Disciplining Democracies: Human Insecurity in Japan-Myanmar Relations 9781529232868

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“Japan’s diplomacy towards Myanmar is based on a policy of ‘democracy as process (not progress)’, which rewarded Myanmar’s military regime too much for too little. This book gives a straightforward answer to this inconsistency through convincing discussions based on credible sources.” Kei Nemoto, Sophia University

This book examines Japan’s relationship with Myanmar from the passage of its constitution in May 2008 to the February 2021 coup d’état that finished its transition to a ‘disciplined democracy.’

LINDSAY BLACK

Lindsay Black is Associate Professor at the Institute for Area Studies at Leiden University..

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

“A detailed, indeed exhaustive, study both of the realities of the Japanese economics-driven presence in Myanmar and the rhetoric Tokyo uses to legitimize it.” Donald M. Seekins, Meio University

It explores the nexus between security and political economy in the context of changing regional dynamics characterized by ‘Great Power’ competition and cooperation. Focusing on the impact of Japan’s relations with Myanmar on people in Myanmar and beyond, the author argues that the Japanese government and businesses side-lined ‘universal values’ for profit at the expense of human security.

Disciplining Democracies

This text develops a unique Area Studies approach that critiques how Japan’s foreign policy elites perceive Japan’s role in the liberal international order.

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations combines original research and theoretical innovation to give fresh insight into the changing politics of the region.

East Asian International Relations

Human Insecurity in Japan-Myanmar Relations

SERIES EDITORS Yongjin Zhang Shogo Suzuki Peter Marcus Kristensen

LINDSAY BLACK ISBN 978-1-5292-3284-4

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

9 781529 232844

B R I S TO L

@policypress

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations Series Editors: Yongjin Zhang, University of Bristol, UK, Shogo Suzuki, University of Manchester, UK and Peter Marcus Kristensen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark This series publishes cutting-edge research on the international politics of East Asia, the ongoing transformation of the region, as well as the impact of such transformation on the wider global order. It welcomes theoretically informed and theoretically innovative works that can help develop and establish new Asian schools of thought in International Relations theory.

Also available The Essence of Interstate Leadership Debating Moral Realism Edited by Yan Xuetong and Fang Yuanyuan A Hierarchical Vision of Order Understanding Chinese Foreign Policy in Asia By Antoine Roth Middle Powers in Asia Pacific Multilateralism By Sarah Teo China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory Edited by Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski China Risen? Studying Chinese Global Power By Shaun Breslin The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia Towards an Ethical Explanation By See Seng Tan

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International advisory board Amitav Acharya, American University, Washington D.C., US Mark Beeson, University of Western Australia, Australia Barry Buzan, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Zhimin Chen, Fudan University, Shanghai, China Ja Ian Chong, National University of Singapore, Singapore Paul Evans, University of British Columbia, Canada Rosemary Foot, University of Oxford, UK Evelyn Goh, Australian National University, Australia Linus Hagström, Swedish Defense University, Sweden Miwa Hirono, Ritsumeikan University, Japan Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University, Japan Weixing Hu, University of Macau, China Xiaoming Huang, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Christopher R. Hughes, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Yang Jiang, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, South Korea Jing Men, College of Europe, Belgium Nele Noesselt, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany John Ravenhill, University of Waterloo, Canada Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University, Japan Yu-Shan Wu, National University of Taiwan, Taiwan

Find out more at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/ bristol-studies-in-east-asian-international-relations

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES Human Insecurity in Japan–​Myanmar Relations Lindsay Black

First published in Great Britain in 2023 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2023 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​3284-​4 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​3285-​1 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​3286-​8 ePdf The right of Lindsay Black to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc Front cover image: Getty /​Contributor Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Dedicated to Fulton

Contents List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements

viii x

Introduction 1 The Evolution of New Area Studies 2 ‘Asia’s Liberal Leader’ and Human Insecurity 3 Japan as a ‘Bridge’: Facilitating Myanmar’s Transition to a ‘Disciplined Democracy’ 4 Japan and Special Economic Zones in Myanmar 5 Meddling for Profit: Japan’s Peace-​building Role in Myanmar 6 Dereliction of Responsibility: Japan’s ‘Liberal Leadership’ in the 2016–​20 Rakhine Crisis Conclusion: The Chimera of Progress

1 17 34 59

Notes References Index

81 101 126 153 176 179 220

vii

List of Abbreviations AA ADB ARSA ASEAN BCIM BCP BIA BRI DDA DPJ FOIP G7 HRW ICC ICJ ICoE IDP IR ITD JBIC JETRO JICA JMA KNU KPSN LDP LIAS MEC MEHL METI MOFA MOU

Arakan Army Asian Development Bank Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar economic corridor Burmese Communist Party Burma Independence Army Belt and Road Initiative Dawei Development Association Democratic Party of Japan Free and Open Indo-​Pacific Group of Seven Human Rights Watch International Criminal Court International Court of Justice Independent Commission of Enquiry Internally Displaced People International Relations Italian-​Thai Development Japan Bank for International Cooperation Japan External Trade Organization Japan International Cooperation Agency Japan Myanmar Association Karen National Union Karen Peace Support Network Liberal Democratic Party Leiden University Institute for Area Studies Myanmar Economic Corporation Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Understanding viii

List of Abbreviations

MPC MPSI NGO NHRC NLD NMSP NPA NUG ODA OISCA PDEA R2P SDF SEZ SLORC SPDC UNDP UNFC UNHCR UNSC USDP UWSA

Myanmar Peace Centre Myanmar Peace Support Initiative non-​governmental organization National Human Rights Commission National League for Democracy New Mon State Party National Police Agency National Unity Government Official Development Assistance Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Responsibility to Protect Self-​Defence Forces Special Economic Zone State Law and Order Restoration Council State Peace and Development Council United Nations Development Programme United Nationalities Federal Council United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Security Council Union Solidarity and Development Party United Wa State Army

ix

Acknowledgements My initial interest in Japan–​Myanmar relations was sparked by students who quizzed me about the unfolding Saffron Revolution when I was first appointed as an Assistant Professor at Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (LIAS). Though absorbed in writing my first book on Japan’s Security Strategy, the Japanese government’s responses to developments in Myanmar kept drawing me back and, in 2013, I published an article on the subject in The Pacific Review. I stand by the research in this article, but came to question the conclusions which were largely positive about the Japanese government’s mediation between Myanmar and the international community. Interactions with colleagues at LIAS spurred my intellectual engagement with Japan’s international relations leading me towards more critical approaches in line with the focus of ‘New Area Studies’. The result is this book. I am grateful to my colleagues and students at LIAS and across the University of Leiden for their support and insights. Particular thanks go to Yih-​Jye Hwang with whom I co-​wrote a number of articles on human security, which guided my thinking on the subject. Presentations of earlier drafts and discussions with members of Modern Japan Studies, Modern China Studies, the Leiden Political Economy Group and staff in the MA International Relations were essential in the development of this book. All errors and omissions in this work are my own. My thanks to the editors of The Pacific Review and the Journal of Human Security Studies for allowing me to reproduce parts of articles I published in these journals (Black, 2013; Black and Hwang, 2019). The research for this book benefited from sabbaticals through Osaka School of International Public Policy’s (OSIPP) Cross-​Appointment System at Osaka University and at Taiwan National University (NTU). My sincere thanks to Professor Matsuno Akihisa and Professor Satoh Haruko at OSIPP, to Professor Philip Tsu at NTU, and to all the staff involved in the Taiwan Fellowship Grant. Staff at Bristol University Press have made publishing this book such a smooth experience. I am indebted to both Stephen Wenham and Zoë Forbes for their assistance throughout.

x

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my friends and family for their continued support without which this book would not have come to fruition. Michelle and Fulton have met the many frustrations that writing brings with good humour and love. They have been my rock throughout.

xi

Introduction On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, under the command of General Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup d’état, ousting the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Together with members of her party, Aung San Suu Kyi was incarcerated on trumped up charges. Citizens who took to the streets in protest were gunned down or arrested. For those knowledgeable of Myanmar’s recent history, the scenes were depressingly familiar. The coup ended Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ and was widely condemned by the international community. The Japanese government was less critical of the coup, maintaining ties with the government of General Min Aung Hlaing and seeking to mediate between his government and the opposition forces. Japan’s substantial economic investments in Myanmar since its transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ meant that it had much to lose from the country becoming once again estranged from the liberal international order. As ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, Japan could also claim a duty to entice Myanmar back onto the path to democratization. The Japanese government’s engagement with Myanmar concerned not only material benefits, but also international status. This monograph charts the course of Japan’s relationship with Myanmar from the passage of Myanmar’s constitution in May 2008 to the 1 February 2021 coup d’état that brought an end to Myanmar’s democratic transition. It places the Japan–​M yanmar relationship in historical context to understand how this relationship evolved and what Japan’s contemporary commitments to and ambitions in Myanmar are. While the few accounts of this relationship note Japan’s geoeconomic and geopolitical interests in the country, the significance of Myanmar’s democratic transition for Japan’s status as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ has been side-​lined. It is necessary to understand why Japan follows a distinct approach in its relations with Myanmar. This monograph sets out not only to correct this omission, but also shed light on the contradictions of Japan’s pursuit of both its national interests and a ‘value-​based diplomacy’ when these undermined the security of human beings in Myanmar and of those who had fled across its borders. 1

Disciplining Democracies

Rehabilitating a ‘pariah’ Since crushing the democratic protests of August 1988, in which Aung San Suu Kyi had emerged as a democratic icon, Myanmar’s military regime had become isolated by the international community and increasingly reliant on China. For Japan, Burma’s decent into ‘pariah’ status would prove a bitter pill, as throughout the Cold War, Japan had been Burma’s largest aid donor. Retreat signalled that Japan’s wager on Burma’s development and the opportunities this would offer for Japanese firms had been lost. Rather than channelling Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) into sustainable economic development programmes, the ruling Burmese junta had squandered the country’s resources and impoverished their people for their own enrichment. Decades of civil war scarred the country and shaped the outlook of the ruling junta, which placed the security of the state above that of its people. As the international community turned away, China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and itself experiencing international isolation in the wake of the crackdown on the Tiananmen protests, began to enhance its ties with Burma’s military elite. For the next two decades, China steadily built its economic, political and military relations with Myanmar, dominating its international relations. Further acts of brutality by Myanmar’s junta, as in the Saffron Revolution of September 2007, and callous neglect, as in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, cemented Myanmar’s ‘pariah’ status. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar’s military elite began the slow process of transitioning to what they termed a ‘disciplined democracy’. According to this ‘disciplined democracy’ project, Myanmar’s military would retain substantial power over the country’s politics, economics and security, substantially curtailing the extent to which Myanmar could democratize. Few were convinced. In 2010, Myanmar held its first general election for over two decades. The election was widely panned in the international media and by foreign governments for failing to be both free and fair. For many in the international community, Myanmar remained a ‘failed’, ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ state. Yet, under the presidency of former General Thein Sein, Myanmar’s ‘democratic transition’ from 2011 began to attract supporters in the international community. By the time of Myanmar’s next general election in 2015, won by the NLD, most developed and democratic states had normalized or were normalizing their relations with Myanmar. Economic sanctions were steadily dropped as official visits by world leaders heralded Myanmar’s progress. Foreign direct investment and aid poured into the impoverished country, diversifying Myanmar’s foreign relations and rehabilitating the country into the liberal international order. As this process unfolded so new opportunities to re-​engage Myanmar emerged. Pundits, policy makers and foreign policy experts dubbed 2

Introduction

Myanmar as ‘Asia’s last frontier’; a land rich in minerals, energy resources, timber and gem stones, that hosted a burgeoning consumer market. For states and transnational corporations willing to take on the risk of investing in Myanmar, the advantages of a cheap but well-​educated workforce were ripe for the picking. As production costs had risen in China’s eastern coastal provinces, East Asia’s primary production hub during the 1990s and early 2000s, so firms sought alternative production sites in South and Southeast Asia. Of these, nowhere seemed as cheap or replete with potential for growth as Myanmar. For many, opening ‘Asia’s last frontier’ to the global economy presented an unprecedented opportunity for profit and expansion. Myanmar’s geographical location at the crossroads of South, Southeast and East Asia made it a particularly attractive prospect. Developing Myanmar’s infrastructure could rewrite the political economy of these three regions by providing overland routes from China to the Bay of Bengal, linking to India’s growing economy and connecting the Mekong region. In southern Myanmar, for example, a Thai-​led investment project aimed to establish a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Dawei, providing Bangkok with more direct access to the Indian Ocean. These routes would provide alternatives to the narrow Malacca Straits, dubbed the ‘world’s most important trade route’; a sea line of communication that some analysts argue is beset by piratical attacks and terrorist threats. For China, Myanmar was perceived as a solution to its own Malacca dilemma, countering fears that the US military might close the Straits to China-​bound traffic in the event of hostilities. Access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar offered a means to develop China’s poor southwestern regions that were left behind as China’s coastal regions boomed. Neighbouring Yunnan province, in particular, sought to benefit from Myanmar’s development through communication and transport links as well as oil and gas pipelines to Kyuakphyu in Rakhine state, where a consortium led by China’s CITIC corporation had begun developing a SEZ (Tun and Mclaughlin, 2015). Military ties were also significant and the Chinese government looked to secure access for its naval vessels at Myanmar’s deep-​water port in Sittwe, as part of what some naval analysts have dubbed China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy (Pehrson, 2006).

Japan in decline? China’s continued influence in Myanmar had long concerned Japanese policy makers, who were fearful of China’s rise as a harbinger of Japan’s decline. As Myanmar began its transition to democracy, so numerous indicators signalled a power transition in East Asia. The bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in 1990 presaged two ‘lost’ decades in which Japan’s growth stuttered and firms struggled under a burden of debt. During the same period, China continued 3

Disciplining Democracies

on a path of economic reform, entered the World Trade Organization and overtook Japan to become the second largest global economic power in gross domestic product terms. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China exercised its economic power through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which drew states from Southeast Asia to Europe into China’s economic orbit, including Myanmar. For Japan, the BRI signalled a new challenge to Japan’s economic interests and investments in South and Southeast Asia. Politically, Japan also remained somewhat isolated in the East Asian region because of its failure to atone for its historical aggression from the late 19th century through until the end of the Second World War. China and the Koreas continued to press Japanese governments to provide unequivocal apologies for its past behaviour, leading to ‘apology fatigue’ in Japan and continued tensions in its relations with its immediate neighbours. Nationalism pervades the politics in and relations between East Asian states, inhibiting cooperation in one of the most economically dynamic regions of the world. The sense that Japan was in decline relative to China was further amplified by the tragedy of Japan’s triple disaster. On 11 March 2011, a tsunami followed a massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake off eastern Japan, sweeping across the Tohoko coastline. The death toll reached nearly 16,000 people with a further 2,500 people missing and just over 6,000 injured. Hundreds of thousands of residents were displaced, not only by the devastation caused by the earthquake and tsunami, but also due to the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear reactor, which malfunctioned as the tsunami flooded the facility. Reconstruction costs and insurance claims soared, setting back economic development in an already peripheral region of the country. Critiques also surfaced about Japan’s leadership and the nefarious ties between Japan’s energy industry and the bureaucracies that should have ensured that proper safety standards were maintained (Kingston, 2014). The events of 3.11 would be seared into the minds of the Japanese people. Japan’s ageing society further compounded the feeling that Japan was in retreat. Japan’s low birth rate meant that its population was shrinking, while Japanese people enjoyed the longest life expectancy in the world. Over the course of the 21st century, a diminishing Japanese workforce would have to take on a growing financial burden and care for a vast number of pensioners. A reluctance to bolster Japan’s working population through promoting migration and the limited impact of repeated attempts to create a system in which Japanese women could build successful careers and Japanese families could thrive, left the conundrum of Japan’s ageing society unresolved. The coffers of the Japanese state were ill-​prepared for this eventuality as successive Japanese governments sought to pay their way out of Japan’s lost decades. Japan’s national debt soared to become the highest in the developed world. Japan also came under pressure from the international community, particularly its ally, the US, to play a greater role in international security. 4

Introduction

The deployment abroad of Japan’s Self-​Defence Forces (SDF) had long been constrained by Japan’s pacifist constitution, Article 9 of which forbids Japan from possessing military potential. Though successive Japanese governments would embark on legal reforms to enable the SDF to participate in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, this did not include active military deployments permitting the use of weapons or the exercise of collective self-​defence. US pressure (beiatsu) pushed the Japanese government to seek new ways of contributing to international security. The concept of human security, articulated in UN development reports in the early 1990s, provided an alternative due to its combination of both the physical security of individuals (freedom from fear) and their basic human needs (freedom from want). While Article 9 inhibited the extent to which Japan could protect individuals from harm, the Japanese government could argue that its ODA programme was realizing people’s basic needs. Successive Japanese governments championed human security in Japan’s foreign policy, culminating in Japan co-​sponsoring a resolution in the UN General Assembly to accept the concept as central to the conduct of international affairs on 10 September 2012. Nonetheless, the perception that Japan failed to adequately contribute to international security combined with China’s opposition undermined Japan’s bid to join the UN Security Council (UNSC) during the 1990s and early 2000s. Over the same period, China revolutionized its People’s Liberation Army from a bloated and outdated force, to a leaner and more technologically sophisticated military. On 26 December 2008, China dispatched two People’s Liberation Army Navy destroyers and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden to combat maritime piracy. Three months later, Japan would follow suit, dispatching Maritime Self-​Defence Forces destroyers to the region. Though this indicated Japan’s intention to play a larger international security role, Japan’s involvement in anti-​piracy operations was constrained by legal issues related to Japan’s constitution and qualified by the inclusion of Japan Coast Guard personnel on board the Maritime Self-​Defence Forces destroyers who would be responsible for arresting any pirates (Black, 2012). Here again, Japan appeared to following in China’s wake. From 2009, the People’s Liberation Army Navy was increasingly deployed to assert Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. In September 2010, a month before Myanmar’s first general election since its democratization process had started, a Japan Coast Guard vessel was rammed by a Chinese fishing boat near the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands. This incident and the diplomatic clash it triggered initiated arguably the worst period in Sino-​Japanese relations since the end of the Second World War, raising security tensions that pitted the People’s Liberation Army against the SDF in the East China Sea. Under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, the security tensions between China and Japan spilled over to encompass 5

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the South China Sea disputes, as Abe backed US Freedom of Navigation Operations and developed strategic partnerships with regional powers to contain Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Sino-​Japanese relations did improve following US President Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-​ Pacific Partnership, a regional Free Trade Agreement that excluded China, his initiation of a trade war with China and pressure on Japan’s trade relations with the US. Nonetheless, the underlying perception of China’s rise and Japan’s decline remained strong in Japan. Amidst this pessimist climate in Japan, Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ offered some hope. Opportunities for Japanese investment were rife with some Japanese businesspeople even declaring a ‘gold rush’ in Myanmar. Japanese media reported that these opportunities had to be seized and Myanmar prised back from China’s clutches. Japan may be in decline, but it was still competing. At the same time, Myanmar’s development and rehabilitation into the liberal international order appeared as a reflection of Japan’s own past. Comparisons with Japan’s emergence after the Second World War as an economic power and accepted member of the liberal international order were made. Some representatives of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) even touted that Myanmar was experiencing its own Meiji revolution under the Thein Sein government with centuries of bureaucratic and political inertia being overturned and the promise of modernity finally grasped (Söderberg, 2015: 156; Takase, 2015: 61). Only Japan could act as Myanmar’s guide and teach its leaders and people how to bridge between autocracy and democracy, poverty and development, tradition and modernity, turmoil and peace. Accordingly, the Japanese government advised on the reform of Myanmar’s economic institutions, wrote off Myanmar’s debts, established the Thilawa SEZ, and channelled aid to develop infrastructure across the country that would strengthen connections between Myanmar and the Mekong subregion through the construction of economic corridors to the benefit of Japanese businesses. Japan’s continued relevance and power in the East Asian region could be understood through its engagement with Myanmar. Like all frontiers, ‘Asia’s last frontier’ symbolized not only a land of opportunity, but also represented a space in which the self, the nation, could be rediscovered, where new challenges would reinvigorate the body politic, where Japan could recreate itself through the imprint of its experience on a ‘virgin’ territory. Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ thereby offered Japan further recognition as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ in the face of China’s rise. By appealing to ‘universal values’ and ‘rule of law’, the Abe Shinzō administrations (2012–​20) conjured an ethically benevolent Japan against a malevolent Chinese other. Prising Myanmar away from China’s influence demonstrated the success of Japan’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’ under Prime Minister Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 6

Introduction

Japan’s support for Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ was further testimony that Japan could reassert itself as a regional power following the demise of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations (2009–​ 12) and counter-​claims that Japan was in decline. For Abe, a vision of Japan as a ‘beautiful country’ (utsukushi kuni), push for economic reforms under the label ‘Abenomics’, and determination to pass controversial legislation, such as the State Secrecy Law in December 2013 and reinterpretation of the constitution in July 2014, were all necessary to revive Japan’s national spirit and economy, and ensure its long-​term security. Abe’s opponents voiced their concerns about his flouting of democratic processes, efforts to curtail citizen’s rights and the media, historical revisionism, and embrace of right-​wing nationalism (Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017). In March 2019, addressing LDP parliamentarians, US President Donald Trump’s chief strategist, Steve Bannon, praised Abe as ‘Trump, before Trump’, a populist leader commanding a leading industrialized state (Nakano, 2019). Japan’s ‘decidedly authoritarian turn’ under Abe (Nakano, 2019), overlaps with Myanmar’s transformation into a ‘disciplined democracy’. For both Japan and Myanmar, this period is a crucial one in their political histories.

Disciplined democracy/​human insecurity Even as the international community supported Myanmar’s democratic transition with economic assistance, ethnic tensions in Myanmar’s borderlands, notably between Buddhist and Muslim communities in the restive, northwestern state of Rakhine, erupted into violence. Communal tensions in Rakhine state in 2012 and 2013 were spurred on by nationalist Buddhist propaganda inciting violence against Muslims (Wade, 2017). The Muslim Rohingya minority,1 in particular, were singled out as an existential threat to Buddhist people in the Rakhine. Rohingya communities were forced off their land by local militias and corralled into Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps with no recourse to justice and scant access to basic human needs. Throughout Myanmar military forces looked on or acquiesced in these ethnic cleansing operations. Increasing numbers of Rohingya escaped across the border to refugee camps in Bangladesh or placed themselves in the hands of human traffickers who spirited them away to sea. In 2015, international pressure targeting human trafficking in Southeast Asia, specifically in neighbouring Thailand, stranded Rohingya migrants in the open ocean without provisions and at the mercy of the elements. The boat crisis received substantial international media attention, but apart from international non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), few questioned the trajectory of Myanmar’s democratic transition. Concerns about the nature of Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’ grew following a series of attacks against Myanmar border posts by the Arakan 7

Disciplining Democracies

Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on 9 October 2016, that killed ten police and seven soldiers. In retaliation, the Tatmadaw carried out extensive ‘area clearance operations’ in which crimes against humanity were perpetrated, including arbitrary killings and rape of Rohingya people. Though the violence subsided, it would erupt again following further ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017. By January 2018, nearly 690,000 Rohingya had fled the violence and sought refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh in what would become Asia’s biggest humanitarian crisis. The events brought international condemnation on the Tatmadaw and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government which opted to defend the country’s armed forces. Throughout, the Japanese government elected to work with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government rather than reprimand it and the Tatmadaw. Japan’s substantial investments and national interests in Myanmar trumped any duty to upholding human security. The Rohingya crisis, though the most publicized, was only one of a series of issues in Japan’s relationship with Myanmar that raised questions about Japan’s position as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ and self-​professed commitment to a ‘value-​based’ diplomacy. While promulgating a rhetoric of ‘universal’ values, Japanese foreign policy makers sought to tap Myanmar’s rich natural resources, cheap but well-​educated labour force, and gain a foothold in Myanmar’s burgeoning consumer market. The impact of Japan’s political and economic engagement with Myanmar on local communities and the country’s myriad ethnic conflicts has seldom been considered. This is in spite of the Japanese government’s commitment to human security to free individuals from fear and want in its foreign policy. This monograph adopts an Area Studies approach to examine the disjuncture between the discourse on Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ and the practice of Japan’s foreign policy with Myanmar, which has failed to protect human beings.

Area Studies and International Relations The International Relations (IR) literature on Japan’s relationship with Myanmar tends to portray the close ties as being due to geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. Japan needed to counter China’s influence in Myanmar and realize its economic objectives, notably through the construction of economic corridors connecting the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to the benefit of Japanese transnational production networks and trade. While the geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions are important, area specialists, such as Seekins (2007), draw attention to the historical interactions between Japan and Myanmar, demonstrating that the relationship extends beyond the calculation of material interest to encompass close personal bonds and friendly public perceptions on both sides. This monograph builds on Seekins’ insightful work to consider how an Area Studies approach can shed new light on Japan’s relationship with Myanmar and broader regional vision. 8

Introduction

Historically the relationship between Area Studies and IR has been a problematic one, with scholars of the former acting as informants for the latter, not least to further imperialism. As Area Studies evolved, so scholars became more critical of this relationship, questioning their work from postcolonial positions. The result is an Area Studies that begins by interrogating how areas are defined, by whom and for what purpose. Ontologically speaking, this is a fundamental distinction from IR, which takes relations between nation-​states to be its primary point of departure. Rather than understanding Japan–​Myanmar relations in interstate terms, this monograph asks how areas are contested. This requires an understanding of locality and positionality in order to ascertain how actors define who they are and the spaces in which they exist. In the case of Rakhine state in northwestern Myanmar, for example, ongoing ethnic and religious tensions between the Rohingya, Arakan Buddhists and Burmese Buddhist populations continue to erupt into violence over who has a right to the land. Taking a broader perspective on areas in Japan–​Myanmar relations reveals the economic connectivity of the Mekong subregion as being key to Japan’s ambitions to facilitate the operations of Japanese transnational production networks within the global political economy. At the same time, the construction of infrastructure to tie the Mekong subregion together has transformative effects on local areas, making previously geographically remote ethnic communities living in Myanmar’s borderlands more accessible. Such transformations create a myriad of new opportunities as areas are redefined, from employment to environmental exploitation and military control. Japan–​Myanmar relations are not static, but a dynamic reinterpretation of space for profit, particularly in the case of Myanmar when understood as ‘Asia’s last frontier’; a virgin land ripe for transformation. Comprehending such processes requires engaging with local positions, an awareness of the impacts of globalization, and the discursive construction of areas and policies, notably foreign policies. An Area Studies approach also requires critically reflecting on the complex histories and societies involved. The notion of ‘Asia’s last frontier’ should give us pause. This is not the first time that Myanmar has been perceived as a ‘virgin frontier land’ open to foreign domination. From the 1820s on, British imperialists expanded their empire through the Burmese heartland, exploiting the country’s rich resources and seeking a path to China’s southwest. Dense, malaria infested jungles replete with dangerous wildlife prohibited the construction of a British route to China through Burma; an idea that lay dormant until the outbreak of the second Sino-​ Japanese War (1937–​45). By 1939, the Japanese army had routed Chinese nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-​shek to Chongqing. In response, the Allies began to supply Chiang via the Burma Road, a transport route through mountainous northern Burma completed in 1938 by a 200,000 9

Disciplining Democracies

strong Burmese and Chinese workforce. Together with the promise of Burma’s rich natural resources, closing the Burma Road was a key incentive for the Japanese invasion of the country. By 1942, Japanese imperialist forces had swept through the Irrawaddy plains and controlled Burma’s key administrative centres and transport routes, including the Burma Road. The Japanese army’s supply lines remained precarious, however, with the Japanese navy overstretched and unable to reliably replenish Japanese forces in Burma. An alternative rail link from Rangoon to Bangkok was built to provision Japanese troops. It became known as the ‘death railway’ due to the brutal treatment and conditions that civilians and prisoners of war forced to work on it experienced at the hands of the Japanese army. Until the end of the Second World War, Burma was the far western frontier of the Japanese empire; a land divided not only by geography, but also by ethnicity as the Japanese enlisted the support of the majority Burmese Buddhist population to fight against the British and their allies among the country’s ethnic minority groups, including Rakhine Muslims who today identify as Rohingya. Japan’s invasion of Burma and the allied reconquest of the country would devastate its cities and agricultural zones alike, leaving a legacy that has ramifications to this day. The Japanese Imperial Army also helped establish and train the Burma Independence Army (BIA), which was led by young Burmese anti-​ imperialists known as the ‘thirty comrades’, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s father Aung San (Seekins, 2007: 24). Though Burma experienced periods of democratic reform after the Second World War when the country gained its independence, ultimately, the BIA would morph into the Tatmadaw and its military generals would come to dominate the government, particularly in the wake of General Ne Win’s 1962 coup d’état. As Seekins states: [R]‌adical political and social changes made possible during the Japanese occupation created a ‘post-​colonial’ state with an evocative and authentic (though selectively constructed) national identity, for the ethnic majority. But this was achieved at the price of excluding most of the indigenous and foreign ethnic minorities from the political-​ military centre. And after 1941, the ‘political’ and ‘military’ spheres were inseparable, since men with guns, rather than colonial officials or elected politicians, dominated the political stage. (Seekins, 2007: 15, emphasis in original) For Japanese political elites, the close ties shared between the BIA and Japan’s Imperial Army would help shape a close relationship through the course of the Cold War, with Burma becoming the first recipient of Japanese reparations.

10

Introduction

Japan–​Myanmar relations in perspective Despite their fascinating history, relatively little has been written in Japanese or English on the Japan–​Myanmar relationship. Seekins’ book Burma and Japan since 1940: From ‘Co-​prosperity’ to ‘Quiet Dialogue’ remains the most up-​to-​date overview of the relationship in English (Seekins, 2007). His work traces Japan’s relationship with Burma from the Second World War to the early 2000s to demonstrate how the bonds between the two countries were forged through a wartime alliance and cemented via aid during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the junta’s crackdown on the 1988 democratic uprising, Japan and Myanmar gradually and reluctantly drifted apart. Seekins’ analysis, though informative, misses the key political, economic and security developments of the last 10–​15 years. Seekins’ book is also descriptive and not theoretically driven. It is unable to provide an account of the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic developments connected to China’s rise and its BRI. Similarly, work by Nemoto Kei (2014; 2015), Japan’s foremost expert on the historical relationship between Japan and Burma/​Myanmar, provides essential reading on the foundations of the relationship, but only briefly tackles contemporary developments. Haacke’s (2006) account helpfully sets out how Japan has sought to engage Myanmar diplomatically rather than isolate it, as the EU and US have done, but was also published before Myanmar’s democratization process began. Edström (2009) also provides an overview of the Japan–​Myanmar relationship, but only touches on more recent developments and is more policy orientated. In more recent work, Lam Peng Er (2016) examines Japan’s engagement with Myanmar as the country democratized from 2010, to show that Japan is still able to compete with China in the region. While a timely account, Lam’s reliance on English-​language news and government sources does not engage the political and academic questions at the heart of this monograph. Ryan Hartley (2018a; 2018b) examined Japan’s relationship with Myanmar since 1988, covering Myanmar’s democratization process. Hartley provides a thorough foreign policy analysis, detailing how a network of Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, businesses and NGOs have set and sought to achieve Japan’s political and economic goals in Myanmar. Hartley’s work, though informative, does not engage with the central theoretical questions at the heart of this monograph. By analysing Japan’s foreign policy discourse in its relationship with Myanmar to understand how Japanese policy makers have used this relationship to promote an image of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, this monograph complements Hartley’s foreign policy analysis of the relationship. This monograph goes further by critiquing Japan’s ‘value-​diplomacy’ discourse and failure to secure human beings, if not its exacerbation of human insecurity.

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More generally, historical accounts by Thant Myint-​U (2001), Charney (2009), Taylor (2009) and Aung-​Thwin and Aung-​Thwin (2012) offer overarching accounts in which Japan figures from the Second World War onwards, but is not the focus of the analysis. Other histories, such as those by Smith (1999) and Callahan (2003), detail Burma’s long-​standing ethnic conflicts and are of particular relevance to understanding the fractious nature of the Myanmar state today. Alternatively, Steinberg’s (2001) detailed account of how the Myanmar state functions remains essential reading for those seeking to comprehend Burmese politics, but its foreign policy is only the subject of a couple of chapters in which Japan is not conspicuously present. Beyond these historical accounts, more recent Japanese scholarship examines Myanmar’s politics, economics and security; shedding some light on the implications for Japan. Edited volumes by Kudō Toshihiro (2012a; 2015a) provide in-​depth analysis of contemporary developments in Myanmar pertaining to democratization, ethnic conflicts, political and economic relations, among other issues. These volumes and other work by Kudō (2010; Kudō and Ōki, 2020) provide invaluable insights into how Japanese scholars perceive Myanmar today and shed some light on Japan’s relationship with Myanmar. Other books (Yamaguchi, 2012a; Yamaguchi and Terai, 2012; Mitsuhashi, 2013) tend to be more journalistic in tone and/​or biased in their assessment of Japan–​Myanmar relations, seeking to paint these relations in a rosy light that echoes the rhetoric of the Japanese government. Nakanishi Yoshihiro has written the most compelling academic account of the Rohingya crisis, including an assessment of Japan’s role (2021), making this book an important resource for the chapter on the Rohingya in this manuscript. More broadly, Thant Myint-​U’s book, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia (2011), does capture the emerging geostrategic and geoeconomic dimensions of Myanmar’s contemporary relations with its neighbours, but is more of a travelogue that side-​lines Japan. Thant Myint-​U’s more recent book entitled The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century (2020), charts the course of Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ providing insights into Myanmar’s domestic politics through his close connections to leading political figures. This book is complemented by Nemoto Kei’s (2019) monograph Myanmar Takes Flight that similarly charts the successes and pitfalls of Myanmar’s democratic transition, highlighting the challenges faced by the Aung San Suu Kyi administration. Japan does not figure prominently in Nemoto or Thant Myint-​U’s work and the advent of the coup, following the publication of these books, has changed the context of the Japan–​Myanmar relationship. A couple of recent books in Japanese do focus on Myanmar’s February 2021 coup d’état and the policy implications for Japan (Kitagawa, 2021; Nagasugi, 2021). These volumes provide useful descriptive narratives rather than an extensive academic treatment. In short, 12

Introduction

there is a need for a more critical, theoretically driven and up-​to-​date examination of the contemporary Japan–​Myanmar relationship that situates this relationship within the broader trends of Japan’s regional policy.

Structure of the book Following this introductory chapter that sets out the focus of the book, Chapter 1 addresses the core theoretical concerns that lie at the intersection between Area Studies and IR. Though Area Studies began as a key component of imperialist efforts to remake the non-​Western world in the image of the West and then to inform neoliberalist and neoimperialist projects during the Cold War, the field has since evolved to comprehend global politics differently from IR. Decades of self-​reflection on its troubled history has enabled a revitalized Area Studies agenda to form. As Area Studies has developed, so scholars have become increasingly vigilant of knowledge-​making practices and reflective of the subjectivity of research. By questioning how actors discursively constitute areas for specific ends, Area Studies rejects the ontological basis of IR that is grounded in a state-​centric approach. A revitalized Area Studies can make important contributions to both global politics and policy-​making communities, including: a focus on the grassroots; providing critical insights into complex societies and histories; an appreciation for the transmission of ideas through global networks; a concern with the impacts of globalization; the discursive construction of foreign policies; and an appreciation of area knowledge and philosophy. Collectively, these contributions encourage a re-​evaluation of Japan–​Myanmar relations that challenges existing accounts in the IR literature. Drawing on the theoretical foundations laid out in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines Japan’s designation as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’. A growing body of literature has championed Japan’s contribution to upholding the liberal international order in East Asia, notably through the Japanese government’s commitment to free trade deals. This literature side-​lines both the Japanese government’s supposed commitment to a ‘value-​based diplomacy’ and the historical context of Japan’s engagement with the East Asian region. While certain aspects of Japan’s regional vision are new, notably the securitization of Japan’s ODA programme, much of Japan’s contemporary regional vision incorporates ideas that have evolved over the course of Japan’s modern history. The chapter sketches these historical developments to demonstrate how the end of the Cold War culminated in critiques of Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order, requiring a rethink of Japan’s international security and developmental policies. By the early 21st century, the concept of human security had achieved a prominent place in Japan’s foreign policy lexicon, denoting a human-​centric approach to Japan’s international security 13

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and developmental contributions. It is upon this discursive foundation that Japanese foreign policy makers have developed their interpretation of the Free and Open Indo-​Pacific (FOIP) and contemporary regional vision as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’. The chapter concludes by examining the inconsistencies and contradictions inherent to the discourse of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, setting up the focus of the remaining chapters which unpacks this discourse in the context of contemporary Japan–​Myanmar relations. Building on the two foundational chapters, the book examines four case studies on contemporary Japan–​Myanmar relations from an Area Studies perspective. The first case study, covered in Chapter 3, explores the construction of Japanese foreign policy narratives concerning the evolving democratization process in Myanmar. The chapter argues that Japanese policy makers have consistently sought to distinguish their relations with Myanmar from other states in the international community by depicting Japan’s relationship with Myanmar in terms of bridging (kakehashi). The notion of Japan acting in this kakehashi role can be observed in the statements of various policy makers who imagine the Japanese state as a go-​between the international community and Myanmar, seeking to entice Myanmar into the liberal international order through ‘positive linkage’, namely Japan’s offer of ODA to the Myanmar government in return for steps towards democratization, such as the freeing of political prisoners. By democratizing, these Japanese policy makers argued, Myanmar could shed its ‘pariah’ status, enabling the West to lower economic sanctions and recognize it as a legitimate member of the international community. This chapter traces Japan’s responses to the evolution of Myanmar’s democracy in the post-​Cold War period with a particular emphasis on events after the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis through to the election of the NLD in the November 2015 general election. The human cost of economic development is the subject of Chapter 4. The primary incentive of both the Japanese government and businesses in encouraging Myanmar’s democratization process was to exploit the human and natural resources of the country and construct economic corridors across the Mekong region to facilitate trade. Japanese investment, aid and regulatory support would prompt Japanese firms to shift production away from China, where costs were steadily mounting, to new and more profitable sites, as well as to diversify their investment portfolios. The Japanese government’s support for Japanese business ventures in Myanmar was encapsulated in its sponsoring, through JICA, of the Thilawa SEZ. This landmark project put the ethical dimension of Japan’s ODA programme in Myanmar to the test. The Thilawa SEZ should have been developed in accordance with JICA’s ODA guidelines, which require that communities affected by the project be treated humanely and adequately compensated for any disruption to their lives and livelihoods. Instead, the land of the Thilawa residents was 14

Introduction

coercively appropriated, the residents were inadequately compensated and moved to an inappropriate relocation site where the quality of housing was poor and the conditions for life were unsanitary. Despite mounting a legal challenge against JICA with the help of Mekong Watch, a Japanese NGO, JICA conducted its own investigation that found that it was ‘not in non-​ compliance’ with its own guidelines. Japan’s support for the construction of the Dawei SEZ witnessed similar land grabs at the expense of the local population. The Thilawa and Dawei cases highlight a major discrepancy between Japanese policy makers’ rhetorical commitment to human security and the reality of neoliberal imperatives in Myanmar. Chapter 5 examines the Abe administration’s attempts to act as a peacemaker in Myanmar’s multiple and persistent ethnic conflicts. Intent on countering Chinese influences in Myanmar’s border regions, JICA dispersed ODA to help develop ethnic areas and the Abe administration turned to the Nippon Foundation to act as a mediator between the Myanmar government and the various ethnic groups. Since becoming involved in the ethnic conflicts, the Nippon Foundation has channelled sizeable funds into food aid, health care and resettlement programmes, as well as sponsoring dialogue between the different parties in the disputes. Though aid can play a role in resolving Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, there are numerous problems with Japan’s foreign policy in this case. First, the Japanese government has supported a state-​centric approach that has favoured Myanmar’s military government. Second, Japan’s approach has been based on the faulty assumption that democratization will engender peace. As the democratization process progressed, the international community pressured refugee camps on Myanmar’s borders to close, pushing refugees back into Myanmar where they were at the mercy of military forces. What little security and prospects these refugees had in the border camps gave way to a more precarious existence within Myanmar. Theirs is a bare life, devoid of political voice and at the mercy of the Myanmar government (Pasha, 2013; Shani, 2014). Third, the primary objective of Japan’s mediation and aid in ethnic areas is to secure economic gains and develop infrastructure that will facilitate the advance of neoliberalism in Myanmar. As in the case of the Thilawa SEZ, local communities are being displaced to make way for development and forced to be resilient in the face of dramatic change. At the same time, infrastructure developments allow the Myanmar military better access to areas of ethnic conflict, transforming the contours of the conflicts themselves. Chapter 6 details Japan’s response to the plight of the Rohingya people in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Since Myanmar’s democratization process began, the Rohingya, already a repressed people for decades surviving at the margins of society, have been subject to increasing acts of violence and depredation at the hands of Myanmar’s military and paramilitary forces. Assessing the 15

Disciplining Democracies

violence levelled against the Rohingya, the UN has condemned the Myanmar military and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government for perpetrating crimes against humanity. Despite this, the Japanese government has been noticeably silent, preferring to continue working with the Myanmar authorities in pursuit of their economic aims rather than critique them. Despite depicting Japan as a champion of universal values in Asia, successive Japanese governments have failed to come to the aid of one of the region’s most downtrodden people. This extends to Japan’s long-​standing refugee policy that aims to externalize refugee issues through funding the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations, rather than accepting refugees into Japan. Successive Japanese governments have watched on as an enduring refugee crisis centring on the Rohingya has unfolded, refusing to open its doors. From an ethical standpoint, the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis exemplifies how hollow Japan’s ‘value diplomacy’ rhetoric has been. This case raises important questions about who Japanese policy makers deem to be human; how lines are drawn between ‘insurable’ people in the developed world and those excluded, ‘uninsurable’ people of the developing and underdeveloped worlds. The Conclusion details Japan’s response to the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar in light of its decade long support for Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’. Myanmar’s military under the command of General Min Aung Hlaing overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government and brutally suppressed supporters who took to the streets in protest. Still eager to be seen as a ‘bridge’ between Myanmar and the international community, the Japanese government nevertheless emphasized its ability to steer Myanmar’s military leaders back to the path of democratization. As the coup began to fade from the international news, so the focus on the excesses of Myanmar’s military government gradually weakened, opening up the possibility of accepting the outcome of the coup. This marks an end to the illiberal tragedy of Japan’s engagement with Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’. It is an end in which the people of Myanmar are forced to remain resilient in the face of perpetual human insecurity. The Area Studies approach applied throughout this monograph encourages a critical reflection on Japan’s support for Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’. Notably, the discursive foundations of Japan’s policy towards Myanmar reveal the spatial, temporal and ethical inconsistencies and contradictions within its foreign policy discourse. By highlighting alternative discourses, possibilities may open for Japan’s relations with Myanmar to engage with its people from the bottom up. Nonetheless, the Conclusion remains pessimistic that a brighter and more prosperous future awaits Myanmar’s people.

16

1

The Evolution of New Area Studies Introduction The relationship between Area Studies and IR has been fraught. Area Studies began as a key component of imperialist efforts to remake the non-​ Western world in the image of the West and then to inform neoliberalist and neoimperialist projects during the Cold War. The cosy relationship between area specialists and policy makers compromised the academic freedom of the former from the outset, leading to the notion that Area Studies specialists were ‘real estate agents’, ‘a-​theoretical’ and ‘cameras not thinkers’, who confirmed Western theories by applying them to non-​Western cases. From this vantage point, the West became the active subject in the study of IR, relegating the non-​West to the position of passive objects. A key problem was the emergence of the mainstream IR discipline over the course of the Cold War. Rationalist, state-​centric approaches and an emphasis on positivist methodologies marginalized Area Studies contributions to the field of IR. Even contemporary assessments of the relationship between Area Studies and IR, such as by Acharya (2005; 2014), perceive the former as needing to conform to the latter. Decades of self-​reflection on this troubled history has enabled a revitalized Area Studies agenda, or ‘New Area Studies’ (Houben, 2017), to form. As Area Studies evolved, so scholars became increasingly vigilant of knowledge-​ making practices and reflective of the subjectivity of research. As a result, a revitalized ‘New Area Studies’ can make important contributions to both global politics and policy-​making communities, including: a focus on the grassroots; providing critical insights into complex societies and histories; an appreciation for the transmission of ideas through global networks; a concern with the impacts of globalization; and an appreciation of area knowledge and philosophy. The chapter begins by examining the relationship between Area Studies and IR. Next, the chapter re-​evaluates how an evolving ‘New Area Studies’ can contribute to our understanding of global politics. The chapter concludes by setting out the methodological approach applied in this study. 17

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Area Studies and International Relations The relationship between Area Studies and IR is inherently problematic. Area specialists served the state by providing information for colonial and imperial projects and then, during the Cold War, neoimperialist and neoliberalist projects (Dutton, 2002). In particular, the US government needed Area Studies specialists during the Cold War to realize its economic and security interests through the spread of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ (Szanton, 2002; Calhoun, 2003). While Szanton (2002) notes that there were exceptions, from the outset, Area Studies were ethically compromised, as ‘an integral part of a modernist project that sought to remake the world in the image of the west’ (Goss and Wesley-​Smith, 2010: xii). Area Studies centres were therefore funded by institutions including the Department of Defense, Ford Foundation, Social Science Research Council and Fulbright programme, among others, and worked for US policy makers (Calhoun, 2003). As Cumings states, ‘power and money had found their subject first, and shaped fields of inquiry accordingly’ (2002: 179). Particularly in the US, close ties between government and Area Studies shaped how the latter conducted research and taught its subject matter. By being subordinate to the demands of intelligence gathering, academic freedom was undermined, limiting the extent to which marginal views could be presented (Cumings, 2002). This ‘politically co-​opted “Area Studies” ’ was guided by the threat perceptions of the West (Goto-​Jones, 2011: 94) and served to reify the West and ‘reduce the “non-​Western” into objects of study for the so-​called West, denying the vast majority of the globe its subjectivity and positing it as only a source of data (for the West to analyse in its own terms) and not of innovation or theory’ (Goto-​Jones, 2011: 91). In traditional Area Studies approaches, the West represented a position, usually a term of self-​reference, which designated the speaker as an authority over non-​Western areas (Sakai, 2012: 77–​8). The enunciation of ‘the West’ was therefore a ‘disciplinary apparatus’ of Area Studies regulating ‘how observers enunciate themselves, deploy objects of inquiry, imagine their relations with those objects, and distinguish themselves from the people about whom they claim to produce knowledge’ (Sakai, 2012: 87). Academic disciplines were reified as a ‘static ideal of reason’, whereas areas were denigrated as particularistic (Cheah, 2008: 55–​8, 64). Despite relying on area knowledge, the discipline of IR has perceived the language acquisition and local knowledge needed to study areas as dangerous and compromising, with area specialists suspected of representing the interests of their area rather than those of their state. Few attempts were made to seek out, engage and listen to ‘foreign voices’ on an equal footing that acknowledged the hierarchical relationships and structures of knowledge production. 18

The Evolution of New Area Studies

The discipline of IR has similarly been prone to perceiving ‘foreign areas’ as case studies for theories based on Western philosophies and scholarship, such as realist and modernization approaches, rather than areas being sources of theoretical development (Goss and Wesley-​Smith, 2010: xi–​xii; Goto-​ Jones, 2011). This approach reifies the notion of a modern West whose position at the apex of progress can interpret developments around the world (Pollock, 2010; Goto-​Jones, 2011). For Dutton (2002: 501), the problem is one of translation in which the West employs theory to make the non-​ West understandable in its own terms. As a result, the discipline of IR has perceived area specialists as ‘real estate agents’, ‘a-​theoretical’ and ‘cameras not thinkers’ (Acharya, 2005: 2). Instead of attempting to engage with theoretical principles beyond the West, Western-​centric theories and assumptions in IR were deployed to interpret the contributions of area scholars, fitting their contributions to universal expectations rather than attempting to understand the unique situations ‘on the ground’ (Cumings, 2002). The roots of this problem lie in the evolution of the discipline of IR itself. Mainstream IR has tended to adopt positivist, quantitative and rational choice theories that purport to explain the world from a supposedly objective vantage point. The dominant theories of IR, realism, liberalism and mainstream versions of constructivism depict the world as anarchical, in that there is no higher authority to govern the behaviour of states, which are the central actors in IR. States are unitary, rational actors fixated on issues of high politics, such as war, the national interest and the balance of power. The discipline is predominantly positivist, drawing on quantitative methodologies and rational choice theory. By choosing what to emphasize and what to ignore, Smith (2004) argues that the discipline of IR ‘sings the world into being’, making the discipline complicit in the numerous problems that plague our world today. As Smith (2002) notes, mainstream IR theory marginalizes critical issues, including global inequality, famine, disease, non-​state actors and culture, among others, significantly limiting how we see, debate and act in our world (Smith, 2002). The evolution of IR as a Western-​centric discipline has led to imbalances in citations, publications and career trajectories, reinforcing its Western-​ centrism. As Wæver (1998) and Smith (2002) note, the key to success in an IR career is to publish in one of the ‘top’ IR journals, which is inherently difficult because of low acceptance rates. This leads academics to tailor their work to suit what editors perceive as being ‘good’ IR; views that are predominantly based on traditional theories. In the ‘top’ US IR journals, the overwhelming number of publications are by scholars based in Western institutions who concentrate on rational choice, positivism and mainstream theories (Wæver, 1998: 698–​702). These theoretical choices become embedded and reproduced in these journals over time, relegating alternative approaches to the margins of the discipline (Smith, 2002). This essentially 19

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constitutes an exercise in disciplinary gatekeeping in which those who might challenge dominant accounts in the field are kept out (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004). An example of this can be seen in a response from Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, three well-​known scholars in the field of IR, to postmodern accounts of global politics in International Organization, a ‘top’ US IR journal. They state: IO [International Organization] has been committed to an enterprise that postmodernism denies: the use of evidence to adjudicate between truth claims. In contrast to conventional and critical constructivism, postmodernism falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise, and in IR research it risks becoming self-​referential and disengaged from the world, protests to the contrary notwithstanding. (Katzenstein et al, 1998: 678) Indeed, postmodernist and poststructuralist contributions to the study of global politics were immediately depicted as being humanities approaches in confrontation with IR when they began to engage the discipline from the late 1980s (Rosenau, 1990). Of course, no discipline is static and IR is no exception. Numerous IR scholars now reinterpret and question the problematic history of the discipline and the situatedness of scholarship vis-​à-​vis its subject matter. Nonetheless, IR remains a discipline that is perceived as being behind the times. Not until the 1980s did poststructural and feminist accounts begin to enter the discipline, albeit relegated to the margins (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004). While Area Studies scholars have been questioning Eurocentric approaches across a variety of disciplines for decades (Chow, 1998), such criticism has only entered the lexicon of IR more recently. This can in part be explained by the intimate relationship between the IR discipline and policy-​making communities, particularly in the US, and again by the dominance of mainstream IR ‘gatekeepers’. There have been calls for Area Studies scholars to contribute more to the discipline of IR. Notably, Acharya (2005; 2014), Kaczmarska and Ortmann (2021) and Newby (2021) explore what Area Studies scholars can offer to IR, arguing that Area Studies should not exclude IR but engage it.1 Common to all these calls for Area Studies to engage IR is a perception that a static and parochial Area Studies needs to conform to the discipline of IR (for a critique, see Black, 2022). Within Area Studies there are scholars who do focus on contributing to the discipline of IR in the ways that Kaczmarska and Ortmann, Newby and Acharya intend, but there are also many Area Studies scholars who perceive global politics differently and whose work does not revolve around dominant approaches in or questions posed by IR. Few IR scholars consider how Area Studies offers alternative ways of thinking 20

The Evolution of New Area Studies

about global politics without reference to the discipline of IR and that Area Studies has evolved beyond its traditional state-​and policy-​centric focus.

