would in time grow into the ruling party. As I have already examined the more recent behaviour of the Bengali Communists since coming to power, what remains to be analysed so as to complete the picture, is how Bengal's Communists actually displaced Congress rule in West Bengal. The emergence of the Communists as a ruling force in West Bengal is a function of two related but separate conditions: weakness of Congress and the growing electoral popularity of the CPM. Both of these require explanation. After Independence, Congress emerged in West Bengal—like every­ where else in India—as the ruling party. Having been established as the party of national freedom, there was no question of any other party challenging Congress’ supremacy at that time. Nevertheless, Congress rule in West Bengal was rather weak and had certain distinct characteristics. As already discussed, prior to Independence, Muslims had dominated Bengal's electoral politics. Muslims had also secured the support of Hindu lower castes and classes by promising them agrarian reforms in the 1930s. As Muslim leaders left for Pakistan, the West Bengal Congress found itself weak, fragmented and with little established grass-roots support. Indi­ viduals like Atulya Ghosh and B.C. Roy could still muster electoral majorities through their association with Nehru and Congress, but they had little or no autonomous«power base within the state (Chaudhry, 1976). In order to understand this continued weakness of Congress, one must first understand the social structural changes that occurred in West Bengal immediately after Independence. The social structure of West Bengal since Independence has undergone important changes. The most visible of these was the abolition of the zamindari system. The zamindars, who in one form or another had mediated the relations of provincial governments to villages for centuries, were finally eliminated by India’s sovereign Congress government. As is well known, Zamindari Abolition was implemented imperfectly. Except for the largest and the most visible zamindars, most of them held on to significant pieces of land. To the extent that zamindaris were broken up, the reil beneficiaries were the former ‘occupancy tenants,’ the jotedars. Many of the former zamindars took government compensations and sought to branch out into various non-agricultural commercial activities; as usual, some succeeded, while others joined the ranks of failed entrep­ reneurs. Those who held on to sizeable pieces of land often became

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

408

A T U L K O H L!

jotedars of sorts, in the sense that their influence came to be limited over one or a few villages where they owned land. The most important consequence of Zamindari Abolition, therefore, was to transform a three-tier structure of domination involving the provincial government, zamindars, and village-level jotedars into essentially a two-tiered structure of government and jotedars. As noted, Hamilton-Buchanan had in 1808 found 6 per cent of the cultivating population, the jotedars, enjoying about 36 per cent of the land as tenants of the zamindars. If one thinks of modern-day jotedars as those possessing more than 10 acres of land, it is striking that, in the aftermath of Zamindari Abolition in the 1950s, about 5 per cent of the lafgest landowners still controlled around 30 per cent of West Bengal's land (Table 8). The continuity in the patterns of land concentration over one and a half centuries is rather remarkable. The share of land revenues that the jotedars keep has obviously changed dramatically over this time, just as have the fortunes of many who either acquired more lands or fell upon hard times. The increasing incomes of the jotedars have probably been eaten up by demographic changes, so that abolition of zamindaris did not result in much wealthier individual jotedars. The share of land controlled by the village-level landowners, nevertheless, has been strikingly consis­ tent. The declining share of the land of the largest landowners since Independence becomes significant in light of this historical continuity. Demographic changes are without doubt the most important factor at work. Land reform legislation, however, also contributed. While little or no land has been redistributed, land reform legislations may well have discouraged further concentration of land ownership. This process, coupled with division of property upon inheritance, probably explains the fact that, by the 1970s, landowners owning more than 10 acres controlled around 15 per cent of land—half of what they had controlled in the 1950s. Below the larger landowners also, the general trend in West Bengal has been towards smaller and smaller landholdings from one generation to another. The ranks of those at the bottom of the social pyramid have swollen. About one third of the rural households do not own any land. If one combines those who own no land with those who own less than one acre, these are the rural poor, constituting over one half of all the rural households of West Bengal—a dismal picture of bleak and massive poverty. It is estimated that about half of these rural poor are at any one time involved in some type of tenant farming, creating somewhere between 1.5 and 2 million families of share-croppers or bargadars in West Bengal. What have been the political consequences of these changing patterns in the Bengali social structure? At the top of the social pyramid, the elimination of zamindaris removed the material base upon which the Bengali literati and political elite, the bhadralok, had flourished. The connection of the bhadralok with land in any case, had been weakening for

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

409

quite some time. As the cultured and educated elite, their political preferences thus came to be influenced by many factors, including, of course, their own material well-being. The partition of Bengal at Independence was one of these factors. Many of Bengal’s Hindu elite implicitly or explicitly held Gandhi and the Congress responsible for Bengal’s final partition. Even those who did not hold this position could not easily bring themselves to be enthusiastic about Gandhi and Nehru; (golden Bengal’ had been reduced to one-third of its size as a result of the great national victory of the Congress party. A sizeable portion of the Bengali literary and political elite thus remained either lukewarm or downright hostile towards the Congress. A significant minority, by contrast, joined hands with the Congress and sought to build a new provincial political base. Those with long run vision knew that the political future lay where the majorities lived, namely, in the villages. The Bengali jotedar class were the major beneficiaries of the Congresssponsored Zamindari Abolition. These were also the groups upon which post-Independence Congress sought to build its power base. While this strategy worked rather well for Congress in many Indian states, the results in West Bengal were not as good. As discussed above, many Bengali jotedars had opposed the Congress and its upper caste leadership prior to Independence. New alliances were made, but they did not always endure. Bengali jotedars are a highly diverse group, often belonging to various unclean Shudra castes. In contemporary Bengal, the aguris are significant in Burdwan, the mahishyas in Midnapur, the brahmans and the kayasthas / in Bankura and Hugh, the mahatos in Purulia and the gurkhas in Darjeeling. In such a diverse social setting, caste identity could not become a basis for long lasting political alliances. The Congress sought to rest its power on these diverse groups of local influentials to muster electoral majorities. Myron Weiner in his elite survey in West Bengal in 1958 found many Congressmen to be ‘pillars’ of local communities (Weiner, 1963: 189). In rural areas, these were generally landowning elites of high and intermediate castes. The capacity for , leadership of many of the village headmen of unclean Shudra castes, it is fair to presume, could not have been as great as those higher up in the ritual hierarchy. Caste rigidities and caste identification at the lower end of the social scale, moreover, have been weaker in Bengal traditionally. If one adds to these circumstances the more than sporadic tradition of tenant revolts in Bengal, one is led to see why Bengali jotedars did not provide a stable base of power for the Congress. As the nationalist party, Congress in the early post-Independence years won handsome electoral majorities (Table 1). Their support base, however, proved to be not as stable as in many other states of India. There were no state-wide dominant castes around on which to build long-lasting alliances. The hold of the locally diverse dominant castes over tenants and

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

410

ATUL KOHLI

landless labourers, moreover, was weaker in Bengal than in other states. These social structural peculiarities of Bengal did not help the Congress party. Furthermore, the Congress continued to be thought of as a party of Hindi-lndia. The traditional ambivalence of the Bengali bhadralok towards Gandhi manifested itself as a belief that Congress and Delhi did not have Bengal's interest at heart. Not only was lower class support thus not universal for Congress, but many of the elite, touched by regional nationalism, held Congress suspect. As the euphoria of national Independ­ ence fell into the background, issues of regional nationalism became important electoral concerns further undermining some of Congress’ support. Bengali elites and masses alike were thus not incorporated as easily into Congress as they were in other states of independent India. This was a continuation of a historical trend analysed above. The Communists, by contrast, emerged as a small but significant and well-entrenched political force. Within the first few years, the Communist Party of India had established itself as the major opposition party in West Bengal. The political significance of the Communists was greater than their small electoral support would suggest. This is because the support the Commun­ ists had was ‘hard’—ideologically committed and well organized. Initially, this was among the urban intelligentsia, the unionized working class and small pockets of the radicalized peasantry. The very factors which undermined Congress support worked in favour of the Communists. Cultural proclivity to militant activism and Bengali nationalism ensured that the new generation of political activists, especially in Calcutta, would continue to be attracted not to Congress, but to home-grown left politics. The high caste educated elite, had lost the material base for controlling state level politics. Those who controlled land, by contrast, often belonged to intermediate castes and did not possess the social esteem necessary to mould political trends. The absence of indigenous social groups possessing both property and social esteem thus ensured the failure of hegemonic politics to take root. Non-Bengali capitalists tended either to withdraw capital or secure central support for ensuring their interests. Either of the moves inflamed Bengali passions and created a further distrust of capitalism. Lower classes exhibited political independence and quite a few were attracted to left parties. Cumulatively, these trends hurt the Congress and continued to benefit Bengal’s Communists. With a few minor swings, Bengal’s Communists have steadily improved their electoral support (Table 1). In the early years, the Communists were their own worst enemies. Under Moscow’s tutelage, they continued to look toward the proletariat in a land of peasants. The split within the communist movement eventually laid the groundwork for the long term maturation of the CPM. The CPM was able to distinguish itself from the CPI, over the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

411

years which had been moving closer and closer to the Congress party under Moscow’s directions. The CPM also successfully disassociated itself from the more extreme Naxalites. It learned to take the peasantry seriously from , the Naxalites. As a party seeking electoral victories rather than a peasant revolution, however, the CPM wanted a broad-based support in the countryside; it sought to build alliances with all those below the larger jotedars—the middle peasants, share-croppers and the landless labourers. The CPM thus struck a popular image of a party which was both mildly radical and responsible. At the same time, as it did not have a record of collaboration with Delhi, it could capitalize on regional nationalist themes. Radical, responsible, and West Bengal’s alternative to Congress, these were the images with which the CPM eventually secured electoral majorities. The CPM finally came to power in 1977. This was when the anti-Indira ‘wave’ was sweeping the nation. The sentiments which worked to Janata’s advantage in other parts of India, enhanced the CPM’s electoral position within West Bengal. This suggests that while the CPM has a strong political base within West Bengal, its dominant position also owes something to the capricious shifts of public opinion. Moreover, the CPM emerged victorious under the first-past-the-post electoral system in which a divided opposition—Congress and Janata—is always punished. The reason the CPM has been able to consolidate its position since, of course, has to do with the CPM’s effective performance. Nevertheless, electoral caprice and distortions of the electoral system have benefited the CPM in West Bengal, just as they have often benefitted the Congress nationally and in other states. As opposition parties can unite and electoral popularity can be affected by numerous factors, the CPM may well be voted out of power in the future. Those are the necessary hazards of democratic politics. That outcome, however, would not in any way alter the exceptional nature of politics in West Bengal: a relatively weak Congress party and the significant political position which a ‘radical but responsible’, or a reformist-communist party, has come to occupy within the state. Conclusion I have in this chapter sought to delineate and explain the changing patterns of dominance in India’s Bengal. Sifting through existing historical evidence, one is forced to conclude that, over time, there has been a lot more change in the fortunes of those who have dominated than in the living conditions and the life chances of those who were dominated. The top of the pyramid has continuously evolved. The Nawabs and the de facto zamindars of the eighteenth century were replaced by the British and the legally entrenched zamindars. The educated and upper caste Hindu elite challenged this domination but failed to impose their own rule. Eventually, the Congress as a successful national movement eliminated the Bengali zamindars. The Congress within Bengal also sought to impose

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

412

ATUL KOHU

order mainly by aligning with non-Bengali industrialists and Bengali landowning village influential of diverse caste backgrounds. This system, however, never struck deep roots. It has now been successfully challenged by a reform-oriented communist party. The communist leadership is wefl organized and has sought to build alliances with both the middle and the lower classes of Bengal. Village life over centuries has been dominated by land-controlling or land-owning individuals belonging to locally diverse dominant castes. In addition to controlling land, these jotedars have dominated village economic life through money-lending and control of markets. Below the jotedars, again for centuries, actual cultivation has been carried out by small land-owners, share-croppers or hired landless labourers. These cultivators generally have been members of lower castes, untouchables, tribals, or Muslims. Demographic pressures have obviously swelled the ranks of the rural poor. Changing modes of production have brought about some shifts in the proportion of the poor who are share-croppers or labourers. Some organized lower castes have also successfully raised their status in the ritual hierarchy. None of these changes, however, have altered the overwhelming historical continuity: the majority of the population belonging to the lower castes, and without access to property or gainful employment, have lived under conditions of abject poverty at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid. It is within this broad historical picture of ‘change without change* that contemporary West Bengal provides the unusual case of the emergence of an elected communist government to power. Can an elected communist government make a dent in rural poverty within the constraints of a private enterprise economy? How has a communist government come to power in any case? Why did India’s premier political party, the Congress party, fail to strike deep roots in Bengal? These have been some of the main questions addressed in this essay. The weakness of Congress and the emergence of the Communist parties to power has been analysed with reference to three historical conditions: militant activism of the Bengali educated elite; a social structure within which hegemonic domination was difficult to establish and the mobilization of lower castes and classes was possible; and traditions of disciplined political organization. To summarize, a militant Bengal Hindu elite spearheaded India’s nationalist movement, but it eventually failed to find its rightful place in Gandhi’s Congress. Having forsaken the political ’centre,’ this elite experimented with numerous militant tactics and extremist ideologies before settling upon a fairly mild version of communism. This discontented elite eventually found support within the Bengali social structure. Historically, certain peculiarities within Bengal made it difficult for the upper castes and classes to establish legitimate domination. During the Mughal and British periods, upper castes had access to landed

Digitized by

Google

Original from

- UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN"

