Documents on the Genocide Convention from the American, British, and Russian Archives: The Politics of International Humanitarian Law, 1933–1948 9781474279864, 9781474279895, 9781474279888

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Documents on the Genocide Convention from the American, British, and Russian Archives

Also available from Bloomsbury The Holocaust in Eastern Europe, by Waitman Wade Beorn Nazi Law, edited by John J. Michalczyk The United States and the Nazi Holocaust, by Barry Trachtenberg

Documents on the Genocide Convention from the American, British, and Russian Archives The Politics of International Humanitarian Law, 1933–1948 Volume I

Edited by Anton Weiss-Wendt

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2019 Copyright © Anton Weiss-Wendt, 2019 Anton Weiss-Wendt has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editor of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. xxviii constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design by Adriana Brioso Cover image: Arrival of Russian delegates to the United Nations, October 1946. (© Bettmann/Getty Images) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-7986-4  ePDF: 978-1-4742-7988-8 eBook: 978-1-4742-7987-1 Pack: 978-1-4742-7979-6 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

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Contents Document List Acknowledgments List of Acronyms and Abbreviations List of Archival Collections

vii xxviii xxix xxxiv

Introduction 1 DOCUMENTS 1–169 I Genocide: From a Concept to a United Nations Resolution, 1933–46 (nos. 1–12)11 II The United Nations Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, 1947 (nos. 13–42) III

IV

Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, January–August 1948 (nos. 43–80) Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, September–December 1948 (nos. 81–113)

35

79

167

V Lobbying on behalf of the Genocide Convention, 1947–48 (nos. 114–169)

217

United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: The Three Drafts, 1947–48

299

Further Reading List of Persons Index

313 315 325

vi

Document List DOCUMENTS 1–169

I  Genocide: From a Concept to a United Nations Resolution, 1933–46 (nos. 1–12) No. 1 Raphael Lemkin Outlines the Concept of International Crimes of Barbarism and Vandalism, November 1933 13 No. 2 A Polish Right-Wing Newspaper Slams Lemkin for His Newly Proposed International Crimes of Barbarism and Vandalism, October 25, 1933 16 No. 3 Raphael Lemkin Informs Robert H. Jackson, US Supreme Court Associate Justice, of the Concept of Genocide and the Book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, May 4, 1945 17 No. 4 Robert H. Jackson Tells Raphael Lemkin He Had Read and Appreciated the Latter’s Book and the Article on Genocide, May 16, 1945 18 No. 5 James B. Donovan, Assistant to the Chief US Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Critical of Raphael Lemkin’s Performance at London, September 24, 1945 18 No. 6 Lemkin’s Memorandum for Telford Taylor, Assistant to the Chief US Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, on Criminal Conspiracy, September 28, 1945 19

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No. 7 Raphael Lemkin Considered as Potential Witness at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, His Book Regarded as Prime Source on Genocide, October 11, 1945 20 No. 8 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Eleanor Roosevelt’s Support for His Idea of an International Genocide Treaty, Refers to His Earlier Communication to President Roosevelt, May 18, 1946 23 No. 9 The United Nations Department of Public Information Acknowledges the Receipt of Raphael Lemkin’s Proposal concerning the Crime of Genocide, May 23, 1946 26 No. 10 Legal Observers of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg Jointly Seek to Expand the Count of Genocide in the Indictment, June 25, 1946 26 No. 11 The Soviet Foreign Ministry Outlines an Agenda on Codification of International Law, November 6, 1946 27 No. 12 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Informs about the Draft Resolution Proclaiming Genocide an International Crime, November 23, 1946 32

II  The United Nations Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, 1947 (nos. 13–42) No. 13 British Foreign Office Officials Report on the UN Deliberations concerning the Crime of Genocide, Consider Unnecessary Drafting a Separate Convention, February 24 and 26, 1947 37 No. 14 Conversation between Lemkin and Carl Marcy of the US State Department concerning the US Position on the UN Resolution on Genocide, February 25, 1947 39



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No. 15 The British Foreign Office Prefers the UN Secretariat to Draw a Draft Genocide Convention, March 7, 1947 40 No. 16 The UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations Reports on Divergent Procedure for Drafting a Genocide Convention as Proposed by National Delegations, March 16, 1947 41 No. 17 The British Foreign Office Prefers Delayed Action on Genocide in the United Nations, March 17, 1947 42 No. 18 Raphael Lemkin Not Allowed to Participate in Formal Discussions On Genocide in the ECOSOC, April 4, 1947 43 No. 19 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov Briefed on Soviet Legislation pertaining to the Crime of Genocide, April 5, 1947 43 No. 20 Raphael Lemkin Thanks UN Secretary General Trygve Lie for His Assistance in Passing the UN Resolution That Proclaimed Genocide a Crime under International Law, May 6, 1947 44 No. 21 The UN Secretariat Seeks Names of Legal Experts Who Could Help Draw up a Genocide Convention, May 13, 1947 45 No. 22 Raphael Lemkin Invited to Serve as an Expert of International and Criminal Law in Drawing up a UN Draft Genocide Convention, May 13, 1947 46 No. 23 UK Representative, Professor James L. Brierly, Reports on the First Meeting of the UN Committee of Legal Experts, Eager to Dispose of the Idea of an International Criminal Court, May 15, 1947 47

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No. 24 James Brierly Compares and Contrasts the British, American, and Soviet Outlook on Codification of International Law, as Transpires from the Work of the UN Committee of Legal Experts, May 27, 1947 48 No. 25 The British Foreign Office Welcomes the Decision to Delegate the Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles to the Newly Established International Law Commission, June 5, 1947 50 No. 26 Philip Jessup, US Representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts, Speculates about Further Soviet Moves on the UN Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, June 7, 1947 51 No. 27 US Representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts Reports on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, Cites Personal Differences between Raphael Lemkin, Vespasian Pella, and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres (excerpt), June 19, 1947 52 No. 28 James Brierly Concerned over Political Undercurrents in the Proposed International Law Commission, Critical of Soviet Obstructionism, July 7, 1947 54 No. 29 UN Secretary General Invites the Government of India to Comment on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, July 7, 1947 57 No. 30 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Support of Hartley W. Shawcross, Attorney General for England and Wales, in Passing the Genocide Convention, July 8, 1947 58 No. 31 Eric Beckett of the British Foreign Office Concurs with Professor Brierly’s Pessimistic View on the Codification of International Law, Criticizes the Soviet Postulate of International Law, July 7, 1947 60



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No. 32 Attorney General for England and Wales Hartley W. Shawcross Prefer Disposing of the Question of Genocide as a Declaratory Resolution, Dismissive of Raphael Lemkin, July 21, 1947 62 No. 33 Con D. W. O’Neill of the British Foreign Office Considers the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention a Political Document, Regrets UK’s Commitment, July 29, 1947 63 No. 34 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Raises an Issue of Possible Execution of British Soldiers in Palestine in the context of the Ongoing Debate on Genocide, July 30, 1947 66 No. 35 Gerald Fitzmaurice of the British Foreign Office Concurs with the Opinion That the Genocide Convention is a Political Document, Suggests Submitting No Formal Comments on the Secretariat Draft, August 11, 1947 67 No. 36 The United States Favors a Speedy Passage of the Genocide Convention during the Present Session of the UN General Assembly, August 27, 1947 69 No. 37 US State Department Officials Confidentially Discuss the Contested Issues in the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, September 4, 1947 70 No. 38 Ernest Gross and Dean Rusk Prepare US Commentary on the Secretary Draft Genocide Convention, September 10, 1947 72 No. 39 The British Commonwealth Relations Office Criticizes the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, Informs of the Guidelines Issued for the UK Delegation to the United Nations, October 6, 1947 74

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No. 40 Raphael Lemkin Argues That Genocide Does Not Come under Crimes against Humanity and/or the Nuremberg Principles, November 9, 1947 75 No. 41 The US Delegation to the United Nations Instructed to Vote against the Soviet Resolution That Questions the Need for a Separate Convention on Genocide, November 20, 1947 76 No. 42 Lithuanian Émigrés in the United States Appeal to the United Nations to Indict the Soviet Union for Genocide, November 22, 1947 77

III  Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, January–August 1948 (nos. 43–80) No. 43 The UK Delegation to the ECOSOC Receives Instructions to Consider Genocide under the Heading of Crimes against Humanity, Emphasizes the Significance of the Nuremberg Judgment, January 7, 1948 81 No. 44 The British Foreign Office Prefers the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal to the Genocide Convention, January 19, 1948 86 No. 45 Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammed Zafrullah Khan Alerts President of the ECOSOC Charles Malik to the Charge of Genocide That His Country Brought against India in the Security Council, February 4, 1948 87 No. 46 Representative of India to the United Nations Rejects the Claim of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan That Genocide Was Committed against Muslims in India, Blames the Muslim League for Inciting Intercommunal Violence, February 6, 1948 88 No. 47 Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammed Zafrullah Khan Rejects the Claim of the World Jewish Congress That Genocide Was Committed against Jews in Peshawar, February 12, 1948 90



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No. 48 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Notifies the Foreign Office It Has No Choice but to Support the Establishment of a Future Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, February 14, 1948 91 No. 49 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Informs the Foreign Office about the Debates on Genocide in the ECOSOC, February 16, 1948 93 No. 50 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Summarizes the Debates in the ECOSOC concerning the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, February 21, 1948 95 No. 51 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Abstains from a Vote in the ECOSOC Establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, March 8, 1948 96 No. 52 UN Secretary General Informs the UK Government of the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide and Requests Comments on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, March 18, 1948 97 No. 53 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov Edits Draft Directive to the Soviet Delegate on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, March 25, 1948 98 No. 54 John Maktos Appointed as US Representative on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, March 30, 1948 101 No. 55 The United Kingdom Will Not Comment on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, April 2, 1948 101 No. 56 The US State Department Works out a Position on Genocide Convention prior to the Debates in the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, April 2, 1948 102

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No. 57 John Maktos of the US State Department Reflects on His Nomination as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide back in 1948, May 28, 1973 104 No. 58 Vyacheslav Molotov Forwards to Joseph Stalin a Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Report on the UN Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, April 4, 1948 107 No. 59 Joseph Stalin Edits Basic Provisions of the Genocide Convention Drafted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, April 4, 1948 109 No. 60 The Soviet Delegate on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Receives Instructions from the Foreign Ministry, April 4, 1948 111 No. 61 Aron Trainin Advances a Soviet Perspective on the Draft Genocide Convention in a Newspaper Article, April 4, 1948 112 No. 62 The US State Department Instructs John Maktos, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, How to Proceed, April 13, 1948 117 No. 63 Durwald Sandifer Reports on the Status of Debates in the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide with reference to the State Department’s Instructions, April 14, 1948 119 No. 64 The US State Department Cites Lynching as One of the Reasons It May Reconsider Its Position on the “Complicity” Element of the Genocide Convention, April 20, 1948 121 No. 65 The Delegation of Cuba to the United Nations Wants No Reference to the Nuremberg Judgment in the Draft Genocide Convention [April 29, 1948] 122



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No. 66 The Delegation of Panama to the United Nations Wants No Reference to the Nuremberg Judgment in the Draft Genocide Convention [April 29, 1948] 123 No. 67 The UK Delegate Supports the Idea of Incorporating the Problem of Narcotics in the Genocide Convention, May 13, 1948 124 No. 68 The US State Department Recommends against Referring the Draft Genocide Convention to the Commission on Human Rights in order to Avert Undesirable Modifications, June 3, 1948 125 No. 69 Excerpts from the Interoffice Discussion regarding British Position on the Draft Genocide Convention, June 10–29 [July 2], 1948 126 No. 70 British Commonwealth Relations Office Officials Believe the Governments of India and Pakistan are Unlikely to Object to the Draft Genocide Convention despite Intercommunal Violence in Punjab, June 18 and 21, 1948 134 No. 71 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Bewildered by the Human Rights Commission’s Statement on the Draft Genocide Convention, June 21, 1948 135 No. 72 The British Foreign Office Prepares Guidelines for the UK Representative on the Human Rights Commission, States the UK’s Apprehensions about the Draft Genocide Convention Proved Justified, June 21, 1948 136 No. 73 Confidential Report of John Maktos, US Representative on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, June 24, 1948 138 No. 74 Bernard R. Curson of the British Commonwealth Relations Office Doubts the Genocide Convention is of Value, June 24, 1948 155

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No. 75 Arthur N. Galsworthy of the British Colonial Office Mentions the Colonial Application Clause as the Precondition for Signing the Genocide Convention by the United Kingdom, July 6, 1948 156 No. 76 The British Cabinet Identifies Cultural Genocide and a Colonial Application Clause as Two Major Sticking Points in relation to the Genocide Convention, July 12, 1948 157 No. 77 The British Foreign Office Comments on Specific Provisions of the Draft Genocide Convention, July 20 1948 159 No. 78 The British Cabinet Doubts Forcible Administration of Narcotics Belongs under Genocide, July 23, 1948 160 No. 79 A US State Department’s Position Paper on the Draft Genocide Convention, August 25, 1948 161 No. 80 The UK Delegation Summarizes the Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the ECOSOC, September 2, 1948 165

IV  Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, September–December 1948 (nos. 81–113) No. 81 The British Foreign Office Proposes Gerald Fitzmaurice as Negotiator in Further Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention, September 15, 1948 169 No. 82 Summary of Opinions on Most Contentious Issues in the Draft Genocide Convention as Expressed by National Delegations in the ECOSOC (incomplete), September 17, 1948 170



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No. 83 The British Foreign Office Requests Legal Opinion of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions on the Draft Genocide Convention, September 27, 1948 172 No. 84 Director of Public Prosecutions Considers Acts Enumerated in Article II of the Draft Genocide Convention as Punishable under the British Criminal Law, September 30, 1948 173 No. 85 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Informs the Foreign Office about the Status of Debates on the Genocide Convention, October 5, 1948 173 No. 86 The British Foreign Office Alerts Gerald Fitzmaurice to the Problem of Political Groups in the Wording of the Draft Genocide Convention, October 16, 1948 175 No. 87 Gerald Fitzmaurice Considers Genocide a Political Crime in reply to Vincent Evans of the British Foreign Office, October 18, 1948 175 No. 88 The British Foreign Office’s Working Party on Genocide Reviews Specific Articles of the Draft Genocide Convention, TPQ October 22, 1948 178 No. 89 David Hildyard of the Foreign Office Discusses with T. Hutson of the Home Office How the UK Delegation Should Proceed on the Genocide Convention, October 27, 1948 180 No. 90 Ernest Gross of the US State Department Believes the Soviet Union Will Continue Sabotaging the Genocide Convention, October 28, 1948 181 No. 91 The British Home Office Believes the UK Delegation to the United Nations Overcommitted Itself on the Genocide Issue, October 29, 1948 182

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No. 92 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Responds to the Criticism of the Home Office concerning Its Handling of the Issue of Genocide at Paris, November 8, 1948 183 No. 93 Ernest Gross Solicits a Legal Opinion of the US Department of Justice regarding a Soviet Amendment to the Draft Genocide Convention, November 8, 1948 186 No. 94 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Sees a Slow Progress on the Genocide Convention in the Sixth Committee, November 9, 1948 186 No. 95 Paul Mason of the Foreign Office Alleviates the Home Office’s Concerns about the UK Delegation’s Handling of the Issue of Genocide at Paris, November 22, 1948 187 No. 96 Vyacheslav Molotov Requests Stalin’s Approval of the Draft Directive for the Soviet Delegation in the UN General Assembly, November 24, 1948 189 No. 97 The Soviet Foreign Ministry Urges the Soviet Delegation in the UN General Assembly to Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, regardless of the Status of Soviet Amendments, November 24, 1948 190 No. 98 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Comments on the Latest Draft of the Genocide Convention Article by Article, November 26, 1948 194 No. 99 The British Home Office Satisfied with the Foreign Office’s Assurance That the UK Delegation Did Not Commit to Signing the Genocide Convention, November 27, 1948 197



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No. 100 The British Colonial Office Wants the UK Delegation at Paris to Make Sure the Genocide Convention Does Not Automatically Apply to Colonies, November 30, 1948 198 No. 101 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Suggests to the Foreign Office It Should Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, December 1, 1948 199 No. 102 The US Delegation at Paris Urges the US State Department Seek UN Member States’ Support for the Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, December 2, 1948 200 No. 103 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Further Explains to the Foreign Office Why It Should Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, December 2, 1948 201 No. 104 The British Foreign Office Insists, Due to the Objections of the Home Office, That UK Delegation at Paris Should Abstain from Voting on the Genocide Convention, December 3, 1948 202 No. 105 Robert Lovett of the US State Department Discourages the US Delegation at Paris from Seeking UN Member States’ Support for the Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, December 3, 1948 203 No. 106 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Rejects the Suggestion That It Should Abstain from the Final Vote on the Genocide Convention, December 4, 1948 204 No. 107 Kenneth Younger Communicates the Home Secretary’s Consent That the UK Delegation May Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, conditional upon a Reservation concerning the Right to Grant Asylum, December 7, 1948 205

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No. 108 The British Home Secretary Gives a Go Ahead to the UK Delegation to Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, subject to a Reservation Ascertaining the Right to Grant Asylum, December 8, 1948 206 No. 109 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Summarizes the Final Vote on the Genocide Convention, December 9, 1948 207 No. 110 The British Foreign Office Summarizes the Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the Sixth Committee with reference to the Colonial Clause, TPQ December 9, 1948 209 No. 111 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Reports on the Final Deliberations of the Sixth Committee regarding Political Groups and the International Penal Tribunal, December 11, 1948 211 No. 112 The British Home Office Believes That a Poor Flow of Information Constrained the UK Delegation during the Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention, December 17, 1948 212 No. 113 The British Colonial Office Drafts a Circular Dispatch Soliciting Opinions of the Colonies on the Genocide Convention, December 20, 1948 214

V  Lobbying on behalf of the Genocide Convention, 1947–48 (nos. 114–169) No. 114 Son of Robert H. Jackson Narrates about Raphael Lemkin’s Opposition to Codification of Penal Law, His Enmity to Henri Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella, August 11, 1947 219 No. 115 World Jewish Congress Lobbies with Foreign Governments on behalf of the Genocide Convention, August 29, 1947 221



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No. 116 Norwegian Writer Ingeborg Refling Hagen Urged to Sign an Appeal in support of the Genocide Convention, September 3, 1947 223 No. 117 A List of American and Foreign Citizens Who Support the Genocide Convention, TAQ September 20, 1947 224 No. 118 John D. Rockefeller Jr. Declines an Invitation to Cosign an Appeal in support of the Genocide Convention, September 26, 1947 227 No. 119 Henri Monneray Alerts Raphael Lemkin to the Position of the World Jewish Congress on the Genocide Convention, September 26, 1947 227 No. 120 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Support of the Roman Catholic Church for the Genocide Convention, September 30, 1947 228 No. 121 John Fried Informs Raphael Lemkin of Pending Cases at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal That Contain Charges of Genocide, October 3, 1947 229 No. 122 The British Council of Christians and Jews Inquires with the Foreign Office about the Change in Sir Hartley Shawcross’s Position on the Genocide Convention, January 7, 1948 231 No. 123 Raphael Lemkin Tells about an Unfinished Documentary on Genocide, Reflects on the Drafting Process to date in a Letter to Gertrude Samuels of the New York Times, January 12, 1948 232 No. 124 Pearl S. Buck Conveys to the Editor of the Manchester Guardian the Significance of Public Opinion in support of the Genocide Convention, January 22, 1948 234

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No. 125 Folke Bernadotte of Sweden Reassures His Country’s Commitment to the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Pearl S. Buck, January 24, 1948 237 No. 126 Lord Chancellor William Jowitt Replies to a Question by the Archbishop of Canterbury Why the UK Government Withdrew the Support for a Genocide Convention, February 13, 1948 238 No. 127 Members of the Future US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Commend the Efforts of Charles Malik, President of the ECOSOC, on behalf of the Convention, February 18, 1948 240 No. 128 John Ennals of the World Federation of UN Associations Requests UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to Publically Endorse the Genocide Convention, March 3, 1948 241 No. 129 The UN Human Rights Division Advises the UN Secretary General against Expressing Himself Publically in support of the Genocide Convention, March 9, 1948 242 No. 130 UN Secretary General Trygve Lie Opposes the Idea of Making a Public Statement in support of the Genocide Convention, March 18, 1948 243 No. 131 Raphael Lemkin Underscores Individual Responsibility, Universal Jurisdiction in His Memorandum on Genocide, April 17, 1948 244 No. 132 David H.T. Hildyard of the British Foreign Office Summarizes His Informal Conversation with William W. Simpson, General Secretary of the British Council of Christians and Jews, May 10, 1948 247



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No. 133 James N. Rosenberg of the National Conference of Christians and Jews Appeals to US Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Issue an Official Statement in support of the Genocide Convention, May 11, 1948 248 No. 134 The US State Department Notified about the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for an International Genocide Convention, May 12, 1948 249 No. 135 William W. Simpson of the Council of Christians and Jews Assures James N. Rosenberg That the UK Government Has Only Good Intentions with regard to the Genocide Convention, May 12, 1948 250 No. 136 The Committee for an International Genocide Convention Decides on a Course of Action, May 13, 1948 251 No. 137 The American Committee for an International Genocide Convention Objects to the Inclusion of Political Groups, May 25, 1948 253 No. 138 James N. Rosenberg of the National Conference of Christians and Jews Urges US Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Omit Political Groups from the Final Wording of the Genocide Convention and to Secure British Support for the Treaty overall, June 2, 1948 254 No. 139 A Women’s Organization Urges the UN Commission on Human Rights to State That the Genocide Convention Contributes to the Protection of Human Rights, June 9, 1948 256 No. 140 James Rosenberg and Raphael Lemkin Express Their Views on Certain Provisions of the Draft Genocide Convention in a Conversation with Ernest Gross and Jack Tate of the US State Department, June 9, 1948 257

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No. 141 James Rosenberg Tells US Delegate to the General Assembly John Foster Dulles the British Opposition is Detrimental to the Genocide Convention, June 11, 1948 259 No. 142 James Rosenberg Seeks to Neutralize Potential Opposition to the Genocide Convention by France, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, June 11, 1948 260 No. 143 James Rosenberg Tries to Convince Jack Tate of the US State Department to Drop a Reference to “Political Groups,” Criticizes British Position on the Genocide Convention, July 12, 1948 260 No. 144 A Generic Letter of Introduction Urging the Recipient to Assist Raphael Lemkin in His Efforts on behalf of the Genocide Convention, July 15, 1948 263 No. 145 James Rosenberg Warns Charles Malik, President of the ECOSOC, of Unfortunate Delays Had the Draft Genocide Convention Been Sent for Consideration to the Human Rights Commission and/or the International Law Commission, July 15, 1948 264 No. 146 Raphael Lemkin Differs with James Rosenberg over Several Provisions of the Draft Genocide Convention in a Conversation with John Maktos of the US State Department, July 16, 1948 266 No. 147 Raphael Lemkin Writes to John A. F. Ennals concerning Proposed Curtailing of the Provisions of the Genocide Convention, July 17, 1948 269 No. 148 James Rosenberg Informs Henry MacCracken of a Strategy Adopted by the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, July 19, 1948 272



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No. 149 James Rosenberg Writes to John Ennals about Fundraising and the Strategy to Ensure the Adoption of the Genocide Convention, July 23, 1948 273 No. 150 The US State Department Reflects on Persistent Lobbying of Jewish Organizations in the United States on behalf of the Genocide Convention (excerpt), July 27, 1948 274 No. 151 World Federation of United Nations Associations Tries to Move the Genocide Convention up the Priority List at the Forthcoming ECOSOC Meeting, August 16, 1948 275 No. 152 John Ennals Seeks Reimbursement for His and Raphael Lemkin’s Expenses Incurred in the Lobbying for the Genocide Convention, August 21, 1948 275 No. 153 Communist Party USA Hails the Decision of the Civil Rights Congress to Raise Funds for the Legal Defense of the Indicted Communist Leaders and thus Champion Civil Rights of the Negro People [September 1, 1948] 276 No. 154 James Rosenberg Discusses with Raphael Lemkin the American Position on the Genocide Convention, September 3, 1948 278 No. 155 Raphael Lemkin Disagrees with James Rosenberg over Tactics in Securing the Passage of the Genocide Convention, September 13, 1948 279 No. 156 Samuel McCrea Cavert of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Advises Raphael Lemkin to Scrap References to Cultural Genocide and Incitement to Commit Genocide, September 30, 1948 283

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No. 157 Raphael Lemkin Urges Mobilization of Public Opinion against the Political Group Clause in the Draft Genocide Convention, October 28, 1948 284 No. 158 James Rosenberg Urges John Foster Dulles of the US Delegation to the UN General Assembly to Drop Political Groups from the Wording of the Genocide Convention, November 3, 1948 285 No. 159 James Rosenberg Urges Deleting Political Groups from the Wording of the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Sheila Young of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, November 15, 1948 286 No. 160 James Rosenberg Urges John Foster Dulles and the US State Department to Drop the Reference to Political Groups, November 15, 1948 287 No. 161 James Rosenberg Confers with Raphael Lemkin on the Urgency of Convincing the US State Department to Change Its Mind on Political Groups, November 15, 1948 287 No. 162 The US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Notified of the Latest Discussions within the US State Department, November 16, 1948 288 No. 163 The US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Notified of the Recent Debates in the ECOSOC, November 18, 1948 289 No. 164 Raphael Lemkin Argues against Political Groups in the Wording of the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, November 21, 1948 289



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No. 165 Raphael Lemkin Argues against Political Groups in the Wording of the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Theodore Thackrey of The New York Post, November 23, 1948 291 No. 166 Raphael Lemkin Exhorts the UK Delegation for Flip-Flopping on the Issue of Political Groups, November 28, 1948 293 No. 167 Civil Rights Congress Requests US Attorney General Thomas C. Clark to Remove It from the List of Subversive Organizations, December 2, 1948 293 No. 168 The National Conference of Christians and Jews Takes Credit for the Adoption of the Genocide Convention, December 17, 1948 294 No. 169 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Details on Pakistan’s Claim of Genocide in Punjab, December 20, 1948 295

Acknowledgments This document collection would not have been possible without the generous support of my home institution, the Norwegian Center for the Study of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities. As a Senior Researcher at the center in Oslo, I was able to spend all the time I needed to prepare the publication. In addition, the center sponsored my archival trips to London, Geneva, Moscow, New York, and Washington, DC, for which I want to personally thank the director Guri Hjeltnes. Another individual whose assistance I greatly appreciate is Katie Trostel. Katie, who was interning at our institution from the University of California at Santa Cruz, did a tremendous job transcribing a portion of the documents. If deciphering the British diplomat’s handwriting was not enough a challenge for Katie, then trying to mold the Soviet doublespeak into a coherent text certainly was. Everyone at Bloomsbury Academic I have had a pleasure of communicating with—Beatriz Lopez, Rhodri Mogford, Claire Lipscomb, and Emma Goode—made the publication process very smooth and pleasant. Peer reviewers were most helpful in sharing their comments with me. Finally, I want to thank all the archivists and reference librarians at over a dozen institutions in America and Europe with whom I have been in contact concerning permission to reproduce content. I hope they all agree that the cautionary tale that the documents here tell was indeed worth telling.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ADL

Anti-Defamation League

AJC

American Jewish Congress

AFL

American Federation of Labor

AJA

American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati

AJHS

American Jewish Historical Society, New York

AMDELEGATION US delegation to the United Nations ART. article ASP

National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, cultural section of the Communist Party USA

AVP RF

Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow

BL

British Library, London

CAC

Commonwealth Affairs Committee, UK Government

CC (CPSU)

Central Committee (of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

CFR

Council on Foreign Relations, American think tank

CGSEA

Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, UK Government

CHR

United Nations Commission on Human Rights

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency, United States

CIO

Congress of Industrial Organizations, United States

CJF

Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, United States

CMF

Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation

CPSU

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CO

Colonial Office, UK Government

COL. colonel CRO

Commonwealth Relations Office, UK Government

DCR

Deputy Chief, United States Military Training Mission

DEPT

US Department of State

DOJ

US Department of Justice

DOS

US Department of State

xxx

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

DPI

Department of Public Information, United Nations

DPP

Director of Public Prosecutions, British Home Office

DPOWA

Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America, trade union

EA HIGH COMMISSIONER

East Africa High Commissioner, UK Government

ECOSOC

United Nations Economic and Social Council

EE

Office of East European Affairs, US Department of State

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States

FO

Foreign Office, UK Government

GA

General Assembly of the United Nations

GENO. CON.

Genocide Convention

GC

Genocide Convention

GOVT. government GP. UNDEC.

word or words incomprehensible in transmission

G-2

military intelligence section, US Army

HA COMMITTEE

Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, British Parliament

H OF C

House of Commons, British Parliament

H.E.

His Excellency

HEW

US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HMG

His Majesty’s Government

HO

Home Office, UK Government

HON. Honorable HRC

See CHR

IADL

International Association of Democratic Lawyers

ICJ

International Court of Justice

ICJ

International Commission of Jurists

ILC

International Law Commission, United Nations

IMT

International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg

INFRA

below, under

INP

International Press and Publications Division, US Department of State

IOC

International Organizations Steering Committee, UK Cabinet

IRD

I nformation Research Department, British Foreign Office



List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

xxxi

JLC

Jewish Labor Committee

L

Office of the Legal Adviser, US Department of State

LC

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

LE

Office of the Legal Adviser, US Department of State

MGB

Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR (Ministry of State Security of the USSR, 1946–53)

MP

member of Parliament

MVD

Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del SSSR (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, 1946–91)

NA

National Archives, London

NAACP

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

NARA

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

NCCJ

National Conference of Christians and Jews

NCNA

North China News Agency, London

NCRAC

National Community Relations Advisory Council, American Jewish organization

NEA

Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, US Department of State

NJCRAC

National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, successor organization to NCRAC

NKVD

Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del (Soviet Security Police, 1934–46)

NLT

national leadership team

NSA

National Security Archives at George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

NSWPP

National Socialist White People’s Party, successor to the American Nazi Party

NYPL

New York Public Library, New York

OA

Division of International Organizations Affairs, US Department of State

OAU

Organization of African Unity

OLC

Office of Legal Counsel, US Department of Justice

OSS

Office of Strategic Services, US intelligence agency (1942–45), predecessor of the CIA

PA

Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State

PAR. paragraph PL

Division of Public Liaison, US Department of State

xxxii PQ

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations parliamentary question, British Parliament

PRES. President PRIMMIN

Prime Minister

PUS

Permanent Under-Secretary of State, UK Government

READD-RADD

Russian East European Archival Document Database Collection, National Security Archives at George Washington University

REP. Representative RES. resolution RGASPI

Russian State Archives of Social and Political History, Moscow

RSFSR

Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

RSA

Republic of South Africa

RSS

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization

RT. REV.

Right Reverend

RUSHA

Race and Settlement Main Office, Nazi Germany

SECSTATE

US Secretary of State

SEN. Senator SFRC

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

SG

Secretary General of the United Nations

S. J. RES.

Senate joint resolution, US Government

SPA

Office of Special Political Affairs, US Department of State

S/S

Executive Secretariat, US Department of State

SUPRA above TAQ

Terminus ante quem, the date before which the document must have been written

TPQ

Terminus post quem, the date after which the document must have been written

TU

trade unions

UKA

United Klans of America, white supremacist organization

UKDEL

UK delegation to the United Nations

UMA

University of Massachusetts Amherst, Special Collections & University Archives, Amherst, Massachusetts

UNA

United Nations Archives, Geneva

UNA

Bureau of United Nations Affairs, US State Department

UNE

Office of United Nations Social and Economic Affairs, US Department of State

UNO

United Nations Organization



List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

UNP

Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, US Department of State

UN SYG

Secretary General of the United Nations

USG

United States Government

USIS

United States Information Service

USUN

United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA

Voice of America, US government-funded broadcaster

WAC

West Africa Command, British Army

WC

Workmen’s Circle, American Jewish labor organization

xxxiii

WCAD

West and Central Africa Department, British Foreign Office

WFUNA

World Federation of United Nations Associations

WIDF

Women’s International Democratic Federation, a Communist front organization

WORFEDUNA

World Federation of United Nations Associations

WPB

World Production Board (1941–45), US Government

WWDA

Woodrow Wilson Digital Archive, Washington, D.C.

List of Archival Collections United States American Jewish Archives (AJA), Cincinnati 60 Raphael Lemkin Papers American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS), New York City P-154 Raphael Lemkin, 1900–1959 Library of Congress (LC), Washington, DC MSS61408 Robert H. Jackson Papers, 1816–1983 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland CIA General Records Department of State Decimal File, 1945–49 Department of State Decimal File, 1950–54 Department of State Central Decimal File, 1960–1963 Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Social Department of State General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs Department of State General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Position Papers Maintained by the Executive Director, 1945–74 Department of State General Records, Files of Durwald V. Sandifer Department of Justice General Records, Office of Attorney General, Kenneth O. Simon (Special Assistant), 1983–84 National Security Archives at George Washington University (NSA), Washington, DC Russian East European Archival Document Database Collection (READD-RADD) New York Public Library (NYPL), New York City R-6616 Papers of the Civil Rights Congress ZL-273 Raphael Lemkin Tamiment Library & Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives (WAG), New York City 025 Jewish Labor Committee Records 037 Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights & Genocide Treaties 232 Edward S. Goldstein: Jewish Labor Committee Research Files Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, Missouri Oral History Interviews



List of Archival Collections

xxxv

United Kingdom British Library (BL), London 180 India Office Records and Private Papers, United Nations Organization POL 6761 India Office Records and Private Papers, Pakistan–India Dispute National Archives (NA), London CO 936 Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office, International and General Department and Predecessors: Original Correspondence CO 537 Colonial Office and Predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence FO 371 Foreign Office, Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906 to 1966 FO 1110 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Information Research Department HO 45 Home Office: Registered Papers HO 291 Home Office: Criminal Files LO 2 Law Officers’ Department: Registered Files

Russia Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVP RF), Moscow 6 Secretariat of Vyacheslav Molotov 54 Treaty & Legal Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Russian State Archives of Social and Political History (RGASPI), Moscow 82 Vyacheslav Molotov

Switzerland United Nations Archives (UNA), Geneva SOA 318 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

xxxvi

Introduction

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted on December 9, 1948, and came into force on January 12, 1951. A legal document, it is also the result of a political compromise.1 The UN member states that participated in drafting the Genocide Convention in 1946–48 had divergent interests, which informed their respective positions.2 That holds particularly true for the wartime Allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. These three countries affectively shaped the United Nations as we know it. They had a decisive say on UN agenda and all the decisions that had followed from it. The Genocide Convention is one of the crassest examples of an international treaty that breathes power politics.3 The present document collection seeks to highlight the legal challenges, historical preconceptions, and political undercurrents that had informed the Genocide Convention, its form, contents, interpretation, and application. To rephrase a popular saying, you don’t want to know how politics get made. International legal politics is even more obscured a subject, closely guarded by national governments. Now, eighty-eight years after Raphael Lemkin came up with what later became a concept of genocide, seventy years since the Genocide Convention came into existence, and twenty-seven years since the (tentative) end of the Cold War, we can go back and explore the behind the scenes. The Great Powers chose a separate path to and a different timetable in respect to the UN Genocide Convention. The United States signed the convention immediately after it had been adopted by the United Nations, but did not formally ratify it until November 1988. The United Kingdom did not sign the convention and for several decades refused to accede to, until January 1970. The Soviet Union, for its part, signed the genocide treaty in 1949 and ratified, with reservations, in May 1954. This divergence alone is worth investigating. The two volumes cover the years 1933 to 1988. Lemkin proposed to introduce two new international delicts, barbarism and vandalism, the year the Nazis came to power. See, for example, William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Ch. 4–5. 2 For recent perspectives see Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) and Anton Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide Convention (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2017). 3 As Donald Bloxham and Devin O. Pendas have concluded: “The genocide convention was therefore effectively stillborn.” See Boxham and Pendas, “Punishment as Prevention? The Politics of Punishing Génocidaires” in: The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and Dirk A. Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 623. See also Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide, 11; William A. Schabas, “Origins of the Genocide Convention: From Nuremberg to Paris,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1–2, vol. 40 (2007): 35–56. 1

2

Documents on the Genocide Convention, Volume 1

As the Cold War was drawing to a close, the United States finally ratified the Genocide Convention and the Soviet Union withdrew its longstanding reservations to two of its provisions. What followed belongs more firmly in the domain of international law and hence exceeds the confines of the collection. Until now, the (legal) history of the Genocide Convention has been written almost exclusively on the basis of UN records.1 Those records are in the public domain, and can be easily accessed through the electronic UN Official Document System.2 Consequently, the present collection contains documents deposited in selected archives and research libraries. The listing order—documents from the American, British, and Russian archives—reflects on the actual amount of material that comes from each country. The largest, and most diverse, selection of documents (about 55 percent of the total) comes from the eight archives and research libraries in the United States. The British National Archives and the British Library account for another 35 percent. The Soviet records make up a mere 5 percent of the total. That figure also includes six journal and newspaper articles. In addition, I included twenty-two documents from the United Nations Archives in Geneva, about 5 percent of the total. Although situated in Switzerland, the UN Archives by default contains documents of direct relevance to the subject of this collection. The reason why the collection comprises relatively few documents from the former Soviet archives I explain below. The 436 documents reproduced in this collection make for a fairly representative sample. While it is nearly impossible, or useful for that matter, to establish a total amount of documents on the Genocide Convention available to researchers, I am ready to suggest a 1 to 6 ratio. That is to say, the volumes contain about 15 percent of all available documents. The ratio for governmental records, which are more essential than private records in documenting a state policy, is even higher. To give just two examples, I selected 94 relevant documents from the National Archives and Records Administration and 10 from the Russian Foreign Policy Archives out of ca. 260 and 13 currently accessible, respectively. The principal agencies that have been dealing with the issues related to the Genocide Convention are the following. For the United States: the Department of State (overwhelmingly) and the Office of the US Attorney General; for the United Kingdom: the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Colonial Office, and the Cabinet; and for the Soviet Union: the Foreign Ministry and marginally the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee. In the United States volunteer organizations played an active role in lobbying on behalf of the Genocide Convention, in particular US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948), Lithuanian American Council (1951–54), and Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights and Genocide Treaties of the Jewish Labor Committee (1970–77). These governmental offices and nongovernmental agencies had generated a significant body of material, some of which is reproduced in the present collection.

Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); Schabas, Genocide in International Law; The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, eds. Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 2 https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp. 1

Introduction

3

Among private individuals, Raphael Lemkin has left behind by far the largest paper trail. Lemkin had meticulously preserved all his writings, including drafts. Hard to imagine, but it is by a mere chance that we have this invaluable document cache. After Lemkin had died, essentially in poverty, on August 29, 1959, his landlord unceremoniously dumped the archive on the street. Carted off to Lemkin cousin’s basement, the papers had subsequently found their way into the New York Public Library, the American Jewish Historical Society in New York, and the American Jewish Archives in Cincinnati, Ohio. One of Lemkin’s closest allies was the seventy-fouryear-old James N. Rosenberg. As chairman of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, which was established in 1948 essentially as a Lemkin’s front organization, Rosenberg had displayed an extraordinary energy. Rosenberg’s enthusiasm translated into numerous letters and appeals that he had authored. Other individuals whose name appears often in the documents are unmistakably those who had taken Lemkin’s project to heart: British Parliamentarian Barnett Janner, US Senator William Proxmire, and Betty Kaye Taylor, founder and executive secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights and Genocide Treaties. A principle selection criterion for this publication is the following. The selected documents reflect on specific issues relevant to the Genocide Convention, as established at the time by the parties concerned. Conversely, it is not an objective per se to document the progressive development of international law, if such a process can be positively identified at all. Neither does this collection explicitly aim to tell the story of Raphael Lemkin, even though his name comes forth in numerous documents (essentially through his death in 1959). Lemkin is important when it comes to the genesis of the genocide treaty. He also tried his hand at influencing political decision-making. Yet, the very fact that he represented only himself, and the likely minded individuals and organizations—an ultimate “unofficial man,” as Lemkin used to introduce himself— shut him off from the process. Past June 1947, when the first comprehensive draft of the Genocide Convention had been unveiled, Lemkin a legal scholar had morphed into Lemkin a dealmaker.1 This, involuntary, transformation is documented on these pages, yet it does not constitute a separate chapter in the story of the Genocide Convention as told here. Besides, Lemkin’s life and ideas have been extensively covered in literature.2 See Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on ‘Soviet Genocide’,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, vol. 7 (2005): 551–59. Cf. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee, 2001); Samantha Power, “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), Ch. 2–4; Robert Skloot, If the Whole Body Dies: Raphael Lemkin and the Treaty Against Genocide (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Dan Eshet and Adam Strom, Totally Unofficial: Raphael Lemkin and the Genocide Convention (Brookline, MA: Facing History and Ourselves, 2007); John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2008); The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence, ed. Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer (London: Routledge, 2009); Raphael Lemkin: Soviet Genocide in Ukraine, Article in 28 Languages, ed. Roman Serbyn and Olesia Satsiuk (Kiev: Maisternia Knyhy, 2009); Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind, ed. Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala and Sławomir Dębski (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2010); Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on Nazi Genocide: Not Guilty, ed. Steven L. Jacobs (Jacksonville, FL: Bloch, 2010); Lemkin on Genocide: Written by Raphael Lemkin, ed. Steven L. Jacobs (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2012); Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1

2

4

Documents on the Genocide Convention, Volume 1

In other words, Lemkin appears in the present document collection where and when a particular aspect of the Genocide Convention enters scrutiny. The only exception is the section called “The Lonely Voice of Raphael Lemkin,” which attempts—however difficult that may be—to separate Lemkin a scholar and individual from Lemkin a lobbyist and amateur politician. Neither does the collection deal with particular crimes that at different times were regarded as genocide. That is to say, the documents in the collection do not explore specific cases of mass violence, ways they were conceived and executed. Whenever certain instances of mass murder get mentioned, they typically relate to the issue of implementation of the Genocide Convention. By nature of the Cold War discourse, the country that had attracted most negative attention was Stalin’s Russia. The section “Indicting Communist Countries for Genocide” drives this point home. When identifying specific discourses, the so-called Armenian Question occupies a special place. Both the Soviet and the Americans found it a tough issue to handle politically. The documents in the respective section, for a change, are mainly of Soviet provenances. The Korean War, in contrast, was happening in real time. Consequently, the emerging discourse on genocide incorporated elements of military planning and political decision-making—as transpires from the relevant document section. In terms of types of documents reproduced in the collection, the spread is fairly large: interoffice correspondence, memorandums, whitepapers, guidelines for national delegations, commissioned reports, draft letters, telegrams, meeting minutes, official and unofficial inquiries, formal statements, and newspaper and journal articles. On a classification curve, the featured documents range from unrestricted to limited circulation to top secret. Thanks to routine declassification, we now even have access to selected CIA records. Two such documents, related to the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1959, made their way also into this collection. Those documents that did not make the cut usually display similarity, in both substance and form, to an initial draft. For instance, Lemkin and/or the US State Department would prepare a standard text and subsequently send it to numerous recipients. The same goes for organizations and their modus operandi, say, a coordinated letter campaign that the Lithuanian communities around the world had put in place in the winter of 1952. A perusal of appeals urging US ratification of the Genocide Convention points out to a common pattern, essentially a template. Another two kinds of documents that I typically did not include in the collection constitute cover letters introducing a new item or a new twist in the discussion around the Genocide Convention, and certain draft texts which—in a nearly identical form—were later reprinted as official UN records. Some documents, I admit, proved just too long to be reproduced. In such a case, I tried, whenever possible, to identify a document 2013); Watchers of the Skies, documentary (2015); Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity” (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016); Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide; Lemkin’s book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), was reprinted in 2005. David Crowe is currently working on a new biography of Lemkin.

Introduction

5

prepared by the same authority/individual at around the same time that conveyed the original ideas yet in a more condensed form. In addition to primary sources, I selected several articles from the Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia and a piece from Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo—a major Soviet law journal. Published in Russian, obviously, those articles are not easily accessible yet they project a unique Soviet perspective on genocide and the Genocide Convention. I also included two articles from American newspapers that link up to specific documents in the section “Indicting Communist Countries for Genocide” and “We Charge Genocide: the Campaign to Indict the United States for Racial Discrimination,” respectively. Finally, I reprinted the three major drafts of the Genocide Convention from 1947 to 1948; many a document in Volume I refer to the drafts prepared by the UN Secretariat and the Economic and Social Council, and the one eventually passed by the General Assembly. When it comes to a document selection like this one, some shortcomings are almost inevitable. The farther in time the easier becomes access to primary sources. This is why the bulk of documents in the present collection is from the late 1940s and early 1950s. The United Kingdom’s accession to the Genocide Convention in 1970 came as a result of a long process, which is fully documented. Hence, in the case of the British Government, the policymaking opens up for a most thorough analysis, from A to Z. In the case of the United States, the document trail is also pretty consistent, all the way through the mid-1970s. US State Department records have been declassified through that date. At the time of writing (summer 2017), the records from the 1980s were in the process of declassification. Fortunately, selected records produced by the US Attorney General’s Office go as far as early 1980s. The Congressional Records, the press coverage, and the sources from minor repositories (i.e., Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives) help to complete the picture of a tortured path toward US ratification of the Genocide Convention in 1988. The Soviet case is the toughest. While the Soviet position on the Genocide Convention appears loud and clear in the documents from the years 1946–48, the paper trail slows to a trickle in the subsequent years. This has to do with both objective and subjective factors. A hierarchical system of Soviet governance automatically designated Joseph Stalin as the ultimate authority whose dictum acquired the force of law. Below him was Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Molotov’s department prepared draft directives to the Soviet delegation in the United Nations that participated in the debates on the Genocide Convention. Stalin had read through and edited those guidelines. Once it got sanctioned at the highest political level, the Soviet discourse on genocide became cast in stone. As an indirect proof, a few Soviet journal and newspaper articles from the 1950s–80s reproduced in Volume II are by and large restating the argument elaborated in 1948. Another problem is access to archives. The documents related to the Genocide Convention are deposited in the Foreign Policy Archives, which is part of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Even though the archives is formally opened to researchers, the extent of its holdings is impossible to gauge due to the absence of finding aids. Finding myself at a mercy of the archivists, I had to take them at their word that whatever files I had received is all the archives has on the subject. The documents in the collection provide answers to essentially all questions in connection with the Genocide Convention. Of larger issues, there are just two that

6

Documents on the Genocide Convention, Volume 1

cannot be settled with the help of the records reproduced here. Both involve the reasoning that made the Soviet Government and US President Ronald Reagan decide to go for ratification, in 1954 and 1984–85 respectively. Although the hypothesis that I have advanced earlier is quite convincing I believe, we still have to wait for the next round of declassification—which in the case of Russia may never happen—to know for sure.1 Volume II contains a significantly larger number of documents than Volume I. The explanation is simple, as it is self-evident: the second volume covers a much longer time period than the first one. Even though Volume I begins in 1933, the bulk of documents is from 1945–48, when the Genocide Convention came into being. Volume II features a more even chronological spread, though also here the documents from the years 1949 to 1953 make up nearly two-thirds of all reproduced records. For the reader’s convenience, documents are subdivided in thematic blocks. All but one block in Volume I are organized in a strictly chronological order. When it comes to drawing up a Genocide Convention, it is relatively easy to segregate between the different stages in the process, from the UN Secretariat Draft to the Ad Hoc Committee Draft to the actual convention. Lobbying efforts on behalf of the convention, however, continued throughout and therefore appear under a separate heading. No such neat division is possible after the UN General Assembly had adopted the Genocide Convention in December of 1948. Various aspects of the convention addressed in Volume II—legal, political, ideological, and country-specific—often overlapped within a single document or an internal debate. For example, a document related to the Korean War may occasionally refer to racial discrimination in the United States and/or Soviet reservations to the Genocide Convention. All three subjects constitute separate blocks in the present collection. To maintain chronological order throughout Volume II also proved challenging. Facing the dilemma of organizing documents by month/year versus subject matter, I chose the latter option while trying, whenever possible, to keep the thematic blocks in ascending order. Particular problems with the Genocide Convention, as identified by national governments, translated into a consistent line of argument. To capture the shifting attitudes toward ratification/accession, I assembled relevant records in the countryspecific blocks. For the United Kingdom, the essential periods were 1949 to 1953 and 1962 to 1968. In the case of the United States, the discussion stretched over longer time periods, 1949 to 1962, 1970 to 1977, and since 1983. Alas, the few documents of Soviet provenance produced since 1948 at my disposal are simply not enough to justify a country-specific block. Hence, I divided them between the most relevant sections such as “The Issue of Reservations,” “The ‘Armenian Question’,” and “A Final Push for the UN Genocide Convention.” The way the volumes are organized allows for a dynamic mixture of governmental and nongovernmental records. For example, the section called “The Public Campaign Pro and Counter US Ratification of the Genocide Convention” features letters by

Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the Genocide Convention, 208, 274; idem., A Rhetorical Crime: Genocide in the Geopolitical Discourse of the Cold War (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2018), 154–61.

1

Introduction

7

private citizens and formal replies by State Department officials, resolutions passed by organizations opposing ratification and memorandums by support groups, printed matters, a report on rightwing organizations, a summary of the Senate hearings, and so on. Beyond substantive differences, the documents in the collection reveal a dissimilar fashion in which the Genocide Convention had been debated in each of the three countries. While the Soviet documents on genocide are hardest to get and therefore the fewest, the way the Soviet bureaucracy operated was the most straightforward but also inflexible. There was no internal discussion as such but rather stringent instructions that were passed down the chain of command. Lower ranking Foreign Ministry officials who were put in charge, acted in pursuance of governing ideology and in anticipation of the higher-ups’ reaction. Foreign Minister Molotov, in his turn, edited the relevant documents so as to ensure Stalin’s approval. And whatever Stalin uttered effectively became a law—the line of argument Soviet authorities in all levels had to blindly follow. The penchant for secrecy affected the Foreign Ministry as much as any other Soviet agency, perhaps even more. Neither the top communists nor the rank-and-file diplomats ever elaborated in writing as to why specifically they disagreed with this or that provision of the draft Genocide Convention beyond stating that it was “harmful” or “hostile” to the Soviet Union. Among relevant governmental records, those deposited in the British National Archives in London constitute by far the most nuanced and multilayered source. The sheer amount of material is also significantly larger than that in the National Archives and Record Administration in College Park, Maryland. Within the British Government, the discussion mainly took the form of an exchange of opinions between the Foreign Office and the Home Office. In the early stages, the Colonial Office was also involved in the conversation. Furthermore, the way the process was organized exposed a variety of conflicting and/or overlapping views. In practical terms, for any particular element of the Genocide Convention under consideration, the governmental agency involved—most often the Foreign Office—prepared a memorandum or a whitepaper. That document was then commented upon by several officials, and sometime referenced against the opinions expressed by other departments. A compromise position was subsequently reworked into an official document. This format ensured a less constrained exchange of opinions: one can learn much not only about the issues at stake but also about the professionals who had discussed them. Inadvertently, it also projects a good deal of cynicism—something that might have been possible to document also with regard to other Super Powers had their respective internal modus operandi been different. The most fascinating aspect of an American debate on the Genocide Convention is the disproportionate impact of public opinion on the official proceedings. Barely visible in the British case, and plain unimaginable in the Soviet, interest groups in the United States had fought a decades-long battle over US ratification. The dynamic relationship between advocacy groups and concerned citizens like Lemkin on the one hand and various branches of the US Government, State Department in particular, on the other makes for a fascinating study in its own right. Equally instructive is to see how the lobby groups on both sides of the political spectrum related to the

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Documents on the Genocide Convention, Volume 1

government. At the same time, unlike in the British case, most of analysis and discussion on a governmental level took place in the United States within a single agency, the State Department. The documents produced by the State Department are typically summaries of conversations, which do not convey the kind of drama played out on the other side of the Atlantic. Although the documents in the collection are by default of American, British, and Soviet provenance, they address the situation in many more countries. Several Communist bloc countries in Eastern Europe get recurrently mention in connection with the Genocide Convention, especially Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, as well as the annexed Baltic States. In Western Europe, the Netherlands and West Germany had their share of debate on ratification. The UK Government kept a track of developments in the British Commonwealth countries: India, Pakistan, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. One national perspective I wish could be covered more extensively is French. When Lemkin originally conceived of a Genocide Convention, he thought that “such a treaty would take the life of nations out of the hands of politicians and give it the objective basis of law.”1 Taken in the aggregate, the documents reproduced in this collection suggest the exact opposite result, namely primacy of politics over humanitarian and/or legal considerations in the UN Genocide Convention. * * * The document formatting, as used in the present collection, requires some clarification. Repetition is nearly unavoidable, particularly in the case of lengthy memorandums on ratification of or accession to the Genocide Convention. With each new round of discussion, British and/or American government officials in charge typically summarized the process so far. Hence, such memorandums often sketched the course of negotiations in the United Nations in 1946–48. In the British case, as mentioned earlier, the documents produced within one office may circulate among several. Whenever more than one official contributed his (never hers) opinion, and if they sounded repetitive or did not substantively change the conversation, only the commentaries that eventually became incorporated in the official records have been reproduced here. If the process of drafting of a certain letter or a statement was in and of itself of significance, however, that particular document is reprinted in full, including all the multilevel corrections/suggestions. If the drafting process was more straightforward (e.g., corrections have been accepted without further discussion), only the final version is reproduced. Corrections or addenda in handwriting are set in italics. Minor orthographic errors such as “on” versus “of,” colon versus hyphen have been corrected directly in the text. Publication titles are set in quotation marks, as they appear in the original documents. British English versus American English spelling has been preserved (e.g., “organise” vs “organize”; “connexion” vs “connection”); German and Russian records are rendered in American English. Word capitalization and punctuation has as well been preserved. As far as the spelling of the names of various UN bodies and international treaties is Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, 114.

1

Introduction

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concerned, the capitalization pattern varies from document to document and from country to country. For example, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide would be spelled in all capitals or in lowercase. Alternatively, ad hoc would be italicized, like other Latin terms and expressions. I took special care to make the present document collection user-friendly. The Document List enables a quick search by general subject, date of issue, and main argument advanced in each particular record. To help the reader navigate through thematic blocks, each of them is preceded by document summary in the form of a narrative. Footnotes provide background information on historical figures, events, or records briefly mentioned in the documents. Whenever a person is identified by his position only (e.g., Attorney General, Governor of Aden), a respective footnote gives his full name and affiliation. Added footnotes use Arabic numerals while the original endnotes/footnotes that infrequently appear in the documents (typically printed sources) are marked with asterisk. The names of individuals, including key government officials, who had been engaged with issues directly related to the Genocide Convention appear in the List of Persons. The person list contains the individual’s professional affiliation and the years of service in that particular position as per period when a specific document or a series of documents had been produced. For example: “Austin, R. Warren, US ambassador to the United Nations, 1947–53.” If he or she had been involved with the Genocide Convention in different capacities over a longer period of time, the person list takes note of multiple affiliations: “Evans, W. J. Vincent, UK representative on the Human Rights Commission, 1947–48; Assistant Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, 1947–54.” In the few cases when the exact year of service is impossible to ascertain, the person list marks the year (set in parentheses) when the individual in question had been mentioned in connection with the Genocide Convention. Out of 527 individuals on the list, I was unable to establish either the first or the last name for fifteen.

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Genocide: From a Concept to a United Nations Resolution, 1933–46 (nos. 1–12)

Raphael Lemkin’s original thoughts on what eventually became a concept of genocide (doc. 1) make for a least comprehensive text in the volume. A proposal to define international crimes of barbarism and vandalism, which Lemkin submitted to the Fifth Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in October of 1933, was obviously a work in progress. It does not help that Lemkin’s paper is only available in double translation, from either French or German. Still, the text reproduced below is the earliest and most succinct rendition of his train of thought. Lemkin effectively argued for universal jurisdiction over crimes committed against a collectivity. He framed an assault on a racial, religious, or social group in both legal and moral terms. According to Lemkin, systematic group destruction involved an attack on the life, health, liberty, dignity, culture, and/or economic means of existence of individuals belonging to that group. He spoke broadly of human dignity and the intention to crush it on political, religious, or other motives. As Lemkin later admitted (doc. 8), his original proposal had received little attention, also in his native Poland. A Warsaw newspaper sarcastically remarked that Lemkin belonged to the racial group mostly exposed to barbarism and vandalism (read: he was Jewish), the crimes he was trying to outlaw (doc. 2). Undeterred, Lemkin for the first time outlined a concept of genocide in his 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress. The chapter on genocide takes up 16 pages in the book of 671.1 Lemkin sent his book to several individuals and institutions. One of the recipients, in May 1945, was Robert H. Jackson, associate justice of the US Supreme Court (doc. 3). Whether Justice Jackson actually managed to read the entire book in a short span, as he claimed to, he said he found it interesting (doc. 4). Lemkin’s study prompted an invitation to be part a war crimes unit within the US War Department. In late summer 1945 Lemkin traveled to London, where the Allies just finished drawing up the charter for the International Military Tribunal (IMT). Lemkin found himself at odds with the American delegation. Jackson’s assistant found Lemkin on several occasions violating the protocol (doc. 5). Employing

Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). The book was reprinted in 2005 and again in 2008 by the Lawbook Exchange in Clark, New Jersey.

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Lemkin as a member of the Jackson staff at Nuremberg was considered undesirable due to his “inadequate scholarship . . ., an emotional approach to problems, personality difficulties, etc.” Meanwhile Lemkin submitted to Telford Taylor, assistant to US Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg Jackson, a memorandum that effectively laid out a charge of genocide (doc. 6). As he did earlier, Lemkin spoke not only of physical extermination but also of purposeful humiliation, degradation, and attempts to destroy morale of entire nations and religious groups. Among the defendants’ murderous techniques Lemkin mentioned withdrawal of food, forced labor, and creating hazardous living conditions. As urged by Lemkin, Jackson entered the charge of genocide in Count III (war crimes) of the Nuremberg indictment (doc. 8). Hence, for the first time ever in a courtroom, the word genocide was spelled out when the Nuremberg trial opened on November 20, 1945. That fact was duly acknowledged by the East European countries with observer status at the IMT (doc. 10). Representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia urged the tribunal to incorporate genocide in its judgment while expanding the list of specific victim groups beyond Jews, Poles, and Gypsies (Roma). As of October 1945 Lemkin was considered as a prospective expert witness and his book as possible piece of evidence for the prosecution (doc. 7). In particular, Lemkin could contribute to a study of the German SS and/or Nazi policy of extermination. Axis Rule was readily available in the Jackson Office’s library to assist in preparing materials on genocide. Ultimately, Lemkin had failed to convince Jackson invoking genocide during the trial. The Nuremberg judgment of October 1, 1946, did not use Lemkin’s word.1 Next, Lemkin turned his eyes to the newly established United Nations. Shortly after the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) came into existence in April of 1946, Lemkin approached its chairman Eleanor Roosevelt (doc. 8). Referring to the ongoing trial of major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, Lemkin sought to build an international machinery to prevent the recurrence of barbarism and vandalism. This time he narrowly defined genocide as a coordinated attack on the life, liberty, and property of individuals with the purpose of destroying entire population groups. While emphasizing the important function of the CHR, Lemkin ranked legal protection against genocide higher on agenda than safeguarding human rights. The UN Secretariat, in May 1946, took note of Lemkin’s theory of genocide yet took no further action (doc. 9). Despite Lemkin’s best efforts, genocide featured only marginally on the international legal agenda in 1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union, which played a major role in the establishment of the United Nations, was reading for confrontation with the West on multiple fronts, including the field of international law. A memorandum prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on November 6, 1946 (doc. 11) lays out the Soviet position on codification of international law most comprehensively. The memorandum contrasted “bourgeois” principles of international law with “democratic” principles and the Anglo-American proposal for codification with the Soviet proposal. Traditionally

John Q. Barrett, “Raphael Lemkin and ‘Genocide’ at Nuremberg, 1945–1946,” in The Genocide Convention Sixty Years After Its Adoption, eds. Christoph Safferling and Eckart Conze (The Hague: Asser Press, 2010), 38–51.

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skeptical of international law, the Soviet Union would still be served better by partaking in the codification process. Besides, whatever recommendations concerning the development of international law the UN General Assembly may pass were not binding for the Soviet Union. Going into the multilateral negotiations, the USSR saw a strategic advantage in emphasizing state sovereignty, the right to self-determination, and the fight against fascism. A joint resolution concerning genocide originally proposed in the Sixth Committee (Legal) by Cuba, India, and Panama (doc. 12) eventually made it to the General Assembly. Resolution 96(I) of December 11, 1948, declared genocide an international crime and urged enactment of legislation for its suppression. The comments made by national delegations indicated a divergence of opinion.

No. 1 Raphael Lemkin Outlines the Concept of International Crimes of Barbarism and Vandalism, November 1933 Raphael Lemkin, “Akte der Barbarei und des Vandalismus als delicta juris gentium,” Internationales Anwaltsblatt 6, vol. 19 (November 1933): 117–19 Offences of Barbarism and Vandalism as International Crimes1 By Dr. Raphael Lemkin, prosecutor in Warsaw, member and secretary of the Polish commission for international legal cooperation Delicta juris gentium – a concept introduced in domestic legislation due to the common struggle of nations [attempting to] prevent criminal acts – is characterized [by the fact that] they can be prosecuted in the place where the perpetrator was apprehended, irrespective of the criminal’s nationality or of the place where the crime was committed (universal jurisdiction). Thus, if this kind of offense is committed on State A’s territory, while the perpetrator is apprehended on State B’s territory, it is State B that will mete out punishment. The First Conference for the Unification of Penal Law that convened in Warsaw in 1927 put together a list of such offenses, which included counterfeiting coins, banknotes, and securities; the trafficking of slaves, women, and children; piracy; any intentional act that poses danger to the public; drug trafficking; and pornography.

This is essentially the text of Lemkin’s paper submitted to the Fifth Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in October of 1933. The paper argued against codifying terrorism or political terrorism as a “crime against human rights.” As an alternative, Lemkin proposed international delicts of barbarism and vandalism. Cf. “V Conferencia international para la unificación del derecho penal, Madrid, octubre 1933 (República Española). Terrorisme, Rapport special présenté par M. Raphael Lemkin” (Madrid: Imprenta de Galo Sáez, 1933): 1–19. An extended version of this article appeared two years later in French. Cf. Lemkin, “Les actes constituant un danger general (interétatique) considerés comme delits du droit des gens” in Actes de la Vème Conférence internationale pour l’Unification du Droit Pénal (Madrid 14–20 Octobre1933), eds. Jimenez de Asua, Vespasian Pella, and Manuel López-Rey (Paris: A. Pedone, 1935), 48–56.

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[Over the course of] subsequent conferences and international congresses, the initial list was expanded. Thus the Congress for Comparative Law held in 1932 in The Hague added [to the list] acts against international traffic facilities, the spreading contagious diseases, epidemics, etc. Thanks to the initiative of Prof. E. St. Rappaport, a judge of the Supreme Court in Warsaw, jurisprudence regards warmongering as an international crime.1 Combating all these crimes is in the interests – whether it is practical or idealistic – of the entire civilized humanity. The whole civilized world should declare the existence of inalienable [human] rights [Rechtsgüter] and legal consciousness [Rechtsbewusstsein] as a common [framework] for all civilized nations [Kulturvölker]. When State A prosecutes an international crime that was committed on the territory of another state (B), this does not just [constitute] an ordinary act of legal assistance vis-à-vis the state where the crime was perpetrated. Rather, [the state] acts on behalf of the framework of legal consciousness common to the entire civilized world, one that offers to protect human rights against [any] legal infringements irrespective of national borders. Should this list of international crimes be regarded as exhaustive? By no means! The foresight of the legislator is no match for the ingenuity of the criminal. It is the lot of the legislator to lag behind and to punish, within the letter of criminal law, acts generated by life itself yet incompatible with legal consciousness. When analyzing the ratio legis of offences such as the trafficking of slaves, women, and children, we discover that its basis lies primarily in the postulate of humanity. Here, this means above all the protection of the freedom and dignity of the individual, the prevention of human beings from being treated as merchandise. Other international crimes threaten the peaceful coexistence between nations, as well as economic and cultural cooperation in the world (warmongering, the destruction of transportation infrastructure, counterfeiting, etc.). One type of offense analyzed here addresses the act of interfering in an individual’s private sphere, and another interfering in human social and intergroup relationships. We should admit, however, that life also presents such forms of criminality that bring together both of [those] elements – interference in the individuals’ private sphere and in social interactions between civilized people [Zusammenwirkens der Kulturmenschheit] – important enough to warrant an international response [Reaktion der gesamten Welt]. It is this very encroachment on the individual in his capacity as a member of a collectivity [that matters]. The perpetrator’s intention is to harm not only the individual, but also the group to which he belongs. The target of that crime is not just an individual’s human rights, but also the [very] foundation of humankind’s social coexistence. Above all, we are talking here about violations aimed at the eradication of ethnic, national, denominational, or social collectivities [committed] on [the grounds of] political, religious, or any other motives: massacres, pogroms, forced internment, economic means of annihilation, and similar barbaric acts that target human life and

Emil Stanisław Rappaport (1877–1965), vice president of the Association of International Penal Law, and Lemkin co-drafted a new Polish Penal Code in 1932. The doctrine of international criminal law promoted by Rappaport had a major impact on Lemkin.

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its physical integrity, personal freedom and economic foundations. All those brutalities belong under the category of international crimes – those that encroach upon human dignity insofar as the cause of this humiliation is rooted in the fact of his belonging to one of the abovementioned collectivities, targeted by an extermination campaign. This element alone is characteristic enough to approach the offense in question as an international crime. What is impacted is not just an individual’s private sphere, but rather and above all the collectivity of which he is a member. The consequences of such crimes go beyond the framework of interpersonal relationships; they shake the foundations of a social groups’ sense of belonging within a state, even within a [given] cultural community. Those [criminal] acts that target communities constitute not only a common threat (danger commun), but also a global threat (danger general international), for social psychoses are contagious. By its very nature, [this type of act] is a perpetual threat to humanity. A criminal act against a collectivity achieves its success not through a single action, but through a consistent and systematic violation of rights. This is a perpetration of evil. Last but not least, mankind suffers economic losses caused as a result of such criminal attacks. The principle of universal repression is justified by the unavoidable breakdown of the economic balance in a society due to the mass immigration of the group’s persecuted members, and the accompanying disruption of trade and business. With regard to the job market saturation within [a given] national economy, any unplanned mass migration – prompted not by the interests of the host nation, but [rather] by mere compliance with the right to asylum – means a disruption of the state’s economic stability. The environment inhabited by the uprooted refugees is a breeding ground for susceptibility to antisocial views and acts (consider the assassination of the late French president Doumer).1 Extermination campaigns directed against a given collectivity can manifest itself also in the premeditated destruction of works [of art, an act that] testifies to the group’s spiritual aptitude in the fields of science, art, or literature. A given collectivity’s cultural contribution, irrespective of peculiarities of every single culture, is unmistakably the inheritance of the entire mankind. The destruction of certain works of national culture must be regarded as acts of vandalism vis-à-vis international cultural legacy. The perpetrator inflicts immediate and irrevocable damage not only upon the private owners of the destroyed works [of art] and the directly affected collectivity (to which the private owners belong, and whose creative genius contributed to the creation of these works); it harms the entire civilized world. In light of the abovementioned, I feel it is opportune, in my capacity as Special Rapporteur for the Fifth Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in October 1933, to submit – with the approval of the President of the Polish Commission for International Legal Cooperation, Professor E. St. Rappaport – the following points for consideration. Art. 1. Whoever, out of hatred toward a racial, religious, or social collectivity, or with the end goal of its extermination, commits a punishable act against the life, health, President of the French Republic Paul Doumer was on May 6, 1932 gunned down by a mentally unstable Russian émigré.

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liberty, dignity, or the economic existence of a person belonging to such a collectivity will be punished for the offense of barbarism with imprisonment for up to . . . . . [years] insofar as this criminal act does not require a more severe penalty in accordance with a stricter provision of the penal code.  The exact same penalty will be meted out to the perpetrator whose act is directed against a person who has declared solidarity with or stood up for such a collectivity, without himself belonging to one. Art. 2. Whoever, either out of hatred toward any of the groups listed in section 1 or with the purpose of its extermination, destroys works of art and cultural heritage (of that group), will be punished for the offense of vandalism with imprisonment for up to . . . . . [years] insofar as this criminal act does not require a more severe penalty in accordance with a stricter provision of the penal code. Art. 3.  The criminal acts enumerated in the abovementioned articles will be prosecuted and punished by the state in which the perpetrator was arrested, irrespective of the place in which the act was committed, or of the nationality of the perpetrator.

No. 2 A Polish Right-Wing Newspaper Slams Lemkin for His Newly Proposed International Crimes of Barbarism and Vandalism, October 25, 1933 Gazeta Warszawska, no. 326, October 25, 1933 MR. PROSECUTOR LEMKIN INITIATOR OF NEW PROVISIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW Assistant public prosecutor of the District Court in Warsaw, Mr. Rafał Lemkin, submitted to this year’s conference for the unification of criminal law in Madrid a proposal to prosecute crimes of “barbarism” and “vandalism” as part of the criminal code of all countries. The author defines barbarism as follows: “Anybody who out of hatred or with the purpose of destroying racial, religious, or social collectivity commits punishable acts against life, physical integrity, freedom, dignity, or the economic foundations of a person belonging to any of the mentioned collectivities will be prosecuted for the crime of barbarism.” The author defines vandalism as follows: “Anybody who out of hatred or with the purpose of destroying racial, religious, or social collectivity destroys works of culture and art of that collectivity commits the crime of vandalism.” It is not difficult to guess what motivated Mr. Lemkin to submit this proposal, considering [the fact] that he belongs to the “racial group” most threatened by



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“barbarism” and “vandalism.” It is a dubious honor for Poland that a representative of the Polish judiciary, and specifically Mr. Lemkin, is the author of this kind of project. In any event, Mr. Lemkin became yet another assistant prosecutor with a growing reputation in Poland’s general political arena. The first is Mr. Aron Miller, of the same “racial group” seriously threatened in many countries.

No. 3 Raphael Lemkin Informs Robert H. Jackson, US Supreme Court Associate Justice, of the Concept of Genocide and the Book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, May 4, 1945 LC, MSS61408/98 May 4, 1945 Honorable Robert Jackson Associate Justice Supreme Court Washington, D.C.

323 Rittenhouse Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Justice: I take the liberty of sending you my article entitled “genocide” which appears on page 39 of the Free World, April issue, 1945. This article contains a statement by the recently captured Marshal von Rundstedt, which in connection with other specific acts, points to the particular responsibility of this man as a major war criminal.1 May I also draw your attention to my book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” published three months ago by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which contains also some legal evidence as to war crimes. I would be delighted to present you with a copy but I discovered only today that the first printing of the book is exhausted, and so the second printing has been undertaken by Carnegie Endowment. I am sure however, that the Library of the Supreme Court has a copy. Very sincerely yours, Dr. Raphael Lemkin

The article effectively restated the argument advanced in the relevant chapter of the book. Field Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1975–1953) commanded German Army Group South during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. On October 10, 1941 he issued an order that explained to the troops the necessity of eradicating so-called Judeobolshevism. One of the largest massacres of Jews, at Babi Yar near Kiev in late September 1941, and other mass atrocities took place on his watch.

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No. 4 Robert H. Jackson Tells Raphael Lemkin He Had Read and Appreciated the Latter’s Book and the Article on Genocide, May 16, 1945 LC, MSS61408/98 May 16, 1945 Dr. Raphael Lemkin 323 Rittenhouse St., N.W. Washington, D.C. My dear Dr. Lemkin: Thank you for sending me your article “Genocide”. I have read it and your book with interest, and am glad you called them to my attention. Yours very truly, [Robert H. Jackson]

No. 5 James B. Donovan, Assistant to the Chief US Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Critical of Raphael Lemkin’s Performance at London, September 24, 1945  LC, MSS61408/106 September 24, 1945 MEMORANDUM to Colonel Taylor From: Commander Donovan Subject: Dr. Lemkin 1. The day before I left I talked at our movie showing with Colonel Hodgson of the United Nations War Crimes Commission.1 Colonel Hogdson spoke to me about the activities of Dr. Lemkin in London, stating that: a) Lemkin has been going around to see the members of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (a group which Colonel Hodgson has to handle with extreme diplomacy). Among other things he has told them of the tremendous amount of work which has been done by him and others, excellent evidence

As one of the three assistants to the US chief prosecutor Robert H. Jackson, James B. Donovan (1916–70) headed the section responsible for visual evidence at the Nuremberg International Tribunal.

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assembled in General Weir’s office, etc.1 Since the U.S. has never submitted any evidentiary material of any description to the Commission, this placed Colonel Hodgson in an embarrassing position on what has always been a troublesome problem for him with the Commission. b) At a luncheon with Lemkin and various members of the Commission, to which Colonel Hodgson was invited, Lemkin expressed amazement that Colonel Hodgson had never distributed a copy of “his book” (Axis Rule in Occupied Europe) later adding that if Colonel Hodgson would order them he would be glad to autograph them. Colonel Hodgson was, of course, compelled to agree and ordered them from the War Department. c) Lemkin has contacted certain newspaper people and discussed our war crimes problems with them. d) Lemkin is a “London Pole”, on the wrong side of the political fence at this time, and his presence in London in his capacity of a “member of Justice Jackson’s staff ” can only alienate most of the European representatives of countries seeking Russian friendship, in Colonel Hodgson’s opinion. 2. I would like to add, with respect to Dr. Lemkin, that the question of his employment was considered by OSS on several occasions. that each time it was generally agreed that his employment would not be desirable on the grounds of inadequate scholarship (including his book on “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe”), better Polish scholars available, an emotional approach to problems, personality difficulties, etc. I should also like to add that I informed Colonel Bernays of the foregoing before he cabled for Lemkin to come to London, and he agreed that if Lemkin came he would be his (Bernays’) responsibility. 3. I am sending you this information because I have been told that Dr. Lemkin is now under your supervision in London and thought you would wish to know these facts. Colonel Hudgson’s sole suggestion was that the sooner Lemkin is out of London, the more Colonel Hodgson will be pleased. J. B. D.

No. 6 Lemkin’s Memorandum for Telford Taylor, Assistant to the Chief US Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, on Criminal Conspiracy, September 28, 1945 NYPL, ZL-273/4 September 28, 1945

Assistant Judge Advocate General John M. Weir (1891–1948), who headed the War Crimes Office in the US War Department, was part of the US delegation to London.

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MEMORANDUM FOR COL. TELFORD TAYLOR The defendants have entered a conspiracy for the destruction of crippling the development of entire nations and religious groups by undermining the foundations of their economic existence by destroying their culture and restricting national cultural expression, by depriving these peoples of religious guidance by lowering artificially their birthrate while increasing the German birthrate, by humiliations and degradations and attempts to disintegrate their morale, and by exterminating millions of them in specially created institutions and camps or exposing millions of them to death by under-feeding, forced labor and compulsion to live in specially created unhealthy conditions. Raphael Lemkin

No. 7 Raphael Lemkin Considered as Potential Witness at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, His Book Regarded as Prime Source on Genocide, October 11, 1945 LC, MSS61408/107 October 11, 1945 OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL NURNBERG MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE JACKSON 1. Washington office reports that recruiting program will be substantially completed by 15 October. This will meet all current personnel requirements of all divisions and groups but the arrival of all of these persons will seriously tax billet and office facilities. 2. It is recommended that a new organizational set-up be announced as soon as possible to end the existing uncertainty among certain persons who realize their present assignments are nearing an end. 3. It is suggested that: a. The upper part of the organization chart remains unchanged with no naming of trial lawyers at this time. b. The committees be replaced by groups (as many as necessary, lettered from A on), each to prepare the case for a designated part of the indictment – the Chief of each such group to be named and the number of assisting lawyers, translators, research analysts and secretaries for each group to be fixed. c. Documentation Division to be streamlined by reduction of field force. In first phase its mission would be to complete translation and briefing of documents now in process. When that is finished it would become a “document service” organization to service the various groups mentioned in paragraph b.



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d. Interrogation Division to be streamlined as to field force and directed as to the completion of interrogations on persons now here or on the way; this Division later to become an “interrogation service” to provide summaries to the groups of paragraph b or to make special interrogations at the request of such groups. e. Economic case to be curtailed and restricted as you see fit. ROBERT J. GILL1 Colonel, CMP Executive * * * Enclosure One I One member of the staff should make a thorough study of the State Department volume, “Peace and War – U.S. Foreign Policy, 1931–1941,” and organize the pertinent material which it contains for presentation as proof. II Among the witnesses who should be interviewed, with a view to preparing statements of what they know, and possibly using them as witnesses on the trial, the following are noted: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Seger Strasser Douglas Miller Otto Tolischus Joseph Harsch Bruno Bettelheim The individuals named in connection with particular projects listed below III

A documented study should be prepared, for presentation in evidence, regarding the structure, composition, missions, etc., of the SS and Gestapo. This might be done by Kempner or Lemkin. Such study will supplement the materials which OSS is preparing on this subject. IV On the subject of economic preparations for war, and exploitation and expropriation in Germany, or in occupied areas, both Drucker and Schlamm have highly recommended Mr. Frank Munk. Mr. Domeratzky also speaks highly of him. Munk might head up these projects if it is desired not to use Drucker. Other names

Colonel Robert J. Gill (1889–1933) served as executive officer in the Robert H. Jackson’s Office, in charge of personnel and facilities.

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which come to mind as possible witnesses or sources of information on this subject are: Douglas Miller; Tolischus; Basch; Lemkin; Otto Nathan. Mr. Domeretzky speaks very highly of Nathan’s book, “The Nazi Economic System: Germany’s Mobilization for War,” to which we have also been referred by Mr. Schlamm. V On genocide, materials from War Refugee Board have already been furnished to Colonel Kaplan and Major Farr, and it is believed that further materials are contained in Lemkin’s book and can be procured from the American Jewish Committee. VI Consideration should be given to using Lemkin as witness. His testimony might be in the following form: 1. Formal portions: Qualifications and source materials used by him. 2. A comprehensive summary, not too long, of what appears in his book on the various subjects with which it deals. 3. Introduction of the book in evidence. VII Consideration should be given to having a study prepared on the Nazis’ systematic perversion of law and justice – e.g., corruption of the bar by threats of intimidation, governmental briberies, etc.: corruption of the courts by similar methods, etc. VIII Strategic preparations for war, along the lines summarized in Section II, par. 5 of the Memorandum on Trial Preparation. IX Consideration should be given to setting up a study on the Nazis’ plans for continuing or resuming their drive for conquest after Germany has been militarily defeated. Into this study would also go so much of their plans, 1933–45, as were directed toward insuring ultimate victory even though they lost militarily – as for example, by means of destroying neighboring populations. This is the device with respect to which Lemkin has attributed a particularly vicious statement to von Rundstedt, which statement, so far as known, has not yet been definitively documented.



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No. 8 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Eleanor Roosevelt’s Support for His Idea of an International Genocide Treaty, Refers to His Earlier Communication to President Roosevelt, May 18, 1946 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (4), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Individuals May 18, 1946 Wardman Park Hotel Washington, D.C. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt Hyde Park, New York Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: I intended going to New York last week in order to speak with you about my project of international protection of human rights; however, my duties as advisor on Foreign Affairs to the War Department precluded my absence from the office, even for a short time. It was an honor and pleasure to have your recent note, confirming receipt of my article on genocide, as well as your letter in 1945 expressing favorable remarks with regard to my book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” which was conveyed to you by Mrs. Betty Hight.1 At that time, as you may recall, I was interested in drawing your attention, as well as the attention of our great world leader, President Roosevelt, to the problem of punishing the German War criminals for the crime of genocide, a term I coined for the concept of killing nations and obliterating their cultures.2 I am very grateful to you that your discussed this problem with the President at that time. You will be interested to know that Justice Jackson, during the prosecution of the German War criminals in Nuremberg, accepted my idea of formulating genocide a sa crime and has included the charge of genocide in Count 3 of the Nuremberg indictment.3 Thus a solid foundation in recognizing genocide as an international evil has been laid in Nuremberg. By formulating genocide as a crime, the principle has been proclaimed that a national, racial or religious group as an entity has the right to exist, analogously as the recognition of homicide as a crime proclaims the principle that The document not in the file. Lemkin’s correspondence to Eleanor Roosevelt from 1945 can be found neither in Lemkin’s nor in Roosvelt’s papers. A comprehensive document collection edited by Allida Black, The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers: The Human Rights Years, 1945‒1948, contains no reference to Raphael Lemkin and/or the Genocide Convention. 2 Lemkin recalls this episode in his letter to Eleanor Roosevelt dated February 1, 1950. See doc. no. 355. 3 Count III (war crimes) contained the following formulation: “They [the defendants] conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.” 1

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an individual has a right to live. You, more readily than many others since you have been so prominently connected with the protection and understanding of the needs of under-privileged groups in this country, will understand the wide implications of such a principle. But that is not enough. Out of the Nuremberg nightmare and on the basis of innumerable suffering of members of national, racial and religious groups in the last decade we must find the way to build an international machinery which will prevent the recurrence of barbarity and vandalism. I know that law is not the answer to all world troubles, but law is a good form for international planning and enforcement of certain principles. In 1933 at the International Conference of Legal Experts in Madrid (under the auspices of the Fifth Committee of the League of Nations) I proposed an international treaty to declare as an international crime the persecution of national, racial and religious groups. However, there was no heed given to this at that time. In 1944 I had the sad satisfaction to note that the press pointed out that if my proposal of 1933 had been adopted it would have helped to deal with the offenders of human rights in World War II. (Please see enclosed editorial from the Washington Post.)1 It is my opinion that the United Nations, and especially your Committee, should consider the creation of a machinery for preventing and for punishing the crime of genocide.2 In Europe, where persecutions on racial and religious grounds have always flourished, the average citizen has more respect for the criminal code than for the constitution, or for an international declaration of principles. The average citizen there must have the realization that if he kills a member of an under-privileged group in carrying out a plan of extermination, he commits a distinct crime for which he will be held responsible – not only before the courts of his own country but, in case of escape, before the courts of other countries. Moreover, the statesmen and politicians of those countries should be made to understand that for the tolerating a policy of genocide they are becoming themselves criminals and as such they may be summoned to appear and to give account of their activities before the United Nations. It is extremely important that these statesmen and politicians be classified as criminals and not as leaders who represent a political cause. Genocide as a concept provides for a protection of a minimum of basic human rights of members of those groups which are under a constant attack throughout history. It is the most classical type of persecution and therefore it must be made criminal. I would say it is a minimum of protection below which we cannot go. I have narrowed down the concept of genocide to attacks against life, liberty, and property while the act is undertaken with a long range plan to exterminate whole groups. From my former experience with the League of Nations I realize that it is difficult to obtain international action on criminal protection because criminal protection is an every-day proposition and is a really practical one. Most governments would like to limit themselves to non-binding general statements and declarations which do not involve an every-day action in protecting human beings from suffering. I want to be “Genocide,” Washington Post, December 3, 1944. The UN Commission on Human Rights was established in April 1946.

