Discussing Trump’s America Online: Digital Commenting in China, Mexico and Russia 3031189795, 9783031189791

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Discussing Trump’s America Online Digital Commenting in China, Mexico and Russia

Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova

Discussing Trump’s America Online

Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova

Discussing Trump’s America Online Digital Commenting in China, Mexico and Russia

Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova Department of Communication and Media University of Liverpool Liverpool, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-18979-1    ISBN 978-3-031-18980-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration:PRIRACH NINRAPUN / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Zoya, Nadia, Jordan and Ioana

Acknowledgments

On a personal note, I would like to thank my lovely children to whom I have dedicated this book—Zoya, Nadia, Jordan, and Ioana for bearing up with me, and accepting me and loving me unconditionally no matter what. Two-year-old Ioana deserves special mention here because she has had many naps interrupted by the sound of me typing away on my laptop. I would also like to thank my husband Father John for his support throughout the process, and my parents Zoya and Yordan, and my sister Desislava and her family, for always being there for me. I am most grateful to God for his mercy toward me, and to the one and only Orthodox Church for being the safe haven that I can and I do always turn to. On a professional note, my heartfelt thanks go to my colleagues at the University of Liverpool for their hard work during these very difficult times, which allowed me to spend a whole semester on research leave working on this monograph. I am also grateful for the funding I received both from the University of Chester and from the University of Liverpool (RDIF, School of the Arts) for the coding of comments. Special thanks are due to my three research assistants, who did a brilliant job at a very short space of time—Sofiya Bodurova at the University of Chester, and Rui Wang and Vladimir Zhischenko at the University of Liverpool. There are many other colleagues whose work has inspired me to venture into an unconventional approach to studying online comments. Rather than thanking each and everyone of them individually here, I have attempted to engage with their work in the book itself.

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Contents

Part I Conceptualizing Online Comments from a Global Perspective   1 1 Introduction  3 2 Post-Deliberative  Public Spheres: Beyond Democratic Deliberation and the Public Sphere Framework 23 3 Studying  Global Online Discussions: A Grounded Theory Approach 55 Part II Global Virtual Discussions About Trump and the USA  87 4 Online Comments About Trump and the USA in China 89 5 Online Comments About Trump and the USA in Russia133

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6 Online Comments About Trump and the USA in Mexico169 7 Conclusion215 Index233

List of Graphs

Graph 4.1 Patriotism theme in the Chinese comments 92 Graph 4.2 Geopolitics theme in the Chinese comments 108 Graph 5.1 Power, authority, and accountability theme in the Russian comments135 Graph 5.2 Democracy theme in the Russian comments 149 Graph 6.1 Power and responsibility theme in the Mexican comments 172 Graph 6.2 Democracy theme in the Mexican comments 187 Graph 6.3 Patriotism, identity, and populism theme in the Mexican comments191 Graph 6.4 Religion and morality theme in the Mexican comments 201

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PART I

Conceptualizing Online Comments from a Global Perspective

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Congratulations with a convincing Victory of the pro-Putin candidate! The ‘Russian World’ won in America, against which the entire Western world factually worked. What a great news, to live in a nation where you dream big and where your rights are protected. As opposed to the Mexican president, who is good for nothing, who aspires to nothing … except for being lazy! Whatever some think about America, but they are worthy of respect! There is democracy and the choice of the ordinary people! This is not our “monster” with its 146%!))) If Trump comes to power and eases the US-Russia relationship, China would be in danger. After all, in recent years, China-Russian relations have been drawn closer by their common enemy, the US. Who would have thought that today the American system, now defunct, would create its own terrorist? An intolerant and mad person. They have an enemy on the inside. How long is this going to last? The Americans turned out to be more racist, misogynistic and backwards than what we could imagine. May God look well after us as this thing is heading at full speed towards becoming the new Hitler. Donald Trump’s unexpected triumph in the presidential elections of the United States of the North is a defeat for the world, this could lead us to a Third World War.

From Hosanna to Crucify Him—these were some of the initial reactions to Donald Trump’s presidential victory in the US 2016 elections in the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Slavtcheva-Petkova, Discussing Trump’s America Online, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7_1

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USA and worldwide. It is not surprising, that as the online comments from China, Mexico, and Russia show, online publics around the world reacted in a similar way. This is only at the surface level, however, because even the brief extracts at the beginning of this Introduction tell a much wider story—about online commentators’ ability to build persuasive arguments and enter into conversations with other people online, about the depth and scope of their comments beyond the immediate emotional reactions to a rational evaluation of Trump’s victory in terms of their country’s relationship with the USA as well as the future of democracy and the world more widely. The comments not only show that online political talk can be revealing about ordinary people’s political attitudes, views, and opinions but also make us reconsider the important question about the broader purpose online political talk actually serves. Does it help or hinder societies—democratic and non-democratic alike? This book explores these questions by focusing on virtual commentators’ views of the US President Donald Trump, the USA, and their country’s relationship with the USA in three very different, but fascinating countries—China, Mexico, and Russia. This introductory chapter presents the main aims and intended contributions of the monograph as well as the structure of the book. While there has been a recent proliferation of studies on online comments, the majority have focused on a specific context—predominantly the established democracies of the Global North—and issues relevant to that context without really exploring the potential for a global or at least cross-national comparative focus. By investigating virtual commentators’ views on Trump, the USA, and their country’s relationship with the USA, the book not only provides rich empirical material but also allows for a critical exploration and rethinking of the key frameworks and concepts used in most scholarship on online commenting, most notably Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere concept and the wider democratic deliberative framework that it is part of as well as more importantly for grounded theory construction from the bottom up. For years, scholars of online comments have worked in a somewhat vicious circle. Regardless of how interesting the context or case study is, there is an almost inherent imperative to study online discussions through the lens of Habermas’s public sphere concept and the democratic deliberative framework. Even those who willingly attempt to move away from this framework, inevitably end up measuring their findings against it before predictably concluding either that there is no/little evidence for the existence of a virtual public sphere or that

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although the potential for its development exists, it has not been realized. Yet, online political talk still occurs and has its significance but what is it, if it is not democratic deliberation? Instead of trying to impose the democratic deliberative framework on yet another set of contexts (two of which are not even democratic countries), this study adopts a bottom-up grounded theory approach to the study of online comments with the aim of answering this key question and offering a conceptual typology of online political talk on a global scale. It includes qualitative thematic analysis via the constant comparison method coupled with quantitative content analysis of more than 2200 comments about Trump and the USA posted since the election of the US President in 2016 in the most widely read news media’s online fora in China, Mexico, and Russia that allow the opportunity for commenting.

Why China, Mexico, and Russia? China, Mexico, and Russia make for excellent case studies. The three countries’ relations with Trump and the USA have been rather turbulent. Trump’s election victory in 2016 led to very different reactions in the three countries under study. Hopes were high for a more positive and productive relationship between the USA and Russia in Russia but the optimistic mode did not last long after the country was implicated in interfering in the US elections as well as a related series of scandals involving Trump’s close aides and the Russian authorities. China’s response to Trump’s election victory was much more cautious and while Trump’s state visit to China in 2017 was seen as a good sign, what followed in the next few years has been a full-blown trade war. The US–Mexico relations, on the other hand, have been in crisis since Trump’s election (Velasco, 2018). Trump’s threats against Mexico included his election promise to build a wall on the southern border that the Mexicans would be required to pay for as well as that he would deport millions of undocumented Mexicans (“illegal aliens”). The altercations between Trump and the three countries are a reflection of wider geopolitical and ideological issues in the post-Cold War world order. The USA has undoubtedly (re)-established itself as a hegemonic power but China’s growing economic power and Russia’s increasingly militant attitude toward the USA and “the West” threaten this position. The war in Ukraine is an excellent case in point with Russia frequently presenting it as an onslaught on liberalism and “Western values.”

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Similarly, in the case of China, as Katz (2021) put it, “With China’s large population, growing economic and military strength, and increasingly assertive leadership, it is not surprising that the U.S. and many of its allies have become wary of China.” An important point that Paszak (2020) made was that “China began to be depicted as a strategic rival that poses a threat to the interests while being part of a distinct civilization and fostering different values.” This is a very important point to bear in mind because China and Russia promote very different values to those the USA represents, and as such, any strategic advantage that they gain poses a potential threat to liberal values and the future of liberal democracies more generally. As Macfarlane (2020) pointed out, “China’s rise has led some to speculate that we are witnessing the ‘end of the American century’” or in any case, “any claim on the part of American democracy to provide a political model.” It is important to observe the extent to which these battles over hegemony and political values are reflected in the online comments. Moreover, the three countries also represent excellent case studies in the realm of online discussions. China and Russia both have authoritarian/semi-authoritarian regimes, albeit with very different levels of restrictions of the Internet, while Mexico is one of the democratic countries in Latin America considerably understudied in the context of virtual discussions. China is the most heavily censored of the three countries. The Chinese Internet has been subjected to the largest and perhaps most sophisticated censorship strategy in the world, including the great firewall blocking most Western websites such as news media websites and social media platforms. Its policy is underpinned by the principle of “sovereign internet.” China also frequently launches hacking attacks on foreign servers and websites. Yet, despite the heavy censorship, as deLisle et al. (2016) pointed out, “the Internet and especially social media have become pervasive and transformative forces in contemporary China” (p. 1). They claimed that “policy debates and public discourse regularly occur through—and sometimes focus on—the Internet and social media to an extent unimaginable a decade or two ago. Almost no area of public concern remains beyond the reach of discussion in cyberspace” (p. 2). Yet, China is known for its “reverse censorship,” namely for “surreptitiously posting large numbers of fabricated social media comments” by the so-­ called 50-cent army or 50-c party—2 million commenters allegedly paid by the state to post pro-government comments online (King et al., 2013, p. 484). As Negro (Franceschini, 2018) explained, while cyber-utopianism

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was very common in China in the late 2000s with Chinese intellectuals expressing “the belief that the Internet had the power to support pluralism and forms of democracy in the country” (p. 104), recent trends are considerably more negative. The Chinese authorities seem to have “further developed their skills in channelling the public opinion (yulun yindao)—or, to use President Xi’s words, are doing their best to occupy the ‘main battlefield of public opinion struggle’ (yulun douzheng de zhu zhanchang)” (Franceschini, 2018, p. 104). Surveillance is rife in the country and the social credit system is a prime example of the authoritarian state’s ingenuity in the use and abuse of contemporary technologies for both commercial and political purposes and always in the name of some alleged societal good. This study explores the extent to which these ideas have sifted through the Chinese online publics. Russia, on the other hand, while not as restrictive authoritarian country as China—in fact different labels have been used to describe it—from neo-­ authoritarian to managed democracy—boasts a subtler system of restricting the potential for free speech online. Whatever label is used, the key features of relevance to this project are the same: while hopes for democratization of society and the media were very high in the first few years after the fall of communism, Putin’s Presidency put an end to these processes. Russia is not a democracy and while the political regime is different from the one during Soviet times, there has definitely been a significant deterioration in the degree of freedom of expression in the country coupled with a sustained strategy of stifling critical voices, propaganda, and neo-imperialist discourses masked as patriotism (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018), particularly exacerbated after the war against Ukraine was launched in 2022. Gel’man (2010, 2014) used the term “half-freedom of speech” to describe the situation. The Russian language Internet (Runet) is not as heavily censored as China’s but it has also played an ambivalent role in home and world politics. The Kremlin has allegedly been investing in paid trolls (Sindelar, 2014) but commentators have also praised Runet’s powerful role as a catalyst for change (Suslov, 2017). Suslov (2017) argued that “digital media have become the main outlet for supplying Russians with perspectives and interpretations that dissent from those aired on the state-controlled TV channels” but “the flipside is that this visibility gives the policing institutions free rein to prosecute virtually any active ‘netizen’.” However, the largely positive trends observed in Russia in the initial post-Cold War years were reversed after the authorities took a much more pro-active approach in regulating the Internet in response to the

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2011–2013 wave of protests and the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. The grip on freedom of expression has significantly tightened since and even more so after the war in Ukraine started in 2022. The Russian government has used a range of measures in the past few years aimed at curtailing freedom of expression ranging from blocking websites and Internet blackouts during protests to legal and infrastructural Internet controls and content filters. A series of amendments to existing legislation, inspired by China’s sovereign Internet policy and informally known as Russia’s “sovereign Internet law,” came into force in 2019. They require Internet service providers to install equipment that allows the authorities to automatically block content the government has banned and reroute Internet traffic without actually going through the Internet providers themselves (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Regulatory agencies have repeatedly used their power to order the blocking of content or impose fines. There has also been a concerted effort toward using predominantly Russian mobile apps and websites. The year 2022 saw the worst restrictions ever with a new law effectively criminalizing any critical reporting in Russia about the war against Ukraine, including banning the use of the word “war” in relation to it. Access to Facebook and Russian websites based outside of the country was also blocked. The third country in this study—Mexico—is a democracy with the freest Internet out of the three countries but as a young democracy, it too has its issues. Due to the levels of poverty and inequality and the resulting digital divide, the Internet penetration rate is very similar to that in China and lower than in Russia. According to 2020 World Bank data, 72% of the Mexican population had access to the Internet as opposed to 71% of the Chinese population and 85% of the Russian population. Higareda’s (2013) evaluation of the state of development of the public sphere in Mexico showed that its deliberative potential was severely impeded by the social and economic inequalities as well as patronage and a weak rule of law—all general impediments to democracy as well. Moreover, online propaganda and disinformation have been rife, especially during the 2018 election campaign. The generally high levels of violence against journalists also inhibit Internet freedom. Still, as Higareda (2013) pointed out, the Internet in Mexico, “offers extraordinary opportunities to create a deliberative opinion-making process in Mexico” and “is evolving into the leading means of social communication for deliberative democracy due to its interactivity and the virtually infinite space it offers for all possible

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perspectives in politics, thus facilitating an ideal deliberative space for Mexican citizens” (p. 329). The different degrees of democratic development and free speech as well as the turbulent relations with the USA make these three countries timely and worthwhile case studies for the purposes of this study. The most different systems design enhances the grounded theory approach by allowing for broader and more well-rounded conclusions to be drawn about respective similarities in the patterns of online discussions and argumentation and the role of online spaces because if some similarities persist despite the cross-national differences, then a fuller picture of the potential factors that play an important role on a more general level can be drawn. The qualitative nature of the project and the presentation of findings by country would allow for a careful consideration of the respective factors and would minimize the potential for drawing unsubstantiated conclusions.

Research Questions and Contributions of the Study The main research question this study aims to answer is: What is the nature of online political discussions about a global personality such as Donald Trump and a global power such as the USA? The sub-questions can be split into two main categories: (1) Deductive questions (Questions 1–4) emanating from previous research on online political talk, addressed by both methods—thematic and content analysis. (2) Inductive, open-ended questions (Questions 5–8), exclusively addressed by the grounded theory approach via the thematic analysis. 1. What is the quality of argumentation in the online comments about Donald Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? 2. What is the level of engagement among online posters in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? 3. To what extent are the comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia civil? 4. Are there any significant implications for the nature of political talk more broadly arising from questions 1–3? 5. What are the key themes in the online discussions about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? 6. What views do online commentators express of Trump and his electoral victory?

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7. To what extent and how do online commentators’ views of Trump and the USA change as a result of the changes in the relationship between Trump and the respective country? 8. How can the patterns of discussion about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia be conceptualized? The book makes three main contributions. First, focusing on a global event such as the election of the US President as well as the longer-term perception of him as a global public figure and of his country as a global player allows us to explore the potential for a global dimension of online commenting. Using a combination of global events such as the US President’s election, inauguration and impeachment trial, and events with a national focus (albeit with much wider implications) such as Russia’s alleged meddling in the US elections, Trump’s promise to build a wall with Mexico and the trade war between China and the USA, permits us to explore the interrelation between the global and the national dimensions on the level of online public perceptions and views. The significance of Trump’s election victory and subsequent presidency cannot be underestimated. As Vile (2016) pointed out, Trump’s victory was not simply “a moment of madness that will disappear when Trump is no longer in the news” but it told a bigger story about the persistence of the underlying causes that led to his election in terms of deep-rooted conflicts and inequalities, decreasing credibility of the American dream narrative as well as wider issues related to the American political system and its “future outlook.” All these developments have important repercussions beyond the USA because they contribute to a growing trend toward questioning the US role as a driver of democracy and democratic political values around the world and the wider relevance of these values, as some of the comments actually show. The findings are relevant beyond Trump’s personality and the specific events selected, because they illustrate the potential for making claims about the globality of online political discussions in terms of focus, topics/themes, and personalities, while also accounting for the significance of local/national issues that inevitably influence the direction and the nature of these discussions. As already indicated, the most different systems design approach is beneficial, because it allows us to draw broader conclusions about the potential for online discussions of a global nature across different contexts. Any similarities in the patterns of discussion and argumentation despite the systemic differences would enhance

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theory building by making it better grounded than a narrower focus on one context or a few very similar contexts. Second, as I argue in Chap. 2, while it is truly time to move away from the prevailing Habermasian framework on online political discussions, because all research so far suggests that it is not applicable in its ideal entirety, it is not yet time to fully abandon the term public sphere. As Fraser (2014) pointed out, public sphere theory has a rich history and is likely to be used in the future because of its central idea, namely “that ordinary people are not just objects of the designs of the great, but political subjects; that they deserve a decisive say in the matters that concern them in common; that they have the capacity to mobilize communicative power both as a means to effect change and as an end in itself” (p. 155). Yet, as all empirical studies demonstrate, the notion has never been applicable in its entirety in its Habermasian sense, both on a national and on a transnational level, let alone in the context of virtual political discussions in the form of online comments. As any idealized normative framework, it has a lot to offer more in an aspirational than in an explanatory way, and there are key elements to it that show the potential value of some of its features. Habermas himself, however, never presented his framework as reality but rather as a norm that societies should aspire to. A potential outcome of this aspirational process is “its contributive value of advancing people to become a public” (Pernaa, 2017, p. 12). Therefore, while we should not devote yet another study to a fruitless treasure hunt in search of a treasure that does not exist, it is nonetheless important to build upon the work of the numerous scholars in the field who have meticulously studied online political talk underpinned by the belief in the value of the public sphere. The term “public sphere” should not be abandoned altogether because it has its rich history and normative, even ideological, value but it should be used in the plural as a placeholder for spaces for open discussions among members of different publics that have the capacity to contribute to politics and policy-making. In order to recognize the fact that these public spheres are not and are unlikely to ever be fully and truly deliberative, a more suitable term is post-deliberative public spheres. This is the term that I use in the current study, which adapts and utilizes only those elements of the deliberative framework on which the evidence is inconclusive/contradictory (e.g., on the link between civility and deliberation) or have shown some empirical merit (e.g., “deliberative moments”). This study will, therefore, both build on existing research and use a grounded theory approach.

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Third, on a conceptual level, such a multi-faceted, yet open-ended investigation of three very different countries would allow us to draw conclusions about the global nature of online political talk and to build theory from the bottom up. Most studies on online political talk are from one context and build upon a Habermasian conceptualization of the public sphere, thus not really accounting for contextual differences and reaching rather predictable conclusions. By contrast, this study offers an open-­ ended, grounded theory conceptualization of global online political talk in three different contexts beyond the established liberal democracies of the Global North. It shows that while the national contextual peculiarities play a significant role, commentators even in authoritarian countries express their opinion and are capable of building arguments and of conversing with other people online. Thus, in the Conclusion, the book offers a typology of global online political topic arising from the grounded theory approach.

Structure of the Book The book is split into two main parts. Part I, “Conceptualizing Online Comments from a Global Perspective,” includes the Introduction and the two theoretical and methodological chapters, while Part II, “Global Virtual Discussions about Trump and the USA,” incorporates the three empirical chapters and the Conclusion. Chapter 2, “Beyond Democratic Deliberation and the Public Sphere Framework,” advocates a rethinking of and moving away from the democratic deliberation and public sphere framework. The public sphere concept has been one of the most widely used concepts in communication scholarship in the last few decades with an increased focus on the online realm. While many theoretical works discuss the potential for the development of a virtual public sphere, most of the empirical research suggests that while such potential does indeed exist, it is rarely realized and most certainly not by fulfilling all key characteristics formulated in Habermas’s seminal work on the public sphere. Scholars differ in their views as to the extent to which this potential can ever be realized or indeed the extent to which Habermas’s framework should be used as a benchmark as opposed to “an ideal for civic participation and interaction” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 8). This chapter offers a critical overview of the main claims put forward in the academic literature about the potential development of a virtual public

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sphere as well as a range of alternative concepts and frameworks offered by researchers. It lays the foundations for the current study by advocating a rethinking of the main premises of the democratic deliberative framework and most of its alternatives, which do not appear to move much beyond the key premise of deliberative theory—namely, the usefulness of political talk online mainly as a means of enhancing democracy. Most studies exploring these topics suffer from three main deficiencies, which necessitate a reconsideration of the frameworks they are built upon: (1) They emanate predominantly from the Global North. (2) The majority of countries they cover are democracies. (3) The majority focus on one country and do not offer cross-national comparisons. (4) The majority of studies are based on normative assumptions that are not applicable beyond the established democracies of the Global North. The chapter argues that the deficiencies of current research in online discussions open up avenues for new research and innovative conceptualization, especially in non-democratic contexts. The limitations of the democratic deliberative approach should not preclude us from studying online discussions and comments. As Papacharissi (2002) argued, “Still, people who would never be able to come together to discuss political matters offline are now able to do so online, and that is no small matter’ (p. 23). It is important to study this phenomenon in established democracies but even more important to do that in non-democratic countries or younger democracies where restrictions on free speech are much more common. Moreover, the few available studies from beyond the established democracies of the Global North show that the quality of argumentation can actually be better and that incivility is not such a big issue (e.g., Zhou et  al., 2008; SlavtchevaPetkova, 2016a). This chapter also outlines in more detail the novel concept of post-deliberative public spheres. After unpacking the main claims made in studies about online comments and the virtual public sphere Chap. 3, “Studying Global Online Discussions: A Grounded Theory Approach,” then discusses the benefits of the theoretical and methodological approach used in this study. It offers an alternative framework for the study of online comments by adopting a bottom-up grounded theory approach. Rather than trying to force an existing theoretical framework on the rich data emanating from three very different and fascinating contexts, it includes qualitative thematic analysis coupled with quantitative content analysis of over 2200 comments about Trump and the USA posted in China, Mexico, and Russia since Trump’s election in 2016. This monograph offers an investigation into the quality

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of argumentation, the levels of engagement among users and the degree of incivility of the comments through quantitative content analysis but it also includes an entirely open-ended qualitative thematic analysis of the themes and patterns of discussions in the comments. The sample consists of the top news sites in the three countries that offer the opportunity for commenting and from which the comments could be retrieved for the full time period under investigation. The chapter presents and justifies the steps taken in terms of sampling and methodological procedures by focusing on thematic analysis and the constant comparison method as well as the sampling procedures. The sample is designed in such a way as to make the comments comparable across countries but there are inevitable contextual peculiarities of the countries the study focuses on, which are further explored in this chapter and in the empirical ones. The Internet plays an important role in all three countries, which provide opportunities for citizens to express their views online, albeit with varying degrees of freedom of expression. They are compared in terms of three key aspects: (1) Recent relationship with Trump and the USA. (2) Democratic development and freedom of speech. (3) The role of the Internet as a tool for political discussions. The chapter concludes by explaining the importance of conducting cross-national research on these topics and outlining the main potential contributions in this area of study. Chapter 4, “Online comments about Trump and the USA in China,” is the first empirical chapter, presenting the results of the analysis of 756 comments about Trump and the USA posted in China between November 2016 and July 2020. The three empirical chapters follow the exact same structure—starting with a brief introduction about current developments in the relationship between the respective country and the USA and available public opinion polls on Trump, and then followed by three main parts: key events and themes; argumentation, engagement, and civility; and patterns of discussion. There do not appear to be any public opinion surveys of Chinese citizens’ views on Trump, but reports claim that his nickname on China’s Internet is Te-mei-pu, meaning “totally unpredictable” (Buckley, 2019). As Buckley (2019) put it, “China has experienced Mr. Trump’s changeable ways more than most countries.” Despite the fact that he visited China in the first year of his presidency, relations soon soured due to his trade demands as well as over human rights. Trump also asked the Chinese government to investigate the former Vice President Joe Biden and his son over allegations that they have received millions from China. The trade war between the two countries continued well into

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2020 when Trump upped his efforts to persuade some of his key allies such as the United Kingdom to join him in putting pressure on China. Part I traces online commentators’ reactions to the key events in the relationship between China and the USA since Trump’s election victory, most notably the trade war. It identifies the key themes that dominate the discussions and compares them to the official narratives by the Chinese authorities on the US–China relationship and President Trump. The analysis shows that Chinese commentators’ views of Trump are very similar to the official views. This is not surprising, given the high levels of censorship in the country. King et al. (2013) estimated that the government fabricated and posted about 448 million comments a year. Their study showed that rather than arguing with opponents of the government and the party, the main strategy was “to distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime” (p. 484). King et al. (2013) concluded that “almost none of the Chinese government’s 50c party posts engage in debate or argument of any kind” (p. 486). This study shows that there were very few posts about Trump’s election victory and commentators were mainly discussing his personal appearance labeling him as funny and arrogant, but there was also some concern that a potential improvement in the relations between the USA and Russia might lead to a deterioration in the relationship between China and Russia as one of the opening comments shows. The trade war sparked the interest of Chinese online users much more so than Trump’s election victory with the majority of comments being ideologically framed and full of patriotic pathos, nationalistic propaganda, and even calls for censorship. The patriotic sentiments very narrowly revolved around calls for standing up for your country, even fighting for it, and resisting “US imperialism,” including the buying of US goods—most notably iPhones. The word “motherland” was frequently used. Nationalistic slogans were common, for example: “We are determined to fight against US imperialism even if with a hungry belly … My country is amazing! The war has started. China will win. The Chinese people will win … With the wisdom of our people, we will be able to defeat the US empire! I love my China! The key is that Americans cannot bear things longer than the Chinese! The Chinese can endure it, but Americans cannot!” There were even calls for increased censorship and acceleration of the production of missiles and nuclear bombs as well as threats against those “who offend China.” Part II then analyzes the quality of argumentation, the level of engagement between

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online posters and the extent to which the comments can be classified as civil. The majority of commentators did not engage in any way whatsoever with other users and the points they were making, and incivility was very rare (less than 2% of all comments). The final part then offers a typology of the patterns of discussion emanating from the bottom-up analysis with a view to reaching a wider conceptual conclusion about the nature of online discussions and the spaces within which these discussions take place. Chapter 5, “Online comments about Trump and the USA in Russia,” is the second empirical chapter, presenting the results of the analysis of 760 comments about Trump and the USA posted in Russia between November 2016 and July 2020. Russia was the only G20 country where Trump was the preferred choice for US President. The Pew Research Center (Bialik & Poushter, 2017) reported that Trump received a higher confidence rating (53%) in Russia than either of his two predecessors ever did. Similarly, the favorable attitude toward the USA in Russia almost tripled—from 15% during Obama’s presidency to 41% in the beginning of Trump’s presidency. As already indicated, initial hopes that Trump’s election would lead to a warming up of the relationship between the two countries were quickly dashed after Russia was accused of meddling in the presidential elections, and Trump came under pressure due to the dubious connections his closest advisers forged with Russia. Trump’s attitude to Russia and President Putin has been ambivalent—from initially promising to forge a new partnership as part of his strategy to revise the role of the USA in the world to eventually reverting “to a more mainstream position on US foreign policy, including some harsh criticism of Russia for its support of Syrian President Bashar” (Rutland, 2017, S41). Chapter 5 follows the exact same structure as Chap. 4. It is split into three main parts. Part I traces online commentators’ reactions to the key events in the relationship between Russia and the USA since Trump’s election victory. It identifies the key themes that dominate the discussions and compares them to the official narratives made by President Putin on the US–Russia relationship and President Trump. As expected, the analysis shows that Russian commentators’ views of Trump changed very much in line with the official narrative linked to the changing nature of the relationship between the two countries although alternative views were also shared and debated. The initial reactions to Trump’s victory were mixed: from some being in celebratory mood—congratulating him on his victory and calling him “our candidate”/“the pro-Putin candidate,” and even arguing that “the Russian world won in America”—to others who were

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considerably more cautious in their evaluation saying that they did not know whether to “rejoice or to cry now” but making the point that they were hopeful that Trump would not be like Obama who “brought a lot of grief.” A wider point that was discussed was about the nature of democracy and the differences in terms of political systems between Russia and the USA. The initial enthusiasm about Trump was soon replaced by increasing disappointment with him and his country’s treatment of Russia. Commentators labeled subsequent developments as “a witch hunt” and were frequently referring to a blame narrative against Putin and Russia. A typical comment was along these lines: “Putin is to blame for everything. The cat left her kittens this Putin is to blame. Putin seems to have intervened in ‘their’ elections because he actually was born at all. Exceptional morons.” There were alternative views shared, however, that recognized the autonomy of the USA and its right to play a powerful role regardless of what Russia and its President think. While some comments were explicitly discussing the US–Russia relation, the majority were implicitly passing a judgment on both countries’ political systems by often outlining their normative views and expectations. A bone of contention was whether democracy was a good thing not just in political terms but also in relation to the standard of living and people’s self-esteem. Part II then analyzes the quality of argumentation, the level of engagement between online posters and the extent to which the comments can be classified as civil. A reasonably high percentage (>40%) of commenters engaged with other users and the points they were making, and incivility was very rare (less than 10% of all comments). The final part then offers a typology of the patterns of discussion emanating from the bottom-up analysis with a view to reaching a wider conceptual conclusion about the nature of online discussions and the spaces within which these discussions take place. Chapter 6, “Online comments about Trump and the USA in Mexico,” is the third empirical chapter, presenting the results of the analysis of 717 comments about Trump and the USA posted in Mexico between November 2016 and July 2020. Mexico was threatened by Trump during the presidential campaign with a large border wall, which he claimed he would build by making Mexico pay for it. While construction of the wall started during his presidency, it did not progress very swiftly and was halted by the new President Joe Biden. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s rating in Mexico was the lowest among 37 nations polled in 2017 according to the Pew Research Center. 94% of Mexicans opposed Trump’s proposed border wall and only 5% had confidence in him to do the right thing

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regarding world affairs. By comparison, the lowest level of public support for Barack Obama in Mexico was 38% in 2011 (Wike et al., 2018). The analysis of the comments shows two competing narratives: on the one hand, a very critical attitude of online commentators toward their own authorities and on the other hand, strong patriotic sentiments (“We can fight the USA”). While the general view of Trump was undoubtedly negative with commentators calling him “terrorist,” “schizophrenic,” and “idiot,” a lot of posters actually feared that the real danger lied in the incompetent reactions and policies of the Mexican state. In fact, as one commentator put it, Trump had turned into a convenient excuse for why things were not going in the right direction in Mexico—“the source of all our problems, the one and only culprit … responsible for the sufferings of this poor Mexico... where the federal government doesn’t hold any responsibility.” The second clearly demarcated position involved a recognition of the powerful role of the USA but also a clear acknowledgment that Mexico’s fate was in its own hands and that “we can fight the USA”/“Trump wants to submit us, but he won’t. We are an independent country, not an American company. Sovereignty and dignity.” Here, some even drew parallels with Cuba or as one commentator put it, “If we claim ourselves victims, as these three donkeys intend doing, we will fall on our faces and will be consumed by the inaptitude of cowardice. Cuba, a little dictatorial island, managed to not be subdued by the empire. Mexico … will weather the storm from above and will keep moving ahead. DO NOT DOUBT IT. United Mexico!” Similar to Russian commentators, Mexicans also discussed the state of democracy in the USA with some talking about “the end of democracy” and the USA losing its authority to “give lessons of democracy to any country” or more generally passing a judgment on the whole world. As one commentator put it, “If Trump is the most powerful man in the world, the world is not (doing) well.” However, there were voices expressing the exact opposite opinion—namely, that America remains “a nation where you dream big and where your rights are protected. As opposed to the Mexican president, who is good for nothing, who aspires to nothing … except for being lazy!” Part II then analyzes the quality of argumentation, the level of engagement between online posters and the extent to which the comments can be classified as civil. A similar percentage to Russia engaged with other users and the points they were making, but incivility was higher than in Russia or China (about a quarter of all comments). The final part then offers a typology of the patterns of discussion emanating from the bottom-up analysis with a view to reaching

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a wider conceptual conclusion about the nature of online discussions and the spaces within which these discussions take place. The final chapter includes a comparison between the three countries under study and draws wider conclusions about the role of online commenting as a means of providing a space for virtual discussions as well as the nature of these discussions. The relevance of the findings spans well beyond the specific events and personalities analyzed in the study, including in relation to an increased questioning of the USA’s role as a world leader in promoting democratic values as well as other recent developments in the relationships between the respective countries. The conclusion offers a typology of global online political talk by mapping the comments onto a spectrum of authoritarianism/censored media to democracy/free media with commentators in an authoritarian country such as China fully backing the official line and not really engaging in any meaningful discussions with each other or indeed venturing into commenting on wider political issues such as the state and nature of democracy to commentators in democratic countries such as Mexico where opinions can be much more polarized and critical of the authorities, and the levels of engagement between commentators tend to be higher but incivility is also much more common. Russia tends to be in the middle of this spectrum with high levels of engagement among commenters and polarizing views but also a lot of propaganda slogans in support of the official policy line. In comparison with China, Russian comments tended to be considerably more multi-layered than Chinese ones with online posters discussing a wider range of topics such as the standard of living; democracy; fake news; and censorship and propaganda. Predictably, the willingness of online commentators to use the virtual space as a means of counteracting/ questioning or holding to account official discourses depends to a large extent on the degree of freedom of expression they are allowed. This shows that while online public fora can be utilized as spaces for political discussions, their role cannot be solely conceptualized in terms of potential for democratization because even the quality of argumentation and the levels of engagement depend largely on key contextual factors such as the relevant political system, the degree of freedom of expression, and the overriding ideology—a point I come back to in the Conclusion. Thus, the post-deliberative public spheres are fluid, versatile, and with a very strong nationalist focus, playing into current national political narratives and propaganda efforts, thus in all cases also serving in one way or another the existing political regime and ideology. The obvious

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differences should not prevent us from observing two key similarities: the strong presence of patriotic, nationalistic, and populist sentiments in all three countries and the tendency to discuss wider political issues through the lens of normative views, including about their own country. The comments tell us as much about commentators’ views of Trump and the USA as about their perceptions of their own state. Judgments on the USA are not passed in a vacuum—they are interlinked with people’s normative views about their own country and about politics in general. The degree of incivility seems to be linked to the degree of freedom of expression and state of democracy of a country, but given that we studied only three countries, other contextual factors should be taken into consideration before drawing wider conclusions. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the limitations of the study and potential venues for future research.

Bibliography Bialik, K., & Poushter, J. (2017). Most G20 countries have little confidence in Putin, Trump on world affairs. Pew Research Center. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-­tank/2017/07/06/most-­g20-­ countries-­have-­little-­confidence-­in-­putin-­trump-­on-­world-­affairs/ Buckley, C. (2019, October 5). China loves news about Trump’s controversies. Not this time. The New  York Times. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/10/05/world/asia/trump-­china-­biden.html deLisle, J., Goldstein, A., & Yang, G. (2016). Introduction: The internet, social media, and a changing China. In J. deLisle, A. Goldstein, & G. Yang (Eds.), (pp. 1–28). University of Pennsylvania Press. Franceschini, I. (2018). The internet in China: A conversation with Gianluigi Negro. Media in China, 3(4), 102–105. Fraser, N. (2014). Publicity, subjection, critique: A reply to my critics. In K. Nash (Ed.), Transnationalizing the public sphere (pp. 129–156). Polity. Gel’man, V. (2010, March 9). Ловушка полусвободы. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://republic.ru/posts/1310531 Gel’man, V. (2014). The rise and decline of electoral authoritarianism in Russia. Demokratizatsiya, 22(4), 503–522. Higareda, F. C. B. (2013). The development of the media and the public sphere in Mexico. Mexican Law Review, 5(2), 305–331. Human Rights Watch. (2020). Russia: Growing internet isolation, control, censorship: Authorities regulate infrastructure, block content. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-­growing-­internet-­ isolation-­control-­censorship

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Katz, M.  N. (2021). The role of deflection in Putin’s diplomacy towards the U.S. Kennan Cable, 71. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-­c able-­n o-­7 1-­r ole-­d eflection-­p utins-­ diplomacy-­toward-­us King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. American Political Science Review, 107(2), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000014 Macfarlane, L. (2020). A spectre is haunting the west—The spectre of authoritarian capitalism. openDemocracy. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https:// www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/a-­spectre-­is-­haunting-­the-­west-­ the-­spectre-­of-­authoritarian-­capitalism/ Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere. New Media & Society, 4(1), 9–27. Paszak, P. (2020). China-U.S. trade war: Origins, course and consequences. Warsaw Institute. Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://warsawinstitute. org/china-­u-­s-­trade-­war-­origins-­course-­and-­consequences/ Pernaa, H.-K. (2017). Deliberative future visioning: Utilizing the deliberative democracy theory and practice in futures research. European Journal of Futures Research, 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-­017-­0129-­1 Rutland, P. (2017). Trump, Putin, and the future of US-Russian relations. Slavic Review, 76(S1), S41–S56. Sindelar, D. (2014, August 12). The Kremlin’s troll army. The Atlantic. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2014/08/the-­kremlins-­troll-­army/375932/ Slavtcheva-Petkova, V. (2016a). Are newspapers’ online discussion boards democratic tools or conspiracy theories’ engines? A case study on an eastern European “media war”. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(4), 1115–1134. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699015610880 Slavtcheva-Petkova, V. (2016b). “We are not fools”: Online news commentators’ perceptions of real and ideal journalism. The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 21(1), 68–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161215612203 Slavtcheva-Petkova, V. (2018). Russia’s liberal media: Handcuffed but free. Routledge. Suslov, M. (Ed.). (2017). Digital orthodoxy in the post-soviet world: The Russian orthodox church and web 2.0. Ibidem-Verlag. Velasco, J. (2018). The future of U.S.-Mexico relations: A tale of two crises. Mexico Center, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. https://scholarship. rice.edu/handle/1911/102785 Vile, M. (2016). The true significance of the 2016 US presidential election. openDemocracy. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.opendemocracy. net/en/presidential-­candidates-­2016-­us-­election/

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Wike, R., Stokes, B., Poushter, J., Silver, L., Fetterolf, J., & Devlin, K. (2018). Trump’s international ratings remain low, especially among key allies. Pew Research Center. Retrieved February 7, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps-­international-­ratings-­remain-­low-­ especially-­among-­key-­allies/ World Bank. (2020). Individuals using the internet (% of population). Retrieved February 15, 2022, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT. NET.USER.ZS Zhou, X., Chan, Y.-Y., & Peng, Z.-M. (2008). Deliberativeness of online political discussion. Journalism Studies, 9(5), 759–770. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14616700802207771

CHAPTER 2

Post-Deliberative Public Spheres: Beyond Democratic Deliberation and the Public Sphere Framework

The public sphere concept has been one of the most widely used concepts in communication scholarship in the last few decades with an increased focus on the online realm. As Goldberg (2011) pointed out, there has been “a preoccupation” (p. 739) with the concept in new media research. While many theoretical works discuss the potential for the development of a virtual public sphere, most of the empirical research suggests that while such potential does indeed exist, it is rarely realized and most certainly not by fulfilling all key characteristics formulated in Habermas’s seminal work on the public sphere. In fact, there are wide variations both in the formulation of the key criteria that an ideal public sphere must conform to and the ways in which empirical work “tests” the evidence. Scholars differ in their views as to the extent to which this potential can ever be realized or indeed the extent to which Habermas’s framework should be used as a benchmark as opposed to “an ideal for civic participation and interaction” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 8). This chapter sets the theoretical framework for the book by first offering a critical overview of the main claims put forward in the academic literature about the potential development of a virtual public sphere as well as a range of alternative concepts and frameworks offered by researchers. It advocates a rethinking of the main premises of the democratic deliberative framework and most of its alternatives, which do not appear to move much beyond the key premise of deliberative theory—namely, the usefulness of political talk online mainly as a means of enhancing democracy. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Slavtcheva-Petkova, Discussing Trump’s America Online, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7_2

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Most studies exploring these topics suffer from four main deficiencies, which necessitate a reconsideration of the frameworks they are built upon: (1) They emanate predominantly from the Global North. (2) The majority of countries they cover are democracies. (3) The majority focus on one country and do not offer cross-national comparisons. (4) The majority of studies are based on normative assumptions that are not applicable beyond the established democracies of the Global North. The chapter argues that the deficiencies of current research in online discussions open up avenues for new research and innovative conceptualization, especially in non-democratic contexts. The limitations of the democratic deliberative approach should not preclude us from studying online discussions and comments. As Papacharissi (2002) argued, “Still, people who would never be able to come together to discuss political matters offline are now able to do so online, and that is no small matter’ (p. 23). It is important to study this phenomenon in established democracies but even more important to do that in non-democratic countries or younger democracies where restrictions on free speech are much more common. Moreover, the few available studies from beyond the established democracies of the Global North show that the quality of argumentation can actually be better and that incivility is not such a big issue (e.g., Zhou et al., 2008; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2016).

Democratic Deliberation and the Public Sphere Framework The public sphere concept as formulated by the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas is built upon the premise that citizens’ public deliberation based on reasoned argumentation and outside the control of market and political forces is key to a democracy, because rational public debate leads to the formation of public opinion, which in turn guides politics. As Habermas, Lenox and Lenox (1974) put it, the public sphere mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion, accords with the principle of the public sphere, that principle of public information which once had to be fought for against the arcane politics of monarchies and which since that time has made possible the democratic control of state activities. (p. 50)

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The public sphere, therefore, provides an opportunity for citizens’ direct communication, thus allowing them to “remain plugged into the daily routines of democratic governance and public sphere” rather than becoming distanced, detached or indeed apathetic or cynical to politics (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 114). It is the coming together of private individuals in a public space similar to the English coffee houses and French salons that Habermas originally described in his work. In today’s society, the media serve this role. Habermas acknowledged that the public sphere has undergone a transformation from “the liberal public sphere which originated in the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolution to a media-dominated public sphere in the current era of what he calls ‘welfare state capitalism and mass democracy’” (Kellner, 2014). Deliberation, therefore, is defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers, 2003, p. 309). Stromer-­ Galley (2007) defined deliberation in a similar way—“as a process whereby groups of people, often ordinary citizens, engage in reasoned opinion expression on a social or political issue in an attempt to identify solutions to a common problem and to evaluate those solutions” (p. 3). It is an essential aspect of democracy because it allows a key opportunity for people to inform public debate and ultimately policy-making. The advent of the Internet provided new impetus for the democratic deliberative framework, because cyber-optimists saw in the online space the potential not simply to bring about an expansion of the public sphere but also to remedy a lot of the ills associated with it in terms of equality, elitism, and commercialization. Dahlberg (2001) summed up the high stakes invested in the virtual deliberative ideal: the Internet was seen “as the means for an expansion of the public sphere of rational-critical citizen discourse—discourse autonomous from state and corporate power through which public opinion may be formed that can hold official decision makers accountable” (p.  616). The cyberspace was considered to have the potential to “increase political participation and pave the way for a democratic utopia” and to ultimately halt “the alleged decline of the public sphere lamented by academics, politicos, and several members of the public” and enhance democracy (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 10). As Chen (2017) put it, “people must be part of the decision-making of government if a nation is to be of the people and for the people” (p. 31), because the “open interplay of opinion and policy is the distinguishing mark of popular rule” (Lasswell, 1941, p. 15).

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However, as Habermas (1991) acknowledged himself, the bourgeois public sphere was “a category that is typical of an epoch” and as such “it cannot be abstracted from the unique developmental history of that ‘civil society’ (burgerliche Gesellschnft) originating in the European High Middle Ages; nor can it be transferred, ideal typically generalized, to any number of historical situations that represent formally similar constellations” (p. xvii). Moreover, as Susen (2011) wrote, the assumption that the bourgeois public sphere was representative of “the contemporary world par excellence is both conceptually and empirically reductive. For such a view fails to take into account the fact that modern society contains a multiplicity of simultaneously existing, and often competing, public spheres” (p. 55). This important limitation of his framework rarely gets mentioned in the numerous works attempting to apply the public sphere concept to very different contexts and historical epochs. In their attempts to present neat and systematic explanations of the social world, social scientists often end up desperately trying to find evidence of the key elements of Habermas’s conceptualization only to reach the largely expected conclusion that while there is potential for the development of virtual Habermasian public sphere, this potential is actually not realized (among others, Chen, 2017; Liu & Weber, 2014; del Valle et  al., 2020; Häussler, 2018; Richardson & Stanyer, 2011). As Richardson and Stanyer (2011) put it, “the deliberative democratic potential of online discussion is a long way from the deliberative ideal” (p. 983). What are these key elements, however? This too is a contested issue, because empirical research all too often either does not include a clear outline of the criteria used to evaluate the evidence for the existence of the public sphere or “there are marked variations in the actual public sphere criteria utilized” (Dahlberg, 2004, p. 3), and therefore a general lack of consistency (Graham, 2015). Graham and Witschge (2003) wrote there was a wide gap between theory and empirical research largely due to the complexity and vagueness of the main indicators for evaluation of the public sphere. As Benson (2009) argued, “the term ‘public sphere’ is used more as a rhetorical token than as a way to systematically organize research” (p. 179). The term public, in Habermas’s (1991) view, means “open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs” (Habermas, 1991). In addition to the public aspect, Chen (2017) explained that deliberation included equal opportunities for everyone to participate; the use of evidence— backing up one’s points, and reciprocity—providing an opportunity for alternative viewpoints to be shared, discussed, and taken on board, or put

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simply, “it requires participants to listen and respond to each other” (Graham, 2015). In their empirical investigation of Twitter as a public sphere, Liu and Weber (2014) used four criteria: equality, diversity, reciprocity, and quality, and reached the conclusion that Twitter was not an ideal public sphere for democratic conversations. In Graham and Witschge’s (2003) view, there were four crucial dimensions of the public sphere: active participation by citizens; the availability of discursive spaces for deliberation; mass media serving a two-edged function—as “a transmitter of information and a forum for a ‘critical eye’ on governmental affairs”; and the process of deliberation as a rational-critical debate (p. 175). Steiner et al. (2004) developed a quantitative measure of deliberation, encompassing five dimensions: participation, justification, content of justifications, constructive politics, and respect. By analyzing both Habermas’s earlier work, namely The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and his later works, most notably The Theory of Communicative Action, Dahlberg (2001, 2004) drew up a list of ideal requirements that public discourse must fulfill in order to be classified as a public sphere: thematization and reasoned critique of problematic validity claims; reflexivity; ideal role taking; sincerity; formal and discursive equality; and autonomy from state and corporate power. While Dahlberg’s list is arguably the most systematic attempt to offer a typology of the key features of the public sphere, it also reveals the key deficiency of the Habermasian model. Predictably, any form of online discourse would struggle to live up to these normative conditions, because “these conceptualizations of the public were somewhat idealized” (Papacharissi, 2002, p.  11), and because political life offline similarly would struggle to live up to this idealized view (Dahlberg, 2005). Thus, when del Valle et al. (2020) used an adapted version of Dahlberg’s list, which included the categories of inclusion, discursive equality, reciprocity, justification, reflexivity, empathy, sincerity, plurality, and external impact, their study demonstrated that the tweets by Dutch MPs about other MPs could not be considered “full-fledged deliberative” despite exhibiting “important components of rational-critical debate” (p. 211). Moreover, as pointed out by many of Habermas’s critiques, his original conceptualization failed to account for the structural inequalities that prohibited equal participation in public deliberations, most notably the exclusion of women and people from lower social classes. As Papacharissi (2002) put it, “it is ironic that this pinnacle of democracy was rather undemocratic in its structure throughout the centuries” (p. 11).

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The process of deliberation itself has been defined in different ways by different scholars. According to Graham and Witschge (2003), deliberation works on three levels of understanding: reciprocity (“the taking in (listening, reading) of another’s claim or reason and giving a response to that claim”), reflexivity (“reflecting on another’s claim or reason against one’s own claim or reason”) and empathy (“a process of ‘putting yourself in their shoes’”) (Graham & Witschge, 2003, pp. 176–177). Klinger and Russmann (2015) included five indicators for measuring deliberation quality: statement of reasons, proposals for solutions, respect, doubts, and reciprocity. Reciprocity is a common element of democratic deliberation, but as empirical studies demonstrate, it is difficult to achieve in its ideal form, because while many of the discussions enable opinion-expression, they do not necessarily lead to a high quality of argumentation/conversat ion (Papacharissi, 2010). A key bone of contention is the role that disagreement plays in the process. According to Habermas, consensus was a key condition for deliberation. But as Schudson (1997) pointed out, truly democratic talk was “profoundly uncomfortable” (p. 299), because it was among people from different values and backgrounds. In his view, a degree of incivility might actually be necessary in public deliberations in order to move democratic processes forward, and by extension democracy itself. Lyotard (1984) also questioned Habermas’s claim that consensus was an essential component of the process. Similarly, Papacharissi (2010) spoke of “undue emphasis on consensus as a requirement for a healthy democracy” (p.  118). Gutmann and Thompson (1998) claimed that moral conflict could not be avoided in politics and while disagreement was a key aspect of democratic deliberation, deliberation also offered a way for resolving conflicts or at least recognizing opposing views. However, Chen (2017) reminded us of the cross-pressures hypothesis, “which posits that exposure to disagreement in one’s social group demobilizes people from participating politically,” so rather than increasing societal participation, exposure to opposing views might actually decrease it (p. 37). Nonetheless, this is not always the case, as empirical research has demonstrated over the years. In fact, disagreement and exposure to different views sometimes encourage participation (Chen, 2017). Thus, Häussler’s (2018) study into debates on policy issues in the UK showed that the degree of contentiousness of an issue has “the greatest positive effect on the discursive quality of the public sphere” (p. 8).

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Another related key topic in democratic deliberation research is about the link between incivility and deliberation. This is an important issue to consider, because as Chen (2017) pointed out, “the first casualty of online incivility is the death of the utopian dream of the Internet’s potential to foster an unfettered space for discussion and debate, a virtual version of the public sphere” (p. 62). The majority of studies focusing on incivility reach the conclusion that comments are frequently uncivil and as a result of that, the ideals of democratic deliberation cannot be achieved because incivility precludes deliberation. Santana (2014) used the term “rampant incivility” (p. 18) as a defining characteristic of online discussion boards. However, when civility is operationalized in these studies, it is often defined as politeness (for a summary, see Rossini, 2020). Thus, according to Blom et al. (2014) an uncivil post was “a post that featured a character criticism or offensive language” (p. 1319). Santana’s (2014) operationalization of uncivil comments included: “personal or inflammatory attacks, threats, vulgarities, abusive or foul language, xenophobic or other hateful language or expressions, epithets or ethnic slurs, sentiments that are racist or bigoted, disparaging on the basis of race/ethnicity or that assign stereotypes” (p. 25). Yet, as Papacharissi (2004) pointed out, civility and politeness are actually two different terms and while civility “has always been considered a requirement for democratic discourse” (p. 260), politeness is not. She defined civility not simply “as general politeness and courtesy” (p.  260) but “as collective politeness, with consideration for the democratic consequences of impolite behavior” (p.  267). In her view, it was only when people were being offensive to social groups that their behavior had lasting repercussions on democracy. Being rude or impolite did not necessarily equate to being uncivil. Her operationalization of civility included three items: a threat to democracy, the assigning of stereotypes and a threat against individuals’ rights. Her 2010 empirical study of a few newsgroups actually showed that the majority of online conversation was both civil and polite. Chen (2017) also argued that incivility was not synonymous with rudeness, but it was “part of a larger continuum of aversive speech that both violates what is considered normal in conversation and also has the potential to cause harm” (p. 6). In her operationalization, incivility “includes such attributes as name-calling, insults, and profanity, as well as speech that includes stereotypes, homophobic, racist, and sexist language; and sweeping xenophobic statements” (Chen, 2017, p. 83) but it was on the same spectrum as politeness. Whether something was uncivil/civil or

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polite/impolite was determined by the intensity and frequency of these attributes. A key question she asked was whether deliberation could occur even when there was incivility in a conversation. She offered a conceptual model that aimed at capturing this relationship according to which non-­ normative speech could be placed on a continuum ranging from impoliteness to virulent hate speech: Incivility that can be deliberative would hit the midpoint on this spectrum. I call this midpoint the ‘deliberative moment zone,’ suggesting this type of speech may exhibit deliberative attributes even if it is does not meet all the requirements of public deliberation. This zone is shown as a gray circle on the model. Communication that is too polite or too nasty has no potential for deliberation … Impoliteness is closer to the center and within the zone because it is more uncivil, but it offers potential for deliberation. (p. 84)

When testing her conceptual model with three sets of online comments, Chen (2017) reached the conclusion that comments can indeed be both deliberative and uncivil. In her book, she sought evidence for “deliberative moments” online, if not full-fledged deliberation (Chen, 2017, p. 11). What she looked for in particular in online comments on US-focused topics was whether evidence was used to back up a point and whether commenters were asking “legitimate questions” (Chen, 2017, p. 13), and ultimately whether incivility and deliberation could co-exist. Her results showed that incivility and deliberation could indeed co-exist and that the online space provided the potential for “deliberative moments”—“brief forms of public deliberation, small bites, if you will, that offer some support for the ideals of free debate, inclusiveness of viewpoints, and discussions across difference encompassed by democratic deliberation” (p. 176). Similarly, Freelon (2015) showed that deliberative and liberal individualist characteristics such as insults and lack of reciprocity co-existed in online newspaper comments. Rossini (2020) even argued “that the pervasiveness of incivility is not incompatible with democratically relevant political talk. Instead of focusing on the tone of political talk, scholars interested in understanding the extent to which digital platforms threaten democratic values should focus on expressions of intolerance” (p.  1). In her view, incivility was “a context-dependent feature of discourse that may convey a rude or disrespectful tone, but is not necessarily incompatible with political talk” (Rossini, 2020, p. 6). Uncivil online discourse in her definition is, therefore, “a matter of tone, not substance, of discourse” such as “the use

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of a vulgar word, name-calling, or potentially offensive language that, if removed, would make the same comment “civil” without changing its substance” (p. 6). Intolerant discourse, on the other hand, poses a threat to democracy and in Rossini’s (2020) view is “beyond the scope of incivility” (p. 6). Rossini (2020) built on Gibson’s (2009) definition of intolerance. Gibson (2009) conceptualized intolerance as “the unwillingness to put up with disagreeable ideas and groups.”

