Direct Democracy and International Politics: Deciding International Issues Through Referendums 9781685856311

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Direct Democracy and International Politics

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Deciding International Issues Through Referendums John T. Rourke Richard P. Hiskes Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rourke, John T., 1945Direct democracy and international politics : deciding international issues through referendums / by John T. Rourke, Richard P. Hiskes, and Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-263-8 1. Referendum. 2. Democracy. 3. International relations. 4. World Politics—1945I. Hiskes, Richard P., 1951II. Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto, 1951- . III. Title. JF491.R68 1992 328.2—dc20

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

92-8773 CIP

Contents

1

Democracy and History: The End or New Direction?

2

Referendums and the Theory of Democracy

11

3

A Historical Overview of Referendums

31

4

Realists' Fears, Democrats' Hopes, and Questions for Research

57

5

1

Referendums, Europe, and International Organizations

71

6

Referendums and the Specter of Secession

111

7

Referendums International Politics: The United and States

151

8

Democratic World Politics: Performance and Prospects

171

Bibliography

185

Index

195

About the Book and Authors

202

1 Democracy and History: The End or New Direction? Democracy is on the upsurge throughout the world. Both a simple reading of the daily newspapers and scholarly research tell us that authoritarian governments were falling and being replaced by more democratic versions as the 1980s closed and the 1990s began. 1 Not only that, some observers assure us that democracy stands on the threshold of global triumph. Indeed, we are at "the end of history," according to Francis Fukuyama's provocative essay in The National Interest? H e proposes that "we may be witnessing... the end of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." In the foreseeable future, he predicts, political evolution will settle on a political system that is "liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed." Fukuyama's discussion is less cavalier than some critics suggest. He concedes, for example, that religious fundamentalism has a resurgent, often powerful appeal and could lead to full or quasi-theocratic political systems, such as Khomeini's Iran, and that persistent nationalism is fertile ground for all sorts of potentially dark political impulses—and Fukuyama does not dismiss the development of new, yet unforeseeable, political movements. Even with these caveats, Fukuyama's assertion justifiably has evoked considerable discussion and criticism. The new democracies in many countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are still in their infancy and thus fragile. As for Europe, conservative critics fault Fukuyama, a Sovietologist, for being too optimistic in assuming the demise of totalitarian Communism as a political system under the impact of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika rhetoric and the democratic rumblings of Tiananmen Square. The failure of the 1991 coup attempt by Communist traditionalists, then the atomization of the USSR itself into fifteen independent countries seemingly proved the conservative critics wrong, but there are new predictions that Soviet communist totalitarianism will be replaced by Russian chauvinist authoritarianism and similarly repressive regimes in some of the other erstwhile Soviet republics. It is ironic that while the plotters did not succeed in replacing Mikhail Gorbachev with themselves, 1

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they did (unwittingly) help to replace him with Boris Yeltsin. The Russian president is certainly charismatic and has preached democratic reform, but he has also sometimes been erratic, and as his strength has grown his governance of Russia has not always fully met democratic standards. From the other end of the spectrum, some of Fukuyama's liberal critics doubt that democracy, which has been unable to cure societies of poverty, drugs, racism, and other social ills, can confidently be described as the wave of the future. Other liberal critics argue that democratic theory is too state-oriented and is not likely to result in a truly liberal world regime. What is needed, they suggest, is a globalization of democratic thinking that will promote substantive, egalitarian democracy as well as procedural democracy in a global context. 3 There is another line of criticism, important to this work, that looks to the evolution of democracy rather than to the competition of democracy with other political systems or to the test of whether it betters social conditions. Fukuyama takes the view that the principles and practice of democracy have not changed significantly in nearly two centuries, that "the present world seems to confirm that the fundamental principles of sociopolitical organization have not advanced terribly far since 1806. " 4 We are skeptical that democracy's need to compete with other political ideologies is over. More important for this study, we do not even believe that democracy's own internal dialectical evolution has achieved its ultimate form of being. The liberal democracies that Fukuyama argues are the epitome of political development are all republics, representative democracies. Are such republican systems the "end of democratic history?" The answer may well be no. Whether or not Fukuyama is correct in the long run, the political changes that sparked his essay have also urged many other scholars to examine the relationship between peace and democracy. Questions about the coming of democracy and its policy impacts have indeed occupied entire issues of some leading academic journals in recent years. 5 It is also important to note that the debate over the future of democracy in the world is not simply an abstract issue to challenge intellectuals. There is a strong argument that democracy is an agent for peace. This contention has, of course, been pondered by political philosophers for centuries. In 1795, Immanuel Kant argued in Perpetual Peace that the spread of democracy would change the world by eliminating war, because "if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be d e c l a r e d . . . , nothing is more natural than [that] they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war." Some scholars have reached the Kantian conclusion that democracies are more peaceful than authoritarian political systems. 6 Most others have

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3

been more cautious. There is evidence, for example, that overall democracies and authoritarian systems are equally likely to be at war.7 But what is truly enticing is the finding of several recent studies that democracies are both more likely to align themselves and less likely to go to war with each other because of similar political cultures and that in democracies popular pressure does seem to restrain bellicose leaders at least some.8 Also, the long-standing and prevailing view among political scientists that the public is largely inert, ignorant, and impotent in foreign policy matters has undergone significant revision. The quality of mass involvement in such issues will be a major topic here, but suffice it to say that numerous recent studies have painted a much more optimistic picture of public interest and input in foreign and defense policymaking.9 If there is validity, as there seems to be, in the correlation between democracy and peaceful state behavior, then the spread of democracy makes it arguable that the expansion of popular government will bring greater freedom from the oppression of international war as well as from oppression by domestic regimes. It is also plausible that strengthening the role of citizens in their country's decisionmaking will further increase the restraints on leaders that some studies have found. Popular participation can be enhanced through a variety of techniques. Although generally neglected in scholarship and even less present in the popular mind, there is a slow evolution of direct democracy techniques. These involve a process whereby voters, not representatives, directly decide whether or not to adopt specific statutory or constitutional proposals. There are several types of direct democracy procedures, and they will be addressed presently. The point here is that they are not only becoming more common but are also a possible evolutionary direction for human governance. It would be rash to suggest that representative government as the current, basic democratic form is threatened. But it would be equally inappropriate to ignore the growth of direct democracy as a method of democratic decisionmaking. The growth of direct democracy is evident in Figure 1.1, which looks solely at national referendums. There are thousands of additional subnational referendums each year. Two trends can be particularly noted in Figure 1.1. One is basic growth. The first national referendums in the post-Greco-Roman world occurred about 500 years ago. They were rarities, however, and even during the nineteenth century, national referendums were held at an annual rate of less than one (0.74). The global spread of representative democracy in the twentieth century, either in practice or as a caricatured standard of legitimacy, was accompanied by a collateral growth of direct democracy. During the century's first decade, referendums were held at an annual rate of 1.9; by mid-century (the 1950s), the frequency stood at 8.1; and in the 1980s (through 1986), an average of 16.8 national referendums were held each year.

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& International

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Fig. 1.1 A v e r a g e A n n u a l R e f e r e n d u m s , 1 8 0 0 - 1 9 8 6

18

16.6 16 14

m +

16.8

All Countries

CD A l l C o u n t r i e s E x c e p t Switzerland

19thC

190009

10-19

20-29 30-39 40-49

50-59 60-69 70-79

80-86

Time Period This figure is based on data from D a v i d Butler and Austin R a n n e y , eds., Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Washington, D.C.: A m e r i c a n Enterprise Institute, 1978) and John Austin, D a v i d Butler, and Austin R a n n e y , " R e f e r e n d u m s , 1978-1986," Electoral Studies 6/2 (1987): 139-142.

The second notable phenomenon is the geographic spread of direct democracy. The Swiss pioneered national direct democracy, and during the eighteenth century, 74 percent of the world's seventy-four national referendums occurred in Switzerland. By the mid-twentieth century, however, Switzerland's share had dropped to 56 percent of eighty-one national referendums, and it further ebbed to 40 percent of 118 national referendums from 1980 through 1986. This spread of direct democracy initially occurred in Europe and areas dominated by European immigrants, but in more recent years, referendums have also become more common in Third World countries. As Figure 1.2 shows, the average annual referendum rate in the Third World has increased from a mere 0.1 during 1900-1909, to 2.8 at mid-century, to 4.3 from 1980 through 1986. This is certainly no tidal wave, but it does indicate a steady, if slow, flood tide.

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Democracy & History

Fig. 1.2 Average Annual 1st & 3rd W o r l d Referendums, 1800-1986

14

T

12.6

12.5

W o r l d Countries B 3 "5

I W o r l d Countries 10 --

8

--

6

--

19thC

190009

10-19

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

70-79

80-86

Time Period This figure is based on data from David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., Référendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Washington, D.C.: A m e r i c a n Enterprise Institute, 1978) and John Austin, David Butler, and Austin Ranney, " R é f é r e n d u m s , 1978-1986," Electoral Studies 6/2 (1987): 139-142.

T h e increase in the national r e f e r e n d u m rate f r o m less than o n e a y e a r in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o a p o i n t w h e r e , b y 1980-1986, an a v e r a g e 1.4 national r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e b e i n g h e l d e a c h m o n t h , p e r s u a d e s us that d i r e c t d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g w a r r a n t s f u r t h e r research. T h i s study addresses direct d e m o c r a c y with a particular f o c u s o n its use t o d e c i d e issues r e l a t e d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations. 1 0 T h e r e are s e v e r a l r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e that the use o f d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y in g e n e r a l and t h e use o f d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y to d e c i d e i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues in particular m a y g r o w . T w o o f these reasons are d o m e s t i c a l l y f o c u s e d : the g e n e r a l s p r e a d o f d e m o c r a t i c systems; and the persistent, and in s o m e cases g r o w i n g , distrust o f g o v e r n m e n t b y its citizens. T h e s e m a y augur g r e a t e r d e m a n d

for

n a t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m s , particularly as citizens b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d t o t h e process, see it used in o t h e r countries, and/or p a r t i c i p a t e in it at subnational levels in their o w n countries. N u m e r o u s studies in the U n i t e d States,

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for example, have documented the upsurge in the incidence of direct democracy there. Furthermore, U.S. opinion surveys over the last decade or so indicate that, depending on timing and how the question is worded, between 54 and 69 percent of respondents with an opinion favor using referendums or some other form of direct democracy at the national level.11 Changes in the world political environment will also enhance the growth of direct democracy decisionmaking. Burgeoning international interdependence is blurring the lines between foreign affairs—the traditional preserve of the leadership—and domestic affairs, in which self-interested groups and citizens are more interested and more active. Fewer issues are now purely international or domestic, as such; instead, there is a growing number of "intermestic" issues. People are more apt to perceive these issues in terms of their personal impact. Therefore, intermestic issues are, like their domestic cousins, more often subject to pluralistic decisionmaking processes than are foreign policy decisions.12 The communications revolution is also heightening the public perceptual sense of intimacy with international affairs. Radio, television, and VCR technology have turned the old adage "it's a small world" into an important political phenomenon. Students standing in front of tanks in Tiananmen Square, Nelson Mandela striding to freedom in South Africa, and the Soviet flag being lowered one last time from atop the Kremlin all now occur in our living rooms, bedrooms, and dens. These changes have broadened foreign policymaking beyond the domains of executive political leadership and the bureaucracy to include increased pluralistic participation by the mass, interest groups, and legislatures. This, in turn, will promote a concomitant rise of direct democracy decisionmaking on international issues. Before outlining our approach to this study, it would be wise to define several key terms. These include national referendums, international issue, and referendums. We use national referendums in a fairly broad sense, including votes by existing countries, votes in what were countries at the time of the vote, and votes in what later did or might have become countries. This third group especially includes votes on political status—mostly independence. It should be noted that this criterion was used to compile the statistics in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, but the study itself will also include subnational referendums on international issues. International issue is a trickier term. The dividing line between what is an international issue and what is a domestic issue was never precise; increased international interdependence has rendered the distinction even less clear today. Therefore, we will use the term broadly. Some issues, such as Spain's decision to remain in N A T O , are obvious. Others are less so, and we include as international-issue referendums those that, im-

Democracy & History

1

mediately or potentially, involved possible sovereignty (or presovereign autonomy) for a dependent territory or the shift of national association for a dependent territory from one country to another; votes that significantly and directly affected a country's military structure, resources, or utilization; and votes on matters involving foreign commerce. The plural referendums merits brief etymological and conceptual discussion. We have chosen to pluralize referendum as referendums instead of referenda because we are persuaded by Butler and Ranney's rationale for preferring referendums,13 by the preference of most dictionaries for that form, and by the (somewhat reluctant) need to bow to modernity. We use referendum to designate all procedures whereby voters directly cast ballots on issues. This includes classic referendums, in which an issue is referred to the voters either after the legislature has voted on it or in lieu of legislative decision. There are also advisory referendums that come before but are not binding on or even prefatory to legislative action. Whatever their exact form, they all rely on the agreement of the government to refer an issue to the voters before popular action is possible. Beyond these, we use referendums to include initiatives, an even more direct form of democracy. An initiative is begun by popular action, usually in the form of a petition, to place an issue on the ballot for voter decision. In some cases, the legislature may have an opportunity to adopt the legislation before the popular decision or to place an alternative proposal before the voters. At root, though, the placement of the issue on the ballot comes from the citizenry, not the government. To avoid rather clumsy construction, we will use referendum to include all referendums and initiatives, and we further intend to include both starting points (government and citizens) and both outcomes (binding and advisory) in our definition of referendum. The various procedural forms receive further attention in Chapter 3 and in the subsequent discussion of specific referendums. The following discussion of international-issue referendums is both philosophical and empirical. In the first chapter we explore the conceptual relationship between referendums and democratic theory. We ask three fundamental questions relating to democracy, referendums, and international politics. First, is there a necessary connection between the use of referendums and the meaning of democracy? Second, even if there is a good democratic argument for using referendums, do the realities of international politics suggest that referendums might be an inappropriate method of making foreign policy decisions? Third, do the special requirements of diplomacy, such as continuity, expertise, and secrecy, presume that in the relations between states too much democracy is a dangerous thing? Chapter 3 then surveys the history of direct democracy, with an

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emphasis on international-issue referendums. Chapter 3 also briefly discusses the technical procedures for initiating and holding referendums. Chapter 4 lays the groundwork for the ensuing study of international-issue referendums. We begin that chapter by building on the work done by David Magleby, Thomas Cronin, and other scholars on direct democracy in the United States and by David Butler and Austin Ranney and by others on general comparative direct democracy. These studies combine with the discussion of democratic theory in Chapter 2 and the historical survey of international-issue referendums in Chapter 3 to provide the basis for a series of questions about the nature of referendums. The resultant questions, in turn, help structure the examination of specific types of international-issue referendums in Chapters 5 through 7 and our conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 8. Referendums relating to relations between countries and international organizations are the subject of Chapter 5. These include votes by Norway, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and France on the European Economic Community; Spain's decision on NATO membership; and Switzerland's referendum on United Nations membership. Chapter 6 focuses on independence succession, devolution, and other such issues of national status and territorial jurisdiction. This includes votes in Quebec, Scotland, Wales, and several Spanish regions about their future relations with the countries in which they are located. Several recent national-status referendums in the former Soviet Union and its constituent republics are also discussed. Chapter 7 examines a series of nonbinding referendums held in U.S. states on the international issues of implementing a nuclear freeze and ending U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam. The study of voter interest and participation in these exercises and their impact provides insights into the role of opinion, especially when electorally expressed, on policy. Chapter 8 concludes the study. In it we bring together the comparative evidence on the propositions formulated in Chapter 4. We also address the issues of democratic theory raised in Chapter 2, and, last, make some suggestions about the path of future research. NOTES 1. On the growth of democracy, see Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35/2 (June 1991), pp. 356-381. 2. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3, 5. Along with Fukuyama's essay, National Interest printed comments by Allan Bloom, Pierre Hassner, Gertrude Himmilfarb, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Stephen Stanovich. Other comments can be found

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in an editorial, probably by literary editor Leon Wiesteltier, "It's a Small World After All," New Republic 3/596-597 (September 18-25, 1989), pp. 7-9; and in Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," National Interest 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 3-10. 3. Examples include David Held, "Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System," Economy and Society 20/2 (May 1991), pp. 138-172; and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Introduction: The Global Context of Democratization," Alternatives 16/2 (Spring 1991), pp. 119-128. 4. Fukuyama, "End of History?" p. 15. Fukuyama's choice of 1806 is a reference to Georg W. F. Hegel's contention in Phenomenology of Mind (1807) that the dialectic of political ideology came to an end in 1806 when the French defeated the Prussians at Jenna, thereby (Hegel supposed) signaling the triumph of the French Revolution's liberal democratic ideals over the autocratic foundation of the Prussian crown. 5. For example, see the symposium in Journal of Conflict Resolution 35/2 (June 1991). 6. For example, R. J. Rummel, "The Politics of Cold Blood," Society (November/December 1989), pp. 32-40. 7. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (1976), pp. 50-69. 8. Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflict, 1816-1976, Journal of Conflict Resolution 33/1 (1989), pp. 3-35; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (1986), pp. 1151-1169; T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35/2 (1991), pp. 187-211. Morgan and Campbell find only a small relationship between regime type and bellicosity, but their indicators, while weak, point in that direction. 9. An excellent multinational study that finds public opinion not as unstable as earlier assumed is Bruce M. Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). A study of Denmark can be found in HansHenrik Holm, " A Democratic Revolt? Stability and Change in Danish Security Policy 1979-1987," Cooperation and Conflict 24 (1989), pp. 179-197; for Finland, see Krister Stálberg, "Public Opinion in Finnish Foreign Policy," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1987 (Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 1987), pp. 15-25; and for the United States, Robert T. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 (1988), pp. 211-247. 10. Most of the work on direct democracy has concentrated on domestic issues, which are the most common subject of referendums. The most extensive work has been done on the United States, with the work of David Magelby (1984) standing out as a comparative (among states), general study. A recent work by Cronin (1989) adds to this U.S.-focused literature. Less has been done with the international-issue referendums. The majority of studies have examined a particular referendum. Two edited volumes, one by Butler and Ranney (1978), the other by Ranney (1981), pioneered the cross-national study of referendums. Both these works made valuable contributions, but they are generally compendiums

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of national experiences, and there is a need to be more systematically comparative. 11. Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 174-176. 12. Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs," Foreign Affairs 57 (1979), pp. 308-324. 13. David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 4.

Referendums and the Theory of Democracy Democracy is often considered akin to Gertrude Stein's "Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose." But we know that all roses are not alike; nor are all democracies. Democracies differ both politically in terms of the processes they encompass and economically in terms of the notions of distributive justice they embrace. Democracies also vary according to the degree of citizen participation they presume, with "direct" democracies requiring a great deal of input by citizens and indirect democracies relying primarily on the decisions of elected representatives. These aspects of democracy are explored within democratic theory, a domain that traditionally has not been central to the scholarly discourse about the nature and conduct of international relations. The long-dominant and still powerful realist school of international relations theory discounts the possibility that the type of domestic regime might be an independent variable that affects the conduct of state behavior in the international sphere. As Francis Fukuyama correctly observes, "Realism maintains that the struggle for power among nations is universal in both time and space, and that is only the [polar] shape of the international system . . . that determines the likelihood of war or peace." 1 The gap between international relations theory and democratic theory is rapidly narrowing, however. The reason for the enhanced interest in democracy among many international relations scholars is, as we noted in Chapter 1, the surge of democratization that has occurred and continues globally. By Fukuyama's count, "there were three democracies in 1790; 13 in 1900, 27 in 1919, and 62" in 1991.2 What particularly intrigues international relations theorists is the "unrealpolitik" possibility that type of domestic-regime does affect foreign policy. Is it true, as Immanuel Kant believed, that democracies are more peaceful? If so, and if democratization continues, then world politics should become steadily less combative. This topic has been addressed by symposiums in leading international relations publications such as the Journal of Conflict Resolution (June 1991). Even more recently, the American Political Science Association's journal PS (December 1991) chose the issue of democracy and foreign policy for its "In focus" symposium. The bulk of the research to date finds that, indeed, democracies and 11

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nondemocracies do behave differently. Detailing the growing body of literature on this subject is beyond our needs here, but its general trend is worth noting. R. J. Rummel argues strongly for a connection between democracy and relative pacifism. H e contends that "theoretical and empirical research establishes that democratic civil liberties and political rights promote nonviolence and lay a path to a warless world." 3 It must be said that most other scholars are much less categorical and that a great deal of debate continues on why and how often democracies fight. 4 Still, there is a general finding that amongst themselves democracies are less aggressive than are authoritarian governments. 5 Democracies are also more likely to form alliances with one another than they are to ally themselves with nondemocracies. 6 E v e n more central to this study is the finding that the degree of democracy may be related to relative peaceableness. Rummel, for one, observes that his research leads him to believe that "the more democratic the political system of two states, the less violence between them." 7 Other studies by T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie Schwebach and by T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell tend to confirm Rummel. 8 Morgan and Schwebach consider the degree to which democracies are "constrained," that is, their competitiveness in selecting political leaders and their diversity of decisionmaking structures. T h e scholars conclude that "constrained democracies seem to be the least war-prone type of s t a t e . . . . This can be interpreted as further support for the . . . a r g u m e n t . . . that the 'most democratic' of the democracies are the most peace loving." 9 These studies serve to bring democratic theory into the mainstream of international relations theorizing, as do other studies that explore such topics as the degree of elite reliance on public opinion when making foreign policy, and differences between elites and masses in their opinions on foreign policy options. 10 Y e t these studies do not venture far into the realm of democratic theory. This hesitance is understandable given the purpose of the studies, but it is regrettable nevertheless for two reasons. First, if one wants to argue that degrees of democracy are relevant to international relations because more democratic governments act differently than less democratic governments, then one must have some idea of what constitutes more or less democracy. Usually these degrees are defined within the context of representative government by asking and answering such questions as " A r e elections contested?" or "Is there decisionmaking competition among governmental institutions?" It may be, however, that a truer measure of degree of democracy has to do with increased citizen participation that is not related to representative institutions. That is, a higher level of democracy is evidenced not merely by higher voter turnout in elections, but in the use of direct democratic procedures to make final decisions. For our purposes, the measure of democracy will be utilization of international-issue referen-

Referendums & the Theory of Democracy

13

dums. To make use of this measure, we need to spend some time exploring its relevance to the theory of democracy. The second reason to consider democratic theory rests on its ability to help us reach well-reasoned, normative proposals. It is easy to give lip service to the desirability of democracy, but we need to ask more penetrating questions about the worth of heightened democratic procedures in the making of foreign policy. Doing so puts us in sharp contrast with the realist position that the threatening thicket of world politics is singularly unsuited for popular decisionmaking. If democracy is good and the realists are right, then how should we make foreign policy? Should we sacrifice one good (democracy) for another good (foreign policy expediency), or is the reverse choice the better one? What if we find that the direct democratic process is neither better nor worse than the representative democratic process in terms of policy wisdom. D o we accept the status quo because changing it gains no policy advantage? O r do we change the process because we lose no policy advantage by doing so while we gain m o r e democracy? Questions such as these r e q u i r e that we p r o b e democratic theory more deeply, which we will now do. All definitions of democracy include some notions of popular selfgovernment or control over political elites. In the United States, these ideas exist within the context of representative government, wherein the people supposedly rule by electing those who make and enforce law. This is held to be democracy, but of a particular type—"indirect democracy." Indirect, or representative, democracy dates to the eighteenth-century ideas of John Locke and James Madison, among others, and encompasses within it a fear of excessive popular interference with the process of government. Interference here would be like citizens making their own laws or insisting on the right to ratify or reject legislation passed by their representatives. This type of interference defines what is known as "direct democracy" and its best-known instrument: the citizen referendum. Direct democracy sometimes goes by the name "participatory democracy" to highlight the demands of its nature (and its advocates), and it has a history that dates to the practices of the ancient Greeks and to the arguments of Rousseau. Those who have provided the philosophical arguments for direct democracy have often been considered visionaries, Utopians, or the like. They were certainly far-sighted, but they were not woolly dreamers because, as noted earlier, the use of referendum politics has greatly increased in recent decades. Furthermore, referendums are increasingly used to decide international as well as domestic issues. Therefore, in this chapter we will explore the relationship between democracy, referendums, and international politics. Any such relationship, if indeed one exists, will be complex and not immediately apparent within the vicissitudes of contemporary international relations or democratic theories. The habits of representation in

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politics and secrecy in international affairs are difficult to break, and doing so will require changes in both political thinking and behavior. Direct democracy requires habits of participation and openness, characteristics not always or automatically assumed pertinent to the practice of foreign or domestic policy in representative governments. Our examination of the connections among democracy, referendums, and international relations will focus on three questions. First, are referendums an essential part of democratic politics due to their requirement of public participation? Second, even if participation in referendums is necessary for democratic politics, do the hard realities of international politics require that we temper any democratic urges for popular decisionmaking? Third, does the traditional baggage of diplomacy, including secrecy, expertise, and an assumption of required continuity amid the flux of democratic politics, presume that decisions must be left to those well trained in the language and history of foreign relations?

DEMOCRACY A N D PARTICIPATION

Democracy is easier to define using prepositions than verbs. We say that democracy is distinctive as government "by" and " o f ' the people, not merely "for" them. But this does not tell us what either democratic citizens or their governments are supposed to "do." Furthermore, in a sense democracy includes what citizens and governments "may not do," in that it restricts actions on the part of both citizens and government as much as it requires them to act. Citizens must respect the freedom and rights of others, and this often presumes restraint. Similarly, governments must not encroach unnecessarily onto the citizen's private realm of individual autonomy and freedom of choice. These are all democratic sentiments in one way or another about what citizens and government must not do, but they tell us little about the actual practice of politics in democratic societies. Politics is about "doing," but what democratic citizenry should do has been the subject of debate in political theory for 2,000 years. The ancient Greeks determined that democracy meant that all citizens play an active role in the day-to-day affairs of government. Thus, each citizen was available for selection to the Senate (or Boule), as chosen annually by lot. Also, an assembly of all citizens made final decisions on all legislation (based on a quorum of 6,000 for important decisions) and provided citizen judges and juries for criminal trials, such as the one that convicted Socrates of impiety and condemned him to death. This is clearly democracy of a thoroughly direct sort, and it is distinct from the sentiments of Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democratic practice as nothing more than the "competitive struggle for the people's vote." 11

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Schumpeter's idea of democracy as a "method" rather than an "end in itself' clearly specifies the activity of democracy, but for the citizen that activity is limited to voting periodically for individuals who will make policy and law.12 This is a very restrictive view of the role of participation in a democracy, but one that has more adherents today than the ancient Greek view. One of the reasons for this preference for the Schumpeterian image of democracy is reflected in the opinion of James Madison, who held that if men were angels, no government would be necessary In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 13

Here Madison defends representative democracy as a more stable and workable alternative to monarchy than was the Greek model. But that defense incorporates a suspicion that common citizens are unable to make complex political decisions themselves. Therefore, Madison allows only a restricted realm of political action open to citizens in indirect democracy. Disagreements about the degree of participation required for democracy fill the pages of journals and books, and this is an important dispute. Widespread use of referendums would increase the opportunities for participation a great deal, thereby at least potentially surpassing the Madisonian and Schumpeterian strictures on citizen action. These disputes raise two issues about democracy and participation. First, what activities count as actual political participation? Second, how much participation should democracy require? These two questions frequently merge into a question concerning what individuals must do to protect their freedom, a value at the center of all definitions of democracy. Democratic politics by any definition is always about political freedom in some sense. But if not all life's activities can be called political, then democratic freedom may have little to do with how much one participates in political activity. For instance, is one doing political things when at work, at church, in the kitchen, studying for exams, or playing soccer? If not, then political freedom may refer to a small part of one's life. But if everything one does is political in some sense, then democracy and the struggle to protect freedom permeates one's daily life. Similarly, the second issue of democracy and participation also elicits questions about the nature and protection of individual freedom. If one is required to spend a great deal of time in political activity, such as attending meetings, is one's freedom enhanced or lessened? It might be argued that the less participation is required, the more freedom exists from such imposition on one's time. Conversely, it could be said that the more time

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one spends making political decisions, the freer that person is. This reasoning is based on the Rousseauian assumption that real freedom means obedience to laws that one has made oneself—even if this means one has to be "forced to be free." Reducing questions about the degree and nature of participation required in democracy to questions about individual freedom may not immediately seem very helpful. Even if democratic theorists who disagree about the need for participation do agree on the priority of liberty in democracy, what good does that do if they disagree on the meaning of liberty? Yet, it does help in light of Sir Isaiah Berlin's famous dichotomy between kinds of liberty, which directly relates to the direct and indirect models of democracy we are discussing and to the degree and kinds of participation the two models embody. In his essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," Berlin distinguishes between what he calls "negative" and "positive" liberty. 14 This distinction is well known among political theorists, but here we will add to the dichotomy by applying what Berlin says about liberty to participation and kinds of democracy as well. Thus, we will extend the metaphor to include "negative and positive participation" as well as "negative and positive democracy," the latter being roughly equivalent to indirect or representative democracy and direct or participatory democracy. Berlin characterizes negative liberty as "simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others." 15 Negative liberty refers to the relative degree of coercion exercised against the individual. It does not concern the source of coercion as much as simply the amount. Thus, a person is considered free to the extent that the individual is exempt from outside interference when attempting to do or be what he or she wishes. Full negative liberty then would be the total absence of coercion. Negative liberty, as Berlin rightly admits, does not necessarily (or at least logically) presume democratic politics or government. It may turn out for other reasons that the political system that best protects negative liberty is democratic, but this is because of other ideas such as rights, equality, or the definition of what things are political that have come to be affiliated with the idea of pluralism in the defense of the individual. As strictly a provider or protector of negative liberty, no form of government presents itself as a uniquely superior form. Nor does negative liberty by itself recommend any particular kinds or degree of participation as necessary to protect the negative liberty of the individual. Indeed, some forms of participation may seem, if not actually coercive, at least intrusive and therefore to be avoided. Face-to-face political meetings of the New England town meeting type, for instance, present clear moments of coercion to many participants. 16 Similarly, political advertisements affiliated with either elections or, conceivably, referendums might contain intrusiveness or even deception, and thus

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participation in them would actually violate the principle of negative liberty. Also, negative liberty places no intrinsic value on increasing the degree of participation. From an individual's standpoint, participation might seem onerous, and therefore an increase in it may be invasive or coercive. Whether an individual is correct in this assumption is, of course, open to question; but negative liberty allows no appeal beyond the individual as the best judge of his or her own interests. Positive liberty is both a fuller and potentially more dangerous view of liberty, according to Berlin. The focus of positive liberty is the source, rather than the extent, of coercion and "derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master." 17 This aspect of liberty takes as its goal the self-actualization of the individual as an autonomous being to realize his or her full potential. Here it is not enough to avoid external coercion to be truly free; one must take charge of one's life and be truly able to choose goals and values by oneself. The individual, in short, must be rationally self-directed and a full participant in everything that affects individual direction and choice. The difference between negative and positive freedom is a subtle one, but Berlin realizes that its impact is potentially huge. 18 Since positive liberty, unlike negative liberty, does not assume that the individual is the best judge of his or her own interests, positive liberty opens the door both for democracy with its emphasis on self-government and participation and for authoritarian systems that promise discovery of the true self. Positive liberty also stretches the political realm to include every aspect of life where power is exercised—at work, home, school, church, everywhere. If power is exercised, politics is present. If politics is present, it must be democratic politics, and I must participate in it to ensure that I am part of the decision. Positive liberty is a democratic notion in a way that negative liberty is not. The former demands activity by the individual as a self-actualizing, rational actor in the political process. In so doing, positive liberty requires participation both to a fuller degree and of a different kind than does negative liberty. More participation is needed to make the individual better educated in the political process and to ensure that he is author of political decisions that affect him. A different kind of participation is also required in that the definition of politics is broadened to include not just governmental activities but all potential sources of coercion over the individual. Thus, participation is for individual development as a whole person, not just for the protection of negative liberty as a citizen defined as voter. Carole Pateman offers a classic presentation of the argument for "positive participation": The theory of participatory democracy is built around the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isola-

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Politics

tion from one another. The existence of representative institutions at the national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that level of socialization, or "social training," for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. This development takes place through the process of participation itself. The major function of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures. 19 The strongest arguments in favor of citizen referendums can be made within this theoretical context of positive liberty, participation, and democracy. Several scholars have debated the merits of referendums, and we will look briefly at their reasons for and against. In the last analysis, however, the argument about referendums is essentially about participation and whether or not democracy requires this type of citizen input. Political theorist Benjamin Barber testified before a U.S. congressional subcommittee considering a constitutional amendment allowing the use of a national referendum. Barber held that democracy and referendums are inseparable, contending that in the end, in fact, the real issue at stake in [this proposed amendment] is whether or not America believes in democracy, and believes it can afford the risks that go with democratic life. All of the objections to it are so many different ways of saying "the people are not to be trusted"—a skepticism which, it is perfectly true, can be traced back to the "realism" and cynical elitism of a significant group of constitutional fathers. But there is really no democratic alternative to such trust: if the American people are not capable of self-government, our democracy will perish— whether or not elites keep them from initiating legislation.20 Barber's view of democracy is one that presumes positive liberty and participation. For him this presents a clear argument in favor of referendums.21 Others argue in favor of referendums on the grounds that they are useful in "checking" government, but this line of reasoning is less important to Barber based on his view that these reasons invoke negative liberty as the standard of democratic freedom. Also, arguments against referendums based on citizen ignorance, laziness, and lack of expertise fail to impress Barber, since the political quality of the citizenry is not really the issue of democracy. Instead, he argues that it is more important to realize that [even] if Americans sometimes seem unfit to legislate, it may be because they have for so long been passive observers of government. The remedy is not to continue to exclude them from governing, but to provide practical and active forms of civic education that will make them more

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fit than they were. Initiative and referendum processes are ideal instruments of civic education; paradoxically, the more truth there is to the charge that the people are not fit to govern, the greater is the need to involve them in government. 22

For Barber then, powerful arguments for referendums derive from his view of positive liberty as the basis of democracy. He defends referendums as means of participation that educate citizens about how to take control of their own lives and develop as human beings. As such, referendums are part of a larger notion of democracy—"strong" democracy—that encompasses all of individual life and subsumes it under the title politics. Not all democratic theorists agree with Barber's view of democracy or with the arguments for referendums that his view entails. Some of those who disagree with Barber respond that the widespread use of referendums will lessen the power of political parties and interest groups in electoral politics while simultaneously reinforcing the power of special interests in the more important function of agenda setting. 23 Organized groups with money therefore might easily dominate referendums both because of their abilities to organize signature-gathering efforts and their capacity to mount slick advertising campaigns to sway votes. 24 Other criticisms of referendums include the belief that direct legislation will result in excessively complex and lengthy ballots that will discourage voting, thereby losing all educative effect on voters. Furthermore, referendum opponents often argue that expanding the role of referendums will lead to frivolous legislation or, even worse, to "hate" legislation focusing on hot emotional issues that stir up temporary demands for changes that, if adopted, would violate precious constitutional guarantees. At best, critics charge, such referendums would stimulate eventual judicial determination on the constitutionality of the legislation approved by the vote and thereby violate the populist spirit of both direct and representative models of democracy. 25 Finally, some critics argue that citizens are simply not equipped intellectually to understand the complicated process of legislation or the compromises frequently necessary to complete it. These are serious challenges to the idea of participatory democracy and its reliance on referendums. They are not, however, necessarily damning criticisms. Though there certainly have been some cases where referendums have been abused and have resulted in badly worded ballot propositions or even bad law when approved, there is also evidence supporting the efficiency and propriety of many referendums. Besides, many of these criticisms apply equally well to legislatures and the traditional process of lawmaking. 26 To some extent Barber is correct in asserting that behind the case against referendums there lurks an essentially antidemocratic distrust of the public. But we should be careful not to belittle the risks of direct

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legislation out of a misguided faith in the educative effects of referendums. It is true that in the act of legislation a society is not necessarily seeking the truth but merely the common good or the public interest. In this function, citizens have as legitimate a role as any would-be (and full-time) legislative "expert." It is also at least plausible that increased opportunities for participation in the legislative process would make citizens more civilly aware and virtuous and in some sense freer. But the case for referendums does presume either a different kind of politics or a different kind of citizen than that required for representative, indirect democracy. Politics would no longer be defined merely by elections, and responsible citizens would have to do more than accept the role of passive voters. How easy this transformation would be is difficult to gauge, and on some issues—those of international politics—we must also ask how dangerous. Arguments for referendums—or, broadly, for direct democracy—are almost never based on international political issues. This is curious, in a way, since in the United States and elsewhere, many referendums have been held to determine issues as diverse as declaring U.S. cities "nuclearfree zones" to Britain's decision to remain in the European Economic Community, or Common Market. Bizarre decisions were not forthcoming, and disaster did not result. On the other hand, even those who favor referendums on domestic issues might make a case for not holding referendums on international issues. These issues are often very complex, involve a variety of different kinds and degrees of expertise, and, as von Clausewitz observed, the possibility of war always hovers somewhere in the background. Furthermore, the classic realist school of international political analysis contends that international politics is based on power, not rights, justice, or other moralistic ideas that motivate everyday citizens. Given these complexities and dangers, the argument goes, it is more reasonable to leave international politics to the experts. This line of reasoning cannot be ignored before we examine, in the following chapters, the possibility of using referendums to resolve issues of foreign policy and international relations. Therefore, we must confront some special arguments against direct democracy that allegedly arise from the nature of international politics. This nature includes four aspects that do not seem amenable to direct legislation: the requirement of "realism" in useful international relations theory and the accompanying necessities of expertise, secrecy, and continuity in the practice of foreign policy. Of course, some might argue that these are necessary attributes of politics at any level and that therefore direct democracy is always a bad idea. This argument seems extreme, but at the international level it has a certain plausibility—at least traditionally so. Thus, to explore the place of direct democracy in this context is to test the strength of its appeal and the applicability of its transforming politics.