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practical and therefore I propose a minimum. If this minimum is secured we have achieved very much, but not all. We should proceed also in obtaining international cooperation in securing the protection of other human rights, such as freedom of information, freedom of speech, or cultural and linguistic development, the right to employment and education and so forth. But for the protection of these other human rights we will not need the machinery of criminal law, and it would be impractical now to conceive the denial of such rights as an international crime. For the protection of such rights the international machinery of controls, consultations and admonitions to governments would suffice. To give an example – if Bulgaria does not grant the rights to Macedonians to open their own schools, the Government of Bulgaria should be advised by your Committee to refrain from such policy. But if the Government of Bulgaria organizes crematoria or concentration camps for the Greeks, Macedonians or Jews, the members of the cabinet who gave such orders commit the crime of genocide and should answer for it – not only before their own courts but in addition before foreign courts wherever they may be apprehended, and especially before the United Nations, before which they would appear not as statesmen but with the stigma of crime. Please excuse this lengthy letter, but somehow I feel that I should write to you as Chairman of the great committee on human rights, especially as I read today that you are preparing a general report on the protection of human rights.1 You will understand that I am eager to see my idea for which I have been working since 1933 has your attention and, through you, the attention of all leaders who are working for a better world. I take the liberty to enclose some literature and clippings on the subject of genocide, from which you will see that in some circles this idea has already made its way. Very sincerely yours, Raphael Lemkin Enclosures: (1) Article on Genocide from The American Scholar containing an outline for international machinery to prevent the crime of genocide2 (2) Editorial on Genocide, Washington Post, of December 3, 1944 (3) A pamphlet from the Washington Post. Please see Section 3 of Introduction3 (4) Article on Genocide by Francis Bower in the November 1945 issue of The Nineteenth Century and After4 P.S. An editorial on genocide appeared also in the New York Herald Tribune of October 24, 1945.5

Lemkin refers to a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Lemkin, “Genocide,” The American Scholar 15, no. 2 (April 1946): 227–30. 3 Since the document is not in the file, it is hard to establish which particular publication Lemkin has in mind. 4 Francis Bower, “Genocide,” The Nineteenth Century (November 1945): 234–40. 5 “The Crime of Genocide,” New York Herald Tribune, October 24, 1945. 1 2

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No. 9 The United Nations Department of Public Information Acknowledges the Receipt of Raphael Lemkin’s Proposal concerning the Crime of Genocide, May 23, 1946 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (4), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Individuals May 23, 1946 Mr. Raphael Lemkin Wardroom Park Hotel1 Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Lemkin, Many thanks for your most interesting letter of 20 May, and annexes thereto. The theory you advance appears to deserve serious consideration and, to this end, I am bringing it to the attention of the Legal Department of the United Nations. Very sincerely yours, B. Cohen Assistant Secretary General

No. 10 Legal Observers of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg Jointly Seek to Expand the Count of Genocide in the Indictment, June 25, 1946 Document no. 258 in SSSR i Niurnbergskii protsess. Neizvestnye i maloizvestnye stranitsy istorii, ed. Natalia Lebedva (Moscow: “Democracy” International Foundation, 2012), 480–81. MEMORANDUM FOR THE IMT CHIEF PROSECUTORS COUNCIL We, representatives of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and the Republic of Yugoslavia at the NMT in Nuremberg, have the honor to submit to the chief prosecutors Council the following suggestions:2

Wardman Park Hotel, at the corner of Connecticut Avenue and Woodley Road, was at the time one of the Washington’s largest. 2 The Soviet Union tried, but ultimately failed, to induct its satellites—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—into prosecution. Consequently, the three East European countries participated in the Nuremberg tribunal in the role of observers. 1



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The indictment in Count III, Section VIII, Subsection A includes the following statement: “They conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.” The evidence that has already been presented in court during the trial, or yet will be presented, not only corroborates the counts outlined in the indictment, but also shows that the crime of genocide (extermination of peoples) was committed also against the peoples that had not been mentioned in the abovementioned indictment, specifically against the peoples and certain classes (groups), for example, intelligentsia and clergy in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.1 We highly appreciate the great job that the prosecution had done representing our countries before the Tribunal; we regard it as significant, for both our countries and the [matter of] historical truth, that in the trial’s last stages as well as in the final statements, the prosecution emphasize the complexity and international significance of the crime of genocide – as follows from evidence [for prosecution] itself. We sincerely hope that – in the name of justice, yet taking into account international law so that to legally guarantee peaceful progress for the future generations – the Tribunal will consider the crime of genocide when passing its judgment. Gen. Ečher, for the Czechoslovakian delegation dr. Stanislaw Piotrowski, for the Polish delegation dr. Albert Vajs, for the Yugoslavian delegation

No. 11 The Soviet Foreign Ministry Outlines an Agenda on Codification of International Law, November 6, 1946 AVP RF, 6/8g/99/70 [November 6, 1946] MEMORANDUM REGARDING AN ITEM FROM THE ADDENDUM TO THE AGENDA OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The original suggestion to list Slavs, alongside Jews and Gypsies (Roma), as groups specifically targeted by the Nazis came from Andrei Vyshinsky, on October 13, 1945. On this occasion, Vyshinsky talked about a “policy of mass extermination,” without using the word genocide. See Vyshinsky’s memorandum to Molotov regarding the draft indictment in SSSR i Niurnbergskii protsess, 255–57.

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“IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE CHARTER CONCERNING THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CODIFICATION” (US PROPOSAL) The question of advancing codification of international law was raised already at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.1 Proposals to that effect were filed by Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, and Philippines. The same issue was discussed at the San Francisco Conference. It should be noted, though, that the Great Power delegations, including that of the USSR, only emphasized the need for advancing development of international law, obviously diverging as to the direction of that development.2 As a result of the discussions, the Charter was included in the abovementioned item urging a progressive development of international law and its codification. The question of conducting studies for the purpose of codifying international law has thus been addressed in principle. We are currently talking about implementing the decision incorporated in the Charter. That is how the US delegation put it in its appeal to the UN Secretary General. Consequently, the Assembly is facing the question of when and how to carry out the necessary studies. The US delegation apparently believes that the postulated problem should be addressed in the near future. Hence we are having two questions before us: (a) Do we believe it is the right time that we can, and should, launch studies for the purpose of codification of international law? (b) And, if we indeed believe it is about time, what sort of procedure [meropriiatiia] should we propose for a better organization of such studies? * * * The issue of codification of international law is not really new. This issue was born out of the struggle between bourgeoisie (that sought after and eventually achieved political power) and absolutism. Under the conditions prompted by the October Revolution and the strengthening and development of the Soviet state, the ruling bourgeoisie attempted to consolidate reactionary forces and to simultaneously strengthen “legality,” which it [the bourgeoisie] hoped would safeguard against “expropriation of property.” Attempts The Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, DC brought together representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China, who from August 21 to October 7, 1944 discussed plans for a new world organization. In fact, international law barely featured at Dumbarton Oaks—in a single paragraph, as an affirmation of primacy of domestic jurisdiction over universal jurisdiction. 2 The San Francisco Conference, which was held between April 25 and June 25, 1945, had a major impact on further development of international law. One proposal—which became part of Article 1 of the UN Charter—prescribed settling disputes in accordance with “principles of justice and international law.” Another proposal adopted by the conference dealt with the “development and revision of the rules and principles of international law.” The ensued discussion focused on the semantics of the words development and revision. As a compromise decision, Article 13 of the Charter called on the General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of “promoting international co-operation in the political field, and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.” See Ramaa Prasad Dhokalia, The Codification of Public International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), 147–50. 1



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at codifications became more frequent. Hence, the overthrown slaveholding society had created Corpus Juris Civilis in an attempt to prolong its existence by means of systematization of norms. The League of Nations once tried to carry through codification of international law. It attempted to ensure the protection of private property against revolution by means of international law, to reinforce the supremacy of imperialist states while retaining a hint of democratic phraseology. After several years in preparation, an international conference for the codification of international law was convened in 1930.1 The conference agenda contained three issues: (1) Citizenship, that is, determining the status of “fugitives from revolution” and assisting in the “scramble for soldiers” as a way of preparing for war (i.e., military duty in the case of double nationality) etc. (2) Territorial waters, that is, granting excessive rights to foreign vessels to use them (which was mainly in the interests of major maritime nations). (3) Responsibility of the state for the damage caused within its territory to personality or property of the foreign nationals (credit payments, damage caused by “uprisings, riots, and other disorderly conduct”).2 To counterbalance such a “development of international law and its codification,” a different direction has emerged: the development of democratic principles of international law; the right of nations to self-determination; equality, independence, and protection of national sovereignty; the fight for peace. The emergence of this course of progressive development of international law is exemplified by the pacts of non-aggression and mutual assistance signed by the USSR, the convention for the definition of aggression, the pact of economic non-aggression, etc.3 The fight against fascism prompted the raise of popular movements. The ruling bourgeoisie was forced to adopt more democratic policies. This made it possible – to a certain extent and for a certain time – a consolidation of antifascist forces. The movement for “peace and security” became stronger. The UN came into existence. The cleansing of international law of its antidemocratic features appeared both necessary and doable. The UN Charter entered a clause on advancing the “progressive development of international law and its codification.” The war came to an end. The ruling bourgeoisie got scared that, despite the heavy losses, the Soviet state has emerged [from war] even stronger, that the people’s masses across the world have come to appreciate their own strength and started demanding full participation in governing their respective countries and in determining the direction of international relations, that the number of states with truly democratic form of governance has increased, and that the movement of national liberation was on the rise in colonies and semi-colonies. Codification of international criminal law was for the first time proposed in 1926 by Romanian scholar Vespasian V. Pella, vice president of the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (International Association of Penal Law). The first conference for the unification of international law was convened in Warsaw in 1927. 2 The Soviet delegation at the 1930 conference levelled strong criticism on all three issues, plus colonialism. The Hague conference proved a failure in that the Soviet Union refused to sign any joint document. 3 The Soviet legal doctrine regarded bilateral treaties as the safeguard of national sovereignty and thus the most suitable conduit in foreign relations. 1

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Hence, the ruling bourgeoisie started leaning toward reactionary forces, started propping or even reviving monarchist and terrorist groups. The Bourgeoisie is seeking ways to strengthen its supremacy in the field of international law, too. That concerns first and foremost the US and Great Britain. In an attempt to progressively increase their economic and political dominance over other countries, the US and Great Britain are trying to push for such a “progressive development of international law” that would enable them to (a) carry out the “tough with Russia” policy; (b) gain full economic control over other countries; (c) safeguard private property from revolutionary upheavals in the countries that set out, or may set out, on a path of democratic development; (d) impact a political system of another country; and (e) infiltrate those countries with agents, spies, etc. The fact that it is the US delegation that raised the question of establishing a procedure for the study toward codification of international law shows that these studies would be carried out in pursuit of the just mentioned objectives. Thus there are two main lines along which the “progressive development of international law and its codification” may proceed: (1) The Anglo-American line, which uses quasi-democratic phraseology in order to formulate the “freedom of economic penetration,” the “freedom of navigation,” protection of private property against revolutionary upheavals (framed as “human rights”), etc. (2) The Soviet line, which aims at a truly progressive development of international law and its systematization (codification), at cleansing it of antidemocratic deposits [nasloeniia], at restoration of bourgeois-democratic principles that create its foundation in order to “more consistently and decisively bring out the democratic in them” (as Lenin referred to bourgeois-democratic slogans). The struggle to follow up, to a certain extent, the Soviet line will undoubtedly not be an easy task. The “wall of votes” came to be felt already at the Peace Conference.1 It will exhibit itself, among others, in the selection and the nature of recommendations that may come out of the “studies.” It would be good, therefore, to delay the implementation of the said objective. Yet it seems to me that we cannot, and should not, refrain from pursuing the objective that we have ourselves previously formulated in the Charter. (1) First of all, we should keep in mind that until now we have only been talking about preparing studies “for the purpose of advancing a progressive development of international law and its codification,” and that on the basis of those studies the Assembly is entitled to only make recommendations. In the opposite case, the Assembly would transform into a supranational body. Consequently, whatever recommendation in the field of development of international law the Assembly may make is not binding for us. (2) Studies for the purpose of developing international law and its codification will take considerable time. Let us remember that the original Committee of Legal Experts for the purpose of codification was established by the League of Nations in 1920, but the First International Conference to that end was only convened by the league in

The Soviet Union was consistently outvoted in the General Assembly in the immediate postwar years, the fact duly incorporated in the Soviet defensive rhetoric.

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1930. In the years to come, [with the] “studies” [underway], the international situation is going to change. The time is working for us. (3) The fight for the formulation of principles and norms of international law (for which we have to thoroughly prepare ourselves) we may wage from the advantageous position of protecting the purity of democratic principles: the right of nations to selfdetermination, safeguarding independence and sovereignty, equality among states, the struggle against oppression in all its forms and revival of fascism in any form or shape. (4) The US proposal will likely garner wide support at the Assembly session. By refusing to endorse it, I believe, we may put ourselves in a difficult situation and let ourselves, to a certain degree, being pushed away from decisive participation in setting up the “studies” and in formulating its direction. Our consent will give us the opportunity to influence the selection of members of a separate Committee of Legal Experts and the selection of the study’s topics. * * * The League of Nations in 1920 set up a Committee of Legal Experts (consisting of 5 members). As a result of the committee’s deliberations, a conference was convened in 1930 in The Hague, with the participation of representatives of 47 countries (USSR, if this is correct, sent an observer to the conference). Establishing a special Committee of Legal Experts or a Sub-Committee of the Sixth Committee (Legal) is perhaps the most expedient. Such a committee might comprise 15 best qualified scholars of international law. We should make sure that Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice – according to which the judges “represent the major forms of civilization and the major world legal systems – is observed. The committee should be entrusted with selecting themes for the study and with presenting for the next session of the General Assembly a proposal regarding [specific] issues along with the explanation as to how they fit the objective of progressive development of international law and its codification. It is advisable turning to academic institutes and societies dealing with international law with the request to assist in the work undertaken by the UN. This should be done in the first place in our own country. Our representative on the committee will have a difficult task before him. A group of Soviet scholars of international law must assist him. Simultaneously, on-related work of the Institute [of Law of the Soviet Academy of Science] and of [legal] scholars would contribute to the development of the Soviet science of international law, which does not match up, I admit, to the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet state. Propositions (1) Support the US delegation’s proposal concerning the implementation of Article 13 of the UN Charter that prescribes carrying out studies for the purpose of advancing international law and its codification. (2) In order to carry out preparatory work, set up a committee comprised of 15 best qualified scholars of international law. (3) Consider it expedient convening a committee meeting in The Hague.

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(4) Request the committee to present before the next session of the General Assembly a list of [specific] issues of international law that need to be addressed along with the explanation as to why it is necessary for the purpose of progressive development of international law and its codification. (5) Request Secretary General to (a) Call on academic institutes and societies dealing with international law to assist in the work undertaken by the UN. (b) Appoint a well-qualified official from the Legal Department of the UN Secretariat Office as an assistant to the committee.

No. 12 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Informs about the Draft Resolution Proclaiming Genocide an International Crime, November 23, 1946 BL, IOR, L/E/9/1488 180/72 November 23, 1946 WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations) No. 1920 IMPORTANT GIANT CENTRAL Following for Beckett from McKinnon Wood. Committee 6 yesterday considered resolution (A/[grp.undec.]/50] presented by Cuba, India and Panama asking E.C.O.S.O.C. to study the possibility of declaring “genocide” (race murder) an international crime on the same footing as piracy, of assuring international co-operation for its punishment and also of securing enactment of national penal legislation for its suppression. After Cuba had introduced the resolution Attorney moved amendment to replace operative clause which declares “that genocide level of international crime for commission of which principals and accessories as well as States are individually responsible”. While favouring conclusion of convention on international crimes, he strongly urged that Assembly must at once declare aggressive war and [?] genocide crimes, basing himself on Nuremberg trial and quotations from Grotius and Westlake.1 Supporting the proposal India submitted Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is credited with laying the theoretical foundations for international law. English legal scholar John Westlake (1828–1913) further elaborated on the principles of international law.

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amendment calling for national legislation and France on ground that States could not have criminal responsibility moved to read “principals and accessories be they private persons or statesmen”. Uruguay supported Attorney. U.S.S.R. favoured reference to E.C.O.S.O.C. United States which had earlier put in resolution for “formulation of principles of character of Nuremberg” and Poland did not speak before meeting was adjourned but favoured referring subject to codification sub-committee and the latter will probably move in this sense at the next meeting which will not be till after Monday. [Copy sent to Mr. Beckett.]

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The UN Resolution 96(I) of December 11, 1946 exposed fundamental differences between UN member states in general and the former Allies in particular regarding way forward on genocide. The United Kingdom emerged as the starkest critic of the proposed Genocide Convention. Foreign Office (FO) officials regarded the Assembly resolution as useless and the task of drafting a separate convention ridiculous (docs. 13, 15, 17). As of winter and spring of 1947, the British were willing to settle for an inconsequential draft prepared by the UN Secretariat. Or else, “we should not mind if it got lost somewhere and died a natural death.” The United States wanted a quick action on the Genocide Convention in the General Assembly, in part due to favorable public opinion (doc. 36). The State Department preferred referring the UN resolution to the CHR and the ILC, a potential move resisted by Lemkin (doc. 14). Lemkin’s indirect request to be part of deliberations in the matter of genocide was initially turned down by the UN Secretariat (doc. 18). The decision was shortly reversed, however, due to the tight drafting schedule and Lemkin’s perseverance (doc. 21). Lemkin, along with Vespasian Pella and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, were in May 1947 appointed as external experts who would draw up a Genocide Convention under the aegis of the Secretariat’s Human Rights Division (doc. 22). The Soviets did not have a clear idea how to proceed on the issue of genocide. Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sought information if the Soviet legislation contained any provisions relevant to genocide (doc. 19). All his ministry could come up with was the notorious article 58(I) (counterrevolutionary crimes) of the Russian Penal Code. Oxford law professor James Brierly predicted a fruitful Anglo-American cooperation and workable relationship with the Russians on legal matters (doc. 23). Within few weeks and months, however, the British representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts had to drastically revise his opinion. He no longer put trust in the work of the newly proposed International Law Commission (ILC), mainly on account of Soviet obstructionism (docs. 24, 28, 31). His American counterpart thought as much about the Soviets yet still felt positive about the ILC’s prospects (doc. 26). While the British did not support the French idea of an international criminal court (ICC), they seemed to agree on the need to codify so-called Nuremberg principles (doc. 25). The discussion around Nuremberg principles and genocide was complicated by personal antagonism between Lemkin on the one side and Pella and Donnedieu de

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Vabres on the other. Prepared with the assistance of the three legal experts, the UN Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention was a “maximum program,” in the words of the US representative on the committee and Columbia law professor Philip C. Jessup (doc. 27). The UN Secretariat, too, regarded the draft convention a subject to further discussion. For that matter, it invited UN member states to comment on the document (doc. 29). Lemkin, whose original ideas largely informed the text of the draft convention, wanted to promptly submit it for consideration by the General Assembly. The political situation was deteriorating while the “enemies of the convention” were seeking to bury it in various committees—he conveyed to Attorney General Hartley Shawcross, former Nuremberg judge and member of the UK delegation, in July 1947. To facilitate the process, Lemkin came out strongly against including political groups among those protected by the convention (doc. 30). Shawcross, however, in the internal correspondence to the Foreign Office, dismissed both the Genocide Convention and its main proponent (doc. 32). The Foreign Office concurred in the opinion that the draft convention proved to be a highly contentious political document. By expanding the meaning of genocide beyond physical destruction, it threatened to put the United Kingdom in the dock. Among possible genocide cases were mentioned the treatment of Germans in the British Zone of occupation, the Welsh in the United Kingdom, the Jews in Palestine, the communists in Greece, and several colonial peoples. Ideally, the UK Government would like to see the very idea of a convention on genocide dropped. An alternative course of action would be “spinning out matters in such a way that nothing ever happens” (doc. 33). Further instances that could be interpreted as genocide according to the present draft included the use of atomic weapons in Japan and the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. When discussing how to avoid reopening these and similar “embarrassing” questions, the Foreign Office came to the following conclusion: the Genocide Convention should not be drawn up exclusively by legal experts, for “some political advice would be needed to persuade the drafters to keep off politics” (doc. 35). The Commonwealth Relations Office had a direct message for the UK delegation. Since the draft Genocide Convention raised a number of political issues, including treatment of minorities—drop the whole idea of an international treaty (doc. 39). The United States, as of September 1947, still wanted to retain political groups yet was weary of the notion of cultural genocide, especially the draft clause regarding “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group.” Establishing an ad hoc tribunal like one at Nuremberg was no longer an opinion, while a permanent criminal court had remained an abstract proposition (doc. 37). Most crucial, the discrimination against black Americans could potentially become an international concern under the terms of the genocide treaty. Yet the chances of that ever happening remained slim, the State Department concluded (doc. 38). Consequently, the US delegation was instructed to vote against the Soviet-sponsored resolution that linked the issue of genocide to the codification of Nuremberg principles and actually questioned the very need for a separate convention (doc. 41). Lemkin’s insistence on segregating between genocide and laws of war, and his vailed warning



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against “internationalizing” crimes like lynching (doc. 40) might as well inform the American position. On November 22, 1947, the New York Times informed that the Lithuanian government in exile had charged the Soviet Union with genocide—the first such charge to ever be filed (doc. 42). The exiles accused Soviets of the extermination of the Lithuanian nation, specifically by means of deportation and forced labor. The General Assembly should act on the Lithuanian appeal, determined the newspaper. The question was how.

No. 13 British Foreign Office Officials Report on the UN Deliberations concerning the Crime of Genocide, Consider Unnecessary Drafting a Separate Convention, February 24  and 26, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67573/UN1658 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: RESOLUTION ON GENOCIDE Refers to United Nations Journals: Nos. 41, 47, 58 Object of this Resolution was that some form of law should prevent repetition of crimes against groups of people. Minutes February 24, 1947 Mr. Howard Smith Mr. Beckett GENOCIDE A resolution on genocide was passed by the Assembly of the United Nations at its recent Session. Copy of the text attached. The resolution was introduced by the Delegates of Panama, India and Cuba and was generally supported. The account of the proceedings in Committee 6 will be found in the following pages of the United Nations journal. Journal No. 41 Supplement No. 6 (AC.6/84) Journal No. 47 Supplement No. 6 (AC.6/96), & Journal No. 58 Supplement No. 6 (AC.6/127)1 2.  The sponsors of the resolution declared that the object of it was to prevent a repetition of crimes against groups of people by ensuring that such crimes were covered in the future by some form of law. There was practically no disagreement of substance,

See the full text of the documents in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, eds. Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), vol. 1, 8–12, 18–24, 28–30.

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though one draft had to be altered owing to the fact that the French maintained that under French law States could not be admitted to possess criminal responsibility. 3.  There was considerable argument about the correct procedure to be followed after the passage of a resolution; the Soviet Delegate insisting that the Economic and Social Council should be instructed to go ahead and prepare a draft Convention. Other Delegates thought that the Committee of Jurists entrusted with the codification of International Law would be a better forum, but in the interests of unanimity the Soviet proposal was ultimately agreed to (the Soviet Delegate thought that the Economic and Social Council was “particularly indicated by reason of its vast possibilities” – Journal No. 58 page 133).1 4.  The Economic and Social Council will have to decide itself how to undertake the necessary studies, and our Delegation need instruction. The obvious thing to do would be to refer the resolution to the Commission on Human Rights. The only trouble about this is that the Commission has all the work it can manage owing to its determination to present something in the way of a statement on human rights by the next Assembly and it cannot be expected itself also to produce a draft Convention on genocide. On the other hand, it might be suitable to pass this task to the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Minorities when it is set up. 5.  Please Kindly let us have your early observations so that we can send a telegram to the Delegation. I do not think that this is a matter which need to go to the I.O.C. (If any more detailed knowledge of the Debate is required Mr. Beckett is in constant touch with Mr. McGinnos McKinnon, who was present and can undoubtedly throw light on the Sub Commission Committee 6 proceedings. (P. H. Gore-Booth) *** February 26, 1947 This Assembly resolution on genocide is a useless resolution, and I think our attitude to it generally must be that we should not mind if it got lost somewhere and died a natural death, and at the most we do not want much time and expense being wasted in drawing up a perfectly useless convention. The resolution requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary studies for the drawing up of a draft convention which is to organise international co-operation between states with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. It is all a complete waste of time, seeing that, if genocide takes place anywhere, it will take place under conditions where no international convention will be observed. Genocide means, I suppose, the destruction of an entire human group just as homocide means the destruction of an individual.2 It is in view of the above that I think we have to frame our suggestions to our representative on the Economic and Social Council. There seem to me to be three possible alternatives. The Council might send it to the Human Rights Commission or to the Codification Commission Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification was established by Resolution 94(1) from December 11, 1946 in accordance with the UN Charter. 2 Eric Beckett apparently meant to say homicide. 1



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or direct the Secretariat to make the studies and submit a draft to the Council at a later date before the next Assembly. The Human Rights Commission has more than enough on its plate at the moment, and it would be a great pity to start off the Codification Committee with this ridiculous task when we want it to occupy itself with the more serious and proper subject of how international law or some parts of it can be codified. On the whole, therefore, I recommend that we should suggest that the Secretariat could study this matter and draw up a draft deprecating any special organisation to deal with this matter. [signed] Eric Beckett

No. 14 Conversation between Lemkin and Carl Marcy of the US State Department concerning the US Position on the UN Resolution on Genocide, February 25, 1947 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/2-2547) February 25, 1947 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Genocide Participants:

Mr. Lemkin, Civil Affairs, War Department Mr. Carl Marcy – OA

Copies to:

Mr. Fahy – Le Mr. Kotschnig – OA Mr. Wainhouse – OA Mr. Maktos – OA Mrs. McDiarmid – OA Mr. Kaplan – OA

Mr. Lemkin telephoned to discuss the position which the United States expects to take in connection with the General assembly resolution on genocide which is an item on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the Economic and Social Council. I explained to Mr. Lemkin that I could not speak for the Department. He said that he understood. Mr. Lemkin then said that he had ascertained that the Department of State wanted to refer the genocide resolution to the Human Rights Commission. I said that to my knowledge the Department had not made any such position public but that such a reference seemed to me to be logical since genocide seemed ultimately related to the subjects considered by the Human Rights Commission. Mr. Lemkin said that he was afraid that genocide will get involved in the political maneuverings in connection

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with human rights and would be lost. He said that he hoped that a convention on genocide would be the first convention approved by the United Nations. I said that the General assembly resolution was very clear in specifying that a convention on genocide is to be reported to the next assembly and that I felt, therefore, that the Human Rights Commission, if the matter is referred to it, would be under a mandate to prepare such a convention so that the Economic and Social Council could report to the General assembly next September. Mr. Lemkin then said that he understood that Mr. Fahy wanted to have a special committee to handle the subject of genocide. I said that I did not know what Mr. Fahy’s position might be on this matter. Mr. Lemkin asked if he might get in touch with me later on this subject.

No. 15 The British Foreign Office Prefers the UN Secretariat to Draw a Draft Genocide Convention, March 7, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67573/UN1658 March 7, 1947 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK (To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations) No. 745 Repeated to Washington No: 246 Saving IMPORTANT SECRET GIANT GENOCIDE Following is guidance on item 21 of provisional Agenda of Economic and Social Council – Assembly resolution on genocide. 2. This Assembly resolution is generally speaking a useless one seeing that if Genocide (meaning the destruction of an entire human group just as homicide means the destruction of an individual) takes place anywhere it will take place under conditions where no international convention will be observed. However the idea of the sponsors of the resolution in the Assembly was to prevent a repetition of crimes against humanity, in this case the particular case of crimes against groups of people, by ensuring that such crimes were covered in the future by some form of law. There was in the Assembly practically no disagreement of substance, and it will be recalled that in the 6th Committee the Attorney-General himself expressed the view that the United Nations had clearly to state that aggressive war and genocide constituted punishable crimes.



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3.  The main difficulty is with regard to the procedure to be followed in giving effect to the resolution, which “requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary study, with a view to drawing up a draft Convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly.” There are three possible alternative courses. (a) The Council might refer the matter to the Human Rights Commission; or (b) to the Codification Committee; or (c) Direct the Secretariat to make the necessary study and submit a draft to the Council at a later date before the next Assembly. 4. The Human Rights Commission already has more than enough work and cannot possibly be expected to produce a draft Convention on genocide before the next Assembly. As regards the Codification Committee we want it to occupy itself with the more serious and proper subjects of how International Law or some parts of it can be codified. On the whole therefore we recommend that the Secretariat should be instructed to study the question of genocide and to draw up a draft convention. We should depreciate the setting up of any special committee or organisation to deal with this question. 5.  You should be guided by the above when this item comes before the Economic and Social Council.

No. 16 The UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations Reports on Divergent Procedure for Drafting a Genocide Convention as Proposed by National Delegations, March 16, 1947 BL, IOR, L/E/9/1488, 180/72 March 16, 1947 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on] WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to United Nations) No. 868 IMMEDIATE FERTILE Your telegram No. 7451 Council took Item 21 (genocide) on March 15th. All speakers supported preparation of a Draft Convention, but there was considerable divergence on procedure. LatinAmericans, France and U.S.S.R. wanted an ad hoc Drafting Committee of Council See doc. no. 15.

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Members to meet in the interval before the next Session of the Council. United States and Netherlands supported alternative (a) in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference, Norway supported alternative (b), and China and ourselves spoke for alternative (c), China suggesting that the Council might refer the Secretariat’s draft to the Sub-Committee on prevention of discrimination for study. 2.  No decision was taken and the four alternatives were referred to the Committee of the whole on social questions. Secretariat are very much against a Committee of the Council Meeting between Sessions and we hope at least to avoid this, though it may be necessary to accept reference to the Human Rights Commission. 3. If you have any further views on this they should reach us by 0800 hours 18th March.

No. 17 The British Foreign Office Prefers Delayed Action on Genocide in the United Nations, March 17, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67573/UN1902 March 17, 1947 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK (To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations) No. 877 Repeated to Washington No. 304. Saving IMMEDIATE SECRET FERTILE Your telegram No. 868 [of 16th March.] Genocide We should be glad to see this item lost sight of and therefore see some advantage in suggestion of China that the Secretariat should prepare first draft, and that this draft should be referred to Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination (presumably through the Human Rights Commission). If matter is referred to the Human Rights Commission the Council must emphasise that the Human Rights Commission must first finish its important task of drafting the International Bill of Rights before giving any attention to question of Genocide.



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No. 18 Raphael Lemkin Not Allowed to Participate in Formal Discussions On Genocide in the ECOSOC, April 4, 1947 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (4), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Individuals April 4, 1947 Miss Birgitta Bellander, President Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Swedish Section Stockholm, Sweden Dear Madam, I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram dated 7 March 1947 concerning your request that Mr. Lemkin should be present in an official capacity at the deliberations of the Economic and Social Council in the matter of genocide. For your information members of the public are not permitted to participate in discussions taking place within any of the organs of the United Nations. Very truly yours, D. Underwood1

No. 19 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov Briefed on Soviet Legislation pertaining to the Crime of Genocide, April 5, 1947 AVP RF, 06/09/23/287 April 5, 1947 To Comrade V. M. Molotov2 In view of the General Assembly’s resolution [prescribing] UN member states to pass laws against genocide (the killing of individuals or the extermination of entire populations on ethnic, racial, or religious grounds), we inform you, as per your request, that the Soviet legislation contains the following [articles] pertaining to this issue:3 1. By proclaiming before the law the equality of Soviet citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or race, Article 123 of the Constitution of the USSR declares unlawful Further information about this particular individual is unavailable. Possibly, D. Underwood served under Benjamin Cohen in the UN Department of Public Information or under Henri Laugier in the UN Department of Social Affairs. 2 Molotov forwarded the brief to Vyshinsky. 3 Refers to UN Resolution 96(I) from December 11, 1946. 1

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[predusmatrivaet presledovanie zakonom] any direct or indirect curtailment of the rights of Soviet citizens on the basis of their race or ethnicity, as well as the promotion of any sort of racial, exclusiveness or contempt.1 2. Article 58-1 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR [Russia] (and relevant articles of the Penal Codes of other Soviet Republics) regards as counterrevolutionary crimes any activity that aims to undermine or to lessen the proletarian revolution’s national achievements.2 Hence, accountability for this kind of offense [genocide] should fall under the article that deals with counterrevolutionary crimes, even though the paragraph on “Counterrevolutionary Crimes” does not include specific provisions regarding acts of racially or ethnically motivated murder and extermination.3 The section “Especially Dangerous Crimes Against the [Present] System of Government” in the penal codes of our Soviet Republics only applies to the incitement of ethnic hatred and discord [rozn] by means of propaganda or agitation. These codes have no provisions whatsoever for the punishment of religiously motivated murder and extermination. 3. The USSR’s Penal Code (currently in the works and sent to us upon request) contains the section “International Crimes Against Peace and Humanity” that provides for punishment in cases involving racially, ethnically, or religiously motivated murder, torture, and other atrocities.4 S. Vinogradov S. Krylov

No. 20 Raphael Lemkin Thanks UN Secretary General Trygve Lie for His Assistance in Passing the UN Resolution That Proclaimed Genocide a Crime under International Law, May 6, 1947 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (4), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Individuals May 6, 1947 H.E. M. Trygve Lie Secrtetary General This is a nearly verbatim rendition of Article 123 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution, which appeared in Section X, “Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens.” 2 The notorious Article 58(I) was a staple tool for political repression in Stalin’s Russia. Among the 4.8 million people arrested in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1938, 69 percent were sentenced on charges of counterrevolutionary activity. 3 The Russian linguistic tradition does not distinguish between killing and murder, whereas the word natsionalnost usually refers to ethnicity. 4 The 1936 Constitution provided for the promulgation of a USSR penal code, yet the 1958 reform placed only the most important criminal laws within its jurisdiction. 1



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United Nations Lake Success, N.Y. Your Excellency: I hope you remember our correspondence from April and May (May 23, 1946, B. Cohen) concerning the necessity of declaring genocide an International crime.1 I am very happy to see now a year later that this project has materialized. I wish to thank Your Excellency most warmly and to congratulate on the very important work done by the United Nations in this respect. As the author of the concept of genocide in International law I am especially gratified by this development. Somehow the French Revolution, which proclaimed the rights of man, forgot about the most essential of our rights, namely, the right to exist. It is inconceivable to have an orderly International life without effective International guarantees of the right of existence of entire human groups and their cultures. I take this opportunity to enclose a recent article of mine, which gives a background history of the problem of genocide, including the splendid work of the United Nations. Respectfully yours, Raphael Lemkin

No. 21 The UN Secretariat Seeks Names of Legal Experts Who Could Help Draw up a Genocide Convention, May 13, 1947 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (1) A, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Governments May 13, 1947 [Memorandum] Dr. Ivan Kerno Assistant Secretary-General, Legal Department Henri Laugier Assistant Secretary-General, Social Affairs Department General Assembly Resolution on Genocide As you know, the resolution on Genocide adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its last session instructs the Secretary-General “to undertake, with the assistance of experts in the field of international and criminal law, the necessary studies with a view to drawing up a draft convention in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly”. See doc. no. 9.

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Professor Giraud of the Division of Human Rights has prepared a preliminary draft study and convention which, in accordance with the same resolution, will be submitted to the Codification Committee toward the end of its present session. Before the Codification Committee is consulted, however, it will be necessary to seek the assistance of experts in the field of international and criminal law. It has been proposed that, because of timing difficulties, these experts be sought within the membership of the Codification Committee. I would very much appreciate your indicating to Professor Giraud the names of those members of the Codification Committee who should be asked to act in that capacity. You will note that there should be experts not only in the field of international law but also in the field of criminal law. I may add that we have also asked Professor Lemkin who has exhibited a great interest in this matter to consult with us in the capacity of an expert.

No. 22 Raphael Lemkin Invited to Serve as an Expert of International and Criminal Law in Drawing up a UN Draft Genocide Convention, May 13, 1947  UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (4), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Individuals May 13, 1947 Professor Raphael Lemkin 2003 Kalorama Road Washington, D.C. Dear Professor Lemkin: As you know, the Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution at its last session by which it instructed the Secretary-General to “undertake, with the assistance of experts in the field of international and criminal law, the necessary studies with a view to drawing up a draft convention in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly”.1 I would very much appreciate your letting us have the benefit of your experience in this matter and acting as one of the experts contemplated by the resolution. If this is agreeable to you, Professor Giraud will get you into touch with you by telephone and let you know when you should come to Lake Success. I should say that the consultations with experts contemplated by the resolution must take place within the

The UN official forgot to mention that the proposed convention deals with the crime of genocide. This mistake was corrected in the French version of the letter dated May 21, 1947. Laugier sent an identical letter to Lemkin in Washington and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella, both in New York.

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next few days since we hope to submit a project to the Committee on the Development and Codification of International Law which is now in session. Yours sincerely, Henri Laugier Assistant Secretary-general In charge of Social Affairs

No. 23 UK Representative, Professor James L. Brierly, Reports on the First Meeting of the UN Committee of Legal Experts, Eager to Dispose of the Idea of an International Criminal Court, May 15, 1947 NA, FO 371/67519/UN3071 May 15, 1947 United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations My dear Beckett, I think you may like a rather fuller account of the start of our Committee to supplement the telegram which is being sent to you today.1 The atmosphere is very friendly. The Soviet member turns out to be a student of early English law, and has studied in England. He has presented me with a brochure, in Russian, of excerpts from the laws of Athelstan.2 The Columbian has been telling me how important it is that British should not disinterest herself in Latin America, and explaining how easy it would be for me to go out to his country and lecture. So far only Jessup and myself have produced anything in the nature of definite proposals. We have each put in a written memorandum, and each addressed the Committee at some length. The only other member who has advanced anything definite is the Frenchman, who wants an International Criminal Court.3 For the moment he has been put off, with some difficulty, until we come to Nuremberg, and so far no one has supported him. It may later be possible to dispose of the matter as being outside our terms of reference. I got the impression that not many members have any definite instructions. I know that is so with the Chinese and the Australian, but of course it is early days yet. Document not in the file. The UN Committee of Legal Experts was established by a UN resolution of December 11, 1946. The seventeen members of the committee convened from May 12 and June 17, 1947. The committee was succeeded by an International Law Commission, as provided for by the UN resolution of November 21, 1947. 2 Vladimir Koretsky (1890–1984), an expert on international private law and member of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1946, 1947, and 1949. 3 Henri Donnedieu de Vabres (1880–1952), a professor of international law at the University of Paris from 1945 to 1952. In 1945–46 he served as the French judge at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. 1

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Jessup is evidently disposed to be cooperative, and I think it will be expedient to work with him as far as possible, even at the cost of some concessions from our plan. The main points on which his plan differs from ours are: (a) the method of election, and (b) the functions of the proposed commission. As to (a) he proposes a method similar to that for electing the judges, and does not like our proposal of the Court. He thinks that although the member sought to be elected for their individual qualifications, it will nonetheless be necessary to secure representation for the main juridical cultures as it is with the judges. He thinks also that his plan will secure more prestige for the Commission, and he is very anxious to get this. I know you attach importance to election by the Court, but it seems to me that there is some force in these arguments and I should be glad to have your views. I can, of course, press for the Court, but I rather doubt whether I can get it through. (b) As regards functions, Jessup’s proposal is that they should be twofold: (1) “the preparation of drafts upon such subjects as may be referred to the Commission by the General Assembly, and upon such other subjects as the Commission might determine to be in need of this type of treatment”; and (2) “the scientific restatement of existing rules and practices of international law”. I do not like the idea of the Commission proposing subjects for international conventions, and I believe that your view is that this is really a political matter, that legislation should be proposed when a practical need has made itself felt, and that it is not for the Commission to say when such need exists. Other points on which the American plan differs from ours are more of less consequential on this divergence. They propose the submission of the Commission’s drafts to Governments for their comments. It seems to me that this would lead us into all the difficulties that the League plan got into. Also, they would let the General Assembly refer the drafts to its Sixth Committee, and possibly to a small group of governmental representatives for recommendation. This, I think, is open to the same objections. We saw a little of your sister of our voyage out, and found that she was travelling with a Miss Hagell, an acquaintance of my sister, for whom we were also on the lookout. We spent the interval before the meeting of the Committee very pleasantly in trips to Montreal, and to an old pupil of mine in Vermont. Yours ever, J. L. Brierly

No. 24 James Brierly Compares and Contrasts the British, American, and Soviet Outlook on Codification of International Law, as Transpires from the Work of the UN Committee of Legal Experts, May 27, 1947 NA, FO 371/67519/UN3151 May 27, 1947



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United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations My dear Beckett, Thank you for your very prompt reply to my cypher telegram No. 1440 of 21st May.1 I will comment on it in detail later in this letter. But I think you may first like to have some general impressions of the work of the Committee. We move painfully slowly. We have decided after two weeks work to recommend the setting up of a Commission, for three years in the first place, but with a view to permanency, to carry out the progressive development of international law and its eventual codification in accordance with further recommendations which we shall make, but about which we are now disputing. Koretsky, the Soviet representative, is the chief cause of our slowness. He makes speeches of inordinate length and great violence (though personally he is pleasant enough). He is against the whole idea of restatements: conventions, and only conventions, are worth having. Yesterday he actually argued with apparently passionate conviction that restatements are a device by which imperialist powers hope to keep in continued subjugation nations which are struggling for their freedom!2 But I think he is not doing his cause much good by ranting of this kind. So far the only attacks on restatement in principle have come from the U.S.S.R., Sweden and Poland. The Netherlands, France, Argentine, Brazil, Australia, China, U.S.A. and U.K. favour them, though not always in a form which we can accept. Panama has not said a single word yet, and Egypt only a few formal sentences; but our Indian chairman expresses no personal or governmental views. The Jugoslav will probably go with Koretsky, though his frequent interventions are nearly always concerned with punctilios of procedure. Venezuela and Columbia hardly ever speak. It is difficult to know what Koretsky is after. It may be that he opposes restatements simply because we and the U.S. favour them. Or it may be that he realises that U.S.S.R. could always block a convention which she did not like, whereas a restatement, though not binding, might morally weaken some position she might wish to take up. But at the end of a long harangue yesterday, and just as we were breaking up, Koretsky asked for a small sub-committee to try and reach an agreed formula. After consideration Jessup and I have decided to accept this on Monday. It cannot do any harm, and it may show us what he really wants. The sub-committee will consist of Koretsky, Jessup, the Netherlands, Brazil, who is a jolly old boy and an inveterate peace-maker, and myself. To return to Jessup’s proposals. Before I received your telegram we decided that he (with China) should present them to the Committee, and I should reserve my attitude. I think this is still the best arrangement, as I shall then be able to put our views where they differ from his, and at the same time to give him general support. You will have seen that the basic difference between his views and ours is that we, I In his communication to Brierly from May 22, 1947, Beckett agreed with the former that the prospective law commission should not propose subjects for international conventions. Otherwise, Beckett warned, “I think that we are almost certain to be back in all the difficulties of codification under the League of Nations and the result will be failure.” Beckett suggested Brierly “do your utmost to bring him [Jessup] round over this aspect of the matter….” 2 Cf. doc. no. 11. 1

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think, had envisaged the Commission as mainly a supervisory, and therefore not a full-time, body. Also I, and I think you, had mainly had in view its functions as regards codification, and not given much consideration to the other part of our reference, “the progressive development of international law”. Jessup wants it to have quite important functions in this regard also. His memorandum has been modified in important respects since I sent my telegram. In particular he has withdrawn his proposal for “independent consideration of and recommendation to the General Assembly of topics in relation to legislative development” to which I objected on the same grounds as you mention in your telegram. What remains is merely a reference to “topics initially considered” by the Commission, and what he has in mind is that the Commission might usefully recommend technical improvements such as uniform formal clauses in multilateral treaties, a multilingual glossary of terms, etc. I had also used the arguments you suggest against a too ambitious role for the Commission. On that his view is that we ought to recommend the scheme which we consider the best, and that it will be for the Assembly to decide whether it has the means to carry out our scheme as a whole, and if not to assign priorities (which possibly we also might suggest) to its various items. I have also expressed my doubts whether fulltime appointments will attract the best men. With reference to paragraph 4 of your telegram, he does not want the restatements to require adoption by the Assembly or ratification by governments. He wants to leave the gate matter open, as we do, to be decided as may seem best in each case. Yours ever, J. L. Brierly

No. 25 The British Foreign Office Welcomes the Decision to Delegate the Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles to the Newly Established International Law Commission, June 5, 1947 NA, FO 371/67519/UN3184 June 5, 1947 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be restrained by the authorized recipient and not passed on] WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to United Nations) No. 1531 Repeated to Washington Saving Your telegram No. 1597: Codification of International Law Following for Beckett from Brierly



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Committee has decided to recommend to General assembly that an International Law Commission should be set up and broadly that its organization and procedures should follow lines of proposal jointly submitted by the United States of America and China (United Nations DOC A/AC. 10/33 of 23rd May). I expect that it will be possible to send you next week draft of my report covering Committee’s detailed recommendations on this item of its Agenda and on those concerned with relations with Organs of United Nations and with enlisting the assistance of National or International Bodies. 2.  Committee has decided by an overwhelming majority to recommend (France alone voting against with one or two abstentions) that the question of plans for the formulation of the Nuremberg principles should be referred to the proposed International Law Commission and that our Committee should not undertake discussion of substantive pr[grps. omitted]. * * * Minutes June 9, 1947 Proposal for setting up of an International Law Commission means in fact that present Committee will not engage in any discussion of subject matter, but will merely have fulfilled an organisational role. I am glad that formulation of Nuremberg principles will be left to the new body. The French Representative (Prof. Donnedieu de Vabres) was obstinately persistent in bringing this question to the fore, or in recommending setting-up of an International Criminal Court. No action is called for at this stage. C. B. B. Heathcote-Smith June 9, 1947 I have in fact sent a letter to Prof. Brierly in reply to this one, and the Dept. has a copy of it. E. Beckett

No. 26 Philip Jessup, US Representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts, Speculates about Further Soviet Moves on the UN Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, June 7, 1947 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/6-747) June 7, 1947

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PERSONAL Mr. Charles Fahy Legal Adviser Department of State Washington, D.C. Dear Charles: I am taking advantage of Saturday morning to clean up some work at the University, but I want to drop you a line which you will get Monday morning. I enclose a paper which I understand that Professor Brierly, the U.K. delegate, will probably introduce. It seems to me that it represents a position which we could support perhaps with a statement concerning the importance which we attach to the subject and that there is nothing our committee can do to move the consideration of the project forward more rapidly.1 Although I have no definite evidence, I have a hunch that the Soviet delegate may urge detailed consideration of the Secretariat draft. If he does so I think he would be supported by the French, Polish, and Yugoslav representatives but probably no others. Our session yesterday afternoon presented a fine display of stalling technique by the Russian group. If they intend to continue this approach the committee may not conclude its work before I have to leave for Seattle. You may recall that I am under obligation to begin teaching in the University of Washington summer school on Monday, June 23. Under these circumstances, I wonder whether the matter of John Maktos’ appointment as alternate is proceeding and whether you want to leave the conclusion of the work to him. The situation in the committee shifts from day to day like the weather and it may be that we can move forward more rapidly next week, but I think it is just as well to be prepared for eventualities. I suppose you will phone me if you want to discuss these points. Sincerely yours, Philip C. Jessup

No. 27 US Representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts Reports on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, Cites Personal Differences between Raphael Lemkin, Vespasian Pella, and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres (excerpt), June 19, 1947 NARA, DoS General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 59/3039E/18 (US/A/AC.10/4) June 19, 1947 Document (which does not necessarily deal with the draft Genocide Convention) not in the file.

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CONFIDENTIAL SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CODIFICATION 5. The principles of Nuremberg and Genocide The discussions in the Committee on the principles of Nuremberg and genocide were complicated by personal factors. The French Representative, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, is a specialist on international penal law and on other aspects of international law. He was the French Judge on the Nuremberg Tribunal. He arrived a little late, in ignorance of the fact that the Committee’s main task was to recommend methods for the progressive development of international law and its codification. He was accompanied, unofficially, by Professor Vespasian Pella, a Rumanian who has made the development of international penal law his life work and in his mind, practically his monopoly. He evidently has great influence over de Vabres. They appear to resent the fact that Dr. Lemkin has achieved remarkable success in the promotion of the concept of genocide. A marked antagonism was in evidence between Lemkin on the one side and Pella and de Vabres on the other. Pella made a determined effort to secure from the committee an invitation to appear before it and to testify as an expert on international penal law. In this effort he was supported by de Vabres and by Assistant Secretary General Kerno. The invitation was opposed by the Representatives of the United States, UK, and USSR. The eventual compromise was that Pella delivered a twenty-minute lecture one afternoon in another room at Lake Success. Kerno presided and the members of the Committee all attended in their individual and not in their official capacities. Professor de Vabres put in a paper (A/AC.10/29) the thesis of which was that genocide should be considered merely an aspect of “crimes against humanity” which should be studied in connection with the formulation of the Nuremberg principles.1 When it was apparent that the Committee did not share this view, he urged that the subject of genocide de deferred for consideration to the ILC – a maneuver which Lemkin believed was designed to forestall the possibility of consideration of the topic by ECOSOC and by the GA in 1947. The position of the United States was that it had taken the lead in the Sixth Committee of the GA in making clear that the Codification Committee was not to attempt itself to formulate the Nuremberg principles but merely to make plans for their formulation. The paper introduced by the United States (A/AC.10/36) made this clear and won the support of the Committee. On genocide, the instructions to the United States Representative were to avoid any appearance of trying to delay action on the subject although it was to be recognized that this Committee was not suitably constituted to enter into substantive discussions on the subjects. The United States Representative accordingly secured the cooperation of the UK Representative in introducing a paper which in effect recommended that

See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 137–43.

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the Committee leave the question of genocide at this stage to ECOSOC (A/AC.10/44).1 The United States Representative opened the debate by making a strong statement on the importance which the United States attached to the subject, but supporting the UK proposal. This led to a series of statements by other members of the Committee on the same lines. The result is that the records of the Committee show vigorous support for the elaboration of a convention on genocide although the text of its communication to the Secretary-General merely indicates that it could not enter into substantive discussion of the Draft Convention prepared by the Secretariat, owing to the absence of information regarding the views of governments. (A/AC.10/). The Secretariat draft (A/AC.10/42) was prepared with the assistance of Lemkin, Pella and de Vabres. It is described by the Secretariat as a “maximum programme”. In the opinion of some individuals it would characterize as genocide the work of the House Committee on Un-American Activities or of American foreign missionaries. It clearly will require careful study and eventual redrafting. The draft will presumably now be sent by the Secretary-General to governments with the request that they submit comments before the next meeting of ECOSOC on July 16. It is not to be expected that many such comments will be received before that date. The United States Representative in ECOSOC will therefore need to be prepared to take a position on the next step. It can be confidently anticipated that Dr. Lemkin will continue to press for procedure which would assure some further action on genocide by the General Assembly at its Second Session.

No. 28 James Brierly Concerned over Political Undercurrents in the Proposed International Law Commission, Critical of Soviet Obstructionism, July 7, 1947 NA, FO 371/67519/UN3645 July 7, 1947 COPY All Souls College Oxford My dear Beckett, 1. I send you, as promised, some impressions on the meeting of the “Committee on the progressive development of international law and its codification”. 2. The Committee was badly constituted, and it was surprising that, in view of the keenness of states at the last General assembly to be represented on it, those states that did get on the Committee should not have sent better qualified representatives. See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 145–46.

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Only three or four had any special knowledge of international law; most of the others were diplomats or consuls of no great distinction. This cause of itself would have been enough to give the Committee the non-scientific political atmosphere which soon became apparent. 3. We had a very weak chairman in the Indian Sir Dalip Singh. He was personally a very charming person with wide intellectual interests, and he was pathetically anxious to do well; but he knew nothing about international law, he was unconscious of the undercurrents in the Committee, and he was infinitely tolerant to obstructive tactics in debate. With the best intentions he contracted the habit of trying to bring a debate to a head by formulating the issues before us, but his formulations invariably confused the discussion and started a fresh round of explanatory speeches. 4. But much the most serious handicap was the attitude of the Soviet representative, Koretsky. I have never met anyone with such an inexhaustible flow of language; if we had not had the simultaneous interpretation device, we should probably still be sitting. Over and over again he made the same points, but he had a first rate mind and he certainly knew his brief. At first I was puzzled; he seemed merely bent on obstruction. But gradually I came to see that all his advocacy was based on a clear and consistent position, namely that the U.S.S.R. will not recognise the binding force of any rule to which it has not expressly agreed. Hence his insistence on conventions and nothing but conventions, and his unqualified opposition to anything which might add force, even merely persuasive force, such as our restatement would give, to the existing customary law. I do not think that he ever actually said that the U.S.S.R. does not admit any obligatory force in that law, but he certainly implied that. He attacked it over and over again as the creation of a few favoured states which had had the luck to get in first with their own bourgeois ideas, and were now trying to impose those ideas on other states which had never been consulted about their formulation. It was time for these other states to make their voices heard; they must cut the dead wood out of the existing system and formulate the law of the new genuinely democratic era.1 5. This is a note which will certainly be struck again when the General Assembly considers our report, and it is a very dangerous one. Based as it is on a half-truth, it is very difficult to controvert, and from the eager way in which countries like Egypt and India rose to the bait every time, it is certain to appeal strongly to the “underprivileged” members of the Assembly. They don’t stop to ask whether it is really true that the existing law treats them unfairly, and they have no particular principles that they want to put in its place. But they begin to suspect that they being exploited, and they are determined to be in at the reconstruction of the law. That was one of the reasons that led to the fixing of the number of the Commission at fifteen. All the weaker states were reckoning up their chances of a seat on the Commission for themselves as obviously as if they had made their calculations aloud. 6. There was hardly any support for our idea that the Court should appoint the members of the Commission – only Sweden, I think. But a much more serious blot in the report is the decision to make the service full-time. Unfortunately on both these points I had the Americans against me. I argued as strongly as I could that this would Cf. doc. no. 11.

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prevent the best qualified men from coming forward as candidates, and I am sure that that will be one result, and I also used the argument of expense. But there was a feeling in everyone’s mind, I think, except mine that the Commission will be overwhelmed with work and that nothing but full-time service will enable it to make any progress. This is clearly one of the matters which we should try to get changed at the Assembly. 7. I suggest that at the Assembly the basis of our argument should be that the Commission is being established in the first instance only on an experimental footing. Let us therefore go slow at first. We could point out that if experience shows that full time service is really necessary, it would be easy to make the change from part time to full time, whereas if it shows the reverse it would be difficult to go from full time to part time. So too with the argument from expense; why decide now to spend a very large sum of money which may prove not to be necessary? That argument applies also to the numbers of the Commission; start with, say, nine, and go up to fifteen if a large number proves necessary. 8. Then I think we might argue that it is by no means certain that there will be a lot of work for the Commission. If the plan of work envisaged in the report is examined carefully, I think it is certain that much of it will amount to little or nothing. I think, for instance, that it is true of paragraphs 8 and 9, which deal with the Commission’s role in what we ordinarily call international legislation, though in deference to Koretsky’s violent opposition to that term we avoided its use. But I cannot myself think that it is at all probable that the Assembly will normally refer to the Commission projects of legislation, that is to say, of extending the law into new fields; projects of that kind are either technical or political, and not primarily legal, and the Commission would be a quite unsuitable body to handle them. Nor again has para. 9 in my opinion any real importance. What remains is what we call “codification” (paras. 11–15), the Panamanian declaration, Nuremberg, and genocide. But none of these can be done in a hurry, and none of them can be done by a committee; they need concentrated individual work, first class facilities for research, such as libraries; and it is simply ludicrous to think that they could be carried on in the offices or conference rooms of Lake Success, or indeed anywhere but in an academic atmosphere. 9. There are a lot of smaller points in the report which I think are not satisfactory, but I will not go into these now. The unnecessary elaboration of these was partly due to the Americans, who had evidently given them a lot of thought, and partly to Koretsky, who was determined to reduce the Commission’s powers of initiative and to tie it hand and foot to the Assembly. I suggest that we might urge the omission of most of these detailed instructions, and leave the Commission much freer to frame its own programme and methods of work, but that may not be easy to put over. But here again we could use the argument that this is desirable in the first instance at least while the Commission is on an experimental footing. 10. We asked the Secretary-General to suggest governments that they should be ready with their lists of candidates at the next Assembly in order that, if it is decided to establish the Commission, elections may not have to be postponed for another year. But I doubt if that will be effective, both because governments are not as a rule willing to make arrangements for eventualities which may not arise, and still more because I do not see how any man can say whether he will or will not be a candidate until he



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knows for certain the conditions of work, what the salary will be, whether full or part time, etc. 11. Looking back on this Committee I feel that the prospect of any real progress for international law coming out of it is very small. The report itself might be turned into a workable scheme, but the most perfect scheme will be useless if it has to be worked in the sort of atmosphere of this Committee. If the Commission is brought into existence, one of its members will be Koretsky or his counterpart, and there will be others, perhaps even a majority, whose first aim will be to press their national claims, and who will look to their own governments for instructions. No good can come out of a Commission of that kind, and for myself I should not be sorry to see the whole thing postponed until, if ever, the times are more propitious for a genuinely cooperative and scholarly effort. Yours sincerely, J. L. BRIERLY

No. 29 UN Secretary General Invites the Government of India to Comment on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, July 7, 1947 BL, IOR, L/E/9/1488, 180/72 July 7, 1947 United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General Pandit Jahwarlal [sic] Nehru The Honorable Minister for External Affairs Department of External Affairs New Delhi, 3 India The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Honorable Minister for External Affairs of India and, in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 28 March 1947 in connection with the crime of genocide, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Document E/447 containing a Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the International Crime of Genocide, together with a study on this subject.1 The Secretary-General has the honour to state that these documents were drafted by the Secretariat with the assistance of experts in the field of international and criminal This is a standard letter sent to all UN member states.

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law, and that in drafting the Convention the Secretariat was guided by the principles set forth in Resolution 96(I) adopted by the General assembly on 11 December 1946 on the Crime of Genocide. The Secretary-General wishes to make clear that in transmitting the Draft Convention he is not recommending any specific proposal therein, but that the document now enclosed is intended to provide a wide basis for discussion and to facilitate the work of Member Governments by drawing attention to all the important aspects of the question of genocide. The Draft Convention is accordingly very comprehensive, but is so drafted that its scope might easily be reduced by certain omissions or by amendments to the present wording. The Secretary-General has the honour to state it would be desirable if at all possible for the comments of Member Governments to be before the Economic and Social Council at its fifth session which is scheduled to last from 19 July until 16 August 1947. In the case of those Governments who are Members of the Economic and Social Council, it would be desirable to have the views of such Governments presented at the Council by their representatives.

No. 30 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Support of Hartley W. Shawcross, Attorney General for England and Wales, in Passing the Genocide Convention, July 8, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67519 July 8, 1947 Sir Hartley Shawcross, Attorney General of U.K. Whitehall, London. Sir Hartley, Since long I intended to write to you and to report on the developments in the matter of genocide, which owes its international recognition to your efforts at the last Assembly of the U.N. The Social and Economic Council decided in March 1947 to request the Secretary General to prepare a draft convention on the crime of genocide with the assistance of experts in international criminal law and after consultation with the Committee on Progressive Development and Codification of International Law to submit the draft convention to member governments for their observations. In May 1947 the Secretary General invited three experts, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, whom you know from Nuremberg, Professor Pella and myself. We have prepared a draft convention but the Committee on Codification could not give its Opinion because of the following reasons. The Committee was not a body of legal experts. With the exception of four



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professors all the others were members of legislations and embassies in Washington. They considered themselves as representatives of their own governments and could not express their opinions on the convention for lack of instructions from their governments, which did not see the Convention yet. To-day, July 9, 1947 the Secretary General intends to submit the draft convention to the member states. But already on July 19, the Social and Economic Council will meet again for four weeks and will discuss the draft convention. It is of great urgency that the governments should send in their remarks as soon as possible. If the lawyers will not spoil the splendid work of the last assembly we will have the convention on genocide this year. A number of lawyers do not see the difference between genocide and crimes against humanity. Not all of them realize that genocide is predominantly (here lies its main urgency) a peace time concept. If genocide is committed in time of war it will be considered either a war crime when committed in occupied territory; or as one of the crimes against humanity if committed by the aggressor state on its own nationals on its own territory. I tried to explain to the lawyers here that one should not destroy the results of Nuremberg by confusing or misinterpreting crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are a useful addition to the Hague Convention and to crimes against peace. If a government engages in aggressive war, it tries to destroy its opposition by killing and persecutions. Such crimes are part of aggression. That is the sense of art.6 par. C of the Nuremberg Charter.1 Crimes against humanity cannot become international crimes like piracy. What would happen if the courts in England would be given the jurisdiction over all acts of persecution (including political discrimination) committed under the Hitler regime? I hear that some lawyers in England would like to wait with the genocide convention until all possible crimes of any international significance are codified in an international criminal code or otherwise. But such a work would take decades. We should concentrate now on the most burning matters, as you rightly pointed out at the last Assembly. Throughout history the main attacks were directed against religious, racial and national groups. They have no protection now. There are no more minority treaties. The framers of the International Bill of Rights do not foresee any practical possibility of enforcement of such rights on an international scale. Human rights are based on national constitutions and national constitutions and are the outgrow of political ideologies. We can now do constructive work on genocide, because it is essentially a national-cultural concept. The political groups do not belong here organically and if some governments will prefer to omit them, then we still have much to protect. I feel that if we will not have the Convention on genocide this year we might not have it for many years because the political situation is deteriorating. The adoption of the Convention would signify also a strengthening of the United Nations.

Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter defines Crimes Against Humanity as follows: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

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Sir Hartley, now like in autumn 1946 so much depends on you. This convention will not become a law without your support. You public utterances appeal to the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world. I am sure that if you would kindly agree to make a public statement as to the necessity for the Governments to act quickly on the convention, the Social and Economic Council which meets in 10 days will not even try to postpone the issue for a year or so. And nobody would dare to think about sending the Convention to a Committee to be created by the future General Assembly to be studied for years to come. The enemies of the Convention will never dare to attack it frontally. The way to kill a real thing is to send it to committees for study. I take the liberty of making this appeal to you, because I see here certain dangers which for obvious reasons I would not like to discuss in this letter. I am enclosing the draft of the Convention and other material including my broadcast of to-day to the B.B.C. in London, in which I take the liberty of quoting you.1 Thank you, Sir Hartley, for your great generosity and I hope you will forgive me this long letter. Very sincerely yours Raphael Lemkin

No. 31 Eric Beckett of the British Foreign Office Concurs with Professor Brierly’s Pessimistic View on the Codification of International Law, Criticizes the Soviet Postulate of International Law, July 7, 1947 NA, FO 371/67519/UN3645 July 7, 1947 FOREIGN OFFICE Right Honorable Sir Hartley Shawcross Attorney-General My dear Attorney, Codification Committee 1. I am enclosing (1) a copy of the Report which the Codification Committee have adopted; (2) a long letter from Professor Brierly giving his account and views on the proceedings; and (3) a short letter from him.2

Document not in the file. Of the three documents mentioned above only one, Brierly’s “long” letter to Beckett from July 7, 1947, is in the file. See doc. no. 28.

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2. I hardly expect that, with the present great pressure of work, you will find time to read all this material. I therefore mention one or two points. 3. Subject to any views which you may wish to express, we shall adopt, at the General Assembly, an attitude to the Report of the Codification Committee very much on the lines of those suggested by Professor Brierly in his long letter. We can accept the main ideas of the Committee’s Report but we shall take the line that they are too elaborate and too expensive. In particular, we shall try very hard to get agreement that the members of the future International Law Commission, which it is proposed should be set up to deal with the progressive development of international law and its codification, should not work on a whole-time basis. 4. We shall have to be ready to propose and vote for candidates for this International Law Commission. I therefore enquired personally of Professor Brierly if he would be prepared to serve on it. It seems to me that we could get to one better and that he, having just vacated his Chair at Oxford, would have leisure for this purpose. You will see that he says he would serve if the members of the International Law Commission are to work on a part-time basis but he would not do so if they are appointed to work on a whole-time basis. In fact, I do not think anybody who is any use will be got to serve if the International Law Commission is to work on a whole-time basis, and there is clearly, I think, no possible reason for a whole-time basis at all. Professor Brierly is also going to endeavour to make some suggestions to me about suitable foreigners for membership on this Commission. 5. Would you agree that we should propose Professor Brierly on the assumption that we have succeeded in getting the whole-time basis of work changed into parttime? If we do not succeed on this, I cannot think at the moment of anybody in this country of any weight whom we could get at all, and I am inclined to think we should have to try and find quite a young man who might be prepared to do this sort of thing for two or three years, meaning afterwards to become a reader or professor of international law. 6. I personally read with great interest Professor Brierly’s conclusion as to what lay behind the attitude of Professor Koretsky, the Russian. I think I can confirm from other sources that Professor Brierly is absolutely right here. I received not long ago a little monograph from a member of the English Bar, who has spent much time in Russia, called Schapiro, on the “Soviet conception of International law”.1 It was based on a careful study of the treatises of international law recently produced in the Soviet Union by inter alia Professor Korovin, who turns up in Soviet delegation at U.N.O. from time to time.2 This monograph confirms absolutely what Brierly says in his letter. It is hardly conceivable, I know, but Professor Korovin actually says in his book that, in the very last resource, only the Government of the Soviet Union can properly say what international law is, and based on the ultimate principles of justice and the Leonard B. Schapiro, “The Soviet Concept of International Law,” The Year Book of International Affairs 2 (1948): 272–310. In 1945–46 Schapiro (1908–1983) worked for the British Intelligence as an expert on Russia; during his lifetime Schapiro was regarded as a preeminent British Sovietologist. 2 Evgeny Korovin (1892–1964) was a Soviet scholar of international law who had taught, among other places, at the Institute of Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the School of Diplomacy by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. From 1945 onward Korovin served as a Soviet representative on several international bodies. 1

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Government of the Soviet Union is really the ultimate and only depository of those principles and all this to be found in a text book.1 7. You will also observe that, at the end of his long letter, Professor Brierly does not see much chance of any real progress for international law coming out of any execution of the Codification Committee’s Report. I am afraid that Brierly is right. There was, I believe, only one real hope, namely, that the work should be entrusted to scientific experts who should produce re-statements with merely persuasive value, and that there should be no attempt to conclude conventions, but the Russians have seen the trap and there are so many small countries which possess no international lawyers of weight and reputation at all, so they too are not very keen on this scheme. Yours sincerely, W. E. BECKETT

No. 32 Attorney General for England and Wales Hartley W. Shawcross Prefer Disposing of the Question of Genocide as a Declaratory Resolution, Dismissive of Raphael Lemkin, July 21, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67519/UN3792 July 21, 1947 W. E. Beckett Esq., C.M.G., K.C., Foreign Office, Downing Street, S.W.1. Dear Beckett: I have received the enclosed letter from Dr. Lemkin, whom I expect you know.2 He is rather a bore and has got a bee in his bonnet about genocide, which, as you know, he raised at the General Assembly. I thought myself that it would be quite impracticable and valueless to have an international convention on genocide, and that the simplest course would be to have a resolution at the Assembly declaring that genocide is an international crime. This, I think, would have been at least as useful as any convention would like to be, and it would, I thought, have satisfied the demand for some declaration of an international character about the matter. I do not myself altogether share the view which Professor Brierley has rather indicated; that the question of the Nuremberg Korovin is credited with formulating so-called international law of transitional period, in 1923, which supposedly came to replace bourgeois international law. Korovin’s scholarship was available also in English, in the form of two articles that he had published in the American Journal of International Law, in 1928 and 1946 respectively. 2 See doc. no. 30. 1



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decision and genocide are matters that cannot be dealt with in a hurry.1 My own feeling is that they must either be dealt with in a hurry by adopting merely declaratory resolutions to the effect that the Nuremberg decision represents the existing law and that genocide is an international crime, or they will not be dealt with at all. I doubt whether it will make much difference in the end what method is adopted, but I do not want to be committed to any view which implies that the Nuremberg decision does not represent the existing law in the matter. I should be grateful for any assistance you could give me in sending Lemkin a suitable reply. Yours, Hartley Shawcross

No. 33 Con D. W. O’Neill of the British Foreign Office Considers the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention a Political Document, Regrets UK’s Commitment, July 29, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67519/UN3792 (Minutes) July 29, 1947 The past history and present position of “genocide” are as follows: (a) The General Assembly on 11th December 1946 passed a Resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary study studies with a view to drawing up a draft Convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly. (The text of the Resolution and a convenient summary of the various steps which followed it will be found on pages 14 and 15 of the document E/447 in UNE 1036 UN4436.) (b) The Economic and Social Council instructed the Secretary-General, last March, to draw up a draft Convention; and this was done with the help of a number of legal experts. The draft, which will be found in the paper E/447 in UNE 1036 UN4436 (which should be re-entered UN) was circulated on 10th of this month under cover of a letter from the Secretary-General which invited the comments of all members of the United Nations. The Secretary General asked for comments in time for the current session of the Economic and Social Council. He did not receive any. The action taken by the Economic and Social Council so far – since the matter was on its Agenda – can be seen from para. 2 of New York telegram No. 1923 of 18th July and para. 4 of tel. 1952

See Brierly’s letter to Beckett, July 7, 1947, NA, F.O. 371/67519/UN3645.

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of 22nd July.1 It appears that a Resolution is now being drawn up for submission to the General Assembly explaining that since the Council had received no comments from Governments, it could not submit an agreed draft Convention to the next session of the Assembly. Action by the Foreign Office is required at the moment in the form of (1) Comments on the draft Convention; and (2) An answer to the Attorney-General’s letter in this paper. Please see comments on the draft Convention by Mr. Arculus in his minute in UNE1036. I understand that it was at one time hoped that the Convention on “genocide” would prove a simple and non-contentious item on the Assembly’s Agenda, and get the Assembly meeting off to a good start. No such hope can survive a study of the document E/447. It is a remarkable example of the folly of wise learned men. It is not a simple legal draft, but a highly political document. It brings into issue a number of important political questions which, I am sure, the General Assembly did not intend should be mixed up with the study of “genocide”; in particular, the whole question of the protection of minorities. Professor Lemkin’s letter to the Attorney-General within makes it clear that this is the aspect of the subject on which he is particularly keen.2 “Genocide”, I should have thought, meant killing. The authors of the draft Convention do not agree, and have extended it to cover a wide variety of acts of other kinds. In this, it seems to me, they diverge from the terms of the Assembly Resolution, which said “genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homocide homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.” The experts were aware of the danger of extending the definition to other acts than those causing death, and quite a sensible discussion of the problems raised by such extension can be found in Section III on pages 16 and 17 of E/447. But these sensible views find no reflection in the draft Convention. The best case that can be made for its authors is that they have, as suggested in the first paragraph on page 16 of E/447, embraced as far as possible all the points that could conceivably arise, in order that amendment should proceed by exclusion rather than addition. Most of the guts, and the mischief, of the draft convention can be found in Article 1. This extends the definition of genocide almost ad infinitum. In its present form this Article would be totally unacceptable to H.M.G., and I imagine to any other Government. As the Convention stands, I think quite a plausible case could be made out for arguing that, were it in operation, H.M.G. would be guilty of genocide in the following cases: (i) Against the Germans in the British Zone, under Article I, II, 1(b); (ii) Probably against a number of colonial peoples under the same Clause; (iii) Perhaps against the Welsh as we don’t allow Welsh to be used in Law Courts; (iv) Certainly against the Jews in Palestine on a number of grounds; (v) Possibly against the population of the United Kingdom, by virtue of “denial of housing”.

Secretariat draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, NA, F.O. 371/67519/UN3833; document from July 22, 1947 not in the file. See doc. no. 30.

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For further examples, the Greeks would be guilty of genocide for exiled Communists (since they are members of a political group, and protection is extended to political groups); and I suppose the governments of both Northern and Southern Ireland would be consider each other guilty of genocide practically every day in their dealings with religious minorities. Unfortunately, we are committed by the Assembly Resolution of last year to the proposition that a Convention on genocide should be drawn up.1 It seems to me a great pity that we ever entered into this commitment. The great advantage of not making a solemn declaration when that genocide is a crime is that you thereby avoid the risk of letting it appear that you ever supposed it to be anything else. In English law, murder is a crime not by statute but under the common law; similarly, it seems to me, genocide proper, while certainly it should be a crime in international law, should not be a crime defined by Convention. If you do so define it, you run straight up against the difficulty of which a very good example occurs on page 22 of E/447, where Professor de Vabres, arguing in favour of the suggestion that protection should be extended to political groups, said that their exclusion might be regarded as justifying genocide in the case of such groups. The argument of Professor Pella, which immediately follows, is equally even more pernicious. He seems to have thought that, while protection should be extended to political groups, this should not cover the activities of Nazis and Fascists. Thus apparently, in spite of the Convention, and Government could slaughter its own Nazis or Fascists with impunity. As examples of further difficulties which would arise for us if this Convention were ever agreed to, Articles VI and IX may be cited. The first would oblige us to pass domestic legislation in this country covering the crime of genocide; the second would oblige us to try this crime, or a new section of the Permanent International Court of Justice. What are we to do about all this? I suggest a fairly full reply might be sent by Mr. Fitzmaurice to the Attorney-General’s letter within, expressing our views on the draft Convention, and suggesting that we should send to Professor Lemkin a brief reply saying merely that the draft Convention contains from our point of view a number of rather grave difficulties which we are now considering. Our course of conduct at the Assembly, I suggest, should be governed by the desirability of getting the sole whole idea of having a Convention on genocide dropped, if we cannot succeed in this, either because the temper of the Assembly is in favour of the draft Convention (I should imagine this to be unlikely) or because the Assembly will feel bound by its previous Resolution, then all we can do, I think, is to aim at thining spinning out matters in such a way that nothing ever happens. I can see no advantage in submitting comments on behalf H.M.G. in reply to the Secretary-General’s invitation. They would have to be extremely stale elaborate and exhaustive, and would be very tiresome to draw up. I suggest that instead our representative on whatever Committee of the Assembly which first deals with this question – it will presumably be Committee IV VI – should be prepared to make a brief statement setting out our main general objections to the draft Convention, and should suggest that, if further work has to be done on the whole project, a fresh start should be made by drawing up a much briefer and simpler UN Resolution 96(I) of December 11, 1946.

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Convention modelled more closely on the definition of genocide given in last year’s Assembly Resolution. Such a revised draft, I suggest, might well be undertaken by persons other than international legal experts. (C. D. W. O’Neill)

No. 34 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Raises an Issue of Possible Execution of British Soldiers in Palestine in the context of the Ongoing Debate on Genocide, July 30, 1947 NA, H.O. 45/25308 July 30, 1947 En Clair WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations) No. 2031 Repeated to Washington IMMEDIATE Mr. Chairman, I have asked your permission to make a statement at this juncture and I am grateful for the opportunity. 2. Some of us had hoped that since Nazi Germany was defeated, such crimes as genocide had become a thing of the past, and that there might be no need for international conventions prohibiting or condemning them. Those hopes have been disappointed. It is true that we are not at present confronted with the practice or the threat of genocide, but some news received this morning from Palestine shows that the spirit of international lawlessness not far removed from genocide is not yet dead. There is the threat or the fact – we do not yet know which – we are still in suspense – of a revival of the primitive, barbarous and hateful practice of the execution of hostages. Two of my countrymen, soldiers, are involved. They have been threatened with execution as hostages. 3. I am not going to ask for a resolution. I am not going to invite discussion and I do not know how the case stands in international law. But as a Committee of the United Nations is considering a question which deals with the legal protection of the lives of men and women, my delegation must make known to that Committee the deep emotion of horror which it feels at the idea of a revival of the barbaric practice of execution of hostages and its profound hope that the constructive work and growing influence of the United Nations will result in the final extermination of crimes against humanity, whether genocide against communities or crimes against individuals.



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No. 35 Gerald Fitzmaurice of the British Foreign Office Concurs with the Opinion That the Genocide Convention is a Political Document, Suggests Submitting No Formal Comments on the Secretariat Draft, August 11, 1947 NA, F.O. 371/67519/UN3792 August 11, 1947 Draft letter To the Attorney General: I am writing in reply to your letter of 21st July to Beckett, who is at present away in New York, helping our Delegation there with the Security Council discussions on the Egyptian case.1 I am sorry there has been so much delay in answering your letter, in which you enclosed a letter to you from Dr. Lemkin on the subject of the draft U.N. Convention on Genocide, but this draft is a complicated document and it has taken us some time to consider it and formulate our views. Incidentally, since you may not have a copy of the document, I now enclose one. I do not of course suggest that you should bother to read the whole of this very long paper, but there are certain passages in it to which you may like to which you may like to refer as you read this letter. The main trouble with this draft Convention is that it has turned out to be anything but a dispassionate legal execution of the instructions contained in last year’s Assembly Resolution. It is instead a highly political document of a most controversial character, and I fear that as it stands it would be quite unacceptable to H.M.G., and, I imagine, to almost any other Govt. The Assembly Resolution of 11th Dec. 1946 out of which it arises was fairly straightforward and simple; and it was assumed that the draft of it Convention would be on similar lines. The question is indeed extensively sensibly discussed on such lines in Section III on pages 16 and 17 of the document I enclose (E/447); but unfortunately the Convention as a whole proceeds on quite a different lines basis. The Assembly Resolution says “Genocide is the denial of the right to existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings”. The draft Convention goes far beyond this definition to cover a great variety of acts of other kinds of than killing; these are listed in the highly controversial Article I, which extends the notion of genocide almost ad infinitum, and even seems primarily designed to include the whole question of the protection of national or racial or even political minorities. As the Convention stands, it might quite plausibly be argued that, were it in operation, H.M.G. would be guilty of genocide in a number of cases, as for example against the Germans in the British Zone, against the Jews in Palestine or against a number of colonial peoples. Furthermore there are other recent political acts, unsavoury enough perhaps but probably unavoidable, which might be condemned as See doc. no. 32. On July 8, 1947, Egypt demanded the withdrawal of British troops from its territory. The Security Council took up the Egyptian case on August 5.

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genocide by a strict interpretation of the Convention. I have in mind such episodes as the dropping of atomic bombs on Japanese cities, the expulsion of Germans by the Polish and Czechoslovak Govts., or the exile by the Greek Government of Members of the Communist Party – for, as you will see, the draft Convention protects “political groups” against genocide as well as groups of other kinds. The draft Convention in fact might lead to the reopening of a great many old and new questions to the considerable embarrassment of ourselves and practically everybody else. Further difficulties would arise from Articles VI and IX of the Convention were it ever in force. The first would oblige us to pass domestic legislation in this country covering the crime of genocide; the second would oblige us to set up a special international court to try this crime, or alternatively a new section of the Permanent International Court of Justice. Furthermore, the second of the two “Suggestions submitted by the Experts” (page 64 of E/447) would involve the setting up of “Special National Offices” for the centralisation of information on “antagonism between human groups” and the transmission of such information to the Secretary-General of the United Nations! Unfortunately we are committed by last year’s Resolution to the proposition that there should be an International Convention on Genocide. Having seen this draft, I heartily concur with you in regretting this, and agree that the best and simplest course would have been to have a Resolution at the Assembly declaring genocide to be an international crime, and to have leaving left the matter there. The present procedural position is as follows. The Secretary-General in a circular letter of 10th July asked members of the United Nations for their comments on this draft. The Committee for the Codification and Development of International Law was also asked some time ago for its views on the draft, but it prudently took refuge in the fact that no comments had been received from governments and therefore felt it must likewise decline to give any. The draft Convention was on the Agenda of the recent meeting in New York of the Economic and Social Council. That body likewise took refuge in the absence of any comments from the governments, and has prepared a Resolution for submitting submission to the General Assembly complaining explaining that since no comments from governments had been received, the Council could not submit an agreed draft Convention to the next Session of the Assembly. Presumably the matter will come before the Assembly on the basis of this Resolution. We do not think there would be any advantage in drawing up comments and forwarding them to the Secretary General. Silence may well prove to be the best course of dealing with this question, and we think we should adopt it. At present, subject to your views, we are inclined to think that all that is needed is that our representative in whatever Committee of the Assembly best fairest deals with this question – it will presumably be Committee VI – should be prepared to make a brief statement setting out our main general objections to the draft Convention; and, if it does not as we hope prove to be the case that most members, when they have seen this Convention, will be ready simply to let the matter drop and do no more about it, should suggest that, if further work has to be done on the whole project, a fresh start should be made, and a much briefer and simpler Convention should be drawn up, modelled more closely on the definition of genocide given in last year’s Assembly Resolution. We are inclined to think that anybody entrusted with the preparation of the revised draft should not



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consist exclusively of international legal experts. Some political advice would be needed to persuade the drafters to keep off politics. You will no doubt wish to reply to Dr. Lemkin’s letter Unless you feel it is necessary to go into any debate in replying to Dr. Lemkin, suggest that you should it would be enough to send a brief reply, saying only that the draft Convention raises a number of points of political implication considerable difficulty, which are not being considered.

No. 36 The United States Favors a Speedy Passage of the Genocide Convention during the Present Session of the UN General Assembly, August 27, 1947 NARA, DoS General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 59/3039E/18 August 27, 1947 RESTICTED SD/A/C.6/45 GENOCIDE THE PROBLEM The Economic and Social Council on August 6, 1947 adopted a resolution concerning the proposed draft convention on genocide, including the following points: 1. That the program for consideration of the Secretariat Draft Convention had not been carried out since (a) the General Assembly Committee on Development and Codification of International Law had not considered the substance of the draft, (b) it had not been feasible to submit the draft to the Human Rights Commission, and (c) the comments of the Member states on the draft had not been received in time for consideration in the Fifth Session of ECOSOC; 2. That the General Assembly should be informed that ECOSOC proposes to proceed with consideration of the subject as rapidly as possible subject to any further instructions of the General Assembly; 3. That the Secretary-General is requested to transmit the draft Convention to the General Assembly, together with any comments from Member governments which may be received in time. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The United States Delegation should stand ready to go forward with immediate final drafting of the Convention by the General Assembly. 2. In case the substance of the draft is considered by the General Assembly the United States should adopt the positions indicated in a commentary on the Secretariat Draft to be submitted later.1 See doc. no. 38.