The evolution of ‘New Area Studies’ Area Studies has moved on to challenge its problematic past and seek out new avenues for the field to develop. Several features of a revitalized ‘New Area Studies’ are worth setting out. These points do not constitute a theoretical paradigm shift for the IR discipline. There is a good deal of IR scholarship that connects with the concerns of ‘New Area Studies’. The following points do stress the need for reassessing Area Studies scholarship in all its diversity to understand developments in global politics. First, the ontological start point for Area Studies is to question how ‘areas’ are defined, by whom and for what purpose. The notion of ‘areas’ in Area Studies thereby raises the core question ‘where is here’, requiring that scholars problematize spatial categories rather than accept them (LIAS, 2012). Rethinking or questioning space in Area Studies entails (re)politicizing issues at different levels of analysis (Smith, 2010). By doing so, the politics inherent in the construction of areas can be exposed. The discursive construction of ‘areas’ became a more prominent concern of area scholars as the advent of globalization challenged Area Studies and the meaning of an ‘area’ itself. By the end of the Cold War, Area Studies faced new challenges, not only in terms of diminished funding, but also in terms of settled geopolitical categories suddenly becoming unstable, particularly with the advance of neoliberal globalization (Goss and Wesley-​ Smith, 2010; Smith, 2010: 25; Sidaway, 2012). The advent of globalization thereby exacerbated many of the problems faced by traditional approaches to Area Studies, while opening up opportunities for its development. The initial challenge came from writers like Barber (1996), Ohmae (1999) and Friedman (2007) who maintained that the advance of globalization was leading to a homogenizing, borderless or flattening world in which the primary ‘area’ of study had become the globe. Area Studies scholars responded by arguing that such accounts were wholly inadequate. These broad-​brush attempts to understand a globalizing world merely provided ‘ideological camouflage’ for global power, reproducing the myth of the inevitable progress of neoliberalism (Smith, 2010: 29) and failed to comprehend how globalization has intensified disparities between rich and poor around the world (Szanton, 2002). Area Studies scholars therefore challenged such accounts of globalization by locating power, exposing the inequalities and injustices by repoliticizing the impacts of globalization (Smith, 2010: 29), and demonstrating how globalizing forces are ‘mediated and shaped by local histories, structures, and dynamics’ (Szanton, 2002: 18). 21

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The advance of globalization also questioned the nature of ‘areas’ themselves by drawing attention to the interconnectivity, networks and diversity from the local through to the global level (Slocum and Thomas, 2003; Davidson and Goldberg, 2004). Area Studies scholars had long been aware of these issues, perceiving areas in terms of their historical permeability and transformation (van Schendel, 2002). For example, the disjuncture between ethnic groups and state borders defined by imperialist practices demonstrates how areas overlap with each other rather than one area ‘ending where the next one begins’ (van Schendel, 2002: 650). Area Studies embraced the notion that areas were not given, but socially constructed, conditioning how social practices evolve in any given area (Smith, 2010: 26–​9). So rather than comprehend Area Studies as the summation of scholarly work on diverse bounded areas, the field today examines how ideas and people move, how technologies and philosophies are shared and interact to produce new knowledge. Second, rather than contribute to policy making by acting as informants who provide insights into political and economic developments in states around the world, Area Studies scholars today focus on how global politics impacts and is understood by individuals and communities; how the grassroots express their experience of the world (Goss and Wesley-​Smith, 2010). Doing so entails a combination of area familiarity, linguistic expertise and receptivity to multidisciplinary approaches (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004: 57, 59; LIAS, 2012), as well as a willingness to listen to how others express their experiences (Hutchings, 2011). Area Studies scholars are acutely aware that accessing the voices of the oppressed can be problematic. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s seminal article ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1993), raised key questions about whether it was even possible for the subaltern to articulate a position, given the repressive discourses of patriarchy and imperialism that conditioned how the other was understood. Numerous responses to her article continue to bring the issue of voice and representation to the centre of Area Studies concerns. As part of the humanities, Area Studies scholars therefore do not seek to explain phenomena in terms of iron laws or ‘regularities in social life’ (Edgar and Pattison, 2006: 94), but instead try to understand what human beings value in their lives, how these values have changed over time, and to question these values as a contribution to a debate on how else human societies might live in the future (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004; Harpham, 2005; Edgar and Pattison, 2006).2 Area Studies, like the humanities as a whole, are therefore concerned with how human agency has been articulated and set down in myriad formats that inform how we live and ought to live (Bullen et al, 2004; Harpham, 2005; Bate, 2011; Howells, 2011).3 These values can only be understood via a deep knowledge of context, an appreciation of the complexity of that context and the linguistic abilities to decipher what these 22

The Evolution of New Area Studies

values mean within that given context. By investigating what human societies value, the humanities adopt a comparative approach that seeks to learn from other societies (Bate, 2011). For Cheah (2008), sharing the perspectives and experiences of people across different areas can be understood in terms of an ongoing and evolving expression of universality. In so doing, Cheah (2008) radically destabilizes the traditional distinction between Western-​centric disciplinary claims to universality versus the parochialism of Area Studies. Third, as no single discipline can encompass the complexity of any given context, so a receptivity to multidisciplinary work is required (Cumings, 2002; Szanton, 2002). This means delving into the complex evolution of multiple disciplines and engaging scholars from other disciplinary backgrounds. The contrast with IR here is stark. IR scholars tend to appropriate insights and retool methodologies from ‘foreign’ disciplines without regard to central disciplinary debates (Vrasti, 2008). While this serves to further isolate IR from other academic disciplines, it also has dramatic and troubling implications for state practices. For example, the US military’s ‘Human Terrain System’ incorporated ethnographic expertise in the social sciences and humanities to better understand and control foreign populations during the war on terror (Der Derian et al, 2010). Such attempts to further imperialist objectives fail to comprehend the problematic history of the ethnographic method in anthropology and subvert an approach to investigate how human beings understand their world into a means to manage them. Fourth, understanding any given area also requires a critical engagement with its history. As part of the humanities, area scholars develop a critical conscience about the past that exposes violations of human dignity and their perpetrators, regardless of their position (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004: 58). Traditional approaches to Area Studies were guilty of speaking for and about foreign others, and it was not until the publication of Edward Said’s seminal work on Orientalism in 1978 that area scholars began to fundamentally challenge the Western-​centrism of Area Studies (Goss and Wesley-​Smith, 2010; Sidaway, 2012). Drawing on Said’s work, this approach to history could be understood as a contrapuntal reading, whereby both the history of empire and resistance are incorporated and Euro-​centric histories are upended (Chowdhry, 2007; Seth, 2011; Bilgin, 2016). At the same time, humanities scholars must be self-​aware of their power to reinterpret the past and of how their efforts might be employed by others (Harpham, 2005). Conducting research in the humanities is a cautious endeavour that requires constant self-​ reflection for the scholar to realize as accurate an interpretation of the text as possible (Harpham, 2005). As Harpham (2005: 32) writes, ‘to read is to struggle to understand a mind that struggled to express itself, and this shared struggle is one of the bases for communication between author and reader’. This raises the issue of translation in academic work. Capan et al (2021) examine the politics of translation in IR to critique the ways in which the 23

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discipline of IR has understood translation as either transplantation (that is, transplanting knowledge and norms from active agent A to passive agent B) or transmission (that is, the transmission of knowledge across space as a coherent, packaged whole). With both of these approaches, the translator seeks to render the object of study intelligible to their audience in the familiar terminology of the IR discipline. As Dutton (2002: 501) argues, translation is ‘the power of the West to extract, replicate, and make anything, anywhere, portable and intelligible in its own terms’ (Dutton, 2002: 501). By contrast, Capan et al (2021) understand translation in terms of transformation; namely that translation is a political act that is transformative by nature. Translation does not allow language to remain the same, but creates new understandings that can include as well as exclude, or establish new restrictions on political action or remove existing ones. Translation is always in process. In the context of Japan studies, Johnson (1980) emphasizes the complexities of the Japanese language and the pitfalls of translation, particularly with regard to politics. He maintains that it takes both linguistic skill as well as cultural understanding to make sense of Japanese politics. Specifically, Johnson (1980) emphasizes the omote (front) and ura (back) aspects of Japanese culture, whereby the researcher has to appreciate that the overt meaning (omote) of the interlocutor conceals their true intention (ura). Though the dynamics of omote and ura are not unique to Japan, Johnson asserts that they are ‘more pronounced in Japan’ (Johnson, 1980: 91). There is a danger here of accepting a culturally essentialist argument that it is the distinct aspects of Japanese culture that are responsible for miscommunications. Such a position negates the centrality of agency in politics. Johnson is aware of this problem, noting that this is the intent behind the ‘Japanese [who] have on occasion sought advantage in the difficulties of their language’ (1980: 115). This volume, while noting the disparity between the foreign policy rhetoric and practice of the Japanese government, also critiques how and for what ends policy makers manipulate language. By exposing the contradictions inherent to Japan’s foreign policy discourse, the argument seeks to destabilize this discourse, opening up new opportunities for critique and change. Fifth, researchers must understand their own situatedness vis-​à-​vis their research and embrace a diversity of knowledge, experiences and subject positions (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004: 58–​9). This is what the Area Studies core course at Leiden refers to as a ‘global positioning sensitivity’4; a sensitivity about how knowledge is produced about others and whom this benefits. The texts that humanities scholars study remain open to multiple reinterpretations, which in themselves contribute to broader debates about human life that can never be resolved (Harpham, 2005). Imagination, creativity, critique and argumentation skills are therefore at the heart of the humanities (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004; Edgar and Pattison, 2006). Humanities scholars question the notion that research can be value-​free. 24

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Both the researcher and the subject of research are embedded in a social environment that conditions how they see the world and from which they cannot detach themselves. Instead, humanities scholars emphasize the need for a reflexive approach that brings the socialization of the researcher and the subject of research into question (Foucault, 1966 [1973]; Smith, 2004). Bueger and Villumsen (2013) therefore emphasize the need for IR scholarship to acknowledge the positionality of the researcher, consider a myriad of theoretical perspectives, seek out narratives that have been marginalized, query dominant concepts, and question how knowledge is produced and for whom. Sixth, in accepting the subjective nature of research and the positionality of the researcher towards their subject matter, Area Studies locates itself firmly within the humanities and therefore emphasizes interpretative methods and critical analysis (Small, 2013). The critical analysis referred to here goes beyond much of the work labelled critical in IR, which is, as Hobson (2007) notes, often written from the perspective of Western standpoints and informed by Western theory. What Hobson (2007) calls a post-​racist IR is one that perceives all actors (Western and non-​Western) as active agents, and understands East and West as co-​constituting in a dialectical relationship. Seventh, understanding the complexity of a specific area and engaging voices from the grassroots means that Area Studies are policy relevant. As Davidson and Goldberg (2004: 58–​9) note, because no policy can be successful without an understanding of social, cultural and historical contexts, Area Studies scholars, as part of the humanities, have a duty to inform policy-​making communities through clear and purposeful argumentation. Indeed, the focus on teaching critical thinking and argumentation skills, which is at the heart of the humanities, can foster politically engaged citizens and informed policy and decision makers (Drakeman, 2016: viii, xi, 5). The emphasis on understanding history in the humanities can both inform contemporary choices in society and government, as well as to highlight that such choices are usually contested and therefore seldom easy to make or to realize (Bate, 2011). The humanities emphasis on values and ethics can also be applied to other disciplines, such as the hard sciences, to question the motives and impacts of ‘advances’ in technology, commerce, politics and law (Bate, 2011; Drakeman, 2016: 7). It is crucial to recognize, however, that the policy contribution made by area scholars is likely to be critical of foreign policies that are focused on securing national interests. Such foreign policies fail to understand the complexity of any given situation by not considering the impacts of foreign policy on local communities or appreciating the historical context. Eighth, one attempt to decentre the Western-​centrism of mainstream IR has been to explore the possibility of non-​Western IR theory. For some, like Acharya and Buzan (2010), this project is limited to adding more colour to 25

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IR theory. For others, Area Studies can offer far more to mainstream social science disciplines, like IR. Area Studies can disrupt orthodox positivist accounts in the social sciences (Dutton, 2002: 502, 526) and contribute to research that is more inclusive in terms of its consideration of various perspectives and positions (Szanton, 2002). Nonetheless, there are numerous concerns related to the enterprise of generating non-​Western IR theory. The West–​non-​West framing denotes a problematic binary that ignores exchanges between the West and non-​ West or reifies Western approaches, only to relegate the non-​West to the position of a subaltern who cannot speak (Spivak, 1993). For Chen (2011), the oppositional logic of West–​non-​West is a ‘Hegelian trap’ leading to the creation of nationalist schools of thought that replicate the same fallacies as hegemonic IR. Just because a theory is produced outside ‘the West’, wherever that is, does not mean it is necessarily accurate or compelling, nor does it mean that Area Studies scholars should seek out non-​Western IR theories and act as advocates for them (Goto-​Jones, 2011). As Chow (1998: 3, 6) notes, attempts to establish ‘Chinese’ approaches have only resulted in a ‘narcissistic’ and ‘megalomaniac’ reification of supposedly unique Chinese characteristics. Instead, Chen (2011) asserts the need to think in post-​Western terms that acknowledge the deep exchange of thought across time and space, a concern that is shared in Area Studies. The key here is first that comparison should not always be with European political thought, as there are ideas that may resonate between different cultures, but receive little treatment in Europe, and second, that rather than comparing ideas because they derive from different spaces, it is the comparison of common ideas that is of importance regardless of their origin (Goto-​Jones, 2011). Linked to this is the importance of recognizing the interaction and transmission of ideas across time and space (Hobson, 2007).

‘New Area Studies’ and the discursive construction of Japan–​Myanmar relations These eight tenets of ‘New Area Studies’ guide this investigation of Japan–​ Myanmar relations. This study is critical of state-​centric, rational actor theories, such as realism and liberalism, that understand national interests in material terms and as fixed. It assesses how norms and culture influence behaviour, but, attentive to critiques of ethnocentrism and exceptionalism, this study comprehends norms and cultures as constructed discourses that benefit some at the expense of others. This study is sensitive to how historical accounts are political and constructed by diverse actors. An engagement with historical narratives enables scholars to contextualize foreign policy discourses temporally and to understand how specific discourses have evolved over time, as well as what these discourses exclude or side-​line and why. Finally, this 26

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study draws on ‘New Area Studies’ to operate freely across levels of analysis and to question how any given ‘area’ is constituted, by whom, and for what ends. It comprehends areas to be both physically and discursively contested spaces by a myriad of actors. ‘New Area Studies’ does not take agency for granted. Drawing on a rich postcolonial tradition, area scholars are aware of how agency can be concealed, misrepresented and marginalized. They are therefore open and reflective of the ethical implications of their work, as well as of their biases and the subjective nature of research. They are sensitive to locality and positionality when seeking to understand how actors define and contest the areas in which they exist. The methodological approach in this volume analyses Japan’s foreign policy discourse to understand how Japan’s national interests are explained and justified. The argument demonstrates a concern with the broader historical context and examines how foreign policy actors articulate and comprehend history is specific ways to realize national or personal interests. In order to make sense of this discourse and its core elements, this volume considers a wide range of sources including foreign policy documents, speeches, news articles and academic work, among others. The sources referenced are in both Japanese and English, reflecting a concern with how Japan’s foreign policy discourse operates domestically and internationally. The focus of the argument is not on revealing the decision-​making process of the Japanese government as regards its foreign policy towards Myanmar, which is covered well by authors such as Hartley (2018a; 2018b). The aim of this volume is to complement such work by providing an alternative and critical angle. Japanese policy makers have stressed a variety of competing values in their diplomacy, and at times played down specific values, demonstrating a sensitivity towards how they would like Japan’s foreign policy to be understood. Such articulations constitute a sense of what Japan represents, what Japan’s regional, if not global, role is purported to be, and accordingly how Japan should act. An emphasis on discourse is therefore central to this study of Japan–​Myanmar relations and the methodology deployed in this research draws heavily on poststructural and postcolonial approaches, and discourse analysis.5 The volume acknowledges and builds on the work of constructivists who examine Japan’s foreign policy discourse, including Gustafsson (2014), Bukh (2015), Hagström (2015), Kolmaš (2017), Hanssen (2020) and Tamaki (2020). At the same time, this volume distances itself from constructivist works, particularly those which reference Japan’s identity and ontological security, that reify Japan as having a specific identity, for example, pacifist/​benevolent, that the Japanese government abides by. Such work belongs to a traditional understanding of Area Studies that contributes to the IR discipline by applying Western-​centric IR theories to Japan, a non-​Western case study. Such work can reinforce a problematic belief in Japan’s exceptionalism and speak to the interests and ideology of Japanese 27

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right-​wing nationalists, who perceive Japan as unique, altruistic and peaceful. By contrast, this volume critically analyses how policy makers and elites construct foreign policy discourses to realize Japan’s national interests. It seeks to understand the roots of these discourses and to deconstruct Japan’s foreign policy discourse to reveal its inherent contradictions and inconsistencies. This volume challenges the notion that Japan has an identity that is fixed or that merely shifts from one identity, such as pacifist, to a new identity, such as a ‘normal’ state, in response to the prevailing international circumstances. The essential problem here lies in how discourse is understood. This volume agrees with Dunn and Neumann’s definition of discourse as ‘systems of meaning-​production that fix meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it’ (2016: 4). Powerful actors produce hegemonic discourses that impose meaning on the world, such that these meanings become common-​sense understandings that are reinforced by social and historical practices to become a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1991: 73), repressing alternative discourses (Howarth, 2010). As Howarth (2010: 313) argues, ‘every discursive formation … involves the exercise of power, as well certain forms of exclusion, and this means that every discursive structure is uneven and hierarchical’. Foreign policy makers continually perpetuate and reinforce such hegemonic discourses about their state’s foreign policy in order to assert what their state stands for, but also to justify their foreign policy by juxtaposing the actions of their state against threatening others (Campbell, 1992). Foreign policy makers seek to legitimate their state’s core values and reinforce representations of their state by exporting their values and having them be accepted by others, while delegitimizing the values of their opponents. Policy makers are thereby engaged in a continual process of transforming others to make them like themselves, while simultaneously emphasizing their state’s distinctiveness. Hegemonic discourses can nonetheless be challenged and replaced by counter-​hegemonic discourses. Howarth (2010) refers to moments of dislocation during which the hegemonic discourse has trouble explaining or justifying existing policy. As the hegemonic discourse falters, so alternative discourses may emerge to win the consent of the population. Hanssen (2020), for example, notes how temporal othering is a key feature of Japan’s security identity discourse. He perceives identity discourses as competing with each other and details how over time Japan’s security discourse shifts from the Yoshida Doctrine to the normal nation discourse. Hanssen (2020) cites the 1990–​1 Gulf War as an example of a dislocation in Japan’s foreign policy discourse as Japan’s failure to dispatch troops led to critiques of chequebook diplomacy and the demise of the Yoshida Doctrine (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of this dislocation). Rather than hegemonic discourses shifting places with counter-​hegemonic ones, Dunn and Neumann (2016: 3–​4) emphasize a poststructural position 28

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that perceives discourse as emergent and relational in the sense that meanings are never closed, fixed or permanent, but constantly in process. This understanding of discourse in process reveals how foreign policy discourses are not internally consistent, but rather intertwined, fluid and contradictory. For example, the Abe administration relied on both the discursive construction of Japan as a peaceful democratic state after the Second World War and Japan’s status as Asia’s oldest democracy to juxtapose Japan’s supposedly benevolent regional policy with China’s assertive approach. The contradiction inherent in this temporal othering lies in both the temporal break that underlines the end of the Second World War as a moment of discursive dislocation and change, while simultaneously referencing the temporal continuity embedded in Japan’s long-​standing democratic traditions dating to the early 20th century. Thus, though policy makers may believe that their discursive constructions are whole and complete, inevitably fractures appear, splitting the constructed image and necessitating renewed efforts to sustain the fiction of a stable discourse. Such an analysis is reflected in the works of numerous postcolonial scholars, who stress that the experience of colonialism and neocolonialism negatively affects the psychology not only of the colonized, but also of the colonizer (Césaire, 1955; Memmi, 1965; Nandy, 1983). For example, Nandy emphasizes in his work how British discourses of colonialism reified aggressive ‘masculine’ ideals and degraded values that challenged the dominant discourse, such as critical thought, labelling these ‘feminine’ (1983: 30–​3). He adds that the creation of a British colonial identity required a homogeneous sense of self, papering over the vast social and class inequalities that pervaded the country at the time (Nandy, 1983: 35). One of the many contributions of postcolonial and poststructural thought is that one need not wait for an externally induced dislocation to challenge a hegemonic discourse. The emergent nature of all discourse leaves it always open to critique. Because foreign policy discourses remain arbitrary, hiding numerous other possibilities of what a state might represent and how it might act, a core aim of a poststructural approach is to ask how a particular interpretation or representation came about and to challenge this interpretation by examining which discourses have been excluded or marginalized (Campbell, 2007). Exposing marginalizations and exclusions and highlighting alternatives can generate counter-​hegemonic discourses that aim to ‘free’ individuals from a specific ‘regime of truth’ (Ashley, 1981: 227). Though such an emancipatory process is ultimately ephemeral, as counter-​hegemonic discourses give rise to new hegemonic discourses in an ‘endlessly repeated play of dominations’ (Foucault, 1971: 85), the importance of seeking out marginalized or excluded discourses is at the heart of politics (Edkins and Zehfuss, 2005: 461). There is no single, correct solution in any given case. Actors are embedded in a social world, the problems of which they are 29

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trying to respond to, making them part of the problem (Zehfuss, 2009b). Drawing on the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida, Zehfuss argues that we are confronted by a variety of options that are not necessarily reconcilable, presenting us with an aporia, or non-​way (Edkins and Zehfuss, 2005; Zehfuss, 2009a). Deciding how to address an aporia requires a ‘leap of faith’, a judgment in the knowledge that an attempt to do what is ‘right’ may result in some ‘wrong’ (Zehfuss, 2009a). That helping some may come at the expense of others (Zehfuss, 2009a). The emphasis should always be on keeping the political debate going, even once a decision has been reached (Campbell, 1992: 203; Edkins and Zehfuss, 2005). Alternative paths should always be considered as they may lead to new approaches. As Zehfuss (2009b) argues, ‘what is conceivable has changed over time and therefore there is no reason to assume that the world as we know it now will or must remain as it is’ (2009b: 495) and that ‘thinking about something in a different way can already be an intervention, part of changing the world’ (2009b: 496). To expose how foreign policy discourses function, it is necessary to demonstrate how a particular ‘text’ operates to legitimize certain understandings and delegitimize alternatives through discourse analysis (Milliken, 1999: 230; Devetak, 2005). As Campbell argues: [P]‌oststructural approaches need to be understood as interventions in conventional understandings or established practices … contrary to the logic of causal explanation, a poststructural approach works with a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloging, calculating, & specifying ‘real causes’, and concerns itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. (Campbell, 2007: 219) We therefore have to ask constitutive questions, such as how did a certain representation or understanding come about, who does this benefit and how can it be destabilized (Hansen, 2006)? Hansen’s approach to discourse analysis distinguishes between three discursive strategies that are employed to create specific meanings (2006). First, ‘spatiality’ refers to processes that distinguish the self from the other. It is concerned with how boundaries are established and maintained. Second, ‘temporality’ delineates how actors interpret their position in relation to time and how they understand progress. Finally, ‘ethicality’ relates to just and unjust behaviour, who is responsible and for what. The combination of these different discursive strategies is ultimately unstable and cannot logically be maintained. Destabilizing a discourse therefore requires a deconstruction of the arguments being made to expose the assumptions and logic upon which they are based (Zehfuss, 2009a). Doing so raises the possibility of rethinking 30

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any given discourse by exposing what is being omitted and marginalized (Zehfuss, 2009b). Such a discourse analysis works on two levels, namely establishing meaning within the discourse, or ‘studying discourses as systems of signification’ (Milliken, 1999: 231–​6), and examining how the discourse is reproduced (Milliken, 1999: 236–​42). Meaning within a discourse can be identified in a number of texts through a variety of different techniques, such as predicate or metaphorical analysis that identify how words, phrases and images designate actors and the relationships between them (Milliken, 1999: 232–​5). The reproduction of a discourse can be seen in terms of how dominant notions of common sense prevail over possible alternatives, as Milliken emphasizes, ‘an elite’s “regime of truth” made possible certain courses of action by a state … while excluding other possibilities as unintelligible or unworkable or improper’ (Milliken, 1999: 236). To consider the possibility of different foreign policy action requires individuals to be self-​reflective about the dominant discourses in their society. Rossdale (2015: 376–​7) maintains that if an individual is to act ethically and responsibly they need to reflect on how their self-​understandings are not reliable but ‘unstable’, ‘incomplete’ and ‘intersubjective’. For example, in an attempt to assert a state’s stable foreign policy discourse, policy makers dictate the history of their state, even to the point of criminalizing certain interpretations of history (Mälksoo, 2015). As contradictory perspectives will always emerge as actors from different states perceive the same historical event in alternative ways, achieving a stable foreign policy discourse becomes impossible and instead fuels interstate hostilities (Mälksoo, 2015: 226). It is therefore imperative not to close down debates about history, but to keep them open (Mälksoo, 2015: 226–​31; Rossdale, 2015: 378, 380). Though such openness towards discourses about what a state represents and how it should act exposes the contradictions inherent to the discourse, it is vital that these contradictions are engaged rather than blindly accepted or glossed over (Rossdale, 2015: 384). This approach can be ‘a potentially generative and creative force’ that continually pushes the individual to question what their state stands for, whether it lives up to its commitments and to propose how their state might evolve alternative foreign policies (Browning and Joenniemi, 2017: 43–​4). Thinking Japan’s foreign policy otherwise also requires an engagement with local actors who are directly impacted by Japan’s foreign policy. This engagement is necessary not only to expose how the realization of Japan’s national interests can come at the expense of local communities, but also to listen to how local actors articulate different understandings of ‘areas’, in terms of the contours, meanings, values and aspirations attributed to these ‘areas’. These alternative definitions of ‘areas’ are juxtaposed against those that find expression in Japanese foreign policy and Myanmar’s domestic policy to 31

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consider how these policies might be reformulated to place local communities at the centre of the decision-​making process. Accessing the voices of local communities is not straightforward. The opinions of local actors are often apparent in local news sources and civil society reports, which are cited throughout the case study chapters. At the same time, sensitivity is required to ensure that local voices and agency are not misrepresented or manipulated to speak for the objectives of states and non-​state actors alike. Conducting interviews with people in Myanmar would be one way of addressing this issue, but here too, the interviewer influences how the interviewee’s voice is represented when writing up the research (Vrasti, 2008). The inclusion of Burmese sources could also add to the argument in this volume. Including such sources is beyond the scope of this volume and also not the focus of the argument, however. The primary focus of this volume is to explore the discursive parameters that have informed the development of Japan’s foreign policy towards Myanmar.

Conclusion Over the past three decades or more, a ‘New Area Studies’ has evolved to rethink how area studies can contribute to understandings of global politics. First, area scholars are concerned with the impacts of globalization, critical of those powerful agents who benefit from the advance of globalization at the expense of others, and aim to repoliticize issues that globalization processes can obscure. This requires exposing who defines a given area and to what ends, rather than accepting a given spatial category as an ontological start point, as the state-​centric discipline of IR does. Second, Area Studies scholars are concerned with the impacts of global policy upon human communities around the world and are particularly attentive to how these communities articulate their concerns. Third, to engage with voices from the grassroots and understand local contexts, an in-​depth knowledge of the area, its languages and an appreciation of multidisciplinary approaches is required. Fourth, a critical understanding of and engagement with an area’s history is needed to comprehend the myriad ways in which an area’s past can be articulated, but also a sensitivity to which voices are omitted in these articulations. Fifth, a vigilance about knowledge-​making practices and the situated nature of scholarship guides work in area studies. Sixth, area scholars adopt a critical post-​racist or post-​Western approach that is aware of how knowledge has been transmitted and shared across time and space. Seventh, Area Studies is policy relevant, often by being critical of foreign policies. Eighth, areas are seen not simply as case studies to test Western theories, but sources of theory in their own right. This study incorporates many of the key contributions of ‘New Area Studies’ to reassess how Japan’s relationship with Myanmar can be understood. 32

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Notably, this study draws upon discourse analysis to ascertain how Japan’s political and economic elites have defined their foreign policy with Myanmar in the context of Japan’s broader regional relations. By drawing on accounts from Myanmar’s grassroots, this study examines how Japanese enterprise and diplomacy has exploited ‘Asia’s last frontier’ in a quest for profit and influence. In doing so, this study takes issue with the discourse propounded by Japanese elites of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ promoting democracy and development in Myanmar. The objective of this critique is not to label the Japanese state as inferior for failing to live up to universal values, but to challenge how Japan’s foreign policy elites have incorporated universal values into their discourse. Arguing in favour of a universal standard to which Japan’s foreign policy should comply would run counter to the poststructural framework underpinning the analysis. This volume does not assert that the Japanese government should or should not impose sanctions on the Myanmar regime or accept the National Unity Government (NUG) as Myanmar’s legitimate government, for example. These are among the myriad policy options available to the Japanese government. Whether these options are pursued or not is shaped by the dominant discourses driving Japanese foreign policy. It is these dominant discourses that this volume seeks to uncover not only to comprehend Japan’s relationship with Myanmar, but also to consider alternative discourses that would open up new policy options. The volume is particularly interested in policies that are more attentive to the needs and concerns of human communities in Myanmar, as the next chapter makes clear, and therefore engages with the perspectives of writers, scholars, practitioners, civil society representatives and others, both Japanese and non-​Japanese, who question Japan’s relationship with Myanmar. Opportunities to rethink both Japan’s foreign policy discourse and the practices this discourse sustains may emerge by embracing Cheah’s (2008) proposition that the universal can be understood in terms of sharing the experiences of others across areas. Acts of sharing require both empathy and critical self-​reflection. Concerning the impact of Japan’s foreign policy on the security of human communities, Cheah’s emphasis on ‘sharing’ challenges Japan’s foreign policy elite to rethink how they and others define human security, who is deemed worthy of enjoying security and who is not, and ultimately what it means to be human? Sharing is a dialogue between multiple partners and not the notion of ‘Japan as a bridge’ that supposedly acts as a conduit of Western universal values to non-​Western states thanks to its ‘unique’ experience as Asia’s first developed democracy. As the next chapter makes clear, discourses about Japan as an ‘Asian liberal leader’ are not new, but have surfaced throughout Japan’s modern history shaping the course of Japan’s foreign policy.

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‘Asia’s Liberal Leader’ and Human Insecurity Introduction In late May 2019, the Lowy Institute, a leading Australian think tank on global politics, declared Japan to be the leader of the liberal international order in Asia, hailing Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s commitment to multilateral forums and establishing regional standards, notably on trade (Johnson, 2019). This view has been echoed by academics and media commentators in both Asia (Chang, 2021; Hosoya, 2021) and the US (Ikenberry, 2017; Hornung, 2018). These sources maintain that Donald Trump’s ascendancy to the office of US president undermined a liberal international order that was already in crisis due to the Lehman shock of 2008, economic inequality and growing populism around the world (Ikenberry, 2017; Chang, 2021). With the US relinquishing the leadership of the liberal international order, it now fell upon Japan’s Abe Shinzō and Germany’s Angela Merkel to have the conviction to lead (Ikenberry, 2017). For some, Abe more than met expectations on trade by making Japan the ‘pivotal state’ in the establishment of the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (Solís and Katada, 2015), following Trump’s withdrawal from its predecessor, the Trans-​ Pacific Partnership, as well as finalizing the EU-​Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. For Katada (2020), Japan’s regional leadership extended beyond trade to include multilateral financial ties and development assistance. In terms of maintaining regional security, others champion the passage of the 2015 security legislation by the Abe administration, enabling Japan’s SDF to participate in collective self-​defence, enhanced bilateral security ties, and Abe’s promotion of liberal values in the face of China’s illiberal rise (Chang, 2021; Solís, 2021). The Abe administration capitalized on its designation as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ by promoting a ‘values-​based diplomacy’ (kachikan gaikō) that emphasized ‘universal values’, ‘free and open order’, ‘connectivity’, ‘thought 34

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leadership’ and ‘bridge-​building’ (kakehashi), including in Japan’s FOIP strategy (Jimbo, 2018). As Asia’s first democracy and developed state, Japanese policy makers have long perceived their country as having a unique regional role. As an ‘in-​between state’ that straddles both East and West, Japan can act as a ‘thought leader’ and mentor to developing and democratizing Asian states. Abe’s ‘values-​based diplomacy’ also juxtaposed Japan’s supposedly ‘benevolent’ regional vision with China’s authoritarian approach (Yoshimatsu, 2010: 99–1​ 01; Midford, 2019: 45–6​ ; Kingston, 2020). In so doing, Abe used the rhetoric of ‘value diplomacy’ to reinterpret Japan’s constitution, enabling security reforms that enhanced the role of the SDF under the banner of ‘proactive pacifism’ (Kingston, 2020: 14–​15). Proponents of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ tend to separate politics from economics, playing up the latter and playing down the former when it comes to Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order. Ikenberry, for example, perceives the role of Abe Shinzō’s government to be the promotion of free trade agreements in Asia, leaving Angela Merkel to act as ‘the moral voice of the liberal democratic world’ (2017: 8). Ikenberry’s division of labour between Japan and Germany belies his own definition of the liberal international order that is ‘organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation, democratic solidarity, and internationalist ideals’ (2017: 3). For Ikenberry, the liberal international order is a comprehensive set of institutions, rules and norms, and not a grab bag from which states can pick and choose. The claim that Japan acts as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ must be evaluated on the Japanese government’s claim to uphold universal values and not just its commitment to achieving its economic and security interests under the banner of the liberal international order. The notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ also needs to be understood in the context of Japan’s modern history, as this is not the first time that Japan’s regional vision has emphasized its commitment to upholding and promoting universal values. This chapter opens by outlining the historical evolution of Japanese regional visions. While certain aspects of Japan’s regional vision are new, notably the emphasis on ‘universal values’ in conjunction with the securitization of Japan’s ODA programme, much of Japan’s contemporary regional vision incorporates ideas that have evolved over the course of Japan’s modern history. The chapter sketches these historical developments to demonstrate how the end of the Cold War culminated in critiques of Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order requiring a rethink of Japan’s international security and developmental roles. By the early 21st century, the concept of human security had achieved a prominent place in Japan’s foreign policy lexicon, denoting a human-​centric approach to Japan’s international security and developmental contributions. It is upon this discursive foundation that Japanese foreign policy makers have developed 35

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their interpretation of the FOIP and contemporary regional vision as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’. The chapter concludes by examining the inconsistencies and contradictions inherent to the discourse of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, setting up the focus of the remaining chapters which unpacks this discourse in the context of contemporary Japan–​Myanmar relations.

The evolution of Japan’s ‘liberal leadership’ in Asia The notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ in the FOIP adopts a temporal break that glosses over the period of Japanese imperialism and expansionism culminating in the Second World War, to emphasize Japan’s postwar development and democratization as a benevolent contribution to the region. Accordingly, during the Cold War era, Japanese governments developed a regional vision based on economic development and anti-​militarism under the Yoshida and Fukuda Doctrines. The success of Japan’s regional vision could be observed in the country’s rapid rise as an economic powerhouse and the spread of Japan’s developmental state model throughout the region. Japanese foreign policy makers today reiterate this discourse to legitimize Japan’s claims to regional leadership and contribution to the liberal international order. In so doing, these policy makers omit the recurring discursive strands that echo from Japan’s imperial era. From the early 1930s and throughout the Second World War, Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-​prosperity Sphere, or ‘Asiatic Monroe Doctrine’, provided a unifying concept to justify Japanese imperialism (Hotta, 2007: 2). For proponents of the concept, Japan was perceived as liberating East and Southeast Asian states from Western imperialism and nurturing their development under Japanese tutelage. A notable expression of this idea was Akamatsu Kaname’s ‘flying geese’ paradigm which portrayed Japan as the lead goose in a flying V pattern of industrializing states which would benefit from developing in Japan’s slipstream as it shed outdated technologies to the follower geese. By the 1930s, the discourse underpinning Japanese imperialism combined a Meishuron pan-​Asianist ideology with liberal internationalism (Hotta, 2007: 75–​7; Abel, 2015). Meishuron pan-​Asianism asserted that as Asia’s most powerful and developed state, Japan was guided by a manifest destiny to lead the Asian region and transform Asian states in Japan’s image, by force where necessary (Hotta, 2007: 45). Meishuron pan-​ Asianism differed from two competing strands of pan-​Asianism, namely Teaist pan-​Asianism and Sinic pan-​Asianism. The former, associated with the Japanese thinker Okakura Tenshin, emphasized the common bonds between Asian nations and the richness of their cultures, while the latter advocated a union (dōmei) of Asian states, all of them equal, based on the idea of ‘the same letters, the same race’ (dōbun dōshu) (Hotta, 2007: 31). Though Japanese thinkers emphasized different aspects of pan-​Asianism, 36

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they shared a sense that Asia was different and that Japan was a leader which combined modernity with tradition and had a unique role, or even duty, to transform Asia in Japan’s image (Hotta, 2007: 48–​9). Japan could therefore act as a mentor as its empire expanded (Hotta, 2007; Abel, 2015: 180–​1), a notion that would continue to be articulated albeit in different guises in the post-​Second World War era. Japan’s pan-​Asianist prewar discourse worked in tandem with liberal internationalism (Hotta, 2007: 75–​6). Liberal internationalism emerged in the post-​First World War era and is associated with US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, encompassing free trade, open diplomatic agreements, the promotion of democracy and self-​determination, raised during the Treaty of Versailles negotiations. Though Wilsonian liberalism would be unevenly applied internationally, it altered the conduct of international relations in East Asia by de-​emphasizing the balance of power and renouncing imperialist expansionism in favour of multinational concord in support of weaker nations (Iriye, 1965). The Japanese elite that had hitherto focused on Japan’s acceptance into the international community based on modernization and imperialism were forced to re-​evaluate the foundations of Japan’s foreign affairs (Iriye, 1965). Nonetheless, in the first half of the 20th century, liberalism and empire went hand-​in-​hand, with the core liberal values defined in opposition to a non-​Western other who had to be socialized through imperialism. As Mehta (1999) emphasizes, liberal universal values, such as human rights, democracy and self-​determination, are all embedded in illiberal imperial practices under the banner of a ‘civilizing mission’. Literature on Japan’s shift from democracy in the 1920s to a militarist, imperialist regime in the 1930s has tended to blame Japan’s distinct culture, traditions and system rather than perceive this shift as a problem of liberalism itself (Akami, 2005). Akami (2003) argues that ‘for inter-​war liberal internationalists, not only in Japan but also in Australia, Britain & the US, nationalism, imperialism & wartime collaboration were often the norm, and not an aberration’ (2003: 124). Though there were tensions between the pan-​A sian and liberal internationalist discourses, notably between the military, which promoted Meishuron pan-​Asianist expansionism, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which was committed to liberal internationalism, they were compatible in terms of Japanese strategic thinking (Hotta, 2007: 81–​2). Japanese leaders and political thinkers stressed core liberal values, such as national independence, equality and mutually beneficial cooperation, as underpinning Japanese imperial expansionism (Abel, 2015: 177). Japan’s approach mirrored that of Western imperial powers as it sought recognition as a great power (Suzuki, 2005), becoming an ‘enlightened exploiter’, working for the material benefit of Japan at the expense of those it conquered and justifying the conquests in international legal terminology (Dudden, 2005). 37

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A good example of the Japanese government’s interweaving of liberalism and imperialism can be seen in its submission of the racial equality proposal in 1919 as part of the negotiations culminating in the Treaty of Versailles. For the Japanese government at the time, the racial equality proposal was intended to achieve Japan’s acceptance as a great power, rather than an altruistic act designed to establish a universal value (Shimazu, 2002). The British and US opposition to the inclusion of the racial equality clause in the Treaty of Versailles left Japanese elites disillusioned with the international order and provided succour to pan-​Asianist supporters of Japanese imperialism in the 1930s (Shimazu, 2002). Even those Japanese intellectuals most committed to Wilsonian liberalism would find themselves torn between their internationalist beliefs and the realities of an age of empires. Nitobe Inazō was a prominent Japanese interwar liberal and educator who worked in Japan’s colonial government in Taiwan, served as Under Secretary General of the League of Nations, and was appointed chairman of the Japan branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He published widely in English, seeking to act as a ‘bridge across the Pacific’ by promoting understanding of his Japanese homeland (Howes and Oshiro, 1995). His work in support of Japanese colonialism, paternalism towards Japan’s imperial subjects, and his failure to condemn Japanese expansionism would make him a controversial figure (Howes and Oshiro, 1995: 4–​5). Despite his efforts to bridge between East and West, Nitobe has been heavily criticized for his misrepresentations and idealization of Japan in his work (Ota, 1995). Following the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which saw the Japanese military claim Manchuria, Nitobe was widely perceived as a propagandist for the Japanese empire in the US (Ota, 1995: 241). The difficulty of maintaining a commitment to international liberalism in an age of empires was shared by other Japanese interwar liberal internationalists, many of whom represented the Japanese empire throughout the 1930s and the Second World War, but would be rehabilitated to serve as Japanese representatives in international institutions in the post-​Second World War era (Akami, 2003: 277–​8). A notable exception to this trend was Yanaihara Tadao, Nitobe’s pupil and successor, who advocated an exclusive approach to empire based on morality and respect for different cultures and took a more principled stance against Japanese expansionism, relinquishing his post at Tokyo University (Nakano, 2007). With the exception of a few left-​wing intellectuals, such as Yanaihara, most Japanese elites perceived themselves to be superior to other Asian peoples and therefore the rightful leaders of Asia (Asia no meishu) (Shimazu, 2002: 183). For the many peoples Japan conquered, Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-​ prosperity Sphere was mere propaganda to disguise the Japanese Imperial Army’s aggression and wanton extraction of raw materials to feed the Japanese war effort. The experiences of these conquered peoples would shape how 38

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states in the East and Southeast Asian region responded to Japan’s economic recovery and rise after the Second World War. In particular, the failure of Japanese political figures to adequately atone for the historical legacies of the Second World War, such as the ‘comfort women’, wartime forced labour, the Nanjing massacre, or medical experiments on human subjects, impacted how Japan was perceived in East and Southeast Asia (Kawashima, 2017; Kushner, 2017a).1 Rather than confront Japan’s imperialist past head on, the various organizations embroiled in Japan’s empire engaged in a damage-​limitation exercise in the post-​Second World War era in order to avoid responsibility for the war (Kushner, 2017b). This gave rise to a nationalist view of history that perceived the Second World War as structurally inevitable, thereby eliminating the question of agency and responsibility for the war (Koyama, 2018). Subsequently, Japanese conservatives and nationalists derided what they saw as a ‘masochistic’ view of history that blamed Japan for the Second World War and sought to re-​instil a patriotic understanding of history in Japan’s education system (Koyama, 2018). In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Japanese government’s focus was on reconstruction and moving forward, leaving questions of responsibility hidden or buried as unanswered legacies of the Second World War. This aversion to address Japan’s wartime experience would also shape a reluctance pervasive within the MOFA for Japan to play too prominent a regional role, lest Japanese leadership be misunderstood as assertiveness. Notably, Japan played a central role in developing the Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, but MOFA sought to disguise these efforts in order not to alarm Japan’s Southeast Asian partners in light of Japan’s imperialist past (Krauss, 2000; Ashizawa, 2008). By adopting such a cautious line, MOFA would occasionally clash with the foreign policy goals of Japan’s Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI),2 which sought a more active regional economic role for Japan (Krauss, 2000; Inoguchi, 2011). The US occupation of Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War also played a key role both in terms of how Japan would be rehabilitated into the liberal international order and how Japan’s empire would be understood and remembered (Fujitani, 2015). Under US occupation, Japan developed a victim narrative centring on the Second World War, whereby the Japanese people and emperor were victims of a militarist clique (Orr, 2001). Accordingly, Marxist and socialist Japanese historians were silenced and Japanese school children received a sanitized history of Japan that failed to fully confront the issues of agency and responsibility for Japan’s empire (Koyama, 2018). National contrition was directed towards the US and victims of the ‘Pacific War’ rather than towards Asia, and war responsibility was no longer a key focus in public discourse (Orr, 2001). For Oguma (2002), the dissolution of Japan’s empire after the Second World War led to the idea that Japan was a mixed-​race nation being jettisoned in favour of a homogeneous 39

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nation theory, which incorporated a desire to proclaim the Japanese people as pacifist with the emperor as their eternal figurehead. This homogeneous nation theory, which never had any academic substance to it, then developed with Japan’s economic success leading to a boom in Nihonjinron texts that proclaimed the uniqueness of the Japanese people (Oguma, 2002). This belief in Japanese uniqueness would further feed the notion that Japan had a specific role to play as a mentor to Asian states, which would rarely be questioned in Japanese society. As Kato (2006) notes, the manner in which Japanese public officials and prominent intellectuals failed to adequately problematize Japan’s wartime empire resulted in the creation of a ‘pseudo-​ democracy’, one in which political language and engagement was lacking. The cornerstone of the US occupation was the imposition of an anti-​ militarist constitution on Japan. The constitution became coupled with a belief in the benefits of pacifism among the Japanese population to avoid being again misled into a disastrous conflict. Successive Japanese governments embraced this anti-​militarist position by implementing the Yoshida Doctrine, which set out a focus on economic recovery and a reliance on the US for Japan’s defence. This is not to say that there was unity among Japanese politicians and diplomats regarding Japan’s foreign policy towards Asia. Kanda (2017) distinguishes between the ‘mainstream’ approach of the Yoshida Doctrine within the ruling LDP and the thinking of ‘tributaries’, such as that led by Kishi Nobusuke, a Japanese prime minister and former Manchukuo bureaucrat who had been indicted, though not prosecuted, as a war criminal following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. While the Yoshida Doctrine espoused a separation of politics and economics, with Japan focusing on economic development and entrusting Japan’s security to its US ally, Kishi pushed for rearmament and a more autonomous Japanese foreign policy with Japan leading an Asian regional bloc. As Japan’s prime minister, Kishi rammed revisions to the US–​Japan security treaty through the Diet in 1960, ordering the police to eject members of the opposition from the Diet to ease the passing of the legislation. Widespread public protests against the revisions ultimately toppled Kishi with his ambitions for constitutional revision and acknowledgement of Japan’s great power status unrealized. Kanda (2017: 195–​6) notes that it was only by the late 1970s that the Yoshida Doctrine had become fully entrenched and that Japan’s Asia policy was founded on economic development and quiet diplomacy rather than on an assertive regional leadership. Nonetheless, Kishi’s emphasis on revising the constitution to legitimize Japan’s armed forces, enabling Japan to play a more assertive regional role, would return when his grandson, Abe Shinzō, first became prime minister in 2006, and again from 2012. Despite the emphasis on establishing a temporal break with the military adventurism of Japan’s empire in the post-​Second World War period, wartime discourses of regional co-​prosperity and equality would resurface in 40

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Japan’s international relations. This was notable at the Bandung Conference in 1955, where, paradoxically, these wartime discourses were rearticulated to enable Japan to be ‘rehabilitated’ back into the liberal international order (Abel, 2015: 248). For example, Asakai Koichirō, head of Japan’s Economic Committee at the 1955 Bandung Conference, stated ‘during comparatively short periods, Japan has successfully passed through various stages of economic development, and we shall be only too happy if our experiences could be studied and utilized by other countries in the region’ (Abel, 2015: 233). As Abel argues: [T]‌he main thrust of Japanese policy at the [Bandung] conference consisted of two seemingly contradictory goals: on the one hand, the presentation of a ‘new Japan,’ reborn as a completely different kind of nation after defeat; and on the other hand, the rehabilitation of important elements of wartime ideology adjusted to the changed circumstances of the 1950s. (Abel, 2015: 220) Japan’s wartime ideology continued to influence Japan’s foreign policy in the postwar era in the form of the pan-​Asianist notion of Japan as a mentor. A key element in Japan’s rehabilitation into the liberal international order was a stress on UN liberal values as a cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy, connecting Japan to both liberal states in the West and developing states in Asia (Abel, 2015: 237–​8; Jimbo, 2018: 71). Abel (2015: 230, 237–​8) notes that the emphasis on regional co-​prosperity, equality and UN liberal values would be repeated in Japan’s foreign policy discourse for decades after the Bandung Conference. For example, in 1963, Shiina Estusaburō, a Japanese Manchukuo bureaucrat and foreign minister, asserted that ‘even now, whether we like it or not, the goal of Japan must be the liberation, independence, co-​existence and co-​prosperity of the nations of Asia and Africa, because we and they share a common destiny’ (Kanda, 2017: 185). The Bandung Conference demonstrated how engrained the wartime thinking of co-​prosperity combined with liberal values had become in Japan’s foreign policy discourse. For Southeast Asian leaders, the promise that an economically powerful Japan could help them to achieve their goal of economic development arguably trumped Japan’s problematic foreign policy discourse. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Japan’s relationship with those Southeast Asian states which had suffered at the hands of Japan’s Imperial Army were naturally strained. As Japan’s economy flourished in the 1950s and 1960s, encouraging Japanese firms to expand into Southeast Asia, so fears grew in Southeast Asia that Japan’s attempt to dominate the region through military might in the Second World War would now be accomplished through economic means. Nonetheless, the desire for 41

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economic development in Southeast Asia during the Cold War was such that Japanese aid and investment was welcomed. Of the three phases in Japan–​Southeast Asian relations that Sudo Sueo (1988: 509) sets out, the first two, namely reparations (1952–​64) and regional economic development (1965–​75), were designed to placate Southeast Asian states’ desire for growth while achieving Japan’s national economic interests. The tensions between economic development and Japanese economic dominance would ultimately erupt onto the streets of Southeast Asian cities. In 1972, a boycott of Japanese goods was organized in Thailand and Malaysian officials critiqued Japan’s synthetic rubber exports that undermined its own rubber sector (Sudo, 1988: 511). During Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974, violent anti-​Japanese protests hit Jakarta and Bangkok (Lam, 2013: 11). It was not until Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo’s tenure (1976–​8) that the underlying political tensions in Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia would begin to be addressed through the Fukuda Doctrine, which marked the third phase of Japan–​Southeast Asia relations. In accordance with the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan would contribute to peace in Southeast Asia through non-​military means as an equal partner, developing positive and mutually beneficial relations, including through the enhancement of cultural ties, and look to build bridges between Southeast Asian states by proposing to mediate following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (Sudo, 1988: 512–​14). The Fukuda Doctrine was a proactive Japanese foreign policy that purported to be ‘value-​free’ in the sense that Japan would not take sides in Southeast Asian disputes, but instead seek to act as a neutral arbiter (Sudo, 1992: 154). Southeast Asian states welcomed the Fukuda Doctrine, which would remain a touchstone in Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia into the early 21st century (Lam, 2013: 2, 14–​16). Concerns about Japanese remilitarization surfaced in the 1980s and early 1990s, but by the mid-​1990s, Southeast Asian leaders and people were generally positive about Japan’s regional role (Lam, 2013: 16–​18).

Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order at the end of the Cold War The end of the Cold War brought criticisms of Japan’s economic mercantilism and security free-​r iding to the fore. The Japanese government’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Myanmar and China following crackdowns on democratic protests in August 1988 and June 1989, respectively, raised concerns within the Group of Seven (G7) that Japan placed its economic interests above protecting democracy and freedom. Japan’s initial response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, in which pro-​d emocracy demonstrators were gunned down by the Chinese military in the centre of 42

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Beijing, was to focus on the delivery of Japan’s third yen loan to China, a move that was swiftly condemned by the G7 (Jimbo, 2018: 71–​2). When Japan bankrolled the international effort to excise Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 1990–​1 Gulf War, but failed to send troops, Japan was derided for engaging in ‘chequebook diplomacy’. The Japanese government’s responses to these events engendered a crisis among Japan’s political and diplomatic elites who understood the necessity to build human rights into its ODA programmes in line with the expectations of the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development and engage more actively in international security affairs. Japanese governments began chipping away at Japan’s anti-​militarist constitution and norms that inhibited the use of Japan’s SDF, in part due to international pressure, but also due to the emergence of the threat of a nuclear-​armed North Korea and China’s rise (Samuels, 2007). In 1991, the then President of the Japan Forum on International Relations, Ito Kenichi, contrasted the ‘passive pacifism’ embedded in Article 9 of Japan’s constitution with the ‘proactive pacifism’ through which Japan could contribute to international peace (Midford, 2019: 41). In June 1992, the Japanese Diet passed the UN Peacekeeping Cooperation law, enabling Japan’s SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, albeit under restrictive conditions that inhibited the use of weapons and limited Japan’s contributions to reconstruction and support roles. Among other developments, Japan’s defence expenditure occasionally crept over the 1 per cent of gross domestic product mark, successive governments relaxed the prohibition on arms exports, and Japan’s Defence Agency was upgraded to a Ministry (Samuels, 2007). From December 2012, Prime Minister Abe led the transformation of Japan’s security policy under the heading ‘proactive pacifism’. This concept differentiated Japan’s approach to international security from the ‘passive pacifism’ of the Yoshida Doctrine. Under Abe, key changes included: the creation of a National Security Council and National Security Strategy, revisions to the 2010 National Defence Program Guidelines, further relaxations on arms exports, the procurement of limited force projection capabilities, and a reinterpretation of Japan’s Constitution to enable the right of collective self-​defence to be exercised (Gustafsson et al, 2018). Japan’s increasingly proactive foreign security policy was extended to Southeast Asia through the 1990s and into the 2000s with peace-​building supposedly becoming a central pillar of Japan’s foreign policy (Lam, 2009). Japan participated in a UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia from 1993 and followed this up with attempts to mediate in a number of Southeast Asian conflicts (Lam, 2009; Sudo, 2009; Pressello, 2014). The Japanese government was also a driving force behind a regional response to maritime piracy around the turn of the 21st century (Black, 2014). In 43

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response to the Asian Financial Crisis, the Obuchi Keizō administration proposed regional financial support mechanisms that would develop into the Chiang Mai Initiative, as well as contributing to the development of disaster response, tackling epidemics and diseases, addressing energy issues, and enhancing people-​to-​people exchanges (Sudo, 2009: 152–​ 4). Since the articulation of the Fukuda Doctrine, successive Japanese governments sought to play a key bridging role in Southeast Asia, working primarily through economic means, but increasingly looking to stabilize political and security relations in the region since the end of the Cold War (Pressello, 2014). The crises that engulfed the Japanese government at the end of the Cold War also impacted Japan’s ODA programme. Growing international critiques of the mercantilist nature of Japan’s ODA policy prompted the Japanese government to establish its first ODA Charter in 1992, which emphasized the promotion of democracy, market economy, fundamental human rights and freedom (Jimbo, 2018: 72). By the late 1990s, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō sought to build on the tenets of Japan’s 1992 ODA Charter by associating Japan’s foreign aid policy with the UN concept of human security. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) advanced the concept of human security in its 1993 Human Development Report, which focused on the development needs of human beings, including access to food, employment opportunities and environmental care (UNDP, 1993: 2). In its 1994 report, the UNDP subsequently added health, personal, community and political security to the original three components, and divided the concept into freedom from want and freedom from fear (UNDP, 1994: 24–​5). Whereas freedom from want concerned issues related to economic development, freedom from fear expressed a need to confront threats that undermined the liberty of individuals and sought to protect their physical well-​being. According to the UNDP, the state should be replaced as the key security referent with human beings, yet it remained predominantly up to policy makers to interpret human security as they saw fit. For Japanese policy makers, the elasticity of the concept of human security enabled them to placate those critics who perceived Japan’s aid policy as mercantilist and not contributing to the promotion of human rights and democratization. At the same time, Japan’s human security policy reassured Asian leaders who were focused on economic development and wary of interference in their domestic affairs. The Obuchi administration’s emphasis clearly lay with the notion of freedom from want (Katsumata, 2006: 249, 258–​60), building on the earlier principle of comprehensive security articulated by Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (Hook et al, 2005: 155), which stressed the need for economic assistance to people in the developing world. 44

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Human security began to be incorporated into Japan’s aid policy with an emphasis on Basic Human Needs and poverty reduction articulated in Japan’s 1999 mid-​term policy review (Matsumoto, 2014: 195). In 2003, under the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, Japan would revise its ODA Charter again to incorporate human security as a key pillar (MOFA, 2009b). The Charter stressed that ‘[f]‌ull attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market-​ oriented economy, and the situation regarding the protection of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country’ (MOFA, 2003: 5). The 2003 ODA Charter also specified that ODA had to be in Japan’s national interest (Matsumoto, 2014: 195; Kato, 2016: 4–​5), highlighting a tension between promoting ‘universal’ values, such as democratization and human rights, and furthering Japan’s economic interests. For Japan, democracy promotion entailed a strong economy, a stable government and continuous political engagement, as mentioned in the ‘Three Pillars of Development Cooperation’ in the 2010 ODA White Paper (MOFA, 2010a: 21). Increasingly, and particularly since the DPJ administrations of 2009–​12, connections between the Japanese government and businesses in Japan’s ODA policy strengthened, mirroring Japan’s aid approach during the Cold War (Lam, 2006: 146; MOFA, 2010a: 18; Matsumoto, 2014: 195; Kato, 2016: 13). With the 2015 revision to the ODA Charter, Japan’s focus on development expanded to include security issues (Kato, 2016: 5). For Kitaoka Shinichi (2016), who became JICA’s president on 1 October 2015, Japan’s ODA now fuses a ‘proactive contribution to peace’ with human security, Japan’s contribution to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and the realization of Japan’s nation interests. The conflation of these differing concepts and policies ultimately undermines Japan’s commitment to human rights and democratization, as according to Kitaoka’s understanding, anything can be interpreted as fulfilling a human security contribution to peace and development, including sales of military and law enforcement equipment to authoritarian regimes. The Abe administration pushed through the 2015 revisions to the ODA Charter, despite calls from Japanese NGOs to review it. As Ohashi Masaaki states: [Japan’s] new Development Cooperation Charter hardly reflects any of the NGO points. On the contrary it seems very nationalistic and narrow minded, with large gray zones around the use of ODA for prohibited military purposes, and prioritizes the economic growth of developing countries as well as short-​term benefits for Japanese private companies. (Ohashi, 2016: 341) Japan’s ODA had come full circle, returning to a mercantilist approach, but now with an added emphasis on security. 45

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‘Universal values’ and Japan’s proactive regional contribution With the changes to Japan’s ODA Charter and gradual expansion of the SDF’s role, ‘universal values’ began to acquire a more prominent place in Japan’s foreign policy (Jimbo, 2018: 73). Nonetheless, these ‘universal values’ were not overtly stressed in Japan’s foreign policy until 2007, when the then Foreign Minister, Asō Tarō, articulated the concept of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. Asō’s ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ spanned a broad geographical scope, from Japan in East Asia, through Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East and Balkans, to the Baltic states. It covered a diverse range of issues and emphasized ‘universal values’, namely freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, rule of law and market economy (Jimbo, 2018: 63) and elaborated on Asō’s earlier claim that Japan was a ‘thought leader’ that could transfer its advanced knowledge and experiences to other Asian states (Asō, 2005). For Asō, a country could only achieve political stability and economic prosperity once fundamental human rights and values were in place (Jimbo, 2018: 66). Japan could assist states through ODA, democracy promotion and peace-​building (Jimbo, 2018: 68). Though the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ appealed to the Abe administration for its overt commitment to securing the liberal international order thereby satisfying Japan’s US ally that it was no longer free-​r iding, the focus on countering China’s rise in the region was clear (Jimbo, 2018: 73–5​ ). Despite Japan’s proactive engagement of Southeast Asia, by the early 2000s, Japan was seen to be losing ground to China in the region (Masaki, 2007). Notably, China signed a Free Trade Agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation before Japan (Lam, 2006: 142). Japan’s trade with Southeast Asian states was also in decline relative to China (Yoshimatsu, 2010: 101–​3). To differentiate its engagement with Southeast Asian states in the face of China’s growing regional influence, Japanese officials emphasized ODA, stressing quality aid over quantity, focusing on innovation, training and personnel exchange in addition to ODA directed towards infrastructure development (Jackman, 2016). The ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’s’ focus on containing China led China-​leaning politicians and bureaucrats within MOFA to counter this approach (Zakowski et al, 2018). For example, former ambassador to China, Tanino Sakutarō, as well as the Asia Diplomacy and Security Vision Study Group and the Asia Strategy Study Group led by Aisawa Ichirō and former LDP Secretary-​General Katō Kōichi were openly critical of how the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ targeted China (Zakowski et al, 2018: 122). In addition, Diet members of the Koga, Tanigaki and Nikai factions established a parliamentary league that focused on Asia and downplayed ‘value diplomacy’ 46

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(Zakowski et al, 2018: 122). When Abe resigned as prime minister in 2007, his successor, Fukuda Yasuo, was quick to ditch the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ with its emphasis on ‘value diplomacy’ due to concerns about alienating China (Jimbo, 2018: 63, 65; Kingston, 2020: 14). Though the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ was shelved, it remained an attractive foreign policy approach not only among those eager to contain China, but also among right-​wing politicians and bureaucrats with a revisionist agenda (Zakowski et al, 2018). Notably, the emphasis on ‘value-​based diplomacy’ chimed with Abe’s ambition both to revise Japan’s constitution to enable the SDF to participate in collective self-​defence and to get over what he perceived to be the Japanese people’s masochistic view of history (Jimbo, 2018: 73–​5). It was no surprise then that right-​wing politicians like Abe and Asō drew support from MOFA officials with right-​ wing ties, particularly Yachi Shōtarō and Kanehara Nobukatsu who were the architects of ‘value-​diplomacy’ and the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ (Zakowski et al, 2018: 117). When Abe returned as prime minister in December 2012, both Yachi and Kanehara, respectively Head and Deputy Head of Japan’s National Security Secretariat, would prove instrumental in rehabilitating the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ in the shape of the FOIP (Hosoya, 2019: 20). By this point, MOFA was more accommodating towards Abe’s FOIP strategy and worked closely with the Ministry of Defence to realize Abe’s ambitions to transform Japan’s international security role in light of China’s rise and growing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas (Lindgren, 2019: 37). In one of his first speeches upon returning as Prime Minister, Abe sketched out a vision of a Democratic Security Diamond comprised of the US, Japan, India and Australia, which would promote ‘universal values’ and secure the liberal international order in the East Asian region (Abe, 2012). The Democratic Security Diamond would later evolve into the Quad, comprising the same members and focusing on military capacity building, which itself would become the security cornerstone of Abe’s FOIP. As Koga (2019: 286) notes, Abe’s FOIP strategy aimed to ‘tactically hedge’ against China’s rise and manage America’s perceived regional decline. Accordingly, the Abe administration focused on keeping the US engaged in East Asia through the FOIP, building on Japan’s long-​standing commitment to its alliance with the US (Ashizawa, 2008; Terada, 2010). In addition, the Japanese government forged pseudo alliances with and sought to enhance the maritime security capacities of India, Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN states to balance against China (Koga, 2019: 287). In particular, Japan’s FOIP strategy embraced long-​standing efforts to actively participate in multilateral security fora in East and Southeast Asia and develop the material and operational capacities of regional coast guards (Black, 2014; Wallace, 2018: 889–​90). While Abe’s efforts built on those of previous administrations, 47

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including those of the DPJ (Mulgan, 2010), they have been more overtly geared to containing China (Koga, 2019: 295). Japan’s FOIP strategy also comprised a geoeconomic dimension that emphasized Japan’s economic relationship with India and Southeast Asia (Jimbo, 2018: 80). METI played a central role in advancing Japan’s economic diplomacy and interests through the FOIP, notably by encouraging the export of infrastructure to South and Southeast Asian states to find new markets and opportunities for Japanese firms (Yoshimatsu, 2017; Wallace, 2018). Japan’s FOIP strategy thereby echoes Japan’s overseas development policy of the 1970s and 1980s, when the Japanese government worked closely with Japanese businesses, using ODA to export infrastructure to East and Southeast Asian states to build international production networks (Yoshimatsu, 2017: 495). Already in the 1990s, Japanese governments began to elaborate a development strategy for Southeast Asia based on the idea of infrastructure connectivity. This strategy was finalized with the publication of ‘The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan’ by Japan’s Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia in 2010 (Zhao, 2018: 561–​2). The shift back to a mercantilist developmental approach owes much to the DPJ governments (2009–​12), which began moving away from any pretence of a humanitarian-​based ODA policy by providing financial and political backing for Japanese firms exporting infrastructure to South and Southeast Asia as a means of growing Japan’s economy (Yoshimatsu, 2017: 494–​5, 504). Rhetorically, the DPJ justified its approach through recourse to the notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s mentor’ or ‘thought leader’. For example, in his ‘New Commitment to Asia Speech’, then DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio asserted that Asian people could learn from Japan because of Japan’s ‘unique’ character as the ‘first in Asia’ to modernize and become a democracy (Hatoyama, 2009). Japan’s aid could also be applied to pressure states into adopting political or strategic positions in line with Japan’s broader regional interests. For example, when meeting with the Cambodian leader Hun Sen in November 2015, there was a clear link between Abe Shinzō voicing his concerns about Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, implicitly supported by Cambodia, and Japan’s provision of a concessional loan of 17 billion yen to repair highway No. 5 running from Phnom Penh to the Thai border (Yoshimatsu, 2017: 505; Zhao, 2018: 560). Japan’s infrastructure exports, like the loan to repair Cambodia’s highway No. 5, have been central to the development of Japan’s ‘horizontal economic corridors’ strategy (Wallace, 2018). These ‘horizontal (or East–​West) economic corridors’ comprise massive infrastructure projects designed to offset the ‘gravitational pull’ of China’s economy via its ‘vertical’ or ‘North–​ South’ and Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridors financed by China’s BRI (Masaki, 2007: 5; Yoshimatsu, 2010: 99–​101; Mizuno, 2016; Wallace, 2018: 898–​9). In the Mekong subregion, Japan’s 48

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East–​West Economic Corridor from Mawlamyine in Myanmar to Da Nang in Vietnam, and the Southern Economic Corridor from Dawei in Myanmar to Cai Mep-​Thi Vai in Vietnam, of which Cambodia’s highway No. 5 is an integral part (JICA, 2018; 2019a), further serve to facilitate the operations of Japanese production networks. These corridors enable better and cheaper access to local and international markets and labour and help shift production away from China where both political risks and production costs have increased (Wallace, 2018: 896). Japan’s economic strategy within the FOIP has tended to be more flexible than its security strategy, adapting to meet the concerns of ASEAN about isolating China and the shifting international situation (Hosoya, 2019; Satake and Sahashi, 2020: 8–​9). Notably, Donald Trump’s Asia policy raised doubts about America’s commitment to the security and prosperity of the region. As President Trump initiated a trade war with China and abandoned the Trans-​Pacific Partnership, so key figures in the Japanese Prime Minister’s office (Kantei), such as Nikai Toshihiro, Secretary General of Japan’s ruling LDP, and Imai Takaya, Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister, played a prominent role in convincing Prime Minister Abe to collaborate with China’s BRI (Terada, 2019: 1063–​6). As Suzuki Shogo (2021) notes, it is inaccurate to describe Sino-​Japanese relations simply in terms of geopolitical rivalry, as economic interdependence can foster cooperation in the quest for commercial opportunities in the region. In such an environment, it is no wonder that Japan’s ‘liberal leadership’ has remained fluid. That said, examining Japan’s ‘liberal leadership’ in Asia over time exposes a number of discursive strands that continue to dominate Japan’s regional foreign policy discourse, such as the notion of Japan as a ‘bridge’ and a ‘thought leader’ that can be traced back to Japan’s modernization in the early 20th century.

Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’: a critical review The notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ should not be taken at face value considering the Japanese government’s weak commitment to human rights and democratization, as well as for democratic backsliding in Japan itself (Mulgan, 2016; Midford, 2019; Asahi Shimbun, 2020; Kingston, 2020; 2021). Though no state stays true to a ‘value-​based’ approach to diplomacy, as all states are focused on achieving national interests and are concerned by geopolitics, the Abe administration’s recurrent references to ‘universal values’ singles the administration out for attention (Kingston, 2020). The Japanese government’s emphasis on ‘value diplomacy’ serves specific foreign policy ends and should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. The Japanese government’s discourse on universal values is not just about convincing the international community of Japan’s contribution to the liberal international 49

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order, but also emphasizing what Japan is in the world, to itself as much as to others. At the same time, this discourse on universal values disguises democratic backsliding in Japan, seeks to overcome Japan’s past imperialism and justifies Japan’s mercantilist aid practices. Japan’s position as a ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ contains inherent tensions as it is simultaneously pulled in two directions. Japan’s transition from the Fukuda Doctrine to a more security-​orientated strategy in Southeast Asia highlights these inherent tensions well. Southeast Asian states expect Japan to continue to abide by the core tenets of the Fukuda Doctrine and not antagonize China, while these states also look to benefit from enhanced security ties with Japan. For its part, the US expects Japan to act as a reliable ally in containing China and to promote the liberal international order in the Asian region. Japan is thereby subject to US pressure (beiatsu), relegating Japan to the position of a deputy to the US in translating and relaying the rules, values and institutions of the liberal international order to East and Southeast Asian states (Terada, 2014). This leaves Japan’s foreign policy attempting to satisfy different demands and has impacted the articulation of Japan’s regional vision in spatial, temporal and ethical terms. In terms of spatiality, the question of whether and how to include China is central. The FOIP has been widely understood as a collective strategy to contain China, yet the Japanese government has tried to retain some flexibility in its relations with China and looked to engage in China’s BRI. Related to this is the position of the US in the region and its degree of commitment to the US–​Japan alliance weighed against the Japanese government’s fears of abandonment or ‘Japan passing’. In terms of temporality, Japan’s regional vision comprises a mixture of temporal linearity, temporal displacement and temporal break. The notion of Japan as a regional ‘thought’ leader from the early 20th century onwards is founded on its status as Asia’s first democracy and developed state, indicating a linear conceptualization of time in which Japan is ahead of and in a mentorship role regarding its regional neighbours (Jimbo, 2018: 66, 70). Japan’s mentorship role is predicated on its ‘followers’ or ‘tutees’ catching up, but the hierarchical relationship is both preserved indefinitely and inherently exploitative, denoting a temporal displacement that forever maintains Japan in the future versus its partners located in the past. Japan’s regional vision also tackles the issue of Japan’s imperial expansionism by employing a temporal break to designate this troubled period in Japan’s past as an aberration. Japanese foreign policy makers thereby portray their state as a benevolent regional leader based on: • a sense of the timeless duty of Asia’s first developed democracy spanning the entirety of Japan’s modern history; • a mentorship role that fixes Japan ahead of other Asian states; and 50

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• Japan’s re-​entry into the international community as a developed, democratic state after the Second World War. These discursive manipulations of temporality mask the period of Japanese imperialism that was central to Japan’s modern history and development, while simultaneously ignoring the historical links between empire and liberal values. The Abe administration employed this discourse to encourage the Japanese people to move on from what Japanese nationalists perceived to be a ‘masochistic’ view of history that had mired the country in endless apologies for Japan’s conduct in the Second World War and prevented Japan from revising its constitution (Jimbo, 2018: 67). Prime Minister Abe’s revisionism resulted in democratic backsliding that upset the ethical foundations upon which Japan’s claims to benevolent regional leadership rest. The Abe administration’s passage of Japan’s State Secrets Law, constitutional reinterpretation and suppression of media freedom have all brought Japan’s supposed promotion of ‘universal values’ into question. The Japanese government’s commitment to ‘universal values’ has always been tempered by its spatial position as a supposed ‘bridge’ between East and West, leading to an elastic interpretation of ‘universal values’. In foreign policy speeches, Prime Minister Abe articulated ‘universal values’ as constituting: rule of law, free trade, human rights and democratization. For MOFA, these categories are expanded to encompass everything from responding to refugee crises, to drug trafficking and cybercrime (MOFA, 2018a). With such an expansive array of issues, ‘universal values’ comes to mean everything and nothing. There is no attempt to connect these diverse issues into a coherent framework that promotes these values, enabling the Japanese government to ignore ‘universal values’ and support states regardless of regime type or human rights record (Chachavalpongpun, 2017a; Midford, 2019: 46). Tackling drug trafficking, for example, involves cooperation between Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) and law enforcement authorities throughout the Asia-​Pacific region (MOFA, 2018a). This includes ties between the NPA and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) that date back to 2006 (Caliwan, 2017). On 5 December 2017, Commissioner Mika Sakurai, Director for International Drug and Firearms Investigation, headed a delegation of Japan’s NPA to hear first-​ hand from PDEA Director General Aaron N. Aquino about the ‘PDEA’s accomplishments, operational capabilities and facilities’, as well as to acquire ‘a better understanding of [the PDEA] and the current drug trends affecting the national drug situation in the [Philippines]’ (Caliwan, 2017). This is in spite of the Philippines President, Rodrigo Duterte, initiating a ‘war on drugs’ upon assuming office on 30 June 2016, in which over 12,000 Filipinos have been killed, at least 2,555 of which by the Philippine National Police, raising concerns among the international community about widespread human 51

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rights abuses (Conde, 2021). The Japanese government requires ‘universal values’ to be sufficiently expansive and malleable to realize Japan’s national interests, even at the expense of ‘universal values’ themselves. A key rhetorical aspect that exemplifies the malleability of universal values in Japan’s foreign policy discourse is the assimilation of ‘universal values’ with ‘Asian values’. Japanese foreign policy makers maintain that ‘universal values’ are conditioned by national history, traditions and culture (Yachi, 2013; Kanehara, 2015). Speaking at the ‘Shared Values and Democracy in Asia’ Symposium’ on 19 January 2016, Prime Minister Abe stated that ‘[in the latter half of the 20th century] we could say the values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law were “universal” among the peoples of Asia and Africa in the true sense’ (Abe, 2016a). He then amended this remark in the same speech by saying, ‘Asia’s democracy has a distinct mark engraved in it from ancient times, reflecting the values we have held dear for generations’ (Abe, 2016a). How precisely Asian democracy can have ‘a distinct mark’ from ‘ancient times’ and yet still value democracy as ‘universal’ in the ‘true sense’ is never made clear. Similarly, Abe has repeatedly stated that, in line with the Fukuda Doctrine and bound by a commitment to ‘universal values’, Japan would not become a military power, despite him pushing a far-​reaching security agenda with constitutional revision and collective self-​defence at its heart (Abe, 2013a; 2013b). This mix of ‘Asian’ and ‘universal values’ is not unique to Abe, but also features in statements by other policy makers, such as Prime Minister Koizumi, JICA and MOFA (MOFA, 2004; GPAJ, 2019). The combination of universal and Asian values in Japan’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’ discourse has enabled the Japanese government to adopt a more flexible approach in light of the concerns of Southeast Asian states. By February 2018, Japan had dropped references to the value-​orientated aspects of FOIP, notably to reassure ASEAN that it remained at the centre of East Asia’s regional order (Koga, 2019: 298; Satake and Sahashi, 2020: 13). At the same time, ‘universal values’ remain associated with the FOIP strategy in an effort to contain China (Lindgren, 2019: 35, 39). For example, though Satake and Sahashi (2020: 13) note that Japanese policy makers have avoided references to ‘universal values’ in their FOIP strategy, China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping is ‘completely opposite to the direction of FOIP, such as the consolidation of its power and the suppression of freedom of speech, religion, and academics’ (Satake and Sahashi, 2020: 18). Japanese foreign policy makers can always therefore refer to ‘universal values’ when it suits their interests, and downplay them when they are no longer as useful. The Japanese government’s emphasis on ‘universal values’ is primarily due to security concerns about China’s rise and a need to differentiate Japan’s regional engagement from China’s. For example, Hiroaki Shiga, Executive Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute, maintained that while 52

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both Japan and China’s aid focuses on mutual benefit and non-​interference, Japan’s approach is different from China’s, which is ‘Sino-​centric’ and does not focus on global governance (GPAJ, 2019). Critics, such as Jeff Kingston (2020: 4; 2021), however, maintain that despite Japan’s rhetoric of universal values, it has become difficult to differentiate between Japan and China’s foreign aid policies. As Söderberg (2010) emphasizes, the similarities between Japanese and Chinese regional aid policies are in no small part due to China learning, as a recipient of Japan’s ODA from the late 1970s, how to use aid as a mercantilist tool to achieve the country’s economic interests. Japanese policy makers are also wary of pressing Southeast Asian states too much on human rights violations or autocratization, as doing so might enhance China’s influence in the region (Kingston, 2020). Both China and ASEAN states have voiced concern about Japan’s intentions in incorporating ‘universal values’ into the FOIP (Hosoya, 2019: 21), and Japan’s foreign policy-​making community remains split over whether or not to support undemocratic states in Asia or lose them to China (JCIE, 2019). For Ken Inoue, Senior Advisor to JICA on Democratic Governance, maintaining bilateral relations is important, regardless of infringements of human rights (GPAJ, 2019), signalling that universal values are expendable. While Japan’s ‘value diplomacy’ discourse is predicated on differentiating Japan’s foreign policy from China’s, Japanese foreign policy makers have adopted a pragmatic approach, de-​emphasizing ‘universal values’ when these did not correspond to Japan’s national interests (Jimbo, 2018: 69, 77–​9). Japan’s pragmatic approach thus mirrors that of China. The combination of ‘universal values’ and national history, traditions and culture in Japan’s value-​based diplomacy also serves nationalist ends, namely an obedient population that supports their government’s efforts to ‘normalize’ the Japanese state through constitutional revision. A key official behind Japan’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’, Kanehara Nobukatsu, argues that Japan’s failures, including being an unreliable alliance partner to the US, soaring national debt and weak defence capabilities, can all be attributed to a Japanese view of citizenship that emphasizes self-​deprecation and critique of Japan’s past (Kanehara, 2015). Accordingly, Japanese citizens should not simply criticize the Japanese government, but be active participants in Japanese politics to realize national interests (Kanehara, 2015). To do so requires the Japanese people to overcome the ‘split’ in Japan’s postwar and prewar identities and reconcile Japan’s traditions with Japanese democracy (Kanehara, 2015). Kanehara’s position mirrors that of Abe, as advanced in his book, Utsukushi kuni e (Abe, 2006), which seeks a revival of a Japanese national spirit to overcome the humiliation of defeat in the Second World War and the constitution imposed by the US. In the same vein as Asō’s emphasis on Japan’s 100-​year history of democracy, this revival of a Japanese national spirit constitutes no less than an attempt to work around the temporal 53

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break upon which Japanese policy makers rely to sidestep the impacts of Japanese imperialism in their foreign policy. The Abe administration steadily worked to curb Japanese democracy, through the State Secrets Law, suppressing media freedoms and constitutional revision, to ensure that a Japanese national spirit would be enshrined in law, at the expense of ‘universal values’ (Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017). As Mulgan points out, the Abe administration’s proposed revisions to Japan’s 1947 constitution state that ‘human rights derive from a country’s history, culture, and traditions, and are, therefore, qualified to the extent that they are influenced by these factors … the maintenance of so-​called “public order” is elevated over all individual rights’ (Mulgan, 2016). Abe’s illiberal approach received widespread condemnation among the Japanese population who perceived his administration to be bypassing democratic debate by ramming security bills through the Diet and thereby acting unconstitutionally (Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017). Abe brushed off such criticism, justifying these changes in term of a ‘proactive pacifist’ response to the evolving security environment in which Japan found itself, notably China’s assertive foreign policy in the South and East China Seas and North Korea’s expanding nuclear programme. As Midford (2019: 42) notes, Abe’s labelling such changes as ‘proactive pacifism’ is little more than a ‘cynical deception’ designed to sugar-​coat what are essentially elements of a realist strategy. The purpose of a ‘value-​based diplomacy’ is to promote Japanese benevolence internationally by asserting Japan’s maturity as an Asian democracy in order to overcome the post-​Second World War constraints on Japan’s foreign policy. In so doing, the Japanese government not only differentiates Japan’s actions from those of China, but also justifies revisions to Japan’s own constitution, even as these revisions undermine the same ‘universal values’ emphasized in Japan’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’. In addition to Japan’s problematic ‘value-​based diplomacy’ discourse, the substance of Japan’s approach can also be said to be lacking; democracy promotion being a good case in point. Japan places little emphasis on democracy promotion compared to many Organisation for Economic Co-​ operation and Development countries, devoting comparatively less of its aid budget, and focusing on less sensitive areas, such as capacity building and technical support (MOFA, 2018a; GPAJ, 2019). When promoting democracy, the Japanese government contributes little in terms of the development of civil society or political parties (Ichihara, 2018). Rather than channelling aid to build civil society networks, Japan’s aid focuses on strengthening a state’s ability to govern and collect revenue (Kingston, 2020). There are three main reasons for this. First, Japanese officials remain reluctant to intervene in the domestic politics of recipient countries of Japan’s ODA on issues related to human rights and democracy promotion. Hiroaki Shiga, Executive Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute, argues 54

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that Japanese officials have perceived development aid to be apolitical and should not interfere in the domestic politics of other countries because of Japan’s history of imperialism (GPAJ, 2019). Despite the Abe administration advocating a ‘proactive’ diplomacy that surmounts a supposedly ‘masochistic’ view of history, it is worth noting how the legacies of Japanese imperialism continue to restrain Japan’s regional leadership. Second, the recipient-​ based nature of Japan’s ODA results in recipient states asking Japan to fund specific projects that tend to benefit the ruling elites (Ichihara, 2018). Few recipient states request support with democracy promotion or human rights. Third, Japan’s ODA is rooted in the belief that democracy flows from economic development and that ‘universal values’ are conditioned by the specific cultures in which they develop (Ichihara, 2018; Kingston, 2020). Hence, development tends to take precedence over democratization and democratization is understood to develop in distinct ways marked by each country’s culture, history and traditions. These three factors have hindered Japan’s efforts at democracy promotion. The Japanese government’s interpretation of human security has played a key role in justifying an emphasis on economic development over promoting democracy and human rights. Successive Japanese governments emphasized freedom from want, encompassing development and basic human needs, over freedom from fear, spanning state repression, freedom of speech and fundamental human rights. Even though Japan’s ODA Charter was amended in 1992 and 2003 to place a greater emphasis on human rights, human security and democratization, the Japanese government is not legally bound to do more in these areas. The Abe administration’s revisions to Japan’s ODA Charter in 2015 further cemented Japan’s development-​first approach (Zhao, 2018: 562), but also allowed for a greater emphasis on security-​related aid in line with Abe’s concept of ‘proactive pacifism’ (Kingston, 2020: 15). Japan’s ODA is intended to achieve win-​win outcomes both for Japanese firms and recipient states rather than promote ‘universal values’, such as freedom and democracy. Despite claims that Japan’s human security policy places human beings as the primary subject of security, the implementation of this policy has remained state-​centric. On 1 May 2003, the Commission on Human Security, chaired by Amartya Sen and Ogata Sadako, published the Human Security Now report which argued for states to protect people from the top-​down and empower people from the bottom-​up (Ogata and Cels, 2003: 273–​82; Fukushima, 2010: 95; Osa, 2012: 98). After Ogata became the president of the JICA on 1 October 2003, JICA quickly incorporated human security into its mission statement and ODA disbursement practices (JICA, 2010). For Ogata, the notion of empowering people equated to combining state protection measures with the implementation of socio-​development programmes to provide 55

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people with education, employment, health care and social safety, so that they could make more ‘informed choices’ about their lives (JICA, 2006). Similarly, Takasu Yukio, then Japan’s UN representative, maintained that human security meant ensuring that human beings would be resilient in the face of immediate and persistent threats to their well-​being (MOFA, 2008f). Others, such as Hoshino Toshiya, who became Japan’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, cut out local communities all together, viewing human security as a partnership between states and international organizations (Hoshino, 2006). To develop its bottom-​up approach to human security, Japan’s MOFA determined to engage NGOs and civil society organizations in its ODA policy more (Fukushima, 2010: 98–​100), notably through its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects and by coordinating with the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (Fukushima, 2010: 105, 113). Incorporating NGOs into Japan’s human security policy promised to enhance its effectiveness, make it more transparent, and bolster coordination and dialogue with affected communities (Hoshino, 2006: 29–​30; Noda, 2006: 34–​7; Fukushima, 2010: 114; Osa, 2012: 127). Nonetheless, Japanese NGOs receive a small fraction of Japan’s ODA budget (Noda, 2006: 36) and there remains some reluctance on the part of MOFA to work with NGOs as fully fledged partners in the policy-​making process (Yoshida, 2004: 142). A number of Japanese NGOs have chosen not to work with their government’s human security policy, as they perceive the Japanese government to be paying lip-​service to human security rather than the concept guiding the policy process (Fukushima, 2010: 114–​15). Japan’s approach to human security has categorized human beings as victims in need of state or international support to survive rather than people who have an active say in shaping their lives in the face of immediate and perennial threats. This interpretation of human security is founded on a similar logic to the civilizing mission that interwar liberals espoused in justification of imperialism.

Conclusion Japan has been dubbed ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ following the US abandoning its commitment to the liberal international order under Trump. Debates about Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order have evolved since the end of the Cold War, when the Japanese government faced criticism for its mercantilist aid policy and failure to dispatch troops in the 1990–​1 Gulf War. Following these two diplomatic ‘shocks’, successive Japanese governments emphasized human security in their ODA policies and enhanced the role of Japan’s SDF in UN peacekeeping missions abroad. In 2007, then Foreign Minister Asō Tarō proclaimed an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, marking 56

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an overt commitment in Japan’s foreign policy to upholding ‘universal values’ and maintaining the liberal international order in light of China’s rise. Under the second Abe Shinzō administration, Asō’s ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ would morph into the FOIP concept. The literature extolling Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ does not consider the discursive construction of Japan’s regional vision over time. The notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ cannot be understood without reference to Japan’s modern history. During the interwar period, in particular, pan-​Asianism and liberalism combined in Japan’s foreign policy to promote the expansion of Japan’s empire as a civilizing mission. Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, pan-​Asianist thought and liberalist principles were reworked in order to rehabilitate Japan back into the international community and underpinned Japan’s regional policy. There are echoes of Japan’s regional liberal leadership throughout Japan’s modern history. The notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ is not particularly new, but rather a specific articulation of a regional vision founded on discursive precedents, including Japan as a mentor and ‘bridge’ between East and West. When uncritically reproduced in debates about Japan’s contemporary international relations, these discursive constructs are problematic. The intent of the discourse about Japan’s regional ‘liberal leadership’ or ‘value-​based diplomacy’ is to circumvent the legacies of Japan’s imperial past and present Japan as an enduring benevolent state facing up to China’s authoritarian challenge. To do so, right-​wing officials and politicians assert that Japan’s constitution must be revised to legitimize the SDF and allow it to participate in collective self-​defence. Under Abe, constitutional revision went further to constrain fundamental human rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, and was coupled with a suppression of the media. Japanese people were required to be patriotic, not critical of the state. A blind acceptance of the notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ ignores how the Abe administration sought to ‘discipline’ Japan’s democracy. The discursive construction of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ and ‘value-​ based diplomacy’ reveals numerous contradictions that have endured throughout Japan’s modern history. Japan is said to bridge between East and West, yet is torn in its commitment to both. The Japanese government has promoted ‘universal values’ in Asia, only to condition these values with particularistic Asian cultures and histories. Japanese governments have emphasized a human-​centric approach to development, but rely on top-​down, state-​centric policies that side-​line communities affected by Japanese-​funded aid projects. China is excluded from Japan’s FOIP, which relies on ‘value-​based diplomacy’, yet with Japan’s economy intimately tied to China’s and uncertainty over America’s regional commitment, the Japanese government has sought out opportunities to work with China’s 57

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BRI. ‘Universal values’ remain embedded in Japan’s foreign policy discourse, but these values are quickly dropped in practice. Since its turn to democracy from November 2010, Myanmar came to occupy a prized place within Japan’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’. For Japan’s leadership, Myanmar’s democratic transition appeared to validate Japan’s emphasis on ‘universal values’ and became a frequent reference point in prime ministerial speeches. By developing a strong political and economic partnership, that included cancelling much of Myanmar’s debt, the Japanese government looked to wean Myanmar away from its dependent relationship with China and forge a brighter future for its citizens as a liberal democratic country. This positive view misjudged the nature of the transition itself. Myanmar’s military elite had long planned a shift to a ‘disciplined democracy’ in which it would maintain a stranglehold over political, economic and security affairs. As Myanmar’s transition to democracy slowly unravelled, notably with the outbreak of violence in Rakhine state, the Abe administration clung to the belief that economic development would keep the country on course for this bright future. At the same time, Japan’s engagement with Myanmar revealed practices that violated Japan’s commitment to a ‘value-​based’ approach, undermining the security of human beings across the country. The following chapters explore Japan’s problematic relationship with Myanmar’s democratization process and the impact of this relationship on the security of human beings.

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Japan as a ‘Bridge’: Facilitating Myanmar’s Transition to a ‘Disciplined Democracy’ Introduction This chapter traces Japan’s responses to the evolution of Myanmar’s democracy in the post-​Cold War period with a particular emphasis on events after the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis through to the election of the NLD in the November 2015 general election. The chapter argues that Japanese policy makers have consistently sought to distinguish their relations with Myanmar from other states in the international community by depicting Japan’s relationship with Myanmar in terms of bridging (kakehashi). The notion of Japan acting in this kakehashi role can be observed in the statements of various policy makers who imagine the Japanese state as a go-​between the international community and Myanmar. This kakehashi role is founded on a particular interpretation of Japan’s own historical experience whereby Japan shed its status as an Axis power and re-​entered the international community as a democratic state in the wake of the Second World War. This discourse is encapsulated in Asō Tarō’s concept of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ able to bestow its wisdom as the first democratized and developed state in East Asia on others in the region. As Chapter 2 discussed, this kakehashi approach can be traced to Japan’s prewar imperialist policies and discourses towards the East and Southeast Asian regions. There is therefore an inherent contradiction between the temporal break that Asō’s ‘thought leader’ notion relies on and the evolution of Japan’s bridging discourse from the early 20th century onwards. The notion of ‘democratization as process’ rather than ‘democratization as progress’ is key to Japan’s kakehashi approach. Whereas the latter expects concrete and irreversible steps towards a teleological democratic end point, such as the military’s withdrawal from politics and constitutional revision, the former perceives democratization to be a cyclical process in which 59

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democracy is negotiated over time within specific contexts. The Japanese government’s emphasis on ‘democratization as process’ allowed it to readily accept the Myanmar junta’s ‘roadmap to a disciplined democracy’ in which the military would continue to wield substantial oversight, even after general elections were held. Other members of the G7 have tended to adopt a ‘democratization as progress’ approach, condemning and sanctioning the Myanmar regime for human rights abuses and imprisoning opponents. By contrast, the Japanese government has sought to entice the Myanmar regime to democratize through ‘positive linkage’, namely Japan’s offer of ODA to the Myanmar government in return for steps towards democratization, such as the freeing of political prisoners. By democratizing, these Japanese policy makers argue, Myanmar can shed its ‘pariah’ status, enabling the West to lower economic sanctions and recognize it as a legitimate member of the liberal international order. Japan’s kakehashi approach, based on democracy as process and positive linkage, can be observed in Japan’s response to Myanmar’s efforts towards democratization following the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis through to the election of the NLD in the November 2015 general election. Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ challenged Japan’s kakehashi approach, before Myanmar could be widely accepted back into the international community. Subsequent events, notably the repression of the Rohingya minority in Rakhine state, increasingly brought Japan’s engagement with Myanmar into question, signalling that Myanmar’s democratic transition was faltering, if not regressing. Before turning to these developments, the chapter opens by tracing the emergence of Myanmar’s democracy movement to the events surrounding the 8.8.88 revolution and the ambition of the protesters to realize a democratic state free from the dominance of Myanmar’s military.

The 8.8.88 revolution and Myanmar’s budding democracy movement Since taking power in the 1962 coup, the Ne Win regime had become deeply unpopular, not least because of the state of the Burmese economy. By the mid-​1980s, Burma was heavily indebted and its economy was in free fall, prompting the UN to designate Burma as a ‘least developed country’ in December 1987 (Brown, 2013: 154–​6). Two demonetizations of the Burmese kyat in 1985 and 1987 left swathes of the population with worthless currency and the removal of price controls on rice on 1 September 1987 exacerbated the existing food crisis (Brown, 2013: 155–​7). Tensions between the populace and ruling junta were already high when, in mid-​March 1988, riot police and army units brutally crushed student-​led protests against the regime in Rangoon (Charney, 2009: 148–​50; Brown, 2013: 158). On 60

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23 July, Ne Win announced that he would step down, but the failure to ensure democratic elections resulted in further protests across the country throughout the summer, ending in a further crackdown from 8 August, hence the 8.8.88 revolution (Charney, 2009: 152–​3; Brown, 2013: 158–​9). Seizing power on 18 September, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) continued to repress the population, but also attempted to appease the public through the promise of a general election. When the election was finally held on 27 May 1990, the NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, scored a resounding victory, to the surprise of the ruling junta. The SLORC recognized the results of the election, but refused to transfer power to the NLD. Neither the international community nor the NLD accepted this move, condemning the SLORC’s illegitimate power grab in the face of the election result. The Japanese government condemned Burma’s military junta in the wake of their crackdown on the 8.8.88 revolution. Nonetheless, under pressure from METI officials and business groups, the Japanese government formally recognized the SLORC on 17 February 1989 and subsequently cancelled Myanmar’s outstanding debt (Haacke, 2006: 74). Notably, the Nihon-​Biruma Kyōkai (Japan-​Burma Association) successfully petitioned the Japanese government on 25 January 1989 to resume aid and re-​establish diplomatic relations lest Japanese firms suffer financially (Seekins, 2007: 69). Watanabe Hideo, chairman of what would become the Japan Myanmar Association (JMA), was a key figure in Japan–​Myanmar relations. As a former Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, Watanabe acted as a go-​between for the Japanese government from 1987, developing strong links with generals in the Myanmar military in the process. The renewal of ties came in spite of long-​held concerns in the Japanese government, academia and media that Japan’s aid to Burma had been wasted under the Ne Win government (Seekins, 2007: 68, 78). Subsequently, the Japanese government resumed humanitarian aid to Burma and continued to engage the junta diplomatically in order to further democratization in the country (Seekins, 1992: 246; Holliday, 2005: 403; Haacke, 2006: 73–​4). Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar, Ōtaka Hiroshi, made it clear to the Myanmar regime that ODA would only be restarted in full once the political situation had stabilized and genuine economic reforms were underway (Seekins, 2007: 95). Japan’s official policy looked to strike a balance between contending ministerial and interest group stances. METI and Japanese businesses were eager to resume Japan’s economic relationship with Burma, whereas Japan’s Ministry of Finance perceived the Burmese government to have mismanaged the economy and squandered Japanese aid. For its part, MOFA valued Japan’s close relationship with Burma, but was also under pressure to conform to the hard-​line stance adopted by other G7 states (Seekins, 2007: 97–​9). The international community remained critical of the Japanese government’s swift 61

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recognition of the SLORC and its resumption of aid (Dalpino, 2007). Aung San Suu Kyi was similarly disparaging of Japan’s normalization of relations with the SLORC so soon after the 8.8.88 revolution (Seekins, 2007: 99). Partly in response to this criticism, the Japanese government would emphasize the promotion of human rights and democracy when establishing its first ODA Charter in 1992, as detailed in Chapter 2. Having quelled the democratic revolution of 1988, the SLORC under the command of General Than Shwe modernized the Tatmadaw and began to consolidate their control over greater swathes of the country. Particularly after the transition of power from the SLORC to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, the Tatmadaw was able to pacify Myanmar’s border regions, either through successful military campaigns against or through ceasefire agreements with armed ethnic minority groups (Callahan, 2012: 121; Huang, 2013; Pedersen, 2014: 24; see also Chapter 5). As Woods (2011) notes, ‘ceasefire capitalism’ placed the Tatmadaw in control of key natural resources, from timber, to narcotics and jade, thereby enhancing the regime’s economic power (Woods, 2011). The emergence of the SPDC facilitated Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN, as on the surface it appeared that the junta had turned over a new leaf, despite the fact that the SPDC merely cemented Than Shwe’s control. Mirroring ASEAN’s acceptance of the SPDC, Japan’s foreign policy towards Myanmar remained largely consistent. Japan’s approach can be understood in terms of positive linkage, namely working through quiet diplomacy with the Myanmar junta to take steps towards democratization and improve human rights, such as releasing political prisoners, in return for increased levels of aid (Haacke, 2006: 73). By contrast, other members of the G7 were less convinced and imposed stricter sanctions on the regime, particularly following the US Freedom and Democracy Act passed by the George W. Bush administration in May 2003 (Charney, 2009: 179, 186). Despite taking control of Myanmar following the 1988 protests, it was not the intention of the military command to govern the country on a permanent basis, but rather to ensure stability while preparing a managed transition to democracy. In many ways it was no surprise that the Tatmadaw wished to rid itself of the burden of rule. By the early 2000s, though the junta had managed the impact of international sanctions by developing relations with ASEAN, China, India and Russia, the country remained comparatively economically and technologically backward (Seekins, 2007: 91–​2; Selth, 2018: 3). In a stark admission of the Tatmadaw’s failings, Prime Minister and Director of Military Intelligence Khin Nyunt saw the need for Myanmar to shed its pariah status in order to reverse widespread poverty throughout the country (Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2012: 200–​1; Taylor, 2012; Huang, 2013: 256). International acceptance would open up new opportunities for financial investment and development that would predominantly benefit the 62

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Tatmadaw, enabling the junta to settle the country’s debt and retain power for the longer term (Charney, 2009: 182; Kingsbury, 2014; Selth, 2018). Khin Nyunt drew up a ‘Seven-​Point Roadmap to Democracy’ that would result in a new constitution and the establishment of a ‘disciplined democracy’, namely a façade of civilian rule under the de facto control of the Tatmadaw (Pedersen, 2011: 52; Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2012: 203–​4; Taylor, 2012: 232; Selth, 2018: 1). Myanmar’s neighbours, especially Indonesia, provided models upon which the junta could base the country’s democratization process, allowing it to maintain substantial power, while handing over the burden of rule to elected politicians (Pedersen, 2011). Khin Nyunt’s ‘Roadmap’ failed to gain the support of the international community and Than Shwe swiftly had him imprisoned on corruption charges and disbanded the Military Intelligence corps, effectively removing a potential challenger to his rule (Kingsbury, 2014: 354; Pedersen, 2014: 27; Lall, 2016: 13). The demise of Khin Nyunt created new opportunities for civil society groups to emerge, free from the scrutiny of the Military Intelligence corps. Myanmar’s budding middle class, particularly in Yangon, began to discuss politics more openly and sought to expand educational options for Myanmar’s youth, including programmes in English, computing, business and accounting (Lall, 2016: 19). The establishment of Myanmar Egress in 2006 was particularly significant. Myanmar Egress, supported by European funding, developed as an educational institute and think tank that trained a new cadre of politically savvy students and presented policy papers that found their way to the heart of government (Lall, 2016: 22–​6; Thant Myint-​ U, 2020: 122–​3). The emergence of a politically active civil society would become one of the key, though often overlooked, factors, as the junta began to slowly transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ (Taylor, 2012: 232–​3). At the same time, the overt protestations by civil society groups would further expose the junta’s callous disregard for human life, notably during the Saffron Revolution.

The Saffron Revolution On 26 September 2007, the Myanmar junta violently suppressed demonstrations that had been simmering since mid-​August. The cause of the protests predominantly lay in the junta’s decision, apparently on the advice of the International Monetary Fund, to remove subsidies on fuel, causing a price hike on fuel of between 100 to 500 per cent and raising prices of most basic commodities (Charney, 2009: 196). Unable to afford the costs of commuting or daily necessities, Burmese people, particularly under the guidance of Buddhist monks, took to the streets. Dubbed the ‘Saffron Revolution’, the UN estimated that between 80 to 110 people were killed, with thousands more wounded or imprisoned (UN News Center, 2007). Among the dead 63

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was Nagai Kenji, a Reuters photo journalist who was shot by a Burmese soldier at point-​blank range. The G7 quickly condemned the actions of the Myanmar junta and even ASEAN, an organization committed to non-​ interference in the domestic affairs of its members, signalled its ‘revulsion’ (Selth, 2008a: 285). By contrast, China, Russia and India remained largely silent, if not supportive of the junta, in the aftermath of the crackdown as they looked to secure their national interests in the country (Selth, 2008a: 287). The Japanese government called for the Myanmar government to exercise restraint and engage in dialogue with the protestors (MOFA, 2007a). Japan withdrew US$4.7 million in aid to Myanmar (Selth, 2008a: 285), but quickly fell in line with ASEAN states whose initial condemnation gave way to engagement. Speaking on 26 October 2007, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Komura Masahiko, reiterated the Japanese government’s resolve to democratize Myanmar through dialogue (Komura, 2007). Japan’s quiet diplomacy was rooted in positive linkage, with a quick resumption of humanitarian aid and the promise of further aid in return for progressive steps towards democratization, such as the release of political prisoners. Komura also pressed Myanmar’s then Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Nyan Win, to work with Mr Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, to develop a pathway towards national reconciliation and democratization (Komura, 2007; 2008; MOFA, 2007b) signalling Japan’s efforts to act as a go-​between or bridge (kakehashi) between Myanmar and the international community. Japan’s efforts in this regard were openly acknowledged by Gambari in early 2008 (MOFA, 2008b; 2008c). Japan’s opposition parties challenged their government’s approach by calling for tougher measures on the Myanmar government. Speaking in the Diet on 3 October 2007 (Diet, 2007a), Hatoyama Yukio, then Secretary General of the DPJ, stated that, ‘although I believe that Japan is one of the few countries that can play a bridging (hashiwatashi) role between the military junta and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the current state of affairs is extremely regrettable’. Hatoyama called on the Japanese government to demand the immediate release of political prisoners and push for a concrete path to democratization. On 4 October (Diet, 2007b), Teruya Kantoku of the Social Democratic Party accused the Japanese government of propping up Myanmar’s military dictatorship with aid, instead of instituting sanctions in light of the Nagai shooting (Diet, 2007b). Even members of the LDP’s coalition partner, the Komeito, urged the government to work through multilateral channels and the UN to pressure the Myanmar government (Diet, 2007b). In subsequent Diet debates (2009a; 2009b) opposition parties emphasized that the Myanmar government had never investigated the Nagai shooting or considered the evidence presented in a Japanese autopsy report that proved that Nagai was shot at point-​blank range. On 19 June 2009 (Diet, 2009a), for example, Takemasa Koichi of the DPJ questioned whether the Nagai case could be 64

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brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. Such efforts had no impact on the Japanese government, which was committed to its engagement policy with Myanmar based on ‘national reconciliation and genuine dialogue’ (MOFA, 2008a) and ‘improv[ing] the credibility and transparency of the process of democratization’ (MOFA, 2008b).

Cyclone Nargis and the constitution Japan’s engagement of Myanmar would again be scrutinized following the Myanmar junta’s callous disregard in the wake of Cyclone Nargis which made landfall on 2 May 2008 and caused the deaths of an estimated 138,000 people. The scale of the devastation, coupled with a lack of resources and poor infrastructure in the Ayeyarwady Delta, would have been a challenge for any government to tackle. The junta did declare a state of emergency and assembled the National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee to organize the government’s response and, in the first two weeks after Cyclone Nargis struck, the military distributed over 5,600 tons of emergency aid to affected communities (Lall, 2016: 33). Yet, for over three weeks, the junta prevaricated before finally allowing humanitarian assistance into the country, exacerbating the human costs of the disaster. The junta’s failure to send rescue teams, the denial of entry to foreign humanitarian workers and the requisitioning of aid by the military all led to unnecessary suffering among an already devastated population (Selth, 2008b; Seekins, 2009). The Myanmar government’s prioritization of state over human security was clear for all to see (Seekins, 2009). Rather than support civil society and NGOs in tackling the disaster, the government held back, viewing these actors as a threat. Despite the junta’s continued procrastination, the Japanese government refused to criticize the Myanmar junta, committing to their engagement policy in line with the notion of democratization as process. Acknowledging the humanitarian crisis that Myanmar faced, on 5 May, the Japanese government quickly offered 28 million yen in assistance (MOFA, 2008d) and on 9 May requested that Chairman Than Shwe permit Japanese emergency medical teams into affected areas (MOFA, 2008e). Responding to a request by Ban Ki-​moon, then Secretary General of the UN, Than Shwe finally permitted two Japanese emergency teams to enter Myanmar on 25 May, over three weeks after the cyclone had made landfall (MOFA, 2008h). By mid-​June as the death toll soared, the Japanese government had extended US$3 million (approximately 320 million yen) to support humanitarian efforts and rebuilding (MOFA, 2008g). By way of comparison, in response to the Sichuan earthquake on 12 May 2008, ten days after Nargis had struck, the Japanese government had pledged 500 million yen within 24 hours and had emergency rescue teams on the ground by 16 May (MOFA, 2008i). Of course, the two natural disasters were dissimilar and Japan’s relationship 65

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with China is of a different order of magnitude, but the comparison clearly demonstrates the indifference of the Myanmar junta towards the well-​being of its own people. In contrast to Japan’s policy of engagement, the rest of the G7 openly condemned the Myanmar regime’s apathetic response. There were numerous calls after Cyclone Nargis made landfall to classify the junta’s failure to respond in terms of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Cohen, 2009). Most notably the then French Foreign Minister Foreign, Bernard Kouchner, proposed an international response to the disaster under the R2P banner. His calls were blocked in the UNSC by South Africa, China and Russia, which all argued that the concept of R2P did not cover natural disasters (Cohen, 2009). Nonetheless, Kouchner’s invocation of R2P had already shifted the discursive understanding of Nargis from a natural disaster to a legal case for humanitarian intervention. The ramifications of this shift were that the junta was put on notice and came under pressure to act (Haacke, 2009). Fears of foreign military intervention had long concerned the junta, so Myanmar’s leadership took the threat of R2P seriously (Selth, 2008b). Kushner’s invocation of R2P raised the stakes for the international community, which now had to articulate a response to Nargis in terms of R2P. For ASEAN and Japan, this meant seeking a diplomatic alternative to R2P. ASEAN and Japan gradually mobilized in the aftermath of Nargis to coax the junta into accepting international assistance (Cohen, 2009; Haacke, 2009; Özerdem, 2010). Though a more systematic and institutionalized response could have saved weeks and therefore lives according to Caballero-​ Anthony and Chng (2009), as the junta began to accept aid by 23 May 2008, so Japan and ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts were perceived as being more successful than an armed intervention would have been (Özerdem, 2010). On 10 May 2008, only eight days after Nargis struck, the Myanmar junta proceeded with a referendum on a new constitution. Both the timing of the referendum and the content of the new constitution were highly problematic. A significant number of citizens were not able to vote because of the impact of the cyclone and the constitution itself ensured that the junta would continue to dominate Myanmar’s politics. The constitution would guarantee that one-​quarter of all seats in Myanmar’s parliament would be held by the military, that generals would head the key Ministries of Home Affairs, Border Affairs and Defence, that the military would run the country in ‘emergency situations’, and that the NLD party would be banned from participating in elections. Because of restrictions on voting in the referendum, the new constitution was bound to be adopted and once in place would be practically impossible to revise, as more than 75 per cent of the parliament would have to vote in favour of any revision. The constitution was a central aspect of the junta’s 2003 roadmap for opening up Myanmar’s economy by encouraging an end to sanctions through democratization. The key to this 66

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roadmap was that the junta would remain in control of the democratization process throughout (Kingsbury, 2014: 357; Nakanishi, 2014: 90; Pedersen, 2014: 25). In Japan, opinions were split about the implications of the junta’s 2008 constitution. As DPJ member, Suematsu Yoshinori, noted in a session of the Japanese Diet on 11 April 2008 (Diet, 2008), the referendum on the constitution constituted a ‘reversal of democracy’, arguing that Japan should condemn Myanmar’s junta. Responding to Suematsu’s comments, then Foreign Minister for the LDP government, Komura Masahiko, agreed that there were concerns about the content of the new constitution and whether the referendum would be free and fair. Nonetheless, Komura stood by Japan’s continued engagement of Myanmar, urged the international community to pay attention to the democratization process in Myanmar and stated that Japan should not interfere in Myanmar’s internal affairs. Komura further maintained that Suematsu’s ‘reversal of democracy’ comments were counter-​ productive and could exacerbate the plight of Myanmar’s citizens. This exchange in the Japanese Diet highlights two different temporal understandings of democratization, namely democratization as progress versus democratization as process. Suematsu, a proponent of democratization as progress, sees democratization as Myanmar’s teleological end point. Hence, the Japanese government must judge each step towards democratization according to universal democratic standards, such as free and fair elections, parliaments that can be contested, constitutions that can be revised, and so forth. Failure to live up to these standards constitutes a ‘reversal’ that requires the intervention of the international community, including Japan, to rectify. For Komura, an advocate of democratization as process, the Myanmar junta should be praised for any enunciation performed or action taken that the junta itself categorizes as democratization. The Japanese government should reserve judgement as far as possible, linking any perceived progressive development with increases in aid (positive linkage). Democratization is not an end point, but an aspiration that actors perpetually redefine to fit the specific context in which they find themselves. Once in motion, democratization cannot be reversed and should not be impeded by foreign powers, as democratic reform will come from within the state. The Japanese government’s stress on democratization as process and positive linkage can be observed in a tense exchange between Nakasone Hirofumi, then Minister for Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Aso’s LDP government, and his Burmese counterpart, U Nyan Win, on 25 May 2009. During the meeting Nakasone noted that the Myanmar junta had still not resolved the Nagai shooting incident and that Aung San Suu Kyi was once again under house arrest (MOFA, 2009a). Nyan Win’s response was unequivocal. According to Nyan Win, Japan had no business interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrest, and 67

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that ‘political and economic issues must be kept separate’ (MOFA, 2009a). Nyan Win continued by asserting that Japan was in league with the US and EU in their attempt to undercut Myanmar’s attempts efforts ‘to improve its relationship with the international community’. Despite their strained conversation, Nakasone still invited Nyan Win to the Mekong-​ Japan Summit Meeting to be held in November 2009 in Tokyo (MOFA, 2009a). Though the invitation to attend the development-​focused summit appeared conditional on improvements in terms of democratization, the Nagai case remained unresolved and Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest. The ‘Mekong-​Japan Action Plan 63’ proclaimed a series of Japanese investment and aid initiatives from which Japanese firms and elites in the Mekong countries stood to benefit, mentioning only in passing that participants in the Summit Meeting had faith that Myanmar’s November 2010 general election would be ‘transparent, democratic and inclusive, with participation of all parties concerned’ (MOFA, 2009c).

The November 2010 general election Though the DPJ had frequently critiqued the LDP’s engagement policy, when the DPJ won the Japanese general election, held on 30 August 2009, it quickly adopted the LDP’s engagement policy and accepted the notion of democratization as process. In a Diet exchange on 14 April 2010 between Suematsu Yoshinori of the DPJ, and Takemasa Koichi, Vice Foreign Minister during Hatoyama Yukio’s DPJ government, Suematsu urged the Hatoyama administration to do more to promote democratization in Myanmar (Diet, 2010). Suematsu noted that the upcoming general elections in Myanmar would constitute an important moment to gauge the progress of democratization in the country and suggested that China should intervene on Japan’s behalf to resolve the Nagai shooting case. Suematsu’s comments in many ways mirrored those of Takemasa’s criticisms of the LDP government in previous Diet sessions when the DPJ was in the opposition. While pushing the Myanmar junta to release political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and ensure that the elections were both free and fair, Takemasa otherwise did an about-​turn. Takemasa highlighted that democratization in Myanmar would take time and that Japan should abide by ASEAN’s non-​interference principle. Similarly, Takemasa maintained that the Nagai case remained a bilateral issue and that interference from third parties was not welcome. The Nagai case would not be solved before the November elections, and the elections themselves proved to be anything but free and fair with an NLD boycott resulting in a landslide for the military-​backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In response to the elections, MOFA’s Press Secretary stated his ‘disappointment’, but hoped that the Myanmar government would ‘ensure that these elections mark the start of a more 68

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inclusive phase by implementing measures such as the release of political detainees … in order to realize transition to a civilian and accountable system of government’ (MOFA, 2010b). Similarly, Japan’s business community echoed that the elections symbolized a ‘new start’. Writing in the Japan External Trade Organization’s (JETRO’s) ‘Asian Research World Trends’, Myanmar expert Kudō Toshihiro noted the concerns of the international community with the elections, but added that the transition to civilian rule and the inclusion of ethnic minority parties represented a step forward after 22 years of the junta (Kudō, 2011: 39). Considering the response of Japanese elites to the 2010 elections from a spatial standpoint, it was clear that the exclusion of the NLD did not preclude further democratic advances in line with the concept of ‘democratization as process’. This was in contrast to the stance taken by Western governments. For example, the UK’s Foreign Minister William Hague (2010) stated that ‘The British Government will stand by the people of Burma’ and condemned the junta for being ‘a brutal regime that has pillaged the nation’s resources and overseen widespread human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, rape and torture’ (Hague, 2010). US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also stressed that ‘[t]‌he United States stands steadfastly with the Burmese people’ by ‘maintain[ing] rigorous sanctions against members of the regime and their supporters … [to] bring an end to human rights abuses’ by Burma’s ‘pariah’ government (Clinton, 2010). For the US and UK governments, the NLD’s boycott of the elections signalled that the Burmese people did not perceive the elections as legitimate and that the elections were therefore not evidence of ‘democratization as progress’. By the summer of 2011, the international community’s position regarding Myanmar’s democratization process had begun to shift. For Tsumori Shigeru, a former Japanese ambassador to Myanmar, the context of the Arab Spring was key. The junta saw this as an opportunity to diversify its foreign relations and resolve tensions with the US. The US in turn reciprocated, looking to counter China’s rise (Tsumori, 2012: 161–​2). On 19 August 2011, Thein Sein expressed his desire to work with the international community, including global and regional institutions. In response, on 18 November, President Obama praised Myanmar’s democratic reform process and on 30 November Secretary of State Clinton visited Myanmar, signalling a decisive change in US policy (Nakanishi, 2014: 91). In January 2012, Thein Sein not only pardoned political prisoners, but also permitted the NLD to participate in the upcoming April 2012 by-​elections and invited monitors from the EU, US and ASEAN to ensure that the 2012 by-​elections proceeded in a free and fair manner (Nakanishi, 2014: 90; Lall, 2016: 78). As a result, the US began relaxing sanctions on Myanmar in February (Nakanishi, 2014: 92). In the April 2012 by-​elections, the NLD party won 43 out of the 45 seats being contested and Aung San Suu Kyi began an international tour to gain 69

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support for the democratic process and an end to sanctions (Nakanishi, 2014: 91). Her efforts bore fruit with President Obama’s November 2012 visit to Myanmar (Nakanishi, 2014: 93). Reforms under the Thein Sein administration continued apace, including the cancellation of the China-​ financed Myitsone Dam project, legislation to enable a free press to operate, and a commitment to ending the use of child labour and child soldiers in Myanmar (Lall, 2016: 74–​5, 79–​80). Myanmar’s newly inaugurated parliament also took its role seriously, proposing key legislation to further Myanmar’s democratic process. That said, the military still held substantial political power in government and parliament and economic power in terms of the military’s control of major Burmese enterprises. In an article published in the popular Japanese monthly Sekai, Yoshitsugu Kōsuke (2014), a professor at Ritsumeikan University, attributed the shift in the stance of the international community to Japan’s kakehashi or bridging role based on democracy as process and positive linkage. On 27 June 2011, Japan’s Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Kikuta Mikiko, visited Myanmar to re-​establish Japan–​Myanmar ties, share expectations about Myanmar’s democratization efforts, and signal that Japan would encourage Western states to relax sanctions on Myanmar (Yoshitsugu, 2014: 241). The Japanese government thereby indicated that it would actively promote Myanmar’s democratization process by acting as a bridge between Myanmar and the West. In October 2011, Japan’s then Foreign Minister, Gemba Kōichirō, met with his Burmese counterpart, Wunna Maung Lwin, and stated that Japan perceived Myanmar as a member of the Asia-​Pacific democratic community and would accordingly provide aid in return for progress on democratization (Yoshitsugu, 2014: 242). In November 2011, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko met with Thein Sein and was persuaded that Myanmar’s democratization process was genuine. A subsequent meeting between Gemba, the Myanmar government, and Aung San Suu Kyi set the stage for further improvements in Japan–​Myanmar ties, concluding investment agreements that would allow the Thilawa SEZ, in which Japan would invest heavily, to proceed (Yoshitsugu, 2014: 243–​4). In addition, the Japanese government agreed to debt relief for Myanmar and the resumption of yen loans at the November 2012 ASEAN summit (Yoshitsugu, 2014: 245–​6). Japan was the first country to resume aid and offered US$900 million in bridging loans through JICA to enable Myanmar to pay off its remaining debts to Japan and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Söderberg, 2015: 155–​7). The Abe Shinzō administration continued the approach of its predecessor, announcing new yen loans to Myanmar, which would be supplemented with further aid and security cooperation based on the principle of ‘proactive peace’ when Abe visited Myanmar in May 2013 (Yoshitsugu, 2014: 247). The investment and aid deals signed between Japan and Myanmar during the Thein Sein administration would 70

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amount to US$5 billion, dwarfing the amounts put forward by the US and EU (Lall, 2016: 156). Though Yoshitsugu overstates Japan’s role in influencing the international community, assessments by Japanese policy makers and diplomats did indicate a general sense that Myanmar’s political system was transforming in line with the notion of democratization as process. By 2012, Umeda Kunio, Chief of Section South Asian Affairs at Japan’s MOFA, claimed that everyone in the Japanese government was positive about the pace of reforms in Myanmar (Umeda, 2012: 8). Former Ambassador Tsumori confirmed Umeda’s assessment, arguing that Thein Sein was building transparent and accountable governance that allowed a greater role for NGOs and civil society, freedom of assembly and unions, and relaxed rules regarding the media (Tsumori, 2012: 160). Though Myanmar’s constitution remained problematic, it did enable a division of political power, clarified distinctions between the military and civilian rule, and allowed for future electoral competition between the USDP and NLD (Tsumori, 2012: 159–​60). In addition, Thein Sein changed Myanmar’s electoral laws to allow the NLD to participate in future elections and even raised the possibility of future constitutional revision (Tsumori, 2012: 160–​1). Considering the structural hurdles to constitutional revision, Tsumori’s prediction appeared more hopeful than likely. Similarly, Yamaguchi Yōichi, another former Japanese ambassador to Myanmar, argued that though the Burmese military had not relinquished power, Myanmar was democratizing and that, ultimately, the military would enable constitutional revision and return to their barracks (Yamaguchi, 2012b: 44). Yamaguchi also disparaged critiques of Myanmar’s democratization process by Western governments and media, which possessed an inadequate understanding of Myanmar’s history and culture. Arguing that Myanmar had to be understood in its own unique context, Yamaguchi compared Myanmar with Japan during the warring states period, noting that talk of human rights in Japan’s warring states period would be similarly meaningless (Yamaguchi, 2012b: 45). This mix of past and present is problematic because Yamaguchi’s point is based on a contradiction, namely that to understand a country, one needs to know its unique history, only to then compare Myanmar’s current situation with Japan’s warring states period (1467–​1600). In contrast to the positive assessments of Myanmar’s emergence from military rule following the 2010 elections by Japanese officials and pundits, numerous academics emphasized caution (Pedersen, 2011; Callahan, 2012; Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2012; Taylor, 2012; Egreteau, 2014; Jones, 2014a). All were positive about the pace of democratic reforms under the Thein Sein government, but noted the continued dominance of the military in political and economic affairs. Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2012) argued that though reformers within the military, such as Thein Sein, had advanced democratization by 71

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enabling a freer press, releasing political prisoners and granting the NLD the right to contest elections, hardliners in the military alarmed by the pace of change or pro-​democracy advocates anticipating a more rapid transformation could still derail the process. Immediately after the Thein Sein government was sworn in during April 2011, the National Defence and Security Council was established. The National Defence and Security Council was dominated by military officials and bestowed with the authority to declare a state of emergency, in which it would be granted full government powers (Kingsbury, 2014: 358). The presence of the military was pervasive throughout the post-​2011 government and bureaucracy, with retired officers taking up new positions as politicians and administrators (Egreteau, 2014: 267). The constitution, which ensured the continued prominence of the military in Myanmar’s politics, remained in place with no prospects of revision. According to these academics, democratization in Myanmar would only make real progress when the military relinquished power, returned to their barracks, and allowed the constitution to be amended. None of these developments seemed probable when the USDP took power and became increasingly improbable following the outbreak of communal violence in Rakhine state in 2012.

