Disaster Risk Governance: Four Cases from Developing Countries 9781138225022, 9781315401171

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Disaster Risk Governance

Disaster Risk Governance offers the first extensive engagement with disaster risk governance in the Caribbean and sub-­Saharan Africa. In the last 15 years, Kenya, Jamaica, Dominica, and Zanzibar have all suffered massive destruction from disasters caused by natural hazards. Despite the tremendous investments in disaster risk reduction (DRR), disasters have wiped out the developmental gains of these countries. In this book, Denise D. P. Thompson argues that disaster risk governance (DRG) as a practical and academic matter has not been given the attention it deserves, and as a result, this neglect has undermined the time, money and resources invested in DRR in developing countries since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thompson proposes that properly conceptualizing DRG based on context will help to address some of the deficiencies. Consequently, DRG needs to become a central focus, particularly for developing countries. Written with real-­life implications for developing countries, Disaster Risk Governance is perfectly suited for practitioners and researchers in area studies, disaster risk reduction and disaster governance, as well as students of disaster studies. Denise D. P. Thompson is a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York. Her research work and publications focus on disaster risk reduction and governance, vulnerability, and disaster supply chain and logistics in multi-­state systems in the Caribbean and sub-­Saharan Africa. In addition to her research work, Denise Thompson teaches classes in public policy, organization theory and emergency management, and works to develop curricula and program improvement initiatives to improve student learning outcomes in these areas.

Disaster Risk Governance

Four Cases from Developing Countries

Denise D. P. Thompson

First published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Taylor & Francis The right of Denise Thompson to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-22502-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-40117-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of Figures List of Tables List of Boxes Acknowledgments List of Acronyms

  1 Introduction

vi vii viii ix xi 1

Part i

19

  2 Over Four Decades of Ignoring Disaster Risk Governance

21

  3 Disaster Risk Governance in Developing Countries: Making Conceptual Connections

39

  4 Disaster Risk Governance

62

  5 Institutions: The Centerpiece of Governance

75

Part ii

107

  6 Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica

109

  7 Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica

138

  8 Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya

163

  9 Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar

191

10 Disaster Risk Governance in Developing Countries

213



Index

225

Figures

1.1 Destruction Caused by Natural Hazards in the Caribbean, 2000–2017 6.1 National Disaster Committee Organization Structure 8.1 Kenya’s New Devolved System 8.2 Structure of County Government in Kenya 9.1 Zanzibari NCDM Structure and Coordination Mechanism

5 123 169 170 206

Tables

1.1 Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 6.1 Disaster Impact in Jamaica, 2000–2018 6.2 Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix, Jamaica 7.1 Probabilistic Risk Profile of Dominica, 1990–2014 7.2 Disaster Impact in Dominica, 2000–2018 7.3 Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix, Dominica 8.1 Disaster Impact in Kenya, 2000–2018 8.2 Kenya Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 9.1 Annual Direct Losses (US$) 2016, Zanzibar 9.2 Multidimensional Poor and Vulnerable Population in Zanzibar 9.3 Zanzibar Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 10.1 Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix

12 110 133 140 141 157 164 185 193 193 208 216

Boxes

5.1 5.2 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1

Regionalism Colonialism Jamaica Learns Lessons from Hurricane Gilbert 1988 Hurricane Maria Pummels Dominica Climate Change Exacerbates the Drought Challenges in Kenya Zanzibar Faces Challenges in Preparing for Climate Change

82 88 122 139 177 192

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been completed without the help and guidance of several people to whom I am indebted: My family, for giving me the time and space to write. Danny Nembhard, for giving guidance on the conceptual and analytical framework. My research assistants, Tyresa Jackson and Monica Zambrano Saquicela, for conducting research, developing tables, and the table of contents for the book. Material for this book is based on research conducted in Kenya, Zanzibar, Jamaica, and Dominica during the summers of 2016 and 2017 and I would like to say thanks to these colleagues. In Kenya I would like to thank my friend Wasye Musyoni, Program Manager at Norwegian Church Aid, who arranged my appointments and site visits in Nairobi, Lake Naivasha, and rural villages. Wasye made sure that everything ran smoothly while I was in Kenya. To Arnold Ambundo from Act Alliance, and colleagues at the Ministry of the Interior and Coordination, National Disaster Operations Center, who allowed me to sit in on the National Platform meeting, June 28–30, 2017, to learn about the progress made on the national work plan in disaster risk reduction 2016–2020. James Origa, for the many documents he provided on DRR in Kenya as well as for his time to sit and talk about the issues. In Jamaica I would like to thank Major Clive C. Davis, Director General, Sophia Mitchell Regional Coordinator Eastern Jamaica for Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM); Terry Forrester, Parish Disaster Coordinator for Kingston and St. Andrew; and Phillipa Ricketts, Edmund Parish Disaster Coordinator for the Municipality of Portmore. Ms. Clare Bernard, Deputy Director General at the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) in charge of Sustainable Development and Social Planning, who helped me to develop my conceptual frame for my case studies and directed me to critical materials and contacts. In Zanzibar, I am appreciative to Aboud Jumbe, Head of the Policy, Planning and Research Unit at the Department of the Environment, Second Vice President’s Office, Zanzibar and the Department of Environment; and to Mr. Amani Mussa Ali Peace, IT Officer, Zanzibar Disaster Management Commission. In Dominica, I am thankful for the help of Jeremy Collymore, former executive director of CDEMA.

x   Acknowledgments I am indebted to my college, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and my university, the City University of New York, for their support in the form of grant funding, a book award to help with editing, and course release so that I could conduct the research and write this book. I also owe thanks to my department—the Department of Public Management—for allowing me time during the semester to get my writing finished.

Acronyms

ACP-­EU AfRP ALRMP AMISOM ASEAN AU BPOA CARICOM CBCD CBDRR CBOs CCDM CCM CCRIF CDC CDEMA CDERA CDM CHC CIDP CoFMAs CPA CPACCP CPIA CUF DAC DCF DMD DPP DRG DRM DRR

African, Caribbean and Pacific-­European Union Africa Regional Platform Arid Lands Resource Management Project African Union Mission to Somalia Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Barbados Plan of Action Caribbean Community and Common Market Community-­based Disaster Management Committee Community-­based Disaster Risk Reduction community-­based organizations community-­based comprehensive disaster management Chama Cha Mapinduzi Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility Center for Disease Control Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency comprehensive disaster management Coordination and Harmonization Council County Integrated Development Plans community forest management agreements Country Poverty Assessment Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Global Climate Change Project Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Civic United Front Development Assistance Committee Drought Contingency Fund Disaster Management Department Director of Public Prosecutions disaster risk governance disaster risk management disaster risk reduction

xii   Acronyms EAC EDD EIA EIB EOC EU GDP GEF GFCCC GIS GNI GOJ HIP IAWG IDA IEBC IGAD IMF INGO IOC IPCC ISDR JCF JDF JFB JIS KDF KFSM KFSSG KMKM KRC KSAC LAPA LGA MDAs MDGs MoJCA MRALGSD MSI MSI+5 NAO NCDM NDC NDCC

East African Community empowered deliberative democracy environmental impact assessment European Investment Bank Emergency Operations Center European Union gross domestic product Global Environment Facility Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction geographic information system gross national income Government of Jamaica Harmonized Implementation Program Inter-­Agency Working Group International Development Association Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Monetary Fund international non-­governmental organization Indian Ocean Commission Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Jamaica Constabulary Force Jamaica Defense Force  Jamaica Fire Brigade Jamaica Information Service Kenya Defense Force Kenya Food Security Meeting Kenya Food Security Steering Group Kikosi Mddlum Kuuia Magendo Kenya Red Cross Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation local adaptation plans of action local government authority ministries, departments and agencies Millennium Development Goals Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ministry of State Regional Administration and Local Government and Special Departments Mauritius Strategy of Implementation Mauritius Strategy Implementation five years after network administrative organization National Committee for Disaster National Disaster Committee National Disaster Coordinating Committee

Acronyms   xiii NDE NDMA NDMP NDMU NDO NDOC NDP NE NEO NEOC NEPAD NEPO NGO NP NPDRR NPS NRT NSGRP II NYS NZP OAS OCHA ODPEM ODM OECD OECS PDC PIOJ PMO-­DMD PVO RGOZ SADC SIDS SCCAF SDCs SOP SW SWIO RAFI TDCS TEPRP TSH UK UN UN DESA

National Disaster Executive National Drought Management Authority National Disaster Management Policy National Disaster Management Unit National Disaster Office National Disaster Operations Centre National Disaster Plan National Executive National Emergency Operation National Emergency Operations Center New Partnership for Africa Development National Emergency Planning Organization non-­governmental organization National Platform National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction National Police Service National Response Team Second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty National Youth Service National Zonal Program Organization of Amer­ican States Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Office for Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Office of Disaster Management Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization of Eastern Caribbean States parish disaster committee Planning Institute of Jamaica Prime Minister’s Office Disaster Management Department public volunteer organization Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar Southern Africa Development Cooperation small island developing states Special Climate Change Adaptation Fund Shehia Development Committees standard operating procedure south-­west Southwest Indian Ocean Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Tanzania Disaster Communication Strategy Tanzania Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan Tanzanian shilling United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

xiv   Acronyms UNDP UNESCO UNFCCC UNISDR USA USAID WB ZAWA ZCCAP ZCCS ZDMF ZECO ZEMA ZEPRP ZUSP ZMC ZNP ZPPP ZSGRP ZURA

United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction United States of America United States Agency for International Development World Bank Zanzibar Water Authority Zanzibar Climate Change Action Plan Zanzibar Climate Change Strategy Zanzibar Disaster Management Fund Zanzibar Electricity Corporation Zanzibar Environmental Management Authority Zanzibar Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan Zanzibar Urban Services Project Zanzibar Municipal Council Zanzibar Nationalist Party Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty Zanzibar Utility Regulatory Authority

1 Introduction

In this book, I argue that disaster risk governance (DRG) is a significant factor in explaining disaster outcomes in developing countries. I use the term disaster risk governance to mean the specific arrangements that societies put in place to manage their disaster risks within the broader context of governance. However, as the chapter on disaster risk governance will show, the concept’s definition is far from settled because its root concept “governance” is contested. Disaster risk governance is the central focus of this book because of its centrality in disaster risk reduction. Weak governance is a disaster risk driver linked to other risk drivers, including poverty, individual disempowerment, inadequate risk reduction infrastructure, inadequate capacity and so on (see PreventionWeb, 2015) that conflate to increase vulnerability. Done right, DRG helps to connect and then steer multiple processes, leveraging them to reduce disaster risks and our exposure to them. In that regard, disaster risk governance brings a more coherent strategy to our efforts to reduce disaster risks so as to improve its outcomes. This book focuses on disasters that result from natural hazards, including climate change in four developing ­countries—Kenya, Zanzibar, Jamaica, and Dominica—arguing that DRG is the missing ingredient that hampers positive disaster outcomes. In doing so, the book is framed around the following key questions: (1) Why is disaster risk governance central to achieving disaster risk reduction in developing countries? (2) How does context frame DRG? (3) What is the state of DRG in Kenya, Zanzibar, Jamaica, and Dominica? (4) Are there commonalities among the better-­ performing and the poorer-­performing countries? Disasters that result from natural hazards have long shown us their destructive force. Over the last several decades or so, though, their life and death impacts have been demonstrated with more frequency, killing many, wiping out entire communities, destroying national economies, and retarding development and growth. No efforts should be spared to manage their effects. To be clear, disasters impact all countries, but the governments and disaster managers of developing countries face the unenviable task of confronting their devastation and improving outcomes amid severe constraints that have their genesis in a variety of root causes—political, economic, social, world systems, mismanagement, inadequate capacity, and so on.

2   Introduction The poor, most of whom live in developing countries, are often more exposed and almost always more vulnerable than more affluent populations. World Bank (2018) data show that from “1995 through 2014, 89% of storm-­related fatalities occurred in lower-­income countries, even though these countries experienced just 26% of storms.” Disaster losses often push developing countries backwards as resources have to be shuffled around to mount a response to and work to recover from the impact of natural-­hazard-related disasters. Hallegatte et al. (2016), in Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty, found that approximately 75% of the losses in economic growth are attributable to extreme weather events. Climate change threatens to push an additional 100 million people into extreme poverty by 2030. For instance, modeling data show that climate-­change-driven disasters could significantly reduce food availability in poor regions in Africa by lowering crop yield by as much as 30% by 2080 and resulting losses in income (Hallegatte et al., 2016). Moreover, developing countries are often not in a position to recover from disaster by themselves, nor are their neighbors able to come to their assistance since many are typically in a similar position developmentally. Internally, individuals are often not connected to risk transfer tools or social safety net programs (see Baarsch & Kelman, 2016) to support them through turbulent times. Within these contexts, disasters may upend efforts to eradicate poverty, build resilience and the push a sustainable development agenda (Hallegatte et al., 2016). Although a challenge for all countries, poverty remains a vexing and profound problem in developing countries. No consensus exists on what the problem of poverty is, and there is no scientifically agreed upon definition of this political term, “poverty” (Alcock, 2006). The term remains contested, but an argument can be made for why we should try to understand it. Simply, poverty constrains options—livelihood, life prospects such as choices about food, where one lives, goes to school, educational opportunities, choices about what to do pre- and post-­disaster, are all impacted by poverty. To understand poverty, we need a multidimensional lens because of its many aspects, layers and interconnections. Using a multidimensional index better connects the fact of people’s actual existence and deprivation caused by underdevelopment, lack of access and poverty. By examining the multiple dimensions of the system, a more integrated approach can be taken to fixing the problems associated with underdevelopment (Khoday, 2018) and disasters. For instance, broad categories such as structure of the economy, resource prices, local institutions, property rights, entitlements, access, gender, race, and ethnic relations cause some households and individuals themselves to increase the environment for disasters, affirming what has long been reported in the development and gender literature. Even as we work to develop countries, improve their growth prospects as well as the prosperity of their people, contradictions exist in development policies and practices being pushed as their remedy. Indeed, some have successfully argued that modern development is one of the root causes of the planet’s crisis

Introduction   3 (Khoday, 2018), resulting in large-­scale vulnerabilities among individual, groups, and countries. New thinking on development, including the latest global development framework—the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—seems to be better comporting to the interconnections of sustained development, risk exposure, vulnerability and ecological balance. Recent global development frameworks have begun to place emphasis on this balance as a critical factor in sustainable development (Khoday, 2018). The need for this balance is very present in developing countries since many are experiencing the ill effects of ecological imbalance on their people’s daily lives with high frequency and intensity. The increasing regularity of disasters and the number of deaths, as well as the rising cost of rebuilding, have justified the focus on and investments in disaster risk reduction since the late 1980s. In the last 15 years, Kenya, Jamaica, Dominica, and, to a lesser extent, Zanzibar have all suffered significant destruction from disasters caused by natural hazards. Post-­disaster needs assessments from these disasters tend to highlight weaknesses around resourcing, capacity, funding, and coordination among actors in different measures across these countries. These gaps signify a need for a more coherent strategy to plan for disasters in the developing country context.1 These issues have their basis in disaster risk governance (DRG). As a practical matter, DRG is not being given the attention it deserves, causing gaps in DRR, and these gaps, in turn, have undermined the time, money and resources invested in DRR since the late 1970s and early 1980s. As such, the DRR paradigm in developing countries needs a refocus. Three of the countries covered in the book (Zanzibar, Jamaica, and Dominica) are small island developing states (SIDS), which are a subset of developing countries. The other (Kenya) is a continental country located in sub-­Saharan Africa. Small island developing states are a group of just over 50 small developing countries and territories mainly concentrated in tropical and sub-­tropical areas in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and off the coast of West Africa in the Atlantic Ocean (Kelman & West, 2009; Watson, Zinyoweru, & Moss, 2000). A few small islands such as Malta and Cyprus lie outside these areas in the Mediterranean Sea. The SIDS designation came in April 1994 at the first Global Conference on Sustainable Development in Barbados. The conference adopted the Barbados Program of Action (UN, 1994), which was updated a decade later in the Mauritius Strategy (UN, 2005). Although not a monolith, SIDS are alike in fundamental ways. They share peculiar vulnerabilities and characteristics that make them particularly susceptible to disasters caused by natural hazards2—listed by the United Nations as a particular group of developing countries, SIDS face higher vulnerability than larger islands and continental states. They are prone to disasters that result from natural hazards and have fewer resources to dedicate to comprehensive disaster planning and disaster risk reduction. Moreover, one hazard can impact multiple small islands in the same region, rendering them incapable of helping each other in a disaster (UN, 2005). Besides, SIDS’ small size, isolation, natural hazard vulnerability, and their economic risk exposures place additional strains on their

4   Introduction economies, ecology, and physical and social infrastructure that impact their ability to respond to disasters and recover from them. Natural-­hazard-related disasters continually erode their development achievements (Possekel, 2012; World Bank, 2018). For example, most of these countries are small coastal states where hazard events such as a storm or an earthquake may cover most of their territory, leaving the remaining unaffected parts unable to fund the recovery process internally. The 2017 hurricane in Dominica resulted in damage and destruction of around 220% of GDP (Government of Dominica, 2017) and massive displacement and loss of livelihood. Inaction to reduce the effects of climate change among Caribbean SIDS could cost them 5% of GDP by 2025 and 10% by 2050 (UN-­OHRLLS, 2015). Much of the country’s capital stock and public infrastructure are exposed to storm surges, flooding and high wind because of their concentration in coastal areas. Although not the only or most significant development indicator, such high average GDP losses represent a severe drag on long-­term development. Moreover, continued erosion of GDP will, over time, serve to wipe out development gains, leaving many residents socially vulnerable. More fundamental still, SIDS are likely to face rapid and high levels of urbanization to the few larger cities; gender inequality because of patrimonial practices; and illegal extraction of resources undergirded mainly by corruption and government ineffectiveness. Moreover, structural characteristics such as physical isolation, small population size, and limited resources increase the opportunity for disasters to escalate into crises. The enormous level of vulnerability that comes with small size prompted the 1994 UN Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. The conference focused on more deliberately addressing their vulnerabilities. A significant product of the conference was the Barbados Plan of Action (1994), which was “a blueprint for sustainable development of SIDS.” No country, developed or developing, large or small, escapes the ravaging effects of disasters. Even as this book was being written, there were multiple hazard impacts that have resulted in disasters. Over 800 people have died in an earthquake and a tsunami triggered by the 7.5 magnitude earthquake off the coast of Indonesia (Wei-­Has, 2018). The earthquake and tsunami combination was the second such sequence of events in 13 years. Wildfires are raging in California and have killed close to a hundred so far. A bridge collapse in Italy, droughts followed by flooding in Kenya in 2018, flash flooding in the UK in 2018, monsoon rain destruction and deaths in Kerala, India, in 2018 and the list goes on. However, developing countries suffer more losses and deaths when they experience disasters, and recovery is more challenging. Michel-­Kerjan et al. (2012) found that economic losses in middle-­income countries amounted to about 1% of GDP (1970–2006), compared with less than 0.1% of GDP losses for high-­income countries, and 95% of deaths because of disaster that result from natural hazards take place in developing countries. This point has been repeatedly validated (e.g.,

Introduction   5 see Schipper & Pelling, 2006; Michel-­Kerjan et al., 2012; UNISDR, 2012; World Bank, 2018; Kahn, 2003; Possekel, 2012). People who are marginalized socially, economically, culturally, politically, and institutionally are especially vulnerable to disasters, and per capita, developing countries house relatively more of these people. The same scale hazard can cause a much bigger disaster in developing countries, making them even more vulnerable. In the Caribbean, the need for humanitarian assistance more than doubled from US$3.3 billion in 2011 to US$7.2 billion in 2014 (OCHA, 2016), and costs are rising. Figure 1.1 provides a general overview of disasters’ impacts on select Caribbean islands, tracking disaster losses since 2000.

US$27 billion damages and losses between 2000 and 2017 in 13 of CDB’s member countries.

The 2010 Earthquake in Haiti resulted in US$8.1bn or 114% of GDP in losses.

Tropical Storm Erika in Dominica 2015 US$483mn or 90% of GDP in losses.

Hurricane Maria 2017 in Dominica US$1.3bn or 200% of GDP (Griffith, S 2018).

Irma 2017 Anguilla: US$332 million.

Figure 1.1  Destruction Caused by Natural Hazards in the Caribbean, 2000–2017. Source: Jeremy Collymore (2018) “Social Security: Supporting a Culture of National Resilience.” Public Lecture in Support of Anguilla’s Social Security Board.

6   Introduction Jamaica has had a long history of natural-­hazard-related disasters dating back to 1559, when the first recorded hurricane caused extensive damage to the entire island.3 More recently, an examination of disasters that result from natural hazards in Jamaica shows that between 2000 and 2018 there have been some 20 major disaster events in Jamaica, killing over 115 people, affecting 864,894, and causing over US$27.5 million in assessed damage (Guha-­Sapir, 2017).4 Jamaica’s disaster risk governance system is the most developed of the countries in this study because its institutional context is the most developed. It has had three watershed moments (1988, 2004, and 2007) that served to shift disaster risk reduction paradigms, strengthen its resolve, and set it on a path to building a more coherent disaster risk governance framework: “Do not wait for the last minute to make the decision to move from where you are. Decide now and begin to make arrangements to leave now” [said Prime Minister Simpson-­Miller]. Thousands heeded the call and headed inland to towns where people were stockpiling tinned food, water, flashlights, blankets, candles, and plywood. However, others decided to stay.  (Carroll, 2007) They would live to regret that decision. Around 45 of those people died as a result. In its 2012 assessment of the state of DRR in Jamaica, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) (2012) estimated that if DRR measures were not taken seriously by all, not just some, the magnitude of the damage and losses were expected to increase significantly. The PIOJ estimated that losses would move from an average 2% of GDP in the years 2000–2010 to close to 14% by 2025. The country’s most significant hindrances were under-­capacity, financing and a lack of incentives, but in Jamaica, the norms were changing. Between 2000 and 2018 there have been some five significant disaster events in Dominica, killing around 118, affecting around 107,7575 and causing around US$2.5 billion in damage (Guha-­Sapir, 2017), mostly accounted for by Hurricane Maria. Hurricane Maria losses amounted to 226% of gross domestic product based on 2016 figures (ReliefWeb, 2018). It is no stranger to disasters, having experienced Hurricane Lenny in 1999, Hurricane Dean in 2007 took 20% of the country’s annual GDP, Tropical Storm Erika in 2015 destroyed 90% of the country’s GDP, and Hurricane Maria took over 220% of Dominica’s GDP. These storms severely damaged farming, fisheries, agriculture, and tourism—the island’s primary economic sectors. In Tropical Storm Erika in 2015, damage and loss amounted to EC$1.3 billion, or US$482 million, and Hurricane Maria obliterated almost every industry and public infrastructure. However, up until Hurricane Maria, Dominica maintained a response posture. In Kenya, between the years 2000 and 2018 there have been some 78 disaster events, killing over 2,116; around 24,568,975 were affected, and the economy experienced over US$236 billion in damage (Guha-­Sapir, 2017). Droughts ­continue to affect the population, ranging from several hundred to the tens of

Introduction   7 thousands in any given year. Moreover, although Kenya established several disaster-­related organizations when it signed on to the Hyogo Framework for action, the 2017 assessment by Schultink and Chatterjee (2017) put into stark terms Kenya’s continued experience with droughts and its impacts: Looking at newspaper headlines, one would think that droughts are confined to the dry, arid areas of Kenya. However, often unnoticed is the insidious effect on the country’s economy. Experts estimate that there have been twelve severe droughts since 1990. The average annual cost of the damage caused to crops is estimated at around KHS125 billion/US$1.25 billion— with each drought reducing the country’s gross domestic product by an average of 3.3%. The longer-­term effect of the drought episodes on women and children are insidious but are not represented in these numbers. Consider this: 2.6 million people in Kenya are severely food insecure, 370,000 children and 37,000 pregnant and lactating women are severely malnourished; the health consequences of this will be catastrophic if not urgently addressed. (Schultink & Chatterjee, 2017) Zanzibar is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change given its size, physical and social vulnerability, and location. Floods, tropical cyclones, and earthquakes cause around US$2.2 million in disaster losses per year, or around 2.6% of the country’s annual GDP (World Bank, 2016). The Zanzibari islands have already begun to experience the adverse effects of climate with the most extreme changes coming since 2005. A high percentage of its GDP is directly or indirectly associated with climate-­sensitive sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and fisheries (UKAID et al., 2012). The 2005 flood was the result of the highest intensity of rainfall on record (UKAID et al., 2012; World Bank, 2016). Around 10,000 people were made homeless, and the estimated economic cost was about 0.5% GDP. The 2007 drought resulted in one of the worst agricultural harvests on record and reduced the island’s GDP by some 2–4%, and led to 300,000 malnourished persons in 2008 (UKAID et al., 2012). Although progress has been made in implementing the priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action, no definite and coherent strategy exists in Zanzibar to promote investment in DRR. Developing countries do not necessarily experience more hazards, but they do bear a significantly higher proportion of the deaths and destruction from them. The extent of relative economic damage and fatalities are by far more substantial in developing countries as a percentage of their GDP (World Bank, 2018). Indeed, weather-­related disaster wealth losses are moving at a faster pace than wealth is being created in developing countries (UNISDR, 2012, p. 5). It is time to rethink the way we plan for and organize our actions to reduce the risks and prepare for disasters more effectively.

8   Introduction

Conceptual Framework The fact that there have been significant DRR investments, mostly through projects and other international and regional aid in these developing countries, but with a significantly lower return on this investment, means a strategic rethinking of approach and strategies to achieve DRR is required. Most of these countries have laws, organizations, networks, capabilities, and resources that are meant to handle disasters, but these tend to be uneven in developing countries (Tierney, 2012), and limited in many cases. These challenges for DRG in developing countries are all contingent upon a frayed governance context that is not streamlined to leverage legislation, local knowledge, and institutions, or develop the capacities and resources necessary to promote disaster risk reduction. The conceptual model utilized here proposes that both the hard and soft institutions are central to disaster risk governance. The term “institutions” is used to mean the specific apparatus for crafting and enforcing laws, regulations and standards on DRR and the delivery of DRR initiatives. Put differently: institutions are legislation, organizations, actors, and incentives that regulate decisions, organizations, and activities, and the social rules or norms that structure social interaction around these. The actors and incentives are included as part of the institutional context because they set the norms and context for DRG. Although institutions are different from the organizations that function under them (Schiavo-­Campo & McFerson, 2008), organizations are included in the institutional context because they help to regulate social interaction and human behavior and, as such, they are an essential aspect of the DRG context. In an earlier work, Jones et al. (2016) identify three specific contexts of disaster risk governance—stakeholder, institutions and incentives contexts. They define the “stakeholder context” of DRR as those involved in implementing DRR, the relationships among them, and the role of power in these relationships. Their argument accepts that state functions are being redistributed “upwards” to international institutions, “downwards” to regional and local tiers of authority and “outwards” to a range of non-­state actors. The “institutional context” is the specific “apparatus” for enforcement of regulations and standards and the delivery of DRR initiatives (e.g., formal organizational structures, legislative and judicial context, and divisions of responsibilities and roles for DRR) (Jones et al., 2016), but also the informal norms around disasters and our need to plan for them. Successive waves of public sector reform can undermine institutional coherence and weaken efforts to achieve disaster risk reduction (ibid.), especially if the norms are underdeveloped or missing. The “incentive context” includes efforts to promote risk reduction or restrict risk-­promoting behavior at all levels including at the individual level. In DRR, emphasis is still placed on high-­cost, corrective approaches rather than on proactive, lower-­cost actions (Gall, Cutter, & Nguyen, 2014). The right mix of incentives could, over time, result in tipping points for behavioral change in disaster risk reduction and risk-­sensitive choices. For instance, our tendency to prefer providing

Introduction   9 private goods to the detriment of public goods provision or for political patronage in disaster relief are disincentives to disaster risk reduction (Jones et al., 2016). So too are our propensity for rent-­seeking or corruption (e.g., collusion between corrupt building contractors and building inspectors) (Jones et al., 2016). While the framework used by Jones et al. (2016) includes essential aspects of governing, I believe the authors’ formulation is incomplete. First, the authors focus on the hard institutional context to the neglect of softer institutions (culture and norms) that undergird the formal institutions. Culture develops and evolves from shared experiences and not only shapes societal values and norms but also integrates values and norms into observable patterns (Schein, 1990). Observable patterns are the artifacts—the visible manifestation—of fundamental, second-­ nature assumptions. Second, hard and soft institutions are not to be understood in a binary sense but are more nuanced, with hard and soft institutions residing in each of the formal and informal domains of governance; the concepts are fluid (e.g., whether we know it or not, our lived experiences, how we perceive them, how we make sense of them, how we react to these experiences, shape the formal legal basis of societies) (Shaffer & Pollack, 2011). So, the actors and incentives contexts are not distinct from the hard or formal institutions; the institution is constitutive of actors and incentives. I propose that the institutional aspects are the key governance component and that the actors working within the formal and informal institutional contexts are a significant part of the institutional context, as are the culture and norms, legislation, and organizations. Institutions include formal organizations and groups but go beyond them to also include informal non-­legal norms as well. Norms are cultural products (including values, customs, and traditions) that represent collective representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual perceptions of particular group conduct (Bicchieri et al., 2018). The actors and their relationships within specific policy domains display certain values and norms that influence decisions and outcomes. Their actions shape the disaster architecture and influence policy; they are the responders and planners whose work affects disaster outcomes. How local actors are integrated or marginalized into this process—clear roles and responsibilities, including participation in planning and decision-­making—determine the success of the policies and programs created and their longevity. As essential parts of the process, local actors will defend policies that they were instrumental in creating; otherwise, they will not. Groups of individuals (political parties, government agencies, companies, NGOs and CBOs as well as clubs) collaborating around a common purpose share specific norms common to those groups (Raschky, 2008; World Bank, 2010). Values and norms must, therefore, be seen as central to governing. They display foundations of our belief systems and shared values that get transformed into social and economic policies and actions over time. National culture—the set of beliefs and customs, values, norms, and behaviors that exist within the population—influences social development outcomes. Hofstede (2013) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from others.”

10   Introduction National culture is learned by age ten and is very difficult to change or to manage. In fact, Hofstede (2013) found that we could not manage how national culture shaped personality because of how it works at the subconscious level. National culture, more than regional culture, shapes personality along dimensions such as openness, conscientiousness and personality type. Using the World Values Survey, Hofstede and McCrea (2004), in cross-­national studies in 30 countries, found that mean personality scores differ along national culture dimensions. Moreover, in government service delivery, Mayfield and Mayfield (2012) found that cultural models, especially dynamic cultural models, may be good predictors of infrastructure development in the countries studied. The fact that most DRR organizations are underfunded in developing countries is not a coincidence. Even today in certain quarters (e.g., in ethnic groups) there are carry-­ over views about the nature of disaster, believing them to be acts of God. This thinking must catch up with the current knowledge on DRR that promotes risk reduction and disaster management. Also, government funding allocations and spending usually have to be carefully balanced between competing priorities that are biased towards existing current needs over potential needs that may only arise if there is a disaster. Further, government ineffectiveness is starker in policy domains such as DRR where there are sometimes years between disasters. Legislation provides the formal, rule-­based context for disaster risk reduction. Legislations form the codified aspects of policy decisions—laws, regulations, rules, and standards. Legislation sets the tone for how we manage disaster agencies: resource availability, including funding; their location in the government bureaucracy; agency structure and power distribution; the direction of disaster risk reduction in countries and communities; and so much more. Much of the progress made in disaster risk reduction in the case study countries is due to legislative and policy changes that have established the enabling environment for disaster risk reduction activities. There is no single definition of what an organization is because there are so many different varieties. In its simplest definition, an organization is a system of consciously coordinated activities and people organized to accomplish a particular goal (Barnard, 1938), or a collection of interacting and interdependent individuals who work toward common goals and whose relationships are determined according to a particular structure (Duncan, 1981). Within each organization, people generally share a common set of norms, and these norms shape their behaviors and activities in achieving the organization’s goals. By taking on a distinctive set of values, each organization acquires a character, a structure, and an identity. This character makes organizations part of the institutional context. In many, if not most, developing countries, disaster risk reduction organizations share a standard set of norms. They are usually, as the study countries show, scrambling for resources, and lack the vital technology and skillset to effectively respond to disasters and to conduct disaster risk reduction activities. Although organizations display their unique cultures, they are also embedded within the broader societal context. In developing countries, weak institutions

Introduction   11 result in weak governance. As an example, issues of corruption impact organizational effectiveness. Corruption is not specific to developing countries, but in developing countries corruption is pernicious because it is often left unchecked, negatively impacting the most impoverished residents, and resulting in them being made even more vulnerable. Incentives are tools that can and perhaps should be used to spur communities and disaster policy actors and professionals on to do things to reduce vulnerabilities, build resilience culture and put the appropriate infrastructure in place to make communities robust. Without them, it is difficult to induce public and political actors to work to mainstream disaster risk reduction. Dixit (1997) reminds us that in organizational settings incentives do not have to be financial, but often “take the form of complex quid pro quo in a larger multidimensional bargaining game” (p.  378). This thinking is not restricted to the organizational setting but can be applied in wider social settings such as communities as well. In the community setting incentives show residents and other property holders that there are benefits to DRR. It is up to decision-­makers and disaster professionals to explain or inform residents about what these benefits are. Incentives are a vital part of the institutional context because they regulate actors’ behavior within and outside of the institutional context (Chapter 5 discusses these in detail).

Using a Standard Measure to Compare the Case Study Countries One of the things I try to do in this book is to compare the state of disaster risk governance across the case study countries in order to discuss the status of DRG in these countries more objectively. It helps to address the fundamental questions driving this work—the state of DRG and what makes for stronger or weaker DRG. In Table 1.1, I present a disaster risk governance inventory that operationalizes disaster risk governance using the five dimensions: norms, legislation, organization, actors, and incentives. Each institutional dimension is further sub-­divided into several key measures using the Sendai Framework Priority Two Goals and the literature on governance and disaster risk governance as guides. None of the five dimensions here is independent, as each constantly interacts with all the others. Countries must have at least one indicator in each category to be considered as having strong DRG.6 The score assists the author to more objectively determine how each country is faring when compared with others on disaster risk governance. More importantly, the score guides the author in making claims about whether the status of DR governance is more advanced in one state over another. Disaster outcome data (number of deaths, number affected, property and infrastructural damage) are used to support arguments and analysis. My underlying assumption is that when disasters happen, countries with a weak governance context experience higher mortality and economic losses, given similar levels of hazard exposure than countries with a more robust institutional and governance context (ISDR, 2009; Schipper & Pelling, 2006). The

12   Introduction Table 1.1  Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix Key Governance Elements SOFT INSTITUTION Culture 1 Basic assumptions and values about disasters and DRR and what to do about them 2 DRR norms: A Routine media coverage B Schools and community disaster education programs C Public education and awareness-building D Community leaders and residents with knowledge of importance of DR and importance to take steps to reduce E Drills, preparation, early warning systems F Post-event assessment, learning G Questioning, continuous improvements HARD INSTITUTION Legislation 1 Enshrined in constitution 2 DR legislation on the books and implemented 3 Support legislation undergirds specific DR legislation 4 Integration and mainstreaming of legislation in development laws and planning 5 Policy implementation, monitoring, oversight Organization 1 Organization with specific disaster focus 2 Operates at multiple levels, integrated, national coverage 3 Appropriate capabilities and knowledge, including local knowledge 4 Well positioned in government bureaucracy 5 Senior politicians chair important committees 6 Appropriately staffed, facilities, technology 7 Routine funding 8 Contingency funding 9 Data collection, integration, knowledge management Actors 1 Home-grown, multiple levels represented and active

Jamaica

Dominica Kenya

Zanzibar

Introduction   13 2 Community residents and organizations with defined roles 3 Regional platforms active 4 Global platforms (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, SDG) 5 Coordinated efforts, national system 6 Coordinated efforts with all actors, cooperation agreements Incentives 1 Sales taxes 2 Tax rebates 3 Penalties and fines 4 Relocation incentives, regulation enforcement, etc. Total DRG Score (32) Sum of plusses and minuses Net DRG Score Source: The literature on disaster governance and institutions as well as Priority Number 2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction help to derive the institutional factors in the matrix.

summary matrix is used to operationalize the critical elements of DRG and use it to assess the state of DRG in these countries.7 The challenge facing developing countries today in DRR is not deciding whether disaster risk governance is a good idea, but rather how we can put in place a governance framework that will lead to DRR and ultimately disaster resilience and sustainable development. In this book I layout such a framework and then apply the framework to the examination of DRR in the case study countries. The remaining sections of the book proceed as follows: Chapter 2 connects some of the underlying features of disaster risk reduction, assessing why disaster risk governance is needed to connect them coherently to reduce disaster risks. Chapter 3 examines the evolution of disaster risk reduction in developing countries and points to gaps in governance in these frameworks. Chapter 4 examines governance and assesses why it is so critical to disaster risk reduction in developing countries. The chapter assesses essential dimensions of governance concerning DRR. Chapter 5 conducts a more in-­depth examination of the institutional aspects of governance. One of the areas I focus on here is colonialism. Some readers might question the logic of this focus, but I believe that the colonial legacy impedes developmental progress even today. The chapter demonstrates that many developing countries have not escaped the vestiges of colonialism and their institutions and public administration show this. Chapters 6–9 present disaster risk governance cases in two countries in sub-­ Saharan Africa (Kenya and Zanzibar) and two in the Caribbean (Jamaica and Dominica). Each of the four chapters is dedicated to one country and lays out the disaster risk governance architecture, the country context and some of the limitations to governance in each. Chapter 10 presents a comparative assessment of the cases in line with the central focus of the book, trying to see if there are

14   Introduction c­ ommonalities between the stronger and weaker performing countries and weighing the implications of the findings. In developing contexts, disaster risk governance must go further than merely signing on to global DRR frameworks. The chapter returns to the conceptual framework and discusses theoretical and practical implications of weak disaster risk governance. It provides some concluding remarks on the need to more coherently frame a disaster risk governance agenda and infrastructure in developing countries.

Notes 1 Developing countries run along a continuum. Countries are more or less developed (or developing). As such, not all developing countries show poor disaster risk governance and poor disaster outcomes. For instance, Chile has made substantial investments in governance over the last two decades. Around the same time that Haiti experienced its earthquake (7.2), Chile experienced a much stronger 8.8 earthquake, which resulted in just 450 deaths, most from an ensuing tsunami (see Michel-­Kerjan et al., 2012). Over 250,000 died in Haiti. 2 SIDS are highly exposed countries in which disaster losses have been particularly high. Historical data show that in the period from 1970–2010, disaster losses exceeded 1% of GDP and exceeded 8% in the most extreme cases (see Michel-­Kerjan, et al., 2012). 3 For a more extensive listing, see National Library of Jamaica Report on the History of Hurricanes and Floods in Jamaica, accessed at http://nlj.gov.jm/history-­notes/History %20of%20Hurricanes%20and%20Floods%20in%20Jamaica.pdf. 4 For disaster damage and death data, it is best to get the data directly from the country being assessed, or as an alternative, using regional datasets, and where possible I have. However, for cross-­country comparison I used Guha-­Sapir’s dataset on damage to standardize, in a way, the data being compared, and in some cases, these are the most current datasets I am able to find. 5 The figure is greater than the island’s population of less than 75,000 because it is cumulative over time and many people are repeatedly impacted. 6 A ranking system employing 1, –1 and 0 is used to assess the presence (1), present but weak (–1) or absence (0) of each key measure for each sub-­component. One point is given for each criterion existing in the country being assessed. A minus (–) is assigned using the list of deficiencies noted by experts and technical reports for each country. A negative value is used based on reported deficiencies by experts interviewed or from pre-­existing technical reports. A positive value is assigned if the measures are deemed to be improving based on expert or technical reports. The points are then added, and net plusses and minuses subtracted/added. A net score is calculated. The higher the net score, the better is the state of DR governance. The maximum score possible is 32 points. A country with strong DR governance will score 85% or better (at least 27.5/29); one with moderate DR governance will score 75–85% (at least 27/32), and one that is weak will score less than 75% (26.5/32 and below). 7 This matrix’s usefulness in explaining cross-­country variations in DRG is limited. It is used to provide a basis for comparison, as a guide. Over time, though, it could be refined to be more useful in pinpointing gaps in DRG.

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16   Introduction McKirdy, E., Sterling, J., & Yan, H. (2017, Sept 19). Dominica PM: Hurricane Maria “devastates” island. CNN. Accessed at www.cnn.com/2017/09/18/americas/atlantic-­ storms-maria-­jose-lee/index.html (April 3, 2017). Michel-­Kerjan, E., Hochrainer-­Stigler, S., Kunreuther, H., Linnerooth-­Bayer, J., Mechler, R., Muir-­Wood, R., Ranger, N., Vaziri, P., & Young, M. (2012, Sep.). Catastrophe Risk Models for Evaluating Disaster Risk Reduction Investments in Developing Countries. Accessed at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/WP201207_EMK-­SHSHK-­JLB_EvaluatingDisasterReduction.pdf (November 26, 2018). OCHA (2016). Latin America and Caribbean: Over 10.6 Million Affected by Disasters in 2016. Accessed at http://interactive.unocha.org/publication/rolac_2016_in_review/#p=6. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-­OHRLLS) (2015). Small Island Developing States in Numbers: Climate Change Edition 2015. Accessed at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2189SIDS-IN-­NUMBERSCLIMATE-­CHANGE-EDITION_2015.pdf. Planning Institute of Jamaica (2012). Socio-­economic and Environmental Disaster Impact Assessment Handbook for Jamaica: A Quick Guide to Undertaking an Assessment Using the DaLA Methodology Following an Extreme Event in Jamaica. Prepared under the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) Phase 1. Accessed at www. pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/Sustainable_Development/Final%20DaLA%20Handbook_ Jamaica_Feb11_2013.pdf (March 28, 2018). Possekel, A. K. (2012). Living with the Unexpected: Linking Disaster Recovery to Sustainable Development in Montserrat. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media. PreventionWeb (2015). Weak Governance. Accessed at www.preventionweb.net/risk/ weak-­governance. Raschky, P. A. (2008). Institutions and the losses from disasters caused by natural hazards. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 8(4): 627–634. ReliefWeb (2018). Post-­Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria September 18, 2017. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/report/dominica/post-­disaster-needs-­assessmenthurricane-­maria-september-­18-2017 (March 29, 2018). Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. Amer­ican Psychological Association, 45(2): 109. Schiavo-­Campo, S., & McFerson, H. M. (2008). Public Management in Global Perspective. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Schipper, L., & Pelling, M. (2006). Disaster risk, climate change and international development: scope for, and challenges to, integration, Disasters, 30(1): 19−38. Schultink, W., & Chatterjee, S. (2017). Kenya’s debilitating drought—370,000 children in dire need of help: we must neither allow the poorest in Kenya to bear the cost nor let this crises stifle Kenya’s human development. Thomson Reuters Foundation News. Accessed at http://news.trust.org/item/20171023130503-xo7f4. Shaffer, G. C., & Pollack, M. A. (2011). Hard versus soft law. International Security, 52(1): 1147–1241. Accessed at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol.52/iss4/1 (November 21, 2018). Tierney, K. (2012). Disaster governance: social, political, and economic dimensions. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 37: 341–363. UKAID, Dewpoint and Global Climate Change Partnership (2012). Climate Change on Zanzibar: Impacts, Adaptation, Economics and Low Carbon Growth. Accessed at http://economics-­of-cc-­in-zanzibar.org/images/Revised_conference_presentation_for_ seychelles_low_file_size.pdf (April 4, 2018).

Introduction   17 United Nations (1994). Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, Yokohama, Japan May 23–27, 1994. Accessed at www. unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/8241 (January 16, 2018). United Nations (2005). Review of the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Item 10 of the Provisional Agenda, World Conference on Disaster Reduction Kobe, Hyogo, Japan January 18–22, 2005. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/ intergover/official-­doc/L-­docs/Yokohama-­Strategy-English.pdf (November 9, 2018). UNISDR (2017). Words into Action Guidelines: Governance System, Methodologies, and Use of Results—National Disaster Risk Assessment 2017. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/ files/52828_nationaldisasterriskassessmentpart1.pdf (January 2018). Watson, R., Zinyoweru, M., & Moss, R. (2000). IPCC Special Report on the Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability. Accessed at www.grida. no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/?src=/climate/ipcc/regional/index.htm (September 26, 2009). Wei-­Has, M. (2018). The science of Indonesia’s surprise tsunami. National Geographic. Accessed at www.nationalgeographic.com/evironment/2018/09/indonesia-­tsunamisulawesi-­explained-science-­geology/. Wilkinson, E., Twigg, J., & Few, R. (2018). Building Back Better: A Resilient Caribbean after the 2017 Hurricanes. Overseas Development Institute Briefing Notes. Accessed at www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-­documents/12028.pdf. World Bank (2010). The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment: An Evaluation. Accessed at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCPIA/Resources/ CPIA_eval.pdf (March 9, 2018). World Bank (2016). Disaster Risk Profile: Zanzibar. Accessed at http://documents.world bank.org/curated/en/785201492588221053/pdf/114364-WP-­PUBLIC-disaster-­riskprofile-­zanzibar.pdf.  World Bank (2018). Data: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. Accessed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.MACR.XQ (March 8, 2018).

Part I

2 Over Four Decades of Ignoring Disaster Risk Governance

An assessment of the trajectory of risk reduction activities in developing countries shows a pattern of strategic growth contingent on movement at the global level, one that has neglected disaster risk governance. As the chapter will show, national disaster agencies were created, legislation to establish and fund disaster management agencies was approved, but with little coherence. These efforts were largely promoted by global development agencies. National-­level efforts moved in step with action at the global level. So, as the global-­level mechanisms changed focus, so have developing countries. This chapter tracks this development, showing that not until the 2000s did global agreements’ proponents begin to comprehend the relationship between DRR and DRG and start to promote governance as a key pillar in DRR. The chapter reviews the global disaster risk reduction frameworks and agreements since the United Nations initiated the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The global effort to reduce disaster risk in the late 1970s gave the concept of disaster planning and management a small boost in the Caribbean and sub-­ Saharan Africa. Government efforts were concentrated on post-­disaster relief and capital development projects after the various destructions (e.g., see Ford, 2011). Also, each government responded to its disasters separately. Moreover, later, even when there were regional agreements about implementing preparedness and response planning, these agreements were not implemented in the individual countries because many governments did not ensure their implementation (Bisek, Jones, & Ornstein, 2001, p. 5). In the meantime, the need for a more systematic and integrated approach to disaster management became increasingly apparent. Many of the countries in sub-­ Saharan Africa and Caribbean islands suffered many hazard impacts over the last 200 years, with increasing frequency of impacts in recent times. While the entire Caribbean region is predisposed to the impacts of hazards, Jamaica and Dominica have experienced more severe impacts than others. Since 1802, when disaster records were first collected in Jamaica, that country has had at least ten significant hurricane impacts and frequent flooding, including in 1979, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 (Collymore, 1993; Trotz, 2002). These frequent hurricanes and flooding events caused significant destruction to the social and economic infrastructure in Caribbean countries—roads, bridges, agriculture,

22   Part I community centers, hospitals and so on. The 1986 flooding in Jamaica is typical of the havoc they can wreak. The Planning Institute of Jamaica (1987) estimated that the hurricane destroyed some 17,000 acres of crops, blocked or damaged several roads and directly affected over 40,000 people. Total damage including losses to the agricultural sector was estimated at US$48 million. In Dominica, Hurricane David in 1979 had the most catastrophic effects in modern times on the island, but there were also severe storms in 1989, 1995 and 1999 (Benson et al., 2001). In 1999, the island suffered extensive damage from Hurricane Lenny and a volcanic alert in 1998–1999 alerted Dominica’s people to the island’s susceptibility to future volcanic activity (Benson et al., 2001). Hurricane David severely damaged 50% of Dominica’s housing stock; two-­ thirds of the island’s population of 80,000 were left homeless (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Development Program, and Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2004). In Kenya, extreme climatic events have long posed a significant risk to Kenya, contributing to making that country one of the most disaster-­prone in Africa and perhaps the world (Parry et al., 2012). Since 1960, observed mean annual temperatures have increased by 1.0°C, or an average rate of 0.21°C per decade; changes in rainfall patterns have also been observed during this period (McSweeney et al., 2009). Floods and droughts are particularly concerning, with frequent significant droughts interspersed with floods every three years or so (Parry et al., 2012), but at the same time, rain showers have become increasingly unreliable in locations such as Eastern Province in the decades since the 1960s (Awuor et al., 2009). As a result, Kenya has experienced several natural disasters with significant population impact since then. The 1991–1993 drought that affected about 1.5 million people in northern Kenya and the 1997–1998 El Niño floods, which affected 1.5 million people and where 80% of small stock perished, are just a couple examples (see Deya, 2017). Zanzibar is one of the sub-­Saharan Sudano–Sahelian belt region countries prone to desertification (Nanjira, 1997). Heavy rains and landslides characterize its risk profile and have worsened since the 1940s and 1950s. Its largest islands of Unguja and Pemba are low-­lying, with highest points of 120 and 95 meters, respectively, leaving them vulnerable to tropical cyclones and tidal flooding (Mangora et al., 2015). Their location, altitude, and smallness also make the Zanzibari islands highly susceptible to the impacts of climate change, sea-­level change, extreme events, and seawater intrusion into underground aquifers (Mangora, 2015). The highest toll on human life has come, though, from drought, desertification, and pest infestation (Nanjira, 1997).

Early Efforts at Disaster Risk Reduction In the Caribbean, the development of the Pan Caribbean Disaster Planning and Prevention Project (PCDPPP) began in July 1984. Several severe tropical storms ravaged the region and overwhelmed the capacities of the countries to cope, leading to the development of a ten-­year project (Ford, 2011; Collymore, 2011).

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   23 The PCDPP gained its sponsorships from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency, the government of the Netherlands, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), and other participating countries and territories (Trotz, 2002). The PCDPPP jointly developed and/or implemented disaster mitigation and technical assistance programs with regional organizations, including the University of West Indies, the Caribbean News Agency, the Caribbean Council of Engineering Organizations, the Caribbean Telecommunications Union, the Jamaica Office of Disaster Preparedness, the Barbados Central Emergency Relief Organization, CARICOM, OAS, and other UN agencies (see Thompson, 2010). The project focused on the response to disasters and left voids in the other areas of disaster management (Collymore, 2011). International donors were repeatedly called upon to provide funding assistance for response and restoration of the same infrastructure after each disaster. This situation was not sustainable. The Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) was formed in September 1991, five months after the PCDPPP ended, because the heads of governments saw the urgent need for a more permanent institutional mechanism to replace the PCDPPP in the region (Thompson, 2010). In Africa, regional bodies focusing on disaster risk reduction (African Union; communities of Sahel-­Saharan States, Eastern African Community) came much later with the Hyogo Framework for Action. Around the same time (1991), a discussion about how to more effectively help countries cope with the impact of disasters was taking shape at the international level among multilateral and bilateral donors (A. Mullings, personal communication, May 15, 2008; Trotz, 2002). The lack of disaster management arrangements in disaster-­prone developing areas like the Caribbean was concerning. The Pan Caribbean Disaster Planning and Prevention Project (PCDPP), initiated to fill some of the voids, lacked institutional commitment and involvement of broader civil society. Plus, being a project meant that the Pan Caribbean Disaster Planning and Prevention Project had an expiration date.

The UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction The UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990–2000) marked a seminal period for disaster management practice. As the number and cost of disasters continued to rise, Resolution 44/236 and associated programs initiated a decade (1990–1999) dedicated to reducing disaster risks through international cooperation (UN, 1999). The decade’s objective was to use concerted international action, especially in developing countries, to reduce the human and property loss, property damage, and social and economic disruption caused by disasters caused by natural hazards (UN, 1999). The decade brought together governments, intergovernmental organizations, and appropriate non-­governmental organizations as central players in disaster preparedness and mitigation by fostering a multisectoral, interdisciplinary dialogue that resulted in a strategy for disaster reduction.

24   Part I This decade should be credited with bringing a multidisciplinary approach to the study of disasters and evolving DRR practice. Disciplines including geography and geology, political science, economics, urban planning, environmental management, ecology, and engineering helped to strengthen the applied approach to disaster management (Cardona, 2003, p.  5). Contributions came from scholars in the USA and Europe, but also practitioners in developing countries in the Caribbean and Latin America (Cardona, 1993), and alerted practitioners and researchers alike that they needed to focus on social and economic as well as political aspects to better understand disasters. Scholars proposed that vulnerabilities lie at the heart of how hazards impact places; they result not only because of the physical attributes of a place but also display social, economic and political components as well. Where the ability of a place to resist or recover from the impact of hazards is inadequate, a disaster could happen even after a minor hazard impact (Wisner et al., 2004). For instance, social scientists studying disasters found that similar scale hazards could have fundamentally different impacts on two countries because of a difference in their economic and institutional conditions. Social classes in the same country face differential risk exposure because of position relative to power, their access to resources and social networks, access to education and support services, corruption and government ineffectiveness, and so on (see Wisner et al., 2004). Poorer countries face steeper challenges in resisting and recovering from disasters, and there are differential impacts that result because of the size of a place; larger countries are better able to withstand hazard impacts than smaller ones. Unfortunately, in reality, the decade was spent mainly on the symptoms of disasters rather than their root causes. The strategy included the establishment of national and regional programs for disaster preparedness and response (Lechat, 1990); the policy and other institutional components were mostly missing. As a result, critical contextual challenges were ignored, and solutions lacked the integration of knowledge and expertise from the multidisciplinary literature it spawned (Manyena, 2016, p.  41). Strategy and program development mostly paid lip service to knowledge integration, and in particular, indigenous knowledge and experiences remain missing from DRR and DRG strategies (Mercer et al., 2010). In marginalizing indigenous knowledge, the strategies and programs failed to recognize that the conditions in indigenous communities are potentially factors leading to risk exposure or that these communities could educate them on potential remedies. In a few cases, the practical application of this recognition generally only occurred on a small scale within communities, where for centuries indigenous peoples had adjusted their livelihood strategies to adapt to climate and ecological changes (Mercer et al., 2010). These insights are mainly being lost in DRR planning efforts and DRG strategies. The United Nations was the logical agency to spearhead the decade’s efforts because of its unique leadership role based on its global development work, ­universal character, broad policy agenda, and function as a forum for global dialogue (UN, 1999). One pressing task was to create clear guidelines for future

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   25 actions at all levels. However, in reality, not much progress was made to advance disaster management, as many countries were only just setting up their disaster response frameworks or had not yet gotten around to fully realizing that we could manage the risk factors in vulnerable societies or communities to cause disasters. A few progressive ones (Jamaica, Colombia) were bucking the norms at the time. They understood and embraced the idea that disasters were not fundamental “acts of God” about which nothing could be done (Drabek, 1991). We could manage disasters. Still, disaster management remained mostly technical and parochial, focused mainly on disaster response, preparedness and to some extent on mitigation—not taking advantage of the interdisciplinary scholarship that was blossoming at the time.

The Barbados Plan of Action and the 1994 Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World Around the mid-­1990s two essential strategies brought some alignment to disaster risk reduction, making it one of the central features of sustainable development. The 1994 UN Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States was dedicated to stopping environmental vulnerabilities of small developing countries and resulted in the Barbados Plan of Action and the Yokohama Strategy and Plan for a Safer World. The 1994 Barbados Plan of Action (BPOA) crafted “a blueprint for the sustainable development of Small Island Developing States [SIDS].” In the Caribbean, the BPOA led to the establishment of the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) in 1989—a regional inter-­ governmental body aiming to work with its members to respond to disasters and plan for them in small Caribbean states that were members of the Caribbean Community. In line with the Barbados Plan of Action, the World Bank follow­up report (2000) highlighted vulnerability to natural hazards among the four areas of challenge and opportunity for developing countries in the Caribbean Sea, as well as the Indian and Pacific Oceans (World Bank, 2000, p. 3). In 1994, the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was convened in Yokohama, Japan (May 23–27, 1994) to review the progress made in advancing disaster management during the international decade. The Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World (1994) and its associated Plan of Action for the rest of the decade and beyond recognized each country’s sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens from disasters related to natural hazard. The Yokohama Strategy emphasized the need to keep efforts focused on developing countries (United Nations, 1994). Vulnerability to natural hazards in these countries had been increasing and, with it, human and economic losses had likewise risen. An outcome of the Yokohama Strategy laid out a commitment to ramp up efforts to focus specifically on reducing vulnerabilities. In particular, attention was given to the least developed, landlocked countries and the small island developing states (SIDS), where there remained high rates of land and human vulnerability (United Nations, 1994).

26   Part I However, in reality, large gaps remained in addressing vulnerabilities because root causes were not being addressed. For instance, the strategy left gaps in linking social and economic development principles and practices with technical abilities to protect crucial infrastructure and reduce conditions of poverty for vulnerable populations (United Nations, 2005). Nor did it recognize the need to involve the broader interests of the private sector, scientific and professional communities, and related partnerships such as land use planning, building and construction codes, and advanced technology and techniques, risk transfers, and so on, particularly in less developed and disaster-­prone countries (United Nations, 2005). As a result, the lack of area-­specific knowledge limited the strategy. Without this knowledge and feedback, making the appropriate improvements has been a challenge. Further, there were significant gaps in governance. For instance, there was a lack of systematic implementation, cooperation, and reporting of progress to reduce risk and vulnerability to disasters by countries working to implement the decade’s principles (United Nations, 2005). Reporting requirements dictated by the UN were time-­consuming, and national actors seemed to be caught up in a reporting loop. Plus, local disaster risk reduction capacity was inchoate, and the broader governance base in the countries was weak, thus retarding implementation efforts. Moreover, at the UN there was little consideration for the level of political will and commitment needed to drive DRR in the countries. In addition, the steep learning and implementation curve limited practical actions that could support disaster risk reduction. Moreover, there were few, if any, efforts made to ensure national disaster reduction strategies were linked to sectoral interests in national and local development planning or efforts to build a legal infrastructure around disaster reduction (see United Nations, 2005). In the end, an integrated and coherent approach to disaster risk reduction and management remained lacking at the end of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The high-­level Mauritius international meeting held in Port Louis, Mauritius, in January 2005 marked the culmination of a comprehensive review of the Barbados Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS. The discussion recognized that constraints remained to fulfill the goals of the BPOA. In particular, SIDS had implemented the Barbados Plan of Action amid severe limitations, such as restricted financial resources and an overall decline in official development assistance (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2005). Moreover, critical issues such as the link to poverty, institutional capacity and political will in the country were ignored in the previous attempts to respond to and manage disasters. Besides, SIDS had pursued the implementation of the BPOA severely constrained by limited financial and other resources, including an overall decline in official development assistance (UN Division for Sustainable Development Goals, n.d.) and corrections were needed. The adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution (A/57/262) and the Mauritius Strategy of Implementation (MSI) of 2005 recognized these deficiencies. The MSI outlined an additional five priority areas for action and added four new thematic platforms on trade, health, knowledge management, and culture, building on the original 14 BPOA thematic areas (UN Division for Sustainable

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   27 Development Goals, n.d.). The additional five priorities were intended to support SIDS in their efforts to achieve internationally agreed upon development targets and goals, such as outlined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs remained the overarching development framework for the world from 2000–2015 (United Nations, 2015). MDGs targeted eight goals built around poverty reduction. Although disaster risk reduction was not explicitly mentioned in the MDGs, all the goals—especially Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; Goal 4: Reduce child mortality; Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability—address the issue of vulnerability. Yes, it is true that the MDGs have resulted in successes in eradicating poverty, gender equality in education and combatting communicable diseases and maternal health. The number of people living on less than $1.25 a day has been reduced from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015.1 Further, around two-­thirds of developing countries have achieved gender parity in primary education access; and 2.6 billion people have gained access to improved drinking water since 1990.2 Moreover, lives saved because of improvements in child mortality, maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis have been significant (McArthur & Rasmussen, 2017). Still, a review of MDG achievements by the United Nations (2015) found that, despite successes, the poorest and most vulnerable people were still being left behind and living in risky situations. Among the challenges facing developing countries, the political and governance contexts presented unaddressed obstacles to acceptable disaster outcomes in developing countries. These had not been addressed explicitly in the frameworks guiding the development agenda globally, until the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015).

The Hyogo Framework for Action The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 was a global agreement to “build the resilience of nations and communities to disasters by promoting a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards” (UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [ISDR], 2005). Hyogo supported three overarching strategic goals. The first was integrating disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning. The second was developing and strengthening institutions, mechanisms, and capacities to build resilience to hazards. The third was the systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs. For the first time, governance was a focus of the global framework on disaster risk reduction. Priority Action Number 1 (HFA1) is to “ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.” The thinking behind HFA1 is that governments should take bold efforts administratively and politically to reduce the risks (Lassa, 2014).