Moving Away from Habermas: Key Reasons and Alternative Frameworks What existing research has clearly shown is that anyone looking for Habermas’s ideal version of the public sphere online will reach the exact same conclusion: that “the Internet is at best an emerging public sphere” (Hennen, 2020, p. 68) but most definitely not a complete one if judging by the key criteria. It is time, therefore, to truly move away from a full-­ fledged Habermasian conceptualization and look for alternative theoretical explanations by potentially preserving some of the key elements of his framework, because studies repeatedly find evidence of “deliberative moments” (Chen, 2017, p. 176). Why is it important to do that? Let me reiterate the key reasons why it is fruitless to continue searching for evidence of an ideal, Habermasian-type, of public sphere. 1. Access to computers, electronic devices and the Internet is not equal for everyone—there are gross disparities both within and between nations, and scholars have repeatedly talked about the digital divide. As Papacharissi (2002) pointed out, “the fact that online technologies are only accessible to, and used by, a small fraction of the population contributes to an electronic public sphere that is exclusive, elitist, and far from ideal—not terribly different from the bourgeois public sphere of the 17th and 18th centuries” (p. 14). While there have been marked improvements in the levels of access to the Internet, it still remains the case that large portions of the world’s population have little or no access to the web. 2021 Internet penetration statistics showed that less than two-thirds of the world’s population overall had access to the Internet with Africa being the worst continent in terms of Internet penetration with less than half of the population with access to the Internet (43.2%), while the

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leader was North America with 93.9% Internet penetration rate (Internet World Stats, 2021). Papacharissi’s (2002) conclusion made 20 years ago was still valid: “At the present time, political discussions online are a privilege for those with access to computers and the internet. Those who would benefit the most from the democratizing potential of new technology do not have access to it” (p. 19). Even in countries with high levels of Internet penetration, online discourse was dominated by a few people (Papacharissi, 2002; Eveland et al., 2011). Eveland et al.’s (2011) review of the literature on online political conversation and deliberativeness showed that these conversations “do not closely reflect deliberative ideals” (p. 1084). In fact, some scholars such as Sanders (1997) argued that there was a fundamental flaw with the whole deliberative framework based on rationality and mutual respect. According to her, “Appeals to deliberation … have often been fraught with connotations of rationality, reserve, cautiousness, quietude, community, selflessness and universalism, connotations which in fact probably undermine deliberation’s democratic claims” (p. 348). The condition of mutual respect, Sanders (1997) argued, was less likely to be met by the underrepresented groups in society such as women, ethnic minorities, and poorer people. Fraser (1990) reminded us that “an important strand of feminist political theory has claimed that deliberation can serve as a mask for domination” (p.  64). This is important because when the arguments of the “systematically disadvantaged” are systematically disregarded, then “we should at least reevaluate our assumptions about deliberation’s democratic potential” (Sanders, 1997, p.  349). This is all linked to the wider issue that Brandenburg (2013) raised, namely that technology itself would “not alter the nature of the established Eurocentric and non-­ participatory model of representative democracy” (p.  195). He argued (like others before him) that “the almost uncritically accepted assumption that deliberation and the existence of a functioning public sphere are necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of ‘true’ democracy is entirely unwarranted” (p. 195). 2. The relationships between incivility and deliberation, and reciprocity and deliberation remain contested largely due to the inconsistent operationalization of the terms. As already pointed out, scholars disagree in their views as to whether civility is synonymous with politeness, and whether incivility always hinders deliberation. Further to

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that, there are some who argue that civility and mutual respect are not actually part of Habermas’s original model (Häussler, 2018). In fact, Häussler (2018) claimed that Habermas’s work on civil disobedience as the litmus test for democracy showed that “norms of civility and respect might sometimes (have to) be temporarily suspended” (p. 50). Similarly, there is no clear agreement in the literature on the issue of reciprocity. While scholars tend to accept the view that reciprocity is a key element of deliberation, different studies reach conflicting conclusions on the extent to which reciprocity is a feature of online conversations (for a summary, see Graham, 2015). Graham (2015) provided examples from 19 different papers showing conflicting findings due to the different ways in which reciprocity was conceptualized. His analysis also revealed methodological issues— coding individual messages rather than the thread of discussion, thus limiting the scope of analysis. 3. The Internet provides a space not just for voices enhancing democracy and its quality but also for radical, extreme, right-wing discourses and hate speech as well as flaming. For example, as Hughey (2012) wrote, “the Internet is a space in which otherwise taboo racial rhetoric finds expression” (p. 165), thus providing a platform for disturbing discourses “long marginalized in public spaces” (Loke, 2013, p. 179). There is a huge body of literature on all of these topics and while it is beyond the scope of this book to engage fully with it, it is, nonetheless, important to mention it, because online comments are not neutral or benevolent but they might also have negative repercussions—an important point to bear in mind when evaluating the Internet’s contribution to democracy. As Dutton (2018) put it, “Instead of being seen as a technology that fosters democracy, the internet and related technologies are increasingly identified as posing threats to democratic structures and participation in politics and society” (p.  4). In a study on online comments in the UK, Richardson and Stanyer (2011) described the discussion boards as caustic and “a paradigm example of how not to engage in critical discussion if you were actually interested in attempting to resolve differences of opinion” (p. 995). Furthermore, in some countries the Internet also provides a platform for authoritarian leaders to suppress people’s human rights and remain in power (Linde & Karlsson, 2013). This is particularly applicable in the case of China and Russia—a topic I will come back to later.

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Recognizing that due to this, it is unlikely that we will find evidence of an idealized public sphere would also allow us to move on in our theorization of the online space, especially from a cross-national perspective on a topic of global reach and significance. 4. The focus on deliberation and the “undue emphasis on consensus as a requirement for a healthy democracy” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 118) limit scholars significantly and prevent them from exploring new avenues for research, and for ultimately providing better theoretical explanations about the relationship between the virtual space and democracy. Eveland et al. (2011) claimed that a very large proportion of studies on informal political conversations did indeed use the deliberative framework as their key theory. They argued that this should not be the case because this framing could “lead to unrealistic expectations about the function of political conversation in the lives of individuals, and possibly undue attention to certain aspects of political conversation to the relative exclusion of others” (Eveland et  al., 2011, p.  1086). Fishkin (1995) introduced the notion of “incompleteness” by arguing that it was often the case that a process is evaluated as “less deliberative because it is incomplete in the manner specified” (p. 41). In his view, “a great deal of incompleteness must be tolerated,” and improving deliberation was actually about improving “the completeness of the debate and the public’s engagement in it, not a matter of perfecting it” (p.  41). Rossini (2020) advocated an altogether abandoning of the deliberative framework because “looking for elusive normative ideals” in the form of “an ‘online public sphere’ that fulfills the criteria of ideal discourse is unrealistic” and “prevents scholars from understanding how different forms of expression can contribute to democratic political talk” (p. 4). Predictably, most empirical evaluations of the potential for development of a Habermasian-type virtual public sphere reached rather dire conclusions (e.g., Albrecht, 2006; Blom et  al., 2014; Brandenburg, 2013; Strandberg, 2008; for a summary, see Freelon, 2015). As Albrecht (2006) put it, “much of the optimism in relation to online deliberation as a means to foster democracy is called into question by observations of actual online communication” (p. 69). Freelon (2015) summarized that “the consensus finding” of online deliberation research was “that most popular online forums are not very deliberative” (p. 773). Brandenburg (2013) claimed

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that “online deliberation is a cacophony of detached dialogues, if not monologues, that are not intertwined and that are not leading towards establishing a societal consensus on values and ends as much as means” (p. 196). He strongly argued against the engineering of online deliberation, because in his view, “the core requirement for the functioning of a public sphere is citizenship,” and “in order to effectively engineer an online public sphere, one also has to effectively engineer an online public” (Brandenburg, 2013, p. 196). In Chambers’s (2009) view, the result was a general refocusing of attention from the mass public to mini-publics as well as a differentiation between theories of democratic deliberation and theories of deliberative democracy. The key difference between the two sets of theories was again in the focus with the former focusing “on discrete deliberative initiatives within democracies,” and the latter on “the large questions of how the public or civil society in general relates to the state” (Chambers, 2009, p. 324). If there is no point searching for something that does not exist in its ideal entirety, what are the alternatives? While acknowledging the usefulness of the deliberative democracy framework, Dahlberg (2005) also argued that it only “takes us part of the way in analyzing and understanding political discussion on the Internet, especially if we focus on new, extra-parliamentarian politics” (p. 155). His alternative was complementing the framework with what he called “civic cultures” (p. 155), namely a way of conceptualizing “the factors that can enhance or impede political participation—the enactment of citizenship understood as forms of social agency” (Dahlberg, 2005, p.  157) or in other words, “an analytic construct that seeks to identify the possibilities of people acting in the role of citizens” (p. 158). He clearly acknowledged that while the impact of these developments on democracy in general was not yet clear, “the Internet is at the forefront of the evolving public sphere” (Dahlberg, 2005, p. 160). A few scholars proposed alternatives to the Habermasian public sphere by building on Manuel Castells’s network society framework (e.g., Bruns, 2008; Dean, 2003). Dean (2003) argued that “the notion of the public sphere is not only inapplicable to the Net, but also and more importantly, that it is damaging to practices of democracy under conditions of contemporary technoculture” (p. 95). Her main criticism was linked to the capitalist aspects—the technologies, concentration of corporate power, the financial markets, etc. Her alternative was that of “a political architecture rooted in a notion of networks” (Dean, 2003, p. 95). She used the term neodemocracies instead of public sphere. In Dean’s (2003)

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conceptualization, the web was a zero institution—a placeholder designating institutionality with no normative and empirical claims. Rather than achieving consensus, the goal was contestation. As Dean (2003) put it, “these networks accept that democracy is animated by a split: they thrive on this split, acknowledging the committed endeavors of those engaged in struggle. By focusing on contestation instead of consensus, then, neodemocracy acknowledges the unavoidable antagonisms of political life” (p. 109). Here the aim was not to achieve consensus but for one side to win because “neodemocratic politics are struggles for hegemony” (Dean, 2003, p. 110). Bruns (2008) proposed another alternative—that of networked deliberation. He talked about the decline of the conventional public sphere as a result of the one-to-many mass media’s replacement with “many-to-many, user-led media of the networked age whose systemic features necessitate the development of vastly different models for the mediation of political processes” (Bruns, 2008). In Bruns’s (2008) view, the growing gap between journalists and their audiences has led to the mushrooming of “a wide variety of new, conceptually localised public spheres … focussing on specific topics which are of interest to their particular constituencies of users and participants” and ultimately to the “produsage” of politics. As a whole, this model was one of non-representational democracy—“a kind of opt-in democratic process” whereby everyone can opt-in but the likelihood is that those people with a vested interest in the issues being discussed would be more likely to participate in and dominate the debates. Benkler et al. (2015) offered another alternative, namely that of the networked public sphere, conceptualized as “the range of practices, organizations, and technologies that have emerged from networked communication as an alternative arena for public discourse, political debate, and mobilization alongside, and in interaction with, traditional media” (p. 596). Another strand of research conceptualizes the public sphere and the public in the plural. Fraser (1990) and Kellner (2014) suggested that it was better to theorize a multiplicity of potentially overlapping and/or conflicting public spheres, including of mainstream and excluded groups, rather than one liberal or democratic public sphere. Fraser (1990) argued that “although in stratified societies the ideal of participatory parity is not fully realizable, it is more closely approximated by arrangements that permit contestation among a plurality of competing publics than by a single, comprehensive public sphere” (p. 68). She made a similar argument for egalitarian, multi-cultural societies and overall concluded, “the ideal of

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participatory parity is better achieved by a multiplicity of publics than by a single public” (Fraser, 1990, p.  70). This idea of “a public of publics,” namely a distributive and decentered public sphere (s) was also shared by Bohman (2004, p. 140). Toepfl (2020) further build on this body of work and argued that even in authoritarian societies there are multiple publics, defined as “constellations of participants, environments, and discursive practice” (p. 110). A study into the link between sociodemographic characteristics and the quality of deliberation in Zurich showed that “… the quality of the deliberation was not stratified, but the participation was” (Klinger & Russmann, 2015, p. 482). Other alternatives particularly oriented toward marginalized groups include testimony (Sanders, 1997), and rhetoric, greeting, and storytelling (Young, 2000). Papacharissi (2002) offered a useful way of thinking about the Internet and its role in public discussions and deliberations. She argued that the Internet “provides additional space for political discussion” but “it is still plagued by the inadequacies of our political system,” and because of that it “does not constitute a public sphere” but more of a public space (p. 13) with the main difference between the two being that “a virtual space enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 11). Her conclusion was that the Internet and related technologies have created a new public space for political discussion but this public space: facilitates, but does not ensure, the rejuvenation of a culturally drained public sphere. Cheap, fast, and convenient access to more information does not necessarily render all citizens more informed, or more willing to participate in political discussion. Greater participation in political discussion helps, but does not ensure a healthier democracy. New technologies facilitate greater, but not necessarily more diverse, participation in political discussion since they are still only available to a small fraction of the population. In addition, our diverse and heterogeneous cultural backgrounds make it difficult to recreate a unified public sphere, on or offline. Finally, decreased citizen participation is only one of the many problems facing our current political system. Dependence on special interests and a capitalist mode of production also compromise democratic ideals of equality. (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 22)

After briefly presenting the two main hyperbolic views of the Internet’s role vis-à-vis democracy, Coleman and Blumler (2010) argued that rather than choosing one of these two camps, we should think of the Internet “as an empty space of power which is both vulnerable to state-centric (and, for

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that matter, corporate) strategies and open to occupation by citizens who have few other spaces available for them to express themselves in constructive democratic ways” (p. 9). In their view, the Internet introduced new elements into the relationship between “representatives and represented and governments and governed,” and as such it possesses “vulnerable potential to improve political communication” but that this potential would be wasted without relevant policy interventions, shaping and nurturing those democratic opportunities (Coleman & Blumler, 2010, p. 10). A major flaw identified by scholars is the mismatch between theory and practice. Ryfe (2005) argued that “the theory of deliberative democracy needlessly remains removed from its practice” (p.  64). Thomson (2008) claimed that the approach adopted by empirical researchers on deliberative democracy was to extract isolated passages on the benefits of deliberative democracy from different theoretical writings and then to formulate hypotheses, “find or (more often) artificially create a site in which people talk about politics, and conclude that deliberation does not produce the benefits the theory promised and may even be counterproductive” (pp.  498–499). Mutz (2008) advocated an altogether abandoning of deliberative theory and instead developing “‘middlerange’ theories that are each important, specifiable, and falsifiable parts of deliberative democratic theory” (p. 521). In her view, deliberative theory lacked three key requirements for it to be classified as a productive social theory, namely “1. clearly defined concepts; 2. specification of logical relationships among concepts within the theory; 3. consistency between hypotheses and evidence accumulated to date” (Mutz, 2008, p.  524). She argued that deliberation was defined in different ways by different scholars with major disagreements on issues such as whether consensus was an essential outcome of deliberation, whether deliberation must be public and whether informal conversations among ordinary people qualified. A crucial point that Mutz (2008) made was that studies all too often confused the requirements for deliberation to occur with the desirable outcomes. Thus, the necessary requirements she enlisted were: “accuracy of information in discourse, civility, public (versus private), reflection, group-based, rule-­governed, face-to-face, reason-giving, equality of reason-giving/participation, disagreement with others, interactivity of discourse, link to political action (binding/consultative/none), collective versus individual, and equal-status participants” while the desirable outcomes were: “awareness of oppositional arguments, political tolerance,

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perceptions of legitimacy of opposition, knowledge/information gain/ sophistication, empathy, willingness to compromise, participation/civic engagement, opinion change toward more ‘public-spirited’ view, opinion consistency, faith in democratic processes, political self-efficacy, consensual decision, social capital/feelings of community, social trust, depth of understanding of one’s own positions” (Mutz, 2008, p. 530). Moreover, Mutz (2008) argued against trying to find evidence of all these requirements in one type of public talk because “if the theory retains as much baggage as it currently carries, it risks squandering its ultimate potential” (p.  533). Similarly, Thomson (2008) advocated a separation between three key elements in the analysis of deliberation—conceptual criteria (“what is necessary for a practice to count as deliberation”), evaluative standards (“what counts as good (or better) deliberation”), and empirical conditions (“what is necessary for producing good deliberation (or less strongly, what may contribute to producing good deliberation”) (p. 501). O’Mahony (2021) summed up the key deficiencies of the public sphere framework: The essential problem of Habermas’s theorizing of the public sphere is that the various essential components that he outlines do not add up to a compelling framework, that is to say, one that adequately captures the full implications of the actuality and potentiality—in the right institutional conditions—of public discourse. To a considerable extent, the parts are there: the conception of rational–critical public opinion; the account of communicative reason in itself and its extension beyond an account of truth to an account of rightness; the embedding of communicative reason in a theory of society; and the articulation of a communicative theory of democracy through the related explication of the twin concepts of deliberation and public sphere. But the fragmented manner in which these parts are articulated at different places and times, together with the persisting question of whether Habermas’s orientation is sufficiently radical or critical in a democratic sense to capture the empirically manifested normative challenges of the present, leaves the public sphere concept difficult to employ in normatively informed social research and analysis. (p. 9)

All in all, the above outline of the democratic deliberation framework with the public sphere concept at its heart and a few alternatives emanating from a critical exploration of it demonstrates a few key deficiencies with these approaches. All of them emanate from the Global North and therefore the majority of countries they cover are democracies,

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predominantly the advanced democracies of the “West.” Cross-national comparisons are rare. Yet, as Delli Carpini et al. (2004) pointed out, the democratic potential of deliberation is highly context-dependent. Willse (2005) wrote that many postcolonial, feminist, and psychoanalytic critics of public sphere politics saw them “as expressions of a Western universalizing discourse of liberal modernity. They point to the mechanisms of exclusion (hierarchies of gender, class, race, ethnicity and nationality) on which the public sphere depends and question the underlying assumptions of reason and agency within public sphere discourse.” As a whole, these studies are based on normative assumptions about the value of democracy and it being a golden standard, but these normative assumptions actually preclude any meaningful analysis of the current trends observed in non-­ democratic countries, especially such as China and Russia, which are very clearly not on to a linear path toward democratization. Public sphere theory is indeed: premised upon the distinctive historical experience of modern subjects in the Global North. It is they, and they alone, who have undergone processes of democratization in territorial states that possessed the capacity to solve their problems and meet their needs. It is they, and they alone, who are suffering now from the loss of that capacity. It is they, and they alone, therefore, who could conceivably aspire to create an analogous framework on a broader scale—a transnational democratic framework within which legitimate public opinion can be mobilized across borders to constrain efficacious public power at the global level. Whatever confidence those subjects may have in that possibility cannot be generalized to non-European peoples with little experience of effective state sovereignty and even less basis for trust in global institutions. Public-sphere theory, so the argument goes, is Eurocentric. Instead of scaling it up in the current conjuncture, we should replace it with some other framework, better able to express the emancipatory hopes of postcolonial subjects in the Global South. (Fraser, 2014, p. 144)

Furthermore, Fenton (2018) quite rightly questioned whether public sphere theory, which was so heavily dependent on a liberal democratic frame, could adequately address the current political, democratic, and economic crises. She posed the following question: “Can a concept dependent on a liberal democratic frame that is now so undone really offer a critical perspective suggestive of democratic futures or is it rather holding us back, capturing us in the comfort zones of liberalism offering no more than fake democracy and in the process threatening to hinder critical

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theory’s ability to better imagine emancipatory futures?” (Fenton, 2018, p. 28). Fenton’s (2018) answer is a resounding no. She also asked, “How much longer can we fake democracy in the name of critical theory?” She rightly argued that “we need new theoretical insights capable of addressing the complexities of power in the digital age” (p.  33). Moreover, as Kellner (2014) explained, “the principles of the public sphere involved an open discussion of all issues of general concern in which discursive argumentation was employed to ascertain general interests and the public good. The public sphere thus presupposed freedoms of speech and assembly, a free press, and the right to freely participate in political debate and decision-making.” These freedoms are clearly lacking in countries such as Russia and China so there is not much point in looking for empirical evidence for the existence of a Habermasian type of public sphere in them. Political talk is, nonetheless, occurring in these countries and it should be studied, because as Graham (2015) pointed out, not all political talk, especially informal political talk, was aimed at decision-making or political action but that did not mean that it was meaningless, because it could lead to other benefits such as increasing levels of political knowledge and civic engagement—important both in democratic and in non-democratic countries. Freelon (2015) also explained that in addition to deliberation, there were other standards of political behavior that might be more prevalent online such as communitarianism, namely “collaborating with like-minded others to advance ideologically specific goals and disengaging with outsiders; and liberal individualism, or the single-minded pursuit of uninhibited self-expression, usually at the expense of civility and responsiveness” (p. 774). Furthermore, the web provides the space that enables “people who would never be able to come together to discuss political matters offline are now able to do so online, and that is no small matter” (Papacharissi, 2002, p.  23). Eveland et  al.’s (2011) review also showed that although online conversations did not meet the deliberation criteria, there was “evidence that the Internet may be a space in which those who do not otherwise discuss politics can feel more comfortable participating in political conversations than in face-to-face settings” (p. 1084). All this clearly indicates that there should be a rethinking of the theoretical frameworks aimed at explaining online political talk and this is where the main contribution of this study lies. Due to its qualitative, open-ended nature, and while retaining some key elements of existing frameworks, the methodological approach would allow us to analyze the data via a bottom-up, grounded theory approach. Adopting an open-ended approach to the

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study of online political talk is important, because as Papacharissi (2002) wrote over 20 years ago, “the internet may actually enhance the public sphere, but it does so in a way that is not comparable to our past experiences of public discourse. Perhaps the internet will not become the new public sphere, but something radically different. This will enhance democracy and dialogue, but not in a way that we would expect it to, or in a way that we have experienced in the past” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 14). We cannot, therefore, use frameworks emanating from a particular historical context to unpack a radically different phenomenon because that significantly limits our conceptual apparatus. Greater participation in political discussion is indeed “not the sole determinant of democracy. The content, diversity, and impact of political discussion need to be considered carefully before we conclude whether online discourse enhances democracy” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 14).

Conceptualizing Online Discussions Beyond the Established Democracies of the Global North Why is it important to study online discussions beyond the established democracies of the Global North and what might we expect? Is there a conceptualization that allows us equally well to explain the nature of online conversations in democratic and non-democratic countries? Central to the democratic deliberative framework is the role that deliberation should and could play in a democratic society. As Chambers (2003) clarified, deliberative democracy was not a substitute or an alternative to representative democracy but it was rather “an expansion” of it (p. 308). A key premise, of course, is the focus on democratic societies. How about the so-called managed democracies like Russia or authoritarian societies like China? What role could deliberation play there and is there a role for it at all? Some of the arguments frequently used when discussing the importance of online deliberation for the future of democracy are similarly used in non-democratic countries but in a slightly modified way—rather than as a way of enhancing democracy or a key component of it, the virtual public sphere is seen as a potential tool for democratizing authoritarian societies by giving citizens a voice to openly express their views and even hold the powerful to account. Habermas (2006) himself argued, that the Internet would have “unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try

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to control and repress public opinion” (p.  423). Similarly, Linde and Karlsson (2013) saw e-government and e-participation as a potentially “important factor in improving the overall quality of government in non-­ democratic political regimes” (p.  270). They discussed a peculiar trend from the UN 2010 e-participation index, namely that “the most rapid developments in the construction of online environments that offer citizens the opportunity to take part in political processes seem to take place in authoritarian countries” (Linde & Karlsson, 2013, p. 269). Thus, non-­ democratic countries such as Bahrain, Kazakhstan, and Malaysia even ended up in the top 20 on the e-participation index. The conclusion reached was that “the overall distance between advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes in digital terms has decreased substantially, suggesting that the gap of the global ‘digital divide’ … has been decreasing in recent years” (Linde & Karlsson, 2013, p. 269). However, these trends might be misleading if we do not properly account for the relevant contextual factors. As Linde and Karlsson (2013) reminded us, “hybrid regimes seek so uphold an image of democratic legitimacy to the international community” (p. 271), which explains why “the opportunities and channels for participation cannot be too restricted” (p. 271). At the same time, the rulers cannot risk participation and activism reach levels that may constitute a threat to the regime’s hold on power. So, although the Internet and e-participation may have some liberalizing or democratizing effects in non-democratic regimes, democracy is most likely not the conceptual basis of government supervised e-participation initiatives. (Linde & Karlsson, 2013, p. 271)

They also pointed out that the Internet was frequently used for propaganda and surveillance purposes, but censorship could not be as easily applied as in relation to traditional media so the Internet did indeed provide a platform for dissenting voices. It is very important to bear these key points in mind when analyzing comments in the Russian and Chinese Internet spaces. Furthermore, a main reason why Habermas failed to offer a more widely applicable and indeed realistic as opposed to idealistic conceptualization was because he did not “examine other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois, competing public spheres. Or rather, it is precisely because he fails to examine these other public spheres that he ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere” (Fraser, 1990, pp. 60–61). As already pointed out, Marxists

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and feminists further criticized his framework for not accounting for the role of social structures and stratification more widely. As Chebankova (2011) put it, “societies are stratified, and the single public space is incompatible with pluralistic aspirations of post-modern democracies” and instead a nested public sphere or multiple public spheres offer more opportunities for participation (Chebankova, 2011, p. 319). Chebankova (2011) argued that this was especially the case in Russia. She explained that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia endorsed a Western institutional structure and initially began a Western-style development but the peculiarities of its own context, geopolitics, and history actually exacerbated some of the structural problems. As Chebankova (2011) pointed out, “while in the West many of the trends discussed above evolve independently, or with the help of natural market forces, in Russia the state plays a prominent role and directs them. The public sphere therefore becomes instrumental in creating a certain climate of public opinion, establishing ‘appropriate’ behavioral patterns, and influencing people’s preferences” (p. 321). As a result, the Russian public sphere in her view was very monolithic, dominated by the hegemonic state, bureaucratic elites and the upper classes. She also reminded us of Charles Taylor’s (1995) thesis of fabricated pluralism—the illusion created in authoritarian and transitional countries that a genuine public sphere existed so that a misleading impression was created of a functioning democracy. I will further discuss the Russian context in Chap. 3 but given that this study focuses on a cross-national comparison of online discussions about a global figure such as the US President and a global power such as the USA, then should we consider the potential for development of a transnational/global public sphere, given all these contextual peculiarities and the general deficiencies in the public sphere framework more widely? As Cammaerts and Van Audenhove (2005) wrote, “the assumption is often made that the Internet facilitates new forms of interactive engagement by (global) citizens, such as public forums and discussion mailing lists, allowing for a transnational public sphere to thrive” (p. 186). Similarly, Castells (2008) wrote that the public sphere “shifted from the national to the global and is increasingly constructed around global communication networks” (p.  78). Bohman (2004) explained that a transnational public sphere was “created when at least two culturally-rooted public spheres begin to overlap and intersect” (p. 310). According to Hennen (2020), in recent years there has been an emergence of transnational public spheres

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from below, rather than from above through mass media. When considering the potential for a development of a transnational public sphere, Fraser (2007) argued that it was difficult to associate the two essential elements of the public sphere concept, namely normative legitimacy and political efficacy, with the idea of transnational public spheres. As she explained, “It is difficult to associate the notion of legitimate public opinion with communicative arenas in which the interlocutors are not fellow members of a political community, with equal rights to participate in political life. And it is hard to associate the notion of efficacious communicative power with discursive spaces that do not correlate with sovereign states” (p. 8). The greatest difficulty rests with the fact that “the public sphere theory has been implicitly informed by a Westphalian political imaginary: it has tacitly assumed the frame of a bounded political community with its own territorial state” (Fraser, 2007, p. 8). However, Fraser’s analysis showed that a rethinking of the concept allowed for its application in a transnational post-Westphalian context. Thus, public opinion could be considered legitimate if “it results from a communicative process in which all potentially affected can participate as peers, regardless of political citizenship” (Fraser, 2007, p. 22). However, the second condition was more difficult to achieve because it required the construction of new, transnational powers with the capacity to solve transnational problems that the public would address. As Cammaerts and Van Audenhove (2005) pointed out, “the notion of an emerging transnational public sphere is highly problematic” (p.  195), because while the issues addressed might be transnational, the participants themselves are located in particular national contexts, and their discussions are restrained by language and other context-specific barriers. Critics of Fraser’s transnational public sphere conceptualization also emphasized its narrow positioning within a Global North liberal democracies-dominated landscape. Conway and Singh (2009) argued that it reflected “the very particular experience of a small number of Western societies, and failed to grapple with the imperial underside of either phase … In other words, both the Westphalian and post-Westphalian institutions of our world have, for many, served as little other than the instruments of their own exploitation and domination” (p. 78). They even made the very strong but pertinent claim that “the creation of new global mechanisms and political institutions of the sort imagined by Fraser would likely signal the expansion of modes of domination, subalternization, exploitation and impoverishment of the world’s majority” (Conway & Singh, 2009, p. 78). Building

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on Gitlin (1998), they instead proposed a different terminology—“that of transnational sphericules … that interact and converge, but also fragment and diverge” (p. 194). While recognizing the deficiencies in the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, including on a transnational scale, Loader (2014) described a positive recent trend of increasing involvement of young people in online discussions but not of a deliberative nature. He argued that rather than trying to mend them or reform them, young people were actually circumventing “broken democracies” (Loader, 2014, p. 3). Loader (2014) wrote: Instead of being confined by the regulatory regimes of exclusive national public spheres, the potential strength of the networked young citizen is their capacity to challenge the discourses of the most powerful social groups, who increasingly derive their power from global networks. By questioning and disrupting these everyday dominant narratives through the creative use of a repertoire of media including text, video, and images, the networked young citizen is thereby able to contribute to the generation of alternative public opinion. Rather than deliberative, it is better understood as a ‘discursive’ form of democratic engagement. (p. 3)

It is, therefore, important to bear this distinction in mind when considering the key differences and similarities in the nature and content of the online discussions about Trump and the USA across three very different nations. This would allow us to consider the extent to which we can actually talk about a post-Westphalian context and indeed of networked post-­ Westphalian digital citizens. In her subsequent work on the subject of transnational public spheres and in response to her critics, Fraser (2014) made a key point of high relevance to this study. While recognizing that the basic preconditions of democratic publicity are unfulfilled, she also referred to the USA as “a declining global hegemon,” dictating “the basic terms under which we live” (p. 130). She then went on to argue such a force of domination could not be “brought to account by even the most vigilant national publics,” but transnational public spheres could do a much better job in that respect. However, the criteria they had to fulfill to be classified as transnational public spheres remained as idealistic as before as well as the wishful thinking that relevant transnational public institutions would enforce public opinion. These key aspects look as unlikely to be realized in 2023 as they were at the time Fraser published her work. Fraser (2014) recognized this issue herself and talked about a widening

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gap between public sphere theory and practice, which she yet again blamed on the Westphalian frame of political theory than the public sphere notion belonged to. Schlesinger reminded us that the search for a transnational public sphere was mainly confined to the European Union—a direction of travel set to a very large extent by Habermas himself. Efforts to find evidence of a robust European public sphere, however, have largely been futile (for a summary, see Auel & Tiemann, 2020; Hennen, 2020; Monza & Anduiza, 2016). In fact, those studies have reached very similar conclusions to most studies on the virtual public sphere—while there is potential, it is not really realized especially in the idealized Habermasian version of the public sphere. As Auel and Tiemann’s (2020) review showed, “the concept of a European public sphere defined as a single and unified public space spanning the whole of the EU was rejected in the academic literature rather early on as an unreachable ideal or utopia. Instead, and in part drawing on Habermas’s re-conceptualisation of the public sphere as constituted by different interconnected arenas of public communication, the focus turned to the concept of national, but connected and Europeanised, public spheres” (p. 37). Similarly, research on the potential for development of a transnational/global public sphere (Fraser, 2007; Loader, 2014) has been largely speculative with very few empirical studies that did not reach particularly optimistic conclusions in relation to current trends (e.g., Brownell, 2012; Conway & Singh, 2009).

Post-Deliberative Public Sphere(s) In light of all these developments and in response to recent societal changes, scholars coined new terms such as “disrupted public spheres” (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p.  243) and “post-public sphere” (Schlesinger, 2020, p. 1545). Even though they enlisted the changes that have necessitated the reconceptualization of key terms and theories in political communication, they did not really conceptualize these new terms. Schlesinger (2020) used the term post-public sphere to vaguely reflect “the present, unsettled state of play: it signals a transition to an unknown destination” (p.  1557). However, I would argue that it is not yet time to fully abandon the term public sphere. As Fraser (2014) pointed out, public sphere theory has a rich history and is likely to be used in the future because of its central idea, namely “that ordinary people are not just objects of the designs of the

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great, but political subjects; that they deserve a decisive say in the matters that concern them in common; that they have the capacity to mobilize communicative power both as a means to effect change and as an end in itself” (p.  155). Yet, as all empirical studies demonstrate, the notion has never been applicable in its entirety in its Habermasian sense, both on a national and on a transnational level, let alone in the context of virtual political discussions in the form of online comments. As any idealized normative framework, it has a lot to offer more in an aspirational than in an explanatory way, and there are key elements to it that show the potential value of some of its features. Habermas himself, however, never presented his framework as reality but rather as a norm that societies should aspire to. A potential outcome of this aspirational process is “its contributive value of advancing people to become a public” (Pernaa, 2017, p. 12). Therefore, while we should not devote yet another study to a fruitless treasure hunt in search of a treasure that does not exist, it is nonetheless important to build upon the work of the numerous scholars in the field who have meticulously studied online political talk underpinned by the belief in the value of the public sphere. The term “public sphere” should not be abandoned altogether because it has its rich history and normative, even ideological, value but it should be used in the plural as a placeholder for spaces for open discussions among members of different publics that have the capacity to contribute to politics and policy-­making. In order to recognize the fact that these public spheres are not and are unlikely to ever be fully and truly deliberative, a more suitable term is post-deliberative public sphere(s). This is precisely the kind of public sphere that I expect to find in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia. Post-deliberative public spheres are versatile and context-dependent but they fulfil a very similar function in different societies—to provide a space for public discussions on issues of political nature.

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CHAPTER 3

Studying Global Online Discussions: A Grounded Theory Approach

After unpacking the main claims made in studies about online comments and the virtual public sphere in Chap. 2, it is now time to turn to the methodological approach used in this book. As already indicated, while building upon key concepts and measures as used by public sphere scholars, this study adopts a bottom-up grounded theory approach. Rather than trying to force an existing theoretical framework on the rich data emanating from three very different and fascinating contexts, it includes qualitative thematic analysis coupled with quantitative content analysis of over 2200 comments about Trump and the USA, posted in China, Mexico, and Russia since Trump’s election in 2016. This monograph offers an investigation into the quality of argumentation, the levels of engagement among users and the degree of incivility of the comments through quantitative content analysis, but it also includes an entirely open-­ ended qualitative thematic analysis of the themes and patterns of discussions in the comments. The sample consists of the top news sites in the three countries that offer the opportunity for commenting and from which the comments could be retrieved for the full time period under investigation. The chapter presents and justifies the steps taken in terms of sampling and methodological procedures by focusing on thematic analysis and the constant comparison method. The sample is designed in such a way as to make the comments comparable across countries but there are inevitable contextual peculiarities of the

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countries the study focuses on, which are further explored in this chapter. The main reason for selecting them is their turbulent relationship with Trump and the USA and the differing role that the Internet plays in them. The Internet plays an important role in all three countries, which provide opportunities for citizens to express their views online, albeit with varying degrees of freedom of expression. China is the most heavily censored. The Chinese Internet has been subjected to the largest and perhaps most sophisticated censorship strategy in the world, including the great firewall blocking most Western websites such as news media websites and social media platforms. China also frequently launches hacking attacks on foreign servers and websites. Yet, despite the heavy censorship, as deLisle et  al. (2016) pointed out, “the Internet and especially social media have become pervasive and transformative forces in contemporary China” (p. 1). Russia, on the other hand, while not a fully authoritarian country but actually labeled by some scholars as a managed democracy boasts a subtler system of restricting the potential for free speech online. The Russian language Internet (Runet) is not as heavily censored as in China but it has also played an ambivalent role in home and world politics. The Kremlin has allegedly been investing in paid trolls (Sindelar, 2014) but commentators have also praised Runet’s powerful role as a catalyst for change (Suslov, 2017) The war in Ukraine led to a much higher level of restrictions of freedom of expression, effectively removing the potential for any critical media coverage and forcing all opposition media on and offline to put a halt to their operations under the threat of prison sentences. Mexico is a young democracy with the freest Internet out of the three countries, significantly understudied in the context of online political talk. The scarce evidence available in English suggests that online propaganda and disinformation have been rife, especially during the 2018 election campaign. The generally high levels of violence against journalists also inhibit Internet freedom. While focusing on online commentators’ reactions to Trump and the USA, the book actually offers an in-depth study into cross-national audiences’ views of a global event—the 2016 US Presidential elections and a global figure— the US President. The chapter concludes by explaining the importance of conducting cross-national research on these topics and outlining the potential contributions in this area of study. The main research question this study aims to answer is: What is the nature of online political discussions about a global personality such as Donald Trump and a global power such as the USA? The sub-questions can be split into two main categories: (1) Deductive questions (Questions 1–4) emanating from previous research on online political talk, addressed

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by both methods—thematic and content analysis. (2) Inductive, open-­ ended questions (Questions 5–8), exclusively addressed by the grounded theory approach via the thematic analysis. 1. What is the quality of argumentation in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? 2. What is the level of engagement among online posters in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? 3. To what extent are the comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia civil? 4. Are there any significant implications for the nature of political talk arising from questions 1–3? 5. What are the key themes in the online discussions about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? 6. What views do online commentators express of Trump and his electoral victory? 7. To what extent and how do online commentators’ views of Trump and the USA change as a result of the changes in the relationship between Trump and the respective country? 8. How can the patterns of discussion about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia be conceptualized?

Grounded Theory and Methods As Chap. 2 demonstrated, while a common approach in the social sciences and beyond, testing an existing theory poses a significant limitation: it limits researchers’ scope to contribute to knowledge and society especially when the empirical data actually suggest that the theory in question does not provide a plausible explanation for the observed practice. This is precisely the case with the deliberative democratic and public sphere framework as originally formulated by Habermas. What to do then? There are two options: either to refute the theory altogether or to attempt to revise it. Both approaches have limited value for the purposes of the current study. There is not much point in using new and rich empirical data to refute a theory that has already been refuted in its entirety multiple times (Chap. 2). There is very little value as well in trying to force an already refuted theory, albeit with useful elements in it, on yet another set of contexts, but it still makes sense, nonetheless, to utilize those useful elements, thus building on the work of other scholars before us. What a grounded theory approach offers is a third option—to construct theory from the

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data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2014). As Charmaz (2014) explained, it “begins with inductive data, invokes iterative strategies of going back and forth between data and analysis, uses comparative methods, and keeps you interacting and involved with your data and emerging analysis” (p.  1). This approach allows researchers much more flexibility due to its open-ended nature. This is a major benefit particularly in the context of the current study—because if what people are doing online when discussing politics is not democratic deliberation, then what is it? A grounded theory approach would allow us to answer this question without pre-empting the answer in the way that starting off with a list of ideal criteria would do without actually fully, if at all, explaining the observed practices. Does using grounded theory mean that we are completely disregarding the efforts of other researchers before us on related topics? No, it does not. Why reinvent the wheel if researchers have already struggled with these questions, albeit perhaps in different contexts and with different case studies, but there have been some advances made in the conceptualization process? Chapter 2 already outlined the necessity for preserving some elements of the democratic deliberative framework since evidence of them is found in existing studies (e.g., “deliberative moments”) or because the evidence on the link between certain elements and deliberation in existing research is inconclusive (e.g., on the link between civility and deliberation). This study, therefore, both builds on existing research and uses a grounded theory approach, thus adopting a very similar approach to what I did in a previous project (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2016a, 2016b). However, this book significantly expands the scope beyond one national context and topic of national significance to a multinational context by focusing on a cross-national comparison (China, Mexico, Russia) and a topic and personality of global significance (the USA and Trump). This is achieved by combining two very flexible methods—quantitative content analysis with a qualitative grounded theory method, namely thematic analysis via the constant comparison method. All comments in the sample are analyzed in both ways. What are the benefits these two methods offer and what practical steps are taken in the process? Thematic analysis is a widely used and very flexible foundational method of qualitative analysis that allows researchers the freedom to indeed analyze the data in an open-ended way from the bottom up without facing any theoretical restrictions (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is “a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes)

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within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). As Braun and Clarke (2006) explained, the method is “essentially independent of theory and epistemology, and can be applied across a range of theoretical and epistemological approaches” (p.  78). Similarly, content analysis is one of the most widely used methods of textual analysis in media and journalism studies. It too is not necessarily tied to a particular theoretical or epistemological approach and is frequently combined with other methods. It is “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). It provides the opportunity for systematic description of the salient and manifest features of texts (Deacon et al., 2007). The flexibility of these two methods as well as the potential they offer in combination make them a perfect fit. The thematic analysis allowed us to analyze the data in an open-ended way with a view of constructing grounded theory, while the content analysis provided the opportunity to establish to what extent previously identified features of political talk were present in the sample. Both methods include the process of coding but in the case of thematic analysis in an inductive way while in the case of content analysis in a deductive way. The content analysis followed a conventional process of designing a codebook on the basis of previous research, refining it via a pilot study initially with Russian comments, and then adapting the codebook used for the Russian part of the study to the respective national contexts (e.g., the main events in the relationship between the two countries; main actors, etc.). Three research assistants retrieved and coded the samples, and I recoded a selection of the comments. The intercoder reliability scores are within the acceptable limits. Additional information on the intercoder reliability scores as well as the measures used is available in the measures’ section. With regard to the thematic analysis, as Charmaz (2014) explained, grounded theorists use qualitative coding—by attaching labels “to segments of data that depict what each segment is about” (p. 4), thus raising analytical questions about the data from the very beginning. It usually involves initial and then focused coding. The process adopted in this study follows the six steps as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). The overall aim was constructing theory. “A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82). The key here is therefore not in terms of theme prevalence but in relation to the research question. The six phases of analysis, which work in a recursive as opposed to a linear way, are

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1. Familiarizing yourself with your data: transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas. 2. Generating initial codes: coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. 3. Searching for themes: collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme. 4. Reviewing themes: checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic “map” of the analysis. 5. Defining and naming themes: ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme. 6. Producing the report: the final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 87). The constant comparison method (Glaser, 1965; Dye et al., 2000) is used throughout the analysis, thus blending the grounded theory approach with the thematic analysis method, and enabling a closer inspection of the data. The four stages of the constant comparison method are closely aligned with the phases of the thematic analysis and the aim of constructing theory. They are (1) “Comparing incidents applicable to each category” (in this case each theme). (2) “Integrating categories and their properties.” (3) “Delimiting the theory,” and (4) “Writing the theory” (Glaser, 1965, p. 439). The themes I arrived at after following these steps are not mutually exclusive. Although theme prevalence was one of the factors that informed my decision as to whether to explore the significance of a certain theme, I decided against presenting the results of the qualitative analysis in a quantitative way, because while important, prevalence does not equate significance. As Braun and Clarke (2006) explained, “a theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” but “more instances do not necessarily mean the theme itself is more crucial. As this is qualitative analysis, there is no hard-­ and-­fast answer to the question of what proportion of your data set needs to display evidence of the theme for it to be considered a theme” (p. 82).

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Sampling and Measures The method of sampling is theoretical sampling with the aim of achieving theoretical saturation. This sampling approach is at the heart of grounded theory and the constant comparison method. Hood (2007) argued that “without constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling, and theoretical saturation of categories, we have lost the power of the method” (p. 152). Theoretical sampling is based on decisions made throughout the data analysis process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hood, 2007). In this particular case, the data collection started in 2016 and was completed in 2020. Initially, comments from the Russian Internet were collected and analyzed, and then a decision was reached that theoretical saturation has not been achieved, so further comments were collected and analyzed over the course of the next few years. That then informed the data collection process for Mexico and the USA for comparative purposes. Theoretical sampling guided both the selection of websites and the selection of topics. The idea was to use similar criteria across the three countries to achieve comparability. The comments were selected in the following way. The period of investigation was from Trump’s election victory on November 8, 2016, until July 2020  in order to be able to observe both the initial reactions to Trump’s victory in the three countries under study and the changes in public perceptions of Trump and the USA in the course of his presidency. The sample selected for the study included the comments posted under articles published on the most visited news websites in China, Russia, and Mexico that allowed the opportunity for comments. Initially, in all three countries alexa.com was used to identify the ten top news websites. The next step was to then check whether these top news websites offered the opportunity for comments during the time period of investigation and if they did, whether comments about the selected key events in each country could still be retrieved. Subsequently, the websites that fitted these criteria were included in the sample. This was a fairly straightforward process in the Russian and the Mexican cases. The Mexican sample included five websites—https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/, https://elpais.com, https://www.excelsior.com.mx/, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/, and https://www.milenio.com/. The sample included the Spanish newspaper El Pais with an online edition in Mexico, because alexa.com showed that it was among the top ten most popular news websites in the country at the time of data retrieval. The Russian sample included seven

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websites—https://ria.ru/, http://www.mk.ru/, https://www.gazeta. ru/, https://news.rambler.ru/, https://www.kp.ru/, https://www. vedomosti.ru/, and https://www.kommersant.ru/. Alexa.com did not provide sufficient or indeed reliable information about the top news websites in China; so, another source of information about the top news providers—Qimai Statistics—was used there instead. Qimai is a Chinese professional mobile application data analysis platform. According to alexa.com, there were only 2 news websites in the top 20 list of websites. However, both of these—Xinhuanet.com and China.com. cn—did not provide the opportunity for comments. Many mainstream Chinese news websites, especially state-owned ones such as xinhuawang (新华网, xinhuanet.com), cankaoxiaoxi (参考消息, cankaoxiaoxi.com), yangshiwang (央视网, news.cctv.com), do not offer online commenting services. Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), a non-state-owned news platform, was selected as the data source due to two main reasons. First, it offered commenting services. It had both a web platform and a mobile phone app. The mobile app ranked top in the category of news apps according to Qimai Statistics (https://www.qimai.cn/rank/index/brand/all/ genre/6009/device/iphone/country/cn). This is important because many Chinese Internet users prefer using mobile phones to reach the news. According to China Internet Network Information Centre, up to June 2019, there were 685.87 million online news users or 80.3% of China’s total netizen population. Among them, the number of mobile news users had reached 600.2 million, accounting for 78% of mobile Internet users. Second, it worked as a news aggregator. A large number of professional news content producers, including state-owned news outlets, and non-state-owned news agencies or individuals have registered their official accounts on Jinri Toutiao to reach a wider audience. Therefore, news reports of selected key events could be found on it. In sum, Jinri Toutiao provided a wide range of news reports and enjoyed a large user base. Jinri Toutiao was founded in 2012 by its parent company ByteDance, a Chinese multinational Internet technology company headquartered in Beijing. This emerging Internet giant owned a range of mobile apps, including Jinri Toutiao, TikTok, Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok), Helo (an Indian social media app), Babe (an Indonesian news and content app), and Huoshan (a Chinese short-form video app). According to the self-introduction of Jinri Toutiao (https://www.toutiao.com/about/), as of December 2019, more than 180 million content producers have registered on its platform, publishing 600 thousand pieces of news per day on

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average. Also, according to QuestMobile (a business intelligence service provider specialized in China’s mobile Internet market), as of June 2019, Jinri Toutiao has 260 million monthly active users and 120 million daily active users. The comments included in the sample were published under articles produced by as many as nine different news organizations—我在 现场 (I’m On Site), 东方IC (Oriental IC), 环球时报 (Global Times), 央 视新闻 (CCTV News), 新华网客户端 (Xinhua News), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), 中国日报网 (China Daily), 壹易财经 (Yiyi Finance), and 北京日报 (Beijing Daily). The events to be studied as part of the project were selected in the following way. The guiding idea was to select both events that were of global significance and would allow for comparability among the three countries selected such as Trump’s election victory, inauguration, and first impeachment trial, and ones that were directly related to the respective country’s relationship with Trump and the USA such as ramifications arising from Russia’s alleged meddling in the US elections, Trump wall, and the US–China trade war. For each country, the immediate reactions to Trump’s election victory were used as the first event. A timeline with the most important events in the relationship between each country and the USA was then drawn for the period November 2016–June 2020, and the most prominent events/ongoing developments were selected for each country with a strict limited time frame for each of the events. Given the predominantly qualitative nature of the study and the grounded theory approach adopted, the selection of events was not set in stone but changed in the course of coding and analysis. While for comparability purposes both across countries and across time, the first event, namely Trump’s election victory stayed the same, the selection of subsequent events was an ongoing process. The Russian sampling started off rather ambitiously whereby a timeline of as many as eight different events/developments was included but the number was subsequently reduced to five: (1) Trump’s election victory in November 2016. (2) Trump security adviser Michael Flynn’s resignation in February 2017 after leaks suggesting he tried to cover up Russia talks. (3) FBI Director James Comey’s dismissal in May 2017. (4) Trump’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak in May 2017. (5) Trump’s first impeachment trial in January 2020. The number of events in Russia had to be reduced from the original list of eight because of the similarity of the events and their little analytical value if far too many were to be covered. The initial quantitative coding was conducted in 2017 while the additional

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collection of data and quantitative coding took place in 2020. After learning from the experience with the Russian comments, it was decided that the number of topics included in the Chinese and the Mexican samples would be fewer than in the Russian case. In the case of China, they were limited to two: (1) Trump’s election victory and (2) The trade war between China and the USA and the run-up to it. In terms of the second key event, the time frame to select related news reports was set from March 22, 2018, when Trump signed a memorandum imposing trade sanctions on China until June 2020 when the data collection period ended. There were numerous news reports about the trade war, so only those that received at least 100 online comments were chosen. The aim was to cover key points in the trade war, while focusing on the comments under articles that had caught the interest of the commenters the most. In the case of Mexico, four events were selected: (1) Trump’s election victory in November 2016. (2) Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. (3) Trump wall— Trump’s signing of Executive Order 13767 for a wall to be built along the Mexico-United States border in January 2017 and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s decision to cancel his trip to the USA as a result of that. (4) Trump’s first impeachment trial in January 2020. The selection, retrieval of data and subsequent quantitative coding for Mexico and China took place in 2020. Once an event was included in the sample, all articles fitting the criteria were initially selected and then further narrowed down to the ones that were the most popular in terms of page visits, number of likes/comments/ reposts, etc. If the selected articles then had more than 100 comments (which was mainly the case in China), only the first 50 comments were analyzed, because this was considered enough for the purposes of reaching theoretical saturation. This approach was initially tested in a pilot study about Russia. Given the qualitative nature of the study and the need for in-depth thematic analysis of the comments, at the pilot study stage it was concluded that ca. 600–700 comments per country would allow us to achieve theoretical saturation, while also being able to keep a close eye on the relationship between the different contextual factors. This was not a number randomly arrived at but it was the actual number of comments that the Russian coder retrieved and analyzed after following the inclusion criteria. All comments downloaded and analyzed were publicly available. Extracts from the comments are used during the presentation of findings. Finally, many of the major media web pages in Russia and Mexico only offered limited feedback opportunity via the Facebook widget, which

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often limited the comments storage time to a  few months (Mexico) or weeks (Russia), while even those with dedicated forum servers might not store part or all of the data (feedback on comments, likes/dislikes, original views, personal account details are just a few of the frequently missing details)—which is the main reason why many popular websites are not represented in the study sample. Widgets are also prone to losing like/dislike data very soon or not storing them at all. For the Mexican and Russian samples, once the sources were identified, the research assistants used the internal counters of the sources (first by number of page visits, number of likes/comments/reposts, then by position of the article in internal/external search by key words) for ranking of each news page among comparable news pieces in order to identify the most popular and relevant piece of news within our list of sources. The comments to those news articles were then copied in full for further analysis. For Trump’s election victory, all the comments that could be found published by the top ten sources within a week of the event were coded. Similarly, in China all comments on the platform about Trump’s election victory were coded. Measures Given the predominantly qualitative nature of the study and the grounded theory approach, the quantitative measures were limited in scope and aim. The quantitative content analysis served one main aim, namely by building on previous research, to address the deductive research questions on the quality of argumentation, the levels of engagement and the incivility of the comments. Additional categories were also devoted to the way in which the commenters described Trump, the USA, their country, and President with the aim of aiding the thematic analysis. All these aspects were then subjected to more thorough in-depth analysis during the qualitative coding phases. As pointed out in Chap. 2, different studies measured deliberation in public discourse in different ways but in essence, they were looking for very similar traits albeit in varying degrees of breadth and depth. Given that it is clear that we are not going to find all the key features of deliberation in this study nor are we looking for a comprehensive examination of a process we know does not exist in its ideal entirety, I decided to focus on three key aspects, which more or less capture the essence of the deliberative thesis made in previous academic studies: (1) the quality of argumentation,  including reasoning, e.g., justifying one’s position, providing

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reasons/evidence and reciprocity, e.g., asking and responding to questions/remarks, acknowledging other people’s views/positions; (2) The levels of engagement with other commenters, with the topic of the news article and with the news outlet and/or author of the article; (3) The extent to which the comments exhibit features of incivility. All three elements are intrinsically linked. Here I have split them into separate categories so that the different elements can be more easily coded and analyzed. I will briefly outline a few of the key points that in addition to the main issues discussed in Chap. 2 have informed my analysis and my decision to focus on these three aspects. With regard to argumentation, Richardson and Stanyer (2011) provided a good practical framework for analyzing its quality by focusing on the frequency and form of online argumentation in relation to the journalistic article and to other commenters. They defined argumentation as “a process whereby claims are attacked and defended and differences of opinion resolved” (Richardson & Stanyer, 2011, p.  986). This definition is very similar to the ones outlined in Chap. 2 as well as to Freelon’s (2015) measure of deliberation with his three criteria: “question-asking, opinion justification, and acknowledgment across lines of political difference” (p. 780). Similarly, Stromer-Galley (2007) used the following measures of deliberation: “reasoned opinion expression, references to external sources when articulating opinions, expressions of disagreement and hence exposure to diverse perspectives, equal levels of participation during the deliberation, coherence with regard to the structure and topic of deliberation, and engagement among participants with each other” (p. 4). Richardson and Stanyer’s (2011) study involved both quantitative content analysis and qualitative analysis of the argument schemes. Similar aspects were covered in Manosevitch and Walker’s work (2009). They drew upon Gastil’s (2007) operationalization and split deliberation into two distinct processes: the analytic process and the social process. The analytical process “refers to the substance of the issue being discussed and involves the creation of an information base intended to ensure that participants understand the nature of the problem” (Manosevitch & Walker, 2009, p. 12). It included the following indicators: narrative, facts, sources, values, position, and reason. The social process incorporated three indicators: “addressing other comments and commenters,” “posing questions,” and “addressing the article content” (Manosevitch & Walker, 2009, pp. 14–16). The study concluded that the analytical process of deliberation mainly included evidence of three indicators: “contribution of factual

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information associated with the issue,” “explicitly stating a position on the issue,” and “providing reasons in favor or against a particular position on the issue” (Manosevitch & Walker, 2009, pp.  18–19), while the social process predominantly involved addressing other commenters. Argumentation in this study is quantitatively measured with four variables covering the two key aspects—reasoning and reciprocity. Reasoning includes two variables: (1) Reasons provided to justify one’s position/ standpoint. (2) Evidence provided to back up one’s position/standpoint. Reciprocity includes two variables: (1) Asking and responding to questions/remarks. (2) Acknowledging other people’s views/positions. A comment receives 1 point for each of these characteristics. The argumentation score is then calculated on a scale of 0 to 4 with 0 being the lowest and 4 being the highest. With regard to the engagement variables, it is important to code separately engagement with other users and engagement with the topic of the original article the comments are linked to, because participants might be engaging with what other participants have said, but the topic of conversation might have changed from the original focus in the article. Stromer-­ Galley and Martinson (2005) differentiated between the structuring topic—“the topic established prior to or outside of the immediate interaction”—and the interactional topic—“the subject of discourse established through the interaction” (Stromer-Galley, 2007, p. 6). As Stromer-Galley (2007) explained, “Both structuring topic and interactional topic likely matter to the quality of deliberation. Participants who are brought together to discuss one topic, the structuring topic, but spend most of their time discussing unrelated topics, are not addressing the fundamental problem they were brought together to address” (p. 6). Finally, with regard to incivility, as Chap. 2 outlined, there is disagreement on what incivility actually entails in practice—whether it is rudeness/impoliteness or whether discourse has to be detrimental to democracy, for example, to include an attack on a group of people, to be classified as uncivil. This is an important distinction to bear in mind because the evidence so far (see Chap. 2) suggests an inconclusive link between incivility and deliberation, precisely because of the fuzziness of the concept of civility. Rossini (2020) reminded us that the conceptual fuzziness in defining (in)civility was linked to a wider lack of recognition of the fact that norms were actually flexible and context-dependent. She argued for the use of the concept of intolerance, which, however, in her own study was defined rather specifically in relation to values shared

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predominantly in the advanced liberal democracies of the Global North. Other studies also showed that the quality of argumentation depended on the nature of the publication and the cultural context (e.g., Richardson & Stanyer, 2011; Ruiz et al., 2011). Therefore, rather than operationalizing civility in a one-size-fits-all way, in this study the coders were asked to decide whether a comment was civil or not depending on what is considered civil in the relevant national context. In addition to that, I used three variables to code incivility: (1) Is the comment impolite/rude? (2) Is there evidence of intolerance toward a group in the comment? (3) If yes to 2, is this group of people a whole nation or nations? The reason I asked the last question is because in the course of the qualitative coding, I discovered that rude language in China was most commonly used with reference to America and American people. This in turn poses further challenges with regard to the conceptualization of civility, which I discuss at greater length during the presentation of findings.

