Discourse and the Continuity of Reference: Representing Mental Categorization [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110808698, 9783110167658

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Discourse and the Continuity of Reference

W DE G

Discourse and the Continuity of Reference Representing Mental Categorization

by Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York 2000

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin

A professorial dissertation (Habilitationssschrift), accepted by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Hanover University, printed with the financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Science Foundation).

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Zelinsky-Wibbelt, Cornelia: Discourse and the continuity of reference : representing mental categorization / Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 2000 Zugl.: Hannover, Univ., Habil.-Schr., 1997 ISBN 3-11-016765-4

© Copyright 2000 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printing: W. Hildebrand, Berlin. Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Preface This book presents intermediate results of a research project which I carried out at the University of the Saarland and at Hanover University. The present publication is based on my professoral dissertation (Habilitationsschrift) which was accepted by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Hanover University. Since then I have revised it considerably. I wish to express my thanks to several people who have contributed to the result of this work. First and foremost, the EUROTRA machine translation project was the context in which I was initially confronted with the problems I tried to solve in this book. Therefore I am grateful to the project manager Johann Haller who engaged me in the project and who encouraged me to tackle this work. He was an interested and patient reader and commentator of all of the papers which preceded and prepared it. Rene Dirven is the other important person to whom I would like to express my gratitude. He played a primary role in establishing cognitive linguistics in Europe. It was at a workshop at Trier University in 1985, organized by Rene Dirven, when Langacker first introduced his theory of cognitive grammar in Germany where I became convinced that with my interest in the relation between language and cognition I was on the right path. Rene Dirven became interested in my research on a workshop which I organized at IAI Saarbrücken (Institute for Applied Information Science at the University of the Saarland). He accompanied this project until recently and played an essential role in its acceptance. This project has also profited from the financial support provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, "German Science Foundation"). They funded seven months of my work in between my positions at the University of the Saaxland and Hanover University by a fellowship (Habilitandenstipendium). Likewise, they are supporting the printing of this book. The final version of this monograph has also

vi Preface profited from my research project L E X I K U R S (Typological investigation of lexicalization in discourse), also supported by the DFG. The results of this project have stimulated many of my latest research ideas. Susanne Richardt is due thanks for having read great parts of the linguistic chapters of this book which has helped to increase its readability. Thanks also go to James Robert Carter who has made many improvements to style and organization of the text both as a linguist and as a native speaker. However, the edition of this monograph is due to Mouton de Gruyter's editor in chief, Anke Beck who kindly offered me to publish my work. Finally, the present result would not be manifest without my husband's work, Hans-Bernd Wibbelt. He has been responsible for the type-setting in I^TeX and T^X, with which he was busy during the last weeks before the camera-ready copy went to print.

Hanover, July 2000

Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt

Contents

Preface List of

ν figures

xi

1 Introduction 1.1 Reference and categorization 1.1.1 Categorization 1.1.2 The continuity of reference 1.1.3 Evaluating the truth conditions 1.1.4 Distinguishing between existing knowledge and new information 1.1.5 The priority of meaning vs. form 1.1.6 The creation of novel meanings 1.1.7 The origin of creativity 1.2 Cognitive linguistics 1.2.1 The continuum of knowledge 1.2.2 Against the strong principle of compositionality . 1.2.3 A performance-based perspective 1.2.4 Linguistic performance as part of global behaviour 1.3 Non-focussed objectives 1.4 Overview

1 2 4 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 14 15 16 16

2 Philosophical issues in reference and truth 2.1 From intension to extension 2.2 The inextricability vs. the inscrutability of language . . 2.3 The collective achievement of intensions 2.4 The acquisition of knowledge and language 2.5 Joining referential realism with referential holism . . . . 2.6 Wittgenstein's empirical fallacy

18 19 22 26 31 32 36

viii Contents 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14

From linguistic object to the objective subject Intersubjectivizing empirical knowledge Mutual knowledge vs. relevance Chomsky's empirical paradox Linguistic competence as the atomistic residue The mind as a black box The encyclopedic unity of linguistic knowledge Conclusion

40 44 47 51 54 58 59 60

3 Psychological theories of reference and categorization 3.1 Gibson's approach to ecological realism 3.2 Neisser's ecological approach 3.3 Piaget's constructivism 3.4 Johnson-Laird's mental model theory 3.5 Conclusion

61 61 74 78 81 85

4

Selecting the psychological model of reference 4.1 The economical abstraction of prototypes 4.2 The economical processing of prototypes 4.3 The semantic priority of information processing 4.4 Categorization and reference 4.5 Conclusion

87 87 92 97 99 102

5

Representing mental categorization 104 5 . 1 The speakers' VOLITION 105 5.2 Prototypes and schemata 108 5.3 Centre vs. periphery of a conceptual region 114 5.4 Linguistic vs. encyclopedic meaning 117 5.5 Top-down inheritance 120 5.6 Categorization and the continuity of reference 126 5.7 Categorization and referential integration 130 5.8 The hierarchical representation of categorization . . . . 131 5.9 Schematizing along the conceptual type hierarchy . . . . 135 5.10 The unification-based formalism 138 5.10.1 Hierarchy 139 5.10.2 Disjunction 141 5.10.3 Conjunction 143 5.11 Distinguishing lexical vagueness from polysemy 145

Contents

ix

5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15

Different types of lexical vagueness 147 Polysemy across basic cognitive domains 150 The lexical representation of basic cognitive domains . . 153 Autonomous vs. dependent predications 155 5.15.1 Dependency of prepositions 157 5.15.2 Dependency of adjectives 160 5.16 Conclusion 162 6 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy 6.1 Nominal predications 6.2 Relational predications 6.2.1 Temporal predications 6.2.2 Basic atemporal relations 6.3 Conclusion

164 165 181 181 186 195

7 Representing discourse domains 7.1 Schemata, frames, and scripts 7.2 Discourse representation by mental models 7.3 Relating image schemata and mental models 7.4 Inferring implicit information 7.5 Conclusion

196 196 199 201 209 213

8 Metonymy and metaphor as universals 8.1 Metonymy as domain representation 8.2 Langacker's billiard-ball model 8.3 Metaphors as extensions across domains 8.3.1 The origin of analogy and creativity 8.3.2 Metaphors, analogy and truth 8.3.3 Metaphors support cognition 8.3.4 Analogy is knowledge-based 8.4 Metaphorical models of abstract domains 8.5 Conclusion

214 215 221 223 224 232 233 234 240 249

9 Contextual functions 9.1 The interaction between lexicon and grammar 9.2 Contextual selection 9.3 Contextual configuration 9.4 Contextual shift

250 250 251 257 262

χ

Contents

From an UNBOUNDED to a BOUNDED region . . 263 From a WHOLE situation to a PART 266 9.4.3 Shifting between periods of time 269 9.4.4 Reorganizing the same region 269 9.4.5 Shifting between regions by metonymy 278 9.4.6 Discourse coherence and lexical dominance . . . 283 9.5 Contextual inference 286 9.6 Conclusion 288 9.4.1 9.4.2

10 Representing token vs. type reference 10.1 Reference as a cross-linguistic phenomenon 10.2 The functional unity of reference 10.3 Reference to an instance of a type 10.4 Reference in different valency relations 10.4.1 Bounding an instance by PP modification . . . . 10.4.2 Bounding an instance by verbal predication . . . 10.4.3 Bounding an instance by adjective modification . 10.5 Type reference to prototypes 10.6 Type reference against the profile-base relation 10.7 Type reference to COUNT entities 10.8 Conclusion

290 292 293 297 300 301 303 305 311 314

11 General conclusions and perspectives 11.1 Achievements of this work

319 320

11.2 Perspectives

315

318

321

References

324

Index

349

List of figures 1.1

Cups, (adapted from Labov, 1973)

6.1 6.2 6.3

A conceptual type hierarchy for nominal predications . . 166 A conceptual type hierarchy for temporal predications . 182 A conceptual type hierarchy for atemporal relations . . 187

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7

Mental model of over (plane, Sahara) Mental model of above (plane, clouds) Mental model of over (lamp, table) Mental model of * over (lamp, table) Mental model of above (Picasso, Miro) Mental model of since and for Domains, schemata, and mental models

202 203 204 204 205 207 208

8.1

8.2

Ad hoc metonymy from W H O L E to Inferring default predications

218

9.1 9.2

Lexical entries of school, enter, start and famous Lexical entries of leave, university and John

10.1 Three different types of

MASS

1

PART

nouns

217

. . . .

252 256 297

Chapter 1 Introduction This work deals with two contrasting, but mutually interrelated capabilities of the human mind: reference and categorization. We are concerned with how speakers employ these capabilities in linguistic processing. Our overall aim is to illuminate the relation between language and cognition. Reference results from speakers' ability to evaluate the application of linguistic expressions in a particular context. We assume that the speakers' mental representations provides the truth-conditions by which they know how to refer linguistically to experienced information. Let us exemplify our objective in more concrete terms: how do speakers apply adequate expressions to refer linguistically to the series of cup-like bowls and bowl-like cups given below (cf. Labov, 1973)?

Figure 1.1: Cups, (adapted from Labov, 1973)

2 Introduction

1.1

Reference and categorization

In order to be capable of applying lexical units such as cup, mug, bowl and vase in linguistically adequate ways speakers must know the methodology by which they subsume meaningful tokens of experience under a common conceptual type. This methodology results from the mental organization of the speakers' experiences. It is the ability of recognizing the same semantic category by identifying the different perceptual instances and contextual realizations to which speakers refer by the same linguistic sign. Thus the methodology of mental categorization as the result of mentally organizing and representing human experiences is a theory or model of experienced reality. Language plays a key role in establishing the speakers' methodology of categorization (Neisser, 1987b, vii). From the perspective of cognitive linguistics mental categorization is the origin from which lexical meanings emerge. Concomitant with categorization, however, the meanings of lexical units differ from one usage event to another, and the contextual framing of senses is potentially infinite. The polysemy vs. vagueness of lexical meanings and their flexible and creative use axe central topics of current discussions in lexicology and lexicography. The unsolved problem of how words acquire, preserve and change their meanings has been discussed from the very beginnings of philosophy. Although the problem was addressed from the most varied of perspectives, the meaningfulness of words has remained an important area of study throughout the history of philosophy and linguistics, and, as yet, the problem remains unsolved. None of the various perspectives taken throughout the history of linguistics has been successful in explaining the referential behaviour by which speakers achieve a contextually integrated representation of lexical meanings. In our view, one of the major reasons responsible for this shortcoming is an insufficient reflection on the relation between theory and practice. Lexicology deals with the structure of the lexicon from a general theoretical perspective, while lexicographers consider lexicons as tools to be used for special purposes. If we consider the differences which may be observed even with lexicons pursuing comparable purposes, the gap between the induction of general methodological standards developed by lexicologists and the deductive implementation of these standards by lexicographers becomes obvious (Boguraev and Briscoe, 1989, 1). In

Reference and categorization 3 view of the multitude of diverging lexicological frameworks (cf. Pustejovsky, 1993, 1), the lexicographers' difficult objective of recognizing discrete states within the vagueness, fuzziness and variability of lexical categories is left largely unsupported by lexicologists. So far, all attempts towards objectivizing the process of word sense distinction have failed (cf. Geeraerts, 1993). Lexicalization seems to be a transitory phenomenon to the lexicographer, and not fully operationalizable. Yet speakers seem to be perfectly capable of communicating the nuances of their mental representations, of whatever complexity these contextual elaborations may be. On the one hand, speakers handle the variation of information by mental categorization i.e. by learning to evaluate the contextually varying information as being irrelevant for determining the range of application which holds for a particular linguistic expression. On the other hand, categorization occurs also by flexible reference i.e. by stretching the boundaries of mental categories in an infinite potential of possible contexts. Speakers handle this flexibility by virtue of their knowledge about the tolerance range of each category. In natural language discourse, speakers are constrained by this tolerance range in relation to the specific situation when they negotiate their interpretations in complex cooperative social interactions. These complex interactions result in multiple adjustments of mental categorizations to the particular discourse requirements. The negotiation of mental representations is thus indispensable, since it presupposes economy and structure in information processing on the one hand and guarantees the socio-culturally determined flexibility of language on the other. The range of application which a particular expression adopts within categorization is thus determined both by contextual reduction, by which the relevant information is constrained, and by contextual extension, by which ever more contextual information is subsumed under the same semantic category. On this view, lexical vagueness is prerequisite in that it provides for the referential variations which establish the continuity of reference. These referential variations are pragmatically constrained and demand the open structure of categories, the latter implying in turn the open structure of the lexicon, the components and relations of which change in accordance with the requirements of the continuously changing world.

4 Introduction 1.1.1

Categorization

Having defined categorization in this way as the methodology by which speakers subsume meaningful tokens of experience under a common semantic category, the classical question arises: how in general is it possible that humans can reason in terms of categories? What are the conditions that make speakers decide under which category a perceived information belongs in order to express it in linguistically adequate ways? If we assume categories to result from the mental organization of the speakers' experiences we must ask at least the following questions about categorizations (cf. Ros, 1990, 3f.): 1. What should linguists take a category to represent as the result of cognition? 2. What are the mental activities performed with the activation of a category, and how do speakers acquire the capability of categorization? 3. How do speakers know that a particular categorization is methodologically "adequate", i.e. how do speakers know that a specific category identifies a particular linguistic sign as meaningful in an utterance situation? Which and how much information do speakers need in order to be able to decide about the application of a sense? At this point different semantic theories give different answers to the essential question of whether there is any exact set of attributes which we may claim to be necessary and sufficient for deciding on the truth of a particular linguistic sign. This question is related to Frege's idea (cf. Frege, 1975b) that the intension as the content of an expression unambiguously determines its extension as the set of instances to which an expression applies. Frege's view has been criticized in particular during the last quarter of the 20th century by the developing paradigm of cognitive linguistics. The most important criticism brought forth with respect to the Fregean principle was that Frege himself did not make explicit the mental processes by which speakers achieve the referential relationship. This criticism has been developing in particular along the lines of the following arguments.

Reference and categorization

5

The most important observation was concerned with the claim that categorization does not occur by necessary and sufficient conditions. The conditions under which a certain term applies in ordinary language use are rather evaluated by the speakers' common sense, which often considers necessary conditions as irrelevant. Consider the applicability conditions as they are imposed on the natural categories of birds and fish in ordinary language use. We can take penguins as a case in point, as speakers have difficulties in categorizing penguins as birds. Prototype semantics explains this difficulty on the one hand by the fact that birdlike attributes are weakly elaborated with penguins. On the other, defining attributes of the core, such as HAVE FEATHERS, CAN FLY, are even missing completely with penguins (cf. Rosch and Lloyd, 1978). By their weakly elaborated attributes penguins represent the borderline of the family of birds. With this idea prototype theory borrows from the later Wittgenstein (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a), who introduced the idea that instead of necessary and sufficient conditions unambiguously defining the intension of a concept by which the tokens falling under the extension may be determined, there are only family resemblances between the members of a concept. The attributes determining the intension of a concept have different values with different tokens of a conceptual type. By distinguishing the core of a concept from the periphery of a concept, the core is associated with all of the defining attributes, whereas at the periphery many characteristic attributes may be missing with untypical members of a category. In this way prototype semantics could explain that a robin is rated as a "better bird" than a canary by North American speakers (cf. Rosch, 1973; Rips et al., 1973), because its characteristic features are more birdlike than they are with other birds - hence the robin is the American prototype for birds. As the distinction between defining and characteristic attributes proved to be irrelevant for speakers, the psychologist Barsalou introduced the distinction between context-dependent and context-independent semantic attributes. A classical example of this distinction is the context-dependent conceptualization of piano in the following (cf. Anderson and Ortony, 1975; Schoen, 1988, 115): (1.1)

The man lifted the piano.

(1.2)

The man tuned the piano.

6

Introduction

Test persons associated the category HEAVY with piano in the first example, while for the second example they associated the category N I C E S O U N D with piano. We may grasp this linguistic behaviour even better with the conceptualization of a frog (cf. Barsalou, 1982, 87): if speakers are supposed to conceptualize a frog as an animal without thinking of any specific context, the category E D I B L E is not activated, while this is the case if the context consists in a French restaurant. Schoen (cf. Schoen, 1988) has introduced the distinction between high and low polysemy as being established by a change of central vs. peripheral features distinguishing between senses and suggests studying metaphor in order to establish the logical conclusion of this distinction by evaluating the limits of the core context. The categorization of attributes by which meanings become identified may even be complicated by information not being explicitly uttered, such that the listener has to infer implicit information, information which may furthermore prove to be invalid at later stages of the discourse. This is illustrated by the following example, with which Thorndyke investigated backward inferencing (cf. Thorndyke, 1976): (1.3)

The hamburger chain owner was afraid French fries would ruin his marriage.

(1.4)

The hamburger chain owner decided to join in order to save his marriage.

his

love

for

weight-watchers

Thorndyke's results show that only 6 % of the test persons falsely inferred that the hamburger chain owner's wife did not like French fries. Yet the question of when and how listeners draw the adequate inferences has not been answered to this day. Finally, Frege's theory lost attractiveness because his conception of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of concepts was tremendously rigid, such that the processing of novel information was deemed impossible. Yet the desire to experience new information is the very motivation for speakers to become engaged in communicative interactions. The mere verification of existing knowledge would be tremendously boring. In order to achieve the integration of existing knowledge and new information in efficient and flexible ways, speakers have to represent their knowledge in the informationally adequate degree of abstraction. The more abstract speakers represent their

Reference and categorization

7

knowledge, the more economical and parsimonious this representation is on the one hand, and the more flexible speakers may use their knowledge on the other. Prom a cognitive perspective the adequate degree of lexical vagueness seems pragmatically prerequisite for a situationally adequate negotiation of the intended meaning, for the continuity of reference to proceed along the range of lexical vagueness. This referential continuity is prerequisite for new meanings to develop and result in an increase of human knowledge. 1.1.2

The continuity of reference

Following Rosch's investigations of natural categorization (cf. Rosch and Lloyd, 1978) and Lakoff's approach to cognition (cf. Lakoff, 1987) we assume lexical units to be associated with concepts which are graded and radially organized in a network of concepts: a concept is graded from a prototypical central token to a periphery where non-typical tokens gradually represent the borderline to a different concept. By analogy to this different concepts of a lexical unit are organized in a radial structure with a central concept from which less central concepts may be extended. On this model categories do not apply by necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, the concepts of a lexical unit are vague at their borders. This vagueness is essential in that it provides for the referential variations which represent the continuity of reference. The continuity of reference allows the particular referential tokens to be adjusted in actual usage events to the specific requirements of each individual discourse situation. On the one hand, the continuity of reference is established by extending a concept beyond its borderlines. On the other hand, speakers may shift through the radial chain of concepts, if the referential token and the conceptual type are not sufficiently compatible. An example is the noun Freund ("good friend") in German. As long as the closeness of relationship does not pass beyond a significant threshold, the referential tokens are sufficiently compatible with the conceptual type corresponding to the English paraphrase "good friend". As soon as a certain threshold of intimacy is surpassed, the continuity of reference is broken and speakers shift to the metonymic variant corresponding to the English equivalents girlfriend and boyfriend respectively.

8

Introduction

The economy of this flexible linguistic behaviour consists in the fact that, through the plasticity of concepts and by the reduction of irrelevant information, speakers can subsume ever more referential instances under the same conceptual type (cf. Geeraerts, 1988). On this view, it is prerequisite that concepts are lexically vague to provide for the referential variations between the activities by which speakers fix the actual senses (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 198ff.; Strohner, 1990, 123ff.). The speakers' flexible and holistic methodology of linguistic processing is enabled by an adequate knowledge representation system. If we reject necessary and sufficient conditions and accept the prototype model, how is the prototype represented? Is it a categorially represented paradigm abstracted from individual instances or is it the most representative instance? Or are concepts based on innate principles (cf. Jackendoff, 1983, 24ff.; Lenneberg, 1977, 287f.) rather than on learned prototypes? 1.1.3

Evaluating the truth

conditions

If we reject necessary and sufficient conditions, we have to develop an alternative explanation of how speakers evaluate the truth-conditions of linguistic utterances. In particular, we have to explain how speakers achieve consistent mental representations of a common linguistic expression. Thinking of Labov's paper on the vagueness of the truth conditions of cups (cf. above, figure 1.1), we may specify this question: how are speakers capable of agreeing on what they are referring to when using the noun cup? Or take S C A L A R adjectives, such as long, much, warm, dirty, which depend not only on the noun they modify, but also on the speaker's subjective attitude. Speakers living at the same place will agree on what they experience as a warm summer day. Also a long queue and a short queue will be referred to consistently by customers of the same supermarket because of their common experiential background. On the other hand, an agreement on what dirty trousers is meant to refer to has to be negotiated in specific situations. Even more difficult to agree on are the meanings of noun phrases which depend strongly on social criteria, such as an expensive car or a large flat or a good job. With these noun phrases consistent reference will not be achieved within the speech community of one language, but only within socially defined subgroups

Reference and categorization

9

of the linguistic community and in specific situations. According to Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory of communication (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), speakers agree in their interpretations via the principle of relevance: they negotiate their mental representations by recognizing the relevant information on the basis of minimal cognitive cost and maximal cognitive benefit. 1.1.4

Distinguishing between existing knowledge and new information

Following the theory of mental models we assume a distinction between existing knowledge and newly encountered information. Accordingly, our linguistic representations relate conventionalized meanings and reasoning by inference as corresponding to the continuity of reference, which presupposes the following abilities: • On the one hand, speakers must recognize a lexical sense as a previously occurring and conventionalized one. This recognition consists in the mental instantiation of a type concept through the evaluation of a referential token. • On the other hand, the speakers' reasoning by inference achieves the continuous creation of novel senses by semantic extension. This creation is not predictable in the strong sense, since the emergence of novel senses depends on many conditions, most importantly on the situation giving rise to it. Nevertheless, semantic extension always occurs by way of exploiting relational structures of the speakers' knowledge about language use. In this sense semantic extension by lexicalization of newly created senses is predictable. The principle of analogy thereby gives rise both to the speakers' creation and the immediate understanding of novel word senses. 1.1.5

The priority of meaning vs. form

While it is commonly accepted within the cognitive paradigm that meaning and form are intricately related, the crucial question asks for the relative priority of both: is the grammatical organization of linguistic utterances the result of the speakers' volition, or is it in grammatical organization that linguistic meaning originates? In other words: does language use determine the speakers' conceptualization of the world or

10

Introduction

vice versa, i.e. does the speakers' conceptualization of the world affect the development of linguistic structure? 1.1.6

The creation of novel meanings

We are looking for a linguistic explanation of the creation of novel meanings by inference. In each discourse situation speakers follow cognitive constraints which reflect their natural and cultural environment. These cognitive constraints control the possibility of integrating referential values into meaningful situations. By these constraints we explain why some utterances are definitely impossible within a specific language on the one hand. We explain why seemingly "impossible" utterances, if supported by the adequate discourse context, may easily be understood. In their effort to communicate, speakers aim at the intentional integration of the referent into the overall situation and thereby make the "impossible" meaning possible. This view relates back to the age-old dispute about anomalous meanings. Adhering to cognitive linguistics, however, we strongly reject the traditional structuralist view on anomaly (cf. Chafe, 1968). Within the particular discourse situation, reasoning is defeasible, i.e. representations assumed earlier in the discourse may be overridden by information obtained later in the discourse. We also resist the view, however, that every interpretation may become possible. The world we live in provides a cultural and natural environment, which, within certain limits, allows prediction of the possible and impossible situations giving rise to possible meanings. Nevertheless, we are convinced that we can in fact distinguish between degrees of acceptability as exemplified in the following contextually dependent uses of the nouns child and beefsteak (cf. Nunberg, 1979, 149): (1.5)

The beefsteak has ordered another beer.

(1.6)

* Today we have child on the menu.

(1.7)

She has been with child for five months.

(1.5) sounds impossible if used decontextualized. Yet if uttered by a waiter in a restaurant, speakers would be capable of inferring the intended sense of beefsteak.

Reference and categorization

11

On the other hand, we insist on the impossibility of inferring any sense from (1.6) in our cultural community: in our world there simply exists no situation for which speakers might represent the sense of a CONSUMABLE MASS for child. Not being part of the speakers' existing knowledge representation, speakers do not have available any inference rule by which the coherent integration of the referential information of (1.6) into their existing knowledge may be achieved, such that a possible mental model results. Accordingly, this utterance would be evaluated as not conveying any possible sense. In (1.7) the discourse situation of talking about the STATE of being pregnant does enable the speaker to activate the UNBOUNDED MASS concept of child, which has been conventionalized in this idiom. In processing (1.5) speakers are incapable of representing a coherent relation between the VOLITIONAL predicate order and a conventionalized sense of beefsteak. Yet by using their knowledge of the restaurant domain, speakers achieve a reversal of the profile-base organization by applying the image-schematic metonymy rule 1 which projects the POSSESSED beefsteak

t o t h e c u s t o m e r a s t h e HUMAN POSSESSOR (cf.

Langacker, 1987a, 183ff.). All three of these examples, although relatively unusual, exemplify major objectives of the work: the origin of linguistic creativity as well as the relation between linguistic flexibility, creativity and relevance (for the sake of economy) are major issues of our linguistic explanation of the speakers' coherent representation of each particular discourse situation in terms of mental models. 1.1.7

The origin of creativity

Where does the speakers' linguistic creativity originate - i.e. where are we to locate the principle of creativity? Is it linguistic creativity or cognitive creativity, or both, such that the productivity of language and cognition are two sides of the same coin? The theory of Mental Models answers this question by explaining how speakers represent meaningful utterances by integrating their referential information such that they achieve a coherent representation of the conceived situation. According to Johnson-Laird's theory (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983), speakers represent their utterances in at least two ways: they build 1

Profile and base are introduced below in section 5.1 and image schemata in section 5.2.

12

Introduction

their propositional representations directly from explicitly uttered information. In addition, speakers build an analogous representation of the conceived situation. It is essentially on the basis of the relational structure (cf. Gentner and Toupin, 1986) that this representation is analogous to the speakers' perceived information on the one hand, and to their existing knowledge on the other. On this basis, speakers can draw inferences on implicit information, which allows extreme instances of ad hoc metonymy to be explained as a case of indirect reference, as illustrated in example (1.5) above. The essential contribution of the theory of mental models to cognitive linguistics is its account of the coherent integration of referential information in the representation which is analogous to the conceived situation. This referential coherence endows lexical units with sense. On this view, linguistic creativity originates at a more general cognitive level. In the following we will introduce the theoretical prerequisites of cognitive linguistics for investigating this level. The terms "cognitive" and "mental" will be used interchangeably throughout this work.

1.2

Cognitive linguistics

With the development of cognitive linguistics interest in lexical semantics was rekindled. This development was in fact initiated by linguists who had formerly adhered to the mechanistic paradigm of generative linguistics, but who had come to realize the limits of purely formal linguistic methodologies. Cognitive linguistics was influenced by the experimental results of psycholinguistics (cf. Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1987a; Rosch and Lloyd, 1978; Barsalou, 1987). By creating a continuation of weak behaviourism, experimental psycholinguistics studies the speakers' observable referential behaviour. Psycholinguistic experiments are constructed so as to give clues to the speakers' mental organization of the meaningful relations of linguistic expressions. At the same time the theoretical achievements of cognitive linguistics are exerting feedback on the experimental sciences and may be observed to have an astonishing influence on computational linguistics (cf. Pustejovsky, 1991; Croft, 1985; Carbonell, 1980; Hobbs and Kameyama, 1990; Wilensky, 1990) and cognitive science in general. The speakers' referential behaviour is investigated most perspicuously in Johnson-Laird's theory of Mental Models (Johnson-Laird,

Cognitive linguistics

13

1983). The central question of the paradigm of Mental Models is how speakers organize their mental representations in order to fit best the structure of the world. Yet, the functionalist commitment of the theory of Mental Models maintains the main claim of weak behaviourism in that it denies that mental processes can be explained in terms of brain states. The continuous integration of newly encountered information into the speakers' existing knowledge representation explains the relation between sense and reference. This relation presupposes a mental lexicon as one pole of the knowledge representation system pertaining to a language. We will elaborate this in the following sections. 1.2.1

The continuum of knowledge

Firstly, we have come to understand linguistic knowledge as a continuum of symbolic structure (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 18ff.) in which discrete states are only discernible if this knowledge is applied and thereby identified in terms of more specific symbolic structures in actual usage events. The continuum consists in the potential vagueness of the boundaries of all linguistic components: for instance, the components of grammar and lexicon only constitute two poles of a continuum and are distinguished rather for methodological reasons. Borderline cases can often only be treated with respect to the particular purpose one is pursuing. A case in point are polysemous senses which may not be clearly distinguished if decontextualized or if the available context is insufficient. This is evidenced by many antonymous pairs of values, such as the ABSTRACT nouns research and development, for which the distinction between MASS and COUNT is even more difficult to draw, i.e. to conceptually reconstrue for explanatory purposes, than for the CONCRETE domain. Existing lexicons categorize research exclusively as a MASS concept (cf. Sinclair, 1989; Cowie, 1989) which in Mourelatos' sense (Mourelatos, 1981) is equivalent to the IMPERFECTIVE ASPECT. But does this category apply on all occasions of use, or may we also use these nouns as referring to a COUNT, i.e. BOUNDED concept in marked situations? The latter would then obligatorily be designated by the definite noun phrase in English, as in the following sentence, in which a specific part of the UNBOUNDED concept normally associated with the noun research becomes individuated through TEMPORAL delimitation effected by the prepositional phrase at the moment:

14

Introduction

(1.8)

The research I am doing at the moment is being funded by the DFG.

This bounding may also be observed with Vendler's ACCOMPLISHMENT vs. ACHIEVEMENT distinction (cf. Vendler, 1 9 6 7 ) if we apply this to nominals. Does combination refer to an ACCOMPLISHMENT which will eventually come to an end, or to an ACHIEVEMENT already in its final stage? Or is it even finished, i.e. does combination convey the STATIVE RESULT?

1.2.2

Against the strong principle of

compositionality

Secondly, we do not agree with the strong version of the principle of compositionality, according to which the meaning of the whole is exclusively a function of the meanings of its parts. We deny the assumption, that is, that the semantic components of the composite meaning establish both necessary and sufficient conditions for understanding the meaning of the composite whole. Instead, the meanings of the components are determined by their unique integration into the overall discourse context, this integration resulting ultimately from the function of the whole system, i.e. there is a feedback from the composite whole to the components. This rejection of the strong principle of compositionality is fully in keeping with the assumption of the continuum of linguistic structure which guarantees the success of communication, both in terms of the principled achievement of intersubjectivity and in terms of the creation and immediate understanding of novel senses through the continuous development of the linguistic system into a higher-order state of organization. That is, each creative innovation which may ultimately become conventionalized starts to be used within a strongly supporting environment. By a significantly frequent relation to the linguistic system and (concomitant to this) by an equally significant contextual coherence a novel meaning is then subsumed by the system according to the needs of the linguistic community. 1.2.3

A performance-based

perspective

Thirdly, from a performance-based perspective we are aware of the general tendency of oral communication to be deficient, i.e. to have unclear references through being disturbed by noise, being conveyed

Cognitive linguistics

15

with unclear pronunciation or through linguistic expressions not being perceived because of various other external disturbances affecting the linguistic medium. All of these cases are instances of indeterminateness concerning the meaning of the components, i.e. in these situations a component is an insufficient condition for understanding the meaning of the whole. In order to infer the meaning of those components not yet understood speakers make use of top-down processing in these cases by proceeding from what they have already composed in their striving to attribute sense to the whole. The mutual complementation of bottom-up and top-down parsing is a necessary requirement for theories investigating utterances beyond the syntactic structure of sentences. Discourse analysis and the theory of Mental Models agree in the assumption that the meanings of the components may neither be sufficient nor even necessary conditions, exactly because natural language understanding does not proceed in such mechanistic, deterministic ways as conceived by theories of formal semantics, but in considerably more holistic and flexible terms (cf. Beaugrande, 1997). There is fairly strong psycholinguistic evidence for parallel, interactive processing, in which lexical access and structural parsing occur together (cf. Garman, 1990, 322ff.). In assuming this interaction between analytic, data-driven bottom-up parsing on the one hand, and holistic, theory-driven top-down parsing on the other (cf. Beaugrande, 1997, 147), we defend both a holistic and systems theoretical investigation of language. What this claim of holism further implies is our basic point that we cannot investigate flexible language use by relying on a purely rationalist conception of language. 1.2.4

Linguistic performance as part of global behaviour

Fourthly, the problems raised cannot be solved by exclusively following linguistic theories and methodologies. Instead, satisfactory solutions will only be achieved by investigating language use as part of global behavioural patterns. Linguistics is considered to be related to psycholinguistics, neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, sociology and philosophy. The question of how the division of labour between these disciplines works has not yet been answered convincingly. Therefore, it is our opinion that we can only approach a solution to the problem if we consider the mutual dependencies existing between all these dis-

16 Introduction ciplines. We hope that by considering the individual contributions as well as the interdependences of these research disciplines our linguistic hypotheses and representations will achieve a greater degree of stability and general validity.

1.3

Non-focussed objectives

Before going into greater detail, let us briefly mention the topics which we will intentionally not be touching on in this work: • We will neither be concerned with the phonological, nor with the morphological representation and processing of meanings in their respective context. Thus we will not discuss how lexical creativity and flexibility as well as the general possibility of understanding are supported by prosodic information or by other phonological means (for instance, submorphemic analogy), nor will we consider morphological productivity. • Likewise we will not analyze the phenomenon of reference and categorization from a diachronic perspective in any systematic way. • Finally, we will remain neutral as to the medium of communication, i.e. we will generally not distinguish between spoken and written discourse.

1.4

Overview

Proceeding from philosophical and psychological theories, we will first settle the question of reference from a philosophical perspective on the relation between language and cognition in chapter 2. The abstract perspective taken by the philosophy of language and mind is followed by the more concrete considerations by which cognitive psychology explores human knowledge and information processing, as presented in chapter 3. We point out how semiotics on the one hand (Peirce, 1934) and the theory of Mental Models on the other (Johnson-Laird, 1983) have evolved in philosophy and psychology from the opposing paradigms of mentalism or idealism vs. realism or rationalism. In chapter 4 we will look for a psychological model of the mental categorization and processing of referential information. Investigat-

Overview 17 ing these phenomena in an interdisciplinary perspective, we interrelate the philosophy of language and mind, cognitive psychology and psycholinguist ics, and, in conclusion, we introduce our theory of cognitive linguistics in chapter 5. The linguistic metalanguage of our representation will be introduced in chapter 6. The representation of polysemy in discourse domains in chapter 7 is followed by the representation of metonymy and metaphor in chapter 8. Finally, we implement the contextual representation of word senses in chapter 9. The selection of a foreground along Langacker's dimensions of cognitive representation is implemented in a unification-based formalism throughout chapters 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in order to have an effective methodological device for computing the continuity of reference. In chapter 9 each referential procedure establishes a contextual function by which different senses are categorized. We elaborate the function of contextual shift with the metonymic variation between C O U N T and MASS reference in chapter 10. This chapter is based on an implementation in the CAT2 machine translation system at IAI Saarbrücken 2 . Most of the examples are more or less directly based on the E S P R I T (the European scientific information technologies programme of the European Commission) corpus which was translated in the EUROTRA machine translation project. This book bears the fruits of my work in this project.

2

Institut für Angewandte Informationsforschung an der Universität des Saarlandes ("Institute for Applied Information Science at the University of the Saarland")

Chapter 2 Philosophical issues in reference and truth In this chapter we will approach the relation between reference and truth from a philosophical perspective. More specifically, we will assess philosophical concerns in human reasoning and knowledge. This will be done particularly with regard to the meaningfulness of the word. The relevance of a theory of knowledge for our objective resides in its abstract concern for human reasoning, in finding out the methodologies which enable us to gain knowledge and in finding out the criteria by which we can evaluate and verify the truth of our knowledge. Truth results from an adequate relation between a linguistic utterance and a state of affairs. We can distinguish between two extreme positions concerned with the truth of human knowledge, namely idealism and realism. Idealism claims the subjective mind of the individual to have priority in determining the truth of human knowledge, to have priority over the objective, which is external to human consciousness. As a consequence of this relation between subject and object, the objective is virtual, it is an abstract ideal. The subjective mind may never transcend this infinitude of possibilities in finite experiences. Realism claims objective reality to be prior to and to exist independently of the individual subject, i.e. reality is taken to be absolute. Nevertheless, the subject can consciously access reality. This relation becomes exaggerated to the extreme by naive realism, which seems to be gaining some attractiveness in current theories (cf. below, Gibson's psychological theory of direct perception in section 3.1). On the naive realistic view the relation between objective reality and the subject's consciousness reduces to the individual's direct sensory perception of the world.

From intension to extension

19

Neither of these extremes accounts for the individual's epistemic success in their continuous striving to attribute truth to their perceptions and conceptions of the world. As a consequence of this, the philosophy of language investigates the truth of human reasoning by evaluating its linguistic manifestations. The claim is made that only at this linguistically controlled level of reasoning philosophy can adequately verify the truth of human thoughts. The main purpose of this chapter therefore consists in searching for a philosophical explanation of the speakers' relation between linguistic reference and truth.

2.1

From intension to extension

Frege used the sign Venus (cf. Frege, 1975b, 52) to introduce the notions of sense and reference. He took the referent of the sign to correspond to the signified object itself (cf. Frege, 1975b, 44). Frege held that the speakers' striving for truth proceeds from sense to reference (cf. Frege, 1975a, 44f.). Thus the identification of an object directly establishes the reference of the respective expression. The sense is the particular mode of presentation, the conventionalized criterion by which speakers determine the reference of an expression as being its object in the world. The referent is determined as falling under a description on the basis of the truth of the expressed proposition. Thus the sense of a referring expression depends on its contribution to the sense of the sentences in which it may occur. The sense of a sentence obtains its truth value from the conditions which have to be fulfilled in the world (cf. Frege, 1975b, 48f.). Thus, before fixing the referent of an expression, speakers have to evaluate the truth of a proposition (cf. Frege, 1975b, 47), which is achieved strictly compositionally in that it depends on the sense and reference of its components. However, according to Frege depending on the mode of presentation expressed by morning star or evening star, the same referent embodied by the planet Venus may be identified by different senses (cf. Frege, 1975a, 52f.). He did not, however, explain how this active process works, how the subjective image of an object is turned into an objective one. Objects are taken to be referred to directly by definite descriptions, which Frege, anticipating the Russellean terminology (cf. Russell, 1905), defined as being functionally equivalent with proper names, in that they may ultimately not be accounted for otherwise than by mere osten-

20 Philosophical

issues

sion. According to this purely extensional account of semantics two expressions referring to the same object(s) but differing intensionally may be substituted in all contexts, except for indirect, opaque contexts containing propositional attitudes. In this way Frege did not explain how speakers come to understand what falls under the same intension, i.e. how they come to know the truth conditions with which to refer to and agree in their concepts. The truth conditions are assumed to hold independently of the particular speakers and the context of utterance (cf. Frege, 1975b, 41ff.). Yet the truth conditions which have to be fulfilled in the world in order to apply to it the expression morning star mean that speakers may only refer to it as occurring in the morning, this again depending on the intension of morning. Analogously, there may also exist sentences in which evening star and morning star together have to determine the truth of a sentence and both expressions may only achieve this in dependence on each other. The sentence The evening star is the same planet as the morning star may not be evaluated as to its truth value if it is unclear how evening star and morning star determine each other both intensionally and extensionally. Frege himself admits that speakers who are proceeding from different descriptions and are not being aware of the fact that they are referring to the same referent do not speak the same language (cf. Harrison, 1979, 63). Frege, however, does not explain this as a lack of agreement, i.e. of intention to compare each others' thoughts. He conscientiously refrained from psychological considerations of mental procedures as this would lead philosophy away from the public procedure of going from sense to reference. Yet it was through experience and observation that humans came to identify both the intensions of morning star and evening star with the same planet Venus. In this way, the extension as the set of instances referred to by a common expression is prerequisite for the speakers' representation of concepts in terms of the intensional properties which the extension as the class of individuals embodies. Frege's claim of absolute truth was so influential on the philosophy of language of this century, as well as on formal linguistics in general and on model-theoretic semantics in particular, that reductionism flourished accordingly. Montague overcame Frege's direct relationship between language and the world (cf. Montague, 1974a; Montague,

From intension to extension

21

1974b) by extending the scope of a theory of meaning to pragmatics. He abandoned Frege's principle in that he asserted that the truth of a sentence was no longer an absolute one, but became valid in relation to intensional contexts of possible worlds. Reference is established indirectly by a denotation function with which possible denotations (in the sense of referents) can be determined in possible worlds in which a particular sentence achieves an interpretation. Within a possible interpretation an expression adopts a possible denotation. The intension of an expression corresponds to a denotation function in that it consists of a set of extensions defined over a set of possible worlds. Thus, an intension is a function that determines the extension in relation to possible worlds and relevant contexts. An expression, therefore, cannot be meaningful on its own, but is associated with a referent by an interpretation: for an intension to be used, a reference-point is needed in addition and this consists in mapping relevant contexts onto possible worlds. Montague, however, did not constrain his notion of possible worlds by our knowledge of the real world, so that it may genuinely be assumed for any expression that a possible world can be generated. 1 By the same token, Montague did not explain how and why different speakers of the same speech community can refer to their experiences in sufficiently compatible ways. As his main concern was in fact possible worlds, he did not even assume any distinction between the actual world and possible worlds. Accordingly, Montague did not say anything about how speakers actually fix their reference-points. In conformity with other formal semanticists Montague assumes that syntax and semantics axe autonomous and abstract levels of representation. The intensional contexts of possible worlds are constituted on a purely logical basis, such that logically equivalent, but syntactically different expressions are assigned the same intensions. Yet Montague's reductionism consists in a paradox: possible worlds are defined with a virtually empty set of assumptions about the real world and without considering the speakers' interpretations in possible contexts. His abstract construction of a purely formal and artifi^ h i s idea still prevails today in formal semantics, for instance in situation semantics.

22 Philosophical

issues

cial grammar does not consider the insufficiencies of natural language. These can only be understood on the basis of an empirical perspective on the speakers' linguistic behaviour, a perspective to which we will now turn.

2.2

The inextricability vs. the inscrutability of language

We can point out the linguistic relevance of the relation between intension and extension by considering analytic sentences. Analytic sentences are defined as predicating a property of the subject already inherent in its meaning, i.e. an analytic proposition expresses a tautology in that the predicate expresses a property already involved in the meaning of the subject. In this way the following example may be considered as a typical analytic sentence: (2.1)

Bachelors are unmarried

men.

The predication results in a tautology, as it is already part of the intension of bachelor itself, i.e. being among its defining set of features comprising ADULT, MALE, UNMARRIED, etc. Analytic truths are thus invariably fixed like mathematical laws and, according to logical positivism, they are defined by the rules of language. Synthetic and contingent truths, on the other, are known a posteriori through empirical experience, i.e. through factual knowledge about the world. They may therefore prove to be wrong if empirical investigation shows that things are different from what they were taken to be according to previous experience. The analyticity assumption thus makes a sharp distinction between semantics and pragmatics by not considering specific situations as being responsible for the contextually supported integration of new experiences into existing knowledge. Pragmatically, a listener may well disagree with the traditional intension of bachelor in (2.1). In our cultural community the relatively analytic meaning has been relaxed by the change of social conventions. By empirical observation we can see that for particular social groups the truth value of (2.1) has changed in dependence of the intensions which speakers associate with each term of the sentence. We see that it is through the speakers' referential behaviour that intensions may gradually change and not vice versa. By their knowledge of the world, speakers can do this even with quasi-analytical meanings.

The inextricability

vs. the inscrutability

of language

23

Exactly this is what Quine claims to hold true for all parts of human knowledge: there is only empirical knowledge about linguistic meanings, which are continuously reorganized, augmented and changed, and therefore are in great part unstable. Meaning, Quine claims, is in principle indeterminate: there is only reference, no sense (cf. Quine, 1960, 239f.). This indeterminacy resides in our exclusively empirical knowledge. Quine claims that speakers never have theoretical knowledge about the relation between language and the world, as they may never transcend their empirical knowledge of the world they live in. From this it follows that the meaning and truth of an utterance may only be evaluated in actual speech situations. Therefore speakers are only allowed to grasp the meaning of any utterance against the whole body of their empirical knowledge as well as against their possible observations; and this relation differs from one speech situation to another (cf. Quine, 1960, 72,125ff.), as human observations will always be limited.2 This is Quine's inextricability thesis which defines his behaviourism within language (cf. Quine, 1960, 206). There is no ultimate distinction between linguistic evaluation and factual consideration as to the truth and falsity of a statement. Furthermore, factual change in the world and the conceptual revision of our theory about the world cannot be distinguished (cf. Quine, 1971a). The inscrutability of linguistic behaviour, on the other hand, arises outside language, and may only be observed by the bilingual speaker (cf. Quine, 1960, 206). In this way Quine intends to resolve the scholastic distinction between ontological and epistemological modality. Essential attributes are predicates related to a subject necessarily de re in an ontologically determined persistent way. Attributes which speakers associate with a predicate only contingently are predicates related to the subject epistemologically in a de dicto modality, by our factual knowledge of the world. This knowledge is subject to change and therefore must be discovered in an infinite procedure of empirical observation. According to this definition, an object may then have a potentially infinite number and combination of de dicto qualities without ceasing to exist as the very same object. De dicto qualities hold arbitrarily, they are a matter of contingency, while de re qualities must not be changed, since 2 Here the methodological question arises how, in view of this variability of observations, the individual may construct theories about the world.

24 Philosophical

issues

this would have the effect of changing the whole object. For Quine, the ontological quantification over instances of a category by means of attributes is metaphysical, because it cannot be proved epistemically. This behaviourist stance of rejecting any ontological commitment is a strong argument against the possibility of verifying the existence of analytic sentences, which do not need any experience, but are supposed to hold true by linguistic convention. Quine points out that analytic truths are in principle impossible, as speakers have no certainty about the necessity of any part of their knowledge (cf. Dummett, 1974, 352f.), and therefore he rejects the existence of analytic statements altogether. B y relating them to the speakers' potential world knowledge, their analytic a priori status becomes lost. Only in this way may we linguistically observe and hence explain the speakers' flexible and dynamic language use (cf. Quine, 1960, 127) and, in particular, the development of novel senses (cf. Quine, 1960, 128). Thus, the practical impossibility of having the potential body of our linguistic experience available with each linguistic utterance implies the theoretical impossibility of ultimately determining analytic sentences. By extending the cultural and linguistic community this same indeterminateness holds for translation between languages (Quine, 1960, 26ff.). It is now generally accepted in translation science that total equivalence of content represents an ideal relation between source and target language text. Prom his radically behaviourist view Quine develops his uncompromisingly holistic view: a translation could only approximate determinacy by relating all possible utterances of the source language to all possible utterances of the target language. Thus for Quine even translation practice is in principle impossible, since translators may never transcend their translation behaviour and arrive at theoretical knowledge of their translations, because their empirical knowledge of both languages is too weak. In view of these empirical considerations Quine's refutation of intensions and his reliance on purely stimulus-response oriented linguistic behaviour together define the meaning of a term purely by ostension (cf. Quine, 1960, 100), i.e. with the greatest possible cognitive effort, irrespective of the likelihood of communicative success. However, if we assume the vagueness of the meanings of terms to be embodied in fuzzy edges, as Quine in fact does (cf. Quine, 1960, 125ff.),

The inextricability vs. the inscrutability

of language

25

then it is implied in his assumption that however fuzzy the concept may be, the edges enclose some region, the parts of which axe interconnected in a particular way. And it is essentially through the relations between the parts (cf. Gentner and Toupin, 1986) that speakers evaluate the truth of their mental representations. As Wittgenstein puts it, speakers learn colour names in language games in which "things are put in a certain order" (Wittgenstein, 1977b, III§110). Thus the veridicality of language games requires more than mere thought-reading on the side of the listener. Therefore, for the sake of communication, we should not put up with the impossibility of intensions in principle, i.e. we should accept the notion of intension for methodological reasons. Proceeding from Quine's scepticism, we intend to account for the process in which speakers negotiate intersubjectivity in their interpretations. While Lewis follows Quine's criticism of analyticity, he points out that we may define it in two ways (cf. Lewis, 1969, 2; Lewis, 1972, 175): 1. with respect to a language, such that an analytic sentence would hold true in every possible world in which the respective language is used; 2. with respect to a speech community, such that an analytic sentence would be true in the respective language, if it were part of a language of that speech community. This distinction may be exemplified by considering the relation between the intension and extension of bachelor. Contemporary social conventions allow an unmarried man to live together with a woman in the same way as a married man. In former times this was a socially stigmatized behaviour, so that the state of being unmarried was the essential condition for a man to be called a bachelor. Today the truth conditions of bachelor no longer depend on the official convention of marriage, but rather on similarity standards defining marriage as a "form of life" (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §241), in German eheähnliches Verhältnis (literally, "marriage-like relationship"), a phrase with no direct correspondence in English, but which may be paraphrased as: "They live together as if they were married." This conditional paraphrase makes obvious that language use does not depend on absolute

26 Philosophical

issues

conditions being either fulfilled or not, but rather on relative conditions, which may be fulfilled more or less significantly and which speakers, in their evaluation of the meaning of utterances, consider as such by "measuring" them with respect to their consistency of measuring results, to use Wittgenstein's image (cf. Wittgenstein, 1984, §82; Wittgenstein, 1977a, §242). The relative consistency of these measured values through time and across speakers is of course a precondition for successful communication. Fillmore has long supported our above attempt at a conditional definition of the concept of bachelor, by pointing out how its social relevance dominates the three analytic attributes: The noun bachelor can be defined as an unmarried adult man, but the noun clearly exists as a motivated device for categorizing people only in the context of a human society in which certain expectations about marriage and marriageable age obtain. Male participants in long-term unmarried couplings would not ordinarily be described as bachelors; a boy abandoned in the jungle and grown to maturity away from contact with human society would not be called a bachelor; John Paul II is not properly thought of as a bachelor. (Fillmore, 1982, 34) This quotation reflects the general climate in which cognitive semantics was born, namely within the recognition of the human motivation of meaning. By having an idea about how the meaning of a term fits into the whole system, speakers fix the extension of a term at different occasions of use and thereby in turn determine its intension.

2.3

The collective achievement of intensions

From Quine's radically behaviourist position, the refutation of intensions and analytic truths raise the following questions: 1. How do speakers come to refer linguistically in sufficiently adequate ways? 2. How do speakers of the same speech community come to "slice up" the world, i.e. to make meaningful distinctions in sufficiently compatible ways? For Quine the very basic dispositions of information processing provide an answer to the second question (cf. Quine, 1960, 80ff., 90ff.). These

The collective achievement of intensions

27

dispositions are in paxt genetically wired and may be explained as a result of Darwin's principle of natural selection. They render a similarity standard by which humans may induce an image of their environment. Very basically, human beings are born with the ability to acquire the same similarity standards (cf. Quine, 1977, 162f.). On account of these similarity standards the representations of our common experiences are compatible between human individuals. Theoretically, human beings have dispositions for discovering their surroundings and for behaving in adequate, i.e. sufficiently compatible ways. Due to these dispositions children eventually acquire the same individuation apparatus by which they slice up the world in compatible ways. This individuation apparatus enables speakers to make distinctions within and abstractions from perceived information. As Quine claims the acquisition of the ability to individuate to go hand in hand with language and observation (cf. Quine, 1971b, 77f.), the individuation of objects is constrained by the respective language and sociocultural environment, such that different linguistic and socio-cultural communities have acquired differing individuation apparatus. This is the explanation which Quine gives for the observation that translational one-to-one equivalents are generally lacking between languages. Prom this it follows for Quine that the explanation of linguistically consistent behaviour can only be achieved by studying the linguistic behaviour itself, which according to Quine (cf. Quine, 1960, 35ff.) consists in stimulus-response relations. On account of the intersubjectivity of their stimulus meaning, Quine distinguishes stimulus-response relations into standing sentences, situation sentences and observation sentences: 1. Standing sentences declare static facts which cannot be denied by an empiricist who does not make the metaphysical assumption of possible worlds. 2. Situation sentences make statements about observed contingencies which are more subject to different responses. 3. Observation sentences express an intersubjectively observable stimulus situation. Quine's standing and observation sentences may change with our knowledge of the world, not in a metaphysical sense, however, but in an em-

28 Philosophical

issues

pirically graspable, behaviourist way, according to which our linguistic knowledge is indistinguishable from knowledge of the world. Situation sentences are most subject to variation. Thus Quine considers those meanings as quasi-analytic which are least amenable to being changed, and we may continue his relativization of intersubjective meaning linguistically. There are cases of great indeterminacy occurring with expressions referring to bodily D E S I R E S and to V O L I T I O N S or E M O T I O N S of the human mind. The difficulties of accounting for these indeterminate meanings are major topics of philosophical discussion. Philosophical realism refrains from dealing with abstract meanings, because an indeterminate account of emotions would be incoherent with the claim of a direct reference relationship to the external world. Wittgenstein points out the philosophical error of excluding mental states and processes (more precisely, the sensation designated by the verbal predication to have pain) from intersubjective communication. In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein therefore argues against the concept of a "private language" (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§244-253). Since language represents a conventionalized form of life which must be compatible with the environment in which it occurs, utterances about our abstract internal feelings are consistently understood by being accompanied by the respective behaviour. The sensation is externalized by the respective stimulus behaviour and and is verified by being communicated according to a conventionalized linguistic rule. There are also expressions bearing little or no indeterminacy of meaning. Examples are technical instruments, the function of which is fixed by the world-wide community of users, such as that of the term TV set. The function of these artefacts plays a causal role in our use of them and hence unambiguously represents their central meaning (Ahn, 1998). In principle, however, Quine's pessimism is very soon verified if we extend the list of examples. Let us take natural kind terms, which P u t n a m and Schwartz (cf. Schwartz, 1977) claim to embody essential properties, in contrast to the nominal kind terms denoting artefacts. This claim may be refuted quite easily. What counts as sand in contrast to pebble by virtue of its granularity may be indeterminate even for one

The collective achievement

of intensions

29

and the same speaker (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §229-233). But this example also shows, that Quine's idea of speakers keeping the reference more stable with MASS terms is not an adequate generalization (cf. Quine, 1960, 70ff.). As Quine puts it, MASS terms have not divided their reference, and terms denoting individuals with divided reference are semantically more indeterminate, because speakers cannot grasp the divisions between tokens of individuals. Or referentially spoken, it is difficult for speakers to cut the world at its joints (cf. Boyd, 1993, 511f.). We may refute Quine's claim empirically. Both traditionally and cognitively, nouns are considered to refer typically to BOUNDED entities (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 183). The external boundaries of COUNT entities may lack prominence across speakers, speech communities and different languages. This indeterminateness often enables flexible language use (cf. our initial example of cups in chapter 1). Nevertheless, it is equally well t h e INTERNAL CONFIGURATION of MASS entities which

is represented at a medium level of granularity in order to enable flexible language use. With the GRANULARITY of sand, depending on our natural and social environment, we either abstract significantly enough to achieve the conceptualization of a MASS, as in the following: (2.2)

all the sand of the desert

O r we conceptualize t h e p a r t s as INDIVIDUAL a n d REPLICATE COUNT

entities by focussing on these, as in the following: (2.3)

There is a grain of sand in my eye.

The culturally determined variation of the MASS-COUNT metonymy figures most clearly in cross-linguistic comparison: for instance the German COUNT noun Information corresponds to the English equivalent information denoting a MASS concept. We can conclude that the semantic COUNT-MASS distinction is a universal disposition but does not seem to provide evidence for a bias towards conceptualizing MASS concepts. The distinction rather points out the relevance of the differing situational and socio-cultural environments in which the terms are used and have their functional values fixed. This indicates that the referential iconicity of the distinction proceeds from a universal cognitive disposition (cf. Imai and Gentner, 1997).

30 Philosophical

issues

Socio-culturally based indeterminacy is exemplified by the quasinominal kind term lawn. We consider the meaning of this noun as quasi-nominal as it refers to a cultivated object of natural origin. This dual character is also evident from the meaning of meadow and grass. Rather than establishing two sharply delineated phenomena, lawn and meadow represent states on a culturally graded continuum. Thus lawn denotes a COUNT entity, the extension of which is determined conventionally by its cultural function and common sense relevance as well as scientifically by botany and gardening, i.e. by our theories about the cultivation of nature, so that these determinants certainly result in different and identical concepts, for instance in English, German and Spanish. Scientifically, i.e. theoretically the same extension is determined by unambiguous definition for all three languages. Empirically, however, with the natural environment, common sense knowledge extends the unambiguous intension in accordance with the cultural function and the communicative relevance which the internal configuration of the area referred to by English lawn, German Rasen and Spanish cesped has to fulfil. The natural kind term dandelion has different equivalents in French, because of the cultural conventions in which it is to be found beyond its natural origin: dent de lion refers to the PLANT and pissenlit to the EDIBLE delicacy. The extension of pissenlit has swept over the national borders to Southern Germany where Löwenzahn has two senses corresponding to the French equivalents dent de lion and pissenlit respectively. In the northern regions of Germany and in Britain this nutritional function of dandelion does not exist and is henceforth not conventionalized linguistically. The importance of Quine's general refutation of analytic truths cannot be overestimated, even more so in view of current syntactic theories in linguistics, in which rules are taken to have a kind of a priori validity. By the same token, the neat distinction between semantics and pragmatics, which most linguists maintain, requires a thorough reconsideration in the light of Quine's scepticism. B y leaving pragmatics to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, linguists lose the object of their semantic investigations. Yet our experiences within the world ultimately license our linguistic conventions. No reductionist semantic theory can explain the subtle distinctions in meaning which

The acquisition of knowledge and language

31

speakers obviously want to achieve by using different expressions. Nor can "inadequate" language use be neglected by declaxing it "nonsense" (cf. Seuren, 1977, 151). Hence there is no justification for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of man's dispositions to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations. (Quine, 1960, ix)

2.4

The acquisition of knowledge and language

Quine's assumption of our purely extensionally driven interpretation also explains how we learn the meanings of lexical units during language acquisition. Quine mentions colour words as representing extreme instances of context dependency, since they are only applied in relation to some object (cf. Quine, 1960, 127). We can exemplify this with the nominals hair, wood, clothing, paint which, by referring to different domains, may qualify as red in potentially more differing optical shades than two different colours, such as orange and red (cf. Gellatly, 1995). This context dependency is the inscrutability of language which defines the vagueness of meanings from outside language. Thus for Quine knowledge acquisition consists in learning how to refer linguistically to the world. With children this acquisition proceeds from the disposition to recognize similarities and to learn to refer to these by using simple observation sentences. As the differences between languages consist in their different individuation procedures, Quine assumes that in the beginnings of language acquisition children are incapable of isolating individuals from their environment in any way (cf. Quine, 1960, 92). He assumes that children acquire their languagespecific individuation apparatus in accordance with their linguistic and socio-cultural environment. In the beginning of their referential behaviour, when children have not yet acquired this individuation apparatus, Quine claims they refer to M A S S concepts only, which they later on individuate by quantification. In this stage children do not make any difference in their use of the terms mama, red and water. They do not refer to the INDIVIDUAL and identical, recurrent person, when using the noun mama, but simply to the enduring human presence, which may eventually be quantified by the same, that, more mama. This

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quantitative adjustment proceeds essentially by ostension (cf. Quine, 1960, 94), i.e. by observation sentences. Such adjustments may also become necessary in the case of different individuations in a foreign language. For instance, when translating from a German COUNT noun into an English MASS noun, we have to express the individuation by a PARTITIVE, as in English a piece of information, a loaf of bread. For Quine, however, there is no unique adjustment for any translational mismatch. Instead, the criterion is the respective linguistic behaviour that differs on particular cultural grounds (cf. Quine, 1960, 78). Quine's assumptions about the acquisition of language correspond to the assumption of cognitive linguistics that speakers learn to individualize a PART from a WHOLE and to generalize a WHOLE from

its PARTS by their image-schematic representations (cf. below, section 7.3; Lakoff, 1987, 283). This cognitive ability corresponds to the Gestalt-psychological principle of figure-ground organization, the ability by which humans are capable of selecting the relevant information within the relevant context. We will see that this is one of the most important abilities in relating human language and thought.

2.5

Joining referential realism with referential holism

Returning to the ontological quantification into possible worlds Kripke was involved in a revival of the distinction between ontological and epistemological modality (cf. Kripke, 1977, 69ff.). With his assumption of rigid designators (cf. Kripke, 1977, 78f.) he followed Putnam's assumption of cross-world reference (cf. Putnam, 1977b, 129). This notion is meant to embody an epistemological notion of necessity holding a priori, de re on the one hand (cf. Kripke, 1977, 81), and a metaphysical notion of necessity a posteriori on the other (cf. Kripke, 1977, 85), holding de dicto in counterfactual possible worlds (cf. Kripke, 1977, 82).

With respect to the latter, mathematical truths which cannot be contradicted are a case in point. Across different possible worlds proper names are rigid designators by being referentially fixed, i.e. they refer to the same object, irrespective of the possible world in which they are used and independently of some commonly agreed on description, since they only refer to objects without having meaning (cf. Kripke, 1977, 72).

Joining referential realism with referential holism 33 Kripke reduces his explanation of linguistic "understanding" to some basic principle of human interaction, in so doing coming very close to Davidson's principle of charity (cf. Davidson, 1984, 165ff.): Charity ... is a condition of having a workable theory ... Charity is forced on us ... if we want to understand others, we must count them as right in most matters. ... Successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true, view of the world. (Davidson, 1984, 197, 201) The speakers of a community keep the reference relation constant in a causal chain of quotations, from one generation to the next. When a name is used for the first time, this is the baptism of a natural kind (cf. Putnam, 1977a, 115ff.), where a good instance of the kind is referred to without necessarily knowing its true nature, i.e. its essential properties do not necessarily matter. These, as Putnam puts it, are not a matter of language, but become known with empirical investigation. After a kind is baptized, it is passed on from speaker to speaker, where the relation of sameness holds between all of its referents in the causal chain without the speakers knowing a uniquely identifying criterion. The causal chain is established instead by the whole body of knowledge shared by the particular speech community, which thereby associates a particular name with a particular referent (cf. Evans, 1977, 195ff.). The sameness relation of Evans' causal chain of names corresponds to Kripke's rigid designators. Putnam extends the concept of a rigid designator to natural kind terms, the reference of which is kept constant by a chain of co-operating speakers, motivated by the principle of the division of linguistic labour (cf. Putnam, 1977b, 125ff.). Depending on the relevance which a particular term has in their social interactions, different groups of speakers within the same linguistic community know different aspects of the term's stereotype. In this way, a stereotype represents a common sense theory of meaning in terms of the minimal knowledge of an expression necessary for successful communication. Kripke likewise extends his own notion of a rigid designator to natural kind terms. By distinguishing between essential and contingent properties, he achieves the three-fold distinction between linguistic analyticity, epistemological aprioricity and empirically gained knowledge with metaphysical necessity (cf. Kripke, 1977, 84ff.). The reference

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to natural kinds, such as water and gold is not linguistically fixed, i.e. there is no analytic criterion for associating a natural kind term with a linguistic description. The application of a natural kind term cannot be licensed by some superficial qualities which have been conventionally defined to be true of the corresponding object. What counts as referential mechanism is the scientific definition (cf. Kripke, 1977, 87), for instance the chemical formula of the natural kind term water, H^O, which in the case of doubt should help identify the correct extension. The scientific formula holds of the natural kind de re, like an essence quantified into modal contexts, i.e. irrespective of language use. Thus, both Putnam's (cf. Putnam, 1977b, 130f.) and Kripke's notion of necessity is a metaphysical one rendered necessarily a posteriori for which we have no verificational criterion: if the essential properties of a natural kind are true at all, which the experts will actually never come to know, a rigid designator necessarily refers to the same reference object in all possible worlds in which it exists. And since the essence of a natural kind is a matter of scientific investigation, i.e. it has empirical validity, it is true by necessity a posteriori. With his claim that knowledge of natural kind terms is fundamentally empirically grounded, Putnam avoids the assumption of analytic truths. Accordingly, his concept of a stereotype does not allow essential attributes pertaining to a natural kind analytically. The stereotype of a natural kind term is only a collection of attributes representing neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, but assigned by the division of linguistic labour whose relation to reality is guaranteed by the scientific investigation of experts. The attributes representing the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to fall under a natural kind term are distributed holistically among a linguistic community. Thus, the ordinary language speaker is incapable of fixing the reference of a term (cf. Putnam, 1977b, 127). The necessary and sufficient condition for fixing the reference is the chemical formula which is not part of the intension and which may only be applied by the experts. Thus, the continuity of reference is guaranteed by a continuous link between the speakers' common sense reference of a lexical unit and scientific progress, which is the continuous uncoverage of the real structure of a term's intension, the real "essence", however, not changing so much that the extension would change. This is part of Putnam's definition

Joining referential realism with referential holism

35

of metaphysical necessity. If the scientific formula H2O corresponds to the essence of water, this is the core fact by which the same object is identified in all possible worlds (cf. Putnam, 1977b, 130f.). But how can a term's reference be determined from outside language? How can language-external procedures guarantee the speakers' mutual agreement in understanding and using a term? How is scientific discourse related to common sense discourse, i.e. how is the division of linguistic labour delimited by scientific investigation? The core facts constitute the stereotype and accordingly the extension corresponding to a term (cf. Putnam, 1977a, 117). Putnam underlines that there is no unique set of core facts which speakers can convey and therefore the extension can only be kept correct by descriptions in terms of naive theories (cf. Putnam, 1977a, 116f.). The stereotype plays a very central role in that it is present with the baptism of a natural kind. The task of semantics should consist in the empirical explanation of the core facts of terms, which determine the mechanisms by which the normal use of a word is understood and learned. The task of this empirical explanation is then left to the social sciences, without however clarifying the important methodological implications involved in the division of linguistic labour on the one hand and the scientific investigation of experts on the other. According to Putnam, (cf. Putnam, 1977a, 118), semantics is a typical social science, as it lacks mathematical precision and therefore should not be reduced to what can be described in mathematical terms. Putnam's social division of linguistic labour implies the direct relation to reality. He strictly excludes any mental representation of meaning: "Meanings just ain't in the head" (Putnam, 1977b, 124), as this subjective commitment would not guarantee correct reference. On the other hand, the social division of linguistic labour generates a holistic image which we find difficult to reconcile with Putnam's metaphysical realism, as the expert's correction is an external manipulation which cannot become integrated into the self-regulation of the language system. As yet, our basic question, is left unanswered. How can we explain what speakers actually do when they agree in their consistent application of a natural kind term? What is more, how can they agree on a completely novel sense without any difficulties? Obviously, we can-

36 Philosophical

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not explain this by relying on scientific definitions which are evaluated outside the community of speakers. Nor can we deny speakers to have mental access to some abstract notion of meaning which goes beyond the empirically given reference (cf. Apel, 1976b, 177) and which is a standard of agreement on the one hand and a standard of truth on the other. Speakers generally do not caxe about the chemical formulae for natural kind terms. Successful communication can only be explained in terms of the negotiations achieved by the communicators themselves.