28   Part I However, the assumption that governments are entirely rational institutions is flawed and does not exist in reality—political interests, and the ever pressing need to tackle urgent social issues like healthcare and debt repayment trump the need to plan for things that may never happen. Implicitly recognizing governments’ challenge, the HFA suggests that actors beyond governments get involved in risk reduction through mechanisms such as multisectoral national platforms where the memberships are open to governments/local governments, NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), the private sector, academia, motivated individuals and so on (Lassa, 2014). Moreover, Hyogo did much to raise public awareness of disaster risk reduction (Oxley, 2015). Caribbean islands and most African countries adopted the tenets of the Hyogo Framework. In Africa, the African Union (AU)—an intergovernmental organization that represents all African countries in its New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) economic development program that was adopted in 2001—recognized that natural and human-­caused disasters put development at risk (World Bank, 2010). The partnership recognized the pressing need for institutional frameworks, risk identification, knowledge management, governance, and emergency response as critical to the DRR agenda in Africa (African Union, 2004). To meet these challenges, the AU established an overarching Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction to address these issues (World Bank, 2010) whose goal is to guide dialogue and foster the political commitment to DRR. The regional strategy’s core DRR objectives are: (1) increase political commitment to DRR; (2) improve identification and assessment of disaster risks; (3) enhance knowledge management; (4) increase public awareness; (5) improve governance of DRR institutions; and (6) integrate DRR into emergency response management (World Bank, 2010). Also, recognizing that interventions can best be conducted at national level, the strategy mainly facilitates programs at the country and regional levels and provides strategic options for countries to select based on their national context (African Union, 2004). In April 2010, the Second Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa endorsed this program of action and highlighted the need to continue working on DRR. The declaration addressed the need for strengthening regional institutions and capacity development and increasing investments in DRR (UNISDR, 2010). Regional partners were pulled in as a critical player in this strategy. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (eCOWAS)—Technical Committee on Disaster Management recommends ways to operationalize a DRR strategy in the region (World Bank, 2010). The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) works toward objectives such as institutional reinforcement, knowledge improvement, capacity-­building, rebuilding and rehabilitating solutions (World Bank, 2010). The Inter-­Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has developed a regional strategy to strengthen sub-­ regional disaster preparedness and response capabilities that incorporate a regional program for DRM. The program aims at disaster mitigation through capacity development and enhancement (World Bank, 2010).

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   29 In recent years some countries have strengthened their national DRM authorities and formulated national policies, strategies and action plans (World Bank, 2010). The institutional arrangements of DRR agencies are very diverse across the sub-­Saharan Africa region. National authorities are typically established under various ministries, including the ministries of the interior, defense, agriculture, and local government (World Bank, 2010). Moreover, multi-­stakeholder platforms involving several ministries, UN agencies, and NGOs to enhance cooperation in DRR had already been created in several countries before the launch of National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction (World Bank, 2010). In some countries, national platforms—meant to be the coordinating mechanisms to mainstream DRR into development policies, planning and programs in line with the implementation of the HFA (Soumalia, 2013)—have not yet been established due to lack of resources, limited capacities, institutional structures or legal foundation (World Bank, 2010). Kenya, a signatory to all the agreements noted above, got its most significant boost from the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015. Although not enough, since its ratification, the government of Kenya has taken several measures aimed at protecting lives and property from destruction arising from natural hazards and human-­induced disasters (UNDRR AF, 2017). DRR efforts in Kenya include the establishment of various institutional and legal mechanisms for dealing with emergencies. These include the National Drought Management Authority (established after the 2011 drought), the National Disaster Operation Center, the National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU), rapid response teams from the Kenya Defense Force (KDF ), and the Kenya Red Cross (KRC) (UNDRR AF, 2017). At the local level, as a result of Hyogo, the Kenyan county governments have tried to incorporate disaster risk management into their county integrated development plans (CIDPs), and some counties have already established county disaster management policies and strategies (UNDRR AF, 2017). The government has also reached an advanced stage of policy and legal frameworks for disaster risk reduction, but efforts have stalled since 2009. The legislation is yet to be passed into law by the Kenyan government (UNDRR AF, 2017). Further, Hyogo focused mainly on climate-­related hazards to the neglect of other risk drivers that face developing countries. For instance, droughts remain a constant threat in Jamaica and Kenya; earthquakes are also prevalent and could cause significant damage and destruction, as seen in Haiti in 2010. The same is true for flooding caused by seasonal rains and associated landslides. Also, there was limited guidance on how to address pre-­existing structural challenges that resulted in or increased vulnerabilities to natural hazards and disasters that might result (Oxley, 2015). The variations in disaster outcomes between the countries implementing the Hyogo Framework reflect the uneven social and economic development and governance capacity that increase risk and vulnerability (Eltinay & Egbu, 2017). Moreover, the guidance that existed under Hyogo was insufficient, and further standards development was necessary at the regional and national levels. The

30   Part I UN ESCAP mid-­term assessment of the Hyogo Framework found a lack of synergies between different implementation levels, which led to a breakdown in coordinated and coherent action (UN ESCAP, 2011). Still, there was some integration of the framework’s five priorities at the national level. There was also the recognition that some action was needed to decentralize authority where capabilities existed, thus empowering local communities including grassroots organizations. Progress was also uneven and reflected broader economic and institutional capacities, including a lack of national legislation and built capacity for systematic risk assessment (UN ESCAP, 2011). By ratifying the Hyogo Framework, countries in the regions got a much-­needed boost to build the inter-­governmental agencies and national platforms. For instance, the Caribbean Community created CDEMA to focus on a comprehensive disaster management strategy and framework where its focus shifted from response to planning, and mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development planning, understanding the islands’ vulnerabilities and working to take a more coherent approach to disaster risk reduction (Thompson, 2010). By aligning its 2005–2012 enhanced comprehensive disaster management strategy and framework with Hyogo’s objective, the regional disaster management agency (CDEMA) positioned itself and the islands in the region to access resources including technical assistance and funding. However, the region experienced a lack of political will, the low positioning of disaster management agencies within the government bureaucracy, lack of funding and insufficient trained experts and staff.

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) is the follow­up agreement to the Hyogo Framework. The Sendai Framework charts the global course between 2015 and 2030. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’s expected outcome over the next 15 years is: “The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods, and health and the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities, and countries” (UNISDR, 2017). During its consultations and negotiations, there were appeals for guidance on how to engage all stakeholders, selling them on ownership of actions and strengthening accountability in disaster risk reduction. Other frameworks had not done this, relying instead on individual countries to apply the global standards at the national level with only broad guidelines to help. Priority 2 of the Sendai Framework focuses on strengthening disaster risk governance systems in order to steer disaster risk reduction efforts, emphasizing “an  all-­hazards, all-­phases-of-­the-disaster-­cycle, all-­sector, all-­levels-of-­society approach,” and recognizing gender equity as a cross-­cutting theme. The rhetoric at the national level followed this approach, including an emphasis on community-­ based comprehensive disaster management (CCDM) among ­Caribbean states. Community-­based initiatives have been launched (in Caribbean countries) to better ensure that national DRR plans integrate community realities.

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   31 The Sendai Framework considered social dimensions of DRR and sustainable development. For example, the significant role that women play in disaster response and recovery and humanitarian actions more generally was now under consideration. Moreover, gender equality, women’s empowerment, and women’s rights have been integrated as essential pillars in disaster plans of action. In sub-­Saharan Africa and Caribbean countries, gender mainstreaming efforts are under way, pushed through the national platforms for disaster risk reduction and national women’s groups as well as local and international academics. However, there remains a significant amount of work to do in assisting women to become empowered and reflect their choices, decisions, and opinions in disaster legislation and practice. Resulting from the Hyogo and continuing in the Sendai Framework, national platforms are the primary organ promoted by the United Nations to implement DRR in the country. The national platforms were established with enumerated responsibilities from national through to local levels. The platforms facilitate coordination of disaster activities across sectors. They also maintain a broad-­ based dialogue between national and regional levels meant to promote awareness among the relevant industries and sectors. They work to integrate risk reduction into development policies and planning at all levels of government (UNISDR, 2007). In addition, the national platforms work to adopt or modify, where necessary, legislation to support disaster risk reduction. These include regulations and mechanisms that encourage compliance and promote incentives for undertaking risk reduction and mitigation activities (UNISDR, 2007). At the community level, national platforms advocate for community participation in disaster risk reduction through the adoption of specific policies, promoting networks of practice, the strategic management of volunteer resources, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and delegating and providing the necessary authority and resources (UNISDR, 2007). We can point to achievements in DRG at the regional and national levels in Kenya, Jamaica, Zanzibar, and Dominica, but at the local levels the DRG gaps remain steep. The opening session of the 2018 UNDAC Advisory Board Annual Meeting focused on finding better ways to engage especially the local-­level capacity, but also noted similar needs at national and regional levels in disaster risk response. For instance, in her opening remarks, Assistant Secretary-­General for Humanitarian Affairs Ursula Mueller pointed to significant areas of growth in humanitarian operations, oversight and disaster management investment. She noted that local, national, regional and international capacity to prepare for and manage crises continues to grow. National, sub-­national and regional authorities are increasingly taking control in international humanitarian operations post-­ disaster. These actors have become more articulate and sophisticated in demanding what type and quality of international help they receive. They are asking for more accountability for monies committed to disaster recovery, and national authorities are beginning to invest more in disaster risk management, enabling stronger emergency preparedness and prevention (Reliefweb, 2018). The diverse network of actors brings individual strengths that together might more quickly handle the situation. Mueller singled out regional organizations

32   Part I and their role in disaster response during Hurricanes Irma and Maria. UNDAC, working closely with the Caribbean Disaster Emergency and Management Agency (CDEMA) and national authorities in civil–military coordination and information management, deployed several teams (Mueller, 2018). UNDAC brought analytical and technical experts, and logistical support, while CDEMA, collaborating with regional and international partners, deployed over 90 response personnel that conducted search and rescue, assessed damage, identified needs and got relief operations going (Mueller, 2018). In Kenya, Zanzibar, Dominica, and Jamaica, the national platforms are active and continue the work begun with the HFA. In Kenya, it has been an established body working to implement the Africa Program of Action adopted by the African Union (AU) early in 2017. The program of action aligns closely with the Africa Regional Platform for DRR (AfRP) and the 5th Global Platform for DRR. The platform brings together governments, civil service organizations, academia, the private sector, donors, and UN agencies to deliberate on how to accelerate implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR AF, 2017). However, since the implementation of the Sendai framework in 2015, practitioners and scholars alike are already finding that governance remains the missing link/­ingredient. Countries are at different levels of development, and it is not surprising that there are disparities on the state of the national platforms and the function they undertake. For example, the framework presents a system-­ wide, holistic framework, but does not elaborate on how this should be done at the local level. As a result, application of policies, norms, standards, and regulations to manage and reduce risk across the developing world lag behind the levels needed. Root causes of disasters are still not adequately addressed (Oxley, 2015), nor are issues of equality and culture, dimensions of individual and group behaviors and their impact on vulnerability creation being adequately addressed. Existing risk governance capacities and arrangements generally fail to achieve their aims, although governance was a critical cross-­cutting goal in Hyogo and remains one in Sendai (Gall et al., 2014). The countries in the Caribbean and sub-­Saharan Africa all have dedicated national organizations committed to disaster risk reduction and management. Many have carried out legal or policy reforms, and many have created national multi-­stakeholder platforms to help with the implementation of the goals of disaster risk reduction, and they have established some coordination mechanism to organize these actors and their activities. However, there has been less emphasis on strengthening informal community-­based efforts to reduce disaster risks (Oxley, 2015), or to integrate their groups and organizations into these efforts. If we take Kenya as an example, one could argue that the national platform has fared well only because the UN system supports its work. The national ­platform was established outside of the government bureaucracy. Ministers of governments who sign on to the United Nations National Platform agenda commit their countries to increase efforts in funds harmonization, policy alignment, and managing results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   33 because of UN support for these activities (OECD, 2005). Kenya’s government seems uncommitted to support the platform financially; moreover, Kenya is not alone. Overall, the global frameworks, while instrumental in moving the DRR agenda forward, displayed several blindsides. The rate and scale of change required to implement the framework’s requirements were too large at the country level, and as such, in most cases targets were not being met. Institutionally countries’ governance frameworks, including their institutions, lagged behind those required (legislation, organization, capacity) for the framework to succeed. A review of national platforms in 2013 in anticipation of the post-­2015 disaster risk reduction framework pointed out that in the future national platforms on DRR should focus on capacity-­building given the implementing countries’ economic challenges (Sanahuja, 2013). Among other things, the lack of funding and undercapacity issues mean that the national platforms are limited in their ability to play a more proactive leadership and advocacy role at the national level, and they are limited in systematically engaging with other sectors (Sanahuja, 2013). The report accurately pointed to the need for dialogue and coordination with national and sectoral players, as possible financial partners who are relied on to play a leading role in DRR (ibid.). Moreover, the period in between each new framework is short (10–15 years) leaving many developing countries struggling to consolidate gains and then catch up, many limited by funding allocation from national governments. For instance, many of the national platforms remain underfunded and under-­ resourced, although they were critical stakeholders in achieving the Hyogo Framework goals and continue to be a central pillar in implementing the Sendai Framework’s goals. Further, the stringent reporting requirements take the focus away from needed DRR activities to write and submit progress reports.

Sustainable Development Goals Over the last four years or so another consequential global effort influencing disaster risk reduction in developing countries is the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs result from an intergovernmental agreement meant to guide global development efforts between 2015 and 2030. SDGs are designed to build on the MDGs by completing what was not achieved and swinging the global development agenda forward. The SDGs (2014) framework is an interrelated set of 17 aspirational goals aiming to transform the developing world to developed status over 15 years. One of the flaws with the SDGs is that the goals are universal—each country, regardless of development status, is asked to achieve the same benchmarks (e.g., by 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women, and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions) (UN, n.d., 2014). Besides, the SDG poverty goal of $1.25 per day cannot lift anyone out of poverty. Hickel (2015) finds that on $1.25 per day, children in India would have a 60% chance of being malnourished. The SDGs hold no one

34   Part I accountable for achieving specific commitments, although they require many groups working together to achieve their ends. Critics have argued that perhaps, instead, the roles and responsibilities in implementing the SDGs should be differentiated according to different national realities, capacities, and levels of development, as well as according to national policies and priorities. The SDGs do not explicitly mention “disaster risk reduction,” although they do address it by focusing on reducing underlying causes of vulnerability in our social, economic and physical environments—Goal 1 to reduce poverty; Goal 5 to reduce gender inequality; Goal 10 to reduce inequality overall; Goal 8 for decent work and economic growth; Goal 11 for sustainable cities and communities, all build on the root causes of vulnerability. More directly related, SDGs 11–15 focus on sustainable and resilient cities, in consumption and production patterns, in the way we use and conserve oceans, seas and marine resources, and managing forests and biodiversity. Of particular significance here, its focus on climate change in Goal 13 recommends that all countries work to strengthen the global response to climate change. However, the focus on sustainability is contradictory to the SDGs’ reliance on the old assumptions of industrial growth—ever-­increasing levels of extraction, production, and consumption as reflected in Goals 7 and 8 (Hickel, 2015), which led to our present condition in the first place. So, the climate change focus in the last two frameworks (Sendai and SDGs) boxes in efforts and overlooks some underlying assumptions about our production and consumption philosophy. The 2017 reporting on Agenda 2030’s climate change goal showed that most reporting countries had already begun to implement or are working to implement the SDGs. They are improving their mechanisms for environmental impact assessments, proposing new legislation and some have proposed constitutional amendments. Also, countries are working out how to better integrate planning and execution where once they were compartmentalized. Their challenge remains “how?” Within the context of weak governance, there are steep obstacles to overcome. The right types of strategies and investments are central to us making an impact in reducing disaster risks.

Concluding Note Today, governance remains a blind spot in DRR despite all the efforts to build a DRR infrastructure since the 1970s and 1980s. The lack of strategic coherence between concurrent frameworks such as Sendai and the SDGs shows that gaps in governance remain. Piecemeal solutions result in two fundamental challenges: groups working at cross purposes, rather than in harmony, and groups working to secure their interests sometimes coming into conflict with each other. As a result, DRR progress remains disappointing. Although disaster governance is coming more into focus, undercapacity, inadequate resources and high vulnerability keep developing countries occupied with working out exactly what is meant by sustainable development and resilience in each specific country context.

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   35

Notes 1 See the Guardian (2015, January) article, “What have the millennium development goals achieved?” Accessed at www.theguardian.com/global-­development/data blog/2015/jul/06/what-­millennium-development-­goals-achieved-­mdgs. Also see The Brookings Institution’s John McArthur and Krista Rasmussen (2017, January) piece on “How Successful were the Millennium Development Goals?” Accessed at www.brookings.edu/blog/future-­development/2017/01/11/how-­successful-were-­the-millennium-­ development-goals/. These are just two of the works showing some consensus on MDG successes. 2 Ibid.

References African Union (2004). Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/files/13093_africaregionaldrrstrategyfullpdf.pdf.  Awuor, C., Ensor, J., & Berger, R. (2009). Increasing Drought in Arid and Semi-­Arid Kenya: Understanding Climate Change Adaptation. Rugby, UK: Practical Action Publishing. Accessed at www.developmentbookshelf. com/doi/book/10.3362/9781780440415. Benson, C., Clay, E., Michael, F. V., & Robertson, A. W. (2001, Oct 31). Dominica: Natural Disasters and Economic Development in a Small Island State. Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/875391468770118094/pdf/multi0page.pdf (January 31, 2018). Bisek, P. A., Jones, E. B., & Ornstein, C. (2001). A Strategy and Results Framework for Comprehensive Disaster Management in the Caribbean. Developed under the Comprehensive Approach for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project, CDERA, USAID and UNDP. Cardona, O. D. (2003). Indicators for Risk Measurement: Methodological Fundamentals. IDB/IDEA Programme of Indicators for Disaster Risk-­Management. Manizales: National University of Colombia. Available at: www.idea.unalmzl.edu.co. Collymore, J. (1993, October–­December). International perspectives on disaster planning: a view from the Caribbean. IDNDR, Number 03. Accessed at http://nzdl.sadl.uleth.ca/ cgi-­bin/library?e=d-­00000-00---off-­0paho--00-0----0-10-0---0--0direct-10---4-------01l--11-en-­50---20-about---00-0-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-800&a=d&cl=CL3.2&d=HASH 01bda4994cc6d8188d3f9c34.4.fc (July 21, 2009). Collymore, J. (2011). Disaster management in the Caribbean: perspectives on institutional capacity reform and development. Environmental Hazards, 10(1): 6–22. Deya, Fred (2017, June 7). Assessment of Kenya’s preparedness to disasters reveals that more measures are still at deficit. Reject Media Diversity Center. Accessed at http:// reject.awcfs.org/article/assessment-­of-kenyas-­preparedness-to-­disasters-reveals-­thatmore-­measures-are-­still-at-­deficit/ (July 19, 2017). Drabek, T. E. (1991). The evolution of emergency management. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government, 3–29. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Development Programme, and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (2004). Assessment of the Socioeconomic and Environmental Impact of Hurricane Ivan in Jamaica. Report LC/ MEX/L.636, LC/CAR/L.22. Accessed at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDISMGMT/Resources/JamaciaL636completo.pdf. Eltinay, N., & Egbu, C. (2017). Disaster risk reduction conceptual framework: open data for building resilience in critical infrastructure. In: Chan, P. W., & Neilson, C. J. (eds.),

36   Part I Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ARCOM Conference, 4–6 September 2017, Cambridge, UK, Association of Researchers in Construction Management, 197–207. Ford, K. (2011). The Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project. Environmental Hazards, 10(1): 23–29. Gall, M., Cutter, S. L., & Nguyen, K. (2014). Governance in Disaster Risk Management (IRDR AIRDR Publication No. 3). Beijing: Integrated Research on Disaster Risk. Hickel, J. (2015). The problem with saving the world. Jacobin Magazine. Accessed at www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/global-­p overty-climate-­c hange-sdgs/?utm_ content=buffer9c605&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_ campaign=buffer (November 10, 2018). Lassa, J. A. (2014). Disaster Risk Governance: Strengthening Collaboration with Non-­ State Actors. (RSIS Commentaries, No. 065). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. Accessed at https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/19945/RSIS0652014.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Lechat, M. F. (1990). The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction: Background and Objectives. Oxford: Blackwell. Mangora, M. M., Shalli, M. S., Kaur, N., Jumah, S. M., Mwita, F., & Bakar, S. (2015). Local Adaptation Investment Planning in Zanzibar: A Baseline Review of Policy and Institutional Framework. First Vice President’s Office, Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Tanzania. Accessed at www.researchgate.net/profile/Mwita_Mangora/publication/ 276288350_Local_Adaptation_Investment_Planning_in_Zanzibar_A_Baseline_Review_ of_Policy_and_Institutional_Framework/links/5555e69c08ae6943a872de76.pdf. Manyena, B. (2016). After Sendai: is Africa bouncing back or bouncing forward from disasters? International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 7(1): 41–53. McArthur, J., & Rasmussen, K. (2017, January 11). How Successful were the Millennium Development Goals? Brookings Institution. Accessed at www.brookings.edu/blog/ future-­development/2017/01/11/how-­successful-were-­the-millennium-­developmentgoals/. McSweeney, C., New, M., & Lizcano, G. (2012). UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles, Kenya. Accessed at www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/climate/projects/undp-­cp/ UNDP_reports/Kenya/Kenya.lowres.report.pdf. Mercer, J., Kelman, I., Taranis, L., & Suchet-­Pearson, S. (2010). Framework for integrating indigenous and scientific knowledge for disaster risk reduction. Disasters, 34(1): 214–239. Mueller, U. (2018, Feb.). Opening Remarks by the Assistant Secretary-­General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ursula Mueller, at the UNDAC Advisory Board Annual Meeting. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/ opening-­r emarks-assistant-­s ecretary-general-­h umanitarian-affairs-­a nd-deputy-­ emergency (November 28, 2018). Nanjira, D. (1997). Disaster losses in East Africa. Strategic Issues, pp. 82–89. Accessed at http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/pdf/eng/doc4725/doc4725-contenido.pdf (April 3, 2017). OECD (2005). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) Accra Agenda for Action (2008). Accessed at www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf.  Oxley, M. (2015, July). Review of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. Accessed at www.gndr.org/news/item/1490-critique-­to-sfdrr.html  Parry, J. E., Echeverria, D., Dekens, J., & Maitima, J. (2012). Climate Risks, Vulnerability and Governance in Kenya: A Review. Commissioned by: Climate Risk Manage-

Over Four Decades of Ignoring DRG   37 ment Technical Assistance Support Project (CRM TASP), joint initiative of Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and Bureau for Development Policy of UNDP. Accessed at www.eldis.org/document/A64511 (December 19, 2017). Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) (1987). Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1986. Kingston: PIOJ. Reliefweb (2018, Feb. 6). Opening Remarks by the Assistant Secretary-­General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ursula Mueller, at the UNDAC Advisory Board Annual Meeting. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/report/ world/opening-­remarks-assistant-­secretary-general-­humanitarian-affairs-­and-deputy-­ emergency (December 4, 2018). Sanahuja, H. (2013). Findings of the Review of National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction 2012–2013, Final Report. Accessed at www.preventionweb.net/files/35266_ nationalplatformsreview.finalreport.pdf (November 14, 2018). Soumaila, I. M. (2013). Role of Diverse Actors in National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction in West Africa: A Case of Togo and Niger National Platforms. ALC Working Paper No. 13. African Leadership Centre, King’s College London. Accessed at www.africanleadershipcentre.org/attachments/article/177/ALC%20Working%20 Paper%20No.13%20Ibrahim%20Malam%20Soumaila.pdf. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform (2005). MSI (2005): Mauritius Strategy of Implementation: BPoA +10: Mauritius Strategy (Ten Year Review of BPoA). Accessed at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/conferences/msi2005 (January 16, 2018). Thompson, D. P. (2010, Sep 15). A Framework for Making Multistate Disaster Management Systems Perform: Insights from the Caribbean Emergency and Disaster Response Agency (now CDEMA) Germany: Lambert Academic Publishers ISBN: 978-3-8383-7687-5. Trotz, O. U. (2002). Disaster Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change—A CARICOM Experience. Presented to the UNDP Expert Group Meeting, Havana, Cuba, June 17–19, 2002.  UNDRR AF (2017). Meeting: Kenya National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction—Regional Office for Africa. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/we/inform/events/54074. UN ESCAP (2011, Apr 21). Achievements and Challenges in Implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action in Asia and the Pacific. Second session Bangkok, June 29–July 1, 2011. Item 5 of the Provisional Agenda Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action. Accessed at www.unescap.org/idd/events/cdrr-­2011/CDR2-INF8.pdf (November 7, 2018). UNISDR (2007, March). Guidelines: National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/files/601_engguidelinesnpdrr.pdf  UNISDR (2010). Declaration of the Report of the Second Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction Nairobi, Kenya, from 14 to 16 April 2010. Accessed at www. unisdr.org/files/18733_englishreport.pdf UNISDR (2015). Assessment Mission for the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Review of National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction in Post-­Hyogo Consultations 2015. Accessed at www.bing.com/search?q=translation+fro m+french+to+english&form=EDGTCT&qs=SC&cvid=aaa7563b889b4c5d86d984c8d cd7bead&refig=51c25cd13b8d40d6be0d6ffcbe1784f5&cc=US&setlang=en-­U S (November 14, 2018). UNISDR (2017). Terminology. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology. United Nations (n.d.). About the Sustainable Development Goals. Accessed at www. un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-­development-goals/.

38   Part I United Nations (1994). Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, Yokohama, Japan, May 23–27, 1994. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/8241 (January 16, 2018). United Nations (1999). International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, Program Forum 1999, Geneva, Switzerland. Geneva: United Nations. United Nations (2005). Review of the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Item 10 of the Provisional Agenda, World Conference on Disaster Reduction Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, January 18–22, 2005. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/ intergover/official-­doc/L-­docs/Yokohama-­Strategy-English.pdf (November 9, 2018). United Nations (2014). UN Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. Assessments for sustainable development, Chapter 2 in Prototype of Sustainable Development Report. Accessed at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1454 Prototype%20Global%20SD%20Report2.pdf. United Nations (2015). The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015. Accessed at www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20 %28July%201%29.pdf (November 9, 2018). United Nations Division for Sustainable Development Goals (n.d.). MSI (2005): Mauritius Strategy of Implementation, BPoA +10: Mauritius Strategy (Ten Year Review of BPoA). Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis, I. (2004). At risk. Natural Hazards, ­People’s Vulnerability and Disasters, 2: 471. World Bank (2000). Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy. Washington, DC: World Bank. Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 267231468763824990/Small-­states-meeting-­challenges-in-­the-global-­economy World Bank (2010). Report on the Status of Disaster Risk Reduction in Sub-­Saharan Africa. Accessed at www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/publication/AFR.pdf (November 28, 2018).

3 Disaster Risk Governance in Developing Countries Making Conceptual Connections

Disaster risk governance must take its cue from its social, economic, political and administrative contexts as well as development imperatives and ideals of those contexts. Within these contexts, concepts such as development, sustainable development, vulnerability, undercapacity and resilience are not settled in terms of their scope or definition. These require some reckoning. While the empirical chapters (Chapters 6–9) provide context-­specific information, it is worth focusing here on some of the conceptual issues that frame DRG in developing countries. Development, both materially and conceptually, is contentious (Apter, 1987, p. 7), which makes it difficult to define (Power, 2004). The development process is somewhat of a moving target that changes in different places and at multiple dimensions. By that, I mean different societies and cultures have varying sets of values, regarding what constitutes progress, which leads to the concept having a variety of meanings and venues over time depending on who is doing the judging. There are pockets of populations and locations in developed countries that could be deemed developing and vice versa. Crafting and applying DRG must take these into account. Power relations, marginalization, and discrimination, for instance, are not uniform even within a country, and complicate DRG across time and scale. Definitions in use by the major development agencies have been mainly normative, focusing on enlarging people’s choices around human development measures and rank-­ordering countries based on how well people are doing in economic measures such as gross national product, purchasing power parity of less than US$2 per day, and other aspects of the “good life” (Power, 2004). There are more than a couple of points to be made here, but I will propose two. First, practitioners and scholars alike agree that income by itself is not a good predictor of development. Robert Barro’s (1991) seminal paper on economic growth found a general lack of convergence in per capita incomes across developing countries post-­independence. Decades of empirical work has proved that aggregate income indicators such as GNP/GDP as a measure of economic growth with the rise of neoliberalism is meaningless in representing the real situation on the ground (Peet & Hardwick, 1999; Power, 2004) and mask more than they reveal. The range of GNP per capita found in developing countries varies

40   Part I widely. In Dominica, gross domestic product per capita is around US$7,000, but only around US$900 in Zanzibar.1 A visit to developing countries like Kenya and Jamaica would show wide variations in public infrastructure, institutional quality, and other social services indicators. Second and more fundamental, who gets to decide what is development really and what are the markers to hit to be determined “developed”? This line of questioning has prompted scholars to argue that the definition of development was value-­laden (e.g., Sachs, 1992; Power, 2004) and amoeba-­like, giving power to developed countries and their experts to decide. These experts have decided what the key measures are, setting these up as ideals (Sachs, 1992, p.  4.) and then developing assistance programs around them for implementation in developing countries. As a classic example, President Truman’s 1949 four-­points speech challenged Amer­icans to “assist people around the world who are struggling for freedom and human rights to help them achieve it.” He encouraged Amer­icans to continue programs for world economic recovery and to strengthen international organizations. Also, Truman encouraged these organizations to draw on the “expertise of the United States to help people across the world help themselves in the struggle against ignorance, illness, and despair,” as Truman committed to support for the United Nations and its work. This perspective guided international development aid for decades as if people in developing countries had little or no agency—the United States had to help them before they could assist themselves out of poverty. Poverty alone does not mean that populations will be ignorant or living in despair. There are other structural reasons such as inequality, lack of access, marginalization, lack of a voice and agency that must work with poverty to cause desolation. Without this understanding, Truman and his administration ­determined—based on their experiences—that underdeveloped countries could become developed by hitting economic, education and health targets based on the development experiences of the USA. As such, scholars have argued that the naming of a large part of the world “poor” and underdeveloped was political. The label was mainly used in reference to former colonies at the end of the colonial era at a time when “development” became a way to frame the new challenges and opportunities of self-­government in the 1950s and 1960s (Sachs, 1992; Power, 2004). Further, we should not take it for granted that development is always positive (Hart, 2004). This line of thought has long followed development professionals and their institutions. Extolling the virtues of development at the neglect of its disadvantages, these actors have worked to devise mechanisms and procedures that make societies fit pre-­existing models (Power, 2004), that do not necessarily work in developing countries’ contexts given their history, economy, traditions and political contexts. Escobar (1995) lamented the tendency of the “developing” world in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to give high power to developed countries and their institutions to shape popular perceptions about development. So many variables—historical context, economic context, their marginalization from world systems, their culture—are different. It is little

Making Conceptual Connections   41 wonder, then, that many of the models have failed when applied to the diverse developing contexts whole scale. Moreover, the idea of development is as relevant to “developed” as it is to “developing” countries. The developed world cannot profess to be “developed” when sections and groups within them face income inequality, lack access to resources including jobs, education, and healthcare, when there is injustice, racial and religious prejudice, high poverty rates and the like (Kelman et al., 2016; Gaillard & Jigyasu, 2016; Power, 2004). For instance, the rates of poverty in the southern states of the USA rival those in “developing” countries and their rates of racial injustice, illiteracy, and income inequality are greater than or rival those in “developing” countries (Gaillard & Jigyasu, 2016).

More Than Just Poverty Prior definitions of development had a preoccupation with the poor and those people living on the edges of economic existence. There is no consensus on what the problem of poverty is, and there is no scientifically agreed upon definition of this political term “poverty” (Alcock, 2006). Although it is a contested term, poverty is a problem that is worth fixing because it constrains options—­ livelihood, choices about food, where one lives, works, goes to school, makes decisions about what to do pre- and post-­disaster. In disaster situations, poverty can lead to choices that further exacerbate a person’s or group’s post-­disaster situation. Poverty, however, is but one piece of the puzzle. Rather than focusing on poverty and income, a more promising and realistic way to understand and fix issues concerning development is to focus on a multidimensional approach to fixing the problem. Owen Barder (2012), in his Kapuscinski Lecture on the “implications of complexity theory for development” at the Center for Global Development, framed development as an emergent property of an economic, social and political system. Development is not merely the sum of characteristics of individual parts of the system; it is the consequence of how the different components of the system interact with each other. We could have system-­wide interactions that do not correspond to the properties of individual components but create new elements—for example, developed countries can display aspects of underdevelopment and vice versa. If we understand development as an emergent property of the economic, political and social systems, not just the sum of the economic output of all the firms in the economy, or the sum of the well-­being of the citizens of a nation, we are better able to see the system-­wide manifestations. People, firms, technologies, and institutions at different levels interact with each other within the economic, social and political system to improve the circumstances of people in these contexts. Specifically, development is the capacity of those systems and their processes to facilitate growth, inclusiveness, and opportunities for all people. Unfortunately, not all people are valued, included, or reap the rewards of these processes. Development work at both the national and international levels is catching up with this line of thought. The United Nations, arguably the organization that

42   Part I does the most development work around the world, does not have an official definition for what a developing country is, despite labeling around 159 nations as “developing” (Fernholz, 2016). The World Bank, realizing the uselessness of simply lumping countries in the bottom two-­thirds of gross national income (GNI) into the category “developing,” decided to get rid of the categorization altogether (ibid.). As of 2016, the World Bank no longer distinguishes between “developed” countries and “developing” ones in the presentation of its data (ibid.)—there is just too much heterogeneity between Malawi and Malaysia for both to be classified in the same group—Malaysia is more like the US than Malawi (ibid.). While measures of GNI per capita are useful, when we split data across inflation-­adjusted brackets of low, middle and high income, they become problematic. For example, China, Bolivia, and Eritrea, which fall in three different income groups, are all lumped together as “developing” (Fernholz, 2016). The movement away from income data as the chief development indicator reflects the paradigm shift from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a strategy to progress “developing” countries upward and out of poverty as primarily defined by GNI to sustainable development goals (the Sustainable Development Goals), a more universal concept that applies across countries (ibid.). Development is everyone’s problem. The most recent Human Development Report focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals as its centerpiece, trying to strike a balance between sustainable development goals and ecological balance, and lies in stark contrast to past development reports that focused on humans and their needs, ignoring ecological balance (Khoday, 2018), and uses a measure called the “multidimensional poverty index” to guide decisions. Using a multidimensional index better connects the fact of people’s actual existence and deprivation by using the multiple dimensions of the system. These include economic and social policy such as GNI or GDP and income inequality, access to social services and opportunities, disempowerment and so on (Hackl, 2018; Khoday, 2018). On average—and taking population size into account2— income inequality increased by around 11% in developing countries during the years between 1990 and 2010, and more than 75% of the population today are living in societies that are less equal than they were in the 1990s (UNDP, 2014). If we take the whole world income and divide it into two halves, the wealthiest 8% would make much of the global income, leaving the other half to be shared among the other 92% of the population (Milanovic, 2013). Applying the same type of division to income in the USA, the numbers are 78 and 22, and in Germany, the numbers are 71 and 29 (Milanovic, 2013, p.  205). Further, it would take three-­quarters of the world’s more impoverished population to get to the first fifth of total global income, yet only 1.7% of those at the top suffice to get to the last fifth (Milanovic, 2013). Income inequality could retard development, and so is an essential consideration in vulnerability assessment. Evidence shows higher income inequality between households in developed and developing countries since 2010, and that

Making Conceptual Connections   43 the difference is systematically associated with a more significant disparity in non-­income outcomes. Income inequality is on the rise globally and is a threat to long-­term social and economic development (UNDP, 2014). Average inequality within developing countries has been slowly rising since the early 1970s, and with it, persistent poverty (Ravallion, 2014).3 These new inequality trends are not related to unchangeable economic forces, but rather, they depend to a great extent on the proactive equality promoting policy choices that governments make (Hulme, 2016; Ravallion, 2014). Reducing inequality requires addressing cultural norms that reproduce inequality and strengthening the political agency of disadvantaged groups. Culture is among a series of variables that could lead to disasters and environmental degradation (e.g., see Wisner et al., 2004). Disparities in health, education, income, and other social development programs have roots in bargaining power within marriage and other gender relational factors; discrimination of all sorts, inclusion/exclusion, and lack of access tend to be entrenched in most countries. But coupled with inadequate resources, more significant levels of government ineffectiveness and capacity challenges, higher resource prices, less developed local institutions, property rights, and entitlement issues do not bode well for developing countries.4 In addition, concerns about power and race as well as gender relations and their impacts on choices and individual worth have long been reported in the gender and development literature (Enarson, 2012). The factors above interact with household and individual circumstances and lead these groups to do things during the course of daily living that can increase the environment for disasters; added to those above, climate change, biodiversity loss and disaster losses threaten to upend progress made in development as well as with the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda (Khoday, 2018). So, there are still deep contradictions existing in development policy and practice that need to be addressed—interactions between social, economic and power relations contribute to our development crisis (Khoday, 2018), resulting in large-­scale vulnerabilities that might later result in disasters among individuals, groups, and countries. The global frameworks that have driven disaster risk reduction (DRR) and sustainable development activities, particularly since the year 2000, have emphasized the pivotal role that governance plays in disaster risk reduction, but yet have not prompted a real focus on the issue. These frameworks (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, Sustainable Development Goals) underline that without the crucial governance element, national and international efforts at DRR bear little fruit. These global frameworks stress putting in place robust institutions at the international, national, and local levels, mainstreaming DRR in national policies, developing support legislation, building technological and technical capacity, garnering political commitment, decentralizing responsibilities, and engendering community participation. True, Hyogo and Sendai also note social and cultural factors as necessary to DRR, but how to take them into account in DRR is lacking. The frameworks’ custodians have sought and continue to work with states to integrate DRR into planning, legislation, and daily routines (UNISDR, 2017).

44   Part I National governments have followed suit. For instance, the governance guidelines in the Hyogo Framework recommend that states establish a national system for understanding disaster risk and integrating them into related policy and planning mechanisms and for developing organizations whose mission is disaster risk reduction. The Sendai Framework builds on Hyogo’s goals, but positions governance as a critical driver in DRR and resilience. Developing countries have, to varying degrees, implemented the recommendations of the global frameworks with varying results. Having this discussion is seminal to one on disaster risk governance. Disaster risk governance is best understood within its macro-­environmental contexts. By that I mean, a workable disaster risk governance framework considers the broader societal, political, economic, social and geographic situation of the country within which it is practiced. There is no homogeneity among developing countries, but within a range, they tend to share specific characteristics in the macro-­environment. It is well documented that developing countries face high degrees of economic and institutional vulnerabilities (Briguglio, 2003; Watson et al., 2000; UN DESA & UN OHRLLS, 2011). Their economies are small and generally non-­diverse, making them prone to external shocks from global market trends. Also, public–private partnerships, which provide security against the human and economic losses from disasters, are either unavailable or underdeveloped in most highly exposed developing countries (Linnerooth-­Bayer & Mechler, 2007). The institutions in developing countries are invariably weak, but range along a continuum from weaker to stronger; they often lack adequate capacity to make and implement DRR policies because of limited resources (e.g., Grindle 2004; Risse, 2013; Fukuyama, 2007). Moreover, a host of institutional quality measures are negatively correlated with national disaster death counts in developing countries (Khan, 2003, p.  3). For instance, developing countries often exhibit pockets of high population densities that are unplanned and spontaneous (Watson et al., 2000). The majority of their populations have fewer individual and support resources when compared with people of developed countries. High unemployment and underemployment remain stubborn policy problems. Their governments suffer economic and financial setbacks after a disaster since disasters place added stress on already indebted states (Ghesquiere et al., 2004; Khan, 2003; Mechler, 2004; Renn, 2009). In developing countries, external dependence is substantial. Developing countries typically export their raw material to developed countries, needing to import finished goods as well as technologies from them at much higher prices, then having to import finished products at much higher rates than their exports puts them at a disadvantage economically. However, it has also been observed that the degree of such dependence also varies from country to country. As these characteristics vary along a continuum, so must the DRG framework.

Making Conceptual Connections   45

Not Just Development but Sustainable Development: Concepts and Challenges In 1987, the Brundtland Report sought to officially define sustainable development for the first time in the international development arena as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”—linking environmental concerns with development (LéLé, 1991). However, this definition is contradictory. Sustainable development is a moving target. First, what are needs and who determines what needs are legitimate (see Redclift, 2005)? Second, needs are temporal and spatial—they change over time and from place to place (see Connelly, 2007). So, development is a loaded concept—development for whom? What are its processes? Moreover, who decides? There is no real consensus on the societal goals that would count as sustainable development, although there is a strong emphasis on poverty reduction, and access to resources (see Connelly, 2007). Sustainable development embraces the complexity of human–environment relations across a diversity of disciplines and expertise. Understanding that dramatic change can happen, sustainable development allows for a community or country to adapt to change when it happens while maintaining its development trajectory (see Connelly, 2007). But this approach has inherent problems. There may be no real consensus on the societal goals that would count as sustainable development, although there is a strong emphasis on poverty reduction and access to resources (see Connelly, 2007). Others, while noting the ambiguity in the term “sustainable development,” focus on the founding definition in the Brundtland Report as its pivot. This variation in starting point obscures its purpose and weakens it as a policy goal. It is little wonder, then, that like “development,” the term “sustainable development” has run into some semantic problems of its own. The mainstream debate about sustainable development has separated interrelated processes—disaster risk reduction, including looking at gender equality, women’s empowerment and human rights for all, climate change and sustainable development (Kelman, 2015)—despite the apparent linkages. This tendency to separate these interrelated concepts has limited our understanding and application. Sustainable development, climate change, and disaster risk reduction communities have each approached the complex set of issues from different angles (Kelman, 2015). Sustainable development considers that disasters, development, and poverty are inextricably linked. For instance, the literature on sustainable development shows how disaster impacts can derail growth in rich and developing countries alike (Uitto & Shaw, 2016). Disaster risk reduction is the: concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters—reducing exposure to hazards, lessening vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improving preparedness and early warning for adverse events. (UNISDR, n.d.)

46   Part I It aims to understand why a system can or cannot cope with potential hazardous events and proposes solutions that limit vulnerability while supporting resilience. Climate change and its effects are considered to be the most significant environmental threats to sustainable development and have adverse impacts on human health, food security, economic activity, natural resources and physical infrastructure (IPCC, 2007). Adaptation is considered to be one of the four building blocks (along with mitigation, finance, and technology) required for a strengthened future response to climate change. Climate change mitigation or adaptation has become more pressing than other hazard drivers, although remedial actions in the communities intersect on social, institutional, economic, and governance strategies and can more effectively tackle together to promote sustainable development better. Driven by the 1987 Brundtland Report, the mainstream debate about sustainable development has ignored culturally specific definitions of what is sustainable, focusing instead on poverty, population growth, environmental and other socioeconomic factors that are negatively impacting earth’s resources. The Brundtland Report was commissioned to continue the work of a previous one appointed by the Club of Rome and conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1972 (Meadows et al., 1972). In that report, The Limits to Growth, the authors used computer modeling to explore the interaction between exponential population growth and finite resources. This report concluded that: unless we contain population growth, most natural resources will disappear over the next century. The Limits to Growth highlighted the detrimental effects of human activity on the planet and further that we needed to take action to help the poorest populations of the world and their perspectives on development. The report called for greater coordinated political action and responsibility (Meadows et al., 1972) to provide for the world’s poor. The Brundtland Report placed environmental concerns at its center and proposed legal principles for environmental protection, ignoring social, cultural and institutional factors. Sustainable development has become the watchword for international aid agencies and development planners and practitioners; it has become the dominant development approach since the 1990s. Using sustainable development as the guiding principle, the United Nations-­sponsored Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 sought to build community and national resilience to disasters. The Hyogo Framework integrated disaster risk considerations—structural and nonstructural disaster mitigation efforts, early warning systems, resourcing— into sustainable development processes as a critical strategy to ensure that social and economic development gains are protected and sustained. Agencies such as the UNISDR using a sustainable development approach have been working to mainstream disaster risk reduction and disaster management into national policies, planning processes, plans and decision-­making at all levels and across all sectors, and more particularly into national sustainable development plans, especially in developing countries (see Rao, 2013). This approach has prompted scholars (e.g., Jordan, 2008) to suggest that “ultimately sustainable development is a political concept replete with governance

Making Conceptual Connections   47 questions.” For example, policies on disaster risk reduction, such as those incentivizing or promoting relationship-­building among actors, all bend to political will and the prevailing party ideology at the time. Governance plays a central role in the sustainable development debate, but the considerable range and complexity of overlapping concepts (vulnerability, resilience, understanding risks, and sustainable development) create significant challenges. The academic literature shows a lack of consistency in interpretations of the term “sustainable development.” It was originally used as a desirable “state of global equilibrium” or maintaining a delicate balance between the human need to improve lifestyles and feeling of well-­being, on the one hand, and preserving natural resources and ecosystems, on the other. But in order to sustain growing populations, we need economic growth and/or income redistribution or both in some combination, which could put pressure on the earth’s finite resources. The incomplete perception of poverty problems, vulnerability, what motivates people to take actions to reduce risks, the role of economic growth as only one in a series of critical variables, and whether broad participation is necessary to achieve sustainable development goals limits the success of actions taken to promote sustainability. They could also lead to contradictions in policymaking (LéLé, 1991). In this regard, sustainability without sudden and uncontrolled collapse is difficult. There is also confusion about the concept of “sustainability.”5 The concept has become part of the global development jargon and is widely used by multiple disciplines and sectors but mostly unrelated to its original meaning. The interconnectedness of the concepts DRR, climate change and sustainable development, their issues and scales, the variety of actions and actors involved in each, as well as long-­term effects of past actions on current and future conditions mean that addressing sustainability during post-­disaster reconstruction is complicated (see also Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2015; Guarnacci, 2012; Vasavada, 2013; Bang, 2013), albeit necessary. The current global development framework (SDGs) espouses the need to systematically link areas together that impact sustainable development such as disasters and development. This perspective resonates with those made by the Commission on Global Governance’s initial report, Our Global Neighborhood, to the United Nations’ 50th anniversary session in 1995. The report called for a reassessment of the future of governance. The Commission saw the need for universal values— equality, liberty, life—that could only be achieved if the different disciplines, sectors, and levels all work together. There was no alternative to it (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). Successful efforts at sustainable development will have disaster risk reduction and climate change as critical pillars, and there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the three concepts. Hazard drivers such as climate change, poverty, isolation, globalization, inequality, lack of access, and marginalization overlap to cause disasters that disrupt development at multiple scales, putting the goals of sustainable development in jeopardy (Kelman et al., 2016; Uitto & Shaw, 2016). Disasters can wipe out years of development gains and increase the vulnerabilities of communities experiencing

48   Part I their impact (Uitto & Shaw, 2016; Greve, 2016). Efforts at sustainable development will also reduce or increase vulnerabilities and so must be carefully balanced. Environmental degradation and climate change add complexity and uncertainty to disaster risk reduction by increasing the potential severity and frequency of triggering events that lead to disasters (Uitto & Shaw, 2016; Greve, 2016). These issues are being discussed in ongoing sustainable development negotiations, but a focus on climate change and the fundamental differences between the communities that have hampered their integration in practice remain (Birkmann & Teichmann, 2010).

Governance as a Cross-­Cutting Theme One element that is getting increasing attention in the disaster risk reduction and climate change literature but is still too little considered in DRG analysis is the impact of poor development practices in creating increased vulnerability, resulting in development losses and growing indebtedness (Lélé, 1991; Kelman, 2015). Scholars (for example see Wisner et al., 2004, 2012; Kelman, 2015) have shown that there is a causal link between disaster risk and development. For example, in their chart depicting the progression of vulnerability, Wisner, et al. (2012) show how root causes based on social and economic structures, ideology, history and culture, including traditions and religions, impact dynamic societal and macro-­ forces pressures which develop into fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations. Coupled with climatological, geomorphological, geological and biological hazards, these lead to high natural, physical, human, social, economic and political vulnerabilities (Wisner et al., 2012). There is also research (see Tierney, 2012) that implicates forces including globalization, world-­system dynamics, social inequality, and sociodemographic trends that could increase the vulnerability of people and place to the impact of natural hazards. How we arrange governance systems should be mindful of these realities. Disaster risk governance systems are nested within and influenced by overarching global and societal governance systems. State–civil society relationships, economic organization, and societal transitions have implications for disaster governance (Tierney, 2012). One consequence is that weaknesses in societal governance mechanisms and relationships will translate into weaknesses in disaster risk governance. The historical and developmental contexts found in developing countries limit their ability to create governance systems that support systemic planning and mobilization of actors at multiple levels who collaborate to eliminate the root causes of vulnerability and build capacities that will ultimately help to reduce disaster risks. These go hand in hand, impacting each other in several ways (Rao, 2013). For developing countries, the term sustainable development can be problematic. The term denotes a striving to be better, not only for the present generation but for future generations also. Most of the world’s poorest countries are former colonies (Austin, 2010; Rodney, 1973), and their institutions remain weak and under-­resourced, requiring the communities at risk to share not only the future of risk knowledge generation but also DRR policy formulation.

Making Conceptual Connections   49 Disaster risk governance (risk governance) is pivotal to our understanding of the connection between risk processes, vulnerability, resilience (Rodney, 1973) and sustainable development. Disaster risk governance describes the translation of the substance and core principles of governance to the context of risk and risk-­related decision-­making. Here governance is understood to represent the multitude of actors and processes that lead to collective binding decisions (e.g., van Asselt & Renn, 2011). DRR needs governance to make connections with broader societal and developmental processes that have implications for it and to translate the processes and decisions made into actions among multiple actors.

Vulnerability Gone are the days when disasters were perceived as “acts of a vengeful God” (Drabek, 1991) punishing humankind for unknown purposes (McEntire, 2001). This thinking has long proved to be simplistic. It ignored the role of humans in at least contributing to, if not causing, the conditions for disasters (McEntire, 2001). Disasters occur at the interface between an extreme physical event and a vulnerable population (Lewis et al., 1976, p.  2; Lewis & Kelman, 2010; Cutter et al., 2008; Kelman et al., 2016; Alexander, 1995; Mileti, 1999). Neither vulnerability nor disasters are the sole product of bad luck or apathy but must be understood as a result of other processes endemic to the systems in which disasters occurred (Wisner et al., 2004; Oliver-­Smith, 1986; Mileti, 1999; Hewitt, 1983, 2007). These other processes include fragile livelihoods and unsafe locations that result from dynamic pressures and social and economic structures, ideologies, history and culture, and traditions (see Wisner et al., 2012), although they are not limited to them. For instance, those living on $1.20 or less per day might suffer other challenges that lead to them being vulnerable, including marginal living circumstances, poor healthcare, and low schooling levels. Disasters, then, are best understood as a result of the “complex interaction between a potentially damaging physical event (e.g., floods, droughts, fire, earthquakes and storms) and the vulnerability of a society, its infrastructure, economy and environment, which are determined by human behavior” (Birkmann, 2006, p. 10). Similar to many of the concepts used in this book, there is no universally accepted consensus on the term “vulnerability,” which makes a definition challenging to pin down (Birkmann et al., 2013). For example, Kelman et al. (2016) define vulnerability as the “propensity to be harmed but not being able to deal with the harm given the social processes (power relations, inequality and discrimination, poverty and so on) creating and maintaining that propensity.” Another definition by UNISDR (2017) defines vulnerability as “[t]he conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.” Still another definition of the concept from the IFRC (n.d.) states, “vulnerability is the diminished capacity of an individual or group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-­made hazard.”

50   Part I These definitions converge on the term’s degree of susceptibility or fragility of communities, systems or elements at risk. Vulnerability determines the degree of risk, predisposition, and the lack of resistance of an individual or a place to hazards (McEntire, 2000). As such we can anticipate the potential for a disaster based on the fragility of critical systems and infrastructure and how they will interact with a potentially damaging physical event. Measures to tackle vulnerability are often social, since the process is being caused by social issues such as exploitation, marginalization, victimization, personal or corporate greed. These issues are not considered often enough in the vulnerability literature and assessment methods (Kelman, 2008; Cutter et al., 2000), although the resonance of a few loud voices (Kelman et al., 2016; Birkmann & Wisner, 2006) are changing this. A vulnerability is more likely to be present when there is a combination of high liabilities and low capabilities from diverse and overlapping environments, each separately able to offer only limited support against breakdown in the other. Vulnerability is not only about the current state, but also about the process by which the current state of exposure was reached and its current trajectory (Hewitt, 2007; Oliver-­Smith, 1986). In that regard, vulnerability is both a process and an outcome. A vulnerability is more likely to be present when there is a combination of high liabilities and low capabilities in social, cultural, political, and economic environments (McEntire, 2000). Each category influences every other category. So, the “vulnerability process” reflects dynamic characteristics such as fragility and susceptibility, weakness, or exposure that can perpetrate or resolve the current state of vulnerability. Our values, ideas, behaviors, and actions have led to many of these characteristics in the first place (Lewis & Kelman, 2015; Mileti, 1999). Some causes of vulnerability are more readily considered in vulnerability assessment and more easily factored into interventions proposed and made. Others are not so readily linked but are more insidious to the vulnerability process and outcome. They include corruption, victimization, exploitation, marginalization, personal or corporate greed, and human rights, which are just beginning to be taken seriously in the vulnerability literature and assessment methods (see Lewis & Kelman, 2010; Kelman, 2008; Cutter et al., 2000). These causes intersect on the poor, depriving them of access, livelihood options, and physical capital, including stable housing and day-­to-day living options. At these intersections, people and their communities are vulnerable to the effects of natural hazards. The state of being vulnerable varies over time, and so addressing vulnerability (the current state) must also be an ongoing process of addressing capacity and capability issues, empowerment, education, and sustainability throughout a country or system at all levels (Lewis & Kelman, 2010; McEntire, 2000). Measures to tackle vulnerability are often social since most of the causes of disaster risk are socially distributed. This distribution reflects social divisions in society (Enarson et al., 2007), concentrating around gender, race, age, and ethnicity— empowering people and giving them choices, resource allocation, social and

Making Conceptual Connections   51 technical, and holding elected officials accountable when they do nothing to improve the conditions that cause vulnerability (Kelman et al., 2016). For instance, disasters hit women harder because of their condition and position in society (Twigg, 2004). Generally, women’s access to education, resources, and income-­earning opportunities are limited. Decision-­making within the household and in the community is still mainly male-­dominated, although women contribute significant resources in these spheres. Even during disasters, women are expected to carry out their regular tasks, but in more difficult conditions, in addition to dealing with the consequences of the catastrophe itself (ibid.). Also, especially in the aftermath of disasters, women’s historical lifecycle caregiving responsibilities put added pressures on them (Enarson, 2010). Moreover, Ahmed (2015), citing a study by researchers from the London School of Economics and the University of Essex, finds that higher numbers of death among women result because disasters exacerbate previously existing patterns of discrimination that render them more vulnerable to the fatal impact of disasters. Sleeping in the open air makes women more vulnerable to sexual assault, as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2010 Haiti earthquake showed, and young girls are exposed to human trafficking as well. In older age, women are more likely than older men to live alone and experience poverty, and African Amer­ican women and other marginalized ethnic minority groups display higher levels of poverty in households headed by them (Enarson, 2010). So, places and people are made to be hazard-­prone (Wisner et al., 2004; Hewitt, 1983) by the politics, policies, customs and economics of that place. Factors in the built environment cannot be isolated from elements in the social, economic, political and other complex contextual and cultural contexts. A vulnerability is most often associated with poverty, but it can also arise when people are isolated (tourists), insecure and defenseless (homeless, deep rural, remote island) in the face of risk, shock or stress. Indeed, we can perpetuate vulnerability by our values and actions. On the contrary, we can also reduce our vulnerabilities by reducing or moving away from our past beliefs and actions, from individuals up to communities and countries (Wisner et al., 2004; Lewis, 1999). The vulnerability processes combine with social, economic, and structural variables in different contexts to determine differential vulnerability and resilience within and across these contexts, affecting places and individuals differently (Thomalla et al., 2015; McEntire, 2000).

Capacity and Resource Access Capacity refers to the strengths, attributes, and resources available within societies in general, communities, or organizations to reduce and manage disaster risks and strengthen resilience (UNISDR, 2017). Existing knowledge, strengths, attributes and resources in individuals, organizations or society are vital foundations for capacity-­building for DRR. Capacity may include infrastructure, institutions, individual knowledge and skills, and collective attributes such as social relationships, leadership, and management (UNISDR, 2017). Infrastructure

52   Part I including roads and bridges, airports, ports and marine terminals, IT, power and other service infrastructure, whether publicly or privately owned, needs to be shored up to withstand hazard impacts as people rely on them to respond to and recover from hazard impacts. Societal or institutional-­level capacities constitute the enabling environment within which individuals and organizations at multiple levels function (UNDP, 2009). At this level, collective attributes such as social relationships and networks should be built to promote inclusion, equity, accountability, leadership, and management. At the organizational level, capacity development drives policy formulation and implementation, as well as the procedures and frameworks necessary to deliver the organization’s mandate. At the individual level, individual capacity has to be understood within the context of both the infrastructural and organizational level and enabling environment. Do the circumstances facilitate personal knowledge and skills-­building? Are infrastructural, legislative, or organizational settings supportive of individuals’ need to become more resilient themselves? Building capacity may be a less straightforward strategy for individuals, since, unlike infrastructural and societal capacity-­building, the drivers of individual vulnerability reside outside the household—e.g., world systems, political ideology and partisanship, class structure, gender issues, economic policies and priorities, including wealth distribution, security, stability, building policies, livelihood practices and so on—that the individual has no control over (Wisner et al., 2004). The individual’s capacity to reduce their vulnerability is therefore often limited without outside intervention. To build up capabilities for DRR, fundamental attributes of the system or place must be developed. Limited human, institutional, infrastructural and financial capacity are especially prevalent in developing countries, although these situations can be identified in sections of developed countries as well. They limit our ability to resist and recover from disaster shocks (Thomalla et al., 2006). In practice, though, local peoples have been known to mobilize to resist unsustainable (vulnerability-­increasing) forms of development or livelihood practices—for example, Allen’s (2006) work in the Philippines, where local peoples were able to mobilize to more effectively raise local concerns with political representatives to build local capacity for community–based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation. The lesson is that even marginalized individuals and groups possess some ability to help themselves during disaster shocks. With support, marginalized groups (including women, the elderly and disabled), foreigners (including tourists), and the young can better hone their capacities to prepare for and resist the impacts of disasters caused by natural hazards (Wisner et al., 2012). Women’s capacity in producing and selling goods and their role as wage earners are still underutilized but remain central to building household livelihoods and family coping ability during crises (Twigg, 2009). Capacity development, then, goes beyond simple resource availability to resource access (Wisner et al., 2004). Over the long term, all individuals and communities need to be able to access resources to build capacities that help to remove the causes of disasters and resist and recover from disasters. This type of

Making Conceptual Connections   53 capacity-­building requires holistic approaches at all scales—individual, community, country—related to stresses and hazards (from health to livelihood; from the immediate to the long term; from individual to societal) (Thomalla et al., 2006).

Resilience Many proponents of sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, and climate change, especially global development organizations, have enlisted “resilience” in a normative sense—as an ideal to strive for even if it might not be realistic in some contexts. For them, resilience plays a vital role in reorienting our thinking away from piecemeal efforts to more systematic solutions to rebuild better and systematically integrate disaster risk reduction into development planning and sustainability considerations—these are the stuff of governance. Resilience relies on our capacity to learn, make decisions and to act on these decisions using valid information and evidence (Comfort et al., 2012), as well as build up institutional and individual capacities by addressing broader social issues and integrating these into development planning and solutions. Resilience requires governance mechanisms to systematically steer processes that connect policies and practices around the goals of resilience. These are discussed below. Disaster resilience has come into currency in disaster risk reduction after a long history in a variety of disciplines, from mechanics (Rankine, 1867, 1908) to psychology (Masten, 2001; Rutter, 1993; Flach, 1988; Timmerman, 1981), ecology (Walker & Salt, 2012; Folke, 2006) and socio-­ecological systems (Holling, 1996; Walker et al., 2004; Berkes et al., 2000; Gunderson, 2000), economics (Batabyal, 1998), and the social sciences more generally (Anderies et al., 2004; Ludwig et al., 1997; Luthar & Cicchett, 2000), including disaster sciences (Alexander, 2013; Manyena et al., 2011). The increased policy and research interest in disaster resilience (e.g., Davoudi & Porter, 2012) has not reduced the current definitional debates in the literature. In some ways, these debates continue because scholars continue to work in silos that limit the cross-­disciplinary integration of scholarship, approaches, and methods (Cutter et al., 2008). The lack of a concrete definition has caused some scholars to wonder whether “resilience” is doomed to become another buzzword (e.g., Davoudi & Porter, 2012). The first known dictionary definition of resilience came from Thomas Blount in 1618 (Alexander, 2013), when the term was used in two different ways: (1) to rebound, and (2) to go back on one’s word. In 1839 Bell used the term to mean “the ability to recover from adversity” (i.e., grit or fortitude). By the 1820s engineering sciences used the term to describe the strength and elasticity of steel. Alexander (2013) found that the modern usage of the term in civil protection “resilience” was used in the 1860s to mean the robustness of the cladding of the prototype of iron ships. Steel beams were resilient because they were able to survive due to steel’s rigidity (strength) and ductility (absorbing the force with deformation, thereby retaining its integrity) (Alexander, 2013). By extension, the strength of human societies resides in their ability to devise means of withstanding disasters while maintaining their integrity.