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DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Only with difficulty can the world of international affairs be compared with the direct democracy advocates' favorite images of a New England town meeting or the deliberations of the Athenian Boule. International politics is not carried out by neighbors in any meaningful sense. It is characterized by a cultural relativism of principle and a heterogeneity of institutions that make agreement difficult on the simplest of matters. International politics incorporates a plethora of languages and speaks its own patois of diplomacy; it carries its own sense of history amid the rewriting of the past by those who survive; and it presumes to practice the political craft behind closed doors in the shadow of war. According to the realist school, international politics is not about rights, justice, freedom, or morality by any but the victor's definitions. T o quote some of the first to expound this essence, international politics is the realm of necessity and power, wherein "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." 27 So reads the theory of realism as it pertains to international relations. Realism begins with the assumption that domestic politics and international politics are fundamentally different, that unlike citizens in the modern state, nations exist in a Hobbesian state of nature because of the absence of a supreme authority over them. In the words of contemporary theoretician Kenneth Waltz, while domestic politics "is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law, international politics is the realm of power, struggle and accommodation." 2 8 Realism asserts that, as is the case in Hobbes's state of nature, relations between states are based almost exclusively on considerations of national interest and power, not on issues of morality, because in the absence of supreme authority there exists no consensus on morality's dictates. A s noted U.S. diplomat and writer George F. Kennan asks, "If our government should set out to pursue moral purposes in foreign policy, on what would it base itself? Whose outlooks, philosophy, religious concepts would it choose to express?" 29 Similarly, Hans Morganthau delivers the realist catechism: "The purpose of [U.S.] foreign policy is not to bring [moral] enlightenment or happiness to the rest of the world but to take care of the life, liberty and happiness of the American people." 30 We should see immediately why the doctrine of realism challenges the usage of referendums on international issues. First, realists are apt to conclude that because citizens have a regrettable tendency to moralize about issues, including those of international politics, prudence dictates that foreign policy should be left to the experts. Realism downplays the moralistic aspects of international politics as distracting, or even dangerous to the national interest. Realists are t h e r e f o r e suspicious of referen-

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dums, which even their defenders acknowledge could be a tool of emotional hate groups or others seeking to legislate their own moral agenda. 31 And even if the referendum process were altered to prevent such occurrences, the theory of participation that stands behind referendums seems, to the advocates of realism, somehow out of place or "unrealistic" in the realm of foreign affairs.

Referendums and the Theory of International Relations We cannot evaluate all of the theory of realism here, but two points should be made about how it relates both to democracy and to the "real" world.32 First, it has been argued that realism is fundamentally antidemocratic, particularly in its most current application in nuclear deterrence theory. Nuclear deterrence is realism in its purest—and most secretive—manifestation. Thus, to show that deterrence theory is flawed due to its antidemocratic stance is to strike at the heart of realism in general. Second, because it ignores the deeply felt moral impulses of real people, as well as the need for greater humanitarian cooperation between states, it can also be argued that realism is fundamentally unrealistic as a guide for action or decisionmaking. Nuclear deterrence theory is full of ironic acronyms such as M A D (Mutual Assured Destruction) that obscure its place as the centerpiece of contemporary realist thought. Deterrence theory prescribes mutual assured destruction, that is, virtually simultaneous mass incineration, as the primary defense strategy among nuclear superpowers and a main deterrent to war between nuclear-armed states. M A D requires a willingness on the part of one nation utterly to obliterate another, and it presumes that this response would in some sense be acceptable to its citizens. If the strategy is to work, the target nation must believe that retaliatory mass annihilation is supported by the other side's citizens. Therefore, at least to a significant degree, public opposition to massive retaliation will decrease this credibility, without which MAD is empty and the strategy flawed. In the United States, the recent nuclear freeze movement, which is examined in Chapter 7, illustrated that M A D is indeed not an acceptable defense posture in the minds of many U.S. citizens. Furthermore, as we will see, the success of that movement was itself a product of forty-five years of U.S. ambivalence about nuclear weapons and the strategies that rely on them. For this reason, Richard Falk argues that if the threat of M A D is unacceptable to the citizens of a democratic nation such as the United States, then the strategy clearly cannot work and is "unrealistic." M A D is absurd, he contends, because it poses an ethical dilemma that is unresolvable: the threat of nuclear destruction is itself heinous to any rational human being, because it would never be moral to carry it out. Thus, Falk contends, the United States could pursue this strategy only in secrecy,

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thereby making its fundamental foreign policy one unaccountable to the public. This makes deterrence basically antidemocratic, and also potentially destabilizing in the domestic politics of a democratic society that would not accept such levels of unaccountability in any other policy area. Accepting a destabilizing defense policy is clearly moronic, since the point of defense is stability. Thus, because it negates its own foreign policy goal by contradicting the requirements of domestic policy, MAD is truly mad, or at least not worthy of the name "realist" in a democratic society.33 Falk's argument is clever, but perhaps merely so. For as Michael Walzer points out, weapons systems are seldom chosen democratically in the modern state, and when compared to other means of destruction, there is nothing intrinsically undemocratic in nuclear weapons themselves. Thus, as policy, MAD may indeed be undemocratic, but not necessarily unrealistic given the history of defense policies in democratic nations.34 Walzer suggests that democracies can remain stable domestically while pursuing nuclear deterrence if they have a variety of what he calls "normal" and "abnormal" avenues of political participation. Abnormal avenues include demonstrations, civil disobedience, nonparty social movements, and the like, which can restrain political leaders without threatening the political system as a whole. Walzer's argument essentially tries to retrieve nuclear deterrence by providing other forms of political restraint on leaders who ultimately must make any nuclear initiation or response decision. These forms of restraint try to provide both democratic and moral controls on foreign policy in order to make it achievable in a democratic society. That is, they are attempts to render foreign policy realistic in democratic political terms. However, an interesting possibility here is that the use of referendums relating to defense strategy (or to those who carry it out) might provide the same "reality check" on deterrence theory and thereby make this hallmark of realist foreign policy truly realistic. Referendums that asked for advisory opinions from the public on the development of new, or the discontinuation of old, weapons systems and strategies would give clear signals to leaders and provide needed legitimacy for eventual policies. At the same time, while referendums might today be considered "abnormal" politics in the area of defense policy, they are certainly less threatening to the political system as a whole than are Walzer's other abnormal measures. If democracies in fact require special measures for the acceptance of defense policy as democratic, moral, and therefore realistic, then perhaps referendums should become part of the realist's strategy. Referendums and the Practice of International Relations There seems, then, to be room in the theory of international relations for the argument in favor of referendums. But can the same be said for the actual practice of international politics? Does not the world of foreign

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affairs require decision by technical experts and discretion by those schooled in the history of policy and the art of silver-tongued communication known as diplomacy? And does not foreign policy require a continuity and constancy unsuitable to the unpredictable nature of popular opinion? These are serious challenges to the case for referendums, and their ready acceptance show us how accustomed we have become to the idea that the world of foreign affairs is a rarified realm where common citizens have little place. Expertise is required in international affairs both in the formulation of policy and its articulation abroad. This is why, for instance, the State Department plays both an advisory role in the making of foreign policy and a representative one in the provision of diplomats and ambassadors. These are distinct functions, however, and they offer separate arguments against the use of referendums in foreign policymaking. The two also come together, in theory at least, to provide a third aspect of foreign policy— continuity in foreign affairs. A persistent theme of the arguments against referendums is that they open the way for inconsistency and vacillation in policy areas where they are employed to make decisions. 35 The practice of international politics then demands three functions of policymaking that referendums must fulfill if they are to be utilized: formulation, articulation, and continuity. Two arguments can be made for why the formulation of international affairs policy need not be under the exclusive purview of policy elites. First is the general contention concerning the need for and benefits of increased democratic participation. Democracy under any definition presumes that citizens have some say over decisions that affect their lives in significant ways, and certainly this applies to foreign as well as domestic affairs. It should be remembered that foreign policy and domestic legislation share one essential feature: they are at best approximations of the public interest, not necessarily of revealed truth. Regularly, as numerous diplomatic case studies show us, foreign policy decisions are also driven by a number of factors that have little to do with public interest. These include the likes of a leader's personality quirks, mental and physical health, ego, political ambitions, and personal belief system. Other studies demonstrate that while the public is normally willing to follow the policy advocated by national leaders, sometimes mass and elite opinion differ on issues, sometimes the public disagrees with leadership policy, and sometimes following the public's preference would have been the wiser course. Thus, though the public interest does require some expertise for its articulation, it is a fundamental belief of any democratic theory that citizens should, at some level, always be called upon to render an opinion on what that interest is or who can best serve it. Calling upon the citizens in this way requires trust in their ability to perceive the interests they share in common, but this is no more or less than trust in democracy in general.

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There is a second, stronger argument for giving citizens a voice in foreign policy formulation via the referendum process. A t least in liberal democracies like the United States, it is a basic political premise that individual freedom demands protecting the right of individuals to make moral decisions. In other words, individual moral autonomy constitutes a basic political goal of liberal democratic theory and politics.36 Obviously, this means that much of what passes for politics in liberal societies involves decisions about whether issues are primarily moral in nature and thus a matter of private freedom to choose, or primarily political and therefore a matter of public policy. Many domestic policy issues, such as abortion rights and the location of dumps and other types of unwanted public facilities, turn on the question of which is the proper context for decision. In international affairs, such questions as the ethics of intervention or the general morality of war frequently take on, or are invested with, obvious moral overtones. This is not to say that all foreign policy issues are essentially moral in nature and therefore properly in the domain of private decisionmaking by democratic citizens. It does argue, though, that among all political issues those of foreign policy often clearly present moral choices and dilemmas. Thus, from the standpoint of liberal democracy, they present even a stronger argument for citizen input than do many domestic issues, due to the liberal rubric that on issues of morality, there are no experts. The second function of international politics—that of articulation and representation of national interests abroad, or simply diplomacy—presents more straightforward arguments for referendum use. Viewed cynically, a diplomat "is an honest man who is sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." 37 Viewed charitably, he is "a man of experience, integrity, and intelligence, a man, above all who is not swayed by emotion or prejudice, who is profoundly modest in all his dealings, who is guided only by a sense of public duty, and who understands the perils of cleverness and the virtues of reason, moderation, discretion and tact." Under either view, "mere clerks are not expected to exhibit all these difficult tasks at once." 38 The argument for using referendums in international affairs requires neither the abolition of the diplomatic corps nor its recruitment of an army of mere clerks from the ranks of citizens. It does require, however, that diplomacy no longer be open to its cynical characterization as lying in the national interest. Using referendums in even an advisory capacity in foreign affairs will certainly make the diplomat's task a more open, less secret one, since representatives from all countries will be able to refer to the vote of citizens in those plebiscites. Also, citizens will be able to judge better if their opinion of the national interest is being represented abroad by their ambassadors. This may indeed tie the hands of diplomats to a degree, but the argument for not doing so, we contend, invokes the cynical view of diplomacy and of public intelligence—a view difficult to defend

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on democratic grounds. Finally, the practice of international politics requires some continuity in policy. This seems a troublesome requirement for referendums, since the image of referendum politics is often that of the institutionalization of whim and passing fancy. This image is sometimes deserved, as we see in the next two chapters, since many referendum results have been subsequently reversed or overturned by popular, legislative, or even court decision. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to assume either that referendums are unique among decision procedures in their lack of a sense of history, or that they cannot be designed to place greater emphasis on considerations of continuity. Furthermore, just like policy made by leaders, decisions made by referendums justifiably are changed because of altered circumstances, reordered priorities, or the undesirable outcome of existing policy. Democratic politics in general is messy and tumultuous and frequently has a short attention span. This is true in electoral politics as well, and there is never a guarantee that one administration will carry on the foreign policies of its predecessors. Continuity is a problem then in electoral as well as referendum politics, and the only way to ensure foreign policy continuity is to give all diplomatic power to a permanent, nonelected bureaucracy that would be empowered to appoint its own experts and institute is own decisions. This would surely be an extreme and undemocratic response to the need for continuity, and the fact that it has never been seriously suggested shows that policy continuity ranks lower on the scale of democratic virtues than other political virtues. If one of these virtues is, as we propose, increased citizen participation in the name of positive liberty, then the use of referendums in deciding foreign policy cannot be ruled out.

CONCLUSION

The use of referendums in the practice of international politics will certainly change the way democracies make foreign policy. Mainly it will make the policy process more open to public view and to public action. This carries risks, of course, as every enlargement of the domain of public access invites the dangers of misuse and abuse of power. Particularly in international affairs, democracies have been hesitant to take these risks, and the result has been a policy process shrouded in secrecy. As citizens, we have come to accept and even expect this, as if international politics must by its very nature be populated by shadowy spies and whispering diplomats playing games of hide-and-seek and speaking words that do not mean what they seem. Democracy deserves better than this so-called " r e a l " world of international affairs. Two thousand years ago the great Athenian leader

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Pericles argued that the greatness of democracy lay in its confidence in shouldering the burden of openness. Athens was a city open to the world—its debates on any issue of peace or war were conducted publicly for citizens and visitors to hear. It feared neither new ideas nor strategies from abroad nor the dissemination of its own. And its demise, the historian Thucydides tells us, resulted not from exposing state secrets but from losing the virtue of openness. As Berlin concedes, politics based on positive liberty runs the risk of totalitarianism. But democracy is always a risky proposition, and its only defense is to remain true to its own nature. This is the authenticity of which Pericles spoke and which democracy must still exhibit if it is to be secure. Democracy encompasses in its nature the ideas of openness and empowerment of individuals over the course of their own lives. This nature is not merely the domestic one that stops at the water's edge. Foreign and domestic policies are both presumably the products of one democratic system. If that system is truly democratic, both policies must exhibit the same democratic faith and confidence. It is at least worth exploring, then, the proposition that foreign policy can successfully be made through an open democratic process. Referendums represent a start in the attempt to make international politics more democratic by offering to each citizen a "way in" to this political realm. How well they have functioned in this regard in many countries and how referendums might be further used will be discussed in the following chapters.

NOTES 1. Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon," PS: Political Science and Politics 34/4 (December 1991), p. 663. 2. Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy," p. 659. 3. R. J. Rummel, "The Politics of Cold Blood," Society (November/December, 1989), p. 40. 4. A balanced, not too convinced, or skeptical review is D. Marc Kilgour, "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35/2 (June 1991), pp. 266-284. 5. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (1986), pp. 1151-1169; Zeev Moaz and Nasrin Abdulali, "Regime Type and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33/1 (1989), pp. 3-35; Bruce M. Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). The realists, of course, have not been silent on this issue. For one article that both disputes Fukuyama's "End of History?" article and the idea of moving toward a democratic, warless world, see Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," National Interest 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 3-10. 6. Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," Journal

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of Conflict Resolution 35/2 (June 1991), pp. 285-306. 7. Rummel, "The Politics of Cold Blood," p. 33. 8. T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" paper presented at the American Political Science Association convention, August 1991, Washington, D.C.; T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 35/2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211. 9. Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies," p. 8. 10. There is evidence that the role of public opinion is affected by differing domestic political processes and institutional arrangements in democracies. Thomas Risse-Kappen has examined the interaction of public opinion, domestic structure, and security policy in France, Japan, West Germany, and the United States in "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Security Policy in Liberal Democracies: France, Japan, West Germany, and the United States," paper presented at the International Studies Association convention, April 1990, Washington, D.C. This study was later published as "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Security Policy in Liberal Democracies," World Politics 43 (July 1991), pp. 479-512. He argues that "the centralization of the political system and its autonomy from societal forces" (that is, the degree of democracy) within the four democracies "appear to determine whether the public has an impact." In sum, he continues, "the stronger the state institutions and the greater its control of the policy network, the less influential public opinion." This is important because the degree of public opinion input affects policy choice. Leaders and the public do not always have the policy preferences. There is a considerable gap in the United States, for instance, on some issues. These differences are evident in the quadrennial poll done by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and analyzed by John Rielly, most recently in his "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the '90s," Foreign Policy 82 (1991), pp. 79-96. Rielly found, for instance, that the American public was a good deal less interventionist than its leaders. 11. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943), p. 269. 12. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 241. 13. The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1951), p. 322. 14. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in his Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). 15. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," p. 122. 16. See Jane Mansbridge's discussion of just such meetings in Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic, 1980). 17. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," p. 131. 18. Some disagree that the difference between negative and positive liberty is real. See Gerald MacCallum, "Negative and Positive Freedom," Philosophical Review (July 1967), pp. 312-334. 19. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 42. 20. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment, hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution on

Referendums & the Theory of Democracy

29

S.J. Res. 67,95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977), p. 195. 21. Barber's arguments for referendums are part of a larger description of democratic life he terms "strong democracy," and which encompasses many other participatory measures as well. See Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 281-289. 22. U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, p. 195. 23. See David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), chapters 1 and 2, for a general summary of the arguments for and against referendums. 24. In addition to Magleby's Direct Legislation on this point, see the discussion of the use of paid signature-collecting firms in states with referendums, as put forth in Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Robert M. Stem, "The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators," paper presented at the American Political Science Association convention, Atlanta, August 1989. 25. See the testimony of noted participatory democratic theorist Peter Bachrach on these possibilities in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative. 26. On the latter score, see, for instance, Eli M. Noam, "The Efficiency of Direct Democracy," Journal of Political Economy 88/4 (1980), pp. 803-809; Harlan Hahn, "Correlates of Public Sentiments About War: Local Referenda on the Vietnam Issue," American Political Science Review 64 (1970), pp. 1189-1198. 27. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponessian War, edited by John H. Findley (New York: Modern Library, 1951), p. 331. Contemporary realist thinker Robert Gilpin echoes this ancient description of international politics, which, he says, "can still be characterized as it was by Thucydides: the interplay of impersonal forces and great leaders World politics is still characterized by the struggle of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a coalition of global anarchy." War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 230. 28. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 113, as quoted in Avner Cohen, "Reflections on Realism in the Nuclear Age," in Political Realism and International Morality, edited by Kenneth Kipnis and Diana T. Meyers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 221. Waltz is most accurately classified as a "neorealist," but the distinction between neorealism and realism is, for our purposes here, not pivotal, with the exception that neorealists are more prone than realists to consider perceptions and values (and therefore sometimes morality) as a source of international behavior. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), discuss realism (pp. 81-119) and neorealism (pp. 119-123). 29. Unpublished paper delivered at the conference "Morality and Foreign Policy" held in Charlottesville, Virginia, in June 1977, as quoted in Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Ethical Dimensions of Diplomacy," Review of Politics 46/3 (July 1984), p. 376. 30. Unpublished paper delivered at the conference "Morality and Foreign Policy" held in Charlottesville, Virginia, June 1977, as quoted in Thompson, "The Ethical Dimensions of Diplomacy," p. 380. 31. See testimony of Barber and Bachrach in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative. 32. For a recent discussion of democratic theory and international realism,

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see Alan Gilbert, "Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Realism, Regimes, and Democratic Internationalism," Political Theory 20/1 (1992), pp. 8-37. 33. Richard Falk, "The Anatomy of Nuclearism," in Indefensible Weapons, edited by Robert J. Lifton and Richard Falk (New York: Basic, 1982). 34. Michael Walzer, "Deterrence and Democracy," New Republic (July 2, 1984), as discussed in Stephen J. Rosow, "Nuclear Deterrence, State Legitimation, and Liberal Democracy," Polity 21/3, (Spring 1989), pp. 346-367. 35. Magleby, Direct Legislation, chapter 2. 36. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 59-63. 37. Attributed to Sir Henry Wotton; quoted in Thompson, "Ethical Dimensions," p. 373. 38. Sir Harold Nicolson, quoted in Thompson, "Ethical Dimensions," p. 374.

A Historical Overview of Referendums Direct democracy extends far back into political history. Popular voting on public issues occurred in the Greek city-states, and plebiscites were held in Rome. Then, after a lapse of a millennium and a half, the practice reappeared in Europe. The growth of popular voting on issues has grown quite slowly since then, but there is evidence that it, along with general democratic practice, is on the upswing worldwide. PRE-TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFERENDUMS

Many of the earliest referendums were held to decide questions of foreign relations and defense. The international-issue focus of these pre-twentieth century referendums occurred partly because such issues comprised a large part of the state's legitimate functions before the beginning of popular nationalism and social welfare policy in the late eighteenth century.1 As early as 1552, the cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun decided by unrecorded votes to remain a part of France. There were also several referendums in the 1790s and two in 1860 by which various cities or regions voted to merge into France. Another early example of self-determination occurred in the papal territory of Avignon in 1791. Leaders in the neighboring French department proposed incorporating Avignon, but the Assembly in Paris rejected the plan because there was insufficient evidence about the desires of Avignon's residents. The Assembly sent three commissioners to determine popular sentiment. They conducted a series of "town meetings" in which all males who were twenty-five or older, who were not domestic servants, and who paid at least ten pence in annual taxes were eligible to vote. Of the ninety-eight districts in Avignon, fifty-two voted to join France, nineteen wanted to remain with the pope, and twenty-seven refused to vote at all. Of this third group, seventeen districts reasoned that they had already voted for France once, and, it being harvest time, they could not spare the time to vote again. Based on this crude procedure, and after a spirited debate, the Assembly enacted legislation absorbing Avignon in September 1791.2 Italy similarly held a series of votes in the 1860s in which various 31

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provinces decided their f u t u r e n a t i o n a l identity. British analyst Philip G o o d h a r t argues that "it is fair to say t h a t t h e m o d e r n state of Italy was built by a series of r e f e r e n d u m s " a n d q u o t e s Italian s t a t e s m a n C o n t é di C a v o u r ' s characterization of the Italian " D u k e s , A r c h d u k e s , a n d G r a n d D u k e s " as having " b e e n b u r i e d u n d e r t h e pile of ballots d e p o s i t e d in the electoral urns." 3 Foreign issues also h a v e b e e n occasionally subject t o p o p u l a r votes for over five centuries in Switzerland. 4 T h e first Swiss r e f e r e n d u m was held in 1449 w h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t of B e r n e ( t h e n an i n d e p e n d e n t Swiss state) a s k e d its citizens t o a p p r o v e a special tax t o pay off d e b t s f r o m an earlier war. T h e g o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d in 1513 n o t t o e n t e r alliances w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of the landsgemeinde ( t h e c a n t o n ' s active, e n f r a n c h i s e d citizens), and in 1531 it f u r t h e r agreed not t o g o t o war prior t o obtaining the p e o p l e ' s permission by r e f e r e n d u m . D u r i n g t h e following two a n d a half centuries, t h e r e w e r e seventy-seven similar issues, which, according to Belgian scholar Simon Deploige, were mostly "of a military c h a r a c t e r — s u c h as the u n d e r t a k i n g of an expedition, t h e conclusion of peace, t h e m a k i n g of treaties and alliances, t h e expediency of prohibiting t h e e n l i s t m e n t of citizens as m e r c e n a r i e s , [and] t h e imposition of a w a r tax." 5 Similar, if less f r e q u e n t , r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e held in Z u r i c h as early as 1489. It e v e n a p p e a r s that in s o m e cases the a r m y constituted itself as a limited a n d self-interested landsgemeinde t o d e c i d e i m p o r t a n t military questions. By t h e early 1600s, t h e r e f e r e n d u m device b e g a n t o w e a k e n as t h e various Swiss political units c a m e u n d e r c o n t r o l of p o w e r f u l oligarchies. Swiss d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e use of r e f e r e n d u m s fell victim to t y r a n n y a n d t e m p o rarily d i s a p p e a r e d in t h e 1700s. A l p i n e direct d e m o c r a c y h a d n o t died, h o w e v e r . T h e Swiss r e n e w e d their use of r e f e r e n d u m s in the a f t e r m a t h of t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , which s p r e a d its d e m o c r a t i c ideals to Switzerland by dint of b o t h p e n a n d sword. Switzerland's p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c restructuring was g o v e r n e d by the F e d e r a l A g r e e m e n t of A u g u s t 1815, a n d several c a n t o n s used t h e i r r e n e w e d a u t o n o m y t o r e i n t r o d u c e r e f e r e n d u m s . Valais, for instance, decided t h a t a m o n g o t h e r things, "military c a p i t u l a t i o n s " h a d t o b e r e f e r r e d to t h e voters. By t h e 1830s, t h e use of r e f e r e n d u m s h a d s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t virtually all of t h e cantons. S o o n t h e r e a f t e r , t h e process of p o p u l a r initiative also c a m e into use. F r o m this p o i n t on, direct d e m o c r a c y persisted, a n d while its episodic evolution d u r i n g m o s t of t h e n i n e t e e n t h century is b e y o n d the s c o p e of this b o o k , it is a p p r o p r i a t e to c o m m e n t that t h e practice of holding r e f e r e n d u m s was well established by t h e time of t h e 1874 federal constitution. T h e r e s u r g e n c e of direct d e m o c r a c y in Switzerland was m a r k e d by forty-one national r e f e r e n d u m s b e t w e e n 1875 and 1898. O n l y five of t h e s e votes h a d international implications, a n d in each case the citizens rejected f e d e r a l laws a d o p t e d by t h e n a t i o n a l legislature. T h e first of the five

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r e f e r e n d u m s occurred in July 1876. In it, 54.2 percent of Swiss voters rejected the government's imposition of a tax on eligible citizens w h o did not p e r f o r m military service. Opposition was motivated by several concerns, including resistance to new taxes, the fact that several cantons already had such a tax, and the income-based formula on which the tax was based. In a rarity in the annals of referendums, however, the Federal Assembly persisted, and another, similar law was adopted in J u n e 1878. Surprisingly it was not challenged—an outcome, in the estimate of one analyst, that "was due not so much to the modifications introduced into the original bill as to the indifference of the people who felt that the matter must b e settled." 7 T h e Swiss could be as reluctant to spend as they were to b e taxed. In May 1884, they rejected by a 61.5 margin a special legislative appropriation of 10,000 francs to the Swiss legation in Washington, D.C. Economic considerations also prompted 58.1 percent of the Swiss voters in O c t o b e r 1891 t o favor a tariff designed to provide leverage in the renewal of several commercial treaties between Switzerland and its neighbors. February 1895 again saw the Swiss react against the costs of diplomatic representation. This time, 58.8 percent rejected a federal law that eliminated the possibility of having a r e f e r e n d u m to challenge the Federal Council diplomatic appointments and costs associated with maintaining representation abroad. Opposition sprang from two concerns. O n e was that diplomatic representatives were not popular in Switzerland, where they were regarded as being paid too much for doing too little. This was especially true in cantons that had few relations with foreign lands and that objected to the law on the ground that it would involve additional expense. Democracy was the other concern, and even international-oriented citizens refused to diminish the sphere of referendums. 8 T h e fate of several of these votes reflected the Swiss reluctance to grant greater power to the central government, and that sentiment accounted for the rejection of two measures in the middle part of the decade that involved the status of the military. T h e first, in N o v e m b e r 1895, was a compulsory r e f e r e n d u m because it involved a constitutional amendment. Except in times of war, control of the army was divided between the cantons and the Federation, and the proposed a m e n d m e n t would have virtually ended cantonal control. Fifty-eight percent of the voters and almost all of the cantons rejected this perceived p o w e r grab by the central government. T h e issue arose again the next year when the Assembly passed a law making military discipline in peace as well as war subject to federal law. This second attempt was rejected even m o r e resoundingly by 81.5 percent of Swiss voters. T h e turnout for the international r e f e r e n d u m s in Switzerland ranged from 44 percent for the February 1895 vote on diplomatic representation to 67.6 percent for the N o v e m b e r 1895 constitutional question of military

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control. A s a general rule, the international referendums seemed to spark somewhat less interest than the domestic referendums. Of the eight referendums held during the years 1875 through 1879, the military tax exemption vote (1877) had the second lowest vote total and was 6.8 percent lower than the average referendum turnout during that period. Three other domestic referendums were held on the same day as the 1884 vote on the appropriation for the legation in Washington; of the four, the international referendum had the smallest vote total, although only marginally so. T h e only international referendum to spark an exceptionally large voter turnout was the constitutional amendment on control of the army. Of eight referendums held from 1894 through 1896, it received both the second largest vote total and 35.5 percent more votes than the average referendum during the period. T h e second vote on military control also received more votes, in this case 13 percent, than the average referendum during this period. B y contrast, the 1895 vote on diplomatic representation received much less attention. Its 11.9 percent below-average-turnout was the worst during the period. It should also be noted that the outcome of the voting largely depended on the questions' domestic ramifications rather than their international implications. Domestic concerns such as the power of the federal government versus the power of the cantons and the people, costs and taxes, and narrow economic interests were the deciding factors, with Swiss voters regularly rejecting federal laws that seemed to encroach on their sense of popular sovereignty and parochial self-interest. TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFERENDUMS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES The use of referendums has spread during this century, both geographically and in frequency of use. B y far the greatest number of referendums have occurred in Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, where, generally speaking, industrial prosperity and democratic practice have existed the longest. Referendums in Europe From 1900 through 1986, European countries conducted 365 national referendums, but only a small fraction of these were related to world politics. There were also approximately a dozen international-issue referendums (self-determination, devolution, autonomy) held in provinces, states, regions, or other subnational units. Since 1986, there have been several other international-issue referendums in Europe, involving selfdetermination issues in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Historical Overview of Referendums

35

In pre-World War II Scandinavia, Iceland voted (92%) in 1918 for union with Denmark, only to reverse itself (100%) in 1944 and opt for independence. Norwegians in 1905 approved (100%) separation from Sweden. The voters in the Aaland Isles also rejected (46%) in 1919 union with Sweden, choosing to stay with Finland. Danes agreed (64%) to cede the Virgin Islands to the United States in 1916 and also voted (97%) to incorporate North Schlesweig into their territory in 1920. At the same time, in a League of Nations plebiscite, the people of that territory approved (75%) their incorporation into Denmark, while the voters of South Schlesweig chose (80%) to join Germany. Other League plebiscites during 1920-1921 saw the people of Allenstein (98%), Marienwerder (92%), and Upper Silesia (60%) choose incorporation into Germany rather than Poland. It is worth noting that the national status of regions that opted for or against Germany remained uncontentious during the interwar years, while areas such as Danzig and the Polish corridor and the ethnic German areas of Czechoslovakia, which were refused the referendum option because of the objection of the Poles and Czechs, were subject to revisionist claims by Germany in the late 1930s. Also during 1920-1921, voters in Klagenfurt picked (59%) annexation to Austria rather than Yugoslavia, and those of Sopron preferred (65%) becoming part of Hungary rather than Austria. Somewhat later (1935), the residents of the Saar selected (90%) Germany over France. The people of Luxembourg in 1919 were more favorable to France, choosing (73%) to join it, rather than Belgium, in an economic union. Germans repudiated (95%) war guilt and reparations in 1929, but because of the mere 15 percent turnout, the issue failed to get a majority of the eligible electorate and failed. Germans (99%) and Austrians (100%) agreed to Anschluss in 1938. Since World War II, the greatest number of national referendums on international issues have been held on relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1972, French voters approved (68%) an expansion of the EEC, and that year Denmark (63%) and Ireland (83%) approved joining the EEC, while Norwegian voters rejected (47% ) membership. Three years later, the British electorate voted (67%) to continue membership in the EEC, and in 1986 Danish voters did (56%) the same by approving changes in EEC rules. The self-governing Danish territory of Greenland, however, chose (53%) in 1982 to withdraw from the EEC. Finally, the people of Malta in 1956 approved (77%) integration with Great Britain, then reversed themselves in 1964 and voted by a narrow margin (50.7%) for independence. Another international-issue referendum decided (57%) in 1986 that Spain would remain in NATO. There were also several referendums involving France and Algeria's relations. In January 1961, simultaneous votes were held in France and Algeria on Algerian self-determination. French voters (75%) and Algerian voters (70%) agreed that Algerians should determine their own