2.6

Wittgenstein's empirical fallacy

The later Wittgenstein had already undermined the dualistic assumption of language-independent, external knowledge on the one hand and language-dependent internal knowledge on the other by merging both into a unified whole. The meaning of linguistic expressions, so Wittgenstein claimed, resides in observable interactions within the conventionalized potential of our ordinary language use. Within this conventionalized potential of our language system meaning is not predefined, but a capability evolving continuously from contexts of situation. Speakers can only grasp a particular meaning in the respective context of use from a certain behaviour (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§139-141; §138; §§146-149; Wittgenstein, 1984, §§78, 88). All contexts in which an expression is used are related, not by an intermediate essence, but instead by family resemblances, the only criterion he assumed for the application of a linguistic expression. Within a family-resemblance structure each member resembles at least one other member. With this assumption Wittgenstein also set himself off from his early theory presented in the Tractatus (cf. Wittgenstein, 1960). There is no single ideal language by which speakers adequately make reference to reality. Rather, the contrary holds: they are always enmeshed in new meaningful structures evolving from language use. The rules of language are determined within language games (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §130). Language games consist in a continuous rearrangement of rules (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §23). Each application of a linguistic rule is determined both by the preceding rule applications and by the speaker's current decision on its use, which in turn feeds back onto the rule (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §186). Knowledge of language and knowing how to follow a rule are two sides of the same

Wittgenstein's

empirical fallacy

37

coin (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§149-155; Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§145, 150). To understand and to use a word or a sentence means to know a language. Knowledge of language consists in the possibility of its use, which is infinite (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§145, 146, 150). On this view, the experts are within ordinary language use - they consist in the words themselves - as nicely set out by Rieger's holistic sensenetwork-theory: Every word of a language must be viewed as an independent expert process that, when invoked, knows how to go about deciding what role it plays in its current context. (Rieger, 1978, 277) The later Wittgenstein vehemently defended the view that linguistic conventions are agreed upon and extended by the common interactions of the speakers of a linguistic community - by their form of life (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§23, 97-199, 202), "the language game" which is manifested in specific contexts of situation. Yet he did not show how speakers achieve this agreement. He denied that this process may be consciously accessed in any terms, as speakers have no conscious knowledge of what they agree on (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §92).3 At no time can they give a definition of an expression's meaning, as they can never arrive at any basic axioms, from which such a definition could proceed (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§68-71). These axioms could only be recognized from outside language, but speakers can only understand language from within (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §103). They have no access to anything outside language, e.g. to something like Putnam's essential properties of the experts' knowledge. An utterance achieves meaning from our perspective on reality by means of a specific method of representation (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §122). Wittgenstein compares both with the method of measuring, in which a specific extension is determined as measurable by associating it with a certain scale (cf. Wittgenstein, 1984, §§45, 95). This is the only condition: speakers must be sure of the scale to fit the respective extension. All other scales are then automatically excluded by this condition (cf. Wittgenstein, 1984, §217). Our method of measuring 3

The interesting point is that Wittgenstein considered language to work as long as the linguistic rules are unconscious.

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is verified by a certain consistency of measuring results (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §242). The similarities establish the family-resemblance structure. By achieving agreement on their linguistically established referents, speakers automatically relate their expressed ideas to reality. They have no possibility of transcending this relationship. In this way we can explain meaning by the conditions under which a corresponding expression is used by the respective speech community in sufficiently compatible situations, the language games related in a family relationship. Sufficient compatibility achieved by consistent language use is defined only as precisely as necessary (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §74f.). Within the complex net of family resemblances "sameness" is achieved by sufficiently compatible language use by following a rule (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§67, 208, 224, 225). This in turn is achieved by the intention to behave in accordance with reality, with the conceived or expected world. If speakers no longer fit reality when following a certain rule (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §125), they look for new rules which fit reality better (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §182). This behaviour presupposes that the applications of their rules have arrived at a point which is beyond the range of its possible exceptions, this failure of application being always part of a rule's applicability conditions (cf. Wittgenstein, 1984, §235). The convention is vague and hence cannot be delineated by sharp boundaries, since language games are related in family-resemblance structures and hence do not operate on sharply bounded concepts, but only on continuous transitions between concepts (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§76, 120). Continuity is the condition of the possibility of language use (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §77; Wittgenstein, 1984, §215). Wittgenstein illustrates the conditions of continuity as follows: "What are the conditions for an agglomeration of grains of sand to be called a heap of sand?" (Wittgenstein, 1984, §211) Wittgenstein's solution is that the search for exact definitions of language use is the very origin of the enigmas in the philosophy of language. Each definition entails undefined concepts. And so we would be trapped in an infinite regress if we looked for an ultimate definition (cf. Wittgenstein, 1991, 49). Vagueness and indefiniteness are necessary tolerance spaces of the flexibility and creativity of ordinary language use. Fuzziness seems to be a logical

Wittgenstein's

empirical fallacy

39

precondition of our knowledge and its corresponding linguistic expression (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §88). The exact ideal knowledge is a metaphysical illusion (cf. Wittgenstein, 1984, §77). Yet, speakers always move within reality, as they exclude expressions and utterances from their language which do not express any sense, because they do not designate anything in the world (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§499-503, 508). They evaluate this by their empirical knowledge, which is collective and is communicated by their institutionalized linguistic capability of playing language games (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§42, 199). The ultimate principles of the basic language games cannot be explained, however. They can only be pointed out as the a priori and necessary preliminaries: Unser Fehler ist, dort nach Erklärungen zu suchen, wo wir Tatsachen als 'Ursachenphänomene' sehen sollen. D.h., wo wir sagen sollten: Dieses Sprachspiel wird gespielt. (Wittgenstein, 1977a, §654) There is no metalanguage with which one can talk about ordinary language: one cannot talk about, but only within language. The ultimate basics of language games are determined by the limits of the world itself (cf. Wittgenstein, 1984, §§148-152). Wittgenstein's empiricism implies that linguists, bound to their native language, cannot investigate language use on a theoretically more abstract level. They can never achieve an ultimate explanation of what speakers experience as the same language use, they can only describe it. In this way, Wittgenstein denies any linguistic theory which purports to explain linguistic behaviour. Yet the theory consists in Wittgenstein's abstract image of collective meaning achieved by way of continuously creating family resemblances between different occasions of use (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§68-71). The fact that speakers can also grasp and negotiate completely new situations by using existing linguistic expressions suggests that there must be some meaningful organization behind all language games, something more abstract than the empirically valid family resemblances, some general principle which allows for the application to a completely new situation (cf. Apel, 1976b, 177). This abstract principle exactly corresponds to Wittgenstein's claim of the capability of extending the finite series of examples to a potentially infinite one (cf. Wittgen-

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stein, 1977a, §§208-214). Speakers are able to extend the series by means of their general cognitive disposition to recognize similarities and differentiations. By continuously applying the method of measuring, which Wittgenstein admits to be mediated by the linguistic capability, speakers continuously increase the consistency of their language games. Thereby the enigma, the inscrutability of the latter, eventually becomes transparent. Yet in applying Wittgenstein's methodology of measuring, how do speakers evaluate the consistency of their measured values? We will address this problem in the following section.

2.7

From linguistic object to the objective subject

According to Popper (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977) the gulf between realism and mentalism may ultimately be bridged by the common sense speaker and conceptualizer themselves. Intentional beings - occupying a proper part of their environment, with which they interact by exchanging information and physical energy - assume this environment to be real, since otherwise their own physical existence would have to be questioned (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 36) 4 . Yet humans never conceive of reality in objective terms directly, i.e. they never know something directly from perception, but only by conscious problem solving in terms of active and, in particular, intentional interaction with the environment (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 30,43,147). In creating theories humans continuously objectivize their subjective perceptions and ideas. Applied to cognition, we may assume that, by interacting with their environment, humans create a new cognitive system by becoming a proper part of the environment on the next higher level of reasoning. The human cognitive system may subsume environmental information and thereby improve the representation of the environment. By assuming Popper's interaction between system and environment we exclude the direct realism of contextualism as put forth by J. J. Gibson (cf. section 3.1 below), favouring instead the real interactionism developed by Piaget (cf. section 3.3 below). In Popper's realistic view it is through the ability of intentional problem-solving that human beings become conscious of their own in4

This line of argumentation was also pursued by philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Hume.

From linguistic object to the objective subject

41

tellectual identity. It is on account of this ability that they can decide on which new actions should be integrated into their conventional system of interactions. Popper assumes the universe to be a system of ecological complexity which may be continuously reduced to less complex systems. In this hierarchical layering of systems the traditionally assumed principle of upwaxd causation explains how the more complex systems emerge from lower-level systems (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 17ff.). In addition, Popper assumes the ecological principle of downward causation (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 19). We will argue that this principle is very important for the explanation of the origin of consciousness. It accounts for the feedback of effects on their causes as well as for the feedback of the whole system on the interactions of its constituent parts. This feedback mechanism points to the relation between A B S T R A C T and C O N C R E T E information. Prom a holistic point of view a separation into distinct categories, such as C O N C R E T E and A B S T R A C T , is impossible and hence may be valid only for methodological reasons. At the same time, if we consider the Wittgensteinian reflections on A B S T R A C T sensations, such as hunger and pain, the distinction between subject and object, between the mentally subjective and the physically objective, falls under this principle. How can humans externalize and objectively verify their private subjective sensations? Popper's principle of downward causation explains the objectification of subjective mental or bodily experiences. Subjective sensations become objectivized by reacting on their physical causes and by establishing lower-level representations of the resulting higher-level socio-cultural interactions. Popper considers the universe as an ecosystem which has emerged from the most concrete, physical system to the most complex, theoretical, objective system, with subjective experience in between. On this view upward causation means that the physical event is experienced as a symptom by the subject. Through downward causation, on the other hand, subjective experiences become objectivized by theories feeding back to their physical manifestation (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 36ff.). Theories about the human organism verify the subjective sensation of pain by explaining pain as an imbalance of the bodily system. This explanation is presented in particular by means of language.

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By means of objective theories physicians can even subjectively change the cortical structure of the human brain, the physical result of this intervention again manifesting the objectivity of their theory. In fact, there is a continuous interaction between the subjective mind and the physical body. Popper takes this as establishing the causality implied in the creation of social conventions and theories (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 9). Thus he claims constant feedback to be exerted from the subjective experience to its objective materialization (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 144), such that from our linguistic view, the objective in terms of conventions and theories emerges as a new quality (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 120f.). The conception of the objective is not innate (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 44), but relies purely on the mind's ability to recognize the sameness of actions or experiences. Language is one of the conventional systems which establish the objective emergence of subjective situations (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 144). By making use of the linguistic system speakers can refer to their subjective experiences and control these (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 108,122), thereby reorganizing them on a higher level, i.e. by substituting their subjective by more objective representations. Popper considers the very ability to learn a language to be innate and to be an exclusively human capacity (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 144). He assumes the innate linguistic dispositions to have emerged through natural selection. The complexity of language is explained as a function of general learning processes based on the speakers' socio-cultural evolution (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 129f., 132ff.). In fact, the ability to learn resides in the very principle of intentional selection, in the human ability to make choices (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 128). This ability, according to Popper, comes close to being identical to consciousness (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 127). The relevant aspects of information are evaluated as those which amplify a conceptualizer's knowledge and thereby reorganize their previous knowledge into a higher-order state of development. The principle of intentional selection is performed actively by the human learner. Popper assumes humans to be capable of anticipating the integration of relevant information in order to improve the functioning of their own system and to increase the success of their interaction with the environment (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 128). This is their conscious ability

From linguistic object to the objective subject

43

to select the relevant information. In this hierarchical system, Popper explains objective, socially organized knowledge as having arisen originally from unconscious, arbitrary and innate cognitive dispositions and as having developed by subjective modifications, expectations and action programmes (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 132). Popper is silent, however, on the actual development of objective consciousness from subjective unconscious experience. Yet how then can human beings access unconsciousness to develop it into conscious knowledge? It is obvious that most of human knowledge does not directly originate from experience, i.e. it is not the result of intentional selection of information. The bulk of human knowledge is inherited through communication by modifying, i.e. amplifying the innate dispositions and by enhancing and extending the acquired knowledge system (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 121,130ff.). This inherited knowledge is mediated linguistically. According to Popper humankind's objective creation of language interacts with the continuous extension of consciousness through which human beings become aware of their environment. We can extend Popper's view. Both the development of language and consciousness have been externalized in terms of theories. Theories have exerted feedback on the material environment in terms of products, this feedback effecting a reorganization of their relations and at the same time subsuming some of the relations so that the theories become part of the functional system of consciousness (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 122). Popper points out that human beings need the objective medium of language (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 129) to locate themselves within their spatial and temporal environment. They require language in order to be conscious of themselves as a part of reality, as an active component of the social system by participating in its development, by reflecting on its state up to the present time, and by imagining the system's development beyond (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 127ff.). In this interaction and integration human beings become conscious of themselves as individual identities (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 118). For Popper the ultimate criterion for realizing this self-identity is the bodily identity involving the condition that the body contains the brain as one of its parts. Following Plato's metaphor of the "mind

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as a pilot" (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 105, 120), Popper considers the "active psycho-physical identity" as being the programmer to the brain: the brain is seen as functioning like a computer for a creative programmer. Popper assumes that humans are not born with a tabula rasa but with a huge amount of inherited knowledge as the result of the evolution of the human brain (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 121). Popper's metaphorical relation between computer and brain, however, by no means offers an exhaustive explanation of how human beings develop consciousness. We will address this issue in the following section.

2.8

Intersubjectivizing empirical knowledge

Within Peirce's philosophy of signs the activity through which speakers achieve consistent knowledge of the world became the actual object of study (cf. Peirce, 1934). Speakers interrelate knowledge and language in a rule-governed and at the same time creative process whereby they achieve the integration of analytic and synthetic reasoning schemes. This process is intersubjective in that the listener decodes the sign in the opposite direction from that which the speaker took when encoding the sign. This intersubjective relationship supports Peirce's claim of the continuity of reference in the infinite interpretation of sense during the evolution of the world. Thereby the ubiquity of reasoning consists in intersubjectivizing existing knowledge by striving for new interpretations. Peirce conceives of the whole universe in terms of signs. A sign is a triadic relationship between medium, object, and interpretant. Each interpretation results in a new, potentially higher-order sign, which again enters the interpretation relationship. The infinitude of interpretations results from the interpretants' mind as an unlimited semiosis, each interpretation creating new information, thereby enhancing and amplifying the representations which eventually approximate the true nature of objects. By gradually creating truth through a series of probabilities the interpretants' representations proceed from subjective to objective interpretation. Thus the unlimited semiosis maximizes objectivity and minimizes subjectivity by moving through three fundamental and universal modes of reasoning. These modes of reasoning are logically defined by analogy to the scientific method of investigation

Intersubjectivizing

empirical knowledge

45

and employ abduction, induction, and deduction. Within this reasoning scheme, Peirce's three poles of the sign - medium, object, and interpretant - become important instances of his three categories, of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness - the immediately given, its empirical verification, and its contextual conventionalization. Within the three modes of reasoning the speakers' striving for new interpretations is particularly accounted for by Peirce's reconsideration of abduction. Peirce's abduction is a redefinition of the Aristotelian "retroduction". In Peirce's theory abduction presupposes the Firstness (cf. Apel, 1976a, 170ff.), in which the semiotic nature of a sign originates. The category of Firstness is immediately given without abstraction and differentiation, i.e. without relation to anything else (cf. Nagl, 1992, 98ff.). Thus Firsts, such as REDNESS, resemble Aristotle's qualia, in that they are the condition for the possibility of a sign. Yet Firstness as the possibility of a sign must enter a higher-order synthesis, as provided in a statement, in order to become real. Abduction is the most uncertain way of reasoning and involves hypothesizing novel experiences, though linguistically it is the most effective way for speakers to interpret new information. In order to illustrate these modes of reasoning let us analyse how speakers interpret non-conventionalized creative utterances such as the following:5 (2.4)

The hamburger is getting impatient, because she wants to pay her bill.

Abduction is a hypothesis which presupposes two premisses, an abstract rule and an observed result from which speakers infer that the result represents a case of the hypothesized rule: Result: Rule:

Case:

A hamburger is getting impatient because she wants to pay her bill. Persons may be called by the name of an object in their possession. A waiter calls a person hamburger.

A b d u c t i o n : Result & Rule =Φ· Case Thus a customer in a restaurant who is confronted by a waiter uttering (2.4) would conclude from the above given rule that the waiter 5

This example was introduced by Nunberg (Nunberg, 1979, 149).

46 Philosophical issues must have a customer in mind to whom they refer by the noun hamburger. In abduction speakers first of all proceed from the rule which enables them to represent the sign's intension ironically as a means of representation. Thus abduction as the weakest form of hypothesis is that component of the semiosis which underlies the speakers' creativity, their active representation of novel meaning. The empirical validity of this abductive conclusion is evaluated inductively, which presupposes the Secondness of Peirce's semiosis. Result: Case: Rule:

A hamburger is getting impatient because she wants to pay her bill. A waiter calls a person hamburger. Persons may be called by the name of an object in their possession. Induction: Result h Case =s> Rule

Through intentionally representing the perceived indexical relationships between the signs the interpretant verifies the extensional validity of the predication hamburger. Finally, the Thirdness of Peirce's semiosis applies the inductively achieved generalization in terms of a conventionalized truth by proceeding deductively to an instance of the pragmatically rendered situation, the conventional symbol resulting in the triadic relationship of the sign as the representation of an interpretation for someone. Rule: Case: Result:

Persons may be called by the name of an object in their possession. A waiter calls a person hamburger. The person is a customer who has ordered a hamburger and wants to pay her bill. Deduction: Rule L· Case

Result

The sign is the conventional bearer of a representation which is interpreted by an intentional communicator as indicating the object for which it is intended to stand. That is, each sign relationship comprises three components from which sense arises: the pragmatic relation of a symbol to one or more communicative partners, the semantic relation

Mutual knowledge vs. relevance

47

of an icon to an object of representation and the syntactic relationship of an index to other symbols. This is the hierarchical procedure of semiosis, which, in its infinitude, creates Peirce's idealistic realism: reality is established by the bounding point of our knowledge, by our interpretations approximating some ideal agreement on the truths of our hypotheses (Peirce, 1934, 407). This bounding point may only be conceived of in probabilistic terms: knowledge is never complete and finite as it is always achieved by symbolically represented concepts which rely on perception and memory, and these are always deficient. Thus Peirce's idea of the infinite process of semiosis presupposes that symbolic representations are principally vague. This vagueness of the symbolic representation and comprehension guarantees the possibility of the continuous development of the original sign for the purposes of creativity and efficiency: for understanding a sign in terms of adjustments and in terms of creating novel images of it whenever necessary. To summarize: abduction by apperception, induction by presupposition as the evaluation of abduction, and deduction by experience represent a unified methodology of analytic and synthetic reasoning schemes, resulting in the intersubjectification of sense (cf. Apel, 1976a, 172f.). The object of interpretation resides in the virtual subject's linguistic behaviour. In this unified view of the real, the ideal and the subjective, the creation of novel linguistic meanings receives a natural explanation. The subject may introduce novel semantic aspects into the "ideal" and negotiate and evaluate these meanings in real situations. In doing this speakers go beyond the recognition or reproduction of a conventional form-meaning relationship. We will adopt this methodology and readdress it linguistically. Yet how do speakers actually agree in their meanings? We will be concerned with the speakers' negotiation of meaning in the following section.

2.9

Mutual knowledge vs. relevance

Speakers in general intend to use language in a way which is compatible with their linguistic knowledge as well as with the general behavioural conventions and presuppositions of the addressee. One way of explaining how speakers may achieve this compatibility has been introduced by the pragmaticist Grice (cf. Grice, 1975). According to Grice, the com-

48 Philosophical issues prehension of an utterance consists in the listener's recovering firstly its explicit content in terms of the propositional form and the mood expressed, and secondly, the speakers' implicit assumptions. On this view, the speakers' intention to communicate becomes mutual knowledge for speaker and listener. Prerequisite for this recovery is the speakers' communicative intention, by which they want their informative intention to be recognized on the audience's side. Now, according to Grice, this recognition is guaranteed by the speakers' communicative behaviour meeting the standards involved in the co-operative principle, specified by the maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975, 45ff.). All of the maxims prescribe the communicative behaviour of the speaker, who is supposed to express a cognitive relation between speaker, listener and environment (cf. Seuren, 1977, 250). In order to be as clear, simple and short as possible, speakers adapt their communicative intention to the specific requirements of the environment. By specifying the conditions under which speakers intend to communicate sense, Grice abandons Frege's principle that linguistic meaning holds true independently of some speaker's and listener's mental state, a view which was so influential on the philosophy of language (cf. Putnam, 1977b, 132). All of Grice's principles proceed from the listener's overall assumption that the speaker intends to communicate sense. This assumption implies that the sense of linguistic utterances always conveys more than the corresponding truth conditions. According to Grice, then, the result of the listener's analysis of the speakers' communicative intention is thus an intensional representation of meaning. Thereby the intension is reduced to the speakers' communicative intention. The m a x i m of quantity allows the speaker to achieve the situationally adequate degree of informativity by holding the required balance between redundancy and economy, i.e. by making utterances just as explicit as necessary for enabling the listener to follow the conversation fluently. On the other hand, the m a x i m of quality controls the veridicality which lies behind the speakers' intention to make the listener believe what is being conveyed. The m a x i m of relation forces the speaker to select and focus on the informational components which are necessary for providing the listener with what they consider relevant, and what the communicative partners need for achieving the

Mutual knowledge vs. relevance 49 given conversational objective. On the listener's side the maxim of relation implies that they accept the speakers' transmission of intention. By the m a x i m of manner, on the one hand, speakers control the method by which their speech acts are performed in order to structure them in a clear and convincing way right from the beginning. The maxim of manner forces speakers to avoid ambiguity and vagueness wherever this seems superfluous with regard to the maxim of quantity. Finally, it is also the maxim of manner which enables the speaker to be as short as possible with regard to the required explicitness. The quintessence of Grice's cooperative principle is the following: if a speaker follows all of these maxims, the addressee is confronted with a linguistic behaviour which conforms to the conventions they are acquainted with, and they automatically reconstruct the speaker's intentions by identifying and selecting the intended information. The essential feature of the Gricean cooperation is thus the reconstruction of the speaker's communicative intention on the listener's side, a feature which implies that the speaker must presuppose the listener's knowledge right from the beginning of the conversation (Strohner, 1990, 253). However, this automatic reconstruction based on the addressee's knowledge about the overall behavioural conventions becomes less obvious if one or more of the behavioural maxims axe violated. This may be the case, for instance, if too much information is left implicit, or if an ad hoc metonymy or metaphor is used without being sufficiently supported contextually. In ordinary goal-directed discourse situations the addressee believes that the speaker has a reason for flouting the maxims: in the effort to communicate, the listener therefore cooperates with the speaker as long as possible by applying all available communicative strategies for identifying and selecting information in order to uncover a given sense behind any kind of conversational implicature. It is obvious that the static relation construed by Grice between speaker, listener and environment cannot cope with flexible and creative language use. Sperber and Wilson reject the audience's symmetrical reconstruction of the speaker's communicative intention and define communication as an essentially asymmetric process (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 43), in which the communicator intends to change the cognitive environment of the addressee (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 46, 58). Sperber and Wilson introduce the notion of cognitive envi-

50 Philosophical

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ronment as an alternative to the mutual knowledge framework within which shared knowledge is symmetrically constructed. A cognitive environment is a set of assumptions which the communicator is capable of mentally representing and accepting as true (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 46). Yet the actual effects which the communicator represents are only partly predictable (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 58), because of the vagueness of implicitly communicated assumptions and implicatures. According to Grice's pragmatic approach, implicatures are recoverable on a par with explicitly communicated assumptions without which the co-operative principle could no longer be maintained (Grice, 1975, 58). According to the Relevance Theory of communication, implicatures are not identified by following a conversational maxim, but instead in conformity with the principle of relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 195). Explicatures and implicatures are seen as establishing two forms of communicated assumptions on a continuum of intended and only partly predictable cognitive effects (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 201). This cognitive approach to communication takes speakers to achieve the dynamic integration of information by negotiating the adequate balance between new information and existing knowledge (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 48ff.), as this relation always differs between the communicative partners. In contrast to Grice, this balance between the speakers' knowledge representation systems is not presupposed at the beginning of the conversation, but has to be achieved during the conversation by a flexible and economical negotiation. The cognitive relevance of Sperber and Wilson's theory consists in their claim that the success of communication depends on the amount of contextual effects (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 108ff.). The efficiency of human information processing consists in achieving the greatest multiplication effects by combining existing knowledge with newly encountered information with the lowest possible processing effort (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 48). These multiplication effects establish the degree of relevance achieved in the conversation, which thus results from the amount of effects and the accessibility of assumptions (knowledge). The economy of this communicative interaction consists in instantiating only those components of existing knowledge which in view of the intended effects are most relevant in the particular situation. Further-

Chomsky's empirical paradox

51

more, the discourse partners rely as much as possible on the preceding information. Newly encountered information is relevant to the degree to which it is new on the one hand and to the degree to which it can be integrated into the existing knowledge as well as the ongoing discourse on the other (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 121). Only if this economical interpretation is not successful will the discourse partners incrementally widen the context by additionally relevant components of knowledge and information. There is no doubt that in their communicative behaviour, speakers rely on their partner model by which they know how close the listener's cognitive environment is to their own one, i.e. whether and how their specific and general knowledge, their social role, register, attitude, etc. accord with their own; and how much the listener knows about this accordance. Through this knowledge about the discourse partner(s), speakers are able to predict different probabilities as to the possible interpretations, these predictions already being a selected subset of all possible contextual effects (cf. Seuren, 1977, 271). Speakers then proceed inductively by selecting one specific interpretation from this subset in accordance with what follows within the ongoing utterance.

2.10

Chomsky's empirical paradox

After Peirce's introduction of the speakers' consistent negotiation of sense Chomsky falls back to Cartesian intuition in his philosophical assumptions of the speakers' knowledge of language. Linguistic intuition is pre-programmed by a rich disposition of the human brain. As this is in sharp opposition with our aim of elucidating the relation between language and cognition, we have to delineate ourselves with respect to the major assumptions of generativism. This section therefore lays out the most essential bearings of Chomsky's philosophy in the field of linguistics, the critical reactions and their eventual influence on the development of performance-oriented linguistics (cf. Seuren, 1977, 215; Hörmann, 1976, 40; Lakoff, 1987, 181; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 178,267f.). Chomsky, the founder of generative linguistics, is in strong conflict with the semiotic idea of the unity of the sign, as he takes the linguistic object to exist prior to communication. This object is taken to exist in terms of the "ideal speaker-hearer". In relation to this idealization he considers actual communication as grammatically deficient and there-

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fore not worth being investigated scientifically (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 83). In this way, generative grammar restricts itself right from the beginning to explaining the most ideal intersection of possible languages. Most importantly, Chomsky claims the study of language to follow the methodologies of the natural sciences (cf. Chomsky, 1977, 207; Chomsky, 1981, 14; Chomsky, 1986), by strictly separating the object of linguistic investigation from its communicating subject (cf. Apel, 1976a, 269). In Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics (cf. Chomsky, 1957) his nativist assumption is the essential condition for his mentalism. The linguistic object is assumed to exist in the speakers' disposition of the richly equipped brain structure with which children are born. This disposition is Chomsky's linguistic faculty - the language acquisition device which enables human beings to acquire their native language so quickly and easily. In Chomsky's view, the human mind is preprogrammed by a specifically linguistic faculty, an innate part of the human brain strictly distinct from other inborn faculties (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 12f.). As a consequence, there is also a strict distinction between linguistic competence and other knowledge resources in the human mind. Linguistics has to investigate linguistic competence as the deeply unconscious knowledge which speakers have acquired of their native language on the basis of their linguistic faculty. Yet it is the paradox of Chomsky's mentalism that the mental processes underlying linguistic performance may not be assessed by the empirical observation of the linguist but only by means of intuitions, by the direct access to our deeply unconscious knowledge about language (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 13, 91). With this empirical paradox Chomsky makes a solipsistic philosophical regress. As behaviourism had not been able to provide a theory of learning which accounts for the acquisition of linguistic knowledge (cf. Skinner, 1950), the general linguistic climate was such that Chomsky's solipsism was gratefully accepted. Faculty theory flourished in psychology before the turn of the last century. Yet after having been discredited both genetically and biologically (cf. Bunge and Ardila, 1987, 193), it was strongly renounced thereafter. A move towards the investigation of general cognitive learning principles occurred most notably within the school of Gestalt Psychology, which as a radically holistic theory naturally turned against

Chomsky's empirical paradox

53

a particularization of the human mind into different modules and in particular against the strong version of faculty theory. This strong version even assumed independent faculties, such as perception, memory, language and reasoning, that enable humans to acquire the respective knowledge from the information surrounding them (cf. Bunge and Ardila, 1987, 95). Chomsky's distinction between separate mental faculties supports his separation of subject and object: by presupposing a strict distinction between subjective performance and objective competence, the object of investigation may only be accessed in terms of Chomsky's empirical paradox (cf. Chomsky, 1966, 62ff.). There is a technical illusion hiding here behind the Chomskyan paradox: Chomsky's mechanistic subject-object distinction is in conflict with his mentalistic methodology of relying on the intuitions of native speakers who are supposed to have direct access to their unconscious linguistic competence (cf. Chomsky, 1966, 61ff.; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 268). This "meta-competence" enables native speakers to evaluate linguistic data by distinguishing adequate, i.e. grammatical sentences, from inadequate, i.e. ungrammatical sentences (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 13). While the empirical evaluation by native speakers is an unavoidable methodological principle, if taken to its conclusion, this evaluation should point out the cognitive relevance which the linguistic object has for its communicating subjects. Adequate language use is not evaluated by the native speakers' access to their unconscious linguistic competence, but instead resides in the consistency rendered by the intersubjective relevance which speakers impose on the linguistic object (cf. Apel, 1976b, 269f.). On this view, the evaluation of linguistic data would relate grammatical structures directly to meaning. In such an empirically valid explanation of linguistic performance, the notion of communication would avoid Chomsky's modular view by neither ignoring the organically unified whole, nor the analytically accessible parts. Such an empirical explanation would then automatically include an account of the speakers' ungrammatical behaviour (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 267).

54 Philosophical

2.11

issues

Linguistic competence as the atomistic residue

Initially, generative linguistics specified and reduced the general objective to the mere description and explanation of the syntactic devices of language (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 15, 92ff.). Even the level at which languages are claimed to be universally compatible was taken by Chomsky to be strongly syntactically determined (Chomsky, 1957, 83f.). Parallel to his claim of linguistic autonomy Chomsky introduced the claim of syntactic autonomy (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 106), which means that syntactic structure exists and can be accounted for independently of semantics. Having defined linguistics as following the principles of the natural sciences, it was a logical consequence to leave the investigation of linguistic performance to the sciences studying human behaviour, as linguistic performance consists of considerably more complex behaviour than that which could be described as strictly rule-governed. Likewise, Chomsky's distinction of fundamentally different mental faculties in turn licenses his division into semantic and encyclopedic knowledge. He explained linguistic knowledge in terms of linguistic organization and encyclopedic knowledge in terms of pragmatics. With this distinction the study of pragmatics is left to psychology and sociology, a view still heavily defended by formal grammarians. Linguistic competence is defined as a functionally autonomous module (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 17) in that the principles and rules which are intended to account for linguistic structures are considered to be fundamentally different from those which determine the organization of other cognitive modules. This, so Chomsky's argument, must follow from the fact that human beings as the "privileged creatures" are the only ones endowed with linguistic competence, such that there is a qualitative break between humans and other animals because of their unique endowment with the linguistic faculty. This faculty cannot be an offshoot from humankind's general intelligence (cf. Chomsky, 1966, 4ff.; Chomsky, 1986, 25). Chomsky argues for the uniqueness of human competence as represented by the linguistic freedom and creativity that he attributes to speakers. Human language is fundamentally different from any other type of communication as it fulfils functions beyond practical communication, which is not the case with the "pseudo-language of animals" (cf. Chomsky, 1966, 29).

Linguistic competence as the atomistic residue

55

In Knowledge of Language (cf. Chomsky, 1986) Chomsky claims to have a completely new concept of what he takes linguistic competence to consist in. This turn seems to be a reaction to linguistic theories which doubt the existence of a specifically linguistic competence based on an innate linguistic faculty. Chomsky claims in particular to have shifted from mentalism to realism, having resolved the difference between the natural and social sciences by taking brain and mind as being equivalent (Chomsky, 1986, 40ff.). Linguistics is claimed to be a biological science, "mental states are encoded physically" (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 26, 38). Observable linguistic behaviour is now referred to as "externalized language" (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 44), abbreviated with "e-language", and this is beyond any possible description and explanation. In fact, Chomsky even claims that e-language is not worth being described at all. Firstly, he considers the observable externalized linguistic behaviour a merely arbitrary human artefact (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 26). How can it be arbitrary, however, if it is constrained by linguistic competence (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 268), which is taken to be an equivalent of the brain? Secondly, the description of e-language is considered an unworthy enterprise because in Chomsky's view linguistic theories, by intending to explain observable linguistic behaviour, cannot actually explain anything that really occurs. Externalized language is considered an "epiphenomenon at best" (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 25). The study of internalized language now corresponds to Chomsky's former notion of linguistic competence as the steady state which, on the basis of the innate language faculty, is acquired at some time. This internalized language is taken to be real, as it produces physically encoded mental states (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 26, 38). This steady state internalized language is very stable (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 12), it may only undergo peripheral modifications concerning lexical change (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 25). But it is exactly the change of lexical meanings and forms which arises from making infinite use of finite means. Linguistic creativity has always been Chomsky's major reason for considering linguistic competence as a species-specific endowment (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 15). How can lexical flexibility be assumed as peripheral to knowledge of language if it is such a pervasive and frequent phenomenon? Considered as lying on the periphery of the language system, lexicalization then

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becomes inexplicable in any systematic terms. But how in this case can lexical meanings be separated from the grammatical patterns in which they are used? And what kind of storage capacities would this image of the lexicon demand? It is obvious that Chomsky undermines the speakers' knowledge of the structure of the lexicon as well as the speakers' knowledge of the multitude of lexical meanings (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 86; Hörmann, 1976, 498). All this follows from a neglect of the relation between meaning and form. Chomsky's resistance to studying observable linguistic behaviour most clearly proves to be mentalism, since he claims that the brain which he takes to be identical to the mind - is fax from being explainable (cf. Searle, 1992, 245). We favour the functionalist commitment of the ultimate inaccessibility of the brain processes from which mental states axe assumed to emerge (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 47ff.). We completely agree with the elimination of dualism with respect to the mind-body problem (cf. Searle, 1992, 14ff.). Chomsky himself considers knowledge about the functions of the brain to be just imagination: So little is known about the relevant aspects of the brain that we can barely even speculate about what the connections might be. We can, however, imagine how they might be established in principle, however remote the goal. (Chomsky, 1986, 39) This quotation demonstrates that Chomsky's metaphysical idealism has to be considered mentalism in its purest form. His assumption about the equivalence between mind and brain is in conflict with his claim that native speakers' judgements "are readily accessible and informative and give us direct evidence as to the structure of internalized language" (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 36). This methodological claim is quite clearly mentalistic. How can the speakers' intuition of their deeply unconscious knowledge become objectively real without being externalized in terms of intersubjectively accessible information? Linguistic judgements are clearly concerned with actually produced utterances, i.e. they deal with Chomsky's externalized language. Chomsky's assumption that intuitive judgements on the part of native speakers provide direct evidence for their internalized, deeply unconscious knowledge of language is inconsistent with his claim of introducing realism into the study of the

Linguistic competence as the atomistic residue 57 mind in terms of brain processes. In this point we agree with Seaxle's emergentist mind. Taking unconsciousness as a biological process (cf. Searle, 1992, xii), there is nothing else apart from consciousness, except for unconscious knowledge derived from conscious knowledge (cf. Searle, 1992, 19). Although Searle sees consciousness as emerging from physical processes - in not excluding the abstract from the concrete he defines consciousness as a physical process (cf. Searle, 1992, 1) - he considers the aim of an objective assessment of these physical processes as unattainable (cf. Searle, 1992, 19). From this Searle concludes that humans have no objective access to large parts of reality. Subjectivity is an essential feature of the human mind. On Searle's view then, any non-physical explanation in terms of "deeply unconscious" knowledge is ruled out as relying on "non-existent" states of the mind (cf. Searle, 1992, 245). The only means of arriving at realistically valid explanations are observations, which must strive for the highest possible validity, i.e. we must deal with real and ordinary instead of constructed or idealized situations and speakers. We cannot explain linguistic structure by mere generalization, separated from its functional nature, i.e. from the humanly relevant dimensions of language (cf. Hörmann, 1976, 40). Both reduction and specialization are important epistemological principles (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 14f.; Bunge and Ardila, 1987, 34ff.). The emergence of cognitive linguistics must be considered as a reaction to these generativist claims. All its distinguishing features may be summarized by its struggle against reductionism in its non-constructive sense. Cognitive linguistics may be seen as a reaction to the following reductionist assumptions of generative linguistics: • reduction of an overall cognitive disposition, of which language represents a specific part, to an autonomous linguistic endowment (cf. Toulmin, 1971, 383; Lakoff, 1987, 181 • reduction of the infinite process of communication in linguistic performance to a finite and steady state of linguistic competence (cf. Apel, 1976a, 275ff.). This in turn implies reduction of a wide range of possible linguistic utterances in situations to what is only a small subset of so-called well-formed ideal sentences (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 267).

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• reduction of our overall linguistic knowledge (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 268; Hörmann, 1976, 40; Lakoff, 1987, 58) to an autonomous syntactic module. Only this module is considered as relevant to the linguist. Chomsky's overall criteria for the adequacy of a linguistic theory are economy, elegance and simplicity in linguistic representation in order to have the greatest possible gain with lowest possible costs (cf. Chomsky, 1957, 18ff.; Chomsky, 1986, 56ff.,81ff.). Yet his assumption of syntactic priority is so strong that he never comes to realize that a single system, in which syntax and semantics constitute one integrated component, provides a simpler explanation of how the human mind works, and that this suggests the consequence that all cognitive activities are based on a common core of cognitive principles and rules (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 15). Thus, although having initiated a revival of mentalism in linguistics, Chomsky's reductionist theory in no way accounts for the functions of the mind in which human knowledge of language resides, since it cannot explain how speakers assign meanings to sentences, i.e. how speakers use language to refer intentionally to the environment. Thus, although denying his mentalist commitment today, Chomsky still defends a strongly mentalistic approach without making any verifiable assumptions as to how the human mind works.

2.12

The mind as a black box

Behaviourism must be credited with enabling psycholinguistics to become an established science with a sound methodological foundation. 6 Yet this service was overlooked owing to behaviourism's refutation of the human mind (cf. Bunge and Ardila, 1987, 134). It is important to acknowledge that the positive features of behaviourism laid the scientific foundation of experimental psychology. This was especially true of weak behaviourism, which excluded the study of mental processes for methodological and technical reasons, as long as the experimental scientific basis was lacking (cf. Tolman and Honzik, 1930; Morris, 1937). Through the development of natural empirical methods and by creating hypotheses about not observable relations lying behind the observable behaviour, weak behaviourism gradually developed towards the con6

Behaviourism thus was in fact the predecessor of cognitive science.

The encyclopedic unity of linguistic knowledge

59

struction of hypothetical psychological theories (cf. Bunge and Ardila, 1987, 135). Nevertheless, Skinner's strong version of behaviourism, which denied the need of a theory of learning, obviously had to be revised, as was done for instance by Vygotsky and Hull (cf. Vygotsky, 1962; Hull, 1952). Before this revision Chomsky's hard criticism of behaviourism was successful in view of behaviourism's general lack of a theory of language acquisition. The adherents of the materialist paradigm which was developed later by Vygotsky, Lenneberg and Luria (cf. Vygotsky, 1962; Lenneberg, 1967; Luria, 1966) were aiming at explaining linguistic behaviour. Yet the paradox of Chomsky's criticism of behaviourism consists in his own lack of a theory of language acquisition, a lack inherent in his nativist philosophy. The way in which the establishment of behaviourism occurred at the same time had far-reaching consequences for the possibility of developing an interest in what is going on in the "black box" of the mind. 2.13

T h e encyclopedic unity of linguistic knowledge

Any attempt to grasp a meaning locally or globally follows from the methodological need for hypothetical agreement between speakers (cf. Davidson, 1984, 201). Locally, we need this grasp of recognizing consistent language use across speakers. Globally, we need to grasp the meaning in dictionaries and thesauri in terms of semantic networks which render the mediating instruments for relating different languages (and possibly different speakers of the same language): by "a set of instructions ... for insertion ... into a series of contexts ... and for the correct disambiguation of the same terms" (cf. Eco, 1984, 68). This reconciles the philosophical debate about and synthetic truths, which we have theoretically disentangled in our discussion of the philosophy of language and mind. Only those meanings may be considered as "quasi-analytic" which are most resistant to change, and linguistic interpretation and translation between languages is only possible in probabilistic terms. Quine's rejection of analytic truths is supported by the semiotic assumption of the infinite semiosis of sense. The postulation of necessity de re, i.e. the search for essential attributes of a predicate, clearly becomes an unrealistic enterprise. Prom an empirical point of view we can only associate something with a predicate contingently, i.e. de dicto, by our knowledge of the world, which may change. The

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distinction between intension and extension becomes irrelevant. We only need a locally established encyclopedia through which the extension becomes fixed with respect to specific purposes and the particular communicative needs in a particular discourse situation. Whereas cognitive linguistics has acquired a notion of "the body in the mind" (cf. Johnson, 1987, 194f.) after centuries of dualist dogmatism, mechanistic linguistics ignores this progress and theoretically falls back into ages where dualism was a natural offshoot of religious dogma.

2.14

Conclusion

In this chapter we have laid the epistemological foundation for our empirical work. The major objective was a discussion of the different philosophical theories dealing with the relation between intension and extension. Purely truth-functional intensional semantic theories (cf. Frege, 1975b; Frege, 1975a; Montague, 1974a) have been set out as reductionist as they give no account of the dynamic synthesis through which speakers continuously approach the object of their consciousness. Moreover, we have argued that consciousness is a feedback phenomenon which can only develop within an actual world and within a specific speech community (cf. Lewis, 1972). Purely extensional semantic theories, as defended by Quine's and Wittgenstein's empiricism (cf. Quine, 1960; Wittgenstein, 1977a), have been considered as methodologically inadequate because they are not capable of explaining the epistemic success resulting from the continuity of reference (cf. Kripke, 1977; Putnam, 1977b) embodied by the speakers' common sense intersubjective process (cf. Apel, 1976a). The infinitude of the semiosis of meaning through newly inferred information (cf. Peirce, 1934) rules out generativism and dualism, as introduced by Chomsky (cf. Chomsky, 1966). Within the unified methodology of reasoning the consistent application of language follows from the speakers' ideal agreement on the truth of their hypotheses.

Chapter 3 Psychological theories of reference and categorization We continue to investigate different psychological perspectives on how speakers perceive and conceive of the world. Whereas some of these approaches are not concerned with language in particular, we consider them as relevant with respect to our central question of how speakers mentally represent their environment so that they can refer to it in linguistically adequate ways. Psychological insights into cognition may provide important clues for the representation of linguistic utterances. Furthermore, psychological theories of cognition may have implications for how cognition relates to language. Most importantly, this chapter will bring us nearer to a solution of how linguistic reference and categorization work. In particular, we axe looking for a psychological explanation of how speakers are successful in referring linguistically to their environment.

3.1

Gibson's approach to ecological realism

In the sixties the American psychologist J.J. Gibson developed his ecological realism (cf. Gibson, 1979). He claims the environment to be meaningful not by its physical existence (cf. Gibson, 1982, 15), but by its ecological reality. In a very general sense his notion of ecological reality consists in the mutually fitting relationship between the observer and their directly perceivable environment. Humans perceive the ecological optics in terms of the "affordances" of their environment, a term which Gibson introduced (cf. Gibson, 1982, 16ff.) to refer to what the subject needs in order to identify objects and to discriminate their qualities. The affordances enable the subject to recognize what is normal, relevant and sufficient in the respective situation. Thus the

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subject is able to make use of the environmental functions. Gibson claims that by relating the observers' behaviour to their environment the environmental affordances become objectively real for them. With his notion of affordances, Gibson aims at abandoning the absolute distinction between subject and object (cf. Gibson, 1982, 45f.). As soon as the subject makes use of the environment's affordances, these are no longer part of the environment, but have been embodied as part of the subject itself. Gibson exemplifies his ecological idea of the relation between subject and object with the behaviour of human beings in relation to their clothing (cf. Gibson, 1982, 43). As soon as human beings come to wear their clothes, these are no longer part of their environment, but establish an extension of their own human bodies. This naive realism is in contrast with our semiotic view on the three-fold nature of the sign, which we developed in section 2.8, where the relation between sign and signified is taken to consist in the subject's representation of the object. With reference to our previous line of argumentation we may in fact evaluate Gibson's example as merely pointing out the result of the evolution of the objectively conventionalized system of a society of clothed human beings. Before the integration of clothing within the human society, clothes were less conventionalized as individual possessions and more external to the socio-cultural system. In comparison to this previous stage of the social system, we may consider the state in which human beings are generally clothed as being of a higher-order state of organization, achieved by the collective behaviour and the mutual acceptance of the creators of the clothing system. This explanation also accounts for the reason why human beings cannot arbitrarily move into any part of their environment in a way that it becomes subsumed as an extension of their own physical existence. In fact, the abstract semiotic system of clothing ensured that clothes in general became the physical extension of human beings and thus could function either as human environmental affordances or as an extended part of the human body. With this dynamic integration the borderline between individual and environment is not conceived as an absolute one. Gibson claims that the same may be said of language, the affordances of which continuously surround speakers, such that language becomes part of their own behaviour, of their individual existence, as

Gibson's approach to ecological realism

63

soon as the subject makes use of the linguistic affordances (cf. Gibson, 1982, 281f.). By virtue of the relations between the speakers' linguistic behaviour and their environment the environmental linguistic affordances correspond to objective reality. This ecological image of a subject interacting with its environment and subsuming it continuously is also in sharp contrast to Chomsky's nativism, which lacks any idea of interaction between the subject's linguistic performance and feedback exerted on this performance. Instead, both competence and performance are conceived of by Chomsky as being sharply distinguished, with the consequence that a stative system of knowledge is defined as the sole object of research. According to our view on the relation between subject and object, however, the speakers, by their interaction with their environment, become aware of the environmental linguistic conditions, and, as a consequence, speakers continuously feed back on their knowledge representation. This representation will thereby eventually approach but never meet reality, instead of being just objective information existing arbitrarily and being perceived directly. In accordance with Gibson's idea of the relativity of the distinction between individuals and their environment we can say that communication in performance would be the relatively persistent representation of the speakers' linguistic-encyclopedic environment, which is in a mutual relationship with their own communicative needs and activities. With his analogy between visual information processing and linguistic processing Gibson tries to do away with the Chomskyan notion of competence. However, he only considers the physical environment, the perception of which he claims to be neither subjective nor as relying on consciousness. He does not say anything about the emergence of the abstract socially provided perspectives which we consider to be the very condition for any incorporation of such systems as that of clothing being viewed as an extension of the human body. Yet even with the physical environment of humans we cannot deny the role of subjectivity and consciousness, when their perceptions deviate significantly from information which is relevant and normal. Such perceptual deviations may be due to either system-external or systeminternal manipulation. While language can cause misconstrued perceptions, it is also an ideal instrument for revising such perceptions.

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Gibson's neglect of the abstract, socially mediated representations of the observers' environment may be explained by his denial of any distinction between nature and culture, between body and mind, and this in turn is in line with his denial of consciousness. With this denial Gibson wants to overcome any residual dualistic conception. For him there is only one, albeit immensely varied environment. On Gibson's view, therefore, an explanation of the relation between concrete and abstract environment is superfluous: indeed, any such explanation would be in conflict with his theory. However, the distinction between the observers' concrete and abstract representations is most crucial for their perception, since perception becomes continuously more difficult with increasing complexity, i.e. with increasingly abstract processing. Gibson, however, denies that any hierarchical structuring is mentally imposed on the observers' perceptions of the environment. Although Gibson considers the environment to be ecologically real only for a specific observer from a particular position on the respective scene, it is at the same time an essential ingredient of his theory that the ecological reality of the environment, most particularly its persistence or stability through time, enables all individuals to have the same opportunities for discovering it by moving around within it and by arbitrarily shifting each perspective into any other one (cf. Gibson, 1982, 79). Again, this claim does not consider social reality, in which the problem of delimitation arises. That is, Gibson does not answer the question of what counts as a common environment in which all observers can move in the same way. And where are the limits of this environment (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 45)? As soon as we introduce the social dimension, the arbitrariness of the observers' motion becomes constrained by social rules, and as a consequence, different social groups establish different systems with differing environments. Prom their interactions with their environment each social system projects its own image of reality. Depending on how close these different representations are to reality, different social groups have different possibilities of successfully applying their mental representations of reality and of improving them as a the result of their successful functioning. Gibson in no way accounts for the immense complexity of cognitive environments. Due to the observers' mental and social position, their momentary af-

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filiation and the resulting perspective on the environment, depending on whether they are working, at home or elsewhere, and depending on their concomitant interests, the complexity of their cognitive environment can vary considerably (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 41). And due to these differences, different observers are capable of developing differently efficient heuristics of revising and optimizing their mental representations (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 45). If we apply this view on the abstract behaviour of social groups to linguistic and other information providing environments, we can straightforwardly reject Gibson's claim for the equality of the observers' conceptions of their objective environment. We can do this exactly through consideration of the multiple dimensions along which social and linguistic differences and different possibilities of communicating about and conceiving of one's environment have developed. Depending on age, sex, profession, social and geographical origin and, most importantly, depending on the range of intelligence and commitment, differing relations to reality and differing images of it arise from different integrations within one and the same society. Along each of these dimensions we can observe that with increasingly abstract environments humans achieve increasingly more complex mental representations and it becomes increasingly more difficult to achieve compatible mental representations between individuals. This decrease of compatible mental representations holds especially for representations of different social groups. Without these perspectivized abstract representations any institutionalized learning, different types of schools and universities, as well as professions with different expertise would be impossible. Thus, it makes no sense when Gibson talks about a potential reality, because in view of these differences the problem just turns into the question of how humans achieve sufficiently compatible conceptualizations of the actually relevant environment through space and time; and their ultimate aim being to cope with the environment in sufficiently adequate ways, their conceptualizations must also be as close as possible to what the environment really is. In line with his notion of the objective observer, Gibson denies the overall figure-ground principle which organizes perceived reality into a foregrounded figure and a background (cf. Gibson, 1982, 70, 110f., 247). In their everyday interactions, however, humans steadily expe-

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rience the figure-ground organization most clearly when they have incomplete perceptions or illusions or when they produce ad hoc images of reality. Ecologically speaking, humans perspectivize their environment on many different levels by the figure-ground principle. Social constraints imposing figure-ground organizations on their perceptions may be found at least on the following levels: • The ethnic social macro-level of a whole nation; • The subcultural micro-level, on which different groups can be distinguished along the dimensions of age, sex, income, profession, education. A relevant example, which we will analyze linguistically below, is the figure-ground organization of the semantic domain of school: it depends on the individual's role within this domain which of the senses is stored as the dominant one in memory. This dominant sense is then the figure to be profiled against the ground which is provided by the coherent domain established by all of the senses of school in parallel. A teacher probably would take the A C T I V I T Y of teaching referred to by school as being most relevant, whereas a caretaker would rather take the C O N C R E T E C O N T A I N E R provided by the building of school as the most relevant sense; the parents of a child may think of the staff of teachers as the I N S T I T U T I O N referred to by school as providing the relevant sense. • The interactional level, on which all different kinds of actions may constrain people to organize their perceived information into figure and ground. On this level the same speakers may assume different perspectives within one discourse domain and situation in considering the levels mentioned above. On this view, one might only objectivize the figure-ground effects by considering all observers' views at all social levels, and this kind of objectivization is clearly in conflict with the assumption of a multilevel socio-linguistic heterogeneity. Gibson's ecology of perception, therefore, is in sharp conflict with the most obvious socially provided subjectivity. Most importantly, by denying the figure-ground phenomenon, Gibson can never explain how different discourse partners ever come to have compatible knowledge of their environment: how speakers maxi-

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mize the relevance of each piece of information by their coherent integration of new information in their proceeding discourse representation as well as in their existing knowledge (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 48ff.). Speakers achieve this maximization of relevant information by knowing which relevant inferences have to be drawn. Gibson, however, continues to assume that the observers themselves are capable of objectivizing their incomplete or otherwise defective perceptions independently of communicating with their environment. He does not consider communication as a means of achieving a balance between figure and ground, between different perspectives. For him there is no imbalance of the information processing system, there may only be momentary perceptual disturbances and the actual information is objectively real. Subjects can move through their environment and thereby continuously assume reciprocal perspectives. Although with the continuous motion of an observer the organization of things changes for them as well, underneath there is invariance. Moving through the environment, observers discover what information is hidden, because they either have seen it already or will come to see it later from another perspective. The Gibsonian observer can see as many organizations of the same things as necessary for "directly" perceiving the things as they are. A misconceived figure-ground relation is just the result of a structural disturbance in their momentary perspective. A momentary misconception from an unfortunate perspective is corrected by the observers who know the underlying invariant structure, and who do not perceive their environment from the subjective perspective anymore, but impose on this perspective the invariant real structure of the world (Gibson, 1982, 212). Observers are taken to perceive the affordances, because they have learned them to be relevant for their own experience. A momentary change in their needs does not change the existence of the affordances and their value for the observer. The ecological relation between the two is a physical one for Gibson, from most basic tactily and visually perceivable affordances to higher-order ones such as taste (cf. Gibson, 1982, 155). It is the same relation for everybody, especially if part of an ecological niche; and because of the observers' compatible needs, everybody can discover such an ecological niche in which the individual is perfectly integrated into the environment.

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Gibson claims that these organizing and integrating activities do not represent any higher-order processing, but reside simply in the capability of discovering the hidden parts of the environment. But in consideration of the immensely varied human environment, is it not also their capacity for generalization and abstraction of information that enables humans to infer which parts of the hidden information is most relevant in each individual case? Prom this view, the adequate evaluation of experience in terms of giving the adequate feedback to the environment crucially depends on learning, i.e. on higher-order mental processing. To a great extent this learning is directly mediated by language. It would not even be achieved without language if we consider the huge amount of knowledge which humans inherit from the media (cf. Popper and Eccles, 1977, 130ff., 144). The inference of hidden information, the neglect of redundant information and the recognition of the relevant as well as the expectation of not yet provided information are all capabilities which have been learned from the experience of complex interactions with an individual's environment. And this environment is typically social when we consider that the most prominent locus of learning is established by schools. The more humans learn, the more complex becomes the knowledge representation system which they apply to their experiences. On this view, all the inferencing capabilities make use of the observer's abstract mental representation of the respective situation, and each time a more complex type of situation is manipulated, the representation is reorganized into a higher-order state. Information which is not explicitly given is not hidden, but is also not yet an integrated part of the system. Different figure-ground constructions then result from different focusses of attention. Different focusses of attention in turn are induced by having learned to take different perspectives on the same state of affairs and by relying on different background knowledge. Without any notion of knowledge Gibson resembles the behaviourist Quine, who only relies on observations and who takes the meanings of terms as being established by all ostensively fixed referential activities. Analogously, Gibson's assumption of direct perception maintains that it is the sum of all perspectives taken on the same environmental part that determines the individual's invariant information.

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Gibson's claim of the capability of direct perception and his denial of higher-order processing is compatible with his denial of egocentric perception (cf. Gibson, 1982, 216), and he explains the latter with the claim that perception and self-awareness always complement each other (cf. Gibson, 1982, 125). Such a balance, however, would be the ideal which normally is not the case. Gibson's assumption of this ideal complementation is of course compatible with his assumption of all humans being capable of discovering their own ecological niche. This complementation would indeed be possible with direct perception. As soon as we assume experience to be subjective, however, the individuals' consciousness of the social relations is seen to result from their perception of the environment. Gibson claims that perception means to experience rather than to have information. Yet experience is never a direct representation of perceived information, but is always a subjective interpretation in terms of an individual's existing knowledge. In this way Gibson does not support his assumption that the real world is known by sufficient experience via the direct perception of information. - Gibson assumes that the observers' natural perspective (cf. Gibson, 1982, 73ff.) projects the environment into geometrical forms which simplify the shapes of objects considerably. In the activity of perspectivizing, momentary disturbances become irrelevant for the wellexperienced observer, and on this background the invariant represents the essential. It is through this ability to project each point of observation into any other possible position that each observer is capable of perceiving the same environment (cf. Gibson, 1982, 79). With his notion of an ecological optic Gibson abandons the traditional notions of space and time and substitutes them by the reciprocal concepts of invariance and variance. Time becomes eternal and space infinite. Spaces are continuous; there are no bounded places, borders being imposed on spaces artificially. Only objects are neatly demarcated against their environment, and as these are moveable they have to be learned continuously. But where are the limits of the observers' motion with respect to the Gibsonian persistent environment? And where are the observers' common opportunities to discover the invariant behind the continuous motion? Concomitant with the observers' trivial capability of objectivizing their perceptions, Gibson denies that communication plays any role

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in information processing (cf. Gibson, 1982, 261f.). Information processing is conceived in a mechanistic fashion by Gibson (cf. Shannon and Weaver, 1949): it is only a channel for transmitting ideas between speaker and listener, and the investigation of this activity is left to communication theory, since for Gibson communication has nothing to do with a theory of perception. The information is taken to be itself embodied in the energy of light, in mechanical and chemical energy. It is just there. And communication is conceived of in terms of the container metaphor: language and other representational means simply provide containers for transferring information from a sender to a receiver. Prom a semiotic point of view, however, this is only information which the observers make use of, which they need in creating and shaping higher-order information. And how can humans perceive consistently without communicating about their perceptions, which Gibson admits axe sometimes defective? Gibson assumes every correction to occur through the individuals themselves, nothing is achieved by them as the result of social interaction. There are only two possibilities of perceiving: direct, real perception, and arbitrarily defective perception, without these extremes being related by a scale of possibilities. Gibson's assumption of the unlimited retrieval of information (cf. Gibson, 1982, 261) is also compatible with his claim of direct perception. However complex the information may be, there is no limit to its processing. Gibson mentions, in particular, age as being no limit. This illusion of information processing being unlimited is most obvious evidence of his ignorance as to socio-linguistic research, which has established that age is one dimension along which linguistic variation occurs. This ignorance fits, of course, Gibson's picture of communication having nothing to do with the perception of information. But as soon as one drops this view, one comes to realize that information retrieval is not a matter of the environment and of the observer's labelling alone. Instead, it is only through the observers' integration within their environment that information becomes significant for them. Admittedly, the environment of the "information processing era" we live in cannot be referred to without being an integral part of the society of this era. Both knowledge and information that become relevant for humans today are largely of a fairly abstract nature, in that they require a very highly developed level of information processing. This is most evident

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in Gibson's image of the observers' motion as prerequisite for information retrieval. In our information processing era we rather come to perceive information through abstract mental processing instead of through physical motion. By moving volitionally through society humans come to communicate about their social environment. The social environment consists of hierarchies and groups of communicators into which an individual observer is integrated. It depends on the observers' degree of integration how much information they may access. Gibson does not provide any sufficiently convincing explanation of the capability of perceiving invariances and transformations directly. The same holds for Gibson's rejection of the notion of memory as an abstraction of experience. Instead of assuming memory to function as the locus of human knowledge Gibson assumes the improvement of perception and attention as a process of learning the continuous direct extraction of information. Learning proceeds via the discovery of invariance and awareness of transformation, with the perception of persistence being dominant in coming to know the true nature of the environment (cf. Gibson, 1982, 266f.). Perception does not turn into memory or knowledge in Gibson's view, it continues to exist, and correspondingly there is no definite distinction between present, past and future. Gibson assumes that the classification into these temporal categories is forced on humans by the particular language which expresses them. Prom a linguistic point of view, however, just the contrary holds: in many languages speakers can use tenses not corresponding to the time of event in colloquial speech, such as the use of present for past as well as for future experiences in German. This is clear evidence of the gradient borderlines experienced between past, present and future time. Yet the linguistically achieved imposition of the temporal categories on the speakers' experience of time is most important for successfully interacting with each other and for referring to their temporally embedded activities over time, for learning from the past in order to successfully plan the future. The experiences' efficient selection of the relevant information relies on their successful selection of information achieved in the past. Along with his insistence that memory is superfluous for accessing information Gibson denies any disposition of the mind. Information is simply there; there is no generalization beyond information in terms

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of knowledge. Knowledge is substituted by a higher degree of informativity (cf. Gibson, 1982, 278). We are in favour of any attempt to overcome the dualism of knowledge and information, yet for methodological reasons we still need a measure of minimal informativity. But Gibson does not even touch on what this degree of informativity might consist in. He mentions rules and strategies which the child learns for discovering information, but he considers them only as an instrument for extracting and abstracting the relevant environmental invariances. It is undeniable that rules and strategies do not establish knowledge, but enable the observer to acquire it. What then distinguishes Gibson's idea of the relevant invariances from the cognitive notion of knowledge representation? Gibson distinguishes the observer's perception of the physical environment from the information obtained from semiotic sources such as books and pictures. Of course this is compatible with his denial of communication as playing any role in information processing. Information is not a process, it is just there and directly accessed (cf. Gibson, 1982, 270, 272). This direct access to information, however, strongly undermines the active and intentional representation of meaningful information which the observer is continuously concerned with. Gibson does not pay the slightest credit to the individual's creativity as a function of both the communicator's freedom and their socially constrained interactions. Gibson's rejection of communication playing any role in information processing inevitably leads him to deny the possibility of reorganizing images in ways compatible with the representations which observers construe for direct perceptions (cf. Gibson, 1982, 277). Certainly speakers perform no direct evaluation with images as they do with perceptions. Yet in the same way as we assume communication to have a corrective function from the top to the bottom of the social community, where the individuals find themselves, we assume communication to be a constructive force in perception and in imaging possible or past experiences. Speakers may eventually lead their communicative partners to recreate the information which they have experienced and incorporated into their knowledge representation. This capability requires speakers to be intimately aware of the distinction between present, past and future. Nevertheless, Gibson considers any mental representation

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apart from direct perception to be mere imagination. He does not accept language to be part of the perceptual system. Language, however, covers the image creating activity and mediates the imaging force inter subjectively. How is the impossibility of imaging past experiences in compatible ways reconcilable with Gibson's claim of the continuity of perception? That is, how do the observers integrate themselves within the continuity of time without having any methodological and quantificational means of delineating the scope of the present time from that of past and future perceptions? Gibson admits that, apart from direct perception, information can also be transmitted indirectly via language and other semiotic systems (cf. Gibson, 1982, 281ff.). But at the same time he stresses the crucial difference between indirect perception and direct perception. In contrast to what happens in direct perception, Gibson assumes that with indirect perception the amount of information is limited if transmitted by language. Another crucial difference between indirect and direct perception consists in the impossibility of evaluating the verbally transmitted information as reliably as one always can with direct perception. With this assumption, however, Gibson again presupposes a non-socialized individual. Although perception is more direct than communication, in certain situations it is the complexity of communication which can be more appropriate for uncovering the hidden information and evaluating it correspondingly. Indeed, in most situations language is indispensable for approaching reality by making transparent what humans do not yet know. Moreover, Gibson claims the principled priority of perception and thereby opens himself to the charge of dualism. Gibson's assumption of the modularity between perception and language is in contradiction with his holistic assumption of the distinction between individual and environment being a relative one. In assuming the relative distinction between individual and environment, Gibson should also assume this relative distinction between direct perception on the one hand and indirect perception transmitted by language on the other. Information becomes indirect as soon as the individual transforms it into another means of representation. Finally, Gibson's ecological approach to perception needs to be revised by a relative distinction between change and invariance, as the

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environment changes and becomes cognitively more objective through humans incorporating increasingly more objects into their own knowledge representation.

3.2

Neisser's ecological approach

As a cognitive psychologist Neisser is in sharp contrast to Gibson. He takes cognition to represent a dynamic activity: the acquisition, organization and use of human knowledge (cf. Neisser, 1979, 13). He considers perception to be the most basic cognitive activity since it establishes the interface where cognition and reality meet and discover the real nature of the environment. With regard to this he criticizes Gibson's theory of "direct perception" (cf. Neisser, 1979, llff., 20ff., 42ff., 94), according to which human beings just perceive what is afforded to them by their environment. Neisser rejects the view in his claim that human intelligence relies on the individuals' ability to subjectively direct the focus of their attention (cf. Neisser, 1979, 68-82). Human beings do not mechanistically import reality into their minds by means of a fixed capacity. Instead, they learn from each experience and this influences their further social behaviour. On this view information "transforms" human beings instead of purely informing them. On the one hand they have learned certain schemata from experience that enable them to focus on, select and anticipate certain aspects of information rather than others. New information, on the other hand, may change their schemata. Thus existing schemata may be specialized by perceived information. Neisser strongly argues against Gibson's affordances of information, which are assumed to exist irrespective of the observers' motivations, intentions or reasons to process information. Neisser's point is that the environmental affordances are also a matter of the perceiving individual (cf. Neisser, 1979, 63), as every perceiving organism is capable of being aware of certain aspects of its environment rather than others (cf. Neisser, 1979, 18). The specific environment into which humans are born makes them learn which information they have to ignore and which information they have to focus on (cf. Neisser, 1979, 13ff.). For Neisser the theory itself must be ecologically valid (cf. Neisser, 1979, 14ff.). On this assumption, psychology cannot rely on the physical relation between human beings and their environment alone. Neisser's

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foremost concern is that human behaviour can only be explained by its integration into a specific culture (Neisser, 1979, 143ff., 151; Neisser, 1987a, 18ff.)· Only by this integration do situations become meaningful to the individual (cf. Neisser, 1979, 13ff.)· Although Neisser admits that human beings axe born with a certain schematic disposition for cognition (cf. Neisser, 1979, 56f.), he does not make the nativist assumption of a rich innate capacity underlying cognitive activity as this would not do any justice to the human ability to learn (cf. Neisser, 1979, 57). The continuous development of this capability is evident from the perceiving individuals continuously adapting their schemata to experienced information (cf. Neisser, 1979, 52). Neisser moreover argues against nativism in his claim that the individual's socio-cultural integration can never be grasped by introspection. On a very general level, however, Neisser takes the schematic ability to be genetically wired rather than acquired by experience (cf. Neisser, 1979, 52). As Neisser takes perception to be an activity which depends on the individuals' ability to learn, different social groups may perceive in differing degrees of granularity and may have differing perceptions (cf. Neisser, 1979, 42). In view of this perspectivized knowledge the more humans learn the less they are in danger of being manipulated (cf. Neisser, 1979, 144). And the more intelligent individuals are, the more information they can pick up from their environment (cf. Neisser, 1979, 78). Neisser mentions that manipulation occurs in particular by indirect information (cf. Neisser, 1979, 118): as the anticipated image is not followed by a direct perception, a misconceived image may influence the perceivers' following perceptions. Neisser takes verbally transmitted information to be indirect (cf. Neisser, 1979, 145) and to result in pure imaging, whereby manipulations become possible. Concomitant with this, Neisser assumes indirect perception to be manipulable by verbally provided information. Verbal manipulation is created when the speaker intentionally perspectivizes an objectively accessible meaning by a subjective semantic structure (cf. Neisser, 1979, 127). The more listeners rely on what other speakers tell them, and the less they rely on their own information directly perceived in the environment, the less objective their information processing will be. The more pas-

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sive and reproductive they process information, the less listeners will strive for truth (cf. Neisser, 1979, 144f.). On the other hand, the more actively and goal-directedly listeners process the information, the nearer they will come to the truth of their images. Linguistically determined information processing is more indirect and more subjective the more speakers have structured their perceptions in terms of their own intentions; linguistically provided information, that is, rests on a dual intentionality, firstly during perception and secondly during speech production. And it is this intentionality, the basic ability of extracting information and of selecting a corresponding linguistic utterance, which Neisser takes to be innate (Neisser, 1979, 129ff.). Thus, human communication provides speakers with immense opportunities for improving their understanding in terms of intersubjectivizing their knowledge. But language is also an instrument for creating misunderstandings and illusions, i.e. an instrument for subjectivizing one's understanding. This dual polarity of the corrective function of linguistic interaction leads Neisser to conclude that humans will never achieve complete understanding among one another. With time, however, the recursive nature of human perception, in which language plays a crucial role, brings cognition nearer to discovering the true nature of the individuals' environment (Neisser, 1979, 151). In this respect Neisser suggests that although language has its own grammatical organization, linguistic processing is not fundamentally different from other activities of the human mind. With this notion of ecological perception Neisser claims that the investigation of the normal and natural must be part of a cognitive theory, which otherwise is too narrow and artificially constructed in not accounting for the necessary and ecologically valid types of human behaviour (cf. Neisser, 1979, 17). Neisser's theory is in sharp contrast to Gibson's assumption that by the motion of objects and by the observers' own mobility, observers eventually come to know their own environment from each possible perspective and thereby can also anticipate objectively real information. Neisser claims that it is the very motion of objects which influences the observers' subjective attention, as the motion of objects determines the observers' eye movements and thereby their focus of

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attention (cf. Neisser, 1979, 22-24, 140-143). Perception is most effective during motion, because the observer then achieves the highest degree of activity and intentionality (Neisser, 1979, 123ff.). This has nothing to do with Gibson's basic requirement that objective reality is perceived directly through this mobile activity. On Neisser's view, goal-directed behaviour is very well subjectively grounded, but motion makes an individual's cognitive structure more flexible and more complex. Yet although each experience depends on an individual's knowledge, humans always strive towards truth, in that they always change their knowledge with new experiences, thereby adapting it to their perception of reality (cf. Neisser, 1979, 150f.). With this assumption about the continuity and the recursive nature of perception on the basis of continuous feedback, Neisser tries to reconcile the extreme positions of realism and mentalism. Realism is taken to consider only the environmental structure and thereby considers all hypotheses about internal mental constructions as intuitionist. Mentalism on the other hand merely relies on hypotheses about mental representations without considering which information the environment really provides (cf. Neisser, 1979, 13ff.). Neisser achieves this reconciliation with the observation that humans must have sufficiently compatible cultural schemata, otherwise communication would break down (cf. Neisser, 1979, 148ff.). Concomitant with this he assumes that humans are able to make sufficiently similar predictions with their compatible schemata. Also in contrast to Gibson's claim about the infinity of the individual's retrieval of information, Neisser underlines that perception is not limited by some general principle, but by the individual's capacity to process information (cf. Neisser, 1979, 82ff.). He considers it inadequate to apply such terms as capacity limitation and extraction to human information processing, as these terms may be better associated with passive containers, the function of which is the mere storage of objects, instead of the active development of structure. Analogously, Neisser points out the inadequacy of talking about general storage limitations, and instead claims that individual processing limitations constrain the selection of information. Neisser overcomes dualism along several dimensions. Most importantly, he abandons the competence-performance distinction, assum-

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ing linguistic utterances to be based on a continuum of actively stored linguistic representations. These continuous representations enable humans to make complex utterances, the meanings of which are more than the sum of the meanings of their parts, although the whole meaning never really comes into existence and instead always remains virtual (cf. Neisser, 1979, 28f., 51, 106f.)· Neisser's endeavour to explain human understanding by the individuals' social interaction, however, rests on an all too vague distinction between the individuals and the society they live in. Neisser talks about society and culture as a whole and, concomitant with this, of the in principle socially determined language on which the individuals also depend as a whole. In this explanation, however, the important relation between the individual and society, and the difference between them, are left unexplained. Piaget has fundamentally criticized this traditional view of social sciences (cf. Piaget, 1972, 48, 221f.). Society cannot be conceived of as an undifferentiated whole, but instead in terms of the relations between the individuals of the system. It is with each interaction between two or more individuals that a change of the whole system is effected. The relation between the individuals' information processing and the environmental constraints has been convincingly dealt with by Piaget (Piaget, 1972, 176), whose view we will pursue in the following section.