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

413

wealth but seldom controlled land directly. After Independence, the clean castes lost some of these rights. Those controlling land, by contrast, were of a diverse caste background, often belonging somewhere in the middle of the ritual hierarchy. Their control of property was not matched by their social esteem. Urban industry and wealth came to be controlled by a significant number of non-Bengalis. This diversity at the top of the socio-economic pyramid made hegemonic domination difficult. The educated elite, in any case, had repeatedly challenged one aspect or another of the overall domination. Lower classes and castes also have repeatedly proven restive in this environment. It was not an easy setting for 'consensual* politics of the Congress type to take root. The Communist elite of Bengal did not become serious contenders for power till they gave up their seemingly heroic militancy. Once the Communists decided to build mass support around reformist and regional nationalist themes, however, they found a ready hearing in Bengali society. A well-disciplined party, helped by similar traditions of terrorist organizations in the past, finally enabled the Communists to move to the centre stage of Bengali politics. Over the last decade or so, the Communist rulers have made some serious attempts to alter historically inherited patterns of domination. The patterns, however, are deep and the problems are massive. The Commun­ ists are also constrained both by the larger national framework and by the tensions within their own alliance between the very poor and the moderately well-to-do. The Communists, nevertheless, have successfully isolated the prop­ ertied elite from the political sphere. While the jotedars continue to own land, they cannot easily mobilize state power to buttress their local power any more. They also have difficulty securing governmental resources as patronage. The Communists have instead channelled these resources to the moderately well-to-do. They have also attempted, with some success, to improve the security and the material conditions of the poor share-croppers. Unfortunately, however, even the Communists have not as yet been able, or have not attempted, to do much for the poorest of the poor—the landless labourers. REFERENCES Ahmed, A. F. Saladuddin. 1965. Social Ideas and Social Change in Bengal, 1818-1835 (Leiden: E. J. Brill). Ahmed, Muzaffar. 1961. The Communist Party of India and Its Formation Abroad (Calcutta: National Book Agency). Alavi, Hamza. 1965. ‘Peasants and Revolution’, Socialist Register. Baden Powell, B. M. 1892. The Land System o f British India (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Bardhan, Pranab. 1976. ‘Variations in Extent and Forms of Agricultural Tenancy*, Economic and Political Weekly, 11 Sept., Number 18.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

414

A T L'L ICOHL!

Basu. Sajal. 1974. W est Bengal— The V iolent Years (Calcutta: Prachi Publishers). ----------- . 1982. Politics o f Violence: A Case Study o f W est B engal (Calcutta: Minerva Associates). Bengal Chamber of Commerce. 1971. W est Bengal: A n A nalytical Study (New Delhi: Oxford Sl IBH Publishing Company). Beteille, Andre. 1965. Caste, Class, a n d Power (Berkeley: University of California Press). Bose, Nirmal Kumar. 1959. M o d em Bengal (Calcutta: Vidyodaya Library). Bose, N. S. 1960. The Indian A w akening and B engal (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay). Broomfield, John. 1968. E lite C onflict in a Plural Society (Berkeley: University of California Press). ----------- . 1982. M ostly A b o u t Bengal: Essays in M odem South A sian H istory , (New Delhi: Manohar Publications). Chakrabarty, Saroj. 1974. W ith D r. B. C. R o y and O ther C h ief M inisters , (Calcutta: Bensons). Chattopadhyay, Gautam. 1970. C om m unism and Bengal's Freedom M ovem ent. (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House). Chaudhry, Nirmal. 1976. ‘West Bengal: Vortex of Ideological Politics’ in Iqbal Narain (ed.). State Politics in India (New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan). Danda, Ajit K. 1968. D evelopm ent and Change in a B engal Village (Calcutta: National Institute of Community Development). ----------- . 1971. D evelopm ent a n d Change in B asudha (Calcutta: National Institute of Community Development). Das, Arvind N. (ed.). 1979. A grarian Relations in India (New Delhi: Manohar Publications). Druhe, David N. 1959. Soviet Russia a n d Indian C om m unism (New York: Bookman Associates). Franda, Marcus. 1968. ‘West Bengal* in Myron Weiner (ed.). State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press). ----------- .1971. Political D evelopm ent a n d Political D ecay in B engal (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay). ----------- . 1972. R adical Politics in W est Bengal (Cambridge MIT Press). Gallagher, John. 1973. ‘Congress in Decline: Bengal, 1930 to 1939’, M o d em A sian S tu d ies , v. 7, part 3, July, 589-645. Gordon, Leonard. 1972. ‘Radical Bengalis: Alliances and Antagonisms’, South A sian R eview , July, 341-4. Ghosh, A. and Dutt, A. 1977. D evelopm ent o f Capitalist Relations in A griculture (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House). Ghosh, Sankar. 1971. The D isinherited State: A Study o f W est B engal 1967-70 (Bombay: Orient Longman). Gopal, S. 1948. The P erm anent Settlem ent in B engal and its R esults (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.). Kamik, V. B. 1978. M . N . R oy: A Political B iography (Bombay: New Jagriti Samay Publisher). Kohli, A. 1983. ‘Parliamentary Communism and Agrarian Reform: The Evidence from India’s Bengal’, A sian S u rvey , v. XXIII, No. 7, July, 783-809. ----------- . 1984. ‘Regime Types and Poverty Reform in India*, Pacific A ffa irs , v. 56, No. 4, Winter 1983-4, 649-72. ----------- . 1984. Communist Reformers in West Bengal: Origins, Features, and Relations with New Delhi*, John Wood (ed.), State Politics in C ontem porary India: Crisis o r C ontinuity ? (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Rise o f Reform Communism in West Bengal

415

----------- . 1987. The State and P overty in India: The Politics o f R eform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kopf. David. 1979. The B rahm o Sam aj and the Shaping o f the M odern Indian M ind (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Kothari, Rajni. 1970. Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown and Company). Lowenthal, Richard. 1969. Issues in the Future o f A sia (New York: Praeger Publishers). Majumdar, R. C. 1971. H istory o f A n cien t B engal (Calcutta: G. Bharadwaj & Co.). ------------. 1973. H istory o f M ediaeval B engal (Calcutta: G. Bharadwaj & Co.). ----------- . 1978A. H istory o f M o d em Bengal, Part O ne (Calcutta: G. Bharadwaj & Co.). ----------- . 1978B. H istory o f M o d em Bengal, Part Tw o (Calcutta: G. Bharadwaj & Co.). Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and U topia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World). Moore, Jr., Barrington. 1966. Social O rigins o f D ictatorship a n d D em ocracy (Boston: Beacon Press). Nicholas, Ralph W. 1963. ‘Village Factions and Political Parties in Rural West Bengal', Jo u rn a l o f C om m onw ealth Political Studies , v. 2, No. 1, November, 17-32. Overstreet, Gene D. and Windmiller, Marshall. 1959. C om m unism in India , (Berkeley: University of California Press). Rahman, Hossainur. 1974. H indu-M uslim Relations in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications). Ram, Mohan. 1971. M aoism in India (Delhi: Vikas Publications). Rasul, M. A. 1974. A H istory o f A ll India Kisan Sabha (Calcutta: National Book Agency, Ltd.). Ray, Ratnalekha. 1979. C hange in B engal Agrarian Society, 1760-1850 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications). Roy, M. N. 1964. M . N . R o y ’s M em oirs (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd.). ----------- . 1946. N ew O rientation (Calcutta: Renaissance Publisher). Roy, Renajet. 1971. The A g o n y o f W est B engal (Calcutta: New Age Publishers, Ltd.). Sanyal, Hitesranjan. 1981. Social M obility in B engal (Calcutta: Papyrus). Sarkar, Sumit, 1973. The Sw adeshi M ovem ent in Bengal, 1903-1908 (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House). Sarma, Jyotirmoyee. 1980. Caste D ynam ics A m o n g the B engali H indus (Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Ltd.). Scalapino, Robert (eds.) 1965. The C om m unist R evolution in A sia (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.). Sen Gupta, Bhabani. 1972. C om m unism in Indian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press). ----------- . 1978. ‘Pramode Das Gupta: Party Builder In Eastern India', P erspective , Calcutta, April. Sen, Sukomal. 1977. W orking Class in India: H istory o f Em ergence a n d M ovem ent, 1830-1970 (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company). Weiner, Myron. 1963. Political C hange in South A sia (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay). Zagoria, Donald: 1971. ‘The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India', A m erican P olitical Science R eview , vol. XLXV, No. 1, 144-60, March.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC POLITICS: POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN PUNJAB PA U L W A LLA C E

Piazy the ever-present onion in Indian cooking, provides an apt metaphor in an examination of class, caste, status, ethnicity and dominance patterns in Punjab. Peel away the layer of economic position within a class and uncover the stratum of izzaty honour or status which binds particular groups, often irrespective of economic position. Further layers reveal admixtures of social and political characteristics such as tribe-like values, caste and kinship considerations, language, region and religion. Political and cultural patterns shaped by group history have hardened over time into ethnic identities. These, in turn, when the onion is cut into cross-sections, can take political shape in the form of alliances and factions resulting in dominance patterns which may be transitory or long-lived, but cross-cut the neat compartmentalizations identified above. Contemporary social, economic and political complexities reflect both continuity and change as Punjab has moved from independent status under Ran jit Singh, to British imperial control, and state status within the Indian Union. At a broad level of generalization, continuity is manifested socially, in the central importance of religious identity in interaction with other religious identities; economically, via the dominance of particular caste/ tribal groups as exemplified by the Jats in the countryside and merchant groups in urban areas; and politically, by the factions which must bridge and accommodate the diversities in order to construct the alliance systems necessary to protect or advance the group’s position or achieve desired policy outcomes. Central at all times to the dynamics of Punjab is the role of the state, particularly in regard to the rural areas. Soldiers recruited from the land­ owning peasantry, and Punjab as a granary, were two early and continuing governmental concerns. Shortly after the British conquest in 1848, Punjab's military recruits were notable in enabling the British to crush the sepoy rebellion of 1857. Communal and other identities were reinforced by the British in the military units recruited from the province, in recruitment to government services, and in the developing representative institutions. New and expanded arenas for mobilization and politicization provided an increasingly competitive environment in which the state served as the ultimate source of power. The state, whether in the colonial or

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

417

Political M obilization in Punjab

contemporary period, both shaped and reflected the elements within its jurisdiction. Change has taken place within different frameworks of authority. But whether the highest authority has been British or Indian is secondary to the transformation of Punjab from a feudal social and economic order into a dynamic commercial system that increasingly emphasized instrumental values and a high degree of mobility. Political mobilization related to this modernization process as both a cause and an effect. Economic change stemmed at least partly from ethnic and religious revitalization and competition. These forces, in turn, have been stimulated by economic developments and opportunities so as to produce an interactional process of change. Punjab projects an image of vitality and rapid development that, at this basically horizontal level of analysis, appears to eiribrace the population of the entire state. It is conceivable that the appearance will become the reality with continuing economic transformation and mobilization. At present, however, and for some time, a substantial part of the population has reaped only marginal economic benefits while its social position remains virtually unchanged. Landless labourers, menial servants, and what is perhaps best categorized as a lumpen proletariat in urban areas, are neither significantly mobilized nor relatively economically improved as compared with the past. Nonetheless, broad-based economic and social improvements have taken place in Punjab, particularly for the rural area embraced by the green revolution. One study concludes that ‘as measured by food, medical care, educational facilities, and housing, there have been substantial improvements in general welfare*. More specifically, ‘the gains have gone at least as much to the poorer villagers as to the wealthier’ (Leaf: 1983, 268; also see Blyn, 1983). The explanation of these conflicting interpretations of the impact of economic development lies in the diversity present in Punjab. Regional differences exist with regard to irrigation, roads, utilization of inputs such as fertilizer, cropping patterns and mechanization and agricultural imple­ ments in general (Sharma: 1981, 270-75). As an aggregate, Punjab statistics are very impressive when compared with all-India averages. But the benefits are not uniform throughout the state. Nor do the higher wages for agricultural labourers in green revolutions areas, and in areas adjacent to towns and cities necessarily spill over to poorer and more remote areas (Sharma: 1981, 290-91). Finally, a newer phenomenon is the employment of large numbers of migrant agricultural labourers from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and even Orissa. It is possible, perhaps probable, that these migrants will become over time yet another permanent element in the Punjab mosaic.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PAUL WALLACE