Contextual Peculiarities Why focus on these three countries in particular and what contextual peculiarities should we bear in mind? The Introduction touched upon these issues but it is nonetheless important to reiterate and expand upon the key points here before I embark on the actual analysis where further contextualization is provided. The different degrees of democratic development and free speech as well as the turbulent relations with the USA make these three countries timely and worthwhile case studies. China, Mexico, and Russia are three very different countries politically and historically unified by one key characteristic in relation to this study—the rather acrimonious relationship with the USA, not just historically but also during the course of Trump’s Presidency. Trump’s election victory in 2016 led to very different reactions in the three countries under study. Hopes were high for a more positive and productive relationship between the USA and Russia in Russia, but the optimistic mode did not last long after the country was implicated in interfering in the US elections as well as a related series of scandals involving Trump’s close aides and the Russian authorities. China’s response to Trump’s election victory was much more cautious and while Trump’s state visit to China in 2017 was seen as a good sign, what followed in the next few years has been a fullblown trade war. The US–Mexico relations, on the other hand, have been in crisis since Trump’s election (Velasco, 2018). Trump’s threats

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against Mexico included his election promise to build a wall on the southern border that the Mexicans would be required to pay for as well as that he would deport millions of undocumented Mexicans (“illegal aliens”). Furthermore, the three countries also represent excellent case studies in the realm of online discussions. The Internet plays an important role but there are substantial differences in Internet freedom. China and Russia both have authoritarian/semi-authoritarian regimes, albeit with very different levels of restrictions of the Internet, while Mexico is a democratic country. All three countries are understudied in the realm of online political talk. The most different systems design enhances the grounded theory approach by allowing broader and more well-rounded conclusions to be drawn about respective similarities in the patterns of online discussions and argumentation and the role of online spaces as providing potential opportunities for discussions of a global nature. Any similarities in the patterns of discussion and argumentation despite the systemic differences would enhance theory building by making it better grounded than a narrower focus on one context or a few very similar contexts. The qualitative nature of the project and the presentation of findings by country would allow for a careful consideration of the respective factors and would minimize the potential for drawing conclusions that are not fully substantiated. I would briefly cover three key aspects for each country here: (1) Recent relationship with Trump and the USA. (2) Democratic development and freedom of speech. (3) The role of the Internet as a tool for political discussions. The relationship between China and the USA was rather turbulent during Trump’s Presidency culminating in the 18-month-long China–US trade war. There did not appear to be any public opinion surveys of Chinese citizens’ views on Trump, but reports claimed that his nickname on China’s Internet was Te-mei-pu, meaning “totally unpredictable” (Buckley, 2019). As Buckley (2019) put it, “China has experienced Mr. Trump’s changeable ways more than most countries.” Despite the fact that he visited China in the first year of his presidency, relations soon soured due to his trade demands as well as over human rights. Trump’s pledge to reduce the trade deficit resulted in him imposing tariffs in January and March 2018, significantly affecting China’s exports. In April 2018, China retaliated by imposing tariffs on US products. Over the next few months the measures on both sides intensified and the war continued in full bloom. The negotiations between the two sides came to fruition

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with the signing of the so-called phase one deal on January 15, 2020, partially easing tensions. The trade war helped the USA reduce its trade deficit with China. Trump also asked the Chinese government to investigate the former Vice President Joe Biden and his son over allegations that they have received millions from China. The trade war was a reflection of a wider anxiety about China’s increasing economic role worldwide but the economic dimension was not the only one that Trump and other leaders were worried about. As Katz (2021) put it, “With China’s large population, growing economic and military strength, and increasingly assertive leadership, it is not surprising that the U.S. and many of its allies have become wary of China.” An important point that Paszak (2021) made was that “China began to be depicted as a strategic rival that poses a threat to the interests while being part of a distinct civilization and fostering different values.” This rivalry between the two countries is of fundamental importance because it is not just an economic rivalry but also a rivalry over political and strategic leadership and indeed setting normative values worldwide, leading commentators to claim that China’s rising role is posing a threat not just to US hegemony but to the future of liberal democracies more generally (Macfarlane, 2020). As Macfarlane (2020) pointed out, “China’s rise has led some to speculate that we are witnessing the ‘end of the American century’” or in any case “any claim on the part of American democracy to provide a political model.” It is important to observe the extent to which these battles over hegemony and political values are reflected in the online comments by Chinese posters. China’s values are indeed very different from those generally shared by the liberal democracies of the Global North. China is an authoritarian communist country infamous for its appalling human rights record. Its economic policies have prompted commentators to label it as “authoritarian capitalism” (Witt & Redding, 2013; Macfarlane, 2020) although the term used in official Chinese documents is “socialist market economy system” (Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020), 2014). Of particular relevance to this study is the total lack of freedom of expression in the country and the heavy censorship of the Internet. In 2010, the government published the white paper “The Internet in China,” informed by the “internet sovereignty” concept, namely China’s determination to have jurisdiction over web content and providers within Chinese territory (Macfarlane, 2020). It set out the framework for a range of repressive measures prohibiting and penalizing “the spread of information that contains content subverting state power,

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undermining national unity [or] infringing upon national honour and interests” (Macfarlane, 2020). In this way China also provided a model for other authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes around the world. Moreover, as Negro (Franceschini, 2018) pointed out, “it has also been contributing actively to the shaping of the political and scientific international discussion” in the direction of Internet sovereignty, namely Internet governance at the domestic level. The most famous aspect of that policy is the imposition of the “Great Firewall of China,” permanently blocking most Western social media, news websites, and applications. China also frequently launches hacking attacks on foreign servers and websites. Yet, despite the heavy censorship, as deLisle et  al. (2016) pointed out, “the Internet and especially social media have become pervasive and transformative forces in contemporary China” (p.  1). They claimed that “policy debates and public discourse regularly occur through—and sometimes focus on—the Internet and social media to an extent unimaginable a decade or two ago. Almost no area of public concern remains beyond the reach of discussion in cyberspace” (p. 2). Yang (2003) also claimed that the “The Internet provides alternative spaces for public debate” (p. 463) and provided both examples of discussion boards online and of common ways that users reverted to in order to bypass the censorship filters not allowing them to use certain words/symbols. As Franceschini (2018) wrote, “for the past couple of decades, the Internet has been one of the most contentious arenas for public discourse in China, a site of confrontation between authorities eager to exert control and users attempting to re-appropriate discursive spaces” (p. 102). One of the manifestations of this confrontation is China’s “reverse censorship,” namely the practice of “surreptitiously posting large numbers of fabricated social media comments” by the socalled 50-cent army or 50-c party—2 million commenters allegedly paid by the state to post pro-government comments online (King et  al., 2013, p. 484). King et al. (2013) estimated that the government fabricated and posted about 448 million comments a year. Their study showed that rather than arguing with opponents of the government and the party, the main strategy is “to distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime” (p. 484). King et al. (2013) concluded that “almost none of the Chinese government’s 50c party posts engage in debate or argument of any kind” (p. 486). All in all, as Negro (2018) explained, while cyber-­utopianism was very common in China in the late 2000s with Chinese intellectuals expressing “the belief

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that the Internet had the power to support pluralism and forms of democracy in the country” (p. 104), recent trends were considerably more negative. The Chinese authorities seem to have “further developed their skills in channelling the public opinion (yulun yindao) —or, to use President Xi’s words, are doing their best to occupy the ‘main battlefield of public opinion struggle’ (yulun douzheng de zhu zhanchang)” (p. 104). Exchanges with foreign countries were also very limited, and the Internet market was dominated by three companies, significantly reducing diversity and variety of platforms, and online public opinion centers “tasked with collecting and analysing online discussions” have “mushroomed” (Negro, 2018, p. 104). Overall, surveillance is rife in the country and the social credit system is a prime example of the authoritarian state’s ingenuity in the use and abuse of contemporary technologies for both commercial and political purposes and always in the name of some alleged societal good. Thus, the State Council Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020) stated that “its inherent requirements are establishing the idea of a sincerity culture, and carrying forward sincerity and traditional virtues, it uses encouragement to keep trust and constraints against breaking trust as incentive mechanisms, and its objective is raising the honest mentality and credit levels of the entire society.” This study explores the extent to which these ideas have sifted through the Chinese online publics. There are lots of parallels between China and Russia both in terms of political relations with the USA, and censorship and surveillance but the situation in Russia with regard to freedom of expression and the use of the Internet pales in comparison with China even after the most recent restrictions imposed during the war against Ukraine. In fact, Toepfl’s (2020) classification of the multiple authoritarian public-at-large put the two countries in two different categories—China in the “policy-critical public-­ at-­large” type where “not only uncritical but also policy-critical publics operate, which involve significant, mass audiences” but “leadership-critical publics are still notably absent,” while Russia was put in the “leadership-­ critical public-at-large” category where all three types of publics were present (p. 117). It will be an understatement to say that the relationship between Russia and the USA has been very dynamic not just over the past few years but most notably during the Cold War when the two countries were major ideological rivals. In the post-Cold War period, US leaders struggled to come up with a sustainable policy toward Russia (Rumer & Sokolsky, 2019). As Rumer and Sokolsky (2019) explained:

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Throughout this period, the U.S.-Russian relationship has experienced a familiar pattern of boom-bust cycles: a new administration comes in dissatisfied with the state of the relationship and promises to do better. It launches a policy review that generates a reset aimed at developing a partnership. A period of optimism follows, but obstacles to better relations emerge, and optimism gradually gives way to pessimism. By the end of the administration, the relationship is at the lowest point since the end of the Cold War. (p. 1)

In Rumer and Sokolsky’s (2019) view, two main issues hindered any positive developments in that respect: first, Russian leaders saw their country as a great power and would not accept American primacy. On the contrary, “they rely on anti-Americanism to legitimize their unpopular policies with domestic audiences” (p.  1). Second, similarly in the USA, Russia was “seen as the cause of many problems in the world” (p. 1) and as a potential threat to the post-Cold War supremacy of the USA. Relations significantly soured during Obama’s Presidency, most notably during the conflict in Ukraine when sanctions were imposed on Russia both by the USA and by the EU. Trump’s Presidency came with renewed hopes for a better relationship, given his pro-Russia stance in the campaign, but in the end followed an all-too-familiar pattern. Initially, Russia was “the only country in the G20 group of nations where Donald Trump is the preferred choice for the next President of the United States” (Slutsky & Gavra, 2017). After premature hopes on both sides that Trump’s election would lead to a warming up of the relationship between the two countries, those hopes were quickly dashed due to the fact that Russia was accused of meddling in the US presidential elections. Trump’s own attitude to Russia and President Putin has been ambivalent. Rutland (2017) argued that Trump’s relations with Russia “have been a drama in three acts” (S41). In Act One, Trump: was insisting that he would radically revise the role of the US in the world, and he saw forging a new partnership with Russia as part of that agenda. In Act Two, in the months after the election, Trump found himself under sustained attack as more information surfaced about Russian efforts to hack the election, together with the dubious Russian connections of some of his closest advisers. Then, in Act Three, after launching the missile strike on Syria on April 7, the Trump administration reverted to a more mainstream position on US foreign policy, including some harsh criticism of Russia for its support for Syrian President Bashar. (S41)

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Russia’s alleged interference in the US elections and Trump’s close aides’ links with the country dominated the headlines in the first few months after Trump’s election. In December 2016–January 2017, intelligence information was declassified, suggesting that Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 during the US presidential election with the aim of undermining public faith in the US democratic process and denigrating Hilary Clinton. Trump’s Security Advisor Michael Flynn resigned in February 2017 after leaks suggested he had tried to cover up his phone conversations with Russian ambassador to the USA Sergey Kislyak shortly before Trump’s inauguration when Flynn was part of the transition team and sanctions against Russia were discussed. Then in May 2017 Trump fired the FBI director James Comey over his handling of the FBI’s investigations of the Hillary Clinton email scandal and of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, especially in relation to the alleged collusion with Trump’s presidential campaign. These developments went hand in hand with sustained efforts on both sides to justify isolationist foreign policies with populist appeals to patriotism and a strife for geostrategic power. This project aims to capture Russian commenters’ reactions to these developments and the extent to which these top changes in relations were reflected in online publics’ perceptions of Trump and the USA as well as Russia’s own role. Defining Russia’s political system in the post-Cold War period and in particular during Putin’s terms as President is no easy task. Different terms have been used by scholars—“neo-authoritarian” (Becker, 2014, p. 191), “managed democracy” (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p. 106), “incomplete democracy” (Rose & Shin, 2001), “electoral authoritarianism” (Gel’man, 2014, p.  503), and “consultative authoritarian regime” (Toepfl, 2020). Whatever label is used, the key features of relevance to this project are the same: while hopes for democratization of society and the media were very high in the first few years after the fall of communism, Putin’s Presidency put an end to these processes. Russia is not a democracy and while the political regime is different from the one during Soviet times, there has definitely been a significant deterioration in the degree of freedom of expression in the country coupled with a sustained strategy of stifling critical voices, propaganda, and neo-imperialist discourses masked as patriotism (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018). Russia’s media system is indeed neo-authoritarian and has much more in common with “similar non-­ democratic systems around the world than with the Soviet system that

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once prevailed on the same territory” (Becker, 2014, p.  191). Gel’man (2010) used the term “half-freedom of speech” to describe the situation. The approach adopted was indeed of eliminating critical convent without actually eliminating the media outlets themselves... Putin’s handling of liberal media sets a good example for other neo-authoritarian leaders…, especially those who want to reap the benefits of capitalism without paying the hefty price that democratic systems demand. His approach to media management and control looks ad hoc and sporadic at times, but it has certainly become much more confident and stringent with time, and thus more successful for his own image, popularity, and credibility. (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2018, p. 194)

While for years efforts to control the media were mainly focused on TV, the Internet has attracted significant regulatory attention especially, since the wave of protests in 2011–2013 and the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. In general, Putin and the Kremlin’s grip on media significantly tightened. Runet has played an ambivalent role in home and world politics. On the one hand, the Kremlin has allegedly been investing in paid trolls (Sindelar, 2014; Lonkila et al., 2020) but on the other hand, commentators have praised Runet’s powerful role as a catalyst for change (Suslov, 2017). The Russian Internet is not as heavily censored as in China, and it still provides a platform for alternative voices, albeit to a very limited extent, even more limited after Russia launched a war on Ukraine in 2022. Suslov (2017) argued that “digital media have become the main outlet for supplying Russians with perspectives and interpretations that dissent from those aired on the state-controlled TV channels” but “the flipside is that this visibility gives the policing institutions free rein to prosecute virtually any active ‘netizen’ whose statements could be construed as ‘spreading extremist ideas.’” Despite much speculation about the potential role of the Russian Internet, the title of Oates’s (2013) book tellingly describes its current state: Revolution Stalled: The Political Limits of the Internet in the Post-Soviet Sphere. Lonkila et al. (2020) argued that the tighter grip on the Russian Internet was prompted by the wave of protests in 2011-2013 during which social media and the Internet were used as an important mobilization tool. They wrote that this was a wake-up call for the Russian authorities and it marked the beginning of the process of the “occupation of Runet” (p. 17). The Russian government has used a range of measures in the past few years aimed at curtailing freedom of expression ranging

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from creating a blacklist of websites and blocking websites to Internet blackouts during protests to legal and infrastructural Internet controls and content filters to harassment and prosecution of Internet users. Websites giving a platform to critical voices have been shut down, blocked/blacklisted, or have changed ownership. There has also been a concerted effort toward using predominantly Russian mobile apps and websites. In a speech in 2014, Putin referred to the Internet as “a CIA project” (MacAskill, 2014). A series of amendments to existing legislation, inspired by China’s sovereign Internet policy and informally known as Russia’s “sovereign Internet law,” came into force in 2019. They required Internet service providers to install equipment that allowed the authorities to automatically block content the government has banned and reroute Internet traffic without actually going through the Internet providers themselves (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Regulatory agencies have repeatedly used their power to order the blocking of content or impose fines. The potential for foreign ownership of media organizations was also been significantly limited after the introduction of a maximum 20% stake. Moreover, as Lonkila et al. (2020) pointed out, “the operation of pro-government trolling and automated bots has resulted in the polarization and ‘pollution’ of the political debate on Runet but its influence extends further, as the discussion concerning Russian attempts to interfere in the U.S. elections has revealed.” Is it all doom and gloom then? The fact that the Russian authorities have upped their efforts to “regulate” the Internet to such a significant degree is testimony of its powerful role in the country (or at least potential for it). Moreover, the Russian public and media are not uniform, and as Toepfl (2020) argued, it might as well be the case that there are three types of publics in the Russian context—“uncritical publics,” “policy-­ critical publics,” and “leadership-critical publics” (p. 112). Overall, even if it is very unlikely for the Russian Internet to become a tool for significant political change in the current climate, but given that it has indeed become the main outlet for expressing dissent, it is important to ascertain whether the online comments about Trump are a manifestation of the Internet’s potential to provide a platform for open debate and discussion or on the contrary, of the negative trends Schlesinger (2020) alluded to when using the label post-public sphere. Schlesinger (2020) argued that Russia’s interference in online messaging during the US presidential campaign in 2016 in pursuit of its global strategic aims as well as “the abuse of data for the purposes of covert political advertising and its connection to targeted

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misinformation has become an increasingly salient issue for how the post-­ public sphere operates, not least in its cross-border info-war dimension” (p.  1549). This project also explores the extent to which online users’ views of Trump reflect the official Kremlin line about the USA and the broader changes in the relationship between the two countries, namely between the policy agenda and the public agenda as expressed in online comments and blog posts. Unfortunately, after the start of the 2022 war in Ukraine, there is not much room for hope as the grip on media freedom has tightened to such an extent that all media critical of the Kremlin had to shut down or relocate abroad or they faced prison sentences simply for referring to the war as war and not a special operation. The third country in this study—Mexico—is very different in that respect to the first two but it too has had a rather turbulent relationship with Trump. Mexico was threatened by Trump during the presidential campaign with a large border wall, which he claimed he would build by making Mexico pay for it—“the latest episode in a long litany of US-Mexican altercations” (BBC History, n.d.). Unsurprisingly, Trump’s rating in Mexico was the lowest among 37 nations polled in 2017 according to the Pew Research Center (Wike et  al., 2018). 94% of Mexicans opposed Trump’s proposed border wall and only 5% had confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. By comparison, the lowest level of public support for Barack Obama in Mexico was 38% in 2011 (Wike et al., 2018). “Trump wall” has been a long-standing dream of the former US President. Suggested initially in 2014, the wall promise featured prominently in Trump’s campaign—it was mentioned more than 200 times in his 2016 campaign (Jankowicz, 2020). After his inauguration in January 2017, Trump signed an executive order instructing the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security to begin the process of constructing the wall. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto then decided to cancel his trip to the USA in response to the executive order, which in turn prompted Trump to threaten Mexican imports with a 20% tax. Nieto clearly stated that “Mexico does not believe in walls. I’ve said time again; Mexico will not pay for any wall” (Agren, 2017). A battle with Congress to secure funding for the construction of the wall marked the next few months. Finally, construction of the wall started in 2020 but was then put to a halt once Joe Biden became President. All in all, 455 miles were constructed during Trump’s Presidency but only 49 miles were a new construction, while the rest included the replacement of old, dilapidated barriers. Trump wall and his country’s relation with Mexico were

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underpinned by his wider rhetoric about the negative role of immigration on America. As Ojeda and Telles (2021) explained, “Donald Trump’s political rise utilized the narrative that America ceased being great because of ‘illegal’ immigrants and trade agreements that produced deficits and took US jobs.” In this narrative, Mexico was sending its “worst people” and the “big, beautiful wall” was a much-coveted solution to this problem (Ojeda & Telles, 2021). However, the economic narrative was valid only at face value because it was underpinned by very strong nationalist sentiments and according to some academics (e.g., Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; Mutz, 2018), anxieties on racial and diversity grounds. The study explores whether Mexican commentators have picked up on some of these wider issues and what they make of them. The comments might also reflect an important domestic development in Mexico itself—the 2018 election of the new President—Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Obrador and Trump actually had much in common. As Payan and Arboleya (2021) wrote, they: shared a personal, nationalist and authoritarian understanding of power— although not a friendship. In each other, they both found a kindred spirit. They were connected by their use of animosity as a political attitude, and of frontal attacks on institutions as a strategy. They polarized society as a tactic and exhibited contempt for the rule of law as a necessity. They undermined professional public administration as way of exercising authority and insulted the media and freedom of expression as a ploy.

Obrador, initially a strong critic of Trump, was later accused of cozying up to him, especially when he visited the White House four months before the 2020 US elections—a move strongly criticized for his symbolic value. Unlike China and Russia, Mexico is a democratic country and as such has a much higher degree of freedom of expression, including on the web. However, it is notable that due to the levels of poverty and inequality in the country and the resulting digital divide, the Internet penetration rate is very similar to that in China and lower than in Russia. According to 2020 World Bank data, 72% of the Mexican population had access to the Internet as opposed to 71% of the Chinese population and 85% of the Russian population. Higareda’s (2013) evaluation of the state of development of the public sphere in Mexico showed that its deliberative potential was severely halted by the social and economic inequalities as well as patronage and a weak rule of law—all general impediments to democracy

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as well. Nonetheless, despite its nearly 200-year-old history of democratization, Mexico is a young democracy in many respects. The country had a semi-authoritarian, one-party political model for 71 years (1929–2000). The year 2000 was pivotal in Mexico’s transition to democracy. As Hiskey (2013) explained, “for many, Mexico became a democracy on the night of 2 July 2000, when the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) conceded defeat in the presidential elections for the first time in its seventy-­ year existence. For students of Mexican politics, however, the country’s democratic transformation was years in the making.” However, similar to many young democracies or democracies in transition, democratization is a long process and lots of issues hinder its progress. Camp (2015) summed up the consensus on its progress: Mexico’s transition to democracy occurred with relatively little violence, but its success to date can be described as limited to that of an electoral democracy. When measured by most traditional qualities of a consolidated democracy, including the culture of law, transparency, accountability, human rights, and so forth, Mexico has not achieved those goals.

These issues inevitably affect the development of the media in the country and their societal role. According to Higareda (2013), during the post-revolutionary authoritarian regime, the emergence of free media was deliberately restricted through “an effective mixture of blunt and subtle tactics to prevent autonomous, critical and independent media that could have fostered a deliberative public sphere in Mexico from developing” (p. 319). Post-authoritarianism there was a marked transformation toward freedom of expression but some of the remnants of the old regime still plague the media, most notably patronage and corruption practices, and violence against journalists. Freedom House’s 2020 report suggested that “the security environment for journalists remains highly challenging. Reporters probing police issues, drug trafficking, and official corruption face an increasingly high risk of physical harm.” Another issue highlighted in the report was news media’ dependence on the government for advertising and subsidies. In 2020, the Committee to Protect Journalists recorded the highest number of killings of journalists in any country in Mexico. The Internet, according to Higareda (2013), “offers extraordinary opportunities to create a deliberative opinion-making process in Mexico” and “is evolving into the leading means of social communication for deliberative democracy due to its interactivity and the virtually infinite

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space it offers for all possible perspectives in politics, thus facilitating an ideal deliberative space for Mexican citizens” (p. 329). Still, there is a scarcity of studies on this topic. Using the keywords, “Mexico” AND “online comments” did not retrieve any academic publications in English. Trends on related topics are not very positive. There has been an alleged rise in the use of social media as a tool for shaping populist practices and discourses more broadly in Latin America as well as use of the Internet for misinformation and disinformation purposes, especially during the 2018 presidential campaign and the COVID-19 pandemic, and targeting of bloggers and online journalists by organized crime gangs.

Why Trump and the USA—Concluding Remarks Finally, in lieu of concluding remarks, it is worth briefly explaining what necessitates the focus on Trump as a global public figure and the USA as a global player. First, the USA is undoubtedly a hegemonic power on the world stage in the post-Cold War geopolitical order. Second, the election of a new US President is an event of global significance, and Trump’s election was indeed an historic moment. Trump’s victory raised important questions about the future of liberal democracy and free media. By positioning himself as an anti-establishment, anti-legacy (or as he called them liberal) media populist candidate, Trump illustrated both some of the best and worst features of democracy in practice. The significance of Trump’s election victory and subsequent Presidency cannot be underestimated. As Vile (2016) pointed out, Trump’s victory was not simply “a moment of madness that will disappear when Trump is no longer in the news” but it told a bigger story about the persistence of the underlying causes that led to his election in terms of deep-rooted conflicts and inequalities, decreasing credibility of the American dream narrative as well as wider issues related to the American political system and its “future outlook.” All these developments have important repercussions beyond the USA because they contribute to a growing trend toward questioning the US role as a driver of democracy and democratic political values around the world and the wider relevance of these values, as some of the comments actually show. The findings are relevant beyond Trump’s personality and the specific events selected because they illustrate the potential for making claims about the globality of online political discussions in terms of focus, topics/themes, and personalities, while also accounting for the significance of local/national issues that inevitably influence the direction and

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the nature of these discussions. Trump was and remains a highly polarizing figure and as such an ideal candidate for a cross-national comparative study on online publics’ perceptions of him and the USA more broadly. Third, using a combination of global events such as the US President’s election, inauguration and impeachment trial, and events with a close national focus such as Russia’s alleged meddling in the US elections, Trump’s promise to build a wall with Mexico and the trade war between China and the USA allows us to explore the interrelation between the global and the national dimensions on the level of online public perceptions and views. Broader issues that are likely to come into the play are commenters’ views on democracy and its future, and the US role on the world stage. Finally, on a conceptual level, such a multi-faceted, yet open-­ ended investigation of three very different countries, would allow us to draw conclusions about the global nature of political talk.

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PART II

Global Virtual Discussions About Trump and the USA

CHAPTER 4

Online Comments About Trump and the USA in China

This is the first empirical chapter, presenting the results of the analysis of 756 comments about Trump and the USA posted in China between November 2016 and July 2020. The three empirical chapters follow the exact same structure—starting with a brief introduction about current developments in the relationship between the respective country and the USA and available public opinion polls on Trump, and then followed by three main parts: key events and themes; argumentation, engagement and civility; and patterns of discussion. There do not appear to be any public opinion surveys of Chinese citizens’ views on Trump, but reports claim that his nickname on China’s internet is Te-mei-pu, meaning “totally unpredictable” (Buckley, 2019). As Buckley (2019) put it, “China has experienced Mr. Trump’s changeable ways more than most countries.” Despite the fact that he visited China in the first year of his presidency, relations soon soured due to his trade demands as well as over human rights. The comments focus on two main topics: Trump’s election victory and the trade war. The trade war sparked the interest of Chinese online users much more so than Trump’s election victory with the majority of comments being ideologically framed and full of patriotic pathos, nationalistic propaganda, and even calls for censorship. Part I traces online commentators’ reactions to the key events in the relationship between China and the USA since Trump’s election victory, most notably the trade war. It identifies two key conceptual themes that

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dominate the discussions: blind/zealous patriotism versus r­ationalized/ constructed patriotism, and geopolitics in flux—the trade war, hegemony/imperialism, and the new world order. The focus of the study is on online comments about Trump and the USA but the Chinese comments revealed a lot about what Chinese commenters felt about their own country and its place in the world. The nationalistic focus was very strong and that is why the grounded theory analysis showed that the patriotic/ nationalistic theme is the key one underpinning the comments. The focus on China is also linked to another theme, namely the changing dynamics in world politics as a result of the rise of China and the alleged decline of the USA. Part II then analyzes the quality of argumentation, the level of engagement between online posters and the extent to which the comments can be classified as civil. The analysis shows that the majority of commenters did not engage in any way whatsoever with other users and the points they were making, and that incivility was very rare but it also questions the meaning of incivility when confrontational relations between two countries are concerned. The final part then offers a typology of the patterns of discussion emanating from the bottom-up analysis by identifying two patterns: echoing and cheering the official narrative, and gauging nascent public opinion. As expected, the analysis shows that Chinese commenters’ views of Trump were very similar to the official views. This is not surprising, given the high levels of censorship in the country and the activities of the so-called 50-c party (King et al., 2013). Every change in the focus of the official narratives led to a chorus of supportive voices rather than a rational discussion about the claims made. On occasions, posters expressed disagreement but this was rare and usually not properly followed up by arguments but instead only by repetitive slogans, maintaining the official message. Staying “on message” seemed to be a collective task diligently fulfilled.

Key Themes The focus of the study is on online comments about Trump and the USA but the Chinese comments revealed much more about what Chinese commenters felt about their own country and its place in the world. The nationalistic focus was very strong. As already pointed out, the two events the analysis focused on were Trump’s election victory and the trade war between China and the USA. Trump’s election victory was barely of interest to Chinese online news users but the trade war between the two

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countries attracted a lot of interest. The grounded theory approach was already explained in Chap. 3. During the initial coding phase I identified over 250 different themes, which I then refined to 15 broader themes (each of them with lots of different sub-themes) before embarking on the focused coding during which these themes were further refined and elaborated upon. Thus, in the final phase I identified two broad themes: blind/ zealous patriotism versus rationalized/constructed patriotism, and geopolitics in flux—the trade war, hegemony/imperialism, and the new world order. Blind/Zealous Patriotism Versus Motivated/ Rationalized Patriotism Patriotic and nationalistic sentiments and views dominated Chinese comments about Trump and the USA. I draw a distinction here between two main types of patriotic discourses—blind/zealous patriotism and motivated/rationalized patriotism. Patriotism is very broadly defined as a “feeling of attachment and commitment to a country, nation, or political community … love of country” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2021). This definition is only a starting point, because the comments themselves better demonstrate what meaning Chinese citizens imbued in the concept. On the one hand, many commenters were engaging in blind/zealous patriotism. Schatz et al. (1999) defined blind patriotism as “an attachment to country characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism” (p. 151). I add the term zealous here because, as will become evident from the many examples that I use in the analysis, there was a lot of passion and religious-like devotion in these expressions of love and attachment. This broader theme contained within it three sub-themes: (1) Emotional expressions of patriotism and references to the “ancestral land”/“motherland.” (2) Putting China first. (3) Fighting and propaganda slogans. The second broader category of patriotic comments was that of motivated/rationalized patriotism. These comments were not just based on blind emotional attachment but also attempted to offer rational reasons, motivating their love for China and explaining what makes China a great country. As part of this theme, I identified two sub-themes: (1) “Us”—Chinese character and identity. (2) “Them” and the process of othering—America as “the other” (Graph 4.1).

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Blind/ Zealous Patriotism

Motivated/ Rationalized Patriotism

• 1. Emotional patriotism and the “ancestral land”/“motherland”. • 2. Putting China first. • 3. Fighting and propaganda slogans

• 1. "Us" - Chinese character and identity • 2. "Them" and the process of othering - America as "the other"

Graph 4.1  Patriotism theme in the Chinese comments

Blind/Zealous Patriotism Emotional Patriotism and the Ancestral Land/Motherland In this category, commenters expressed unreserved attachment to, support for and love of their country. As one of them put it, “I am Chinese. I love the motherland. It is that simple.” Similarly, another one wrote: “Six words describe myself: I love China, I am Chinese.” For these people being Chinese was equivalent to loving China and nothing further could or should be added to that unqualified love, or in the words of a few other commenters: “I love my China.” Another poster even admitted to not understanding the ins and outs of the trade war but that in no way prevented them from feeling devoted to their country: “Don’t understand complicated things, but as a Chinese, [you] must be patriotic.” In fact, this comment called for a normative allegiance to one’s country. Other examples included posters who referred to their country (which they repeatedly called “my country”) as “awesome,” “amazing,” or “a great country” without explaining what makes it great. As the first comment shows, the word “motherland” was frequently used. In fact, the Chinese word is 祖国 and while it is indeed commonly translated as “motherland,” as my research assistant also translated it, the original expression is gender-neutral and perhaps a more correct

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translation of it would be ancestral land. Most references to the motherland/ancestral land, however, were largely emotional and devoid of any specific explanations as to what the ancestral land meant to them. These references fulfilled two main purposes. First, they were a tool for expressing unconditional love and support for China during the trade war with the USA without references to any specific actions or indeed rational reasons for that support. Most of these comments were brief and emotional: “Praise the great motherland!”; “Great motherland, I love you, come on!”; “Thumbs up for the powerful motherland,” “The motherland will win!”; “I am proud of my motherland.” The second group of comments with references to the motherland included calls for action or support for continued retaliatory action against the USA, and explained that the commenters’ own contribution was very much needed: “Stay in your work place, be the talent the motherland needs most”; “Be together with the motherland,” “The motherland needs my contribution.” For some, the responsibility lay with them as an individual (as one poster put it, “I love my motherland. When it needs me, I will step forward without hesitation”), while for others, their responsibility as individuals was to remind others about their collective responsibility toward Chinese society and the cause of the trade war in this specific case. Collective responsibility often came up as an underlying topic and was also seen as a key feature of Chinese character and society, as will become obvious in the section discussing Chinese identity. It went hand in hand with national unity and the need to be tough and strong—essential attributes at a challenging time. Here are a few examples: Never be soft at critical moments. Only a strong motherland can realise a great life for the Chinese people. Together against the American wolf. The Chinese people are united and support any decision by the motherland. Being blockaded for thirty years! Fifty years! The Chinese people are united! The motherland will be stronger!!!

These comments did not only show an inherent belief in the unity of the Chinese people and the strength of the “motherland” but also hope for a bright future and a process of othering of the USA. One commenter even said: “How can the Americans understand the deep feelings of Chinese people for their motherland and families?” I will come back to these two aspects later on in the discussion when delving deeper into the process of

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othering and the substance behind the utopian ideal of a bright future. As can be seen from these comments, their authors showed blind and unconditional support for their “motherland.” On an even more specific level, this support materialized in numerous calls encouraging a drive toward buying domestic products at the expense of American goods, particularly Apple products such as iPhones. As one of the posters put it, “Supporting domestic products … is to support the motherland.” Here are two further examples of this trend: Don’t always buy iPhones. The US is bullying you. As a Chinese citizen, I support my motherland and support domestic products. United as one mind and do not buy American goods. US imperialism is a paper tiger. Support the motherland to carry out the trade war to the end. The motherland will win. Long live the motherland.

As these comments showed, being a Chinese citizen for these posters came with the added implicit obligation to support their country by buying domestic products. I will separately explore the comments encouraging the purchase of Chinese goods in the section on China’s bright future because there were many more of them than the ones explicitly referring to the motherland. The references to the ancestral land/motherland are important because they demonstrate a process of conceptualizing China as a unified powerful entity. There are some commenters who humanized China: “Be tough, my motherland,” “Come on, motherland.” The use of the word “ancestral land” also included an implicit attempt to honor one’s roots and to build upon the achievements of previous generations. What we evidence in this first sub-theme is a progression from blank emotional statements and declarations of allegiance to specific calls for action. Putting China First The second sub-theme in the first broader theme of blind/zealous patriotism also contained declarations of allegiance and calls for action but the added element here was that commenters explicitly prioritized China or put simply, they put China and its interests first. Putting China first included being prepared to endure hardship in the name of one’s country and strict punishments for anyone who was seen as betraying their country. A few commenters explicitly stated that they were prepared to starve to support their country’s counterattack on the USA:

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Yes, as an ordinary man, I firmly support the counterattack. Even if I can barely keep alive on chaff and wild herbs, I am not afraid of it. Support our country’s counterattack. In this case, counterattack is the only way out! We are determined to fight against US imperialism even if with a hungry belly. Better to live a hard life than to bow to the United States.

Patriotism here was two-dimensional. On the one hand, it included unwavering support for one’s country even potentially at the expense of one’s life. On the other hand, it included resistance to the enemy in the face of the United States and its imperial role and ambitions. The process of othering was also evident in these comments. As one poster put it, “We can be fed with sweet potatoes every day. You Americans can’t.” Thus, the alleged endurance and strength of the Chinese people were contrasted with the alleged lack of endurance and weakness of American people. Other sacrifices people declared that they were prepared to make were to economize on food and clothing or to more generally “live on a shoestring”; “go through thick and thin”; and “live a hard life” in the name of China. As one commenter summarized, “It doesn’t matter if we live a hard life or work hard, what is key is that China needs to be strong.” This personal devotion to their country also resulted in posters’ strong condemnation of anyone who, in their eyes was involved, in any form of national treachery and/or betrayal of China’s interests. National treachery prior to the coronavirus pandemic was defined by commenters as disrupting internal cohesion, messing with China and upsetting Chinese people, pleasing the enemies, and promoting America. The national traitors were most commonly either the news media or other commenters. Here are a few examples: There are always some bad people who seek any opportunity to stir up trouble! Beware of those who want to destroy the stability and unity and try to separate us! Confronting a big enemy, those [news reporting accounts] which please the foreigners while disrupting internal cohesion should be killed. Those accounts should be sealed! In the face of strong enemies, those who please the enemies and annoy us should be beaten to death. Severely punish marketing news accounts which serve foreign countries! A firm blow should be given to those who spread fake news about tariffs. They have seriously interfered with the stability of the market! Rumour mongers who disrupt the stability of our society must be investigated and punished.

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As evident from these comments, they lacked substance in terms of providing specific examples of the alleged betrayal but were instead very emotive. It did not become clear what news media have specifically done to merit such a response but the alleged effect of their reporting was undoubtedly evaluated as damaging for China. Given that in their eyes no mercy should be shown to national traitors, there were frequent calls for severe punishments such as banning them/closing them down; detention and arrests; beating up; or even killing of journalists and/or other commenters: Those [news reporting accounts] which mess with our China, should be killed without mercy. Smash those [account holders] who undermine the morale of our army! [We] should teach those pro-American marketing account holders a lesson. [There are] too many internet traitors. They should be beaten. It’s time to ban certain internet traitors. These marketing account holders behave like the traitors in the war against Japan. We must wipe them out!

Any penalty against traitors, including the use of violence, was fully justified in the eyes of online commenters. The strength of these sentiments was underpinned by a long-running campaign in China on promoting internal cohesion and presenting any act of criticism of the authorities as a betrayal of national interests. This state ideology had permeated people’s minds to the extent that there was no attempt to weigh the severity of the punishment against the severity of the alleged act of betrayal. In fact, it is impossible to judge the severity of the betrayal, given that there are no explanations provided in the comments about the specific “treacherous” actions but just emotive evaluations of their impact and calls for strict punishments. Fighting and Propaganda Slogans The lack of criticality and rationality of the patriotic sentiments expressed was most clearly visible in the many comments containing fighting and propaganda slogans. The fighting slogans’ sub-theme contained the biggest number of comments of all sub-themes in the sample. Widespread patriotism was important because as one commenter put it, “since everyone is so patriotic, the American empire is nothing to fear.” The comments here worked on a few different levels.

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At the most basic level, the slogans were very brief just urging support for China mainly in the form of fighting or in the more extreme cases, fighting to death: “Work hard and unite together, our Chinese people.” “Fight it”; “Fight it to death, otherwise just surrender”; “Resolutely support our country’s decision! Unite and cheer for China in times of crisis”; “Long live the great, glorious and righteous Communist Party of China!”; “Support the country to be stronger!”; “China should fight back”; “Do not have any illusions and prepare for battle. Come on, let’s hurt each other”; and “Go China.” Some of the features already evident in the previous sub-themes were also present in the slogans such as the calls to unity and hard work, the references to China as a strong country as well as the invocation of a common national identity through deictic expressions and personal pronouns (“our Chinese people”). In all the comments, there was only one reference to the Communist Party of China and quite predictably, it was not really linked to anything said in the previous comments but it was clearly very positive. At the next level, the slogans urged for “resolute resistance” to the USA as the perpetrator in this war and usually described it in negative terms: Resolutely resist … Don’t be fooled. Firmly support the fight back against the US empire. Millions of people are of one mind. [Our] wills unite like a fortress. Defeat US imperialism! With one heart, face the enemy’s artillery, march forward, march forward, march forward! We shall not bow our heads to the US empire. We must fight back. [Let’s] overthrow the American empire. Great motherland, I love you, come on!

References to the USA as an empire to be defeated were very common. Due to their nature, these references worked on a very superficial level: there is this huge powerful empire that has attacked us but we can defeat it. Some of the more in-depth comments offered explanations as to why America had decided to attack China and what geopolitical implications the trade war had for China, the USA, and the world more broadly, which I will further discuss in the next sections. Some commenters were drawing historical parallels and were also building upon the legacy of Chairman Mao. As one of them put it, “We are not afraid of anything! In Chairman Mao’s words, self-reliance! Work hard! Fight

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against imperialism to the end with determination!” Chairman Mao’s legacy of self-reliance featured prominently in the comments as a strategy for China’s utopian bright future. At the next level, there was a rudimentary attempt to justify the counterattack against America and to explain its wider significance. For a few commenters, it was important to teach the USA a lesson, namely to show it “what pain is”: “For a hooligan country like the US [America’s national flag], you have to strike it hard, otherwise it won’t know what pain is. I support my country!” Another one similarly said: “Of course, we know we both will get injured. But my fighting back is meant to let the US feel the pain, so that it will never mess with us. In short, combat violence with violence. So, I support [the decision] to fight and fight back appropriately.” A third commenter had a specific aim in mind: “It’s impolite not to give something back for what one receives. Let’s do this until America apologises.” As evident from the examples, there are attempts at justification and rationalization here but not of patriotism itself, which is as blind and as zealous as in the comments with no justification whatsoever. Here what is rationalized to an extent is the retaliatory, fighting approach. In some cases, it is rationalized as a means of teaching the USA a lesson, the lesson of what it means to be in pain so it does not mess with China again so the well-being of China remains an utmost priority. As one poster put it, “Fight for the dignity of the Chinese nation.” On an even wider level, the fight against America was seen as serving a wider common good. China was perceived as fighting on behalf of the whole world with the aim of creating a new world order, which unsurprisingly included an overthrowing of US hegemony (explicit) and its effective replacement with Chinese hegemony (implicit). The outcome was still the same: a victorious China: Fight US imperialism to the end! Their purpose is to stop China’s development! Dominate the world! We must unite! Overthrow US imperialism! The Chinese people and the dear motherland will always be together! China will win! Justice will prevail! The people will win! The soldiers and civilians are united as one. Let’s see who can compete with us! If you fight with Trump, fight to the end, and create a new world!

Why was replacing the USA with China as a world hegemon a good thing, though? The blind/zealous patriotism comments did not provide an

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answer to this question but we can find such an answer in the second main category of comments—those containing evidence of motivated/rationalized patriotism.

Motivated/Rationalized Patriotism “Us”—Chinese Character and Identity A key sub-theme identified during the coding process was that of Chinese identity and character as well as of Chinese society more broadly. When cheering their country or explaining why it deserved to win the trade war, commenters were frequently mentioning key features of Chinese character that they felt unified them as a nation. Sharing a collective national identity is an intrinsic aspect of patriotism and nationalism. The sociological understanding of identity sees it as a process that involves self-­categorization by the individual and social categorization—society placing a label (Jenkins, 2004; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2014). This section, therefore, focuses on individuals’ conceptualizations of their own national identity. When talking about Chinese society, the commenters identified a few key features that they believed characterized their society: collective responsibility, comprehensive national strength, self-reliance and self-sufficiency, internal cohesion and unity, and a great Chinese national spirit. On the individual level, the Chinese people presented themselves and their fellow citizens as brave and invincible, calm, confident, hardworking and patient, tough, able to bounce back and with high endurance, wise, and mature. I will now elaborate upon each of these characteristics by providing examples from the comments. To start with, China’s comprehensive national strength was seen as a key asset of Chinese society. The expression itself was used by one of the commenters who said that “comprehensive national strength will always be the most important bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations!” Another one also used a similar expression when arguing that China was very confident that it would defeat the USA in the trade war “based on its national strength.” But what does it actually mean? A significant number of posters talked about China’s huge population as an advantage in the battle with the USA. As one person put it, “Unity is strength. With more people comes more power. The united Chinese are invincible in the world!” A few explained that China’s huge population undermined America’s claim to power: “How powerful is America? China is so big.

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There are so many people in China. If everyone unites together and does well in his/her own work, there is no reason to fear America, a paper tiger.” Furthermore, posters saw China’s potential not only as being able to defeat America but also as being capable of rising as an  unstoppable power on the world stage: “The great China is unstoppable! There are 1.4 billion Chinese people who are united as one and there is no obstacle that can stop China’s progress!” Here again there is a clear reference to China’s population. China’s population was only one aspect of its comprehensive national strength. Commenters also referred to China’s “huge market.” A few talked about the need for China to “awaken” its “inner strength” and “inner skills” defined in opposition to “external support.” This idea of China’s inner strength is actually implicitly related to another key notion that dominated the trade war discourses toward the later stages, namely the idea that China should become self-reliant and self-sufficient. Many were referring to Chairman Mao’s legacy in that respect, quoting him as the visionary that saw China’s self-sufficiency “as the most reliable magic weapon for us to transition from a big country to a great power.” This quote does in itself contain the realization that the fact that it is a big country does not automatically make China a great power but more strategic work is needed in order for it to truly become a great power. In that respect, commenters could be split into two groups: some who believed that China was already self-sufficient and others who argued that this process was in the making and the country had to work to achieve it. Thus, one commenter pointed out that “China is very rich in resources, self-­ sufficient, and not afraid of anything,” while another one argued that “independence and self-reliance are the guiding lights of the invincible Chinese people.” Yet another Chinese Internet user was calling on his fellow citizens to “carry forward the fine tradition of self-reliance and independence.” The ability to carry collective responsibility was seen as another key asset of Chinese society, and commenters often felt the need to remind their fellow citizens of its importance. As one poster put it, “Many a little make a mickle. For the fate of the nation, everyone is responsible.” Another one explained what the approach should be: “When big trouble falls, firstly, each one should do his work well. Secondly, solve the problem jointly with others.” One person reposted a text message sent by the Provincial National Security Office at the start of the trade war, which said that maintaining national security was a collective responsibility: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China, all state organs and armed forces,

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political parties and organizations, enterprises, institutions and other social organizations are responsible for maintaining national security.” Calls for collective action were frequently made in the course of the trade war. Supporting the Chinese company Huawei, which was under attack by the USA, was one example of such a call. There was even a suggestion for a mutual fund to be created to which every Chinese citizen would be encouraged to donate to fund Huawei’s legal battle with the USA. There were also more generic pleas for everyone to contribute with whatever they could—money, effort, energy. It was clear that collective responsibility was not seen as a given or a fixed national feature but as something that people actively had to endorse. In other words, compliance was conceptualized as being part of citizens’ responsibility—as is common in communist countries. Similarly, praising China’s unity and internal cohesion usually went hand in hand with calls for sustained action. An Internet user saw the trade war as “a test of the patience and national cohesion of the country.” The claim was immediately followed by the following words: “Come on China! We do not have a retreat. We cannot lose and will not lose!” References to Chairman Mao were also presented as a motivating factor: “Chairman Mao said that the military and the civilians are united like one person, undefeatable.” Another person also talked about the military and civilians united as one, and then added: “Let’s see who can compete with us!” “Let the US empire see our unity.” The majority expressed confidence in the collective power of the Chinese: Millions of people are of one mind. Our wills unite like a fortress. The Chinese people are united and support any decision by the motherland. The Chinese are all good. People can be united at the critical moment. The Chinese can’t be beaten. The harder the enemy is on us, the stronger we are.

The ability of the Chinese to bounce back and come out stronger at a challenging time also featured prominently in the comments. In fact, one of the commenters even referred to it as the ability to be reborn: “Every sanction or blockage imposed by the Western countries causes China to be reborn with full energy like a phoenix.” A few others pointed out that the more China was under pressure, the stronger it became:

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We grew up under the blockade of the United States. History has proven that the more punishing the blockade, the stronger China will be … The more they want to block us, the faster we develop. This is the personality of the Chinese nation. The Chinese nation has always had more energy when facing greater difficulties! Fight the trade war as long as you want. We strive for self-reliance. The more you fight with us, the stronger we will be.

As the last few comments showed, the Chinese also prided themselves on their resilience and high endurance. One person explained that “The Chinese are good at fighting for a long time,” while according to a few others the key to winning the trade war was the ability to endure till the end. A poster summed up the prevailing sentiment: “The Chinese people can overcome all difficulties.” In Chinese commenters’ views, Chinese people had much higher endurance than Americans: We can be fed with sweet potatoes every day. You Americans can’t. The key is that Americans cannot bear things longer than the Chinese! The Chinese can endure it, but Americans cannot!

This ability to endure hardship and come out stronger in the end was linked to their hardworking and patient nature and the prevailing “great Chinese national spirit.” As one person put it, “Trump is betting that China will not be able to make it. Obviously, he is wrong, because the patience of the Chinese people is beyond his imagination!” Another one declared that “The Chinese are the most hardworking people.” Faith in the collective abilities of their nation was widespread. One commenter wrote, “Chinese people will not succumb to this. We are the most resilient people, and nothing can stop our forceful steps!” Another one pointed out that China’s confidence was “based on its national strength.” This confidence in their own abilities was also prompted by a belief that unlike the Americans and their President who acted in a rushed, childish, even crazy, way, the Chinese were mature and acted in a calm, calculated, and altogether wise way. One of the comments likened Trump’s attitude to that of a hooligan acting up in front of an adult: “Trump has exhausted his set of intimidation tricks, but the Chinese government and the Chinese people are not panicked at all. Trump behaves like a little hooligan in front of an adult.” Another one wrote that “Like playing with children, China

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will always be a big country that promotes justice and peace, and no demon can defeat it.” An Internet user contrasted “the poor skills of the Trump administration” to China’s response demonstrating “its calm and vision.” A fellow poster wrote that “With a stable mindset and firm confidence, victory must belong to the Chinese people.” All in all, as a few of the commenters pointed out, their wisdom was going to lead them to victory: “The smart and wise Chinese people will surely overtake [America] in the corner!” “With the wisdom of our people, we will be able to defeat the US empire!” A key refrain repeated time and time again was: “We are not afraid,” “We are unbeatable.” Chinese national characteristics and collective strength were frequently used as justifications for this brave outlook. We have a full range of industries, relatively abundant natural resources, and a huge world-class market … I’m afraid of you! Trade war? Or military confrontation? The coming will always come, as long as there is enough power to deal with all kinds of attacks. We were not scared in the past when we were poor. Let alone now. China will not be afraid as long as it has chips and rare earth minerals … We’ve survived through the eight years of the war against Japan … China will win. China must be sober-minded. The US has always tried its best to overthrow China throughout history, but China has never been afraid of the US.