3.3

Piaget's constructivism

It was Piaget's foremost objective to bring forth a theory of learning which, from the viewpoint of a biologist and behavioural psychologist, convincingly discarded on the one hand nativist theories assuming a rich biological equipment as being innate (cf. Piaget, 1970), and on the other any naive realism, such as Gibson's purely empirical approach to perception (cf. Piaget, 1981; cf. Piaget, 1983). Piaget's theory of cognition is constructivist in the sense that he assumed an individual's knowledge representation to consist in the continuous interaction with the environment. By this interaction the individual achieves the representation of coherent schemata which are considered as epistemically viable by the individual, both on the basis of the whole knowledge representation system and in view of the respective experience. Piaget's key to an answer of how consistent reference becomes possible is the

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question of how human beings come to know the relations of identity, similarity and difference. The achievement of these relations represents the capability of coming to know reality (cf. Piaget, 1972, 11). On the one hand Piaget focusses on the subjective determination of each experience as following from the specific development of an individual's consciousness. With his notion of constructive knowledge representation, on the other hand, he does not consider this construction of knowledge as arbitrary, but as adaptive, as continuously taking hold of the states of affairs constraining the individual's knowledge, whereby the individual is continuously striving towards fitting more adequately into the environment. In contrast to Neisser's nativist commitment concerning the intentionality of human beings, Piaget gives a unified account of the development of human consciousness. Higher-order levels of consciousness are achieved by a continuous differentiation of conscious knowledge, whereby a more adequate integration into the environment is achieved. Conscious cognition consists in goal-directed behaviour starting from the undifferentiated periphery, where relevant information cannot be distinguished from irrelevant one, moving towards the centre of human consciousness, where knowledge of the relevant problem-solving devices achieves a differentiated representation of the situation into which the cognitive behaviour becomes integrated (cf. Seiler, 1994, 76). The original development of Piaget's theory was based on an empirically motivated explanation of cognitive development in children and the corresponding acquisition of language. Piaget's key notions in pursuing these achievements are the following: • The premise of the objective requires the development of object permanence, which consists in the ability to know an object by an abstract mental image, a concept represented independently of the perception of the respective object. • The premise of the subjective involves postulating the existence of an active, reality-creating agent. • The unity of the subjective and the objective is created by the natural drive of human beings towards a balance between the cognitive agent and their environment.

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Piaget explained these key notions via the complementary dispositions of structure and operation. Piaget's concept of operation springs logically from his action-oriented perspective: animate beings only come to know their environment by interacting with it. The continuous interaction ultimately yields the internalization of a corresponding schema. The achievement of this internalization depends on the complexity of the respective experiences, i.e. on the similarities and differences of all individual occurrences which the child has to recognize in order to be able to associate some re-occurring interaction with a common schema. The knowledge which adults have about the world resides in mental images in terms of schemata of permanent objects, abstract knowledge about objects and situations which can be applied to all specific occurrences. All schemata in common represent a structured and continuously developing system of knowledge. The development proceeds according to laws of operation which have been internalized to manipulate the spatial properties of objects by transforming their orientation, their position, their shape and their size. Children thereby come to recognize permanent objects, i.e. mental representations independent of the immediate perception of objects and reconcilable with what humans already know. Piaget called this operation assimilation (cf. Piaget, 1972, 10): the continuous subsumption of newly experienced information under already existing schemata. It is the subject's active consciousness. This process, however, is steadily constrained by reality and thus has nothing to do with arbitrariness or pure subjectivity. The cognitive agent's active modelling of reality not only consists in the perception of new information, but also in the resolution of conflicts between existing knowledge and new information: if the environment does not fit into the internal knowledge system of the cognitive agent, the latter may adapt, i.e. reorganize existing schemata in order to be able to integrate the newly experienced information. Piaget called this operation accommodation (cf. Piaget, 1972, 11). Piaget's notion of accommodation represents a theory of learning in which the cognitive system is striving towards achieving an equilibrium in each interaction with the environment. From a higher-order level of organization each accommodation presupposes reorganizations on lower-order levels of the system (cf. Glaserfeld, 1994, 34) before the

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system has reached its equilibrium. Thus interaction is prerequisite for accommodation, and Piaget considers linguistic interaction to be most effective in this respect (cf. Glaserfeld, 1994, 33). The complementary interactions of assimilation and accommodation correspond to a kind of reconciliation of subjective construction and objective reorganization. Assimilation and accommodation are both inseparable components of cognition. From the most elementary stimulus-response behaviour to the most abstract form of reasoning the individual is always internalizing the perceptions and conceptualizations by means of complementary assimilation and accommodation. Human intelligence thereby ultimately achieves a homoeostatic balance (cf. Piaget, 1972, 55) in relation to the environment. Prerequisite for the ability of accommodation are the self-regulativity of the structure of the system and its openness to the environment as well as its holistic way of functioning; human beings thus achieve the reorganization of the whole system instead of changing only local elements of it (cf. Piaget, 1972, 22). Prerequisite for assimilation is that there have to be some invariant components of knowledge in which the overall system resides and which make the cognitive agent behave successfully by relying on meaningful expectations, plans and purposes (cf. Piaget, 1972, 70ff.). The consequence of both abilities is the differentiation of pre-existing schemata and the generalization of more abstract schemata, and finally the generation and integration of new schemata. This was Piaget's theory about the interaction with and the incorporation of perceived reality. In fact, Piaget's conception of the interaction between the subject's experiences and the objective constraints of the environment was such that he assumed that although human beings come very close to knowing reality, they nevertheless never come to possess an exact image of reality, as accommodation can only operate on preceding processes of assimilation into the subject's schemata. 3.4

Johnson-Laird's mental model theory

With his theory of Mental Models, Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird, 1983) claims to bridge the gulf between mentalism and realism (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 203) in that his overall objective is an account

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of how speakers organize their mental representations in order to best fit the structure of the world. According to Johnson-Laird (JohnsonLaird, 1983, 244) speakers achieve their semantic representations in at least two ways. Firstly, they build their propositional representations directly from explicitly uttered information. Secondly, they build an analogous representation of the conceived situation. It is essentially on the basis of the relational structure (cf. Gentner and Toupin, 1986) that this representation is analogous to the speakers' perceived information on the one hand, and to their existing knowledge on the other. In this way Johnson-Laird overcomes existing semantic theories, such as Katz's componential analysis (cf. Katz, 1972) and the Quillian semantic network analysis (cf. Quillian, 1968). The propositional representation specifies the respective states of affairs which have to be fulfilled in order to be true (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 155). The analogous representation is more specific. It is achieved by recursive reorganization resulting in concrete representations of mental models (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 156). These consist of all concrete properties and relations which may become relevant from the explicitly uttered information. In addition, the implicit information is inferred in an interactive and defeasible fashion (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 126ff.) in order to cope with the possibility that inferences or utterances made at later stages of the discourse may necessitate a revision of earlier assumptions made by default (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 408). The essential point which distinguishes Johnson-Laird's mental model theory from traditional semantic theories is its dynamic perspective, in that it takes into consideration the actual conditions in the respective discourse situation from which the properties of the perceived entities and the relations between them emerge, instead of relying on some abstract lexical function which does not properly specify the truth conditions that hold in the particular situation (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 407, 438) and which thereby do not fully account for the concrete meaning of the utterance. Johnson-Laird takes the essential prerequisite for flexibility and economy to consist in the mind's innate ability to taxonomize (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 153, 203f.). On the basis of this ability referential vagueness and referential discreteness can be intentionally represented within the mental models of both speaker and listener (cf. Johnson-

Johnson-Laird's

mental model theory

83

Laird, 1983, 263) in order to economically reduce or flexibly enhance complexity (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 409). This flexibility also embodies the important ability which is the foremost objective in linguistic learning: to know the mental procedures that relate speakers to the world (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 399). The properties and the relations themselves axe not abstracted before the respective utterance has been processed, namely after the interpretation function has inferred all the truth conditions of the respective expressions. This is to say that the semantic properties and relations are not explicitly given, but emerge from the unique integration of the components into the composite expression. They are thus the result of the dynamic evaluation of sense. This very abstract assumption about the processing of linguistic meaning is an illuminating and elegant attempt at a solution to the as yet unsolved problem of the relation between intension and extension. On this view, the respective intension is referentially determined. The referential procedures themselves may never be grasped theoretically: speakers know them intrinsically, but there is no way of externalizing the referential procedures on a meta-theoretical level (cf. JohnsonLaird, 1983, 446f.). Reference is an intentional procedure which relies on the particular nature of human consciousness. And of the latter we can only achieve a functionalist account (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 448f.). Consciousness can be explained but not simulated in terms of how the human brain works (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 475). Mental models account for human consciousness as consisting in the ability of self-reflective behaviour through recursive representations of mental models (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 470ff.). The recursive representation of mental models is subjective and relatively autonomous in that the self-awareness of consciousness, with the recursive embedding of mental model representations, reaches a stage where the individual mind can no longer control its representations, because they rely on unconscious physical processes which lack any symbolic value, i.e. their function is an arbitrary result of their organization (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 464f.). Human consciousness thus corresponds to the recursive ability to embed models within models. The condition for such a model to create human consciousness is the procedural representation of how the

84 Psychological

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mind really works. We can imagine this procedural hierarchy to work across a potentially infinite number of levels. The bounding-point of consciousness is reached when the lower-level representation can no longer be consciously accessed in terms of the higher-level representation. At this point the human mind is no longer aware of the reduction of information which the structure of the lower-level representation has undergone. This image of human reasoning as a self-reflective system implies the highly parallel nature of these complex recursive procedures. The whole module is monistic with brain and mind establishing two poles of the hieraxchy. This architecture of the human mind corresponds to Langacker's commitment to the parallel distributed processing system of language (cf. Langacker, 1991, 525) ultimately residing in the exchange of material energy. For Johnson-Laird ambiguity is the key to efficient linguistic behaviour (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 233). Although he is biased in favour of fixed lexical entries with a fixed relation between intension and extension (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 441), the recursive nature of mental models can perfectly cope with incomplete intensions. JohnsonLaird comes close to Barsalou's solution, who makes a distinction between context-dependent and context-independent values (cf. Barsalou, 1982): the number of senses that a word actually has is finite (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 238); the referential values a word may assume, however, are infinite, as these depend on each individual discourse situation and are assigned non-deterministically by recursive revision (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 247). That is, for Johnson-Laird the possession of senses is a relatively static and discrete relation, whereas he takes reference to the world via mental models to be dynamic and continuous. Again, dualism is lurking in this commitment, and the dynamic behaviour is not really explained by neglecting the mediating relationship between the referential function and the lexicalization of a lexical unit's senses. Johnson-Laird explains ambiguity to arise from frequency of usage and the speakers' need for a more efficient fixing of the referent (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 441). The efficient procedures themselves, however, remain implicit. The rules for representing a mental model are not subject to conscious access (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 468). It remains unexplained how exactly a single mental model becomes selected from

Conclusion

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a whole lot of possible models. Johnson-Laird's neglecting to explain exactly the speakers' efficient representation of mental models results from his resistance to properly constraining the relations between possible senses and possible discourse situations. Johnson-Laird's three clues to consciousness - reference, sense, and the recursiveness of mental models - can be made explicit within Croft's notion of the unity of domain (cf. Croft, 1993, 336ff.). A domain is intentionally represented by the speakers' particular purpose of discourse: both the overall domain of discourse and the particular discourse referents would be represented recursively by the normally assumed defaults subsuming the contextually presupposed information across levels of mental representation until the intended referents are fixed and coherent with the domain knowledge. The explanation of Johnson-Laird's resistance can be found in his vehement opposition to conventionally motivated semantic theories. In opposition to these traditional semantic theories Johnson-Laird relies purely on the individual's modelling of perceived states of affairs (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 410). Johnson-Laird is rather provocative in this point in order not to undermine the listener's burden of mentally modelling perceived states of affairs, for which he nevertheless admits the listener to have certain default assumptions (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 447).

3.5

Conclusion

In this chapter we have investigated different theories of perception and cognition. Gibson's theory of direct perception (cf. Gibson, 1979) has been considered as merely hiding the speakers' achievement of a mental representation within Gibson's treatment of learning and incomplete information. Gibson's concept of purely external information which is 'just there' does not do any justice to the individuals' intentionality which determines their motivation to move in the environment as well as in their abstract behaviour. A potentially exhaustive motion cannot be a condition for objectivization. For Neisser the individuals' environment becomes meaningful to them by their own integration into the environment. The ability to move is just a condition for the flexible processing of complex information. Among others, Neisser abandons the competence-performance distinction, which is still lurking in Johnson-Laird's distinction be-

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tween sense and referent. Neisser achieves this by considering meanings as holistic and virtual: a complex meaning never really comes into existence, it always remains a plan. Neisser himself claims that the ecological validity of his approach is his consideration of specific environments, into which the subject is integrated and which thereby become meaningful in compatible ways to all subjects in that environment. Culture therefore becomes the key to ecological validity for Neisser. He does not deal, however, with the cross-cultural ability by which humans integrate themselves into their environment, as he considers the very ability to select the relevant information to be innate. Johnson-Laird takes linguistic flexibility to rely on the mind's innate ability to taxonomize, whereby speakers are enabled to intentionally represent their mental models in recursive procedures which establish the subjective nature of human consciousness. We take JohnsonLaird's idea of the continuity of reference (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983) to explain the relation between the speakers' knowledge representation and cognition. Yet we argue that Johnson-Laird does not give a satisfactory explanation of the speakers' epistemic success in their referential procedures since he does not constrain the relations between possible senses and possible discourse situations. We therefore conclude that Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models has to be extended by Croft's notion of the unity of domain knowledge. Speakers represent domains intentionally in dependence on the particular discourse situation (cf. Croft, 1993). Methodologically, this is achieved by Piaget's constructivist approach (cf. Piaget, 1972), according to which the complementary interaction between the assimilation of environmental information into the speakers' internal mental representations on the one hand, and the accommodation of internal schemata to environmental information on the other, explains the interaction between the subjects' experiences and the objective constraints of the environment. Although Piaget has been criticized for not having provided a theory of cognition applicable to individual situations (cf. Seiler, 1994, 96), we claim that an explanation of the relation between language and cognition is achieved most convincingly by this combinatorial approach.

Chapter 4 Selecting the psychological model of reference In this chapter we will evaluate different psycholinguistic models of categorization and reference. The ultimate aim is to select the model which explains most convincingly how speakers process linguistic utterances in order to refer successfully to their environment. In particular, we will consider different psychological assumptions about the relationship between language and cognition, between polysemy and the organization of prototypes, and the corresponding linguistic behaviour.

4.1

The economical abstraction of prototypes

The information provided to speakers by their experience of reality is notoriously variegated. Yet it is obvious that speakers have immense capabilities for storing and processing the bulk of information in extraordinarily economical ways. Faced with this variation of information which human cognition has to manipulate, prototype semantics came forth with the idea that humans abstract certain "natural categories" as relatively constant mental representations into which they continuously classify the perceptions of their environment (cf. Rosch and Lloyd, 1978). That is, speakers abstract a type concept on the basis of which actually occurring tokens are evaluated (cf. Hampton, 1998, 138). The conceptual representation of a bird, for instance, consists of the properties of its prototypical, i.e. most representative instance in terms of S H A P E , SIZE, ABILITY T O FLY, HAVING FEATHERS, HAVING A BEAK, etc.

According to psycholinguistic experiments the prototypical image by which speakers represent a bird is a BLACKBIRD in Europe and a ROBIN in the United States. This difference between prototypes

88 Selecting the psychological model points out that the respective representation results from the frequency with which speakers experience the tokens in their natural and cultural environment. When evaluating less representative instances of a category occurring in specific contexts, speakers can adapt their mental abstractions to the actually perceived instances by means of transformations, shifts, specializations, approximations and other mental reorganizations (cf. Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998, 254). A number of psycholinguistic experiments have shown the perceptual relevance of prototypical characteristics. Subjects were presented with instances of a category, such as OAK for TREE. They required less reaction time when associating typical instances with the corresponding category (cf. Rips et al., 1973; Mervis and Rosch, 1981; Smith et al., 1998, 169ff, 192f.) than was the case with less typical instances. For example, in accordance with ordinary knowledge of language a P E N G U I N might not be categorized as a bird in a compatible situation, as there are very few characteristics which a P E N G U I N shares with a R O B I N or with a B L A C K B I R D . Monolingual lexicons categorize P E N G U I N S as seabirds incapable of flying, using their reduced wings for swimming (cf. Cowie, 1989; Sinclair, 1989). The speakers' common sense taxonomies axe tailored in accordance with their natural and socio-cultural environment, whereas scientific taxonomies axe organized on the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions, which apply by way of exactly measurable values as is prerequisite for the natural sciences.1 However, the speaker is not left alone with "prototypical birds" when representing the typicality space of birds from the prototypical central instance to increasingly less prototypical, peripheral instances. There are characteristics attributed to birds on account of which speakers intuitively come to image a SWAN for the nominal white bird, or an E A G L E for a wild bird, all these having their own typicality spaces overlapping with the basic typicality space of BIRD.2 The typicality space is 1

The cognitive relevance of common sense folk taxonomies not necessarily corresponding to scientific knowledge relates to the paradox of realism. Ironically, it is Putnam's reliance on scientific definitions of the extensions of natural kind terms which leads him to the conclusion that meanings cannot establish mental representations. 2 Cf. Osherson and Smith, 1981, who found that a large spoon is more typically

The economical abstraction of prototypes

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also socially determined (cf. Markman and Makin, 1998, 331) through speakers preferring those instances of a category which axe valued as positive and which thereby become the prototype (cf. Osgood et al., 1957; Clark and Brownell, 1975; Keil, 1998, 105; Margolis, 1998, 352). Furthermore, the size of a category may be graded on a prototypicality scale. There axe a number of objects which must have a certain minimum size in order to fall under the respective category, otherwise the instance's lack of size becomes linguistically indicated, for instance, by a diminutive or by the instance even being designated by another lexeme and thus being outside the organization of the respective category. Thus, whereas morphological modification in booklet, leaflet in English and in German Brötchen corresponding to French petit pain is a criterion for instantiating a peripheral, yet included instance of a category, a completely new lexical unit has been created in English with the equivalent roll for Brötchen. Size itself is organized along a typicality scale in that the more extended is usually preferred to the less extended. Prototypicality is universally tied to the orientation of perception towards the positive pole normally represented by the quantitative maximum: H I G H dominates Low, L A R G E dominates SMALL, W I D E N A R R O W and FAST S L O W (cf. Greenberg, 1966; Clark and Brownell, 1975). This dominance relation has been lexicalized with several concepts. For instance the dimensions themselves are generally designated by the positively extended pole, such as height, width, speed. The preference of the positive pole is also symbolically expressed by the word order in bi-nomials expressing antonymies of dimensions, as in high and low, up and down, tall and short, over hill and dale, on elbows and knees. Many evaluations in A B S T R A C T domains are grounded in PHYSICAL domains, as is obvious in the linguistic means which have become conventionalized for positive-negative evaluations (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). This stereotyped structure corresponds to the human natural perceptual scheme. Human perception is explained in terms of the orientational m e t a p h o r both on an object- and meta-linguistic level (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Dent and Rader, 1979; Clark, 1973b). The vertical dimension is naturally perceived by humans' normally upright posture and their contact with or orientation towards the surface W O O D E N than a

small spoon, which is more typically

METAL.

90 Selecting the psychological model of the earth determined by the pull of gravity. This upwards rather than downwards orientation is lexicalized in the examples of the orientational metaphor given above which is to be found throughout human behaviour and their linguistic expression at any time. The inferences, expectations and beliefs of humans are all driven by this fundamental perceptual principle grounded in physical space. Thus a positive evaluation generally corresponds to the spatial concept H I G H as in high spirits, high spot, high life, whereas a negative evaluation generally corresponds to the D O W N concept, as in low spirits, low quality, low grade, fallacy, to be totally down. This default is accepted and specified by nouns inherently denoting positive entities. The default of a positive extension may be in conflict with nouns inherently denoting negative entities. In certain social contexts the positive pole of the vertical dimension does not correspond to its maximal extension, but instead, to the opposite, as in the prices are rising, the prices are falling, where from the perspective of the customer rise has a negative meaning and fall a positive. Likewise, the temporal extension referred to by cancer and war is represented in the opposite orientation, i.e. the less extended generally being preferred as the more positive pole. The fact that human expectations are always directed towards the preferred default explains that the relation to the less expected instances is not reflexive. That is, the less prominent instance is imaged as more similar to the most prominent prototype, while the reverse does not hold (Tversky and Gati, 1978). Basic level categories are a further structurally economical way of processing information, and they are functionally preferred over other categories by speakers (cf. Berlin et al., 1974; Lakoff, 1987, 199f.). Psycholinguists have found out that speakers have lexical categories mentally organized into the already mentioned folk taxonomies, natural and simple hierarchies in which categories are located on different levels of granularity, compatible with, but much simpler than the biological taxonomies classifying natural kinds. Experiments have shown that for most speakers of the world the most prominent categories are located at the genus level, a medium level of granularity within the hierarchically structured mental space (cf. Markman and Makin, 1998, 331). This is called the basic level, due to its prominence.

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Basic level categories are learned first (cf. Clark, 1973a), processed more easily and with less time. They are used more frequently (cf. Biedermann et al., 1999, 132; Gentner and Medina, 1998, 291) and axe functionally more salient than categories located at superordinate and subordinate levels. Basic level categories embody a balance with regard to the distinctiveness and informativity of the category (cf. Murphy and Brownell, 1985; Coley et al., 1997, 75ff.). Basic level categories are maximally distinctive between classes and maximally informative within classes. In contrast to this the superordinate level figures high in distinctiveness and low in informativity (cf. Biedermann et al., 1999, 131; Coley et al., 1997, 76ff., 104ff.). Inductive inferences are maximized at the basic level of abstraction (cf. Coley et al., 1997, 104). It has been verified psycholinguistically that speakers have significantly more difficulties in associating an image with a lexical unit the more general this term is (cf. Aitchison, 1993, 42). Examples of basic level categories are ROBIN in contrast to B I R D , P O O D L E in contrast to D O G , R O V E R in contrast to C A R , BUNGALOW in contrast to H O U S E . The most salient perceptual correlation at the basic level seems to be S H A P E (cf. Margolis, 1998, 361ff.; Markman and Makin, 1998, 348). Adhering to the organizational means of prototypical representations themselves, however, basic level categories have inherited the very essence of prototypes. There is a continuous borderline between the basic level and the subordinate and superordinate categories, in that speakers extend the basic category in the saihe way as they extend the prototypes, depending on the specific discourse domain, (cf. Rosch et al., 1976).3 According to a comparison of traditional societies' categorizations with those of urbanized American students (cf. Coley et al., 1997, 108) basic level categories become more specific with experts. In ordinary language, a particular instance can become representative of a basic category through metonymy, such as Tempo for P A P E R H A N D KERCHIEF in German, or Kleenex in the UK. By their morphologically simpler structures Tempo and Kleenex are the preferred expressions for basic level designation. By losing their specific characteristics their extensions become equal to that of P A P E R HANDKERCHIEF. 3 Rosch gives the example of the football domain, in which a subcategory of glove, the football glove, is experienced as basic, as normal gloves are functionally irrelevant in this domain.

92 Selecting the psychological model

4.2

The economical processing of prototypes

The economical abstraction of prototypes in terms of their lexical representation is mutually interrelated with their economical processing. Whereas the prototype structure of a concept controls its contextual variability, flexibility creates the continuous, graded relationship between conceptual categories and their corresponding expressions in mental processing. This graded relationship determines the typicality space of the concept which provides the central tendency of categorizing instances against a scale ranging from a typical core to an atypical periphery. This categorization, however, may be adapted to the requirements of the specific environment. Both central tendency and flexibility with respect to the extension of categories are evidence for the economy of language use (cf. Geeraerts, 1988, 208): • T h e flexibility of categorization implies the continuous extension of concepts at their boundaries (cf. Markman and Makin, 1998, 331); concept extension enables ever more tokens to be subsumed under the same type. Speakers extend or transform categories by stretching or shifting their boundaries to adapt or approximate their mental abstractions in terms of categories to the requirements of their continuously changing environment. As we have seen, these categories apply in accordance with humans' common sense knowledge about the world we live in, not according to some list of exhaustive scientific conditions. • In spite of its potential for continuous change, categorization by extension is also economical in that it reduces the immensely variegated information to manageable, conventionalized conceptual types (cf. Gentner and Medina, 1998, 267; Markman and Makin, 1998, 333f., 349). This assumption of prototype semantics has nothing to do with mechanistic reductionism. Instead, it is a matter of ecological integration of informational instances in the existing knowledge representation system. The operationalization of this reduction and adaptation is an extremely difficult endeavour in discourse representation. Linguistic processing is confronted to a great extent with very concrete information of each particular situation, from which listeners have to sort out the relevant information, while the irrelevant is dropped, includ-

The economical processing of prototypes

93

ing incompatible information which may arise from the overextension of categories (cf. Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998, 249). The capability to recognize the situationally relevant information cannot be underestimated. It has been shown that the more associative links speakers come to activate with an expression, the less explicitly they can identify the corresponding concept itself (cf. Anderson, 1976; Nelson et al., 1985). This conclusion points out the importance of being able to ignore the irrelevant relations. Again, folk taxonomies exemplify this reduction of information to the relevant relations, in that they organize human ordinary knowledge in considerably less complex terms than the corresponding scientific taxonomies organize "theoretical" knowledge. What is most important is that the economy consists in achieving just the adequate degree of reduction, while retaining enough redundancy and idiosyncracy as necessary for an economical access and retrieval of information. • The central tendency of categorization is obvious from human perception and imaging of certain properties which are always experienced above a certain threshold of salience independently of context (cf. Durkin and Manning, 1989, 589; Margolis, 1998, 356ff.). On this view, economy in mental processing is to be found in the reorganization of existing knowledge on the basis of new information. Structure is imposed on the conceived information which is reorganized in terms of conventionalized knowledge structures. Concerning the access to existing knowledge we find different psycholinguistic models to be en vogue. Being concerned with the economy of mental categorization in this section we are dealing with models about lexical access to polysemous lexical units. The hypothesis of meaning dominance (cf. Simpson, 1981; Glucksberg, 1986, 315ff.) provides yet another instance of economy in mental categorization. This psychological finding has given rise to a shift of interest in prototype semantics. Prototype semantics originated in the investigation of the typicality structure of a single concept, such as ordinary sparrows being typical birds, or the normal concept of a table. Today prototype semantics has shifted to an interest in the typicality

94 Selecting the psychological model structures of polysemies. This shift is due to psycholinguistics having found evidence to support the hypothesis that lexical units normally have dominant senses which are generally preferred over other senses during mental processing. Dominant senses thus establish one pole of the graded applicability space of a polysemous lexical unit. Thus, for a specific period of time and for a significant speech community it is legitimate to assume a dominant sense as establishing the default within an ordered set of polysemy relations. This dominant sense then applies in the absence of contextually conflicting conditions. For instance, the ordinary sense of window which refers to the SPATIAL domain of buildings still dominates the sense used in the domain of computer technology. The domain of computers, nevertheless, exemplifies that dominant senses are to be assumed only temporarily. Dominant senses have the status of hypotheses which on the one hand result from a high frequency of usage and on the other from their prominence within the mental models of the world in which they represent integral parts. The hypotheses about meaning dominance may prove to be invalid in certain less frequent, less expected discourse situations, if these situations provide contextual information to defeat the dominant sense, such as the computer window or mouse. The notion of meaning dominance arose with the assumption of different models of lexical access, meaning dominance resting on the ordered search model. This model assumes that speakers access the senses of a word sequentially, depending on the frequency of usage which they have experienced and according to which they have mentally represented the senses in a hierarchical structure (cf. Simpson, 1981; Frisson and Pickering, 1999, 1379). In accordance with the observations of early prototype semantics about reaction time, Simpson and Forster (cf. Simpson, 1984; Forster, 1981) found that while reaction time increases with the number of senses, the dominant meaning is generally accessed fastest and the retrieval is finished if the dominant sense fits into the context. Moreover, by analogy to the nonreflexiveness of central properties of a sense described above, the dominant sense could be shown to be activated also in contexts favouring the subordinate sense, while the reverse was not observed (cf. Durkin and Manning, 1989). Other asymmetry effects that corroborate the assumption of sense dominance are provided by the observation that

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subordinate senses axe judged more similar to the dominant senses than vice versa. Priming delays could be observed from non-dominant to dominant targets, whereas with priming in the opposite direction the observed delays were weaker (cf. Williams, 1992, 202). Caramazza and Grober (cf. Caramazza and Grober, 1976) intend to account for the speakers' economy by excluding their representation of extended senses. By assuming speakers to store only the most dominant senses in their mental lexicon, this approach intends to account for their active construction of the related, subordinate senses, which are generated by applying conventionalized polysemy rules. According to the underspecified account (cf. Frisson and Pickering, 1999, 1366ff.), an abstract representation of related word senses is accessed first and allows for the immediate representation of the more specific intended sense. The question about dual search processes is related to the assumption of ordered access. This question has arisen from the observation that frequency effects decrease with increasing grammatical function (cf. Glanzer and Erhenreich, 1979; Forster, 1981). Thus at least two lexicons may be distinguished by the criterion of lexical vs. grammatical meaning. Yet, grammaticalization also being a lexicalization process (cf. Bybee et al., 1994, 9), the question of dual search processes is first of all a methodological question. In contrast to the ordered access model, the exhaustive access model makes the assumption that for a very short time all meanings become instantiated in parallel, until speakers during post-lexical access select the meaning which is in conformity with the context (cf. Seidenberget al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et al., 1979; Prather and Swinney, 1988). Gildea and Glucksberg (cf. Gildea and Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, 1986) bear evidence against any exhaustive lexical access, favouring instead a strictly selective access right from the beginning. In this selection only the contextually appropriate meaning becomes instantiated. A strictly selective model of access is then dependent on contextual bias only (cf. Schvaneveldt et al., 1976; Frazier et al., 1999, 92) and independent of dominant and subordinate senses, such that no other meanings become activated.

96 Selecting the psychological model However, according to investigations performed by Oden and Spira (cf. Oden and Spira, 1983) it seems that it is not access that is restricted, but rather the degree of activation, so that the appropriate sense is selected faster with the respective context. In line with these findings we actually favour a combination of context-sensitivity, meaning dominance and exhaustive access, thus incorporating both categorization and reference into the process of lexical access. The first reason for this combination is that speakers have the possibility of backtracking their already achieved representation, if assumptions made earlier in the discourse have to be revised in view of information processed later in the discourse. Senses can, furthermore, be flexibly tuned in accordance with syntagmatically co-occurring senses. Most importantly, this tuning is carried out in accordance with the speakers' mental model, into which a word sense is integrated by their experience in the world. Our differentiated view settles the problem of how the dominant sense is defeated. The theoretical conflict between frequency effects and context effects cannot be resolved by assuming dual search processes in two lexicons, one lexicon with the most frequent words, and a supplementary exhaustive lexicon. There would be a delay in access time when context dominates. Instead, the order and typicality space in which word senses are represented and accessed changes as a function of usage (cf. Forster, 1981, 200; Damasio, 1989, 26f.; Schoen, 1988, 121). If the words semantically related to the target word exclude competing senses right from the beginning, frequency effects are blocked and the contextually coherent sense is instantiated directly. On the other hand, if the context is neutral or lacking, the most frequently occurring meaning is activated. With a weakly biasing context, all senses become instantiated in pre-lexical access for about 250 to 500 milliseconds (cf. Kintsch, 1986; Simpson, 1981, 134; Forster, 1981, 204; Tanenhaus and Lucas, 1987, 217ff.; Williams, 1992, 196), from which the contextually adequate sense is then selected post-lexically. The promise of the notion of meaning dominance resides not in the economy of the ordered search model, but in the implications for the organization of polysemy in that the less dominant senses may be explained in terms of the more dominant senses (cf. Williams, 1992, 209ff.). This issue is involved in the resolution of fundamental problems with respect to the relation between categorization and reference.

The semantic priority of information processing 97 Finally, there is the as yet ineffable way of economical information processing speeding up categorization. Categorization is achieved against the background of the encyclopedic knowledge of humans which, although representing a generalization from experienced information, is enormous, both with respect to complexity and quantity. It is implausible that speakers activate all components of their encyclopedic knowledge which are related to an utterance. In accordance with relevance theory (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995) speakers activate exactly the relevant components of their knowledge. As yet, however, this economical behaviour remains an enigma to psychologists and linguists. How is it that speakers manage to access and focus on just those components of their knowledge which in the respective discourse situation figure as most prominent? The answer to this question obviously would provide the key to human cognition.

4.3

The semantic priority of information processing

No sense of a lexical unit exists just on its own as part of the speakers' lexical competence. Rather, through indexical components conditioning each other in the respective context, the meanings of lexical units are in principle relational. The successful comprehension of an utterance then consists in constructing all of its direct relations as well as inferring all of its indirectly implied relations from the respective discourse context. The interpretation of an utterance is successfully concluded if all relational variables are associated with constant, nonconflicting values and thereby constitute a semantically coherent structure. In this structure the individual lexical units derive their senses from their position within the complex relational grid of the components of an utterance. These semantic constructions and inferences axe integrated into the knowledge representation system. From this perspective it is by reasoning rather than by recognition that a semantic interpretation is achieved (cf. Keil, 1989). It is not only for theoretical, but also for empirical reasons that we reject any modular approach to information processing. We do not distinguish between subsequent levels of processing such that the syntactic level has priority over the semantic level, linguistic-semantic information only being processed after syntactic processing and conceptual world-knowledge being processed as the final stage. This approach

98 Selecting the psychological model

to linguistic processing is called autonomous or modular because each level is designed as a neatly distinguishable module functioning independently of all other modules. This is, of course, a highly economical way of linguistic processing and fairly easy to simulate in comparison to a more interactive fashion. Strictly modular systems operationalize their sequential linguistic processing along at least two hierarchical dimensions: 1. They are functionally autonomous in that they assume the sequential processing of each individual level, independently of any other level, proceeding from the most formal and stable syntactic level, which requires most mechanistic processing and rule-based categorization (cf. Margolis, 1998, 351ff.; Smith et al., 1998, 191; Erickson and Kruschke, 1998, 129), to the least formal conceptual level, on which sense relations may be encoded in flexible and complex terms. 2. They assume a strictly bottom-up oriented processing, proceeding from decontextualized word meanings and subsequently composing structurally more complex representations, in which context is only consulted for resolving lexical ambiguities when necessary. In contrast to modular systems strictly interactive models of processing are located at the other extreme. They claim that there is an extensive switching between bottom-up and top-down processing required by contextual feedback right from the beginning. Strictly interactive models, that is, only rely on context, this preventing any activation of multiple meanings, and it is instead only the contextually appropriate sense which results. Thus, strictly interactive models unify with the selective access model for purposes of word sense disambiguation. From our integrated view linguistic reasoning rather proceeds both in a weakly sequential and modestly interactive fashion. In this process the recognition of the syntactic structure has a supporting function rather than being temporally prior (cf. Strohner, 1990, 116ff.; Samuelson and Smith, 1999, 4, 31). For instance, the agent of an action may be syntactically supported as the semantic focus of attention if it is expressed as the subject of the sentence, the default position for this function.

Categorization and reference 99 Furthermore, the independent representation and processing of syntactic structure has turned out to be too rigid (cf. Strohner, 1990; Besner and Johnson, 1989): it rather seems plausible that lexical meanings are prior in linguistic processing with syntax having only a supporting function, as the achievement of a semantic representation figures out to be the foremost objective of speakers. This cannot proceed in a strictly sequential fashion, as speakers need to backtrack for defeating and overriding the structures and values they have already built, if the subsequent context is in conflict with the previous one. In short, strictly sequential processing seems to be insufficient, i.e. too rigid for human information processing. Instead, a combined top-down as well as bottom-up and forwards as well as backwards directed processing seems to be more economical. In view of the economy of linguistic processing, both the modular and the interactive model seem to us to lose too much processing time by adhering to either one or the other extreme. Neither the strong reliance on the persistence of information, nor the assumption of pure flexibility of information processing may actually be observed in real situations, in which there is always a moderate mixture of persistence and flexibility, of modular and interactive processing. Both from a holistic and from an analytical point of view, the speakers' referential behaviour as well as their categorization explain different situations of learning, such as language teaching and language therapy, the interpretation of novel senses as well as the interpretation of incomplete utterances. All this is possible for speakers by virtue of the intricate interrelatedness of levels and concepts. These dynamic creations axe easier the more world knowledge speakers have acquired and the more structure they have imposed on this knowledge, and thus the better this knowledge can be accessed by intentional and goal-directed procedures, both weakly sequential and weakly interactive. We are still left, however, with the inescapable question as to how categorization and reference are to be distinguished. 4.4

Categorization and reference

As members of the same speech community, speakers have some constant context-independent knowledge about lexical meanings at any specific point in time, the rest being context—dependent (cf. Barsalou, 1982; Barsalou, 1987), i.e. fairly unpredictable without reference

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to context. Context-independent knowledge develops from contextdependent knowledge by high frequency of usage. Through time, however, even context-independent properties may change as the consequence of a significant frequency of new pragmatic relations pertaining to the respective lexical unit. Thus, on account of external pressures speakers readjust lexical meanings to new requirements of the environment by way of changing their extension which eventually effects a redefinition of the intension. In terms of the centre-periphery model, however, this redefinition is not an entirely arbitrary process. Frequency and function imply the degree of robustness and integratedness of meaning and thus the probability of change. The context-dependent vs. context-independent distinction offers a very important approach to the old problem of the distinction between sense and reference. The psychologist Schoen (cf. Schoen, 1988, 119ff.) uses the term low p o l y s e m y to describe those variations which occur in the peripheral region of a concept corresponding to the context-dependent properties. This variation does not change the referent, whereas high p o l y s e m y consists in the variation of central, context-independent properties (cf. Frazier et al., 1999, 88), normally resulting in a referential change. In linguistic terms then contextdependent properties may be taken to be responsible for the indexical components in the representation of senses. The psychological evidence of a distinction between context-independent and context-dependent semantic properties of words is thus in line with the centre-periphery hypothesis of prototype semantics. With respect to the fundamental question of categorization and reference, the natural partitions hypothesis (cf. Gentner and France, 1982) renders quite illuminating and intuitive insights. Much in accordance with fairly archetypical intuitions, the natural partitions hypothesis claims a principled difference to exist between nominal concepts corresponding to relatively stable representations and relational concepts corresponding to more variable representations. The stability of nominal concepts correlates with object permanence and persistence concerning their attributes on the one hand. On the other, the stability of nominal concepts correlates with internal cohesiveness, a property which does not adhere to M A S S nouns and C O L L E C T I V E nouns (cf. Imai and Gentner, 1997, 193).

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Research in language acquisition abounds with evidence for the last claim: Gentner (Gentner and Prance, 1982, 307) reports that in their first months children acquire only a small number of M A S S nouns compared to the number of semantically unique nouns which refer to one instance only. Internal cohesiveness is thus a matter of material concentration being graspable at once. B O U N D E D N E S S is also a correlate of stability in that it is implied in gestalt persistence. All these attributes enable children to learn these 'namelike' nounobject relationships considerably earlier than the linguistic expressions for relations. This also fits the gestalt psychological notion of "goodness of figure" which can be predicted from the cohesiveness relations holding between the parts (cf. Imai and Gentner, 1997, 169; Samuelson and Smith, 1999, 2): the relations between the parts of a figure must be significantly above the number of relations to other objects. At the same time "goodness of fit" determines the degree of B O U N D E D N E S S of a figure against its surroundings. The relation by which nouns designate their referents has also been shown to be more alike cross-linguistically than the relational grid embodied in the expressive force of verbs, adjectives and prepositions (cf. Imai and Gentner, 1997, 195). The contextual variability increases from verbs over adjectives to prepositions (Gentner, 1981, 176). So nouns bear evidence against the Whorfian relativity hypothesis (cf. Whorf, 1956), while verbs fit more into the Whorfian perspective, this concerning particularly the way in which the relations between objects are linguistically expressed. There are a vast number of examples which support this claim. Talmy (Talmy, 1978) contrasts English and Spanish with respect to the distribution of M O T I O N expressions: (4.1)

The bottle floated into the cave. La botella entro la cueva, flotando.

Whereas in English the M O T I O N verb float is specified for M A N N E R and the preposition into specifies the DIRECTION, in Spanish the opposite applies, D I R E C T I O N being subsumed under the semantics of the verb entrar, while the M A N N E R is expressed by the adverbial phrase flotando. This observation in turn indirectly supports the claim that the relation between nouns and objects is more direct and therefore more objective than the relation between verbs and prepositions and their corresponding actions, locations, etc. Young children try to avoid

102 Selecting the psychological model relational meanings, for instance, by using relational adjectives attributively (cf. Gentner and Prance, 1982). Furthermore, Gentner (cf. Gentner, 1981) provides us with abundant evidence from psychological experiments and investigations for the claim that in cases like metaphor and other literal mismatches the meanings of verbs are generally more adjusted to context. The predominance of metaphors with verbs in relation to nouns corroborates the assumption (cf. Croft, 1993). As a sufficiently frequent adjustment of contextually induced variations may ultimately develop into a conventionalization, this explains why verbs have a greater number of senses than nouns. Finally, the semantically more variable nature of verbs explains that they have been shown to be harder to learn, to remember, to produce and to comprehend (Gentner and France, 1982). Psycholinguistic investigations of natural language translation have also shown that translators take nouns to contribute more to their interpretation of a text than other lexical categories (cf. Königs, 1993, 233f.). So we may summarize that a number of cognitive routines support the assumption that the meanings of nouns are lexically more fixed in relation to the meanings of verbs, and that verbs behave more with respect to the particular contextual requirements.

4.5

Conclusion

In this chapter we have been concerned with two contrasting, but mutually complementing phenomena: with economical categorization and with flexible reference. Proceeding from the hypothesis that lexical processing plays a major role in these phenomena, we have discussed the leading assumptions of different models of lexical access and have come to favour the view of lexical access achieving a compromise between context-independent sense dominance and context-dependent search processes, as well as between pre-lexical exhaustive access and post-lexical context-dependent selection. We have, moreover, concluded that economy and flexibility may only work on common grounds if we compromise between weakly sequential and weakly interactive processing. Finally, we have seen that there exists a graded division between the fairly context-independent nominal concepts and the relatively context-dependent relational concepts corresponding to verbs, adjectives and prepositions, observing

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103

how the language-specific distribution of relational information over the syntagmatic plane is responsible for cross-linguistic divergences in grammatical constructions.

Chapter 5 Representing mental categorization In the previous chapters we have been concerned with developing a philosophically coherent and psychologically real concept of the relation between language and cognition. So far we have come to recognize that categorization and reference are mutually interrelated objectives by which speakers process linguistic utterances. Philosophically, we have argued that word senses are neither purely intensionally determined, nor are they determined on exclusively extensional grounds. Psychologically we have concluded that speakers process word senses both in a bottom-up and top-down direction as well as in a parallel and sequential fashion. The validity of this integrated view on the relation between language and cognition becomes intuitively obvious if we consider ordinary language situations in which we ask a native speaker to explain the meaning of a word. Johnson-Laird (cf. JohnsonLaird, 1983, 205) gives the example of the noun time being perfectly understood if supported by adequate context in a sentence, such as the following: (5.1)

Have you ever spent any time in Sussex?

However, when we extract the noun time from its context and ask for its meaning, we realize that the human mind has no immediate access to the most basic semantic representations. This ultimate inaccessibility is in fact an essential feature of mental representations, which we have already explained philosophically by the unlimited semiosis of the interpretant's mind (cf. above, section 2.8; Peirce, 1934). Psychologically, we have anticipated this characteristic of mental representations by Piaget's interactionism (cf. section 3.3 above; Piaget, 1972) and Johnson-Laird's claim about the ultimately subjective selfreferentiality of the human mind (cf. section 3.4 above; Johnson-Laird,

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1983, 465). In the following we will be concerned with how speakers achieve the volitional representation of meaning in context. The interdisciplinary framework which we have prepared in the preceding chapters creates a methodologically sound basis for defining our theoretical position with respect to the relation between language and cognition. In this chapter we will in particular introduce the methodological and terminological prerequisites which will be applied in the following chapters. We will thus introduce our representation of the speakers' mutually dependent processes of reference and categorization. 5.1

T h e speakers' V O L I T I O N

The interpretation of a word's meaning in different ways relies on the speakers' capability of representing alternative mental images of the same state of affairs. A cognitive representation is the result of the speakers' VOLITION, of their ABSTRACT MOTION through conceptual structures whereby they select certain substructures as PARTS. These PARTS represent a foreground-background organization corresponding to the Gestalt-psychological figure-ground distinction (cf. Köhler, 1929). The figure represents the foreground which is related to a presupposed background, called the ground. The figure-ground representation is linguistically relevant from at least five significant cognitive dimensions (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 189ff): the dimension along which profile and base are distinguished; the dimension of schematicity; the dimension of trajector/landmark alignment; the dimension along which the speaker perspectivizes the scene; and the dimension where the prototypical structure of entities is represented. Along the most significant cognitive dimension a speaker divides a scene into profile and base. This organization occurs along the paradigmatic dimension. The base is that part of a domain which is in the scope of the conceptually covered predication (cf. Langacker, 1988b, 58ff., 70ff.). More specifically, a predication is usually profiled against several domains, only certain substructures of which figure as prominent. The base is the necessary background knowledge in relation to which a profile obtains its meaning (cf. Clausner and Croft, 1999, 5f.; Croft, 1993, 339). It is the function of a predication to single out a specific part of the base so that it attains special prominence.

106 Representing mental categorization In other words, the profile occupies that region within the domain in which a concept is anchored by instantiation so that it is unambiguously demarcated from all other regions of the domain. By contrasting the language-specific profile-base organizations in the lexicon we can discover language-specific gaps. For instance, the English nouns lamb, ewe, mutton and sheep profile regions in different domains of the common domain matrix (cf. Clausner and Croft, 1999, 7) 1 , which consists in the knowledge speakers have about a certain animal: lamb profiles the A G E , ewe profiles the female G E N D E R , mutton the EDIBLE meat, sheep the aspect that these animals occur COLLECTIVELY in flocks rather than INDIVIDUALLY. Contrasting these profiles with German, we find only Lamm and Schaf to be elaborated at the level of the lexicon, corresponding to the English nouns lamb and sheep. Speakers always conceptualize a scene along the dimension of schematicity, i.e. they can mentally represent some state of affairs in a more fine-grained or more coarse-grained resolution. For instance, in German there exists only one noun for the animal Hund ("dog"), which is not lexically specialized according to G E N D E R . This is achieved morphologically by the derivational morpheme -in in Hündin, whereas in English there are the two lexemes dog and bitch, dog denoting both the neutral hyperonym and the male hyponym, whereas bitch denotes the female animal. Again, the dimension of schematicity corresponds to the paradigmatic dimension. For the mental profilings organizing the information structure of linguistic utterances Langacker (cf. e.g. Langacker, 1987a, 217) has introduced the terms trajector (TR) and landmark (LM). The TR as the more movable entity normally corresponds to the linguistic subject, while the LM as the larger and generally more stationary entity typically corresponds to the linguistic object. The TR normally corresponds to what is "new" in the situation of discourse, and the LM refers to the information which is "given". In this way, speakers structure the content into LM and TR at each syntagmatic level of a discourse. The information structure of utterances is typically pragmatically conditioned. One example of pragmatically conditioned TR-LM alignment would be the active/passive alternation, of which the active normally 1

Cf. also Croft, 1993, 340, where he introduces the term "domain matrix" for "the combination of domains simultaneously presupposed by a concept".

The speakers'

VOLITION

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profiles a scene in a more natural way. It is not possible to express all situations by the passive construction in which the position of trajector and landmark is exchanged (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 234). This is shown by the fact that intransitive verbs cannot passivize, something which is certainly based on their semantic content (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 50). The fact that the T R A N S I T I V I T Y of specific verbs differs between languages indicates the language-specific conceptualizations of these verbs. The speakers' perspective on the scene is a further dimension along which they represent their mental image of perceived reality. This is achieved through the position from which they view the situation. Consider Bolinger's example (cf. Bolinger, 1975, 181): (5.2)

The airlines charge too much.

(5.3)

Airlines charge too much.

These sentences differ in that in the first sentence the subject is profiled against the base of all common carriers and existing airlines, but in the second against all existing ones and in addition all potentially existing ones in the past and in the future, the latter resulting in generic reference. Therefore it is more usual to enforce the restriction to the present time by using the present continuous form in sentence (5.4) than in sentence (5.5) (in which we mark the unusualness by a question mark): (5.4)

The airlines are charging too much.

(5.5)

? Airlines are charging too much.

The difference in the totality which is referred to is yielded exactly by the perspective from which the speaker views the situation. In the first case the speakers' perspective is such that the scope of their predication includes all airlines currently existing. In the second case, the speaker is farther away from the real situation which coincides with the time of speech, thus the predication ranges not only over all currently but also over all potentially existing airlines. In both (5.2) and (5.3) the speaker expresses a generalization by evaluation. The fact that the speaker implicitly performs this illocution has to be interpreted first, and only then can the inference to generic reference be drawn.

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The last dimension along which we assume speakers to represent perceived reality is prototypicality. A speaker can use a sense to refer to a more or less typical instance of the category, depending on how they represent the relation between perceived reality and conceptual categorization. In the representation of reference we have to relate the respective types to their instances, as predicating a typical property of a concept must be distinguished from predicating a contingent property. This semantic distinction surfaces in different structures, as we will see below in chapter 10. All of these dimensions along which speakers achieve a figureground alignment imply their subjective representation of the object of conceptualization in that their focus of attention does not necessarily coincide with the foreground of a scene (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 130). Speakers are both the subject and the object of a predication, depending on how explicitly they refer to their own evaluation of the respective utterance.

5.2

Prototypes and schemata

The contextual interpretation of word senses becomes most obvious with drastically indexical expressions such as prepositions. If we asked a native speaker to explain the semantic distinction between over and above, the speaker would be incapable of providing us with a systematic rule. In contrast to this, we can induce the distinguishing semantic characteristics from the following contexts in which the prepositions over and above are used: (5.6)

The plane is flying over the Sahara.

(5.7)

The plane is flying above the clouds.

In (5.6) the preposition over expresses where the plane is flying in the H O R I Z O N T A L dimension, that the plane is flying over the Sahara and not over the sea. In (5.7) the preposition above expresses the height of the plane in the V E R T I C A L dimension, that the plane is flying above the clouds and not below. We will elaborate how speakers distinguish the relevance of these dimensions in the respective discourse context below in section 7.3. Speakers achieve the interpretation of an utterance during the semantic evaluation by comparing actually occurring tokens of lexical

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units with their mentally stored type concepts (cf. Gentner and Medina, 1998, 264f.; Brown, 1998, 301). These conceptual types are mental abstractions of previously experienced tokens. In this way conceptual types are theoretical hypotheses of speakers following from a significant frequency of tokens. The similarity standards which drive the subsumption under a common type concept establish the speakers' knowledge representation system (cf. Gentner and Rattermann, 1991). In locational domains conceptual types represent the speakers' prototypes. Speakers represent locational domains by the regions covered by the autonomous extension of prototype concepts (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 152ff.). A prototypically organized concept is graded from a typical centre to a nontypical periphery of a region (cf. Clausner and Croft, 1999, 3). In the periphery concepts are vague, as there is a continuous transition between similar concepts in the neighbourhood region. Our initial example of the noun cup in chapter 1 is a case in point. Prototypes are not only a matter of frequent experience of tokens and 'goodness of fit' between type and token. Prototypes are also a matter of functional relevance (cf. Ahn, 1998; Bloom, 1998; Brown, 1998), which they receive within the speakers' representations of their environment. In configurational domains conceptual types represent the speakers' generalizations over instances (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 152ff.). T H R E E DIMENSIONAL space is a typical example of configurational domains. The SCALES of length, breadth, width, height provide variables on one or more dimensions, the particular values of which are configured in dependence on the autonomous meanings of those predications to which they are contextually related. Thus the configuration of high achieves quite different values as the modifier of heel or tower. The conceptual type of high is graded by the specific size which is a component of the conceptual types of heel and tower. The variables of configurational domains provide abstract schemat a establishing the disposition of the conceptualizer that enables them to construct instances. Through this disposition speakers are capable of anticipating and finding contextually fitting information which unifies with their schematic knowledge and which thereby configures its specific value. Schemata thus represent in particular spatial variables

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capable of configuring the relative sizes and shapes of almost all objects in the speakers' environment. The representation of a schema was originally put forth by the psychologist Bartlett (Bartlett, 1932) and was further developed by his followers (Rumelhart, 1975; Rumelhart, 1980). The original idea of Bartlett's schema representation is still used in current psychology, as well as in discourse analysis and artificial intelligence (AI): a schema represents the stereotypical organizations of events. In cognitive linguistics image schemata are assumed to represent the speakers' bodily based experiences. These experiences organize domains stereotypically, such as the relation between the V E R T I C A L a n d t h e H O R I Z O N T A L DIMENSION a n d t h e F R O N T a n d B A C K O R I E N -

in the domain of S P A C E (cf. Langacker, 1991, 399ff.; Lakoff, 1987, 267; Johnson, 1987, 18ff.; Heine, 1997, 90fF.). In our bottom-up and top-down directed processing of word senses in discourse domains both notions of a schema will become relevant. In a third interpretation we will make use of Langacker's notion of schematizing along a hierarchy of concepts (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 378f.), as developed in section 5.8 below. The economy of our integrative and dialectical representation consists in the assumption that only when context-independent knowledge proves to be insufficient is contextual knowledge used incrementally for flexible inferences. The successful interpretation of word senses within this multi-directional and recursive process consists in the speakers' evaluating their mental representations by firstly matching them against their own knowledge about word senses, secondly by negotiating their own mental representations with other speakers' representations, and thirdly, by verifying their own representations against their successful functioning in the overall environment. Thus it is coherent with our philosophical reconciliation between extensional and intensional semantics that we consider conceptual types to be hypothetical and hence to be evaluated continuously against newly incoming information. By evaluating their hypotheses, speakers may either verify and preserve them, or they will have to revise them in accordance with the specific contextual information. It is obvious that, within this continuous evaluation, similarity between stimulus information and stored knowledge is not an invariant relation, but a TATION

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context-dependent one in that the speakers' focus of attention is selectively oriented towards the contextually relevant dimensions of an instance (cf. Nosofsky, 1986; Sperber and Wilson, 1995). Linguistic interpretation may not be reduced to the recognition of information as being sufficiently similar to the speakers' stored knowledge. It rather enables effective reasoning in which prototypes and schemata become identified as emergent representations. In this way knowledge becomes incorporated in information processing (cf. Keil, 1989). Thus, while prototypes are assumed to represent a typical core as the unification of token concepts (cf. Geeraerts et al., 1994, 45ff.; Herskovits, 1986, 25, 90f.; Langacker, 1987a, 49ff.), schemata allow for the economical processing of information along the conceptual type hierarchy in that different levels of schematization - i.e. differently finegrained mental models - become relevant in the respective discourse situation. We consider both schemata and prototypes to be economical mental categorizations by which speakers control and integrate the immensely variegated and notoriously ambiguous information. Thus, in spite of the structural continuity which semantic categories embody at their borderlines, it is perfectly legitimate for linguists to abstract semantic categories as discrete states, provided that they account for the contextual integration by which their economical and flexible unification is guaranteed. On this view, semantic categories do not represent structural primitives: their function derives from their paradigmatic relations within the speakers' hierarchical knowledge representation and from their compositional relations by which unification occurs along the syntagmatic dimension. A purely schema-based processing of meaning has proved too rigid because in most cases there is no common schematic representation which may generalize over all possible instantiations. This observation is reflected in the Wittgensteinian idea of family resemblances (cf. above section 2.6; Wittgenstein, 1977a, §§139-141; §138; §§146149), which has received confirmation through the empirical results of prototype semantics (cf. Rosch and Mervis, 1975), and is most illuminatingly brought to life in the radial networks of Lakoff (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 83ff.). Psychologically, family resemblances refer to perceptual similarities between central and peripheral tokens of a conceptual type. Thus family resemblances are an alternative to necessary and sufficient

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conditions, in that each member resembles at least one other member of the concept's family resemblance structure. Different concepts of a lexical unit may equally be interrelated in a family resemblance network which represents a typical concept in the centre from which less typical concepts depart (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 430ff.). The point is that the similarity relations between polysemous senses are not necessarily transitive: if sense A is semantically related to sense B, and sense Β to sense C, a relation between A and C does not necessarily hold. To illustrate this potential lack of transitivity let us consider the relations between the senses of school: if we relate the C O N T E N T sense represented by the teachers and pupils to the P R O C E S S sense corresponding to the teaching and learning from a synchronic perspective, the C O N T A I N E R sense of school does not necessarily follow from the P R O C E S S sense as a consequence of the P R O C E S S sense being related to the C O N T E N T sense, because the P R O C E S S of school may take place outdoors. Analogously, there is no synchronic relation from the PARADIGM sense of school to the building as a C O N T A I N E R . The potential lack of transitivity between polysemous senses is an important feature of the family resemblance idea. Prom this it follows that speakers do not necessarily interrelate several polysemous senses by a single schema, but rather by several schemata. The reason is that diachronically the relations between polysemous senses are determined pragmatically by the speakers' communicative needs (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 64). Hence the number of schematic generalizations and thereby the degree of lexical redundancy cannot be a purely logical objective for the linguist. The limitations imposed on the organization of the lexicon result from socio-cultural conventions which cannot be captured in terms of fully regularized behaviour that is subsumed under a rigid rule scheme. Finally, the exclusive assumption of schemata has often proved these to be too coarse-grained and rigid for explaining the speakers' economical information processing: schemata do not enable speakers to draw inferences in sufficiently flexible ways (cf. Whitney, 1987; Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980). A case in point is the interpretation of DIMENSIONAL adjectives and prepositions. As configurational categories prepositions are crucially context-dependent. Hottenroth represents the contextual interpreta-

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tion of the French preposition dans in a family resemblance network (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 214f.). Although she assumes the interpretation of the preposition to be a function of a lexical disposition from which speakers instantiate all and only the possible representations in the respective context (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 183), she does not represent the lexical meaning of dans by an abstract schema generalizing over all possible contextual instantiations. Instead she assumes more specific semantic abstractions, among which the central schema of dans represents only a certain range of prototypical uses (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 207). Prom this abstraction the assumed instantiations are projected by a small number of cognitive principles known from object conceptualization and categorization in general. Thus Hottenroth takes the most typical interpretation of dans to relate something to a T H R E E - D I M E N S I O N A L hollow object materially bounded at all sides (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 190f.). From this complete enclosure she assumes speakers to project in various ways complete closures onto objects which themselves are only PARTIALLY B O U N D E D or U N B O U N D E D , e.g. by the principle of "Gestaltschließung" as in the following examples (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 192): (5.8)

Les peches dans le hol "The peaches in the bowl"

(5.9)

La viande dans I'assiette "The meat on the plate"

Hottenroth assumes another projection to occur from a T H R E E - D I M E N SIONAL hollow object materially bounded at all sides to U N B O U N D E D M A S S concepts, as in the following examples (cf. Hottenroth, 1 9 9 3 , 199):

(5.10)

les galaxies dans I'espace "the galaxies in space"

(5.11)

la vie dans I'univers "life in the universe"

Projections may furthermore be achieved from T H R E E - D I M E N S I O N A L to T W O - D I M E N S I O N A L or O N E - D I M E N S I O N A L B O U N D E D concepts, as in the following examples (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 199ff.):

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(5.12)

le point dans le cercle "the point in the circle"

(5.13)

I'intervalle dans la ligne "the break in the line"

Hottenroth relates the different interpretations of the preposition dans in a family resemblance network (without using this term), where the nodes correspond to the interpretations and the arcs correspond to the cognitive principles projecting the interpretations (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 214f.). It is a question of how much these cognitive principles may be generalized in order to represent the predication of spatial relations beyond those predicated by the preposition dans (cf. Hottenroth, 1993, 181). The more general such principles would prove to be, the less redundant the structure of the lexicon could then be designed.

5.3

Centre vs. periphery of a conceptual region

The centre of prototypical concepts arises from several related criteria which represent conceptual components as conventional, generic, intrinsic and unique (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 159ff.). The criterion for the conventionality of a concept is its regular use by a speech community. The conventionality of a semantic value results from the degree of its involvement in social interaction on the basis of which it is accepted by a speech community. This is especially obvious with prepositions the correct application of which is difficult to learn and often even ignored by speakers. The relational concepts of prepositions differ not only across languages, but also across dialects of one and the same language. One example is the distinction between the German prepositions zu and nach ("to"). Both are used with the G O A L roles of M O T I O N verbs. Zu relates an A G E N T moving along a P A T H to a H U M A N or D E F I N I T E G O A L which is conceptualized as a P O I N T or B O U N D E D region (cf. Kempcke, 2000; Wahrig, 1980), whereas nach expresses a D E F I N I T E D I R E C T I O N without implying a boundary (cf. Langacker, 1991, 402), as in the following examples: (5.14)

a.

Ich gehe zu Oma. "I am going to grandma."

Centre vs. periphery of a conceptual region

(5.15)

b.

Ich gehe zum Briefkasten. "I am going to the letter-box."

c.

Sie flogen zum Mond. "They were flying to the moon."

a.

Ich fahre nach England. "I am going to England."

b.

Sie geht nach Hause. "She is going home."

115

Yet, even in context we may observe a high degree of vagueness concerning the semantic distinction between zu and nach. INSTITUTIONS are generally represented by their H U M A N M E M B E R S , and, as a consequence, may be used with VOLITIONAL verbs. But even with "welleducated" speakers we may observe a high tendency to use nach, for instance when going to a department store: (5.16)

Lafi uns nach Karstadt

gehen!

"Let us go to Karstadt!" The standard German expression would nevertheless be the following: (5.17)

Laß uns zu Karstadt gehen! "Let us go to Karstadt!"

The use of nach in (5.16) has been extended in colloquial speech to be used in a more general sense for the A C T I V I T Y of visiting an INDIVIDUAL H U M A N being. Thus with this example we may observe that the convention of using zu when visiting HUMANS as expressed by the standard German sentence in (5.18) is not respected by a large number of speakers, who instead use the substandard expression illustrated in (5.19): (5.18)

Ich gehe zu Oma. "I am going to grandma."

(5.19)

? Ich gehe nach Oma. "I am going to grandma."

