Disputed Questions on Virtue 2010011501

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The Hackett

ONO) O INT NS

Disputed Gueen on Virtue

Translated by

Jeffrey Hause WR

ekarel

Claudia Eisen Murphy Tehanere eceetevam-valea @oyoabentsalcctavaeny

Jeffrey Hause~

The Hackett Aquinas Robert Pasnau and Jeffrey Hause General Editors This series offers central philosophical treatises of Aquinas in new, state-of-the-art translations distinguished by their accuracy and use of clear and nontechnical modern vocabulary. Annotation and com­ mentary accessible to undergraduates make the series an ideal vehicle for the study of Aquinas by readers approaching him from a variety of backgrounds and interests.

Thomas Aquinas Disputed Questions on Virtue

Translated by Jeffrey Hause and Claudia Eisen Murphy Introduction and Commentary by Jeffrey Hause

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge

Copyright© 2010 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 1 413 12 11 10

1 2 3 45 6 7

For further information, please address Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. P.O. Box 44937 Indianapolis, Indiana 462 44-0937 www.hackettpublishing.com Cover design by Brian Rak Interior design by Jennifer Plumley Composition by Professional Book Compositors, Inc. Printed at Sheridan Books, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 12257-127 4. [Selections. English. 2010] Disputed questions on virtue/ Thomas Aquinas ; translated by Jeffrey Hause and Claudia Eisen Murphy ; introduction and commentary by Jeffrey Hause. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-0-87220-925-l (pbk.) - ISBN 978-0-87220 -926-8 (cloth) 1. Virtues. 2. Christian ethics-Catholic authors. I. Hause, Jeffrey. II. Murphy, Claudia Eisen. III. Title. BJ255.T3H38 2010 l 79'.9-dc22 2010011501

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences­ Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-l 98 4 @

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction Note on the Translation Abbreviations and Epithets

Vll IX XXIV XXVI

On the Virtues in· General On Charity On Fraternal Correction On Hope On the Cardinal Virtues

96 182 203 224

Commentary Bibliography Index

258 390 393

V

ACKNO\VLEDGMENTS We would like to thank Marilyn McCord Adams, E. J. Ashworth, and especially Robert Pasnau for helpful comments on the translation. T hanks are also due to the University of Toronto for granting Claudia Murphy a sabbatical to work on the translation. We are both deeply in­ debted to Norman Kretzmann, whose critical appreciation of Aquinas' ethics still stands as a model for us. For help with the Commentary, I would like to thank Rachel Lu, Louis Mancha, Chris Pliatska, and especially Robert Pasnau, whose frank and generous comments have made for a much improved vol­ ume. Thanks are also due to audiences at the Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy, the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the University of Toronto, and the International Medieval Congress, as well as to my students at Creighton University, the Har­ vard Divinity School, St. John's Seminary, and the University of Vir­ ginia. I am grateful to the Creighton Graduate School and Dean Timothy Austin, who offered support for me to write this commentary. I would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for a summer stipend that allowed me to complete the unit On Charity. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endow­ ment for the Humanities. Jeffrey Hause Department of Philosophy Department of Classical and Near Eastern Studies Creighton University

Vll

For Marilyn Adams and In Memory of Norman Kretzmann

INTRODUCTION Contempora ry readers approaching one of Plato's Socratic dialogues for the first time will be drawn in quickly. The vivid characterization, the drama of the debate, and the importance of the resolution will all be clear to them. We can expect much the same when they read Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy or Adam Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments, two of the most engaging ethical texts in Western thought. But on picking up a copy of Aquinas' Disputed Questions on Virtue, these same readers might at first be mystified and confused. Each ar­ ticle is headed by a mass of objections that seem to come from nowhere, the terse replies are filled with technical language and com­ plex arguments, and it is not immediately clear why Aquinas treats the particular topics he discusses. Each article piles more of the same on the earlier ones, and a quick perusal of the work might impress us as just so much sound and fu ry. The task I undertook in writing the commentary on these disputa­ tions was precisely to demystify them so that contemporary students and scholars can see their considerable value. The language, it is true, is technical, but no more so than Aristotle's. The arguments are com­ plex but wonderfully clear, and Aquinas' crisp and plain style is per­ fectly suited for elucidating their structure. The topics for discussion grew out of Aquinas' own engagement with thinkers who shaped his intellectual milieu, including those long past, such as Aristotle and Augustine; those more recently past, such as Peter Lombard and W illiam of Auxerre; and those alive at the time Aquinas was writing. In this respect, his practice was no different from that of contempora ry writers on ethics. Moreover, Aquinas orders the discussion of these topics carefully and crafts his discussions ingeniously in order to ac­ complish his overarching goal: to develop a theory of virtue that is both intellectually satisfying and morally and spiritually advantageous. Disputed Questions on Virtue is an astounding accomplishment in its own right and, together with its companion piece, the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae, constitutes one of the few truly great ethical systems in Western thought. The philosophical commentary that accompanies the translation does most of the work of clarifying and explaining Aquinas' views. In this brief introduction, I will simply try to put the Disputed Questions in its context by saying a few words of background about its author, the practice of disputation, and why Aquinas thought virtue so important for human life. IX

Introduction

X

Life The youngest son in the d'Aquino family, Thomas was born between 1224 and 1226, probably in the family castle of Roccasecca, which lay midway between Rome and Naples in what was then the Kingdom of Naples.' His father, Landulph, was a descendant of the counts of Aquino, and his mother, Theodora, was of aristocratic Neapolitan heritage. Among 13th-century aristocratic families, the norm was to pass the family holdings and title, if any, to the eldest son, while younger sons were often sent to the "better " monasteries. In keeping with the practices of their class, Thomas' parents sent him, in the care of his nanny, to the venerable monastery of Monte Cassino when he was five. Thomas received his elementary education at Monte Cassino.His parents expected he would have a lifelong career there, eventually be­ coming abbot.However, political troubles involving the monastery led Thomas' father to remove him temporarily, as he thought.To further Thomas' studies, his family sent the young teenager to the University of Naples until the time of troubles passed. Matriculating in the undergraduate Arts College, Aquinas studied the Aristotelian philoso­ phy that would characterize much of his thought throughout his ca­ reer.It was here that the young Aquinas encountered the Dominicans and decided to become a Dominican friar rather than a Benedictine monk. While a monastic life was generally seen as socially appropriate for the younger sons of aristocrats, life as a mendicant friar was not, es­ pecially if that son was expected to become a notable abbot in a pres­ tigious monastery. With their plans for their son thwarted, Aquinas' parents attempted to retrieve their errant son from the Dominicans to talk him out of his folly. The Dominicans, however, had ushered him out of Naples (reasonably fearing just such a move) and were traveling north with him when a small band, acting at the behest of the d'Aquino family, stopped the Dominicans and seized Thomas, return­ ing him to his family. Although the d'Aquino family did not imprison Thomas, they kept him under close watch for months while they attempted to convince him to return to the Benedictines. Their efforts proved useless; Thomas was resolved to become a Dominican. We do not know for certain what motivated his choice at that time, but we do know that the Dominicans, who had been forming close ties to leading universities, 1 For details on Aquinas' life, I am drawing from two superb studies: Torrell ( 1996) and Tugwell ( 1988).

Introduction

Xl

could offer Aquinas a better education than the Benedictines. This ed­ ucation would help Aquinas to develop his biblically and philosophi­ cally informed conception of God and of the world as it relates to God, and in turn it would better enable him to lead others to that same un­ derstanding. In later life, Aquinas wrote eloquently of this distinctively Dominican fusion of the contemplative and active life, finding in it the greatest possible expression of love for God. Those who preach and teach so that their neighbors can better know and love God have climbed "to such heights of charity that they forego even divine con­ templation, although they take the greatest pleasure in it, so as to serve God in the salvation of their neighbors." 2 After about fifteen months, the d'Aquino family relented and al­ lowed Thomas to return to life with his Dominican confreres. Want­ ing Thomas to resume his studies, his order sent him to Paris, where the preeminent Dominican scholar, Albert the Great, was teaching. When Albert left Paris to take a position as professor at the newly formed Dominican house of studies in Cologne, Aquinas followed him there, working with Albert not just as his student but also as his academic secretary, compiling class notes from Albert's lectures on Pseudo-Dionysius' On the Divine Names and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for publication. Eventually, Albert recommended Aquinas for graduate studies in theology at Paris, Europe's premier institution in that discipline. In 1252 Aquinas left Cologne for Paris, where he lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. 3 At that time, students seeking advanced degrees in theology had to demonstrate their fitness to conduct re­ search and to teach on a sufficiently wide range of subjects and in the requisite depth. In contrast with our contemporary university practice, in which students write dissertations on subjects of their own choos­ ing, medieval universities required students to lecture on the Sen­ tences, revising their work for publication. Commenting on Lombard's Sentences satisfied at least the breadth requirement, since it covered, from the medieval perspective, every important topic in Christian the­ ology: the Trinity (Book l ) ; creation-in particular, humans pre- and postlapsarian (Book 2); the incarnation and return to God (Book 3); and the sacraments (Book 4). Although Aquinas had treated ethical 2

On Charity 11 resp. 6.

3 Ordinarily, graduate students in theology first offer lectures on the Bible, and afterwards on the Sentences. We know that Aquinas lectured on Isaiah while at Paris, but he may have done so during his first stay in Paris, before he for­ mally undertook graduate studies.

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Introduction

topics in his lectures on Isaiah, his work on Book 3 of the Sentences constitutes his first sustained and sophisticated treatment of virtue. Aquinas became a master, or professor, in 1256 and taught in the graduate Faculty of Theology at Paris until the end of the 1258-9 aca­ demic year.There he held his first series of disputations (the Disputed Questions on Truth).Because there was only one Dominican profes­ sorship, the order moved Aquinas from Paris to teaching positions in Italy to allow another Dominican theology student to become master. Aquinas was extremely productive during these periods, writing, among other things, the Summa Contra Gentiles, the First Part of the Summa Theologiae, the Commentary on Job, and the Disputed Ques­ tions on the Power of God. However, apart from the ethical elements in his work on Job and the compact discussions of virtue in the Com­ pendium of Theology, Aquinas wrote little on ethics during this period. Nevertheless, his work in metaphysics and moral psychology, much of which intersects in his philosophical and theological anthropology, laid some groundwork for the work in ethics he was planning to do. Those plans were realized in Paris, where the Dominicans reas­ signed Aquinas in 1268. While there, he wrote a basic commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and composed the astounding 303 questions of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae, the unit de­ voted to ethics. He also held several disputations on ethical subjects, which he revised and published.The largest of these, his Disputed Questions on Evil, treats evil, vice, sin, and the causes of sin, in par­ ticular free choice and the demons.4 The remaining disputations in ethics are those on the virtues collected in this volume. In the short time- not quite four years-before Aquinas left Paris for Naples in 1272, he had developed one of the great systems of moral thought. In it, Aquinas describes the metaphysical and psychological bases of ethics, explains the nature of virtue and its relationship to natural law, explores sin and merit, and investigates dozens of virtues, detailing their complex interrelationships. The work was theoretically powerful and at the same time a guide to life, both this-worldly and other­ worldly. Perhaps only Aristotle's and Kant's ethical writings rival it in its ambition, scope, and perennial appeal. Aquinas lived for only two years after leaving Paris for his professor­ ship in Naples.There, he underwent a startling change.Late in 1273, as he was saying mass, something happened that dramatically affected

4 Some scholars date this disputation to Aquinas' late Italian period. Reasons for and against this dating are found in Torrell (1996, 201-7).

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Xlll

his attitude toward his life in this world, including his teaching and writing.He lost his characteristic desire to write and never put pen to parchment again.He left the Third Part of the Summa Theologiae un­ finished and ceased teaching courses. When, out of perplexity, his sec­ retary and close associate Reginald of Piperno pressed him on why he had lost his desire to write, Aquinas explained that what he had seen during his mass made his writing seem "like straw in comparison, " as Aquinas' biographer Bartholomew of Capua reports. Whatever hap­ pened to Aquinas during that life-changing mass-a mystical vision? a stroke? utter exhaustion from years of overwork?-it left him without enthusiasm for life in this world. Nevertheless, the event did not de­ bilitate him, and early in 1274 Aquinas set out to take part in the Ec­ umenical Council of Lyons.On his way, his head struck a tree branch. Left dazed, he regained himself and was able to travel further.At this time he dictated one final work, a response to a request from the abbot of Monte Cassino to settle a question about divine foreknowledge and human freedom.Within a few days of his accident, however, Aquinas felt unable to continue, and stayed briefly with his niece. Feeling bet­ ter, he tried once again to make the journey, but quickly relapsed and was taken to the monastery of Fossanova, where he died on March 7. In 1323, Pope John XX.II declared Aquinas' canonization, and in 1567 Pope Pius V declared him a doctor of the church.

Disputations Aquinas wrote in a number of genres. He composed treatises on philo­ sophical and theological subjects; commentaries on philosophical works and books of the Bible; sermons and hymns; all in addition to the two famous summas, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologiae. He also wrote a number of works called "disputed ques­ tions " or "disputations, " including the treatments of virtue in this vol­ ume. Unlike treatises or commentaries, disputed questions might at first strike contemporary readers as an arcane exercise, a highly styl­ ized effort in which dozens of distinct lines of argument wend their way chaotically toward some sort of resolution.On further examina­ tion, we should find that what we read in the disputed questions is not so different from what we might find in a lively 21st-century philoso­ phy class filled with bright and well-read students.That should not be surprising, since these disputed questions are in fact revised versions of classroom exercises Aquinas held at the University of Paris. By the time Aquinas became a professor, disputations had become an important part of university life, and the practice had spread to

XIV

Introduction

houses of study outside the university as well.5 Its origins predate the university, going back to the 12th-century practice of punctuating an­ alytical lectures with "questions." These questions called up difficul­ ties or matters of interest found in the texts at issue, and allowed professors and students to pursue them in greater depth.In contrast, the disputed question was emancipated from any particular text.A pro­ fessor would conduct a course on a certain range of related issues (such as evil or virtue), and at each meeting of the course there would be a debate of sorts over a particular question selected by the profes­ sor.The effort served multiple purposes.On the one hand, it was a ve­ hicle for training students to construct compelling arguments for a particular conclusion at the same time that they learned their profes­ sor's views on the matter.On the other, it was an important opportu­ nity for research by the professor, whose disputations were regularly revised and then published. In the graduate Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris, pro­ fessors held two sorts of disputations. Public disputations were more formal events, bringing together students of various professors and some­ times other professors as well.After the professor announced the posi­ tion he would take on the question under discussion, participants formulated arguments in objection to that position.An advanced grad­ uate student was appointed to respond to each of these objections as part of his training for academic life.The next day, after taking into account all the objections and responses, the professor would return and offer his formal reply.A secretary would take down the proceedings, and the pro­ fessor would then rework it into a form suitable for publication.Private disputations, which involved only the professor and his own students, were less formal and more intimate, but took much the same form. It would be a mistake to think that the text of the Disputed Ques­ tions on Virtue that Aquinas published was simply a transcript of his classroom exercise, although we can assume that much of what it con­ tains records what actually transpired among the participants. Since the responses to the objections generally represent or accord with Aquinas' views as he records them in other works, it is plausible that he revised his student respondent's work quite substantially, some­ times discarding the student's answers entirely.Aquinas also must have reordered the objections, since we find he often groups similar objec­ tions together.Sometimes, we read among the objections, "But some­ one responded ..." (sed dicebat). These interjections might report In what follows, I am indebted to Bazan et al. ( 1985) for details on the prac­ tice of disputations. 5

Introduction

xv

what the student respondent answered, or they might record what an­ other participant answered from the floor (hence our use of "some­ one" rather than a more definite reference). We can assume, from Aquinas' use of the indicative in recording these, that they report ac­ tual interjections; in works that were not classroom exercises, such as the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas puts these sorts of objections in hy­ pothetical terms.6 However, Aquinas undoubtedly exercised consid­ erable creativity in editing the objections. After all, he retains only those that are useful in setting up further objections, adding to the drama of the dialectic as it unfolds. All those that played no heuristic role were surely edited out. Jean-Pierre Torrell, Aquinas' finest biog­ rapher to date, suggests that Aquinas' classroom replies must also have been simpler and shorter than those he later published, on the grounds that students could not follow such complex arguments as the ones we read in his published work.7 Torrell's assumption about the students' abilities seems unwarranted, however. After all, these graduate students were steeped in the texts and arguments raised in the objections that set the stage for the professor's reply, and in short order the students would grow accustomed to their professor's line of thought. Aquinas' arguments in particular are no more difficult to follow than those we can hear now at scholarly conferences, and his spare, lucid Latin is at least as clear as the vernacular prose of our better contemporary scholars. If scholars' published work was more complex than their classroom responses, that may be due more to their own rethinking of the material than to the incapacities of their students. What we find in a disputation, then, is a slightly different and more formalized version of patterns prevalent in contemporary university seminars. We can easily imagine a lively exchange in a seminar on, say, philosophy of mind when the professor raises the question of whether self-deception is possible. Someone who has been reading Freud will report Freud's understanding of self-deception. Another student, who has been reading Sartre, then offers Sartre's criticisms of Freud. A third student, not taken with either Freud or Sartre, moves on to different ground by discussing Donald Davidson's views. After a lively exchange, the professor, taking all these comments into ac­ count, lectures on her own view, later publishing the material as a chapter in her book on the workings of the mind.