As becomes evident from these few examples, the Chinese commenters also made historical parallels and emphasized the need, while mobilizing their patriotism, to defeat the USA with reasonable actions. A few of the posters also made the point that the USA was significantly underestimating China’s abilities and power, and “The United States is also insignificant in our eyes.” “Them” and the Process of Othering—America as “the Other” As the outline of Chinese commenters’ construction of Chinese collective national identity demonstrated, the Chinese very often self-identified themselves and their nation in opposition to the USA and American people. A clear process of othering was taking place whereby the Chinese themselves as individuals and collectively as a society were seen as possessing “good” features while the USA was the bearer of everything bad. This

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is not surprising, given that othering is a key aspect of identity as a process. “Identity is not only about similarity but also about difference—the existence of ‘us’ presupposes the existence of ‘them’” (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2011). For some theorists of identity such as Fredrik Barth (1969), difference is more important than similarity, because as Hall (1996) pointed out identities were “more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity” (p.  4). So if America was the other, how was the other constructed by Chinese online users? Predictably, the other/ “them” was constructed in complete opposition to “us.” If China was strong, with high endurance, wise, and calm, America was the exact opposite—childish, irrational, greedy, and selfish, a hooligan and a bully, with low endurance and its President was crazy and unpredictable. Frequent references to two animals were made: a wolf and a dog. Thus, a few commenters talked about the “wolfish ambitions of US imperialism” that will never die, while others were urging their fellow citizens to unite against the “American wolf”: “Together against the American wolf”; “Defeat the Ambitious American Wolf!”; “Let’s confront the wolves, tigers and leopards.” Similarly, on many occasions America and American people were called dogs or “dog-like”: Since ancient times, dogs have been afraid of people. If you are strong, it will retreat. If you step back, it will attack you. Don’t give the dog-like America any opportunity [to attack]. Chinese people should withdraw some money to play with this crazy dog. Have a look at who is afraid of whom.

What do these references to animals actually signify? Historian Chang-Tai Hung explained that the dog and wolf allegories had been historically used to ridicule the American government. In Chinese folklore, the wolf is a symbol of “cupidity and rapaciousness” (Hung, 2017, p.  160). A 1950s cartoon The Wolf’s Disguise “depicts Washington as a wolf masquerading as a gentleman who lies in order to promote his scheme to dominate the world” (Hung, 2017, p.  160). Subsequent works of art depict the American wolf as greedy and selfish. Similarly, the allegorical image of a dog is also used in a condemning way by the Chinese (Hung, 2017). Political cartoonists frequently depict the USA as a dog. Historian Yuan-­ Tsung Chen explained that while “in the West, a dog is man’s best friend; but in China, dogs are abject creatures. In Chinese, no idiomatic

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expression is more demeaning than the term ‘running dogs’” (p.  240). Furthermore, according to Hung (2017), the image of “a running dog parallels that of the United States as a wolf. Both bestial representations provide convenient and familiar symbols that political artists can target, but they also validate the use of violence since the annihilation of beasts is justified” (p. 168). He linked that approach to a wider strategy of justifying the elimination of the alleged enemies on the grounds of national security: The common practice of portraying political opponents in subhuman or nonhuman form, such as animals, reptiles, and insects, to demonize the enemy allows propagandists to insult their adversaries without guilt and implies that the elimination of enemies would bring about a safer society. Exaggeration of the enemy’s dreadful acts also justifies trust in the authorities to repel the common threat. (Hung, 2017, p. 161)

This appears to be the motivation of the Chinese posters as well. The more America is portrayed as inherently bestial, flawed, and evil, the easier it is to justify any form of action against it. Many pointed out that the trade war was started by America itself so the Chinese only began “messing” with America because the USA started messing with them in the first place. One commenter explained that learning how to respond to America’s actions would take time: “Through long-term practices, we will eventually understand how to hit an evil dragon where it hurts. Let those who behave wantonly pay the price.” The USA, commenters claimed, was “always defending its own best interests,” was simultaneously increasing “tariffs on our goods,” and was still wanting “our rare earth and other resources.” It was trying to “bully” China into accepting its rules. President Trump was undoubtedly seen as the main culprit behind the decision to wage a war on China. While most interpreted his decision as a strategic move aimed at stopping or at least containing China’s rapid development, for some it was more a result of his personality: “Trump is crazy. He started the trade war, very bad. He lives a life of luxury and cannot bear others being happy.” The words “crazy” and “a lunatic” were used by a few people. One wrote that “his brain does not function well,” while another one explained that “usually, when you encounter a lunatic (mental patient), you must keep a distance. But when you meet a lunatic like Trump, the Chinese will definitely not hide but will confront him boldly.” Commenters also talked about Trump’s unpredictability. One

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person warned that Trump “may make strange moves. Be careful of this unreliable guy.” Another one called him “Mr Unreliable”—“He changes quickly like the uncertainty of rains. Maybe all tariffs will be cancelled tomorrow! Back to the way things were before! He may shock the world … [I want to be quiet].” A third one simply advised his fellow citizens not to pay “too much attention to people like Trump or Pompeo. Their temper is like June days or children’s faces, capricious.” All in all, commenters contrasted Trump’s crazy and unpredictable behavior to China’s calm and calculated response, again clearly defining the “us” in opposition to the “other”: Trump’s crazy blackmailing is nothing more than a cloud floating by in the eyes of the Eastern power. There is an old saying in China: “cope with the shifting events by sticking to a fundament principle.” You change every day, but I don’t have time to change according to your behaviour. Play with yourself.”

Another word that was used to describe Trump in particular and the USA more generally was hooligan: “Now the US is a hooligan, beware!”; “The US is a rogue, a hooligan and an untrustworthy country”; “Trump behaves like a little hooligan in front of an adult.” A commenter blamed the trade war on “the gangster logic of the Americans.” According to the Chinese, America’s hooliganism could only be fought by striking it “hard, otherwise it won’t know what pain is.” As one poster put it, “For the tone-deaf, music is useless, no matter how good it is. As far as I can remember, US imperialism is an absolute hooligan with a sore head and oozing feet. Now, [and] nothing is better [than this], it has become an asshole of the world. There is no way to talk with him logically. The only way is to unite the whole world and make US imperialism disappear from the earth.” The argument built here could not be clearer: China is generally a peaceful country, but America has attacked it due to its bullish, imperialist, hooligan behavior. A sensible mature country such as China cannot reason with a hooligan like America so it has no other choice—in fact, it sees it as its duty to act as a world-leading country and unite forces behind it with the aim of defeating the evil American imperialism. One commenter summed up this very logic succinctly: Now the US has become an untrustworthy country, leaving China only one way to go. If the US wants to talk to China, China will open its door. If

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America wants to fight, then [China will] fight it to the end. Like playing with children, China will always be a big country that promotes justice and peace, and no demon can defeat it.

Moreover, they were dealing here not just with any country but with a big enemy or in the words of one commenter—“our biggest enemy”! A good number of posters, however, reassured their fellow citizens that they had nothing to worry about, because in the words of Chairman Mao, America was no more than “a paper tiger.” This label was repeatedly used in the comments although only one person attributed its origin to Mao. Mao himself did not coin the phrase as such but his use of it in relation to America was indeed novel and much quoted. In a 1946 interview, he said: “The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon. All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful.” In a later interview, he further argued that the USA: “In appearance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of; it is a paper tiger. Outwardly a tiger, it is made of paper, unable to withstand the wind and the rain. I believe that it is nothing but a paper tiger.” Building on the legacy of their leader, one of the commenters echoed his words even without explicitly referring to him: “US imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers. They have atomic bombs, but I have grenades.” Although only one person actually quoted Mao himself in relation to the paper tiger comparison, his thinking and broader ideology had clearly influenced the Chinese internet users more than half a century later not only because references to America as a paper tiger were common but also because the arguments used were very similar to the original arguments put forward by Chairman Mao. Geopolitics in Flux—The Trade War, Hegemony/Imperialism, and the New World Order As some of the examples used in the presentation of the patriotic theme showed, commenters also very frequently engaged in discussions of a geopolitical nature. These discussions were wide-ranging—from speculating on America’s motivations, to wage the trade war on China to questioning the US role as a world hegemon, to predicting what the future might hold

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Turning bad into good - The trade war as an opportunity for China's upheaval

• 1. The "real" nature of the trade war • 2. China's upheaval

Shuffling cards - China's utopian bright future and the new world order/

• 1. China's utopian bright future • 2. The new world order

Graph 4.2  Geopolitics theme in the Chinese comments

for world politics and for China’s and America’s standing in the world. Two key themes underpinned the discussions: (1) Turning bad into good—the trade war as an opportunity for China’s upheaval. (2) Shuffling cards—China’s utopian bright future and the new world order (Graph 4.2). Turning Bad into Good: The “Real” Nature of the Trade War To start with, when discussing America’s motivations for launching the trade war, most people clearly pointed out that America was the perpetrator, and in that sense, the war was “unavoidable.” Commenters wrote that the war was “provoked by the Yankees,” “initiated by the US,” and that Trump had started it. One poster wrote: Thirty years ago, Trump threatened to fight a trade war against China in a television interview. Now, 20 to 30 years later, Trump eventually succeeded in becoming the president of the US. He cannot stop or cancel the trade war between China and the US. This is the soul in his bones!

The most common reason for the launching of the war, according to the Chinese commenters, was America’s attempt to stop or contain the rapid development of China with the aim of maintaining its world hegemony:

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The ultimate goal of the US government is to stop the momentum of China’s rapid development and maintain America’s global hegemony. The United States just wants to interrupt the progress of the “Made in China 2025: Intelligent Manufacturing Initiative”. And the sanctions are always imposed on China’s key development projects. Sinister. Chairman Mao said long ago that the evil ambition of American imperialism to overthrow us will never die. Fight US imperialism to the end! Their purpose is to stop China’s development! Dominate the world! We must unite! Overthrow US imperialism!

The alleged success of the Made in China 2025 initiative was quoted by a few people as the reason their country was targeted. A few saw an even more sinister motivation in the US actions: not just slowing down its development but “the death of China”: The conflict between the US Empire and us is no longer something that money can solve. America wants you to go down forever and not be able to challenge it. They want your death rather than money. Chinese people should be aware! The US wants our money as well as our lives. It is not just the US who wants China dead. There is absolutely no one who can succeed—because China always holds its life tightly in its own hands. A country trying to take China’s life will never live a second longer than China.

By unveiling an even more “malicious plan” to “kill” China as a country, it becomes much easier to justify any form of retaliatory action against the USA and any other country, for that matter, that dares to attack China. Speculations were rife as to what exactly was the “real” nature of the trade war. A few people called it “a psychological war” without really explaining what they meant by that apart from “America playing psychological tricks on us.” Some said that it was mainly economic since America’s aim “to destroy the win-win situation of cooperation and seize [a] greater [share of the] economic benefits [of trade].” For others, this was predominantly a public opinion war and the follow-up developments with the coronavirus pandemic provided even more evidence of that, or as one person put it, “You cannot just think that a man of moral integrity does not fear any slanderous attack. Global public opinion is as lethal as the pandemic! Go, China!!!” This take on the war was linked to a broader view shared by a number of Chinese netizens that the war was inherently political and ideological:

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The essence of Sino-US confrontation is ideological confrontation. China-US economic and trade frictions are about integrity and ideology! The trade war is not a fight for interests, but more for dignity, sovereignty, equality and rules.

The ideological aspect of the battle served as a major motivation for China to see the trade war as a “life-and-death struggle” and to fight “resolutely.” As one person put it, “The essence of this China-US trade war is a life-and-death battle between the Chinese and the Americans. Chinese people cannot take it seriously enough!” Another one explained that “if we do not take this chance to hurt the US badly, it will cause trouble in the future.” Self-defence in the form of counterattack was seen as an inevitability: No matter who loses more, this has been unilaterally initiated by the US, which requires us to fight back! Mao Zedong once said: We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack! Don’t mess with me and I won’t mess with you. But if somebody messes with me, you can bet I’ll mess with them. Counterattack and strike the painful spot until America dares not act at it wishes.

Turning Bad into Good—China’s Upheaval While there were a few moderate voices who similar to the first commenter did not rule out the possibility that both sides would lose from the trade war, many urged their fellow citizens to make the most of it and see the war as an opportunity for China’s upheaval or as one person put it, as something that “turns the bad into good.” Another person wrote that “After ten years of the trade war, the world will be surprised to find that China has risen, but the US has fallen.” Similarly, a poster argued that “The trade war makes China more confident. It makes us be more united, and contribute to the revival of our great nation!” While in the beginning of the trade war there were more cautious voices, with time there was an increase in the number of people who saw the trade war as an opportunity. As one commenter put it, “Chinese companies should take this window of opportunity and make up for their shortcomings quickly.” Another one explained that by not trading with the USA, the Chinese economy might

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develop “faster and better” because it would be in a position to trade with “more than 200 countries and regions in the world.” This person argued that America would eventually “come knocking on our door.” Other netizens also argued that America was being “extremely foolish” because: America’s blockade of Chinese companies is bound to lead to the loss of China’s large market. And once the Chinese companies are forced to develop their own chips independently, the US will no longer pose a threat to Chinese high-tech. So, in the long run the US is extremely foolish, because it underestimates the determination of the Chinese. China’s rise is inevitable. Only cooperation with China can truly achieve a win-win situation for both sides.

Other posters argued that if American companies and products withdrew from the Chinese market, this vacuum would inevitably have to be filled by domestic or foreign substitutes, and that “may be good news for other countries in terms of international trade. Through being repeatedly tempered, China will progress faster and better!” Germany was quoted as a potential beneficiary from the falling out between China and the USA.  People went out of their way to frame every single aspect of the trade war as potentially beneficial for China. Thus, one commenter wrote that the higher tariffs were “a good thing, encouraging more independent innovations and self-made products in China. China will only become stronger.” Another one expressed their view that it was good for China that America had stopped importing their steel because they could use this as an opportunity “to shut down a bunch of large steel mills because their pollution is very serious.” The US sanctions imposed on the Chinese company Huawei in the midst of the trade war were frequently given as an example of a bad situation that had the potential to turn into a good one. One person summed up the prevailing sentiment: Trump will be so scared by Huawei he will pee in his pants and will declare a state of emergency in the US. The entire US will be in a panic. Such a declaration will become free advertising for Huawei. The American suppression of Huawei could turn into a good thing.

The ongoing battle with the USA did indeed become a means of free advertising for Huawei, especially in China itself. Many wrote that they

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had replaced their iPhones with Huawei mobile phones and did not forget to mention how good the Huawei phones were and how happy they were with them. There was a lot of cheering of Huawei because this was “a key move in the China-US trade war,” and it should not be “treated simply as American suppression of a Chinese company.” The US sanctions against Huawei were seen as a collective attack on Chinese technology, or as one commenter put it, “It’s more accurate to say the US is blocking the rise of Chinese technology than to say it is blocking Huawei. The Chinese people should recognize this fact and fully support Huawei to win this white war.” In this trade war, the country must coordinate its strategies very closely with those Chinese enterprises that are being supressed. Only unified commands and coordinated operations can achieve useful results!!! Applaud for Huawei! Huawei, come on! Faced with the trade war, we should show neither inferiority nor superiority to the US. Come on, Huawei. Come on, China. Huawei is a role model for Chinese companies. It wins glory for China! It fights for China! All Chinese people should support Huawei, support justice! Huawei, I applaud you!

Huawei was seen “as a role model” for Chinese companies not only because it was “the backbone of China’s high-tech manufacturing industry” but also because it paved the way for a policy of resistance to American domination, or as commenter put it, “Sue FedEx as well. Unveil their ugly faces and beat them until their heads are broken and bleeding.” Similarly, another one wrote, “People all over China want to see that America is smashing his feet with the stone he lifted.” Shuffling Cards—China’s Utopian Bright Future and the New World Order In general, enthusiasm for China’s future was rife. One person even wrote, “Every sanction or blockage imposed by the Western countries causes China to be reborn with full energy like a phoenix.” Another one added that “As long as the Chinese nation insists on self-improvement and [maintains] an unyielding national spirit, the revival of China will not be far off!!!” A third one saw the trade war as “an obstacle that must be overcome in order to realise the ‘Chinese dream’.” For the majority of

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commenters, no matter how torturous the road was, the outcome was bound to be positive for China. A utopian bright future awaited their country: An old man’s (Mao Zedong) saying is good: the future is bright; the road is tortuous! [Like] [Like] [Thank You] [Thank You] We will break through the darkness and go into the light! Money or energy, give whatever you have to help. Being united as one will help us to get through this winter and greet a beautiful spring!

The bright future promise is a common communist strategy for ensuring compliance with the regime in the hope of better times. The message is: no matter how difficult your lives are, hang in there, your poor life and the sacrifices you are asked to make are not a result of the actions of the authorities (you should not even be thinking of them) but they are all a means to an end—the bright future! Even admitting that the road was tortuous was an achievement of sorts because another key feature of communist regimes is that people do not discuss their difficulties in public and life is generally presented as a bliss. Although references to the tortuous road were made (implicitly or explicitly) when discussing the personal impact of the trade war on their lives, the majority claimed that they were not really affected by it: It’s none of my business. I haven’t bought anything from abroad. I can’t even afford expensive goods produced at home. So, I have nothing to do with it. I haven’t felt any pressure or influence on my life. The China-US trade war has been going on for a long time, but in the lives of ordinary people, everything remains as usual. Haven’t felt anything changed yet. Why haven’t we felt any impact of the trade war?

Only one person mentioned that they were unemployed but most references to the tortuous road were made in a typical way for the communist propaganda: Don’t be too happy. This is just the beginning. The war won’t end easily. In the future, every candidate for [the US] presidency will play the China card for more votes. The trade war can only be won by fighting hard, hurting it, and hurting the global economy.

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Support domestic products. Everyone makes their own contribution. Increase domestic consumption. We will definitely overcome the difficulties. China will win. I love my motherland. No matter how hard it is, it will pass! The hard life shall pass. The older generation was able to survive hardship in the past. It’s nothing for us?! There are always obstacles on the way to becoming powerful.

These comments demonstrate two significant trends. First, as the first two comments showed, a range of strategies were proposed in order to make the Chinese dream come true. Second, as the last comment demonstrated, they gave us an indication about what this bright future might actually entail (“becoming powerful”). I will initially elaborate upon the first trend and will then discuss the second one. Two main types of strategies were proposed by the Chinese commenters. On the one hand, short-term strategies oriented toward ensuring that China wins the trade war, and on the other hand, long-term ones with a view of developing China as a world leader. The short-term strategies included: imposing retaliatory economic sanctions; encouraging the buying of domestic products and discouraging the purchasing of American goods by most notably boycotting Apple products; not travelling overseas but travelling domestically; challenging the US dollar; stopping the exports of steel to the USA; selling (a part of) the US debt; and focusing on improving and protecting the national economy. Protracting the trade war was also seen as a potentially good thing for China. The long-term strategies were building on Chairman Mao’s strategy of self-reliance/self-­ sufficiency and investing in science—research, development, high tech, key skills, and innovations. In both cases, China’s character and national identity were seen as a key strength. Patriotism was a driving force informing the direction of these strategies and the end goal. Thus, buying domestic products and no longer purchasing American goods was seen as an act of patriotism: “Supporting domestic products … is to support the motherland.” Under the banner of “every citizen is a soldier,” commenters were urging their fellow Chinese citizens to: “use domestic products and ditch American goods. Let 1.3 billion Chinese people unite together to defend themselves against their foreign enemies.” A person justified this view of American products by explaining that Apple products in particular should be boycotted, because they “threaten our national internet security” and “our domestic products are no worse than

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Apple.” Another one wrote that “No one does not like their own children! Use domestic products!” Commenters pointed out that if all Chinese people stopped using iPhones, then China would easily win the trade war. A person praised their fellow citizens for improving their political consciousness by not showing off their iPhones as much as they used to do. They suggested that by using domestic products, “the users can also have a good reputation for being patriotic,” thus implicitly referring to the social credit system. “Apples are not sold in the fruit shop anymore,” another one summed up. In addition to Apple products, Chinese netizens were urging the imposition of tariffs on GM, Ford, Boeing, Nike, Adidas, McDonald’s, and Hollywood products as well as the banning the sales of soybeans and soybean goods on health and safety grounds. In the eyes of the Chinese, “all American products have lost their credibility” and the erecting of an economic great wall was seen as the key to winning the trade war. The message was clear: “Come on, everyone. Don’t buy imported goods, [or] travel overseas. Buy domestic products and travel inside China.” This policy of “active de-Americanization” was to be complemented by destabilizing the US dollar by “de-dollarizing” China and selling the US debt as well as banning the export of rare earth resources: De-dollarize earlier, sell US debt. What’s the point of making more money and lending it to the US? The essence of US hegemony is dollar hegemony. If the trade war is prolonged, China will inevitably try to weaken the US dollar (US debt, petrodollars, etc.). If it is done properly, it will quickly weaken the strength of the US! Gradually dump US debt. If not, Trump will not honour America’s debt later.

Longer-term, the focus had to be placed on the Chinese economy itself because commenters felt that the key lesson that China should learn from this trade war was about “the severity of international trade and the importance of keeping core technology.” As one person put it, “History has proved that as long as the core products are self-produced, blockading the country is a dead-end street.” The key to “holding its own destiny” for China was in the development of high technology, which should go hand in hand with sustained investment in research and development, as these comments show:

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The core technology must be in your own hands. The country should plan ahead like Huawei, upgrade the structure of the high-tech industry, and increase support to companies, so that we can avoid being constrained by others at critical times. Focus on practicing key skills, improve policies through long-term planning, pay attention to science and technology, and truly improve the development of technology. There are so many people in China and so many people in the world. There is no shortage of talent. Given the high rewards, there must be [people with] high-tech talent to apply for jobs in China. It is necessary to protect the top scientists, equip them with bodyguards, babysitters, drivers, cooks and security staff and other essentials. Every company must invest heavily in research and development while making money, otherwise it will be seized by the throat.

Ultimately, what China was aiming to achieve through these measures was self-reliance so it was not ever held hostage by other countries. As Thomas (2019) pointed out, the Maoist concept of self-reliance “has been supported by all subsequent leaders, even if its application has evolved over time. That’s because self-reliance fundamentally means that the CCP will retain ultimate control over China’s economic development—an enduring consensus that has heavily influenced policy across generations of leaders.” However, the reason why so many commenters started talking about self-reliance at this point in time was because the Chinese President Xi Jinping used the concept initially in the autumn of 2018. He said “key technology is becoming harder to obtain internationally” and thus China was “forced to take the road of self-reliance” (Thomas, 2019), a claim he repeated several times over the course of the next few months. Unsurprisingly, the first mention of the concept of self-reliance in the comments was after Jinping started talking about it with the same focus evident on “key technology.” Here are a few examples: Independence, self-reliance, striving for strength! China must be self-reliant to avoid being crushed and seized by the throat!!! Only by being self-reliant can you be unafraid of others sticking in your throat. The old man Chairman Mao is farsighted! It also made the Chinese people appreciate the foresight of the people’s leader, Mao Zedong. Independence and self-reliance are key to China’s standing in the forest of the world’s nations. We must maintain the independence of economy, industry, and technology.

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After the implementation of these strategies, there was only possible outcome of the trade war in the eyes of the Chinese people—victorious China: The Chinese nation will win, the Chinese people will win. China will win. The Chinese people will win. Persist to the end. The Chinese people will never be defeated.

China’s victory clearly meant that the USA would be the loser in this war. The USA itself “could only go backward” or even worse—“destroy itself” and “end in failure.” Just fight. Happiness comes from comparing China and the US. We cannot develop. They may even go backwards. What are we afraid of? Ultimately the US will hurt itself by initiating the trade war! The US will end in failure! If it continues, the US will destroy itself. While China is getting stronger and stronger. The United States will go downhill in the trade war, which the people of the world are happy to see. The loser must be the US. The US will never win against China in this kind of war unless it changes its political system.

After the start of the pandemic, other countries “slandering” China also joined the category of those who deserved severe punishments, but this time the thread of wiping one’s enemies out gained further impetus and an even stronger military dimension. Commenters were seriously concerned that their country’s reputation was being unfairly and severely damaged. “The Eight Allied Imperialist Forces want to divide up China again. Be prepared to face a fierce fight, and completely, thoroughly, and cleanly defy my enemies!” wrote one person. Trump’s future was also considered to be in jeopardy, because China was “shaking his throne” and because he has shot himself in the foot by starting the trade war with China and later “slandering” it. Trump’s biggest mistake, in the eyes of Chinese commenters, was underestimating China and thinking that it was similar to Japan and the Soviet Union rather than paying “attention to the strength and status of China.” As one person put it, “After WW2, the US killed off some of the second largest countries in the world. This time, the US is taking China’s case for granted but has failed.” Another one said that “China and the US are matched in

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strength.” A third one added that “History must not be repeated. We should mobilize all forces to gather evidence and strike the anti-China countries led by the United States badly.” The commenters quite rightly predicted that Trump was unlikely to win the 2020 presidential elections because “When Trump’s higher tariffs hurt the Americans themselves, the Americans will elect another president to withdraw these tariffs.” Although interest in Trump’s election victory was very weak, by the end of his presidency there was widespread consensus that Trump was not good for China. Victorious China which has defeated the superpower USA and thrown Trump out of power was only one aspect of China’s bright future. Much more significant were the wider implications of this victory that the Chinese people envisaged in their comments. In their view, China’s victory would lead to a symbolic shuffling of cards on the world stage and a new world order with China at the helm: Independence and self-reliance are the guiding lights of the invincible Chinese people. It is also the most reliable magic weapon for us to transition from a big country to a great power. The soldiers and civilians are united as one. Let’s see who can compete with us! If you fight with Trump, fight to the end, and create a new world! In this trade war between China and the United States, the fact that China can stand firmly on the front line, oppose unilateralism, fight against American bullying, and let the world know China and understand China is a victory in itself. China’s performance in this trade war has actually exceeded the significance of the trade war.

Chinese commenters clearly recognized that at present the USA held a hegemonious position but in their view “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable. The Chinese dragon is taking off.” Moreover, as one person put it, “two tigers cannot coexist on the same mountain. The brave one wins!” References to China as the “eastern great power” or “eastern giant” were common. They were hoping that “No. 1 will become No. 2” or even No. 3. The summer of 2018, in particular, was seen as “an important turning point in the global order.” The new world order that China was promoting would be one in which justice would prevail and China would “make a peaceful life for people all over the world.” China’s victory was a victory for peace and justice, or as one person put it, “Feel that there is no more justice out there. Let the Eastern Lion roar in the mountains and reshape the world.” That’s why “the people of the world”

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would be happy to see China’s rise and America’s decline. One commenter even quoted the British polymath Bertrand Russell who allegedly said that “China will create a more splendid civilization than the West!”

Argumentation, Engagement, and Civility The quality of argumentation of the comments was very low with a mean score of 0.37 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level of argumentation. While there were reasons provided to justify one’s viewpoint/position in 27.9% of the comments, evidence was used in only 3.7% of the sample and questions were asked in 5.3% of the comments. Only 3 out of 756 commenters acknowledged other people’s views/positions, which is 0.4% of all comments. The most common type of evidence used was statistics while it was difficult to judge for most questions who the addressee was. Thus, overall while there was some evidence of reasoning (a score of 0.62 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest and 4 is the highest possible score), there was barely any reciprocity at all (a score of 0.1 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 in the lowest and 4 is the highest possible score). With regard to engagement, a very similar trend was observed. While the overall level of engagement was higher—1.1 mean on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level of engagement— engagement was predominantly taking place with the topic of the article the comment was related to. The majority of comments—85.8%—were on topic and 13.5% engaged with the news medium or the author of the article, most frequently by praising the author for his insightful analysis. Thus, the editor of The Global Times received lots of praise for his analysis of the trade war. However, engagement with other users in terms of getting involved in a conversation with them was non-existent. Only 12 comments in total or 1.6% had some level of engagement with other users. The others did not even acknowledge that other comments existed. Even the ones where there was some level of engagement with other users never directly addressed the other user. It was more a case of answering a question posed. Alternative views were never acknowledged, let alone tackled. All in all, there was a cacophony of voices sharing very similar views but not really talking to each other. Given the collectivist nature of Chinese society and that so many of the commenters were praising the politeness of Chinese people, it is puzzling that no attempts were made to talk with each other. The culture of commenting seemed to be very much

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expressing agreement with the ideas put forward in the respective article and pretending that other people’s views did not exist. In a way, there was very strong cohesion in terms of the ideas discussed and supported, as the qualitative analysis shows, but no dialogue, let alone evidence of deliberation. Staying on topic was a key feature of the Chinese comments coupled with no or very little engagement with other users. On a more superficial level, there was some engagement with the comments expressed through the number of likes. The average number of likes per comment was 121 but with a standard deviation of 608. The most liked comment received 15,125 likes, thus providing further evidence for the popularity of the blind/zealous patriotism theme, because this comment was precisely an expression of it. It said: “I am Chinese. I love the motherland. It is that simple.” The second most liked comment with 2643 likes was along similar lines: “Supporting domestic products … is to support the motherland. [Like] [Like].” The third most liked comment with 2618 likes was urging the closing down of traitor websites: “All of these [news reporting accounts] who pass information to foreign countries [and] create and disseminate rumours should be closed down!” A comment quoting Chairman Mao was also among the most liked with over 2000 likes. Another comment calling Trump “a lunatic” attracted 1456 likes. Similarly, a comment calling the USA “a hooligan” received 1334 likes. By contrast, the very few comments expressing alternative and potentially dissenting views received very few likes—between 2 and 24. The least liked ones in this category were two comments: one in which the poster called for the “killing” of Huawei as well as another one in which the commenter wrote: “How many jobs have we lost? I am unemployed now.” The personal plight of this person was not appreciated by their fellow citizens. With regard to civility, as explained in Chap. 3, I initially asked my research assistant, who is Chinese herself to use her insider cultural understanding of what counts as civil or uncivil in the Chinese context and code according to her understanding. According to her coding, only eight comments were uncivil or 1.1% of all comments. These were mainly comments using animalistic references when describing a person or a group of people. There was no swearing, and foul language was used in only two of the comments. One referred to the USA, Japan, South Korea, and Australia as “the sons of bitches,” while in the other one an expert’s opinion was called “bullshit.” Out of these seven comments, only two were offensive to a person—one of the experts was called “a roaring pig” and “a dog expert.” All the other comments contained animal references that were more

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generally addressed at a group of people—for example, “dog-like traitors” with reference to two websites that have published allegedly fake news about the trade war or “dog-like America” or America as “a crazy dog.” Similarly, when I did the coding by using two separate variables for civility and a third clarifying one, while in total there were more impolite (5.7%) and intolerant (5.3%) comments, the majority were directed either at Trump or at the USA collectively. Thus, I coded the word “hooligan” with reference to America as an example of impoliteness. Similarly, when references were made to Trump as “a lunatic” or “crazy,” I coded them as impolite unlike my research assistant who did not consider these references to be impolite in the Chinese context. Regardless of the understanding of civility, in general, the majority of comments were clearly very civil. In fact, the usefulness of the categories of incivility and intolerance is questionable in a case such as this one when the majority of comments discuss a conflict between two countries. If we apply a strict definition of intolerant discourse as cases when “individuals or groups are attacked in ways that violate moral respect and threaten democratic pluralism” (Rossini, 2020, p. 2) as I did in this study (Honneth, 1996), and this individual is the President of a rival country or the group is a whole nation-state (only two of the intolerant comments were targeting a different group) as in this case, then can we really claim that these comments are detrimental to democracy, especially given that we are not even dealing with a democratic country in this case?

Patterns of Discussion A comparison between the news articles and the comments published under them as well as subsequent contextualization on the basis of the events under study and key political interventions in the form of speeches or political activities showed two main patterns of discussion in the Chinese context—(1) Echoing and cheering the official narrative. (2) Gauging nascent public opinion. The vast majority of comments were in the former category. They generally followed a pattern—as soon as a point of view was put forward in a news article, particularly by an “authoritative” person or news medium, it was picked up and repeatedly echoed by the commenters. The fact that there were barely any comments about Trump when his election victory was announced might be explained by the fact that the articles in this sample announcing his victory did not contain any value judgments about him. One of the headlines was “What does Trump’s

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election as President of the United States mean to China?” but the article did not provide an answer to this question—in fact, it was not discussed at all. It simply reported the facts. With regard to the trade war, the direction online political talk took underwent a few changes, not because of the quality of argumentation or any attempt at agenda-setting by the commenters but because the official narratives were somewhat modified in the course of the trade war due to the way it evolved. There was usually a speech by a political leader or an analysis by a respected commentator that somewhat shifted the direction and then everyone followed suit. There were numerous examples of this trend. The notion that the USA was afraid of the rapid development of China and wanted to contain it was picked up by commenters after it was put forward in an article by CCTV News discussing the “real purpose” of the USA in launching the trade war and referring to the Made in China 2025 strategy and using a set of data to back up their points. Another article by an expert from the Ministry of Commerce was met with praise because it explained that “the Sino-US contradiction is essentially a contradiction between the hegemonic United States and the emerging power of China. It is a conflict caused by the United States’ attempt to contain China.” In it, the view was expressed that the trade war was “likely to become a major landmark event in the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation from ‘standing up’ and ‘getting rich’ to ‘becoming strong’” as well as an opportunity for China to “rewrite and establish international economic and political rules”—views that were later echoed by the commenters. Similarly, an article by the state-run news agency Xinhua News summing up the need for China to counterattack emphasized the fact that China never wanted to fight but it had no choice. This then prompted a wave of supportive statements by commenters, including declarations that they were prepared to live through hardship in the name of China since “the motherland” needed their contribution. A few months into the trade war, and the expression “protracted war” started to be used in the articles—again something simultaneously picked up by the commenters with the additional element of people explaining how they have not felt the impact of the war on a personal level. By the same token, the idea that “comprehensive national strength will always be the most important bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations” was expressed in a China Daily article. Another key idea put forward in this article and subsequently echoed as a key theme in the comments was that of the trade war as an opportunity for upheaval, especially for China’s high-tech companies, which “should seize this

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window and quickly make up for their shortcomings” (http:// ex.chinadaily.com.cn/exchange/par tners/77/rss/channel/cn/ columns/32tlvc/stories/WS5d84b1b8a31099ab995e150e.html?tt_ group_id=6738708040930820612). This is how the article ended: China has always had a tradition of “independence and self-reliance,” which is also at the heart of Mao Zedong’s thinking, which runs through the entire process of Chinese revolution and construction. When China became independent and self-reliant, China possessed a large number of technologies such as atomic bombs, artificial satellites, nuclear submarines, Yun-10 aircraft, and Galaxy computers. It embodies the Chinese nation’s self-­improvement and indomitable national spirit, presents Chinese style and Chinese character, and this time is no exception, China’s “fate” has the final say! (http://ex.chinadaily.com.cn/exchange/partners/77/rss/ channel/cn/columns/32tlvc/stories/WS5d84b1b8a31099ab995e150e. html?tt_group_id=6738708040930820612)

The notions of self-reliance and independence as well as the key strength in terms of national spirit were all key themes in the comments. Every change in the focus of the official narrative led to a chorus of supportive voices rather than a rational discussion about the claims made. In fact, the enthusiasm in the form of propagandistic slogans and declarations of patriotic devotion in the comments far outweighed the pathos in the articles themselves. Thus, a news piece about Huawei’s legal battle with the US authorities was met with an outpouring of support by Chinese posters. Another article by The People’s Daily summarized the main points in the 71-page white paper published by the Information Office of the State Council of The People’s Republic of China in September 2018 called: “The Facts and China’s Position on China-US Trade Friction.” These main points were exactly the points echoed by the Chinese citizens as outlined in the section on the key themes in the comments. It talked about “The trade bullyism practices of the US administration,” the initially cooperative attitude of China but also the need for it to “safeguard” its national dignity and core interests as well as its ambitions to “firmly implement an innovation-driven development strategy” and its firm commitment to “building a community with a shared future for mankind.” The paper ended with: A just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust one finds little support.” In a world of increasing uncertainty, instability and insecurity, China

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will remain true to its original aspiration, follow the trend of the times, shoulder its responsibility for justice, and pursue the greater good. It will unswervingly safeguard the multilateral trading system, press forward with the reform of global governance, promote world peace, contribute to global development, uphold international order, and build a community with a shared future for mankind.

The 71-page white paper was not analyzed in any level of depth in the articles and the comments were even worse in that respect because its coverage only led to an increase in the propagandistic slogans and declarations of blind patriotism. Justice and promoting world peace also became key topics in the Chinese comments. Another article by Xinhua News argued that “China stands on the moral high ground.” That inherent belief in China’s moral superiority was coupled with an implicit dissatisfaction with the US (and more broadly the world’s) treatment of China. As argued by Boylan et al. (2021), this was due “to a long-felt sense of persecution in the global space and an eagerness to participate fully, and lead in some issue areas, in international affairs” (p. 23). The idea of divine retribution was also implicitly present in the comments, especially when they were discussing the “unfair treatment” of China during the pandemic. In fact, one commenter wrote “Good and evil are rewarded eventually.” The reactions to the pandemic in the USA and in other Western countries were met with a high level of dissatisfaction and there were even calls for a military attack. Again, similarly to all other key themes, in this case, there was an article published discussing the unfair treatment of China particularly by the USA in which the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was condemned for his slandering of China. One poster summed up the prevailing sentiment, again implicitly referring to China’s moral superiority: “The truth belongs to the real strong man. The one who offends China will be punished!” All in all, the majority of Chinese comments tell the story of how propaganda under a dictatorial authoritarian regime works in practice in the digital age. The online space is a sad reflection of Chinese society and similar authoritarian societies. It does not really matter whether the posts were written by real people, bots, or the 50-cent army: the vast majority were on message and even cheered the message with patriotic pathos. As one of the commenters implicitly acknowledged, in China propaganda is a good thing—“Hu is skilled in propaganda. He analyses things thoroughly, reasonably, with the big picture in mind. I have read the dialogue between

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Hu and young people from Hong Kong. It is indeed good, rational. Thumbs-up!” The person the commenter referred to was Xijin Hu, the editor-in-chief of Global Times—a newspaper developed under the auspices of People’s Daily—the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lee (2010) explained that the newspaper was targeted at “elite audiences” and featured “the most extensive international news coverage in Mainland China. The Global Times is furthermore the primary site for public commentary and discussion of the country’s role in global politics, culture, and economy, especially with respect to China’s peaceful rise to the status of global superpower” (p. 260). It is known for echoing the Communist Party’s line. There were two further articles published by The Global Times on March 27, 2018, and July 09, 2018, that attracted a lot of comments. Both articles were highly critical of a few news stories widely circulated on WeChat. The first article related to a news story arguing that China had admitted defeat and had conceded to the USA in the trade war. It did not name the original sources of these articles although there were screenshots included from two news websites—mychinanews.com and backchina.com. The latter one targets Chinese citizens abroad and is blocked in mainland China. The Global Times article argued that these “marketing accounts with unknown origins and intentions” had misrepresented a story by the Wall Street Journal. The Global Times article quoted Huawei’s boss Xu Zhijun urging Chinese readers to “pay more attention to the Chinese authoritative media’s voice on the issue of trade war’, and patiently wait for the latest news from the Chinese diplomatic and commercial departments from the negotiating table, instead of being affected by these marketing accounts with unknown origins and intentions. Zhijun also encouraged news users not to ignore all “‘keyboard experts’ constantly preaching on the Internet that ‘China should not fight back against the United States’.” The second article with the headline “Chinese, beware! Two more rumours about the China-US trade war” claimed that two news stories published by a domestic website called Shanghai Metals Market, branding itself as “the leading integrated internet platform provider of nonferrous and ferrous metals,” were fake. One of them announced the imposition of additional sanctions by the USA and the other one quoted a speech by Trump, which according to The Global Times, he had not actually delivered. In addition to fact-­ checking, the critical piece also offered three media literacy tips: (1) “Learn English well and understand the common sense of American politics, because only in this way will you not be fooled by domestic rumors and

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can go directly abroad for verification.” This is a paradoxical tip, given that the way the information in that particular case was verified was by going on the Wall Street Journal website—a website banned in China. One of the commenters was even puzzled by this tip by asking: “Why learn English?” The second tip was: “Don’t listen to information sources of unknown origin, and follow authoritative media at home and abroad as the standard, especially from authoritative media to understand Trump’s real foreign policy.” The final tip was to be mindful of claims about time and place of the event because rumors usually did not specify time and place. Both articles by the Global Times attracted a flurry of supportive comments urging the banning/killing/severe crackdown and punishments of these “marketing websites” as well as arrests or beating up of the “rumour mongers.” One person wrote, “There are far too many Internet traitors. They should be beaten.” Another one similarly added that “Those accounts should be sealed! In the face of strong enemies, those who please the enemies and annoy us should be beaten to death.” A few urged these “pro-American marketing account holders” “disrupting internal cohesion” to be taught a lesson. A commenter pointed out that “The wise do not buy rumours!” Rather than discussing the points made in the articles under critique, commenters were unilaterally condemning them because they had been advised to do so. Moreover, they were even harsher than the original article condemning the two news pieces, which was not particularly calling for sanctions, let alone beating up or killing. These examples yet again demonstrate the nature of the first pattern of discussion identified in the comments, namely that of echoing and cheering the official narrative. The second pattern of discussion was of gauging nascent public opinion. In these cases, opinions on views expressed by an expert were split with some commenters openly disagreeing with the expert’s position and questioning his credibility and authoritativeness. There were two such cases—one concerning an interview given by the Chair of the National Institute of Financial Research and former Deputy Managing Director of the IMF—Zhu Min, and a second one related to an opinion piece by Zhaozhong Zhang, a retired Chinese military theorist, mockingly nicknamed as “局座”—“Chief of the Strategic Fool-You Agency.” There was a reason why these experts were allowed to publicly voice their opinions, even though they were not necessarily seen as official representatives of the Chinese authorities and, as such, were not necessarily entirely echoing the official narrative. In both cases, the experts served a useful purpose from

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the perspective of the authorities themselves, which explains why they were not outrightly condemned by state media in the way “rumour mongering” news accounts were. The authorities could in this way test nascent public opinion by allowing experts to give voice to strategies that they were deliberating upon but had not fully decided on or by sharing bold outlooks for the future. Thus, Zhu Min was discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a softer versus a harder counterattack on the USA, while Zhaozhong Zhang was predicting a very optimistic, and therefore much-­ coveted outlook, for China’s future. Given that the experts were not seen as official representatives of the Chinese authorities, their views could be much more openly discussed and subjected to criticism than if they were simply presenting the official state message. The article with Zhu Min’s interview was published by CCTV News— the news channel of China’s Central Television and a mouthpiece of government. The headline was: “Authoritative interpretation! Is there a China-US trade war or not? Is China’s counterattack too weak?” Min was advocating an approach along the lines of: “I am not afraid to fight with you, but I am still very rational. I hope to avoid this conflict for the common interest of the whole world” as well as a cautiously optimistic outlook about the outcome of the trade war. Since in the interview his view was somewhat ambivalent—from it is better as a power of stability for China not to fight to still we have a range of measures at our disposal which we can use to counterattack, commenters’ views also reflected this ambivalence with some arguing for a more cautious and tempered approach, while others advocated uncompromising fighting and retaliation. In that particular case, there were even a few users who directly attacked Min’s expertise: The expert’s philosophy is “Better to be a dog in a peaceful time than a human being in a chaotic country”, so I call the expert “Dog Expert”. I think that if two cars collided, the one hit hardest takes advantage of the [other]. It’s better not to fight, or else hit the US hard. Some experts and scholars in China are just graduates of junior high schools. They are cowards, working for the interests of the US at the expense of China’s. Zhu Min’s article is very mediocre. Don’t be afraid of the Yankees! Since Trump has raised his big stick, he just wanted to beat China down to his feet! Don’t have any illusions about the Yankees! Mao Zedong once said: We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack! The war against Japan! The War of Liberation! The Korean War! … At all times and in all countries, whether on the political,

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economic, or military front, it is fruitless to compromise and beg for peace in exchange for the other party’s mercy. What we need is the unity of the Chinese nation, all together to win the trade war provoked by the Yankees! Another “expert”. Intellectuals, intellectuals get the country into trouble.

The fact that Min gained his postgraduate degrees from US universities clearly did not work in his favor and was used as a point of attack for some commenters. This example also showed that when there was ambivalence in the narrative and the official policy, there was also potential for meaningful discussions and argumentation. However, as it becomes clear from this example, this potential was realised only to an extent because even if we disregard the questioning of his expertise, even though there was an attempt to use evidence and justify one’s opinions, there was no real discussion among the commenters themselves who were not addressing each other’s views. Similarly, in the second case, in his analysis Zhaozhong predicted that “Trump will bring the United States to the second place in the world during his tenure” and China would overtake the USA. Zhaozhong is one of the most well-known military commentators and military theorists in China who often appears on state-owned television outlets such as CCTV. He is also a professor at Chinese People’s Liberation Army National Defence University, and holds the rank of Rear Admiral in the People’s Liberation Army Navy. However, Zhaozhong’s nickname is Chief of the Strategic Fool-You Agency because of his wrong predictions during the CCTV live broadcast of the Iraq War and his attempts to hide the real military strength of China by most notably denying the existence of the Chinese stealth fighter J-20. His analysis was met with split opinions. On the one hand, some people praised him (“this is a great opinion. Thumbs up”; “Sharp opinions”; The “Chief of the Strategic Fool-You Agency” is one of the few people who dares to speak up. I hope you will be safe your whole life. The CIA is seeking opportunities to kill you”), while others mocked him (“Chief of the Strategic Fool-You Agency, eastern fairytales”). A few were being sarcastic by writing: (“You are like a God,” “Worship”). Notably, there were some who expressed critical views of the Chinese authorities: Mr Zhang, don’t you think China won’t wake up until someone taps it? I still remember a video recording of the “Chief of the Strategic Fool-­ You Agency’s comments on whether the US would attack Kuwait after it

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attacked Iraq. Those comments were so accurate! They capture the Chinese government’s later judgement on the US-Iraq war! A tall tree catches the wind. This is the result of China’s bragging in recent years.

As a whole, these nascent dissenting views were very rare and therefore cannot be conceptualized under a third pattern of discussion not only because of their low prevalence (less than 2% of all comments) but also because they all sounded like lonely voices. In addition to the four examples below, there were six more instances of that: [Just because] they lose more than you, doesn’t mean you can win the trade war! How many jobs have we lost? I am unemployed now. According to the WTO’s agreement, China should have completed its transformation of the market economy by 2011 at the latest. Seven years later, the others deem that you do not have a market economy and you are still talking back! The content promoted daily by news agents is not correct. They said the increased tariffs on Chinese goods will eventually be paid by US consumers. Now it is clear that, in essence, increasing tariffs limits the exports of Chinese goods into America and restricts the development of the manufacturing industry in China. The news outlets should talk more about these aspects. Please kill Huawei. The Chinese people have been deceived. An infectious disease is an objective fact. If you release the information about it one day later [than necessary], everyone can blame you. We should announce such an objectively real pandemic promptly in the future. We should not stick to the principle of maintaining social stability, otherwise more instability may come.

As can be seen from the examples, they did not directly criticize the political leadership but were questioning some of the official narratives and/or policies by providing a personal outlook of the impact of the trade war (“I am unemployed now”), evidence that things were not as rosy as the authorities made them sound (“no market economy,” restricted development of the manufacturing industry, America losing does not mean we are winning) or by making constructive suggestions (release information about the pandemic more promptly). This was not done in a systematic or organized way, though. These views were usually presented in isolation and were just left hanging without properly being followed up by

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arguments but instead only by repetitive slogans, maintaining the official message. Still, it is significant that there were at least a few critical voices out there in public despite all the censorship. Nonetheless, staying “on message” seemed to be a collective task fulfilled diligently, manifesting itself in various forms—from wishful thinking masked as reality (don’t buy American goods, we can manage without their products) to an aspirational goal (it’s hard but our ultimate goal should be self-reliance). As one person put it, “We want to live, have money and be self-reliant.” Self-­ reliance was presented as this magic weapon (as one of the commenters puts it) for a transition from “a big country to a great power.” There was also occasional guilt-tripping for anyone who has bought property in the USA or traded with the USA.

Concluding Remarks To sum up, two key themes were identified in the 756 comments about Trump and the USA posted on the Chinese Internet between November 2016 and July 2020. The first key theme was that of patriotism, split into two sub-themes—that of blind/zealous patriotism, and of motivated/reasoned patriotism. Within the first sub-theme, there were lots of emotional expressions of patriotism and references to the “ancestral land”/“motherland”; declarations of devotion and potential sacrifices in the name of China (“putting China first”); and numerous fighting and propaganda slogans. Within the second sub-theme, there was a clear process of collective identity with a strong othering dimension to it. America and American people were clearly presented as the other. China and Chinese people were presented as strong, with high endurance, wise, mature, and calm, while America and American people were portrayed in a contrasting way—as the exact opposite—childish, irrational, greedy, and selfish, a hooligan and a bully, with low endurance and its President as crazy and unpredictable. The second key theme was that of geopolitics in flux—the trade war, hegemony/imperialism, and the new world order. It contained two sub-themes—the first one of turning bad into good included a conceptualization of the trade war as an opportunity for China’s upheaval and within it, it contained a discussion about the “real” nature of the trade war, while the second one of shuffling cards was a discussion of China’s utopian bright future and the new world order. The quality of argumentation was generally very low, and while there was some evidence of reasoning, there was no reciprocity in the comments. Similarly, while

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the level of engagement with the topics discussed in the news articles was high and there was also some engagement with the author/news medium, there was no engagement with other users. Most of the comments were civil but the application of the incivility/intolerance categories proved very problematic, given that most offensive posts concerned a whole country at a time of a trade war. Finally, two main patterns of discussion were identified in the comments: echoing and cheering official narratives and gauging nascent public opinion. Expressing alternative views to the official narrative was extremely rare and never subjected to a proper discussion. There was clearly no evidence of deliberation in the Chinese comments, given that commenters were not acknowledging each other’s views and were not really engaging with other users in any way whatsoever. Studying online political talk in a context such as the Chinese one still proved to be a fruitful endeavor because it revealed its current nature, the relevant themes and patterns of discussion as well as the relationship between the comments and the news articles they were related to  and ultimately, that there is political talk in the online space, albeit of a very limited nature.

Bibliography Barth, F. (1969). On ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organisation of culture difference. Waveland Press. Boylan, B. M., McBeath, J., & Wang, B. (2021). US–China relations: Nationalism, the trade war, and COVID-19. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 14(1), 23–40. Buckley, C. (2019, October 1). China loves news about trump’s controversies. Not this time. The New York Times. Retrieved February 7, 2022, from https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/10/05/world/asia/trump-­china-­biden.html Chen, Y.-T. (2008). Return to the middle kingdom: One family, three revolutionaries and the birth of modern China. Union Square Press. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2021). Patriotism. Retrieved February 7, 2022, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/patriotism-­sociology Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who needs identity? In S. Hall & P. Du Guy (Eds.), Questions of cultural identity (pp. 1–17). Thousand Oaks. Honneth, A. (1996). The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts. The MIT Press. Hung, C.-T. (2017). Mao’s New World: Political culture in the early People’s republic. Cornell University Press. Jenkins, R. (2004). Social identity. Routledge.

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King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. American Political Science Review, 107(2), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000014 Lee, C.-C. (2010). Bound to rise: Chinese media discourses on the new global order. In M.  Curtin & H.  Shah (Eds.), Reorienting global communication: Indian and Chinese media beyond Borders (pp. 260–283). University of Illinois Press, Chapter 13. Rossini, P. (2020). Beyond incivility: Understanding patterns of uncivil and intolerant discourse in online political talk. Communication Research. https://doi. org/10.1177/0093650220921314 Schatz, R., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriotism. Political Psychology, 20(1), 151–174. Slavtcheva-Petkova, V. (2011). Children, Europe and the media: A comparison between Bulgaria and England. PhD Thesis. Retrieved February 7, 2022, from: https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/thesis/Children_Europe_and_the_ media_a_comparison_between_Bulgaria_and_England/9480851 Slavtcheva-Petkova, V. (2014). Rethinking banal nationalism: Banal Americanism, Europeanism, and the missing link between media representations and identities. International Journal of Communication, 8, 43–61. Thomas, N. (2019, April 25). Mao Redux: The enduring relevance of self-reliance in China. Macro Polo. Retrieved February 7, 2022, from https://macropolo. org/analysis/china-­self-­reliance-­xi-­jin-­ping-­mao/

CHAPTER 5

Online Comments About Trump and the USA in Russia

This is the second empirical chapter, presenting the results of the analysis of 735 comments about Trump and the USA posted in Russia between November 2016 and July 2020. Russia was the only G20 country where Donald Trump was the preferred choice for US President. The Pew Research Center (Wike et  al.,  2018) reported that Trump received a higher confidence rating (53%) in Russia than either of his two predecessors ever did. Similarly, the favorable attitude toward the USA in Russia almost tripled—from 15% during Obama’s presidency to 41% in the beginning of Trump’s presidency. Initial hopes that Trump’s election would lead to a warming up of the relationship between the two countries were quickly dashed after Russia was accused of meddling in the presidential elections, and Trump came under pressure due to the dubious connections his closest advisers forged with Russia. Trump’s attitude to Russia and President Putin has been ambivalent—from initially promising to forge a new partnership as part of his strategy to revise the role of the USA in the world to eventually reverting “to a more mainstream position on US foreign policy, including some harsh criticism of Russia for its support of Syrian President Bashar” (Rutland, 2017, p. S41). This chapter follows the exact same structure as Chap. 4. It is split into three main parts. Part I traces online commentators’ reactions to the key events in the relationship between Russia and the USA from Trump’s election victory until February 2020. The reactions to news articles on five key

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Slavtcheva-Petkova, Discussing Trump’s America Online, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7_5

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events were analyzed in Russia: (1) Trump’s election to the presidency in November 2016. (2) Trump security adviser Michael Flynn’s resignation in February 2017 after leaks suggesting he tried to cover up Russia talks. (3) FBI Director James Comey’s dismissal in May 2017. (4) Trump’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak in May 2017. (5) Trump’s first impeachment trial in January 2020. The thematic analysis revealed three broader themes: (1) Power, authority and accountability; (2) The meaning and significance of democracy; and (3) Identity, friends, and enemies in politics. While some comments were explicitly discussing the USA–Russia relation, the majority were implicitly passing a judgment on both countries’ political systems by often outlining their normative views and expectations. A bone of contention was whether democracy was a good thing, not just in political terms but also in relation to the standard of living and people’s self-esteem. Unlike the predominantly streamlined and “on message” narratives in the Chinese comments, the viewpoints expressed among Russian commentators were much more polemic. Part II then analyzes the quality of argumentation, the level of engagement between online posters, and the extent to which the comments can be classified as civil. The analysis shows that more than a third of commentators engaged with other users and the points they were making, and that incivility was very rare. The final part then offers a typology of the patterns of discussion emanating from the bottom-up analysis with a view to reaching a wider conceptual conclusion about the nature of online discussions and the spaces within which these discussions take place. Three main patterns of discussion were identified in Russia: (1) Echoing the official narrative. (2) Challenging the official narrative, and criticizing the political system and leadership. (3) Mocking everyone and everything. Sarcasm was a key feature of the Russian comments.