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The obvious reason is that the semantic distinction between zu and nach is conceptually less central to a large number of speakers. Genericity depends on the degree of schematic elaboration of a sense within the conceptual type hierarchy: the more coarse-grained a semantic value is, the more it is viable to become accepted as conceptually central; the more specific it is, the more it tends to be shared only by a specialized number of speakers. Different reference-point alignments of window are conventionalized by the compounds window-pane and window-frame (cf. Cruse, 1986, 159f.). On the one hand, the lexicalization of P A R T S occurs on account of the greater expressive force of these explicit designations. On the other hand these reference-point alignments are too fine-grained to become conventionalized metonymic distinctions of window. Thus the more generic representation of window is conceptually more central than the more specialized representations of the compounds designating the corresponding P A R T S . The more decontextualized a sense can be represented, i.e. less context is needed to categorize an instance of the type concept, the more intrinsic is the relation between the lexical unit and its meaning, i.e. the more context-independent the relation between type and token is represented. Langacker mentions S H A P E as being a very intrinsic property, "as it reduces to the relations between the P A R T S of an object and does not require interaction or comparison with other entities" (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 160f.). Behavioural characteristics are least intrinsic in Langacker's list of examples, as they are most context-dependent, i.e. they come about only by interaction with other behavioural entities. This is also in line with the social, interactional view, which considers the centrality of A C T I O N S to depend on the speakers' behaviour within their environment and on the direction in terms of which they represent the relation between source and target sense of a polysemous lexical unit. There axe further principles of intrinsic conceptualization. A relaxed version of meaning postulates is implemented in the mental lexicon: Q U A L I T I E S are H O M O G E N E O U S in themselves, such as silken, hard, transparent, although distributed heterogeneously across entities and situations. In the case of a PRIVATIVE conceptualization there can be neither a SPATIAL nor a T E M P O R A L extension, nor can any other positive semantic value be assumed, as with gap, lack, absence (cf. chapter

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6 below). E X T E N S I O N does not apply to negative polarity. The speakers' schematization along the conceptual type hierarchy is relatively intrinsic to their worldview, depending on the potential falsifiability of their representations. For instance the hierarchical representation of natural kinds, such as tree as a hyponym of plant, is represented fairly context-independently. These are examples of cognitive constraints, which, by not being socially determined, are intrinsically wired into the lexical representation of meaning. Uniqueness captures the notion of some category being necessary and sufficient in its weak sense in order to apply. Here again Langacker gives S H A P E as an example (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 160), in that it is unique to the respective category and therefore sufficient for the identification of an instance. Thus the prototypical centre of concepts may be empirically represented as follows. Conventionalization may be represented along the social dimension of the speech community. Genericity may be represented by schematizing along the conceptual type hierarchy. Intrinsicness depends on the hierarchical representation of hyponymy and meronymy, i.e. P A R T - W H O L E relationships (cf. Cruse, 1986, 157ff.). Finally, the uniqueness criterion is least viable of being violated within the speakers' negotiation of a referential representation. Computationally speaking this way in which a semantic value gains centrality may be computed analogously: the more coarse-grained a semantic value is with respect to its position within the conceptual type hierarchy, the more generic it is and the more it is suspected of having a higher degree of conventionality than any more fine-grained semantic values of the entity at issue. Intrinsicness and uniqueness may be compared to Putnam's core facts about natural kinds (cf. Putnam, 1977a, 117). 5.4

Linguistic vs. encyclopedic meaning

On account of the recursive nature of mental representations, speakers are capable of evaluating any lower-level representation by a higherlevel representation. From this assumption it follows that we cannot distinguish between linguistic and encyclopedic meaning in a principled way (cf. Dahlgren, 1988). Instead, schematization accounts for lower-level vs. higher-level representations. Analogously, the strict

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separation between literal and non-literal meaning is not at issue in cognitive linguistics, as will become clear when we deal with the representation of metaphors below (cf. section 8.3). Thus our view is clearly incompatible with the generativist notion developed in the context of the two-level approach introduced by Bierwisch and Lang (cf. Bierwisch, 1989; Lang, 1989; Lang, 1993; Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992). In their view a schema represents a semantic parametrization at the linguistic level of the lexicon which provides for the generation of a family of concepts at the conceptual level. The crucial point is that the semantic parameters are instantiated by conceptual representations, which are achieved contextually by the speakers' world knowledge and thus are distinguished from and processed after the speakers' semantic representations encoded in the linguistic lexicon. As a consequence, several polysemous senses are contextually instantiated concepts of one and the same schematic structure represented in the lexicon as part of the grammar at the linguistic level. The economy of this modular and sequential generation of representations has in fact initiated its prevailing status in computational linguistics and in artificial intelligence (cf. e.g. Sowa, 1993; Pribbenov, 1993; Krieger and Nerbonne, 1993; Habel et al., 1989). In contrast to this, we consider context-dependent and contextindependent knowledge to interact closely during the whole process of interpretation. We deny the strictly sequential fashion of information processing which assumes a principled difference between modules of representation. Rather, in accordance with the psycholinguistic observations put forth in the previous chapter, we claim that due to its economical principles, information processing is only a weakly sequential and weakly interactive, yet highly complex process, in which after perception all levels and components interact in top-down and bottomup as well as in forwards and backwards directed processes, these processes being themselves highly recursive (cf. Hirst, 1988; Prather and Swinney, 1988). Instead of distinguishing between linguistic and encyclopedic representation, we assume meaning to evolve in discourse domains from lexical representations with the greatest degree of autonomy to lexical representations with the greatest degree of context dependence. Lexical meanings thus apply probabilistically, as they are constantly developing by contextual influence. That is, lexical mean-

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ings apply non-monotonically, as lower-level representations may be invalidated by higher-level representations. By recognizing that the borderline between the speakers' knowledge representation system and the environmental information is in continuous flux, we cannot distinguish between semantics and pragmatics in principle. This integrative view on the interpretation of meaning anticipates the failure of the generative lexicon, which intends to infer logical polysemies by type coercion rules (cf. Pustejovsky, 1995; Boguraev and Briscoe, 1989; Lascarides et al., 1995; Pranks, 1995). The generative idea of type coercion is that polysemous lexical units are lexically encoded with logical types. Logical types represent the alternative grammatical contexts corresponding to the polysemy of a lexical unit. The term logical polysemy thus implies its non-redundant lexical representation in favour of economy. Instead of listing all senses of a lexical unit, these are generated by compositional rules which shift the default sense by coercion. For instance verbs expecting a PROCESS, such as finish, shift the semantic type of its complement by coercion, as in the following examples of book and cigarette: (5.20)

a. b.

Let me finish the book. Let me finish the cigarette.

As with a verb's argument structure, the structured representations of the nouns book and cigarette may be composed as T E L I C roles with the "privileged" actions of reading and smoking. In (5.20) book and cigarette may accordingly be coerced to the interpretations of these T E L I C roles (cf. Pustejovsky, 1993, 88ff.). It is consistent with the generative lexicon that the study of preferences is not the objective of lexical semantics, but is left to pragmatics (cf. Briscoe et al., 1990, 43). In this context we may also mention Melcuk, who makes lexical distinctions on the assumption of a principled distinction between linguistically relevant meaning on the one hand and encyclopedic meaning on the other (cf. Melcuk and Polguere, 1987; Iordanskaja and Melcuk, 1990). He defines the former as having some bearing on other lexical units, such as influencing the processes of metaphorical and metonymic extensions at the level of linguistic meaning. He mentions W H I T E as a linguistically relevant dimension of snow, because this quality obtains a symbolic value in idiomatic expressions and metaphors, for instance in as white as snow (cf. Melcuk, 1988, 180f.).

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In contrast to the logical coercion of word senses and the distinction between linguistic and encyclopedic meaning, our non-deterministic approach to the representation of family resemblance networks relies on the speakers' negotiations of the communicatively relevant meanings (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Dahlgren, 1988). Speakers unify lexicon and grammax in propositional representations and infer the relevant implicit information from their analogous representations. On the assumption that lexical polysemy is organized in terms of domains, there is more redundancy between lexicon and grammar than assumed by the adherents of the generative lexicon. A more exhaustive lexical representation has to be assumed to account for the process of metaphorical extension as being a shift between domains. Metonymically related senses have to be represented at the level of the lexicon as we take them to provide essential coherence relations for semantic domains at the level of the discourse, and they do this, among other things, by being divided into autonomous and dependent predications. Thus we do not represent the ad hoc polysemies of book and cigarette at the level of the lexicon but infer them from the analogous representations in the mental model, as already explained above. The conventionalized polysemy of school is of course represented in the lexicon. Redundancy accounts for the developmental stage of the lexicon on the one hand and allows for certain pragmatically grounded idiosyncratic constraints on the other. Most importantly, the continuity of reference rules out any generative approach to the semantic lexicon, as linguistic rules have to be continuously adapted to the experience of the speakers' environment, such that the experienced reference to perceived reality must be taken to feed back to the rules. Each referential procedure, by its integration into the already created representation, effects a revision, such that under a strong assumption there is only reference, sense being only a methodological vehicle by which the multitude of reference procedures is controlled.

5.5

Top-down inheritance

In order to represent the speakers' intentional semantic interpretation we have to consider the composition procedure by which speakers integrate the components into a composite whole. It is indisputable that the meaning of a complex utterance is composed of the meanings of

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121

its components. In addition it is always the integration of an utterance into a specific discourse situation which, by top-down inheritance, achieves the unique identification of all referential relationships. The meaning of the composite whole is not the mere sum of the meanings which the components contribute to it. Instead, the meaning of the components is ultimately determined by the structure and functioning of the whole system within the specific discourse situation. Thus, each piece of information is evaluated in relation to the knowledge system and thereby is sanctioned by the system as a whole or - if unusual, but compatible with the situation of discourse - may modify the whole system. In principle there are no situations which are completely alike so that humans access new pieces of information at any time. Although relying on existing knowledge without which no reasoning would be possible, they continuously amplify existing knowledge by contextually rendered novel information, whereby their knowledge representation system is developed into a higher-order form of representation. In order to be capable of processing the experienced situation in terms of conventionalized cognitive knowledge, speakers access the relevant information for evaluating the corresponding expression as used in a richly specified situation. This relation between the conventionalized structure of systems and the situational environment in which they are used gives rise to the emergence of novel qualities which (re)organize the meaning of a complex expression (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 454ff.). This relation is responsible for the fact that language performance does not proceed in a strictly compositional fashion. Language is a self-regulating open system created by the permanent exchange of information with its environment. Thus linguistic processing is self-regulative in that it is goal-directed in a principled way. An utterance can only be endowed with sense by the listener actively recognizing the speakers' intention. Speakers therefore continuously reorganize their knowledge along the following dimensions along which open systems develop (cf. Fleischer, 1990, 38; Schweizer, 1979, 87ff.)· Linguistic understanding is essentially referential. Reference is achieved by the system-internal representation of system-external information. With their referential representation speakers integrate their subjective behaviour into the objective environment. This inte-

122 Representing mental categorization gration is achieved by discriminating and coordinating behaviour which is coherent through time. Interactionism reflects the overall interaction of speakers with their environment. Interactionism embodies the most basic principle of system development: system-external components establishing the environment of system-internal components become subsumed to be part of the system at the next higher level of the speakers' knowledge representation. Composition is thereby achieved by integrating the components instead of purely calculating their sum. The systeminternal variation which occurs on the previous level of organization is thereby reduced to become more constrained on the next higher-order level of organization. That is, each higher-order development creates an increase in organization. In order to know the truth conditions which a particular situation imposes on the respective linguistic utterance, speakers represent linguistic utterances in at least two ways. They build their propositional representations directly from explicitly uttered information in a linear fashion and in addition build an analogous representation of the experienced situation (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983). It is essentially on the basis of the relational structure (cf. Gentner and Toupin, 1986) that these mental models are analogous to the speakers' perceived information on the one hand and to their existing knowledge on the other. According to Sperber and Wilson communication crucially consists in selecting the relevant information within the relevant context of discourse (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995). It seems to be an efficient characteristic of natural language understanding to reduce one's mental model precisely to the relevant components of both knowledge and information. Only if speakers recognize the relations so far represented to be insufficient, will they flexibly widen their mental model. The ability to represent the relevant relations in very economical ways seems to be an essential characteristic of human cognition and thus prerequisite of natural language processing. Based on their mental models, speakers can infer implicit information which has not been explicitly mentioned. By relying on holism the continuity of reference is taken care of: language cannot be explained as a static structure, but only as a dynamic activity, with variations between the states in which senses are mentally fixed. The sum of these variations defines the range of plas-

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ticity of a category's periphery. Holism also accounts for how linguistic meaning is processed as part of some broader cognitive routine and in terms of a flexible, multi-directed process. This implies a broad notion of compositionality and context. Only by evaluating the overall context, comprising socio-cultural and psychological interactions between speakers in specific situations, can linguistic descriptions account for the complexity of the cognitive representations in communication. In these cognitive representations flexibility and creativity are outstandingly complex problem-solving activities. Flexibility includes the mental closure created by the completion of partial information 2 in elliptical constructions representing ad hoc metonymies and by the completion of non-perceived information. The emergence of novel word senses can only be evaluated in accordance with productive cognitive schemata fitting the respective discourse situation. These cognitive schemata rely on all situationally relevant components of the conceptual encyclopedia (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1982), and only on these. This relational and relative nature of word meaning on the one hand, and the methodological requirement of discrete senses on the other suggest the compromised image of the lexicon functioning as interface within this encyclopedia (cf. Strohner, 1990, 165), which by relating to all knowledge resources can be moved in many directions within the system and its environment. To achieve linguistic flexibility and creativity concepts are by necessity lexically vague and thus provide the variations between the activities by which speakers fix the actual senses. Methodologically this means that we assume a distinction between concept, referent and sense (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 396ff.; Strohner, 1990, 53f., 102, 122E): 1. Concepts are lexically encoded types or their contextually inferred extensions. Conceptual types provide abstract semantic representations, which on being activated enable speakers to understand the actually occurring tokens. Conceptual types either provide their representations directly or through these representations being inferred from some analogous related conceptual type, as with the following ad hoc extension of ham sandwich: 2

Langacker refers to this activity as the "closure phenomenon" (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 106f.).

124 Representing mental categorization (5.21)

The ham sandwich is getting impatient, because she wants to pay her bill.3

It is most evident that the VOLITIONAL ACTIVITY of getting impatient cannot be predicated of a ham sandwich. The necessary condition for the listeners' inferring the intended semantic ad hoc extension is the contextual support provided by the adequate discourse domain, i.e. the domain in which a ham sandwich may refer to a VOLITIONAL AGENT. We will see how the restaurant domain supports this inference contextually. 2. The referent is the perceived external information with which the instantiated type concept becomes associated. The achievement of this relation is in no way a trivial activity, as may be suspected from the conceptual type necessary for the ham sandwich use in example (5.21). Successful reference is the condition for the relation to make sense. Yet where do speakers take the conceptual type from in cases like the ham sandwich is getting impatient? 3. Sense only results from the association between concept and referent within the speakers' mental model of the discourse situation, i.e. by relating the concept with all components of their knowledge that are relevant in the respective situation. If this results in a coherent structure, the concept may be integrated within the speakers' mental model representation. On account of this integration, based on its relations with the situationally relevant components of knowledge and information is a concept really used and endowed with sense. In this way lexically vague concepts are adjusted to the specific requirements of each individual discourse situation. Speakers may infer the HUMAN AGENT sense of ham sandwich by the using their knowledge of the restaurant domain and by applying the well-conventionalized metonymic rule by which they are licensed to project the POSSESSED ham sandwich to the customer as the HUMAN POSSESSOR. We may paraphrase the result of this projection by the following: 3 It was Nunberg (cf. Nunberg, 1979, 149) and Lakoff and Johnson (cf. Lakoff, 1980, 35) who introduced this type of metonymy, and I am indebted to them for having inspired me in proceeding from such drastic cases.

Top-down inheritance (5.22)

125

The customer who is eating the ham sandwich is getting impatient.

By exhausting the principle of analogy speakers steadily develop the linguistic system towards a homoeostatic balance. This is achieved by a higher degree of organization. The understanding of novel information always proceeds by analogy to existing knowledge (cf. JohnsonLaird, 1983, 447), such that the speakers' existing knowledge is continuously widened by newly acquired information. Yet cognition does not consist in pure knowledge acquisition of discrete states of affairs. Instead, speakers may also stabilize their existing knowledge using the information perceived or, vice versa, new information may weaken existing knowledge. Cognition results in an increase of knowledge through categorization and differentiation. This is the basic feature of natural systems as introduced by de Saussure, the founder of structural linguistics (cf. Saussure, 1967). The basic principles of structure building are identification, differentiation, and opposition. Feedback mechanisms arise from effects or influences on systemexternal components which feed back on their causes. These causes arise system-internally. Speakers process a complex utterance on the basis of this interaction and thereby eventually integrate the components into a composite whole. With increasing knowledge speakers can better access the contextually and communicatively relevant components of their knowledge. This ability may be partly explained by the hierarchical representation of their knowledge. This hierarchical representation stabilizes the structure of systems in that all effects are inherited from the most basic to the highest level of representation, although at each level novel qualities may emerge which cannot be predicted from the structure and function of the components, but rather result from the structural-functional unity of the whole system. Yet another important cognitive mechanism receives support from the hierarchical representation: a linguistic component inherits its sense from higher-order components and inherits knowledge from lowerorder components. Sense is inherited from top to bottom, from the composite whole to the components. Sense is the result of integrating the referential representations into the overall knowledge of the dis-

126 Representing mental categorization course. Knowledge is inherited bottom-up, from the meanings of the lexical components to the composite whole. Finally, a feature's position within the hierarchical knowledge representation determines its semantic load: the higher a feature's position the higher its semantic load in terms of the degree of conventionalization by which it contributes to the stability and preservation of the knowledge representation system. The increase of semantic load with the increasingly higher-order position of features results from the increasing amount of features depending on the feature in the highestorder position. Language comprehension is conscious experience and as such proceeds in a recursive fashion (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 426). In this way speakers build mental representations of their own mental behaviour. Speakers continuously evaluate their mental representations: they evaluate the truth conditions of their mental models in order to relate them to the corresponding propositional representation. Human reasoning proceeds basically non-monotonic (cf. McDermott and Doyle, 1980), in that the number of inferences does not increase proportionally with the number of assumptions, because inferences made at earlier stages of a discourse may be invalidated and hence defeated by inferences made at later stages. Equi-finiteness consists in the possibility that the same result may be achieved by proceeding from different starting points. This corresponds to the assumption of cognitive linguistics that the order in which a linguistic representation is built is not necessarily deterministic, i.e. linguistic performance does not necessarily work in a procedural fashion. According to Langacker, for instance, speakers may enter a semantic network at different points, yet still achieve the same results (cf. Langacker, 1988a, 152; Fleischer, 1990, 38). 5.6

Categorization and t h e continuity of reference

It is for the sake of successful communication as well as for the sake of meta-linguistic analysis that we need to assume discrete states within the continuum of the speakers' knowledge representation system. This methodological requirement has to be considered at all levels of objectand meta-linguistic concern. On account of its continuity the speakers' knowledge representation enables the flexible processing of discrete

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127

pieces of information. Thus, vagueness in terms of the continuity between categories is a prerequisite for linguistic flexibility and economy. For cognitive linguistics this structural continuity is one of the major areas of interest and has been evidenced abundantly. Language is a necessary means for figuring out discrete instances against the continuous background of human knowledge (cf. Sowa, 1984, 345ff.). Continuity between "components" of the linguistic system mirrors human conceptualization at all levels of complexity. The qualitatively different components of grammar and lexicon represent two poles of a continuum. This is illustrated by dubious cases. Multi-word units such as idioms are a case in point as the meanings of their components only have a minor compositional function (cf. Gibbs, 1990). Contextually however, these multi-word units may behave like single words, for instance co-referentially or in translation: (5.23)

It is as easy as falling off a log! Das ist doch kinderleicht!

Here the multi-word idiom behaves like a single lexical unit, if one considers the comparative reference as well as the translation into the single lexical category kinderleicht in German. However, with this idiom, although it is processed as a single routinized structure, for purposes of analysis, the speaker might still intentionally become aware of how the individual words contribute to the meaning of the whole (cf. Gibbs, 1994, 162ff.), whereas the compositional function of other idioms is even more "frozen" or "dead". The structural continuum of language figures most clearly in lexicography. As is evident from the dispute about what should count as a word sense and about what criteria should be used to distinguish word senses, the distinction into word senses is not an exclusively objective process (cf. Geeraerts, 1993). This is not only experienced in lexicographic work, but also in the use of foreign language lexicons with similar purpose, such as the OALD (cf. Cowie, 1989) and COBUILD dictionaries (cf. Brown, 1996) which assume different word sense distinctions for many polysemous lexical units. That is, in many cases these lexicons differ in the granularity and order of sense distinctions. This variation across lexicons is due to the fact that words themselves behave variably and are not static containers for meaning, as mis-

128 Representing mental categorization takenly expressed abundantly by the conduit metaphor (cf. Reddy, 1993) in ordinary language use. For instance, when words are said to contain meaning or to be empty of meaning words are referred to as containers. Yet words axe not containers of meaning, but are dynamically processed by speakers and thereby provide access to a rich body of knowledge, which, within certain limits, varies between situations and speakers. These contextual variations may eventually result in the conceptual conventionalization of variation at the level of the lexicon. The conduit metaphor is an old inheritance of structural semantics. Its outstanding chaxacteristic is that it assumes a sharp distinction between linguistic competence and performance, the speakers' competence residing in their structural knowledge in terms of rules, while their performance consists in the functional application of these rules. The proponents of the conduit metaphor consider words to be static containers of intensions in terms of a fixed and exhaustive set of semantic properties, such that speakers can take the meanings out of their containers and put them back after having used them. On the basis of this assumption language is reduced to some primitive, rigid tool, not suitable for intentional, goal-directed actions. Intentional and goal-directed behaviour goes far beyond this container image. Cognitive semantics instead accounts for meanings not being fixed a priori, but as being represented by flexible and efficient negotiations between speakers and their interpretations in complex communicative interactions. Continuous learning is necessary, the mentally stored knowledge never suffices to manage the infinite potential of novel situations, which always impose new requirements on the speakers' linguistic capabilities. Therefore, in contrast to the conduit metaphor, the representation of meaning is never compositional in the strong sense - i.e. the meaning of the whole is never exclusively a function of the conventionalized meanings of its components - and linguistic utterances always create novel aspects of meaning, which render their communicative value. Speakers can interpret novel aspects of meaning without difficulty as their interactions are integrated in specific situations. The interpretation of partial and novel meanings is achieved by analogy with structurally similar previously experienced discourse situations. This linguistic behaviour gives rise to the continuity of reference. Prom this perspective, the distinction between system and environment

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is not an absolute one, but can only be made with respect to the specific situation, intention, purpose and other communicative criteria. By analogy to relaxing the dichotomy between system and environment, the distinction between polysemy, vagueness and indeterminacy also cannot be drawn irrespective of the particular purpose, discourse domain and application which word sense distinctions should serve (cf. Geeraerts, 1993),4 as it is always the speakers themselves who make the distinctions for their particular communicative objective. Johnson-Laird's criterion (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1987, 197) for the correct number of senses required in order to interpret and produce all possible uses of a word has therefore to be specified with respect to purpose, application and discourse domain. His conception of word meaning as consisting in the speakers' active representation of mental models is in sharp contrast with the conduit metaphor of structural linguistics. In each situation in which a specific word is used, a unique mental model is built up to enable its interpretation. It is this relation between the conventionalized structure of knowledge systems and the situational environment in which they are instantiated which gives rise to the emergence of novel qualities. In principle, the meaning of any complex expression may be reorganized in this way by the speakers' representation of a mental model (cf. Strohner, 1990, 32fF.). Having rejected the conduit metaphor and instead having accepted the continuity of reference along the continuous reorganization of knowledge the assumption of generation obviously becomes rejected, since it lacks the idea of feedback from the top of the knowledge system. Social negotiations and other pragmatically driven representations of mental models do not take part in the 'generation' of utterances. As soon as the notion of feedback is introduced, the set of rules also becomes infinite and flexibility and creativity are enhanced. One of the most basic notions of generative linguistics, its distinction between linguistic competence and performance, can no longer be maintained. The description of linguistic competence is not an issue in cognitive linguistics. The search for linguistic competence is an intuitionistic, introspective enterprise, since linguistic competence as such may not be accessed by the linguist. Linguistic evidence may only be achieved 4

A learner's dictionary makes different word sense distinctions than the Oxford English Dictionary working on historical principles.

130 Representing mental categorization by observing speakers performing linguistic actions (cf. section 2.10). The use of the term would be misleading, even more so, as competence by Chomsky's definition (cf. e.g. Chomsky, 1966, 62ff.) is developed by the child in relying on its innate language faculty. Cognitive linguistics strongly denies the separation into distinct mental modules and the corresponding innateness of their original biological faculties (cf. above, section 2.10). Instead, it favours general cognitive learning principles related not particularly to language, but to cognition in general. One of the most pervasive of these abilities consists of the speakers' sensorily based image schemata. On this view, it is linguistic flexibility and the creation of ever new semantic content which provides for the motivation and the delight of communication. Flexibility and creativity thereby are indispensable for the speakers' continuous creation of perspectives and purposes. If speakers were constrained in conveying what is contained in a container, they would be constrained accordingly in their representations of thoughts and theories, as well as in the solution of new problems. In short, speakers would be incapable of carrying out any of the abstract creative activities required by their rapidly changing world.

5.7

Categorization and referential integration

On account of the continuity of reference, linguistic processing essentially consists in integration, which enables the conceptualizer to compare and merge several linguistic components into one consistent, complex conceptualization. Along the syntagmatic dimension integration is constrained by selectional restrictions. Along the paradigmatic dimension integration occurs in accordance with grammatical default rules operating on the conceptual type hierarchies of different lexical units and phrases. By representing the speakers' processing of conceptual types we will account for their integration of basic semantic lexicalization patterns in specific discourse contexts. In doing this we distinguish, with Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 73ff.), between the paradigmatic schematic dimension, which one may conceive of as vertical in a hierarchical representation, and the syntagmatic dimension, which one may conceive of as horizontal in the composition of the linear sequence of an utter-

The hierarchical representation of categorization 131 ance.5 Along the syntagmatic dimension smaller linguistically manifested components axe sequentially integrated into larger composite structures. The semantic well-formedness of each composite structure depends on the valency relations (Langacker, 1987a, 277), by which the components' schematic meanings are unified. Thus, whereas along the syntagmatic dimension the crucial function is composition, along the paradigmatic dimension it is categorization. However, the unification of semantic content occurs both by composition and categorization: categorization consists of schematization into more fine-grained or more coarse-grained semantic categories as instantiated by contextual information. Along both the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic dimension categorization and composition interact by semantic extension, by projecting a conceptual type on account of the contextual requirements. In this way the prediction of novel structures is a crucial function, by which novel categorizations along the paradigmatic dimension become instantiated compositionally along the syntagmatic dimension. This contextual integration of concepts will be implemented throughout our work in terms of the mutual interaction between categorization and composition. 5.8

T h e hierarchical representation of categorization

In view of the enormously varied information which speakers have to process, the question arises as to how they represent the infinite nuances of word meanings. On the assumption that word meanings exhibit a dynamic organization, the long standing dispute about how many senses one should assume for a word dissolves. A reconciliation between diverging theories of word meaning is achieved, none of which alone can handle flexibility: • The Katz/Fodor tradition assumes word meanings to be containers for a fixed and finite set of semantic features that obligatorily apply on each occasion of usage by way of semantic decomposition (cf. Katz and Fodor, 1963). We have already rejected this approach on account of its rigid nature. • The network approach, as introduced by Quillian (cf.Quillian, 1968), implies that the meaning of a word may be explained by 5

Although the basic idea, of course, goes back to de Saussure.

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relating it to other words through semantic associations. By doing this, however, the network adherents cannot explain how the extension of a word is determined by the process of reference. This accomplishment must be explained in terms of more basic concepts (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 212ff.). In fact, this can only be achieved by supplementing the relations between the components of the system by notions which in some way transcend the object language and thereby achieve a kind of meta-language. This meta-language would have to account for the speakers' general cognitive disposition to learn a natural language as well as for its creative use. • The meaning-postulate proponents assume no representation of lexical meanings at all, but instead only inferences of the kind: if Β is a FATHER, then it must be a H U M A N M A L E entity; all H U MAN entities are VOLITIONAL, SO Β must also be VOLITIONAL. This theory again seems implausible, since there must be structured meaning representations to begin with, in order to know the relation of a meaning to other meanings from its integration within the overall structure. Obviously, speakers mentally represent conventionalized meanings in terms of cognitive routines, which do not need to be inferred on every occasion of use (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 237). The same holds for the Katz/Fodor proposal: the decomposition into features also seems unlikely to occur with well-conventionalized meanings. Of course, these cognitive routines are neither necessary nor sufficient, but have the status of hypotheses. The speakers may consciously evaluate their routines through comparison with the situation at hand and inferences may be drawn if necessary (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1987, 193). None of these well-established theories is able to cope with what has traditionally been called "anomaly", which we pursue here under the notion of creativity. Thus we will represent concepts by semantic features which, however, do not apply in the sense intended by Katz/Fodor in dependence on a fixed set of deterministically applying conditions. The contextually adequate features effecting the sense are instantiated by the context providing the relevant encyclopedic relations by which

The hierarchical representation

of categorization

133

the speakers represent the discourse situation. These encyclopedic relations consist in the relations between the entities to which the lexical units of the utterance refer. But in contrast to the network approach these are structured representations which in turn are integrated within structures. The mental representation of meaning thus follows the conceptual type hierarchy along different levels of abstraction in that at each level of abstraction the respective type is schematic in relation to the type specialization it includes as a proper subset (cf. Langacker, 1 9 9 1 , 6 1 ) . Thus A N I M A T E is schematic in relation to the more specialized semantic category H U M A N . This general principle of a hierarchical knowledge representation corresponds to a disposition of the human mind. By this disposition speakers represent each lower-level representation at a higher level of representation. This hierarchical representation is enabled by the recursive function of the human mind (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1 9 8 3 , 18FF., 3 2 2 , 477) which embodies the criterion of human consciousness: by accessing a representation from a mentally higher level humans may become conscious of the lower-level representation. On this view linguistic categorization is a product of human consciousness, and is achieved in the following way. • A semantic representation is ultimately composed of semantic features; these, however, are not defined as primitives, but axe variables with respect to time and place and are constrained by other features in the network which thereby determine the meaning of a semantic feature. • Semantic features correspond to nodes in a network labelled with terms we know from our object language. The definitions which they receive by their position within the network, however, impose on them a meta-linguistic status. Thus, basic cognitive domains correspond to semantic features within the network representation on the one hand and to the most basic cognitive dispositions and their interrelations on the other. • The interrelations between semantic features hold with differing strength, depending on the epistemological status of their m e t a linguistic definition. Thus, the example of a meaning postulate linking F A T H E R , H U M A N M A L E and V O L I T I O N A L I T Y cannot be

134 Representing

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categorization

defeated if it makes any sense at all. Besides these relations other less basic relations may be defined as constituting empirically contingent defaults, thereby providing for the possibility of their being defeated. • Semantic features as conceptual categories are hierarchically structured, this hierarchy being exhausted by the speakers' cognitive disposition to schematize along the conceptual type hierarchy. Yet the hierarchical representation occurs by default. Although the conceptual type hierarchy is such a pervasive principle in human reasoning, Langacker leaves his explanation of the conceptual type hierarchy without any reference to its default processing (cf. Langacker, 1991, 61). 6 • The conceptual type hierarchy represents the speakers' continuous abstraction from reality: from the most basic, meta-linguistic categories at the lowest level of the speakers' cognitive dispositions to the most empirical categories at the top level of the conceptual type hierarchy, directly corresponding to some object expression used to refer to some real experience. This representation is both structure-preserving and structure-changing. Speakers could not understand their object-language if they did not have any assumption about how an utterance relates to reality (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 399ff.). This assumption includes, most importantly, knowledge about how the speakers' representations axe related to reality. From this we conclude that the most concrete relations in the type hierarchy have originally been iconic, i.e. the form has corresponded to an analogous representation of the world. By thus relating the mental representations of words to the mental representation of the world, this approach to linguistic meaning explains how speakers refer to the actually existing world. Instead of explaining this relation, the three theories criticized above, however, explain the intension of words autonomously (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 232), i.e. independently of the process of reference by which the extension of words is identified and steadily revised. On this view, although 6 Unfortunately, Langacker makes no reference to the notion of default assumptions, although the notion of default is undeniably part and parcel of his model.

Schematizing along the conceptual type hierarchy

135

we decompose word senses into features, our approach is fundamentally different from the deterministic Katz/Fodor approach. Our integration of the structure of senses within the overall structure of the conceptual encyclopedia and the discourse situation thus combines analytic and holistic methodologies. By representing word senses in this way we provide for interactive processing in that the features as categorial components of senses are assigned values by recursive, functional analysis, in which all compatible components are related among one another as well as to their relevant context. This is carried out until an integrated, coherent structure evolves in the absence of irresolvable conflicts.

5.9

Schematizing along the conceptual type hierarchy

Meta-linguistically the unification of the components' conceptual types into a composite whole presupposes the integrated representation of semantic categories. Semantic categories represent an ordered set related by hierarchy, disjunction and conjunction. These relations ease referential integration in semantic categorization by the speakers' ability to schematize along the hierarchy of concepts. In all cases schematization along the hierarchical organization of concepts enables compositional unification. is the parameter along which speakers may conceptualize word senses in the contextually adequate degree of granularity by descending and ascending the conceptual hierarchy. A superconcept is schematic relative to its more elaborate instantiations. For instance, DIMENSION is the superconcept of 3 - D I M E N S I O N A L , as indicated in the following hierarchy:

1. SCHEMATICITY

DIMENSION

ι— ONE-D L·TWO-D L - THREE-D

Basic cognitive domains represent the lowest and thus the most general level of conceptualization. Hierarchical representations of word meanings may be compared at different levels of granularity and accordingly figure as identical, similar or different. is the principle according to which a schema as a conceptual generalization along the parameter of

2. SCHEMATIC T R A N S P A R E N C Y

136 Representing

mental

categorization

schematicity is always implied in its instantiations. Thus DIM E N S I O N is schematically transparent in the categorization of a T H R E E - D I M E N S I O N A L object. 3. Specialization in the vertical dimension of the type hierarchy and extension in the horizontal dimension are assumed as natural processes in the unification of partial information with complete information (cf. Briscoe et al., 1990). A special case are translational equivalents which, despite the schematic intensions of source and target language expressions being unified, differ in their semantic extensions. An example is the English noun control which corresponds to the more specialized equivalents Regelung, Steuerung, Bedienung in German. 4. The hierarchical relations between categories may help to resolve referential ambiguities, for instance between "given" and "new" (cf. Gawronska-Werngen, 1990; Fargues and Perrin, 1990). The resolution may be the condition for correct article selection when translating from a language which makes little use of articles into one which makes extensive use of articles. In the following example it may be inferred from the hyponymy relation existing between pets and cat in English, and analogously between Haustiere and Katze, that cat ("Katze") refers to an already introduced discourse object. As a consequence, cat is referred to by a definite NP, which is usually used to indicate the "given" in both English and German: (5.24)

Wir haben Haustiere. Hund Knochen.

Die Katze frißt Mäuse und der

We have pets. The cat eats mice and the dog eats bones. * Cats eat mice and dogs eat bones. The asterisk with the bare construction cats indicates the inadequateness of the translation, in which the indefiniteness of the hyponym designated by cats is interpreted generically through the cataphoric reference of the German NP die Katze to Haustiere not being taken into consideration. The identifying reference of the noun phrase die Katze can only be interpreted by anaphoric ref-

Schematizing

along the conceptual type hierarchy

137

erence as the hyponym of Haustiere. This shows the translational relevance of the conceptual type hierarchy. 5. Hierarchy is related to usage probability: between the level of basic categories and their specializations a higher degree of conceptual schematization relates to higher usage probability, while a higher degree of specialization relates to lower frequency, but higher degree of informativity (cf. Wu, 1990, 416). 6. Constraints and inheritance mechanisms may be expressed easily. Thus, in the following example the verb continue is lexically dependent on an argument expressing T I M E and inherits the more specific, hierarchically nested substructure of T I M E from the conceptual type of the nominal month·, month is lexically specified as referring to the domain of TIME, more specifically to an ACCOMPLISHMENT, i.e. it has lexicalized the sense of a B O U N D E D P E R I O D OF T I M E (cf. below, chapter 6 for a more detailed definition). By this inherited substructure the verb continue in turn unifies with the ACCOMPLISHMENT reading of class which becomes selected accordingly: (5.25)

Classes continue another

month.

7. The projection of polysemy relations based on semantic types may be done with more expressive force. Take again the hierarchically nested feature TIME, which is schematic in relation to its disjoint specializations BOUNDED and UNBOUNDED. B O U N D E D T I M E in turn specializes into the disjoint categories ACCOMPLISHMENT - implying a period - and ACHIEVEMENT implying the terminal point of a P E R I O D , as shown in the following representation: TIME

UNBOUNDED BOUNDED

-

ACCOMPLISHMENT ACHIEVEMENT

The disjoint categories of ACCOMPLISHMENT VS. ACHIEVEMENT are very frequently related metonymically, as in proposal, decision, solution. These nouns have lexicalized the logical relation that a period includes its ending point. From this metonymy type the ACHIEVEMENT sense may be inferred for lexical units which

138 Representing

mental

categorization

have not yet lexicalized this categorization and which thereby may be integrated into a compositional structure.

5.10

The unification-based formalism

According to Langacker, the way in which cognitive grammar achieves the integration of components into a composite structure makes it a unification-based model par excellence (cf. Langacker, 1991, 532). Therefore our formal representation of conceptual integration will rely on a unification-based formalism, as introduced by Martin Kay (cf. Kay, 1979; Kay, 1985). In terms of this formalism categorization occurs through the unification of attribute-value structures. At each level these structures consist of an attribute on the left-hand side and a value on the right-hand side, where the attribute represents a variable to be specified by a constant value. Values may be simplex or may again be complex attribute-value structures, as represented in the following attribute-value schema: "LU

Ν

Τ

[Β

A 0]

TR

Τ

[Β

Α Ε]

LM

Τ

[Β

A CD]

In this schematic attribute-value matrix the lexical unit LU is the only variable specified by a simplex value V. The attribute LU is conjoined by the attribute Τ, Τ being paired with the complex value consisting of the attribute-value pair Β A, to be read as: the attribute Β is a variable to be specified by the value A. The attribute-value pair Β A is instantiated by the innermost value of the complex value which elaborates the attribute LM. We indicate this inheritance of values across functions by boxed integers. In addition, the attribute TR is in conjunctive relationship to LU and LM, TR unifying with the complex value of the verbal predication consisting of the innermost attributevalue pair Β A. An attribute-value matrix thus represents the following: • Lexical units are associated with concepts represented by the simplex attribute-value pair LU PRED. This attribute-value pair is conjoined with a complex attribute-value structure.

The unification-based

formalism

139

• Contextual knowledge is presupposed by the functions T R and LM, again paired with structured concepts. • The unification of values with attributes occurs via paradigmatic top-down and bottom-up inheritance as well as via syntagmatic inheritance between the components of a composite structure as indicated by the boxed integers. We exemplify the formalism with the preceding example (5.25): "continue

5.10.1

VERB

TIME

BOUNDED

TR

TIME

[BOUNDED

ACCOMPLISHMENT

•]

LM

TIME

[BOUNDED

ACCOMPLISHMENT

•]

ACCOMPLISHMENT

• ]

Hierarchy

Hierarchy allows for the schematization along the conceptual type hierarchy to achieve the contextually adequate degree of granularity. Disjunctively related polysemies may be left schematically vague by the context, because the unifying semantic constraints are missing at the syntagmatic level. Thus the noun cover in (5.26) is vague with respect t o t h e CONCRETE o r ABSTRACT SEMIOTIC r e a d i n g , b o t h of w h i c h m a y

unify with the verb forget as is represented underneath the example: 7 (5.26)

Peter forgot the cover of the book. ? Peter vergaß den 'forget

TEMPPRED

TIME

BOUNDED

LM

ABSTRACTION

Buchumschlag.

ACHIEVEMENT] [ABSTRACT V

CONCRETE

111

The disjoint senses of cover may be schematized along the following hierarchy in which the ABSTRACT and CONCRETE path are in disjoint relationship: 7

For the content and organization of the domain hierarchy see section 6.1 below.

140 Representing mental

ABSTRACTION

- C

categorization |— SEMIOTIC L·INSTITUTION MENSURA L

SOCIAL

ABSTRACT

t

CONCRETE

MENTAL

We resolve the vagueness of cover by two alternate unification procedures: (5.27)

a.

Peter forgot to bring the cover of the book with him. Peter vergaß, den Buchumschlag

bring

[TEMPPRED

CONCRETE

MOTION

b.

ACHIEVE]

cover ABSTRACTION

LM

mitzubringen.

NOMPRED CONCRETE

Peter forgot what the cover of the book looked like. Peter vergaß, wie der Buchumschlag

look like

[TEMPPRED

ABSTRACT

SEMIOTIC

STATIVE]

cover TR

aussah.

ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED ABSTRACT

SOCIAL

SEMIOTIC

=1]

In (5.27a) cover establishes the L M of the C O N C R E T E M O T I O N verb bring, which in turn is the LM of forget. Hence the referent of cover has to be C O N C R E T E in order to unify with the C O N C R E T E M O T I O N predicated by bring. In (5.27b) the SEMIOTIC content of the verb look like unifies with the SEMIOTIC sense of cover functioning as its T R . This example is interesting in particular with respect to the issues of economy and flexibility, as it does not work very well in German and Dutch, but according to English native speakers is perfectly possible in English. That is, the German translation of (5.26) only implies the sense paraphrased in (5.27a) and not the paraphrase given in (5.27b). The question mark in (5.26) therefore indicates that the assumed German equivalent does not imply the German translation in (5.27b) but only the translation given in (5.27a).

The unification-based formalism

141

This is evidence for Langacker's assumption that verbs typically predicate CONCRETE PHYSICAL MOTION (cf. Langacker, 1991, 285f.), whereas ABSTRACT MOTION in t h e SOCIAL d o m a i n m a y well b e rep-

resented by English speakers, but in this case cannot be represented for (5.26) in German. (5.26) is an instance of incomplete information which speakers process by representing their mental model in order to infer not explicitly mentioned information. Grammatically, forget unifies with an infinitive clause in (5.27a) in which cover functions as CONCRETE LM following t h e CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT verb

bring

and relates to (5.26) by object-to-object raising. In contrast to this, (5.27b) is grammatically more marked: forget unifies with a w/ι-clause in which cover functions as TR preceding the ABSTRACT STATIVE verb look like and relates to (5.26) by object-to-subject raising. The marked grammatical construction implied by (5.26) thus may be explained typologically, in that the higher-animacy argument provided by Peter cross-linguistically tends to precede the lower-animacy argument provided by cover (cf. Croft, 1990, 112ff.; Wierzbicka, 1996, 421). As we have seen, German does not allow this marked grammatical construction. This observation corroborates the semantically more sophisticated development of the English language by virtue of its grammatical simplification as a non-case-marking language with a fixed word order. 5.10.2

Disjunction

Specialization by disjoint but related senses captures the fact that of two alternate specializations one and only one can apply in the respective context. This is accounted for by the disjunction relation illustrated by the disjoint specializations of cover in (5.27a) and (5.27b). Thus the metaphorical relation between the senses of cover is formally represented by the disjunctive relation in order to constrain the possible unifications. In the discourse context of (5.28) speakers relate the source sense of cover to its metaphorical target sense by an EVALUATIVE predication. Both senses of cover may become instantiated in the mental model of the discourse situation. This is represented by the disjunctive relation of the senses of cover at the propositional level, as represented underneath the example:

142 Representing (5.28)

mental

categorization

The cover on the book is

interesting.

NOMPRED ABSTRACTION

CONCRETE V

^ABSTRACT

^SOCIAL

SEMIOTIc]

Sentence (5.28) has to be treated as an instance of elliptical language use in which the source sense of the metaphorical projection is left implicit within the domain of discourse. If we resolve the ellipsis by making it explicit the noun cover relates two semantically contrasting senses. A S E M I O T I C sense indexically relates to its C O N C R E T E source sense, as represented underneath the examples. (5.29)

a.

The book has a cover.

coverl ABSTRACTION AG GR

b.

NOMPRED CONCRETE INTERN CONFIG E X T E R N BOUND

The cover is interesting

cover2

HETEROGEN COUNT

to read.

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

SOCIAL

AGGR

INTERN C O N F I G EXTERN BOUND

SEMIOTIC

1]

HETEROGEN COUNT J

Alternatively, the following sentence is semantically incoherent, since the prepositional phrase on top of demands the C O N C R E T E sense of book if cover is taken to refer to a book cover, and more specifically to the same book cover which the book is in: (5.30)

? The cover on top of the book is

interesting.

Polysemy is thus represented by structural correspondences and differences between senses. The semantic relations between the word senses

The unification-based

formalism

143

are represented by overlapping and disjoint categorizations. Overlapping sets of features represent the commonalities existing between semantically related senses, as cover illustrates in the domain of AGGREGATE. The disjoint features represent the polysemy of cover in the domain of ABSTRACTION. 5.10.3

Conjunction

CONJUNCTION allows for several semantic domains to represent the structure of one sense, thereby identifying it as well as distinguishing it from all other senses. In the contextual use of a conjunction one or more domains may be profiled against other domains serving as base. For instance, the noun research is conceptualized as extending without boundaries both in the domains of AGGREGATE and T I M E . The speakers' conceptualization of research as a MASS resides in the irrelevance of the boundaries in the domain of AGGREGATE. This is analogous to their conceptualization of the CONCRETE M A S S usually referred to by the noun water: in the same way in which they abstract away from all individual occurrences of water in lakes, rivers and other water CONTAINERS to achieve the conceptualization of a HOMOGENEOUS MASS, they mentally abstract from the discrete occurrences of individual research institutes to achieve the concept of the M A S S term research. The conceptualization of UNBOUNDEDNESS works in a similar fashion in the domain of TIME: speakers neglect any starting and ending points of individual, temporally limited but overlapping research projects. Both the domains of AGGREGATE and T I M E may be conceptualized with equal prominence as effected by the SPATIAL P P and the verbal predication of an A B S T R A C T M O T I O N in the domain of T I M E in (5.31). In (5.32) the noun research is profiled as the trajector within the E X TENDED landmark designated by Saarbrücken. Here the SPATIAL P P profiles the domain of AGGREGATE in the representation of research. In (5.33) the noun progress functions as TR in the NP any progress in research. Progress is a predication made in the domain of T I M E , whereby it profiles the domain of T I M E in the landmark elaborated by research. We have represented the profiles by bold typeface beneath the examples. These profilings do not imply a change in reference.

144 Representing (5.31)

mental

categorization

In Europe research in linguistics

always lags behind the US.

In Europa liegt die Forschung in der Linguistik den USA zurück.

(5.32)

•research

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

TIME

UNBOUNDED

AGGR

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

"research

(5.33)

hinter

SOCIAL CONVENTION] ACTIVITY] MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

Linguistic research in Saarbrücken ally oriented. Die linguistische erorientiert.

immer

is strongly

computation-

Forschung in Saarbrücken ist stark comput-

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

SOCIAL CONVENTION]

TIME

UNBOUNDED

AGGR

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

ACTIVITY] MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

Many people deny any progress in research. Viele Leute leugnen den Fortschritt "research

der

Forschung.

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

TIME

UNBOUNDED

SOCIAL CONVENTION

AGGR

'EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

ACTIVITY] MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

There are senses for which a conjunctive relation of the type hierarchymay be lexically irrelevant in principle. Thus, all nouns represent the

Distinguishing

lexical vagueness from polysemy

145

domain of AGGREGATE as one component, while only a subset represents the domain of TIME, a domain which is less typical of nominals, because it has been inherited in the derivation of nominal predications from verbal predications.

5.11

Distinguishing lexical vagueness from polysemy

At the beginning of this chapter we distinguished lexical polysemy from lexical vagueness as occurring with different lexical categories. The issues of lexical polysemy and lexical vagueness relate to one of the most central problems of lexical semantics. Is polysemy a case of lexical representation or rather a case of lexical vagueness and contextual differentiation? Or do we have both lexical polysemy and lexical vagueness, depending on the degree of conventionalization which the respective semantic function has undergone? This is of course the central question of this work. How can we identify discrete, qualitatively distinct senses of words and at the same time claim the continuity of reference to be an indispensable requirement of semantic performance? Or can we just settle this question by methodological needs, as Wilks suggests (cf. Wilks, 1988, vi): " . . . there never was any lexical ambiguity until dictionaries were written ... lexical ambiguity is no more or less than a product of scholarship: a social product ..." The overall objective to be pursued in this work is to find out how the division of linguistic labour between grammar and lexicon is implemented: What should be represented at the level of the lexicon and what should be computed by contextual functions? We will approach this central problem of lexical semantics by representing the grammatical behaviour of different lexical categories. The fact that one word may have more than one meaning basically originates from the requirement that one word must in principle be able to identify infinitely many reference points, i.e. infinitely many tokens must be subsumed under the same type concept. Language is by necessity economical, since it is impossible to create a new word for each individually occurring meaningful instance. Instead, referential variation is provided by different types of conceptual vagueness. Conceptual vagueness is one of the most essential and inscrutable characteristics

146 Representing

mental

categorization

of human language and thought. In this respect it remains crucially elusive to the linguist how semantic representations are accessed (cf. Leech, 1974, 123). The representation of vagueness is obviously a pragmatic requirement for the speakers' activity of imposing structure on the multitude of perceived information in economical ways, by negotiating the reorganization of the same concept in potentially infinitely many ways (cf. Fillmore, 1978, 169; McLure, 1990). It seems that we have come across one of the most basic cognitive dispositions: Vagueness is an inherent property of semantic representations. It represents the speakers' underlying continuum of knowledge from which their communicative ability of negotiating the relevant boundaries of meanings proceeds. We are referring to lexical vagueness for the sake of reference point variation within one and the same concept, which dominates discussions on the topic in analytic philosophy. From an empirical point of view, however, lexical vagueness is only one pole of a continuous scale of degrees of conventionalized variations which originally arose from conceptual vagueness. If we consider the contextual variation of MASS concepts, U N BOUNDED modifiers are least successful in influencing the identification of a BOUNDED instance of the MASS, as they are themselves intrinsically vague, i.e. the referential identification of an instance is contextdependent in a principled way, as for instance important in important information. In contrast to this, semantically BOUNDED modifiers achieve the identification of a BOUNDED instance of a MASS concept, in that the M A S S concept inherits the BOUNDED value of the modifying concept, as in the information retrieved, where the identification of information is grounded by the definite article. The grammatical form of the past participle retrieved represents the BOUNDEDNESS par excellence of the PERFECTIVE aspect. Other typically BOUNDED modifiers are N O N - G R A D A B L E , ABSOLUTE adjectives such as in the respective information. Depending on its significance in terms of frequency and communicative relevance, contextual variation comes close to semantic variation between senses which are lexically distinct to different degrees. When a lexical unit eventually develops semantically distinct variations between senses, the original pragmatic requirement for lexical vagueness

Different types of lexical vagueness

147

ultimately changes into the continuous integration of different senses under one lexical unit. Lexical vagueness providing for reference-point variation on the one hand and polysemy embodying semantic variation in the lexicon on the other may be considered, firstly, as different developmental stages of a language and, secondly, as corresponding to different communicative needs of different parts of the system. The latter can be paraphrased with Lyons' picture of "diachrony-within-synchrony" (cf. Lyons, 1977, 620). From a cognitive perspective the structuralist distinction between diachrony and synchrony is resolved into a continuous process in which speakers are striving for the truth of their utterances (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 17; Heine et al., 1991, 21). This striving for veridicality arises from the speakers' cognitive and communicative needs. Thus diachrony is deeply rooted in synchrony and Coseriu's irreversible relation of synchrony within diachrony may no longer be maintained (cf. Coseriu, 1974, 243ff.). In interacting linguistically, speakers are continuously involved in cognition without ever coming to represent the true nature of the world. Meaning is a cognitive phenomenon and may therefore only be explained by relating language and thought to each other. If we investigate the form as distinct from its meaning, as an independent result constituting a steady state of the language system (cf. Chomsky, 1986, 25ff.), the diachronic semantic development becomes irrelevant (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 68). By investigating meaning only by its form, as it is done with constituent structure analysis and with case relations, the language-specific environment to which the form of a language is related, i.e. the referential relationship, is not considered and the translation between languages becomes virtually impossible (cf. Wierzbicka, 1996, 425f.).

5.12

Different types of lexical vagueness

Vagueness occurs either within the I N T E R N A L C O N F I G U R A T I O N or at the conventionalized E X T E R N A L B O U N D A R I E S of concepts which are in different ways left as undefined arbitrary regions. Firstly, natural kind terms (cf. Putnam, 1975) provide a conceptual continuum, of which conventional distinctions are scientifically welldefined in relation to the respective environment. However, in terms of common sense folk taxonomy, which represents the environment in

148 Representing mental categorization the minds of ordinary language users (cf. Brown, 1998, 279ff.), these definitions are communicatively irrelevant in that in different communicative situations the distinction is stretched towards one category or another. Examples axe the M A S S terms gold, water, white flour, the concepts of which are scientifically defined according to their internal, chemical configuration or in terms of their granularity. In contrast to these M A S S conceptualizations the nouns referring to conventionalized temporal periods such as day and night, winter and summer are defined by their external boundaries and thus embody C O U N T concepts. The multitude of uses embodied in these nouns and their differing communicative needs again show the irrelevance of their definitions. When does a working day or a school day begin and end? What is a night trip for which a special night charge is demanded? How does the following use of summer refer to its E X T E R N A L B O U N D A R I E S ? (5.34)

Last summer was extremely long. Temperatures began to fall in November.

Obviously, (5.34) expresses that the standard boundary of summer is extended until the beginning of November. The communicatively licensed stretching of the E X T E R N A L B O U N DARIES of C O U N T concepts as well as the rejection and overriding of the internal configuration of M A S S concepts operates on what Margalit termed lexical "indefiniteness" (cf. Margalit, 1976, 211). Secondly, no scientific definition is provided for the distinction of nominal kind terms, which refer to the continuum of artifacts (cf. Bloom, 1998; Ahn, 1998), as introduced by Putnam (cf. Putnam, 1975). This continuum is divided in probabilistic terms based on the conventionalized function in types of situations. We can distinguish at least two types of continuity for which probability assumptions are made. Peripheral vagueness applies to concepts of artefacts, such as the well-known distinction between cup, mug, bowl and vase (cf. our initial representation of cups in the introduction of chapter 1). This type of vagueness and its corresponding probability assumptions are feature-dependent. Labov's examples embody intensional vagueness (cf. Labov, 1973), in that the features themselves fulfil cultural conditions, such as H A N D L E , R O U N D , H I G H E R T H A N W I D E , W I D E R T H A N H I G H (cf. Lang, 1989). These cultural conditions may be relaxed, that

Different types of lexical vagueness

149

is the features may be rejected and overridden if this becomes necessary by the communicative context. Obviously, this type of intensional vagueness is continuously redefined with the constant production of new instances of artefacts. In addition to the high degree of regional variation this type of vagueness is correlated with different regional habits which help to identify the respective referential tokens. Different cups are used for British tea, for Italian espresso, for French cafe au lait and Spanish cafe con leche. Beyond the regional variation of artefacts we may observe a social distribution in the use of different social groups. Socially, the noun cup is associated with a higher prestige value than the noun mug. What English speakers refer to by the noun bowl may be used and referred to by tasse in a French bistro. In this way we may observe on the one hand a social distribution of the features of an intensionally vague concept across speakers of a linguistic community in the sense of Putnam's stereotype (cf. Putnam, 1 9 7 5 ) , which allows for the social distribution of linguistic labour (cf. above, section 2.5). On the other hand, we observe the distribution of features across instances of a peripherally vague concept. The prototype region of the concepts of artefacts may thus be represented along the social dimension. Internal continuity establishes an inherent context-dependence for a concept. Examples are SCALAR and DIMENSIONAL concepts which principally depend on the entity's extension to be located within the SCALAR or DIMENSIONAL grid (cf. Pinkal, 1 9 8 0 ) . The specific value of the concept of the adjective long depends on the extension designated by the noun modified, as in long eyelashes, a long train. In these examples the lexical concept of the noun specifies a spatially significant extension, whereas the SPATIAL EXTENSION predicated by the adjective is lexically vague. The SPATIAL variable of the lexical concept of long is contextually specified by inheriting the value of the noun it modifies, i.e. the nominal TR achieves the configuration of the specific value of the LM predicated by the adjectival long through imposition of its own boundaries. This type of continuity corresponds to Margalit's "indeterminateness" (cf. Margalit, 1976, 211). Thirdly, lexical vagueness often occurs with A B S T R A C T concepts, which, although they may well have an origin in PHYSICAL SPACE, are

150 Representing mental categorization very hard to conceive of in terms of their E X T E R N A L BOUNDING and their INTERNAL CONFIGURATION. Margalit refers to these concepts as "obscure" (cf. ibid.). Examples are the nouns information and data, which are currently undergoing a semantic change from a lexicalized M A S S to a C O U N T sense. In the following section we will deal with polysemy as the result of lexical vagueness and contextual variation.

5.13

Polysemy across basic cognitive domains

If semantic variations have become lexically conventionalized, speakers associate one and the same lexical unit with several semantically related senses. The distinction into semantically related senses is the result of economical language use which imposes structure on the speakers' experience by reducing the experienced information to abstract knowledge about language use. In general this decontextualized knowledge does not provide these related senses as discrete entities, but rather as a continuous polysemy structure. When using lexical concepts in context this lexical continuity is resolved by different lexical concepts unifying with and thereby identifying each other's senses. In this unification different types of lexical vagueness correspond to the different contextual functions which resolve it. Lexically we distinguish word senses by basic cognitive domains (cf.Langacker, 1987a, 147ff.), which are basic because they emerge directly from experience and thereby comprise universal principles of gestalt and function in the domains of SPACE, AGGREGATE, T I M E and L I F E , such as the perception of S H A P E and DIMENSION. Thus basic domains establish mentally irreducible units of meaning and thereby are necessary for the schematic elaboration within the conceptual type hierarchy as well as for the syntagmatic composition of all higher-order conceptual representations. Within our integrated approach these basic domains are not primitives. Instead, their syntagmatic function is constrained by paradigmatic restrictions which prevent the co-occurrence of features. Basic domains universally determine how speakers perceive and conceive of their environment, although they are distributed differently in different languages, i.e. they are expressed by different forms and to different degrees and thus do not divide the world in analogous but rather in alternative ways and in differently fine-grained resolutions (cf. Wierzbicka, 1996, 425f.).

Polysemy across basic cognitive domains

151

Related senses of a polysemous lexical unit are distinguished by basic cognitive domains. This distinction is represented by mental image schemata. A clear example of polysemy arising by the metaphorical transfer of image-schemata across basic cognitive domains are prepositions, such as in, before, through, which predicate relations in the domains of SPACE and T I M E , as represented in the following metaphorical extension of a C O N C R E T E schema of in. 8 (5.35)

a.

the customers in the queue (in 1)

inl

ATEMPREL

TR

customers ABSTRACTION

INCLUSION]

queue ABSTRACTION LM

b.

in2 TR

LM

NOMPRED CONCRETE NOMPRED CONCRETE

SPACE

DOMINANT AXIS DIMENSION

HORIZONTAL ONE-D

AGGR

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

HETEROGEN CONTAIN

the work in the development / organization / compilation (in 2)

TEMPPRED

INVOLVEMENT

work ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED ABSTRACT

TIME

^UNBOUNDED

development ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED NOMPRED ABSTRACT ABSTRACT

TIME

[BOUNDED

ACTIVITY J

ACCOMPLISH]

In (5.35a) we represent the INCLUSION sense of the preposition in, requiring a C O N C R E T E TR to be INCLUDED in a LM which is a O N E DIMENSIONAL CONTAINER. The metaphorical transfer has been a8

In contrast to Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a), who has introduced the concept of basic domain, we do not equate the basic vs. non-basic distinction with the C O N C R E T E VS. A B S T R A C T distinction. Our notion of basic domains corresponds to the most basic categories which organize the speakers' environment, such as S P A C E , T I M E , A G G R E G A T E , VOLITION a n d SOCIAL C U L T U R E .

152 Representing mental

categorization

chieved by the schema in which a T R is included in a O N E - D I M E N S I O N AL HORIZONTALLY O R I E N T E D L M . In the A B S T R A C T domain of T I M E an A C T I V I T Y happens within an A C C O M P L I S H M E N T from which the metaphorical INVOLVEMENT sense of in emerges, as represented underneath (5.35b) (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 147ff.). Basic domains give rise to the psychological phenomenon of sense dominance, to the prototypical organization of polysemy structures (cf. above, p. 93; Glucksberg, 1986; Simpson, 1981). The autonomous senses of nominal predications are a case in point. Linguistically, we may verify the psychological hypothesis of sense dominance by reconstructing the diachronic development of senses synchronically. For instance, the original M A S S sense of information corresponds to the normal default assumption which speakers have about the senses of this lexical unit (cf. Brown, 1996, 569) and may therefore be represented as dominant, while the C O U N T sense becomes gradually introduced in the supporting context. On the other hand, the diachronic development is not necessarily reflected in synchrony. Nor do speakers necessarily develop a dominant sense for each nominal predication. For instance, there is not necessarily a preference for a dominant sense of university and school in ordinary language use. The original sense of an A C T I V I T Y and the I N STITUTION sense organize the same basic domain, which is A B S T R A C T , while the C O N T A I N E R sense is predicated in the C O N C R E T E domain which is nevertheless part of the same domain matrix. On account of the differing social status of the users for whom different senses become relevant the senses of university and school are differently distributed over the individuals of one and the same speech community, depending for instance on whether they work at the university, at school, at the post office, and so on. The different senses of university and school are thus represented subjectively by the communicative relevance which the semantic distinctions have to the differing social status of the language user. Yet the intended sense is directly accessed on account of its being supported by the mental model of the discourse domain.

Basic cognitive domains

5.14

153

The lexical representation of basic cognitive domains

Due to computational methods in lexicography, modern mono-lingual dictionaries are corpus-based on real language in use (cf. Cowie, 1989; Brown, 1996). The entries reflect central and typical uses corresponding to the common and important senses of a word (cf. Brown, 1996, vf.). The typical contexts thus represent the grammatical structures by which different senses of a word may be distinguished. Most importantly, the corpus-based representation of mono-lingual dictionaries is based on frequency of usage and thus reflects the speakers' default reasoning. Finally, the grammaticality of senses is indicated by accounting for the functions which organize the discourse: speakers use grammatical functions in order to express their attitude towards the content of the discourse and in order to intensify and downtone an utterance. In thesauri the hierarchical organization of domains is represented by metonymy, meronymy and hyponymy. In artificial intelligence the I s - A relation represents hyponymy relations. For instance, the values ONE-DIMENSIONAL, TWO-DIMENSIONAL, a n d THREE-DIMENSIONAL

are hyponyms of the variable DIMENSION. Cognitively, co-hyponyms are metonymically related senses and represent image schemata. The Η A S - A relationship represents P A R T - W H O L E relations, i.e. meronymy. P A R T - W H O L E relations are often expressed by compounds. In this case the W H O L E has not lexicalized different senses for its PARTS, but merely allows for different reference-point variations. The P A R T S of a window explicitly designated by the compounds window-pane and window-frame are a case in point. Describing polysemization as an extension within or across domains is by itself nothing fundamentally new. Word senses have always been analyzed into categories. This componential analysis is typically derived from the usage patterns of the respective words and is thus compatible with Langacker's distinction between basic cognitive domains on which his usage-based model of cognitive grammar rests. In the following we distinguish polysemous senses of lexical units by basic cognitive domains which we have taken from monolingual lexicons (cf. Brown, 1996; Cowie, 1989) and generalized into more consistent schemata:

154 Representing

mental

categorization

crop • COUNT: QUANTITY of grain • COUNT: GROUP of people cauliflower • COUNT: TOKEN of cabbage • MASS: T Y P E of cabbage research • MASS: COGNITIVE A C T I V I T Y • COUNT: COGNITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT leave • CONCRETE MOTION: FROM INCLUSION T O EXCLUSION • ABSTRACT MOTION: FROM INCLUSION T O EXCLUSION window • SPACE FOR MOTION BETWEEN INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN CONCRETE CONTAINER • SPACE FOR MOTION BETWEEN INCLUSION A N D EXCLUSION IN ABSTRACT CONTAINER school • COUNT: COGNITIVE INSTITUTION • MASS: COGNITIVE A C T I V I T Y • COUNT: CONCRETE COLLECTION • COUNT: PART OF INSTITUTION • COUNT: COGNITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT • MASS: COGNITIVE STATE • COUNT: ABSTRACT COLLECTION

Autonomous vs. dependent predications

5.15

155

Autonomous vs. dependent predications

Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 298) distinguishes between autonomous and dependent predications, in that meanings may behave as more lexical or more grammatical. The importance of this distinction derives from its power to explain the grammaticality of linguistic utterances. Locational domains provide autonomous meanings which may themselves instantiate information in a discourse. In contrast to this, configurational domains provide dependent meanings which may not instantiate information in a discourse without being related to the meanings of other signs (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 214; Croft, 1991; Kleiber, 1990). Langacker defines conceptual dependency in the following way: One structure, D, is dependent on the other, A, to the extent that A constitutes an elaboration of a salient substructure within D. (Langacker, 1987a, 300) Thus speakers organize the content they intend to convey in a discourse in locational domains, while they organize the structure of a discourse in configurational domains. This claim implies that lexically, speakers intend to represent the true nature of their external environment. Grammatically, speakers intend to represent the lexically provided content on a higher level, on which they may evaluate their lexical representations by meta-knowledge as involved in opinions and attitudes. Through this evaluation, speakers integrate themselves in the universe of discourse. Configurational domains are organized by abstract image schemata which represent the core meanings of lexical concepts (cf. Sweetser, 1988). By empirical verification the hypothesis that image schemata represent the core meanings of lexical concepts (cf. Heine et al., 1991, 33) may corroborate prototype semantics. Polysemous predications such as while, which may express both the lexically autonomous concept of the noun and the grammatically dependent relational concept of the conjunction, are a case in point. Linguistically, we may represent the locational domain from the theoretical hypothesis of the image-schematic core meaning involved in the speakers' metaknowledge. By virtue of their cultural independence, the core meanings may be evaluated multilingually. By accounting for translational equivalents, this contrastive perspective may enable a verification of

156 Representing mental

categorization

universal categories of human experience (cf. Bybee et al., 1994, 10). The distinction between autonomous and dependent parts of speech is also in line with empirical results in psycholinguistics (cf. section 4.4 above). Langacker exemplifies valency structures by the prepositional phrase under the table (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 279ff.), where the preposition under is semantically dependent on the relatively more autonomous noun referred to by the table. In Langacker's terms under profiles the meaning elaborated by the table, which guarantees the integration of the constituents into a composite whole. In terms of unification-based grammar, the preposition under is lexically schematic with respect to the lexically more autonomous noun table. Thus, under provides an abstract schema which unifies with the autonomous value of the noun table, such that the composite structure inherits the unified semantic structure. The interconnections are not part of the lexical concept of dependent predications. The lexical concept of dependent predications only provides a disposition which is unified with constant values in the respective contextual interactions. That is, the lexical schema of dependent predications inherits the specific semantic values from the contextually provided semantically more autonomous landmarks and trajectors. Thus we can determine the order of inheritance from more autonomous parts of speech to more dependent parts of speech on the basis of the degree of lexical autonomy. Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 63) defines a noun as denoting a region in some domain, this region consisting of the interconnections between those PARTS which either do not have any autonomous function or which have lost it. Nouns typically refer to discrete physical objects (cf. Langacker, 1993, 14) having a lexical disposition for the quantification of a limited amount of substance. This quantification in turn implies its replication and grounding within the current discourse space. An essential characteristic of nominal predications consists in the interconnections between the entities constituting the PARTS of the profiled region being relatively dense and stable in comparison to other predications. In its ideal realization, the profiled region is covered continuously and is internally compact. Gentner assumes these characteristics of nominals to explain the fact that nouns are more sta-

Autonomous vs. dependent predications

157

ble in fixing the reference and verbs are more flexible in adjusting their meaning as required by the context (cf. Gentner, 1981; Gentner and France, 1982; Gentner, 1982). Reminding one of the conduit metaphor Ertel (cf. Ertel, 1986) reflects this relative stability of nouns using the image of a box into which speakers put their meaningful aspects. Yet the role which nominal concepts adopt in Langacker's billiard-ball model (cf. Langacker, 1991, 13f., 283f.) is more in line with the "anticontainer" idea of mental models, according to which nominal senses axe continuously integrated in different mental models. 5.15.1

Dependency of prepositions

Prepositions are relational predications, as they are conceptually dependent on the autonomous predications which they interrelate. 9 Nevertheless, although the relation which verbs, adjectives and prepositions predicate is lexically more schematic than that of nominal predications, verbs, adjectives and prepositions also embody meaningful structures relatively free from context. The schematic meaning of the dependent lexical predication is imposed on the whole sentence or phrase. The dependent predication thereby functions as what Langacker calls profile-determinant (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 288ff.). And this is what the principle of weak compositionality is meant to consist in: within the composition a coherent W H O L E results from the autonomous components shading their values into the schematic variables of the dependent predications (cf. Goschke and Koppelberg, 1992, 149; Rips, 1995, 90ff.). The concepts of D I M E N S I O N and S C A L E represent typical dependent predications. Thus the preposition in may assume many different senses, depending on the semantics of the nominals it interrelates. In the following we exemplify and represent how a subset of the schematic dispositions of in unifies with the contextually provided trajectors and landmarks:

9

Cf. Rauh, 1991 and Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993b, who give extensive overviews on the representation of prepositions.

158 Representing mental categorization (5.36)

a.

biscuits in the box

ATEMPREL

INCLUSION

biscuits

TR

ABSTRACTION

DIMENSION MOTION

SPACE

"box

ABSTRACTION

LM

b.

DIMENSION

AGGR

COUNT HETEROGEN CONTAIN

INTEGRATION

raisins

ABSTRACTION ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED CONCRETE NOMPRED CONCRETE E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG

COUNT HETEROGEN

a bird in the tree

ATEMPREL

LOCATIONJ

'bird TR

THREE

raisins in the cake a hole in the tissue

AGGR

c.

NOMPRED CONCRETE

' E X T E R N A L BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

'cake LM

THREE-D MOVABLE

SPACE

ATEMPREL TR

NOMPRED CONCRETE

ABSTRACTION SPACE

Γ tree ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED CONCRETE MOTION

MOBILE

NOMPRED CONCRETE

SPACE

MOTION

NON-MOVABLEJ

AGGR

E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG

COUNT HETEROGEN

Autonomous vs. dependent predications d. in

smoke in the air [ATEMPREL

QUALITY]

smoke

TR

ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED CONCRETE E X T E R N A L BOUND INTERNAL CONFIG

AG GR

air LM

ABSTRACTION

E X T E R N A L BOUND INTERN CONFIG

STATEJ

living ABSTRACTION

TEMPPRED ABSTRACT

TIME

UNBOUND

peace

NOMPRED ABSTRACT

TIME

UNBOUND

AGGR

E X T E R N A L BOUND INTERNAL CONFIG

ABSTRACTION

LM

MASS HOMOGEN

living in peace ATEMPREL

TR

MASS HOMOGEN

NOMPRED CONCRETE

[

AGGR

e.