418

Stratification: Rural-Urban, Agriculturist-Non-agriculturistf Region and Religion Social stratification, embracing both class and caste, and the ethnic dynamics closely related to certain features of that stratification, are central to both continuity and change in Punjab. Demography adds still another interrelated factor. A basic feature of all the Punjabs—preIndependence undivided Punjab, post-Independence Punjab after Parti­ tion in 1947, and the smaller Punjab created in 1966—is the broad division between agriculturists and non-agriculturists enshrined and institutional­ ized in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, which came into force on 8 June 1901. That Act placed restrictions or prohibitions on the disposal of agricultural land (Lai: 1907, 1-2), and in so doing identified on a district basis each grouping as agriculturist or non-agriculturist. Acquisition of land by non-agriculturists had to be prevented, according to the government, so that it could maintain the support of the agricultural groups. (An early classic exposition specifically on Punjab is Darling, 1928.) Otherwise, there would be ‘a serious political danger’ (Lai: 1907, 1-2; Barrier, 1966). Rural-urban, consequently, was not defined simply as those who lived in a rural or urban setting, but as particular social groups so classified by the government. An earlier example of such a policy occurred in 1866 when higher school fees were assessed on the sons of non-agriculturists; ‘the first recognition of the necessity of encouraging the education of the peasanty’ (Trevaskis: 1928, 230). Governmental policy consistently targetted the agricultural sector. By the time of the Land Alienation Act of 1900, a structural transformation in the nature of agricultural production had already been in progress. The issue was seen as ‘prosperity and loyalty’, to use the language of the period, in contrast to what contemporary social scientists would be more inclined to emphasize as resource development and regime legitimacy. At annexation, Himadri Banerjee points out, Punjab did not have a major perennial canal. By the end of the nineteenth century, ‘all the major Punjab rivers were harnessed for bringing water to their respective doabs' (two waters, or the area between two rivers). Land reclamation, rural mobility to canal areas, economic and social development resulted (Banerjee: 1982, 201-02). Thus agriculturists can be conceived broadly as an economic class reinforced by conscious political targeting, in this case, irrespective of whether the individuals involved lived in rural or urban areas! In fact, in terms of conscious identification and efforts to organize around agricultu­ ral interests, the class essentially consisted of landowning peasants led by the wealthier members of the group. In Punjab, since there is a large number of small landowners, this constituted a significant number. Politically, the Unionist Party in the inter-war period arose out of the rural bloc in the new legislative system following World War I. Its core

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

419

Political M obilization in Punjab

issues for the provincial alliance of primarily Muslim and Hindu landown­ ers, but including some Sikhs, revolved around rural concerns as embodied in the Land Alienation Act, 1900 and subsequent amendments. Key areas included relief from indebtedness to moneylenders, and increased atten­ tion to educational facilities in rural areas. A powerful rural-oriented party, in which the Muslims were the largest single element, stimulated a counter-reaction in the form of mobilization of basically Hindu urban groups such as the National Progressive Party led by Raja Narendra Nath. (Husain, 1946 and Ahmad, 1985). Limited awareness, a restricted franchise, and essentially elite politics continued to characterize Punjab until Independence. It is questionable to what extent, if any, landless agricultural labourers, mainly Scheduled Castes and menials, benefited from a primarily higher caste phenomenon. Nonetheless, in the limited sense utilized here, class, in the form of a growing agriculturist orientation, organized leadership and increasingly important state and political arenas, provided one element in the early mobilization of Punjab. Rural-urban distinctions, however, were not uniform throughout Punjab when related to two other factors, religion and region. All three must be considered in relation to each other. Even as electoral constituen­ cies were constituted so as to institutionalize rural and urban identifica­ tions, a further delineation on the basis of religious community for both electoral and administrative representation purposes provided an addition­ al element. Punjab, like other provinces in India, consequently developed a complicated administrative and electoral system which tended to reinforce and legitimize the salience of existing orientations. Regionalism interacted with the rural-urban and communal factors so as to result in three dominant orientations within the political culture of Punjab. Muslims numerically dominated in the western districts of what became Punjab Pakistan, while Hindus made up the majority in the south-eastern districts of the Haryana region. Regionalism and religion thus overlapped, suggesting the possibility of the two factors intensifying each other. The predominantly rural nature of the Muslim population in the western districts and of Hindus in Haryana, however, served as a common element between the two regions. Communal differences, therefore, could be cross-cut and partially moderated through emphasizing rural concerns. Fazl-i-Husain and Sir Chottu Ram, Muslim and Hindu respectively, institutionalized this process with the founding and develop­ ment of the Unionist Party (Husain, 1946; Wallace, 1980a). The same three factors related to one another in a different manner in the central districts. In this area, which embraced a major part of the Majha, Malwa and Jalandhar (also spelled Jullundur) doab regions, neither Muslims, Hindus nor Sikhs dominated. A second difference involved the rural-urban factor. Hindu leadership in the central districts, in contrast to Haryana, was largely centred in urban areas and around

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PAUL WALLACE

420

Map I. Punjab before Partition

Ma p II. Punjab 1956

Digitized by

Google

Map III. Punjab 1966

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

421

Political M obilization in Punjab

commercial interests. Communal and rural-urban factors as a consequ­ ence overlapped in the central districts. Muslims were identified as basically rural and Hindus as primarily urban. The urban Hindu identification stemmed from their numerical and economic dominance in urban areas. In fact, a majority of Hindus in this region were rural, but they were a definite minority in rural areas compared to either Muslims or Sikhs. Sikhs also had a rural orientation in this region and a section of the community did co-operate with the Unionist Party on this basis. A larger section of the Sikhs who were politically activated, however, were more motivated by the communal factor as it operated against closer relations with Muslims, and had linkages with the Hindu-led Congress nationalist movement in Punjab. Partition eliminated the western districts and all but a politically insignificant percentage of the Muslim community. Thereby, it altered the geographic and social composition of the communal, rural-urban, and regional orientations, but affected their interactive nature and political dynamics much less. After 1947, Muslims no longer related to the three basic orientations which, nonetheless, remained and continued to operate with marked continuity. Following Partition, former centres of Hindu population on the eastern plains of Haryana and in the hill districts continued to be overwhelmingly Hindu. In fact, the Hindu percentage increased with the exodus of all but a small number of Muslims. Despite Hindu dominance in Haryana and the hill areas, only a minimal degree of consensus existed between these two regions, or with Hindus from other parts of Punjab. A Hindu orientation did exist to some extent in relation to Hindu-Sikh issues such as the imposition of the Gurmukhi script. Nonetheless, agreement as to strategy and tactics in opposing Akali Dal-led Sikh claims proved to be difficult to achieve on the basis of religion alone. A monolithic Hindu orientation failed to develop partly due to the regional factor which cross-cut and somewhat moderated communal considerations. Hindus of the hill areas differed markedly from Hindus in the eastern plains and had few linkages with them. They, moreover, were further distinguished from Hindus in the central plains (Punjabi region) by their exceptionally low rate of urbanization. The rural-urban and hills-plains orientations were significant in reducing the political poten­ tialities of a Hindu orientation during the Sikh movement for a Punjabi Suba in the 1950s and 1960s. Rural-urban and regional considerations contributed to the kind of mobilization that resulted in the trifurcation of Punjab in 1966. Himachal Pradesh absorbed most of the hill areas while rural Hindu-dominated Haryana became a separate state. Tables 1, 2, and 3 drawing on data from the 1961 census provide basic information for comparing pre- with post-1966 Punjab. Regional as well as rural-urban and community categories, arranged by district and summa­ rized for the central plains (essentially contemporary Punjab) as well as

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

422

PAUL WALLACE

T able 1

Regional, Community and Rural-Urban Distribution by District, 1961 Percentage District

Geographical Region

Political Region

Hissar

Eastern plains

Haryana:

Rural Urban Total

Rohtak

Eastern plains

Haryana:

Gurgaon

Eastern plains

Mohindcrgarh

Total Population

Hindu

Sikh

Others

10.8 4.9 10.2

.7 2.2 .6

Rural Urban Total

88.5 92.9 89.2 99.1 95.4 98.6

.1 2.5 .4

.8 2.1 1.0

1,299.471 241.037 1.540.508 1,225.884 194.507 1.420,391

Haryana:

Rural Urban Total

79.1 93.9 81.5

.1 3.5 .7

20.8# 2.6 17.8'

1.035.105 205.601 1.240.706

Eastern plains

Haryana PEPSU:

Rural Urban Total

99.6 95.0 99.2

.1 3.6 .4

.3 1.4 .4

494.878 52.972 547.850

Kamal

Eastern plains

Haryana:

Rural Urban Total

12.4 9.5 11.9

1.4 1.1 1.3

1.234.838 255.592 1.490.430

Ambala

Eastern plains and hill

Mixed:

Rural Urban Total

86.2 89.4 86.8 68.0 78.7 71.4

27.9 18.4 24.8

4.1 2.9 3.8

933.884 439.593 1,373.477

Kangra (includes new district of Kulu)

Hill

Hill:

Rural Urban Total

98.5 90.3 98.2

.7 4.9 .8

.8 4.8 1.0

1,019,197 43.321 1,062.518

Lahaul and Spiti

Hill

Hill:

Rural Urban Total

46.8 — 46.8

.8 — .8

52.4 — 52.44

20.453 — 20,453

Simla

Hill

Hill:

Rural Urban Total

1.2 8.7 4.8

.7 2.8 2.2

58,468 54.185 112,653

Hoshiarpur

Hill and central plains

Hill and Punjabi:

Rural Urban Total

98.1 88.5 93.0 66.7 76.1 67.1

32.2 21.7 30.9

1.1 2.2 1.4

1,087.193 146,300 1,233,493

Gurdaspur

Hill and central plains

Hill and Punjabi:

Rural Urban Total

43.0 77.8 50.1

49.4 17.2 42.9

7.6 5.0 7.0

788,603 199,391 987,994

Jalandhar

Central plains

Punjabi:

Rural Urban Total

55.7 19.2 44.8

.4 1.3 1.3

877.379 349,988 1,227,367

Ludhiana

Central plains

Punjabi:

Rural Urban Total

43.9 79.2 53.9 21.7 67.2 35.7

77.5 30.5 63.0

.8 2.3 1.3

707,776 314,743 10,22519

Ferozcpore

Central plains

Punjabi:

Rural Urban Total

32.0 75.1 40.6

66.7 22.6 57.9

1.3 2.3 1.5

1,294,161 324,955 1,619,116

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political Mobilization in Punjab

423

Pcrccrlagc District

Geographical Region

Political Region

Central plains

Punjabi:

Central plains

Punjabi, PEPSU:

Central plains

PEPSU:

Sangrur

Central plains

PEPSU:

Patiala

Central plains

PEPSU:

PUNJAB TOTALS

Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total

Hindu

Sikh

Others

19.6 63.8 32.9 32.1 70.6 41.0 17.8 60.5 27.1 49.9 61.3 51.9 39.7 64.2 45.8 60.5 76.2 63.7

77.7 34.1 64.5 67.2 28.1 58.2 81.7 37.3 72.3 47.4 25.3 43.7 58.7 34.4 52.8 36.5 20.9 33.3

2.7 2.1 2.6 1.3 .8 .5 2.2 .6 2.7 13.4" 4.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.0 2.9 3.0

Total Population 1.070.892 464.024 1,534,916 264.559 79,219 343,778 831,700 223,477 1,055,177 1,183,694 240,994 1.424.688 790,082 258,696 1,048,778 16,218,217 4,088,595 20,306,812

SOURCE: Rural-urban and community figures were computed from bask data furnished in Government of India. Census Commissioner, Census of Indus. 1961. Paper No. 1 of 1963. Religion. New Delhi: to conform with demographic and political variables. ' Includes 17.5 per cent Muslims for total and 20.7 per cent Muslims for rural. * Includes 46.5 per cent Buddhists and 5.9 per cent Muslims. Lahaul and Spiti was the only district in Punjab with a significant percentage of Buddhists. Includes 11.6 per cent Muslims.

T able 2 State-wide Rural-U rban Distribution within each Community, 1961 *

Hindus Sikhs Muslims

Rural Population

Rural Percentage of Total Community

Population

Urban Percen­ tage of Total Community

9,813,292 5,914,292 348,069

75.9 87.4 88.5

3,116,753 854,837 45,155

24.1 12.6 11.5

state-wide, enable comparative analysis. Partition reduced the number of major religious communities from three to two. Nonetheless, neither Hindus nor Sikhs dominated the new state on the basis of gross numbers. More importantly, each of the two communities dominated the urban and rural areas respectively. In the central plains, Hindus comprised 69.3 per cent of the total urban population as contrasted with 27.6 per cent for the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

424

PAUL WALLACE

T able 3 Hindu and Sikh Rural-Urban Distribution in Central Plains, 1961 Rural Central Plains Percentage of Total C. P.Rural Percentage of Total Community in Central Plains Urban Central Plains Percentage of Total C. P. Urban Percentage of Total Community in Central Plains Total Central Plains Percentage of Total Community in Punjab

Hindu

Sikh

Total

3,364,881 (37.8) (65.1)

5349,433 (60.1) (88.2)

8,896,039

1,802,829 (69.3) (34.9)

716,977 (27.6) (11.8)

2,601,787

5,167,810 (40.0)

6,065,909 (89.6)

SOURCE: Computed from basic dau furnished in Government of India, Census Commissioner, Census o f India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1963, Religion, New Delhi: Manager of Publications. 1963,31-4. For the purposes of Table 3, the central plains were defined as the entire districts of Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur. Jalandhar. Ludhiana. Ferozepore, Amritsar, Kapurthala, Bhatinda, Sangrur, and Patiala. The bias introduced by the inclusion of the hill areas of Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur tends to increase the rural Hindu population. The Sikh-Hindu rural-urban contrast after 1966, consequently, would be of an even greater magnitude if the hill areas were removed from the central plains calculations.