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3. In case the substance of the draft is not considered by the General Assembly, the United States should propose that the draft be considered by the International Law Commission and the Commission on Human Rights. DISCUSSION If there is any general sentiment in favor of the immediate drafting of the General Convention during the present meeting of the General Assembly, the United States should not take a position in any way opposed to this action. This is because (1) the United States has previously supported the program which was intended to lead to the conclusion of the Convention at this session of the General Assembly, and (2) because the postponement of this project involving the reversal of previous positions, might have an unfortunate effect upon public opinion. The previous decisions to push this Convention to a rapid conclusion have been based in part upon the consideration that this should be done before world opinion has forgotten the atrocities committed during the war. While the above considerations are of over-riding importance, this Government has the underlying position that the subject matter ordinarily should have further expert consideration than it could receive if the final negotiations were to take place at the present session. The proposed International Law Commission seems clearly to be the proper body to take up this task, especially considering that genocide is a new and complex subject and closely related to matters which will engage the attention of that body. Attention is particularly called to the action of the Committee on Development and Codification of International Law in suggesting that the proposed International Law Commission be invited to give consideration to the drafting of an International Penal Code. It would also be advisable, if the matter is not concluded during the present session of the General Assembly, to have the Commission on Human Rights examine this Convention, since it is not only engaged in the preparation of a Declaration on Human Rights but may also soon undertake the drafting of a human rights convention. For these reasons, it is believed that the General Assembly, if it does not itself undertake to negotiate the Convention, should not leave this subject in the hands of ECOSOC, but should place it in the hands of the International Law Commission. It should be clearly understood that in taking this matter out of the hands of ECOSOC, the General Assembly would not be setting a precedent for the future preparation and consideration of conventions more nearly within the competence of that organ.

No. 37 US State Department Officials Confidentially Discuss the Contested Issues in the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, September 4, 1947 NARA, DoS General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 59/3039E/18 September 4, 1947



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Department of State Memorandum of Conversation CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Participants: Copies to:

Genocide Mr. Fahy, Mr. Gross, Mr. Hendrick, Miss Whiteman, Mr. Halderman SPA: Mr. Rusk OA: Mr. Kotschnig

Mr. Fahy explained his view that the United States should stand ready to draft the final genocide convention at the forthcoming session of the Assembly. The Delegation should not press the matter, and if general sentiment is found to be in favor of referring the problem to the ILC, the United States should concur. This position was agreed to. The question of including political groups in the definition of genocide was discussed. It was agreed to adhere to Mr. Fahy’s position to include such groups. Mr. Gross expressed concern that the inclusion of “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group” (Article I, II, 3(b) Secretariat Draft) could easily be construed as embracing forced transfer of minorities such as have already been effectuated by agreement among the United Nations.1 A preference was indicated for the deletion of this provision. SPA’s objection to including the elements of cultural genocide (suppression of language, books, historical and religious objects, etc., Art. I, II, 3(c), (d) and (e)) was discussed and agreed to. The problem of an international penal jurisdiction was brought up and it was agreed that it would be preferable for the General Assembly not to undertake the establishment of such a tribunal at this time for the following reasons: 1. The problem of creating such a tribunal is very complex and would greatly increase the task of concluding a convention; 2. Rather than having a permanent tribunal to deal with genocide, it would be preferable to have a single tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide as well as other international offenses. The General Assembly should not proceed to consider a penal tribunal in connection with genocide until the ILC has had an opportunity to examine the broader problem. Mr. Halderman pointed out that in the proposed re-draft of the Secretariat draft, it is provided that nothing in the Convention is to be construed derogating from the right of the parties to establish an ad hoc tribunals along the lines of the Nuremberg tribunal, pending the establishment of a permanent penal tribunal. This was agreed to. The possible desirability of a procedure for injunctive relief was suggested by Mr. Gross and concurred in by Mr. Fahy. It was noted that Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ gives the Court power to indicate provisional measures which ought to be Apparently, the memorandum refers to the Potsdam Agreement of August 1, 1945 signed by the Allies (the wartime alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union was sometimes referred to as the “United Nations”). The “orderly transfer” of ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, stipulated in the agreement, effectively became a mass expulsion.

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taken to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending a final decision. It was felt that a stronger injunctive procedure (so far as the ICJ is concerned) would require an amendment of the Court’s statute. It was agreed that further consideration could be given the subject in connection with the proposed international penal tribunal. During the course of the discussion Mr. Fahy said that he did not anticipate the convention actually being invoked for fifty years, “or maybe 20.”

No. 38 Ernest Gross and Dean Rusk Prepare US Commentary on the Secretary Draft Genocide Convention, September 10, 1947 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/9-1047) September 10, 1947 MEMORANDUM To: U: Mr. Lovett Through: S/S From: Le: Mr. Gross SPA: Mr. Rusk Discussion The attached commentary is intended to serve the following purposes: 1. The Secretariat of the United Nations, pursuant to instructions, has prepared a draft Convention on Genocide (Tab. 1) which is now submitted to member States for comment. The attached paper, if approved, will constitute the commentary of the United States. It may be noted that at the end of the Commentary is an Annex containing a redraft of the Secretariat draft, incorporating changes suggested by the United States. 2. The commentary will also serve as an instruction to the United States Representative who participates in the final drafting of the Genocide Convention. According to a position already agreed to (Tab. 2), the United States will participate in the drafting of the Convention at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly if the Assembly decides to follow this course of action. The principal purpose of the proposed Genocide Convention is to implement a decision of the General Assembly taken last year (see Tab. 1, page 14) declaring genocide (the deliberate destruction of racial, religious, political and other groups) to be an international crime, and recommending the conclusion of a convention on the subject. Under the proposed convention states should (1) enact appropriate legislation for the suppression of the crime, (2) extradite persons accused of the crime, (3) in certain circumstances commit accused persons to an international tribunal, and (4) take measures to obtain appropriate United Nations action when genocide is in question. The principal changes which the United States recommends in the Secretariat Draft are: 1. The United States disapproves a provision which would give states party to the convention jurisdiction to try the nationals of any other state who are accused of



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genocide, regardless of where the alleged offense was committed (see comment under Article VIII, pages 8–9 of commentary. 2. The United States disapproves the inclusion of “cultural genocide” (suppression of language, books, cultural monuments, etc.) as an offense under the convention (see comment under Article I on page 5 (paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of commentary). 3. The United States disapproves the proposal of including in the convention the establishment of a permanent international tribunal to deal with genocide. It does, however, indicate its willingness, in due course, to give consideration to the creation of a permanent international penal tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide as well as other international offenses. Pending the creation of such a tribunal, provision is made for the establishment of ad hoc tribunals to deal with genocide. The principal problems involved in dealing with this subject are: 1. Whether “political” groups should be included along with “national, racial and religious” groups, the destruction of which constitutes genocide. It was decided to include these groups with the understanding that the offense is to be restricted to physical destruction (see comment of Secretariat, Tab. 1, page 22). 2. The enactment of United States Federal Legislation on genocide, as required by the Convention, will result in placing under Federal jurisdiction some offenses which normally fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States. However, the United States has concurred with other member nations in regarding genocide an international crime. This view has generally prevailed since the inception of the concept, which resulted from the Nazi atrocities during the war. The proposition is considered to be readily sustainable under American constitutional law that genocide is properly an international offense and appropriate for treatment by international convention. 3. The possibility exists that sporadic outbreaks against the Negro population in the United States may be brought to the attention of the United Nations, since the treaty, if ratified, would place this offense in the realm of international jurisdiction and remove the “safeguard” of Article II(7) of the Charter. However, since the offense will not exist unless part of an overall plan to destroy a human group, and since the Federal Government would under the treaty acquire jurisdiction over such offenses, no possibility can be foreseen of the United States being held in violation of the treaty. Recommendation It is recommended that the attached commentary be approved. Concurrences Le SPA Attachments Commentary by the Government of the United States (ISP D-146/47) Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide (E/447) Position paper for General Assembly – Second Session (ISP D-144/47) Approved – L Complete file returned to Mr. Halderman in OA

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No. 39 The British Commonwealth Relations Office Criticizes the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, Informs of the Guidelines Issued for the UK Delegation to the United Nations, October 6, 1947 BL, IOR, L/E/9/1488, 180/72 October 6, 1947 OUTWARD TELEGRAM Political Department Pol. 9970/47 CYPHER (O.T.P.) From To Repeated

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations1 U.K. High Commissioner in New Delhi2 U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi, No. 1833 SAVING to U.K. Delegation, New York (for Curson) SAVING to H.M. Embassy, Washington

IMPORTANT No. 973 New York telegram No. 2754 3rd October. United Nations adopted Resolution on th 11 September, 1946 declaring genocide to be crime under International Law and asking Economic and Social Council to arrange for draft Convention to be drawn up. At request of Economic and Social Council United Nations Secretariat have drawn up draft Convention. But views of Governments have not yet been obtained on this draft. 2. This draft instead of being as we hoped simple and non-contentious, raises number of political questions including whole problem of minorities. Thus it includes in definition of genocide confiscation of property and prohibition of use of national language. It fails to isolate genocide from war itself and from incidents and situations which might be concern of Secretary Council. It would cause special difficulty for us. 3.  U.K. Delegation New York have therefore been instructed: (a)  to try to get idea of Convention dropped on ground of difficulty of defining genocide and instead to propose declaratory Resolution condemning genocide in general terms; (b) failing this to press for reference of whole matter to International Law Commission which may be set up with a view to this Commission preparing more suitable draft Convention.

Christopher Addison (1869–1951), Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in 1947. Terrence A. Shone (1894–1965), UK High Commissioner in New Delhi from 1947 to 1948. 3 Laurence Grafftey-Smith (1892–1989), UK High Commissioner in Karachi from 1947 to 1951. 1 2



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No. 40 Raphael Lemkin Argues That Genocide Does Not Come under Crimes against Humanity and/or the Nuremberg Principles, November 9, 1947 AJHS, P-154/1/18 November 9, 1947 My dear Mr. Fahy: I have been studying today the French note on genocide. It occurs to me that the French government does not make any concrete proposal. However you might be interested to know that the Committee on the Development and Codification of International Law at its session of June 1946 dismissed briefly any suggestion about mixing genocide as a crime under the law of nations with the Nuremberg principles. The prevailing opinion was that crimes under the law of nations like piracy, trade in women and ultimately genocide belong essentially to the jurisdiction of national courts independently of the place where the crime was committed. Of course exceptions might be introduced by way of reciprocity of punishment or the necessity to obtain permission from the government whose citizen is to be tried as provided by the U.S. draft on genocide. All crimes under the Nuremberg Law belong to military jurisdiction of the occupying powers. A codification of the Nuremberg law can only produce a new law of war. Not all crimes envisaged in the Nuremberg Charter can become “crimes under the law if nations” (delicta juris gentium). If one would try for example to elevate all crimes against humanity to the rank of “crimes under the law of nations” and make them a matter of international concern also in time of peace this would make international life intolerable. Every government would constantly have an occasion to intervene in the internal affairs of another country. From my work in Nuremberg I remember that we classified as crimes against humanity also such acts as political oppression even not involving violence, like dissolution of the trade-unions by the Hitler regime. I have discussed this matter last year with Professor Brierly who could not understand how somebody could suggest that the law of war should be mixed with the law of peace. If the French suggestion would be followed it would “internationalize” even individual crimes of the murder type like Lynching. This was certainly not the intention of the authors of the resolution of December 11, 1946 and of the draft convention prepared by the Secretary General. At the last assembly you have had a remarkable success by obtaining a unanimous affirmation of the Nuremberg principles by 55 nations. This means on the other hand that we are now bound by the classification of crimes as envisaged in the Charter and there are in law no other crimes against humanity than those envisaged by the Charter[…].1 Only the first page of the letter is available. Fahy acknowledged the receipt of Lemkin’s letter on November 10, 1947.

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No. 41 The US Delegation to the United Nations Instructed to Vote against the Soviet Resolution That Questions the Need for a Separate Convention on Genocide, November 20, 1947 NARA, DoS General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 59/3039E/18 November 20, 1947 RESTRICTED US/A/961 United States Mission to the United Nations REPORT OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE ON GENOCIDE 1. United States Position The delegation should abstain from voting, or, as a second choice, vote against the resolution. In view of the vote in the Committee, it is not believed that any speech by the United States representative would change the result. So far as putting the United States on record either abstention or a vote against the resolution would appear to be adequate. The resolution, which is in the main an amendment proposed by U.S.S.R., requests the Economic and Social Council (a) to proceed with the studies on the problem of measures of combating genocide; (b) to study therewith the question whether a convention on genocide is desirable and necessary, and if so, whether there should be a separate convention on genocide, or whether the question of genocide should be considered in connection with drafting the convention regarding the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal; and (c) to consider, if inclusion of a separate convention on genocide is considered necessary, the draft convention on genocide prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, and to submit a report on the matter to the third session of the General Assembly. The alternative proposal for abstention rather than a vote against the resolution is based on the fact that the resolution has some useful features. Furthermore, it should be noted that in the Committee nobody voted against the resolution and 35 votes were cast in favor of it. 2. History in Committee The United Kingdom proposed an amendment to the preamble of the resolution which declares “that genocide is an international crime entailing national and international responsibility on the part of individuals and states.” This amendment was adopted by vote of 21 (including the United States). Then the Committee considered the Soviet amendment discussed above, and on a roll-call it adopted it by a vote of 22 to 18, the United States voting against the amendment. The resolution, as amended, was then adopted 31 to 0. The United States abstained because it had made its position clear by voting against the Soviet amendment



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and because a single vote against the resolution as a whole, which contained some useful features, was not considered preferable to abstention. 3. Possible Developments in Plenary Session It is not anticipated that any other delegation will raise any question in the Plenary Session. It is not believed that any speech by the United States would result in adoption of the original proposal of Subcommittee II.

No. 42 Lithuanian Émigrés in the United States Appeal to the United Nations to Indict the Soviet Union for Genocide, November 22, 1947 “Appeal From Lithuania,” New York Times, November 22, 1947 The first post-Nazi appeal against the crime of genocide, or the extermination of entire groups of human beings, has been submitted to the UN by the Lithuanian legation in Washington, representing one of the three Baltic nations overrun and annexed by Russia but still recognized as independent by the US.1 The Legation’s appeal charges that the Russian authorities are proceeding with the extermination of the Lithuanian nation through wholesale arrests and murders, and especially through the deportation of large segments of the population to the slave labor camps of Siberia.2 The Lithuanian representatives appeal to the UN to take measures for safeguarding the Lithuanian people against enslavement and extermination, in keeping with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the UN Charter. These charges have been raised before in neutral reports and find support in the fight of many Lithuanians from their country or into the underground resistance forces. Deportation and dispersal of whole population and their extermination in slave labor camps have become common practice in Eastern Europe, and the Russians in particular are sensitive about “unfriendly” populations in strategic border areas. They liquidated as hostile the Checheno-Ingush Republic and the Crimean Republic and deported their populations into the interior.3 The inhabitants of the three Baltic states, who are likewise fighting Russian rule, appear to have been doomed to the same fate to make room for a solidly Russian frontier population. This confronts the UN with a problem. A resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly last December declared genocide to be an international crime for which principles and accomplices, whether private individuals, public officials As a consequence of the US policy of non-recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia each maintained legal representation in Washington, DC. 2 The deportation of June 1941 carried away some 17,000 Lithuanians. Further large-scale deportations followed in May 1948 and March 1949. 3 In February 1944 Soviet authorities deported the entire Chechen (387,229) and Ingush (91,250) population on the pretext of collaboration with the Nazis. The exact same pretext was used for the deportation of Crimean Tatars (191,014) in May 1944. Shortly thereafter both the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Autonomous Republic were officially dissolved. 1

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or statesmen are punishable. A specific convention for international cooperation in stamping out this crime is now being prepared by the Assembly committees, but this cannot absolve the Assembly itself from the duty of acting on its own resolution. At the very least, it would seem to be under the obligation to investigate the charges. For even if Russia refuses to permit an investigation on the spot; there are ample precedents in the Spanish and Greek situations to hold an investigation on the basis of whatever evidence is available.1 What the Assembly cannot afford to do is to turn its back and look the other way when the spokesmen of small nations appeal for a hearing on lifeor-death charges of this kind. And since the present Assembly is drawing to a close, the task of examining these charges would seem to devolve on the Little Assembly as one of the first tests of its efficacy in meeting the purposes for which it was created.2

It is not immediately clear what is referred here as the “Spanish situation.” In the case of Greece, the United Nations in October 1947 established—over Soviet objections—a special commission on the Balkans tasked with investigating the cross-border incidents that fueled the civil war in that country. 2 The Little Assembly was a colloquial name for an Interim Committee of the UN General Assembly, which was proposed by the US delegation in September of 1947 as a means to bypass the Soviet veto in the Security Council. 1

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The British Government continuously regarded the Genocide Convention a political and provocative document. The Cabinet Steering Committee argued that the Secretariat draft was mixing the issue of minority protection with that of physical destruction. It stood firm that “spats of useless oratory” in the United Nations would do nothing to deter potential genocide (doc. 43). The British insisted that genocide was already a crime under international law and that the best way to proceed was through CHR and ILC (doc. 44). The discussion took a different turn when, on February 4, 1948, Pakistan accused India of genocide of Muslims—the charge the government in Delhi denied (docs. 45–46). A week later, it was Pakistan’s turn to refute claims of genocide against Jews in Peshawar (doc. 47). Reporting on the debates in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UK delegation tried to convince the Foreign Office it should vote in favor of referring the Secretary draft to an ad hoc committee, or else risk being isolated alongside the Communist bloc (docs. 48–49). Still the United Kingdom refused a membership in the newly established Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (doc. 50) and abstained—the only country to do so—when it came to a vote on March 3 (doc. 51). Neither did the United Kingdom accept the UN Secretary General’s standard invitation to comment on the existing Secretariat draft (doc. 55). Comprised of France, Lebanon, Venezuela, China, Poland, the United States, and the Soviet Union, the ad hoc committee was tasked with preparing a new draft of the Genocide Convention (doc. 52). In contrast to the British, the Americans were committed to a UN Genocide Convention. US delegate John Maktos eventually accepted the nomination to serve as chairman of the ad hoc committee (docs. 54, 57, 62). The State Department settled for a simplified convention, which would avoid the thorny issue of implementation. By emphasizing the “crimes of mass extermination” and simultaneously limiting the complicity to state officials, the State Department sought, among other things, to exclude racial discrimination and specifically lynching from its purview (doc. 56). That particular concern repeatedly came up in the conversation while the Ad Hoc Committee was in session in April and May of 1948 (docs. 63–64). The Soviets were meanwhile reading an agenda of their own. A draft directive to the Soviet delegation prepared by the Foreign Ministry, and preapproved by the Communist Party (doc. 96), left no room for discussion. The Soviet Union favored domestic

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jurisdiction over universal and therefore saw no need for an ICC. It regarded genocide as “organically” linked to fascism/Nazism and insisted on banning “genocide propaganda” and the organizations that spread it. At the same time, it rejected any attempts to define as genocide state prosecution of the crimes committed by armed bands. Most empathetically, the directive endorsed the notion of cultural genocide (doc. 53). In his cover letter to Joseph Stalin, Molotov emphasized those provisions of the Secretariat draft that he found directed against the Soviet Union: confiscation of property, denial of food, and indirectly forced labor (doc. 58). Stalin approved the directive with one essential corrective; the Soviet leader struck down the clause that protected political groups and/or provided that genocide could be politically motivated (doc. 59). The actual instructions sent to the Soviet delegate on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (doc. 60) was augmented by a newspaper article written by a preeminent Soviet expert on genocide, Aron Trainin. In a popular form, Trainin explained the perceived shortcomings of both the Secretariat draft and the codification of international law at large (doc. 61). Lemkin, who had entertained a sense of ownership vis-à-vis Genocide Convention, worked up the delegations of Cuba and Panama to insist that a reference to the Nuremberg judgment in the preamble was out of place (docs. 65–66, 73). The draft prepared by the ad hoc committee still caused unease in Washington, London, and Moscow. The State Department was worked out over the articles dealing with cultural genocide and incitement to commit genocide, respectively. In order to avoid undesirable modifications, the department suggested overpassing the CHR, which was expected to review the latest draft of the Genocide Convention (doc. 68). The CHR did not have time to study the document anyway, yet considered it comprehensive enough to be forwarded to the ECOSOC and eventually the General Assembly (doc. 71). By far the most comprehensive, confidential US report on genocide was prepared on June 24, 1948, by Maktos (doc. 73). The thirty-three-page-long report drew a sharp line between the American-French-Chinese conception of genocide and the Soviet-Polish conception. The deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide made Maktos conclude that the former group of states sought a legal document while the latter a propaganda tool. The Soviet Union, the US delegate predicted, will be the most strenuous critic of the genocide treaty. Beside detailed comments on each of the convention’s nine draft articles, Maktos provided insightful observations about individual delegates and the three outside experts—Lemkin, Pella, and Donnedieu de Vabres. The United States objected to listing specific criminal acts in the definition of genocide and rejected the notion of direct incitement. Simultaneously, it stressed state complicity, which the French opposed. In their opposition to the principle of universal jurisdiction, the Americans came to agree with the Soviets. Maktos also explained why: at the present time of tension, the danger of political abuse of that particular provision was real. Drawing on the confidential report, the State Department in late August 1948 prepared a guideline for the US delegation (doc. 79). While the delegation should stand its ground on cultural genocide and incitement, it was given more leeway with regard to protected groups. The State Department favored the inclusion of political groups but also of economic and social groups. However, if a large number of states objected—certainly Latin American and East European countries—the US delegation might reconsider its position. The British still had difficulties making up their mind on the Genocide Convention, as transpires from an internal debate that took place in the Foreign Office in June



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1948 (doc. 69). “As we did not succeed in persuading the Assembly not to pursue a Convention,” one FO official wrote, “we must I think reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is going to be one.” Politically, he suggested, it was better for the United Kingdom to cooperate than to stand on the sidelines. Another opinion was to maintain a destructive attitude toward the genocide treaty, with a little help from the Soviets. The United Kingdom maintained that the exclusion of political groups would effectively condone their destruction (doc. 77). Insofar as political groups were covered, something akin to genocide was going on in Eastern Europe with regard to anticommunist opposition. For that reason alone, the Foreign Office was certain that the Communist bloc would never become a party to the Genocide Convention. In equal measure, the Slav countries were opposed to an ICC. Nothing more than a pious idea anyway—speculated yet another FO official—it could be safely omitted or else played against the Soviets. The aversion to the notion of cultural genocide, which the United Kingdom and the United States shared, had to do with British colonies and dominions. Both the Colonial Office (CO) and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) reminded of the significance of the so-called colonial application clause, without which the Genocide Convention would have been automatically extended to all dependent territories (docs. 74–75, 78). As far as the reciprocal violence in India and Pakistan was concerned, however, the CRO believed the ongoing conflict did not prejudice the eventual decision on the Genocide Convention (doc. 70). When the ECOSOC briefly met in late August 1948 to review the draft convention, the danger inherent in too wide a definition of genocide was on display. As reported by the UK delegation (doc. 80), the Polish representative attacked the United Kingdom on account of cultural genocide while the Soviet representative cited the specific examples of alleged genocide taking place in Kashmir and Malaya.

No. 43 The UK Delegation to the ECOSOC Receives Instructions to Consider Genocide under the Heading of Crimes against Humanity, Emphasizes the Significance of the Nuremberg Judgment, January 7, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950025/6 January 7, 1948 CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS Draft Brief for U.K. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the Economic and Social Council on Genocide (See I.O.C. (47) 141 and I.O.C. (47) 185) 1.  The problem of genocide was introduced to the United Nations during the General Assembly’s First Session (2nd Part) in October–December, 1946. On 11th December, 1946, the General Assembly adopted a Resolution (text at Annex I) by which

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genocide was defined as a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; and declared to be a crime under International Law. The Economic and Social Council was requested to undertake the necessary studies with a view to drawing up a draft Convention for submission to the Second Regular Session of the Assembly. 2.  The Council, on the 28th March, 1947, by a Resolution of which the text is at Annex II, instructed the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of experts in the field of International and Criminal Law, the necessary studies with a view to drawing up the draft Convention. Consultations were to take place with the Codification Committee and, if feasible, with the Commission on Human Rights; the draft Convention was also to be referred to all the member Governments, and subsequently submitted to the next Session of the Economic and Social Council. 3.  In execution of these instructions the Secretariat (Division of Human Rights and Legal Department) prepared a draft Convention (U.N. document E/447 for annotated text, or A/362 for plain text) in consultation with three experts, M. Donnedieu de Vabres, Professor Pella and Professor Lemkin. The draft was submitted to the Codification Committee, which on the 17th June, 1947, informed the Secretary-General that, in the absence of information as to the views of Governments, it felt unable to express any opinion in the matter. On the 7th July, 1947, the Secretary-General circulated the draft Convention to governments with a request for their observations. None was received in time for the Fifth Session of the Economic and Social Council in July and August which submitted a Resolution to the General Assembly explaining that, since the Council had not yet received comments from governments, it was impossible for it to submit an agreed draft Convention to the next Session of the Assembly. The actual text of this Resolution is at Annex III. 4.  Instructions sent to the United Kingdom Delegation at the Fourth Session of the Economic and Social Council followed the line that: (a) Governments should first (i.e. before any definite action is taken) be given an opportunity to comment on the draft Convention prepared by the Secretariat; and (b) That the draft Convention besides being referred to the Human Rights Commission should also be referred to the International Law Commission if such a body were set up. 5.  His Majesty’s Government have not sent to the Secretary-General any comments on the proposed draft Convention, since detailed examination of it revealed that it is a highly political and provocative document, and it was felt better to reserve our fire for the Assembly Meeting. It had originally been hoped that the Convention on Genocide would prove a simple and non-contentious item on the Assembly’s agenda, and get the Assembly meeting off to a good start; but the Convention as drawn up destroyed any such hope. It brought into issue a number of important political questions which the General Assembly probably never intended to be mixed up with the study of genocide, in particular the whole question of the protection of minorities. The definition of genocide given in the Assembly Resolution of 11th December 1946 and quoted above was in fact extended by the draft Convention to cover a wide variety of acts of many kinds, and went far beyond the “denial of the right of existence” and



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the total or partial “destruction” of human groups to which the Assembly Resolution referred. The convention defines as genocide such acts, for instance, as subjection of individuals to conditions of life likely to result in debilitation; confiscation of property; prohibition of the use of a national language, destruction of books or historical and religious monuments. 6.  The Convention, in short, apart from being useless in that it would prove no deterrent to any nation bent on committing genuine genocide on a big scale, is in its present form totally unacceptable to His Majesty’s Government. It cuts across many problems of international law, human rights and minority questions; and it fails to isolate genocide from war itself and from such “incidents” and “situations” as might be the concern of the Security Council. Were it adopted, it might well serve to re-open recent political issues solutions of which have been condoned on grounds of expedience, as for instance the expulsion of Germans from Poland or the exile of Greek Communists (for it protects political no less than radical or national groups). It would provide a happy hunting ground for political agitators in all save totalitarian countries. So called “cultural genocide” in particular offers much scope for such agitation on matters at present of “domestic jurisdiction”. Moreover, it might quite plausibly be argued that, were the Convention in force, His Majesty’s Government would be guilty of genocide in several cases, against e.g. Germans in the British Zone, the Jews in Palestine, or even perhaps certain colonial peoples. There would be further difficulties for His Majesty’s Government if this convention were ever adopted, since, under Articles VI and IX, we should be obliged: (a) to pass domestic legislation in this country governing the crime of genocide (unfortunately the Resolution accepted last year already to some extent commits us to do this): and (b) to take part in setting up a special International Court to try this crime, or a new section of the International Court of Justice. 7.  When the item came up before the Assembly at the recent session, the U.K. Delegation was unable to get the whole idea of a convention dropped or indefinitely shelved. The genocide discussions in the Sixth Committee provoked spates of useless oratory, many delegates being influenced by a campaign which had been begun in the United States largely at the instigation of one or more of the three experts employed by the Secretariat to prepare the draft convention, and which had been taken up strongly by Jewish organisations in the U.S.A. and other countries, including the United Kingdom. The convention itself however found little favour as it stood, and the Sixth Committee was persuaded that it had not the time to set to work to prepare a new convention. 8.  Ultimately the Assembly adopted a resolution not entirely to our satisfaction (text at Annex IV) referring the matter back to the Economic and Social Council who are expected, with the aid of the views of member Governments, to proceed with the completion of a convention to be submitted with a report of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly. The Council is further instructed to take into account the fact that the International Law Commission, which will be set up in due course in accordance with the Assembly Resolution of 21st November, 1947 has been charged with the formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg

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Tribunal, as well as the preparation of a draft code of offences against peace and security. (This last provision (a Chinese amendment) should be noted, as it forms the point de départ for the line to be taken by the U.K. representative to the Economic and Social Council – see paragraph 12 below). 9.  The U.K. representative in the 6th Committee of the Assembly recommended, without ever formally moving, a merely declaratory resolution along the following lines: 1. Asserting again that genocide was a crime, entailing national and international responsibility; 2. Calling the attention of all Member States to the principles of the draft convention and recommending adherence to these principles in the legislative bodies of such States; 3. Referring the draft convention to the International Law Commission in order that it might consider whether such a draft convention was desirable or necessary. 10.  In suggesting the desirability of such a Resolution Sir Hartley Shawcross made, in the full Sixth Committee, the following points which still represent the view of His Majesty’s Government notwithstanding the very different Resolution eventually passed by the Assembly: Genocide is a crime, and that view had been adhered to by the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. If a convention were drawn up, not all states would adhere to it and that would cast doubts on an already established matter. Genocide was already a crime under prevailing International Law; a convention would weaken the rule rather than strengthen it. To attempt to draw up a Convention was both unrealistic and unwise; and the draft that had been prepared fell far short of defining the crimes of murder and destruction. It was clear from the lack of comment on the Secretariat’s draft convention by Member Governments that Governments felt unable to commit themselves to such a convention in the present circumstances. This matter was too serious for theorising or procrastination; if a state wished to commit genocide on a big scale it would not be deterred by the existence of a convention whether or not the state in question had adhered to it or not. In present circumstances it was more realistic to reply on existing law, such as had been formulated and executed at Nuremberg. 11.  Mr. Beckett, U.K. representative on the Sub-Committee of Committee 6 which considered this subject at greater length, went into more detail and suggested that, if it were desired to deal with genocide in a more detailed manner than by mere condemnation of it, the right thing to do was to have it considered in conjunction with the codification of the Nuremberg principles by the International Law Commission, since in codifying these principles the Commission would necessarily be dealing with crimes against humanity. A separate convention merely dealing with genocide stricto sensu would be of little value and would mark no progress in International Law. This was no doubt why the three experts who had prepared the Secretariat’s draft on genocide had produced a detailed and comprehensive statement with the object of prohibiting many forms of racial and religious, etc., persecution and discrimination



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which were manifestations of the same spirit of intolerance which led in its extreme form to genocide itself. It was this extension ad infinitum of the notion of genocide which invalidated the draft convention as an instrument. No doubt it was proper that these racial, etc., animosities and their manifestations in the form of persecution and discrimination should be studied, but the proper place for this to be done was the non-discrimination and minorities sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission. Mr. Beckett accordingly suggested that the only commonsense way to deal with the problem of a genocide convention was to split the matter in this way: refer genocide stricto sensu to the International Law Commission to be dealt with in connexion with the codification of the Nuremberg principles, and refer the rest of the matter to the appropriate sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission. 12.  It is extremely doubtful whether the Economic and Social Council will be able to produce anything in the way of a separate genocide convention which the 1948 Session of the General Assembly would be prepared to recommend to Governments with any hope of getting a substantial number of accessions to it. Accordingly, in the forthcoming session of the Economic and Social Council, the U.K. Delegation should: (a) continue in general to take the line that was taken by the U.K. Delegation to the General Assembly (see paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 above); (b) press in particular that (i) problems of racial and other animosities manifested against individuals and groups in the form of persecution and discrimination should be left to the non-discrimination and minorities sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission, (ii) the question of genocide stricto sensu, if it is felt that a declaratory condemnation of it is insufficient, should be dealt with under the heading of crimes against humanity in the course of the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg judgement by the International Law Commission when set up, as it will be during the next session of the General Assembly, It might be added that preparatory work prior to the actual setting up of the Commission at the Third Session of the General Assembly could well be done in the interim by the United Nations Secretariat, so the problem would remain a live issue: (c) refrain from giving any specific undertaking that H.M.G. will furnish observations on the draft Convention. 13.  When coupling the subject of genocide with that of the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg Judgement, the U.K. representative should bear in mind the following point (which is most important from the war crimes point of view). It is undesirable that this matter should be dealt with until the actual trials of war criminals are further advanced, since the appearance during the course of such trials of codification texts emanating from the United Nations might well be used by Counsel defending war criminals and lead to confusion; it is essential to avoid anything which might call in question the present validity of the Nuremberg decisions. Reference of this question to the International Law Commission (which cannot begin functioning until the end of 1948) has safeguarded our position in this respect.

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14.  It may be of use to the U.K. Delegation to know the substance of certain of the more important comments on the Secretariat’s draft convention submitted in writing by Member Governments in compliance with the Secretary-General’s request: (a) The Government of France (see A/401/Add.3) supported the general aim of the convention in principle but regretted “that the question of genocide was not considered in correlation with the principles affirmed in the Statute and sentences of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and as a parallel to the conception of crime against humanity, of which genocide is merely one of the aspects.” (This point agrees exactly with our view – see the beginning of paragraph 11 above). The French Government was willing to co-operate in drawing up a convention of a more realistic nature. (b) The Government of the United States submitted lengthy detailed comments (see A/401/Add.2) including many drafting changes, and proposed a revised version of the convention, thus clearly accepting in principle the idea of a convention. Some possible abuses were pointed out, and also some divergences from American democratic practices. An important point made was that the problem of jurisdiction to try crimes of genocide is at least as complicated as that of drawing up the convention itself, and should be regarded as a separate task; the suggested establishment of a permanent international penal tribunal should be considered by the International Law Commission.

No. 44 The British Foreign Office Prefers the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal to the Genocide Convention, January 19, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN55 January 19, 1948 CONFIDENTIAL The Reverend W. W. Simpson, M.A., In the Foreign Secretary’s absence, I am replying to your letter of the 7th January, about the Convention on genocide.1 I do not think that there has been any fundamental change of attitude on the part of British representatives to the United Nations on the subject of genocide. In 1946, as you say, Sir Hartley Shawcross strongly supported the resolution eventually adopted, which among other things contained the affirmation that genocide was a crime under international law, a view already implicit in the judgment of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Later, however, when the three experts nominated by the Secretariat of See doc. No. 122.

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the United Nations had produced their draft convention, it became apparent that the production of a convention was a difficult and highly controversial matter, involving both legal and political issues. I do not know whether or not you yourself have examined the text of this draft Convention, which is to be found in United Nations document E/447 of which I enclose a copy; but I feel sure that if you look at it you will agree that there was room to doubt whether in fact many governments would be able to adhere to a convention of this type. Such abstention would tend to cast doubts on an already established matter, since genocide is already a crime under prevailing international law. We felt accordingly that the convention might in the end weaken rather than strengthen the rule it sets out to establish. We accordingly came to the conclusion that it would be better in this matter to reply on existing international law, such as had been formulated and executed at Nuremberg; and it was with this in mind that, in the 1947 General Assembly, Sir Hartley Shawcross recommended that the Assembly should confine itself to a resolution reiterating national and international responsibility, and referring the matter of a convention for further study to the International Law Commission which is to be set up this year. You will see that the Resolution of the General Assembly adopted this year contains a paragraph supporting this view. This Commission, we are inclined to feel, should conduct its work on genocide in connexion with the codification of the relevant decisions deriving from the judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal, another task which it has to do. But much of the substance of the original draft convention can in our view more profitably be dealt with in other ways. For instance, many problems of racial and other animosities manifested against individuals and groups in the form of persecution and discrimination are more properly the concern of the appropriate organ of the Human Rights Commission; and we hope that the Economic and Social Council at its forthcoming session will agree with this view. I hope these explanations will be sufficient to assure you that a very serious view of the problem of genocide is taken by His Majesty’s Government. We are only doubtful of the efficacy of the draft convention that has been prepared, and inclined to feel that a fresh problem will command wider consent and produce more useful results. Hector McNeil

No. 45 Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammed Zafrullah Khan Alerts President of the ECOSOC Malik to the Charge of Genocide That His Country Brought against India in the Security Council, February 4, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/8 February 4, 1948

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Dr. Charles Malik President Economic and Social Council United Nations Lake Success, New York Dear Sir: I understand that the Economic and Social Council has under its consideration the presentation of a final draft of Convention on “Genocide”. In this connection may I request you to draw the Council’s attention to the charge of “Genocide” which my country has been obliged to bring against India in a formal note (extract attached), which is now before the Security Council.1 The perpetration of this insensate crime against the Muslims of India was commenced about the month of June 1947. It still goes on. The total number of Muslims living in India was approximately 35 million at the beginning of this period. In the course of the last six months about one million Muslims have been destroyed and over five million driven from their homes. The number of those forcibly converted is not yet known, but it is believed to run into millions. The remaining Muslim population of India stands faced with physical and cultural annihilation. From the above you will appreciate my country’s deep interest in the proceedings of your Council. In the name of the thirty million Muslims now facing extermination, may I express a hope that the Council will rapidly proceed to a completion of the Convention on “Genocide” whose impelling necessity has been tragically proven by the sufferings of millions of my erstwhile fellow countrymen. Yours faithfully, Sir Mohamed Zafrullah Khan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Pakistan

No. 46 Representative of India to the United Nations Rejects the Claim of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan That Genocide Was Committed against Muslims in India, Blames the Muslim League for Inciting Intercommunal Violence, February 6, 1948 BL, IOR, L/PJ/7/13515, POL 6761/48 February 6, 1948 United Nations ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL Document not in the file.

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UNRESTRICTED E/638 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH DRAFT CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA The President of the Council has received the following communication from the Government of India: The President, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, Lake Success, N.Y.

February 6, 1948

Sir, In Document E/634 of February 4, 1948, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has referred to a campaign of genocide which, he alleges, has been and is still being pursued in India.1 2.  The Government of India repudiate all the allegations against India contained in this document. The communal disturbances in India and Pakistan are mainly due to the systematic preaching of communal hatred over a number of years by the Muslim League prior to the partition, and to the subsequent massacres in Pakistan, to which some prominent leaders of that country rendered direct and indirect encouragement. Large numbers of non-Muslims in Pakistan have been murdered or compelled to leave their homes and seek shelter in India. The Government of India are today faced with the problem of settling over five millions of refugees who have been the victims of unrestrained communal hatred in Pakistan. The Government of India do not, however, wish to assert that Pakistan has been guilty of genocide in regard to the mass massacres of non-Muslims. The object of this letter is to emphasise that the unfortunate communal disturbances in Pakistan and India are not due to the policies and actions of the Governments concerned, but are due, as stated, to the preaching of communal hatred by the Muslim League. 3.  You are aware that a dispute between India and Pakistan is at present before the Security Council. During the debates on this dispute, the Indian representative has not only refuted the charge of genocide against India as entirely baseless, but has shown that Pakistan has introduced the charge in order to obscure the immediate point at issue – Kashmir. I am confident that you will resist this obvious attempt on the part of Pakistan to treat the Economic and Social Council as a medium of propaganda for the untenable allegations which Pakistan has made against India in the Security Council. 4.  In conclusion, I would remind the Economic and Social Council that India was one of the three countries primarily responsible for introducing the subject of genocide in the United Nations. The Government of India are therefore naturally anxious for the

See doc. no. 45.

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speedy adoption of a Convention on the subject. It is to be hoped that all States would adhere to such a Convention and strictly enforce its provisions. I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, (signed) P.P. Pillai Representative of India

No. 47 Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammed Zafrullah Khan Rejects the Claim of the World Jewish Congress That Genocide Was Committed against Jews in Peshawar, February 12, 1948 BL, IOR, L/PJ/7/13515, POL 6761/48 February 12, 1948 United Nations ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL UNRESTRICTED E/660 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH GENOCIDE COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN The President of the Council has received the following communication from the Government of Pakistan: SIR MOHAMMED ZAFRULLAH KHAN Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Pakistan Barclay Hotel 111 East 48th Street New York City “Dear Sir: It has come to my notice that the World Jewish Congress has submitted to the United Nations Economic and Social Council a memorandum on Genocide* in which, among other things, it is alleged that genocide was being committed against the Jews in Pakistan. While the memorandum gives no specific incident or incidents of the alleged ‘anti-Jewish outbreaks’ in Pakistan, the name of a town in Pakistan, namely PESHAWAR, is mentioned along with ADEN, where, it is stated, ‘the very foundation of Jewish Communities which existed for centuries have been destroyed’.



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On behalf of the Pakistan Government I categorically deny the above allegations. Some time ago the Pakistan Government instituted an enquiry on a similar complaint received from the World Jewish Congress in respect of a certain incident which occurred in Peshawar. After a thorough investigation it was discovered that in this particular transaction one Jewish citizen lost his life and two members of his family received injuries. The motive was ‘robbery’. The World Jewish Congress was duly informed of the result of the enquiry by the Pakistan Ambassador in U.S.A. No incident of any kind involving molestation of any Jewish citizen has since occurred in Pakistan. Yours faithfully, Akhtar Husain Secretary-General for Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan” “Dr. Charles Malik President Economic and Social Council United Nations” * Document E/C.2/78

No. 48 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Notifies the Foreign Office It Has No Choice but to Support the Establishment of a Future Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, February 14, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN362 February 14, 1948 IMPORTANT FERTILE CONFIDENTIAL WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations) No. 500 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 500 of 14th February repeated to Washington Saving Your telegram No. 609 Genocide Following from Parliamentary Under Secretary

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Lord Chancellor’s reply has made it somewhat difficult for me within the terms of the brief to adopt here tactics which might mitigate the criticism which we shall undoubtedly receive for pursuing this attitude. In the Council on February 13th I spoke on the lines of the brief and Lord Chancellor’s reply. The Council appears to be approaching the matter with more restrained enthusiasm than was shown in the General Assembly. Our view is supported by the Dutch, half-heartedly by the Australians, and secretly by the Americans whose representative told me that it would be approximately their view if they “had the courage of their convictions”. But the Americans are now committed to a convention and are proposing (Document E662) that the Council set up a Committee of the Council composed of the four members which have submitted comments (Denmark, France, United States and Venezuela) with instructions to prepare a new draft for submission to the 7th session of the Council after reference to the next session of the Human Rights Commission. There is some support for a larger committee. I have told the Netherlands representative that United Kingdom does not wish to be nominated for such a committee. 2.  It is clear to me that now I have put on record again the view of His Majesty’s Government that any convention will be of doubtful value, and that the subject should be divided so that Genocide stricto sensu is referred to the International Law Commission and the other broader aspects to the Sub-Commission on non discrimination. I should not oppose the Council’s attempting to fulfill the instruction from the Assembly namely to prepare a draft convention (or revise the present draft) for submission to the next Assembly. 3.  The French delegation have submitted a comparatively short draft conventions (Document E/623/ADD 1) dealing with Genocide being “an attack on the life of a human group or of an individual as a member of such group” etc. and providing for an international criminal court and an international prosecutor’s office the constitutions of which are to be contained in annexes to the draft to be circulated later. 4.  If, as seems inevitable, a committee of the Council is set up to prepare a new draft it may be that it will produce a draft confined to Genocide stricto sensu and perhaps containing provisions relating to an international court and prosecutions office which will add cogency to the argument that it should be referred to the International Law Commission. At the same time the Committee might recommend (or leave the way open for the Council to do so at its 7th session) that the wider aspects of Genocide should be referred to the Sub-Commission on Non-Discrimination. 5.  In the Social Committee (to which the item has now been referred) I shall remind members of the views of His Majesty’s Government whenever it appears suitable to do so, and support any proposals which might ultimately assist in the realization of those views. But if I oppose reference of the Secretariat draft to a committee I shall probably be alone in this with the Soviet group. Therefore, unless you instruct me to the contrary, I propose to vote for reference of the documents to a committee with suitable terms of reference, but I shall at the same time make it clear that when its report is received at the next session, this delegation will press the Council to recommend to the Assembly the division of the subject as I suggested in the general debate, and reference



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of the appropriate subjects (with such documents as may result from the work of the E.C.O.S.O.C.) to the International Law Commission and the Sub-Commission on Non-Discrimination respectively. 6.  Full report of debate follows by Saving telegram.

No. 49 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Informs the Foreign Office about the Debates on Genocide in the ECOSOC, February 16, 1948  NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN376 February 16, 1948 FERTILE WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations) No. 26 Saving Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 26 Saving of 14th February, repeated to Washington On Thursday, 12th February, the Economic and Social Council in Plenary Session began discussion of Item 31, Genocide (E/621, E/622, E/623. Add. 1, E/634, E/638, E/660, E/622) and disposal of the item at Friday’s session by referring it to the Social Committee of the Whole.1 2. The Venezuelan delegate opened the debate, pointing out that an accusation of genocide had already been brought before the Council (referring presumably to E/634).2 The Council was not now concerned with the question whether or not there should be a convention on genocide. The Council must now produce a draft for the Assembly, and must presently refer the Secretariat’s draft convention to an ad hoc Committee to that end. The speech of the United States delegate followed, being an elaboration of document E/662. The Australian delegate proposed reference to the International Law Commission, stressing the need for sound legal and moral principles. The French accepted the Venezuelan and United States suggestions and said that the political and administrative questions involved must be settled before the convention was sent to the General Assembly.

See the full text of the documents in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 478–579. 2 See doc. no. 45. 1

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3. After Poland had supported the suggestion of an ad hoc Committee, the Lebanese delegate said that genocide was only genocide when the motives behind it were religious, political or economic fanaticism. New Zealand then supported reference to an ad hoc Committee, composed of government representatives and jurists, while Brazil asserted that although it was desirable to refer the matter to the International Law Commission, the Assembly’s decision that the question was urgent precluded such a course. 4.  At the resumption of the debate on Friday Davidson (Canada) supported the United States proposal than an ad hoc committee of the Council should be set up to prepare a draft convention on the basis of the Secretariat draft and the comments on it by Governments. He felt that this committee should include those members of the Council who had already made comments with the addition of those two or three members of the Council and aided wherever possible by legal and social experts. 5.  China pressed for a speedy conclusion of the draft Convention on United States lines and drew attention to the need to include in any draft convention a provision to cover the method of genocide practised by the Japanese in China by the use of narcotics. 6.  P.U.S. spoke on the lines of IOC (48) 2 pointing out that there was serious danger of a convention on genocide, which Governments might or might not accede to, weakening if not invalidating the accepted principle that genocide is a crime under international law.1 With regard to the French draft convention (E/623/Add 1) he said that it seemed to be a useful document but the proposal for an International Criminal Court was far-reaching and would certainly have to be studied thoroughly by the International Law Commission. The Netherlands supported the United Kingdom view. 7. The U.S.S.R. agreed with the United Kingdom that the concept of genocide needed to be much more clearly defined and that the Council was not in a position to discuss the substance of the matter at this stage as only very few members of the United Nations had yet submitted comments. He spoke at length on the need for a definition of genocide to cover the stirring-up of racial and religious hatred by fascist and semi-fascist organisations. As an example of the effect of organisations, he quoted the antisemitic disturbances in the United Kingdom last year. He made it quite clear, however, that in his view His Majesty’s Government were making every effort to control the activities of such political agitators. He concluded by formally moving that the question of genocide should be referred to the Human Rights Commission for consideration. 8.  France then suggested that the ad hoc committee could report to the Human Rights Commission which would then submit a final draft convention to the Third General Assembly. 9.  The item was then referred to the Social Committee of the whole to consider the various proposals.

Christopher Mayhew (1915–97), Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office from 1945 to 1950.

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No. 50 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Summarizes the Debates in the ECOSOC concerning the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, February 21, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN448 WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations) February 21, 1948 IMPORTANT FERTILE CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office No. 634 of 24th February, repeated for information to Washington Saving Your telegram No. 722: Genocide Social Committee took Genocide on February 21st and adopted by 13 votes to none with 4 abstentions the resolution in my immediately following telegram. 2.  Discussion was mainly devoted to terms of reference and composition of new Ad Hoc Committee that nearly all members wanted to see set up. A United States draft (E/662/ADD1) asked the Secretary General to prepare a second draft convention in the light of comments by Governments and proposed a committee of four to assist him the primary responsibility remaining with the Secretary General. A Venezuelan draft (K/663) laid the primary responsibility for drafting on a committee of nine members including the five great powers whose participation the Venezuelan considered essential as they were bound to play the main part in any under-taking to punish committers of genocide. The Secretary General would merely advise this committee which would take the present draft as its starting point. Both proposals provided for consultation of the Human Rights Commission if possible. 3.  Debate showed most members impressed by the Venezuelan arguments that the Secretary General could not be expected to take the policy decisions involved in preparing a new draft and that since the present draft presumably represented his considered views it was unreasonable to ask him to revise them without policy directives which the Council had not time to give at this session. It was simplest and best therefore to entrust both policy and drafting to a body of legal experts representing Governments. 4.  Parliamentary Under Secretary spoke as proposed in paragraph 5 of my telegram 500 and introduced an amendment to fit either proposal requesting the Committee “to take into consideration the possible desirability of referring genocide stricto sensu to the International Law Commission and other aspects of genocide under the draft prepared by the Secretariat to the Sub-Commission on Discrimination of the Human Rights Commission.” The nearest thing to support came from Australia who recognised that

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the I.L.C. might ultimately have to be consulted before final adoption of a convention but did not think submission of a draft to the Assembly should be delayed in order to seek I.L.C.’s views. At the other extreme Poland accused us outright of delaying tactics and sabotage though it is interesting to note that Poland was against trying to cover cultural and other forms of near-genocide as being likely to delay the immediate object of concluding a convention on genocide stricto sensu. The Soviet Union again proposed referring the whole question to the Human Rights Commission alone but was defeated. 5.  Finally we withdrew our amendment which had served its purpose in making our position clear and would not have secured any vote but ours. The resolution adopted is a truncated form of the Venezuelan draft with minor points from the American one. We abstained from all the voting. 6. We were strongly pressed to accept membership of the Committee, the Venezuelan maintaining that its whole point was lost without us. We judged it best, however, to stand firm by our refusal on the grounds that holding the views we did we could not usefully participate. New Zealand originally on the Venezuelan slate also declined and so did Australia when proposed in her place. 7.  We propose if you agree to abstain again in plenary and not to speak there unless something happens to make it desirable for us to state our position once again.

No. 51 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Abstains from a Vote in the ECOSOC Establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, March 8, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN529 WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations) March 8, 1948 RESTRICTED FERTILE Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 63 saving of 4th March, repeated for information to Washington saving. Your telegram No. 912 [of February 27th]. Item 31 – Genocide. The Draft resolution submitted by the Social Committee (E/690; my telegram No. 635), together with the financial estimate in E/690/Add.1, was adopted unchanged by the Council in plenary session on March 3rd. All members voted for it except the United Kingdom representative, who abstained with an explanation. 2. The only other speech came from Katz-Suchy (Poland) who asked for unanimous approval of the resolution as an urgent necessity if those guilty of genocide



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were to meet with their deserts. He reinforced his demand by citing a recent American judgment in a war crimes trial at Nuremberg in which the shooting by the Germans of captured partisans was held no crime under the laws of war because the partisans were not members of a regular and recognisable military force entitled to treatment as ordinary prisoners of war. In the name of the millions of Poles slaughtered in the war he protested against this “monstrous judgment”. We fear the reference is vague but we quote it because it was in the light of the Polish speech that the United Kingdom representative felt it desirable to put on record once more our reasons for disagreeing with the proposed treatment of the subject, adding again that the Nuremberg tribunal and the Assembly had both declared genocide an international crime.1

No. 52 UN Secretary General Informs the UK Government of the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide and Requests Comments on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, March 18, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN628 March 18, 1948 United Nations SOA 17/2/01/EG The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Foreign Office, Downing Street London, S.W.1 England The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom and has the honour to inform him that the following resolution concerning the crime of genocide was adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 3 March 1948: “THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, TAKING COGNIZANCE of the General Assembly Resolution No. 180(II) of 23 November 1947, REQUESTS the Members of the United Nations which have not yet done so to transmit at the earliest possible date their comments on the draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General (document E/447), Juliusz Katz-Suchy was apparently referring to The USA v. Wilhelm List et al., commonly known as the Hostages Trial, or Case 7, which was held at Nuremberg between July 1947 and February 1948. To remind, the count of genocide was featured in the indictment but not in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal.

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ESTABLISHES an Ad Hoc Committee composed of the following Members of the Economic and Social Council: China, France, Lebanon, Poland, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Venezuela. INSTRUCTS the Committee: (a) to meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations in order to prepare the draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, in accordance with the abovementioned resolution of the General Assembly, and to submit this draft convention, together with the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights thereon to the next session of the Economic and Social Council; and, (b) to take into consideration in the preparation of the draft convention, the draft convention prepared by the Secretary-General, the comments of the Member Governments on this draft convention, and other drafts on the matter submitted by any Member Government; REQUESTS the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures to enable the Committee effectively to carry out the tasks entrusted to it.

The Ad Hoc Committee established by this resolution will meet from 5 to 17 April 1948 at Lake Success. The Secretary-General has the honour to request that Member Governments transmit to the Secretariat, as soon as possible, their comments and observations on the draft convention on the crime of genocide (document E/447 – 26 June 1947) which has already been circulated.

No. 53 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov Edits Draft Directive to the Soviet Delegate on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, March 25, 1948 AVP RF, 06/10/14/137 March 25, 1948 [Sent] to Comrade Molotov for approval. The commission will convene on April 5, 1948 in New York SECRET DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SOCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE [CONVENED] TO DRAFT THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION1 The Soviet representative on the Ad Hoc Committee [established for the purpose of] drafting the Genocide Convention is advised to proceed as follows: The directive resembles, both substantively and stylistically, the serialized article on genocide that Aron Trainin published in the Soviet press in May of the same year. In the absence of any other expert on genocide in the Soviet Union at the time, Trainin was likely the main author of the directive, and by extension of the “Basic Provisions of the Genocide Convention” from which it was derived. Cf. doc. no. 44.

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I a.  When defining “genocide” as a crime, proceed from the assumption that the corpus delicti encompasses the racially, ethnically, religiously, and politically motivated physical destruction of populations.1 b.  If the issue is raised of whether or not the notion of physical destruction should cover not only those instances of the outright murder of specific population groups on abovementioned grounds, but also the premeditated creation of living conditions aimed to destroy that segment of the population – do not object to that proposal. c.  Object to the excessive broadening of the notion of “genocide,” by qualifying as “genocide” those measures that target native language speakers and those measures that target national culture, since such measures belong under the categories of the protection of human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities. Regard it as necessary [to include]: cultural genocide.2 d.  Suggest dropping the list of genocidal acts that go beyond physical destruction enumerated in the draft convention; [it is] invariably incomplete and simultaneously too broad. If other delegations insist that specific forms of genocide should be retained, do not object to mentioning examples such as acts of mass murder or individual executions; the creation of regimes that lead to the extinction of effected population groups; the causing harm and carrying out of biological experiments; the prevention of births by means of sterilization and forced abortion. e.  Object to any attempts to define as genocide the criminal prosecution by the state of crimes committed by armed bands, gangs or other [splinter] groups, which is provided for in the domestic legislation. II a.  Reject the proposal to establish a permanent international criminal court or an ad hoc tribunal for the prosecution of individuals indicted for genocide, since the establishment of such a tribunal would constitute an encroachment on the internal affairs of the state and on state sovereignty. On the same grounds, object to the obligatory prosecution of perpetrators of genocide, irrespective of the place where the [actual] crime was committed, by parties to the Convention. Support the provision according to which perpetrators of genocide should be tried by the courts of the state on whose territory the crimes were committed. b.  Go along [with the presupposition] that genocide should not be regarded as a political crime (which would otherwise oblige parties to the Convention to extradite perpetrators of genocide), except when the extradition proceed in accordance with the laws and international agreements of the given state. c.  In the case that a majority of Committee members still decide to consider the establishment of an international genocide tribunal, state that the Soviet representative would not participate in an article-by-article discussion of this proposal since he objects on principle to the creation of an international court. All corrections in the text are by Molotov. In accordance with Soviet linguistic tradition, the drafters used the word national with regard to both language and culture.

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Make every effort to get the following provisions adopted: a. Genocide is organically linked to fascism and related ideologies; committing the crime of genocide is the result of the incendiary fascist “theories” of misanthropy and similar ideologies promoting the dominant races and the extermination of the so-called “lower races”. b. States are legally bound to disband, and to prevent the resurgence of, those organizations created for the purpose of inciting racial, ethnic, or religious hatred, of for committing genocide. c. States are legally bound to make provisions in their legislation regarding the prevention and punishment of genocide, as well as the incitement of racial, ethnic, and religious animosity – introducing penalties for the abovementioned crimes in the case that the respective states’ penal code does not contain such provisions. IV Regard as “genocide” acts that prepare for genocide, as well as genocidal propaganda and conspiracy and incitement to commit the crime. V Support the provision, which states that in all cases of genocide (as well as in all instances of the violation of the abovementioned obligations) parties to the convention are legally bound to notify the Security Council so that it may adopt the necessary measures in compliance with Article VI of the UN Charter. VI In the case the Committee receives any additional drafts besides the one submitted by the Secretary General, immediately communicate their contents along with any conclusions or suggestions. While waiting for [additional] instructions follow those in sections I–V and avoid making any binding statements. VII In case that a majority of the Committee does not support the Soviet proposals enumerated in section I-a and I-b (the definition of genocide); in I-d (making criminal prosecution a part of genocide); in section II-a (establishing a permanent international tribunal or an ad hoc tribunal, as well as obliging the parties to the Convention to prosecute perpetrators of genocide regardless of the site of the crime) – vote against these particular provisions and the convention as a whole, and make along the way a relevant statement regarding the motivation for such a vote. VIII The delegation should make no decisions, nor submit any new proposals to the ad hoc committee without the previous approval of Headquarters [Tsentr].



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No. 54 John Maktos Appointed as US Representative on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, March 30, 1948  NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/4-248) March 30, 1948 Mr. John Maktos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State My dear Mr. Maktos: You have been designated to serve as United States Representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide of the United Nations Economic and Social Council which will meet in New York April 5–19, 1948. You will receive a separate communication covering financial arrangements for your trip. Sincerely yours, For the Acting Secretary of State, John E. Peurifoy Assistant Secretary

No. 55 The United Kingdom Will Not Comment on the Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, April 2, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN628 April 2, 1948 (UN 628/48/78) OUTFILE The United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York Dear Delegation, Please refer to United Nations letter SOA 17/2/01/EG of 18th March requesting comments on the draft Convention on genocide prepared by the Secretary General (document E/447).1 We think that His majesty’s Government’s attitude to this question has been made abundantly clear by the various statements made by the United Kingdom Delegation both at the Assembly and at the last session of the Economic and Social Council. We therefore do not propose to furnish any detailed comments on the Convention concerned. If you agree will you reply to the Secretary General on the above lines. Yours ever, UNITED NATIONS (POLITICAL) DEPARTMENT2 See doc. no. 52. The letter was composed by FO’s David Hildyard. See H. M. Philips’s reply to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie (along the lines proposed above) from April 6, 1948 in the same file.

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No. 56 The US State Department Works out a Position on Genocide Convention prior to the Debates in the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, April 2, 1948 NARA, DoS General Records, Files of Durwald V. Sandifer, 59/55D429/8 April 2, 1948 THE ACTING SECRETARY THROUGH: S/S L – Mr. Gross UNA – Mr. Sandifer Position on Genocide Convention in ECOSOC Drafting Committee Problem: The problem is to determine the United States Position in Drafting of Convention on Genocide by the ad hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations which is to meet in New York from April 5 to 17. Recommendation: It is recommended that a simplified convention consisting of three substantive articles be approved as the United States position in the drafting committee of the Economic and Social Council. (Annex A). Discussion On September 30, 1947, the United States submitted to the Secretariat of the United Nations its comments on a draft convention on genocide prepared by the Secretariat, together with a draft convention prepared by the United States.1 The comments and the draft convention were released to the press on February 10, 1948 with the statement that the comments “do not represent the final position of the United States Government on this issue”. (Annex B). On November 23, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council to proceed with the completion of a convention on genocide, taking into account that the International Law Commission to be set up by the General Assembly has been charged with the formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal as well as the preparation of a draft code of offences against peace and security. The Economic and Social Council on March, 1948 appointed an ad hoc committee of seven to prepare a draft convention. The members of the committee are the United

See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 557–62.

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States, China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the U.S.S.R. and Venezuela. The committee is to meet Monday, April 5. The committee will have before it the Secretariat draft convention on genocide, the United States draft convention of September 30, 1947, and a draft convention prepared by the French. The French draft contains merely a simple definition of genocide and articles relating to an International Criminal Court. In preparation for this committee, the previous drafts have been carefully reexamined in the Department and in consultation with the Department of Justice. There is general agreement on the desirability of the United States supporting a simplified draft consisting of three substantive articles (Annex A). This proposal is based upon the following considerations: 1.  The convention is simply a statement of substantive international law which justifies future sanctions against offenders. The Nuremberg trial of aggressive war charges was criticized as being ex post facto. Such a convention on genocide would form a juridical basis for future, but not past, international action against persons charged with genocide. 2.  The simplified definition in Article II covers the heinous crimes which the General Assembly undoubtedly had in mind, namely the crimes of mass extermination. (The Assembly resolution of December 11, 1946 defines genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups.”) The definition in the United States draft of September 30, 1947 includes detailed enumeration of offenses, such as subjection to lack of proper housing, clothing, etc. In domestic legislation definitions of homicide state merely the general rule and do not include the enumeration of detailed methods by which homicide may be committed. It is felt that the same rules of drafting should be followed in international legislation. 3.  By limiting the crimes to those committed “with the complicity of the responsible officials of a state,” only those offenses are included which are perpetrated as a matter of state policy, such as the German exterminations of the Jews. Such a definition would not include sporadic lynching or racial discrimination. 4.  The simplified convention does not take up the whole thorny question of implementation. It was felt that questions of implementation should be determined at the time actual questions arise in the light of circumstances then existing. The United States has already taken the position that no provision should be made in the genocide convention for a permanent international penal court, or an international court to deal solely with genocide. It was felt that there were dangers in providing as the United States position of September 30, does for an ad hoc tribunal with a limited compulsory jurisdiction which could be set up by a simple majority of the contracting states. Such a provision would make it possible for a group of countries, not including the United States, to establish an international tribunal to try for acts said by them to be genocide and to bring before such tribunal a United States citizen already physically in their custody. Certainly the United States Senate would never agree to this. On the other hand, to require an ad hoc tribunal to be unanimously agreed to by the parties to the convention runs the risk of a vote by one recalcitrant

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state. The dilemma was resolved by providing that guilty persons shall be punishable by a “competent” tribunal which leaves the question open. This would leave a government free to object that any international tribunal to which it had not agreed was not competent. It was felt that it was necessary to make some reference to an international tribunal, because the mere statement that a person guilty of genocide is punishable might be interpreted to confer jurisdiction on one state unilaterally to punish for acts said by it to constitute genocide committed outside its jurisdiction. 5.  With a simplified definition of genocide it was not felt necessary to include provisions such as are contained in Article V of the United States draft of September 30 for domestic legislation since the codes of all civilized countries make homicide and acts of violence a crime.

No. 57 John Maktos of the US State Department Reflects on His Nomination as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide back in 1948, May 28, 1973 Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Oral History Interview with John Maktos (excerpt), May 28, 19731 Memoir of John Maktos 2. GENOCIDE [pages 2–4] The mass extermination of millions of Jews by the Hitler regime shocked the conscience of mankind. At its first session the United Nations General Assembly adopted unanimously Resolution 96(I), of December 11, 1946. It provided that genocide is a crime under international law. Pursuant to this resolution there was established a United Nations Committee on Genocide. Its mandate was to prepare a draft convention on the crime of genocide. In the Department I prepared the draft that the United States was to submit to the Committee at its session in the spring of 1948, and was appointed U.S. Delegate to the Committee. At the 1945 San Francisco Conference the so-called Big-Five powers – China, France, USSR, United Kingdom and U.S. – had a gentleman’s agreement to refrain, as much as possible, from seeking to head U.N. organs. This was to avoid possible claims of dominance by them of the U.N. Aware of this understanding, I did not accept nomination for the Committee’s chairmanship. When, however, the USSR delegate was nominated for this office, he accepted.

Maktos prepared two short memorandums concerning his work with the Department of State during the Truman years. These memorandums (pages 1–16) were followed by supplementary remarks (pages 17–48).

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During the recess prior to the voting I remember my calling the Department of State from New York where we were meeting. After referring to the above developments, I pointed out the increased difficulty of implementing our position regarding certain provisions we wanted incorporated in the convention, with the USSR delegate as a presiding officer. I asked and received authorization to be renominated and to accept the nomination. I did so and was elected chairman of the Committee. With a few changes, my draft was approved. In 1948, the draft convention prepared by the Committee was considered in the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee) of the U.N. General Assembly later in 1948. It was unanimously approved by Assembly Resolution 260A (III), of December 9, 1948, under the title “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” Oral History Interview with John Maktos Washington, D.C., May 28, 1973 by Richard D. McKinzie [pages 30–35] MCKINZIE: I note that in your memorandum of May 28, you write about the genocide issue before the United Nations, and you seem to write with some feeling about this. Was this a subject of particular personal interest to you? MAKTOS: I must admit that it was. I tried to be objective, as objective as I could be, but there is no doubt that the killing of millions of human beings had really moved me. On the other hand, I could not but present the issues to the Department in an objective manner, for instance as to what legal provisions should be incorporated in the treaty that was to be drafted. And I prepared a draft, not with any personal feelings, but with a viewpoint as to what provisions would be effective. For instance, I thought of including a ban against extermination of political ideologists. I felt that that would be inadvisable because some countries might not accede to the treaty to be prepared, because of political difficulties. They may think that they may be accused of being genocidal should they take certain steps in relation to parties not forming part of an existing government. Therefore, I excluded that from enumeration of the kinds of classes – racial, ethnic, religious – that should be treated in the convention. But my appointment to the committee to draft the Genocide Convention, was not because of my personal views, but because of my functions. I did not include in the memo of May 28, how we spent a good deal of time, after I got authorization to be renominated as chairman of the committee, wrangling about whether or not it was permissible to be renominated having once rejected nomination. Of course, there was no law, or regulation of the United Nations, that prevented anything like that, but fortunately those who nominated me really put it across – and I don’t remember even who did, although I think it was the French delegate, (Pierre) Ordonneau. I’m sure that you are familiar with the prerogatives of a chairman who may try to impede anything they may dislike. For instance, he may give prior recognition to another delegate who has a proposal more in accord with the chairman’s views; and once that proposal is made it can be voted upon, which of course, could make another

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proposal academic. I’m not accusing anybody in particular, but there is no doubt that a chairman may be able to recognize a delegate ahead of another, put a resolution ahead of another, and so forth. And it was such reasons that made me call the State Department to see whether I should be renominated as chairman of the committee. It may reflect a little personal thing, but there was really more of that substantive nature that made me take action. Discussions of the position that I took in the Legal Committee of the United Nations, and on which I did not expatiate in my memo, would be found in the official records of that committee at the Paris Conference in 1948. I did not put in that short memo that, after every meeting, there was a summary record made by the United Nations’ staff which summarized the discussion at the meeting. U.N. documents could be given the letter A/, A being for the General Assembly. C.6. for instance would be Committee 6, C.l. Committee one, or C.5.; the capitals SR would mean Summary Record, and those summaries would be numbered consecutively. The first meeting would be SR1, the next meeting SR2, and all the discussions in the Legal Committee can be found in its Summary Records in the official records of the United Nations. MCKINZIE: You said that with a few changes your draft in 1948 was approved. Were there any particular changes which you would have preferred not to have occurred? MAKTOS: I don’t recall any significant inappropriate provision that was excluded or included in the final draft. I must admit that at the final meeting of the drafting committee, when I congratulated its members, I did not mention that they had put across our position in relation to genocide so successfully. The only regret that I still remember very poignantly was in connection with an entirely different problem, the definition of aggression. We really wanted to defeat any definition in the United Nations. To give you a reason that I did not give in my memo. Assume that there is a definition that says: aggression elements are a, b, c, d, e, f. By the time you discuss those elements in the United Nations, aggression may already have been accomplished. How successfully such a definition would have prevented the Czechoslovak invasion? And so I remember thinking that it would be so much better to leave the term aggression undefined, elastic. If, driving a car, you are “negligent,” you are guilty of a violation of law. Who would ever attempt to incorporate in the definition of “negligence” all the myriad of circumstances that may amount to negligence. Well, a thing that I regretted was this: One of the delegates had told me he would vote against defining aggression. Had he done so, the vote in the Legal Committee would have been 26 against defining and 25 for it. That would have ended any further steps in the future to define aggression. This conversation was a private one and nothing else. And when I saw him voting for definition, I was quite disappointed because we had to continue to deal in the U.N. with this issue for years



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No. 58 Vyacheslav Molotov Forwards to Joseph Stalin a Foreign Ministry’s Report on the UN Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention, April 4, 1948 AVP RF, 06/10/14/137 To retain V. M. 5.IV 4.IV.48 To Molotov (corrections in text) I. Stalin To Comrade STALIN. On March 3, 1948, the Economic and Social Council, in accordance with the General Assembly’s resolution, created an Ad Hoc Committee (consisting of representatives of the USSR, Poland, USA, China, France, Lebanon, and Venezuela) entrusted with the preparation of a draft Convention against the crime of genocide to be presented before the next session of the Council.1 The notion of genocide as delict was introduced in international law in connection with the trial of major German war criminals by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, who stood accused, among others crimes, of the premediated and systematic extermination of racial and ethnic groups among the civilian population in the territories occupied by Hitler’s armies. The Council-created Ad Hoc Committee is slated to start its work on April 5, 1948 in New York. While preparing the draft Genocide Convention, the Economic and Social Council directed the Ad Hoc Committee to consider the draft prepared by the UN Secretariat General and other drafts that may be submitted to the Committee. Thus, one may expect that the Ad Hoc Committee takes the Secretariat draft as a basis for discussion. As it stands, that draft contains a series of provisions politically unacceptable to us that are directed, though covertly, against the Soviet Union. Those provisions include, for example, the provision in the Secretariat draft Convention according to which genocide also encompasses such acts as “creating living conditions via forced labor and physical exertion that cause the debilitation or death of individuals” or “deprivation of all means of existence through confiscation of property” or “denial of housing and supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of the territory concerned.”

All underlining and comments in the text are by Stalin. The paragraph obviously refers to the next session of the General Assembly, not the ECOSOC’s.

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Furthermore, the Secretariat draft Convention stipulates that offenders should be punished within the territory and the jurisdiction of the given state, regardless of the offender’s citizenship or the place where the offence was committed. This provision violates the principle of state sovereignty. In yet another provision of the Secretariat draft, the principle of state sovereignty is violated, namely [the provision by which] genocide cases should be considered by a Permanent International Tribunal or an Ad Hoc International Tribunal, and not by the national courts of any given state. It should also be noted that when the Secretariat draft defines genocide, it totally ignores the organic link between this crime and fascism and fascist theories promoting misanthropy, the supremacy of so-called “higher” races, and the extermination of so-called “lower” races. Since the Secretariat draft is politically unacceptable [to us] due to the abovementioned shortcomings, the Soviet Foreign Ministry deems it necessary to set off this draft against our own draft [outlining the] main provisions of the Genocide Convention. Our draft of the basic provisions of the Genocide Convention eliminates the abovementioned shortcomings. Our draft rejects the attempts to render as genocide deprivation of the means of existence of this or that group through the confiscation of property or measures linked to physical exertion, supposedly leading to the debilitation or death of individuals. The Soviet draft proceeds from the assumption that the categories of crimes falling under genocide include not only the direct killing of certain population groups on racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds, but also the premeditated creation of the kind of living conditions that lead to their extinction [napravleny na ikh unichtozhenie]. Simultaneously, the draft resolutely rejects any attempts to regard as genocide criminal prosecution by the state of crimes committed by armed bands, gangs or other [splinter] groups (as stipulated in the domestic legislation). The Soviet draft – as opposed to the Secretariat draft – presupposes the provision in the Convention according to which genocide is organically linked with fascism and fascist theories promoting misanthropy, the supremacy of so-called “higher” races and the extermination of so-called “lower” races. The Soviet draft argues that prosecution of genocide should be carried out by domestic courts, and not by an International Tribunal (as stipulated in the Secretariat draft). By the same token, the Soviet draft proposes an expansive notion of so-called “cultural” genocide, presupposing a series of acts falling under this category of crimes. Furthermore, in order to prevent genocidal crimes, the Soviet draft provides for the punishment of genocide in all its forms as well as [the punishment] of measures that aim to incite racial, ethnic, and religious hatred. In consideration of the abovementioned points I submit a draft of the basic provisions of the Genocide Convention and a draft directive for the Soviet representative on the Ad Hoc Committee. Requesting your approval, V. Molotov 2 April 1948



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No. 59 Joseph Stalin Edits Basic Provisions of the Genocide Convention Drafted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, April 4, 1948 AVP RF, 06/10/14/137 [April 4, 1948] BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION I Genocide, whose aim is the extermination of particular population groups on racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds, is one of the gravest crimes against humanity and international law. The crime of genocide is organically linked to fascism and fascist-Nazism and analogous fascist racist “theories” which preach misanthropy racial and ethnic hatred, the domination of the so-called superior races, and the extermination of the so-called lower races.1 Genocide sullies the name of those countries in which the crime of genocide, on-related propaganda, and incitement to commit such a crime still take place. Such crimes are both a gross violation of, and an insult to, the principles and goals of the United Nations, constituting the gravest crime against international law humanity. The fight against genocide calls upon all civilized peoples to take decisive action toward the prevention of the abovementioned crime, and toward the suppression and outlawing of the incitement of racial, ethnic, and (religious) hatred, and toward the severe punishment of individuals guilty of inciting, committing, or masterminding said crimes. By recognizing genocide as the most heinous international crime, and by attaching great importance to combating it, the Soviet Government proposes the adoption of a convention which would include the following basic provisions. II The definition of genocide in the convention should be based on the presumption that this crime denotes the racially, ethnically, (religiously) and politically motivated physical destruction of population groups. The notion of physical destruction must encompass not only instances of the outright murder of certain population groups on the abovementioned grounds, but also the premeditated establishment of living conditions aimed to destroy that segment of the population.

All comments in the text are by Stalin.

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The concept of genocide should also encompass those policies and actions that target national language and culture (i.e., “national-cultural genocide”), including the following: a. prohibiting or limiting the use of the national language in both public and private spheres; banning instruction in the native languages in schools; b. destroying or banning books printed in the native languages; c. destroying historical and sacred buildings, museums, records, libraries and other monuments and artifacts of national culture (or religious worship). IV By the same token, the convention should provide for the following acts of genocide: 1. Attempts to commit genocide. 2. The following acts leading up to genocide: a. studies and research for the development of genocidal techniques; b. manufacturing equipment as well as storing and supplying materials and items known to be used for the purpose of committing genocide; c. instructions, orders, commands, and the division of tasks for the purpose of committing genocide. V The convention should establish a penalty at the same level of severity as that for genocide for the following acts: 1. premeditated participation in all forms of genocide; 2. direct public incitement to commit genocide (whether it resulted in a crime or not); 3. complicity or other forms of conspiracy for the purpose of committing genocide. VI The convention should declare as a criminal offense engaging in any form of genocide propaganda (the press, radio, film, etc.) that incites racial, ethnic, or religious animosity or hatred, or encourages committing acts of genocide. VII The convention should enumerate instances of genocidal crimes such as mass murder or individual executions on racial, ethnic, (religious), or political grounds; the creation of the conditions leading to the extinction of the population groups subjected to those conditions; maiming or conducting biological experiments [on humans]; preventing births by means of sterilization or forced abortion. VIII The convention should contain the following provisions: a. states are legally bound to disband and to prevent the resurgence of organizations created for the purpose of inciting racial, ethnic, or religious hatred, and committing genocide;



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b. states are legally bound to make provisions in their legislation toward the prevention and punishment of genocide, and toward the prevention of the incitement of racial, ethnic, and religious animosity, introducing penalties for the abovementioned crimes in the case that the respective states’ penal codes do not contain such a provision. IX The convention should provide for charges of genocide to be heard in the national courts in accordance with the domestic legislation of any given country. X The convention should stipulate that the signatories report to the Security Council all instances of genocide, as well as all violations of the convention’s provisions, so that the appropriate measures can be taken in accordance to Paragraph VI of the UN Charter.

No. 60 The Soviet Delegate on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Receives Instructions from the Foreign Ministry, April 4, 1948 AVP RF, 06/10/14/137 [April 4, 1948] DIRECTIVE TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ON THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE UN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL [CONVENED] TO DRAFT THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION The Soviet Representative on the Ad Hoc Committee [established for the purpose of] drafting the Genocide Convention is advised to proceed as follows: I.  Submit to the Ad Hoc Committee “Basic Provisions of the Genocide Convention” (see attached) and suggest to the Committee that it should accept this particular draft as a basis for drafting the Convention. II.  In the case that the Secretariat draft, or any other draft, is selected as a basis for discussion, the Soviet representative should be guided by the “Basic Provisions of the Genocide Convention,” as indicated in para. I. III.  Furthermore, the Soviet representative should advance the following points: a. Regard as unnecessary the enumeration in the Convention of [specific] acts of genocide, for such a list would inevitably be incomplete and at the same time may unduly expand the notion of “genocide.” b. Reject any efforts to subsume under the notion of genocide the prosecution of crimes committed by groups (armed groups, gangs), which belong to the domestic jurisdiction.

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IV.  Reject the proposal to establish a permanent international criminal court or an ad hoc tribunal for the prosecution of individuals indicted for genocide, since the establishment of such a tribunal would constitute an encroachment on internal affairs and state sovereignty. On the same grounds, object to the Convention obligating its parties to prosecute perpetrators of genocide irrespective of the place where the [actual] crime was committed. Support the provision according to which perpetrators of genocide should be tried by the courts of the state on whose territory the crimes were committed. V.  Go along [with the presupposition] that genocide should not be regarded as a political crime (which would otherwise oblige parties to the Convention to extradite genocide perpetrators), save that the extradition should proceed in accordance with the laws and international agreements of the given state. VI.  In the case that a majority of the Committee members still decide to consider the establishment of an international genocide tribunal, state that the Soviet representative would not participate in an article-by-article discussion of this proposal since he objects on principle to the creation of an international court. VII.  In the case that the Committee receives any additional drafts besides the one submitted by the Secretary General, immediately communicate their contents along with any conclusions or suggestions. While waiting for [additional] instructions, follow those [instructions referred] in sections I–V and avoid making and binding statements. VIII.  In the case that a majority of the Committee does not support the Soviet proposal outlined in the “Basic Provisions of the Genocide Convention” – specifically the definition of genocide, the inadmissibility [nedopustimost] of making criminal prosecution a part of genocide, of establishing a permanent international tribunal or an ad hoc tribunal, and of declaring parties to the Convention responsible for the prosecution of perpetrators of genocide – the Soviet delegate should vote against these particular provisions and the Convention as a whole, and make along the way a relevant statement regarding the motivation for such a vote. IX.  The delegation should make no decisions, nor submit any new proposals, to the Ad Hoc Committee without the previous approval of Headquarters [Tsentr].

No. 61 Aron Trainin Advances a Soviet Perspective on the Draft Genocide Convention in a Newspaper Article, April 4, 1948 A.  Trainin, “Genotsid,” Izvestia, April 4, 1948 “Genocide” I Soviet readers are hardly familiar with the word genocide.* The atrocities that gave rise to this word are totally alien to their consciousness and conscience. Genocide means * From the Latin word genus (kin) and occidere (kill).



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systematic murder. Yet murder is just a means to the end goal of genocidal crimes. The goal of genocide is the destruction of racial and ethnic groups. Victims of genocide are to be found only among those groups; as part of the group, each person is a victim – everyone will perish, the entire group, the entire nation. Genocide is engendered by fascist “theory” that regards the primacy of a single “chosen” race and [calls for] the destruction of all the rest. Genocide is racism in action, it is Majdanek and Auschwitz, gas vans and gas chambers.1 As a result of the genocide carried out by Hitler’s Germany, in the Auschwitz camp alone 2.5 million people were murdered. An additional 500 thousand perished due to starvation and diseases. All in all, Hitler’s policy of state-sponsored banditry killed at least 12 million civilians.2 Is it conceivable, then, that the conscience of freedomloving people and international judiciary can ignore these atrocities? When the day of reckoning came, and the executioner Kaltenbrunner, the “diplomat” Ribbentrop, the murderer Keitel, and the “anti-Semite no. 1” Streicher stood trial at Nuremberg, they were charged not only with [waging] aggressive war and violating the laws of war, but also with [devising] Majdanek and Babi Yar.3 The people’s judgment was pronounced. But is mankind safe from the repetition of fascist atrocities? As a result of the Soviet people’s heroic victory, the chief perpetrator of genocide – German fascism – was defeated. However, reactionary forces, afraid of the menacing rise in political mass movements, are ready yet again to turn to the methods and “agents” of fascism. Fascist industrialists, who armed Hitler’s Germany, are invited back to steer the German economy while leading [otvetstvennye] führers are used in the fight against German democrats. In the context of a kind of [svoeobraznyi] fascist renaissance, demolished fascist “theories” – the “theory” [proclaiming] the supremacy of certain races and nations over others and the “theory” [justifying] the economic exploitation of one state by another – are making a comeback (naturally, in a subtle form) in some places. The United Nations, created for the purpose of national security, towers over the abyss separating advocates of peace from instigators of war. Sometimes (with the active participation of the Soviet delegation) it cuts short the attempts of certain countries to make the international organization into an organ of the “chosen” few, into a bloc tool, while other times it obediently yields to the organized voting machinery.4 However, there are issues at hand that acutely reflect the people’s will, among them the issue of coordinating the struggle against all sorts of attempts to destroy en masse groups and nations, that is, genocide.