159

ACTIVITY

STATEJ MASS HOMOGEN

The schematic relations of in profile both metonymy and metaphor. The intermediate position of the senses of prepositions between grammat icalization and lexicalization is obvious. As prepositions are originally SPATIAL predications, they often embody a typical SPATIAL sense around which the other senses cluster (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 416ff.)10. In example (5.36) the typical sense is clearly predicated by in in (5.36a), which includes a M O V A B L E TR in a L M elaborated by a 3 DIMENSIONAL B O U N D E D CONTAINER. This relation between TR and L M induces the archetypical INCLUSION sense on in. The other senses are ordered with respect to their A B S T R A C T I O N and M O B I L I T Y in the domain of A G G R E G A T E . The perfect INCLUSION is no longer present in the examples from (5.36b) to (5.36d), yet it is discernible as being metonymically related to the INCLUSION sense in the C O N C R E T E 10 Cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt (Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993a) for a detailed analysis and generation of prepositional meaning. Intended as a model for machine translation, the analysis applies to the source language and to the generation of the target language during the process of translation.

160 Representing

mental

categorization

domain. 11 In (5.36b) a C O N C R E T E TR is related to a C O N C R E T E internally HETEROGENEOUS LM which induces the INTEGRATION sense. In (5.36c) a M O B I L E TR is located in a B O U N D E D HETEROGENEOUS L M . In (5.36d) a TR elaborated by an U N B O U N D E D HOMOGENEOUS M A S S is related to a L M which is likewise an U N B O U N D E D HOMOGENEOUS M A S S . This induces the QUALITY schema of in. Finally, in (5.36e) the TR as an U N B O U N D E D ACTIVITY is contained within the L M of an U N B O U N D E D STATE. This induces the STATE schema of in. Thus (5.36e) differs from the metonymically related senses in that this sense of in has resulted from metaphorical transfer into the A B S T R A C T domain of TIME. These examples illustrate the contextual dependence of the lexically schematic senses of the preposition in which are elaborated in the context of the semantically autonomous TR being located with respect to its semantically autonomous LM. 5.15.2

Dependency

of adjectives

Analogously, the meaning of adjectives configures depending on the meaning of the noun to which the respective adjective attributes a particular property. Again, this is most obvious with DIMENSIONAL and SCALAR adjectives, and there has been extensive discussion about the configuration of their gestalt (cf. Bolinger, 1972; Lang, 1989; Vandeloise, 1993; Vandeloise, 1988; Dirven and Taylor, 1988; Pustejovsky, 1991). Underneath the following examples we represent the configuration of the adjectives' SPATIAL ORIENTATION in accordance with the SPATIAL ORIENTATION referred to by the noun. This is a purely functional representation in that the trajector is considered as "the figure within a relational profile" and the landmarks "as providing points of reference for locating the trajector" (Langacker, 1987a, 217), "a region along a compaxison scale" (Langacker, 1987a, 219). Thus, within a noun phrase the noun functions as the trajector which is located relative to the landmark elaborated by the modifying adjective.

11

This phenomenon has also been discussed for example by Herskovits (cf. Herskovits, 1986), Hottenroth (cf. Hottenroth, 1993), Cuyckens (cf. Cuyckens, 1993).

Autonomous (5.37)

a. TR

LM

b. TR

LM

c. TR

LM

(5.38)

a. TR

LM

long grass grass

NOMPRED

SPACE

[DOMINANT AXIS

long

ATEMPREL

SPACE

[DIMENSION

long legs legs

NOMPREED

SPACE

[DOMINANT AXIS

long

ATEMPREL

SPACE

[DIMENSION

a long queue queue

NOMPRED

SPACE

[DOMINANT AXIS

long

ATEMPREL

SPACE

[DIMENSION

HORIZONTAL • ]

ONE D • ]

a fast typist typist

NOMPRED

ABSTRACT

[SOCIAL

fast

ATEMPREL

TIME

[UNBOUNDED

MEMBER • ]

MANNER Ξ ]

TEMPPRED [CONCRETE

TIME

[UNBOUNDED

TR

[ANIMATE

MOBILE] ACTIVITY • ]

HUMAN]

a fast trip \trip TIME

Γfast L M

VERTICAL • ]

ΟΝΕ-D E ]

type

T R

V E R T I C A L HI]

ΟΝΕ-D Ξ ]

ABSTRACTION

b.

vs. dependent predications

TIME

NOMPRED [BOUNDED

A C C O M P L I S H M E N T U]]

ATEMPREL Γ I BOUNDED

ML A C C O M P L I S H M E N T QJL

161

162 Representing mental

categorization

In the same way as the relevant SPATIAL DIMENSION and ORIENTATION of long in (5.37a), (5.37 b) and (5.37c) is induced by the lexically or contextually determined ORIENTATION embodied by the referents of the nouns, in (5.38) the T I M E value predicated by the adjective fast is induced from the prototypical T I M E value referred to by the noun. Although long in its prototypical SCALE corresponds to a positive SPATIAL profile, by predicating more rather than less extension, contextual unification proceeds from the noun's prototypical value to the schematic disposition predicated by the adjective. Even something extremely short may be qualified as being long within its class, such as long eyelashes. Examples (5.37) and (5.38) exemplify how the relational predication made by the adjective configures depending on the noun it is modifying. In (5.37a) and (5.37b) the CANONICAL ORIENTATION of grass and leg is assumed as being VERTICAL and unifies with the DIMENSIONAL disposition of the adjective. In (5.37c) the CANONICAL ORIENTATION of queue is HORIZONTAL in its default context and likewise copies its value into the lexical disposition of the adjective long. The semantic disposition of the adjective fast is TIME, which, again, is clearly relative if we compare the M O T I O N of ants and planes. In (5.38a) a SOCIAL M E M B E R is characterized with respect to the A C T I V ITY of typing, this, however, by accumulating all inherited instances of individual occurrences of the respective ACTIVITY in summary fashion. As a consequence of this, the sense of fast configures as a HABITUAL STATE predicate. As TR, fast inherits the M A N N E R of typing from the L M , which is a SOCIAL M E M B E R . The SOCIAL M E M B E R sense of typist in turn lexically inherits the individual occurrences of the ACTIVITY of typing from the verb type. In contrast to this, the predicate fast configures as a BOUNDED predicate dependent on the BOUNDED T I M E of the ACCOMPLISHMENT referred to by the nominal trip in (5.38b).

5.16

Conclusion

In this chapter we have been concerned with the speakers' mental categorization and the corresponding representation of linguistic utterances. Linguistically, we have seen how speakers achieve this representation by grammatical unification of lexical concepts. Cognitively, this

Conclusion

163

unification has been assumed to rely on a number of dispositions which enable and constrain the infinite variation of information. Basically, the knowledge representation of speakers has been evidenced to be probabilistic in all respects. This probabilistic nature explains the ultimate inaccessibility of mental representations. One instance of this probabilistic nature is implied in the gradient structure of prototypes, which allows for the speakers' negotiating the stretching of concepts at their borderlines. Another instance of the hypothetical nature of knowledge is embodied in the inherent vagueness of semantic representations which likewise allows for the communicative negotiation of the relevant boundaries of concepts. Finally, it is evident that the knowledge representation of speakers is hierarchical. This hierarchical knowledge representation is enabled by the recursive function of the human mind. In this way speakers may consciously access a semantic representation from a higher level. Along the parameter of schematicity, speakers may ascend and descend the conceptual type hierarchy and thereby resolve the vagueness of representations to different degrees of granularity.

Chapter 6 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy One of the most important cognitive capabilities is schematization along the dimension of schematicity. This is achieved by linguistically representing a scene in differently fine-grained ways. With respect to the lexicon this means that speakers universally represent their knowledge in a conceptual type hierarchy which defines the type space of possible instantiations (cf. Langacker, 1993, 60ff.). In the following we give the interpretations of this type space. We will first follow the hierarchical organization of locational cognitive domains in which autonomous predications are made. Figure (6.1) represents the conceptual type hierarchy along which speakers schematize the meanings of nouns. In this hierarchical representation nodes correspond to attributes and values. Arcs represent the specialization relations. The more solid arcs relate domains which establish the domain matrix by their conjunctive relationship. The less solid axes correspond to the disjunctive relation, which represents that either of the values may be instantiated. We represent this disjunctive relation by the symbol "V" in our rules. For reasons of space, we use abbreviations in our rules for some attributes and values which we introduce in this section. These abbreviations are given in brackets following the full names. Our matrix of basic cognitive domains differs from that of Langacker in that we include the very distinction between basic and non-basic domains, the CONCRETE VS. ABSTRACT distinction, within the basic domain matrix, the degree of ABSTRACTION from sensorial perception being itself a basic domain. Langacker's principle of schematization allows for hierarchical specialization into subsequently more specific

Nominal

predications

165

levels of the conceptual hierarchy. Note that at all levels the conceptual type hierarchy provides for the elaboration of the most basic and most pervasive metonymy. This is established by the speakers' activity of organizing a WHOLE into differently salient components (cf. Herskovits, 1986, 85). It is by this important activity and, in particular, by how it is achieved that our environment becomes meaningful to us. Along the conceptual type hierarchy we can observe speakers to f o r e g r o u n d a M E M B E R VS. a COLLECTION; a n ACHIEVEMENT VS. a n ACCOMPLISHMENT; a TWO-DIMENSIONAL VS. THREE-DIMENSIONAL extension, a n d a n a l o g o u s l y a ONE-DIMENSIONAL VS. a T W O - D I M E N SIONAL extension; a COUNT VS. a MASS entity; a CONTENT VS. a CON-

TAINER. In the following section we will be concerned with providing an interpretation of these domains.

6.1

Nominal predications

ENTITY 1. ABSTRACTION

Across this domain the complexity of conceptualization as the result of levels of information processing is established. 2. T I M E

This domain corresponds to the time axis occupied by TEMPORALLY significant entities. 3. SPACE

Within this domain spatially significant entities are marked with respect to their intrinsic and canonical properties. 4. AGGREGATE ( A G G R )

Within this domain entities are marked with respect to their EXTERNAL BOUNDING a n d their INTERNAL CONFIGURATION. 5. L I F E

Within this domain all entities designated by a natural or nominal kind term are organized.

166 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy

SOCIAL _ CONVENTION I— ABSTRACT

—

ABSTRAC TION MENTAL CONCRETE

QUALITY SEMIOTIC INSTITUTION MENSURAL SCALE MEMBER MODE

-c

Έ

COGNITION PERCEPTION EMOTION

CONSCIOUS-_ NESS

UNBOUND -

TIME BOUND

—

_i— —

ACCOMPLISHMENT ACHIEVEMENT

MOTION

-

-

SPACE

DOM POLE

FRONT REAR TOP BOTTOM LEFT RIGHT

DOM AXIS

HORIZONTAL VERTICAL

ORIEN TATION ENTITY

AGGRE GATE

>— DIMENSION

-E

THREE-D TWO-D ONE-D

EXTERN BOUND

—Ε

COUNT UNIQUE MASS

INTERN CONFIG

I— COMPLEX

HOMOGENEOUS HETEROGENEOUS INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE PARTITIVE SORTAL PRIVATIVE CONTAINER CONTENT HUMAN NON-HUMAN

I— ANIMATE GENDER

MALE FEMALE

INANIM

Figure 6.1: A conceptual type hierarchy for nominal predications

Nominal predications

167

ABSTRACTION = 1. ABSTRACT

Entities which do not directly spring from experience by providing the experiencer with information which cannot b e sensorily perceived in terms of their physical existence, but are the result of higher order information processing. In the age of the information processing which we live in, the vast majority of entities are located within this domain. 2. CONCRETE

Only entities arising directly from experience by being sensorily perceived may be located within this domain. Usage patterns: flower, cloud, factory, water

house, desk, wool, hair,

ABSTRACT = 1. SOCIAL CONVENTION ( C O N V )

In this domain socially significant entities are organized. Usage patterns: certificate, invitation, page, dozen, office, bank, government, teacher, student

integration,

2. MENTAL

Entities originating in the human mind are marked in this domain. Usage patterns: hope, expectation, fear, happiness, vantage point, observation SOCIAL CONVENTION = 1. QUALITY

The domain within which A B S T R A C T entities axe classified according to a quality; this is very often achieved in terms of capabilities residing in relations between individuals. Usage patterns: deficit, solidarity, drawback, control 2. SEMIOTIC

This is the domain within which conventional sign systems give

168 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy rise to entities conveying information according to the rules of the system. We have either the semiotic processes as the CONTENT or their objective manifestation as the CONTAINER or the medium of both as the ORIGIN. Usage patterns: conversation, description, message, agreement, proposal, article, programme, document, full stop, annex, radio, television, computer 3.

INSTITUTION

This is the Social domain of HUMAN entities which axe conceptualized as a COLLECTION by definition of their structures and principles. Usage patterns: community,

office, government,

commission,

in-

dustry, school 4.

MENSURAL

Functions quantifying other entities by a numerically defined scale. Usage patterns: two cups of flour, three boxes of vegetable, 10 metres of cloth, a 100 km trip 5.

SCALE

In this domain entities with relative or proportionate extent are represented. Nouns designating SCALE entities may be preceded by a noun referring to a MENSURAL entity, the latter then having the function of specifying the scale in terms of quantified units. Usage patterns: a length of 5 cm, a height of 2.50 m, a temperature of 20 degrees 6.

MEMBER

In this domain members of a socially defined group are marked. Usage patterns: teacher, socialist, catholic MENTAL

-

1. M E N T A L

MODE

Within this domain the mode of information processing is established.

Nominal predications

169

2. CONSCIOUSNESS Within this subdomain the VOLITION ALITY of the mental activity is specified. MODE = 1. COGNITION In this domain the speaker locates VOLITIONAL and INTENTIONAL MENTAL states or activities which are not SEMIOTIC. Usage patterns: thought, idea, problem, perspective,

concept

2. PERCEPTION Only sensorily perceivable information is processed within this domain. Usage patterns: view, taste,

smell

3. EMOTION T h e cognitive individual's subjective reactions based on their sensory feelings are located in this domain. Usage patterns: fear, anger,

happiness

CONSCIOUSNESS = 1. VOLITIONAL Cognition and perception proceeding volitionally are marked in this domain. Usage patterns: idea, intention,

consideration,

rejection

2. NON-VOLITIONAL This is pure sensation, i.e. physical feeling directly experienced by the individual. Usage patterns: feeling, pain, itch TIME 1. UNBOUNDED (UNBOUND) Domain within which the temporal structure of entities is conceptualized as enduring homogeneously with arbitrary starting and ending points.

170 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy 2. BOUNDED (BOUND)

Domain within which the temporal structure of entities is conceptualized as developing in definite stages with a culminating or terminal stage or point included. UNBOUNDED = 1. STATE

This is the domain within which entities are located which are conceptualized as existing homogeneously, i.e. as unchanging throughout their UNBOUNDED duration. This means that they completely lack any internal structure as well as any starting and ending points. STATIVE entities axe PERSISTENT, i.e. if they hold over an interval of time, they also hold over all subintervals (cf. Kauz, 1985, 25). Usage patterns: (a) STATIVE nominals cannot accept 6y-phrases, around-phi&ses and other adverbials which have the function of semantically fixing an entity with respect to time: * Her anxiety around midnight * My knowledge by Christmas (b) Adjectives of VOLITION and INTENTION are unusual with STATIVE entities (cf. Dowty, 1979, 55): ? The intentional knowledge was unexpected. ? Harry's enforced stay ... (c) STATIVE entities sound odd when attributed to entities referred to in pseudo-cleft constructions: ? What John had was knowledge. ? What John was in was solitude. 2. ACTIVITY

This is the domain within which entities axe located which axe conceptualized as enduring homogeneously or as evolving gradually through time. Their temporal structure is relatively undefined.

Nominal predications

171

Usage patterns: (a) A verbal predication with an ACTIVITY designated by its subject nominal may only take /or-phrases, not in-phrases as PP-modifier: The activity was done for an hour. ? The activity was done in an hour. (b) An ACTIVITY nominal cannot be the subject of take to (cf. Dowty, 1979, 55), at least the take to predication does not range directly over the ACTIVITY which it governs: ? The walk took John an hour. BOUNDED= 1. ACCOMPLISHMENT (ACCOMPL)

This is the domain within which entities are conceptualized as being temporally structured such that they are oriented towards a terminal point or phase which constitutes its meaning. This implies that they are expected to reach the ACHIEVEMENT phase, but that the focus is on the direction towards this terminal point or phase (cf. Vendler, 1957). Usage patterns: (a) The prototypical sentential adverbial modification is a prepositional phrase with in in its TEMPORAL meaning if an A C COMPLISHMENT entity is the trajector or landmark of the sentence; the use of TEMPORAL for seems to be highly marked, if not generally impossible: The implementation was done in an hour. She did the implementation in an hour. * The implementation was done for an hour. *She did the implementation for an hour. (b) ACCOMPLISHMENTS can normally occur as the complements of finish: finish the book / examinations / implementation (c) ACCOMPLISHMENT entities often have an extended sense denoting high frequency or habituality (cf. Dowty, 1979, 54): This deserves closer examination.

172 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy 2. A C H I E V E M E N T ( A C H I E V )

This is the domain within which entities are conceptualized as being temporally structured such that they have just achieved a terminal point or phase which constitutes its meaning (cf. Vendler, 1 9 5 7 ) . This A C H I E V E M E N T phase is the result of an overall accomplishment with the focus on the terminal point or phase. Usage patterns: (a) With an A C H I E V E M E N T entity designated by the noun in subject or object position /or-phrases as sentence modifiers sound strange: ? The decision was done for a minute. (b) A C H I E V E M E N T S are generally unacceptable as complements of finish and stop: * He finished his arrival. * He stopped the adoption of the proposal. (c) The following lexical units fall into the class of adjectives predicating a T E M P O R A L L Y U N B O U N D E D property and are semantically anomalous with nouns referring to A C H I E V E MENTS (cf. Ryle, 1949, 53): ? an attentive proposal, ? a vigilant arrival. SPACE = 1.

MOTION

In this domain speakers conceptualize entities intrinsically mobile or moveable. 2. D O M I N A N T P O L E ( D O M P O L E )

In this domain the dominant side of a T H R E E - D I M E N S I O N A L or T W O - D I M E N S I O N A L object or the dominant pole of a O N E DIMENSIONAL entity are conceptualized. 3. D O M I N A N T A X I S ( D O M A X I S )

In this domain speakers conceptualize objects with a dominant extension along either the V E R T I C A L or the HORIZONTAL D I MENSION.

Nominal predications 4.

173

ORIENTATION

Within this domain entities are associated with an inherent orientation. 5.

DIMENSION

T h e domain of THREE-DIMENSIONAL SPACE in which an entity is associated with its actual gestalt in terms of its dimensions. MOTION = 1.

MOVEABLE

Entities which may b e moved to another position. Usage patterns: to move the table, to take your handbag, to send the letter to the editor, to take the money out of the purse, to kick the ball, to drive the car 2.

MOBILE

Entities capable of moving themselves. Usage patterns: a fast typist, the arm fell down, the boy is running round the corner DOMINANT POLE = 1.

FRONT

Entities which have either an intrinsic or a canonical front. Usage patterns: the front of the car / house / kitchen / desk / wardrobe 2.

REAR

Entities which have either an intrinsic or a canonical rear. Usage patterns: the rear of the car / house / 3.

kitchen

TOP

Entities which have either an intrinsic or a canonical top. Usage patterns: the top of the page / car / book 4.

BOTTOM

Entities which have either an intrinsic or a canonical bottom. Usage patterns: the bottom of the page / car / book

174 Domains 5.

of the conceptual type hierarchy

LEFT

Entities which have either an intrinsic or a canonical left-hand side. Usage patterns: the left of the page / car / book 6.

RIGHT

Entities which have either an intrinsic or a canonical right-hand side. Usage patterns: the right of the page / car / book ORIENTATION = 1. INTRINSIC ORIENTATION

Entities with their sides conceptualized as oriented independently of any context, i.e. these entities are assigned an INTRINSIC ORIENTATION by speakers independently of the immediately surrounding objects and independently of the dimensional grid. Usage patterns: blouse, trousers, coin, book,

mountain

2 . CANONICAL ORIENTATION

Objects which must have a "normal" position in order to fulfil their ordinary function are conceptualized as CANONICALLY ORIENTED objects.

Usage patterns: wardrobe, chest, tower, car DIMENSION 1. T H R E E - D I M E N S I O N A L

(THREE-D)

Entities with their actual gestalt conceived of as THREE-DIMENSIONAL.

Usage patterns: in front of the tree, near the cupboard, to walk through the meadow 2. T W O - D I M E N S I O N A L

(TWO-D)

Entities with their actual gestalt conceived of as TWO-DIMENSIONAL.

Usage patterns: in the town, on the carpet, to walk over the lawn

Nominal 3. O N E - D I M E N S I O N A L

predications

175

(ONE-D)

Entities with their actual gestalt conceived of as O N E - D I M E N SIONAL.

Usage patterns: along the seam of the carpet, further the coast, a satellite put into orbit

north

along

AGGREGATE (AGGR)= 1. E X T E R N A L BOUNDING ( E X T E R N B O U N D )

Within this domain the external boundary conditions of an entity apply. It is with respect to this domain that entities are evaluated according to Quine's "built-in modes of dividing their reference" (cf. Quine, 1960, 91), meaning that it is an inherent attribute of nominale designating COUNT entities to determine what figures as a single instance. 2. INTERNAL CONFIGURATION ( I N T E R N C O N F I G )

Within this domain entities are marked with respect to whether they have an internal structure or not. 3. C O M P L E X I T Y

(COMPLEX)

Within this domain the internal complexity of an entity is determined. Different structures may be imposed on an entity, which may also superimpose themselves and thereby replicate M A S S entities. The linguistic unit expressing the complexity is then the bearer of the plural morpheme. Or in other words, the complexity expression has a quantifying function, having less semantic content than the nominals on which they impose their meaning, but more lexical content than true quantifiers. EXTERNAL BOUNDING = 1.

COUNT

By analogy with Langacker's definition (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 190), speakers use COUNT concepts as covering a B O U N D E D region within the scope of predication in their primaxy domain. This includes all entities which are conceptually B O U N D E D at the level of the lexicon in their primaxy domain which is relevant for its conceptualization as a "thing", e.g. the domain of T I M E or SPACE, as well as the SOCIAL or M E N T A L domain.

176 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy Usage patterns: (a) As intrinsically DISCRETE entities, different instances of occurrence may be conceptualized and designated by replicating them. penguins, tables, programmes, expectations (b) On the other hand, putting a PARTITIVE in front of the noun designating the COUNT concept with the function of singling out a PART, would change the truth value of the COUNT concept, as Bunt's "heterogeneous reference hypothesis" would then be violated, i.e. the whole would no longer be intact. * 10 % of table (c) Nouns designating COUNT concepts may be preceded by any cardinal number phrase. thirty tables, a dozen penguins (d) Nouns designating COUNT concepts may not be used without the definite or indefinite article in Germanic languages; in Romance languages they generally do not accept the partitive article in the singulax. ? Table is what he needs to write on. ? System is what you need for programming. ? II y a encore du table. 2. UNIQUE

Nouns designating UNIQUE concepts designate a BOUNDED region within the scope of predication in their primary domain. UNIQUE entities subsume only one token under their type concept and therefore their nominal expression is not replicable. Usage patterns: the earth, the sun, the Rhine, Europe 3. MASS

By analogy with Langacker's definition, speakers conceptualize MASS nouns as covering a region that is not specifically bounded within the scope of predication in its primary domain (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 203ff.). As boundaries are irrelevant for the conceptualization of a MASS, we can infinitely unify and divide different instances of a MASS without the MASS losing its truth value.

Nominal predications

177

Usage patterns: (a) Nouns designating MASS concepts are not pluralizable without additional linguistic means, as there axe: i. PARTITIVE constructions, where the PARTITIVE has the function of a quantifier in quantifying and thereby bounding some part of the MASS: different kinds of information, all sorts of communication, multiple branches of electronics ii. Exophoric reference achieved by way of ellipsis: different waters/industries The image of a replicate M A S S is achieved by a covert predication which induces its COUNT concept on the overtly designated MASS. This covert predication is not necessarily a PARTITIVE, but may be provided by all contextually fitting bearers of the MASS concept, such as rivers full of water, sites of industries. iii. Pluralia tantum designate a COLLECTIVE MASS at the level of the lexicon, i.e. more or less autonomous and identical INDIVIDUALS are conceptualized as being interrelated to constitute an UNBOUNDED MASS: people, costs, peas (b) Nouns denoting MASS concepts must be used in the bare construction in the case of EXISTENTIAL or GENERIC reference. INTERNAL CONFIGURATION

=

1. HOMOGENEOUS (HOMOGEN)

Only MASS entities may be marked in this domain, since only these satisfy Bunt's "homogeneous reference hypothesis" (Bunt, 1985, 46). This means that it is only with entities for which we do not conceptualize any external boundaries that we can abstract away from any internal configuration in terms of particles as discrete sub-parts. Thus, we can arbitrarily divide a HOMOGENEOUS MASS without the original MASS ceasing to exist; or in more formal terms, any quantity of a MASS inherits all properties

178 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy of the M A S S of which it is a entities are S T A T E entities.

PART.

Prototypical

HOMOGENEOUS

Usage patterns: a bit of silence, a glimpse of freedom, fear, hurry 2. H E T E R O G E N E O U S

weakness,

(HETEROGEN)

In this domain speakers conceptualize entities which do not satisfy Bunt's "homogeneous reference hypothesis", as they consist of clearly different PARTS which do not inherit the properties of the W H O L E entity. These are typically entities conceptualized as COUNT, which embody different functional structures not separable into different referents. COMPLEXITY 1. INDIVIDUAL (INDIV)

Within this domain speakers mark entities as having an autonomous gestalt or function. 2. C O L L E C T I V E

(COLLECT)

Entities marked in this domain are conceptualized with the focus on their being composed of "individual" sub—parts, which agree either in function or attributes. At the level of this agreement any PART inherits the properties of the W H O L E COLLECTION, whereas below this level of agreement the PARTS differ among one another and do not inherit any properties of the W H O L E COLLECTION, i.e. they have individual functions. Usage patterns: • Some C O L L E C T I V E S only have the function of designating the multiplicity of analogous individuals; they are being used as a classifier of another entity: a class of words, a group of students, a set of individuals, a bundle of features, a family of concepts, the Cognitive Science Society • Some of these C O L L E C T I V E S have preserved their autonomous meaning: Your class has already gone home. You are invited to join this party.

Nominal predications

179

My family does not tolerate this. We live in a multi-racial society. The European community • Some COLLECTIVES are conceptualized with a strong agreement in attributes. The focus on the replication of analogous individuals has generally given rise to a metonymic extension of a COLLECTIVE MASS to the replicable COUNT sense: people, information, • Some ogous tional ferent

industry

COLLECTIVES

are conceptualized as subsuming analindividuals only by virtue of their superimposed funccommonality; their individuals are otherwise quite difand are designated by different lexemes:

all different kinds of vegetable, the furniture of this room, the cutlery in that drawer, the kitchenware in that cupboard 3. PARTITIVE

Entities which refer to their function only as part of a larger WHOLE. Their function or existence, that is, does not become relevant without the support of a functionally more autonomous entity. Usage patterns: A PARTITIVE is semantically dependent on another entity which must be provided either by a P P governed by the preposition of or by a genitive argument, symbolizing a proper subpart, or by a precedent noun in a compound, either symbolizing a proper subpart or subset of the referent, this then supporting a new referent, at least virtually: the energy centre, the institute's portion (of the budget), an extract of peppermint/a peppermint extract, a piece of cake 4. SORTAL

Entities which have the function of subsuming other entities under a common whole. Usage patterns: kinds of hope, types of gold, sorts of bread, ways of saying, variants of meaning

180 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy 5.

PRIVATIVE

Entities which attribute the function of non-existence to other entities. Usage patterns: a deficit in the budget, lack of petrol, a gap in the lexicon, in absence of expertise, a hole in the tissue 6.

CONTAINER

Entities inherently conceptualized as containing other entities. Usage patterns: lake, cup, wardrobe, bottle 7.

CONTENT

Entities inherently conceptualized as content of other entities. Usage patterns: water, petrol, wine LIFE = 1.

ANIMATE

Within this domain all living creatures capable of TIVITY are conceptualized.

MOBILE A C -

Usage pattern: postman, linguist, cat 2. INANIMATE ( I N A N I M )

Within this domain all entities incapable of are conceptualized.

MOBILE ACTIVITY

Usage patterns: flower, stone, house, car ANIMATE = 1.

SELF-REFLECTIVE

In this domain animate beings are distinguished according to their ability of self-reflectiveness. Usage patterns: human, dog 2.

GENDER

In this domain animate beings are distinguished according to their gender. Usage patterns: woman, man, boy, girl, ewe

Relational predications

181

SELF-REFLECTIVE = 1. HUMAN

In this domain speakers conceptualize CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL or A B S T R A C T COLLECTIVE entities (INSTITUTIONS) capable of VOLITIONAL and INTENTIONAL COGNITIVE actions. This means that it must be possible to use them as trajectors of COGNITIVE verbs. 2. NON-HUMAN

All ANIMATE beings not capable of VOLITIONAL and INTENTIONAL COGNITIVE action. INANIMATE = 1. ARTIFICIAL CONCRETE entities without any natural origin but instead being the result of human creative production.

Usage patterns: car, telephone, computer, bowl, cup, software 2. NATURAL

Either CONCRETE or A B S T R A C T entities which originally exist or happen independently of human action. Usage patterns: stone, water, river, earth, magnetism, weather

6.2 6.2.1

Relational predications Temporal predications

SITUATION = 1. ABSTRACTION 2. TIME ABSTRACTION = 1. CONCRETE

Verbal predications about sensorily perceivable situations. Usage patterns: Peter is running. I am riding on a horse. You must beat the eggs. The sun is beaming.

182 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy MOTION

r— C O N C R E T E AB STRACTION ABSTRACT

VOLITIONAL NON-VOLITIONAL

BOUNDED

ACHIEVEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENT

SITU ATION

r— I— TIME

UN BOUNDED

r-

ACTIVITY r— STATIVE

COPULATIVE NONCOPULATIVE

Figure 6.2: A conceptual type hierarchy for temporal predications 2. ABSTRACT

Verbal predications about complex situations in need of higherorder information processing which are not sensorily perceivable. Usage patterns: to develop a system, to prevent an action, to order the objects, to know the answer, to think about the visit CONCRETE = 1. MOTION

In accordance with Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 167) SPATIAL MOTION is assumed to consist in "change through time in the location of some entity", where the change takes place in conceived t i m e and which by sequential scanning is made to correspond "point-by-point" to the continuous time span of

processing time. MOTION = 1. MOBILE

Ability by which entities change their spatial location by means of their own energy. Usage patterns: to run down the street, to raise one's hand 2. MOVEABLE

External effort by which entities incapable of changing their spatial location by means of their own energy are moved. Usage patterns: to push the cart, to kick the ball, to drive the car

Relational predications

183

ABSTRACT = 1. V O L I T I O N

In accordance with Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1991, 412f.) VOLITION corresponds to A B S T R A C T M O T I O N which is assumed to consist in "an initiative construal in which an [active] experiencer establishes mental contact with another entity". TIME = 1. B O U N D E D (BOUND)

Verbal predications about situations which are conceptualized to include a terminal or culminating phase or point. 2. U N B O U N D E D ( U N B O U N D )

Verbal predications about situations which are conceptualized as enduring homogeneously with arbitrary starting and ending points. BOUNDED 1. A C C O M P L I S H M E N T

(ACCOMPL)

Verbal predications about situations conceptualized as being directed towards a terminal point or phase, which implies that they will reach an A C H I E V E M E N T phase as part of their meaning. How-

ever, the focus is on the direction towards the terminal point or phase. This means that a goal is expected but not yet reached. Each accomplishment is assigned exactly one s t a r t event and either one stop-event or one culminating event. Usage patterns: to examine, to combine, to develop a film, to install, to implement, to improve, to cook a meal, to discuss, to finish, to defend, to revise, to argue, to convince, to learn driving Constraints: (a) The prototypical sentential adverbial modification is a prepositional phrase with the T E M P O R A L preposition in, and only very marginally with for: She developed the film in an hour. ? She developed the film for an hour.

184 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy (b) ACCOMPLISHMENTS can normally occur as the complements of finish and other TEMPORALLY BOUNDED verbs: finish to examine/combine/develop (c) Simple present form has iterative or habitual meaning (cf. Dowty, 1979, 54): Opticians develop films. A cook cooks meals. 2. ACHIEVEMENT (ACHIEV)

Verbal predications about situations conceptualized as proceeding with a definite phase structure, the terminal point or phase of which is just being achieved as the result of the action. T h e

focus is on the terminal point or phase being achieved by t h e action. Every achievement is assigned exactly one culminating or ending event. Usage patterns: to propose, to intervene, to abandon, to die, to arrive, to leave, to enter, to surrender, to accept, to adopt, to give up, to stop, to start, to attack, to retreat, to fail Constraints: (a) With sentences in which ACHIEVEMENTS occur sentential modifying /or-phrases sound strange: * They adopted the decision for a minute. (b) ACHIEVEMENTS are generally unacceptable as complements of finish: * He finished to adopt the decision. (c) ACHIEVEMENTS are generally unacceptable as complements of stop: * He stopped to adopt the decision. (d) The following DYNAMIC class of adverbials is semantically anomalous with ACHIEVEMENT verbs (cf. Ryle, 1949, 53): attentively, vigilantly, conscientiously, obediently, carefully, studiously, pertinaciously, rapidly, slowly, systematically

Relational predications

185

UNBOUNDED = 1. STATE

Verbal predications about states of affairs which exist homogeneously and unchangingly throughout their duration. They completely lack any internal structure as well as any starting and ending points. Usage patterns: • Generally constrained in taking the progressive aspect (cf. Dowty, 1979, 54ff.). • Do not accept 6y-phrases. • Adverbs of VOLITION are unusual with Dowty, 1979, 55):

STATIVE

verbs (cf.

? John forced Harry to know the answer. • Cannot be used in the imperative: * Know the answer! • Cannot appear in pseudo-cleft constructions: * What John did was know the answer. 2. A C T I V I T Y ( A C T I V )

Verbal predications about situations conceptualized as having no definite but rather a homogeneous phase structure with arbitrary starting and ending points. The focus is on the action which is to proceed or be carried out. Usage patterns: • Modifying adverbs are preferentially She is writing continuously.

DURATIVE.

• Simple present has ITERATIVE or HABITUAL meaning in unmarked contexts (cf. Dowty, 1979, 54f.): Mary works at the department. John listens to Mary. • Allow only /or-phrases as PP-modifiers: John walked for an hour. * John walked in an hour. • Cannot be a complement of take to (cf. Dowty, 1979, 54f.) : * It took John an hour to walk.

186 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy STATE = 1. COPULATIVE

STATIVE verbs combining either with atemporal relations or with nominal predications and having no content beyond functioning as profile determinant of the Stative predication it dominates. COPULATIVES "profile continuation through time ... with all component states being identical" (Langacker, 1991, 65). Usage patterns: to be, to establish, to represent, to look, to seem, to sound 2. NON-COPULATIVE

All STATIVE verbs which do not merely profile continuation through time. Usage patterns: to sit, to lie, to know

6.2.2

Basic atemporal relations

The syntactic category of adjectives has the semantic function of predicating an atemporal relation by providing an elaboration site for nominal concepts. That is, they are conceptually dependent on the more autonomous nominal concepts with respect to which they are only schematically characterized. The nominal trajector fills the dependency slot provided by the adjective's relational predication and thereby locates itself within this specific landmark. Serving this function adject i v a l p r e d i c a t i o n s a r e t y p i c a l l y STATIVE a n d GRADABLE (cf. B o l i n g e r ,

1967). PROPERTY = 1. ABSTRACTION

Properties depend either on sensorily perceivable nominal concepts or on sensorily non-perceivable higher-order conceptual representations. 2. TIME

Properties are intrinsically conceptualized as BOUNDED or UNBOUNDED i n t h e d o m a i n of TIME.

Relational predications ABSTRAC TION

187

ABSTRACT CONCRETE CHARACTER MANNER

ACTIVITYι—

MATTER

- E

UN BOUNDED STATE

SCALE

— c

TIME I— PRO PERTY

BOUNDED

ATTI TUDE

DIMENSION AGE PROVENANCE SPATIAL TEMPORAL MENTAL

ACHIEVEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENT RESULT

- E

COMPARISON -

COMPARATIVE SUPERLATIVE

EVALUATION •

POSITIVE NEGATIVE —

I—

LOCATION

QUALITY SHAPE COLOUR

DEONTIC

MODALITY EPISTEMIC GRADABLE NON-GRADABLE

- i

DESIRE PERMISSION OBLIGATION ESSENCE POSSIBLE PROBABLE LIKELY CERTAIN

Figure 6.3: A conceptual type hierarchy for atemporal relations 3. ATTITUDE

Properties expressing the speakers' attitude concerning the object or situation talked about. 4. GRADATION

Properties which are either vague with respect to differing degrees of realization or properties which are defined as having one realization only. ABSTRACTION

=

1. ABSTRACT

Properties not sensorily perceivable which are dependent on nonperceivable entities. Usage patterns: a great surprise, of equipment, a secret invitation,

a grateful answer, a poor piece a goodwill approval

188 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy 2.

CONCRETE

Sensorially perceivable properties dependent on CONCRETE entities. Usage patterns: a big chair, a large kitchen, a solid ice-block TIME = 1. UNBOUNDED (UNBOUND)

Semantically unmarked properties are UNBOUNDED, i.e. they axe conceptualized as enduring infinitely without any starting and ending points. 2. BOUNDED

Properties which make us conceptualize the DYNAMIC aspect of the entities or situations on which they depend. UNBOUNDED = 1. ACTIVITY ( A C T I V )

Properties which make us conceptualize the DYNAMIC aspect of the entities or situations on which they depend as enduring without any starting and ending points in their primary domain. In a non-primary domain they can adopt the BOUNDARIES of the entity on which they are dependent. Usage patterns: typically expressed by the present participle, which extends the scope of predication indefinitely beyond the time of discourse, as in a promising assumption, the stimulating discussion 2.

STATE

Properties which make us conceptualize the STATIVE aspect of the entities on which they depend as enduring without any starting and ending points in their primary domain. In a non-primary domain their schematic characterization can adopt the BOUNDARIES of the entity on which a STATIVE property is dependent. STATIVE properties axe P E R S I S T E N T , if one holds over an interval of time, it holds over all subintervals (cf. Kauz, 1985, 25). Usage patterns: an active behaviour, a slow commitment, a busy aggregation, a strong belief, a great advantage, a similar outfit

Relational predications

189

• In English the progressive cannot be used with stative adjectives in predicative function (cf. Dowty, 1979, 130): * John is being tall. • The do-test applies negatively (cf. Dowty, 1979, 165): * What the machine did was being noisy. ACTIVITY = 1. CHARACTER

Properties predicating a characteristic state of entities independent of their application in the domain of T I M E . Usage patterns: often used in predicative function as in resistant to change, capable of programming, a satisfying answer, a frightened look, her conscientious procedure, some information illustrative of, information inherent in this word, music characteristic of this time, weather representative of this country, a behaviour consonant with the general climate, a character liable to/inclined to ignore itself, a development parallel to the Western world, a work compatible with the requirements 2. MANNER

Properties predicating the way in which entities or situations axe conceptualized to occur. Usage patterns: a drastic change, a conscientious objection, active help, vigilant support, busy work, convincing success, confusing information, annoying information, disappointing (exciting, alarming) news, her/an embarrassing behaviour, amusing (boring, bewildering) music STATIVE

-

1. M A T T E R

Properties defining a material which is scientifically defined in its original sense. Usage patterns: a silken poem, a metallic

leather

190 Domains 2.

of the conceptual type hierarchy

SCALE

Properties predicating a relative SCALE to be graded and "derelativized" by the entity which grades the relative SCALE. Usage patterns: a young child, old wine, a new age, a large shoe, a thin leaf 3.

LOCATION

Properties locating entities or situations in relation to the current discourse space. Usage patterns: the preceding / following section / number MATTER = 1.

QUALITY

Properties specifying the substance or appearance of the entity which they depend on. Usage patterns: silken, metallic, 2.

woollen

SHAPE

Properties classifying an entity into a scientifically defined form. Usage patterns: a square market, a round table, a round biscuit, a pointed knife 3.

COLOUR

Properties designating a scientifically defined colour spectrum in their literal sense. Usage patterns: a red face, red hair, a red sun, black sugar, black earth SCALE = 1.

DIMENSION

Properties providing relative extent along one or more dimensions. Usage patterns: a high desk, a large flat, a big house, a big tower 2.

AGE

Properties predicating an extent of existence relative to the entity on which they are dependent.

Relational predications Usage patterns: a young cheese, a young girl, a new car, a new table-cloth, mountains

191

old

LOCATION = 1. SPATIAL

Properties locating an entity or situation within the current discourse space. Usage patterns: the local bus, the preceding statement, the next chapter, the present hearers, the middle quotation, the top line, the eastern direction, the indoor demonstration, the neighbouring buildings 2. T E M P O R A L

Properties relating entities or situations to the time of discourse. Usage patterns: •

NON-GRADABLE;

• Not GRADABLE by adverbs;

• Do not take diminutive or augmentative suffixes; • May only be used in attributive function. future development, immediate help, the current vice-chancellor, previous research, the introductory information, the forthcoming news, ongoing research 3. MENTAL

Properties relating entities or situations to the speakers' knowledge. Usage patterns: a known device, a forgotten appointment, stored information

an envisaged visit, the

4 . PROVENANCE

Properties relating entities or situations to their origin. Usage patterns: electronic research, industrial development, news, anti-authoritative education

physical weight,

BBC

192 Domains

of the conceptual type hierarchy

BOUNDED = 1. ACCOMPLISHMENT

(ACCOMPL)

Property expecting a BOUNDING to be achieved. Usage patterns: a fast dance, a productive colleague, mortal danger 2. ACHIEVEMENT

(ACHIEV)

Property intrinsically predicating a BOUNDING being achieved at the time of discourse or at the time of reference. As such, they are typically elaborated by present participles. Usage patterns: a culminating

enterprise,

a uniting walk

3. RESULTATIVE ( R E S U L T )

Property intrinsically predicating a BOUNDING having been achieved before the time of discourse or reference time. As such, they are typically elaborated by past participles. Usage patterns: a given organization, an introduced topic, a furnished room, a painted kitchen, a closed door, a broken glass, an established science, a hidden mistake, a known obstacle, the paid bill, the corrected test ATTITUDE = 1. COMPARISON

(COMPAR)

Properties predicating a standard of similarity or difference by which two or more entities or situations are compared, which thereby receive a proportionate distance in their primary domain. Usage patterns: similar figures, the same location every day, identical results, two different letters from the same address, compatible success, alike in form, the converse idea, otherwise reconcilable 2. EVALUATION ( E V A L )

Properties by which the speaker locates an entity,somewhere on a positive-negative scale and thereby attributes a value to an entity. Usage patterns: a special offer, a damaging interruption, a useful advice, a positive hint, an essential characteristic, a satisfying offer

Relational predications 3.

193

MODALITY

Properties by which speakers can relate the existence of entities or situations to the actual world from possible to necessary. MODALITY 1.

DEONTIC

Properties by which the speaker can express various degrees of permission, obligation, or essence to be associated with an entity. Usage patterns: the necessary information, the allowed time, the granted amount, an unwarranted investigation 2.

EPISTEMIC

Properties by which the speaker can express various degrees of probability to be associated with an entity. Usage patterns: a probable behaviour, a presumable attitude, likely endeavour, an unexpected visit

a

DEONTIC 1.

DESIRE

Properties by which speakers can express their desire in relation to the entity or situation talked about. Usage patterns: the preferred information, an unwelcome visitor 2.

unsuited to the job, the desired amount,

PERMISSION

Properties by which speakers can express their permission in relation to the entity or situation talked about. Usage patterns: the accepted solution, an unwarranted 3.

behaviour

OBLIGATION

Properties by which speakers can express the obligation imposed on the entity or situation talked about. Usage patterns: a necessary investigation, obliged to help, pressed for cash, a pressing engagement, a dutiful job

194 Domains 4.

of the conceptual type hierarchy

ESSENCE

Properties holding of entities or situations in an analytical sense, i.e. being part of their own meaning. Usage patterns: natural, fluid EPISTEMIC = 1.

POSSIBLE

Properties by which speakers express their belief concerning the possible existence of an entity or situation. Usage patterns: potential, conceivable, imaginable 2.

PROBABLE

Properties by which speakers express their belief concerning the probability of an entity or situation. Usage patterns: presumable, 3.

certain,

promising

LIKELY

Properties by which speakers express their belief concerning the likelihood of an entity or situation. Usage patterns: convincing, credible, 4.

persuasive

CERTAIN

Properties by which speakers express their conviction concerning the certainty of an entity or situation. Usage patterns: obvious, evident,

indisputable

GRADATION = 1.

GRADABLE

Properties dependent on entities providing a conventional standard for the property's proportionate extent, i.e. GRADABLE adjectives are lexically vague with respect to their degree of realization on a contextually provided scale (cf. Dowty, 1979, 88; K a m p , 1975). This makes GRADABLE properties UNBOUNDED. T h e y constitute the unmarked class of adjectives. Usage patterns: long eyelashes, a long train; a high tower, a high desk; a large country, a large kitchen

Conclusion

195

2. N O N - G R A D A B L E ( N O N G R A D )

Properties conceptualized with fixed, i.e. invariable realization, which either holds or does not hold of an entity (QUALITY, Q U A N TITY, LOCATION).

Usage patterns: the main canon, an electronic mail, the united symbols, the preceding paragraph, an unwarranted proposal, the alleged murderer

6.3

Conclusion

In this chapter we have introduced the most basic conceptual type hierarchies which speakers use in the composition of a valency relation as will be represented in the following chapters: the autonomous concepts of nominal predications are interrelated by the temporal predications of verbs and modified by the atemporal relations of adjectives. During the composition of a valency relation speakers unify these concepts by the relational concept depending on the more autonomous concept with which it unifies and from which it thereby inherits the representation. In this way speakers represent the meaning of a complex sentence by proceeding from the most autonomous concept and by subsequently unifying more dependent predications with the already built representation in accordance with the methodological prerequisites introduced in chapter 5.

Chapter Τ Representing discourse domains In this chapter we will see how the resolution of polysemy is achieved in the particular discourse context by speakers drawing on both lexical knowledge and knowledge about the organization of discourse domains. Speakers achieve the representation of discourse domains by proceeding from lexically encoded concepts with the relatively highest degree of semantic autonomy to those lexical concepts embodying the greatest degree of context-dependence. In this way the vagueness of lexical concepts is contextually configured by top-down inheritance, from discourse representation to the representation of lexical concepts. The representation of domains is achieved by bottom-up inheritance, from the representation of lexical concepts to the representation of discourse. Whereas semantically autonomous concepts express the content of a discourse, semantically dependent concepts interrelate the autonomous concepts and thereby organize a discourse. In sections 7.2 and 7.3 we will introduce this discourse representation by image schemata. During the development of discourse analysis a number of representations have been introduced, and we will be concerned with these representations in the first section of this chapter.

7.1

Schemata, frames, and scripts

Obviously, speakers axe able to create and understand novel meanings by drawing on already experienced discourse situations. The psychologist Bartlett assumed (cf. Bartlett, 1932) that humans would get lost in the complexity of detailed and novel information if they did not have the ability to abstract the reoccurring and obviously canonical, functionally relevant parts of situations as being the very constitutive elements of their detailed and varied experiences. Bartlett's idea was

Schemata, frames, and scripts

197

that only these abstractions as reoccurring s c h e m a t a are stored in memory. Humans are then able to associate each newly experienced situation with some abstract event type. According to Bartlett's theory, these situation types are constrained to different degrees, depending on the strength of social norms or natural laws. And depending on the degrees of the constraints speakers will be successful in understanding an occurring situation against the background of their knowledge of event types. While further developing the original notion of a schema concept, Tanenhaus and Lucas (cf. Tanenhaus and Lucas, 1987) focus on the dynamic aspect which Bartlett saw as being involved in the abstract knowledge of temporal organisations. A schema was defined as a "higher-level complex knowledge structure" (Dijk and Kintsch, 1983, 141; Rumelhart, 1975) which represents objects in terms of their stereotyped, so-called characteristic (instead of necessary) attributes and abstracts away from idiosyncratic, accidental attributes. Van Dijk intended to represent the macro-structure of a discourse as reducing, organizing and categorizing "semantic information of sequences as wholes" (cf. Dijk, 1977, 132). In reaction to both artificial intelligence and psychology, Minsky introduced the notion of a frame (cf. Minsky, 1975; Charniak, 1975) to account for the efficiency, power and speed of information processing. In particular, frames were introduced to overcome an inadequate concept of concrete and local as well as unstructured memory. Aiming at a more general representation, Minsky assumed frames to refer to stereotyped knowledge, that speakers were supposed to have generalized over previously experienced situations, their objects, attributes and spatial organization. Formally speaking, a frame establishes a hierarchical network in which the dominating nodes correspond to irreversible knowledge about the respective situation, whereas towards the terminal nodes the possibility of choosing between alternate valid nodes increases. If a frame is instantiated by a compatible discourse situation, each node consists of an attribute-value pair. Attributes either render slots to be filled with appropriate values for different stages and participants of situation types, or the nodes have already assigned default assumptions. The latter is generally the case with terminal nodes. For instance, with chair such a default assumption might be that of

198 Representing

discourse

domains

the normal function of a chair as a facility on which to sit down; or with knife the normal function may be taken to be an INSTRUMENT with which to cut E D I B L E things. Frames are, however, highly abstract generalizations about spatial configurations which in most cases allow for exceptions. For a number of reasons the straightforward matching of actually processed discourse situations with frame representations is invalidated by psycholinguistic evidence. Firstly, more than one frame or even a whole lot of frames may be evoked in a specific discourse situation, the frames then in part competing or overlapping so that speakers have to select the situationally coherent parts. This renders the frame concept uneconomical. It is unlikely that speakers activate all frames of the knowledge representation related to the information of an encountered situation. They rather seem to process the information in highly economical ways by instantiating only those components of their knowledge which are relevant and sufficient for the understanding of the ongoing scene (cf. Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Garnham, 1989; Whitney, 1986; Whitney, 1987). This is what the economy of information processing consists in: in just recognizing the relevant relations. Yet the problem of how to select the relevant parts of knowledge has not been settled by frame semantics. Secondly, speakers have to make differently strong adjustments of their frames as far as their coherence with the encountered situation is concerned. This adaptation remains a problem, since frames provide much too abstract knowledge in comparison to what may appear as a coherent meaningful utterance in an actual discourse situation. Intending to represent stereotyped event sequences in social interactions, Schank and Abelson (cf. Schank and Abelson, 1977) developed the notion of a script. While Schank and Abelson's developments took place in artificial intelligence, Sanford and Garrod (cf. Sanford and Garrod, 1981) evaluated the idea of typical sequences of behaviour psychologically in what they called scenarios. These event structures were particularly designed to supplement missing information in particular discourse situations, i.e. information which has not been explicitly mentioned in those situations. Although a flexible reduction of knowledge plays a very important role in human reasoning, all means of representing merely abstract and

Discourse representation

by mental models

199

rigid knowledge structures suffer from the same inefficiencies: they axe all too coarse-grained and too rigid to manage the processing of actually encountered discourse situations, which contain very fine-grained information to which the speakers' knowledge representation has to be adjusted continuously. By representing exclusively internal relationships, no coherent interpretation may be achieved, i.e. a discourse situation may not really be endowed with sense without a flexible relation between abstract knowledge and concrete information. The concrete information of the potential representation of discourse situations consists of infinite relations between the relative sizes and shapes of almost all objects in the speakers' environment (cf. Hatim and Mason, 1990), not to mention the culture-specific perspectives on these relations.

7.2

Discourse representation by mental models

In order to account for the flexible representation of the organization of objects, Johnson-Laird has refined the static conception of frames and schemata in more dynamic terms (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983). According to his theory the continuously experienced information is organized in mental models. The theory of Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Gentner and Rattermann, 1991) assumes that speakers represent their experienced information both in terms of linear propositions and analogous models. Analogous representations create a model of reality which does not primarily encode an exact copy of the objects themselves but represents their organization instead. The relational analogy of mental models may be illustrated with concrete pictures. A photograph normally represents a very finegrained model of reality by preserving most of the properties of the represented situation. An abstract painting, however, may reduce perceived reality to some basic relations in order to achieve the intended effect. In a similar vein, listeners seem to represent their mental models by reducing the analogous information to just the relevant relations, and by extending these relations only if they prove to be insufficient. Prom their analogous representations listeners may thus draw inferences about not explicitly mentioned information. During the representation of a mental model (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983), a speaker integrates all relevant relations which are part of their encyclopedic knowledge into an analogous representation of the perceived situation.

200 Representing discourse

domains

This is built up separately from and in addition to the propositional representation, which is also represented on its own right and which is equally necessary (cf. Dell and O'Seaghdha, 1992). For instance, the difference between active and passive voice, which is not represented in a predicate-argument structure, becomes relevant in the foregroundbackground organization of mental models. Propositions are linear representations more directly related to linguistic utterances. Speakers construe them specifically for purposes of linguistic expression by extracting those parts from the mental model which make necessary the inferences of the missing parts on the listener's side. What exactly speakers extract from their mental models to transform it into the propositional representation depends on their own knowledge and on their assumptions concerning the listener's knowledge, as well as on the context and earlier stages of the discourse (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 65). In the ideal case speakers then transform their propositional representation into an utterance which is maximally relevant. Now, how do speakers recognize the communicatively relevant information? According to Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory communication involves the comparison of interpretations (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Gutt, 1991, 189). Sperber and Wilson claim that the ability to compare interpretations may be a universal disposition of human reasoning. In order to agree in their interpretations, speakers negotiate their mental representations by recognizing the relevant information within the relevant discourse context, using minimal cognitive effort and maximal cognitive benefit (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). This is the principle of relevance. Speakers represent a mental model for each scene which is the topic of a conversation they take part in. The mental model consists of the discourse referents which represent the parts of the scene and the relations between them. Now, in addition to these relations, speakers relate the explicitly mentioned discourse referents to the not explicitly mentioned background referents, which are part of the speakers' general encyclopedic knowledge of discourse situations. They evaluate these relations as to situational relevance and consistency within the discourse representation so far achieved. Finally, speakers select the most suitable background referents required to complete the coherence

Relating image schemata and mental models

201

of the discourse. Let us return to our example of ad hoc metonymy to illustrate this representation: (7.1)

The beefsteak at table four is getting

impatient.

In (7.1) beefsteak cannot be assigned a discourse referent directly, as by relying on conventionalized lexical concepts no unification with the predicate order is possible. This provides the reason for speakers to evaluate and reorganize their mental model at this stage of the discourse. The most highly ranking inference rule is activated, which in this case is the metonymic image schema relating the HUMAN P O S SESSOR to its POSSESSED (cf. Langacker, 1993, 7ff.). With this image schema speakers take the customer as the most likely background referent as the POSSESSOR to be related to beefsteak as the POSSESSED within this discourse domain: by projecting the POSSESSOR on its P O S SESSED the nominal beefsteak inherits its semantic representation from i t s POSSESSOR.

Example (7.1) is an ad hoc metonymy: however peculiar or "impossible" an example it may seem, speakers obviously have no problem in rendering such creative utterances possible, provided they have enough knowledge about the respective discourse domain, i.e. they must know the restaurant domain. They must also have experienced sufficient information from the discourse situation, i.e. speakers must have realized that there is a customer in the restaurant who has been eating a beefsteak. By relating knowledge and information in this way, speakers are capable of inferring the implicit metonymy embodied by beefsteak. Thus, the processing of non-conventionalized linguistic utterances neatly illustrates the relevance of the interaction between acquired knowledge and situationally rendered information.

7.3

Relating image schemata and mental models

We will illustrate the integration of knowledge and information with relational linguistic expressions which embody a high degree of contextdependence, more precisely, with the translation of the German preposition über into English over and above, (cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993a; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993b; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993c). At the beginning of chapter 5 we mentioned the semantic distinction between over and above as an example of the principled context dependence of mental

202 Representing

discourse

domains

representations. We will elaborate this observation now by representing the discourse organizational force of prepositions. Prepositions are discourse organizers by instantiating an abstract image schema which represents the conceptual type of a preposition in the lexicon (cf. Langacker, 1991, 399). As fundamental reflections of the speakers' bodily experiences image schemata play a key role in the representation of polysemy. The prepositions over and above relate a T R to a LM in the domain of SPACE. These prepositions represent the speakers' bodily experience of the normally upright position which they have in the VERTICAL DIMENSION. Moreover, through the VERTICAL DIMENSION the gravitational force is exerted from the HORIZONTAL SURFACE of the earth. The discourse organizational force of the prepositions over and above is represented by the image schema relating the VERTICAL to the HORIZONTAL DIMENSION. The image schema is derived from the mental model which interrelates the specific attributes of the particular discourse referents of TR and LM. In order to translate the German preposition über into English over or above, translators have to evaluate the relevant semantic distinctions of the German spatial preposition über. Translators achieve this distinction by relating the relevant attributes in their mental models: (7.2)

Das Flugzeug fliegt über der Sahara. =Φ> The plane is flying over the Sahara.

sea

Sahara

Figure 7.1: Mental model of over (plane, Sahara)

Relating image schemata and mental models 203 (7.3)

Das Flugzeug fliegt über den Wolken. The plane is flying above the clouds.

above

in below

Figure 7.2: Mental model of above (plane, clouds) In these examples the mental models have to be reduced to different image schemata. In order to translate (7.2) adequately into English, the schema must profile the flight of the plane against the HORIZONTAL DIMENSION. The relevant information is that the plane is flying over the Sahara and not over the sea. This image schema is expressed by the English preposition over. In order to translate (7.3) adequately into English, the schema must profile the flight of the plane along the VERTICAL DIMENSION. The relevant information is that the plane is flying above the clouds and not below. This image schema is expressed by the English preposition above. The discourse representation must aim at this intended interpretation. We have assumed the default meanings in these examples. We may also assume a discourse representation in which the unusual sentence The plane is flying over the clouds is possible. This sentence is strongly marked, as the HORIZONTAL extension of clouds is usually conceptualized as UNBOUNDED, in contrast to the geographically BOUNDED Sahara. Therefore the preposition über in (7.3) does not express the geographical location of the plane but, instead, its height. This default information is not expressed within the sentence, but must be inferred from the mental model which represents the discourse situation. Let us consider more specifically how speakers relate objects along the VERTICAL DIMENSION. The functional relationship between lamp and table in example (7.4) requires the light of the lamp to be distributed evenly over the HORIZONTAL SURFACE of the table, as rep-

204 Representing discourse domains resented in figure 7.3. This function is a socio-cultural convention, according to which speakers negotiate how far the lamp may be located from the centre of the table in order to fulfil the truth-conditions for using the preposition over. (7.4)

Die Lampe hängt über dem Tisch. =Φ· The lamp hangs over the table.

Figure 7.3: Mental model of over (lamp, table)

Figure 7.4: Mental model of * over (lamp, table) In figure 7.4 the lamp is too far from the centre of the table in order to fulfil the truth conditions for applying the preposition over. Example (7.5) does not require any functional relationship beyond the deictic relationship HIGHER T H A N in the VERTICAL DIMENSION, as represented in figure 7.5.

Relating image schemata and mental models 205 (7.5)

Der Picasso hängt über dem Miro. The Picasso is above the Miro.

Η

Figure 7.5: Mental model of above (Picasso, Miro)

These examples illustrate that the relation between the objects as represented in the image schema are insufficient for translating into the language-specific predicate of the propositional representation. The representation in figure 7.4 may neither be translated into the German preposition über, nor into English over or above. In contrast to this, the compatible relational representation in figure 7.5 contains the relevant attributes by which the objects are related for speakers to evaluate that this mental model may be translated into German über and English above. Hence, within the representation of a mental model, translators have to interrelate the objects by their relevant attributes in order to infer the respective image schema from which they axe then capable of translating their analogous representations into the adequate propositional representations. The spatial polysemy of the German preposition über results from the speakers' conceptualization of perceived reality (Lakoff, 1987, 443; Langacker, 1991, 402). In our examples the senses of über instantiate the image schema which, due to the vertical posture of the human body, universally relates the VERTICAL with the HORIZONTAL DIMENSION. Speakers have to infer this relational information of the image schema from the concrete mental model. These image schemata are theoretical hypotheses about universal semantic distinctions grounded in human perception. Due to their perceptual basis these semantic distinctions are iconic. As we have seen, these universal image schemata

206 Representing discourse

domains

are symbolically exploited by different forms and to different degrees in different languages. Furthermore, the application of these image schemata to their corresponding mental models has to be negotiated in each particular discourse situation, because the image schema is indexically related to the mental model. Speakers achieve these indexical relations in very flexible ways. As yet, it is still a matter of research as to how fine-grained the analogous mental representations of humans correspond to the perceived situation and how they axe translated into propositional representations. It is obvious that differently fine-grained mental models have to be represented in examples (7.2) to (7.5), in order to chose the respective image schema which determines the selection of the adequate preposition. Furthermore, the indexical relation between an image schema and a mental model is conventionalized in different ways in different languages, as different attributes become relevant in English and German. The granularity of the mental model depends on the indexical functions which the objects adopt in the respective relationship. The more conventionalized the relationship is represented, i.e. the more it depends on the objects themselves as being relevant, the more fine-grained the relationship is represented and the more likely it is that over is selected in English. In this case we have an iconic mapping between form and meaning. And vice versa, the more indexical the relationship is represented, the less it depends on the central attributes of the objects themselves, depending instead only on the contextual relationship between them, and the more likely it is that above is used in English. This abstract representation is supported by the generic copula be as the verbal predication of sentence (7.5) in English. Analogously, the integration of schemata within mental models may be illustrated with the translationally relevant metonymy of the German preposition seit. The German preposition seit has two senses in the domain of TIME, one of which is translated into English since and the other into for. The relevant semantic distinctions of the German preposition seit are achieved by representing the temporal organization of each sense of seit in the form of a schema. This schematic representation is the theoretical prerequisite for the translator to select the adequate target language equivalent. Seit translates into English since if it relates an ACCOMPLISHMENT, as elaborated by waiting in (7.6), to

Relating image schemata and mental models

207

a POINT IN TIME which establishes its starting point, as expressed by three ο 'clock. This sense of seit may also be paraphrased by German seitdem, -dem focussing the starting point of a period. If, however, seit relates an ongoing ACCOMPLISHMENT t o a PERIOD O F TIME, such as

in (7.7), where seit relates the waiting to three hours, it is translated into English for. This sense of seit may also be paraphrased by German seither, -her focussing on the PERIOD OF TIME from starting to ending point (cf. Kempcke, 2000; Wahrig, 1980). (7.6)

Wir warten seit drei Uhr. We have been waiting since three o'clock.

(7.7)

Wir warten seit drei Stunden. We have been waiting for three hours.

starting point since

utterance time

V

time span for

1 3:00

1 1 4:00

event time

1 1 5:00

1 6:00

Figure 7.6: Mental model of since and for Cognitively (Lakoff, 1987, 285f.; Langacker, 1991, 402), the meanings of the preposition seit may equally be related to a universal image schema, by which the meaning of a PATH is frequently related to either its starting or its ending point. The preposition for makes reference to the concept of a PATH metaphorically in the domain of TIME, where PATH b e c o m e s P E R I O D O F T I M E .

208 Representing discourse domains Prototype semantics considers image schemata as universal core meanings, whereby polysemous senses may be distinguished monolingually and translational equivalents may be interrelated multilingually (cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1986). Image schemata evolve from intrinsically quasi-necessary relations which organize a domain in terms of the speakers' world view. Intrinsic relations are taken to represent the schematic attributes of concepts defined against the speakers' theory of the world. Intrinsic attributes axe quasi-necessary, because they are relatively stable. Hence they are least viable for being violated, because they are the condition for the linguistic expression to apply. Thus inUniverse of

^^^Discourse^^^^ Domain

Domain

Domain

Figure 7.7: Domains, schemata, and mental models trinsic attributes provide universal reasoning schemata, which axe represented by image schemata. These image schemata are theoretical hypotheses about universal semantic distinctions which are grounded in human perception. As we have seen, image schemata are exploited

Inferring implicit information

209

by different forms and to different degrees in different languages. Image schemata represent the relations between PARTS of a discourse domain metonymically. Figure 7.7 represents the hierarchy of knowledge within the universe of discourse. Each universe of discourse subsumes several discourse domains which evolve from the representation of mental models. Mental models are represented at the basic level at which the relevant parts are related in accordance with the coherence relations and by the figure-ground principle. These paxts merge into universally valid image schemata. At the basic level image schemata relate the relevant parts of a domain metonymically. As soon as the coherence relations between the PARTS of an image schema provide sufficient cognitive benefit, the image schema may become communicatively relevant in a cognitively distant, more abstract target domain. At this point we may observe the emergence of metaphorical meanings as a result of the transferred image schema.

7.4

Inferring implicit information

Utterances are creative and incomplete in a principled way. This means that beyond the cognitively relevant reduction to image schemata, discourse representations must also rely on very concrete and detailed aspects of knowledge, as exceptions to the rule continuously arise (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 247). On this view, discourse representations create concrete mental models, and only under this condition can the referential relations to actually encountered situations be achieved. This concreteness avoids reductionism in several respects: 1. By representing the referential relations between the system and its environment, structuralist reductionism disappears on account of the achieved self-referentiality of the system. 2. By relating social patterns of behaviour (cf. Labov, 1973) to utterances as linguistic behaviour, we evade any individualist reductionism. We achieve this by accounting for how speakers negotiate their individual mental models in order to make them sufficiently compatible and to agree on their interpretations and the domain of reference. Speakers construe partner models in order to decide which parts of their mental models to make linguistically explicit in the particular communication.

210 Representing discourse

domains

3. We also intend to relate affective patterns of behaviour to how the utterance is made, thereby aiming at the interpretation of beliefs and attitudes (cf. Strohner, 1990, 88, 248). 4. Earlier stages of the discourse may have to be reconsidered and revised if in conflict with information obtained in later stages of the discourse. Johnson-Laird's mental model conception has been vigorously developed and elaborated. According to Johnson-Laird, the ability to create models is mastered first in the process of language acquisition. Only after children have acquired a principled understanding of how words contribute to the meaningfulness of sentences do they come to discover the intensions of words (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 263ff.). Johnson-Laird claims the knowledge of word meanings to be arranged in a networklike hierarchical organization without any primitive labels, as any label embodies entailments to other labels and is in principle revisable. This relational and relative nature of intensions derives from truth conditions being not specified in relation to the real world, but in relation to the speakers' mental models of the world (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 262ff.). And without wanting to settle the realism vs. mentalism debate (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 182ff.), Johnson-Laird points out how the key to human consciousness, the very basis of human language and thought, is its recursive nature, which implies that any explanation of how the mind really works will remain partial, because we can always find a new explanation which is better than the previous one in view of newly perceived information (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 476£). Concomitant with this, human knowledge will always remain incomplete. The speakers' recursive and non-deterministic representation of a mental model of the discourse situation underlines the inadequacy of Pustejovsky's treatment of "logical metonymy" (cf. Pustejovsky, 1991; cf. above, section 5.4). Pustejovsky has introduced the notion of logical metonymy into the generative lexicon approach (cf. e.g. Pustejovsky and Annick, 1988, 522). In logical metonymy the logically required argument is substituted and semantically absorbed by its own argument. Let us consider the following examples: (7.8)

a.

I need time to finish the beefsteak.

b.

I need time to finish the

swimming-pool.

Inferring implicit information c.