6 He generally uses si dicatur ("if the response were made") . 7 Torrell ( 1 996, 62).

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Introduction

Theoretical Background to Aquinas' Discussion 1 . Why we need virtue. Although Aquinas begins the Disputed Ques­ tions with an account of virtue so general that it covers the virtues of everything from God to pigeons to mushrooms and even rocks, his in­ terest is in distinctively human virtues.But what sort of character human virtue will have in general, and what the specific human virtues will turn out to be, depends on human nature. In Aquinas' view, humans are importantly like the earth's other living things.8 Like plants, we are bodily creatures that are generated, live, and die.We take in nutrition, we expel waste, and we reproduce. Like other ani­ mals, we engage in all these activities through the use of our senses, which allow us a limited cognitive grasp of the world, and through the use of our two sensory appetites, which Aquinas (following Aristotle) calls the "concupiscible" and "irascible " appetites. In both humans and nonhuman animals, the concupiscible appetite desires a pleasant good, and the irascible strives to overcome obstacles to satisfying those desires for what is pleasurable.So, Aquinas argues, the passion of love is a concupiscible passion, while anger is an irascible passion. However, we humans part company with our fellow animals, Aquinas argues, because of our distinct rational nature, which is ex­ pressed in our rational faculties.Preeminent among these faculties is reason, which allows us a more extensive cognitive grasp of things than senses do, since it enables us to form and master concepts and disci­ plines and even, in the next life, to see God in himself. In addition to its contemplative functions, reason also has practical functions, such as determining how we should best perform our tasks and spend our time.Moreover, humans have three appetitive powers we can also call rational.The will, or rational appetite, responds to rational considera­ tions in seeking the good as reason conceptualizes it.Furthermore, in humans, even the irascible and concupiscible appetites are rational in a sense, since we can exercise some rational control over their activi­ ties and can in fact train them to respond rationally. So humans are not simply nonrational animals with reason appended to them any more than nonrational animals are plants with senses appended to them.Our rational nature characterizes even powers that are thor­ oughly nonrational in other animals. These rational faculties give human life a large degree of indeter­ minacy or open-endedness that, in his view, nonhuman animals lack. 9 8 Aquinas' ful lest sustained discussion of human nature may be found in Questions 75-89 of ST 1 . 9 See VirtGen 6.

Introduction

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Sheep have an instinctive flight reaction when they see a predator: they see a wolf, tense up, and run.They do not weigh various consid­ erations in light of their good to determine whether running would be a worthwhile course of action under the circumstances.Humans, by contrast, must determine for themselves how to think and act and feel. It is true that we have some natural starting points for our activities. For instance, our reason is structured in such a way that we under­ stand the basic principles of thought and action when we learn the concepts they contain. Once we understand "whole " and "part, " we will simply see that a whole is greater than any of its proper parts.But we have nothing like innate knowledge, and beyond the most basic principles of thought, we must work at discovering what is true and what is worthy of belief. Likewise, our will has a natural desire for our good.But without instinct to guide us, we have to formulate our own conception of what our good consists in and find ways to ensure that our lives stay focused on that good. We have, in short, a constellation of faculties that make our lives open-ended in multiple ways and yet are subject to rational control.By training our faculties rationally, we can train them to act and respond in more determinate ways.We can do this by developing what Aquinas calls "habits. " 10 These are not simply reflex reactions, mindless repeti­ tions, or addictive impulses-nothing that could possibly limit our agency.They are instead relatively permanent dispositions that de­ velop our faculties by inclining them to act in more determinate ways. Instead of limiting our agency, they fulfill our faculties by making us more effective agents: they afford us better control over what we do. Therefore, our habits lie in our rational control.In fact, they are at hand for us to use-or not-when we will.1 1 Those habits that incline a faculty to perform its function well are virtues, while those that detract it from performing its function well are vices.Aquinas recognizes an enormous number of virtues. Some are intellectual virtues, as for instance the various sorts of scientific knowledge we acquire when we master a discipline such as physics or

10

See ST 1-2 49. 11 In support, Aquinas often cites Averroes' dictum that a habit is what we use when we will (e.g., ST 1-2 49. 3 oc, 50.5 Reply, 52.3 Reply, 63.2 resp. 2). (In making this claim, Averroes was himself speaking only about intellectual ca­ pacities, drawing on a line of thought he found in Aristotle's On the Soul 2.5.) Aquinas likewise cites a text from Augustine's On the Good of Marriage, some­ times pairing it with the text from Averroes: "A habit is that by which one acts when the need arises" (VirtGen 1 Reply, On Hope 4 oc 3, ST 1-2 49. 3 oc) .

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geometry. Others are appetitive virtues, which direct our appetites to good ends and turn them into good instruments of reason.These in­ clude patience, which inclines us to maintain our equanimity when others inflict unfair hardships on us, and temperance, which helps us to stay clear-headed when the pleasures of food, drink, and sex beckon.These virtues are important, Aquinas explains, because they make our intellectual and moral activity easier.12 Someone who has never studied calculus can, in principle, sit down with a guide to the subject and work through a complex problem. But it will consume a great deal of time and mental effort, and if the answer turns out to be right, that may be due as much to luck as to following the guide. Someone who has mastered the discipline will be able to perform the same calculations in short order and without much effort. Much the same is true in our moral lives. Someone who lacks the virtue of gen­ erosity may have no idea how to treat houseguests visiting from abroad. Should she invite them to stay for a few days, or weeks? Should she offer them gifts when they arrive? Throw them a party? Take them on tours of the city? Or should she simply give them a key and tell them to enjoy themselves? In contrast, a generous person will be able to discern more readily what sort of treatment to give her guests and will take pleasure in doing for them whatever is called for.With­ out virtue, we will often find ourselves flustered and frustrated. 2. Virtue and happiness. It should be no surprise, then, that Aquinas also thinks that without virtue, we will never be happy. 13 For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, happiness is not a feeling of elation or pleasure.It is not a feeling of any sort at all, though people who are happy do often feel elated.Happiness is rather an activity: the most fulfilling sort of activity for the kind of beings we are. 14 It is not up to us to choose what sort of activity this is, but it is determined for us by our human nature, just as bovine nature determines what the good life is for Beulah the cow and feline nature determines what it is for Ricky the cat.1 5 Since the defining characteristic of human nature is rationality, in Aquinas' view, human happiness must consist in some sort of rational activity. The more steadfastly, readily, accurately, and continuously we engage 12 VirtGen I Reply, 9 resp. 1 3; On Charity 2 Reply; ST l-2 1 07.4 Reply. Aquinas generally uses the word beatitudo to signify happiness, although when he contrasts the happiness of heaven with the imperfect happiness we can attain by our own resources in this world, he sometimes calls this-worldly happiness felicitas, since beatitudo suggests blessedness. 14 ST 1-2 3.2-8. 1 5 ST l-2 3.8. 13

Introduction

XlX

in this rational activity, the happier we are. We achieve this goal through exercising our virtues. However, as we've seen, Aquinas thinks that we express our ration­ ality not just in reason's activity but in all sorts of human activities that reason directs.Contemplating God, conducting experiments in biol­ ogy, and constructing models of voting behavior in psychology all count as rational activity. However, so can loving other people, crav­ ing a warm bath, tensing up before fighting, or calming down from in­ tense anger, insofar as these are under our rational control.Does our happiness consist in the virtuous exercise of only the loftiest rational activities? Or does it consist in the virtuous exercise of any and all ra­ tional activities? Aquinas offers a complex answer to this question, drawing on the work of his predecessors Augustine and Aristotle. Augustine often stresses that a life limited to this world cannot bring us genuine hap­ piness; after all, the so-called happiness of this world can never last, and we are continually beset by troubles and anxieties.1 6 Finding this view congenial, Aquinas argues that perfect happiness consists in the vision of God had by the blessed in heaven. Because God is the source of all truth, contemplating God is the most satisfying intellectual ac­ tivity, and because he is perfect goodness, he is infinitely lovable. There is nothing the blessed could want that they do not already have. They are perfectly happy because they spend eternity in the activity of contemplating and loving God. By contrast, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics says nothing about the possibility of any life after this one but speaks only about what this­ worldly happiness consists in.But rather than rejecting Aristotle's view in favor of an otherworldly Christian account of happiness, Aquinas in­ tegrates a version of Aristotle's account into his wider Christian picture. We can in fact live earthly lives that are happy, in a sense; he often speaks of this as "imperfect" happiness. 1 7 Here, following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes two tiers of this imperfect happiness.The higher tier consists in the virtuous activity of rational contemplation.We will be happiest if we contemplate God, since he is the noblest of objects, though even contemplation of the various branches of knowledge will make us happy as well.The lower tier consists in the virtuous activity of practical reason, directing our life's many actions and passions. Aquinas thinks, somewhat optimistically, that those who enjoy a this­ worldly contemplative happiness will also have moral virtues, on the 16 17

Trin 1 3 .8. l l ; Against the Academicians I . I .2. ST 1-2 3 . 5 , 3.6, 4.7 ; NEComm 1 0. 12.

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grounds that moral virtue is required for the sort of self-control and tranquility of mind needed for that kind of contemplative activity. 1 8 Without virtue, the course of our rational activity could never run smoothly enough to constitute happiness, for the reasons already noted. We might sometimes manage to uncover and contemplate aspects of an intellectual discipline, or determine how to conduct ourselves and act accordingly, but without virtue we could not with any regularity do so readily, unfalteringly, and with pleasure. We would face obstacles to our contemplation, which would be frequently interrupted by labori­ ous efforts to uncover the truth, and our wayward passions would get in the way not just of our efforts at contemplation, but of our attempts to determine what shape our lives should take. To have any chance at happiness, then, we must submit ourselves to discipline. We need to ha­ bituate our sensory appetites to submit to right reason to develop their capacity to act rationally; we need to habituate our wills to value and love goods beyond our own narrow self-interest; and we need to habit­ uate reason not just to deliberate and judge well but also to command well, so that we actually carry out the activities we determine best for our lives.19 Beyond this, for the higher tier of contemplative happiness, we need to learn the various disciplines of knowledge. The highest of these is wisdom (that is, metaphysics or first philosophy), since it is the architectonic discipline: it judges and orders all the others. 20 The virtues that contribute to our this-worldly happiness are all virtues in our power to acquire.Even the mentally challenged, who would have difficulty in the more complex theoretical disciplines, can develop prudence and moral virtue. Great intelligence might make a person a better moral philosopher, but aptitude for moral philosophy is not the same as aptitude for morality. However, no one can acquire the virtues needed for the eternal and perfect happiness of the next life. To gain that good, God must share his own life with us, thereby elevating us to godhood. He does this through the gift of grace, whose effects are supernatural virtues that make us capable of directing our lives to God as our eternal happiness. 2 1 Primary among these are the three theological virtues: through faith we believe certain truths about God precisely because God has revealed them; through hope we look forward to attaining God in the next life by trusting in his saving power; and by charity we become friends with God, loving him above 18

ST 2-2 180.2. VirtGen 4-7. 20 ST 1-2 57.2. 21 VirtGen 9, 10; On Charity 2. 19

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all things, and loving our neighbors because they too belong to God. In addition, Aquinas argues, grace also results in supernatural moral virtues, which he calls "infused" virtues, whose task is to incline us to activities conducive to meriting eternal happiness.22 T he exercise of these virtues, which give us a readiness and facility in performing ac­ tivities that take us toward God, gives us a foretaste of the happiness of the life to come, although this foretaste is likewise an imperfect hap­ piness at best: in the next life we will see God continuously and as he is, but in this life we see him only through faith, and our contempla­ tion of him is not simply clouded but constantly interrupted. Aquinas' moral psychology and theory of acquired virtue have been influential among believers and nonbelievers alike, and those who dis­ agree with each other about the existence of God or the truth of Chris­ tianity find much to agree on in their admiration for Aquinas' writing in these fields. As we might expect, it has generally been Christian philosophers and theologians who have been interested in the array of infused virtues, while others have generally shelved their discussion, taking them to be the fantastic inventions of a brilliant but misled mind, or worse, the pernicious holdovers of a dogmatic and supersti­ tious age. Whatever we may think about the existence of God or the plausibility of divinely infused virtues, this shelving has been to the detriment of philosophy. As I hope the commentary on these disputa­ tions will show, Aquinas' treatment of divinely infused virtue develops his wider theory of virtue, including the part that deals with acquired virtue. Moreover, many of Aquinas' divinely infused virtues have secu­ lar cousins, and his treatment of the one can serve as an invaluable re­ source for contemporary thinkers in developing secular virtue ethics. To offer just one example, contemporary philosophers have called our attention to the importance of developing trusting attitudes, and some have even argued that trust is a foundational virtue, a condition for our developing and exercising other virtues. 23 In developing these ideas, they generally reach back for inspiration no further than Hobbes. How­ ever, readers should be able to see that Aquinas' treatment of hope can be just as valuable in this endeavor. Theorists of trust could help them­ selves to Aquinas' insights on the structure of hope, the psychology of hope, and the ways in which hope forms partnerships with other virtues such as justice and humility in order to bring us to our good.24 VirtGen 9, 10; CardVirt 2. A brief but illuminating example may be found in Annette Baier (2004). 24 For the structure of hope, see On Hope I and Commentary. Like hope, trust involves a three-part relation. T hose who trust aim at attaining or preserving 22

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Introduction

In these five disputations on virtue, Aquinas brings the wealth of Greek and Christian thought to bear on his effort to construct a theory of virtue. He trains his organizational genius on the chaotic mass of virtues discussed in the Western philosophical tradition, explaining with his characteristic clarity the manifold relationships they bear to each other.The result is an intellectually appealing theory of virtue that serves us as well in the 21st century as it served Aquinas' contemporaries. But it would be a mistake to think that Aquinas meant his work simply as a major contribution to ethical theory. His interest in virtue-its cause, development, loss, and connection to happiness-reveals a con­ cern that people become virtuous. After all, Aquinas extols the Domini­ can way of life precisely because it combines contemplation with leading others toward happiness.Like the best of his predecessors, Aquinas means his theoretical work to serve in part as a guide to life.