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& International

Politics

future. After negotiations, a new round of referendums was held in 1972, with both French (91%) and Algerian (100%) voters agreeing to the negotiated terms. Also, at the subnational or territorial level, a 1946 independence movement in the Faroes (islands) failed. A bare 50.1 percent of the vote favored separation from Denmark, but with only a 66.4 percent turnout, the percentage of the total electorate favoring independence was only 33 percent, and the measure was defeated. Spain had a series of provincial referendums in Andalusia, Basque, Catalonia, and Galacia during 1979-1981, and voters in each favored increased autonomy by at least 77 percent. Voters in Gibraltar chose (100%) in 1963 to maintain the "Rock's" links with Great Britain. In 1973, voters in Northern Ireland also chose (99%) to stay in the United Kingdom, although a widespread Catholic boycott resulted in an only 59 percent turnout and an absolute majority of a narrower 58 percent. Six years later, Wales and Scotland held separate referendums to approve devolution. The proposal garnered only 21 percent of the Welsh vote and was defeated. Scottish voters favored (52%) greater autonomy, but a turnout of only 64 percent meant that only a third of the overall electorate voted for the proposal, which needed an absolute 40 percent to prevail. The travails of the dying Soviet Union and the profound shifts in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s sparked the most recent round of self-determination referendums on the continent. Yugoslavia was doomed, in the estimate of many, to potential violent disintegration when two of its constituent republics, Croatia and Slovenia, voted by respective margins of 88.2 and 94 percent for sovereignty. The Serbiandominated central government and army rejected those decisions, and by late 1991 there was bloody fighting between Serbs and Croates. It is ironic that the Soviet Union was the scene of some of the widest use of referendums. The votes involved the future of the Soviet state and its relations with its constituent republics. Several of these will receive detailed examination in Chapter 6. The Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia led the way in February and March 1991 when more than 75 percent of the voters responded yes to referendum questions asking whether they supported independent statehood. The republics of Georgia and the Ukraine followed suit in March, as did Armenia in September, with similarly strong votes for some level of independence or autonomy. The Soviet central government weighed in with its own March 1991 referendum. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to demonstrate popular support for a continuation of the USSR as a unified state in this first and, as it turned out, only nationwide referendum in Soviet history. With nationalist sentiments running high in most republics, the central government cleverly worded the question to read: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of the Soviet Socialist Repub-

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37

lies as a renewed federation of equal, sovereign republics in which h u m a n rights and f r e e d o m s of a person of any nationality will b e fully guarant e e d ? " Inasmuch as voting against such wording could b e construed as favoring the old, oppressive order, the r e f e r e n d u m was approved by a large majority of those that voted. T h e impact was diluted, however, by the fact that six of the republics refused t o participate in the vote, and this abstention dropped the r e f e r e n d u m majority to 61 percent of all registered voters. 9 Also, the U k r a i n e submitted two separate questions to its people on the same day relating to greater f r e e d o m f r o m Moscow's control, and each received a higher percentage of the vote than did the r e f e r e n d u m sponsored by Moscow. 10 E v e n given these limits, Gorbachev gained at least t e m p o r a r y relief from centrifugal forces. T h e turnout was 72.3 percent, rising to about 80 percent if the six abstaining republics are factored out. T h e overall yes vote was 76.4 percent, which also equates to 61 percent of all registered voters and 56 percent of all Soviet adults. T h e yes vote in the various republics, ranged f r o m a low of 70.2 percent in the U k r a i n e and 71.3 percent in Russia to the mid-90 percent range in several of the south-central republics such as the T u r k m e n SSR. T h e erstwhile U S S R also held or p o n d e r e d r e f e r e n d u m s on other issues. O n the same day as the republics were voting on the continuation of the USSR, voters in southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were asked whether the territory should b e returned to J a p a n , f r o m which it had b e e n taken after World W a r II. Predictably, a scant 11 percent of the Soviets in the area voted yes. G o r b a c h e v proposed in May 1990 to stage a national r e f e r e n d u m on his economic reform proposals, although the idea was eventually dropped. A m o n g others, one of the top Kremlin economic planners, Stanislav Shatalin, opposed the idea of a national r e f e r e n d u m on economic reform as an attempt by the government to pass the crisis on to the people rather than m a k e a decision. Shatalin also displayed little confidence in the wisdom of the masses, scoffing that "if all progress was subject to a r e f e r e n d u m , we would all be still u p in the trees throwing coconuts and stones at each other." 1 1 T h e r e f e r e n d u m device was also used by the president of the Russian republic, Boris Yeltsin, who maneuvered to improve his bargaining position with Gorbachev by threatening to hold a Russian r e f e r e n d u m on the increasing authority that the Soviet parliament was giving to Gorbachev. A final irony of the latter-day use of r e f e r e n d u m s in the moribund U S S R is that a D e c e m b e r 2,1991, r e f e r e n d u m in the U k r a i n e was the death knell of the Soviet Union. G o r b a c h e v had b e e n struggling to preserve the country in a new, decentralized form, b u t the approximately 90 percent Ukrainian vote for complete independence ended Gorbachev's plan. With only some hyperbole, the republic's new president, Leonid M. Kravchuk, declared that "a new U k r a i n e has been born. A great historical event has

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occurred which will not only change the history of the Ukraine, but the history of the world." 12 There was even a Soviet proposal to hold the first multinational, international-issue referendum. Moscow first reacted to possible German reunification by trying to slow it down, and one gambit was a proposal by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that all countries that had gone to war with Nazi Germany should hold national referendums on the issue of German reunification. Not surprisingly, the Germans did not favor the idea. Then West German chancellor Helmut Kohl rejected the international referendum on unification on the grounds that "we don't need a midwife." 13 Switzerland continued during the twentieth century to be the leading referendum laboratory, holding 243 national referendums, or 67 percent of the European total. The Swiss, appropriately by referendum, reserved the right for themselves to approve or reject treaties signed by their government. A strong majority of 71.4 percent decided in 1921 that all treaties that bound the country for more than fifteen years (or for an unspecified time) would be submitted to referendum if 30,000 citizens or eight cantons demanded a vote. The provision has been little used, however. In 1923, a treaty with France relating to the customs-free zone of Savoy and Gax was rejected. Similarly, a 1975 agreement with the International Development Association (IDA) that would have granted new loans to the I D A was handled as a treaty and was successfully challenged by a slim majority of 51.1 percent of Swiss voters. 14 Two international-issue referendums in 1977 dealt with the process of ratifying treaties. The Swiss executive (Federal Council) ratifies international treaties but generally only after approval by the Federal Assembly, and prior to 1977 this was not subject to challenge. Under rules established by referendum in 1977, this legislative approval is subject to challenge by petition in limited cases. A popular initiative was proposed allowing all treaties to be challenged by popular initiative, but it failed, receiving only 22 percent of the popular vote and carrying no cantons. Part of the referendum's aim was achieved, however, because the parliament put forth a counterproposal that, by contrast, was adopted, carrying 61 percent of the popular vote and winning a strong majority of the cantons. 15 Under the adopted counterproposal, if a treaty involves becoming a member in a collective security organization, such as the United Nations, or joining a supranational organization (and thus surrendering sovereignty), such as the European Communities, then it is construed as a constitutional change and therefore requires final approval by a majority of both the popular and cantonal votes. Joining an international organization that does not involve military commitments or the subordination of sovereignty or subscribing to multilateral, international lawmaking treaties requires only majority popular vote if challenged, but the successful counterproposal

Historical Overview of Referendums

39

increased the number of needed challenge signatures from 30,000 to 50.000.16 Some other international questions have been treated as constitutional q u e s t i o n s b e c a u s e they r e p r e s e n t e d a loss of sovereignty. Switzerland's decision to join the League of Nations was one of these. T h e 56.4 percent majority was carried by strong pro-League voting in Frenchspeaking cantons and was opposed by German-speaking cantons. In the French-speaking canton of Vaud, for example, the vote for joining the League was 63,300, with the vote against a mere 4,800. The question of becoming an associate member of the E u r o p e a n Economic Community was put to Swiss citizens in 1972, and 72.5 percent of them voted yes. More recently, an international-issue referendum was conducted in March 1986 to decide if Switzerland would join the United Nations. The move, which is discussed further in Chapter 4, was favored by only 24.3 percent of the Swiss and was thus rejected. Yet another recent Swiss referendum with important potential international ramifications was a D e c e m b e r 1989 vote on completely disbanding the Swiss army. The move was placed on the ballot through an initiative petition sponsored by a coalition of disarmament and leftist groups. Most of Switzerland's political elite condemned the move, with Federal Council president JeanPascal Delamuraz characterizing the idea as "an idiocy as big as the Matterhorn." 1 7 Analysts predicted a low turnout and a 75 percent or more rejection of the proposal, but they were wrong. Almost 70 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls in the largest turnout in nearly twenty years, and 35.6 percent pulled the yes lever. Surveys showed that only about 15 percent really wanted to get rid of the army, but there was widespread support for lessening defense expenditures, the perceived autocratic attitude to the army, and the long obligation virtually all Swiss men have to militia duty. That led many Swiss to vote yes, and the referendum served, in one observer's estimate, as "a slap in the face for the establishment" that would ease the move to reform the military and the rules of military service. 18 Referendums in Australia and N e w Zealand The Oceania countries have regularly held referendums, with Australia conducting forty-one and New Zealand nine national referendums during this century through 1986. New Zealand held no international-issue referendums, although the country's 1949 vote (78%) to continue conscription arguably was related to foreign affairs. Only four of Australia's referendums involved international issues. Two were partly related to foreign trade. A referendum in 1913 proposing a constitutional amendment to increase the federal government's authority in the areas of domestic and foreign trade and commerce was narrowly

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defeated when it was favored by only 49 percent of the voters and carried only three states. Thus, the amendment received neither the needed majority of the popular vote nor the majority of state votes. And, a 1946 constitutional amendment referendum on giving the federal government power over the organized marketing of primary products was approved (50.6%) by a majority of the national vote but carried only three states and was lost. There were also two nonbinding referendums held during World War I on the issue of conscription for foreign military service. These pitted Australia's "establishment" against its lower classes. Conscription was supported by wealthier people, Protestants, and Australians of English stock who wished to support London and the economic benefits of a strong British Empire. All the major newspapers favored the draft, as did the Anglican churches. The opposition was centered among Catholics, especially Irish Catholics who were more concerned with London's treatment of Ireland than they were about England's war with Germany. Labor unions were also staunchly opposed to a military draft, but union power was quite limited during this period. Given the political dominance of the elite forces that favored conscription, the referendum results were a surprise. The first in 1916 was narrowly defeated (49%), and another attempt the following year also went down (48%). Australia has also conducted thirty-four state-level referendums. One of these, Western Australia's 1933 vote on secession from the Commonwealth, is relevant to our discussion. After more than a quarter century of local discontent with federal power and policy, Western Australia held a referendum in April 1933 on the question of secession. Almost 90 percent of the voters went to the polls, where secession carried a strong 66 percent of the vote and 92 percent of the electoral districts. The federal government was not willing to concede the issue, however, so the state government appealed to the British "Imperial Parliament" in London. There a joint committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons rejected the petition, arguing that the people and states of Australia had "agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth," and that "according to constitutional usage" the Australian union could not be dissolved unless "invoked by the voice of the people of Australia." 19 Referendums in Canada Canada has had only two national referendums, the second of which, in 1942, approved (64%) conscription. There also have been a number of provincial or territorial referendums, three of which involved the question of self-determination. The first two occurred in 1948, when Newfoundland voters decided their future relations with Canada.20 Newfoundland had been a separate dependency of Great Britain and had enjoyed consid-

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erable domestic self-governance. T h e n , in 1933, N e w f o u n d l a n d the territory experienced severe economic difficulties and lost considerable autonomy when it was placed u n d e r a "Commission" government controlled by L o n d o n . T h e m o d e r a t e return of prosperity by the end of World W a r II rekindled the question of N e w f o u n d l a n d ' s political status. A n elected convention of Newfoundlanders p o n d e r e d several options, including economic union with the United States or confederation with Canada. T h e convention decided, however, to offer voters only two choices: continuation of the Commission f o r m of government for five years or a return to a "Responsible G o v e r n m e n t " system of local autonomy. Strong protests over the omission of the Canadian confederation option, however, persuaded the British government to include that third possibility on the ballot. L o n d o n also decided that in order to win, an option would have to receive a majority vote. A first r o u n d of balloting failed to resolve the issue, but the Commission option was eliminated because it trailed (14% ) far behind Responsible G o v e r n m e n t (45%) and confederation (41%). T h e second vote six weeks later resulted in a slim majority (52%) for confederation, and in 1949 N e w f o u n d l a n d became C a n a d a ' s tenth province. A second international-issue r e f e r e n d u m concerning the f u t u r e national and perhaps international status of one of C a n a d a ' s subnational units occurred in 1980. This time an existing province, Quebec, considered greatly loosening confederation ties, and there were some in the p r e d o m inantly French-culture province who advocated independence from the b a l a n c e of p r e d o m i n a n t l y English-culture C a n a d a . A n u p s u r g e of Québécois nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s culminated with the separatist-leaning Parti Québécois led by R e n é Lévesque gaining control of the provincial parliament in 1976. This was followed in 1980 by a referendum on w h e t h e r the province should seek "sovereignty-association," an undefined separate status with the rest of the confederation. In a triumph of Canadian (instead of regional) nationalism, the proposal was defeated (40%) amid a strong (84%) turnout. T h a t did not end the controversy, however. T h e 1990 failure of Canada's provinces to ratify the so-called Meech L a k e accord, which was designed to ensure Q u e b e c a degree of cultural uniqueness, sparked renewed unrest in the province. Even b e f o r e the rejection, surveys showed almost two-thirds of French-speaking Québécois favoring some degree of autonomy f r o m Canada, and in the aftermath even Q u e b e c ' s pro-unity premier, R o b e r t Bourassa, was moved to warn that "English Canada must clearly understand that Q u e b e c is today and forever a distinct society, capable of ensuring its own development and its destiny." 2 1 T h a t sentiment, backed by an act by the province's parliament that called for a r e f e r e n d u m to b e held n o later than O c t o b e r 1992, helped spur the national government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in S e p t e m b e r

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1991 t o p r o p o s e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a n g u a g e a i m e d at conciliating Q u e b e c ' s F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g majority. It r e m a i n s t o b e seen, b u t increasingly strong s e n t i m e n t s in b o t h Q u e b e c and t h e o t h e r provinces m a y e v e n e n d t h e chance of an a u t o n o m o u s , b u t still associated, Q u e b e c . In N o v e m b e r 1991, an angry M u l r o n e y rejected t h e idea that Q u e b e c could h a v e b o t h political i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d t h e b e n e f i t s of c o n t i n u e d e c o n o m i c association with C a n a d a . " W e l l t h e hell with y o u , " M u l r o n e y e x p o s t u lated. "If C a n a d a is u n a c c e p t a b l e , it's u n a c c e p t a b l e completely. Y o u c a n ' t b e a p a r t - t i m e C a n a d i a n . Y o u d o n ' t get it b o t h ways. Y o u can't walk a b o u t like a cafeteria, t a k i n g t h e b e s t p a r t of C a n a d a saying, ' I ' m going to t a k e these, and I ' m going t o leave y o u with t h e rest.'" 2 2

Referendums in the United States T h e U n i t e d States holds the ironic twin distinctions of being t h e world l e a d e r in n u m b e r of direct d e m o c r a c y decisions (by r e f e r e n d u m , initiative, recall) while, at t h e s a m e time, being o n e of the few long-term d e m o c r a t i c countries that has n e v e r held a n a t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m . 2 3 R e f e r e n d u m s in the U n i t e d States a r e as old as the republic. T h e first exercise in direct d e m o c r a c y was held by M a s s a c h u s e t t s in 1778 on a d o p tion of the n e w state constitution. T h e p r o p o s e d d o c u m e n t lacked a bill of rights and was t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t e d by a five-to-one margin. A r e d r a f t e d constitution received public a p p r o v a l two years later. T h r o u g h t h e 1800s, r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e only sporadically used, b u t t h e y did resolve such issues as the site of t h e T e x a s capital (1845), voting rights in C o l o r a d o (1848), a n d w h e t h e r t o c r e a t e a Michigan state b a n k (1850). 24 T h e spirit of t h e populist m o v e m e n t and t h e progressive e r a s p a r k e d a d r a m a t i c growth in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of direct d e m o c r a c y a f t e r m o r e t h a n a century of s p o r a d i c use. In 1892, t h e P e o p l e ' s p a r t y b e c a m e the first national p a r t y t o call f o r direct d e m o c r a c y in its presidential p l a t f o r m . S o u t h D a k o t a b e c a m e the first state to a d o p t t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r statutory law in 1898, a n d e i g h t e e n o t h e r states followed suit by the e n d of W o r l d W a r I. Interest in initiative a n d r e f e r e n d u m f a d e d with t h e progressive m o v e m e n t ' s decline, a n d for t h e next forty years n o n e w states a d d e d the p r o c e d u r e . T h e n , in t a n d e m with its e n t e r i n g t h e u n i o n as a state, A l a s k a a d o p t e d t h e p r o c e d u r e in 1959, a n d a n e w p a t t e r n of growth b e g a n . N o w all U.S. states except D e l a w a r e h a v e s o m e f o r m of initiative, r e f e r e n d u m , o r recall. T h e r e are a f e w states, such as Connecticut, w h e r e r e f e r e n d u m s a r e limited t o constitutional a m e n d m e n t proposals, b u t in a b o u t 75 percent of the states, initiatives o r r e f e r e n d u m s can decide s t a t u t o r y as well as constitutional proposals. T h e r e is n o precise c o m p i l a t i o n of all s t a t e w i d e r e f e r e n d u m s in U.S. history, b u t t h e r e h a v e b e e n o v e r 3,000 s u c h v o t e s , including a p p r o x i -

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mately 1,500 initiatives. 25 There has also been a host of local referendums, numbering 16,000 in 1968 alone. 26 Most of these measures have been on state and local issues, but there has been a smattering of votes relevant to world affairs. During the war in Vietnam, for instance, there were votes on the issue of continued U.S. participation, and in the early 1980s there were a n u m b e r of votes on the nuclear freeze issue. Contrary to the widespread use of referendums and initiatives at the state and local levels, popular voting on issues has never been possible at the national level. Pragmatic and philosophical reasons persuaded the delegates to the 1787 constitutional convention to establish a representative form of government. There is n o record indicating that referendums were considered in Philadelphia. Pragmatically, geographic distance and transportation difficulties in the fledgling country dictated a republican form of government because, as James Wilson noted, "it is impossible for the people to act collectively." 27 Philosophically, the framers were influenced by Montesquieu, David H u m e , and others who argued that the divergent interests and social inequalities that characterize large states would spark clashes leading to civil disruptions. Many delegates were thus skeptical about the ability of the people to exercise restraint and wisdom while directly governing themselves. Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry commented that "the evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people . . . are the dupes of pretended patriots." A n d Roger Sherman of Connecticut similarly proclaimed that he was operating under the premise that the common people should have as little as possible to do with the direction of government. 2 8 A s a result of these views, the Constitution provides that "all legislative Powers herein granted shall b e vested in a Congress of the United States." It is important to note that, contrary to a widely held assumption, the legislative authority placed in Congress does not constitutionally deny that power to the people. Congress can allow legislative issues to be decided by referendum and on one occasion did so. In 1846, Congress voted to return part of the original land ceded by Virginia for the federal district of Washington if the people of what became Alexandria County agreed to the retrocession by referendum. The voters chose to rejoin Virginia, and the state began to exercise jurisdiction without further congressional action. More than two decades later, an unhappy Alexandria taxpayer challenged his obligation to pay Virginia taxes claiming that the referendum was unconstitutional on several grounds. The matter was finally settled by the U.S. Supreme Court. It ruled in Phillips v. Payne (1876) that Virginia's reannexation of Alexandria and, by inference, the referendum were legal. 29 The opinion for the majority written by Justice Noah Swayne did not rest primarily on the referendum issue, but he did note that "under certain circumstances, a constitutional provision m a y . . . b e waived by a

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party entitled to insist upon it." The court has become even more precise in its support of the possibility of a national referendum without the need for a constitutional amendment, a development that we will explore more extensively in Chapter 6. The first strong movement for holding a national referendum occurred just prior to the Civil War when the Senate defeated by a single vote a proposal to hold a national vote on the abolition of slavery. As the crisis that culminated in World War II grew, the Ludlow amendment calling for a public vote before a declaration of war renewed interest in a national referendum. 30 This idea of requiring popular consent before going to war first emerged during World War I. Progressive Republicans unsuccessfully tried to persuade the 1916 Republican convention to endorse such a referendum; earlier Democratic presidential candidate and secretary of state William Jennings Bryan supported it; the Senate twice (1915, 1917) voted in favor of it; and the 1924 Democratic national platform included it. In 1935, Indiana Democratic representative Louis Ludlow revived the controversy when he proposed a constitutional amendment that read in part, "Except in the event of an invasion of the United States or its Territorial possessions and attack upon its citizens residing therein, the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast thereon in a Nationwide referendum." Public opinion strongly favored the amendment. Two polls taken in late 1937 found three-quarters and two-thirds of the respondents supporting Ludlow's proposal. Nevertheless, the amendment was defeated in both houses of Congress. The House of Representatives voted it down 209 to 188 in January 1938, and the Senate rejected the proposal 73 to 17 in October 1939. Despite the strong public support for the proposal, its rejection posed no political liability to members of Congress. Of those who ran again, 76 percent who had voted for the amendment were reelected; 82 percent who had voted against it were reelected. Thus, public support was wide but not deep. The idea of a national direct democracy procedure also received some attention in the mid-1970s as a reaction to the twin traumas of Vietnam and Watergate. Several joint resolutions were introduced in the House and in the Senate that would have amended the Constitution to establish a national initiative procedure. Polls indicated that 73 percent of the public with an opinion supported the proposal; yet, the joint resolutions languished after hearings and never came to a floor vote.31 The aborted attempt to move legislation to establish national direct democracy through Congress in the mid-1970s does not mean that the movement is dead. Certainly it is dormant, but direct democracy remains vigorous at the state and local levels in the United States, there is contin-

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ued interest at the academic level, and there are renewed calls by political activists to give U.S. citizens a greater and more direct say in their country's policy. 32 TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFERENDUMS IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Although little has been written about them, referendums in African, Asian, and Latin American countries are not infrequent. 33 Virtually all of the referendums in these countries have addressed domestic issues, especially constitutional changes and expressions of support for the government or its policies. B u t there have been a few international-issue referendums, mostly on sovereignty and similar political status questions. The first in an independent country occurred in 1917 when Uruguay held a referendum to approve its constitution. Since then, more than 100 other referendums have been held. With few exceptions, the voting has not been held under Western-style democratic conditions, and the results have been lopsided and predictably have favored the government position. Referendums in Asia Sixteen Asian countries or their territories held forty-four referendums between World War II and 1986. They mostly involved domestic issues, although a 1947 referendum in the Philippines granted special concessions to U.S. multinational corporations. There were also several internationalissue referendums related to such self-determination issues as territorial jurisdiction, autonomy, and sovereignty. These included Turkish Cypriots approving ( 7 0 % ) a separatist constitution in 1985, several border regions voting to join either India or Pakistan in 1948, and Sikkim's voters deciding (no data available) to join India in 1975. A similar referendum was held in Singapore. There, in September 1962,71.1 percent of the voters approved a plan to merge their city-state with Malaya, Sarawak, and Sabah in order to establish the Federation of Malaysia. There was no legal obligation for Singapore, which was autonomous within the British Commonwealth, to hold the referendum, but Prime Minister L e e Kwan Y e w sought the vote as a legitimization of his plan to merge with Malaya and the other provinces. The voters did not truly have a democratic choice, however. There was no provision on the ballot to vote against merger. Rather, voters could select among three plans: the negotiated pact with Malaya or the terms of either of the other two pacts (with Sarawak or Sabah) creating the federation. L e e justified this tactic by declaring that all Singapore's political parties supported

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federation, but this was not the case, and one opposition party urged voters to reject merger by casting a blank ballot. The inability to vote against merger and an intense government campaign for the negotiated settlement ensured overwhelming support. The size of the majority was the only real question. B y that measure, Lee's ability to gain only 71 percent of the vote, while 3 percent voted for one of the other two plans and nearly 26 percent inferentially voted no by casting blank ballots, indicated substantial resistance by the populace. It is even reasonable to speculate that the voters might have rejected the merger if they had been given more balanced information and a more democratic choice. Ironically, the blank-ballot voters may have been wiser. After only three years, predominantly Chinese Singapore withdrew from the predominantly Malay federation because of ethnic tensions. Referendums in Africa Countries and territories in Africa had held eighty-eight referendums through 1986, the first of which was a 58 percent decision by Natal to merge with South Africa in 1909. Southern Rhodesian voters in 1922 gave 59 percent approval to self-government rather than joining South Africa. The rest of the African referendums have occurred since 1945. Many African referendums were on independence or some other question of political association, with understandably huge majorities favoring freedom. Several nascent African countries voted on whether to stay in the French Community, with most opting by large majorities to do so. The only exception was Guinea, which chose immediate independence by 97 percent in 1958. Egypt's president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, led a movement to merge his country along with Syria into the United Arab Republic, a plan that was approved in 1958 by 99 percent of the voters in the two countries. There was a related movement to establish the Federation of Arab Republics in 1971, and this was also overwhelmingly supported by voters in Egypt ( 9 9 % ) , Syria ( 9 6 % ) , and Libya ( 9 9 % ) . In the end, however, all of these plans failed, as did a similar gesture by Moroccan voters, who in August 1984 approved ( 9 9 % ) an abortive federation with Libya. There were a few other referendums that had vote margins narrow enough to characterize as a contest. Fifty-seven percent of Equatorial Guinea's citizens in 1963 chose autonomous government under Spain over independence, but five years later they reversed themselves and chose independence by a 63 percent vote. In 1964, Malta's voters approved independence from Great Britain by a narrow 50.7 percent majority. British Togoland, in a UN-sponsored referendum, voted by 58 to 42 percent in 1956 to join Ghana rather than French Togoland, and in 1959 the voters in the northern section of British Cameroon decided (62 percent) to delay a

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decision on whether to join with Nigeria. Two years later, under U N auspices, they chose ( 6 0 % ) to merge with Nigeria, while the voters in the southern section opted ( 7 0 % ) to merge with French Cameroon in the newly independent county of Cameroon. T h e only African international-issue referendum on a question other than self-determination issues was held by Egypt. President Anwar Sadat sought a show of public support in 1979 for his peace treaty with Israel to offset the nearly universal condemnation from other A r a b countries. Peace, but not democracy, was served when a virtual 100 percent turnout approved the treaty by 90 percent.

Referendums in Latin America and the Caribbean Seventeen countries or territories in Latin America and the Caribbean held thirty-four referendums in the twentieth century to 1986. T h e vast majority of these occurred after 1945. Only a few of these referendums were related to international policy, however. Seventy-seven percent of Puerto Rican voters agreed to commonwealth status with the United States in J u n e 1951; in July 1967, voters reaffirmed that stand, with 60.5 percent voting for continued commonwealth status, 38.9 percent preferring statehood, and only 0.6 percent wishing independence. T h e British sponsored a West Indies Federation in the late 1950s, comprising several of their Caribbean possessions, but in 1961 Jamaicans rejected ( 4 6 % ) continued association, and the island became independent in 1962. Aruba voters chose ( 8 2 % ) to differentiate their island from the rest of the Netherlands Antilles in March 1977, and that led to their independence in 1986. Panamanians approved the Panama Canal treaty with the United States by 67 percent in October 1977. What was remarkable about this vote was not the outcome, but its relatively narrow margin. T h e treaty had been negotiated by Panamanian strongman General O m a r Torrijos, and he had staked considerable political capital on the treaty and a strong show of support. Voting against the treaty, he told Panamanians, "means committing a crime against the country." 3 4 For Panamanians, the most controversial issue of the treaty was the continued U.S. right of intervention if the canal's operation was threatened. A combination of political pressure, pride at regaining sovereignty over the Canal Z o n e (even with conditions), and the treaty's economic benefits persuaded business and most other organizations in Panama to support Torrijos and the treaty. B o t h left- and right-wing nationalists remained opposed, however. T h e resulting drumfire of criticism against the treaty's acceptance because it allegedly permitted possible " Y a n k e e imperialism" and because voting was monitored by U N officials and by representatives from two dozen North and South American universities kept the winning margin well below the

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90 percent Torrijos had desired. In 1979, voters in the Virgin Islands rejected (44%) autonomy from the United States in a very low (38%) turnout. The most recent international-issue referendum was held in Argentina in November 1984, with 81 percent of the vote approving the Beagle Channel treaty with Chile. The Pacific Nationalist stirrings and accompanying political changes have led in recent years to the first referendums in the Pacific region. All were held in U.S. dependencies. Citizens of Guam faced six choices about their future in January 1982, and a strong plurality (49% ) favored commonwealth status. During 1983, three other territories made choices about their political future. Voters in the Federated States of Micronesia approved (79% ) a Free Association Compact with the United States, and Marshall Islanders voted (58%) for a similar agreement. A majority (56%) of voters on the islands of Palau opted for a Free Association Compact with the United States. The vote required 75 percent approval, however, and the compact was therefore defeated. This was reversed in September 1984, when the compact was approved (67%) under new rules. REFERENDUM PROCEDURES

There have been hundreds of referendums in this century, but they have hardly been identical. Instead, the technical procedures that govern the holding and conduct of referendums are as diverse as the different countries that hold them. The rules that govern the initiation, conduct, and impact of referendums are of more than just technical interest. They also often have an important impact on the outcome and impact of the referendum. One way of classifying referendums is by their legal status. The constitutions of some countries establish referendums, in some countries there is statutory authority only, and in other countries referendums are extralegal. Another way to categorize referendums is by the specific mechanisms by which referendums are initiated. These include referendums mandated by the constitution, initiated by the legislature, proclaimed by the executive, and begun by popular petition. Referendums can also be distinguished by their impact: some are binding, others are not. Then there are differentiations according to degree of government regulation of and intervention in the campaign. Voting procedures are, of course, established by the government. But beyond this, some governments take a passive or limited role, while other governments are active in regulating the campaign and participating in it. There are also decision criteria. Most

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r e f e r e n d u m s are a yes/no vote decided by a simple majority. A minority have special rules requiring extraordinary majorities of a specified percentage of all eligible voters. F u r t h e r m o r e , many r e f e r e n d u m s are not democratic at all. Democracy is, of course, a m a t t e r of spirit as well as process, and in some countries r e f e r e n d u m procedures and voters are oppressively manipulated. T h e resulting votes then are not true examples of direct democracy; they merely serve as government-controlled exercises to acquire the patina of popular support for despotic decisions. T h e following sections will illustrate some of the diversity of the rules and circumstances of referendums, and subsequent chapters will further discuss technical procedures and political activity as they affect the outcomes of the various referendums. It is impossible to catalog all the complexities of referendums, however. W h a t is perhaps most important to understand is that there are diverse possibilities to construct and conduct referendums. Sometimes, when they fail to m e e t full democratic ideals, it is because the r e f e r e n d u m process has b e e n abused by politicians b e n t on achieving a particular o u t c o m e rather than determining the people's wishes. This condemns those politicians, not the referendums. F u r t h e r m o r e , the diversity of process provides us with examples of evenh a n d e d governments and informed and active voters, and these are models f o r reform and the future. • Legal Status: Constitutional change frequently requires a referendum. Ireland's move to join the E E C is an example, in that joining the supranational organization required some surrender of legislative authority. Forty-nine of fifty U.S. states require popular approval of constitutional changes. A b o u t half the states have procedures for constitutional or statutory change that can b e begun by the voters by signing petitions. Arizona has the most difficult qualifying formula, requiring the signatures of 10 percent of the electorate. T h e easiest standard, found in Massachusetts, requires signatures equal to 2 percent of the vote in the last general election. Given the 1988 turnout, this would require fewer than 30,000 signatures in a state with a population of 5.9 million (or 0.5 percent of the population). • Initiation: Swiss referendums are sometimes m a n d a t e d by the constitution and are sometimes initiated by popular petition. 3 5 Constitutional changes require referendums. Optional r e f e r e n d u m s can b e initiated only by a petition of the people. This contrasts with most countries, w h e r e r e f e r e n d u m s are begun by the government and where the people have no similar authority. In Switzerland, any legislative act can b e put to r e f e r e n d u m if within ninety days of publication 50,000 citizens sign a petition calling for a r e f e r e n d u m . R e f e r e n d u m s can also b e activated by popular initiative requiring the signatures of 100,000 citizens. This proced u r e is usually used for constitutional change. T h e Federal Assembly cannot change the wording of the proposed change, but it can put forth a

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counterproposal. In some countries, the legislature may initiate a referendum. According to the Danish constitution, bills passed by parliament may be put to referendum at the request of one-third of parliament's members. Some bills, including those that discharge treaty obligations, are exempt. Furthermore, legislation involving the transfer of power to an international organization, such as the UN or the EC, must be submitted to a referendum unless the legislation authorizing transfer is supported by five-sixths of the Folketing's members. The 1948 referendums in Newfoundland illustrate extralegal procedures. They were neither constitutionally mandated nor legislatively proscribed. Instead, a popularly elected special convention decided to put two choices (continued rule by London or autonomy) before the people, and the British secretary of state for Commonwealth relations decided to add confederation with Canada as a third option. While referendums are allowed under the French constitution, the votes of 1961,1962, and 1972 all violated constitutional requirements in one or more ways and therefore were extralegal and executive initiated. The constitution provides that the president may propose referendums only if a proposal is sent to him or her by the government (premier) and the legislature. In the case of referendums on constitutional change, the proposal can go forward only after both chambers of the legislature have passed the amendment. The 1961 vote on Algeria was announced by President Charles de Gaulle on November 16,1960, and the government's proposal was not made until December 8. Furthermore, since the freeing of Algeria (which was legally an integral part of France) violated the constitutional provision guaranteeing inviolability of French territory, action by both chambers was necessary but not taken. The 1972 vote on expanding the EEC contravened constitutional requirements much as the 1961 vote had done, with President Georges Pompidou announcing the vote three weeks before the government proposal was received. • Impact: Swiss referendums are always binding. Norway's and Ireland's votes on joining the EEC were binding. Denmark's was not, although the Danish government pledged that it would honor the people's decision. Similarly, the British vote on the EEC was not binding, but the government was committed to carrying out the popular mandate. There was speculation, however, that if the referendum had resulted in a slim majority for withdrawal, a substantial number of pro-EEC majority party (Labour) members might have joined with Conservative and Liberal party members to block legislation to withdraw Great Britain from the EEC. In the Spanish NATO referendum, Prime Minister Felipe González initially indicated that the referendum was not binding, but his party later conceded that it would be morally bound to abide by the results. Referendum results, whether binding or not, are normally put into

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effect by the government, but not always. A f t e r World W a r I, U p p e r Silesia was claimed by both Poland and Germany. A vote was held on a community-by-community basis. A majority of these, as well as a majority (60%) of the popular vote, opted for inclusion in Germany. The Allies decided, however, to partition the region, with roughly 60 percent going to G e r m a n y and 40 percent going to Poland. • Regulation and Intervention: Beyond establishing basic voting procedures, the degree of government regulation of referendums varies considerably. Most countries, for example, do not try to limit expenditures on referendum campaigning, although some countries and U.S. states provide for campaign finance reporting. A few countries, such as the United Kingdom in 1975, have provided limited funds for conducting the campaign. In countries with publicly owned broadcast media, the degree of equal access to the airwaves is a critical issue that we will return to in later chapters. Sometimes media time is allocated equitably; often it is not. During some referendum campaigns, the government has also printed and distributed not only its own information (sometimes biased, sometimes not), but also statements and background by opposing sides. T h e degree of participation in the campaign by the government on behalf of one side or the other of the issue also varies. In the 1972 Irish E E C election, the government was technically neutral, but it informally campaigned vigorously for membership. Civil servants produced promembership literature and helped prepare promembership speakers. The cost of these and other government activities far exceeded the limited official funds given to the pro- and antimembership movements, resulting in a lopsided advantage for those who favored joining the E E C . This favoritism contrasts sharply with the Danish and Norwegian E E C campaigns, which were administered more evenhandedly. In Norway, funds were given to each of the country's political parties in proportion to its legislative strength, and equal funds were given to pro- and antimembership organizations. The government also spent considerable funds in a generally neutral effort to inform voters, and the public broadcast media were analyzed to ensure fair coverage. The United Kingdom did not attempt to regulate contributions in its E E C referendum campaign. It did, however, legislatively recognize two ad hoc umbrella organizations that had sprung up to respectively favor and oppose continued E E C membership. T h e two organizations had literature distributed free by the government, were allowed access to the BBC, and received equal public funds. The government favored continued membership, and there were some changes of bias; but public manifestations of this p r o - E E C position were not egregious, and official publications and the government-controlled media were generally evenhanded.