I need time to finish the beer.

d.

I need time to finish the cigarette.

211

In (7.8a) finish is ambiguous for instance with respect to finish eating or finish grilling, depending on whether the conversation takes place in a dining room, in a restaurant, or in a kitchen. (7.8b) is ambiguous with respect to many activities in which one can imagine a swimmingpool to be involved in: one can fill it, clean it, empty or repair it, each of these activities being related to a different situation for which the speaker correspondingly represents a different mental model on the basis of their stored knowledge and their experienced information. In the fairly well-routinized, yet not lexicalized metonymies in (7.8c) and (7.8d), the object NPs the beer and the cigarette do not refer to the CONSUMABLE object itself, but to the not overtly expressed ACCOMPLISHMENT of consuming the object. The paraphrase reflects the mental inference of implicit information to be concluded from the analogous representation of the mental model: (7.9)

to finish drinking the beer

In contrast to (7.8) the ACCOMPLISHMENT reading is conventionalized with film in (7.10a): (7.10)

a.

John enjoyed the film.

b.

The film was indeed

informative.

In (7.10a) film, in accordance with the ACTIVITY verb enjoy, is referred to as the ACCOMPLISHMENT of watching the film which again is not explicitly mentioned, but has been taken over to become the conventionalized meaning of film. In contrast to this, in (7.10b) film is referred to as the SEMIOTIC OBJECT itself. The latter sense establishes the bounding point, the ACHIEVEMENT of the ACCOMPLISHMENT of watching the film in accordance with the evaluation by the STATIVE adjective informative. (7.8) is comparable to (7.1) as a metonymic extension which speakers have originally created in accordance with their mental representation of the discourse situation. A predicate-argument structure is reduced to the argument: drinking the beer is reduced to beer and the customer eating the beefsteak is reduced to beefsteak. The difference

212 Representing discourse domains between the examples (7.1), (7.8) and (7.10) consists in the novelty and thus in the speakers' intentional representation of the meaning of (7.1) as compared to the conventionality and thus the automatic representation of the meaning of (7.10). Nevertheless, in view of a multiplicity of different possible discourse situations in which a cigarette may be rolled or a beer may be filled, metonymies axe not generated in a logical sense, but apply non-monotonically in that their default is always defeasible. Also fitting into the type of metonymy arising from partial language use are the well-conventionalized usage patterns of VOLITIONAL verbs which in accordance with Pustejovsky's definition "logically" require some relational predication as their grammatical object. This, however, is often not overtly expressed, as in the following example: (7.11)

John believes Mary.

For (7.11) speakers mentally represent in fairly automatical ways something like the following paraphrase: (7.12)

John believes the story which Mary tells him.

The inference consists in inserting the proposition tell (Mary, story, John) in which the verbal predication tell relates Mary as the agentive trajector of the relative clause with the anaphoric pronoun him functioning as the recipient landmark. The agentive trajector in the metonymic use functions as the landmark of the main clause towards which the VOLITIONAL A C T I O N predicated by believe is directed. Example (7.13) can be explained in a parallel fashion. It is mentally represented as indicated by the paraphrase in (7.14). In (7.13) the object attributed to Mary has taken over the whole predication expressed by the infinitive clause in (7.14). (7.13)

John considers Mary a genius.

(7.14)

John considers Mary to be a genius.

In English this construction has become conventionalized with a large class of EVALUATIVE and C O M P A R A T I V E verbal predications, such as to esteem, to elect, to make, to rate, to certify, to count, to proclaim. The metonymy of this class, however, is not exhaustive, as alongside

Conclusion

213

there are the verbs to which the evaluated or compared NP is obligatorily adjoined by an explicitly mentioned relational predication, namely either by the C O P U L A T I V E preposition as or for or by the verbal copula to be (cf. Quirk et al., 1985, 1200f.): accept as, acknowledge as, characterize as, class as, defines as/to be, describe as, intend as, regard as/to be, see as, treat as, use as. Probably the reluctance to enter the metonymy pattern of consider has something to do with the degree of intentionality implied in the verbal concept as a conscious mental evaluation or comparison.

7.5

Conclusion

Metonymie language use is one way of providing partial information in discourse, and it is thus an instance of economy. Speakers easily access new occurrences of partial information by mentally completing the missing linguistic items. Langacker calls this the closure phenomenon (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 106). In order to identify the relevant information it is a major objective of speakers to rapidly represent the missing information. This representation is an intentional inference procedure, as has been illustrated in (7.1) with a non-conventionalized metonymy. If a particular expression conveying partial information becomes established, however, the closure phenomenon has turned into a conventionalized cognitive routine, and speakers are no longer aware of the partiality or discrepancy of the information. Instead, the meaning of the originally missing linguistic item may have become subsumed and lexicalized with the linguistic item to which the missing information is functionally related. The inadequacy of assuming a purely static frame conception is proved by the variations of mental models not only across situations, but also across speakers, who continuously have to negotiate and adapt their discourse representations. The intended referent of ad hoc metonymies cannot be identified "logically", but only probabilistically, depending on the listeners' judgement of what is relevant for the understanding of the whole discourse. This understanding crucially derives from their general encyclopedic knowledge as well as from their knowledge of the discourse referents already introduced in previous stages of the discourse.

Chapter 8 Metonymy and metaphor as universals Metonymies and metaphors are models for extending the lexicon by categorizing the world (cf. Lipka, 1988). As a cognitive phenomenon new meaning results from the speakers' creativity by increasing the informativity of language (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 65). Pragmatically, speakers thereby maximize the communicative efficiency of language by minimal differentiation of form (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 64). Semantically, meaning evolves in discourse domains which are metonymically structured in the first place. The metonymic organization of domains is thus prerequisite for the metaphorical transfer across domains (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 68; Heine et al., 1991, 62).

This may be illustrated by the semantic development of English while. The lexical category of the noun while originated in Old English and expressed a P E R I O D in the domain of T I M E , where it became metonymically extended to the grammatical category of a conjunction in Middle English in order to express the SIMULTANEITY of two events in the domain of TIME. Prom this discourse organizational function in the domain of TIME, the conjunction became extended into the domain of CAUSE in Early Modern English, where it became used in the A D VERSATIVE sense (cf. Onions, 1973; Simpson and Weiner, 1989). What is particularly evident with the last extension of while is the preservation of the abstract image schema representing a C O N T R A S T between two situations (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 80). Thus, typologically we may predict semantic extensions by means of mental image schemata. Image schemata represent universal categories of human experience. On the one hand image schemata relate polysemous senses, and on the other hand they relate translational equivalents (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 38; Bybee et al., 1994, 19). Returning to meaning

Metonymy as domain representation

215

as a cognitive phenomenon, we have to represent how the adequate balance between creativity and routine is achieved in communication: by following the principle of relevance, speakers strive to achieve maximal cognitive benefit with minimal cognitive effort (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995). The principle of relevance accounts for the continuity of reference: by contextually induced reference-point variation within one and the same concept speakers try to keep the chain of reference continuous as long as possible (cf. above, section 2.5). Only if the cognitive effort of contextual variation is no longer warranted may we observe speakers to be involved in a schematic projection within or across domains. Metonymy and metaphor are two complementary and equally necessary stages of the same problem solving activity (cf. Heine et al., 1991, 48). Within domains, organization occurs metonymically (Croft, 1993, 347ff.). Metonymy represents a semantic domain by organizing it in terms of image schemata. Image schemata result from a problem solving activity in which the representation of a domain is reduced for the purposes of recognizing the relevant information in discourse (cf Heine et al., 1991, 70). A metonymic projection relates the source meaning with the target meaning within the particular discourse context by foregrounding the schematic structure efficiently for an effective interpretation of the relevant information. The evolution of metonymies organizes the same domain until the schematic structure is conventionalized sufficiently to allow for the metaphorical projection into a different domain. The principle of analogy enables the projection of abstract image schemata (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 80) from source domains with rich knowledge representation into target domains with poor knowledge representation. The metaphorical projection occurs in a discourse context in which the source meaning is not available (cf. Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 87). Prerequisite for this is the speakers' adequate differentiation of the source domain. This representation results from metonymic organization.

8.1

Metonymy as domain representation

A metonymic extension occurs when speakers project a lexical meaning to a contiguous one within the same domain of discourse (cf. Croft, 1993, 347). Contiguity is the result of experience, i.e. functional promi-

216 Metonymy and metaphor as universals nence and frequency determine conventionalization. In addition, it is the naturalness of the experiential condition in terms of the coherence between a sense and its context which mates speakers accept the conventionalization of a metonymic extension. These are prerequisite for the lexicalization of senses. Discourse coherence is an essential condition for assuming and resolving polysemies (cf. Fass, 1988, 152). It is particularly in respect of the naturalness of discourse that a cognitive approach is concerned with the use and development of metonymies. From this view the conventionalization of a novel metonymy results from a significant need for a new referential system. The existing representation is no longer economical in view of the communicative requirements (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 39f.). It is the stage within the development of discourse coherence where flexibility in terms of exhausting a concept by stretching its borderlines has given way to the creation of novel autonomous concepts. The novel sense is conventionalized as soon as the discourse coherence relations it embodies are sufficiently strong. This conventionalization is the consequence of a continuous functional change. Langacker considers ad hoc metonymies as one of many instances of reference-point constructions, in which entities located in the same region by virtue of their functional relationships can be used to refer to each other (cf. Langacker, 1993, 30). As Langacker explains it, speakers predict reference-point relationships along the paradigmatic dimension on the basis of a mentally salient association between the entity, normally designated by the expression, and the actually intended referent. This capability is assumed to be universal, because it has an indispensable communicative function, which again relates to economy and flexibility in language use: speakers can on the one hand refer as precisely as necessary to achieve the desired attention on the listener's side, and they can focus on what has the greatest salience for them on the other (cf. Langacker, 1993, 30f.). Very often speakers shift to different parts of one and the same conceptual structure to focus on this part as the active zone, i.e. the mental referent remains constant, while the speakers' perspective changes. The ability to refer to differently salient active zones within one and the same conceptual structure overlaps with the ability to shift to a contiguous target concept, this resulting in a metonymic extension of the source concept.

Metonymy

as domain representation

217

There is empirical evidence for universal image schemata (cf. Langacker, 1993, 2f.) by which reference-point alignments may be predicted (cf. Langacker, 1991, 171). The highest ranking ones are WHOLES dominating PARTS in the salience hierarchy. Traditionally this reference-point alignment is called "synecdoche". CONCRETE objects dominate ABSTRACT entities, with HUMAN AGENTS ranking topmost within the CONCRETE domain. A case in point is the dominating position of the HUMAN AGENT resolving the reference-point alignment of beefsteak in (7.1) (cf. above, p. 201). According to the image schema which relates a POSSESSED e n t i t y to its POSSESSOR, a HUMAN AGENT

is the most salient and thereby the default referent of the metonymically used noun beefsteak. What has become profiled with a metonymic extension constitutes the background in the source sense (cf. Croft, 1993, 348ff.), as in the metonymy in (8.1), where the source meaning contains knowledge about its PARTS in relation to the domain. The predicate fill up requires the tank as PART of the car to be profiled as the reference-point against the car as the base by assuming the default function of tank as the CONTAINER for petrol. As PART of the referent of car, tank imposes its semantic structure on the WHOLE referent of car, as represented in figure 8.1. (8.1)

fill

up the car with petrol

•fill up TIME

TEMPPRED [BOUNDED car AGGR

ACCOMPLISHMENT

[nompred w h o l e HI] EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

COUNT HETEROGEN CONTAINER

LM tank

NOMPRED

AGGR

'EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

PART

2nd LM

IMPLICIT • ]

petrol

NOMPRED

AGGR

"EXTERNAL BOUND INTERNAL CONFIG COMPLEXITY

CONTAINER

tank

COUNT HETEROGEN CONTAINER

MASS HOMOGEN CONTENT

Ε

Figure 8.1: Ad hoc metonymy from WHOLE to PART

218 Metonymy

and metaphor as universals

In (8.2) the predicate finish induces the A C C O M P L I S H M E N T of reading on book, the A C C O M P L I S H M E N T of smoking on cigarette and the A C COMPLISHMENT of drinking on beer, as represented in figure 8.2, where none of these syntagmatically lacking P A R T S can be claimed to have developed functional autonomy in book, cigarette and beer. (8.2)

finish

the

book/cigarette/beer

•finish

TEMPPRED

TIME

[BOUNDED

ACHIEVEMENT

• ]

book

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

TEMPPRED

read

SOCIAL

SEMIOTIC

LM

finish

TEMPPRED

TIME

[BOUNDED

TIME

ACHIEVEMENT NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

CONCRETE

smoke

ACCOMPL E ]

• ]

cigarette

TEMPPRED

[BOUNDED

m]

•

TIME

BOUNDED

ACCOMPL

Figure 8.2: Inferring default predications The syntagmatic relationships involved in the representation of metonymy motivate Dirven (cf. Dirven, 1993b, 6) to call this type of ad hoc metonymy "linear metonymy". With the term linear, Dirven intends to refer to the fact that, in contrast to metaphors, metonymies may well be interpreted compositionally, i.e. their referential value derives from all explicit and implicit linguistic components related to the metonymy within the relevant discourse context. In (7.1) (cf. above, p. 201f.) the selectional restrictions of the VOLITIONAL verb order are clearly violated by the default referent of beefsteak. This instantiates the representation of the ad hoc metonymy which unifies with the selectional restrictions of order. The metonymic projections from P A R T to W H O L E and vice versa represent only two types of a multitude of metonymies. In cognitive terms, they are the most basic, as metonymic extension is always achieved in the referential perspective by profiling a P A R T of

Metonymy

as domain representation

219

the discourse domain against the base provided by the source sense or vice versa. In this profiling, the source sense functions as the prototype, which is extended to a contiguous concept. This extension is enabled by schematization along a hierarchy of meronymically related concepts, i.e. along a hierarchy of P A R T - W H O L E relationships, from which an abstract image schema emerges. For instance, with the lexical unit Burgundy the prototypical source meaning is schematically represented by P L A C E OF ORIGIN, which implies knowledge about the T Y P I C A L P R O D U C T as its PART. Prom this abstract image schema the metonymic sense of Burgundy emerges which refers to the wine produced in that place. From a cognitive point of view, which is concerned with the mental "flow" of information through the linguistic structure being represented, the most essential thing to be observed with metonymic transfer is that normally the semantics of the predicate profiles the metonymic sense of its argument (cf. Croft, 1993, 354). From this normal observation, which occurs at all levels of predication, Croft concludes that metonymy generally arises from domain highlighting by profiling a PART against its base as the W H O L E . Thus metonymy applies to those linguistic components which establish the relatively autonomous predications at the respective level of analysis (cf. Croft, 1993, 336), while the reverse is pointed out to be true for metaphors, as will be seen below. Croft's conclusion is consonant with the fact that, by relating autonomous predications, image schemata are taken to organize domains metonymically. The dependent relations of image schemata are projected across domains metaphorically. As a consequence, image schemata distinguish source and target concept at the lexical level and instantiate the mental model at the level of the discourse situation. In table 8.1 we represent image schemata by which metonymies are organized (cf. Lipka, 1988; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 38ff.; Wilensky, 1990; Ullmann, 1962; Leisi, 1973). Most metonymies profile a P A R T ( Ρ ) against the original sense as the base (B) of the discourse domain (D). As an extension of this profile-base organization, speakers create metonymies from variations between different PARTS related to the base concept, as between CONTAINER and CONTENT, both of which are metonymically related to the presupposed

220 Metonymy and metaphor

as

Source meaning Ρ =

C O N C R E T E CONTAINER

Ρ =

CONTENT

Ρ =

COMPANY NAME

Β =

COMPANY NAME

Β =

INSTITUTION

Β =

ACCOMPLISHMENT

Ρ =

C O N C R E T E CONTAINER

Β =

C O N C R E T E LOCATION

Β =

MASS

Β =

P L A C E OF ORIGIN

Ρ =

POSSESSED

Β =

WHOLE PREDICATE-

universals

Metonymie extension Ρ =

C O N C R E T E CONTENT

Β =

W H O L E GESTALT

Β =

CLASS O F PRODUCTS

Ρ =

M E M B E R S O F COMPANY

Ρ =

M E M B E R S O F INSTITUTION

Ρ =

R E S U L T O F ACCOMPLISHMENT

Ρ =

SEMIOTIC CONTENT

Ρ =

INHABITANTS O F LOCATION

Ρ =

INSTANCE OF A MASS

Ρ =

TYPICAL PRODUCT

Ρ =

POSSESSOR

Ρ =

PART O F P R E D I C A T E -

glass, bottle, kitchen, living-room a whine, a beer

Kleenex

Daimler

MPI, Nato

organization, work

book, paper, proposal Germany

industry, danger, water, society

Burgundy, Stilton

bluestocking, hamburger

ARGUMENT S T R U C T U R E

ARGUMENT S T R U C T U R E

Β =

MANIPULATION O F O B J E C T

Ρ =

D =

SOCIAL A C T I V I T Y

Ρ =

INSTITUTION

Ρ =

CONTAINER

customer of beefsteak

predicate-argument structure smoking the cigarette

beefsteak

MANIPULABLE O B J E C T

argument cigarette, beer, book

school, post, church, university

Table 8.1: Types of metonymic extensions

Langacker''s billiard-ball model

221

WHOLE. This profiling between WHOLES and PARTS of a domain establishes a continuous energy flow, from which the same metonymies eventually emerge.

8.2

Langacker's billiard-ball model

With respect to the representation of domains, Langacker designs the metaphor of the billiard-ball model of communication (cf. Langacker, 1993, 13f., 191, 283) in which linguistic discourse basically consists of "energetic interactions" between "discrete physical objects" in space and time. In this model nominals refer to BOUNDED substances adopting the role of billiard-balls (cf.Langacker, 1993, 283). In the ideal, archetypical case the discrete objects of this model correspond to the referents of nouns, which embody the highest degree of autonomy, i.e. they are most capable of symbolizing some clear notion of existence in that their conceptualization is not dependent on any other concept. The continuous integration of nominal senses in different mental models may be compared with the different locations the billiard-balls adopt on a billiard table. To give the metaphor of the billiard-ball game some more clearly delineated shape, let us think of the billiardballs as being there on the billiard table when the players start to play. By pushing the balls with their cues the players engage them in presupposed interactions corresponding to the schematic meanings of verbs, which result in a change of location and in energy transfer by the mutual contact between the billiard-balls. Each interaction presupposed and initiated by the players, however, assumes its own individual sequence of stative relations which they observe by sequentially scanning it mentally. In Langacker's model this image of sequential scanning corresponds to the conceptualizes' mental profiling of an event (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 248ff.). A profiled event is composed of a sequence of stative relations which the speaker mentally scans sequentially. In this image the billiard-ball players stand for the language users who have nominal predications as relatively autonomous entities at their disposal. Relational predications elaborated by verbs, adjectives, and prepositions are only schematically characterized with respect to the nominal participants they depend on in the speakers' mental representations. Speakers use these schemata to profile the interconnections of entities in spatially extended as well as in temporally dynamic relations.

222 Metonymy and metaphor as universale If we relate Langacker's billiard-ball model to the conception of the universe of discourse in terms of discourse domains, we can conceptualize the structure of one domain to have resulted from slicing it up into the communicatively necessary parts and components and hierarchically nested subdomains. That is, the slicing up is the result of permanent energetic interactions. The flow of energy between the participants consists in the very transitoriness of their interactions, which exist only as long as the momentary energy flow endures. And the more permanently this energy flow occurs, the more permanently this energy flow can affect the participants in terms of pushing them to some contiguous or proximal place within the discourse domain or domain matrix against which the corresponding nominal is profiled in its source sense, thereby having extended the source node to a metonymic target node. In this billiard-ball model the condition for movement is provided by the physical substance of the billiard-balls. It is obvious that Langacker's billiard-ball model represents a revival of classical materialism, which takes causality to reside in spatially extended substances which change their location as the result of pushing each other to and fro. Materialism takes this causal interaction as evidence for the physical bodies to be real, that is physical reality is the disposition to interact. Not surprisingly, Langacker extends his billiard-ball model by a spreading activation or parallel distributed processing model (cf. McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Langacker, 1991, 525fr.).1 In order to infer and evaluate the relations of the potential range of mental models, human reasoning works through the spread of activation, the distribution of energy through the knowledge representation system, which works largely parallel and is therefore called parallel distributed processing (PDP) at the neural level (cf. McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Neubert, 1994, 416). This distributed processing occurs largely unconsciously in contrast to conscious problem solving, which rather works in a sequential fashion. In this way a parallel distributed processing system provides a holistic methodology from which creative behaviour evolves and by which completely new situations may be predicted and evaluated. Α PDP system may in particular represent the 1

Langacker does so, without, however, mentioning the interrelatedness of the two models.

Metaphors as extensions across domains

223

attributes of objects and the relations between them (cf. Broadbent, 1995; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986). Thus real situations may be represented by analogous models. The assumption is made that human knowledge is distributed holistically over the neural structure of the brain. Each synaptic relationship between two neurons is associated with an activation potential which can change as a function of inhibition and activation. By the spread of activation, nodes acquire and lose energy (cf. Hofstadter, 1996, 205). Correspondingly, an assumption is not evaluated as being either true or false. Instead, there is a threshold which has to be reached for an assumption to be activated. Above this threshold, humans can learn, i.e. they are programmed in a way which enables them to generalize their knowledge incrementally whenever the processed information is sufficiently compatible with the knowledge of the system. The more general the knowledge, the more resistant it is to change or decay (cf. Hofstadter, 1996, 205). This multi-dimensional processing is claimed to be perfectly capable of coping with imperfect information. Imperfect information is taken to be categorized in relation to prototypical knowledge by "inference to its best understanding" (cf. Churchland, 1996, 16). The ability of discriminating highly detailed and complex patterns evolves from a high-dimensional representation. Yet it is impossible to predict all of this potentially evolving multidimensional information (cf. Churchland, 1996, 39).

8.3

Metaphors as extensions across domains

In contrast to metonymic extension to contiguous conceptual structures in one and the same domain, metaphorical extension occurs if speakers transfer the conceptual structure of a source sense to a different target domain (cf. Croft, 1993, 355ff.; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 46ff.; Carbonell, 1980; Hobbs, 1983). This is typically an extension from concrete, sensorily perceivable source domains to abstract, semantically more complex target domains, which are mentally represented at a considerably higher-order level. Metaphorical extensions occur particularly in domains against which social and cognitive interactions are profiled. By performing a metaphorical extension speakers create a representation from which they can draw inferences they were incapable to draw without this representation. Intuitively given to human beings and related with many affective aspects, the CONCRETE source senses

224 Metonymy

and metaphor as universale

are most capable of rendering the target sense transparent by organizing it in terms of its perceivable structure and thereby making it better accessible than a corresponding exhaustive paraphrase. Having been extended from CONCRETE PHYSICAL SPACE, metaphors are related in a conventionalized system. The coherent gestalt structures of source domains are mapped onto the target domains by image schemata from which new coherent gestalt structures emerge. Thus the principle of analogy interrelates metonymic and metaphorical processes and thereby enables the most uncertain and creative conclusion through abduction in that the speaker concludes from an observation and a rule to a case (cf. above, section 2.8; Hopper and Traugott, 1993, 40). By this abduction the speakers' creative behaviour is no longer compatible with the original linguistic system. Through contextual induction, by which speakers continuously evaluate their own linguistic behaviour, the creative behaviour eventually becomes conventionalized. Speakers then proceed deductively, until their behaviour is compatible with a new state of the system. 8.3.1

The origin of analogy and creativity

What is at issue according to our semiotic view then is how the transfer between domains is achieved on the one hand, and how new metaphors emerge from the transferred representation on the other. These questions have been posed throughout the historical development of theories on metaphor. The main issue of all theories on metaphors is the origin of analogy. The concept of analogy crucially determines the evaluation of metaphorical language use. In the following we will therefore briefly discuss and evaluate different theories on metaphors with regard to how they explain the transfer and emergence of metaphorical meanings in language use. 8.3.1.1

The ornamental view

The view that metaphors are mere ornament goes back to antiquity. In The Art of Rhetoric (cf. Butcher, 1894) Aristotle discussed metaphors as embodying a mere rhetorical device used to influence others' opinions or even to deceive. This manipulative force was claimed to embody the subjective meaning of metaphors, i.e. speakers were considered

Metaphors as extensions across domains

225

incapable of communicating true knowledge of the world when using metaphors. As a consequence, metaphors had to be substituted by their corresponding literal expressions. The substitution view is rooted in a paradox. If speakers are supposed to substitute metaphors by their literal paraphrase, they must first of all know the true literal synonym. This means that they have to know the intensions of the metaphorical meaning and its literal correspondent objectively in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions in order to evaluate whether the metaphorical meaning and its literal paraphrase are intensionally equivalent. Yet prototype semantics has pointed out that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions defining the application of categories in ordinary language. Thus, the ornamental view is inadequate for evaluating metaphorical language use. 8.3.1.2

The comparison view

This theory takes metaphors to be derived from similes (cf. Miller, 1993). On this view, metaphors are created by implicit comparison. The analogy between the literal and the metaphorical meaning is expressed by an implicit ellipsis, as in the simile in (8.3) and its corresponding metaphorical derivation in (8.4): (8.3)

Richard is like a gorilla.

(8.4)

Richard is a gorilla.

This view, however, assumes a preexisting analogy between source and target domain and thereby undermines the referential function of metaphors (cf. Camac and Glucksberg, 1984; Tourangeau and Sternberg, 1982). It is on account of this referential value that Searle (cf. Searle, 1993) has criticized the substitution of metaphors by their literal paraphrase, because speakers do not know the intensionally equivalent paraphrase defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, it is only extensionally that metaphorical meanings may be fully evaluated. Intensionally, metaphors are vague and thereby provide for the referential variations which establish the continuity of reference. It is on account of these referential variations, i.e. the extension determining the intension on each occasion of use, that the evaluation of semantic

226 Metonymy

and metaphor as universale

similarity cannot proceed in a purely intensional fashion. Otherwise some of the extensional content will always get lost. From a cognitive perspective, we may thus exclude any predetermined analogy to exist between metaphors and their literal paraphrases. Metaphors embody intensional vagueness as their particular representation is referentially determined. Thus, the comparison view is also inadequate for evaluating the validity of metaphorical language use. 8.3.1.3

The interaction view

Richards and Black (cf. Richards, 1936; Black, 1962) turned against the comparison view by denying the preexisting similarity between source and target domain. Instead, they claimed that speakers create the similarity at the referential level. By the speakers' common sense assumptions the source meaning interacts with the metaphorical target meaning which is being created. In this interaction the similarity is achieved by a filter highlighting certain attributes of the source meaning while covering others. This interaction does not occur at the level of the lexicon, where speakers cannot distinguish between source and target sense. Richards and Black claimed that this elaboration is achieved at the more complex level of our knowledge representation of the world. Accordingly, source and target sense have to be investigated in terms of systems in which the speakers' knowledge and beliefs concerning the application of senses are represented (cf. Black, 1993, 26ff.). The criticism of the interaction view, again, consists in uncovering a paradox: Black's metaphor of a filter is in contradiction with his assumption of similarity creation, as with a filter speakers may only use attributes which they already know (cf. Indurkhya, 1994, 69ff.). That is, interactionism does not explain how speakers actually create the similarity. In particular it is left implicit how they process metaphorical meanings which are completely new, while on the other hand, metaphors are claimed to establish models by which new domains are represented (cf. Black, 1993, 19ff.). Thus, we may conclude that the interaction view cannot explain whether and how metaphorical language use can support cognition.

Metaphors 8.3.1.4

as extensions

across domains

227

The tension theory

T h e tension theory accounts for metaphors which are neither created by comparison of intensions, nor by referential interaction, but by the activation of an emotional tension (cf. Weinrich, 1995). This tension is achieved by contrasting two referents the combination of which is experienced as unusual in a way similar to the rhetoric device of an oxymoron, as in the following: Romeo: ... Ο loving hate Ο anything, of nothing first create! Oh heavy lightness! Serious vanity! Mis-shapen chaos of well-seeming forms! Feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health! Still-waking sleep, that is not what it is! This love feel I, that feel no love in this. Dost thow not laugh? Benvolio: No, coz, I rather weep. (Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet Li. 174-182) The predication of a tension may even occur in the same domain, such that we have a mixture of metaphor and metonymy, a metaphtonymy (cf. Goosens, 1990), as in the German example schwarze Milch ("black milk", cf. Weinrich, 1996, 327). This example is taken from Celan's Todesfuge which Weinrich takes to illustrate that even though there is a contradiction it is not the semantic distance but the semantic proximity from which the informational effectiveness of metaphors results. By frequency of usage the emotional tension is claimed to be reduced. The explanatory range of this theory clearly is insufficient, as there are many non-emotional metaphors. The tension view, moreover, does not account for how the emotional contrast is related to rational cognition and therefore again is inadequate for an evaluation of metaphorical language use. 8.3.1.5

The generative theory

The generative theory takes metaphor to come about by perspectivization. This theory takes metaphors to be created by the role which the expression assumes in a particular domain as a result of the reorganization of the respective discourse situation (cf. Schön, 1993, 138). Schön

228 Metonymy

and metaphor as universals

illustrates how a metaphorically achieved perspectivization can change problem-solving into problem-setting in social policy. The generative metaphor develops from a pre-analytic knowledge of similarity between source and target domain, without the creators of the metaphor knowing exactly the content of the similarity. After this pre-analytic stage, speakers can represent a general model of the generated metaphorical concept. Yet, we know that manipulation becomes possible in particular with linguistic expressions embodying an analogy (cf. Schön, 1993, 145). Following Eco in his criticism of iconicity (cf. Eco, 1976) who claims the analogy to be conventional, we may extend Schön's concept of the generative metaphor (cf. Schön, 1993, 145) to iconic expressions in general. For purposes of manipulation iconic expressions are intentionally created according to conventionalized similarity relations, such as in the following metaphorical comparison (cf. Ortony, 1993, 353): (8.5)

Encyclopedias are gold mines.

Again, this theory does not properly explain why these and not other roles become relevant with the creation of metaphors. Obviously, the relevance of generative features can only result from their integration within the relevant context of discourse and within the relevant knowledge. Listeners should be capable in principle of evaluating metaphors as being incompatible with their model of reality by knowing how to integrate the relevant variables into a coherent whole. Otherwise the myth of Gestalt Psychology (cf. Köhler, 1929; Koffka, 1935), the missing explanation of why the whole is more than the sum of its parts, would not be overcome. Accordingly, there would remain a gap between the knowing subject and the known object. As Gibbs has pointed out for idioms, these are well partially represented compositionally by the knowledge which speakers have of the domains involved (cf. Gibbs, 1994, 275). As a consequence, we have to reject the generative theory as being inadequate for evaluating the meaningfulness of metaphorical language use. 8.3.1.6

The invariance hypothesis

Lakoff and Johnson assume that language and thought are basically metaphorical (cf. Lakoff, 1980, 36, 154). They hold that the metaphorical principle establishes a creative and pervasive methodology of human

Metaphors as extensions across domains

229

reasoning in that speakers interpret each newly experienced information in terms of already known states of affairs. Human knowledge is largely determined by the structure of image schemata. These have developed from bodily and sensorial orientations which are taken to be innate (cf. Johnson, 1987, 161ff). Lakoff's "invariance hypothesis" (cf. Lakoff, 1990, 39ff.) investigates the assumption of whether the topology of the source domain in terms of which speakers represent their image schemata of CONCRETE PHYSICAL SPACE is preserved in ABSTRACT reasoning about the domains of TIME, CAUSALITY, MODALITY etc. (cf. Dirven, 1993a). The extreme interpretation of this view holds that all ABSTRACT reasoning originates in the transfer of image schemata (cf. Lakoff, 1990). By highlighting the most salient properties of the source domain speakers represent structural schemata which they axe capable of projecting onto the concepts of the target domain. Speakers can continually make use of this transfer in the lexical representation of ABSTRACT concepts. This representation is exactly "the product of metaphorical creativity [which] is essential to the functioning of languages as flexible and efficient semiotic systems" (cf. Lyons, 1977, 567). An example is the well conventionalized CONDUIT metaphor (cf. Reddy, 1993), which considers language to represent a CONTAINER into which meanings are put by the speaker and from which they are taken by the listener, as expressed in the following examples (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 92ff.): (8.6)

Your argument is vacuous.

(8.7)

That conclusion falls out of my argument.

(8.8)

I'm tired of your empty arguments.

(8.9)

That argument has holes in it.

(8.10)

I do not get my thoughts across.

(8.11)

I cannot capture my idea in words.

(8.12)

Please insert your ideas in the paragraph.

(8.13)

This sentence is empty of meaning.

(8.14)

This passage does not contain any meaning.

230 Metonymy

and metaphor as universale

It follows from the invariance hypothesis that the metaphorical system of a language reflects the speakers' understanding of the world (cf. Lakoff, 1993, 245). Lakoff underlines that the speakers' knowledge is not similar to reality, but rather corresponds to their experiences which are ultimately constrained by their bodily dispositions and thus may never be transcended (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 184; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 4, 10, 19, 56, 104, 128). The invariance hypothesis may be criticized as being inconsistent in several respects. The assumption that all abstract reasoning is metaphorical implies that speakers cannot evaluate an abstract categorization as being methodologically adequate, i.e. they cannot evaluate the truth conditions under which a particular expression applies to their experiences (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 179), as human reasoning principally occurs by understanding one experience in terms of another (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 179). In particular, speakers cannot evaluate the truth of novel information in relation to their existing knowledge, as, according to the invariance principle, the imageschematic structure of the target domain may not be violated (cf. Lakoff, 1993, 215, 235; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 58). The metaphorical principle is ultimately grounded in the speakers' physical experience on the one hand and influences their experience of new situations on the other (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 68, 147, 153; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 103). Yet metaphors are claimed to represent the speakers' experience of reality through the creation of new structural similarities (cf. Lakoff, 1993, 240f.). In this way Lakoff and Johnson do not solve the problem of what speakers actually represent with the creation of metaphors. They claim that categorization is not achieved consciously, but is bodily determined (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 18f.). The invariance principle does not consider how something becomes most relevant in a particular context and in a particular domain of discourse, and is therefore inadequate for evaluating the cognitive effort and benefit of metaphorical language use. Thus the principle of analogy which had already been considered as innate by Aristotle is left unexplained and, paradoxically, creativity as well, which Lakoff and Johnson assume to be indispensably interwoven with metaphors (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 151).

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231

Lakoff and Johnson admit that human categorization is constrained by the speakers' experience of reality (cf. Lakoff, 1993, 181, 216; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 5, 95), which is constantly being tested in the speakers' successful functioning in their environment (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 194). Yet this commitment is undermined by the circular function of the metaphorical principle: metaphors both originate in the speakers' experience and influence it (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 103). By claiming the representation of reality to depend on the speakers' bodily experience as a preconceptual (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 267), pre-existing structure, they take this disposition to account for the very need for the metaphorical reorganization of the target domain. But if reality could only be accessed by the speakers' predisposed representations, speakers would be incapable of evaluating their metaphorical systems as cognitively adequate and there would be no reason for creating new metaphors. Again we are faced with an empirical paradox. If the metaphorical system is inaccessible to conscious awareness (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 56, 104), how can it then be described linguistically? The speakers' need for a better understanding of ABSTRACT domains cannot be constrained on an exclusively system-internal basis. Instead of their preconceptual bodily experiences preventing them from making their conceptualizations more coherent with reality (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 56, 102), the speakers' representations are constrained by communication. Communication involves the comparison of interpretations (Gutt, 1991, 189). Sperber and Wilson claim that the ability to compare interpretations may be a universal disposition of human reasoning (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 46ff.). In order to agree in their interpretations, speakers negotiate their mental representations by recognizing the relevant information with minimal cognitive cost and maximal cognitive benefit. This is the principle of relevance. On this view we must reject Lakoff's claim that the metaphorical systems of a language are unconscious (cf. Lakoff, 1993, 245; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 10, 56). With metaphors speakers create conscious problem-solving representations by which they intentionally access the target domain. The human mind does not create unconscious representations (cf. Searle, 1992, 172f., 234, 245), as the human mind is intentional and emerges from the brain. Every subconscious rou-

232 Metonymy

and metaphor as universale

tine is the ultimate result of conscious learning. Speakers axe capable of consciously evaluating their routinized, subconscious mental activities. They achieve this evaluation by changing from automatic routine to conscious problem solving. By mentally locating themselves on a higher level, speakers have meta-knowledge at their disposal for evaluating their lower-level representations. Mental representations which are incompatible with the experienced world typically result from a manipulation of reality which lacks any superordinate distance to itself. Thus, metaphors result from an intentional need for a better representation of the target domain. In this way, speakers are responsible for constantly evaluating and revising their representations to make them more compatible with reality. Piaget has convincingly pointed out that the human sensorimotor system is learned and this largely undermines Lakoff's notion of an automatic and unconscious acquisition of image schemata (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 104, 128). Thus it is exactly in dealing with metaphors - more precisely, it is the investigation of the constraints that reality exerts on the speakers' activity of similarity representation - which brings us nearer to our problem of how speakers come to have such compatible mental models about the world, and how 'analogous' their mental models are to the environment which they represent and in which they are capable of functioning successfully if they know the constraints of reality. Lakoff and Johnson's claim of the unconscious mind is crucially inconsistent with the undeniable self-referentiality of humans, who thereby differ from other animals. 8.3.2

Metaphors, analogy and truth

None of the theories revisited so far is concerned with the speakers' adequate use of metaphorical meanings. As a consequence, none of the theories achieves an explanation of the communicative success of the speakers' representations of the world. Moreover, all theories lack a definition of similarity along which the intensional representation develops in dependence on the extensional variations of the metaphorical meanings. By presupposing a notion of invariance between source and target domain, these theories take the speakers' knowledge of the world to be accidental. Yet, we may even observe with new meanings that they are not created on an exclusively contingent basis. Even when

Metaphors as extensions across domains

233

a new concept is being created, speakers have a rough idea about the content of the concept, the representation of which is analogous to the thing being designated. This representation is then continuously developed in the process of cognition (cf. Schwartz, 1977, 33). By providing a model of reality, metaphors do in fact explain a central methodology of human reasoning and language. Metaphors establish the methodology of reasoning in models, of gaining knowledge by recursive reasoning which then becomes knowledge about knowledge by being evaluated with respect to the truth conditions under which the metaphorical expression refers to the experienced world. 8.3.3

Metaphors support cognition

Metaphors support problem solving in that they mediate between source and target domain by providing an analogy between the subject's knowledge and the object of learning. Yet how exactly this analogy comes about is the controversial question between different theories on metaphors. According to the theory of Mental Models (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983) metaphors are models which are used intentionally for achieving epistemic success and thereby are theory-constitutive (cf. Boyd, 1993, 524; Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993, 450). Through the relational analogies between source and target meaning the mind as a connectionist system is strengthened (cf. Carroll and Thomas, 1982, 47). Being models of reality, metaphors support the inference of implicit information. By relying on two hypotheses, metaphorical language use supports in particular abductive conclusions, the most intelligent and complex way of reasoning. This creative way of reasoning occurs especially with ad hoc metaphors, as with the following example taken from Glucksberg and Keyser (cf. Gluckberg and Keysar, 1993, 403): (8.15)

Some desks are junkyards.

This ad-hoc metaphor only makes sense in a context, where the untidiness of a desk is compared with the disorder of a junkyard. The similarity has to be induced first by observation, before the metaphorical referent is represented by abduction. By functioning as models, metaphors accordingly support the speakers' cognitive development. It is exactly on account of the openendedness of metaphorical mean-

234 Metonymy

and metaphor

as

universale

ings that metaphors are an excellent means of cognition, since this openendedness provides for the continuity of reference and the concomitant revision of meaning by its continuous accommodation to the causal structure of the world. On this view the openendedness of metaphorical meanings is not a heuristic means of reasoning, but instead is epistemically valid (cf. Boyd, 1993, 484, 500ff.). These conclusions necessitate a revision of the traditional concept of cognition: there is no direct acquisition of knowledge in terms of precise meaningful contents. Instead, cognition is rather the social coordination of the collective process by which the members of a linguistic community represent their knowledge of reality (cf. Boyd, 1993, 507ff.). Meaning is procedural, and is an ability which does not only comprise the accommodation of the speakers' knowledge to the causal structure of the world: this collective ability logically includes the members of the community accommodating their semantic representations to each other. Now we may explain the continuous epistemic success which results from the application of the speakers' theories in the creation of metaphors. Their representations of reality cannot be completely arbitrary (cf. Boyd, 1993, 509). Yet their knowledge about the structure of the world is context-dependent and is only accessible in actual use by being referred to linguistically, or by any other signs (cf. Peirce, 1934). Furthermore, each instantiation of the speakers' knowledge is dependent on their overall knowledge representation. Finally, metaphors represent an economical means of communication, as a single expression enables the listener to recognize the relevant information with minimal cognitive effort and maximal cognitive benefit. 8.3.4

Analogy is

knowledge-based,

According to the theory of Mental Models (cf. Gentner and Toupin, 1986; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 410f., 463; Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993, 447) the ability to reason analogically is an innate disposition with which humans may interpret new information in terms of existing knowledge. By means of this ability speakers continuously integrate new information into their existing knowledge representation. On this view, the use of metaphors corresponds to the methodological principle of coherently integrating new information into existing knowledge.

Metaphors as extensions across domains

235

Now we come to realize that similarity does not exist at the level of the lexicon, but at the level of the discourse. The analogy between discourse domains results from the organization of human knowledge. The hierarchy of human knowledge is crucially responsible for the representation of analogy. As humans are predisposed to represent their knowledge hierarchically (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983, 153f., 463f.), it follows that the hierarchical organization of their knowledge must provide the notion of similarity. The more specific a meaning is, the higher its semantic load in terms of the degree of conventionalization by which it contributes to the stability and preservation of the system. The increase of semantic load with increasingly higher-order position of features results from the increasing amount of meanings depending on the meaning in the highest-order position. This complexity of the speakers' knowledge representation is incompatible with a principled distinction between literal and figurative meanings, but rather allows for a relative distinction based on the hierarchical level at which both meanings of a lexical unit are located. On this hierarchically based view, source and target meaning are distinguished by the context and by the speakers' intention (cf. Ortony, 1975). The analogy comes about by the speakers' evaluation of the metaphor's coherent integration in the discourse domain, by the speakers evaluating their own knowledge. Thus we may assume metaphors to be created at neither of the extreme poles of granularity, because at the most generic pole the meaning would be too variable for establishing any analogy, the truth conditions of which could not be evaluated. At the most specific pole of human knowledge there would be too much content which would violate the truth conditions of the analogy. We may assume that the analogical relationship is rather created at a medium level of granularity, known as the basic level of categorization (cf. Brown, 1965, 321; Berlin et al., 1974; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 27). The dominance of basic level categories, such as pig and bucket, consists in their shapes being first learned, better remembered and needing less reaction time for their being named in word identification tests than the more specific objects of the subordinate level, such as Spanish pig, plastic bucket, as well as the more general objects of the superordinate level, such as animal, container. We may explain this basic level dominance by the speakers' primary physical and cultural interactions with these categories

236 Metonymy

and metaphor as universale

determining the organization of their knowledge which most specifically corresponds to their experience. Likewise, we may observe that there is a strong correspondence between the representations of basic level categories if we compare common sense and expert knowledge (cf. Gentner and Stevens, 1983, 2; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 27). The knowledge which speakers have about their knowledge follows universal semantic principles by which they organize their mental models. Most importantly, the image-schematic principle organizing the basic level categorization achieves the metaphorical transfer across domains and thereby the emergence of new representations. A theory of metaphors must explain the function which the speakers' knowledge representation fulfils in the interaction with metaphorical language use. By investigating this function of human knowledge representation we will realize that it is inseparably interwoven with the organization of language as a grammatical tool. We will now describe how metaphors emerge from different analogies between source and target domain. 8.3.4.1

Structural analogy

Analogy in structure results from transferring the organization of the source domain onto the target domain (cf. Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993, 449; Lakoff, 1980). The structural analogies existing between source and target meanings enable the conclusion of hypotheses which would not have been possible without the structural analogies between domains. This implies the hypotheses that the higher the quantity of analogical relations between the domains the better the quality of the metaphorical relationship on the one hand and on the other the more relational, i.e. the more abstract the analogy is, the greater the cognitive benefit (cf. Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993; Gentner and Medina, 1998, 271). It is exactly on account of the relational attributes and not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that metaphors are models which represent domains. By reorganizing as well as by strengthening and weakening these relational attributes the analogies between source and target domain may be revised, and thereby the representations become accommodated to the causal structure of the world.

Metaphors as extensions across domains

237

On this view, the creation of metaphors crucially depends on domain coherence (cf. Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993, 449). Mayer points out that metaphors emerging from relational analogy are particularly adequate in expert-lay communication (cf. Mayer, 1993, 569). By transferring the structure of the well-known domain to the domain to be learned, the learner's ability to connect the relevant variables into a coherent schema is strengthened (cf. Mayer, 1993, 572). An example is the relation between an argument in the domain of discourse and the military domain as established by the structural analogy of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 79FF.): (8.16)

Your claims are indefensible.

(8.17)

He attacked every weak point in my

(8.18)

His criticisms were right on target.

(8.19)

I demolished his argument.

argument.

In these examples the structure of the MILITARY domain is imposed on the concept of an argument in DISCOURSE. The speakers' understanding of an argument becomes coherent by their knowledge of the gestalt of war. 8.3.4.2

Orientational analogy

Orientational analogies result from the speakers' direct bodily experience being used in evaluating spatial dimensions. This type of analogy is for instance involved in the positive and negative polaxities of the vertical dimension, as implied in the following metaphorical schemata which embody the polarity of antonyms (cf. Lakoff, 1980, 15ff.; Lakoff a n d J o h n s o n , 1999, 50, 99): M O R E IS U P , LESS IS DOWN, G O O D IS

UP, BAD IS DOWN. These schemata derive from the vertical posture of the human body as expressed in the following idioms: (8.20)

I am completely down today.

(8.21)

The quality of this paper is high.

(8.22)

Her spirits are rising.

(8.23)

He rose to a better position.

238 Metonymy

and metaphor as universals

Lakoff and Johnson's assumption that humans are predisposed to conceptualize their experiences in terms of their bodily determined image schemata (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 267) does not allow speakers to evaluate their conceptualizations on a higher level of representation, because they always remain entwined in their bodily dispositions (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 104). This would unwarrantedly support the hypothesis of the manipulative force of metaphors as put forth by the generative theory of metaphor (cf. Schön, 1993). 8.3.4.3

Ontological analogy

Ontological metaphors imply global and detailed correspondences between domains, such that metaphorical creativity is evidence of their epistemic validity (cf. Lakoff, 1980, 25ff.; Lakoff, 1987, 387f.; Carbonell, 1980). An example is T H E M I N D A S A M A C H I N E metaphor which assumes an analogy to exist between the brain-mind system of human beings and the hardware-software configuration of computers, as illustrated by the following examples (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 27f.; Boyd, 1993, 486): (8.24)

My mind just is not operating today!

(8.25)

This news is very hard for me to process!

(8.26)

The human mind is preprogrammed.

(8.27)

Our memory has storage and retrieval

(8.28)

Frequent mental processes become automatic

(8.29)

Consciousness is a feedback

limitations. routines.

phenomenon.

This analogy crucially depends on the hierarchical representation of the domains involved. The ontological metaphor's dependence on the particular knowledge representation may be observed by the inflation of the computer metaphor in ordinary language use. This metaphor may be related to different ontological assumptions which cognitive science makes about the relation between brain and mind (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 257ff.). The position of strong artificial intelligence (AI) assumes the hardware of the computer to be theoretically capable of producing the same intelligent behaviour as the human brain. The

Metaphors

as extensions

across domains

239

materialist version of strong AI claims the "identity theory" according to which mental states axe identical with brain states (cf. Grush and Churchland, 1996, 221; Searle, 1992, 35). The functionalist version of strong AI considers mental behaviour as an i n p u t - o u t p u t relation which is independent of the internal material system (cf. Newell and Simon, 1972). Searle conceives of this dualism as Cartesianism. T h e functionalist commitment thereby makes the assumption that theoretically the hardware of the computer may substitute the human brain. ... the brain does not really matter to the mind. Because the mind is a computer program and because a program can be implemented on any hardware whatever ... the mind can be specified, studied, and understood without knowing how the brain works, (cf. Searle, 1992, 44) As one of the strongest opponents of strong AI, Searle rejects the theoretical possibility of identifying the human brain with its mind. As Searle assumes mental states to emerge recursively from the functions of the human brain (cf. Searle, 1992, 14), he excludes an objective physical correspondence of consciousness, because this would presuppose a reductionist dualism. Searle's strongly emergentist commitment logically excludes the human mind existing independently of its brain, such that the reduction of the human mind to its brain becomes theoretically impossible. Thus mental representations are emergent qualities and for this reason they cannot be reduced to physical functions. According to Johnson-Laird, the internal representations of artificial systems will never be capable of achieving a true referential relationship to the external environment (cf. also Johnson-Laird, 1988, 54). Mental representations result from an interaction of external information and internal representation in a living system which thereby gains knowledge about its environment. The representations of artificial systems consist exclusively of system-internal relations and thus axe purely syntactic relations. Moreover, the recursiveness of artificial systems does not correspond to the human capacity of metarepresentation, which enables us to evaluate our assumptions and to behave correspondingly. It has been proved for instance that human attitudes have a direct impact on the inferences to be drawn (Johnson-Laird, 1993, 25).

240 Metonymy and metaphor as universale

8.4

Metaphorical models of abstract domains

In the creation of metaphors speakers continuously transfer knowledge from more C O N C R E T E domains to more A B S T R A C T domains. Prom each transfer a higher-order representation emerges which represents a lower-order representation. By representing new domains metaphorically, human knowledge becomes increasingly more abstract and complex as each transfer achieves an additional level in the hierarchy of knowledge representations. Whereas humans are capable of accessing the relevant parts of their knowledge more rapidly with an increasing amount of knowledge, the context-dependence of the complexity of their socio-cultural conventions makes their representations seem "inscrutable" to the linguist. This is the reason why, with the exception of intensional states, A B S T R A C T predications have largely been ignored in formal semantics and analytic philosophy. Semantically A B S T R A C T predications make reference to states of affairs which cannot be perceived sensorily in terms of their INTERNAL CONFIGURATION and their E X T E R N A L BOUNDING. Linguistically, we may solve the problem of representation by, firstly, relating and reducing the A B S T R A C T predication to its lower-level representation, whereby we achieve the analogy involved in the transfer. Secondly, we may account for the emergent representation in the target domain. For instance, metaphors which have emerged in the domain of T I M E are represented by image schemata which have originated in the domain of SPACE. More precisely, we have to proceed from the contexts in which speakers conceptualize C O N C R E T E meanings with respect to E X T E R N A L BOUNDING and INTERNAL CONFIGURATION to develop a notion which is rich enough for the semantic representation of ABSTRACT domain predications in the lexicon. Ontogenetically, language is C O N C R E T E . In the beginnings of linguistic performance human beings started to refer linguistically to their concrete physical environment. As these surroundings, the sociocultural context in which human beings were engaged, became increasingly more abstract, external pressure in terms of a need to linguistically refer to the ABSTRACT environment was exerted on the linguistic system. And instead of creating new words, it was easiest for speakers to reorganize the meanings of already existing lexical units by transferring the meanings from the physical domain to increasingly more

Metaphorical models of abstract domains

241

domains, such that their physical origin may no longer be evident. Lakoff has corroborated this hypothesis abundantly (cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). Yet, there are still many A B S T R A C T predications in which the physical origin is evident, as for instance the PATH schema in way: ABSTRACT

(8.30)

We must take this way.

This example can be interpreted both in an A B S T R A C T and in a C O N CRETE SPATIAL sense. The same holds for the P E R C E P T I O N IS C O G NITION metaphor expressed by view: (8.31)

You have taken a bad view on the scene.

Transparency, vacuum, touch, feel, hear etc. are interpreted analogously. We may extend this series infinitely. Other A B S T R A C T nouns are interpreted in terms of physical processes, such as anger, which is interpreted in terms of BODILY H E A T , C O O K I N G , BOILING, O V E R FLOWING LIQUIDS, e t c .

Basically, the spatial concepts which have been transferred into domains can all be reduced in some way to the I N T E R NAL CONFIGURATION or to the E X T E R N A L BOUNDING as well as to the ORIENTATION designated by the respective predication. In the following we represent that within the original image schemata in the domain of SPACE speakers have achieved image-schematic reductions to the cognitively relevant relationships which enable the emergence of the metaphorical meaning in the domain of T I M E (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 176f.). PHYSICAL M O T I O N must be correlated with A B S T R A C T VOLITION by the common characteristics of being an A C T I V I T Y extending through either SPACE or T I M E and thus effecting change either PHYSICALLY or VOLITION ALLY. Conceptually, both C O N C R E T E PHYSICAL M O T I O N and A B S T R A C T VOLITION constitute a transition between several temporally sequential physical or cognitive events. These become meaningful by sequential scanning (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 248ff.) as in the following examples profiling the ACCOMPLISHMENT verb dig up as expressing a B O U N D E D SEQUENCE in SPACE and T I M E : ABSTRACT

(8.32)

a.

They are digging up the garden.

b.

The newspapers are digging up the scandals.

242 Metonymy

and metaphor as universals

jump, on the other hand, refers to an ACHIEVEMENT in the same way as some physical object which is bounded by the outlines of its gestalt. A jump is B O U N D E D as a P O I N T IN T I M E . In contrast to this, jumping designates the M A S S noun which refers to all potential occurrences of the movement in T I M E at once by summary scanning (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 255ff.). This interpretation of physical motion is extended into abstract domains by nouns such as the following: A

(8.33)

extension — extending

(8.34)

raise — raising

The nouns on the left-hand side are interpreted as BOUNDED in the domain of T I M E , i.e. either as an ACCOMPLISHMENT or as an ACHIEVEMENT, while the gerundive derivations on the right-hand side are interpreted as UNBOUNDED in the domain of T I M E , i.e. they make a predication about an ACTIVITY extending indefinitely beyond the time of utterance. This is achieved by the derivational morpheme -ing, which, as the profile determinant, imposes its schematic meaning of an ATEMPORAL CONTINUOUS relation on the derivation. The nominal predication extending does not refer to one individual occurrence of the ACTIVITY which is bounded in time, but rather to all potential occurrences of the ACTION in common, which speakers can accumulate in the same way as they abstract away from the individual occurrences of water and conceptualize it as being distributed HOMOGENEOUSLY. In the following we represent the profiles designated by -ion and -ing: -ion

PROFILE

TIME

BOUNDED

-ing

PROFILE

TIME

[UNBOUNDED

ACHIEVEMENT V RESULT

ACTIVITY]

Many A B S T R A C T nouns are nominalizations, which may be characterized by analogy to the relation between the semantic base of the verb and the aspect resulting from the morphological derivations (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 207f.; Langacker, 1987b, 53ff.). In the same way as with verbs the component states constituting a nominalization are profiled, but this profiling occurs collectively by summary scanning against the

Metaphorical models of abstract domains

243

base of the verb. In German the nominalization by means of the morpheme -keit, as in Erweiterbarkeit, and correspondingly in the English noun extensibility by means of the derivational morpheme -ity denote an IMPERFECTIVE QUALITY, 2 whereas nominalization by means of the morpheme -ung as in Erweiterung and correspondingly in the English noun extension by means of the derivational affix -ion often denote P E R F E C T I V I T Y , i.e. a n ACCOMPLISHMENT or a n ACHIEVEMENT. N o m -

inalization by means of zero derivation as in Erweitern

("extending")

results in IMPERFECTIVITY. T h e LOCATION, ORIENTATION, ORIGIN a n d G O A L of SPATIAL en-

tities must be represented in terms of ABSTRACT schemata which account for INITIAL a n d FINAL BOUNDING b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s p e a k e r s '

vantage point, i.e. the position from which they view the situation giving rise to a conceptualization. It depends, for instance, on the speakers' perspective whether the beginning or end is designated as being part of a process or not. The German noun Ziel has two lexicalized equivalents in English: aim implies that an ACHIEVEMENT is envisaged, but must not necessarily be realized, while goal implies its ACHIEVEMENT to be part of the predication, as represented in the following: 'aim

NOMPRED

TIME

BOUNDED

goal

NOMPRED

TIME

[BOUNDED

ACHIEVEMENT

The spatial relations constituting regions and relations between regions must be represented in ABSTRACT domains, i.e. we need a general notion of t h e INTERCONNECTION or CONTIGUITY a n d DISTANCE exist-

ing between entities. A n area in its ABSTRACT meaning is BOUNDED if referring to a specific domain in the same way as in its CONCRETE meaning when it refers to a specific region. A bundle and a package in their ABSTRACT sense are also BOUNDED and establish a COLLECTIVE constituted of analogous individuals just as in their CONCRETE sense: 2 Both

the German and the English nouns are derived from the adjectival deriva-

tions erweiterbar and

extend.

and extensible

which in turn are derived from the verbs

erweitern

244 Metonymy

and metaphor as universals

several bundles of semantic features can be generated for each word of a sentence respectively. In contrast to this, the A B S T R A C T nouns costs and information make reference to a C O L L E C T I V E M A S S by being constituted of indefinitely many occurrences at the lexical level. In the following we exemplify and represent the relations of socalled 'frozen' or 'dead' metaphors in terms of the above given conceptualizations of the INTERNAL CONFIGURATION and E X T E R N A L B O U N D ING, the ORIENTATION, M O T I O N , and SPATIAL RELATION between entities predicated by the source and target sense. The cognitive representation of these relations comes about by the speakers' activity of relating their sensory and motor schemata to the A B S T R A C T domain predication. In the attribute-value structures underneath the examples we have indicated both the source sense and the target sense. We have represented in particular the analogous image schemata of the relational predications preserved across domains, as well as the distance between these domains by the different landmarks of the predications. These examples provide evidence that the metaphorical extensions apply to inherently relational predications. This is not some arbitrary feature of our examples, but instead illustrates a general rule for metaphorical extension by domain mapping (cf. Croft, 1993). In terms of the billiardball model, that is, archetypical energetic interactions are mapped from their physical manifestation in C O N C R E T E SPACE onto A B S T R A C T domains in which CAUSAL, T E M P O R A L , M O D A L , SCALAR, and other relations are configured by depending on relatively autonomous nominal concepts which impose their relatively intrinsic values of E X T E R NAL BOUNDING and INTERNAL CONFIGURATION onto the dependent variable of the relational predication. In (8.35) the RELATIVE DISTANCE predicated by the relational predication far is elaborated by the HORIZONTAL and EVALUATIVE landmarks respectively. In (8.35a) the conceptualizer scans along the HORIZONTAL DIMENSION, along which a DISTANCE is predicated, in (8.35b) the nominal problem induces the projection of far from onto the C O G N I T I V E domain, where it predicates the NEGATIVE force of problem by evoking the image of a long trajectory of the mind. The spatial senses of the predications run, reach and forward in (8.36) to (8.38) are extended to their metaphorical senses by being pro-

Metaphorical models of abstract domains

245

jected from the domain of SPACE onto the domain of T I M E , where the concepts preserve their E X T E R N A L BOUNDARIES. Thus the M O T I O N predicated by run in (8.36) is left B O U N D E D in both source and target representation. The distance to be covered by the M O T I O N predicated by the ACHIEVEMENT verb reach in (8.37) is unified with the B O U N D E D meaning of the nominal Munich, and with the MENSURABLE B O U N D ING P O I N T embodied by the nominal 10 % in (8.37b). Thus parallel to the PHYSICAL M O T I O N along a PATH to a G O A L imaged with (8.37a), speakers mentally scan along an imaginary PATH to the G O A L provided by the nominal 10 % in (8.37b). As in (8.38a) forward expresses an orientation towards a boundary in (8.38b). In (8.39b) the metaphorical extension into the S E M I OTIC domain has preserved the image schema of both the E X T E R N A L BOUNDING and the INTERNAL CONFIGURATION. Both senses in (8.39) invoke the concept of a B O U N D E D COLLECTION. In (8.40) the INTERCONNECTION predicated by between is specified by an INDIVIDUAL T R and a R E P L I C A T E L M . The preposition between shifts from the representation in T W O - D I M E N S I O N A L or T H R E E DIMENSIONAL SPACE in (8.40a) to the representation of T I M E in (8.40b) which may also assume a second VERTICAL DIMENSION by analogy with the SPATIAL sense: in the same way as there may be different heights of houses, there may be ups and downs in jobs. In (8.41b), the metaphorical phrase a sea of troubles induces the image of a M A S S which on the model of the infinity of the sea covering earth in (8.41a) is conceptualized as burying the experiencer by flowing over their mind in infinite quantities. Finally, in ( 8 . 4 2 ) the variable SCALE lexically embodied by deep is specified by the trajector elaborated by water and thought respectively, both referring to an UNBOUNDED M A S S which is supported by the default assumption of a relative extension predicated by deep. By analogy with the C O N C R E T E sense, the metaphorical sense of deep predicates an intrusion well inside the M A S S . (8.35)

a.

Our house is not far from the centre.

b.

This problem is far from being trivial.

'far from ABSTR RELATION

ATEMPREL' CONCRETE DISTANCE

'far from ABSTR RELATION

ATEMPREL ABSTRACT DISTANCE

246 Metonymy

(8.36)

and metaphor

a.

She is running through the forest.

b.

She is running through the rehearsal. TEMPPRED

run ABSTFt

CONCRETE

TIME

BOUNDED

LM

MOTION] ACCOMPL]

'ABSTR

CONCRETE

AGGR

[ E X T E R N BOUND

run through

COUNTj

TEMPPRED

ABSTR

ABSTRACT

TIME

BOUNDED

LM

(8.37)

as universale

VOLITION] ACCOMPL]

"ABSTR

ABSTRACT

AGGR

[ E X T E R N BOUND

COUNT]

a.

We must reach Munich

b.

We must reach 10% of the votes.

reach

TEMPPRED

ABSTR

CONCRETE

TIME

BOUNDED

LM

MOTION] ACHIEVE]

"ABSTR

CONCRETE

AGGR

[BXENRN BOUND

reach

TEMPPRED

ABSTR

[ABSTRACT

TIME

[BOUNDED

LM

tonight.

COUNT]

VOLITION] ACHIEVE]

ABSTR

ABSTRACT

[CONVENT

AGGR

EXENRN BOUND

1]

MENS

COUNT]

Metaphorical (8.38)

a.

Just move forward some

b.

I look forward to the meeting on Monday.

'move

forward

[CONCRETE

TIME

[BOUNDED

look forward

TEMPPRED

ABSTR

[ABSTRACT BOUNDED

MOTION] ACCOMPL]

VOLITION] ACCOMPL

]J

a.

She has sent a Christmas package to Helen.

b.

She has sent the information

'package ABSTR

package to Helen.

NOMPRED CONCRETE

AGGR

"EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

package ABSTR

NOMPRED ABSTRACT

AGGR

(8.40)

inches.

TEMPPRED

ABSTR

TIME

(8.39)

models of abstract domains

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECTIVE

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECTIVE

a.

There is an old house between the new ones.

b.

I am between jobs.

ABSTR

ATEMPREL CONCRETE

RELATION

[INDIVIDUAL

between ABSTR

ATEMPREL ABSTRACT

RELATION

[INDIVIDUAL

between

REPLICATE]

REPLICATE]

247

248 Metonymy and metaphor as universals

(8.41)

a.

The sea covers three-quarters

b.

A sea of troubles came over her.

ABSTR

cover

TEMPPEED CONCRETE

TIME

[BOUNDED

sea TR

ACCOMPL]

NOMPRED

AGQR

E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

three-quarters ABSTR

ABSTRACT

AGGR

EXENRN BOUND

come over

TEMPPRED BOUNDED

sea

(8.42)

AGGR

NOMPRED E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG

her

NOMPRED

AGGR

[EXENRN BOUND

He is in deep waters.

b.

He is in deep thought.

deep

TR

'deep

ABSTR RELATION

TR

[CONVENT

MENsj

COUNT]

ACCOMPLJ

a.

ABSTR SCALE RELATION

MASS HOMOGEN CONTENT

NOMPRED

TIME

TR

of the earth.

MASS HOMOGEN

COUNTI

ATEMPREL CONCRETE DIMENSION DISTANCE ABSTR

CONCRETE

AGGR

[ E X T E R N BOUND

MASS]

ATEMPREL ABSTRACT DISTANCE ABSTR

ABSTRACT

[MENTAL

AGGR

E X T E R N BOUND

MASS]

COGNITION]

Conclusion 249

8.5

Conclusion

In this chapter we have investigated the creation of metonymy and metaphor as two complementary stages of the same problem solving activity. We claimed the speakers' ubiquity of reasoning to consist in transcending existing knowledge representations through striving for new meanings. We have seen that metonymy extends autonomous predications within the same domain of discourse and with the original sense being explicitly or implicitly given in the discourse situation. In this way metonymy strengthens the informativity of domains and enables the representation of the relevant information by relating the senses indexically. In contrast to this, metaphor was verified to extend the representation of dependent predications, which interrelate different autonomous concepts, into a distant target domain. This extension is achieved abductively, by the most hypothetical way, namely by reasoning iconically. Prom this extension the cognition of new semantic content emerges. The relevant attributes establishing the analogy between source and target concept have been claimed to be negotiated inductively. Speakers induce this knowledge representation as part of their theoretical knowledge of language, which they apply deductively in the creation of analogous metaphorical representations. In this way speakers continuously evaluate the analogy which their knowledge representations bear to experienced reality.

Chapter 9 Contextual functions The procedural and recursive nature of the human mind (cf. JohnsonLaird, 1983; Barsalou, 1987; Langacker, 1987a) embodies major contextual functions through which word senses are represented. These functions include the prediction of non-conventionalized senses by inference. The assumption of contextual functions has implications for our lexical concepts. This chapter will therefore be devoted to the selection, configuration, shift, modulation, highlighting and inference of word senses. Which procedure is chosen depends firstly on the lexical unit's relation to the discourse, its degree of semantic autonomy vs. context-dependence, and secondly on its function within the information structure of the utterance. According to Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 350ff.) this information structure is caused by a predication, whereby the predicate is conceptually dependent on the foregrounding and backgrounding of the parts of an utterance, i.e. the meaning of a predicate in principle embodies lexical indeterminateness. 9.1

The interaction between lexicon and grammar

As we have seen along all linguistic dimensions, the same discourse organizational principle focusses a coherent W H O L E so that it can single out the functionally adequate P A R T . In following this principle we proceed from traditional notions of linguistic phrases, clauses, and sentences, which are typically controlled by the foregrounded meaning of its predicate (cf. Croft, 1991), as in the following example: (9.1)

John entered the room.

Here we have the archetypical verbal function expressing a change of state and selecting preferentially a HUMAN trajector and a N O N H U M A N landmark. The archetypical form-meaning relation between

Contextual selection

251

controller and controlled, however, may be modified where the modifying functions of the predicate are in a default order, i.e. they are preferred in the absence of conflicting conditions. In the following example the lexical ACHIEVEMENT sense of the verb enter is shifted to an ACCOMPLISHMENT by the modifier slowly, which itself predicates a n UNBOUNDED EXTENSION i n t h e d o m a i n of T I M E :

(9.2)

John entered the room slowly.

We adopt Langacker's assumptions about the archetypical functions of lexical categories (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 189): nouns typically designate BOUNDED regions; verbs typically express change over time; adjectives relate a thing and a STATIVE quality; prepositions in their original function interrelate two CONCRETE things in the domain of SPACE. In the following sections we will in particular represent how lexical and grammatical categories interact in the indicated way.