54   Part I When “resilience” made its way to human ecology from natural ecology, mainly through the works of economists and geographers, there was an emphasis on system stability as its central feature. This definition aligns with the current UNISDR (2009) definition of “resilience”:  The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. (p. 10) In this definition, the terms “resist,” “absorb,” “accommodate to,” and “recover” align with prior meanings to absorb, and recover, while “the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” aligns with human ecology’s emphasis on system stability over time. While some note the inherent contradiction in the definition, e.g., “restoring equilibrium and moving away from it to a new system state” at the same time (e.g., see Alexander, 2013, p.  2710), I do not. Resilience thinking understands places not as neutral entities, but as complex systems that are in a constant state of flux (Davoudi & Porter, 2012), in which stability is at best fleeting. It (resilience) emphasizes an inherent uncertainty in societies where there exists a dynamic interplay between stability, adaptability, and transformability (Davoudi & Porter, 2012). If we understand societies as complex adaptive systems rather than seeing them as orderly, mechanical and reasonably predictable, we would better understand their chaotic, complex, uncertain, and unpredictable nature and thus the contradictions that are inherent in them. In this regard, the seemingly stable state that we see around us in nature or society “can suddenly change and become something radically new, with characteristics that are profoundly different from those of the original” (Kinzig et al., 2006, in Davoudi & Porter, 2012). My point is that, faced with adversities (e.g., disasters and catastrophes), a resilient system hardly ever returns to its prior state. It will typically morph into a new condition to survive as it adapts to its changing or changed environment (Davoudi & Porter, 2012). Alexander (2013), in tracking the epistemological development of the term “resilience,” shows the durability of its central meanings—absorbing, maintaining integrity, rebounding, recovering, and robustness—across disciplines, in mechanics, psychology, medicine, ecology, economics and so on. The concept, then, does not suffer from a lack of consensus on meanings, although there is no single unified definition of the term, but rather, it suffers from our inability to operationalize it adequately. What does a resilient society look like? How do we know when we come to it? Can we ever get there? There are several reasons why operationalizing resilience is problematic. I will discuss only two here. First, the very definitions of “resilience” vary at different scales of operation. For instance, signatories to international frameworks such as the Hyogo Framework for Action or Sendai Framework have

Making Conceptual Connections   55 worked to apply their principles at national and local levels with only limited success. It is difficult to apply global measures to localities with different levels of social, physical, and economic resources (Connelly, 2007) and historical background. Even before countries can begin to address resilience, efforts must be made to understand their vulnerabilities and reduce them, resolve issues or power dynamics, discrimination, marginalization, and disempowerment, institutional context, integrate these strategies into development planning and build the capacities of communities, their resources, and their coping mechanisms at various levels and sectors (Connelly, 2007). These issues are situational and subjective, as are the strategies to reduce them. There is a long and widely accepted body of work that remains current (e.g., Hewitt, 1983, 2007; Oliver-­Smith, 1986; Wisner et al., 2004; Bankoff et al., 2004) to support this thinking. Second, there is a complex array of interacting and interconnected factors that impact how we understand resilience. Risk is transferred into the future and compounded (Gaillard & Jigyasu, 2016). This line of thought implies a couple of things. First, decisions, policies, and practices by prior generations or those located in seemingly unrelated locations can create hazards that affect other populations not making or influencing those hazards. In planning there will be unknown unknowns missing from our scope of planning, indicating that with the best efforts, even the rightest country will never be resilient. Second, an examination of sociocultural contexts and power helps to capture underlying variabilities across different societal systems (Cote & Nightingale, 2012, p.  476). In resilience, the underlying variables, some known, others not, in a dynamic relationship may never lead to countries or communities or individuals becoming resilient. Disaster risk governance helps to push DRR by working at the intersection of social, economic, cultural, political and global forces to reduce disaster risks Effective disaster risk governance produces resilience (Djalante et al., 2011), and ultimately sustainable development. As such, DRG is imperative for developing countries seeking to grow sustainably. However, building and promoting DRG has been especially challenging to achieve in developing countries. The new development push—sustainable development—provides an opportunity to move DRR in a new direction, but it requires sound DRG. Besides, we will have to choose whether to focus on climate change to the detriment of other risk drivers. And how? These are questions of governance, and they are context-­ driven.

Notes 1 Incomes in developing countries range from less than US$1,025 in countries like Zanzibar to $12,475, which is a substantial difference in terms of quality of life indicators. This makes comparisons within groups very difficult. 2 The rise in global within-­country inequality is accounted for by the increased disparities within China and India, where more than a third of the world’s population live, and, therefore, tends to dominate the aggregate income inequality index (see Milanovic, 2013; Sala-­i-Martin, 2002).

56   Part I 3 During the 1970s to the 1990s, rising inequality in developing countries was seen as a less pressing concern than ensuring sufficient growth, because economic growth, not income equality, was the key to poverty reduction (see Ravallion, 2014). Depending on the measurement methodology, income inequality has remained relatively stable (Ravallion, 2014; Milanovic, 2013) or is rising (see UNDP, 2014) in developing countries. 4 These issues are discussed in detail in further chapters in the book (e.g., see Chapters 4 and 5). 5 The concept of sustainability is old, dating back to at least 400 bce, where Aristotle referred to a Greek concept in talking about household economics. The household had to be self-­sustaining and could not just be consumption-­oriented. The concept of sustainability is used as a “balance between resource consumption and reproduction.” The term was applied to forestry in the twelfth to sixteenth century to mean sustained yield. Since the late 1980s, sustainability has crossed over to the development literature because of the awareness of a rapid deterioration of the human environment and its natural resources. In that context, sustainable development means “development that promotes prosperity and economic opportunity, greater social well-­being, and protection of the environment.” As such sustainability via sustainable development has been put on the international political agenda by the UN and other multilateral and bilateral agencies and NGOs (see the Road to Rio Report: “A Common Future” to “The Future we Want”, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio + 20 (2012). Accessed at https://rio20.un.org/resolutions-­more.

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4 Disaster Risk Governance

Disaster risk reduction needs disaster risk governance (risk governance) to translate risk reduction processes and decisions into collective action among multiple actors (e.g., van Asselt & Renn, 2011). In this book, I use disaster risk governance to mean “the specific arrangements that societies put in place to manage their disaster risk” (PreventionWeb, 2015) within a broader context of risk governance (Renn, 2008, in UNISDR, 2015). However, as the chapter will show, the concept’s definition is far from settled because its root concept “governance” is contested. Governance is used as the central focus of this book because of its importance in regulating the multiple actors and processes around disaster risk reduction. Like others (e.g., see PreventionWeb, 2015), I argue that weak governance is a disaster risk driver linked to many other risk drivers, including poverty, inequality, poor planning, and development. Governance helps us to understand how actors carry out collective action, as well as how stakeholders determine, implement and evaluate the rules for those interactions (Baggio, Scott, & Cooper, 2010). Their actions are guided by an “interrelated set of norms and practices designed to reduce the impacts and losses associated with disasters” (Tierney, 2012, p. 314). I propose that the path to disaster risk reduction runs through disaster risk governance. Disaster risk reduction needs DRG to make connections with broader societal and developmental processes that have implications for it and to translate the processes and decisions made into actions around policy problems; as such, DRG facilitates shared solutions to problems in disaster risk reduction. To more fully understand disaster risk governance, one would do well to understand the root concept of “governance.” Disaster governance research has advanced since the early 2000s (see Tierney, 2012; Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Miller & Douglass, 2016; Pelling & Wisner, 2012; Gall et al., 2014b; Wisner et al., 2004, 2012; Alexander, 2013; Field & Kelman, 2018), but there remains some variation in its definition that turns on the lack of consensus on definition of the root term “governance.” Even after multiple books and articles on the subject (Renn, 2017; Gall et al., 2014b; Blackburn, 2014; Wachinger, et al., 2013; Alexander, 2013; Bang, 2013; Tierney, 2012; Djalante et al., 2011; Pelling, 2011; Ikeda & Nagasaka, 2011; Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006), the debates rage on.

Disaster Risk Governance   63 While I cannot attempt a complete historical review of the concept’s evolution here, I will cite literature from a variety of disciplines to track the evolution and come to a definition. The term entered the English language in the late 1300s from old English and medieval Latin. The original meaning was “the action or manner of governing” (OED, 2013, in Alexander, 2013). In Public Administration, Harlan Cleveland (1972) first used the word “governance” as an alternative to the phrase “public administration” in the sense of steering processes of governing, and this is the manner in which Pierre and Peters (2000) use the term. This definition lacked the specificity needed to be helpful. Later, public policy scholars Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) defined governance as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constraint, prescribe and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services” (p. 7). The definition, while more specific, left gaps that empirical evidence was beginning to pick up. For instance, the definition left governance in the government or state-­centered or hierarchical realm, when, in reality, multiple actors were fashioning solutions to problems collaboratively, and governments were contracting out services. In public administration, the shift from hierarchical to collaborative mechanisms came from empirical observations. Public administration scholars including H. George Frederickson, Bingham, and others were writing about it. Frederickson (2007) observed a long-­standing theoretical debate in the field of public administration about the concept. For him, governance should be understood as the work that governments do, and the ones it contracts out, which for him is the subject of public administration’s study. Also, Bingham et al. (2005) identify the citizenry along with horizontal networks of public, private, and non-­profit organizations as the new structures of governance, which lie in opposition to the traditional hierarchical organizational decision-­making. So, the concept of governance, indeed in public administration, was evolving. By the 2000s, the concept of “governance” had consolidated into a few core meanings—governance as a theory; governance as an empirical phenomenon; and governance as a normative prescription (Jordan, 2008, citing Pierre & Peters, 2000). Governance as theory comes from scholars wanting to explain some of the empirical findings in governance studies (Jordan, 2008). Three main modes of governing—markets, networks, and hierarchies aggregate collective problem-­solving, decision-­making and actions—frame governance as theory (Stoker, 1998). Markets are the formal rules and informal norms meant to change the behavior of economic actors through market-­based instruments such as taxes, incentives and penalties (Williamson, 1996; Rediker & Seth, 1995). Networks are where more organic and informal contractual relationships among multiple actors regulate behavior (Rhodes, 1996), and in hierarchies, traditional mechanisms are used to regulate behavior by giving higher grants of authority from higher to lower governing levels (see Dixon & Dogan, 2002). However, a system of ideas intended to explain governance based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained has not emerged. Even today

64   Part I one would be forgiven to think that governance as theory is in an embryonic state (Flinders, 2002, p. 52; Jordan, 2008), underdeveloped and unsophisticated state (Pierre & Peters, 2000) being merely a set of empirical observations not quite reaching to the level of theoretical abstraction or generalizable claims. For these and other reasons, the skeptics of governance as theory claim that there is not, and never was, a grand theory of governance (see Young, 2005, in Jordan, 2008); the contextual variations are too significant. The term “governance” in a normative, prescriptive sense is an ideal, something that should be adopted to improve a situation. For example, good governance— associating governance with an efficient public service, independent judiciary, the rule of law, transparency, an accountable system for collecting and allocating funds, human rights, as well as for benchmarking and promoting best practices—is a reform objective promoted by international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations. The concept of “good governance” denotes more accountability and fewer corrupt practices by governments while at the same time trying to ensure that the public’s voice is heard (Lassa, 2014). Governance as an empirical phenomenon is often referred to as “new modes of governance,” especially those that rely on the coordinating power of networks as opposed to the traditional hierarchies and markets (Jordan, 2008). This society-­focused view of governance is increasingly replacing the state-­centric view. The idea is, governance systems, traditionally viewed through the lens of sovereignty, have now been hollowed out and so have given rise to multiple actors—even global actors—stepping in to deliver what governments once did (Tierney, 2012; Rhodes, 1996). The hollow state—a metaphor for the increasing use of third parties that carry out activities once reserved for the state—gives way to collectivities of actors sharing resources in joint problem-­solving and decision-­making. This notion of governance originates in the fields of international relations and international political economy, where international interdependencies erode the authority of the state to shared authority (Rhodes, 1996) and as a result governance, while embracing formal government authority, has expanded to also include non-­government informal mechanisms where authority is decentralized, disaggregated and pluralistic (Rhodes, 1996). In some cases, government authority is supplemented by international organizations, Western powers, and regional actors. What results are more and more policy competences being moved up to international bodies, and down to communities, regional and other non-­state actors (Rhodes, 1996; Tierney, 2012; Pierre & Peters, 2000). Concerns about the lack of a clear and consistent definition of governance rest in part on the dimensional and operational levels. Governance can be understood in both a horizontal and a vertical dimension (Renn, 2009; Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Lyall & Tait, 2004; Kooiman, 1993; Ingraham & Lynn, 2004; March & Olsen, 1995; Peters, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). The horizontal dimension includes the relevant actors within a defined geographical or functional segment at the same level of operation—state-­to-state, community-­tocommunity, country-­to-country—and decision-­making processes. Even at the

Disaster Risk Governance   65 same level of operation, there are complexities surrounding governance. At each level, decision-­making concerns the types and nature of participation, actors, and their relationships, management of volunteers, delegation and provision of necessary authority and resources and so on (Aysan & Lavell, 2015). The vertical dimension concerns the hierarchical linkage between the policy and operation. For example, these include the institutional relationships between the local, regional, national and global levels. On the one hand, multi-­level governance displays multiple vertical and horizontal interlocking authority structures that can complicate authority and decision-­making. Also, the national government power can be diluted as other actors take on increasing roles. On the other hand, it is assumed to be more efficient at setting standards and implementing economic support. However, on the other hand, the power dilution can complicate authority as roles become unclear and resources to carry out responsibility become scarce. There are tensions between the society-­centered and the state-­centered view. The traditional state-­centered view of governance proposes that the state, although depleted and delivering fewer services, is still an important actor and the logical site of political accountability and public legitimacy in service delivery (see Gamble, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000). National governments are still accountable for DRR in their countries and cannot just farm this activity out to non-­state actors whole scale. Governments are the legitimate authority of the state, vested with rights to make decisions on behalf of their residents, to whom they are also accountable. This situation does not mean that states entirely retreat, except perhaps in failed state contexts. The state’s role varies depending on the context, with non-­state actors playing a range of roles to a greater or lesser degree. In contexts of fewer resources, non-­state actors are allowed to play a more significant role, blurring the lines of authority. Ambiguous as the concept is, we should not conclude that governance has too many meanings to be useful (Rhodes, 1997), and besides, we cannot avoid it in the field of development (Jordan, 2008). Governance ensures that the essential elements—social, managerial, technical, and financial principles—are adhered to in order to deliver on the promise of disaster risk reduction. Researchers in disaster risk reduction (Cannon, 2008; Twigg, 2009; Alexander, 2013; Chandler, 2014; Wisner & Kelman, 2015) see governance as the precursor to the long-­term resilience of communities. Governance sets the pre-­conditions for vulnerability reduction and facilitates preparation, prevention, mitigation, and recovery. However, the historical and contemporary developmental contexts found in developing countries often limit their government’s ability to create sound governance systems and capitalize on their benefits (more in Chapter 5). Disaster risk governance is caught up in these wider governance debates.

Disaster Risk Governance DRG is nested within and influenced by overarching societal governance ­systems—globalization, world-­system dynamics,1 social inequality, and sociodemographic trends (Tierney, 2012). A broad range of functions shares the governance

66   Part I space. Globalization determines who are winners and losers depending on how well they are connected to global markets and trade, economic, financial, transportation, communications networks, and regimes. The losers are those not well integrated into these large-­scale systems (Tierney, 2012). Forces such as globalization influence how disaster risk governance as a subset of these broader processes is and has to be as polycentric and multi-­scale as the broader governance system when practiced in developing countries. In developing countries, functions that were once the purview of the state are now increasingly dispersed among diverse sets of actors, including governmental institutions, private sectors, and civil society entities (Tierney, 2012, p.  342) as global forces and world systems hollow out the state. Disaster governance, then, is polycentric and multi-­level, meaning that it is characterized by disarticulated states and networks of providers (Moynihan et al., 2011; Tierney, 2012). In polycentric governance, there are multiple centers of decision-­making authority/unit, each sufficiently autonomous to be able to make decisions (McGinnis, 2016). However, they work collectively to maximize decisions on some common interests. Several independent centers of leadership, power, and ideology within a single system typify polycentric governance (Orchard & Stringer, 2016; Anderson & Ostrom, 2008). Also, horizontal and vertical institutional authority linkages become important in polycentric governance. The relationships in this arrangement are facilitated through social contracts that are mostly non-­binding legally (Jones, Hesterly, & Boratti, 1997; Baggio, Scott, & Cooper, 2010; Boin, 2009; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). Still, governance through the formation of networks of public and private actors has helped to solve difficult public problems. Indeed, disaster risk reduction is one domain in which governance has become indispensable (Kapucu, 2011, 2015). Disaster risk governance is a process that consists of “the interrelated sets of norms, organizational and institutional actors, and practices that are designed to reduce the impacts and losses associated with disasters” arising from all hazards (Tierney, 2012, p. 344). Its dimensions indicate that disaster risk governance has to be, as it traditionally has been, fragmented among multiple actors at the local, state, national and international levels, as well as within and between sectors and bureaucracies. What makes disaster risk governance taxing, and sometimes near impossible, has been the level of coordination and interaction among these multiple governmental, civil society, or corporate entities (Gall et al., 2014a). From the practitioner side, the UNDP Issue Brief definition on disaster risk governance has been gaining traction/prominence, at least as a practical definition in international circles (see Rao, 2013). The brief defines “disaster risk governance” as “the way in which the public authorities, civil servants, media, the private sector, and civil society coordinate at community, national and regional levels in order to manage and reduce disaster and climate-­related risks” (UNDP, 2013, p. 1). However, this definition is limited. Although it mentions disaster risks, its focus is on climate-­related risks in the development context. Scholars and practitioners in separate and mostly independent research and policy communities understand and practice governance differently. A typical

Disaster Risk Governance   67 call among stakeholders has been for more guidance on “governance,” including a clear delineation of the responsibilities between global, regional, national, and local level in disaster risk reduction (see Rao, 2013). In all the definitions there is the consensus that DRG is collaborative, multiple-­level, with multiple actors, not just government institutions, but communities, individuals, civil society groups and international organizations. In addition, the norms regulating these interactions and relationships take place within broader societal contexts. While governments play a central role in DRR efforts, their increasing inability to plan for, respond to, and recover from disasters has led to the recognition that functions once in their purview must now be more dispersed among a diverse set of actors. Multiple government agencies at multiple levels of operation as well as the public, civil society, private sectors, and non-­governmental organizations now share the burden (Tierney, 2012, p.  342; Kapucu, 2011, 2015), and are simultaneously implementing solutions to disaster-­related problems. However, they need to work cooperatively (Wisner et al., 2012; Renn, 2009) more deliberately and coherently. There is no consensus on how, but there is a consensus that governance cuts across all the institutional and traditional domains. Governance brings essential types of social and political activities together to accomplish the DRR mandate by strategically linking members to problems that need solutions, holding them accountable, working together to change attitudes and behaviors to achieve these mandates. Also, governance mediates the many arrangements—individual, institutional, societal—that individual effort alone cannot fix (Renn, 2009). Further, governance provides guidance on how to balance the power of the members as they try to achieve these purposes through laws or norms (Renn, 2009).

Disaster Risk Reduction Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is “the systematic development and application of policies, strategies, and practices to minimize vulnerabilities, hazards and the unfolding of disaster impacts throughout society, in the broad context of sustainable development” (UNISDR, 2004, p. 3). The updated UNISDR definition in 2009 is more nuanced than the 2004 version, showing a more sophisticated understanding of the term. The 2009 definition understands the concept and practice of DRR as a process. It explicitly mentions the causal factors as important vulnerability drivers, connecting them with human practices such as land management. The 2009 definition runs:  [the] concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and place, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. (UNISDR, 2009, p. 10)

68   Part I Connecting the key processes to deliver on the goals of DRR require a coherent strategy to reduce or remove the underlying causes of disasters, and planning and preparing for the hazards that trigger disasters (UNISDR, 2004, p. 3; Twigg, 2007; Kelman et al., 2016; Thomalla et al., 2015). By itself, DRR will not achieve its intended objectives. The strategy needs to be steered in the right direction. Here is what I mean. Disaster risk reduction is the policy objective of disaster risk governance, and disaster risk governance facilitates DRR’s goals and objectives, and the execution of plans and activities across different levels, sectors, and timescales. These goals, objectives, plans, and activities are then translated into concrete targets, indicators, and timeframes that guide the work of actors working collaboratively to achieve DRR goals. A central concern for disaster risk reduction remains the level of exposure to risks, including those from natural hazards, their economic impacts, and how to build capacities and coping mechanisms at various levels (household, communities, country). The fact that we now agree that disasters are human-­made means that we also understand that being able to withstand them requires human solutions, from all humans at every level to reduce the causal factors of disasters systematically. The trouble is that not all humans are included, not all knowledge is respected, and not every level of operation is resourced or can contribute. The DRR’s definition contains within it concepts that themselves need to be defined and operationalized to be meaningful. For instance, the definition of DRR— “reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters”—points us to concepts that are context-­specific and may indirectly result in root causes that cannot directly be tied to disaster risks. These may hide other underlying vulnerability-­causing factors like equity and are not readily identifiable unless one understands economic or historical contexts. Additionally, the definition subsumes within it other concepts that are themselves complex. For instance, “reducing exposure to hazards” speaks not only to a process of finding and eliminating or reducing risk exposure, but also to the capacity to do so. In the end, DRR is also normative. Its ideals—resilient societies and sustainable development—are proving to be too high for developing countries to attain because they rely on systematic changes in contexts that will be favorable to such changes. The realities associated with systems change—for instance, capacity and context and activity alignment, as well as resource scheduling—are different at different scales. At the national level, systems change might mean paying attention to vulnerable populations, including those with disabilities, children, and women, including their voices in planning and programming and then scaling up these decisions. Also, it could create disaster organizations in all country regions; or it could mean to implement a policy that would decentralize responsibilities, increase participation from a broad cross-­section of people and resources to local governments (Bang, 2013, in Rao, 2013). At the local level, systematic change might mean getting communities and municipalities to coordinate action around land use, or improve farming methods, or to undertake joint planning to reduce disaster risks. At the regional level, systems change might mean creating a multi-­level, multi-­government,

Disaster Risk Governance   69 multi-­sector disaster response system or regional risk transfer system that responds to DRR needs in all participating countries. There are clear needs at every level to systemically reduce disaster risks. However, who decides what systems change means or who should do what and who should lead the process are governance issues. The caveat for DRG is that the actors should not just emerge; they need to be chosen carefully. While convincing arguments can be made for private, NGO groups and individual citizens’ public involvement in achieving DRR, this wide-­ scale participation might not be logical or necessary. The real contributors, some argue (Saward, 1996; Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 1996), are really the technical or political elites who are qualified or can be trusted to identify problems and come up with genuinely sustainable solutions. Even at the local level, the municipal governments should be the ones taking measures to plan and regulate development in hazard-­prone areas, to enforce orders restricting settlements in risky zones, and to enable access to safe housing and well-­situated land (Bang, 2013, in Rao, 2013). However, a counter-­argument is that wide-­scale, not selective, participation builds a culture for DRR, community and individual capacities that will ultimately allow DRR. Opportunities for everyone to have a stake in shoring up and building their community’s capacity serve to improve capabilities for disaster risk reduction, which is a goal of DRR. The term “disaster risk reduction” shows a recognition of the ongoing nature of the work and the holistic ways of thinking, as well as multiple actors, methods and approaches needed to come together to achieve it (UNISDR, 2009). The “disaster as development” literature understands DRR as “a set of practices to protect development from outside threats rather than an accumulation of risks that arise during the course of development” (UNISDR, 2015, p. 28). The 2009, 2011, and 2013 Global Assessment Reports start from the position that disasters are manifestations of development problems—exposure and vulnerability are the result of underlying risk drivers, including poverty and inequality, poor planning, environmental degradation, climate changes, and so on (UNISDR, 2015, p.  33; Wisner, et al., 2004, 2012; Thomalla et al., 2015; Kelman et al., 2016). International frameworks in this tradition—e.g., the Millennium Development Goals, and its replacement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)— link disaster risk reduction to sustainable development and see reducing disaster risks as important to that agenda. The SDGs’ position is that there is no cumulative development without systematically putting strategies in place to manage disaster risks at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels. The study countries are all signatories to the SDGs’ agenda, but again, it is unclear whether this new framework will lead to a cumulative development effect over the next 15 years to 2030, by which time the effects of climate change will have intensified; many developing communities will be unstable as populations move to more “stable” areas (Hallegatte et al., 2016). In the mid-­1980s countries such as Jamaica were beginning to articulate, at global humanitarian meetings, that recovery and rebuilding investments sometimes produced or reproduced disaster risks. For these countries, risks were

70   Part I bound up in endogenous variables, those residing in social, economic, developmental, and environmental contexts as much as or even more than in natural hazards (Zobler, 1976; Quarantelli, 1978; Hewitt, 1983; Maskrey, 1989) as well as in world-­systems dynamics. This thinking is now well represented in the academic literature (Wisner, 2003; Lavell, 2003; Cutter et al., 2014; Kelman et al., 2016). Further, during the 1980s, Jamaica had begun to practice disaster risk management, not just disaster response, as many of its development cohorts were. Around the early to mid-­1980s the disaster management organization in Jamaica adopted disaster prevention, mitigation, recovery and reconstruction measures (disaster risk management was taking shape) (UNISDR, 2015). The regional disaster organization CDEMA, of which Jamaica is a member, was being established, and multilateral organizations (e.g., the World Bank’s GFDRR, the EC’s ECHO) had begun to create specialized units which combined emergency management functions with disaster recovery and mitigation and prevention measures (UNISDR, 2015).

Concluding Note In developing countries, disaster risk governance takes place in increasingly disarticulated states where much of the work is driven by international actors like the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, by regional bodies. Although often centered on government institutions, disaster risk governance involves a web of interactions of actors from the international, regional, and local levels. However, developing countries often do not possess all the institutional and financial capacity needed to govern. In 2011, the UNISDR noted that in most countries, existing risk governance arrangements were inappropriate and that reforming them had to be a priority; these arrangements were fundamental to reducing disaster risks. In central government, this means that anchoring overall responsibility for disaster risk management in a ministry or office with adequate political authority to ensure policy coherence across sectors is imperative. So too is decentralizing service delivery by establishing enumerated mandates, explicit budgets and systems of accountability to promote ownership and improve risk governance capacities at all levels (Rao, 2013). Today we accept that disaster risk governance is best achieved when society as a whole engages in planning for and managing the range of risks they face. However, developing countries’ governments, although hollowed out, retain the responsibility to take care of their citizens and to keep them safe. Undercapacity, poor institutions, and generally weak governance frameworks have resulted in non-­government agencies virtually taking over the process. Scale and contextual factors complicate how we understand governance and its practicality.

Note 1 “World-­system” is an alternative explanation of why some countries cannot become developed while others are. Early scholars such as Wallerstein (2000) aimed to achieve

Disaster Risk Governance   71 “a clear conceptual break with theories of ‘modernization’ ” (Martínez-Vela, 2001, p. 1). It refers to the inter-­regional and transnational division of labor, which divides the world into core countries, semi-­periphery countries, and periphery countries. Core countries focus on higher-­skill, capital-­intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-­skill, labor-­intensive production (see Martínez-Vela, 2001, accessed at http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/WorldSystem.pdf ).

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5 Institutions The Centerpiece of Governance

As early as 323 bce political philosophers such as Aristotle concerned themselves with institutions and how to use them to govern.1 They believed that institutions could structure the behavior of both the governed and those who govern them towards better ends (Peters, 2000). After the English civil war, Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) argued for strong institutions to save humankind from its worst instincts (Peters, 2000). For Hobbes, some type of social arrangement was necessary because people naturally tend to seek power and their preservation or that which they consider “good.” This is the law of nature. Not wanting to be in a perpetual state of war because of these instincts, individual members give over some of their powers to a mediating influence, a sovereign (a king), that would execute the laws on their behalf.2 I might not agree with Hobbes’ conclusion to promote the authority of an absolute—undivided and unlimited—sovereign power, but I agree with his thinking on the need for a mediating force to keep order or, as he acknowledges, “peace.” Institutions are the foundations on which the mediation takes place. With these (and other)3 formative inputs, the study of institutions shaped fields such as philosophy, anthropology, democratic thought, international relations, economics, political science, and so on. Institutionalism is characterized by the political context in which decisions occur and for the way they influence us, and there are a few varieties. To early institutionalists (Old Institutionalists), institutions including the law and its central role in governing, the machinery of governing systems and the policies they created mattered in fundamental ways for shaping collective action. Institutions were the formal institution of government (Peters, 2000; Schmidt, 2005). New institutionalism was a response to the absence of institutional analyses when explaining collective action (Schmidt, 2005). For new institutionalists, the state is not just government, but the entire range of governing structures—state and non-­state. New Institutionalism understands institutions based on the way actors explain or legitimize political actions through discourse.4 More recently, the extent to which institutions mattered in long-­run economic performance and development has been shown to be significant by economists, especially economic historians and political economists (e.g., Hirschman, 1958; North, 1988; Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Chong

76   Part I & Calderón, 2000; Rodrik, Subramaniam, & Trebbi, 2004). Hirschman (1958), from empirical evidence, highlights the role that government institutions played in orchestrating economic development in Saudi Arabia, and Chong and Calderón (2000) find that the more efficient the institutions, the lower the degree, severity, and incidence of poverty in a country. Institutions support economic imperatives by providing the incentives necessary to regulate individual and organizational choices and actions, which in turn drive a reduction in poverty (Adams, 1993).

Not Just Formal, but Also Informal Institutions A large body of literature on institutional economics has been built on the works of Douglass North, but also on Ronald Coase and his student Oliver Williamson’s contributions. By focusing on institutional questions such as why institutions emerge, prevail and change in societies, North has been instrumental in reviving interest in institutions in the twentieth century (North, 1990, 2005). These questions led to the unearthing of several essential dimensions in institutional analyses, including the role of politics in institutional development. More fundamental, the role of informal institutional constraints, such as norms and belief systems (shaped by cognitive factors driven by the individual and their experiences, not the institutional imperatives), was becoming more evident. The informal aspects of institutions influence institutional development and survival and so should be considered when assessing how institutions function. In a similar vein, Coase (1998) suggests that the welfare of human society depends not only upon the exchange of goods and services in the market, but that the cost of exchanging these goods and services also depends on a country’s institutions’ ability to facilitate those exchanges efficiently and effectively. A country’s legal system, its political system, its social system, its culture, must facilitate, not hinder, exchanges or make them onerous (Coase, 1998). When institutions hinder or make exchange difficult, transaction costs are high; and people find other means of exchange, including corrupt ones. In effect, it is the formal and informal institutions that govern the performance of an economy (Coase, 1998).

Institutions in Disaster Risk Governance Since the late 1970s developing countries, in different measure, have erected institutions to manage disaster risks. These institutions have enacted policies and programs, many funded by international aid agencies, to manage or reduce disaster risks, to respond to them and recover in their wake. Many of these efforts have failed. This chapter discusses the importance of institutions in disaster risk reduction, arguing that not enough attention has been focused on it. A growing body of literature in DRR and disaster risk management (e.g., Kahn, 2005; Raschky, 2008; Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 2007; Manuta & Lebel, 2005; Blaikie et al., 2004; Oliver-­Smith, 2002),

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   77 but not enough, focuses on institutions as a critical ingredient in disaster risk reduction. Ahrens and Rudolph (2006) focus on institutions as central to governance. They define disaster risk governance as “countless formal and informal institutions which shape policy formulation and implementation” (p.  212). In particular, governance structures are the political and economic institutions, as well as factors related to individual actors and organizational capacity (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006, p. 210). However, for the authors, the focus is on formal institutions. To them, the most fundamental characteristic of institutions is that they include enforceable norms, rules, and regulations that serve common purposes and structure and constrain social interaction. Rules constrain behavior but can also provide opportunities to promote preferred behavior by opening up choice and avenues that might not otherwise exist. These are the fundamental strengths of institutions. Susceptibility to disaster can be interpreted as a consequence of institutional failure. Perceptions about disasters, our willingness to purchase insurance or to prepare for disasters, enforcing building codes and other regulations, or zoning laws, or building disaster institutions are all part of the institutional context because they form complex social norms that reproduce themselves (Bicchieri et al., 2011). A country’s “institutional context” constitutes the specific apparatus for enforcement of regulations and standards as well as for the delivery of public services. Institutions enable ordered thought, expectations, and action regarding public policy issues by imposing structure and consistency on human activities (Hodgson, 2006). When we fail to recognize that institutions are the centerpiece of governance, we miss out on their ability to regulate behavior in order to achieve specific purposes. Institutions regulate decisions and actions by rewarding or punishing behaviors and putting in place mechanisms to reinforce these actions; they create organizations and groups that focus on specific social action and interaction around social problems. Although institutions must provide some degree of stability and predictability, institutions are not static. They change and adapt as the needs dictate (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006). Pushing people to plan and prepare for disasters, reducing vulnerabilities, building capacities and promoting sustainable practices are dynamic processes, and to adequately address them requires institutional change over time. Wachinger et al. (2013), though, question the efficacy of emphasizing institutions as the critical focus of DRG; to them, stakeholder involvement should be the central focus in disaster risk reduction and the processes that govern them. Where different groups of actors collaborate, their efforts are more sustainable than when individuals act on their own. When the public, public authorities, and disaster experts actively participate in disaster risk reduction activities, each is more willing to learn from each other and to adjust their perceptions and behavior when confronted with reliable information on exposure, consequences, and options for protective measures. However, even stakeholders work through formal institutions, and at the same time informal, non-­legal rules and norms circumscribe their decisions and

78   Part I actions. Despite the myriad actors involved in DRG, storm damage is more severe in Haiti than in the adjoining Dominican Republic, and more severe in Dominica than it is in regional neighbor Jamaica. The differences lie in the quality of the institutions (see Chapters 6–9). The quality of a country’s institutions impacts the condition of its DRG. Evolving discussions within and between the academic and practitioner communities point to an increasing recognition that, in order to reduce disaster risks, including those caused by extreme natural phenomena, there needs to be a clear role for strong institutions as a fundamental part of the governance context (Savoia et al., 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Posner, 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, 2012; Peters, 2000; Adams, 1993; North, 1988; Coase, 1998: Keefer & Knack, 1998; Hirschman, 1958). The term “institutions” is used to mean the specific apparatus for crafting and enforcing regulations and standards for DRR and the delivery of DRR initiatives. More specifically, institutions are systems of established and prevalent social rules or norms including the laws, the organizations that implement and oversee them, the actors, and the incentives that structure social interaction. The norms are the foundation of the basic rules of behavior and are different from the organizations that function under them (Schiavo-­Campo & McFerson, 2008). Legislation Laws are the system of rules which a particular country or community recognizes as regulating the actions of its members and which it may enforce by the imposition of penalties. The laws will only work if individuals agree to follow their letter, if not their spirit. A regulation is a type of law. Regulations are rules or orders that guide action and have the force of law. In DRR, regulations are important because, over history, we have shown that we will not willingly take action to limit our exposure to hazards, and often make our vulnerabilities worse (e.g., building in flood or fire zones, chop down our forests and destroy our wetlands, and so on). Regulatory quality addresses perceptions about a government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private development (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In private development, for instance, there are regulatory burdens and tax inconsistencies in regulations that might lead to actions that are counter to the ones being promoted. Regulatory burden speaks to the risk that normal operations (e.g., business) become more costly because of the regulatory environment. The regulatory burden could result in high cost of regulatory compliance, which often leads to non-­compliance or bureaucratic inefficiency on the part of service providers strangled by bureaucratic oversight. Regulatory burdens vary across sectors depending on the sector’s importance in society and the political attention paid to it. The more weight the citizenry places on the deliverables of a sector, the more political it is and the more oversight is placed on it. Tax inconsistency captures the risk that there are fines and penalties for non-­compliance that appear disproportionate or manipulated for political ends (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   79 either case, there will be push back from those on whom the regulations are imposed. Ultimately state failure and policy instability result. State failure is the risk that the state is unable to ensure law and order or facilitate the supply of essential goods and services, or plan for and manage current or future emergencies, such as disasters of any type (Kaufmann et al., 2010), without help. In cases of state failure, policy instability might result. Policy instability reflects the risk that the government’s broad policy framework will shift from one year to the next, making the business and governance environment more challenging (Kaufmann et al., 2010). This situation might include more onerous economic, social or environmental regulation, or no regulation at all; price controls or caps; import/export barriers; more political control of monetary policy; or only more direct intervention into the operations and decisions of private companies (Kaufmann et al., 2010). These practices erode confidence and lead to an underdevelopment trap. Actors Institutions define and constrain the set of individual choices (Raschky, 2008). North (1991) defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints structuring political, economic and social interaction, including their enforcement characteristics. This definition means that institutions have oversight and regulatory quality to them. In this regard, governments play a central role in DRR efforts and drafting and enforcing regulations. However, their increasing inability to fulfill their roles has necessitated diverse actors playing critical roles in DRG. Like Tierney and others, Bang (2013) also takes an extensive participatory approach, borrowing from the UNISDR’s definition. DRG is “the way in which national and subnational actors are willing and able to coordinate their actions to manage and reduce disaster-­related risk” (p.  3). Djalante (2012) focuses on flexible and participatory methods of governance through multi-­stakeholder platforms. Moreover, Ikeda and Nagasaka (2011) focus on collaboration and decision-­making in enhancing coping capacities in their definition of disaster risk governance. A multitude of collaborations, interactions or decision-­making actions, then, is carried out by a “wide range of stakeholder participants (national/local governments, local communities, residents’ groups, business groups)” (Ikeda & Nagasaka, 2011, p.  3). In short, it has been established by many that DRG should—no, must—involve a multitude of actors if we are to successfully tackle the problem of reducing disaster risks and build resilience. As discussed in Chapter 4, this society-­centered approach (Tierney, 2012) indicates that disaster governance is multi-­level and multi-­directional. Reliance on Global Organizations Western influence in former colonies has not diminished since colonization. Since the 1980s, bilateral and multilateral donors have demanded Western-­style reforms in developing nations. Such reforms include anti-­corruption measures

80   Part I through civil service and accountability measures, decentralization, strengthening service delivery through private companies and NGOs, and establishing civic associations. These and other influences have prompted international relations scholars (e.g., Raadschelders & Vigoda-­Gadot, 2015, p.  66) to claim that we now have a layer of international organizations in various parts of the world that work to push a global agenda on local populations, especially in the developing world. Hence, the influence of global elites from Europe and North America on the rest of the world is far-­reaching. The idea that global social forces will over time create a “common” society is not particularly new (Chandler, 2000) but has been a dominant criticism against globalization. There is some consensus, among social scholars, globalization theorists, and sociologists (Fukuyama, 1992; Giddens, 1998, 2013; Chandler, 2000), that globalization will extend to creating similar social and political values around the world. Indeed, we are already witnessing globalization’s effects on social and economic policy and practice. Global public organizations are the foremost purveyors of this homogenizing push. They develop frameworks and guiding documents on everything from food and workplace safety, to monetary and fiscal policy, to childhood development, corruption, ecological integrity, and disaster risk reduction. In the disaster risk reduction policy and program areas, global development organizations have not only funded disaster relief, but they have also proactively engaged in disaster risk reduction measures such as promoting national platforms, pushing model legislation, funded consultants to formulate policies that are shopped around to countries or used as strings for more funding. These policies, plans, and standards are adopted globally, particularly in developing countries, because they come with funding, where funding might otherwise be limited, to support DRR service delivery. As a process, globalization facilitates changing values and cultural paradigms in countries that were once isolated (Giddens, 1998; Chandler, 2000). The values are often contrary to contextual circumstances, and so most do not result in anticipated benefits. Other aspects of the continuing debate question how many similarities will result. The global push for uniformity has highlighted a significant tension between the demands for cultural individuality and more localized traditions on the one hand and a more homogenous world of cultural values on the other (Chandler, 2000, p. 230). Although globalization does not in itself create more homogeneity in the social and economic domains, some of its central values, such as “good governance,” “transparency,” “fiscal responsibility,” “citizen participation,” and “open markets,” have become increasingly dominant. While others, such as social development, protectionism and wealth redistribution have declined since the nineteenth century, they are yet again finding a more protected regional base (Chandler, 2000), particularly in the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump. The influence of global elites from Europe and North America on the rest of the world is far-­reaching. They are entrenched in the development arena in developing countries. For instance, Western influence on former colonies has not

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   81 diminished since colonization. Over the last four decades, bilateral and multilateral donors have demanded Western-­style reforms in developing countries pushed by agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations. Such reforms include anti-­corruption measures through civil service and accountability measures, decentralization, strengthening service delivery through private companies and NGOs, and establishing civic associations. The plurality of institutional arrangements in developing countries means that DRG cannot escape their influence, although not all developing countries have accepted them in the same measure. Regional Organizations In developing countries, regional disaster organizations and groups constitute a growing and vital part of the disaster planning and response landscape. Some scholars even go as far as to argue that regionalism is both the successor to the nation-­state and an alternative to globalization, serving as a useful bridge between the international and national systems (Ferris & Petz, 2013). Disaster trends suggest that the frequency and destructiveness of hazards are increasing; the regional level provides a potential area of excess capacity in disaster risk reduction and management. However, regional governance remains understudied, even as emerging research on its role in disaster risk reduction is getting some focus (Ferris & Petz, 2013). Regional disaster agencies have emerged as essential brokers in disaster risk reduction efforts. Regional organizations and groups constitute a growing and vital part of the disaster planning and response landscape. Some scholars even go as far as arguing that regionalism is both the successor to the nation-­state and an alternative to globalization (Ferris & Petz, 2013). Regions can be seen as serving as a useful bridge between the international and national systems (Ferris & Petz, 2013). They work from cultural and linguistic commonalities with disaster-­impacted countries, and as a result, provide a forum for building trust that is unlikely on a global scale (Haver & Foley, in Ferris & Petz, 2013). Further, regional entities can often be instrumental in establishing common policies and resolving contentious issues (Ferris & Petz, 2013). They are better able to articulate a more coherent regional platform for members, and thus more likely to reach consensus on issues of mutual interest. Regional organizations are more aware now that they have a role to play because of their contextual insights of environmental phenomena, including hazards. Further, regional organizations are often better resourced than disaster organizations in member countries and in many instances can respond more quickly than international ones. Moreover, their intervention may also be more socially and politically palatable. Regional disaster-­focused organizations play a central role in fundraising, technology transfer, technical assistance and for generally raising the profile of members, who individually may be too small or too underdeveloped to organize and successfully represent their interests. The members of regional organizations

82   Part I can and do leverage a well-­placed regional organization to improve the practice and at the same time build regional capacity. Regional organizations’ visibility in the disaster governance landscape has significantly increased over the last 15 or 20 years. In the disaster risk governance landscape, regional organizations have spearheaded DRR activities, including the development of model legislation and making the legislation implementable in the Caribbean and sub-­Saharan Africa. They have provided knowledge on how to build up the national organization. They work with young people to build a culture for DRR and promote knowledge creation as well as to access funding to support programs and projects

Box 5.1  Regionalism Regionalism is a blanket term covering a range of processes. At its core, the term focuses on the impact of regional social and economic exchange and the links between economic integration, institutions and identity (Hurrell, 2007). In this book, I use regionalism to mean interstate cooperation around a particular policy area as well as regional consolidation (see items c and d below). It is, however, essential to recognize the variety of ways in which the term “regionalism” is used. Hurrell (2007, p. 130) provides an excellent summary: a b c d e

Regionalism is societal integration and the often-­undirected processes of social and economic interaction; Regionalism is regional awareness and identity; the construction of different forms of cognitive regionalism; Regionalism is regional interstate cooperation. It is the creation of region-­ wide regimes in a variety of policy areas; Regionalism is state-­led economic integration; and Regionalism is regional consolidation (when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world and forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues).

In this book, the author refers to three regional entities: the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency, which is an intergovernmental agency of CARICOM, a grouping of 22 countries—17 member states and 5 associate members—working to secure economic, trade and social integration. The East African Committee (EAC) is a union of six partner states that promotes a customs union, a common market, monetary union and political federation. The EAC has also established a Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Unit to play a significant role in implementing its Disaster Risk Reduction Act and the implementation of the Sendai Framework in the region. The South West Indian Ocean Commission (SWIOC) is a tool for regional cooperation, across all sectors—political and diplomatic, economic and ecological, cultural and health. SWIOC prepares its five member states to respond to the standard sustainable development challenges, including disaster risk reduction.

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   83 meant to shore up national institutions focused on disaster risk governance. In developing countries, then, the role of regional organizations is essential. Excellent examples include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Ferris & Petz, 2013), and the standard protocols for comprehensive disaster planning plus use of military assets through a regional response mechanism in the Caribbean. Further, in the Pacific region, UN agencies have organized a regional protection cluster using a rotation system to ensure rapid response to disasters in the region (Ferris & Petz, 2013). It is not a complete countermeasure to globalization, but “regionalism” is increasingly becoming a means of using similar cultural, social and economic experiences to build institutions that are better equipped to tackle shared complex regional problems. Regional bodies work to leverage their regional knowledge to build platforms for the entirety of their members. They are more efficient at marketing and implementing programs and standards in collaboration with members. Regional entities also serve as a bridge between members and global actors. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa are influential regional governance players for disaster risk reduction. Incentivizing Disaster Risk Reduction Disasters themselves should be the most significant incentive to practice disaster risk reduction. Repeated disasters can erode years of developmental gains, which in turn increases poverty and causes people to make sub-­optimal disaster risk reduction decisions and behaviors. Recurring economic stresses induced by disasters that result from natural hazards induce fluctuation in income, which may increase vulnerability (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006). People forced to live in dangerous locations because of limited choices to do otherwise put themselves in unsafe positions. In economic thought, incentives became a focus with Adam Smith’s division of labor principle and exchange. Laffont and Martimort (2009) say that “how to design institutions in order to provide proper incentives for economic agents is a central question of economics today” (p.  11). Members of a firm may have different objectives, some of which might be contrary to those of the firm, making delegation of duties/responsibilities problematic without incentivizing workers to work towards achieving the firm’s goals (e.g., see Marschak, 1955; Arrow, 1968). The starting point of incentive theory corresponds therefore to the problem of delegation of a task to an agent with private information (Laffont & Martimort, 2009). The concept of incentives is used more and more in climate change literature. Institutions provide incentives to steer required behavior. In organization theory, Chester Barnard proposes both general (associational attractiveness, adaptation of conditions to habitual methods and attitudes, the opportunity to enlarge participation) and specific incentives (salary and bonuses, personal non-­material opportunities, desirable physical conditions) to induce behavior (Barnard, 1938, p. 142).

84   Part I There is an insufficient push towards disaster investment in developing countries that confounds economic considerations. Neither the governments nor their citizens are willing or able to spare the efforts and resources needed to commit to risk and vulnerability reduction. Disaster risks are growing primarily because of human action. Unplanned urbanization, persistent poverty, structural inequality, lack of political commitment and ecosystem degradation are increasing the possibility of disasters and decreasing our ability to resist, recover from and rebuild better after they occur. The problem of inducing society’s members to practice risk reduction behavior has its roots in economic theory. Human beings with different levels of self-­interest, differing levels of resources, knowledge, and information have different choices or different decision criteria, some coinciding with the DRR goals, others working contrary to them as individuals seek to achieve their ends. At the organizational level, risk management is buried at the lowest level of organization (see Hubbard, 2009). Further, even the most sophisticated risk management models are applied to the lowest operational level where risks are seen as individual, discrete events, neglecting the larger and more damaging ones that can significantly weaken an organization. Moral hazard is an incentive problem. A moral hazard may occur where one individual may change their actions to the detriment of another individual (e.g., financial transaction). In the context of disaster risk reduction, a moral hazard considers that individuals, whether unwilling, lazy or indifferent, do not take mitigative steps to reduce hazard vulnerability. For instance, scholars studying risk transfer systems (e.g., Gruber, 2008) find that in some cases where people do purchase risk insurance, they might not undertake mitigative measures, thinking that insurance is enough. In these cases, the insured is more likely to be negatively impacted by the risk against which they are insured, than those without insurance (Grubel, 1971). In areas where universal norms of behavior, while serving the public interest, also abridge individual self-­interest, individuals will violate the laws to preserve their self-­interest (Pauly, 1968; Grubel, 1971) as an economically rational actor, unless there are penalties for their violations. The uncertainty about disasters (if they will happen, their intensity, what type) complicates the moral hazard issue. Why put resources into reducing disaster risks, when a disaster might not result, even with a hazard impact? Further, if one purchases insurance, why not just claim on the insurance policy in the event of a disaster? With information uncertainty, the opportunity cost of preparing for a disaster might be perceived as exceeding costs foregone of doing something else. Insurance must not be so structured as to make people benefit from the thing they are insuring against (Baker, 1996). If society does not provide the appropriate incentives or disincentives to influence people’s action around disaster planning and reducing disaster risk, only minimal risk-­averse actions will be taken, if any.

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   85 Marginalization of Local and Indigenous Institutions In many parts of the world, and especially in postcolonial states, local and indigenous institutions remain essential. Local institutions operate at multiple levels, not just one. Uphoff (1992) found three levels:  localities, which are sets of communities that have kinship, marketing or other connections, communities or villages or towns, and groups. These have in common the prevalence of face-­to-face interpersonal relationships, which are naturally more frequent and intense within groups and communities than within localities. (p. 3) Formal local organizations are part of the local institutional context. They include formal CBOs, civic groups, and associations, and local NGOs that have been actively promoting development, conservation, and governance activities at multiple levels. In many communities, however, local institutions tend to neglect critical indigenous practices in promoting their goals. Indigenous institutions are traditional customary norms and practices and ethnic or tribal societies. While they are not considered local or indigenous institutions, households and individuals are enmeshed into local and indigenous institutions that shape their decision-­making and behavior. Local and indigenous institutions include local governments, civic associations or service organizations, their interactions and relationships (Uphoff, 1992). They are closer to the people and integrate their traditions and lived experiences into practices and policies. Not only are these institutions constitutive of user groups, but they also know the local and customary norms and informal protocols, and local knowledge. As such, local and indigenous institutions are rightly featured as necessary in the natural resource management, climate change adaptation and sustainable development literature (see Uphoff, 1992; Agrawal, 2008, 2010; Yami & van Asten, 2018). While local institutions are not always able to resolve issues of vulnerabilities, if they are absent, all conflicts must be dealt with at higher levels, yielding slower and often less appropriate outcomes (Uphoff, 1992). Local, but especially indigenous, institutions are deeply rooted in their communities and have been engaged in a variety of ways in many countries since colonial times. For example, in sub-­Saharan Africa, chieftaincies constitute one such indigenous institution (Beall & Ngonyama, 2009) and remained incorporated into formal governance structures and systems. During the colonial period, indigenous institutions were engaged by colonial powers in a range of ways (Beall & Ngonyama, 2009). In the postcolonial period, indigenous and local institutions were viewed as a resource for achieving development (Yami & van Asten, 2018). However, in disaster risk reduction currently, country actors, including indigenous peoples, are often marginalized from the DRR planning and response

86   Part I process, their insights from lived experiences lost in policies formulated. This situation was evident in the response and recovery efforts in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. Integrating local and indigenous institutions encourages local peoples to take a longer-­term view of their communities’ developmental needs, including those concerning disaster risk reduction, by facilitating common expectations and mechanisms for cooperation that focus on community, not individual interests (Uphoff, 1992). Actively engaging local and indigenous institutions better ensures that local peoples may comply with the requirements of DRR with fewer inducements and sanctions (ibid.). Ignoring them means that their disaster institutions are not developed, and there is diminished local and indigenous DRR capacity. Also, building up local and indigenous institutions means that national DRR efforts can begin to be successfully decentralized because local capacity is dispersed, and DRR activities have a greater chance of being sustained. Local and indigenous institutions remain pivotal to effective governance. Especially in Africa, these institutions predated colonization, and developed intricate systems of local governance, but are not limited to that period. Several features of pre-­colonial social and leadership institutions make them suited to governing. First, ethnic leaders and chiefs enjoy considerable support and popularity across local communities, and local chiefs have significant power in allocating and administering land rights (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013). Even today, local chiefs exert significant de facto power in assigning rights in Africa. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) found that chiefs play a significant role in assigning land in rural areas in Africa, and Easterly (2001) documents the instrumentality of strong ethnic institutions in conflict resolution and social capital building at the local level. Further, local leaders collect taxes and provide some essential public goods, such as disaster relief (e.g., Glennerster, Miguel, & Rothenberg, 2013; Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2012) in countries like Kenya. With the start of the twenty-­first century, several developing countries have passed legislation and even constitutional amendments (e.g., Kenya and Zanzibar) to formally recognize the role of ethnic institutional structures in relief distribution and recovery assistance via a system of customary law (see Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013). So central were the tribal governments in the lives of their citizens during the colonial era that some European colonizers strengthened tribal chiefs and kings via indirect rule. Ethnic or tribal societies with strong political institutions were found to be more successful in getting concessions both from colonial powers and from national governments after independence (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013). However, not all colonizers empowered tribal chiefs, leaving their institutions weak and marginalized from broader governing processes. On the eve of African independence, some countries attempted to limit the role of ethnic institutions. However, leaders’ inability to provide public goods or extend their reach beyond their capitals led them to continue relying on the local ethnic-­specific structures rather than the national government (Englebert, in

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   87 Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013). Today tribal governance is still seen as necessary, yet they are still mostly marginalized, as clearly seen when response operations are mounted. In Dominica it was not difficult to find reports of the international community (UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination team, OCHA, disciplined international forces, and WFP) and regional actors (CDEMA) being on the ground and providing direct support to the local disaster relief mechanism during Hurricane Maria in 2017. However, none noting the work of local actors outside of neighbor helping neighbor was found. Ignoring local actors means that local institutions are not developed around disaster risk reduction, and there is diminished local DRR capacity. Building up local institutions means that national DRR efforts can begin to be successfully decentralized because local capacity is dispersed, and DRR activities have a greater chance of being sustained. Historical Drag on Institutional Development Early institutionalists in political science tended to have a pronounced historical foundation for their analysis, focusing on how contemporary political systems were embedded in their historical development. That is to say, to better understand the way politics worked in a specific country or system, researchers had to understand the country’s or system’s evolving development pattern that produced it (Peters, 2000). Development was a function of the country’s collective historical experience and the political context influenced by that history (Peters, 2000). Differential development patterns and gains have long been of central concern to scholars on Africa (Rodney, 1972), the Caribbean (Lewis, 1950; Beckford, 1972, 1985; Elliot & Harvey, 2000) and Latin America (Prebisch, 1959, 2016; Furtado, 1964, 2018). These scholars have found that the weight of history is embedded in the current governance contexts, and in developing countries, the weight of history often prevents them from becoming developed. The weight of history hinders socially fair development opportunities and burden-­sharing in response to such shocks (Rodrik & Subramaniam, 2003) in some countries, and so they often buckle under the weight of these shocks. In developing countries, colonialism5 left a legacy of weak institutions and, by extension, weak governance systems as settlers from colonizing powers occupied countries, usually in Africa and the Caribbean, but also in other places in Asia, subjugating their people and exploiting their lands economically. Beckford (1972), for instance, suggests that “there are factors which adhere in the institutional environment in certain poor countries which contribute to persistent underdevelopment as seen in many plantation economies and societies, such as those of the Caribbean.” Moreover, despite considerable changes in the social, economic and political order, the problems of peasant development promoted by colonialism remain inextricably bound up in an institutional relations framework not far different from that which existed during the slave plantation period (Beckford, 1985). The plantation system continued to have a stranglehold on postcolonial societies, limiting resource accessibility by the poor and reflecting

88   Part I a persistent struggle by the peasantry to break through an institutional setting that is biased toward its stagnation (Beckford, 1985). Colonization has had an enormous influence upon the structuring of governments and governance in the developed world. This specific historical experience continues to have a significant and persistent impact (via world systems and globalization) on institutions in postcolonial countries long after these experiences cease to exist (Banerjee & Iyer, 2002). For instance, in the Caribbean, Hope (1983, pp. 50–51) finds that the administrative state was shaped primarily by the colonial governing forces and remains a product of that colonial era, maintaining some of the features and attitudes of the former colonial rulers and displaying institutional overhang. Former colonies suffered from an institutional overhang in that some of the effects of prior institutional arrangements have persisted for a long time after the colonial institutions were formally changed. European colonizers established a wide range of political structures in the colonies between 1859 and 1914 during the second wave of colonization (Jones, 2007). Under colonialism, the colonial governor was not a central authority, but each was granted a great deal of de facto independence from his government. Governors were questioned or recalled only after egregious policy failures (Jones,

Box 5.2  Colonialism Colonialism is the policy or practice by European settlers of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, subjugating its people and exploiting the land economically. The term is not restricted to a specific time or place and is often confused with imperialism. The differences between imperialism and colonialism lie in whether the acquired territory is ruled directly or indirectly by the occupying European settlements through military, economic and political dominating forces (Kohn & Kavita, 2017; Stuchte, 2011). Imperialism refers to a period of expansionism by European countries through the exercise of power over the conquered regions, either through direct acquisition or indirect mechanisms of control. While the term is frequently used interchangeably with colonialism, in imperialism there was no significant European settlement in the new territories. European rulers worked with local rulers to maintain their economic interests, e.g., in China (Stuchte, 2011). Unlike imperialism, colonialism was thought to need a period of political dependence on European settlers to advance the uncivilized native peoples to a point where they could sustain self-­ government (Kohn & Kavita, 2017). Most former colonies are developing countries located in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean today. The imperialism timeline runs from around 1450–1950, with colonialism occupying the 1800s onwards, when European trade with Africa became established, and European nations gained much of the colonies’ natural resources and began to industrialize them. For more, see Shilliam (2010). 