Sikhs, while Sikhs constituted a majority of 60.1 per cent of the total rural population (Table 3). To underscore and dramatize the demographic situation, Table 1 reveals that Amritsar District, wherein resides the Sikhs* Golden Temple, had a Hindu urban majority of 63.8 per cent, while Patiala District, central to the Malwa region which is the home of key contemporary Akali Dal leaders, had a Hindu urban majority of 64.2 per cent. In both cases, of course, Sikhs maintained a strong rural majority, 77.7 per cent and 58.7 per cent respectively. Urban percentages changed marginally in favour of the Sikhs as enumerated in the 1971 census. Hindus declined from 63.8 per cent to 60.3 per cent in Amritsar, and from 64.2 per cent to 63.9 per cent in Patiala with corresponding Sikh increases to 37.75 per cent and 34.9 per cent respectively. Hoshiarpur was the only district in 1971 with a Hindu rural majority, while Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur were the three districts out of twelve in the state with overall Hindu majorities (Census o f India 1971, 1972: 60-2; Statistical Abstract o f Punjab 1983: 1984, 62-3). Politically, the rural-urban, agriculturist-non-agriculturist dimension of Punjab as related to the communal configuration has found expression in two very different patterns of political behaviour; irredentism, appealing essentially to one dimension, or accommodation, in which effective efforts are made to bridge or link two different identities.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

425

Political M obilization in Punjab

Caste Class, in the form of agriculturist or merchant and urban identifications, and caste are not mutually exclusive concepts in the Punjab setting. Agricultural castes, rather than agriculturists per se, were identified and institutionalized in the Land Alienation Act of 1900. Caste orientations are further complicated by the intermingling of tribal-like features so as to render distinctions betweeen the two difficult. This is particularly true for agricultural castes. Trevaskis emphasized the interrelationship between caste and tribe in concluding that agriculturists in Punjab (were never properly absorbed into the caste system’, but ‘they were affected by it’ (Trevaskis, 1928: 63). Ibbetson, in the 1883 census, used the term ‘tribal type of caste’ which, in a manner similar to Trevaskis, also considered the occupation and political position of a group in addition to their ritual status (Ibbetson, 1916: 10-12). He discussed in detail the development of this mixed category especially as it pertained to the Jats whom he rated as ‘in every respect the most important of the Punjab peoples’ (Ibbetson, 1916: 103). In the 1931 census, (Table 4), the last one in which castes were enumerated, Jats comprised 21.3 per cent of the total population of Punjab as compared to the second highest ranking caste, Rajputs, who were 8.3 per cent of the population (Khan, 1933: 323). The Jat background includes the absorption of members from invading tribes, intermarriage with high caste Rajputs as well as individuals from low castes, and the addition over time of aboriginal groups. Their social status has varied, accordingly, from a low level corresponding to the Shudras to a high level approaching that of the Rajputs (Ibbetson, 1916: 97-131). Generally, rising Jat social status corresponds to major periods of economic transformation and political mobilization beginning as early as the seventeenth century (Habib, 1976: 100). The Jats gained political power during the period of the Sikh misls in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and continued to gain prominence under the kingdom of Ranjit Singh, a Jat. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were recognized as the premier agricultural grouping in Punjab and central to its politics. Tribal-like ties related Hindu, Sikh and Muslim Jats in different regions, cross-cutting communal and territorial distinctions to a significant extent, and with a notable degree of egalitarianism. Caste characteristics, on the other hand, are also manifested by Jats. In most respects they tend to conform to the model of a ‘dominant caste’ as delineated by Srinivas (Srinivas, 1959: 1-16; 1962: 90), constituting the single most important element—socially, economically and politically—in the rural areas of the state. A Jat section of a Punjab village normally contains the finest houses and most often is clearly demarcated from those of other social groups. Service castes relate to Jats in the Punjab equivalent of the jajmani system wherein there is occupational specialization and a

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PAUL WALLACE

426

T

a ble

4

Major Hindu, Sikh and Muslim Castes, 1931 Hindu

Caste aggarwal ahir arain arora aw an biloch brahman chamar chhimba chuhra dagi and koli dhobi faqir ghirath gujjar Jat jihwar julaha kahar kamboh kashmiri khattri kumhar lohar machhi mahtam mali meo mirasi mochi mussalii nai pathan qasab kanet rajput

Digitized by

Number 352,999 218,578 1.146 661,268

Sikh

Percen­ tage of Total Caste 93.1 98.5 .1 85.2

Number

—

—

—

114,329 —

—

—

—

181,472 12,543 25,940 124,054 170,439 992,309 127,881 53,488 62,422 37,635

99.6 7.1 9.0 99.8 24.5 16.3 45.4 8.0 70.4 15.7

—

460,851 162,263 74,761 —

15,482 71,846 —

—

—

—

102,358

—

—

—

4,646 2,134,598 58,683 5,449 9,079 101.866 55,112 34,499 16,935

—

.4 1.7 —

26.9

36,367

.7 35.2 20.8 .8 10.2 42.5 —

10.7 5.6 5.1 —

55.7 —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

41,820

11.0

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

300,429 577,374

98.2 24.5

Google

50,312

2,105 53,412 22,344

162,224 256,533 —

—

—

—

—

1.7

4,755

—

23.7 83.8

.7 14.4 18.6 24.8 —

—

539,242 624,695

—

521,247 2,941,395 95,940 612,579 17,152 100.081 201,885 —

423,617 241,972 314,862 13,413 13,300 133,089 243,330 464,218 472,616 236,104 350,008 127,198 —

2.1

Percen­ tage of Total Caste

—

2,518 1,330,057

14.7

—

—

89.3 26.9 22.4

1,113 7,991

6.986 158,753 17,898 169,247

Number

.4

—

—

99.2 62.1 25.9 54.0

Percen­ tage of Total Caste

1,684

—

1,050,382 684,963 24,959 368,224

Muslim

1,721,334

—

1.1 99.9 —

100.0 100.0 —

.2 55.5 3.3 —

92.4 89.2 —

74.8 48.5 34.1 91.1 19.3 41.8 99.5 —

68.3 72.6 100.0 20.5 15.5 100.0 99.4 98.2 100.0 62.0 100.0 100.0 —

73.2

Total

379,068* 221,933 1,331,203 775,734 539,242 624,695 1,058,598 1,102,435* 96,269 681,359* 182,235 175,557 287,445 124,340 6% ,442 6,068,302 281,512 672,243 88,656 239,582 202,920 516,207 620,402 333,910 314,862 65,262 85,758 133,089 244,726 472,616 472,616 380,657 350,008 127,198 305,814 2,351,650

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Punjab Hindu

Caste rathi ramdasia saini sayad sheikh sunar tarkhan teli

Number 134,078 12,235 78,379

Sikh

Percen­ tage of Total Caste

Number

99.9 9.7 47.4

—

67.080 86,888

Muslim

Percen­ tage of Total Caste

—

—

53.0 52.6

—

—

—

—

294,223 414,623 34,558 346,948 344,927

100.0 100.0 21.6 53.0 99.6

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

62.0 22.6 .4

26,071 159,103 —

Number

Percen­ tage of Total Caste

—

—

99,026 147,955 1,373

A ll

16.3 24.3 —

Total

134,096 126,487** 165,190 294,223 414,623 159,655 654,053 346,342

SUMMARY: Major C astes

21.3% 4.7% 3.7% 2.4% 2.4%

Jat arain brahman gujjar julaha

rajput chamar * arora chuhra tarkhan

8.3% 4.3% 2.7% 2.4% 2.3%

• Other major merchant castes include khattri, 1.8% and aggarwal, 1.3%. SOURCE: Compiled from Government of India. Census Commissioner, Census o f India, 1931, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part II, Tables by Khan Ahmad Hasan Khan (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette, 1933), 282-301. All castes with a total population of 50,000 or more were included in the table. With few exceptions, the total figure for a given caste (last column) is larger than the sum of the individual totals under each community. The difference was occasioned by caste returns from other religious groups. Summary percentages provided in ibid.. Part I. Report, 327. * aggarwals included 24,341 Jains, chamars included 256,349 ad-dharmis, chuhras included 34,996 Christians, and ramdasias included 47,619 ad-dharmis.

relationship between patron and client. Commercialization, particularly in green revolution areas, may be effecting changes in this pattern. The social hierarchy in rural areas is evidenced by the deference paid by non-Jats to Jats and the general refusal of Jats to intermarry with non-Jats. Politically, economically and numerically, Jats—and, after 1966, Sikh Jats—are most often the single most important group at the village level (Dhami, 1981: 294, 297, 317). Consequently, categorizing Jats strictly in caste terms poses special problems. F. G. Bailey, wrestling with a somewhat comparable problem as regards the Konds in Orissa State, classified them as 'both a caste and a tribe*, with more emphasis on their tribal characteristics. He posited a tribe-caste spectrum in which the extreme of the tribal part reflected a segmentary egalitarian type and did not contain any dependents (Bailey, 1960: 264-5).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

428

PAUL WALLACE

While Jats in Punjab are similar in some characteristics to the tribal Konds as described by Bailey, they differ in others. To a marked degree their generally egalitarian intra-Jat relationships approximate the tribal model, which may contribute to the conclusion in the 1931 census that caste is "weakest in the Punjab* as compared to other areas in India (Hutton, 1933: 438). In relation to non-Jats, however, caste-like character­ istics assume a greater importance. In addition to the particular role of Jats, caste in Punjab is weakened by the lesser importance of brahmans as compared with other parts of India. Numerically, they were the fifth largest caste according to the 1931 census with a population of over one million and 3.7 per cent of the total population of the province. Nonetheless, as Prakash Tandon so succinctly wrote, that brahmans ‘could be the leaders of society, in a position of privilege, I only discovered when I went to live outside the Punjab* (Tandon, 1961: 76). Causal factors for the relative*weakness of brahmans may include the following: 1) the coexistence in the Punjab of three different religious communities in which the brahmans had a role primarily among Hindus; 2) reform movements with strong anti-brahman overtones including Kabir (1440-1518), Guru.Nanak and the development of the Sikhs, and the Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century; and 3) the continuance of tribal orientations. Other caste groups in Punjab such as the merchant-oriented khattris, arorasy and aggarwals, with a combined percentage of 5.8 per cent in 1931, and the artisan and Scheduled Castes seem to correspond in structure and role performance to analogous castes elsewhere in India. Each caste in the system, however, has to be affected to some functional extent by the relative weakness of the brahman priestly caste and the tribal aspect of the agricultural castes. It is important to emphasize that no attempt is being made to construct a case against the political imfwrtance and pervasiveness of caste in Punjab. On the contrary, appointments to ministerial positions, applications for party tickets, and interviews with MLAs and other politicians in Punjab evidence a keen appreciation of caste as one of the important elements of political support. As one illustration approximately 500 applications were examined for MLA and MP tickets in 1963-4. Careful consideration was normally given in supporting materials to the caste composition of the constituency in relation to the candidate. Congress Party District Obser­ vers also emphasized the role of caste in their reports (Wallace, 1966). In another study, on the 1980 Parliamentary elections, politicians, scholars and newspaper accounts invariably cited their understanding of the caste composition of their areas (Wallace, 1980b). An appropriate conclusion would appear to be that caste in Punjab has been relatively less significant than in other states, and operates politically in conjunction with other concerns. Prior to Independence, caste interacted with other identities to

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

429

Political M obilization in Punjab

moderate communal considerations. Sir Chottu Ram, the Hindu Unionist leader of Haryana, allied with Muslims and Sikhs from the western and central parts of the province at least partly and perhaps primarily on the basis that they were rural and fellow Jats. Their hegemonic rule extended from the early 1920s to shortly before Independence. Even the concept of Jat took on a broader meaning within this framework as Sir Chottu Ram also viewed Jats not as just a tribe or caste but as synonymous with rural and backwardness (Bhardwaj, 1944: 17-24; Wallace, 1980a). Muslim and Hindu Jats subsequently, after 1947 and 1966 respectively, became part of other political jurisdictions leaving essentially only Sikh Jats in Indian Punjab. Nonetheless, the rural as well as Jat identity remained. Too much stress, on the other hand, can be placed on the political efficacy of Jats. In the post-Independence period, in particular, rapid social mobilization, economic development, party competition and factionalism have tended to divide the Jats of Punjab. Even numerically, while Jats are the largest single group in Punjab, they do not constitute a majority. Moreover, the Congress, Akali Dal and Communist parties, in contempor­ ary Punjab, all appeal to and share the Jat support base. Scheduled Castes, 26.87 per cent of the population in the 1981 census, are distributed relatively evenly throughout the state ranging from a low of 20.89 per cent in Firozpur (also spelled Ferozepur) district to a high of 36.27 per cent in Jalandhar district (Punjab, 1984: Statistical Abstract 1983, 53, Census o f India, 1978: 200-01). Whether Hindu or Sikh, they generally provide important support to the Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP). Both class and caste considerations are involved as Scheduled Castes perceive Jats to be economically dominant in regard to rural landed relationships and as ‘caste enemies’. Therefore, they tend to oppose the other three major political parties in which the Jats are predominant, the Akali Dal and the two communist parties (Juergensmeyer, 1982: 198, 229; 1983: 121-5). A still low level, but increasing, assertiveness of Scheduled Castes against higher castes is somewhat negated politically by internal conflicts such as that between chamars and non

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF Ml n

1967 1969 1985 1972 1977 1980 No. Percentage vote No. Percentage vote No. Percentage vote No. Percentage vote No. Percentage vote No. Percentage vote •

Party Congress Akaii Dal CPI CPM Jan Sangh* (BJP) Janta* Others

48 26* 5 3 9

13 104

37.40 24.69 5.16 3.26 9.85

38 43 4 2 8

39.28 29.59 4.54 3.10 ' 8.84

17.73

1 8

1.41 22.03

104

66 24 10 1 0

3 "l04

42.84 27.65 6.51 3.25 4.97

14.78

17 58 7 8

33.4 31.0 6.3 3.5

63 37 9 5 1

47.99 26.92 6.45 4.06 5.37

32 73 1 0 4

37.9 38.6 4.4 1.9 4.4

25 2

15.0 10.8

0 2

3.0 9.21

1 4

1.0 11.9

117

117

,

1

115**

* Includes two seats won by the dissident Master Tara Singh Group.