The Russian linguistic tradition prefers the Polish Oświęcim to the German Auschwitz. The number of victims at Auschwitz-Birkenau is currently estimated at 1.1 million, and the number of civilian victims of the Nazis, including Jews, at 20.9 million. 3 Chief of the RSHA Ernest Kaltenbrunner, foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, supreme commander of the Wehrmacht Wilhelm Keitel, and publisher of the anti-Semitic newspaper Der Stürmer Julius Streicher were sentenced to death and executed, along with other eight high-ranking Nazi officials, on October 16, 1946. An estimated 78,000 people were murdered at Majdanek death camp and 100,000 at the Babi Yar ravine on the outskirts of Kiev—a substantial percentage of them were Jews. 4 The Soviet Union, which found itself in a perpetual minority in the United Nations, consistently accused the United States of building up an anti-Communist bloc within the world organization. 1 2

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On November 21, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution according to which genocide is a “crime condemned by the civilized world” calling for the “cooperation between states for the purpose of implementing measures toward the prevention of genocide.” An ad hoc committee established for the purpose of reviewing the draft Genocide Convention, began its work on April 6, 1948 in New York. The ad hoc committee received two drafts of the convention, one prepared by the so-called committee on the progressive development of international law and another by the Soviet delegation. The provisions and definitions [in those two drafts] partially align, but mainly split, the opinions of the countries whose representatives sit on the committee. That was the case during the initial discussion. II The Soviet “Basic Proposals” proceed from the thesis that [the definition of] genocide covers the physical destruction of population groups “on racial and ethnic (religious) motives.” Obviously, political groupings that unite people on the basis of their political views are different from those that unite people on the basis of their race or ethnicity. Nevertheless, the US delegate, when voting on the Soviet proposal, declared that he reserves the right to amend the Soviet formula later. Following his lead, the representative of France hasted to add that he, too, reserves the right to amend the Soviet proposals. This constituted the first, subtle, attempt to include persecution of political groupings under [the definition of] genocide.1 However, as soon as yet another issue came up on the agenda – the important issue of national-cultural genocide, that is, crimes whose goal is to destroy national culture – the US delegates quickly lost interest in expanding the notion of genocide. The Soviet state is a great commonwealth of free nations. The Soviet “Basic Proposals,” therefore, consistently advance the agenda for protecting people’s culture – native language, national schools, and national literature. The US delegate steadfastly argued against the inclusion in the draft convention of provisions addressing national-cultural genocide. Whenever the outright rejection of Soviet proposals threatened to expose the actual views [podlinnye pozitsii] of certain delegations – [views] that are hardly concerned with the effective suppression of genocide – those delegations briskly used simple tricks and hollow argumentation in an attempt to obscure or sweeten their voting practice. Hence, a majority of the committee rejected the provision in the Soviet “Basic Proposals” that concerns the organic link between genocide and fascism. The US delegate then made a statement to the effect that voting down this provision does not mean that his government supports fascism, but just that it considers this issue as lying outside the purview of the convention. Well, things are not looking good when a government makes a special statement that it does not support fascism. Not everyone would put trust in such a declaration anyway. Along with other, cowardly, attempts to evade direct answers, the Soviet delegate’s rock solid [neosporimyi] proposal regarding the prosecution genocide propaganda was rejected. Shamelessly flaunting real or fake ignorance, some delegates pointed out Trainin intentionally used the word gruppirovka [grouping] instead of gruppa [group] in order to tone down the political element of genocide.

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that [the issue of] propaganda is covered by the provision concerning the incitement to commit genocide – a provision that was already adopted by the committee. Yet, any literate person would know that these are different concepts. Incitement is a call to commit a specific crime (say, to kill someone), while propaganda encompasses such calls in general, and is particularly dangerous as a means of sowing ethnic and national hatred. The debates in the committee concerning the Soviet proposal to introduce domestic legislation against genocide proved particularly instructive. Undoubtedly, genocidal crimes should be tried by the legal authorities [organy] of those states on whose territory those crimes were committed. Therefore, it is obvious that the trials of genocide perpetrators require domestic legislation. The committee chose to disagree. Countering the precise and clear proposal of the Soviet delegate requiring that parties introduce domestic legislation on genocide, the US representative wrapped his proposal in a fog of vague words and generic phrases: “Acting in accordance with the constitutional procedure, parties should pass or recommend to their legislative bodies the provisions toward the implementation within their national borders of the goals enunciated in the Convention for the Punishment of Genocide.” “Constitutional procedure,” “to really implement,” “goals enunciated in the convention” – this pile of words can only lessen the responsibility of states to take up the fight against genocide, can only distort the simple idea that each state should promptly adopt measures on behalf of the entire civilization. The fight against genocide – a crime that calls for the destruction of ethnic groups and nations – receives the staunch support of the Soviet people. However, the present international situation, the rampant campaign of slander waged by warmongers, requires a measured response against all the noise [shumnoe dvizhenie] around genocide in certain places. Such caution is warranted by the [events of the] recent past – which the Soviet public cannot and should not forget – lessons from the past reminiscent of certain tendencies today. Those lessons emanate from the following facts. In the aftermath of the First World War, international [law] conferences in bourgeois countries set out to develop a coordinated legal system [that would protect] against infringements on the “foundations of modern civilization.” The [conferences’] slogan, and even terminology, have changed over time. The III International [Codification] conference in Brussels in 1930 subsumed these infringements under the notion of “terrorism.” The V conference, in Madrid in 1933, introduced two new terms, “vandalism” and “barbarism.” The real issue, however, remained the same: under the pretext of combating “terrorism,” “vandalism,” and “barbarism,” a new means of warfare against a growing democratic movement was tested, a means of suppressing an ever-growing movement for democracy and socialism.1 Now, after the end of the Second World War, persistent, cynical voices resume talk of a unified front of capitalist countries against the movement for democracy and socialism. These modern heralds of reactionism and obscurantism, of course,

This paragraph effectively summarizes Trainin’s trademark criticism of the codification movement of the 1930s. Cf. his Ugolovnaia interventsiia (Moscow: OGIZ, 1935) and Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost gitlerovtsev (Moscow: Iiurizdat, 1944).

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have their own approach to the problem of genocide…One does not fail to notice that even the commentary on the draft convention prepared by the “committee on the progressive development of international law” betrays a certain leniency [slyshatsia notki sniskhoditelnogo otnosheniia] toward perpetrators of genocide. For example, the commentary contains the following statement: “The majority of people who partake in acts of genocide consider themselves to be honest citizens incapable of committing individual crimes for [personal] gain for personal vengeance.”1 Thus, it turns out that fascist cutthroats, who had over the course of years killed millions of people just because they [the latter] belonged to a “lower” race, were actually not executioners and torturers, but “honest citizens.” This [type of academic] discourse is appalling, yet it is a fact. Genocide surely is the most heinous atrocity engendered and promoted by fascism. The convention should ensure effective means to counter that atrocity. Simultaneously, it should be free of loopholes, which could be maliciously used against peace and democracy III The ad hoc committee on genocide in New York faces obstacles. The cause of those difficulties is easy to identify. Some delegates are apparently trying to resolve a truly difficult dilemma: to prepare the kind of genocide convention that would look like any other proper convention – with a solemn preamble, articles, and paragraphs – but at the same time would lack the real means with which to combat the forces that cause genocide. The work of the ad hoc committee, and the results of that work that can, already now, be summarized, fully support this conclusion. The first piece of evidence is that a majority of the committee at its last meeting adopted a totally unsatisfactory draft Genocide Convention, in light of the tasks before the General Assembly when it set up an ad hoc committee on genocide. The draft convention (passed by a majority [vote] in the committee) does not provide a proper definition of genocide; there is no mention of organic link between genocide and fascism; among the targets of genocide are mentioned political groups – which have nothing to do with acts of genocide and [whose inclusion] only belittles the important task of combating genocide while parrying blows against the instigators of that heinous crime. It should also be mentioned that the majority of the committee members refused to include in the convention a provision on the prosecution of genocidal propaganda and of preparatory acts, as well as the prosecution of [those cases in which] the perpetrators of genocide acted on superior order. The majority of the committee refused the Soviet delegation’s proposal to extend the convention to include accessories to genocide. Yet, it made mention of establishing an international genocide tribunal, which constitutes direct interference in the internal affairs of states (which, due to the sovereignty [status], have the obligation to combat the crime of genocide). This particular commentary applied to draft Article III regarding genocide propaganda. It went on to argue that, “They will be induced first to condone and later to commit genocide, because they have been convinced that the existence of the human group designated as the victim of genocide is a very great evil, that this group represents error and perversion, that it imperils society, the nation, some religion, some political or social system, that it is an obstacle to progress, etc. That is the philosophical and ideological preparation for genocide.”

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As a result of the above [mentioned points], the draft Genocide Convention, adopted by a majority [vote] in the ad hoc committee, turned out to be totally unsatisfactory, despite the series of amendments submitted at the initiative and insistence of the Soviet Union representative. No self-conscious [uvazhaiushchee sebia] state would join such a convention; such a convention can do nothing to effectively combat the crime of genocide. The Soviet delegation in the committee has assumed a consistent and steadfast position, opposing all attempts to evade confronting genocide in all its forms. It [the Soviet delegation] persistently exposes the instigators of crimes that stain the [reputation of those] countries in which such atrocities, genocidal propaganda, and incitement to commit genocide still take place. Prof. A. TRAININ Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences

No. 62 The US State Department Instructs John Maktos, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, How to Proceed, April 13, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/4-1348) April 13, 1948 Department of State Outgoing Telegram CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT 211 USUN New York For Maktos 1.  DEPT has reviewed position on Genocide in light of Ad Hoc Committee’s first week of discussion. It has noted especially the situation created by Soviet action in coming forward in support of a Genocide Convention and with a set of principles which it succeeded in having adopted as a basis of general discussion. Soviet representative has shown usual tendency to make propaganda use of this situation, and seems to have received considerable support on a number of points from other members of Committee. 2.  In this situation, DEPT is concerned that in following position outlined in position paper forwarded to you with its instruction to USUN, US shall not find itself in a minority with a loss of moral leadership on this question. With this in mind, you

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are authorized at an opportune time to make following adjustments in draft articles annexed to position paper: (1) Art. II  Delete phrase “committed with the complicity of the officials of a state.” DEPT has noted general opposition to this provision in meeting of Apr. 7 (No. 399, Apr. 8). It is possibly open to objection that it is not strictly in accord with GA Res. of Dec. 11, 1946, par. 1. In modifying your previous statement on this point, you should explain that this was intended to cover failure to act on part of state officials as well as action. It was our thought that it would cover all important cases of Genocide and would provide a more workable document. But since there seems to be a possibility of misunderstanding effect of provision, we will not press for its inclusion. To avoid possibility of further misunderstanding because of variation from previous US draft we suggest following redraft of this Art.: “Genocide is the act of totally or partially exterminating, destroying, or denying the right to existence, or of attempting or conspiring thus to exterminate, destroy, or deny the right to existence of racial, national, religious, or political groups of human beings.” (2) Art. III  Divide this into two arts. the first to read: “All public officials, including chiefs of state and private individuals participating in the act of Genocide shall be punishable for the crime.” (3) New Art. IV  “Punishment of the crime of Genocide shall be carried out by the competent tribunals of the state in which the crime was committed or by a competent international tribunal. Assumption of jurisdiction by the international tribunal shall be subject to a finding by the tribunal that the state in which the crime was committed has failed to take adequate measures to punish the crime.” This spells out authority of international tribunal to determine whether adequate national measures have been taken. Important thing is to get agreement on jurisdiction of international tribunal. DEPT prefers this general reference to international tribunal, but if it is essential to get agreement on international jurisdiction, you may agree to more specific provision on ad hoc tribunal along lines of US comment of Sept. 30, 1947. Willingness of US to provide for international judicial action might be emphasized, a step which USSR is apparently unwilling to take. 3.  In view of changes made above, it will probably be necessary to include a provision on national laws. You are authorized to agree to a provision along following lines: “The contracting parties shall make such provision in their laws as required by their constitutional procedures for giving effect within their borders to the provisions of the Convention for the punishment of the crime of Genocide.” 4.  DEPT considers it preferable for you not to introduce these arts. as a new draft but to propose them as the various subjects are taken up. Lovett Acting



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No. 63 Durwald Sandifer Reports on the Status of Debates in the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide with reference to the State Department’s Instructions, April 14, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/4-1448) April 14, 1948 CONFIDENTIAL Office Memorandum, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT To: Le: Mr. Gross From: UNA: Mr. Sandifer Subject: Trip to New York on Genocide Pursuant to the arrangement that we had agreed upon late Monday afternoon, I went to New York on Tuesday morning to discuss the general situation on genocide with Mr. Maktos, Miss Fite, and Mr. Rosen, and especially to explain the Department’s instruction, no. 211, April 13.1 General Remarks I attended the meeting of the Committee in the afternoon from 2 to 6:30. The situation in the Committee appeared in general to be good. The Committee was finishing its discussion of the last two points in the Soviet paper which has served as the principal basis of discussion for the first week of the Committee’s work. The procedure has been to discuss and agree on general principles with the intention to proceed, following that, to drafting. The caliber of the personnel of the Committee seems to be unusually high. There is a rather even and delicately balanced division in the Committee with the French and the Chinese representatives at present working in accord with the United States; the Polish Delegate of course follows the Russian lead, which leaves the balance in the hands of the Lebanese and the Venezuelan delegates. One or more of these has tended recently on some important points to vote with the United States, France, and China, although during the first week their tendency seemed to be in the other direction. At the meeting on Tuesday afternoon the Committee voted 7 to 0 to include a statement that genocide should be judged by competent tribunals of the state in which the crime was committed; that the principle of international jurisdiction should be included in the Convention (4 to 2, Venezuela abstaining); that the principle of universal jurisdiction should not be included in the Convention (4 to 2, Venezuela and Lebanon voting for, and China abstaining for lack of instructions); that there be included in the Convention (proposal of the United States) a provision that the jurisdiction of the international tribunal should be subject to a finding that the state in which the crime was committed had failed to take adequate measures (4 to 0, with Poland, USSR, and Venezuela abstaining). The remainder of the session was devoted to See doc. no. 62. See also Robert Lovett’s telegram to Ernest Gross from April 13, 1948, NARA, DoS Decimal Files, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501. BD Genocide/4-1448).

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a discussion of the tenth Russian point to the effect that the signatories must report to the Security Council all cases of genocide and all breaches of the obligations imposed by the Convention so that necessary measures can be taken in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter. The principal difference of opinion on this point was over restricting the Article to the Security Council, the United States, France, and China arguing that whatever reference was made on the one should include all its competent organs. It was clear that the vote, if taken at the close of the session would have been 4 to 3 against the Russian proposal and in favor of all competent organs. The Lebanese Delegate asked for an adjournment to give time for further clarification of the discussion. Department’s Instruction I went over the Department’s instruction carefully with Mr. Maktos and his Advisers and explained the reasons for the changes, particularly the proposal not to press our position on state complicity. Mr. Maktos and Mr. Rosen felt that the principle of state complicity was sound, but they recognized the importance of our not pressing a position which would be regarded by other delegates and the public as seriously restricting the scope of the crime of genocide as previously understood. They felt that the provision in our new Article 4, limiting the jurisdiction of the international tribunal to cases in which it made a finding to take adequate measures to punish the crime, largely compensated for the omission of the provision on state complicity. On the latter point Mr. Rosen was concerned that this should not be drafted or construed in such a way as to cause us difficulties with cases such as lynching cases in which there is an acquittal in the face of convicting evidence of guilt. There was agreement on the proposed new text of the definition of genocide, except with reference to the inclusion of the phrase “denying the right of existence”. It was agreed that this was satisfactory so long as the point is kept uppermost that the thing that we are talking about in all of this discussion is the physical elimination of the group. Mr. Maktos and his Advisers raised serious question with reference to paragraph 3 of the instruction on national legislation. They questioned the necessity of including it and pointed out that they would be seriously embarrassed to come forward with a proposal for a provision of this kind on national legislation as they had taken a strong position when the matter was voted on two or three days ago and a 4 to 3 decision taken not to include a provision on national legislation. As there appeared to have been some confusion in the vote at the time it was taken, it was left at that time with the understanding that the matter would be re-examined when they came to the drafting stage. I suggested that Mr. Maktos follow the situation very closely at that point, that he take no initiative on a proposal for national legislation, but that if strong pressure was made for the inclusion of a provision, he could then by way of compromise agree to accept something along the lines of the draft suggested in paragraph 3, namely that “The contracting parties shall make such provision in their laws as required by their constitutional procedures for giving effect within their own borders to the provisions of the Convention for the punishment of the crime of genocide.” Other Provisions Another provision which was causing serious concern was the insistence by other states, but especially the French, that a definition of the term “direct incitement” be included. Mr. Maktos had attempted without success to reach agreement with the French under



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which they would support our insistence on the elimination of the Russian proposal on propaganda, and that we would agree to a statement in the Report to the effect that direct incitement in the sense of our “clear and present danger” doctrine is included in the meaning of the word “attempt”. The French Delegate is insisting that this should be included in the definition.1 I told Mr. Maktos that I thought he should continue to endeavor to persuade the French to accept his compromise and that I would consult Mr. Gross about the possibility of agreeing to the inclusion of “direct incitement” provided there was a clear and present danger doctrine. (After consultation with Mr. Gross on my return, I called Mr. Maktos and told him that he should continue to insist on including the statement in the Report and not including the term “direct incitement” in the text.) The other principal provision which it appeared might be pressed in the Committee was the one on extradition. I told Mr. Maktos I would consult when I returned to the Department about this provision but that I thought that we could not oppose the provision too strongly if it was along the lines of Article 6 of the old United States draft. There will be difficulty in the drafting stage on restricting the definition to a general definition, avoiding the detailed specifications that have appeared in the latest drafts. Also, the voting will surely be in favor of including cultural genocide, on which we will have to make a reservation.2 Cc Mr. Rusk Mr. Hendrick (to send to Mr. Harris, Department of Justice) Mr. Maktos

No. 64 The US State Department Cites Lynching as One of the Reasons It May Reconsider Its Position on the “Complicity” Element of the Genocide Convention, April 20, 1948  NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/4-2048 CSBM) April 20, 1948 Office Memorandum, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT To: UNA – Mr. Sandifer From: L – Mr. Gross Subject: Genocide I have read your thoughtful and careful memoranda of April 14. On Friday Mr. Wechsler called me from New York saying he did do at the suggestion of John Maktos, to express concern about our change in position on the “complicity” aspect of the Genocide definition. He covered pretty much the same ground that you and I had covered with Charles Fahy, but from quite a different viewpoint. He feels Pierre Ordonneau (1912–90), French delegate on the Ad Hoc Committee. See also Gross’s reply to Sandifer from April 20, 1948 in the same file.

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that the definition in the form in which we have now revised it will make it difficult to secure acceptance by the Senate and he expresses the view that our present definition is open to a construction which would include individual murders or lynchings. He made no points which we had not canvassed but was obviously unhappy about the changes. I told him that you and I had been somewhat reluctant to abandon the “complicity” position, but the following factors among others had brought us around to Charles Fahy’s viewpoint: (1) The new requirement for a finding by the International Tribunal that the state in which the crime was committed had failed to take suitable measures; (2) That the complicity formula did not get around to the lynching problem, because of the “negative” aspect of this formula, i.e. the intention to include acquiescence or failure to act as an element of complicity; (3) The solid opposition of the other members of the Committee to our position; and (4) The background of the situation, which made it difficult from the public relations standpoint to appear to recede basically from our position in the draft circulated last winter. Wechsler admitted the force of these points but still adhered to his own view. Apparently the Yale Law Journal is preparing a special issue on Genocide and Wechsler has been approached for a piece on the subject. He may express opposition to our latest view. One aspect of Wechsler’s call which troubles me was his statement that Maktos is unhappy about the change, not merely for prestige reasons, but also on the merits. This puzzles me somewhat because I gathered from your memorandum of April 14 that there was agreement on the proposed new text. If Maktos is as unhappy as Wechsler indicates, it may be desirable to hold his hand. However, I have not heard from him directly and it may be that Wechsler unintentionally exaggerated Maktos’ concern.

No. 65 The Delegation of Cuba to the United Nations Wants No Reference to the Nuremberg Judgment in the Draft Genocide Convention [April 29, 1948] UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (1) B, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Governments April 29, 1948 United Nations Delegation of Cuba Mr. John Maktos Chairman Special Committee on Genocide Dear Mr. Maktos: As you know, my Delegation was one of the sponsors of the Resolution on Genocide and since then has been active in furthering the cause of an international Genocide Convention.



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My Delegation considers the Convention on Genocide as an original contribution to international law. We would appreciate it very much if your committee, in drafting the Convention on Genocide, would not make any reference, direct or oblique, to the Nuremburg Law. Sincerely yours, GUILLERMO BELT Delegate of Cuba to the United Nations

No. 66 The Delegation of Panama to the United Nations Wants No Reference to the Nuremberg Judgment in the Draft Genocide Convention [April 29, 1948] UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (1) B, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Governments [April 29, 1948]1 United Nations Delegation of Panama Mr. John Maktos Chairman, Special Committee on Genocide Lake Success, N.Y. Dear Mr. Maktos: The Delegation of Panama, which was one of the sponsors of the resolution on genocide at the United Nations General assembly in 1946, expresses its satisfaction with the progress of work on genocide. Simultaneously, this delegation expresses its concern that the genocide convention should be envisaged as an original contribution of the United Nations to international law. This delegation would highly appreciate if it would be possible to keep the wording of the draft free from any direct or indirect references to the judgment of the Tribunal of Nuremberg. Sincerely yours, Ricardo J. Alfaro [?]2

UN Department of Social Affairs filed the undated communication received from the delegation of Panama on May 11, 1948. Nearly identical note by the delegation of Cuba (doc. no. 46) presupposes a similar date of submission, that is, around April 29, 1948. 2 Signature illegible; Lemkin in the same breath mentioned Cuba’s Belt and Panama’s Alfaro as original supporters who were susceptible to his insistence on segregating the Genocide Convention from the Nuremberg judgment. See Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 122–23. 1

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No. 67 The UK Delegate Supports the Idea of Incorporating the Problem of Narcotics in the Genocide Convention, May 13, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950028/12 May 13, 1948 WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations) No. 1488 MOST IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED FERTILE Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 1488 of 13th May, repeated for information saving to Washington. Narcotics Commission became involved today in discussion of genocide on a reference from the ad hoc Genocide Committee, seeking co-operation as to the inclusion in their draft definition of genocide of a reference to genocide by narcotic drugs. The bulk of our Commission particularly the delegates of Poland, Egypt and China, eagerly welcomed this conception and a series of resolutions began to take shape, for example: “The Commission on narcotic drugs considering that narcotic drugs, especially synthetic drugs, constitutes and may constitute a powerful instrument of crime of genocide, and having expressed the view that the Convention as adopted by the ad hoc Committee does not contain either implicitly or explicitly this particular form of committing genocide urges the Economic and Social Council to recommend that the crime of genocide by the use of narcotics be covered by the above mentioned Convention”. 2.  I intervened late in the discussion having had a tentative word with Fearnly.1 I said I did not consider it was for the Narcotics Commission to embroil itself in a definition of genocide, that I did not myself know what genocide meant, although I was aware that His Majesty’s Government’s views had been made publicly known. I continued that it would be perfectly proper for the Commission, having studied relevant matter before them, to reach a finding that “the Japanese military and other authorities in Manchuria had utilised narcotics, and particularly narcotics manufactured in a factory specially equipped at Mukden, for the purpose of undermining the resistance of the Chinese people”.2 I was willing that this finding should be embodied in a resolution which Actually John T. Fearnley, Second Secretary of the UK delegation to the United Nations. According to the information submitted to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs by the United States, Japanese occupation authorities in Manchuria built a factory at Mukden capable producing 50,000 kg of heroin annually, about fifty times the estimated demand for that particular drug in the world.

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could even be expressly related to the current work of the Genocide Commission but preferably be embodied in the report of our Commission. Support was forthcoming from the United States and French delegates. 3.  The matter still under debate has been adjourned until tomorrow and I can perhaps then secure a postponement pending the results of this consultation with you, which I have however kept to myself. But I am not inclined to this course, thinking it preferable that a resolution on the Polish lines should go forward, myself abstaining and having my abstention recorded. There are strong features in my position. There is the support, not yet in terms, of the French and the United States delegates. Still more there is the fact that the enthusiasts have said they attach great importance to unanimity and may abandon their line of attack in the face of firm opposition, even if confined to me. 4.  I shall probably have to determine my course before instructions can reach me; if so I shall proceed as indicated above.

No. 68 The US State Department Recommends against Referring the Draft Genocide Convention to the Commission on Human Rights in order to Avert Undesirable Modifications, June 3, 1948 NARA, DoS General Records, Files of Durwald V. Sandifer, 59/55D429/8 [June 3, 1948] CONFIDENTIAL Position on Whether the Human Rights Commission Should Deal with the Substance of the Genocide Convention PROBLEM The problem is to determine what position the United States should take if there is no opportunity in the Human Rights Commission to deal adequately with the substance of the draft convention on genocide prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council (hereafter referred to as the Convention). If the Human Rights Commission decides to go into the substance of the Convention a separate paper entitled “Position on Genocide Convention Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide” deals with the position which the United States should take regarding the various articles of the Convention. RECOMMENDATION If a proposal is made not to go into the substance of the Convention but to refer it to ECOSOC for its consideration, the Delegation should vote in favor of such proposal.

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DISCUSSION The Human Rights Commission has to deal with so many subjects at the current session that the time at its disposal is not sufficient to give adequate consideration to the Convention. Because of this, there is danger that certain undesirable modifications of the text of the Convention may be adopted. As to what the proposed modifications might be, see separate paper entitled “Position on Genocide Convention Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide.”1 The Convention is, in general, acceptable to this Government except for Articles III and IV (c). The former deals with cultural genocide and the latter makes incitement to genocide punishable. The reasons why these provisions are objectionable are set forth in the position paper mentioned above. It is practically certain that neither of those provisions could be eliminated in the Human Rights Commission and, as stated above, any other changes might be undesirable. For the reasons mentioned above, if there is a proposal to refer the Convention to ECOSOC without consideration of its substance by the Human Rights Commission, the Delegation should vote in favor of such proposal.

No. 69 Excerpts from the Interoffice Discussion regarding British Position on the Draft Genocide Convention, June 10–29  [July 2], 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN1191 June 10, 1948 Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Transmits United Nations document containing the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (5th April–10th May) and the Draft Convention drawn up by the Committee (Minutes) The new draft convention will be on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council meeting in July. I think we must now make up our minds where we stand. The background can be found in the draft brief for the UK representative to the Human Rights Commission (IOC (48) 94 attached). Our attitude so far can be summarized as follows. 1. Genocide stricto sensu should be referred to the International Law Commission to be considered in conjunction with the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg judgment. The Commission would also consider the question of whether a convention was desirable or not. 2. Cultural genocide is more properly the affairs of the Committee on nondiscrimination and the protection of minorities, which is a subcommittee of the Human Rights Commission. However we have always had to accept the view of the majority which wanted a convention and to content ourselves with expressing The points raised in the position paper are addressed more extensively by John Maktos, US representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, in his confidential report of June 24, 1948. See doc. no. 73.

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our misgivings in view of the complexity of the question. The last convention, drafted by the Secretariat, was very comprehensive and quite unrealistic and has fizzled out. The Economic and Social Council then set up an Ad hoc Committee to draft a new one. The U.K. abstained in this vote, and refused to take part on the grounds that, as was well known, we did not think it would be of any use, and a rejected convention was worse than none. Now however the Convention has appeared. The Soviet Union voted against it, after having disagreed with most of the articles especially the mention of political groups and the suggestion of an international tribunal. Poland abstained in the final vote. Both obviously wanted an anti-Nazi (From the new [?] point of view) document without any question of supra national authority. The U.S. was against the inclusion of cultural genocide as we had been before. Venezuela was against the suggestion of an International Court. Chaos seems assured in the Economic and Social Council, but we shall find it difficult I think namely to go on saying refer it to the I.L.C. The Convention is of course pretty futile already. It only applies to those states which accede, and whose laws condemn genocide (no one amended to condemn). The international tribunal is a pious hope. Apart from cultural genocide the convention seems to boil down to: 1. A definition of genocide stricto sensu (Article II) 2. An obligation to see that regulation punishes genocide 3. Acceptance of extradition in genocide cases 1.  [It] is necessary sometimes, and is probably the only useful thing that can be done. The Home Office and Colonial Office may have views on this article. 2.  [It] Does not I think affect us as Article II is at the moment. 3.  [It] Seems – [illegible] all how political crimes and political genocides are unlikely to be things known as “genocidal” in normal circumstances. I think however that legal advice must have be sought. Also I would suggest that either we should ask for opinions from the Home Office, Colonial Office, and possibly CRO, as we should have a meeting to discuss it. We could then produce a brief for the I.O.C. to approve. We had intended waiting for the comments of the Human Rights Commission. These do not seem likely to be forthcoming as the H.R.C is coming to an end and has only dealt with a small part of the agenda. The Home Office are also worried by the absence of a “line” e.g. on the Narcotics Commission. I suggest therefore that we tackle this subject now. Legal Advisor D. Hildyard * * * June 12, 1948 I agree that we had better make up our minds about this, as it is to be discussed at the Economic and Social Council in July. My preliminary view is that the draft convention is not too bad, except for the inclusion of “cultural genocide.” But I think we must have the views of the legal adviser first. Then we should clear our own minds, and thereafter we might have an inter-departmental meeting as Mr. Hildyard suggests. Roger Allen * * *

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June 15, 1948 If this is to come before the Economic and Social Council in July it would seem necessary to circulate this draft to an I.O.C. committee in order that the instructions given to our representative may be agreed. If the Foreign Office think fit to do so under some covering memorandum, I may make the following observations which may be of some use in this connection. Our attitude to this Convention in the past is in the brief which is annexed to this paper. We have in the past opposed the idea of this Convention and there is consequently no reason why we should not take, if we think fit, a destructive attitude towards it. Putting it broadly, physical and biological genocide as defined in Article 2 is something from which no state which tolerates it will be deterred by reason of its obligations under any convention. To take the world as it is to-day, and noting that political groups are included, there may be some reason to suppose that something like genocide is going on in Eastern Europe with regard to groups who oppose Communist ideology, but I think, in view of the Russian attitude, we may be quite sure that none of these states will become a party to this Convention. It will be alleged that the political groups include the worst types of Nazis and Fascists, but the answer to this is, of course, that even if it does you are not entitled to take any of the steps enumerated in (1) to (4) of Article 2 against them. In so far as this is going on in Eastern Europe, it is by the deliberate act of the government of the states concerned. On the other hand, it has been alleged that something in the nature of genocide is or has taken place in India and Pakistan, but here, in so far as it is taking place, it is not the deliberate policy of the governments but because the governments are unable sufficiently to restrain the actions of masses. Consequently, from the point of view of genocide stricto sensu, Article 8 is the only Article which has any reality, and if it were thought well to enter into commitments to take serious action in the case of genocide in this sense, it is questionable if Article 8 is really strong enough. Turning to cultural genocide, this is really a minority provision, and of course our policy has been to leave that to the Human Rights Commission before which, in fact, the question actually is. Whatever else is not clear, it seems to me clear that it is absurd to deal in the same convention with physical and biological genocide and cultural genocide. The first is an absolute monstrosity. The second proceeds on the basis which may or may not be accepted, that a language or a culture has a sort of corporate right to exits. Religion, or course, is here too and I imagine that even those persons who would not take the same line about language and culture would probably agree that religions must be allowed to exist, so far as people wish to believe in them, in a world which believes in human rights at all. It is, however, absurd to put these two wrongs, if they are both wrongs, of such extraordinarily different order of magnitude, into the same convention because the action and the procedure is not necessarily at all appropriate to the other. [signed] Eric Beckett * * *



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June 16, 1948 Draft to Home Office, CRO and CO asking for comments on the draft convention. I have already asked him by telephone. When his comments come in we can arrange a meeting to approve a draft brief for the I.O.C. D. Hildyard * * * June 29, 1948 Meeting with Mr Rosenberg, Dr MacCracken, and Rev. W. Simpson (Council of Christians and Jews) on Genocide. Mr. Rosenberg said that he had come to Europe primarily to see people about the Genocide Convention. He very much hoped that the UK and the US would support a convention and thus give a hand to the world. He agreed that his present draft was not perfect and would like to raise four points. 1. The inclusion of political groups. This might lead to the Slavs opposing it which would be a pity. However he agreed with that they would probably do so anyway, and that we should not sacrifice a point of principle for their problematic support. 2. Cultural genocide. He realized that Article III as at present drafted would never get through and suggested that it should be debated and something in the lines of the following added to Article II “Any deliberate act of collective violence committed with the intent to destroy the language religion or culture of a national religious or racial group.” 3. He suggested that Article VII was too vague and should be strengthened by the addition of the words “to be created under the authority of the United Nations” or that the Article be omitted altogether. 4. He realized that “incitement” –Article IV (c) went too far for the purpose of British American law and suggested that it be omitted. In conversations he said that he realized that the convention could not contain any provision for enforcement which was impractical in the present state of the world. It was therefore “Brutum fulmen” [empty noise] but nevertheless he thought that it was valuable as a basis from which to build, and that after the Assembly resolutions calling for it would be a great disillusion if it were not forthcoming even if in fact that did not go beyond the Assembly Resolutions. (Laws must be built up gradually as was English Common Law). Dr MacCracken made the point that churches and minority groups in the USA such as the Jews and the Poles much wanted a convention and would be disappointed if it failed to the extent that they might seriously affect the Election. Mr. Heppel and I agreed that we would make a note of his points raised and discuss them with the Legal Advisors. We added that brief for the EcoSoc Council had not yet been agreed. D. Hildyard * * *

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June 30, 1948 Genocide The draft Convention on Genocide drawn up by the Ad hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council is to be considered by the Council at its next meeting. Two issues are involved A) Whether HMG should support a Convention on Genocide of any kind B) The acceptability of the present draft. A. The background to this question has been given fully – IOC (48)2 and IOC (48)88. Briefly it is as follows. The General Assembly passed a Resolution on December 11th 1946 (Annual) declaring genocide to be an international crime for which both private individuals and public officials were punishable, and inviting member states to enact the necessary legislation for its prevention and punishment. The Resolution also requested the Economic and Social Council to draw up a draft Convention. The U.K. supported this Resolution, although we had in debate suggested that the question of a convention was a law. A draft convention was drawn up by this Secretariat (UN document E/447) and proved to be a highly political and controversial document involving the whole question of the treatment of minorities. It was totally unacceptable to most states and therefore was discarded. HMG having seen this document too came to the conclusion that a convention was unlikely to do any good as it was unlikely that any action beyond the terms of the Assembly Resolution would be practical and a convention which was not accepted would do more harm than good by throwing doubt on an already established principle. Since then our attitude has been that the only practical course is to refer genocide stricto sensu to the International Law Commission to be considered in conjunction with the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg judgment, and to refer Cultural Genocide to the committee – now discrimination and the protection of minorities. We have therefore refused to comment on the Secretariat draft, and we abstained both on the question of a convention both in the Assembly and in the Economic and Social Council, declining to sit in the ad hoc committee which drew up the present convention. As we expected it has not proved easy to draw up a convention. The Secretariat draft was discarded and the General Assembly at its second session had to limit itself to reaffirming that Genocide was a crime, and requesting the economic and social council to complete a convention taking into account the work that the International Law Commission had been set up to do. This last sentence was included at the suggestion of the U.K. and could act as a way [?] out. The Economic and Social Committee decided, however, to go ahead with the drafting of a Convention, and set up an Ad hoc Committee which produced the present draft. This is very much more limited than the Secretariat draft, although it still contains some controversial points. We can now maintain our attitude that a convention can do no good and may do harm. We could sit back and watch others continue the debate: the Convention which in any case have a difficult passage and the Slav bloc is almost certain to vote against it.



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Or we could assume that the objectionable parts of the Convention are removed and then support it. In the latter case we could point out that in fact the Convention does not go beyond the Assembly Resolution in anything but the definition of genocide (+ extradition): that therefore we do not consider it of any practical value but that we are prepared to abandon our previous attitude and support it because other people want it and that Assembly Resolution have called for it. This kind of course would appear to be both the easiest and best. We can hardly oppose the Convention and abstention now that the Convention is likely […] the Assembly Resolution might be difficult in view of the Resolution and From the practical point of view it probably does not make the slightest difference either way, but this very fact makes abstention more difficult. (In any case it would seem pointless to try to strengthen the Convention or make it more effective.) As regards this attitude of other countries to the Convention in principle the Americans and the French seem in favour. The Russians will probably never accept a Convention including political groups and mentioning an international tribunal. Lobbying has been strong from the Churches and some Polish and Jewish organizations (I attach a minute on a meeting with Mr. Rosenberg who was representing a society of Jewish and Christian churches in favour of a genocide convention). WFUNA have also now come out in favour of a Convention (UN1354/48478). B. The present draft Convention (E794) 1.  The inclusion of Political Groups The original Assembly Resolution included political groups. Since the Slavs have always been against this inclusion, to the extent possibly of refusing to support a Convention which did include them. The Russians wanted a purely anti-racial and antiFascist document, and tried to insert paragraphs of that kind wherever possible. This has been resisted, although various other states have been against including political groups on the grounds of practicability, since a political group is an impermanent and shifting body. It would not appear desirable to sacrifice this point of principle to please the Slavs: the inclusion of political groups must lead to the conclusion that their extinction is perfectly legal. 2.  Narcotic genocide The Chinese representative on the drafting Committee wished to include an amendment to the definition of genocide to cover narcotics. He suggested “impairing the physical integrity or mental capacity of members of the group. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs also recommended to the ECOSOC Council that narcotic genocide be covered in the convention. (The point is a little academic as it has only arisen in war time). The Chinese addition seems too loose and might have far reaching implications: although narcotic genocide is obviously of great importance its inclusion in the present convention would seem premature. 3.  Cultural Genocide This has been the main bone of contention as between all the now Slav powers. The U.S. have agreed with the U.K. view that it is out of place in a document dealing with

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mass murder. HMG had always held that cultural genocide was properly the concern of the Human Rights Commission (subcommittee on non-discrimination and the Protection of minorities), but unfortunately time was insufficient for the Commission to Comment on the Convention. There is no doubt that the inclusion of cultural genocide introducing commitments which cannot be properly assured will be resisted, and might cause the Convention its collapse. Nor do the most enthusiastic supporters expect it to go through. The most that could be accepted seems the inclusion of the lines “Any deliberate act of collective violence committed with the intent to destroy the language religion or culture of a national religious or racial group.” (Suggested by Mr. Rosenberg) Otherwise it would be necessary to HMG to oppose the Article III on cultural genocide to the extent of opposing the Convention in view of its possible implications in the Colonies and also in the Dominions. 4.  Article IV Direct incitement to commit genocide This goes altogether too far for either U.S. or U.K. law and should be omitted as has been agreed by the most fervent supporters of the Convention except for the Slavs. The latter wish to include national, religious and racial propaganda as crimes, an addition which should be thoroughly resisted as infringements of freedom of opinion. Incitement can only be a crime if it leads to a breach of the peace. This point may also be raised by the Slaves in connection with Article VI, the introduction of legislation. 5.  The suggestion of an International Tribunal in Article VII This is a compromise article and completely ineffective. The Slavs dislike even the mention of an international court. It has been suggested that either the article should be strengthened by the addition of a phrase such as “to be created under the authority of the United Nations” or it should be omitted. From HMG’s point of view it does not seem to matter much being only a pious hope, and could well be omitted. The only advantage might be that its inclusion might finally decide for Slavs to oppose the Convention which would be an advantage as then they would be banned from invoking its provisions (but also possibly a disadvantage since no protection), if only for propaganda proposes. 6.  The absence of a Colonial Application Clause This has been omitted by the drafting committee, and the U.K. would have to insist that it be added. 7.  Extradition The U.K. would have to make a reservation in Article IX similar to that of the U.S. On this point it would appear that HMG could accept the convention as drafted (subject to the detailed comments of Legal Advisors). D. Hildyard * * * July 1, 1948 As we did not succeed in persuading the Assembly not to pursue a Convention we must I think reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is going to be one.



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I think that, politically, it is better to co-operate than to stand aside: particularly if, as I believe, the present draft can be made acceptable to us with relatively few amendments. But we should not display enthusiasm and should certainly refuse to sign if we do not get a satisfactory Colonial Clause. I take it there must be a meeting to discuss details. [Signed] R. P. Heppel * * * July 2, 1948 The position reached seems to be as follows: (1) We have in the past held aloof from work on the Genocide Convention, because we felt it would do no good and might do harm, but we voted in favour of an Assembly resolution which inter alia instructed the Economic and Social Council to draw up a draft Convention. (2) The Economic and Social Council have to consider this draft at their forthcoming meeting, beginning the 19th July. (3) We have now to make up our minds whether or not we should support a Genocide Convention, and if so whether this draft could form the basis of such a Convention. This is a political question to which we must provide the answer. My view is that we should support this Convention, subject to three provisos, namely: (a) That we obtain the advantage addition of a satisfactory colonial clause; (b) That cultural genocide is excluded from the Convention, and (c) That we secure any amendments of detail which Legal Advisers may consider essential. My reasons for this view are briefly: (i) The majority of the United Nations appear to be in favour of the Convention; (ii) There is a considerable body of opinion in this country in favour; (iii) The present Convention seems to be innocuous, subject to the three provisos above. I suggest therefore that the procedure now should be as follows: (a) If it is decided at a departmental level that we should in principle support this Convention at the Economic and Social Council, we should prepare a skeleton brief for the I.O.C., incorporating so far as possible the views on points of detail of our Legal Advisers and those of other interested governmental departments i.e. the Home Office, the Colonial Office and the C.R.O.; (b) this skeleton brief should be discussed at departmental level with those concerned, including representatives from the other/other government departments, and a brief for I.O.C. produced during the course of next week. Roger Allen

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No. 70 British Commonwealth Relations Office Officials Believe the Governments of India and Pakistan are Unlikely to Object to the Draft Genocide Convention despite Intercommunal Violence in Punjab, June 18  and 21, 1948 BL, IOR, L/PJ/7/13515, POL 6761/48 June 18, 1948 Minutes Mr. Walsh Atkins Foreign Affairs and United Nations Department have, in their file No. U. 2380/15, referred to us for our comments the UNESCO Draft Convention on Genocide.1 2.  It will be seen from the copy of the Government of India’s letter dated 6th February at the foot of this file that the Government of India was one of the original sponsors of the proposal for a Convention on Genocide and they are unlikely, therefore, to object to the general principles of the Draft Convention which has now being been prepared. Similarly I think we may assume that Pakistan will be in favour of the general principles embodied in the Convention. 3.  I have read through the Draft in some detail and do not think that any of its Provisions will prove objectionable to either of the two Dominion Governments or an embarrassment to us in our relations with them. Article III is the one most likely to cause trouble but if it is in the cultural sphere I do not think that either India or Pakistan would care to associate themselves with the active suppression of the language and culture of minority communities. Their policy might at times entail some restriction on minority languages and cultures as a result of positive measures taken to foster those of the majority community, but this would in no way involve a contravention of Article III. 4.  It is just possible that Pakistan might embarrass the Government of India by calling for action under the terms of the Charter against Sikh organisations whom they might allege to have been guilty of Genocide during the communal flare-up in the Punjab at the end of 1947. As Pakistan’s allegation of Genocide against the Government of India is already under examination by the Security Council, the passing of this Draft Convention by the United Nations is not likely to add to the difficulties and embarrassments arising out of the Punjab disturbances. 5. We may inform the Foreign Affairs and United Nations Department that so far as we are concerned the Draft Convention is unobjectionable. * * *

Atkins apparently meant to say ECOSOC, not UNESCO.

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June 21, 1948 Mr. Fowler I agree generally and have replied to Div. ‘A’ as follows: “No comments to transmit to the Foreign Office from the Div. B. angle. There are clearly a number of points in the draft Convention, especially Article III, which may give rise to difficulty for India or Pakistan. But they are not in a good position to be difficult about it; and in any case I should judge that the draft Convention as a whole is going to have a pretty rough ride. We should be grateful to be kept in touch with any developments on this from the India or Pakistan side. (For reference, our file is No. Pol. 6761/48).

No. 71 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Bewildered by the Human Rights Commission’s Statement on the Draft Genocide Convention, June 21, 1948 NA, C.O. 936/19/2; NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN1191 June 21, 1948 WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations) No. 163 Saving FERTILE Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 163 Saving of 18th June, repeated for information to Washington Saving. Following from Wilson Genocide Commission dealt summarily with the draft Convention on the 16th June. Resolution was passed in the following terms: “The Commission on Human Rights has taken note of the draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, and of the report attached to it (document E/794, 26th May 1948). Due to lack of time, the Commission was not able during its third session to cover the draft Convention thoroughly and therefore is not in a position to make any observations concerning its substance. However, the Commission is of the opinion that the draft Convention represents an appropriate basis for urgent consideration and decisive action by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly during their coming sessions”.

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2. The above represents a valiant attempt to combine two inconsistent ideas, namely: (i) that the Commission had no time to study the report, and (ii) that the Commission felt that it was a sound basis for further work. 3. In the discussion which preceded the voting I restated the views of His Majesty’s Government on the lines of the Lord Chancellor’s speech in the House of Lords last February. 4. The Soviet delegate attacked the draft Convention on the lines of the Soviet statement incorporated in E/794, and the Slav group voted against the resolution. The Belgian delegate joined me in abstaining and said that he could not commit his Government in regard to the merits of the present draft Convention.

No. 72 The British Foreign Office Prepares Guidelines for the UK Representative on the Human Rights Commission, States the UK’s Apprehensions about the Draft Genocide Convention Proved Justified, June 21, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950025/10 [June 21, 1948] Extract from I.O.C. (48) 94 Draft Brief for the U.K. Representative to the Human Rights Commission. (3rd Session) Genocide The draft Convention on Genocide drawn up in April 1948 by an ad hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council is to be referred to the Human Rights Commission at its next meeting. This draft Convention is the result of the Resolutions of the General Assembly of 11th December, 1946, and 21st November, 1947 and the background is briefly as follows. Following the Nuremberg judgement there was general agreement in the United Nations that genocide should be declared an international crime in peace as well as war. When the question was discussed the United Kingdom representative recommended: 1. That the Assembly should declare that genocide was a crime entailing national and international responsibility. 2. That the Member States of the United Nations should be invited to enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and punishment of this crime. 3. That the question of a Convention should be referred to the International Law Commission. The Assembly resolution of 4th December, 1946 covered 1 and 2, but requested the Economic and Social Council to draw up a draft convention. This was drawn up by the Secretariat at the request of the Economic and Social Council (E/447).



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The first convention was long and comprehensive and completely unrealistic. It defined genocide in the widest possible sense to include almost any form of persecution and discrimination. And it included a Statute for an International Criminal Court to punish offenders against the Convention, see IOC (47) 185 for comment. This was bound to be unacceptable to most if not all members of the United Nations. When it was considered in the Sixth (Legal) Committee the United Kingdom representative suggested that if it was desired to deal with the question in a detailed way, it should be divided into two questions. 1) Genocide Stricto sensu should be referred to the International Law Commission to be considered in conjunction with the codification of the principles of the Nuremburg judgement. 2) Cultural genocide should be referred to the non-discrimination and Minorities sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission. This line has been followed in all subsequent discussions. In view of the failure of the first draft convention (very few Governments had even commented on it), the General Assembly in November 1947 passed a further resolution and asked the Economic and Social Council to draw up a draft convention after studying the first, and taking into account that the International Law Commission had been charged with the formulation of the principles of the Nuremburg judgment. The Economic and Social Council set up an ad hoc Committee of seven, which finished a draft convention on May 4th 1948. The United Kingdom representative abstained in the proposal to set up a Committee and declined to serve in it as it was considered to be an unrealistic approach which might well do more harm than good if States found themselves unable to accede to the Convention, and thus cast doubt on the condemnation of genocide. A statement to this effect was made in the House of Lords on 10th February. The apprehensions of the United Kingdom seem to be fully justified. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics voted against five out of ten articles and the preamble and made statements deploring other articles. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was especially against the inclusion of political groups in the article of definition and the suggestion of a component international tribunal to punish the crime. Poland usually followed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States of America was against including cultural genocide in the Convention at all, though France which had opposed it until then, voted for it. Venezuela was also against an International Criminal Court. Many votes were taken 4-3 or 5-2, and many statements of dissent were made. The Convention is therefore likely to have a difficult passage. From the point of view of the Human Rights Commission the main interest will probably centre around Article 3 on cultural genocide. The United Kingdom have always taken the view that this is a question for the non discrimination and minorities sub-committee to consider, and it seems that the United States of America now shares this view; it seems quite out of place in a convention on the prevention of mass murder. The Article itself is limited to the prohibition of the use of language or publications in the language, and the destruction or prevention of the use of cultural institutions. So far as is known without any detailed investigation having been made these provisions would not conflict with existing English law, and raise no difficulties in either England or the Commonwealth and Colonies.

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The United Kingdom has not taken any line as yet on the question of political groups nor on enforcement. Venezuela joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland in wishing to exclude political groups from the convention on the grounds of realism, but the majority opinion would definitely appear to favour their inclusion in the definition of genocide stricto sensu but not in cultural genocide. Article 4 defines the punishable acts: conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement, attempt and complicity. These would all appear to be offences under English law except for incitement to cultural genocide which might well be considered as coming within freedom of speech. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wished to include propaganda in this article, but his was rejected by the Committee. The question of an International Criminal Court to punish genocide definitely does not come within the scope of the Human Rights Commission. In any case the reference to such a court (Article 7) contains no practical proposals. It is worth noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics originally supported the United Kingdom view that genocide should be referred to the Human Rights Commission. We might therefore have their support if we proposed that cultural genocide should be removed from the convention to the province of the nondiscrimination sub-committee. Instead it would seem probable that this is probably the only point that the Human Rights Commission should consider. In this connexion Article 31 of the Draft Declaration and His Majesty’s Government’s written comments on it should be noted. The Convention, after consideration by the Human Rights Commission, is to be reconsidered by the Economic and Social Council at its next meeting in June.

No. 73 Confidential Report of John Maktos, US Representative on the ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, June 24, 1948 NARA, DoS General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 59/3039E/28 June 24, 1948 CONFIDENTIAL Us/e/ac.25/2 UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE ON THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON GENOCIDE OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (APRIL 5  – MAY 10, 1948)1

The report is supplementary to that, unclassified, report submitted by the US representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide.

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1. INTRODUCTION The basic cleavage discernible in the Committee between the United States-FrenchChinese conception of a convention on the one hand and the Soviet-Polish conception of the other might be described as follows: The former were interested in drafting a legal document, whereas the latter were interested in drafting what they frankly described as an “educational” document, not for “jurists” but for the “peoples of the world”, in other words, a propaganda weapon. The Soviet representative spoke of the “voice of humanity” and said that the Committee was not drawing up the final text of a convention, but could take greater liberty than would be possible in the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly to which the draft convention would be referred (a statement which casts considerable doubt on whether the U.S.S.R. takes the drafting of a convention seriously.) The United States, France and China insisted on the principle of jurisdiction by an international tribunal; the U.S.S.R. and Poland insisted on the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts, with an obligation to report cases of genocide to the Security Council. Obviously, if the principle of the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is recognized, the crime of genocide must be defined with great precision and care, but if the crime is punishable only by national courts, the value of a convention lies chiefly in the fact that it furnishes a basis for charging other governments with the commission of genocide. Moreover, reference of genocide cases to the Security Council as the only means of international redress would ensure the Great Powers of the power of veto in respect to charges against them. II. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE DRAFT CONVENTION BY THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED ON THE COMMITTEE The United States representative objected to the following aspects of the draft convention: 1) Article 3 on “cultural” genocide, on the ground that the act of creating the new international crime of genocide was one of extreme gravity and that his Government felt that “it should be confined to those barbarous acts directed against individuals which form the basic concept of public opinion on this subject,” and that the acts covered in Article 3 “should appropriately be dealt with in connection with the protection of minorities.” (See U.S. statement in The Committee Report, E/794, p. 18).1 2) The inclusion of “direct incitement” in Article 4 on the ground that if such incitement was of a nature to create an imminent danger that the commission of a crime would result it would generally constitute a part of an attempt and/or an overt act of conspiracy, and that to outlaw such incitements it was sufficient to outlaw the attempt or conspiracy without specifically enumerating “direct incitement,” (See ibid., p. 21). It is assumed that this Government will continue to object to these features of the draft convention. See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 1110–60.

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The United States representative also objected during the committee debates to the inclusion in Article 2 of specified motives in the definition of the crime of genocide. This was done for the following reasons: The definition of genocide proposed by the Soviets made it essential that for acts of violence to constitute genocide, it must be proved that they were committed on grounds of race, nationality or religion. This appeared objectionable since it could be argued on the basis of such a text that groups of persons could be exterminated with impunity upon proof that this was not done for racial, national or religious motives but on other grounds. The United States, therefore, proposed as a compromise the formula used in the French draft convention (Doc. E/623/Add.1), that genocide existed when it was committed “particularly by reasons of…nationality, race, religion or opinions.”1 Such a formula would leave it open for a tribunal to find that genocide had been committed if other than listed motives were proven. The formula was rejected on April 19, by a vote of 4 to 3 (U.S., China, France). The vice of the Soviet formula was, however, subsequently, considerably reduced by the inclusion of political groups in the list of protected groups with the corresponding addition of “political opinion” among the listed motives in the definition. The formula in regard to motive in Article 2 as finally adopted (“on grounds of the racial or national origin, religious belief or political opinion of its Members”) seems to cover most of the conceivable grounds of persecution from a practical point of view. Whether or not the United States should press again for the French formula referred to above is questionable. France will undoubtedly object to Article 3 defining “cultural genocide.” The French representative agreed in principle (April 8) that cultural genocide might be criminal but stated that the attitude of the French Government was one of “caution and waiting” and “reserve” since the concept raised questions being dealt with by the Commission on Human Rights and in the work in connection with the protection of minorities. He declined to take part in the drafting of Article 3 by an informal subcommittee and voted against it. It is possible that the French Government may also object to Article 6 regarding the obligation to enact national legislation. The French representative argued strongly against its inclusion, and suggested (April 23) that with such an article his Government might not ratify the convention. In his argument he relied heavily on the fact that the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1946 “invited” notions to enact legislation for the prevention and punishment of genocide, stating that nothing more than the Assembly resolution was necessary or desirable. However, he voted for Article 6 as finally drafted. The Soviet Union will be the most strenuous critic of the convention as drafted, since their representative voted against the convention as a whole and made a detailed statement in this regard which is appended to the Committee report. Briefly summarized the statement raises the following objections to the convention: The preamble does not recite that genocide is “organically bound up with fascism-nazism”; political groups are included among the groups protected; propaganda aimed at See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 577–80.

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inciting hatred or provoking genocide is not made criminal; certain acts preparatory to the commission of genocide are not penalized; the convention does not bind the parties to disband and forbid groups intended to incite hatred or commit genocide; it does not include a statement that genocide cannot be justified by command of law or superior orders; the provision in the convention relating to national legislation does not refer to legislation for the prevention as well as the punishment of genocide nor the prevention and suppression of incitement to hatred; the convention violates national sovereignty by including the principle of the competence of an international court. The keynote of the Soviet opposition to the convention will undoubtedly be that it is not an “effective” nor a “realistic” instrument in the “struggle” against genocide. The Polish objections to the Convention will, of course, follow the same lines, as did the statement of the Polish representative who abstained from voting on the convention as a whole. Since this report was drafted, an article has appeared in TRUD (Moscow) attacking the drafting convention adopted by the Committee. It is striking in that it uses many times the identical language of the Soviet representative on the committee. The article cites statistics on the mortality rates and medical care of negroes in the United States, implying, though not directly stating, that their treatment constitutes genocide. (Curiously, this point was never raised by the Soviet representative on the Committee.) The article singles out for criticism the inclusion of political groups in the convention, the failure to penalize propaganda for genocide, and the reference to the creation of an international tribunal. It characterizes as “casuistic” the article proposed by the United States in respect to national legislation and states that “the United States delegation and those of some other countries have made strenuous efforts to substitute the clear and precise Soviet proposals by a project which would contain no realistic means for the struggle against genocide.” It concludes that in the further stages of preparing a convention, the Soviet Union will endeavor “to obtain effective and real measures against genocide, which has covered with shame those countries where this crime has been perpetrated, and where the propaganda or racial and national hatreds continue, and originate the crimes of genocide.” (Daily Report, Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, Central Intelligence Agency, May 17, 1948 (Restricted Edition) .)1 Venezuela will object to the draft convention because political groups are included among the protected groups, and because international jurisdiction is provided for. The Venezuelan representative stated that his Government might not ratify the convention on these two grounds. Though it did not appear from the voting and debate in the committee that China will have any strong objection to any particular article of the draft convention, it is not impossible that at the next meeting of the General Assembly, the Chinese will support referring the draft to the International Law Commission, since the Chinese representative suggested privately that he felt sure that the Assembly would refer the convention to that Commission.

The newspaper article in question sounds similar to that published by Trainin in April 4, 1948 issue of Izvestia. See doc. no. 61.

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III. COMMENTS ON THE ATTITUDES OF THE VARIOUS DELEGATIONS The Chinese representative, Dr. Lin Mousheng showed a great desire to agree with the United States position.1 Though at first he opposed the inclusion of “political” groups among those protected, as urged by the United States representative, he later reversed this position and voted for their inclusion, thereby making up the four votes necessary for the inclusion of the words in the draft. He also joined the United States representative in opposing the inclusion of “incitement” in Article 4, though he had originally been willing for it to be inserted. The French representative, Mr. Ordonneau, similarly aligned himself almost uniformly with the United States position and did not hesitate to show his disagreement with or displeasure at the tactics of the Soviet representative.2 The United States representative explained to him the unwillingness of his Government to include “incitement” in Article 4 and urged him to support the United States in recommending its deletion. Mr. Ordonneau later stated privately that he was obliged by his instructions to vote for the inclusion of “incitement”, but that to assist the United States Government he would propose the insertion of the word “direct” thus restricting the meaning. As a result of this move on his part, the word “direct” was included by a vote of 3 to 2 (the U.S. and China abstaining.) (See also infra, p. 16 et seq.). The Lebanese representative, Mr. Azkoul, apparently had Palestine uppermost in his mind and insisted repeatedly that there was a distinction between the destruction of a group as a group, and the destruction of all the individuals in a group, the former only being genocide.3 His vote was unpredictable, since he sided now with the USSR and Poland, now with the U.S., France and China. The vote of the Venezuelan representative, Mr. Perez-Perozo, like that of the Lebanese was unpredictable.4 Having voted for the inclusion of “preparatory acts” as criminal acts under the convention, he reopened the question the following day and cast a negative vote on the side of the United States, France and Lebanon (China abstaining) thereby causing the deletion of preparatory acts from the draft convention. On one of the final days of the Committee’s meetings he showed some discomfiture at being in the minority with only Poland and the USSR in opposing the inclusion of political groups among those protected, saying that he would reverse his vote (even after second reading) if the grounds of his opposition were not stated separately from those of the Soviet and Polish representatives in the Committee report. It is believed that of all the delegates, Dr. Perez-Perozo was the most influenced by Dr. Lemkin, the author of the term “genocide” and an active lobbyist for the drafting of a convention along the lines proposed by himself (see infra, p. 10).5 The Polish delegate, Dr. Rudzinski, was, of course, under obvious pressure from the Soviet delegate, who on more than one case took a position opposite to that previously Mousheng Hsitien Lin (1906–?), a Confucian philosopher, political scientist, and diplomat. Pierre Ordonneau (1912–90), a French lawyer and civil servant. 3 Karim Azkoul (1915–2003), a Lebanese historian, philosopher, and diplomat who served as rapporteur on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide. 4 Víctor Manuel Pérez Perozo (1898–1969), a Venezuelan academic and diplomat. 5 Of the seven members of the ad hoc committee, Lemkin indeed maintained the closest contact with Pérez Perozo. See Totally Unofficial, 133, 135, 251. 1 2



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stated by Dr. Rudzinski.1 The latter then either voted with the Soviet representative or abstained from voting, and upon such occasion his embarrassment was obvious. (Dr. Rudzinski was obliged, for example, to reverse his initial opposition to the inclusion of the concept of cultural genocide in the convention and his advocacy of the principle of “universal repression”.) He was always quick in debate to attack statements by the United States representative. The Soviet representative, Mr. Platon Morozov, was as a rule very gracious both in the formal committee meetings and in conversation.2 Although he reiterated the same points over and over again, he launched no real attacks against any delegates. He did, however, very deftly hint more than once that the motive of various representatives in opposing the Soviet point of view were “not frankly expressed,” and ridiculed persons who, he said, stated that they shared his point of view but voted against him. He insisted that the draft of a convention which he submitted was not a Soviet draft but was based on the draft prepared by the Secretariat. Statements made at various times by various representatives that with certain provisions in the convention governments might fail to ratify it were characterized by him as an attempt to bring “pressure” and he added that the Committee should not be “frightened.” He attempted to give a sinister interpretation to the inclusion in the convention of a provision for the justification of an international tribunal over genocide by saying that the tribunal referred to was a “Platonic” one which would be established “some time, somehow.” Thus, he said, instead of a real and active struggle against genocide, we have a vague idea, which he said “is not fortuitous.” In his final statement he took the credit for those parts of the Convention which he favoured, calling them “Soviet proposals.” At the last meeting of the Committee he expressed the “hope and confidence” that in the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, the Soviet views would prevail. IV. COMMENTS ON THE CONVENTION 1. Preamble There is a desire on the part of certain members of the Committee to include in the preamble to the Convention a reference to Nazi-Fascist crimes. The Soviet representative proposed that the preamble should state that “the crime of genocide is organically bound up with Fascism-Nazism and other similar race ‘theories’.” This was opposed by all of the members of the Committee except the Polish representative, the French representative making a strong and persuasive argument that it was erroneous to base a genocide convention on one example in the history of the immediate past whereas genocide had occurred throughout history and might recur in the future for other than racial reasons. The Polish representative proposed that the preamble might state that “recently the crime of genocide has been committed with particularly hideous results by the Nazi and Fascist regimes.” The French representative stated in

Aleksander W. Rudziński (1900–1989), a Polish lawyer and counselor to the Polish delegation to the United Nations. In 1950 he resigned from his position and was subsequently granted asylum in the United States. 2 Platon Morozov (1906–86), a Soviet lawyer and diplomat. In 1946 he served on the Soviet delegation to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 1

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conversation that he would be content if a reference to the Nuremberg judgment was included. The Committee finally decided on the formula “having been profoundly shocked by many recent instances of genocide.” The item which gave rise to one of the most heated controversies in the Committee’s debates was the reference in the preamble to the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The tension which the discussion occasioned appears to be explainable primarily in the light of certain personalities involved. Dr. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the word “genocide”, considers himself the author of the concept and has indeed been the most active lobbyist for the drafting of a convention on the subject. He was one of the three experts consulted by the United Nations Secretariat in the drawing up of its draft of a convention (Doc. E/447). The other two experts consulted by the Secretariat were Mr. Vespasian Pella, a Rumanian writer well known since the last war in the field of international criminal law, and Mr. Donnedieu Vabres, a distinguished French scholar in the same field who was the French judge on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Dr. Lemkin’s attitude towards these two persons can only be described as one of intense hatred, which would appear to spring primarily from jealousy. When the reference to the Nuremberg tribunal was inserted in the preamble, upon the motion of the French representative, Dr. Lemkin remarked with great emotion to one of the United States advisers “With this in the preamble, M. Donnedieu de Vabres will be made a judge on whatever international criminal tribunal is established.” Probably his basic objection to a reference to the Nuremberg tribunal arises from his personal desire to be known as the one responsible for the genocide convention and from his fear that any reference to the Nuremberg tribunal implies that the genocide convention grew out of the Nuremberg trial. This interpretation of his violent opposition is borne out by a telegram received by the U.S. representative from the Liaison Secretary of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, undoubtedly inspired by Dr. Lemkin, which said: “Does it [the preamble] imply that UN by enacting this convention does not make an original contribution to International Law?” In any event, after the Committee voted to include the Nuremberg reference, Dr. Lemkin openly and actively lobbied in the ensuing eighteen hours with the Committee members for a reversal of this position. (Both the French and Chinese representatives stated privately that they considered Dr. Lemkin’s approaches to Committee members improper in this and other connections.) On the following day the Committee actually voted during second reading to reconsider and to delete the reference, only France and the United States opposing. At that point, the French representative announced that if business was going to be done in this way, he was retiring from the Committee. He was undoubtedly angered by the fact that the Venezuelan and Lebanese representatives had apparently been persuaded to change their votes by Dr. Lemkin. Upon a personal appeal by the U.S. representative as Chairman that he resume his seat and upon a conciliatory statement from the Soviet member that he had voted under a misapprehension, the French representative rejoined his colleagues at the Committee table, and the Venezuelan motion to delete the Nuremberg reference was withdrawn.



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Later, two letters were received by the Chairman of the Committee signed by the chiefs of the Cuban and Panamanian Missions of the United Nations, respectively, expressing opposition to any reference to the Nuremberg judgment in the preamble.1 When they were circulated at the Committee meeting for the information of the members, the French representative remarked openly, “Are these letters signed by Dr. Lemkin?” It should be noted that, as drafted, the preamble does not base the genocide convention on the Nuremberg Charter or judgment but simply makes a reference to the historical fact that persons guilty of similar acts (of extermination) were punished by the Nuremberg judgment. It should also be noted that the General Assembly Resolution of November 23, 1947 instructed the Economic and Social Council to take into account the fact that the International Law Commission had been charged with the task of formulating the principles of the Nuremberg Charter. In the course of the debates on the question of the Nuremberg reference the French representative pointed out that by the time the General Assembly meets next fall, the judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo) will have been handed down, and that, if appropriate, reference to that judgment could also be included in the preamble.2 2. Article I The statement that “genocide is a crime under international law” was included in Article 1 by a vote of five to one (France) with one abstention (U.S.S.R.). This is the language of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1946. The French representative undoubtedly cast a negative vote since he was under instructions to have genocide declared a “crime against humanity”. (See infra). It is possible that in the General Assembly there will be a move to relegate the statement to the preamble. Considerable feeling to this effect was voiced informally subsequent to the vote by the Venezuelan representative. He gave as his reason that to put the statement in the preamble would be more “solemn”. He may have been influenced by Dr. Lemkin (See supra, p. 10) whose reasons for opposing the whole article are not clear, but are possibly based on his fear that the convention will be referred to the International Law Commission. The United States representative abstained from voting on the inclusion of the phrase “whether committed in time of war or in time of peace”, having taken the position that though admittedly genocide could be committed in time of war a specific reference to that fact raised complicated questions relating to the laws of war and also might be construed as prejudicing the work of the International Law Commission in the formulation of the principles of the Nuremberg charter. The phrase was included by a vote of three (China, France, Poland) to one (Venezuelan) with three abstentions. See doc. nos. 65–66. The letters were signed by Guillermo Belt of Cuba and Ricardo Joaquín Alfaro of Panama, respectively. Lemkin maintained a close contact with both diplomats, whom he placed in the category of “friendly delegates.” See Totally Unofficial, 123, 151, 172, 175, 200, 249–50. 2 The reference to the Tokyo Tribunal’s judgment, issued on November 4, 1948, was never entered in the text of the Genocide Convention. 1

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The French draft convention (E/623/Add.1) described genocide in Article 1 as a “crime against humanity”, and the French representative moved that this concept be included in Article 1 of the convention.1 The U.S. representative opposed this proposal on the grounds that the term “crime against humanity” was generally understood to have a technical meaning since its use in the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal where it was limited to acts of persecution or extermination committed in connection with, or in execution of, war crimes or crimes against the peace (aggressive war). He pointed out that the International Law Commission to be elected by the next General Assembly had been charged with the formulation of the Nuremberg principles and of a code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind and that it was undesirable to prejudice the Commission’s work by defining genocide at this time as a crime against humanity. (The French representative had indicated in private conversation that he did not feel so strongly on the subject, and expected to be defeated.) It is possible that the issue will be raised again in the Economic and Social Council or General Assembly, since there has been a strong move on foot among European scholars (particularly Belgian and French) to classify genocide as a crime against humanity. This may be inspired by dislike of Dr. Lemkin who was known on the continent before the war in international academic circles (See supra, p. 10). The question seems perhaps academic and theoretical, but it is believed that the position of the U.S. representative was sound that the work of the International Law Commission should not be prejudiced by taking a position now that genocide is or is not a crime against humanity. 3. Article II The United States representative strongly opposed the listing in the definition of genocide of specific acts which might constitute the crime. He was supported by the French representative who argued, with the United States representative, that the enumeration of methods by which genocide could be committed constituted bad draftsmanship from a legal point of view. (The Secretariat draft convention on genocide (Doc. E/447) did contain such specific enumeration.) The question of narcotics as an instrument of genocide was raised in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs by the Polish representative on May 4, 1948 shortly before the Genocide Committee finished its work. The Chinese representative on the latter committee thereupon inserted a statement in the committee report that he wished it understood that Article II (2) and (3) and Article IV (b), (d) and (e) should cover genocide by narcotics, if they were not specifically mentioned in the convention. On May 17, the Narcotics Commission adopted a resolution recommending that the Economic and Social Council insure that the genocide convention cover the use of narcotics as an instrument. (Doc. E/799) It may be anticipated therefore that the question of such a specific reference to narcotics will be raised at a later date.

See the text of the French draft convention in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 577–79.

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4. Article III See above, pp. 2 and 3 in regard to the opposition of the United States and French representatives to this article on “cultural” genocide. Both representatives voted against the adoption of this article on first reading, but abstained on second reading, since the latter reading related to matters of form and language. Though the Lebanese delegate participated in the drafting of Article III on cultural genocide and voted for it originally, upon second reading of the draft convention, he abstained from voting. This resulted from the fact that the Committee refused to consider the Lebanese proposal during second reading that to the “grounds” enumerated in Article III should be added “political opinion” since the language and culture of a group might be attacked because of a group’s political opinions. 5. Article IV The United States representative took the position that in so far as incitement created an imminent danger that it would result in the commission of a crime, it would generally constitute part of an “attempt” and/or an overt act of “conspiracy”, and that therefore, since the latter two concepts were included in the article, it was unnecessary to enumerate “incitement” or “direct incitement” (see U.S. statement in the Committee report, E/794, p. 21). It proved impossible, however, to obtain the deletion of incitement from Article 4 (as for discussion with the French representative on the subject, see supra p. 7). The French representative stated in conversation that “direct incitement” in civil law has a more restricted meaning than “incitement” and that the phrase has a precise legal meaning for the continental lawyers. (It is to be noted that Article 3 of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism signed at Geneva in 1937, lists “incitement” and “direct public incitement” separately as acts to be made criminal. 7 Hudson, International Legislation, 862.) The final vote on the inclusion of the phrase was 3 to 2 (USSR and Poland) with 2 abstentions (U.S. and China). The Soviet and Polish representatives voted against the phrase simply because they considered the word “direct” as too restrictive and wished to broaden the concept by a specific reference to “propaganda” (see infra, p. 28). Since the possibility of deleting incitement was broached to the French representative on April 14 and the final vote was not taken until April 22, it seems likely that in the interval he referred the question back to the French Foreign Office, and was acting under instructions when he voted for the inclusion of “direct incitement”. In fact, he stated in conversation that he had instructions to vote for the broader term “incitement”. (The draft convention submitted by the French Government on February 5, 1948 (E/623/Add. 1) has listed as punishable “attempt, provocation or instigation to commit genocide”.) Accordingly, there is considerable doubt that the United States can succeed in having the reference to “direct incitement” deleted when the draft convention is considered by the Economic and Social Council and General Assembly, since in the ad hoc committee only the Chinese representative supported the United States position, and he had in fact originally been in favor of the inclusion of incitement.

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The words “in public or in private” were added upon the motion of the Venezuelan representative with no dissent and two abstentions (including the United States). The French representative said that under French law incitement could be committed either in public or private. The words “whether such incitement be successful or not” were added by a vote of four with three abstentions (including the United States). The French representative remarked that under French law, incitement need not to be successful, but that he would nevertheless vote for the phrase. The Venezuelan representative said that incitement was a separate crime in Venezuela. That is also true in France. Article 60 of the French Penal Code includes among accomplices in an act denominated a crime or misdemeanor persons who by certain specified means “have incited this act.” Article 23 of the law of July 29, 1881 relating to the press makes punishable as accomplices in acts denominated crimes or misdemeanors, those “who by speeches, cries or threats offered in public places or meetings, or by writing, printed matter sold or distributed, placed on sale or exposed in public places or meetings, or by placards or posters, exposed to public view, have directly incited the author or authors to commit said act, if the incitement is successful.” The provision is also made applicable when the incitement is followed by an attempt. An amendment of January 10, 1936 and May 6, 1944 to the 1881 law on the press makes punishable those who by the means enumerated in the foregoing paragraph “have directly incited to theft, or murder, pillage and arson,” or certain other enumerated crimes when the incitement is not successful. It was informally suggested to the French Representative, since he took the lead in Committee in respect to technical questions regarding Continental and derivative legal systems, that the customary term in international documents governing accessoryship, and aiding and abetting was “participation”. This term was in fact used in the Secretariat draft convention (Doc. E/447, Art. II, p. 7) and in the Terrorism Convention of 1937. The French Representative was unwilling however to agree to this term but insisted on “complicity” and the United States Representative agreed, feeling that “complicity” covered accessoryship, aiding and abetting. A statement to this effect on his part was inserted in the Committee report. 6. Article VI The Soviet representative proposed the inclusion in the convention of an article obliging parties to the convention to enact legislation for the prevention and punishment of genocide and incitement to racial, national and religious hatred. It was obvious that none of the other members of the committee, with the exception of Poland, had any taste for the suggestion that their Governments should enact legislation to prevent “incitement to…hatred.” The United States representative originally submitted a proposal that states should enact “or recommend to their legislature” the enactment of the necessary legislation, the phrase “or recommend” being taken from the Red Cross Convention of 1929. He later withdrew the proposal of the latter phrase and was able to persuade a majority



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to vote for the phrase to “give effect to the provisions of the Convention”. The United States representative was also able to persuade the Committee to adopt the formula “in accordance with their constitutional procedure” as contained in the Department’s instruction in telegram no. 211 of April 13.1 During the discussion of the phrase “in accordance with their constitutional procedures” appearing in Article VI, the United States representative referred to both procedural and substantive requirements of the United States Constitution. The chief emphasis however in the Committee discussions was on the procedural aspect – namely, the problem of federal governments in which there is both state and federal legislation in respect to crime. In view of the possible ambiguity with respect to the phrase “constitutional procedures” consideration might be given to suggesting either in the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly that the phrase be amended to read: “in accordance with their constitution” or “in accordance with their constitutional requirements.” Consideration should be given to the question whether new legislation must be obtained penalizing “genocide” as such, or how far existing federal legislation in this country already penalizes the acts listed in Article II and what new legislation might be necessary in order to comply with the requirements of Article VI and also of Article VII (that persons charged with genocide, attempt, etc. “shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed”). It will also be necessary to determine what legislation is necessary to make all the acts prescribed by the convention extraditable in conformance with Article IX. It is assumed that this Government will not accept Article III of the Convention relating to “cultural” genocide so that implementing legislation in respect thereto will not be needed. The question of the necessity for legislation in respect to an international criminal tribunal will, of course, arise when and if agreement is reached for the establishment of such a tribunal. 7. Article VII As indicated above, the Soviet representative objected violently to the principle of international jurisdiction (see supra, p. 9). Both he and the Polish representative were quick to attack the principle on the ground that the composition and jurisdiction of such a court were left undefined. The Polish representative argued that the signatories to the convention were asked to “sign a blank check” in this respect. He did state, however, that he would have been able to accept a reference to an international court possibly to be established without obliging signatories to assume an a priori obligation with respect to such court. The Venezuelan representative also opposed the principle of international jurisdiction. The principle was supported by the United States, France, China and Lebanon. The United States representative, in accordance with the Department’s instructions of April 10, proposed that genocide should be defined as the “act of exterminating…a See doc. no. 62. See also Robert Lovett’s telegram to Ernest Gross from April 13, 1948, NARA, DoS Decimal Files, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501. BD Genocide/4-1448).

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group, committed with the complicity of the reasonable officials of a state.” Such a definition was, of course, predicated on the fact that the instructions contemplated reference in the convention to international jurisdiction only. While the majority of the committee opposed the concept of state complicity, the French representative appeared originally to favor the idea, though he retreated somewhat from this position later. The written comments of the French Government on the question of genocide come close to recognizing state complicity as a prerequisite to genocide (Doc’s. E/623, p. 41 and A/AC.10/29, p. 7). It appears possible therefore that the French Government might have been willing to agree to the original United States proposal. As instructed by the Department in its telegram No. 211 of April 13 the United States representative did not continue to press for the inclusion of the phrase relating to state complicity, and no other representative raised the question again.1 In accordance with the Department’s instruction of April 13, the United States representative proposed that there be added to the article on international jurisdiction a provision that the assumption of such jurisdiction should be subject to a finding that the State where the crime was committed had failed to take adequate measures to punish the crime. This was accepted in principle on April 13 by a vote of four to three (the four votes being those of the same representatives favoring the principle of universal jurisdiction). However, when the actual drafting was reached, the inclusion of such a paragraph was defeated by a vote of five to one (U.S.), with one abstention (U.S.S.R.). The reason given by the majority was that such a paragraph inserted now “might prejudice the question of the court’s jurisdiction” (i.e., that the details regarding the establishment of an international court and its jurisdiction are to be worked out later). In connection with Article VII, it should be noted that the French draft (Doc. E/623/Add. 1) contemplated setting forth in the genocide convention the actual details regarding the establishment of an international criminal court. The French representative did not, however, insist on this, but went along with the position of the United States that such details involved complicated questions which should await future developments such as the work of the International Law Commission in drafting a code of offenses against peace and security. The principle of universal repression or jurisdiction (that is, that any government may punish an accused in its custody, irrespective of the place where the crime was committed) was advocated by the Polish representative on the second day of the Committee’s meeting (April 6). The principle was also supported by the Venezuelan representative, and was embodied in Article VII of the Secretariat draft (Doc. E/447, p. 38). On April 13, the French representative, stating that he was speaking personally and without instructions, energetically opposed the inclusion of the principle in the convention, pointing out the very serious dangers of political abuse involved in such a provision. The United States and Soviet representatives also opposed its inclusion, the former pointing out that Anglo-American law was based primarily on the territorial theory of crime and that the United States and Great Britain had never accepted the broad principle of universal jurisdiction over crime. The inclusion of the provision was defeated on April 13 by a vote of four (U.S., France, U.S.S.R. and Poland) to two See doc. no. 62.

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(Venezuela, Lebanon) with China abstaining. A motion to reconsider was defeated by the same vote on April 26. (This was one of the occasions on which the Polish representative was obviously obliged to reverse his original position upon pressure from the Soviet representative.) It is highly probable that the issue will be raised again in the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly, since the Venezuelan and Lebanese representatives, particularly the latter, said in conversation that they strongly supported the idea. Dr. Lemkin (see supra, p. 10) is a fanatic advocate of the principle. He argues ingeniously that the Assembly has stated that “genocide is a crime under international law” and that by definition such a crime is subject to universal repression. Such an argument is not believed to be sound since there is no general agreement on the meaning of the term “crime under international law”. It is obvious that the U.S.S.R. for political reasons will never support the principle of universal jurisdiction. And it is to be assumed that France will continue to oppose it, since the French representative, some two weeks after he had stated in Committee that he had no instructions on the point, said in private conversation that he was much concerned about the question and it may perhaps be assumed that in the interim he had received instructions on the point. The Chinese representative, though he abstained in voting on the matter, had in fact included the principle in the draft convention which he submitted (Doc. E/AC.25/9) so that the ultimate position of the Chinese Government on the question is not clear.1 It is believed that in view of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution requiring an accused to be tried in the district “wherein the crime shall have been committed” serious constitutional difficulties for this Government might be raised by the inclusion of the principle of universal repression. Broadly speaking, in this country the offenses which, though committed abroad (at least by American citizens), are punishable in the United States are those which are “offenses against the operations of the Government”. Moreover, the dangers of political abuse of a provision embodying the principle of universal jurisdiction are so obvious at the present time of tension that it seems unlikely that the United States would ever agree to a convention containing such a provision. During the debate on universal repression, the French representative intimated that his government might not be averse to a provision in the convention regarding the right or duty of a state to punish its own nationals for acts of genocide committed outside its jurisdiction. (The laws of most continental countries do in fact penalize their own citizens for many types of criminal acts committed abroad). A member of the United Nations Secretariat later informally expressed the view that the convention should contain a provision obliging a state to punish its own nationals for acts of genocide committed abroad. In other words, it is not impossible that a limited proposal of this sort will be made in the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly. 8. Article VIII The question of action by the United Nations in respect to genocide was one of the most hotly debated by the Committee. The Soviet representative proposed that See the text of the Chinese draft convention in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 833.

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the Convention obligate parties to report all cases of genocide and all breaches of the convention to the Security Council so that action could be taken in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. The United States representative devoted a great deal of argument in opposition to this formula saying that reference to the Security Council should not be compulsory and that the possibility of reference to organs other than the Security Council should not be precluded. It was further argued that if the Soviet proposal contemplated enlarging the existing competence of the Security Council, this could not be done by the genocide convention, and that if it did not, it was unnecessary. The Soviet proposal was rejected (April 26) by a vote of five to two (U.S.S.R. and Poland). Probably the great importance which the Soviet representative obviously attached to his proposal arose from the following considerations. His Government was strenuously opposed to conferring jurisdiction in respect to genocide on an international court and wished it to appear that it had no objection to some international forum but that its only objection was to an international court. As a matter of fact, in view of the veto, the Soviet Union would be judge of its own cases just as much as if they were tried in the Soviet courts. Furthermore, if the genocide convention is used merely for propaganda purposes, the Security Council would be an ideal sounding board since any action adverse to the U.S.S.R. could be vetoed. 9. Article IX With respect to this article on extradition, the United States representative made the following statement which was inserted in the Committee Report: “With respect to the Article on extradition, the representative of the United States desires to state that until the Congress of the United States shall have enacted the necessary legislation to implement the Convention, it will not be possible for the government of the United States to surrender a person accused of a crime not already extraditable under existing laws. Moreover, the provision in the Constitution of the United States regarding ex post facto laws would preclude the government from granting extradition of any person charged with the commission of the offense prior to the enactment of legislation defining the new crime.” V. SOVIET OR POLISH PROPOSALS REJECTED BY THE COMMITTEE The following proposals of the Soviet and Polish Governments were rejected by the Committee: 1. Preparatory acts: The Soviet representative proposed the insertion of a paragraph making criminal the “preparatory acts” listed in Article II (2) (a), (b) and (c) of the Secretariat draft (Doc. E/447). The United States representative strongly opposed this. The proposal was at first carried (April 22) by a vote of four to three (U.S., France, Lebanon). On the following day, the Venezuelan representative informed the U.S. and French representatives before the meeting that he wanted to shift his vote, because he realized the dangers of such a provision and how it could be utilized for propaganda purposes. Accordingly, a second vote was taken, and it was voted to omit preparatory acts by a vote of four to three, the U.S., France, Lebanon and Venezuela voting for omission.