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   89 2007). As a result, these colonies adopted many different forms of political institutions, from highly extractive institutions (e.g., the Belgium Congo) to relatively strong institutions that insured the protection of property rights based on how the governors shaped them, mainly through informal means (e.g., Singapore, the United States). Countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Jamaica, and Dominica are some of development’s biggest “losers.” Much of their abundant resources were extracted by colonizer countries with very little invested in building the countries. Post-­ independence decision-­making and executive authority in the Caribbean were transferred from the colonial governors and secretaries to local politicians, serving as ministers, who were collectively responsible to their respective legislatures (parliamentary system). Power was centralized under each minister, and there was little coordination between departments and ministries as they conducted national policy (Jones & Mills, 1976). Policy efforts were piecemeal and lacked a coherent development strategy. Responsibility for policy formation transitioned from a chief professional officer to the minister of an elected government (Hope, 1983). Moreover, bureaucratic power shifted from the technical development administrator as head of a department to the minister in office, thus giving the political apparatus supremacy over the state bureaucracy (Hope, 1983). Most former colonies are developing countries located in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean today, where European nations gained much of the colonies’ natural resources and used them in their own industrialization process; colonies gained very little from this process. Hence, postcolonial societies have been mostly unable to reform the extractive institutions that were the legacy of their colonial political and institutional systems. Consequently, sub-­Saharan Africa’s institutional legacy of colonial rule, particularly the political institutions, are primarily in crisis today (Mamdani, 2001). Besides, European colonial powers arbitrarily put together very different ethnic groups of people and created countries that have been difficult to govern and vulnerable to conflict in the postcolonial period (Odusola et al., 2017). Corruption, poverty, poor infrastructure, low capacity, and recurrent ethnic clashes plague these countries. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) have conducted two influential historical works that together provide evidence to support the argument that colonialism transformed the developmental trajectories of nearly all countries in the developing world—a legacy that has been difficult to reverse (Lange, 2004).6 According to Acemoglu et al. (2002), because European settlers who lived in colonies both demanded and helped to construct institutions that protected property rights in some colonies termed “settlement colonies” (e.g., the United States, Australia), they built relatively efficient institutions (e.g., legal systems). These more inclusive institutions have persisted, thereby benefiting these countries in the postcolonial era (direct rule). Alternatively, where large-­scale, long-­term European settlement did not occur, European colonial state officials were focused merely on extracting wealth from the colonies (indirect rule). In these cases, colonial powers, therefore, failed

90   Part I to build institutions that would help colonies develop (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). In Africa, European settlers worked through local elites (e.g., tribal chiefs), who were accountable to colonial authority but mostly left to run the indirect system (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). In this context, many local elites adopted despotic behaviors that carried through to the post-­independence era (Mamdani, 1996) and share some responsibility for the poor development trajectory in postcolonial countries. In the Caribbean, the underlying issues were similar to those in Africa. For instance, Jamaica’s rich endowment of natural and agricultural resources, vibrant culture, relatively stable democratic system, along with its excellent strategic location, has nevertheless failed to benefit it after colonization. The island has failed to take advantage of these features to accelerate growth on a sustained basis post-­ independence because of its weak institutional legacy, mainly because the growth model pursued post-­independence has not been sustained, lasting only for a decade post-­independence (Hughes, 2006). That said, the question about whether colonial powers had a major or minor role in a colonized country’s development trajectory, although open to debate (Iyer & Banerjee, 2005), displays significant correlation. For instance, Lange (2004) finds a negative and robust relationship between the extent of indirect rule and political stability, bureaucratic effectiveness, lack of state regulatory burden, the rule of law, and government corruption, even controlling for other factors. As a general rule, institutional authority depends upon institutions. If we break these institutions, power evaporates. Further, political institutions are delicate and therefore especially vulnerable to overwhelming force (Gerring et al., 2011) such as entrenched partisanship, corruption, and traditional inequities. Much of the qualitative work on postcolonial country legacies focuses on three aspects of the indirect rule that, in combination, promoted local despotism at the expense of centralized control (Lange, 2004). First, the administrative state institution was minuscule, concentrated almost exclusively in the colonial capital, and having very little interaction with the colonial population, characteristics that endowed it with very little infrastructural power (Mann, 1984). Such states lacked the capabilities to implement public policy outside of the capital city and often had no option for pursuing a strategy other than coercion. Second, indirect rule endowed chiefs with great institutional powers (Roberts & Mann, 1991; Mamdani, 1996; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002). They were granted control over “customary law,” and because it lacked formalization, they were able to mold and wield it for personal benefit (Mamdani, 1996; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002). Customary law also endowed chiefs with control over communal lands and chiefdom police, both of which could be employed coercively to dominate local inhabitants (Roberts & Mann, 1991; Mamdani, 1996). Although most works focused on the judiciary, chiefs also had executive and legislative powers that further concentrated power in their hands. Third, the chiefs’ intermediary positions between colonizers and the constitutional powers of chiefs were augmented by their intermediary positions between colonizers and the colonized, which enabled them to control information and

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   91 resource flow between the colonial administration and the local population, thus avoiding colonial supervision (Clapham, 1982; Reno, 1995; Scott, 1972). Consequently, chiefs were able to pit administrators and local subjects against each other in their quest for more autonomy (Reno, 1995; Scott, 1972). So great were their powers that post-­independence reforms failed to weaken tribal chiefs and resulted in an active impediment to state governance and broad-­based development (Mamdani, 1996, in Lange, 2004). Things have hardly changed from that time. Hope (1983) wrote that politicians in the Caribbean are seen mainly as power brokers, with civil servants filling positions as clerks. The bureaucratic colonial administration has since been replaced by native politicians who exercise centralized authority and control over the government bureaucracy. The entrenchment of partisan factions meant that in many former colonies the development agenda favored some citizens over others, creating winners and losers. On the practitioner side, the World Bank and other international agencies have focused on institutions as they have come to realize its importance in the development enterprise since the early 2000s. In its 2002 World Development Report, for instance, the Bank emphasized governance and specifically institutions as a critical component of governance. In that report several measures were operationalized as key institutional indicators, including government effectiveness, state failure, policy instability, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of public service quality, civil service quality and independence from political pressures, policy formulation and implementation quality, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Three broad categories denote government effectiveness: infrastructure disruption, state failure, and policy stability. Infrastructure disruption reflects the likelihood of disruption to or inadequacy of infrastructure for transport, including due to terrorism/insurgency, strikes, politically motivated shutdowns, disasters caused by natural hazards; infrastructure includes (as relevant) roads, railways, airports, ports, and customs checkpoints (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Corruption Corruption is particularly difficult to define because behavior that is considered corruption to some may not be corruption to others. Further, it is not easy to measure, relying a lot on information provided by offenders and on estimates. Nye (1967) presents one of the most frequently used definitions of corruption as “behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-­regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-­regarding influence” (p. 419). However, others, such as Lancaster and Montinola (1997) and Gardiner (2017), have conducted extensive treatments of the concept. Gardiner (2017) warns that no definition of corruption will be equally accepted in every state of contextual issues, and Lancaster and Montinola (1997) suggest that in no case

92   Part I has the concept been easy to define. Where Nye falls short, e.g., abuse of corporate office, aspects of fraud and abuse of power, Lancaster and Montinola (1997) have examined political corruption starting from the basis of rival definitions and suggest that the best way to rid ourselves of its definitional burden is for corruption to ultimately incorporate the assessment of rival explanations.  In public administration, corruption has an ancient heritage. Bardhan (1997) finds evidence of corruption in public administration since the fourth century bc in India. In Kautilya writings (e.g., Arthashastra), Bardhan found evidence that corruption in governments was as natural as speaking or eating. An excerpt from the Arthashastra reads, Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king’s revenue. (Kangle, 1972, p. 91, in Bardhan, 1997, p. 1320) However, without rules and mechanisms in place to stop it, corruption will continue unchecked and often undetected (Bardhan, 1997). The prevalence of corruption is highly correlated with other measures of bureaucratic efficiency, such as the amount of red tape (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). For example, corruption and red tape are found to be significant predictors in economic development because they impact the indicators that predict government effectiveness. Researchers (e.g., Rose-­Ackerman, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 2010) find that corruption and red tape are mutually supportive—corruption and red tape often go hand in hand (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 2010). Indeed, corruption was prominent in the writings of the Renaissance thinker Machiavelli. Corruption as a term appears 93 times in the Discourses, 65 times in Book I, 4 times in Book II, and 23 times in Book III (Ritner, 2011). In assessing the tribulations of the state—disease, conquer—Machiavelli sees none as pernicious as corruptness because, for it to exist requires a critical mass. According to Machiavelli, “a wicked citizen could not commit evil in a republic that is not corrupted” (Ritner, 2011). For Machiavelli, Julius Caesar’s dictatorship and Brutus’s ending of it was the product of the corrupted state of Roman life—­ people just cannot be trusted to do good, especially men of means. Caesar is forgiven for his tyranny by the corruption of the Romans (Ritner, 2011). New laws had to be created to root out the “evil” of corruption (Ritner, 2011). International development agencies including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the OECD have led the way in trying to control corruption by linking funding and aid to the control of corruption. Also, international NGOs dedicated to monitoring corruption (e.g., Transparency International) were established. The 2005 UN convention against corruption—the most comprehensive corruption convention to date—was put into force. In 2007 the World Bank launched its Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy. Further, countries including the United States, itself experiencing high levels of corruption in many of its states, have significantly

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   93 increased their enforcement under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Action through the US Department of Justice and Security and Exchange Commission (see Olken & Pande, 2012). Moreover, since 1998 approximately 40 countries have ratified the OECD Anti-­Bribery Convention. These efforts show concerted efforts to reduce corruption globally To be clear, I am not arguing that corruption is endemic to developing countries only; it is not. Human beings are mostly self-­interested and want to maximize their satisfaction. Human nature dictates that some will do whatever it takes to fulfill their satisfaction. However, in many of the corruption surveys, there is a strong negative correlation with it, human development and income—higher-­income countries tend to, not always, have less corruption. The consensus in practitioner and academic quarters is that corruption is often high in low-­income countries, and it is costly. Further, there are suggestions that, given the right incentives, elected officials, career civil servants and civil society in these countries can reduce corruption if they desire it (see Lancaster & Montinola, 1997). Yet, corruption is becoming ever more entrenched in societies and reversing course is more challenging. Crises do not exempt some people, often those with power, from taking advantage of crises to enrich themselves or to not follow the rules. Lewis (2012) for instance found that corruption is more often ignored as merely greasing the wheels than as a more fundamental challenge to governance. As such, it is often not investigated, regardless of its negative impact on society’s most impoverished residents or its penchant to keep undeserving elites in power. Lewis (2012) observes that in the Indonesian forest fires of 1997–1998 it was neither poverty nor poor agricultural practices that ultimately resulted in the fires. Instead, Lewis found that the greediness of law enforcement officers and politicians involved in forest conversion was really to blame. Plantation development created the unsafe ecological and social conditions for the fire disaster (Lewis, 2012). Also, the incentives for insurers and contractors to push for such regulation are lower in weaker-­governance economies (Kenny, 2009). Property and business owners and contractors can avoid regulation because of weak enforcement or bribery. In turn, insurers cannot be confident that buildings will be constructed according to code. Moreover, contractors may lose out to informal construction techniques or less scrupulous firms if they insist on building to code. However, for a corrupt senior official in charge of construction, passage and non-­ enforcement of codes may be an optimal approach to the regulation of construction, which means that shoddy construction is unlikely to be detected in the short term (Kenny, 2009). Buildings may subsequently fail, but this is likely to be some time in the future, when the official has moved on to another position. Moreover, a review of natural hazard-­related building codes in developing countries found that the existence of such codes varied significantly across countries, and even where codes existed, they were frequently hard to access, and their legal status was often unclear (Kenny, 2009). There are costs and benefits to the corruption that all states try to control. The pity is that they do this through agents who possess discretionary power. Private

94   Part I individuals and firms that want favorable treatment may be willing to pay these agents to get it. Low-­level bureaucrats are agents of their superior officials— ministers and other elected officials, judges and administrators. Administrators, ministers, and other elected officials are responsible to the voting public; judges are responsible for legal norms, not to their self-­interest (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). People make corrupt payments to agents of the state in order to receive a benefit or avoid a cost. Such payments are not merely transfers (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). They affect the behavior of both payers and recipients. In thinking about where to draw that line, one must ask whether payments to agents advance or undermine public goals (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). Also, bribes often act as incentives to public officials, but tolerance of these payments, especially by outside lenders and donors such as the World Bank, is likely to dim the prospects for long-­term reform (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). In considering what orders and actions are best to control and bring glory to their state, it is clear that the greatest threat to the maintaining of an enduring state is corruption (or corruptness, corruptedness, corruptibility) (Machiavelli, in Ritner, 2011). Corruption appears in many different forms, but always as a foil to virtue and aid to fortune in Florentine society (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). Societies that allow the payment and receipt of bribes, for instance, can also allow poor building practices, poor regulation enforcement, and high levels of moral hazard, leaving its poorest citizens highly vulnerable to disasters caused by natural hazards. As we have witnessed, development may not benefit all citizens where corruption is systemic, even in countries endowed with abundant natural resources (Rose-­Ackerman, 1998). The risk is that individuals or businesses will be forced to offer bribes or engage in other corrupt practices in order to conduct business, secure a major contract to or import or export a product outside of customs norms (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Systematic corruption makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to live and do business daily. It also threatens a company’s ability to operate, or it could open it up to legal or regulatory penalties (Kaufmann et al., 2010). At the organizational level, Williamson (1985) built on Coase’s work on transaction cost economics (TCE)—part of the revival of interest in the New “Institutional Economics” that had its roots in the market failures of the 1960s. The transaction cost approach merges law, economics, and organization to explain why organizations fail or survive. TCE maintains that the primary purpose of economic institutions is to minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). In his work, Williamson (1985) agrees with Barnard (1938) on the need to integrate informal institutions as an essential component in economic growth and development. Williamson found that the informal organization supports the formal organizations; there cannot be one without the other. We cannot prioritize formal (that is, legal, written, codifiable, or explicit rules and regulations) over informal institutions (non-­legal rules of the game, rituals, relationships, and customs), since “formal” institutions always depend upon non­legal rules and inexplicit norms to operate (Hodgson, 2006). Without informal support, formal institutions are not viable. Moreover, legal rules become

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   95 important only by becoming embedded into customs and habits (Miller, 2011; Hodgson, 2006). Government Ineffectiveness and the Capacity Issue The development studies consensus since the early 1980s and 1990s is that the lack of state capacity and poor institutional quality are responsible for economic stagnation in many developing countries (Englebert, 2000; Brautigam, 1991; Hyden & Bratton, 1992; Ndulu et al., 1996). State capacity is defined as its ability to design and implement policies, make credible commitments, regulate behavior, and effectively run an efficient bureaucracy (Besley & Persson, 2009; Skocpol, 1985). In disaster risk reduction, developing countries are challenged by the lack of resources, such as technology, trained and experienced human resources, implementation of regulations, adequate coordination and, importantly, funding. Inadequate funding to commit to disaster risk reduction efforts is especially stark in developing countries and has led to reliance on global public organizations to build institutional capacity. Inadequate organizational capacity impedes institutional development by creating a situation in which foreign organizations and associated institutional arrangements are welcomed and can dictate disaster policies in developing countries. Here is what I mean. The disaster risk reduction legislation adopted by developing countries comes substantially from global disaster elites like the United Nations that often sideline ethnic institutions in planning, funding priorities, and programming. Ethnic institutions and their communities, then, remain underserved, under-­resourced and lack the institutional capacity needed to develop their DRR systems. Other Explanations of Institutional Deficiency However, colonialism and corruption and governance indicators are not the only factors that impact the context within which disasters take place and are governed. In sub-­Saharan Africa, Englebert (2000) suggests that there has been no shortage of theories to explain why sub-­Saharan Africa’s development has been retarded since the end of the colonial period. Several scholars have proposed alternative theories of Africa’s stagnation. For instance, some political theorists claim that Africa’s leaders, having inherited artificial polities from the colonial period, resort to neo-­patrimonial strategies to foster their power and prevent the dislocation of their peasant societies. A hybrid type of rule transpires in which informal political ties and exchanges supplant the formal administration of the country. In a neo-­patrimonial regime, the chief political executive and his agents exercise authority mainly through personal whim, not through laws, rules and institutional norms. Neo-­patrimonial policies, inherently redistributive, use the resources of the state to pursue their political and essentially private aims of power maximization. As a consequence, the capacity of the state is weakened; and there is little consideration for pro-­growth policies (Englebert, 2000, p. 9).

96   Part I Another explanation lies in a lack of congruence between formal institutions such as the state and informal institutions and norms. Englebert (2000) suggests that economies are more likely to be efficient, the more congruent they are with informal institutions and norms that are more endogenous to their societies. The challenge of building developing countries’ institutional context is that informal norms (e.g., practices, incentives and penalties) are not typically visible to outside observers (Schiavo-­Campo & McFerson, 2008, p.  15). These informal norms explain the well-­known paradox of many countries—that formal rules, regulations, administrative systems, and processes appear sound and coherent, while in reality governments are inefficient and ineffective, corruption is pervasive, and public services are inadequate (Schiavo-­Campo & McFerson, 2008, p. 15).

Informal “Soft” Institutions Disaster risk reduction takes place within a cultural context and as such DRG requires attention to the cultural processes that shape how risk is conceived, prioritized and managed. Disaster risk perception not only depends on the danger hazards potentially create but also by the behavior of the prevailing culture of these places (Kulatunga, 2010). Disasters occur at the interface of society, technology, and environment and are fundamentally the outcomes of the interactions of these features (Oliver-­Smith, 1996, p. 303) When a disaster strikes, whatever its origin, it tends to eventually affect most aspects of community life (Oliver-­ Smith, 1996). Whether or not individuals and groups plan for disasters, how they respond to disasters and how they recover from them invariably involve their belief systems. For instance, communities might be attached to an unsafe place because their ancestors or families have lived there for generations, or because it is close to the sea/ocean. As examples, in California, despite frequent and destructive wildfires, people continue to build in fire-­prone areas. There is a concentration of building and public infrastructure along coastal areas in Dominica although the island has had to rebuild these very infrastructures multiple times. In drought-­ridden areas in sub-­Saharan Africa, connection to tribal lands by tribal, ethnic and indigenous communities have kept groups living in these areas. The continued practice of these norms means that disaster losses and community destruction by disasters continue to be profound. These kinds of connections adhere people to unsafe places where culturally their peoples have lived. The lack of strong disincentives to take actions that will increase the exposure to hazards keep people living in unsafe locations. Culture, while not the only, is an essential explanatory variable in disaster outcomes because it can help us explain individuals’ and communities’ posture toward disaster risk reduction and management. Whether or not societies take preparation for the impact of hazards, whether they practice mitigation, whether they try to build back better and safer, whether or not they buy risk insurance, are products of their prevailing culture. However, some scholars reject cultural explanations altogether, arguing that these explanations inevitably “blame the

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   97 victims” for their problems (see Matters, 2008), or credit them with little or no individual agency to take their well-­being into their own hands. Still, culture as an influence on disaster risk reduction behavior cannot be overlooked. Culture is the full range of learned human behavior patterns. The term was first used in this way by the pioneer English anthropologist Edward B. Taylor in his book, Primitive Culture (1871), where he noted that culture was “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Our language (written and spoken), beliefs about God or a supreme being, government type and structure, relationship with the environment, familial relationships, building norms and traditions are all influenced by culture. The absence of disaster planning by individuals and groups and an inadequate recovery infrastructure are linked to their cultural predisposition. The tendency to rely on ex-­post disaster risk reduction strategies and reliance on governments to help in the event of a disaster is the result of culture. Exploring ways to transition to ex-­ante strategies for disaster recovery would be a positive move. Developing countries including Caribbean SIDS display structural and cultural characteristics that favor ex-­post recovery financing and high moral hazard burden. For example, regulations that support hazard insurance are almost non-­ existent; community-­level infrastructure that supports risk insurance is non-­ existent, and legislation is missing. Society is complex. Behavioral norms are culturally inculcated and play a significant role in shaping societies, but it would be foolish not to recognize the role of private incentives in motivating behavior in addition to these cultural phenomena (Laffont & Martimort, 2009). For instance, in developing countries governments themselves faced with structural issues—including fewer resources than needed to provide services to their citizens, a lack of accountability, institutional effectiveness—are forced to make trade-­offs between immediate and much-­needed services and events that might not happen. Governments face incentives to underinvest in costly disaster prevention policies and damage mitigation regulations (Neumayer et al., 2014). The results, especially over the long term, are clear between those that invest and those governments that do not. Disaster damage varies significantly across countries. At the individual level, people face the additional uncertainty about whether a building will, in fact, be able to withstand the full force of a natural hazard (Neumayer et al., 2014), or even if their investments, once made to reduce disaster risk, will produce a return on investment. They do not fully know the exact hazard strength up to which construction can withstand the hazard’s destructive force (Neumayer et al., 2014). Moreover, even if individuals are willing to invest in disaster risk reduction, such as disaster-­proofing buildings, purchasing risk insurance to aid disaster recovery efforts, or to reduce vulnerabilities, they are often reluctant to do so because there is no to little incentive to do so.

98   Part I Norms Norms are cultural products (including values, customs, and traditions) that represent collective representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual perceptions of particular group conduct (Bicchieri et al., 2011). Groups of individuals (political parties, government agencies, companies, NGOs and CBOs as well as clubs) collaborating around a common purpose, share specific norms that are common to those groups (Raschky, 2008). Norms must, therefore, be considered as central to governing. They are the foundation of our belief systems and get transformed into social and economic policies and actions. Norms are reflected in vision, consensus, long-­term thinking, volunteerism, incentives, commitment and enthusiasm (Twigg, 2009). Norms shape how organizations posture and restrict the actions of actors while promoting others within them. Norms regulate the way communities engage with the principles and foci of DRR and how they then deliver these through adaptation and transformation. Where disaster agencies are positioned with the government bureaucracy, legislation/policies that support their work and the culture within these organizations are essential pieces of the institutional context. It goes beyond specific disaster management laws to include public planning and regulation in areas relevant to establish long-­term risk reduction of disasters (Nam, 2012). Norms allow us to consider both the formal and informal institutions and give us a more holistic lens through which to understand disaster risk governance.

Concluding Note Institutions play a fundamental role in governance. Strong institutions both reflect and create successful disaster outcomes because they support better disaster planning and prevention, mitigation, and recovery. Developing countries grapple to find ways to bolster disaster risk reduction. Among their challenges are corralling actors and resources, providing incentives to support disaster risk reduction, and establishing the institutional context that effectively supports these activities. Prompted by global public organizations, developing countries have built up their DRR systems over the last three decades through projects funded by international agencies, legislative reforms, improved funding, and community participation. However, existing governance challenges restrict these measures of effectiveness. There is steep competition for resources in developing countries, along with slower changes in norms, institutional lag, legislative crawl and a tendency to marginalize local and indigenous actors. These reduce policy effectiveness and ultimately waste resources. Developing the institutional context is the primary path to improving governance. The good news is that although it will take time, institutions can be manipulated. Given the will to change them, they will turn. However, change can take time to materialize, and local actors must be a central part of the process.

Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   99

Notes 1 I do not attempt here to give a comprehensive history of institutional theory, or to disaggregate the field in its originating fields in philosophy, political science, anthropology, sociology or economics and political economy or to the institutionalism that emerged in the 1980s under the general heading of new institutionalism (NI), which some describe as a restatement of previous scholarship (see Scott, 2008; Maine, 1880). My purpose is to provide a broad framework of the arguments of institutions’ importance in mediating human desires and wants. 2 Human beings come to this conclusion through fear and reason. See Hobbes (2016).  3 E.g., Aristotle’s discussion of regime types (politeia), or Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, and in particular his Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689), where he presents arguments on the equality of human beings who are invested with natural rights in a state of nature in which they live free from outside rule, have influenced the founding documents of countries like the United States of America. 4 Schmidt (2005) offers a more extensive discussion of the different varieties of institutionalism. 5 There is no set definition of the term “colonialism” and changing morality has colored our understanding of the term. But there is consistency that power is exerted by one group over another. Horvath (1972) provides a definition of the term contrasting it with “imperialism,” a term with which it is often used interchangeably. Colonialism is “a form of intergroup domination in which settlers, in significant numbers, migrate permanently (at least long term anyway) to the colony from the colonizing power” (Horvath, 1972, p. 47). The difference between colonialism and imperialism is that in imperialism, only few settlers, if any, from the colonizing power migrate to the colony (Horvath, 1972).  6 Acemoglu et al.’s work is not without criticism. A case in point is the back and forth with Jeffrey Sachs, who takes issue with the apparent idea that only inclusive political institutions will create the room for dynamic innovation, otherwise, vested interests of the politicians and the major incumbent economic powers will stifle the innovation and growth (see Sachs, 2012a, 2012b). While I am not saying that inclusive institutions are the be all and end all of growth and development, I use it as an example of a central pillar of governance, institutions and its potential in shaping governance processes and results.

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Institutions: Centerpiece of Governance   103 Mamdani, M. (2001). Beyond settler and native as political identities: overcoming the political legacy of colonialism. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4): 651–664. Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of Sociology, 25(2): 185–213. Manuta, J., & Lebel, L. (2005, June). Climate change and the risks of flood disasters in Asia: crafting adaptive and just institutions. In: International Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, University of Chiang Mai, Chiang Mai, Thailand, June 21–23, 2005. Marschak, J. (1955). Elements for a theory of teams. Management Science, 1(2): 127–137. Matters, H. C. (2008). The term culture figures prominently in the literature on poverty, race. The Colors of Poverty: Why Racial and Ethnic Disparities Persist, 76. Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). Pre-­colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development. Econometrica, 81(1): 113–152. Miller, S. (2011). Social institutions. In: Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). Accessed at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2019/entries/social-­institutions/. Nam, T. (2012). Citizens’ attitudes toward open government and government 2.0. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(2): 346–368. Ndulu, B. J., Van De Walle, N., & Appleton, S. (eds.). (1996). Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal (Vol. 21). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Neumayer, E., Plümper, T., & Barthel, F. (2014). The political economy of natural disaster damage. Global Environmental Change, 24: 8–19. North, D. C. (1988). Ideology and political/economic institutions. Cato Journal, 8(1): 15. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 97–112. North, D. C. (2005). Institutions and the process of economic change. Management International, 9(3): 1. Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and political development: a cost-­benefit analysis. Amer­ican Political Science Review, 61(2): 417–427. Odusola, A., Cornia, G. A., Bhorat, H., & Conceição, P. (eds.) (2017). Income Inequality Trends in Sub-­Saharan Africa: Divergence, Determinants and Consequences. United Nations Development Program. Accessed at https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/3799401/files/Income.pdf (September 29, 2017). Oliver-­Smith, A. (1996). Anthropological research on hazards and disasters. Annual Review of Anthropology, 25(1): 303–328. Oliver-­Smith, A. (2002). Theorizing disasters: nature, power, and culture. Catastrophe and Culture, 23–47. Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. Annual Review of Economics, 4(1): 479–509. Pauly, M. V. (1968). The economics of moral hazard: comment. Amer­ican Economic Review, 58(3): 531–537. Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge University Press. Prebisch, R. (1959). Commercial policy in the underdeveloped countries. Amer­ican Economic Review, 49(2): 251–273. Prebisch, R. (2016). The Economic Development of Latin America. ECLAC Thinking, Selected Texts (1948–1998). Santiago: ECLAC.

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Part II

6 Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica

The chapter places Jamaica in its macro-­environmental context using the disaster risk profile to frame the discussion. More specifically, this chapter examines the investments made in the soft (culture and norms) and hard institutions of disaster governance (legislation, organizations, actors, incentives), and the actors and incentives that comprise the disaster risk governance context in Jamaica. The chapter will show that Jamaica has invested in reducing disaster risks but is still lacking some essential elements in disaster governance that retards success. The country maintains state-­centered governance but embeds a society-­ centered DRG system within it. The state-­centered system biases it toward power asymmetry at the national level, which inhibits the development of disaster infrastructure at the local level. This power asymmetry acts as a fundamental barrier to the development of a decentralized DRR system. Learning is the chief asset to DRG in Jamaica, but the lack of institutional resources and norms and diminished organizational capacity minimizes what the country can do by itself to improve its DRR circumstance and outcome.

Context and Disaster Risk Profile The location, geography, and geomorphology of Jamaica make the country particularly vulnerable to several meteorological hazards in the form of tropical storms, storm surges, drought, bushfires, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Tropical cyclones have the potential to affect the entire island, as demonstrated in 1988 with Hurricane Gilbert. Coastal areas are vulnerable to tropical storms passing over or near the shore, typically between June and November during an extended hurricane season. Jamaica’s position on the Northern Caribbean plate boundary increases the likelihood of an earthquake within the country (Disaster Risk Reduction Centre, University of the West Indies, 2012, p. 66). Floods are localized, but the residual impacts on communities along river channels or within limestone depressions can cause trouble for communities (Disaster Risk Reduction Centre, University of West Indies, 2012, pp. 66–67). Similarly, landslides and mudslides triggered as the earth shifts during extended periods of rain are localized but can upend a community’s activities for days.

110   Part II Despite frequent floodings, droughts are increasingly becoming an issue in Jamaica. Drought conditions can affect specific sections of parishes or be widespread over most of the island, impacting food production and surface water supply (Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management, 2008a). Poor national water storage systems sometimes exacerbate the problem, making more people vulnerable to their effects. Records of earthquakes dating back to the sixteenth century when the Europeans first settled the land reveal that, in any given year, up to 200 earthquakes can be felt on the island (Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management, 2008b). The above distinct categories of natural disasters common on the island increase its state of vulnerability. In addition to natural hazard-­related disasters, Jamaica has also experienced a few epidemics that affect public health and safety. Since 1852, Jamaica has undergone a series of epidemics and outbreaks, including smallpox and cholera (1852), polio (1953 and 1981), malaria, and yellow fever. As of November 17, 2012, there were a total of 3,830 dengue fever cases reported compared with 3,202 reported cases in 2010 (PIOJ, 2016). Chick V and Zika viruses have also ravaged the country in recent years. Densely populated towns increase the potential for spreading disease (PIOJ, 2016). Moreover, the potential for food insecurity among segments of the population is considerable. The recent Jamaica National Food and Security Policy seeks to promote a more comprehensive strategy to address vulnerabilities resulting from climate and related natural hazards, including food availability through macroeconomic stability and competitive markets (PIOJ, 2016). The recurrence of disasters due to natural hazard impact results in significant losses for communities, but outside of two significant disasters in 2004 and 2007, those affected per capita are decreasing; nonetheless, damage per person is increasing even when the two significant hurricane years are taken out (Table 6.1). The increasing damage cost per person could be accounted for by the infrastructure exposure on the island. Table 6.1  Disaster Impact in Jamaica, 2000–2018 Year

Deaths

Number Affected

Damage Per Person**

2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

13 15 4 3 5 12 15 0 0 0

25,000 350,000 8,000 5,000 33,188 4,000 2,506 215,850 91,595 125,000

$7.63 $339.16 $11.33 – $112.48 $24.73 $55.65 unknown unknown unknown

Source: Raw data from EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database – Universite catholique de Louvain (UCL) – CRED, D. Guha-Sapir – www.emdat.be, Brussels, Belgium, March 27, 2018. Note ** Total per person= raw data/total population.

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   111 Further, Jamaica’s proximity to North America also makes it vulnerable to the impacts of technological and other human-­made hazards, including terrorist attacks, oil spills, and hazardous materials accidents.

Two Governance Systems Jamaica’s general governing system is a strong centralized one, with some deconcentration at the sub-­national level. This deconcentration means that there is a transfer of responsibility to lower-­level central government authorities, or to other local authorities who are upwardly accountable to the central government (see Yuliani, 2004).1 In this regard, Jamaica has no illusions that the local levels are able to shoulder the burden of DRR and so does not rely on it to do so. It does, however, pull in individual and community actors from the local levels and grants them defined but limited duties. At the community level many DRR duties are done on a voluntary basis. Then ODPEM works to build disaster awareness and training in community groups at these levels. There are also public service announcements about disaster preparedness. In doing so, ODPEM in Jamaica builds up a culture for DRR. Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy, or a constitutional monarchy based on a system of representation. The island is a unitary state and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Having gained independence from Britain in 1962, Jamaica has based its government on the British Westminster-­Whitehall system of socio-­political culture (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). A governor general represents the Queen on the island. Although neither the Queen nor the governor general has any real authority in administering state affairs, the Queen is head of state, and she appoints a governor general to be her representative in Jamaica on the prime minister’s advice (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). The constitution binds the governor general from any political party affiliation, but they do represent the Queen in ceremonial events, such as the opening of Parliament, and presentations of honors and military parades. If there is a vacancy in the prime minister’s office, the governor general will appoint one from among the membership of the House of Representatives (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). Jamaica’s governance system is essentially a centralized one, although efforts have been made to deconcentrate some responsibilities downward to parishes and local governments. The cabinet is the center of this governing framework. It initiates government policies and programs and is responsible for the general direction and control of the government (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). By law, the cabinet consists of the prime minister and no fewer than 11 other ministers (no upper limit is specified). No more than four ministers must be appointed from among the senators and the rest from the House of Representatives (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). Ministers have portfolio responsibilities—e.g., housing, health, education, finance—and each conducts their ministry’s routine business without referring it to the parliamentary secretary in charge. Ministers of state and parliamentary

112   Part II secretaries lend oversight to ministers in their portfolio responsibilities. However, matters of significance are brought before the cabinet for deliberation and decision (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). The prime minister forms and presides over the cabinet. The prime minister also appoints members of the Privy Council, chief justice, commissioners of the three service commissions, but must advise the Queen as well as the governor general on the appointments (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). This centralized system coupled with government inefficiency in some instances means that fraud and red tape plague Jamaica’s government bureaucracy. Corruption in Jamaica averaged around 72.44 from 1998 until 2017, reaching an all-­time high of 99 in 2009 (Trading Economics, n.d.). The 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International ranks Jamaica as the 68th least corrupt nation out of 175 countries,2 no doubt due to the passage of the long-­awaited Jamaica Integrity Commission Bill, which was passed in the House of Representatives on January 31, 2017. In lending support for the bill, the prime minister noted the drop in the Corruption Perception Index from 69 out of 168 countries in 2015 to 83 out of 176 countries in 2016 (Henry, 2017). The Integrity Commission Bill establishes a new commission housing a commission for the prevention of corruption, the current Integrity Commission, and an office of the contractor general to be a single compliance mechanism for parliamentarians, public officials, and members of the public who carry out public functions (Henry, 2017). The bill’s primary aim is to consolidate laws relating to the prevention of corruption and the award and monitoring of government contracts. It also promotes a single commission to develop and strengthen measures to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute acts of corruption (Henry, 2017). Discussions with the average person on the street or in the Jamaican newspapers tell a more disturbing story of corruption. Jamaicans themselves see corruption as pervasive throughout, involving top government leaders and critical institutions to ordinary citizens. In a speech at the 26th annual installation of the president and officers of the Rotary Club of St Andrew North on June 25, 2012, Contractor General Greg Christie noted that in Jamaica, corruption was “considered by many to be the largest single impediment to our country’s attainment of sustained economic growth and development” (Christie, 2012). Its pervasiveness in Jamaica is evident in law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities to “dispassionately investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption in high places” (Christie, 2012), and in the inability of ordinary citizens to access official documents such as passports without “greasing the wheels” of some, not all, frontline bureaucrats. Issues such as these have fueled a deep-­rooted culture of greed and dishonesty. The country’s generally weak institutional framework, including its relatively new anti-­corruption institutional framework, only serves to exacerbate the challenges. Contractor General Christie called on the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ), the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce, and the Jamaica Manufacturers’ Association to insist upon enforcing stringent corporate governance,

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   113 a­ nti-­corruption and corporate social responsibility compliance policies and for significant self-­introspection and soul-­searching on the part of citizens in how they conduct their personal and business affairs (Christie, 2012). In 2017, Christie, reflecting on the continued corruption problem, gave a more scathing rebuke of Jamaica and its affinity for corruption, calling it “entrenched and pervasive” (Christie, 2017). Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Using World Bank data for Jamaica, the country scores 69/100, or 69%, in 2017,3 indicating that the country struggles with corruption and its effects. Policy implementation surfaces as a critical cause of government ineffectiveness in Jamaica. Jamaicans, trying to find ways to access government services, often resort to paying “something” to get the services (e.g., passports, driver’s licenses and permits, land use permits, and so on) they need.

Social and Economic Picture Key social indicators, including poverty, unemployment, and income inequality, in Jamaica rank among the worst in the Americas despite the progress made by the government to restructure its debt via debt exchange and other economic programs (Jamaica Observer, 2011). Persons at risk are estimated to make up around 60% of Jamaica’s total population (Carby et al., 2012). Female-­headed households make up just under 50% of the population, are underemployed, and unemployment remains a stubborn problem in Jamaica. According to the Planning Institute of Jamaica, in 2016 the total unemployment rate hovered around 13% (13.2%; 9.3% male and 17.6% for females) and GDP per capita stood at US$642.5 (PIOJ, 2016). Jamaica has the second-­highest unemployment rate in the Americas (Ball et al., 2011). Jamaica also shows the fourth-­highest poverty rate at 43.1% compared with 23 regional neighbors (Ball et al., 2011). Debt servicing was 27.7% of GDP (2016). The debt to GDP ratio was 122.5% at the end of 2016, compared with 126.1% at the end of 2015 (PIOJ, 2016). Limited economic diversity, as a result of reliance on tourism, bananas, sugar, alumina, bauxite, and apparel, does not provide the government with the ability to withstand global economic slumps. External shocks, such as a slump in the global economy, make it even more difficult for countries like Jamaica to mobilize necessary financial resources for disaster preparedness and mitigation. Many tourists coming to the island each year creates an added set of vulnerabilities from transient populations, some with language differences, who have no connection in the country. Evacuation protocols remain underdeveloped, and local road networks are limited in their ability to move large numbers of people. Moreover, the island has two large airports, one on either side of the island. These challenges could lead to a logistical nightmare should authorities have to mount a large-­scale evacuation exercise.

114   Part II Other macroeconomic issues set the stage for disaster risk governance in Jamaica. The island debt to GDP ratio stands at 113.89% of Jamaica GDP in 2016—a 7.38 percentage point fall from 2015, when it was 121.27% of GDP (see PIOJ, 2016). The debt to GDP ratio is set to drop below 100% in 2018/194 (see Williams, 2017). A reduction in this ratio means that the government will need to borrow less to service its debt. However, the country’s economic circumstances remain strained and are likely to curtail growth severely. Jamaica does receive a fair amount in development assistance. In 2016, of the US$45 billion in official development assistance, the majority serviced energy and water management, disaster risk reduction efforts, infrastructure development, climate change initiatives, and macroeconomic and social stability (PIOJ, 2016). Income inequality and marginalization remain troubling issues for Jamaica. The top 20% of the population has averaged between 50% and 54% of national income over the last 20 years (Jamaica Observer, 2014). The highly unequal distributions of income and wealth result in a profound perception of income inequality, which could potentially be destabilizing. In Jamaica, social and class resentment festers because the rich are blamed for the plight of the poor, and moving from poverty to being rich is only possible for a few criminals, entertainers, and athletes (see Jamaica Observer, 2014).

Disaster Risk Governance This context necessitates a strategy that can leverage institutional opportunities to improve DRR. A focus on institutions is a strength of the Jamaican DRG context. However, aspects of both the soft and hard institutions have been neglected. Soft Institutions Culture and Norms The values, customs, and traditions in DRG in Jamaica began to take shape after Hurricane Gilbert in 1988. That hurricane marked a watershed moment in disaster management in Jamaica. Before Hurricane Gilbert, disasters were seen as acts of God whose costs competed with social services such as healthcare and education. Very little preparedness and mitigation were done, even in the face of hurricane warnings. Over 60% of the population, equaling around 810,000 persons, were affected by Hurricane Gilbert, and several deaths were directly attributable to it. Property losses ran over US$1 billion; the hurricane obliterated the agricultural sector (Trotz, 2002). Government recovery spending eroded the national income base and slowed economic development; instead of moving forward, the same infrastructure was being fixed or replaced over and over again because of frequent storms and hurricanes. In the first decade after Hurricane Gilbert, the country focused on institutionalizing disaster response by putting in place procedures and protocols, as well as supporting organizations and legislation. These were mostly to aid disaster

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   115 ­ itigation and response. Multi-­sector planning concentrated on critical sectors m including the energy sector, where design changes were made and enforced; infrastructure was built or reinforced, and construction standards developed (interview with H. Nembhard, personal communication, July 10, 2017). Public asset correlation management was conducted to assess their dependence and try to reduce them, and studies were conducted to understand what drove infrastructural vulnerability and how these could be fixed (ibid.). These efforts, however, were limited by funding, loan and aid availability, and their repayment terms. Further, the absence of any significant disasters between Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 and Hurricane Ivan in 2004 meant that the existing DRR systems put in place after Hurricane Gilbert were not tested and there were gaps in the system as well as planning lapses. Tests came in 2004 with Hurricane Ivan and again in 2007 when Hurricane Dean caused severe damage to the island. Hurricane Ivan forced the country into a comprehensive disaster management mode in line with global and regional frameworks. Ordinary citizens began to think about disaster mitigation as a necessity for building construction, even if they were not constructing in hazard-­prone areas. Also, civil engineers were working to shore up public infrastructure to withstand certain wind speeds and shaking from earthquakes (interview with H. Nembhard, personal communication, July 10, 2017). At the regional level, the regional enhanced Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) strategy was carefully aligned with the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015 and is significantly influenced by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, 2014). Enhanced CDM focused efforts on all hazards, all phases, all sectors, and emphasized greater community involvement. The most current DRR and development agendas (SDGs and Sendai Framework) put climate change at the center of development efforts. While climate change could potentially be destructive to small islands like Jamaica, de-­emphasizing or overlooking other hazards to which Jamaica lie vulnerable could prove to be a significant error.

Investments in DRG Legislative and Development Agenda It is safe to say that the strength of the Jamaican disaster governance system lies mainly in the number of disaster legislation passed into law from the early 1990s. However, weak enforcement, inadequate organizational resources, and challenges in scaling down legislation implementation to the parish and local levels remain a challenge. The sections below look at the changes in DRG in Jamaica chronologically to show the ebb and flow of DRG movement on the island. The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act of 1993 The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act of 1993 established the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management

116   Part II (ODPEM) to advise the prime minister on disaster preparedness and emergency management (Disaster Preparedness Act, 1993, p.  4). ODPEM’s principal objectives were to advance disaster preparedness and emergency management measures in Jamaica by facilitating and coordinating the development and implementation of integrated disaster management systems (Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act, 1993). Through this Act, the ODPEM had the legal basis to develop and implement policies and programs to attain an appropriate state of national and sectoral preparedness for coping with emergencies (McCalla, 2012). This 1993 Act ensured that the prime minister enforced rules to govern disaster management and emergency preparedness within the country. It gave disaster preparedness and emergency management a visible and politically powerful advocate for disaster management in Jamaica. It also placed the disaster office high enough in the bureaucracy to have access to some of the resources it needed, and the visibility it needed to launch disaster management in Jamaica. National Hazard Mitigation Policy and the National Response Matrix (2005) The National Hazard Mitigation Policy 2005, along with the National Response Matrix 2005, was the result of growing recognition that there is a strong relationship between sustainable development, and the social and economic cost of hazard and disaster impacts. The policy’s chief purpose was to support the integration of hazard-­risk reduction into national development strategies, noting the importance of a community-­based approach to the design and implementation of related measures. It promotes the actions of various actors and partnership in conceptualizing, designing and implementing hazard-­ risk reduction measures, to support sustainable development (Ministry of Land and Environment, Jamaica, 2015). The hazard mitigation policy also sought to reduce environmental, social, and economic dislocations and emphasizes making infrastructure more robust, improved land use practices, and rehabilitation of degraded areas. Moreover, it promotes collaboration and coordination among national, regional, and international agencies to harmonize activities towards achieving common hazard mitigation objectives; empowers communities to manage hazard risk; and promotes the protection and rehabilitation of the natural, social, and physical environments through hazard mitigation (McCalla, 2012). A look through major social and economic development planning documents (Economic and Social Survey Jamaica; Survey of Living Conditions) shows increasing reporting on gender, but in particular women’s, issues. Disaster Risk Management Act of 2015 The new Disaster Risk Management Act of 2015 repeals the earlier 1993 ­Disaster Act. The 2015 Act gives a renewed mandate to ODPEM to advance

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   117 d­ isaster preparedness and emergency management measures in Jamaica by building an integrated disaster management system and instituting measures as necessary for disaster mitigation. It also renews ODPEM’s role in “developing and implementing policies and programs to achieve and maintain an appropriate state of national and sectoral preparedness for coping with all emergencies which may affect Jamaica” (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p. 6). The Disaster Act of 2015 also establishes the National Disaster Risk Management Council, the National Disaster Response Coordination Plan, parish disaster committees, and zonal committees (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p.  13) to build synergies between response and planning, and gives responsibility to the director general of ODPEM to do so. The Act is strengthened with the inclusion of procedures for disaster preparedness and responsiveness of public bodies and public officials, NGOs, community-­based organizations, and persons or organizations who volunteer in disaster response efforts, as well as persons or organizations who are required by law to perform functions related to preparedness for and response to disasters. The 2015 Disaster Act also specifies how services and systems for disaster response will be mobilized, who should man the Emergency Operations Center, and how families and their property will be protected (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p.  14). It oversees protection and restoration of communications after a disaster, distribution and replenishment of emergency stores, safeguarding against risks of fire and epidemics, shelter provision, evacuation, facilitating volunteers, and cooperation with international organizations and foreign governments (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p. 14). With the passage of the Disaster Act in 2015, the ODPEM’s focus and position within the government hierarchy has changed. The ODPEM’s current focus is on disaster risk reduction and management, a move that expands its role from focusing on disaster prevention and emergency management. Reclassification has relocated the ODPEM in a line agency. Whereas it was a central executive in the Office of the Prime Minister, it is now a line agency within the Department of Local Government and Community Development, a ministry with responsibility for development planning, minor water supplies, parochial road maintenance, fire services, and disaster preparedness and emergency management (Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, n.d.). The 2015 Act places a national disaster council over which the prime minister presides to govern DRR. In addition to the above, the 2015 Act provides significant revisions on disaster risk governance at the parish level and includes communication protocols with the ODPEM director general in the event of a disaster. Parish Disaster Committees (PDCs) The 2015 Disaster Act (pp. 16–17) mandates a PDC for each parish. The PDC’s duties include developing and submitting a Parish Disaster Risk Management Plan to the ODPEM director general for approval and regular review. The PDC also brings disaster management and disaster operations in each parish in line

118   Part II with the national strategic policy framework. The PDC is responsible for reviewing and assessing the disaster management plan and activities of local groups in the parish and ensuring that communities in each parish are made aware of ways of preventing disasters and mitigating their adverse effects as well as responding to and recovering from them (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p.  17). The PDC also identifies resources that may be used for disaster operations in the parish (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p. 17). Each local authority for a parish is responsible for managing disaster and giving effect to DRR matters within its local jurisdiction. The local authority— the municipal corporation—appoints a parish disaster coordinator to carry out the daily execution of functions conferred on the local authority (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p. 18). The 2015 Act encompasses new mandates on how to address disaster management and emergency services in its section 28. Under this provision, every permanent secretary, head of government agency, or any other public body shall ensure that there is a communication liaison with the director general concerning disaster matters. Further, these actors must be prepared to submit to the director general a disaster management plan, which is reviewed from time to time (Government of Jamaica, 2015, p. 25). Further, the 2015 Act seeks to strengthen the island’s overall preparedness, as well as emergency management and response processes through a range of measures. The measures explicitly recognize existing organizational structures, such as the National Disaster Committee, parish disaster committees, and zonal committees, with their roles and functions clearly established. The 2015 Act also legally creates a National Disaster Fund, providing a legal basis for evacuating at-­risk individuals based on their location; and identifying vulnerable, high-­risk areas. Moreover, the Disaster Council is now recognized by law, and the ODPEM board is known as a statutory body with an executive director and staff. The 2015 Disaster Risk Management Act promotes the administration of disaster risk reduction and the administration of disaster management efforts. It also provides for the identification and description of high-­risk areas, especially vulnerable areas, and necessary support actions to be taken regarding any area so designated. In sum, the 2015 Disaster Risk Management Act highlights the government’s commitment to implementing a disaster management framework and elevates disaster management among the government’s policy priorities. This Act legitimizes a coordinated approach to disaster management in Jamaica. Plans and SOPs In addition to the Disaster Act of 2015, and other specific disaster legislation, there are a series of plans and SOPs for the national emergency operations (NEOs). These include an activation system and a format to facilitate monitoring of all agencies, departments, individuals and voluntary organizations; and also comprises decentralized administrative guidance from ODPEM up to the National Disaster Committee. The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is the

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   119 designated administrative hub of disaster and emergency response and is seen as the “nerve center” of disaster response. Its SOPS are an integral part of Jamaica’s disaster preparedness plans. A damage assessment plan is an investigation into the damage to either a specific facility or a particular area. It aids disaster recovery decision-­making in that it tells the disaster managers what type and amount of assistance is required to restore a sense of normality after a disaster. The assessment plan is to be recorded and assessed at the national and parish levels by the appropriate agencies. The National Earthquake Response Plan outlines the intended actions to be taken by the government of Jamaica in response to an earthquake. The National Fire Management Plan’s goal is to provide the framework for institutions, government, and NGOs to meet the threat that large-­scale fires may pose to various sectors of society. The plan outlines strategies that will provide a coordinated effort for response, preparedness, and mitigation strategies. Support legislation strengthens DRM and ensures that the country’s disaster legislative agenda is more likely to be accomplished. At the community level, the 2015 amended Jamaican constitution entrenched the local government system as a critical governance pillar in Jamaica (McCalla, 2012). This constitutional amendment promoted local government reforms in 2016 to give municipal governments more authority and autonomy. The 2016 local government reforms have been catalysts for revitalizing local governments in Jamaica. Three, in particular, stand out. First, the Local Governance Act of 2016 allows for local authorities to be granted greater scope and influence in managing municipal affairs. Second, the Local Government (Financing and Financial Management) Act of 2016 provides a comprehensive framework for financing local authorities. And third, the Local Government (Unified Servicing and Employment) Act of 2016 dictates the scope of regulation for personnel employed by local government authorities. These reforms allow local governments a stronger foundation from which to raise funding for and influence disaster planning, and manage and build its human resource capacity (PIOJ, 2016). National Development Plan Jamaica has taken several steps to mainstream climate change into its national developmental processes and mechanisms. Chief among these is the Vision 2030 National Development Plan. Vision 2030 has explicitly incorporated climate change as one of its 15 outcomes (hazard risk reduction and adaptation to climate change), but climate change is enshrined in the entire document. Vision 2030, spearheaded by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), is a plan with strong implementation support by the two major political parties. Government ministries and agencies are building Vision 2030 into their plans and budgets. Alignment with the Millennium Development Goals signifies that the country will receive resources from international agencies to develop programs

120   Part II and projects. Four goals (focused on health and empowerment, safety and security, economy, and a healthy natural environment) prop up Vision 2030. Goal 4 focuses on hazard risk reduction and adaptation to climate change and includes an emphasis on physical planning, reforming outdated laws, enforcing building regulations, reducing poor land use practices, eliminating squatting, and joining global efforts to reduce the role of climate change (PIOJ, 2010). As part of Jamaica’s National Development Plan, Vision 2030 outlines vital areas for the country’s development. These include a focus on how the country’s government and its people will tackle significant problems, including sustainable development, institutional development, and disaster management, all part of an initiative to move the nation to “developed country status” by the year 2030 (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2010). Vision 2030 has benefitted from input from students, NGOs, community groups, churches, trade unions, media, public and private sector groups, and from the diaspora. It has support for its implementation from both major political parties, whose leaders have voiced their commitment to making the plan work. There was a deliberate effort to have broad input and participation from as many Jamaicans as possible. Goal 6 of the country’s growth-­inducement strategy for the short and medium term incorporates environmental management as one pillar. These priorities, in turn, shape the country’s annual budget. From these, the Jamaican government participates in a retreat with development partners (funders including the World Bank, Inter-­Amer­ican Development Bank, European Development Fund, Caribbean Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), where the two sides work to reach a consensus on priorities. Programs and projects develop around the agreed-­upon priorities. Implementation of Vision 2030 is well under way, and its funding reflected in government ministries’ and agencies’ budgets. Many international agencies are using the Vision 2030 document to develop programs and projects for Jamaica (PIOJ, 2010, p. 13). For disaster risk reduction, this includes capacity-­building projects, training of around 30 persons in post-­disaster impact assessment methodology, skills-­building in rapid visual screening for seismic assessment for the staff of municipal corporations, and upgrading approximately 120 GIS professionals and practitioners (PIOJ, 2016). Vision 2030 proposes a new paradigm for governing. It fashions governance as shared power and authority. Instead of centralizing decisions at the national level, decision-­making involves institutions, the private sector, and citizens, including youth groups, cooperatives and consumer organizations (PIOJ, 2010, p. 30). However, capacity issues at the lower levels mean that many issues revert to the national level. Mainstreaming Climate Change As a signatory to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other international development frameworks, plus its growing experience with disasters related to natural hazards, Jamaica seems to be shifting focus to climate change.

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   121 It is too early to tell, but this focus might be sidelining other risks that cause frequent destruction, damage, and death on the island. Jamaica is the sole Caribbean participant in two global projects. As with DRR, the country’s approach to managing climate change is to rely on international funding to carry out the bulk of its activities, hence running the risk of not sustaining earlier gains. Another recession, which some economists speculate is on the horizon, could derail efforts to build on previous gains made. Jamaica is one of ten countries in which local-­level adaptation action is being supported through the Community-­based Adaptation to Climate Change Program financed by the GEF through UNDP. It is also part of the European Commission’s Global Climate Change Alliance, which is financing priority adaptation measures in 18 vulnerable countries around the world (McCalla, 2012). The European Union-­funded Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction project will seek to address issues of environmental degradation, Jamaica’s high vulnerability to climate change impacts, inadequate mainstreaming of climate change issues into sectoral plans and national policies, and lack of awareness about climate change (McCalla, 2012). Its primary objective is to assist Jamaica with its adaptation to climate change and to contribute to its sustainable development. The project does so by making vulnerable areas more robust so that they can reduce the risks associated with natural hazards (McCalla, 2012). The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) ensures that there is no duplication of effort (McCalla, 2012). Education and Awareness In countries where there are limited resources to spare, DRR is usually one of the first casualties. In these environments education and awareness are vital in all DRR efforts and crucial elements in the DRG terrain. Education and outreach is fundamental in building a culture of disaster planning and preparedness that involves future generations from an early age. Starting with the 2012–2013 school year, the Ministry of Education, working with ODPEM, has begun to educate students on climate change and disaster reduction in its primary and secondary school curriculum (McCalla, 2012). ODPEM has also used well-­known personalities and entertainers to promote awareness of the value of prevention, mitigation, and preparedness (Carby, 2005). Electronic media provides access to prime air time at highly discounted rates or free of cost. ODPEM’s outreach extends to lectures to government offices, hotels and other businesses, schools, assisting them to develop contingency and recovery plans, drills and exercises (Carby, 2005). The thinking behind these education and awareness initiatives is that an informed public will awaken to the consequences of not planning for disasters and come to recognize the benefits of planning and preparation as central to their well-­being. Still, there remains work to be done on knowledge-­building about the consequences of climate change and its link to disasters, while not neglecting the other hazards to which Jamaica is vulnerable.

122   Part II Box 6.1  Jamaica Learns Lessons from Hurricane Gilbert 1988 Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 highlighted that many communities lacked the skills needed to manage the hazards to which they were vulnerable. Those communities with these skills systematically respond better to events and were able to assist themselves with evacuation, sheltering, assessments, and supplies management (Carby, 2005). After Hurricane Gilbert, Jamaica’s ODPEM began a program of skills transfer to communities. They developed flood warning teams, search and rescue, first aid, contingency planning and shelter management (Carby, 2005). Communities played a crucial role in identifying mitigation measures and providing labor to execute mitigation activities. In the private sector, the dominant telephone company, Cable and Wireless, worked to make its system more robust. The company systematically placed much of its telephone network underground. Reports credit this move for the minimal loss of telephone service during and after Hurricane Ivan in 2004. In addition, ODPEM with Portmore, the fastest growing municipality at the time, drafted the first evacuation plan. Since then, a full-­scale exercise involving residents has been staged every year and has proved to be useful in increasing awareness. The evacuation plan was also revised, with input from all stakeholders. Further, Hurricane Gilbert led to improvements in inter-­agency cooperation among organizations with disaster management responsibilities.

In disaster governance, the fact that the prime minister sits atop the National Disaster Council is significant. In the parliamentary system, the executive derives its democratic legitimacy from an ability to command the legislative branch (parliament) from which they are directly elected and to which they are held accountable (McCalla, 2012). Because the prime minister usually rises from the ruling party in the legislative branch, they have tremendous power over the legislative process. Having the prime minister on the National Disaster Council means that the highest-­ranking elected official is the face of disaster governance in the country and that disaster management has the full force of the government behind it. The National Disaster Committee (NDC) and its six sub-­committees lead Jamaica’s disaster risk reduction governing mechanism. Initially conceptualized in the late 1970s as a policy and technical oversight committee, the NDC guides the prime minister in planning and implementing policies necessary to counter the effects of hazards. At the time, the committee was under the chairmanship of the prime minister, the Honorable Edward Seaga of the Jamaica Labor Party, and included several key agencies and all government ministries. Other agencies such as utility companies, international donors, search and rescue organizations, the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation (KSAC), the commissioner of police, the Jamaica Fire Brigade (JFB), and the Jamaica Defense Force Chief of Staff (JDF ) were also committee members. These agencies are placed within the disaster response matrix to maximize their effectiveness and work with ODPEM to fulfill its mandate. As chair of the NDC, the prime minister meets annually to

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   123

Chairman Prime Minister

Committee Executive

Deputy Chairman Parent Ministry

National Coordinator Director General ODPEM

Sub-Committees

Figure 6.1  National Disaster Committee Organization Structure. Source: Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). Accessed at www. odpem.org.jm/DisastersDoHappen/DisasterManagementinJamaica/JamaicasDisasterManagementFramework/DisasterManagementattheNationalLevel/tabid/236/Default.aspx.

approve disaster policy matters with the National Disaster Executive (NDE) (ODPEM, n.d.). The NDC then became dormant during the 1980s and was only resuscitated in 1989 under the chairmanship of then Prime Minister Michael Manley of the People’s National Party after Hurricane Gilbert struck. In the event of a widespread emergency, the National Disaster Executive oversees ODPEM’s management as well as the activated National Emergency Operations Center (ODPEM, n.d.). The various NDE committees produce and monitor mitigation, prevention, and preparedness plans and task ODPEM with implementation responsibilities. The NDE committees meet annually to provide policy directives. They review and monitor the National Disaster Strategy, formulate guidelines, and assign responsibilities to the National Response Team (NRT) (ODPEM, n.d.). They also ensure adequate human resources and physical resources for emergency operations before, during, and after a national disaster. And they advise, monitor, and supervise the annual work programs of disaster-­related activities while coordinating emergency activities of voluntary organizations, both locally and overseas (ODPEM, n.d.). The devastating flood in June 1979 that saw 40 deaths and economic losses of US$27 million signaled the need for an agency to coordinate, monitor and manage the response to hazards and educate the public on all aspects of disasters (Jackson, 2005). The international donor community strongly supported this

124   Part II move and the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Relief Coordination (ODIPERC) was in 1980 to undertake this mandate. The International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) gave a boost to the creation of a more comprehensive approach to disaster risk reduction, not just relief coordination (Jackson, 2005). The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act of 1993 resulted in the renaming of ODIPERC to the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM), a statutory body under the provisions in the same year.5 In Jamaica, the ODPEM leads the day-­to-day disaster risk reduction operations. As a statutory body, ODPEM is an agency of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development. The mayor of Kingston heads the ministry. ODPEM develops and implements policies and programs to maintain an appropriate level of national disaster preparedness. It also encourages and supports disaster preparedness and mitigation measures in all parishes with the help of local government authorities, community-­based organizations, and private and voluntary organizations. Moreover, ODPEM promotes early warning, emergency response, relief and recovery operations in emergencies, along with other responsibilities (ODPEM, n.d.). No appointment within ODPEM stands without the approval of the minister in charge. Within three months of the concluding fiscal year, the minister is to report on dealings that transpired during that previous year along with any additional documentation on ODPEM operations that is to follow. The ODPEM reports to the line minister on the existence of any local condition in any region that endangers public safety and on any part of the island threatened with or affected by a natural or technological hazard (Disaster Preparedness Act, 2015). Within ODPEM’s scope of operation are misalignments between the deconcentrated regional, parish and zonal systems and the national disaster system. Trying to build some type of a decentralized system within the broader centralized parliamentary system is challenging. Of the six sub-­committees that comprise the National Disaster Committee, the Administration, Finance and the Public Service Committee, and the Public Information and Education Sub-­committee co-­chaired by the Jamaica Information Service (JIS) and the ODPEM are pivotal (ODPEM, n.d.). Within the NDC, ODPEM’s primary responsibility lies in coordinating the management of the various types of disasters that affect the nation. The prime minister chairs the NDC, and they are the overall manager of the nation’s preparedness, mitigation, recovery, and rehabilitation efforts. Parish Level Parish Disaster Committees At the parish level, ODPEM works through parish disaster committees (PDCs) that operate out of the parish council offices. The city mayor of each parish chairs the PDC. Parish council offices are usually grossly understaffed and lack

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   125 technical and adequate financial resources (ODPEM, n.d.). Parish disaster committees respond at the parish level whenever there is a disaster. They also forge links with the response agencies, community groups, and community-­based organizations (Mitchell, personal communication, July 2017). The custos, a civic post of the parish level, and the mayor of the city have responsibility for disaster risk reduction at the city level, with the mayor being the working member of the parish disaster committee (ODPEM, n.d.). The custos and mayor chair the PDC jointly. Other members of the parish disaster committee include all parish councilors and local representatives of the various agencies and interested groups. Parish disaster committees work to forge partnerships between parishes and response agencies, community groups, and community-­based organizations. Parish Disaster Coordinator Each parish has a parish disaster coordinator who is responsible for coordinating all activities geared towards awareness, prevention, and response (ODPEM, n.d.). Each parish disaster coordinator has the responsibility for keeping up with guidelines stipulated by ODPEM and formulating plans to address local emergencies. The National Zonal Committee The National Zonal Committee is the coordinating body for the National Zonal Program (NZP). It has responsibility for monitoring all aspects of the program, preparing public education programs, and arranging fundraising programs. After Hurricane Gilbert in September 1988, the ODPEM realized that communities needed to be better prepared for a disaster (ODPEM, n.d.). The NZP was established so that communities could coordinate among themselves within the first 72 hours after a disaster until external help arrived. Communities make up zones and focal points. In 1996, the Seventh Day Adventist Movement was charged with overseeing the NZP and still does so today. The NZP works by dividing the island into clusters of communities called zones, which are further divided into focal points. The NZP provides public education within the applicable zones regarding disaster preparedness and emergency response, liaises with relevant PDCs, nominates persons to be trained as shelter managers, and prepares zonal disaster plans to be incorporated into the parish disaster risk management plan (Government of Jamaica 2015, p. 19). Zones Communities across the island are divided into clusters called zones. A zone chairman leads disaster response effort, passing information to the parish disaster committees (PDCs), and monitors each zone. The zone chairperson identifies personnel and needed equipment (e.g., radio, CB, cellular phones, backhoes, and bulldozers) (ODPEM, n.d.).