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The 1980 Quebec referendum was also waged under the aegis of two opposing umbrella organizations sanctioned by the parliament and controlled by the two major parties. Only the established organizations could spend significant sums on the campaign or receive access to public broadcasting time. The object was to avoid the influence of money; the drawback was that those with independent views or arguments not in accord with the legislative parties were effectively shut out of the contest. One analyst does conclude, however, that "when it was tested in 1980, the Quebec l a w . . . proved less draconian than many had feared."36 Sometimes the government takes a very strong stand. Beginning the 1972 EEC referendum campaign in France, President Pompidou told his country by radio and television: The question asked of you is clear and concise. Each of you can understand it easily. Since you want a France which is strong, prosperous and free, and since here destiny can only be accomplished within a powerful Europe, mistress of herself, you will respond massively to my a p p e a l . . . , you will go to the polls and accomplish your duty as a citizen, you will say "Yes" to the future of your children, "Yes" to France, "Yes" to Europe. 37

• Decision criteria: Majority rule is the most common standard, but there are variations and exceptions. Swiss constitutional amendment referendums, for example, must be agreed to by both a national overall popular majority and a popular majority in a majority of the cantons. Other referendums are decided by simple national majorities. Referendums usually are conducted with only two choices: accepting or rejecting the proposal on the ballot. Where there are more than two options, it is common to require a majority, with a runoff referendum if a majority is not received on the first round of voting. The 1948 Newfoundland referendums are an example, and confederation, which finished second to autonomy on the first ballot, gained a majority on the second. According to the Danish constitution, rejecting a referendum proposal requires a negative vote by both a majority of those voting and at least 30 percent of the entire electorate. This provision had no effect in the high-turnout (90%) EEC referendum. Against the government's recommendation, the British Parliament decided that the Scottish devolution vote would be authoritative only if supported by 40 percent of the entire electorate as well as a majority of those voting. Scottish voters opted for devolution by a narrow 51.6 percent, but the turnout was less than 63 percent. This meant that less than a third of the entire electorate voted for devolution, and the measure was defeated. To have passed the measure would have required an approximate 63 percent yes vote given the turnout. On constitutional amendments, almost all U.S. states require simple

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majorities. O n e state requires three-fifths approval, another two-thirds, and three states require approval by a plurality equal to a majority of those voting in the electoral contest or referendum with the highest participation o n election day. In all other types of initiative and referendum, only a simple majority of the popular vote is required. The method of counting can sometimes b e important, especially o n votes involving territorial status. The British decision to count the 1973 Northern Ireland vote on a provincewide, instead of a county-by-county, basis virtually ensured that the result would overwhelmingly be for continued union with Great Britain. N o t only did Protestants outnumber Catholics two to one, but, recognizing the sure outcome, most Catholics boycotted the referendum. O n e MP proposed to count votes on a countyby-county basis, and that might have had a very different impact. Of the six counties, Fermanagh and Tyrone had Catholic majorities, and a separatist vote in those counties would have substantially increased the pressure on London to allow the two counties to join the Irish Republic. • Wording: The wording of a referendum is sometimes a controversial issue. A t times, the wording is purposely vague to try to minimize opposition or even to avoid the defeat of a proposal. The Parti Québécois won power in 1976 in part on its pledge to hold a referendum prior to any declaration of independence. That attracted s o m e voters who, while opposed to the governing Liberal party, were also opposed to or doubtful about i n d e p e n d e n c e . W h e n it structured the 1980 vote, the Parti Québécois, knowing it would be routed on a straight independence referendum, chose to ask the voters for authority to negotiate sovereigntyassociation, an uncertain term. The strategy failed, the referendum was lost, and the Parti Québécois was soon also defeated. The word devolution used in the Scottish and Welsh referendums to describe their possible future status was similarly opaque. Vernon Bognador comments that "devolution is, after all, a rather peculiar constitutional category;... lying as it does somewhere along the spectrum between the unitary and the federal states." In his estimation, the concept was "meaningless" to most of the electorate, and it was "not surprising, therefore, that there was considerable confusion among the yes and no camps in the referendum campaign." 38 Wording may have also contributed to the defeat of the World War I Australian referendums on overseas use of military conscripts. D o n Aitkin argues that both referendums "were strangely worded indeed," and this may have helped prompt their defeat. 39 The 1916 ballot, for example, asked Australians: Are you in favour of the Commonwealth having, in this grave emergency, the same compulsory powers over citizens in regard to the requiring of their military service for the terms of this war, outside the Common-

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At other times, long and specific wording may be a key to adoption. In the general election that brought him to power, Spanish prime minister Felipe González campaigned against continued Spanish membership in NATO. Once in power, though, he changed his view, but the prime minister was faced with splits within his party, many of whose members remained strongly opposed to staying in NATO. To ensure a pro-NATO vote, to ease the difficulty of explaining his switch, and to avoid splitting his party, González needed to word the question with "all of the political shrewdness t h a t . . . [he] and his aides could muster."40 The result was a question that, among other things, stipulated that Spain's military would not integrate with the NATO command structure; thus the outcome of the vote left Spain in NATO—just. There are two main points to be taken from this brief overview of the technical aspects of the referendum process. The first is that it is difficult to make general statements about the conduct of referendums. Their authority, initiation, impact, level of government involvement and regulation, decisional criteria, and wording are highly variegated. Yet, these technical aspects are important, and the second point to draw is that the way in which referendums are held can affect their outcome. Since a referendum is, after all, a political process, if and how such exercises in direct democracy should be conducted is often the field of considerable controversy as a proposal's proponents and opponents maneuver for advantage. NOTES 1. This chapter relies heavily on David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); and John Austen, David Butler, and Austin Ranney, "Referendums, 1978-1986," Electoral Studies 6 (August 1987), pp. 139-147. Also on the development of referendums, see A. Chunkath, "Referendum: Its Genesis, Growth and Raison d'Etre," Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies 11 (December 1979), pp. 86-100. 2. Philip Goodhart, "Referendums and Separatism I," in The Referendum Device, edited by Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981). 3. Goodhart, "Referendums and Separatism," p. 139. 4. This section relies heavily on Simon Deploige, The Referendum in Switzerland (London: Longmans, Green, 1898). 5. Deploige, The Referendum in Switzerland, p. 46. 6. As an example of the number of votes during this period, the 1876

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referendum was rejected by 156,157 yes (45.8%) to 184,894 no (54.2%). 7. Quoted in Deploige, The Referendum in Switzerland, p. 219. 8. Deploige, Referendums in Switzerland, p. 240. 9. The six were Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia. 10. Moscow's question received a 70.2 percent yes vote in the Ukraine. One of the two other questions, which was asked in the mixed ethnic area of eastern Ukraine and which asked whether people wanted to be part of the "Union of the Soviet Sovereign States," received an 80.2 percent yes vote. The other question, asked in the strongly ethnic Ukrainian western area of the republic, asked whether voters favored an independent Ukraine. The yes vote was 90.2 percent. 11. New York Times, September 21,1990, p. A l . 12. Hartford Courant, December 3,1991, p. A l . 13. Hartford Courant, February 2,1990, p. A9. 14. George A. Codding, Jr., "The Swiss Political System and the Management of Diversity," in Switzerland at the Polls: The National Elections of1979, edited by Howard R. Penniman (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 21. 15. In addition to twenty full cantons, there are six cantons that because of their small populations count as a half canton for voting purposes. 16. Codding, "The Swiss Political System." 17. Time, December 11,1989, p. 70. 18. New York Times, November 29,1989, p. A6. 19. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda: Six Histories: Australia, Newfoundland, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, United Kingdom (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978), p. 6. 20. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda, pp. 8-14. 21. Time, July 2,1990, p. 30. 22. New York Times, November 21,1991, p. A3. 23. Other countries that have been continuously democratic since 1945 and that have not held national referenda include the Netherlands, Japan, Costa Rica, Israel, India, and Mexico during their years as democracies. Other democratic countries that have not held referenda since World War II include Austria and Finland. Germany held referenda prior to the war but has held none since. 24. Penelope J. Gazey, "Direct Democracy—A Study of the American Referendum," Parliamentary Affairs 29 (Spring 1971), pp. 123-139. 25. The reader is reminded that to avoid clumsy wording we are using referendum to cover all the various techniques of direct democracy, including initiatives and recalls, as discussed in Chapter 1. 26. Eugene C. Lee, "The American Experience, 1778-1978," in Ranney, The Referendum Device. 27. James Madison, Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention of1787, June 6,1787. 28. Madison, Notes, May 31,1787. 29. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130 (1876). 30. Ernest C. Bolt, Jr., Ballots before Bullets: The War Referendum Approach to Peace in America, 1914-1941 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977); Richard Dean Burns and W. Addams Dixon, "Foreign Policy and

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the 'Democratic Myth': The Debate on the Ludlow Amendment," Mid-America 47 (October 1965), pp. 288-306. 31. A Gallup poll in 1978, as reproduced in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment, hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution (on S.J. Res. 67), 95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977), p. 646, found that 57 percent favored a national initiative procedure, 21 percent opposed it, and 22 percent were uncertain. 32. A recent, somewhat skeptical, view of the referendum process and the possibilities for a national system in the United States is presented by Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). For a recent book advocating more direct democracy, see David S. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 33. See Thomas B. Smith, "Referendum Politics in Asia," Asian Survey 26 (July 1986), pp. 793-814; Alvaro Marques and Thomas B. Smith, "Référendums in the Third World," Electoral Studies 4 (April 1984), pp. 85-105. The South refers to those countries that usually share a history of colonization and lagging economic development. These factors are also often accompanied by sporadic democracy. 34. Facts on File, September 9,1977, p. 698. 35. Jean-François Aubert, "Switzerland," in Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, edited by David Butler and Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978). 36. Ranney, The Referendum Device, p. 183. 37. Claude Leleu, "The French Referendum of April 23,1972," European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), p 26. 38. Vernon Bogdanor, "Referendums and Separatism II," in Ranney, The Referendum Device, p. 45. 39. Don Aitkin, "Australia," in Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, p. 131. 40. Gary Prévost, "Spain's NATO Choice," World Today 49 (August-September 1986), p. 131.

Realists' Fears, Democrats' Hopes, and Questions for Research We have thus far emphasized the growing, worldwide use of referendums to decide national and international policy issues. We have also examined the possible significance of this trend in light of theories about strong democracy and about the need for realism in foreign policy. To recapitulate, realists tend to oppose using referendums in foreign policy. They fear that if foreign policy is partially removed from the hands of seasoned diplomats and government experts, decisions will be made cavalierly, without the benefits of dispassionate knowledge and first-hand experience. Either popular ignorance or sentimental moralism will prevail. Advocates of participatory or strong democracy tend to be divided about the use of referendums. Many, but—as we shall emphasize in this chapter—not all, celebrate referendums and view them as leading to greater citizen awareness and activism. The admirers believe that referendums increase citizens' political participation, interest, and understanding and that they buttress the legitimacy of the political order. 1 A few advocates of participatory democracy, however, fear that under current social conditions referendums can easily be distorted into a tool that shrewd elites can use to manipulate politically inexperienced masses. Referendums, according to such wary democratic theorists as Peter Bachrach, are desirable only if they take place in a wider environment of constant participation in workplace councils, neighborhood assemblies, and other places where decisions that affect one's life can be made. 2 This environment arguably will nurture in voters the political knowledge, empathetic attitudes, and compromising skills required for thoughtful participation in international-issue referendums. Without this environment, Bachrach and others believe, referendums can easily lead to harmful, o f t e n x e n o p h o b i c policies; most voters, living in a largely nonparticipatory society, lack the preparation to act as mature, morally responsible citizens. The realist and the two strong-democratic views of referendums—one optimistic, the other wary—differ considerably. As we discussed earlier, the theoretical traditions have different relationships to the moral principle of positive liberty. Each tradition also rests on different perceptions about how people typically act during referendums and, correspondingly, 57

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predicts dire or wonderful consequences. These different perceptions evoke questions for empirical research. For example, when and why are referendums used in foreign policy? By what methods and to what degree are citizens educated about the relevant issues and presented with appropriate information? Do people vote with little information or no basic understanding of the issues, or are voters informed and aware? Which political and social groups—the incumbent elite, oppositional demagogues, the rich, the poor, or others—win in the short run through the use of referendums? Do referendums frequently produce reckless discontinuities in nations' foreign policy? Or is the impact of international-issue referendums on a nation's overall foreign policy limited or, at other times, salutary? In this chapter, the different empirical propositions implicit in strongdemocratic and realist theories will be identified and briefly elaborated. This effort will allow us to explore in later chapters what recent international-issue referendums can teach us about the benefits and dangers of a more democratic foreign policy. TIMING OF REFERENDUMS

In terms of the timing of referendums—why referendums sometimes occur and sometimes do not—at least three testable propositions come to mind. One theory, advanced by Vernon Bogdanor, is that referendums frequently appear in liberal democracies when factions within a ruling party so intensely disagree over a major policy question that the split jeopardizes continuation of party rule. Under such circumstances, a referendum is sometimes a useful way to resolve disagreements without alienating either side. It can provide a procedural solution to potential party fratricide and a way of preserving party power amid threatened factionalism.3 Another theory, suggested by the research of David Magleby, is that referendums are consequences of efforts by well-financed and well-organized minorities of nonelites who wish to redirect government action.4 Through petitions, lobbying, and occasional protest, the nonelites cajole governments into holding referendums on policy questions that they are thus far deciding in ways contrary to these mobilized minorities. Referendums from this perspective are a process by which certain organized groups can redress grievances. Magleby expresses skepticism that most people have sufficient financial and organizational resources to initiate referendums. He views referendums as largely tools of the social "haves." Magleby, nonetheless, sees the source of referendums as lying outside elite circles. A terrifying variant of this general argument made by Magleby is

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provided by Bachrach, who says his personal political theorizing is strongly democratic. He believes that Americans today are inadequately experienced in making decisions about complicated policies and argues that referendums are most likely to occur when selfish minorities that have money, organization, and rhetorical skills enlist the support of large majorities through "hate" campaigns that play upon the majorities' unreasoned fears. Bachrach contends that recent domestic referendums on busing, pornography, and abortion illustrate just how manipulative referendums can be. 5 One can easily extend Bachrach's argument to the realm of foreign policy, saying that today's international-issue referendums are tools of well-organized and well-financed groups trying to manipulate everyday voters on issues where their emotions run high and their knowledge is low. Such issues might include foreign aid, support for the United Nations, escalation of defense expenditures, and undertaking "winnable" wars. A third theory concerning the timing of referendums is that international-issue referendums most often occur when government policy is clearly at odds with the wishes of a significant proportion of a country's citizens. This view holds that a referendum does not occur unless there is first a majority of voters who feel troubled by current policy and believe change is necessary. Referendums thus are the result of neither various governing parties' calculations about how to bolster their organizational power nor of small, well-organized interest groups' efforts to manipulate others. Referendums, according to this third theory, occur when there is palpable evidence, such as petitions or demonstrations, that a majority or near majority of the general public is strongly dissatisfied with current policy and believes that its preferences are being blatantly neglected by elites. Referendums are one political tool by which intense, but ignored, blocs of citizens can protect their interests from government. 6 If any one of these propositions about the origins of referendums is true, its validity logically has implications for the persuasiveness of the strong democrats' and the realists' theses. For example, many advocates of participatory democracy interpret referendums as a consequence of general citizen discontent with government policy and nonresponsiveness. It is said that elites generally will not risk submitting major and controversial policy to an unpredictable citizenry, and that interest groups are reluctant to subject their policy wishes to the glare of media coverage and public debate. 7 Therefore, referendums must be the result of sufficient public clamor to cause elites to want to quell discontent. If, however, international-issue referendums primarily occur either because of political parties' calculations concerning organizational power or because of interest groups' pressures, then many advocates of strong democracy probably would be dismayed. Instead of being natural expressions of the public's concern, this would mean that referendums are ploys by elites or

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by i n t e r e s t - g r o u p minorities seeking goals that a r e n o t directly c o n n e c t e d to t h e public g o o d , at least so f a r as it is u n d e r s t o o d by large n u m b e r s of voters. T h e alleged n a t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e f e r e n d u m process a n d t h e public's will would b e called into question. A d v o c a t e s of realism in m a k i n g foreign policy also would b e t r o u b l e d if t h e r e c e n t increase in international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s is a c o n s e q u e n c e of e i t h e r p a r t y calculations or interest g r o u p pressures. N e i t h e r , a f t e r all, is necessarily c o n n e c t e d t o studied assessments of foreign affairs a n d national needs. T h e realist wants policy t o b e d e t e r m i n e d by dispassionate calculations of national n e e d s and n o t b e simply t h e result of t h e struggle of special interests for c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e . It is likely t h a t advocates of realism also would b e uneasy, b u t n o t necessarily surprised, if t h e citizenry at large p r o v e d t o b e t h e n o r m a l instigator of r e f e r e n d u m s . Realists t e n d t o b e skeptical of t h e abilities of e v e r y d a y citizens t o m a s t e r the intricacies of foreign affairs a n d to c o n t r o l their private frustrations and moralistic impulses. If r e f e r e n d u m s a r e p r o d u c e d by t h e desires and discontent of an u n e n l i g h t e n e d public, this would only r e i n f o r c e t h e realists' fears. By this s t a n d a r d , r e f e r e n d u m s would b e a c c e p t a b l e to t h e archetypical realist only if they w e r e generally t h e result of calculated e f f o r t s by experts in foreign policy a n d n o t usually g e n e r a t e d by partisan concerns, minority pressure, or majority whims. B u t t h u s far n o m a j o r political theorist has m a d e such an a r g u m e n t . 8 In s u m m a r y , t h e r e a r e t h r e e c o m m o n p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t the origins of foreign policy r e f e r e n d u m s . T h e y focus alternately on t h e role of (1) intraparty d i s a g r e e m e n t s over m a j o r policy questions, (2) interest g r o u p activism, a n d (3) citizens' general discontent. T h e t r u t h of e a c h proposition has b e a r i n g o n which theory a b o u t r e f e r e n d u m s — t h e realist's, the optimistic strong d e m o c r a t ' s , or t h e w a r y strong d e m o c r a t ' s — s e e m s the most r e a s o n a b l e in light of historical e x p e r i e n c e and t h e r e f o r e deserving of acceptance.

CITIZEN EDUCATION A N D REFERENDUMS M a n y political theorists w h o advocate e i t h e r realism o r strong d e m o c r a c y are c o n c e r n e d n o t only a b o u t w h e n and why r e f e r e n d u m s occur, but also a b o u t w h e t h e r a n d how voters are e d u c a t e d b e f o r e they cast t h e i r ballots. A d v o c a t e s of strong d e m o c r a c y and advocates of realpolitik would b e c o n c e r n e d if r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e held w i t h o u t extensive discussions and systematic dissemination of i n f o r m a t i o n . A d v o c a t e s of realism, of course, would not b e surprised if serious discussions of t h e issues d o n o t occur. A f t e r all, these theorists p r e s u m e that e v e r y d a y voters are n o t interested in t h e subtleties a n d technical issues s u r r o u n d i n g r e f e r e n d u m s a n d instead act o u t of moralism or headless passion. A d v o c a t e s of s t r o n g d e m o c r a c y ,

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such as Benjamin Barber, would hope that today's referendums are preceded by serious educational campaigns in which issues are discussed fully and information becomes widely available. 9 Their provisions might include campaign periods to ensure that all sides have sufficient opportunity to voice their arguments, government preparation and mailings of information packets to all qualified voters, and government-appointed commissions responsible for publicizing the different sides. In addition, many advocates of strong democracy would hope that citizens in referendums would study the available information and then cast ballots in a deliberate manner. Many democratic theorists, moreover, would expect most voters to think independently of government officials' directives and endorsements by the news media. 1 0 If referendums are approached by vast majorities of voters in a thoughtless manner, despite serious efforts to broaden discussion and provide voters with information, and if voters seem easily duped by either organizational elites or media celebrities, then the participatory-democratic defense of referendums would be seriously weakened. There would be no obvious connection between the institution of referendums and a mature, autonomous spirit of citizenship. Of course, advocates of realism presume that voters will not think seriously about the public good, even if voters' education and dissemination of information do occur. Thus, two sets of questions for empirical investigation arise. First, do serious educational campaigns precede international-issue referendums? If so, what is the substance of the campaigns? Second, are citizens who vote informed and thoughtful when they enter the booth, or do they approach casting their ballots by uncritically accepting the endorsements of political and social authorities? WHO PARTICIPATES? Referendums are, in the opinions of most theorists of strong democracy, an institutional opportunity for citizens at large to participate more directly in policymaking processes. Direct democracy permits, and even reinvigorates an interest in, widespread political participation. 11 But do eligible citizens, in fact, participate in referendums when given the opportunity? Participation in referendums by every citizen is an unreasonable expectation, of course. Personal illness, inclement weather, natural disasters, job obligations, family crises, child care, and other aspects of daily life can dissuade politically concerned people from going to the polls. Another, and arguably more appropriate, standard forjudging the extent of citizen participation is conceivable, however. That standard is the average electoral turnout within a nation. A r e turnout levels for interna-

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tional-issue referendums comparable to, or even higher than, those for other major, national-level elections? Or are levels for international-issue referendums significantly lower, suggesting that referendums do not in practice significantly enrich citizenship for most politically interested persons? Some theorists of voting behavior who do not advocate strong democracy might predict that referendums would have significantly lower turnout rates because of the absence of party cues to simplify voters' choices. In the absence of unambiguous party endorsements, a greater effort is required to become familiar with issues and to choose a position. Because of the effort required, some who vote in national elections stay home during an international-issue referendum rather than undertake the trouble to decide by themselves complex issues. Thus, as an instrument for popular involvement in politics, referendums are bound to fail. 12 A counterargument by theorists of strong democracy is possible, however. One can argue that unlike modern elections, in which candidates from "catch-all parties" blur positions and issues so as to appeal to as many constituencies as possible, international-issue referendums offer stark alternatives. 13 Perhaps unusual excitement, historical significance, and drama accompany major referendums, and they, at minimum, partly offset the inconvenience of a lack of party cues. Consequently, current turnouts at international-issue referendums might not necessarily be significantly lower than turnouts for national elections. Referendums on a particularly significant issue, in fact, might have a higher turnout than is the norm for national elections. An advocate of realism in foreign policy would probably not be primarily interested in turnout levels per se, but would stress the social composition of voters. D o well-educated and well-traveled people who realists believe might have cosmopolitan interests and perspectives vote? Or do most of the voters in international-issue referendums consist of "the great unwashed," that is, people with modest-to-small incomes, with modest-to-small experiences in the broader world, and therefore (realists presume) with modest-to-small perspectives on global issues and foreign life? If nonwealthy, largely untraveled, and therefore parochially minded people vote, the fears of the realist are reinforced: uninformed people, lacking minimal experience and knowledge about foreign affairs, are making policy decisions, presumably on the basis of untested prejudices and small-town moralism. Thus, two sets of questions arise about "who votes?" First, are turnouts for today's international-issue referendums significantly lower than normal turnouts for national elections? Or are turnout rates comparable, suggesting that a large proportion of everyday nonelites are taking advantage of the opportunities to participate in today's foreign policy referendums? Second, what is the sociopolitical background of people who vote

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in today's international-issue referendums? D o "the great unwashed vote?" O r are voters on international issues from above-average income and educational strata and therefore likely to have at least some familiarity with events and conditions abroad? WHO WINS?

Some advocates of strong democracy argue that all citizens "win" from today's international-issue referendums in the sense that citizens' roles are expanded, citizens develop a greater sense of efficacy and responsibility, and the political system's legitimacy is reinforced (see Chapter 2). But other writers, including participatory democracy advocate Peter Bachrach, are more cynical about the alleged general winners of referendums. These skeptics believe instead that referendums primarily help a variety of self-serving special interests at the cost of the general good. Who are these special interests that allegedly benefit from referendums at the sacrifice of the general good? According to Bachrach and others, it is the inordinately wealthy who primarily benefit. Through their funding of campaigns, which skew the public's understanding of issues, the rich can indirectly control voters' behavior and prevent them from considering the general good. 14 Some authors focus not on the wealthy but on the national-level electronic media and its celebrities who can manipulate voters' thinking through endorsements and slanted presentations of the news. According to this line of argument, voters are extremely passive in their thinking and are easily manipulated by screens and sound waves and the messages that media leaders prefer. 15 A third possibility deals with oppositional demagogues, who allegedly play upon the fears and resentments of voters in order to unseat established elites. According to this theory, voters resemble the impulsive, amoral mob described by Gustav LeBon and at times by Sigmund Freud. Voters are said to lack the ability to reason patiently and independently about international issues. They therefore can be easily led by a person skilled in playing on voters' feelings of insecurity, anger, and resentment. 16 A final possibility involves the incumbent government. Through biased wording of referendum choices and direct and indirect support for particular sides, established elites in effect determine the outcome of the referendums despite the alleged rule of the people. If this occurs, referendums are a method for elites to legitimate their favored policies and thus minimize citizen discontent, rebelliousness, and independence. Through referendums, elites help citizens run to their chains, which are covered by democratic-looking procedures. 17 To recapitulate, there are at least four distinguishable theories about

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who wins by using referendums. Each identifies different groups of people who allegedly benefit from international-issue referendums: the wealthy, leaders of the media, oppositional demagogues, and political elites. The different theories lead to the following predictions: 1. The side that receives the most private funding and business support usually wins. 2. The side that is endorsed by the national media usually wins. 3. The side that engages most extensively in emotional appeals and demagoguery usually wins. 4. The side that the government endorses usually wins. ARE REFERENDUMS SIGNIFICANT IN LONG-TERM FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION? Some policy-oriented readers might ask: " D o n ' t both theorists of strong democracy and theorists of foreign policy realism exaggerate the historical significance of international-issue referendums? Granted, referendums are more common today than 100 years ago. Still, they play such a minute part in overall foreign policymaking that they do not deserve the attention given to them. Foreign policy is basically unaltered." Advocates of realism who fear the spreading use of referendums assume, of course, that policy implications are extensive and that referendums disrupt long-term policy continuities rooted in decades of diplomatic experience and tradition. Referendums are for realists a Pandora's box of unpredictable emotion and passion that threaten established diplomatic order. Theorists of strong democracy are not of one mind concerning the impact of referendums on foreign policy. Some argue that policy impact per se is not as important as the value of the participatory process. The creation of an interested, involved, and reflective citizenry should be the summum bonum, the unquestionably "highest good," of politics. Whether the results of referendums disrupt preexisting traditions of policymaking is a secondary issue at best. A policy without active, involved citizens is intrinsically deplorable, this view maintains, regardless of whether or not there is continuity in the content of policy. 18 A second strong-democracy argument exists that is somewhat compatible with the realists' line of argument. According to this position, which has been forcefully advanced by Bachrach, referendums are usually used by demagogues and wealthy interests to manipulate masses into passing legislation that harms everyday people. Bachrach argues that new "hate" legislation on topics such as abortion and the death penalty is being passed through referendums because voters, lacking practice in making

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policy decisions in daily life, act on instinct and resentment rather than on reason. Like the realist, this type of strong-democracy theorist insists that a Pandora's box of unreasoned passion is being open. But where the strong democrat's argument differs from the realist's is that even a strong democrat, such as Bachrach, fearful of politically inexperienced masses, would not assume that elites on their own have necessarily made wise and generally beneficial policies in the past. 19 A third possible argument from a strong-democracy position is that contrary to the realists' presumption most citizens are not reckless when participating in international-issue referendums. Instead, they tend to be cautious when they vote because they appreciate the benefits derived from the policy status quo and are reluctant to change it in radical and unpredictable directions. According to this line of argument, referendums usually function as a desirable check on elites' impulses to innovate. In the words of one British conservative, referendums are "not a spear, but a shield" protecting citizens from unwanted legislative change. 20 Ironically, and contrary to the Madisonian presumptions so deeply entrenched among scholars and citizens in the United States, it is the elites, not the nonelites, who are the primary sources of discontinuous and perhaps thoughtless change in foreign policy.21 Once again, several testable propositions arise from these divergent theories about the significance of referendums for ongoing foreign policy traditions. They are: 1. Today's international-issue referendums play a marginal role in the making of foreign policy. Foreign policy remains basically the same as before. 2. Referendums produce radical discontinuity in foreign policy because voters' passions and ignorance result in innovative policies that are at odds with a country's diplomatic tradition. 3. Referendums function as prudent restraints on elites' innovative impulses. Whereas elites often desire new directions in foreign policy and have little commitment to tradition, nonelites are more reluctant to undertake risks that may jeopardize present arrangements and benefits. Therefore, referendums usually are decided in favor of the status quo. SUMMARY

The increasing use of referendums in deciding international issues can be greeted with enthusiasm or alarm, depending in part on one's theoretical predilections and in part on empirical experience. In Chapter 1 we compared the strength and weaknesses of each

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position on the basis of the moral principle of positive freedom. W e noted the argument that if one values positive freedom, then one logically should approve of the use of referendums to decide questions of foreign policy on the grounds that this process advances active citizenship. This chapter has introduced a series of questions and alternate empirical propositions that are also relevant for deciding one's position vis-à-vis referendums. Depending on the answers to these questions, one might be persuaded to adopt either an optimistic strong-democratic view, a wary strong-democratic view, or a realist view of referendums, irrespective of one's commitment to the principle of positive freedom. Stated differently, one can adopt a theoretical position in favor of or against referendums not only a priori, on the basis of logical deduction from a moral principle, but also a posteriori, on the basis of empirical knowledge that makes one theoretical position appear more plausible and convincing than its rivals. In the following chapters, we will review several recent internationalissue referendums in light of the different testable propositions introduced in this chapter. For the sake of convenience, a list of approximately a dozen empirical propositions that guide our inquiry in the remainder of the book will be presented in the appendix that follows this chapter. After surveying examples of referendums in recent history in light of these propositions— and the broader questions about timing, voter education, participation, and policy impact which the propositions imply—we will reconsider the relative validity of the three archetypal ways of thinking about referendums that have been articulated in this chapter. Again, these theoretical perspectives are not value-neutral ways of describing the world. Each perspective encourages different assessments about the relative value and dangers of referendums. Because the different theoretical perspectives entail different judgments about the benefits and costs of internationalissue referendums, the data that we will gather will aid us in deciding a posteriori whether the increasing use of referendums should be greeted with approval, ambivalence, or alarm.