Key Themes The thematic analysis of the 735 comments about Trump and the USA in Russia identified three key themes. The procedure followed was outlined in Chap. 3 but I will briefly explain here how I arrived at these three themes. During the initial coding phase, I identified 115 different themes, which I then refined to 30 broader themes (each of them with lots of different sub-themes) before embarking on the focused coding during which these themes were further refined and elaborated upon. Thus, in the final

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phase I identified three broad themes: (1) Power, authority, and accountability; (2) The meaning and significance of democracy; (3) Identity, friends, and enemies in politics. Their meaning and the sub-­ themes included as part of these broader themes are further explained in the respective sections. Power, Authority, and Accountability This broad theme contained a number of sub-themes within it, as Graph  5.1 shows—(1) Power—meaning & inter- and intra-state power contestations. (2) Authority. (3) Accountability. Power Power was unanimously defined by Russian commenters as political power, namely the possession of political control, authority, or influence over others within one’s own state or in relation to other states. Thus, the term was often used in relation to the US presidential elections and by comparison, Russian presidential elections. Here are a few examples of cases in which the word “power” was explicitly used: it’s very interesting to watch the elections in America. Such a heat of passion! I wonder whether there will ever be similar elections in Russia. Or only continuity of power?

Power

Authority and Accountability

• Meaning • Inter-state contestations • Intra-state contestations

• Authority • Responsibility and accountability

Graph 5.1  Power, authority, and accountability theme in the Russian comments

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Two shameful phenomena—Putin and Trump. Both brought to power by a Russian enterprise. It’s a prime example of how those in power can be criticised, including being criticised by representatives of legislative power, using words that would be impossible to use in some other territories. (Like Russia)

However, a key bone of contention was what yielded this power—economic, military, or other type of strength. Аccording to one commenter, “A victorious country is the one which is stronger in military terms.” Their post was in response to another comment in which power was defined in economic terms. The commenter used historic examples, which prompted a heated discussion: Anti Vatnik, Comparison of economies is a favorite method of liberal political scientists. But in fact—this is nonsense! A victorious country is the one which is stronger in military terms. A vivid example—barbarians. They simply destroyed the Roman Empire, defeating it in battles. And it would be nonsense to compare economies of Romans and barbarians, not even talking about their cultural differences… Scoffer, shit analogy, Rome did not have nuclear weapons, but America does. Scoffer, I would also, add, here that the winner is the one who is stronger in spirit, and the majority of people who live in the country with economy No. 13 really have a strong spirit. But people in the country with the economy number 1 have never had it))) Taleites, Exactly! The country with the “strongest army in Europe”—lol))) Exactly! And it does the right thing! The president of such a country apriori influences world politics. Can it be any other way? What else did they expect? Anti Vatnik, barbarians were not as educated and clever as Romans, however, Alaric I took, plundered, and then destroyed Rome. And more about the brains—modern Russian weapons clearly show that “brains” of modern Russian designers are not worse than in your admired America.

As the comments demonstrate, power was seen as multi-faceted: while for some, it was restricted to military strength, for others, it also included social and cultural capital, including education, collective intelligence, and national spirit. Similarly, there was no consensus on the issue of who the “real” agents of power were. One person argued that the winner in the US elections would not be the elected President but that the President “will

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be ruled by those whom we never see. They are always in the shadows— bloodthirsty, insatiable.” Another commenter clarified that power was in the hands of “the money bags” who “will not allow any president to do whatever he thinks is appropriate.” A third poster was even more specific—they explained that “only America and the Bilderberg Group decide everything, not a person.” One person summarized the meaning of the term power by saying that “politics is a struggle.” Indeed, as evident from the discussion in these comments, they often talked about contestations of power, which in this particular conversation were seen as taking place predominantly on the inter-state level but other commenters also discussed intra-state power struggles. On the inter-state level, the implications of Trump’s election victory for Russia and for other countries were frequently discussed. In general, the majority of commenters saw his victory as a positive event for Russia—a “triumph” both for Trump himself and for Russia: Hooray! TRIUMPH! Pleased and surprised by the choice of the US people! We believe in and wait for Trump! We will start living in a new way! Hooray—it’s a revolution! Trump will lead America to new heights! Long live the United States! It’s a good day today! The world has got hope. Maybe there will be no war…

As can be seen from these few examples, many Russians were in a celebratory mood with high hopes for the future in terms of their own country’s relation with the USA as well as the US role in the world more broadly. As one person summarized, there was “so much joy from the victory of Trump in Russia that there is a feeling that Russians are more hoping for Trump than for Putin.” Russians’ hopes on the surface level were that sanctions against Russia would be lifted, and that Ukraine would be taught a lesson. One person wrote, “the sanctions and counter sanctions will be lifted and Russian economics will improve dramatically!” Another one said: “Rejoice, maybe the war in Ukraine will finally come to an end.” A third one added: “The administration of the territory called Ukraine—the play is over. Crimea is ours. Collect your junk and throw where no matter …” On a deeper level, a victory for Trump clearly meant a victory for Russia and by implication a stronger and more powerful Russia. Trump was called by many “our Trump” and he was seen as Putin’s protégé or even creation. One person wrote, “Congratulations with a convincing

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Victory of the pro-Putin candidate! The ‘Russian World’ won in America, against which the entire Western world factually worked.” Another one urged his fellow citizens to “rejoice,” because “Trump will have a RussianPutin plume for the rest of his life.” A third one said that “Trump became ‘Trump’ thanks to Putin.” However, not everyone thought that this was a cause for celebration. One commenter wrote that Trump was “Putin’s shameful henchman and servitor.” Some commenters pointed out that they “do not even know what to expect now. An unpredictable situation.” A commenter also warned that Trump reminded him of Reagan. While some were indeed more cautious in their approach and wrote they did not know whether “to cry to or to rejoice,” one thing was for certain: if Hilary Clinton had won, that would have been bad for Russia because Trump was the lesser “of two evils.” As one person put it, “Thank God the regular Clintons’ reset in the US-Russia relationship won’t happen.” For most of the commenters, Clinton was a symbol of everything bad for Russia. The Clintons were “liars and scammers,” and the Ukrainian nationalists “were betting on Clinton.” While for many, Trump’s election victory was important for their country, others questioned its relevance to Russia and their own lives. The word “circus” was often used by way of description of the US elections. Circus was hereby used as meaning a chaotic form of entertainment with no other purpose than being interesting to watch: Silly circus—why should we watch it??? Why do WE need this election? What a profound shameful provincialism? Elections in the US, elections in the US. Is there nothing else to write about ??? Boredom… Have we joined America? Why do we broadcast elections in real time? Even the State Duma election was not made that way. Everything was in order, noble. Maybe the deputies are worried about their property in the States? That could be expected. These days TV channels broadcast only Trump and his team. There are no more themes except “our happy future with America and the president Trump” for the past 6 months. The whole world turned upside down. We call other countries America’s vassals, but just look at us…So much shame for the new generation of the Russian administration, who lost their sense of dignity. And it’s affecting people.

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As these comments show, the heavy focus on the US presidential elections in Russia was worrying some people because they saw it as undermining the power of their own country. By focusing on the USA, Russia was acting as a provincial rather than a global power, or worse as a vassal of the USA—the 51st state, as one person put it. This person contrasted the significant interest in the US elections with the very low level of interest in the Russian State Duma elections, which in their view, had not even attracted 5% of this amount of coverage. Another commenter saw this as a way of detracting attention from the domestic problems that the Russian authorities had to instead concentrate on: So tired of these Trumps, Lavrovs, Syria and Lepen. When will the administration start eventually working? No jobs. Our roads haven’t been repaired for two years—sink holes on the road are bigger that the actual road. Prices increase every single day. And here is Trump again.

Another topic that was undoubtedly seen as relevant for all commenters, and which was a further example of inter-state power contestations, was all the allegations about Russian involvement in US politics. The initially positive attitude toward Trump was quickly changed once the drama around Russia’s involvement in US politics unfolded. As one commenter summarized: Yesterday they were screaming with happiness and champagne was flowing like rivers. And now they are roaring and attacking Trump. Trump is the president of the US, not of Russia. And he swore to serve America, not Russia. Russia has its own president. Ask all your questions to him.

The allegations about Russia’s meddling in the US elections and subsequent problematic conversations with US representatives were met with either sarcastic comments or a recognition of the fact that different rules applied in a democratic country like the USA or indeed a recognition that Russia has gone too far in its actions. Some commenters were making fun of what they considered to be “the overreacting” of the US authorities in the handling of Michael Flynn’s talks with the Russian ambassador to Washington resulting in his resignation. “Can’t he just chat with the ambassador? Is he a leper or something?,” one person wrote. Another one said, “Sensation, on the front pages: balalaika and vodka were found at Michael Flynn’s home)).” Commenters were also wondering how

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diplomats would work if they were not allowed to speak with American representatives. One person wrote, “I just wonder … but how is it possible to work then in the diplomatic field, if not to contact?” Some of the replies this person received were that Americans “have completely forgotten the word ‘diplomacy’ and don’t use it in everyday life” or that they were “using a ‘non-contact’ way (or through the condom … ha-ha).” A few people used the expression “witch hunt” to describe the situation: The witch hunt in the US continues to spread. It turns out that the American politician’s conversation with the Russian ambassador to the United States is almost a crime. This reminds me of what used to be like during the Stalin era in the USSR. Now if you need to remove someone from the administration of the USA, you can just come to him, say “Hello” and exchange a couple of phrases. It will be worse than a “black mark” for him. Or you can do it easier—just write something good and positive about this person on Facebook, for example. Look, Trump’s advisor knows how to say “Thank you” in Russian language, this is a conspiracy! Terrifying! This reminds me of situations that we used to have in the past century under Joseph Stalin. Have you been to Germany? German spy! Talked to an Englishman? English! Let it be also Japanese. For persuasiveness. Good students. Wild hysteria, which will not end well. Serious illness. It seems that a dictatorship of marasmus and mania of chasing engulfed the USA. Has the witch hunt started? Some kind of a circus or a mania for persecution.

Similarly, FBI Director James Comey’s dismissal was met by ridicule by many, also provoked to a large extent by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s joking that he has not heard of it. “Russian hackers have really long arms. And they don’t forgive insults,” one person wrote, while another one added, “Soon his mother-in-law will start ‘broadcasting’ for him from a socket with a sepulchral voice and voices from Russia will poke in his inflamed consciousness.” The implications of these developments for the US–Russia relation and Russia’s overall influence were also discussed. One person wrote that Flynn’s resignation “will definitely be not good for the Russia-US relationship. It seems that Trump won’t be given a chance to turn his promises into life.” Another commenter argued that

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Russia’s propaganda machine went too far this time and did Trump a disservice through the constant boasting about the allegedly agreed lifting of sanctions: “Flynn was ruined by the unbridled and brainless chatter in the Russian media about the allegedly already 100% resolved lifting of sanctions against Russia literally in the very first days of President Trump’s inauguration! And in this regard, it should be noted that Russia did Trump a true disservice in his most difficult internal political showdowns during the first days of his presidency.” А few posters called Flynn “Kremlin’s Trojan horse” or “Our Kremlin gently recruited agent.” As one person put it, “Our Kremlin gently recruited agent had been quickly kicked out. Our Trump may follow him soon, it’s not the Tsar’s monarch Russia.” For some, Flynn’s resignation was a clear testimony of the different norms that applied to US political life. One person wrote: “Public lying is unacceptable for the US politician—Kremlin is in shock: how can they even rule there like this? Why can’t you just: ‘I know that you know that I’m lying, but what can you even do to me?’” Others, however, disagreed with this claim and gave examples of the multiple times when the US President was caught lying. A few people saw Flynn’s resignation as a first step in the gradual downfall of Trump himself: “‘The process has started’ as Mikhail Gorbachev used to say. It seems that Trump won’t work for three months. Like ‘an elephant in a dishes shop,’ he will destroy all the goods, and there will be nothing to trade.” The relations between Russia and the USA or developments in the USA were often discussed through the prism of a power contestation over Ukraine. Thus, while Trump’s election victory was seen as a cause of disappointment for Ukraine, Flynn’s resignation was seen as a cause for celebration: “It’s a holiday in Ukraine due to support from the White House. We lost, or to be accurate—our government, because we made a bet on Trump.” Similarly, another commenter wrote that Trump did not defend himself against the “first strike” against him and there would be many more to follow. “Trump became trauma centre,” one person wrote. All in all, commenters’ attitude toward Trump changed not because he was seen as maliciously attacking Russia (e.g., like Obama) but because he was considered too weak and therefore useless or even harmful for Russia. I will further discuss the posts questioning Trump’s authority and contrasting it with Putin’s authority in the follow-up section on authority but for now, it is worth pointing out that some posters were actually irritated by this portrayal of Russia and Putin as extremely powerful and constantly meddling in US politics:

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President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin made the decision on the resignation of the head of the FBI James Comey in the Kremlin personally. Don’t hide anything from American people. Soon, the US will join Russian Federation; work in Kremlin goes very fast. There is an agreement on this with the ruling elite of the United States, everything has been agreed upon, the terms have been approved. Maybe this information will calm especially impressionable US citizens? Russian hackers, interference in the elections, Trump is the agent of the Kremlin, Putin appoints his people to leading positions in the US—the Americans have already “closed” their brains from such information.

Similarly, another person wrote: “And again we are at fault,” while a third one added, “Don’t we all know who gave Trump a recommendation to dismiss Comey.” Other commenters were also joking that the USA would soon “join the Russian Federation”: Soon the USA will be renamed to the RUS. According to the latest information, Kremlin clarified, that the USA will not be a part of Russia, but will become a Russian colony. I would add… The USA will be renamed to the Federal Region of Russian Federation. USA—an autonomous settlement of the Anadyr region with a direct subordination to Sochi.

While some commenters ridiculed this pointing a finger at Russia and Putin, others thought that it was founded: Russia interfered with the US presidential elections, how they pushed Trump through to become president, how Putin’s trolls, bots and hackers created fake voters in the US, polluted Internet, press and TV news with tweets, posts and pro-Trump propaganda, denigrated and badmouthed Clinton and manipulated voters’ minds. How they organised gatherings of fake voters sponsored from Russia, who toured across the whole of America rallying for Trump…State criminal Putin didn’t succeed in tearing America into pieces with Trump’s help, but unfortunately there won’t be much left from Ukraine very soon…

Power contestations were also discussed on an intra-state level. Thus, Trump’s election victory was seen as a victory of an anti-establishment, “extra-systemic” figure over the powerful political establishment. One person summed up the prevailing sentiment, “Given how much money

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and administrative resources were invested in Clinton—it’s Trump’s crushing victory!” Another poster explained that Trump’s victory showed “that the predators who seized power don’t have limitless power. The technologies of mass zombification of the population don’t guarantee its preservation. Of course, this is a very alarming signal for those who are in power!” However, this image of Trump as an anti-establishment figure was not accepted by all. When one person wrote that Trump’s first impeachment trial was: “a cold civil war between the elite and the people,” another one reacted by saying: “So Trump must be an ordinary guy from a working-class family, who achieved everything on his own, with his own honest labour? Or is he actually a billionaire’s son, addicted to jobbery and dubious fraud?” A few other people also referred to the impeachment trial as a civil war between “regular conservative Americans” who “want to restore the America of the 40s and 50s—‘to put the women and the blacks back in their place’” and liberals who “destroyed everything that was human there, same as they did in the rest of the world.” The Democrats were, of course, those liberals who have started “this lawless and politically engaged impeachment” as part of their “suicidal political march” and as expression of “their profound hatred towards American voters.” The battle between Republicans and Democrats featured heavily in the comments, especially in the context of the impeachment trial. In general, negative references to the Democrats dominated the narrative. Both in relation to Trump’s election victory and in relation to the impeachment trial, Democrats were presented as losing and as an elite that was out of touch with ordinary people and their needs. The House of Representatives was described as: a ward of a retirement home, toothless, greedy and envious old people from a mental health unit against a Napoleon ward. Madhouse indeed. When are they going to fight each other? Trump would personally knock out a few remaining teeth to a few democratic congressmen. I bet on Trump.

Another commenter wrote that the democrats were making “nothing but futile noises” because “their guilty conscience” was speaking. A third one asked: “Where’s people’s voice in this impeachment?” A poster speculated that this was the Democrats’ way of returning their investment in the Clintons because they “invested 10 times more in Clinton’s electoral campaign than Republicans did… Nothing personal, that’s just business!” The result of the impeachment trial was yet another example of a loss for the Democrats:

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Democrats failed again, yet another time they cannot kick Donya (Donald) out. They should open an American embassy for themselves, maybe then they might change those at the helm. Trump, just like our (president), will win the second term with confidence. And then the Democrats with Angelina Jolie at the helm will dance on the successes of the Republican party. Softening of the images of the national leaders, gradual departure from a strict political dogma—politics is a struggle.

The presentation of politics as a struggle is based on the assumption that this struggle includes battles or power contestations ending up with clear winners and losers. While both in the case of Trump’s election victory and the impeachment trial, the Democrats were the losers, the Republicans were not necessarily presented as the winners. In the eyes of the Russian online commenters, the real winner was Trump, but Trump was seen as being “just nominally from the Republicans” but actually “alien to the values of the Republican Party.” The Republican party was presented as “very sluggishly and unconvincingly” defending Trump’s decision to dismiss Comey. Authority While Trump was indeed presented as a winner in relation to both his election victory and the outcome of the first impeachment trial, his authority was on occasion questioned by commenters, particularly in relation to Flynn’s resignation and Comey’s dismissal. One person asked, “What kind of a guarantor the president of the USA is, if he doesn’t even know what his administration is doing? If his apparatus doesn’t guarantee obedience of governmental structures to the president, then he can guarantee only an on-time change of toilet paper in his toilet.” Similarly, another one expressed incredulity at the fact that the CIA could investigate their own president: “What kind of counterintelligence is it that is ‘digging under’ the president, and what kind of president is it, who does not manage his subordinate staff.” These comments were guided by an implicit assumption that like Putin, presidents are omnipotent and all-powerful, and no one in their own country should be able to undermine their authority or indeed investigate them. Similarly, a poster wrote that “This Trump turned out to be not that strong. They will be controlling him. System!” A key explanation for Trump’s lack of authority was precisely the fact that he was “extra-systemic” and did not have “‘his’ people” in the system. А big mistake he was seen as having made was not to “kick out” all of Clinton’s

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team and that with time made him “a punching bag.” Not having “a team for action” was “no good,” as one commenter put it. Another one wrote, “He tries to rule the country just like he rules his own company. He will ‘break his neck’ if he continues doing this.” A person even felt sorry for him: “It’s hard for Trump. He is sort of a president but there is also a sort of a vacant post. Who will win?” A president who was most certainly not likely to vacate his post any time soon and was undoubtedly seen as more powerful than Trump was the Russian President himself. Unlike Trump, there were no doubts expressed about his authority. Commenters were referring to him as irreplaceable and great. As one person put it, “It has long been understood that Putin is the most powerful person in the world. Obama and Merkel look like children in comparison with him.” A few commenters wrote how proud they were of their president for being able to influence the US elections: I’m proud of our President!!! If the head of a “weak regional country” managed to influence the election of the “exceptional” one, the banana-lover had been mistaken in Russia!!! LOL McFaul!! How could Putin influence the presidential election of such a superpower country as the US, if even one of the American thinkers recently bewilderedly wondered “WHO IS MISTER PUTIN?” I have been voting for Putin since 2001 and will carry on doing so, feel free to explode from anger.

These comments also show that their authors were ridiculing what they perceived to be the underestimation of Putin and Russia’s power by key US politicians such as President Obama and Ambassador McFaul. The racist reference to Obama was not an isolated case and I will separately deal with this issue when discussing the final theme in this chapter. As the last comment demonstrates, however, not everyone was sharing this positive view of Putin and his power. A few people pointed out that he was “irreplaceable” like a member of a royal family who rules for life: In our country the Parliament would be levelled by ARMATAs (new Russian tank), while The Irreplaceable (Putin) would continue to rule for life, going for terms 7 and 8, extending those to 8–10 years. The President of Russia is a king. There’s no opposition in the country and whoever is unhappy with something is treated as an extremist.

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What about us, are we going to get an impeachment or we’ll live 20 more years under Mr “there’s-no-money-but-you-keep-hanging-on”. Putin, 4 presidents will change in America between 2001 and 2024, while our sun-face will be there till a pig flies.

While not necessarily welcome, Putin’s authority in Russia was undeniable, and even his strongest critics could not really see a way out in the near future. In fact, in response to the last comment, one person jokingly replied that the only change possible was the temporary replacement of Putin with Dmitry Medvedev. Moreover, in relation to Trump, he seemed to have the power over, because as already indicated, Trump was described as Putin’s protégé or even creation. As one commenter jokingly wrote, “Well, if it was Putin who appointed Trump as a president of the United States, then Donald, as an honest man, should monthly appear in the Kremlin to report on the work done.” However, the sarcastic tone that was evident in this last comment was also a frequent feature of the comments regarding Putin’s alleged power. Many ridiculed the underlying assumption in the news articles about Putin’s powerful role as well as the blame narratives in relation to Putin’s power and authority over the USA: I have the inscription here on a baseball cap: Russian world, Putin is everything! Was Putin nominating for the elections? Michael confuses Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin with God! Putin seems to have intervened in “their” elections because he actually was born at all. Exceptional morons. Of course. Putin did not sleep this night—he was turning the counters at the polling stations. Well done! It seems that McFaul is telling the truth. Knowing that in many provinces and villages in the US it’s required to provide an identity card. Also, knowing the GDP, McFaul correctly judged that Putin, with his knowledge of the English language, could take advantage of this moment to insolently vote in favor of Trump. That’s how he influenced the election result, as it turns out. What a childish behavior: whatever happens, it’s Putin to blame. However, it turns out that Putin is the most powerful person in the world, because he is able to change any situation in the American elections and bring “his” candidate to the presidency. Something like this!

The authority theme was also present in the discussion about Comey’s dismissal. Trump’s decision was seen as a way of him reasserting his

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authority over a person who had “practically made him a president, and whom Trump repeatedly praised, at that very moment (a coincidence, of course) when Comey conducts an investigation on Trump’s and his team’s activities.” Comey himself was in turn portrayed as a person who has lost his authority. As one commenter put it, “Correct decision. An FBI director that finds out news from the TV doesn’t deserve anything else.” Another commenter expressed a similar sentiment: Maybe Trump will teach these leaders of strategic organizations to work, and not gossip and weave intrigues. If the head of the FBI is confused in “testimony” then what kind of a leader is he!!! Even to us, people who are not initiated into American secrets, after the statements of such heads of serious US organizations, it is unclear and the question arises: what are these people doing, except for wiretapping of citizens’ phones where a great mind is actually not needed.

As is obvious from this comment, the person questioned the authority not just of Comey but also of the US intelligence services as a whole by disparaging the activities they engaged in and their intellectual abilities. Responsibility and Accountability The final sub-theme as part of the power theme was that of responsibility and accountability. Political power brings about not just a set of privileges and a position of authority but also a set of responsibilities and an expectation of accountability. Thus, commenters, on the one hand, discussed this theme in relation to Trump, and on another hand, in relation to their own politicians, most notably President Putin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, and the Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova. Zakharova was subjected to a particularly vehement attack by commenters for her commentary of Lavrov’s visit to the USA. They ridiculed her for calling the visit “a triumph of Russian diplomacy.” “The whole world is confused!!!…What nonsense Russian officials write this morning,” a commenter wrote. Another one asked, “Zakharova, when will you and people like you stop humiliating my country? You are dancing for journalists and saying nonsense, and you think that it’s normal. I’m so tired of you.” Attacks against her were both of a personal nature and in relation to policy failures:

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Stop drinking heavily and this world will no longer seem so ugly to you. I’m proud of Zakharova, no one will ever be able to accuse her of intellectual agony. No intellect—no agony. We, Russians, are the most intelligent people in the world, and our Masha is the smartest. But more than half of our population live in poverty, for some reason. And those stupid Americans are enjoying their lifestyle. Due to their stupidity, I suppose. Why Zakharova doesn’t want to diagnose the amount of pensions, the level of corruption and bills tariffs in Russia?

Her boss Lavrov was also criticized for his poor diplomatic skills and on personal grounds. Similarly, when criticizing Putin, Russian citizens were highlighting particular societal issues such as the low standard of living, “the hard life” of ordinary Russians, the increase in prices, unemployment, and sink holes on the roads. A key question implicitly underlying the discussions about Trump’s impeachment trial and often by comparison Putin’s unshakeable power was the issue of who a president was or should be accountable to. As already evident from the discussion of authority, for many a president’s authority should be uncontested, which leaves little, if any room for accountability, while others were really struggling with Putin’s long-­ lasting authoritarian rule. For some, a president could and should only be accountable to the people who have elected him as this commenter argued: Those who you obsequiously and soapily call “opposition,” i.e., the Democrats, CANNOT impeach Trump, because he was elected, in a rather democratic way, by the majority of the US population. And only when that majority, those people—not party officials, not Trump’s opponents—when that majority becomes unhappy with the work of their representative—that’s when the question (about impeachment) can be raised.

This focus on the allegedly powerful role of the people was also linked to a wider discussion about the meaning and value of democracy. The Meaning and Significance of Democracy The meaning and significance of democracy featured heavily as a theme in the Russian comments. Commenters were both attempting to define democracy and question its value (Graph 5.2).

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Defining democracy

Finding fault with democracy

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• Meaning • Significance

• Issues • Questioning its value

Graph 5.2  Democracy theme in the Russian comments

Defining Democracy Trump’s election victory prompted a heated discussion on the topic. Many commenters saw it as a prime example of democracy in action with both its advantages and disadvantages: Whatever some think about America, but theirs is worthy of respect! There is democracy and the choice of the ordinary people! This is not our “monster” with its 146%!))) With such an administrative resource, Obama’s support and the whole system, and the result is different!))) Dmitriy Kruchinin, “Whatever some think about America, but their system is worthy of respect! There is democracy and the choice of ordinary people”—In fact, there is an uprise of the people against the Authorities and against the system that played all the way on one side of the pitch. Well, contrary to popular opinion in some countries, democracy does exist in this world. Nobody was going to falsify the results in favor of Clinton, no matter how many people from different countries (and even in the United States) were waiting for it. The entire elite of the country was against Trump—the current president, the administration of Trump’s own party. The majority of the media and most of the newsmakers were against Trump. But the Americans voted for Trump. This is democracy.

As the examples demonstrate, democracy was defined as the ability of people to choose freely who would rule them and the existence of a sound political system that made this choice possible regardless of what the elites

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might wish. The role of the President as one person put it was to “satisfy the hopes of the people” and if that did not happen, he could easily be kicked out and replaced with somebody “better” because “Trump is not a king.” Accountability was seen as a key aspect of a working democracy. One commenter explained that “this system is called a ‘protection from an idiot’: which means, that one single idiot, though having power, cannot make a huge damage to the country. Therefore, Donald will be peacefully sitting and calmly breathing, but may be not for very long.” In response to this comment, another person agreed and added that the US system was “strong” because “it holds Trump under a full control.” The US elections reminded Russian commenters how different the US political system was from their own political system, which in their view, could not be defined as a democracy because election results were predictably always in favor of the “irreplaceable” Putin and there was no “intrigue” in them. One commenter even joked by saying: “What is it with them, don’t they like STABILITY?” Russia’s system did not permit a real rule by the people but was designed and redesigned in such a way as to allow authoritarian rule. The term authoritarian and its derivatives were not used, though. No one gave a specific label to the current Russian political system. A few people explicitly wrote that they wished Russia was a democratic country and pointed out the key differences between Russia’s political system and the US democracy: I would love to see the same system as in the US, that’s democracy. In Russia one person has all the democracy and he does what he wants with everyone dancing to his tune. You can dissolve all you want in Russia, they just sit there on their bums. Of course, Russia is not the US, in Russia if tomorrow the President decides to raise the retirement age to 100, raise VAT to 50%, income tax to 50% and petrol prices to 200 rubles per liter, Duma and Sovet Federatsiy would joyfully approve that. Trump is an official, he’s not God’s appointee. So if the people who voted him in see that he is not worthy of the trust he was given, he will be asked to vacate the post in favour of someone who is more worthy. It is only in Russia that officials assume their positions for life and imagine themselves to be kings.

A few commenters pointed out that Russia was a “servile” country and the people of Russia themselves did not want a democratic system for their country. One person provided an example with the protests in the street

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where according to them even if 50,000 out of 17 million people living in Moscow took to the streets, this was still less than 1%. They asked: “what democracy are we talking about” and added that “the fact that a bunch of yuppie knobheads like you don’t like the government doesn’t mean that others support your opinion, I don’t support you, so it’s 50/50.” Another clear benefit of democracy that commenters saw was the principles upon which it was built. One person pointed out that Americans lived by “following the laws, and we prefer living according to our life principles.” Another commenter similarly wrote that American laws were a strength for them because “although the nation is young, it has absorbed the aggregate experience of generations of Western countries.” Flynn’s resignation and the impeachment trial were seen by some precisely in this light: Flynn wasn’t tricked by anyone. FBI was listening to his calls with Kislyak where he really was promising to soften sanctions. And afterwards Flynn lied about it. And now he will have to pay for it. You can’t act like this in a democratic society. The main principle of democracy is “No past services can mitigate a crime/misconduct.” In a democratic country the situation is that even if you saved the world and today you were seen drunk driving, you can no longer be an example of a good citizen for the society. This is the main, the most important and the “smartest” principle for any civilized country. This is a real democracy. Members of the opposition can criticise and even impeach the current president. But hang on there, Trump! That’s what democracy is like in this country, which is the same age as our Bolshoy theatre. Here’s the difference between a real democratic state and a state run by criminals and police.

Being able to criticize and even investigate one’s country’s president was seen as a prime example of democracy in action. The supremacy of law regardless of who the person was and how important they might be was also pointed out as a key feature of a truly democratic society. Some commenters were making fun of their fellow citizens who saw that as an example of the lack of authority of the US President. As one person put it sarcastically, “American intelligence agencies do not obey the president??? But are investigating him?? What a country)))))))))))))).” Another one added: “Disgusting country, even the President has no freedom there.”

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Finding Fault with Democracy While many were singing the praises of democracy, for others, democracy had its disadvantages. Here, the narrative changed from a focus on Trump’s character and personality and the potential harm he could cause in his powerful role as US President to criticisms of the checks and balances system, which was seen as limiting Trump’s power and undermining his authority. Initially, in response to his election victory, commenters were expressing doubts about his ability to rule the USA and generally do good in the world: This democracy has costs. As a result of democratic elections, a semi-literate (in the literal sense), incompetent, mentally unbalanced xenophobic won. That was the choice of the people. But if the people realise that the choice was wrong, in four years they may have an opportunity to correct this mistake. What will this mistake (if it’s actually a mistake) cost Americans is their business. Every nation deserves its government. Especially people who have an opportunity to choose their government. I only wish that the consequences of this mistake will not be tragical for the rest of the world, who is not responsible for the choice of American people.

As this comment demonstrates, the person who wrote it could clearly see the benefits of a democratic system in terms of really giving people the power to choose who to represent them but they also acknowledged the potential perils in terms of opening up the door to intolerant or even mentally ill people and giving them huge power, not just over America itself but also over the whole world. While in this opinion, the author did their best to weigh both the benefits and the downsides of a democratic system, others were much more critical of Trump’s personality and the power that a person like him had. Different derogatory terms were used to describe him: a “brainless ego maniac”; pliable and unpredictable”; a liar; a “humourist,” “very tyrannical” “a whipping boy”; “not an intellectual”; and “a red-headed old man.” Later on, in the context of Flynn’s resignation and impeachment trial, some commenters ridiculed the US system for belittling the president and undermining his authority and effectively empowering unelected officials over their elected president: So, does it mean that security officers are now independently investigating their boss and his advisors? This means that they now have intelligence to

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decide what is right or wrong for the country, and not the citizens and the elected president. Such an interesting democracy;). What democracy do you mean? The king is played by his entourage. JFK (Kennedy) thought he could make decisions… till Dallas 1963 happened.

A few people saw the impeachment trial as a way for the elites to undermine the power of the people in a democratic society and therefore to undermine democracy itself. One person quoted Trump’s own words that the impeachment trial was Democrats’ attempt to undermine democracy by openly expressing their “profound hatred towards American voters.” Another one wrote that the Democrats could not impeach Trump “because he was elected, in a rather democratic way, by the majority of the US population. And only when that majority, those people—not party officials, not Trump’s opponents—when that majority becomes unhappy with the work of their representative—that’s when the question (about impeachment) can be raised.” A third one saw the impeachment trial as evidence of the power of business interests in a democracy such as the US one: A case about Hunter Biden’s corruption has been blocked by a counter impeachment of Donald Trump. This engaged approach to presidential institution, where “business” circles publicly transform democracy to their benefit, via Senate and CongressS, demands an investigation at a much larger scale than predicted before, an investigation into the systemic work of the authorities in the country. This vehicle should be operational, especially in a democratic state. So what’s happening. All of a sudden, a billionaire and a supplier of escort services to politicians in the US and Britain hangs himself in a high security prison, then the Bidens, excited by their Ukrainian cases, launch themselves into an unbelievable jobbery with impeachment, turning the House of Representatives into a circus. Juggling the pillars of governance in the state is not going to end up well for the country. Looks exactly like it was in the USSR.  A decision is taken by those in charge of the wing of the party that gets further and further away from the real democracy…and a mindless herd led by unscrupulous top-of-the-classsystem elite, who only care about their own benefit and bribe the most marginalized part of the electorate.

The USA was also accused by some of applying double standards in its professed commitment to democratization worldwide:

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When our so-called opposition and all sorts of “people who fight for rights” contact the US ambassador, this is called the development of democracy. When someone from their administration is in contact with our ambassador, this is called espionage. Should not be confused!

As this comment demonstrates, its author found it problematic that the democratic flag was waved whenever it was in the US interests to do so but that there was generally no fair treatment of other countries or for that matter, promotion of democratic values when their interests were infringed or perceived to be infringed. Similarly, a person made fun of the claim that Flynn’s resignation demonstrated the “smart” principles upon which a genuine democracy was built by arguing that “The main principle of the Western democracy is to say one thing, meaning something completely different.” Another one thought that the impeachment trial was yet another example of the USA not practicing what it preaches: “USA are getting rid of the president who tried fighting corruption and thievery. That’s all one needs to know about the standards of American ‘democracy’.”

Identity, Friends, and Foes in Politics Similar to the Chinese sample, the identity theme also featured in the Russian comments albeit not to such a strong extent. The “other” here was America and Americans but there was also a high degree of self-­ deprecation and irony toward stereotypical collective identifications or attempts to present Russian people and their character as superior to Americans. Thus, commenters were making fun of the claims that Russia was “special and exceptional.” When one person wrote that “Russia has its own, peculiar way,” another one replied “to nowhere.” Russian identity was very often presented in contrast to American identity. There were claims made that Russians were “stronger in spirit” than Americans and cleverer than them. Americans’ geographical knowledge was ridiculed by one person who wrote that “most Americans can hardly find Ukraine on the map. Best case scenario, they heard it’d be somewhere on the other side of the ocean.” In fact, some people wrote that Americans and their politicians were “not smart.” This claim, however, was contested by other commenters:

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If they are so stupid and you are so clever, then why are you so poor? We, Russians, are the most intelligent people in the world, and our Masha (Zaharova) is the smartest. But more than a half of our population live in poverty, for some reason. And those stupid Americans are enjoying their lifestyle. Due to their stupidity, I suppose. They might be stupid those Americans… why do they need all that? And us—we are all happy and in approval and applauding! Why is the Russian Federation laughing at everyone but still lives worse than everyone else?

This topic about the differences in the standard of living between the two countries prompted a heated discussion. Thus, one commenter took issue with the fact that a few of his fellow citizens wrote that they were proud of their country and their President by writing: “Kpss26, when our country at least approaches the American or European standard of living, then there would be a cause for pride. I don’t see it right now.” This comment was heavily criticized: Tamara Lit, to approach the American “standard of living”? Would you like to compare the number of homeless people here and in New York? There are many more of them and many are of a working age. You want citizens to be moved from the demolished (and for a very good reason) “Khrushchev” style houses into trailers? A huge number of the US citizens live in them. Do you want such an improvement of living conditions? Or do you all see pastoral—lawyers’ and medical workers’—country houses? The number of “pettifoggers” in North America is not small, but this is the main population of the country. And talking about the standard of living of the majority—go there and see—no one forbids you from going there. Or are you on the sanctions’ lists? Tamara Lit, you need to wake up! And remove “the dollar coins” from your eyes! Life in Russia has never been a paradise, therefore, we had problems, have them and will have them! Russian problems are different from those that America has. When people like you start talking about the States, you usually talk about people who live a very good life, and when you start talking about Russia, for some reason, the level of evaluation does not rise above the garbage bin! Tamara Lit, Tamarochka, watch a video on YouTube with a title “Los Angeles City of Homeless” before writing such nonsense. And talking in general, Americans live in debts, do you consider this a high standard of living?

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As is clear from these comments, many took issue with the claim that the standard of living in America was higher than in Russia, and provided examples aimed at demonstrating that this was not necessarily the case or directly attacking the author of the initial comment by urging her to leave the country. One person compared her with Russian dissidents who were “just yapping.” This in turn prompted others to quote statistics on the number of immigrants and the high number of Green card applications. The use of the possessive determiner “our” was very common in the Russian case both by those who were defending their country and by those who were making fun of some of the claims about its greatness or uniqueness. Sarcasm was often used so as a whole, the Russian “us” was definitely different from the Chinese one—it was considerably more selfcritical and even self-deprecating. “Our” was not used only in relation to Russia but also in relation to Trump who many called “our Trump”: Ran away from the wolf, but met with the bear on their way….(Trump, our lovely Trump)… Yes, he is ours, Kremlin’s thoroughbred one. Was “our Tump” holding his fists for “our Lepen”? Back again Trump is ours.

The irony in some of these comments is clearly evident but the repeated use of the inclusive possessive determinant is a reflection of the dominating discourse, especially in the beginning of Trump’s presidency of him being “a friend” of Russia or indeed a Russian/Putin creation. The friendship theme was not featuring as prominently in the comments as the contrasting theme about the “other” or indeed about Russia’s foes and enemies, but on the few occasions when the word “friend” was used, it was mainly in relation to Trump. One commenter pointed out that TV coverage was dominated by two topics: Ukraine and “our friend Trump.” Another one wrote that “we may only be guessing…what this FRIEND will do next.” America as a whole, however, was not conceived of as a friend but quite the contrary—as an archnemesis: Throughout history, America has never been a friend of Russia or of the USSR! There were only times of calm and truces, but there was never a real friendship! America has always wanted to destroy, divide Russia and manage its resources. What kind of friendship is that? And when was Europe friendly? Since the times of the USSR, the West has been afraid of communism!

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Especially after the shootings of civilians that have their own opinion. What kind of friendship is that? So we don’t have fewer friends now. We cannot be friends with oil addicts.

In the views of most commenters who pronounced themselves on this topic, America could not really be friends with anyone because its aim was “to dictate everything to everyone” in order to retain its “position of strength.” One person even wrote that America was “evil”: “The very existence of a country created on the blood that carries death is evil.” Another commenter wrote that the United States behaved in such a way as if it was “in a state of declared war and any contacts with opponents are considered as a betrayal.” Moreover, a few people drew historical parallels, showing that American politicians generally behaved “very aggressively with us” because the American strategy has always been to “oppose” Russia. That’s why for many, nothing good could ever be expected of American presidents, and their initial enthusiasm about Trump was soon replaced by disappointment in him: “Obama has been removed … But this evening someone took shit at our entrance again! Do American presidents inherit this habit, just like a nuclear suitcase.” Nonetheless, if there was one person who was the epitome of an archnemesis for Americans that was Barack Obama. There was not even a single positive reference to Obama in the comments. In the commenters’ view, he had “brought a lot of grief to the world.” Moreover, there were numerous racist references to him with posters calling him “a banana-­ lover,” and urging him to get up “on a palm tree until the end of the year! Let him stay time and tear off coconuts for tourists!” The n-word was also used in one of the comments, and repeated references were made to his skin color. The negative attitude toward Obama was not justified. All comments about him were based on the assumption about implicit agreement that he was indeed bad for Russia. Obama was the ultimate other for Russia—different in every single respect, including skin color and having generally worked in Russia’s harm. Similarly, Clinton was described as an “intellectually sluggish” compulsive liar whom Russians were very happy to see lose the elections. The list of foes was not limited just to America, Obama, and Clinton. For many, it included Ukraine and, for some, Europe and the West more generally. One commenter wrote that “the whole of Ukraine dreams about Russia’s collapse, they can neither work nor eat and sleep. How soon, how soon? not yet collapsed? And its own country has reached the bottom: random people are in power and robbing the country.”

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Argumentation, Engagement, and Civility The quality of argumentation of the comments was very low with a mean score of 0.68 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level of argumentation. While questions were asked or were responded to in 28% of the comments, and there were reasons provided to justify one’s viewpoint/position in 25.9% of the sample, evidence was used in only 9.5% of the comments and only 4.6% out of 735 commenters acknowledged other people’s views/positions. The most common type of evidence used was historical references or statistics. Thus, both the levels of reasoning and reciprocity were very low with scores of 0.70 and 0.66, respectively, on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest and 4 is the highest possible score. With regard to engagement, the level of engagement was higher than the quality of argumentation but again generally low. The average level of engagement was 1.1 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level of engagement. Engagement was predominantly taking place with the topic of the article the comment was related to. The majority of comments—71.3%—were on topic and 37% engaged with other users, while 6.3% engaged with the news medium or the author of the article. What happened on a few occasions was that a single comment provoked a very strong reaction by commenters to the extent that most of the comments published after it were discussing this one particular comment and not the actual topic the news article was about. Thus, an article about Lavrov’s visit to the USA and the fact that journalists were denied access to it led to a flurry of comments supporting the White House’s decision not to let reporters in with lots of critical opinions expressed about US media. Then, a commenter wrote: “At least Russian media is stable—President scored 7 goals,” which provoked a lengthy discussion about the sports the Russian president played (or not) and whether the photo shoots with him playing a sport were just publicity stunts by a macho president or Putin was actually “setting a good example for the people.” This was a good indication of engagement between commenters but not much deliberation, given that no one seemed to be changing their opinion or to at least be genuinely acknowledging other people’s viewpoints. Similarly, bickering and banter among commenters or the use of sarcasm was very common, and once a thread was started, it easily got off-topic or turned into an uncivil discussion. Thus, one particular

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comment about the standard of living in America being higher than in Russia attracted lots of follow-up comments but the thread did not end on a polite note: Kpss26, when our country will at least approach American or European standard of living, then there would be a cause for pride. I don’t see it right now. Tamara Lit, nobody forces you to be proud of Russia … On the contrary, go to the country you can be proud of … Then maybe the air in Russia will become cleaner …

In terms of the more superficial engagement with the comments, the average number of likes per comment was very low—4.55 with a standard deviation of 16.29. By contrast, the average number of dislikes per comment was higher—5.71 with a standard deviation of 60.78. 57.4% of the comments were not liked by anyone and 88.7% did not receive any dislikes. The most disliked comment received as many as 1190 dislikes. This was a comment posted under an article about Putin’s election victory with an accusation against another commenter: “Haven’t you been ordered at an urgent meeting that you can’t insult the US and Americans from now on? But it seems that they have already ordered that. Because you immediately stopped calling them ‘Pindos’.” The term “Pindos” was indeed used on a few occasions. It is a popular Russian pejorative term for US citizens. Its origin is not entirely clear but most sources consider it to have derived from the Serbian word pindo, which means penguin. It had been used in reference to the way American soldiers dressed in Yugoslavia, with heavy packs and bulletproof vests. In Russian usage, it is a common derogatory term for Americans and even for Russians critical of Putin. The second most disliked comment with 771 dislikes was the following: “Obama has been removed … But this evening someone took s..t at our entrance again! Do American presidents inherit this habit, just like a nuclear suitcase?” It is not very clear what this comment was in reference to because it did not appear to be linked to any other comments, but it was in relation to an article about Trump’s election victory and the break-in of a Russian journalist at his celebration party. The third most disliked comment with 711 dislikes was also about Trump’s election victory: “The dictators of the whole world sighed with relief. No one will prevent them from ruling and lovingly oppressing their people for the rest of their lives.” The high

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number of dislikes clearly revealed that a lot of people took issue with the fact that this particular commenter was not happy with Trump’s election victory and saw it as a worrying sign on the international world stage. The next few most disliked comments were with considerably fewer dislikes (285 and 272) and were also under that same article. The most liked comment, on the other hand, had 262 likes, and it was in relation to an article announcing the positive outcome for Trump of the first impeachment trial: “They will clap their hands in Duma again in the morning…” The second most liked comment had 180 likes and was in relation to an article announcing that the former US ambassador to Russia had accused Russia of interfering in the US elections: “Yes McFaul, yes!!! And I also personally intervened, accuse me too. (You can even impose sanctions on me). Putin intervened in the world politics at the very moment when Yeltsin appointed him as his substitutional president. From this very moment Putin has not left you alone. And he never will))))” Similarly, the third most liked comment with 170 likes was along the same lines: “The cat left her kittens and Putin is to blame for this.” With regard to civility, as explained in Chap. 3, I initially asked my research assistants, who are Russians themselves to use their insider cultural understanding of what counts as civil or uncivil in the Russian context and code according to this understanding. According to their coding, only 9.9% were uncivil. These comments fell into a few different categories: (1) Using swearing words. (2) Using derogatory terms in relation to American people in general (e.g., “exceptional morons,” “Pindos”), or to Ukrainian people (e.g., “idiots,” “crowing Ukrainians”) (3) Making racist references to Obama (e.g., “banana-lover,” advice for him to get up on a banana tree). (4) Being offensive to other commenters (e.g., “miserable,” “cheap,” “worthless,” “idiot,” “stupid,” “jerk”). (5) Being offensive to politicians or other public figures like Zakharova (e.g., personal attacks, claims that she liked drinking too much, “stupid,” “clown”). When I did the coding by using two separate variables for civility and a third clarifying one, in total there were more impolite (16.9%) and intolerant (9.1%) comments. Examples of the kind of comments that I coded as uncivil but my Russian research assistants did not consider uncivil included: calling America evil, Satan’s residence or Pendostan; calling Ukrainian politicians rats or Ukrainians Bandera patriots; calling somebody stupid, accusing another commenter of writing comments for financial gain; or calling her a narcissist, making sexual references to female politicians or even using the n-word in reference to Obama. Similar to the Chinese case, when

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references were made to Trump as “brainless ego maniac” or “mentally unbalanced xenophobe,” I coded them as impolite, unlike my research assistants who did not consider these references to be impolite in the Russian context. Regardless of the understanding of civility, in general, the majority of comments were civil. The Russian results also make us question the usefulness of these categories of incivility and intolerance in a case when the majority of comments discuss a conflict between two countries. Half of the intolerant comments in the Russian sample were in reference to America or Ukraine.

Patterns of Discussion A comparison between the news articles and the comments published under them as well as subsequent contextualization on the basis of the events under study and key political interventions in the form of speeches or political activities showed three main patterns of discussion in the Russian context—(1) Echoing the official narrative. (2) Challenging the official narrative, and criticizing the political system and leadership. (3) Mocking everyone and everything. Similar to the Chinese case, there were commenters who were echoing the official narrative in their posts but there was not necessarily much cheering here unlike in China. Even the supporters of the official position showed evidence of critical thinking, namely building upon the ideas put forward by Russian political leaders rather than simply repeating them passionately and zealously, as in the Chinese case. Thus, in the beginning, Trump’s election victory was met with hope and high expectations about the future, including that sanctions against Russia would be lifted. People were talking about the fact that Trump was Putin’s choice or in fact, Putin’s creation and that through his victory, Russia had won. There was also a particular focus on the fact that Ukraine would not be happy with the choice of the American people, which was seen as a good thing. A few commenters wrote that “Ukrainians won’t handle this.” One person said that “Ukrainian ‘politicians’ began to fuss, urgently removing all their bad online statements concerning Trump. Rats are worrying around. :),” while another one added that the victory was “dedicated to all crowing Ukranians.” One poster even expressed hope that “Crimea will be ours.” This narrative of hope and the focus on Ukraine echoed some of the coverage of Russian political leaders in the articles commenters were writing under. Some of the news articles were quoting Putin and his press secretary who said that Trump’s election

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victory “gives hope” for improving the relations between the two countries. The Crimea topic also featured in one of the articles where the former Crimean prosecutor Natalya Poklonskaya was quoted as reminding Trump of his promise to recognize the result of the Crimean referendum. Similarly, the former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul was quoted as saying Trump’s victory was a big loss for Ukraine. He tweeted: “biggest loser in the world tonight—Ukraine.” By the same token, when McFaul tweeted that “Putin intervened in our elections and succeeded. Молодец” and the Russian authorities including Zakharova and Putin started denying that, commenters followed suit. Most of the comments mocked the claim that Putin was to blame for everything: The cat left her kittens and Putin is to blame for this. invisibleworld, also Russia and Putin are personally to blame for the fact that in the 17th Galaxy the constellation of the Small Bear exploded and the Black Hole developed! :))))) Well, something like that … And the graviticum was stolen by the agents of Kremlin!

Commenters were not only trying to undermine the claims about Russia and Putin’s alleged interference in the US elections but they also started questioning McFaul’s competence and intelligence, thus echoing Zakharova’s words that the blame narrative commenced after McFaul’s appointment. One person asked: “I don’t understand, how could such a stupid guy as McFaul become an ambassador?” A commenter replied that it was “normal practice for Americans to appoint people like McFaul as their ambassadors. Such concepts as ‘a man’ and ‘adult and intelligent’ are not applicable to them.” Another one added: “Are there any others, smarter? As I haven’t seen any. Each of their performances is like a reprise in the circus.” By the same token, another article on the election victory included a quote from an expert who explained Trump’s victory with the misguided focus in Clinton’s campaign on issues such as “maintaining a liberal international order, spreading democracy, containing Russia and portraying Vladimir Putin as the focus of world evil.” These issues featured prominently in the comments whereby liberalism and liberal values were consistently mocked. Similarly, an article by Komsomolskaya Pravda called Trump “our Trump”—phrasing repeatedly used by commenters. The author wrote: “The whole world is discussing the attempt to expel our Donald Fredovich from the White House” (https://www.kp.ru/

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daily/27050/4115993/). One of the commenters summed up these sentiments by saying: “Trump, get rid of the enemy within, Russia will not leave you in trouble!” Another one similarly wrote: “The red-headed old man is in rage. Impeachment is what they want… Donny, get rid of them all, we still need you in this position!” Ukraine as a topic also featured heavily in the comments on the impeachment trial in a generally negative and disparaging way. Similarly, the topic of who Russia’s friends and enemies were showed that America was conceptualized by many as the enemy. A survey by the Levada Center demonstrated that when 82% of respondents said that modern Russia has enemies and 70% of them thought that the USA was Russia’s enemy while the percentage for Ukraine had changed from 34% in November 2018 to 14% in September 2020. All in all, on some subjects such as Ukraine and President Obama, there seemed to be a clear agreement in line with the official narrative. Given the existence of critical narratives on other topics and the high degree of self-deprecation and irony, this is an indication of the power of nationalism, populism, and propaganda. The second pattern of discussion was challenging the official narrative and criticizing political elites. Thus, this group of commenters pointed out that Trump’s election victory was an example of democracy in action—the democracy that Russia did not have and was unlikely to have any time soon. References were made to Russian elections where Putin in the words of one commenter won “with 146%.” One commenter wrote: “I wonder whether there will ever be similar elections in Russia. Or only continuity of power?” Similarly, when some commenters in line with the official narrative started ridiculing the claims that Putin had interfered in the US elections, others pointed out how life under Putin had become harder. Trump’s impeachment trial also led to comparisons of the two countries’ political systems and an expression of regret that Putin seemed to be “irreplaceable” and ruled Russia like a dictator. The impeachment trial was seen as “a prime example of how those in power can be criticised, including being criticised by representatives of legislative power, using words that would be impossible to use in some other territories.” As already indicated, the words of the Spokeswoman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova that the US media was in “an intellectual agony” were met with very strong criticisms directed at her personally and at Russian diplomacy more generally. She was accused of “humiliating my country” and of being “a typical chauvinist” and “a psychological vampire” like Putin. There were also allegations about corruption and

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incompetence directed at Sergey Lavrov. Commenters were also making fun of Zakharova’s “prompt use” of Facebook with the aim of posting “deceptive” content. The third pattern of discussion included commenters mocking everyone and everything and engaging in banter or bickering among themselves. Sarcastic comments were very common on each of the topics discussed, and there was no person or topic that was spared. Commenters made fun of their own politicians, of American politicians, of journalists, and of each other. While I have already provided a lot of examples of that in the outline of the key themes, I would just add a few more here. One story that was met with lots of sarcastic comments was of a Russian journalist who boasted that she had managed to vote in the US elections despite the fact that she was not a US citizen and that she then subsequently managed to sneak into Trump’s party on election night. Commenters expressed their incredulity at the fact that somebody had the audacity to boast about breaking the law. Others felt that she had made the whole story up. What did I just read about? I think, she just saw it in a dream. Perhaps this report will be mentioned in history as the beginning of a new relationship between Russia and the US, and it will turn out that the journalist from Moskovskiy Komsomoletz Elena Milchanovska contributed to this story. Very good! It’s better to say “fairytales” writer: whatever I don’t know, I’ll make it up. This is good. Dreams are coming true ( (c) Gazprom) No security can stand in her way… Poor girl was working for 5 hrs. I didn’t quite get it. Did she really break the electoral laws of the US and then confessed to the president of the US while being in the US? I guess, that it’s good that everyone was so busy at that moment, that no one cared about her. Otherwise she would be given 10 years imprisonment in a company of a 200 kg “lover.” So Soviet….and naïve. You had to eat something after drinking! How much alcohol did she drink, so it was possible to imagine an interview with Trump hugging her at the same time? Not surprising, that even snipers that were hiding under the stairs (according to her words at least) got scared! What a stupid woman, and she doesn’t even understand this! Where are such people coming from?