A Map of the Disputed Questions on Virtue There are five disputations on virtue in this series: On the Virtues in General, On Charity, On Fraternal Correction, On Hope, and On the Cardinal Virtues. Each is self-contained and can be read independ­ ently of the others, and we could well take these to be five related but independent works on different aspects of Aquinas' theory of virtue. Even so, these five works together constih1te an epitome of Aquinas' theory of moral virtue.25 On the Virtues in General lays the founda­ tions of Aquinas' theory of the virtues, explains how they are to be dis­ tinguished and grouped together in that theory, and explores their role in our psychology. In the course of this effort, Aquinas identifies char­ ity as the most fundamental of all virtues; and in the second disputa­ tion, On Charity, he explains why charity holds this preeminent place some good that they desire with concupiscible love. T his need not, as in the case of hope, be a difficult or formidable good, but I suspect it most often is. Frequently, the good is our physical or psychological well being or that of our loved ones. Sometimes it is our reputation and honor or that of a loved one. Moreover, as with hope, the good is a future good. Even in the case in which what we want is to safeguard a good we already possess, the desire is to preserve it into the future. T he other obj ect of trust is, as with hope, another person who has the power to help us to attain or to safeguard the desired good. So, both hope and trust may have the character of an expectatio, an expectation or await­ ing or prospect. For the psychology of hope, see On Hope 3 and Commentary. 25 Where "moral virtue" is taken broadly, to include the theological virtues of hope and charity.

Introduction

XXlll

among the virtues by exploring its nature and role in our moral psy­ chology. The brief disputation On Fraternal Correction concerns one particular act of charity, rebuking our morally wayward neighbors. As Aquinas explains, such rebuke counts as an act of charity only under certain very strict conditions, and identifying those conditions helps us to see how to live a life of charity in our own concrete circumstances. Because both hope and charity involve love for God, we might think that these two virtues simply collapse into one. In the disputation On Hope, Aquinas not only shows that the two virtues have independent functions but also nicely explains the dynamic psychological interplay between the two of them. Finally, On the Cardinal Virtues details the central place of the cardinal virtues, both in the taxonomy of the virtues and in our moral psychology, filling in many of the details of Aquinas' theory of virtue that the introductory disputation On the Virtues in General leaves undiscussed.

NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION The Latin text we have used for this translation is the provisional Leo­ nine text, which the Leonine Commission kindly supplied us with. In a few cases we have amended the text, most often in keeping with the earlier but largely reliable Marietti edition, since the provisional Leo­ nine text contained no critical apparatus. Aquinas wrote clear, concise Latin in the academic style of his day. We have therefore rendered his prose in a clear, concise contemporary English academic style. We have tried wherever possible to avoid jar­ gon. However, Aquinas used many technical terms, and we have often found it necessary to keep these terms technical in English to avoid misunderstanding. For instance, we render modus as "way " when it is not used technically, but as "mode " when Aquinas uses it to speak of modes of predication. We have in most cases retained the most commonly used English translations of key terms in Aquinas: "temperance " for temperantia, "prudence " for prudentia, "wisdom " for sapientia, and "habit " for habitus. These translations have recently come under considerable criticism. "Temperance, " we are told, is too narrow for Aquinas' tem­ perantia, tied in contemporary usage to the condemnation of alcohol. That is true, but other reasonable renderings face like criticism. "Self­ control" and "moderation " are too broad, and "temperateness " is more at home in meteorology. Critics of "prudence " say that it sounds too self-centered or too priggish as a translation of prudentia. They most often prefer "practical wisdom. " But "practical wisdom" will conjure up nothing in the mind of a reader, except perhaps perplexity at an ap­ parent redundancy, since contemporary English speakers think of wis­ dom as a practical virtue to begin with. The criticisms of "habit " as a translation of habitus are more persuasive. After all, in much contem­ porary English usage, "habit " implies something mindless or outside a person's agency, while for Aquinas a habitus is always under our con­ trol and can enhance a person's agency. Nevertheless, we do in some cases use the word "habit " much as Aquinas uses habitus, such as when we speak of inculcating a habit of study in students or when we speak of our customary practices as our habits. The word "habit " also has the advantage of suggesting a disposition that is hard to change, and no reasonable alternative conveys this notion as effectively. How­ ever, among all the good reasons for translating these terms as we do, the most persuasive is precisely their pervasiveness. In other English translations, these are the most commonly used terms, and we want to XXlV

Note on the Translation

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enable students who cannot read Latin but who want to consult other texts of Aquinas to be able to do so with a minimum of difficulty and confusion. In translating biblical passages, we have generally used as our basis the Douay -Rheims version, an elegant English translation of the Latin Vulgate. W hen, according to the provisional Leonine text, Aquinas at­ tributes a quotation to the wrong unit of a work, we have simply ex­ changed the incorrect for the correct attribution in the translation. However, when he attributes a quotation to the wrong work entirely, we retain the error in the translation and correct it in a footnote.

ABBREVIATIONS AND EPITHETS Units of Articles a.: article aa. : articles c.: chapter d.: distinction lect.: lecture obj.: initial objections oc: opposing consideration resp.: response (to an initial objection) subq.: subquestion

Works by Aquinas CardVirt: On the Cardinal Virtues DispQEvil: Disputed Questions on Evil DispQPower: Dipsuted Questions on the Power of God DispQTruth: Disputed Questions on Truth FratCor: On Fraternal Correction MattComm: Commentary on Matthew NEComm: Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics PerfSpLf Perfection of the Spiritual Life Phi/Comm: Commentary on Philippians RomComm: Commentary on Romans SCG: Summa Contra Gentiles SentComm: Commentary on the Sentences SentCommLR: Commentary on the Sentences, Lectura Romana ST: Summa Theologiae 1: First Part of the Summa Theologiae 1-2: First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae 2-2: Second Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae VirtGen: On the Virtues in General

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Abbreviations and Epithets

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Works by Other Authors CD: Augustine, On Christian Doctrine CG: Augustine, City of God Con{: Augustine, Confessions DivNames: John Damascene, On the Divine Names GA: Aristotle, Generation of Animals HomGosp: Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospel Inv: Cicero, On Invention LovGod: Bernard of Clairvaux, On Loving God Morals: Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of fob NE: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics OFC: Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will OrthFaith: John Damascene, The Orthodox Faith Ret: Augustine, Retractations Sent: Peter Lombard, Sentences SS: On Spirit and Soul TrEfn: Augustine, Tractates on the Epistles of fohn TrGTn: Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of fohn Trin: Augustine, On the Trinity

Epithets "The Apostle": St. Paul "The Commentator": Averroes (lbn Rushd) "The Master," or "The Master of the Sentences": Peter Lombard "The Philosopher": Aristotle

On the Virtues in General Article I Are Virtues Habits? Reasons to think they are not, but are acts instead 1 . In his Retractations ( 1. 9), Augustine says that virtue is the good use of free choice. But the use of free choice is an act. Therefore, virtue is an act. 2. People are owed reward only on account of their acts. But a re­ ward is owed to every virtuous person: Whoever dies in a state of charity will attain happiness. Therefore, virtue is something merito­ rious. Since anything meritorious is an act, virtue is an act. 3. The more God-like something in us is, the better it is. But we are especially like God insofar as we are acting, because God is pure activity. Therefore, the best thing in us is our activity. But virtues are the greatest goods in us, as Augustine says in On Free Choice (2. 1819). Therefore, virtues are acts.

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4. The perfection of our earthly journey is parallel to the perfection of our heavenly homeland. But the perfection of our homeland is an act. More precisely, it is happiness, which consists in an act, according to the Philosopher (NE 1.7 1098a l6). Therefore, the perfection of our earthly journey- virtue-is also an act.

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5. Those things that are classified in the same genus and mutually exclude one another are contraries. But because an act of sin is opposed to virtue, it excludes it. Therefore, virtue is in the genus of act.

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6. In On the Heavens 1. 11 (28 l a l 5), the Philosopher says that virtue is a power's utmost extent. Since a power's utmost extent is an act, so is virtue. 7. The soul's rational part is more excellent and more perfect than its sensory part. But the sensory power performs its activity without any mediating habit or quality. Therefore, there is no need to posit in the intellective part any habits that render its operation perfect by their mediation. 8. The Philosopher says in Physics 7.3 (246b23) that virtue is a dis­ position of something perfected to what is best. But since what is best

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On the Virtues in General

is an act, and since a disposition belongs to the same genus as what it disposes to, it follows that virtue is an act. 9. In On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 1 Augustine says that virtue is the ordering oflove. But, as Augustine says in The City ofGod 19. 13, an ordering is a disposition o f equal and unequal things that as­ signs each its place. Therefore, virtue is a disposition, not a habit.

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10. A habit is a quality that is difficult to change. But a virtue is easy to change, since it is lost through a single act of mortal sin. There­ fore, virtue is not a habit. 1 1. If we need certain habits-the sort that are virtues - we need them either for natural operations or for meritorious operations, which are, so to speak, supernatural. However, we do not need them for natural operations. After all, since any nature, including one that lacks senses, can perform its operation without a habit, we therefore have all the more reason to think the rational nature will be able to do it. Likewise, we do not need them for meritorious operations be­ cause God performs these in us, "who works in us to will and to ac­ complish " (Philippians 2: 13). Therefore, virtues are in no way habits.

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12. Everything that acts through a form always acts as that form de­ mands. For instance, what is hot always acts by heating. Therefore, if the mind contains some habitual form of the sort called virtue, then it will turn out that anyone with a virtue must act as the virtue demands. But this is false; for if it were true, every virtuous person would b e confirmed i n virtue. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

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1 3 . Habits are in powers to make their operating easier. However, we do not need anything to make our acts of virtue easier to perform. This is apparent, for acts of virtue consist principally in choice and volition, and nothing is easier to perform than an act that consists in a volition. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

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14. An effect cannot be more excellent than its cause. But if virtue is a habit, then a habit will be the cause of an act, which is more ex­ cellent than a habit. Therefore, the claim that virtue is a habit ap­ pears incorrect. 65

1 5 . The mean and the extremes belong to the same genus. But moral virtue is a mean between passions, and passions belong to the genus of acts. 1

See 1 . 1 5.25; cf. CG 1 5 .22.

Article 1 : Are Virtues Habits?

3

Opposing considerations

1 . According to Augustine (OFC 2.18-19), virtue is a good quality of the mind. However, virtue cannot be in any species of quality except the first: habit.

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2 . T he Philosopher says in Ethics 2.6 (1106b36) that virtue is a habit of choosing, lying in a mean. 3 . T hose who are asleep have virtues, because virtues are lost only through mortal sin. But there are no virtuous acts in sleepers, since they do not have the use of free choice. T herefore, virtues are not acts.

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Reply

"Virtue," according to the meaning of the word, designates what completes a power. T hat is why virtue is also called strength, since a thing achieves its impulse or movement through the power it has that has been made complete. For "virtue," as the word implies, refers to a power's perfection. Accordingly, the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1.11 (28 l a l 5) that virtue is the utmost extent of power in a thing. However, power is said to be directed to activity. Therefore, we see what completes a power when the power engages in its perfect operation. Furthermore, because whatever operates has its operation as its end (since everything. according to the Philosopher in On the Heavens 2 . 3 (286a8), is for the sake of its operation as its proximate end), each thing is good to the extent that it is fully di­ rected to its end. T hat is why virtue makes its possessors good and their activity good too, as Ethics 2.6 ( 1106a 15-17) states. What is more, this line of argument also makes it clear that virtue is the disposition of what has been perfected to what is best, as stated in Physics 7.3 (2 46b2_3 ).2 All these accounts apply to the virtue of anything whatsoever: A horse's virtue is what makes it and its activity good-and the same is true for the virtue of a stone, or a human being, or anything else. However, the manner in which a power is completed varies in keeping with which of various characters it has; for one sort of power only acts, another is only acted on and moved, and a third sort acts and is acted on. Accordingly, a power that only acts does not need anything introduced into it to be the source of its acts. T hat is why the virtue of such a power is just the power itself. Examples of this sort of power include the divine power, the agent intellect, and natural powers. 2

The Latin text wrongly cites Metaphysics 7.

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On the Virtues in General

Hence, the virtues of these powers are not habits of any kind, but these very powers, which are complete in themselves. On the other hand, those powers that are only acted upon are powers that do not act unless they are moved by others. Their acting or not acting is not up to them; instead, they act through the impulse of the power moving them. The sensory powers, considered in themselves, are of this kind, which is why the Philosopher says in Ethics 6.2 (1139a 19) that they are not the source of any acts. T hese powers are perfected for performing their acts by the introduction of some­ thing else -something that is in them not in the persistent way forms are in their subjects, but merely in the way an undergoing is. (The image in the eye's pupil is an example of this.) For this reason, the virtues of these powers are not habits either. Instead, they are the powers themselves insofar as they have actually been acted on by their corresponding active causes. The powers that both act and are acted upon are those that are moved by what acts on them in such a way that their movers do not determine them to a single course. Instead, their acting or not acting is up to them. To this group belong powers that are rational in some way. These powers are rendered complete for acting by the intro­ duction of something that is in them not merely the way an undergoing is, but the way a form is that is stable and persists in its subject. Even so, the result is not that these forms necessarily compel the power to one course, because if they did, the power would not be in control of its acts. The virtues of these powers are neither the powers themselves, nor undergoings (as with the sensory powers), nor qualities that act necessarily, like the affective qualities of natural things. Instead, they are habits, through which one can act when one wills to, as the Commentator says in On the Soul 3.18. Moreover, Augus­ tine says in On the Good of Marriage 2 1 that a habit is that by which one acts when the need arises. So, it is clear from these remarks that the virtues are habits, and it is also clear how habits differ from the second and third species of quality. It is readily apparent how they differ from the fourth species, shape: Shape, as such, does not imply a directedness to act. On the basis of these remarks, we can also show that we need virtuous habits for three reasons. First, for steadfastness in our operation. After all, what depends on the operation alone changes easily if it has not been stabilized by a habitual inclination. Second, we need them to perform a perfect operation readily. That is because, unless a habit in some way inclines the rational power to one course, then whenever we have to perform an operation, we must

Article 1 : Are Virtues Habits?

always first make an inquiry about what to do. We have a clear example of this in the case of someone who has not yet acquired the relevant habit of knowledge but wants to reflect, and in the case of someone who lacks the relevant habit of virtue but wants to act as virtue demands. For this reason, the Philosopher says in Ethics 3.8 (l l l 7a22) that our unanticipated actions are done from habit. Third, we need virtuous habits to bring our perfect activity to ful­ fillment pleasurably. Habit is responsible for this. Because it has the mode of a nature, it makes the activity proper to it connatural, so to speak, and therefore pleasurable, since appropriateness causes pleasure. Accordingly, the Philosopher holds that pleasure in what one does is a sign of one's habit (Ethics 2.3, l 10 4b3-5).