APPENDIX: PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL-ISSUE REFERENDUMS • Propositions About Timing: 1. International-issue referendums usually occur when factions in a governing party disagree over a major policy question. 2. International-issue referendums occur primarily as a result of interest group pressure. 3. International-issue referendums usually occur when a large plurality of the citizenry in a polity is openly and strongly dissatis-

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fied with its g o v e r n m e n t ' s c u r r e n t policies. •

Propositions A b o u t V o t e r s ' E d u c a t i o n : 1. E x t e n s i v e i n f o r m a t i o n c a m p a i g n s p r e c e d e t o d a y ' s i n t e r n a tional-issue r e f e r e n d u m s . 2. M o s t citizens w h o vote in an international-issue r e f e r e n d u m d o n o t seriously think a b o u t t h e issues involved. 3. Most voters in international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s cast their ballots almost entirely on t h e basis of their g o v e r n m e n t ' s e n d o r s e m e n t s . 4. Most voters in international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s cast t h e i r ballots almost entirely o n t h e basis of n e w s m e d i a e n d o r s e m e n t s .

•

Propositions A b o u t Participation: 1. V o t e r t u r n o u t s f o r international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s a r e significantly lower t h a n v o t e r t u r n o u t s f o r national elections. 2. V o t e r t u r n o u t s f o r international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s a r e significantly higher t h a n voter t u r n o u t s for national elections. 3. M o s t voters in international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s a r e f r o m low-income backgrounds. 4. M o s t voters in international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s a r e p o o r l y e d u cated.

•

Propositions A b o u t Victory: 1. T h e side that receives t h e largest a m o u n t of business s u p p o r t a n d private f u n d i n g usually wins an international-issue r e f e r e n dum. 2. T h e side that is e n d o r s e d by the national m e d i a usually wins an international-issue r e f e r e n d u m . 3. T h e side that engages most extensively in d e m a g o g i c " h a t e " campaigns usually wins an international-issue r e f e r e n d u m . 4. T h e side that t h e g o v e r n m e n t e n d o r s e s usually wins an international-issue r e f e r e n d u m .

•

Propositions A b o u t Significance: 1. International-issue r e f e r e n d u m s h a v e little l o n g - t e r m impact o n t o d a y ' s foreign policy. Following a r e f e r e n d u m , a n a t i o n ' s foreign policy r e m a i n s basically u n c h a n g e d . 2. International-issue r e f e r e n d u m s lead t o significant u p h e a v a l in a n a t i o n ' s foreign policy traditions. 3. International-issue r e f e r e n d u m s a r e usually d e c i d e d in f a v o r of

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NOTES 1. Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics in a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 281-289. Barber's views are also found in a letter in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment, hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution on S. J. Res. 67,95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977), pp. 192-196. For a convenient summary and sympathetic critique of the strong democrat's case for référendums, see Peter K. Eisinger, Dennis L. Dresang, Robert Booth Fowler, Joel B. Grossman, Burdett A. Loomis, and Richard M. Merelman, American Politics: The People and the Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 479-486. 2. See, for example, Bachrach's testimony in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 59-65; Philip Green, Retrieving Democracy: In Search of Civic Equality (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), p. 177; Christopher Lasch, "Mass Culture Reconsidered," Democracy 1 (October 1981), pp. 7-22; Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 275-276. 3. Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System: The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), parts 1-2. 4. David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), chapter 4. 5. Bachrach's testimony in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 59-65. 6. Statement by People's Lobby in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 146-149. A precursor to this argument can be found in Delos F. Wilcox, Government by All the People, or the Initiative, the Referendum, and the Recall as Instruments of Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1912), chapter XVIII. See also Eisinger et al., American Politics, pp. 479-486. 7. Barber's letter in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 192-195. 8. Bogdanor's argument about political moderation and Tory democracy, however, can be read as anticipating such an innovative line of realist theorizing. Bogdanor, The People and the Party System, parts 1-2. 9. Barber's letter in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 195-196; Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 285-286; Green, Retrieving Democracy, p. 177; Eugene C. Lee, "Can the British Voter Be Trusted?" Public Administration 66 (Summer 1988), pp. 165-180. 10. Barber's letter in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 193-194; Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 281-289; David D. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 26-29. 11. Barber's letter in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 193-195; Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 281-289; Bogdanor, The People and the Party System, pp. 83-85,90; Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers, pp. 26-29. 12. Magleby, for example, explores this line of argument in Direct Legislation,

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chapters 5 and 7. 13. For a famous criticism of the consequences for citizenship of "catch-all parties," see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Political Parties and Political Development, edited by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 177-200. 14. Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 90-124,189191; Bachrach's testimony in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 59-63. 15. On the profound impact of the news media on our understanding of political events, see Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). See also, Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 226; and Lasch, "Mass Culture Reconsidered." 16. Bachrach's testimony in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 59-63. For illustrations of the realist position on this issue, see John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," American Journal of Sociology 67 (March 1962), pp. 482-493; Henry Fairlie, "The Unfiltered Voice: The Dangerous Revival of the Referendum," New Republic 24 (June 24,1978), pp. 16-17; Cronin, Direct Democracy, pp. 187-215. 17. Bachrach's testimony in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 60,63. 18. Barber's letter in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 193-195. 19. Bachrach's testimony in U.S. Congress, Voter Initiative, pp. 59-65. For illustrations of the realists' fear that referendums would allow swings in popular mood to disrupt long-term policies, see Carl Cohen, Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 88-89; Cronin, Direct Democracy, pp. 250-251; Fairlie, "The Unfiltered Voice." 20. Bogdanor, The People and the Party System, p. 69. 21. Bogdanor, The People and the Party System, parts 1-2. See also Magleby, Direct Legislation, p. 153; Philip Goodhart, "Reflections on Referendums," in The Referendum Device, edited by Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 1-2.

Referendums, Europe, and International Organizations This chapter begins analyzing the last chapter's questions, focusing on seven referendums in Western Europe that decided membership in international organizations. The first of these are five 1970s referendums related to membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). 1 These referendums occurred in France, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, and Great Britain. The other two referendums both occurred in 1986. They respectively decided if Spain would remain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and if Switzerland would join the United Nations. The 1958 Treaty of Rome, which joined six Western European countries into the EEC, was a landmark in European integration. Further progress occurred along two lines. One was expanding the scope of integration, symbolized by the coalescing of the EEC and other regional organizations into the European Communities (EC) in 1967. The other path to progress was expanding the membership in the EEC and EC. While EEC membership remained stable for fifteen years, there was an assumption that it would expand. The key was Great Britain because of the size of its economy, its heritage as a European leader, and the probability that a number of other, smaller European countries, including Ireland, Norway, and Denmark, would follow the British lead in seeking membership. In the 1960s, the Conservative government in London sought to join the EEC, but French president Charles de Gaulle vetoed British membership. Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Labour government again sought membership in the late 1960s and was again rejected by de Gaulle. The passing of de Gaulle from power offered the opportunity to resume European integration, and in June 1970, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway all began negotiating EEC membership. A year later, Great Britain concluded negotiations, and in October 1971 the House of Commons agreed to membership effective January 1, 1973. Negotiations between the other three applicants and the EEC were also successful. In April 1972, French president Georges Pompidou submitted to French voters the question of whether France should support an expansion of the EEC. Sixty-eight percent said yes. The next month, 83 percent of Irish voters favored their county's entry into the EEC, and in 71

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October, 63 percent of Danish voters also opted for membership. On the other hand, 53 percent of Norwegian voters rejected membership in September. T h e issue was not fully settled in Great Britain, however. T h e Conservative government that led the country into the E E C was defeated in 1974, the new Labour government renegotiated membership terms, and the issue of continued British membership in the E E C under the new terms was referred to the voters in J u n e 1975. Sixty-seven percent chose to have their country accept the new terms and remain in the E E C . Similarly, the issue in Spain was whether to remain in an international organization—in this case N A T O . Spain had joined N A T O in 1981 under a conservative government. T h e Socialists had demanded a referendum on the issue as a campaign tactic during the following election. When the Socialists won, they were forced to proceed even though the prime minister had a change of heart and favored remaining in the alliance. Fifty-two percent of Spaniards agreed in a reversal of earlier public opinion, and Spain remained in N A T O . Just four days later, the Swiss voted on joining an international organization, the United Nations. Here again the status quo carried the day. Despite overwhelming support for membership by the government and most of the society's elite elements, three out of four Swiss voters who went to the polls voted no, thereby overwhelmingly rejecting U N membership. THE TIMING OF THE REFERENDUMS Why were these European referendums held? For Ireland, the answer is simple: the Irish constitution required a referendum because membership amounted to a constitutional amendment insofar as it bound Ireland to accept E C decisions. This, in effect, limited the legislative power of the Irish parliament. In the other four countries, more complex reasons persuaded leaders to schedule the referendums. Suffice it to say at this point that they were more the result of parliamentary and party politics than any other factor. The changes in France that ended de Gaulle's decade in power and brought Pompidou to the presidency also ended French opposition to expansion of the E E C . While the French constitution provides for holding referendums, there was no requirement to submit the E E C issue to the voters. Indeed, the more important question of French membership itself had not been referred to the people in 1958. Analysts agree that Pompidou's desire for a referendum on E E C expansion was largely the result of partisan politics, including the intrafactional struggle among his supporters. 2 Pompidou also sought to

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refurbish his sagging political image by demonstrating that he could create a strong national consensus on a major policy issue. His political maneuvering was also aimed at political parties across the spectrum. Pompidou wanted to manifest his independence from the hard-line Gaullists who opposed British entry into the E E C and to bedevil the Gaullists by changing policy using a referendum, which had been a favorite tool of de Gaulle. Pompidou saw the referendum as a way to appeal to opposition centrists, who were keen Europeanists, in the hope of winning their support for the government coalition and as a tool to drive a wedge between the parties of the left, which were divided on the issue. All of this, Pompidou hoped, would create favorable conditions for the forthcoming general election. On the international level, Pompidou also expected a referendum victory to strengthen his position at the approaching Paris summit meeting. 3 The way the referendum was announced was one sign of these motivations. Constitutionally, the president calls for a referendum only after a proposal is forwarded to him by the premier and the legislature. In 1972, however, Pompidou attempted to take political credit by announcing three weeks before parliamentary action that there would be a referendum. It is also notable that the referendum was not occasioned by public pressure to decide the E E C expansion issue by popular vote. In fact, the French electorate was markedly indifferent, as we shall see. Unlike France, the Norwegian constitution has no provision for holding referendums. Therefore, the popular vote on the E E C was technically advisory. Like France, however, Norway had historical precedent for referendums, with the April 1972 vote on the E E C being the fifth referendum since Norway's independence in 1905. Based on this precedent and on a 1967 government white paper that recommended a referendum to legitimize the decision of the Storting (parliament), there was "a general understanding that...a referendum on the issue would be held." 4 The decision to hold a referendum was reinforced further by intraparty divisions on the E E C issue, with the MPs of several parties disagreeing among themselves. 5 There were also serious splits between party leaders and rank-and-file members. These divisions convinced the leaders that a referendum would avoid damaging stresses within their parties. At the leadership level, the governing Labour party, for example, strongly supported E E C membership, with about two-thirds of its MPs favoring entry. Still, that left one-third of Labour's MPs opposed or unsure. Labour and several other parties also experienced splits between their MPs and their local leaders and rank-and-file members. For example, half the Christian People's party MPs favored membership, but a scant 19 percent of the party's formal members agreed, and only 25 percent of its identifiers were promembership. These splits also extended to the general

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political structure, with political leaders distinctly more promembership than the general populace. 6 Support within the Storting for membership was 60 to 75 percent, given wavering members.7 That contrasted markedly with public opinion. One poll found that during the referendum debate, opposition ranged from a high of 74 percent to a low of 56 percent; another poll's "no" range was 70 to 52 percent. Just as Norway's was, the Danish decision to hold an EEC referendum was heavily influenced by both intraparty leadership splits and by intraparty leader-follower splits within the left parties. General public opinion was also a factor. Two articles of the Danish constitution are relevant to the decision to submit membership in the EEC to referendum. Article 42 specifies that acts of the Folketing (parliament) may be submitted to referendum if requested by one-third of the Folketing's members. The other, Article 20, mandates that legislation involving any surrender of Danish sovereignty to an international body be submitted to referendum unless it commands at least a five-sixths majority in the 179-member Folketing. Throughout the 1960s, most Danish political leaders and a strong majority of public opinion favored EEC membership. One study estimated that if the issue had been decided in the 1960s, a referendum would not have been held because parliamentary opposition was limited to the relatively small (ten to twenty MPs) Socialist People's party (SPP) and because "the size of t h e . . . opposition in the electorate fluctuated between a mere 5 to 10 percent against a support level stabilized in the 50 to 60 percent range." 8 Renewed negotiations in the early 1970s and shifts in Danish political attitudes and alignments, however, promoted the referendum option. Danish politics generally veered leftward, and that was accompanied by rising opposition to EEC membership. Public opposition to membership tripled in 1971 to approximately 30 percent, while support sank as low as 35 percent, and the "don't know" group varied around the 30 percent mark.9 Opposition in 1971 was strongest among the left parties. This was particularly important for the Social Democrat party (SDP), which was the largest single party but not part of the government. While most SDP MPs favored membership, only 22 percent of SDP rank-and-file members favored E E C membership, 40 percent were opposed, and 30 percent were undecided. With a national election impending, and given the trend of public opinion and its own party identifiers' position on the issue, SDP leaders were afraid that they would be outflanked on the left by the strongly antimembership SPP. To keep the issue out of the 1971 general election and thus avoid the possibility of losing seats to the SPP, one SDP leader, in May 1971, proposed holding an extraconstitutional referendum before a final Folketing vote (expected in 1972) on membership. That

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proposal quickly was altered by other SDP leaders to a postparliamentary vote, which would be binding (by legislative agreement) even if E E C membership received a five-sixths Folketing ratification. The governing majority of center-conservative parties acceded to this SDP electoral maneuver for two reasons. First, one of the government coalition parties, the Radical Liberal party (RLP), included several antimembership MPs, while a majority of R L P voters favored membership. Second, in the estimate of one study, the other governing-coalition parties realized that rejecting a referendum "would... cast them in the unenviable role of undemocratic elitists who arrogantly refused to trust major issues to the will of the people." 10 Therefore, the Folketing overwhelmingly voted to submit the E E C question to referendum after the legislative vote, whether or not it received a five-sixths vote. Once the Folketing committed itself to a referendum, there was little chance that the decision would be altered, and any possibility disappeared with the parliamentary elections, which brought the SDP to power in a coalition government dependent on the SPP. Of the five countries that held EEC-related referendums in the 1970s, Great Britain was historically and constitutionally the least likely to hold a referendum. The British had never held a national referendum, nor was there any provision in British law for holding one. Furthermore, most political leaders opposed the idea. Indeed, in 1970, Prime Minister Harold Wilson specifically rejected the idea of a referendum on E E C membership, arguing, "We have a parliament... and I think it is right that it is the Parliament which should take that decision with a sense of full responsibility, with a sense that reflects national views and national interests." 11 Furthermore, under the Conservative government of Edward Heath initial British membership in the E E C was decided by parliamentary action. When, in the early 1970s, the idea of a referendum was proposed and rejected by the Labour as well as Conservative leadership, one of Labour's leading figures, James Callaghan, predicted that a referendum was "a life-raft into which the whole party [might] one day have to climb." 12 His speculation proved accurate. The split within the governing Labour party government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson was the most important factor behind the decision to hold a referendum on continued membership in the EEC. The issue clearly threatened the short-term ability of the party to remain in power and arguably also threatened the long-term cohesiveness of the party as an ongoing institution. It is instructive that in his book on the referendum, Anthony King, after having discussed Labour party politics for three full chapters, begins his fourth chapter with this comment: Readers of this book must be beginning to wonder whether [this] is a book about the Common Market referendum or about the internal

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T h e q u a n d a r y of t h e L a b o u r p a r t y resulted f r o m division and ambivalence within t h e party, b o t h a m o n g leaders a n d b e t w e e n leaders a n d p a r t y voters. In t h e 1960s, L a b o u r p r i m e minister H a r o l d Wilson and m o s t of t h e British political elite h a d f a v o r e d entry into the E E C . A M a y 1967 H o u s e of C o m m o n s v o t e s u p p o r t i n g application f o r entry h a d carried by a strong 488 t o 62, with L a b o u r M P s voting 260 to 35 t o back the application. Public opinion also f a v o r e d joining, with a 1966 poll finding 71 p e r c e n t in f a v o r a n d only 11 p e r c e n t opposed. 1 4 T h e a t t i t u d e of m a n y in G r e a t Britain h a d c h a n g e d by t h e early 1970s, h o w e v e r . A 1970 poll f o u n d that a f t e r b e i n g stung by two F r e n c h rejections, only 18 p e r c e n t of British r e s p o n d e n t s f a v o r e d entry, 72 p e r c e n t w e r e o p p o s e d , a n d 10 p e r c e n t w e r e u n c e r t a i n . S u p p o r t for m e m b e r s h i p t h e n grew slowly, b u t L a b o u r party identifiers r e m a i n e d particularly o p p o s e d . By 1972, for example, overall British opinion had b e c o m e evenly divided on m e m b e r s h i p , with a b o u t 41 p e r c e n t on either side of t h e q u e s t i o n a n d 18 p e r c e n t u n c e r t a i n . L a b o u r i t e s , h o w e v e r , w e r e still strongly o p p o s e d , with only 25 p e r c e n t for, 62 p e r c e n t against, a n d 13 p e r c e n t unsure. 1 5 M a n y L a b o u r party activists, including its MPs, also swung into o p p o sition. Partisanship was o n e factor that m o t i v a t e d this shift, a n d Wilson a n n o u n c e d in 1971 that while h e did not o p p o s e m e m b e r s h i p , h e could not s u p p o r t it on t h e t e r m s being n e g o t i a t e d by the Conservative H e a t h g o v e r n m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , the L a b o u r p a r t y ' s N a t i o n a l E x e c u t i v e and its a n n u a l c o n f e r e n c e w e r e d o m i n a t e d by the p a r t y ' s left, which was suspicious that e c o n o m i c integration would stall a shift to a m o r e socialist o r d e r in G r e a t Britain. Still o t h e r s in t h e L a b o u r party, including R o y Jenkins, the d e p u t y l e a d e r in t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s , c o n t i n u e d t o f a v o r m e m b e r ship even along the t e r m s b e i n g n e g o t i a t e d by the Conservatives. T h e d e p t h of the split within t h e L a b o u r party was e v i d e n t in an O c t o b e r 1971 vote in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s w h e n 198 L a b o u r M P s v o t e d t o reject the Conservatives' negotiating terms, b u t sixty-nine o t h e r L a b o u r MPs, including Jenkins, d e f i e d p a r t y discipline and voted to s u p p o r t t h e g o v e r n m e n t . A c c o r d i n g to King, " R e b e l l i o n is t o o w e a k a w o r d for w h a t h a p p e n e d . . . . [It] was civil war." 1 6 All in all, King estimates, t h e strong p r o - and a n t i - E u r o p e a n integration forces a c c o u n t e d for a b o u t half of t h e L a b o u r party, while t h e o t h e r half, including Wilson, " w e r e m o r e conc e r n e d with t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of p a r t y unity t h a n with achieving any particular o u t c o m e on E u r o p e . " 1 7 This p r a g m a t i c half of the p a r t y saw a

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r e f e r e n d u m as a life r a f t t o save t h e party. W i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n h a v i n g j o i n e d t h e E E C in 1973 o n t h e Conservatives' terms, the strategy devised by t h e L a b o u r party t o maintain unity during the 1974 g e n e r a l election was twofold: call f o r a r e n e g o t i a t i o n of the t e r m s of e n t r y a n d submit t h e final decision on r e m a i n i n g in t h e E E C , e v e n given n e w t e r m s , t o t h e British p e o p l e by r e f e r e n d u m . T h e 1974 general election was successful f o r L a b o u r ; it achieved a p a r l i a m e n t a r y majority, a n d Wilson again b e c a m e p r i m e minister. T h e renegotiations with the E E C also progressed rapidly. T h e s e twin successes also had negative c o n s e q u e n c e s for the L a b o u r party, h o w e v e r . In t h e end, Wilson h a d to p r o c e e d with the r e f e r e n d u m because, as V e r n o n B o g d a n o r put it, " t h e L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t . . . [could not] h a v e b e e n held t o g e t h e r without t h e . . . r e f e r e n d u m . " 1 8 O n e negative factor was t h a t despite t e r m s t h a t m e t m o s t p r e v i o u s objections, a strong c o n t i n g e n t of L a b o u r i t e s , especially t h o s e t o t h e left of t h e p r i m e minister, r e m a i n e d o p p o s e d t o m e m b e r s h i p o n virtually any terms. W h e n the H o u s e of C o m m o n s v o t e d in A p r i l 1975 o n c o n t i n u i n g m e m b e r s h i p u n d e r the t e r m s r e n e g o t i a t e d by the L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t and s u p p o r t e d by the p r i m e minister, Wilson h a d to allow a f r e e v o t e o r risk being d e f e a t e d within his o w n party. O n t h a t vote, 145 L a b o u r M P s v o t e d against their own leadership, while only 137 s u p p o r t e d Wilson, a n d 33 abstained. E v e n a third of Wilson's cabinet m e m b e r s a n d half t h e j u n i o r ministers voted against him o r abstained. A second force b e h i n d L a b o u r ' s continued s u p p o r t f o r a r e f e r e n d u m was the fact that the g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n r e m a i n e d divided a n d c o n f u s e d . Polls in January 1975 showed that w h e n asked, " D o you think that w e w e r e right or w r o n g to join the C o m m o n M a r k e t ? " only 31 p e r c e n t of r e s p o n dents thought the m o v e was right, and 50 p e r c e n t t h o u g h t it wrong. A s k e d w h e t h e r G r e a t Britain should stay in, 33 p e r c e n t said yes, 41 p e r c e n t said no, and 26 p e r c e n t did n o t k n o w or would n o t choose. Y e t , at t h e s a m e time, 53 percent (to 22 p e r c e n t o p p o s e d ) said that if t h e g o v e r n m e n t could negotiate terms acceptable to it, t h e n G r e a t Britain should stay in t h e EEC. 1 9 Finally, and p e r h a p s m o s t pivotally, having a n n o u n c e d its s u p p o r t f o r a r e f e r e n d u m at a time w h e n it was in t h e minority a n d w h e n E E C entry t e r m s h a d b e e n negotiated by t h e Conservatives, t h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t , now in p o w e r and having r e n e g o t i a t e d t e r m s to its liking, could n o t r e n e g e on its pledge to give t h e p e o p l e t h e final say. A s early as F e b r u a r y 1971, surveys f o u n d that nearly 80 p e r c e n t of t h e British p e o p l e f a v o r e d a r e f e r e n d u m on t h e E E C issue, and that p r e p o n d e r a n c e of o p i n i o n rem a i n e d steady t h r o u g h t h e following years' debate. 2 0 T h e r e f e r e n d u m in Spain o n w h e t h e r to r e m a i n in N A T O was p r o m p t e d , like several of t h e E E C r e f e r e n d u m s , b y p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l

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maneuvering more than by any burst of democratic enthusiasm on the part of either the political leaders or the citizenry. One key aspect of the 1986 NATO referendum is that it involved a complete about-face for the moderately left Socialist government of Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez. A decade earlier, the rebirth of Spanish democracy after the death of longtime dictator Francisco Franco in November 1975 both accelerated Spain's shift from a quasi-isolationist to a more internationalist stance and made Spanish membership in such international organizations as the EC and NATO acceptable to their member countries. The moderately conservative Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) party won control of the Cortes (parliament) in 1977; Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo negotiated Spain's entry into NATO; and in October 1981, the Cortes ratified the accession by a vote of 186 to 146.21 The main political opposition was provided by the Spanish Socialist Worker's party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), which finished second in the 1977 elections. The PSOE opposed Spain's entry into NATO, and it also wanted to reduce or eliminate the U.S. bases in Spain. In the October 1981 Cortes vote, González and other PSOE deputies voted along with deputies of the further-left parties against membership. Political fortunes changed in the 1982 general elections. The PSOE campaigned on a platform that included holding a referendum on Spanish membership in NATO. The strategy was that even if the party did not capture control of the Cortes, the referendum could be used to terminate NATO membership.22 The PSOE won, however, and González was named prime minister. The already fragmented UCD fell into even greater disarray and was replaced as the chief opposition party by the distinctly right-wing Alianza Popular (AP) party led by Manuel Fraga. Once elevated to power, González changed his view of the political landscape and his position on NATO. The new prime minister wanted to move the PSOE closer to the middle of the political spectrum to bolster its future electoral fortunes. Internationally, he also wanted to end Spain's isolation from Europe. Part of this was based on the urge to rejoin the family of acceptable nations after Spain's quasi-exile during the four decades of fascist Franco rule. Another part of the internationalist movement was based on the wish to improve Spain's economy by joining the EC. Membership in NATO soon was linked to Spain's application for EC membership. The connection was never formally made by Europeans, but it was made inferentially clear to González during his discussions with other European political leaders.23 As a result, he was intimating that he favored continued membership in NATO as part of Spain's movement into Europe and away from isolationism. Then, in October 1984, González presented a ten-point foreign policy plan that included staying in NATO. This new position created several political problems. One was within

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the PSOE, where many officials and rank-and-file members continued to be against membership in NATO. Complicating this, González did not consult within the PSOE or, some say, even his own government before announcing his ten points.24 Second, the prime minister's credibility with the electorate was at stake, given his widely commented on, frequently derided about-face. 25 Third, he and the PSOE had earlier called for a referendum to try to overturn the U C D adherence to NATO. Once he turned in favor of remaining in the alliance, he was stuck with the risk of a referendum, which he had proposed, defeating his policy preference. González escaped potential political traps by pushing the idea of a referendum while also relying on his considerable personal appeal and an all-out campaign to ensure that Spanish voters supported his position. The prime minister's control of his party and of the Cortes were amply confirmed by prereferendum maneuvering. The PSOE approved continued membership during its December 1984 congress. Then, in late December 1985, almost 80 percent of the Cortes voted for continued membership. This was followed in late January by a decision of the Council of Ministers to hold a referendum on March 12. Thus, the referendum was a product of partisan political maneuvering rather than any commitment to expanding direct democracy in Spain. Nevertheless, most Spaniards supported a popular vote. A February poll found that 67 percent favored holding a referendum, with only 20 percent opposed and 13 percent unsure. The referendum was not greeted with wide enthusiasm by the elites, most of whom supported N A T O membership. What worried many elites was that public opinion on the issue had varied greatly since democracy had been reestablished. Early majority support for membership had reversed by mid-1983 to 57 percent of Spaniards opposing membership. By the time the referendum was announced in January 1986, opinion stood at 33 percent favoring membership, 30 percent opposed, and 37 percent undecided. 26 González's maneuver, therefore, was a considerable gamble. The vote was not legally binding, but various members of the government indicated it would be morally binding. As such, it might have resulted in Spain's withdrawal from NATO. Among other implications, this outcome would have considerably distressed the Spanish military, elements of which had nearly overthrown the government in February 1981. To add to the drama, the prime minister put his political life on the line by hinting that a referendum defeat would result in his government's resignation and new elections. In a fledgling democracy, all this created considerable apprehension. Much of the printed media opposed having a referendum. 27 The conservative morning newspaper Ya termed the referendum "an unnecessary risk." Some papers favored holding the referendum, but even these worried that González's maneuver was dangerous. The day after the referendum, El Pais expressed relief that "one of the most controversial

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and schizoid episodes of the infant Spanish democracy is now over." La Vanguardia added that "the nightmare is over," and Diario 16 concluded, "There was something suicidal about this referendum." The wording of the referendum, which was determined by the González government, added to the mixed reception in Spain to this exercise in democracy. To make membership palatable to a majority of voters, the referendum specified a limited Spanish commitment to N A T O that would not include integration into the alliance's military structure. The prime minister also inserted two tangential clauses that pledged Spain to be a nuclear-free zone and promised to reduce the U.S. military presence in Spain. 28 The magazine Cambio 16 called this wording "the candy of sweet and easy digestion," and there can be little doubt it eased passage. 29 One of the magazine's polls, for instance, found that on this language, 47 percent would vote yes, 26 percent no, with 27 percent undecided. When the same poll asked people simply if they favored or opposed alliance membership, only 37 percent said yes, 38 percent said no, and 25 percent were undecided.30 In addition to appealing to PSOE members, the wording had the salutary effect, in González's view, of confounding the opposition. The A P and other conservative parties favored full membership in N A T O without the strings attached by the prime minister's wording. They were left in a difficult position. Voting yes meant both favoring limited membership and also supporting their prime political opponent, González. Voting no meant withdrawal. Rather than do either, the AP decided to urge its members to abstain. As Ya commented, the prime minister had performed "the miracle of making it impossible for anyone to vote in accordance with his convictions." 31 The wording of the Swiss referendum was as straightforward as the Spanish effort was convoluted. Yes or no on joining the United Nations was the simple choice. The results also stood in contrast. Just four days after Spanish voters decided to remain in an international organization, Swiss voters made an opposite choice. On March 16, 1986, the Swiss overwhelmingly voted against a proposal to have their country join the United Nations. Switzerland is noted for its political stability, and the long evolution of the UN referendum reflected that reputation. 32 The Swiss are somewhat caught between their desire to remain rigidly neutral, on the one hand, and their considerable international involvement and their recognition of the growing importance of international organization, on the other. The viability of the United Nations and the increasing importance of the EC are of particular concern to the Swiss. As a result, the Federal Council (the collective executive) recommended in 1965 that the federal parliament consider UN membership. This idea's genesis lasted more than two decades. A federal-sponsored report in 1981 recommended membership, but

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f u r t h e r study and intervening g e n e r a l elections p e r s u a d e d t h e cautious Swiss t o d e f e r deciding t h e issue. By law, a r e f e r e n d u m was r e q u i r e d , b e c a u s e joining a theoretically s u p r a n a t i o n a l organization, such as t h e U n i t e d Nations, is c o n s t r u e d as affecting Switzerland's constitutionally proclaimed sovereign neutrality. Finally, a f t e r nearly t w e n t y - o n e years, a d a t e for an exercise of t h e p o p u l a r will was set.