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Spokeswoman Zakharova was also mocked by numerous commenters, as the extract demonstrates: If someone here indeed has an intellection agony, it is Zakharova. Is she really crazy? Someone should walk her like a dog along the Seaside Embankment of Sevastopol. Maybe it’s better to drown her instead. Just like MuMu dog.

This extract is actually a mild example of the types of jokes used to mock Zakharova. There were some considerably more inappropriate comments and/or ones containing personal attacks. The common denominator is that the most offensive and ugly mockery seemed to be directed at women. The comments about Zakharova led to a discussion about the first ladies Melania Trump and Brigitte Macron in the context of masturbation and erection. Attempts at wordplay were also made on occasions. Thus, a commenter wrote that “Comey is in ‘coma’.” Another one offered Comey a “job” as a Russian hacker—“if it is so important for the relations between our countries.” Jokes about the intelligence services and stereotypical images of Russia were also common. Thus, one poster wrote that “In 75 years FSB will declassify the file of the agent in disguise Donald Trumpovich. Alaska will come back home!” Another one asked his fellow citizens: “So, do people feel good living in Russia—where all the military and political leaders have been firmly recruited by the Department of State for a very long time?” A third one wrote: “Russian spies are everywhere. Oh my God, how scary!” Trump was also subjected to a lot of mockery. Comparisons were drawn between him and a Russian TV host when a report claimed that he had “shouted” at the TV. There were also jokes about his personal appearance, especially his haircut, his wife, and his marital history. However, there were no comments of a sexual nature in relation to any of the men commenters laughed at. Only women were subjected to these types of demeaning comments.

Concluding Remarks To sum up, three key themes were identified in the 735 comments about Trump and the USA posted on the Russian Internet between November 2016 and February 2020. The first key theme was that of power,

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authority, and accountability. Power was defined as political power, and commenters were discussing a range of inter- and intra-state contestations such as the turbulent US-Russia relations and the implications of Trump’s victory for the future relation between the two countries. There was disagreement on some issues such as Trump’s authority (or lack of) and what it actually meant for a president to demonstrate his authority. Comparisons were drawn with the Russian president. In the second main theme, commenters were discussing the meaning and significance of democracy by both defining it and questioning key aspects of it. Commenters took part in heated discussions about the main differences between the Russian and American political systems. Some saw the US elections as a perfect example of democracy in action and expressed regret about the undemocratic nature of Russia’s political system and the irreplaceability of Putin. Others highlighted a range of issues plaguing American society and professed their loyalty to the Russian President. The final theme was that of identity, friends, and enemies in politics. The “other” here was America and Americans, but there was also a high degree of self-deprecation and irony toward stereotypical collective identifications or attempts to present Russian people and their character as superior to Americans. Russia was not described as having many friends but there were some references to Trump as “our friend.” By contrast, the list of enemies was longer with Obama being in the lead position here. The quality of argumentation of the comments was very low in terms of both reasoning and reciprocity but questions were nonetheless asked or were responded to in 28% of the comments, and there were reasons provided to justify one’s viewpoint/ position in 25.9% of the sample. The level of engagement was higher than the quality of argumentation but again generally low. Engagement was predominantly taking place with the topic of the article the comment was related to. The majority of comments—71.3%—were on topic and 37% engaged with other users, while 6.3% engaged with the news medium or the author of the article. What happened on a few occasions was that a single comment provoked a very strong reaction by commenters to the extent that most of the comments published after it were discussing this one particular comment and not the actual topic the news article was about. Similarly to the Chinese case, most of the comments were civil (although fewer than in China) but the application of the incivility/intolerance categories proved problematic here as well, given that most offensive posts concerned Ukraine or America at a time of turbulent relations between Russia and these two countries. Finally, three

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main patterns of discussions were identified in the comments: echoing the official narrative, challenging the official narrative, criticizing the political system and leadership, and mocking everyone and everything. All in all, the political talk among commenters was very lively at times, and the Russian Internet provided a space for a freer discussion of Russia and America’s political systems and leadership than the majority of state media in Russia provide. Given the tightened grip on media, including on the Internet, the fact that such discussions were still allowed to take place was most welcome. Whether or not it would lead to an actual democratization of Russian society is quite another matter and in 2023 this looks more unlikely than even during the data collection period but the fact that people could be introduced to ideas that they would not be introduced to via other media channels was certainly significant enough and shows the important role of online political talk and the spaces within which it takes place. Putin’s subsequent tighter grip on the Internet also demonstrates that the authorities realise its potential especially at crucial points in time and are fearful of it.

Bibliography Levada-Center. (2020). Enemies. Retrieved July 2, 2022, from https://www. levada.ru/en/2020/11/05/enemies-­2/ Rutland, P. (2017). Trump, Putin, and the future of US-Russian relations. Slavic Review, 76(S1), S41–S56. Wike, R., Stokes, B., Poushter, J., Silver, L., Fetterolf, J., & Devlin, K. (2018). Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially among Key Allies, Pew Research Center, Retrieved February 07, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-lowespecially-among-keyallies/

CHAPTER 6

Online Comments About Trump and the USA in Mexico

This is the third empirical chapter, presenting the results of the analysis of 717 comments about Trump and the USA posted in Mexico between November 2016 and July 2020. Mexico was threatened by Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign with a large border wall, which he claimed he would build by making Mexico pay for it. While the construction of the wall started during Trump’s Presidency, it was never completed. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s rating in Mexico was the lowest among 37 nations polled in 2017 according to the Pew Research Center. 94% of Mexicans opposed Trump’s proposed border wall and only 5% had confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. By comparison, the lowest level of public support for Barack Obama in Mexico was 38% in 2011 (Wike et al., 2018). This chapter follows the exact same structure as Chaps. 4 and 5. It is split into three main parts. Part I traces online commentators’ reactions to the key events in the relationship between Mexico and the USA from Trump’s election victory until March 2020. The reactions to news articles on four key events were analyzed: (1) Trump’s election victory in November 2016. (2) Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. (3) Trump wall—Trump’s signing of Executive Order 13767 to be built along the Mexico–US border in January 2017, and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s decision to cancel his trip to the USA as a result of that. (4) Trump’s first impeachment trial in January 2020. The thematic analysis

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Slavtcheva-Petkova, Discussing Trump’s America Online, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7_6

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revealed four broader themes: (1) Power and responsibility. (2) Democracy—meaning and future. (3) Patriotism and populism. (4) Religious and moral dimensions. Commenters were discussing Trump and his Presidency as well as the US–Mexico relation, while at the same time demonstrating a very critical attitude toward their own authorities mixed with patriotic sentiments (“We can fight the USA”). While many posters expressed a negative view of Trump by calling him “terrorist,” “schizophrenic,” and “idiot,” a common approach was to use developments in the USA as a starting point for discussing Mexican politics and politicians such as Presidents Nieto and Obrador. For Mexicans online, Trump had turned into a convenient excuse for why things were not going in the right direction in Mexico—“the source of all our problems, the one and only culprit…responsible for the sufferings of this poor Mexico… where the federal government doesn’t hold any responsibility.” Similarly to Russian commentators, Mexicans also discussed the state of democracy in the USA with some talking about “the end of democracy” and the USA losing its authority to “give lessons of democracy to any country” or more generally passing a judgment on the whole world. As one commenter put it, “If Trump is the most powerful man in the world, the world is not (doing) well.” However, there were voices expressing the exact opposite opinion—namely, that America remains “a nation where you dream big and where your rights are protected. As opposed to the Mexican president, who is good for nothing, who aspires to nothing… except for being lazy!” Part II then analyzes the quality of argumentation, the level of engagement between online posters, and the extent to which the comments can be classified as civil. The level of engagement was twice as high as the quality of argumentation but still generally low, while incivility was the highest among the three nations researched but the majority of comments were actually civil. The final part then offers a typology of the patterns of discussion emanating from the bottom-up analysis with a view to reaching a wider conceptual conclusion about the nature of online discussions and the spaces within which these discussions take place. Two main patterns of discussion were identified in Mexico: (1) Challenging the official narratives and criticizing the political system and leadership. (2) Proposing alternative narratives and taking the discussion in a new direction. Discussions in the Mexican online space were of the most varied nature in comparison with the Chinese and the Russian spheres. Similarly to the Russian comments, the Mexican ones were very polemic but the

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discussions were much more heated and very impolite at times. Commenters were also much more inclined to wander off topic predominantly by discussing domestic politics.

Key Themes The thematic analysis of the 717 comments about Trump and the USA in Mexico led to the identification of four key themes. The procedure followed was outlined in Chap. 3 but I will briefly explain here how I arrived at these four themes. During the initial coding, phase I identified 61 different themes, which I then refined to 17 broader themes (each of them with lots of different sub-themes) before embarking on the focused coding during which these themes were further refined and elaborated upon. Thus, in the final phase I identified four broad themes: (1) Power and responsibility. (2) Democracy—meaning and future. (3) Patriotism and populism. (4) Religious and moral dimensions. Their meaning and the sub-themes included as part of these broader themes are further explained in the respective sections. Power and Responsibility This broad theme contained a number of sub-themes within it, as Graph 6.1 shows—(1) Power—Intra-state contestations, inter-state contestations and resisting submission attempts, and global contestations. (2) Responsibility—assuming responsibility: actors and actions. Power—Inter-State Contestations The relationship between Trump and Mexico, including Mexican politicians, featured heavily as a topic in the comments. Trump’s election victory was met with predominantly negative reactions (“anger,” “sadness,” and “surprise” in the words of one commenter) and concerns about what his victory would bring for Mexico as well as for the USA and the world more widely. Some commenters drew an apocalyptic picture by also making historical references to World War II and the plight of the Jews: Today the apocalyptic reality starts, terror spreads worldwide, prophecies emerge and thrive. On November 9, 1938 the attacks against the Jews started in Germany (The Night of Broken Glass). Today is November the 9th, it is already 2 am Mexico time, and we have been given this disgusting news. Trump, President-elect!

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Power

Responsibility

• Inter-state contestations and resisting submission attempts • Intra-state contestations • Global contestations

• Assuming responsibility: Actors • Assuming responsibility: Actions

Graph 6.1  Power and responsibility theme in the Mexican comments Both candidates were definitely disgusting. Now all we can is to hope that this man doesn’t do too many stupidities. My heartfelt greetings. I hope they keep protesting and won’t allow this spawn of Hitler to rule in the US. Keep protesting and cancel the election, it’s the best thing that can happen. Trump is crazy, he’s mentally sick and he’s going to destroy the world like Hitler did. Remember history, let’s not repeat it, renounce Trump. No one wants him except for demented racists. Trump the fascist is scary, even more now with the power he will have, but the fear of opening the Pandora’s box. As they say here in the stadiums! He wants to cry, he wants to cry, he wants to cry.

One person wrote that it was “sad to follow the rise to power of such a deplorable character as Trump,” while another one pointed out that “there is no doubt that this man is really ill. I wonder how did he manage to get into the White House, if a thorough psychometric examination had indicated otherwise?” Trump was indeed very often described as mentally ill, “crazy,” “deranged,” “paranoid,” “demented,” “imbecile,” and “an idiot” with one person even writing that he had “a personality disorder, where schizoid delirium behaviour of the greatness sticks out.” Other diagnoses included schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, and Narcissistic personality disorder. Commenters also called him brutal, “a terrorist,”

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“tyrant,” and “dictator.” References were made to his “ignorance” and the fact that he had allegedly not read a full book in his adult life as well as the claim that he was a “descendant of trappers and brothel keepers.” One person wrote that “the North American voters lost their reasoning when they arrived at the polls.” Another one concluded that “Americans turned out to be more racist, misogynist and backwards than what we could imagine. May God look well after us as this thing is heading at full speed towards becoming the new Hitler.” A similar explanation was provided in the following comment: Just like Hitler, who rose to power during the period of economic, social and political crisis, doubled down by the effects of the Great Depression of 1929, told the nonconformists (who believed they were of a superior race), that he was going to give them “a place under the sun that legitimately belonged to them”, now Trump rises to power promising the same to “the forgotten people”, which is a euphemism for the uneducated non-­ conformists, those who believe that because they are white they deserve what globalization and the natural ways of the world have denied him. Only time will show them their nefarious mistake!

The biggest worry for Mexican commenters was the implications of Trump’s “craziness” for their country. As one person explained, “Trump is a self-righteous and egotistic fool and will make changes because of pure pride or because he opened his little mouth promising something during his campaign—and he will deliver it even if it affects his country. He is sick with self-pride and will never admit that he was wrong. He will always try to win.” Trump’s unpredictability and irrationality were a big cause for concern for Mexicans. Posters were worried that Trump would fulfill his promises to erect a wall with Mexico and to deport the illegal immigrants as well as that he would generally start persecuting Mexicans in America and that as a whole, nothing good awaited their country in the next four years. There were concerns about the planned levy on Mexican products with the aim of funding the wall and overall about “the economic outcomes that the Trumpist fury will cause.” A commenter reminded his fellow citizens that “Trump based a big chunk of his campaign on the hatred against the Mexicans” by arguing that “we send ‘rapists’ and ‘criminals’ to the US, that he would build a wall and would make us pay for it, that he would renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement or he

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would leave it, because us Mexicans ‘take advantage’ of the US people.” The underlying fear was that of potential “submission” of their country due to the fact that he “hates Mexico and Mexican people” and is “not a friend of Mexico.” We’ve got this threat, it’s not an imaginary one, and with so many stones The Crazy One is throwing around there will be one that finds a target. Lies will come back to damage him (Trump). He wants to submit us, but he won’t. We are an independent country, not an American company. Sovereignty and dignity! I wonder if Trump will actually use his term to screw Mexico up or whether we are just making this up. Anyway, what we are definitely not doing is trying to move forward by creating jobs and strengthening education, businesses and the rule of law. Rant over.

The trade negotiations were also seen in this light—as an attempt by the USA to blackmail Mexico and “take us for a ride.” Commenters were also debating whether being a neighboring country to the USA and bilateralism more broadly was a good thing. One person wrote: “cheating and short-term bilateralism has to stop, because we get stuck in it. It is better to avoid areas of dependency and explore new economic possibilities, because with the neighbors on the other side we are doomed, even if it was Democrats who had the presidency.” Another one, however, argued that Mexico should make the most of its close proximity to the USA: Have you seriously thought, Señor Muñoz, what would become of Mexico without the bilateral relationship with the US? And without those millions of dollars of transfers that come to Mexico every year without a penny of taxes? Please sir, although you do not believe it, Mexico has the privilege of being the closest neighbour to the greatest power in the world. What if it was not so?

As some of the comments demonstrated, what really intensified Mexicans’ fear was the lack of trust in Mexican politicians that they could react appropriately to Trump’s threat. One commenter reminded their fellow citizens that there were lots of examples of submission in Mexican history, or as they put it: There are more examples of submission and surrender in our history than those of respect, starting with the imposition of Victoriano Huerta, with the

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plot and murder of Madero, then the oil expropriation and now the energy sector reforms. There has always been this attitude of bowing before the interests of the gringo capital.

Subsequently, whenever the relationship between Trump and Mexican presidents Nieto and Obrador was discussed, the Mexican presidents were always criticized for their lack of leadership skills and for indeed bowing before the US President and “licking gringo feet.” Nieto’s controversial invitation to Trump to visit Mexico during the 2016 presidential elections was severely criticized with commenters arguing that their president had helped Trump get elected: The only thing that visit was good for is that Trump used Pena Nieto as his door mat in Los Pinos. And the country does not really benefit in any way from the fact that our president is a shoe polisher for a foreign president. The reunion of Trump and Pena really scares me… This pair of idiots will reunite to plan how to “screw up” Mexico, they will sign the second “Pact against Mexico,” like the one signed by Pena and the parties. We already know the result, we lost Mexico. Pena says this proudly after helping Trump to win. The very image of Trump next to Peña, both speaking on from their podiums, with the national emblem on the podium of Peña, the Mexican flag in the background, Trump on one side, in an archtypical scene between presidents. Whether it was Peña’s intention or not, he propelled Trump’s image among his followers and those in doubt at the very moment when Trump’s campaign was deflating. That’s when Trump really took off. His fanatics were probably thinking: look at him, with Mexico at his feet.

The reception of Trump as a president before actually being elected to the post was mentioned by other people as well as an example of how Trump had “used” the Mexican president for his aims, thus yet again demonstrating how “submissive and dependent on others” Mexico was. Similarly, President Obrador was later on attacked for his “sheepish and servant-like attitude” towards Trump with one commenter arguing that “The North American president has practically turned the Mexican one into his lap dog and a puppet.” This was in response to an article calling Obrador “shrewd” in his dealings with Trump. Also in response to this article, another person wrote: “It’s because you have to be ‘shrewd’ to be trampled over, pissed on, kicked about with half of your cabinet of idiots and still say that the relationship is good and that you are friends. Wow,

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stupidity and cynicism also require shrewdness.” A third one added: “Amlo’s attitude towards Trump is not shrewd at all. This is not the quality that Amlo has. It’s an attitude of submission that’s the product of ignorance and fear of Lopez Obrador, who trusts Trump with everything that Trump orders him to do.” Overall, commenters argued that the US President did not treat Mexican politicians (labeled as “a bunch of submissive morons”) with respect precisely because of their servile attitude toward him. Therefore, he used them as his pets or worse “as a mat” and the USA as a whole “treats Mexico as the backyard of their home, because some of Mexico’s governors are fagots, rats, corrupt drug traffickers and motherland-selling vultures,” thus “screwing us up.” Nonetheless, there were also commenters who were happy that Trump was elected President and saw some benefits of his presidency for Mexico. Some rejoiced mainly out of spite, namely because their fellow citizens who had immigrated to the USA would suffer: Hahahaha, Latino softies carry on trembling because their free ride is over, well, their f@cking American dream is over. Hahahaha viva Trump! Now the US will truly be for and about the Americans. Trump will fight for an American-controlled NATO.  This will fall apart! “The immigrant doesn’t like it!” Hahahaha Yeeeah! Accept it! Donald Trump is the new president of the USA… wake up! Donald Trump won the vote of the American people and Hilary Clinton won the vote of the illegals! Stop crying!

This negativity toward their fellow citizens was not always justified, as the comments demonstrated. When it was, it mainly included claims that Mexicans in America were there for the “free ride.” For some, this was part of a wider issue of Mexico not pulling its weight in preventing illegal emigration to the USA. Thus, some commenters supported Trump’s reasons to sign an executive order for the building of the wall he promised during his election campaign. One person wrote that “nothing is done here to stop or control the legions of undocumented people that come from other Central American countries with the final destination in the United States. You can see these hungry people asking for spare change among the cars that stop at traffic lights in many of our cities, León, Guadalajara, San Luis Potosí etc.” Another poster argued that “the rats who run this country pay 100% of their salaries for the wall. Although these money come from us, we citizens hardly see it anyway. I can assure

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you that with everything they steal you could build at least 5 walls from end to end.” A third one added that borders existed for a reason and it made perfect sense for illegal immigrants to be deported. They wrote: “what you sow is what you reap. All that US media in Spanish transmit, all those TV and radio stations, is that all you can find in Mexico and further down (the map) is corruption, drugs, cartels, criminals, kidnapping.” Some Mexicans, therefore, saw Trump as providing an opportunity for their own country to change some of its notorious policies or practices, including corruption—the top issue that commenters unanimously agreed plagued Mexican society. Yes! Be afraid (Tremble!)! But only those mediocrities, parasites, criminals, those who lack character and are fearful of the fight—because now they will have to do things and not just enjoy the things done for them. Long live Donald Trump! Ouch! What will those who were against Trump do now? Starting with the head of the cartels, and all the crap of the Mexican parasitic particracy and its allies (“media,” “analysts,” “journalists,” “magistrates,” “reporters,” “artists,” “intellectuals,” “markets,” “athletes,” “writers,” “advertisers,” “benches,” “communicators,” etc.). Would they block the roads, burn trucks, close Reforma, give up their “charges,” will they leave for another planet? Long live independent candidates and proper democracy! Watch them in 2018. And now we will hopefully see a change in Mexican government, the change we all want. Trump is the best president that Mexico has ever had.

These comments show that some Mexicans were hoping that Trump’s presidency would bring about improvements in their own government and country. Trump was seen as the nudge that the country needed to put its act together—“As they say, sometimes you need just a little nudge to do things, so maybe with Trump Mexico will come together for everyone’s common benefit.” Power—Intra-State Contestations As the outline of the inter-state contestations showed and similarly to the Russian comments, the discussion of Trump and his presidency often led to comparisons with domestic politics and politicians. The majority of commenters described Mexican politicians in very negative terms. Depending on the timing of the comment, the focus fell on the two

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presidents—Enrique Peña Nieto (in office from December 1, 2012 to November 30, 2018) and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (in office since November 30, 2018). A key criticism was with regard to the spread of corruption in the country. One person wrote: Mexico is as is because of corruption, it is a shame that so many of us have to leave our homeland to work in the US because the government offers us nothing. The country is rich and full of potential, but it is only the rulers that have it all. This is a shame and corruption has to stop. Get out Pena Nieto and all the vultures that steal from the people! The cast is complete for “A Pair of Idiots”, one in the US and the other one in Mexico. This will be a competition to find out which president is the most stupid one. I’m betting a lot on Pena Nieto… sorry for my local affiliations. Americans have already realised that they shat their pants and would be governed by an idiot. In Mexico we have been supporting stupidity and corruption for 4 years.

In relation to the trade negotiations between the two countries, a commenter wrote that Nieto did not know how to negotiate, because “he only knows how to plunder the nation’s riches.” Another one argued that the Mexican president “is good for nothing” and “aspires to nothing… except for being lazy!” A third one added: “And to rob everyone with his gang!” There was a lot of anger directed at Nieto accusing him for “plagiarizing his bachelor thesis, refusing to come clear on Tlatlaya, Tanhuato, Apatzingán, and a thousand other similar issues?” Other accusations against him included an alleged link with “El Narco” and money laundering. While there was the odd voice defending the Mexican president, the majority shared the view that “Pena Nieto is shagging Mexico ‘with no love’.” A few commenters even wrote that Pena Nieto was “the most disapproved president” or “the worst president” in the history of Mexico.” Similarly, views on his successor were also very negative. Obrador was criticized for being a “crafty liar,” stupid, and “a coward” attempting to implement Chairman Mao’s economic policies. He was accused of being a drug trafficker, “a narco leader,” and generally a criminal. One person wrote that ordinary people run the risk of being imprisoned for a fake invoice but “if you steal billions from the Treasury like Pena Nieto, Moreira or Bartlet, then nothing happens, Obrador ensures you are immune. Obrador=criminal… they are all the same bandits.” Other commenters shared similar sentiments:

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No, justice will never be served to these genocidal criminal mafiosos… Obrador… and I forgive them. His prosecutor is now ready. Because he would walk free, like all those criminals. Impune and happy. Obrador is a mental preacher, more of the same. That scamming parasite is going for another term of stealing. Do you really trust Obrador blindly? Despite the fact that he lived off Mexican politics all his life? The reelection of a gringo president is in the constitution of the United States, while it’s not in the constitution of Mexico. To reelect Obrador for what he has “done” would be catastrophic.

As a whole, there were many more positive comments of Trump than of any of the Mexican Presidents. American domestic politics was also discussed by commenters. Trump’s first impeachment trial provoked a heated debate between those who believed that Trump was innocent and should not be persecuted, and those who were hoping that he would be impeached because he deserved it due to his “abuse of power” and due to the fact that “anyone else would do a better job.” There were also Mexicans who did not really expect much to come out of the impeachment trial but they were at least hoping that it would make Trump slow down and “curb his pride.” One person wrote that this was “an unjust political trial against a president who has been working for the good and the justice of the US, with trade treaties, with the migration triggered by the system, I hope they won’t make a mistake.” By contrast, other commenters expressed their negative views of Trump. One person wrote that Trump was known as “a mouthpiece, a liar, narcissistic, fickle person” and even a criminal who was only interested in being re-elected. Another one added, “What a disgusting pain in the bum (Trump)! This animal, this non-human, is pure cynicism! Infamous ginger orangutan. There is no doubt that the wretch has a lot of power and is easy with revenge, even in the worst-case scenario.” Regardless of what Mexicans thought of Trump, most felt that the impeachment trial was “a historical mistake”/“historic failure” by the Democrats who had actually “arranged him a traffic-free highway for the upcoming elections. If they were a little smarter, they would have gotten much more just by making the American people understand what a dangerous liar he is.” The majority felt that the Democrats had started the whole process as a revenge for Hilary Clinton’s defeat, and even though Trump was “unbearable, but this show by Democrats was only to topple a Republican and win the next presidential reelection.” As a whole, the

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Democrats “are desperate for power and use the Constitution at will.” Commenters demonstrated their understanding of the nature of the intra-­ state contestations taking place in the run-up to presidential elections: Many people get this wrong. This was a political trial and this is why politics sets the tone to it. In politics, the combination of forces define the ideas and actions to be used. Which then shows that Democrats started the case knowing they would lose. They did so because they figured that even if they lose they would damage Trump’s reelection campaign. With so few months left till the elections, the impeachment should be done by the people at the polls. But Democrats know that Trump has too good of a chance to be reelected and that’s why they wanted to get him out of the way through the back door. The accusations against Trump are lies fabricated by the United States press and the Democrats. A President of the United States has never been accused of so many anomalies, none of which have been proven to date. Democrats are desperate for power and use the Constitution at will.

The trial itself was seen as “chronicles of an announced failure” and its outcome in favor of Trump a major defeat for the Democrats—a predictable “electoral farce” with the Democrats “going from bad to worse towards a total defeat.” As one person put it, the result was that the party had “increasingly discredited themselves by being so desperate for power.” Another one called them “corrupt and backward Democratic losers? Get rid of them now! Lazy progressives are having hard time, they have no future, they have to go! Long live freedom!” A third one even expressed the view that the party itself should be put on trial “for not letting President Trump work.” They wrote: “They created as much fuss as they could, but look at Trump, he is at the front and charging. It is people like him who always win the fight, who fight at the front and have no fear. He is getting four more years in power, because the so-called Democrats created the best propaganda for his reelection. They have no brains, and with Pelosy at the forefront, the battle was lost prematurely.” Trump was described as coming out victorious after the priceless publicity provided by the Democrats: And while they are making a fool of themselves, unable to count a few thousand votes, Trump addresses the nation in a self-congratulating exercise, whether justified or not. Horrible week for Democrats.

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TRUMP, TRUMP, TRUMP, TRUMP!!!!!! The Democratic farce is over. The phenomenal president has a free walk toward reelection. Cathedral bells ring, muses recite poems, the heavens open to greet the magnanimous. GOD SAVE MR. TRUMP, GOD SAVE AMERICA !!!!!!!

Nonetheless, that view of Trump coming out victorious of the impeachment trial was not shared by everyone because there was a group of people who tried to provide a more in-depth analysis of these developments by exploring the implications for democracy—a topic that I will discuss in the subsequent section on the theme of democracy. There were also commenters who saw the Democrats’ defeat as a symptom of a more serious issue the party suffered from—the inability of the “opposition party” to find “a good candidate, a good rooster, a young and experienced candidate who could crush the old backpain Trump.” In order to beat Trump in the presidential race, the Democrats would “have to be much more intelligent in forging an electoral strategy” and would “have to work with their base (voters), to convince the undecided and change minds of Trump’s voters.” Views were split on the potential outcome of the 2020 Presidential elections. Some were persuaded that Trump would win because “no other candidate in the contention is any good” and because “the gringos prefer Trump, that’s what polls say and they are right.” This last commenter also wrote that “the despair of the Democrats is evident, they already lost, that’s the last convulsions of the hanged man.” Others felt the exact opposite: It doesn’t matter, Trump’s totally ruined the country, his sad end has been decided in the long run. His political time has come to an end and I am very happy. In the elections of 2021 the citizens who are fed up with Trump are going to vote him out of the White House, where he shouldn’t have ever entered to corrupt all those institutions that were democratic before him. It is very unfortunate for the world to have (him as) the president of the most powerful country in the world with nuclear weapons at his disposal. Voting him out is a duty for all of us with dual citizenship.

This last post clearly shows that the intra-state contestations discussed by the Mexican commenters had global implications due to the fact that the USA was indeed “the most powerful country in the world,” “a world power and everything that is done in that country affects other countries.”

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Power—Global Contestations Mexicans online frequently framed the US President as a danger to the world due to his mental instability, brutal character, lack of strategy, and the fact that he was “making everyone an enemy”: Donald Trump’s unexpected triumph in the presidential elections of the United States of the North is a defeat for the world, this could lead us to a third world war. The situation is even more difficult as it’s not just the US population, but the whole world knows that Trump is not right in the head and that he is a danger for the peace in the world as he repeatedly provokes all countries… except for Israel of course. A regular undomesticated gringo feels like they are in a promised land and that all the barbarities this crazy man is doing at a global level are worth the treats they are getting! Unfortunately for them (and all of us) we will have to pay for it sooner or later. Well yes, he now has the momentum to finish this term and start the second one, but the problem is in his own nature… He is and will always be a chav, who is not fit for becoming a US President. As soon as he gets over the effects of the failed attempt (to impeach him), he will carry on being a danger for the planet (where did I hear this before). He doesn’t care about climate change or proliferation of weapons to civilians.

In addition to the global threat that Trump was seen as posing, a few people also discussed the implications of his election victory for Cuba in particular. One person wrote that “Cuba is already left without Venezuela’s money and now Trump wins. Castro’s communist dictatorial empire is slowly coming to an end.” Another one added that “hopefully Trump will put that communist gorilla back in his place, it is not fair to all Cubans who have died at the hands of that genocidal family.” A third one called the Castro brothers “a pair of octogenarian assassins, as mad as it gets” and argued that “the fateful little brothers would be the only ones to lose out since the whole island is theirs.” Another poster wrote that “the Cuban dictatorship and the national kleptocrats will have many nightmares throughout the next four years!” Not everyone saw Trump as a danger, though. For some, Trump’s election victory was the harbinger of “a new era of less corruption in the world” and later on in the course of his presidency, “the extraordinary success of his economic and foreign policy” was seen as “changing the world forever, as it happened in the 80s with Ronald Reagan.”

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Another global topic that was discussed at length was Trump’s Russian connection. The word “Trumpoid” was used in that context. Trump was considered to be Putin’s protégé who received help during the campaign in exchange of empowering “Putin in his struggles with Europe.” Again, opinions were split, especially in relation to the impeachment trial. For some, Ukraine “was involved in the Russian plot that occupied the press and Democrats for two years and falsely accused Trump of being a Russian agent,” which as a whole “was an attempt to undermine a president elected by millions of people.” Biden was seen as “engaged in games with the whole fascist mafia that governs Ukraine.” China was another global player that was mentioned in the comments. Some commenters interpreted Trump’s militant behavior toward Mexico as a result of the pressure he was under from China. This person wrote: “The problem is NOT Mexico. USA is protecting its borders and economic life in the face of a greater confrontation with China and its group of allies.” Another one also argued that China and India were in a different league to Mexico. Trump was “in the cowboy style of the Wild West, trying out his forces, playing with Mexico to see the reactions, what works or what does not. Because if he really wants to save and strengthen the American economy, he will have to face the mighty China, the Asian Tigers, India. This is not a piece of cake.” Responsibility—Actors and Actions A common topic was who was to be held responsible for the difficult situation Mexico was in—Trump, Mexican politicians, Mexican people, or broader global processes and trends. One commenter wrote: “We are responsible for trusting the politics of globalization, for signing a Free Trade Agreement, as if it was a blank check, with one of the most predatory countries, for preferring a neoliberal policy at any cost instead of strengthening the internal economy.” In this comment, although a range of factors were mentioned, responsibility ultimately fell with Mexicans themselves. A number of commenters went further than that and shared the view that the US President (Elect) was used as a scapegoat for all Mexico’s problems. As one person put it, Trump was “turned into the source of all our problems, the one and only culprit…responsible for the sufferings of this poor Mexico… where the federal government doesn’t hold any responsibility, everything is Trump’s fault, everything comes from outside… it’s absurd.” A few commenters explained that Trump “suits perfectly” and is a perfect fit for the Mexican government because

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by portraying him as Mexico’s biggest threat and the one person to blame for all problems, the locus of responsibility was shifted from Mexican politicians to Trump himself. They wrote: It allows to ask us to ‘unite’ and thus forget about our problems that were here since before the election of Trump and even before he became the candidate. It’s not like Trump is not a threat, but our weak state makes it even worse. Now it turns that the media want us to believe that Pena Nieto is brave and is doing the right thing, while his messages are simple promulgations of dignity and nationalism, devoid of action.

Another person also argued that finding an external enemy in the face of Trump was a deliberate strategy by Nieto with the aim of diverting attention from “his own mismanagement.” They added that the Mexican President “almost succeeded in finding a common enemy for Mexico in the old madman Trump, to the point that many Mexicans portrayed Nieto as a hero for nothing less that the ‘achievement’ of cancelling his visit to the US.” A commenter also asked “A timely question: who has done more damage to our people over the years? Politicians or Donald?” Similarly, a poster wrote that “Trump doesn’t govern Mexico. He will be calm… but the real problem of Mexico is Mexicans… some more than others.” They gave lots of examples of recent problems that Mexico had been experiencing, which had nothing to do with Trump: Everyone is talking about “the enormous harm that Trump has brought to us”… spokespeople of confusion. Was it Trump who has been sacking Mexico for 70 years? Was it Trump who sank PEMEX? Was it Trump who sacked Coahuila, Veracruz, Quintana Roo, Chihuahua, Sonora? Was it Trump who loaded Mexico to the top with debts in dollars? Was it Trump who turned Mexico into an exporter of cheap labour… a country that supports cheap manual labour, corruption, miserable salaries and slave conditions of labour—as the great attractions for investment into Mexico? Did Trump start the gasolinazo? Was it Trump who fooled us with the supposed “reforms” of the energy sector or telecoms, which were a farce and a failure? The problem is not Trump.

Similarly to this last comment, another one wrote that “neither Trump, nor the Chinese nor any other external factor is responsible for the great problems of Mexico and for those to come. It is simply because Mexico has not created its growth platform and that’s simple to explain: the

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corruption of the rulers and the entrepreneurs that are with them. So, let’s not close our eyes and blame the external antichrist, it’s all about the devils that we have in our own country.” As in previous comments, corruption was seen as the main issue that Mexican society was plagued by. Different solutions were proposed both to Mexico’s internal problems and to Trump’s threat. Assuming responsibility for their actions and getting on with their work as well as ensuring that everyone in government does their job was pointed out as the key to success: Each public official, public servant or anyone who works in the government should work according to their responsibilities, rights and obligations, and focus on recovering the wealth, as that’s the reason we citizens are so poor. Because there is no discipline, there is no respect, there is no authority from the President of the Republic, Cabinet, Deputies, Senators, Governors, Municipal Presidents, Unions. They do not have the ability to govern, that is why there is so much unemployment, insecurity, corruption, because nobody does what they really should do as public servants, that is why the people are tired of so much corruption and there is nobody who does anything. I agree with you that our governments have failed to reduce poverty, violence, corruption and impunity. I believe the time has come for citizens to demand compliance with the law and certain commitment from our politicians. Is it feasible to create a citizen movement that stops those who don’t oppose to or commit these acts—and proposes punishments?

This last comment alluded to the fact that although the reason for failure thus far lied with those in power, citizens should also assume responsibility and take action. According to another poster, the responsibility lied at a different level—that of the home where the culture of corruption emanated from because politicians represented society as it was. As one person put it, “Our poor country, we really left it in ruins” so responsibility for the plight of their country, in the view of this poster, was shared by Mexicans themselves. A fellow Mexican felt that the change should be led by educated Mexicans who believed in the rule of law. The cultural level was the most important one, commenters felt: If we cannot emerge as a real country that is free from corruption and is full of men and women with honour, then nothing can save us. This is why it is an opportunity to reinvent our culture, with everyone (contributing) from their space and with their essence, without fear, without bad copies, with creativity, values, originality and ideas.

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A few Mexicans also provided more specific political advice on how their politicians should be dealing with the USA. They argued that Mexico was “too soft” and that’s why Trump did not respect Mexican politicians. The alternative proposed was “tough” negotiators and going “on the offensive.” One person wrote: “We were too soft and were used as a dirty wipe for all US problems. We should start liberalising drugs, like Portugal did, and also send a warning that we won’t be a filter for Central American illegals.” Another topic, which included a discussion about assuming responsibility, revolved around the question of who was to blame for Trump’s election victory and subsequently for his acquittal in the first impeachment trial. As already explained, the Democratic Party was seen as the main culprit for not having a strong enough candidate in the elections and for starting a pointless impeachment trial later on. Politicians in general were also blamed for causing citizens to lose their trust in them. One person wrote: The problem was not Trump, but the politicians of both countries that made the society no longer believe in them nor in the system that they created. Hence someone appears with promises that are totally different from conventional politics and inspires the hope for change. People are no longer weighting what they say, they just ask for change. This problem can also easily happen in Mexico if someone comes up with these same features.

Other explanations for Trump’s election victory included: Americans’ longing for security due to the terrorism threat and “Obama’s weakness”; hypocrisy among American people who say one thing (that they respect diversity) but do another (vote for Trump), or as one person put it, “who in your community are politically correct while suspicious of everything when being at home”; and the US electoral system, which “can be manipulated, hijacked, by people who specialise in these systems” and which basically secured Trump’s victory. Mexican and Cuban immigrants were particularly singled out for their hypocrisy. A commenter wrote that “Cubans on the island must thank Cubans in Florida for Trump’s triumph. They keep stabbing each other, these polarized, selfish, unfortunate brothers.” Another one explained that among those who voted for him were “many Latinos who long for the old days of America…with white supremacy and control over the world.” A third person expressed the view that immigrants “of all colours” were “fearful, have paranoia, to

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the point where even those who emigrated don’t want fellow countrymen from their countries of origin.” A poster also wrote that it looked illogical that “those who were going to be deported voted for Trump.” Later on, during the impeachment trial it was argued that “racial minorities enthusiastically cheer for Trump because of the great prosperity that he has brought to the country.” Democracy—Meaning and Future The second major theme was that of democracy: meaning and the future of democracy (Graph 6.2). Trump’s election victory was seen as an example of “proper democracy” in action, which exemplified what democracy was all about, namely the existence of an electoral system that allows an anti-establishment candidate to win the support of the people and to actually rule the country: Precisely because it is a democracy, Trump can govern, the people have chosen him, despite the stories of the press, the great fortunes of the USA and the billionaires who control the Internet. Democracy means democracy, since Trump legitimately won, whatever could have been, it’s a moment of unity. At the end, I don’t think he will build the wall nor would he deport immigrants. Politicians and all sorts say

Meaning

The future of democracy

• Definition • Democracy in action

• The US losing its credibility as a world leader • The end of democracy?

Graph 6.2  Democracy theme in the Mexican comments

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things to get votes, I think people will work it out by talking and I hope good changes are on the way. I do not agree with Trump’s future policies, and, as a foreigner exercising his freedom of expression to the full, I voice opinions, but the point here is that he is not an illegal president. He won based on a certain process, which several presidents used before him to come to power, where the win is not by majority of votes, but by majority of delegates. If people are unhappy with this, they should seek to change it to the majoritarian voting, as it is in many countries of the world. But until that happens, the law works for whoever got the majority of delegates’ votes and not because of other reasons or because someone doesn’t like him.

Democracy also included accepting Trump’s victory and “the laws that govern this country” even if “my guts turn because this person is our president.” This view was largely shared by most people who expressed an opinion on the subject. The outcome of the impeachment trial was also seen as an example of democracy in action by some commenters: Justice is what happened. The institutions have functioned like a proper democracy that is US, the Senate has avoided an institutional coup. The president is chosen by the people, not Democrats. God save Mr. Trump, God save America !!!! Do not lie Republicans, do not: the House, democracy, justice. Accept the democratic result.

However, the alternative view on the outcome of the impeachment trial was that it signaled the beginning of a very negative process, namely the USA losing its credibility as a world leader in democracy. Trump didn’t come out victorious. It’s worth mentioning that democracy in the US is of a third class now. It’s not genuine, or at least it is not better (it is not worse) than it was before. Republicans are no longer interested in the security of their country or in sticking to its laws. On top of that, they only care that their party stays in power, even though that’s due to someone immature, rude, ignorant and mentally ill. The US have already fallen low enough. Other democracies will already look down on it (of course, we are not talking about Mexico). Trump will forever remain a stain on the US political history and the US don’t have any authority for giving lessons of democracy to any country.

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Historic failure of the so-called Democrats. They wanted to alter the results of the polls and they lost. At the next elections we will see an even more divided society and a democracy more vulnerable than ever. Farcical gringo crap! A madman “leading” the “most powerful” country in the world, capable of doing any illegality (even killing, as he mentioned himself), and even then the “honourable” gringo legislators care more about their personal interests than those of their country and “decide” to “pardon” him! Gringo democracy is a farce!

The trial was described as “a circus” and “a farce” because everyone voted not on the basis of whether they believed that “Trump is guilty or not guilty, instead they vote like their party tells them to (except for one person). This is why this is a proper farce of a trial… like the whole of politics in reality.” Not everyone agreed with this evaluation, though, because when one person called the impeachment trial a ridiculous “yankee show,” another one replied that this was not a spectacle because “conflict of interest and obstruction of justice are punished, no matter who the president is.” Nonetheless, others were considerably more pessimistic and interpreted the result of the impeachment trial as an indication of the end of democracy in the USA. For them, the fact that “one of the greatest villains in history rules the country that was an example of democracy not so long ago” was very significant indeed because “for hundreds of millions of people in the world, the USA will never be the same again. Those are the people who continue to believe that truth is important, that solidarity between human beings is essential, that women and men should have the same rights, and that the planet has its limits.” Trump’s victory and the fact that he was “the most antidemocratic of the gringo presis” was more than a petty domestic political battle. It was a signal about a significant change in values for a society that has for years been seen as the main promoter of democracy worldwide. In fact, one commenter saw Trump’s 2016 election victory in this light: “As of 20 January 2017, The US stops being the country of democracy and liberty and turns into a country alienated by censorship, racism and xenophobia. Humanity will pass through the dark side for 4 years with a madman in the White House.” Another person even expressed the view that similar to the Roman Empire that had “its apogee and its perigee,” “the North American empire might be arriving to its climax and this demented man might be the one to ride it into the sunset.” A commenter also wrote that everything Trump said should

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be ignored, and that it would be better if “he self-isolates and keeps his mouth shut… while he finishes destroying his country.” The biggest testimony to the fact that Trump was driving America to the grave was that the American system allowed a person such as him to be elected to the highest post. A few people even used the term “terrorist” to describe the US President: “Who could’ve thought that today the American system, now defunct, would create its own terrorist? An intolerant and mad person. They have an enemy on the inside. How long is this going to last?” The only way out of this situation, especially after the unsuccessful first impeachment trial, was for Trump not to be re-elected in 2020, which would allow “American leadership in the world” to be “restored and politics to return to decency.” As one person put it, “the citizens who are fed up with Trump are going to vote him out of the White House, where he shouldn’t have ever entered to corrupt all those institutions that were democratic before him. It is very unfortunate for the world to have (him as) the president of the most powerful country in the world with nuclear weapons at his disposal. Voting him out is a duty of all of us with dual citizenship.” Another one similarly wrote that “as we already know what his nature is like, what he really is made of, we would have to agree that a son of a bitch like him should not be a president of the United States. It’s that simple.” Patriotism, Identity, and Populism The third big theme in the Mexican comments was that of patriotism, identity, and populism (Graph 6.3). I decided to combine these three sub-­ themes because the process of collective identity is intrinsically linked to patriotism while patriotism and populism go hand in hand. Populist leaders rely on patriotic sentiments and drawing upon a common collective national identity in their rhetoric. Patriotism The patriotic theme was mainly framed around the discourse of submission that Mexican commenters believed their country was subjected to by the USA and strategies to untangle itself from the USA as a truly free and “independent country” (“not an American company”) without falling prey to other forces in the context of globalization and interdependence and under the pressure of neoliberalism and capitalism. In this narrative, Mexico should be “united” in the face of Trump’s threat, because although

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Populism

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• Patriotism - definition • Us vs. them

• Definition

Graph 6.3  Patriotism, identity, and populism theme in the Mexican comments

“he wants to submit us” and “they want to sink us…with the ingenuity of Mexican people we will move forward.” Ultimately, politicians had to ensure that they did not behave as cowards in their relationship with Trump, because as one commenter pointed out, if they did, their fate might be similar to that of Emperor Moctezuma who was allegedly stoned to death by his own people. This person wrote: “Let’s hope that 500 years later history does not repeat itself and Enrique Peña Nieto does not act like a coward and disappoints us trying to mitigate the anger and indignation that the Mexican people have against those who offended us.” Another one also pointed out that if the “little dictatorial island” of Cuba “managed to not be subdued by the empire,” then Mexican politicians should most certainly not behave like victims because “we will fall on our faces and will be consumed by the inaptitude of cowardice.” Mexican politicians’ duty was to put Mexico first and ensure that they “act with caution, are not obedient and mediocre, and act against the interests of their own country.” Instead what they were believed to have been doing was to “rapidly sell themselves to power” because they were “liars, they lack the guts to defend the essence, history and moral values of our nation.” The selling to power included bowing before Trump. A commenter who was particularly worried about what would come out of the partnership between Trump and Nieto concluded that the reunion between the two was scary, because they were signing “a pact against Mexico” and the

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result was: “we lost Mexico.” Some of the comments focused on the importance of “sovereignty and dignity,” while others reminded their fellow citizens why it was worth putting up a fight for their country: We are a nation that inherited a great civilization, our ancestors were great medics, built pyramids like those in Egypt and we have a lot to be proud of, our culture, gastronomy etc. Above all we inherit the courage of our ancestors and we are the reckless who would rather die in battle than surrender. But we are also intelligent as any human being and we won’t fall for provocations. If they want other people to search for these provocations, we will not give them weapons.

Talking about the greatness of their nation, as in this last comment, was actually very rare and it was done mainly with historical references. No one seemed to claim that Mexico was a great nation at present. Mexican patriotism was most definitely not similar to Chinese patriotism. Mexican commenters did not really talk about the greatness of their nation or how it would conquer the world, as Chinese commenters did. In fact, a poster pointed out that “Mexico is an insignificant player in the events happening worldwide.” Nieto’s visit to the USA was given as an example of an event that went unnoticed by the “majority of gringos” who “were unfazed by what was said during the visit, and they cared even less about whether the faint-hearted Pena defended his nation.” There was only one person who wrote that they were “proud to be Mexican, now and always!” Fighting slogans were also extremely rare—there were only a couple of comments urging their fellow Mexicans to “carry on.” The Mexican comments as a whole were in fact much more focused on the issues their country was experiencing and its realistic outlook rather than getting involved in any form of blind waving of the Mexican flag. This explained why there was such a heavy focus on explaining what went wrong in Mexico and coming up with strategies for tackling Trump’s threat. One commenter argued that due to the fact that Mexico had always being “bowing before the interests of the gringo capital…, this (narrative of) respect for national sovereignty is a utopian tale that has never existed. The actual reality is more like that of someone condemned to be executed, who is hoping for either his executioner’s forgiveness or his bad aim—all for not doing his job beforehand. And what was that job? Well, the one that so many other countries did: not depending economically and socially on others. We are now going to pay for the lack of developmental policies.”

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Thus, while there were references made to Chairman Mao’s policy of self-reliance, most proposals were more along the lines of strengthening their own economy and introducing a degree of protectionism. Different suggestions were made—from finding new business partners like China, South Korea, Japan, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Central America, and Canada to breaking of NAFTA and entering bilateral negotiations, thus “reinventing ourselves as a nation. Nothing is impossible for a country as rich as ours.” Another proposal was to punish America somehow. Ideas included consuming more domestic and fewer American products and services, thus affecting “the income of the gringos as they won’t expect it”; imposing additional taxes on “gringo companies that want to sell in Mexico…just to screw them up” as well as on Mexican oil; considering “how to make money for Mexico outside of NAFTA, for example by offering retirement opportunities for Americans in Mexico or asking all Mexicans who chose to go on holiday to the USA to pay a fine of 10,000 US dollars. One commenter even went as far as to propose the following: “if Donaldo Trumps is going to expel illegal immigrants, Mexico must expel all the gringos who are here watching over the security of their backyard, and eliminate everything that’s gringo here so that none of it is left in Mexico.” Another one wrote that Mexico should just let all the drugs pass through and he will put his hands up in no time.” Realistic or not, all these strategies were aimed at teaching Trump a lesson by showing the USA that it needs Mexico and that it’s important to have a strong country as its neighbor, thus urging the US President to “calm his belligerent actions against Mexico”: From now on the immediate challenge is to boycott anything “made in USA” and to consume everything “made in Mexico.” The economic side (of things) is the most sensitive and the easiest one to put in practice, since it only requires personal will to implement. I challenge you to do this, let’s go Mexico! How do we resolve this? We already gave USA an actual part of the country, then gave them products and labour, are we not learning from it? Or we don’t want to learn, or maybe we can’t … or maybe we are delusional and we keep changing mirrors for gold, as they suggest we do. Stop selling what we have, keep it, start with ourselves, travel by bike, appreciate our intellectual talents—as Ghandi did. The relationship between Mexico and the United States is complex and if there are problems in Mexico, there will be problems in the United States. It is in their interest that their neighbour has jobs and opportunities for their

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citizens, otherwise the migration of Mexicans and Central Americans increases the risk for their own economic, political and social systems having problems. Trump does not understand that the United States’ prosperity depends on the prosperity of other countries, especially Mexico. When the peso lost a lot of value against the dollar, the states on the southern border of the United States declared themselves a disaster zone. If the trade between Texas and Mexico stops, this will lose 90 billion dollars a year worth of exports. Is this how Trump seeks to strengthen his country?

What some of these commenters were alluding to was the fact that Trump’s protectionism was doomed as a strategy in today’s globalized world because there was too much interdependence and mutual dependence among nations. In fact, one person put it in these exact terms by writing that “being a businessman is not the same as having to abide by the rules and regulations of international trade. No country is autonomous and globalization is the best example of it.” All in all, offering solutions and assuming responsibility for the fate of their country was considered to be important, as this comment explained: I believe we should speak from the first person singular. I think, I do, I say, I write and that way we will understand each other better. What do I do, as a Mexican, to make sure that my country is the nation that I dream of, I think of, I believe in, etc? Because I see that there is a lot of criticism and no solutions or contributions.