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Responses to the initial arguments

1 . Like power, virtue can also be understood in two ways. It can be understood materially, as when we call what we are capable of our power. It is in this way that Augustine asserts that virtue is the good use of free choice. It can also be understood essentially. Taken this way, neither a power nor a virtue is an act. 2. "Meriting" has two senses. In its strict sense, it just means per­ forming some action on the basis of which one justly acquires a reward for oneself. In its looser sense, any condition that makes a human being worthy in any way is called "merit." For instance, we might say that Priam's appearance merited rule over a kingdom be­ cause it was worthy of kingly rule. Therefore, since reward is owed to merit, it is owed in a way even to the sorts of habitual quality that make someone suitable for reward. It is in this way that baptized infants are owed a reward. A reward is also owed to actual merit, and then it is owed not to virtue, but to its act. Still, it is in a way because of actual merit that baptized infants are re­ warded too, since the sacrament of baptism, through which they are born to a new life, gains its effectiveness through Christ's merit. 3. Augustine says that virtues are the greatest goods of their kinds, not the greatest goods absolutely speaking (just as we say fire is the most refined of bodies). T herefore, we cannot conclude that there is nothing in us better than the virtues. We can conclude that they number among the greatest goods of their kind. 4. Just as on this earthly journey there is a habitual perfection, virtue, and an actual perfection, virtue's act; so likewise in our heavenly homeland happiness itself is an actual perfection, arising from a habit that has been brought to perfection. Accordingly, the

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Philosopher also says in Ethics 1 that happiness is an activity in ac­ cordance with perfected virtue. 3 5. An act of vice eliminates an act of virtue directly, the way one con­ trary eliminates another. In contrast, it eliminates a habit of virtue coincidentally, insofar as it separates a person from God, the cause of infused virtue. Accordingly, Isaiah says: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God" ( 59:2). This also explains why the ac­ quired virtues are not eliminated by a single vicious act.

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6. We can understand the Philosopher's definition in two ways: If we understand the definition materially, we are taking "virtue" to mean what a virtue is capable of, which is the utmost extent among those things a power is capable of. Take, for instance, the virtue of someone who can carry a hundred pounds. This virtue is in him insofar as he is capable of carrying a hundred pounds, not insofar as he is capable of carrying sixty. If we understand the definition essentially, virtue is called the ut­ most extent of power because it designates what completes a power, whether what completes it is something other than the power or not.

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7. As indicated, the lines of argument concerning the sensory and rational powers are not parallel.

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8. That is called a disposition to x by which something is changed to achieve x. True, the terminus of a change and the disposition to it are sometimes in the same genus, as when the terminus of the change of alteration is a quality; and so a disposition to this terminus always belongs to the same genus as the terminus. Sometimes, however, a change and its terminus belong to different genera, as when the ter­ minus of an alteration is a substantial form. So, a disposition does not always belong to the same genus as that to which it is a disposition. [The quality] heat, for instance, is a disposition to the substantial form of fire.

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9. "Disposition" is used in three ways: to mean the disposition through which matter is disposed to receiving form (in this sense, heat is a dis­ position to the form of fire); to mean the disposition through which an agent is disposed to acting (in this sense, swiftness is a disposition for running); and to mean the ordering of various things to one another. And it is in that way that Augustine uses "disposition." But it is only when "disposition" is used in the first sense that disposition is divided in opposition to habit. In the second sense, virtue is itself a disposition.

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See 1098a l6-l8 and l 099b26-l l00a 5.

Article 2: Is the Definition of Virtue Asserted by Augustine Accurate?

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10. Nothing is so stable that it would not of itself immediately cease to exist if its cause were absent. T herefore, we should not be surprised if we lose infused virtue as soon as mortal sin breaks our connection to God. Nor is this incompatible with virtue's enduring character, which is intelligible only on the condition that virtue's cause persists. 1 1 . We need a habit for each sort of operation. T he three reasons given above explain why we need one for natural operations. However, we need a habit for meritorious operation for yet another reason: to raise our natural power to what surpasses nature-which is done through an infused habit. Nor is this need removed by the fact that God operates in us, because he acts in us in such a way that we are also acting. And so we need a habit to enable us to act with sufficient efficacy.

12. Every form is received in its subject in keeping with the character of the receiver. But it is a characteristic property of a rational power that it is capable of opposed alternatives and that it has control over its own acts. Therefore, it is never the case that a habitual form compels a rational power to act in keeping with that form. Rather, a rational power is able to act or not act.

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1 3. T hose acts that consist in choice alone are easy to perform in

some way or other. But it is not easy to perform them as they should

be performed, that is, readily, steadfastly, and with pleasure. T hat is why we need virtuous habits for this.

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14. Every animal or human motion that begins anew comes from some moved mover and depends on an actually existing prior agent. And so a habit does not elicit an act from itself unless some agent prompts it. 1 5 . Virtue is a mean between passions, not in the sense that it is itself a mean passion, but because through its action it fixes the mean between passions.

Article 2 Is the Definition of Virtue Asserted by Augustine Accurate? Augustine's definition: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us." 1 1 Aquinas takes this definition from the Sentences of Peter Lombard (2.27. 1 ). T he definition, as stated, dates back to Prosper of Aquitaine (Sentences 106),

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Reasons to think it is inaccurate I . Virtue is a kind of goodness. So, if it is itself good, it is so either through its own goodness or through another's. In the second case, we have an infinite regress. In the first case, virtue is the primary goodness, because only the primary goodness is good through itself.

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2. What is common to every being should not be included in the definition of any one of them. But being is the genus of every being. T herefore, because good is coextensive with being, "good" should not be included in the definition of virtue. 3. Goodness plays the same role in nature that it does in morality. But, since good and bad do not differentiate species in nature, we should not include "good" in virtue's definition as the specific differ entia of virtue itself. 4. The account of a genus does not include any of its differentiae. However, the account of quality includes "good," just as it also in­ cludes "being." Therefore, "good" should not be added to the defi­ nition of virtue so that it reads: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind."

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5. Goodness and badness are opposites. But badness does not con­ stitute a species, since it is a privation. T herefore, neither does good­ ness, and so we should not include "good" in the definition of virtue as its constitutive differentia. 6. Since goodness is in more things than quality is, goodness cannot differentiate one quality from another. T herefore, we should not use "good" in virtue's definition as the differentia of quality or of virtue. 7. Nothing is made out of two actualities. But "good" implies an ac­ tuality, and so does "quality." Therefore, it is a mistake to say that virtue is a "good quality."

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8. W hat is predicated of a thing abstractly is not predicated of it concretely. For instance, whiteness is a color, but it is not colored. So, since goodness is predicated of virtue abstractly, good is not predicated of it concretely. So, it is not right to say "virtue is a good quality." 9. No differentia is predicated abstractly of a species. That is why Avicenna (Metaphysics 5.6) notes that human being is not a ration­ ality, but rational.

who had collected the definition's elements from Augustine's scattered re­ marks in On Free Choice of the Will (2. 1 8-19).

Article 2: Is the Definition of Virtue Asserted by Augustine Accurate?

10. Since what is morally bad is the same as vice, what is morally good is the same as virtue. T herefore, "good" should not be included in the definition of virtue, for if it were, one and the same thing would define itself.

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1 1 . Mind has to do with the intellect, but virtue concerns our affec­ tions. It is wrong, then, to say that virtue is "a good quality of the mind." 12. According to Augustine (Trin 1 2.3.3), "mind" refers to the soul's higher part. Therefore, since some virtues are in the soul's lower powers, it is inaccurate to include "good quality of the mind" in virtue's definition.

13. "Subject of virtue" refers to a power, not an essence. But "mind" seems to refer to the soul's essence, since Augustine says that intelli­ gence, memory, and will are in the mind (Trin 1 0. 1 0- 1 2). Therefore, "mind" should not be included in the definition of virtue. 14. T he characteristic property of a species should not be included in its genus's definition. Therefore, since rightness is the characteris­ tic property of justice, rightness should not be included in the defi­ nition of virtue so that it reads: "a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly."

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1 5. For living things, existing is living (On the Soul 2. 4 41 5bl 3-1 4). However, virtue does not perfect us for existing, but for doing. It is incorrect to say, then, that by virtue "one lives rightly."

16. Whoever is proud of something uses it badly. So, since there are people who are proud of their virtues, some people use virtue badly. 1 7. In On Free Choice of the Will (2. 1 8), Augustine says that only the greatest goods cannot be used badly. However, virtue is not one of the greatest goods because these are the ones we desire for their own sake, and that is not true of virtue. We desire virtue for the sake of something other than virtue, since we desire it for the sake of happiness. Accord­ ingly, "which no one uses badly" is wrongly included in the definition. 1 8 . A thing is generated, nourished, and grows from the same source. But virtue is nourished and grows by our own acts, since a de­ crease in cupidity is an increase in charity. T herefore, virtue is gen­ erated by our acts. T he clause "which God works in us without us," then, is wrongly included in the definition.

19. We count what removes an impediment as a mover and a cause. However, free choice in a way removes impediments to virtue.

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Therefore, the claim that God works virtue without us is wrongly in­ cluded in the definition. 20. Augustine says, "He that created you without you will not justify you without you " (Sermon 169. 11. 13). Therefore, the clause "that God works in us without us " is wrongly included in the definition.

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2 1. It appears that this definition applies to grace. So, since grace and virtue are not one and the same thing, the definition does not define virtue correctly. Reply This formulation captures the definition of virtue, and if we leave out the last clause, it applies to every human virtue. As said (a. 1 reply), virtue perfects a power as regards its perfect act. So, because a perfect act is the end of the power or the agent, virtue makes both the power and the agent good, as noted earlier (a. 1 reply). Accordingly, the definition of virtue includes something about the act's perfection, and something about the perfection of the power or agent. Two things are required for an act's perfection. First, the act must be right. Second, the habit from which it springs must be incapable of being the source of a contrary act. After all, a source of both good and bad acts cannot, of its own nature, be a perfect source of a good act. That is because a power's perfection must be the source of a good act in such a way that it cannot be the source of a bad one in any way. That is why the Philosopher says in Ethics 6. 3 ( 1 139614-18) that opinion is not a virtue, whereas knowledge is: Opinion can be true or false, but we have knowledge only of what is true. The first requirement for a perfect act is designated by the clause "by which one lives rightly, " and the second by the clause "which no one uses badly. " Virhie also makes its subject good. In this connection, we must consider three things: (a) The subject itself is specified by the expression "of the mind, " since human virtue can be only in what be­ longs to a human being as such. (b) The intellect's perfection is designated by the word "good, " since something is called good be­ cause of its directedness to its end. ( c) Finally, "quality " designates the way it inheres in its subject, because virtues are not in their subject the way undergoings are but the way habits are, as pointed out above (a. 1 reply). All these elements apply to moral, intellectual, and theological virtues, regardless of whether the virtues are acquired or infused. But

Article 2: Is the Definition of Virtue Asserted by Augustine Accurate?

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the clause Augustine adds to these- "which God works in us without us" - applies only to infused virtues.

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Responses to the initial arguments 1 . Just as accidents are called beings not because they subsist, but because by them something is [in a certain respect] , so virtue is called good not because it is itself good, but because through it some­ thing is good. So, it is not necessary that virtue be good through another goodness, as if it were informed by another goodness.

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2 . It is not the good coextensive with being that is included here in the definition of virtue, but rather the good that is specific to moral acts. 3. Actions, such as heating and cooling, are differentiated on the basis of the agent's form. Now, goodness and badness serve as a form and object of the will, since what is active always impresses its form on what is passive, and the mover on what it moves. That is why moral acts, whose source is the will, are differentiated into species on the basis of goodness and badness. On the other hand, the source of natural activities is the form and not the end. That explains why in nature species are not differentiated on the basis of goodness and badness, though in morality they are.

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4. Moral goodness is not included in the concept of quality, so the argument is irrelevant. 5. Badness does not constitute a species in virtue of being a privation, but in virtue of what underlies the privation, since that is incompatible with the character of goodness. This explains how badness constitutes a species. 6. This objection assumes "goodness" has the sense of "natural goodness" rather than the sense of "moral goodness" - the sense found in the definition of virtue.

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7. "Goodness" [in Augustine's definition] does not imply any goodness other than virtue itself, as what I have said makes clear. So, be­ cause virtue is essentially a quality, it is clear that "good" and "quality" do not refer to different actualities, but to one and the same. 8. This argument does not work in the case of transcendentals, which encompass every being; after all, essence is a being, goodness is good, and oneness is one, though we cannot say on the same pattern that whiteness is white. Here is the reason: W hatever the intellect can grasp, it must grasp as having the character of a being and, consequently, of something good and one. That is why the

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intellect can grasp essence, and goodness, and oneness only as hav­ ing the character of a being, of something good, and of something one. It is for this reason that we can say that goodness is good, and oneness is one. 2

Article 3 Can a Power of the Soul Be a Subject of Virtue? Reasons to think that it cannot

1. According to Augustine (OFC 2 . 1 9), virtue is that by which one lives rightly. But living is due to the soul's essence, not to any of its powers. T herefore, no power of the soul is a subject of virtue. 2. Graced existence is more excellent than natural existence. But natural existence stems from the soul's essence, which is more ex­ cellent than its powers, since it is their source. T herefore, graced ex­ istence, which stems from the virtues, does not stem from the soul's powers, and so no power turns out to be a subject of virtue. 10

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3 . An accident cannot be a subject. But a power of the soul is classified as an accident, for natural power and its lack fall under the sec­ ond species of quality. Therefore, a power of the soul cannot be a subject of virtue. 4. If one power of the soul is a subject of virtue, then any of them can be. T hat is because vices assail every one of the soul's powers, and virtues are directed against these vices. But not just any of the soul's powers can be a subject of virtue, as will become clear below (a. 4 reply). Therefore, no power of the soul can be a subject of virtue. 5. T he active principles in natural things, such as heat and cold, are not subjects of other accidents. But the soul's powers are active principles, since they are sources of the soul's operations; and so they cannot be subjects of other accidents. 6. The soul is the subject of its power. So, if the soul's power is the subject of another accident, then by parity of reasoning, that accident will be the subject of yet another accident, and so on to infinity. Since this is absurd, the power of the soul is not a subject of virtue. 2 T he manuscripts do not contain any responses by Aquinas to initial arguments 9-2 1 .

Article 3: Can a Power of the Soul Be a Subject of Virtue?

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7. In the Posterior Analytics 1.22 (83a36-37), Aristotle says that no quality has a quality. But a power of the soul is a quality belonging to the second species of quality, and virtue is a quality belonging to the first species. Therefore, no power of the soul can be a subject of virtue. Opposing considerations 1 . The source of an action belongs to the same subject the action belongs to. Therefore, since the virtues' actions belong to the soul's powers, so do the virtues.

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2. The Philosopher says in Ethics 1.13 (1103a 4) that the intellectual virtues are rational essentially, whereas the moral virtues are rational by participation. But "rational essentially" and "rational by participation" describe certain powers of the soul. Therefore, the soul's powers are subjects of virtues.