126   Part II Across the island, communities separated into zones and led by appointed zone chairs disseminate information regarding disasters to the parish disaster committees (PDC) in each zone (Ricketts-­Edmund, personal communication, 2017). The zonal chairperson is charged with locating resources (e.g., backhoes and bulldozers) and identifying equipment needs. Zones are the first groups to organize information dissemination efforts with the greater community from the zone headquarters. The Seventh Day Adventist church and school and the Red Cross serve as zonal support and coordinating distribution centers. In the event of a disaster, zones will be the first group to be activated. Disaster information is communicated from the zone headquarters, located at a Seventh Day Adventist church hall or school (Ricketts-­Edmund, personal communication, 2017). Needed assistance is coordinated from that location, which also serves as the distribution center from where other support agencies assist victims (ODPEM, n.d.). Focal Points Under the National Zonal Program, zones are further divided into focal points. The focal points operate on a smaller scale than do zones. Focal points work alongside the zonal chairperson (ODPEM, n.d.). Personnel at focal points identify resources and ensure their availability, including things like cellular phones, power saws, and support personnel, such as nurses and doctors (ODPEM, n.d.). Focal points also pass along information to zones regarding the state or level of disaster within their community. Funding Funding is a significant limiting factor in DRR in Jamaica. It makes governing difficult. In the financial year 2009/2010, funding allocations for disaster amounting to US$479,059 (J$40.0 million) were made indirectly under the distributions for projects to strengthen disaster risk management (PIOJ, 2016). Of that amount, US$323,059 (J$27.489 million) supported projects in natural hazard management in urban coastal areas, and US$156,000 (J$13.274 million) serviced the Building Disaster Resilient Communities Project (PIOJ, 2016). In addition, US$1.5 million (J$128.811 million) went to ODPEM (de Windt & Jackson, n.d.). However, from the US$1.5 million appropriation to ODPEM, the real direct allocation for natural disasters was a paltry US$58,762 (J$5.0 million), which went to capital relief allocation as well as to purchasing and storing food supplies. In 2015 a disaster relief fund was created and funded to the tune of US$40,000 (J$50.0 million). The funds were used for the coordination of relief activities (de Windt & Jackson, n.d.). A recurrent sum of US$438,808 (J$54.851 million) is allocated by the Ministry of Health to cover the operating expenses for emergencies, disaster management and special services having to do with epidemic and health-­related disasters. The Ministry of Finance and the public service allocate monies to pay the premiums for catastrophe risk insurance (de Windt & Jackson, n.d.).

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   127 The 2015 Disaster Act notes that ODPEM’s funds and resources should consist of such sums as made available to it by Parliament. It stipulates that ODPEM is entitled to other monies and property, which may in any manner become payable or be vested in ODPEM in respect of any matter incidental to its functions (Disaster Act of 2015). These include municipal corporation funding and donations. ODPEM’s income is exempt from income tax, stamp duty, and transfer tax. Moreover, it is exempt from taxation under the Transfer Tax Act. Any transfer of property or of any right or interest belonging to it is exempt from taxation under the Transfer Tax Act (Disaster Act of 2015). Its expenses, including remuneration of members of staff, are paid out of ODPEM’s funds and resources (Disaster Act of 2015). Funding has remained an intractable problem and one of the most significant limitations to DRG in Jamaica. Ultimately, the Ministry of Finance must ensure that adequate funds are available and disbursed at times and in the amounts needed to address emergencies (OAS, n.d.). There is no standard for how each agency or ministry with a role in disaster management is allocated funds to carry out its functions (OAS, n.d.). ODPEM’s annual budget approximates J$170 million (OAS, n.d.). Section 118(1) of the Jamaican Constitution authorizes the creation of a contingencies fund. The contingencies fund allows the finance minister to make advances from it if they are satisfied that there is an emergency expenditure need for which there is no sufficient provision made by an appropriation law (OAS, n.d.). The Caribbean Development Bank, for example, has established a US$20 million loan assistance fund that can be used to assist with recovery efforts (OAS, n.d.). The 2015 Disaster Risk Management Act (Disaster Act) requires that the government set up a National Disaster Fund (p.  29) overseen by the minister of finance. The funds are supported by monies allocated each year by Parliament to support DRR. The amount of funding is equivalent to 1% of the sum paid annually through building fees, in addition to donations and grants by persons and organizations approved by the minister of finance, or monies the NDC raised by activities organized by or on behalf of the NDC. The Disaster Act stipulates that a fund coordinator be responsible for policy and general administration of the fund. The assets of the fund shall be applied towards the mitigation of disasters, the adoption, and promotion of preventive and preparedness measures and to recovery or relief efforts because of a catastrophe in Jamaica. The fund committee along with ODPEM is responsible for the administration of the fund. Among other things, the fund committee determines the funding criteria to be applied to fund projects and programs dedicated to mitigation of, prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from emergencies and disasters. Using a complicated algorithm based on infrastructure exposure, monies are designated to the parishes. This approach inevitably means that the most deprived parishes—and, by extension, the most vulnerable areas—receive limited allowances from the fund because of their limited infrastructure, even as their physical, social and economic vulnerabilities remain high. At the national level, where ODPEM resides, allocations are also insufficient to replace or restore exposed infrastructure, limiting its capacity to achieve

128   Part II CDM. Its staffing is limited to 66 staff members, a third of the complement needed in total, including administrative staff. Challenges in staffing at ODPEM permeate the entire organization, from the national down to the local level, and means that gaps exist in technical expertise throughout the disaster management system in Jamaica. As a result, tactical disaster response and relief operations are centralized at the national level (Hughley et al., 2016). Besides, the GOJ continued its risk financing measures through the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF ), a pooled, parametric risk insurance facility with membership consisting of other small island Caribbean states. The policies provide tropical coverage for damage caused by cyclones, earthquakes, and excessive rain. The limits are US$63.2 million for cyclone damage, US$63 million for earthquake damage, and US$28.3 million for extreme rainfall peril (PIOJ, 2016). Once a trigger has been met, guaranteed minimum payouts by the government occur (PIOJ, 2016). Further, under prompting from the World Bank, the government of Jamaica has set up a disaster fund overseen by the Ministry of Finance and managed by a fund committee appointed by that ministry. In the past, the fund could only be used for response efforts; now monies can be used for mitigation efforts as well (Davis, personal communication, July 3, 2017). The mechanics of the fund have not yet been worked out, nor has the oversight committee met to decide on fund mechanics. For example, there is no guidance on how monies are spent, how the fund is triggered, who terminates the trigger, how the fund is grown, and so on. The fund currently sits at US$3.2 million (J$400 million), which is significantly less than the World Bank stipulates given the public assets exposed (Davis, personal communication, July 3, 2017). Based on the island’s asset exposure, the World Bank has estimated that around US$50–100 million is needed (Davis, personal communication, July 3, 2017). At the municipal level, building and sub-­division operation through municipal corporations generate the bulk of disaster funding. In 2016, the value of building and planning application receipts by municipal corporations was estimated at US$448 million (J$56 billion); estimated cost of those approved was US$3.21 million (J$40.2 billion) (PIOJ, 2016). Other funding comes from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and is allocated for many of the most needed projects. In addition, municipalities sometimes apply to international agencies for support to fund critical DRR projects. NGOs undertaking DRR projects in Jamaica are not required to coordinate with ODPEM, and often do not (Hughley et al., 2016). The Special Climate Change Adaptation Fund (SCCAF ) provides a line of credit that will support select climate change adaptation initiatives, including resources for disaster preparedness. Regarding catastrophic risk financing, the government of Jamaica pursues risk financing measures by purchasing insurance coverage under the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility Segregated Portfolio Company (CCRIF SPC). The policies provide coverage for tropical cyclones (US$63.2 million), earthquake damage (US$63 million) and excess rainfall peril (US$28 million) (PIOJ, 206). A built-­in minimum payout feature guarantees minimum total

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   129 payouts for the policy year in an amount equal to the premium paid, once the excess rainfall policy has been triggered (PIOJ, 2016). Regional and international donors play a strategic role in how the CCRIF SPC is structured. For instance, in April 2018, over 40 representatives from member countries, regional organizations, international development partners, and CCRIF SPC came together to help define the facility’s strategic direction to 2030 and determine how CCRIF SPC can further support the countries in the region (CCRIF, 2018).

Actors The disaster management and emergency framework in Jamaica consists of a multi-­tiered system involving myriad organizational actors. Many are members of the National Disaster Committee, which works alongside the ODPEM to fulfill its mandate. These include all government ministries, all utility companies, and international donor agencies such as the United Nations. Also, search and rescue organizations such as the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF ), the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF ) and the Jamaica Fire Brigade helped in disaster management efforts (ODPEM, n.d.). Non-­governmental bodies are also part of the natural disaster framework, most notably the Seismology Unit at the University of the West Indies (UWI), the Salvation Army, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, the meteorological office, and faith-­based organizations. The Jamaica Red Cross is a key ally in disaster risk management in the country. A voluntary relief society, the Jamaica Red Cross is auxiliary to the armed forces medical services in Jamaica, the only National Red Cross Society that may carry out these activities in Jamaica (Jamaica Red Cross, n.d.). First established in Jamaica as a branch of the British Red Cross, the National Society in Jamaica was recognized by the Government in the Jamaica Red Cross Society Act of Parliament No. 40—1964 in October 1964 (Jamaica Red Cross, n.d.). One of the foremost responders to disasters, the Red Cross works as an auxiliary to the Jamaican government in times of emergencies, disasters, or crises (Jamaica Red Cross, n.d.). In its work to target the most vulnerable, the Red Cross undertakes ongoing programs at varying levels of quality and coverage, including disaster response and mitigation, livelihood support, and shelter (Jamaica Red Cross, n.d.). The organization provides food and non-­food items as well as other relief services to those affected by disasters and is at the forefront of sheltering on the island. At the regional level, the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) has brought its extensive network of actors, resources, and expertise to bear on DRG in Jamaica. As a network organization, CDEMA has multiple and multi-­faceted relationships with others. The CDEMA is an intergovernmental agency, which means that it accesses the resources of national governments, regional agencies (e.g., CARICOM and Pan-­Amer­ican Health Organization or the Caribbean Development Bank), and international aid agencies, with which it has cooperative agreements (CDEMA, n.d.; Collymore, 2008). A cooperative

130   Part II agreement is a legal instrument used by parties to enter into a relationship for the principal purpose of assistance (Mack & Timms, 1993). Coordination Mechanisms ODPEM is the national coordinating body for DRR in Jamaica, its director general is the national coordinator and is required by the Disaster Act of 2015 to regularly prepare a draft national coordination plan which includes coordination of a planned response in the event of a disaster and cooperating with international bodies and foreign governments in anticipation of, during or after a disaster (Disaster Act 2015). ODPEM coordinates the national disaster structure as well as its stakeholders and leads the island in disaster planning and programming. It has established a National Zonal Committee that then coordinates the National Zonal Program, which integrates communities into disaster planning and response. The National Zonal Committee monitors all aspects of the program, prepares public education programs, arranges fundraising programs, and prepares detailed policy statements for the program. Citizens have also been drafted into the Zonal Program, but mainly serve in disaster response, and not all have bought into the idea that we all play a role in it. The idea that “someone else will do it” interferes with a coordinated response effort as citizens opt in and out of their roles, which they view as optional. For instance, they attend community meetings and take part in seminars and workshops dealing with disaster management (ODPEM, n.d). Citizens, NGOs, and CBOs are also drafted to manage shelters, provide healthcare assistance, or loan equipment, such as bulldozers, in a catastrophe, but might not show up when they are needed.6 At the regional level, the CDEMA Coordinating Unit has created a Comprehensive Disaster Management Coordination and Harmonization Council (CHC). The CHC is the primary engine used to integrate and implement CDM across sectors within and between countries. The council’s purpose is to provide guidance on program implementation and to foster governance of the enhanced CDM strategy and framework in the Caribbean (Collymore, 2007). The CHC comprises vital development partners, sector leads, participating member states, and private and non-­governmental organizations. The CHC helps to explore synergies between developmental partners, regional governments, the private sector, civil society, and other comprehensive disaster management (CDM) stakeholders (Collymore, 2007; Riley, 2008). The sector liaison brings proposals for the sector on disaster risk reduction. Donors and other stakeholders are the ones who decide on which aspect of CDM-­related activities they will fund. The CDM process in the Caribbean is now more stakeholder-­driven, which means a couple of things: operational and decision-­ making challenges. For example, at the inaugural CHC meeting held in February 2008, stakeholders foresaw logistical difficulties in coordinating their work across-­country and anticipated problems with sourcing funding to keep the process going (Riley, personal communication, May 27, 2008).

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   131 The CHC supporting mechanism includes six sub-­committees, each coordinating CDM-­related activities in various sectors of the economy: agriculture, education, finance, health, tourism, and civil society. The Food and Agriculture Organization will lead the agricultural industry, the University of the West Indies will lead the education sector, the Caribbean Development Bank will lead the financial sector, the Pan Amer­ican Health Organization will lead the health sector, the Caribbean Tourism Organization will drive the tourism sector, and the Civil Society Sector Sub-­Committee (CSSSC) guides the civil society sector. Each sub-­committee reports to the sector lead, a CHC member with considerable expertise in the field. These sector leads will report to the CDEMA Council. CDEMA will play a supporting role in each sub-­committee through CDEMA employees, who are termed “internal leads” for the particular sector (CDEMA, n.d.; Riley, personal communication, May 27, 2008). Cooperation agreements are essential for CDEMA because of its sweeping mandate and limited funding. In fulfilling its mandate, CDEMA relies on economic sector leads to make each ready for a hazard impact. The focus on sectors has moved CDEMA to more formal relationships and reporting requirements. For instance, in the agricultural sector, the lead agency identified is the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. In each CDEMA participating member state, CDEMA works with important sector partners to coordinate mitigation measures and manage the impact of hazards.

Incentives There are no incentives to encourage individuals to reduce risk exposure, and the new Disaster Risk Management Act of 2015 only assigns penalty on persons obstructing ODEM officers’ access to property deemed unsafe, withholding pertinent information or those failing to comply with instructions given by an authorized officer during a disaster. However, the 2015 Disaster Risk Management Act does not explicitly address incentives or disincentives—no penalties for locating in floodplains, no credits or tax rebates for taking measures to reduce disaster risk exposure. The potential of a catastrophic disaster striking the island should be incentive enough for countries like Jamaica to appropriately invest in disaster planning. The disaster risk profile of the island indicates that if a 500-years-­scale seismic event were to take place, Jamaica will lose more than US$2 billion in the value of public infrastructure. That amount is more than 10% of the public capital stock in the country, including main roadways and thoroughfares, educational facilities, and utilities, including electricity and water. Furthermore, the island is at risk of more than US$2.4 billion infrastructure loss when a hurricane of once every 250 years scale hits the island (IDB, 2014). Catastrophe risk assessment for Jamaica shows that while the numbers of deaths from natural disasters are trending downward, losses to public infrastructure remain high. In 2016 alone, damage to roads and water infrastructure alone ran to J$145.2 million. Every dollar spent on rebuilding carries with it a steep opportunity cost, as the money

132   Part II could be better spent on sustainability in development. But competition with routine service delivery often redirects funds needed for disaster planning to other more pressing areas like healthcare and debt repayment. Given its economic circumstance, Jamaica has made a substantial investment in disaster risk reduction but has a way to go before the country can be described as resilient. Residents are more aware of the havoc that disaster can wreak than they were even a decade ago. However, those incentives that would encourage individuals to take steps to restrict their disaster risk are still lacking.

The State of Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica Using the disaster risk governance matrix presented, we can try to more objectively assess the state of disaster risk governance in Jamaica. Table 6.2 shows the rating on the hard and soft institutions comprising the DRG context in Jamaica. It shows that despite the laudable work done in Jamaica to improve disaster risk governance, several challenges remain to close the loop in building strong disaster risk governance to steer DRR efforts in Jamaica. The soft institutional context that undergirds the hard institutions is the relative strength of DRG in Jamaica. The island has done a decent job of learning from past events as well as from international best practices and has worked to continuously improve both the practice of disaster governing and of understanding its risk profile. Its governance system is one of the best in the region. Other developing countries around the world have learned from Jamaica. However, while soft institutional aspects have been leveraged to build a more robust DRG system, it cannot compensate adequately for the weaknesses in the hard institutional elements of governance. Jamaica’s hard institutional aspects are being built, but not fast enough. While legislation is in place, organizational elements (human resources, technology, funding) remain inhibitors to the robust system needed to minimize the impact of disasters. Incentives to promote good DRR behavior and limit bad ones are still lacking, with the few on the books remaining unenforced. Incentives mark the weakest component of the DRG context with no noted actions taken to incentivize or disincentivize individuals to reduce risk exposure. Deep-­rooted weaknesses such as inadequate capacity development at the local levels and government ineffectiveness at the national level have led to calls for a better developed community-­based approach to DRR. Community-­based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR) fosters the participation of vulnerable communities in both the evaluation of risk and in ways to reduce it (Gaillard & Mercer, 2013). In extreme cases, the proponents of CBDRR have rejected all top–down or outside support to local communities (Broekhuijsen, 2009), which unfortunately is often the case in developing countries where populations remain ill-­equipped to tackle disasters. There still needs to be improved engagement between ODPEM and local government, especially in planning and decision-­making. Moreover, with funding presenting such a challenge, policymakers and practitioners have been proposing some innovative ideas to generate disaster-­specific

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   133 Table 6.2  Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix, Jamaica Key Governance Elements

Jamaica

SOFT INSTITUTION Culture 1 Basic assumptions and values about disasters and DRR and what to do about them 2 DRR norms: A Routine media coverage B Schools and community disaster education programs C Public education and awareness-building D Community leaders and residents with knowledge of importance of DR and importance to take steps to reduce E Drills, preparation, early warning systems F Post-event assessment, learning G Questioning, continuous improvements

1 1 1 1– 1– 1– 1 1–

HARD INSTITUTION Legislation 1 Enshrined in constitution 2 DR legislation on the books and implemented 3 Support legislation undergirds specific DR legislation 4 Integration and mainstreaming of legislation in development laws and planning 5 Policy implementation, monitoring, oversight

1 1 1– 1–

Organization 1 Organization with specific disaster focus 2 Operates at multiple levels, integrated, national coverage 3 Appropriate capabilities and knowledge, including local knowledge 4 Well positioned in government bureaucracy 5 Senior politicians chair important committees 6 Appropriately staffed, facilities, technology 7 Routine funding 8 Contingency funding 9 Data collection, integration, knowledge management

1 1– 1– 1 1 1– 1– 1– 1–

Actors 1 Home-grown, multiple levels represented and active 2 Community residents and organizations with defined roles 3 Regional platforms active 4 Global platforms (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, SDG) 5 Coordinated efforts, national system 6 Coordinated efforts with all actors, cooperation agreements

1 1– 1 1 1 1

Incentives 1 Sales taxes 2 Tax rebates 3 Penalties and fines 4  Relocation incentives, regulation enforcement, etc. Total DRG Score Sum of plusses and minuses Net DRG Score

27 13 14

Source: The literature on disaster governance and institutions as well as Priority Number 2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction help to derive the institutional factors in the matrix.

134   Part II funding. For example, de Windt and Jackson (n.d.) suggest that contribution to a disaster funding scheme similar to the education or National Housing Trust fees, where corporations and individual taxpayers pay a percentage of their earnings in the form of a tax, to more adequately shore up the National Disaster Fund and make it sustainable. International actors work most often at the national level, but they are increasingly overstepping the national government to work with parish and community-­ level organizations in disaster risk reduction. The project focus taken by ODPEM is primarily due to this dependence on international actors and ensures that outside actors retain a substantial stake in Jamaica’s disaster governance. When projects are funded, funders dictate the terms of the funding. However, some of these funding terms are onerous on the recipient countries. For instance, excessive reporting requirements take a toll on the limited human resources, which are usually tied up with reporting and laying the basis for other prescribed actions, some of which may be out of sync with the island’s social and cultural contexts. As a result, things take a long time to happen or take place piecemeal. With piecemeal efforts, there is no coherent approach to DRR and sustainable development. Furthermore, implanting a deconcentrated system in a centralized one is not without its weaknesses. The deconcentrated system is meant to be more agile and ready to respond to needs at the local level. But it still needs approval from ODPEM for things such as purchases or taking on staff. Besides, many parish offices are housed in parish councils that are physically cramped, requiring more office space and technology. Funding is also a problem at the parish level and limits what these offices can do.

Notes 1 Not to be confused with decentralization (transferring the power from the federal to regional or state level, or delivering management functions to other authorities) or devolution (transferring of governance responsibility for specified functions to sub-­ national levels, either publicly or privately owned, that are largely outside the direct control of the central government), deconcentration or administrative decentralization refers to a transfer to lower-­level central government authorities, or to other local authorities who are upwardly accountable to the central government (Yuliani, 2004). Decentralization and deconcentration are public management strategies, but devolution is a political decision with managerial consequences. For a more detailed comparison, see, for example, www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/interlaken/Compilation.pdf. 2 A Transparency International CPI score of 50 or below signals prevalent bribery, a lack of punishment for corruption, and public institutions that do not respond to the needs of citizens. It found that more than two-­thirds of countries score below 50, with an average score of 43. Jamaica’s score is 44. 3 See World Bank Global Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ wgi/index.aspx#reports. 4 The Minister of Finance and the Public Service, Dr. Nigel Clarke, notes that the country’s debt-­to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio is projected to fall below 100% at the end of the 2018/19 fiscal year. See www.loopjamaica.com/nl/node/330552; and https:// countryeconomy.com/national-­debt/jamaica.

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   135 5 See a more detailed historical reflection on disaster management in Jamaica from Ronald Jackson (2005), former director general of ODPEM Jamaica, accessed at www. mona.uwi.edu/cardin/virtual_library/docs/1091/1091.pdf. Also see Collymore (2011). 6 For example, see Østensvig’s (2006) work, in which she found that “interagency cooperation within the NGO community is not frequently utilized at the headquarters.” 

References Ball, L., De Roux, N., & Hofstetter, M. (2011). Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Accessed at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11252.pdf.  Broekhuijsen, M. (2009). Towards a Resilient Future: Experiences with Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation. The Hague: Cordaid. Carby, B. (2005). Jamaica’s experience with Hurricane Ivan: the case for mitigation and preparedness programmes. Reliefweb Updates. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/report/ jamaica/jamaicas-­e xperience-hurricane-­i van-case-­m itigation-and-­p reparednessprogrammes. Carby, B., Burrell, D., & Samuels, C. (2012). Jamaica: Country Document on Disaster Risk Reduction. DIPECHO. Accessed at http://eird.org/dipecho-­action-plan-­caribbean/ HELPAGE-­FINAL-COUNTRY-­DOC.pdf (December 27, 2018). Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (2018). CCRIF Strategic Plan 2018–2021. CCRIF SPC. Accessed at www.ccrif.org/sites/default/files/publications/CCRIF_­ Strategic_Plan_2018-2021.pdf.  Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (2014). Regional Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy and Programming Framework 2014–2024 (Draft). Accessed at www.cdema.org/CDMStrategy2014-2024.pdf. CDEMA (n.d.). Comprehensive Disaster Management Coordination and Harmonization Council (CDM CHC): Civil Society Sub-­sector Committee (CSSSC). Accessed at www. cdema.org/TOR_Development_CSSSC_Website.pdf (February 2, 2018). Christie, G. (2012, June). Overcoming the Problem of Corruption in Jamaica. Accessed at http://jamaica-­gleaner.com/gleaner/20120628/cleisure/cleisure3.html (December 7, 2018. Christie, G. (2017, March 26). Jamaica’s Future Choked by Cancer of Corruption. Accessed at www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Jamaica-­s-future-­choked-by-­cancerof-­corruption_93609. Collymore, J. (2007). Disaster impacts on the Caribbean. In: International Perspectives on Natural Disasters: Occurrence, Mitigation, and Consequences (pp. 303–322). Dordrecht: Springer. Collymore, J. (2008). Personal communication. Former Executive Director, CDEMA, May 26, 2008. Collymore, J. (2011). Disaster management in the Caribbean: perspectives on institutional capacity reform and development. Environmental Hazards, 10(1): 6–22. https://doi. org/10.3763/ehaz.2011.0002. Davis, C. (2017). Personal communication. Director General, ODPEM. July 3, 2017, Kingston, Jamaica. De Windt, C. S., & Jackson, R. (n.d.). The Caribbean Emergency Legislation Project. Organization of Amer­ican States. Accessed at www.eird.org/encuentro-­sta-marta/descargas/sesiones-­tematicas/Sesion1/sesion-­1-ClaudiaW.pdf (January 31, 2018). Disaster Risk Reduction Centre University of West of Indies (2012). Jamaica: Country Document on Disaster Risk Reduction. Accessed at http://dipecholac.net/docs/files/216jamaica-­country-document-­on-disaster-­risk-reduction.pdf.

136   Part II Gaillard, J. C., & Mercer, J. (2013). From knowledge to action: bridging gaps in disaster risk reduction. Progress in Human Geography, 37(1): 93–114. Government of Jamaica (2015). Disaster Risk Management Act, 2015 (No. 1 of 2015). Accessed at https://japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/341_The%20Disater%20and%20 Preparedness%20and%20Emergency%20Management%20Act,%202015%20No.1.pdf. Henry, B. (2017, Jul 21). Senate Approves Integrity Commission Bill. Accessed at www. jamaicaobserver.com/news/senate-­approves-integrity-­commission-bill_105509?profile= 1373 (December 10, 2018). Hughey, E., Morath, D., Leuck, R., Stelow, C., Doug, M., Mielbrecht, S., Gray, H., & Bosse, T. (2016). Jamaica: National Disaster Preparedness Baseline Assessment. Pacific Disaster Center. Accessed at www.pdc.org/wp-­content/uploads/2018/06/NDPBA_ Jamaica_Final_Report.pdf. Inter-­Amer­ican Development Bank (IDB) (2014, April). Disaster Risk Profile for Jamaica. Environment, Rural Development and Disaster Risk Management Division; Technical Note No. IDB-­TN-635. Accessed at https://publications.iadb.org/en/ publication/12031/disaster-­risk-profile-­jamaica. Jackson, R. (2005). Jamaicans Better Prepared for Natural Disasters. Jamaica Information Service. Accessed at https://jis.gov.jm/jamaicans-­better-prepared-­for-natural-­ disasters-ronald-­jackson/. Jamaica Information Service (n.d.). Government in Jamaica. Accessed at http://jis.gov. jm/media/GovernmentOfJamaica.pdf (December 19, 2017). Jamaica Observer (2011). Poverty, Income Inequality on the Rise in Jamaica. Accessed at http://jamaica-­gleaner.com/gleaner/20111009/business/business8.html. Jamaica Observer (2014). Income Inequality Breeds Resentment. Accessed at www. jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/Income-­inequality-breeds-­resentment_16492815. Jamaica Red Cross (n.d.). About Us. Accessed at www.jamaicaredcross.org/about-­us/ who-­we-are/history. Mack, J. H., & Timms, G. G. (1993). Cooperative agreements: government-­to-government relations to foster reservation business development. Pepperdine Law Review, 20: 1295. McCalla, W. (2012). Review of Policy, Plans, Legislation and Regulations for Climate: Resilience in Jamaica. Accessed at www.mona.uwi.edu/physics/sites/default/files/ physics/uploads/Review%20of%20Policy%2C%20Plans%2C%20Legislation%20 %26%20Regulations%20for%20Climate%20Resilience%20in%20Jamaica.pdf. Ministry of Land and Environment, Jamaica (2015). National Hazard Risk Reduction Policy for Jamaica of 2005. Accessed at www.odpem.org.jm/Portals/0/Mitigation_ Preparedness/Hazard%20Mitigation%20Planning/National%20Hazard%20Risk%20 Reduction%20Policy%20for%20Jamaica.pdf. Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (n.d.). About Us. Accessed at www.localgovjamaica.gov.jm/aboutus.aspx.  Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (n.d.). Jamaica Disaster Management Framework. Accessed at www.odpem.org.jm/DisastersDoHappen/Disaster ManagementinJamaica/JamaicasDisasterManagementFramework/tabid/239/Default.aspx. Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (2008a). Learn More about Droughts. Accessed at www.odpem.org.jm/DisastersDoHappen/TypesofHazards Disasters/Droughts/LearnMoreAboutDrought/tabid/286/Default.aspx#Jamaica_s_ Drought_Vulnerability. Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (2008b). Learn More about Earthquakes. Accessed at http://www.odpem.org.jm/DisastersDoHappen/Typesof HazardsDisasters/Earthquakes/LearnMoreAboutEarthquakes/tabid/256/Default.aspx.

Disaster Risk Governance in Jamaica   137 Organization of Amer­ican States (OAS) (n.d.). CELF Jamaica: Caribbean Emergency Legislative Project (CELP). Accessed at www.oas.org/en/sedi/dsd/elpg/pastProjects/ Documents/JamaicaFINAL.pdf (January 2, 2018). Østensvig, I. (2006, June). Interagency Cooperation in Disaster Management: Partnership, Information and Communications Technology and Committed Individuals in Jamaica. Master’s thesis. Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Accessed at www. islandvulnerability.org/m/oestensvigm.pdf  Planning Institute of Jamaica (2010). Vision 2030 (abridged version). Kingston: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Planning Institute of Jamaica (2016). Economic and Social Survey Jamaica. Kingston: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Ricketts-­Edmund, P. (2017). Personal communication/interview. Portmore Municipal Council, Jamaica.  Riley, L. (2008). Regional Level Progress in the Implementation of the Enhanced Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy 2007–2008: Selected Highlights. 3rd Caribbean Conference on Comprehensive Disaster Management. Accessed at www.cdemavl.org/bitstream/123456789/149/12/l_riley.pdf. Trading Economics (n.d.). Jamaica Corruption Rank. https://tradingeconomics.com/ jamaica/corruption-­rank. Trotz, O’D. U. (2002). Disaster Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change—A CARICOM Experience, June 17–19, 2002. www.onu.org.cu/havanarisk/papers. Williams, R. (2017). Debt to GDP Ratio at 115%. Accessed at https://jis.gov.jm/debt-­ gdp-ratio-­115/ (December 2018). Yuliani, E. (2004). Decentralization, Deconcentration and Devolution: What Do They Mean? Accessed at www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/interlaken/Compilation.pdf.

7 Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica

Dominica faces geographic, social, and economic vulnerabilities. Located in the eastern section of the Caribbean known as the Windward Islands, to the southeast of the Caribbean Sea, Dominica is exposed to the northeast trade winds (northeasterly) that tend to carry storms with them. With a rugged and mountainous interior, the 291-square-­mile island (754 square kilometers) has a mere 91 miles of coastline (Momsen & Niddrie, 2018) where its population tends to cluster. Roughly a third of its 72,000 inhabitants live in the parish of St. George or in and around the capital city Roseau; the volcanic interior is sparsely populated (Momsen and Niddrie, 2018; Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017; PreventionWeb, n.d.).1 Dominica presents an interesting case study because Hurricane Maria almost destroyed it in September 2017, and in its wake, the prime minister has vowed to become the world’s first disaster-­resilient island. To understand whether the proposition is even feasible, one needs to examine the disaster risk governance context pre- and post-­Hurricane Maria, which is where the emphasis is placed in this case study. On September 18, 2017, the category 5 storm pummeled the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica). The hurricane was the thirteenth named storm of the 2017 Tropical Atlantic Hurricane Season (Government of Dominica, 2017). Hurricane Maria was powerful. With winds of 155 mph, it was the most powerful hurricane ever to strike the island. Over 90% of buildings were destroyed, and virtually none was left untouched (Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017). Although the official death toll from Hurricane Maria was 27, almost 100% of Dominica’s population was displaced by the storm (Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017). Based on a European Union estimate, the damage and losses from Hurricane Maria stood at over 200% of its annual GDP, equivalent to approximately US$1.3 billion (Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017). Public infrastructure including electricity and telecom networks, roads and water infrastructure bore significant damage. However, the housing and agriculture sectors suffered the most significant destruction. The government of Dominica estimates predict that the recovery process would take several years, billions of dollars and that the decline in goods production and service delivery

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   139 Box 7.1  Hurricane Maria Pummels Dominica Climate change and with it sea-­level rise pose significant challenges for Caribbean islands. The islands are now experiencing more severe storms (category 4 and 5) and more prolonged lasting storms. At the end of the 2017 hurricane season, Hurricane Maria, a category 5 storm, pummeled Dominica. Hurricane Maria was the 15th named storm of 2017. The island’s population is mostly clustered along the coast, with roughly a third living in the parish of St. George, or in and around the capital of Roseau; the volcanic interior is sparsely populated (PreventionWeb, n.d.). This population concentration along the coast means that the likelihood of infrastructural damage is significant around few urban centers. At the high-­level donor meeting, Dominica’s prime minister told CNN: “So far we have lost all what money can buy and replace” (McKirdy, Sterling, & Yan, 2017). On the island around 95% of buildings were damaged or destroyed, over 3,000 were displaced and living in shelters, and the few remaining roads remained blocked by tree trunks and debris (Elie, 2017). One resident put in stark terms her experiences during the recovery from Hurricane Maria: Every day my son would go to the bay, hoping to get a delivery of food and bottles of water. He would stand there from morning to night, watching as neighbors collected boxes of supplies delivered by their relatives on fishing boats from Guadeloupe and Martinique. But every day he would leave empty handed and disappointed. We have no one there to help us. (Elie, 2017) Post-­disaster needs assessment concluded that Hurricane Maria caused total damage of EC$2.51 billion (US$931 million) and losses of EC$1.03 billion (US$382 million). These sums amount to 226% of Dominica’s 2016 gross domestic product (GDP) (Government of Dominica, 2017). The identified reconstruction and resilience needs to build back better, where possible, amount to EC$3.69 billion (US$1.37 billion) (Government of Dominica, 2017), indicating that Dominica’s government will have to take out loans and also rely on the goodwill of the international community as well as supranational and regional organizations. Hurricane Maria presents an opportunity for Dominica and other Caribbean islands impacted by both Hurricanes Irma and Maria to build back better. But structural issues such as weak enforcement of building codes, high social vulnerability, economic activities that undermine fragile coastal ecosystems, the highly specialized and vulnerable nature of the island’s economy, plus fiscal and disaster risk governance challenges will need to be addressed with some urgency (Wilkinson et al., 2018).

140   Part II may continue for several years (Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017). One resident summed up the plight of residents remaining on the island, “Everywhere needs rebuilding but there is no money to rebuild things with … Everything else is gone” (Elie, 2017). Post-­disaster damage assessment shows that destruction concentrated around the coastal regions, especially in the south of the island. This is significant because over 70% (2017 estimates) of the island’s population lives in its urban centers, which are located along its coastal areas; approximately 15,000 people live in the capital Roseau (PreventionWeb, n.d.), where the urbanization rate rests at 0.85% (2015–2020 estimate) (PreventionWeb, n.d.); and the population density is 251 per square mile (Momsen & Niddrie, 2018). These relatively high population density rates put a strain on services and infrastructure provision, including housing and healthcare, adding to the vulnerability of the country and its people. Dominica’s population is concentrated around the capital city of Roseau in the parish of St. George, which is one of the dominant population centers on the island. The most prominent rural parishes, St. Andrew and St. Paul, are among the largest parishes in Dominica based on land area (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). The island’s interior is mostly uninhabitable. Layers of virgin rainforest typified by cascading rivers and water pools, mountain peaks, and ridges interrupted by two major volcanic peaks characterize it. The highest peak, Morne Diablotin, stands at 4,747 feet (1,447 meters). Its close rival, Morne Trois Pitons, reaches up to 4,669 feet (1,423 meters) and is a UNESCO World Heritage Site (Momsen & Niddrie, 2018). Probabilistic risk assessment results for the island (Table 7.1), taking into account all possible disaster scenarios, including severe losses, show an island extremely vulnerable to four major hazard groups (PreventionWeb, n.d.). The best-­case scenario concerning losses is from an earthquake strike, which could potentially cause losses of around 71% of GDP; the losses from other natural hazards are much worse, and Hurricane Maria showed this to be true. The majority of deaths (50%) between 1990 and 2014 resulted from landslides, 33% were from cyclones, and nearly 17% resulted from fires (PreventionWeb, n.d.), but hurricanes result in the most significant combined financial losses, accounting for over 86% of the economic losses on the island, followed by floods at around 7% of the economic losses (PreventionWeb, n.d.). Dominica’s physical Table 7.1  Probabilistic Risk Profile of Dominica, 1990–2014 Hazard

Absolute Losses (Million US$)

Gross Savings/Losses (% of GDP)

Earthquake Wind Storm surge Multi-hazard

13.06 23.83 31.63 68.52

–71.237 –129.983 –172.529 –373.748

Source: Adapted from PreventionWeb (n.d.).

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   141 vulnerability set up the island for much of the devastation experienced during Hurricane Maria and its predecessors, including Hurricane Erika. The island’s physical vulnerability is not atypical, but its small size and the threat of climate change makes it more pressing. Tiny island states like Dominica could face whole-­scale destruction because of the combined effects of climate change. Dominica’s government has been expressing concerns that the island is already experiencing its effects—rising temperatures and sea level and associated coastal erosion, flood and storm surge could disproportionately magnify disaster risk on the island. Further, geological hazards including volcanoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, and landslides are highly probable to impact Dominica (FAO, 2007). Over the last decade or so, it has been struck by two other storms besides Hurricane Maria that have caused landscape-­scale disasters, setting the country back developmentally. In August 2015, Tropical Storm Erika caused total damage estimated at US$483 million, equivalent to 90% of Dominica’s GDP (GFDR, 2017). And in 2007, Hurricane Dean (August 16–17, 2007) severely affected all sectors of the Dominican economy, including agriculture, fisheries, and forestry (FAO, 2007). While the number of deaths is low, those affected, as well as the damage done to infrastructure, lives, livelihood and property, especially in recent years, continue to erode development gains. Damage per capita as a result of disasters due to natural hazard impacts in Dominica is the highest of the four developing states and has grown exponentially between 2011 and 2017 (Table 7.2). The disconnect between place and people vulnerability and the government’s reactive stance are added causes for concern.

Social and Economic Vulnerability The island’s primary industries, agriculture and eco-­tourism, are both vulnerable to natural and human-­made hazards, making the country’s economy vulnerable. Five hurricanes and one severe flood have negatively impacted these industries over the last decade. In 1999, Hurricane Lenny devastated the nation, causing

Table 7.2  Disaster Impact in Dominica, 2000–2018 Year

Deaths

Number Affected

Damage per person**

2004 2007 2011 2015 2017

 –  2  – 30 27

100 7,530 240 28,594 71,293

–

$281.00 – $6,613.00 $27,191.00

Source: Raw data from EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database – Universite catholique de Louvain (UCL) – CRED, D. Guha-Sapir – www.emdat.be, Brussels, Belgium, March 27, 2018. Note ** Total per person= Total damage/total population

142   Part II significant damage and destruction. In 2007, Hurricane Dean caused severe damage to farmers to the tune of EC$0.888 million, or US$370,000; in 2008, Hurricane Omar’s damage to the fisheries sector ran to EC$2 million, or US$742,000, up to 20% of GDP; government compensation to farmers amounted to EC$1.6 million, or US$594 million (Government of Dominica, 2017; GFRR, 2017). In 2010, Hurricane Tomas inflicted destruction on the agricultural sector to the tune of EC$10.7 million, or US$3.96 million (GFRR, 2017). In 2011, extreme rainfall wiped out infrastructure amounting to EC$100 million, or US$37 million in damage and destruction (GFRR, 2017). And in 2015, Tropical Storm Erika resulted in EC$1.3 billion, or US$482 million, in losses and damage (GFRR, 2017). The extent of the impact in Dominica has roots in, although not exclusively to, its large dependent and vulnerable population, high rates of poverty, high under- and unemployment, inequality, and non-­diverse economy. Its growing young and elderly populations coupled with the island’s economic condition is cause for concern. Approximately 41.9% of the population are children and youth below 25 years; children below 14 years account for around 25% of the population (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). Residents aged 60 years and above account for 14.8% of the population, and children aged 0–4 years account for around 9.3% of the population (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). The elderly population comprises 12.2% of the population and accounts for 9.8% of the poor. St. Joseph, St. Patrick, and St. David parishes display the highest poverty rates at 47.2%, 42.7%, and 40% respectively (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). Children (0–14) and youth (15–24) are disproportionately represented among the poor, accounting for 52.1% of the poor (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). Women, children, and youth are among the most vulnerable groups in Dominica. Poverty data indicate that more than half of Dominica’s children and youth (52.1%) live in poor households (World Bank, 2013). This large dependent population relies on a healthy financial base contingent on solid economic and employment numbers for support. However, the island’s economic fundamentals are not healthy. Poverty and unemployment remain intractable problems in Dominica, and the island remains one of the Caribbean’s most impoverished countries (Momsen & Niddrie, 2018), even with a rising GDP per capita. The poverty rate was estimated at 25.7% pre-­Hurricane Maria (Government of Dominica, 2017), but poverty is more pressing in rural areas, where over three-­quarters of Dominica’s needy families live (World Bank, 2013). Moreover, the indigent rate stands at 3.1%, and the vulnerable population stands at 11.5% (Government of Dominica, 2017); approximately 13.9% of the population is unemployed (World Bank, 2013). The poverty problem is made worse because of new patterns of marginalization associated with food insecurity, rapid and unplanned urbanization, high levels of violence, including against women (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). There is a strong correlation between poverty and food insecurity and indigenous status. Dominica’s indigenous population faces greater food insecurity than non-­indigenous populations. In Dominica, rising food insecurity, associated with the decimation

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   143 of the agricultural sector by Hurricane Maria, could push residents into unsustainable farming practices such as seen in other islands such as Haiti (Wall-­ Bassett et al., 2012). The level of schooling, female headedness, and income are also found to be significant contributors to food insecurity in Dominica (Wall-­ Bassett et al., 2012). The indigenous Carib (Kalinago) people are particularly vulnerable. Their communal land ownership reduces access to credit, and marginalization from the society’s mainstream increases their poverty rate (Momsen & Niddrie, 2018). Disasters could push these communities further into poverty and economic marginalization, unless the recent replanting interventions (Caribbean360, 2017), although not widescale, gain enough momentum in indigenous and other communities to thwart instincts to use poor cultivation techniques in a bid to stave off hunger. The Dominican government’s anti-­poverty measures have improved employment and self-­empowerment levels by promoting and implementing strategies to diversify the economy. For example, the government put in place fiscal measures that were controlling and reducing public expenditure, and ballooning public debt (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). With these gains wiped out by Hurricane Maria, the government is redoubling its cost control approaches and has sought regional and international support to fund these programs. Further, geothermal exploration has helped to diversify Dominica’s economy, with agriculture now playing a significantly lesser role in the economy (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). Moves such as these lead to the country’s economy being poised for takeoff before Hurricane Maria, and the 2009 Country Poverty Assessment (CPA) showed signs of success of poverty reduction and economic stabilization measures. However, like other small islands, Dominica is vulnerable to external shocks, including those from the continued reduction in protection for banana exports to the European Union. Worse still, the surge in food and energy prices in conjunction with the global economic crisis of 2009 and 2010 and the associated decline in remittances and continued devastation from natural disasters have put Dominica at a disadvantaged situation (World Bank, 2013; Government of Dominica, 2017). High unemployment and underemployment are critical characteristics of the economy. The level of crime and violence in Dominica is alarming. In 2010, its murder rate stood at 21.1 per 100,000 population, topping countries like Ukraine, and even Syria and Lebanon (Dominica News Online, 2017), which are plagued by ongoing civil unrest. During 2015 and 2016, Dominica was assessed as a hotspot for drugs, and homicides, thefts/robberies, aggravated assaults, drug seizures (other than marijuana), firearm seizures, bodies found, people disappearances, and sudden deaths increased during that period (Dominica News Online, 2017). Dominica’s 2017 Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.715 is below the average of 0.757 for countries in the high human development group and below the average of 0.758 for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP, 2018). From Latin America and the Caribbean, countries which are close to Dominica in the 2017 HDI rank and to some extent in population size are Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia, which have HDIs of 72 and 90, respectively

144   Part II (UNDP, 2018). The HDI is an average measure of basic human development achievements in a country (UNDP, 2018). Like all averages, the HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level (ibid.). Gender Inequality Index (GII)2 While there is no ranking for Dominica, mainly because of insufficient data, the island is party to most of the conventions on the rights of women and has in place multiple legislation on the rights of all citizens, including women. For instance, there remain continuous interventions including public awareness and advocacy, prevention programs, legislation, and policy formulation, victims support mechanisms, police training, and community outreach programs.3 Further, women are well represented in decision-­making positions in government and corporations in Dominica. Nevertheless, violence against women remains a significant problem in that country. Social and cultural norms and practices complicate the issues around gender and render the efforts to fix the problem difficult.

General Governing Context Dominica is a republic with a non-­executive presidency4 in which the people and their elected representatives hold power. It is also a parliamentary democracy, a form of government in which the party (or a coalition of parties) with the highest representation in its unicameral parliament (legislature) forms the government, its leader becoming prime minister. The republican type of governance means that decision-­making power and specific grants of accountability have been transferred downward to sub-­national levels. In Dominica, the local government system thrives on volunteerism and non-­partisanship (Paul-­Rolle, 2014), and often is not equipped to govern and consistently provide services. Further, none of the councils—municipal, village, or indigenous Caribs—is fully autonomous and all are under capacity; they derive much of their funding from the central government, and these are not enough to support the activities under their purview. The island’s local government system consists of 42 local authorities, in addition to the Roseau city council, Portsmouth town council, Canefield Uban council, the Carib (Kalinago) council, and 38 village councils. These local authorities are elected bodies, legally empowered to manage the affairs under their jurisdiction including taking social and economic services closer to the people who need them and creating well-­founded communication channels between central government and local communities as well as developing local institutions capable of managing the development of their localities (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). Local governments also establish and maintain parks and roads, sanitation and public facilities, provide social and economic assistance, and develop recreational and educational programs.

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   145 However, the parliamentary system is known for its centralization of power and its inflexibility. That system can be operationally inefficient since new laws passed usually create new layers of governance arrangements that weigh down the state’s ability to act. The fact that the parliament is unicameral in Dominica might be a counterweight to operational inefficiencies by reducing the layers of decision-­making and speeding the process up somewhat.

Disaster Risk Governance Disaster risk governance in Dominica takes place amid social, economic and geographic vulnerabilities and governing challenges. As new approaches are crafted to set Dominica on a path to become resilient, the island is trying to promote a more systematic method of doing so. The creation of CREAD is a significant part of this strategy. Investments in DRG Dominica does have in place laws that regulate disaster response and planning. Some of these have been in effect since the late 1970s, when they did not fully understand the scope and potential impact of climate change as a primary risk driver, particularly in small islands with severe implications for their sustainable development, let alone their very survival. The Constitution Section 14 of Dominica’s constitution (No. 1027 of 1978, revised 1990) authorizes the prime minister to take measures that are reasonably justifiable to deal with the situation during any period of public emergency, including post-­ disaster, that exists in Dominica. Under this authority, several pieces of legislation related to disaster management have passed into law, including the following. The Emergency Powers (Disaster) Act of 1987 Chapter 15.03 of this 1987 Act makes provision for the welfare and safety of the community in cases of disaster and matters connected to these cases. Under this Act, the prime minister may, by proclamation in the Gazette, declare that a state of emergency exists on the island or in any portion of it. The Act focuses on emergency response and communication of announcements such as a state of emergency or an emergency proclamation. In addition to the constitution, several plans and legislation govern disaster management in Dominica. The National Disaster Plan (NDP) was initially developed in 1988 and subsequently revised, most recently in 2006. Together with the National Hurricane Disaster Management Plan, the Climate Change Adaptation Policy, and the Disaster Preparedness Plan for the agriculture sector,

146   Part II the National Disaster Plan attempts to guide disaster response, mitigation, and management by assigning specific responsibilities and procedures under a single policy framework for disaster risk management and reduction. The problem is that policy implementation and capabilities of agencies designated to do the work are often not in place. Here is what I mean. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1993) Moreover, in 1993, Dominica ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), echoing the international community’s commitment to reduce the impacts of climate change on coastal countries. Dominica was among four countries in the region (along with Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) to adopt a comprehensive climate adaptation framework (CPACC) project (1998–2001) (World Bank, 2014). But little was put in place to build on the project findings and successes at the national level. Climate Change Adaptation Policy (2002) The policy’s purpose is to foster and guide a national action plan to address short-, medium- and long-­term effects of climate change while improving the quality of life of Dominica’s residents. The policy seeks to reduce the impact of climate change on the environment, the economy, human settlements, public infrastructure and human health in the small island state (London School of Economics, 2018). It also aims to improve knowledge-­creation and understanding of climate change in an integrated way. Since the policy became law, the country has remained increasingly focused on climate change to the neglect of other risk drivers such as tropical storms. Dominica’s National Disaster Plan (2009) outlines the line of succession (authority) in declaring a national disaster. The line of succession runs from the Prime Minister down through the Minister for Communications, Works, and Housing, then Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Communications, Works, and Housing (OAS, n.d.). The Plan requires the National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) to develop, operate and maintain a National Emergency Operations Centre (OAS, n.d.), but capabilities are fledgling, and funding remains a challenge. Some of the sub-­committees (comprising representatives from several government agencies) put in place under the NEPO to guide emergency planning and operations were not fully operational before Hurricane Maria. Draft Comprehensive Disaster Management Legislation The first draft of Dominica’s Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) legislation was developed in 2013 under the CDM Harmonized Implementation Program (CDM HIP) with financing from UK AID, DFATD (now Global Affairs Canada) and the Australian Aid Agency (VP Digital, 2017). In August

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   147 2015 Tropical Storm Erika struck Dominica, providing an opportunity to examine and address gaps in the draft legislation (ACAPS, 2017). More troubling, Dominica was awarded 9,640 euro by CDEMA through its Country Directed Funds, which were allocated to CDEMA by the EU ACP-­EU Natural Disaster Risk Management in the CARIFORUM Program to review and update its draft CDM legislation in April 2017. However, when Hurricane Maria struck in September 2017, the draft CDM legislation had not been signed into law, indicating systemic and non-­systemic weaknesses in Dominica’s legislative context. On paper, Dominica has a series of legislation and support legislation geared at planning for, mitigating and responding to disasters. However, the length of time legislation remains in draft highlights a lack of commitment to disaster risk reduction, let alone resilience-­building. Right up until Hurricane Maria’s impact, the island remained selective in its implementation of the existing legislation. For instance, by law, the EOC was established but poorly resourced. There remains an urgent need to strengthen the legislative frameworks and regulatory mechanisms in Dominica itself. The Comprehensive Disaster Management legislation is supported by the regional organization CDEMA in recognition of Dominica’s need for it. The CDM legislation represented an effort to fill some of the remaining gaps in existing disaster legislation, but it remained unratified before Hurricane Maria (Collymore, personal communication, February 2, 2018). When Hurricane Maria struck Dominica there was no broad legal-­institutional framework for comprehensive disaster management on the island, and the implementation of existing legislation was lagging, thus retarding the disaster and climate change investments being made or failing to more efficiently apply them (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). The length of time taken to pass the draft comprehensive disaster management legislation is telling and indicates a couple of related things. There seems to be no culture of learning, which limits the country’s ability to leverage past experiences to shape future actions. This policy creep is evidence of more systemic weaknesses in Dominica’s political context, including the unfortunate lack of political will to push the disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation agenda inside of Dominica. Moreover, the existing legislative framework for DRR is piecemeal, and the pieces of legislation together do not present a coherent approach to comprehensive disaster management and ultimately resilience-­building. Support Legislation Support legislation shore up and help to consolidate disaster action. They provide a more comprehensive legal basis for governing in specific policy domains, thereby improving the chances that particular organizations, roles, and functions, as well as resources in support of policies, are integrated into vital related areas of activities. Additional policy and legislation support DRR in Dominica include the Low-­Carbon Climate-­Resilient Strategy of 2012, the National Parks and Protected Areas Act of 2003, the Physical Planning Act of 2002, the Agricultural Small Tenancies Ordinance of 1991 (Cap 58.70), the

148   Part II amended Forest Act of 1991, the Fire and Ambulance Services Act (Chapter 42:60) of 1991, and the National Climate Change Adaptation Policy (2002). The Low-­Carbon Climate-­Resilient Strategy of 2012 The Dominica Low-­Carbon Climate-­Resilient Strategy (2012–2020) is perhaps the most sweeping plan to date with direct relevance to disaster management. The strategy aims to further the island’s efforts in the establishment of a green economy. It also puts forward a plan to achieve the island’s sustainable development goals while meeting critical social development and poverty reduction targets (Climate Investment Funds, 2012). The strategy recognizes the challenges that small island developing states face because of climate change (ibid.). The National Parks and Protected Areas Act of 2003 The National Parks and Protected Areas Act (2003) dictates that the minister responsible for national parks has the power to make regulations for the preservation and the prevention of soil erosion, landslides, mud deposits, and siltstones in the water. The act offers legal protection to approximately 20% of Dominica’s forestlands as forest reserves or national parks (Government of Dominica, 2008). The Physical Planning Act of 2002 The Physical Planning Act of 2002 provides the legislative framework for the integration of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process into planning. The objective of the 2002 Physical Planning Act is to achieve orderly and progressive land development and orderly, efficient, and equitable planning, allocation, and development of resources of Dominica (section 3). The Act focuses on both rural and urban areas and regulates the construction of buildings and related matters; it also governs the acquisition and development of land for planning and similar purposes. Part IV (23) (1) of the act mandates environmental impact assessment for any application for development permission to which the second schedule applies. However, section (23) (2) of the Act gives discretionary powers to the Physical Planning Division (the Authority) for any development where significant environmental harm could result. The latter discretion could weaken the law. Three Other Acts The Agricultural Small Tenancies Ordinance of 1991 (Cap 58.70) amended the 1976 Act and promoted soil and water conservations (Government of Dominica, 1976). The amended Forest Act of 1991 regulates forest management, logging, and property rights, and fosters institution-­building. The Forest Act controls and protects watersheds by maintaining water supplies in springs, rivers, canals, and reservoirs. And, the Fire and Ambulance Services Act (Chapter 42:60) of 1991

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   149 provides the framework for reducing the risks from fire hazards, essentially complying with regulations for the protection of lives and property (Government of Dominica, 1976). To be clear, over the past three to four decades the small island of Dominica has established several legislations to address specific aspects of disaster management, but these lack comprehensiveness and integration. For example, the Emergency Legislation Project, a project to review existing emergency legislation in the Caribbean, found that in Dominica disaster legislation are inadequate to handle the crippling after-­effects of recurring disasters (ALNAP, 2011). First, Dominica needed to not only enact adequate legislative authority but also promote their implementation. There is a need for improved building standards, including those for public infrastructure, as well as strong oversight to ensure their implementation. Hurricane Maria destroyed 95% of buildings in Dominica, not because of a lack of legislation regulating building standards, but because of a lack of incentive to enforce existing laws. Further, there is a lack of established funding mechanisms that would adequately fund disaster management. The lack of funding is not unique to Dominica but needs to be addressed head on there since climate change, and other risk drivers, intensify. Plus, this lack of funding also limits capacity-­building and institutional development. For instance, a 2009 OAS report found that Dominica needed to update its national emergency plans and procedures, and strengthen community committees to position them better to respond by improving their capabilities, such as access to emergency personnel, and promoting the transfer and exchange of disaster information between national and local levels. Hurricane Maria proved that these concerns are still valid and even more pressing. The destruction wrought by Hurricane Maria gives the country an opportunity to build back better. The goal, according to Prime Minister Skerrit, is to become the world’s first resilient country. How Dominica gets there will depend in large part on a coherent disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation strategy with strong legislation in place and support laws in tow. Organization The disaster organization structure in Dominica is scattered over several agencies and departments. The National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) is the government organization responsible for planning and organizing counter-­ disaster measures at the central government level in Dominica (OAS, n.d.). Its roles and functions are laid out in the National Disaster Plan of 2001. Nine ministers of government, nine permanent secretaries, nine heads of government departments, and nine representatives from the private sector comprise the NEPO. The organization is mandated to meet twice per year, with one of these meetings scheduled for the start of the hurricane season (Isaac, n.d.). NEPO has, in turn, established a National Advisory Committee meant to develop and recommend policies, plans, and guidelines for the prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery measures for Dominica (OAS,

150   Part II n.d.). Together, NEPO and the Office of Disaster Management coordinate CDM-­ focused disaster management programs (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). The prime minister serves as the NEPO chairman. This fact not so much gives a high-­profile voice to disaster management, but centralizes disaster management responsibilities. The National Disaster Coordinator serves only in a secretarial capacity. The central government in Dominica moves slowly, and decisions do not easily scale down to communities. Office of Disaster Management The Office of Disaster Management (ODM) operates under the auspices of the National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) and was established in response to the increasing incidence of natural disasters, particularly hurricanes. Being responsible for disaster response and coordination means that the ODM plays a pivotal role in implementing the National Disaster Plan once it is activated (OAS, n.d.). It is the ODM’s job to coordinate with the various government departments and non-­government actors to mount the response effort during disasters, engaging the different levels through the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) (Isaac, n.d.; Paul-­Rolle, 2014). If the drafted comprehensive disaster management framework were to be adopted into law, the ODM’s mandate would extend to mitigation and recovery, which will more realistically move Dominica towards its new resilience agenda. This move would move Dominica more in line with the strategy in Jamaica. National Disaster Office (NDO) The National Disaster Office (NDO) resides in the Ministry of Justice, Immigration, and National Security. The National Disaster Coordinator manages the NDO and works under the direction of the permanent secretary of the Minister for Justice, Immigration and National Security (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). While disaster planning is centralized in NEPO under the prime minister, implementation is done through a line ministry whose mission is to administer justice, to protect and promote intellectual property rights, and ensure proficient analysis and investigation of financial crimes in an efficient manner (Government of Dominica, 2019). Local Government There has been an increase in the number and severity of localized small- and medium-­scale disasters in Dominica, and local governments are being increasingly called upon to participate not only in response but also in rehabilitation and risk reduction efforts. As such, the responsibilities of local government authorities are being expanded to include assisting communities in risk mitigation, preparation and responding to disasters at a local level (Paul-­Rolle, 2014). Each community is encouraged but not mandated to have a community-­based disaster management

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   151 committee (CBDC), which work as best as possible to follow the national model for disaster management as closely as is possible (Isaac, n.d.)—and with their limited resources, they often do not meet this requirement. For instance, much of the workforce is voluntary and are not required to participate in disaster management activities if they do not want to, or cannot. Funding Funding is a pivotal piece of a robust disaster governance framework. Without it, policies and plans are mere pipe dreams without outside assistance. The disaster risk governance agenda in Dominica is left unfulfilled in large part because funding remains an afterthought, allocated only after other, more pressing, competing needs are met. So, although the Dominican parliament appropriates monies for disaster management operating costs, a contingency pool of funds and funding for disaster response, the sums are usually inadequate. Within the annual budget, monies are allocated through the ministry with responsibility for disaster management for the necessary payments for purchases and operating costs such as salaries, recurring expenses, and education outreach (OAS, n.d.). The parliament also allocates a contingency pool to the ODM of EC$1 million, mostly used for disaster response. Hurricanes Maria and Erika showed that this sum is minuscule to the island’s disaster response needs, let alone for DRR or systematically building resilience. Like Jamaica, Dominica has made efforts to strengthen its financial resilience to natural hazard shocks by purchasing catastrophic risk insurance. The island is a member of the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF SPC), a multi-­country risk-­pooling program. CCRIF SPC allows participating countries to purchase insurance coverage to finance immediate post-­disaster recovery needs through risk pooling, risk retention, and risk transfer. Dominica received a payout of US$19 million from CCRIF after Hurricane Maria. Contingency pools of funds at concessionary rates with international agencies such as the World Bank and regional agencies such as the Caribbean Development Bank are available to developing countries like Dominica once a disaster strikes. The amounts states can receive are calculated based on their per capita income. Before Hurricane Maria, Dominica was classified by the World Bank as a middle-­income country with GDP per capita of over US$7,000, and so would not qualify for the international loan concessions. However, given the scale of destruction on that island, these rules were waived. The 2018 real GDP growth was projected to be –15.5%, and central government revenues were expected to decline by up to 13% in 2018 based on Government of Dominica figures (Government of Dominica, 2017). The World Bank, then, prepared a financial package of over US$100 million for Dominica to provide immediate support to farmers, rebuild public infrastructure, strengthen resilience, and help create economic buffers (World Bank, 2017). A further US$750,000 was made available to Dominica by the Caribbean Development Bank as an Immediate Response Loan designed to support clearing

152   Part II and cleaning after Hurricane Maria damage (Caribbean Development Bank, 2017). After Hurricane Maria, the European Investment Bank (EIB) established an emergency post-­disaster reconstruction concessionary loan program to help Dominica’s recovery efforts. These loans were earmarked for building back better infrastructure and integrating climate risk and vulnerability assessments into the projects, including improved water resource management (World Bank, 2017). In addition to concessionary loans, Dominica received grants from within and outside of the region because of the extent of the catastrophe. As an example, the Caribbean Development Bank also made an Emergency Relief Grant of US$200,000 available to Dominica to assist with damage assessments and transportation of emergency relief supplies, water and sanitation resources, roofing materials for emergency shelters and community buildings, and temporary accommodation for displaced persons (Caribbean Development Bank, 2017). The UK also provided £50.7 million in grant funding to Dominica for priority infrastructure projects. These include a newly agreed £25 million grant to transform the badly damaged water sector across the island (Hurricane Maria left 97% of the population without clean water). Further, the award is being used to redesign and reconstruct Dominica’s water supply, building better infrastructure to withstand future extreme weather events (Dominica News Online, 2017). So, monies coming from sources within and outside of the country are available to Dominica to fund disaster recovery and build back better. The problem is that there are significant funding deficits internally, leaving the country to rely on the goodwill of outside funders or to access loans that must be repaid. Loan repayment places added stress on Dominica, competing with service delivery for other pressing social needs. Moreover, in the case of a global economic downturn, outside funding might be significantly scaled back, or eliminated. This situation continues to jeopardize the island’s development goals.