+ The Jan Sangh was the major constituent of the Janta Party coalition in 1977. Just prior to the 1980 elections, the Jan Sangh group left the Janata Party with the new name of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP). •• The BJP won two Assembly seats in Jalandhar on 16 December 1985, in addition to the four noted above. Elections to these two seats were not held on 25 September due to the death of an independent candidate who had been contesting both seats. SOURCES: Election reports, newspaper accounts, Satish Sharma, 1983. Also sec Brass, 1975.

448

PAUL WALLACE

after only eight months on 22 November 1967. The Congress party had a major role in bringing down the Gumam Singh Ministry and became the prop for the succeeding Lachhman Singh Gill minority government. Gill was a dissident Akali. Continuing defections and counter-defections marked the high degree of political instability. Finally, Congress withdrew its support and Punjab was placed under President’s Rule on 23 August 1968 (Tribune, 24 August 1968). Another effort at accommodation, this time before the elections, returned the Akali Dal-Jan Sangh alliance to power following elections in February 1969. The Akalis won their highest seat total up to that point with 43, and for the first time was the largest single party in the Assembly. By contrast, the Congress party total declined from 48 to 38 (Table 14; Tribune, 12 February 1969). Defections further enhanced the Akali total enabling it to gain an ^absolute majority. Pressures then accelerated in the SGPC or organisational wing of the party for less accommodation with the Jan Sangh and more rapid movement on Sikh issues. The ministerial group lost to the SGPC wing on government policy on the increased use of the Punjabi language and the new Guru Nanak University. Utilization of Hindi, a core Jan Sangh ethnic issue, suffered as a consequence. Politically, however, the cost was high as the Jan Sangh resigned from the coalition. The Akali Dal finally had sole control of both the SGPC and Punjab Assembly political systems, but could not sustain its dominance in Chandigarh alone. Losing its alliance severely weakened the Akali Dal electorally. In the March 1971 elections to the national Parliament, the Akali Dal won only one of 13 seats while the Congress party won 10 ( Tribune, 12 March 1971). A year later, still without allies, the Akali Dal lost control of the Assembly with the Congress party returning to power. Akalis won only 24 seats and 27.6 per cent of the votes in contrast to the 65 Congress seats and 42.8 per cent of the vote (Tribune, 1£ March 1971; Table 14). The Congress party, according to Akali sources, sought mutual co-operation with the Akali Dal immediately after Prime Minister Gandhi declared a nationwide Emergency on 26 June 1975. Instead, the Akali executive unanimously criticized the Emergency as an ‘onslaught on the civil liberties, freedom of press and freedom of speech, a rape on democracy and a great step towards dictatorship’ in Amritsar on 28-30 June 1975 (The Spokesman, vol. 27, No. 1, 2 January 1978, 1). A ‘Save Democracy Morcha’ began on 9 July and continued until elections were announced in January 1977. It is estimated that over 40,000 Akalis were arrested or under detention including the President of the Akali Dal and 18 Akali members of the Assembly. Pro-Akali newspapers were either closed or penalized. Coalition accommodation politics emerged in 1977 following the twenty month Emergency as the Akalis allied with the CPM, and the new Janata party, which had emerged nation-wide as a reaction to the Emergency. In

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

449

Political M obilization in Punjab

Punjab the Janata included the Jan Sangh, Praja Socialist Party supporters, Scheduled Castes, Congress dissidents and independent Hindus. These three parties, all of which opposed the Emergency and in many cases shared mutual confinement, won all the Lok Sabha seats in the national elections held in March 1977. The Economic and Political Weekly emphasized the importance of the Akali resistence to the Emergency in its winning eight of the parliamentary seats (26 March 1977,532). A re-poll in April added an additional seat to the Akali total. Equally significant, if less spectacular, the coalition victory in the June 1977 Assembly elections resulted in the Akali Dal coming close to a clear majority with 58 out of the 117 seats. Underlining the importance to the Akalis of the coalition was the Congress vote percentage of 33.4 per cent which won it only 17 seats, while its coalitional partner, the CPI won seven (Table 14). A judicious allocation of seats between the winning coalition members allowed them to engage in straight electoral fights with the Congress rather than the more normal multiple contests. Defections then provided the Akalis with a majority. A clear majority this time did not induce the Akali Dal to break the coalition. Meaningful co-operation betweeen the rural-oriented Akali Dal and the Hindu urban-based Janata party ensued from June 1977 for a two-year period. A Sikh weekly, The Spokesman, described the harmony between the two parties as if nirvana had been reached: . . . there is perfect understanding, cooperation and unanimity (between the two parties in the Government). Both now completely identify themselves with the interests of the State instead of with the interest of any particular section of the State's people on communal basis (vol. 27, No. 4,12 September 1977, p. 10). One test of communal relations developed in March 1978 when Mahant Sewa began the second month of his highly publicized fast on behalf of the inclusion of Chandigarh and Punjabi areas of Haryana into Punjab. Major Sikh feaders moved quickly to defuse the tension. Akali President Jagdev Singh Talwandi and SGPC President Gurcharan Singh Tohra agreed with Mahant Das on the issues, but opposed disturbing communal harmony. Tohra affirmed that the issues would be solved through ‘peaceful negotiations' (The Spokesman, vol. 27, No. 28,6 March 1978, p. 1). These code terms clearly meant that agitational politics threatened Hindu-Sikh relations, and thus the ruling alliance. That could not be condoned. Important differences were aired. The Akali Dal and related organiza­ tions continued to press a variety of Sikh and Punjab demands peacefully, demands that a few years later would be central to a militant movement. Government functioning, particularly with regard to rural and agricultural concerns, had impressive results. An Integrated Rural Development Programme, major changes in rural credit, and other measures can be related to significant agricultural production increases (Gill, 1983; Dhami, 1984: 92).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PAUL WALLACE

450

A 26-month golden age of accommodation and communal harmony ended on 3 September 1979, as a consequence of national political developments re-energizing Akali factionalism. Stat>-Centre linkages were supportive of the ruling Punjab coalition so long as the Janata party maintained its cohesion in New Delhi. But in July 1979 the heterogenous national party split with Charan Singh as the new Prime Minister, leading a new party and a minority government. One important issue involved charges of Hindu communalism through the role of the RSS and the Jan Sangh elements within the Janata party. In Punjab, Akali organizational leader Talwandi responded by successfully leading a fight to end the state alliance with what his group characterized as the ‘Janata dominated by the RSS’ (The Hindu, 4 September 1979). Ending the coalition in the Assembly fed back into Sikh politics and also disrupted the Akali Dal. Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal fought against terminating the alliance and tenaciously led the ministerial wing of the Akali Dal that attempted to maintain it, at least for the Lok Sabha elections that were held subsequently in January 1980. Determined opposition by Talwandi resulted in ‘two warring factions’ (Tribune, 11 January 1980). Not only was the Akali Dal unable to effect a meaningful inter-party coalition for the election, but active intra-party sabotage occurred. Accordingly, Indira Gandhi’s Congress(l) swept 12 of the 13 Punjab Lok Sabha seats (Wallace, 1980b). Continuing internecine warfare within the Akali Dal also aided the Congress(I) in returning to power at the state level in the May 1980 elections with a majority of 63 seats to 37 for the Akali Dal. Janata, in a meteor-like manner, split into three pieces which won only one seat between them in contrast to their second-rank position of 25 in 1977. According to Lala Jagat Narain, a veteran political leader and prominent newspaper publisher, the Bharatiya Janata Party which emerged from the Janata once again became ‘literally the Jan Sangh’ in Punjab (interview, Jalandhar City, 14 November 1980). Alliance with the Akali Dal assisted the CPI and CPM to win nine and five seats respectively (Table 14). Electoral defeat further embittered relations between the ministerial and organizational wings of the Akali Dal so that it became impossible to conduct scheduled elections to the party executive in March 1980. Talwandi, nevertheless, lost his presidency as he and his Working Committee were replaced by a seven-man committee (Tribune, 3 March 1980). Reconciliation failed so the contending groups split into rival Akali Dais with Talwandi becoming increasingly strident. Talwandi emphasized the goal of an autonomous state in September 1980 (Tribune, 15 September 1980), followed the next month by a delineation of desired Centre-State relations in which only four subjects would remain with the Centre: defence, communications, currency, and external affairs (Tribune, 14 and 24 October 1980). He then moderated his demand for an autonomous state by describing it as remaining within the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

451

Political M obilization in Punjab

‘country’s constitutional framework’. At the same time, he escalated the rhetoric by threatening to launch a religious war (Tribune, 21 October 1980)—the same language used by Master Tara Singh during the 1960-1 movement. By contrast, the opposing Akali Dal led by Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal represented the moderates. Former Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal and SGPC President Gurcharan Singh Tohra remained with Longowal. Tohra’s re-election to the SGPC Presidency on 19 November 1980, and the inclusion of nine of the Longowal group along with two from the Talwandi group in the eleven member Executive Committee, confirmed the dominance of the moderate Akali Dal (Tribune, 20 November 1980). But its dominance remained precarious. In addition to the Talwandi Akali Dal, internal opposition also came from the Akali Dal (Master), a dissident group formed by Master Tara Singh after he lost power in 1961 and continued by his followers after his death on 22 November 1967. It contested elections as in 1977 when 36 Sikh independent candidates ran on Master Tara Singh’s bow and arrow symbol, and continued to hold ‘All-India’ conventions as in Jalandhar on 26 October 1980 (The Hindu, 11 June 1977; Tribune, 27 October 1980). Santokh Singh presided over the Master Akali Dal in 1980 drawing primarily urban, non-Jat support in Punjab, as well as assistance from the Delhi and Bombay gurdwaras. Santokh Singh had close links with the Congress(I). Coalition strategies and internal factionalism constituted two important elements in the political decline of the Akali Dal during this period. In addition, the Congress party contributed to the Akali disarray leading to the partial displacement of Akali authority among Sikhs by Sant Jamal Singh Bhindranwale and the extremist movement that he led in Punjab. As early as 1982, Ayesha Kagal in a carefully researched article for The Times o f India concluded that Bhindranwale ‘was originally a product, nurtured and marketed by the Centre to cut into the Akali Dal’s spheres of influence’-. In the 1979 SGPC elections, she reports, Amrik Singh, President of the All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) and key Bhindranwale aide, ‘was fielded against the Akali Dal’s candidate (Jiwan Singh) Umranangal’ (12 September 1982). Amrik Singh lost the contest to the prominent Akali, but Bhindranwale’s supporters won four seats (Suri and Dogra, 1981: 136). Joseph Lelyveld subsequently wrote that Bhindranwale ‘had been initially recruited into politics by Sanjay Gandhi after his mother’s fall from power in 1977’ (The New York Times Magazine, 2 December 1984, 43). Bhindranwale, a relatively minor religious recluse, began his rise to prominence the following year, on 13 April 1978, in a violent encounter with the Nirankaris, a non-mainstream community of Sikhs who believe in a living guru. Bhindranwale was later implicated in the assassination in Delhi of Baba Gurbachan Singh, the Nirankari guru, on 24 April 1980.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

452

PAUL WALLACE

Veteran author and journalist Khushwant Singh unqualifiedly ascribed the assassination to ‘Bhindranwale’s followers’ after which many more Nirankaris were killed in various parts of Punjab (Khushwant Singh, 1984: 9). Lok Dal leader Charan Singh, speaking in Parliament, criticized the Congress government for not taking action against Bhindranwale even though 4some 50 Nirankaris had so far been killed’ (The Times o f India, 25 August 1982). The most detailed information of the assistance provided by Congress leaders is furnished by the highly respected national columnist Kuldip Nayar. Giani Zail Singh, Darbara Singh and Sanjay Gandhi are all linked to the building up of Bhindranwale as a counter to the Akali Dal. Zail Singh served as Chief Minister of Punjab until 1977, became the Union Home Minister in 1980 and then President of India. Darbara Singh was the Congress(I) Chief Minister of Punjab from 1980 until President’s rule in 1983. Considering Bhindranwale’s development of a terrorist movement and the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984, Nayar concludes that ‘little did they realise at that time that they were creating a Frankenstein’ (Nayar and Singh, 1984: 31). Akali institutionalization as centred in the SGPC and led by the Akali Dal increasingly deteriorated as the fundamentalist movement began to systematically engage in intimidation and assassination against Hindus and Sikhs who were seen as opposing Bhindranwale’s concept of orthodoxy. An organized movement clearly operated by 9 September 1981 when Lala Jagat Narain, a prominent Punjab Hindu newspaper publisher, died from the bullets of what commonly became called ‘a hit squad’. Other prominent individuals killed included Narain’s son Romesh Chander, H. S. Manchanda, president of the Delhi Gurdwara Prabandhak Commit­ tee, A. S. Atwal, Member of Parliament and scholar V. N. Tiwari and Gyani Pratap Singh, a retired priest (Khushwant Singh, 1984: 9). Sikh revivalism in the form of fundamentalism energized the movement as Bhindranwale exercised the power of defining a true Sikh. According to Bhindranwale, Sikhs followed the practices established by Guru Gobind Singh in 1699 including the five Ks: kes (unshorn hair), kangha (comb), kach (shorts), kara (steel bracelet) and kirpan (sword). Cutting or trimming one’s hair, recognizing any guru after Guru Gobind Singh, smoking or drinking alcohol and other practices meant, according to Bhindranwale, that one ceased to be a Sikh. Sikhs who observed the five Ks over a long period were known as keshdari Sikhs and became the mainstream among the Sikhs in contrast to sahajdaris who followed other Sikh traditions. SGPC elections, however, allowed non-keshdaris to qualify as voters by declaring themselves sahajdaris (Suri and Dogra, 1981: 137). Akali Dal leaders are keshdari Sikhs, who won their battle for control of Sikh temples in the 1920s so that they, rather than sahajdari Sikhs, can manage them. Moreover, SGPC institutions essentially propagate a