Identity This last comment also raises an interesting identity question. Its author urged Mexicans to think and act in the first person singular and yet, they used the collective “we” at one point. What is the collective we? How did Mexican posters actually describe their collective identity? Although the pronoun “we” was very often used, especially when considering Trump as a threat and potential strategies to counter-act the threat, this collective “we” was not a united collective identity but a divided one between Mexicans still living in Mexico and Mexicans who had emigrated to America, on the one hand, and educated and uneducated Mexicans, on the other hand. Negative references to Mexicans in the USA were made on many occasions. They were called “bums” who “would now be scrambling around the US immigration corrals causing problems,” “entering without papers and they still wanted the cake and the chocolate on the

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table when they arrived.” One person even referred to his fellow citizens as “chimpanzees” and advised them to “finish washing the dishes and cleaning your North American boss’s office,” because it was their last day of “illegal work,” given that Trump would deport them and they “won’t be able to send those 10 puny dollars a month so that your mommy and your numerous plebs could buy some beans in that dusty Mexican village of yours.” This commenter also pointed out that “there are Mexicans in Mexico, like us, who hire gringos and who also earn a lot more than an average North American.” The comment was very patronizing and offensive, drawing a line between “us”—the Mexicans in Mexico who were doing so well that even Americans worked for them, and “them”—the poor Mexicans in America working illegally, cleaning offices, and not deserving to be even called human. This reference to Mexicans cleaning North American bosses’ offices was made by a few people. One of them used another pejorative term— nacos—to refer to their fellow citizens in the USA.  It means low-class, someone less sophisticated and poorer: “what an awkward man Edgarcito… raging like a crazy Indian that you are. Better hurry up cleaning your North American boss’s office, before he arrives to catch you using the computers in the office where you take out the bins at night. They don’t need nacos like you or any of your illegal plebs in the US. Viva Trump you wankers!” Another one wrote that “Mexican migrants are also lacking balls and dignity, since it is impossible that one bastard or several gringo bastards humiliate them in this way and hassle them for a few pesos. With their savings and an aid fund that the Mexican government could potentially provide them with, they could return and work in this country and not go begging gringos there.” In line with this argument, a poster added that “an immigrant from whatever country and in whatever country will always be a second-class citizen.” The more in-depth comments were exploring the reasons for the immigration issues. One commenter pointed out that Mexican politicians had for a long time “turned a blind eye” on the problem and the socialist government was particularly to blame, because it was “one of those which believe that all countries in the world should get rid of the borders. AMLO must be suffering because Trump is not letting him get away with it. Mexicans have already had their own experience of suffering from these caravans of undesirable people from corrupt Central American countries. Maybe now they understand why Trump won’t let them in.” American politicians, in particular, the Democrats were also accused of hypocrisy:

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By speaking of “protecting immigrants” and condemning them to be exploited twice (1) By the mafias of the “coyotes” who traffic them from Mexico (with the majority of them coming from Central America) to USA for the “modest” sum of between USD 5000 and 15,000 per person (which Democrats “don’t know about”) and (2) the low wages they are paid for being “wet.” (undocumented)

The negative references were not limited to Mexicans immigrants, however, but they were also in relation to Mexicans in Mexico who, according to commenters, were uneducated (with “the general level of education…somewhere around 6th grade of primary school”) and easily manipulated by the media; and therefore generally not working or working in low-paid jobs because they have not studied or trained. One person summed up: “We are not a high society, we are all corrupt, corruption is born at homes and the rulers are the people that we elect so that they represent us.” Another one even claimed that “Mexicans are even more racist than our Northern companion may be.” A few people were also making fun of other commenters’ views, writing that “this country is full of geniuses” and “everyone is wise and mighty when public opinion is asked, but the stealing goes on and on and no one moves a finger so that we Mexicans begin to change.” This last commenter saw this type of behavior as the main reason explaining “why the bullies from the government do what they do to us, putting their boot on our backs, while we continue to fight and lie to them through various ways (like this one), but I repeat, we don’t want and act to see a great change in this Mexico which survives by the grace of God, so stop making stupid comments in public.” In a similar train of thought, another person advocated for a more active approach, especially by “we the educated Mexicans” who “should go and claim what belongs to us, in Mexico and in any other country of the world.” He pleaded with his fellow Mexicans to “enter any country through a border.” Having said all that, there were a few positive references to the collective Mexican identity. Mexicans were described as ingenious, courageous, intelligent and friendly, and descendants of a nation “that inherited a great civilization” with ancestors who “were great medics, built pyramids like those in Egypt and we have a lot to be proud of, our culture, gastronomy etc.” One person argued that the more the USA changes toward Mexico, “the more we turn to our national identity. The truth is that the model

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imposed from the outside is changed from the outside. Our values are immutable and we should openly work with them.” Mexican society as a whole was described as plagued by corruption and criminality. I already dealt with the corruption topic, so I will just briefly mention here the main criminality aspects that commenters focused on— violence and drug dealing. A commenter wrote that Mexico was a “bloodied country” and that it was “SAD… to see violence all the time, to add this to the pack of jackals in the government that hurt and plunder the country.” In addition to Mexican immigrants who were often portrayed as the other, Americans were most clearly the “them” in Mexican comments. The one word that most frequently described them was “gringo”—a term clearly signifying otherness, namely a person speaking a foreign language or in the Mexican case most definitely white people from the USA. There are different versions about the origin of the word, but it was most commonly associated with either a song sung by American soldiers during the nineteenth-century Mexican-American war—“Green grow the rushes,” which Mexicans heard and started calling them by the first two words as they sounded to them—“grin go” or with the green uniform they were wearing and Mexicans’ response to them “green go home” (https:// www.vocabulary.com/articles/wordroutes/the-­colorful-­origin-­stories-­ of-­gringo/). The term is not considered to be offensive. In comparison with the Chinese and Russian comments, there were actually not that many references to American character and identity. One person attempted to define the term “Americans” by arguing that “Americans are all those born from Alaska to Cape Horn, not just the bloody yankees.” As already explained, a key topic of discussion was Americans’ alleged inclination to treat Mexicans in a patronizing and generally submissive way but there was only one person who referred to Americans as “imperialists.” According to this line of argument, Trump was “a fitting president for his country” and “should govern the US for life and bring more chaos and disorder to this dark country. Maybe then they would pay a little for what they have done to other countries.” Some of the terms used to define Americans and American society were “stupid,” “Trumpian eyelets,” “more racist, mysogynist and backwards than what we could imagine.” This is how a few people summed up the main reasons for Trump’s victory based upon their perception of American culture and values:

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In Gotham City of New York tycoon Trump came to save them. He already put his name on a skyscraper. All he needs now is his mask and cape to complete his Batman impersonation. Or is it Joker? This is how many Americans must have voted as their culture and values don’t come from what they learnt from histories, (but) from modern X-Box games. Tough reality… I wonder why nobody saw this coming? The reasoning I see behind this is that there are a lot of “country” people from the gringo ranches where the “red necks” (“nacos gringos”) live, people that nobody polls and interviews. Sometimes those of us who live in the cities mistakenly believe that only we exist, that everyone has the Internet, Facebook, watches the news on smart devices and that only these people have the right to comment and vote, but no, the socio-economic pyramid is a lot larger at the base.

Americans were also described as selfish and hypocritical, because they only saw “other countries’ problems, not their own” and because they did not consider the global implications of Trump’s election to the presidency but “a regular undomesticated gringo feels like they are in a promised land and that all the barbarities this crazy man is doing at a global level are worth the treats they are getting!” Some even went as far as to argue that Americans are ruthless because they “are not interested in the means if they achieve their ends.” One person concluded that Trump was “a belch of his country and society.” Another one referred to the USA as “strange.” American society was presented in divergent ways. For some, “everything works in the United States” because it was “a great nation,” “a country of laws,” and a rich economy “where you dream big and where your rights are protected.” For others, corruption and criminality were issues not just for Mexico but also for America. One person pointed out corruption existed in the USA “at the highest levels,” while another one added that “there is a corrupt class within all parties” and that there was “mafia in power.” An example they provided was of the Madoff investment scandal. In addition to that, arms dealing was presented as “the business of the United States” since “they use weapons as sweets in American schools.” Drug dealing and consumption were also highlighted as a problem. Another issue was the overreliance on the credit card system. One person wrote that Americans were “dominated by their little credit card system.” The American dream was actually to “get into debt and be a slave forever.” There were a few commenters who discussed the link between the criminal aspects of Mexican and American societies in relation to human

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trafficking, drug dealing, and weapons. One person blamed it all on the American mafia: The American mafia has crushed Mexico. They benefit from billions of dollars that they pocket yearly, at the cost of pain and sufferings of tens of millions of dead Mexicans. All the bad actions the American mafia does through their employees the Mexican mafia. Kidnapping, extortion, bribing politicians, all that. El Chapo, Guzman, El Azul and other heads of thugs, they are just employees of the American mafia. They manage international drug trafficking, together with the British mafia. They use their Mexican employees to produce, transport and distribute “medicine,” which they use to “cure” over 30 million of American drug addicts.

Similarly to this argument, another commenter wrote that drug consumption in the USA was “the engine that moves drug traffickers in our country,” but the reason it was possible was because Mexican authorities were colluding with the gangsters. A few people even wrote that Presidents Nieto and Obrador had links with the drug-dealing mafia or were, in fact, drug traffickers themselves. However, although rare there were also those recognized the fact that Mexico had a big role to play in all that, because as one person put it, the Mexican Customs and border surveillance systems were the ones who let weapons through. Populism In the cases when the term “populism” or “populist” was explicitly used, it was either in relation to the US President or the Mexican presidents Nieto and Obrador or all three of them. One commenter explained how populists act: Populists deceive their followers to get their support. As soon as they come to power, they deflate little by little and sink together with their supporters. Trump’s popularity had an unprecedented drop in just 10 days. We should be aware of this example and of what can happen to our country with the messiah-like Obrador, his fanatics and his gang intend to take the country to the cliff edge with their lefty fantasy and outdated populism.

Comparing the strategies of the presidents of both countries and warning about potential dangers was a common strategy. Thus, another person wrote that “now the gringos will find out what demagogy and populism is, all that Pena Nieto told them about in his time, and be careful with

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Trump’s populism.” This person was referring to a speech that Nieto delivered in the UN, “warning about messiah-like leaders.” Ironically, he himself was also accused of being a populist whose messages are “simple promulgations of dignity and nationalism, devoid of action.” A commenter explained that the rise of populists such as Trump and Nieto was possible, because “the politicians of both countries that made the society no longer believe in them nor in the system that they created. Hence someone appears with promises that are totally different from conventional politics and inspires the hope for change. People are no longer weighting what they say, they just ask for change.” Thus, as another person put it, “Machismo, fascist ideology, manipulating population through fear, abundant ignorance that generates fanaticism, basic and radical nationalism triumphed in the USA.” Opinions were split between those who thought that Trump was “a good populist” who “forgets his own campaign promises, like that of the Gettysburg pact” and “only cares about his own interests and not about the destiny of his own country,” and those who believed that he was an anti-establishment candidate who “succeeded without governmental support,” and who subsequently “has been working for the good and the justice of the US.” The former argued that “just like Hitler, who rose to power during the period of economic, social and political crisis,” Trump appealed to the “forgotten people.” The latter saw Trump as an antidote to the neoliberal political and media elites who “have been attacking him with insane and unjustified rage.” One person wrote: And what if, instead of being another eloquent Hitler, Castro Uno, Chavez and Amlo, Trump is a genuine disruptor of the oligarchic-prone political omerta, as oligarchs are always engrained into any democratic establishment—according to Michels. (An obvious example would be the Clinton Foundation’s business with the earthquake that struck Haiti.)

Populism could be hindered or stopped only if profound changes took place on the level of shared values. One person wrote that key principles should be strengthened such as “respect for others, education that teaches our population to think rather than memorize, to build bridges for constructive dialogue instead of (building) walls between national and international communities.”

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Religious and Moral Dimensions The fourth theme in the Mexican comments was religious and moral dimensions (Graph 6.4). References to God were frequently made by the commenters and I have nominally split them into three main categories: (1) In God we trust—prayers and references to God’s grace and mercy. (2) Divine retribution. (3) The evil one—references to the devil and/or demons. The tolerance theme mainly revolved about the issue of political correctness. God and Religion To start with, Trump’s election victory was met by some with prayers and blessings (“God save Mr Trump! God save America”), and a plea to God to “enlighten him in all his decisions and especially in international politics and to make the new cold war with Russia disappear for the tranquillity of humanity.” Others prayed to the Lord “to protect us from the possible damages that the bad government of President Trump may cause us in the next 4 years,” “look well after us as this thing is heading at full speed towards becoming the new Hitler,” or “for our politicians to dedicate themselves to looking for ways to satisfy Mexican needs, forgetting about their personal interests, which are more obvious every time.” One person actually prayed for Trump to “go to hell.” There were also commenters

God and religion

Morality and tolerance

• In God we trust • Divine retribution • The evil one

• Political correctness

Graph 6.4  Religion and morality theme in the Mexican comments

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who prayed to God to bring them the impeachment of “the deceitful Trump” as a Christmas present or who were arguing that Mexico “survives by the grace of God” and asked God to forgive the “misdoings” of their fellow commenters “to our Morena Virgin who protects millions of Mexicans, even those mentally retarded.” There was also a discussion about hope, namely whether hope was a “silly” thing or not. One commenter wrote: “hope is a heavy burden that requires strong backs, it is not for the weak, it is for the tireless, it is for those who in the bitter moments draw strength from the weakness.” Divine retribution and the Old Testament “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” principle also featured in the comments. Mexicans wrote that Trump and his associates would pay “for all the wrong they do” and that “he who lives by the sword dies by the sword.” Some saw Trump’s impeachment trial in this light of God serving justice, while for others Mexico’s fate was an example of a country paying for its sins by being “so far from God.” As one person put it, “What sins might this country have done for being left at the mercy of two individuals like these? Help us our Lady of Guadalupe!” Another one wrote that they would fast for a week in the hope that the impeachment trial “happens as soon as possible for this person who has done so much damage to humanity.” A major bone of contention was whether Trump was the evil one or a representative of the devil, for example, a demon, or whether God was on Trump’s side. Those who believed in the former wrote that Trump was a devil or a demon who “wears a diabolic mask,” that his election victory put a start to “the era of the Demon of Trasalandia” and “a priest would have poured some holy water on it to exorcise the vain Donald.” For one person, Steve Bannon was actually “the Satan who whispers in the ear of the absolute idiot Trump.” Others accused Trump (and Mexican politicians) of hypocrisy and not practicing what they preach, and of using God for their own gain. The latter, however, thought that all these accusations against Trump were “satan’s business…all the satan followers against Donald Trump…but god is on his side.” This commenter’s spelling of God with a lower g, however, led to a heated discussion about the meaning of God: David Rodriguez: Oy oy, and how do Mexicans vote? And you are a slow one if you still believe that this thing called god exists hahaha, you’re still delusional. David Rodriguez: God does not exist, that’s why so many pedophiles are spiritual guides to so many dark souls.

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Easy, lefty! Calm down! Manuel Soto Trujillo: if you wanted us to know you are an atheist—you got it, atheists carry god in their mouths all the time. David Rodriguez, God is not a puppet who fixes everything when we lose it. Your image of God is wrong. Or maybe it is that “god” is with the bad guys, as you say. With the evildoers, those who foster the Hate Your Neighbour views. With the bandits who do not pay taxes because they are very smart (?). A ruthless exploiter. “god” written in lowercase refers to Satan, while God with a capital is our Lord and Saviour. Please be more careful and respectful when writing the holy name of the God. Tomas Perez Alvarez, Just the way you put it, exactly, because “god” written in lowercase refers to Satan. And you got it right, because he is the cause of evil in human beings like crooks, fraudsters, bandits, criminals etc. Which god are you referring to? To the god of Ku Klux Klan, who are going to march for Trump’s victory on the 3rd of December? Talking about Pena Nieto secretly helping Donald Trump, it might be half true, because Donald Trump helped him by getting him stuck and leaving him full of excrements. Which god, you stupid? Joel Arzmendi: who is god?

As this thread of comments demonstrates, there was a fundamental disagreement about (a) whether God exists; (b) His nature; (c) His role in relation to humans’ free will, including to do evil. While the discussion touched upon a range of relevant theological issues, it did not really go into any depth and the tone was rather nasty and negative, thus not being particularly conducive to a fruitful and constructive outcome. Tolerance Trump’s election victory was seen as the beginning of a new era even in moral terms but there was disagreement as to the direction of morality. For some, this was the beginning of a dark period for humanity, marked by a general lack of tolerance, manifested in “censorship, racism and xenophobia.” It was seen as a dark moment particularly for “the people who continue to believe that truth is important, that solidarity between human beings is essential, that women and men should have the same rights, and that the planet has its limits.” The alternative argument was, however, that Trump was defending the rights of anyone opposed to the ideology promoted by the Democrats, namely of what was seen as hypocritical political correctness, gender and LGBT ideology, and even an attack on religious beliefs. As one person put it:

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What you avoid (not sure why, might be because it offends you) is that Trump managed to put himself into a position, where he is seen as the main villain opposed to the Marxist bio-ideology of gender and its gross attempts to meddle with the education, he is absolutely against abortions and doesn’t give in to political correctness (which is the name for lies in twenty-first century) of pseudoapocaliptic marionettes like Greta the firecracker. How could these evil evangelists like all these things about him? We are not even talking about the feminazi simulators, who seek to replace machism with an identical tyranny and imposition.

As this comment indicates, there were some who were very supportive of Trump’s views, and some even went as far as to express homophobic sentiments. Thus, one person wrote that “there are already too many lesbians and homosexuals in this world, on top of all the porkies,” while another one argued that “those who promote this gay culture should tremble even more, now they will be put into their places.” Others were, however, of the exact opposite view. They felt that Trump was “a fascist, zionist, is ignorant, misogynistic, and has many other flaws.” He was also accused of racism by some. A commenter wrote that “Hitler and Trump are similar with many of their ideas and we already know how that part of history ended.” This same person advised a defender of Trump “unless you are white with blue eyes, go get ready to collect rubber.” References were made to the strong influence of Steve Bannon who was defined as “a white race supremacist” and the fact that many people voted for Trump in the hope that he would return “their country to the 1960s with white supremacy and control over the world.”

Argumentation, Engagement, and Civility The quality of argumentation of the comments was very low with a mean score of 0.69 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level of argumentation. While there were reasons provided to justify one’s viewpoint/position in 37.8% of the comments, and questions were asked or were responded to in 21.5% of the sample, evidence was used in only 8.9% of the comments and only 1.5% out of 717 commenters acknowledged other people’s views/positions. Thus, both the levels of reasoning and reciprocity were very low with scores of 0.94 and 0.46, respectively, on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest and 4 is the highest possible score. With regard to engagement, the level of engagement was nearly twice as high as the quality of argumentation but again generally low. The

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average level of engagement was 1.23 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level of engagement. Engagement was predominantly taking place with the topic of the article the comment was related to. The majority of comments—72.9%—were on topic and 31.9% engaged with other users, while 13.4% engaged with the news medium or the author of the article. Similarly to the Russian case, on a few occasions a single comment provoked a very strong reaction by commenters to the extent that most of the comments published after it were discussing this one particular comment and not the actual topic the news article was about. In general, there were more discussions emanating from arguments made in some of the comments. Commenters also frequently referred to each other by name as this example demonstrates: I respect your way of thinking Matida Mo and Eduardo Garza, but we are not what you think, we are a nation that inherited a great civilization, our ancestors were great medics, built pyramids like those in Egypt and we have a lot to be proud of, our culture, gastronomy etc.

In terms of the more superficial engagement with the comments, the average number of likes per comment was very low—1.71 with a standard deviation of 5.618. The average number of dislikes per comment was even lower than that—0.47 with a standard deviation of 2.309. 57% of the comments were not liked by anyone and 92.7% did not receive any dislikes. The most disliked comment received only 28 dislikes. The comment was in relation to Trump’s presidency: “What is going on, one of the greatest villains in history rules the country that was an example of democracy not so long ago.” The second most disliked comment with 24 dislikes was the following: “I wish we had a Spanish Trump.” However, this same comment attracted nearly 3 times more likes—60 likes in total and this made it the second most liked comment as well. The third most disliked comment with 18 dislikes read: “Trump will forever remain a stain on the US political history and the US don’t have any authority for giving lessons of democracy to any country.” The most liked comment, on the other hand, had 67 likes and it was in relation to an article about Trump’s impeachment trial: “Chronicles of an announced failure. Democrats are going from bad to worse towards a total defeat.” As already indicated, the second most liked comment was also the second most disliked one. The third most liked comment with 52 likes was: “Excellent news for the free! And with his popularity to the max!” It was in relation to an article about Trump’s acquittal in the first impeachment trial.

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With regard to civility, as explained in Chap. 3, I initially asked my research assistants to use their insider cultural understanding of what counts as civil or uncivil in the respective contexts and code according to this understanding. According to their coding, 24.3% of the Mexican comments were uncivil. These comments fell into a few categories: (1) Using swear words. (2) Using insults in relation to politicians. Trump and the Mexican presidents were particularly attacked by being called all sorts of names (e.g., “infamous ginger orangutan”/“ginger ape”/“ginger clown”/“ginger twat”; “carrot,” “rats,” “thieves,” “a cowardly and stupid president,” “a madman,” “Obrafuehrer,” “Tabasco donkey,” “arrogant, self-centred old leper,” “unfortunate crazy spawn of Hitler,” “bastard,” “submissive morons,” “self-righteous and egotistic fool,” “madman Trump”; “fascist, ignorant, misogynistic”; “inept,” “idiot,” “a bloody racist killer”; “scamming parasite,” “immigrant-hating son of a whore,” “Nazi ape”). Other politicians as well as journalists or in one particular case a former politician now turned columnist were also occasionally targeted with words such as “stupid chimpanzee”; “half idiot,” “ignorant pseudo journalists,” “lazy progressives,” “muppets,” “pseudo journalistic assassins”; “kleptocrats”; “literary neoporfist,” “dirty lefty intellectuals,” “creature,” “shitty parasite,” “illiterate and offended monkey,” “fagots, rats, corrupt drug traffickers and motherland-selling vultures,” “intellectual dwarf”. (3) Using insults in relation to other commenters, for example, calling them idiots, silly/stupid, coward, on drugs, illiterate, moronic, imbeciles, peasants, dirty lefty, sick righties, apes, or with mental health illnesses. Unlike China and Mexico, derogatory terms were very rarely used in reference to all Americans (e.g., “trumpian eyelets,” “bloody yankees”). When I did the coding by using two separate variables for civility and a third clarifying one, in total there were more impolite (32.6%) and intolerant (13.1%) comments. Examples of the kind of comments that I coded as uncivil but my research assistant did not consider uncivil included: accusing other commenters of being paid to write comments or of being on drugs; referring to Trump voters as “regular undomesticated gringo”; calling a Mexican journalist “a third-­ world reporter”; the use of the word “bulshit” or urging their fellow commenters to “pray for him (Trump) to go to hell.” Regardless of the understanding of civility, in general the majority of comments were civil although as a whole, there were considerably more uncivil comments in Mexico than in China and Russia.

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Patterns of Discussion There were two main patterns of discussion in the Mexican comments: (1). Challenging the official narratives, and criticizing the political system and leadership. (2). Proposing alternative narratives and taking the discussion in a new direction. Discussions in the Mexican online space were of the most varied nature in comparison with the Chinese and the Russian spheres. In the first type, commenters were expressing disagreement with the point of view or policy put forward and a general level of deep distrust toward the politician or politicians in charge of implementing that policy. In the second case, they were also offering alternative solutions or were taking the discussion in a completely new direction. Unlike Chinese and Russian commenters, there was no echoing, let alone cheering of the official narrative, and in some cases, there was no reference to the official narrative. Mexican society was consistently presented as polarized and ridden by conflicts, and therefore the impression was often created in the articles, and even more so in the comments, that there was no official narrative but rather a cacophony of competing narratives. As a whole, agreeing with the official narrative was so rare that commenters created the impression that it did not really matter what the authorities proposed—they would always find fault with it and accuse them of corruption and gross incompetence. The first pattern of discussion was challenging the official narratives, and criticizing the political system and leadership. Commenters tended to question every single point of view or policy put forward by those in power in their country regardless of whether this was Nieto or Obrador. Here the comments were united by common degree of deep distrust of all politicians (and often of their fellow commenters) and a general pessimistic outlook on the future. All too often it was not even a question of expressing disagreement with the policy proposed but it was more a case of expressing distrust of the person in charge and the general ability of the respective president or his government to implement the policy in question or indeed for Mexico as a whole to stand its ground. Thus, when an article by El Universal reported that PAN had asked for a tough approach before Trump, commenters questioned Nieto’s ability to be tough and provided many examples from Mexico’s history of submission and “bowing before” the interests of the USA as well as from his track record as President, for example, “the same firmness with which they applauded the reforms of the illiterate judiciary.” Similarly, when an article by Excelsior mentioned that the NAFTA negotiations had started, commenters expressed their doubts as to Nieto’s negotiating abilities. One commenter

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wrote that Nieto “doesn’t know how to negotiate.” Another one pointed out that Mexico did not have any tough negotiators, which is why they would not dare stand up to Trump. Trump’s invitation to Mexico a few months before the elections was considered to have been done “out of silliness,” because Nieto and the Foreign Minister were in commenters’ views, “no visionaries, they cannot do that, they can only steal!” Commenters also took issue with Obrador’s approach to Trump and the USA and the journalist’s presentation of it as shrewd in an article by Milenio (https://www.milenio.com/opinion/joaquin-­lopez-­doriga/en-­ privado/el-­presidente-­y-­la-­fiesta-­en-­paz): Hahahahaha, now you did make me laugh Joaquin. What do you call “shrewdness,” the sheepish and servant-like attitude of the Tabasco donkey (Obrador) towards Trump? The North American president has practically turned the Mexican one into his lap dog and a puppet and now it turns out this is called “shrewdness”? Hahaha It’s because you have to be “shrewd” to be trampled over, pissed on, kicked about with half of your cabinet of idiots and still say that the relationship is good and that you are friends. Wow, stupidity and cynicism also require shrewdness. Amlo’s attitude towards Trump is not shrewd at all. This is not the quality that Amlo has. It’s an attitude of submission that’s the product of ignorance and fear of Lopez Obrador, who trusts Trump with everything that Trump orders him to do.

Another example of Mexican commenters criticizing a narrative that at first glance was written in their defence was a news article providing examples of the increase of racist rhetoric and incidents in America as a result of Trump’s rhetoric (https://www.excelsior.com.mx/ global/2016/11/10/1127542). Instead of sympathizing with the plea of the people affected and potentially expressing concern about the dangerous implications of Trump’s statements, commenters starting arguing against political correctness and claiming that the newspaper article had misrepresented Trump’s views: He said that the illegal immigrants that come from Mexico are not exactly the best that our country has to offer, but that rapists and thieves also arrive. It is a shame that they take this out of context as if he said that everyone in Mexico is a rapist and a thief. And how do I know this? I went to the source where they got these lies from. These media are pure brainwashing, just like the Clinton News Network.

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Putting “politically correct” statements before a real analysis of the situation with the US makes the whole article look like a damn shite!!!

The most heavily criticized article in the sample was an opinion piece by the former politician Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, published in El Universal. Ledo is Former Mexican ambassador to the European Union, founder and president of the Party of Democratic Revolution in Mexico. His opinion peace was about the impeachment trial. In it, he called Trump’s presidency “deranged” and argued that Mexico “should act more forcefully in defence of the national interest. We should privilege our action in multinational forums, instead of getting bogged down in a tricky and short-­ term bilateralism” (https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/opinion/porfirio-­munoz-­ledo/la-­destitucion-­de-­trump). Commenters were outraged at Ledo’s opinion. One of them called him “the one who betrayed democracy in Mexico.” Another one wrote that he was a “dinosaur” who had survived the system “at our expense.” A third one said that “this creature has lived all his life sucking juices out of the Treasury.” Having said that, there were a few people who argued that he had plenty of experience which Mexico should draw upon. The majority of posters disagreed with his view that Mexico should abandon bilateralism, and a few also defended Trump’s presidency. The second pattern of discussion was proposing an alternative narrative. For example, when the outcome of Trump’s first impeachment trial was announced, commenters started discussing the implications of the positive development for Trump for their president and country. While some argued that Obrador would continue with his allegedly submissive attitude toward the US President, others advised the Mexican president to consider more carefully the reasons for Trump’s belligerent rhetoric on immigration-related issues and to take respective action: Now this guy came to remind them what they should do by international treaties, stop playing stupid like they don’t know of the violations to international treaties that other democratic presidents allowed them to get away with. But Trump is not ducking from the stupid, the best thing that’s come out of this is the migrants’ issue. If Trump didn’t jump at Ebrad and Amlo, these thousands of bums would now be scrambling around the US immigration corrals causing problems.

There were many instances of commenters diverting the discussion in a direction slightly different to the one proposed in the article or debating an issue from a range of angles. This was most certainly the case when the

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implications of Trump’s election victory or the impeachment trial were considered for Mexico, for the USA, and for the world. Different options for the future were considered, and there was a polemic on the role the different political parties and other actors have played in the process. Most of the themes identified in the comments were initiated by commenters themselves. Thus, an opinion piece discussing the implications of Trump’s impeachment trial (https://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/pascal-­ beltran-­del-­rio/acorralar-­a-­trump-­es-­un-­peligro-­para-­mexico/1351676) prompted a heated discussion about Mexican politics and economy. The author of the piece argued that the impeachment trial was a very bad thing for Mexico because: Our country expected the renewed version of the North American trade agreement—the T-MEC, as we call it here—to be approved soon, but Pelosi’s announcement does not bode well. And it is not just because the impeachment will delay the discussion of the T-MEC in the US Congress— it is obvious that it cannot compete with a process of impeachment of the President of the United States and the opposition will not want to give Trump a political victory at this time. But because the US President may be inclined to declare that his country is leaving the current agreement, NAFTA, due to the delay of the Democrats in approving the renegotiated version last year. Can you imagine a start to 2020 in which Trump announces that his country is leaving NAFTA, a few weeks after having inscribed the Mexican drug cartels on the list of terrorist organizations, which could happen today Friday? There is no doubt: a cornered Trump can be a danger for Mexico.

The commenters then started discussing the nature of Mexico’s economy and whether it was a good idea for the Mexican President to follow Chairman Mao’s policy as well as drawing historical parallels to Mexico’s past. A person reading some of the comments would have no idea what the article they were commenting was actually about because they took on a life of their own. As a whole, heated exchanges of viewpoints were very common, which often led to bickering among commenters with lots of personal accusations and offensive remarks on occasions, completely unrelated to the topic the comment was linked to. While in comparison with China and Russia, the Mexican comments had the highest level of discussion with commenters acknowledging each other’s points of view and attempting to tackle alternative viewpoints with arguments, they were also the most uncivil comments out of the three countries. What often

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happened was that posters initially attempted to enter into a meaningful discussion with each other but once it became clear that agreement was unlikely to be reached either because of a point of view expressed diametrically opposed to their own beliefs or because other people did not seem to accept their views, they started attacking each other personally. Thus, the comments on an article about the impeachment and the potential implications of the outcome for the free trade agreement with Mexico deviated entirely from the topic at one point and lost any substance: If Obrador does poorly—it means Mexico is doing well. Rats, thieves and corrupt officials are doing well, you must be one of them. Obrador is your president, now sit down. Are you sitting? Calm down Juanito, do you have nothing better to do than to argue for your president? They represent the Fourth Transformation and are working on their arguments that T4 is worth it. Rick Rdgz Hdez, enjoy your pot of biscuits with your messiah, you miserable bot. Juan Perez, is it your name or pseudonym to hide your stupidity. A president cornered and eager to divert attention from his person there in the US, a cowardly and stupid president here in Mexico—what a perfect mix for Mexico to be stuck in a difficult position (not something we’ve actually been missing a lot). Mexico getting stuck? You will be stuck on your own, you pessimistic fool, start screaming when you get there!

Still, on occasions there was a genuine discussion of viewpoints, which was not necessarily of a deliberative nature but which nonetheless constituted some form of political talk. Here are a few examples of that: May the Holy Child bring us this Christmas gift (the impeachment of the deceitful Trump), even if it happens after Christmas! Yes, but first of all take the nuclear launch cades from him, to prevent the idiot from throwing a crazy strop. It won’t get through the Senate.

One of the most heated discussions that took place among commenters was about the benefits of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The columnist in an article by Excelsior (https://www.excelsior.com.mx/ opinion/jorge-­fernandez-­menendez/2017/02/01/1143489) argued

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that the protectionist measures proposed by Trump were unrealistic and would not really affect Mexican companies, because the USA would have to reindustrialize at a scale impossible to be implemented in a short space of time. The article argued that Mexican businesses were generally happy with NAFTA. One of the commenters then wrote that the trade agreement had indeed “brought some great benefits” to the great “entrepreneurs” “but an ordinary citizen still does not see how this has benefited anyone. FTA has not improved people’s standards of living or wages, or anything else it was supposed to achieve.” This comment then led to a whole thread discussing the claims in it: You did not live in the 70s, 80s, 90s, when there were no bicycles or TVs in the country, but the benefits are obvious to those who did. Although it is partially true that FTA was not a panacea, it brought more opportunities than we had before. Of course, I lived in the 80s, 90s etc. Same as then, today we produce nothing, makeup, and also production at miserable costs for international companies is not proper industrial production, despite all the crappy ads on TV. Jeronimo, you have to know your staff to comment on serious issues. Along the border thousands of people have jobs, in big cities the industry employs thousands, the IT industry in GDL (Guadalahara) employs thousands, the services in DF (Mexico City) have thousands, aerospace industry in Bajio employs thousands. Unfounded opinions like yours is what makes the public on the internet devalue things like these. Jerónimo, you are obviously unaware of the following: Bimbo, the world leader in the production of bread, Femsa, the second largest company in the world in soft drinks, Cemex, the largest cement producer in the world, Vitro, the world leader in glass manufacturing, including windshields for automobiles, Nemak, an auto parts producer with a worldwide presence, Carso group, a world leader in telecommunications and construction, among others, Herdez, a food producer with a presence in several countries, etc, etc, etc, inform yourself before commenting to avoid looking ridiculous. JERONIMO, if an ordinary citizen does not see how FTA has benefited us, it is because he does not work, and if he does not work, it is because he is not trained, and if he is not trained, it is because he did not study—and I can carry on with this (logic), it’s just an example. Not all companies are prepared to participate in the FTA, and this is where the problem is because both federal and state governments are to blame, as well as the businessmen, remember they were only given three years to get ready and very few managed to do so.

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This was just the beginning of the discussion, which went on with further 16 comments closely related to the first comment. Posters were picking up on each other’s points and were trying to provide reasons and in some cases evidence to tackle another commenter’s view. While there was not much evidence of anyone changing their opinion, there was very clear evidence of acknowledging other people’s viewpoints and engaging with them.

Concluding Remarks To sum up, four key themes were identified in the 717 comments about Trump and the USA posted on the Mexican Internet between November 2016 and July 2020. The first key theme was that of power and responsibility, split into a few sub-themes—inter-state contestations and resisting submission attempts, intra-state contestations and global contestations for the former, and assuming responsibility: actions and actors for the latter. Mexican commenters discussed a range of contestations at all three levels with the relevance for their own country often at the heart of their discussions. They were heavily critical of global politicians such as Trump and their own politicians, and corruption was seen as the main issue plaguing Mexican society. The second key theme was that of democracy—meaning and future. Trump’s election victory, while met with fear, was seen by many as an example of democracy in action although commenters also made very dire predictions for the future of democracy since they felt that Trump’s victory undermined the US status as a world leader in that respect. The third key theme was that of patriotism and populism. The patriotic theme was mainly framed around the discourse of submission that Mexican commenters believed their country was subjected to by the USA and strategies to untangle itself from the USA as a truly free and “independent country” (“not an American company”) without falling prey to other forces in the context of globalization and interdependence and under the pressure of neoliberalism and capitalism. The other in the Mexican case was either the American nation and citizens or Mexican immigrants. The final key theme was religious and moral dimensions. It included an intermingling of faith and trust in God and God’s mercy and attempts to identify the evil forces at play as well as frequent attacks on values that were seen as infringing religious freedoms. The quality of argumentation of the comments was very low with the level of reasoning twice as high as that of reciprocity but still very low. While there were reasons

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provided to justify one’s viewpoint/position in 37.8% of the comments, and questions were asked or were responded to in 21.5% of the sample, evidence was used in only 8.9% of the comments and only 1.5% out of 717 commenters acknowledged other people’s views/positions. The level of engagement was nearly twice as high as the quality of argumentation but again generally low, and engagement was predominantly taking place with the topic of the article the comment was related to. A third of the comments also engaged with other users, and 13.4% with the news medium or the author of the article. Similarly to the Russian case, on a few occasions a single comment provoked a very strong reaction by commenters to the extent that most of the comments published after it were discussing this one particular comment and not the actual topic the news article was about. In general, there were more discussions emanating from arguments made in some of the comments. Roughly a third of the Mexican comments can be considered uncivil, which makes Mexico the country with the highest proportion of uncivil comments out of the three in the sample. The application of the incivility/intolerance categories was not as problematic as in the case of China and Russia, because there were very few posts that were directed at a whole country and its people, namely America. Finally, two main patterns of discussion were identified in the comments: (1) Challenging the official narratives, and criticizing the political system and leadership. (2) Proposing alternative narratives and taking the discussion in a new direction. Discussions in the Mexican online space were of the most varied nature in comparison with the Chinese and the Russian spheres, thus clearly demonstrating the importance of freedom of expression for the nature of online political talk.

Bibliography Wike, R., Stokes, B., Poushter, J., Silver, L., Fetterolf, J., & Devlin, K. (2018). Trump’s international ratings remain low, especially among key allies. Pew Research Center. Retrieved July 2, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/ global/2018/10/01/trumps-­international-­ratings-­r emain-­low-­especially-­ among-­key-­allies/

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

What are the main trends in digital commenting about Trump and Trump’s America in China, Mexico, and Russia? What do the online comments in these three countries tell us about online political talk more broadly? The Conclusion returns to these key questions by comparing the findings from the three countries. The chapter is split into three parts. The first part answers the main research questions by exploring the differences and similarities in the global discussions about the US President Donald Trump and the USA as a whole. It shows the important role that issues of world hegemony and competing ideologies play in global online discussions. The second part then summarizes the main conceptual contributions of the study and explains what the post-deliberative public spheres look like while the final part proposes venues for future research.

Global Discussions: Differences and Similarities As explained in the Introduction, the main research question this study aims to answer is: What is the nature of online political discussions about a global personality such as Donald Trump and a global power such as the USA? The sub-questions fall into two main categories: (1) Deductive questions (Questions 1–4) emanating from previous research on online political talk, addressed by both methods—thematic and content analysis.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Slavtcheva-Petkova, Discussing Trump’s America Online, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7_7

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(2) Inductive, open-ended questions (Questions 5–8), exclusively addressed by the grounded theory approach via the thematic analysis. I will in turn answer the research questions. 1. What is the quality of argumentation in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? The quality of argumentation in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia is generally very low with Russia and Mexico demonstrating very similar levels of argumentation (a mean score of 0.68 for Russia and 0.69 for Mexico on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level and 4 is the highest level) and China being with nearly two times lower level of argumentation (0.37). In all three countries, there was more evidence of reasoning than of reciprocity with China consistently having the lowest scores in all categories with barely any reciprocity at all. The level of reasoning was the highest in Mexico (0.94 as opposed to 0.70 in Russia and 0.62 in China), while the level of reciprocity was the highest in Russia (0.66 as opposed to 0.46 in Mexico and 0.1 in China). 2. What is the level of engagement among online posters in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? The level of engagement among online posters in the online comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia was higher than the quality of argumentation but still generally very low with China and Russia scoring 1.1 on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is the lowest level of engagement and 4 is the highest, and Mexico scoring 1.23. Engagement was predominantly taking place with the topic of the article the comment was related to—85.8% in China, 72.9% in Mexico, and 71.3% in Russia. There was a significant difference with respect to engagement with other users with similar levels in Russia and Mexico (37% and 31.9%, respectively) and a very low level in China—only 1.6%. It is remarkable how most of the Chinese comments did not acknowledge in any way whatsoever that other views had been expressed—it was as if no other comments existed. Even the ones where there was some level of engagement with users did not directly address the other user. It was more a case of answering a question posed. Alternative views were never acknowledged, let alone tackled. Given the collectivist nature of Chinese society and that so many of the commenters were praising the politeness of Chinese people, it is puzzling

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that no attempts were made by Chinese netizens to talk to each other. The culture of commenting seemed to be very much expressing agreement with the ideas put forward in the respective article and pretending that other people’s views did not exist. Engagement with the news medium or the author of the article, on the other hand, was more common in China. It could be found in 13.5% of the comments, most frequently in the form of praise for the author. There was the same level of engagement in Mexico—13.4%, while in Russia it was much lower—6.3%. As a whole, China’s comments were characterized by a strong degree of consensus and cohesion in terms of the ideas expressed but no dialogue among commenters, let alone evidence of deliberation. Staying on topic seemed to be a collective task dutifully executed. Diverting from the main topic and engaging in discussions with other users were much more common in Russia and Mexico. On a few occasions, specific comments provoked a very strong reaction by commenters to the extent that most of the comments published after the polemic post were discussing only this one comment, and were often deviating from the topic of the article. While there was evidence of reasoning and to an extent reciprocity, we cannot really talk of full-fledged deliberation in the Habermasian sense since no one seemed to be changing their opinion or to be genuinely acknowledging other people’s viewpoints. 3. To what extent are the comments about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia civil? The degree of civility of the comments varied from country to country whereby the most civil comments could be found in the most authoritarian country in the sample and the most uncivil ones in the most democratic one. Thus, the vast majority of comments in China were civil with only 5.7%, which can be classified as impolite and 5.3% as intolerant. In Russia, on the other hand, 16.9% of the comments were impolite and 9.1% were intolerant. In both countries, most of the intolerant comments were with reference to Trump, America as a nation and American people collectively. In fact, the usefulness of the categories of incivility and intolerance is questionable in a case such as this one when the majority of comments discuss a conflict between two countries. If we apply a strict definition of intolerant discourse as cases when “individuals or groups are attacked in ways that violate moral respect and threaten democratic pluralism” (Rossini, 2020, p. 2) as I did in this study (Honneth, 1996), and this

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individual is the President of a rival country or the group is a whole nation-­ state, then can we really claim that these comments are detrimental to democracy, especially given that we are not even dealing with democratic countries? Mexico’s case was different in that respect because there was a much higher proportion of impolite comments—nearly a third of the comments were impolite (32.6%) and 13.1% were intolerant. The uncivil comments were often in reference to other commenters, or to Mexican politicians, and not so much in reference to Trump and America. 4. Are there any significant implications for the nature of online political talk more broadly arising from questions 1–3? The nature of online political talk appears to be very closely related to the nature of the political system of the respective country under study. In a strict authoritarian country like China, there is barely any engagement among users and the quality of argumentation is the lowest among all three countries. The comments there were also the most civil. All in all, we can map the comments onto a spectrum of authoritarianism/censored media to democracy/free media with commentators in an authoritarian country such as China fully backing the official line and not really engaging in any meaningful discussions with each other or indeed venturing into commenting on wider political issues such as the state and nature of democracy to commentators in democratic countries such as Mexico where opinions can be much more polarized and critical of the authorities, and the levels of engagement among commentators tend to be higher but incivility is also much more common. Russia tended to be in the middle of this spectrum with high levels of engagement among commenters and polarizing views but also a lot of propaganda slogans in support of the official policy line. In comparison with China, Russian comments tended to be considerably more multi-layered than Chinese ones with posters discussing a wider range of topics such as the standard of living; democracy; fake news; and censorship and propaganda. Predictably, the willingness of online users to use the virtual space as a means of counteracting/ questioning or holding to account official discourses depends to a large extent on the degree of freedom of expression they are allowed. This shows that while online public fora can be utilized as spaces for political discussions, their role cannot be solely conceptualized in terms of potential for democratization because even the quality of argumentation and the

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levels of engagement depend largely on key contextual factors such as the relevant political system and the degree of freedom of expression. 5. What are the key themes in the online discussions about Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia? The key themes that featured in the comments in either all three or two of the countries were (1) Identity, patriotism, and populism; (2) Democracy—meaning, significance, and future; (3) Power, responsibility/accountability, and geopolitics. The patriotic theme was much more prominent in China than in Russia and Mexico, and while what patriotism meant was debatable in the Mexican context, in China the views presented were very uniform—mainly along the lines of supporting one’s country and its political leadership, and fighting against the other, namely America. Blind patriotism was very common. In the Mexican case, there was not much evidence of blind patriotism. The patriotic theme was mainly framed around the discourse of submission that Mexican commenters believed their country was subjected to by the USA and strategies to untangle itself from the USA as a truly free and “independent country” (“not an American company”) without falling prey to other forces in the context of globalization and interdependence and under the pressure of neoliberalism and capitalism. The patriotic theme was not one of the key ones in the Russian context. Very few patriotic sentiments were expressed in Russia where sarcasm, bitterness, and irony dominated the discussions. The democratic theme, on the other hand, was important in Mexico and Russia but not in China where the word democracy was not used even once. Both in Mexico and in Russia there were discussions about the benefits of democracy as well as whether Trump’s presidency was a good or a bad thing for the future of democracy. Finally, in relation to power and geopolitics, the views presented in China were again considerably more uniform than in Russia and Mexico. For the majority of Chinese commentators, there was no doubt that their country was a rising power and that its future on the world stage was bright. Russian and Mexican posters did not generally share such a view of their countries, and while opinions in Russia were split about their political leadership and Putin in particular (or on occasions, were not expressed at all), in Mexico, online users were highly critical of their authorities and did not present a favorable picture of the place of their country worldwide or in relation to the USA. Russians also did not make any references to their country as a great or rising power.

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The comments were much focused on the present with very few historical references and no outlook toward the future, let alone presenting it as a bright future as in the Chinese context. 6. What views do online commentators express of Trump and his electoral victory? Trump’s election victory was met with very different sentiments in the three countries under study. In China, there was no real interest in it or in Trump himself for that matter. There were very few comments on the topic and only a few commenters expressed concern. One wrote that if Trump came to power and eased the US–Russia relationship, China would be in danger. Another one said that “there will be no good things.” The lack of comments about Trump’s election victory might be explained by the fact that the articles in this sample announcing his victory did not contain any value judgments about him. One of the headlines was “What does Trump’s election as President of the United States mean to China?” but the article did not provide an answer to this question—in fact, it was not discussed at all. It simply reported the facts. By contrast, in Russia and Mexico, there was a huge interest in the US elections and Trump but while the majority of Russians were describing Trump as “our Trump,” albeit some were making fun of this, for most Mexicans Trump was a threat and his election victory was a bad thing for their country. In general, the majority of Russian commenters saw Trump’s victory as a positive event for their country—a “triumph” for both Trump himself and for Russia. Many Russians were in a celebratory mood with high hopes for the future in terms of their own country’s relation with the USA as well as the US role in the world more broadly. As one person summarized, there was “so much joy from the victory of Trump in Russia that there is a feeling that Russians are more hoping for Trump than for Putin.” Russians’ hopes on the surface level were that sanctions against Russia would be lifted, and that Ukraine would be taught a lesson. On a deeper level, a victory for Trump clearly meant a victory for Russia and by implication a stronger and more powerful Russia. Trump was called by many “our Trump” and he was seen as Putin’s protégé or even creation. However, not everyone thought that this was a cause for celebration precisely because of the perception about a close link between Trump and Putin, and because of Trump’s unpredictability. Even the sceptics, however, were willing to interpret Trump’s victory as an example of democracy in action. While

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commenters saw the benefits in terms of really giving people the power to choose who to represent them, they also acknowledged the potential perils in terms of opening up the door to intolerant or even mentally ill people and giving them huge power, not just over America itself but over the whole world. Not everyone looked favorably on Trump and different derogatory terms were used to describe him: a “brainless ego maniac”; “pliable and unpredictable”; a liar; a “humourist”; “very tyrannical”; “a whipping boy”; “not an intellectual”; and “a red-headed old man.” These derogatory terms and many others along these lines (e.g., mentally ill, “crazy,” “deranged,” “paranoid,” “demented,” “imbecile”, “idiot” “ terrorist,” “tyrant,” and “dictator”) were also used in Mexico where Trump’s election victory was generally seen as a serious cause for concern. It was met with predominantly negative reactions (“anger,” “sadness,” and “surprise”) and concerns about what his victory would bring for Mexico as well as for the USA and the world more widely. Some commenters were drawing an apocalyptic picture by also making historical references to World War II and the plight of the Jews, and writing that Trump’s triumph might lead to a third world war. Some saw Trump’s election victory as signaling the end of democracy or in the very least the US status as a world leader in promoting democracy. Others were worried that Trump would fulfil his promises to erect a wall with Mexico and deport the illegal immigrants as well as that he would generally start persecuting Mexicans in America and that as a whole, nothing good awaited their country in the next four years. A commenter reminded his fellow citizens that “Trump based a big chunk of his campaign on the hatred against the Mexicans.” Nonetheless, despite the very strong general negativity, some Mexicans saw Trump’s victory in a positive light. They could understand his reasons for targeting illegal immigration from Mexico and expressed hopes that his presidency would bring about improvements in their own government and country. Trump was seen as the nudge that the country needed to put its act together, especially given that commenters accused their politicians of using him as a scapegoat for all their problems. Overall, the quantitative analysis shows that the strongest negative sentiments against Trump were expressed in China where 77% of the opinions about him were negative, followed by Mexico with 45.1% and then Russia with 33%. By the same token, Russia had the highest number of positive views expressed about Trump—54.5%, followed by Mexico with

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9.5%, and China with 4.2%. Thus, only in Russia positive views about Trump dominated the online discussions about him and the USA throughout the period under study. 7. To what extent and how do online commentators’ views of Trump and the USA change as a result of the changes in the relationship between Trump and the respective country? In spite of the fact that positive views of Trump outweighed the negative ones, the one country in which commenters’ views changed most radically over time was Russia very much in line with the changes in the relationship between the two countries. The celebratory mood and initial hopes about the future prompted by Trump’s election victory were soon replaced by disappointment and disbelief that Russia could so easily once again turn into the main culprit for America’s woes in the context of the allegations about Russia’s meddling in the US elections. Disappointment was expressed with not only the US authorities’ handling of the situation and what many saw as an excessively cautious attitude toward Russian representatives, labelled by some as “a witch hunt” but also for some, it was disappointing that their own country yet again played a negative role and created a negative image for itself on the world stage. Views of Trump himself did not change that radically. His image of an anti-establishment figure standing up to the likes of Obama and the Clintons (much hated in Russia) still featured in the discussions of the first impeachment trial against him. The initial narrative of hope and the focus on Ukraine echoed some of the coverage of Russian political leaders in the articles commenters were writing under where Putin and his press secretary were quoted as saying that Trump’s election victory “gives hope” for improving the relations between the two countries, and different authoritative figures claimed that Ukraine was the biggest loser in the US elections. Nonetheless, disappointment with Trump himself soon grew with commenters writing that he “really turned out to be pliable and unpredictable” and that “we lost, or to be accurate—our government, because we made a bet on Trump.” Flynn’s resignation was seen as a blow for Russia, or as one person put it, “our Kremlin gently recruited agent had been quickly kicked out. Our Trump may follow him soon, it’s not the Tsar monarch’s Russia.” Doubts were expressed about his ability to assert authority with posters writing that “Trump turned out not to be that strong. They will be controlling him” and asking “what kind of president he is, not managing to

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subordinate his staff.” One commenter even wrote that the only thing Trump was in charge of was the “on-time change of toilet paper in his toilet.” However, when discussing the impeachment trial, many commenters were very supportive of Trump. This can be explained by the fact that dislike or even hatred toward the Democrats always took precedence over any negativity toward Trump. Even when he was considered weak and not as a good “friend” of Russia as initially hoped, Trump was never described in such negative terms as Obama and the Clintons. He was most certainly never portrayed as an enemy of Russia. In response to his acquittal in the impeachment trial, one person even jokingly wrote: “In 75 years FSB will declassify the file of the agent in disguise Donald Trampovich. Alaska will come back home!” Negative sentiments were on occasions expressed precisely because of his alleged links to Russia and Putin. One commenter wrote that both Trump and Putin were “two shameful phenomena. Both brought to power by a Russian enterprise.” Another one called Trump “Putin’s shameful henchman and servitor.” The quantitative analysis confirms these trends. 72.7% of the comments about Trump’s election victory expressed a positive view of Trump, 27.3% a negative view and the rest were neutral. However, when discussing Flynn’s resignation and Comey’s dismissal, there were more negative views of Trump (54.5% and 46.7%, respectively) than positive (27.3% and 40%, respectively). This trend was then reversed when discussing the impeachment trial with 52.1% expressing a positive opinion of the US President and 31.3% a negative one. We cannot really talk about a marked change in the views about Trump and America in China and Mexico, because in both countries they were predominantly negative since the onset. In China, President Trump was undoubtedly seen as the main culprit behind the decision to wage a war on China—a view shared both by the authorities and by commenters. Commenters attributed it to a large extent to his unstable mental state. Trump was described as a “crazy” “lunatic” who behaved like an unpredictable, unreliable, capricious, temperamental, and altogether childish hooligan. As one person put it, “He changes quickly like the uncertainty of rains.” Another one called him “the biggest tyrant in modern history.” Still, China was not to be intimidated by Trump because his biggest mistake, in the eyes of Chinese commenters, was underestimating their country and thinking that it was similar to Japan and the Soviet Union rather than paying “attention to the strength and status of China.” Trump’s future was, therefore, bleak in contrast to China’s own bright future.

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In Mexico, while negative views of Trump also dominated the discussions, the impeachment trial provoked a heated debate between those who believed that Trump was innocent and should not be persecuted because he was “a genuine disruptor of the oligarchic-prone political omerta,” and those who were hoping that he would be impeached so that “the American leadership in the world is restored and politics returns to decency.” One person wrote that this was “an unjust political trial against a president who has been working for the good and the justice of the US, with trade treaties, with the migration triggered by the system, I hope they won’t make a mistake.” By contrast, other commenters expressed their negative views of Trump. One person wrote that Trump was known as “a mouthpiece, a liar, narcissistic, fickle person” and even a criminal who was only interested in being re-elected. Another one added, “What a disgusting pain in the bum (Trump)! This animal, this non-human, is pure cynicism! Infamous ginger orangutan. There is no doubt that the wretch has a lot of power and is easy with revenge, even in the worst-case scenario.” Criticisms of the way Mexican political leaders behaved toward and handled the relationship with Mexico were rife regardless of whether they were seen to be toadying up or standing up to him so in this sense we cannot talk of marked changes in commenters’ views of Trump in line with a marked change in the relationship between Trump and Mexico. From the onset Trump was described as having the power over Mexico and as trying to subordinate Mexico in any way possible, which was seen as a bad thing by the majority of online posters. Nonetheless, there was a notable minority who supported Trump. In fact, Trump had more support among Mexican posters than Mexican politicians did. The quantitative analysis confirms these trends. While there were considerably more negative views of Trump than positive ones in relation to all events, the highest level of negativity was in relation to Trump wall (86%) and his first days in office when he also announced the renegotiation of NAFTA (65.7%). There were no positive comments about him in relation to Trump wall, and only two positive comments in relation to his first days in office. By contrast, although most views about him were negative, his election victory and the impeachment trial attracted a few positive opinions about him (11.9% and 11.3%, respectively). 8. How can the patterns of discussion about Donald Trump in China, Mexico, and Russia be conceptualized?