Actors Dominica is a party to global frameworks and guidelines from the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World (Yokohama Strategy) to the Sendai Framework for Action, all of which promote action on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Outside actors have always played a non-­trivial role in disaster risk reduction, and now with the emphasis on climate change adaptation, they continue to drive the planning and actions. The following are just a few examples. Regionally, three regional organizations continue to promote and fund disaster risk reduction activities in Dominica—CDEMA, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), and the CDB. Of these organizations, CDEMA has done the most to build DRR in that country, including promoting draft legislation and technical support for Dominica, and is a significant player in the DRG landscape. As examples, CDEMA has piloted the drafting of comprehensive disaster management legislation and regulation. An adaptation guide accompanies the draft legislation in Dominica, but it remains unratified.

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   153 Moreover, as a CDEMA participating state, Dominica receives contributions from CDEMA’s Emergency Assistance Fund (OAS, n.d.). The CARICOM Regional Framework 2005–2015 has been closely aligned with the regional CDM strategy that CDEMA has been working with each of its participating states to implement since 2005. The CDM strategy is a comprehensive, integrated approach to developing disaster management in the region, tracking and using the number of output and outcomes that involve all hazards, all phases of the disaster management cycle, and all sectors of the economy (CDEMA, 2014). Moreover, work with CDEMA has also resulted in the development of a Country Work Program (CWP, 2012–2016). Generally, the CWP guides interventions and consolidates efforts, turning commitment by stakeholders on climate change adaptation and disaster management into programmable actions in priority outcome areas of the Regional Enhanced Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy and Programming Framework in Dominica. The CWP’s purpose is to reduce duplication of efforts by more tactically linking commitments with areas of need. Importantly, though, information-­sharing among agencies, both regionally and nationally, is weak, causing a drag on coordination and decision-­making, and doing little to reduce duplication of efforts. Ineffective information-­sharing is mainly due to limited capacity and lack of an overall mechanism to share information. Besides, the Post-­Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) after Hurricane Maria received technical support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) and the World Bank Group (WBG), which provided the overall guidance for the PDNA process. Moreover, the EU-­funded ACP-­EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program, managed by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), co-­financed this PDNA report. Programs such as the GFDRR enable knowledge exchange related to issues such as shelter building standards. The GFDRR supports projects that help improve the government’s capacity to identify and retrofit vulnerable shelters, and design and construct resilient new structures (GFDRR, 2017). Significant efforts such as these are piecemeal and have not presented a coherent strategy to adequately inform hazard and vulnerability reduction activities in Dominica. The World Bank, experiencing the futility of the single project approach, embarked on a multi-­project approach to reducing disaster risks by funding and implementing measures to mitigate the magnitude of natural disasters impact on the lives of people. The projects include adaptive measures to build resilience to current and future hydro-­meteorological shocks, a complement of civil works projects to improve infrastructure resilience to disaster events and climate change adaptation measures, and land resettlement as well as restriction of access to legally designated parks and protected areas. But again, a broader coherent strategy that can scale down to localities and communities and scale up to the national level from the funded projects would result in a more sustained success, but remained lacking in Dominica immediately pre- and post-­ Hurricane Maria.

154   Part II Post-­Hurricane Maria, Dominica called upon and received a tremendous amount of aid from international donors for its climate change adaptation and resilience-­building efforts. In partnership with the World Bank, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United Nations Development Program, and others, the government of Dominica has set in motion a resilient recovery plan and an agency—Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD)—to guide the recovery effort. Together the agencies have pledged around US$400 million to support it (The Economist, 2018). Within CREAD, a Resilient Recovery Plan was developed. Its key priorities include encouraging resilient building practices in the housing sector, improving livelihood opportunities and helping farmers adopt climate-­smart practices. The CREAD strategy is a project­based approach that CREAD will implement (Ekstein, 2018). Understanding the slow and tedious nature of policy development and adaptation in Dominica, the government took the unprecedented decision to build an execution agency— CREAD—outside of its standard public service systems (Government of Dominica, 2017b). CREAD’s mission is to coordinate all reconstruction work to avoid duplication of effort, maximize economies of scale, spot and fill critical gaps, avoid bureaucratic infighting and ensure all reconstruction activities focus on a single climate-­resilient recovery plan (CRRP). CREAD’s first task was to determine best practices across every sector—roads, building codes, energy grids, water management—before enforcing them island-­wide (Ekstein, 2018).  As should already be evident, CREAD’s most significant challenge might be its sustainability. Based on the post-­disaster needs assessment (Government of Dominica, 2017b), CREAD will cost close to US$2.5–3.5 million annually depending on the degree of its implementation role. How will the operating costs be sustained? The government’s resources to fund CREAD are minuscule, prompting them to develop a funding strategy built on a project-­based approach, building in a small operating cost to run the agency into project costs. Time will tell if these efforts are successful. Coordinating the Actors Within Dominica it is the Office of Disaster Management’s job to coordinate with the various government departments and non-­government actors to mount the response efforts during disasters, engaging the different levels through the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) (Isaac, n.d.; Paul-­Rolle, 2014). The task has proven difficult, as disaster planning and response functions are housed in different ministries with different powers, resource bases, mandates, and jurisdictions. Disaster planning is centralized in NEPO under the prime minister, while implementation is done through the Ministry of Justice, a line ministry whose mission is to administer justice, protect and promote intellectual property rights, and ensure proficient analysis and investigation of financial crimes (Government of Dominica, 2018), which is not in sync with the needs of disaster management or DRR.

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   155 Like Jamaica, Dominica is a member state of the regional coordinating unit CDEMA. The CDEMA coordinating unit is party to the Comprehensive Disaster Management Coordination and Harmonization Council (CHC),5 the primary engine that integrates and implements the regional comprehensive disaster management strategy (CDM). The approach is applied across sectors within and between countries. The council’s purpose is to provide guidance on program implementation and to foster governance of the enhanced CDM strategy and framework in the Caribbean (Collymore, 2007). The Coordination and Harmonization Council comprises vital development partners, sector leads, participating member states, and private and non-­governmental organizations. The CHC helps to explore synergies between developmental partners, regional governments, the private sector, civil society, and other comprehensive disaster management (CDM) stakeholders (Collymore, 2007). The sector liaison brings proposals for the sector on disaster risk reduction. Donors and other stakeholders are the ones who decide on which aspect of CDM-­related activities they will fund. CDEMA utilizes various cooperation agreements to help it deliver on its mandate. The agreements bring needed resources including technology and technical expertise, but also bring the required funding. Cooperative agreements are signed with industry sector leads that will work to ready the specific sector for a hazard impact. The focus on sectors has moved CDEMA to more formal relationships and reporting requirements. For instance, in the agricultural industry, the lead agency is the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. In each CDEMA participating member state, CDEMA organizes with crucial sector players to coordinate mitigation measures to make the assets and infrastructure hardier.

Incentives The incentives context is undeveloped in Dominica, with the country receiving zero points in this category (Table 7.3). Currently, there is no monitoring of regulations, no tax rebates or penalties and fines for risky behavior, and no relocation incentives. These deficiencies are in large part due to a general weakness in policy implementation in Dominica. The building and zoning codes have not been implemented and whatever flaws exist in them have therefore not been tested, strengthened or replaced. Post-­Hurricane Maria, CREAD’s first task was to determine best practices across every sector and how best to enforce them island-­wide (Ekstein, 2018). CREAD made an effort to translate the shoring up of public infrastructures such as roads, energy grids, and water management, housing and construction, into a manageable, well-­coordinated and carefully sequenced set of projects, annual plans and realistic six-­month targets (Government of Dominica, 2018) to improve implementation. Until Hurricane Maria, there was no impetus to address this issue. The 2017 hurricane is yet another stark reminder that Dominica needs to deploy an incentive framework to inspire all relevant actors in all sectors and

156   Part II levels to take action to limit the effects of climate change and, with it, improve disaster risk reduction as the island works to build resilience.

Soft Institutional Context Norms Despite its exposure to multiple hazards in the last decade alone, Dominica remains mainly reactive to disasters, often showing its most considerable resolve in the immediate period after a disaster. Even the necessary post-­disaster needs assessment, fundamental to address needs and sequence recovery, was stalled because the technical skills were not present on the island. In the period immediately following Hurricane Maria, Dominicans waited for days for external disaster needs assessment and other technical support in data collection to arrive from regional partners such as CDEMA and from international aid agencies from the EU. Since the early 2000s the levels and forms of hazard risk information available in Dominica have remained low, hindering appropriate risk-­averting decision-­making (e.g., see Benson et al., 2001). Several explanations have emerged for the lack of technical capabilities. One answer is that there exist financial limitations to funding DRR services. For instance, DRR competes with too many other priorities needing immediate attention to focus on events that might never happen. The other more plausible explanation is that the political will is lacking. Almost by default, spending on quick recovery efforts wins out because of the lack of political impetus to focus on DRR, which includes passing legislation, streamlining disaster-­related organizations or instituting strategies to incentivize residents and corporations to invest in mitigation (Benson et al., 2001). More fundamental still, even amid back-­toback catastrophes fueled by disasters that result from natural hazards, neither the government nor its people have made the fundamental shifts necessary to promote disaster risk reduction, let alone the resilience drive the current government now pushes.

The State of Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica Using the disaster risk governance framework outlined in the introductory chapter, Table 7.3 summarizes the state of disaster risk governance in Dominica. The island has mainly remained reactive to disasters, but post-­Hurricane Maria is becoming more strategic and proactive in planning for disasters and how to bounce back from them. Smartly, it has begun by building its formal institutional context for disaster governance. CREAD, although now a single entity, is an example of this approach. CREAD’s goal is to coordinate all reconstruction work to avoid duplication of effort, maximize economies of scale, spot and fill critical gaps, avoid bureaucratic infighting by the many agencies that now have jurisdiction over some aspect of DRR and climate change adaptation, and ensure that all reconstruction activities focus on a single climate-­resilient recovery plan (CRRP).

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   157 Table 7.3  Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix, Dominica Key Governance Elements

Dominica

SOFT INSTITUTION Culture 1 Basic assumptions and values about disasters and DRR and what to do about them 2 DRR norms: A Routine media coverage B Schools and community disaster education programs C Public education and awareness-building D Community leaders and residents with knowledge of importance of DR and importance to take steps to reduce E Drills, preparation, early warning systems F Post-event assessment, learning G Questioning, continuous improvements

1– 1– 1– 1– 1–

HARD INSTITUTION Legislation 1 Enshrined in constitution 2 DR legislation on the books and implemented 3 Support legislation undergirds specific DR legislation 4 Integration and mainstreaming of legislation in development laws and planning 5 Policy implementation, monitoring, oversight Organization 1 Organization with specific disaster focus 2 Operates at multiple levels, integrated, national coverage 3 Appropriate capabilities and knowledge, including local knowledge 4 Well positioned in government bureaucracy 5 Senior politicians chair important committees 6 Appropriately staffed, facilities, technology 7 Routine funding 8 Contingency funding 9 Data collection, integration, knowledge management Actors 1 Home-grown, multiple levels represented and active 2 Community residents and organizations with defined roles 3 Regional platforms active 4 Global platforms (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, SDG) 5 Coordinated efforts, national system 6 Coordinated efforts with all actors, cooperation agreements

1 1– 1– 1– 1– 1 1– 1– 1 1 1– 1– 1– 1– 1 1 1– 1–

Incentives 1 Sales taxes 2 Tax rebates 3  Penalties and fines 4  Relocation incentives, regulation enforcement, etc. Total DRG Score Sum of plusses and minuses Net DRG Score

23 –17 6

Source: The literature on disaster governance and institutions as well as Priority Number 2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction help to derive the institutional factors in the matrix.

158   Part II Still, local actors including elected officials need to become more vested in the governance process, laws passed must be implemented and monitored, local organizations need to be strengthened, incentives must be punitive, thus driving norms around disaster planning, mitigation and vulnerability reduction, not only focusing on climate change adaptation, but to all hazard drivers. Benchmarking and monitoring has remained weak due to unavailable information on vulnerability, exposure, expected climate change impacts and related matters. An overall structure for analyzing and integrating disaster risk information in the development process is lacking. In fact, the current National Disaster Coordinator, Mr. Isaac, laments the total dependence on information coming from overseas in disaster response and planning (see Isaac, n.d.). Moreover, the lack of a forecaster in the National Emergency Operation Center and the absence of legislation have not helped. These have compounded the weak interface between national and local governments and communities to enhance community risk management and design strategies that are more responsive to community needs (World Bank, 2013). An undiversified economic base means that disaster impacts can be long-­ lasting if critical sectors such as eco-­tourism are impacted, further exacerbating economic challenges after a disaster (Government of Dominica, 2017). The DRR and DRG story in Dominica is a familiar one, as cross-­country evidence, even among the countries mentioned in this book, shows. But Dominica has been provided with overwhelming evidence of its need to act. Its government has decided to use Hurricane Maria as an opportunity to change its culture around DRR. The chapter shows that Dominica’s state of disaster risk governance is weak despite the level of regional and international investment in DRG in that country. It has not been good at learning lessons from its past experiences, but Hurricane Maria might have been a critical incident for the country given the prime minister’s commitment. The caveat is that prime ministers come and go depending on the political tide. In addition, norms are difficult to change. Although it is too early, initial actions taken after Hurricane Maria are not showing the level of systematic corrections necessary to drive a resilient agenda. In Dominica’s case, the governance tragedy has been the lack of political will, which has critically curtailed actions in disaster risk governance. It has also had a negative ripple effect throughout Dominica’s disaster governance mechanism. Local governments lack the capacity and the national government lacks the political will to develop the disaster risk governance infrastructure. In Dominica, communities are not mandated, nor should they be required, to lead DRR or resilience efforts. But essential consideration must now be given to cultivating a culture for DRR and forging the necessary political will to drive the fundamental change that is necessary. This soft context has negatively influenced Dominica’s hard institutional context, which has never really been attended to and so remains weak despite ample opportunity. Now the government, perhaps through the prime minister, will have to be strategic in leading whole-­scale changes to drive resilience. Integrating communities and creating endogenous capabilities at every level and

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   159 sector will help to change norms. So too will awareness-­building and integrating local and indigenous communities into resilience-­building efforts. Developing a disaster fund and incentives around disaster risk reduction must be a crucial part of the game plan. So too must reducing poverty and social vulnerability, which stand in the double digits. These are all disaster governance challenges that must be integrated with the wider governing framework. There are already huge incentives to building a resilient Dominica—the island is on the front lines of climate change and it could potentially be wiped off the map. It is that serious. Authorities must plan for potential landscape-­scale destruction to become more frequent, and systematic action has to become the strategy.

Notes 1 PreventionWeb is managed by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). I rely on data coming out of this source a bit in this chapter because I find it to be a comprehensive and credible source of data and information from developing ­countries, many of which experience challenges capturing, retaining, and managing information. 2 The 2010 HDR introduced the GII, which reflects gender-­based inequalities in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity (reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent birth rates; empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by women and attainment in secondary and higher education by each gender; and economic activity is measured by the labor market participation rate for women and men) (see http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/ themes/hdr_theme/country-­notes/DMA.pdf ). 3 See www.cepal.org/12conferenciamujer/noticias/paginas/7/49917/Dominica_Report_-_ XII_CRM.pdf ). 4 A non-­executive president is a symbolic leader of a state who performs a representative and civic role but does not exercise executive or policymaking power. Dominica’s constitution calls for a president as head of state and a prime minister as head of government. Both serve terms of office for five years. The president oversees the parliament, while the prime minister heads the cabinet. The president chooses cabinet members from among representatives of the House of Assembly. No more than three cabinet members may be senators, with the other six coming from outside the cabinet (Momsen & Niddrie, 2018). The parliament consists of one chamber (House of Assembly) comprising 32 members. See more at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Accessed at www.constitutionnet. org/sites/default/files/non-­executive_presidencies_0.pdf. 5 Rather than repeating what has already been discussed, the reader can learn more about the CHC in the chapter on Jamaica.

References ACAPS (2017). Lessons Learned—Dominica: Lessons Learned from Tropical Storm Erika. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20171024_ acaps_dominica_lessons_learned_tropical_storm_erika.pdf. ALNAP (2011). Caribbean Emergency Legislation Project: Improving the Legal and Institutional Framework Related to State of Emergency. Accessed at www.alnap.org/ help-­l ibrary/caribbean-­e mergency-legislation-­p roject-improving-­t he-legal-­a ndinstitutional-­framework (March 10, 2018).

160   Part II Benson, C., Clay, E., Michael, F. V., & Robertson, A. W. (2001, Oct 31). Dominica: Natural Disasters and Economic Development in a Small Island State. Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/875391468770118094/pdf/multi0page.pdf (January 31, 2018). Caribbean360 (2017, Nov.). Food security: a priority for Dominica. St. Lucia Times News. Accessed at www.caribbean360.com/news/food-­security-priority-­dominica (December 14, 2018). Caribbean Development Bank (2017, Sept. 22). CDB Announces Support for Dominica after Hurricane Maria Emergency Response. Accessed at www.caribank.org/news room/news-­and-events/cdb-­announces-support-­dominica-after-­hurricane-maria. CDEMA (2014). Regional Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy and Results Framework 2014–2024. Accessed at www.cdema.org/CDM_Strategy_ 2014-2024.pdf.  Climate Investment Funds (2012). Dominica Low Carbon Climate Resilient Development Strategy 2012–2020. Accessed at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?pag e=view&type=400&nr=717&menu=1515 (January 31, 2018). Collymore, J. (2007). Disaster impacts on the Caribbean. In: International Perspectives on Natural Disasters: Occurrence, Mitigation, and Consequences (pp. 303–322). Dordrecht: Springer. Collymore, J. (2018). Personal communication. Former Executive Director, CDEMA, February 2, 2018. Dominica News Online (2017, Jan. 15). Concerns—Dominica’s Crime Status. Accessed at https://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/features/letters-­to-the-­editor/concerns-­ dominicas-crime-­status/ Ekstein, N. (2018). Climate changed: the quest to hurricane-­proof an island: Dominica, ravaged by the storms of 2017, is not taking the next ones lying down. Bloomberg. Accessed at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-10/dominica-­plans-to-­be-the-­ world-s-­first-climate-­resilient-country. Elie, J. (2017, November). “It feels like Dominica is finished”: life amid the ruins left by Hurricane Maria. Guardian. Accessed at www.theguardian.com/global-­development/ 2017/nov/01/it-­feels-like-­dominica-is-­finished-life-­amid-the-­ruins-left-­by-hurricane-­ maria. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (2007). FAO Agricultural Damage Assessment Mission to Dominica Following Hurricane Dean. Accessed at https://reliefweb. int/report/dominica/fao-­agricultural-damage-­assessment-mission-­dominica-following-­ hurricane-dean (January 30, 2018). Global Facility for Disaster Reduction (2017). ACP-­EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program: Session 2: ACP-­EU NDRR Program sharing country experiences and lessons learned—Commonwealth of Dominica. Accessed at www.gfdrr.org/sites/ default/files/publication/DOMINICA%20-%20ACP-EU%20NDRR%20Focus%20 Day%20presentation%20-%209%20June%202017.pdf (January 31, 2018). Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) (2017). Bringing Resilience to Scale. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Annual Report. Accessed at https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/GFDRR-­AnnualReport-­2017.pdf. Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (2017, September 18). Executive Summary: Post-­Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria. Accessed at https://resilient caribbean.caricom.org/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2017/11/DOMINICA-­E XECUTIVESUMMARY.pdf (January 30, 2018).

Disaster Risk Governance in Dominica   161 Government of Dominica (1976). Agricultural Small Tenancies Act, Version No. 002 National Parks (Park) Regulations 2003 S.R. No. 74/2003 Version as at 14 March 2008. Accessed at www.dominica.gov.dm/laws/chapters/chap58-70.pdf. Government of Dominica (2008). Version No. 002 National Parks (Park) Regulations 2003 S.R. No. 74/2003 Version as at 14 March 2008. Accessed at www.legislation. vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/LTObject_Store/LTObjSt5.nsf/d1a8d8a9 bed958efca25761600042ef5/efb666b14ac43be4ca257761003f1329/$FILE/0374sr002.pdf. Government of Dominica (2017b). Post-­Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/dominica-­pdnamaria.pdf. Government of Dominica (2018). Office of Disaster Management (ODM). Accessed at http://justice.gov.dm/divisions/office-­of-disaster-­management-odm. Isaac, Nathaniel (n.d.). Early Warning Systems in Dominica. Accessed at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLACREGTOPNUT/Resources/4160377-1357590589927/ 8996498-1357590799892/8996560-1357606630155/EWS_in_Dominica.pdf (January 31, 2018). London School of Economics (2018). National Climate Change Adaptation Policy of Dominica. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. Accessed at www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/law/national-­climate-change-­adaptationpolicy-­2/ (December 20, 2018). McKirdy, E., Sterling, J., & Yan, H. (2017, Sept 19). Dominica PM: Hurricane Maria “devastates” island. CNN. Accessed at www.cnn.com/2017/09/18/americas/atlantic-­ storms-maria-­jose-lee/index.html (April 3, 2017). Momsen, J. D., & Niddrie, D. L. (2018, January updated). Dominica. Accessed at www. britannica.com/place/Dominica (March 8, 2018). Organization of Amer­ican States (OAS) (n.d.). CELP Profile Dominica: Caribbean Emergency Legislative Project (CELP). Accessed at http://oas.org/dsd/EnvironmentLaw/CaribbeanLegislationProject/Profiles/DominicaFINAL.pdf  Paul-­Rolle, A. (2014). Disaster Risk Reduction Profile: Dominica 2014. Accessed at www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/46345 (January 29, 2018). PreventionWeb (n.d.). Dominica Risk Profile. Accessed at www.preventionweb.net/ countries/dma/data/ (January 29, 2018). The Economist (2018). Getting over Hurricane Maria: some people and businesses have given up on disaster-­prone Dominica. The Economist. August. Accessed at www. economist.com/the-­americas/2018/08/30/getting-­over-hurricane-­maria. UNdata (2018). Dominica. Accessed at http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName= Dominica (January 31, 2018). VP Digital (2017, April 11). CDEMA Funds Disaster Legislation in Dominica. Accessed at https://thevoiceslu.com/2017/04/cdema-­funds-disaster-­legislation-dominica/. Wall-­Bassett, E. D., Vander Mey, B. J., & Guiste, P. (2012). Food security in three regions of Dominica: baseline data and social epidemiological exploration. Journal of Hunger and Environmental Nutrition, 7(2–3): 224–238. Wilkinson, E., Twigg, J., & Few, R. (2018). Building Back Better: A Resilient Caribbean after the 2017 Hurricanes. Overseas Development Institute Briefing Notes. Accessed at www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-­documents/12028.pdf. World Bank (2013). Project Information Document (PID) Concept stage Report No.: PIDC420. Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/973831468032632806/ pdf/PID-­Print-P129992-04-09-2013-1365520890978.pdf (January 31, 2018).

162   Part II World Bank (2014). Project Information Document (PID) Appraisal Stage Report No.: PIDA2757. Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/441531468025798014/ pdf/PID-­Appraisal-Print-­P129992-03-06-2014-1394125006045.pdf (March 9, 2018). World Bank (2017). Joint Statement by Dominica Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit and World Bank Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean Jorge Familiar. Press release. Accessed at www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-­release/2017/10/31/joint-­ statement-by-­d ominica-prime-­m inister-roosevelt-­s kerrit-and-­w orld-bank-­v icepresident-­for-latin-­america-and-­the-caribbean-­jorge-familiar.

8 Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya

Kenya is a significant player in eastern Africa because of its strategic location and its recent economic successes. It shares land borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Somalia, and has a critical Indian Ocean port. The country has a population of about 48.5 million (2016) (World Bank, 2017; Mbaku, 2018). After more than 30 years of stagnant economic growth, Kenya’s GDP rose from 1.5% in 2002 to 5.8% in 2010, but was projected to decline to 4.6% in 2012 (World Bank, 2013; Parry et al., 2012). Other central social indicators, including life expectancy at birth, access to primary and secondary education, and access to clean water, have all improved (UNDP, 2010). Kenya’s real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last seven years. In fact, since 2014, progress on its economic indicators has resulted in Kenya being ranked as a lower-­middle-income country because it crossed a World Bank threshold of US$1,026 per capita gross national income (World Bank, 2017).1 However, its relative economic success tells only a small part of Kenya’s development story. The sub-­Saharan African country experiences high rates of physical, social, economic and political vulnerabilities.

High Rates of Physical, Social, Economic and Political Vulnerabilities Severe climatic conditions in Kenya pose a significant risk to the country’s population, and contribute to it being one of the most disaster-­prone in Africa. Of particular concern in Kenya are floods and droughts, with significant droughts occurring about every ten years and moderate droughts or floods every three to four years (Parry et al., 2012). As in other parts of the world, deaths because of disasters that result from natural hazards are generally trending down in Kenya (Table 8.1). The numbers are testament to the efforts taken in Kenya, and internationally, to strengthen the Drought Management Authority and related drought management mechanisms. However, droughts continue to account for the majority of those affected by natural hazards in Kenya. Since 1960, observed mean annual temperatures have increased by 1.0°C, or an average rate of 0.21°C per decade; changes in rainfall patterns have also been observed during this period (McSweeney et al., 2012). More significant rainfall

164   Part II Table 8.1  Disaster Impact in Kenya, 2000–2018 Year

Deaths

Number Affected

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

135 53 212 39 69 56 204 33 128 29

2,312,000 3,536,200 783,300 42,657 3,862,458 211,164 8,600,692 20,242 250,670 115,800 1,600,000 245,299 3,011,000 25,000

– 138 42 26

Source: Raw data from EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database – Universite catholique de Louvain (UCL) – CRED, D. Guha-Sapir – www.emdat.be, Brussels, Belgium, March 27, 2018.2

has been seen during the short rains of October to December (GOK, 2010; Perry et al., 2012), and the long March to April rain showers have become increasingly unreliable in locations such as Eastern Province (Awuor, 2009). Drought-­prone provinces in Kenya’s eastern, northeastern, coastal areas, and parts of the Rift Valley are expanding, and there is a high incidence of food insecurity in these regions. Flood-­prone areas include Budalangi, Nyando, and Rachuonyo (McSweeney et al., 2012), and landslide-­prone zones such as Muranga district, parts of Kiambu, Thika, Maragua, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Nyandarua and areas around Mount Kenya region (McSweeney et al., 2012) are facing increased pressure as the incidents of those hazards increase. Over the last four decades, Kenya has experienced several natural disasters with significant population impact. Deya (2017) points to the 1991–1993 drought that affected about 1.5 million people in northern Kenya and the 1997/1998 El Niño floods, which affected 1.5 million people and killed 80% of small stock. The 2000/2001 drought was the worst in the last 100 years; around 5 million people lost their livelihoods and had to depend entirely on relief food, and in 2003–2005 severe drought again affected the country. In 2009/2010 floods again inundated the country, resulting in landslides in several areas (see Deya, 2017). Undoubtedly, droughts are the primary risk exposure faced by the Kenyan people, affecting livestock production and causing violent clashes among pastoralist communities and residents (Deloitte, 2017). With around 70% of Kenya affected by drought, food insecurity and malnutrition are on the rise and pressure the national budget. Estimates from Deloitte (2017) are that the government may be required to spend at least 21.5 billion Kenyan shillings in 2018 and 2019 to alleviate hunger and suffering for well over a million people, and the problem is worsening. A recently released natural disaster profile of Kenya explains its

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   165 drought problem. Over 80% of Kenya’s landmass is either arid or semi-­arid, not able to adequately support more than a half of the livestock and just over 30% of the total human population (Deya, 2017). Increasingly dry and harsh weather conditions coupled with poorly managed food reserves and distribution are rendering communities within them food insecure. Much of Kenya’s agricultural production is rain-­fed, and the ongoing drought is negatively impacting agricultural areas including northwestern, northeastern, northern, and southeastern regions, creating greater vulnerability among households in these regions. As crops continue to fail, and herds of livestock die, low-­ income families continue to experience crisis, leading to critical levels of acute malnutrition in places.3 As a result, food prices continue to rise, driving inflation to 10.3% in March 2017, a five-­year high (World Bank, 2017), and exacerbating already difficult economic and social conditions in Kenya. The country’s food insecurity problem is part of a larger pattern of food insecurity seen around the world and is typical in East Africa. Between 2015 and 2016, the Global Report on Food Crises in 2017 reported that 180 million people worldwide faced food insecurity in 2016, whereas only around 80 million were food insecure in 2015. But as weather patterns change, the situation is becoming dire for more households in Kenya, where effective grain management including distribution and storage remain a pressing challenge (Famine Early Warning System Network, 2013).4 Agriculture remains the backbone of Kenya’s economy, directly generating about 26% of annual GDP and providing employment, food security, and rural livelihoods (Parry et al., 2012). As of 2016, the industry accounted for 20% of employment, 75% of the labor force, and over 50% of revenue from exports (Deloitte, 2017). However, climatic conditions directly influence productivity in the agricultural sector, since nearly all of Kenya’s crop production (98%) is rain-­ fed (WRI et al., 2007, p.  34; Herrero et al., 2010; Deloitte, 2017). Moreover, high-­income-earning export crops such as flowers occupy much of the small proportion of irrigated cropland (UNWWAP, 2006; Deloitte, 2017) and are owned mainly by foreigners, mostly from the Netherlands, resulting in at least a portion of those earnings not being invested into the Kenyan economy. In the animal husbandry and livestock sector, nearly half of production occurs in the water-­scarce arid and semi-­arid lands (Herrero et al., 2010; Nyariki et al., 2009), and droughts have historically led to significant animal losses there. Droughts also increase the likelihood of forest fires, which adversely affect the forestry industry, where much of what is not protected through legislation is cleared for agriculture, grazing of livestock, and charcoal production (Parry et al., 2012). In 2016, the government of Kenya in conjunction with the Kenyan private sector launched the Kenya National Agricultural Insurance Program to address the challenges that agricultural producers face when there are significant production shocks, such as from droughts and floods (Deloitte, 2017). The program, with assistance from the World Bank Group, builds on the experience of similar programs in Mexico, India, and China. One program line will focus on livestock

166   Part II insurance, while another will focus on maize and wheat insurance (Deloitte, 2017). Compounding the issues related to droughts, the rainy season (the “long rains” in April and May and the “short rains,” for a few weeks between October and December) often brings with it flooding, as parched and dry earth with minimal vegetation cover experiences excessive runoff with torrential rainfall. In 2018 around 100 people died and nearly 260,000 were displaced by flooding in Kenya during the May rains (Feingold & Thornton, 2018). Disease such as cholera and malaria, which are already active, spread during floods. Flood-­associated outbreaks complicate this situation. Further, surges commonly damage or destroy much of the healthcare infrastructure (Feingold & Thornton, 2018). Moreover, after flood water subsides, starvation ensues because the land turns so dry that it just cannot support crops and livestock. These complicated and prolonged cycles result in frequent and repeated losses of life, property, public and other infrastructure, and livelihood and coping strategies fray. At the same time, climate analyses focused on Kenya project that a general decrease in mean annual precipitation will occur with wetter conditions likely during the short rains of October to December (Parry et al., 2012). While Kenya has made positive progress toward sustainable development over the past decade, Kenyans continue to face several challenges that increase their exposure to climate-­change-related risks. Kenya faces severe anthropogenic threats as well. The country faces security threats, most notably from Al-­Shabaab, the Somalia-­based Islamist group. Although terrorist attacks in Kenya have drastically reduced in the last decade, there are still sporadic attacks (Deloitte, 2017). In January 2017, Al-­Shabaab militants attacked Kenyan soldiers deployed with AMISOM at a Kenyan military base in Kulbiyow, near the Kenyan border with Somalia, and in 2016 Al-­ Shabaab militants staged multiple attacks in Mandera county near the Kenya– Somalia border (Deloitte, 2017). Other Vulnerabilities In 2015/2016 around 36.1% of all Kenyans continue to live below the national poverty line, declining by around 9% since 2005/2006 (World Bank, 2018). The economic gains made since 1997 have primarily benefited the wealthiest quintile of Kenyans (World Bank, 2009), further contributing to Kenya’s high level of economic and social inequality (Shifa & Liebbrandt, 2017; see also Oxfam, n.d.). Kenya continues to rank low at 142 out of 189 countries and territories on the Human Development Index. Kenya’s HDI value for 2017 is 0.590—which put the country in the medium human development—but places it below the average of 0.645 for countries in the medium human development (UNDP, 2018). Within East Africa, Kenya’s HDI ranks above the average of 0.537 for countries in sub-­ Saharan Africa. By itself, though, the HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human development across the country’s population, for instance, when the HDI value

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   167 is discounted for inequality, Kenya falls to 0.434, which represents a loss of 26.4% (UNDP, 2018). This rate of inequality compares less favorably even with other medium HDI countries that typically show average loss due to inequality of 25.1%. As an example, access to social services such as healthcare and potable water has improved but remains poor. This situation is true especially in rural areas, where an estimated 40% of Kenyans do not have reliable access to potable drinking water, and health care continues to be unreliable (World Bank, 2009; Thuita & Ouma, 2019). Moreover, the 2017 female HDI value for Kenya is 0.568 compared with 0.610 for males, resulting in a gender development index (GDI)5 value of 0.931, ranking Kenya 137 out of 160 countries in gender inequality in 2017 (UNDP, 2018). While Kenya plays a critical role in East Africa and is poised to be a success story in the region, partisanship, weak governance, corruption, and a skills gap remain central concerns (World Bank, 2017; Deloitte, 2017). Corruption threatens Kenya’s economic and development trajectory. Kenya ranks 145th out of 176 countries with a score of 26, showing no improvement from the 2014 rankings. Despite adopting anti-­corruption measures, including passing a law on the right to information, which should improve government transparency, it is evident that Kenya has a long way to go to stem the tide of corruption (Agutu, 2017). Moreover, even where anti-­corruption measures are in place, they are regularly skirted or ignored (ibid.). Transparency International reports that Kenya is plagued by untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions, including the police and the judiciary, who abuse their power and undermine the institutions (Agutu, 2017). With allegations of misappropriation of public funds on the rise, corruption remains a serious impediment to doing business in Kenya. Partisanship The postcolonial era in Kenya is marked by increasing partisanship among its 42 tribes as they vie for power. Tensions have surrounded the last couple of elections in Kenya. Who can forget the catastrophic post-­election violence of 2007 and 2008? Around 1,300 people were killed and 660,000 displaced during that election (Mbaku, 2018). Again in 2017, the presidential elections were marred by sectarian conflict, primarily as a rise in identity politics tested Kenya’s democratic system. The Kenyan Supreme Court overturned the presidential election results and ordered an election re-­run within 60 days (Mbaku, 2018). Preparations for the re-­run election were, however, marred by controversy as Odinga’s opposition coalition took issue with the proposed October 17, 2017, date, arguing that it did not allow the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) enough time to prepare for a credible election. After the IEBC moved the date back to October 26, 2017, Odinga still refused to participate because “his party lacked confidence in the credibility of the process” (Mbaku, 2018). Many opined that Odinga and his supporters had provoked the violence, even preventing voters from taking part in the election in four counties in western Kenya, an opposition stronghold (Mbaku, 2018). It was

168   Part II not a surprise when Odinga rejected the election results, characterizing them as a “mockery” (Mbaku, 2018). What was surprising was that he decided not to challenge the results in court as he had done previously, leaving many to suggest that the results were less flawed than Odinga was making them out to be, and he knew it. Still, intense partisanship in Kenya threatens political stability and ultimately undermines other efforts to sustain economic growth and security in that country.

Governing and New Constitution A revised constitution (2010) sought to bind the country’s subcultures together through common ideals and shared values in the hopes of better serving Kenya’s citizenry. In this spirit, during his inaugural address in 2017, President Kenyatta announced that his government would encourage unity based on common citizenship and the values enshrined in the country’s new constitution (Mbaku, 2018). Also, the document enumerated ideals of bringing service delivery and accountability closer to the people. The 2010 constitution enshrined in it the principles of devolution, delegation, democratization, and reduced bureaucratization. As an example, devolution seeks to transform political and economic governance and to strengthen accountability and public service delivery at local levels. The UNDP (2016) found that since devolution was initiated, public confidence in government has increased from 69.7% in April 2015 to 78% by September 2016 due in large part to evidence-­based decision-­making (UNDP, 2016). Nonetheless, many citizens still feel marginalized (Mbaku, 2018), as the sub-­national government remains under capacity and under-­resourced, unable to deliver services at the time and in the quantities needed. Plus, accountability systems are not triggered when functions are not performed, giving no real incentive not to deliver services. Kenya relies on its international partnerships and, through its constitution, has made these agreements binding on its people. General rules and conventions in international law ratified by Kenya are enshrined within the country’s legal context. For instance, Article 2(5) of the Kenya Constitution states, “the general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya.” Further, Article 2(6) states that “Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution” (Constitute Project, 2018, p. 16). This means that general rules of international law could likewise have application as law in Kenya (ibid., p.  16). The provisions of Article 2(6) are contentious in legal circles in Kenya, where legal scholars are debating what constitutes “international law” and what exactly is “ratification” in the context of the Kenyan Constitution. For instance, could international law and treaties supersede national laws and under what circumstance? Moreover, the central question for any country is, “where does the power to make domestic laws reside?” Article 94(5) is believed to have given these rights to parliament and Article 2(6) appears to take that right away. These points are relevant to our discussion here, since disaster risk governance in developing countries like Kenya are driven mainly by

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   169 Republic of Kenya

National Executive

Legislature or Parliament

Judiciary

Transition Authority National Assembly

Senate

National and County Government Coordinating Summit and the Council of County Governors

Common Citizens

Superior Courts Sub-ordinate Courts

County Governments Learned Citizens

County Assemblies

County Executives

Intergovernmental Relations Forums

County Security Committee

County Assemblies Service Board

Boards of Cities / Municipalities

Common Citizens

County Public Service Board

Institutional Relationships are: • Executive • Accountability • Work • Policy Guidance

Figure 8.1  Kenya’s New Devolved System. Source: Gabriel Lubale (2013).

international development actors and global disaster risk reduction frameworks. Moreover, because of funding needs, national governments often acquiesce to international development organizations in how to carry out their DRR efforts. Still, sovereign countries reserve the right to carry out DRR as they deem necessary (see a more detailed discussion at Kiunuhe, 2010). With its new devolution strategy, the venue for disaster risk reduction has shifted from the national to the county government level. There are distinct grants of power for specific functions between the national and county governments, which are set out in the constitution’s fourth schedule. Also, on paper, there is interdependence between national and county governments and duties not explicitly assigned to either the county government will

170   Part II County Assembly • Speaker • Elected members

• Governor

• Head of County Public Service

• Deputy Governor

• Executive Committee (county ministers)

• County Directors (10)

• County Service Departments • Finance and Accounting • Physical Planning/Housing • Agriculture and Livestock • Public Works and Utilities • Environment and National Resources • Public Service Management • Health Services • Trade, Ind. Dev. and Reg • Education, Culture, Social • Roads and Transport • Elected

• Civil servants

• Appointed

• Departments

Figure 8.2  Structure of County Government in Kenya. Source: Mwenda (2015).

automatically revert to the national government (Constitute Project, 2018, p. 11). However, in practice, specific areas of service delivery such as disaster risk reduction show a lack of integration.

Investments in Disaster Risk Governance Hard Institutions The Legislative and Regulatory Framework Statutory laws and regulations help to embed structures, practices, and activities into all sectors, levels of government and in civil society. These instruments lay the foundation for an integrated and coordinated disaster risk reduction and management strategy that focuses on all aspects of DRR. Except for drought management, Kenya does not have a comprehensive legislative framework to promote DRR. The country benefits from a very high level of support from the international community, mostly through the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks and high-­level interventions by global public organizations. However, it lacks an adequate disaster governance system (Government of Kenya, 2009). Even at the legislative level, there is a great deal of external input in the policy and strategy development around DRR. For instance, the UNDP

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   171 works closely with government officials in ministries, parliamentary committees, departments, and agencies to enhance their technical capabilities, skills, and knowledge base (UNDP, 2016). The following sections provide some of the key examples of disaster legislation in Kenya. Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (2006–2016) Currently, the Kenya Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (2006–2016) lends the guidance to its DRR efforts (Parry et al., 2012). The Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy supports an integrated approach to DRR and management and provides guidance on mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development programming, planning, and implementation (Perry et al., 2012). The strategy was meant to support local adaptation to climate change and hazard vulnerability reduction. Its goals include enhancing the legal and policy framework for disaster management, establishing a focal point for disaster management activities, mainstreaming climate adaptation into development planning, and integrating climate change projections into disaster management efforts (Perry et al., 2012). With its expiration, there is no indication whether there will be a replacement or whether it will revert to being the default guide for DRR action in Kenya. However, many of the goals of the Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy remained unaccomplished, perhaps because deficiencies in the DRG system made the strategy unfeasible. There was no legal basis to fund the activities it supported. There was no coherent institutional strategy for DRR. Moreover, there was no integration of actors, sectors, or agencies, nor was there any connection between the hazard drivers. Besides, the focus remained on drought management, to the neglect of other hazard drivers. At the same time, activities pushed from the global level, including Vision 2030 and the Hyogo Framework for Action, were being heavily promoted by the United Nations and were gaining traction around the globe. Vision 2030, in particular, gave impetus to the crafting of a new Kenyan constitution as well as the proposed disaster risk reduction and management legislation. Vision 2030 Vision 2030 is an outgrowth of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and is a vehicle for accelerating the transformation of Kenya from a developing into a rapidly industrializing middle-­income nation by the year 2030. Vision 2030 is a long-­term development blueprint for the country that focuses on three pillars—economic, social and political (Kenya Vision 2030). The economic pillar focuses on six priority sectors (tourism, agriculture and livestock, wholesale and retail, manufacturing, financial services, offshore business processes, and trade). The sectors were expected to help raise the GDP growth rate by around 10% between 2004 and 2018. However, these goals were lofty and generally resulted in inconsistent growth in Kenya’s GDP. Real GDP growth year-­on-year data in Kenya from March 2010 to December 2018 averaged 5.6%.

172   Part II Despite reaching an all-­time high of 13.6% in March 2011, the subsequent year saw a negative growth rate of –0.8% in December 2012. Likewise, GDP slowed down to 5.0% in the second quarter of 2017 compared with 6.3% in the corresponding quarter of 2016, driven by sharp increases in food prices spurred on by adverse weather conditions and a steep rise in international oil prices (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The Vision 2030 social pillar sets out to build a cohesive and equitable society by focusing on seven sectors: education and training; health; environment; water and sanitation; labor; youth and human resource development and population; urbanization and housing. Within these sectors, arid and semi-­arid districts, communities with high incidence of poverty, unemployed youth, women, and all vulnerable groups are given special attention. The environmental component addresses enhancing disaster preparedness in all disaster-­prone areas and improving the capacity for adaptation to global climatic change. Vision 2030 also promotes ecological conservation that supports the economic pillars (Kenya Vision 2030). The political pillar aims to push for unity, entrench equality regardless of one’s race, ethnicity, religion, gender or socioeconomic status, and seeks to harness the diversity of Kenya’s people’s values, traditions, and aspirations. Regarding Vision 2030, however, Kenya has a steep hill to climb. Much of the Vision 2030 priorities are being implemented through project funding, which brings into question the sustainability of the momentum built up with its rollout. Inadequate and limited resource allocation to aid implementation of the Vision, political interference and uncertainty, an unstable political environment, constant inflation compounded by weak currency, and global economy are just some of the factors that might limit the Vision’s success in Kenya. The Constitution Although Kenya does not yet have a comprehensive disaster management law that can provide a basis for DRG, the new constitution integrates necessary provisions on disaster risk reduction and management, including support to counties to coordinate and manage disaster risks. It also provides for contingency funding during emergencies. During the field research for this study in 2017, a draft disaster management policy was being considered, although not for the first time. The proposed disaster management policy was first presented to the cabinet in 2009 but did not have the traction to support its passage into law (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015, p. 6). National Climate Change Response Strategy of 2010 Kenya’s National Climate Change Response Strategy of 2010 was developed in part to address the climate change gap in the Vision 2030 document. Vision 2030 does not fully recognize potential catastrophic losses from climate change and its impact on Kenya’s development goals (Perry et al., 2012). The National Climate Change Response Strategy’s purpose is to mainstream climate change

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   173 adaptation and mitigation into “all government planning, budgeting, and development objectives” (GOK, 2010, p. 12). It proposes necessary adaptation measures for the sectors including health, agriculture, water, fisheries, tourism and wildlife, livestock and pastoralism, and physical (Perry et al., 2012). The Draft National Disaster Management Policy of 2009 The draft National Disaster Management Policy (NDMP) has yet to be approved by either the parliament or the cabinet, although there is an obvious need for it. Successive disaster events, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, the Climate Change Conference (Nairobi, November 2006), and a recent comprehensive environmental assessment survey over the entire country prompted the NDMP to point to the urgency of the need. These reports and events have all stressed the central role that climate change adaptation must play in any sustainability plan or integrated national strategy for disaster risk reduction (Government of Kenya, 2009). The NDMP’s overall goal is to prevent disasters and their impacts on people, infrastructure, and the environment in a coordinated manner, thereby increasing the resilience of families and communities affected by disasters (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015, p. 6; Perry et al., 2012). Governance is a central feature of the draft NDMP in that it seeks to institutionalize mechanisms to address disasters at all levels (Government of Kenya, 2009). If passed, the legislation would establish a framework for institutionalizing and coordinating disaster risk reduction across sectors and actors, placing equal emphasis on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and recovery (Perry et al., 2012), and integrating drought management into the risk reduction framework. The DNDMP annexes contain sector- and hazard-­specific policies (e.g., fire safety management policy, policy for the sustainable development of the arid and semi-­arid lands, and so on) (GOK, 2009). The annexes also include pathways to capacity-­building, performance goals and measures for three– five years, and a national disaster response plan that outlines annual plans and budgets, contingency plans, response and recovery operations plans, and tools to facilitate implementation, including risk mapping, hazard and vulnerability analysis, and research as well as standard operating procedures (GOK, 2009). The NDMP, then, would frame a more coherent disaster risk governance philosophy where the focus is spread across risk and vulnerability assessment to disaster response and recovery, putting Kenya on a more sustainable development path. Under the proposed legislation, the institutional framework for disaster management would be streamlined by repositioning existing organizations such as the National Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction as a key, but not the central, DRR organization, and establishing new organizations including a unit that focuses on disaster coordination. But the NDMP lacks the political support necessary to become law, perhaps because the National Climate Change Response Strategy of 2010 is already being executed and climate change is seen as the most significant hazard driver based on the country’s experiences with droughts and flooding.

174   Part II Other Draft Legislation The draft DM legislation of 2016, whose purpose is to establish a Disaster Risk Management Authority that liaises with national and county governments and helps them deal with catastrophes and promote disaster risk management measures, has been proposed but not yet signed into law (Ayaga, 2016). The DM legislation would also establish a Disaster Risk Management Fund to support disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery, and would lead to the formation of a county disaster risk management committee responsible for advising the county governments on matters relating to disaster management (Ayaga, 2016). Importantly, the bill would also coordinate crisis activities, making the response quicker. Like the draft NDMP, support for these pieces of legislation has waned. Shortsightedness among elected officials has not given the bill the support it needs to become law. Support Legislation Specific disaster legislation must be undergirded by allied laws to be meaningful. There are three bills in parliament awaiting approval. Other legislation— including the Environmental Management and Coordination Act No. 8 of 1999; the Kenya Red Cross Society Act (Cap 256); the Water Act (Cap 372); Grass Fire Act (Cap 327); Petroleum Act (Cap 116); the Explosives Act (Cap 115); the St. Johns Ambulance of Kenya Act (Cap 259); Factories Act (Cap 514); the Local Authority Act (Cap 265); the Chief ’s Act (Cap 128); the Children’s Act; and the Police Act—support emergency operations in different sectors of Kenyan society. The DRR Organization While there are gaps in the legislative context for DRR in Kenya, its organizational context is more developed. Disaster management is a shared function of national and sub-­national government. At the sub-­national level counties are expected to be the first line of response in disasters, and there are well over 20 different agencies conducting some aspects of DRR at this national level (Development Initiatives, 2017), which lead to fragmentation and even gaps in service delivery. Below are some of the most significant organizations involved in ­disaster risk reduction in Kenya. The National Executive The National Executive (NE) sits atop the disaster management organizational structure in Kenya and comprises the national cabinet and is chaired by the president of Kenya (Development Initiatives, 2017). It is the highest decision-­making organ for disaster management, advising the president on executive decisions concerning disasters including the declaration of emergencies or disasters and

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   175 international appeals for assistance (Origa, personal communication, June 29, 2017; Development Initiatives, 2017;). The NE is constitutive of cabinet secretaries (ministers) responsible for national security, county governments, disaster management, foreign affairs, health, water and irrigation, agriculture, livestock, defense, environment, and information, although not limited to these (Development Initiatives, 2017; Origa, personal communication, June 29, 2017). The NE is required to meet at least twice annually but could potentially convene more frequent meetings during periods of disasters. The NE’s functions are carried out as part of the usual duties of the cabinet. The National Disaster Coordinating Committee An executive arm of the NE, the National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC) assists the National Executive in discharging its functions. Comprising principal secretaries of relevant ministries, the NDCC’s core function is to execute the NE policy decisions relating to disaster management. The draft NDMP would mandate the NDCC to meet at least quarterly, with more frequent meetings during disasters (Development Initiatives, 2017, p.  18). Currently, though, meetings are ad hoc and tend to center around catastrophe. Kenya National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction The Kenya National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NPDRR) is a coalition of institutions and organizations involved in disaster risk reduction in Kenya. The NPDRR is a framework for coordinating national efforts on disaster risk reduction and provides the opportunity for different agencies to exchange information and data. As such, it is a critical entity in the DRG landscape in Kenya. It provides technical guidance to decision-­making authorities, including the NE and the NDCC. It also plays a critical role in shaping the Africa Program of Action (Ambundo, personal communication, June 30, 2017). National Disaster Operations Centre In 1998, the government of Kenya through an executive order established the National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 18). The NDOC was created as a response to the 1997/1998 flooding caused by the El Niño rains, and as such the institution has had the responsibility of coordinating a response to the resultant floods. Following the 1998 terrorist bombing in Nairobi, the work of the NDOC was institutionalized. Since then, the NDOC has become the government agency that coordinates response to all disasters in the country, but its full scope of work is much broader. The NDOC monitors all disasters on a 24-hour, seven-­day-per-­week, year-­ round basis, mobilizing national resources to combat rapid-­onset disasters (Development Initiatives, 2017, p.  18) and coordinating and responding to

176   Part II d­ isaster activities. It also collaborates and networks with other stakeholders, sensitizing and informing the public on disaster-­related issues (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 18). The National Drought Management Authority Kenya has had a relatively long history with food insecurity, mainly because of droughts. It is little wonder then that drought management is one of the most developed areas of disaster risk governance. Established in 2012 through the State Corporations Act after the 2011 drought, the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) leads on drought preparedness and response. It is a specialized agency charged to deal with droughts and their effects as well as to mitigate the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector (NDMA, n.d.). The NDMA is also the principal organ for the implementation of all policies relating to drought management. It works to sustain and strengthen the institutional arrangements for drought management and coordinates related activities. The NDMA Act of 2016 gives the Authority a stronger legal status. Among other things, the act offers the NDMA the responsibility for policy, coordination of drought response, putting into place systems of early warning for drought risk and linking the country’s drought management to international disaster processes. Within the NDMA, a Drought Contingency Fund (DCF ) supports livelihoods in communities vulnerable to drought. The DCF ’s primary objective is to facilitate early mitigation efforts to reduce the time between warning of drought stress and response at the county level (NDMA, n.d.). In the NDMA, two coordinating bodies at the national level bring together various stakeholders in drought preparedness, including the Kenya Food Security Meeting and the Kenya Food Security Steering Group. However, as Deya (2017) found, only 23 out of 47 counties under the control of the NDMA are prepared for drought disasters. Relief supplies management and cross-­country coordination are the main contributors. National Cereals and Produce Board The National Cereals and Produce Board Act (Cap 338), together with the Exchequer and Audit Regulations 2002 (Strategic Grain Reserve Trust Fund), requires the government of Kenya to maintain at least 8 million bags of 90 kilograms of grains in stock, or the cash equivalent, at any given time. The reserve forms a critical element of disaster relief strategy, but the stores are not being efficiently managed and are typified by wastage and improper management. Owino (2016) found that some maize grains, for instance, were as much as eight years old and that around 400,000 bags were too old for consumption and would have to be destroyed. There are calls to develop a better solution to grain storage that would minimize spoilage (Owino, 2016), but these calls have gone unheeded. As a result, food insecurity continues to be a problem in sections of the country.

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   177 Box 8.1  Climate Change Exacerbates the Drought Challenges in Kenya Drought remains a significant and enduring challenge to the Kenyan people. Maize production in the coastal areas decreased by 99% compared with the long-­term average, pastoralist communities in the arid and semi-­arid lands (ASAL) counties are losing their livestock, and people have to walk three miles further to access water (Rowlands, 2017). In 2017, the Kenyan government declared a national drought disaster as 23 out of 47 counties affected were impacted by drought conditions (Kibet, 2018). The number of people that are food insecure stood at approximately 3 million, having more than doubled since 2014, and an estimated 357,285 children and pregnant and lactating mothers are acutely malnourished (Kibet, 2018; Rowlands, 2017). Further, recurrent droughts have triggered local conflicts over scarce resources and eroded the ability of communities to cope (Reliefweb, n.d.). Wholesale staple food prices have increased by between 8% and 32% above average in the urban markets as Fall Army Worm pests are devastating crops (Kibet, 2018). Three million people lack access to potable water as a severe drought has dried up water resources in about 23 of Kenya’s 47 counties (Reliefweb, n.d.). Based on their assessments, aid agencies including the World Food Program agree that this is the most severe drought in a decade. With two-­thirds of Kenya’s landmass already desert or semi-­desert, Kenya is already vulnerable to low rainfall; the frequent La Niña and El Niño associated with widespread changes in weather patterns have exacerbated the pastoral, agricultural and human vulnerabilities. Coupled with La Niña, changing weather patterns attributed to climate change are causing less reliable rainfall patterns (Rowlands, 2017). In Kenya’s Rift Valley—the breadbasket of the country—almost a third of the population is suffering from acute malnutrition and health-­related issues, including severe respiratory problems (Kibet, 2018). Kenya’s drought challenges are expected to intensify over the coming years.

Kenya Defense Forces The primary role of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF ) is to defend and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kenya and, as such, integrating the Kenyan Defense Forces and the Kenyan Police into the DRR system makes sense because of the ongoing terrorist threats in the country. The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF ) have played a prominent role in disaster management in Kenya since the bombing of the United States Embassy on August 7, 1998. Article 241 of the Kenyan Constitution establishes the KDF, and the Kenyan Defense Forces Act (Cap 25) of 2012 governs the KDF. A secondary role sees the KDF assisting civilian authorities in times of emergency or disasters, working to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by civil unrest or instability. During emergencies and disasters, the Kenyan Defense Forces Act requires that the KDF work with the National Police Service to protect lives and property. The KDF continues to provide disaster response and

178   Part II preparedness services, including in search and rescue, medical services, and construction works as well as the construction of dams and waterworks (Ministry of Defense, n.d.; see also GOK, n.d.). National Police Service In Kenya, the National Police Service (NPS) has also played a prominent role in responding to sudden onset disasters and other emergencies. The NPS is established under Article 243 of the Constitution of Kenya (GOK, 2011). In addition to its security role, the NPS can be deployed in times of emergency, including disasters. Through practice, the police serve as incident commanders in any sudden-­onset disasters (GOK, 2011). In 2013, the creation of the National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU) within the NPS signaled its core role in national disaster risk reduction and governance efforts. The unit’s core function is to coordinate with other agencies and service providers in the proper management of disaster response in the country (GOK, 2011). Since its establishment, the NDMU has acted as a response team for sudden-­onset disasters, in coordination with the NDOC (GOK, 2011). The current fragmentation has resulted in duplication of efforts and suboptimal approaches to DRG. There are efforts at the national level to coordinate action, but these mostly focus on response. The proposed Disaster Risk Management Bill of 2016, if passed, would provide for a more streamlined and coherent system of DRG in the country. But there might be some resistance as agencies fear a loss of their identities if efforts are centralized (Development Initiatives, 2017).

Actors Besides government agencies, there are several civil society groups and organizations, and regional and international bodies active in disaster risk governance in Kenya. These stakeholders’ contributions have proven invaluable in improving drought outcomes, including improving livelihood and food security strategies. Efforts continue to encourage collaboration and partnerships to realize synergies and promote trust, goodwill, and ownership of drought management. Regional Actors Kenya remains a party to a few regional disaster risk reduction agreements that help to support and guide disaster action in Kenya by offering a strategy for a standard approach to shared risks in the region, providing comprehensive policy architecture for disaster management in Kenya. Three of these are discussed below. The African Union Like international actors, regional actors play an enormous role in disaster risk reduction. Kenya is a member of the African Union (AU) as established under

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   179 the African Union Constitutive Act. Although this Act does not explicitly refer to disaster response, it provides for member states to work towards “eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent” (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015, pp.  16–17). The Act also provides for some decision-­making organs within the AU. The highest decision-­making organ is the executive council, which coordinates and makes decisions on policies common to the member states, including environmental protection, humanitarian action, and disaster response and relief (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015, pp. 16–17). Further, various agreements and guidelines developed under the AU provide for disaster risk reduction and management. The Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction was developed with support from the AU, and its new Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) provides directives on disaster management in Kenya. These initiatives were adopted by the highest decision-­making organ of the AU in 2004 (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015). The strategy provides a framework for a standard approach to shared risks in the region (ibid.). Inter-­Governmental Authority on Development Another critical regional mechanism for Kenya is the Inter-­Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD was explicitly established in 1996 to work on drought management in the region. Since 1996, the organization has rapidly transformed its mandate, extending it to the general development of the member states, including conflict management (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015). IGAD has developed some policies and programs that touch on disaster management, especially drought. For example, in 2002 IGAD adopted the Disaster Risk Management Program that provides comprehensive policy architecture for disaster management (Origa, personal communication, June 29, 2017; Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015). In particular, IGAD requires member states to establish general national disaster management agencies to ensure coordination among member states in disaster response. In 2012, the member states also adopted a framework for ending drought emergencies in the region through the IGAD Drought Disaster and Sustainability Initiative (IDDSI). The East African Community Kenya is also a member of the East African Community (EAC), which the EAC Treaty (1999; enforced 2000, amended 2006) created. Article 112(1)(d) provides that in cooperating on matters dealing with the environment, partner states will “take necessary disaster preparedness, management, protection and mitigation measures especially for the control of natural and man-­made disasters” (EAC Treaty, 1999). The EAC also adopted a disaster risk reduction and management strategy that provides the policy architecture for disaster management. The

180   Part II approach seeks to move disaster management in the region from response-­based to a prevention and forecasting model (EAC Treaty, 1999). In addition to the EAC Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Strategy, the EAC Climate Change Policy, Strategy, and Master Plan provides a robust policy framework for disaster management. It provides for measures for building and strengthening the ability of communities to deal with the reality of climate change through adaptive measures (EAC Treaty, 1999). The DRR strategy adopted in 2006 includes early warning, preparedness, emergency response, and post-­disaster recovery programs. The EAC Food Security Action Plan also provides a mechanism for coordination and implementation of joint programs for addressing food insecurity in the region (EAC Treaty, 1999). The plan is developed in line with the EAC Treaty requiring member states to work on a mechanism for the establishment of food security and rational agricultural production. International Actors The National Disaster Management Policy (NDMP) builds on global and regional effort and action plans for disaster risk reduction. Specifically, the NDMP builds on initiatives such as the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World of 1994, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation issued at the World Summit on Sustainable Development of 2002, and the Millennium Development Goals of 2000. The Copenhagen Conference of 2009 and the Mexico Conference of 2010 on climate change as well as the Hyogo Declaration and Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015 also inform that policy. Alignment with these initiatives boosts legislative and programming action in Kenya, which includes funding and technical support. The World Bank’s work in Kenya to accelerate sustainable growth, reduce inequality, and manage resource scarcity supports the government’s Vision 2030 development strategy. Take as an example the bank’s alignment of its work with the country’s big four priorities in universal healthcare, affordable housing, food security, and manufacturing (World Bank, 2019). This work has supported a reduction in key development challenges such as poverty and overall economic and social vulnerability, which have remained intractable in Kenya (World Bank, 2019). Although not enough by itself to improve overall disaster risk governance in Kenya, Vision 2030 has been instrumental in advancing DRR in Kenya institutionally. For example, the national platform promoted by the UNISDR is the fulcrum of the disaster risk governance system in Kenya. Moreover, the Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the World Humanitarian Summit all aim at improving the economic and social welfare of communities and countries and play a significant role in DRR (UNDRR, 2017). Implementation of these international agreements moves in line with the country’s constitution and strategic plans such as Vision 2030 (Origa, personal communication, June 27, 2017).