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

453

Political M obilization in Punjab

version of Sikhism with numerous pamphlets on hair and the other elements of the Guru Gobind Singh tradition. Nonetheless, politically and socially the dominant Akali group appeared to be outflanked by Bhindranwale and other extremists on the one hand and the ruling Congress(I) on the other. Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal’s dominant Akali Dal consequently adopted a more militant approach which progressively included religious concerns. It not only lacked power in the Punjab Assembly, but had increasingly effective competition in the Sikh community and its core base in the SGPC. The ‘Punjab Problem’, as it became titled, developed most clearly from 1981 and remained India’s most serious crisis except for the brief period following an agreement reached by Longowal and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 24 July 1985. Until early 1981, little support existed in Punjab for Khalistan, the extremist concept of a completely autonomous or independent state. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a former Punjab Minister residing in England, is generally credited with its inception. As the self-appointed president, he issued non-accredited Khalistan passports, sought membership in the United Nations, and raised funds and supporters largely from outside of India. Surprisingly, and possibly unknowingly, the conservative Chief Khalsa Diwan provided a prestigious forum for the public espousal of Khalistan at the 54th All-India Sikh Educational Conference held in Chandigarh on 17-18 March 1981. Ganga Singh Dhillon, a Sikh businessman from the United States, associated himself with the Khalistan movement as he publicly called for a separate Sikh nation with associated membership in the United Nations. ( T r ib u n e and T h e In d ia n E x p r e s s , 18 and 19 March 1981). A week later at Anandpur Sahib, the birthplace of k e s h d a r i Sikhism, the large gathering of Sikhs which came to celebrate the Holi festival were greeted with Khalistan banners and slogans generated largely by the extremist Dal Khalsa and Nihangs { N a tio n a l H e r a ld , 22 March 1981). Longowal’s Akali Dal strongly denounced the Khalistan demands even asserting that it ‘was being raised at the instigation of Congress(I) leaders’. Prakash Singh Badal, former Akali Chief Minister and leader of the Longowal group in the Assembly, asserted that the Chief Khalsa Diwan was ‘a pro-Government and pro-Congress(I) stooge’ ( T r ib u n e , 14 April 1981). Rather than Khalistan and separatism, the dominant Akali Dal had decided to make increased autonomy for Punjab the major Sikh issue. A series of resolutions passed at Anandpur Sahib in 1973 became reactivated so as to meet the ‘legitimate aspirations’ of the Sikhs. The Union Government’s refusal to grant these demands, the Akalis charged, ‘was itself paving the way for Khalistan’ ( T r ib u n e , 14 April 1981). The 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution became the focus of Akali demands. Originally, it surfaced after the Akali defeat in the 1972 elections. Subsequent events including the Emergency and Akali lead­ kesh d a ri

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PAUL WALLACE

454

ership of the state government resulted in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution receding to the background. Now it served as a bridge between the two major Akali Dais and provided a link to Bhindranwale. Talwandi’s dissident Akali Dal began its morcha in April 1982, Bhindranwale started his movement for the release of AISSF leader Amrik Singh in July, and Longowal led a separate nahar roko agitation to block work on the Yamuna-Sutlej link canal. All three movements allied on 4 August 1982 with the Anandpur Sahib Resolution as a joint demand and Longowal as the overall dictator’ of the combined movement. It remained the centre-piece of Sikh demands along with a variation in tactics such as the rasta roko (block road) within the larger framework of a dharam yudh (religious or righteous war). Ayesha Kagal concluded that LongowaFs alliance with the extremists ‘has successfully alienated opposition parties with whom they could share a political future* (The Times o f India, 19 December 1982). Khushwant Singh reported that the Akali purpose was to 'destabilise the Congress Government through agitation* (1984: 8-9). A reporter for an Indian business journal characterized the Akali tactic as a 'masterful stroke’ which enabled the Longowal Akali Dal ‘to forge an alliance between the religious consciousness of the Sikhs and the political and economic demands of the Jat Sikh capitalist farmers’ (Bhushan: 1983: 59). None of these conclusions are mutually exclusive. A long agitation, however, could also work to the disadvantage of LongowaFs more moderate Dal. Militant tactics, no matter how non-violent, could fuel support for the continuing extremist and violent movement led by Bhindranwale. Longowal needed meaningful concessions from New Delhi with a return to a more normal political process. Negotiations with the Union Government centred on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, but that proved difficult for several reasons. First, the October 1973 version consisted of not one, but a number of issues, ranging from Centre-State relations to secular matters pertaining to Punjab, and including concerns particular to Sikhs. Primary attention has been riveted on the state autonomy demand which would restrict central authority to defence, foreign relations, currency and general communications for all states. New Delhi viewed this in terms of separatism rather than as a negotiating stance. Other parts of the Resolution called for absorbing parts of adjoining Haryana and Rajasthan, and the enactment of an All India Gurdwara Act. At least two additional versions with the designation 'Anandpur Sahib* were subsequently set forth. A reformulated version was passed by the All India Akali Conference held at Ludhiana on 28-9 October 1978. Most importantly, the earlier demand limiting the Union Government to only four spheres changed to an endorsement of ‘the principle of State autonomy in keeping with the concept of Federalism*. The most specific part of the Resolution on this subject is the statement that ‘it has become

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

455

Political M obilization in Punjab

imperative that the Indian constitutional infrastructure should be given a real federal shape by redefining the central and state relations and rights. . . ’ (GOI, 1984: 72-3). Subsequently, Talwandi’s dissident Akali Dal’s agitation in April 1981 emphasized the separate nation dimension of the 1973 Resolution in what can be construed as a third version. Adding to the confusion, Longowal’s Akali Dal specified forty-five demands in September 1981 and a revised list of fifteen demands in October 1981. The latter included eight religious demands, and seven that were placed in a category labelled political, economic and cultural demands. Item nine returned to limiting the Centre to ‘Foreign Affairs, Defence, Currency and Communications’ (GOI, 1984: 61-5). All submis­ sions continued to fall into three broad groupings; Centre-State relations, secular Punjab issues, and Sikh specific demands. Obviously, enormous scope for bargaining and disagreement resulted from what looked like a kaleidoscope of demands. Representatives from the Akali Dal negotiated with New Delhi beginning 10 October 1981 in a series of meetings that continued through 1984. Agreement seemed to have been reached several times but ultimately collapsed. According to the Government, the Akali Dal ‘lacked the will to arrive at a settlement' as it was unable ‘to deal with the pressures of militancy which was based on unabashed communalism. . . ’ . New Delhi viewed the problem as separatism and terrorism: ‘The essence of the problem in Punjab was not the demands put forward by the Akali Dal in 1981 but the maturing of a secessionist and anti-national movement, with the active support of a small number of groups operating from abroad’ (GOI, 1984: 3). Another interpretation shared by most Sikhs and many Hindus is that the Government did not bargain in good faith, undermined possible agreements, and maintained the Punjab problem so as to further divide the Sikh community. A larger communal strategy, in which Punjab played an important, but not exclusive role, is also attributed to the Congress(I), as it prepared for national elections in December 1984. National columnist Pran Chopra wrote in 1983 that ‘there is bound to be a Hindu backlash’. Hindus, he concluded, have herded under the Congress(I) umbrella, since Mrs. Gandhi has so well cast herself now in the image of a Hindu goddess. Herding them (Hindus) in is one part of Mrs. Gandhi's motives, as it was in Jammu too; another part is to use ‘insecurity* on the border for beating her drum of 'India in danger' ( The Illustrated W eekly o f India, 11 December 1983; also see D. L. Sheth, ‘Wooing the Hindu Voter’, Indian Express M agazine , 9 December 1984. A contrary view is set forth in S u n d a y , 12 No. 10, 6-19 January, 1985).

Punjab’s difficulties as they continued into 1984 became more than a ‘problem’. Regular authority systems, both political and social, as they had functioned for over one hundred years literally broke down. Neither President's Rule as it came into effect in 1983 supported by increasing use

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

PAUL WALLACE

456

of paramilitary forces, nor Sikh or Hindu institutions could contain the growing violence. Constant changes of officials did not improve the functioning of administration or law and order efforts. They signified growing ineffectiveness. Congress(I) factionalism centring around a weak Chief Minister, Darbara Singh, and an equally ineffective Giani 21ail Singh, the Home Minister, contributed to the necessity for President's Rule. A continuing Akali-led agitation provided an umbrella for what in fact were various competing and increasingly antagonistic Sikh groups. Instead of the SGPC providing an institutional centre for the legitimization of Sikh authority, it became the locale for Sikh strife. Longowal's Akali Dal and Bhindranwale's movement, both encamped in the Golden Temple complex, began to engage in mutual killings in April and May 1984. The assassination of Surinder Singh Sodhi, Bhindranwale's chief bodyguard, was attributed to the Akali Dal (L). B hind ran wale retaliated. Moreover, Longowal's dominance in his own Akali Dal and the SGPC continued to slip. At a meeting of his party and the SGPC in May, it appeared that about a third of the SGPC members and district Akali presidents had defected to Bhindranwale (India Today, 15 May 1984). Longowal acknowledged in a letter to Home Minister P. C. Sethi in April 1984 that ‘there is mounting resentment among Sikhs . . . I am finding it difficult to hold them back in check’ (The New York Times, April 1984). Basic differences distinguished the Akali Dal from Bhindranwale's movement. Elite Jat dominance under the hegemony of successful landowners is one important dimension of the Akali Dal. Economic elements in the various Anandpur Sahib resolutions, and other demands, emphasized the interests of agriculturists seeking to maintain and enhance the gains accrued through the* green revolution. Electrical and atomic power, water, mechanization, credit facilities, support prices, and agro­ industries are demands which tend to be highest on the Akali agenda. A clear example of its orientation is contained in the 1978 Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Resolution 3 proposes that a stock exchange be established in Ludhiana. Resolution 7 points out that poor farmers cannot afford to mechanize. The recommended solution is to (abolish the excise duty on tractors’ so that ‘ordinary farmers’ may also have ‘farm machinery’ (GOI, 1984: 72, 77). Although Bhindranwale also emphasized enhancing Punjab economi­ cally and the need for additional resources, his primary concern focused on Sikh identity. Bhindranwale and the Akali leaders both shared the keshdari Guru Gobind Singh tradition. As a Sant, a religious leader, Bhindranwale had his parallel in the Akali Dal in Sant Longowal and the earlier Sant Fateh Singh. Nevertheless, under Akali leadership observance of the religious rules was increasingly lax, even in rural Punjab. Khushwant Singh recounts sitting on the platform at a gurdwara during a Bhindran­ wale polemic against clipping beards, smoking and especially drinking. Bhindranwale is reported as exclaiming that he would like to pour

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

457

Political M obilization in Punjab

kerosene on whisky-drinking Sikhs and ‘set the bloody lot ablaze*. Khushwant also reports that this statement received ‘loud acclamations* although ‘more than half the Sikhs sitting with him and ‘a sizeable proportion of the peasant audience, were hard-drinking men’ (1984: 27). Akali leaders, Sant or otherwise, also had a heritage of Hindu-Sikh co-operation which certainly became strained at times, but never fully disappeared and at times operated impressively. Bhindranwale’s fun­ damentalism threatened Hindu-Sikh linkages and even provided the impression that one of his objectives sought communal transfers of population so that Punjab would be composed not only of pure Sikhs, but in a large majority. The Sikh majority of 60.2 per cent reported in the 1971 census appeared to have declined in 1981 to 52 per cent according to some press reports (Bhushan, 1983: 67). In fact, when the long-delayed data became available in July 1985, the Sikhs had marginally increased their majority to 60.7 per cent (Table 13; Indian Express, 21 July 1985). Fundamentalism, especially coupled with violence, destabilized HinduSikh relations, increasingly hurt the economy, and held out the possibility of a new Sikh leadership. Bhindranwale didn’t threaten Jat leadership as he also came from a Jat family. But his following and the thrust of his movement suggest a marked movement away from the more successful Jat Sikh Akali leadership social base. In this respect, journalistic characterizations of Bhindranwale as Punjab’s Ayatollah Khomeini may reflect more than the purist, fun­ damentalist elements of his movement. There is another parallel. Bhindranwale mobilized some of the more marginal Sikh elements under the banner of what can be construed as religious nationalism, and perhaps separatism. Bhindranwale himself came from a poor Jat peasant family ‘so poor that often it could not buy fodder to feed their buffaloes’ (Khushwant Singh, 1984: 24). To what extent his appeal had an economic base remains to be determined. In some measure, economic marginality did seem to be important. Marginality in terms of status certainly formed a central part of his appeal as Bhindranwale provided identity, motivation, and direction. The All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) constituted a prime support group for'Bhindranwale, and continued to be a major organiza­ tional hub of the movement following his death. By the late 1970s, the AISSF, rather than the very active communist student organization, appeared to be the dominant group in Punjab institutions of higher education. Limited and perhaps declining economic opportunities provide one explanation for the political mobilization of Sikh youth. Limitations on prestigious agricultural employment, the low level of industrialization in Punjab, and the financial and legal difficulties of migration pose problems for young Sikhs. Khushwant Singh states that ‘it was the educated unemployed Sikh youth who became (sic) pliable material in the hands of Marxists or Sikh fundamentalists* (1984: 23). Particular attention should be paid to rural Sikh youth competing