Communal violence in the Rakhine Though Japan, together with much of the international community, applauded the efforts of the Thein Sein government, by 2012 there were clear signs that Myanmar’s democratic transition was faltering, most notably with the eruption of communal violence in Rakhine state, which flared up sporadically over the period of 18 June to November 2012.1 The 2012 sectarian violence followed the violent rape and murder of an Arakan Buddhist woman at the hands of three Muslim men on 28 May (ICG 2013; Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 36–​41).2 In response, Arakan Buddhists attacked a bus on 3 June in Toungop, killing ten Muslims. With tensions already heightened by the military-​supported USDP’s promise to allow Muslims to vote in the 2010 elections in an attempt to undermine the local Rakhine nationalist party, the tit-​for-​tat murders ignited widespread sectarian violence (Fair, 2018: 67). The Myanmar government declared a state of emergency on 10 June and sent in the military, but already some 98 people had died, 5,338 homes had been destroyed and 75,000 people, predominantly Rohingya Muslims, became IDPs. The military presence subdued the violence, but failed to tackle the underlying grievances and was deeply controversial. From a spatial perspective, the Myanmar military had clearly delineated between the Arakan Buddhist population that were accepted citizens and the Rohingya people who were depicted as ‘illegal Bengali immigrants’. 72

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The communal violence in Rakhine state demonstrated that the Tatmadaw had given away none of its crucial interests pertaining to security (Selth, 2018). As far as introducing the rule of law to Myanmar, the Tatmadaw had ensured that its meaning centred on obedience rather than legal rights (Cheeseman, 2014a). In the case of the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state, the rule of law was enforced to ensure exclusion rather than equality (Cheeseman, 2014a), a strategy that MacLean (2019) labelled ‘lawfare’, raising the question of which other minority groups might be targeted should they not be seen to obey the rule of law. The same logics of personal and structural violence that had guided military rule, continued to define the role of the military in Myanmar’s affairs as it democratized (Cheeseman, 2014b). The military deployed its monopoly on violence to meet its economic and political ends through such means as land grabs or ethnic violence (Cheeseman, 2014b). MacLean (2019) describes the military’s land grabs and the containment of the Rohingya population in internment camps as spacio-​cide, a tactic designed to remove and erase the Rohingya presence from Rakhine. Rather than address the systemic repression of Muslim communities, a report submitted by a presidential commission examining the violence in Rakhine state urged the military to ‘increase operations, target alleged “Bengalis” posing as members of national races, scrutinize identification records, close border crossings, and enforce the 1982 Citizenship Law’ (Cheeseman, 2014b: 336). As Chapter 6 demonstrates, the Rohingya had long endured repressive policies and state-​led violence. Notably, in 1982, the Burmese government under Ne Win passed a Citizenship Law that did not recognize the Rohingya as one of the country’s national races. Instead, Ne Win asserted that the Rohingya people were Bengali immigrants who had illegally entered the country from Bangladesh. As a result, the Rohingya community became increasingly marginalized and persecuted. The 1982 Citizenship Law has been widely condemned by prominent international officials. Tomas Ojea Quintana, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, stated that the Citizenship Law ‘contravenes generally accepted international norms to ensure that there is no State sanctioned discrimination on the basis of religion and ethnicity’ (HRW, 2013: 112). As the communal violence in Rakhine state unfolded, the 1982 Citizenship Law ensured that the Rohingya would have no form of legal redress. The promulgation of a right-​wing nationalist anti-​Muslim rhetoric also drew on the 1982 Citizenship Law to motivate those targeting the Rohingya with violence. The relaxation of freedom of speech that accompanied the democratization process, allowed right-​wing nationalist associations, including groups led by Buddhist monks such as the Organization for the Protection of Race & Religion (Ma Ba Tha),3 to widely publicize an anti-​Muslim rhetoric and agenda that made the exacerbation of violence 73

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thinkable (HRW, 2013: 7; Walton, 2015: 518; Schissler et al, 2017: 381, 386; Wade, 2017). Ma Ba Tha succeeded in getting four anti-​Muslim race and religion laws passed in parliament (Wade, 2017) and undermined attempts at reconciliation between the Rohingya, Rakhine Buddhist and Burmese Buddhist communities (Schissler et al, 2017: 389–​91).4 Though there is insufficient evidence to claim that these Buddhist nationalist monks worked hand-​in-​hand with the Myanmar military as Howe (2018) claims, Myanmar’s government sanctioned this rhetoric, perhaps perceiving the creation of a Muslim enemy as a means of justifying the role of the Tatmadaw (Wade, 2017). As the end date for the state of emergency (mid-​October 2012) approached, so tensions mounted again, particularly following a Buddhist nationalist rally on 2 September in Mandalay led by the ultra-​nationalist monk Ashin Wirathu who called for the expulsion of ‘Bengalis’, a derogatory term applied to the Rohingya people, from Myanmar. On 21 October, following the withdrawal of government troops, the sectarian violence reignited across Rakhine, primarily targeting the Rohingya. The official death toll for the renewed violence stood at 192, with 8,614 homes destroyed, and a further 140,000 IDPs, again mostly Rohingya people, suffered in the violence. The Rohingya IDP camps effectively became ‘open prisons’, severely restricting the movement of the Rohingya people (Pedersen, 2018: 18). On 5 December 2012, the UN Under-​Secretary-​General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination, Valerie Amos, referred to the ‘dire’ humanitarian situation unfolding in Rakhine, stating that ‘I saw thousands of people in overcrowded, sub-​standard shelter with poor sanitation. … They don’t have jobs, children are not in school and they can’t leave the camp because their movement is restricted’ (HRW, 2013: 74). Pedersen (2018: 19) notes that a further consequence of the 2012 violence was that within Myanmar, the Rohingya became characterized as a national Muslim problem, rather than a local Rakhine issue, helping to raise popular support for the military. The Myanmar military’s repressive and violent treatment of the Rohingya raised fundamental ethical issues and concerns about the direction of Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’. International NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), quickly condemned the Myanmar authorities, noting that on multiple occasions local police and military failed to intervene to stop the violence and that President Thein Sein’s declaration of a state of emergency empowered the security forces to attack the Rohingya (HRW, 2012: 1, 18; 2013: 5, 16–​17; Wade, 2017). State-​sanctioned violence contravened numerous international conventions to which the Myanmar state was a party, violating Article 15 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (Abdelkader, 2014: 400) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which required the Myanmar government to formally recognize people who were ‘born in its territory 74

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who would otherwise be stateless’ (Zawacki, 2012: 19–​20). A number of activists, academics and journalists labelled the state-​sanctioned violence against the Rohingya as acts of genocide, citing numerous contraventions of the 1948 Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, and invoking the principle of R2P that charges the international community with a duty to intervene (Zarni and Cowley, 2014; ISCI, 2015). According to William Schabas, the application of the term ‘genocide’ was problematic in this case owing to the lack of evidence that the Myanmar state was systematically destroying the Rohingya as a race (Zawacki, 2012: 21). Nevertheless, crimes against humanity, as defined in the Rome Statute of the ICC, were applicable (Zawacki, 2012; HRW, 2013: 11–​12; Amnesty International, 2015: 12). Civil society groups also rebuked Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to defend the Rohingya (HRW, 2012: 9; 2013: 107), raising the charge that she had ‘provided cover’ for Western leaders to shirk their responsibilities (Green, 2013: 96–​7). Aung San Suu Kyi adopted the position that both sides shared the blame for the violence (Shibata, 2013). According to Ware and Laoutides (2018: 38–​9) the depiction of Aung San Suu Kyi as uncaring does not acknowledge her expressions of compassion towards the victims of the violence and efforts to bridge ethnic divides. Media and activist condemnation of Aung San Suu Kyi did not recognize the difficult position that the NLD leader found herself in during Myanmar’s transition to a disciplined democracy. With the 2015 general elections on the horizon, the NLD had to be attentive to the growing anti-​Muslim sentiment among the Buddhist majority population (Lee, 2014). Any expression of support for the Rohingya by the NLD would likely be exploited by Myanmar’s ruling military government to paint the opposition as unpatriotic and weak on national security, potentially losing the NLD vital votes. Having won the 2015 election, the NLD government established an advisory commission on ethnic and religious tensions in Rakhine state, headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to address communal tensions (Munroe, 2016). Nonetheless, in December 2019, when charges of genocide were brought against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, Aung San Suu Kyi’s decision to defend the Tatmadaw tarnished her reputation, as detailed in Chapter 6. For its part, the international community was blindsided by the violence, failing to grasp the depth of the hostilities and systemic repression of both the Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya communities. Having castigated the regime for its violent suppression of the Saffron Revolution in September 2007 and its negligent response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, the international community had been taken in by Thein Sein’s proactive steps towards democratization and were eager to benefit from the economic opportunities that were opening up in the country. The 75

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sectarian bloodshed in Rakhine state threatened to undermine the narrative of a reforming pariah state. Despite recognizing the Rohingya as a distinct ethnic group, the international community were, at this point, still reluctant to press the Myanmar government and understood tensions in Rakhine in terms of ‘communal violence’; exempting the Myanmar government from responsibility because of concerns that they might jeopardize their commercial and strategic interests (Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 687–​8). The international community continued to praise Myanmar’s reform and democratization processes under Thein Sein (Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 749) and the US and EU gradually eased sanctions on the regime despite ongoing tensions in Rakhine (Abdelkader, 2014: 404–​8). HRW alleged that the international community was more focused on business access to the country than taking the Myanmar government to task (HRW, 2012: 9; 2013: 107). HRW and the UN’s appeal to the international community to pressure the Myanmar government to ‘end discrimination and violence against the Rohingya’ (HRW, 2013: 134; UN, 2013) was largely ignored, but already set a normative standard for the international community’s response to the situation in the Rakhine. The UN and NGOs raised this normative standard in response to ongoing repression and violence in the Rakhine, resulting in charges of crimes against humanity and the Rohingya genocide case held in December 2019 at the ICJ. Any endorsement of Myanmar’s democratization process from October 2012 should be considered in light of this strengthening normative standard. The plight of the Rohingya was again highlighted in the refugee boat crisis of 2015. The US categorization of Thailand as a Tier 3 country in its annual report on human trafficking sparked the crisis. Reports had surfaced alleging that human traffickers were working with the Thai authorities to transport Rohingya migrants to Thailand where they could be sold on to work in various industries throughout the region in conditions tantamount to slavery (Szep and Grudgings, 2013). Concerned that the US categorization of Thailand as a Tier 3 country could result in sanctions against them, the Thai government responded in early May 2015 by cracking down on human traffickers who had been ferrying Rohingya migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh (Amnesty International, 2015). The traffickers in turn began to abandon their human cargo on the open ocean (Amnesty International, 2015). Approximately two to three weeks after the crisis started, ASEAN finally agreed to provide humanitarian assistance and provisional shelter to the migrants (Amnesty International, 2015: 35–​6). By mid-​2015, the UNHCR had estimated that approximately 1,100 people had lost their lives leaving Myanmar and Bangladesh by boat since 2014 and that approximately 1,000 more remained missing (Amnesty International, 2015: 10). Although Japanese leaders voiced concerns about the situation in Rakhine state during summit meetings between Japan and Myanmar, the 76

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emphasis in these meetings was always on ODA, foreign direct investment and development projects (MOFA, 2012; 2014). In response to the 2015 Rohingya boat crisis, the Japanese government pledged US$3.5 million but refused to take in any refugees (Shibata, 2015), in line with its long-​standing policy to externalize refugee issues. For some, the Abe administration’s failure to condemn the repression of the Rohingya in Myanmar demonstrated that the Japanese government’s emphasis on universal values and human rights was just empty rhetoric (Fujitani, 2013). The Japanese government avoided the term ‘Rohingya’, acquiescing to the Myanmar military and government’s interpretation of the Rakhine crisis and the ostracization of the Rohingya people. In spite of developments in Rakhine state, the November 2015 general elections further cemented in place the notion that Myanmar was continuing to democratize and were widely applauded by the international community. The NLD won majorities in both the upper and lower houses of parliament. Nonetheless, a number of troubling issues with both Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD had become apparent. Despite its democratic credentials, the NLD itself was run top-​down, with the leadership’s decrees going unchallenged by its rank-​and-​file (Lall, 2016: 68). Aung San Suu Kyi’s praise for the military, even as it executed a repressive campaign against the Rohingya in Rakhine state in 2012–​13 and carried out attacks against Kachin ethnic groups, marked her as siding with the previous regime (Lall, 2016: 84–​5). In addition, Aung San Suu Kyi’s support for the continued operation of the Chinese-​Tatmadaw co-​run Letpadaung copper mine, which had been subject to protests that had been brutally suppressed by the police, further singled her out for criticism (Lall, 2016: 84). Despite taking power in 2015, the NLD also did not appear to offer many original policy proposals beyond a fixation with changing Myanmar’s constitution and was dismissive of the think tanks and advisors who had supported the Thein Sein administration with new policy ideas (Lall, 2016: 210; Thant Myint-​U, 2020: 225). Furthermore, through the 2008 constitution, the military continued to hold significant power in the Cabinet and, with 25 per cent of seats guaranteed for the military in parliament, could veto any proposal to revise the constitution (Nemoto, 2016a: 59–​61). Myanmar still had a long way to go before its democratic system could be said to be deeply embedded within the fabric of society. The Japanese government gave more credence to Myanmar’s democratization process than it arguably deserved, depicting it as a fresh start that wiped the slate clean. In so doing, the Japanese government was bound to a temporal discourse that was inherently contradictory. A notable example of this was Japan’s cancellation of Myanmar’s debt in April 2012, resumption of yen loans, and investment in the Thilawa SEZ, all of which drew a clear line between past and present, enabling Myanmar to move on (Umeda, 2012: 10). 77

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In a sense, this temporal break appeared to signal the end of a policy based on democratization as process, as there was little room for positive linkage if economic relations were fully restored. Nevertheless, the discourse of ‘democratization as process’ continued, as the degenerating situation in Rakhine state highlighted the fragility of democratization in Myanmar. The Japanese government sought to justify Japan’s increasingly mercantilist strategy in Myanmar by simultaneously insisting that democratization had arrived in Myanmar, even though it remained ‘in process’. The Japanese government ignored the fact that Myanmar’s democratic transition was not a fresh start, but rather a calculated transfer of power that began with the junta’s 2003 roadmap to democracy and coordinated by the military throughout from a position of strength.

Conclusion Successive Japanese governments since the end of the Cold War have formulated their relationship with Myanmar in terms of bridging (kakehashi), ‘democratization as process’ and positive linkage. Since the 8.8.88 revolution, Japanese political and business elites have been attuned to Myanmar’s economic potential, rewarding any effort towards democratization with aid and the promise of investment. The Japanese government’s insistence on ‘democratization as process’ endured despite the junta’s suppression of the 2007 Saffron Revolution and callous disregard for human security in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Myanmar’s ‘roadmap to democracy’ and constitution further demonstrated the junta’s intention to continue to exercise power in a ‘disciplined democracy’. Nevertheless, when Thein Sein came to power through the widely discredited 2010 general elections, his administration surprised many in the international community by committing to a series of democratic reforms. Japanese politicians and diplomats played a significant role in promoting the notion that Myanmar’s democratization process was a genuine ‘fresh start’ and supported this stance through substantial debt relief and aid. At the same time, numerous scholars raised concerns about the continued influence of the military on political affairs throughout Thein Sein’s tenure, noting in particular the military’s suppression of communal violence in Rakhine state which broke out in 2012. Favouring the Buddhist Rakhine community, the Tatmadaw forced the Muslim Rohingya into internment camps or exile and actively supported the targeting of Rohingya people. Throughout, Japanese politicians, diplomats and officials supported the Myanmar government, maintaining that conditions in the country would improve under the banner of ‘democracy as process’. Japan’s human rights, human security and democratization rhetoric rang hollow in the face of the deteriorating situation in Rakhine state. 78

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Advocates of Japan’s ‘value-​diplomacy’ justified Japan’s approach by drawing on a flexible, but inherently contradictory, discourse. Japanese foreign policy makers could proclaim that Japan was bridging between Myanmar and the international community and acting as a ‘thought leader’ able to democratize and develop Myanmar and draw it towards a teleological end point of history. According to this discourse, Myanmar was like Japan in the Meiji era, needing only to follow Japan’s trailblazing path. Yet, there was also a sense of temporal displacement, as Japan would always remain the ‘thought leader’ speaking from the future to those countries in the past which needed to catch up. The opportunities Japan hoped to gain from ‘Asia’s last frontier’ were based on an exploitative relationship whereby Japanese firms would plunder Myanmar’s cheap labour and abundant natural resources. The future that Myanmar citizens might hope for was founded on a present in which their lives would be bulldozed away to establish SEZs and economic corridors. Myanmar would be hindered from crossing the ‘bridge’ from the premodern to the modern, from underdeveloped to developed, from authoritarian to developed state. The notion of Japan as a bridge also denoted a temporal break that attempted to cover up the less desirable aspects of Japan’s historical relationship with Myanmar. As Chapter 2 explained, Japanese elites referred to ‘bridging’ both in terms of Japan’s post-​Second World War transformation and economic miracle, and Japan’s status as Asia’s oldest democracy. This obscured the discursive continuity between Japanese imperialism and Japan’s contemporary foreign policy towards the region. Such temporal breaks were invoked to indicate fresh starts in the Japan–​Myanmar relationship, such as the ‘special relationship’ that developed after the Second World War or the cancellation of Myanmar’s debt in November 2012 as a reward for the country’s democratization. Yet, Japanese officials still needed to account for the deficiencies in Myanmar’s fledgling democracy. They did so through the notion of democratization as process, whereby the mere enunciation of democratization justified continued economic engagement and political support. This form of temporal cyclicality, in which process is given precedence over progress, was embedded in the return of Japan’s mercantilist aid strategy; one that paid lip-​service to democratization and human rights. Following a ‘democracy as process’ approach also raised ethical implications for Japan’s ability to act as a ‘bridge’ as it distinguished between Asian and universal values. Japanese leaders tried to straddle these two sets of values by appealing to both simultaneously, but in so doing, they diluted the content of these values until they became devoid of meaning. In ethical terms, what was left was a sense of anything goes. As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the Japanese government’s commitment to human rights and security were reinterpreted through the lens of Asian and universal values to formulate a state-​centric foreign policy designed to realize Japan’s national 79

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interests. Despite featuring in Japan’s foreign policy rhetoric, Japanese policies towards Myanmar have failed to secure human beings from want and fear, not only in Rakhine state, but also in terms of Japanese investments in SEZs, economic corridors, and mediation in ethnic conflicts in Myanmar’s borderlands. In all these cases, communities have been reduced to a bare life, devoid of political voice, and forced to be resilient in the face of structural inequality and repression.

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4

Japan and Special Economic Zones in Myanmar Introduction The human cost of economic development is the subject of the fourth chapter. The primary incentive of both the Japanese government and business in encouraging Myanmar’s democratization process was to exploit the human and natural resources of the country. Myanmar’s cheap, abundant and comparatively well-​educated workforce would provide new opportunities for Japanese firms to shift production away from China, where costs were steadily mounting, to new and more profitable states. Alarmed by China’s continued rise, the Abe administration encouraged Japanese businesses to diversify their investment portfolios for geostrategic, as well as economic, reasons through financial and regulatory support (Dooley and Inoue, 2020). Financially, the Japanese government would provide substantial debt relief, as well as both grant and loan aid to build key infrastructure that Myanmar lacked and that was needed to attract Japanese businesses. Regulatory support included assisting the Myanmar government in writing new investment laws that were favourable to Japanese businesses. The Japanese government’s support for Japanese business ventures in Myanmar was encapsulated in its sponsoring, through JICA, of the Thilawa SEZ. This landmark project put the ethical dimension of Japan’s ODA programme in Myanmar to the test. The Thilawa SEZ should have been developed in accordance with JICA’s ODA guidelines, which require that communities affected by the project be treated humanely and adequately compensated for any disruption to their lives and livelihoods. As Mekong Watch, a Japanese NGO, recorded, the land of the Thilawa residents was coercively appropriated, the residents were inadequately compensated and moved to an inappropriate relocation site where the quality of housing was poor and the conditions for life were unsanitary. Though the residents mounted a legal challenge against JICA with the help of Mekong Watch, 81

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JICA conducted its own investigation that found that it was ‘not in non-​ compliance’ with its own guidelines. JICA did seek to ameliorate conditions at the relocation site for the former residents of Thilawa, but minor improvements to the relocation site still forced its residents to be resilient, subject to a bare life on the margins of Myanmar’s developing economy and society. The forcible appropriation of the Thilawa resident’s land to build a SEZ sponsored by the Japanese government and a consortium of Japanese businesses highlights a major discrepancy between Japanese policy makers’ rhetorical commitment to human security and the reality of neoliberal imperatives in Myanmar. At the same time as the Thilawa SEZ was being developed, the Japanese government joined a consortium to begin work on the Dawei SEZ and the infrastructural links that would connect this deep-​sea port with Thailand via the Southern Economic Corridor. As with the Thilawa SEZ, villagers in the Dawei region were forced to relocate to substandard sites with little hope of recompense or the ability to maintain their livelihoods. The case of the Dawei SEZ further exposed how Japanese investment priorities in Myanmar superseded considerations of human security and the impact of development projects on local communities. This chapter opens with a brief examination of Japan’s economic relationship with Myanmar during the SLORC and SPDC years, before turning to how Japanese political and business elites welcomed the economic opportunities as Myanmar transitioned to a ‘disciplined democracy’. The discursive foundations of the economic goals of Japanese elites in Myanmar set the tone for how Japanese investment has been conducted in practice. Notably, the temporal dimensions of Japanese elite discourse on Myanmar’s development emphasize Japan’s position as a ‘thought leader’ that can guide a backward Myanmar locked in the past to a more prosperous future in which all Myanmar citizens will benefit. The subsequent sections on the Thilawa and Dawei SEZs reveal the hollowness of this rhetoric in practice.

Myanmar’s post-​1989 economy As Chapter 3 noted, the Burmese economy collapsed in the mid-​1980s, triggering the 8.8.88 demonstrations that the Tatmadaw brutally suppressed. The military governments of the SLORC and SPDC periods (from 1989 to 2010) contended with sanctions imposed by the G7 states that limited Myanmar’s economic relations. Increasingly isolated, the junta turned to neighbouring states to sustain Myanmar’s economy. After 1989, China, in particular, became a major trade and investment partner for Myanmar, reducing incentives for the junta to reform Myanmar’s economy (Seekins, 2007: 124). China enhanced its energy security by acquiring natural gas from Myanmar, constructing oil and gas pipelines from Kyaukpyu to Yunnan, 82

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which were completed in 2015, and by building hydroelectric power plants. The construction of the pipelines facilitated the transport of oil and gas from Myanmar’s energy-​r ich deep-​water seas directly into China, bypassing the Straits of Malacca that represented a potential chokehold on East Asia’s energy imports from the Middle East and Africa (Hartley, 2018a: 300). These pipelines have come at a significant cost both to local communities who were displaced without compensation and to the environment (Mizuno, 2016). China’s BRI sought to further improve the energy and transportation infrastructure through central Myanmar and access to the Indian Ocean by constructing a deep-​water port on Maday Island near Kyaukpyu. An overland route through Myanmar’s northern regions aimed to connect Yunnan with Bangladesh and India, the so-​called BCIM corridor. The Chinese government has also attempted to secure its frontier with Myanmar due to the ongoing civil conflicts, while making the most out of the border trade, notably in timber and jade (Kudō, 2012b). As Myanmar remains one of the most difficult countries in the world in which to do business (Japan Times, 2017a) and Western investors have been put off by human rights abuses in Myanmar, especially as concerns the Rohingya in northwestern Rakhine state, so the Aung San Suu Kyi administration increasingly turned to China for trade and investment (Japan Times, 2017a). Since the 1 February 2021 coup, Japanese elites fear that China will once again dominate in Myanmar. Despite their strengthening economic relations and warming ties, Myanmar was not a Chinese client state over the SLORC and SPDC years. Security cooperation was limited and economic relations were mutually beneficial, facilitating the Tatmadaw’s business and strategic interests (Haacke, 2011). The Tatmadaw also fought armed ethnic groups in Myanmar’s borderlands that had strong ties with the Chinese government, contrary to the wishes of Beijing (Haacke, 2011). In addition, the Thein Sein administration suspended the Myitsone Dam project, which the Chinese government had invested heavily in, due to local opposition, thereby cooling the relationship (Kudō, 2012b: 11–​12). As Myanmar proceeded with its transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, so opportunities for states like Japan and the US to develop their interests in the country served to lessen Myanmar’s economic reliance on China. Engaging with Myanmar’s economy has largely involved dealing with two military-​run conglomerates founded in the SPDC/​SLORC era, namely the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). MEC concentrated predominantly on heavy industry and construction, while MEHL focused on the extraction of raw materials (including jade, rubber and timber) (Kingsbury, 2014: 359–​62). These two conglomerates would come to dominate Myanmar’s economy, facilitating corruption between the military and their business associates (Lall, 2016: 135–​6). The junta’s privatization policies from 2009–​10 further 83

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embedded the cronyism inherent in Myanmar’s political economy (Lall, 2016: 135–​6). By the 2010 elections, Myanmar had become the second most corrupt state in the world, according to Transparency International (Steinberg and Fan, 2012: 362), as the majority of Myanmar’s citizens languished in poverty. With the deepening of the Rohingya crisis from August 2016, the UN Human Rights Council singled out both MEC and MEHL as funders of genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Tatmadaw (UNHCR, 2019). Though the Japanese government limited their official relationship with Myanmar and suspended their ODA programme, key Japanese business groups, including Mitsubishi and Marubeni, continued to act as a conduit for the Japanese government during the SLORC/​SPDC era (Seekins, 2007: 118). Following a visit by a Keidanren delegation in June 1994, major Japanese firms, including Daiwa Securities, Fuji corporation and Sumitomo bank, began operations in Myanmar, even though concerns were raised that Mitsui was complicit in human rights violations through their involvement in the Yadana gas field (Seekins, 2007: 118–​19). The initial interest among Japanese businesses in investing in Myanmar waned as firms complained that a lack of infrastructure, opaque government policies and a dual exchange rate system undermined profitability (Seekins, 2007: 123). The Japanese government continued to dispense ODA following its recognition of the SLORC in 1989, despite the junta’s failure to abide by the human rights conditions set out in Japan’s ODA Charter (Seekins, 2007: 127–​32). In a widely critiqued move that circumvented Japan’s ODA Charter, the Japanese government even offered ‘humanitarian aid’ to reconstruct the Mingaladon airport in February 1998 (Seekins, 2007: 138–​9). While under house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi opposed Japan’s business operations in Myanmar, comparing their activities to ‘passers-​by’ exploiting a bounteous orchard and ruining its future productivity (Seekins, 2007: 134). Throughout the SLORC/​SPDC years, Japanese political and business elites sought to pursue economic opportunities in Myanmar when they arose, showing little concern for the human rights and security of the country’s people. Despite fears that the SPDC was not reforming the Myanmar economy, in December 2002, Japan’s then foreign minister, Kawaguchi Yoriko, proclaimed that the Japanese government would forgive Myanmar 127.4 billion yen in debt (Seekins, 2007: 127; Mekong Watch, 2021b). The Japanese government would provide further debt relief in 2013 to the tune of 188.6 billion yen, as well as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) offering bridge loans amounting to US$912 million to pay off loans from the ADB and the World Bank (Mekong Watch, 2021b). In addition to lessening Myanmar’s debt burden, the debt relief provided by Japan opened the door to further Japanese ODA and investment to Myanmar as its democratization process proceeded. 84

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As the Thein Sein administration undertook political and economic reforms, so Japanese elites would focus on developing Myanmar’s southern regions that were key to the realization of the East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors. These economic corridors would facilitate the operations of key production networks, not least those in the vicinity of Bangkok, but would also service the Thilawa and Dawei SEZs. Japan’s economic engagement of Myanmar also served geopolitical purposes. For influential American IR scholars, like John Ikenberry (2018), China’s challenge to the liberal international order required America’s allies to support emerging democracies, reinforce international institutions and solve global problems. Binding a developing Myanmar to the global political economy would further socialize the country to abide by global norms, standards and institutions, in turn facilitating Myanmar’s democratic transition. As ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, Japanese elites perceived their country to be a key mentor that could socialize Myanmar into the liberal international order, prizing it out of China’s grasp.

Japan’s ‘thought leadership’ and the transformation of ‘Asia’s last frontier’ While the Japanese government extolled the benefits of connectivity as a means of countering Chinese influence, Japanese businesses were also drawn by the economic opportunities that the Japanese government’s embrace of Myanmar’s democratization process enabled. Dubbed ‘Asia’s last frontier’, Myanmar was depicted in the Japanese media as a golden opportunity for Japanese companies to establish new production sites and benefit from a cheap but well-​educated workforce, abundant natural resources, a growing consumer market in the heart of Southeast Asia, as well as tax breaks and customs exemptions (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014; 2015a). Participating in a panel on developments in Myanmar published in the Japan Monthly Trade Report, Mega Hideshi, Sumitomo corporation’s representative in Yangon, summed up business sentiment about Myanmar when he stated, ‘Myanmar is “Asia’s last frontier”. Myanmar has a favourable geographic position surrounded by India, China, Thailand, Bangladesh and Laos. … Its market of 60 million people, rich natural gas resources, cheap workers are all attractive, and it is said to be pro-​Japanese’ (in Kuroda, 2014). ‘Asia’s last frontier’ was therefore a virgin land, yet to be fully conquered by capital, ripe for ‘trailblazing Japanese businesses’ to exploit (Kuroda, 2014: 17). Though Japanese firms would benefit from Myanmar’s abundant cheap labour in the short term, the prospect of Myanmar’s market developing offered additional possibilities for Japanese exporters in time (Seki, 2016: 31). ‘Asia’s last frontier’ heralded a bright future for Japan. 85

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Japan’s business community still feared that they had set off too late to benefit from the opportunities that ‘Asia’s last frontier’ had to offer. As democratization proceeded in Myanmar, following the ‘Saffron Revolution’ of September 2007, so the Japanese government and industry were increasingly eager to counter Chinese dominance in the country, especially following the establishment of the China-​led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2015b). By 2013, Japanese journalist, Kōyama Norio maintained that Japanese cultural traits, such as an unwillingness to take risks, and business practices, such as a slow, formal and hierarchical decision-​making process, meant that Japan was already too late for the ‘gold rush’ and that Myanmar could soon become Japan’s ‘lost frontier’ (Kōyama, 2013). This sense of caution was clear in business discussions about investing in Myanmar. A raft of problems, including corruption, opaque investment regulations, international sanctions, workers’ poor English language and business skills, as well as a lack of water and electricity supply, had deterred and delayed Japanese investments (Kuroda, 2014: 14–​16; Ryū, 2014: 41; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014; Seki, 2016: 26). According to Ido Mitsu (of Mitsubishi, Yangon) and Murota Yūsuke (of Mitsui, Yangon), firms from countries more willing to accept these conditions, including Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, had all gotten a head start (in Kuroda, 2014: 8). Even by 2014, commentators maintained that JICA still lacked a long-​term vision for economic development and Japanese investment in Myanmar, just as the West was ending sanctions (Ryū, 2014: 40), signalling that Japan was still moving too slowly to keep up with the increasing competition. Observed from this perspective, Japan appeared to be in the past, trapped by cultural traditions of hierarchy and formality that stunted the pioneer spirit needed to conquer ‘Asia’s last frontier’. Others, such as Seki (2016) and Maruyama (2014), writing in Japanese monthly economic and trade journals, argued that Japan had quickened its pace sufficiently to catch up and gain from the opportunities Myanmar provided. For Maruyama (2014: 19), already by December 2013, Prime Minister Abe had pledged 154 billion yen in assistance for Myanmar, approximately 10 per cent of Myanmar’s national budget, to help pay for the necessary infrastructure on which Japanese firms would depend. Seki (2016: 29–​30) noted the unprecedented speed with which the Japanese government finalized the Thilawa SEZ deal and highlighted the favourable conditions that would enable Japanese firms to flourish in Myanmar. These conditions, including tax exemptions and low corporation taxes, were due to a raft of new or revised laws on foreign investment that came into force under the Thein Sein government from 2011 on (Seki, 2016: 31–​ 2). These were laws that Japanese businesses lobbied their government to pressure Myanmar to introduce (Kuroda, 2014: 12), or were written with the assistance of Japanese economic bureaucrats (Roughneen, 2014). By 86

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late 2014, Japan had committed itself to Myanmar’s economic development regardless of the process of democratization, human rights abuses or ongoing ethnic conflicts. Indeed, Hiroe Tōru (of Itochu corporation, Yangon) voiced his concerns that Myanmar’s 2015 general elections could disrupt Japanese business interests, if the military-​backed USDP were to lose control of the parliament to the NLD (in Kuroda, 2014: 10–​11). Hiroe’s comment signalled a preference among Japanese businesses to continue to work with the Tatmadaw despite the long-​running exposure and critiques of its human rights abuses in the country. This was not the first time in Myanmar’s history that it has been considered a frontier land to be fought over. A similar motive of acquiring Burma’s human and natural resources, including timber, rice and oil, drove Japan’s conquest of the country from 1942 to 1945, but Japan’s imperialist past has rarely been considered in the discourse of contemporary Japan–​Myanmar relations. Writers like Seki (2016: 24) mention the impact of the British empire on Myanmar, but omit Japan’s history of imperialism. For Seki (2016) and Mizutani (2014: 58), Japan’s ‘special relationship’ with Myanmar developed in the post-​Second World War era. Even writers who do consider Japan’s imperialist era, like Maruyama (2014: 18), only do so to extend this ‘special relationship’ further into the past. There is never a sense of how both the British and Japanese empires impacted upon the subsequent economic, political, social and security development of Myanmar (Thant Myint-​ U, 2001; Brown, 2013; Thant Myint-​U, 2020). Instead, Japan provided Myanmar with massive aid (Maruyama, 2014; Mizutani, 2014) and all responsibility for the failure of that aid to result in infrastructure development lay at the hands of the Myanmar government (Kuroda, 2014: 11). This ‘temporal break’ enables an ‘altruistic’ Japanese foreign policy discourse to take centre stage. Japan’s supposedly benevolent assistance and investment contributed to a sense that Myanmar’s development and democratization process would inevitably proceed, as the country opened up to the world economy. For Murayama (2014: 18), thanks to Thein Sein, democratization in Myanmar was proceeding ‘like an arrow’, allowing the economy to open as Western sanctions were lifted. Echoing Murayama, Takeuchi Takuro of JICA’s Civilian Coordination Department stated, ‘Myanmar today is like Japan in the Meiji era. They need the necessary social infrastructure, but the leadership’s will to reform is overflowing’ (in Takase, 2015: 61). Similarly, Masahiko Tanaka, JICA’s Chief Representative in Myanmar, referred to Myanmar’s reform process as ‘like a small Meiji Restoration’ (Söderberg, 2015: 156). This discourse has a long lineage. During his tenure, Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (1964–​72) echoed his predecessor Kishi Nobusuke (1957–​60) in perceiving Japan’s regional role as a mentor to Southeast Asian states that could adopt similar reforms in the fields of science, technology, education 87

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and politics to those of the Meiji era (Llewelyn, 2014: 99). Like Meiji Japan, Myanmar would adopt new technologies and practices that would enable it to develop. This belief was deeply rooted in Japan’s understanding of its ODA policy which has been conditioned by a sense of Japanese ‘exceptionalism’, a country able to adapt foreign technologies to grow economically and become a world leader that can teach other states to catch up (Kato, 2016); a ‘thought leader’ in other words. The notion of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ that had successfully assimilated foreign technologies since the Meiji era was also prevalent in the Abe administration’s discourse on Japan’s revival, the notion that ‘Japan was back’. Abe, for example, discussed the Meiji era in terms of a golden age whose spirit had to be recovered to tackle Japan’s challenges in the present (Osaki, 2018). Herein lies the inherent contradiction that Japan’s Meiji revolution sets Japan apart as a ‘thought leader’ in Asia, yet the Japanese people had supposedly lost the ‘Japanese’ spirit that had ensured the success of the Meiji revolution thereby undermining Japan’s ability to act in the present as a ‘thought leader’. In a sense, Myanmar was presented as a mirror in which Japan could see its glory projected and affirmed. According to this ‘thought leader’ discourse, it was up to Japan to further Myanmar’s democratization and development, to give the Burmese people ‘hope’, enabling them to improve their standard of living and realize their dreams (Seki, 2016: 34). For Japan’s business community, Japan’s supposedly altruistic economic engagement with Myanmar should be celebrated. Echoing long-​standing Japanese concerns that Japan’s aid to China had not been adequately acknowledged, Japanese business people urged their government to fly the Japanese flag over its ODA projects in Myanmar, so that the Burmese people would know whom to thank (Kuroda, 2014: 16; Maruyama, 2014: 19). As Nagai Shinsuke of JICA’s East Asia and Oceania Department stated: We implement JICA’s procurement guidelines in a proper, fair and transparent way. Through our socio-​environmental guidelines we avoid or reduce environmental and social impacts. We look to fill in the gap between JICA’s guidelines and the situation in each country to devise a policy and provide assistance that will bring the country up to international standards. (In Takase, 2015: 61, emphasis added) Though Hiroe Tōru (of Itochu, Yangon) lamented that Myanmar was 30 years behind Indonesia in terms of its development (in Kuroda, 2014: 9), ultimately, with Japan’s support, Myanmar would reach the teleological end point of capitalist development. The discourse of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ has underpinned Japanese assistance geared to improve Myanmar’s legal, infrastructural and regulatory capacities. Japanese officials have assisted the Myanmar government by 88

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contributing to reforms of the country’s legal system to foster a more conducive environment for investment (Roughneen, 2014). JICA was instrumental in developing the Central Bank of Myanmar’s online banking services to facilitate international payments and mobile banking through an ODA grant issued on 25 October 2013, to bring Myanmar’s financial institutions in line with the rest of ASEAN (JICA, 2016). JICA’s Oshikiri Koji noted that at the time of taking on the project, Myanmar’s banking system was antiquated, with trades handled manually rather than electronically (Okabe, 2014). JICA required that the contract to bring Myanmar’s banking systems up to international standards had to be awarded to Japanese contractors and the contract ultimately went to Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd, NTT DATA Corporation, KDDI and Fujitsu Limited (Daiwa Institute of Research, 2012; Okabe, 2014). The project was JICA’s brainchild, with its experts advising the Myanmar government and Central Bank at each stage of the process. As Kon Tetsutaro, JICA’s head of Southeast Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated, ‘We orchestrated events again and again’ (Okabe, 2014). Japan Exchange Group and Daiwa Institute of Research were also instrumental in writing Myanmar’s legal code for the Yangon Stock Exchange (Okabe, 2014). Daiwa Institute of Research was particularly important in guiding the reform of Myanmar’s financial system, having operated in Myanmar since the 1990s (Okabe, 2014). JICA further modernized Myanmar’s electronic banking system in 2020, promising to update the system in the first six months of 2021, provide guidance and human resource support (JICA, 2020), and operate and maintain the system (Nan Lwin, 2020a). In short, Japanese businesses lobbied their government to persuade the Myanmar government to initiate reforms that Japanese businesses and bureaucrats would write for the benefit of Japanese businesses, both in terms of the long-​term opportunities that would open up in Myanmar, as well as the more immediate contracts to implement the reforms.

Human insecurity and the Thilawa Special Economic Zone While a sense that Japan’s ‘altruism’ as a ‘thought leader’ was guiding Myanmar’s development, there remained an overriding need to keep Myanmar ‘in the past’, where its labour would remain cheap for the benefit of Japanese production. The notion that Myanmar would ever ‘catch up’ with Japan contradicts the narrative that Japanese businesses should invest to reap the rewards in an underdeveloped country. Nagai Shinsuke’s statement championing JICA’s human and environmentally focused guidelines and the notion of Japan as a benevolent ‘thought leader’ bestowing its knowledge to a backward Myanmar in no way matches with JICA’s actual conduct in setting up the Thilawa SEZ. 89

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Located 23 kilometres from downtown Yangon, the Thilawa SEZ covers 2,500 hectares and commenced operations from September 2015, making it Myanmar’s first SEZ. Together with JICA, Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Sumitomo Corporations acquired a 49 per cent stake in the development of the Thilawa SEZ, eyeing substantial business and investment opportunities stemming from Myanmar’s cheap labour force and expanding market (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2015a). According to the Irrawaddy newspaper, Watanabe Hideo, chairman of the JMA and former Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, played a central role in the Japanese government’s cancellation of Myanmar’s debt and realizing the Thilawa SEZ (Irrawaddy, 2021). Prime Minister Abe Shinzō described the Thilawa SEZ as ‘the symbol of Japan–​Myanmar cooperation’, adding that Japan ‘want[s]‌to enhance the well-​being of the people in our partner countries’ and that ‘Japanese companies … [place] great value on individuals … [and] become firmly rooted in local communities … [so that] people … can lead more prosperous daily lives’ (Abe, 2016b). In addition to laying the physical and financial groundwork for the Thilawa SEZ, the Japanese government and JICA also assisted the Myanmar government in establishing the 2014 Myanmar SEZ law and guided the Thilawa Management Committee in operating the SEZ (Takase, 2015: 58–​9; JICA, 2019b). The law set out a range of inducements for foreign businesses to invest in Myanmar, including tax breaks, waiving import duties on raw materials and no limits to foreign shareholders (Lall, 2016: 141). The 2014 Myanmar SEZ law was critiqued by the International Commission of Jurists for devolving responsibility to SEZ Management Committees without ensuring adequate oversight, especially as concerns the human rights of workers and environmental safeguards, allowing the Management Committees to interpret their mandate and the law for their own benefit (Mekong Watch, 2017a; Thame, 2017: 32–​3). The International Commission of Jurists advocated a freeze on all SEZ projects in Myanmar until the legal loopholes were addressed (Mekong Watch, 2017a). A key issue with devolving responsibility to the SEZ Management Committees was that corruption remains endemic in Myanmar. To initiate a project, investors must first pay off military officials, who realize their own personal financial interests at the expense of economic development and democratization that benefits Myanmar’s citizens (Aung Soe Lin, 2016; Thame, 2017: 56–​7). The Thilawa SEZ also demonstrated a return to public–​private Japanese ODA initiatives that had been scrapped in 2001 due to domestic and international criticisms concerning corruption and unfair practices (Matsumoto, 2014: 194); a development that Japanese businesses heartily welcomed (Kuroda, 2014: 16). Japan had clearly reverted to a more self-​ interested approach to ODA under the DPJ governments and this continued

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under Prime Minister Abe, as Myanmar democratized and opened up to the global economy. If anything, the Thilawa SEZ merely served to demonstrate that the critiques of Japan’s Cold War mercantilist aid policy remained as relevant as ever. Countering this argument that Japan’s ODA remained mercantilist was the assertion that Japanese investments and ODA in Myanmar abided by JICA’s guidelines that were written with the concept of human security firmly in mind. Although both JICA and Keidanren emphasized the importance of human as well as infrastructure development in Myanmar (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2013), this did not extend to the concept of human security as the Japan-​ based NGO Mekong Watch highlighted in its reporting on the Thilawa SEZ.1 Mekong Watch aims to represent ‘the voices of people affected by Japanese-​financed development projects in the Mekong Region to relevant decision makers in Japan’ (Mekong Watch, 2016) and with this in mind, the NGO began monitoring JICA’s interest in investing in the Thilawa SEZ in the spring of 2014. As early as 24 April 2014, Mekong Watch noted that JICA was not abiding by its environmental and social guidelines concerning the distribution of aid and had failed to meet with local residents to discuss their concerns (Mekong Watch, 2014a). According to the NGO, JICA officials continued to ignore the villagers’ appeals to discuss the development of the Thilawa SEZ despite the villagers raising serious concerns pertaining to the coercive means employed by the Burmese authorities to force Thilawa residents to give up their land, as well as the failure to adequately compensate the residents or find an appropriate relocation site (Mekong Watch, 2014b). U Myint Thwin, the lawyer representing the villagers, noted that the government seized the land in 1997, but had not abided by Myanmar’s Land Acquisition Act and had required residents to pay land ownership tax until 2012 (Mekong Watch, 2014c). The claims made by the residents were supported by a report conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, which noted that the relocation site for those evicted from the Thilawa SEZ was not even up to the international standards for refugee camps, mentioning in particular the contaminated water supply (PHR, 2014; Thame, 2017: 45). Physicians for Human Rights’ director of programmes, Widney Brown, stated that: [T]‌he Thilawa project exemplifies how devastating forced displacement can be on local communities when governments completely disregard human rights laws for the sake of a business development. The Burmese and Japanese governments should work to improve the living conditions for those displaced by this misguided venture, and ensure that this disaster is not repeated when hundreds of other families are relocated for future development projects. (Mekong Watch, 2014d)

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In the words of U Mya Hlaing, leader of the Thilawa Social Development Group, a community organization protesting against the SEZ, ‘the people in Thilawa continue to suffer, but the Myanmar government isn’t listening and JICA isn’t listening. They don’t seem to care that the project is violating their own guidelines’ (Mekong Watch, 2014b). On 4 June 2014, the Thilawa Social Development Group submitted a formal complaint to JICA requesting that an investigation be conducted into JICA’s funding of the Thilawa SEZ (Mekong Watch, 2014e). Expressing his motivation for filing the complaint, Khine Win, noted the failure of JICA to ensure that the residents’ livelihoods were maintained. He stated: [T]‌he houses they built in Myaing Tha Yar [the relocation site] were so small and poor quality, so I decided to take compensation instead so I could build a better house for my family. Now I am in debt. And because it took so long to build my house, I lost my contract with the factory where I worked. This new life is very difficult for me. (Mekong Watch, 2014e) In response, JICA began its first ever investigation into a development project since its Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations were passed in 2010 (Mekong Watch, 2014f). As part of the investigation, JICA’s chief examiner, Dr. Harashina Sachihiko, met with residents to discuss their concerns (Mekong Watch, 2014c). The case was even taken up in the Japanese Diet on 12 May where Ishibashi Michihiro of the DPJ quizzed Tanaka Akihiko, the head of JICA, and Kishida Fumio, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the failure of JICA to abide by its guidelines (Mekong Watch, 2014g). Despite the attention the case received, the Burmese authorities continued to intimidate Thilawa residents in a bid to compel them to drop their complaint (Mekong Watch, 2014h). The complaint was ultimately rejected by JICA’s Examiners’ Office on 4 November 2014, which found that JICA was ‘not in non-​compliance’ with its own guidelines, despite emphasizing the need for improved dialogue with local residents (Annen and Harashina, 2014). The local residents responded that JICA’s examination had simply accepted the Myanmar government’s position on land rights and had not properly evaluated issues relating to sewage and unsanitary water quality at the relocation site (Mekong Watch, 2014i). The Thilawa residents voiced specific complaints against the manner in which JICA’s report was produced. Mya Hlaing, for example, stated that ‘[Thilawa residents] mortgaged their houses and bought motorbikes for taxi businesses, because they don’t have any job opportunities and they have nothing to eat. … But it was written [in the JICA report] as if people bought motorbikes because they got extra cash’ (Yen Saning, 2014c). Related to this, residents noted that the vocational training offered to help them 92

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transition to a new form of employment in no way matched the available employment opportunities (Thu Htet, 2022: 13). JICA’s approach to the development of the Thilawa SEZ paid scant attention to providing displaced communities with alternative livelihoods. JICA quickly looked to move on from the report, emphasizing that JICA officials had been dispatched to resolve any outstanding issues through a ‘livelihood recovery program’, which included ‘posting new rules about using wells and disposing of garbage’ (Takase, 2015: 60), as if the problems of the relocation site were due to residents not behaving properly. Takeuchi Takuro of JICA’s Civilian Coordination Department stated, ‘[t]‌here have been a number of disputes between the Myanmar government and [former Thilawa] residents, which civil society has also pointed out. We are tackling this issue by providing aid to improve the lives of those who have been in consultation with various people’ (Takase, 2015: 59). JICA thus attempted to dodge the blame for the forced evictions and inadequate relocation conditions former Thilawa residents suffered. Though the examiner’s report did not accept JICA’s responsibility for the damage to people’s livelihoods, the report did suggest a number of improvements that needed to be made at the relocation site that included sewage and water quality (Mekong Watch, 2015a). From January 2015, Mekong Watch acknowledged that JICA worked with the Myanmar government and Thilawa residents to help the residents pay off outstanding debts, organized microfinancing for residents to start their own businesses, provided vocational training so that residents would be more likely to find work in the new SEZ, and oversaw improvements to the sewage and water supply systems at the relocation site (Mekong Watch, 2015a). JICA’s review of its involvement in the Thilawa SEZ also led to the creation of a Multi-​ Stakeholder Advisory Group involving the NGO Earthrights International to respond to the concerns of the local community (Thame, 2017: 34). The SEZ Management Committee and investors were unwilling to cooperate, however, undermining the work of the Multi-​Stakeholder Advisory Group (Thame, 2017: 34). Looking to gloss over and move on from the complaint and investigation, the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee deliberately misconstrued the problematic relocation process as an achievement, stating: It is the first time in the entire history of Myanmar in conducting the relocation and resettlement of the Project Affected Persons (PAPs) according to the international standard. Since it is the first experience, it is not a perfect process; however, it is considered a success and a good learning process as the relocation was complete [sic] peacefully in accordance with the Resettlement Work Plan, which was drafted in accordance with the guidelines of JICA and the World Bank’s environment and social safeguard policies. (Aung Soe Lin, 2016) 93

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This statement, together with JICA’s conclusion that it was ‘not in non-​ compliance with its own guidelines’, demonstrates that capital writes its own story, erasing the damage it causes. For Wells (2019) this rewriting of the development process is part and parcel of neoliberal development in an age of post-​politics in which grievances can be aired, but are perpetually deferred. The complaints procedure set up by Japanese and Burmese managers of the Thilawa SEZ were designed to marginalize complaints, making them appear parochial rather than systemic, and to shift responsibility from one actor to the next (Wells, 2019). Seen from this critical perspective, Japan might be considered as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ implementing ‘international norms’ by allowing critique of the developmental process, only to side-​line the voices of the oppressed and further erode their human security. This critical perception of the liberal world order is the antithesis of the liberalist understanding, championed by prominent IR scholar, John Ikenberry. Rather than the liberal world order furthering democratization, human rights, economic prosperity, peace and freedom through international organizations, a critical view exposes the inherently self-​interested nature of the ‘liberal order’ that is designed to benefit global capitalist elites at the expense of the proletariat. The rapacious advance of neoliberal capital can be observed in the widespread problem of resettlement in global development. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim admitted that his organization’s resettlement programmes were poorly implemented and monitored and that in most cases the World Bank had no idea as to the impact of development projects on relocated communities (Schlief, 2015). It is worth noting that JICA’s guidelines are even more problematic than the World Bank’s, lacking measures to address gender issues related to resettlement, for example (Thu Htet, 2022). As Wells (2019: 50) notes, the politics of development is still in play with NGOs, such as Earthrights International, openly challenging the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee’s interpretation and application of ‘international norms’ and demonstrating that the Thilawa SEZ in no way conformed to the most basic and internationally accepted aspects of good practice in development. That said, in a post-​politics world, NGO reports can quickly be buried, or even, as discussed later in the case of Mekong Watch, their engagement in the development process can be co-​opted. The case of the Thilawa SEZ highlights a number of issues relating to the ethical dimension of Japan’s relationship with Myanmar. Focusing first on the Japanese government, by its own admission, JICA did not do enough to ensure the human security of Thilawa residents following its support for the SEZ. JICA failed to discuss the development project with local residents or to adequately consider their claims that the Myanmar authorities had coerced them into giving up their land. JICA failed to live up to its own guidelines in terms of the Income Restoration Plans, did not ensure that the living standards of resettled individuals be at least equal to their former living 94

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standards, and ignored issues raised by the local community concerning the retraining process (Thu Htet, 2022: 7, 17). The fact that JICA undertook its own report rather than allowing an independent inquiry to review its conduct further demonstrates the inadequacy of Japan’s human security policy from an ethical perspective. The report itself rewrote the experiences of Thilawa residents, such as those of Mya Hlaing, so that these experiences conformed to JICA’s interpretation of the development process. Once it became clear from the report that JICA’s approach to financing the Thilawa SEZ had been less than adequate and that more had to be done to ensure the welfare of the community at the relocation site, the organization responded with programmes and infrastructure designed to increase the resilience of the residents to the substandard conditions they now faced. Throughout, JICA sought to distance itself from any responsibility for the harm caused to Thilawa residents. The activities of Mekong Watch also need to be critically evaluated, however. The NGO undoubtedly perceived their activities as working on behalf of Thilawa residents to publicize their cause, support residents’ calls for an investigation and help push the Japanese government to respond to their basic needs at the relocation site. Nevertheless, the NGO acted as a problem-​ solving organization that aimed to adjust JICA’s approach to development, rather than seeking out alternatives to development. The interaction between Thilawa residents and Mekong Watch demonstrates how the residents were encouraged to articulate their concerns in terms of compensation and legal obligations; a language that adhered to JICA’s developmental approach. The fact that Mekong Watch praised JICA’s efforts following the report to provide debt relief, microfinancing, vocational support and improvements to water management at the relocation site was indicative of a Japanese NGO that had internalized their government’s development policy and merely sought to smooth its rough edges for those people whose lives had been bulldozed away.

The Dawei Special Economic Zone: the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s rigid approach to development At the same time as Japan’s problematic involvement in the Thilawa SEZ was being investigated, the Japanese government became connected to the Dawei SEZ project in Myanmar’s southern Tanintharyi region. The Dawei SEZ was projected to become the largest SEZ in Southeast Asia, covering a total of 20,000 hectares (approximately 196km2), approximately 50 times the size of the Thilawa SEZ. If completed, the Dawei SEZ would comprise an industrial zone and deep-​sea port, as well as become the Western terminus of the ADB’s Southern Economic Corridor. Located only 132km from the 95

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Thai border, the Dawei SEZ would link up with supply chains throughout the Mekong region, connecting the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean. Myanmar Egress, a civil society organization that was established in 2006 to provide the ruling junta with fresh policy ideas to push the country towards democratization and development, became a key proponent of the Dawei SEZ, dispatching a policy proposal to the Myanmar government in 2007 (Thame, 2017: 32). The military-​run MEHL were also heavily involved in the development of the Dawei Deep-​Sea Port in Launglon, seeking to capitalize on the exclusive rights to loading and unloading cargo at the SEZ (Kingsbury, 2014: 359–​62). The Myanmar and Thai foreign ministers met on the side-​lines of an ASEAN meeting to tackle the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, where they signed an agreement to press forward with the Dawei SEZ (Thame, 2017: 36). The project formally got the go-​ ahead on 2 November 2008 as a joint venture between Max Myanmar, a major Burmese business group run by Zaw Zaw and with strong ties to the Tatmadaw, and the Thai-​registered company Italian-​Thai Development (ITD) (Thame, 2017: 36), but the joint venture quickly ran into financial difficulties. Geographically remote and lacking even basic infrastructure, the costs of developing the Dawei SEZ were prohibitive, making it difficult to attract international investment (Lall, 2016: 141). The Japanese government’s deliberations about whether or not to become involved in the development of the Dawei SEZ came at a delicate moment in Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, as the November 2015 general elections loomed. Considering the fraudulent 2010 general elections, it remained to be seen whether the upcoming general elections in Myanmar would proceed in a free and fair manner and whether the military would support an election result that did not favour the USDP. These concerns made Japan’s involvement in the Dawei SEZ particularly uncertain (Mekong Watch, 2015b). Ultimately, the November 2015 elections passed without incident, were widely seen as legitimate, and brought the NLD to power. On 15 December 2015, the Japanese government signed on to the Dawei SEZ, investing in the project through JBIC and providing assistance via JICA, but selecting not to be actively involved in the development of the SEZ until the first phase of construction had been completed by ITD (Muramatsu and Nitta, 2021). In view of this, it appeared as though Myanmar’s ongoing democratization process justified the Japanese government’s continued investments in the country. That said, as Chapter 3 discussed, developments in Rakhine state, coupled with the continued dominance of the military in politics, augured ill for Myanmar’s democratization process. The Japanese government’s primary motivations for being involved in the Dawei SEZ were to promote the involvement of Japanese firms in infrastructure projects, build connectivity between Japanese transnational production sites, and strengthen Japan–​Myanmar relations at the expense 96

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of China–​Myanmar relations (Thame, 2017: 41). Japanese financing for the project would also be rewarded with substantial dividends once the SEZ took off (Thame, 2017: 41). At the same time, the Japanese government was concerned about the feasibility of the Dawei SEZ. Already in 2013, Japan’s METI carried out a study that concluded that Dawei SEZ would be too expensive a project were strict environmental guidelines to be followed, stating that ‘there is a need to design environmental regulations that would make it advantageous for Japanese companies to come aboard’ (Mekong Watch, 2017c). METI’s conclusions raised concerns that the human rights of residents and the protection of ecosystems in and around Dawei would not be adequately protected. Dawei’s location as the Southern Economic Corridor’s gateway to the Indian Ocean promised a new export base to Middle Eastern and African markets, especially for Japanese production firms located in Thailand, and the Japanese government actively encouraged Japanese construction companies to develop the SEZ (JBIC, 2015; Kudō, 2015b: 62). By the summer of 2017, the Japanese government became more deeply involved with JICA drawing up the comprehensive development plans for the Dawei SEZ and the Tanintharyi region (Bangkok Post, 2017). Though ITD remained involved in the project, on 14 January 2021, the Dawei SEZ Management Committee finally cut ties with the company, highlighting ‘repeated delays, continuing breaches of financial obligations … and failure to confirm their financial capacity to proceed with development’ (Muramatsu and Nitta, 2021; Thai PBS World, 2021). ITD’s withdrawal left the Japanese government in the driver’s seat of the Dawei SEZ project. Just as with the Thilawa SEZ, concerns were raised about the impact of the Dawei SEZ on local inhabitants. Owing to the projected size of the Dawei SEZ, it was estimated that between 22,000 and 43,000 people would be negatively impacted by the development of the Dawei SEZ (Mekong Watch, 2015b). Of the people affected by the Dawei SEZ, only 8 per cent had consented to the project by 2008 when construction commenced, and less than one-​third of those affected had been informed by ITD or the government about the extent of the project (Dawei Development Association, 2014; Earthrights International, 2022). Construction of the Dawei SEZ was heavily criticized by both local and international NGOs. Notably, residents were not informed about construction work and were not compensated for damages or loss of land, the resettlement site for evicted residents was inadequate, leading to a deterioration of living standards for those who moved there, and construction caused significant environmental degradation including to farmland and water resources, as well as wildlife (Dawei Development Association, 2014; Mekong Watch, 2017c). A number of dispossessed residents stated that they were intimidated by local representatives of the 97

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military-​backed USDP (Dawei Development Association, 2014: 41). The Dawei Development Association (DDA) (2014: 64–​71) found that the Dawei SEZ project violated numerous international and domestic laws related to development projects and human rights, not least as pertains to transparent communication and consultation, evictions and resettlement, and environmental impacts. The DDA, together with Thai NGOs, complained about ITD’s violations of human rights and community rights in the case of the Dawei SEZ to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Thailand in March 2013 and November 2015 (Dawei Development Association, 2014; Mekong Watch, 2015d; 2017c; Earthrights International, 2022). In its submission to the Thailand Council for Ministers on 25 December 2015, the NHRC concluded that ITD had violated human rights and community rights in the construction of the Dawei SEZ (Mekong Watch, 2015d). With the Japanese government having signed on to the Dawei SEZ, ITD claimed that as it no longer ran the project, it had no duty to recompense residents who had suffered (Mekong Watch, 2017c). On 4 August 2015, the DDA together with two other local civil society groups contacted Japan’s Foreign Ministry, JICA and JBIC. Their letter notified the Japanese government of existing human rights and environmental abuses, expressed concern about Japan’s involvement in the construction of the Dawei SEZ and Southern Economic Corridor, and held the Japanese government responsible for resolving existing issues related to the development of these two projects (Mekong Watch, 2015c). The letter further requested that the Japanese government involve local groups in the decision-​making process pertaining to the Dawei SEZ and Southern Economic Corridor (Mekong Watch, 2015c). The Japanese government’s response was to deny any responsibility for work carried out before 2015, when it formally signed on to the Dawei SEZ (Mekong Watch, 2017c). In April 2017, Mekong Watch petitioned JICA for failing to consider the human rights of residents in Dawei and along the Southern Economic Corridor in Myanmar (Mekong Watch, 2017b). Specifically, Mekong Watch insisted that JICA: fully inform residents and civil society groups about developments regarding the Dawei and Southern Economic Corridor projects; include residents and civil society groups in discussions about the projects; be held accountable for the projects; abide by the findings of the NHRC of Thailand report; and pay attention to the local and international NGOs that had criticized the Dawei SEZ and Southern Economic Corridor projects (Mekong Watch, 2017b). JICA’s continued stonewalling and denials of responsibility mirrored the approach it had taken towards local residents in the case of the Thilawa SEZ. JICA’s rigid approach to development side-​lined the communities that Japan’s ODA Charter had sworn to protect under the banner of human security. 98

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When the Japanese government signed on to the Dawei SEZ project in 2015, concerns were also raised about its impact on the ongoing and fragile peace process between armed ethnic groups and the Tatmadaw. Considering the Southern Economic Corridor would pass through land controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), the potential to derail the peace process was apparent. The KNU had already prevented road construction, citing environmental degradation and human rights abuses (Mekong Watch, 2015b). As Chapter 5 makes clear, the position of the Japanese government in the peace process was to identify itself as a mediator in the ethnic conflicts, while pressing for the realization of Japan’s developmental projects regardless of the impact on local communities. When the Dawei SEZ Management Committee finally expelled ITD from the project, they noted that China was the only alternative, should the Japanese government fail to find the funding to keep the project afloat (Thai PBS World, 2021). This veiled threat to turn to the Chinese government had already convinced the Japanese government to become more closely involved in the development of the first phase of the SEZ’s development in late November 2020, following the NLD’s victory in the general elections (Nan Lwin, 2020b; Muramatsu and Nitta, 2021). Two weeks after ITD’s ejection from the project, on 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw initiated a coup that would put the Japanese government’s commitment to Myanmar’s development in jeopardy.