VOTER EDUCATION If elections or r e f e r e n d u m s a r e to o p e r a t e optimally, citizens p r e s u m a b l y m u s t cast an i n f o r m e d vote. T h a t can b e b r o u g h t a b o u t by providing a high level of balanced i n f o r m a t i o n in t h e f o r m of n e u t r a l analysis o r t h e airing of opposing views c o m b i n e d with a high level of v o t e r interest that disposes t h e m to acquire available i n f o r m a t i o n . In t h e five E E C - r e l a t e d r e f e r e n d u m s , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and interest factors ranged significantly. T h e F r e n c h r e f e r e n d u m was at t h e low ext r e m e in b o t h areas, with i n f o r m a t i o n b o t h scanty a n d one-sided a n d with t h e electorate indifferent and unheeding. F r o m this nadir, i n f o r m a t i o n a n d interest improved, with G r e a t Britain a n d Ireland in t h e middle, a n d N o r w a y and D e n m a r k at t h e high e n d . F r e n c h voters s h o w e d little interest in their r e f e r e n d u m , but this is a r e a s o n a b l e r e s p o n s e inasmuch as Presid e n t P o m p i d o u devised t h e r e f e r e n d u m for his own political p u r p o s e s , r a t h e r t h a n to ascertain F r e n c h views on e x p a n d i n g t h e E E C , and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n in the g o v e r n m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d b r o a d c a s t m e d i a was biased. Vincent Wright's analysis of t h e A p r i l 1972 vote o n t h e E E C a n d t h e o t h e r r e f e r e n d u m s held d u r i n g F r a n c e ' s Fifth R e p u b l i c c o m m e n t s t h a t the official campaigns on r a d i o a n d television w e r e supervised by t h e Constitutional Council and w e r e "generally fair." T h e y w e r e p r e c e d e d a n d accompanied, however, by "unofficial campaigns which w e r e monstrously biased in favor of the r e g i m e a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t . " W r i g h t c o n c l u d e s t h a t " n o r e f e r e n d u m campaign was an educative exercise." 3 3 This a p p r o a c h was reflected in 1972 in t h e k n o w l e d g e a n d interest of F r e n c h voters. Less t h a n t w o w e e k s b e f o r e t h e r e f e r e n d u m , 49 p e r c e n t of t h e electorate still was u n a w a r e of t h e q u e s t i o n to b e decided, a n d m o s t of those w h o did k n o w t h e q u e s t i o n t h o u g h t it unclear. 3 4 F u r t h e r m o r e , polls indicated that a substantial p e r c e n t a g e of the F r e n c h recognized t h e r e f e r e n d u m as manipulative, r a t h e r t h a n politically justified, and t h e r e f o r e viewed it as unnecessary. T h e E E C campaign in Ireland saw the distribution of a substantial a m o u n t of information, b u t it was heavily one-sided. T h e g o v e r n m e n t , t h e m a i n political parties, t h e press, and most of t h e leading e c o n o m i c organizations were p r o m e m b e r s h i p . T h e g o v e r n m e n t s p e n t p e r h a p s £250,000 on the campaign. T h e s e public f u n d s w e r e s u p p o s e d t o b e f o r n e u t r a l o r

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balance information only, but in fact the government's strong promembership position was reflected. Indeed, the government not only supplied promembership forces with information, but officials from the Industrial Development Authority, the Agricultural Marketing Board, and other public agencies were allowed to campaign for membership. Furthermore, the government directly and indirectly gave the promembership movement approximately £30,000, and it raised another £125,000 from other sources. These sources combined for perhaps £400,000 in promembership campaigning. The antimarket forces, by comparison, were impoverished, raising only about £40,000, or 10 percent of the funds commanded by their opponents. There was also wide television and radio press coverage, but this too, as one study comments, was "on the whole favorable to membership." 35 The Norwegian referendum, in contrast to its French and Irish counterparts, was marked by a high level of much more evenhanded information. T h e parliament allocated approximately 10 million kroner (£750,000) for the campaign. Of this sum, almost half was distributed to the political parties in proportion to their parliamentary strength, another 2.5 million kroner was divided evenly between the pro- and antimembership organizations, and the government spent approximately 3 million kroner on its own information campaign. One gauge of this funding's extent is that it equaled more than half of British funding for its 1975 referendum in a Norwegian population that is one-fourteenth the size of Great Britain's. The government issued a wide variety of free, readily available, and generally balanced booklets and pamphlets on E E C membership issues. There was no unsolicited distribution of literature, however, other than a printed voting appeal just before the referendum. Public television and radio gave extensive and largely even coverage to the campaign. By contrast, the national newspapers, most of which are associated with one or another of the political parties, took stands that corresponded with their particular party affiliation. Therefore, insofar as most of the parties backed membership, so did the press. Local papers were dominated by letter-writing campaigns by the two sides. With government information largely unbiased, the pro- and anticampaigning was left to the two umbrella organizations and to the various political parties. The antimarket organization was more organized and effective, distributing, for example, the EEC News every other week with a print run of 1.3 million—one for every three Norwegians. The Danish referendum on the E E C exceeded even the high levels of information and interest exhibited in the Norwegian referendum. Indeed, one study estimates that the "campaign before the referendum . . . was undoubtedly the most extensive political campaign ever undertaken in Denmark. It was also one of the most intensive." 36

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T h e quality and a m o u n t of i n f o r m a t i o n in t h e D a n i s h c a m p a i g n was impressive. T h e g o v e r n m e n t a p p r o p r i a t e d s o m e £1,800,000 f o r t h e campaign in a p o p u l a t i o n of just 5 million, an e x p e n d i t u r e twice t h e p e r capita allocation in N o r w a y and nearly five times t h e p e r capita e x p e n d i t u r e in Ireland. Also, t h e loose-knit, p r o - a n d a n t i m e m b e r s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n s raised funds, amassing a p p r o x i m a t e l y £450,000 each. T h e g o v e r n m e n t used its s h a r e of t h e f u n d s t o publish a g r e a t deal of e v e n h a n d e d information. E v e r y h o u s e h o l d received a b o o k l e t , f o r e x a m ple, that included a r g u m e n t s on b o t h sides of t h e issue a n d s t a t e m e n t s b y e a c h of t h e nine m a j o r political parties. T h e g o v e r n m e n t also e n c o u r a g e d a n d h e l p e d f u n d the f o r m a t i o n of citizens g r o u p s t o discuss t h e issues a n d f o r m u l a t e opinions. In all, o n e study e s t i m a t e s t h a t 500,000 p e o p l e , 10 p e r c e n t of all D a n e s , w e r e involved in this aspect of t h e campaign. 3 7 L i k e t h e N o r w e g i a n campaign, a n d in contrast t o t h e Irish a n d British r e f e r e n d u m campaigns, t h e D a n e s did n o t m a n d a t e o r specifically recognize p r o a n d a n t i m e m b e r s h i p umbrella organizations, a l t h o u g h s o m e aggregating of forces on b o t h sides of t h e issue did informally occur in b o t h Scandinavian countries. T h e r e w e r e also several television a n d r a d i o p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a n d all the m a j o r parties and organizations t h a t gained recognition by collecting petition signatures w e r e given e q u a l time to p r e s e n t their positions. H o w e v e r , since most of t h e m favored m e m b e r s h i p , this resulted in an imbalance f o r m e m b e r s h i p d u r i n g these p r e s e n t a t i o n s . T h e interest of D a n i s h citizens was high. F o r e x a m p l e , m o r e t h a n 60 p e r c e n t claimed t o have seen all o r most of t h e television p r e s e n t a t i o n s . A s a result, knowledge increased. H a n s e n , Small, and Siune h a v e concluded that political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s flowed well b e t w e e n leaders a n d t h e masses, with the views of t h e two b e c o m i n g " m o r e c o n g r u e n t as t h e result of a two way influencing p r o c e s s " a n d with the e l e c t o r a t e b e n e f i t i n g f r o m " t h e learning process which e n a b l e d [it] to use n o t only m o r e a r g u m e n t s b u t also m o r e specific and sophisticated o n e s [on which] to b a s e [its] decision." 3 8 T h e British r e f e r e n d u m ' s level of activity a n d interest, by c o m p a r i s o n , was less t h a n that in the Scandinavian countries, b u t substantially b e t t e r t h a n the lackadaisical showing in the F r e n c h r e f e r e n d u m . T h e British g o v e r n m e n t s p e n t a total of £1,250,000 o n the c a m p a i g n , o r a b o u t 2.5 p e n c e p e r citizen. This contrasts poorly with t h e 25 p e n c e p e r citizen s p e n t by N o r w a y ' s g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e 45 p e n c e p e r citizen s p e n t by t h e D a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t . E v e n allowing f o r e c o n o m i e s of scale, it is clear t h a t t h e British a p p r o p r i a t i o n did not allow for a significant level of official information. Most of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s f u n d s were used to p r i n t a n d distribute t h r e e p a m p h l e t s to each h o u s e h o l d . O n e p a m p h l e t set o u t t h e prom e m b e r s h i p case, one a r g u e d t h e a n t i m e m b e r s h i p case, a n d t h e third aired t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s views, a n d thus, in t h e w o r d s of A n t h o n y King,

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" w a s simply a n o t h e r version of t h e 'yes' case." 3 ' T h e g o v e r n m e n t also gave £125,000 to each of the t w o established u m b r e l l a organizations: (pro) Britain In E u r o p e ( B I E ) a n d (anti) N a t i o n a l R e f e r e n d u m C a m p a i g n ( N R C ) . T h e s e two organizations also solicited f u n d s , a l t h o u g h t h e e f f o r t greatly f a v o r e d B I E , which w a s heavily supp o r t e d by British commercial interests and was able to raise £1,336,000 in a d d i t i o n t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t grant. T h e N R C f a r e d poorly, g a r n e r i n g only an additional £8,629 a n d 81 pence. Thus, the total £133,629 N R C campaign f u n d was only 9 p e r c e n t of the B I E ' s treasury. Insofar as t h e y w e r e able, t h e s e organizations c o n d u c t e d r e f e r e n d u m campaigns t h a t paralleled t h e c o u r s e of p a r l i a m e n t a r y campaigns, with local meetings a n d s p e e c h e s a r o u n d t h e country a n d with canvassers distributing leaflets a n d k n o c k i n g on d o o r s . T h e b r o a d c a s t a n d printed m e d i a also played i m p o r t a n t , b u t s o m e w h a t limited, roles in the campaign. B e c a u s e t h e r e h a d b e e n two g e n e r a l elections in t h e previous eighteen m o n t h s , media leaders a s s u m e d t h a t t h e public a p p e t i t e for political a r g u m e n t had b e e n sated. T h e r e h a d b e e n particular criticism of t h e B B C for t o o m u c h coverage, a n d , as Philip G o o d h a r t explains, television executives "were anxious t o avoid r a m m i n g the r e f e r e n d u m into t h e public's e a r s a n d eyes." 4 0 Similarly, D a v i d B u t l e r a n d U w e Kitzinger observe that while the printed m e d i a "was n e v e r w i t h o u t r e f e r e n d u m stories," it can also b e said that " t h e limit was the digestion of t h e British public. T h e n e w s p a p e r s quite early on decided that, while the r e f e r e n d u m must b e covered, it was s o m e t h i n g of a bore." 4 1 U n l i k e t h e b r o a d c a s t m e d i a , t h e printed press t e n d e d t o f a v o r o n e side o r t h e o t h e r . T h e Times, for example, in the ten w e e k s p r i o r t o the vote, d e v o t e d a b o u t 40 p e r c e n t of its coverage to p r o m e m b e r s h i p stories and a b o u t 30 p e r c e n t each to a n t i m e m b e r s h i p and n e u t r a l stories. A n d t h e o n e - d a y analysis of column-inch coverage f o u n d t h a t in the nine national p a p e r s , p r o m e m b e r s h i p coverage exceeded a n t i m e m b e r s h i p in five, t h e bias w e n t t h e o t h e r way in three, and only o n e was b a l a n c e d . Public interest in the r e f e r e n d u m paralleled the media's: attentive but not excitedly so. R e g a r d i n g t h e limited broadcast m e d i a coverage, polls f o u n d t h a t 14 p e r c e n t thought that it was t o o much, 34 p e r c e n t t h o u g h t it was a b o u t right, 30 p e r c e n t w a n t e d m o r e , and 22 p e r c e n t h a d n o opinion. In t h e c a m p a i g n ' s last week, as coverage increased, t h e " t o o m u c h " p e r c e n t a g e r o s e to equal " n o t enough." 4 2 T h e r e is s o m e indication that the t h r e e government-mailed p a m p h l e t s h a d s o m e impact, with 75 p e r c e n t of poll r e s p o n d e n t s saying t h e y h a d at least seen o n e o r a n o t h e r of t h e leaflets, and 25 p e r c e n t saying they h a d r e a d at least o n e thoroughly. 4 3 By contrast, traditional local campaigning s e e m e d largely invisible. By c a m p a i g n ' s end, only 30 p e r c e n t could recall having seen " a n y sign of p e o p l e campaigning for Britain t o stay in o r leave t h e C o m m o n Market." 4 4 T h e b r o a d c a s t media had m o r e of an audience.

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The eight pro- and antimembership television presentations drew an average of 21 million viewers, and campaign broadcasts on radio averaged 2.2 million listeners. 45 It is not clear whether these broadcasts, despite substantial audience levels, had an impact on voter preferences. Voting intentions remained relatively stable during the three months preceding the referendum, and only 5 percent thought the broadcasts had affected their views. Furthermore, specific information was not strong among respondents in British polls. After the renegotiated terms were announced, 56 percent of Britons could not think of any new terms, and this included 54 percent of the people who were switching to a promembership position because of the new terms. Another survey asked voters questions about the E E C and found that more than half of the respondents could not correctly answer even one of the six questions. 46 The official efforts to educate voters before the Spanish referendum and the quality and amount of information available to them were lower than in any of the E E C referendums, except perhaps the French vote. The entire official referendum campaign from its announcement to the day of the vote encompassed only six weeks, although the possibility had been discussed for well over a year. There was no official funding of a mass education effort, nor was there any attempt by the pro-NATO government to encourage, much less fund, groups to urge a no vote in the referendum. As a result, while a large number of grassroots efforts did form to oppose membership, they were ill-organized and had few financial resources to air their views. That left it to the media to carry on the informational campaign. The dispersal of information to voters and their interest in it were affected in part by the issue of whether to vote at all. The AP and other right-of-center parties had urged citizens to abstain from voting in the referendum, and a minority of the media either joined the conservatives' call for abstention or were ambivalent about whether citizens should vote. The impact of the mixed message about participation was to lessen the interest of the population, part of which reasonably concluded that it did not have to become well versed on a subject on which it would not vote. The second matter, the particular issues at stake in the decision, received a reasonable amount of attention in the printed media. Many papers were not editorially neutral, however, and they also slanted their reporting to a significant extent. On the membership issue itself, a majority {Diario 16, Cambio 16, and La Vanguardia) openly favored a yes vote, while others (El Pais) ambiguously favored membership. No major printed media source openly opposed staying in the alliance. By comparison, the untrammeled bias of the state-controlled television network (TVE) left even the printed media aghast. Information on T V E was one-sided, and it broadcast a long, last-minute appeal by González for a

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yes vote without affording equal, indeed any, access to the opposition. This T V E performance was roundly condemned by the printed media, with El Pais typically commenting that T V E "has followed the official line in a stifling manner and has not served the society as a whole." 47 All this constrained citizen interest and knowledge. A late January poll, for example, found that 20 percent of those questioned thought (incorrectly) that Spain was not a member of N A T O , and another 16 percent did not want to hazard a guess. When told that Spain was indeed in N A T O , only 56 percent had any opinion about whether or not military integration with N A T O was desirable. 48 This dearth of opinion reflected a tepid level of interest among Spain's electorate. An early February poll found just 45 percent saying they were "much" or "fairly" (bastante) interested in the results of the referendum. Another 26 percent expressed " a little" interest; 24 percent said they had " n o " interest, and 4 percent did not respond. T h e highest (much/fairly) interest was among Spaniards who were left-political identifiers ( 6 7 % ) , aged 26 through 40 ( 5 4 % ) , and the upper class ( 5 8 % ) . T h e lowest interest (little/none) was among centrists ( 6 0 % ) , those older than 60 ( 6 1 % ) and the working class (58% ). 49 Switzerland's democracy and its referendum tradition were as old as Spain's democratic processes were new. In this context, the 1986 Swiss referendum on U N membership was less remarkable than Spain's N A T O vote. The Swiss had gone to the polls about every three months during 1985 to decide twelve different issues, ranging from electoral law to vivisection. It was not an unusual year. Eleven referendum questions were decided in 1984; the 1986 UN referendum was only the first of seven that year. Because of this constant round of referendums, the UN referendum was not the subject of the particular focus that often occurs in countries where referendums are less common. It was not, however, business as usual in Switzerland. The U N question carried the potential of a major shift in Swiss policy. In part for that reason, it did not share the ballot with another issue (it is common in Switzerland for several issues to be presented at the same time). That level of interest sparked considerable coverage of the issue, and in a country as highly educated as Switzerland and as extensively served by the media as it is, there was considerable debate and available information on both sides of the issue.

VOTER PARTICIPATION It is axiomatic that democratic government requires some citizen participation in the process of making choices. W e have also contended that democracy is enhanced by a high level of participation by all citizens eligible to vote. The third set of questions that structure this study concerns this issue

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of participation. It varied considerably among the five countries along lines that might b e expected given the level of interest discussed above. Participation also varied within countries. This occurred for a variety of reasons that related to the individual countries, but in greatest part it related to the classic variations by socioeconomic status ( S E S ) that numerous studies have found in numerous countries. T h e lack of interest by the French in the 1972 referendum and their recognition that the campaign was an attempt at political manipulation by President Pompidou was further evidenced by voting turnout. Several opposition parties, most notably the Socialists, urged abstention, and others recommended spoiling the ballots. T h e right-wing Ordre Nouveau, for example, suggested writing " Y e s to Europe, No to Pompidou" on the paper ballot. 50 Lack of interest, the voters' accurate sense of being manipulated, and the organized campaign to abstain or spoil ballots had their effect. Nearly half the electorate (47.6% ) did not participate, of which 11.5 million abstained and 2 million cast spoiled ballots. This contrasts with the approximate 75 percent turnout for the 1968 and 1973 general elections, and both the referendum's abstention rate ( 3 9 . 5 % ) and the spoiled ballot rate ( 7 . 1 % ) were the highest in French electoral history, encompassing both general elections and referendums. Claude Leleu's analysis of voter turnout indicates that the exceptionally low level of participation was only somewhat related to the left parties' call to abstain from the election. T h e r e is evidence that Communist party supporters heeded their party's call, but voters identifying with the Socialist party did not especially do so. Instead, according to Leleu, "correlations all point in the same direction . . . non-participation stemfmed] more from the indifference which affected all the political groups than from the role played by the Socialist party." 5 1 What Leleu's argument misses, however, is that the referendum was widely reported by the press and understood by the public to b e a partisan political ploy by Pompidou. T h e r e f o r e , the lack of interest of many French citizens showed a fair amount of political savvy, not deplorable inertia. T h e Irish were as enthusiastic as the French were blasé. This is surprising given the lopsided campaign and the fact that a promarket victory was never in doubt. T h e 70.9 percent voter turnout was the highest for any Irish referendum, but it was about 4 percent lower than the previous, 1969 general election turnout. Norwegian voters also exhibited a high level of interest in the E E C issue, with 29 percent describing themselves as "very interested." T h e 79.2 percent voting turnout was also very high, although a few percentage points below the 1 9 6 5 , 1 9 6 9 , and 1973 general elections. T h e social demographics of Norwegian voting participation conformed to the pattern found for many countries by many studies: lower

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S E S groups were "less interested in the issue, [knew] less about [it], . . . [had] less access to some important channels of information . . . [and had] less confidence in [their] knowledge about the issue." 52 Rating S E S from 0 (low) to 8 (high), for example, only 12.3 percent of those in the lowest three S E S groups expressed high interest. B y contrast, the highest three S E S groups had a high interest average of 55.7 percent. Of the low group, 47.7 percent had heard of the government's information pamphlets; 90 percent of the high groups had. O f the low group, 28.7 percent felt competent to take a position on the issue compared to 53 percent of the high group. It would have been reasonable to predict that this demographic pattern of knowledge and interest would favor a promembership vote in Norway, since higher S E S groups supported membership and lower S E S groups were opposed. Also, membership was perceived as a particular threat by fishing communities, which tended to be on the lower S E S periphery. That, accelerated by the high level of consensus in these communities, heightened interest and participation in them. B y contrast, more evenly divided communities, such as urban, industrialized centers, had something of a voting drop-off. 53 The keen interest of Danes in the referendum was further demonstrated by the extraordinary turnout of 90.1 percent, the highest level in Danish history. Analysis of participation in the Danish referendum indicates that, as could be expected, turnout was affected by social status. 54 This was only marginal, however, and while metropolitan Copenhagen had a lower turnout than rural areas, at 88.9 percent it was only slightly lower than the national average or the vote in any of the other major areas (excluding Greenland). Copenhagen narrowly voted against membership, and that position was strongest in working-class constituencies. But given the high turnout everywhere and the easy victory for membership, even a 100 percent turnout in Copenhagen would have only slightly changed the margin, not the result. British interest stood between the highs of Scandinavia and Ireland and the low of France. On referendum day in June 1975, 64.5 percent of eligible Britons cast ballots. It was a lower turnout than for any national election after World War II. B y comparison, the preceding parliamentary election in October 1974 had occasioned a turnout of 72.8 percent. Still, the voting level was higher than that in many other stable democratic countries, such as the United States. In Great Britain, as in the other countries holding E E C referendums, participation was affected by S E S status. One poll that grouped probable voting according to three S E S groupings found that 72 percent of the highest group, 64 percent of the middle group, and only 58 percent of the lowest group were likely to vote. 55 The age factor was also typical, with middle-age voters going to the polls more than the young and the old, and

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m e n w e r e m o r e apt to vote t h a n w o m e n (68 t o 65 p e r c e n t ) . A n o t h e r analysis indicated a relationship b e t w e e n t u r n o u t a n d t h e p e r c e n t a g e of m a n u a l laborers in a district or area, with a 2 o r 3 p e r c e n t t u r n o u t variation a t t r i b u t a b l e t o this factor. This was also r e l a t e d t o t h e drop-off f r o m t h e 1974 general election, with working-class a r e a s having an e v e n m o r e significant vote decline t h a n areas with h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e s of professional a n d white-collar workers. Participation in Spain's N A T O r e f e r e n d u m was lower t h a n in any of the E E C r e f e r e n d u m s e x c e p t F r a n c e ' s . T h e 59.4 p e r c e n t t u r n o u t was also low by Spanish s t a n d a r d s . T h e 40.6 p e r c e n t abstention r a t e was t h e highest in any n a t i o n a l election t o t h a t time. A n o t h e r 6.5 p e r c e n t of the votes w e r e b l a n k . I n s o f a r as t h e s e b l a n k votes w e r e political statements, which most were, this would increase abstention to 44.5 percent. E v e n the 40.6 figure was 20 points higher t h a n abstentions in the 1982 general election and 8 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n in t h e 1978 r e f e r e n d u m on the constitution. O n e ramification is that while c o n t i n u e d N A T O m e m b e r s h i p was s u p p o r t e d by 52.6 p e r c e n t of t h o s e w h o v o t e d (with 39.8 p e r c e n t against, 6.5 p e r c e n t b l a n k , a n d 1.1 p e r c e n t spoiled), overall less than a third of the eligible e l e c t o r a t e v o t e d for N A T O . Mitigating the image of Spanish d e m o c r a t i c lethargy is the fact that p a r t of the low t u r n o u t resulted f r o m t h e a b s t e n t i o n calls by the conservative parties. Surveys showed that b o t h s u p p o r t f o r having a r e f e r e n d u m a n d expressed interest in the results w e r e m u c h lower o n t h e right t h a n on t h e left. F u r t h e r m o r e , the intention to abstain was m u c h m o r e p r e v a l e n t on the right. W h e n asked w h e t h e r abstaining was a responsible position, 47 percent of the right identifiers said yes; only 18 p e r c e n t of the left identifiers agreed. 5 6 A n o t h e r study r e p o r t e d that b e t w e e n a third and a half of 1982 C P - U C D voters said they i n t e n d e d to abstain. 5 7 T h e p a t t e r n of voting reflected this politically m o t i v a t e d lack of interest and participation. A b s t e n t i o n i s m was highest in a r e a s w h e r e the conservatives had the greatest electoral strength. T h e r e was also a strong correlation (0.62) b e t w e e n the level of b l a n k v o t e s and conservative strength in electoral areas, which indicates that a significant n u m b e r of blank votes were acts of abstention r a t h e r t h a n indications of ambivalence. 58 Voting participation was r e a s o n a b l y e v e n across t h e country, alt h o u g h t h e r e w e r e a few areas of very low t u r n o u t . T h e r e was s o m e relationship b e t w e e n t u r n o u t and result. Of t h e fifty-six geographic voting areas, eight had t u r n o u t s 5 p e r c e n t o r less t h a n t h e n a t i o n a l average. All of these areas voted yes. Twelve of t h e voting a r e a s h a d t u r n o u t s 5 p e r c e n t o r m o r e above the national average. W h e t h e r high t u r n o u t h a d an impact o n o u t c o m e d e p e n d s on interpretation. Six of t h e t h i r t e e n areas that voted n o had high turnouts; b u t of t h e twelve h i g h - t u r n o u t areas, six v o t e d yes a n d six voted no. T h e blank vote factor a d d s a n o t h e r complexity t o t h e analysis. E l e v e n areas c o u n t e d blank votes that e x c e e d e d 10 p e r c e n t of

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the ballots cast. All of these areas voted yes. The three areas with less than 3 percent blank ballots all voted no, and the thirteen areas that voted no averaged 4.7 percent blank votes, 1.8 percent below the national average. If the blank vote was added to the nonvote, this would again tend to indicate that the abstention strategy (low turnout/blank vote) favored the status quo. 59 There was no thought of politically motivated abstention or casting of blank ballots in Switzerland. The U N membership issue had the portent of a major change in Swiss foreign policy, and it occasioned considerable interest in the country. The turnout of 2.10 million Swiss voters was just below the record turnout of 2.14 million in February 1984 referendums and was more than 600,000 higher (40%) than the average referendum turnouts the previous year. This is particularly impressive in light of the feeling in the press that the public had wearied of the long-contemplated U N referendum and given the fact that polls showed that the referendum would certainly be defeated. Still, in a country that sometimes seems sated on voting, the relatively high turnout amounted to just over half (50.7%) of the eligible voters. But it is also true that this was almost 2 percent higher than the preceding and next general elections in 1983 and 1987. Turnout in the various cantons ranged significantly from a high of 75.5 percent to a low of 36.4 percent. Turnout was higher than the national average in almost all the German-speaking cantons, while French and Italian-speaking cantons averaged less than a 45 percent turnout.

DETERMINANTS OF VICTORY The crux of any referendum is, of course, the decision of the electorate, and this section examines this crucial factor. It will become evident that a wide range of cues, including nationalism, group/voter self-interest, the positions of parties and political leaders, the stance of the media, and interest group funding all play a role. These roles varied considerably, however, among the five referendums that addressed E E C membership. In France, partisanship was a key factor in the vote. President Pompidou never quite risked turning the referendum into a personal vote of confidence as President de Gaulle regularly had. Still, Pompidou cast it in terms broader than the immediate issue. Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schuman announced that if the referendum question was "disapproved by the people, it is up to them to designate another president, and we shall have another government." 6 0 Also, Pompidou asserted that the referendum vote was tantamount to an electoral test of his entire European policy. Leleu's analysis indicates that the low turnout did not affect the outcome. With the government strongly supporting a yes vote, with the

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m a j o r right a n d c e n t e r parties holding t h a t position, a n d with m o s t of business a n d t h e m e d i a also urging yes, t h e r e was little d o u b t a b o u t t h e o u t c o m e of t h e campaign. 6 1 T h e Irish c a m p a i g n was e v e n m o r e one-sided t h a n F r a n c e ' s . I n d e e d , it was so lopsided that it is h a r d t o imagine Irish voters making any decision o t h e r t h a n endorsing m e m b e r s h i p in the E E C . T h e g o v e r n m e n t strongly e n d o r s e d a n d c a m p a i g n e d f o r m e m b e r s h i p , and of t h e 144 m e m b e r s of t h e Dail ( t h e Irish p a r l i a m e n t ) , t h e seventy-five w h o w e r e m e m b e r s of t h e F i a n n a Fail ( t h e g o v e r n m e n t p a r t y ) a n d t h e fifty-two w h o w e r e m e m b e r s of t h e m a i n opposition F i n e G a e l p a r t y s u p p o r t e d m e m b e r s h i p . O n l y t h e relatively small ( s e v e n t e e n M P s ) L a b o u r p a r t y o p p o s e d m e m b e r s h i p . This was b a s e d on t h e a n t i m e m b e r s h i p position of t h e 350,000-worker-strong Irish T r a d e U n i o n Congress, and, most particularly, its m e m b e r union, the Irish T r a n s p o r t and G e n e r a l W o r k e r s U n i o n , with 150,000 m e m b e r s . T h e o t h e r n o t a b l e a n t i m e m b e r s h i p g r o u p consisted of small f a r m e r s in W e s t Ireland, w h o w e r e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t m a r kets in the E E C . T h e coalition standing b e h i n d m e m b e r s h i p was m u c h m o r e p o w e r f u l . In addition t o the g o v e r n m e n t a n d m a j o r political parties, virtually all of business a n d industry f a v o r e d m e m b e r s h i p , a n d this h e l p e d t h e p r o m e m b e r s h i p f o r c e s outraise a n d o u t s p e n d their o p p o n e n t s by ten to one. T h e m e d i a also f a v o r e d joining t h e E E C . G o v e r n m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d television was n e u t r a l , b u t all six n a t i o n a l n e w s p a p e r s e n d o r s e d m e m b e r s h i p . T h e issues in Ireland, and in t h e rest of t h e c o u n t r i e s c o n d u c t i n g r e f e r e n d u m s o n t h e E E C , t e n d e d to h a v e a d o m e s t i c slant. T h e r e w e r e several issues that could h a v e spelled trouble f o r m e m b e r s h i p . W i t h 7 p e r c e n t u n e m p l o y m e n t , t h e r e was concern a b o u t t h e f a t e of such laborintensive a n d static or declining industries as textiles a n d leather. Agricultural and fisheries competition c r e a t e d o t h e r worries. T h e possible sale of land to f o r e i g n e r s and t h e f e a r of f r e e immigration, especially f r o m Italy, t o u c h e d nationalist as well as e c o n o m i c sensibilities. T h e o p p o s i t i o n also a r g u e d t h a t joining E u r o p e would inevitably c o m p r o m i s e Irish neutrality and lead t o N A T O involvement a n d foreign wars. Finally, as in all c o u n tries, the opposition m a i n t a i n e d that m e m b e r s h i p would m e a n loss of Irish sovereignty. T h e s e messages never p e r s u a d e d the bulk of Irish voters. P a r t of this failure was b e c a u s e the a n t i m e m b e r s h i p forces h a d scant f u n d s to air their view. T h e i r campaign also was so lacking in g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n , s t r o n g speakers, a n d persuasive slogans that t h e public t e n d e d t o associate t h e antis with " t h e subversive label of militant and violent r e p u b l i c a n i s m I n d e e d it was almost impossible t o coalesce t h e o p p o n e n t s w h o , in the public eye, s e e m e d t o b e d o m i n a t e d by mavericks a n d nutcases." 6 2 T h e p r o m e m b e r s h i p forces, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , w a g e d a skilled c a m paign. Individual groups, such as f a r m e r s and f i s h e r m e n , w e r e t a r g e t e d

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with messages t h a t specifically a d d r e s s e d their concerns. T h e g o v e r n m e n t f u r t h e r e a s e d f e a r s by including specific clauses in t h e m e m b e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t that mitigated o r e x t e n d e d t h e impact m e m b e r s h i p w o u l d h a v e b e y o n d a transitional period. M o s t analysts view N o r w a y ' s r e f e r e n d u m as a c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y struggle with a p e r i p h e r y victory. Hellevik a n d Gleditsch a r g u e t h a t d e s p i t e s o m e party influence, " t h e conflict over t h e E E C issue was a conflict b e t w e e n c e n t e r a n d p e r i p h e r y . " T h e y c o n t e n d that " t h e E E C [was] a n e w idea that h a d n o t yet p e n e t r a t e d to t h e p e r i p h e r y , " and " m e m b e r s h i p in t h e E E C was in t h e interest of the m o r e p o w e r f u l , the b e t t e r e d u c a t e d , [and o t h e r elite groups]." Yet, despite t h e fact that most Storting m e m bers, business leaders, t h e press, and o t h e r opinion leaders f a v o r e d m e m bership, polls d u r i n g t h e year leading u p t o t h e S e p t e m b e r 1972 v o t e s h o w e d that a m a j o r i t y of N o r w e g i a n s consistently o p p o s e d m e m b e r s h i p . T h e n o votes declined f r o m a r o u n d 70 p e r c e n t in late 1971 t o 53.5 p e r c e n t in t h e actual vote, b u t t h e elite message was n e v e r able to o v e r c o m e t h e bases of opposition. This elite-mass split led Hellevik and Gleditsch t o conclude t h a t the r e f e r e n d u m was " e x t r a o r d i n a r y " b e c a u s e of " t h e resist a n c e of public opinion t o [the] shift in t h e direction of the political leaders w h e n these a n n o u n c e d their position and pressed for s u p p o r t [of m e m b e r ship]." 6 3 T h e c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y dimension can b e seen, and m e m b e r s h i p was rejected in p a r t b e c a u s e a n t i m e m b e r s h i p p r e f e r e n c e s d o m i n a t e d lower S E S groups. A study t h a t divided voters into nine S E S g r o u p s f o u n d t h a t voters in t h e lowest t h r e e (26.6 p e r c e n t of t h e s a m p l e ) r e j e c t e d m e m b e r ship by an absolute majority, and t h e middle t h r e e (57.8 p e r c e n t of t h e s a m p l e ) rejected m e m b e r s h i p by plurality (with " d o n ' t k n o w " holding t h e balance). Only in the highest t h r e e S E S groups, comprising only 15.8 p e r c e n t of t h e sample, did the p r o m e m b e r s h i p position c o m m a n d an absolute majority. 6 4 E d u c a t i o n h a d a m e d i u m impact; e c o n o m i c status indicators w e r e stronger. T h e c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y split (and the impact of parochial concerns) was also evident in N o r w e g i a n s ' r e a s o n s for favoring o r o p p o s i n g m e m b e r s h i p . Of t h o s e w h o s u p p o r t e d m e m b e r s h i p , the m o s t p r e v a l e n t reasons cited ( 4 8 % ) w e r e such cosmopolitan explanations as it was g o o d to favor "a u n i t e d E u r o p e " o r that it would p r o m o t e " p e a c e in E u r o p e . " A n o t h e r 41 p e r c e n t m e n t i o n e d e c o n o m i c advantages, such as secure e m p l o y m e n t , t o explain their s u p p o r t of m e m b e r s h i p . T h e a n t i m e m b e r ship reasoning was m o r e diverse. A b o u t half explained that m e m b e r s h i p would b e b a d for t h e m economically, with a negative impact on f a r m i n g and fishing s e e n as t h e most t h r e a t e n i n g . A n o t h e r 40 p e r c e n t gave generally parochial answers such as fearing t h e loss of sovereignty, general p r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e status quo, or f e a r of c h a n g e or strangers. 6 5 T h e p a t t e r n of v o t e r attitudes a n d decisionmaking in D e n m a r k in

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many ways resembled Norway's, although the results were markedly different. As in Norway, the struggle occurred along a center-periphery dimension. Most of Denmark's trade and industrial leaders favored membership, and that was reflected in the solid support of the more conservative parties. Trade unions were opposed, although this did not reflect clearly in the moderate Social Democrat party leadership, most of whom favored membership. The farthest-left party in the Folketing, the Socialist People's party, strongly opposed membership. Danish farmers and fishermen, who were more confident than their Norwegian counterparts of their ability to compete in the larger market, favored membership. The center-periphery pattern was also generally evident in voters' positions. Elklit and Petersen's SES analysis yielded expected results. 66 For example, there was a marked decline in support as one moved from employers to while collar workers to blue collar workers. In Denmark, however, geographical support was nearly the reverse of the pattern in Norway. The areas farthest from Copenhagen were the most favorable, largely because of the support of agriculture and fishing and because of the large, antimembership industrial class in Copenhagen. The distribution of arguments in the Danish electorate for and against membership also had some parallels to the patterns in Norway and elsewhere. Proponents most often (32%) cited economic reasons for joining, arguing that it would mean greater prosperity. Strong messages from commercial and governmental supporters urged this view. Secondarily, supporters cited specific (self-centered) interests (13%) and ideological concerns (14%), such as the ideal of a united Europe. Opponents, by contrast, most often (35%) cited the loss of sovereignty as the basis of their opposition. Secondarily, they argued that the country would suffer economically (15%), or they held ideological views (11%), such as concern about the bourgeois nature of the EEC. 67 Several scholars also carefully studied the pattern of opinion formation by studying pro and con arguments in the Folketing and among the electorate. 68 They agree that party position, party identification, and referendum voting decisions were strongly linked. This included, according to one analysis, an intricate pattern of mutual influence that paralleled "the more idealized models of opinion-policy relationships in democratic societies" and indicated the voters were not simply following elite cues.69 Voting patterns in the British referendum generally resembled the patterns found in Ireland, Norway, and Denmark. Political position (leftright) and party identification were important; center-periphery/SES status was also a key variable. There were differences, however. Political position was a bit more important and social position a bit less important in Britain than in the other countries. This may well have stemmed in part from two factors. First, the British were voting on the status quo, whether or not to remain in the EEC; Irish, Norwegian, and Danish voters were