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Reply There are three ways a subject can be related to its accident: a. As its sustainer. That is because an accident does not subsist through itself; rather, its subject sustains it. b. As a potentiality to an actuality. That is because a subject un­ derlies an accident as a potentiality for its actuality (and that ex­ plains why an accident is called a form). c. As a cause to its effect. That is because the principles of a sub­ ject are essential principles of its accident. One accident cannot be the subject of another in the first way. The reason is that no accident subsists through itself, and so no ac­ cident can serve as another's sustainer (unless we were to say that one accident is another's sustainer insofar as it is sustained by its subject). However, in the second and third ways, one accident can be re­ lated to another in the manner of a subject. After all, there are acci­ dents that are in potentiality to others: Transparency is in potentiality to light, and a surface is in potentiality to color. Moreover, one acci­ dent can be another's cause: Moisture causes flavor, for instance. In­ deed, we say one accident is another's subject in this manner-not because one accident can sustain another, but because a subject can receive one accident through another's mediation. We say that a power of the soul is a subject of a habit in this manner too. For one thing, a habit is related to a power of the soul as an actuality to a potentiality; for the power is indeterminate in its own nature, and through a habit it is determined to this or that.

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Moreover, acquired habits are caused through the principles of the soul's powers. In reply, then, the soul's powers are subjects of virtues in this sense: A virtue is in the soul through a power's mediation. Responses to the initial arguments 1 . The "live " included in the definition of virtue refers to action, as noted above (a. 2 reply).

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2. Spiritual existence stems from grace, not from the virtues; for grace is the source of our existing spiritually, while virtue is the source of our acting spiritually. 3. A power is a subject not through itself, but insofar as the soul sustains it.

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4. We are now discussing human virtues. Accordingly, powers that cannot be human powers in any way- those that reason's command does not at all extend to, such as the powers of the vegetative soul­ cannot be subjects of virtue. However, any assault that arises from these powers occurs through the mediation of the sensory appetite, and reason's command does extend to that appetite. As a result, the sensory appetite can be called human and can be a subject of human virtue. 5 . Among the soul's powers only the agent intellect and the powers of the vegetative soul are active, and these are not subjects of any habits. The soul's other powers are passive. Even so, they are sources of the soul's actions insofar as their active counterparts move them.

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6. There is no need to go on to infinity, because we will reach some accident that is not in potentiality with respect to another accident. 7. When it is said that no quality has a quality, what is meant is that a quality is not through itself the subject of another quality. But this is ir­ relevant to what I am arguing, as noted above (in the reply and resp. 3).

Article 4 Can the Irascible and Concupiscible Appetites Be Subjects of Virtue? Reasons to think that they cannot 1 . Contraries naturally come to be in the same thing. But virtue's contrary is mortal sin, and mortal sin cannot be in the sensory ap-

Article 4: Can the Appetites Be Subjects of Virtue?

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petite, which is divided into the irascible and concupiscible ap­ petites. T herefore, the irascible and concupiscible appetites cannot be subjects of virtue. 2. A habit and its act belong to the same power. However, as the Philosopher says in his Ethics (8.13 1163a23), the principal act of virtue is choice. Since the irascible and concupiscible appetites can­ not perform an act of choice, they cannot be subjects of virtuous habits either. 3 . Nothing corruptible is a subject of something everlasting. (With this principle, Augustine proves that the soul is everlasting, since the soul is a subject of truth, which is everlasting [On the Immortality of the Soul 4.5]). But the irascible and concupiscible appetites, like the other sensory powers, do not persist once the body is gone ( even if it seems that way to some). On the other hand, the virtues do persist: For as Wisdom 1: 15 says, "Justice is everlasting and immortal," and by par­ ity of reasoning we can say the same about all the virtues. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible appetites cannot be subjects of virtues.

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4. T he irascible and concupiscible appetites have bodily organs. So, if there are virtues in these powers, they will be in bodily organs, and so our imagination or fantasia will be able to grasp them. And in that case they will not be perceptible only by the mind, as Augustine 1 says justice is: It is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind.

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5 . But someone responded: T he irascible and concupiscible ap­ petites can be subjects of virtue insofar as they participate in reason in some way. On the contrary, we say that the irascible and concupiscible ap­ petites participate in reason insofar as reason directs them. But rea­ son's direction cannot sustain a virtue, since it is not itself something that subsists. T herefore, the irascible and concupiscible appetites can­ not be subjects of virtue, not even insofar as they participate in reason.

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6. Just as the irascible and concupiscible powers, which belong to the sensory appetite, obey reason, so do the sensory cognitive powers. But since there cannot be virtue in any sensory cognitive power, there cannot be any in the irascible and concupiscible powers either. 7. If the irascible and concupiscible appetites could participate in reason's direction, we could curtail the rebellion against reason 1 Not Augustine, but Anselm. In On Truth, Anselm uses the formula to define truth in Chapter 1 1 and applies it to justice in Chapter 1 2.

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lodged by the sensory appetite, which contains the irascible and con­ cupiscible appetites.Now, this rebellion is not infinite.After all, the sensory appetite is a finite power, and a finite power's activity cannot be infinite.We could, then, entirely quash this rebellion. The reason is that every finite thing is completely exhausted when bits of it are removed over and over, as the Philosopher makes clear in Physics 1.3 ( 186b26-27). This is how we could fully cure the sensory appetite in this life-but it is impossible to cure it fully. 8. But someone responded: God, who infuses virtue, could eradicate this rebellion completely. It is because of us that it is not completely eradicated. On the contrary, human beings are what they are insofar as they are rational.After all, it is on this basis that they are classified in their species. So, the more something in us is subject to reason, the more suitable it is to human nature.But if the rebellion under discussion could be completely quashed, the lower powers would be maximally subject to reason-and this would be maximally suitable to human nature. So there is no impediment on our part to the complete quashing of that rebellion.

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9. Avoiding sin is not sufficient for the character of virtue.After all, as Psalm 34: 14 says, the perfection of justice consists in this: "Forsake evil and do good." But hating what is bad characterizes the irascible appetite, as On Spirit and Soul 45 says, and so there cannot be virtue in the irascible appetite at any rate.

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IO. On Spirit and Soul also says that the desire for virtues is in rea­ son (SS 45), while the hatred of vices is in the irascible appetite (SS 11 ).But virtue and the desire for virtue are in the same subject, since each thing desires its own perfection.Therefore, every virtue is in reason and not in the irascible or concupiscible appetite.

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1 1 . There cannot be in any power a habit that is only acted on and does not act, because a habit is that by which one acts when one wants, as the Commentator 2 says in his long commentary on On the Soul 3.18. But the irascible and the concupiscible appetites are acted upon and do not act, because sense does not have control over any 2 Ibn Rushd, known in Latin as Averroes, a 1 2th-century philosopher who wrote in Arabic and worked in the Islamic tradition. He wrote short, medium, and long commentaries on many of Aristotle's works, including On the Soul. Out of respect for the value of these commentaries, Latin-speaking Christians called Averroes "the Commentator."

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of its acts, as Ethics 6.2 ( 1139a 19) says. Therefore, there cannot be virtuous habits in the irascible or concupiscible appetites. 1 2 . Specific subjects are commensurate to specific properties.But virtue is commensurate with reason, not with the irascible and con­ cupiscible appetites, which we share with nonhuman animals. Moreover, virtue is in human beings alone, just as reason is.There­ fore, every virtue is in reason, with none in the concupiscible and irascible appetites. 1 3 . The Gloss3 says about Romans 7: "The law is good: When it pro­ hibits concupiscence, it prohibits every evil." Therefore, all vices be­ long to the concupiscible appetite, whose act is concupiscence. Since virtues and vices belong to the same subject, virtues do not be­ long to the irascible appetite, though they do belong to the concu­ piscible at any rate.

Opposing considerations 1 . The Philosopher says that temperance and courage belong to the soul's irrational parts (NE 3.10 1 1 17623-24).But these irrational parts-the sensory appetite- are the irascible and concupiscible ap­ petites, as he maintains in On the Soul 3.9.There can, then, be virtues in the irascible and concupiscible appetites. 2. A venial sin is a disposition to a mortal sin.Moreover, a completion is in the same subject as the disposition toward it.So, since venial sins are in the irascible and concupiscible appetites (for the first stirrings are an act of the sensory appetite, and the Gloss on Romans 7 classi­ fies those stirrings as a venial sin), mortal sin can be found there as well-and therefore so can virtue, which is the contrary of mortal sin. 3 . The mean and the extremes belong to the same subject. But some virtues are a mean between contrary passions: For instance, courage is a mean between fear and boldness, and temperance be­ tween an excess and a deficiency in desires for pleasures. So, since these sorts of passions are in the irascible and concupiscible ap­ petites, it is apparent that virtue can be in them too.

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Reply Everyone agrees on one part of the answer to this question, while their views on another part are incompatible with each other. 105 3 The Glossa Ordinaria, a 12th-century compilation of patristic and medieval glosses on the Bible.

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Everyone concedes that some virtues are in the irascible and concu­ piscible appetites (for instance, temperance in the concupiscible and courage in the irascible). But then differences arise about this claim. Some thinkers find that there are two distinct sets of irascible and concupiscible appetites: one in the higher part of the soul, and the other in the lower part.They say that the irascible and concupiscible appetites in the soul's higher part can be subjects of virtue because these powers belong to the rational nature, while that is not true of the irascible and concupiscible powers in the soul's lower part, since they belong to the sensory and animal nature. However, I have already dis­ cussed this in a different investigation (namely, whether we can find in the higher part of the soul two distinct powers, one of which is an irascible appetite and the other a concupiscible, strictly speaking). 4 At any rate, whatever anyone might say about this issue, we must maintain that there are virtues in the irascible and concupiscible appetites that are in the soul's lower part, as the Philosopher says (NE 3. 10 l l l 7b24), and others say as well.The following will make this evident. Since "virtue" refers to what completes a power, as said above (a. 1 reply), and since a power concerns an act, we must locate human virtue in those powers that can be sources of a human act. But it is not called a human act just because it is exercised in or by a human being in any way whatsoever, since in certain activities plants and nonhuman animals are just like us. Rather, human acts are those acts specially characteristic of human beings.Now human beings, as opposed to other sorts of creatures, have this as a special characteris­ tic as regards their acts: They have control over their acts.Therefore, any acts over which human beings have control are human acts, strictly speaking, while those over which they lack control are not, even i f they occur in human beings (for instance, digesting, growing, etc.). So there can be human virtue in something that is the source of this sort of act -an act over which one has control. However, we should be aware that acts of this sort can have a threefold source.One source is the primary mover and commander, through which human beings have control over their acts. This is reason or will. The second is a moved mover-the sensory ap­ petite- which is moved by the higher appetite insofar as it obeys rea­ son, and then in turn moves our limbs by its command. The third is what is moved only: our limbs.

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Although both the limbs and the lower appetite are moved by the higher part of the soul, they are moved in different ways. A limb obeys a command of the higher part, and it does so blindly and without any resistance, in keeping with the order of nature, as long as nothing hinders it. T he hand and the foot provide clear examples. On the other hand, the lower appetite has its own characteristic inclination arising from its own nature, and this explains why it does not obey the higher appetite blindly but sometimes resists. Accord­ ingly, Aristotle says in his Politics 1.5 (125 4b 4-5) that the soul governs the body by a despotic reign, as a master governs a slave, who does not have the resources to resist the master's command in any respect. O n the other hand, the rational part governs the soul's lower parts by a royal and political reign, the way kings and leaders of cities govern free persons, who in some cases have the right and the re­ sources to oppose the commands of the king or leader. T herefore, to perform a perfect human act, we need nothing in our external members beyond their natural disposition, by which they are naturally suited to be moved by reason. However, in our lower appetite, which can oppose reason, we do need something if it is to perform without opposition the operation reason commands. For if the operation's immediate source is imperfect, the operation must be imperfect, however perfect its higher source may be. So, if the lower appetite were not perfectly disposed to following reason's command, the operation, whose proximate source is the lower ap­ petite, would not be perfectly good, since some opposition from the sensory appetite would accompany it. Because of this, the lower appetite would feel a certain sadness, since the higher appetite would have moved it violently. This is what happens in people with strong desires they do not follow because reason forbids it. T herefore, when someone's operation must concern matters that are the objects of the sensory appetite, in order for the operation to be good, there needs to be a disposition-a perfection-in the sensory appetite to enable it to submit to reason easily. We call this sort of disposition a virtue. T herefore, when a virtue concerns what lies in the irascible power's characteristic sphere, then this sort of virtue is also said to be in the irascible power as its subject. T his is the case with courage, which is concerned with fear and daring, magnanimity, which is concerned with hope for demanding things, and gentleness, which is concerned with anger. Furthermore, when a virtue concerns what lies in the concupiscible power's characteristic sphere, then it is said to be in the concupiscible power as its subject. T his is the case with chastity, which concerns sexual pleasures, and sobriety and absti­ nence, which concern the pleasures of food and drink.

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Responses to the initial arguments 1 . We can conceive of virtues and mortal sins in two ways: as acts or habits. If we take the irascible and concupiscible appetites' acts by themselves, they are not mortal sins. However, they cooperate in an act of mortal sin when reason consents to their aiming at something contrary to the divine law or moves them so that they aim at it. Like­ wise, the acts of these appetites cannot be acts of virtue when they are considered by themselves, but only when they cooperate with reason in order to carry out its command. So, the acts of mortal sin and of virtue do belong, in a way, to the irascible and concupiscible appetites. That is why the habits of both mortal sin and virtue can also be in these appetites. Even so, the fact is that just as an act of virtue consists in the irascible and concupiscible appetites' following reason, an act of sin con­ sists in reason's being drawn to follow the irascible and concupiscible appetites' inclination. That is why sin tends to be attributed more often to reason as its proximate cause; and for the same reason virtue tends to be attributed to the irascible and concupiscible powers. 2. As already noted (reply), an act of virtue cannot be an act of the irascible or concupiscible appetite alone, apart from reason. In fact, an act of virtue consists more principally in something that reason contributes, namely, choice, for reason commands the irascible and concupiscible appetites, and as with any operation, the agent's action i s more principal than the patient's passion. Accordingly, w e say that virtue is in the irascible or concupiscible appetites, not because they accomplish the whole act of virtue, or even that part that is more prin­ cipal, but because through a virtuous habit an act of virtue receives the last completion of its goodness: It enables the irascible and concupiscible appetites to follow reason's direction without difficulty. 3. Even if we suppose that the irascible and the concupiscible ap­ petites do not persist in the separated soul as actual powers, they do persist there the way things exist in their roots. That is because the soul's essence is the root of its powers. Likewise, the virtues attributed to the irascible and concupiscible appetites persist in reason as in their root, since reason is the root of all virtues, as will be shown later (CardVirt 4 resp. 1 3 ). 4. We find a gradation among forms. There are some forms and pow­ ers completely immersed in matter. Their every action- and their every accident - is material. The elements' forms are a clear example. Conversely, the intellect is completely free from matter, and so its op­ eration takes place withot,t the body's participation. But the irascible

Article 4: Can the Appetites Be Subjects of Virtue?