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

458

PAUL WALLACE

largely unsuccessfully with urbanites in higher levels of education (Sun, 1981: 257-63). Such Sikhs are likely to be marginally educated with few prospects in rural or urban areas that correspond to cognitive views of their status or ambitions. By contrast, the weapons and motorcycles of the hit squads symbolize a new social freedom, desired lifestyle, and enhanced self-esteem. The charisma of Bhindranwale renewed pride in Sikh identity and ethnic nationalism, and provided a sense of purpose otherwise lacking. Some indication of the size of this sector as well as belated recognition of the problem is revealed in a Punjab government employment plan announced in November 1985. Shortly after returning to power in the state, the Akali Dal stated it would find jobs for 30,000 essentially Sikh youth in public and private employment—including loans for schemes such as buying mini-buses for transport purposes, presumably in rural areas (India Today, X, No. 22, 30 November 1985, 12). According to this line of analysis, marginal Sikh youth came from families with varying levels of income, low to high. The critical dimension was their self-perception with regard to status, future prospects, and what they considered to be channels for dealing with their situation. Since regular educational and occupational opportunities appeared to be inadequate or too limited, they were ripe for mobilization by an extremist movement. To the extent that this conclusion is correct, it helps explain the sanctuary provided to the terrorists in rural areas dominated by relatively prosperous Jats. Their children or relatives of kinsmen were involved. Moreover, expression of Sikh religious ethnicity, whatever one might feel about the tactics, certainly evoked sympathy and understanding, especially during the period when normal authority systems no longer functioned. Sikhs not living in Punjab should also be considered in terms of their marginality. Only in Punjab are they a religious majority. Elsewhere they are a minority. Outside of Punjab, 21.38 per cent of India's Sikh population lived as minorities according to the 1971 census. They constituted 7.16 per cent of the population in Delhi, 6.29 per cent in Haryana, 2.29 per cent in Kashmir, 1.33 per cent in Rajasthan, and 1.3 per cent in Himachal Pradesh (GOI: Census 1971, Paper 2 of 1972, 20-21). Overseas Sikhs also constitute an impressive diaspora. By 1970 Jat Sikhs were 60 per cent of the Indian immigrant population in the United Kingdom (Helwig, 1979: 2,155). Fifteen years later, in 1985, Sikhs totalled approximately 500,000 and managed more than 130 gurdwaras (India Today, X, No. 22, 30 November 1985, 29). Significant Sikh communities also exist'in Canada, the United States, West Germany, East Africa, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Politically, Punjab’s normal authority systems had ceased to function with any effectiveness by summer 1984. Police and para-military units constituted one force, while terrorists continued to operate in Punjab and adjoining areas. New Delhi, whatever its intentions, could not bring

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

459

Political M obilization in Punjab

negotiations to a successful conclusion. Massive military force, rather than conciliation, is the option it chose. Operation Bluestar mounted by the Indian military first sealed off Punjab from the rest of India beginning on 1 June 1984. Combat began at the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar on 4 June culminating with the final assault on 6 June. The number of people killed varies according to the source. It can safely be estimated that at least 1,000 people were killed including almost 100 military and about 400 pilgrims (India Today, 30 June 1984, 8-21 ff.; The New York Times, 28 July 1984; GOI, 1984: 169). Simultaneously, the army moved into forty-two other ‘religious places’ throughout Punjab ‘to flush out’ the terrorists (GOI, 1984: 50-51). Operation Bluestar, as a military operation, successfully eliminated the leading terrorists and their temple sanctuaries. Military occupation also reduced, but did not eliminate terrorist acts. But the military action did not provide a political solution. To the contrary, the possibility of a political solution appeared more remote than it did formerly since Akali leaders as well as suspected terrorists were placed in confinement. Communalism between Hindus and Sikhs flared in response to Operation Bluestar. Sikhs, including moderates, displayed a rare unanimi­ ty in condemning the military assault on the Golden Temple. Hindus tended to be equally ardent in defending the necessity of the action. The polarization is captured in a statement by a national journalist who also happens to be a Punjab Hindu: ‘Punjab’s tragedy is that there are no Punjabis any more in Punjab—only Sikhs and Hindus* (Nayar and Singh, 1984: 7). More violence followed. Terrorists’ retaliation struck at the centre of India’s political system when two of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards assassinated her in New Delhi on 31 October 1984. Communal retaliation resulted in af least 3,000 Sikhs killed by 4 November when the military succeeded in restoring order. Half or more of the killings occurred in New Delhi (The New York Timesy 5 November 1984; 17 March 1985), in actions in which the police and some Congress(I) politicians are alleged to have been involved (Who Are The Guilty?, 1984: 1-26; The New York Times, 5 November 1984). Sikh insecurity as a consequence of the riots led to an outpouring of about 50,000 Sikhs from other areas to Punjab (The Times o f India, 23 December 1984). Refugee camps in Delhi were established for about 2,000 Sikhs whose homes were destroyed or who didn’t feel safe (The Indian Express, 11 January 1985). Punjab’s SGPC established a large relief fund and assisted with resettlement. Popular response to the refugee needs in Punjab were of such a magnitude that by January relief camps were described as ‘bursting with provisions and clothing’ (Tribune, 11 January 1985). After Operation Bluestar and Bhindranwale’s death Punjab continued to reel from intensified communal identities seemingly held in check by

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

460

PAUL WALLACE

military occupation. National elections in December 1984, from one perspective, could be seen as further widening the communal divide. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother, consistently empha­ sized the theme of the unity and integrity of India during the election campaign. To many, these were code words for the Sikh secessionist threat in Punjab. National opposition parties were criticized as having been sympathetic to Akali Dai demands. The alleged Sikh threat also received dramatic visual presentation in an omnipresent election poster of Mrs Gandhi delivering a speech in which she stated: "Whenever 1 will die, every drop of my blood will make India strong, and will keep alive a united India.* Yet, at the same time, the elections were followed by new initiatives in finding a solution to the Punjab problem. Rajiv Gandhi's Congress(I) won four-fifths of the parliamentary seats decided in December, 401 out of 508. His style following the elections reflected a sense of confidence and purpose. Bhabani Sen Gupta compared him favourably with his mother in commenting that "Rajiv Gandhi has suddenly changed the political climate of India from one of confrontation to conciliation* (India Today, X, No. 2, 31 January 1985 , 59). Punjab was one of two states which did not participate in the elections. Nonetheless, the impact also began to be felt there as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his first nation-wide address after the elections, established solving the Punjab problem as his number one priority, and engaged in semi-secret dialogues with various Sikh groups. Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal and seven other Akali leaders were released from internment on 11 March. In another conciliatory gesture two weeks later the Prime Minister toured Punjab and announced an economic package which included an integral railway coach factory, the first major heavy industry for the state (The New York Times, 24 March 1985; The Christian Science Monitor, 1 April 1985). Other actions in response to strong Sikh feelings quickly followed. Three major Sikh demands were conceded by New Delhi when it announced on 11 April that it would establish a judicial inquiry headed by Justice Ranganath Misra into the allegations of organized violence following Mrs Gandhi’s assassination. At the same time, the Government lifted the ban on the All India Sikh Students Federation, and released a number of interned Sikhs (The New York Times, 12 April 1985). These steps, plus a continuing dialogue conducted largely through the auspices of Punjab Governor Arjun Singh, resulted in a negotiated agreement that had eluded Punjab for over three years. The Punjab problem was replaced by the Rajiv-Longowal Accord read out to cheering members of both houses of Parliament on 24 July 1985 (The Times o f India, 25 July 1985). Key components included: — referral of the portions of the Anandpur Sahib resolution relating to

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

461

Political M obilization in Punjab

Centre-State relations to the Commission headed by retired Supreme Court Justice R. S. Sarkaria which had been appointed in March 1983; transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab with a commission to determine which areas of Punjab should go to Haryana as compensation; rehabilitation p i Sikhs who deserted the army following Operation Bluestar by providing them employment, and recruitment to the military on the basis of merit; compensation to innocent persons killed during the Punjab agitation; extension of the jurisdiction of the Misra judicial inquiry into the Delhi riots following Mrs Gandhi's assassination to include Bokaro and Kanpur; referral of Punjab and Haryana's claim in regard to the Ravi-Beas river system to a tribunal for adjudication; and promotion of the Punjabi language by the central government.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali Dal leader Sant Longowal each provided optimistic interpretations of the agreement. Rajiv gave a new twist to his election slogan in viewing the Accord as enabling ‘the beginning of a new phase of working together to build. . . unity and integrity*. Longowal declared: ‘The period of confrontation is over. The morcha stands automatically withdrawn* (The Times o f India, 25 July 1985, 12). Enhanced legitimacy accrued to Longowal and his majority Akali Dal as a consequence of the Accord and the continuing support of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Acclaim for the Accord came from most of India, and from most sections of Punjab as well as overseas. But as could be anticipated, opposition appeared in neighbouring Haryana and Rajasthan states over provisions that related to their interests (The Times o f India, 28 July 1985). More significantly, a faction of the AISSF allied to the extremist United Akali Dal rejected the Accord. Two days later, in a scene reminiscent of the Bhindranwale period, AISSF activists shouted slogans such as Longowal is a ‘traitor to the panth* in front of the Akali Dal(L) office at the Golden Temple complex. A violent clash with the Akali youth wing narrowly was averted (The Times o f India, 26 and 28 July 1985). Limited terrorist actions and continuing extremist positions by the United Akali Dal under the titular leadership of Bhindranwale*s father, Baba Joginder Singh, provided an ongoing challenge to LongowaPs Akali Dal. Then Longowal was assassinated on 24 August, immediately raising fears of the revitalization of the Punjab problem. A successor to Sant Longowal did not seem to be immediately apparent as major Akali leaders had been establishing their own positions in a somewhat factious mode underneath the Longowal umbrella. It seemed possible that renewed militancy would be stimulated in the ensuing competition. Nevertheless, the transition to former lawyer and Union Minister of Agriculture in the Janata Government, Surjit Singh Bamala, occurred smoothly. Instead of the terrorist action against Longowal destabilizing the Akali Dal Punjab, it fortified the climate for normal, non-violent political processes. Extremist support clearly waned as a sympathy wave coupled

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

462

PAUL WALLACE

with the popularity of the Accord swept the Akali Dal into political power in elections held on 25 September. The role of the Prime Minister also contrasted sharply with the earlier period. Instead of undermining the Akali Dal and engaging in confronta­ tion, Rajiv Gandhi obviously assisted it even though he and his party campaigned vigorously. T don't care which party wins the election. Let India win and all will be gainers,' is an example of one of his many supporting statements (Bhabani Sen Gupta, India West, 20 August 1985). Veteran British election specialist David Butler flew from England because, as he explained, this is 4the only election I have known where the ruling party has been so eager to lose' (India Today, X, No. 19,15 October 1985, 25). The singularly most important election statistic was the voter turnout of 66.5 per cent of eligible voters, higher than the high rates of the preceeding 1980 and 1977 elections. A boycott of the elections called by the United Akali Dal and the AISSF, amid terrorist threats, failed. The Akali Dal, for the first time, reached its goal of political dominance over Punjab. It won an absolute majority in the Assembly, although its vote percentage of 38.6 per cent was only a bit higher than that of the Congress at 37.9 per cent (Table 14). Its control over the SGPC, however, established its sway both over the secular political system of Punjab and the Sikh temple management system. Clearly, the situation was extraordin­ ary, more like a scenario written in Bombay or Hollywood than in Chandigarh and New Delhi. Equally, if not more important, a moderate accommodative party had been refashioned by Longowal and Bamala. Appeals to communal harmony were given substance with the election of three Hindus and one Muslim on the Akali Dal ticket. Bamala's greatest strengths were described as 'moderation, sobriety and the ability to win people over with his quiet charm and diffident smile* (India Today, 15 October 1985). After assuming the Chief Ministership, he outmanoeuvred the AISSF and contained the always restless Akali political barons such as SGPC President Gurcharan Singh Tohra and former Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal. Yet, maintaining this accommodative style of political leadership became more and more difficult. Akali factionalism did not dissipate, even though the present generation of leadership almost all came from the Malwa region of Punjab and were Jat Sikhs (Bhushan, 1983: 50-51). Moreover, terrorism soon regained its momentum. By April 1986, extremists had once again occupied the Golden Temple and used the sanctuary to proclaim the formation of Khalistan. After Chief Minister Bamala sent in the police to arrest the militants, one-third of the Akali legislators, led by former Chief Minister Badal, resigned from the party in protest, leaving the Akali Dal(L) dependent for survival on Congress(I) support.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