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   181 Coordinating the DRG Network The demonstrable commitment and participation of a large number of stakeholders in the current disaster management efforts in Kenya indicate the real goodwill to address the issues among civil society agencies (Draft National Policy for Disaster Management in Kenya, 2009). The National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC) assists the National Executive in discharging its functions by coordinating the critical ministries involved in DRR. But there is no harmonization of disaster risk management activities, resulting in duplication of functions and competition. Also, there exists a weak framework for coordinating the effort of the civil society and government agencies. Interviews conducted by practitioners show significant weaknesses regarding coordination, risks of duplication, and bureaucratic strongholds that have negatively hampered DRR work (Kenya Red Cross et al., 2015). As an example, Kahuha (2012) found that although several organizations include natural disaster management in their strategic plans, the process is not harmonized and different organizations implement their strategies independently. The net effect is a reduction in the overall efficacy of disaster risk management. There is, then, a need to reorganize the natural disaster risk management structure to enable stakeholders better to satisfy and deliver on their mandates. None of these solutions is feasible without a proper governance mechanism. There is neither a coordinated policy framework nor an up-­to-date legal basis for the current disaster management work in Kenya, as most are pending approval. I have found, and several practitioners (e.g., see Development Initiatives, 2017; Kahuha, 2012) agree, that what exists is partly a spontaneous disaster response system, which has been proving inefficient. With this fragmentation comes a lack of confidence in the current systems; humanitarian actors have established other working groups to coordinate disaster preparedness more effectively. For example, the Inter-­Agency Working Group on Disaster Preparedness for East and Central Africa (IAWG) brings together INGOs in the humanitarian sector in the country to aid efficient disaster response. The group does not include government and is seen as a system for INGOs to coordinate operations and share knowledge (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 17). DRG efforts in Kenya are coordinated mostly around hazards that commonly affect Kenya and that are grouped by broad generic types into clusters. For instance, those environmentally triggered events such as climate-­related droughts, floods, storms, and landslides are grouped. So too are geologic disasters, including volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and earthquakes; human-­made disasters such as socioeconomic, technologic-­industrial, or political conflicts; biological disasters including epidemics and diseases of pests (human, livestock, and crops), and so on (Development Initiatives, 2017). The groupings mean that disaster risk reduction in Kenya remains in silos, needing a governance framework to bring the elements together, with drought management, especially in drought response, being the best-­run part of the DRG system in Kenya. However, it too is not without challenges in areas such as food management.

182   Part II Within the government structure, the coordinating committee—the National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC)—is inefficient. With the proposed DRM policy, the Ministry of State for Special Programs in the Office of the President would work proactively to coordinate DRR initiatives within a unified policy framework at all levels (Draft National Policy for Disaster Management in Kenya, 2009). This approach is more coherent than the former outdated and unintegrated one that resulted in duplication of efforts and wasteful use of resources (see the Draft National Policy for Disaster Management in Kenya, 2009). Moreover, the response posture in Kenya exposes residents to higher risks and slower recovery. Funding The organizations charged with handling disasters in the country continuously struggle with inadequate budgetary allocation and conditional donor support, such that the amount of money made available for disaster management is far less than the actual amounts needed (Kenya Draft National Policy for Disaster Management, 2009). Resource allocations for disaster preparedness appear to be increasing, mainly due to increasing aid funding (Development Initiatives, 2017). In 2016/2017, disaster-­related projects formed close to 2.5% of the total budget—20.5 billion Kenyan shillings (US$205 million)—and this sum is projected to increase to 2.6% in 2017/2018 (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 26). Kenya’s government provides funds for disaster preparedness and prevention, mainly through ministries, state departments and county governments, to fund aspects of disaster risk management. These cut across the Ministries of Interior, Devolution and Planning, Health, Agriculture, Environment, and Water. The government in its 2016/2017 national budget allocated around KES 20.5 billion (US$205 million) on disaster preparedness. However, allocations from the national and sub-­national budgets need be increased to meet demands. Counties, for instance, invest in disaster preparedness through the county budgets, but amounts allocated suffer because of competing needs in emergency services, human resources development, and equipment. Continued fund inadequacy means that during times of emergency, funds have to be reallocated from other development priorities, undermining efforts in those areas. The frequency of disasters in Kenya has increased, resulting in available funds being spread too thinly to be effective. This rising demand for funding, especially in drought management, has made government increasingly reliant on development partners to fund disaster management initiatives. However, with an ever-­increasing number of crises around the globe, Kenya finds itself in a precarious funding position. Potential reduction in national earnings owing to reduced exports, diminished tourist arrivals, persistent inflation, and other complicating trade relations (Development Initiatives, 2017) compound the disaster risk governance problems in Kenya.

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   183 Government Contingency Fund for Disasters The government has established a disaster contingency fund similar to the contingency funds and emergency funds allocated via the County Emergency Funds Act. The country is required to make an annual allocation of up to 2% of the total budget for disaster response, funded mainly by the EU through the Ministry of Finance. The draft DRM law has also proposed a DRM fund, which will be no less than 2% of the country’s annual revenue. The draft NDMA also has a drought contingency fund for drought response. Donor Funding Deya (2017) found that donor funding for DRR in Kenya has increased steadily over the years to US$27 million (KES 2.7 billion) in 2014. Multilateral institutions contributed the majority (63.5%) of this disaster aid to Kenya (Development Initiatives, 2017, pp.  27–28). In 2014, EU institutions contributed the majority (56.1%) of multilateral aid, amounting to US$15.1 million (KES 1.51 billion), mainly toward drought preparedness. The United States gave the second highest amount (14.4%) followed by Sweden (13.6%) (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 26). That said, international funding does not remain stable over time. The proportion of aid delivered by OECD countries in the form of bilateral assistance has decreased from 71.8% in 2009 to 36.5% in 2014 (Development Initiatives, 2017, pp.  27–28). Moreover, in the recent past security concerns by aid workers, including those at the UN as well as NGOs, saw them scaling down their operations. Overseas support from some quarters for DRR in Kenya is dwindling (Deya, 2017).

Incentives Environmental conservation under the social pillar of Vision 2030 uses economic incentives and public–private partnerships (Kenya Vision 2030) to encourage conservation. Conservation is an integral part of Kenya’s drought management strategy, which is the focus of disaster risk reduction in Kenya. The incentives are modest but constitute a step in the right direction. Besides those, I have found no evidence that Kenya has in place any incentives to induce DRR behavior.

Soft Institutions Norms In the last 20 years or so the attitudes to disaster risk reduction and management have shown some movement towards the careful management of disasters, and away from mere response after the fact. The country has signed on to various

184   Part II regional and international DRR frameworks in a strategic effort to leverage these to build the national DRR infrastructure. However, disaster reduction legislation has been drafted but not approved, and organizations have been established, but not resourced to the extent needed. Responsibility has been delegated to the county level with not enough capacity to be meaningful, and at the local level residents are not integrated into the county governance system, while the local level, the first line of disaster response, is not adequately integrated and strengthened as a vital part of the county system. The norms are not easily changed by simply signing on to international DRR frameworks or ad hoc legislation. Likewise, decentralizing action and responsibility within the context of inadequate capacity and resources contexts is futile. Building norms that are friendly to DRR require deliberately orchestrated efforts, which then will create a good foundation for improving disaster risk governance. The soft institutions set the tone for DRG and create the impetus for legislative action. More people will see the need to get involved in DRG and will more likely defend the policies and legislation that are developed to reduce disaster risks—hence setting the tone about the importance of DRR and hence the need for DRG. If the hard-­institutional norms are developed from outside of their cultural context of the operation, potential conflicts will occur. The fact of being party to international frameworks and regional DRR agreements, especially the recent iterations, e.g., Hyogo, Sendai and SDGs, are good examples. There is no broad consensus on their importance to everyday people’s lives and so few people are willing to defend them. The outside frameworks and agreements, for instance, call for updating or replacing legislation that is built from pre-­prepackaged guidelines developed outside of Kenya. Inside of the country, disaster response, not DRR, is the norm.

The State of Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya The current state of disaster risk governance in Kenya calls for urgent attention to the disaster risk governance fundamentals (Table 8.2). Too much focus is on disaster response to the detriment of a more comprehensive approach. Also, heavy focus on drought management to the neglect of other risks and low political will from the national government epitomize DRG in Kenya. Kenya provides incentives for environmental conservation, but not generally for risk reduction, and its legislative context is weak. A Note on Devolution Devolving DRR responsibility to the county level in Kenya when it lacks the sub-­national and local capacity to work is problematic. Devolution is supposed to make service delivery more reliable and more efficient since the sub-­national governments are closer to the people and understand them best. It also involves making local and regional public managers more autonomous and more accountable, ultimately improving efficiency and saving money.

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   185 Table 8.2  Kenya Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix Key Governance Elements

Kenya

SOFT INSTITUTION Culture 1 Basic assumptions and values about disasters and DRR and what to do about them 2 DRR norms: A Routine media coverage B Schools and community disaster education programs C Public education and awareness-building D Community leaders and residents with knowledge of importance of DR and importance to take steps to reduce E Drills, preparation, early warning systems F Post-event assessment, learning G Questioning, continuous improvements

1–

1 1– 1– 1–

HARD INSTITUTION Legislation 1 Enshrined in constitution 2 DR legislation on the books and implemented 3 Support legislation undergirds specific DR legislation 4 Integration and mainstreaming of legislation in development laws and planning 5 Policy implementation, monitoring, oversight Organization 1 Organization with specific disaster focus 2 Operates at multiple levels, integrated, national coverage 3 Appropriate capabilities and knowledge, including local knowledge 4 Well positioned in government bureaucracy 5 Senior politicians chair important committees 6 Appropriately staffed, facilities, technology 7 Routine funding 8 Contingency funding 9 Data collection, integration, knowledge management Actors 1 Home-grown, multiple levels represented and active 2 Community residents and organizations with defined roles 3 Regional platforms active 4 Global platforms (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, SDG) 5 Coordinated efforts, national system 6 Coordinated efforts with all actors, cooperation agreements

1 1– 1– 1–

1 1– 1 1– 1– 1– 1– 1– 1 1 1 1–

Incentives 1 Sales taxes 2 Tax rebates 3  Penalties and fines 4  Relocation incentives, regulation enforcement, etc. Total DRG Score Sum of plusses and minuses Net DRG Score

21 14 7

Source: The literature on disaster governance and institutions as well as Priority Number 2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction help to derive the institutional factors in the matrix.

186   Part II Forty-­seven new county governments are now in charge of overseeing functions that were once reserved for the national government, including disaster risk reduction, health care provision, pre-­primary education, and maintenance of local roads. In turn, these county governments should receive a share of national revenues. The majority of the national revenues collected—84.5%—is allocated to the national government, while only 15% is set aside for counties (Kimenyi, 2013). Counties receive a greater share of revenues the larger their population, the higher their poverty rate and the larger they are in landmass. The remaining 0.5% is reserved as an equalization fund (Kimenyi, 2013) that works to support the income of various classes of persons across counties. However, they are also being expected to mobilize revenue from other sources, such as taxes on property and entertainment within the counties. With intense long-­term drought and weakened livelihood options, revenue-­generation in counties is greatly diminished and county-­level capacity remains under-­ resourced and incapable of undertaking the necessary disaster planning and management activities by itself. The Kenyan government would be wise to consider that, especially in its early stages, devolution and other efforts at decentralization in developing countries are often more like deconcentration because service delivery mechanisms are merely local offices of central governments rather than independent local governments accountable to local constituents (Litvack et al., 1998). Kenya’s current devolution strategy displays these tendencies.

Notes 1 By World Bank standards for the 2019 fiscal year, low-­income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of US$995 or less in 2017; lower middle-­income economies are those with a GNI per capita between US$996 and US$3,895; upper middle-­income economies are those with a GNI per capita between US$3,896 and US$12,055; high-­income economies are those with a GNI per capita of US$12,056 or more (World Bank, n.d.). A stable macroeconomic environment, low oil prices, earlier favorable harvest, rebound in tourism, strong remittance inflows, and an ambitious public investment drive in Kenya since 2011 have together led to this improved designation (World Bank, 2017). In 2016, Kenya showed economic growth of an estimated 5.9%—a five-­year high (World Bank, 2017). These indicators make Kenya one of the fastest growing economies in sub-­ Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2017). In the medium term, economic growth is projected to rebound to 5.8% in 2018 and 6.1% in 2019, consistent with Kenya’s underlying growth potential (World Bank, 2017). 2 Where available, disaster data come from Kenya; however, with a lack of data collection and management capacity, much of the disaster data for this chapter comes from databases outside of Kenya. 3 See for example Kenya Food Security Outlook 2017 at http://fews.net/sites/default/ files/documents/reports/KE%20FSO%20Feb%20-%20Sep%202017_Final.pdf. 4 For a more in-­depth analysis of the drought relief management discussion see https:// foodtank.com/news/2017/04/food-­insecurity-rise-­new-collaborative-­report-provides-­ global-picture/. 5 The GDI measures gender inequalities in achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: health (measured by female and male life expectancy at birth),

Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   187 education (measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and mean years for adults aged 25 years and older); and command over economic resources (measured by female and male estimated GNI per capita) (see UNDP, 2018).

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Disaster Risk Governance in Kenya   189 Oxfam (2017). A Climate in Crisis: How Climate Change is Making Drought and Humanitarian Disaster Worse in East Africa. Accessed at www.oxfam.org/sites/www. oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/mb-­climate-crisis-­east-africa-­drought-270417-en.pdf (March 11, 2018). Parry, J. E., Echeverria, D., Dekens, J., & Maitima, J. (2012). Climate Risks, Vulnerability and Governance in Kenya: A Review. Commissioned by Climate Risk Management Technical Assistance Support Project (CRM TASP), joint initiative of Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and Bureau for Development Policy of UNDP. Accessed at www.eldis.org/document/A64511 (December 19, 2017). Reliefweb (n.d.). Kenya: Drought 2014–2018. Accessed at https://reliefweb.int/disaster/ dr-­2014-000131-ken (March 12, 2018) Rowlands, L. (2017). Climate Change Making Kenya’s Droughts More Severe. Accessed at www.ipsnews.net/2017/03/climate-­change-making-­kenyas-droughts-­more-severe/ (March 12, 2018). Shifa, M., & Leibbrandt, M. (2017). Urban poverty and inequality in Kenya. Urban Forum, 28: 363. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-017-9317-0. Thuita, G., & Ouma, M. (2019). Inequality and rural poverty: innovative agricultural practices for sustainable and social development in Kenya. In: Emerging Economic Models for Global Sustainability and Social Development (pp. 84–97). Hershey, PA: IGI Global. UNDP Kenya (2010). 2010 Annual Report: Renewing the Hope of Kenyans. Accessed at www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/library/annual-­reports/undp-­kenya-annual-­ report-2012.html.  UNDP (2016). Building Resilient Communities: 2016 UNDP Kenya in Focus. Accessed at www.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Annual%20Reports/UNDP%20Kenya%20 2016%20Annual%20Report_clickable%20version.pdf (March 20, 2018). UNDP (2018). Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update: Briefing Note for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update, Kenya. Accessed at http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-­notes/KEN.pdf. UNDRR (2017). Meeting: Kenya National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. Accessed at www.unisdr.org/we/inform/events/54074. UN World Water Assessment Program (UNWWAP) (2006). Case Study: Kenya National Water Development Report. Prepared for the 2nd UN World Water Development Report, ‘Water: A Shared Responsibility’ (2006). Accessed at www.ircwash.org/sites/ default/files/WWAP-­2006-Kenya.pdf. World Bank (n.d.). World Bank Country and Lending Groups: Country Classification. Accessed at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-­ bank-country-­and-lending-­groups.  World Bank (2009). Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment: Executive Summary and Synthesis Report. (Report No.44190KE). Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region. Accessed at http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3081. World Bank (2013). Kenya Economic Update: Times to Shift Gears. Edition number 8. Accessed at www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Kenya/ kenya-­economic-update-­june-2013.pdf.  World Bank (2017, October 10). The World Bank in Kenya. Accessed at www.world bank.org/en/country/kenya/overview (February 2, 2018). World Bank (2018, April 10). Poverty Incidence in Kenya Declined Significantly, but Unlikely to be Eradicated by 2030. Accessed at www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/ publication/kenya-­e conomic-update-­p overty-incidence-­i n-kenya-­d eclinedsignificantly-­but-unlikely-­to-be-­eradicated-by-­2030 (December 26, 2018).

190   Part II World Bank (2019). Overview: World Bank in Kenya. Accessed at www.worldbank.org/ en/country/kenya/overview. World Resources Institute; Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Kenya; Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Kenya; & International Livestock Research Institute (2007). Nature’s Benefits in Kenya: An Atlas of Ecosystems and Human Well-­ Being. Washington, DC and Nairobi: World Resources Institute. Accessed at http://pdf. wri.org/kenya_atlas_fulltext_150.pdf.

9 Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar

Since the 1970s Zanzibar has displayed significant vulnerabilities to natural and human-­made hazards (terrorism, piracy, accidents). It has a total land area of 2,560 square kilometers. The largest island, Unguja, is 1,464 square kilometers, followed by Pemba, which is 985 square kilometers in area (Mangora et al., 2015). Unguja and Pemba are surrounded by numerous other islets along the East African coast. The islands are mainly low lying, with the highest point being 120 meters on Unguja, leaving them vulnerable to tropical cyclones and tidal flooding (Mangora et al., 2015). Due to its geographical location and limited land area, Zanzibar is highly susceptible to the impacts of climate change, sea-­level rise, and seawater intrusion into underground aquifers, among other extreme events (Mangora et al., 2015). Zanzibar is a semi-­autonomous territory of Tanzania, one of the sub-­Saharan Sudano–Sahelian belt region countries prone to desertification (Nanjira, 1997). The region is a zone of the arid and semi-­arid belt extending over 2,600 miles from the Atlantic Ocean north to Mauritius. The risk profile of this region has worsened since the 1940s and 1950s. Drought, desertification, and pest infestation inflict the highest toll on human life, but flooding is the most significant risk, with the residential sector experiencing over 85% of the total losses (Nanjira, 1997). Modeled average annual rainfall from non-­tropical cyclone events is 1,567 mm, ranging from a minimum of 839 mm to a maximum of 2,343 mm (GFDRR, 2016); most of the rain falls between April and May. Regions in the southwest of Unguja have the highest potential for flooding (GFDRR, 2016). In 2013, the GDP of Zanzibar stood at US$1.16 billion; per capita GDP was only US$848 million, and average annual losses from flooding were US$1.9 million (GFDRR, 2016). Extreme flooding events could take the loss estimates much higher—a 100-year event could result in over US$13 million in damage, over 1% of Zanzibar’s GDP (GFDRR, 2016). Although per person losses from disasters that result from natural hazards in Zanzibar are relatively low compared with other small island states like Dominica, reports (World Bank, 2017; GFDRR, 2016) show that Zanzibar loses around US$2.2 million annually in direct losses and emergency costs (Table 9.1) associated with natural hazards. Zanzibar has no history of significant earthquake losses or casualties, although earthquakes are very common in the southwest

192   Part II Box 9.1  Zanzibar Faces Challenges in Preparing for Climate Change Climate change poses significant development challenges for Zanzibar. In Zanzibar, individual annual climate-­change-related events are becoming more frequent and cause average economic costs of over 1% of gross domestic product (GDP), reduce long-­term growth and affect significant numbers of people and disrupt their livelihoods (World Bank, 2015). Future economic costs related to climate change could be large, equivalent to a further 1–2% of GDP per year by 2030 (GCAP, 2011, in World Bank, 2015). Already feeling the effects of climate change, Zanzibar has set out to prepare its institutional context. The main feature is its Climate Change Strategy of 2014. The strategy is crucial in enhancing Zanzibar’s climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction agenda. The strategy aims to build climate change adaptation capacity; enhance institutional and coordination arrangements to adequately address climate change; enhance participation in climate change mitigation activities; and mobilize financial support to tackle climate change (Ampaire et al., 2016; World Bank, 2015). However, significant challenges remain (World Bank, 2015): •

• • • •

Securing financing to support climate resilience has been a challenge. Funding levels are insufficient and stand at a fraction of the US$600 million in annually required support for adaptation alone (World Bank, 2015). And as it stands, more than 65% of climate finance is directed toward mitigation activities (World Bank, 2015). There is little systematic mainstreaming at strategic or programmatic levels since climate adaptation and mitigation has been predominantly done through standalone project-­level interventions (World Bank, 2015). The disconnection between national and local governments is hindering implementation and coordination of climate change action from the national level to the local level (Ampaire et al., 2016). Limited climate change knowledge across all levels leads to low adaptation responses to climate change among stakeholders. Low country-­level institutional capacities minimize effective implementation of climate change initiatives.

Indian Ocean region where the islands sit. The two primary sources of seismic activity are the mid-­Indian Ridge in the Indian Ocean and the East African Rift System (GFDRR, 2016). So, there is a possibility of earthquakes occurring, and when they do, they could cause significant damage. Zanzibar has experienced two earthquakes in recent history, one in 1977 and the other in 2005, but no damage was reported in either case (GFDRR, 2016). The small islands that make up Zanzibar also display high social and economic vulnerabilities. Zanzibar’s total population was around 1.5 million people in 2018, with an annual population growth rate of 3.1% (Government of Tanzania and Office of the Chief Government Statistician Ministry of Finance and Planning Zanzibar, 2018). Rapid urbanization and uneven economic development plague

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   193 Table 9.1  Annual Direct Losses (US$) 2016, Zanzibar Natural Disasters

Total Direct Losses

Emergency Costs

Losses Per Person**

Earthquakes Floods Tropical Cyclones

$140,000 $1,900,000 $9,000

$23,000 $440,000 $20,000

$0.12 $1.80 $0.02

Source: Adapted from World Bank et al. (2016). Risk Profile Zanzibar p.  3 www.gfdrr.org/sites/ default/files/publication/drp_zanzibar.pdf. Note ** Calculated using a population of 1.3 million for 2016.

the islands, and in places such as Zanzibar City deepens the physical and urban vulnerabilities (World Bank, 2017). The rate and level of urban growth present red flags for Zanzibar because its population growth vastly outstrips economic growth. Zanzibar City in Unguja houses the largest population of around 208,000 people (World Bank, 2017). An annual population growth rate of over 3% (IRINNews, 2007) with weaker than expected economic growth of less than 5% and an inflation rate close to 10% (Zanzibar Vision 2020) threatens to raise vulnerabilities even further in Zanzibar. The poverty level1 in Zanzibar fell from 60% in 2007 to around 47% in 2016 (World Bank, 2017), but varies across the islands. Deprivation in Zanzibar stands at over 40%, with 17% of the population displaying severe levels of deprivation (Table 9.2). The more rural Pemba has not fared as well as the more urban Unguja; Pemba’s poverty rate increased from 48% in 2010 to around 55% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Unguja registered the steepest drop in poverty by over 8%, from 26% in 2010 to 18.4% in urban centers, but by only 3% in rural areas outside of Zanzibar City in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). The reduction in poverty in Unguja has been attributed to increased returns to household businesses, improved productivity in the agricultural as well as in non-­farm sectors, and improvements in the levels of education attained by heads of household and their spouses (World Bank, 2017). Still, even in Unguja large segments of the population continue to cluster around the poverty line and could Table 9.2  Multidimensional Poor and Vulnerable Population in Zanzibar Zanzibar Severe Deprivation (%) Moderate Deprivation (%) Vulnerable (%) Non-Deprived (%)

17 27 31 25

Source: World Bank (2017). Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/778051509021 699937/pdf/120689-WP-P164456-PUBLIC-11-3-17-25-10-2017-20-15-5-ZanzibarPovertyAssess ment.pdf.

194   Part II quickly fall back into poverty given minor market shocks that affect the price of its spices or a catastrophic disaster.

Disaster Risk Governance Reports from the UNISDR (2015) show that Zanzibar has made good progress between 2007 and 2013 in DRR, particularly in crucial areas of governance and institutional arrangements. Overall economic losses due to disasters have been trending upwards despite progress in DRR policies prompted by the country’s adoption of the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015 (UNISDR, 2015), the recently implemented Sendai Framework (2015–2030), and governance and institutional progress on the island. The following sections assess these investments and their results.

Investments in Hard Institutions Legislation The Zanzibar Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act No. 2 of 2015 was part of a broader set of processes to build good governance in Zanzibar. Unlike the 2003 Act, Act No. 2 establishes the legal framework for disaster risk reduction and management in Zanzibar, outlining the institutional arrangements, authorities and functions, and financial provisions for disaster management and the reduction of underlying risk factors (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Further, Act No. 2 establishes disaster management policies, regulations, plans, strategies, and guidelines for ensuring timely and effective response to the disaster, facilitates immediate disbursement of funds and other resources during emergencies and/or disaster, and oversees the application of the disaster management plans during any period of natural disaster or emergencies. Moreover, Act No. 2 gives necessary directives for the plans, policies, and strategies to be implemented and supports the coordination of all disaster relief operations and preparedness measures; it also strengthens the government’s capacity to deal with disasters and emergencies (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). Also, the framework supports the mobilization of resources for effective disaster management from within and outside of Zanzibar (ibid.). Some practitioners have seen the approach used under Act No. 2 in Zanzibar (ibid.) as a top–down approach that is still too focused on response, not with planning or integrating disaster risk in development planning. And although initiatives such as the local government reform formulate a policy for non-­ governmental organizations (NGOs) working in DRR and support enhanced public access to information (African Development Bank, 2005), disaster actors are concerned that the legal frameworks and processes in place do not facilitate broad public and community consultations.

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   195 Disaster Management Policy of 2011 The Disaster Management Policy of 2011 helps to provide guidance on how to handle disasters in order to minimize their effects on citizens’ lives, livelihoods, and property (see Ame, 2015). The policy proposes the establishment of a Zanzibar Disaster Management Fund (ZDMF ) to ensure that enough resources are available for disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (UNISDR, 2015). The ZDMF is financed through allocations by the House of Representatives, donations or grants made both within and outside of Zanzibar, donations by the public, and imposed fines. However, setting aside funds to plan for and respond to disasters without also setting aside funds to shore up critical infrastructure remains a pressing concern. In fact, a 2015 UNISDR assessment shows that even with the ZDMF, critical infrastructure remained insufficiently protected against disaster risks, both immediately and in the long term, as the effects of climate change intensify. Also lacking are contingency financing mechanisms that would give the government a source of funds to immediately respond to disasters and humanitarian crises when they occur (UNISDR, 2015). The Zanzibar Disaster Communication Strategy of 2011 The Zanzibar Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (ZEPRP) of 2013 is a national multi-­hazards functional plan that sets forth appropriate actions to be taken in response to an emergency or major disaster, including the potential or imminent threat of any event. The plan facilitates coordination for the delivery of resources and services necessary to deal with the consequences of an emergency or major disaster. It describes the disaster situation and planning assumptions, the concept of operations, response and recovery actions, and the organizational and specific assignments of responsibilities to the departments and government agencies tasked with local response communication (Ame, 2015). The National Operational Guidelines of 2013 The National Operational Guidelines of 2013 provide a coordinated framework to guide the implementation of the 2011 Disaster Management Policy. The guidelines now incorporate changes in the disaster management policy that would ensure community resilience to disasters. Further, the changes are in line with the five-­year National Disaster Management Policy Implementation Strategy and the Disaster Management Policy Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, and the Framework for Action 2005–2015 (PreventionWeb, 2015). The Zanzibar Climate Change Strategy of 2014 The Zanzibar Climate Change Strategy (ZCCS) of 2014 presents the vision of a sustainable and climate-­resilient Zanzibar. Realizing that Zanzibar is already

196   Part II suffering significant impacts from current climate variability and is periodically affected by the extremes associated with El Niño and La Niña, the ZCCS is a “response framework” for addressing vulnerabilities, impacts, and adaptation, for current climate variability and future climate change. It considers the potential opportunities for low-­carbon sustainable development and is aligned with existing government development policies. Efforts are under way to prepare a Zanzibar Climate Change Action Plan (ZCCAP) that will guide implementation of the ZCCS. The ZCCS provides a coherent and consistent view of the vulnerability and risks of current climate variability. Among other things, it establishes a response framework to enhance Zanzibar’s economic, social and environmental resilience and helps build capacity, raise awareness, and promote climate-­aware and sustainable livelihoods for all of society, but especially local communities. Moreover, it proposes ways to develop and strengthen the institutional and coordination arrangements for addressing climate change and developing plans to mobilize financial support (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2013). Moreover, guiding principles such as participatory approaches, community-­ based capacity awareness and the consideration of gender and vulnerable groups as key cross-­cutting issues are incorporated into the strategy (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2013). Even with the ZCCS in place, the problems remain several-­fold. First, there is limited climate change knowledge across the board, which has stymied adaptation responses to climate change among stakeholders. Second, the institutional capacities to implement and strengthen the process across the country is lacking. Third, poor coordination from the national to the local level remains a challenge and negatively impacts implementation of actions around climate change (see Ampaire et al., 2016) Zanzibar’s Development Vision 2020 Several new and existing support legislations bolster the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2015. Zanzibar’s Development Vision 2020 document recognizes that the impacts of disasters and emergencies might be severe in Zanzibar if prevention, preparedness, and response capacities are not in place to deal with such emergencies (Shein, 2011, p.  70). A point worth noting here is that Vision 2020 also recognized the vital role that international cooperation networks might play in facilitating access to specialist expertise needed to build up disaster reduction capacity, including providing early warning support for all impending disasters. Vision 2020 encourages continued mobilization of domestic and international resources for disaster reduction activities. (Shein, 2011, pp. 70–71). It is a significant visioning document that is aligned with the tenets of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an interrelated set of 17 goals aimed at transforming the world through targeted interventions around 169 targets in key development sectors. Vision 2020 in Zanzibar aligns with the SDGs’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030).

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   197 Zanzibar’s Vision 2020 presents a picture of what the country could look like in 2020 as it works to become a middle-­income country by that year (Shein, 2011). It aims to motivate, inspire, and galvanize the population to work together to achieve this dream. A review of the progress made since 2000 shows that by 2011 swift progress had been shown in infrastructures, especially the main roads network, and accessibility to health services, including easier access to government-­run primary health care units and education enrolment, both of which have improved substantially (Shein, 2011, p.  ii). At the same time, the assessment showed that the country still needed to make a more concerted effort to conserve the natural environment and to invest substantially in institutional reforms. Some (see, for example, Shein, 2011, p.  iii) saw the lack of enabling policies and laws as a hindrance to progress. Importantly, objective number six of Vision 2020 recognizes, supports, and facilitates the role of all internationally recognized institutions and their national member societies in disaster prevention, preparedness, and response at domestic and regional levels on the island. It also encourages continued mobilization of domestic and international resources for disaster reduction activities (Shein, 2011, pp. 70–71). Vision 2020 also sets out broad parameters for enhanced prevention, preparedness and response capacities against natural and human-­made disasters at all levels. It promotes and encourages broad participation in disaster preparedness planning and builds a culture of safety and cleanliness. Perhaps most importantly, Vision 2020 calls for the establishment of a comprehensive information system that would identify and assess the risk involved in disaster-­prone areas; it establishes reliable communication channels and decision-­making capabilities among the actors in pre-­event disaster management and preparedness activities. However, in related areas such as crisis communication, many residents rely on elderly community leaders in their local areas for disaster information (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). Moreover, Ame (2015) found that disaster and early warning information disseminated community-­wide depends heavily upon indigenous knowledge alone, which can sometimes be unreliable. Support Legislation The Second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP II) The report on the national progress in implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action (2011–2013) highlights deficiencies in implementation mainly because of reduced capacity issues. Examples include the Strategic Goals 1, 2 and 3. Strategic Goal 1 calls for more effective integration of disaster risk considerations into sustainable development policies and programming at all levels (PreventionWeb, 2015). It emphasizes disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and vulnerability reduction. Strategic Goal 2 focuses on the development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms, and capacities at all levels, particularly at the

198   Part II c­ ommunity level, which can systematically contribute to building resilience to hazards. These two areas are steps in the right direction, but early experience is showing that critical units such as the Department of Policy, Planning, and Research unit in the Ministry of Finance and Planning remain ill-­equipped to support their functions (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). Strategic Goal 3 focuses on the systematic incorporation of risk reduction into the design and implementation of comprehensive emergency management programs (PreventionWeb, 2015). However, the fact that some strategic initiatives under this goal—including emergency responses and plans, as well as standard procedures to be followed by all disaster stakeholders during times of ­emergency—have been centralized in the Disaster Management Department using the Tanzania Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (TEPRP) and Tanzania Disaster Communication Strategy (TDCS) (PreventionWeb, 2015) should concern many. The Zanzibari islands are separated from mainland Tanzania by water and, as we saw in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria in 2017, could be cut off for extended periods, making a disaster situation worse. National Forest Resources Policy The proposed Zanzibar National Forest Resources Policy signals an understanding for a new direction in Zanzibar’s forest resources management. The document more clearly articulates a strategy for community forestry (CoFMAs) in Policy Statements 6 to 9 (Mangora, 2015) by providing the legal framework for community groups and government to both own and manage forests and woodlands for their benefit (National Forest Resources Policy). The policy aims to protect, conserve, and develop forest resources for social, economic and environmental benefits of present and future generations of the people of Zanzibar.2 The Environmental Management Act No. 3 of 2015 The Environmental Management Act No. 3 of 2015 repeals the Environmental Management for Sustainable Development Act No. 2 of 1996. Act No. 3 is a more comprehensive piece of legislation than the 1996 bill in that it articulates better provisions relating to the conservation, protection, and management of the environment. Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction are the central issues in this law. Section 13 discusses climate change governance, including implementing agencies and committees, while section 14 spells out funding arrangements, including funding authority and sources and uses of these funds. Section 15 spells out what constitutes offenses and penalties for infringement of the law. The DRG Organization In 2003 the Disaster Management Act No. 2 was passed in Zanzibar. The Act stipulated the establishment of the Disaster Management Department (DMD) as

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   199 the national disaster management coordinating body. The DMD was established three years later in 2006. The Act also introduced the National Disaster Management Committee, which has responsibility for overseeing and coordinating government efforts on disasters and the preparation for disaster operations (Ame, 2015). However, this Act was limited and did not go far enough to support a more comprehensive approach to disaster risk management. As a result, it failed to garner broad support from practitioners or to build the institutional capacity and support infrastructure required to reduce disaster risks or manage disasters effectively. Its replacement, the 2015 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, established a commission. The commission is a semi-­autonomous national coordinating body with the highest decision-­making authority for disaster management and related matters in Zanzibar (Ame, 2015; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). The second vice-­president in the Ministry of State chairs the commission. Other commission members include: all ministers of the government, the attorney general, secretary of the Revolutionary Council, regional commissioners, brigadier commander of peoples’ defense forces, commissioner of police, the deputy director general of national security, Commodore of Kikosi Mddlum Kuuia Magendo (KMKM), the commissioner of fire and rescue, the director general of Zanzibar Port Corporation, and the commissioner of the Department of Education (Ame, 2015). Responsibility for disaster management lies with the Ministry of Lands, Water, Energy, and Environment, which is a key central government agency in Zanzibar comprising four departments or directorates, three authorities, one corporate entity, one commission, and one land tribunal. Together, these are responsible for the delivery of various components of the Ministry’s Vision and Mission. An executive director of the commission is appointed by the president to, among other things, prepare the Zanzibar Disaster Management Plan, which must be approved by the commission before the plan can be implemented (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). There is also a secretariat of the commission that has a wide-­ranging mandate to coordinate all disaster and preparedness measures and oversee and coordinate disaster management. The secretariat also organizes capacity-­building at all levels, and advocates for the integration of disaster management issues into sectoral development plans. Moreover, it manages programs, strategies and other administrative activities, and develops communication and public awareness programs on disaster management in the communities and with other stakeholders (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2015 also establishes the National Technical Committee on which all permanent secretaries of all the ministries, Zanzibar Chamber of Commerce, and traders’ associations in Zanzibar sit (Ame, 2015). The Technical Committee works to integrate disaster actors and functions more effectively into development plans. It moreover is responsible for advising the disaster risk reduction commission and performing all directives issued by it (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). The

200   Part II commission secretariat prepares and coordinates all technical committee and commission work and establishes and maintains the government and selected district warehouses (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Further, the Commission’s secretariat is mandated to collect relevant data and disseminates them to all concerned ministries, departments, agencies, and individuals, and prepares the budget and performance calendar for the commission (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015), but remains severely challenged in this area. Although the highest authority in disaster management, the Disaster Management Commission is not empowered to deal with integrated development planning that considers risk and development sim progress towards resilience (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). ultaneously to Its lack of data and information collection, management and dissemination capacity remain major shortcomings to it doing its work effectively. National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction The Disaster Management Department (DMD) established the National Platform (NP) for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2005, with Tanzania’s signing of the Hyogo Framework for action. The National Platform currently has over 60 members. The National Platform is a multisectoral body chaired by the director of the Disaster Management Department. It is composed of members from government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) as well as local government agencies (LGAs), UN agencies, international and national development partners, academics, the private sector, religious and faith groups, NGOs, civil societies, and the media. Two technical committees comprise the National Platform. One focuses on slow-­onset disasters, for example, drought and civil conflicts (PreventionWeb, 2015). The other committee concentrates on sudden or rapid-­onset disasters, for example, accidents, fires, earthquakes, cyclones, and floods (PreventionWeb, 2015). A national multisectoral platform (NMP) for disaster risk reduction was established to complement the NP and align the island’s DRR activities with the Hyogo Framework for Action, and its successor framework the Sendai Framework for Action. An NMP Secretariat, located in the Disaster Management Department, Office of the Prime Minister, has broad representation from central and local governments, private institutions, UN agencies, and the media in addition to international and national development organizations, religious and faith-­ based groups, NGOs and community-­based organizations (CBOs). Stakeholders in these groups support the government in DRR efforts. Still, there remains room for expansion of actors from grassroots groups and political types, such as members of parliament, who remain underrepresented (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). Besides, women’s organizations are still largely missing from the national multisectoral platform (PreventionWeb, 2015), which might likely turn on cultural and religious reasons and the traditional ways women have been marginalized in Zanzibar.3

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   201 District Level District-­level planning is still centralized (Mangara et al., 2015) in the District Disaster Management Committee. The structure follows that at the national level. A district commissioner chairs each District Disaster Management Committee, which comprises a district administrative secretary, the mayor of each municipality or chairperson of town or district council, parliamentary representative, district security officer, district police commander, representatives of civil service organizations, and fire chief (Tidemand, 2003). Within each District Disaster Management Committee is a Technical Committee chaired by the director of the district. The Technical Committee is responsible for implementing decisions on all matters regarding disaster management for each district (Zanzibar Constitution, 2015). Sub-­District or Shehia Level A Shehia is a local ward or administrative structure for a single town administrative subdivision. In every Shehia there is established a Shehia Disaster Management Committee chaired by the Shehia. Shehias’ functions include taking operational control in the event of a disaster or emergency to ensure that help is provided to affected households and mobilizing financial and material resources needed for disaster management (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Shehias also work to identify and map all hazards in their respective locations and conduct risk and vulnerability analyses, establish civic groups for disaster management, and oversee, empower, and supervise disaster management activities at the household level (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). In Zanzibar, the 2003 Disaster Management Act established a disaster management organization. The Disaster Management Department (DMD) was created in 2006, which has given it just a dozen years to ramp up its reach, authority, and capabilities to take on the job. Since its inception, the DMD has sought to ensure that appropriate response systems, procedures, and resources exist to support those affected by disasters (Fisher & Mwase, 2011). However, staffing is woefully inadequate and in fact remains significantly depleted at the lower organizational levels. Around 22 members working in 5 primary units staff the department. Also, multiple aspects necessary for disaster relief and planning remain weak. These include planning and research, finance and administration, operations, communication and information, education and community mobilization (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). The Disaster Management Department is also supposed to recruit officers at the district level and Shehia levels, but the pace of recruitment is slow and the number of trained personnel low (ibid.). There remains much work to build the organizational context for disaster risk reduction in Zanzibar.

202   Part II Funding As stipulated in the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2015, government appropriations fund the Disaster Management Commission. The House of Representatives must approve all sums of monies to the commission through majority vote. Once its budget has been approved, the executive director of the commission authorizes all salaries, working expenses, and other charges properly arising from its work (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). The government of Zanzibar currently has a National Relief Fund that can be tapped to respond, including the purchase of relief goods at times of emergency, but it cannot be used to restock warehouses outside times of crisis (Fisher & Mwase, 2011). Every financial year the executive director of the Disaster Management Department submits to the commission a detailed estimate of income and expenditures (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Upon deliberation and recommendations by the commission, the budget amounts are allocated to the parent ministry’s general budget and from there to operational units (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Moreover, subject to the Public Finance Act of Zanzibar, Zanzibar established a disaster management fund under Section 40 of the 2015 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act. The fund consists of financing approved by the commission’s representatives in the annual budget, as well as grants supported by subscriptions contributed by the public and can be used for wide-­ranging purposes. As examples, the fund is used for disaster relief, rescue operations, and humanitarian assistance during emergencies at the national or local levels, including the hiring of land, equipment, and procuring materials and facilities and establishing additional temporary buildings during a disaster; plus, any other use for which the commission deems necessary (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). However, the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2015 does not spell out funding arrangements at the sub-­district level. At that level, authorities in the Shehia system are allowed to collect revenues through registration of taxicabs, auctioneers’ fees, and fees from rent and use of council property as well as from property taxes. Data on local government revenue are incomplete, which makes it difficult to estimate how much is collected in any given year. However, estimates are that collections are very low, and although committed to taking appropriate actions to address disaster management, the central government has veered from its funding commitment to the sub-­district level. By that I mean there is no fund allocated explicitly for DRR activities at LGA level and conflicts occur between local authorities and various central government agencies over a range of taxes, such as trade licenses and road licenses, that can aid disaster risk reduction efforts. Revenue-­sharing arrangements are thus in general need of clarification (see Ame, 2015). There are no regular budget allocations for DRR to local government, and 0% of local budgets are allocated explicitly to DRR. As of February 2015, the

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   203 UNISDR (2015) estimates that only about 3% (21 billion Tanzanian shillings, US$0.2 million) of the 2014–2015 budget was committed to disaster risk management. The UNISDR (2015) found that 80% of DRM investment came from the “significant” category in the country’s budget and this was embedded in development projects and went mainly for prevention and mitigation. Further, UNISDR (2015) also found that much of the investment in DRR is related to the expected impacts of climate change. Other funding to the commission comes from donations, grants, and loans that the commission may, from time to time, receive from any person or organization (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Besides, other monies may accrue to the commission whether in the course of its operations or otherwise (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2015). Questions remain as to what types of solutions can be found to increase the financial resilience of the Zanzibari islands against natural hazards. The Southwest Indian Ocean Commission (SWIOC), an organization funded by an amalgamation of international donors, including the UNISDR and the EU, often funds projects that focus on DRR in the region. The SWIO RAFI seeks to provide a basis for improving the understanding of disaster risks and risk financing solutions of participating islands, including Zanzibar (GFDRR, n.d.). In 2014, the Indian Ocean Islands—Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zanzibar—welcomed the launch of the World Bank’s Southwest Indian Ocean Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (SWIO RAFI) (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). This initiative was the first phase of a longer-­term commitment to developing financial protection mechanisms for the Indian Ocean. This first phase consists of capacity-­building, establishing a regional risk information platform, contributing to the development of risk profiles, formulating disaster risk financing strategies, and undertaking a feasibility study to identify the various options for disaster risk financing and insurance (ibid.). Since 2014, the Southwest Indian Ocean Commission has worked with each island to provide the financial resources, methodology, and technical expertise to build capacity on each island to fund disaster response and recovery. The methodology established partnerships with large international organizations (World Bank, UNISDR) as indispensable. Many of these partnerships have already been established, including some technology transfers to local teams in Zanzibar through training seminars on topics such as how to conduct national risk profiles, and have established loss databases for the island (GFDRR, 2016). It is not uncommon for international NGOs and other public international organizations to provide emergency assistance even in minor emergencies. After the floods of April 2005, the International Federation of the Red Cross allocated US$67,500 (EUR52,000) to Zanzibar’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF ) to respond to this emergency (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005). In addition, Care International provided mosquito nets to those affected in the camps and made a cash donation of US$5,000 (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005). Further, the

204   Part II Aga Khan Foundation contributed US$21,000 to the government’s appeal for Zanzibar flood victims, while the UNDP office offered a cash donation of US$50,000 for the relief response (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005).

Actors The 2015 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act enumerates a few committed disaster risk reduction actors, such as the meteorological agency, the Ministry of Health, defense forces, the Ministry of Finance, and the Disaster Management Department. Further, Sections 19, 20, and 21 call for the establishment of a Shehia that integrates local communities and reserves spots for the elderly on Shehia councils. Supported by government decentralization policy, Shehia councils implement fundraising strategies that empower local agencies to mobilize resources better to aid implementation of districts’ development plans. However, although the prime focus has been to enable disaster management partners to respond as quickly as possible in assisting disaster-­affected communities, their ability to mobilize resources has frequently been overwhelmed. In addition, establishing the sub-­national platform in Zanzibar in 2011 has helped to broaden the scope of participation in the national multisectoral platform agenda in Zanzibar (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). However, the national platform brings an additional layer to DRG in the national structure that makes coordination more difficult. Regional Actors Regional actors are an integral part of the disaster risk governance landscape in Zanzibar. The island participates in regional or sub-­regional actions to reduce disaster risk organizations, including the Southwest Indian Ocean Commission (SWIOC). Through SWIOC, a sub-­regional early warning system has been put in place, protocols for transboundary information-­sharing have been implemented, and regional and sub-­regional strategies and frameworks have been established and resourced (PreventionWeb, 2015). Zanzibar’s participation in the SWIO Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (SWIO RAFI) guarantees that the island’s risk assessments and policy guidance model meet best practice standards to manage regional hazards and risks. As an example, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in Zanzibar through SWIOC works with the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States to prepare for biological risks. USAID sponsors this program (PreventionWeb, 2015). Zanzibar works with such regional bodies as the African Union, Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC), and East African Committee on various issues related to disasters. The primary challenge in implementing regional initiatives is the slowness inherent in such processes; more significantly, inadequate political will among member countries can slow down the implementation of crucial resolutions (PreventionWeb, 2015).

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   205 International Actors Like other developing countries, Zanzibar, whether independently or through Tanzania, is the recipient of international assistance in the area of disaster risk reduction and governance. The island is party to several treaties and agreements on disaster risk reduction, including the Sendai Framework for Action that supports building out the DRR infrastructure, facilitating extensive participation, monitoring, and funding of a disaster contingency fund. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), the agency in charge of overseeing the implementation of both the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks, has rolled out projects like risk profiling and modeling in Zanzibar along with several other sub-­Saharan countries to complete hybrid and probabilistic risk modeling. UNISDR’s efforts directly assist the Zanzibari government’s capacity for analytical assessment of catastrophic risk and ultimately forms the basis for risk financing and investment decisions (for example, see Hendricksen et al., 2015; UNISDR, 2015). Further, the World Bank has had a long history of partnerships with Zanzibar on financial resilience in disasters. Drawing lessons from the Pacific insurance pilot program as well as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Scheme, it recently piloted a risk transfer program in Zanzibar. What is salient about these efforts is that they are built to align with the efforts of other international funders as the country works to improve its ability to withstand disasters and recover quickly. The World Bank risk transfer initiative builds on the UNISDR/ ISLANDS Project and uses information housed on the risk information platform and includes disaster risk financing strategies that are specific to the region (World Bank, 2013). Coordinating the Network of Actors Zanzibar has a very defined structure that guides the coordination of the actors in DRG (Figure 9.1). The National Committee sits atop that structure and works through the Disaster Management Department and the National Technical Committee to coordinate and synchronize disaster management efforts, although it mainly focuses on disaster preparedness and relief operations when there is a disaster. The National Disaster Management Committee works in close collaboration with vital sectoral ministries (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). Also, at the district level, the district disaster secretariats are responsible for overall coordination at that level (ibid.). The National Technical Committee works to integrate disaster actors and functions more effectively. A provincial committee coordinates disaster-­related action at the provincial level, while the Commune/Sangkat committee coordinates efforts at the communal level, including all disaster relief operations and preparedness measures; and the framework supports the mobilization of resources for effective disaster management.

206   Part II

National Committee for Disaster

Cabinet NCDM Secretariat

DM Working Team of Ministries/Institutions

Financial Inspection Unit Provincial-Municipal Committee for Disaster Management (PCDM)

PCDM/M Secretariat

Disaster/Khan Committee for Disaster Management (DCDM)

DCDM/KH Secretariat

Commune/Sangkat Committee for Disaster Management (CCDM)

CCDM/S Secretariat

Figure 9.1  Zanzibari NCDM Structure and Coordination Mechanism. Source: SNAP (2008).

Incentives There are no incentives for everyday citizens of the islands to practice DRR, but like Jamaica, Zanzibar limits obstruction of emergency responders in the conduct of their jobs. Section 7 in the 2015 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act addresses offenses relating to refusal to provide information, refusal to perform duties without reasonable cause, refusal to surrender properties or to provide service during disaster, and offenses relating to wrong warnings. The Act establishes fines and penalties for these actions. For example, any person who restrains an authorized person from performing their duties as provided for under this Act commits an offense and shall be guilty and liable on conviction to a fine of not less than 500,000 Tanzanian shillings and not more than 1,000,000 Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment. In addition, any person who refuses to furnish any information required by the commission relating to a disaster, commits an offense and shall be guilty and liable to a fine of not less than 200,000 Tanzanian shillings and not more than 500,000 Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than three months.

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   207

The State of DRG in Zanzibar As the preceding sections show, DRG in Zanzibar is being short-­circuited by several fundamental challenges: awareness and knowledge on the issues, marginalization of some groups, including women, who play a central role in disaster response and recovery, lack of skilled human resources, and inadequate funding and incentives to promote risk-­aversion behaviors. These are all limitations and gaps that reside in the hard-­institutional context of disaster risk governance. As Table 9.3 shows, the DRG mechanism is weakest in the organizational and incentives aspects of DRG, although Zanzibar is the only country offering disaster-­related risk-­aversion incentives (see Table 9.3). Actions on the ground have not kept pace with disaster risk reduction policy and legislation. Efforts are still heavily focused on disaster response and climate change adaptation rather than on planning and integration along the lines of the Sendai and Hyogo Frameworks (A. Jumbe, personal communication, May 26, 2016). Even then, early response is not well organized, there is no pre-­ positioning of relief items, and no logistics or distribution plans are in place (PreventionWeb, 2013; Ames, 2015). Moreover, the lack of trained and skilled personnel, financial resources, technology, and materials to support implementation suggests that priority actions are necessary for these areas. Even members of the national committees do not have requisite qualifications for their work in disaster management. Friendship and popularity seem to drive job selection, rather than experience and academic qualifications, for posts (Ame, 2015), which often means that the more influential Arabs often land the job, qualified or not. These personnel choices dampen efforts to build DRR in Zanzibar and may in part be due to a lack of available programs of study on the island as well as a lack of DRR awareness-­building in communities as a whole. Weaknesses in technology acquisition as well as in information and knowledge management undermine data collection and their dissemination. Currently, there is limited computer systems capability to manage disaster events (A. Peace, personal communication, June 25, 2016). As late as 2015, Ame found that rudimentary communication devices and equipment and technology for early warning and communication systems are not accessible to as many people as expected. Moreover, the continued marginalization of essential groups such as women, who continue to play a central role in disaster planning and recovery, needs to be addressed to improve response and recovery outcomes. Furthermore, the lack of funding and trained human resources remain stiff challenges to DRG work but is symptomatic of broader training and development needs on the island. A 2012 situational analysis of the state of public services in Zanzibar revealed that significant institutional, functional, and organizational challenges affecting public service agencies were a lack of clarity regarding the roles and functions of government as well as weaknesses in organizational arrangements, structures, and systems that challenge the public services, including disaster organizations

208   Part II Table 9.3  Zanzibar Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix Key Governance Elements

Zanzibar

SOFT INSTITUTION Culture 1 Basic assumptions and values about disasters and DRR and what to do about them 2 DRR norms: A Routine media coverage B Schools and community disaster education programs C Public education and awareness-building D Community leaders and residents with knowledge of importance of DR and importance to take steps to reduce E Drills, preparation, early warning systems F Post-event assessment, learning G Questioning, continuous improvements

1–

1– 1–

HARD INSTITUTION Legislation 1 Enshrined in constitution 2 DR legislation on the books and implemented 3 Support legislation undergirds specific DR legislation 4 Integration and mainstreaming of legislation in development laws and planning 5 Policy implementation, monitoring, oversight Organization 1 Organization with specific disaster focus 2 Operates at multiple levels, integrated, national coverage 3 Appropriate capabilities and knowledge, including local knowledge 4 Well positioned in government bureaucracy 5 Senior politicians chair important committees 6 Appropriately staffed, facilities, technology 7 Routine funding 8 Contingency funding 9 Data collection, integration, knowledge management Actors 1 Home-grown, multiple levels represented and active 2 Community residents and organizations with defined roles 3 Regional platforms active 4 Global platforms (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, SDG) 5 Coordinated efforts, national system 6  Coordinated efforts with all actors, cooperation agreements Incentives 1  Sales taxes 2  Tax rebates 3  Penalties and fines 4  Relocation incentives, regulation enforcement, etc. Total DRG Score Sum of plusses and minuses Net DRG Score

1 1 1 1

1– 1– 1– 1 1 1– 1– 1– 1– 1 1 1 1– 1 1– 22 12 10

Source: The literature on disaster governance and institutions as well as Priority Number 2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction help to derive the institutional factors in the matrix.

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   209 (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 2012, pp. 8–10). The tendency to establish new organizations without adequately analyzing their affordability and sustainability, or the lack of policy or legislation to elaborate on the roles, functions, mandates, and accountabilities of key state organizations, often resulted in overlaps and duplication of efforts (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 2012). Moreover, a shortage of skilled workforce, limited opportunities for capability development and skill enhancements weaken service delivery. Moreover, outdated bureaucratic infrastructures and regulatory frameworks lead to gross inefficiencies (ibid.). Further, the absence of well-­established performance standards contributes to poor performance in the public service, and lack of appropriate accountability mechanisms does not motivate either organizations or individuals to account for resources and results (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 2012). Moreover, inefficient and ineffective records management systems limit government decision-­making. For instance, the management of public records has yet to reach desirable standards for managing information and documents in public institutions (ibid.). An essential aspect of the recent government reforms in Zanzibar was improving government planning, regulatory and transparency capacities, and generating and allocating resources efficiently in the public service. The hope is that by creating a more democratic and pluralistic government, one that sees Africans in seats of power (Shein, 2011, p. 74), the government will become not only more responsive but more efficient as well. For instance, there was an urgent need to support Zanzibar’s rapidly expanding urban population and to manage urban growth in a way that would not continue to marginalize some. As important, to fight the high level of corruption in Zanzibar, anti-­corruption measures were instituted to improve government effectiveness and make government more transparent. Furthermore, the Anti-­corruption and Economic Crime Authority (ZACECA) was created with the understanding that public officials, as well as citizens, are equally responsible for fighting corruption. One of ZACECA’s first activities was to launch media campaigns to raise public awareness of the national strategy to eradicate corruption and to improve public understanding of corruption and the mechanisms to prevent it, and to encourage citizens to report incidents (UNPO, 2013). There exists a deep history of corruption on the Zanzibari islands, and especially in the government. More generally, governance reforms have resulted in the establishment of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in 2003 to strengthen prosecution and dispensation of justice, within and outside of government. Also, efforts are being made to separate the prosecutorial and investigative functions and establish a framework for Criminal Justice, along with new initiatives including establishing new organizations, improving the accessibility of laws for all Zanzibaris by increasing the number of judges and magistrates, reviewing the existing laws and creating an enabling environment for non-­governmental legal entities to operate in the isles (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 2012).

210   Part II However, many of these independent initiatives have resulted in a limited positive change (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 2012). Fragmentation and duplication have limited reform effects, and momentum and public service agencies still face severe institutional challenges. Focusing on disaster risk governance would provide a more coherent and systematic strategy to DRR—focusing on not only the hard but the soft institutions. The legislative, organizational, and incentive frameworks must align with the cultural contexts, which provide the foundation for the hard institutions and their durability in implementation.

Soft Institutions Disaster risk governance is not immune to Zanzibari cultural norms. The reliance on indigenous leaders for disaster information, which is sometimes incorrect, is a challenge that can only be addressed if indigenous actors are better integrated into the DRG structure. However, Zanzibar has long grappled with deep social divisions that have marginalized certain groups—for instance, long-­ held tensions between the Arabs, who have been economically dominant, and the Africans, who have struggled economically for well over a century. These tensions spill over into government and governing. The tensions became ingrained and had thwarted efforts at social and economic development, especially among those of African descent, in Zanzibar. The Zanzibari Vision 2020 document—drafted in 2000—was seen as a way to bring the country together and set it on a growth path. Governance reform was a key pillar and Vision 2020 outlined a long-­term policy for promoting good governance, capacity-­building and empowerment of ethnic groups (Schein, 2011). Cultural norms, developed and ingrained over a long time, are not easily changed by legislation and planning documents. In fact, they often shape the crafters’ world view and perceptions of things. Without a fundamental belief that we can shape how our communities and ourselves stand up to disasters that result from natural hazards, we will not incentivize DRR, nor will we build the capacities of disaster organizations, and we will leave legislation passed but unimplemented. The soft institutions allow those in charge to provide appropriate incentives for taking specific mitigation measures, including building within the provisions of zoning laws, and tying incentives to these. A strong culture around disaster risk reduction will facilitate the creation and development of sound disaster risk governance mechanisms that facilitate the mobilization of the entire society to address disaster risk and so optimize the investments made in DRR. Strong disaster risk governance facilitates the development of integrated and structured financial support for managing disaster risk especially at the District and Shehia levels, and that is what is now needed in Zanzibar.

Notes 1 The data are based on World Bank estimates of $1.90 per day as the global poverty line.

Disaster Risk Governance in Zanzibar   211 2 The complete articulation of the National Forestry Policy is contained in the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Natural Resources at www.tzonline.org/pdf/national forestrypolicyforzanzibar.pdf. 3 See for instance Kizito Makoye’s February 16, 2016 piece in the Christian Science Monitor on how the government and several NGOs have been working on a series of awareness campaigns to help women understand their land ownership rights. Accessed at www.csmonitor.com/World/Making-­a-difference/Change-­Agent/2016/0216/Women-­inZanzibar-­learn-the-­law-to-­keep-control-­of-their-­land. Or Ali Shaaban Juma’s (2017) piece on gender-­based violence against Zanzibari women and women at risk of abuse, at www.dandc.eu/en/article/gender-­based-violence-­harming-women-­zanzibar.