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Three broader patterns of discussion can be identified across the three contexts: (1) Echoing and/or cheering the official narrative. (2) Challenging the official narrative, political system and leadership. (3) Engaging in an alternative narrative—be it through sarcasm like in the Russian case, or through gauging nascent public opinion when policy direction was uncertain like in the Chinese case, or by taking the discussion in a new direction like in the Mexican case. Again, there was a close link between the political system of a country and the patterns of discussion. In a strict authoritative regime like the Chinese one, the dominant pattern was that of echoing and cheering the official narrative. Rigorously supporting the official message was a collective task dutifully fulfilled by the majority of commenters. Chinese comments tell the story of how propaganda under a dictatorial authoritarian regime works in practice in the digital age. The online space is a sad reflection of Chinese society and similar authoritarian societies. It does not really matter whether the posts were written by real people, bots, or the 50-cent army: the vast majority were on message and even cheered the message with patriotic pathos. As one of the commenters implicitly acknowledged, in China propaganda was a good thing. While there was evidence of echoing the official narrative in the Russian semi-authoritarian/managed democracy context, there was not necessarily much cheering there unlike in China. Even the supporters of the official position showed evidence of critical thinking, namely building upon the ideas put forward by Russian political leaders rather than simply repeating them passionately and zealously, as in the Chinese case. Judging by the comments, Putin’s propaganda efforts did not appear to have sifted through to online commenters in the way they had to state media, which is a major difference with China. There did not appear to be an overriding ideology in Russia either and Putin’s message was difficult to sustain, given the reality on the ground, which commentators were discussing, for example, the low standard of living. Furthermore, in the Mexican democratic context, there was not really any evidence of echoing, let alone cheering the official narrative, and in some cases, there was no reference to the official narrative Quite the contrary, the dominant pattern there was of challenging the official narrative and criticizing the political system and leadership. In general, commenters were highly critical of their leaders. Mexican society was consistently presented as polarized and ridden by conflicts, and therefore often the impression was created in the articles, and even more so in the comments, that there was no official

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narrative but rather a cacophony of competing narratives. As a whole, agreeing with the official narrative was so rare that commenters created the impression that it did not really matter what the authorities proposed—they would always find fault with it and accuse them of corruption and gross incompetence. While critical narratives could also be observed in Russia, they were not as prevalent as in Mexico and did not concern the whole political class, as the Mexican comments did. Moreover, on some topics such as Ukraine and President Obama, there seemed to be a clear agreement in line with the official narrative. Given the existence of critical narratives on other topics and the high degree of self-deprecation and irony, this is a clear indication of the power of nationalism, populism, and propaganda in a semi-authoritarian/managed democracy context. The final pattern of discussion of engaging in an alternative narrative had different manifestations in the different countries. In China, it found expression in attempts to gauge nascent public opinion. Thus, in a few cases opinions on views expressed by an expert were split with some commenters openly disagreeing with the expert’s position and questioning his credibility and authoritativeness. In both cases, the experts served a useful purpose from the perspective of the authorities themselves, which explains why they were not outrightly condemned by state media in the way “rumour mongering” news accounts were. The authorities could in this way test nascent public opinion by allowing experts to give voice to strategies that they were deliberating upon but have not fully decided on or by sharing bold outlooks for the future. In other words, where the direction of policy was undecided and uncertain, commenters were given a degree of freedom to deliberate and discuss. However, this freedom was used to a very limited extent, because online users did not really enter into conversations with each other but each one was individually expressing their opinion on the views put forward by the respective expert without acknowledging other commenters’ views. In Russia, the depth of discussion was also limited by the fact that while mockery and sarcasm were frequently used, alternatives were not really deliberated upon. Part of the reason for that was that there was a strong sense of powerlessness—Putin was portrayed as irreplaceable and the future as very bleak with no real prospect for change any time soon. Finally, in Mexico, unlike China and Russia, there were numerous examples of commenters proposing an alternative narrative and diverting the focus of the discussion in a direction slightly different to the one proposed in the article or debating an issue from a range of angles. The future

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there was also described as bleak and there seemed to be a high degree of powerlessness due to the corrupt and rotten nature of their political leadership. Discussions in the Mexican online space were of the most varied nature in comparison with the Chinese and the Russian spheres.

Post-Deliberative Public Spheres: Main Features This study clearly shows that online political talk in different national contexts can have a valuable global dimension, not just in terms of topics and people discussed but also in terms of similar patterns of discussion, and interplay between common underlying themes. It also demonstrates that the deliberative democratic framework is too narrow and precludes any potential for meaningful discussion beyond fairly simplistic and predominantly quantitative analysis of key dimensions of deliberation. The framework is too narrow not only because it is based on an ideal, normative understanding of what purpose online political talk should serve rather than an attempt to genuinely understand what purposes it actually serves but also because it is almost entirely oblivious to the importance of context. My analysis shows that context is of profound importance. We can map the comments onto a spectrum of authoritarianism/censored media to democracy/free media with commentators in an authoritarian country such as China fully backing the official line and not really engaging in any meaningful discussions with each other or indeed venturing into commenting on wider political issues such as the state and nature of democracy to commenters in democratic countries such as Mexico where opinions can be much more polarized and critical of the authorities, and the levels of engagement between commentators tend to be higher but incivility is also much more common. Russia tends to be in the middle of this spectrum with higher levels of engagement among commentators than in China and polarizing views but also a lot of propaganda slogans in support of the official policy line. In comparison with China, Russian comments tend to be considerably more multi-layered than Chinese ones with posters discussing a wider range of topics such as the standard of living; democracy; fake news; and censorship and propaganda. Predictably, the willingness of online commenters to use the virtual space as a means of counteracting/questioning or holding to account official discourses depends to a large extent on the degree of freedom of expression they are allowed. This shows that while online public fora can be utilized as spaces for political discussions, their role cannot be solely conceptualized in terms

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of potential for democratization, because even the quality of argumentation and the levels of engagement depend largely on key contextual factors such as the relevant political system and the degree of freedom of expression. Therefore, the first key characteristic of the post-deliberative public spheres is that they are very much context-bound. Nonetheless, there is another very important factor that plays a key role—the existence and strength of an underpinning ideology in the society under study and the scope that ideology leaves for constructive political discussions online. The three countries studied in this book represent three different types of society in that respect: China, at one end, with a strong and clear but highly restrictive underpinning ideology; Mexico, at the other end, with a nascent democratic neoliberal nationalistic ideology and a strong degree of polarization underpinning it; and Russia in between where there is an ideological uncertainty and even ideological void/crisis to some extent. While Russia’s ideological stance was very clear during communism, in the post-Cold War era, commentators used the term Putinism to describe the ideological stance of the country. Putinism has never been the kind of stable ideology that characterizes China at the moment or indeed the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the online comments reflect that. They mirror both Putinism’s successes and failures, namely the battle between the anti-Western/anti-US/anti-foreign forces’ narrative and the pro-democracy one. As Applebaum (2013) explained, a key defining feature of Putinism was the need for legitimacy, which manifested itself in a harsh rhetoric about the West and especially the USA with the aim of inoculating “the Russian public against the example of more open societies” (p. 8) because Putin’s greatest threat and fear was “Western democracy rhetoric” (p.  7). Alongside Putinism, the Russian world (“Руский мир“) narrative also gained a lot of traction especially during the war against Ukraine, embodying both Russia’s (neo-)imperialist territorial ambitions and its claim to be championing anti-liberal, Orthodox values. The comments clearly reflected this tension with online users entering into heated discussions on these topics although without necessarily delving into a discussion about the Russian world narrative, probably because these discussions gained considerably more prominence after the data collection period. Mexican comments also reflected the ideological nature of their society, namely the polarization in Mexican society and the fragility of its political system, which albeit a democracy, was a relatively new democracy, ridden by lots of issues.

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However, the obvious differences should not prevent us from observing two key similarities: the strong presence of patriotic, nationalistic, and populist sentiments in all three countries and the tendency to discuss wider political issues through the lens of normative views, including about their own country. The comments tell us as much about commentators’ views of Trump and the USA as about their perceptions of their own state. Judgments on the USA were not passed in a vacuum—they were interlinked with people’s normative views about their own country and about politics in general, which are in turn impregnated with the dominant ideology or clearly showed the lack of a clear underpinning ideology and the respective ideational struggles. Thus, in a country such as China where there is a clear ideology and a strong and consistent propaganda effort to promote it, online political talk mirrors that ideology in every single respect. The political system does not leave any or much leeway for the free circulation and consideration of alternative ideologies. In countries such as Russia and Mexico where there is a degree of uncertainty, ambiguity, or contradiction in the respective ideology or an ideological void, these ambiguities are also reflected in the online comments to the point where the online space turns into an arena for ideational battles and struggles of the two competing narratives or in the case of Mexico of multiple competing narratives. Therefore, a second key feature of the post-deliberative public spheres is their intrinsic ideological nature. All in all, what conclusions can we draw about the post-deliberative public spheres? On an empirical level, even on topics and personalities of global significance, they tend to have a strong nationalistic focus and agenda, while still providing platforms for engagement with wider ideological and political issues such as the role of democracy in contemporary society as well as inter- and intra-state relations, and hegemony and counter-­ hegemony. US hegemony in the post-Cold War order while undeniable was persistently questioned and contested by online commenters in the three countries under study. The conversations among them echoed wider debates and developments such as Russia’s and China’s attempts to challenge America’s hegemony and promote anti-liberal values. Thematically, the discussions revolved mainly around the agendas and issues set by political leadership—even the debate as to whether the USA was a champion of democracy and liberal values or indeed whether democracy was a good thing more broadly and for their countries, respectively, echoed decades-long debates among political leaders on these issues. The degree of sophistication or indeed potential for deliberation very much

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depends on the degree of freedom of expression that a country has with Chinese comments lacking in both sophistication and engagement. Similarly, the civility of comments is also linked to the degree of freedom of expression and state of democracy of a country, but given that we studied only three countries, other contextual factors should be taken into consideration before drawing wider conclusions. On a conceptual level, therefore, we can see that the post-deliberative public spheres are very much constrained by context and ideology. Despite the one clear benefit that they offer, namely providing a space for public discussions, they also tend to play into current political agendas set by those in power and in some cases into their propaganda efforts, thus serving rather than subverting the political status quo, including the US hegemonic status worldwide. It is notable that neither the Chinese nor the Russian comments made claims about the superiority of their political regimes to the US one. Thus, while in the Chinese comments there was constant praise for China, it was more along the lines of see what a great nation we are and how our power is rising or indeed how bad the USA is but there is no explicit discussion of a Chinese alternative to US hegemony. There were no claims that the political system in China was better than the US democracy. While there were attacks on US democracy or a questioning of its democratic nature indeed, there was no justification of or explanation of the benefits of the Chinese political system. This was even more the case in the Russian context. Thus, the online comments as a whole tended to confirm America’s dominance in the world as all comparisons of their own countries were made in relation to the USA.

Venues for Future Research This project served an important exploratory purpose. In a field dominated by quantitative studies measuring deliberative potential, it was important to explore the potential that qualitative methods and a grounded theory approach offer for conceptualizing online political talk on a global figure and a country of global importance in three very different contexts. While the study offered a useful attempt at conceptualization, it was focused on three countries with turbulent relationships with the USA. Given how important context is, it will be interesting to investigate other countries from different parts of the world, with different political systems and less of a turbulent relationship with the USA. It is also worthwhile to consider whether the trends observed in China, Mexico, and

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Russia in terms of engagement, quality of argumentation and civility, and the relationship with ideology and current political systems, can be observed in other contexts as well. Finally, there were lots of interesting findings that were not fully explored in as much depth as they could be. One example was, commenters’ inclination to use specific expressions to describe the other (in that case—America and Americans)—from animal references in China (wolf, dogs) and Russia (pindos) to the word gringos used extensively in Mexico. Similarly, speculations about the future were rife in all three countries but while the future was presented as bright in China, it was seen as rather bleak in both Mexico and Russia. Why is that? Is it due to the power of propaganda in China or are there other factors that explain this trend? It is undeniable that the national outlook is very strong in all three countries as they were frequently focusing on the implications of developments in the USA for their own country. However, the global outlook was also present in the discussions in various ways and it is most definitely worth further investigating the interplay between these two levels.

Bibliography Applebaum, A. (2013). Putinism: The ideology. LSE ideas: Strategic update. Retrieved July 2, 2022, from https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/ updates/LSE-­IDEAS-­Putinism-­The-­Ideology.pdf Honneth, A. (1996). The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts. MIT Press. Rossini, P. (2020). Beyond incivility: Understanding patterns of uncivil and intolerant discourse in online political talk. Communication Research. https://doi. org/10.1177/0093650220921314

Index

A Accountability, 79, 134–148, 150, 166, 219 Administration, 73, 78, 101, 121, 137–140, 144, 149, 154 Agreement, 33, 78, 118, 127, 142, 157, 163, 210–212, 217, 226 Ambassador, 63, 74, 134, 139, 140, 145, 154, 160, 162, 209 America, 3, 16, 18, 68, 78, 89, 93, 95–98, 101–110, 113, 117, 119, 127, 128, 135–139, 142, 143, 146, 149, 152, 155–157, 159–161, 163, 166, 167, 170, 173, 176, 186, 188, 190, 195, 198, 201, 208, 214, 215, 217–219, 221–223, 229–231 Ancestor, 192, 196, 205 Animal, 102, 103, 118, 179, 224, 231 Appearance, 15, 105, 165 Argument, 4, 12, 15, 32, 36, 38, 40, 42, 66, 71, 88, 104, 105, 128, 195, 197, 199, 203, 205, 210, 214

Argumentation, 9, 10, 13–15, 17–19, 24, 28, 41, 55, 57, 65–69, 87, 88, 117–120, 126, 128, 134, 158–161, 166, 170, 201–203, 213, 214, 216, 218, 228, 231 Army, 6, 71, 94, 122, 136, 225 Attack, 6, 29, 56, 67, 71, 73, 78, 95, 99, 101, 102, 107, 108, 110, 122, 125, 126, 147, 160, 165, 171, 203, 213, 230 Audience, 36, 56, 62, 72, 73, 123 Authoritarian, 6, 7, 12, 19, 33, 37, 42–44, 56, 69–72, 74, 78, 79, 122, 148, 150, 217, 218, 225, 227 Authoritarianism, 19, 74, 218, 227 Authoritative, 119, 123–125, 222, 225 Authorities, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, 68, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78, 94, 103, 111, 121, 124–127, 134–149, 151–153, 162, 166, 170, 185, 188, 199, 205, 207, 218, 219, 222, 223, 226, 227

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Slavtcheva-Petkova, Discussing Trump’s America Online, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18980-7

233

234 

INDEX

B Banter, 158, 164 Battle, 6, 70, 77, 95, 97, 99, 108, 109, 121, 136, 143, 144, 180, 189, 192, 228, 229 BBC, 77 Beijing, 62 Belief, 7, 11, 48, 71, 91, 100, 122, 203, 211 Betrayal, 93, 94, 157 Biden, 183 Bilateralism, 174, 209 Blame, 17, 127, 146, 160, 162, 184–186, 195, 212 Bomb, 15, 105, 121 Bone, 17, 28, 106, 134, 136, 202 Border, 5, 17, 40, 64, 69, 77, 169, 177, 183, 194–196, 199, 212 Boss, 123, 148, 152, 195 Brain, 103, 136, 142, 180 Bully, 102, 103, 128 Bullying, 92, 116 Business, 63, 111, 143, 152, 153, 174, 193, 198, 200, 202, 212 C Cabinet, 175, 185, 208 Cacophony, 35, 207, 226 Campaign, 8, 17, 56, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 94, 143, 162, 169, 173, 175, 176, 180, 183, 200, 221 Candidate, 3, 16, 80, 81, 111, 138, 146, 172, 177, 181, 184, 186, 187, 200 Capacity, 11, 40, 45, 46, 48 Capital, 39, 136, 175, 192, 203 Capitalism, 25, 70, 75, 190, 213, 219 Card, 106, 110–117, 128, 146, 156, 198 Cartel, 177, 210 CCTV, 63, 120, 125, 126

Celebration, 138, 141, 159, 220 Censorship, 6, 15, 19, 42, 43, 56, 70–72, 87, 88, 128, 189, 203, 218, 227 Change, 7, 10, 11, 15, 39, 47, 48, 56, 57, 61, 71, 74–77, 88, 104, 115, 120, 121, 144, 146, 173, 176, 177, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188, 189, 196, 200, 222–224, 226 Charge, 153, 177, 207, 223 Child, 100, 104, 105, 113, 145 China, 3–10, 13–15, 18, 19, 33, 40–42, 48, 55–58, 61–65, 68–72, 75, 76, 78, 81, 87–129, 161, 166, 183, 193, 206, 210, 214–231 China Daily, 63, 120 Citizen, 9, 14, 24, 25, 27, 35, 37, 38, 42–44, 46, 56, 69, 80, 87, 89, 92, 97–99, 102, 104, 105, 108, 112, 113, 118, 121, 123, 138, 142, 147, 148, 151, 153, 155, 159, 164, 165, 173, 174, 176, 181, 185, 186, 190, 192, 194, 195, 212, 213, 221 Citizenship, 35, 45, 181, 190 Civilian, 96, 99, 116, 157, 182 Civility, 11, 14, 29, 32, 33, 38, 41, 58, 67, 68, 87, 117–119, 158–161, 204–206, 217, 230, 231 Civilization, 6, 70, 117, 192, 196, 205 Clinton, Bill, 138 Clinton, Hilary, 74, 138, 142–144, 149, 157, 162, 176, 179, 222, 223 Coding, 33, 59, 60, 63–65, 68, 89, 97, 118, 119, 134, 160, 171, 206 Cohesion, 93, 94, 97, 99, 118, 124, 217

 INDEX 

Collective, 29, 38, 88, 91, 97–101, 110, 128, 136, 154, 166, 190, 194, 196, 217, 225 Collectivist, 117, 216 Comey, James, 63, 74, 134, 140, 142, 144, 146, 147, 165, 223 Communication, 8, 12, 23, 25, 30, 34, 36, 38, 44, 47, 59, 79 Communism, 7, 74, 156, 228 Community, 32, 39, 43, 45, 89, 121, 122, 186, 200 Company, 18, 62, 72, 99, 108–110, 114, 120, 145, 164, 174, 190, 193, 212, 213 Comparability, 61, 63 Comparison, 5, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 40, 44, 55, 58, 60, 61, 72, 77, 105, 119, 135, 136, 148, 161, 163, 166, 170, 177, 197, 207, 210, 214, 218, 227, 230 Concept, 4, 12, 13, 23, 24, 26, 38–40, 45, 47, 55, 67, 70, 89, 114, 162 Conceptualization, 12, 13, 24, 26, 27, 31, 36, 42, 43, 45, 58, 68, 97, 128, 230 Confidence, 16, 17, 40, 77, 99–101, 133, 144, 169 Conflict, 10, 28, 73, 80, 107, 119, 120, 125, 161, 189, 207, 217, 225 Confrontation, 71, 101, 108, 183 Congress, 77, 153, 210 Consensus, 28, 34–36, 38, 79, 114, 116, 136, 217 Conspiracy, 140 Construction, 4, 17, 43, 45, 77, 101, 121, 169, 212 Consumption, 112, 198, 199 Contestation, 36, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142, 144, 166, 171–183, 213

235

Context, 4–6, 10–13, 24, 26, 42, 44–46, 48, 55–59, 68, 69, 76, 118, 119, 129, 143, 152, 160, 161, 165, 183, 190, 206, 208, 213, 219, 220, 222, 225–227, 230, 231 Control, 8, 24, 43, 71, 75, 76, 114, 135, 150, 176, 186, 187, 204 Conversation, 4, 27–30, 32–34, 38, 41, 42, 67, 74, 117, 137, 139, 140, 226, 229 Cooperation, 107, 109 Coronavirus, 93, 107 Counterattack, 92, 93, 96, 108, 120, 125 Country, 4–10, 12–20, 24, 32, 33, 39–44, 55, 56, 59, 61, 63–65, 68–70, 72–74, 76–79, 81, 87–90, 92, 93, 95–99, 101, 104, 105, 107, 109–111, 113–116, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 133, 134, 136–139, 144, 145, 147, 149–151, 153–157, 159, 161–163, 165, 166, 170, 173–178, 181–200, 202, 204, 205, 207–210, 212–231 Cowardice, 18, 191 Credibility, 10, 75, 80, 113, 124, 188, 226 Crimea, 137, 161, 162 Criminal, 142, 151, 173, 177–179, 198, 203, 224 Criminality, 197, 198 Cuba, 18, 182, 191 Culture, 72, 79, 117, 123, 185, 192, 196–198, 204, 205, 217 Cyberspace, 6, 25, 71 Cyber-utopianism, 6, 71

236 

INDEX

D Damage, 150, 174, 180, 184, 201, 202 Death, 29, 93, 95, 107, 108, 124, 157, 191 Declaration, 92, 109, 120–122, 128 Definition, 30, 31, 60, 66, 89, 119, 217 Deliberation, 5, 11, 12, 23–48, 58, 65–67, 118, 129, 158, 217, 227, 229 Democracy, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 12, 13, 17–20, 23–25, 27–29, 31–47, 56, 67, 68, 70, 72, 74, 78–81, 119, 134, 135, 148–154, 162, 163, 166, 170, 171, 177, 181, 187–190, 205, 209, 213, 218–221, 225–230 Democratization, 7, 19, 40, 74, 79, 153, 167, 218, 228 Demon, 101, 105, 201, 202 Department, 123 Dependency, 174 Deputy, 138, 185 Development, 5, 8–10, 12, 14, 17, 19, 23, 26, 34–36, 43–45, 47, 63, 68, 69, 73, 74, 78–80, 87, 96, 103, 106, 107, 112–114, 120–122, 127, 140, 141, 154, 170, 181, 209, 229, 231 Deviation, 118, 159, 205 Dialogue, 35, 42, 118, 122, 200, 217 Dictator, 159, 163, 173, 221 Dictatorship, 140, 182 Difference, 9, 10, 12, 17, 20, 30, 33, 35, 37, 46, 66, 69, 102, 136, 150, 151, 155, 166, 215–227, 229 Diplomacy, 140, 147, 163 Diplomat, 140

Direction, 10, 18, 47, 71, 80, 112, 120, 170, 203, 207, 209, 214, 225, 226 Disagreement, 28, 38, 66, 67, 88, 166, 203, 207 Disappointment, 17, 141, 157, 222 Discourse, 6, 7, 19, 25, 27, 29–34, 36, 38–40, 42, 46, 65, 67, 71, 74, 80, 89, 98, 119, 156, 190, 213, 217–219, 227 Discussion, 4, 6, 9–11, 13–20, 24–26, 28–30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 41–48, 55–81, 87, 88, 91, 105, 106, 119–129, 134, 136, 137, 146, 148, 149, 155, 158, 161–167, 170, 171, 177, 186, 197, 202, 203, 205, 207–231 Disinformation, 8, 56, 80 Dislike, 65, 159, 160, 205, 223 Diversity, 27, 42, 72, 78, 186 Dollar, 112, 113, 155, 174, 184, 193–195, 199 Domination, 32, 45, 46, 110 Donkey, 18, 206, 208 Drug, 79, 176–178, 186, 193, 197–199, 206, 210 E Economy, 70, 108, 111–114, 123, 127, 136, 183, 193, 198, 210 Editor, 117 Education, 136, 174, 196, 200, 204 Efficacy, 45 Effort, 8, 15, 19, 47, 58, 73–76, 99, 225, 229, 230 Egypt, 192, 196, 205 Election, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15–17, 55, 56, 61, 63–65, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78–81, 87, 88, 116, 119, 120, 133–139, 141–146, 149, 150, 152, 157, 159–164, 166, 169, 171, 172, 175, 176, 179–182,

 INDEX 

184, 186, 187, 189, 198, 201–203, 208, 210, 213, 220–224 Elimination, 103 Elite, 44, 123, 142, 143, 149, 153, 163, 200 Empire, 15, 18, 94, 95, 99, 101, 182, 189, 191 Employee, 199 Endurance, 93, 97, 100, 102, 128 Enemy, 3, 93, 95, 99, 103, 105, 112, 115, 124, 134, 135, 156, 163, 166, 182, 184, 190, 223 Energy, 99, 100, 110, 111, 175, 184 Engagement, 9, 14, 15, 17–19, 34, 39, 41, 44, 46, 55, 57, 65–67, 87, 88, 117–119, 129, 134, 158–161, 166, 170, 204–206, 214, 216–219, 227–231 Enterprise, 99, 110, 136, 223 Enthusiasm, 17, 110, 121, 157 Epistemology, 59 Equality, 25, 27, 37, 38, 108 Ethnicity, 29, 40 Europe, 136, 156, 157, 183 European, 47, 155, 159 Event, 10, 14–16, 19, 56, 59, 61–65, 80, 81, 87, 88, 119, 120, 124, 133, 134, 137, 161, 169, 192, 220, 224 Expression, 7, 8, 14, 19, 20, 25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 40, 56, 66, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 89, 90, 95, 97, 103, 118, 120, 128, 140, 143, 163, 188, 214, 218, 219, 226–228, 230, 231 F Facebook, 8, 64, 140, 164, 198 Fact, 11, 14, 26, 31, 32, 45, 48, 66, 67, 69, 73, 76, 87, 98, 110, 116, 119, 120, 123, 126, 127, 139,

237

144, 151, 155, 158, 160–162, 164, 167, 173–175, 179, 181, 182, 185, 189, 190, 192, 194, 199, 204, 217, 220, 222–224, 226 Factor, 9, 19, 20, 35, 43, 60, 64, 69, 99, 183, 184, 219, 228, 230, 231 Failure, 115, 147, 179, 180, 184, 185, 189, 205, 228 Faith, 39, 74, 100, 213 Family, 91, 143, 145, 182 Fate, 18, 98, 121, 191, 194, 202 Fear, 94, 98, 107, 172, 174, 176, 180, 185, 200, 208, 213, 228 Feature, 7, 11, 27, 30, 33, 36, 48, 59, 60, 65, 66, 74, 80, 91, 95, 97, 99, 101, 111, 118, 134, 146, 151, 186, 227–230 Flynn, Michael, 63, 74, 134, 139–141, 144, 151, 152, 154, 222, 223 Follower, 175, 199, 202 Fool, 173, 180, 206, 211 Force, 6, 8, 13, 24, 44, 46, 55–57, 71, 76, 98, 104, 112, 115, 116, 159, 180, 183, 190, 213, 219, 228 Foundation, 13 Frame, 40, 45, 47, 64, 109 Framework, 4, 5, 11–13, 23–48, 55, 57, 58, 66, 70, 227 Freedom, 7, 8, 14, 19, 20, 41, 56, 58, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 151, 180, 188, 213, 214, 218, 219, 226–228, 230 Frequency, 30, 66 Friend, 102, 134, 135, 154–157, 163, 166, 174, 175, 208, 223 Friendship, 78, 156, 157 G Gang, 80, 178, 199 Gender, 40, 203, 204 Generation, 46, 92, 112, 114, 138, 151

238 

INDEX

Geopolitics, 44, 88, 89, 105–106, 128, 219 Germany, 109, 140, 171, 193 Globalization, 173, 183, 190, 194, 213, 219 Governance, 25, 71, 122, 153 Government, 8, 14, 15, 18, 25, 38, 43, 70, 71, 75, 76, 79, 100, 102, 107, 125, 127, 141, 151, 152, 170, 177, 178, 183, 185, 195–197, 201, 207, 212, 221, 222 Greatness, 156, 172, 192 Gringo, 175, 179, 181, 182, 189, 192, 193, 195, 197–199, 206, 231 Grounded theory, 4, 5, 9, 11–13, 41, 55–81, 88, 89, 216, 230 H Habermas, Jürgen, 4, 11, 12, 23–28, 31–43, 47, 48, 57 Hacker, 140, 142, 165 Hacking, 6, 56, 71 Hegemony, 6, 36, 70, 88, 89, 96, 105–107, 113, 128, 215, 229, 230 History, 11, 15, 26, 44, 47, 48, 71, 79, 100, 101, 113, 116, 156, 164, 165, 172, 174, 178, 188, 189, 191, 198, 204, 205, 207, 223 Huawei, 99, 109, 110, 114, 118, 121, 123, 127 Hypocrisy, 186, 195, 202 I Identity, 89, 91, 95, 97–102, 112, 128, 134, 135, 146, 154–157, 166, 190–200, 219

Ideology, 19, 94, 105, 108, 200, 203, 215, 225, 228–231 Ignorance, 173, 176, 200, 208 Immigrant, 78, 156, 173, 176, 177, 186, 187, 193, 195–197, 206, 208, 213, 221 Immigration, 78, 194, 195, 209, 221 Impeachment, 10, 63, 64, 81, 134, 143, 144, 146, 148, 151–154, 160, 163, 169, 179–181, 183, 186–190, 202, 205, 209–211, 222–224 Imperialism, 15, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 102, 104–107, 128 Impoliteness, 30, 67, 119 Inauguration, 10, 63, 64, 74, 77, 81, 141, 169 Incivility, 13, 14, 16–20, 24, 28–32, 55, 65–68, 88, 119, 129, 134, 161, 166, 170, 214, 217, 218, 227 Independence, 98, 114, 116, 121 Industry, 101, 110, 114, 127, 212 Inequality, 8, 10, 27, 78, 80 Influence, 10, 74, 76, 80, 111, 135, 136, 140, 145, 204 Information, 24, 25, 27, 37–39, 59, 62, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74, 118, 124, 127, 142, 147 Innovation, 109, 112 Institution, 7, 36, 40, 45, 46, 75, 78, 99, 153, 181, 188, 190 Insult, 29, 30, 103, 140, 159, 206 Integrity, 107, 108 Intellectual, 7, 71, 126, 147, 148, 152, 163, 177, 193, 206 Intelligence, 63, 74, 136, 147, 151, 152, 162, 165 Interaction, 12, 23, 36, 67 Interactivity, 8, 79 Interdependence, 190, 194, 213, 219

 INDEX 

Interest, 6, 15, 36, 37, 41, 64, 70, 71, 87–89, 92–94, 103, 108, 116, 121, 125, 139, 153, 154, 175, 189, 191–193, 200, 201, 207, 209, 220 Interference, 74, 76, 142, 162 Internet, 6–8, 14, 25, 29, 31–33, 35, 37, 38, 41–44, 56, 61–63, 69–72, 75, 76, 78–80, 87, 94, 98, 99, 101, 105, 112, 123, 124, 128, 142, 165, 167, 187, 198, 213 Intervention, 38, 119, 161 Interview, 105, 106, 124, 125, 164, 198 Intimidation, 100 Intolerance, 30, 31, 67, 68, 89, 119, 129, 161, 166, 214, 217 iPhone, 15, 92, 110, 113 Irony, 154, 156, 163, 166, 219, 226 Irreplaceability, 166 Isolation, 127 J Job, 46, 78, 114, 118, 127, 139, 165, 174, 179, 185, 192, 193, 196, 212 Journalism, 59 Journalist, 8, 36, 56, 79, 80, 94, 147, 158, 159, 164, 177, 206, 208 Judge, 94, 117 Judgement, 20, 119, 127 Justice, 96, 101, 105, 110, 116, 122, 179, 188, 189, 200, 202, 224 K Killing, 79, 94, 118, 124, 189 Knowledge, 39, 41, 57, 146, 154 Kremlin, 7, 56, 75, 77, 141, 142, 146, 156, 162, 222

239

L Label, 7, 59, 70, 74, 76, 97, 105, 150 Labour, 143, 184, 193 Land, 89–92, 128, 182, 198 Language, 7, 29, 31, 45, 56, 68, 118, 140, 146, 197 Lavrov, Sergey, 63, 134, 139, 140, 147, 148, 158, 164 Law, 8, 76, 78, 79, 151, 164, 174, 185, 188, 198 Leader, 19, 32, 33, 70, 72, 73, 75, 105, 112, 114, 120, 144, 147, 161, 165, 178, 188, 190, 200, 212, 213, 221, 222, 224, 225, 229 Leadership, 6, 70, 72, 76, 127, 134, 161, 167, 170, 175, 190, 207, 214, 219, 224, 225, 227, 229 Legacy, 95, 96, 98, 105 Legislation, 8, 76 Legitimacy, 39, 43, 45, 228 Lesson, 18, 94, 96, 113, 124, 137, 170, 188, 193, 205, 220 Levada Center, 163 Level, 4, 6, 8–12, 14, 15, 17–19, 28, 31, 32, 40, 41, 43, 48, 55–57, 59, 60, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 81, 88, 92, 94–97, 117, 120, 122, 129, 134, 137, 139, 142, 148, 155, 158, 166, 169, 170, 182, 185, 196, 198, 200, 204, 205, 207, 210, 213, 214, 216–220, 224, 227–231 Liberal, 6, 12, 25, 30, 36, 40, 41, 43, 45, 68, 70, 75, 80, 136, 143, 162 Liberalism, 5, 40, 162 Liberation, 125 Lie, 41, 102, 174, 180, 188, 196, 204, 208 Life, 27, 36, 45, 91, 93, 103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 116, 126, 138, 140, 141, 145, 148, 150, 151, 155, 163, 173, 179, 183, 197, 209, 210

240 

INDEX

Limitation, 13, 20, 24, 26, 57 Literature, 12, 23, 32, 33, 47, 60 M Mafia, 183, 196, 198, 199 Mao, 95, 96, 98, 99, 105, 107, 112, 114, 118, 178, 193, 210 Market, 24, 35, 44, 63, 70, 72, 93, 98, 101, 109, 127, 177 Marketing, 93, 94, 123, 124 Measure, 8, 27, 55, 59, 61–70, 75, 114, 125, 212 Media, 5–7, 19, 23, 25, 27, 36, 43, 45, 46, 56, 59, 62, 64, 71, 74–76, 78–80, 93, 94, 123–125, 141, 149, 158, 163, 167, 177, 184, 196, 200, 208, 218, 225–227 Mercy, 94, 126, 202, 213 Message, 33, 88, 98, 111, 113, 122, 125, 128, 134, 184, 200, 225 Method, 5, 9, 14, 55, 57–61, 136, 215, 230 Methodology, 12–14, 33, 41, 55 Mexican, 3, 5, 8, 9, 17, 18, 61, 64, 65, 69, 77–80, 169–179, 181–187, 190–199, 201, 202, 206–210, 212–214, 218, 219, 221, 224–228 Mexico, 4–10, 13, 17–19, 48, 55–58, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 77–81, 169–221, 223–231 Migration, 179, 194, 224 Military, 6, 70, 99, 101, 115, 122, 124, 126, 136, 165 Minister, 63, 134, 140, 147, 208 Minority, 32, 187, 224 Misinformation, 77, 80 Misogynist, 173 Mistake, 115, 144, 152, 173, 179, 223, 224

Mobilization, 36, 75 Mockery, 165, 226 Model, 6, 27, 30, 32, 33, 36, 70, 71, 79, 110, 196 Money, 99, 102, 107, 111, 113, 114, 128, 137, 142, 176, 178, 182, 193 Morality, 203 Motherland, 15, 89–92, 95, 96, 99, 112, 118, 120, 128 Motivation, 103, 105–108 Mouthpiece, 125, 179, 224 N Nacos, 195 NAFTA, 193, 207, 210, 212, 224 Narcissist, 160, 224 Narrative, 10, 15–19, 46, 66, 78, 80, 88, 119–121, 124, 126, 127, 129, 134, 143, 146, 152, 161–163, 167, 170, 190, 192, 207–209, 214, 222, 225, 226, 228, 229 Nation, 3, 17, 18, 25, 31, 46, 68, 73, 77, 89, 96–98, 100, 101, 108, 110, 114–116, 120, 126, 151, 152, 169, 170, 180, 191–194, 196, 198, 205, 213, 217, 230 Nationalism, 97, 163, 184, 200 Nationalist, 19, 78, 138 Nature, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 32, 41, 42, 46, 48, 56–58, 63–66, 68, 69, 81, 95, 100, 105–108, 117, 124, 128, 129, 134, 147, 165, 166, 170, 180, 182, 190, 203, 207, 210, 211, 214–216, 218–219, 227–230 Negativity, 176 Negotiation, 69, 97, 120, 174, 178, 193, 207 Negotiator, 186, 208

 INDEX 

Neo-authoritarian, 7, 74, 75 Neodemocracy, 35, 36 Neoliberalism, 190, 213, 219 Net, 35 Netizen, 7, 62, 75, 107, 109, 113, 217 Network, 35, 36, 44, 46 Newspaper, 30, 61, 123, 208 Nieto, Enrique Peña, 64, 77, 169, 170, 175, 178, 184, 191, 192, 199, 200, 203, 207, 208 Norm, 11, 33, 48, 67, 141 O Obama, Barack, 16–18, 73, 77, 133, 141, 145, 149, 157, 159, 160, 163, 166, 169, 186, 222, 223, 226 Obrador, Andrés Manuel López, 78, 170, 175, 176, 178, 179, 199, 207–209, 211 Operationalization, 29, 32, 66 Opinion, 4, 7, 12, 14, 18, 19, 24, 25, 33, 39, 40, 43–46, 66, 69, 72, 79, 87, 88, 107, 118, 119, 124–126, 129, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 170, 183, 188, 196, 200, 209, 210, 212, 213, 217–219, 221, 223–227 Opposition, 39, 98, 101, 102, 104, 145, 148, 151, 154, 181, 210 Organization, 36, 63, 76, 99, 147, 210 Othering, 89, 91–93, 101–105, 128 Ownership, 76 P Pandemic, 80, 93, 107, 115, 122, 127 Participation, 12, 23, 25, 27, 28, 33, 35, 37–39, 42–44, 66 Partner, 193

241

Partnership, 16, 73, 133, 191 Party, 6, 15, 71, 88, 99, 126, 144, 148, 149, 153, 159, 164, 175, 180, 181, 188, 189, 198, 210 Pathos, 15, 87, 121, 122, 225 Patriotism, 7, 74, 88–118, 122, 128, 170, 171, 190–200, 213, 219 Patronage, 8, 78, 79 Pattern, 9, 10, 14, 16–18, 44, 55, 58, 69, 73, 87, 88, 119–129, 134, 161–165, 167, 170, 207–214, 225–227 Peace, 101, 105, 116, 122, 126, 182, 209 Perception, 10, 20, 39, 61, 74, 81, 197, 220, 229 Personality, 9, 10, 19, 56, 58, 80, 100, 103, 152, 172, 215, 229 Pew Research Center, 16, 17, 77, 133, 169 Pindo, 159, 160, 231 Platform, 6, 30, 33, 43, 56, 62, 65, 72, 75, 76, 123, 184, 229 Pluralism, 7, 44, 72, 119, 217 Policy, 6, 8, 16, 18, 19, 25, 28, 38, 70–74, 76, 77, 110, 113, 114, 124, 126, 127, 133, 147, 177, 178, 182, 183, 188, 192, 193, 207, 210, 218, 225–227 Politeness, 29, 32, 117, 216 Politician, 140, 141, 145, 147, 153, 154, 157, 160, 161, 164, 170, 171, 174, 176, 177, 183–187, 191, 195, 199–202, 206, 207, 209, 213, 218, 221, 224 Politics, 7, 9, 11, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 48, 56, 58, 75, 79, 80, 88, 106, 123, 134–137, 139, 141, 144, 158–161, 166, 170, 171, 177, 179, 180, 183, 186, 189, 190, 200, 201, 210, 224, 229

242 

INDEX

Population, 6, 8, 31, 37, 62, 70, 78, 97, 98, 143, 148, 153, 155, 182, 200 Populism, 163, 170, 171, 190–200, 213, 219, 226 Populist, 20, 74, 80, 190, 199, 200 Poverty, 8, 78, 148, 155, 185 Power, 3, 5, 7–9, 11, 25, 27, 33, 35, 37, 40, 41, 43–46, 48, 56, 61, 70, 72–74, 76, 78, 80, 97–99, 101, 104, 116, 120, 125, 128, 134–148, 152, 153, 157, 163, 165, 166, 170–188, 191, 198–200, 207, 213, 215, 219–221, 223, 224, 226, 230, 231 Presidency, 7, 10, 14, 16, 17, 61, 68, 69, 73, 74, 77, 80, 87, 111, 116, 133, 134, 141, 146, 156, 169, 170, 176, 177, 182, 198, 205, 209, 219, 221 President, 3–5, 7, 10, 15–18, 44, 56, 64, 65, 72–74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 100, 102, 103, 106, 114, 116, 119, 120, 128, 133, 136–139, 141, 142, 144–155, 157–160, 163, 164, 166, 169, 170, 175–185, 188–190, 193, 197, 199, 201, 206–211, 218, 220, 222–224 Press, 41, 122, 142, 161, 180, 183, 187, 222 Pressure, 15, 16, 99, 111, 133, 183, 190, 213, 219 Prevalence, 59, 60, 127 Price, 75, 103, 139, 148, 150 Pride, 155, 159, 173, 179 Principle, 6, 24, 41, 104, 127, 151, 154, 200, 202 Privilege, 32, 147, 174, 209 Problem, 18, 25, 37, 39, 40, 44, 45, 66, 67, 73, 78, 98, 139, 155,

170, 182–186, 193–195, 198, 209, 212, 221 Procedure, 14, 55, 134, 171 Process, 7, 8, 11, 25, 27, 28, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 45, 48, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65–67, 74, 75, 77, 79, 89, 91–93, 97, 98, 101–105, 120, 121, 128, 141, 179, 183, 188, 190, 210 Product, 69, 92, 102, 109, 112, 113, 118, 128, 173, 176, 193, 208 Production, 15, 37, 212 Progress, 17, 79, 98, 107, 109 Project, 7, 9, 63, 69, 74, 76, 77, 107, 230 Promise, 5, 10, 69, 73, 77, 81, 111, 140, 162, 173, 186, 200, 221 Propaganda, 7, 8, 15, 19, 43, 56, 74, 87, 89, 94–97, 111, 122, 128, 141, 142, 163, 180, 218, 225–227, 229–231 Prosperity, 187, 194 Protectionism, 193, 194 Protest, 8, 75, 76, 150 Publics, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 24–28, 30, 33–48, 65, 69, 71, 72, 74, 76–78, 80, 81, 87, 88, 107, 111, 119, 123–125, 128, 129, 141, 160, 169, 185, 196, 212, 218, 225–228, 230 Public sphere, 4, 8, 11–13, 19, 23–48, 55, 57, 78, 79, 215, 227–230 Punishment, 92, 94, 115, 124, 185 Purpose, 4, 7, 9, 43, 57, 61, 63, 64, 72, 76, 80, 91, 96, 107, 120, 124, 138, 226, 227, 230 Putin, Vladimir, 7, 16, 17, 73–76, 133, 136–138, 141, 142, 144–148, 150, 156, 158–163, 166, 183, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226, 228 Putinism, 228

 INDEX 

R Race, 29, 40, 173, 181, 204 Racism, 189, 203, 204 Range, 8, 13, 19, 23, 36, 59, 62, 70, 75, 101, 112, 125, 166, 183, 203, 209, 213, 218, 226, 227 Rationality, 32, 94 Reality, 11, 48, 105, 128, 171, 189, 192, 198, 225 Realm, 6, 12, 23, 69 Reason, 28, 31–43, 56, 62, 65–68, 89, 91, 98, 104, 106, 107, 114, 117, 124, 148, 155, 158, 166, 176, 177, 185, 188, 195–197, 199, 204, 209, 213, 221, 226 Reelection, 179–181 Reflexivity, 27, 28 Regime, 6, 7, 15, 19, 42, 43, 46, 69, 71, 74, 79, 111, 122, 225, 230 Region, 109, 142 Regulation, 194 Relation, 3, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 19, 34, 43, 47, 59, 60, 66–69, 72–74, 77, 87, 88, 105, 134, 135, 137, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 156, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 170, 178, 183, 196, 198, 199, 203, 205, 206, 219, 220, 222, 224, 229, 230 Relationship, 3–5, 10, 14–16, 19, 30, 32, 34, 38, 56, 57, 59, 63, 64, 68, 69, 72, 73, 77, 87, 129, 133, 138, 140, 164, 169, 171, 174, 175, 191, 193, 208, 220, 222–224, 230, 231 Relevance, 7, 10, 19, 46, 70, 74, 80, 138, 213 Reliability, 59 Religion, 201–203 Report, 14, 60, 62, 64, 69, 79, 87, 146, 164, 165 Representation, 103

243

Republican, 143, 144, 179, 188 Requirement, 27–30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 72 Research, 9–14, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36, 39, 47, 56, 58–60, 65, 90, 112–114, 118, 119, 160, 161, 206, 215, 216, 230–231 Resignation, 63, 134, 139–142, 144, 151, 152, 154, 222, 223 Resistance, 93, 95, 110 Resource, 98, 101, 103, 113, 143, 149, 156 Respect, 3, 27, 28, 32, 33, 46, 73, 77, 79, 98, 119, 122, 123, 149, 157, 174, 176, 185, 186, 192, 200, 205, 213, 216–218, 228, 229 Response, 5, 7, 28, 46, 47, 59, 60, 68, 77, 94, 101, 104, 136, 146, 150, 152, 175, 197, 223 Responsibility, 18, 91, 97–99, 122, 147–148, 170–187, 194, 213, 219 Restriction, 6, 8, 13, 24, 58, 69, 72 Retaliation, 125 Retribution, 122, 201, 202 Revenge, 179, 224 Revolution, 121 Revolutionary, 15, 71 Rhetoric, 33, 37, 78, 190, 208, 209, 228 Risk, 39, 43, 79, 178, 194 Rivalry, 70 Role, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16–19, 25, 27, 28, 35, 37, 42, 44, 56, 69, 70, 73–76, 78–81, 93, 105, 110, 123, 133, 137, 146, 148, 150, 152, 167, 199, 203, 210, 215, 218, 220, 222, 227–229 Rumour, 93, 118, 123–125

244 

INDEX

Russia, 4–10, 13, 15–19, 33, 40–42, 44, 48, 55–58, 61, 63–65, 68, 69, 72–75, 78, 133–167, 201, 206, 210, 214–229, 231 Russian, 3, 5, 7, 8, 16, 18, 19, 43, 44, 56, 59, 61, 63–65, 68, 73–76, 78, 134–142, 144–150, 154–167, 170, 177, 183, 197, 205, 207, 214, 218–220, 222, 223, 225, 227, 228, 230 S Sacrifice, 93, 111, 128 Sample, 14, 55, 58, 59, 61, 63–65, 94, 117, 119, 154, 158, 161, 166, 204, 209, 214, 217, 220 Sampling, 14, 55, 61–68 Sanction, 64, 73, 74, 99, 107, 109, 110, 112, 123, 124, 137, 141, 151, 155, 160, 161, 220 Sarcasm, 134, 156, 158, 219, 225, 226 Satan, 160, 202, 203 Saturation, 61, 64 Scandal, 5, 68, 74, 198 Scheme, 66, 102 Science, 57, 112, 114 Scope, 4, 31, 33, 57, 58, 65, 228 Score, 59, 67, 117, 158, 204, 216 Security, 63, 79, 98, 99, 103, 112, 114, 134, 152, 153, 164, 186, 188, 193 Self-reliance, 95, 97, 98, 112, 114, 116, 121, 128 Self-sufficiency, 97, 98, 112 Semi-authoritarian, 6, 69, 71, 79, 225, 226 Sentiment, 15, 18, 20, 29, 78, 89, 94, 100, 109, 122, 142, 147, 163, 170, 178, 190, 204, 219–221, 223, 229

Significance, 5, 10, 34, 58, 60, 63, 80, 96, 116, 134, 135, 148–154, 166, 219, 229 Slogan, 15, 19, 88, 89, 94–97, 121, 122, 128, 192, 218, 227 Society, 7, 11, 24–26, 32, 33, 35–37, 39, 42, 44, 45, 48, 57, 72, 74, 78, 91, 93, 97, 98, 101, 103, 117, 122, 151, 153, 166, 167, 177, 185, 186, 189, 196–198, 200, 207, 213, 216, 225, 228, 229 Solution, 25, 28, 78, 185, 194, 207 Sovereignty, 18, 40, 70, 71, 108, 174, 192 Space, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 19, 25, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 41, 43–45, 47, 48, 69, 71, 80, 122, 134, 167, 170, 185, 207, 212, 214, 218, 225, 227, 229, 230 Speech, 7, 9, 13, 14, 24, 29, 30, 33, 41, 56, 68, 69, 75, 76, 119, 120, 123, 161, 200 Sphere, 37, 207, 214, 227 Stage, 60, 64, 80, 81, 98, 116, 160, 219, 222 Standard, 17, 19, 39–41, 118, 124, 134, 148, 153–156, 159, 205, 212, 218, 225, 227 State, 5–8, 18–20, 24, 25, 27, 35, 40, 44, 45, 47, 68, 70–73, 75, 78, 94, 98, 109, 125, 135, 138, 139, 142, 151, 153, 155, 157, 167, 170, 184, 194, 212, 218, 223, 225–227, 229, 230 Statement, 28, 29, 75, 92, 120, 147, 161, 208, 209 Statistics, 31, 117, 156, 158 Status, 115, 123, 213, 221, 223, 230 Stereotype, 29 Strategy, 6, 7, 15, 16, 38, 56, 58, 71, 74, 78, 96, 103, 110–112, 115,

 INDEX 

120, 121, 125, 133, 157, 181, 182, 184, 190, 192–194, 199, 213, 219, 226 Strength, 6, 46, 70, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 112–116, 120, 121, 126, 136, 151, 157, 202, 223, 228 Strike, 73, 96, 108, 116, 141 Structure, 4, 12–20, 27, 33, 44, 66, 114, 133, 144, 169 Struggle, 7, 27, 36, 72, 108, 137, 144, 183, 229 Stupidity, 148, 155, 172, 176, 178, 208, 211 Submission, 171, 174, 176, 190, 207, 208, 213, 219 Substance, 30, 31, 66, 92, 94, 211 Sub-theme, 89, 92, 94, 95, 97, 128, 134, 135, 147, 171, 190, 213 Success, 79, 107, 144, 182, 185, 228 Suffering, 18, 40, 170, 183, 195, 199 Summary, 29, 33, 47 Superiority, 110, 122 Superpower, 116, 123, 145 Support, 7, 16, 18, 19, 30, 72, 73, 77, 90–93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 110, 112, 114, 118, 121, 133, 141, 149, 151, 169, 184, 187, 199, 200, 218, 224, 227 Suppression, 109, 110 Supremacy, 73, 151, 186, 204 Surveillance, 7, 43, 72, 199 Survey, 14, 69, 87, 163 Symbol, 15, 71, 102, 103, 138 Syria, 73, 139 System, 3, 7, 9, 10, 17, 19, 37, 56, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 80, 113, 115, 122, 134, 144, 149, 150, 152, 161, 163, 166, 167, 170, 179, 186, 187, 190, 194, 198–200, 207, 209, 214, 218, 219, 224, 225, 228–231

245

T Talent, 91, 114, 193 Talk, 4, 5, 9, 11–13, 19, 23, 28, 30, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 48, 56, 57, 59, 63, 69, 81, 104, 117, 120, 127, 129, 134, 139, 155, 167, 192, 211, 214, 215, 217–219, 223, 224, 227, 229, 230 Target, 103, 123, 174 Tariff, 69, 93, 103, 104, 109, 113, 116, 127, 148 Tax, 77, 150, 174, 193, 203 Technology, 7, 31–33, 35–37, 62, 72, 110, 113, 114, 121, 143 Term, 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 35, 43, 46–48, 55, 59, 64, 70, 72, 74, 75, 80, 89, 94, 95, 103, 109, 117, 118, 121, 134–137, 142, 144, 145, 150, 152, 159, 160, 166, 174, 177, 179, 182, 190, 194, 195, 197, 199, 203, 205, 206, 217, 218, 220, 221, 223, 227, 228, 231 Territory, 70, 75, 136, 137, 163 Terrorist, 3, 18, 170, 172, 190, 210, 221 Test, 23, 33, 99, 125, 226 Testimony, 37, 76, 141, 147, 190 Thematic, 5, 9, 13, 14, 55, 57–60, 64, 65, 134, 169, 171, 215, 216 Theme, 9, 10, 14–16, 55, 57–60, 80, 87–90, 92, 105, 106, 118, 120–122, 128, 129, 134–149, 154, 156, 164–166, 170–204, 210, 213, 219–220, 227 Theoretical saturation, 61, 64 Theory, 4, 5, 9, 11–13, 23, 26, 32, 34, 35, 38–41, 45, 47, 55–81, 88, 89, 216, 230

246 

INDEX

Trade agreement, 78, 210–212 war, 5, 10, 14, 15, 63, 64, 68–70, 81, 87–92, 95, 97–101, 103–113, 115–117, 119, 120, 123, 125–129 Transformation, 25, 79, 127 Transition, 47, 74, 79, 98, 116, 128 Transnational public sphere, 44–47 Treachery, 93 Treasure, 11, 48 Treaty, 179, 209, 224 Trend, 7, 10, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 72, 76, 80, 92, 112, 117, 120, 122, 183, 215, 223, 224, 230, 231 Trial, 10, 63, 64, 81, 134, 143, 144, 148, 151–154, 160, 163, 169, 179–181, 183, 186–190, 202, 205, 209, 210, 222–224 Triumph, 3, 137, 147, 182, 186, 220, 221 Troll, 7, 56, 75, 142 Trump, Donald, 3–5, 9, 10, 12–18, 20, 46, 48, 55–58, 61, 63–65, 68–70, 73, 74, 76–78, 80–81, 87–129, 133–167, 169–227, 229 Typology, 5, 12, 16–19, 27, 88, 134, 170 Tyrant, 173, 221, 223 U Ukraine, 5, 7, 8, 72, 73, 75, 137, 141, 142, 154, 156, 157, 161–163, 166, 183, 220, 222, 226, 228 Ukrainian, 138, 153, 160, 161 United States (USA), 3–6, 9, 10, 12–18, 20, 44, 46, 55–58, 61, 63–65, 68–70, 72–74, 76–78, 80–81, 87–129, 133–167, 169–215, 217–224, 228–231

Unity, 71, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 102, 126, 187 Utopia, 25, 47 V Value, 6, 10, 11, 19, 28, 30, 35, 40, 48, 57, 63, 66, 67, 70, 78, 80, 119, 144, 148, 154, 162, 185, 189, 191, 194, 197, 198, 200, 213, 220, 228, 229 Variable, 67, 68, 119, 160, 206 Violence, 8, 56, 79, 94, 96, 103, 185, 197 Visit, 5, 64, 65, 68, 147, 158, 175, 184, 192 Vote, 111, 146, 164, 176, 180, 181, 186, 188–190, 198, 202 Voter, 142, 143, 153, 173, 181, 206 W Wall, 5, 10, 17, 63, 64, 69, 77, 81, 113, 169, 173, 176, 177, 187, 200, 221, 224 War, 5, 7, 8, 15, 69, 72, 75, 94, 95, 101, 103, 105–108, 110, 111, 115, 120, 125–127, 137, 143, 157, 182, 197, 201, 221, 223, 228 Weapon, 98, 105, 116, 128, 136, 181, 182, 190, 192, 198, 199 Web, 31, 36, 41, 62, 64, 70, 78 Website, 6, 8, 56, 61, 62, 65, 71, 76, 118, 119, 123, 124 Work, 11, 12, 23, 25–28, 33, 37, 46, 48, 57, 59, 60, 66, 91, 93, 95, 98, 102, 122, 126, 140–142, 146–148, 153, 157, 178, 180, 181, 183, 185, 188, 195, 197, 198, 212, 225

 INDEX 

World, 3–7, 10, 16, 18, 19, 26, 31, 45, 56, 71, 73–75, 77, 80, 81, 88, 89, 95–98, 102, 104–106, 108–117, 121, 122, 125, 126, 128, 133, 136–138, 143, 145–149, 151, 152, 155, 157, 159, 160, 162, 169–174, 181, 182, 186, 188–190, 192, 194–196, 204, 210, 212, 213, 215, 219–222, 224, 228, 230

247

X Xenophobe, 161 Xenophobia, 189, 203 Y Yankee, 106, 125, 126, 189, 197, 206 Z Zakharova, Maria, 147, 148, 160, 162–165