9.2

Contextual selection

Contextual selection of alternate, equally valid senses of a polysemous lexical unit presupposes a lexical unit being associated with disjunctively related senses. A convenient example is the polysemy of school, for which the context may select the CONCRETE CONTAINER, the INSTITUTION, or the PROCESS sense. Representing the three cognitive d o m a i n s of SPACE, SOCIAL CONVENTION a n d TIME these senses con-

stitute the relevant PARTS which together create a family resemblance structure, as illustrated below the following examples: (9.3)

Usually school starts at 8.00. [ P A R T = ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INSTITUTION]

(9.4)

The school is famous for its teachers. [ P A R T = ABSTRACT CONTENT OF INSTITUTION]

(9.5)

You can enter the school through the back door. [ P A R T = CONCRETE CONTAINER]

252 Contextual

functions

schooll

ABSTRACTION AGGREGATE

schools ABSTRACTION AGGREGATE

~school3

NOMPRED CONCRETE E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

NOMPRED ABSTRACT

SOCIAL INSTITUTION

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECTIVE

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

TIME

BOUNDED

AGGREGATE

"EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

'enter

TEMPPRED

ABSTRACTION

^CONCRETE

TIME

[BOUNDED

'famous

ATEMPREL ABSTRACT EVALUATION

'start

ABSTRACTION

TEMPPRED ABSTRACT

TIME

[BOUND

ABSTRACTION ATTITUDE

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECTIVE

SOCIAL CONVENTION] ACCOMPLISHMENT1 COUNT HETEROGEN INDIVIDUAL

MOTION] ACHIEVEMENT]

ACHIEVEMENT]

Figure 9.1: Lexical entries of school, enter, start and famous Figure 9.1 represents the relevant semantic distinctions of the lexical units school, enter, start and famous. In (9.3) the LM designates a POINT IN TIME, and from this point the ACHIEVEMENT predicated by the verb starts: this ACHIEVEMENT sense of start selects the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense of school. In (9.4) the adjective famous functions as LM by providing an ABSTRACT EVALUATION which can only select the A B S T R A C T INSTITUTION sense. I n ( 9 . 5 ) t h e T R is t h e M O B I L E a g e n t .

This can only be conceived TAINER, which provides the arisen by way of metonymic teachers, who in (9.4) by the

of as moving into the CONCRETE CONLM. Etymologically, the latter sense has extension from the ACCOMPLISHMENT of quality of their teaching contribute to the

Contextual

selection

253

reputation of the INSTITUTION, where the ACCOMPLISHMENT of teaching and learning takes place (cf. Onions, 1973; Simpson and Weiner, 1989). That is, diachronically the CONCRETE BUILDING sense is one

end of a metonymic chain stretching from PROCESS to INSTITUTION and finally to BUILDING. Thus diachrony may be taken to provide evidence of lexical structure from a synchronic perspective. Even with university the application of the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense works well in English, but not in German:1 (9.6)

Die Schule fängt am Montag wieder an. "School starts on Monday."

(9.7)

? Die Universität fängt am Montag wieder an. "University starts on Monday."

Synchronically we may observe a high social and situational variation towards either direction of the family resemblance structure. Depending on which social group a speaker belongs to - whether they are a pupil, a teacher, a parent, a caretaker or a neutral person - the different senses may become differently salient and may then be selected accordingly. It is because of the potentially equal communicative relevance of the senses of this polysemy type that Dirven refers to it as conjunctive metonymy (cf. Dirven, 1993b, 7). This behaviour makes lexical units for which a sense becomes contextually selected fit Putnam's concept of a stereotype (cf. Putnam, 1975) embodying the social distribution of linguistic labour - with the difference, however, that there is no expert knowledge distinguished as constituting the essential facts. Indeed, rather the opposite pertains: The equal validity of each sense originates from mutually representing parts of a family resemblance structure of which different senses become salient in each discourse situation in which one sense is selected accordingly. To illustrate the analogy and concomitant unification of SPACE and TIME, let us look at an example from Taylor (cf. Taylor, 1995, 5f.; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1995a), who for his part is arguing against Bierwisch and Schreuder (cf. Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992): 1However, in colloquial speech the morphological clipping, as in Die Uni fängt am Montag an, is perfectly acceptably and abundantly used.

254 Contextual (9.8)

functions

a.

John left the university

at 4 pm

yesterday.

b.

John left the university

in 1980.

c.

John left the university

a short time ago.

The example illustrates the metonymy of university, which in English is analogous to that of school. With each sense a secondary LM in the domain of T I M E selects the coherent sense of university. University in t u r n unifies either with the C O N C R E T E M O T I O N sense or with the A B S T R A C T VOLITION sense of leave. Our analysis of the verb leave is evidence for our claim that the domain of SPACE functions as an iconic model for the domain of T I M E . In (9.8a) leave is used in the C O N C R E T E sense, predicating John's PHYSICAL M O T I O N from within the university building or campus functioning as the CONTAINER, to outside the C O N C R E T E CONTAINER. This sense is induced by the secondary LM of leave, the P P which predicates a P O I N T IN T I M E , which on the time axis is located no more than some hours before the T I M E O F DISCOURSE. In contrast to this, leave predicates an ABSTRACT VOLITION in (9.8b), a CONVENTION in the SOCIAL domain of teaching and studying. John functions as an ABSTRACT M E M B E R OF A SOCIAL G R O U P either consisting of students or of the university staff. Again, this ABSTRACT function of the T R and the VOLITION sense of leave are induced by the secondary LM: the P P predicates a reference point in the domain of T I M E functioning as the INCLUSION of the ABSTRACT INSTITUTION a n d VOLITION.

Finally, in (9.8c) the secondary LM provided by the NP a short time ago is semantically vague enough for the sense of leave to remain unresolved in respect of both readings. Both T R and LM may elaborate each of their senses in parallel. Figure 9.2 represents the metonymic and metaphorical extension by means of the attribute-value structures of the verb leave and the nouns university and John. The conjunctive PARTS as the senses of school and university represent the semantic domain of institutionalized teaching. Being constituents of an overall discourse domain, the selection of a PART is exclusively triggered by the respective discourse situation, in which the mental model is represented as indicated below the sentences of (9.3), (9.4), and (9.5) above.

Contextual selection

255

This example allows us to demonstrate in more concrete terms the fundamental and principled theoretical and methodological difference between cognitive semantics on the one hand and the two-level approach pursued by Bierwisch and Schreuder on the other (cf.Bierwisch, 1989; Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992; Lang, 1989; Lang, 1993). In section 5.4 we introduced the two-level approach. In sharp contrast to cognitive semantics this generativist approach assumes a strict distinction between linguistic-semantic knowledge and conceptual knowledge about the world. In view of this theoretical dichotomy the question arises whether two senses of leave are conventionalized in the lexicon, or whether a lexical disposition is elaborated by the actually used trajector and landmark in the specific context. The second option is adopted by the two-level approach. At the level of the lexicon, leave is represented by a single entry from which different senses are inferred compositionally from domain knowledge at the conceptual level (cf. Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992, 28). From the viewpoint of cognitive grammar, we have disentangled the inheritance of features in relation to the general difference between autonomous and dependent predications, in order to analyze the specific flow of information through which subsequently larger linguistic units are integrated compositionally. This composition is represented in figure 9.2. Taylor also notes that the C O N C R E T E vs. I N S T I T U T I O N reading of university co-varies with the PHYSICAL vs. A B S T R A C T , rational reading of John (cf. Taylor, 1995, 5f.). As we have illustrated with (9.8), the senses of leavel and leave2 unify at a coarse level of granularity; at a more fine-grained level, however, they are selected as distinct representations, as indicated by the categorial representations of the two senses of university and John in figure 9.2. No P O I N T I N T I M E is foregrounded in (9.8b) and the default interpretation of leave would be A C C O M P L I S H M E N T . This sense is also corroborated by the following perfectly possible context: (9.9)

It took John six months to leave the

university.

Nevertheless, this construction is impossible with the C O N C R E T E sense of leavel, which therefore has to be distinguished as A C H I E V E M E N T sense. According to monolingual dictionaries (cf. Sinclair, 1989; Cowie, 1989) leave is part of a class of verbs which in their typical sense pred-

256 Contextual

functions

icate an A C H I E V E M E N T . Therefore, lexically both senses are represented and the selection depends on the respective context. The rep' leave 1

TEMPPRED

ABSTRACTION

[CONCRETE

TIME

[BOUND

leaveS

TEMPPRED

ABSTRACTION

[ABSTRACT

TIME

[BOUND

universityl ABSTRACTION

NOMPRED CONCRETE

AGGR

university2

MOTION]

ACHIEVEMENT

VOLITION]

ACCOMPLISHMENT!

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

AGGR

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

'Johnl

SOCIAL INSTITUTION COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECT

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

CONCRETE

AGGR

"EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

LIFE

ANIMATE

ΓJohn2

NOMPRED

MOBILE j COUNT HETEROGEN INDIVIDUAL

[GENDER

ABSTRACT

[SOCIAL

MENTAL

VOLITION

ABSTRACTION

AGGR

COUNT HETEROGEN CONTAIN

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY ANIMATE

MALE

GROUP MEMBER]

COUNT HETEROGEN INDIVIDUAL

GENDER

MALE

Figure 9.2: Lexical entries of leave, university and John resentation of leave indicates that, cognitively, verbs follow nouns on the scale from lexically autonomous to dependent predications. Verbs most archetypically and universally predicate "energetic interactions"

Contextual configuration

257

in SPACE and TIME by designating the speakers' behaviour - the components of which are social interactions on which the verbal predicate depends (cf. Langacker, 1991, 283ff.)· This archetypical nature of the verb receives different degrees of realization, depending on which participants interact with the verbal predicate. Langacker assumes a pre-linguistic, experientially rooted canonical event model, which represents "the normal observation of a prototypical action" (Langacker, 1991, 286). Speakers have a "general tendency to structure abstract conceptions with reference to more concrete ones" (cf. Langacker, 1991, 303). Lakoff likewise claims every verb to have a positive aspectual profile which represents a typical, lexically foregrounded sense from which less typical senses depart. He reports from Sweetser's experiments (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 71ff.) that speakers have abstracted idealized cognitive models in which the typical meanings of verbs axe foregrounded (cf. Sweetser, 1984). Concomitant with these claims we assume that leave represents a foregrounded SPATIAL sense as the typical one in the lexicon. Yet speakers may access both the SPATIAL and the ABSTRACT SOCIAL sense of leave in dependence on the senses of John and university. By schematizing along the conceptual type hierarchy, speakers may represent (9.8c) as leaving the polysemy unresolved until the context selects either of the meanings of John and university.

9.3

Contextual configuration

Contextual configuration presupposes a schematic disposition in the lexicon. A schema is a generalization over several contextually induced specializations in that it represents the unification of these specializations. In the speakers' evaluation of the meaning of a lexical unit which occurs as a token in a specific discourse situation, a comparison with a mentally stored schema would have to meet the following conditions (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 68, 371ff.): If an instance (I) is categorized by comparison with a schema (S), S as a generalization over different specializations must always be implied in I, so that the following relation must hold: Ic s We assume schemata for lexical units which are lexically vague, in that their lexical representation is "relative" as to their contextual configu-

258 Contextual

functions

ration in a locational domain. Lexical schemata are dependent on the context in a principled way. This idea has been introduced by Lakoff (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 420) and Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 437f.). Lakoff assumes schemata particularly for purposes of explaining the interpretation of prepositions. A schema is abstract, in that it "cannot be imaged concretely, but ... structures images" (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 420). In this sense a schema establishes a "minimal specification interpretation" from which all the fully elaborated senses may be induced indexically. This also corresponds to Langacker's notion of a schema as being a superstructure of its elaborations within specific usage events (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 68). Lakoff compares two different ways of processing schematic structures. The first possibility he discusses is that for a given lexical unit only one schema exists in the lexicon, and specific senses result from information provided by the context. Lakoff mentions verbs and direct objects as possible candidates for this option (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 422). The second possibility he assumes is that in addition to a lexical superschema there exist lexical representations of all fully specified subschemata. Lakoff favours this second option: There is ... evidence that favours the full specification interpretation ... We will argue that the senses of over form a chain with schema 1 at the centre. On the full specification interpretation, the schemata ... are part of that chain. Some of those schemas form links to other senses. The existence of such links suggests that the full specification interpretation is correct. (Lakoff, 1987, 422) Lakoff makes an important point here by claiming that the family resemblance structure which represents the typicality of the senses of a preposition is captured in the speakers' mental lexicon. Lakoff accordingly claims that the senses of a preposition are organized in the lexicon. We agree with Lakoff's assumption that speakers cannot interpret metonymies and metaphors arising from human experience without representing the structure imposed on their experience and its corresponding expressions. Langacker also uses prepositions to illustrate semantic dependence. Being dependent on their landmarks, prepositions inherit the necessary substructure compatible with their schema. The preposition's

Contextual configuration 259 lexical representation is hence schematic, and by virtue of their degree of schematicity, prepositions presuppose the meaning of the whole phrase. Langacker refers to this function as profile determinant. 2 The speakers' more fine-grained encyclopedic knowledge of nominal concepts elaborating the LM renders the necessary substructure for achieving the adequate prepositional sense. In view of the irregularity of linguistic structures, Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 87) also refrains from generalizing one schematic meaning from all senses of a preposition in the lexicon. In order to maintain his non-reductionist position, he claims that "a complex expression must be treated as a separate entity in its own right regardless of componentiality" (Langacker, 1987a, 87). We consider schematic abstractions to be constructive conceptual types which enable the emergence of referential instances by means of unification with more autonomous prototypes. D I M E N S I O N A L adjectives represent an indisputable instance of contextual configuration. As relational predications, adjectives are conceptually dependent on more autonomous nouns and verbs (cf. Langacker, 1991, 158ff.; Vandeloise, 1993). If an adjective occurs as a modifier of a noun, the configuration of its meaning proceeds in the following way: the autonomous meaning of the noun is lexically represented with respect to its D I M E N S I O N and copies the specific value into the D I M E N S I O N A L disposition of the adjective. We illustrate this configuration by the following uses of the German D I M E N S I O N A L adjective groß. A proposition is the minimal context for the configuration of the adjective's meaning (cf. Pustejovsky, 1991, 413), as in the following translationally relevant distinctions, for which the configuration in terms of the inheritance of features is represented underneath.

2

Langacker uses the traditional notion of "head" in head-modifier constructions to explain this profile-ground relationship (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 235f.).

260 Contextual (9.10)

functions

Der große Stuhl steht vor dem The big chair is standing LM

TR

(9.11)

Diese

groß

ATEMPREL

TIME

UNBOUND

Stuhl

NOMPRED

SPACE

[DIMENSION

Klavier.

in front of the

STATE

SCALE

als die

This flat is larger than the old COMPARISON

ATEMPREL

TIME

UNBOUND

(9.12)

SPACE

m]

alte.

one.

^DIMENSION

groß

Wohnung TR

DIMENSION

T H R E E - D HL]

Wohnung ist größer

PROPOSITION

piano.

STATE

T W O - D Q]jj

[SCALE

DIMENSION • ]

NOMPRED DIMENSION

[PART

T W O - D CD]

Er hat sich große Mühe bei der Fertigstellung

gegeben.

He took great pains to finish it. great

ATEMPREL

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT

TIME

UNBOUND

• [STATE

patns

NOMPRED

ABSTRACTION

ABSTRACT HI

TR AGGR

E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

SCALE E ]

MASS [ 3 HETEROGEN COLLECT

Lexically, a concept encodes the maximal dimensions of the actual gestalt of an entity. This actual gestalt is then projected onto the contextually relevant dimensions in accordance with the context of discourse, by imposing "on them some extrinsic set of coordinates" (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 153). In this projection the referent itself does not

Contextual configuration

261

change, but the projected PART then corresponds to what Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 273) calls the "active zone" of the referent, which is highlighted. In (9.10) no projection occurs. Instead, THREE-DIMENSIONAL space provides the actual gestalt of the concept of the German noun Stuhl within this context of discourse, in which the functional unity of the WHOLE object is represented as being in a SPATIAL ORIENTATION to-

wards another object. The sense of German groß which is thereby represented is normally translated into British English big. In (9.11) the projection of dimensions is achieved by the discourse topic of comparing the extension of flats, which is typically conceived of in terms of the TWO-DIMENSIONAL region of the floor accommodating the place one needs for one's furniture. The conceptualization of a TWO-DIMENSIONAL positive extension is preferentially designated by the adjective large in British English. Otherwise the adjective hoch would be used in German, i.e. when talking about the VERTICAL ONE-DIMENSIONAL extension of flats; and situations in which one would talk about the volume of flats in terms of cubic metres axe very special and marked and therefore need not be assumed for ordinary language use. In (9.12) the noun Mühe ("pains") is a MASS term predicating an ABSTRACT EMOTION. This triggers the configuration of the meaning of the German adjective groß as ABSTRACT, and with this meaning German groß preferentially translates into British English great. To summarize, our notion of a schema S is defined as follows: • S represents the conceptual vagueness of a lexical unit at the level of the lexicon. • S represents the conceptual vagueness of relational predications which are conceptually dependent on their landmarks in a principled way, most typically encoded by DIMENSIONAL and SCALAR adjectives and prepositions. • S inherits the communicatively relevant DIMENSIONAL or SCALAR values from its LM. • A proposition is the minimal context for the configuration of S (cf. Pustejovsky, 1991).

262 Contextual

functions

The semantic representation of (9.10), (9.11) and (9.12) illustrates how contextual configuration applies analogously to adjectives, which are lexically schematic with respect to their realization on an equally contextually graded SCALE. The extension predicated by the SCALAR adjective groß is contextually graded depending on the spatial extension referred to by the nouns (cf. Pustejovsky, 1991). Whereas the proposition is the minimal context for the configuration of a relational predication, which is provided within the sentence in (9.10), (9.11) and (9.12), the maximal context may well be a whole paragraph, which points out the limits imposed on a sentence-bound configuration of a schema. 3

9.4

Contextual shift

Contextual shift occurs if the context introduces a marked perspective on a dominant sense. By this the lexically dominant, prototypical concept encoded with the respective lexical unit is shifted to a less typical concept. The psychological hypothesis of sense dominance introduced in section 4.2 supports this contextual function (cf. Glucksberg, 1986). When speakers evaluate the meaning of a lexical unit occurring as a token in some utterance, a comparison to a mentally stored prototype would have to meet the following conditions (Langacker, 1987a, 371ff.): An instance (I) must approximate the prototype (P) or match it in the ideal case, i.e. a relation Ρ which is more typical than I, or in the ideal case exactly as typical as I, must be computable by speakers in accordance with the typicality values (T) of Ρ and I represented as T(P) > T(I) The prototype is related to a chain of senses with decreasing centrality. If the dominant sense is incompatible with the context, speakers directly access the less typical sense in accordance with contextual information, as is psychologically evidenced (cf. above, p. 93). That is, the default values representing a concept's degree of centrality are neither necessary nor sufficient applicability conditions: context is equally important and may defeat the default assumptions. 3 Zelinsky-Wibbelt (cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993a) implements the complexity of the sentence-bound configuration of relational predications in finer detail for prepositions.

Contextual shift 9.4-1

From, an

UNBOUNDED

to a

BOUNDED

263

region

This shift type operates on nouns such as water which, if decontextualized, axe assumed to represent a M A S S concept with relative intrinsicness. If these nouns are not semantically modified 4 or if the modifiers have no impact on the M A S S concept because they themselves are conceptualized as U N B O U N D E D , the intrinsic semantic value of the noun is preserved, as in the following examples and their representations: (9.13)

(Das) Wasser ist lebensnotwendig für die Menschheit. Water is indispensable for

TE

'water EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG

NOM PRED" MASS HOMOGEN

SCOPE

s

LM

humanity.

TYPE •

ATTITUDE SCOPE

MODALITY TYPE

Ξ ^DEONTIC

OBLIGATION]!

•

AGGR

[EXTERN BOUND

GROUNDING

[SCOPE

MASS • ]

2.LM

(9.14)

TYPE Ξ ]

(Die) interessante Forschung wird gefördert. Interesting research is being supported. research TR S

AGGR SCOPE

LM

NOM P R E D "EXTERN B O U N D INTERN CONFIG COPLEXITY TYPE

MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

•

ATTITUDE

[EVALUATION

GRADATION

GRADABLE

SCOPE

TYPE

P O S I T I V E j"

•

In (9.13) the M A S S noun water remains semantically unmodified by being related to the D E O N T I C OBLIGATION indispensable, which induces a HABITUAL perspective on the scene. This is a very strong criterion for 4

By this we mean functionally related linguistic items which have an impact on the default sense (cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1990 and Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1995a).

264 Contextual

functions

the preservation of UNBOUNDEDNESS, and so in turn generic reference is achieved. In (9.14) the noun research refers to an ABSTRACT MASS with relative intrinsicness (cf. Sinclair, 1989). The adjective interesting does not influence this conceptualization, because being a GRADABLE adjective, it is itself lexically vague as to its degree of realization, which can only be graded on some contextually introduced scale (cf. Bierwisch, 1989). What is obvious with these examples is that both NPs refer generically, and hence in English the nouns are obligatorily used in the bare construction. Whereas in English grammatical definiteness means identification of boundaries, in German definite NPs are generally ambiguous with respect to generic or identifying reference if interpreted independently of context. Therefore, the grammatical form of the English NP has to be achieved by distinguishing between generic vs. identifying reference in German, as outlined. For the noun research a boundary may be provided by one or more specific areas of research on which the social focus of attention is currently drawn. Against this base speakers would individuate a particular quantity within the UNBOUNDED MASS of research. In (9.15) this boundary is provided by the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense of the verb pursue which enables grounding by definiteness: (9.15)

The interesting research pursued in cognitive linguistics is being supported. research EXTERN BOUND TR

s

LM

2.LM

NOM PRED MASS

INTERN CONFIG

^HETEROGEN

SCOPE

T O K E N EI

RELCL

TIME

ACCOMPL

SCOPE

T O K E N [D

ATTITUDE SCOPE

EVAL ASPECT

COLLECT]

POSITIVE DURATIVE

T O K E N HI

Note that this is a contextually induced shift at the level of the NP. There is no lexicalization of a sense corresponding to a PART of the MASS in terms of a BOUNDED instance of research. In contrast to this the noun development has conventionalized the concept of a BOUNDED instance at the level of the lexicon, as used in the following example:

Contextual shift 265 (9.16)

The development of this system establishes a major accomplishment.

In (9.16) the referent of the noun development is typically conceived of as a BOUNDED ACCOMPLISHMENT in the domain of T I M E (cf. Vendler, 1967; Sinclair, 1989). Accordingly, the referent of development is grounded with respect to a particular system expressed by the PROXIMAL demonstrative pronoun of the prepositional phrase, and this effects the unification with the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense of development (cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1991; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1995a), as represented in the following attribute-value structure: NOM P R E D

'development

'EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMLEXITY

AGGR TR

BOUND

TIME

of this LM

ACCOMPL]

UI2

_SCOPE

s

system

GROUNDING 'establish

POSSESSIVE P R E D QUANT

PROXIMITY

SCOPE

T O K E N Ε ] [Σ •

TEMP PRED

TIME

UNBOUNDED

ATTITUDE

EVAL ASPECT

2.LM

SCOPE

C O U N T H] HETEROGEN INDIV

STATE]

POSITIVE PERFECTIVE

T O K E N (Ε

The HOMOGENEOUS MASS concepts corresponding to the English nouns grain and hair (cf. Wierzbicka, 1996, 387) may be used to refer to a HETEROGENEOUS concept under pragmatically marked conditions. Speakers normally abstract away from the discrete, but analogous members of the COLLECTION referred to by grain and hair. Yet the use of the quantifying phrase in the NP 10.000 grains per kg results in the conceptualizations of discrete grains, corresponding to HETEROGENEITY and individuation. As in this example, grain may be marked with respect to number and definiteness (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985, 335). Or one could count a person's hair per square centimetre, and as a result state the number of hairs, such as you have only got 20 hairs on this square cm! This pragmatically supported grammatical unification of lexical concepts is represented in the following structure:

266 Contextual

functions

'hair TR

AO GR .SCOPE

NP LM

9.4-2

-

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG

COUNT HETEROGEN

COMPLEXITY

COLLECT [D

TOKEN

Ε

m

'twenty

ATEMPREL

GROUNDING

[QUANT

SCOPE

TOKEN HI

on this 2.LM

NOM PRED

square

cm,

MENSURABLE]

SPAT PRED

GROUNDING

[QUANT

SCOPE

TOKEN

MENSURABLE] •

From a W H O L E situation to a PART

Verbs as relational predications interconnect entities and as such are contextually dependent on their conceptually more autonomous landmarks and trajectors. Langacker takes verbs to express a positive temporal profile (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 244) in their typical function, i.e. they express change over time. This implies that the interconnections which a PROCESS achieves sequentially through TIME between TR and LM are preferentially PERFECTIVE (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 254). We can refine Langacker's notion of P E R F E C T I V I T Y with Vendler's ACCOMPLISHMENT VS. ACHIEVEMENT distinction (cf. Vendler, 1967, 103fF.). This distinction implies BOUNDEDNESS in different degrees as exemplified on pp. 171 ff. above, the ACHIEVEMENT having already reached the final stage of an ACTION, while the ACCOMPLISHMENT is still striving towards it. ACTIVITIES are UNBOUNDED, i.e. they endure through T I M E with irrelevant or non-perceivable starting and ending points. STATES do not effect a change in the interconnections of entities, i.e. they are most clearly UNBOUNDED and untypical for the lexical category of verbs. These functions of verbs correlate with the empirical fact that verbs predicating an ACCOMPLISHMENT or an ACHIEVEMENT are also of considerably higher frequency both as tokens and types. According to monolingual dictionaries die belongs to the class of verbs which typically predicate an ACHIEVEMENT (cf. Brown, 1996), as it exemplifies perfectly in its dependence on the P U N C T U A L landmark

Contextual

shift

267

in (9.17a). In processing (9.17b), however, speakers have to perform a shift to the ACCOMPLISHMENT required by the D U R A T I V E L M , as represented below: (9.17)

a.

He died immediately

TR LM

b.

TIME

TEMP PRED

l"

ACHIEVEMENT

ASPECT

PUNCTUAL

accident.

• ] •]

He died over a long and painful period of time.

TR LM

Contrarily,

'die

after the

die

TEMP PRED

TIME

ACCOMPLISHMENT

ASPECT

DURATIVE

Ξ

m]

modifiers may result in B O U N D I N G or preserving the U N B O U N D E D N E S S of A C T I V I T Y verbs as in (9.18a) and (9.18b): (9.18)

TIME

a. TR LM

b. TR LM

He is always

working.

work

TEMP PRED"

TIME

ACTIVITY El

ASPECT

DURATIVE

ml

He works until 6 o'clock. work

TEMP PRED

TIME

ACCOMPLISHMENT S j

ASPECT

TERMINATIVE

• ]

In (9.18a) the present participle of work is induced by the D U R A T I V E A S P E C T of the adverbial which supports the normal A C T I V I T Y sense conceptualized as extending indefinitely beyond the T I M E O F R E F E R ENCE. In (9.18b) the TERMINATIVE aspect induced by the preposition until achieves the shift from the normal A C T I V I T Y sense of work to a B O U N D E D ACCOMPLISHMENT sense. The D U R A T I V E aspect results in a shift from ACCOMPLISHMENTS to ACTIVITIES as in the following examples:

268 Contextual (9.19)

a.

functions What are you doing?

do

TEMP

TIME

ACTIVITY

[D

GROUNDING

[ASPECT

D U R A T I V E HL]

b.

TR

LM

PRED

I am finishing the paper. finish

TEMP

TIME

ACCOMPL

GROUNDING

^ASPECT

[TIME

PRED • DURATIVE]

ACCOMLISHMENT]

In (9.19a) the DURATIVE aspect of do enforces the lexically maximal schematic representation of do (cf. Brown, 1996) which thereby instantiates its ACTIVITY sense. In (9.19b) the progressive form introduces the DURATIVE perspective on the ACCOMPLISHMENT of finish taking place at the TIME OF DISCOURSE. The auxiliary be is the profile determinant which atemporalizes the ACHIEVEMENT sense of finish to an ACCOMPLISHMENT (cf. Langacker, 1991, 424ff.). Again, TIME adverbials such as the PUNCTUAL adverbial just may effect a shift from ACCOMPLISHMENT to ACHIEVEMENT: (9.20)

I am just finishing the paper.

TR

LM

finish

TEMP

TIME

ACHIEVEMENT

GROUNDING

[ASPECT

just

[ASPECT

PRED •

DURATIVE]

PUNCTUAL

Ξ ]

To summarize, we have represented the domain of TIME as organized in terms of PART-WHOLE relations, where it is characteristic for the lexical category of verbs that the PART is more typical than its WHOLE. That is, the ACHIEVEMENT sense should generally be preferred over the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense, and the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense over the ACTIVITY sense, if there is no conflicting grammatical modification. This preference logically follows from our assumption that verbs typically express change over TIME.

Contextual 9-4-3

Shifting

shift

269

between periods of time

Although metonymy preferentially applies to autonomous predications (cf. Croft, 1993, 336), marked nominal senses resulting from nominalizations of verbs denoting an AKTIONSART normally shift from an ACCOMPLISHMENT to an ACHIEVEMENT sense, as the following nouns illustrate: examination, combination, installation, implementation, organization, test, review, project

improvement,

If these nouns are polysemous with respect to either the ACCOMPLISHMENT, the ACHIEVEMENT sense or the RESULT sense, they shift from the ACCOMPLISHMENT sense to the ACHIEVEMENT sense, or from the ACHIEVEMENT sense to the RESULT sense. These P A R T - W H O L E relations consist of the different stages of the W H O L E ACTION. The nouns represent the organization between PARTS and W H O L E S in a less evident way, because as nominalizations of verbs they are semantically marked and have in part lost the typical function embodied in ACTIONS typically designated by verbs. For a more detailed explanation and exemplification see above, chapter 6. With these semantically marked nominalizations both the default behaviour of nouns which typically denote "things", and the phenomenon of verbs which in the unmarked case embody a prototypical AKTIONSART, have been lost to some degree. ACTIVITIES refer to an UNBOUNDED ACTION IN TIME, which endures either HOMOGENEOUSLY or HETEROGENEOUSLY indefinitely without any conceivable starting and ending points. Examples are the nominals research, occupation, communication used indefinitely, as definiteness in these cases would express the BOUNDING, as effected by a semantic modification in the following example: (9.21) 9-4-4

The communication Reorganizing

the same

stopped. region

Reference-point variations between PART and W H O L E , as illustrated in the preceding sections, represent the indispensable capability of speakers to flexibly tune a lexical concept to contextual requirements (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 125), without these contextual variations being sig-

270 Contextual

functions

nificant enough to enforce a referential change. That is, without the contextual variations differing significantly across mutually exclusive discourse situations reference-point variations within one and the same region occur under the following conditions: • By shifting the active zone within one and the same conceptual structure different P A R T - W H O L E relations result: the speaker performs a shift from the normally relevant W H O L E to the contextually supported PART. • The criterion for referential consistency is established by the original region of the discourse domain covered by the whole concept being preserved. The coherence relations within the concept are stronger than those to any other concepts. The mental ability of representing the contextually coherent PARTS of the respective entities is explained as reference-point ability by Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1993, 29ff.). This ability elaborates the speakers' knowledge of the prototypical, lexically salient W H O L E which provides an abstract schema of how they are to relate the less salient PARTS to this W H O L E . If a PART is evaluated as contextually coherent, the referent does not change, but instead the appropriate active zone of the referent is focussed. The W H O L E entity is normally more central than its PARTS (cf. Langacker, 1991, 171). Thus, with their reference-point ability speakers can functionally foreground the active zone of a referent, without necessarily changing the referent itself. This reference-point ability presupposes the typical representation of nominal concepts as regions consisting of relatively dense and stable interconnections between their PARTS (cf. above, section 5.15). If applied sufficiently often, however, this foregrounding of PARTS can always result in a conventional conceptualization of an autonomous function, which then implies a referential change. A typical and frequent reference-point variation is exemplified by nouns like window, door, lake. These nouns capture different possibilities of schematicity by which the corresponding reference-points are referred to. The basic variation lying behind these different schematizations is that of different P A R T - W H O L E relationships within one and the same concept.

Contextual shift

271

Note that Lakoff and Croft do in fact assume that at least three conventionalized senses corresponding to the PARTS of window are interrelated in an idealized cognitive model of the functional characteristics of a window, namely the casement, the glass and the frame (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 417f.; Croft, 1993, 349f.). However, this analysis has been criticized, for instance by Taylor (cf. Taylor, 1992; Taylor, 1995, 7ff.). Accordingly, we do not assume three different senses of window in the lexicon, but instead treat this as a case of PART-WHOLE relations of one and the same concept. This assumption is corroborated by the fact that the PARTS of window are lexicalized morphologically by the compounds window frame, window pane and window sill. The following examples illustrate how the speakers' perspective on the discourse situation changes the active zone of the referent, while the same entity is referred to: (9.22)

a.

The living-room has two windows.

b.

Please open the window.

c.

I can see you through the window.

d.

The cat is sitting in the window.

e.

The cat is jumping through the window.

In (9.22) the PARTS of window establish no autonomous INDIVIDUALS themselves, i.e. without being integrated into the WHOLE they have no function. (9.22a) exemplifies reference to the WHOLE window. In (9.22b) to (9.22e) different PARTS are profiled, while the other PARTS of the window are also present, but from the speakers' perspective are functionally placed in the background of the mental model which they represent for the normal discourse situation of window. The identification of a PART to which a speaker refers implicitly 5 occurs firstly by representing the propositional structure and by evaluating whether the propositional frame of the verbal predicate is fulfilled in all of the above uses of window. In (9.22) the schematic meaning of the ACTIVITIES predicated by the verb suffices to project the shape of the WHOLE gestalt fulfilling the normal function of window to that of the contextually required PART. If the lexically salient WHOLE gestalt 5

The expressive designations of a PART of window by a compound are left implicit in (9.22).

272 Contextual

functions

of window does not semantically unify with the predicate, speakers evaluate whether a reference point fits into the respective propositional structure. The verb open in (9.22b) is a M O T I O N predicate which requires the casement of window to be moved so that a functional change from the closed state to the open state occurs. The casement establishes its MATERIAL BOUNDARY as well as one of the prototypical functions which a window normally fulfils, i.e. opening and closing for purposes of ventilation. When processing (9.22c) the speaker has to decide whether the P E R C E P T I O N verb see plus the P E R C E P T U A L TRAVERSAL induced by the projective sense of the preposition through unify with the reference-point of a window-pane as the focussed PART of the WHOLE. In (9.22d) the cat is referred to as sitting in the open window, more precisely on the window-sill. Speakers have to infer this PART from their mental model, as the explicit prepositional phrase does not express this reference point. In their evaluation of (9.22e) speakers have to compute whether the M O T I O N verb jump plus the SPATIAL TRAVERSAL induced by the preposition through unify with the frame as the relevant PART. On this propositional level speakers can presuppose existing knowledge about P A R T - W H O L E relationships. They proceed from the psychological verification of the dominance of the W H O L E GESTALT over its PARTS, as represented in the following attribute-value matrices of see, through and window. 'see VOLITION TR LM through TR LM

TEMPPRED VISUAL P E R C E P T I O N ANIMATE CONCRETE

ATEMPREL ' MOVABLE CONTAINER

window ABSTACTION

NOMPRED CONCRETE

AGGR

^EXTERN BOUND

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

HETEROGEN CONTENT V CONTAIN

COUNTj

Secondly, the speakers' reference-point ability generally resides in their image-schematic representations. While explaining how speakers evaluate the propositional information of an utterance we have already im-

Contextual shift

273

plicitly made reference to the analogous representations which speakers activate in the evaluation of senses. This indicates a very close interaction between propositional and analogous representations. Thereby our assumption is corroborated that the speakers' processing of linguistic utterances largely occurs in an interactive fashion instead of sequentially. Langacker assumes the speakers' image-schematic abilities to be highly abstract and innate (cf. Langacker, 1993, 3). These innate schemata are assumed to provide speakers with structures to be elaborated experientially. That is, the concept of image-schemata corresponds to the psychological hypothesis of a universal disposition with which children are born into their specific environment and which constrains the elaboration of their image-schematic disposition. Although we doubt the innateness of image schemata, the following of these pervasive and universal abilities become relevant in the representation of the examples given in (9.22). The ability to mentally scan via a PATH from a S O U R C E to a G O A L is abstract, in that it does not imply any domain such as S P A C E or T I M E . A S the result of experience and learning, the abstract ability provided by the image-schematic structure S O U R C E - P A T H - G O A L is then successfully elaborated in different cognitive domains, the first of these being the SPATIAL one. The SPATIAL domain is first mastered and internalized by the child, because of its obvious ease of access: by virtue of its PHYSICAL basis it is the world which is most relevant in the first stage of child development. In this way the conceptual archetype of PHYSICAL M O T I O N A L O N G A PATH F R O M S O U R C E T O G O A L is acquired. This conceptual archetype is expressed linguistically by sentence (9.22e) above. While growing up, the child continuously learns more about the world on the basis of its experience and is able to understand ever more complex scenes. And eventually the A B S T R A C T correspondence to the above defined conceptual archetype will be learned as P E R C E P TUAL o r COGNITIVE M O T I O N A L O N G A

PATH F R O M S O U R C E

TO

in the SOCIAL domain. This archetypical schema is exemplified by sentence (9.22c) above, where the PATH is elaborated by through. In (9.22c) the PATH is expressed by the P E R C E P T U A L M O T I O N verb see, the SOURCE by the VOLITIONAL, self-referential agent and the G O A L GOAL

274 Contextual

functions

by the semantically schematic pronoun you. We represent the speakers' image schemata in the following attribute-value matrix, where the ABSTRACT a t t r i b u t e s of SOURCE a n d GOAL are associated with t h e

pronouns I and you: through

ATEMPREL

TR

SOURCE

LM

GOAL

PATH]

[HUMAN

[HUMAN

/]

YOU]

Another pervasive image-schematic ability (cf. Bowerman, 1978) is t h e relation of INCLUSION represented by t h e CONTAINER-CONTENT

schema. The elaboration of this image-schematic ability in the conceptualization of the SPATIAL domain is exemplified by sentence (9.22d), where the cat functions as the CONTENT of the window-frame, and the latter functions as the CONTAINER. This function is induced by the preposition in, as represented by the following attribute-value matrix: ATEMPREL TR

INCLUSION

AGGR

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

HETEROGEN CONTENT

AGGR

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY

HETEROGEN CONTAINER

Let us finish the explanation of the speakers' reference to window with the image schema of CAUSE-EFFECT (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 54£; Langacker, 1991, 408ff.). This image schema enables humans on the one hand to achieve an understanding of the interactions by which they are surrounded, and on the other to take part in these interactions in the development of their environment. The image schema of CAUSEEFFECT is abstract in not making reference to any interaction between a CAUSE and an EFFECT, and instead provides just the image of energy being put forth from some SOURCE, this energy being capable of effecting some CHANGE. This abstract image schema may then be elaborated by the AGENT-PATIENT frame. Sentence (9.22b) is an indirect or not very salient example of this archetype: through the use of the imperative mood the agent becomes syntactically covert, and only

Contextual shift

275

indirectly controls the ACTION (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 54f.). This elaboration is represented by the following attribute-value matrix: 'open

TEMPREL

TR

[CAUSE

LM

[EFFECT

AGENT] PATIENT]

Yet speakers represent marked discourse situations in which the PARTS of a window have exceptionally become functionally autonomous individuals. In the following examples only the PARTS are relevant and thus referred to, as is even indicated by the anaphoric reference to them by means of hyponymy, i.e. through specifically rementioning the referent by explicit designation of the communicatively relevant PART:

(9.23)

a.

The price of the window is $ 250. It comprises casement.

b.

The window is broken.

c.

The windows of the house are too small. must be resized.

the whole

We must buy a new pane. The

frames

In (9.23a) speakers represent a model of the discourse situation of a shop selling windows. This mental model induces the casement sense. In (9.23b) speakers represent a mental model of a discourse situation in which the glass of a window is broken and a window pane has to be inserted. Finally, in (9.23c) speakers represent a situation of the frame within the brick wall of a house being too small and activate the sense of the brick frame of window. In these examples it is by anaphoric reference, by explicitly rementioning the PART which becomes relevant with a lexical hyponym, that the PART becomes functionally autonomous within the domain. Through this hyponymy the coherence relations achieved for the proposition support the mental model of the overall discourse situation, i.e. the coherence relations must reach a significant threshold for the mental model of the discourse situation to be represented. Within this mental model the ad hoc metonymy of window may be integrated. Despite having a contextually supported shift between different referents, the coherence relations between the discourse domain and its reference object are not strong enough for the different

276 Contextual

functions

referents to have become lexicalized in terms of different senses. This is because the coherence relations have not yet become established as a convention representing an integral part of the speakers' everyday social interactions. As with reference-point variations the speaker foregrounds complementary P A R T S of the W H O L E gestalt by exchanging figure and ground, the phenomenon of figure-ground reversal (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 125; Pustejovsky and Annick, 1988, 519). Reference-point variations resulting in figure-ground reversals abound in language: (9.24)

(9.25)

a.

The lake is not far from here.

b.

There are a lot of fish in the lake.

c.

Yesterday John swam all around the lake.

a.

The lamp is hanging from the ceiling.

b.

This lamp is too bright.

c.

The design of this lamp doesn't go with this room.

The meanings of lake and lamp conform to Quine's "heterogeneous reference condition", according to which nouns denoting C O U N T concepts cannot be divided into their P A R T S without losing their normal referential function within their normal discourse domain. The referents in (9.24) and (9.25) thus remain constant, according to the criterion of the H E T E R O G E N E O U S reference condition. The W H O L E is relevant in (9.24a), the C O N T E N T in (9.24b), the C O N T A I N E R in (9.24c). More specifically, in (9.24b) speakers focus the B O U N D E D M A S S of water contained in the concavity created by the boundaries of the lake. In (9.24c) they focus the E X T E R N A L BOUNDARIES establishing the C O N TAINER of the water (cf. Taylor, 1995, 6f., 12). Analogously, in (9.25a) the W H O L E is referred to. In (9.25b) speakers focus the bulb as the C O N T E N T and the light intensity as its function, whereas in (9.25c) they focus the shade as establishing the C O N T A I N E R of the bulb. In (9.24) and (9.25) the functions of lake and lamp would be violated if one separated the P A R T S from the W H O L E in order to move them to a different region. In any case, a quantificational change would automatically result in the loss of the integrated function of this P A R T within the W H O L E with the effect that the unified function of the W H O L E is violated.

Contextual shift

277

With these reference-point vaxiations between WHOLE, CONTAINER and CONTENT we can especially observe, on the one hand, a variation between different reference points of one and the same conceptual referent where this, on the other hand, may develop into different concepts at the level of the lexicon, a situation with which we will be concerned in section 9.4.5 below. 9.4.4.1

Contextual modulation

Contextual modulation is an optional amplification of a sense by a n o n conflicting predication which keeps the referent constant, as with the INTENSIFIERS i n (9.26) a n d (9.27):

(9.26)

an exciting

adventure

(9.27)

a complicated

confusion

The coherence of discourse comes about through several reference relations creating a coherent and integrated system (cf. Strohner, 1990, 250f.). This integration results from the interactive processing of contextual functions in a recursive fashion. If contextual modulation occurs, however, no recursion is performed as this only enhances the active zone of the referent. In comparison to reference-point variation resulting from perspectivizing different PARTS of a WHOLE, speakers have the WHOLE GESTALT in the scope of their predication when they modify this by modulation. Thus in contextual modulation the nominal's concept is related to the LM, which in (9.26) and (9.27) is elaborated by the INTENSIFYING adjectives. This conceptual enhancement of the same referent is a natural process implied in our conceptual type hierarchy. 9.4.4.2

Contextual highlighting

Contextual highlighting consists in the general foregrounding and backgrounding of the domains establishing the domain matrix of a sense. In (9.28a) summer as one PERIOD within the annual seasons provides a temporal reference point as landmark for the location of the ACHIEVEMENT referred to by accident. Its location on the time axis of the year, its value in the domain of TIME, is therefore in the foreground. In contrast to this, the landmark in (9.28b) elaborates the domain of

278 Contextual functions with respect to which the referent of summer is profiled. So the temperature as the distinguishing characteristic of summer is in the foreground in (9.28b): TEMPERATURE,

(9.28)

a.

The accident happened last summer.

b.

Last summer was extremely hot.

Again no recursion becomes necessary in these representations of summer, as this is not a case of changing the referent, but rather a case of differently salient conjunctively related domains within the conceptual type hierarchy. In comparison to reference-point variation resulting from foregrounding different complementary PARTS of a W H O L E GESTALT, contextual highlighting results from foregrounding different components of the domain matrix which conjunctively characterize the concept of a lexical unit. The achievement of this foregrounding is a natural process implied in the conjunctive relation of our conceptual type hierarchy. 9-4-5

Shifting between regions by metonymy

Metonymy is evidence of linguistic flexibility and creativity in that it represents the stage where reference-point variations are turned into semantically significant variations. Metonymie variations are conventionally sanctioned by the communicative need for autonomous, but semantically related referential systems. So far we have focussed on the prevailing P A R T - W H O L E relationships which give rise to metonymy either at the level of the discourse - by focussing on different PARTS of the original referent - or at the level of the lexicon - by focussing on autonomous PARTS of a discourse domain. If P A R T - W H O L E relationships have developed into autonomous, metonymically related senses, it is usually the WHOLE which provides the more dominant sense (cf. Bloom and Kelemen, 1995, 7). Table 9.1 points out how reference-point variation within one and the same referent can turn into metonymy through the communicative need for a new referential system. On the left-hand side we represent the different functions of P A R T - W H O L E relations which have originated in different PARTS, i.e. different reference-points of one WHOLE. The right-hand side of the table represents the P A R T - W H O L E relations as having developed into metonymic relations between different autonomous PARTS. The

Contextual shift 279 Autonomous Whole

Autonomous Parts

functional unity

functional multiplicity

functionally unified behaviour

structurally distributed behaviour

internally related parts externally bounded whole gestalt

external bounding of parts

internal reference-point variation

metonymy

one referential system with different reference points

more than one referential system with individual referents

quantificational difference

quantificational difference

loss of representation

emergence of representation

environmental influence on representation and function of system

higher-order representation subsumes environment as part of referential system

Table

9.1:

The functional relations between

PARTS

and

WHOLES

contrasting poles of this dichotomy result from the speakers' active dividing of perceived reality into different types of discourse situations. The integrated complex W H O L E on the left-hand side of the table represents a functional unity with internally related PARTS. SO by the speakers' focussing their attention on the internal configuration of one and the same referential system, they achieve the analysis of integral P A R T - W H O L E relations of one entity. This referential system does not change as long as the PARTS of the W H O L E have stronger relations to each other than to any system-external components. In this stage a quantificational difference, i.e. the removal of a P A R T , would result in a loss of representation, i.e. the representation would no longer fulfil the truth conditions. As soon as the PARTS develop stronger relations to the environment than to the internal configuration of the W H O L E , quantificational difference would result in qualificational emergence creating a new state of the system. Instead of focussing on the internal configuration of the W H O L E in terms of its PARTS, speakers come to focus on the external boundaries

280 Contextual

functions

of the PARTS. AS a consequence, the different reference-point relationships between a WHOLE and its PARTS within one referential system turn into metonymic relationships creating more than one referential system with autonomous, though semantically related referents. The autonomous PARTS represent a functional multiplicity with a structurally distributed behaviour, i.e. the PARTS may fulfil their function at disjoint locations of the discourse domain. To summarize, P A R T - W H O L E relations establish reference-point variations within one and the same referent or metonymies. As long as a quantificational change does not result in a system internal change, we make reference to one and the same functionally unified WHOLE, since Quine's HETEROGENEOUS reference condition (cf. Quine, 1960) rules out the dissociation of a PART from a BOUNDED entity. This reference condition determines that integral PARTS of COUNT concepts may not be removed, as this would result in the object ceasing to exist as the very same object; it would no longer fulfil the truth conditions without the missing PART. However, with PARTS which occupy different regions of a domain and which thereby represent autonomous functions in relation to the WHOLE, speakers have achieved semantic multiplicity reorganizing and improving the representation of the discourse domain. With bottle we can easily change the CONTENT of wine into juice or even into soap without a violation of meaning. An important condition is that we are analyzing basic level categories, that is, categories located at a medium level of genericity where most P A R T - W H O L E relationships become cognitively salient: categories of this level are the first learned and the most often used. The lexicalization of PARTS may be observed most frequently at this level (cf. Brown, 1965, 321; Berlin et al., 1974; Lakoff, 1987, 283; Gentner and Stevens, 1983, 2). With the lexicalization of P A R T - W H O L E metonymies we thus have the following stage of development: • The development into qualitatively different concepts each of which may instantiate a referential system which differs from that of the other concept(s). • The fulfilment of autonomous and different individual functions in a discourse domain which is more differentiated than at the previous stage of development. Thus, through the pressure of commu-

Contextual shift

281

nicative needs, reference-point variation gives way to metonymy. We may conclude that reference-point variation and metonymy correspond to different diachronic stages within the development of a discourse domain. The genericity of this metonymic principle, namely the metonymic shift from the W H O L E gestalt to a P A R T of it, corresponds to the speakers' image-schematic ability of F I G U R E - G R O U N D R E V E R S A L . Having originated in Gestalt Psychology this term indicates that there is a dominant figure and a background supporting the figure. With this figure-ground relationship we can observe synchronically how the diachronic development from concept-internal variation to the variation between different concepts proceeds. We can conclude that semantic shift by metonymy arises if the contextual coherence supporting the conceptual reference to an autonomous P A R T occupying a different region has become sufficiently conventionalized and thereby enforces a semantic distinction of the conceptual variation at the level of the lexicon. We illustrate this P A R T W H O L E metonymy with the autonomous P A R T S of the noun bottle. The PARTS in (9.29b) and (9.29c) may obviously occupy different regions and may well be integral components in the respective domains. Moreover, the C O N T A I N E R may steadily be reified by its C O N T E N T : (9.29)

a.

This shelf is full up with wine bottles. [ W H O L E ]

b.

This bottle of wine is excellent.

c.

You have to pay a deposit on the bottle. [CONTAINER]

[CONTENT]

The nominal bottle has obviously given way to the communicative need for functionally autonomous senses. These senses conceptually cover spatially disjoint regions of the domain of EATING A N D D R I N K I N G . The W H O L E gestalt is referred to in (9.29a) with the bottle as the closed CONTAINER with its C O N T E N T to be found in the supermarket, or in someone's store-room or wine cellar in the basement. The C O N T E N T is referred to in (9.29b) as one P A R T of the W H O L E which may well become spatially dissociated from it for instance by decanting a bottle of wine or by distributing the liquid into the individual wine glasses of the guests at a party. In both situations within the discourse domain of EATING A N D DRINKING it is perfectly legitimate to talk about the

282 Contextual

functions

excellent bottle by way of referring to the decanted quantity or to the glasses into which the wine has already been poured. At the same time t h e CONTAINER as t h e other PART of t h e WHOLE gestalt is no longer

present within this situation in (9.29c), being already in the dustbin or having been returned to get back the deposit. Semantic multiplicity may even be represented along the social distribution of linguistic labour, which we illustrate with the usage pattern of the noun kitchen in (9.30), where the furniture as the CONTENT is not necessarily built in in all social groups: (9.30)

(9.31)

a.

The kitchen is next to the living room.

b.

We need a new kitchen built in.

c.

But before that we have to paint the kitchen.

a.

I would prefer to sleep in the bed next to the window.

b.

This bed is not warm enough.

c.

The prices of the beds refer to the frame only.

In (9.30a) reference to the WHOLE gestalt is made. In order to fulfil its function as a WHOLE, the room needs to be enclosed by walls and needs the necessary furniture contained in it. In (9.30 b) a shift to the furniture PART as the CONTENT must be achieved. In (9.30 c) a shift t o t h e SPATIAL BOUNDARIES of t h e CONTAINER f u n c t i o n provided by

the walls becomes necessary. This example is a clear case of referential change, as conceptually, both PARTS of a kitchen may potentially occupy different regions, the kitchen as the empty room of a newly bought flat and the kitchen as the furniture in a shop selling kitchens. Analogously, in (9.31a) the WHOLE bed is referred to as being located in the bedroom. In (9.31b) the bedcover is referred to, and in (9.31c) the frame as PART of the bed is explicitly referred to. There is abundant psychological evidence that speakers prefer the WHOLE object to function as referent in relation to its PARTS (cf. Bloom and Kelemen, 1995, 2, 22; Waxman and Hall, 1993; Shipley and Sheperson, 1990). Bloom and Kelemen claim this tendency to be a byproduct of the general default behaviour of mentally representing objects as individuals rather than as kinds (cf. Bloom and Kelemen, 1995, 4). They observe this behaviour already in small children. In

Contextual shift

283

accordance with these empirical findings we take the WHOLE gestalt to be perceived as the typical referent in examples (9.29), (9.30), and (9.31). 9-4-6

Discourse coherence and lexical dominance

Within cognitive linguistics the static notion of a semantic field has been substituted by the dynamic notion of a domain. The scope of a semantic domain emerges from the requirements of the particular discourse (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 113; Fauconnier and Turner, 1998). While metonymy is traditionally explained by a semantically contiguous structure being represented within the same semantic field as the original sense of a lexical unit, we have explained the lexicalization of metonymic concepts which previously established the PARTS of a coherent W H O L E as occurring with a change of domain. This observation in turn requires a relativization of the notion of domain, as proposed by Croft (cf. Croft, 1993). He has extended the notion of a domain into that of a domain matrix (cf. Croft, 1993, 340). This extended notion allows for a "shift of domains" within the same domain matrix (cf. Croft, 1993, 348). With respect to our objective of distinguishing lexical vagueness from polysemy the crucial question is how to represent the domain matrix within which the lexicalization of new metonymies may take place. The assumption is made that lexicalizations emerge from and represent the coherence relations within the respective domain. Domains, that is, emerge from coherent discourse representations. If we return to the noun kitchen, we realize that this example is a clear case of referential change, as both PARTS may potentially be located in different domains, the walls establishing the room of the building and the furniture in a shop. In these different domains speakers have to achieve different coherence relations and different functional requirements. The coherence relations axe provided by the lexicalized relations which organize the respective domain of discourse (cf. Fass, 1988, 152; Fass, 1997, 149ff.). What is essential for the notion of domain coherence is the scope of predication, the base in relation to which the speaker profiles a PART as being conceived in terms of a naturally autonomous INDIVIDUAL which may or may not cover some BOUNDED region in this domain (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 191ff.). Langacker men-

284 Contextual

functions

tions that, when making reference to PARTS of the HUMAN body, it is more natural to refer to a knuckle as PART of its immediate base finger, instead of mentioning the hand as providing its base, although, logically speaking, this PART-WHOLE relation well exists by the relation of transitivity. What counts, however, is the immediate scope of predication, "the innermost of its layered regions - that with the highest degree of salience and relevance" (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 118ff., 490). This seems to be a byproduct of the HETEROGENEOUS reference condition of COUNT concepts: if the coherence of the WHOLE is violated by linguistically dissociating any PART from it, the unity of the WHOLE is lost likewise. For (9.32) speakers represent a discontinuous image of window: window is left linguistically covert, although the PARTS within its immediate scope of predication require the WHOLE to be explicitly mentioned. Instead the PART is profiled against the region in the next or even next but one layer within the representation of the WHOLE. The following utterances are therefore unusual: (9.32)

a.

? The pane of this room is broken.

b.

? The frame of this room must be resized.

c.

? The handle of this wall does not work.

In hearing (9.32a) to (9.32b), even though there may only be one pane, one frame, and one handle representing the PARTS of a window in the room, such that there cannot arise any referential ambiguities, listeners would consider the effort to communicate to be too great: they have to infer the coherence relations consisting of the pane, frame and handle being PARTS of the window. They infer these relations by resolving the transitivity relationship, thereby arriving at the PART-WHOLE relations which are part of their lexically stored knowledge pertaining to the lexical entry of window. Instead of this effort listeners would expect pane, frame and handle to be related to their immediate base, as in the following: (9.33)

a.

The pane of this window is broken.

b.

The frame of this window must be resized.

c.

The handle of this window does not work.

Contextual shift 285 Langacker's criterion of the immediate scope of predication for coherence in reference-point constructions within the same referent corresponds to Fass' semantic distance, the number of axes to be traversed between two nodes in a H A S - A taxonomy (cf. Fass, 1988, 158). This intrinsic property of a meronymic path (cf. Cruse, 1986, 169) forms one of the two basic notions of coherence in preference semantics. The other basic notion of coherence is represented by the inclusion relation if a node is the hyponym of its immediately dominating node (cf. Fass, 1997, 149). Both of these coherence relations explain the naturalness of Langacker's immediate scope of predication in hierarchical relationships. A handle is rather categorized and referred to as PART of a window, instead of a room. Wine is more naturally referred to and categorized as drink than as liquid. With reference-point construals within one and the same referent, profile-base relations have to be established within the immediate scope of predication as illustrated in (9.33a), (9.33b), and (9.33c). This condition seems to be less obligatory with different regions corresponding to different metonymically related senses. In the case of conventionalized different PARTS in terms of autonomous INDIVIDUALS, speakers are more prone to construe functionally natural profile-base relationships with different layers in between, exactly because of the autonomy of INDIVIDUALS. An autonomous individual can be related more easily to any more inclusive layer, because as potentially MOVABLE entities speakers are free to profile them against any functionally coherent base, as in the following: (9.34)

a.

The kitchen is included in the price of the house.

b.

You can take the eiderdown out of the bedroom.

c.

The bottle is in the garage.

Whereas in the case of non-autonomy the routinization generally holds for Langacker's immediate scope of predication, with autonomous predications there is a higher degree of routinization of coherence relations within the domain matrix. This is exemplified by (9.34a), for which the listener can easily associate the furniture of the kitchen with the more inclusive entity of house. There does not arise any violation in this discontinuously construed scope of predication. Consider instead the analogous construction with handle:

286 Contextual (9.35)

functions

? The handles are included in the price of the flat.

Clearly, with the non-autonomous PART designated by handle speakers need the immediate scope of predication, as in the following: (9.36)

The handles are included in the price of the windows.

These observations are clear evidence for the claim that speakers consider only the relevant relations when organizing their mental models. The psychological evidence about the dominance of the WHOLE GESTALT within a metonymy structure, the heterogeneous reference hypothesis and the empirical evidence obtained in preference semantics support the hierarchical representation of the scope of predication between a WHOLE and its PARTS such that this hierarchy may be a criterion for the semantic distance, for the possible scope of predication w h i c h a PART has in relation t o its WHOLE. T h e quantification of t h e

semantic distance should in turn quantify the coherence relations. The coherence relations represent the domain of discourse either by relating different r e f e r e n c e - p o i n t s a s PARTS w i t h i n t h e WHOLE c o n c e p t or

by relating different autonomous PARTS as organizing the domain of discourse metonymically on a higher level of representation. By quantifying the semantic distance we achieve on the one hand a quantification of the coherence relations and on the other a quantification of the immediate scope of predication or minimal relevance which is necessary for a coherence relation to become integrated within a mental model.

9.5

Contextual inference

Contextual inference is what Pustejovsky deals with under the term of coercion. We do not to use Pustejovsky's term, as inferences follow naturally from both the propositional and the analogous representation 6 . In order to illustrate the contextual function of inference let us return to the example which initiated our investigation (Nunberg, 1979, 149; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 35): (9.37) 6

The beefsteak has ordered another beer.

Although this is not how it is explained by Pustejovsky (cf. Pustejovsky, 1991), discussions with colleagues have shown that the explanation of the mechanism somehow gets lost behind the negative force of the term "coercion".

Contextual inference

287

This has been explained as an instance of non-conventionalized ad hoc metonymy. PART of the predicate-argument structure, the customer who has ordered the beefsteak, namely the beefsteak as the affected object, adopts the meaning of the WHOLE predication. This occurs through application of the metonymic POSSESSOR-POSSESSED rule. Within the representation of a mental model of the discourse situation an inference from a syntagmatic PART designated by beefsteak to t h e WHOLE as t h e POSSESSOR of t h e POSSESSED

beefsteak

is inferred, i.e. the most typical agent of the VOLITIONAL ACHIEVEMENT expressed by the verb order (cf. Langacker, 1991, 172; Langacker, 1993, 30). As grounding predications possessives range among the most salient functions which anchor the intended referent with respect to the current discourse space (cf. Langacker, 1991, 170). The referent is thereby located, i.e. identified within the discourse situation, and thereby uniquely accessible to both speaker and listener (cf. Langacker, 1991, 170). Now, one may ask, especially with respect to this drastic case of ad hoc metonymy, why speakers take such a burden of mental effort on themselves. The first answer is that, according to Grice, listeners rely as much as possible on the intended relevance of the respective utterance and assume that speakers have fulfilled the felicity conditions (cf. Grice, 1975, 45ff.; Austin, 1962). The second answer is that by its communicative relevance within this particular discourse domain, this ad hoc metonymy has been created by speakers for reasons of economy and relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 46ff.). As Langacker puts it (cf. Langacker, 1993, 30), speakers construe a referential change if in the particular discourse situation this is the most economical way to direct the listeners' attention to the intended target, where economy arises from the cognitive salience which the target entity has within this discourse domain by virtue of its original meaning. The actual name of the customer is irrelevant in this context, and the waiter may indeed extend the economy of this ad hoc metonymy by referring with it to other customers. A lot of time and mental effort may thus be saved, and speaker and listener may eventually achieve an economical continuity of reference. Although (9.37) shows that each meaningful use is unique within its current discourse situation, for methodological reasons we need a relaxed distinction between the activity of process-

288 Contextual

functions

ing the obtained information on the one hand and the representation of lexical knowledge and discourse knowledge on the other. Nevertheless, (9.37) exemplifies the transitory nature of the distinction between knowledge and information.

9.6

Conclusion

Having returned to our original example, we can verify and extend our hypotheses: speakers have indeed immense opportunities for tuning word senses in very flexible ways, but there are still predictable cognitive constraints residing in their mental representations of possible lexicalizations and discourse situations. These constraints are predictable both in relation to register and in relation to what the speaker expects the listener to know and, among other things, in relation to what has been dealt with in the preceding conversation. These constraints may evoke the acceptability and eventually sanction the conventionality of novel senses: at a specific point in time and dependent on their communicative intentions the speakers' cognitive constraints guarantee that flexibility is not completely arbitrary. Instead, by its relative systematicity, flexibility guarantees consistency. And finally, by its very existence, flexibility enables speakers to understand and control their enormously varied and ever changing environment. Proceeding from assumptions about flexibility, economy and creativity in the mental representation of polysemous lexical units, we have implemented a model in which four different contextual functions operate on accordingly different lexical representations. Contextual selection operates on equally valid lexical senses. The function of contextual configuration is taken to operate on an abstract schema. We have shown that this function operates in particular on the semantic representations of lexical units which are intrinsically vague at the level of the lexicon. Contextual shift applies to a dominant sense. Contextual inference induces a non-conventionalized ad hoc sense. We have illustrated how each contextual function achieves a coherent interpretation by representing a cognitively significant foregroundbackground organization: by relating a TR to a LM along the syntagmatic dimension and by relating a profile to its base along the paradigmatic dimension. By exhausting the principle of analogy, which we take to organize the whole lexicon, these contextual functions control

Conclusion

289

consistency by the representation of image-schemata. Furthermore, we have pointed out how contextual functions enable flexibility in terms of creativity by the representation of mental models. A coherent structure of partial or incoherent information can only be obtained if the conflicting values of conventionally contradicting functions are defeated and overridden by inserting and thereby integrating a function which by its fitting into the mental model of the discourse situation reconciles the conventionally conflicting values. We have concentrated on how the E X T E R N A L B O U N D I N G and the I N T E R N A L C O N F I G U R A T I O N of an entity axe represented. This will be elaborated by a computational implementation in the following chapter.

Chapter 10 Representing token vs. type reference We now turn to a particular type of P A R T - W H O L E relationship, one which occurs at both the lexical and the grammatical level.1 We are referring here to the grammatical distinction between type reference, ranging over the whole kind of an entity, and token reference, ranging over an instance of the type. We will be concerned with how speakers are able to profile the type of an entity, i.e. how they profile the maximal extension of an entity inherently conceptualized as covering a B O U N D E D or U N B O U N D E D region. In English a limited spatial extension is instantiated and normally grounded by the noun taking a determiner. That is, discreteness is schematic with the lexical type: a specific instance of the type is both selected and grounded by a grounding predication with respect to the current discourse space. We are concerned with token vs. type reference as it occurs with the trajector of a sentence or phrase in terms of what is traditionally referred to as the "topic" or "new" information. Lexically, M A S S concepts axe inherently conceptualized as extending continuously and UNBOUNDED. Hence they cannot be instantiated through the direct use of a determiner. Instead, they first of all have to be linguistically quantified in absolute or relative terms before a determiner can instantiate this profile by grounding it at a specific location within the domain of instantiation, as in (10.1). In contrast to this, C O U N T concepts which are inherently conceptualized as covering a B O U N D E D region require some maximally general context to be im1

This chapter is based on an implementation in the CAT2 machine translation system at IAI Saarbrücken, Institut für Angewandte Informationsforschung an der Universität des Saarlandes ("Institute for Applied Information Science at the University of the Saarland"). The implementation has resulted in successful article translation from German into English.

Representing

token vs. type reference

291

posed on them, in order to refer generically to the whole kind. This context is for instance provided by the HABITUAL A S P E C T in (10.2). (10.1)

all the sand of the desert

(10.2)

A beaver builds

dams.

The conventionalized shift between token reference and type reference and vice versa is ultimately grounded in the archetypical principles represented in Langacker's billiaxd ball model of linguistic interaction. Space, time, matter and energy constitute the prerequisites of interaction (cf. Langacker, 1991, 13f., 118). A specific flow of interaction results in the instantiation of discrete portions of matter which, by their own interactions, propagate the flow of energy. The essential principles contained in this image are the following: • Originally, i.e. before any flow of energy could become active, the essential parameters of space and time, namely matter and energy, constituted an UNBOUNDED potential within their domains of space and time. • The activation of energy resulted in the division into discrete material objects within distinct domains. • Depending on the objects' EXTENSION in SPACE and the degree of their compactness among the most important factors, any two or more objects are capable of transferring certain potentials of energy. • There are no two energetic interactions which axe exactly alike, as each interaction results in the objects' changing position, whereas only a small subset of apparently sufficiently similar energetic interactions effects a further change in the decompartmentalization of matter. Change is achieved either by further dividing objects or by fusing two or more discrete objects. • On the whole, however, objects change their position rather than their own constitution. In spite of their relatively stable constitution through time it is the infinite change of position of objects which effects the infinite variation of energetic interactions.

292 Representing token vs. type reference

10.1

Reference as a cross-linguistic phenomenon

As we are concerned with the conditions under which speakers refer to perceived reality, it is our aim to explain why reference to the same state of affairs is expressed by grammatically different noun phrases in different languages. Our central assumption is that universal semantic distinctions, such as the distinction between M A S S and C O U N T concepts, are distributed differently and expressed by different forms as well as to different degrees in different languages. Like Wierzbicka (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985; Wierzbicka, 1996, 381ff.) we take the grammatical structure of noun phrases as an example of the iconicity of language as a whole. The grammar of noun phrases mirrors the way in which speakers conceptualize their environment, in particular, how they come to conceive of E X T E R N A L L Y B O U N D E D and U N B O U N D E D as well as INTERNALLY C O N F I G U R E D regions to which nouns refer. Dealing with the semantics of noun phrases and the nouns which constitute their autonomous function, we make a distinction between type and token. Nouns correspond to a type concept by virtue of their autonomous meanings, i.e. irrespective of some actual use, although the inherent meaning of a word has of course been established as an abstraction of actual uses over time. Langacker refers to this as the schematic characterization of a type, and speakers store this characterization independently of its use (cf. Langacker, 1991, 55ff.). Reference only occurs when a noun is used in a grammatical construction, as in a noun phrase. For this a particular instance as the token of the type has to be mentally instantiated. In order to let the listener infer the intended reference, the speaker has to ground the instance with respect to the current discourse space, with respect to the discourse situation comprising the speakers and the immediate circumstances (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 126ff.) and with respect to the type specification of the entity. That is, the type concept has to be anchored in a specific position of the current discourse situation, whereby it becomes oriented and projected from the speaker's point of view and in relation to other concepts.