Conclusion Japan’s economic engagement with Myanmar since the start of the latter’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ reveals an inherent contradiction between Japan’s benevolent foreign policy discourse and its development policies. While Japanese foreign policy elites championed their country’s role as a ‘thought leader’, bestowing Japanese wisdom in the form of ODA and legal reforms on an underdeveloped country, Japanese business elites were drawn by the fruits of ‘Asia’s last frontier’, namely Myanmar’s cheap labour, natural resources, growing market and strategic location. Japan’s ‘thought leader’ discourse was central not only to reinforcing the image that Japanese elites had of their country, but also served to promote the notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, upholding democratic and human rights norms in the face of China’s rising challenge to the liberal order. In addition, this ‘thought leader’ discourse reinforced the idea that Japanese benevolence was rooted in its history. The Myanmar government was pushing key reforms that echoed Japan’s Meiji revolution. This notion was grounded in temporal continuity, a sense that Japan’s relationship with Myanmar had always been benign and mutually beneficial, glossing over the devastation of Japanese imperialism and its impacts on the post-​Second World War development of Burma’s political economy. 99

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The idea of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ is problematic, not only for obscuring the self-​interested economic and strategic goals that drove Japanese government and business involvement in Myanmar, but also for reifying Japan’s development policy based on the conception of Japanese culture as unique. As Watanabe Chika notes (2018: 29, 31), the notion of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ or bridge (kakehashi) equates to a form of ‘self-​orientalisation’ that essentializes Japanese culture to achieve developmental ends. Rather than reifying culture as fixed and immutable, Watanabe argues that ‘differences are … products of contingent historical and social processes conditioned by both national and international political economies’ (2018: 29) and that we need ‘to investigate what the people studied think and do in the name of culture, and with what consequences’ (2018: 40). The Japanese government was a key instigator in Myanmar’s reform process, with organizations like JICA promoting and then writing the reforms for the Myanmar government to execute. Japanese firms would not only benefit from a more stable investment environment that these reforms heralded, but would also receive the business contracts to implement the reforms. The fruits of these efforts could be observed in the involvement of the Japanese government and businesses in the Thilawa and Dawei SEZ projects. Both SEZs promised Japanese businesses substantial rewards for their efforts, but also exposed how Japanese developmental projects engendered human insecurity among local populations. The Japanese government, notably JICA, worked to conceal their involvement in the damage these SEZ projects caused, shifting the blame to local actors, while quietly working to partially ameliorate conditions in resettlement sites. Japanese foreign policy and business elites adopted a similar approach when seeking to mediate in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, in part to secure the development of the East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors through Myanmar’s troubled borderlands as the next chapter makes clear.

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5

Meddling for Profit: Japan’s Peace-​building Role in Myanmar Introduction As Myanmar transitioned to a ‘disciplined democracy’ following general elections in 2010, so the Abe administration sought to mediate in Myanmar’s long-​standing ethnic conflicts. By playing a peace-​building role in Myanmar, the Abe administration could demonstrate its contribution to the liberal international order. Notably, the Japanese government channelled aid to Myanmar through JICA and enlisted the support of the Nippon Foundation, appointing its head, Sasakawa Yōhei, as a peace envoy to Myanmar. Proponents of this policy maintained that Japan could make a major contribution to resolving Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts by working with NGOs to provide aid and assistance, consisting not only of food and medical supplies, but also human resources, technical assistance and financial aid (JICA, 2013d; Manabe, 2013: 104–​5; Nippon Foundation, 2013a; Tanaka, 2013). Though many ethnic minorities have accepted Japanese aid, the Japanese government’s ability to act as a mediator in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts has not only been limited, but also divisive. Not only do Japan’s peace-​building efforts in Myanmar fail to comprehend the complexity of the country’s myriad ethnic conflicts, they also ignore the historical role Japan played in developing the Burmese military, during the Second World War, as well as its substantial aid programme to the military government during the Cold War. Japan’s ‘peace-​makers’ fail to appreciate that their long-​standing relations with Myanmar’s military elite undermine their trustworthiness as mediators from the standpoint of those ethnic minority groups that have fought the Tatmadaw over the preceding decades. Japan’s foreign policy also does not comprehend how the Tatmadaw’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ tackled the civil conflicts separately from the democratization process (Jones, 2014b; Ruzza, 2015) and excluded 101

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ethnic minority groups from drafting the constitution (Nilsen, 2013). One indicator of the military’s continued control over the transition to democracy can be observed in its willingness to resort to arms against ethnic groups, even repeatedly ignoring calls by the Thein Sein administration to desist from doing so (Nilsen, 2013: 128; South and Joll, 2016: 182). Throughout the transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, the military resorted to a divide and conquer strategy that sought to exploit divisions between the ethnic minority groups rather than engage in a genuine peace process (Pedersen, 2008: 46; Nilsen, 2013: 130–​3). If the Japanese government intends to mediate in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, then it should heed the words of Soe Aung, spokesman of the Forum for Democracy in Burma, a Thailand-​ based political activist group, who stated, ‘any outside parties … who want to offer their help for peace in Burma, must have in-​depth understanding of ethnic people’s long-​term struggle to achieve their birthrights. Superficial understanding will do more harm than good’ (in Saw Yan Naing, 2014a). Japan’s ambitions to act as a mediator in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts belies its true intent, which is to open up the Myanmar economy by building key infrastructure to connect Myanmar’s neighbouring Mekong states with the Indian Ocean. Japan’s proposed East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors both run through areas of ethnic conflict, notably contested by the Karen ethnic minority and the Tatmadaw. Pacifying these areas is key to achieving Japan’s regional ambitions. The roads and bridges that Japanese aid has been building will not only connect economies, but make ethnic regions more accessible to Myanmar’s security forces. Dubbed ‘Asia’s last frontier’, Myanmar is perceived by many entrepreneurs and politicians in Japan as a virgin land ripe with economic opportunity as it democratizes. Meddling in the enduring conflicts at the frontier’s edge for influence and profit exposes the brazen mercantilism of Japan’s foreign policy at the expense of war-​weary communities. This chapter opens by detailing the complexity of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, before considering Japanese attempts at mediation and use of aid to address Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts in light of their complexity. It highlights that the Japanese government’s emphasis on economic development and connectivity together with its state-​centric approach further destabilized Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts and undermined the human security of ethnic communities. Finally, the chapter explores the Japanese government’s problematic response to Myanmar’s refugee issues, which have been exacerbated by the ethnic conflicts.

Complexity of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts Making sense of Myanmar’s myriad ethnic conflicts is complex. Many of these conflicts have endured over seven or eight decades and have shaped 102

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the evolution of the country since independence. It is no exaggeration to say that Myanmar is a country forged in the cauldron of war (Callahan, 2003). The raison d’être of the Tatmadaw from its founding has been to maintain the Union through force of arms and defeat the ethnic groups which have clamoured for a federalist system that would grant them substantial independence. The diverse histories of each of the conflicts therefore needs to be understood (for detailed histories, see Smith, 1999 and Callahan, 2003). While the main insurgent forces have been grouped around the Kachin, Karenni, Karen and Shan ethnic groups, the conflicts have not been limited to these groups, notably including the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) during the Cold War. No ethnic conflict in Myanmar is alike, with each comprising diverse economic, historical, military, cultural and political issues. Armed ethnic minority groups have also experienced internal divisions, received varied degrees of international support, and have fought and allied with each other at various points. The ground continues to shift as the military and armed ethnic groups sign ceasefire agreements or break them and return to arms. The main commonality between the different ethnic conflicts is the perpetration of human rights violations against local populations, which have further entrenched animosities on all sides (Pedersen, 2008: 56–​7). The motivations of the various sides of these conflicts are not only political, but also economic. Myanmar’s borderlands, where the ethnic conflicts endure, are rich in natural resources, including timber, jade and opium. Controlling these resources and the profits they generate fuelled the conflicts during the Cold War, but also inhibited attempts to achieve a meaningful peace in the post-​Cold War era. The various ceasefire agreements that the Myanmar government signed with many of the armed ethnic groups in the 1990s proved to be little more than a means to divvy up control of natural resources, fashioning an uneasy status quo in which the Tatmadaw and the armed ethnic groups maintained combat readiness to protect their economic interests. Foreign interference further complicates any understanding of Myanmar’s civil wars. During the Cold War, remnants of Chiang Kai-​shek’s Kuomintang forces relocated to Myanmar’s eastern border, where, with Central Intelligence Agency support, they prospered through their control of the opium trade. China, for its part, supported the BCP, which was also based on Myanmar’s eastern border. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the BCP, China has remained concerned by Myanmar’s ongoing ethnic conflicts, both because of China’s geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in Myanmar, but also because of the potential spill-​over of these conflicts into Yunnan, where ethnic ties remain strong. While Myanmar’s military junta and armed ethnic groups share responsibility for the country’s long-​running ethnic conflicts, the legacies of colonialism, the Second World War and the Cold War set the foundations for ethnic violence in the country. Under British colonial rule (1824–​1948), 103

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the ruling Burmese Buddhist elite were gradually removed from command of the Burmese heartland in favour of a colonial administration headed by British officials and staffed primarily by Indian bureaucrats. Focusing on controlling Burma’s rich agricultural plains and extracting the country’s natural resources, the British opted to leave frontier areas of Burma under the control of local ethnic leaders (Prager Nyein, 2009: 127). Under a strategy of divide and rule, the British thereby side-​lined the Burmese Buddhist majority and drew on soldiers from the ethnic minority groups to staff its colonial armed forces. When Japan invaded Burma in 1942, it looked to the Buddhist Burmese majority for support against the British and their ethnic minority allies. Centred around the Thirty Comrades, who were then young, Burmese, anti-​colonialist activists, Japanese officers helped to build, train and arm the BIA. Though the BIA would ultimately turn on their Japanese allies, the bitter Burmese campaign of the Second World War not only devastated the country but also divided it along ethnic lines. Japan’s foreign policy rarely considers the impact of Japan’s occupation of Burma during the Second World War. When this period is mentioned, it is usually tackled in a manner that obfuscates Japan’s role in Burma’s history, undermining the Japanese government’s ambition to act as an honest broker in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. For example, the Nippon Foundation website provides a brief overview of Burma’s history that refers to the Second World War in the following terms, ‘in the turmoil of World War II, the Japanese military took control during the 1940s. This period saw the Battle of Imphal in the north and the construction of the Burma Railway in the south, and the impact of both was felt nationwide’ (Nippon Foundation, 2016a). The pervasive use of the passive tense in the Nippon Foundation’s reading of Burma’s history, coupled with the neutral language encapsulated in the words ‘turmoil’, ‘took control’ and ‘the impact’ camouflage a far more brutal invasion and military contest between Japanese and Allied forces. There is no engagement with the arguments of leading historians who emphasize the role Japanese imperialism played in further entrenching ethnic divides in Burma, as well as establishing and arming Burma’s military forces (Seekins, 2007; Nemoto, 2014). Instead, the emphasis is on maintaining a temporal divide between Japan’s post-​Second World War experience and its imperialist history. The conclusion of the Second World War left a country awash with weapons with numerous groups clamouring for self-​determination. Then British Prime Minister Clement Attlee determined to quickly conclude Burma’s independence, which it finally celebrated on 4 January 1948; reneging on promises made to the various ethnic minorities to support their demands for either a federal system or separation from Burma. Though the Panglong Agreement of 12 February 1947, signed by a number of ethnic leaders and Aung San, one of the Thirty Comrades, a key independence 104

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leader and father of democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi, looked to establish a unified state, by 1949 the country was already sliding into a series of civil wars that endure to the present day (Prager Nyein, 2009: 128). Even how the Panglong Agreement has come to be perceived differently by the various parties involved in the ethnic conflicts has arguably become an additional source of tension between these parties (Walton, 2008). Attempts to resolve the various ethnic conflicts during the Cold War were substantially undermined following General Ne Win’s coup in 1962. Having taken power, Ne Win advanced his ‘Burmese Path to Socialism’ based on a unified state dominated by the military and favouring the Burmese Buddhist majority that did not tolerate any separatist claims (Prager Nyein, 2009: 128; Walton, 2013; Jones, 2014b). As Farrelly (2013: 313) states, ‘[in Burma] anxiety about the potential for territorial fragmentation is the principle motivation for those who consider the military’s role essential to national survival’. By the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of the ethnic conflicts had changed. Notably, external funders of ethnic groups, such as China and Thailand, no longer perceived the ideological or strategic benefits in supporting ethnic conflict (Jones, 2014b: 791–​2). With the collapse of the BCP at the end of the 1980s, due to mutinies and the drying up of Chinese government funding, armed ethnic groups in Myanmar’s borderlands began to sign ceasefire agreements with the government of Myanmar (South, 2008). These ceasefire agreements were the brainchild of Military Intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt (Smith, 2007: 40). At this time, as detailed in Chapter 3, the Burmese military junta faced an existential crisis. In the summer of 1988, Burma’s democracy movement took to the streets demanding political change. The military brutally suppressed the demonstrations, removed Ne Win from power, established the SLORC and held national elections in 1990. The SLORC then ignored the results of the election, which the NLD had won, and proceeded to maintain military rule. The NLD’s democratic challenge combined with the precarious nature of Myanmar’s economy encouraged the SLORC to negotiate with the various armed ethnic groups. Though a cessation of open hostilities was welcome, the ceasefire agreements should not be taken at face value. Woods (2011) refers to the dynamics of ‘ceasefire capitalism’ by which the Myanmar government was able to expand its reach into ethnic boarder areas through the control over natural resources, while also eroding the military challenge the armed ethnic groups had presented (Jones, 2014b: 972–​4). Initially, the ceasefire deals financially benefited the leadership of the armed ethnic groups,1 but slowly transferred territory and lucrative natural resources, such as timber and jade, to regional Tatmadaw commanders, as the Tatmadaw pursued a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy (Sherman, 2003). These regional commanders were able to extend their management over these resources by seizing border crossings and taxing trade (Sherman, 2003), as well as through 105

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cultivating transnational business links, further undermining the financial resources available to the armed ethnic groups in a process Woods describes as ‘appropriating the market to do battle’ (2011: 753). Such were the profits to be had in Myanmar’s border areas, that neighbouring states replaced their policies of tolerating or actively supporting insurgent groups, in favour of ‘constructively engaging’ the Myanmar government (Smith, 2007: 43–​4). Woods asserts that Tatmadaw’s land grabs in ethnic border areas were also facilitated by international aid, including from JICA, ‘as exercises of military securitization and nation-​state building’ (2011: 766). The political-​economic relationship between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups, as well as the profits accruing to transnational business elites and neighbouring states from the exploitation of natural resources in Myanmar’s borderlands, resulted in what Smith (2007) termed a ‘conflict trap’. This ‘conflict trap’ weakened the incentives to resolve the ethnic conflicts, as each group attempted to gain from the border economy (Smith, 2007). Myanmar’s ‘conflict trap’ has impacted most severely upon the lives of local communities in the ethnic borderlands, as expanding Tatmadaw control of border areas resulted in numerous violations of human security, including extortion, sexual violence, forced labour and forced relocation (Fink, 2008; Karen News, 2016). Though ethnic insurgent groups are not guiltless of committing human rights abuses, Fink (2008: 450–​1) perceives Tatmadaw violence against civilians as systemic, resulting from the training soldiers receive, their perception of ethnic people as enemies, a lack of government funding and subsequent need to exploit local communities, combined with a lack of punishment for transgressions. Myanmar’s ‘conflict trap’ also had significant environmental impacts, such as deforestation and water pollution (Brenner, 2015: 349). Sherman (2003: 238) describes the resulting extraction of Myanmar’s natural resources as being mostly illegal and unsustainable, undermining the country’s long-​term development for short-​term profit. As Sherman notes: Under the SPDC, Burma’s economy has been transformed into one of rampant economic opportunism. Control of the national economy, including all formal economic enterprises and much of the organized black market, is concentrated in the hands of a small circle of elites, including military officers, drug warlords, and regional businessmen. (Sherman, 2003: 238) Japanese firms have also been implicated in the unsustainable appropriation of Myanmar’s natural environment. For example, Nittetsu Mining Corporation applied for land around Kha Maung Thwe, in spite of a petition from villagers to the Myanmar government to stop land grabs and the environmental devastation caused by resource extraction (Karen News, 106

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2014c). The long-​term impacts of this economic opportunism on both local communities and the environment have been ignored to facilitate the short-​term expropriation of wealth in the hands of a few. The extension of Tatmadaw control over ethnic border areas has, in some cases, led to a backlash against the leadership of ethnic armed groups. Brenner (2015) describes how, in the case of the Kachin Independence Organization and Kachin Independence Army, younger officers rejected the ceasefire sell-​outs among the top leadership and resumed the armed struggle against the Myanmar government since 2011. These officers were particularly incensed by the Myanmar government’s request in 2008 that the ethnic armed groups be reconfigured as Border Guard Forces within the Tatmadaw structure (Brenner, 2015: 342–​3), but also dismayed that the struggle for political power had degenerated into factional infighting among the Kachin Independence Organization and Kachin Independence Army leadership over the region’s rich natural resources, especially jade, gold and timber (Brenner, 2015: 348). The rank-​and-​file of the Kachin Independence Army and local Kachin communities, that had not benefited economically from the ceasefires, appeared largely to support the resumption of conflict (Brenner, 2015: 349–​50). Brenner’s work therefore highlights that Myanmar’s ceasefires have been transient, divvying up economic profits in the short term, without seeking the long-​term political resolution of the conflicts themselves. As the Kachin case highlights, ceasefires can quickly disintegrate and conflict can suddenly reignite. The political economy of conflict in Myanmar’s borderlands has not been uniform, requiring an appreciation of the unique aspects of each ethnic conflict. In the case of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Jonsson et al (2016) describe a process whereby the Tatmadaw bribed the UWSA to facilitate peace, allowing both the Tatmadaw and UWSA to reap the profits from the drug trade emanating from UWSA territory. The Tatmadaw adopted this ‘bribing for peace’ approach due to the difficulty of conducting military operations in the remote hills of the Wa state, against the militarily adept and well-​manned UWSA (Jonsson et al, 2016: 547). The Wa, however, constitute an alternative confederate model and therefore an inspiration for other armed ethnic groups. In the case of the Arakan Army’s (AA) attacks on Burmese army border posts and units in January 2019, for example, it was precisely the Wa state confederate model that was referenced as the core goal of the Arakan Army (Irrawaddy, 2019a). Rather than continue to give ground to the Tatmadaw, armed ethnic groups can pursue the higher degree of political independence that the Wa state has achieved. The various attempts to solve Myanmar’s civil conflicts, while showing some promise, have proceeded tentatively. In particular, Aung San Suu Kyi promoted dialogue with Myanmar’s ethnic communities through the 107

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21st-​century Panglong process. Two important players in this process were the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a coalition founded in 2011 comprising 11 ethnic groups, which first met in Tokyo in April 2013, and funded by the Nippon Foundation (Saw Yan Naing, 2013a), and the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team, established in November 2013. Both of these coalitions have provided platforms for Myanmar’s ethnic minority groups to negotiate collectively with the Myanmar government and military (Manabe, 2013: 97; Nilsen, 2013: 127; South and Joll, 2016: 183). Despite funding the UNFC, it is unclear whether the Nippon Foundation truly understands the position of the ethnic minorities. When asked about the peace process by the Irrawaddy newspaper, Sasakawa maintained that ‘[e]‌very citizens [sic] in Myanmar is hoping for unification, not secession’ (Irrawaddy, 2013). This comment ignores both the ethnic minority groups’ struggle for a federal system and questions concerning what form Myanmar’s union should take. In addition to conflict breaking out in some ethnic areas, notably Shan, Kachin and Rakhine, there are further outstanding issues with the ongoing negotiations between the ethnic groups, the government and the military. First, a key sticking point in the new Panglong negotiations was the insistence by the UNFC on a federal system comprising eight equal states that the military continues to oppose, stressing the unity of all minorities under government rule (Pedersen, 2008: 54; Manabe, 2013: 93, 99). Second, civil society groups have been side-​lined from the peace process, despite the key role they play in connecting the peace process with local communities (Burma Partnership, 2016; South and Joll, 2016), and the concern that representatives attending the conference may reflect their own elite interests rather than those of their people (Dolan, 2016). Third, aid agencies tend to perceive their role as providing technical solutions to local issues in the peace process, rather than engaging the local communities themselves to establish their position in a highly politicized environment (South and Joll, 2016: 185). Fourth, not all armed ethnic groups are included in the Panglong process as the Tatmadaw prohibited key armed groups from signing the National Ceasefire Agreement (Dolan, 2016). Fifth, while the international community has been supportive of the peace-​building efforts, states have tended to adopt a hands-​off approach. When foreign states have become involved, they have tended to support the government position and worked through government-​run or sponsored organizations, ignoring local actors in ethnic minority regions (South and Joll, 2016: 184–​5). In sum, though the 1990 ceasefires reduced the scale of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, Myanmar’s democratic transition from 2011 was fragile and uncertain, with many ethnic conflicts unresolved and sporadic violence breaking out periodically (Burma Partnership, 2016; Dolan, 2016; South and Joll, 2016: 182). 108

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Japanese aid and the ethnic conflicts Japan had mostly steered clear of mediating in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, despite peace-​building in Southeast Asia supposedly becoming a pillar of Japan’s international contribution to security (Lam, 2009), as Chapter 2 mentioned. Japanese policy makers understood that there was a limited amount that Japan could do to further conflict resolution in a country that shunned foreign intervention in its domestic affairs, particularly as concerns the protracted ethnic conflicts. With Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ and increasing international investment, however, the Abe administration sought to influence Myanmar’s peace process, notably by working through ODA and the Nippon Foundation. The involvement of the Nippon Foundation in Myanmar’s peace process is said to stem from the close relationship between Prime Minister Abe and the Foundation’s chairman, Sasakawa Yōhei (Yen Saning, 2014a; Hartley, 2018a: 295). Like Abe, Sasakawa is a prominent Japanese nationalist figure. Sasakawa’s father, Sasakawa Ryōchi, was imprisoned as a class A war criminal, but went on to run the highly profitable Japan Boat Racing Association after his release (Seekins, 2021: 11). Seekins (2021: 11) notes that while Sasakawa built close ties with both the Tatmadaw and Aung San Suu Kyi as Myanmar transitioned to a ‘disciplined democracy’, his ‘own operations inside the country have been far from transparent, and Japanese officials are notably reticent to describe them in detail’. In June 2012, Abe appointed Sasakawa as his Goodwill Ambassador for the Welfare of the National Races in Myanmar, a position that encompassed establishing a forum in which the ethnic group leaders and the Myanmar government could meet, as well as directing aid to the country (Nippon Foundation, 2013a; PR Newswire, 2013). On 22 December 2012, for example, the Nippon Foundation delivered US$64,000 in food aid to displaced communities of Mon ethnicity in Moulmein (Thin, 2013). Expressing his thanks for the Nippon Foundation’s assistance, New Mon State Party (NMSP) chairman Nai Htaw Mon stated, ‘[o]‌ur Mon refugees are living in poor conditions. This aid might not be enough to help everyone, but it will help a lot of people … [it] will help a lot with the peace process’ (Lawi Weng, 2012). Humanitarian assistance together with the construction of houses funded by the Nippon Foundation to accommodate internally displaced people from Karen communities have also been well-​ received (Saw Yan Naing, 2013b). Looking to extend such humanitarian assistance to ethnic minority groups, the Nippon Foundation funded the UNFC (Saw Yan Naing, 2013a). While some ethnic minority groups have welcomed outside assistance, foreign mediation in the peace process has been limited and raised a number of concerns. Even with the signing of a nationwide ceasefire in 2015, ethnic groups still warned of human rights violations. For example, Major General 109

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Nerdah Bo Mya, head of the Karen National Defence Organisation, stated, ‘the international community must not understand. In the current political situation investment and development in Burma means human rights violations. The US, EU, ASEAN and Japan might not be directly involved [in these violations], but by supporting the regime they are’ (Karen News, 2015a). Similarly, international NGOs, such as Burma Campaign UK and HRW, raised their concerns about debt relief and aid to Myanmar in light of ongoing human rights abuses and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Tatmadaw forces in the context of ongoing ethnic conflicts, as well as endemic corruption and the Tatmadaw’s command over the economy (Saw Wei Thoo and Zwartz, 2013). Japan’s support for peace-​building in Myanmar has tended to support the Tatmadaw’s ‘illiberal strategies’ to manage ethnic conflicts and extend their economic and military power, rather than to seriously resolve the underlying causes of conflict (Stokke et al, 2022). Voicing his reservations about international aid donors operating in Myanmar, Bertil Lintner, an expert on the country, argued that aid competition rather than coordination has defined the approach of multiple donors, as they scramble to profit from the aid business in the country (Lintner, 2013). Similarly, Audun Aagre, director of the NGO Norwegian Burma Committee, expressed his concerns as follows, ‘I have been terrified by the lack of understanding by some international decision makers on huge international peace funds. … Many [of them] mix up militia groups driven by economic interests with ethnic armed organizations mainly driven by political interests’ (Saw Yan Naing, 2016a). These critiques have extended to Japan with some doubting that Japan can act as a bridge between the ethnic groups and the government, as Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar, Numata Mikio, has claimed (Mahtani, 2014). Critics perceive Japan and the Nippon Foundation’s role in Myanmar’s peace process as an attempt to counter Chinese influence in the border regions, reassure Japanese businesses of the diminishing risk to their investments and secure access to natural resources (Mahtani, 2014). According to Umeda Kunio (2012), Chief of Section South Asian Affairs at MOFA, there were limits to Japan’s ability to act as a bridge in its relations with Myanmar, as Japan could not act as an intermediary between the ethnic groups still at war with the Burmese military (Umeda, 2012: 8, 11). As Lam Peng Er stressed, ‘while Tokyo aspires to play a role in national reconciliation and is willing to provide generous amounts of aid, a peace-​building role may be a bridge too far’, adding that ‘Japan lacks the knowledge and finesse to be a peacemaker [in Myanmar]’ (2016: 530–​1). In Japan’s case, the underlying approach and assumptions that guide the aid process, the content of the aid itself and the motivations behind granting aid all need to be questioned. First, Japanese policy makers have assumed that economic development and connectivity will engender both democracy and peace, when the injection of aid into conflict situations can potentially fuel 110

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further conflict. Second, the Japanese government has pursued a state-​centric approach to development, leaving affected communities disempowered and alienated. Third, the Japanese government has encouraged the repatriation of refugees in spite of ongoing threats to their existence should they return. In the face of such threats, Japan’s aid policy encourages resilience rather than seeking to resolve human security concerns together with local communities.

Development and connectivity fuelling ethnic conflict Japan’s approach to mediating in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts is based on a misplaced belief that democratization and development will automatically engender peace (JICA, 2013a; Nippon Foundation, 2013a; 2013b; 2016a; Ruzza, 2015). As the Nippon Foundation’s website explains, ‘some ethnic groups’ struggle for greater autonomy from the central government has resulted in many years of conflict. Tensions remain, even after the beginning of the transition to democracy, and this has resulted in regions that lag in terms of development’ (Nippon Foundation, 2016a). Not only does the use of the passive tense in this quote conceal the complex history of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, the solution to the conflicts is also clearly denoted in terms of democracy and development. There has been no attempt to disaggregate the democratization and peace processes, to appreciate how the Burmese military has withheld development and extended its economic interests in border regions as part of its military strategy, or to consider how development and neoliberal market reform might destabilize conditions in ethnic minority areas. Similarly, former president of JICA, Tanaka Akihiko, stated in a speech entitled ‘Myanmar’s Development in Regional Context and JICA’s Engagement’ on 9 August 2013: ‘[L]‌ong-​term engagement’ helps our partners accumulate technology, infrastructure, human capital, as well as build relationships of trust, or ‘social capital.’ That, in turn, forms the basis for shared innovations, eventually contributing to the development of organizations, societies, and the country as a whole. Japan’s own experience of modernization and development validates this view … spreading democratic values in Southeast Asia is intrinsically gratifying to the Japanese people. … Just as we, the Japanese, want a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic Southeast Asian-​regional community, we would like to be a partner of a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Myanmar. (Tanaka, 2013, emphasis added) Hence, JICA’s aid policy towards Myanmar is discursively framed in terms of Japan’s ability to act as a ‘thought leader’ for the East Asian region and promoter of democratic values through economic assistance. 111

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Tanaka elaborated on JICA’s aid approach at the 3rd Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum, 7 February 2015, where he emphasized that expanding transportation and telecommunications infrastructure would enhance connectivity and economic development in Myanmar’s ethnic borderlands (Tanaka, 2015). JICA assumes that its efforts will be openly embraced as JICA officials advocate an ‘inclusive’ approach to development through which local communities are regularly consulted (Tanaka, 2015). Both these points of ‘improved connectivity’ and ‘inclusive development’ require further scrutiny, as this connectivity is tied to Japan’s broader strategic aims for the Mekong subregion and the extent to which local communities are included in the developmental process is questionable. As Chapter 4 highlighted, the notion of connectivity is a key driver in Japan’s foreign policy towards Myanmar. Japanese policy makers envision East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors crisscrossing the Mekong region to link the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean, culminating in the Thilawa and Dawei SEZs. Japanese production sites in the region stood to benefit from these corridors with improved access to regional and global markets. Myanmar had long been the weakest link in Japan’s regional vision, but the country’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ opened new opportunities for development and investment. The East–​ West and Southern Economic Corridors traverse ethnic territories in Myanmar, notably Karen territories, that have been riven with conflict. Resolving these conflicts therefore became a paramount aim to achieving Japan’s national interests. JICA has justified its approach to economic development and connectivity in spatial terminology, under the label of ‘geographical inclusion’ (Tanaka, 2015). Tanaka Akihiko, former JICA president, outlined the meaning of this in terms of connecting Myanmar’s various regions to the economic corridors running through Indochina, such that local communities could profit (Tanaka, 2015). On 31 October 2019, JICA, together with Myanmar’s Ministry of Construction, began work on the Gyaing-​Kawkareik Bridge in Kayin state, a key component of the East–​West Corridor project (JICA, 2019c). It would be the first of three bridges, supported with a JICA loan of 33.869 billion Japanese yen, designed, in the words of Karasawa Masayuki, Chief Representative of JICA Myanmar Office, to enable ‘safe and reliable transport networks especially freight transport from Bangkok to Thilawa SEZ’ (JICA, 2019c). JICA’s concept of ‘geographical inclusion’ thereby defines the Mekong subregion in terms of linking Transnational Production Networks to facilitate the transportation of goods and material. Despite Tanaka’s insistence that local communities benefit from this ‘connectivity’, they are only geographically included as an afterthought. The economic corridors that crisscross the lands of ethnic communities not only destabilize the ecosystems upon which these communities rely, but also facilitate government and 112

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military access to these lands. The opportunities these economic corridors offer to ethnic peoples lies primarily in migration away from their native lands to work in production centres or to remain to staff tourist attractions off the highways that bisect their territories (JICA, 2013d: 263). A JICA report published in October 2013, entitled ‘Preparatory Survey for the Integrated Regional Development for Ethnic Minorities in the Southeast Myanmar’, set out JICA’s core ambitions and approaches to development as they relate to Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts (JICA, 2013d). The report stated that Myanmar’s ongoing ethnic conflicts together with the poor quality of infrastructure in the country were the primary challenges inhibiting Myanmar’s economic development (JICA, 2013d: 185–​6). The ongoing conflicts prevented the development of key infrastructure, such as hydropower dams, needed to develop Myanmar (JICA, 2013d: 158, 162, 164, 263, 264, 300, 370). Myanmar’s economic development through ODA and private investment by Japanese firms was the key to solving Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts according to the report (JICA, 2013d: 31, 37). The JICA report focused on developing Myanmar as a trade hub in the global political economy via the establishment of the East–​West Corridor (linking Mawlamyine to the Mekong subregion) and the Southern Corridor (that terminates at Dawei), including the construction of deep-​water and regional ports, in order to benefit Japanese businesses (JICA, 2013d: 22, 30–​1, 159, 166, 193–​4, 213–​14, 301, 307, 356). These economic corridors were designed to link up with China’s North–​South Corridor to further facilitate subregional connectivity (JICA, 2013d: 31). According to JICA, those townships located on these economic corridors would stand to benefit from Japanese development through infrastructure linkages to the broader region and key industrial and manufacturing sites (JICA, 2013d: 271–​2, 286–​7, 292, 296). The report made it clear that Japanese development was geared to drawing Myanmar’s rural hinterland, where ethnic conflicts are located, towards Yangon through a process of ‘national integration’ (JICA, 2013d: 356–​7). For JICA, the Myanmar government was the key actor throughout the report, marginalizing ethnic minority groups. For example, in the case of environmental management, all projects would be managed through state agencies making control of the environment a way of extending state control in ethnic minority areas (JICA, 2013d: 83). The report acknowledged that Myanmar’s rapid industrialization and economic growth would negatively impact the environment (JICA, 2013d: 74, 79), but stressed that this could be minimized by properly managing the environment and preventing illegal resource extraction perpetrated by ethnic minorities (JICA, 2013d: 80). Environmental management therefore entailed ascertaining the ownership and development rights for 113

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the resources (JICA, 2013d: 266). Considering that the report designated ethnic minorities as illegally extracting resources, it logically followed that the Myanmar government would determine itself to be the rightful owner of resources in Myanmar’s ethnic lands. In September 2014, the Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), which comprises 28 civil society organizations, critiqued JICA’s Preparatory Survey (KPSN, 2014a; 2014b). Specifically, Saw Paul Sein Twa, a coordinator for KPSN, challenged JICA’s underlying assumption that development in ethnic areas would lead to reconciliation, that the situation was becoming safer for refugees and IDPs to return to their hometowns in Myanmar, and that local communities were included in JICA’s deliberations. Paw Paul Sein Twa stated, ‘we are concerned that JICA’s blueprint neither sufficiently recognizes the uncertain political context nor proposes people-​centred development alternatives. We hope that JICA will talk to us about our people’s concerns for the sustainable development of our country’ (KPSN, 2014a). The report cited the case of JICA’s involvement in establishing the Thilawa SEZ as evidence that the interests of local communities would not be considered (KPSN, 2014b: 17). The KPSN report indicated that JICA: had an insufficient grasp of the causes of ethnic conflict in southeastern Myanmar; lacked consideration for humanitarian and environmental issues; was not acting transparently; and was not working with civil society organizations (KPSN, 2014a). The Karen community continued to critique the impacts of dam building involving Japanese firms on local communities who were being forcibly displaced (Nan Lwin, 2018). The KPSN report detailed how JICA’s blueprint was focused on ‘infrastructure and export-​based industrial development’ in order to realize Japan’s regional economic interests and would likely exacerbate the conflicts in southeastern Myanmar (KPSN, 2014b: 1–​2, 6, 8–​9). The KPSN’s claim that JICA’s approach could enflame existing conflicts between the Myanmar military and ethnic groups rested on four points. First, KPSN accused JICA of ‘working around the conflict’ rather than seeking to understand its causes, and of collaborating with the government in pursuit of economic opportunities rather than consulting local communities (KPSN, 2014b: 7–​9, 15–​17, 21). Second, KPSN argued that JICA’s report was based on the false premise that development would engender peace and that poverty was a key cause of conflict in southeastern Myanmar (KPSN, 2014b: 10). KPSN maintained that the abuses of the Myanmar military, rather than poverty, were the key drivers of the conflict, and that the Karen community had sought throughout to safeguard ‘human rights and [achieve] autonomy’, based on ‘our right to our culture and control over our own lives, natural resources and land’ (KPSN, 2014b: 11). Third, by focusing on infrastructure development, JICA’s report could fuel the conflict as the government would 114

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be encouraged to illegitimately confiscate land and damage the natural environment to construct roads and hydropower plants (KPSN, 2014b: 12, 18). Fourth, the construction of roads would facilitate the access of the Burmese military to all areas of Karen state (KPSN, 2014b: 13). The KPSN report (2014b: 4) detailed a number of recommendations, including the need for JICA to: commission an independent report on the causes of the conflict; operate in line with international humanitarian and environmental development principles; and consult and act in partnership with local actors according to JICA’s own principles. The KPSN report emphasized that only with a comprehensive peace deal and the rule of law could democracy and human rights be realized, enabling development projects to go ahead (2014b: 12). KPSN urged a suspension of major development projects, such as those related to the Dawei SEZ, until a peace deal could be signed (KPSN, 2014b). Criticizing JICA’s emphasis on regional connectivity to realize Japan’s economic interests, the KPSN report stated: The world has learned many things from decades of often destructive economic development. Now industrial development seems to be coming to our land, really for the first time. In the year 2014, with all those lessons learned and new knowledge and practices to draw upon, it is illegitimate for an agency that represents the Japanese people to proceed with these outdated and discredited processes. (KPSN, 2014b: 3) The KPSN report concluded that ‘JICA’s approach will weaken community engagement, empowerment, and the chances of achieving a sustainable peace’ (KPSN, 2014b: 10). KPSN’s critiques of JICA’s report were echoed throughout the Karen community, which noted that by proceeding with aid and development projects prior to signing a long-​term peace deal, the government was looking to use international donors to strengthen its hand (Saw Yan Naing, 2014b). As the KNU’s Brigade 5 leader General Baw Kyaw Heh said in January 2014, ‘It is like a cold war. You turn off your weapons, but you strengthen your control through social developments’ (Saw Yan Naing, 2014b). Similarly, the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network questioned the opaque process through which aid had been delivered, the failure to consult local people in the process, and raised concerns about land-​grabbing in ethnic minority areas, specifically in relation to the JICA-​funded Dawei SEZ (Saw Yan Naing, 2014b). Speaking to reporters on 9 September 2014 in Yangon, Susanna Hla Soe, director of the Karen Women’s Action Group, stated ‘JICA is one-​sidedly working with the Union government and the Karen State government, while neglecting communities and organizations’ (Yen Saning and Saw Yan Naing, 2014). 115

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Japan’s state-​centric approach and lack of community empowerment JICA’s developmental approach is based on the premise that increased connectivity will enhance the development prospects of ethnic minorities, notably the Karen. To promote and legitimize JICA’s Myanmar policy, the involvement of ethnic communities in the developmental process and their acceptance of aid projects was key. JICA framed its peace-​building efforts and aid to Myanmar in terms of ‘inclusive development’, which comprises national reconciliation, starting with a nationwide ceasefire, free and fair elections, and aid that reaches ethnic minorities (JICA, 2013b; Tanaka, 2015). Tanaka Akihiko, former JICA president, described JICA as adopting a ‘comprehensive approach’ in its peace-​building efforts in Myanmar that addressed social and infrastructure needs, security concerns (notably the removal of landmines), agricultural and industrial development, and enhanced bureaucratic governance (Tanaka, 2013). At the third Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum on 7 February 2015, Tanaka emphasized that Japan had ‘worked with regional governments to establish regional and community development plans that adequately reflect the voice of the people and the communities they belong to’ (Tanaka, 2015). Japan’s peace-​ building approach started with assistance to ethnic minorities in Karen and Mon states with the intention of expanding aid to other regions based on the success of the initial aid programme (Tanaka, 2013). Kitaoka Shinichi, whose term as JICA president commenced on 1 October 2015, echoed this inclusive approach, when praising Myanmar’s ‘human-​centred development’ at a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on 27 March 2017 (JICA, 2017a). Despite JICA’s emphasis on ‘inclusive development’, local communities repeatedly complained that JICA chose to work through the Myanmar government, did not consult them on aid programmes, and disregarded abuses of human security (Karen News, 2014a). Saw Paul Sein Twa, a Karen Environmental and Social Action Network Group spokesperson, stated: They [JICA] have failed to understand the key driving factors of conflict in Eastern Burma … [so] the plan could fuel new conflict. … For us the issues around the ownership and control over land and natural resources are one of the key drivers of the conflict and these must be resolved first … JICA asked us to consult with them after they had released [their] report –​it seems they are moving as fast as possible after the ceasefire … and when they asked our consultation it was only on minor details. (Karen News, 2014a) Local critics argued that JICA’s approach lacked an understanding of the realities on the ground from early on in JICA’s aid programme for Myanmar, 116

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following the initiation of Myanmar’s democratization process in 2010. Referring to JICA’s flagship aid project in Myanmar, the Baluchaung (known locally as Lawpita) No. 2 Hydropower Plant, Ku Oo Rei, secretary for the Karenni National Progressive Party, stated ‘the international community thinks Burma’s government is making reforms now, but in reality these changes are only a veneer. Japan’s government needs to research more about the human right abuses still ongoing in the dam area before they give the government an [sic] ODA –​people must come first’ (Karen News, 2011). Specifically, Ku Oo Rei pointed to forced relocation and lack of compensation to local communities affected by the operation and proposed repairs to the hydropower plant (Karen News, 2011). Despite these concerns, JICA commenced the repairs to the Baluchaung hydropower plant in the summer of 2014 (JICA, 2014). The Nippon Foundation has been similarly critiqued for failing to involve local communities in its aid projects. Though the Nippon Foundation argues that their assistance goes directly to the ethnic communities (Saw Yan Naing, 2013b), local communities are rarely directly consulted on aid projects (Irrawaddy, 2013). Even when they are involved, their opinions can be changed or mediated as they reach the decision-​making level and may have little impact at the implementation stage. A key part of the problem was that the Nippon Foundation worked through the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) (Nippon Foundation, 2016a), which JICA described as ‘truly neutral’ (JICA, 2013d: 340), despite being a government run organization primarily funded by Japan and the EU (South and Joll, 2016: 183). Doing so side-​ lined local communities. Audun Aagre, director of the NGO Norwegian Burma Committee, noted that since the democratization process began, international donors shifted aid away from ethnic minority groups to work through the MPC, undermining well-​functioning education and health care systems in ethnic areas in the process (Saw Yan Naing, 2016a). After coming to power in the 2015 elections, the NLD government scrapped the MPC and established the National Reconciliation Peace Centre to oversee the peace process.2 The NLD’s reasoning behind this change has not been made clear, but concerns about corruption among MPC staff and the failure of international funds to bring substantial benefits to ethnic communities were raised in the media (Saw Yan Naing, 2016a). The problem of aid in rebuilding former conflict zones extends to education. Japanese aid has targeted the development of schools throughout Myanmar (Nippon Foundation, 2016a), but with seemingly little regard for the impact of education policy on the ongoing ethnic conflicts. Since the military coup of 1962, the Myanmar government has Burmanized the education system, which includes the promotion of the Burmese language (Pedersen, 2008; Walton, 2013; Holliday, 2014). As South and Lall (2016: 133) point out, ‘the perceived Burmanization of state and society has constituted one of the 117

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prime grievances of ethnic nationality elites, who have mobilized minority communities to resist militarized central government authority, in the context of one of the world’s most protracted armed conflicts’. JICA assisted the Myanmar government in the development of new textbooks, insisting that democratization was progressing in Myanmar (despite ethnic conflicts and the Rakhine crisis). JICA claimed that the textbooks respect diversity, but no mention was made of ethnic language versions of the textbooks or the promotion of ethnic languages (JICA, 2017b). As the Japanese government channelled aid via the Myanmar government for education, so it strengthened the Burmanization of the education system in Myanmar’s borderlands and undermined efforts to teach in the ethnic languages, thereby contributing to the conflicts. For JICA, education together with health care are core elements in resolving Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. As its October 2013 preparatory report stated, ‘it is a time of transition for Myanmar, and deliberative discussion is needed to maintain security … to build mutual trust among communities, ethnic groups, and the government through proper, effective and efficient educational and health care services should be at the centre of the social development agenda’ (JICA, 2013d: 259). Being a ‘time of transition’, however, facilitated intrusive and extensive policy reforms by the government designed to manage their citizens. JICA emphasized coordination with Myanmar’s government, despite designating that the provision of education and health care in Myanmar’s ethnic regions were primarily NGO-​related tasks (JICA, 2013d: 258). When JICA focused on higher education reform, it emphasized funding for engineering, business, finance and banking programmes (Tanaka, 2013), clearly connecting education aid to Japan’s long-​ term national interests. For example, on 9 August 2013, JICA opened the Myanmar-​Japan Centre for Human Resources Development with the aim of helping ‘Japanese companies to make inroads in Myanmar’ (JICA, 2013c). While the Thein Sein government introduced reforms in education, ethnic groups complained that these reforms did not benefit their communities (South and Lall, 2016: 146). Not only has Japan’s approach to providing aid been state-​centric, it also sought to improve ties between the Tatmadaw and Japan’s SDF. A Nippon Foundation initiative funded the ‘Japan–​Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program’ to the tune of US$208,971 since it began in 2014. The initiative brought together the Japanese and Burmese military brass for training on how to operate a military within a democratic system (Nippon Foundation, 2016b). The notion that the Tatmadaw can operate in accordance with democratic standards has to be tempered by an understanding of how it moulded Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’. Not only has the Burmese military engaged in military campaigns against armed ethnic groups, UN officials have also accused it of perpetrating crimes against humanity 118

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against the Rohingya in Rakhine state (BBC, 2016). While the focus of this military exchange is on ‘civilian control’, it has also established personal connections between Myanmar and Japan’s military forces during a period in which such control has been noticeably absent. Despite the UN levelling charges of crimes against humanity in the case of the Tatmadaw’s operations against the Rohingya and in other ethnic conflicts, the Nippon Foundation continued to laud the benefits of the ‘Japan–​Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program’ and welcomed a senior delegation of Tatmadaw officers, headed by Lieutenant General Than Tun Oo, commander of No. 6 Bureau of Special Operations, to Japan on 20 September 2019 (Sasakawa, 2019). How ethnic groups were supposed to trust that the Japanese government or the Nippon Foundation could act as an honest broker in the case of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts in light of this military exchange programme has never been clear. Following the 1 February 2021 coup, HRW urged the Japanese government to end its ‘Military Officials Exchange Program’ (Narisawa, 2022).

Refugee repatriation and resilience in the face of perennial threats With Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’, aid agencies began to divert aid away from funding refugee camps and towards improving the situation in Myanmar, believing that peace and development would naturally come with democratization.3 This assumption was questioned by UNHCR representatives who were worried that refugees were being forced to return to Myanmar prematurely (Saw Yan Naing, 2013c). Pressure built upon refugees to return, even when they were not assured that conditions were safe for them to do so because their land remained in the hands of the Burmese military or because of landmines (Saw Yan Naing, 2016b). An example of such pressure that was initiated early on in Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ was the Norwegian-​led Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), which aimed to resettle IDPs in Myanmar (Saw Wei Thoo and Zwartz, 2013). The Karen community raised concerns that the areas IDPs would be relocated to were still occupied by Tatmadaw troops, that the peace process remained uncertain, and that there was a lack of dialogue between the Norwegian government and civil society groups (Kean, 2012). The MPSI was also criticized for working through the MPC, the government agency sponsored by the EU and Japan, alienating ethnic minority groups (Karen News, 2015b). Despite widespread criticism about the MPSI, the Japanese government also sought to repatriate refugees from Thai border camps to Myanmar. The Nippon Foundation provided housing for returning refugees and delivered humanitarian aid, including food, traditional medicines and mobile medical 119

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clinics (Nippon Foundation, 2013a; 2013c; Saw Yan Naing, 2017). Though such aid may appear well intentioned, when considered in light of JICA’s October 2013 ‘Preparatory Survey for the Integrated Regional Development for Ethnic Minorities in the Southeast Myanmar’ (JICA, 2013d), it is clear that the Japanese government sought to exploit Myanmar’s IDPs and refugees. The report perceived IDPs and refugees as cheap labour who would harvest natural resources, including rubber, cashew nuts and tree sap, that could be transported to industrial clusters and processed to make products for Japanese firms ranging from latex, industrial oil, to ink and paint (JICA, 2013d: 30, 32–​4). The refugees and IDPs would need to be controlled by ‘be[ing] integrated into a formal industrial cluster [and residing] in planned settlement areas’ (JICA, 2013d: 34). As the report stated, ‘Hlaingbwe TS [Township] is expected to receive a large number of refugees and IDPs, and this should be taken positively for expanding opportunities for the development of the township. … To expand employment opportunities significantly for returnees and residents, manufacturing industries should be established such as agro-​ processing’ (JICA, 2013d: 268–​9). JICA acknowledged that developmental projects, including dams, mines and plantations, would exacerbate the displacement of people (JICA, 2013d: 312), but the report failed to note how JICA-​run projects had already displaced or would likely displace people, focusing instead on how to exploit this cheap labour. In short, the JICA report concealed its profit motives in a discourse of peace-​building. In order to encourage IDPs and refugees to return, despite the precarious situation on the ground, JICA sought to engage with civil society organizations. For example, Nishimori Yuki, a JICA consultant, met with representatives of the Karen community and proposed the establishment of a refugee information centre in Myawaddy that would help refugees to determine whether or not it was safe to return to Myanmar (Karen News, 2013). Nonetheless, Thai-​based NGOs, such as the Karen Refugee Committee and the Committee of Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP), advised Nishimori that the conditions in Myanmar remained unsafe for refugees and IDPs (Karen News, 2013), raising the question of whether the refugee information centre was really necessary. Similarly, KPSN noted that local communities and refugees had not been consulted about the process of establishing the information centre, so they had no control over the information they were being presented with (KPSN, 2014b: 13). KPSN added that the government’s intended resettlement sites were deeply problematic, being located near to Burmese military bases, designed to exploit cheap labour, and forcing refugees and IDPs to relinquish their land rights (KPSN, 2014b: 13). Nishimori’s mission seemed to do little more than put a human face to JICA’s developmental ambitions. That similar criticisms continued to surface after 2013, signalled that the Japanese government and the Nippon 120

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Foundation were merely paying lip-​service to the notion of ‘inclusive development’. For example, a representative of the KNU, Padoh Aung Win Shwe, met with Japanese parliamentarian, Ishibashi Michihiro, on 30 April 2014, to express that the Japanese government and Nippon Foundation were not adequately consulting the ethnic minority groups (Karen News, 2014b). Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK, chastised Japan’s approach of pushing refugees to return to Myanmar without comprehending the precarious environment in Myanmar’s borderlands (Arterbury, 2014). In 2018, the Border Consortium, a Thai-​based NGO working on behalf of refugees along the Thai border, released a report entitled Human Security in South Eastern Myanmar that indicated the ongoing challenges that refugees and IDPs faced when returning to Myanmar and critiqued the cuts in aid for the border camps which forced refugees to return (Border Consortium, 2018). Hence, under the guise of democratization, support for refugees was being withdrawn, forcing them to return to an unstable life in Myanmar where they would need to be resilient in order to survive. An alternative to encouraging the return of refugees to Myanmar would be for the Japanese government to accept more refugees in Japan, but the Japanese government has mostly avoided admitting refugees fleeing Myanmar’s numerous ethnic conflicts. An exception to this was a pilot project whereby Japan accepted 90 Burmese refugees from the Mae La Camp in Thailand over a period of three years, starting from 2010 on a trial basis (Miyamoto, 2009). Though a comparatively small project, it was Asia’s first case of third country resettlement and was billed as a form of contributing to the international community (Ishii, 2011: 122–​3). This pilot project was beset by numerous problems including omitting indicators for success or failure and not considering the implications of or developing the policy beyond the end of the three-​year period (Ishii, 2011). The pilot project conceptualized refugees as means rather than ends in themselves. The refugees were perceived as a form of investment and assessed in terms of their work ethic or perceived as a solution to Japan’s greying society (Ishii, 2011: 126–​7). Indeed, the notion that this tokenistic project constituted a Japanese contribution to the international community highlights that accepting these refugees was more about image than substance. In addition, Mae La is a camp for Karen refugees located approximately 75 kilometres north of Mae Sot, the border crossing between Myanmar and Thailand for Japan’s East–​West Economic Corridor. By accepting refugees, the Japanese government could attempt to placate those in the Karen community who were wary of the impact of the East–​West Economic Corridor on their communities. Pledges to accept more refugees, such as in the case of this pilot project, have also invariably been responses to international pressure on Japan (Tokaji, 2010; Suzuki, 2015). Japan continues to accept few refugees and refuses to substantially increase the number of refugees it accepts. 121

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Japan’s MOFA is clear on what Japan’s responsibilities vis-​à-​vis refugees are, stating that: [F]‌rom a humanitarian point of view, refugee assistance is a bounden duty of a member of the international community. It is also consistent with Japan’s position to seek permanent peace while cooperating with the international community and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedom. Thus, Japan is undertaking refugee assistance, regarding it as one of the important pillars of Japan’s contribution to world peace and prosperity. (MOFA, 2000) While the rhetoric correlates with the liberal values and the emphasis on human security that Japanese foreign policy makers propound in their diplomacy, Japanese responses have not lived up to them. Japan’s policy pertaining to refugees is limited to financial contributions to the UNHCR and other associated international organizations,4 as well as supplying aid to developing states so that they can manage refugee issues themselves (Dean and Nagashima, 2007). Refugee assistance does not mean Japan sharing the burden of global refugee problems, but shifting the burden on to other states, arguing that return and reintegration are the only long-​term solutions to refugee problems (Ashiki, 2008). For example, Prime Minister Abe praised Japan’s financial contribution in his speech at the UN’s first Summit for Refugees and Migrants on 19 September 2016, asserting that Japanese aid would help refugees be ‘self-​reliant’ and promote development to tackle ‘the humanitarian and development nexus’ (Japan Times, 2016a). Abe’s speech highlighted Japan’s tendency to rely on chequebook diplomacy to externalize refugee problems. This approach essentially treats refugees as a commodity to be traded on the global market by funding the repatriation or resettlement of refugees elsewhere (Chimni, 1998; Dean and Nagashima, 2007). Japanese policy makers propose three reasons why Japan does not accept more refugees. First, representatives of Japan’s Immigration Bureau argue that it is a matter of geography and that the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa result in large numbers of applicants in European states, whereas the conditions are different in East Asia leading to fewer applications (Nariyama, 2015; Honshihenshūbu, 2016). Second, Takizawa Saburo, chairman of the board of the Japan Association for UNHCR, notes that as an island country with few foreign communities, Japan remains an unpopular destination for refugees (Yoshida, 2017). Considering the large numbers of refugees housed in camps across the Asian region, the Japanese government could still be doing more to accommodate refugees in Japan. Were the Japanese government to encourage and assist more refugees to come to Japan and provide the proper support for them, then they could 122

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build more foreign communities, making Japan potentially more attractive to refugees. These first two reasons are little more than excuses. The third reason constitutes the primary rationale for limiting the number of refugees Japan takes, namely that the Japanese government adopts a strict interpretation of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees (Dean and Nagashima, 2007; Nariyama, 2015) in order to prevent job-​ seeking foreigners from abusing the system by claiming refugee status (Honshihenshūbu, 2016: 110–​11). Japan’s Justice Ministry interprets the UN Convention on Refugees as applying to those people who face threats to their lives in their home country, even though the UNHCR refugee guidelines state that individuals who face threats to life and/​or freedom qualify for refugee status (Tanaka, 2018). The Japanese government’s strict interpretation of the convention means that refugee applicants have to be able to provide substantial evidence of their persecution, in spite of the fact that gathering such evidence may be impossible when fleeing persecution (Kikuchi, 2017a). The rationale for adopting this strict interpretation of the Refugee Convention according to officials at Japan’s Justice Ministry is that most refugees are flouting Japan’s immigration system, as they are actually economic migrants applying for refugee status in order to gain entry to and work in Japan (Kikuchi and Tanaka, 2018). Because of a legal loophole, people, who would usually be refused entry to Japan as unskilled economic migrants, can apply for refugee status and start working six months after submitting their application (Yoshida, 2017). Japan’s Justice Ministry therefore determined that only those applicants who are deemed ‘highly likely to be recognized as refugees’ would be granted the right to work in Japan (Kikuchi and Tanaka, 2018), enabling the government and conservative media to target what they call ‘fake refugees’. This problematic discourse fails to tackle both the actual refugee crises in the world and Japan’s responsibility towards solving these (Osaki, 2017a). Proponents of this ‘fake refugees’ discourse in Japan build on long-​standing arguments that Japan is too ethnically and culturally homogeneous for refugees to be able to integrate (MOFA, 2005; Honshihenshūbu, 2016). Groups in Japan who would welcome a more lenient immigration and refugee policy tend to do so as a means of fixing Japan’s ageing society. According to Tanaka Masako, an associate professor at Sophia University, since Japan’s workforce is declining, ‘Japan should give [migrants] a work permit with conditions equivalent to those for Japanese workers’ (Yoshida, 2017). Tanaka’s position is echoed by the veteran LDP representative, Kōno Tarō, who has broken with the conservative position of his party and advocated an open-​door policy towards accepting unskilled blue-​collar immigrants (Osaki, 2017b). Kōno’s position was mirrored by Nakagawa Masaharu of the Democratic Party (Osaki, 2017b) and Kunimatsu Takaji, 123

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former chief of the National Police Agency (Mie, 2017), demonstrating that there are voices on both sides of the political divide and within conservative circles who would welcome a more ‘progressive’ approach to immigration. Nonetheless, what is clear here is that the underlying reasoning behind such a position is a concern for the long-​term health of the Japanese economy, rather than a statement about Japan’s international ethical obligations as a liberal democratic state.