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2. Propaganda: The Soviet representative was obviously particularly anxious to have included in the convention a provision making criminal propaganda aimed at inciting racial, etc. hatred or provoking the commission of genocide. To his evident disappointment this was defeated (April 22) by a vote of five to two (U.S.S.R. and Poland). During the preliminary discussion of principles, the French representative had said that he agreed in principle that “direct” (and only “direct”) propaganda for genocide fell within the concept of “direct” provocation, but stated that he preferred general rather than specific language in the convention. (The draft convention submitted by the French (E/623/Add. 1) had listed as punishable “attempt, provocation or instigation to commit genocide.”) When the question came up for a vote in the drafting state on April 22, and only the Polish representative voted in favor of the Soviet proposal regarding propaganda, the Soviet representative stated that all except the United States representative had previously admitted that the “use of mass media [for propaganda] was one of the forms of genocide,” and insisted that this was an important admission which should be included in the Committee report with a reference to the fact that the only objection came from the United States. The draft report did not in fact contain such a statement and again the Soviet representative insisted that it be included. The Chinese representative then proposed that the report state that certain members felt that a reference to propaganda “might be misinterpreted in such a way that it would prove injurious to freedom of information and therefore might jeopardize the Convention’s success.” The United States, French and Venezuelan representatives associated themselves with this statement. The two latter representatives were willing, upon insistent reference by the Soviet representative to previous discussion, to have added in the report the statement that “Other members added that in their opinion the repression of such propaganda was covered in so far as it came under ‘direct incitement’ in Article IV.” 3. Command of law and superior orders: The Committee rejected by a vote of four to two (U.S.S.R. and Poland) with one abstention (Lebanon) (April 23) the Soviet proposal for inclusion in the convention of a statement that “command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide.” The Polish representative professed to be extremely angry at this and inserted in the Committee report a statement that the omission of the provision prevented the “Polish delegation from accepting responsibility for the Convention in its present form.” 4. Disbanding groups or organizations which have participated in any act of genocide: This was rejected in principle (April 9) by a vote of four to three (U.S.S.R., Poland, Lebanon) and on April 26, by an identical vote, the Committee refused to reconsider the question, upon presentation by the Polish representative of a draft article on the subject. The Soviet and Polish representatives will obviously re-agitate all of the foregoing questions in the consideration of the draft convention by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. It is believed that this Government should continue to oppose their inclusion, with the possible exception of the rule regarding “command of law or superior orders.” Article VIII of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal provided that the “fact that the defendants acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not

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free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.” A similar provision is found in Article VI of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Prior to 1944, the Basic Field Manual of the War Department relating to the rules of land warfare provided that individuals of the armed forces would not be punished for acts “committed under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders.” This provision was deleted in 1944 and a section added making punishable persons who violate the accepted laws and customs of war with the proviso however that superior orders or governmental sanction “may be taken into consideration in determining culpability either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment” (Basic Field Manual FM 27-10, Change No. 1, 15 Nov. 1944). VI. THE COMMITTEE REPORT Considerable difficulty was encountered with the preparation of the Committee Report. As originally drawn up by the Lebanese representative as Rapporteur, it included statements interpreting the draft convention. The Rapporteur insisted that these were interpretations unanimously agreed on by the Committee, and that in some instances he would not have voted for a particular article had it not been so interpreted. The United States, French and Soviet representatives took the firm position, however, that such interpretations did not belong in the report, that they would not be binding on governments and that in any event for the Committee to approve them would require days of debate. It was accordingly decided to omit them. On second reading the Rapporteur inserted a footnote to the effect that in the original draft report he had included “commentaries on the scope of the provisions unanimously adopted, based on the opinions expressed in the Committee.” The Soviet representative objected strenuously to such a footnote, stating that this was an attempt by indirection to do what the Committee had voted against and to imply that the interpretations originally drafted by the Rapporteur were those of the other Committee members. It proved impossible so to reword the footnote as to satisfy all the members of the Committee and it was accordingly decided to drop the footnote altogether. The Rapporteur appeared to feel deeply on the matter and at one point stated that he would be obliged, if the footnote were omitted, to refrain from approving the Report. The United States representative, however, was able, as Chairman, to draft a statement of the Rapporteur’s position which was acceptable to the latter. With the inclusion of this statement in the Report, the Rapporteur was willing to join with the other Committee members in approving the Report. It was never clear just which particular interpretations were considered so essential by the Lebanese delegation, so that it is hard to anticipate what, if any, amendments to the Convention the Lebanese may later offer. A large part of the Report consists of statements of the minority positions of the Soviet and Polish representatives which the latter were most insistent on inserting. The Rapporteur was resentful of the fact of their inclusion, and asked for a statement to be inserted in the Summary Report that as a result he could not be responsible for the symmetry and logic of the Report. The Venezuelan representative was also vociferous, particularly in private conversation in opposing the inclusion of the Soviet statements in the report.



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The Venezuelan representative raised the question whether it should not be stated in the convention that nothing therein affected the customary privileges and immunities of a diplomatic officer. The Committee decided to omit the statement on the ground that general rules of international law were not to be understood to be abrogated without a specific statement to that effect, and that it was unnecessary to single out one such rule for mention. VII. POSSIBLE REFERENCE OF THE CONVENTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION There was considerable speculation informally by some members of the Commission that the General Assembly might refer the draft convention to the International Law Commission to be elected by it which is charged inter alia with the formulation of the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and of a code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. At the last meeting of the General Assembly in 1947, the French were in favor of referring the drafting of a convention to that body (for the comments of the Chinese representative, see supra, p.6). It was said by some members that since the British are opposed to a convention they will attempt to shelve it by having it referred to the International Law Commission. Others felt that the convention as drafted would be unacceptable to many governments for varying reasons and that in an effort to achieve a compromise the convention would be sent to the Commission. Some of this speculation may have been inspired by Dr. Lemkin (see supra, p. 10) who insists that sending the convention to the Commission means its death. In his opinion a reference to the Nuremberg judgment in the preamble means that the Convention will be referred to the International Law Commission, and he admittedly inspired a letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the National Conference of Christians and Jews which expressed concern over alleged efforts to have the genocide convention referred to the Commission. John Maktos June 7, 1948

No. 74 Bernard R. Curson of the British Commonwealth Relations Office Doubts the Genocide Convention is of Value, June 24, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN1191 June 24, 1948 Dear Hildyard, Many thanks for your letter of 21st June, UN. 1191/48/78, about the draft Genocide Convention. In general, having seen the draft Convention, we have discovered no reason why the views of the United Kingdom Government should in any way be modified from

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those expressed by Mr. Mayhew at the 6th Session of the Economic and Social Council (New York telegram No. 500 of 14th February, 1948), namely that any Convention on Genocide will be of doubtful value. The following are our points of more detailed criticism: (a) There is no Colonial Application clause. Without such a clause it would be quite improper for the United Kingdom to adhere to so contentious a convention as this, unless all territories for which she is internationally responsible were also prepared to accept it. (b) We dislike the proposed Article III which would almost certainly be seized upon in South Africa, as well as in some of the territories in Africa for which the United Kingdom is responsible, to support agitation against restrictions imposed in the course of the day-to-day administration. The Article is in any case hardly appropriate in a convention intended to deal with mass-murder and we should hope that it could be resisted on that ground. (c) We should deprecate any attempt to modify the present Article VI on the lines of the original Soviet draft. (d) We are inclined to sympathise with those members of the Committee who felt that the reference to an international tribunal in Article VII had no practical value. But we assume that you will already be looking into this point. I am sending a copy of this letter to Galsworthy, (Colonial Office). [Signed] B. R. Curson

No. 75 Arthur N. Galsworthy of the British Colonial Office Mentions the Colonial Application Clause as the Precondition for Signing the Genocide Convention by the United Kingdom, July 6, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN1191 July 6, 1948 My dear Hildyard, Genocide You asked for our comments on the draft Convention drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide. While we are not by any means enamoured of the proposal for such a Convention, we feel that the objections to it will primarily affect the U.K., although they will, of course, apply with equal force in the Colonies. We assume that the Foreign Office view is still that set out in the brief on Genocide for the U.K. Delegation to the ECOSOC of the 7th January (I.O.C. (48) 2). We agree with the arguments set out in this brief against a Convention on Genocide and, in particular, with the objections set out in paragraph 6 to the inclusion of “cultural genocide”, and to the difficulties of passing domestic legislation governing the crime of Genocide. On the present



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drafting of the Convention, however, we regard the possibility of any of our Colonial Governments’ acts being misinterpreted as “cultural genocide” as being remote. In accordance with our general policy, we should have to press for the inclusion of a Colonial Application Article. Without it we should be in the position that arose at the last Assembly, when the Colonial Application Articles in two Conventions on Traffic in Women and Children and Obscene Publications were deleted in the process of the assumption by the United Nations of responsibility for those Conventions, that is to say that we should be unable to sign the Convention until (a) we had consulted all our Colonial Governments, and (b) they had all agreed to H.M.G. signing the Convention on their behalf. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ormerod, at the C.R.O. [Signed] A. N. Galsworthy

No. 76 The British Cabinet Identifies Cultural Genocide and a Colonial Application Clause as Two Major Sticking Points in relation to the Genocide Convention, July 12, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN1481 July 12, 1948 CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS Item 18  of Provisional Agenda of 7th Session of the Economic and Social Council GENOCIDE Note by the Foreign Office The draft Convention on Genocide drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council is to be considered by the Council at its forthcoming meeting. The background to this subject will be found in I.O.C. (48)2. The United Kingdom voted in favour of the first General Assembly resolution on Genocide (11th December, 1946, Annual) which inter alia instructed the Economic and Social Council to draw up a draft Convention. The main purpose of the resolution, however, was to affirm that Genocide was an international crime and to invite Member States to enact the necessary legislation for its prevention and punishment. The United Kingdom has held aloof from the work on the a Convention because it was felt that it could do no good, and indeed might do harm if it failed, by throwing doubt on a principle which we regard as already well established in international law. The attitude of the United Kingdom to a Genocide Convention has been largely influenced by the tone of the first draft Convention drawn up by the Secretariat on the

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instructions of the Economic and Social Council. This turned out to be a highly political and controversial document which could never have been generally accepted and was discarded when very few governments even commented on it. Therefore, when the Subject was considered again by the General Assembly at its Second Ordinary Session in the autumn of 1947, the United Kingdom Representative argued that: (1) Genocide is an international crime as stated in the Nuremburg judgment. If a Convention were drawn up, not all States would adhere to it and that would cast doubts on an already established matter. (2) If it were desired to deal with Genocide in a more detailed manner than by mere condemnation, it was more realistic to rely on existing law such as had been formulated at Nuremburg, and therefore the right thing to do was to have it considered by the International Law Commission in conjunction with the codification of the Nuremburg principles. (3) A separate Convention merely dealing with Genocide stricto sensu would mark no progress in international law. (4) Cultural Genocide involved the whole question of the treatment of minorities and should therefore be referred to the Sub-Committee of the Human Rights Commission dealing with non-discrimination and the protection of minorities. The General Assembly nevertheless passed a resolution which as well as re-affirming that Genocide was a crime, called upon the Economic and Social Council to draw up another Convention. The United Kingdom abstained from voting on this resolution which was passed by 38 votes to 0 with 14 abstentions. In the meantime a large body of public opinion in many countries had shown itself in favour of a Convention. Support has been forthcoming from the World Federation of United Nations Associations, and in this country from the Council of Christians and Jews and various other religious bodies, particularly those with connexions with America where several religious organisations have formed a society to support a Genocide Convention.1 Consequently His Majesty’s Government might be severely criticized for standing aside from a Convention on the grounds that it would mark no progress in International Law and therefore do no good. However, examination of the text of the present draft Convention has shown that even if it were considerably amended, we should need to make a number of changes in our domestic legislation before we could accede to it, and it is at least doubtful whether Parliament would be prepared to devote the necessary time to this. It is therefore suggested that the United Kingdom representative should take the following line at the Economic and Social Council. He should restate the United Kingdom arguments and proposals, i.e. that the most practical way of dealing with the question is to refer Genocide stricto sensu to the International Law Commission, and cultural Genocide to the Human Rights Commission. If, however, there appears to be a majority in favour of a Convention, he should say that while he cannot commit His Majesty’s Government at this stage to the support of any Convention or hold out any promise that we would ratify the present one, he is prepared to take See doc. nos. 122, 128, 132–133, 138.

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part in the consideration of the present Draft with a view to producing an improved draft Convention. The present draft is likely to be considered in the Council by the Social Committee. Various amendments are desirable in any case from the legal point of view, and it is suggested that with two exceptions no definite instructions should be laid down for the United Kingdom representative. Decisions as to wording can only be taken on the spot, and reference back will always be possible. The two exceptions are Cultural Genocide, which is out of place in a convention of this kind, and should be referred to the Human Rights Commission, and a Colonial Application Clause. The United Kingdom representative should make it clear that His Majesty’s Government would not support a Convention where the first is included and the second excluded.

No. 77 The British Foreign Office Comments on Specific Provisions of the Draft Genocide Convention, July 20  1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN1481 July 20, 1948 Notes on the Draft Convention on Genocide together with I.O.C. (48) 158 Article 1. “In time of war” This addition seems particularly unsuitable since much of war could accurately be called genocide. Article 2. Sub-heading 4: “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” From the point of view of the U.K. legislation and the complications it would introduce this provision should either be excluded or drastically modified. The Inclusion of Political Groups The original Assembly resolution included political groups. Since then many States have objected to their inclusion in a Convention of this kind. The Slav bloc have always wanted a document purely directed at Nazi race theories and have strongly resisted the idea of including political groups. Inter alia they have pointed out that these groups are impermanent and often undefinable whereas national, racial and religious groups are clearly defined bodies. This argument has met with some support from other States such as Venezuela which considered the inclusion of political groups possibly desirable but quite impracticable. The U.K. has always held that the exclusion of political groups would in fact be condoning their slaughter. While no International Penal Tribunal with the necessary jurisdiction and power exists national authorities remain the only sanction and to exclude political groups implies that the national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect them.

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A particular point arises from the Resolution passed by the Narcotics Commission (page 22 of the Report of the Commission E/799). It is assumed that this question will be referred by the Committee examining the Narcotics Report to that examining the Genocide Report. The issue is not altogether an easy one. If it were a question of the forcible administration of narcotics, that would, doubtless, be one form of interference with the “physical integrity” of the “group”; and provisions in relation to it would be little, if at all, less acceptable than provisions aimed at castration or other forms of physical violence, being recognizable in our law under one or another form of assault. It would oversimplify the matter so to view it. What the protagonists may have in mind is an organised campaign to make drugs freely available, doubtless to a population prone to seize any easy opportunity of getting drugs. The persons concerned would be guilty in the ordinary way of criminal offences against Narcotics legislation; but if the persons were the Government, what then? Suppose they encouraged doctors to prescribe drugs freely and chemists freely to honour such prescriptions, the law would be satisfied and the Government could probably only be assailed through the machinery for enforcing Narcotics Conventions, the Narcotics Commission, E.C.O.S.O.C., and finally the Assembly at which the ultimate sanction, expulsion from the U.N.O. would be available. If his Majesty’s Government participates in detailed discussion of the terms of the Genocide Commission, this aspect of the matter should be kept in mind. Article 4 (c). “Direct Incitement” The U.S. representative made a statement that in his view it was sufficient to outlaw attempt at conspiracy without specifically enumerating the acts of direct incitement. Article 5 A reference to Heads of State is not acceptable from the point of view of British legislation. Article 7. “or by a competent international tribunal” The Slav bloc do not want even the possibility of an international tribunal to be mentioned nor do various other States suggest such as Venezuela which also considered it opposed to Article 2(7) of the Charter. The U.K. has not taken any attitude on this question but in any case it would seem to be “brutum fumen” and only mentioned with a view to the future.

No. 78 The British Cabinet Doubts Forcible Administration of Narcotics Belongs under Genocide, July 23, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950025/10 July 23, 1948 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT



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CONFIDENTIAL I.O.C. (48) 158 – Addendum CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS Item 18  of Provisional Agenda of 7th Session of the Economic and Social Council GENOCIDE (Note by the Home Office) A particular point arises from the Resolution passed by the Narcotics Commission (page 22 of the Report of the Commission E/799). It is assumed that this question will be referred by the Committee examining the Narcotics Report to that examining the Genocide Report. The issue is not altogether an easy one. If it were a question of the forcible administration of narcotics, that would, doubtless, be one form of interference with the “physical integrity” of the “group”: and provisions in relation to it would be little, if at all, less acceptable than provisions aimed at castration or other forms of physical violence, being recognizable in our law under one or another form of assault. It would over-simplify the matter so to view it. What the protagonists may have in mind is an organized campaign to make drugs freely available, doubtless to a population prone to seize any easy opportunity of getting drugs. The persons concerned would be guilty in the ordinary way of criminal offences against Narcotics legislation; but if the persons were the Government, what then? Suppose they encouraged doctors to prescribe drugs freely and chemists freely to honour such prescriptions, the law would be satisfied and the Government could probably only be assailed through the machinery for enforcing Narcotics Conventions, the Narcotics Commission, E.C.O.S.O.C., and finally the Assembly at which the ultimate sanction, expulsion from the U.N.O. would be available. If His Majesty’s Government participates in detailed discussion of the terms of the Genocide Commission, this aspect of the matter should be kept in mind. HOME OFFICE

No. 79 A US State Department’s Position Paper on Draft Genocide Convention, August 25, 1948 NARA, DoS General Records, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 59/3039E/28 (SD/A/C.6/61) August 25, 1948 RESTRICTED SD/A/C.6/61

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Position Paper DRAFT CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE PROBLEM The problem is what position the United States Delegation should take at the General Assembly with respect to the draft convention on genocide prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide. The text of this draft convention, hereinafter referred to as the convention, is attached hereto as Annex A. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The Delegation should support, in general, the text of the convention except as indicated in the following recommendations: 2. The Delegation should endeavor to add to Article II “economic” and “social” groups. If, however, a sufficiently large number of representative states make it clear that they would not accept a convention with this addition, the Delegation should reconsider this matter. 3. Likewise, if a sufficiently large number of representative states make it clear that the retention of “political” groups in Article II of the convention would cause them not to accede thereto, the Delegation should reconsider this matter. 4. The Delegation should endeavor to have Article III and Article IV(c) eliminated from the convention. 5. At an early stage of the consideration of the organization of the work of Committee VI, the Delegation should seek to have established a subcommittee on genocide. DISCUSSION Background – The convention on genocide was prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide established by virtue of the resolution of the Economic and Social Council dated March 3, 1948. (See Committee Report, Document E/794, May 26, 1948).1 The convention had been referred for action to the Commission on Human Rights. At its third session, the Commission decided on June 16, 1948, that, due to the lack of time, it was not able to consider thoroughly the convention. It expressed the opinion that the convention should be considered by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. On August 17, 1948, the Council decided to refer this convention to the General Assembly without any recommendation. Recommendation1 – A paper entitled “Position on Genocide Convention by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide” was prepared for the use of the United States representative on the Economic and Social Council.2 This paper contains specific arguments for the support of provisions already in the convention. It also contains comments with respect to those principal rejected proposals which are likely to be renewed.

See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 1110–60. 2 See doc. no. 73. 1



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Recommendation 2 – Article II of the convention, quoted below, relates to physical extinction of human groups. At the briefing of Mr. Dulles on August 16, he raised the question why Article II should not also prohibit the killing of persons because they are members of a property class, since such killing would, of course, be just as objectionable as the extermination of a racial group on grounds of racial origin. If, however, as stated in the recommendation, a large number of representative states make it clear that the inclusion of such a provision in the convention would make it unacceptable to them, the Delegation should reconsider the question as to what position it should take with respect to this issue. If the Delegation should decide not to press this matter any further, it might consider the desirability of expressing the expectation that the convention might be modified in the future to have such a provision added thereto. In connection with objections from states to this proposed addition, it should be noted that the Eastern countries on the Ad Hoc Committee did not vote for the convention which at that time did not, of course, contain the proposed addition. Soviet objections to this modification cannot but reflect unfavorably on the objectors, since obviously the killing of members of the capitalistic class, for instance, merely because they belong to that class, should not be tolerated. Attention may also be called to the fact that the Draft Declaration of Human Rights, as approved by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at its third session at Lake Success on June 18, 1948, contains in Article 2 the following provisions: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property or other status, or national or social origin. (Underscoring inserted).

Some of the rights set forth in this declaration are: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” (Article 3). This declaration was approved by a vote of 12 to 0, with 4 abstentions from the Eastern States. To cover the class of persons envisaged by the proposed modification, Article II of the convention may be amended to read as follows, the underscored part representing the proposed additions: “In this Convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious, economic, social or political group, on grounds of the national, social or racial origin, religious belief, economic status, or political opinion of its members; (1) Killing members of the group; (2) Impairing the physical integrity of members of the group; (3) Inflicting on members of the groups measures or conditions of life aimed at causing their deaths; (4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.”

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Recommendation 3 – It is likely that in addition to the Eastern countries, the Latin American countries might object to the retention of “political” groups in Article II. This is because of the revolutions which occur there from time to time.1 As stated in Recommendation 3, if a large number of representative states make it clear that they would not accept a convention which would include “political” groups, the Delegation should reconsider this matter. If the Delegation should decide not to press this point, it might consider the desirability of expressing the hope that the convention might be modified in the future to have such a provision added thereto. Recommendation 4 – While this article on so-called “cultural” genocide is appealing from a popular point of view, the Delegation should oppose the inclusion of this Article in the convention. In opposing it, the Delegation should point out that the act of creating the new international crime of genocide is one of extreme gravity and the United States feels that it should be confined to only those barbarous acts directed against individuals. Article IV(c). This paragraph makes direct incitement, in public or in private, to commit genocide punishable. In opposing the inclusion of this paragraph in the convention, the Delegation might point out that paragraphs (a) and (d) of this Article already refer to “conspiracy” and “attempt” to commit genocide. The convention should provide for the culpability of all those who directly perform or attempt to perform the physical acts comprehended in the crime of genocide, and all who “conspire” together to commit this crimes. In this connection a “direct incitement” to the achievement of the prescribed end, if of a nature to create an imminent danger that it would result in the commission of the crime, would generally constitute part of an attempt or an overt act of conspiracy. To outlaw such incitement, it is sufficient to outlaw the attempt and conspiracy without specifically enumerating the acts of direct incitement in the Convention. Inclusion of acts which do not constitute an attempt, or conspiracy, to commit genocide might result in the convention serving to encourage repressive measures which may be unnecessary to deal with the crime of genocide. At the same time that the convention undertakes to deal with the crime of genocide, it should not unnecessarily restrict fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to freedom of speech and the press. Recommendation 5 – This recommendation obviously is intended to expedite the work of Committee VI.

As one of the Latin American delegates explained, in camera: “On our continent, we are always having a revolution. Then we dance a rumba and forget it. But if this treaty includes political groups, the loser of the revolution can claim before the world that the winner violated the genocide pact and must be punished.” See Herbert Yahraes, “He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime,” Collier’s (3 March 1951): 57.

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No. 80 The UK Delegation Summarizes the Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the ECOSOC, September 2, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN2156 September 2, 1948 WORLD ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) GENEVA TO FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL FERTILE Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 162 Saving of 31st August, repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York Saving Genocide – (Item 19) The procedure (UNE 3705/16/96) described in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 161 (Report of the third session of the Human Rights Commission) was followed in connexion with this Item also, and formal statements were made in Plenary Session by Delegations on 26th August. Full summaries are contained in E/SR’s 218 and 219 UNE 3637/1916/96. 2. These summary records will show that most of the contentious aspects of the draft convention were dealt with in some detail. The following points deserve particular mention: (i)  China concentrated on Genocide by Narcotics, and stated its intention to propose in the General Assembly the inclusion in the Convention of a clause to implement the recommendation of the Narcotics Commission (E/AC. 27/1). (ii)  Poland (Katz-Suchy) referred again (UNE 3185/1916/96) to the charges which he had made on 17th August (see my telegram No. 114) against “certain states” who wished to prevent the early adoption of a convention from “narrow nationalists and imperial motives”. He urged, in support of the retention of the clause on cultural genocide, the beneficial effect it would have on the peoples of colonial independent territories. He also stressed that the importance of Article 9 (extradiction) was illustrated by the fact that war criminals were still being protected by the United Kingdom, United States, and others, and cited in particular the case of Dr. Dering.1 (iii)  The U.S.S.R. (Pavlov) deplored the omission in the preamble of any indication that genocide was organically bound up with racial theories which propagated inter alia, the extermination of the so-called “inferior races”. He referred to two contemporary cases of genocide: (a) the aerial bombardment which the Premier of Kashmir had described as an attempt to annihilate whole villages and tribes, and

The British government in 1947 put the brakes on extradition of alleged war criminals, including Władisław A. Dering. Dering (1903–1965) was a Polish physician who stood accused of conducting medical experiments on humans at Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp.

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(b) The importation of headhunting and cannibalistic Dyaks to fight against the national liberation movement in Malaya.1 3.  United Kingdom (Phillips) in the course of a statement on the lines of a statement on the lines of IOC (48) 158, observed that the danger inherent in too wide a definition of genocide was well illustrated by the manner in which the U.S.S.R. had branded, as genocide, measures in Malaya which were directed solely towards the maintenance of law and order. 4.  The President ruled that since the Council had already decided on 17th August to transmit the draft convention and records of the Council proceedings to the General Assembly, there was no question of taking a formal vote on the matter. The United Kingdom and Netherlands therefore put on record the fact that they would have abstained if a formal vote had been taken. [Advance copy sent to Head of United Nations Economic and Social Department]

The British deployed some Dayaks, native to Borneo, against communist insurgents in Malaya. Known as the Malayan Emergency, the guerilla war began in June 1948 and lasted until 1960.

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Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, September–December 1948 (nos. 81–113)

The British entered the debates on genocide in the ECOSOC’s Sixth Committee (Legal) in the fall of 1948 as skeptical as ever. A newly appointed UK delegate on the committee, Gerald Fitzmaurice, was expected to put forward “some pretty devastating criticism of those provisions which we think to be totally impracticable” (doc. 81). The United Kingdom anticipated disagreement by national delegations on just anything apart from the definition of genocide (doc. 82). Acquiesced to the idea of a UN sponsored Genocide Convention, the Foreign Office did not bet on an ICC to be established any time soon. It wanted to ensure that British nationals potentially charged with genocide be tried in the United Kingdom (doc. 83). The office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was particularly concerned with cultural genocide, arguing that its excessively broad definition might be used to obtain extradition in cases that effectively constituted political offenses (doc. 84). The UK delegation ascertained that the debates in the Sixth Committee, which opened in early October, featured starkly different opinions. So substantial was the disagreement that the delegation was considering adopting a mere declaration of support rather than the actual convention (doc. 85). Particularly tricky proved the issue of political groups. Fitzmaurice proposed deleting from the draft Genocide Convention the words “on grounds of . . . political opinion of its members,” which Foreign Office officials back in London thought was a mistake (docs. 86–87). The FO’s Working Party on Genocide alerted the UK delegation that accession to any convention presupposed passing enabling legislation in Parliament. An international tribunal was not just improbable but undesirable, while the question of political groups tied up with that of extradition for political crimes (docs. 88–89). The dissonance between the UK delegation to the United Nations and the Foreign Office was aggravated by the emerging gap between the latter and the Home Office (HO). The Home Office contended that the delegation had taken too proactive a stand on genocide, in particular with regard to political groups. Hypothetically, had a “political group” in Britain used excessive violence to defy the constitutional authorities, the latter would certainly intend to destroy that group and/or kill members of that group (doc. 91). Although the Foreign Office chose to disagree on a level of detail, it reassured the Home Office nothing could commit the delegation to signature. “The whole subject is of course quite unreal,” wrote Paul Mason, head of the FO’s UN Department, “and I imagine

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that there is practically no chance of our becoming parties to the convention which is beginning to emerge” (docs. 92, 94). Indeed, despite the slow progress in the Sixth Committee, by November the Genocide Convention started taking shape (doc. 94). Ernest Gross, US delegate on the Sixth Committee, was convinced that the Soviet Union would never accept any convention that gives rise to international enforcement. Furthermore, he believed the Soviets intended to sabotage the Genocide Convention by means of amendments so as to preclude a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly (doc. 90). As the ECOSOC was preparing to vote on the draft Genocide Convention, the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly requested further guidelines. In a routine procedure, on November 24, Molotov submitted a draft directive for consideration by the Communist Party Central Committee and personally by Stalin (doc. 96). In addition to earlier postulates, the Soviet Foreign Ministry wanted an article that would extend the convention to dependent and non-self-governing territories. The delegation also received the instructions to reverse its position on the following two provisions. The USSR now recognized the accountability of the state for genocide and accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over disputes involving genocide, insofar as all parties concerned had a consensus to that effect. The directive restated the points concerning an organic link between genocide and fascism, cultural genocide, and disbandment of organizations inciting hatred and genocide (doc. 97). The delegation should no longer object to the clause regarding the forceful transfer of children from one group to another yet protest any references to the present situation in Greece. A passage regarding ethnic and racial discrimination targeted specifically the British. The Soviet Union continuously objected to the inclusion of political groups and to the establishment of an ICC. The latter provision infringed on state sovereignty or even hindered the fight against genocide, according to the directive. Despite the stated shortcomings, the Soviet delegation was told to vote in favor of the Genocide Convention as a whole. This the British obviously did not know. The Home Office knew for sure it did not want the United Kingdom to vote in favor of the convention. Whether to vote against, or merely abstain, was left up to the UK delegate (doc. 99). The UK delegation was hardly satisfied with the Genocide Convention as redrafted by the ECOSOC (docs. 98, 110–11). While scrapping the reference to “incitement”—through joint efforts with the United States—was deemed a success, eliminating the provision for an ICC made the “convention in its present form as virtually powerless to prevent or to punish genocide.” A newly added reference as to a future penal tribunal did not commit any country to recognizing its jurisdiction. The United Kingdom was happy (and Pakistan not) to see the original clause on cultural genocide go, and the Colonial Article reinstated (over Soviet objections). The countries that originally voted for inclusion of political groups (e.g., the United States) reconciled to their eventual deletion—ostensibly in order to make convention more generally acceptable. As the main defect of the draft convention, the UK delegation identified the failure to address the complicity of state and governments in genocide. The resistance was in no way limited to the Communist bloc. As the Foreign Office contended, “[I]t even included the United States who are clearly afraid of accusations which may be made against them as a government in respect of the treatment of the negro and Red Indian populations of the United States.” As the UN debates on the Genocide Convention picked up speed in late November and early December 1948, the different branches of the UK Government seemed



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unable to keep up with the conversation, often talking past each other (doc. 112). The Colonial Office kept insisting that colonies should not be singled out for discriminatory treatment in international conventions (doc. 100). In accordance with the FO instructions, the UK delegation abstained from voting on the Genocide Convention in the Sixth Committee on December 1. In so doing the United Kingdom found itself in company with South Africa and Soviet bloc countries (doc. 101). To avoid further embarrassment, the UK delegation implored the Foreign Office it should consider voting in favor of the convention in the General Assembly. In support of his argument, the UK representative speculated that a number of countries that would likely vote “yes” might refrain from signing and/or ratifying the convention, or just delay action, anyway. Furthermore, he was under strong pressure from the US delegation to go along (doc. 103). As of December 3, the Foreign Office still insisted abstention in the final vote was a reasonable decision (doc. 104). As the counterargument went, the United Kingdom was used to being in a minority on the issue of genocide in the United Nations: “[O]ur distaste for the draft convention is surely well known.” The UK representative reacted with dismay to this proposition. Unless the decision is reversed, the United Kingdom was surely to meet severe criticism both at home and abroad, he reasoned. A vote in favor of the convention, on the other hand, would place the United Kingdom among “progressive and right-thinking countries” and brand the “Slav system [as] a backward one” (doc. 106). At the eleventh hour, on December 7, the Home Secretary relented his opposition. A UK “yes” vote was conditional upon stating that it did not prejudice the established practice of granting the right of asylum (docs. 107–109). On December 9, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention by a unanimous vote of fifty-five in favor, none against and no abstentions. The Soviets duly criticized the final wording of the convention, yet joined in a majority. The United Kingdom thus had a “lucky escape,” in the words of its representative (doc. 109). The Colonial Office was brutally honest—when soliciting opinions of the colonial governors on whether or not they consider the Genocide Convention problematic—in its ex post facto assessment of UK signature (doc. 113). The United Kingdom had gone along only after “there appeared to be a majority in favour of a Convention,” and with no express commitment to ratifying it.

No. 81 The British Foreign Office Proposes Gerald Fitzmaurice as Negotiator in Further Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention, September 15, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN2291 Minutes September 15, 1948 I think the draft brief is all right as far as it goes, but I think it is lacking in the following point. The person who would probably have to deal with this in Paris is Mr. Fitzmaurice,

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who has had no previous acquaintance with this tiresome subject at all, whereas, of course, Mr. Evans and to a more limited extent myself are already familiar with it. Now, I think that Mr. Fitzmaurice will need some rather technical explanation showing in general those provisions which we think we can accept under our existing law, and how we should reconcile them with it, those provisions which we think quite impracticable and why, and, thirdly, those provisions which conceivably, though by no means certainly, we might be prepared to accept, even though they meant some amendment of our existing law. If my memory is right we worked out in committee in my room certain amendments that we should want anyway, and I think Mr. Fitzmaurice will want to know what they are. He must be in a position to put forward in the Sixth Committee some pretty devastating criticism of those provisions which we think to be totally impracticable. No doubt, with a bit of guidance, as we have looked at the matter in the past, he will be able to develop anything we give him himself. Eric Beckett

No. 82 Summary of Opinions on Most Contentious Issues in the Draft Genocide Convention as Expressed by National Delegations in the ECOSOC (incomplete), September 17, 1948 NA, C.O. 936/19/2 September 17, 1948 CONFIDENTIAL I.O.C. (48) 228 CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation to the Third Session of the General Assembly: Item 32 of the Provisional Agenda. Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council. The accompanying brief, which has been prepared by the Foreign Office, is Circulated for the Consideration of the Committee. A further Annex setting out the implications of the Draft Convention from the legal point of view will be circulated in due course. * * * ANNEX IV Summary of Opinion Expressed on the Main Issue of the Principle 1. That the maximum number of States should adhere and/or that a Convention should cover everything on which there is general agreement.



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In favour Not in favour Australia Poland Venezuela Russia Canada Byelo Russia Denmark China United Kingdom View It is unlikely that apart from a definition of the term Genocide there can in fact be general agreement on anything which goes much further than the General Assembly resolutions, i.e. agreement that genocide is an international crime whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, and that States should be invited to enact the necessary legislation to prevent it. A Convention therefore would mark no progress in International Law, and the best procedure would be for the International Law Commission to consider genocide in conjunction with the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg judgment. 2. That cultural genocide should be excluded In favour Not in favour Brazil Poland Canada Russia France Byelo Russia U.S.A. Venezuela (the present Netherlands article should be very much cut down) United Kingdom View Cultural genocide involves the whole question of the treatment of minorities and should therefore be referred to the sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission dealing with non-discrimination and the protection of minorities. 3. That political groups should be included In favour Not in favour France Poland U.S.A. Russia Byelo Russia Venezuela United Kingdom View1

States in favour of a Convention of some kind Australia Brazil Venezuela Russia Canada France China U.S.A. Poland Chile Denmark Byelo Russia Peru The following page, which outlines UK’s position on political groups, is missing from the document.

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If other Members want it New Zealand In favour of reference to the International Law Commission Netherlands United Kingdom

No. 83 The British Foreign Office Requests Legal Opinion of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions on the Draft Genocide Convention, September 27, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN2291 September 27, 1948 Dear [Theobald Mathew] I attach a copy of a draft Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. It is expected that this draft will be considered at the present session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and there are some points regarding it on which I should be grateful for your opinion. The United Kingdom opposes the idea of a Convention on this subject, but it will probably have a large measure of support at the General Assembly and it is possible that a convention will be adopted to which States will be invited to accede. It may then be politically undesirable for the United Kingdom to keep aloof. We have, therefore, been considering what amendments to the draft would be necessary to make the Convention acceptable by the United Kingdom. We have come to the conclusion that, if Article II (4) and Article III were deleted, the remaining acts covered by Articles II and IV already by and large constitute crimes of homicide and personal injury in England. Article VII, however, provides that persons charged with these acts shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by a competent international tribunal, and it is on this Article that I should particularly like to have your views. It is probable that no international tribunal competent in this matter will be created for some time, and, if we accede to a Convention containing Article VII in its present form, we should be obliged to ensure that under our law a person charged with committing in England any of the acts enumerated in Articles II and IV could be tried in England. He might, for instance, while in England have conspired with someone or incited someone to commit genocide in France. Could a person who has committed in England against a group in France any of the enumerated acts be successfully prosecuted in England as our law stands at present, or would legislation be necessary to ensure that English courts would have jurisdiction in such cases? I should also be interested to know what the position would be in the converse case. Could a person who committed in France against a group in England any of the acts enumerated be successfully prosecuted in England? I have found some guidance in



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Archbold, 31st edition, pages 24 and 1417, but the law seems to be rather uncertain.1 I should be grateful if you could let me have a short note on the position which will enable me to brief our delegation to the General Assembly. Signed Sir Eric Beckett

No. 84 Director of Public Prosecutions Considers Acts Enumerated in Article II of the Draft Genocide Convention as Punishable under the British Criminal Law, September 30, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN2291 September 30, 1948 Dear [Eric] Beckett,

re Genocide

I have considered the questions raised in your letter of September 27th. I agree that if Article II (4) and Article III are deleted the remaining acts covered by Articles II and IV are, generally speaking, already crimes under our law. Indeed it might be possible to bring some of the acts contemplated under Article II (4) within the ambit of the criminal law. I am somewhat concerned about Article IX, unless Article III is deleted, as the definition of “cultural genocide” is so wide that it could easily be used to obtain extradition for what are in effect purely political offenses. I have prepared and enclose herewith a resume of the criminal law, both as to offences and jurisdiction, as it applies to the draft Convention. [Signed] Theobald Mathew

No. 85 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Informs the Foreign Office about the Status of Debates on the Genocide Convention, October 5, 1948 NA, C.O. 936/19/2 October 5, 1948 En clair Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice is a major text for criminal lawyers in England and Wales (published since 1822).

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WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (U.K. DEL) TO FOREIGN OFFICE No. 81 Committee 6 Prince Waithayakon (Siam) was elected vice chairman when the South African nominated by Egypt had refused to stand. Spiropoulos (Greece) was elected Rapporteur by 35 votes to 15 votes for Lachs (Poland), when Kaeckenbeck (Belgium) had refused to accept nomination. 2. There was some preliminary discussion on the order in which the items on the agenda were to be taken, and it was decided that Item 4 in the Secretariat’s list genocide should be taken first and Item 9 (invitation to the Director General of the Pan-American Union) should be taken next, and the remaining items in the order in the Secretariat list, see A/C 6/207 for final order of items. 3. The general debate on the draft convention relating to genocide has just been completed. Wide divergence of opinion has shown itself, both on basic principles and on the terms of the draft itself, Reid (New Zealand) effectively showed that one of the causes of this was that the authors of the draft consisted of only 7 members of the United Nations, and that this draft had been given no thorough examination either by the Human Rights Commission, or the Economic and Social Council, further, there had been little response from Governments to request for comments on the draft. As a result it had reached the General Assembly without any previous representative study. 4. The almost unanimous opinion of the Committee was that the draft convention should be considered article by article in full Committee, on the grounds that its reference to a sub-committee would merely lead to duplication of debate and reference to the International Law Commission, of all or parts of the draft, urged by the AttorneyGeneral, would merely delay making the convention effective at the end of general debate, U.S. proposals in A/C 6/208 not (repeat not) to refer final text to International Law Commission was carried 38 to 7. 5. The points of principle of which there is a divergence of opinion are the following. (1) The Soviet Union, Ukraine, Poland and Yugoslavia demand an express reference to Nazi/Fascist ideology, and particularly its racial theories, as being the seed bed from which genocide grows. They also wish to exclude reference to political rules as objects of genocide. (2) The following countries support the inclusion of cultural genocide as a separate offense – Pakistan, Ukraine, Egypt and Venezuela, opposed by India and France. (3) Need for strong preventative and enforcement measures and creation of an international criminal tribunal is pressed by France but vigorously opposed by the Soviet Union, its supporters and also others including Belgium. (4) The inclusion of political groups has wide support, but is opposed by the Soviet Union and its supporters: The U.S. proposes the inclusion of economic group, A/C. 6/214. 6. Kaeckenbeck (Belgium) suggested that in place of a convention there should be a declaration which would elaborate in detail the principles set up in the original General Assembly resolution. This idea received support from Chile and Dominican



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Republic. If, as seems likely, the Soviet Union and like-minded countries are isolated in their demand for a stricter convention, it may be that general agreement could be secured in the committee on the terms of a declaration and in so far as the Committee plainly desires to produce a definite document during the present Assembly, it may be advisable to give our support to the principle of a declaration, when it becomes probable that no substantial agreement can be reached on the terms of a convention. 7. After the close of the general debate, there was an argument on whether the preamble should be considered before or after the text; the later won and we shall proceed with discussions of Article I.

No. 86 The British Foreign Office Alerts Gerald Fitzmaurice to the Problem of Political Groups in the Wording of the Draft Genocide Convention, October 16, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN2826 October 16, 1948 I notice that in the Sixth Committee we have proposed the deletion from Article II of the draft Convention on Genocide of the words “on grounds of the national or social origin, religious belief or political opinion of its members.” In the Working Parties which considered the draft we thought those words served a useful purpose. If for instance a political group resorts to violence in order to promote its views, the lawful authorities can properly take measures to prevent it which may in the last resort involve deliberate killing. Without the words whose deletion is proposed, such killing would come within the definition of genocide in Article 2. With those words it would not be genocide because the killing would not be on the grounds of the political opinion of members of the group but would be for the purpose of preventing violence. I mentioned to Sir Eric [Beckett] your proposed new Article about the International Court and he pointed out that under the Statue of the Court only disputes can be referred to the Court by States. He asked me to mention this to you so that you could bear the point in mind when you prepare your final draft of the Article. (W.V.J. Evans)

No. 87 Gerald Fitzmaurice Considers Genocide a Political Crime in reply to Vincent Evans of the British Foreign Office, October 18, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308 October 18, 1948

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UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION to the General Assembly of United Nations, 57, Avenue d’Iéna, Paris Dear Vincent [Evans], Thanks for your letter of October 16th about the omission of the mention of motives in Article II of the draft Convention on Genocide. We thought this over very carefully but we were all, that is to say the Attorney-General, James Fawcett and myself, of the opinion that the mention of motives was irrelevant and even (on the assumption that one has to take this Convention seriously) rather dangerous, in that it might be possible for someone who had in fact committed genocide to escape conviction for that particular offence on the ground that his motive in seeking to destroy a particular group was not one of those enumerated in the Convention; whereas it seemed to us that the intention to destroy a group by methods of physical extermination must be wrong in all circumstances irrespective of the motive.1 If I might refer to the example you have given: If a political group resorts to violence in order to promote its views it is quite correct to say that as you suggest the lawful authorities could take measures to prevent it doing this, it might in the last resort involve killing members of the group. But surely this would not be with the intention of physical extermination of the group as a group. It is possible to proscribe a group politically, to arrest its members and, in the course of a rebellion, to shoot down members of it, but all this is with the intention of causing the group to refrain from violence, to conform to the law and to employ legitimate methods in the prosecution of its activities. The moment one passes from this to an actual intention to destroy a group as such it becomes essentially genocide. It became pretty clear in the course of the debates here that if the relevance of motives were admitted it would become a comparatively easy matter, especially for States or Governments, to evade their obligations under the Convention and to commit genocide with impunity, by alleging that they had been actuated by motives other than motives of a racial, religious or political etc., character. There has, as a matter of fact, been an immense amount of confusion about it in the Committee. Our proposal for a simple deletion of the reference to motives was not adopted, but on the other hand what has been adopted is an amendment proposed by the Venezuelan Delegation to the effect that genocide consists in the perpetration of various acts with intent to destroy national, racial or religious, etc. groups as such. It does not tie the offence to certain specific motives, and it places the main emphasis, as we here think correctly, on the intention, but it does, at the same time, suggest that the essence of the offence is the national, racial, or religious character of the group. As regards the point about the International Court of Justice, we of course agree that States can only take matters before the Court as disputes, but we are not clear that it is essential to mention the term “dispute” in so many words in the relevant Article of the Convention. Article 36 of the Statue of the Court says that the jurisdiction of the Court “comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force.” On this working (wording?) it would see quite sufficient for an Article in a Convention

Sir Heartly Shawcross (1902–2003), Attorney General for England and Wales from 1945 to 1951.

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to provide that certain matters shall, at the request of any party to the Convention be referred to the Court, though we quite agree that the actual reference would have to take the form of allegations by one of the parties that one of the other parties was in breach of the Convention, i.e., in fact a dispute. I know that Article 38 says “The Court whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it” shall apply international Conventions, the general principles of international law, etc., but this cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Court can only consider disputes for this would exclude the Court’s jurisdiction to give advisory opinions to international organisations. At the moment in our proposed amendments we have two provisions referring to the Court. The first reads as follows: “Where the act of genocide as specified by Article II and IV is, or is alleged to be, the act of the State or Government itself or of any organ or authority of the State or Government, the matter shall, at the request of any other party to the present Convention, be referred to the International Court of Justice whose decision shall be final and binding. Any acts or measures found by the Court to constitute acts of genocide shall be immediately discontinued or rescinded, or, if already suspended, shall not be resumed or reimposed.” The second reads as follows: “In addition to the cases contemplated by Article VII of the present Convention all disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention shall at the request of any party to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.” As you will see, the second of these passages refers to disputes but the first does not, solely because it was more natural and convenient to draft it in that way. But I think a reference to the Court under it would necessary be a dispute. If, however, Eric feels that it would be preferable to use the actual term “dispute” in this first passage we can easily make the necessary adjustments. Incidentally we are not proposing as had been originally contemplated, to suggest the omission of sub-paragraph (4) of Article II namely, “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” It seems to us that such measures could only be imposed by Governments. Consequently, we do not follow the fears expressed in London that the inclusion of this paragraph might necessitate legislation which Parliament would be unwilling to pass. It seems to us that the effect of the paragraph would be the reverse and would merely involve an undertaking not to pass certain legislation or take equivalent steps. As it seems quite obvious that no British Government is in the least likely to do this, we cannot see any harm in retaining this paragraph, given the fact that it is only a Government which could impose measures of this character and that it cannot be a question of passing legislation in order to restrain private individuals from doing so, as they have not the power to do so anyhow. We have also come to the conclusion that it is going to be very difficult for us to effect any substantial alternation in the extradition article. In regard to the first paragraph we are proposing as an obvious improvement to delete the words “and therefore shall be grounds for extradition” and to replacing them by the words “for purposes of extradition”. I have spoken to the Attorney-General about omitting the passage which provides that genocide should not be considered as a political crime

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but he feels, and I must say I agree with him, that we should never get away with this, and that it would indeed be destructive of the whole obligation to extradite, because, in fact, genocide in its more serious forms nearly always is a political crime; possibly religious genocide is not, but almost all other forms, particularly those against national, racial or political groups are nearly always inspired by political motives. The great majority of cases of genocide would therefore automatically be non-extraditable unless it is provided that Genocide shall not rank as a political offence for extradition purposes. Personally I do not share the fears of the people at home on this matter. It is one thing to take the view that however loathsome assassination may be in itself, there may nevertheless be circumstances in which the assassination of a particular political personage or group of personages may be excusable so as to warrant not extraditing, but it is difficult to conceive of any circumstances in which the attempt at exterminating a whole group as a group can be other than a crime morally as well as legally, whatever the motives inspired it. It is for the same reasons that we have not put forward the amendment proposed in London making an exception in favour of lawful actions of war. The Attorney-General took the view that the waging of war with actual intention to exterminate the whole enemy population or some particular group of it must always be wrong. It may be that in the course of the war you take action which may have the effect of exterminating whole groups but it is never with that object, or ought not to be. The object is to defend yourself or overcome the enemy’s opposition. Please let me know if you very much disagree with me on this as it will still be possible to introduce amendments on certain points in the Committee and it will of course be possible to do so later when the thing goes back to the Plenary. Yours ever, [Fitzmaurice]

No. 88 The British Foreign Office’s Working Party on Genocide Reviews Specific Articles of the Draft Genocide Convention, TPQ October 22, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950025/13 [TPQ October 22, 1948] DRAFT1 GENOCIDE Note of meeting of working party The working party first considered the issues in a general way. Throughout it was understood that there was no idea of introducing into British criminal (including The document incorporates changes made to the earlier draft of October 22.

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extradition) laws any reference to genocide as such and that the working party was looking at a sum total of existing offences with a view to seeing how nearly they equated to “genocide”. The delegation should, the working party thought, emphasise that the United Kingdom’s accession to any convention which might eventually be adopted was, inter alia, dependent on Parliament passing the necessary legislation. It was, in particular, most undesirable that H.M. delegation should table a British redraft of any convention when there was uncertainty as to our capacity to ratify that redraft. There is grave uncertainty as to our capacity to ratify the proposed convention, and it is, therefore, considered undesirable that the delegation should put forward a “British draft”. The working party then discussed the ad hoc committee’s draft convention Article by Article along with the notes on it in I.O.C. (48) 228 Addendum. Article I. It is clear that some wars would themselves approach genocide as it is so widely defined in Article 2. It seemed necessary specifically to except in Article 1 lawful acts of war. It also seemed necessary to make clear, if such an exception is introduced, that where a war embarked upon by one belligerent was itself unlawful war, acts of members of that belligerent which would have been lawful acts of war if the war had been lawful were not excluded from the exception. The necessity for an exact definition in Article 1 was particularly illustrated by the case of civil war in which not infrequently the whole object was genocide as defined in Article 2. It was necessary to keep in view the position in the successive stages of civil war, namely, rebellion, recognition of the rebels by some Powers, general recognition of the rebels. Article II. The inclusion of “political genocide” raises the most complicated problems especially in relation to civil war. The words in paragraph (ii) might conveniently be replaced by more precise words such as “causing grievous bodily harm” for which there is a precedent in the Convention for the international prevention and punishment of terrorism signed at Geneva on 16th November, 1937. It was understood that the delegation had already refused to accept sub-paragraph (iv) with which refusal the working party agreed. Article III. It was understood that the delegation had already refused to accept this Article in which refusal the working party concurred. Article V. The working party agreed with the delegation’s proposed redrafting of this Article which reads: “The laws of each of the High Contracting Parties shall provide for the punishment of all acts of genocide as defined in Article II and III committed within its territories”. Note: Old Article IV. Article VII. The working party considered this article should be redrafted to read: “Each High Contracting Party shall use its best endeavours in accordance with its constitution and its laws to bring to trial before a competent national tribunal every person within its territory against whom there is prima facie evidence that he has committed the crime of genocide.” It was understood that there would be some effort to include an obligation to bring offenders before an international tribunal. The working party considered it to be undesirable that there should be any reference to an international tribunal seeing

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that no such tribunal existed. The question of its inclusion could only properly be considered when its constitution and functions were determined. Article IX. The working party considered that the principle that extradition for political crimes should be refused is as deeply entrenched in Great Britain that there would be little likelihood of passing legislation infringing this principle in respect of the crime (unknown to English law) of “genocide”. The working party agreed that the provisions regarding extradition should be re-drafted along the lines of Article X for the convention for suppressing counterfeiting currency, which reads as follows: “The offences referred to in Article III (late IV) shall be deemed to be included as extradition crimes in any extradition treaty which has been or may hereafter be concluded between any of the High Contracting Parties.” “The High Contracting Parties who do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty or reciprocity recognise the offences referred to in Article [?] as causes of extradition between themselves. “Extradition shall be granted in conformity with the law of the country to which application is made”. Mr. Evans informed the working party that the delegation had proposed putting forward a new article on the following lines, of which the final text had not been settled: “Where the act of genocide is committed by the state or government itself or by any organ or authority of the state or government, the matter shall, at the request of any other party to the present Convention, be referred to the International Court of Justice. Upon such references the state or government whose measures or actions are complained of, shall, pending the decision of the court, immediately suspend such measures or notions. In the event of the court deciding that the measures or actions in question constitute acts of genocide as defined in Articles [?] and were committed in breach of the present convention, such suspension shall be final.” The working party considered that this suggested Article, and most certainly its second sentence, was too obviously open to gross abuse and that any abuse might easily have ridiculous results. The working party thought that any Article along those lines would present great difficulties.

No. 89 David Hildyard of the Foreign Office Discusses with T. Hutson of the Home Office How the UK Delegation Should Proceed on the Genocide Convention, October 27, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN2939 October 27, 1948 Foreign Office Outfile UN/2882 2939/48/78 Sent



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Dear Hutson, Thank you for your letter of October 26th enclosing a redraft note of the meeting of the Working Party on genocide.1 There are only two small changes that we would like to make if you agree. In the third and fourth paragraphs on page 2, I think it would be better to say “the delegation would refuse” rather than “had already refused”. Since at that time there had been no detailed discussion of Articles II and III. I think, too, that the last paragraph of all does not quite reflect the views of the meeting and would suggest that it be redrafted as follows: “The Working Party considered that this suggested article, and particularly its second sentence, was open to gross abuse. The Working Party thought that the second sentence should be deleted and the Delegation should be asked carefully to examine the implications of their proposal as regards war and the declaration of war.” This is what Evans and I understood as a result of the meeting and later telephoned to Paris. In case you have not seen the amendments to the draft convention submitted by the Delegation, I enclose copies of the relevant documents and also copies of letters between Evans and Fitzmaurice which I think you should see. The Delegation has not followed exactly the wording agreed by the I.O.C. in the brief year that we had agreed in the Working Party. If you have any comments and will send them to me, I will see that the Delegation has them straightaway. The main stumbling block seems to me to be extradition on which delegation does not agree with the line that we had suggested. Yours sincerely, D. H. T. Hildyard

No. 90 Ernest Gross of the US State Department Believes the Soviet Union Will Continue Sabotaging the Genocide Convention, October 28, 1948 NYPL, ZL-273/1 October 28, 1948 UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS Mr. James N. Rosenberg 27 West 67th Street New York, N.Y. USA See doc. no. 88.

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Dear Jim: I was glad to get the cable from Dr. Clinchy and you, as President and Chairman of the Human Rights Committee, and to learn of your appreciation of my efforts on behalf of the genocide convention.1 As you know, the direct handling of this in Committee is in the hands of Mr. Gross of the State Department. I have been keeping in very close touch with him. I think he is doing everything possible. I had a long talk with him yesterday. It is his impression that the Soviet bloc is absolutely unwilling to accept any convention that might give rise to any international rights of enforcement, and they are trying through various processes of amendment to make the convention sufficiently unacceptable to some Delegations as to make it impossible to get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly. It is, I think, too early to say yet whether these tactics will succeed. Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles

No. 91 The British Home Office Believes the UK Delegation to the United Nations Overcommitted Itself on the Genocide Issue, October 29, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950025/13 UN/2882/48/78 October 29, 1948 Dear Hildyard, Genocide In the limited time at disposal, the position reached, as developed in Fitzmaurice’s letter, has been considered here. First I would wish to express misgivings that the Delegation should have decided on such an active degree of participation; first, by proposing to table a British redraft, and now, alternatively, by having tabled amendments which are so extensive as to differ little in total from a redraft of the whole. I do not think that this was at any time contemplated by the I.O.C., and I feel it to be a large departure from the sense and letter of the brief. The seriousness of the matter lies in our view in the fact, which we think clear, that the draft plus the amendments tabled will, for fulfilment, call for amendments to our criminal law; and that notwithstanding the fact that these amendments have not received, and might not receive, the endorsement of the Home Secretary and his colleagues, and may well fail to commend themselves to Parliament. To table redrafts See also doc. no. 141.

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or amendments seems a course of a very different character from statesmanlike participation in argument designed to bring out difficulties, the position of His Majesty’s Government being reserved throughout. It is fair that I should at least illustrate the proposition advanced, namely that our amendments, (like the original draft), call for changes in our law. In extradition proceedings, extraditions stand to be refused if the crime is considered by the Court as a fact to be political in character. Article IX (i) as drafted says the contrary; so we think, does the British amendment. So that an alteration of our extradition law is involved. More fundamental is the fact that the alteration would of necessity – we can see no escape from this – involve the creation, not only in our extradition law but in our criminal law, of an offence of “Genocide”. Throughout all our discussions, the opposite has been accepted as fundamental. There is a secondary point here, namely that the Home Secretary has an overriding discretion not to authorize extradition, which is hardly in accord with Article IX (2). I don’t wish – it is hardly possible in a letter of reasonable length – to argue the issues arising in war rebellion, revolution, civil war, or etc. But the sense of Fitzmaurice’s argument does not convince us. If a “political group” in this country set itself – in war or rebellion – by methods of sufficient violence to defy the constituted authorities, the intention of the latter would almost certainly be to destroy “the group” and the killing of “members of the group”, (not necessarily, mark you, all of them), would equally certainly happen. Similarly in war. We therefore considered and consider that an exception for “lawful acts of war”, which would incidentally throw some sort of mantle over actions taken in civil war, is right and necessary. There is, we agree, some validity in Fitzmaurice’s argument concerning Article I (4) and it may be that we would not be unable to ratify the Convention on that score alone. The Extradition issues is not however to be forgotten. We assume, in any event, that our delegation did not consult us by voting for its retention. As regards the issues arising by reason of the proposed provisions in regard to the International Court of Justice, these seem to me to be too complex to be tackled in a hurry by us; and they certainly concern the Foreign Office as much, or more, than ourselves. I am not therefore attempting to examine them in this note. I accept your comments on my earlier note. Yours sincerely, T. H. [Hutson]

No. 92 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Responds to the Criticism of the Home Office concerning Its Handling of the Issue of Genocide at Paris, November 8, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3059 November 8, 1948

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My dear Paul [Mason] Thanks for your letter of November 2nd (U.N. 2966/48/78) about Genocide. It is a little difficult to understand why the Home Office are so worked up about this, and we cannot in any case agree that we have been exceeding our brief. It specifically says (I.O.C. (48) 228) that “The United Kingdom Delegate should … endeavour to persuade the Committee to discuss the various points of principle on which there is disagreement;” and again (I.O.C.(48) 288) Addendum) “If the Sixth Committee decides…to consider the draft Convention, article by article, the United Kingdom Delegate may take part in the discussion with a view to producing an improved draft and in so doing should be guided by the notes in the present draft and the re-draft at Annex V.” The brief then goes on to suggest specific amendments to various articles and ends with a re-draft of the whole Convention. If all this does not add up to authority to propose amendments, and if necessary a re-draft, then it seems to us that the brief is rather misleading. It is possible that the Home Office do not appreciate that, according to the procedure prevalent in the Assembly and its Committees, it is not possible to suggest improvements in a text except by way of specific amendments which have normally to be circulated in writing twenty four hours in advance. Consequently, faced as we were with the clear intention of the great majority of the Sixth Committee to draw up a Genocide Convention of some sort, our only way of trying to remedy the obvious imperfections of the present draft was to table formal amendments. Now as to the specific amendments which we have tabled, we are still not very clear what it is in them that the Home Office object to so much. They are not more numerous than those contained in our brief, unless you count some of a purely drafting character, because if we have suggested some additional ones, or we have also omitted others for reasons explained in the previous correspondence and repeated below. As to whether the proposals are more substantial than are contemplated: on the positive side, they are directed to remedying what is obviously the principal defect of the present draft – in so far as the subject is to be taken seriously at all – namely that it really only covers Genocide committed by individuals and barely deals with the far more real and important case of Genocide on the part of States or Governments. This was the main point made in some of the Attorney-General’s statements namely that all serious cases of genocide are committed by or with the connivance of States or Governments and that a Convention that does not cover this matter has very little practical reality, as and it was I think recognised in Hutson’s letter to Hildyard of October 29th (UN2966/48/78), that this particular aspect of the matter is more one of concern to the Foreign Office then the Home Office. On the negative side, we have proposed a number of deletions which the Home Office presumably welcome. The complaint seems to be that we have not gone far enough in this respect, and in particular have not proposed the deletion of the passage which states that genocide shall not be regarded for extradiction purposes as a political crime. The matter has been re-discussed in the light of your letter with the Minister of State and the Attorney-General, and our feeling is that the reasons given in Fitzmaurice’s letter to Vincent Evans of October 18th for not proposing any amendment to the clause concerned still hold good. Genocide is essentially and inherently a political crime. Therefore, to delete the passage which says that it shall



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not be so regarded for extradition purposes would have the effect of making genocide permanently and invariably non-extraditable. The Sixth Committee will not, we think, accept this, and we believe we should only incur odium to no purpose if we suggested it. You of course will appreciate that the whole subject of genocide is highly political and emotion rousing, and that the Slav group here are continually on the look out for any pretext to accuse us of secret genocidal tendencies or of not taking the matter seriously. To put forward an amendment which must have the effect of ruling out extradition for genocide in 99% of cases would only give a handle for this, without, we think, doing much good. If the Home Office feel that the inclusion of this passage makes the Convention totally inacceptable to us then we must simply not sign, and we imagine it is very doubtful whether we shall do so anyhow. Of course nothing we are doing here in any way commits us to signature, and the Home Office need have no fear that any forwardness on our part in proposing amendments or in taking part in the discussion will entail any commitment on His Majesty’s Government. Given that the offending passage about extradition is to remain, you will realise of course that the amendment to it which we did suggest is more or less a drafting one and adds nothing of substance to the Article. Very similar considerations apply to our failure to put forward an exception in favour of lawful acts of war. It would only have been misunderstood, and we cannot think there is any reality in the suggestion that States in fact waging war legitimately might be accused of genocide as such or that such accusations could be sustained even if made. Moreover, we still feel that the intent in war is not to destroy any group as such and in toto, or that if it is it ought not to be, and that the Convention is right in principle to prohibit it. We hope that the above will provide you with the necessary material to reply to the Home Office points made in Hutson’s letter to Hildyard of October 29th (UN 2966/48/78), a copy of which was enclosed in the latter’s letter to Roger Allen of the same date; and to allay the Home Office anxieties. The whole subject is utterly unreal and we cannot think it is going to matter very much whether, in the ultimate event, we become parties to this Convention or not. On the other hand, the general attitude we take up here does matter and it is difficult for the United Kingdom Delegate to avoid taking up a fairly definite attitude of some kind. [Signed] A. Cadogan P.S. It so happens that Article IX – the Extradition Article – was taken to-day owing to certain earlier Articles having been deferred and it was adopted by the Committee in the same form as it appeared in the text produced by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide last May except that the words in the first paragraph “and therefore shall be grounds for extradition” were in accordance with the United Kingdom proposal eliminated in favour of the words “for purposes of extradition” which is a great improvement both from the drafting and general point of view. The United Kingdom representative on the Committee took the opportunity to point out that this Article might create serious technical difficulties both for his and for other Governments particularly insofar as it referred not only to genocide proper but also to the other acts (attempt, conspiracy, etc., to commit genocide) enumerated in Article IV; and that the existence of this article in the Convention might well impair or delay the ability

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of Governments to sign it. We think therefore that our position is fully covered. On the other hand, the discussion in the Committee showed quite plainly that it would have been useless to propose any alteration of substance in the article particularly as regards genocide not being a political crime or that our motives in so doing would only have been completely misunderstood or travestied. For instance, despite the fact that two or three delegations requested the elimination of the reference to the other acts enumerated in Article IV, the Committee insisted on voting it in.

No. 93 Ernest Gross Solicits a Legal Opinion of the US Department of Justice regarding a Soviet Amendment to the Draft Genocide Convention, November 8, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/11-848) November 8, 1948 DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL Control 2837 From: Paris To: Secretary of State No: Delga 655, November 8, 8 p.m. US URGENT FOR WHITEMAN FROM GROSS Committee 6 amended Article 6 draft Genocide Convention to include USSR addition of “to provide criminal penalties for authors of such crimes” after words “constitutional procedures”. Urgently consult Department Justice regarding acceptability Soviet addition. If unacceptable should reservation be made? Abbot Rosen, Justice, familiar with ad hoc committee text. MARSHALL

No. 94 The UK Delegation to the United Nations Sees a Slow Progress on the Genocide Convention in the Sixth Committee, November 9, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3054 November 9, 1948



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DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (UKDEL) TO FOREIGN OFFICE No. 352 IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office No. 352 of 9th November, repeated for information Saving to New York. Progress in Sixth Committee: Genocide It has not so far seemed worthwhile reporting in detail on this subject in view of the extremely slow rate of progress and the fact that so much of the discussion has been taken up with points of detail and procedure. A picture of the probable appearance of the convention is however now beginning to emerge and we shall report fully on this in the course of the next few days.

No. 95 Paul Mason of the Foreign Office Alleviates the Home Office’s Concerns about the UK Delegation’s Handling of the Issue of Genocide at Paris, November 22, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3059 November 22, 1948 CONFIDENTIAL My dear Hutson, You will remember asking me to investigate the position with regard to the Genocide Convention, and in particular the questions you raised in your letter to Hildyard 950025/13 of the 29th October. I have accordingly been into the matter in some detail with the Delegation in Paris, in order to make sure that they fully understood your anxieties. Perhaps I may begin by reporting that the Delegation are fully satisfied that nothing which they are doing in any way commits us to sign any convention, and wish you to be entirely reassured that any forwardness on their part in proposing amendments or in taking part in discussion will not (repeat not) entail any commitment on His Majesty’s Government. As regards amendments, I think you will agree that the brief did not exclude the tabling of amendments by the delegation. The procedure followed at the Assembly makes it impossible to suggest improvements in a text except by way of tabling specific amendments which normally have to be circulated in writing twenty-four hours in advance. I understand that Evans explained this to the Working Party held on 6th

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October, and that it was agreed that the delegation could circulate such amendments, but should not table any redraft of a convention. In any event the main purpose of the amendments proposed by the delegation, apart from drafting improvements and other improvements suggested by the brief, was to try to remedy what is obviously the principal defect of the present draft – in so far as the subject is to be taken seriously at all – namely that it really only covers genocide committed by individuals and barely deals with the far more real and important case of genocide on the part of states or governments. As regards extradition the delegation considered very carefully whether they could propose the deletion of the passage which states that genocide shall not be regarded for extradition purposes as a political crime. In view of the fact that genocide is almost always a political crime, they came to the conclusion that any amendment of ours which would have had the effect of ruling out extradition for genocide in 99% of cases, would certainly have been overruled by a large majority, and we should only have incurred a great deal of odium to no purpose. In the event the United Kingdom representative pointed out that the article concerned with extradition might create serious technical difficulties both for his and for other governments particularly in so far as it referred not only to genocide proper but also to the other acts (attempt, conspiracy etc.) enumerated in Article 4; and that the existence of this article in the convention might well impair or delay the ability of governments to sign it. The Committee insisted on voting the article in, but we think that our position as explained above is fully covered. As regards the delegation’s failure to put forward an exception in favour of “lawful acts of war”, very similar considerations applied. It would have been of no avail and would only have been misunderstood. Moreover the delegation felt that the intent in war and even in civil war is not to destroy any group as such and in toto, and that if it is it ought not to be, and therefore the convention is right in principle to prohibit it. The whole subject is of course quite unreal, and I imagine that there is practically no chance of our becoming parties to the convention which is beginning to emerge. The final decision on this point will clearly largely depend on Home Office views. But as long as the delegation are not committing us, (and I hope the foregoing will reassure you that they are not) and they explain the position on important points as they did over extradition, you will no doubt agree that we should leave them as free a hand as possible. Unreal as the whole topic is, it excites powerful political feelings in various quarters in that strange Assembly atmosphere. The Delegation have to take account of all this in deciding their day to day tactics. But I feel sure that we can rest content with the assurance (categorically given to me by the Delegation) which I have embodied in the second paragraph of this letter. Yours very sincerely, (P. Mason)



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No. 96 Vyacheslav Molotov Requests Stalin’s Approval of the Draft Directive for the Soviet Delegation in the UN General Assembly, November 24, 1948 AVP RF, 06/10/16/173 November 24, 1948 SECRET To the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Comrade STALIN No. 393-M Copy to Beria Malenkov Mikoyan Kaganovich Voznesensky Bulganin Kosygin In March 1948, the Economic and Social Council in accordance with the General Assembly’s resolution created an ad hoc committee consisting of representatives of the USSR, Poland, USA, China, France, Lebanon, and Venezuela, entrusted with the preparation of a draft Convention against the crime of genocide. The notion of genocide as delict was introduced in international law in connection with the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that tried major German war criminals standing accused, among other crimes, of premediated and systematic extermination of racial and national groups among the civilian population in the territories occupied by Hitler’s armies. The abovementioned ad hoc committee in May 1948 prepared a draft genocide convention, which included several of our proposals. The Communist Party, in April 1948, preapproved the directive composed by the Foreign Ministry to the Soviet representative on the ad hoc committee.1 As a follow-up to the ad hoc committee’s report, in August 1948, the Economic and Social Council issued a resolution forwarding the draft genocide convention to the General Assembly. In the earlier stages of debate on the draft convention, the Soviet Delegation was guided by the abovementioned directives and instructions concerning specific issues. The General Assembly plenary session will shortly consider the draft genocide convention, following the conclusion of debates on the draft by the appropriate Assembly’s committee. See doc. no. 59.

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With regard to the question concerning our position on the draft convention as such, the Soviet Delegation requires additional instructions. A draft directive to the Soviet Delegation at the General Assembly, prepared by the Foreign Ministry, suggests a number of amendments in the form of articles and addenda to the convention: a. An amendment that points out the link between the crime of genocide and fascism-Nazism. b. An article on the disbandment of organizations that promote acts of genocide. c. An article on national-cultural genocide. d. An article that concerns extending [the purview of] the convention to dependent and non-self-governing territories. We have insisted on these provisions during the debates on the draft in relevant committees as well. Furthermore, taking into account discussions held in the committees, I suggest that the delegation does not oppose the following provisions in the draft that our representatives had previously objected to: a. A provision concerning the accountability of the state for genocidal acts. b. A provision regarding the jurisdiction of the International Court [of Justice] over disputes concerning the interpretation of, application of, and compliance with the convention. The delegation is directed to vote in favor of the draft convention, even if our abovementioned amendments are rejected. Hereby I submit the additional draft directive for the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly session. Requesting your approval V. MOLOTOV

No. 97 The Soviet Foreign Ministry Urges the Soviet Delegation in the UN General Assembly to Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, regardless of the Status of Soviet Amendments, November 24, 1948  AVP RF, 06/10/16/173 [November 24, 1948] DRAFT DIRECTIVE FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ISSUE OF GENOCIDE In light of the discussions concerning the draft genocide convention that took place in the UN committees, you should abide by the following guidelines in the Assembly plenary:



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First Introduce the following amendments to the draft convention: a. The first amendment to the Preamble, which you described in your [communication no.] 1017, on the organic link between genocide [on the one hand] and fascism, racism, etc. [on the other].1 b. Our article on national-cultural genocide. c. Our article concerning the disbandment of organizations aiming to incite racial, ethnic (religious) hatred, and acts of genocide. d. Our article on the extension of the convention to include dependent and nonself-governing territories. When introducing these amendments, you should make a case for the support of the amendments. Second a. File no objection to the fifth provision of Article II, which regards as an act of genocide the “forceful transfer of children” from one human group to another. We, too, are opposed to the forceful transfer of children to other human groups, unless such a transfer has occurred under duress. In case someone tries to justify this article by referring to the evacuation of Greek children to countries of people’s democracy, you should state that this is not a compulsory evacuation but [is rather] a humanitarian measure that aims to save children from death [spasenie detei ot gibeli].2 b. File no objection to the first provision of Article X, which stipulates that the state is responsible for acts of genocide, since the responsibility of the states that carry out genocide is undeniable. With regards to the stipulation within this particular provision that gives parties to the convention the right to submit to the International Court [of Justice] any dispute related to the interpretation of, application of, or compliance with the convention, you should state that the USSR will adhere to its earlier position, according to which the referral of disputes to the International Court [of Justice] in each particular case presupposes a consensus of all sides to the dispute. Such a statement is necessary in case we decide to sign the Genocide Convention. If we sign the convention, we would have to file a relevant reservation, unless we accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court [of Justice] over genocide-related disputes. c. You should not object, on the grounds mentioned in our [communication] no. 357, [that is,] against the inclusion of political groups in Article II, restricting yourself to brief remarks on this issue, related to the main arguments of your statement (reproduced below).3

Document not in the file. See doc. nos. 244, 252, 354. “Countries of people’s democracy” was the euphemism for Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. 3 Document not in the file. 1 2

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Third In the case that our amendments, enumerated here in section one, are rejected, and the draft adapted by the Sixth Committee stays, you must make a well-grounded statement prior to the vote on the draft convention containing the following arguments: 1. The crime of genocide, which calls for the destruction of certain population groups on the basis of their race and ethnicity (religion), is one the most heinous crimes against humanity. Facts show that genocide is organically linked to fascism-Nazism and to racist “theories” that promote racial and ethnic hatred, the supremacy of so-called “higher” races and the extermination of so-called “lower” races. This kind of crime is a disgrace to the countries where such crimes, genocidal propaganda or incitement to commit [genocide], still take place. Such acts grossly violate the principles and objectives of the United Nations. The fight against genocide requires of the United Nations decisive measures whose purpose is the prevention of the said crimes, as well the deterrence against incitement of racial and ethnic (religious) hatred and the severe punishment of the perpetrators who incite such crimes. 2. The Soviet Union bore the brunt of the fight against German Fascism – which made genocide a part of its daily practice – and has the right, more than any other state, to underscore the need to set up effective defenses against various attempts to revive that particular fascist practice. Hence, the Soviet delegation (in both the committee that prepared the initial draft Genocide Convention and in the current session of the General Assembly) is taking great efforts to produce such a convention capable of earnestly countering this heinous crime. Meanwhile, the Soviet delegation warns against any attempt to evade strong and unfailing condemnation of the said cannibalistic theories of fascism and the crimes of fascist authorities. 3. However, the draft Genocide Convention, as it was presented by the Sixth Committee before the General Assembly, has a few significant defects, which could have been avoided had the respective proposals of the Soviet delegation been adopted. The most significant of those defects are the following: a. The draft fails to mention that genocide is organically linked to fascismNazism and to various racist theories. The Soviet delegation proposed to highlight this connection in the convention’s preamble, but, unfortunately, this proposal did not secure a majority vote. As the respective Soviet amendment was rejected, the adopted text of the convention no longer gives a sufficient description of the true perpetrators of bestial crimes such as genocide. b. Guided by the very same concern – that of fashioning the convention into a tool against the perpetrators of genocide – the Soviet delegation proposed an article that requires all parties to the convention to disband, and to never again tolerate, organizations whose goal is to incite racial and ethnic (religious) hatred, and the very crime of genocide. The rejection of that



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Soviet amendment no doubt undermines the effectiveness of the convention as a tool in the fight against genocide. c. The convention is of lesser value also because it does not include a provision on national-cultural genocide, even though – despite the scientific definition of genocide (whose name comes from the word genus, or people, tribe) – it listed among targets of genocide political groups, [a fact] which, obviously, met well-founded objections. Proposed by the Soviet delegation, yet rejected by a majority, the article on national-cultural genocide presupposes the prosecution of such acts as a ban [issued] against the use of native languages, for any reason, in daily life and in schools by any given ethnic or racial (religious) group; a ban on the printing and dissemination of publications in that group’s language; the destruction of museums, schools, historical monuments, sacred buildings, and so on. Those who carry out the criminal act of genocide could exploit the absence of such an article in the convention, disregarding the basic rights of ethnic and racial minorities, and suppressing and discriminating against those minorities and ethnic groups. Meanwhile, even in the venerable countries that pride themselves on their civilization [kichatsia tsivilizatsiei], not to mention their colonies, the oppression and persecution of ethnic minorities and groups is widespread [nosit vopiiushchii kharakter] and a well-established fact. d. It may seem obvious that all of the Genocide Convention’s provisions should extend also to non-self-governing territories, including dependent [territories]. Such a decision is in full compliance with the great principles and objectives of the United Nations, and is stipulated in paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. Yet, as we know, a majority took exception to the pertinent Soviet proposal and adopted [instead] an article submitted by the British delegation that granted colonial powers the right to extend, or not to extend, the convention to non-self-governing territories. The inclusion of this article diminishes the significance of the convention, and reduces its value for millions of people in dependent and colonial countries. The Soviet Union, as a consistent opponent of the colonial system, regards the article (adopted on the suggestion of the British delegation) as a significant shortcoming of the convention, [effectively] untying the hands of colonial powers. 4. The abovementioned major defects surely reduce the effectiveness of the draft convention presented before the General Assembly. However, since the convention condemns genocide and calls upon all states to combat this crime – which had up to this point often gone unpunished – the Soviet delegation will vote in favor of this convention. Yet, the Soviet delegation wants to state that, as stipulated in Article X with regard to the jurisdiction of the International Court [of Justice] over disputes concerning the interpretation of, application of, and compliance with the convention, the Soviet Union maintains the position – as it has done up until this point – that the referral of this or that dispute to the International Court [of Justice] requires in each and every case the consensus of all parties concerned.

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Fourth When voting on the draft convention article by article, you should: a. Abstain from voting on Articles II and X b. Abstain from voting on the article concerning the extension of the convention to non-self-governing territories, as proposed by the English and [eventually] adopted by the committee c. Vote in favor of the remaining articles in the convention d. Vote in favor of the convention as a whole Fifth We agree with you that we should object to and vote against the resolution adopted by the Sixth Committee regarding the matter of creating an International Criminal Tribunal. Explicate our objections to this resolution by [stating] that the creation of such a tribunal would make states less likely to adopt [oslabilo by otvetstvennost gosudarstv za priniatie] timely measures against crimes such as genocide, not to mention that it infringes on state sovereignty.

No. 98 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Comments on the Latest Draft of the Genocide Convention Article by Article, November 26, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3221 November 26, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE IMMEDIATE SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 535 of 25th November, repeated Saving to New York. Genocide My immediately following telegram contains the text of the draft Convention on genocide as it has now emerged from the Drafting Committee. The following is our commentary on the individual provisions: Preamble: No special point but this text is a considerable improvement on the original text proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee.



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Article I: This is put in declaratory rather than in constitutive form so as to contain the implication that genocide is already contrary to International Law. There is also of course implication that the contracting parties will not themselves, as stated of Governments, commit genocide, but this is not clearly expressed and is from our point of view one of the basic defects of the whole draft Convention. Article II: The preamble to this article leaves out the mention of motives which was contained in the text of the Ad Hoc Committee draft. We have already given you our reasons for thinking that this omission is correct. In any case we think that the words “as such” take care of any point that may exist. You will see that the reference to political groups has been retained. There was much opposition to this but it was eventually carried. The reference to the ethnic groups is quite redundant in view of the already existing word “racial”, but seems harmless. As regards the tabulated List of Acts constituting genocide (a), (b) and (c) raise no special point and contain drafting alterations which should be satisfactory from our stand point.1 As regards (d) we have already given you the reason why we did not think it necessary to oppose the inclusion of this head.2 (e) is new and we do not like it but from our point of view it is unlikely to raise any practical problem.3 Article III: The only special point that arises here is on subhead (c). We and the United States made great efforts to get “incitement” struck out as likely lead, to vague and harassing accusations on the part of one state against another (e.g. against the tone of its press). We were unsuccessful, but you will see that [gp.undec.] the reference to incitement remains the wording of it has been greatly improved. Article IV: Although the drafting of this article is far from satisfactory the phrase “constitutionally responsible rulers” is intended and is thoroughly understood by the whole Committee to be intended to exclude from the scope of this Article constitutional monarchs who have no personal responsibility for the acts or policies followed by their Governments. All the countries having constitutional monarchs took this point and it was very sympathetically received even by the Soviet representative. Article V: This is a thoroughly unnecessary article in view for instance of Articles I, III and IV but we were unable to get it deleted. On the other hand we were able to secure the “phrase “in accordance with their respective constitutions”. This is a great improvement on the original reference to constitutional procedures and it is again of assistance in taking care of the position of the King. Article VI: This is again an unnecessary article and in our view ambiguous as it does not make it clear whether the jurisdiction of the state in whose territory the act was committed Killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. 2 Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. 3 Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 1

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is intended to be exclusive or not. We took this point but were unable to obtain the excision of the article. It was however made clear in the course of the discussions that the article was only intended to secure that there should at least be a trial in the state having territorial jurisdiction if that state was able to bring the accused to trial and that it was not necessarily intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the country of the accused’s nationality. You will see that the reference to an International Criminal Court has been eliminated. There was a great battle over this because in the eyes of many delegations one of the main objectives of the Convention was to pave the way for the setting up of an International Court. In the end it was decided on the proposal of the Netherlands to relegate this matter to a separate resolution which you will find at the end of my immediately following telegram.1 We believe however that there will be an attempt when the text comes back to Committee VI to re-insert in this article some very anodyne reference to a possible future International Criminal Court. If so and if that reference is entirely non-committal we think it should be unnecessary for us to oppose it. Article VII: We have already commented fully on this provision by correspondence and given you our reasons why we did not feel it possible to secure any radical alteration. Our position on this provision has however been fully reserved. Article VIII: This is unnecessary but it at least represents an improvement on the original draft and as it seemed quite harmless we eventually agreed to it in return for support on certain of our own proposals. Article IX: The essential phrase here from our point of view is that which reads “including those relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III”. This represents the sole remnant of our various attempts to secure in the Convention some direct reference to the responsibility of states themselves for acts of genocide and to their obligation not to commit it. We consistently maintained that this was really the only thing that mattered and that all the elaborate provisions for the punishment of individuals etc., while they no doubt had their utility, did not touch the fringe of the problem. There was however a curiously widespread resistance to this point of view which was by no means confined to the Soviet bloc. For instance it even included the United States who are clearly afraid of accusations which may be made against them as a government in respect of the treatment of the negro and Red Indian populations of the United States. We think that there will be a move to whittle down this phrase even further when the text goes back to Committee VI. Provided that any new phraseology proposed does not completely give away the point and that it is also such as the United States feel they can accept, we should for these reasons propose not to object to it. Articles X and XI and XIV to XIX These are formal articles which raise no special issue. It was represented that it was unnecessary and inappropriate to have any time limit on the Convention (see Article XIV) because of its peculiar nature. However a number of delegations felt that the Convention broke new ground and it would be better to have a sort of trial period. Document not in the file.