The functional

10.2

unity of reference

293

The functional unity of reference

Basically, the conceptualization of entities to which nouns refer relies on three characteristics (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985, 335): • UNBOUNDEDNESS v s . BOUNDEDNESS

• arbitrary vs. non-arbitrary divisibility • pragmatically relevant vs. non-relevant countability These characteristics determine whether an entity is conceptualized as a BOUNDED or UNBOUNDED region either inherently replicable or n o n replicable, and whether this region is conceptualized as HOMOGENEOUS and thereby divisible, or as HETEROGENEOUS and non-divisible. Describing a noun in terms of these characteristics, which are directly and systematically motivated by the pragmatically founded conceptualization, stands in opposition to the opinion of many linguists who claim that the division between COUNT and MASS nouns is largely arbitrary or even does not exist at all. This opinion is defended for instance by Pelletier (cf. Pelletier, 1979, 5) or by Ware's metaphor of the "universal grinder" (cf. Ware, 1979, 26). The following citation is most characteristic of this position: "... countability is not in fact a characteristic of nouns per se, but of noun phrases; thus it is associated with nouns in syntagmata, not with nouns as lexical entries." (Allan, 1980, 546) This position is in conflict with the theoretical and empirical assumption of the relative autonomy of the semantics of nouns, this implying some inherent disposition which is, of course, subject to contextual change. Wierzbicka adheres to the scientific paradigm of the latter assumption (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985, 335). She gives an intuitively appealing account of the non-arbitrariness of this division. We assume the following definitions which Langacker gives for the distinction between COUNT and MASS nouns (cf. Langacker, 1987b, 63): • A COUNT noun designates a region that is bounded within the scope of predication in its primary domain.

294 Representing token vs. type reference • A MASS noun designates a region that is not specifically bounded within the scope of predication in its primary domain. The primary domain of an entity is that domain in which instantiation of its type is most likely to occur, as for instance in SPACE or TIME, and on which the entity is marked with respect to bounding. It is also in the primary domain that quantification occurs which may effect SPATIAL a n d TEMPORAL b o u n d i n g .

Langacker's definitions apply to lexical meanings and do not exclude a bounding or unbounding at the level of the NP, i.e. the distinction between COUNT and MASS may be referentially revised. The definitions imply that COUNT nouns are inherently bounded and thereby individuated at the lexical level. It is for this reason that speakers can conceptualize several instances of a COUNT entity and express this fact by the plural inflection. In a representation of several bounded entities speakers can pass the boundary of one COUNT entity and access an image of another one. For MASS nouns, however, they cannot conceptualize a boundary on their own, hence they cannot conceptualize several instances of a MASS, and a MASS may not be individuated without additional linguistic means. The way of conceptualizing entities as regions relies partly on iconic principles which are universal. To a great extent, however, the conceptualization of entities relies on iconic principles which are languagespecific, because different language communities have different cultures. This means that speakers of different languages deal with their environment in different ways, as may be observed, for instance, with the perception of granularity, i.e. the size of particles constituting a HETEROGENEOUS MASS. Examples are oats and wheat corresponding to German Hafer and Weizen, and this data corresponding to German diese Daten. Likewise the perception of boundaries which cannot be changed without violating the behaviour or function of the respective entity (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985, 313) differs between languages. These different perceptions emerge from differing pragmatic relevance related to the same state of affairs in different language communities. Thus speakers of different languages conceptualize the same state of affairs differently in terms of the area it occupies in its primary domain. The definition that COUNT entities occupy BOUNDED regions must be interpreted in a relaxed way. Even in the CONCRETE, physical

The functional

unity of reference

295

domain there exist nouns like horizon which are BOUNDED rather by the criterion of their common function than by their shape. The criterion of a common function also holds for discrete instances of a COLLECTIVE COUNT noun like team, the members of which obviously do not cover a continuously extended region and therefore axe not bounded on behalf of their structural interconnections (cf. Langacker, 1987b, 61). MASS nouns may b e divided into HOMOGENEOUS and HETERO-

GENEOUS. HOMOGENEITY has always been explained as referring to "arbitrary divisibility" (cf. Link, 1983; Bunt, 1985): a HOMOGENEOUS entity, such as water or butter, may be arbitrarily divided into smaller parts without ceasing to exist as the substance it was before, i.e. the concepts of such nouns do not lose their function by being divided. This does not hold for COUNT entities, since these would no longer fulfil their function if cut into pieces. COUNT entities are not arbitrarily divisible, since they are HETEROGENEOUS and DISCRETE. These characteristics also hold for MASS nouns which have traditionally been called "pluralia tantum", such as the nouns furniture, vegetable, cutlery, kitchenware. The concepts to which these nouns refer subsume a COLLECTION of different individuals, i.e. although they are similar - not identical - in function, they are not similar with regard to their gestalt. This makes "pluralia tantum" different from other MASS nouns, which may have a marked COLLECTIVE reading, such as grass, grain, hair. Under normal conditions these nouns axe conceptualized as HOMOGENEOUS on the basis of their analogous function and gestalt properties. From some unusual perspective grass, grain, hair might be considered as HETEROGENEOUS MASSES w i t h DISCRETE particles, for

instance, if one counts grains which have the function of seeds, or if one counts the strands of someone's hair in order to have a measure of the density. If speakers take this perspective then, they conceptualize t h e MASS as COLLECTIVE, i.e. as b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d of a COLLECTION

of identical individuals. In a strictly objective sense no MASS is really HOMOGENEOUS: this characterization is rather what speakers conceive at a level of abstraction which is adequate for their interaction with the MASS (cf. Langacker, 1987b, 65). Thus, at a pragmatically relevant level of abstraction, grass may be divided indefinitely into subparts, but will remain grass. Different instances of cutlery, furniture etc., however, cannot be conceptualized as HOMOGENEOUS nor as COLLECTIVE with

296 Representing token vs. type reference at any level of abstraction, because they lack the analogy in gestalt and function. Therefore, a situation in which speakers would count different instances of furniture cannot arise. Instead, speakers would count the hyponyms which are all EXTERNALLY BOUNDED, as for instance chairs, wardrobes, desks. To summarize, there are three ways in which M A S S nouns may be characterized with respect to their INTERNAL CONFIGURATION. These characteristics determine the countability of entities in semantic terms (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985, 321): ANALOGOUS M E M B E R S

1. For M A S S entities conceptualized exclusively as H O M O G E N E O U S there exists no possibility of counting them without additional linguistic means. They have no "built-in modes of distinguishing their reference" (Quine, 1960, 91), i.e. countability is not lexicalized. These M A S S nouns can, however, adopt the criteria of distinctness, identity and particularity if they occur in the respective grammatical constructions (cf. Lehrer, 1986; Allan, 1977). In some cases the identifying function has already been subsumed by the M A S S SO that this is only overtly identified if there is some specific purpose for partitioning it by some conventionalized form or function, as expressed by a partitive in a piece of butter, a glass of water. In other cases the subsumed identifying function need not be overtly expressed (cf. Laycock, 1975), as in a beer, please. 2.

For C O L L E C T I V E M A S S entities comprised of different individuals, such as furniture, there exists no relevant perspective from which relatively course-grained HOMOGENEOUS M A S S E S may be counted.

3. MASSES axe normally conceptualized as HOMOGENEOUS, but may in exceptional cases also be conceptualized as a COLLECTIVE entity comprising identical individuals, such as grain. There may thus arise a perspective, albeit pragmatically unusual, from which they may be counted (cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1988a; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1988b; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1992; Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1995b). Based on our conceptual type hierarchy, as developed in section 6.1 above, our three types of M A S S nouns have the lexical entries represented in figure 10.1.

Reference

AGGR

furniture

[ E X T E R N A L BOUNDING

MASS

[INTERNAL CONFIGURATION

HOMOGENEOUS

297

NOMPRED

AGGR

gram

EXTERNAL BOUNDING

MASS

INTERNAL CONFIGURATION

HETEROGEN

COMPLEX

COLLECTIVE

NOMPRED

AGGR

10.3

of a type

NOMPRED

butter

Figure

to an instance

E X T E R N A L BOUNDING

MASS

INTERNAL CONFIGURATION

HOMOGENEOUS

10.1:

Three different types of

MASS

nouns

Reference to an instance of a type

In this section we compare the expression of type reference vs. token reference in English and German. Whereas in German individuated as well as non-individuated entities may be designated by definite NPs, only individuated entities may be so designated in English (cf. Hawkins, 1980); non-individuated entities are designated by the bare construction. This contrast is shown in sentences (10.3), (10.4), and (10.5): (10.3)

Wasser ist natürlich.

=ί> Water is natural.

(10.4)

Das Wasser in der Tasse ist

schmutzig.

The water in the cup is dirty. (10.5)

(Das) Wasser ist unverzichtbar Water is indispensable

for

für die

Menschheit.

humanity.

In order to individuate a specific part out of an inherently U N B O U N D E D M A S S concept, this specific part has to be identified, as the water in the cup in example (10.4) (cf. Hawkins, 1988). For an entity to be identified from a description in a context means that there is some function which yields a single reference from a description in a given utterance (cf. Croft, 1985). More specifically, this function consists in a restriction: restrictive modification of an U N B O U N D E D M A S S results

298 Representing token vs. type reference in identification of a particular part of this MASS, as in example (10.4) (cf. Lyons, 1980, 81ff.). The identity of what is talked about is fixed by narrowing the scope of the description. In contrast to this, the inherent UNBOUNDEDNESS of t h e MASS is preserved if t h e MASS entity has no

modifier, as in example (10.3), or if the modifier is not successful in narrowing scope, a situation which holds for non-restrictive modifiers as in example (10.5), as we explain below (cf. Bunt, 1985, 97). In sentence (10.4) the definite article expresses that out of the inherently UNBOUNDED MASS designated by water the quantity which is contained in the cup is picked out as being dirty (cf. Platteau, 1980, 114). This quantification results from the PP-modifier. Quantification and modification are semantically closely related (cf. Bunt, 1985, 197) in that they enable the instantiation of a type concept. That is to say, a token of a type is thereby located at a particular position within the current discourse space available to both speaker and hearer. A token is distinguished from all other instances of the respective type through the particular space which this token occupies. Modification, however, only applies to an unquantified instance (cf. Langacker, 1991, 158f.). Modification narrows down the possible type space to be instantiated in relation to the ground. Grounding is achieved by TENSE, ASPECT, MODALITY, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e TIME O F DISCOURSE a n d t o t h e p r e -

supposed knowledge on the part of the listener. Thus, there is a scale on which adjectives and nominale may be ordered with respect to the extent to which their semantic behaviour is compatible with grounding quantifiers such as these, those, any. Take, for instance, the adjectives current, mutual, last, latest: these axe UNGRADABLE ABSOLUTE adjectives and are actually very close to, even cross-classifying with quantifiers. The following nominale provide a certain measure for individuating a MASS concept: a pile of books, a sort of oil, a way of ironing, a cup of sugar, an extract of peppermint, a lack of petrol. All of these nominals have lost most of their original semantic force in these constructions through having been reduced to the grammatical function of quantification (cf. Langacker, 1991, 88). In (10.5) the adjective phrase predicates an evaluation of the subject NP, and together with the copulative use of be this predication is maximally schematic as to its EXTENSION in TIME, i.e. it predicates a STATIVE relation from which a HABITUAL sentence meaning is inferred,

Reference to an instance of a type 299 and the subject NP thereby refers to a totality, this requiring the bare NP in English. In German, on the other hand, reference to the totality of an inherent type may be compelled by using the definite article, the latter having the function of ruling out any exceptional instance. Let us now illustrate how the speaker is successful in the individuation of M A S S entities. We assume that a listener - following a conversational principle (cf. Declerck, 1986, 87) - tends to interpret German definite NPs with MASS nouns as GENERIC if they do not find any semantic modifiers of the MASS noun which result in a different interpretation. That is, the listener interprets definite NPs with MASS nouns as GENERIC by default unless semantically restrictive constituents yield a contrasting interpretation. In Germanic languages the unmarked identifying function of the definite article is the determination of C O U N T nouns. On the basis of their inherent BOUNDEDNESS at the lexical level speakers can conceptualize several instances of a COUNT entity and express this with the plural form, as in sentence (10.6): (10.6)

Die Zahlen sind ähnlich. The figures are similar.

In German the unmarked GENERIC function of the definite article is its grounding of M A S S nouns. Due to their EXTERNAL UNBOUNDEDNESS MASS nouns are CUMULATIVE, i.e. different amounts of the same M A S S are conceptualized as being arbitrarily unifiable without changing their meaning (cf. Quine, 1960, 91; Bunt, 1985, 46; Link, 1983). Examples of CONCRETE MASS nouns axe water, milk, vegetable, furniture; examples of ABSTRACT M A S S nouns are danger, industry, information, costs. As speakers cannot conceptualize any boundary of a MASS entity on its own, they cannot conceptualize several instances of it, and a M A S S entity cannot be individuated without additional linguistic means. Following Bunt (cf. Bunt, 1985, 197) we assume that semantically non-restrictive modifiers, as exemplified in ( 1 0 . 2 1 ) - (10.23) in section 10.4.3 below, do not affect the UNBOUNDED extension of M A S S entities, because they are themselves conceptualized as UNBOUNDED. They only have the function of an additional commentary comparable to Declerck's "predicational" sentences (cf. Declerck, 1986, 153).

300 Representing token vs. type reference Restrictive modifiers, as exemplified in ( 1 0 . 2 4 ) to ( 1 0 . 2 5 ) in section 1 0 . 4 . 3 below, however, fix the conceptualization of a specific part of the MASS entity, as they themselves embody the property of BOUNDEDNESS. Sentence ( 1 0 . 7 ) is an example of the default grounding of a MASS noun. Here the German definite article has its unmarked GENERIC function, because the MASS noun is not semantically modified, i.e. not restricted: (10.7)

Die Industrie entwickelt sich. Industry is developing.

In the following we will see how differently BOUNDED modifiers are prerequisite for the grounding of an instance of the MASS.

10.4

Reference in different valency relations

Following Langacker we assume that the categorization of COUNT VS. MASS pertaining inherently to an entity occurs in its primary domain. In contrast to this it is the scope of predication that speakers impose on the inherent concept which determines whether they are referring to a type or a token, i.e. whether the designated entity is situated within the scope of their predication or whether it extends indefinitely beyond. This is exemplified by two contrasting uses of the M A S S noun water. In ( 1 0 . 8 ) the scope of predication ranges over the whole extension of water, i.e. over all actual as well as all potential occurrences of water. However, in ( 1 0 . 9 ) speakers take the potential extension of water as the base and impose on it an immediate scope of predication, which comprises only the water of the river Rhine. This difference in the scope of predication then results in the identification of an entity by reference to the token of an inherently UNBOUNDED entity. (10.8)

Water is indispensable for human beings.

(10.9)

The water of the Rhine is dirty.

In contrast to this a GENERIC interpretation results from referring to the type of an entity. Bare plural NPs dominating COUNT nouns may also result in unbounding the inherent BOUNDEDNESS of COUNT nouns. Here we can take Bolinger's example (cf. Bolinger, 1967, 181FF.):

Reference in different valency relations 301 (10.10)

Airlines charge too much.

In 10.10 GENERIC reference is expressed as a result of the speakers' broadening their perspective to grasp an indefinite extension of instances as being representatives of the whole kind of the entity referred to. We now turn to relational predications interconnecting the profiled regions of nominal predications. As we have pointed out in section 6.2.2 above, relational predications axe profiled by verbs, adjectives and prepositions (cf. Langacker, 1987b, 69). According to Langacker relational predications axe conceptualized as being dependent on the entities they interrelate. The increasing schematicity of relational predications at the level of the lexicon is undeniably true. This is not in conflict with our assumption that at a higher compositional level these relational predications can affect the default reference of nominals. The speakers' interpretation of genericity is captured by default rules. Here we follow the line generally taken by artificial intelligence, where default logic is one of the main strategies for interpreting generic statements (cf. e.g. Morreau, 1988; Schubert and Pelletier, 1988; McDermott and Doyle, 1980; Reiter, 1980). There seems to exist a preference order among the modifiers of MASS nouns. This order corresponds to their degree of restricting or preserving the unbounded extension of a MASS, i.e. the order derives from their strength in modifying the referential function of MASS nouns. 10-4-1 Bounding an instance by PP modification Let us briefly consider the effect which prepositional phrases have on the speakers' conceptualization of nominal predications. Prepositions are relational predications, since they profile a relation between two parts of a scene: they localize the trajector with respect to some presupposed landmark. These localizations axe not arbitrary but have to accord with the valency relations of prepositions. Take, for instance, a three-dimensional CONTAINER, as in (10.11) for which the attributevalue matrix underneath represents the valency relation.

302 Representing (10.11)

token vs. type reference

Das Wasser in der Tasse ist

schmutzig.

The water in the cup is dirty. [ATEMP REL

"water TR

PP

LM

INCLUSION] NOM P R E D

AGGR

[

GROUNDING

DEFINITE

SCOPE

TOKEN

cup

NOMPRED

AGGR

EXTERN BOUND

MASS

INTERN C O N G I G

HOMOGEN

•

EXTERN BOUND

COUNT

INTERN C O N F I G

HETEROGEN

COMPLEX

CONTAIN

GROUNDING

DEFINITE

SCOPE

TOKEN

•

Here the inherently UNBOUNDED extension of water is BOUNDED to that held in the cup, which provides the L M in which the quantified instance of water is contained. It is impossible to relate an UNBOUNDED T R to a BOUNDED LM, hence the following sentence is impossible. (10.12)

* Water in the cup is dirty.

Only if a proper name elaborates the L M may the UNBOUNDED extension of a MASS be preserved. This is, for example, the case with proper names designating a PROVENANCE or a LOCATION which merely achieve an additional commentary. Thus, in the following sentences a new UNBOUNDED extension is created as represented underneath: (10.13)

Das Wasser im, Mittelmeer Water in the Mediterranean [ATEMP REL

water TR PP

AGGR

INCLUSION NOM P R E D EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG INDEFINITE

SCOPE

TYPE •

AGGR GROUNDING

schmutzig.

is dirty.

GROUNDING

Mediterranean LM

ist

MASS HOMOGEN

0

NOMPRED EXTERN BOUND INTERN C O N F I G COMPLEX DEFINITE

•

UNIQUE Ξ HETEROGEN CONTAIN

Reference in different valency relations 10.4-2

303

Bounding an instance by verbal predication

The unmarked meaning of verbs, signalled by the verb stem, implies change over time. The morphological derivation of past participles involves the profiling of a final state of the base process. From this a STATIVE predication results (cf. Langacker, 1987b, 69). With the morphological derivation of the progressive aspect in English, the speaker intends to restrict the listener's attention to the immediate scope of predication, namely to that P E R I O D of the base process which coincides with the time of reference. In this P E R I O D the mental image of scanning the component states in summaxy fashion means that the process becomes represented as extending HOMOGENEOUSLY beyond the time of reference. Logically (cf. Eynde, 1987; Dowty, 1979) as well as cognitively, the distinction between the P E R F E C T I V E and I M P E R F E C T I V E aspect is analogous to the distinction between C O U N T and M A S S : just as entities cover a BOUNDED region profiled by the noun, the component states of a P E R F E C T I V E situation cover a B O U N D E D time span (cf. Langacker, 1987b, 80ff.). That is, whereas for prototypical nouns C O N C R E T E physical space is the primary domain where bounding occurs, for verbs it is the domain of T I M E where change occurs. Just as a M A S S noun expresses UNBOUNDEDNESS, the present progressive expresses I M P E R FECTIVITY. It profiles a situation which extends indefinitely beyond the beginning and end of the time of reference, as in (10.14). In contrast to this the simple present expresses P E R F E C T I V I T Y , profiling a situation as BOUNDED, namely as that period which coincides with the time of reference, as in (10.15). (10.14)

The plane is flying above the clouds.

(10.15)

The plane takes o f f .

The aspect of the verb also determines the scope of predication. Accordingly, type reference of a subject nominalization, the primary domain of which is T I M E , results from I M P E R F E C T I V I T Y of the verbal predicate, whereas token reference of a subject nominalization usually results from the P E R F E C T I V E aspect of the verb, which then fulfils its unmarked function of designating change over time. Relative clauses modifying M A S S nouns have greatest influence in affecting the referential function of the noun. They are therefore pre-

304 Representing token vs. type reference ferred over all other modifiers in the interpretation of an entity's B O U N D EDNESS and hence rank highest in the preference list of default rules. A relative clause inherits the value of its E X T E N S I O N in T I M E from its verbal predication. According to Vendler's classification (cf. Vendler, 1967) verbs are B O U N D E D in T I M E if they express an A C H I E V E M E N T or an A C C O M P L I S H M E N T of some state of affairs (cf. Langacker, 1987b). A C C O M P L I S H M E N T S predicate situations which are conceptualized as developing towards either the terminal point or the terminal phase. A C H I E V E M E N T S profile a situation as already having reached this terminal point or phase (cf. Dowty, 1979). In (10.16) the inherent UNB O U N D E D N E S S of the M A S S entity referred to by information is narrowed by the relative clause to that amount which holds for a specific period of time. In this case the A C H I E V E M E N T verb liefern ("deliver") is the condition for bounding. Thus, a portion of the M A S S entity is identified contextually, hence the definite NP in English. The semantic conditions in terms of the inheritance of features during the composition of a valency relation are represented in the attribute-value matrix below the example: (10.16)

Die Information,

die geliefert wird ...

The information

which is delivered ...

information TR NP

AGGR GROUNDING SCOPE

LM

NOM P R E D EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEXITY DEFINITE TOKEN •

deliver

TEMPPRED

TIME

[BOUNDED

ACHIEV

MASS HETEROGEN INDIVIDUAL

E]

In contrast to this, T E M P O R A L L Y U N B O U N D E D relative clauses modifying M A S S nouns preserve the inherent U N B O U N D E D N E S S of the M A S S noun and in this context a German definite NP expresses G E N E R I C meaning, hence the bare construction in English: (10.17)

Die Industrie, die entwickelt wird, braucht

Unterstützung.

Industry which is being developed needs support.

Reference in different valency relations 305 In (10.17), the DURATIVE aspect of the relative clause, which implies that the beginning and end of the situation is UNBOUNDED in relation to the time of reference (cf. Comrie, 1976, 33ff.), is a condition for the preservation of the UNBOUNDED extension of the MASS concept. We represent these relations in the following attribute-value matrix. 'industry

TR NP

LM

NOM P R E D [ E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG [COMPLEX

AGGR GROUNDING

INDEFINITE

SCOPE

TYPE

develop

TEMPPRED

TIME

[UNBOUND

ASPECT

DURATIVE

MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

•

ACCOMPL Ξ

In contrast to this, the PERFECTIVE aspect of a relative clause, the completion which the action has with respect to the reference time, results in BOUNDING and in selecting a COUNT entity grounded by definiteness, as exemplified in sentence (10.18). The attribute-value matrix represents the semantic relations composed in (10.18). (10.18)

Die Industrie, die entwickelt worden ist, braucht weiterhin Unterstützung. The industry which has been developed needs further support. industry TR

GROUNDING

NP

SCOPE

LM

10.4-3

AGGR

NOM P R E D EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX DEFINITE TOKEN E

develop

TEMPPRED

TIME

[EB O U N E D

ASPECT

PERFECTIVE

COUNT HETEROGEN INDIV

ACCOMPL] 0

Bounding an instance by adjective modification

Adjectives are also semantically UNBOUNDED or BOUNDED. In order to be able to determine the BOUNDEDNESS implied by the meaning of adjectives we have to take up again the points made in section 6.2.2. In the same way as for any other predicate the meaning of an adjective,

306 Representing token vs. type reference such as interesting, is characterized by a conjunction of the basic cognitive d o m a i n s , such as ABSTRACTION, TIME, ATTITUDE, GRADATION,

which constitute the range of the conceptual potential of the respective predication (cf. Langacker, 1987a, 147ff.). Different basic domains of an adjective, such as its TIME or its GRADATION, can themselves be BOUNDED or UNBOUNDED, and thus have a bounding or unbounding effect on the MASS noun they modify. Semantically UNBOUNDED adjectives, such as slow, strong, similar, characteristic, preserve the UNBOUNDED extension of MASS entities, whereas semantically BOUNDED

adjectives, such as hidden, culminating, electronic, preceding, result in a restriction of the MASS to the particular amount predicated by the adjective, so that reference to a token occurs, as in (10.19) and (10.20). The bounding effect supports our general assumption that modifiers of MASS nouns can be ordered according to the strength of their restrictions on the MASS concept. In the TEMPORAL domain adjectives may be UNBOUNDED if predicating a STATIVE property or if predicating an ACTIVITY, both extending indefinitely beyond the beginning and end of the time of reference. Adjectives may be BOUNDED if making a predication about something having been achieved or having resulted. In t h e d o m a i n of GRADATION a p r o p e r t y m a y be G RAD ABLE, i.e. de-

pending on the respective context, a property may take different values on a graded scale; or it may be NON-GRADABLE, i.e. it may represent an absolute property, the extension of which cannot be changed. With these bounding and unbounding properties adjectives provide for the grounding of a nominal and thereby determine the referent. The comparison which is expressed by the superlative has greatest strength and hence is preferred over all other semantically restrictive values of adjectives in bounding a MASS concept. It fixes the conceptualization of the MASS entity among all possible realizations to that degree of the property designated by the adjective and only this degree, as in sentence (10.19) (cf. Bierwisch, 1989, 187). In this case the result is the unique identification, achieved through the shift to the lexicalized COUNT sense, which is grounded by a definite NP in English, as indicated by the following example and the representation underneath.

Reference in different valency relations (10.19)

307

Die interessanteste Industrie entwickelt sich. The most interesting industry is developing. 'industry

TR NP

AGGR GROUNDING .SCOPE

LM

-

NOM P R E D "EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG ^COMPLEX

C O U N T [D HETEROGEN INDIV

DEFINITE TOKEN

Ξ

interesting

ATEMPREL

ATTTITUDE

[COMPARISON

SUPERLATIVE E J

N O N - G R A D A B L E adjectives, such as adequate, sufficient, genuine, have a similar although weaker effect in modifying M A S S nouns. The fact that they are also called "absolute" adjectives implies that they either do or do not apply to an entity; there exists only one realization of them. That is, N O N - G R A D A B L E adjectives axe conceptualized as having sharp boundaries dividing them from their surroundings and thus result in a restriction of the UNBOUNDED extension of a MASS. In (10.20) the adjective systembezogen ("system-related"), results in the identification of that portion of the M A S S with the absolute property which is grounded by the definite article in English. The inheritance relations of this semantic restriction are represented in the matrix.

(10.20)

Die systembezogene Information fehlt. =Φ· The system-related information is lacking. "information TR

AGGR GROUNDING SCOPE

NP

LM

'system-related GRADATION

•

NOM P R E D E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG

MASS HOMOGEN

DEFINITE TOKEN

Ε

ATEMPREL NONGRAD

0

There are, however, N O N - G R A D A B L E adjectives which stand out as non-typical when modifying a MASS noun. These are typical examples of Kamp's "predicative" adjectives "whose extensions axe not affected by the nouns with which they axe combined" (cf. Kamp, 1975, 124f.) and which do not result in a delimitation of a M A S S entity. In (10.21),

308 Representing token vs. type reference for instance, by choosing a LOCATIONAL adjective, speakers merely make an additional commentary to the inherently unbounded entity and thus create a new U N B O U N D E D M A S S (cf. Langacker, 1991, 5 9 ) . (10.21)

Die europäische Industrie entwickelt sich. =Φ·

European industry is developing. industry TR

AGGR GROUNDING

NP

SCOPE European LM

NOM P R E D E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX INDEFINITE TYPE 0 ATEMPREL UNBOUND STATE

TIME GRADATION

MASS HETEROGEN COLLECTIVE

[LOC

SPATIAL Q ] ] j

NONGRAD

The same holds for P R O V E N A N C E adjectives modifying M A S S nouns. P R O V E N A N C E adjectives denote a specific origin. The M A S S entity with a specific origin is conceptualized as a new U N B O U N D E D M A S S , as exemplified and represented in the following: (10.22)

Die kognitive Linguistik löst das Problem. Cognitive linguistics solves the problem,. linguistics TR

AGGR GROUNDING

NP

SCOPE cognitive LM

TIME

NOM P R E D E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX INDEFINITE TYPE Ξ

MASS HETEROGEN COLLECTIVE

ATEMPREL UNBOUND STATE

LOC

PROVENANCE

m]

Both LOCATIONAL and P R O V E N A N C E adjectives denote a specific subdomain and thus result in what Dahl (cf. Dahl, 1988) calls "inherited genericity". Inherited genericity holds if a certain subdomain is introduced for the respective entity. Subdomains are divided into neatly defined regions to which the reference of the respective expressions is defined in terms of a context-independent standardization. The referential variation of terms is thus excluded from the beginning. This makes

Reference in different valency relations 309 them compatible with proper names, and LOCATIONAL and P R O V E NANCE adjectives do, in fact, fall under the class of proper names. So rigid designators, the truth conditions of which are so difficult to discover for natural kind terms, 2 subsume both proper names and terms. Both PROVENANCE and LOCATIONAL modifiers "have no impact on the type specification, representing instead an editorial comment by the speaker" (Langacker, 1991, 59). GRADABLE adjectives also preserve the UNBOUNDEDNESS of MASS entities in the unmaxked case: (10.23)

Interessante Informationen

fehlen.

Interesting information is lacking. 'INFORMATION

NOM P R E D [EXTERN BOUND

TR

INTERN CONFIG GROUNDING

LM

"]"] MASS HOMOGEN

INDEFINITE

SCOPE

T Y P E HL

INTERETING

ATEMPREL

GRADATION SCOPE

GRADABLE E] TYPE

J

J

This is so because GRADABLE properties, without being contextually fixed by a conventional standard of comparison, are vague with respect to their degree of realization on a contextually graded scale (cf. Dowty, 1979, 88; Kamp, 1975). GRADABLE adjectives such as interesting are CUMULATIVE and axe therefore classified as MASS adjectives (cf. Bunt, 1985, 199). Note that the type reference in sentences (10.21) - (10.23) does not carry Declerck's "exhaustiveness implicature" (cf. Declerck, 1986, 153FF.), which can only be associated with the N P by an identifying sentence. Moreover, these type readings illustrate Declerck's statement that UNBOUNDEDNESS does not imply infiniteness, but instead only means that "there is no reference to a bound" (Declerck, 1986, 172). In sentences (10.21) and (10.22) the adjective types denote a conventionalized property space, and by modifying the MASS entity they yield a new conventionalized unit. This is comparable to habitual predications which yield GENERIC interpretations (cf. Declerck, 1986; Carlson, 1982). 2

Cf. Putnam's notion of rigid designator, which was intended as a hypothesis about the epistemological status of human knowledge about naturell kind terms (cf. Putnam, 1975).

310 Representing token vs. type reference Again, this is the default case for the modification of MASS nouns by G R A D A B L E adjectives. At least two G R A D A B L E adjective types behave differently, however. MODAL adjectives which are DEONTIC by expressing an obligation restrict the MASS to exactly that partition about which speakers express their will: (10.24)

Die notwendige Information fehlt. The necessary information is lacking. 'information

-

EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG

IPNN AIJUN

TR NP

GROUNDING

DEFINITE

SCOPE

TOKEN

necessary LM

•

NOM P R E D MASS HOMOGEN

•

AT E M P R E L

ATTITUDE

MODALITY

[DEONTIC

OBLIGATION!!]]

Another example of token reference through COMPARISON is given in sentence ( 1 0 . 2 5 ) . By taking a R E P L I C A T E instance of figures and comparing them with each other, IDENTIFICATION of the figures occurs, which is expressed by the definite article in English. The scope of the COMPARISON adjective is left covert in this example: (10.25)

Die Zahlen sind ähnlich. 'Zahlen

The figures are similar.

NOM P R E D "EXTERN B O U N D

AGGR

TR

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

GROUNDING SCOPE

[

LM

MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

DEFINITE TOKEN

Ξ

similar

ATEMPREL

ATTITUDE

C O M P A R I S O N U]

In contrast to this the LOCATIONAL adjective European which is a constituent of the NP has greater force in leaving the reference of the N P UNBOUNDED:

(10.26)

Die europäischen Zahlen sind ähnlich. European figures are similar.

Type reference to prototypes NOM PRED

Zahlen

EXTERN BOUND AG GR

TR

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

GROUNDING s

2nd LM

MASS HETEROGEN COLLECT

DEFINITE

SCOPE LM

311

TYPE Ε

European

ATEMPREL

UNBOUNDED

[STATE

LOCATIONitn]

similar

ATEMPREL

UNBOUNDED

[ATTITUDE

COMPARISON El]

In attributive function C O M P A R I S O N adjectives such as similar and comparable axe lexically vague and therefore do not provide reference to a boundary, as in the following example: (10.27)

Vergleichbare Informationen Comparable information 'information TR

GROUNDING SCOPE

NP

LM

10.5

AGGR

comparable ATTITUDE

fehlen.

is lacking.

NOM P R E D EXTERN BOUND INTERN CONFIG INDEFINITE T Y P E HI

MASS HOMOGEN

ATEMPREL COMPARISON H]

T y p e reference t o prototypes

We distinguish between different ways of achieving type reference to an entity dependent on its relation to the property which is attributed to the NP. By applying a contingent property to the whole class of an entity, the speaker achieves what Heyer calls "kind reference" (cf. Heyer, 1990). Type reference to an entity by default is achieved, on the other hand, by attributing either an essential or a typical property to it, if the entity is a natural kind, or by predication of a conventionalized stereotype. The latter occurs by predicating some typical property of a nominal kind which, in contrast to natural kinds, is conceptualized in the domain of social conventions (cf. Heyer, 1990, 98; Schwartz, 1977, 40; Goossens, 1977, 153f.). The following example of type reference by default is taken from Bolinger (cf. Bolinger, 1967, 181ff.):

312 Representing (10.28)

token vs. type

Fluglinien Airlines

fly

fliegen

Flugzeuge.

airplanes.

•fly

TEMPRED

TIME

[UNBOUNDED

ASPECT

HABITUAL airlines

TR

AGGR GROUNDING SCOPE airplanes

LM

reference

AGGR GROUNDING SCOPE

ACTIVITY NOM P R E D E X T E R N BOUND I N T E R N CONFIG COMPLEX INDEFINITE T Y P E IN NOMPRED E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG INDEFINITE TYPE 0

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECT

COUNT HETEROGEN

The condition for type reference by default in (10.28) is that the A C T I V ITY of flying airplanes is a "quasi-essential" property which a speaker usually has in mind when talking about airlines. Moreover, in (10.28) reference to a type is supported by the H A B I T U A L A S P E C T of the verb phrase, which preserves the U N B O U N D E D interpretation of the N P by default, i.e. if no conflicting conditions are present the bare construction is used, as represented in the matrix. Still, the property of flying aircraft is not necessarily related to an airline: there may, for instance, be the very unusual situation in which an airline has sold all of its planes and is waiting for new ones to be delivered. In (10.29) the contingent predication achieves the grounding of a subset of airlines. As we see, the distinction between token reference by the attribution of a contingent property and type reference by default is mirrored by the grammatical structure of language: in (10.28) the bare construction is obligatory in both English and German, while in (10.29) deflniteness is obligatory. (10.29)

Die Fluglinien lassen wieder Flugzeuge =Φ· The airlines fly airplanes again.

fliegen.

Type reference to prototypes 'fly again

TEMPRED

TIME

[UNBOUNDED

ASPECT

INCHOATIVE

ACTIVITY] NOM PRED

'airlines

EXTERN B O U N D AGQR

TR

INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX

GROUNDING

DEFINITE

SCOPE

TOKEN

airplanes

NOMPRED

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECT

•

EXTERN B O U N D

AGGR

LM

313

COUNT HETEROGEN

INTERN CONFIG

GROUNDING

INDEFINITE

SCOPE

TOKEN Ξ

The prototypical type reference is achieved by NPs in subject position: in this case the entities referred to are mentally foregrounded as the trajector and located with respect to the typical or essential property provided by the landmark, as in (10.31). (10.30)

Water is expensive.

(10.31)

Water is natural. water TR

AGGR GROUNDING

s LM

NOM PRED ("EXTERN B O U N D I INTERN CONFIG TYPE •

natural

ATEMPREL

ASPECT

HOMOGEN

INDEFINITE

SCOPE

ATTITUDE

MASS

0

MODALITY

[DEONTIC

ESSENTIAL

H ] ] j

HABITUAL EL

In both examples the trajector refers to the whole kind of water, which is profiled against the landmark. In (10.30) the landmark is the expensive commodity its costs being a contingent property. In (10.31), in contrast, a more "essential" property is predicated of water. The latter is a case of type reference to a natural kind by default which may not be overridden, in contrast to the type reference of (10.30). "Essential" properties hold for natural kinds without exception and may not change, as represented in the matrix below by bold type. (10.28) to (10.31) illustrate that in order to use nouns referring to natural and nominal kinds, speakers must know how they axe structured with respect to their essential, typical, and contingent properties.

314 Representing token vs. type reference

10.6

Type reference against the profile-base relation

The relation between profile and base is mirrored in the grammatical structure of English. That is, type reference by a D E F I N I T E NP in English expresses that the entity referred to is related to some background which functions as the base. If this relation does not exist, the baxe construction is used (cf. Bolinger, 1975, 181). As the use of the definite article generally signals that the instance referred to is known by both speaker and listener. Type reference by using the definite article in English therefore expresses that the instance is uniquely focussed on by all speech act participants. In addition, it indicates that the instance is maximally profiled with respect to the current discourse space. That is, from what the speakers know and intend to be relevant, the instantiation comprises the maximal base providing its type. Consider the following sentence taken from Bolinger (cf. Bolinger, 1975, 181):

(10.32)

The airlines charge too much (if compared to other common vehicles).

NOM P R E D

'airlines TR

s

AGGR GROUNDING SCOPE

charge LM

(10.33)

•

' E X T E R N BOUND INTERN C O N F I G COMPLEX

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECT

DEFINITE T Y P E Ε] Ξ

TENSE

TEMPPRED PRESENT •

ASPECT

HABITUAL [H

Airlines charge too much.

'airlines TR

AGGR GROUNDING

S

LM

NOM P R E D " E X T E R N BOUND INTERN CONFIG COMPLEX INDEFINITE

SCOPE

type •

charge

TEMPPRED

m

GROUNDING

PRESENT

ASPECT

HABITUAL Ü]

•

COUNT HETEROGEN COLLECT

Type reference to COUNT entities

315

By the HABITUAL A S P E C T of the predication charge the entity designated by airlines is profiled against all common vehicles currently existing, i.e. through the covert hyponymy relation, a subtype of all vehicles is referred to in ( 1 0 . 3 2 ) , as represented underneath. With the bare construction in (10.33) the speaker would refer to all airlines currently existing, and additionally to all those which have existed in the past and possibly those which may exist in the future. This is what Langacker calls GENERIC reference by default (cf. Langacker, 1991, 101), created by the indefiniteness, which occurs if no particular part is singled out by the speaker, as represented underneath (10.33).

10.7

Type reference to

entities

COUNT

GENERIC reference to a C O U N T entity is expressed by a definite N P in most European languages. In the following sentence the totality is referred to by metonymy:

(10.34)

The computer is an indispensable tool nowadays.

Here a single instance is taken to represent the whole kind of computers (cf. Bolinger, 1975, 182). This generalization is achieved by the predication of an OBLIGATION in an indefinite N P : indispensable is a MODAL adjective expressing an OBLIGATION, which in this indefinite construction results in a HABITUAL meaning inducing genericity. In addition, the secondary L M nowadays expresses the HABITUAL A S P E C T . In this way a single instance becomes representative of the whole kind: computer

NOM

AGGR TR

BOUND

INTERN

CONFIG

GROUNDING

DEFINITE

SCOPE

TYPE

[

mini

indispensable

ATEMPREL

ATTITUDE

JMODALITY

ASPECT

COUNT HETEROGEN INDIV

COMPLEX

LM

2nd LM

PRED

EXTERN

HABITUAL

nowadays

ATEMPREL

ASPECT

H A B I T U A L [1]

[DEONTIC

OBLIGATIONTH]j

[B

The indefinite article is used to express that the entity's description satisfies its prototypical or ideal concept (cf. Croft, 1985, 7- 5), or that it expresses a certain regularity or habit (cf. Krifka, 1988, 287). This

316 Representing token vs. type reference results from attributing a typical property to the whole kind of the entity (cf.Declerck, 1986, 168f.) as in the following example: (10.35)

Ein Zuschauer will etwas sehen. Un spectateur veut voir quelque chose. "A spectator wants to see something. "

In (10.35) the property predicated of the entity referred to by Zuschauer defines a stereotype in the sense of Putnam (cf. e.g. Putnam, 1975), who claims that nominal kind terms do not apply by virtue of necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, the socially shared notion of a stereotype corresponding to the nominal kind term ensures its correct application. In this case the speaker presupposes the existence of an instance as being representative, i.e. as applying in principle to every member of the type. In (10.35) the verb expresses a stereotype by the HABITUAL A S P E C T of the MODAL verb want expressing a DESIRE, similar to should be, or is meant to be (cf. Oomen, 1977, 28). spectator TR

NOM P R E D

EXTERN BOUND

COUNT

INTERN CONFIG

^HETEROGEN

GROUNDING

INDEFINITE

SCOPE "want

INDIv]

T Y P E 13 ATEMPREL

ATTITUDE

^MODALITY

ASPECT

HABITUAL

DEONTIC

DESIRE

1]

0

The attribution of stereotypes is realized in an even more straightforward manner by slogans and by what the ordinary speaker understands by the term 'stereotype': (10.36)

Kenner trinken Württemberg er. Connoisseurs drink Württemberger.

(10.37)

Frauen fahren besser Auto als Männer. Women drive better than men.

Type reference to

COUNT

entities

317

Still, the possibility that the stereotype may be changed has to be taken into consideration (cf. Heyer, 1988, 180ff.). As (10.35) refers to a stereotype, this G E N E R I C statement is true even if in Declerck's terminology the predicated typical property does not hold "inclusively" (cf. Declerck, 1986, 157f.) of all members of the set referred to by Zuschauer. Langacker (cf. Langacker, 1991, 101) adopts the notion of "genericity by default", because just as with the N O N - S P E C I F I C use of the indefinite article, in generic reference by default speakers do not uniquely determine the instance of the type concept for the listener, i.e. the type concept is instantiated in a schematic way, and listeners may arbitrarily drop any member of the schematically instantiated type. If an entity is related to a property comparable to Heyer's essential property (cf. Heyer, 1988, 180ff.), a lawlike G E N E R I C reading results. This holds "inclusively", without exception, for the whole kind, for which Carlson adopts the terms "nomic" or "gnomic" (cf. Carlson, 1982). INCLUSIVE G E N E R I C I T Y implies that speakers can infer from the predication to any individual instance of the kind as being representative of this predication. Thus INCLUSIVE G E N E R I C I T Y is achieved by the attribution of essential properties related to the entity in an analytical sense.3 As we see in (10.39), this is mirrored grammatically by definiteness in German and French. (10.38), (10.39) and (10.40) exemplify that the expression of INCLUSIVE G E N E R I C I T Y by analyticity seems to be conventionalized in a more "inclusive" way in French than in German and English. In German and English the interpretation of analyticity seems to be less inclusive and hence does not apply in (10.38) and (10.40), where indefiniteness clearly allows exceptions to the totality for which the essential property applies (cf. Winkelmann, 1980, 97): (10.38)

Zuschauer sind Menschen. Le(s) spectateur(s) est (sont) un (des) etre(s) "Spectators are human beings."

3

humain(s).

Cf. Putnam and Schwaxtz (cf. Putnam, 1977b; Schwartz, 1977), who insist on the distinction between natural and nominal kinds, because only the latter have essential properties which are analytically true and thereby represent the only G E N E R I C meaning with which speakers can make this inference from the type of an entity to each token representative without exception.

318 Representing (10.39)

token vs. type

Der Zuschauer

reference

ist ein soziales

Le(s) spectateur(s)

Wesen.

est (sont) un (des) etre(s)

social(sociaux).

"The spectator is a social being." (10.40)

Ein Zuschauer

ist ein

Le(s) spectateur(s)

Mensch.

est (sont) un (des) etre(s)

humain(s).

"A spectator is a human being." Thus we can conclude that, as fax as the generic force to be achieved for the type of a C O U N T concept is concerned, we can make a basic distinction between the predication of typical properties grounded by indefiniteness in English and German on the one hand and the predication of "quasi-analytic truths" expressed by definiteness in English and German on the other, where the predication of "quasi-analytic truths" achieves greater generic force. By the predication of typical properties speakers refer to an ideal concept.

10.8

Conclusion

In this chapter we have been concerned with how reference to a token vs. reference to a type is grammatically achieved against the lexical instantiation of a C O U N T vs. a M A S S concept. Speakers achieve this through several grammatical operations, each of which is an instance of the figure-ground principle. The type specification of a C O U N T entity depends firstly on its attribution of a typical, an essential or a contingent property. Secondly, the type specification of a C O U N T entity depends on its organization between a profile - which corresponds to its region - and a base as the necessary background against which the region is profiled. Thirdly, the type specification of a C O U N T entity depends on the organization between trajector and landmark. In contrast to this, the specification of a M A S S entity as type or token is mainly organized by means of modifying predications which impose their inherently B O U N D I N G or UNBOUNDING force on the M A S S .

Chapter 11 General conclusions and perspectives The overall concern of this work has been to investigate the integration of referential information into the listener's conceptual knowledge representation system as well as the adaptation of their existing knowledge to newly encountered information. We investigated this issue on the basis of how speakers organize the relevant parts of mental models into coherent relations in figure-ground representations. The following abilities allow speakers to achieve these representations: • the socially distributed ability to select a sense of a lexical unit, referring to a particular component of the discourse domain and providing essential coherence relations by its integration; • the ability to configure a constant value from a schematic disposition of vagueness; • the ability to instantiate a token from a type MASS and, vice versa, of generalizing from an individual token to a generic type; • the ability to focus on different reference points as region as a W H O L E ;

PARTS

of a

• most importantly, we have operationalized the conditions under which P A R T - W H O L E relations of one and the same referent develop into relations between different functionally autonomous referents which then induce the lexicalization of different senses; • finally, we have seen how speakers lexicalize senses with the investigation of the development of metonymy within domains and metaphor across domains as two complementary stages of one and the same problem-solving activity.

320 General conclusions and perspectives

11.1

Achievements of this work

Within our interdisciplinary approach we investigated the main issues within a broader theoretical context by considering psychological theories of reference, psycholinguistic results, as well as major discussions of the philosophy of language and mind. We rejected the generative definition of creativity as residing in the distinction between a finite linguistic competence and an infinite linguistic performance. Instead, we favoured the idea of creativity residing in conceptual vagueness as a principled condition enabling reference to an infinite multitude of discrete linguistic states. The relation between conceptual vagueness and referential identification requires a philosophically sound methodology. Firstly, we rejected any kind of reductionism and dualism. Linguistic processing is interactive in that different levels axe much more processed in parallel rather than sequentially. Speakers achieve a reconciliation between conceptual knowledge and referential information through their collectively achieved intersubjectification: the semiosis of meaning consists in the speakers' constructively transcending their empirical knowledge. The hypothesis was made that speakers achieve this by adjusting their relational concepts to their perceived referents on the one hand, and by integrating the fairly autonomous concepts into their mental models of the discourse situation on the other. This integration is blocked, however, if listeners encounter conflicting values which they may perfectly reconcile by transcending their empirical knowledge by way of non-monotonic reasoning strategies. This allows for the flexible processing of metonymies and metaphors. In section 2.8 and section 9.5 we demonstrated this flexible processing with Nunberg's ham sandwich use, the meaning of which may be derived abductively by means of image-schemata. This drastic case of ad hoc metonymy exemplifies the principle underlying the relation between conceptual vagueness and referential identification: lexical meanings have to be necessarily enhanced with indexical components in each particular discourse situation in order to achieve referential discreteness. These indexical components guarantee the continuity of reference, within which one word may be associated with infinitely many reference-point constructions which arise from different perspectives

Perspectives

321

on the same referent. As we have seen, these referential variations may eventually change into semantic variations. Thus lexical vagueness may ultimately enable polysemy. This model of the speakers' constructively transcending their empirical knowledge implies the defeasibility of sense: we have demonstrated this issue in our implementation in that a semantic assumption may be defeated on the next higher level of organization if a contextually conflicting value requires an adjustment. Furthermore, we have pointed out that the listeners' constructive transcendence of empirical knowledge also consists in just concentrating on the relevant components of knowledge and thereby ignoring the irrelevant components. This constructive reduction of information is complemented, as we have shown, by inferring additionally relevant information which has not been explicitly mentioned but which nevertheless is an essential ingredient of the discourse situation. This idea of the listeners' transcending the explicitly mentioned information was taken from Johnson-Laird who introduced mental models as analogous representations of the linguistically referred to situation. Our adopted methodology indeed bears profound philosophical implications: we had to achieve a reconciliation of philosophical idealism and realism, between linguistic mentalism and realism. Firstly, this was enabled by a differentiated computation of a semantic representation via the assumed distinction between autonomous and dependent predications. Secondly, this reconciliation was enabled by assuming different semantic modalities located at different levels of objectivity - from quasi-analytic, term-like values at one end of the scale, to complete relativity as embodied by DIMENSIONAL adjectives, SPATIAL prepositions and finally proper deictics at the other end of the scale, with different degrees of vagueness in between. 11.2

Perspectives

First and second language acquisition Our distinction between lexical vagueness and referential identification has implications for theories on language acquisition. Further evidence may be gained for Piaget's constructivism. The distinction between autonomous and dependent predications has implications for foreign

322 General conclusions and perspectives language learning, especially for the methods of vocabulary teaching. We have addressed many cognitive universale which still need to be evaluated with respect to the issue of linguistic dispositions: • the ability to represent mental models and image schemata • the ability to reason hierarchically • the ability to reason recursively • the ability to compare interpretations It is an empirical question how innate or how abstract these abilities are when children axe born. Linguistic

impairment

Aphasie disorders may be investigated with respect to the possibility of transcending information if either the access to knowledge is disturbed or the contact to specific aspects of the environment is no longer intact. Schizophrenia represents a further area of research. What implications are involved if the ability to focus on the relevant information is disturbed? Finally, dyslexics and anomia may give evidence of the supporting function of analogous representations in terms of imagery. Linguistic

typology

Our reconciliation between realism and mentalism certainly has implications for the typology of language. In our framework a very likely candidate for universal dispositions has been pointed out to be provided by sensorily based image-schemata. Can an initial linguistic disposition be evidenced in children, a disposition which then develops differently in different environments, such that this is manifested in different relations between linguistic expressions and their related conceptualizations? One example which would corroborate this hypothesis is provided by the cross-linguistically divergent realizations of the M A S S / C O U N T distinction. Other cross-linguistic implications arise from the different semantic phenomena which we assume: •

adjectives and SPATIAL prepositions have already been pointed out with respect to their translational relevance in section 9.3. DIMENSIONAL

Perspectives

323

• How axe different languages related with respect to the figureground principle? The lexicalization of contrasting polysemy patterns on the basis of this principle was a major discussion point in this work. • Does the empirical relevance and projection, e.g. of gestalt properties and dimensions, occur universally? • How are "quasi-analytic" term-like expressions and their corresponding domains related across languages? Does standardization result in the conceptual universality of the terminology across languages? The computer metaphor would be an obvious candidate. • Further evidence can certainly be gained for the hierarchical representation of meaning as a universal disposition. Having assessed the validity and relevance of our objectives with respect to different abilities of linguistic performance, we can anticipate that it will always be the speakers and listeners themselves who are responsible for the veridicality of their mental models of linguistically experienced situations.

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Index abduction, 45-47, 224, 233 Abelson, Robert P., 198 accommodation, 80, 81, 86 acquisition knowledge, 31, 43 language, 31, 32, 52, 59 active zone, 216, 261, 270, 271, 277 affordances, 61-63, 67, 74 analogy hierarchical, 235 metaphorical, 215, 224-226, 238, 240, 245, 249 ontological, 238 orientational, 237 relational, 199 structural, 236, 237 analyticity, 22, 24-26, 30, 33, 34, 44, 47, 53, 59, 317, 318 Apel, Karl-Otto, 36, 39, 45, 47, 52, 53, 57, 60 artificial intelligence, 110, 118, 153, 197, 198, 238, 301 assimilation, 80, 81, 86 Austin, John L., 287 Barsalou, Lawrence W., 5, 99, 250 Bartlett, Frederic C., 196, 197 basic level categorization, 90, 91, 209, 235, 236, 280 behaviourism, 23, 24, 26, 28, 52, 58, 59 strong, 59 weak, 12, 13, 58 Berlin, Brent, 90, 235, 280 Bierwisch, Manfred, 118, 253, 255, 264 Black, Max, 226 Boguraev, Branimir, 119

Bolinger, Dwight, 107, 160, 300, 311, 314, 315 Boyd, Richard, 233, 234, 238 Bunt, Harry, 176-178, 295, 298, 299, 309 Bybee, Joan, 95, 214 Carlson, Greg, 309, 317 Cartesian Linguistics, 51, 52 causal chain of names, 33 centre-periphery model, 6, 7,109, 112 114, 117 Charniak, Eugene, 197 Chomsky, Noam, 51-56, 58-60, 63, 130, 147 Churchland, Patricia Smith, 223 Clark, Eve, 91 Clark, Herbert, 89 closure phenomenon, 123, 213 co-operative principle, 48, 50 componential analysis, 153 composition, 14, 15, 17, 19, 83, 98, 111, 119-121, 123, 127, 128, 130, 131, 135, 138, 150, 157, 218, 228, 255, 301, 304 computational linguistics, 12, 17, 118, 289, 290 Comrie, Bernard, 305 conceptual type hierarchy, 116, 117, 130,133-135, 137, 139, 150, 163-166, 182, 187, 257, 278, 296 consciousness, 18, 37, 40-44, 57, 60, 63, 64, 69, 79, 80, 83-86, 133, 222, 231, 232, 239 constructivism, 78, 86

350 Index contextual functions configuration, 257-259, 261, 262, 288

highlighting, 277 modulation, 277 selection, 251 shift, 262 continuity of reference, 3, 7, 9, 17, 34, 44, 60, 86, 120, 122, 128130, 145, 215, 225, 234, 287, 320 conventionality, 9, 11, 14, 19, 28, 30, 34, 36, 41, 45, 46, 89, 92, 93, 95, 114, 116, 117, 121, 124, 126, 128, 129,132, 147, 148, 150, 201, 206, 211-213, 215, 216, 224, 228, 229, 235, 255, 264, 270, 271, 278, 281, 285, 288, 289, 291,309,311, 317 core meaning, 5, 92, 111, 155, 208 Coseriu, Eugenio, 147 creativity, 11, 12, 72, 123, 129, 130, 132, 214, 215, 229, 230, 238, 278, 288, 289 Croft, William, 85, 86, 102, 155, 215, 217, 219, 223, 244, 250, 269, 271, 283, 297, 315 Cruse, David Α., 285 Dahl, Osten, 308 Damasio, Antonio, 96 Declerck, Renaat, 299, 309, 316, 317 decomposition, 131, 132 deduction, 45-47 default hierarchy, 134 rules, 130, 301, 304 Dijk, Teun van, 197, 198 Dirven, Rene, 160, 218, 229 discourse, 106, 111, 121,123-126, 153, 155, 200, 201, 260, 261, 270, 271, 275, 278, 279, 287-289 analysis, 15, 110, 196, 197 coherence, 12,120,198, 201, 209, 216, 218, 275, 277, 283, 285,

286 common sense, 35 organization, 202, 214 space, 156, 290, 292, 298, 314 disposition, 26, 27, 29, 31, 40, 42, 43, 51, 52, 57 analogical reasoning, 234 bodily, 230, 231, 238 communicative, 231 image-schematic, 273 linguistic faculty, 52, 54, 55, 130 preconceptual, 231 recursive reasoning, 86, 236 schematic, 255, 257, 259 division of linguistic labour, 33-35, 253, 282

domain basic cognitive, 91,133,135,150153 configurational, 109, 110,112, 155, 160, 162 discourse, 110, 118,120, 124, 129, 142, 152, 196, 201, 209, 214, 215, 217, 219, 221, 222, 228, 230, 235, 237, 249, 270, 275, 276, 280, 281, 283, 286, 287 locational, 109, 155, 258 matrix, 106, 152 source, 215, 236 target, 215, 230-233, 236 Dowty, David, 170, 171,184,185, 189, 194, 303, 304, 309 Doyle, John, 301 Eco, Umberto, 228 ecological, 61-64, 67, 86 culture, 86 niche, 67, 69 perception, 66, 69, 73, 76 theory, 74 environment, 61-65, 67-70, 73-79, 81, 85, 86 abstract, 65 cognitive, 49, 50, 64-66, 74, 76 objective, 65 persistent, 69, 71, 72

Index 351 perspectivized, 66 physical, 63, 72, 74 social, 68, 71 equivalence, 24, 27, 29, 30 extension, 20-22, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 43, 46, 60, 110, 132, 134, 225, 226, 232, 244 Eynde, Prank vein, 303 family resemblances, 36, 38, 39, 111— 114, 118, 120, 251, 253, 258 Fass, Dan, 216, 283, 285 figure-ground principle, 32, 65-68, 209 Fillmore, Charles, 26, 146 Frege, Gottlob, 4, 19, 20 Geeraerts, Dirk, 92, 111 generative linguistics, 12, 51, 52, 54, 57, 60, 118-120, 129 genericity, 299-301, 304, 309, 315, 317, 318 by default, 317 hierarchical, 116, 117 inclusive, 317 inherited, 308 Gentner, Dedre, 82, 91, 92, 100-102, 109, 122, 156, 157, 199, 233, 234, 236, 237, 280 Gestalt Psychology, 32, 52, 105, 228 Gibbs, Raymond W., 127, 228 Gibson, James J., 18, 40, 61-74, 85 grammaticalization, 159, 214 granularity, 28, 29, 75, 90, 106, 111, 116, 117, 127, 131,135,139, 148, 150, 163, 199, 206, 235, 255, 259, 294, 296 Grice, Herbert P., 287 grounding, 290, 298-300, 306, 312 Gutt, Ernst-August, 200 Hawkins, John, 297 Heine, Bernd, 110, 147, 155, 214, 215 Herskovits, Annette, 111, 160 heterogeneous reference condition, 175, 176, 276 Hirst, Graeme, 118 Hobbs, Jerry, 223

Hofstadter, Douglas R., 223 Hopper, Paul, 147, 214, 215 hyponymy, 106, 117, 136, 137, 153, 296, 315 iconism, 29, 205, 206, 228, 254, 292, 294 idealism, 18, 56 idioms, 11, 119, 127, 228, 237 induction, 46, 47, 224 inextricability, 23 inference, 6 information complex, 70, 85 direct, 72, 75 explicit, 82 hidden, 67, 68, 73 higher-order, 70 implicit, 6, 49, 82 incomplete, 85 indirect, 73, 75 inferred, 60 invariant, 68 new, 6, 44, 45, 50, 51, 67, 74 objective, 63, 67, 76 perceived, 4, 27, 69-71, 74, 82 processing, 3, 26, 50, 67, 70, 72, 74, 76-78 reduction of, 8, 84 relevant, 3, 9, 32, 42, 43, 49, 63, 67, 70-72, 74, 76, 79, 86 retrieval, 70, 71, 77 vs. knowledge, 72 inheritance, 121, 137-139, 156, 304, 307 inscrutability, 23, 31, 40 intension, 20-22, 24-26, 30, 34, 46, 48, 60, 83, 84, 100,128, 134, 136, 148, 149, 210, 225, 227, 232 intersubjectivity, 25, 27, 28, 44, 47, 53, 56, 60 invariance hypothesis, 228, 230, 232 Johnson, Mark, 89, 110, 124, 228-232 Johnson-Laird, Philip N., 8, 81-86, 104, 122,123, 125, 126, 129,

352 Index 132-134, 199, 209, 210, 233235, 250 Kamp, Hans, 194, 309 Katz, Jerrold, 82, 131, 132, 135 Kay, Martin, 138 Kay, Paul, 235 Keil, Frank, 89 Kintsch, Walter, 96, 197, 198 knowledge common sense, 5, 30, 33, 34, 40, 60, 88, 92, 147, 226, 236 expert, 34, 37, 91 Koffka, Kurt, 228 Krifka, Manfred, 315 Kripke, Saul, 32-34, 60 Köhler, Wolfgang, 228 Labov, William, 8, 148 Lakoff, George, 89, 90, 110-112, 124, 159, 205, 207, 216, 219, 223, 228-232, 257, 258, 271, 274, 275, 280, 286 landmark, 106, 143, 156, 157, 160, 244, 245, 255, 258, 261, 266, 267, 277, 301, 302, 313, 318 Lang, Ewald, 118, 148, 160, 255 Langacker, Ronald, 13, 105-111, 114, 116, 117, 121, 123,126, 130, 131, 133, 134, 138, 141, 150152, 155-157, 160, 164, 175, 176, 182, 183, 186, 200-202, 205, 207, 213, 216, 217, 221, 222, 250, 251, 257-262, 266, 269, 270, 273, 274, 276, 283285, 287, 291-295, 298, 300, 301, 303, 304, 306, 308, 309, 315, 317 language game, 25, 36-40 Lehrer, Adrienne, 296 Leisi, Ernst, 219 Lewis, David, 25, 60 lexicography, 2, 127, 153 lexicology, 2, 3 linguistic competence, 52-55, 57 Link, Godehard, 295

Lipka, Leonard, 219 Lyons, John, 147, 229 maxims of conversation, 48, 49 McDermott, Drew, 301 Melöuk, Igor Α., 119 memory, 66, 71 mental lexicon, 13, 95, 96, 116, 258 mental model, 12, 15, 111, 122, 124, 126, 129, 141,152, 157, 199203, 205, 206, 209, 210, 219, 221, 222, 254, 271, 272, 275, 286, 287, 289 mentalism, 40, 52, 55, 56, 58, 77, 81, 210 meronymy, 117, 153 metaphor, 119, 120, 141, 142, 151, 159, 160, 214, 215, 218, 219, 223-238, 240, 241, 244, 245, 249, 254, 258 billiard-ball, 157, 221, 222, 244, 291 computer, 238 conduit, 128, 129, 157, 229 metonymy, 116, 119, 137, 153, 159, 160, 165, 179, 214-224, 227, 249, 254, 258 ad hoc, 123, 124 logical, 210, 212, 213 Miller, George, 225 Minsky, Marvin, 197 modality de dicto, 23, 32 de re, 23, 32, 34, 59 Montague, Richard, 20 Morreau, Michael, 301 nativism, 63, 75, 78, 79 natural kind term, 28, 30, 33-36, 309, 311, 313 necessary and sufficient conditions, 5, 6, 8, 15, 34, 111, 117, 132, 225, 236, 262, 316 Neisser, Ulric, 74-79, 85, 86 nominal kind term, 28, 311, 313, 316, 317

Index 353 Nunberg, Geoffrey, 286 ordinary language, 34, 36-41 Ortony, Andrew, 235 Osgood, Charles, 89 ostension, 19, 24, 32 parallel distributed processing model, 222

Peirce, Charles S., 44-47, 60,104, 234 Pelletier, Francis, 293 perception, 66, 69-73 and language, 73 defective, 67, 70 direct, 18, 68-70, 72, 73 egocentric, 69 incomplete, 66 indirect, 73 recursive, 76 perspective, 63-67, 69, 76, 80 Piaget, Jean, 40, 78-81, 86, 104 polysemy, 87, 94-96, 119, 120, 129, 137, 142, 145, 147,150-152, 196, 202, 205, 214, 216, 251, 253, 257, 283 high, 6, 100 low, 6, 100 Popper, Karl, 40, 41, 43, 44, 57 possible worlds, 21, 27, 32, 34, 35 predication autonomous, 109, 120, 152, 155157, 160, 164, 196, 216, 219, 221, 244, 249 dependent, 120, 137, 155-157, 162, 186, 196, 219, 244, 249 principle of relevance, 9, 50, 215 private language, 28 problem solving, 40, 215, 222, 228, 231-233, 249 processing interactive, 98, 99, 102, 118, 135, 273, 277 parallel, 95, 104 sequential, 94, 98, 99, 102, 104 profile-base organization, 11, 105-107, 143, 219, 271, 284, 285, 288, 314, 315

prototype semantics, 5, 7, 8, 87, 111, 155, 225 prototypes, 87, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 117, 149, 163 in polysemy structures, 152, 219 Pustejovsky, James, 119, 160, 210, 212, 259, 261, 262, 276, 286 Putnam, Hilary, 28, 32-35, 37, 48, 60, 88, 117, 147-149, 253, 316, 317 quantification, 24, 31 ontological, 32 Quillian, M. Ross, 82 Quine, Willard van O., 23-32, 59, 60, 68, 175, 296, 299 radial network, 7, 111 realism, 18, 28, 35, 40, 47, 55, 56, 77, 81, 210 naive, 62, 78 reasoning default, 153, 299-301, 310 defeasible, 10, 126 inferential, 6, 9, 15, 126, 199201, 211-213, 223, 233, 284, 286-288 recursive, 110, 117,118,126, 133, 210, 233, 239, 250, 277, 278 reductionism, 209 reference token, 290-292, 297, 298, 300, 303, 306, 310, 318 type, 290-292, 300, 303, 309, 311318 type, by default, 311-313, 317 reference-point variation, 147, 153, 215— 217, 269, 270, 276-278, 280, 281 Reiter, Raymond, 301 representation analogous, 12, 82, 83, 85, 122, 134 attribute-value, 138, 244 deterministic, 126 discourse, 67, 215

354 Index encyclopedic, 117-120, 132 higher-level, 14, 62, 80, 84, 117, 119, 121, 122, 150, 223, 240, 279 image schema, 11, 110, 130, 151, 153, 155, 196, 201-203, 205209, 214, 215, 217, 219, 224, 229, 230, 232, 236, 238, 240, 241, 245, 272-274, 281, 289 intentional, 72, 120 intrinsic, 116, 117, 146 knowledge, 50, 63, 68, 72, 74, 78, 79, 86, 126 lower-level, 84,117,119,133, 232, 240 mental, 64, 65, 68, 73, 77, 80, 82, 85, 86 of frames in discourse, 197, 198 of lexical schema, 186, 257-259, 261, 262, 268 of scenarios in discourse, 198 of schemata in discourse, 110,197, 199, 203 of scripts in discourse, 198 procedural, 83, 126 propositions!, 12, 48, 82,120, 122, 126, 141, 200, 205, 206, 259, 261, 271-273, 275, 286 recursive, 83, 135 schematic, 78,109,111-113,116, 118, 123 unification-based, 138 Richards, Ivor Armstrong, 226 rigid designator, 32-34 Rosch, Eleanor, 87, 91, 111 Rumelhart, David, 197, 222, 223 Russell, Bertrand, 19 Ryle, Gilbert, 172, 184 Saussure, Ferdinand de, 131 Schänk, Roger, 198 schematicity, 106, 110, 117, 131, 133136, 163, 164, 301 Schwartz, Stephen P., 233, 317 scope of predication, 105, 107, 277, 283-286, 293, 294, 298, 300,

303 Searle, John, 56, 57, 225, 231, 239 semantic feature, 133-143, 148 semantic networks, 59, 120, 126, 131, 133, 197, 210 sense dominance, 152, 262, 272, 278, 283, 286, 288 sequential scanning, 221, 241 Shakespeare, William, 227 Sperber, Dan, 64, 65, 97, 111, 120, 122, 123, 200, 215, 231, 287 stereotype, 33-35, 253, 311, 316, 317 Strohner, Hans, 98, 123 summary scanning, 242 Sweetser, Eve E., 155 Talmy, Leonard, 101 Taylor, John, 253, 255, 271, 276 trajector, 106,107, 143, 156,157, 160, 245, 255, 266, 290, 301, 302, 313, 318 translation, 24, 27, 32, 59, 147, 214, 290 truth conditions, 8, 19, 20, 25, 48, 122, 126, 230, 233, 235, 279, 280

vagueness, 115, 127, 129, 140, 145150, 163, 196, 226, 261, 283 Vandeloise, Claude, 160 Vendler, Zeno, 14, 171, 172, 265, 266 Weinrich, Harald, 227 Whorf, Benjamin L., 101 Wierzbicka, Anna, 147, 265, 292-294, 296 Wilks, Yorick, 145 Wilson, Deidre, 64, 65, 97, 200, 215, 231, 287 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 5, 25, 26, 28, 29, 36-41, 60, 111