Conclusion Any attempt to mediate in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts needs to understand the complexity of these conflicts. For several decades, armed ethnic groups have fought the Tatmadaw with human rights abuses being committed by all sides for the control of territory, people and resources. Even ceasefires, when they hold, engender a political economy, usually illicit, in which the ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw retain control over strategic routes and resources. These conflicts have their roots in Burma’s experience of colonialism and imperialism, not least in the British imperialists’ backing of ethnic groups to suppress the Burmese majority and Japan’s establishment of a Burmese army to help rout the British. For the Tatmadaw, which has faced ethnic groups armed and supported by foreign powers, outside interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs is treated with caution, if not disdain. Though Japanese efforts at mediation through aid have at times been welcomed, there is not only a limit to Japanese ambitions to play a mediating role in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, but also numerous problems. First, Japanese mediation is founded on a particular conceptualization of space whereby economic development and connectivity will further entrench democratization and peace. Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ has not supported this belief. Instead, economic development and connectivity are in Japan’s national interest as Japan attempts to construct the East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors to link the Mekong region for the benefit of Japanese production networks. Second, though emphasizing an ‘inclusive’ approach to development, Japanese assistance has seldom engaged with local communities, let alone empowered these communities to be in the driver’s seat of development. The Japanese government’s approach to mediation in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts has been state-​centric, including an exchange programme between the Tatmadaw and SDF, thereby side-​lining the armed ethnic groups and their communities. Japan’s channelling of aid through the Myanmar government serves to strengthen the Tatmadaw’s control over border regions, reconfiguring border spaces in the interests of Japanese political and business elites. Fourth, from an ethical standpoint, rather than empower communities and solve human security issues, Japan’s aid fosters human resilience in the face of perennial threats to their 124

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well-​being, as can be observed in encouraging the repatriation of refugees, in spite of the precarious situation they would return to in Myanmar. This emphasis on resilience and lack of empowerment demonstrates that JICA has not lived up to its human security commitments as articulated in its own mission statement. The Japanese government’s meddling in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts has arguably exacerbated rather than resolved them. Perhaps the starkest failure of the Japanese government’s peace-​building approach in Myanmar lies in its externalization of the refugee problem. As a form of ‘chequebook diplomacy’, the Japanese government funds international organizations and NGOs to tackle refugee flows abroad. By contrast, every effort has been made to prevent refugees from being legally accepted in Japan. The Japanese government’s relinquishing of responsibility for human beings displaced and traumatized by conflict would again be seen as the crisis in Rakhine state unfolded and Rohingya refugees in the hundreds of thousands crossed Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh to escape what the UN would describe as a genocide.

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Dereliction of Responsibility: Japan’s ‘Liberal Leadership’ in the 2016–​20 Rakhine Crisis Introduction On 9 October 2016, ARSA attacked a number of border posts on the Myanmar–​Bangladesh border, killing ten police and seven soldiers (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 49–​50). The Tatmadaw reacted quickly, engaging in ‘area clearance operations’ that would last until February 2017, resulting in widespread human rights abuses that were widely condemned by the international community (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 54–​5). Aung San Suu Kyi’s government responded cautiously, refusing to condemn the military, but referring the situation to the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, chaired by Kofi Annan, which she had already set up on 23 August 2016. The October 2016 attacks therefore signalled a significant escalation of the situation in Rakhine. Tensions again rose over the summer of 2017, with the Tatmadaw undertaking further ‘area clearance operations’ in response to ARSA attacks against Rakhine Buddhist civilians in June. On 24 August, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State released its report, which detailed measures designed to address the crisis relating to economic development, human rights, citizenship and security. The Myanmar government swiftly agreed to take on board the Commission’s findings ‘to the fullest extent, and within the shortest timeframe possible’, raising hopes that peace might be possible in the Rakhine (Simpson, 2017). The same evening, in a move widely believed to be planned to coincide with the publication of the report, ARSA launched further strikes against 30 police posts and an army base in northern Rakhine state, killing a dozen security personnel (Simpson, 2017; Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 52). The Myanmar government responded by labelling ARSA a ‘terrorist organization’ under the country’s new Anti-​Terror Law and the Tatmadaw intensified its ‘clearance operations’ that the UN 126

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High Commissioner for Human Rights described as ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ (Simpson, 2017). By January 2018, the UN reported that nearly 690,000 Rohingya had fled Myanmar in what had become Asia’s largest humanitarian crisis. Though all sides in the conflict are likely to have committed atrocities, the main body of evidence and eye-​witness accounts points to the Tatmadaw as responsible for the majority of crimes against humanity (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 55–​7). As ‘Asia’s liberal leader’, Japan had a responsibility to act and could have done more to mediate in the crisis in Rakhine state (Nakanishi, 2021d: 222–​ 6). Japan’s substantial economic investment in Myanmar constituted diplomatic leverage that could sway Aung San Suu Kyi’s government to curb the excesses of the Tatmadaw, gradually restore peace to northern Rakhine, and ensure the security of human beings there. Instead, Japan’s response to the Rakhine crisis from October 2016 mirrored its approach to the sectarian violence in Rakhine in 2012–​13 and the Rohingya boat crisis in 2015, as covered in Chapter 3. The Abe administration, focusing on connectivity through its East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors, emphasized further economic development and democratization as the cure to the intractable identity conflicts that marred Rakhine state (Nakanishi, 2021d: 220–​1). In terms of justice and reconciliation, Japan supported Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in setting up Myanmar’s Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICoE) and attempted to sell this effort to the international community, working through quiet diplomacy as a ‘bridge’. The Japanese government externalized the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh through ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and did not accept an influx of refugees to Japan. As the crisis unfolded, so the Abe administration doubled down on peace through development, while accepting less and less in terms of a ‘credible and transparent’ process regarding justice and reconciliation. To a large extent, the Abe administration and Japanese diplomatic personnel, such as Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar Maruyama Ichiro, endorsed the position taken by Aung San Suu Kyi’s government and the Tatmadaw. This chapter begins by setting out the complex identity politics of Rakhine state in order to understand the history and contemporary dynamics of the conflict and Japan’s role in it. From there, the chapter provides an overview of the violence in Rakhine state from October 2016 on and examines the response of the international community as it gradually ratcheted up pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration to resolve the crisis. Then, Japan’s response to the crisis in Rakhine state is explored through the lenses of peace through development, justice and reconciliation, and refugees and responsibility. The chapter ends by exposing the contradictions in Japan’s foreign policy rhetoric and action in the case of the crisis in Rakhine state to argue that Japan’s response constituted a dereliction of responsibility towards the human security of the Rohingya people. 127

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The plight of the Rohingya It is no easy matter to trace the origins of the situation in the Rakhine due to the long history of tensions and fighting between Rakhine Buddhists, the Rohingya and the Myanmar government and military.1 The Tatmadaw enacted two major operations targeting the Rohingya in 1978 and 1991, causing over 200,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh, and further outbreaks of violence occurred in 2001 and 2009 (Zawacki, 2012; Abdelkader, 2014: 399; Nemoto, 2017: 197; Pedersen, 2018: 17). For decades the situation in Rakhine has been marked by day-​to-​day injustices, repression and underdevelopment. To understand this protracted crisis, it is vital to examine the identity claims made by the parties involved. The term Rohingya is contested within Myanmar and understanding how its use has evolved is central to addressing the situation in Rakhine state.2 According to Leider (2014: 4), until the early 1990s, references to a Bengali population in the Rakhine were not particularly controversial. It was only as advocates for the Rohingya cause, particularly among the Rohingya diaspora abroad, popularized the term that it has become more widely accepted in international media and diplomacy (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 126). The Rohingya and those who sympathize with their cause cite documentary evidence that indicates the presence of the Rohingya in Burma prior to the British colonial period (1826–​1937) (Green, 2013; Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 692). Advocates of the Rohingya cause emphasize research by the Australian National University on Muslim monuments dating to the 8th century in Arakan (the previous name of Rakhine state) and a 1799 linguistic study by British colonial official Francis Buchanan-​Hamilton who noted the existence of a group of Rakhine Muslims who referred to themselves as ‘Rooinga’ (Green, 2013: 94). The Rakhine Buddhist community and the Burmese Buddhist majority, on the other hand, view the Rohingya as illegal Bengali immigrants who arrived in Burma during the British colonial period and do not therefore qualify as a ‘national race’ (taing-​yin-​tha). Until all sides are prepared to critically reassess Rakhine’s complex history by considering the foundations of their own and opponents’ historical evidence and accept the historically fluid movement of people across Burma’s borders, the situation in the Rakhine will remain difficult to resolve (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 104–​5). As Ware and Laoutides (2018) point out, all sides are selective in their choice and interpretation of historical sources. The term Rohingya is actually derived from the word Rakhine, so the reference by Francis Hamilton-​ Buchanan in 1799 does not provide definitive proof of the indigeneity of the ‘Rooinga’ to the region, merely that there were Muslims living in Rakhine (Leider, 2014: 9–​10). The majority of these Muslims were considered the descendants of Bengali slaves, who had integrated into Rakhine society 128

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(Leider, 2014: 12). Though some among the Rohingya community may well have ancestral roots in Rakhine that pre-​date 1826, available census data points to a large influx of Bengali people during the British colonial period (Leider, 2014: 4; Nemoto, 2017: 198–​9; Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 131–​ 4). This is not surprising considering the British colonial elite encouraged migration from India and Bengal to fill its labour and administrative needs in Burma, favouring these migrants over the Buddhist Burmese majority (Seekins, 2007: 7–​10; Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 698). Prior to British colonialism, the idea of race (lu-m ​ yo) in Burma was actually quite fluid (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 176–​7). Britain’s divide-​and-​conquer colonial strategy embedded a notion of race that was fixed and divided society; causing a deep-​seated resentment between the Buddhist Burman majority, ethnic minorities, foreigners and Muslims. A final phase of Muslim immigration into Rakhine state occurred in the post-​Second World War period with settlers coming from Chittagong (Nemoto, 2017: 199–​200). Myriad interpretations of Myanmar’s history complicate how the situation in Rakhine state has been understood. Notably, the Second World War intensified divisions between the Burmese Buddhist majority and the country’s diverse minority groups with the former supporting Japanese intervention and the latter largely backing Britain (Seekins, 2007: 25–​6). Intercommunal violence between Muslims and Buddhists in the Rakhine during the Second World War impacted historical memories on both sides (Leider, 2014: 19; Pedersen, 2018: 16–​17). As Ware and Laoutides note: [M]‌assacres and wide-​spread acts of ethnic cleansing [during the Second World War], perpetrated by both ethnic Rakhine and Muslims, have never been thoroughly addressed. Every bout of violence ever since has been deeply rooted in the memory of these historical injustices, the ongoing segregation, and the political implications of the withdrawal of British patronage for the Muslims at Independence. (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 14–​15) With decolonization and national self-​determination proceeding in the aftermath of the Second World War, colonial boundaries split ethnic groups across borderlines or included minority groups within national boundaries with which they had little association, setting the foundations for Burma’s ethnic conflicts (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 193–​4). The junta’s position on the Rohingya was their response to a problem that had plagued the country since independence from British and Japanese imperial rule, namely how to govern a territory that ‘had never existed as a politically cohesive, centrally administered, multi-​ethnic unit with a settled national identity’ (Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 697). In postcolonial Burma, race therefore took on new importance, especially under Ne Win, Burma’s military ruler from 1962 129

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to 1988, who promoted the myth that all national races stemmed from a common ancestry (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 122–​4). This Burman majority discourse pervaded society and excluded all groups who were perceived as having arrived with British colonialism (Cheeseman, 2017; Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 180–​1). For Ne Win, stoking anti-​Muslim and anti-​colonial fervour was a way to consolidate his position and unite the nation (Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 699). As a result, the Myanmar government labelled the Rohingya as illegal Bengali immigrants and a ‘threat to national security’ (Zarni and Cowley, 2014: 685). After the dissolution of Ne Win’s regime in 1988, the Myanmar military further emphasized the concept of ‘national races’, constructing the military as the true defenders of these races and employing the concept of ‘national races’ in different ways to justify military campaigns against any community deemed not to qualify (Cheeseman, 2017). Over four decades, Burmese governments have used this framing of ‘national races’ to systematically erase the Rohingya in Rakhine state by denying them nationality and legal status (MacLean, 2019). Notably, the Myanmar government systematically oppressed the Rohingya through the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act and the 1982 Citizenship Law (Zawacki, 2012: 18; Green, 2013: 95; Abdelkader, 2014: 395–​6). Myanmar’s 2008 constitution places more weight on the concept of ‘national races’ than on citizenship. This leaves groups like the Rohingya with no other option than to emphasize how they are part of the former in order to enjoy full political rights (Cheeseman, 2017), explaining why Rohingya people have turned down offers of a second-​class citizenship according to which they would not be accepted as a national race. At the same time, the constitution allows neighbouring townships comprising a majority population of one of the national races to apply to become a ‘self-​administered zone’ (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 24–​5). The concern among the Burmese and Rakhine Buddhist populations is that this is precisely what the Rohingya would demand for Maungdaw and Buthidaung provinces, were they to be recognized as a national race (Ware and Laoutides, 2018). While identity issues centred on the concept of ‘national races’ and historical grievances are primarily responsible for the violence in Rakhine state (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 160–​5), the economic dimensions of the conflict should also be considered. Central and northern Rakhine constitute the poorest regions of Myanmar, despite having significant economic potential in terms of rice production, fishing, natural gas, minerals and tourism, as well as the development of Kyaukphyu SEZ (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 30, 158–​9). That said, local elites do not appear to benefit greatly from the economic opportunities that do exist, and while land grabs are an issue, notably in the case of the Kyaukphyu SEZ, these are not in the vicinity of the conflict (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 164–​9). Underdevelopment and domination by Myanmar’s central authorities is certainly a grievance among 130

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the various communities, but economic development alone will not solve the conflict as long as the mutually exclusive identity discourses among the communities remain (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 163). Indeed, Anna Neistat, Amnesty International’s Senior Director for Research, argues that the international community needs to be aware that economic development could exacerbate the crisis, if it favours one side over the other (Japan Times, 2017d). Neistat’s comments are particularly salient in the case of Japan’s policy towards Myanmar, as Japanese policy makers repeatedly emphasize how development is the cure for Myanmar’s diverse civil wars rather than it being a driver of them. In sum, the situation in the Rakhine is complex with selective historical accounts driving an identity conflict between the Rakhine Buddhists, the Bamar Buddhist majority and the Rohingya. This identity conflict is compounded by historical grievances dating to the British and Japanese imperial eras and a discourse on ‘national races’ that purposefully marginalizes the Rohingya, while leaving them with little option other than to justify their existence as a ‘national race’. Economic development might contribute to some kind of solution to the situation in the Rakhine, but only once the identity issues that lie at the heart of the conflict are addressed.

International response to the 2016–​20 Rakhine crisis The international community’s response to the violence in Rakhine state that broke out in October 2016 gradually ratcheted up the normative pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi’s government and, by extension, those governments that continued to support her, like Japan. Successive UN and Associated Press reports outlined widespread atrocities, including rape as a weapon of war, committed by the Myanmar military, police and newly recruited militias (Gelineau, 2017; Southwick, 2017). Over the course of 2017, numerous globally recognized human rights icons, including the Dalai Lama, Malala Yousafzai and Desmond Tutu, all spoke out on the Rohingya issue (Japan Times, 2017b). Aung San Suu Kyi’s government attempted to deflect this criticism, referring to accounts of sexual violence perpetrated by Myanmar’s military as ‘fake rape’ (Gelineau, 2017), for example, and maintaining that the international community failed to appreciate the complexity of the situation in the Rakhine (Wilson, 2017). Such critiques and the Myanmar government’s responses to them increasingly isolated Myanmar from the international community, with Aung San Suu Kyi avoiding both ASEAN’s 50-​year celebration in Manila, in August 2017, and the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2017 (Takeda, 2017: 21). In December 2017, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government formed the International Advisory Board to the Committee for the Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine. A month later, Bill Richardson, former 131

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US ambassador to the UN, resigned from the Advisory Board, critiquing Aung San Suu Kyi’s lack of moral leadership and called for tougher action by the international community. Richardson stated at the time that ‘Suu Kyi’s government lacks both the will and the capacity to faithfully implement the recommendations of the Kofi Annan-​led Rakhine Advisory Commission. … It is becoming increasingly clear that Suu Kyi is part of the problem’ (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 10). A second member of the Advisory Board, Kobsak Chutikul, former Thai ambassador and member of Thai parliament, would also later resign. On 28 August 2018, the UN’s Independent International Fact-​Finding Mission on Myanmar published a further report into the violence in the Rakhine concluding that Myanmar’s commander-​in-​chief, Min Aung Hlaing, together with five generals, had committed mass atrocity crimes, including rape, with ‘genocidal intent’, that the military’s area clearance operations had been planned in advance of ARSA attacks, and that Aung San Suu Kyi’s government was complicit in these crimes (Japan Times, 2018c; Fink, 2019: 178). The report urged the UNSC to refer the case to the ICC, sanction key individuals and enforce an arms embargo, and criticized Facebook for failing to crackdown on discriminatory posts that incited violence against Muslims (Japan Times, 2018c; Fink, 2019: 178). Backing the UN report, the US, Britain, France and Sweden were among the countries urging for Myanmar’s military brass to be prosecuted for crimes against humanity (Japan Times, 2018d). The Japanese government was notably silent about the publication of the report. The Myanmar government immediately rejected the UN report, calling it false and pointing to Myanmar’s own ICoE that had found no evidence of mass atrocity crimes having been committed (Japan Times, 2018d). On 16 July 2019, the US became the first country to impose sanctions on Myanmar’s leading generals in response to crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Tatmadaw (Japan Times, 2019a). US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explained that ‘we remain concerned that the Burmese government has taken no actions to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, and there are continued reports of the Burmese military committing human rights violations and abuses throughout the country’ (Japan Times, 2019a). Speaking in early September 2020, Yanghee Lee, a former UN human rights envoy to Myanmar, stated that the Myanmar government was resolutely erasing all signs of Rohingya villages in Rakhine state to make it impossible for the Rohingya to return (McPherson, 2020). Lee referred to this as ‘a way of exterminating their basic identity’, adding that the UN could be doing more to challenge the Myanmar government (McPherson, 2020). Legal cases on the Rohingya crisis at the ICJ and ICC further added to the pressure on the Myanmar government. On 11 November 2019, the 132

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Gambia, with the support of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation brought charges of genocide against Myanmar at the ICJ. Two months later, on 11 December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi appeared at the ICJ to defend her country and the actions of the Tatmadaw (Japan Times, 2019c). She argued that the lawsuit was ‘incomplete’ and ‘misleading’, denied that there was any ‘genocidal intent’, and maintained that the situation in the Rakhine could be tackled domestically (Japan Times, 2019c). She similarly rejected calls for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the crisis in the Rakhine, arguing that Myanmar was not a party to the Rome Statute (Japan Times, 2018b). The ICJ announced an interim ruling stating that the allegations of genocide brought forward by Gambia against Myanmar were plausible and that Myanmar should take ‘all measures within its power’ to ensure that genocide did not occur, that all evidence related to the allegations would be preserved, and that it would report regularly to the court (Patel and Mandal, 2020). Evidence presented at the ICJ combined with numerous NGO and UN reports on the Rohingya crisis demonstrated that crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military were part of a systematic policy of ethnic cleansing rather than isolated atrocities (Simpson, 2020). In September 2020, a video surfaced in which two Tatmadaw soldiers confessed to participating in crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Rohingya community (Beech et al, 2020). Described by Matthew Smith, chief executive officer at Fortify Rights, as ‘a monumental moment for Rohingya and the people of Myanmar in their ongoing struggle for justice’, the testimony of the two soldiers was the first evidence from the Myanmar side that crimes against humanity had not only been committed, but ordered as part of a systematic campaign of violence (Beech et al, 2020). From the outbreak of violence in October 2016, the international community became increasingly more vociferous in their condemnation of the Myanmar military’s offensives in Rakhine and the failure of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government to adequately respond as evidence of human rights abuses came to light. By contrast, ASEAN’s response to the Rakhine crisis was subdued, in keeping with the organization’s emphasis on non-​intervention and respect for sovereignty. Key ASEAN figures, such as former Secretary General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, were critical of the situation in Rakhine, and argued for a rethink of ASEAN’s non-​interference policy (Dōden, 2018: 73). Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak was similarly critical of the Myanmar government, breaking with ASEAN’s non-​interference policy, though this was widely perceived as an attempt to deflect domestic critiques and cover up two financial scandals (Takeda, 2017: 22–​4). In early November 2016, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights pressed the Myanmar government to investigate alleged crimes perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against Rakhine civilians and allow international aid workers and journalists 133

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access to Rakhine (Japan Times, 2016c). By the end of 2016, ASEAN foreign ministers held an informal meeting in Yangon urging the Myanmar government to find long-​term solutions to the crisis in the Rakhine. None of these efforts could be described as a committed approach to ending the crisis in the Rakhine and ASEAN was widely criticized for its low-​key response (Chachavalpongpun, 2017b; Thakur, 2017). At the same time, ASEAN kept diplomatic channels with the Myanmar government open to enable bilateral aid to reach affected people and areas (Spandler, 2020). As noted in Chapter 3, ASEAN’s quiet dialogue had in the past scored notable successes with the Myanmar regime, notably in ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. Indeed, the international community’s condemnation of the Myanmar government and military arguably had little impact on developments in Rakhine state and did not resolve the ongoing refugee situation in Bangladesh. By maintaining dialogue with the Myanmar government, prominent figures, including Ramesh Thakur, a former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, hoped that ASEAN could play a key role in the repatriation of refugees and access for humanitarian organizations to affected areas (Thakur, 2017). As the crisis wore on, ASEAN’s quiet diplomatic approach demonstrated that it would achieve little by mediating with the Myanmar government to resolve the refugee situation or bring those responsible for crimes against humanity to justice. In these respects, ASEAN’s approach would mirror Japan’s response to the Rakhine crisis.

Japan’s response to the Rakhine crisis, 2016–​20 As the international community ratcheted up pressure on Myanmar over the situation in Rakhine state, so the Japanese government sought to act as a ‘bridge’ between the two. On the one hand, Japanese officials engaged in quiet diplomacy to encourage the Myanmar government to respond to the concerns of the international community that the perpetrators of crimes against humanity be brought to account. On the other hand, the Japanese government relayed to the international community that the best way to address the situation in Rakhine would be to put their faith in Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. This required focusing on economic connectivity and development in the belief that this would lead to peace and further entrench democratization, as well as trusting that Aung San Suu Kyi would deliver a ‘credible and transparent’ judicial process and enable the return of refugees to Myanmar. At the same time, the Japanese government externalized the refugee problem, providing financial support for refugees through the UN, but rejecting any acceptance of Rohingya refugees to Japan. From the eruption of violence in 2016, to the November 2020 Myanmar general elections, Japan’s approach failed to contribute to the resolution of the 134

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situation in Rakhine in any meaningful way. By remaining a steadfast ally to the Myanmar government, Japan assisted Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration in casting aside the international community’s criticisms and maintaining that the situation in Rakhine was being addressed.

Connectivity and peace through development The Japanese government’s emphasis on achieving peace in Rakhine state through economic connectivity and development was clear when, less than a month after the outbreak of violence in Rakhine state, Myanmar’s State Councillor, Aung San Suu Kyi, embarked on a five-​day visit to Tokyo from 1–​5 November 2016. It would be her first visit to Japan since her NLD party won the 2015 elections by a landslide. Though Aung San Suu Kyi had opposed Japan’s engagement of the Myanmar junta, democratization and her newly won political power shifted her focus to economic development in order to resolve the country’s ethnic conflicts and further entrench democratization (Yoshida, 2016a). During her visit, Aung San Suu Kyi appealed to Japanese investors, stating: [Myanmar is] made up of many ethnic people. … There is still armed conflict between various armed groups in our country. We must have peace in order that our development may be stable and sustainable. … In order to have peace, we have to make sure that development is equitable. … We want all ethnic people to feel that they have equal chance to progress in our country. (Yoshida, 2016d; see also MOFA, 2016a) Aung San Suu Kyi’s stance that the path to prosperity, democratization and peace was through development, echoed the Japanese government’s vision for Myanmar, making Japan a valuable partner. Aung San Suu Kyi’s meetings with Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio emphasized aid, development and investment as the solution to the situation in Rakhine. The Japanese government agreed and Aung San Suu Kyi secured 800 billion yen in aid and investment until 2021 (Yoshida, 2016c). There was no focus at this point on the reaction of the Tatmadaw to the attacks on the border posts. As with all subsequent references to the situation in Rakhine state, Japanese officials and politicians never mentioned the Rohingya as a group. The Abe administration’s commitment to Myanmar’s development was particularly noteworthy considering that Japanese business interest in Myanmar was beginning to wane (Yoshida, 2016a). The Japanese government’s emphasis on connectivity and development to resolve the situation in Rakhine did not waver as the crisis persisted over the following years. 135

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From 21 to 23 September 2017, nearly a month after ARSA’s attacks on 25 August 2017, Horii Iwao, Parliamentary Vice-​Minister for Foreign Affairs, met with Myanmar government officials to discuss the situation in Rakhine state (MOFA, 2017b). Horii relayed Japan’s position in a series of meetings with Commander-​in chief of the Defence Services, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Mr Kyaw Tint Swe, Union Minister for the Office of State Counsellor and Dr Win Myat Aye, Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement and Chairman of the Committee on Implementing Recommendations on Rakhine State. Horii’s visit set the stage for subsequent Japanese exchanges with the Myanmar government. On the subject of the Rakhine, Japanese officials would offer vocal support and financial assistance, while quietly raising human rights concerns. In each of these meetings, the Japanese government pushed its broader aims of economic development in Myanmar and regional connectivity, particularly with the East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors that connected to the Thilawa and Dawei SEZs. As Abe Shinzō iterated in his meeting with Htin Kyaw, the President of Myanmar, on 14 December 2017, economic connectivity and development were not only the key to peace in Myanmar, but would strengthen the FOIP strategy (MOFA, 2017e). The meetings between Myanmar and Japanese officials generally concluded with the former reassuring the latter that everything possible was being done to address human rights issues in Rakhine state. Despite the fact that the same human rights concerns surfaced in each meeting, the Japanese government doubled down on its support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s response to the situation in Rakhine state and never alluded to using negative conditionality, such as withholding aid or sanctions, as a stick to compel the Myanmar government to act. While the Japanese government emphasized the violence perpetrated by ARSA, it consistently played down the retaliatory campaign of the Tatmadaw. As the crisis in the Rakhine dragged on, so Japanese policy makers continued to concur with their Myanmar counterparts that the solution to Rakhine’s problems could be solved through economic development, in spite of the violence being embedded in an identity conflict with deep historical roots. For example, in an article published in the Global New Light of Myanmar on 13 January 2018, Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō played down the crisis in Rakhine and emphasized the centrality of public and private cooperation and investment in Myanmar’s democratization and nation-​building processes (Kōno, 2018a). Specifically, Kōno stressed regional economic integration and connectivity as the key to realizing the FOIP strategy, as encapsulated in the Thilawa SEZ, and committed to the urban development of the Yangon region as part of the ‘Japan–​Myanmar Cooperation Program’ established in 2016 (Kōno, 2018a). In early October 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi again visited Tokyo and met with Prime Minister Abe, who continued to voice his support for her government 136

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and democratization in Myanmar, promising further infrastructure aid in Rakhine state (MOFA, 2018h). For an issue that had supposedly become a ‘high priority’, the situation in Rakhine state was relegated to the bottom of the agenda, with economic ties, aid and development heading the bill. In part, Abe’s emphasis on economic engagement sought to counter China’s influence in Myanmar that had increased due to international pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi’s government over the situation in Rakhine state and a resulting drop in foreign direct investment (Fink, 2019: 182). Faced with declining economic influence in Rakhine state, the Japanese government decided to act. In February 2019, JICA and JETRO teamed up with the Myanmar government to hold the Rakhine State Investment Fair. The fair attracted some 350 foreign investors at Ngapali beach, a tourist resort in southern Rakhine state with an enticing offer of a seven-​year tax break (Fone Ying Kyu, 2019; Kasai, 2019a; Lewis and Aung, 2019). Tanaka Kazufumi, JETRO’s managing director in Yangon, signalled that approximately 50 Japanese officials, researchers and investors would be attending the fair and that JETRO would provide advice on human rights issues (Lewis and Aung, 2019). Beyond investment, the fair aimed to end the conflict through development and transform Rakhine’s international image. Htoo Min Thein, secretary of Rakhine’s investment committee, noted that though ‘the Rakhine issue has tarnished the country’s image … the fair will change the international view of Myanmar … [with the aim of ensuring] the long-​ lasting peace, stability and progress in the state through investment’ (Lewis and Aung, 2019). Rakhine state Chief Minister U Nyi Pu added that only the northern areas of Maungtaw, Buthidaung and Yathedaung were experiencing instability and that, ‘if you invest in developing the entire Rakhine state, then those small areas will eventually become more stable and follow the trend to development’ (Fone Ying Kyu, 2019). Such views were fully endorsed by Japanese diplomats, including Maruyama Ichirō, Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar, who maintained that the investment fair would help bring economic development that would mitigate the ongoing conflicts (Kasai, 2019a). On 7 February 2019, Maruyama stated that he was ‘seeking ways for Japanese investors to invest in Rakhine’, including channelling ODA to improve infrastructure in Rakhine state (Nan Lwin, 2019). Maruyama distinguished between those countries that had wrongly critiqued Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration for the situation in Rakhine and countries like Japan that were promoting ‘Myanmar’s economic development, lasting peace and … a peaceful transition’ (Nan Lwin, 2019). Maruyama added that ‘if there is economic development, I believe that there will be no conflict [in Rakhine]’ (Nan Lwin, 2019). In late May 2019, Maruyama stated that Japan ‘cannot agree to the international community applying pressure or taking action against Myanmar concerning the Rakhine issue’, 137

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adding that doing so would only make matters ‘more complicated’ (Kasai, 2019a). Arguing that sanctions against Myanmar would be ‘utter nonsense’, ambassador Maruyama noted Japan’s intention to act as a ‘bridge’ between Myanmar and the international community and help the latter ‘understand the [Myanmar] government’s voice’ (Utsumi and Walker, 2019). Maruyama’s conception of ‘bridging’ did not imply facilitating mediation between Myanmar and the international community. Instead, while supporting the Myanmar government, Maruyama critiqued the international community’s response in a patronizing attempt to convince the world that Japan’s quiet diplomacy and economic engagement were the correct approach to resolving the situation in Rakhine. That quiet diplomacy and economic engagement were not an effective response to the situation in Rakhine could be seen in the numerous critiques the fair attracted. Laetitia van den Assum, a former Dutch diplomat and member of the Annan-​led Commission on Rakhine state, noted her surprise that the Rakhine investment fair was going ahead, ‘even though large chunks of central Rakhine are now off limits to prying eyes’ (Lewis and Aung, 2019). Van den Assum stated that though the Annan Commission welcomed initiatives to promote development in Rakhine, investment had to work in tandem with efforts to ensure security and human rights, and questioned whether companies ‘want to operate under a regime that strictly enforces ethnic segregation?’ (Lewis and Aung, 2019). Even Myanmar’s own embassy in Washington, DC acknowledged that investors should be aware of human rights issues and that in the case of Rakhine state the UN’s Independent International Fact-​Finding Mission had detailed instances of land grabs from refugees fleeing the violence (Myanmar Embassy, 2019). Nagakoshi Yuzuki, a specialist in international human rights law, alleged that the Japanese government’s primary objective in Myanmar was to ‘better Japanese companies’ competitiveness in the Myanmar market’, citing Japan’s support for the February 2019 Rakhine investment fair as evidence that Japan was looking to benefit from land grabs perpetrated against the Rohingya (Nagakoshi, 2020). Her stance was echoed by Muranishi Michimi, a professor in the Department of Law at Gakushuin University, who noted that the Japan’s economic interests were key to understanding why the Japanese government backed Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration’s understanding of the situation in Rakhine state (Muranushi, 2019). It is important to recognize that it was not just Japan that was urging more investment in Myanmar and Rakhine state. Seven international chambers of commerce from Europe, US and Australia penned a joint letter in early February 2019, pushing their governments to support greater investment in Myanmar (Irrawaddy, 2019b). Peter Beynon, chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar, encouraged firms to set aside Myanmar’s ‘negative press’ and invest in Rakhine state, as creating 138

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employment might draw refugees back to the state, adding that ‘engagement is always better than isolation’ (Lewis and Aung, 2019). At the same time, JICA and JETRO’s involvement in organizing the Rakhine Investment Fair sets Japan apart from its peers in the international community. There are also cases that highlight the cosy relations between Japanese firms and the Myanmar military. A report issued by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019 detailed the extensive economic activities between foreign businesses and the Myanmar military, finding that these economic activities funded acts of genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Tatmadaw (UNHRC, 2019). In particular, the report singled out MEHL and MEC as the two primary corporations run for and by the Tatmadaw’s highest officers, including Commander-​in-​Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the Deputy Commander-​in-​Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win (UNHRC, 2019). The report also detailed the activities of a number of companies, including Japanese firms, that had joint ventures or collaborated with MEC and MEHL (Nakanishi, 2021d: 221). The report, together with an Amnesty International investigation, uncovered that the Japanese beer company, Kirin Holdings, had financially supported the Myanmar military and operated a joint venture with MEHL, and that Japan Tobacco had engaged in a joint venture with the military run MEC (Kasai, 2019b; UNHCR, 2019). In addition to Kirin and Japan Tobacco, JPMD Ltd, a Japanese construction firm, entered into a joint venture with MEC’s Amber International Ltd., Japan Credit Bureau worked with MEHL’s Myawaddy Bank, and Nisshin Transportation Co. Ltd managed MEHL’s Ngwe Pinlae Industrial Zone (UNHCR, 2019: 96, 100, 102). The UNHCR urged the international community to impose targeted sanctions and refrain from cooperating with MEC and MEHL until the Tatmadaw’s economic interests were brought under civilian control (Kasai, 2019b; UNHCR, 2019). Despite this, JETRO held investment seminars on 24 July and 27 August 2019 to promote Japanese business investments in Myanmar (Kasai, 2019b). Kasai Teppei, a programme officer for HRW in Tokyo, argued that ‘Japan’s private sector should begin implementing the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. … That would mean doing no business with Myanmar companies that have ties to the military’ (Kasai, 2019b). Though Kirin agreed to review their human rights policy (Kirin, 2018), Nagakoshi (2020) notes that neither Kirin nor the Japanese government made any effort to recompense victims who may have been harmed or identify who was responsible for the donations. According to Nagakoshi (2020), Japan’s actions may have violated customary international legal requirements to prevent genocide and hold perpetrators to account. In terms of addressing issues of justice and reconciliation, however, the Japanese government would consistently side with Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration and, by extension, the Burmese military. 139

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Justice and reconciliation –​Japan as a ‘bridge’ International pressure to address issues of justice and reconciliation in Rakhine state began to mount on Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration from the outset of hostilities in October 2016. During Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Tokyo in early November 2016, John Kirby, US Department of State spokesman, raised US concerns about a lack of transparency about the crisis in the Rakhine and ASEAN parliamentarians called on Myanmar to conduct a ‘thorough and impartial investigation into reports of abuses by security forces in Rakhine state’ (Yoshida, 2016b; 2016c). Myanmar’s presidential spokesman Zaw Htay responded to such criticism by urging UN officials to come to Rakhine ‘and see the actual situation in that region’ (Japan Times, 2016b), in spite of the fact that the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights was continually denied entry to the Rakhine throughout the crisis. Aung San Suu Kyi in turn asserted that there was no evidence linking the military to crimes against humanity. She stated, ‘we have been very careful not to blame anybody in particular unless we have complete evidence as to who has been responsible for what’, insisting that any investigations and judicial proceedings would be conducted by the Burmese authorities (Yoshida, 2016d). Aung San Suu Kyi’s position was hindered both by the nature of Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’ that enabled the military’s continued oversight of political, security and economic affairs (Japan Times, 2016b; Nemoto, 2016b; Nakanishi, 2017), as well as widespread anti-​Islamic rhetoric in Myanmar, making it politically difficult for Aung San Suu Kyi to speak out on behalf of the Rohingya (Nemoto, 2017: 196, 201–​2). Nevertheless, at no point in the crisis did she attempt to wield her substantial moral authority in defence of the Rohingya people. Japanese officials deflected questions about the situation in Rakhine state over the course of Aung San Suu Kyi’s November 2016 visit. Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga Yoshihide, remained tight-​lipped about the extent to which the Japanese government would press Aung San Suu Kyi on the situation in Rakhine, stating only that ‘[we] will exchange opinions about wide-​ranging areas’ and that the Japanese government would continue to keep an eye on developments in the Rakhine (Yoshida, 2016b). In their meeting, Abe and Aung San Suu Kyi did not discuss the alleged human rights abuses committed by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya in Rakhine state (Yoshida, 2016c). Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio was more forthright, praising Aung San Suu Kyi’s efforts ‘for the peace and stability of Rakhine state’ (Japan Times, 2016e). In his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, Kishida stated that ‘no violence would be tolerated’, but he appeared to reference only the attacks on the border guard posts rather than the Tatmadaw’s retaliation (MOFA, 2016b). Throughout her trip, Aung San Suu Kyi pledged to ‘resolv[e]‌the Rakhine State problem in accordance with the rule of law’ (MOFA, 2016a). 140

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Kishida’s acclaim for Aung San Suu Kyi’s efforts was surprising considering developments that were unfolding in the Rakhine during her visit to Tokyo. The Myanmar police force had begun arming and training Buddhist militias to help them combat the threat posed by Rohingya militant groups, a move that Min Aung, a minister in the Rakhine state parliament and member of the NLD party, maintained was necessary as ‘the minority ethnic people need to protect themselves from hostile neighbours’ (Japan Times, 2016d). By contrast, Mathew Smith, founder of Fortify Rights, described the arming of Buddhist militias in the Rakhine as ‘a recipe for atrocity crimes’ (Japan Times, 2016d), a prediction that would be confirmed by UN reports of crimes against humanity in the Rakhine. Following Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Tokyo in November 2016, Japanese officials and pundits remained supportive of both her and her government’s attempts to address issues of justice and reconciliation in Rakhine state. They were notably positive regarding Aung San Suu Kyi’s call for a national advisory commission on the Rakhine crisis, which was chaired by former UN Secretary General Dr Kofi Annan and published a report on 24 August 2017 that touched on sensitive issues, including the 1982 Citizenship Law (MOFA, 2017a). This was in spite of the fact that, in April, Aung San Suu Kyi had rejected claims that the Myanmar military had ethnically cleansed the Rohingya from Rakhine and rebuffed a UN inquiry into the crisis (Chachavalpongpun, 2017b). When ARSA attacked Myanmar border guards following the publication of the Annan Commission’s report, MOFA was quick to post a strong condemnation, indicating that once security was restored, people in Rakhine would be better protected and humanitarian operations could resume (MOFA, 2017a). It was noteworthy that MOFA made no mention of the Tatmadaw’s widely criticized response to ARSA’s 25 August attacks and did not openly urge restraint on the part of the Tatmadaw. Instead, MOFA emphasized the restoration of security, presumably by the Tatmadaw, disregarding widely held concerns about likely violations of human rights. Concerns that the Tatmadaw had perpetrated crimes against humanity were confirmed when reports surfaced of the Inn Din massacre of Rohingya men on 2 September 2017. Key evidence on the massacre had been obtained by two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who were themselves arrested on 12 December by Myanmar’s police force. On 3 September 2018, the two journalists were sentenced to seven years under Myanmar’s Official Secrets Act, which dates back to British colonial times, despite the witness testimony of a police officer who stated that the journalists had been entrapped (Japan Times, 2018a; 2018e). The sentence was supported by Aung San Suu Kyi (Fink, 2019: 177). This case demonstrated how press freedom was being curtailed in ‘democratizing’ Myanmar, and the extent to which the NLD government was prepared to back the Tatmadaw operations 141

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in Rakhine. The UN, EU, US, Canada and Australia were among the organizations and states that demanded the immediate release of the two journalists (Japan Times, 2018e). Both Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide raised the issue of the two Reuters reporters in early January 2018 (Japan Times, 2018a). Speaking about the case, Suga stated that both freedom of speech and human rights were fundamental to the functioning of any democracy, but the Japanese government chose not comment further (Japan Times, 2018e). The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan did speak out, however, stating that ‘the arrest of any journalist for doing their job is an attack on press freedom and human rights’, and that ‘the FCCJ requests that the Myanmar authorities urgently review the sentencing decision’ (Japan Times, 2018e). The two Reuters journalists would ultimately be released, but were incarcerated for longer than the four officers and three soldiers who had been sentenced for perpetrating the Inn Din massacre (Japan Times, 2019b). In light of such a discrepancy in sentencing, the Myanmar military’s claims that it could resolve human rights issues internally could hardly be trusted. While raising alarm about freedom of expression and human rights being curtailed by Myanmar’s Official Secrets Act, similar concerns were levelled at the Abe administration’s State Secrets Law. The State Secrets Law mirrored the restrictive policies of Japan’s imperial government of the 1930s, notably the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which criminalized the activities of any person or group perceived as challenging the state (Hoffman, 2017). According to Kobe University criminal law scholar Uchida Hirofumi, the State Secrets Law would discourage Japanese citizens and reporters from protesting against or criticizing government policies for fear of being arrested (Hoffman, 2017). Combined with government pressure on Japan’s media, the State Secrecy Law indicated that, like Myanmar, Japan’s democracy had become ‘disciplined’ (Repeta, 2014; Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017; Kingston, 2020). Despite concerns about both crimes against humanity and media repression in Myanmar, there was still widespread support in Japan for Myanmar’s democratization process and for Aung San Suu Kyi. Writing in the Japan Times on 18 September, former UN official Hitoki Den argued that ‘Suu Kyi’s role and leadership remains critical for Myanmar’s democratization process, as no one knows the value of democracy better than her, having spent nearly 15 years under house arrest during the military rule’ (Den, 2017). His comments would be repeated by Japanese officials as justification for Japan’s quiet diplomacy and economic engagement of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. Hitoki’s comments were mirrored by others in the region who maintained that the international community needed to adopt a more nuanced understanding of the crisis in the Rakhine. Former Singaporean ambassador to Laos, Kang Siew Kheng (2017), argued that continued 142

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international criticism only silenced those opposed to the mistreatment of the Rohingya within Myanmar while emboldening ultra-​nationalist rhetoric, endangered precarious economic growth and failed to recognize the progress that Aung San Suu Kyi had made. ASEAN, Kang (2017) maintained, needed to step up and engage in quiet diplomacy to resolve the situation. At the same time, more critical voices began to emerge in Japan over the course of 2017, as the Rakhine crisis wore on. On 19 September 2017, a day after Hitoki Den published his opinion piece in the Japan Times, Aung San Suu Kyi indicated that the Rohingya were the ‘troublemakers’ in the Rakhine (Chachavalpongpun, 2017b). One month later, she referenced the Rohingya crisis to argue that illegal immigration was a cause of terrorism that undermined economic development (Japan Times, 2017c). Pavin Chachavalpongpun, associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, pointed to the billions in aid Japan had gifted to Myanmar, together with the debt cancellation and infrastructure projects, and argued that Japan should use this economic influence to put more pressure on Myanmar. He stated: Japan can start now, by talking openly about the Rohingya and what it expects from the Myanmar government. Financial aid from Japan can be employed to control certain behaviour. This would serve as a strong political signal from Tokyo –​a signal of rejecting the legitimacy of Myanmar in its dealings with the Rohingya issue. (Chachavalpongpun, 2017b) Bangladeshi officials were similarly critical of Japan’s cosy economic relationship with Myanmar. Touring Rohingya refugee camps near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, Hishida Yūsuke quoted a top Bangladeshi government minister who stated, ‘international pressure is required for Myanmar to live up to its agreements, but Japan is providing Myanmar with economic aid. We’d like to see economic sanctions at least’ (Hishida, 2018: 177). While 122 countries voted to condemn the human rights situation in Rakhine state in a UN General Assembly vote in December 2017, Japan abstained (Hishida, 2018: 177). In early 2018, an editorial in the Asahi Shimbun (2018) implored the Japanese government to do more to assist in the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, arguing that the Japanese government had a duty to act in support of human rights. Rather than use its economic influence to try to steer the Myanmar government towards a more compelling response to the situation in the Rakhine, the Japanese government continued to show its support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s efforts. During his 21–​23 September 2017 visit to Myanmar, Horii Iwao, Parliamentary Vice-​Minister for Foreign Affairs, backed Myanmar’s efforts at nation-​building, condemned ARSA’s attacks on 143

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Myanmar border forces, and offered emergency assistance up to US$1 million (MOFA, 2017b). A day later, Japan offered US$4 million in emergency grant aid to international agencies to tackle the humanitarian emergency in Rakhine state and to those who fled the violence to camps in southern Bangladesh (MOFA, 2017c). MOFA referred to the ARSA attacks against Myanmar border forces and ‘subsequent destabilization of the situation in the northern part of Rakhine State’ when explaining the offer of grant aid (MOFA, 2017c). Horii also raised concerns about alleged human rights violations and the displacement of 400,000 people since the violence broke out (MOFA, 2017b). Horii added that security must be restored in Rakhine in accordance with the rule of law and human rights and that Japan backed Myanmar in the implementation of the recommendations issued by the Advisory Commission (MOFA, 2017b). The Myanmar officials Horii spoke to all reassured him that everything possible was being done to uphold human rights, restore peace and security, and repatriate and resettle those displaced by the violence (MOFA, 2017b). From September 2017 until the November 2020 elections, Japanese officials maintained the same stance as Horii. Officials would repeatedly stress the need for the Myanmar government to address the situation in Rakhine in line with human rights norms, while pushing for ever greater economic cooperation and investment, particularly in Yangon and Southern Myanmar, and praising the Myanmar government and military’s efforts at nation-​building, democratization and ‘investigations’ into alleged human rights abuses. Meetings between Japanese officials and their Myanmar counterparts included State Minister Nakane Kazuyuki’s visit to Naypyidaw on 20 November 2017 (MOFA, 2017d), Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s meeting with Htin Kyaw, the president of Myanmar, on 14 December 2017 (MOFA, 2017e), Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō’s visit to Myanmar in January 2018 (Dōden, 2018: 75; MOFA, 2018b), and Parliamentary Vice-​Minister for Foreign Affairs Horii’s visit to Bangladesh and Myanmar in late March 2018 (MOFA, 2018c). In these meetings, Japanese officials would indicate progress on the refugee issue, such as Abe hailing the Myanmar-​Bangladesh agreement on the repatriation of refugees signed on 23 November (MOFA, 2017e), but no refugees would be repatriated. They would repeatedly ask for the UN and international media to be granted greater access to Rakhine state, but would be denied. They would raise the case of the two Reuters journalists, who would remain imprisoned. They would emphasize the need to conduct a ‘credible and transparent investigation with international advice’ into alleged human rights abuses, including on the Inn Din incident (MOFA, 2018b), but no compelling investigation would take place. They would urge that the Myanmar government implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission, particularly those designed to tackle the root causes of the conflict, but would be ignored. On 13 January 2018, in an 144

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article published in the Global New Light of Myanmar, Foreign Minister Kōno reiterated the same points raised by Horii, Nakane and Abe, while emphasizing Japan’s support for the Myanmar government and the realization of peace through development and connectivity (Kōno, 2018a). Nakane, Kōno and Horii also met with General Min Aung Hlaing, to discuss Japan’s efforts regarding military cooperation and exchange with the Tatmadaw, specifically the programmes designed to facilitate the operations of the armed forces in a democracy. That such exchanges and programmes would continue to take place as crimes against humanity were being perpetrated in Rakhine state by the Tatmadaw indicates that Japanese officials blindly put their faith in quiet diplomacy to influence the Burmese military, even as all evidence pointed to the contrary. Such exchanges continued even after Min Aung Hlaing was condemned by the international community for his role in perpetrating crimes against humanity in Rakhine state. That little to no progress was ever made on the situation in Rakhine, did not appear to deter the efforts of a Japanese government focused on regional economic integration that would benefit Japanese firms and production networks. Japan’s support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s government would not waiver, despite the ongoing crisis in Rakhine, continued human rights abuses, and the lack of any tangible evidence that the Myanmar government and military were addressing issues related to justice and reconciliation. The Japanese government, eager to highlight any progress on the situation in Rakhine state, readily welcomed the Myanmar government’s announcement on 31 May 2018, that an ICoE would be established and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had been signed with the UN (MOFA, 2018d). The ICoE, which included Ōshima Kenzō, former Japanese ambassador to the UN, would investigate human rights abuses perpetrated in Rakhine state since 25 August 2017, and the MOU facilitated the work of UN agencies operating in Rakhine state regarding the repatriation and resettlement of people displaced by the conflict (MOFA, 2018d). The Japanese government embraced both these developments, adding that Japan expected ‘the Independent Commission of Enquiry [to] implement a credible and transparent investigation and that appropriate measures [would] be taken as a result of the investigation’ (MOFA, 2018d) in accordance with the ‘expectation of the international community’ (MOFA, 2018e). Considering that the international community had been calling for UN access to Rakhine state and an independent, rather than Myanmar-​led, investigation into human rights abuses since the outset of the crisis, the ICoE and MOU were notable both for their limitations and the amount of time it had taken to realize them. Japanese officials urged the Myanmar government to take concrete actions in line with the MOU and ICoE, but eagerly accepted the empty promises from their Myanmar counterparts. Foreign Minister Kōno’s visit to Myanmar in early August 2018 was indicative of the 145

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Japanese government’s approach. In his meetings with President Win Myint and State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar on 6 August 2018, Foreign Minister Kōno stressed that in the short term, the ICoE should be allowed to conduct a transparent investigation, that cooperation with UN agencies should improve, and that the IDP camps around Sittwe should be closed and displaced people with citizenship should begin to be repatriated and resettled (MOFA, 2018f). In a separate meeting, Min Aung Hlaing informed Kōno that ‘Myanmar would firmly promote its nation building in accordance with the will of the people’ (MOFA, 2018f). Kōno’s approach highlighted a number of problematic aspects. First, Kōno’s reference to the resettlement of displaced persons with citizenship was concerning as the Rohingya had mostly not claimed the second-​class citizenship on offer to them. Second, resettlement did not mean returning people to their original or rebuilt homes and villages, but to resettlement camps, funded in part by the Japanese government, that were critiqued both for being built on top of eradicated Rohingya villages and for resembling internment camps (Head, 2019). Third, Kōno’s reference to IDP camps around Sittwe meant that the camps in Bangladesh were not perceived as a priority, as if the Japanese government had become resigned to the fact that the Rohingya camps around Cox’s Bazar would be permanent. Fourth, Kōno’s acceptance of Min Aung Hlaing’s comment about nation-​building in accordance with the will of the people was alarming. It is questionable as to whether the Tatmadaw has ever acted in accordance with the will of the people, and for the Tatmadaw, nation-​building had always excluded the Rohingya and marginalized other minorities. Overall, Kōno’s visit to Myanmar in early August 2018 indicated that the Japanese government hoped for quick results that could indicate to a critical international community that some progress was being made on the ground. It was already clear that the ICoE would be extremely limited in its remit and would lack credibility in the eyes of the international community. On 29 August 2018, spokesman to the President, Zaw Htay, explained that the ICoE would ‘respond to false allegations made by the U.N. agencies and other international communities [sic]’ (Kasai, 2018). The chair of the ICoE, Rosario Manalo, stated that ‘I assure you there will be no blaming of anybody, no finger-​pointing of anybody’ (Kasai, 2018), confirming that the Commission lacked the authority to hold those responsible of human rights violations to account. In view of the deficiencies of Myanmar’s ICoE, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution on 27 September 2018 to establish an independent international commission to analyse human rights abuses perpetrated by all sides in the Rakhine (Kasai, 2018; OHCHR, 2018). The Japanese government abstained from voting on the resolution, showing continued faith in Myanmar’s ICoE (Kasai, 2018; OHCHR, 2018).