463

Political M obilization in Punjab

Meanwhile, terrorist killings increased. During the fifteen months after the Akali Dal took power, some 500-700 persons were killed in the Punjab. In December 1986, Bamala’s government felt compelled to permit the military to take up the war on terrorism in eight districts. Even this proved ineffective in preventing the extremists from getting their candi­ dates installed among the five Sikh head priests, including the Akal Takht in the Golden Temple; or inhibiting the head priests from excommunicat­ ing Chief Minister Bamala after he refused their directive to resign from office. In May 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi suddenly imposed President’s Rule in the state. This was followed by dissolution of the Punjab Assembly, and in March 1988, by the Fifty-ninth Constitutional Amendment which made it possible to suspend Fundamental Rights by declaring a state of emergency in Punjab. Operation Black Thunder culminated the government’s hard line in May 1988. Terrorists and other militants were cleared from the Golden Temple complex in a ten day surgical military action led by the Black Cat commandos of the National Security Guards and involving 3,000 para­ military personnel. In contrast to previous actions, the operation took place under full public scrutiny using a minimum of force. No tanks rolled over the parikrama. Over 100 journalists and television personnel provided live coverage. This enhanced the government’s credibility, especially in its efforts to ‘preserve the sanctity of the temple’. Moreover, most Sikhs didn’t react negatively as in the past due to the combination of military restraint, and the evidence which quickly mounted of temple desecration by the extremists including torture and murder (India Today, 15 June 1988, 5, 36-43. Editorial, Indian Express, 20 May 1988). Although some Akalis called President’s Rule the ‘second murder of Longowal’ (India Today, 31 May 1987), the Rajiv-Longowal Accord appears to have been the casualty of communal politics that crosspressured the Prime Minister as he tried to conciliate the Sikhs without alienating their Hindu neighbours in Haryana. Political considerations in other parts of India and abroad also contributed to the long gaps between centra] government actions as well as the sudden bursts of decision making. Paradoxically, however, only a political solution held out the prospect of undermining the extremists’ appeal in Punjab, especially after the support for Khalistan appeared to recede following the revelations attendant from Operation Black Thunder in May 1988. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi somewhat belatedly took a step in this direction through a new Punjab package announced in the Lok Sabha on 3 March 1989. Release of the 188 detainees held in the Jodhpur jail since the 1984 Operation Bluestar operation captured the headlines. A cautious move toward resuming the political process centred on the announced plan to conduct panchayat elections beginning in May and extending through mid-1989. Equally important was the stated intention to return the

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

464

PAUL WALLACE

functioning of the police to a ‘normal’ status within the context of resuming civil liberties. For example, special provisions of the National Security Act applicable to Punjab were withdrawn, and TADA (the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act) and other special measures were to be restricted to the seriously disturbed areas in the western border districts ( The Hindustan Times and The Times o f India, 4 March 1989). Former Chief Minister Surjit Singh Bamala praised the initiative as ‘better late than never’ while emphasizing, along with other moderates, the need to follow up with ‘bold political initiatives’ (The Times o f India, 4 March 1989). Pessimism, however, continued to reign at the Indian Express. In an editorial, it noted that as ‘terrorism continues unabated in Punjab,’ the new measures ‘may mark no more that yet another one of the Government’s oscillations between a hard and a soft line.’ Part of the motivation for withdrawing cases against persons charged for their speeches or writings, the editorial suggests, may be ‘the inability to enforce the laws’ (6 March 1989). Achieving Khalistan may no longer be a serious consideration for groups other than the Babbar Khalsa. Nonetheless, some elements of the Khalistan movement, such as charges of discrimination against Sikhs, continue to serve to replenish the terrorist ranks. Religion and ethnicity remain as mobilizing forces. In addition, terrorist groups also have financial motives to continue, including extortion, robbery and dealing in drugs, weapons and other contraband. Military force has proved insuffi­ cient in itself to do more than contain the daily killings at a level where it now appears almost acceptable to the larger society in India, and to a lesser extent in Punjab. But, in the most effected districts and in the occasional bursts of violence elsewhere normalcy is shattered. Reestablishment of a full political process and through it political order is necessary. Accommodation remains essential to a workable political process within Punjab and achieving political dominance within it. No one group is sufficiently large, no issue so encompassing, no sub-region so significant to provide the necessary support base. Competition, factionalism and conflict have been endemic within all the Punjabs and certainly have not been stifled during broad-scale accommodation periods. Nonetheless, sensitivity to and accommodating diversity does tend to moderate particularistic demands and communal ism. This is as true for the Congress party as it is for the Akali Dal. Former Home Minister Captain Kanwaljit Singh stated in February 1989 that the Akali Dal(L) would move in this direction by opening its membership to non-Sikhs. Political observers in Punjab suggest the effect would be to weaken the importance of ‘gurdwara based politics’ while developing a more state-wide representation (The Times o f India, 20 February 1989). An even more urgent priority for the feuding Akalis is mutual accommodation by its leaders so as to reconstitute a viable entity out of the several splinter separate parties.

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

465

Political M obilization in Punjab

In contrast to accommodation, an irredentist strategy seeks to establish dominance on a narrow, uncompromising base. Positively, it emphasizes the purity and sanctity of the ethnic community, while negatively it declaims that the community is in danger. Harjot Singh Oberoi terms this ‘the millenrian model’ and cites Ram Singh, leader of the Namdhari movement of the 1860s, as well as the more contemporary Sant Jamail Singh Bhindranwale as the ‘messianic leader’ who emerges in this framework (1983: 46-8). Communal disorders in the late 1920s, the events leading to and arising out of Partition, and the Punjab problem in the 1980s reflect the failure of all groups involved, and particularly their leaders, to more effectively maintain and further develop consociational linkages (Lijphart, 1968). Dominance patterns in any state also involve relations with the Centre. Punjab’s proximity to New Delhi has involved it in almost constant interac­ tions with central party and government leaders. Pre-Independence Punjab Congress bi-factionalism extending into the post-Independence period re­ lated to differing support bases at the national level as led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel. Punjabis in the central cabinet such as Swaran Singh and, more recently, Giani Zail Singh and Buta Singh, continued to be involved at the state level. Centre-State relations as regards resource allocations and the entire gamut of governmental Centre-State interactions are similar in most respects to the concerns evidenced in other states. Virtually every state lobbies strongly for additional resources, as does Punjab. In Punjab’s case, it stresses that its financial flow to the Centre meets with an inadequate return. An oft-dted figure in Punjab is that 80 per cent of the bank deposits by Punjabis are invested outside the state. Economic neglect or discrimina­ tion by the Centre also is part of the charge that of ‘over Rs 20,000 crores spent on the public sector industries, less than 2 per cent have been in­ vested in Punjab’ (Council of Sikh Affairs, c. 1983a: 29). Territorial changes also continue to directly involve the Centre. Partition in 1947 and trifurcation in 1966 fundamentally altered the physical and human geography of Punjab. Territorial and development issues involve interstate differences over territory with Haryana, and water and electrical power resources with Haryana, Rajasthan and Delhi. All of these concerns, whether they be differences over political personalities, the sanctioning of a new party leader, or the resources of the state, result in steady two-way traffic by state and central leaders with implications for the federal system. Economic Ramifications ‘Why are Punjabis such good agriculturists?’ is a question which outsiders often pose and to which the state's inhabitants take great delight in answering authoritatively. Responses include a litany ranging from the ‘sturdy Jat peasant’ to various theories about the weather. More

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

466

PAUL WALLACE

sophisticated explanations are available, but underlying all of them is a remarkable record of long-term agricultural progress. (For an essentially negative account of the British period by a rural Punjab Communist leader, which nonetheless concedes the surplus production and Punjab's relatively superior position in India, see Master Hari Singh, 1983). Partition, according to M. S. Randhawa (Director General of Rural Rehabilitation in Punjab from 1949), split the granary of India unequally. Pakistan received 55 per cent of the population, 65 per cent of the area and perhaps most importantly, about 70 per cent of the canal irrigation and income of the undivided province (1955: 8). A massive transfer of populations involved 4.2 million refugees fleeing to the east and 4.3 million to Punjab in India. Out o f the Ashes is an appropriate title for Randhawa’s account of the resettlement and initial successful efforts at revitalizing Punjab's economy. Refugees from rural, canal irrigated areas as well as from the urban areas brought a higher set of standards and vitality which contributed significantly to the development environment (Randhawa, 1955: 218-23; Nair, 1961: 102-15). Lucian Pye, in an introduction to probably the best study on the psychological impact of Punjab refugees provides a useful generalization: In the end the refugee seems to come out of his experience a more aggressive person. In some others it leads to economic and political risk-taking, a willingness to take the chances necessary to get ahead in life (Keller, 1975: xii).

Aggressiveness and risk-taking, notable characteristics of Punjabis, may have been enhanced by Partition. Punjab had already returned to its role as India's most successful agricutural state before the adoption in 1965-6 of the new high-yielding varieties associated with the green revolution. Notable infrastructural developments, in addition to the human dimension, which provided readiness for this next generation of agricultural change included effective land consolidation, canal and tube well irrigation, power from the massive Bhakra-Nangal Dam, and a new, effective agricultural university in Ludhiana. In brief, Punjab, it can be argued, already employed a green revolution strategy before 1965-6, and thus benefited even more rapidly and fully from new technological advances. Haryana, which became a separate state with the trifurcation of Punjab in 1966, also shares in the agricultural success. A variety of data is available to document Punjab's agricultural success. One highlight is that Punjab in 1980-1, occupying 1.6 per cent of the area of the country and with only 16.7 million people (1981 census), provided 73 per cent of the India-wide procurement of wheat, and 48 per cent of rice (Mehra, 1983: 128). Its production per acre of wheat is second only to Mexico, and of rice is surpassed only by Japan (Table 15). Marked production increases in cotton, potatoes and sugar-cane also have taken place (M. S. Gill, 1983: 832-4).

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Political M obilization in Punjab

467

T able 15 P u n ja b 's G re e n R e v o lu tio n in W h e a t a n d R ic e W heat in Million Metric Tons: 73 per cent of India-wide procurement in 1980-1981 1965-66 1.9 1966-67 2.5 1971-72 5.6 5.4 1973 1974 5.2 1975 5.3 1976 5.8 1979 7.4 1980 7.9 Rice in Metric Tons: 48 per cent of India-wide procurement in 1980-1981 290,000 1966 1970-71 680,000 1972 920,000 1976 1.45 million 1980 3.06 million Wheat and Rice Yield Comparisons with O ther Countries. 1980 Wheat (metric tons per acre) Mexico 3.76 (only country surpassing Punjab) Punjab 2.9 U S. 2.0 Canada 1.8 1.4 S.U. Pakistan 1.4 Rice (unhusked paddy , metric tons per acre) Japan 6.2 (only country surpassing Punjab) 4.4 Punjab China 3.3 SOURCE: Data from M.S. Gill: 1983 and S.P. Mchra, 1983.

Table 16 graphically portrays the state’s leading position in food grain production in comparison with other major states in India; the per capita average for Punjab for the three year period 1979-80 to 1981-2 was 746 kilograms in comparison with Haryana’s second ranking 443, and Madhya Pradesh’s third place with 209. Table 17, for the same time period, established Punjab’s leading position in per capita rural income with Rs 1,627. Haryana is second with Rs 1,270 and Rajasthan is third with Rs 745. A number of additional categories in which Punjab leads India are provided in Table 18, and some additional information pertaining only to Punjab in Table 19. State government support to agricultural production has been consis­ tent. During the British period, new canal colonies were established, the Land Alienation Act of 1900 passed, and an agricultural university

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

468

PAUL WALLACE

T able 16 Per Capita Foodgrains Production (kg.) Average o f1979-80 to 1981-82

»*■ * « "» "* M. P.

< * ■ -

U. P.

vzzzzmzzzzzzzzzm

»

VZZZZ2ZZZZZA “3 UZZZ& 209

YZZZZft

”

v ///4 m

A p

193

Rajasthan ^ Karnataka

»

/////

185

vm j

179

Maharashtra / / / / A TamUNadu \ / / / A Gujarat / / / A West Bengal

163 141

181 ALL-INDIA

133 133

B ih « ^

2

122

V//A™' Kerala E 3 s *

!

SOURCE: Economic Intelligence Service: September 1983, 8.1.

established in Lyallpur, now in Punjab, Pakistan. For two decades before Independence, the rural and Jat dominated Unionist Party comprised the ruling political party. Jats were an important, probably crucial element of Congress party rule as it became institutionalized under Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon from approximately 1951 to the latter part of 1964. A Jat from Amritsar district, he ruled as the 'strong man* of Punjab politics. From the mid-1960s, Congress rule has alternated with coalition govern­ ments led by the Jat-dominated Akali Dal along with periods of Presidential Rule. In brief, the rural, landed farmers symbolized and represented by the numerous Jats have composed the substructure of societal and, most often, political power in a consistent pattern. The superstructure has included

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

469

Political M obilization in Punjab T a b l e 17

Per Capita (Rural) Incomes from Agriculture: Average o f 1976-77 to 1978-79 Per capita Rural Gross State income Per capita Per (rural) gross hectare (rural popu­ cropped from lation area (lakh agriculture cropped area value of income (lakhs) hectares) (Rs crores) (hectares) output (Rs) (4X5) (2+1) (Rs) (3+2)

V)

(2)

(■?)

116 95 255 223 390

66.3 55.2 175.0 103.9 198.6

1,714 1.209 1,889 1,593 2,510

Karnataka West Bengal Kerala Orissa Andhra Pradesh

251 384 199 223 393

111.3 78.8 28.9 82.8 131.2

Madhya Pradesh U ttar Pradesh Assam Tamil Nadu Bihar

398 869 168 314 585

O ther States Tripura Meghalaya Jammu & Kashmir Manipur

M ajor States Punjab Haryana Rajasthan Gujarat M aharashtra

Himachal Pradesh Nagaland Sikkim All-India

(5)

(