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Article XIII: This was the Colonial Article, the insertion of which we were able to secure despite Soviet and other opposition. We have reported on this matter fully separately. As we stated however we were only able to obtain the inclusion of this Article (which was politically very difficult given that the subject matter of the Convention was genocide) by accepting the resolution which figures at the very end of my immediately following telegram but we consider that the terms of this resolution are quite harmless. The following are the only remaining points of interest: 1.  You will see that the original clause on cultural genocide (Article III of the Ad Hoc Committee’s draft) has been completely eliminated. This infuriated the delegation of Pakistan who have consistently voted against us on almost every point that has arisen subsequently. 2.  The main defect of the Convention as already stated is its failure to deal in any specific of satisfactory terms with the main cases of genocide which occur on any serious scale, namely these where the direct action or complicity of state and governments themselves is involved. We here therefore regard the convention in its present form as virtually powerless to prevent or to punish genocide. This would be a perfectly good reason, in view of the attitude we have taken up throughout on this point, for which we could if necessary fail to sign the Convention, on the ground that it would only entail a number of vexatious and difficult alterations in our domestic law, without serving any really useful purpose or doing anything effective to prevent genocide. We understand that the Drafting Committee’s text is likely to come before the main committee at the beginning of next week in case you wish us to try to move any specific amendments, but it will probably be difficult to secure these except on purely drafting points. If we are to move any amendments of substance it will have to be in the plenary where it is quite possible that in any case certain of the clauses and phrases of the present draft may not secure the necessary two-third majority.

No. 99 The British Home Office Satisfied with the Foreign Office’s Assurance That the UK Delegation Did Not Commit to Signing the Genocide Convention, November 27, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3245 November 27, 1948 This should be copied to the Delegation with my comments as soon as possible – with copy of my letter to Mr. Hutson received 29.11 Dear Mason, In Hutson’s absence on sick leave, I am replying to your letter of 22nd November (UN 3059/48/78) about the draft convention on Genocide.1 See doc. no. 95.

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We are relieved by your assurance that the action taken by the Delegation in Paris has not entailed, and will not in any way entail, any commitment of His Majesty’s Government to sign any such convention. We are inclined to share your view that there is practically no chance of our becoming a party to the convention which is beginning to emerge. It seems to us doubtful, or more than doubtful, whether Parliament would be willing – or, indeed, able – to enact legislation to allow the ratification of the convention, and this should be the guiding line for the delegation. We are not unmindful of the considerations advanced in the latter part of your letter, and we appreciate that the actual steps which His Majesty’s Representative takes in Plenary may be influenced by tactical considerations. Nevertheless, we do not think that he should vote in favour of the Convention; whether he votes against, or merely abstains, might be left to him, although our inclination is towards abstention. [Signed] W. Conway Roberts

No. 100 The British Colonial Office Wants the UK Delegation at Paris to Make Sure the Genocide Convention Does Not Automatically Apply to Colonies, November 30, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3265 November 30, 1948 Dear D. Hildyard

Draft Convention on Genocide

You promised Mr. Moreton on the telephone yesterday that you would pass on to the United Kingdom delegation in Paris our comments on the report of the drafting committee to the 6th Committee, I should accordingly be glad if you would bring the following points to their notice. There has always been a considerable body of opinion in the United Nations which holds the view that the United Nations Organization should exercise some sort of supervisory control over the administration of all “non-self-governing territories”. It has always been the accepted policy of His Majesty’s Government to refute these suggestions and to insist that Colonies should not be singled out for discriminatory treatment in international conventions. It seems to us that such discrimination is implicit in the drafting committee’s report in two places. (i)  The third resolution exhorts administering powers which are parties to the convention to take the necessary steps to extend the convention to their dependent territories as soon as possible. We would prefer an additional paragraph to this resolution in similar terms exhorting all sovereign states to adhere to the convention. Sovereign states and colonies would then be treated exactly alike. The covering resolution to the Protocol to bring under control drugs outside the scope of the 1931



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Convention provides a suitable precedent.1 If, however, in the view of the delegation to re-open this issue would seriously prejudice our chances of having article XII accepted in plenary, then since the terms of the offending resolution are vague we would be content to leave the raising of this matter to the delegation’s discretion. (ii)  While Article XII is in a very satisfactory form, there does not seem to be any provision for subsequent denunciation by colonies, although denunciation by sovereign states is implied in Article XIV. We understand our delegation may press for the removal of all reference to denunciation. This would of course be satisfactory from our point of view. But if they are unsuccessful in this attempt, then we would like provision for separate denunciation included in Article XII. Alternatively, if this would prejudice the chances of Article XII’s survival, we suggest our delegation might make a declaration to the effect that they interpreted Article XIV to include denunciation on behalf of a dependent territory. (Miss J. Burnham)

No. 101 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Suggests to the Foreign Office It Should Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, December 1, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3267 December 1, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (U. K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE IMMEDIATE SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 628 of 1st December, repeated Saving to U.K. Del New York. Genocide The Sixth Committee today adopted the Genocide Convention as approved by the Drafting Committee (text already telegraphed), the only alteration of substance being a harmless addition to Article IV about an International Criminal Court on which subject we are telegraphing separately. The Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs was promulgated in Geneva on July 13, 1931. 

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2. In accordance with instructions, the United Kingdom Representative abstained, and subsequently explained his abstention as being intended to reserve the position of his Government in view of the legislative difficulties we anticipated, and the fact that the Convention is its present form was not really likely to be effective for the purpose for which it was intended. 3. We must tell you, however, that the Convention was adopted in the Committee by an overwhelming majority. There were no voices against, and the only abstentions, apart from that of the United Kingdom, consisted of the Soviet bloc. This went very much against the grain, and enquiries have elicited that our attitude is likely to be misinterpreted in the sense that our legislative difficulties will be taken to be a mere excuse masking opposition to the principle of the Convention itself. We are by no means the only country which has stated that it anticipates legislative difficulties. We feel therefore that we should give serious consideration to the possibility of voting in favour of the Convention when it comes up in the Plenary Meeting of the Assembly. We understand that the Convention is likely to be publicized as one of the major achievements of the present Assembly. The attitude of the United Kingdom will therefore certainly be noted, and if abstain it will be quite impossible to do so unobtrusively, because, as today’s vote shows, the company in which we shall do so and our opposition to the whole of the remainder of the members of the United Nations will alone be sufficient to attract attention. 4. We realise that it is our practice to adopt a very scrupulous attitude in these matters, and not to vote in favour of Conventions to which we do not see our way fairly clearly to becoming parties. We have little doubt, however, that a number of other countries which will vote in favour of the Convention will either not sign and ratify it, or will delay doing so for a long time. In view of the atmosphere here, therefore, and of the virtual certainty that our attitude will be misinterpreted and also of the highly emotion-raising nature of the subject, we should like authority to vote in favour of the Convention in the Plenary, accompanying this by a statement which will make it clear that the vote is given on behalf of the Delegation and that the position of His Majesty’s Government must be regarded as fully reserved. 5. There is a move to throw the Convention open for signature at the earliest possible date and it is likely that the matter will be taken in a Plenary Meeting of the Assembly next Monday morning. Please therefore let us have your urgent instructions. If there are points of doubt perhaps you could clear these with us by telephone.

No. 102 The US Delegation at Paris Urges the US State Department Seek UN Member States’ Support for the Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, December 2, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/12-248) December 2, 1948



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL Control 705 From: Paris To: Secretary of State No: DELGA 1030, December 2, noon URGENT TATE FROM GROSS Genocide Convention will probably be signed early next week. In view importance convention, it is felt desirable Department circularize Missions capitals UN members except Soviet bloc and Union South Africa urging signature convention here and, if necessary, transmission full powers here by telegram to UN SYG. Final document containing text Convention will be cabled as soon as available. Doc. A/C.6/289 contains final text except as follows: In Article Two “political” is omitted and “or” is added before “religious”. 2(e) now reads: “Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” At end of six add “or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those contracting parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” Drafting changes in Article 17 which now reads “The SYG of the UN shall notify all members of the UN and the non-member states contemplated in Article XI of the following: (A) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article XI; (B) Notifications received in accordance with Article XII; (C) The date upon which the present convention comes into force in accordance with Article XIII; (D) Denunciations received in accordance with Article XIV; (E) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article XV; (F) Notifications received in accordance with Article XV.” DULLES

No. 103 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Further Explains to the Foreign Office Why It Should Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, December 2, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3273 December 2, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

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DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (U. K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 647 of 2nd December, Repeated saving to United Kingdom Delegation New York. My telegram No. 628: Genocide A number of delegations including the United States, Belgium and China in explanations of their votes made it clear that although they had voted in favour of the Convention they would be unable to implement it (extradition was specially mentioned) unless and until their legislatures had taken the necessary action. It is clear therefore that a number of delegations will support the Convention in the Assembly who may never become parties to it and we do not consider our action in doing the same thing (as we hope you will authorise us to do) could possibly be misinterpreted if we accompany it by a statement on similar lines. 2. In my telegram under reference we omitted to mention that there was one further abstention on the adoption of the Genocide Convention, namely that of South Africa. You will realise that South Africa has made herself almost more unpopular at this Assembly than the Slavs. 3. One further point is that we are under strong pressure from the United States Delegation to support the Convention even if we have to make reservations in doing so.

No. 104 The Foreign Office Insists, Due to the Objections of the Home Office, That UK Delegation at Paris Should Abstain From Voting on the Genocide Convention, December 3, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3273 December 3, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) IMMEDIATE SECRET Addressed to United Nations General Assembly Paris (U.K. Delegation) telegram No. 751 of 3rd December, repeated for information Saving to U.K. Delegation New York.



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Your telegram Nos. 628 and 647 [of 1st and 2nd December] Genocide Following for Minister of State from Parliamentary Under Secretary I am sorry that our abstentions in Sixth Committee has left us alone in such undesirable company. I have carefully explored with Kenneth Younger possibility of authorising you to vote for draft in Plenary while at the same time fully reserving position of His Majesty’s Government as to eventual signature. 2. I am not sure, however, whether you are fully aware of strength of Home Office objections. In their view, to accede to the convention would involve the creation in our criminal law of an offence of “Genocide” as well as a far reaching alteration of our extradition law. Younger assures me that the Home Office would regard it as virtually impossible, even if it were desirable, to put the necessary legislation through Parliament. Taking this view, it is not surprising that they are totally opposed to our doing anything which might even seem to imply that our existing attitude of distaste for the draft convention had been modified. 3. As to our position at the Assembly I have personal recollections of being constantly in a minority on the question of how to deal with Genocide. Our distaste for the draft convention is surely well known; it has always been made clear, and has I think been fully understood, that we detested the crime itself as much as anyone. It should be surprised if after all this time our attitude should now be seriously misunderstood at the Assembly, though we must expect a certain amount of criticism from United Nations enthusiasts over here. Even if we voted for the draft convention with a strong hint that we should never sign, this might cause misunderstanding and leave us open to still greater pressure to sign subsequently. Though there may of course be two views about this argument, I cannot help feeling that it is at least as strong as the contention that you could in the circumstances assert successfully that your vote purely as a delegation in no way prejudged the position of His Majesty’s Government. 4. We are all sorry that you should feel embarrassed, but I feel sure you will be able to make it plain that our attitude, including of course our detestation of Genocide, has remained consistent throughout. It is difficult to believe in view of our record that a serious impression could be allowed to prevail that our abstention is due to the same motives as that of the Slav group.

No. 105 Robert Lovett of the US State Department Discourages the US Delegation at Paris from Seeking UN Member States’ Support for the Genocide Convention in the UN General Assembly, December 3, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/12-248) December 3, 1948

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CONFIDENTIAL Control 849 US URGENT AMEMBASSY PARIS GADEL 666 GROSS FROM TATE REURTEL DELGA 1030, Dec 2. UNA and L do not repeat not believe it wise to circulate missions re genocide as all are familiar with problem and many might resent US pressure. If you disagree call tomorrow 10:30 EST. LOVETT (Acting)

No. 106 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Rejects the Suggestion That It Should Abstain in the Final Vote on the Genocide Convention, December 4, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3305 December 4, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 675 of 4th December, repeated Saving to New York. Following for Foreign Secretary from Attorney General I must say in the most emphatic terms that I am shocked to find that it is proposed that the United Kingdom should abstain from supporting the draft Convention on genocide which will be voted upon in the Assembly on Monday.1 In adopting this Monday, December 6, 1948.

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course we shall find ourselves in a minority consisting of the Slav States and South Africa and we shall lay ourselves open to severe and, I think myself, justified criticism both in the Assembly and at home. 2. Although the proposed Convention on genocide has aroused remarkable emotional enthusiasm both in the Assembly and in Member States, and has been strongly supported by various influential organisations in our own country, I have always thought that its practical results so far as our own law is concerned are insignificant. All of the acts now proposed to be condemned as genocide are, by different names, already criminal under our existing law. To murder, to cause serious bodily harm, such for instance as compulsory abortion or sterilisation, to abduct children or to impose physical conditions calculated to cause death are, I had always thought, grave criminal offences, and we cannot possibly take up at the Assembly the position that any such odious crimes should be excluded from existing extradition arrangements on the ground that they were committed for political motives. Unless, however, we are going to say that these matters are not already criminal and that we are not willing to make them criminal, which would be factually incorrect, or that we consider them entitled to protection on political grounds, which would be politically unwise, I can see no ground on which we can justify abstention. All through the discussions of this matter the last three years, I have emphasised in the debates here that the matters it is proposed to forbid as genocide have long been forbidden by our own law, as they ought to be forbidden by all civilised systems of law. The fact that the Slav States will not commit themselves to forbidding them should provide an excellent argument in support of our own thesis that the Slav system is a backward one, rather than providing an occasion for us to line up with the Slav States against every progressive and right-thinking country in the world. I urgently suggest that our position should be reconsidered and that we should be authorised to support the Convention, stating that in our understanding it involves no alteration in our existing law and practice. 3. The Minister of State agrees.

No. 107 Kenneth Younger Communicates the Home Secretary’s Consent that the UK Delegation May Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, Conditional upon a Reservation Concerning the Right of Asylum, December 7, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3305 December 7, 1948 Attorney-General’s suggestion that the U.K. Delegation should support the Convention on Genocide

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Major Younger telephoned. 1.  He said that the Home Secretary has now agreed that the Delegation may vote in favour of the draft convention when it is voted on in the plenary session of the Assembly. 2.  There is one important reservation which the Home Secretary wants made. (The question of tactics, i.e., how this reservation should be made, is left to the Delegation.) 3.  The reservation which the Home Secretary wants made is as follows: “The vote in favour of the draft convention is not to be considered to be in any way prejudicial to the established traditional and inalienable right of granting the right of asylum.” 4.  Major Younger thought that reference to the right of asylum, as laid down in the Declaration of Human Rights, might be appropriate in this direction connection. 5.  Major Younger added that he thought the reservation described above should might be filled fitted in to a general formula which the Attorney General had proposed roughly on the following lines: “The present impression of H.M.G. is that the existing criminal law entirely covers all the types of offenses envisaged in the draft convention on genocide. A further detailed examination of the draft, however, by legal experts will be necessary before this impression could can be confirmed. Meanwhile, the agreement of H.M.G. to vote in favour of the draft is not to be taken to imply that H.M.G. are in any way committed to any detailed amendment of their law. [signature illegible] * * * No date Mr. Mayhew has no comments. I have therefore telephoned the message to Paris.

No. 108 The Home Secretary Gives a Go Ahead to the UK Delegation to Vote in Favor of the Genocide Convention, Subject to a Reservation Ascertaining the Right of Granting Asylum, December 8, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3305 December 8, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]



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DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) IMPORTANT SECRET Addressed to United Nations General Assembly Paris (United Kingdom Delegation) telegram No. 815 of 7th December. Repeated Saving to United Kingdom Delegation New York. Your telegram 675 [of 4th December] GENOCIDE Following for Minister of State from Parliamentary Under Secretary The Home Secretary has now agreed that the United Kingdom may vote in favour of the draft Convention in Plenary subject to one important reservation being made. We leave to you the tactical question as to how the reservation should be made. 2.  Reservation is as follows: “The vote in favour of the draft Convention is not to be considered to be in any way prejudicial to the established traditional and inalienable right of granting the right of asylum”. We suggest that reference to the right of asylum, as laid down in the Declaration of Human Rights, may be appropriate in this connexion. Reservation might be fitted into a general formula such as the following: “The present impression of His Majesty’s Government is that the existing criminal law entirely covers all the types of offences envisaged in the draft Convention. A further detailed examination of the draft, however, by legal experts, will be necessary before this impression can be confirmed. Meanwhile, the agreement of His Majesty’s Government to vote in favour of the draft is not to be taken to imply that His Majesty’s Government are in any way committed to any detailed amendment of their law”.

No. 109 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Summarizes the Final Vote on the Genocide Convention, December 9, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3377 December 9, 1948 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

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DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (U.K. DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 749 of 9th December, repeated New York Saving. Genocide The Assembly today adopted the report of the Sixth Committee on genocide covering the draft convention on genocide and two resolutions, one for referring the question of an international criminal court to the International Law Commission, and the other recommending parties to the convention of administering dependent territories to take such measures as are necessary and feasible to extend the convention to those territories as soon as possible (for texts see document A/760).1 2. The convention itself was adopted by a unanimous vote of 55 in favour, none against, no abstentions and three absentees. You will thus see that we had a lucky escape, since had we been obliged to continue abstaining we should have been the only delegation to do so. The Slav group, who abstained in the committee, announced after a good deal of grumbling and a protest against the colonial clause that they would vote in favour. South Africa was absent when the vote was taken. In the light of this development I should like on behalf of the delegation to express our gratitude to the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and all others concerned for the understanding shown of our position here. It is undoubtedly the case that the subject of genocide about which most countries at first felt skepticism has in the course of this Assembly come to assume considerable political importance. The first of the two resolutions was adopted by 43-6-3 and the second by 50-0-1. 3. In announcing the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the convention the United Kingdom representative made a statement on the lines of your telegram No. 675. The gist of the statement is contained in my immediately following telegram.2 4. The Soviet Delegation put forward a number of amendments to the convention in the Assembly, the text of which is contained in document A/766.3 Numbers 1 to 4 were rejected by a heavy majority. As regards No. 5 (the Colonial clause), the Soviet representative made a speech on the usual lines on which he singled out the United Kingdom for mention and seemed to accuse [? grp. omtd.] of a desire to reserve the right to commit genocide in colonial territories. The United Kingdom representative replied on the usual lines, and on the vote the Soviet proposal was rejected, though only by a small majority, namely 19 in favour, 25 against and 14 abstentions. The existing colonial clause in the convention therefore stands, and in all the circumstances, and given the nature of the subject, I think we can congratulate ourselves on this result. See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 2, 2022–38. 2 See doc. no. 106. 3 See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 2, 2039–41. 1



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5. The only other point of interest is that the Soviet delegation, in accepting the convention, stated that they would read Article 12 (jurisdiction of the International Court) as only applying to cases where both the parties to the dispute consented to the matter being referred to the Court. This of course is not in accordance with the terms of the Article, but it did not seem worthwhile in the circumstances challenging the Soviet reservation on this point, particularly as we happen to know that certain other delegations, for instance the United States, have only been able to accept this article with great difficulty. It is however interesting as marking the complete opposition of the Soviet Government to anything in the nature of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

No. 110 The British Foreign Office Summarizes the Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention in the UN Sixth Committee (Legal) with Particular Reference to the Colonial Clause, TPQ December 9, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308 December 1948 Foreign Office COMMITTEE 6 (Legal Questions) 1. Genocide The Sixth (Legal Committee) devoted the great majority of its time to the Draft Convention on Genocide which had been drawn up by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council. The draft Convention was considered in great detail and a new text was hammered out which, though it left much to be desired, was certainly [a great] an improvement and was eventually adopted unanimously by the Assembly. The Convention defines genocide as various acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such, and reaffirms that it is a crime under international law. Under the Convention genocide and acts such as conspiracy, incitement, complicity and attempt to commit genocide and made punishable whether they are committed by rulers, public officials or private individuals. Persons charged with any of these acts are to be brought to trial before the competent courts of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or before an international criminal court if and when one is set up and provided its jurisdiction has been accepted by the country concerned. In a separate resolution the Assembly request the International Law Commission to consider the possibility of establishing such a court or a criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice. Although the Convention was approved unanimously there were wide differences of opinion in the Sixth Committee on various issues. It was at first decided to include

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political groups in the definition of genocide but this decision was reversed at the last moment. Several members were in favour of including “cultural genocide” i.e., destruction of the culture of a group as opposed to the individuals in it. The majority, however, voted against it on the grounds that it was out of place in a document dealing with mass murder, and that it was more appropriately dealt with in connection with human rights. Certain countries, in particular the Soviet Union and other Slav States, wished to relate the Convention specifically to “Nazism, Fascism, and other race theories” and to ban, if possible, all propaganda of a “Herrenvolk” [master race] kind. However, the great majority of the Assembly took the view that Genocide was not specifically bound up with Fascism as such. [Although the Convention as adopted is an improvement on the draft submitted to the Assembly by the Economic and Social Council, it is far from satisfactory. As the U.K. representative pointed out, it deals almost entirely with genocide committed by individuals and hardly at all with the real issue, namely the responsibility of States and Governments for acts of genocide committed or tolerated by them.] Some of these provisions, furthermore, might involve the U.K., in particular in the considerable amount of new legislation which might not be considered justified in the circumstances. Consequently, though in voting in favour of the Convention in the Assembly, the U.K. Representative stated that our vote must not be taken as committing H.M.G. to any detailed amendment of their law. Furthermore, in view of the Provision in the Convention that genocide was not to be regarded as a political crime for purposes of extradition, the U.K. Representative stated that our vote in favour of the Convention must would not be regarded by us as prejudicing in any way the established traditional and inalienable right of granting the right of asylum. NB The Convention will not of course come into force for any country until it is actually signed and ratified by that country. 2. Other Questions The Sixth Committee spent a considerable part of its time discussing reparation for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations. Opinion was divided as to whether the United Nations could make a claim against a State under International law as opposed to action in municipal courts. Eventually it was decided to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, and a resolution to that effect, based largely on a combined Anglo-Belgian text, was approved unanimously. Other resolutions which were adopted were in respect of a Bolivian proposal for placing on a more definite footing the permanent delegations to the United Nations, an Egyptian resolution which noted with satisfaction the entry into force of the Headquarters Agreement and called on members who had not acceded to the General Convention on privileges and immunities to do so, and a U.S. resolution requesting members to fulfill the obligations with regard to the registration of treaties. The Assembly also adopted at the instance of the French Government a protocol which transferred to the United Nations certain administrative functions hitherto exercised by the French Government under the 1904 Agreement and the 1910 Convention, on the traffic of women, and the 1910 Agreement on obscene publications, and similarly the a resolution was adopted transferring to the United Nations the functions of the former League of Nations under the Economic Statistics Convention of 1928.



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In connection with both these last items and also in connection with the Genocide Convention, attempts were made to procure the elimination of the traditional colonial article (according to which conventions only become applicable to colonial territories and other territories in a similar position as and a notice to that effect is given by the State internationally responsible for those territories) and to substitute for this article provisions the effect of which would have been to render the conventions concerned automatically applicable to all such territories upon the acceptance of the Convention by the administering country. These proposals were however consecutively rejected after it had been explained by the representatives of countries administering dependent territories that they were inadmissible on constitutional grounds since many of the territories concerned had reached a stage of self-government when they could not be committed in advance and without previous consultation to participating in given international conventions; nor could their legislatures be committed to passing the legislation which might be necessary to implement these conventions locally. It is the view of the U.K. Government that, under modern conditions, no international agreement, whether or not it contains the usual colonial clause, can be regarded as granting [?] any automatic application to colonial territories unless it is stated in terms in the agreement or is clearly to be inferred [?] from its tenour. There were two further items at the Assembly of legal interest. The first was the election by the Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently, of judges to replace those retiring from the International Court of Justice. This resulted in the re-election of all the five retiring judges, the outcome which the U.K. Government welcome as being right in principle, since these retirements at the end of a period of three years instead of the normal period of nine were due to the necessity of setting in motion the rotation of judges [?] by which one third of the Court retires every three years, although [?] (when this rotation is fully established) all those retiring will have served nine years. The second item was the election by the Assembly of members of the International [Law] Commission. Fifteen members were elected for the period of three years, including the British candidate, Professor J. L. Brierly.

No. 111 The UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly Reports on the Final Deliberations of the Sixth Committee regarding Political Groups and International Penal Tribunal, December 11, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3393 December 11, 1948 DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION FROM UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARIS (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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CONFIDENTIAL Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 180 Saving of 9th December repeated Saving to New York. Sixth Committee: Genocide I much regret that by an oversight we failed to let you know that Sixth Committee in adopting draft Genocide Convention, eliminated reference to political groups in Article II. This was proposed and supported by several delegations who had originally voted for inclusion of political groups. Motive was to make Convention more generally acceptable. Committee also made following addition to Article VI “or before such international penal tribunal which should be competent with respect to those contracting parties that have recognised its jurisdiction.” As this does not commit anyone to recognise the jurisdiction of any such Court proposal seems relatively harmless though we do not like it.

No. 112 The British Home Office Believes That a Poor Flow of Information Constrained the UK Delegation during the Debates on the Draft Genocide Convention, December 17, 1948 NA, H.O. 45/25308/950025/15 December 17, 1948 Crime of Genocide Correspondence and memoranda ordaining [?] to consideration by G. A. III Minutes The hectic controversy which took place at the last minute about the vote to be cast by the British Delegation in Paris at U. N. Secretariat Assembly suggests that our machinery for consultation in such cases is very defective. I know that Mr. Hutson has been worried about this for some time and he called my attention several weeks ago to the poor cooperation between ourselves and the Foreign Office lawyers. At that time I think he felt that general agreement had, on the whole, been reached about genocide and that no urgent action was necessary but events proved that this was not the case. Without going through all the old files in detail, I will not express an opinion on the question whether the Delegation in Paris improperly departed from the brief which had been worked out for them by the I.O.C. Whatever the truth of that may be, there have been certain obvious defects in the handling of the issue, and the faults may not all be at the Foreign Office end. Firstly on the legal question, it is really absurd that, after fully two years of public discussion, there should still be an unresolved dispute between the Foreign Office, the Attorney General and the Home Office on



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the question whether the proposed convention will or will not call for amendments in the English criminal law. Our last minute objection to proposed vote in the Assembly was based on the assumption that substantial changes in the extradition law would be required and that these would be unacceptable to Parliament. When I put this to the Attorney General he said he did not think this was the case, that in his view no amendment of English law would be required, and that in any event it was an outrage that the Home Office should take its stand on a legal point of such importance without having so much as consulted the D. of P. P. or the Law Officers. I am bound to say I think there is something in this. Moreover, when I had my last minute consultation with Mr. Hutson and Mr. Brass it was certainly my impression that Mr. Brass was considering the problem for the first time and that he had not previously had an opportunity to give a considered opinion upon it. In view of the importance of the issue in U. N., I find it rather hard to justify our failure to get a really authoritative legal opinion in advance. Another ludicrous aspect of the same legal dispute is that right up to the very last moment we were still basing our opinion upon the draft which is flagged and marked X in 950025/19. The amendments in red ink were presumed to be up to date but, in fact, I learnt, in the course of my final telephone call to the Foreign Office, that the crucial phrase in Article 2 (“or political groups”) had been eliminated. Since most of our argument depended upon the effect which this phrase would have in a situation following a civil war in some foreign country, it was quite absurd that we should not have been instantly informed of this late amendment. There may be some excuse for delay in communications when the Assembly is held in New York, but the bag service between London and Paris is so good that there is no reason why there should be any delay in passing information to interested Departments, even without the use of telegrams. The view has been expressed to me that the Home Office should be regularly represented on British Delegations to U. N. which go abroad. There is something to be said for this and, of course, the Home Office are represented on delegations to special bodies such as the Social Commission. As regards the General Assembly, however, I hesitate to suggest that whole-time Home Office representative should accompany the Delegation. At the recent Assembly, despite our interest in genocide and human rights, I do not think that a high grade Home Office official would have found himself fully occupied. When differences began to arise between ourselves [?] and the Foreign Office it might have been a good thing for Hutson, or one of his assistants, to fly out for personal consultations and clear up all misunderstandings on these matters. I think there would, however, have been be a legitimate objection to a further inflation of our already large delegations at conferences which last for such very long periods. The real remedy is to have much better co-ordination at this end. This appears to be particularly necessary on the legal side. I should like to hear suggestions as to how this could be achieved. KGY [Kenneth Gilmour Younger]

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No. 113 The British Colonial Office Drafts a Circular Dispatch Soliciting Opinions of the Colonies on the Genocide Convention, December 20, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72693/UN3459 December 20, 1948 25102/26/48 Colonial Office Dear Hildyard, I enclose a copy of a dispatch in draft, which we propose sending to Colonial Governors on the subject of Genocide. I should be grateful to know whether you agree to the draft. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to Hutson at the Home Office, and would also welcome his comments. Yours sincerely, J. O. Moreton * * * RESTRICTED To All Colonies, etc. (including Malta) C.G.S.E.A. E.A. High Commissioner C.A.C. W.A.C. C.D.W.W.I DRAFT CIRCULAR DISPATCH FOR F.O. CONCURRENCE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE1 Sir, I have etc. to inform you that the problem of genocide was introduced to the United Nations during the General Assembly’s First Session (Second Part) in October– December, 1946. On 11th December, 1946, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (text at Annex I) by which genocide was declared to be a crime under International Law, whose punishment was a matter of international concern. The Economic and Marginal comments are from January 6, 1949. The final document was circulated on February 7, 1949  in the name of the Secretary of State for Colonies (Arthur Creech Jones). A copy of the document is also available in NA, C.O. 936/19/4.

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Social Council was requested to undertake the necessary studies with a view to drawing up a draft convention for submission to the Second Regular Session of the Assembly. The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution. 2.  The attitude of the United Kingdom was subsequently largely influenced by the tone of the first draft Convention which, on the instructions of the Economic and Social Council, was drawn up by the U.N. Secretariat. This turned out to be a highly political and controversial document which could never have been generally accepted, and was discarded when very few governments even commented on it. When, therefore, the subject was considered again by the Assembly at its Second Session in the autumn of 1947 the United Kingdom representative opposed the idea of a Convention, mainly on the grounds that it would be unrealistic and would not achieve its object of deterring governments from committing genocide: moreover, genocide had been declared crime in the Nuremberg judgment by an Assembly resolution. and A separate convention dealing with genocide stricto sensu which, in any case, was a subject for the International Law Commission, might prejudice this judgment, and would mark no progress in International Law, and if not generally accepted might cast doubt on an already established principle. Furthermore, the idea of “cultural” genocide (namely the destroying of a group’s language, religion, or culture) which had been included in the draft Convention, raised the whole question of the treatment of minorities and belonged more properly to the sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission which was dealing with non-discrimination and the protection of minorities. The best procedure, therefore, would be to refer genocide stricto sensu to the International Law Commission, and cultural genocide to the Human Rights Commission. 3.  The General Assembly nevertheless passed a Resolution on 21st November, 1947, which, as well as re-affirming that Genocide was a crime, called upon the Economic and Social Council to draw up another convention. An ad hoc committee of the Council, of which the U.K. refused to be a member, accordingly met in April and May of this year, and presented a new draft Convention to the General Assembly at its Third Regular Session which opened in Paris on 15th September, 1948. 4.  In the meantime a large body of public opinion in many countries had shown itself in favour of a Convention of some kind. Consequently His Majesty’s Government felt it necessary to revise their position remained of the opinion that such a Convention could do no good, but felt that it would be difficult to stand aside on these grounds alone. On the other hand the revised text of the Convention still contained serious defects, and even if suitably amended seemed likely to necessitate a number of changes in domestic legislation before the United Kingdom could accede to it. The United Kingdom delegation to the General Assembly were accordingly instructed that if there appeared to be a majority in favour of a Convention, they were to take part in discussions with a view to producing an improved draft Convention, provided they made it clear that His Majesty’s Government were not committed at that stage to ratifying any Convention that might eventually be adopted. If, on the other hand, it appeared that there was no basis for agreement on points of principle, the delegation were to take any opportunity which arose on convincing the Assembly that the Convention would serve no useful purpose. 5. In the event, it was evident that there was a considerable majority in favour of a Convention. The Sixth Committee of the Assembly debated the text of the draft

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Convention for 5 weeks during October and November. The majority was in favour of removing all reference to “cultural genocide”, and a Colonial Application Article was introduced. The final text of the Convention was an improvement on that drawn up by the ad hoc Committee but was far from satisfactory. It deals almost entirely with genocide committed by individuals, and hardly at all with the real issue, namely, the responsibility of States for acts of genocide committed or tolerated by them. Some of its provisions furthermore might involve the United Kingdom in particular in a considerable amount of new legislation which might not be considered justified in the circumstances. In the voting in the Sixth Committee the United Kingdom therefore abstained in company with, although for different reasons, South Africa and the Slav bloc. 6.  By the time, however, that the draft Convention came before the Plenary session of the Assembly on 9th December it had become apparent that the subject of genocide about which most countries had at first shown more skepticism, had in the course of the session become one of considerable political importance. Accordingly, although still of the opinion that genocide was essentially a crime committed by Governments which the Convention did nothing to remedy, the United Kingdom delegation voted in favour, with the reservation that His Majesty’s Government were not thereby committed to detailed amendment of U.K. law, and that their vote was without prejudice to the established right to grant asylum. This latter reservation was made because Article VII stated that genocide should not be considered as a political crime for the purposes of extradition. The draft Convention was unanimously adopted by 55 votes to 0, with three absentees (South Africa, Costa Rica, and El Salvador) (Resolution A at Annex II). 7. The other resolutions were adopted by large majorities at the same time (Resolutions B. & C. at Annex II). Resolution B invites the International Law Commission to study the possibility of setting up a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice for trying charges of genocide. Resolution C recommends Administering Powers who are Parties to the Convention to enable it to be extended to dependent territories as soon as possible; this was the price paid in the Sixth Committee for the inclusion of a colonial application article. As it was, the U.S.S.R. delegate attempted in plenary to delete the colonial application article and include a substitute clause which would make the Convention automatically applicable to the dependent territories of any Contracting Party; this amendment was only defeated by 19 in favour, 23 against, 14 abstentions. 8.  The terms of the Convention will now be carefully examined by the Departments of His Majesty’s Government concerned, to decide whether the United Kingdom can ratify its signature accede to it. Although present indications are that this will not be possible for some time to come owing to the number of legislative amendments which would be necessitated (see pt. V). Similarly I should be grateful if you would examine the text of the Convention and inform me in due course whether from the legal point of view you would see any difficulties in its acceptance by the Government of the Territory under your administration. I have etc.

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Lobbying on behalf of the Genocide Convention, 1947–48 (nos. 114–169)

The Genocide Convention can safely be described as Raphael Lemkin’s personal project. It is unsurprising, then, that Lemkin lobbied hard on behalf of the draft treaty, especially with the US and the UK Government. Almost singlehandedly, he built a broad coalition of nongovernmental organizations in support of the convention. His methods, as alluded to earlier (doc. 5), however, did not always win people over. William Jackson, son of and legal assistant to US Chief Counsel at Nuremberg Robert Jackson, did not know what to think of Lemkin’s phone call of August 11, 1947 (doc. 114). Lemkin went hard against the two scholars with whom he worked together on the Secretariat draft Genocide Convention—Pella and Donnedieu de Vabres. Jackson Jr. disagreed that the United States should oppose the codification of international law by the United Nations, as Lemkin insisted for the fear that it might intervene with his initiative on genocide. The World Jewish Congress, on behest of Lemkin, later that month sought out foreign political support for the convention (doc. 115). The signals it got from the Vatican and the Italian Government were rather positive, while in England it essentially hit a brick wall. In the case of East European countries, the sticking issue proved the inclusion of political groups. As Lemkin learned from a different source, though, the World Jewish Congress was not unanimous in its endorsement of the “genocide project” (doc. 119). Simultaneously, Lemkin and a few individuals who embraced his cause began assembling a list of dignitaries willing to sign an appeal on behalf of the genocide treaty in the works (docs. 116–17, 124–25). Not everyone among those they had approached gave his or her consent (doc. 118). As to help emphasize the gravity of genocide, Lemkin received information about relevant court cases pending at Nuremberg by the fall of 1947 (doc. 121). Beginning in January 1948, Lemkin and his supporters identified the United Kingdom as a major stumbling block on the road toward a UN Genocide Convention (docs. 127, 141–43). Lemkin argued that “some delegations, especially the Russian but also the British were not enthusiastic about the fact that there would be a legal basis for looking into the destruction of populations within their spheres of influence” (doc. 123). He cultivated a particular dislike of “Nuremberg lawyers” such as Hartley Shawcross (docs. 122). The UK Government had no scruples—when replying to requests from concerned citizens—saying that its position with regard to the Genocide Convention had not changed, that is, it liked the idea of but not the actual treaty (doc. 126). The

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UK argumentation appeared convincing even to some interested parties such as the British Council of Christians and Jews (docs. 132, 135). The UN Secretary General was not forthcoming either. Upon the request to publically support an early adoption of the convention (doc. 128), Trygve Lie expressed himself to the effect that, insofar as there was no consensus among UN member states whether “it is necessary, or even useful, to adopt a convention,” he could not possibly take part in a “technical controversy” (docs. 129–30). In his broad vision of what constituted genocide, Lemkin was increasingly at odds with national delegations, including the American. Thus, he insisted on the principle of universal jurisdiction, supported the idea of partial destruction (“the killing of 50 persons is also genocide”), and argued for individual complicity versus state complicity (doc. 131). To put lobbying on a more formal footing, in May 1948 Lemkin and his allies formed a US Committee for a UN Genocide Committee (docs. 133–34, 144). Some of the committee members questioned whether the Genocide Convention would “have teeth,” the answer to which was that it should be regarded as a starting point, a platform (doc. 136). One of the battles picked by the committee was lobbying for the exclusion of political group, in the belief that it might win general support for the convention (docs. 137–38, 143). Another emerging pattern, from July 1948 onward, was to negatively compare the UN human rights project to that dealing with genocide (doc. 145). James Rosenberg, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, had emerged as the most active member of the committee alongside Lemkin. In order to have the Genocide Convention passed, Rosenberg was ready to yield on issues of principle more than did Lemkin (docs. 148– 49, 154). In a matter of months, Lemkin fell out with his closest associate (docs. 140, 146, 155). On the subject of universal jurisdiction, Lemkin differed also with other members of the committee (docs. 147, 156). The State Department took into account the opinions expressed by lobby groups, yet made it clear the final decision rested exclusively with US diplomats (doc. 150). By October–November 1948, Lemkin-organized committee went into high gear trying to convince the US delegation to drop the reference to political groups (docs. 157–61, 164–65). The news that the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention kept getting from both the State Department and the ECOSOC were less than reassuring (docs. 162–63). Lemkin specifically criticized the UK delegation for flip-flopping on the issue of political groups (doc. 166). By way of establishing the committee, the National Conference of Christian and Jews took credit for the eventual passing of the Genocide Convention (doc. 168). Once the genocide treaty became a reality, Lemkin shifted his efforts to finding evidence that would justify its existence, as in the case of the India-Pakistan conflict (doc. 169). Two documents in this section break with the established narrative (docs. 153, 167). Both documents deal with the Civil Rights Congress (CRC), an African American organization that came to play a significant role in the debates on the application of the Genocide Convention to the United States in the early 1950s. Throughout CRC’s existence, one of the contested issues had been the extent of its affiliation with the Communist Party USA. The CRC’s efforts to indict the United States for genocide are documented in Volume II.



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No. 114 Son of Robert H. Jackson Narrates about Raphael Lemkin’s Opposition to Codification of Penal Law, His Enmity to Henri Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella, August 11, 1947  LC, MSS61408/2/8 August 11 [1947] Dear Dad: A strange voice came on the telephone this morning, and it turned out to be Dr. Lemkin, who is now a sort of part-time expert consultant to the UN, chiefly on the draft convention on genocide. I never could quite figure the bugger out when he was in London and then Nuremberg, but today we had common cause. He wanted to talk about the hash being made of the codification proposal by the UN committee. I semimodestly referred him to my article in Foreign Affairs, which he had not read, and asked him to lunch to talk it over. When he arrived he was most enthusiastic about the article, which he had read meanwhile, and said he wished he had seen it earlier so as to be able to use it. He unburdened himself of quite a lot of stuff which I found interesting enough to pass along. Let’s consider first de Vabres, bearing in mind that there appears to be a personal vendetta between him and Lemkin. Lemkin says that de Vabres was the one who voted to acquit Schacht, and that Biddle did not; and hence de Vabres is the favorite devil of the French left-wing press these days.1 Further, he says, de Vabres was the chief factor in watering down the judgment on crimes against humanity. According to him, de Vabres is a reactionary, German-minded theorist, a sort of intellectual sympathizer with the Nazis. Lemkin points to the fact that he had been an official visitor to Nazi Germany at the invitation of Hans Frank (some international law association I suppose); that he remained in Paris during the occupation and somehow managed to publish a 700-page book in 1943 when paper was scarce and controlled by the Germans.2 Lemkin further says that he was only a narrow-gauge professor who was appointed judge at Nuremberg through the influence of his son, who at the time was political aide to de Gaulle. This is rather invidious stuff, with sources not identified, but I would be willing to accept quite a bit of it from watching the old fool in action. Now as to codification in the UN, which Lemkin cordially opposes. The lineup according to him is: de Vabres and Pella, the Rumanian, strongly for it; the Russians Hjalmar Schacht (1877–1970) served as Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank of Nazi Germany during the 1930s. Schacht was among the three defendants at IMT who had been acquitted, on the grounds that he helped the anti-Hitler resistance, never held a Nazi Party membership, and served a sentence under the Nazis. 2 Hans Frank (1900–46) was a prominent Nazi lawyer. During the Second World War he served as governor of the Nazi occupied Polish territories, presiding over the mass murder of Jews in that part of Eastern Europe. Frank was sentenced to death by the IMT. 1

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and Poles strongly for it; Phil Jessup sort of fumbling without taking any stand either way. He also says that Fahy, with Biddle’s prodding, pushed it as much as possible. Pella, says Lemkin, is a shrewd, ambitious opportunist who played with Carol, then Antonescu, and now the Commies; he is a former student of de Vabres and has the old man around his little finger; and the comedy is that the French reactionary is being hitched unwittingly to the Communist wagon.1 De Vabres and Pella are strongly for a codification of aggression but equally strongly against Lemkin’s convention on genocide (which is the source of his animus). The Russians and their satellites also are plumping for codifying aggression, and against genocide for obvious reasons; the convention makes genocide a peacetime crime cognizable internationally, in the courts of any land, and we all know how the Russians treat the Balts and other minorities. There are two reasons, Lemkin says, why the Russians want to codify the law on aggression: 1) while Russia is slowly swallowing Europe they want a law against military opposition; 2) their internal propaganda screams that the U.S. is planning an aggressive war, and they would like to fashion a code to use against us for propaganda purposes. I don’t know how accurate Lemkin’s information is, but he says that codification is likely to win because Ivan Kerno, legal adviser to Trygve Lie, is a Commie and pushing it; and because Pella is president and de Vabres vice president of that Association of International Penal Law (or whatever) which you remember de Vabres wanted to meet at Nuremberg, and they are drumming up support for it in all countries. Lemkin wants to do something to head this off, largely I judge because it is mixed up with his own Genocide project, and suggested that you see Austin, Marshall, and others. I did not tell him that you had earlier written Austin and Byrnes; but I did say that it is going to be damn embarrassing for the U.S. to take the lead in stopping codification when it was the U.S. which originally put the question on the U.N. agenda thanks to the impetuous Biddle. (Lemkin also says Biddle has had a hand in pushing it since it got to the U.N. committee.) I too hope something can be done, and now is the time because the Assembly meets in mid-September and this project is on their agenda. While I don’t suppose it would convert many, I am a little sorry that I didn’t have reprints of my article run off and send them around, because at least it does show that there is more to the question that appears on the surface. Anyway, there it is. Lemkin is coming to Washington the end of this week or first part of next week and wants to see you about this. I told him I would write you that he is coming. He will bring along the text of the U.N. committee’s report on the subject, and maybe you will consider it worthwhile doing something. Would you by any chance consider doing a Sunday article for the N.Y. Times, so as to reach a more popular audience than Foreign Affairs? Arthur Krock could perhaps arrange it.2 Or maybe the best way is not through publicity, for the question is a little abstruse to most people, but through our own government.

Between 1938 and 1944 Romania was a dictatorship, ruled through 1940 by King Carol II and subsequently by General Ion Antonescu. 2 Arthur Krock (1886–1974), a long-serving chief of the Washington bureau of the New York Times. 1



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Ran into John Wright and wife in the A.T. & T. building today where I was getting some information. He seems as peppery as ever, and we had a nice chat. If there is anything I can do up here, let me know. Love to all, Bill [William Jackson]

No. 115 World Jewish Congress Lobbies with Foreign Governments on behalf of the Genocide Convention, August 29, 1947 AJHS, P-154/1/18 August 29, 1947 WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS Congress House, 55 New Cavendish Street London, W.1 Professor R. Lemkin Apartment 12B 290 Riverside Drive New York, N.Y. U.S.A. Dear Professor Lemkin, Please forgive me for having failed to write to you sooner. I have had to do so much travelling and to deal with so many unexpected matters, that I have not had a moment to sit down and write or dictate a note on what I have been able to do in regard to the Convention of Genocide. I have spoken to a good many officials on the subject, practically everyone I have met, but I shall limit myself here to the most important people. I did not after all go to the Balkans because the Bulgarian visa has only just arrived, and the Rumanian visa is still on the way. I saw Mr. Masaryk during his visit to Geneva, and I took the opportunity to give him a full and frank statement of our views. In particular, I asked him to use his influence with the East European Governments to prevent them from wrecking the prospects of the Convention because of the unfortunate inclusion of a reference to political groups. I told him that we were trying to do what we can could to induce the Western nations to agree to the excision of this reference, and that we were counting on Czechoslovakia to act as a bridge between the two groups.1 According to Lemkin, Jan Masaryk (1886–1948), in his capacity as Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, was instrumental in convincing the Soviet Union to back the UN resolution of December 11, 1946 that proclaimed genocide an international crime and proposed drafting a convention. See Totally Unofficial, 126–28.

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He assured me in the warmest terms that he was in full sympathy with the purposes of the Convention and would give instructions along the lines I suggested as soon as he returned to Prague. As he did not raise the slightest objection, I am hopeful that we may count on support from this quarter. I have had friendly relations with Masaryk for about 14 or 15 years, and I feel certain that he would have informed me of any difficulty, if there had been any in his mind. I discussed the problem with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Sforza, and separately also with Under Secretary and Chef de Cabinet. They all assured me of their support and they fully realized the importance of the Convention from the Italian point of view in the light of recent frontier changes.1 I am sure we can count on them, though their help is perhaps not at the moment of any great importance. But I fear that we have a fairly long road to travel, and Italy may well become a member of the United Nations before the Convention is adopted.2 What was more interesting and important was the discussion I had at the Vatican. The Pope had left Rome before I arrived, and for various reasons I did not feel it wise to pursue him to his country retreat, more especially as Maritain have also had left Rome for a vacation.3 I therefore asked to see the leading man available at the time at the Secretariat of State, and an appointment was made with Monsignor Dell’Acqua. I was assured that he was not only the senior member of the Secretariat then in Rome, but also the Vatican expert on United Nations matters. The discussion was important because this official, in spite of his reputation as an expert, knew nothing of the Convention or of its history. This is extremely significant, and probably the most important thing that I was able to do was to give him a copy of the text and explain the background and purposes of the Convention, which I did fully. He was extremely interested and obviously sympathetic. I need not tell you that I drew attention to certain situations in which the Church would be especially interested, and I asked that in some appropriate form the Vatican should make known to all who would be likely to listen, the need for action without delay. Monsignor D. was obviously in no position to commit the Vatican but he assured me that the text of the Convention would receive the most careful study and that the considerations I had advanced would be brought to the attention of the Pope. He suggested that I should go back later in the year since the matter was of so much importance, but I arranged, since I could make no commitment on this, that he should be in touch with the Heads of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, which is our affiliated body. I ought to add that the relations between the Vatican and the Union are of the most cordial character, in spite of the fact that the President of the Union is a Socialist who is a public opponent of the special privileges accorded the Vatican under the new constitution. The Monsignor assured me that he had the highest regard and friendliest feelings for the Jewish community, and told me at considerable length A reference to Istria and Dalmatia, which in accordance with the 1947 peace treaty became a part of Yugoslavia. 2 Italy eventually became a member of the United Nations in 1955, yet accessed to the Genocide Convention already in June of 1952. 3 Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) was a French Catholic philosopher whose advocacy of natural law ethics and “integral humanism” had informed the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1



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of his own efforts on behalf of Jews who were eluding the Gestapo during the Fascist regime. The Jewish community very frequently seeks the help of the Vatican and I have no fears on that score. I have, of course, fully prepared our friends in Rome for their part in this matter. Unfortunately, I have not been able to do anything of importance in England. The unhappy Exodus incident formed the substance of all my conversations, which included the visit made by Easterman and myself to the Under Secretary of State, and it would have weakened the importance of the Convention to have dragged in a reference to it after rather tense discussions of the Palestine situation. But I still hope that something important will be done. At any rate, even if the moment is not propitious now, I shall make certain that my colleagues here take the necessary steps as soon as the opportunity occurs. You know that our people here have excellent relations with certain Members of the Government, and that we have a number of Labour M.P.’s on our Executive. I wish I could have done a great deal more, but unfortunately there were many other matters with which I had to deal. Nevertheless, I think these interventions may not be without their usefulness. It is going to be a fairly long business, but I am convinced that if we hammer away at it without interruption, we shall have a good chance of succeeding. With warmest greetings, Yours sincerely, Maurice L. Perlzweig

No. 116 Norwegian Writer Ingeborg Refling Hagen Urged to Sign an Appeal in support of the Genocide Convention, September 3, 1947 AJHS, P-154/1/18 September 3, 1947 Telegram Refling Hagen Fredheim, Tangenstr. Near Oslo, Norway Would be most grateful if you would join us in appeal to General Assembly and world conscience for support of convention on prevention and punishment of crime of genocide. At present Economic and Social Council has transmitted to assembly the Secretary General’s draft of convention proclaiming the destruction of religious, national, racial and other groups an international crime punishable like piracy, trading in women and children. Such crimes will be punishable by international action under

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the new convention. There is danger that General Assembly decision might be delayed and whole issue postponed for one year or more. Most delegations while agreeing on importance of preventing by international convention such crimes as perpetrated in World War II nevertheless underestimate urgency. We are convinced that a great manifesto signed by most prominent leaders all over world brought before assembly will stress urgency issue and this might facilitate decision by forthcoming assembly. Only aim of our action is to support Secretary General’s draft and avoid procedural delays. We ask also Sigrid Undset and Paal Berg to join. Please cable collect to Pearl Buck, 385 Madison Avenue, for support for this humanitarian action. Francois Mauriac Pearl Buck Raphael Lemkin

No. 117 A List of American and Foreign Citizens Who Support the Genocide Convention, TAQ September 20, 1947  AJHS, P-154/2/12 TAQ September 20, 1947 Committee of Americans for Genocide Convention Owen D. Young Gerard Swope Charles E. Wilson – Gen’l Electric Robert D. Young – Chesapeake & Ohio Spyros P. Skouras Gov. Green (Illinois)1 Dr. Frank Graham (U. of N.C.) Prof. Philip Jessup (Columbia U.) Dr. Karl Compton, M.I.T. Dr. Arthur Compton, Washington University, St. Louis Dr. James B. Conant, Harvard John W. Davis Manly O. Hudson, former Judge of the International Court of Justice U.S. Senator Robert E. Wagner “ “ Ferguson2 “ “ Tom Connally “ “ Claude E. Peper Dwight H. Green, governor of Illinois from 1941 to 1949. US Senator Homer S. Ferguson (R-MI), 1943–55.

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Former Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts Rt. Rev. Henry St. George Tucker, Presiding Bishop, Protestant Episcopal Church Supreme Ct. Justice Robert Jackson Dr. Louis Finklestein, Pres. Jewish Theological Seminary Gardner Cowles Jr. (Publisher Des Moines Register, Look Magazine) Henry Luce Albert D. Lasker Bernard Baruch John Steinbeck Sinclair Lewis Carl Van Doren Eric Johnston Auxiliary Bishop Bernard J. Sheil (Chicago) Hon. Stephen Wise Bishop Bromley Oxnam Sen. Leverett Saltonstall Earl J. Harrison Rep. Hatton (Texas)1 Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt Mrs. Wendell Willkie2 Bartley Crum Eugene Meyer Mrs. Ogden Reid Arthur Sulzberger Fiorello H. LaGuardia Harold Stassen Gov. Warren (California)3 Former Governor Ellis T. Arnall Robert Sherwood Henry L. Stimson Dwight Eisenhower Milton Eisenhower, Kansas State College Mrs. William Dick Sporborg, chairman Foreign Affairs Department, Gen’l Federation of Women’s Clubs4 Mrs. LaFell Dickinson, Gen’l Fed. of Women’s Clubs5 Philip Murray William Green Apparently Hatton W. Sumners, a Congressman from Texas from 1913 to January 1947 Edith Willkie, wife of the late politician Wendel Willkie, who was the 1940 Republican nominee for President. 3 Earl Warren, governor of California from 1943 to 1953. 4 Constance Amberg Sporborg (1881–1961) was an advocate of women’s rights and active supporter of the United Nations. As of 1947–48, she held official and semi-official positions in fifteen various organizations, including US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention. 5 Lucy Jennings Dickinson (1883–1971) served as president of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs from 1943 to 1947. 1 2

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Dr. Harry E. Fosdick Nelson Rockefeller Former Gov. Herbert Lehman Senator Vandenberg Henry Wallace Roger J. Straus (Nat’l Conf. of Christians & Jews) Former Attorney Gen’l Homer T. Cummings Francis Biddle * * * International Committee of Sponsors for Genocide Convention Refling Hagen Leon Blum Jacques Maritain Albert Einstein Folke Bernadotte Pandit Nehru Lin Yutang Gabrielle Mistral Julian Huxley Sir Hartley Shawcross Sigrid Undset Rene Cassin (?) Shalom Asch Paul Valery1 Niels Bohr Supreme Ct. Judge Jackson Frederic Joliot-Curie Pearl Buck John Steinbeck Dwight Eisenhower Toscanini2 Ambassador Oscar Lange Anna Reid (Sweden) Pablo Picasso Arthur Rubinstein Bustamente (Cuba)3 Thomas Mann Serge Koussevitzsky Jan Masaryk

Paul Valéry, French essayist and philosopher, passed away in July 1945. Arturo Toscanini was a famed Italian American conductor. 3 Antonio Sánchez de Bustamente y Sirven (1865–1951), a Cuban lawyer and politician who served as judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague from 1922 to 1944. 1 2



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No. 118 John D. Rockefeller Jr. Declines an Invitation to Cosign an Appeal in support of the Genocide Convention, September 26, 1947 AJHS, P-154/2/7 September 26, 1947 Telegram Mrs. Pearl Buck United Nations World 385 Madison Ave. Referring to telegram of September 25th to John D. Rockefeller Jr. signed by you and others, while fully alive to the significance of the objectives sought, Mr. Rockefeller does not feel that he can wisely join in the appeal contemplated. Janet M. Warfield Secretary

No. 119 Henri Monneray Alerts Raphael Lemkin to the Position of the World Jewish Congress on the Genocide Convention, September 26, 1947 AJHS, P-154/1/18 September 26, 1947 My dear friend [Raphael Lemkin]: You know how I am interested in the progress and in the success of your ideas. Therefore I think it useful to send you these lines. You know the competition existing between the different Jewish organizations and especially between the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations (of which the American Jewish Committee is a member) and the Jewish World Congress. Recently the Genocide project has been discussed here in Paris at a meeting of an organization which is a member of the Jewish World Congress. The project has been criticized and was blamed for its limited character. Of course the objections are not well founded and do not take into account the political character of the problem and the necessity of compromise in order to obtain a positive decision of UNO. I hope I shall be able to prevent, with my friends, that Paris sends a counter-project to the Jewish World Congress. If not, I give you this warning in order to give you the opportunity of taking preventive measures, should the necessity arise.

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Needless to say that this letter and the information contained is strictly confidential. With my best wishes and cordially yours [Henri] Monneray

No. 120 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Support of the Roman Catholic Church for the Genocide Convention, September 30, 1947 AJHS, P-154/1/18 September 30, 1947 Right Reverend: Thank you very much for your warm interest in the treaty on genocide.1 I hope His Eminency and you will find a way to overcome the existing difficulties.2 I had a chance to speak this evening with several delegates who are sincere friends of the convention. They think that every effort should be made to prevent a quick negative decision, meaning the referring of the convention to a not yet created committee or referring it to the next Assembly. It was suggested by them that every effort should be made for the time being to prolong the discussion or to interrupt it for at least a week or ten days until effective support for the convention can be organized. After having given more thought to this matter, I take the liberty to make several suggestions. 1.  In order to gain time some delegates might ask for a short delay in the discussions for various reasons. Fortunately the Presidency of this Assembly is well in the hands of Latin Americans, Aranha being President and Dr. Belt being Vice President of the Assembly. Mr. Charles Fahy, the American representative in the Legal Committee might also be approached in order to obtain an interruption of the discussion. This might not be difficult since the legal committee has on its agenda many other items. 2.  Important Latin American delegates should be approached in order to obtain a resolution for sending the convention to a sub-committee of the Legal Committee for working out a final draft. Such a final draft might be easily prepared on the basis of the existing draft within a few weeks. 3.  In the meantime an exchange of letters between his Eminency the Cardinal and President Truman or Secretary Marshall will have decisive influence upon the attitude of the Latin American delegations and a great number of other delegations. 4.  During my audience I was under the impression that His Eminency the Cardinal was sympathetic to the idea of bringing the whole matter to the attention of the Holy Father for the purpose of obtaining from Him a public statement favoring quick action Reverend James H. A. Griffiths (1903–1964) was an Auxiliary Bishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Vatican’s permanent observer on the ECOSOC. 2 Cardinal Francis Spellman (1889–1967) served since 1939 as Archbishop of New York. In his letter to Spellman from September 13, 1949, Lemkin wrote, “In the fall of 1947, I had the great privilege of informing you personally about the work which the United Nations was doing in preparing an international treaty to outlaw the crime of genocide….” (AHJS, P-154/2/2) 1



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on the convention.1 This last action might involve more time and therefore the action foreseen in point 3 should in my humble opinion be undertaken immediately. 5.  Members of the Steering Committee of the Assembly should be approached in order to prevent any possible decision of referring the convention to the next Assembly if such a proposal should be made by unfriendly delegations. I heard of an eventuality that the Steering Committee might be called upon to select a certain number of items from the present agenda for the purpose of “unloading” the present agenda by sending several items to the next Assembly. 6.  President Aranha, Ambassador Belt and other friendly delegates could be asked to make favorable statements about this matter in the Assembly. 7.  As I mentioned today during my audience with you, I am at your disposal for any drafting work and for any other work in connection with the action on the convention. In case His Eminency or you would like to send to the Holy Father a draft of a proposed statement, I enclose a few lines which I drafted in great haste for your kind consideration: “The Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide now before the U.N. Assembly is one of the most important humanitarian issues of our time. The heinous crime of genocide, meaning the destruction of religious, national and other human groups undermines the very foundations of Christian civilization and is in defiance of the conscience of mankind. Religious, national and other human groups must be preserved as a great living force of our civilization. The Roman Catholic Church supports fully the ideals pronounced by this convention and calls upon the nations of the world to make every effort to the effect that this convention becomes international law at the earliest date.” I take the liberty of enclosing meanwhile my article on Genocide, being a reprint of the American Scholar.2 I am also sending some material to his Eminency. As soon as I find copies of other articles, I will send them along. With renewed thanks and very high esteem. I am sincerely yours, Raphael Lemkin

No. 121 John Fried Informs Raphael Lemkin of Pending Cases at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal That Contain Charges of Genocide, October 3, 1947 AJHS, P-154/1/5 October 3, 1947 Dr. Raphael Lemkin C/o Gerlowin

Pius XII (1876–1958) reigned as Pope from 1939 to 1958. Lemkin, “Genocide,” The American Scholar 15, no. 2 (April 1946): 227–30.

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240 West 102nd Street New York, N.Y. My dear friend: Thank you very much for your letter and the kind words you have for my memoranda.1 I would, of course, be glad to receive whatever criticism and comment you might have on them. The information you read in the Times was correct.2 There is now a genocide case pending in Nuernberg – the case against the Einsatzgruppen, the leaders of which are indicted for genocide – the murder of more than one million persons. I shall send you, under separate cover, material on this case.3 Another case involving genocide will start soon, the case against leaders of several Nazi race organizations, such as the Lebensborn Organization of the SS, the Reichssiedlungshauptamt, the organization “zur Festigung deutschen Volkstums”, etc. The subject will be murder, forced Germanization, forced transfer of civilian population from belligerently occupied territories, kidnapping, etc. – as you see involving various aspects of genocide which so far have not been so widely discussed.4 I shall also send you material on this case. In the meantime, my wife and daughter have arrived here. Thank you very much for your kind offer to assist me. I must now plead guilty of a very serious offense. Immediately after I received your letter with the enclosed letter for Dr. De Chetmick, I went on duty to Berlin and from there to Prague where I attended the meeting of the International Law Association). When I came back I moved from the Hotel to a house; and somehow I “verlegte” Document not in the file. “14 Germans Listed in Genocide Cases: Elite Guard Officers and Former Government Officials to be Tried by Americans,” New York Times, July 2, 1947. 3 As a follow-up to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg US military authorities in Germany conducted twelve subsequent trials. The Einsatzgruppen trial (Case IX, or USA v. Otto Ohlendorf et al.) lasted from September 29, 1947 to April 10, 1948 and focused on the crimes committed by mobile killing units of the German Security Police in the occupied Soviet territories in 1941–42. The pretrial investigation, in April of 1947, identified twenty-four high-ranking SS officers who were implicated in “mass murder (genocide).” The amended indictment of July 1947 spoke of crimes against humanity “carried out as part of a systematic program of genocide, aimed at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups by murderous extermination.” See Hilary Earl, “Prosecuting Genocide Before the Genocide Convention: Raphael Lemkin and the Nuremberg Trials, 1945‒1949,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, vol. 15 (2013): 329, 336. 4 The RuSHA trial (Case VIII, or USA v. Ulrich Greifelt et al.) lasted from October 20, 1947 to March 10, 1948 and targeted SS racial policies. The SS Race and Settlement Main Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt des SS, or RuSha) was established in 1931 with the purpose of safeguarding the “racial purity.” The policies implemented by the office during the Second World War, particularly in Poland, paved the way for racially motivated mass murder. The Lebensborn was a subunit of the RuSHA that fostered births among German women classified as “Aryan.” The Office of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, or RKFDV) with Heinrich Himmler at the helm came into existence in 1939 binding the RuSHA and the SS even closer together. Of all military tribunals, the RuSHA trial saw the most comprehensive use of the term genocide, also within the broader meaning proposed by Lemkin. Thus, when discussing the policy of Germanization of Eastern Europe, the prosecution spoke of a “coordinated plan aimed at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups” (Earl, “Prosecuting Genocide,” 328). 1 2



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your letter for Dr. De Chetmick. I found it of course, but only after he and Mrs. De Chetmick had left for Poland. They should be back any day and I shall hasten to give him the letter. Please forgive me!1 Such things never happen to me. It was just an unfortunate chain of circumstances. I have been rather sick in the last two weeks. I think I will be back in the office soon. Next week I shall go to Berlin as commissioner of the Tribunal which is trying the Flick case, in order to interrogate Speer at Spandau Prison.2 As you see, the Courts here are in full swing; but it is foreseen that a very heavy reduction of the staff will take place by the end of the year. I hope you will find time to write me again soon especially about your work with UN which, I trust, is very satisfactory. With kind regards your very cordially, John H. E. Fried

No. 122 The British Council of Christians and Jews Inquires with the Foreign Office about the Change in Sir Hartley Shawcross’s Position on the Genocide Convention, January 7, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN55 January 7, 1948 Dear Mr. Bevin, Dr. Everett R. Clinchy, President of the National Conference of Christians and Jews in the United States, who called to see you during a visit he paid to this country in July last [year], has recently approached us about the Genocide Convention, which was before the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1946, and which is due to be considered by the Economic and Social Council at its meeting on February 2nd this year. I understand that Sir Hartley Shawcross, as a member of the British delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1946, expressed strong support for the unanimously adopted resolution affirming that Genocide is a crime under International Law, but that in subsequent discussions in Sub-Committee the British delegation has adopted a negative or neutral attitude. Our American colleagues are anxious that the British Council of Christian and Jews should help to ensure a favourable consideration of the matter when it comes

Lemkin’s papers contain no further reference to the individual with that name. The Flick trial (Case V, or USA v. Friedrich Flick et al.) lasted between April 19 and December 22, 1947 and targeted German industrialists. Alfred Speer (1905–81) was Hitler’s chief architect and Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg sentenced Speer to twenty years, which he served at Spandau Prison in West Berlin.

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before the Economic and Social Council at its meeting in February. At a meeting of the Executive Committee held yesterday the feeling was strongly expressed that any appropriate action should be taken to safeguard mankind against any further outbreaks of Genocide. The members of the Executive, however, are reluctant to urge support for the Convention to be considered by the Economic and Social Council without a clearer understanding of the reasons which led to the change of attitude by the British representatives to the United Nations. We should therefore greatly value any information you could give us which would help us to form a proper judgment of this matter and would also help our American colleagues to understand the attitude of the British Government in relation to it.1 Yours sincerely, William W. Simpson

No. 123 Raphael Lemkin Tells about an Unfinished Documentary on Genocide, Reflects on the Drafting Process to date in a Letter to Gertrude Samuels of the New York Times, January 12, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 January 12, 1948 Dr. Raphael Lemkin Miss Gertrude Samuels New York Times Sunday Section Times Bldg., N.Y., N.Y. Dear Gertrude, I was told today that you came to see the film strip on genocide. I few words of explanation might be in order. In the summer I proposed to the Secretary General to make a documentary film on genocide. We worked hard with the film division to prepare the script. However, when it came to the production stage we found that the budget had been cut and that the necessary $20,000 for the completion of the film were not available. I was pressing hard for this film since I saw in it a very useful instrumentality for putting across the treaty. As a kind of appeasement the production of a film strip was offered. This is what you have seen. It is a small thing; moreover, this baby is suffering from “diplomatic disease”. According to the accepted rules at the UN one cannot mention as being involved in some wrong either in the past or present. Moreover, as you know, England has actually, though not officially, banned all presentation of war atrocities. See doc. no. 44

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That is the background of the story. However, we might still have a film on genocide, if we will press hard enough. It should be done either through the UN or through a private company. Your suggestion as to March of Time is extremely valuable. But in order to get such action, we must keep the genocide issue before the public eye. You know that the convention was almost killed in the last General Assembly. The opposition was small but skillful. I think I wrote to you about it. It consisted of two types, political and legalistic. Some delegations, especially the Russian but also the British were not enthusiastic about the fact that there would be a legal basis for looking into the destruction of populations within their spheres of influence. The situation was aggravated by the fact that in the Legal Committee the delegation of Pakistan accused Hindustan of genocide. A great deal of deliberate confusion has been created by an ill-advised tendency from a small group of influential lawyers to mix the genocide issue with the larger projects of the codification of international law. They wanted jobs, honors and Mandarin ceremonies to go on for decades in international law committees. In your last editorial you called such committees “perfumed coffins”. In the old league it was a sure way to bury an uncomfortable issue. You will be surprised to hear that the Legal Committee was won over by these intrigues. It adopted an unfavorable resolution to the effect that the Economic and Social Council will be free to decide whether a convention on genocide is necessary at all or whether genocide should be codified in conjunction with the Nuremberg law. This would have meant a reversal of the genocide resolution of December 11, 1946. But the next day we won an overwhelming victory in the Assembly with the noticeable support of the US, France and all Latin American countries and also of Hindustan and Pakistan. It was decided that the Economic and Social Council should continue the work it had begun on the genocide convention and that the final draft should be submitted to the next General Assembly. The delegation at the Assembly stressed the urgency of the matter. It was made clear to the Assembly that international law is strictly divided into the law of war and the law applicable in times of peace. Indeed, the law of war treats the relation between a conqueror and a conquered country. No difficulties of sovereignty exist in such a situation, because sovereignty is either destroyed or suspended. But for normal conditions of peace when you deal with independent states the institution of international crimes applies, which is known and has been elaborated in the international law of peace like trade in women and children, drugs and piracy. For, these crimes are not under military jurisdiction but every country might try a criminal whenever he is apprehended on its territory. The UN will be empowered to intervene in times of peace on behalf of persecuted human groups. Even an international court might be established for the most flagrant cases. This is the meaning of international crimes and according to the resolution if December 11, 1946 genocide is one of them. There is too much genocide in the world today. We cannot afford to be lulled to sleep on this burning question. More human lives were lost in the genocide case of India (about 500,000) than in all cases of so-called threats to peace which have been treated by the Security Council. And still all public attention is focused on the Security Council cases because of the element of political strife. But there is far more human drama in genocide.

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I am sure and I hope that you will help now on the genocide issue as brilliantly as you did in the past. We need your help, because the Social and Economic Council will start work on this issue on February 2. I enclose an article on genocide which appeared today in the UN Bulletin.1 At the end of the article I quoted the NY Times and your editorial but the editor, trying to be “objective” to all the press, left only the title of your editorial “A Treaty for the People”.2 Cordially yours [Raphael Lemkin]

No. 124 Pearl S. Buck Conveys to the Editor of the Manchester Guardian the Significance of Public Opinion in support of the Genocide Convention, January 22, 1948  AJHS, P-154/2/8 January 22, 1948 To The Editor The Manchester Guardian Manchester, England Dear Sir: It has been a liberal education for us who live in the United States, to have upon our own shores the many men and women of the United Nations. The average American scarcely expects to leave his own country in a lifetime. It has been valuable, therefore, for him to have the opportunity to see men and women from many nations moving about his streets and countryside. Even if the delegates do not move as far beyond the limits of New York as we wish they did, we know they are here, we see their faces in our newspapers, and our minds are opened to the world, a little at least. My own mind has been impressed by the difference in the levels of progress between these peoples represented in the United Nations. Surely this is a basic cause for dissension in the world. Some peoples have progressed far in the cultivated humanity of their outlook, in the objective justice of their judgments. Others are still in the tooth and claw stage. England of course, is among the humane and civilized. Americans, whatever our temporary disagreements with England, have always had a faith almost touching in its humility, in the high qualities of British justice. It comforts us, for example, that Britain has kept her word in India and Burma.3

Document not in the file. Editorial, “A Treaty for the People,” New York Times, October 11, 1947. 3 Britain granted independence to its former colonies, India and Burma, on August 15, 1947 and January 4, 1948, respectively. 1 2



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It did not surprise us therefore, when in December 1946 the British delegation, headed by Sir Hartley Shawcross, took the lead in the General Assembly of the United Nations in the adoption of a wise resolution concerning genocide. That resolution affirmed that genocide, which means the destruction of any racial, national, religious, political or linguistic group, should become a crime under international law, and that a convention for the prevention and punishment of this crime should be submitted to the 1947 session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This leadership was the British tradition, and it gave stability as well as inspiration to groups who have suffered from the prejudice and hatred of other peoples. It was not only the Jews who have suffered from genocide. In 1935, to mention only one other case, almost five thousand Haitians perished in a genocide action undertaken by the Dominican dictator, Trujillo.1 It was quite understandable that Mr. Antonio Vieux, the delegate from Haiti, should make a moving speech in the General Assembly in favor of the convention.2 Traffic in women and children and slaves has rightfully been declared an international crime, so has traffic in drugs, and so, too, piracy. Genocide has become an even greater threat and it is likely to increase as nations at different levels of civilization are forced to meet and disagree. It has taken place in Germany, it may take place in Palestine and India, it could take place in China or in the United States. It is only sensible to classify mass murder, or genocide, as an international crime before more of it happens, for it threatens humanity as a whole. The fear of extinction of his group makes freedom for the individual impossible. With a law against genocide, von Ribbentrop could not have served as Ambassador in London, while his government was sanctioning the action against Jews.3 Persons guilty of the crime of genocide have too often escaped punishment by becoming diplomats or finding asylum outside their own lands. A million Armenians were killed by the Turks. Enver Pasha, the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire, guilty of the crime of genocide, was walking in the streets of Tiflis when he was shot by an Armenian student whose parents had perished in the massacres.4 Ataman Petlura, who butchered hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Ukraine, found asylum in Paris. Nobody tried him for the crime which had shocked the conscience of humanity. Since there was no law that declared him responsible, a Jewish tailor in Paris meted out justice in his own

Rafael L. Trujillo Molina (1891–1961) ruled the Dominican Republic effectively from 1930 until his assassination in 1961. Claiming that neighboring Haiti harbored his political opponents, Trujillo in early October 1937 ordered an attack on Haitians in the border areas. The death toll is estimated at 20,000–30,000. 2 Antonio Vieux (1904–1961) served as Haiti representative to the 1947 UN General Assembly. In his support for the Genocide Convention, Vieux called on world nations to renounce the principle of sovereignty for the sake of humanity. See The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 397. 3 Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946) served as the Ambassador of Nazi Germany to Britain from 1936 to 1938, and subsequently as the country’s Foreign Minister. 4 The author of the letter confuses Enver Pasha (1881–1922), War Minister of the Ottoman Empire, with Talaat Pasha (1874–1921), Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. Enver Pasha died in battle against the Red Army near Dushanbe, present-day Tajikistan, in August 1922. Talaat Pasha had fled to Berlin, Germany, where in March 1921 he was gunned down by Soghomon Tehlirian, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. This, and the following anecdote about Petlura, apparently comes from Lemkin. 1

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fashion.1 But this crime of genocide should not be dealt with in such anarchical ways. The time has come for more intelligent, more civilized control. In November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution instructing the Social and Economic Council to present a final draft of the genocide convention to the Third Assembly of the United Nations. The Social and Economic Council will start its work on the convention on February 2, 1948. The primary requisite is the sincere will to enact such a law at all and then decisive action. Of course, no one has the courage to oppose it openly. But it has been opposed obliquely, by negative criticisms. It is asked, for example, “Why make a special convention on genocide?” “Why not connect it with other codifications of international law such as the Nuremberg Principles or the drafting of an international criminal code?” Mr. Seyersted, the delegate from Norway, answered this in General Assembly by saying, “Why complicate the matter by mixing together things which until now have been kept apart, the law of war and the law of peace?” A world full of distress and anxiety cannot wait for security until lawyers have made up their minds about large codifications of international law. Public opinion is already aroused. Telegrams and letters have poured in from leading citizens all over the world. Among those who have signed a manifesto calling for a genocide convention are: LUIS PODESTA COSTA, Professor, University of Buenos Aires, former Legal Adviser to the League of Nations CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS, Professor, University of Buenos Aires, Nobel Prize for International Peace SAMUEL DUARTE, President, Chamber of Deputies, Brazil ARTURO ALLESSANDRI, President of Senate, Chile JUAN ANTONIO COLOMA, President, Chamber of Deputies, Chile GABRIELA MISTRAL, Nobel Prize Literature, Chile LIN YUTANG, author, China BALDOMERO SANIN CANO, author, Columbia FRANCISCO FONSECA CHAMIER, President of Congresso Constitucional, Costa Rica MIGUEL A. SUAREZ FERNANDEZ, President of Senate, Cuba JOSE RAFAEL BUSTAMANTE, Vice-President of the Republic, President of Congresso Nacional, Ecuador CARLOS ANDRADE MARIN, President, Camara Diputados, Ecuador EDOUARD HERRIOT, President, National Assembly, France FRANCOIS MAURIAC, de l’Academie francaise, France ALDOUS HUXLEY, author, Mexico PAAL BERG, Former President, Supreme Court, Norway SIGRID UNDSET, Nobel Prize Literature, Norway Symon Petliura (1879–1926) was a Ukrainian nationalist and head of state of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919–20. Anti-Jewish pogroms during his tenure claimed over 50,000 lives. His assassin, Sholom Schwarzbard (1886–1938), was a Russian Jewish anarchist who fought against the Petliura’s forces as part of the Red Army; fourteen members of his family perished in pogroms during the Russian Civil War.

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HARMODIO AROSEMENA F., President, National Assembly, Panama COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, President, Red Cross, Sweden PEARL BUCK, Nobel Prize Literature, United States of America ROBERT G. SPROUL, President, University of California, Berkley, United States of America QUINCY WRIGHT, Professor of International Law, University of Chicago, former adviser to United States Judge at International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg ALEXANDER BELIC, President of Serbian Academy of Science, Belgrade. Dr. Belic signed in his own name and in the names of all members of the Academy In September 1947, in the United States Congress, an eloquent appeal in favor of the genocide convention was made by Congressman Sabath and reprints from the Congressional Record have been widely circulated. Many editorials have appeared in the United States press. The countries of Latin America have shown special interest and some of the governments, such as those of Panama and Costa Rica, have adopted resolutions calling upon the United Nations to approve the convention. Material available in England for reference includes The Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide U.N. Document – Economic and Social Council, E/447, 26 June 1947; Proceedings of the U.N. General Assembly 1946 and 1947; articles on genocide published in the November 1945 issue of The Nineteenth Century and After; The American Scholar (new York) March 1946 issue; Axis Rule in Occupied Europe by Raphael Lemkin, Carnegie Endowment publication (Washington, 1944). I can not forget how much Britain did to alleviate the fate of the Christians who suffered under the yoke of the Ottoman Empire. At that time it was called “humanitarian intervention.” I am sure that if the people know the facts, Britain will lead again in this new humanitarian intervention, to prevent and punish genocide. Very sincerely yours, Pearl S. Buck

No. 125 Folke Bernadotte of Sweden Reassures His Country’s Commitment to the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Pearl S. Buck, January 24, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 January 24, 1948 COMITÉ CENTRAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE SUÉDOISE Mrs. Pearl S. Buck R.F.D. H3 Perkasie, Pennsylvania U.S.A.

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Dear Mrs. Buck, I have, with great interest, taken part of your letter of December 11th, 1947, concerning the development of the genocide convention. I have taken contact with the Swedish foreign office, which has informed me of the U.N. proceedings in the question. You can rest assured that the Swedish delegation, which voted for the active proposal, will follow the question with a positive interest.1 Sincerely yours, F. Bernadotte

No. 126 Lord Chancellor William Jowitt Replies to a Question by the Archbishop of Canterbury Why the UK Government Withdrew the Support for a Genocide Convention, February 13, 1948 BL, IOR, L/PJ/7/13515, POL 6761/48 February 13, 1948 OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE (BY AIR MAIL)

U. 2380/6 To: CANADA (GOVT) AUSTRALIA “ NEW ZEALAND “ SOUTH AFRICA “ INDIA “ PAKISTAN “ CEYLON “ H. No. 6. SAVING Genocide. On 10th February Archbishop of Canterbury asked following question in House of Lords.2 To ask His Majesty’s Government the reasons which have led them to withdraw the support for a Genocide Convention which they had previously given at the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 11th, 1946, and to inquire whether the Government consider these reasons sufficient to prevent their joining with the United States and thirty-eight member nations in supporting the Convention at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in February. The Swedish government followed up on its promise and ratified the Genocide Convention on May 27, 1952. 2 Geoffrey Fisher (1887–1972), Archbishop of Canterbury from 1945 to 1961. 1



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2. Lord Chancellor replied: My Lords, there has been no fundamental change of attitude on the part of His Majesty’s Government, who regard the crime of genocide with as much detestation as ever. Admittedly, their support was given in December, 1946 to the conception of an International Convention on Genocide; and a draft of such a Convention was in due course prepared by the United Nations Secretariat. A study of this draft, however, convinced His Majesty’s Government that any such Convention would inevitably prove to be a difficult and highly controversial document, to which many Governments might be unable to adhere. In those circumstances His Majesty’s Government formed the opinion that such an abortive Convention might weaken, rather than strengthen, the principle which it set out to establish, and might throw doubt on the proposition, at present universally accepted, that genocide is an international crime. At the second session of the General Assembly last autumn, therefore the United Kingdom delegation expressed the view that a better approach would be for the Assembly to confine itself to a resolution that genocide was a crime entailing national and international responsibilities, and to refer the question of a Convention to the International Law Commission, which is to be elected at the Assembly meeting later this year, for further study. This Commission, His Majesty’s Government feel, would conduct its work on genocide in connexion with the codification of the relevant decisions of the Nuremberg tribunal, another task which it has to perform. Many problems of racial and other animosities manifested against individuals and groups, which the original draft Convention sought to cover, are in the view of His Majesty’s Government more properly the concern of the Human Rights Commission which operates under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The resolution adopted by the Assembly last November recognised to some extent the merits of this approach to the matter, though admittedly it did not endorse in full the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation. That attitude will be maintained by the United Kingdom delegation to the current meeting of the Economic and Social Council, on whose agenda the crime of genocide figures. With regard to the second part of the question, the fact that His Majesty’s Government were in a minority on this question at the last Assembly meeting has not persuaded them that their view was wrong. On the contrary, they hope that it will become more widely held. An honest difference of opinion as to the best means of moving towards a goal common to all of them divided Governments on that occasion. The support expressed by the majority, I should point out, was in any case not for the Convention as originally drafted, but for the idea of having a comprehensive Convention. In His Majesty’s Government’s view, based on the deficiencies and difficulties of the first Draft Convention prepared, it is unlikely to prove possible to draft a comprehensive Convention on this subject to which the majority of Governments will be prepared to adhere. Copy to: Foreign Office, Mr. R. P. Heppel

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No. 127 Members of the Future US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Commend the Efforts of Charles Malik, President of the ECOSOC, on behalf of the Convention, February 18, 1948  UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (3), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Organizations February 18, 1948 Hon. Charles Malik President, Economic and Social Council United Nations Lake Success, New York Dear Mr. President: We the undersigned are happy to express our deep appreciation to you for giving us the hearing on Tuesday of last week at which we urged the prompt drawing up of a convention on the crime of genocide. We also wish to thank you personally as well as officially for giving us your assurance of support of prompt passage of such a convention. On behalf of the religious leaders representative of the American and international organizations for whom we had the privilege to speak, we were deeply moved by your interest and great sincerity. We also thank you for your public support of a convention at the recent meeting of the Economic and Social Council and for the support given by the Lebanese delegate. We are gratified to know that the majority of the members of the Council supported your views on the prompt drawing up of the convention. This matter is of such great concern and so vital to world peace that we cannot conceive of continuing opposition by Great Britain. The unanimous Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1946 not only declared that the “punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern” but concluded its Resolution with the specific request that the “Economic and Social Council undertake the necessary steps with a view to drafting up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly.” As recently as last November, 1947, the General Assembly notified the Economic and Social Council to proceed with the completion of its draft of a convention. In the light of these solemn actions of the member states of the United Nations, we confidentially hope that under your strong leadership as President of the Economic and Social Council, a draft convention will soon be presented not only to the member states but to the entire world.