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Foreign Minister Kōno published an article in the Washington Post on 25 September, explaining why the Japanese government continued to support Myanmar’s efforts to tackle the situation in Rakhine state (Kōno, 2018b). Kōno stated that ‘the Rakhine issue [had] become one of the highest priority issues in Japan’s foreign policy agenda’ and that any solution to the problem had to be led by Bangladesh and Myanmar (Kōno, 2018b). Kōno quoted John F. Kennedy’s book Profiles in Courage, stating that ‘true democracy … puts its faith in the people … faith that the people will not condemn those whose devotion to principle leads them to unpopular courses, but will reward courage, respect honour, and ultimately recognize right’ (Kōno, 2018b). Kōno asserted that Aung San Suu Kyi was faced with a difficult choice between her moral convictions and public opinion which was opposed to the repatriation and resettlement of those displaced by the conflict (Kōno, 2018b). Instead of criticizing Aung San Suu Kyi and ‘short-​ circuit[ing] Myanmar’s evolution toward democracy’, Kōno (2018b) urged the international community to support her efforts, notably the MOU signed with the UN and the ICoE. Kōno’s article served only to disguise how little effort Aung San Suu Kyi made to defend those displaced by the conflict. It is hard to identify a moment in the crisis where she demonstrated a devotion to humanitarian concerns or had chosen an ‘unpopular course’. If anything, her actions throughout the Rakhine crisis indicated a calculated appreciation of the political benefits of publicly playing up a ‘Muslim threat’. In subsequent meetings with their Myanmar counterparts, Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Kōno reiterated that Japan would continue to support ‘Myanmar’s democratic nation-​building’ both diplomatically and through economic assistance. They stressed that: the ICoE’s work must be both credible and transparent; the resettlement of people displaced by the violence must be accelerated; cooperation with UN agencies should be improved; the issue of the two imprisoned Reuters journalists be resolved; and the IDP camps be closed (MOFA, 2018g; 2018h; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019e). That no tangible progress was made on any of these issues was apparent when General Min Aung Hlaing was invited to Tokyo by Japan’s Ministry of Defence in early October 2019. According to the UN, Min Aung Hlaing bore primary responsibility for human rights abuses in Rakhine state. He was also on the US sanctions list and had had his Twitter account suspended for hate speech (Nagakoshi, 2020). In a meeting with the newly appointed Foreign Minister Motegi on 9 October, Min Aung Hlaing reassured Motegi that Myanmar was ready to welcome those displaced persons who could verify their ‘record of residence in Myanmar’, and that the military were ‘fully cooperating with the investigation by the ICoE’ (MOFA, 2019d). Min Aung Hlaing’s comments indicate that even if the environment in Rakhine were conducive to the repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh, 147

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they would need to provide evidence in the form of official documents that they had resided in Rakhine state prior to the violence; evidence that the military would ‘strictly inspect’ (Sometaya, 2019). Considering the swiftness of the Tatmadaw’s operations in August and September 2017, it was unlikely that these refugees would have had the time to collect such documents as they fled for their lives, if they were in possession of such documents at all. Nagakoshi Yuzuki, an international law scholar, asserted that the Japanese government’s invitation to General Min Aung Hlaing to visit Japan in October 2019 demonstrated the extent to which Japan’s economic ties with Myanmar clouded any attempt to resolve the situation in Rakhine, noting that Abe’s hope that Min Aung Hlaing would work with the ICoE in good faith was ‘preposterous’ (Nagakoshi, 2020). Rather than welcome individuals implicated in human rights abuse to Tokyo, Nagakoshi implored the Japanese government to impose targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s military leadership and companies associated with the Myanmar military in line with the US and EU (Nagakoshi, 2020). Describing Japan’s approach as ‘cold-​blooded’, Kasai (2019a), noted Japan’s indifference to the crisis and continued abstentions from UN resolutions. Kasai (2019a) concluded that if Japan is to live up to its designation as ‘leader of the liberal order in Asia’, then it must advance a human rights-​based foreign policy and back UN resolutions that are critical of the Myanmar government and that demand access to the UN special rapporteur. On 21 January 2020, the Myanmar government finally published the Executive Summary of ICoE’s Final Report into alleged human rights abuses in Rakhine state. The report detailed a series of crimes including mass killings, destruction of property and looting, but was widely critiqued for failing to acknowledge acts of genocide, rape in war, and wider crimes against humanity, and for not holding the military leadership accountable for any of the crimes (HRW, 2020). Aung San Suu Kyi’s government noted its intention to investigate and prosecute all criminal acts mentioned in the report, in a move that MOFA described as ‘significant progress’ (MOFA, 2020a). The Japanese government would continue to back Myanmar’s own internal efforts to resolve the situation in Rakhine state, despite the fact that the Myanmar government did not respond to the ICoE final report over the course of 2020 (MOFA, 2020a; 2020b; 2020c). In addition, despite encouraging Myanmar to implement the provisional measures issued by the ICJ, the Japanese government fully supported Myanmar when the Gambia presented its case regarding acts of genocide in Rakhine state to the ICJ. Referring to the ICJ trial in an interview to Myanmar media on 26 December 2019, Maruyama Ichirō, Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar, stated that, ‘I don’t think that the Myanmar military committed genocide nor did they have this intention. … I don’t think that the Myanmar government or the military wanted to kill all “Bengalis” 148

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of the Islamic faith’ (Sometaya, 2020). By referring to the Rohingya as ‘Bengalis’, Murayama rejected the Rohingya’s historical claims to citizenship in Myanmar and drew the ire of Rohingya groups in Japan who protested in front of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Sometaya, 2020). Nagakoshi noted how Maruyama had previously referred to the Rohingya as ‘Bengalis’, in a show of support to Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration that the Rohingya were illegal immigrants (Nagakoshi, 2020). According to Nagakoshi (2020), this ‘reflected a longstanding Japanese policy to turn a blind eye to the Myanmar government’s apartheid policy and genocide’.

Refugees and responsibility The notion of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ in the midst of the Rohingya crisis cannot be understood without a consideration of the Japanese government’s restrictive refugee policy, which Chapter 5 outlined, and its unwillingness to accept Rohingya refugees. On 20 November 2017, addressing a news conference at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi referred to the Rohingya crisis as ‘the most serious refugee crisis since the ‘90s’ (Kikuchi, 2017b). Despite Grandi welcoming Japanese aid to Myanmar to help with the humanitarian disaster as a result of the Rohingya exodus, Grandi was critical of Japan’s policy regarding refugees, which saw Japan accept just 28 refugees from a record 10,901 applicants in 2016 (Kikuchi, 2017b). In a meeting with Justice Minister Kamikawa Yoko, Grandi was informed that Japan had no intention of accepting more refugees (Kikuchi, 2017b). Few Rohingya have made it to Japan and applied for refugee status. Those who have highlight the precarious legal existence individuals face when confronted by Japan’s strict refugee policy. Japanese policy makers argue that Japan’s immigration laws allow refugee applicants to receive temporary permission to remain in Japan, ensuring that their legal status is secure (MOFA, 2005). In fact, the approach taken by Japan’s Immigration Bureau leaves refugees in limbo, including hundreds of Rohingya people who are currently seeking refugee status in Japan. In 2010, out of 160 Rohingya living in Tatebayashi city in Gunma Prefecture, for example, only 11 had been granted refugee status, 40 had special residency permission and the remainder had temporary status (Tokaji, 2010). Without refugee status, these people cannot work or receive health insurance (Tokaji, 2010); a system that Myanmar expert, Professor Nemoto Kei at Sophia University in Tokyo, has labelled ‘very, very inhumane’ (Munroe, 2016). The Japanese government perceives the plight of Rohingya refugees quite differently. Kimizuka Hiroshi of Japan’s Immigration Bureau explained that ‘the Rohingya cannot be forcibly repatriated as there is no home country for them to go to, so they remain in Japan with a temporary status’, adding 149

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‘they cannot be given refugee status because they want to work. For these people there are both migratory and refugee reasons that we must take into consideration on a case-​by-​case basis’ (Itō, 2014). By asserting that Rohingya are simultaneously opportunistic economic migrants and refugees, Kimizuka provides a rationale for delaying and denying the Rohingya legal status. According to Watanabe Shogo of the Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees, such tactics are not uncommon, as Japan’s Immigration Bureau intentionally throws up legal hurdles for Rohingya who apply for refugee status (Shibata, 2015). Japan’s strict immigration policy therefore leaves the majority of Rohingya, and other refugee applicants, living on the margins of society, excluded from health care, unable to legally work and without a political voice. They are reduced to a bare life.

Conclusion As the international community gradually ratcheted up pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration for failing to tackle the Rohingya crisis, so it became increasingly difficult for Japanese policy makers to justify the efficacy of their quiet diplomacy. It was clear that the Japanese government’s efforts to influence Aung San Suu Kyi’s government or the Tatmadaw and act as a bridge between Myanmar and the international community had failed on all counts. One might argue that such government rhetoric is just a smokescreen to achieve Japan’s national interests or that Japan’s approach was pragmatic in view of the broader geopolitical concerns centring on China’s rise and its BRI. Such an understanding simplifies how Japan’s foreign policy rhetoric is designed to reinforce an image of Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’. This image is both internally reproduced by Japanese policy makers who perceive their regional role as bridging between the international community and developing democratizing states in Asia, as well as externally by foreign powers, experts, commentators and the media. Throughout the Rohingya crisis, Japan’s bridging role was encapsulated in a belief that economic development would further democratization and engender peace. Though the focus of the Japanese government has been on connectivity through infrastructure in southern Myanmar that would build economic corridors across the Mekong, even in the case of Rakhine state, economic development was emphasized as the pathway out of the crisis. From this perspective, issues of justice and reconciliation were best left to the Myanmar government and military which apparently could be relied upon to conduct a ‘credible and transparent’ investigation into alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated in Rakhine state by setting up the ICoE. For Japanese policy makers, criticism of Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration, or worse still, sanctions and intervention in Myanmar’s internal affairs, would only undermine Myanmar’s progress towards democratization and prosperity. 150

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The Rohingya crisis exposed this discourse of Japan as a bridge and as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ as hollow and replete with contradictions. First, while economic development may play a role in addressing the situation in Rakhine state, identity conflicts are at the heart of the crisis. Truly addressing the crisis in the Rakhine requires a critical examination of history; a history in which Japan is embroiled, but which Japanese foreign policy makers side-​line by refusing to consider how the Second World War shaped the conflicts in Rakhine state. Second, the link between democratization and reconciliation is a tenuous one. It is hard to foresee how reconciliation can be achieved with the military maintaining such a central role within Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’. As Chapter 4 highlighted, democratization also enabled an anti-​ Muslim discourse to proliferate as freedom of speech laws protected Burmese nationalists, including monks belonging to the Ma Ba Tha organization. Electoral success within Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’ depends on accepting if not adopting an anti-​Muslim stance. Those brave enough to speak out on behalf of Muslims are expediently purged, such as the two Reuters journalists who were jailed under colonial-​era security laws. As the Abe administration passed its State Secrecy Law and suppressed media freedoms, so Japan’s claim to be ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ can only be understood in terms of a ‘disciplined’ form of democracy. Third, considering Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’ and the Rohingya crisis, Japanese policy makers’ insistence that Myanmar was central to the FOIP highlighted the inherently vacuous rhetoric behind this strategy. How could Myanmar be labelled free as the international community alleged crimes against humanity? Fourth, Japanese policy makers’ attempts to bridge between Myanmar and the international community were inconsistent. Japanese officials would urge their Myanmar counterparts to address the situation in Rakhine state in line with the concerns of the international community, while simultaneously criticizing the international community’s condemnation of the Myanmar government and military and doubling down on their belief that economic development would engender peace. Similarly, Japanese officials attempted to persuade the international community that Myanmar’s ICoE was ‘credible and transparent’, even as they watered down the meaning of ‘credible and transparent’ in light of inaction on the part of the Myanmar government and military. Finally, Japanese policy makers perceived their engagement approach as not only effective, but responsible. Yet, when it came to taking responsibility for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Japan did little beyond engaging in chequebook diplomacy to externalize the problem. Throughout the crisis, the Japanese government abandoned the Rohingya to suffer the worst violations of their human security. At the back of the minds of Japanese policy makers lay the hope that Myanmar’s November 2020 elections would finally justify their faith in Myanmar’s democracy. A free and fair election would demonstrate to the 151

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international community that Myanmar, in spite of the ongoing situation in Rakhine state, was heading in the right direction. The NLD’s landslide victory in the November 2020 elections signalled that political power would continue to flow into the hands of politicians and away from the military. On 1 February 2021, the military, under the command of Min Aung Hlaing, initiated a coup and took back control.

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Conclusion: The Chimera of Progress Introduction On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw, under the command of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup. A little over ten years since Myanmar began its transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, the country was once again under authoritarian military control. Though the actions of Myanmar’s military and government in Rakhine state had already returned the country to pariah status within the international community, as Chapter 6 demonstrated, the coup cemented this status, reversing the progress towards building a democracy that had been made. The hopes of the people of Myanmar for a potentially brighter and more prosperous future were dashed. For Japan, the coup came as a shock. Since 2011, Japanese policy makers had actively sought to open Myanmar’s economy through development aid and investment. Myanmar’s geographical position made it the end point for the East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors that would traverse the Mekong region, linking the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. This economic connectivity would improve access for Japanese production networks to regional and global markets. From an ideological standpoint, Japan’s ability to guide Myanmar’s successful democratization and rehabilitation into the international community would bolster its status as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ and counter the notion that Japan was in decline. A Myanmar experiencing its own ‘Meiji revolution’ would provide rhetorical support for a reinvigorated Japan; a Japan that was truly ‘back’. Myanmar’s closer alignment with Japan could counter Chinese ambitions in a scramble for ‘Asia’s last frontier’, helping to fulfil Japanese regional visions of a FOIP. This concluding chapter opens by outlining how the coup unfolded and the international community’s response. The chapter then details Japan’s response to the coup, which was initially uncertain, as policy makers sought to assess how developments would unfold. On the one hand, the Japanese government joined with the international community in condemning the coup and urging a return to democracy. New developmental assistance 153

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projects were paused and Japanese businesses temporarily halted operations in Myanmar. On the other hand, the Japanese government remained eager to engage Myanmar’s newly imposed military government, hoping that either Min Aung Hlaing’s regime would set out a clear pathway to new democratic elections as promised or that with time and changing circumstances the coup would gradually be forgotten. The Japanese government’s objective was a quick resumption of ‘business as usual’, once again revealing the hollowness of Japan’s ‘value diplomacy’ (Kudō, 2021: 7). Following on from this assessment of Japan’s response to the coup, the conclusion re-​examines Japan’s foreign policy discourse towards Myanmar in spatial, temporal and ethical terms. In so doing, the contradictions of Japan’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’ are laid bare. The conclusion closes by considering how Japan’s foreign policy towards Myanmar might be constructed differently.

February 1, 2021, coup d’état On the 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw, under the command of General Min Aung Hlaing, initiated a coup, removing Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratically elected NLD government from power and declaring a one-​year state of emergency. Troops roamed the streets enforcing a dusk to dawn curfew. Min Aung Hlaing justified the coup by referring to electoral malpractice, notably inaccurate voting lists that favoured the NLD, and nullified the results of the November 2020 elections. Though international observers did note some irregularities in the November 2020 elections, the consensus was that the elections were free and fair and represented the will of the people (Bünte, 2021). Sasakawa Yōhei, Japan’s ‘special envoy’ to Myanmar, concurred that there were no ‘serious irregularities’ in Myanmar’s November 2020 elections, though he was noticeably silent on this point following the 1 February coup (Seekins, 2021: 8). Contrary to Min Aung Hlaing’s claims, commentators signalled the military’s concerns about the NLD undermining their power and potentially revising the constitution as the primary cause of the coup (Bünte, 2021; Nakanishi, 2021a; Nemoto, 2021; Seekins, 2021). The initial reaction among Myanmar’s population was a mixture of anger and incredulity, but those who had witnessed the military’s suppression of pro-​democracy protests in 1988 and 2007 were not naive and well understood how the Tatmadaw operated. At first, public demonstrations were confined to the nightly banging of pots and singing of protest songs, but by 5 February a civil disobedience movement led by medical personnel, teachers and students began to emerge (BBC, 2021b). The extent of the protests and civil disobedience movement caught the military by surprise, particularly the passion with which Myanmar’s young ‘Generation Z’, who had grown up in an era of democratization and freedom, would oppose the junta’s rule (Nakanishi, 2021a: 101–​2; 2021b: 112–​13; 2021c: 146–​7). 154

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After four days of protests, reports surfaced in the international media of the Myanmar police opening fire with rubber bullets on street protesters, though medical staff in Yangon signalled that the police were using live ammunition (BBC, 2021d), foreshadowing how the junta’s crackdown would unfold. In mid-​March, ousted parliamentarians led by the former speaker of parliament, Mahn Win Khaing Than, established the Committee for Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and called for a federal system to be established in the country (Japan Times, 2021c). By 12 April, approximately 600 people had lost their lives protesting against the coup (Japan Times, 2021f). Political prisoners who were detained by the Myanmar military and police for protesting against the coup were being brutalized (Kikuchi, 2021b: 152). To anyone who understood Myanmar’s recent history, it was clear that the Tatmadaw was following their long-​established modus operandi of repression and had no intention of engaging in dialogue with the protestors or Myanmar’s democratically elected government. In response to the Tatmadaw’s violent suppression of the protests, by mid-​May the opposition had established the NUG and a People’s Defence Force that began linking up with Myanmar’s myriad armed ethnic groups (Kikuchi, 2021b: 153; Nakanishi, 2021b: 114–​15). The NUG committed itself to developing a federal system, and in early June, to abolish the 1982 Citizenship Law and the issuing of National Verification Cards (Simpson, 2021). On 17 September, the NUG signed on to ICC prosecutions of military and government officials involved in crimes against humanity in Myanmar, including against the Rohingya people, as far back as 2002 (Simpson, 2021). Such commitments to international justice and human rights norms helped to cement the NUG’s alliance with the armed ethnic groups, but also undercut any possibility of negotiating with the Tatmadaw. The NUG’s opposition to the junta’s rule and the conflict between the military and People’s Defence Force and armed ethnic groups endured, signalling a protracted crisis with increasing humanitarian consequences (Nakanishi, 2021c: 148–​9). The G7 quickly condemned the actions of the Tatmadaw and General Min Aung Hlaing, calling for the release of all political prisoners and the restoration of democracy (MOFA, 2021a). On 5 February, the UNSC echoed the G7 statement, though under pressure from China, the UNSC did not condemn the coup outright (BBC, 2021a). Nonetheless, by allowing the UNSC statement to go ahead and abstaining from a UN Human Rights Council resolution denouncing the coup, the Chinese government indicated its displeasure towards the Tatmadaw’s actions (Han, 2021; Seekins, 2021: 11). The Chinese government were particularly concerned about the impact of the coup on economic relations and had long tired of dealing with Myanmar’s ‘incompetent and corrupt’ military (Han, 2021; Nakanishi, 2021a: 99; Seekins, 2021: 10). 155

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ASEAN leaders also expressed their opposition to the coup, but sought to mediate with Myanmar’s military leadership rather than isolate them. On 2 March 2021, in an online meeting, ASEAN leaders urged the junta to exercise restraint when dealing with the ongoing protests (Japan Times, 2021b). If anything, the online meeting between the Myanmar junta and ASEAN leaders only served to legitimate the junta itself, by treating it as Myanmar’s official representative body, and to highlight divisions among ASEAN states (Dunst, 2021: 37–​8; Japan Times, 2021b). Civil society organizations critiqued ASEAN’s failure to defend human rights and democracy in the case of the Myanmar coup, leading to a legitimacy crisis for the regional grouping (Davies, 2021). This legitimacy crisis was further exacerbated when ASEAN convened an emergency summit on 24 April to discuss the Myanmar coup and drew up a Five Point Consensus to tackle the crisis. The emergency summit agreed to: 1. cease all violence; 2. engage in constructive dialogue; 3. designate a special ASEAN envoy to mediate in the crisis; 4. provide humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre; 5. dispatch the special envoy and delegation to Myanmar. (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021) The purpose of the summit was largely symbolic, intending to demonstrate ASEAN’s central role in mediating the crisis to the international community (Khant and Camroux, 2021). By the end of May, ASEAN’s special envoy to mediate in the Myanmar crisis had still not been appointed (Khant and Camroux, 2021) and the five-​point consensus appeared to collapse. Overall, ASEAN’s response was weak, divided and ineffective.

The Japanese government’s initial response and prevarication over sanctions The Japanese government’s initial response to Myanmar’s February 2021 coup was vague, indecisive and bound by the hope that the crisis would swiftly pass so that Japanese businesses could resume their operations (Seekins, 2021: 11). The Japanese government’s position largely rested on whether or not it would impose sanctions and on its ability to act as a ‘bridge’ (kakehashi) and mediate in the crisis. The Japanese government’s prevarication over sanctions was critiqued in light of the swift actions of the other G7 members and Japan’s failure to mediate effectively in the aftermath of the coup demonstrated the hollowness of its ‘bridging’ rhetoric and commitment to ‘universal values’ (Kasai, 2021; Sasamori, 2021a). 156

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On 3 February, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide joined with his G7 counterparts in demanding the release of those detained in the coup, the return of democracy, and the end of the state of emergency (Japan Times, 2021a). Nonetheless, the Japanese government evaded questions about whether or not Japan would impose sanctions, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu saying that Japan would ‘consider its response’ in light of unfolding developments and Deputy Defence Minister Nakayama Yasuhide stating that ‘if we do not approach this well, Myanmar could grow further away from politically free democratic nations and join the league of China’ (Japan Times, 2021a; Morris, 2021). Japan would be the only member of the G7 not to enact sanctions against the Myanmar junta in the wake of the coup (Sugiyama, 2021), in effect abandoning a key negotiation card (Nemoto, 2021: 58–​9). Following the coup, the Suga administration was pressured by Japanese civil society organizations, such as Human Rights Now, and a bipartisan group of Japanese parliamentarians to adopt a stronger stance, including enacting sanctions (Morris, 2021; Sugiyama, 2021). Yamao Shiori, a Democratic Party for the People politician and member of the bipartisan group, stated: [E]‌nacting the legislation (to mobilize sanctions) would have a profound impact by sending a message that Japan now has a tool to punish those involved in human rights abuse. … I believe it would be better for us to have that tool on our own early, instead of waiting until foreign governments tell us to do so. (Sugiyama, 2021) Myanmar expert Nemoto Kei, a professor at Sophia University in Tokyo, also asserted that the Japanese government would need to impose sanctions on Myanmar’s junta if it hoped to have any influence in mediating in the crisis (Nemoto, 2021: 58–​9). Already, crowds of around 5,000 people, mostly Myanmar citizens residing in Japan, were gathering outside the MOFA in downtown Tokyo to protest against the coup and urge Japan to employ its ‘political, diplomatic, and economic power’ to restore democracy to Myanmar (Japan Times, 2021a). On the streets and in parliament, Japanese citizens and representatives pushed the Suga administration to do more. Mekong Watch was among the numerous NGOs calling for Japan to enact sanctions and prohibit business relations with the Myanmar junta in the wake of the coup. On 1 February, Mekong Watch (2021a) released a statement calling on the Japanese government to live up to the principles of Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter, which stipulates that Japanese assistance is based on ‘universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law’. On 4 March, Mekong Watch, in conjunction with 31 other Japanese NGOs, petitioned the Japanese government to suspend aid to Myanmar, investigate businesses with ties to the 157

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Myanmar military and publish the findings, compel Japanese companies to end relationships with MEC and MEHL and provide them with the necessary financial support to enable them to do so (Mekong Watch, 2021b). Speaking on 1 April, Kiguchi Yuka, the Executive Director of Mekong Watch, stated: [W]‌e don’t want Japan’s ‘unique role’ to be one of supplying funds for projects that potentially finance the bullets that kill civilians in Myanmar. It has been nearly a month since we demanded the investigation. In that month, the death toll has risen every day, but the Japanese government has not made its position on aid clear. The Foreign Minister has said there are no new aid projects, but we are very concerned about the existing projects. (Mekong Watch, 2021c) Four months after the coup, Mekong Watch (2021d) was still calling on the Japanese government to cease assistance to and business relationships with the Myanmar junta. Such repeated calls for action fell on deaf ears. Within Japan’s MOFA it was unclear what, beyond condemning the coup, the Japanese government was prepared to do to defend Myanmar’s fledgling democracy. On 20 February, Maruyama Ichirō, Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar, spoke to protesters assembled outside Japan’s embassy in Yangon, assuring them that ‘the Japanese government [would] not ignore the voices of the people of Myanmar’ (Morris, 2021; Sasamori, 2021a). Following Maruyama’s address to protesters, on 8 March, the official website of the Embassy of Japan declared that Maruyama had met with Wunna Maung Lwin, the ‘foreign minister’ of the new regime, signalling that the Japanese government officially recognized the junta (Sasamori, 2021a). The mistake was compounded when Japan’s Foreign Minister, Motegi Toshimitsu, also referred to Wunna Maung Lwin as ‘Myanmar’s new Foreign Minister’, requiring him to quickly retract his statement (Kasai, 2021). Though diplomatic missteps, these statements gave the impression of a Japanese government that was not listening to the people of Myanmar and that was eager to legitimize the junta in order to return to business as usual in Myanmar. After a month of ‘monitoring the situation’ and with the death toll rising in Myanmar, the Japanese government’s position remained ambiguous. The Asahi Shimbun published an article stating that Japan would halt new ODA projects in Myanmar but would not resort to sanctions (Morris, 2021). Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu immediately challenged the Asahi article, stressing that sanctions remained an option (Morris, 2021). By contrast, numerous Japanese diplomatic figures and pundits connected with Japan’s conservative political elite continued to oppose sanctions, echoing Deputy Defence Minister Nakayama Yasuhide’s concerns about China benefiting from the coup at Japan’s expense (Kato, 2021). For example, Sasakawa Yohei, 158

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Japan’s Special Envoy for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, stated that sanctions would ‘not only increase the clout of China … but could also result in the loss of a key security base in the Indo-​Pacific region’, though it was not clear what ‘security base’ he was referring to (Kasai, 2021; Morris, 2021). Takizawa Saburo, a former UN diplomat who worked on refugee issues in Myanmar, agreed, though was more circumspect, speculating that ‘if the [Myanmar] military refrains from attacking civilians, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will not invoke sanctions as it plays into the hands of China’ (Morris, 2021). As the death toll continued to mount in Myanmar, Takizawa’s hypothesis was proved wrong. No matter how repressive the Tatmadaw became, the Japanese government refrained from enacting sanctions and merely voiced its concerns about the situation. For example, on 28 March, Foreign Minister Motegi stated that ‘shooting against civilians, the inhumane treatment of detainees, and the strict crackdown on media activities by the Myanmar military and police are actions that contradict what the Myanmar military officially announced about the importance of democracy. The use of live ammunition against peaceful protests can never be tolerated’ (Japan Times, 2021e). Judging by the Japanese government’s decision not to enact sanctions as the violence escalated, it was clear that the Suga administration was actually prepared to tolerate a good deal more repression. Akimoto Satohiro, chairman and president of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, was another prominent figure who voiced his concern that sanctions would only benefit China. On 19 April, Akimoto penned an opinion piece in the Japan Times in which he chided the US government for instinctively ‘slap[ing] on sanctions … based on its foreign policy DNA’ and for pressuring Japan to do the same (Akimoto, 2021). He went on to assert that: [S]‌anctions could worsen the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar further by pushing one of the poorest countries in the region into economic collapse … [and] might indirectly lead to increased casualties among protestors by unintentionally prolonging the demonstrations … [Myanmar’s generation Z] may be grossly overestimating their capabilities vis-​à-​vis the military. If sanctions leave the protestors feeling a false sense of solidarity with the West over regime change, they may pay dearly for that mistaken notion. (Akimoto, 2021) In addition to reifying economic prosperity over human rights and democracy, Akimoto’s statement revealed three problematic aspects. First, while sanctions imposed on Myanmar in the past have certainly impacted Myanmar’s poor, it is disingenuous to blame sanctions for Myanmar’s economic woes in the aftermath of the coup. The Tatmadaw ousted a 159

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democratically elected government by force. Whether or not Myanmar’s generals anticipated the subsequent economic fallout, they alone remain responsible for this decision. It was also ultimately up to Myanmar’s generals to decide whether or not to engage in dialogue with the opposition in order to restore democratic governance to the country. Second, Myanmar’s citizens were exercising their agency by protesting the coup and this deserves to be acknowledged and respected. Their actions were not dictated by the scale of the sanctions imposed on Myanmar by the international community. Third, Myanmar’s ‘Generation Z’ were fully aware of the extent of the Tatmadaw’s power and the risks they were taking in opposing the coup. Akimoto’s attempt to single out Myanmar’s ‘Generation Z’ as naive was duplicitous. The anti-​coup protest and civil disobedience movements were networked and comprise members from all sections of Myanmar’s society. They knew the Tatmadaw’s history of repression. It was clear that by mid-​May 2021, the ongoing crackdown against the protestors and continued instability across the country irritated the Japanese government. Foreign Minister Motegi indicated that the Japanese government was contemplating a freeze on all ODA projects to Myanmar if conditions in the country remained volatile (Tobita, 2021). Motegi stated: [W]‌e don’t want to do that at all [cut off all ODA], but we have to state firmly that it will be difficult to continue under these circumstances. … As a country that supported Myanmar’s democratization in various ways, and as a friend, we must represent the international community and convey that clearly. (Tobita, 2021) Nonetheless, the Suga administration ignored a survey conducted by Japanese business groups in Myanmar that revealed that a vast majority of Japanese business people and employees at Japanese firms supported sanctions, backed Myanmar’s civil disobedience movement, and favoured the suspension of all Japan’s ODA projects (Japan Times, 2021h). Ambassador Maruyama’s claim in mid-​February that the Japanese government would listen to the people of Myanmar was not reflected in Japan’s foreign policy.

The Japanese government’s failure to mediate with the junta As the coup unfolded, the Japanese government together with prominent Japanese conservatives emphasized that by not imposing sanctions, Japan, through multiple diplomatic and personal channels and based on its special relationship with Myanmar, could act as a bridge and mediate between the junta and the international community (Akimoto, 2021; Kato, 2021). According to Tsuruoka Michito, an associate professor at Keio University, 160

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Japan’s MOFA also resisted enacting sanctions on Myanmar, believing that diplomacy would be more effective in resolving the crisis (Sugiyama, 2021). Nakanishi Yoshihiro, an associate professor at Kyoto University and Southeast Asia expert, also perceived a mediation role for the Japanese government, noting that Myanmar’s generals would not want to risk losing Japanese ODA or investments (Nakanishi, 2021b: 117–​18). Accordingly, the Japanese government stood by its policy of positive linkage, presenting ODA as an inducement for change, rather than threaten the Myanmar junta with the stick of sanctions. Throughout Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, the Japanese government had maintained connections to both the military and the NLD (Kato, 2021). At a press conference on 2 April, while raising concerns about the ongoing situation, Foreign Minister Motegi emphasized the importance of quiet diplomacy, stating simply that ‘what is essential is invisible to the eye’ (MOFA, 2021b). Motegi proceeded to cite Aesop’s fable about a competition between the sun and the wind to remove a person’s coat, implying that warming the relationship through dialogue would be more effective than trying to blow Myanmar into submission through sanctions (Kikuchi, 2021a: 36). The Japanese government’s efforts were well-​received in the US, where a senior White House official noted how Japan had been ‘very active … behind the scenes … encouraging ASEAN to engage proactively with … the junta’, but also in trying to contact opposition figures who had been detained (Sasamori, 2021b). A month later, Foreign Minister Motegi noted the international community’s appreciation of Japan’s diplomatic efforts, emphasizing that ‘we have a greater variety of channels in Myanmar, including with the military, than Europe and the U.S … Group of Seven foreign ministers understand that very well’ (Tobita, 2021). On 30 April four former senior Japanese diplomats at the UN, special representatives to the UN Secretary General Akashi Yasushi, Hasegawa Sukehiro, Yamamoto Tadamichi, and former Japanese ambassador to the UN Ōshima Kenzō, gave a talk in Tokyo emphasizing the importance of Japan’s mediating role in the crisis. The talk recognized the junta as a legitimate ‘stakeholder’ in the process of negotiations, with former Japanese ambassador to the UN, Ōshima, stating that ‘if the regime was ousted, Myanmar would be overrun by insurgents and collapse’ (Brasor, 2021). The four former UN diplomats were joined by a further two former Japanese ambassadors to the UN, Shinyo Takahiro and Hoshino Toshiya, in penning an opinion piece entitled ‘Japan Must Use Its Special Relationship with Myanmar to Facilitate Peace’ in the Japan Times on 6 May 2021, which reiterated the centrality of Japanese mediation in the crisis. The opinion piece noted that the sanctions that had been imposed since the coup had been ineffective and that diplomacy was the best way forward. It is worth quoting their statement at length: 161

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Now is the time for Tokyo to reinvigorate its diplomatic initiatives and take advantage of its unique position … [Japan’s goals] should be to persuade Myanmar’s military leaders to exercise maximum self-​restraint and stop the violence; to prevent opposition groups from engaging in armed conflict; to convince all parties and actors in the conflict to act calmly; to avoid more casualties; and to prevent the country from falling into a civil war. … The heavy civilian casualties caused by the conflict, particularly children, are undeniably part of a serious human rights and humanitarian tragedy, which must be stopped immediately. … It should be recognized that the Myanmar crisis stems from deep-​ seated historical, political and other complex issues. … Japan has vast experience in assisting the development, stability, and prosperity of countries in Southeast Asia, including Myanmar. … Japan is one of the few countries that many in Myanmar hold in trust, given that it has no special agenda, hidden or otherwise. (Akashi et al, 2021) There are a number of points in this statement that raise concerns. First, the notion that Japan could ‘persuade Myanmar’s military leaders to exercise maximum self-​restraint’ jars with the reality of over 750 dead protesters by early May. Should Japan’s supposedly ‘special’ relationship with Myanmar not also encompass an understanding of how the Tatmadaw brutally suppressed previous anti-​junta protests in 1988 and 2007? Second, it is not clear how the Tatmadaw would ‘exercise maximum self-​restraint’, while simultaneously ‘prevent[ing] opposition groups from engaging in armed conflict’, considering the Tatmadaw’s past. The Tatmadaw’s modus operandi when dealing with opposition groups has seldom been to exercise restraint, but to respond with arms. Third, the authors do not consider the Tatmadaw’s perpetration of crimes against humanity, but rather perceive the coup as a ‘tragedy … caused by conflict … which must be stopped immediately’. All questions regarding responsibility and agency are removed by the author’s use of the passive tense. While there were complex issues that led to the coup, it was still a coup perpetrated by the military in the wake of an election that was internationally recognized as legitimate. Fourth, the emphasis on Japan’s ‘vast experience’ in developmental assistance echoes the ‘thought leader’ discourse that continually resurfaces in Japan’s relationship with Myanmar, but also serves to reify economic development over human rights concerns. Finally, the notion that Japan is able to mediate as it has ‘no special agenda’ fails to consider the extent of Japanese aid and investment into Myanmar since its transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’. As Myanmar became mired in instability following the coup, so numerous business ties between Japanese firms and political elites with the military-​run MEC and MEHL conglomerates in Myanmar continued to emerge. Before turning to these significant economic ties, it is worth examining a further call for 162

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Japan’s mediation, this time by Watanabe Yusuke, secretary general of the JMA and son of Watanabe Hideo, chairman of the JMA. In an article published on 26 May 2021, Watanabe Yusuke asserted that ‘Japan must position itself as a bridge between the Tatmadaw and the United States and other democratic countries rather than blindly aligning itself with the Western policy of regime change’ (Watanabe, 2021). Watanabe underscored the close relationship he had built with General Min Aung Hlaing as a central aspect of Japan’s bridging policy, arguing that the Western approach demonstrated an ‘irresponsible disregard for Myanmar’s history’ and amounted to an ‘incorrigible strategic folly’ (Watanabe, 2021). Elaborating on the failure of Western states to understand Myanmar’s past, Watanabe blamed British imperialism for creating ethnic divisions in Myanmar, which he juxtaposed with Japan’s enduring special relationship dating back to Colonel Suzuki Keiji’s role in founding the BIA during the Second World War (Watanabe, 2021). While the era of British imperialism did indeed have a lasting impact on Myanmar, not least in terms of ongoing ethnic tensions, Japanese imperialism also exacerbated these tensions during the Second World War. The BIA ultimately helped oust the Japanese Imperial Army, as the tide turned against Japan in the Second World War, having realized that Burma would be little more than a puppet state under Japanese imperial rule. Watanabe chose to distort this history through his reference to Suzuki and the 30 Burmese Comrades who founded the BIA and fought for Burma’s independence. Watanabe’s claim that Western powers were ‘irresponsibly disregarding Myanmar’s history’ can therefore be turned on himself. The notion of Japan as a ‘bridge’ requires a singular understanding of the past that allows no critique. It is not a history that seeks to engage alternative accounts and perspectives, but a dogmatic dead end. To justify Japan’s unique bridging approach, Watanabe stressed China’s geopolitical threat to the region, referring to Myanmar as Japan’s ‘indispensable anchor in the Indo-​Pacific’ and blamed ‘Myanmar’s democratization efforts for the last decade’ for allowing ‘China to dramatically expand its clout, ironically thanks to its budding relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi’ (Watanabe, 2021). Elaborating Japan’s ‘bridging’ approach, Watanabe maintained that: Japan’s cordial relationship with Myanmar’s government under the ongoing national emergency is not at all antithetical to the Western desire for the country’s democratic future. Rather, they complement each other … Japan remains committed to Myanmar’s economic development as the foundation for the country’s ultimate transformation into a stable democracy … General Min Aung Hlaing[’s] … controversial action on February 1 reflected the provisions of the 163

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2008 constitution, leading to his declaration of the current state of national emergency. (Watanabe, 2021) Here again, the China threat is enunciated to rationalize Japan’s strategy, despite the fact that the Japanese government’s emphasis on regional connectivity worked in conjunction with China’s BRI as Chapter 5 discussed. In doing so, Watanabe twists the concept of democracy inside out to argue for the constitutionality of a coup which, according to him, would inevitably result in democratization, providing Japan supported Myanmar’s generals with economic aid and investment. It was instead the ‘wrong kind’ of democracy that Aung San Suu Kyi advanced to benefit China that needed to be weeded out by the coup. Quite apart from how these discursive contortions serve to justify Watanabe’s own economic interests in Myanmar, the notion that Japan could ‘bridge’ between the Tatmadaw and Western states based on an interpretation of Myanmar’s democratization process and the coup that wholly accepts the legitimacy of the Tatmadaw’s actions is far-​fetched to say the least. Watanabe Hideo echoed his son’s comments, stating in interviews published in the Asahi Shimbun that General Min Aung Hlaing ‘did what he should in accordance with the law’ and that he believed that that Myanmar’s generals would quickly restore democracy, adding that he ‘didn’t want people to say that the military was suppressing and killing its own citizens’ (Irrawaddy, 2021). Watanabe would go on to praise General Min Aung Hlaing, proclaiming that he had ‘grown fantastically as a human being’ and that the Japanese government should endorse his military government (Park and Slodkowski, 2021). In response, Kiguchi Yuka, the executive director of Mekong Watch, stated that Watanabe’s position opposed the Japanese Diet’s condemnation of the coup, stressing that ‘Japanese people reject Mr. Watanabe’s support for the Tatmadaw. Businesspeople who are not members of the Japan Myanmar Association have criticized his arrogant remarks. I strongly reject his comments’ (Irrawaddy, 2021). Watanabe Yusuke and his father persisted in waxing lyrical about their ties to the Myanmar junta. Within a week of the coup, Watanabe Hideo met with General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw, boasting that ‘there is no one who can go between like myself ’ (Irrawaddy, 2021). Despite his claim, it was clear that like the Japanese government, Watanabe had little influence over Myanmar’s military junta (Irrawaddy, 2021). At a press conference on 1 June 2021, Foreign Minister Motegi rejected claims that the Watanabes were an unofficial diplomatic channel to the junta, stating, ‘[Chairman Watanabe Hideo of the Japan Myanmar Association] has not been entrusted with anything. … I believe that Chairman Watanabe is visiting Myanmar at his own volition’ (MOFA, 2021c; see also Irrawaddy, 2021). Coming less than a week after Watanabe Yusuke’s article, Motegi’s attempt to distance the 164

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Japanese government from Watanabe Hideo demonstrated just how little faith the Japanese government had come to have in Watanabe’s ability to mediate on its behalf (Kudō, 2021: 6). The Japanese government’s mediation in Myanmar’s political crisis was mere hyperbole, but it did enable Japanese elites and businesses to preserve their economic interests.

Preserving Japan’s economic interests The coup put Myanmar’s economy, which was already suffering as a result of the ongoing COVID-​19 crisis, under further stress. According to the World Bank, Myanmar’s economy, which had expanded by an average of 6 per cent since 2010, would shrink by 10 per cent, impoverishing millions (Japan Times, 2021f). It was unclear what would become of Japanese investment in Myanmar which had amounted to US$768 million (or 14 per cent of total investment in Myanmar) between 2019 and 2020, making Japan the third largest investor in Myanmar after Singapore and Hong Kong, though Japanese subsidiaries also made up a proportion of the investment from Singapore (Sugiura and Iwamoto 2021; N. Suzuki, 2021). Were the Japanese government to impose sanctions, it would become difficult for Japanese businesses to operate in Myanmar (Sugiura and Iwamoto, 2021). It was also not certain that Japanese firms would be able to recoup losses incurred as a result of the coup were they to abandon the Myanmar market. For example, the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corp. for Transport and Urban Development, a major investment group that had channelled US$163.3 million into Myanmar and was 90 per cent government owned, was not insured against losses incurred as a result of political developments in Myanmar (Japan Times, 2021g). By refusing to enact sanctions on the regime, Asian states, including Japan, were focused on maintaining their economic relations with Myanmar. Reflecting this commitment by Asian states, Aung Naing Oo, Union Minister for Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, said, ‘given the situation, we expect traditional investors will continue to do business here. Their respective governments do not tell their companies not to invest or do business in Myanmar, so we expect investors from these countries will continue to come here’ (Japan Times, 2021d). Despite the reputational hazard of continuing to operate in Myanmar after the coup (Ando and Nussey, 2021), the extent to which Japanese companies had invested in Myanmar demonstrated a commitment that appeared to withstand international criticism. Though foreign investors exited Myanmar in droves following the escalation of the crisis in Rakhine from 2016, around 400 Japanese companies opted to continue to do business in Myanmar (Ando and Nussey, 2021). This tendency to see out Myanmar’s domestic crises appeared to continue following the coup. Numerous Japanese manufacturers suspended 165

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operations in the immediate aftermath of the coup, but looked to restart operations as soon as they determined it was safe enough to do so (Ando and Nussey, 2021). Japanese firms did exhibit a certain caution when it came to investment decisions over the longer term. Reflecting on the ongoing crackdown by the junta in early March, Tanaka Kazufumi, the director of JICA’s Yangon branch stated, ‘it is unlikely that we will see an increasing number of Japanese companies pulling out rapidly, but new investment decisions will be harder to make for the time being. … It depends how the political situation turns out’ (N. Suzuki, 2021). Japanese auto manufacturers, such as Toyota Motor and Suzuki Motor, initially intended to expand their plants at the Thilawa SEZ, though as the junta’s suppression of the protests intensified, further investments were put on hold (Sugiura and Iwamoto, 2021; N. Suzuki, 2021). Kirin, a major Japanese brewing company that had faced substantial criticism for its ties to the military-​ run conglomerate MEHL since the onset of the Rakhine crisis, initially maintained production, while keeping a close eye on developments (Ando and Nussey, 2021; Sugiura and Iwamoto, 2021). As the junta began its crackdown on pro-​democracy protesters, so the public relations fallout took its toll on Kirin and its executives determined to end its relationship with MEHL as a matter of ‘urgency’ (BBC, 2021c). By early May, however, Kirin had still not managed to extricate itself from its joint ventures with MEHL (Japan Times, 2021i; Kikuchi, 2021b: 159). Kirin was only one of several Japanese companies with close ties to the MEC and MEHL conglomerates run by Myanmar’s military. JBIC, Fujita Corporation, Tokyo Tatemono, Satake Corporation and Tasaki and Co. were among a number of Japanese businesses connected to either MEC or MEHL (Japan Times, 2021i). At the height of the Rakhine crisis, Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corp. for Transport and Urban Development, Fujita and Tokyo Tatemono, with financing from JBIC, Mizuho, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, began paying the Myanmar military US$1.84 million in rent annually on the Y-​Complex redevelopment project in Yangon (Japan Times, 2021i; Kikuchi, 2021b: 160). In May 2020, Justice for Myanmar stated that ‘the [Y-​Complex] deal has gone ahead with zero civilian financial oversight and despite a high probability that the project will finance the military’s crimes against humanity and war crimes in Myanmar’s ethnic regions’ (Myanmar Now, 2020). Yokogawa Bridge Corporation and Sumitomo Mitsui Construction Corporation both received support from JICA to work on the Bago River Bridge Construction Project with MEC (Japan Times, 2021i). An engineer working on the project commented that though, ‘[JICA] condemned the coup diplomatically … they have been working together with the junta’s MEC’, adding that a ‘MEC subsidiary is supplying steel for two thirds of the bridge’s construction and is profiting 166

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enormously from the project. … Continuing the relationship with the company while civil servants and workers across the country are on strike is tantamount to supporting the dictatorship’ (Myanmar Now, 2021). In 2016, Japan–​Myanmar Development Institution Inc., managed by Watanabe Hideo, also entered into a joint venture with a military-​run firm (Japan Times, 2021j). For critics, such links between the military-​owned MEC and MEHL and foreign firms facilitated human rights violations and Myanmar’s coup, as the military knew it had substantial business connections upon which it could rely in spite of Western sanctions (Japan Times, 2021j). These links between Japanese businesses and government organizations continued even after the Japanese government had signed on to a G7 commitment on 5 May 2021 to undertake due diligence in Japan’s business relations in Myanmar and after the US, UK, EU and Canada had targeted MEC and MEHL with sanctions (Kikuchi, 2021b: 154, 159). Japan’s financial links to Myanmar’s banking system also remained in the wake of the February 2021 coup. Two of the largest foreign banks operating in Myanmar were Mizuho and Sumitomo Mitsui of Japan, which together with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone corporation and JICA, continued to provide technical support to Myanmar’s Central Bank (Justice for Myanmar, 2021). When the military replaced the governor of Myanmar’s Central Bank the day after the coup, providing the junta with access to Myanmar’s US$6.7 billion in foreign reserves, concerns were raised that the country’s wealth would be siphoned off to Myanmar’s ruling generals (Justice for Myanmar, 2021). It was not just Japanese business links with Myanmar’s military that remained problematic in the aftermath of the coup, but also Japan’s military cooperation with the Tatmadaw. In late January 2021, mere days before the coup, Watanabe Hideo met with General Min Aung Hlaing to enhance relations between Japan’s SDF and the Tatmadaw (Kasai, 2021). According to Watanabe, Prime Minister Abe and Deputy Prime Minister Asō had directed him to build relations with the Tatmadaw since 2013 (Irrawaddy, 2021). Even following the coup, the SDF and Nippon Foundation continued their training programmes with the Tatmadaw, making Japan one of 13 governments to maintain military cooperation with Myanmar (Boyle, 2021). In doing so, Japan kept company with India, Thailand, Russia, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Ukraine, North Korea, Nepal, Pakistan and Belarus (Burma Campaign UK, 2021). Australia, the thirteenth member of this group, suspended its military programme with Myanmar on 7 March. Coming 35 days after the 1 February coup, the delay was described as ‘shameful’ in the Australian media (Boyle, 2021). On 10 August, a statement by HRW revealed that Japan had trained a Tatmadaw general implicated in crimes against humanity and urged the Japanese government to cease its links to the Tatmadaw (HRW, 2022). Japan’s continued business and security 167

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links with the Myanmar junta further highlighted the Japanese government’s weak claim to a ‘value-​based diplomacy’ as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’.

Area Studies and the discourse of Japan–​Myanmar relations The Japanese government’s response to the 1 February coup reiterated a number of discursive elements that the case study chapters highlighted. The notions of Japan as a ‘bridge’ and ‘thought leader’, of economic development as a necessary precursor to democratization, and a belief in ‘democracy as process’ in which positive linkage encourages political reform, were all evident in Japan’s relationship with Myanmar in the aftermath of the coup. Making sense of Japan’s response to the coup from an Area Studies perspective requires both situating this response within Japan’s broader relationship with Myanmar and examining Japan’s foreign policy discourse. Though Japan’s foreign policy towards Myanmar purports to be value-​ based and focused on securing humans, it has in many ways undermined the welfare of human beings and the environment. Japanese policy makers justify this foreign policy by articulating a discourse that is rife with contradictions. Thinking Japan’s foreign policy towards Myanmar differently requires accepting Cheah’s (2008) understanding of ‘universal’ values as evolving through human interaction (Cheah, 2008). This interaction must be inclusive and bottom-​up to comprehend the myriad ways in which human beings make sense of their world. Analysing Japan’s foreign policy discourse according to its spatial, temporal and ethical elements opens up alternative approaches for consideration. From the standpoint of spatiality, Japan’s state-​centric approach began with its acceptance of Myanmar’s political transition from 2008 as a genuine attempt to democratize, rather than understanding how this process was ‘disciplined’ from the outset. Myanmar had been designated as a ‘rogue’ state whose ruling military junta perpetrated innumerable human rights abuses on its citizens, resulting in sanctions and the country’s isolation. Only with Myanmar’s democratic transition could the country be rehabilitated into the liberal international order. This shift from ‘rogue’ state to accepted member of the liberal international order is too black and white, yet it guided the international community’s response to Myanmar from 2011 on, as Chapter 3 discussed. Myanmar’s military had carefully planned their country’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, gifting themselves control of key ministerial positions in the Cabinet, and 25 per cent of parliament seats in the 2008 constitution. These conditions allowed the military to retain a commanding role in national security affairs and gave them de facto veto power in the legislature, notably in the event that opposition parties would attempt to 168

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revise the constitution. The military also maintained their business interests that spanned core areas of the country’s economy. The international community, including Japan, eagerly accepted Myanmar’s democratic transition at face value, but the Japanese government’s approach differed from other members of the G7 in its emphasis on democracy as ‘process’, rather than ‘progress’. Other members of the G7 understood developments in Myanmar in terms of ‘democratization as progress’, isolating Myanmar through sanctions and, in the case of the Myanmar government’s incompetent response to Cyclone Nargis, even threatening intervention. From a temporal standpoint, the other G7 members perceived democracy as a teleological end point that would be achieved through commitments to specific, irreversible, democratic milestones, such as constitutional revision or permanently separating the military from politics. By contrast, Japan’s policy of ‘democratization as process’ perceived democracy to be conditioned by Myanmar’s unique characteristics and culture. Democratization would be achieved over the long term, with steps to advance democracy being welcomed and guidance offered when the democratization process faltered. Accordingly, the Japanese government sought to entice Myanmar to reform through positive linkage and democratization through dialogue. Any action by the Myanmar government that the Japanese government deemed to be positive, such as releasing political prisoners, was rewarded with aid. Conversely, when Myanmar’s democratization process stalled or was even reversed, the Japanese government was committed to maintaining dialogue to bring the democratization process back on track. Though maintaining dialogue may have been preferable to severing Myanmar from the liberal international order, Japan’s policy of ‘democratization as process’ rewarded too much for too little, failing to challenge the Tatmadaw’s continued control over key aspects of Myanmar’s politics, economics and security. Following Myanmar’s 1 February 2021 coup, Japan’s approach to Myanmar remains trapped by its ‘democracy as process’ approach that insists that against all odds the democratization process is ongoing. For the rest of the G7, the coup signalled the end of Myanmar’s democratization, leading to a return to sanctions and isolation. The Japanese government’s foreign policy towards Myanmar has also been state-​centric and top-​down, inhibiting a consideration of the ethical implications of Japan’s foreign policy for local communities. Though Japanese policy makers emphasized an ‘inclusive’ approach to development, Japanese assistance seldom engaged with local communities, let alone empowered these communities to be in the driver’s seat of development. In the case of the Thilawa SEZ, communities were forcibly removed from the lands they had farmed for generations to ramshackle dwellings hardly fit for human habitation. With the support of Mekong Watch, a Japanese NGO, the affected communities brought a case against JICA for failing to live 169

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up to its humanitarian commitments. As a result of their efforts, modest improvements were made to the conditions at the relocation site, but these essentially forced the affected people to be more resilient in the face of what became accepted as inevitable change. This emphasis on resilience and a lack of empowerment demonstrates that, if anything, Japan’s developmental approach leaves human beings more insecure rather than improving their life chances and well-​being. Japan’s state-​centric approach to economic development and conflict mediation, including an exchange programme between the Tatmadaw and SDF, also side-​lined the armed ethnic groups and their communities. As the case of the Karen ethnic minority demonstrates, the Japanese government emphasized economic development and connectivity not only as the key to furthering democracy and peace in Myanmar, but also to realize Japan’s national interests. The Japanese government aimed to achieve these interests through the construction of the East–​West and Southern Economic Corridors to link the Mekong region for the benefit of Japanese production networks. Japan’s developmental ambitions perceived the affected ethnic groups in terms of cheap labour that would benefit from the opportunities that greater economic connectivity would bring. By contrast, the Karen community feared that infrastructure would not only cause ecological destruction and displace communities, but also improve access for the Tatmadaw to their lands. For the Karen, human rights, the preservation of their culture and environment, and political freedom to manage their own territory in a federal system, trumped economic development as their core goals. For Karen refugees who had sought shelter across the border in Thailand, Myanmar’s democratization encouraged the international community to wind down support in the anticipation that the refugees would return to Myanmar. That the conditions on the ground in Myanmar’s periphery remained hazardous, simply pushed these refugees to be resilient in the face of perennial threats. The concerns and goals of the Karen were not actively considered in Japan’s developmental policy. This example highlights fundamentally different ways of articulating Myanmar in terms of space, how space is governed, and what space is for. That communities affected by violence or economic development were not adequately consulted about the policies that would transform their lives raises the spatial and ethical question of who is regarded as a fully fledged member of a political community and who is treated as bare life, without a political voice and to be sacrificed at will. Nowhere was this question more apparent than in the case of the Rakhine crisis and the Rohingya exodus, as discussed in Chapter 6. Unlike the Karen people or the villagers relocated by the Thilawa SEZ, the Rohingya are not even accepted as a ‘national race’ in Myanmar. As Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ proceeded, so new laws allowing for freedom of 170

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speech enabled right-​wing Burmese nationalists to spread anti-​Muslim propaganda and incite violence. The undercurrent of anti-​Muslim rhetoric was key to supporting the Tatmadaw’s ‘clearance’ operations in Rakhine state following ARSA attacks on border posts in October 2016 and made it risky to defend Myanmar’s Muslim communities in public. The denial of legal status and opportunities coupled with the proactive removal and erasure of the Rohingya from Myanmar by military means, or the combination of lawfare and spacio-​cide (MacLean, 2019), were strategies that the Japanese government did nothing to counter. The Japanese government’s response to the Rakhine crisis also externalized issues relating to human security, not least in terms of refugees. When the mass exodus of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh began in the wake of the Tatmadaw’s area clearance operations from October 2016 on, the Japanese government opted not to resettle refugees in Japan. Instead, the Japanese government provided financial support to UN agencies and NGOs to handle the refugees abroad. The Japanese government maintained that resettling refugees to Japan would disrupt Japanese life and that it would be too difficult for refugees to adapt. Japan’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ had clear ethical and spatial implications, delineating who could and could not be accepted into Japanese society and how the Japanese government understood its ethical commitments to the liberal international order. Though Japan was critiqued for its ‘chequebook diplomacy’ in response to the 1990–​1 Gulf War, Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order remains predominantly economic and is arguably mercantilist in orientation. In Myanmar, Japanese policy makers sought to realize Japan’s economic interests by establishing SEZs and building infrastructure to facilitate the operations of its transnational production networks in the Mekong subregion. These policy makers insisted that economic development would inevitably lead to democratization and peace, despite evidence to the contrary. In the case of the Rakhine crisis, detailed in Chapter 6, the Japanese government sided with Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration and the Tatmadaw that any alleged ‘crimes against humanity’ perpetrated by Myanmar’s security forces could be judged within Myanmar and that economic development was the key to diffusing the violence. While economic development may play a role in addressing the situation in Rakhine state, Japan’s approach ignored the embedded identity conflicts that were at the root of the violence in the Rakhine. Little progress is likely to be made on resolving the Rakhine crisis until all sides are prepared to acknowledge each other’s understanding of their history and identity. International actors, especially Japan and Britain, need to acknowledge the impacts of imperialism on Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts if the historical causes of conflicts are to be addressed. Those who have fled the violence in Rakhine state have shown no desire to return until those responsible for crimes against humanity have been brought to justice in a fair, 171

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thorough and transparent process. No amount of economic development in Rakhine state is likely to change this. Underpinning Japan’s relationship with Myanmar is the notion that Japan, as Asia’s first developed, democratic state, can act as a bridge and ‘thought leader’ enabling underdeveloped states to democratize and catch-​up. The spatial conception of Japan as a bridge has a long history that can be traced back to prime ministers such as Satō Eisaku (1964–​72) and Kishi Nobusuke (1957–​60), and resonates in discourses legitimizing Japanese imperialism in terms of liberal internationalism in the early 20th century, as Chapter 2 highlighted. It is grounded in a reification of the Meiji revolution that Japanese political elites perceive as exemplifying a Japanese willingness to adapt and reform by introducing and developing new, foreign technologies and organizational structures. Japanese foreign policy makers used the Meiji revolution as a metaphor for Myanmar’s transformation to a ‘disciplined democracy’ reinforcing the notion of Japan as a ‘thought leader’. This discourse is based on a problematic notion of Japanese cultural essentialism, rather than on a critical reflection of both Japanese history and how foreign policy elites interpret that history for particular ends. While emphasizing temporal continuity through both the ‘Meiji spirit’ and Japan’s history as Asia’s first democracy and developed state since the early 20th century, Japanese policy makers also designate the period of Japanese imperialism as a temporal break. This temporal break side-​lines the negative aspects in Japan–​Myanmar relations and accentuates the benevolence of Japan’s bridging approach. This selective remembering of the past is further compounded by references to Japan’s ‘special relationship’ with Myanmar that dates back to the founding of the BIA by the Japanese military and the 30 comrades during the Second World War. Not only is the stress on temporal continuity and temporal breaks contradictory, it also glosses over the impact of Japanese imperialism on Myanmar’s development, particularly in the case of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities as noted previously, as well as through the militarization of Burmese politics after the Second World War. In spatial terms, the notion of Japan as a ‘bridge’ or ‘thought leader’ is problematic in the sense that it assumes that Japan can transform others based on Japan’s experience, but that only Japan can act as a bridge. Japanese policy makers detect the ‘Meiji spirit’ of reform in Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’, yet simultaneously imbue this ‘Meiji spirit’ with traditional Japanese cultural values that were fundamental to Japan’s rise and that maintain Japan’s distinctiveness from others. Those states transformed by Japan can never become Japan, but are forever on the other side of the bridge requiring Japan’s assistance. At the same time, the notion of Japan as a ‘bridge’ conceives of Japan as neither one or the other but perpetually ‘in-​ between’, a paradoxical spatial position in which ‘universal’ and ‘traditional’ values are promoted simultaneously. 172

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This contradictory blending of ‘universal’ and ‘traditional’ values was instrumental to the Abe administration’s ‘value-​based diplomacy’. Even as Abe insisted on ‘bridging’ between Eastern and Western states to promote the ‘universal’ values of the liberal international order, he understood these values as being transformed within an Asian context and infused with Asian culture and norms, thereby undermining the essence of the liberal values themselves. Hence, the Japanese government would continue to advocate for Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’ in line with its understanding of ‘democratization as process’ that perceives democratization as evolving within particular cultural contexts. It is therefore not surprising that despite international condemnation of the situation in Rakhine state that the Abe administration continued to back Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, insisting that her administration could resolve the situation in Rakhine through a ‘credible and transparent’ judicial process, despite all evidence to the contrary. The reinterpretation of ‘universal values’ in terms of local cultural traditions would also find expression in Japan’s domestic political context. While reifying Japan’s traditional values and its ability to act as a bridge, the Abe administration also lamented the loss of Japan’s ‘spirit’ to advocate revisions to Japan’s constitution. For example, proposed revisions to Japan’s constitution emphasized the obligations that Japanese citizens owed to the state over the state honouring the inherent human rights of its citizens. Like Myanmar, Japan’s democracy was also disciplined as the Abe administration oversaw the passage of the State Secrecy Law and suppressed Japan’s media, actions that many Japanese and international commentators perceived as a return to imperial-​era restrictions on the freedom of speech (Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017). Contrary to the Abe administration’s claim that the Japanese people had lost ‘Japan’s spirit’, Japanese business elites bemoaned that Japan’s hierarchical and bureaucratic culture had stymied the pioneer spirit necessary to conquer ‘Asia’s last frontier’. These elites argued that Japan was slower and more risk-​ averse than its Asian competitors, such as South Korea and Taiwan, and failed to take advantage of the business opportunities stemming from Myanmar’s transition to a ‘disciplined democracy’. From this perspective, rather than Myanmar being able to catch up in terms of development and democracy, Japanese elites perceived Myanmar’s human and natural resources as there to be exploited. This notion of ‘Asia’s last frontier’ discursively separates Myanmar from the rest of Asia, as both an underdeveloped backwater and locale of a new ‘gold rush’, to be transformed into a hub in an interconnected regional and global economy that will benefit Japanese production networks. In accordance with Japan’s ‘thought leader’ discourse, Japanese officials wrote Myanmar’s investment laws and regulations, on the back of an influx of Japanese aid, so that Japanese firms could take advantage of the emerging 173

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opportunities as Myanmar transitioned to a ‘disciplined democracy’. That the frontier will be conquered is never in question, it is mainly an issue of whether or not a business is involved in the process from the outset or too late to benefit from the opportunities that await. Myanmar as ‘Asia’s last frontier’ fails to acknowledge that new frontiers will continue to be opened up in Myanmar and beyond.