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and concupiscible appetites lie midway between these other two. They do use a bodily organ; the bodily change accompanying their acts shows this.On the other hand, they are in a way elevated above 230 matter.What shows this is that reason's command moves them and they obey reason.That is why virtue can be in these powers, na:nely, insofar as they are elevated above matter and obey reason. 5 . It is true that reason's direction, which the irascible and concu­ piscible appetites participate in, is not something subsistent, and cannot through itself be a subject of accidents.Nevertheless, it can be the reason why a thing is a subject of accidents. 6. The sensory cognitive powers are naturally prior to reason, since reason receives objects from them.In contrast, the sensory appetites naturally follow reason's direction, since a lower appetite naturally obeys a higher one. The two cases, then, are not parallel. 7. Virtue cannot entirely quash the irascible and concupiscible ap­ petites' rebellion against reason.After all, they incline by their very nature to what sense determines to be good, which is sometimes at odds with reason. On the other hand, divine power can entirely quash this rebellion- it is powerful enough even to change the natures of things.Still, virtue can curtail this rebellion, insofar as the appetites under discussion grow accustomed to being subject to reason. When this happens, they have the character of virtue from an external source: from reason's control over them. From themselves, however, they retain something of their own characteristic move­ ments, which are sometimes contrary to reason. 8. It is true that what is primary in human beings are those elements characterized by reason. Nevertheless, for the completeness of human nature, not just reason but also the lower powers, and even the body itself, are needed. Therefore, the condition of human nature left on its own is such that something in the soul's lower powers will rebel against reason, as long as those lower powers have move­ ments of their own. However, things are different in the state of in­ nocence and in the state of glory, when reason receives from its conjunction to God the strength to hold the lower powers com­ pletely under its sway. 9. Hating what is bad, insofar as that is said to characterize the irasci­ ble appetite, implies not only turning away from what is bad, but also a movement of the irascible appetite to destroying what is bad. This is the case with those who are angry, for instance.They not only avoid what is bad, but are also moved to extirpating bad things through

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vengeance. But to act this way is to do something good. Furthermore, although this way of hating what is bad is characteristic of the irascible appetite, hating is not its only act. After all, to rise up in pursuit of a de­ manding good is also characteristic of the irascible appetite, whose pas­ sions include not only anger and daring, but also hope. 10. We should take this claim in an extended sense, not strictly, for the following reason. Each power of the soul has a desire for its own good. That is why the irascible appetite desires victory, just as the concupiscible appetite desires pleasure. However, because the con­ cupiscible appetite is attracted to what is good for the whole animal simply, that is, absolutely speaking, every desire for the good is at­ tributed to it. I I. It is true that, considered as they are in themselves, the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not act but are only acted upon. However, insofar as these powers participate in reason to some extent in humans, they also act in a way, and are not in every respect acted on. That is why the Philosopher says, in Politics I . 5 ( 1 2 5464-5), that reason's reign over these powers is political, since powers such as these are to some extent capable of their own movement, in which case they are not entirely subjugated to reason. On the other hand, the soul's reign over the body is despotic, because in their move­ ments, the bodily members are blindly obedient to the soul. 1 2. It is true that nonhuman animals have the irascible and concu­ piscible appetites, but in them, these powers have no participation in reason; and that is why they cannot have any moral virtues. 1 3 . All evils can be traced to concupiscence as their first root, but not as their proximate source. That is because all passions arise from the irascible and concupiscible appetites (as I showed when I was dis­ cussing the soul's passions),5 and the perverting of reason and will most often occurs because of the passions. Alternatively, we can say that the Gloss means by "concupiscence" not just that which is uniquely characteristic of the concupiscible appetite, but that which is common to the whole appetitive power, in every part of which we find concupiscence for something - a con­ cupiscence with regard to which there can be sin. Moreover, no one can sin except by seeking or having concupiscence for something.

5 Aquinas might be referring to Question 26 of his Disputed Questions on Truth or to his more recent Questions 22-2 3 of the Summa Theologiae.

Article 5: Is the Will a Subject o{Virtue?

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Article 5 Is the Will a Subject of Virtue? Reasons to think that it is 1 . Commanders need a greater perfection, if they are to command rightly, than those who carry out their commands, if they are to exe­ cute them rightly. T hat is because the one who carries out com­ mands is given direction by the commander. But, in a virtuous act, the will has the role of commander, while the irascible and concu­ piscible appetites have the role of those who obey and carry out the act. T herefore, since virtue is in the irascible and concupiscible appetites as its subjects, it appears there is a far more compelling rea­ son to think there should be virtue in the will. 2. But someone responded: T he will's natural inclination to the good that is our end is enough for its rectitude. After all, we naturally desire our end, and so the will does not need the further addition of a virtuous habit to make it right. On the contrary, the will concerns not just the ultimate end, but other ends as well, and it is in regard to its desire for these other ends that the will can be disposed either rightly or not. After all, good people set good ends for themselves, while bad people set bad ones; and so Ethics 3 (l l 1 4a32-bl ) says: ''T he way the end appears to a person depends on what that person is like." T herefore, for the will to be right, it must have in it a virtuous habit perfecting it. 3 . In the cognitive part of the soul there is a cognition that is like­ wise natural: the cognition of first principles. Nevertheless, we also have an intellectual virtue concerning this cognition: the virtue of understanding, which is a habit concerned with first principles. T herefore, there should be a virtue in the will regarding that to which the will naturally inclines. 4. Just as some moral virtues, such as temperance and courage, con­ cern passions, there are others, such as justice, that concern actions. Now, operating without passion is characteristic of the will, while op­ erating from passion characterizes the irascible and concupiscible appetites. T herefore, just as there is some sort of moral virtue in the irascible and concupiscible appetites, there is likewise some sort in the will. 5. In Ethics 8. 5 (1157628-31), the Philosopher says love (amor) or affection is a result of passion, while friendship is a result of choice.

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Moreover the sort of love one has for a friend (dilectio ), a love that is without passion, is an act of the will. Therefore, since friendship either is a virtue, or does not exist without virtue, as Ethics 8. 1 ( 1 155a4) says, it appears the will is a subject of virtue. 40

6. As the Apostle shows in 1 Corinthians 13: 13, charity is the most important of the virtues. But only the will is capable of being the sub­ ject of charity. The lower, concupiscible appetite, whose range of ob­ jects includes only sensible goods, cannot be its subject. Therefore, the will is a subject of virtue.

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7. According to Augustine, we are united to God very directly by our will. So, since it is virtue that unites us to God, it appears that virtue is in the will as its subject.

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8. According to Hugh of St. Victor, happiness is in the will. But virtues are dispositions to happiness. Therefore, since a disposition and the perfection it inclines to belong to the same subject, it ap­ pears that virtue is in the will as its subject. 9. According to Augustine the will is that by which one sins or lives rightly (Ret 1.9.4). But rightness of life is due to virtue, which is why Augustine says that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly (OFC 2. 18-19). Therefore, there can be virtue in the will. 1 0. Contraries are such that they naturally come to be in the same subject. But sin is the contrary of virtue, and since every sin is in the will, as Augustine says, it appears that virtue is too.

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I I . Human virtue must be in that part of the soul that is characteristic of humans. But just as reason is characteristic of humans, so is the will, since it is much closer to reason than the irascible and con­ cupiscible appetites are. Therefore, since the irascible and concupis­ cible appetites are subjects of virtues, there appear to be much stronger reasons to think the will is a subject of virtue. Opposing considerations I . Every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as the Philosopher makes clear at the end of Ethics 1 ( 1103a4). Moral virtue has as its subject [the part of the soul] that is not essentially rational but ra­ tional by participation. On the other hand, the subject of intellectual virtue is [the part of the soul] that is essentially rational. We cannot classify the will in either part. It is, to begin with, not a cognitive power that belongs to the part of the soul that is essentially rational. But neither does it belong to the soul's nonrational part, which is in-

Article 5: Is the Will a Subject of Virtue?

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eluded in the rational part by participation in it. It appears, therefore, that the will can in no way be a subject of virtue. 2. T here should not be several virtues directed to the same act. However, that would be the consequence if the will were a subject of virtue for, as shown (in a. 4), there are virtues in the irascible and concupiscible appetites; and since the will is involved in some way with the acts of these virtues, there would have to be some virtues in the will directed to these same acts. We should not contend, then, that the will is a subject of virtue.

Reply T hrough a virtuous habit, the power that is its subject acquires a per­ fection for performing its act. T hat is why a power does not need a virtuous habit to dci something it extends to by its very nature. Virtue directs the soul's powers to what is good; for virtue is what makes its possessors good and their activity good too (NE 2.6 1106a15-1 7). However, what virtue does for the soul's other powers, the will already has by its very nature as the power of will, since its object is what is good. Accordingly, the will inclines to what is good in the way that the concupiscible appetite inclines to what is pleas­ urable and the sense of hearing is directed to sound. Thus the will does not need a virtuous habit to incline it to a good correlative to it, since it inclines to this good by its very nature as the power of will. However, for goods that surpass this correlation, the will does need a virtuous habit. Now, each thing's appetite tends to that thing's own, characteristic good. So, there are two ways a good can surpass this correlation: (1) in respect of the human species, and (2) in respect of the individual. In the first case, the will is raised to a good that surpasses the boundaries of the human good. (By "human" I mean that which a human being is capable of through natural powers.) But above the human good is the divine good. Charity, and likewise hope, raise the human will to this. In the second case, someone seeks to achieve another's good, but the will does not pass beyond the confines of the human good. In this case, justice perfects the will, along with all the virtues tending to­ ward others, such as generosity and the like. After all, justice is an­ other's good, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 5.1 (l 130a 4). Accordingly, two virtues are in the will as their subject: charity and justice. An indication of this is that these two virtues do not concern the passions, as temperance and courage do, even though they be­ long to the soul's appetitive part. It is clear, then, that they are not in

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the sensory appetite, where the passions are, but in the rational ap­ petite-the will- in which there are no passions, since every passion is in the sensory part of the soul, as Physics 7.3 (248a6-9) proves. For the same reason, the virtues that do concern the passions (as courage concerns fear and daring, and temperance concerns desires) must be in the sensory appetite. Nor need there be any virtue in the will on account of these passions. That is because, in the case of these passions, the good is what is in keeping with reason, and the will is nat­ urally inclined to this by its very nature as the power of will, since this is the will's own characteristic good. Responses to the initial arguments

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1 . Reason's judgment is enough for the will to command. T hat is be­ cause the will naturally desires what reason finds good, just as the concupiscible appetite naturally desires what the senses find pleasurable. 2. The will has a natural inclination not just to the ultimate end, but also to the good that reason shows it. T hat is because the will's object is what one understands to be good. The will is naturally directed to this object, as any power is directed to its object, since this is its own, characteristic good, as I have said. Even so, one does commit sins with regard to this object insofar as passion interferes with reason's judgment. 3. Apprehension occurs through a species, and our power of intel­ lect cannot, on its own, apprehend anything unless it receives species from sensible things. Therefore, even fo r things w e apprehend natu­ rally, we need a habit, and this habit also has its origin in a way from the senses, as the final chapter of the Posterior Analytics says ( 2 .19, l 00a l 0-12). But the will does not need any species in order to will, and so the two cases are not alike. 4. T he virtues that concern the passions are in the lower appetite, and the higher appetite needs no further virtue in connection with them, for the reason already given. 5-7. Strictly speaking, friendship is not a virtue, but a consequence of virtue. After all, it follows from the very fact that one is virtuous that one loves those who are like oneself. T he same is not true of charity, which is a kind of friendship with God that raises human be­ ings beyond the limits of their nature. T hat is why the will is the sub­ ject of charity, as I have said (in the reply). T his response makes it easy to see how to answer the objections raised in the sixth and seventh initial objections, since the virtue that unites the will to God is charity.

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8. Certain things required for happiness are dispositions to it. For ex­ ample, the acts of the moral virtues are required to remove impedi­ ments to happiness, in particular, the restlessness of mind that comes from passions and external disturbances. However, there is an activity of virtue that, when it is complete, constitutes the very essence of happiness: the activity of reason or of intellect. After all, contemplative happiness is simply the perfect con­ templation of the highest truth, while active happiness is an activity of prudence, by which one governs oneself and others. Moreover, there is something further that is related to happiness as perfecting it, and that is delight, which perfects happiness as a glow perfects youth (as Aristotle says in Ethics 10. 4l l 7 4b31-33). This delight is an act of the will. If we are speaking about the heavenly hap­ piness promised to the saints, then it is charity that perfects the will by directing it to this delight. However, if we are speaking about the contemplative happiness that the philosophers discussed, then the will's natural desire directs it to this sort of delight. It is clear, then, that not all virtues need to be in the will. 9. It is true that one lives rightly and sins by the will because the will commands all acts of virtue and vice, but not because the will elicits all these acts. It is not necessary, then, that the will be the immediate subject of each virtue. 10. Every sin is in the will the way things are in their causes, since every sin occurs through the will's consent. However, not every sin has to be in the will in the sense that the will is its subject. Instead, just as gluttony and lust are in the concupiscible appetite, anger and pride are in the irascible. 1 1 . Because of its close relationship with reason, it is the case that the will, by its very nature, is in accord with reason; and so to achieve this accord, it does not need the further addition of a virtuous habit, the way the lower irascible and concupiscible powers do.

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Responses to the opposing considerations l '. Charity and hope, which are in the will, are not included in the

division the Philosopher makes. That is because they belong to a fur ther genus of virtue: They are called "theological virtues." On the other hand, justice is included among the moral virtues. That is be­ cause the will, like the other appetites, does participate in reason insofar as reason directs it. After all, even though the will has the intellective part's nature-the same nature reason has -it still does not reach the point that it is the power of reason itself.

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2'. For reasons already given (in the reply), there is no need for virtue in the will concerned with the things for which one has virtue in the irascible and concupiscible appetites.

Article 6 Is There Virtue in the Practical Intellect As Its Subject? Reasons to think there is not I. According to the Philosopher in Ethics 2.4 ( 1 10562-5), knowledge is of little or no value for virtue. He is referring there to practical knowledge. This is clear from what he adds -that many do not ac­ tually translate their knowledge into action -for knowledge directed to action belongs to the practical intellect. Therefore, the practical intellect cannot be a subject of virtue.

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2. People cannot act rightly without virtue, but they can act rightly without the perfection of their practical intellects since someone else can inform them about what they should do. Therefore, the perfection of the practical intellect is not a virtue. 3 . The more we diverge from virtue, the more we sin. However, di­ verging from the perfection of the practical intellect makes a sin less serious, since ignorance excuses an agent partly or even wholly. Therefore, the perfection of the practical intellect cannot be a virtue.

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4 . According to Cicero, virtue acts in the mode of a nature (Inv 2.53.159). However, nature's way of acting is opposed to reason's or the practical intellect's, as Aristotle makes clear in Physics 2.5-6. There, he divides natural agents in opposition to those that act by de­ sign. Therefore, it appears that there are no virtues in the practical intellect. 5. The good and the true differ formally in keeping with each one's own distinct character. But habits are diversified when their objects are formally different. Therefore, since virtue's object is what is good, while the practical intellect's perfection is what is true (albeit directed to activity), it appears that the practical intellect's perfection is not a virtue. 6. According to the Philosopher in Ethics 2 ( 1 106636), virtue is a habit connected with the will. However, the practical intellect's

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habits are different from those in the will or appetitive part, and so they are not virtues. The practical intellect, then, cannot be a subject of virtue.