References African Development Bank (2005). African Development Report 2005: Public Sector Management in Africa. Accessed at https://global.oup.com/academic/product/african-­ development-report-­2005-9780199280841?cc=us&lang=en& (December 12, 2017). Ame, A. W. (2015). Assessment of the Institutional Framework for Disaster Management in Zanzibar: The Case of West District. Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Social Work of the Open University of Tanzania. Accessed at http://repository.out.ac.tz/1274/1/DISSERTATION_-_ ALI_WADI_AME.pdf (January 9, 2018). Ampaire, E. Okolo, W., Acosta, M., Jassogne, L. Twyman, J., Muindi, P., & Mwongera, C. (2016, December). Barriers to Successful Climate Change Policy Implementation in Tanzania. Accessed at https://cgspace.cgiar.org/rest/bitstreams/88580/retrieve (December 28, 2018). Fisher, M., & Mwase, N. (2011). Tanzania: Strengthening National Disaster Preparedness and Response Capacity: End of Programme Evaluation Report UNICEF. Accessed at www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_66795.html.  Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) (2016, November). Disaster Risk Profile: Zanzibar. Accessed at www.gfdrr.org/disaster-­risk-profile-­zanzibar (April 4, 2017). Government of Tanzania and Office of the Chief Government Statistician Ministry of Finance and Planning Zanzibar (2018). National Population Projections 2035. Accessed at www.nbs.go.tz/nbs/takwimu/census2012/Projection-­Report-20132035.pdf. Hendriksen, G., Ishikagi, K., Moriniere, L., Egan, C., Mochizuki, J., Hochrainer-­Stigler, S., Mechler, R., & Williges, K. (2015). Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction: Review of Zanzibar. UNISDR Working Papers. Geneva: UNISDR. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2005). Tanzania: Flooding in Zanzibar Minor Emergency Bulletin No. 1. Accessed at https://reliefweb. int/report/united-­r epublic-tanzania/tanzania-­f looding-zanzibar-­m inor-emergency-­ bulletin-no-­1. IRINNews (2007). High Population Growth Threatens MDGs in Zanzibar. Accessed at www.irinnews.org/report/73175/tanzania-­high-population-­growth-threatens-­mdgszanzibar. Mangora, M. M., Shalli, M. S., Kaur, N., Jumah, S. M., Mwita, F., & Bakar, S. (2015). Local Adaptation Investment Planning in Zanzibar: A Baseline Review of Policy and Institutional Framework. First Vice President’s Office, Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Tanzania. Accessed at www.researchgate.net/profile/Mwita_Mangora/publication/

212   Part II 276288350_Local_Adaptation_Investment_Planning_in_Zanzibar_A_Baseline_Review_ of_Policy_and_Institutional_Framework/links/5555e69c08ae6943a872de76.pdf. Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (2012). Capacity and Needs Assessment of Legal Sector Actors in Zanzibar, Final Report. Accessed at https://info.undp.org/docs/ pdc/Documents/TZA/Final%20Report%20on%20Capacity%20and%20Needs%20 Assessment%20of%20Legal%20Sector%20Actors%20in%20Zanzibar.pdf (May 5, 2017). Nanjira, D. (1997). Disaster losses in East Africa. Strategic Issues, pp. 82–89. Accessed at http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/pdf/eng/doc4725/doc4725-contenido.pdf (April 3, 2017). PreventionWeb (2015, Mar). United Rep of Tanzania, National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2011–2013). Retrieved from www.preventionweb.net/files/29703_tza_NationalHFAprogress_2011-13.pdf (April 18, 2017). Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (2013). Zanzibar’s Climate Change Strategy. Accessed at www.paulwatkiss.co.uk/newimagesanddocs/Zanzibar%20SummaryLR% 20draft%20final.pdf (December 29, 2018). Shein, A. M. (2011, October). Revisited Zanzibar Development Vision 2020 Working Document. Statement by the President of Zanzibar and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council His Excellency Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein. Accessed at www. zanzibaremploymentservices.go.tz/revisited_zanzibar_vision_2020.pdf (January 10, 2018). Tidemand, P. (2003). Local governance in Zanzibar. In: Zanzibar Good Governance Strategy: Report for Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Final Draft Report. United Nations Development Programme, Zanzibar. Accessed at www.dege.biz/ Zanzibar.pdf. UNISDR (2015). Working Papers on Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction: Review of Zanzibar, 2015. Geneva: UNISDR. Accessed at www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2015/en/gar-­p df/UNISDR_Working_ Papers_on_Public_Investment_Planning_and_Financing_Strategy_for_Disaster_Risk_ Reduction_Review_of_Zanzibar.pdf (May 9, 2017). UNPO (2013). Zanzibar: Launch of Anti-­Corruption Campaigns. Accessed at https:// unpo.org/article/16707?id=16707 (December 27, 2018). World Bank (2013, September 22). Political Champions Group—Partnership for Stimulating Insurance Penetration in Lower Income Countries, pp. 1–9. Accessed at http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/611131467997562270/pdf/98014-WP-­ Box391499B-PUBLIC-­PCG-Country-­Note-Tanzania-­0922013.pdf. World Bank (2015, September). Financing Climate-­Resilient Growth in Tanzania. World Bank Group Report Number ACS11581. Accessed at http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/853121468312047723/pdf/ACS11581-REVISED-­WP-P127165-PUBLIC-­ Box393246B-ENR-­GP-Tanzania-­Climate-FINAL.pdf.World Bank (2017, November 3). Zanzibar Sees a Slight Decline in Poverty Except for Pemba. World Bank PRESS RELEASE. Accessed at www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-­release/2017/11/03/zanzibar­sees-a-­slight-decline-­in-poverty-­except-for-­pemba (January 8, 2018). World Bank et al. (2016). Risk Profile Zanzibar, p. 3. Accessed at www.gfdrr.org/sites/ default/files/publication/drp_zanzibar.pdf 

10 Disaster Risk Governance in Developing Countries

The problems associated with disasters are surmountable with proper planning and arrangements to manage disaster risks within the broader governing context. Almost half a century of continued efforts has not yielded significant improvements in disaster risk reduction outcomes. Many of the early efforts focused on disaster response without considering the specific context in which the response strategies were applied. In the 1990s, when the focus shifted toward disaster management, many of these efforts failed to integrate social, physical, economic, political and cultural intersections that prompted disasters. Critical contextual challenges and vulnerability drivers were ignored, and solutions lacked the integration of knowledge and expertise necessary to make an impact. The global frameworks strategic horizon of 10–15-year intervals does not allow for progressive development in the contexts within which they are being applied and has left countries unable to learn and build successes on the prior framework before a new one is launched. Developing countries are not a monolith. They range along a continuum from more to less developed and likewise their governing contexts vary. The global frameworks pushed a standard set of solutions to be implemented across the spectrum of developing countries. Moreover, they were implemented with little guidance and direction in implementing countries. The book’s premise is that disaster risk governance is a key missing or underdeveloped ingredient in disaster risk reduction. Disaster risk reduction does not happen on its own, but must be carefully orchestrated to be successful. The formal and informal institutional contexts must be in place to facilitate it. The social and cultural, legislative, managerial, technical, and financial aspects must be brought together, integrated and harmonized to ensure that the system as a whole is being steered down a path to accomplishing the DRR goals. However, in developing countries, the historical and contemporary developmental contexts found in developing countries often limit their ability to create the governing environment necessary to promote disaster risk reduction and management and to capitalize on their benefits. The case study countries indicate that this premise is not unfounded. No two countries have developed their DRG context in the same measure. Their general governing and macro-­environmental contexts vary and DRG,

214   Part II being an emergent property of these contexts, also varies. Decades of empirical work have shown that aggregate income indicators like GNP/GDP as a measure of economic growth are meaningless in representing the real situation on the ground and mask more than they reveal. However, it is worth repeating: Developing countries face increasing levels of hidden costs and challenges from government ineffectiveness and inefficiencies, historical institutional drag, inadequate capacity, and so on, which cause them to struggle to meet their obligations. Neither Zanzibar nor Jamaica has the highest GDP or GNP, but their DRG mechanisms are stronger that those of Dominica and Kenya. The range of GNP per capita found in developing countries varies widely. In Dominica GDP per capita is around US$7,000, but it is only around US$900 in Zanzibar. A visit to developing countries like Kenya and Jamaica would show wide variations in public infrastructure. Besides income, other factors, such as legislation, organizations, actors, and incentives undergirded by a set of norms that support DRR, form the crux of the DRG context. The number of deaths and level of destruction in Dominica and Kenya are higher than in the other two countries, and their DRG contexts are also weaker. The disaster risk governance matrix (Table 10.1) helps us to pinpoint areas where the countries are struggling. Table 10.1 also helps us to understand a key question asked at the start of the book: Do better-­performing countries have issues in common, and do the poorer-­performing countries share certain similarities? When we couple the disaster risk governance matrix with an understanding of the historical, cultural, and social backgrounds, we get a more nuanced understanding of cross-­country variations in disaster risk governance in developing countries.

What Do the Stronger DRG Contexts Have in Common? Jamaica has the most robust DRG context of the four countries, followed by Zanzibar; Dominica has the weakest. What Jamaica and Zanzibar have in common is that their DRG system is more centralized than Kenya’s and Dominica’s. By that, I mean the central government drives more of the DRR decisions and work. There is a hierarchical system of governance, and although some powers are transferred downward, decision-­making and direction are driven by the central government. In Jamaica power is concentrated at the national level, but different grants of responsibility for DRR are given to lower levels. In Zanzibar, disaster planning power is still centralized in the District Disaster Management Committee. The state-­centered systems tend to lead to power asymmetry at the national level, which acts as a barrier to the development of lower levels of operations— those levels that are closest to service beneficiaries—and this is unsustainable. There are difficulties in scaling down the national disaster risk governance system to the local level. The local levels move more slowly as they are not able to act without approval from the national government level. These inhibit sub-­ national DRG infrastructure development. However, the approach is better able to build accountability since power is not diffused. In Dominica and Kenya, the

DRG in Developing Countries   215 disaster actors are so loosely coupled, and responsibility so dispersed, that accountability is diluted. There is uncertainty about who is accountable or who exactly calls the shots for what. Compounding these, there are no mechanisms in place to hold international, regional, NGO or CBO actors accountable for their results. Some come together to temporarily assist with macro-­environmental turbulence, such as those that occur in a disaster, bringing the resources and scaling ability needed to respond in a timely and effective manner; others are more permanent fixtures in promoting a global development agenda. These organizations are answerable only to their organizations and their boards, not to the beneficiaries of their services. They push their organizations’ philosophy and give primacy to their own priorities. Incentives have the potential to change behaviors concerning disaster risk reduction. Of concern in the four case study countries is that Zanzibar is the only country that provides incentives for citizens to practice DRR. Jamaica and other countries in the Caribbean, led by the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), are only just beginning to discuss the use of incentives as an important part of a mix of strategies to promote disaster risk reduction. Jamaica’s cultural context for DRR is robust. Its DRR norms have been strengthened since Hurricane Gilbert, with most of the progress coming in the early-­to-mid-­2000s. Indeed, the Hyogo Framework for Action was a substantial contributing factor, but much of the work was initiated in Jamaica. There are public awareness programs, including school-­based ones; there is learning from past events, drills and the like. While Zanzibar lacks many of the cultural elements (see Table 10.1), it is the only one of the four countries with incentives in place to regulate DRR behavior. Since 2007, those affected per capita have been significantly reduced, but more work remains. Moreover, Jamaica’s and Zanzibar’s legislative contexts are stronger than those of Dominica and Kenya. Table 10.1 shows that Jamaica and Zanzibar have in place all or most of the legislative items. Zanzibar, however, experiences problems with policy implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Plus, it has a significant problem with information collection, processing, dissemination, and storage. These undermine Zanzibar’s DRG context.

What Do the Weaker DRG Contexts Have in Common? Dominica has the lowest score on the DRG matrix, followed by Kenya (see Table 10.1). Decentralization in Dominica and devolution in Kenya without local-­level capacity restrict the effectiveness of their DRG systems. Also, underdeveloped norms focus on climate change to the neglect of other drivers in Dominica, and on droughts in Kenya, meaning that the infrastructure for other disaster drivers is underdeveloped. Moreover, the marginalization of groups, lack of incentives, and high social vulnerabilities plague the two countries. Table 10.1 shows that Kenya has significant deficiencies in most of the governance measures noted in the matrix. These findings support those of Mutugi

216   Part II and Maingi (2011), who found that even with years of government and administrative reforms in Kenya, economic, social, and cultural barriers have stalled successful devolution efforts. The national and sub-­national levels are under capacity, and greater coherence in the DRR strategy is needed. Significantly, interviews with disaster practitioners in Kenya show that the deficiencies in its disaster risk governance system are many, but a significant problem is a lack of legislation to undergird disaster action, and a lack of information undermines decision-­making. Both Kenya and Dominica share a lack of impetus to pass disaster legislation. Draft legislation takes a very long time to be passed into law, if at all, even after catastrophic events highlight their necessity. Neither Dominica nor Kenya seems to learn from their past experiences. Multiple catastrophes in Dominica have not prompted system-­wide DRR changes until Hurricane Maria almost obliterated that country. Before Hurricane Maria, Dominica showed little effort to integrate disaster considerations into national planning. The current push for resilience is taking place at a time of complete upheaval in all sectors of the country, and although this might provide an opportune time for such a move, the foundation has not been set for resilience. Many of the foundational elements for DRG remain missing in Dominica (Table 10.1). Fundamentally, unless there is access to finances to support the implementation of post-­Hurricane Maria recommendations, the country’s drive to become resilient will be moot. Comprehensive disaster legislation is still pending, and a DRR culture is lacking. Both Dominica and Kenya face direct threats from climate change. Hurricane Maria in Dominica and recent droughts and floods in Kenya show the potential catastrophe. Moreover, the recent earthquake in Kenya’s Rift Valley shows that the potential dangers from earthquakes could be catastrophic. Table 10.1  Summary Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix Key Governance Elements

Jamaica

Dominica

Kenya

Zanzibar

1

1–

1–

1–

1 1

1–

SOFT INSTITUTION Culture 1 Basic assumptions and values about disasters and DRR and what to do about them 2 DRR norms: A Routine media coverage B Schools and community disaster education programs C Public education and awareness-building D Community leaders and residents with knowledge of importance of DR and importance to take steps to reduce E Drills, preparation, early warning systems F Post-event assessment, learning G Questioning, continuous improvements

1 1– 1– 1 1–

1

1–

1– 1–

1– 1–

1–

1– 1–

DRG in Developing Countries   217 HARD INSTITUTION Legislation 1 Enshrined in constitution 2 DR legislation approved into law, regulations 3 Support legislation undergirds DR legislation 4 Integration and mainstreaming of legislation in development laws and planning 5 Policy implementation, monitoring, oversight Organization 1 Organization with specific disaster focus 2 Operates at multiple levels, integrated, national coverage 3 Appropriate capabilities and knowledge, including local knowledge 4 Well positioned in government bureaucracy 5 Senior politicians chair important committees 6 Appropriately staffed, facilities, technology 7 Routine funding 8 Contingency funding 9 Data collection, integration, knowledge management Actors 1 Home-grown, multiple levels represented and active 2 Community residents and organizations with defined roles 3 Regional platforms active 4 Global platforms (e.g., Hyogo, Sendai, SDG) 5 Coordinated efforts, national system 6 Coordinated efforts with all actors; cooperation agreements

1

1 1–

1 1–

1 1–

1

1–

1–

1

1–

1–

1–

1

1–

1–

1 1–

1 1–

1

1– 1–

1–

1–

1

1

1–

1

1

1

1

1

1–

1–

1–

1– 1– 1–

1– 1–

1– 1–

1– 1–

1

1–

1–

1–

1–

1–

1–

1–

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1– 1–

1 1–

1 1–

Incentives 1 Sales taxes 2 Tax rebates 3 Penalties and fines 4 Relocation incentives, regulation enforcement, etc. Total DRG Score Sum of minuses Net DRG Score

1 1–

28 –13 15

22 –17 6

21 –14 7

22 –13 9

Source: The literature on disaster governance and institutions as well as Priority Number 2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction help to derive the institutional factors in the matrix

218   Part II

Cross-­Cutting Themes We have already established that developing countries are not a monolith—their cultures vary, their politics and level of partisanships vary, their incentives context varies, and their legislative and organizational contexts vary. On these matters, the four countries present four distinct DRG experiences that have been discussed throughout the book. There are cross-­cutting themes that bind them. The skeptics of governance as theory claim that there is not, and never has been, a grand theory of governance (see Young, 2005, in Jordan, 2008); the contextual variations are too significant. However, in examining the four country contexts, some commonalities in DRG are evident. The bulk of deaths still occur in developing countries, which would seem to indicate that we are still not getting DRR right or that we are on the right path, but have some way to go. Also, in relative terms, a high proportion of destruction due to disasters caused by natural hazards occurs in developing countries. More significant commonalities are discussed below. The Centrality of International Frameworks and Actors Shaping the national DRG in the image and likeness of internationally prescribed frameworks, when contexts, even among developing countries, are different is problematic. Implementing DRR frameworks coupled with a lack of state capacity has brought international agencies to the fore while at the same time marginalizing local actors (see the organizational elements of the hard-­institutional context of Table 10.1). Reliance on international agencies for project and program funding is common in all the countries and has a long history that goes back, some would say, to the early postcolonial period. Developing countries have come to rely on the help of developed countries and multilateral agencies as well as bilateral arrangements to solve some of their most pressing problems. New forms of public–private and private–private cooperation facilitate these arrangements. In fact, multilateral agencies have been given a wide latitude to act in many policy areas, not just in DRR. In these actions they sometimes tend to ignore important country stakeholders. National Governments Remain Important Actors DRG cannot overlook the traditional role of government as an essential actor in DRR. The traditional state-­focused view of governance proposes that the state, although depleted and delivering fewer services, is still an important actor and the logical site for DRR. They are politically accountable and are the legitimate governing authority. National governments are still accountable for DRR in their countries and cannot just farm these activities out to non-­state actors whole-­ scale. Also, national governments understand their national contexts better than outside actors and are better able to identify and lead the targeted vulnerability reduction measures.

DRG in Developing Countries   219 Under-­Capacity Continues to be a Significant Challenge Disaster risk reduction is just one policy area to experience under-­capacity challenges. Developing countries’ institutional capacities are not and never have been developed, and their governments have always struggled with service delivery. Significantly, the reliance on international actors continues the cycle of under-­ development and under-­capacity at the local levels as well as weak capacity in the national government. In Dominica, for example, post-­disaster needs assessment skills remained lacking, even after multiple disasters, and delayed the response and recovery efforts. In Zanzibar, folk rely on local leaders for information on disasters and what to do about them. Marginalizing the local institutions from DRG leaves significant gaps in governance. This situation is not only a problem for Zanzibar, but is made worse by the central role played by local and indigenous institutions in disaster response and management. In the sub-­Saharan African context, ethnic leaders and chiefs enjoy considerable support across local communities; local chiefs have significant power in allocating and administering certain rights. Their diminished capacity limits what they can do. Poor Coordination among Actors across the Board A typical call among stakeholders has been for more guidance on “governance.” Correctly, they have called for a clear delineation of the responsibilities between global, regional, national, and local level in disaster risk reduction (see Rao, 2013). In all the definitions of governance, there is a consensus that DRG is collaborative, multi-­level, with multiple actors, not just government institutions, but communities, individuals, civil society groups and international organizations. The norms regulating their interactions should spell out responsibilities. In all four case study countries, the coordination mechanisms are weak. As the number of actors involved increases, the chances for poor coordination among them also increase, resulting in ineffectiveness through duplication of efforts and waste. Duplication of efforts and waste hampers attempts to produce results while trying to optimize resources. A couple of efficiency drivers that would improve coordination are worth emphasizing here. The first is where a few leading practices are identified, adapted, and implemented from the national level throughout the country. Without a governance structure that is responsive to innovative and smart practices, good ideas fail to make an impact and efforts to make advances are stymied. Second, developing countries now need to focus on building their information and knowledge management systems to collect, analyze and manage big data. Analytical capabilities will improve coordination practices, including helping to scale them up or down more appropriately. Funding Challenges Under financial stress, governments tend to involve a network of partners in DRR service delivery. It is not the lack of funding, per se, that limits DRR

220   Part II action. Billions of dollars are spent annually to fund multiple projects and programs. Instead, the nature of the funding, stipulations of what funding can be used for and reporting requirements make accessing international funding challenging. International funding agencies normally fund specific areas of need, usually through specific projects that are time-­bound—activities must be carried out at a certain pace to keep project implementers drawing down funds. Further, there is very little if any flexibility in the use of the funds, and the reporting requirements are stringent. The constant need to report on progress ties up the limited human and organizational resources in a constant cycle of reporting. New projects tend to involve new project staff and the like, which means the organizational gaps are never really filled. These issues call into question whether any progress is ever made. The World Bank’s new approach to funding multiple complementary projects (as seen in Dominica) will perhaps guide the way in project funding going forward. It should lead to greater coherence and knock-­on effects. Weak Information and Knowledge Management In place, effective disaster risk governance requires that adequate information and knowledge management (IKM) systems are in place to facilitate effective decision-­making. All the countries struggle in this area, but the issue is starker in Zanzibar. Processes, people, and technology are not in place to manage relevant information to ensure that it is directly accessible to those needing it. Enough relevant, valid and credible information should be provided to aid decision-­ making when needed. Currently, developing countries face a deficit in information collection, processing, storage, management, and dissemination. This IKM deficit runs through all the study countries and points to a more substantial challenge that undermines disaster risk governance in developing countries. The technology to support IKM is expensive and competes with other, more pressing needs. The four case study countries in this book are indicative of a broader trend in IKM as well as information and communication technologies in developing countries. Funding IKM initiatives from national budgets adds to the financial strain of developing countries. Collaborating with regional and international actors to build these capabilities that allow for not only effective decision-­making that drives action, but also transparency, could be a win-­win proposition. The Soft-­Institutional Context In government service delivery, Mayfield and Mayfield (2012) found that cultural models, especially dynamic cultural models, may be good predictors of infrastructure development in the countries studied. Culture influences people’s risk and risk tolerance because it influences their interpretation of what hazards are, how they might impact their lives, and how they should react to them. Culture shapes the norms by which acceptable risks are defined, such as living in

DRG in Developing Countries   221 a flood-­prone or fire-­prone area. Livelihood choices are a product of the culture of a place. Settlement patterns and options, inclusion in society, equality issues, employment opportunities, social networks, and time availability for preparedness are all products of the culture. The cases in this book show that disaster risk governance models or frameworks should not be universalized across all countries, but must be adapted to suit the specific country and regional context. Perceptions about disasters and what to do about them are perhaps as or even more critical than the hard-­institutional aspects. When people accept that disasters can be managed if the underlying root causes and risks are understood and connected, they will become empowered to take action to protect themselves, their families and communities without relying too much on outside assistance. Everyday people will start to question their practices, and they will feel themselves a vital part of the DRR process. This empowerment will lead to local capacity development.

The Importance of Focusing on Disaster Risk Governance The discourse on sustainable development (indeed the pragmatic discourse) and how to achieve it put disaster risk reduction and therefore disaster governance at center stage. It is worth noting, or perhaps reiterating, the approach and some of the conclusions of the book, as they carry implications for how we understand DRG and how we go about shaping it. First, let me address the use of institutions as the centerpiece of governance and for taking a broader view of it: The term “institutions” is used to mean the specific apparatus for crafting and enforcing regulations and standards on DRR and the delivery of DRR initiatives. More specifically, institutions are systems of established and prevalent social rules or norms that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006). They are the basic rules of behavior. In this book, a broad view of institutions is taken, where institutions include legislation, the organization, the actors and the incentives that constitute the hard institution, and the culture and norms of the soft institution. Together these form the contours of DRG. Institutions are different from the organizations that function under them. Organizations help to regulate social interaction and human behavior, and as such, they are an essential aspect of the DRG, but they are only one aspect of several factors contributing to DRG. Second, the case study countries show that DRG does not just occur in networks or hierarchies, but that markets are also crucial in DRG. This idea goes contrary to much of the literature on DRG that tends to focus on either hierarchy (vertical governance/coordination), associated with the state-­centered approach, or networks, as in the society-­centered approach (horizontal governance/coordination). In aggregating collective action, the case studies show that DRG turns on hierarchies, networks, and markets. Here is what I mean. In the study countries, DRR is still mostly driven by the central government level with some grants of power to lower levels through devolution, decentralization, and deconcentration. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I emphasize the

222   Part II power asymmetry that remains in developing countries. This asymmetry favors the central government level, and issues revert to the national level for resolution or assistance. Also, lower levels remain under capacity and are challenged to provide the services and support they are called upon to provide. As such, the state, although depleted and delivering fewer services, is still a central actor and logical site of political accountability and public legitimacy. National governments are still accountable for DRR in their countries as part of securing the welfare of their people, and therefore cannot just farm this activity out to non-­ state actors whole-­scale. Reliance on international agencies for project and program funding is common in all countries. It remained a vestige of the colonial era and is built into the funding and broader organizational aspects of governance. International relations scholars believe that governance is the increasing prevalence of inter-­ state agreements, multinational institutions and organizations, and new forms of public–private and private–private cooperation. The idea is, governance systems, traditionally viewed through the lens of sovereignty, have now been hollowed out and so have given rise to multiple actors—even global actors—stepping in to deliver what governments once did. I propose that the state in developing countries has always—or at least since the early postcolonial era—been hollowed out. There was never enough capacity to deliver government services, including disaster response and now DRR. Developing countries’ capacities have never been developed to the levels needed for governments to be effective; resources have always been limited or mismanaged. Besides, poverty has steadily trended upwards since the start of the postcolonial period, and inequality was built into the colonizers’ desire to “divide and conquer,” to pit group against group and better control the masses. So, developing countries have always struggled with under-­capacity, weak institutions, and service delivery. DRR competed with routine areas of need and was ignored. Markets mechanisms promote or force people to take actions to reduce their disaster risks (taxes, pricing, penalties). Using market mechanisms to regulate social action around reducing disaster risks remains underdeveloped in the study countries but is used in a limited way in Zanzibar. Further, countries in the Caribbean and sub-­Saharan Africa experimenting with risk transfers (Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF ) and the Livelihood Protection Programs) at the country and individual levels as part of the mix of solutions aimed at reducing disaster risks and allowing people to recover faster. These risk transfer mechanisms are all regulated in the market and used to drive social action around DRR. Third, in line with the most recent international DRR frameworks, developing countries are decentralizing DRR responsibilities downward to sub-­national, including local, levels. Within the country context, governing powers have sought to share power by either centralization, decentralization, deconcentration, or devolution. We have seen some aspects of devolution (Kenya), decentralization (Dominica and Zanzibar) or deconcentration (Jamaica). However, different grants of power without the requisite capacity leads to a misalignment in governance. The

DRG in Developing Countries   223 lower governance levels are not developed or resourced enough to deliver the services for which they have become responsible. Even Kenya, which has only recently gone through a process of devolution, is not currently equipped to deliver the services it is called upon to deliver at the local levels. Service delivery mechanisms are merely local offices of central governments rather than independent local governments accountable to local constituents. Kenya’s current devolution strategy depicts theses tendencies. Fundamentally, the capacity in county governments and even at the national level need to be strengthened. The implication here is that without a more advanced sub-­national level of governance, DRG is best centralized, perhaps at the national or the county level. Doing this limits the illusions that the local levels will effectively deliver DRR services. Fourth, one size does not fit all in disaster risk governance. How do we use already developed frameworks in diverse geographic, cultural, and economic contexts to improve DRR outcomes? With over 180 signatories, most of which are developing countries, the current Sendai Framework seeks to homogenize critical principles of disaster risk governance globally. The global frameworks have promoted a general set of principles for disaster risk governance. In the last three to four decades, developing countries have worked with these frameworks to build an integrated disaster risk governance mechanism, but not effectively. As an example, although the disaster risk reduction frameworks call for decentralization of disaster governance, with communities playing a central role, global public organizations continue to play the central role. National governments and communities lack resources, capabilities, and decision-­making authority. In Kenya, Zanzibar, and Dominica, and to a lesser extent in Jamaica, the formal disaster organizations are severely under-­resourced. In Zanzibar, for example, disaster risk governance at the local level is voluntary. Where legislation is signed into law, there is little enforcement. Zoning laws and building codes, for instance, are seldom enforced; the people merely build with no regard for the codes. Disobeying zoning laws is particularly true in urban centers, where high pockets of poverty exist. Further complicating these issues, politicians are reluctant to apply existing ordinances for fear that the costs might be onerous on constituents, who in turn might withhold their votes in the next election cycle. In countries like Canada, the United States, Australia or New Zealand, where government institutions are stronger than those in developing countries, problems of residents ignoring the laws are not minimized. The policies in place are imposed and monitored to disincentivize behaviors that lead to household and community vulnerability. In developing countries, disaster risk governance presents profoundly complex and multi-­faceted challenges. Developing countries pay an unusually high toll because, in many of them, there is neither the will nor the resources to address the underlying social, political and economic causes that make them and their peoples vulnerable to hazards. Amid significant financial constraints, the governments and disaster managers of developing countries face the unenviable task of managing disasters and

224   Part II improving their outcomes. Focusing on building their disaster risk governance might be a good way to leverage limited resources and organize external and internal actors around achieving the DRR goals.

Concluding Note This book has sought to provide a resource to those working in developing countries. The empirical evidence presented shows that weak governance is a disaster risk driver linked to other risk drivers including poverty, weak risk reduction practices, inadequate capacity, lack of funding and the like, which then result in disasters when they intersect with natural hazards. Solutions reside, then, in interdisciplinary conceptualizations of problems and proposed solutions. Some of these findings are not new, but they are important to understand that poor disaster outcomes are not inevitable, even in developing countries. In the area of disaster risk reduction, improvements are possible if strategic efforts are made to assess and fix the disaster risk governance context. The Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix (Table 10.1) to assess the state of disaster risk governance in different contexts is rudimentary but could be refined over time and used as an instrument to drive the assessment of disaster risk governance in various country contexts. The literature review is not exhaustive but was used strategically to connect a number of social concepts and disciplines together to address the complexity of issues brought together to address disaster risk governance. The work, then, is not definitive, but it does move us further along the path to understanding the need for, the challenges to and the scope of disaster risk governance in developing countries. It also adds to our knowledge of contexts that are not given enough attention in the literature, when, in fact, there is a wealth of knowledge that can be had from them. This conversation should continue through continued questioning, theorizing and application.

References Hodgson, G. (2006). What are institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, XL(1). Jordan, A. (2008). The governance of sustainable development: taking stock and looking forwards. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(1): 17–33. Mayfield, J., & Mayfield, L. (2012). National culture and infrastructure development: a comparison among four cultural typologies. Competitiveness Review: An International Business Journal, 22(5): 396–410, https://doi.org/10.1108/10595421211266285. Mutugi, M. W., & Maingi, S. G. (2011, January). Disasters in Kenya: a major public health concern. Journal of Public Health and Epidemiology, 3(1): 38–42. Rao, S. (2013). Disaster Risk Governance at National and Sub-­national Levels. GSDRC, Helpdesk Research Report. Accessed at www.gsustainable developmentrc.org/docs/ open/hdq991.pdf.

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italics denote figures. actors in disaster risk governance 79; centrality of international frameworks and 218; coordinating network of 205–206, 219; in Dominica 152–155; international actors 180, 205; in Jamaica 129–131; in Kenya 178–183; national governments as 218; regional actors 178–183, 204; in Zanzibar 204–206 African Union (AU) 32, 178–179, 204 African Union Constitutive Act 179 Africa Program of Action 32, 175 Africa Regional Platform for DRR (AfRP) 32 Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 28, 179 Aga Khan Foundation 204 Agenda 2030 34, 43, 196 agricultural industry 131, 155 Al-Shabaab (Somalia-based Islamist group) 166 Anti-corruption and Economic Crime Authority (ZACECA), Zanzibar 209 arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) counties 165, 173, 177 Aristotle 56n5, 75, 99n3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 83 Barbados Central Emergency Relief Organization 23 Barbados Plan of Action (BPOA 1994) 3–4, 25–27; comprehensive review of 26; goals of 26; implementation of 26 Barder, Owen 41 Barnard, Chester 83, 94 Barro, Robert 39 Blount, Thomas 53

bribes 93–94 Brundtland Report (1987) 45–46 budget allocations, for DRR 182, 202 building codes, in developing countries 77, 93, 139, 154, 223 Canadian International Development Agency 23 capacity and resource access, within societies 51–53 capacity-building, for DRR 28, 33, 51–53; in Dominica 149; in Jamaica 120; in Kenya 173; for resisting and recovering from disasters 52; in Zanzibar 199, 203, 210 Care International 203 Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) 128, 151, 205, 222 Caribbean Community 25; creation of CDEMA 30 Caribbean Council of Engineering Organizations 23 Caribbean Development Bank 120, 127, 129, 131, 151, 152 Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) 32, 82–83, 129, 215; Country Work Program 153; Emergency Assistance Fund 153 Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) 23; establishment of 25 Caribbean News Agency 23 Caribbean Telecommunications Union 23 Caribbean Tourism Organization 131 CARICOM Regional Framework 2005–2015 153

226   Index Christie, Greg 112 civil society organizations (CSOs) 28 Cleveland, Harlan 63 climate adaptation 52, 146, 149, 171, 192 climate change 45, 48; Agenda 2030’s goal on 34; disasters caused by 2; in Dominica 141, 216; effects of 4, 7; financial support to tackle 192; global response to 34; in Kenya 22, 171, 216; mitigation 46; mitigation activities 192; in Zanzibar 7, 22, 192, 198 climate change adaptation 85; Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction project 121; disaster response and 207; and disaster risk reduction 198; in Dominica 145–148, 152–154, 156, 158; in Kenya 173; Special Climate Change Adaptation Fund (SCCAF) 128; in Zanzibar 192 Climate Change Conference 173 climate-related risks 66 Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) 154 climate-resilient recovery plan (CRRP) 154, 156 Club of Rome 46 Coase, Ronald 76, 94 colonialism: definition of 99n5; difference with imperialism 88; effect on governance 88; policy of 88 Commission on Global Governance 47; Our Global Neighborhood report 47 Commonwealth of Nations 111 communications networks 66 communities at risk 48; degree of susceptibility 50; vulnerability of 49–51 Community-based Adaptation to Climate Change Program, Jamaica 121 community-based disaster management committee (CBDC) 150–151 community-based disaster preparedness 52 community-based organizations (CBOs) 117, 124–125, 200 community destruction, by disasters 96 community forestry, strategy for 198 community resilience, to disasters 195 community risk management 158 Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) 30, 115, 130, 146–147, 150, 152–153, 155, 172 comprehensive disaster planning, protocols for 3, 83 conflict management 179

contingency pools, of funds 151 corporate governance 112 corporate social responsibility 113 corruption 11, 91–95; in ancient period 92; bribes 94; Corruption Perceptions Index 112; costs and benefits to 93; definition of 91–92; “evil” of 92; financial crimes 150; Foreign Corrupt Practices Action (US) 93; Indonesian forest fires (1997–1998) 93; in Jamaica 112–113; in Kenya 167; negative impact on society 93; OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 93; in order to conduct business 94; political 92; in public administration 92; and red tape 92; Transparency International 92; UN convention against 92; in weakergovernance economies 93; in writings of Machiavelli 92; in Zanzibar 209 cost of preparing, for disaster 84 Country Poverty Assessment (CPA) 143 county integrated development plans (CIDPs) 29 customary law 86, 90 Cyclone Nargis 83 damage assessment, plans for: in Dominica 140, 152; in Jamaica 119 decentralizing, of DRR responsibilities 43, 70, 134n1, 184, 222 decision-making 85; in Caribbean 89; in Dominica 144, 216; within household and in the community 51; in Kenya 216; and responsibility for policy formation 89; risk and risk-related 49 desertification 22, 191 developing countries: centrality of international frameworks and actors 218; common elements in context of stronger DRG 214–215; common elements in context of weaker DRG 215–217; decision-making process in 216; disaster risk governance in 213–224; Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 214; focus on DRG 221–224; funding challenges 219–220; information and knowledge management (IKM) systems 220; institutional capacities for DRR 219; national governments as important actor in DRG 218; norms focus on climate change 215; poor coordination among actors 219; soft-institution, influence of 220–221; state-centered systems in 214; under-capacity challenges 219;

Index   227 vulnerability from natural disasters 215; zoning laws and building codes 223 development, definitions of 41 Development Vision 2020 document, Zanzibar 196–197 disaster: community destruction by 96; community resilience to 195; cost of preparing for 84; as development 69; losses from 96; susceptibility to 77 disaster investments: in developing countries 84; in Dominica 145; in Jamaica 115–129; in Kenya 170–178; legislative and development agenda for 115–124; in Zanzibar 194–206 disaster management see disaster risk management disaster management policy: implementation of 195; in Zanzibar 195 disaster planning and management: concept of 21; by individuals and groups 97; see also disaster risk management disaster preparedness 172, 181, 197, 205; community-based 52; Disaster Risk Management Fund to support 174; East African Community (EAC) 179; and emergency management 117, 125; financial resources for 113; in Jamaica 111, 113, 115–116, 119, 124; national and regional programs for 24; nongovernmental organizations 23; resource allocations for 182 Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act (1993), Jamaica 115–116 disaster-proofing, of buildings 97 disaster recovery: and mitigation 70; risk insurance to aid 97; strategies for 97 disaster-related organizations 7, 156; corruption, issues of 11 disaster-related risk 79, 207 disaster response system 69, 181 disaster risk governance (DRG): case study countries 11–14; challenges in developing countries 8, 13; common elements in stronger 214–215; common elements in weaker 215–216; as crosscutting theme 48–49; definition of 1, 66, 77; devolving DRR responsibility 184–186; dimensions of 66; Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 12, 133, 157, 185, 208, 216, 224; in Dominica 22, 145–152, 156–159, 214; factors contributing to 221; implications of weak 14; importance of focusing on

221–224; institutions in 76–96; integrated 223; in Jamaica 6, 22, 132–134, 213–224; in Kenya 182, 184–186, 215–216; marginalizing the local institutions from 219; norms in 98; principles for 223; process of 66; relation with DRR 21; societal governance systems 65–67; societycentered approach to 221; state-centered approach to 221; in Zanzibar 191–210, 214 Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 12–13, 216–217, 224; of developing countries 214; of Dominica 157, 215; of Jamaica 133; of Kenya 185; of Zanzibar 208 disaster risk management 29, 31, 46; capacity-building for 199; financing strategies for 205; in Jamaica 70, 125; in Kenya 182; mobilization of resources for effective 194, 205; policy for see disaster management policy; public awareness programs on 199; responsibility for 199; technology transfers for 203; in Zanzibar 194, 205 Disaster Risk Management Act (2015), Jamaica 116–117 Disaster Risk Management Fund 174 disaster risk reduction (DRR) 3, 8, 43, 44–45, 67–70, 5th Global Platform for 32; Africa Regional Platform for 32; budget allocations for 202; capacitybuilding for 51; definition of 67–68; delivery of 78; in developing countries 213–224; disaster resilience 53; early efforts at 22–23; goals and objectives of 68; goals of 32–34; incentive context of 8; incentivizing of 83–91; institutional context of 8; International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990–2000) 21, 23–25; legislation to support 31; national multisectoral platform (NMP) for 200; National Platforms for 29, 31; objectives of 28; policy formulation for 48; public involvement in achieving 69; regional governance players for 83; regulations and standards for 78; relation with DRG 21; Second Ministerial Conference on 28; Sendai Framework for 30–33; stakeholder context of 8; strategies for 25; undercapacity challenges in 219; World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (1994) 25; in Zanzibar 198

228   Index division of labor 83 Dominica: actors in disaster management in 152–155; Agricultural Small Tenancies Ordinance (1991) 147, 148–149; anti-poverty measures 143; Climate Change Adaptation Policy (2002) 145, 146; Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) 154; communal land ownership 143; constitution on public emergency 145; crime and violence in 143; deaths due to natural hazards 140; decentralization in 215; decision-making process in 144; decline in remittances from natural disasters 143; disaster impact in 141; disaster organization structure in 149–150; Disaster Preparedness Plan 145; disaster risk governance in 22, 145–152, 214; Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 215; Draft Comprehensive Disaster Management Legislation 146–147; effectiveness of DRG systems in 215; Emergency Legislation Project 149; emergency planning and operations 146; Emergency Powers (Disaster) Act (1987) 145–146; Fire and Ambulance Services Act (1991) 148; funding in DRR 151–152; Gender Inequality Index (GII) 144; in general governing context 144–145; Human Development Index (HDI) 143; Hurricane Erika 141; Hurricane Maria 138, 139, 141, 143, 149, 151–154; incentives to reduce risk exposure 155–156; investments in DRG 145; Low-Carbon Climate-Resilient Strategy (2012–2020) 147, 148; National Disaster Coordinator 150; National Disaster Office (NDO) 150; National Disaster Plan (NDP) 145, 146, 149; National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) 154; National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) 149, 150; National Hurricane Disaster Management Plan 145; National Parks and Protected Areas Act (2003) 147, 148; norms of DRR services 156; Office of Disaster Management (ODM) 150; Physical Planning Act (2002) 147, 148; physical vulnerability to climate change 141; post-disaster needs assessment 219; probabilistic risk profile of 140; ratification of UN Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) 146; Regional Enhanced Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Strategy and Programming Framework 153; responsibilities of local government in risk reduction efforts 150; social and economic vulnerability 141–144; social vulnerabilities in 215; state of disaster risk governance in 156–159; support legislation for DRR 147–148; threats from climate change 216; Tropical Atlantic Hurricane Season 138; Tropical Storm Erika 147 Drought Contingency Fund (DCF) 176, 183 droughts 6, 22, 110; economic and social conditions in 165; effect on women and children 7; in Kenya 165–166, 177, 181; management of 179, 181–182; National Drought Management Authority 29 earthquakes 4, 7, 29, 49, 51, 86, 109–110, 119, 128, 140, 181, 191, 192, 200, 216 East African Community (EAC) 82, 179–180, 204; Climate Change Policy, Strategy, and Master Plan 180; disaster risk reduction and management strategy 179–180; Food Security Action Plan 180; policy architecture for disaster management 179 East African Rift System 192 Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) 153 Economic Community of West African States (eCOWAS) 28; Technical Committee on Disaster Management 28 economic incentives 183 economic losses, in middle-income countries 4, 11, 25, 44, 123, 140, 194 economic stresses, induced by disasters 83 ecosystem degradation 84 eco-tourism 141, 158 El Niño 22, 164, 175, 177, 196 Emergency Powers (Disaster) Act (1987), Dominica 145–146 environmental degradation 43, 48, 69, 121 environmental impact assessment (EIA) 34, 148 epidemics: affect public health and safety 110; in Kenya 166 essential goods and services, supply of 79

Index   229 European Commission 121; Global Climate Change Alliance 121 European Investment Bank (EIB) 152 financial crimes 150, 154 financing strategies, for disaster risk management 203, 205 fire hazards 149 floods 4, 7, 21–22, 29, 49, 78, 109–110, 123, 140–141, 163–166, 175, 181, 191, 200, 203, 216 Florentine society 94 Food and Agriculture Organization 131, 155 food availability, reduction in 2, 110 food insecurity 110, 142–143, 176, 180; in Kenya 164–165 food management 181 food production 110 Foreign Corrupt Practices Action (US) 93 forest fires 4; in California 96; in Indonesia 93 forestlands 148 Frederickson, H. George 63 funding, for disaster management: budgetary allocation for 182; challenges of 219–220; conditional donor support 182; contingency pools of funds 151; in developing countries 219–220; in Dominica 151–152; donor funding for DRR 183; government contingency fund 183; by international agencies 222; in Jamaica 126–129; in Kenya 182; for post-disaster recovery needs 151; World Bank’s approach to 220; in Zanzibar 202–204 gender equality 27, 31, 45 Gender Inequality Index (GII) 144 Global Assessment Reports 69 Global Climate Change Alliance (European Commission) 121 Global Conference on Sustainable Development (1994) 3–4, 25 global development agencies 21 global economic crisis 143 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) 70, 153, 191, 203 global income 42 globalization, notion of 47–48, 65–66, 80–81, 88 global public organizations 80, 95, 98, 170, 223 Global Report on Food Crises 165 good governance 80; concept of 64; long-

term policy for promoting 210; in Zanzibar 194 good life, aspects of 39 goods and services, exchange of 76, 79 governance: concept of 62–63; of international relations 64 government contingency fund, for disasters 183 government service delivery 10, 220 green economy, establishment of 148 gross domestic product (GDP) 139, 192; impact of natural hazards on 6–7; per capita 40 gross national income (GNI) 42, 163 Haiti earthquake 51 Hobbes 75 human activity, detrimental effects of 46, 77 Human Development Index (HDI) 143, 166 Human Development Report 42 human–environment relations 45 human-induced disasters 29 humanitarian assistance, need for 5, 202 human trafficking, impact of disasters on 51 Hurrell, A. 82 Hurricane David 22 Hurricane Dean 6, 115, 141–142 Hurricane Erika 141, 151 Hurricane Gilbert 109, 114, 122–123, 125, 215 Hurricane Irma 32 Hurricane Ivan 115, 122 Hurricane Katrina 51 Hurricane Lenny 6, 22, 141 Hurricane Maria 6, 32, 138, 139, 143, 149, 151–154, 216 Hurricane Omar 142 Hurricane Tomas 142 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA 2005–2015) 7, 23, 27–30, 44, 46, 54, 170–171, 180, 194, 197, 200, 205, 215; on climate-related hazards 29; Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) strategy 115; implementation of 29; tenets of 28; UN ESCAP assessment of 30 Immediate Response Loan 151 imperialism: definition of 99n5; difference with colonialism 88; mechanisms of 88; timeline of 88

230   Index incentives, in disaster risk reduction 83–91; concept of 83; for cost of preparing for a disaster 84; disaster-related risk-aversion 207; in Dominica 155–156; economic considerations for 84, 183; historical drag on institutional development 87–91; insurance policy 84; for insurers and contractors 93; in Jamaica 131–132; in Kenya 183; marginalization of local and indigenous institutions 85–87; moral hazards and 84; risk transfer systems 84; in Zanzibar 206 income inequality 42–43, 55, 113–114 Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 28, 82, 203–204 Indian Ocean Islands 203 Indian Ocean region 192 Indonesian forest fires (1997–1998) 93 informal institutional constraints, role of 76 information and knowledge management (IKM) system 207, 219, 220 institutional development, role of politics in 76, 87, 149 institutional economics 46, 76 institutionalism, idea of 75 institutions, in disaster risk governance 76–96; actors in 79, 204–206; chiefs with great institutional powers 90; colonialism and 87; corruption, issue of 91–95; deficiency of 95–96; definitions of 79; development of 87–91; ethnic leaders and chiefs 86; government ineffectiveness and the capacity issue 95; incentivizing disaster risk reduction 83–91; informal “soft” institutions 96–98, 183–184; investments in 194–206; in Jamaica 114–115; in Kenya 170–178; legislation governing 78–79, 194–197; levels of operation of 85; to manage disaster risks 76; marginalization of 85–87; norms of 98, 114–115; opportunities and burdensharing 87; political institutions 89; postcolonial societies 89; private development of 78; for protection of settlement colonies 89; regional organizations 81–83; regulatory burdens and tax inconsistencies 78; reliance on global organizations 79–81; responsibility for policy formation 89; role of 83, 98; soft-institutional context of 114–115, 220–221; in Zanzibar 194–206

insurance policy, in event of a disaster 84, 97; Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Scheme 205; in Jamaica 128; Kenya National Agricultural Insurance Program 165; livestock insurance 165–166 intellectual property rights 150, 154 Inter-Agency Working Group on Disaster Preparedness for East and Central Africa (IAWG) 181 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 28, 83, 179; Disaster Risk Management Program 179; Drought Disaster and Sustainability Initiative 179 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 173 International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990–2000) 21, 23–25 International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) 124 International Federation of the Red Cross 203 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR 2005) 27, 205 investments, in disaster management see disaster investments Jamaica: actors in disaster management in 129–131; British Westminster-Whitehall system of socio-political culture 111; Building Disaster Resilient Communities Project 126; Civil Society Sector Sub-Committee (CSSSC) 131; Community-based Adaptation to Climate Change Program 121; community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR) 132; coordination mechanisms 130–131; corruption in 112–113; cultural context for DRR 215; damage assessment plan 119; debt to GDP ratio 113–114; disaster impact in 110; Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act (1993) 115–116; disaster risk governance in 6, 22, 109–134, 213–224; Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 133; Disaster Risk Management Act (2015) 116–117, 127, 131; disaster risk profile of 109–111; disaster risk reduction governing mechanism 122; education and awareness about DRR 121–124; Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 118; epidemics affecting public health

Index   231 and safety 110; focal points 126; food insecurity 110; funding in DRR 126–129; governing system in 111–113; House of Representatives 112; Hurricane Gilbert 215; incentives to reduce risk exposure 131–132; income inequality 113–114; Integrity Commission Bill 112; investments in DRG 115–129; legislative and development agenda 115–124; lessons from Hurricane Gilbert 122; macroeconomic issues 114; mainstreaming climate change in 120–121; National Development Plan 119–120; National Disaster Committee (NDC) 122, 123; National Earthquake Response Plan 119; national emergency operations (NEOs) 118; National Fire Management Plan 119; National Food and Security Policy 110; National Hazard Mitigation Policy (2005) 116; National Red Cross Society 129; National Response Matrix (2005) 116; National Response Team (NRT) 123; National Zonal Committee 125, 130; National Zonal Program 126, 130; natural hazard-related disasters 110; Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) 23, 115–116, 121, 124, 127, 130; Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Relief Coordination (ODIPERC) 124; Parish Disaster Committees (PDCs) 117–118, 124–125; parish disaster coordinator 125; plans and SOPs for emergency operations 118–119; public asset correlation management 115; risk financing measures 128; Seventh Day Adventist Movement 125; social and economic indicators 113–114; soft institutional context of DRR services 156; soft institutions, for disaster risk governance 114–115; state-centered system biases 109; state of disaster risk governance in 132–134; Transfer Tax Act 127; tropical cyclones in 109; unemployment rate 113; values, customs, and traditions in DRG 114–115; Vision 2030 119–120; zones 125–126 Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) 129 Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) 122, 129 Jamaica Fire Brigade 122, 129 Jamaica Labor Party 122

Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002) 180 Kenya: actors in disaster risk governance in 178–183; adaptation to climate change 171; anthropogenic threats 166; anti-corruption measures 167; constitutional provisions on disaster risk reduction and management 172; coordinating with DRG network 181–182; County Emergency Funds Act 183; deficiencies of DRG systems in 216; disaster impact in 164; disaster management efforts in 181; disaster practitioners in 216; Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 185; Disaster Risk Management Bill 178; Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (2006–2016) 171; donor funding for DRR 183; Drought Contingency Fund (DCF) 176; drought, impact of 165–166, 177; Drought Management Authority 163; DRR organization 174; effectiveness of DRG systems in 215; food insecurity and malnutrition in 164–165; food management in 181; food reserves and distribution 165; Food Security Meeting 176; Food Security Steering Group 176; funding for disaster management 182; GDP growth 163; governing and new constitution 168–170; government and administrative reforms in 216; government contingency fund for disasters 183; hard institutions in DRR in 172–178; hazard vulnerability reduction 171; high rates of physical, social, economic and political vulnerabilities 163–168; Human Development Index 166; incentives to reduce risk exposure 183; Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) 167; investments in disaster risk governance in 170–178; Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) 177–178; legislative and regulatory framework in 170–171, 174; National Cereals and Produce Board 176; National Climate Change Response Strategy of 2010 172–173; National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC) 175, 181–182; National Disaster Management Policy (NDMP) 173, 180; National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU) 178;

232   Index Kenya continued National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) 175–176; National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) 176; National Executive (NE) 174–175; National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NPDRR) 173, 175; National Police Service (NPS) 178; national poverty line 166; natural disaster profile of 164; new devolved system of 169; norms in disaster risk governance 183–184; partisanship among tribes 167–168; process of devolution in 223; service delivery mechanisms 223; social vulnerabilities in 215; soft institutions in DRR in 183–184; state of disaster risk governance in 184–186; structure of county government in 170; terrorist attacks in 166; threats from climate change 216; Vision 2030 171–172, 180, 183 Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) 29, 177–178 Kenya National Agricultural Insurance Program 165 knowledge-building, about consequences of climate change 121 knowledge management 26, 28, 207, 219–220 La Niña 177, 196 laws and legislations, governing institutions in DRG 78–79; comprehensive disaster legislation 216; customary law 90; in Dominica 146–148; in Jamaica 115–124; in Kenya 170–171, 174; in Zanzibar 194–204; zoning laws 223 Leviathan (1651) 75 Limits to Growth, The (1972) 46 Livelihood Protection Programs 222 livestock insurance 165–166 local government agencies (LGAs) 200 man-made hazard, impact of 49, 111, 141, 191 marginalized groups 52 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 46 Mauritius Strategy of Implementation (MSI 2005) 3, 26 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 27, 42, 69, 115, 119, 180; Vision 2030 171 ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) 200

moral hazard 84, 94, 97 Mueller, Ursula 31 multidimensional poverty index 42 national emergency operations (NEOs) 118 National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO), Dominica 146, 149, 150 National Forest Resources Policy, Zanzibar 198 national governments: accountability for DRR 222; as actor in DRR 218 national multisectoral platform (NMP), for disaster risk reduction 200, 204 National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction 29, 31 National Police Service (NPS), Kenya 177, 178 Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program (EU) 153 natural hazards 29; as acts of God 25, 49; building codes in developing countries 93; in Caribbean countries 5, 6, 22; disasters caused by 3, 91; in Dominica 141; gross domestic product and 6–7; impact of 1–2, 48; impact on women 51; in Kenya 22 natural resources, preservation of 46–47, 85, 89, 94 neoliberalism, rise of 39 New “Institutional Economics” 94 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 28, 179 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 23, 28, 67, 130; working in DRR 194 norms, in disaster risk governance 98; in developing countries 215; in Dominica 156; in Kenya 183–184 North, Douglass 76 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 93 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Zanzibar 209 Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) 111, 115–118, 121, 123, 124–125, 134 official development assistance 26, 114 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 152, 153 Pan American Health Organization 129, 131

Index   233 Pan Caribbean Disaster Planning and Prevention Project (PCDPPP) 22–23 Parish Disaster Committees (PDCs), Jamaica 117–118, 124–126 peasant development, problem of 87 pest infestation 22, 191 Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) 6, 22, 113, 119, 120, 121 Plan of Action for a Safer World (1994) 25, 180 policy formulation, for DRR 48; responsibility for 89 political accountability, of DRG 222; in service delivery 65 polycentric governance 66 Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) 3, 139, 153, 154, 156, 219 poverty 2, 41–44; definition of 41; in households 51; in Kenya 166; in Zanzibar 193 Primitive Culture (1871) 97 problem-solving 63–64 protection of lives and property, regulations for 149 public administration 13, 63, 92 public asset correlation management 115 public awareness programs, on disaster management 199, 215 public involvement, in achieving DRR 69 public legitimacy, of DRG 65, 222 public–private cooperation, in DRG 44, 183, 218, 222 regional disaster organizations 81–83; cultural and linguistic commonalities 81; DRR activities of 82; efforts in disaster risk reduction 81; international and national systems of 81; regional disaster-focused organizations 81; regional governance 81; regionalism, issue of 82; role in disaster planning and response 81; visibility in disaster governance 82 regionalism, issue of 82 regional risk transfer system 69 resilience: definition of 54; in disaster risk reduction 53–55; governance mechanisms of 53; in sustainable development 53 resource allocations, for disaster preparedness 50, 172, 182 responsibility, for disaster management 199; decentralizing of 222

risk governance see disaster risk governance (DRG) risk insurance 84; to aid disaster recovery 97; in Jamaica 126 risk knowledge generation, future of 48 risk reduction behavior, practice of 84, 97 risk transfer systems 69, 84 sea-level rise 22, 139, 191 seawater intrusion, into underground aquifers 191 seismic activity 192 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) 30–33, 44, 54, 115, 152, 170, 180, 194, 200, 205, 223; goals of 11; implementation of 32; social dimensions of DRR 31 service delivery mechanisms 186, 223 settlement colonies 89 Seventh Day Adventist Movement 125 slave plantation 87 small island developing states (SIDS) 3–4, 25; blueprint for sustainable development of 4; UN Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (1994) 4 Smith, Adam 83; division of labor, principle of 83 social and economic development 26, 43, 46, 116, 210 social development programs 43 social inequality 48, 65, 166 social networks 24, 221 social safety net programs 2 social welfare of communities 180 societal capacity-building 52 societal governance systems 48, 65 soil erosion 148 Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) 204 South West Indian Ocean Commission (SWIOC) 82, 203–204 Southwest Indian Ocean Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (SWIO RAFI) 203; in Zanzibar 204 sovereign power, notion of 75 Special Climate Change Adaptation Fund (SCCAF) 128 storm-related fatalities 2 strategies, for disaster recovery 97 surface water supply 110 susceptibility 49–50; to disaster 77; to volcanic activity 22

234   Index sustainability, concept of 47, 56n5 sustainable development 2, 31, 46, 55; interpretations of 47; linking disaster risk reduction to 69; low-carbon 196; resilience in 53 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 3, 33–34, 42, 43, 69, 148, 196; Agenda 2030 196; concepts and challenges 45–48; defined 45; global development framework of 47; implementation of 34; in Jamaica 120; of small island developing states (SIDS) 4; World Summit on Sustainable Development 180 Tanzania Disaster Communication Strategy (TDCS) 198 Tanzania Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (TEPRP) 198 Taylor, Edward B. 97 technology transfers, for disaster management 81, 203 terrorist attacks, in Kenya 111, 166 tidal flooding 22, 191 transaction cost economics (TCE) 94 transboundary information-sharing, protocols for 204 Transparency International 92, 112, 134n2, 167 tribal governance, in disaster risk reduction 87 tropical cyclones 7, 14, 22, 109, 128, 191 Tropical Storm Erika 6, 141–142, 147 Truman, Harry S. 40 Trump, Donald 80 tsunami 4, 141, 181 UN General Assembly 26; Resolution (A/57/262) 26 United Nations (UN) 40–41, 92, 95; Barbados Plan of Action (1994) 3–4; convention against corruption 92; Development Program 154; Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) 23; Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 146; Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (1994) 3–4, 25; Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 see Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA 2005–2015); International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990–2000) 21, 23–25; International

Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR 2005) 27, 205; Mauritius Strategy 3; Millennium Development Goals 115; National Platform agenda 32 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 23 University of West Indies 23, 109 Uphoff, N. 85 volcanic activity 22 vulnerability, from natural disasters 49–51, 97; associated with poverty 51; current state of 50; defined 49; degree of risk 50; in developing countries 215; human trafficking and 51; physical and urban 193; risk insurance to reduce 97; social and economic 192; state of being vulnerable 50; of women 51 water storage systems 110 weather-related disaster 7 welfare of human society 76 wildfires see forest fires Williamson, Oliver 76, 94 women’s empowerment 31, 45 women’s vulnerability to disasters 51 World Bank Group (WBG) 2, 25, 91, 92, 94, 128, 153, 165, 205; funding for disaster management 220; risk transfer initiative 205; Southwest Indian Ocean Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (SWIO RAFI) 203; Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy 92; work in Kenya 180 World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (1994) 25 World Development Report 91 World Food Program 177 World Humanitarian Summit 180 Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World (1994) 25–27, 152, 180 Zanzibar: actors in disaster risk management 204–206; annual direct losses due to climate change 193; Anticorruption and Economic Crime Authority (ZACECA) 209; budget allocations for DRR 202; capacitybuilding for disaster management 199; challenges in preparing for climate change 192; Climate Change Action

Index   235 Plan (ZCCAP) 196; climate change adaptation in 192, 198; climate-changerelated events 7, 22, 192; Climate Change Strategy (ZCCS 2014) 192, 195–196; Development Vision 2020 document 196–197, 210; direct losses and emergency costs associated with natural hazards 191; Disaster Communication Strategy (2011) 195; Disaster Management Act (2003) 198, 201; Disaster Management Department (DMD) 201; Disaster Management Policy Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (2011) 195; Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) 203; disaster risk governance in 191–210; Disaster Risk Governance Inventory Matrix 208; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (2015) 199, 202, 204, 206; disaster risk reduction in 192, 198; District Disaster Management Committee 214; district-level planning for disaster management 201; DRG organization 198–200; effects of climate change on 191–192; emergency responses and plans 198; Environmental Management Act (2015) 198; Environmental Management for Sustainable Development Act (1996) 198; financial support to tackle climate change 192; Framework for Action 2005–2015 195; funding for disaster management 202–204; good governance in 194; incentives to practice DRR 206; investments in hard institutions 194–206; legal framework for disaster risk reduction and management in

194–204; multidimensional poor and vulnerable population in 193; National Disaster Management Policy Implementation Strategy 195; National Forest Resources Policy 198; national multisectoral platform (NMP) 200; National Operational Guidelines (2013) 195; National Platform (NP) for Disaster Risk Reduction 200; National Relief Fund 202; NCDM structure and coordination mechanism 206; Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 209; per person losses from disasters 191; physical and urban vulnerabilities 193; poverty level in 193; Public Finance Act of 202; rate and level of urban growth in 193; responsibility for disaster management 199; Second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP II) 197–198; Shehia Disaster Management Committee 201; social and economic vulnerabilities 192; soft institutions 210; state of DRG in 207–210; SWIO Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (SWIO RAFI) 204; vulnerabilities to natural and humanmade hazards 191; Zanzibar Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (ZEPRP 2013) 195 Zanzibar Disaster Management Fund (ZDMF) 195 Zanzibar Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (2015) 194 zoning laws, in disaster risk governance 77, 210, 223