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deciding o n change, w h e t h e r or n o t t o join t h e E E C . Second, British voters w e r e m o r e a p a t h e t i c on t h e E E C issue, a n d a smaller p e r c e n t a g e v o t e d t h a n in any of t h e o t h e r t h r e e countries. Since they w e r e m o r e a p a t h e t i c a n d lacked s t r o n g views, British v o t e r s w e r e m o r e o p e n t o cues f r o m t h e i r parties, political leaders, a n d o t h e r elites. A s a result, British opinion o n t h e E E C issue was relatively stable d u r i n g t h e t h r e e m o n t h s of t h e "official" campaign. O n c e t h e new, r e n e g o t i a t e d t e r m s w e r e a n n o u n c e d a n d t h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e a n d Liberal p a r t i e s e n d o r s e d c o n t i n u e d m e m b e r s h i p , public o p i n i o n a b o u t t h e E E C imp r o v e d dramatically t o s o m e w h e r e n e a r t h e final margin, a l t h o u g h s o m e p r o - E E C m o v e m e n t (5 t o 8 percent, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e poll) did occur between March and June. Several studies h a v e highlighted the i m p o r t a n c e of elite political cues. Business executives, for example, overwhelmingly ( 9 5 % ) favored continu e d m e m b e r s h i p , a n d 73 p e r c e n t believed their business would b e h a r m e d if G r e a t Britain quit t h e E E C . T h e s e attitudes w e r e widely disseminated to the British public through media reporting and through the p r o m a r k e t e e r ' s extensive public relations c a m p a i g n , a n d they h a d their i n t e n d e d effect. Political ideology also played a role in v o t e r position. A s an overall p r o p o s i t i o n , left to right self-categorization h a d a s t r o n g relationship t o o p i n i o n o n t h e E E C , with an increasing right o r i e n t a t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g closely to a p r o p e n s i t y to favor c o n t i n u e d membership. 7 0 T h e impact of t h e political parties was even m o r e i m p o r t a n t . In t e r m s of specific party identification, o n e analysis concluded that " o v e r the years only small minorities of voters h a v e stayed c o n s t a n t in their s u p p o r t for o r opposition to... m e m b e r s h i p . T h e great majority c h a n g e d sides d e p e n d ing o n t h e position of their own a n d the o t h e r parties." 7 1 A s might b e e x p e c t e d given this view, p r o m e m b e r s h i p o p i n i o n (omitting undecided r e s p o n d e n t s ) of the t w o parties (Conservatives, Liberals) w h o s e leaders solidly f a v o r e d t h e E E C was 87 p e r c e n t a n d 70 p e r c e n t , respectively; identifiers with the divided-leadership L a b o u r p a r t y f a v o r e d m e m b e r s h i p by a n a r r o w e r 60 p e r c e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , only 6 p e r c e n t of Conservative voters a n d 7 p e r c e n t of Liberal voters w e r e u n d e c i d e d a w e e k b e f o r e the election. T h i r t e e n p e r c e n t of L a b o u r voters w e r e u n d e c i d e d and thus m o r e likely to sit out t h e r e f e r e n d u m . 7 2 T h e i m p o r t a n c e of partisanship did n o t n e g a t e , h o w e v e r , the important a n d related impact of socioeconomic a n d c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y status. Bristow, for e x a m p l e , f o u n d partisanship t o b e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t index, b u t h e also f o u n d strong correlations b e t w e e n a district's industrialization and (lack o f ) wealth a n d its p e r c e n t a g e of n o votes. 73 O t h e r studies confirm age, class, g e n d e r , a n d r e l a t e d d e m o g r a p h i c p a t t e r n s f o u n d in t h e o t h e r E E C r e f e r e n d u m s . 7 4 In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e w a s e v i d e n c e of g e o g r a p h i c a l

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center-periphery impact. T h e percentage of p r o m a r k e t votes was less in Wales than in England and even less in Scotland and N o r t h e r n Ireland. E v e n within England, the p r o - E E C vote declined as o n e moved outward f r o m the south, through the Midlands, to northern England. T h e specific issues that concerned British voters were akin to those that were on the minds of Irish, Norwegian, and Danish voters. A s true elsewhere, economics was the leading concern of p r o m a r k e t voters, but, somewhat differently, few British voters in this category were concerned with ideological issues, such as a united E u r o p e . Because G r e a t Britain was already in the E E C , the tendency of uncertain or apathetic voters to favor the status quo worked in favor of staying in a m o n g the British, with a b o u t 20 percent citing this reasoning. A bit more than in other countries, economics also dominated antimarket thinking in G r e a t Britain, with rising food prices the particular focus. Nationalism and tradition also were important factors, with 27 percent of a n t i - E E C voters arguing that continued membership meant a loss of independence, and a n o t h e r 14 percent worried about a decline in C o m m o n w e a l t h ties. 75 T h e r e f e r e n d u m in Spain demonstrated yet again that voters merge domestic and international policy concerns together when making decisions. It may be, as one purist argued, that "a vital question of international alignment ought to have involved an argument based on principle: the defense of liberty against a Soviet threat." 7 6 That was not the argument of N A T O proponents, however. Instead, Prime Minister González and others urged Spaniards to vote yes based on a range of economic, nationalist, partisan, and emotional arguments. T h e desire for economic prosperity and the desire to end the isolation of the Franco era combined to create m o m e n t u m t o join the E C . T h e r e was never a formal link between E C and N A T O membership, but González contended that Spain's admission to the E C was directly tied to the p e r m a n e n c e of Spain in N A T O . Spain joined the E C on J a n u a r y 1, 1986, and Foreign Minister Francisco F e r n á n d e z O r d ó ñ e z said that if the N A T O vote on March 12 was no, Spain might either have to pull out of the E C or become a "second-rate" partner. 7 7 Much of Spain's business community endorsed the view that economic prosperity and N A T O were connected. T h e largest banks, for example, joined in a formal statement urging a yes vote, thereby putting some of the country's most conservative capitalists squarely in a political alliance with the socialists. Many Spanish voters were persuaded by this united front. While only 40 percent thought that joining N A T O would benefit the country's defense, 54 percent believed that it would improve relations with the EC. 7 8 T h e fact that the N A T O and E C memberships were not truly interd e p e n d e n t led some to criticize the government for stampeding the public. Cambio 16 editorialized that the contention by the foreign minister was

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"totally u n a c c e p t a b l e , " as was t h e implication that " b y rejecting N A T O w e will e n d u p back at t h e stage of primitive string sandals and h o r s e transport T h e P S O E won the r e f e r e n d u m with t h e votes of frail old-age p e n s i o n e r s f r i g h t e n e d o u t of their wits." 79 G o n z á l e z was also able to play on Spanish e m o t i o n s o v e r t h e U.S. military bases in the country. T h e simmering r e s e n t m e n t in Spain o v e r t h e bases boiled u p during a M a y 1985 visit by P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n . Close t o a million p e o p l e joined in antibase d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in m o s t of Spain's m a j o r cities. T h e a n t i - N A T O faction tried t o capitalize on t h e s e s e n t i m e n t s by linking R e a g a n ' s anticommunist h a r d line, the U.S. b a s e s in Spain, a n d N A T O by arguing that joining N A T O increased t h e d a n g e r of n u c l e a r destruction. Leftists also charged that t h e U n i t e d States d o m i n a t e d N A T O . T h e r e f o r e , m e m b e r s h i p was, in the estimation of the leftist l e a d e r in B a r c e l o n a , t h e "main proof that we a r e a province of t h e „80

empire. G o n z á l e z o u t m a n e u v e r e d the left, however. T h e language in t h e r e f e r e n d u m barring nuclear w e a p o n s f r o m Spanish territory arguably r e d u c e d t h e c h a n c e that Spain would b e subjected t o a Soviet missile b a r r a g e . Second, the r e f e r e n d u m clause a b o u t reducing the U.S. military p r e s e n c e m a d e a yes vote a ballot in favor of f e w e r A m e r i c a n s a n d t h e i r weapons, while a n o vote seemingly supported the Yanqui status quo. F e w S p a n i a r d s f a v o r e d that. Playing on that sentiment a n d again c o o p t i n g o n e of the left's m a i n issues, t h e p r i m e minister argued t h a t joining N A T O would m a k e M a d r i d less d e p e n d e n t on Washington, t h e r e b y s t r e n g t h e n ing Spain's position to force a reduction of the U.S. military presence. Political stability in Spain was a third i m p o r t a n t issue. T h e r e had b e e n an a t t e m p t e d military c o u p five years earlier. T h a t led m a n y Spanish c o m m e n t a t o r s t o argue that " t o put a s t o p . . . to t h e military's toying with t h e internal affairs, the g o v e r n m e n t must give t h e m a toy to play with that will t u r n their minds o u t w a r d . " N A T O was the " t o y . " It would give Spanish officers an external focus and might also h a v e the salutary e f f e c t t h r o u g h " c o n t a c t with the non-political officers of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s " and t h r o u g h "technical m o d e r n i z a t i o n " of fostering "a steady increase in [the] professionalism" of Spain's officers. 8 1 R e l a t e d to this concern, b u t m o r e general and m o r e i m p o r t a n t , was t h e f u t u r e of t h e political system in Spain. M a n y S p a n i a r d s f e a r e d that the conservatives h a r b o r e d desires, perhaps in league with t h e military, to end Spain's democracy. M a n u e l F r a g a and his A P and o t h e r right-of-center parties were t h e main alternative to González and t h e P S O E g o v e r n m e n t , a n d the p r i m e minister was able t o play on the suspicions of t h e right by m a k i n g the r e f e r e n d u m a tacit vote of confidence in his g o v e r n m e n t . This ploy raised t h e specter that a n o vote would bring F r a g a to p o w e r . G o n z á l e z only h i n t e d t h a t h e would resign a n d call e l e c t i o n s if con-

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t i n u e d m e m b e r s h i p was rejected, but o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t officials explicitly m a d e that s t a t e m e n t . G o n z á l e z himself left little d o u b t , t h o u g h , a n d in his televised speech just p r i o r to the vote h e m e n t i o n e d N A T O only twice, stressing instead p e a c e a n d warning darkly of "political instability." 8 2 T h e result of this line of a r g u m e n t , Javier P é r e z R o y o c o m m e n t s , was t h a t t h e r e f e r e n d u m "lost t h e character of a r e f e r e n d u m a n d b e c a m e , for all practical p u r p o s e s , a general vote of c o n f i d e n c e on t h e c o n d u c t of t h e Socialist government." 8 3 T h e strategy of introducing a v o t e - o f - c o n f i d e n c e e l e m e n t into t h e issues was effective. P S O E loyalists, whose ideology disposed t h e m t o vote n o , o v e r w h e l m i n g decided to support c o n t i n u e d m e m b e r s h i p in N A T O a n d t o v o t e yes in o r d e r not to u n d e r m i n e t h e G o n z á l e z g o v e r n m e n t . A n early poll s h o w e d less t h a n half of all leftist identifiers in f a v o r of staying in N A T O along the t e r m s of the r e f e r e n d u m ' s wording. 8 4 T h e c a m p a i g n c h a n g e d the opinion of m u c h of the left a n d center-left, h o w e v e r , a n d in t h e v o t e t h e r e was a high (0.93) correlation b e t w e e n t h e voting a r e a s t r e n g t h of the P S O E in the 1982 general election a n d t h e yes vote in 1986. 85 In addition to these t h r e e m a j o r a r g u m e n t s , the g o v e r n m e n t fielded a host of others, mainly designed to play on Spanish insecurities. T h e g o v e r n m e n t argued that as a m e m b e r of N A T O it would h a v e m o r e leverage t o get G r e a t Britain out of G i b r a l t a r . S o m e a r g u e d that t h e N A T O connection and a modernized military would h e l p Spain retain t h e colonial cities of C e u t a and Melilla, which are inside M o r o c c o . O t h e r N A T O advocates hinted that Barcelona would lose its bid f o r the 1992 s u m m e r O l y m p i c g a m e s and that the plans for a W o r l d ' s Fair in Seville would b e canceled if the vote was no on N A T O . A s o n e opposition l e a d e r l a m e n t e d , the g o v e r n m e n t "warned us of everything except an invasion of A I D S . " 8 6 T h e n o vote was scattered. Several of t h e voting a r e a s w h e r e t h e r e was a m a j o r i t y or plurality were a u t o n o m o u s regions with separatist s e n t i m e n t s , and the n o voting was m o r e an expression of a n t i g o v e r n m e n t s e n t i m e n t t h a n a reflection of opinion on t h e N A T O alliance. T h e r e was also a s t r o n g e r n o vote in areas such as B a r c e l o n a , w h e r e the parties t o the left of the P S O E , such as the communists, w e r e strongest. A n estim a t e d o n e - t h i r d of b o t h P S O E and A P and o t h e r conservative party identifiers also voted no. T h e m e d i a explained that the vote o u t c o m e also resulted b e c a u s e of the public's f e a r that the proposition would lose and b e c a u s e of G o n z á l e z ' s high p e r s o n a l popularity with voters. 87 Ironically, that f e a r was caused by almost universally inaccurate polls showing that alliance m e m b e r s h i p would b e d e f e a t e d . El País, La Vanguardia, Diario 16, a n d o t h e r n a t i o n a l m e d i a s o u r c e s p r e d i c t e d the n o votes w o u l d carry t h e d a y b y u p t o 11

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p e r c e n t . T h e s e polls b o t h s p u r r e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o its strong final-week efforts, u r g e d yes voters t o get t o t h e polls, a n d convinced abstainers that staying h o m e might h a v e a real impact. O n e study declared itself "conv i n c e d " t h a t t h e negative polls w e r e "a decisive influence in helping t h e g o v e r n m e n t win t h e r e f e r e n d u m . O r t o say this a n o t h e r way: if it h a v e n o t b e e n f o r t h e polls, t h e n o ' s would h a v e won." 8 8 T h e Swiss d e b a t e o n U N m e m b e r s h i p m o r e clearly focused on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l ramifications of t h e r e f e r e n d u m q u e s t i o n t h a n did t h e d e b a t e s in t h e E u r o p e a n E E C and N A T O r e f e r e n d u m s . L i k e t h e others, though, t h e issue in Switzerland c o n t a i n e d i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s of d o m e s tic political considerations. T h e r e w e r e t h r e e m a i n issues of d e b a t e : traditional Swiss neutrality, the b e n e f i t s of U N m e m b e r s h i p , and p u r p o r t e d p o w e r - g r a b b i n g by t h e Swiss central g o v e r n m e n t . G i v e n t h e lopsided rejection of U N m e m b e r s h i p , it is t e m p t i n g t o write off the c a m p a i g n as an exercise in futility, b u t that was n o t u n a l t e r a b l y t h e case. In t h e first place, t h e vote in Switzerland did n o t reflect, at least to t h e Swiss, an isolationist stand. A poll t a k e n a f t e r t h e r e f e r e n d u m f o u n d that two-thirds of all Swiss f a v o r e d an active international role. F u r t h e r m o r e , Swiss opinion on U N m e m b e r s h i p h a d swung widely. A s late as 1979,60 p e r c e n t of Swiss f a v o r e d m e m b e r s h i p . T h a t declined t o 35 p e r c e n t in mid-1985, with 38 p e r c e n t o p p o s e d and 27 p e r c e n t u n d e c i d e d . Thus, t h e f a t e of m e m b e r s h i p and, even m o r e , the margin h u n g in t h e b a l a n c e as the campaign b e g a n . Swiss neutrality was first a d o p t e d in t h e early 1500s as a p r a g m a t i c m e a s u r e a f t e r a decisive d e f e a t by F r a n c e . B u t like m a n y old ideas, it has t a k e n on t h e p a t i n a of ideological doctrine. M e m b e r s h i p p r o p o n e n t s a r g u e d that neutrality and isolationism w e r e d i f f e r e n t , and that continued refusal by Switzerland to join the U n i t e d N a t i o n s left the c o u n t r y at risk of being outside t h e m a i n s t r e a m of international interchange. O p p o n e n t s a r g u e d that U N m e m b e r s h i p would e n d Swiss neutrality by requiring it to participate in U N - m a n d a t e d e c o n o m i c sanctions and p e r h a p s even military p e a c e k e e p i n g actions. O p p o n e n t s f u r t h e r c o n t e n d e d that t h e e n d of neutrality would d e t r a c t f r o m Switzerland's i m p o r t a n t roles as neutral m e d i a t o r , h o m e of m a n y international organizations, and host to f r e q u e n t bilateral and multilateral diplomatic negotiations. O p p o n e n t s also capitalized on p r o p o n e n t s ' inability t o cite tangible benefits of joining t h e U n i t e d Nations. T o the contrary, o p p o n e n t s argued that t h e w o r l d b o d y was i m p o t e n t a n d inefficient, that Swiss m e m b e r s h i p d u e s would b e high a n d wasted, a n d that Switzerland's o n e vote a m o n g 160 in the U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y would b e insignificant. T h e p o w e r of t h e central g o v e r n m e n t was also an issue. Switzerland is a strong f e d e r a l system, with considerable p o w e r residing in the cantons. T h e F e d e r a l Council waged an unusually strong e f f o r t to secure a yes vote

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to m e m b e r s h i p . T h a t backfired, h o w e v e r . T h e e f f o r t was widely criticized in t h e press as an e f f o r t t o p r o p a g a n d i z e , r a t h e r t h a n i n f o r m , voters. M o r e o v e r , critics charged that this was p a r t of a growing p a t t e r n a i m e d at increasing t h e p o w e r of B e r n at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e c a n t o n s a n d t h e sovereign p o w e r of t h e p e o p l e exercised t h r o u g h direct d e m o c r a c y . T h i s c a m e at a time w h e n t h e p e r c e n t a g e of Swiss expressing c o n f i d e n c e in t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t h a d p l u m m e t e d f r o m 58 p e r c e n t in 1977, t o 44 p e r c e n t in 1982, t o 38 p e r c e n t in 1986. I n s o f a r as t h e r e f e r e n d u m was a q u e s t i o n of f e d e r a l i s m a n d t h e locus of sovereignty, it was a c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y struggle like m a n y of t h e E E C r e f e r e n d u m s . A l o n g with N o r w a y ' s , t h e Swiss r e f e r e n d u m d e m o n s t r a t e d that t h e p e r i p h e r y s o m e t i m e s wins, especially w h e n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e status q u o . M o s t Swiss elites s u p p o r t e d m e m b e r s h i p . In addition t o t h e F e d e r a l Council, t h e t h r e e largest political parties (Socialist, R a d i c a l D e m o c r a t i c , and Christian D e m o c r a t i c ) s u p p o r t e d m e m b e r s h i p , as did t h e small C o m munist a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s ' Alliance parties. G r o u p s r e p r e s e n t i n g w o r k e r s , w o m e n , a n d s t u d e n t s generally f a v o r e d m e m b e r s h i p , b u t t h e n a t i o n a l business associations r e m a i n e d neutral. T h e P e o p l e ' s party was the only electorally significant p a r t y to u r g e a n o vote, a n d it was joined in that r e c o m m e n d a t i o n by t h e q u i t e small, b u t u p p e r - s t r a t a Liberal party. B u t the strongest o p p o s i t i o n was on t h e p e riphery. D e s p i t e t h e stand of the national parties, a b o u t half t h e c a n t o n level structures of the Radical D e m o c r a t i c a n d Christian D e m o c r a t i c parties o p p o s e d m e m b e r s h i p . T h e m o r e than 75 p e r c e n t margin against m e m b e r s h i p was so o v e r whelming t h a t voting analysis gives only limited insights, b u t they c o n f i r m the c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y n a t u r e of t h e campaign. T h e r e was also a left-right e l e m e n t in t h e vote split. All m a j o r d e m o g r a p h i c e l e m e n t s v o t e d n o except students; w o m e n a n d t h o s e with h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n h a d yes v o t e percentages a bit higher than the national average. W o r k e r s strongly v o t e d no, a n d 97 p e r c e n t of f a r m e r s were o p p o s e d . T h e strongest o p p o s i t i o n c a m e f r o m t h e c e n t e r and right. T w o - t h i r d s of all R a d i c a l D e m o c r a t a n d Christian D e m o c r a t identifiers ignored their national leaders a n d v o t e d no. T h e Socialist identifiers provided most of t h e yes votes, with 54 p e r c e n t of t h e m voting for m e m b e r s h i p . Eighty-six p e r c e n t of unaffiliated v o t e r s cast ballots against m e m b e r s h i p . Traditionalism played a strong role. T h e c a n t o n s t h a t f o r m e d t h e original f e d e r a t i o n in 1291 w e r e t h e most strongly o p p o s e d ; t h e small c a n t o n of J u r a created in 1978 was t h e only o n e t o h a v e m o r e t h a n 40 p e r c e n t of its voters f a v o r m e m b e r s h i p . Exit polls f o u n d that a m a j o r i t y of those w h o h a d voted n o explained their choice in t e r m s of f a v o r i n g c o n t i n u e d traditional neutrality a n d in t e r m s of s u p p o r t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l decentralized federalism. T h e a n t i m e m b e r s h i p v o t e r s also said they c o u l d

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see no benefits from joining the United Nations. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFERENDUMS

The final series of questions guiding this study address the long-term significance of referendums. An initial query is whether voters are prone to favor the status quo over change. Then we can ask whether the decisions, positive or negative, had a significant impact on the various countries' foreign policy. Last, we can examine other, domestic impacts of the campaigns. Departing from previous presentation in this chapter, we will address this issue concurrently, rather than on a country-by-country basis. Whether or not the status quo has the advantage can be easily answered in this case: it does not. In the five EEC-related referendums, "change" carried the day in three: France, Ireland, and Denmark. The status quo was just as clearly victorious in Norway. Great Britain presents a somewhat curious case. Membership in the EEC was clearly a break with British tradition, but the vote itself was about whether or not Great Britain would remain in the EEC, not if it would join. Furthermore, a significant number of voters voted for continued membership because it was the status quo. Therefore, the British referendum was a status quo victory, although, in a greater sense, it was part of a historic change in British orientations. The referendums also represented important foreign policy decisions. Under de Gaulle, France had stressed nationalism—withdrawing from the NATO military command and blocking the expansion of the EEC. The June 1972 vote was a symbol that under Pompidou, France was again open to expanded European integration. Ireland's yes to membership remains steadfast. There was a second Irish vote on membership in 1987 after passage of the EC's Single European Act (SEA), which mandated members to take full account of common policies in foreign and some domestic policy areas.89 There was concern among some Irish voters about domestic interference by the EC, but in the end the referendum passed by a wide 70 to 30 percent. Indeed, the outcome was so certain before the vote, that there was only a 44 percent turnout. The one no to the EEC, Norway's, remains in place nearly two decades later, although the historic forces now affecting Europe may someday reverse Norway's decision. Denmark's accession to the EEC/EC treaties and subsequent events offer an interesting example of the impact of the 1972 referendum, which carried by a 63 to 36 percent margin. During the following fourteen years, membership was not a significant issue in Danish politics, although some parliamentary debate continued because of various concerns by the leftof-center parties. The mid-1980s brought the issue to the fore again

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b e c a u s e of t h e S E A . E l e v e n of t h e twelve m e m b e r - c o u n t r y p a r l i a m e n t s ratified t h e act. I r e l a n d also held a constitutional r e f e r e n d u m , a n d D e n m a r k d e c i d e d t o h o l d a r e f e r e n d u m e v e n t h o u g h it was n o t r e q u i r e d . T h e details of t h e r e f e r e n d u m a r e b e y o n d o u r scope h e r e , b u t brief c o m m e n t a r y is relevant. 9 0 T h e r e f e r e n d u m was m u c h akin t o t h e 1972 e f f o r t . It w a s held b e c a u s e t h e coalition g o v e r n m e n t was shaky, a n d if t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d p u s h e d t h e issue it would h a v e failed in t h e Folketing. N e i t h e r a n e w election n o r r e o p e n i n g negotiations with t h e E C a p p e a l e d to the g o v e r n m e n t , so a r e f e r e n d u m was chosen. It was, t h e r e f o r e , a m a t t e r of picking t h e least u n w a n t e d option, r a t h e r t h a n a b u r s t of d e m o c r a t i c idealism, t h a t p r o m p t e d t h e 1986 r e f e r e n d u m . T h e c a m p a i g n a s s u m e d familiar outlines. T h e c e n t e r f a v o r e d m e m bership; t h e p e r i p h e r y o p p o s e d it. Business and p r o s p e r o u s f a r m e r s w e r e overwhelmingly in favor, a n d the p r o a m e n d m e n t f o r c e s o u t s p e n t o p p o nents t w o t o o n e . V o t i n g c o n f o r m e d to S E S p a t t e r n s . Male, middle-aged, and self-employed p e o p l e w e r e all strong yes voters; y o u n g and blue-collar D a n e s v o t e d no. T h e f a r t h e r right o n e w e n t along t h e p a r t i e s ' ideological s p e c t r u m , t h e g r e a t e r probability that t h e parties' identifiers would v o t e yes. P e r h a p s the most interesting aspect of the vote was the " r e a l " message of t h e voters. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l issue in the c a m p a i g n was n o t outright rejection o r a c c e p t a n c e of t h e E C , b u t w h e t h e r D e n m a r k ' s slide into increasing integration should continue. A b o u t 25 p e r c e n t of D a n i s h voters f a v o r e d g r e a t e r integration, 16 p e r c e n t w a n t e d t o get o u t of t h e E C , a n d 57 p e r c e n t f a v o r e d t h e status q u o . This last category split narrowly in favor of voting yes, b u t t h e final 56 t o 44 p e r c e n t margin of a p p r o v a l was m u c h n a r r o w e r t h a n in 1972. T h e British also r e m a i n s o m e w h a t unsettled a b o u t h o w E u r o p e a n they want t o b e c o m e . Polls indicate that e c o n o m i c ties a r e n o t q u e s t i o n e d . B u t British citizens are m u c h m o r e wary a b o u t increased political ties t h a n are citizens of t h e original six E E C countries. 9 1 F r o m a slightly d i f f e r e n t perspective, 71 p e r c e n t of B r i t o n s say they h a v e " n e v e r t h o u g h t of t h e m selves as E u r o p e a n s , " again the greatest margin in any E C country. 9 2 F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e Conservative party u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p of P r i m e Minister M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r was quite cautious a b o u t t h e political ramifications of E u r o p e 1992. This o r i e n t a t i o n c h a n g e d s o m e w h a t with t h e succession of J o h n M a j o r to N o . 10 D o w n i n g Street. I n d e e d , T h a t c h e r was b r o u g h t d o w n by a revolt within t h e p a r t y led by Sir G e o f f r e y H o w e , h e r foreign secretary. H e resigned t o p r o t e s t T h a t c h e r ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o m o n e tary integration, explaining to t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s t h a t t h e vision of benefits of a u n i t e d E u r o p e was "a good deal m o r e convincing a n d e n c o u r a g i n g for t h e interests of [ G r e a t Britain] t h a n t h e n i g h t m a r e i m a g e s o m e t i m e s c o n j u r e d u p by the p r i m e minister w h o s e e m s t o look o u t on a c o n t i n e n t t h a t is positively t e e m i n g with ill-intentioned p e o p l e scheming

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in her words, 'to extinguish democracy, [and] to dissolve our national identities.'" 93 Despite these events, Thatcher's political demise was based on many factors beyond her E C position, and the British public remains chary of the slide into Europe. That was reflected again in the maneuvering prior to the December 1991 meeting of E C leaders at Masstricht, the Netherlands. Most European countries, especially Germany, were pressing for a commitment to adopt a single currency (the European Currency Unit, E C U ) and for increased power for the European Parliament and other central E C organizations. Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl flatly told the Bundestag that "we favor the political unification of Europe." 94 British reluctance to move toward a federal Europe helped frustrate Kohl's desires. Prime Minister Major was willing to contemplate moving toward greater political integration, but he came under heavy pressure to resist federalization. Former Prime Minister Thatcher, who still held her seat in Commons, called for a new referendum on any treaty that was agreed to in the upcoming meeting at Maastricht and for another prior to adopting full monetary unity in 1996. Major rejected a national vote, arguing that "my view remains that we are a parliamentary democracy, and I see no need for a referendum." 95 That brought an angry retort from Thatcher, who proclaimed that "parliamentary supremacy is the supremacy of the voice of the people. If you deny that to be heard, I think it is arrogant and I think it is wrong." 96 Prime Minister Major was not forced into a referendum, but he did toughen his stand on E C integration, and at Maastricht he forced the deletion of the word federal from the final document and insisted on Great Britain's final right to reject adopting the E C U in 1996. It may well be, then, that the next crucial juncture for Europe will be when the shift from economic to political integration reaches a point where it clashes with residual nationalism. Parliaments, and perhaps the people by referendum, will then face a critical choice of direction. A last consideration of the impact of the referendums is their impact on the domestic political lineup in the respective countries. There were minimal consequences in Ireland, Denmark, and Great Britain, although many of the elements, especially on the left, that opposed membership were not reconciled to it after the referendums. Analysts diverge over the impact of the vote in France. Leleu argues that in a narrow sense of pushing the center parties to join with the Gaullists and splitting the left parties, the use of the referendum device "confirmed the astuteness of [Pompidou's]...initiative." 97 Yet, Leleu also concedes that the lack of interest, and especially the tepidness of the pro-EEC vote by center party identifiers, indicated that the French were not strongly enthusiastic about European integration, about Pompidou's European policy, or about Pompidou as president. Wright sees the results as an unmitigated failure for

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P o m p i d o u , n o t i n g that e v e n t h o u g h t h e Socialists a n d C o m m u n i s t s split on t h e issue, t h e y w e r e able t o conclude a c o m m o n electoral strategy only t h r e e m o n t h s later a n d t h a t P o m p i d o u ' s inability t o galvanize t h e electora t e "clearly t a r n i s h e d " his political reputation. 9 8 T h e m o s t d r a m a t i c domestic ramifications occurred in N o r w a y . In t h e a f t e r m a t h of N o r w e g i a n voters' rejection of E E C m e m b e r s h i p , t h e coalition g o v e r n m e n t d o m i n a t e d by t h e L a b o u r party, most of w h o s e Storting m e m b e r s f a v o r e d entry, resigned and was replaced by an alliance of a n t i m e m b e r s h i p parties. In t h e g e n e r a l election in S e p t e m b e r 1973, t h e L a b o u r p a r t y v o t e d r o p p e d to 35.2 p e r c e n t c o m p a r e d to t h e 46.5 p e r c e n t it h a d g a t h e r e d in t h e preceding, 1969 election. T h e L a b o u r p a r t y was a b l e to f o r m a coalition alliance with t h e f a r t h e r - l e f t Socialist E l e c t i o n Alliance, b u t t h e y held p o w e r with a slim, o n e - v o t e margin. T h e alliance was itself a coalition of a n t i m e m b e r s h i p groups, including t h e C o m m u n i s t party, the Socialist P e o p l e s party, a n d a n t i m e m b e r s h i p e l e m e n t s of t h e L a b o u r p a r t y w h o h a d f o r m e d t h e W o r k e r s ' I n f o r m a t i o n C o m m i t t e e . In t h e political c e n t e r , the Liberal p a r t y split; a n d o n t h e right, an ultraconservative p a r t y f o r m e d a n d gained seats in t h e Storting. 9 9 F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e was s t r o n g evidence of voters realigning t h e i r p a r t y allegiances, especially a m o n g E E C o p p o n e n t s w h o h a d identified with p r o m e m b e r ship parties. A significant n u m b e r of these v o t e r s switched t h e i r p a r t y identification t o an a n t i m e m b e r s h i p party. A s o n e study n o t e d , " E l e c t o r a l changes of this m a g n i t u d e h a d n o t occurred in N o r w a y since a r o u n d 1930." 100 T h e s e shifts in N o r w a y ' s politics w e r e not t h e result of the r e f e r e n d u m alone. Instead, as o n e study p u t it, t h e r e f e r e n d u m " a c c e n t u a t e d a n d accelerated latent tensions and cleavages [up t o t h e n ] c o n t a i n e d by t h e established political order." 1 0 1 T h i s view was s e c o n d e d by V a l e n a n d M a r t i n u s s e n , w h o concluded that t h e E E C dispute was " r e l a t e d to practically all a r e a s of national politics" and "stirred u p t r e m e n d o u s a n t a g o nisms. It b r o k e u p old alliances a n d friendships b e t w e e n a n d within parties a n d c r e a t e d political constellations u n p a r a l l e l e d in m o d e r n N o r w e g i a n politics." 102 Spain's r e f e r e n d u m also h a d s u b s e q u e n t d o m e s t i c political r e v e r b e r ations, b u t t h e y w e r e n o t as p r o f o u n d as N o r w a y ' s . A t least in t h e s h o r t t e r m , the r e f e r e n d u m h a d t h e impacts h o p e d for by P r i m e Minister González. Spain's m e m b e r s h i p in N A T O was r e a f f i r m e d a n d has rem a i n e d strong. W h e t h e r or n o t they w e r e related t o t h e r e f e r e n d u m , t h e subsidiary clauses have also b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d . Spain r e m a i n s nuclear f r e e , and t h e U.S. military p r e s e n c e t h e r e has declined significantly. Domestically, t h e right was discomfited. T h e P S O E t o o k t h e m i d d l e g r o u n d f r o m its main rival, t h e A P , which was already having g r e a t difficulty formulating alternative policies to those of the socialist government. T h e right's call for abstention was, in one study's estimate, "self-defeating"

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and led to "an accentuation of the crisis of the right"103 The standing of Manuel Fraga, the A P leader, was particularly tarnished. Sixty-two percent of Spaniards thought that Fraga had not been sincere in his comments on N A T O , and those who disapproved of him increased to 71 percent, while those who supported him declined to 23 percent.104 The government quickly sought to capitalize on the referendum aftermath by calling elections for June. In those multiparty elections, the PSOE retained its absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies. The A P was particularly dispirited by its failure to increase its representation in the Cortes, and in December 1986 Fraga resigned as A P president. Since then, the PSOE has continued in power, although the disappearance of the right that some predicted in 1986 has not occurred. Thus, it could be said that the referendum resolved several Spanish foreign policy questions including N A T O membership, U.S. bases, and nuclear weapons. The referendum also affected domestic politics, but not in a decisive, long-term way. The Swiss referendum on U N membership, like the E E C and the N A T O referendums, settled its issues at least for the foreseeable future. Switzerland is currently wrestling with the matter of membership in the EC. The Swiss have not applied, but after the 1992 target date of E C economic integration, Austria, Sweden, and other countries may well join. This will increase economic pressure on Switzerland to join also. Membership in the E C would affect Swiss neutrality in much the same way as U N membership because the E C is moving beyond its economic origins to become an increasingly political organization. The organization imposed and relaxed sanctions on South Africa, condemned Iraq's invasion of Iran, and tried to mediate the civil war in Yugoslavia; it has also taken a variety of economic and diplomatic initiatives. In the long term, therefore, EC membership might change Swiss attitudes enough to allow U N membership. This is speculation, though, and especially given the strength of the no vote in 1986, the question of Switzerland's membership in the United Nations is unlikely to be rejoined soon.