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Opposing considerations 1 . Prudence is classified as one of the four principal virtues, even though its subject is the practical intellect. Therefore, the practical intellect can be a subject of virtue. 2. A virtue is human if its subject is a human power. But the practical intellect is a power more properly human than the irascible and concupiscible appetites, since what is essentially F is more properly F than what is F by participation. Therefore, the practical intellect can be a subject of human virtue.

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3 . That due to which anything is so is itself even more so. But in the affective part of our soul we have virtue, and that virtue is due to reason. After all, we invest the affective part with virtue so that it will obey reason. Therefore, we have even stronger reasons to think there should be virtue in the practical reason.

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Reply What marks the distinction between a natural and a rational power is that the former is determined to one object, while the latter is in­ differently disposed to many. Now, when an animal or rational appetite inclines to its desirable object, this must be due to some prior cognition of that object. After all, inclining to an end without any prior cognition is characteristic of natural appetite (as heavy objects, for instance, incline to the earth's center). However, because the object of animal and rational appetite must be an apprehended good, the appetite can have a nat­ ural inclination toward it and the cognitive power can have a natural judgment concerning it as long as that good takes a single form. This is the case for nonhuman animals; for due to the weakness of their active principle, which extends to just a few things, they engage in just a few operations. Consequently, what is good for all members of the same species takes a single form. That is why their cognitive power gives them a natural judgment about their proper good, which takes this single form, and their appetite gives them a natural incli­ nation to it. It is thanks to such natural judgments and appetites that all swallows build their nests in a uniform way, and all spiders weave their webs in a uniform way (and we can make this sort of observa­ tion about any other kind of nonhuman animal).

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Human beings, in contrast, are capable of multiple and diverse op­ erations because of the excellence of their active principle, their soul, whose power in a way extends to an infinite number of things. There­ fore, a natural appetite for what is good, or a natural judgment about it, would not be enough to ensure our acting rightly. For that, appetite and judgment would have to be further determined and perfected. True, a human being does incline by a natural appetite to pursue his own good. Still, since the good for human beings takes a wide va­ riety of forms and consists in many things, one could not have a natural appetite for one's own good when that good has been made determinate in the light of all the conditions required to make it one's own good. That is because this good varies, taking many forms in keeping with the diversity of these conditions (such as persons, places, and so on). For the same reason, one could not have a natural judgment about one's own good. This type of judgment is uniform and insufficient for pursuing a good of this sort. That is why each human being has had to use reason, whose function is to draw connections among di­ verse things, to ascertain and discern what his own good is, where that good is made determinate in the light of all circumstances, in­ sofar as he should pursue that good in the here and now. Without a habit to perfect it, reason can do this about as well as it can discern a conclusion of some theoretical science when it does not have the relevant habit of knowledge: imperfectly and with difficulty. Therefore, just as a habit of science must perfect contemplative reason if it is to discern correctly what is knowable in that science, a habit must also perfect practical reason if it is to discern correctly the human good in each case when one is to act. We call this virtue "prudence," and its subject is practical reason. Prudence also perfects all the moral virtues, seated in the appetitive part. Every one of these virtues produces an inclination in the appetite to some kind of human good. For instance, justice produces an inclination to the good of equality in things relevant to commu­ nal life, temperance to the good of restraint from sensual desires, and so on for each virtue. However, each of these goods can be brought about in various ways-and not in the same way in all cases. There­ fore, to establish the right way, human beings need prudence in judgment. All the other virtues, then, have their rightness and the fullness of their goodness from this judgment, 1 which is why the 1 "This judgment" is the only plausible antecedent for ipso. The Marietti text has ipsa ("this virtue"). In either case, Aquinas' contention is nearly the same, since prudence establishes the mean of moral virtue through judgment.

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Philosopher says that the mean in moral virtue is determined in ac­ cordance with right reason. Because all appetitive habits obtain the character of virtue from this rightness and fullness of goodness, pru­ dence is a cause of all the virtues of the appetitive part, which are called "moral " insofar as they are prudent. And that is why Gregory says in Morals on the Book of Job 22 that the other virtues can be virtues only if they do prudently what they strive after. Responses to the initial arguments 1 . In this passage, the Philosopher is referring to practical knowledge. However, there is more to prudence than practical knowledge, for the following reason. Practical knowledge consists in universal judgments about what we should do (for instance, fornication is bad, we should not steal, etc.). Still, even though someone has this knowledge, it is possible for reason's judgment to face interference in connection with a particular act, with the result that reason does not judge rightly. That is why practical knowledge is said to be of little value for virtue: be­ cause even when people have it, they can sin against virtue. In contrast, the role of prudence is to judge rightly about particu­ lar acts insofar as they are to be done in the here and now. A sin of any sort corrupts this judgment. Therefore, as long as we have pru­ dence, we do not sin. That is why prudence contributes not a little, but a great deal to virtue. In fact, it is a cause of virtue itself, as noted (in the reply). 2. One person can take general advice from another about what to do. However, only the rectitude that prudence affords enables one to sustain one's judgment rightly throughout the act, against the influ­ ence of all passions. Without this, there can be no virtue. 3. The kind of ignorance that is opposed to prudence is "ignorance of choice. " Every bad person is ignorant in this sense. Ignorance of choice occurs when the appetite's inclination interferes with reason's judgment. This does not excuse a sin- it constitutes a sin. On the other hand, the kind of ignorance that is opposed to practical knowl­ edge does excuse one from sin or at least lessens the sin's seriousness. 4. We should take Cicero's claim to refer to the inclination of an ap­ petite that tends to a certain general good, such as acting boldly or something along those lines. However, if reason's judgment did not direct it, this sort of inclination would often meet with downfall, and the stronger the inclination, the harder the fall. For instance, in Ethics 6. 13 ( 1 144bl 0-12), the Philosopher offers this example of a blind person: The harder he runs, the worse he is injured when he smashes into a wall.

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5. What is good and what is true are the objects of two parts of the soul: the intellective and the appetitive. T hese two parts are such that each acts with regard to the other's act. For instance, the will wills the intellect to understand, and the intellect understands that the will wills. T herefore, these two, the good and the true, mutually include each other. That is because what is good is a certain truth, insofar as the intellect grasps it-that is, insofar as the intellect understands that the will wills a good, or even insofar as it understands that something is good. Likewise, what is true is itself also a certain good: a good of the intellect that also falls under the will's purview, insofar as someone wants to understand what is true. In any case, the truth of the practical intellect is a good that is a goal of operation, for a good moves the appetite only on the condition that one apprehends it. Therefore, there is no reason why there cannot be virtue in the practical intellect.

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6. In Book 2 of Ethics, the Philosopher is defining moral virtue (since he offers his account of intellectual virtue in Book 6 of Ethics). But the virtue that is in the practical intellect is intellectual, not moral, for the Philosopher classifies even prudence as an intellectual virtue, as Ethics 6. 5 makes clear.

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Article 7 Is There Virtue in the Contemplative Intellect? Reasons to think there is not 1. Every virtue is directed to acting, since virtue is what makes one's activity good (NE 2.5 l 106al 7). However, the contemplative intellect is not directed to acting, for it does not say anything about what to em­ ulate and what to shun, as On the Soul 3.9 ( 432628) makes clear. Therefore, there cannot be virtue in the contemplative intellect.

2. As Ethics 2.6 states (l 106al 7), virtue is what makes its possessor good. But the habits of the contemplative intellect do not do this. After all, people are not called good just because they have knowl­ edge. T he habits of the contemplative intellect, then, are not virtues. 10

3 . A habit of knowledge perfects the contemplative intellect in a pre­ eminent way. However, knowledge is not a virtue, which is clear from the fact that knowledge is divided in opposition to the virtues; for the first species of quality is divided into disposition and habit,

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and habit is in turn predicated of knowledge and virtue. Therefore, there is no virtue in the contemplative intellect. 4. Every virtue is directed to happiness, which is virtue's end; so every virtue is directed to something. But the contemplative intellect is not directed to anything. After all, we pursue the contemplative sci­ ences for their own sake and not for their usefulness, as the opening of the Metaphysics states (982a1 4-15). So, there cannot be virtue in the contemplative intellect. 5 . An act of virtue is meritorious, but an act of understanding is not sufficient for merit. Rather, "T hey sin who know what is good yet do not do it" (James 4:17). T herefore, there is no virtue in the contemplative intellect.

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1 . Faith is in the contemplative intellect, since its object is the pri­ mary truth. But faith is a virtue, and so the contemplative intellect can be the subject of a virtue. 2. T he true and the good are equally noble because they encompass each other: What is true is a good, what is good is true, and each of these is common to every being. Consequently, if there can be virtue in the will, whose object is what is good, there can also be virtue in the contemplative intellect, whose object is what is true.

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Reply

Virtue is ascribed to a thing in light of its relation to what is good be­ cause, as the Philosopher says, a thing's virtue is what makes its pos­ sessor good and makes its activity good too (NE 2.6 l 106al 5--17). For instance, a horse's virtue is what makes it a good horse, and makes it gallop and bear a rider well-which is a horse's task. So, a habit will have the character of virtue because it is directed to a good. But there are two ways a habit can be directed to a good. It is di­ rected to a good fonnally when it is directed to a good under its char­ acter as good; but it is directed to a good materially when it is directed to something that is good, but not under its character as good. Only the appetitive part of the soul has as its object a good under its char­ acter as good; for good is what all things have an appetite for. There­ fore, those habits in the appetitive part or dependent on it are directed formally to something good. T hat is why they have the character of virtue most fully. In contrast, the habits neither in nor dependent upon the appetitive part can be directed materially to something good, but they cannot be directed to a good formally-to a good

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under its character as good. That explains why they can be called virtues in a way, but not as strictly speaking as habits of the first sort. We must next take into consideration that the intellect, whether contemplative or practical, can be perfected by a habit in two ways. In the first way, it is perfected absolutely and in itself, insofar as it precedes-that is, moves-the will. In the second way, it is perfected by a habit insofar as the intellect follows the will-that is, elicits its own act at the will's command. The intellect can be perfected in both these ways because these two powers-namely, intellect and will-encompass each other, as I have explained. So, the habits that are in the contemplative or practical intellect in the first way can be called virtues in some sense, but not in the full sense. It is in this first way that understanding, knowledge, and wisdom are in the contemplative intellect, and craft is in the practical intellect. After all, people are said to have understanding or knowledge insofar as their intellects have been perfected for knowing the truth, which is the intellect's good. And while the truth can be willed (since a person can will to understand the truth), it is not because of any such willing that the habits under discussion reach their perfection. That is because having knowledge does not make one willing to consider the truth; it just makes one adept at doing so, and so the consideration of truth is due to knowledge not insofar as that consideration is willed, but inso­ far as one's considering is directly trained on its object. It is likewise with craft in the practical intellect. So, craft does not perfect artisans so as to give them appropriate volitions to apply their skill. It only gives them the knowledge and the aptitude to do so. On the other hand, a habit that is in the contemplative or practi­ cal intellect insofar as the intellect follows the will has the character of virtue more truly because it gives a person not just the knowledge and the ability to act rightly, but also the volition. This is the case with faith and prudence, but in different ways. Faith perfects the contemplative intellect in that the will com­ mands the intellect. This is obvious from the act of faith: People as­ sent through intellect to what surpasses human reason only because they will to do so. As Augustine says, only someone who wills to be­ lieve can do so (TrGJn 26.2). Faith, it turns out, is like temperance in this respect: It exists in the contemplative intellect in such a way that it submits to the will's command, just as temperance exists in the concupiscible appetite in such a way that it submits to reason's command. As regards believing, then, the will commands the intellect not just as regards performing an act of belief, but also as regards de­ termining the object of belief. That is because the intellect, as a re­ sult of the will's command, assents to a determinate object of belief,

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just as the concupiscible appetite, thanks to temperance, aims at the mean that reason determines. In contrast, prudence exists in the practical intellect or reason, as I have said, but in such a way that the will determines not its object, but only its end. Prudence figures out its own object: Presupposing as its end the good intended by the will, prudence figures out the ways to realize and preserve this good. From what has been said, it is clear that the habits in the intellect are related to the will in different ways. Some do not depend _on the will at all, except as concerns their use, and even this accidentally, since the use of this sort of habit-such as knowledge, wisdom, and craft-depends on the will and on the habit itself in different ways. After all, these habits bring us to the perfection not of wanting to use them appropriately, but only of being able to use them. Next, there is an intellectual habit that depends on the will to give it its princi­ ple, since in practical matters the end is a principle. Prudence is re­ lated to the will in this way. F inally, there is a habit that also has its object determined for it by the will. This is the case with faith. Although all these habits can be called virtues in a way, the last two have the character of virtue more fully and more strictly speak­ ing. However, they are not on that account more excellent or more perfect habits.

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1 . A habit of the contemplative intellect is directed to its character­ istic act-the consideration of truth-which it perfects. Although it is not directed to any external act as its end, it nevertheless has its end in its own characteristic act. In contrast, the practical intellect is di­ rected to a further, external act as its end. After all, the only reason the practical intellect concerns itself with thinking about doing or making things is to do or make them. So, a habit of the contemplative intellect makes its act good in a more excellent way than a habit of the practical intellect does: The for­ mer makes its acts good as an end, while the latter makes its acts good as a means. However, when a habit of the practical intellect is directed to a good under its character as good (insofar as that habit is subject to the will), it has the character of virtue more strictly speaking. 2. A person is called good, absolutely speaking, not when one of his parts is good, but when he is good as a whole; and this is due to the will's goodness, since the will commands the acts of all the human powers (because any of a power's acts is that power's good). So, only a person with a good will is called good absolutely. In contrast, a person with goodness in some power, but without a good will

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underlying, is called good in a certain respect (for instance, someone with good eyesight or hearing is someone who sees or hears well). These considerations make clear that we do not call people good ab­ solutely just because they are knowledgeable. In this case, we say that they are good intellectually or that they use their intellects well.It is the same with crafts and other habits like these. 3. Knowledge is divided in opposition to moral virtue, and neverthe­ less it is itself an intellectual virtue. We can also reply that it is divided in opposition to virtue most strictly speaking, since knowledge is not a virtue in this way, as was said above (in the reply and resp.to l ).

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4. The contemplative intellect is not directed to anything outside it­ self, but it is directed to its characteristic act as its end. Now, our ul­ timate happiness- the contemplative happiness [ of the next life ]- consists in the activity of the contemplative intellect. There­ fore, the contemplative intellect's habits are closer to ultimate happiness than those of the practical intellect in the sense that they resemble it more. Even so, the practical intellect's habits are pre­ sumably closer in the sense that they prepare us for or enable us to merit [ultimate happiness]. 5. A person can merit by an act of knowledge or a similar habit as long as the will commands the act.Without this, there is no merit. Nevertheless, knowledge does not perfect the intellect for this end, as noted above (reply). That is because having knowledge does not make us the sort of people who have appropriate volitions to reflect; it only makes us the sort of people who are adept at reflecting. That is why a bad will is not at odds with knowledge or craft, as it is with prudence, or faith, or temperance.Accordingly, the Philosopher says that in the case of actions, those who willingly err are further from prudence than those who err unwillingly, but it is the reverse in the case of knowledge and craft (NE 6.5 1 140623-25). After all, the grammarian who makes a syntactical error involuntarily is clearly the less knowledgeable grammarian.