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As history shows, great issues are often lost by being buried in committees. We know, Mr. President, that under your leadership this will not be allowed to happen. If we can be of any service to the Council, we are at its command. Respectfully signed, Church Peace Union and World Alliance for International Friendship through Churches Henry A. Atkinson, General Secretary Federal Council of Churches in America Samuel McCrea Cavert International Conference of Christians and Jews Henry Noble MacCracken, Co-Chairman Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews James N. Rosenberg

No. 128 John Ennals of the World Federation of UN Associations Requests UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to Publically Endorse the Genocide Convention, March 3, 1948  UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (3), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Organizations March 3, 1948 World Federation of United Nations Associations Trygve Lie Secretary-General United Nations Lake Success, N.Y. Sir: The World Federation of United Nations Associations has been and continues to be concerned with the genocide issue. It has lent its active support to the genocide convention by sponsoring an international manifesto which was signed by many world leaders in cultural and political life such as Sigrid Undset, Paal Berg, Edouard Herriot, Pearl Buck and Aldous Huxley, and others. The World Federation watched with great interest and satisfaction how the genocide resolution of 1946 started a world-wide mobilization of public opinion to outlaw genocide. Many representatives of governments and voluntary groups all over the world such as church, labor, women, interracial and peace organizations have joined in this movement. In the present world crisis the adoption of a convention on genocide would be significant to the preservation of peace and the promotion of the spirit of the United Nations. Because of your great authority as a world leader and man who has always

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fought for just causes, may we appeal to you to lend your personal support to the genocide convention. May we take the liberty to ask you to issue a public statement in support of an early adoption of a genocide convention. Please be assured of our respect and deep appreciation for anything you may wish to do in this matter. Yours respectfully, John A. F. Ennals Per Julia Stuart Liaison Secretary

No. 129 The UN Human Rights Division Advises the UN Secretary General against Expressing Himself Publically in support of the Genocide Convention, March 9, 1948 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (3), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Organizations March 9, 1948 United Nations Interoffice Memorandum To: Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General From: Egon Schwelb, Assistant Director, Division of Human Rights Subject: Request for a Statement by the Secretary-General on the Genocide Convention I herewith submit file SOA/17/2/03 which contains a letter from the American Office of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, received 3 March 1948, requesting the Secretary-General to lend his personal support to the genocide convention and asking him to issue a public statement in support of its early adoption. I also submit to you a memorandum by Professor Giraud on the subject. If I may be allowed to present my views on how to advise the Secretary-General on the matter, I submit the following: There is no difference of opinion among Members of the United Nations that, what has been called genocide, should be a punishable crime under international law and the General Assembly has in two resolutions declared that it is a punishable crime. Opinions differ only on the question whether, in order to ensure this aim, it is necessary, or even useful, to adopt a convention. The majority of the General Assembly and a majority of the Economic and Social Council have decided that a convention should be prepared. A minority (among them the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Netherlands and some French spokesmen) are of the opinion that most of the acts coming under the notion of genocide are already punishable as crimes against humanity under existing law, which is already binding upon all States.



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The minority holds that the adoption of a convention on genocide could throw doubt on this position and weaken the strength of international law, if some States would decline to adhere to the Convention. The Economic and Social Council appointed during its present Session a Committee of seven members which, according to present preparations, is due to convene at Lake Success in the first half of April (Document E/734).1 In view of this situation, it appears to be doubtful whether the Secretary-General should issue a public statement in support of the early adoption of the Convention as all the Members of the United Nations are agreed upon the substance and the difference of opinion centers only around the technical question whether or not the Convention is the best remedy to adopt. In making a public statement, the Secretary-General would take part in a technical controversy and would appeal to public opinion in support of one opinion on a technical question which has been adopted by the majority of Members, against the opinion, equally honestly held, of a minority of Powers. In this situation, I think it would be appropriate if the Secretary-General replied to the Secretary-General of the World Federation of United Nations Associations on the lines of the enclosed draft.

No. 130 UN Secretary General Trygve Lie Opposes the Idea of Making a Public Statement in support of the Genocide Convention, March 18, 1948 UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (3), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Organizations March 18, 1948 Mr. John A. F. Ennals Secretary General World Federation of United Nations Associations 1, Avenue de la Paix Geneva, Switzerland Sir, I have to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter undated concerning the crime of genocide. I have followed with great interest the activities of the World Federation of United Nations Associations and need not emphasize how much its work and that of the individual national United Nations Associations are appreciated by this organization. There is no difference of opinion among the Members of the United Nations that genocide is a crime under international law; this has been laid down, inter alia, in two Resolutions of the General Assembly (96(I) and 180(II)). Furthermore, the Economic See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 619.

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and Social Council established an Ad Hoc Committee of seven Members on 3 March 1948 and instructed it to prepare the draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide. This Ad Hoc Committee will, according to present arrangements, convene in the first half of April 1948 and will present its draft, together with the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights which meets in May, to the next session of the Economic and Social Council in July 1948. In view of these decisions and the forthcoming meetings, which give promise of results in the very near future, it would seem hardly necessary for me to make a public statement exhorting the Members of the United Nations to take a step which they have agreed to take and for which they have established the machinery. I should like to add that a public statement on my part is inappropriate also because those Members of the United Nations which were not in favour of the described procedure adopted by the majority are by no means opposed to the proposition that genocide is and should remain a crime under international law and be treated as such. These States however, expressed the opinion that most of the acts within the meaning of genocide are already punishable in international law as crimes against humanity and that the provisions making these acts punishable are binding upon all States. The difference of opinion does not, therefore, affect the substance, namely the question whether genocide is and should remain an international crime, but concerns only the procedure that should be adopted in order to combat this crime most efficiently. On this and all other technical questions the Secretariat has been advising the representative bodies of the United Nations from the beginning and the Council, in the Resolution referred to above, has again requested the “Secretary-General to take appropriate measures to enable the (Ad Hoc) Committee effectively to carry out the tasks entrusted to it.” You may be assured that the Secretariat will, of course, comply with the Council’s request to the best of its abilities. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, Trygve Lie Secretary-General

No. 131 Raphael Lemkin Underscores Individual Responsibility, Universal Jurisdiction in His Memorandum on Genocide, April 17, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 April 17, 1948 (Lemkin’s memo)



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Memorandum on genocide The resolution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1946 and of November 21, 1947 declared unanimously, with strong American support and leadership, that genocide is an international crime for the commission of which individuals and government officials are punishable. The responsibility of individuals is essential, because genocide in most of the cases was committed through groups of individuals blinded by hatred and intolerance. The Nuremberg case is not the only one of genocide. Governments might instigate such crimes, but they are always masters in hiding evidence. The pogroms of the Jews by the German mob was explained by Goering as a “healthy reaction of the German people against arrogance and crimes of the Jews.1 The pogroms in Czarist Russia and Rumania have always been represented as a result of a dislike of the Jews by the native populations. In 1933, great numbers of Assyrian Christians were exterminated in Iraq in the city of Simel. The government of Iraq disclaimed any complicity.2 Factually, if genocide will be treated as a crime only when it is committed with the complicity of governments, a genocide case will never be tried. A government will blame the individual and will deny its complicity. An individual will never dare to accuse its own government, even if he has been involved in the crime in complicity with the government. Moreover, a clause of complicity never belongs to the definition of a crime. A crime is first of all a crime. Later on one tries to find out who did it in order to apply sanctions. The American proposal of April 6, 1948 to the effect that genocide will be punished only in cases of government complicity is not only impractical and makes the entire convention meaningless, but is also in contradiction not only to the two resolutions of the General Assembly, which were adopted unanimously, but also to the American draft on genocide, submitted to the Secretary General of the UN on September 19, 1947.3 This American draft was one of the most constructive documents submitted to the UN by any government. Why was it reversed now? May be there is a false conception of genocide by those American representatives who reversed their previous position. Genocide does not mean the extermination of an entire human group as it happened in the case of the Jews in Germany. The Nuremberg case is one of the most shocking and certainly the hanging of the eleven Nazi leaders did not repair much of the damage. Therefore the draft of the Secretary General as well as the U.S.A. draft of September 1947 considers also partial destruction of human groups, like pogroms, as genocide. The killing of 50 persons is also genocide. Why should it in such a case be required to establish the complicity of governments? A German-wide anti-Jewish pogrom of November 9–10, 1938 was instigated and largely carried out by the Nazi Party paramilitaries, the SA. An estimated 1,000 synagogues and 7,000 Jewish businesses were destroyed, ninety-one Jews killed and further 30,000 arrested during the pogrom. Hermann Göring (1893–1946) was a close associate of Hitler. In 1933 Göring came to establish the Gestapo and since 1936 he had supervised Germany’s rearmament program. Three days after the pogrom, Göring invited top Nazi leaders for a meeting with the double purpose of blaming the Jews for the outrage and eventually squeezing them from the German economy. 2 Prompted by the rumors of atrocities allegedly committed by Christians, the Iraqi army in August 1933 massacred at Simele and surrounding villages in the northern Iraq up to six thousand Assyrians. Subsequent accounts of the massacre typically blamed Arab nationalists. 3 The American draft was actually submitted on September 30, 1947. See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 557–62. 1

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The American representative argues that genocide cases not involving complicity would be punished by governments through their domestic law. But what happens if a government will fails to do so? A government might facilitate the escape of such criminals to other countries. According to the American proposal, other countries cannot do much by way of trying such a criminal. When Petlura, the leader of the Ukrainian Cossacks killed hundreds of thousands of Jews, he escaped to Paris in 1921 and was considered there as a refugee enjoying asylum. This was so socking that a Jewish tailor, Schwarzbart, killed him in Paris. The French jury acquitted Schwarzbart.1 After the case of genocide, committed on the Armenians in the last war, the man who was largely responsible for the massacre, Enver Pasha, escaped to Tiflis and was living quietly there until he was killed on the street by an Armenian student whose family perished through genocide.2 In order to make it possible to try genocide cases against criminals who escape to other countries, one must introduce the definition of genocide into the national legislation of every country. But at the session of the genocide committee on April 9, 1948, the American representative requested that no definition of genocide should be introduced into national legislations. Such proposals knock out the bottom of the genocide convention and make such a convention meaningless. Even if an international tribunal should be proposed, it is not enough by itself. At the last meeting of the Committee of Codification of International Law, most of the countries expressed themselves against an international tribunal. The U.S. representative might propose it. But how far is such a proposal practical, if the U.S. has consistently opposed until now to grant compulsory jurisdiction to the World Court in The Hague? A criminal tribunal must have compulsory jurisdiction. Are we ready to go so far now? The only constructive way is to follow either the draft of the Secretary General or the American draft of September 1947 in addition to many constructive suggestions of members of the committee. The main lines of these drafts are: 3. The definition of genocide should be included in every national legislation. 4. For the crime of genocide shall be responsible individuals and officials. 5. Every country will be in a position to try on its territory genocidists, even if the crime is committed abroad. No political asylum can be granted to such offenders. 6. In most flagrant cases the General Assembly might decide to set up a special tribunal to try genocide cases. 7. Damages shall be paid to survivors of victim groups.

Symon Petliura (1879–1926) was a Ukrainian nationalist and head of state of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919–20. Anti-Jewish pogroms during his tenure claimed over 50,000 lives. Sholom Schwarzbard (1886–1938) was a Russian Jewish anarchist who fought against the Petliura’s forces as part of the Red Army; fourteen members of his family perished in pogroms during the Russian Civil War. Lemkin repeatedly used the example of Petlura revenge assassination in his argumentation. Cf. doc nos. 145, 146. 2 Lemkin confuses Enver Pasha (1881–1922), War Minister of the Ottoman Empire, with Talaat Pasha (1874–1921), Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. Enver Pasha died in battle against the Red Army near Dushanbe, present-day Tajikistan, in August 1922. Talaat Pasha had fled to Berlin, Germany, where in March 1921 he was gunned down by Soghomon Tehlirian, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Along with the case of Petlura, Lemkin repeatedly evoked the story of assassination of Talat Pasha in his argumentation. Cf. doc. no. 147. 1



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8. Only a combination of all these clauses might create a practical machinery for preventing the crime, for punishing the criminals and for educating the peoples of the world in respect to different races, nations and creeds. 9. The American representative tries to limit the definition of genocide to actual killings. This is not enough. What about exposing persons to the danger of death in concentration camps, in ghettos, transporting them in cattle cars, working them to death? And what about sterilizing people, kidnapping their children, breaking up families deliberately and systematically as the Nazis did? A human group of a racial, national or religious character is a living entity with body and soul.1 It should be protected against destruction by all means which can be invented by the devilish mind of the enemies of mankind. Burning of churches, like recently in Bogota, should be punished, too, because such acts destroy a religious group.2

No. 132 David H.T. Hildyard of the British Foreign Office Summarizes His Informal Conversation with William W. Simpson, General Secretary of the British Council of Christians and Jews, May 10, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN977 May 10, 1948 United States religious groups ad hoc committee in connexion with international genocide convention. He has had two letters within the last few days from James Rosenberg, who is Chairman of the Committee on Human Rights of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. In his first letter he says that the religious groups in the United States have formed an ad hoc committee for an international genocide convention. Encloses a note on the main points of Mr. Rosenberg’s second letter regarding the British attitude towards a genocide convention. Asks whether a talk could be arranged. (Minutes) I had an off the record talk with the Rev. Simpson on 11th May. He has always been sensible and practical. I thoroughly appreciate his attitude. We discussed his new draft convention of which the full text was unfortunately not yet available, and agreed that it had already met a good deal of opposition, and would probably meet more. Lemkin repeatedly evoked the metaphor of a nation consisting of body and soul, especially in the early 1950s. 2 Ransacking churches was one of less gruesome aspects of the 1948–58 civil war in Columbia. During the civil war the Catholic Church supported the Conservative Party, whose paramilitary forces fought against those established by the Liberal Party and the Communist Party. 1

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He will answer Mr. Rosenberg (whom he regards as emotional and impractical) on the following lines. 1. HMG fully aware that the Nuremberg judgment is only a “war” judgment: the International Law Commission has as one of its main tasks the codification of the Nuremburg principles on a peace time basis. The misunderstanding is on Mr. R’s side. 2. We have always been against including cultural genocide, and the Americans are now supporting our views. 3. It would do no good writing around to Archbishops, etc. who in fact agree that this attitude is sensible. Also the matter is sub [illegible] anyway. The attitude of the religious bodies here seems entirely favourable: they are merely put in awkward positions by wider elements in America. The Rev. Simpson is working, very happily, for Rosenberg, which was outlined above. D. Hildyard

No. 133 James N. Rosenberg of the National Conference of Christians and Jews Appeals to US Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Issue an Official Statement in support of the Genocide Convention, May 11, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/4-1448) May 11, 1948 Hon. Robert A. Lovett Under Secretary of State Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. Secretary: It gives me great pleasure to inform you of my admiration of the work of Mr. John Maktos as Chairman of the Drafting Committee on the genocide matter. He has been patient, tactful, and wise, and great progress has been made largely as a result of his excellent leadership.1 As you know, there are three further steps coming in reference to a Genocide Convention; (a) consideration thereof by the Commission on Human Rights, of which Mrs. Roosevelt is Chairman; (b) further consideration by the Economic and Social Council at Geneva in July; (c) further study at the General Assembly meeting in Paris in September. At some one of these meetings a public statement from yourself, or Secretary Marshall, or perhaps from President Truman would, in my opinion, be of great help. Perhaps it is wishful thinking but I am encouraged by this morning’s account of conversations between General Smith and Mr. Molotov and it seems to me that in this See also doc. no. 57.

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genocide matter, where all the member states agree, that great service can be rendered to the cause of securing a convention through an appropriate public statement from Washington.1 In these hours of international tension, the fact of unanimous agreement of all the member states in respect of a genocide convention stands out as a ray of light and I am particularly anxious therefore that our country should take a conspicuous leadership in bringing about the adoption of a convention by the next General Assembly meeting. The adoption of such a convention by the United Nations will strengthen that body. I earnestly hope therefore that you will, despite the terrible pressure under which you are working because of immediate pressing problems, be able to give enough time to the genocide matter so that an appropriately strong statement in support of a genocide convention may come from Washington. Yours very sincerely, [signed] James N. Rosenberg

No. 134 The US State Department Notified about the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for an International Genocide Convention, May 12, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/5-1248) May 12, 1948 Hon. Robert A. Lovett Under Secretary of State Department of State Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. Secretary: I forgot to mention to you in my letter of yesterday that an Ad Hoc Committee had been formed for an International Genocide Convention composed of the following members: Mr. Benjamin Abrams, President, Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corp.; Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, General Secretary of the Church Peace Union and World Peace Alliance; Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America; Dr. Everett R. Clinchy, President, and member of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews; Mr. Allan W. Dulles; Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger, Chairman of the Human Rights The conversation between US Ambassador to Moscow Walter Bedell Smith (1895–1961) and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on April 9 might have projected false optimism about the future of SovietAmerican relations. Five days earlier Smith conveyed to Molotov the official US position, according to which the USSR bore the responsibility for world tensions. Molotov rejected all the accusations and threw the onus on the United States. Reporting back to Washington, Smith concluded that the Soviets were not yet ready to talk but had not closed the door either.

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Committee of the American Association for the United Nations; Mr. Willard Johnson, Secretary, Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews; Mr. Thomas H. Mahony, President of the Catholic Association for International Peace, (Miss Katherine Schaefer, National Catholic Welfare Conference, alternate); Mr. Clarence E. Pickett, American Friends Service Committee; Mr. James N. Rosenberg, Chairman, Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews; Dr. George N. Shuster, President, Hunter College, member of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews; Professor Wesley A. Sturges, Dean, Yale Law School. The secretary of the committee is Mr. Willard Johnson, and I have been elected the chairman of the committee. I shall be grateful to you for any comments you may care to make, or any advice you may wish to give me in reference to the present draft convention. It is most important to me to know whether it is entirely satisfactory to the United States. If you find that there is any occasion for any amendments thereto or changes in the phraseology, I hope you will let me know just as soon as possible. I should like to make special mention of the valuable legal services of Ernest Gross in connection with genocide matters. Yours very sincerely, J. N. Rosenberg

No. 135 William W. Simpson of the Council of Christians and Jews Assures James N. Rosenberg That the UK Government Has Only Good Intentions with regard to the Genocide Convention, May 12, 1948 NA, F.O. 371/72692/UN977 May 12, 1948 Dear Mr. Rosenberg, Further to my letter of May 7th, I am writing to let you know that I had a long session yesterday with one of our Foreign Office men who is working on the Genocide Convention.1 My conversation with him confirms my earlier impression that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the British Government with regard to the issues that are at stake in this matter of the Genocide Convention. There has never been any suggestion by the British delegation that the Nuremberg trials and judgements cover the matter of Genocide as an international crime in such a way as to make any further action unnecessary. The whole point of the British recommendation that the matter be referred to the International Law Commission is based upon the Government’s See doc. no. 132.

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recognition of the fact that it would be one of the functions of that Commission to consider ways and means of making principles which applied to a war-time situation applicable to situations which may arise in time of peace. I am interested to learn that it is precisely in connection with the question of the establishment of legal procedure for dealing with acts of Genocide that the drafting Commission is experiencing very great difficulty. You will remember also that the British Government recommended that certain aspects of the problems might be better dealt with by the Human Rights Commission, and I note with interest your reference to the fact that the latest draft of the Convention is likely to be submitted to that Commission at its meeting this month. This is the more significant in view of the difficulties which I understand have arisen with regard to the question as to whether the Convention should cover Genocide in both the physical and cultural sense, or whether it should deal only with this former: that is, with Genocide ‘stricto sensu’. You mention that there is a disposition on the part of the French to exclude any reference to religious aspects of Genocide, but I understand that there is also some objection on the part of the Russian delegation to the inclusion of political groups, while the American delegation has raised difficulties with regard to the inclusion of cultural Genocide in the present Convention. The problem is, as the British Government has always envisaged it as being, one of great difficulty and complexity, but I think you can rest assured that His Majesty’s Government’s chief concern is to find the most effective means of dealing with it. Yours sincerely, (Signed) WILLIAM W. SIMPSON

No. 136 The Committee for an International Genocide Convention Decides on a Course of Action, May 13, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/12 May 13, 1948 Committee for an International Genocide Convention Minutes – Meeting May 13, 1948 12:30 p.m. Lawyer’s Club, 115 Broadway, New York City Members present: James N. Rosenberg, Chairman Henry Noble MacCracken, Co-Chairman, Intrenational Council of Christians and Jews Raphael Lemkin, Yale Universty Law School Julia Stuart, Liaison Secretary World federation of United Nations Associations Benjamin Abrams, Emerson Radio and Phonograph Company Raymond Rubinow, NCCJ observer United Nations Willard Johnson, National Conference of Christians and Jews, Secretary

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Miss Stuart explained the work of the World Federation of United Nations Associations and its international work for genocide through its national associations. She also reported on the ability and interest in genocide of Major John A. F. Ennals, Secretary General of the World Federation. It was decided to change the name and membership of the committee to the American Committee for an International Genocide Convention due to the lack of time and difficulty of clearing decisions with those abroad. It was decided to ask Major Ennals to serve as an ex officio member of the committee because of his concern about genocide and his residence in Geneva where the next U.N. session to consider genocide will be held. Miss Stuart will cable him for his decision with letters to follow. If he accepts he will be asked to represent the committee at the Geneva U.N. (ECOSOC) meetings. It was also decided to ask Everett R. Clinchy or Jacques Maritain to speak before the U.N. on the subject. Mr. Rosenberg stated that he hopes Dr. Lemkin will be able to attend the July U.N. meetings on funds provided by the committee, if Dr. Lemkin is physically able to do so. (He has been ordered by his doctor to take a 3 weeks rest because of his high blood pressure.) There was discussion and agreement on new members as follows: Allen Dulles, New York City Pearl Buck (to be invited by Willard Johnson) Mildred Burgess, Business and Professional Women’s Clubs (to be invited by Miss Stuart) A youth representative (to be chosen and invited by Henry Noble MacCracken) A representative of labor, perhaps Elinore Herrick (to be invited by Willard Johnson after checking with Mr. Abrams).1 Mr. Rubinow is to decide whether it is best for him to be a member of a secretariat with Mr. Johnson, or to have no formal association with the committee (it was later decided that Mr. Rubinow should be listed on the letterhead as U.N. technical advisor). It was decided to send $250 from the genocide funds deposited with NCCJ to Miss Stuart for secretariat help in connection with her work on genocide. It was decided to (1) Print the letterhead as soon as membership is completed; (2) Mimeograph 1,000 copies of the draft genocide convention (Mr. Rubinow to get copy from the U.N.); (3) Print a small pamphlet on genocide in English, French and Spanish for use at Geneva and Paris U.N. meetings. Dr. Lemkin is to write the material after his return from three weeks rest. It should be ready to send to Geneva by July first. Dr. Lemkin and Mr. Rosenberg explained that a genocide convention is essentially different from the Nuremberg Judgment at these points: 1. The Nuremberg Judgment and trials dealt only with aggressive war; genocide with peace time crimes.

Elinore Herrick (1895–1964) was the head of personnel at the New York Herald Tribune. Between 1935 and 1942 she served as New York director of the National Labor Relations Board. Herrick’s name never appeared on the committee’s letterhead.

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2. Nuremberg was a case of the victor over vanquished; a genocide convention will be a voluntary act of equal nations. 3. Nuremberg was essentially “ex post facto.” Mr. Abrams asked if the genocide convention would be effective. Will it have teeth? There was agreement that this, like Magna Carta, the American Bill of Rights and similar great developments is only a beginning, but a most important one, and a platform from which to work. Drs. MacCracken and Eichelberger were elected vice-chairmen of the Committee. Adjournment Willard Johnson Secretary

No. 137 The American Committee for an International Genocide Convention Objects to the Inclusion of Political Groups, May 25, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/8 May 25, 1948 IMPORTANT AND CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL GENOCIDE CONVENTION From: James N. Rosenberg, Chairman Dear Friends: While I am most reluctant to intrude on your time, I feel it vitally necessary to have your advice and comments on matters in the enclosed memorandum to you. I also call attention, special attention, to the fact that the Economic and Social Council will meet in Geneva on July 19th, at which time our committee will be ably represented and it is therefore urgently important that your views on the questions asked you in the enclosed memorandum be sent to me at the very earliest possible moment. Very sincerely, James N. Rosenberg

Urgent * * * May 25, 1948

IMPORTANT AND CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL GENOCIDE CONVENTION In re: From:

GENOCIDE DRAFT CONVENTION JAMES N. ROSENBERG, CHAIRMAN

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You will receive, in this or the next mail, from Willard Johnson, General Secretary of the Committee, a copy of the Draft Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which has just been completed by the seven nation drafting committee. The document is dated May 19, 1948. My examination of this document and of various facts surrounding its preparation leads me to make the following comments and to inquire whether you agree with views which I express in this memorandum. Article II defines genocide as “deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious of political group, on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members”. The inclusion of the “political” group in this definition has aroused serious objection from Great Britain, Latin America, and the Soviet Union, and from various thoughtful men, including American citizens. To leave this word “political” in the definition therefore means that when the matter comes up in Geneva in July before the Economic and Social Council and again before the General Assembly in Paris in September, it is more than likely that there will be such opposition to the definition as to kill our efforts altogether. I therefore propose that our committee should take the position that we have no objection to and on the whole prefer to have that word “political” omitted. While the Government of the United States favors the inclusion of the word “political” the objections to which I refer are so serious that we would be unlikely to obtain the two-thirds majority in the Assembly, which is needed, if we insist on the word “political”. This is a tremendous important point, on which I want your advice, and if you agree with me it is my plan to get in touch with our State Department as promptly as possible and to explain our point of view in the hope that the State Department will consent to elimination of the word “political” in the definition. This I believe to be practical statesmanship.

No. 138 James N. Rosenberg of the National Conference of Christians and Jews Urges US Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Omit Political Groups from the Final Wording of the Genocide Convention and to Secure British Support for the Treaty overall, June 2, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/6-248) June 2, 1948 Honorary Robert A. Lovett Under Secretary of State Dear Mr. Lovett: As you know, a draft convention on the subject of genocide has been prepared by the seven nations committee, of which John Maktos was chairman. Doubtless you have



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a copy of the draft convention. For your convenience I am sending you one herewith. My purpose in writing to you is threefold: FIRST I am of the opinion that in the definition of genocide contained in Article II the word “political” should be omitted. This word has aroused considerable opposition which would disappear, I believe, if that word were omitted. Aside from the pragmatic approach, I suggest that on principle there is considerable doubt as to the advisability of including the word “political”. SECOND Article VII dealing with enforceability is too vague. It leaves the subject of enforcement in midair. Hence I suggest that Article VII should be modified to read as follows: “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or in which the persons so charged are apprehended, or by such international tribunal as may hereafter be created by the General Assembly in any particular case.” You will at once note the basis for my suggestion. THIRD Opposition has come from England to any convention. The chief source of the objection seems to be the view of Sir Hartley Shawcross that the whole matter should be referred to an International Law Commission. For fifteen or twenty years there was an International Committee of the League of Nations to codify International Criminal Law. Vast sums of money were spent and nothing was accomplished. Moreover there is no need for an international convention on criminal law because the subjects with which International Criminal Law has concerned itself are already covered largely by treaties among the civilized nations. These subjects are: trading in women and children; slave trade; obscene publications; traffic in drugs. The only substantial International Criminal Law matter not covered by treaty is the law of piracy which has been established by decisions throughout the various countries. On June 14th I am going to England. While there I want to try to see Sir Hartley in the hope of persuading Great Britain to join with the United States in urging the convention. Before sailing it occurs to me that if you could spare fifteen or twenty minutes for me, it would be most helpful to me and, what is more important, to the cause. An American citizen has been chairman of the seven nations drafting committee. The United States has taken leadership in this effort for a convention dealing with genocide. Here is one subject on which all the nations have agreed. In two meetings of the General Assembly, one in 1946 and the other in 1947, there was a unanimous vote for a genocide convention. My earnest hope is that it may be possible to persuade Great Britain to join in leadership for this cause with the U.S.A. Perhaps you will think the matter sufficiently important to be willing to give me a note of introduction

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to Ambassador Douglas.1 Both he and Mrs. Douglas are deeply interested in the work of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. When I was in London in October Mr. Douglas was in the United States but the Embassy sent a representative to a luncheon I gave to outstanding Englishmen and others, in honor of Dr. Everett R. Clinchy, President of this organization.2 The great religious bodies of this country are devoting themselves most actively to this matter of a genocide convention and to an International Bill of Rights. On June 16, 17, and 18, there will be the meetings at the Town Hall in New York City of some thirty or forty religious and other organizations. The meeting is sponsored by the Church Peace Union, whose general secretary Dr. Henry A. Atkinson is a member of the genocide committee by the American Association for the United Nations, of which organization Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger is a vice-chairman of the genocide committee.3 Lastly, the meeting is sponsored by the World Alliance for Friendship through the Churches, which is also working with our genocide committee. I mention these facts to indicate to you the breadth and the depth of interest in human rights convention and a convention to outlaw genocide. I am strongly inclined to believe that if Sir Hartley will join in supporting the genocide convention the next assembly will adopt it. Please forgive the length of this letter. I felt I should write you in some detail to bring you up to date. I will be glad to cancel any engagement I have between now and June 12th to come down and see you, and I promise to take but little of your time. Faithfully yours, James N. Rosenberg

No. 139 A Women’s Organization Urges the UN Commission on Human Rights to State That the Genocide Convention Contributes to the Protection of Human Rights, June 9, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/8 June 9, 1948 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom To the President and Members Of the Commission on Human Rights United Nations Lake Success, L.I., N.Y. Lewis W. Douglas (1894–1974), US Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1947 to 1950. Clinchy, R. Everett (1897–1986), founder and first president of the National Conference of Christians & Jews. 3 Henry A. Atkinson (1877–1966), general secretary of the Church Peace Union from 1918 to 1955; Clark M. Eichelberger (1896–1980), first director of the American Association for the United Nations. 1 2



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Dear Madam: Dear Sir: We understand that the Economic and Social Council instructed the Commission on Human Rights to submit its comments on the Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide but that it was impossible for the Commission to make a detailed study of the draft convention. In view of the fact that the crime of genocide is being committed at present in many parts of the world, we submit that the Commission on Human Rights state that the adoption of a convention on the crime of genocide is a vital step toward the protection of human groups and toward the maintenance of world peace, and urge the Economic and Social Council to submit the convention to the UN General Assembly in September 1948 for final action. Very truly, Gertrude Baer Permanent Consultant, United Nations

No. 140 James Rosenberg and Raphael Lemkin Express Their Views on Certain Provisions of the Draft Genocide Convention in a Conversation with Ernest Gross and Jack Tate of the US State Department, June 9, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/6-948) June 9, 1948 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Draft Convention on Genocide Participants: Mr. James N. Rosenberg, Chairman, Committee on Human Rights of the National Conference of Christians & Jews, Inc. Professor Raphael Lemkin Mr. Gross – L Mr. Tate – L Copies to: Mr. Maktos – L/I Mr. Halderman – OA Miss Fite – L/M In accordance with the suggestion of the Under Secretary, in his letter of June 7 to Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Rosenberg, with Professor Lemkin, came to Mr. Gross’s office to discuss the proposed Convention on the subject of genocide, together with his letter of June 2, 1948 to Mr. Lovett.1 See doc. no. 138

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Mr. Rosenberg first discussed the point first mentioned in his letter, suggesting that the word “political” should be omitted from Article II of the proposed Convention. Mr. Rosenberg stated that he made the suggestion on purely pragmatic grounds in order to promote acceptance of the Convention by other countries. He felt that if the word “political” remained in the Convention there would be considerable opposition to the Convention as a whole not only by the [iron] curtain countries but by the Latin American states as well. Mr. Gross agreed that this was a consideration that would have to be borne in mind in the course of negotiations. He felt however that as a matter of principle the word should be retained in the Article. If during the course of negotiations it appeared that the retention of the word would block acceptance of the Convention, his opinion was that the matter should be reconsidered at that time. In the meantime he thought that the considerations advanced by Mr. Rosenberg should be borne in mind and the potential dangers explored. Mr. Rosenberg agreed that we should continue to push for the retention of the word “political” up to the point where the Convention as a whole would be endangered. Mr. Rosenberg next discussed Article III and suggested that the concept of collective violence could well be inserted in that Article, so that it would be clear that the Article did not refer to individual acts of violence. Professor Lemkin did not appear happy at this suggestion but as Mr. Rosenberg carried the discussion Professor Lemkin did not have an opportunity to elaborate his position. Mr. Gross inquired if such an addition might not more properly be included as part of Article II, by means of adding a fifth category to that article covering any deliberate acts of violence committed with the intent to accomplish the purposes enumerated in Article III. Mr. Rosenberg thought such an arrangement would be appropriate. The suggestions as to drafting were made in pursuance of Mr. Rosenberg’s assumption that the change should be made. However, there was no commitment that Article III, with the revision of that Article II, revised as indicated above, would be supported by this Government. The discussion then turned to Article VII of the draft Convention and the second point in Mr. Rosenberg’s letter of June 2, 1948 to Mr. Lovett. Mr. Rosenberg said he thought that the words in the latter part of the draft as set forth in his letter were extremely important. He did not think that Article VII as now written in the draft Convention was at all sufficient. He stated that he did not feel strongly that the clause “in which the persons so charged are apprehended” was of vital importance, in spite of Professor Lemkin’s disagreement. Mr. Rosenberg said that he would not press for ad hoc tribunals as his letter indicated he would. He stated that he would be willing to go along with a provision for “a competent international tribunal constituted under authority of the United Nations with jurisdiction to try offenders offenses under this Convention”. Such a provision had been suggested by Mr. Gross and was heartily agreed to by Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Gross stated that he would explore the possibility of such a provision. In the course of his conversation Mr. Rosenberg stated that he was “in a yielding mood” on the question of “incitement”. Finally, Mr. Gross stated that he would be glad to obtain for Mr. Rosenberg a letter of introduction from Mr. Lovett to Ambassador Douglas, in compliance with



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Mr. Rosenberg’s request, in order that Mr. Rosenberg might discuss with Ambassador Douglas the British position and the point of view expressed by Mr. Rosenberg in his letter of June 2, 1948 to Mr. Lovett. This was done latter in the day. Lemkin said he would supply a memo covering his viewpoint on the points discussed above. [Signed] Ernest Gross

No. 141 James Rosenberg Tells US Delegate to the General Assembly John Foster Dulles the British Opposition is Detrimental to the Genocide Convention, June 11, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/8 June 11, 1948 John Foster Dulles, Esq. 48 Wall Street New York, N.Y. Dear Foster: Thinking back to your magnificent work bringing together Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in support of human rights, I feel confident that, despite the many duties which are on your shoulders, your interest in this profoundly important human subject has not decreased. Hence I hope that you will, if you get time and if the occasion arises, put your shoulders behind the adoption of a Genocide Convention. A seven nation committee of the ECOSOC has drafted a proposed convention which on the whole is very good. There are some details in respect of which there must be some changes of phraseology. On this subject I have had a long conference in the State Department and I find that there is a very constructive, thoughtful and effective approach to the subject and deep interest in securing, through the leadership of the United States, the adoption of a convention. Some moment, some time, some occasion, may arise when you, in discussing the foreign policy of the United States, may feel it [is] appropriate to say something publicly on this subject. The main danger of defeat of a convention on genocide, so far as [can] I see, is the apparent opposition of the British. You may perhaps get a chance to say a word to the new Ambassador, indicating the deep interest of the religious leaders of the United States on this subject. That will be extremely helpful. I had wanted to have a chat with you and bring you up to date on details but I have been overwhelmed with work and am sailing for England on Monday next on the Mauritania. Under Secretary Lovett, Senator Austin, Herschel Johnson, have written to Ambassador Douglas in reference to my forthcoming visit in order that I may have

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the advice and help of the Ambassador in talking with the British. I mention this just so that you may know the facts. All the best wishes, Very sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg

No. 142 James Rosenberg Seeks to Neutralize Potential Opposition to the Genocide Convention by France, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, June 11, 1948  AJHS, P-154/2/8 June 11, 1948 Mr. Willard Johnson National Conference of Christians and Jews 381 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N.Y. Dear Willard: Please note the enclosed letter of June 9th from Dr. Cavert which gives you the funds for the new Fact Sheet. I also send you a copy of a latter I have written to Dr. Atkinson. I hope you will read it. It may suggest the possibility of your writing letters to European leaders in France, Holland, Belgium, England. Those are the important people. We must break down the danger of opposition from any of those countries. Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg

No. 143 James Rosenberg Tries to Convince Jack Tate of the US State Department to Drop a Reference to “Political Groups,” Criticizes British Position on the Genocide Convention, July 12, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/7-1248) July 12, 1948 United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention Mr. Jack Tate Office of the Legal Advisor



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United States State Department Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Tate: Dr. MacCracken, Dr. Clinchy, and I sailed on June 14th. Our two tasks were the development of the International Council of Christians and Jews (which is now actually having a series of meetings at Fribourg, Switzerland, with over one hundred representatives of about fifteen countries in attendance. One of their projects is to urge the genocide convention). The other task which concerned us was the Genocide Convention itself. It is of the latter matter that I am writing you. For months I had been in correspondence with the Reverend W. W. Simpson, Secretary General of the British Council of Christians and Jews, and he had communicated with the British Foreign Office in reference to the genocide matter. It turned out, as soon as I met the Reverend Mr. Simpson, that he had received an extremely important letter (which I had never before seen) dated January 19, 1948 from Hector McNeil. Of that letter I enclose a photostatic copy.1 I know you will read it with care. It sets forth the British position. Having read that letter, I felt that it would be helpful if I could have a talk with Mr. McNeil. Accordingly, through the warm introduction which Mr. Lovett had given me to Ambassador Douglas, I was able to see the Ambassador, who immediately arranged for Mr. McNeil to see me. This I did. I found Mr. McNeil an outgoing, frank, and most engaging and able man. After my meeting with him I was unable to see Ambassador Douglas again because I left England for the United States only two days after my McNeil meeting and during those two days Ambassador Douglas was completely tied up in Berlin matters. Hence I wrote a letter to Ambassador Douglas, of which I enclose a copy. Included with that letter a memorandum dated July 1st, of which I also enclose a copy.2 I know you will read these documents, even if they are somewhat lengthy. (I do not send you copies of the enclosures which accompanied my memorandum to Ambassador Douglas because I do not have copies of them and it is not really necessary for you to have them.) The three enclosures give you a pretty good picture of the situation as I left it in England. There is one thing I must add with emphasis. Mr. McNeil gave quite some attention to the use of the word “political” in the definition. When I told him that the inclusion of the word “political” might mean the defeat of the Genocide Convention in the General Assembly because of Soviet and Latin American opposition, he replied that to omit the word would be to give sanction to political genocide. Unfortunately, I was not then aware of the position which Sir Hartley Shawcross took in October 1947 before the United Nations (which I set forth later in this letter). This is a matter of policy for decision by the State Department. If Mr. Lovett wishes to talk over this important question with me, I shall come to Washington. The crucial issue is whether it is better to get a convention adopted without the word “political” or to risk defeat by Soviet action and also to invite a partnership in this respect between the Soviets and Latin America (which I do not relish). If Latin America will join with See doc. no. 44. Documents not in the file.

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the U.S.A. in support of inclusion, the course is clear. If not, the State Department must decide the issue. As you know, a two-thirds vote is probably necessary to put the matter through the General Assembly and if the Russians and their Allies, and the Latin American States join hands in opposing a convention with the word “political”, the two-thirds vote would not be obtained. In connection with the determination of policy as to the word “political” Mr. Lovett will doubtless bear in mind that neither the Russians nor Latin Americans object to the word “national” in the definition and this use of the word “national” may fairly be construed to mean that the destruction of “national” groups, as ex. gr. In Czechoslovakia, could come within the definition. This may be a reason for yielding on the word “political” if thereby a convention may be attained and, at the same time, the American objectives, namely to preserve the freedom of small nations, can be attained. The other points in the convention which Mr. Gross, Dr. Lemkin, you, and I discussed when we were in Washington a month ago are far less serious.1 These points, as you recall, were the following: We all agreed at that meeting that the definition of cultural genocide, Article III, should be changed to add after the words “deliberate act” the words “of collective violence”; and we all agreed that after the word “group” on the third line, everything else in Article III should be struck out. We also agreed as to Article IV that the incitement provision (Subdivision C) ought to come out, on the theory that the inclusion of that Subdivision might be looked upon as trespassing on the principle of freedom of speech. The only other point which we discussed was Article VII. As to that Article, Dr. Malik told me that it was his considered opinion that to get a convention it would have to come out entirely because of jealous national sovereignty. On the other hand, Mr. Gross suggested the inclusion after the word “tribunal” of the words “to be constituted under the authority of the United Nations”. The final handling of policy regarding Article VII must of course rest with the State Department. Its entire omission would not greatly disturb me if the State Department would permit ECOSOC to adopt the State Department proposal relating to jurisdiction as embodied in the United States draft of September 30, 1947.2 You of course have a copy of that draft. It was prepared under the able guidance of Mr. Charles Fahy. It had, I believe, a generally sympathetic reception. Coming back to my conference with Mr. McNeil, I want to underline that I got the feeling that if Mr. Lovett were to urge, as I hope he will do, that the genocide matter should not be referred to a committee of lawyers, Mr. McNeil would agree. The one great danger of defeat of this convention, in my opinion, will be the attempt to refer the whole matter to the not yet existing International Law Commission to codify international law. This would shelve the whole thing for years and would spell defeat of the leadership which the United States has taken in this matter.

See doc. no. 140. See the full text of the document in The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 1, 557–62.

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Summing up, therefore, my suggestion would be: (a) The question of the word “political” must be left to the decision of the State Department; (b) The cultural genocide definition should be changed as above indicated; (c) Incitement ought to come out; (d) Article VII: the policy must be determined by the State Department which I am sure will give consideration to the foregoing suggestions. I must now go back into some detail regarding Sir Hartley Shawcross. This is necessary in view of the fact that Mr. McNeil told me that it was Sir Hartley who drafted that letter, which I enclose. Here is the record then on Sir Hartley. The Journal of the United Nations, issue # 41, Monday, November 25, 1946, page 52, contains discussion about genocide and it is shown that Sir Hartley stated specifically the following: “All States should pass legislation on the subject. International Convention should be concluded.” I quote this because it has been intimated since then by representatives of the British Government than no convention is needed, and the best answer I can give to that is to quote Sir Hartley himself. We also find that Sir Hartley had something to say about the word “political”, the inclusion of which Mr. McNeil now thinks necessary. Here I turn to the summary of the record of the 42nd meeting at Lake Success, Monday, October 6, 1947, 3:00 P.M. (A.C.6 Series 42). This is an official document of the United Nations. On page 2, Sir Hartley Shwcross, in discussing genocide, declared “unless such a convention were adopted by a majority it would do more harm than good. He cited instances were certain States would be reluctant to relinquish domestic jurisdiction by ratification of the convention, for example…in matters relevant to the expression of subversive activities by political groups.” We therefore have two clearly official positions taken by Sir Hartley: (a) there should be a convention; (b) the word “political” should not be included. The January 1948 letter from Mr. Hector McNeil, drafted by Sir Hartley, shows a complete change of position. The great objective is to prevent having this great cause shelved in the hands of a committee of lawyers. Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg

No. 144 A Generic Letter of Introduction Urging the Recipient to Assist Raphael Lemkin in His Efforts on behalf of the Genocide Convention, July 15, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 July 15, 1948

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United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This will introduce Dr. Raphael Lemkin, a member of this committee. We will greatly appreciate it if you will extend every courtesy to him and if you will cooperate with him in the efforts which he is making on behalf of this committee toward accomplishment of a genocide convention. We shall be deeply appreciative of any assistance, or cooperation, or aid you may find it possible to give to Dr. Lemkin. Very truly yours, James N. Rosenberg, Chairman

No. 145 James Rosenberg Warns Charles Malik, President of the ECOSOC, of Unfortunate Delays Had the Draft Genocide Convention Been Sent for Consideration to the Human Rights Commission and/or the International Law Commission, July 15, 1948  UNA, SOA 318/1/01 (3), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide – Comments from Organizations July 15, 1948 United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention Honorable Charles Malik, President Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Palais des Nations Geneva, Switzerland Dear Dr. Malik: I had hoped to be in Geneva for the meeting of the ECOSOC but compelling family duties required my return to the United States. I am terribly disappointed not to be in Geneva when the genocide matter comes up. I feel that there are two possible dangers to the success of your great efforts for a genocide convention. There might be a disposition to refer the whole matter to the Human Rights Commission to become a part of an international bill of rights. This would, in my opinion, shelve the whole genocide matter for a long time; also I feel very strongly and I believe you share my opinion, that in the light of the fact that the General Assembly has regarded this matter of genocide as unique and as so important that it has twice called for a separate convention on genocide, giving it the status of an international crime, requires that we should not allow this paramount genocide issue to be lost in the



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midst of the many complicated problems still unresolved in relation to an international bill of rights. I earnestly hope, therefore, that you will be able to prevail on ECOSOC to continue to deal with genocide as a separate matter of urgent and paramount importance, in accordance with the mandate of the General Assembly. The other danger is the idea of referring the issue to the not yet created International Law Commission. On that subject I had a frank talk in London with Mr. Hector McNeil. I pointed out to him that when the Barons of England wrote Magna Carta they acted and did not refer the drafting to committees of lawyers, and that when the framers of the Constitution of the United States met in Philadelphia in 1787, they wrote a Constitution and did not refer the matter to any committee of lawyers. I trust that my argument carried some weight. It is my profound conviction that to let the genocide matter get to an International Law Commission will destroy all hopes of a convention. It will be nothing more than the repetition of the League of Nations which had an International Law Commission for something like twenty years and never accomplished anything. I know you have all these points in mind and it is really presumptuous of me to write to you, but our committee is so deeply anxious to see the success if your efforts that I am venturing to write you this letter. I enclose herewith a list of international and United States organizations which are championing working for and urging the convention.1 My colleague and dear friend Dr. MacCracken is in Fribourg at the meeting of Catholics, Protestants and Jews. His work there is in developing the International Council of Christians and Jews. He has been authorized by the World Federation of United Nations Associations to be spokesman before the Economic and Social Council on the subject of genocide. The World Federation has a consultative status. Mr. Eichelberger has also authorized him to speak for the American Association of the United Nations. I venture to express the confident hope that Dr. MacCracken will have an opportunity to be heard. I know he is looking forward eagerly to a conference with you. Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg P.S. 1. To give you an idea of the tremendous world interest in this matter, I enclose copy of a letter of July 12th to our committee from the World Federation of Trade Unions in which they not only ask but are “demanding, on behalf of the World Federation of Trade Unions, that the United Nations bodies should adopt an international Genocide Convention”; also the International Union of Catholic Women, with 36,000,000 membership, has written us of their urgent desire for the convention.2 P.S. 2. Recalling the discussion I had with you as to the inclusion of the word “political” in the definition and the opposition this has aroused from the Soviet Union and various Latin American States, and having in mind that the British attitude today seems to urge the inclusion of the word “political”, it may be of interest to you to know Document not in the file. Document not in the file.

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that Sir Hartley Shawcross at the 42nd meeting at Lake Success, Monday, October 6, 1947, 3:00 P.M. (A.C.6 series 42), declared: “unless such a convention were adopted by a majority it would do more harm than good. He cited instances where certain States would be reluctant to relinquish domestic jurisdiction by ratification of the convention, for example in matters relevant to the repression of subversive activities by political groups.” Having in mind your feeling that Article VIII must be omitted, it occurs to me that if this must be done in order to gain the convention, that problem could readily be solved by adding to Article IX which deals with extradition that persons committing a crime of genocide may be subject to punishment in the courts of the country where the wrongdoer is apprehended. This would bring the punishment for piracy and if this were included in Article IX, to which I think there would be no objection, Article VII could safely be omitted.

No. 146 Raphael Lemkin Differs with James Rosenberg over Several Provisions of the Draft Genocide Convention in a Conversation with John Maktos of the US State Department, July 16, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/7-1648) July 16, 1948 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Participants: Copies to:

Genocide Convention Mr. Raphael Lemkin Mr. John Maktos L – Mr. Gross L – Mr. Tate L/P – Mr. Meeker L/I – Miss Whiteman UNA – Mr. Sanders UNE – Mr. Samsarian

Mr. Lemkin called on me at my office this morning. He discussed the four points raised in Mr. Rosenberg’s letter to Mr. Tate of July 12, which were summarized therein as follows:1 See doc. no. 143.

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(a) “The question of the word “political” must be left to the decision of the State Department; (b) The cultural genocide definition should be changed as above indicated; (c) Incitement ought to come out; (d) Article VII: the policy must be determined by the State Department which I am sure will give consideration to the foregoing suggestion.” 1. Genocide of “Political” Groups Article II of the Convention prohibits genocide of political groups. Mr. Lemkin thought it might be desirable to exclude such groups from the Convention. His whole interest was not to jeopardize the success of the Convention by including the provision prohibiting genocide of political groups. He pointed out that in the Latin American countries, there were many revolutions and that extermination of opposing groups was resorted to as a result thereof. The Latinos do not want to admit that publicly. However, they may vote against the Convention or attempt to prevent its approval by the General Assembly if a provision of this kind were included therein. I informed him that the Department has already considered the matter of any possible jeopardy to the Convention and decided to give further consideration to the desirability of supporting the inclusion of the word “political” in the event that such inclusion appeared to endanger the success of the Convention. He stated that he was satisfied with that decision. 2. Cultural Genocide I pointed out to him that in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, the United States had taken the position that, because of its strong objection to the inclusion of cultural genocide in the Convention, it would not participate in the drafting of the pertinent article. When the majority of the Committee approved this article, the United States reserved its position. I then concluded that, under the circumstances, proposals for modification of this article should not come from the United States delegation. He agreed. 3. Incitement Mr. Rosenberg had proposed that the word “incitement” should be omitted from the Convention. I informed Mr. Lemkin that we were in agreement with him on this point. 4. International Court Mr. Lemkin began by stating that he was going to tell me something very confidential. He called attention to the fact that Mr. Rosenberg was about 75 years old and that he might be influenced by sinister forces. As an example of such possibility, Mr. Lemkin stated that in the aforesaid letter of July 12 from Mr. Rosenberg to Mr. Tate, there was going to be included a proposal to omit from the convention Articles VII and X. These articles read as follows: “Article VII – Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal.” “Article X – Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided that no dispute shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving an issue which has been referred

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to and is pending before or has been passed upon by a competent international criminal tribunal.” Mr. Lemkin thought that this omission might have been suggested to Mr. Rosenberg by Mr. Pella through indirect routes. Mr. Lemkin persuaded Mr. Rosenberg to omit such proposal from his letter by telling him that if he included it, he would be destroying the convention. Mr. Lemkin’s remarks regarding this incident are also interesting as an indication of his influence on letters from Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Lemkin then stated that consideration might be given to the desirability of modifying Article VII so as to indicate that the international court is to be established by the United Nations. I pointed out that such a provision might reopen detailed questions as to the establishment of the court, might lead to proposals to make detailed provisions for the establishment of the tribunal and might eventually bring about delay through reference of the whole question to the ILC. He appeared to agree that Article VII should remain as drafted. 5. Universal Jurisdiction Mr. Lemkin resorted to his pet theory of universal jurisdiction. Article VII provides that crimes should be punished in the territory of the state in which they are committed. He thought that other states should have jurisdiction to punish this crime. To show need for such jurisdiction, he referred to an incident which he alleged occurred in Paris in the 20’s. A Mr. Schwarzbart, whose family had been killed in Ukrania [sic] in the pogrom in which about 400,000 Jews lost their lives at the hands of Poltura [sic], killed Poltura in Paris. He was acquitted by a French court.1 Mr. Lemkin thought there should be jurisdiction to punish persons like Poltura if found in another country. He proposed that there should be added to Article IX which deals with extradition a provision reading as follows: “If Extradition did not take place for any reason, the country where the criminal is apprehended should either try him in its own courts or surrender him to the international court.” I informed him that for obvious reasons, the Department was not in favor of universal jurisdiction. He thought that by adding the provision just quoted to the extradition article, it will be sufficiently disguised to prevent detection. He asked that the matter be considered and that he be notified, if possible, by Tuesday, July 20, since he may want to attend the ECOSOC Session. He showed me an immigration reentry permit which he had obtained for the purpose of going to Europe. This permit settles the question which had been raised as to whether he is an American national. He obtained it, not as a Polish national, but as a stateless person. He asked me to notify him of the decision by telephone in New York. His telephone numbers in New York are: Butterfield 8-8000 or Riverside 9-9179. Symon Petliura (1879–1926) was a Ukrainian nationalist and head of state of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919–20. Anti-Jewish pogroms during his tenure claimed over 50,000 lives. Sholom Schwarzbard (1886–1938) was a Russian Jewish anarchist who fought against the Petliura’s forces as part of the Red Army; fourteen members of his family perished in pogroms during the Russian Civil War. Lemkin repeatedly used the example of Petlura revenge assassination in his argumentation. Cf. doc nos. 130, 146.

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He gave quite an account of the establishment of the United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention and obviously wanted me to gain the impression that he was instrumental in bringing it into existence, a thing which I never doubted.

No. 147 Raphael Lemkin Writes to John A. F. Ennals concerning Proposed Curtailing of the Provisions of the Genocide Convention, July 17, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 July 17, 1948 Major John Ennals Federation Mondiale des Associations pour les Nations Unies 1, rue de la Paix Villa Rigot Geneva Dear Major Ennals, Thank you for your letter and prompt action on many things concerning the Genocide Convention. I simply do not know for what to thank you first. I studied lately again the Draft Convention and especially art. 7 and art. 10, which, as I see from your letter, have been suggested for omission at the London meeting. I think that these two articles and especially article 7 require considerable changes, but it would be a great mistake to omit them at all. If article 7 would be omitted, genocide would become a purely political matter to be handled by the United Nations. It would lose the character of crime, since it would be deprived of judicial action. It is not enough to state in a convention that genocide is an international crime, one must see also how and by whom it is punished as a crime. The sense of the two resolutions of the United Nations Assembly, namely of December 11, 1946, and November 21, 1947, is quite clear. Genocide is a crime like homicide, like larceny. This is a great progress and it should not be destroyed by leaving the political ground and going back to the political “marketing” between powers. You will agree with me that human life is just too precious to be an object of transaction between nations in Lake Success or elsewhere. Please note that art. 7 speaks about two different matters; one is trial by national courts to which no government objects, and the other is the trial by international tribunal, which is under criticism by a number of governments. Therefore one can only speak about some corrections to be introduced in art. 7, but not about omission of the entire art. 7. There is a possibility to get even unanimous support for the idea of an international court. Which government could object to such a tribunal, if the decision as to its

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creation for any particular case would be left to the Council? There might be also other solutions which will crystallize in the course of the future work. I wish to reiterate that the tremendous importance of the Genocide Convention from every point of view lies in the fact that genocide is a crime and nothing less. Here lies the superiority of the Genocide Convention in relation to the International Bill of Human Rights. This last document is not ready yet for international action, because the implementation clauses are missing. But you know that implementation of the International Bill of Human Rights will be left to the organs of the United Nations and will never have judicial action behind it. The mass destruction of human life is just a more important matter than denial of education or employment. I am glad if you agree that art. 3 should be changed, so as to include only action through collective violence. In order to simplify the matter it might be better to omit in par. 1 the words “the language”. Language is a part of culture and as simpler as this paragraph will be formulated, as greater will be the chances for its adoption. I discussed the other day with Mr. Rosenberg at great length art. 9. There is a definite loophole, which can easily be filled. In the light of art. 9, the following situation arises: let us suppose that genocide was committed in country A and the criminal has escaped to country B. Country A requests extradition of the criminal from country B. Country B grants extradition and the criminal is tried in country A. All that is clear. However, a situation might arise that it is not possible to extradite the criminal to country A because of the very great costs of transportation or because country A is practicing genocide or is otherwise an area of disturbances. In this last case, the criminal who took refuge in country B should not be allowed to remain unpunished. He should not be allowed to lead a life of luxury in the country of refuge and to engage even in propaganda. You remember well the case of Solomon Schwarzbarth who shot in Paris in 1926 the Ukrainian organizer of pogroms, Siemion Petlura. Petlura escaped to Paris, where he was ready to publish a book. Schwarzbarth’s parents were killed in Ukraine together with several hundreds of thousands Jews. Since there was no law against genocide at that time and Petlura was enjoying his life in Paris, which was shocking to the feelings not only of Schawrzbarth but of millions other decent men, justice was meted out to Petlura by a private citizen. You remember well that the tribunal in Paris had acquitted Schwarzbarth. However, if we would have had a law against genocide at that time (and by law I mean a judicially enforceable rule), not Schwarzbarth would have been tried, but Petlura would have been seized by the French police and handed over to the French court as soon as he crossed the frontier of France.1 Another example illustrates the situation. After World War I, in which over a million of Armenians were killed, about 150 genocidists were taken by the British authorities into custody on the island of Malta. After a certain time they were released. This fact was so shocking to the Armenians that they formed a terrorist Symon Petliura (1879–1926) was a Ukrainian nationalist and head of state in the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919–20. Anti-Jewish pogroms during his tenure claimed over 50,000 lives. Sholom Schwarzbard (1886–1938) was a Russian Jewish anarchist who fought against the Petliura’s forces as part of the Red Army; fourteen members of his family perished in pogroms during the Russian Civil War. Lemkin repeatedly used the example of Petlura revenge assassination in his argumentation. Cf. doc nos. 130, 145.

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organization which has executed a number of Turks on the streets of Berlin and Rome and elsewhere.1 This is a situation which we try to avoid by this convention. Therefore art. 9 should have an additional par. 3 which could eventually read as follows: if extradition did not take place for any reason, the country in which the offender is apprehended will try him by its own courts. I would not like to leave you under the impression that I attach too much importance now to the idea of international tribunals. It might well be that art. 3 as implemented by a new par. 3 will be enough for the start. This would allow us to treat genocide judicially as a crime. In addition we will have the action of the United Nations as provided for in art. 8. As to the omission of political groups I would like to point out that at the last Assembly of the United Nations Sir Hartley Shawcross criticized the convention because it included political groups (see document of the General assembly A/C.6/ SR.42 of 6 October 1947). This information might be of great use to you. I wish to reiterate that both Mr. Rosenberg and I still see a great danger that the international lawyers will try to shelve the convention to the International Law Commission which is to be created next year. They would like to use this dramatic and intellectually attractive issue in their work. We have to watch out against dangers because these gentlemen do not act openly. Mr. Rosenberg received recently a number of important communications of support for the Genocide Convention from different organizations throughout the world. Among these, a statement by the Ligue internationale des femmes catholiques, representing 36 million women, by the International Union of Transport Workers, London, representing 4 million women, by the International Labor Union and many others. May I suggest that you kindly arrange that the Economic and Social Council should receive these statements in their documentation for circulation. It will have a double effect. It will influence the members of the ECOSOC and will also encourage other non-governmental organizations to lend their support. I am sending off this letter in a hurry although I am expecting to fly over to Geneva soon. Please send me a cable about the decision of the Agenda Committee taken on July 16, concerning genocide. Cordially yours, R. Lemkin

Beginning in January of 1919, British occupation authorities in Turkey—frustrated by the tepid efforts of the postwar Ottoman government to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities—arrested and shipped some two hundred alleged war criminals to a detention center in Malta for further trial. Eventually, the British agreed to return the prisoners to Turkey on a promise that they would be tried in local courts; none of the 157 defendants on the list who came back on Turkey in October 1921 stood trial. Talaat Pasha, one of the masterminds of the policy of mass murder of Armenians in 1915–16, subsequently fled to Germany. On March 15, 1921 in Berlin, Talaat was assassinated by Soghomon Tehlirian, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. These and further anecdotes eventually made their way into Lemkin’s unfinished autobiography (since 2013 available as a book). Along with the case of Petlura, Lemkin repeatedly evoked the story of assassination of Talat Pasha in his argumentation. Cf. doc. no. 131.

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No. 148 James Rosenberg Informs Henry MacCracken of a Strategy Adopted by the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, July 19, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 July 19, 1948 United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention Dr. Henry Noble MacCracken International Council of Christians and Jews University of Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland Dear Noble: Herewith copy of letter from Clark M. Eichelberger dated July 16th to Mr. John A. F. Ennals in which he asks that you be authorized to speak before the ECOSOC for WFUNA on genocide. Everything should now be in order for you to be authorized to speak on the genocide matter at the ECOSOC. Lemkin is probably coming over within the next few days and whether he will arrive in time for the genocide hearing I do not know. If he is there in advance of it I think it would be most helpful to you to let him see your proposed address to the ECOSOC but I need hardly say that I would not, if I were you, be controlled by his opinion. Listen to him, get his points of view and then make your own decision as to what you think best to say. While you and I recognize that Lemkin knows much more about the technical problems relating to genocide than either of us, I am sure that you will have the feel of the situation and will use your statesman’s judgment to say, or to refrain from saying, what may be deemed best. You may perhaps deem it advisable to have a talk with the United States delegates in advance of the hearing in ECOSOC. They are, I believe, Mr. Thorp, Dr. Kotschnig and Mr. Stinebower. Whether you deem it advisable or not to do so I leave it to your judgment. Should you address the ECOSOC, it would seem to me that you should stress the idea that you are speaking particularly for religious groups throughout the world, and that good will and mutual understanding among religious groups would be a great forward step toward world peace, and that the genocide convention in outlawing destruction or injury to religious groups will be a great advance of civilization. As to the rest of what you may feel like saying, I leave that all to you. You might also feel it advisable to say that the essential thing is to adopt a convention and that therefore you hope that controversial issues of a political nature may be avoided. However, this is all up to you. I should advise that you refuse to be drawn into discussions as to technical matters, such as are contained in Article VII and X.



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With all best wishes and greetings to Everett and yourself, Yours very sincerely, James N. Rosenberg The danger is that arguments as to clauses may result in reference of the convention to the not yet created International Law Comm’n. Hence I urge that you insist on a simple position: Let us have a convention. Never mind if it is not a perfect document. Perfection is not to be expected. The point of essence is a convention to be approved and developed. That is what the whole world demands.

No. 149 James Rosenberg Writes to John Ennals about Fundraising and the Strategy to Ensure the Adoption of the Genocide Convention, July 23, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 July 23, 1948 Major John A. F. Ennals World Federation of United Nations Associations 1 Avenue de la Paix Geneva, Switzerland Dear Major Ennals : I am happy that we have been able to raise the $1500.00 which are being sent to the American Association for the United Nations for disbursement, earmarked for the genocide work by the World Federation of United Nations Associations. I earnestly hope that this will provide enough so that Miss Stuart can come to Europe. I am assuming you will call for amounts of money from this fund as may be necessary for the genocide work in Europe. As to this work, based on a meeting with our genocide committee last week, I want to urge a simple course and that is – that the World Federation and Dr. MacCracken and all other persons active in the work should urge that a convention be approved by ECOSOC and by the General Assembly. We should refuse to enter into discussions, quibble, or talk about clauses. No convention could be absolutely letter perfect at this stage of world history. The critically important thing is to get a convention, then, in the course of time and in the development of history, if it is imperfect it can be corrected and developed. The danger is, as you know, that the whole subject may be referred to a committee of lawyers, or to the Human Rights Commission, or to some voluntary world conference, and any such course would shelve the matter and indefinitely postpone the convention for years. Let us therefore, you in Europe and we in the United States, avoid getting into discussions about clauses, as to whether they should or should not be adopted.

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We have done this in the past with the Government of the United States, hoping to be helpful, but the time for discussion by our group as to details of phraseology has gone by. Our simple and easy course is to insist that the world demands a convention and that a convention must be adopted. Therefore we should not give ammunition to those who would oppose a convention. Such ammunition we might give if we begin to let ourselves enter into discussions as to semantics. Let us stick to the simple principle. We demand a convention. The world demands it. The General Assembly demands it. There must be a convention. The great danger is the possible attempts to refer the whole matter to an International Law Commission. This, I hope, Dr. MacCracken, and your other colleagues, and you will oppose tooth and nail because that would be a complete defeat of our purpose. Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg

No. 150 The US State Department Reflects on Persistent Lobbying of Jewish Organizations in the United States on behalf of the Genocide Convention (excerpt), July 27, 1948 NARA, DoS General Records, Files of Durwald V. Sandifer, 59/55D429/8 July 27, 1948 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. James Simsarian James Hendrick Human Rights Branch Genocide Mr. Kotschnig will have full information on progress in this subject when he returns from Geneva. I believe you are fully acquainted with all the background here and you can always get help when you need it from John Halderman, who has done a lot of work on it, and from Marjorie Whiteman. The Jewish organizations continue to press very strongly for a genocide convention. So many telegrams came in on this subject during the third session of the Human Rights Commission that I would not dare to guess their number. There has been very good cooperation between the nongovernmental organizations and Department on the convention; a number of their suggestions have been accepted. I would think the main thing to watch here is that the chiefly interested non-governmental organizations know what our position is and that if they wish to bring very strong pressure to change it that we make the decision on the ground of what will constitute an effective and workable convention.



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No. 151 World Federation of United Nations Associations Tries to Move the Genocide Convention up the Priority List at the Forthcoming ECOSOC Meeting, August 16, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/8 August 16, 1948 Cable to New York NLT Stuart WORFEDUNA New York On insistence US delegation genocide placed bottom ECOSOC agenda thus endangering approval convention. Inform committee urgently organize dispatch cables Washington and amdelegation Geneva from American NGOs emphasizing importance consideration this session. Ennals

No. 152 John Ennals Seeks Reimbursement for His and Raphael Lemkin’s Expenses Incurred in the Lobbying for the Genocide Convention, August 21, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 August 21, 1948 WORLD FEDERATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS Villa Rigot 1 Avenue de la Paix Geneva Mr. James N. Rosenberg 165 Broadway New York PERSONAL Dear Mr. Rosenberg, You may remember that when you kindly offered the sum of $1500 we asked for it to be transferred directly to the Main Account of the Federation in Geneva. Presumably at the request of Mr. Eichelberger this sum was transferred to the American Association for transmission to WFUNA. In normal circumstances this procedure would have been perfectly satisfactory, but it so happens that the American Association is behind

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on its dues to the Federation and has informed the Treasurer that this sum of $1500 is to be considered as part of their contribution toward WFUNA’s budget. You will understand that as the money is being spent on a specific purpose which was not provided for in the budget the acceptance of the sum in this way would amount to a loss of $1500 to the normal running of WFUNA. This is a loss which we cannot sustain and the Treasurer is therefore regretfully requesting our New York office to return the money to you. You will, I am sure, understand that the reason for this is purely technical. In the meantime, I believe Dr. Lemkin is writing you concerning expenses which have already been incurred here on his behalf in support of the Convention. They amount so far to approximately $550–600 including postage, cables, telephones and salaries. Against these expenses we have so far received here $200 and we would be grateful if any further sums to cover these expenses might be sent direct to Geneva. With kindest regards, I am, yours sincerely, John A. F. Ennals Secretary-General

No. 153 Communist Party USA Hails the Decision of the Civil Rights Congress to Raise Funds for the Legal Defense of the Indicted Communist Leaders and thus Champion Civil Rights of the Negro People [September 1, 1948] NYPL, R-6616, Part II: Files of William L. Patterson and the National Office, 1 [September 1, 1948] NATIONAL COMMITTEE APPEALS FOR SUPPORT OF CRC FUND DRIVE $5,000 in WISCONSIN, SEPT. 1ST–OCT 15TH Dear Comrade: The following statement was issued by our National Committee: “The National Committee of the Communist Party hails the decision of the Civil Rights Congress to raise $250,000 for the political and legal defense of the 12 indicted Communist leaders.1 We call on all members and friends of the Communist Party and on all who defend the Bill of Rights to give this campaign their full support.

US authorities proceeded in accordance with the 1940 Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith Act, which provided for a ban on an organization “devoted to the violent overthrow of the government” and prosecution of its members insofar as they were “aware of those aims and acted to expand those aims.” The indictment of June 29, 1948 stated that the Communist Party USA was in violation of the Smith Act since July 1945. The arrests were carried out in late July 1948.

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The bi-partisan frame-up of the 12 Communist leaders is an attempt to outlaw the Communist Party, and so pave the way for the fascist suppression of all who oppose reaction’s drive against American democracy and world peace. Hence this case is no private concern of the Communists, but affects the whole American people. It is therefore logical and heartening that a non-Communist organization like the Civil Rights Congress undertakes the defense of the Communist leaders as a major phase of its defense of civil liberty and the rights of labor and the Negro people. We are confident that thousands of non-Communist progressives will recognize that the CRC campaign is an inseparable part of their struggle to check and defend the forces of war and fascism in the November election. We believe they will help defend the framed Communist leaders because to do so is to advance the cause of peace, Negro rights, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and defense of the living standards of the people. The National Committee calls on all Party members, friends of the Party and Worker readers to bring the CRC campaign to their neighbors, shop-mates and associates in the mass organization. Urge them to help assure that the Civil Rights Congress speedily achieves its $250,000 goal. Enlist them in the defense of the framed Communist leaders – the first line of defense of the welfare and progress of the American people and the peace of the world.” William Z. Foster, Chairman Eugene Dennis, General Secretary1 * * * The trial of our National Committee leaders has already been set for Oct. 15th. It is therefore all the more urgent that our members and friends set to work immediately to raise the $5,000 goal for Wisconsin’s share of this $250,000 fund drive. We are not proposing to set quotas for our clubs, but rather urge all clubs to set their own quotas, keeping in mind the urgent need of CRC for funds, and in particular the fact that they are undertaking the legal defense of our 12 national leaders. The need is extremely great, comrades, and we feel confident that with your help these false charges can be exposed, this campaign again to outlaw our Party can be defeated. We urge you to start immediately with the collection of funds and ask that you start sending them in at once through our office, earmarked for the Civil Rights Congress Fund Drive. Comradely yours, Andrew Remes, Chairman Communist Party of Wisconsin

William Z. Foster (1881–1961) and Eugene Dennis (1905–1961) were among the twelve indicted Communist Party leaders. While Foster escaped prosecution due to ill health, Dennis was eventually found guilty and sentenced to five years of prison.

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No. 154 James Rosenberg Discusses with Raphael Lemkin the American Position on the Genocide Convention, September 3, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 September 3, 1948 United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention Dr. Raphael Lemkin Hotel Metropole Geneva, Switzerland Dear Dr. Lemkin: The New York Times on August 27th carries a special from Geneva.1 I am enclosing a copy of it. It is apparently an official statement of the position of the United States, in detail, issued by Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He makes several important points, as you will see from the article. He proposes to cut out all reference to cultural genocide, stating that this view is shared by Venezuela and Canada. Mr. Thorp, according to the article, protested against the portion of the proposed convention dealing with incitement. His third point is to stress the importance of providing for trial by a recognized international tribunal. Doubtless you have had a number of talks with Mr. Thorp. I would like very much, and very much want, the exact position of the United States Government as stated by Mr. Thorp. I hope to get this from you by airmail. I also urgently desire your detailed comments. I intend to call a meeting of the genocide committee in mid September in order that our committee may determine whether to support entirely the United States Government position. I want to tell you frankly that, though I would much prefer to have cultural genocide included, it is my strong disposition to support the views of the Government of the United States of America. Needless to say, I shall not make such a decision simply by myself but shall seek advice of the entire genocide committee. Hence it is very important, since you will not be here, that your views be fully presented to me in a letter from you dealing with the position of the United States Government and I will see to it that your views are fully presented when I have the committee meeting. To sum up, I very much desire at the earliest possible moment the precise position taken by Mr. Thorp and your opinion and comments. My own point of view at this moment, insufficiently advised as I am as to the situation in Geneva and Paris, is that I do not believe in taking the course of the perfectionist and risking everything by trying to get everything. If we can get a convention based on the Thorp position, which makes

“UN Prods U.N. to Act on Genocide Pact: Thorp for First Time Gives View in Detail,” New York Times, August 27, 1948.

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genocide an international crime, I would feel that this would be a victory for the cause, even if incitement and cultural genocide were omitted. Awaiting anxiously your letter, I am Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg

No. 155 Raphael Lemkin Disagrees with James Rosenberg over Tactics in Securing the Passage of the Genocide Convention, September 13, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 September 13, 1948

Geneve, Hôtel Métropole

Mr. James N. Rosenberg Chairman Genocide Committee N.Y. 165 Broadway Dear Mr. Rosenberg, In reference to your and your secretary’s recent letters concerning genocide I wish to state [the following]. At the initial stage of the session private negotiations with delegations have shown that an agreement by a majority of the Council is possible as to the genocide convention. As a basis of this agreement served the program of our committee which consisted mainly in three points: a) omission of political groups b) limitation of cultural genocide to acts of violence c) limitation of the problem of the International Tribunal as proposed in the U.S.A. draft of 30 September 1948. In my previous genocide work I kept in great secret my negotiations with delegates and normally one delegate would not know what I have discussed with another. However, at the last meeting I felt that I should tell about it to Mr. John Ennals, since he is a member of our Committee. I do not remember whether I asked him specifically to be secretive about it, but I certainly did not ask him to talk to those delegates I talked [to] previously. Several days later, Mr. Ennals told me that he discussed the same topic with the same delegates and asked one of them even to speak to another. The matter of the forthcoming agreement on a genocide convention became thus known. The British delegates started to work against the forthcoming agreement. The following device was used. They promised to a number of delegates not to oppose a genocide convention at the Paris assembly under condition that the council will not pass any resolution approving the convention and will limit itself to transmitting the

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convention to the Assembly with individual declarations of the delegations. The British insisted that a decision as to such action should be taken in advance because they apparently feared that the discussion on the merits might lead to agreement as to the text of the convention. At that time genocide figured as number 2 on the agenda. The American delegation proposed to change the order and to put genocide at the bottom of the agenda. This was accepted after some obvious lobbying for votes during the session. Simultaneously the British proposal was accepted. I found out about this action in advance and started to organize counteraction. However, it came too late. I approached Dr. Cavert and asked him to get signatures from members of the Congress of Reformed Churches, which took place at that time in Geneva (text enclosed).1 I cabled to you, to Dr. Atkinson and to other influential friends in U.S.A. and other countries. You have approached them, the State Department and Dulles. In order to call the Council’s attention to the world wide significance of the genocide convention, I arranged through an old Swiss friend of mine, President of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Swiss Parliament, to be received by the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs who expressed to me the interest of his government in this matter. Unfortunately no permission was granted for a representative of the genocide committee to speak. Dr. MacCracken and Dr. Cavert waited in vain. This was a real loss. You remember we have started the genocide committee in your home with this very idea that these prominent leaders will be able to explain the importance of the genocide convention to the Council and to the world. However Dr. MacCracken could see Thorp and has conveyed to him the ideas of our committee what was most important. The contribution of Dr. Cavert in securing the support of great church leaders is invaluable. The refusal to hear our representatives in person did not preclude the World Federation of the United Nations Associations from introducing a document on genocide which was useful. On the day fixed for genocide declarations, everybody was eager to hear the first British positive approach to the convention. Instead the British delegation repeated the same old story we heard from them before: namely, genocide is already declared international crimes, physical genocide should be sent for codification by the International Law Commission (not created yet), cultural genocide should be separated and sent to the Human Rights Commission for further study. (By the way in the human rights commission the British delegation leads in the opposition against the protection of cultural rights of human groups.) Other delegations made mostly favorable statements. Those who promised to support did not fail. A considerable amount of memoranda was submitted to some of the delegates in advance. I succeeded even to introduce some information in the U.S. Statement. Now I come to use the report on the genocide declaration printed in New York Times on August 28th 1948.2 It is inaccurate in certain points. Mr. Thorp criticized cultural genocide because it protects languages and books. But nobody wants include the protection of the language in the convention. Most of the Document not in the file. “UN Prods U.N. to Act on Genocide Pact: Thorp for First Time Gives View in Detail,” New York Times, August 27, 1948.

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delegates accept the view of our committee that only acts of collective violence should be included as a preparatory action to genocide. The delegate of Venezuela who is mentioned in this report stated just the opposite from what has been published. He pointed out that two resolutions of the General Assembly called for a convention not only as to the punishment, but also as to the prevention of the crime of genocide. He quoted the mass destruction of the synagogues by Hitler in 1938 in advance of extermination action of 1942 and the mass destruction of the Christian Armenian Churches by the Turks prior to the extermination of a million Armenians. He said that burning books is not the same as burning bodies, but when one intervenes in time against mass destruction of churches and books one arrives just in time to prevent the burning of bodies. However all these points will be discussed at the beginning of October 1948 in the Legal Committee of the Assembly. Your information about a U.N. subcommittee meeting in Paris on the 19 or 20 September is not accurate. I called only today about it [to] the assistant of the future President of the General assembly in Paris. In the Legal Committee of the U.N. there will be bargaining about points. One point will be exchanged for another. Those delegations which are opposed to particular points of the convention should not be encouraged in their stubbornness. What do you gain if you say now to the U.S. delegation: Keep on opposing cultural genocide? Do you promote understanding or do you achieve rather the opposite? Please do not overlook that the U.S. delegation is also stubborn on political groups and the International Tribunal. Out Committee should rather appeal to the U.S.A. delegation in general terms as to finalization of the convention in Paris and reserve its position to a later point, when the discussion will start. Moreover and more specifically, if you will fight now cultural genocide, you will play in the hands of the British delegation. They fight cultural genocide not in order to have a convention, but in order to be able to bury it (in the form of remaining physical genocide) in the International Law Commission. In their opinion, physical genocide should be treated together with the Nuremberg law and as you well know according to the resolution of the Assembly of 21 November 1947 the codification of the Nuremberg law belongs to the International Law Commission. The British position in the Legal Committee will be: kill one by one. First separate cultural genocide and then start a filibuster discussion on physical genocide, which will end up as you rightly call it in “committeecide”. As I mentioned before we must not be dogmatic about points. We might have to give up one or two of the above mentioned points, but let us do it in time, coldly, through bargaining and certainly not through giving arguments to our skillful opponents. Now I come to another important point which I would like to discuss [with you] sincerely and openly and I hope you will not mind my way of treating it. I have to talk [to you] about it because it worries me, although I am sure, my worries are only formally justified but not as to the moral human substance. You know now even better than before that England and Dr. Malik are opposed to a convention. You remember well that upon your return from England you proposed to me that a complete convention might not be necessary, and that a short resolution called

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“convention” might be enough. At that time I replied: If you want to buy a cow you refuse to buy a horse even if somebody calls it cow. Moreover I have shown to you in the records of the last Assembly that the English tried to sell this point unsuccessfully to the Assembly. Now again: upon your return from London, Ennals sent to me from Geneva a draft of changes to be introduced in the convention agreed upon by you and him in London. This draft suggested the omission of the most valuable articles of the convention, namely those which make genocide an international crime. If this draft would be accepted there would be no judicial action on genocide. We have discussed this point together and you have agreed that the omission of these articles is just impossible. Later I found out that the omission of these articles was suggested to you by Dr. Malik, who professed initially to be a a friend of the convention and here in Geneva proved to be a strong but hidden opponent. Moreover, you remember that before the genocide matter came up in Geneva you advised me by letter that the best way or action would be not to discuss the genocide convention at the Council, but to get an approval without substantive discussion. Well, this was exactly the British idea, only [that] they knew that without discussing the convention on its merits, no approval is possible. These three incidents remind me my personal experience with a member of the U.N. Secretariat, who in private conversations tried to sell to me last year the British idea of the genocide treatment. He did it so skillfully that for several weeks I did not know what his real intentions are. I found it out later. This infiltration of ideas from within is an old trick and has been always used by a skillful opposition. Maybe these three incidents are just accidental, but it might well be that because of your key position in this matter somebody whom you see casually is trying to influence you in the same way as it was tried before on me. Frankly speaking this thought frightens me and you will understand that I am writing to you in order to relieve my mind only. I simply cannot do otherwise. I am glad that the petition action is developing successfully. However a decision must be made soon as to the transmittal to the Assembly in a most effective way. I have informed about this petition several statesmen and they will cooperate. I think a famous international personality in addition to a representative of our committee should present the petition. This should be done soon. Finally I wish to reply to your questions about the financial situation, namely how much money is needed for the rest of my stay in Europe. Our arrangement was that I will spend 100$ a week and business expenses will be secured additionally. From the amount I received in July 1948, there will remain only 100$ when I will come to Paris after tomorrow. I will need a bilingual secretary and office space, since my work in the redrafting stage of the convention will be considerable. This last point is the most urgent and must be taken care without delay. I will have also to have about 400$ for my return to U.S.A. In finishing this too long communication I wish to convey to you and all present members of the Committee my cordial thanks and warm greetings. Sincerely yours, [Raphael Lemkin]



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No. 156 Samuel McCrea Cavert of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Advises Raphael Lemkin to Scrap References to Cultural Genocide and Incitement to Commit Genocide, September 30, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 September 30, 1948 The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America Professor Raphael Lemkin Hotel Rochester Paris, France Dear Professor Lemkin: I understand from Mr. Rosenberg that you are now in Paris working on the problems of the genocide convention. It therefore occurs to me that you would like to know that the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches, held in Amsterdam August 22 to September 4, went on record as endorsing both an international bill of human rights, including measures of enforcement, and a genocide convention. The World Council of Churches, as you doubtless know, is the most widely representative body of churches in existence, including 150 different denominations in 42 different countries of the world. These churches belong to all of the major Protestant bodies and also to the Eastern Orthodox branch of Christendom. I hope that in spite of the tensions and strains within the United Nations at the present time there is some hope of securing a genocide convention. In the light of the statement made by Mr. Thorp concerning the position of the United States it seems clear to me that it would be wise not to press for including the clauses having to do with the destruction of cultures and the incitement to genocide. I am afraid that if we insist on these two points there will be a long and disastrous delay. Although I myself am personally in favor of these two clauses, I have no doubt [whether] it is sound strategy not to jeopardize the securing of some convention by insisting on too much at this time. With warm regards, I remain Cordially yours, Samuel McCrea Cavert General Secretary P.S. A draft for $500 is being forwarded to you today.