Rethinking Japan–​Myanmar relations Japan’s foreign policy discourse sustains the ontological claim that because Japan is benevolent, it promotes human security and well-​being.1 This ontological argument brokers no objections; Japan merely is benevolent. It relies on a series of inherent contradictions to justify and maintain the illusion of Japan’s benevolence in the face of foreign policies that engender human insecurity. Revealing the disjuncture between Japan’s foreign policy discourse and practice, and exposing how Japanese policy makers have discursively contorted space, time and ethicality to realize their interests undermines the coherence of the discourse and the ‘common sense’ understandings the discourse reifies. It draws attention to the issues and actors the discourse has excluded or marginalized. This opens up space for alternative discourses based on the epistemological claim that because Japan promotes human security and well-​being, it acts benevolently. This epistemological claim cannot be taken at face value, but must be supported by evidence. It is a claim that welcomes critique, is self-​reflective about bias, and embraces different standpoints. It engages the opinions of local actors, NGOs and civil society to articulate approaches that are not founded on exploitation. This shift from an ontological to an epistemological claim could enable possibilities for meaningful change for human beings and the environment in which they live. In the case of the Thilawa SEZ, covered in Chapter 4, for example, a human-​centred approach might start with community-​led dialogues about how community life can be enriched. This may mean rethinking or even rejecting an SEZ in order to accommodate the community’s needs and vision. Similarly, the concerns of the Karen people outlined in Chapter 5, about the impacts of infrastructure and economic corridors advanced during a tentative ceasefire, would need to guide discussions about peace and development. Intercommunity dialogue, reconciliation and self-​ reflection about differing historical accounts are needed in the case of ethnic conflicts, including in the Rakhine, as Chapters 5 and 6 highlight. None of these cases necessarily requires a rejection of economic development, but economic development does need to be rethought. All the case studies in this volume demonstrate that the hegemonic discourse that has guided Japan’s relationship with Myanmar, namely that top-​down, state-​led, economic 174

Conclusion

development inevitably engenders democratization and peace and enhances human security, is merely a chimera. A counter-​hegemonic discourse that is bottom-​up, community-​led and focused on human security and well-​being, and environmental sustainability, could forge an alternative foreign policy. Whether such a counter-​hegemonic discourse would gain ground would depend upon the willingness of foreign policy makers to engage seriously with critiques raised about their actions and discourse. Policy makers working in a democratic society should welcome critique as a means to amend their foreign policy. Though Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic credentials were criticized for supporting the military at the ICJ in the case of the Rakhine crisis, her metaphor, expressed during her visit to Japan in 2016, that democracy is a muscle that needs to be exercised to remain strong (Johnston, 2016) is a useful one. An exercise that is central to democracy is self-​reflection when engaging with critique. With a resurgence of populism, the notion of ‘fake news’ has led to curbs on media freedom. In Japan, government restrictions on the freedom of the press have raised concerns about the narrowing space in which critique can be voiced (Repeta, 2014; Stockwin and Ampiah, 2017). Criticism of Japan’s foreign policy and the proposal of alternative approaches may not be welcome in Japan’s current political climate. Following the 1 February coup, Myanmar’s future looks bleak. The military remains in charge, but its rule is contested throughout the country as a condition of civil war takes hold (Soe Win et al, 2022). Myanmar’s deteriorating economy has only worsened with the isolation of sanctions and the impact that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had on energy and food markets. The humanitarian situation has deteriorated significantly since the coup. There are over 10,000 political prisoners languishing in Myanmar’s jails, 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers (over 30,000 since the coup) from Myanmar and 671,000 IDPs in Myanmar (430,000 in 2021 alone) (UNHCR, 2022). It is hard to imagine a return to a democratic process that is accepted as legitimate, both domestically and internationally. Japan’s response to Myanmar’s coup suggests that Japan’s foreign policy and business elites are waiting until neighbouring ASEAN states formally recognize the junta, so that the Japanese government can follow suit and continue to realize its economic and geostrategic interests in Myanmar. Thinking Japan–​Myanmar relations otherwise could help address the unfolding human tragedy in Myanmar, but it appears that there is little impetus towards changing the course of Japan’s foreign policy.

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Notes Introduction 1

The term ‘Rohingya’ is contested in Myanmar, as Chapter 6 explains, but has been widely propagated in the international community and media and is in common usage.

Chapter 1 1

2

3

4

5

Here too, Area Studies scholars face challenges in having their work recognized in research exercises and in mainstream IR journals (Kaczmarska and Ortmann, 2021). Until such institutional practices are reformed the opportunities for engagement will be limited. It should be noted that the history of the humanities as a whole is no less problematic than the history of IR and Area Studies. Until the 1970s, the humanities were dominated by Western-​centric thinking and complicit in innumerable imperialist projects (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004). This has often centred around the interpretation of ‘texts’, in the broadest sense of the word (Davidson and Goldberg, 2004; Harpham, 2005). This emphasis on ‘texts’ may be misleading or too restrictive however. It may be preferable to think in terms of engaging ‘voices’ and the myriad ways in which actors give voice to their situation and experience. See ‘Kerncurriculum: Area Studies’, https://​stu​dieg​ids.lei​denu​niv.nl/​cour​ses/​show/​ 78437/​kern​curr​icul​um_​a​rea_​stud​ies Discourse analysis is only one among the many methodological approaches favoured by area scholars. Alternative approaches, such as ethnography or archival research, could shed new and critical light on Japan’s relationship with Myanmar. For example, Chika Watanabe’s book, Becoming One, has provided key insights into Japan’s engagement with local communities on the ground in Myanmar. Watanabe highlights the efforts of the Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement (OISCA), a prominent Japanese NGO, to reform agricultural practices in Myanmar. While Watanabe emphasizes the positive reception of OISCA’s activities in Myanmar, she remains critical of OISCA’s ties to Japanese right-​wing groups, such as Nippon Kaigi, and its overarching goal to transform individuals (literally ‘human-​making’ –​‘hito-​tsukuri’) in accordance with traditional Shinto values. Watanabe’s argument chimes with key concepts in this volume, such as the notion of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ or ‘bridge’ that can transform other states in its own image, as well as highlighting how nationalist discourses have guided Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe administration in particular.

Chapter 2 1

It should be noted that few former Western states have openly reflected on the impact of their empires upon the people they governed. Indeed, the failure to outlaw empire at the end of the Second World War is in part responsible for the manner in which Japan de-​imperialized (Nandy, 1992; Fujitani, 2015). 176

Notes 2

METI is the successor to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, following the latter’s reorganization in 2001.

Chapter 3 1

2

3

4

Anti-​Muslim riots broke out across Northern and Central Myanmar in March 2013, which can also be understood in the context of Myanmar’s democratization process and growing anti-​Muslim rhetoric (Wade, 2017). For a balanced account of the 2012 sectarian violence, see Ware and Laoutides (2018: 36–​ 41), on which the account in this paragraph is primarily based. Ma Ba Tha was subsequently banned on 23 May 2017 and renamed the Buddha Dhamma Philanthropic Foundation (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 39). It should be noted that generally the Burmese sangha has been a part of the political opposition in Myanmar, such as the case of the Saffron Revolution in 2007, and that there are many among the Burmese Buddhist community who oppose the philosophy and activities of Ma Ba Tha (Walton, 2015: 514–​15, 525).

Chapter 4 1

The case of Thilawa is not uncommon. As Myanmar has democratized since 2011, a parliamentary commission recorded 745 cases of land grabs across the country (Roughneen, 2014).

Chapter 5 1

2

3

4

The sooner an ethnic armed group agreed a ceasefire with the SLORC, the better the terms of the deal (Lall, 2009: 9–​10; Ruzza, 2015: 79–​81, 84–​5). Gradually, groups like the KNU became isolated in their resistance to the Tatmadaw. The KNU was unwilling to conclude a ceasefire that would grant them little in return. Even prior to the NLD’s victory in the 2015 election, tensions were already apparent between the MPC and Thein Sein administration over budget issues (Yen Saning, 2014b). Even before the democratization process began, Thai authorities began to pressure refugees in border camps to return to Myanmar. Uda Yūzō, a Japanese photo journalist with extensive experience of Karen conflict, noted how the Thai authorities were tiring of Karen refugee camps on their border and instead looked to build ties with the Myanmar government to acquire resources and electricity from Myanmar (Uda, 2007: 96). The focus on satisfying Thailand’s national interest thereby raised demands to repatriate Karen refugees to Myanmar where they could experience deprivation or further abuse at the hands of the Burmese military. The plight of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities fleeing decades of civil conflict and the abuses of the Tatmadaw has been exacerbated by the possibility of further opening up Myanmar’s economy to foreign investment. Japan has traditionally been the second largest donor to the UNHCR after the US, so its financial contributions are not insubstantial.

Chapter 6 1

2

Though this chapter focuses on the Rohingya, the Tatmadaw continue to fight the Arakan Army, which seeks to achieve a degree of autonomous rule for the Rakhine Buddhist population. For more on the situation in Rakhine, see Ware and Laoutides (2018) and Nakanishi (2021d). This manuscript employs the term Rohingya, not as an endorsement of the Rohingya’s position, but because it is in common use internationally. It is also used in the Japanese discourse, though crucially not by the Japanese government. While problematizing the 177

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term ‘Rohingya’, the manuscript recognizes that the group that self-​references by this term has suffered for decades in Myanmar.

Conclusion 1

This contrast between ontological and epistemological arguments is made by Edkins and Zehfuss (2005: 452–​3), who in turn draw on work by Susan Buck-​Morss.

178

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219

Index A Aagre, Audun  110, 117 Abe Shinzō  Abenomics  7 ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’  46–​7, 57 and Aung San Suu Kyi  135, 136–​7, 140, 147 democracy  54 development assistance  86 development strategy  48 discursive construction of Japan as peaceful democracy  29 economic development  7, 81, 167 Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’  34–​5, 40, 43, 45 Japan as ‘thought leader’  88 loans to Myanmar  70 meeting with Htin Kyaw  144 nationalism  53 Nippon Foundation  109 peace-​building in Myanmar  101 proactive pacifism  54–​5 Rakhine state  127, 136 refugees  122 revisionist agendas  51, 57 Sino-​Japanese relations  5–​6 Thilawa SEZ  90 universal values  49, 51, 52 values-​based diplomacy  173 Abel, J.  36, 37, 41 ‘Abenomics’  7 Acharya, A.  17, 19, 20, 25–​6 ADB (Asian Development Bank)  70, 84, 95 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State  126, 132, 138, 141, 144 ageing populations  4, 123 aid  see humanitarian aid aid agencies  108 Aisawa Ichirō  46 Akamatsu Kaname  36 Akami, T.  37, 38 Akashi Yasushi  161 Akimoto Satohiro  159 Amnesty International  76, 139

Amos, Valerie  74 Annan, Kofi  75, 126, 132, 141 Annan Commission on Rakhine State  see Advisory Commission on Rakhine State anti-​colonial activism  104, 130 anti-​Japanese protests  42 anti-​militarist constitution  40 anti-​Muslim rhetoric  73–​4, 75, 130, 140, 151, 171 Anti-​Terror Law  126 aporias  30 Arakan Army  107 ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’  46–​7, 57 area clearance operations  8, 126, 171 Area Studies  8–​10, 17–​33, 168–​74 ‘areas,’ concept of (geopolitics)  21 armed ethnic groups  107, 155, 170 arms exports  43 ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army)  8, 126, 132, 141, 143–​4, 171 Asahi Shimbun  143, 158, 164 Asakai Koichirō  41 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)  Cyclone Nargis (2008)  66 Dawei SEZ  96 8.8.88 Revolution  62 ethnic tensions  110 February 2021 coup  156 financial regulation  89 humanitarian aid  76 Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’  46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53 and the junta  175 Myanmar elections  69 non-​interference principle  68, 133 Parliamentarians for Human Rights  133 quiet diplomacy  143 Rakhine state  131, 133–​4, 140 Saffron Revolution (2007)  64 Summit 2012  70 Ashin Wirathu  74 Asia Diplomacy and Security Vision Study Group  46

220

Index

Asia Strategy Study Group  46 Asian Financial Crisis  44 Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank  86 ‘Asian Research World Trends’  69 Asian values  52, 53, 79, 172–​3 Asia-​Pacific Cooperation Forum  39 ‘Asia’s last frontier’  3, 6, 9, 33, 79, 85–​9, 99, 102, 173–​4 ‘Asia’s liberal leader,’ Japan as  1, 6, 8, 34–​58, 85, 94, 99, 127, 148–​53 Asiatic Monroe Doctrine  36 Asō Tarō  46, 47, 53, 57, 59, 167 Associated Press  131 atonement  39 Aung, T.  137, 138, 139 Aung Naing Oo  165 Aung San  10, 104–​5 Aung San Suu Kyi  and Abe Shinzō  135, 136–​7, 140, 147 and China  83, 163, 164 Cyclone Nargis (2008)  67–​8, 69–​70 and democracy  175 8.8.88 Revolution  2, 61, 62 and the February 2021 coup  1, 154 Japanese support for  142, 144–​5, 173 moral leadership  132, 147 November 2010 election  77 opposition to Japan  84 Panglong process  107–​8 Rakhine state conflict  8, 127, 131–​2, 133, 134–​5, 136–​7, 140–​1 Rohingyas  75, 143 Aung-​Thwin  12 Australia  47, 138, 142, 167 authoritarianism  7 autocratization  53 B Baluchaung  117 Ban Ki-​moon  65 Bandung Conference  41 Bangladesh  7, 8, 143, 144, 146, 147 banking  89, 167 Bannon, Steve  7 Barber, B.  21 Basic Human Needs  45 Bate, J.  25 Baw Kyaw Heh, General  115 BCIM (Bangladesh-​China-​India-​Myanmar) corridor  48–​9, 83 BCP (Burmese Communist Party)  103, 105 ‘Bengalis’  72–​3, 74, 128, 149 Beynon, Peter  138 BIA (Burma Independence Army)  10, 104, 163, 172 bilateral aid  134 bilateral security  34, 53, 68 birth rates  4 boat crises (refugees)  76, 127

Border Consortium  121 Border Guard Forces  107 borders  conflicts  83 ethnic groups and state borders in Area Studies  22 ethnic tensions in Myanmar  103, 106, 107, 110 Rakhine state conflict  126 bottom-​up approaches to human security  56 boycotts of elections  69 boycotts of Japanese goods  42 Brenner, D.  107 BRI (Belt and Road Initiative)  4, 49, 50, 58, 83, 164 ‘bridge,’ Japan as  Area Studies  168–​74 evolution of Japan as Asia’s liberal leader  42, 43–​4, 49 facilitating Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  59–​80 February 2021 coup  156–​60, 162–​3 FOIP strategy  35 peace-​building in Myanmar  100, 110 Rakhine state  127, 134, 138, 140–​9, 150–​1 British colonialism  9, 29, 87, 103–​4, 129, 141, 163 Brown, I.  60, 61 Brown, Widney  91 Buchanan-​Hamilton, Francis  128 Buddhism/​Buddhist communities  Japanese support for  10 Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts  7, 9, 104, 105, 128 Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  72, 73–​4 Saffron Revolution (2007)  63 Buddhist militias  141 Bueger, C.  25 Burma Campaign UK  110, 121 Burma Road  9–​10 Burmese language  117 ‘Burmese Path to Socialism’  105 Buzan, B.  25–​6 C Caballero-​Anthony, M.  66 Caliwan, C.  51 Callahan, M.  12 Cambodia  42, 48 Campbell, D.  30 Capan, Z.G.  23–​4 capitalism  88 ceasefire agreements  62, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109–​10, 174 ceasefire capitalism  62, 105 Center for International Cooperation  56 Central Bank of Myanmar  89 Chachavalpongpun, Pavin  51, 134, 141, 143

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DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

chambers of commerce  138 Charney, M.  12 Cheah, P.  18, 23, 33, 168 cheap labour  79, 85, 89, 90, 120, 170 Cheeseman, N.  73 Chen, C.  26 chequebook diplomacy  28, 43, 125, 127, 171 Chiang Kai-​shek  9, 103 Chiang Mai Initiative  44 child labour/​child soldiers  70 China  and Aung San Suu Kyi  83, 163, 164 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)  4, 49, 50, 58, 83, 164 Burmese Communist Party (BCP)  103 China-​Myanmar relations  2, 3–​4, 62, 64, 82, 83, 137, 155 economic corridors  48–​9 ethnic tensions  110 expansionism  48 February 2021 coup  155, 158 FOIP strategy  47 foreign aid policy  53 foreign policy  52, 54 geopolitics  163 Japan’s shift away from  81 and liberalism  34 military forces  5 Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts  103, 105, 110 Myanmar’s reliance on  2, 83, 137 post-​Cold War rise of  43, 46 reform in  3–​4 sanctions  42 security cooperation  83 Sino-​Japanese relations  5–​6, 49, 50 Tiananmen Square  2, 42–​3 trade and investment partner of Myanmar  82, 83 and the US  49 Chng, B.  66 Chow, R.  26 CITIC corporation  3 citizenship  130, 146 Citizenship Law 1982 (Burma)  73, 130, 141, 155 civil disobedience movement  154 civil society  Cyclone Nargis (2008)  71 February 2021 coup  156, 157 Japan  54, 56 Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  63, 65 peace processes  108, 114 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  92, 98 civil wars  2, 105 ‘civilizing mission’  37, 57 clearance operations  see area clearance operations

Clinton, Hillary  69 coercion  91 Cold War  2, 10, 11, 17, 18, 35, 36, 42, 101, 103–​4 collective self-​defence, right of  43, 52 colonialism  29, 38, 103–​4, 129 see also imperialism comfort women  39 commercial law  86–​7 Commission on Human Security  55–​6 Commission on Rakhine State  see Advisory Commission on Rakhine State Committee for Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw  155 community involvement in development  116–​19 community organizations  92, 93, 98, 108, 120 Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership  34 Comprehensive Asia Development Plan  48 conflict traps  106 connectivity  82–​5, 96–​7, 112–​15, 116, 135–​9, 170 conservatism  39 constitutions  Japan  5, 40, 43, 51 Myanmar  1, 66–​8, 71, 72, 77, 102, 169 constructivism  27 Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide  75 co-​prosperity  41 corruption  83–​4, 86, 90, 110 counter-​hegemonic discourses  28, 29, 175 coups d’etat  1, 10, 60, 83, 105, 152, 153–​68 COVID-​19  165 Cowley, A.  75, 76, 129, 130 crimes against humanity  Myanmar military elites  132–​3, 140 NUG  155 Rakhine state  75, 76, 141, 145, 151 Tatmadaw  8, 84, 118–​19, 127, 167, 171 critical engagement with history  23 cronyism  84 cultural essentialism  24, 172 cultural ties  42 cultural traits  86 Cumings, B.  18, 19, 23 currency  60 customs  85 Cyclone Nargis (2008)  2, 60, 65–​8, 78, 96, 169 D Daiwa Securities  84 Davidson, C.  22, 23, 24, 25 Dawei SEZ  3, 82, 85, 95–​9, 100, 112, 115, 136 DDA (Dawei Development Association)  98

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‘death railway’  10 debt cancellation  58, 61, 70, 77, 79, 81, 84, 90 decolonization  129 deep-​water ports  3, 82, 83, 95, 113 democracy/​democratization  Asian values  52 ‘Asia’s liberal leader,’ Japan as  44, 45, 49, 50, 172 curbing of  54 and development  111–​15 ‘disciplined democracy’  59–​80, 102 Myanmar  1–​2, 11, 58, 59–​80 and peace  111 press freedom  141 as process versus progress  59–​60, 65, 67, 69, 70, 78, 79, 169 and refugees  121 ‘roadmap to democracy’  60, 63, 66–​7, 78 universal values  37, 46, 51, 52 Democratic Security Diamond  47 demonetizations  60 demonstrations  63, 105, 154–​5, 157 see also  8.8.88 Revolution; protests Deng Xiaoping  2 Derrida, J.  30 development, peace through  135–​9 ‘development’ as concept  18 development assistance  34, 35, 47–​8, 86, 111–​15, 169–​70 see also ODA (Official Development Assistance) Development Cooperation Charter  45, 157 development projects  77, 94, 120 developmental state model  36 diplomacy  chequebook diplomacy  28, 43, 125, 127, 171 quiet diplomacy  40, 62, 64, 127, 134, 138, 143, 145, 161 values-​based diplomacy  8, 34–​5, 46, 49, 52, 53–​4, 57–​8, 79, 154, 168, 173 ‘disciplined democracy’  acceptance of anti-​Muslim stance  151 February 2021 coup as end to  1, 161 Japan’s support for  6–​8 lessened reliance on China  83 Myanmar’s transition to  2, 58, 59–​80 refugee repatriation  119 role of Tatmadaw  118 ‘Seven Point Roadmap to Democracy’  63 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  96 discourse, definition of  28 discourse analysis  27, 30–​1 ‘divide and conquer’  129 divide and rule  104 DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan)  7, 45, 47–​8, 68

Drakeman, D.  25 drug trafficking  51, 103, 107 Dunn, C.  28–​9 Duterte, Rodrigo  51 Dutton, M.  19, 24, 26 E earthquakes  4 Earthrights International  93, 94, 97 East-​West Economic Corridor  48–​9, 85, 100, 102, 112, 113, 121, 124, 136, 170 Economic Committee (Japan)  41 economic corridors  48–​9, 112–​13 see also BCIM (Bangladesh-​China-​India-​ Myanmar) corridor; East-​West Economic Corridor; Southern Economic Corridor economic development  Burma  60–​1 connectivity and peace  135–​9 co-​prosperity  41 Japan and Special Economic Zones in Myanmar  81–​100 Japan’s economic dominance  42 post-​February 1 2021 coup  162, 165–​8, 170, 173 Yoshida Doctrine  40 Economic Research Institute  48 Edgar, A.  22 Edstrom, B.  11 education  after ethnic conflicts  117–​18 Burmanization of  117–​18 Myanmar  63 patriotic understandings of Japan’s history  39 Thilawa SEZ  92–​3 8.8.88 Revolution  2, 42, 60–​3, 82 elections  2, 61, 66, 68–​72, 77, 87, 96, 151–​2, 154 electricity supply  86 elites  38, 55, 58, 69, 85, 94, 104, 106, 118, 130, 172, 173 emergency assistance  144 see also humanitarian aid Emergency Immigration Act (1974)  130 energy pipelines  3, 83 English language  38, 86 environmental issues  97, 98, 99, 106, 112–​15 ethnic armed groups  107, 155, 170 ethnic cleansing  7, 127, 129, 141 ethnic discrimination  73 ethnic tensions  7–​8, 9, 101–​25 EU (European Union)  69, 76, 110, 119, 142, 148, 167 EU-​Japan Economic Partnership Agreement  34 Eurocentrism  20, 23 expansionism  36, 37, 48 extraction industries  83, 106–​7, 114

223

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

F Facebook  132 fake news  175 Farmaner, Mark  121 Farrelly, N.  105 February 2021 coup  1, 83, 99, 119, 153–​68, 169, 175 federal governments  103, 108, 155 feminist scholarship  20 Fink, C.  106 ‘flying geese’ paradigm  36 FOIP strategy (Free and Open Indo-​ Pacific)  35, 36, 47–​9, 50, 53, 57, 136, 151, 153 food aid  109 food crises  60 forced labour  39 forced relocations  81–​2, 91, 92, 93, 94–​5, 97 see also IDP (internally displaced people); refugees foreign aid policy  44–​5, 46, 61, 64, 65 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan  142 foreign direct investment  2, 77 foreign policy  discourses of  30–​1 Fukuda Doctrine  42 human-​r ights based  148 Japan  5, 8, 24, 27, 30–​2, 33, 40, 43, 50, 53, 57, 101–​2, 104, 168 Japanese as ‘thought leader’  172 ontological claims  174 Rakhine state  147 state-​centric approach  116–​19, 168, 169–​70, 174–​5 US (United States)  159 ‘value-​free’  42 Fortify Rights  133, 141 Forum for Democracy  102 Foucault, M.  25, 28, 29 free press  51, 70, 71, 72, 141–​2, 151, 173, 175 free trade  51 Free Trade Agreements  6, 46 freedom from fear  44, 55 freedom from want  44, 55 freedom of assembly  71 freedom of movement  74 freedom of speech  73, 142, 151, 173 Friedman, F.  21 fuel subsidies  63 Fuji  84 Fukuda Doctrine  36, 42, 44, 50, 52 Fukuda Takeo  42 Fukuda Yasuo  47 Fukushima, A.  56 Fukushima nuclear reactor  4

G G7  42–​3, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 82, 155, 157, 161, 167, 169 Gambari, Ibrahim Agboola  64 Gambia  133, 148 Gemba Kōichirō  70 general election (November 2010)  58, 68–​72 genocide  75, 76, 84, 125, 132, 133, 148 geoeconomics  8, 11, 48, 103 ‘geographical inclusion,’ as concept  112–​13 geopolitics  8, 11, 21, 49, 85, 163 Germany  34, 35 global governance  53 Global New Light of Myanmar  136, 145 globalization  9, 21–​2, 113 gold  107 Goldberg, D.  22, 23, 24, 25 Goto-​Jones, C.  18, 26 Grandi, Filippo  149 Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects  56 grants  81 see also development assistance great powers  37, 38 Greater East Asia Co-​prosperity Sphere  36, 38–​9 Gulf War  28, 43, 171 Gyaing-​Kawkareik Bridge  112 H Haacke, J.  11, 61, 62, 66, 83 Hague, William  69 Hansen, L.  30 Hanssen, U.  28 Harashina Sachihiko  92 Harpham, G.  23 Hartley, R.  11, 27 Hasegawa Sukehiro  161 Hatoyama Yukio  48, 64, 68 health care  118 Hiroaki Shiga  52–​3, 54–​5 Hiroe Tōru  87, 88 Hishida Yūsuke  143 Hitoki Den  142 Hla Soe, Susanna  115 Hobson, J.M.  25, 26 Hong Kong  86, 165 Horii Iwao  136, 143, 144, 145 horizontal economic corridors  48–​9 Hoshino Toshiya  56, 161 Hotta, E.  36, 37 Houben, V.  17 Howarth, D.  28 Howe, A.  74 HRW (Human Rights Watch)  73, 74, 75, 76, 110, 119, 139, 167 Htoo Min Thein  137 human insecurity  7–​8, 34–​58, 89–​95, 116

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Index

human rights  Dawei SEZ  98, 99 and democracy  142 ethnic conflicts  103, 106, 109–​10 and international aid  110 international community  143 Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’  44, 45, 46, 49, 53 Japanese business in Myanmar  136, 139 Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  62, 69, 83 NUG  155 Rakhine state conflict  77, 126, 138, 140, 144, 145, 147, 148–​9 Thilawa SEZ  90 universal values  51 Human Rights Now  157 human security, as concept  5, 44–​5, 174, 175 Human Security Now  55 human trafficking  7, 76 human-​centred development  116, 174 humanitarian aid  84, 109–​11, 119–​20, 144, 156 humanitarian crises  8, 127 humanitarianism  48, 64, 65, 74 Hussein, Saddam  43 hydroelectric power plants  83, 113, 115, 117 I ICC (International Criminal Court)  65, 75, 132, 133, 155 ICJ (International Court of Justice)  75, 76, 132–​3, 148 ICoE (Independent Commission of Enquiry)  127, 132, 145–​6, 147, 148 identity  Japan  27–​8 Rakhine state  128–​31, 171 Ido Mitsu  86 IDP (internally displaced people)  7, 72, 74, 109, 119, 120, 146 Ikenberry, G.J.  35, 85, 94 ‘illegal immigration’  72, 73, 143, 149 Imai Takaya  49 IMF (International Monetary Fund)  63 Immigration Bureau  122 immigration policy  149 imperialism  Area Studies  17, 22, 23 British colonialism  9, 29, 87, 103–​4, 129, 141, 163 Japanese  9, 36, 37, 38, 39, 50, 87, 104, 163, 172 legacies of  55 non-​Western other  37 roots of ethnic conflicts  129, 171 temporality  51 import duties  90

independence (Burma)  104, 129, 163 India  Democratic Security Diamond  47 economic connections with  3 economic relationship with  48 FOIP strategy  47 India-​Myanmar relations  62, 64, 167 Indonesia  63, 88 industrialization  36, 113, 116, 120 infrastructure development  FOIP strategy  48–​9 geopolitics of Myanmar  3 Japan’s peace-​building role in Myanmar  102, 112, 113, 114–​15, 116 Mekong subregion  9 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  81, 82–​3, 86, 91, 96–​7, 171 Inn Din massacre  141, 142, 144 Inoue, Ken  53 Institute of Pacific Relations  38 International Advisory Board to the Committee for the Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine  131 International Commission of Jurists  90 international community  ethnic tensions  109–​10 February 2021 coup  161 ICoE  146 Japan’s role in international security  4–​5 Japan’s state-​centrism  117 and Myanmar’s democratic transition  61, 63, 66, 69, 75, 169, 170 peace-​building in Myanmar  108 Rakhine state conflict  75–​6, 121, 127, 131–​2, 135–​9, 142–​3 international conventions  74 International Organization  20 international production networks  48 international security  4–​5, 43, 109 interviews  31–​2 investment in Myanmar  62, 135, 137, 165–​8 see also development assistance; economic development investment laws  81, 173 IR (International Relations)  8–​10, 17–​33 see also Area Studies Iraq conflict  43 Irrawaddy  90, 107, 108, 138, 164 Ishibashi Michihiro  92, 121 ITD (Italian-​Thai Development)  96, 97, 99 Ito Kenichi  43 Itochu  87, 88 J jade  83, 103, 105, 107 Japan  ageing populations  4 aid  2, 109–​12, 144, 173–​4 apologies for past behaviour  4

225

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’  1, 6, 8, 34–​58, 85, 94, 99, 127, 148–​53 as ‘bridge’  59–​80 business investment in Myanmar  81–​100 conquest of Myanmar (1942–​1945)  87, 104 constitutions  5, 40, 43, 51 Cyclone Nargis (2008)  65 Dawei SEZ  95–​9 decline of  3–​7 defence expenditure  43 disasters  4 emergence as economic power  6 February 2021 coup  153, 154, 156–​68 financial assistance to Myanmar  70–​1, 109–​11 foreign policy  5, 8, 24, 27, 30–​2, 33, 40, 43, 50, 53, 57, 101–​2, 104, 168 immigration policy  123–​4, 149 imperialism  87, 104, 163, 172 invasion  10 investment in Myanmar  8, 81–​100 Japanese aid to Myanmar ethnic conflicts  109–​11 Japanese exceptionalism  27, 40, 48, 88, 172 KPSN report on  114–​15 ‘Liberal Leadership’  126–​52 as mediator in ethnic conflicts  102–​25, 138, 160–​5 as mentor  35, 37, 40, 41, 48, 50, 57, 87–​8 and the Myanmar military  101, 118–​19, 139, 166, 167–​8 peace-​building in Myanmar  101–​25 Rakhine state conflict  76–​7, 127, 134–​9, 140–​9, 150–​2, 170–​1 refugees  77, 121–​3, 125, 134, 149, 171 Rohingyas  143 Sino-​Japanese relations  5–​6, 88 Special Economic Zone (SEZ)  81–​100 special relationship with Myanmar  79, 87, 161–​2, 163, 172 state-​centric approach  116–​19, 168, 169–​70, 174–​5 support for Aung San Suu Kyi  143–​4 as ‘thought leader’  35, 46, 48, 49, 59, 79, 82, 85–​9, 100, 111–​12, 162, 168–​74 uniqueness of the Japanese people  40, 48 see also ODA (Official Development Assistance) Japan Forum on International Relations  43 Japan Monthly Trade Report  85 Japan National Press Club  149 Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corp. for Transport and Urban Development  165, 166 Japan Studies  24 Japan Times  83, 122, 131, 132, 133, 134, 140, 142, 143, 155, 156, 165, 167

Japan Tobacco  139 Japan-​Burma Association (Nihon-​Biruma Kyōkai)  61 Japanese exceptionalism  27, 88, 172 Japanese Imperial Army  10 Japanese language  24 Japan-​Myanmar Cooperation Program  136 Japan–​Myanmar Development Institution Inc.  167 Japan–​Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program  118, 119 JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation)  84 JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization)  69, 137, 139 JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency)  bridging loans  70 Civilian Coordination Department  93 Dawei SEZ  95–​9 ethnic tensions  111–​12 February 2021 coup  166 human security  124 inclusive development  112–​14, 116 investigation into Thilawa SEZ  92–​4, 95 Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’  45, 49, 52, 53, 55 Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  6 peace-​building in Myanmar  101 Preparatory Survey for the Integrated Regional Development for Ethnic Minorities in the Southeast Myanmar  120 Rakhine State Investment Fair  137, 139 resettlement guidelines  94 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  81–​2, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 95–​9, 114, 169–​70 state-​centric approach  116–​19 Thilawa SEZ  90, 114, 169–​70 Jimbo, K.  35, 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53 JMA (Japan Myanmar Association)  61, 90, 163, 164 Johnson, C.  24 Joll, C.  102, 108, 117 Jonsson, M.  107 JPMD Ltd  139 junta  coup d’etat  154–​6 Japan as ‘bridge’ in Myanmar’s democratization  60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 78 Japan-​Myanmar relations  11 Japan’s peace-​building role in Myanmar  103, 105 recognition by ASEAN states  175 Rohingyas  129 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  82, 83–​4 Justice Ministry  123

226

Index

K Kachin communities  77, 103, 108 Kachin Independence Army  107 Kachin Independence Organization  107 Kaczmarska, K.  20 kakehashi  59, 60, 64, 70, 78, 100 see also ‘bridge,’ Japan as Kanda, Y.  40, 41 Kanehara Nobukatsu  47, 53 Kang Siew Kheng  142–​3 Karasawa Masayuki  112 Karen community  102, 103, 109, 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 170, 174 Karen National Defence Organisation  110 Karen Women’s Action Group  115 Karenni ethnic groups  103 Kasai, Teppei  139, 146, 148 Katada, S.  34 Kato, H.  40 Kato Katsunobu  157 Katō Kōichi  46 Katzenstein, P.  20 Kawaguchi Yoriko  84 Keidanren  84, 91 Kennedy, John F.  147 Kha Maung Thwe  106 Khin Nyunt, General  62, 63, 105 Khine Win  92 Kiguchi Yuka  158, 164 Kikuchi, D.  123, 149 Kikuta Mikiko  70 Kim, Jim Yong  94 Kimizuka Hiroshi  149 Kingsbury, D.  72, 83, 96 Kingston, Jeff  4, 35, 47, 49, 53, 55 Kirby, John  140 Kirin Holdings  139, 166 Kishi Nobusuke  40, 87, 172 Kishida Fumio  92, 135, 140–​1 Kitaoka Shinichi  45, 116 KNU (Karen National Union)  99 Kobsak Chutikul  132 Koga, K.  47–​8, 52 Koizumi Junichirō  45, 52 Komeito  64 Komura Masahiko  64, 67 Kon Tetsutaro  89 Kōno Tarō  123, 136, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147 Kouchner, Bernard  66 Kōyama Norio  86 KPSN (Karen Peace Support Network)  114–​15 Ku Oo Rei  117 Kudō Toshihiro  12, 69, 83, 154 Kunimatsu Takaji  123–​4 Kuomintang  103 Kuroda, Kōji  85, 86, 87, 88 Kyaukphyu SEZ  130

Kyaw Soe Oo  141–​2 Kyaw Yin Hlaing  71–​2 L Lall, M.  63, 65, 69, 70, 71, 77, 83–​4, 96, 117–​18 Lam, Peng Er  11, 42, 46, 110 land appropriations  82, 91, 106, 115, 130, 138 Laoutides, C.  72, 75, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132 law enforcement  51 lawfare  73 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party)  6, 40, 46, 49, 64, 123 Lee, Yanghee  132 left-​wing intellectuals  38 legal reform  89 Leider, J.P.  128, 129 Letpadaung copper mine  77 Lewis, S.  137, 138, 139 LIAS (Leiden University Institute of Area Studies)  24 liberal international order  6, 34–​58, 85, 94, 168, 171, 172 Lintner, Bertil  110 loans  48, 70, 81, 84, 112 Lowy Institute  34 M Ma Ba Tha (Organization for the Protection of Race & Religion)  73–​4, 151 MacLean, K.  73 Maday Island  83 Mahn Win Khaing Than  155 Malacca Straits  3, 83 Malaysia  42 Mälksoo, M.  31 Manchurian Incident  38 marginalized/​excluded discourses  29, 31, 73, 113 maritime security  47 Marubeni  84, 90 Maruyama Ichirō  86, 87, 127, 137, 148, 158 Marxist history  39 Masahiko Tanaka  87 masochistic views of history  51, 55 Maung Lwin  70 Max Myanmar  96 MEC (Myanmar Economic Corporation)  83–​4, 139, 158, 162, 166–​7 media freedom  51, 70, 71, 72, 142, 151, 173, 175 mediation  102–​25, 138, 160–​5, 170 Mega Hideshi  85 MEHL (Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited)  83–​4, 96, 139, 158, 162, 166, 167

227

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

Mehta, U.  37 Meiji Japan  6, 79, 87–​8, 99, 172 Meishuron pan-​Asianism  36–​7 Mekong subregion  9, 48–​9, 112, 124, 170, 171 Mekong Watch  81, 84, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 157, 164, 169–​70 Mekong-​Japan Action Plan  63 68 Mekong-​Japan Summit Meeting  68 mentor, Japan as  35, 37, 40, 41, 48, 50, 57, 87–​8 mercantilism  42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 53, 79, 91 Merkel, Angela  34, 35 methdology  27 METI (Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry)  39, 48, 61, 97 middle classes  63 Midford, P.  54 military  Fukuda Doctrine  42 Japan and the Myanmar military  101, 118–​19, 139, 166, 167–​8 and liberalism  37–​8 military elites  2, 58, 101, 132–​3, 140 military governments  71–​2, 77, 101, 105, 140, 153, 168–​9 military in Rakhine state  72–​3 post-​Second World War  41–​2 Military Intelligence Corps  63 Milliken, J.  31 Min Aung  141 Min Aung Hlaing, General  1, 132, 139, 145, 146, 147–​8, 153, 154, 155, 163, 164, 167 Mingaladon airport  84 Ministry of Defence  43, 47, 147 Mitsubishi  84, 86, 90 Mizutani, T.  87 modernization  18, 37, 62 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  February 2021 coup  158 Japan as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’  37, 39, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 56 Japan as ‘bridge’ in Myanmar’s democratization  61, 64, 65, 67–​8, 69, 71 Rakhine state conflict  110, 122, 136, 140, 148, 152 sanctions  161 Mon community  109, 116 Motegi, Foreign Minister  159, 160, 161, 164–​5 MOU (Memorandum of Understanding)  145, 147 MPC (Myanmar Peace Centre)  117, 119 MPSI (Myanmar Peace Support Initiative)  119 Mulgan, A.  54 multidisciplinarity  23 multilateralism  34, 47–​8, 64 Muranishi Michimi  138

Murota Yūsuke  86 Muslim communities  7, 72, 128–​9 see also Rohingyas Mya Hlaing  92, 95 Myanmar  ‘Asia’s last frontier’  3, 6, 9, 79, 85–​9, 99, 102, 173–​4 cheap labour  79, 85, 89, 90, 120, 170 and China  2, 3–​4, 62, 64, 82, 83, 137, 155 complexity of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts  102–​8 constitution  1, 66–​8, 71, 72, 77, 102, 169 democratization  1–​2, 11, 58, 59–​80 ethnic tensions  7, 101–​52 February 2021 coup  1, 83, 99, 119, 153–​68, 169, 175 labour markets  3 ‘pariah’ status  2–​3, 60, 62, 76, 153 peace-​building in Myanmar  101–​25 ‘roadmap to democracy’  60, 63, 66–​7, 78 Special Economic Zone (SEZ)  81–​100 special relationship  79, 87, 161–​2, 163, 172 transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  1, 2, 6–​7, 59–​80 values-​based diplomacy  58 Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum  112, 116 Myanmar Egress  63 Myanmar-​Japan Centre for Human Resources Development  118 Myitsone Dam  70, 83 N Nagai Kenji  64, 67, 68 Nagai Shinsuke  88, 89 Nagakoshi Yuzuki  138, 139, 148, 149 Nai Htaw Mon  109 Najib Razak  133 Nakagawa Masaharu  123–​4 Nakane Kazuyuki  144, 145 Nakanishi Yoshihiro  12, 127, 161 Nakasone Hirofumi  67 Nakayama Yasuhide  157, 158 Nandy, A.  29 Nanjing massacre  39 National Ceasefire Agreement  108 National Defence and Security Council  72 National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee  65 ‘national races’  130, 131 National Reconciliation Peace Centre  117 National Security Council  43 National Security Secretariat  47 National Verification Cards  155 nationalism  37, 39, 51, 53, 73, 109, 143, 171 nation-​building  136, 143–​4, 146, 147 Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team  108 natural disasters  65–​8

228

Index

Ne Win, General  10, 60–​1, 73, 105, 129–​30 Neistat, Anna  131 Nemoto Kei  11, 12, 149, 157 neocolonialism  29 neoimperialism  18 neoliberalism  18, 21, 82, 94 Nerdah Bo Mya, General  110 Neumann, I.  28–​9 neutrality  42 New Area Studies  17–​33, 168–​74 ‘New Commitment to Asia Speech’  48 New Zealand  47 Newby, V.  20 NGOs (non-​governmental organizations)  ethnic tensions  110 February 2021 coup  157 Japan’s ODA policy  56 Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  7, 65, 71 peace-​building in Myanmar  101 Rakhine state  74–​5, 76, 117, 121 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  81, 93, 94, 95 NHRC (National Human Rights Commission)  98 Nihonjinron texts  40 Nikai Toshishiro  49 Nippon Foundation  101, 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 117, 118, 119, 120–​1, 167 Nishimori Yuki  120 Nitobe Inazō  38 Nittetsu Mining Corporation  106 NLD (National League for Democracy)  ethnic tensions in Myanmar  105 February 2021 coup  1, 2, 152, 154 Myanmar’s transition to ‘disciplined democracy’  60, 61, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77 peace processes  117 Noda Yoshihiko  70 non-​interference principle  68, 133 non-​Western International Relations theory  25–​6 non-​Western other  37 North Korea  4, 43, 54 North-​South Corridor  113 NPA (National Police Agency)  51 NUG (National Unity Government)  33, 155 Numata Mikio  110 O Obama, Barack  69, 70 Obuchi Keizō  44 ODA (Official Development Assistance)  Charter  44–​5, 46, 62, 84, 98, 157 February 2021 coup  158, 160, 161 human rights  43, 44–​5, 46, 54–​5 human security  5, 44–​5 Japan to Myanmar  2, 60, 61, 84, 89

Japanese aid to Myanmar ethnic conflicts  109, 113 mercantilism  91 public-​private initiatives  90 Rakhine state  77, 137 regional visions  35 Thilawa SEZ  81 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development)  43, 54 Official Secrets Act  141, 142 Ogata Sadako  55–​6 Oguma, E.  39 Ohashi Masaaki  45 Ōhira Masayoshi  44 Ohmae, K.  21 oil and gas pipelines  3, 82–​3, 84 Okabe, H.  89 Okakura Tenshin  36 omote and ura  24 opium  103 Organization for the Protection of Race & Religion (Ma Ba Tha)  73–​4, 151 Organization of Islamic Cooperation  133 Orientalism  23 Ortmann, S.  20 Ōshima Kenzō  145, 161 Ōtaka Hiroshi  61 P pacifism  40, 43 Padoh Aung Win Shwe  121 pan-​Asianism  36–​7, 38, 41, 57 Panglong Agreement  104, 105, 108 ‘pariah’ status  2–​3, 60, 62, 76, 153 passive pacifism  43 paternalism  38 Pattison, S.  22 Paw Paul Sein Twa  114 PDEA (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)  51 peace processes  99, 101–​25, 127, 135–​9, 140–​9, 161–​2 peacekeeping  43, 45 Pedersen, M.  63, 71, 74, 103 People’s Defence Force  155 People’s Liberation Army  5 Physicians for Human Rights  91 piracy  3, 5, 43–​4 police  77 policy decision-​making  27–​8 political prisoner release  60, 62, 64, 68, 69, 72, 155, 169 Pompeo, Mike  132 populism  175 positionality, researcher  24–​5 ‘positive linkage’  60, 62, 64, 67, 70, 169 postcolonialism  10, 27, 29, 129 postmodernism  20 post-​politics world  94

229

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

poststructuralism  20, 28–​9, 30 poverty  45, 62, 114, 130 press freedom  51, 70, 71, 72, 141–​2, 151, 173, 175 privatization  83–​4 proactive pacifism  43, 54, 55, 70 pro-​democracy demonstrations  42–​3 protests  60–​1, 63, 77, 92, 154–​5, 157, 159, 160, 166 pseudo alliances  47 pseudo-​democracy  40 Q Quad  47 quiet diplomacy  40, 62, 64, 127, 134, 138, 143, 145, 161 Quintana, Tomas Ojea  73 R R2P (Responsibility to Protect)  66, 75 race, as concept  129–​30 racial equality  38 rail lines  10 Rakhine state  alternative discourses  174 ethnic tensions  7–​8, 9, 72–​8, 83, 108, 126–​52 Japan’s ‘Liberal Leadership’  126–​52 oil and gas pipelines  3 post-​February 1 2021 coup  170–​1 Rohingyas  119 violence in  60, 72–​8 Rakhine State Investment Fair  137, 139 rape  72, 131, 132, 148 reconciliation  140–​9 referenda  66 refugees  boat crises  76 camps  7, 74, 119, 143, 146 February 2021 coup  159 Japan  77, 121–​3, 125, 134, 149, 171 Karen community  103, 109, 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 170 repatriation  119–​24, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149–​50 Rohingyas  7, 8, 128–​31, 143, 146, 171 ‘regime of truth’  29, 31 regional aid policies  53 regional co-​prosperity  36, 40, 41 regional economic development  42 regional leadership  36 regional security  46–​9 regulatory support  81, 86, 89, 173 religious discrimination  73 remilitarization  42 reparations  10, 42 repatriations  119–​24, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149–​50 researcher positionality  24–​5

resettlement  94, 97, 146 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)  66, 75 Reuters  141–​2, 147, 151 ‘reversal of democracy’  67 revisionist agendas  47, 51, 57 Richardson, Bill  131–​2 rightful leaders of Asia (Asia no meishu)  38 right-​wing politics  47, 73, 171 riots  60 ‘roadmap to democracy’  60, 63, 66–​7, 78 Rohingyas  7–​8, 10, 60, 72–​8, 83, 84, 119, 127, 128–​33, 138, 140–​51, 170–​1 Rome Statute  75, 133 Rosario Manalo  146 Rossdale, C.  31 rubber  42, 83, 120 rule of law  6, 46, 51, 52, 73 Russia  62, 64, 175 S Saffron Revolution (2007)  2, 60, 63–​5, 78, 86 Sahashi, R.  52 Said, E.  23 Sakai, N.  18 sanctions  calls for international  132, 143, 148 damage to Japanese businesses  165, 167 February 2021 coup  156–​60 G7  62, 82 international community  138 Japan  42, 64, 136, 148, 159, 160–​1, 165 relaxation of  70, 76, 86, 87 UN (United Nations)  132, 147 urged by UNHCR  139 US (United States)  76, 159 Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA  159 Sasakawa Ryōchi  109 Sasakawa Yōhei  101, 108, 109, 154, 158–​9 Satake, T.  52 Satō Eisaku  87, 172 Saw Paul Sein Twa  114, 116 Saw Yan Naing  108, 109, 110, 115, 117, 119 Schabas, William  75 SDF (Self-​Defence Forces)  5, 34, 35, 43, 46, 118, 167, 170 Second World War  9–​10, 36, 38, 39, 103–​4, 129, 163, 172 Seekins, D.  8, 10–​11, 61, 82, 84, 129 Sekai  70 Seki, M.  85, 86, 87, 88 self-​determination  37 Sen, Amartya  55 SEZ (Special Economic Zone)  3, 6, 70, 77, 81–​100, 112, 130, 171, 174 Shan ethnic groups  103, 108 ‘Shared Values and Democracy in Asia’ Symposium’  52 Sherman, J.  106

230

Index

Shiina Estusaburō  41 Shimazu, N.  38 Shinyo Takahiro  161 Singapore  165 Sinic pan-​Asianism  36 Sino-​Japanese Wars  9 Sittwe  3, 146 SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council)  61, 62, 82–​5, 105 Smith, M.  12, 106, 133, 141 Smith, N.  21, 22 Smith, S.  19 Social Democratic Party  64 socialism  39 Söderberg, M.  6, 53, 70, 87 Soe Aung  102 Soe Win, General  139 sources  27 South, A.  102, 108, 117–​18 South China Sea  5–​6, 47, 48, 96, 112 South Korea  4, 86 Southern Economic Corridor  49, 82, 85, 95, 97–​100, 102, 112–​13, 124, 136, 170 SPDC (State Peace and Development Council)  62, 83, 84, 106 special relationship  79, 87, 161–​2, 163, 172 Spivak, G.C.  22, 26 state of emergency  72, 74, 154 State Secrets Law  51, 54, 142, 151, 173 state-​centric approach  116–​19, 168, 169–​ 70, 174–​5 statelessness  74–​5 state-​sanctioned violence  74–​5 Steinberg, D.  12 ‘String of Pearls’ strategy  3 student protests  60 subalterns  22, 26 Sudo Sueo  42 Suematsu Yoshinori  67, 68 Suga Yoshihide  140, 142, 157, 159 Sumitomo  84, 85, 90 Surin Pitsuwan  133 Suzuki Keiji  163 Suzuki Shogo  49 Szanton, D.  18, 21, 23, 26 T Taiwan  86 Takase, F.  93 Takasu Yukio  56 Takemasa Koichi  64–​5, 68 Takeuchi Takuro  87, 93 Takizawa Saburo  122, 159 Tanaka, C.  123 Tanaka Akihiko  92, 111, 112, 116 Tanaka Kakuei  42 Tanaka Kazufumi  137, 166 Tanaka Masahiko  87 Tanaka Masako  123

Tanino Sakutarō  46 Tanintharyi region  95, 97 Tatmadaw  aid  118 crimes against humanity  8, 84, 118–​19, 127, 132, 133, 167, 171 Dawei SEZ  99 ‘divide and conquer’  105 ethnic tensions  102, 103, 106, 107 February 2021 coup  1, 153, 154–​6, 162, 164 and the international community  110 Japan  136 and Japanese firms  139, 145 Rakhine state  73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 126, 141 refugee repatriation  148 Rohingyas  8, 128 role in ‘disciplined democracy’  62–​3, 118 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  82, 83, 87, 96 and the will of the people  146 tax breaks  85, 86, 90, 137 Taylor, R.  12 Teaist pan-​Asianism  36 technology  88, 89, 111, 112, 167 temporal othering  28–​9 temporality  50–​1, 79, 169, 172 terrorism  3, 143 Teruya Kantoku  64 Thailand  3, 7, 42, 76, 82, 97, 98, 105 Thakur, Ramesh  134 Thame, C.  93, 96, 97 Than Shwe, General  62, 63, 65 Than Tun Oo, General  119 Thant Myint-​U  12 Thein Sein, General  2, 6, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83, 85, 86, 87, 102, 118 Thilawa SEZ  6, 70, 77, 86, 89–​95, 100, 112, 114, 136, 166, 169–​70, 174 Thilawa Social Development Group  92 think tanks  63, 77 third country resettlements  121 Thirty Comrades  104 ‘thought leader,’ Japan as  35, 46, 48, 49, 59, 79, 82, 85–​9, 100, 111–​12, 162, 168–​74 ‘Three Pillars of Development Cooperation’  45 Tier 3 countries  76 timber  83, 103, 105, 107 trade routes  3, 9–​10, 113 trade wars  49 translation  23–​4 transnational production networks  9 Trans-​Pacific Partnership  6, 34, 49 Transparency International  84 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  46 Treaty of Versailles  37, 38 Trump, Donald  6, 7, 34, 49 Tsumori Shigeru  69, 71

231

DISCIPLINING DEMOCRACIES

tsunami  4 Tsuruoka Michito  160–​1 U U Mya Hlaing  92, 95 U Myint Thwin  91 U Nyan Win  64, 67, 68 U Nyi Pu  137 Uchida Hirofumi  142 UK  69 Ukraine  175 Umeda Kunio  71, 77, 110 UN (United Nations)  Advisory Commission on Rakhine State  126, 132, 138, 141, 144 Convention on Refugees  123 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness  74 Declaration of Human Rights  74 definition of crimes against humanity 118–​19, 141 February 2021 coup  161 General Assembly  131, 143 Human Rights Council  139, 146, 155 Independent International Fact-​Finding Mission on Myanmar  132, 138 Japanese representatives  56 ‘least developed country’ designation  60 liberal values  41 Memorandum of Understanding  145, 147 peacekeeping  5 Peacekeeping Cooperation law  43 Rakhine state conflict  76, 127, 131, 142, 144 sanctions  147 Under-​Secretary-​General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination  74 Security Council  5, 66, 132, 155 Special Advisers  64 Special Envoy for National Reconciliation in Myanmar  159 Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma  73, 140 Summit for Refugees and Migrants  122 Sustainable Development Goals  45 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)  44 UNHCR  76, 84, 119, 122, 123, 127, 149 UNFC (United Nationalities Federal Council)  108, 109 unions  71 universal values  6, 34–​5, 37, 45–​9, 51–​5, 57–​8, 77, 79–​80, 156, 157, 168, 172–​3 US (United States)  Area Studies  18 Asia policy  49

Democratic Security Diamond  47 ethnic tensions  110 February 2021 coup  159, 161 FOIP strategy  47 Freedom and Democracy Act  62 Freedom of Navigation Operations  6 Human Terrain System  23 International Relations (IR)  19 liberal international order  34, 37 Myanmar general election (November 2010)  69 occupation of Japan  39–​40 Rakhine state conflict  76, 138, 140, 142 sanctions  132, 148, 167 Trump presidency  6, 7, 34, 49 US-​Japan relations  4–​5, 50 Yoshida Doctrine  40 USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party)  68, 71, 72, 87, 96, 98 UWSA (United Wa State Army)  107 V value-​free research  24–​5 values-​based diplomacy  8, 34–​5, 46, 49, 52, 53–​4, 57–​8, 79, 154, 168, 173 van den Assum, Laetitia  138 victim narratives  39, 56 Vietnam  42, 49 Villumsen, T.  25 vocational training  92–​3 voting  66 W Wa Lone  141–​2 Wa state  107 Wæver, O.  19 war crimes  40, 109 Ware, A.  72, 75, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132 Watanabe Chika  100 Watanabe Hideo  61, 90, 163, 164, 165, 167 Watanabe Shogo  150 Watanabe Yusuke  163–​4 water supply  86, 92, 93 Welfare of the National Races  109 Wells, T.  94 Western-​centrism in IR  19, 20, 23, 25, 27 West/​non-​West split in Area Studies  18, 25–​6 Wilson, Woodrow  37 Win Myint  146 Woods, K.  62, 105, 106 World Bank  84, 94, 165 World War II  9–​10, 36, 38, 39, 103–​4, 129, 163, 172 Wunna Maung Lwin  158 X Xi Jinping  4, 52

232

Index

Y Yachi Shōtarō  47 Yadana gas field  84 Yamaguchi Yōichi  71 Yamamoto Tadamichi  161 Yamao Shiori  157 Yanaihara Tadao  38 Yangon region  63, 86, 90, 113, 136, 144, 155 Yangon Stock Exchange  89 Y-​Complex redevelopment project  166

Yoshida Doctrine  28, 36, 40, 43 Yoshitsugu Kōsuke  70, 71 Yunnan province (China)  3, 103 Z Zakowski, K.  46, 47 Zarni, M.  75, 76, 129, 130 Zaw Htay  140, 146 Zaw Zaw  96 Zawacki, B.  75 Zehfuss, M.  30, 31

233