Article 8 Are Virtues in Us Naturally? . Reasons to think that they are 1 . Damascene says in The Orthodox Faith 3.14: "The virtues are nat­ ural, and they are naturally and equally in us all."

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2. T he Gloss on Matthew 4:23 ("Jesus went about . . .") says: "He teaches the natural forms of rightness-chastity, justice, humility­ which humans have by nature." 3. Romans 2:14 says that people without the Law do naturally what the Law prescribes. But the Law enjoins acts of virtue. T herefore, people naturally perform acts of virtue, and so it appears we have virtue by nature. 4. Anthony says in a sermon to the monks: 1 "If the will changes its nature, that is depravity. If its condition is preserved, that is virtue." Furthermore, in the same sermon he says that people need only their natural endowments. But this would not be true if the virtues were not natural. T herefore, they are natural.

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5 . Cicero says that we naturally have dignity of soul, which is, evidently, tied to magnanimity (On Duties 1.13). Therefore, we natu­ rally have magnanimity and, by the same line of argument, other virtues.

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6. All that is required to perform an act of virtue is knowing what is good, willing it, and being able to do it. But this knowledge is in us by nature, as Augustine says in On Free Choice of the Will 2. So is the willing, as Augustine says in his Literal Commentary on Genesis. Fi­ nally, the ability is naturally in us because our will has control over its own activity. Our nature, then, is sufficient for performing works of virtue. So, virtue is natural to human beings- in its starting points. 7. But someone responded: Virtue is natural to human beings in its starting points. Nature, however, does not furnish its perfection. On the contrary, Damascene says in The Orthodox Faith 2. 30: "If we remain in what is according to nahue, we are in a state of virtue; but if we turn from what is according to nature, we recede from virtue toward what is outside nature, and we are in a state of wicked­ ness." It is clear from this passage that our turning away from wickedness is in us by nature. Since this turning away is a feature of perfect virtue, we naturally possess even the perfection of virtue. 8. [Also on the contrary:] Since virtue is a form, it is simple and lacks parts. Accordingly, if we naturally possess it in one of its re­ spects, it is apparent that we naturally possess it in every respect.

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9. Human beings are nobler and more perfect than other, nonra­ tional, creatures. But nature provides these other creatures with enough for their perfection. Since the virtues are among a human being's perfections, it appears, then, we possess them naturally. 10. But someone responded: T his cannot be right, because a human being's perfection consists in many and diverse things, while nature is directed to one thing. On the contrary, the inclination of a virtue is also to one thing, just as the inclination of a nature is. For, as Cicero says (Inv 2.53.159), a virtue is a habit in the mode of a nature, in harmony with reason. T herefore, there is nothing barring humans from naturally possess­ ing virtues. 1 1 . [Also on the contrary:] Virtue consists in a mean. Now, a mean is a single determinate thing. T herefore, nothing bars our having a natural inclination to what is virtuous.

1 2. Sin is the privation of measure, species, and order. But sin is the privation of virtue. T herefore, virtue consists in measure, species, and order. Yet these are things natural to a human being. T herefore, virtue is natural to a human being. 1 3. T he soul's appetitive part parallels its cognitive part. But in the cognitive part there is a natural habit: the understanding of first prin­ ciples. T herefore, the appetitive and affective part, which is the subject of virtue, also has a natural habit; and so it appears that some virtues are natural. 14. T hat is natural whose source is internal. For instance, it is natu­ ral for fire to rise, because the source of this movement is in the thing that undergoes the movement. So, because the source of virtue is in human beings, virtue is natural to them. 1 5 . What grows from a seed that is natural is also natural. But virtue grows from a seed that is natural. After all, as a gloss2 on Hebrews 1 says, God willed to seed every soul with the beginnings of wisdom and understanding. Therefore, it appears that the virtues are natural.

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16. Contraries belong to the same genus. But wickedness is the con­ trary of virtue, and it is natural. For Wisdom 12: 10 says: "For their wickedness was natural"; and Ephesians 2:3 says: "We were by nature children of wrath." Therefore, it appears that virtue is natural. 2 Augustine, Sermon 1 1 7.8. 1 l .

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1 7 . It is natural for our lower powers to be subject to reason. After all, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3 (434a l 2-l 4), the higher appetite, which is reason's appetite, moves the lower, wh ich belongs to the soul's sensory part, as a higher heavenly sphere moves a lower one. But the moral virtues consist in the lower powers submitting to reason. Therefore, the moral virtues are natural. 1 8. For a change to be natural, all that is required is that the inter­ nal passive source of the change have a natural aptitude for that change. After all, the generation of simple bodies is called natural for this reason (since the active source of their generation is external ) . So is the motion of the heavenly bodies (since the active source of their motion is not nature, but intellect ) . But there is a natural aptitude for virtue in human beings. After all, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 2, "We are naturally constituted to acquire the virtues, but we are per­ fected through habituation" ( l 1 0 3a2 5-26) . Therefore, it appears that virtue is natural. 19. What is in a person from birth is natural. But according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, some people seem to be brave and temper­ ate and disposed as the other virtues require from the moment of their birth. Moreover, Job 3 1 : 1 8 says: "From my infancy, compassion grew up with me and came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore, virtues are natural to human beings.

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20. Nature does not fail when it comes to necessities. But human beings must have virtues to reach the end they are naturally directed to, happiness, which is the activity of perfect virtue. Therefore, human beings have virtues naturally. Opposing considerations 1. Natural endowments are not lost through sin. That is why Dionysius says that the demons have retained them (DivNames 4. 2 3 ) . But we do lose the virtues through sin, and so they are not natural. 2. Our natural endowments are not subject to development and loss through habituation. We can develop and lose through habituation what is distinctive of virtue. Therefore, the virtues are not natural.

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3 . What we possess naturally is in all people universally. However, the virtues are not in all universally, since some people have vices, which are contrary to virtues. 4. We neither merit nor demerit through natural endowments, be­ cause they are not up to us. But we merit through virtues, just as we demerit through vices. Therefore virtues and vices are not natural.

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Reply People's disagreement about the way we attain virtues and knowledge mirrors their disagreement about the production of natural forms. There have been some who maintained that [natural] forms preexisted i n matter actually, although i n a hidden way, and that a nat­ ural agent brought them from latency into the open. Anaxagoras held this view, asserting that all things were in all things. 3 As a result, everything could be generated from everything. In contrast, others have claimed that forms are totally from an external source - either from participation in Ideas, as Plato held, or from the Agent Intellect, as Avicenna held - and that natural agents merely dispose matter to the form.4 The third option, Aristotle's, holds a middle course. He holds that forms preexist in the potentiality of matter, but an external natural agent brings them into actuality (GA 2. 3). It is the same when it comes to knowledge and the virtues. Some thinkers have held that they are in us by nature, and that study merely unblocks them. Plato seems to have held this. 5 He main­ tained that participation in separated Forms has caused us to have knowledge and the virtues, but that union with the body h inders the soul from using them. We must unfetter them through studying the various fields of knowledge and through exercise of the virtues. However, others have said that an outpouring from the Agent In­ tellect causes us to have knowledge and the virtues. Our study and exercise o f virtue dispose u s to receive its influence. The third view holds a middle course: Knowledge and virtue are in us naturally insofar as we have the aptitude for them, although their completion is not in us naturally (NE 1 l 1 03a2 5-26). This middle view is better, for just as [the corresponding middle view] about natural forms takes away nothing from the power of natural agents, so this view regarding the acquisition of knowledge and virtue through study and exercise preserves the causal efficacy of these efforts. We must keep in mind, however, that there are two ways an apti­ tude for a perfection and form can be in a subject: ( 1 ) because of a passive potentiality only (for instance, i n the matter of air there is an aptitude for the form of fire); or (2) because of a passive and an ac­ tive potentiality jointly (for instance, a body that can be cured has an 3 Aquinas knows Anaxagoras from Aristotle's discussions (e.g. , Physics 1 .4 ) . 4 Aquinas knows Plato's views chiefly through Aristotle (e.g. , Metaphysics 1 .9) . Avicenna's views could be found in his On the Soul 5 . 5 . 5 See, e.g., Augustine's discussion of Plato i n On the Trinity 1 2. 1 5 .24.

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aptitude fo r health both because it is receptive of health and because it has within itself an active principle of health). It is in this second way that humans have a natural aptitude for virtue. That aptitude is due in part to the nature of our species, since the aptitude for virtue is common to all human beings, and in part to the individual's nature, insofar as some people are more apt for virtue than others. To make this clear, we must be aware that in human beings there are three possible subjects of virtue: intellect, will, and the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible. This is evident from what has been explained earlier (aa. 4-7). Furthermore, we must bear in mind that for each of these there is, in some fashion, both the ability to receive virtue and an active source of virtue. It is clear that the soul's intellective part contains the possible intellect, which is in potentiality to all intelligible things. Intellectual virtue consists in the knowledge of these intelligibles. It is also clear that the intellective part contains the agent intellect, by whose light these potentially intelligible things become actually intelligible. Among these intelligible things, there are certain ones that people come to know right from the outset without intellectual endeavor and inquiry. Into this class fall first principles, and not just principles in contemplative fields (for instance, "Each whole is greater than one of its parts," and other principles like this), but also those in practical matters (for instance, "What is bad is to be avoided," and other principles like this). Now, these naturally known principles are the sources of all subsequent cognition, whether practical or contemplative, which we acquire through intellectual endeavor. It is clear that there is a natural active source in the will's case, too. That is because the will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end, and the end in practical matters has the character of a natural source. Therefore, the will's inclination is an active source -and a source in respect of every disposition acquired in the soul's affective part through the exercise of its powers. Moreover, it is clear that the will itself, insofar as it is a power indifferently disposed to alternative ways of achieving the end, is able to receive a habitual inclination to these or those alternative ways. Finally, the irascible and concupiscible appetites are naturally obedient to reason and so are naturally receptive of virtue. Their virtue comes to perfection in them insofar as they are disposed to pursuing the good of reason. All the aforementioned starting points of the virtues result from the nature of the human species and so are common to all of us. However, there is one kind of starting point of virtue that results from the nature of the individual, insofar as a human being is inclined to

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the activity of some virtue due to his natural constitution or the ce­ lestial bodies' influence. While this inclination is a starting point of virtue, it is not a perfect virtue, because that requires reason's mod­ eration. That is why the definition of virtue includes the clause that virtue disposes one to choose the mean according to right reason. After all, anyone who followed an inclination like this without rea­ son's discrimination would frequently sin. Just as this last starting point of virtue does not have the character of perfect virtue without reason's contribution, neither do any of the starting points discussed earlier. That is because (a) it is through rea­ son's investigation that we come to specifics on the basis of general principles; (b) it is through reason's functioning that a person is led from the desire for the ultimate end to the means suited to that end; and (c) it is reason that, by commanding them, makes the concupiscible and irascible appetites subject to itself. Accordingly, it is clear that reason's contribution is needed to bring a virtue to completion, whether the virtue is in the will, or in the irascible or concupiscible appetites. Note, however, that the starting point of virtue in a higher part of the soul is directed to the virtue in a lower part. For instance, we are rendered apt for virtue in the will through the starting point of virtue that is in the will and the one that is in the intellect, while we are rendered apt for virtue in the irascible and concupiscible appetites through both the starting point of virtue in those appetites and the starting point in the higher powers. However, the converse is not true. Accordingly, it is also clear that reason, which is higher [than the other powers], works for the completion of every virtue. Now, the operative principles reason and nature are divided in op­ position, as Physics 2 makes clear, because a rational power is disposed to alternatives, while a nature is directed to one thing. Therefore, it is clear that a virtue's perfection stems not from nature, but from reason. Responses to the initial arguments 1-5 . The virtues are called natural not with regard to their comple­ tion, but due to their natural starting points in us. And this serves as a response to the second, third, fourth, and fifth objections as well. 6. We naturally possess the ability to do what is good, absolutely speaking, because our soul's powers are natural. Moreover, willing and knowing what is good are in us naturally in a certain respect: as a certain general starting point. Still, this is not enough for virtue.

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For a good operation, which is virtue's effect, a person must readily and unfalteringly achieve what is good, and do so for the most part. One cannot do this without virtuous habits. Analogously, it is clear that people know in general how to do the tasks associated with a craft (for instance, to construct an argument or to make a cut, etc.), but they must have the craft to do it readily and without mistake.It is the same in the case of virtue.

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7. That we tum from wickedness in some way or other, that is due to nature.To do so readily and unfalteringly requires a virtuous habit. 8. We do not say that virtue is partly from nature because one part of it is from nature and another part is not, but because it is from nature in an imperfect mode of being: in our potentiality and aptitude for it. 9. God is perfect in goodness through himself and so needs nothing to attain goodness.The higher substances, who are close to God, need few things from him to attain the perfection of goodness.But human beings, who are farther away from God, need many things to attain perfect goodness. This is because they are capable of happiness, while the lower creatures, which are incapable of happiness, need fewer things than human beings.That is why human beings are nobler than the lower animals, even though they stan life, and that range widens more pro­ foundly for those who have been blessed in the next.

Reply In one view, what makes the virh1es valuable traits to have is that they are remedies for our flaws. We are born impatient and mmt train our­ selves to persevere; we naturally flee dangers and need courage to counter this inborn fault. If we did not have these flaws, however, the virtues would be irrelevant. In a different view, moral virtue does not so much remedy our flaws as develop our raw capacities in order to prevent our moral failure. Our unwillingn ess to wait and our desire to flee danger are not in themselves flaws ( since sometimes I ife calls for just these re­ sponses). Nevertheless, we must train ourselves to wait and stand firm when circumstances call for it. Still, if we never had to wait, or if danger never presented itself, virtue would once again be irrelevant. So, someone espousing either the remedial or preventative view of moral virtues would contend that these virtues are for humans in this life. The blessed have reached so exalted a condition, freed from these mundane pressures and enticements, that they have no need of moral

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Commentary. On the Cardinal Virtues Article 4

virtue. As the 1 2th-century philosopher Peter Abelard describes it, heaven is a reward and fulfillment, a tranquility in the perpetual ac­ tivity of thanking God for perpetual bliss: How mighty are the Sabbaths, how mighty and how deep, That the high courts of Heaven to everlasting keep. What peace unto the weary, what pride unto the strong, When God in Whom are all things shall be all things to men. Jerusalem is the city of everlasting peace, A peace that is surpassing and utter blessedness; Where finds the dreamer waking truth beyond dreaming far, Nor is the heart's possessing less than the heart's desire. But of the courts of Heaven and Him who is the King, The rest and the refreshing, the joy that is therein, Let those that know it answer who in that bliss have part, If any word can utter the fullness of the heart. But ours, with minds uplifted unto the heights of God, With our whole heart's desiring, to take the homeward road, And the long exile over, captive in Babylon, Again unto Jerusalem, to win at last return. There all vexation ended, and from all grieving free, We sing the song of Zion in deep security. And everlasting praises for all Thy gifts of grace Rise from Thy happy people, Lord of our blessedness. There Sabbath unto Sabbath succeeds eternally, The joy that has no ending of souls in holiday. And never shall the rapture beyond all mortal ken Cease from the eternal chorus that angels sing with men. 1 1 In Helen Waddell's elegant translation ( 1929, 163-65 ) , which nevertheless does not do justice to Abelard's original: 0 quanta, qualia sunt ilia sabbata qu