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No. 157 Raphael Lemkin Urges Mobilization of Public Opinion against the Political Group Clause in the Draft Genocide Convention, October 28, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/9 October 28, 1948 Mrs. Jane EVANS American Jewish Conference 522 Fifth Avenue NEW YORK, N.Y. Dear Mrs. EVANS, The genocide convention has entered a critical stage. The U.S.A. delegation has insisted upon the inclusion of political groups. The Latin American delegations (Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, Mexico, Argentina) and a few others, and also the Soviet bloc are opposed to it. Some of the Latin American delegates declared openly: “We do not commit racial genocide, but some of the revolutions which happen in our countries could be classified as destruction of political groups and we would not like to have our internal difficulties aired all the time by international bodies.” Moreover a great number of Latin American delegations have lost their interest in the convention and do not come to the meetings. You realize the gravity of the situation. Your organization helped quickly and most efficiently before and I would like to appeal for your help now again. You know better what to do. I think the American delegation (Hotel d’Iéna, Paris) should receive a number of telegrams demanding to drop issues which endanger the adoption of the convention such as political groups. Moreover, the U.S.A. delegation should be kept under the warm influence of a constant flow of letters and telegrams urging adoption of the genocide convention. Our friends here cannot be left without the influence of American public opinion, because the British are still opposed to the convention and they try to influence the U.S.A. delegation by direct and indirect means. It would be good to have telegrams sent by representatives of various religious and civic groups and also by individuals. Thank you in advance. Please let me know your decision. Cordially, Raphaël LEMKIN Hotel Claridge – room 518 Avenue des Champs-Elysées, PARIS 8°



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No. 158 James Rosenberg Urges John Foster Dulles of the US Delegation to the UN General Assembly to Drop Political Groups from the Wording of the Genocide Convention, November 3, 1948 NYPL, ZL-273/1 November 3, 1948 John Foster Dulles, Esq. Hotel d’Iéna 26, avenue d’Iéna Paris 16, France Dear Foster: Many thanks for your letter of October 28th.1 Noting in the Press that you have been in Stockholm, I can’t begin to tell you how I wished to be there with you and how I would like to have tried to help you with my Swedish friends, the Wollenbergs, etc. That was a tough assignment for you to handle, as I can well imagine that the Swedes would like to join in a Western Bloc but are afraid to do so. In re. genocide, my latest information is that Latin American countries and others are objecting to the inclusion of the word “political” in the convention of genocide and that Gross is urging the inclusion of the word. I think Gross is wrong. My reason for this statement is that the United States has taken the lead toward securing a convention. A convention approved by the Assembly is only a first step. The convention should be ratified or adhered to, if my understanding of international law is correct, by member states and if the word “political” in the definition causes Latin America to refuse adherence that would be a very serious blow. Moreover (and perhaps more important) is the importance, in my judgment, of good relations with Latin America, and this is one of those comparatively minor issues on which it would be the part of statesmanship, as it seems to me, to accept the Latin American point of view and to consent to delete the word “political.” In addition to these practical considerations there is something to be said for a theoretical objection on principle, to the inclusion of the word “political.” In a nutshell, I think it would enhance the prestige of the United States if a convention is adopted. I think it would be a notable forward step in international relations; and I therefore feel that it is better to get a convention without the word “political” than to be beaten by insisting on it. If you have a spare fifteen minutes, if might be helpful to you to have a talk with Raphael Lemkin, a leading member of our committee, who is still in Paris working on behalf of our committee on this genocide matter. I am sending a copy of this letter to Dr. Lemkin. Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg Cf. doc. no. 90.

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No. 159 James Rosenberg Urges Deleting Political Groups from the Wording of the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Sheila Young of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, November 15, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 November 15, 1948 Mrs. Sheila Young, President Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 1754 West 11th Avenue Vancouver, B.C. Dear Mrs. Young: Thanks so much for your letter of November 5th.1 There is a vitally important issue at present, which endangers the Genocide Convention. This relates to the definition of genocide. Various members of the United Nations General assembly object to a definition of genocide which defines genocide as the mass destruction of racial, religious, national, or political groups. The sharp split in the Assembly is whether to include the word, political, in the definition. Without burdening you with the many theoretical problems involved, I can tell you from our constant contact with the problem that insistence on the inclusion of the word, political, in the definition threatens a death blow to the adoption of the convention. The threat is a very serious one. Hence I venture to express the urgent hope that you will cable promptly to the Canadian Delegate to the General Assembly in Paris urging on him the vital importance of the adoption of a convention and stating that it is better to omit the word political in the definition, if need be, rather than to insist on it and thereby lose the whole battle. If you send a cable, do please send us a carbon, as other outstanding organizations are taking a similar course, and we want to collect all the cables and then write to Secretary-General Lie. Sincerely yours, James N. Rosenberg Chairman

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No. 160 James Rosenberg Urges John Foster Dulles and the US State Department to Drop the Reference to Political Groups, November 15, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 November 15, 1948 John Foster Dulles, esq. Hotel d’Iéna 26, avenue d’Iéna Paris 16°, France Dear Foster : Lemkin has sent me a cable of which I enclose a copy. It seems to me that the United States Delegation, in insisting on the inclusion of the word “political” in the definition of genocide, is running grave danger of losing the whole battle for a genocide convention. I am sure you will agree with me that it is better to get a convention eliminating the word “political” from the definition rather than to insist on the inclusion of that word and thereby to lose out. I earnestly hope that you may have an opportunity to talk to Gross and Maktos, who appear to have the matter in charge for the State Department. Sincerely yours, [James N. Rosenberg]

No. 161 James Rosenberg Confers with Raphael Lemkin on the Urgency of Convincing the US State Department to Change Its Mind on Political Groups, November 15, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/2 November 15, 19481 Telegram Dr. Raphael Lemkin Hotel Claridge Paris, France Apparently State Department determined insist inclusion political. This I gather threatens defeat convention. If you convinced impossible move State Department am The date, in pencil, is erroneously given as “49.”

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hesitatingly prepared as last and difficult resort try appeal Truman through various channels. Cable your views remember that going over heads of those in charge always a dangerous move. Rosenberg

No. 162 The US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Notified of the Latest Discussions within the US State Department, November 16, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 November 16, 1948 To: Dr. Willard Johnson From: Verna D. Linzel, Washington, D.C. As you know, I attend the meetings frequently called by the State Department to inform organizations of progress in various areas. The meeting this morning was an interim progress report on the General Assembly. Much of it was background material but the important thing that I wish to tell you about was the report on the Genocide Convention. Apparently this was going along fairly well four or five days ago when the commission decided that there must be no international jurisdiction in this matter; thereby taking the heart out of the whole Convention; unless this action is reversed, the Genocide Convention will, of course, be meaningless. During the discussion period the question was asked as to who was holding up this matter and, of course, the answer was Russia – with the explanation that it is with her a question of sovereignty and she wants no one to interfere. Another rather interesting development was that the question of cultural genocide had been brought up and the very vagueness of this matter made the Commission wary and uncertain about it. Then, too, the South American countries had raised the question as to whether political groups should be included – this in the light of their frequent revolutions. The general consensus of opinion seemed to be that the work on the Declaration of Human Rights was not going any too well and that there was danger of its passing, if at all, with only a small majority. One if the officials made the statement that in this area it may be found necessary to revert to regionalism. I do not at all know whether this will be of any service but because of our immediate interest, I feel I should pass it on. With every good wish,



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No. 163 The US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention Notified of the Recent Debates in the ECOSOC, November 18, 1948 AJHS, P-154/2/9 November 18, 1948 (This is a copy of a cable received by Mr. Eichelburger and sent to Mr. Rosenberg) All articles Genocide Convention passed. Article Two includes political genocide, Article Three deleted, Article Seven omits international jurisdiction, drafting committee at work on concordance British French text. Second reading will follow with attempt to reduce division caused by deletion international jurisdiction. While value [of the] convention [is] seriously reduced by modifications Article Seven to certainty, yet two thirds majority in Assembly [is] due partly [to the] opposition [of] Latin America and Soviets to [the] inclusion [of] political genocide. Britain will probably present text while considering it meaningless and stating nobody will ratify it. Believe Lemkin has reason to be disturbed. [I] am trying [to] arrange Roosevelt Lemkin broadcast.

No. 164 Raphael Lemkin Argues against Political Groups in the Wording of the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, November 21, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 November 21, 1948 Mr. Clarence PICKETT American Friends Service Committee PHILADELPHIA (Pennsylvania) Dear Mr. PICKETT, It’s a great pleasure to communicate with you again. Thanks for your assistance. It seems that we will have soon a genocide convention. However, there is still one difficulty ahead of us. The Legal Committee has adopted in its first reading the following text of Article II. In this Convention genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, religious or political group as such: (1) Killing members of the group; (2) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the groups;

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(3) The deliberate infliction of conditions of life for such groups as are calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (5) Forced transfer of children to another human group. The entire text of the convention in the first reading is finished and the second reading will take place this week. The inclusion of political groups in the definition of genocide raised objections in the first reading by many delegations, such as: Belgium, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, Mexico, Argentina, the delegations of the Eastern bloc, Iran, Egypt and others. Since for the adoption of the convention by the General Assembly we need a two-third majority, we might lose the convention in the Assembly because of the inclusion of the political groups, which is considered by many delegations as a controversial issue. From the enclosed statement of our President, Dr. EVATT, you will see that he suggests in a general way to include in the convention temporarily such issues on which there is a general agreement, and, later, to draft a supplementary convention which will cover the points which are still left open.1 There is now movement underway to adopt the EVATT plan and to omit the political groups in the second reading in order to save the convention. Many delegations [insist] that even if the convention is adopted with the political groups, it will not be ratified by many countries, because of the explosive nature of political groups. In every Parliament there might be found a group of deputies which will oppose the inclusion of political groups. Mr. ROSENBERG wrote to our delegation – Hotel d’Iéna, Place d’Iéna, PARIS 16° – urging the omission of political groups. More pressure on American delegation is urgently necessary. Could you kindly send a telegram urging the omission of political groups? Could you also send kindly a cable to Dr. EVATT – Palais de Chaillot, PARIS – in which you would kindly praise his plan on genocide and ask him to take leadership in saving the convention by omission of political groups? All that will be of the greatest help. Every hour counts, and I know how efficient you are in important humanitarian matters. Thanking you in advance, I am, Very sincerely yours, Raphaël LEMKIN Hotel Claridge – PARIS 8°

In his statement to the ECOSOC on August 25, 1948, Herbert V. Evatt insisted that the issue of genocide should be considered independently of that of human rights and/or the Nuremberg principles. Alongside political groups, Evatt regarded cultural groups as too contested an issue to be included in the convention.

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No. 165 Raphael Lemkin Argues against Political Groups in the Wording of the Genocide Convention in a Letter to Theodore Thackrey of The New York Post, November 23, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 November 23, 1948 Mr. T. THACKEREY “New-York Post”, NEW YORK Dear Mr. THACKEREY, This is to thank you for the marvelous encouraging support you, and the “New York Post”, are giving to the Genocide convention. John HOHENBERG is most helpful to me as a friend and great reporter.1 This convention can be made a law only if we will constantly alert to the dangers presented by a small but very skillful opposition. From the enclosed text of Article II on the genocide convention you will see that it includes political groups. These groups have been first included in the genocide resolution of the General Assembly of 11th December 1946, by the British delegation, at a very late hour of a tiresome genocide meeting in Lake Success. On November 5th 1947, at the Legal Committee of the General Assembly, the British Delegation attacked violently the draft convention submitted for discussion on the grounds that it included political groups (proposed by Britain only a year ago). The British Delegation pointed out that it would be dangerous for States to sign a convention which precludes them from fighting subversive activities of political groups. This statement made a very great impression on the Delegates, and, during the entire convention, and almost succeeded in killing it on the 20th of November 1947. But on November 21st 1947 the convention was saved by the General Assembly leaving Great Britain in a defeated minority. At the present Assembly, Great Britain is cooperating formally only, but this is even more dangerous. Please read report from Paris by Genêt in the “New Yorker” of October 16th 1948 about a statement by Sir Hartley Shawcross.2 In the Legal Committee now, the British delegation started from attacking the very idea of having an International Criminal Tribunal. Instead the British have proposed a very degrading formula which amounts to a confusing notion of states being involved in mutual disputes for killing citizens, like two farmers quarrelling about one killing the other’s chicken. But the worst is yet to come at the General Assembly. The British arousing again their argument of political groups. Shawcross declared in the Legal Committee that he would like to see a Delegate who would dare to oppose now the inclusion of political John Hohenberg (1906–2000) was a newspaper contributor and later professor of journalism who wrote, among others, for the New York Post. Hohenberg recalled his encounters with Lemkin in an article, “The Crusade That Changed the UN,” which appeared in Saturday Review on November 9, 1968 (pp. 86–88). 2 Genêt, “A Letter From Paris, October 5,” The New Yorker, October 16, 1948, 111–15. 1

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groups in the genocide convention. He succeeded and the political groups have been voted in. The U.S. Delegation also proposed the inclusion of political groups. However, a great number of delegations voted against the inclusion of political groups, such as: Belgium, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Mexico, the Eastern Bloc and a number of countries abstained. For the approval of the convention by the Assembly, a two-third majority of votes is necessary. If the Latin American bloc will continue to be divided, the battle is lost. Last year, the Latin American countries saved the convention in the Assembly. You will remember that the original resolution on genocide was sponsored by the delegations of Cuba, Panama and India. The Latin American countries take a special pride in the genocide convention, because of this sponsorship. Dr. Evatt is our great hope. I am in touch with him. Please read his statement in Geneva on genocide (enclosed). According to Dr. Evatt controversial issues such as, for example, political groups should be temporarily omitted, and we should reach an agreement on those issues which are acceptable to all. This is real statesmanship. Next week maybe already the Genocide convention will go before the Assembly. But by the end of this week, there will be a second reading. However already now a whispering campaign among the Delegates is spreading that the Genocide convention will not be approved by the Assembly because it contains “explosive matters” such as political groups. In order to understand that such a game is possible you must realize that Delegates are changing often and some do not remember or wish to forget. But much can be done if one sees the danger and acts accordingly. Not much time is to lose. I appeal to you not only as to the leading newspaperman of America, but also in your capacity as great humanitarian and courageous civic leader. Please take the genocide convention as your cause for the next ten days. Please think about it one hour a day and we will win the battle. The world will be grateful to you. The following steps are urgently necessary at this moment of danger: 1. Strong editorials, stressing the necessity for U.S.A., Latin American and Dr. Evatt’s leadership. 2. Could you kindly mobilize your influential friends in the press, radio? Drew Pearson could help. 3. A cable by you and also other influential writers and radio commentators to U.S.A. delegation – Hotel d’Iéna, Paris – and to Dr. Evatt – Pallais de Chaillot – will be of immense value. I know that I am writing to a very busy man, but I know also that you know the hierarchy of human values and you have proved it so many times. Faithfully yours, Raphaël Lemkin Hotel Claridge Paris 8°



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No. 166 Raphael Lemkin Exhorts the UK Delegation for Flip-Flopping on the Issue of Political Groups, November 28, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 November 28, 1948 Mr. Ernest GROSS American Delegation Hotel d’Iéna – Paris My dear Mr. GROSS, I have received yesterday from New York a copy of a letter sent to you by Mr. James ROSENBERG.1 I noticed the following statement in this letter: “Originally he (Sir Hartley SHAWCROSS) wanted to include the word “political”. Now, if I am correctly informed, he attacks the definition when it includes the word “political”. This statement is incorrect. The record of the U.K. delegation in relation to the problem of political groups is as follows: At the 1946 Assembly, the U.K. delegation proposed the inclusion of political groups in the resolution on genocide. At the 1947 Assembly the U.K. delegation criticized the convention because political groups have been included. At the 1948 Assembly’s Legal Committee, the U.K. delegate called again for the inclusion of political groups. I hope this will be of interest to you. Very sincerely Yours, Raphaël LEMKIN Hotel Claridge Paris

No. 167 Civil Rights Congress Requests US Attorney General Thomas C. Clark to Remove It from the List of Subversive Organizations, December 2, 1948 NYPL, R-6616, Part II: Files of William L. Patterson and the National Office, 1 December 2, 1948 The Hon. Tom C. Clark Office of the Attorney General Document not in the file.

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Department of Justice Dear Sir: I am writing on behalf of Mr. William L. Patterson, national executive secretary of the Civil Rights Congress, to request an appointment with you. Mr. Patterson wishes to discuss, at your earliest convenience, the status of the Civil Rights Congress as one of the organizations described by you as “subversive.”1 He wishes to demand its immediate removal from that category. It is evident that such a characterization by the Attorney General severely hampers this organization in its useful, patriotic and nonpartisan endeavor to lend assistance to individuals and minority groups facing racial or political persecution. Because you have personally announced the findings of the Department of Justice in regard to organizations of questionable loyalty, Mr. Patterson feels that only a personal audience will permit him adequate opportunity to deal with such charges against the Civil Rights Congress as may have prompted your decision. Mr. Patterson will come to Washington at any time such an appointment can be arranged. I am sure you will understand that this organization regards its present status as intolerable, and feels that a speedy disposition of the matter is essential. I trust, therefore, that you will be able to meet Mr. Patterson in the very near future, and that your office will notify me when such an appointment can be scheduled. Respectfully yours, Thomas G. Buchanan, Jr. Executive Secretary

No. 168 The National Conference of Christians and Jews Takes Credit for the Adoption of the Genocide Convention, December 17, 1948 NARA, DoS Decimal File, 1945–49, 59/2186 (501.BD Genocide/12-1748) December 17, 1948 The National Conference of Christians & Jews, Inc. Mr. William Sanders Acting Director Office of United Nations Affairs Department of State Washington, D.C.

The US Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations was introduced in April 1947 at the initiative of Tom Clark. The first list was published in March 1948 and mainly included so-called communist front organizations, in addition to the Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan.

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My dear Mr. Sanders: May I thank you, and through you, the Secretary of State, for your kind letter of December 8.1 The Department’s expression of interest in the possible usefulness of the proposed Commission on United Nations Affairs is very encouraging to the leadership of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. We are very grateful for your suggestion that the proposed Commission be established as an organ of the International Council which coincides with our own planning in the matter. We have been very happy at the news of the passage of the Genocide Convention last week. The Conference played an active role in the movement to secure this Convention, through its initiative in establishing the ad hoc United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention, described in the enclosed leaflet.2 It was this committee that obtained the support of the 166 organizations in some 25 countries and representing a membership of a quarter of a billion people, whose petition was presented to Dr. Evatt last week. It is our belief that the proposed Commission may be able to carry further, and on a broader range of questions, the kind of support given the United Nations in the matter of the Genocide Convention. Sincerely yours, Raymond S. Rubinow

No. 169 Raphael Lemkin Seeks Details on Pakistan’s Claim of Genocide in Punjab, December 20, 1948 AJHS, P-154/1/19 December 20, 1948 Mr. AGA SHAHI Secretary to his Excellency Sir ZAFRULLAH KHAN Ministry of Foreign affairs KARACHI, Pakistan Dear Mr. Shahi, I remember with great gratitude and admiration your splendid contribution to the enactment of the genocide convention.

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Your country will always be proud of the great humanitarian contribution for the genocide cause made by your great leader, Sir. ZAFRULLAH KHAN, by Sir SARDAR BAHADUR KHAN, by Madame IKRAMULLAH, and by yourself.1 I am preparing in a big hurry a little pamphlet on genocide, which will serve the purposes of ratification. I intend to quote therein the statements of the Pakistan Delegates on genocide. Unfortunately, the records of the Legal Committee are incomplete and I am compelled to ask you a great favour of sending me urgently by airmail these three statements. In my pamphlet I will give a description of the genocide case against the Moslems as an example of the urgency for ratification. You gave me kindly the following pamphlets: 1° on RSS in the Punjab, and 2° “Genocide in India” as background material.2 I hope also to find here this statement of Sir ZAFRULLAH KHAN before the Security Council, concerning genocide in March and February 1948. May I ask you the following favours, and please forgive me for putting them down in numbers, almost like an accountant. 1 – Are there other publications on genocide published subsequently to those you gave me? 2 – Could you kindly inform me whether it would be correct to assume that the commission which was sent by the Security Council in February or March to investigate among others the genocide case, did some work on genocide? 3 – Is it correct to assume that the mere fact that your minister brought up the genocide case before the Security Council has prevented the further spread of genocide or has diminished the genocide case considerably or even stopped it? This would prove the impact of the genocide convention or even of a genocide resolution upon the matter involved. One does not like to have the dirty linens washed in public. 4 – Could you kindly indicate whether the genocide case against the Moslems has affected the economic life in the entire continent and even trade with other countries? 5 – What are approximately the losses in terms of religious edifices, religious leaders, monuments, libraries, as a result of genocide? 6 – What was the mortality rate among the refugees flying from places of genocide? 7 – Could you give me some indications as to the role of private individuals and groups, outside government, in the genocide case?

Sardar Bahadur Khan, representative of Pakistan on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), argued during the debates in October 1948 for the inclusion of cultural genocide alongside physical and biological genocide. Agha Shahi served as adviser to Khan. Shaista Suhrawardy Inkramullah, representative of Pakistan on the ECOSOC, claimed at a September 30, 1948 meeting that the thirty-five million Muslims in India were facing cultural genocide. Inkramullah rejected the notion of communal violence, arguing that “acts of genocide [were] deliberately prepared and carefully carried out by the rulers and part of the population of certain Indian States. See The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, vol. 2, 1298–99, 1501. 2 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is a nationalist Hindu paramilitary organization in existence since 1925. The organization was briefly banned in Punjab in January 1947 and, following the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a former member of the RSS on January 30, 1948, it was banned throughout India (the ban was lifted in July of 1949). 1



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Please do not spend too much time in answering to these questions, and please kindly do not delay the answer on one question until you have got the information in order to answer to the other questions. If you think that the actual settlement between INDIA and PAKISTAN is connected in some respect with the genocide action or the United Nations and especially with the charge brought out at the Security Council, please kindly send me pertinent information. I am sure you agree with me that all our present difficulties between races, religions and peoples, should be subordinated to the higher goal to protect humanity as a whole. We all might be proud that we won humanity on the genocide matter in the Assembly. Please present my high regards and deep admiration to your great leader for all the great help he has given to this cause. Cordially yours, Professeur Raphaël LEMKIN Hotel Claridge Ave. des Champ Elysées, PARIS, France

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United Nations Secretariat Draft, June 26, 1947  UN Doc. E/447 Preamble The High Contracting Parties proclaim that Genocide, which is the intentional destruction of a group of human beings, defies universal conscience, inflicts irreparable loss on humanity by depriving it of the cultural and other contributions of the group so destroyed, and is in contradiction with the spirit and aims of the United Nations. 1.  They appeal to the feelings of solidarity of all members of the international community and call upon them to oppose this odious crime. 2.  They proclaim that the acts of genocide defined by the present Convention are crimes against the Law of Nations, and that the fundamental exigencies of civilization, international order and peace require their prevention and punishment. 3.  They pledge themselves to prevent and to repress such acts wherever they may occur. Article I Definitions (Protected groups) I.  The purpose of this Convention is to prevent destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings. (Acts qualified as Genocide) II.  In this Convention, the word “genocide” means a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part or of preventing its preservation or development. Such acts consist of: 1.  Causing the death of members of a group or injuring their health or physical integrity by: (a) group massacres or individual executions; or (b) subjection to conditions of life which, by lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion are likely to result in the debilitation or death of the individuals; or

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(c) mutilations and biological experiments imposed for other than curative purposes; or (d) deprivation of all means of livelihood, by confiscation of property, looting, curtailment of work, denial of housing and of supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of the territory concerned. 2.  Restricting births by: (a) sterilization and/or compulsory abortion; or (b) segregation of the sexes; or (c) obstacles to marriage. 3.  Destroying the specific characteristics of the group by: (a) forcible transfer of children to another human group; or (b) forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group; or (c) prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse; or (d) systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications; or (e) systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.

Article II (Punishable offences) I.  The following are likewise deemed to be crimes of genocide: 1.  Any attempt to commit genocide; 2.  the following preparatory acts: (a) studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; (b) setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; (c) issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide. II.  The following shall likewise be punishable: 1. Willful participation in acts of genocide of whatever description; 2. direct public incitement to any act of genocide whether the incitement be successful or not; 3. conspiracy to commit acts of genocide. Article III (Punishment of a Particular Offence) All forms of public propaganda tending by their systematic and hateful character to promote genocide, or tending to make it appear as a necessary, legitimate or excusable act shall be punished. Article IV (Persons Liable) Those committing genocide shall be punished, be they rulers, public officials or private individuals.



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Article V (Command of the Law and Superior Orders) Command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide. Article VI (Provisions Concerning Genocide in Municipal Criminal Law) The High Contracting Parties shall make provision in their municipal law for acts of genocide as defined by Articles I, II, and III, above, and for their effective punishment. Article VII (Universal Enforcement of Municipal Criminal Law) The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any offender under this Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the offender or of the place where the offence has been committed. Article VIII (Extradition) The High Contracting Parties declare that genocide shall not be considered as a political crime and therefore shall be grounds for extradition. Article IX (Trial of Genocide by an International Court) The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to commit all persons guilty of genocide under this Convention for trial to an international court in the following cases: 1.  When they are unwilling to try such offenders themselves under Article VII or to grant their extradition under Article VIII. 2.  If the acts of genocide have been committed by individuals acting as organs of the State or with the support or toleration of the State. Article X (International Court Competent to Try Genocide) Two drafts are submitted for this section: 1st draft: The court of criminal jurisdiction under Article IX shall be the International Court having jurisdiction in all matters connected with international crimes. 2nd draft: An international court shall be set up to try crimes of genocide (vide Annexes). Article XI (Disbanding of Groups or Organizations Having Participated in Genocide) The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to disband any group or organization which has participated in any act of genocide mentioned in Articles I, II, and III, above.

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(Action by the United Nations to Prevent or to Stop Genocide) Irrespective of any provision in the foregoing articles, should the crimes as defined in this Convention be committed in any part of the world, or should there be serious reasons for suspecting that such crimes have been committed, the High Contracting Parties may call upon the competent organs of the United Nation to take measures for the suppression or prevention of such crimes. In such case the said Parties shall do everything in their power to give full effect to the intervention of the United Nations. Article XIII (Reparations to Victims of Genocide) When genocide is committed in a country by the government in power or by sections of the population, and if the government fails to resist it successfully, the State shall grant to the survivors of the human group that is a victim of genocide redress of a nature and in an amount to be determined by the United Nations. Article XIV (Settlement of Disputes on Interpretation or Application of the Convention) Disputes relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice Article XV (Language – Date of Convention) The present Convention, of which the ……, ……, …… and …… texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of …… Article XVI (What States may become Parties to the Convention. Way to become Party to it) (First Draft) 1.  The present Convention shall be open to accession on behalf of any Member of the United Nations or any non-member State to which an invitation has been addressed by the Economic and Social Council. 2.  The instruments of accession shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Second Draft) 1.  The present Convention shall be open until 31 …. 1948 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation has been addressed by the Economic and Social Council. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2.  After 1 …. 1948 the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any nonmember State that has received an invitation as aforesaid.



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Instruments of accession shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article XVII (Reservations) No proposition is put forward for the moment. Article XVIII (Coming into Force) 1.  The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the accession (or ratifications and accession) of not less than …. Contracting Parties. 2.  Accessions received after the Convention has come into force shall become effective as from the ninetieth day following the date of receipt by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. Article XIX (Duration of the Convention) (First Draft) 1.  The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of five years dating from its entry into force. 2.  It shall remain in force for further successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties that have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period. 3.  Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Second Draft) The present Convention may be denounced by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such notification shall take effect one year after the date of its receipt. Article XX (Abrogation of the Convention) Should the number of Members of the United Nations and non-member States bound by this Convention be less than …. as a result of denunciations, the Convention shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become operative. Article XXI (Revision of the Convention) A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any State which is a party to this Convention by means of a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General.

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The Economic and Social Council shall decide upon the measures to be taken in respect of such a request. Article XXII (Notifications by the Secretary-General) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in Article XVI of all accessions (or signatures, ratifications and accessions) received in accordance with Articles XVI and XVIII, of denunciations received in accordance with Article XIX, of the abrogation of the Convention effected as provided by Article XX and of requests for revision of the Convention made in accordance with Article XXI. Article XXIII (Deposit of the Original of the Convention and Transmission of Copies to Governments) 1. A copy of the Convention signed by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be deposited in the Archives of the Secretariat of the United Nations. 2. A certified copy shall be transmitted to all members of the United Nations and to non-member States mentioned under Article …. Article XXIV (Registration of the Convention) The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Ad Hoc Committee Draft, May 24, 1948 UN Doc. E/794 PREAMBLE THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES Declaring that genocide is a grave crime against mankind which is contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and which the civilized world condemns; having been profoundly shocked by many recent instances of genocide; having taken note of the fact that the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg in its judgment of 30 September–1 October 1946 has punished under a different legal description certain persons who have committed acts similar to those which the present Convention aims at punishing; and being convinced that the prevention and punishment of genocide requires international co-operation; HEREBY AGREE TO PREVENT AND PUNISH THE CRIME AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED:



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ARTICLE I (Genocide a crime under international law) Genocide is a crime under international law whether committed in time of peace or in time of war. ARTICLE II (“Physical” and “biological” genocide) In this Convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious or political group, on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members: 1.  killing members of the group; 2.  impairing the physical integrity of members of the group; 3.  inflicting on members of the group measures or conditions of life aimed at causing their deaths; 4.  imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. ARTICLE III (“Cultural” genocide) In this Convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of the national or racial origin or the religious belief of its members such as: 1.  prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group; 2.  destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. ARTICLE IV (Punishable acts) The following acts shall be punishable: (a) genocide as defined in Articles II and III; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct incitement in public or in private to commit genocide whether such incitement be successful or not; (d) attempt to commit genocide; (e) complicity in any of the acts enumerated in this Article. ARTICLE V (Persons liable) Those committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be punished whether they are Heads of State, public officials or private individuals. ARTICLE VI (Domestic legislation) The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislation in accordance with their constitutional procedures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.

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(Jurisdiction) Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal. ARTICLE VIII (Action of the United Nations) 1. A party to this Convention may call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide. 2. A party to this Convention may bring to the attention of any competent organ of the United Nations any case of violation of this Convention. ARTICLE IX (Extradition) 1. Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall not be considered as political crimes and therefore shall be grounds for extradition. 2. Each party to this Convention pledges itself to grant extradition in such cases in accordance with its laws and treaties in force. ARTICLE X (Settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice) Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided that no dispute shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has been passed upon by a competent international criminal tribunal. ARTICLE XI (Languages, date of the Convention) The present Convention of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic shall bear the date of ……. ARTICLE XII (States eligible to become parties to the Convention. Means of becoming a party) 1. The present Convention shall be open until 31 ….194.. for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2. After 1 …. 194.., the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



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ARTICLE XIII (Coming into force of the Convention) 1. The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of not less than twenty instruments of ratification or accession. 2. Ratification or accession received after the Convention has come into force shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. ARTICLE XIV (Duration of the Convention – Denunciation) 1. The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of five years dating from its entry into force. 2. It shall remain in force for further successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties that have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period. 3. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. ARTICLE XV (Abrogation of the Convention) Should the number of parties to this Convention become less than sixteen as a result of denunciations, the Convention shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become operative. ARTICLE XVI (Revision of the Convention) 1. Upon receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of written communications from one-fourth of the number of High Contracting Parties, requesting consideration of the revision of the present Convention and the transmission of the respective requests to the General Assembly, the SecretaryGeneral shall transmit such communications to the General Assembly. 2. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such requests. ARTICLE XVII (Notifications by the Secretary-General) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in Article XII of all signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Articles XII and XIII, of the date upon which the present Convention has come into force, of denunciations received in accordance with Article XIV, of the abrogation of the Convention effected as provided by Article XV, and of requests for revision of the Convention made in accordance with Article XVI.

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Documents on the Genocide Convention, Volume 1 ARTICLE XVIII

(Deposit of the original of the Convention and transmission of copies to governments) The original of this Convention shall be deposited in the Archives of the United Nations. A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States referred to under Article XII. ARTICLE XIX (Registration of the Convention) The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Final Draft, December 9, 1948 UN General Assembly Resolution 260 A(III) The Contracting Parties, Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96(I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world; Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required; Hereby agree as hereinafter provided.  Article I The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.  Article II In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 



Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

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Article III The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.  Article IV Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. Article V The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.  Article VI Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. Article VII Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.  Article VIII Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.  Article IX Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 

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Documents on the Genocide Convention, Volume 1 Article X

The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.  Article XI The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any nonmember State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  Article XII Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.  Article XIII On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI. The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. Any ratification or accession effected, subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.  Article XIV The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force. It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.  Article XV If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective. 



Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

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Article XVI A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the SecretaryGeneral. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.  Article XVII The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in article XI of the following: (a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI; (b) Notifications received in accordance with article XII; (c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article XIII; (d) Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV; (e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV; (f) Notifications received in accordance with article XVI.  Article XVIII The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.  Article XIX The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

312

Further Reading Barrett, Q. John, “Raphael Lemkin and ‘Genocide’ at Nuremberg, 1945‒1946,” The Genocide Convention Sixty Years After Its Adoption, ed. Christoph Safferling and Eckart Conze (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2010): 35–54. Cooper, John, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2008). Dhokalia, Ramaa Prasad, The Codification of Public International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970). Earl, Hilary, “Prosecuting Genocide Before the Genocide Convention: Raphael Lemkin and the Nuremberg Trials, 1945–1949,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, vol. 15 (2013): 317–37. Elder, Tanya, “What You See Before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring His Archival Papers, 1900–1959,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, vol. 7 (2005): 469–99. The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires, ed. Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). Irvin-Erickson, Douglas, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). King, T. Henry, “Origins of the Genocide Convention: Remarks of Henry T. King, Jr,” Case Western Journal of International Law 1‒2, vol. 40 (2007‒2008): 13–22. Korey, William, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee, 2001). Kunz, L. Josef, “The United Nations Convention on Genocide,” American Journal of International Law 4, vol. 43 (October 1949): 738–46. LeBlanc, J. Lawrence, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991). Lemkin, Raphael, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). Lemkin, Raphael, “Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention,” Yale Law Journal 7, vol. 58 (June 1949): 1142–60. Lemkin, Raphael, “Genocide as a Crime Under International Law,” American Journal of International Law 1, vol. 41 (January 1947): 145–51. Lewis, Mark, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919‒1950 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). Lippman, Mathew, “The Drafting and Development of the 1948 Convention on Genocide and the Politics of International Law” in: The Genocide Convention: The Legacy of 60 Years, ed. by H. G. van der Wilt et al. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012): 15–25. Lippman, Mathew, “A Road Map to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of theCrime Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 2, vol. 4 (2002): 177–95.

314

Further Reading

Morsink, Johannes, “Cultural Genocide, the Universal Declaration, and Minority Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 4, vol. 21 (1999): 1009–60. Power, Samantha, “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind, ed. Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala and Sławomir Dębski (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2010). Robinson, Nehemiah, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1960). Sands, Philippe, East West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity” (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016). Schabas, A. William, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Siegelberg, L. Mira, “Unofficial Men, Efficient Civil Servants: Raphael Lemkin in the History of International Law,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, vol. 15 (2013): 297–316. Simpson, A. W. Brian, “Britain and the Genocide Convention,” British Yearbook of International Law 1, vol. 73 (2002): 5–64. Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Weiss-Wendt, Anton, A Rhetorical Crime: Genocide in the Geopolitical Discourse of the Cold War (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2018). Weiss-Wendt, Anton, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the Genocide Convention (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2017).

List of Persons Abrams, Benjamin

founder of Emerson Radio & Phonograph Company; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Addison, Christopher

British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1947

Alfaro, Ricardo Joaquín

head of the Panama delegation to the United Nations, 1946–48

Allen, Roger

head of United Nations Department of the British Foreign Office, 1949–50

Aranha, Oswaldo

head of the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations; President of the UN General Assembly, 1947

Atkinson, A. Henry

General Secretary of the Church Peace Union and World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, 1918–48; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Austin, R. Warren

US Ambassador to the United Nations, 1947–53

Azkoul, Karim

Lebanese representative and rapporteur on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Baer, Gertrude

permanent consultant for the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in the United Nations, 1946–51

Beckett, W. Eric

Chief Legal Adviser of the British Foreign Office, 1945–53; UK representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Belt, Guillermo

Cuban ambassador to the United Nations, 1945–49; Vice President of the UN General Assembly, 1947

Berg, Paal

Norwegian lawyer and politician (1947)

Beria, Lavrenty

former head of the NKVD; member of the Soviet Politburo, 1946–53; Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, 1953

Bernadotte, Count Folke

Vice Chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, 1943–48

Bernays, C. Murray

attorney in the US War Department; planned the legal framework and procedures for the IMT (1945)

Bevin, Ernest

British Foreign Secretary, 1945–51

316 List of Persons Biddle, Francis

US Attorney General, 1941–45; American judge at IMT, 1945–46

Brass, L. S.

Deputy Legal Advisor of the British Home Office (1948)

Brezhnev, Leonid

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1964–82

Brierly, James Leslie

professor of international law at All Souls College in Oxford, 1922–47; UK representative on the UN committee of legal experts, 1947; member of the International Law Commission, 1948–52

Brügel, J. W.

London-based author of an article on the Genocide Convention in the 1949 volume of Europa-Archiv; no further information available

Buchanan, G. Thomas

Executive Secretary of the Civil Rights Congress, Washington chapter, 1948–49 [?]

Buck, S. Pearl

American writer and novelist; winner of the 1938 Nobel Prize in Literature (1947–48)

Bulganin, Nikolai

member of the Soviet Politburo, 1948–58; Minister of Defense of the USSR, 1947–49

Burgess, Mildred

representative of the Business and Professional Women’s Clubs in the United Nations; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Burnham, Miss J.

British Colonial Office official (1948)

Byrnes, F. James

US Secretary of State, 1945–47

Cadogan, Alexander

UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1946–51

Cates, M. John Jr.

staff member of the Office of UN Social and Economic Affairs of the US State Department, 1947–51

Cavert, Samuel

See McCrea Cavert, Reverend Samuel

Clinchy, R. Everett

President of the National Conference of Christians & Jews; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Cohen, Benjamin

Assistant UN Secretary General for Public Information, 1946–54

Connally, Tom

US Senator (D-TX), 1929–53

Creech Jones, Arthur

British Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1946–50

Curson, R. Bernard

British Commonwealth Office official (1947–48)

Davidson, F. George [?]

Canadian representative on the ECOSOC (1948)

List of Persons

317

Dell’Acqua, Angelo

staff member of the Vatican Secretariat of State, 1938–50

Dennis, Eugene

General Secretary of the National Committee of the Communist Party USA, 1945–59

Donnedieu de Vabres, Henri professor of international law at the University of Paris, 1945–52; French judge at IMT, 1945–46 Donovan, B. James

Assistant to Chief US Prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, at IMT, 1945–46

Douglas, W. Lewis

US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1947–50

Dulles, Allen

US diplomat; involved with the CIA since its inception in 1947; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Dulles, John Foster

member of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly, 1946–48, 1950; US Secretary of State, 1953–59

Ečher, Bohuslav

Czechoslovakian observer at the IMT, 1945–46

Eden, Anthony

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1940–45

Eichelberger, M. Clark

head of the American Association for the United Nations, 1943–61

Eisenhower, D. Dwight

President of the United States, 1953–61

Ennals, A. F. John

Secretary General of the World Foundation of the United Nations Associations, 1946–55[?]; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Evans, Jane

Executive Director of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, 1933–76

Evans, W. J. Vincent

UK representative on the Human Rights Commission, 1947–48; Assistant Legal Adviser of the British Foreign Office, 1947–54

Evatt, Herbert Vere

Foreign Minister of Australia, 1941–49; President of the UN General Assembly, 1948–49

Fahy, Charles

Senior Legal Adviser of the US State Department, 1946–47

Fawcett, James

member of the UK delegation to the United Nations, 1948–50

Fearnley, T. John

Second Secretary of the UK delegation to the United Nations, 1948–49

Fisher, Geoffrey

Archbishop of Canterbury, 1945–61

Fitzmaurice, G. Gerald

Legal Adviser of the British Foreign Office, 1945–60

Foster, Z. William

Chairman of the Communist Party USA, 1945–57

318 List of Persons Fowler, W. D. Robert

Commonwealth Relations Office representative on the UK delegation to the United Nations (1948)

Fried, H. E. John

Special Legal Consultant to the US Judges at Nuremberg military tribunals, 1947–49

Galsworthy, N. Arthur

Assistant Secretary of the British Colonial Office, 1947–51

Gill, J. Robert

Executive Officer in the Office of the Chief US Prosecutor at IMT, Robert H. Jackson, 1945–46

Giraud, Émile

head of research in the UN Secretariat’s Human Rights Division, 1946–55 [?]; secretary in the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Gore-Booth, Paul Henry

head of UN (Economic and Social) and Refugees Departments of the British Foreign Office, 1947–48

Grafftey-Smith, Laurence

UK High Commissioner in Karachi, 1947–51

Gross, A. Ernest

Legal Adviser of the US State Department, 1947– 49; US representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Halderman, John

Adviser of the US delegation to the United Nations, 1948

Heathcote-Smith, B. B. Clifford

official in the United Nations Department of the British Foreign Office, 1947

Hendrick, P. James

US representative on the UN Commission on Human Rights, 1946–48

Heppel, P. Richard

British Foreign Office official (1948)

Hildyard, H. T. David

Legal Advisor of the British Foreign Office (1948–50)

Hodgson, V. Joseph

US Commissioner on the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London, 1944–46

Husain, Akhtar

Secretary to the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (1948)

Hutson, T. H.

British Home Office official (1948)

Ikramullah, Shaista Suhrawardy

Pakistan representative on the ECOSOC, 1948

Jackson, H. Robert

US Supreme Court Associate Justice, 1941–54; Chief US Prosecutor at IMT, 1945–46

Jackson, Eldred William

New York lawyer; son of Robert H. Jackson (1947)

Jessup, C. Philip

professor of international law at Columbia University, 1946–61; US representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts, 1947; US representative to the UN General Assembly, 1948–52

List of Persons

319

Johnson, Willard

President of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1943–58 [?]; Secretary General of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

van Kaeckenbeck, Georges

Belgian representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Kaganovich, Lazar

member of the Soviet Politburo, 1930–57

Kaplan, Z. Sheldon

Assistant to the Legal Adviser in the Division of International Organizations Affairs of the US State Department, 1947–48

Katz-Suchy, Juliusz

Polish delegate to the United Nations, 1946–51

Kerno, S. Ivan

Assistant UN Secretary General in charge of the Legal Department, 1946–52

Khan, Mohammed Zafrullah

Foreign Minister of Pakistan, 1947–54

Khan, Sardar Bahadur

Pakistan representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Koretsky, Vladimir

Soviet Ukrainian delegate to the UN General Assembly, 1946–47, 1949; Soviet representative on the UN Committee of Legal Experts, 1947; member of the International Law Commission, 1949–51

Kosygin, Alexei

candidate member of the Soviet Politburo, 1946–48

Kotschnig, M. Walter

chief of the Division of International Organizations Affairs of the US State Department, 1947–48; deputy US representative on the ECOSOC, 1948

Krylov, Sergei

Soviet member on the International Court of Justice, 1946–52

Lachs, Manfred

Polish representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Laugier, Henri

Assistant UN Secretary General for Social Affairs, 1946–52

Lemkin, Raphael

Polish-American legal scholar; inventor of the word genocide and champion of the Genocide Convention (1933–48)

Lin, Mousheng Hsitien

Chinese technical expert on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Linzel, D. Verna

staff member of the National Conference of Christians & Jews (1948)

Lovett, A. Robert

US Under Secretary of State, 1947–49

MacCracken, Henry Noble

staff member of the National Conference of Christians and Jews; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

320 List of Persons Mahony, H. Thomas

Boston attorney; president of the Catholic Association for International Peace; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1947)

Maktos, John

US representative on and chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Malenkov, Georgy

member of the Soviet Politburo, 1946–57; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1944–53

Malik, Charles

President of the ECOSOC, 1948; rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights, 1947–48

Marcy, Carl

official in the Division of International Organizations Affairs of the US State Department; member of the US delegation to the United Nations, 1947

Marshall, George

US Secretary of State, 1947–49

Masaryk, Jan

Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, 1940–48; president of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, 1946–48

Mason, Paul

head of United Nations Department of the British Foreign Office, 1946–49

Mathew, Theobald

Director of Public Prosecutions for England and Wales, 1944–64

Mauriac, Franҫois

French novelists and journalist (1947)

Mayhew, Christopher

British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1945–50; member of the UK delegation to the United Nations, 1947–48

McCrea Cavert, Samuel

General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1928–50; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 1948

McDiarmid, M. Alice

official in the Division of International Organizations Affairs of the US State Department, 1946–47

McKinnon-Wood, Hugh

member of the UK delegation to the United Nations, 1946

McNeil, Hector

British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1945–49

Meeker, C. Leonard

official in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the US State Department, 1948–51

Mikoyan, Anastas

member of the Soviet Politburo, 1935–66; Minister of Foreign Trade, 1938–49

Molotov, Vyacheslav

Soviet Foreign Minister, 1939–49, 1953–56

List of Persons

321

Monneray, Henri

French assistant prosecutor at IMT, 1945–46

Moreton, O. John

British Colonial Office official, 1946–60

Morozov, Platon

Soviet representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Morton, Thruston Ballard

Assistant US Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, 1953–56

Murray, Philip

President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1940–52

Nehru, Jawaharlal

Foreign Minister of India; Prime Minister of India (1947)

O’Neill, Con D. W.

British Foreign Office official, 1943–55

Ordonneau, Pierre

French representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Patterson, L. William

National Executive Secretary of the Civil Rights Congress, 1946 –56

Pavlov, Alexei

Soviet representative on the Human Rights Commission, 1948–49

Pearson, Drew

American journalist; host of a show on NBC Radio, 1941–53

Pella, V. Vespasian

Romanian expert on international criminal law; coauthor of the UN Secretariat draft Genocide Convention, 1947; president of the International Association of Penal Law, 1946–52

Pérez Perozo, Víctor Manuel

Venezuelan representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Perlzweig, rabbi L. Maurice

head of the International Affairs Department of the World Jewish Congress; head of the WJC delegation to the founding conference of the United Nations, 1945 (1947)

Peurifoy, E. John

Assistant US State Secretary for Administration, 1947–49

Phillips, H. M.

British delegate to the United Nations (1948)

Pillai, Parushottama Padmanabta Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations (1948) Piotrowski, Stanisław

Polish observer at the IMT, 1945–46

Refling Hagen, Ingeborg

Norwegian writer (1947)

Remes, Andrew

Chairman of the Communist Party USA, Wisconsin chapter, 1947–53[?]

Reid, J. S.

New Zealand representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

322 List of Persons Rockefeller, D. John, Jr.

American financier and philanthropist; prominent member of the Rockefeller family (1947)

Roosevelt, Eleanor

US delegate to the UN General Assembly, 1945–52; US (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt) representative on the UN Commission on Human Rights, 1947–53; chair of the commission, 1946–52

Roosevelt, D. Franklin

President of the United States, 1933–45

Rosen, A. Abbot

official in the US Department of Justice; Adviser to John Maktos, US representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Rosenberg, N. James

Chairman of the Committee on Human Rights of the National Conference of Christians and Jews; chairman of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 1948–59

Rubinow, Raymond

observer for the National Conference of Christians & Jews in the United Nations; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Rudziński, W. Aleksander

Polish representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1948

Rusk, Dean

Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs of the US State Department, 1947; alternate US delegate to the UN General Assembly, 1948

Sabath, J. Arnold

US Representative (D-IL), 1907–1952

Samuels, Gertrude

editorial board member of the New York Times, 1943–75

Sanders, William

Acting Director of the Office of UN Affairs of the US State Department, 1948

Sandifer, V. Durwald

Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs in the US State Department, 1948–54; a senior adviser to the US delegation to the United Nations

Schaefer, Catherine

Director of the Office for UN Affairs of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1946–72; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1947)

Schwelb, Egon

Assistant Director of the UN Secretariat’s Human Rights Division, 1947–62

Sforza, Carlo

Foreign Minister of Italy, 1947–51

Shahi, Agha

adviser to the Pakistan representative on the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Shawcross, Hartley

Attorney General for England and Wales, 1945–51; chief prosecutor for the United Kingdom at IMT,

List of Persons

323

1945–46; member of the UK delegation to the United Nations, 1945–49 Shone, A. Terrence

British High Commissioner in New Delhi, 1947–48

Shuster, N. George

President of Hunter College, 1940–60; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1947)

Simpson, W. William

General Secretary of the British Council of Christians and Jews, 1942–74

Simsarian, James

US representative on the UN Commission on Human Rights, 1948

Smith, Howard

British Foreign Office official (1947)

Smith, Walter Bedell

US Ambassador to Moscow, 1946–48

Spiropoulos, Jean

special rapporteur to the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Stalin, Joseph

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1922–52

Stinebower, D. Leroy

deputy US representative on the ECOSOC, 1945–52

Stuart, Julia

liaison secretary of the World Federation of United Nations Associations; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1948)

Sturges, A. Wesley

Dean of the law school at Yale University, 1945–54; member of the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention (1947)

Tate, B. Jack

Deputy Legal Adviser of the US State Department, 1947–54

Taylor, Telford

Assistant to the chief US prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, at IMT, 1945–46

Thackrey, O. Theodore, Sr.

publisher of the New York Post, 1948–49

Thorp, L. Willard

Assistant US Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1946–52

Trainin, Aron

Soviet scholar of criminal law; member of the Soviet prosecution at IMT, 1945–46; vice president of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1947–48

Truman, S. Harry

President of the United States, 1945–53

Undset, Sigrid

Norwegian writer; winner of the 1928 Nobel Prize in Literature (1947)

Vajs, Albert

Yugoslav observer at the IMT, 1945–46

Vandenberg, H. Arthur

US Senator (R-MI), 1928–51

Vieux, Antonio

Haitian delegate to the UN General Assembly, 1947

324 List of Persons Vinogradov, Sergei

head of the United Nations Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 1947–49

Voznesensky, Nikolai

member of the Soviet Politburo, 1947–49

Vyshinsky, Andrei

former Soviet Prosecutor General; Deputy Foreign Minister, 1940–46; Foreign Minister, 1949–53

Walsh-Atkins, Leonard Brian British Commonwealth Relations Office official (1948) Wainhouse, W. David

official in the Division of International Organizations Affairs of the US State Department; adviser to the US delegation to the United Nations, 1947–48

Waithayakon, Prince Wan

Ambassador of Thailand to the United States 1947–52; vice chairman of the UN Sixth Committee (Legal), 1948

Whiteman, Marjorie

Advisor to the US delegation to the United Nations, 1945–51

Wilson, G. M.

secretary in the UK Cabinet Office (1948)

Younger, G. Kenneth

Parliamentary Secretary of the British Home Office, 1947–50

Index abortion, forcible  99, 110, 205. See also sterilization, forcible Abrams, Benjamin  249, 252–3 Aden  90 Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide  81–166, 185–6, 189, 194–5, 197, 209, 215–16, 243–4, 247–8, 254–5, 267 African Americans  73, 141, 196, 277 aggression, legal definition of  106, 220 aggressive war, concept of  40, 103, 220, 252 Alfaro, Ricardo J.  123 Allen, Roger  127, 133, 185 American Bill of Rights  253, 276 American Jewish Committee  22, 227 American Jewish Conference  284 Americans  234 Amsterdam  283 antisemitism  113 Antonescu, Ion  220 Aranha, Oswaldo  228–9 Archbishop of Canterbury  238–9 Arculus, Ronald  64 Argentina  49, 284, 290 armed bands  99, 108, 111 Armenians  235, 246, 270–1, 281 Asch, Sholem  226 Assyrians  245 asylum, right to grant  15, 206–7, 210, 216 Atkins, Walsh  134 Atkinson, Henry A.  241, 249, 256, 260, 280 atomic weapons  68 Auschwitz death camp  113 Austin, R. Warren  220, 259 Australia  47, 49, 92–3, 95–6, 171 Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944)  17–19, 22–3, 237 Azkoul, Karim  142, 144, 147, 151, 154

Babi Yar, mass execution of Jews at  113 Balkans  221 Baltic states  77, 220. See also names of individual countries barbarism, crime of  13–16, 24, 115 Baruch, Bernard  225 basic provisions of the Genocide Convention, Soviet  108–12, 114, 119–20, 143 BBC  60 Beckett, Eric  38–9, 47, 49–51, 60–2, 67, 84–5, 128, 170, 172–3, 175, 177 Belgium  136, 146, 174, 210, 260, 290, 292 Belorussia  171 Belt, Guillermo  123, 228–9 Berg, Paal  224, 236, 241 Beria, Lavrenty  189 Berlin  230–1, 271 Bernadotte, Folke  226, 237–8 Bernays, Murray C.  19 Bevin, Ernest  231 Biddle, Francis  219–20, 226 biological experiments on humans  99, 110 Blum, Leon  226 Bogota  247 Bohr, Niels  226 Bolivia  210 Bolshevik Revolution  28–9, 44 bourgeoisie  28–30, 55 Brass, L. S.  213 Brazil  49, 94, 171, 284, 290, 292 Brierly, James L.  47–52, 54–7, 60–3, 75, 211 Britain. See United Kingdom British Commonwealth  137. See also dominions, British British zone of occupation of Germany  64, 67, 83 Brussels  115

326 Index Buchanan, Thomas G. Jr.  294 Buck, Pearl  223–4, 226–7, 234–8, 241, 252 Bulganin, Nikolai  189 Bulgaria  25, 221 Burgess, Mildred  252 Burma  234 de Bustamente, Antonio Sánchez  226, 236 Byrnes, James F.  220 Cadogan, Alexander  184–6 Canada  94, 171, 278, 286 Carol II of Romania  220 Cassin, René  226 Catholic Church  222, 228–9 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  141 Chechens  77 Chile  171, 174–5 China  42, 47, 49, 51, 84, 94, 98, 103–4, 107, 119–20, 124, 131, 139–42, 144–7, 149, 151, 153, 155, 165, 171, 189, 235 Christians  237, 245, 281 Church Peace Union  256 Civil Rights Congress  276–7, 293–4 Clark, Thomas C.  293–4 Clinchy, R. Everett  182, 231, 249, 252, 256, 261 Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind  84, 146, 150, 155, 236, 248 codification of international law  27–32, 38–9, 46, 53, 59–62, 115, 219–20, 233, 255, 262, 265 Colombia  47, 49, 247 colonial application clause  132–3, 157, 159, 197, 208, 211, 216 Colonial Office, British (CO)  127, 129, 133, 156–7, 198–9, 214–16 colonial peoples  64, 67, 83, 193. See also Dayak people colonies, British  132, 137, 156–7, 165, 198–9, 211. See also names of individual colonies; non-selfgoverning territories Commonwealth Relations Office, British (CRO)  74, 127, 129, 133–5 Communist bloc countries  129, 131–2, 136, 159–60, 163–4, 175, 185, 191,

196, 200–1, 203, 205, 208, 210, 216, 284, 290, 292. See also names of individual countries Communist Party USA  276–7 Communists  65, 68, 83, 128, 220, 276–7 Conferences for the Unification of Penal Law  13, 15–16, 24, 31, 115 Congress of Reformed Churches  280 Connally, Tom  224 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937)  147–8, 179. See also terrorism, international conversion, forcible  88 Costa Rica  216, 237 Council of Christians and Jews  129, 131, 155, 231–2, 247–8, 261, 265 counterfeiting  13–14 Crimean Tatars  77 crimes against humanity  40, 53, 59, 66, 75, 84, 86, 109, 145–6, 242, 244 crimes against peace  59, 146, 219 Cuba  32, 37, 122–3, 145, 292 cultural genocide  71, 73, 83, 99, 108, 110, 114, 126–33, 137–40, 143, 147, 149, 156–9, 164–5, 171, 173–4, 190–1, 193, 197, 210, 215–16, 248, 251, 262–3, 267, 278–81, 283 culture, destruction of  15–16, 20, 71, 83, 88, 99, 132, 134, 137, 193, 210, 270, 280 Cummings, Homer  226 Czechoslovakia  26–7, 68, 106, 221, 262 Davidson, George F.  94 Dayak people  166 Dell’Acqua, Angelo  222 Denmark  92, 171 dependent territories. See non-selfgoverning territories deportations, Soviet  77 Dering, Władisław A.  165 domestic jurisdiction  13, 33, 56, 65, 68, 79–80, 83, 99–100, 103–4, 108, 111–12, 115, 118–20, 139–41, 147–9, 156–8, 171–3, 179–80, 183, 188, 206–7, 209–10, 213, 216, 246, 255, 263, 267, 269–70. See also universal jurisdiction Dominican Republic  174–5, 235

Index dominions, British  132. See also British Commonwealth Donnedieu de Vabres, Henri  51–4, 58, 65, 82–4, 86–7, 144, 219–20 Donovan, James B.  18–19 Douglas, Lewis W.  255–6, 258–61 Doumer, Paul  15 drug trafficking  13, 233, 235, 255. See also narcotics Duarte, Samuel  236 Dulles, Allan W.  249, 252 Dulles, John Foster  163, 182, 201, 259–60, 280, 285, 287 Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944)  28. See also United Nations Eastern Europe  77, 128, 221 economic groups  162–3, 174 Egypt  28, 49, 55, 67, 124, 174, 210, 290 Eichelberger, Clark M.  249, 253, 256, 265, 272, 275 Einsatzgruppen  230. See also International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; Nazi mass crimes Einstein, Albert  226 Eisenhower, Dwight  225–6 Eisenhower, Milton S.  225 El Salvador  216 England  47, 59, 137, 172, 223, 232, 234, 255, 259, 261, 281. See also United Kingdom Ennals, John A. F.  241–4, 252, 269–76, 279, 282 Europe  24, 129, 220, 268, 273, 282 Evans, Jane  284 Evans, Vincent W. J.  170, 175–6, 180–1, 184, 187–8 Evatt, Herbert V.  290, 292, 295 expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe  68, 71, 83 extradition  72, 99, 112, 121, 127, 131–2, 149, 152, 165, 167, 173, 177–81, 183–5, 188, 202–3, 205, 210, 213, 216, 266, 268, 270–1 Fahy, Charles  40, 52, 71–2, 75, 121–2, 220, 228, 262, 271 fascism, Soviet conception of  29, 31, 94, 100, 108–9, 113–14, 116, 131, 140, 143, 174, 190–2, 210

327

fascists  65, 128 Fawcett, James  176 Fearnley, John T.  124 First World War  115, 270 Fisher, Geoffrey. See Archbishop of Canterbury Fitzmaurice, Gerald  65, 67–9, 169–70, 175–8, 181–4 Foreign Office, British (FO)  37, 40–2, 50–1, 64, 86–7, 91–3, 126–38, 156, 159–60, 169–81, 183–4, 187–8, 197–203, 209–13, 216, 231–2, 247–8, 250–1 Fosdick, Harry E.  226 Foster, William Z.  276–7 Fowler, Robert W. D.  135 France  15, 33, 38, 41, 47, 49, 51–3, 75, 86, 92–4, 98, 103–5, 107, 114, 119–21, 125, 131, 137–8, 140, 142–55, 171–2, 174, 189, 210, 219–20, 233, 242, 246, 251, 260, 268, 270, 289 Frank, Hans  219 French Revolution  45 Fribourg  261, 265 Fried, John H. E.  229–31 Galsworthy, Arthur N.  156–7 de Gaulle, Charles  219 Geneva  221, 248, 252–4, 264, 271, 274–6, 278, 280, 282, 292 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (1929)  148 Germans  64, 67–8, 83, 97, 219 Germany  113. See also Nazi Germany Gestapo  21, 223. See also SS Gill, Robert, J.  21 Giraud, Émile  46, 242 Göring, Hermann  245 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greece  65, 68, 78, 83, 174, 191 Greeks  25, 65 Green, William B.  225 Griffiths, James H. A.  228–9 Gross, Ernest  71–3, 121, 181–2, 186, 201, 204, 250, 257–9, 262, 285, 287, 293 Grotius, Hugo  33 Gypsies. See Roma The Hague  14, 31–2, 246 Hague Conventions  59

328 Index Haiti  235 Halderman, John  71, 274 Harmodio Arosemena, Florencio  237 Heppel, Richard P.  133, 239 Herriot, Édouard  236, 241 Hight, Betty  23 Hildyard, David  126–7, 129–32, 180–1, 184–5, 187, 198, 214, 247–8 Hitler, Adolf  59, 281 Hodgson, Joseph V.  18–19 Hohenberg, John  291 Home Office, British (HO)  127, 129, 133, 161, 182–5, 187–8, 197–8, 203, 205–7, 212–14, 216 homicide  23, 38, 40, 64, 67, 82, 103–4, 122, 172, 269 House Committee on Un-American Activities  54 House of Lords  136–7, 238 Hudson, Manly O.  224 humanitarian intervention  237 human rights  14, 24–5, 40, 45, 59, 83, 128, 213. See also UN Commission on Human Rights human trafficking  13–14, 75, 223, 233, 235, 255 Hutson, T. H.  180–1, 184–5, 187, 197, 212–14 Huxley, Aldous  236, 241 Huxley, Julian  226

159, 174–5, 179–80, 194, 196, 199, 209, 212, 233, 246, 255, 258, 267–8, 271, 278–9, 281, 291 international jurisdiction. See universal jurisdiction International Labor Union  271 International Law Commission (ILC)  38–9, 47, 51, 53–7, 61, 70–1, 74, 82–7, 92–6, 102, 126 –7, 130, 136–7, 141, 145–6, 150, 155, 158, 171, 174, 208–9, 211, 215–16, 239, 248, 250–1, 255, 262, 265, 268, 271, 273–4, 280–1. See also UN Committee for the Codification and Development of International Law International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT)  19–24, 26–7, 33, 47, 53, 59, 71, 75, 84–6, 97, 102–3, 107, 113, 144–6, 154, 158, 189, 219–20, 230–1, 239, 250 International Military Tribunal for the Far East  145, 154 International Union of Catholic Women  265, 271 International Union of Transport Workers  271 Iran  28, 290 Iraq  245 Ireland  65 Italy  222

Ikramullah, Shaista Suhrawardy  296 India  32–3, 37, 49, 55, 57–8, 87–91, 128, 134–5, 174, 233–5, 292, 295–7 Ingush  77 Institute of Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences  31 International Association of Penal Law  220 International Bill of Rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights International Court of Justice (ICJ)  31, 65, 68, 71–2, 83, 176–7, 180, 183, 190–1, 193, 209–11, 216, 246, 267–8 International Criminal Court (ICC)  47–8, 51, 71–3, 83, 86, 92, 94, 99–100, 103–4, 108, 112, 116, 118, 120, 122, 127, 132, 137–9, 141, 143, 149, 152,

Jackson, Eldred William  219–21 Jackson, Robert H.  17–19, 23, 219, 225 Japan  68, 124 Jessup, Philip  47–54, 220, 224 Jewish organizations  83, 131, 227, 274. See also names of individual organizations Jewish World Congress  227 Jews  25, 27, 64, 67, 83, 90–1, 103–4, 129, 222–3, 235, 245–6, 259, 265, 268, 270, 281 Johnson, Herschel  259 Johnson, Willard  250, 252–4, 260, 288 Joliot-Curie, Frédéric  226 Jowitt, William A.  238–9 van Kaeckenbeck, Georges  174 Kaganovich, Lazar  189

Index Kaltenbrunner, Ernest  113 Kashmir  89, 165 Katz-Suchy, Juliusz  96–7, 165 Keitel, Wilhelm  113 Kerno, Ivan  45, 53, 220 Khan, Mohammed Zafrullah  87–91, 295–7 Khan, Sardar Bahadur  296 Koretsky, Vladimir  49, 55–7, 61 Korovin, Evgeny  61 Kosygin, Alexei  189 Kotschnig, Walter M.  272, 274 Koussevitzky, Serge  226 Krock, Arthur  220 Krylov, Sergei  44 labor unions. See trade unions Lachs, Manfred  174 LaGuardia, Fiorello H.  225 Lake Success  46, 53, 56, 98, 163, 263, 266, 269, 291. See also United Nations Lange, Oskar R.  226 Latin American countries  41, 47, 164, 228, 233, 237, 254, 258, 261–2, 265, 267, 284–5, 288 –9, 292. See also names of individual countries Laugier, Henri  45, 242–3 League of Nations  24, 29, 31, 48, 233, 255, 265 Lebanon  28, 94, 98, 103, 107, 119–20, 142, 144, 147, 149, 151–4, 189, 240 Lehman, Herbert  226 Lemkin, Raphael  13–26, 39–40, 43–7, 52–4, 58–60, 62–5, 67, 69, 75, 82–4, 86–7, 142, 144–6, 151, 155, 219–21, 223–4, 227–30, 232–4, 237, 244–7, 252, 257–9, 262–4, 266–72, 276, 278–85, 287–93, 295–7 Lenin, Vladimir  30 Lewis, Sinclair  225 Liberia  28 Lie, Trygve  44–5, 220, 241–4, 286 Lin, Mousheng H.  142, 144–7, 151, 153, 155 Lin, Yutang  226, 236 Linzel, Verna D.  288 Lithuanians  77–8

329

London  18–19, 60, 213, 219, 235, 256, 265, 269, 282 Lovett, A. Robert  204, 248–50, 254–9, 261–2 lynching  75, 103, 121–2 MacCracken, Henry Noble  129, 241, 252–3, 261, 265, 272–4, 280 McCrea Cavert, Samuel  241, 249, 280, 283 Macedonians  25 McNeil, Hector  261–3, 265 Madrid  15–16, 24, 115 Magna Carta  253, 265 Mahony, Thomas H.  250 Majdanek death camp  113 Maktos, John  52, 101, 104–6, 117–22, 138–55, 248, 254–5, 266–9, 287 Malaya  166 Malenkov, Georgy  189 Malik, Charles  87–91, 240–1, 262, 264–6, 281–2 Malta  270 Manchester Guardian  234–7 Manchuria  124 Mann, Thomas  226 Marcy, Carl  39–40 Maritain, Jacques  222, 226, 252 Marshall, George  186, 220, 228, 248 Masaryk, Jan  221–2, 226 Mason, Paul  184, 197 Matthew, Theobald  172–3 Mauriac, Francois  224, 236 Mexico  284, 290, 292 Mikoyan, Anastas  189 Miller, Aron  17 minorities, protection of  36, 59, 64, 67, 71, 82, 85, 130, 132, 139–40, 157, 171 Mistral, Gabrielle  226, 236 Molotov, Vyacheslav  43, 98–100, 107–8, 189–90, 248 Monneray, Henri  227–8 Moreton, O. John  198, 214 Morozov, Platon  143, 145, 147–54 Murray, Philip  225 Muslim League  89 Muslims  88–9, 296

330 Index narcotics  94, 124–5, 131, 146, 160–61, 165. See also drug trafficking Nathan, Otto  22 National Conference of Christian and Jews  155, 182, 231, 247, 252, 256, 294–5 national legislation. See domestic jurisdiction Native Americans  196 Nazi Germany  66, 113, 192, 219, 235, 245, 281 Nazi mass crimes  17, 20–2, 27, 59, 73, 103–4, 107, 113, 143, 189, 192, 223–4, 230, 232, 235, 245, 247, 281 Nazis  65, 128, 219 Negro people. See African Americans Nehru, Jawaharlal  57, 226 Netherlands  42, 49, 92, 94, 166, 171–2, 196, 242, 260 New York City  23, 67–8, 74, 101–2, 105, 107, 114, 116, 119, 121, 213, 234, 256, 268, 293 New Yorker  291 New York Post  291–2 New York Times  77–8, 220, 230, 232–4, 278, 280 New Zealand  94, 96, 172, 174 non-self-governing territories  190–1, 193–4, 198, 208, 211, 216. See also colonies, British Northern Ireland  65 Norway  42, 223–4, 236 Nuremberg Charter  59, 75–6, 83–4, 102, 145, 153–5 Nuremberg judgment. See Nuremberg principles Nuremberg principles  50–1, 53–4, 56, 62–3, 75–6, 83–7, 102, 123, 126, 130, 136–7, 143–6, 155, 158, 171, 215, 233, 236, 245, 248, 250, 252–3, 281 Nuremberg trial. See International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg

Palestine  64, 66–7, 83, 142, 223 Panama  32, 37, 49, 56, 122–3, 145, 237, 292 Paris  106, 181, 187, 198, 212–13, 215, 219, 227, 235–6, 246, 248, 252, 254, 268, 270, 278, 281–2, 285–6, 290–2 Pasha, Enver  235, 246 Patterson, William L.  294 Pavlov, Alexei  165–6 Pearson, Drew  292 Pella, Vespasian  52–4, 58, 65, 82–4, 86–7, 144, 219–20, 268 Pérez Perozo, Victor M.  142, 144–5, 148–55 Perlzweig, rabbi Maurice L.  221–3 Peru  171 Peshawar  90–1 Petliura, Symon  235, 246, 268, 270 Philadelphia  265 Philippines  28 Phillips, H. M.  166 Picasso, Pablo  226 Pickett, Clarence E.  250, 289 Pillai, Parushottama Padmanabta  88–90 piracy  13, 59, 75, 223, 233, 266 Podestá Costa, Luis A.  236 pogroms  14, 245, 268, 270 Poland  14, 15–17, 26–7, 33, 49, 52, 68, 83, 94, 96, 98, 103, 107, 119, 124–5, 127, 137–9, 141–3, 145–54, 165, 171, 174, 189, 220, 231, 268 Poles  19, 27, 97, 129 political groups  59, 65, 67–8, 71–3, 83, 105, 109–10, 114, 116, 118, 127–9, 131, 137–8, 140 –2, 159, 162–4, 171, 174–9, 183, 191, 193, 195, 205, 212–13, 221, 251, 253–5, 258, 260–3, 265–7, 271, 279, 284–93 Pope Pius XII  222, 228–9. See also Vatican Prague  222, 230 property, confiscation of  30, 74, 83, 107 Punjab  134, 296

O’Neill, Con D. W.  63–6 Ordonneau, Pierre  105, 142–54 Ottoman Empire  235, 237

Rappaport, Emil Stanisław  14–15 ratification  200–1, 215, 285, 296 Refling Hagen, Ingeborg  223–4, 226 Reid, J. S.  174 Remes, Andrew  277 reservations  121, 132, 186, 191, 202, 209

Pakistan  87–91, 128, 134–5, 174, 197, 233, 235, 295–7

Index von Ribbentrop, Joachim  113, 235 Roberts, Conway W.  197–8 Roberts, Owen  225 Rockefeller, John D. Jr.  227 Rockefeller, Nelson  226 Roma  27 Romania  53, 219, 245 Rome  222–3, 271 Roosevelt, Eleanor  23–5, 225, 248, 289 Roosevelt, Franklin D.  23 Rosen, Abbot A.  119–20, 186 Rosenberg, James N.  129, 131–2, 241, 247–76, 278–83, 285–8, 290, 293 Rubenstein, Arthur  226 Rubinow, Raymond  252, 295 Rudziński, Aleksander W.  142–3, 145–7, 149–54 von Rundstedt, Marshall Karl R. G.  17, 22 Rusk, Dean  72–73 Russia. See Russian Empire; Soviet Union Russian Empire  245 Saavedra Lamas, Carlos  236 Samuels, Gertrude  232 Sanders, William  294–5 San Francisco Conference (1945)  28, 104. See also United Nations Schacht, Hjalmar  219 Schapiro, Leonard B.  61 Schwarzbart, Sholom  246, 268, 270 Schwelb, Egon  242–3 Second World War  24, 115, 224 Seyersted, Finn  236 Sforza, Carlo  222 Shawcross, Hartley  40, 58–60, 62–5, 67, 84, 86–7, 176, 178, 184, 204–6, 208, 212–13, 226, 231, 235, 255–6, 261, 263, 266, 271, 291, 293 Sherwood, Robert E.  225 Shuster, George N.  250 Siam  174 Sikhs  134 Simpson, William W.  86, 129, 231–2, 247–8, 250–1, 261 Singh, Dalip  55 slave trade  13–14, 235, 255 Slavs. See Communist bloc countries Smith, Walter Bedell  248 social groups  162–3, 175

331

South Africa  174, 201, 205, 208, 216 South America. See Latin American countries sovereignty, state  29, 31, 99, 108, 112, 116, 141, 194, 233, 262, 288 Soviet bloc. See Communist bloc countries Soviet Communist Party  189 Soviet Constitution  43–4 Soviet Foreign Ministry  27–32, 61, 107–12, 189–94 Soviet penal code  43–4 Soviet Union  19, 28–33, 38, 41, 43–4, 47–53, 55, 61–2, 76–8, 92, 94, 96, 98–100, 103–5, 107–21, 127–8, 131, 136–43, 145, 147–54, 163, 165–6, 171, 174–5, 182, 186, 189–95, 197, 208–10, 216, 219–20, 233, 242, 251, 254, 261–2, 265, 288–9 Spain  78 Speer, Alfred  231 Spellman, Francis J.  228–9 Spiropoulos, Jean  174 Sporborg, Constance A.  225 Sproul, Robert G.  237 SS, 21, 230. See also Gestapo; Nazi mass crimes Stalin, Joseph  107, 109–11 Stassen, Harold  225 Steinbeck, John  225–6 sterilization, forcible  99, 110, 247. See also abortion, forcible Stimson, Henry L.  225 Stinebower, Leroy D.  272 Stockholm  285 Streicher, Julius  113 Stuart, Julia  242, 251–2, 273, 275 Sturges, Wesley A.  250 Sulzberger, Arthur  225 superior order defense  141, 153–4 Sweden  49, 55, 238, 285 Switzerland  261, 280 Taft-Hartley Act (1947)  277 Tate, Jack B.  201, 204, 257–63, 266–7 Taylor, Telford  19–20 terrorism, international  30, 115. See also Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Thackrey, Theodore O. Sr.  291–2 Thorp, Willard L.  272, 278–80, 283

332 Index Tiflis  235, 246 Toscanini, Arturo  226 trade unions  75 Trainin, Aron  112–17 Trujillo Molina, Rafael J.  235 Truman, Harry S.  228, 248, 288 Turks  235, 271, 281 Ukraine  174, 235, 246, 268, 270 UN Charter  28–30, 31, 73, 77, 100, 111, 120, 152, 160, 193 UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR)  24–5, 38–42, 69–70, 82, 85, 87, 92–6, 98, 125–8, 132, 135–8, 140, 158–9, 162–3, 165, 171, 174, 215, 239, 244, 248, 251, 256–7, 264, 273–4, 280; Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities  38, 42, 92–3, 95, 132, 137–8, 157, 171, 215 UN Committee for the Codification and Development of International Law  38–9, 41, 46–51, 53, 58–62, 68–70, 75, 82, 114, 116, 246. See also International Law Commission UN Committee of Legal Experts. See UN Committee for the Codification and Development of International Law UN Department of Public Information  26 UN Division of Human Rights  82 Undset, Sigrid  224, 226, 236, 241 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)  32–3, 38–43, 45–6, 53–4, 57–60, 63, 68–70, 74, 76, 82–5, 87–98, 101–2, 107, 124–9, 131, 133–55, 173–5, 189, 210, 213–15, 223, 231–4, 236, 238–40, 242–4, 248, 253–4, 257, 259, 262, 264–5, 268, 271–3, 275, 289 UN General Assembly  28, 30–3, 37–41, 43, 45–6, 48, 50–1, 53–6, 58–9, 61– 6, 69–72, 76–8, 81–7, 92–8, 101–7, 114, 116, 123, 129–30, 132, 135–7, 139–41, 143, 145–6, 151, 153, 155, 157, 160, 162, 166, 170–5, 184, 187–90, 192–3, 200, 203–6, 208–16, 220, 223–4, 228–9, 231, 233, 235–6, 238–40, 242, 245–6, 248–9, 254–5,

257, 261–5, 267, 273–4, 279–82, 285–6, 288, 290–2, 297 Union of Italian Jewish Communities  222 Union of South Africa. See South Africa United Kingdom  30, 64–5, 67, 82–5, 87, 92, 94, 97–8, 101, 104, 124, 129–32, 136–8, 150, 155–61, 165, 170–3, 177–80, 182–8, 198, 200, 203–8, 210–11, 215–16, 223, 232–4, 237–40, 242, 247–8, 250–1, 254–6, 259–63, 265–6, 270, 284, 289, 291; delegation of  32, 38, 47–50, 52–5, 66–7, 74, 76, 81–6, 91–7, 101, 124– 9, 135–8, 156, 158–9, 165–6, 170, 173–8, 181–8, 193–209, 211–13, 216, 231–3, 235, 239, 279–82, 284, 289, 291, 293 United Nations  24–5, 29, 40, 43, 45, 51, 59, 61–3, 66, 68, 72–3, 77–8, 85–7, 89, 94, 98, 104–6, 109, 113, 129, 132–4, 136–7, 151, 157, 160, 174, 176, 192–3, 198, 200, 203, 210, 213, 219, 222, 227, 232–5, 237–8, 240–3, 245, 249, 252, 255, 258, 261–3, 265, 268–71, 283, 295–7 United States of America  33, 39, 53, 69–73, 75–7, 83, 86, 91–2, 98, 102–7, 120, 125–6, 129, 131–2, 138–55, 158, 164–5, 171, 189, 196, 204, 209, 220, 231, 233–5, 237, 245–51, 254–9, 261–9, 273–4, 278–83, 285, 292; delegation of 28, 30–2, 41–2, 47–51, 53–5, 69–73, 76–7, 83, 93–6, 102–6, 114–15, 117–21, 125–7, 138–55, 160, 162–4, 174, 181–2, 195, 200–1, 203–4, 246–7, 278–81, 283–4, 287, 290–1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights  25, 43, 59, 70, 163, 206–7, 256, 264–5, 270, 288 universal jurisdiction  15–16, 71–3, 99, 103–4, 108, 119, 139, 143, 149–51, 244–7, 262, 267–70, 281–2, 288–9. See also domestic jurisdiction UN Resolution 96(I) (1946)  32–3, 37–41, 43–5, 58, 63–5, 67–8, 74–5, 81–2, 86, 103–4, 118, 122–3, 130–1, 133, 136, 140, 157, 189, 214,

Index 231, 233, 238–9, 241, 243, 245, 269, 291 UN Resolution 180(II) (1947)  47, 97, 114, 243, 245, 269, 281, 291 UN Resolution 260A(III) (1948)  105, 169 UN Secretariat  32, 39, 41–2, 45–6, 52, 54, 57–8, 72, 74, 82–3, 85–7, 95, 102, 144, 151, 157, 215, 244, 282 UN Secretariat Draft Genocide Convention  52–4, 57–60, 63–78, 82–8, 92–103, 107–8, 111, 116, 127, 130, 136–7, 143–6, 148, 150, 152, 192, 223–4, 237–40, 291 UN Secretariat Human Rights Division  46, 82, 242–3 UN Secretariat Legal Department  26, 32, 82 UN Secretary General  28, 32, 44–6, 54, 56–9, 63, 65, 68–9, 75, 82, 86, 95, 97–8, 100–1, 232, 241–6. See also Lie, Trygve UN Security Council  67, 83, 88–9, 100, 111, 120, 134, 139, 152, 211, 233, 296–7 UN Sixth Committee (Legal)  31, 38, 40, 48, 53, 65, 68, 76, 83–4, 105–6, 137, 170, 173–5, 184–7, 192, 194, 198–9, 203, 208–12, 215–16, 228, 233, 281, 289, 291, 293, 296 UN War Crimes Commission  18–19 Uruguay  33, 284, 290, 292 US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention  158, 240–1, 249–54, 256, 269, 278–82, 285–9 US Congress  152, 237 US Constitution  149, 151–2, 265 US Department of Justice  103, 186, 294 US Department of State  21, 39–40, 70–2, 102–6, 117–22, 125–6, 149–50, 161–4, 182, 201, 203–4, 248–50, 254, 259, 261–3, 266–9, 274, 280, 287–8, 294–5 US Department of War  19, 23, 154 US Supreme Court  17 US War Refugee Board  22

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Valery, Paul  226 vandalism, crime of  13–16, 24, 115 van Doren, Carl  225 Vatican  222–3. See also Pope Pius XII Venezuela  49, 92–3, 95–6, 103, 107, 119, 127, 137–8, 141, 144–5, 147, 149–55, 159–60, 171, 174, 176, 189, 278, 281, 284, 290, 292 veto power  139, 152 Vieux, Antonio  235 Vinogradov, Sergei  43–4 Voznesensky, Nikolai  189 Waithayakon, Prince Wan  174 Wallace, Henry  226 warmongering  14, 115 Warsaw  13–14, 16 Washington, DC  20, 59, 77, 220, 261–2, 275, 294 Washington Post  24–5 Wechsler, Herbert  121–2 Weir, General John M.  19 Welsh  64 Western Europe  221 Westlake, John  33 Whiteman, Marjorie  274 Wise, Stephen S.  225 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom  256, 286 World Alliance for Friendship through the Churches  256 World Council of Churches  283 World Federation of Trade Unions  265 World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA)  131, 144, 157, 241–4, 252, 256, 265, 272–3, 275–6, 280 World Jewish Congress  221–3 World Jewish Council  90–1 World War I. See First World War World War II. See Second World War Wright, Quincy  237 Young, Sheila  286 Younger, Kenneth G.  203, 205–6, 212–13 Yugoslavia  26–7, 49, 52, 174

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