NOTES 1. Technically, the referendums being analyzed here involved the issue of whether to join the European Communities, established in 1967, of which the European Economic Community was a constituent part. Because E E C is used in many of the titles in the bibliography, because the economic matters related to the E E C were the main focus of debate in the countries, and because of continuing somewhat greater familiarity with the concept of the E E C rather than the EC, the former designation will be used when discussing the British, French, Norwegian, Irish, and Danish referendums. 2. Vincent Wright, "France," in Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, edited by David Butler and Austin Ranney (Washington,

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D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 123-156; Claude Leleu, "The French Referendum of April 23,1972," European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), pp. 25-46. 3. Michael Leigh, "Linkage Politics: The French Referendum and the Paris Summit of 1972," Journal of Common Market Studies 14 (1975), pp. 157-170. 4. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda: Six Histories: Australia, Newfoundland, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, United Kingdom (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978), p. 21. 5. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda, p. 21 6. Ottar Hellevik and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "The Common Market Decision in Norway: A Clash Between Direct and Indirect Democracy," Scandinavian Political Studies 8 (1973), p. 232. 7. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda, p. 21; Hallevik and Gleditsch, "The Common Market Decision in Norway," p. 232. 8. Peter Hansen, Melvin Small, and Karen Siune, "The Structure of Debate in the Danish E E C Campaign: A Study of an Opinion-Policy Relationship," Journal of Common Market Studies 15 (1976), p. 122. 9. J0rgen Elklit and Nikolaj Petersen, "Denmark: Denmark Enters the European Communities," Scandinavian Political Studies 8 (1973), p. 203. 10. Hansen, Small, and Siune, "Structure of Debate," p. 104. 11. Philip Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent: The Story of the Referendum Campaign—and the Campaign for the Referendum (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976), p. 12. 12. Anthony King, "Referendum and the European Community," in The Referendum Device, edited by Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 69. 13. King, "Referendum," p. 55. 14. Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p. 17. 15. Dov S. Zakheim, "Britain and the EEC—Opinion Poll Data, 1970-72," Journal of Common Market Studies 11 (1973), pp. 194-196. 16. King, "Referendum," p. 42. 17. King, "Referendum," p. 35. 18. Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System: The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 41. 19. King, "Referendum," pp. 90-92. 20. Zakheim, "Britain in the E E C , " p. 226. 21. The Cortes has two houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies is the more powerful, and following common usage, the term Cortes will mean the Chamber of Deputies unless otherwise noted. For a discussion of the Cortes and its evolution, see Janet Moriarty and John T. Rourke, "The Spanish Cortes: Democracy Re-established," Contemporary Review 232 (May 1978), pp. 234-238. 22. Gary Prevost, "Spain's N A T O Choice," The World Today (August-September 1986), pp. 129-132. 23. Emilio A. Rodriquez, "Atlanticism and Europeanism: N A T O and Trends in Spanish Foreign Policy," in Spain's Entry into NA TO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives, edited by Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder:

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Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 55-71. 24. Joseph M. Vallès, Francesco Pallarés, and Ramón María Canals, "The Referendum of 12 March 1986 on Spain's Remaining in NATO," Electoral Studies 5 (December 1986), pp. 305-311. 25. For example, see Luis Peiró, "El Gran Vuelco," Cambio 16, March 17, 1986, pp. 23-27. 26. Cambio 16, March 17,1986, p. 23. 27. Quotes are from Inocencio Félix Arias, "Spanish Media and the Two N A T O Campaigns," in Gil and Tulchin, Spain's Entry into NATO, pp. 29-40. 28. The referendum read: The Government consider it appropriate to the national interest that Spain remain in the Atlantic Alliance...[under] the following terms: 1. The participation of Spain...will not include incorporation in the integrated military structure. 2. The prohibition on the installation, storing, or introducing nuclear arms on Spanish territory will be continued. 3. The progressive reduction of the military presence of the United States in Spain will proceed.

29. Quote provided by Janet Moriarty, professor of Spanish at the University of Connecticut. Professor Moriarty supplied some of the quotes, statistics, and analysis used. She also supplied the Spanish-language sources cited here and translated by the authors. We wish to thank Professor Moriarty for her valuable contribution. 30. Cambio 16, February 10,1986, p. 20. 31. Arias, "Spanish Media and the Two N A T O Campaigns," p. 37. 32. A great deal of the subsequent commentary on the Swiss referendum is based on C. L. Robertson, "Switzerland Rejects the United Nations," The Fletcher Forum 12/2 (1988), pp. 311-320; Von Luzius Wildhaber, "Das Schweizer Nein zu einer Vollmitgliedschaft in den Vereinten Nationen," Europa-Archiv 15 (1986), pp. 461-467. 33. Wright, "France," p. 156. 34. Wright, "France," p. 156. 35. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda, p. 18. 36. Elklit and Petersen, "Denmark," p. 206. 37. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda. 38. Hansen, Small, and Siune, "Structure of Debate," p. 128. 39. King, "Referendum," p. 122. 40. Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p. 156. 41. David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 161. 42. Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p. 157. 43. King, "Referendum," p. 122. 44. Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 158. 45. Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 212. 46. King, "Referendum," p. 122; Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 213. 47. Arias, "Spanish Media and the Two N A T O Campaigns," p. 39. 48. Cambio 16, February 2,1986, p. 22.

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49. Poll published in Cambio 16, February 19,1986, p. 23. 50. Leleu, "French Referendum," p. 28. 51. Leleu, "French Referendum," p. 43. 52. Ottar Hellevik, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Kristen Ringdal, "The Common Market Issue in Norway: A Conflict Between Center and Periphery," Journal of Peace Research 12 (1975), p. 42. 53. Henry Valen, "Norway: 'No' to E E C , " Scandinavian Political Studies 8 (August 1973), pp. 214-226. 54. Elklit and Petersen, "Denmark." 55. Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 253. 56. Published in Cambio 16, February 10,1986, p. 23. 57. Vallès, Pallarés, and Canals, "Referendum," pp. 307-308. 58. Vallès, Pallarés, and Canals, "Referendum," p. 308. 59. Calculations are the authors' and are based on the voting reported in El Pais, March 13,1986, pp. 16-17. 60. Wright, "France," p. 158. 61. Leleu, "French Referendum." 62. Canadian Unity Information Office, Understanding Referenda, p. 18. 63. Quotes are from Hellevik and Gleditsch, "Common Market Decision," pp. 234,233. 64. Hellevik, Gleditsch, and Ringdal, "Common Market Issue," p. 42. The indicators used to establish SES included age, sex, location (generally distance from Oslo), education, occupation sector, occupational position, and income. All had an expected impact, but age and sex were relatively weak indicators. 65. Hellevik, Gleditsch, and Ringdal, "Common Market Issue," p. 51. 66. Elklit and Petersen, "Denmark," p. 206. 67. Hansen, Small, and Siune, "Structure of Debate," p. 120. 68. Hansen, Small, and Siune, "Structure of Debate"; Elklit and Petersen, "Denmark." 69. Hansen, Small, and Siune, "Structure of Debate," p. 128. 70. Roy Pierce, Henry Valen, and Ola Listhaug, "Referendum Voting Behavior: The Norwegian and British Referenda on Membership in the European Community," American Journal of Political Science 27 (February 1983), p. 53. 71. Quoted in Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p. 53. 72. Subsequent analyses confirm these findings. For example, one study concluded that "party was the most important vote predictor. The analysis considered the possibility that the parties' shifts reflected attitude changes among the electorate, and while it admitted such an interpretation was "technically possible," it concluded that "the...fluctuation in British public opinion...indicates that the voters were taking partisan cues" (Pierce, Valen, and Listhaug, "Referendum Voting Behavior," p. 61). Another aspect of elite cue-giving was the prominent role played by party leaders in the voters' image of the membership question. Antimembership leaders tended to have a poor image among the majority of British voters; the reverse was true for promembership leaders. O n e poll listed twenty-eight such leaders and asked voter opinion of the leader. Of the seventeen leaders familiar to at least 70 percent of the voters, the ten most popular all favored continued membership, the seven least popular all opposed

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it (King, "Referendum," p. 122; Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 256). 73. Stephen L. Bristow, "Partisanship, Participation and Legitimacy in Britain's E E C Referendum," Journal of Common Market Studies 14 (June 1976), pp. 297-310. 74. Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 252; King, "Referendum," p. 133. 75. Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent, p. 251; King, "Referendum," p. 108; Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, p. 254. 76. Javier Tusell, "The Transition to Democracy and Spain's Membership in N A T O , " in Gil and Tulchin, Spain's Entry into NATO, p. 17. 77. Time, March 24,1986, p. 44. 78. Poll published in Cambio 16, February 10,1986, p. 23. 79. Quoted in Anthony Gooch, "A Surrealistic Referendum: Spain and N A T O , " Government and Opposition 31/3 (1986), p. 310. 80. Prévost, "Spain's N A T O Choice," p. 129. 81. Gooch, "Spain and N A T O , " p. 302. 82. Time, March 24,1986, p. 44. 83. Javier Pérez Royo, "Repercussion on the Democratic Process of Spain's Entry into N A T O , " in Gil and Tulchin, Spain's Entry into NATO, p. 22. 84. Poll published in Cambio 16, February 10,1986, p. 23. 85. Vallès, Pallarés, and Canals, "Referendum," p. 308. 86. Time, March 24,1986, p. 44. 87. Arias, "Spanish Media and the Two N A T O Campaigns," p. 38; Vallès, Pallarés, and Canals, p. 307. 88. Arias, "Spanish Media and the Two N A T O Campaigns," pp. 39-40. 89. Michael Gallagher, "The Single European Act Referendum," Irish Political Studies 3 (1988), pp. 77-82. 90. All the statistics provided here on the Danish referendum are taken from Ole Borre, "The Danish Referendum on the E C Common Act," Electoral Studies 5 (1986), pp. 189-193. 91. New York Times, May 28,1984, p. A6. 92. Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, Index to International Public Opinion, 1988-1989 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press), p. 538. 93. Hartford Courant, November 14,1990, p. A9. 94. New York Times, December 2,1991, A l l . 95. New York Times, November 22,1991, A6. 96. Hartford Courant, November 22,1991, A16. 97. Leleu, "French Referendum," p. 26. 98. Wright, "France," p. 161. 99. Henry Valen, "National Conflict Structure and Foreign Politics: The Impact of the E E C Issue on Perceived Cleavages in Norwegian Politics," European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), pp. 47-82. 100. Henry Valen and Willy Martinussen, "Electoral Trends and Foreign Policy in Norway: The 1973 Storting Election and the E E C Issue," in Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent Political Trends in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, edited by Karl Cerny (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 39. 101. Johan J0rgen Hoist, "Norway's E E C Referendum: Lessons and Impli-

Referendums, Europe & International Organizations cations," World Today 31 (March 1975), p. 115. 102. Valen and Martinussen, "Electoral Trends," p. 60. 103. Pérez Royo, "Repercussions on the Democratic Process," p. 26. 104. Poll published in Cambio 16, March 17,1986, p. 29.

109

Referendums and the Specter of Secession During the 1970s, groups advocating independence for subregions within Great Britain, Canada, and Spain successfully challenged statewide parties in several local and general elections. Almost overnight, nationalist parties became important electoral forces, sometimes increasing their shares of the regional vote by 50 percent or more. For example, the Scottish National party's share of ballots cast in British general elections rose from 2.4 percent of the 1964 Scottish regional vote to 30.4 percent in October 1974. In Spain's Basque country (Pais Vasco), the percentage of ballots cast for Basque nationalist parties in general elections rose from 29.8 in 1977 to 44 in 1979. The Parti Queb6cois's share of the vote in elections for Quebec's National Assembly similarly increased, from 23 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1976.1 The stated long-term goal of the nationalist parties was to win complete political independence for their regions. In addition, many nationalist leaders, as distinct from the leaders of statewide parties (that is, state leaders) believed that full independence was unattainable in the short run. They therefore advocated federalism as an intermediate goal and struggled either to establish new regional governments with as many constitutionally recognized powers as possible or to expand greatly the powers of preexisting regional governments. The strategy of expanding the powers of regional governments led to rifts within nationalist organizations. Small but vocal factions maintained that the goal of complete territorial sovereignty was being compromised too much and urged leaders of the nationalist parties to adopt a more militantly pro-independence stance. Concurrently, the sudden popularity of nationalist parties alarmed many state leaders. Some feared that the nationalists might achieve their long-term goal and secede from the existing political order. A federal structure was one compromise solution, and some government leaders openly considered granting a modicum of self-rule to the apparently restive regions in order to undermine the nationalists' popularity. But even that was problematic, for some factions within state parties foresaw dire consequences. For one, even a modicum of autonomy seemed to increase institutional rivalries within the political system and thus dilute 111

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powers the central government needed to combat recessions and other modern problems. Furthermore, partial decentralization might whet the electorates' appetites for more extensive self-rule. Critics of decentralization therefore concluded that, all in all, concessions would reinforce rather than retard the pressure for secession. Amid these complex factional struggles, a remarkable political coincidence occurred at the close of the 1970s. Regional referendums on partial self-rule were held almost simultaneously in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Voters in each country were asked to help decide whether the leaders of the state should decentralize its authority. The wordings of the referendums generally did not explicitly refer to the specter of secession. They referred only to greater decentralization of the political system. Still, many leaders and opponents of nationalist movements anticipated significant foreign policy implications, because they hoped, or feared, that the expansion of regional self-rule and diminution of state authority would be first steps toward territorial separation. This chapter examines the referendums on self-rule during the late 1970s. Attention is given to four themes: (1) why the referendums were held when they were, (2) how voters were being educated about the referendums, (3) who voted, and (4) which side won. Following the discussion of the 1970s referendums, we look at referendums during the early 1990s within the then Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Unlike the referendums held a decade earlier, the popular votes within the Soviet Union were explicitly about independence. Moreover, groups advocating independence won; and their victories foreshadowed the breakup of the Soviet Union. TIMING OF THE REFERENDUMS

Given that referendums on regional self-rule seldom occur in advanced industrialized societies, it is important to ask why such referendums were held in Great Britain, Spain, and Canada during the 1970s. The sudden and impressive electoral successes of nationalist parties in all three countries partly explain the timing of the referendums. But other political factors—in particular, stalemates between forces supporting and forces opposing decentralization—were also at work. In the case of Great Britain, the electoral threat posed by nationalist parties at first simply generated a wish among state leaders to establish elected regional parliaments with strictly limited powers. Referendums were not part of the leaders' original agenda. Following the stunning successes of the Scottish National party (SNP) and the Welsh Plaid Cymru in the two 1974 general elections detailed in Table 6.1, leaders of both the Labour party and the Conservative party felt themselves under pressure

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Table 6.1. Nationalist Performance in British General Elections General Election

1964 1966 1970 1974 Feb. 1974 Oct.

SNIP'S Regional Vote Share (%) 2.4 5.0 11.4 21.9 30.4

Plaid Cymru's Regional Vote Share (%) 4.8 4.3 11.5 10.7 10.8

Sources'. James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 3d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 106-107; Arnold J. James and John E. Thomas, Wales at Westminister: A History of the Parliamentary Representation of Wales, 1800-1978 (Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press, 1981), pp. 202-204.

to p r e v e n t f u r t h e r erosion of their Welsh a n d Scottish electoral bases. B o t h parties t h e r e f o r e resolved in their respective p a r t y congresses t o work for " d e v o l u t i o n . " This m e a n t t h e establishment of regionally elected p a r l i a m e n t s with limited local powers. It would b e a o n e - s i d e d f o r m of " s h a r e d g o v e r n m e n t " : t h e British P a r l i a m e n t would retain sovereignty and have t h e right to override decisions by the regional p a r l i a m e n t s . State leaders h o p e d , p e r h a p s too optimistically, that this mildly prodecentralization p r o p o s a l would satisfy voters' desires for m o r e self-rule a n d t h u s r e d u c e the growing electoral a p p e a l of the S N P a n d the Plaid C y m r u . T h e r e was a f u r t h e r political motive p r o m p t i n g t h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t to e m b r a c e devolution in t h e late 1970s. A f t e r the O c t o b e r 1974 elections, L a b o u r lacked an absolute majority within t h e H o u s e of C o m mons. It n e e d e d m o r e votes. M e m b e r s of the L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t h o p e d that actively p r o m o t i n g g r e a t e r regional self-rule might e n a b l e t h e m to forge a t e m p o r a r y alliance with p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s f r o m t h e S N P a n d t h e Plaid C y m r u . So t h e g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d t o i n t r o d u c e d e v o l u t i o n bills in P a r l i a m e n t in e x c h a n g e for t h e nationalists' s u p p o r t . T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p r o p o s a l s w e r e innovative b u t hardly r e v o l u t i o n ary. In Wales, a popularly elected assembly w o u l d b e established. Its m e m b e r s would b e elected f r o m s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts with only a plurality r e q u i r e d f o r victory r a t h e r t h a n by a system of p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e assembly would n o t h a v e l a w m a k i n g powers. Its p o w e r was t o b e limited to executing laws decided in L o n d o n — p a r t i c u larly laws p e r t a i n i n g t o public culture (libraries, m u s e u m s , etc.), e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n , building codes, a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to political scientist J i m Bulpitt, "In constitutional t e r m s at least, t h e W e l s h assembly was m e a n t t o b e little m o r e t h a n an e n l a r g e d c o u n t y council." 2

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F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e assembly would n o t b e able t o recruit, train, a n d oversee its own civil service. Instead, u p t o 13,000 n e w civil servants would b e p r o v i d e d by L o n d o n . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t ' s proposal, t h e Scottish assembly, unlike its W e l s h c o u n t e r p a r t , would h a v e a f e w legislative p o w e r s in t h e areas of e d u c a t i o n , e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection, and social services. B u t , t h e British P a r l i a m e n t still could o v e r r u l e t h e assembly's decisions at any time. I n d e e d t h e e n t i r e assembly could b e dissolved by P a r l i a m e n t , if it so wished. A s in t h e case of t h e Welsh proposal, t h e r e was t o b e n o s e p a r a t e Scottish civil service a n d n o sources of i n c o m e o r fiscal p o w e r s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e explicitly a p p r o v e d by t h e British treasury. In creating regional assemblies, t h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t did n o t wish t o dismantle all existing political a r r a n g e m e n t s . Scottish and W e l s h affairs would c o n t i n u e b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e British cabinet by Scottish and W e l s h secretaries of state w h o w e r e a p p o i n t e d by t h e British g o v e r n m e n t and w e r e m e m b e r s of t h e m a j o r i t y p a r t y in P a r l i a m e n t . A c c o r d i n g to the L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t ' s devolution proposals, t h e secretaries of state w e r e t o exercise supervisory p o w e r s within t h e assemblies t o e n s u r e that decisions by t h e regional assemblies w e r e in h a r m o n y with those of t h e British g o v e r n m e n t . T h e assemblies, in o t h e r words, w e r e i n t e n d e d t o rival the administrative a u t h o r i t y of local municipal and county g o v e r n m e n t s , n o t t h e legislative a u t h o r i t y of t h e British P a r l i a m e n t . A s Bulpitt p u t s it, " t h e actual institutional losers w e r e local authorities." 3 A s mild as these proposals for political decentralization w e r e — h a r d l y a d i s m e m b e r m e n t of t h e British political s y s t e m — n u m e r o u s m e m b e r s of t h e L a b o u r party o p p o s e d t h e m . M a n y L a b o u r p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s f r o m Scotland a n d W a l e s f e a r e d t h a t any decentralization of g o v e r n m e n t authority would e n h a n c e the prestige of nationalist groups, would give nationalists an institutional f o o t h o l d in local affairs, and would e n a b l e nationalists t o e x p a n d their constituency b a s e t h r o u g h p a t r o n a g e . T h e p r o p o s a l s f o r devolution, in o t h e r words, would increase r a t h e r t h a n diminish, t h e nationalist t h r e a t . S o m e p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s f u r t h e r a r g u e d that devolution would c o n t r a dict t h e p a r t y ' s o w n principle of Britishwide p r o l e t a r i a n unity. Critics a r g u e d that if regionally elected assemblies w e r e established, parochial interests s o o n would play a larger role in t h e political thinking a n d j u d g m e n t of L a b o u r politicians w h o would h a v e t o p a n d e r t o n a r r o w , local interests in o r d e r t o win elections. B e c a u s e of t h e s e concerns, t h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t f a c e d an u n w a n t e d " b a c k b e n c h r e v o l t " by f o r t y - t h r e e of its o w n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s w h e n it i n t r o d u c e d t h e devolution bills f o r Scotland a n d Wales. T h e g o v e r n m e n t a r g u e d that as a minority g o v e r n m e n t it n e e d e d Scottish a n d W e l s h nationalist allies in P a r l i a m e n t t o m a i n t a i n its voting m a j o r i t y a n d

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remain in power. Even the Labour rebels were partially responsive to this appeal to party loyalty, but they wanted a compromise and would support the government's devolution plans only if local popular support for devolution was first demonstrated through the use of referendums—an eventuality that many rebels doubted would occur. 4 In hopes of disrupting the government's strategy for perpetuating its rule, Conservative parliamentarians also called for a referendum. They resurrected the traditional Conservative argument that any extensive change in government structure or activity must first be approved by voters through the use of a referendum. The Tories had argued for a century that referendums were a valuable shield for British citizens against unwanted radicalism by elected elites and party machines. 5 The combined opposition from the Conservative parliamentarians and Labour backbenchers prevented the passage of the government's original devolution proposal. The Labour government therefore compromised and agreed to hold advisory referendums in Scotland and Wales on the proposed regional assemblies. But this was not all. Parliament further decided that passage of the proposals would need more than just approval from a majority of the citizens who turned out to vote. The numerical size of the yes vote in each region would have to be equal to at least 40 percent of all registered voters in that region. This stipulation was called the 40 percent rule. Under it, an abstention would be the equivalent of a no vote, and a low turnout could invalidate an otherwise positive vote for devolution. Welsh and Scottish nationalists reacted angrily to the turn of events. Many were already ambivalent about using referendums because they were not necessarily a neutral weapon in the battle for regional self-rule. Much depended on how the referendums were worded. Opinion polls in the 1970s indicated that majorities in both Scotland and Wales liked the idea of greater regional self-rule as an abstract principle. Opinion polls also showed, however, that whenever residents were asked whether they desired a specific form of regional government, overall popular support for self-rule quickly fragmented, with minorities supporting different institutional arrangements, different schemes of representation, and different legislative powers.6 Scottish and Welsh citizens differed, among other things, over whether assemblies should be able to levy taxes; whether Parliament should be able to override the decisions of an assembly; whether members of the assemblies should be representatives from local governments or directly elected; whether members of the assemblies should be elected through a winner-take-all system of voting or by means of a proportional-representation system; and whether the assemblies should have powers to restructure the local economies. Second, many nationalists viewed the content of Labour's proposals

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f o r regional self-rule as a public relations gimmick r a t h e r t h a n a serious t r a n s f e r of p o w e r . M e m b e r s of t h e Plaid C y m r u w e r e especially disapp o i n t e d over t h e lack of l a w m a k i n g p o w e r s p r o p o s e d for their region's assembly a n d w a n t e d a second q u e s t i o n a d d e d t o the g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e f e r e n d u m ballot: " D o you believe that t h e p r e s e n t A c t should h a v e g o n e considerably f u r t h e r , granting W a l e s full i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t u s ? " T h e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t , predictably, r e f u s e d to e x p a n d t h e ballot. 7 Finally, Scottish a n d W e l s h nationalists were angry a b o u t t h e 40 p e r c e n t rule, which s e e m e d to h a v e b e e n arbitrarily a d d e d to t h e r e f e r e n d u m process. T h e 40 p e r c e n t rule obviously increased t h e likelihood that t h e p r o p o s a l s would b e d e f e a t e d , and that eventuality could seriously set b a c k t h e nationalists' struggles. D e f e a t of the devolutionary proposals, for i n s t a n c e , m i g h t c o n v i n c e o t h e r m e m b e r s of P a r l i a m e n t t h a t t h e nationalists' call for regional g o v e r n m e n t was not popularly s u p p o r t e d and should not b e h e e d e d . D e f e a t might also d a m a g e the nationalists' prestige a m o n g voters by m a k i n g t h e strategy of patiently working for regional g o v e r n m e n t s e e m unfeasible and politically irrelevant. M a n y nationalists t h e r e f o r e saw t h e r e f e r e n d u m p r o c e d u r e as a political minefield t h a t the L a b o u r p a r t y h a d eagerly laid. C o n t r o v e r s y over the use of r e f e r e n d u m s in deciding q u e s t i o n s of regional self-rule was m u c h less h e a t e d within Spain t h a n it was within G r e a t Britain. This was partly b e c a u s e of the peculiarities of t h e Spanish constitution. In h o p e s of securing s u p p o r t f r o m traditionally restive ethnic groups, the designers of the 1978 constitution included a provision allowing t h r e e "historic n a t i o n s " — C a t a l o n i a , Galicia, and the B a s q u e count r y — t o acquire regional g o v e r n m e n t s with legislative powers. B u t b e f o r e regional g o v e r n m e n t s could b e established, r e f e r e n d u m s must b e used to d e m o n s t r a t e citizens' s u p p o r t for the regional g o v e r n m e n t s . It was exp e c t e d that elected politicians in each region would first f o r m a t e m p o r a r y g o v e r n m e n t , which would d r a f t an a u t o n o m y proposal specifying policy a r e a s in which f u t u r e regional g o v e r n m e n t s would m a k e laws. T h e t e m p o r a r y g o v e r n m e n t s t h e n would p r e s e n t their proposal to t h e Spanish g o v e r n m e n t for its consideration. T h e Spanish g o v e r n m e n t and leaders of the regional g o v e r n m e n t s would n e g o t i a t e a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e initial p r o p o s a l and t h e n submit t h e revised p r o p o s a l t o the Spanish p a r l i a m e n t , the Cortes, for consideration and approval. T h e goal of the lengthy process of reviewing and negotiating the details of an a u t o n o m y a r r a n g e m e n t was to increase t h e likelihood of building consensus b e h i n d a single plan of regional self-rule a m o n g all interested parties. Theoretically, t h e final bill would first receive t h e blessing of all m a j o r political institutions; t h e n it would b e s u b m i t t e d to t h e p o p u l a t i o n of the relevant region f o r a final test of b r o a d support. If a simple majority of the voters supported t h e proposal, it would b e i m p l e m e n t e d .

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C o n t r o v e r s y arose, h o w e v e r , over w h e t h e r r e f e r e n d u m s could b e used in o t h e r Spanish regions t o decide on self-rule. T h e Spanish constit u t i o n p e r m i t t e d " n o n - n a t i o n a l " regions t o w o r k t o w a r d small a m o u n t s of self-rule t h r o u g h a very long p r o c e d u r e of review, negotiation, a n d imp l e m e n t a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o o n e section of the constitution, t h e C o r t e s a n d t h e Spanish g o v e r n m e n t would m a k e t h e final decision o n e a c h region's a u t o n o m y , w i t h o u t t h e use of a r e f e r e n d u m . R e g i o n a l legislative p o w e r s would initially b e q u i t e limited. A f t e r a five-year trial p e r i o d , t h e r e p r e sentatives f r o m a n o n - n a t i o n a l regional g o v e r n m e n t could, if it wished, apply f o r m o r e extensive powers. B u t a n o t h e r and o f t e n o v e r l o o k e d section of t h e constitution allowed disgruntled leaders of a region t o call for a r e f e r e n d u m if t h e y desired e i t h e r substantially g r e a t e r self-rule t h a n t h e Spanish g o v e r n m e n t wished or a m o r e rapid i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of decentralization t h a n t h e g o v e r n m e n t wished. B u t b e f o r e t h e C o r t e s would consider t h e results of t h e s e special r e f e r e n d u m s as authoritative, the p r o p o s a l s would n e e d to b e a p p r o v e d by a m a j o r i t y of all eligible voters in each province t h a t would b e u n d e r t h e jurisdiction of o n e of t h e p r o p o s e d regional g o v e r n m e n t . If the p r o p o s a l failed t o pass this rigorous test of p o p u l a r i t y — e v e n if in only o n e province—extensive devolution would n o t b e established. If local r e p r e s e n t a tives t h e n r e m a i n e d dissatisfied with t h e a m o u n t of regional self-rule t h a t the Spanish g o v e r n m e n t g r a n t e d , they could call for a n e w r e f e r e n d u m on regional self-rule, b u t only a f t e r a five-year hiatus. 8 S o o n a f t e r t h e constitution was in place, the newly elected Spanish g o v e r n m e n t was s w a m p e d by a u t o n o m y p r o p o s a l s f r o m almost every region. T h e central g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r s t a n d a b l y was f e a r f u l t h a t it was t r a n s f e r r i n g t o o m a n y policymaking p o w e r s t o the n e w regional governments. M a n y regional coalitions w e r e d i s a p p o i n t e d with t h e few p o w e r s that the central g o v e r n m e n t wished to grant. A f t e r b i t t e r negotiations, t h e constitutionally r e q u i r e d r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e called in t h e t h r e e recognized " n a t i o n a l " territories of Galicia, Catalonia, and t h e B a s q u e country. M o s t " n o n - n a t i o n a l " regions simply b a r g a i n e d directly with t h e gove r n m e n t f o r limited a m o u n t s of local p o w e r , with t h e possibility of requesting g r e a t e r a m o u n t s of p o w e r a f t e r five-year trials. A n d a l u s i a , however, was different. 9 T h e A n d a l u s i a n s argued t h a t the Spanish governm e n t was b e i n g t o o miserly a b o u t sharing powers. T h e y claimed, t h e r e fore, that a r e f e r e n d u m was n e e d e d and p e r m i t t e d by t h e new constitution. T h e designers of S p a i n ' s 1978 constitution h a d n o t anticipated t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of A n d a l u s i a would desire a d e g r e e of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t that was f a r g r e a t e r t h a n t h e Spanish g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d w a n t t o grant. I n d e e d , t h e n u m b e r of n o n - n a t i o n a l regions r e q u e s t i n g self-rule astonished m o s t Spanish politicians a n d s e a s o n e d political observers. Besieged with r e q u e s t s f o r r e g i o n a l self-rule, t h e S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t f e a r e d t h a t

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the process of decentralization would soon get out of hand. The impatient Andalusians epitomized the problem. Moreover, if the Andalusian referendum passed, other regions might also request referendums. The Spanish government therefore only grudgingly recognized the constitutionality of an autonomy referendum for Andalusia and then worked vigorously to defeat the proposal. Why did representatives of Andalusia press for a referendum instead of taking a more patient and piecemeal approach to self-rule? The movement for self-rule was partly an outgrowth of local politicians' growing fears that once given autonomy, Catalonia and the Basque country (two of the most economically developed and industrialized regions of Spain) would use their regional governments to secure budgetary favors from the Spanish government and to obstruct the Spanish government's efforts to transfer Basque and Catalan wealth to poorer regions of Spain. If impoverished regions, such as Andalusia, were to have their economic interests protected and promoted, they would need as much self-rule as possible, and as soon as possible. This would allow them to bargain directly with the central government and to stand out when requesting financial aid, as it was expected Catalonia and the Basque country would. There were, in addition, electoral pressures and motivations behind the Andalusians' call for a referendum. Because of its failure to solve the profound and persistent problems of Andalusia's declining agrarian economy, the Franco regime had alienated many residents from the Spanish state. In this environment of constant hunger and joblessness, a newly organized nationalist party, the Andalusian Socialist party (Partido Socialista Andaluz, or P S A ) , quickly became a major electoral force. The P S A won only 4 percent of the ballots cast in the 1977 elections; but in 1979 it won 11.9 percent of the ballots, which is a large share of votes within Spain's multiparty system. 10 The PSA's sudden success convinced many statewide parties to advocate autonomy in order to expand their electoral base. The regional branches of the Spanish Workers' Socialist party (Partido Socialista Obrero de España, P S O E ) , the Spanish Communist party (Partido Comunista de España, P C E ) , and several other major parties began adding Andalusian adjectives to their names in hopes of attracting more voters. With the exception of leadership of the Popular Alliance party (Alianza Popular, A P ) and other archconservative parties, party leaders throughout Andalusia were soon declaring their support for autonomy. They were, in effect, bidding for the PSA's apparently growing nationalist constituency; and amid this intense competition for votes, advocacy for a referendum became one litmus test of the sincerity of a party's commitment to Andalusian self-rule. The political origins of Quebec's referendum differ from both the British and Spanish cases in that Canada's central government never called for the referendum and never viewed the referendum as binding.

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T h e r e f e r e n d u m , instead, was unilaterally called f o r by the g o v e r n m e n t of Q u e b e c province, h e a d e d by a precocious nationalist party, t h e Parti Québécois (PQ). F o r m e d in 1968, t h e P Q sought v o t e r s largely by advocating national i n d e p e n d e n c e . Of course, t h e r e h a d b e e n m a n y nationalist parties in Q u e b e c ' s history. Still, t h e P Q was in m a n y ways ideologically u n i q u e . Previously, electorally successful nationalist parties h a d a d v o c a t e d merely modifying C a n a d a ' s f e d e r a l system of g o v e r n m e n t , n o t c o m p l e t e independ e n c e for Q u e b e c . In addition, m o s t earlier nationalist p a r t i e s o p e n l y aligned themselves with t h e Catholic church a n d a d v o c a t e d t h e p r e s e r v a tion (if n o t e x p a n s i o n ) of t h e c h u r c h ' s role in e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e provision of social services. T h e P Q was t h e first electorally successful nationalist p a r t y t o call outright f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e and t h e first electorally successful nationalist party in Q u e b e c t o distance itself organizationally a n d ideologically f r o m t h e Catholic church. 1 1 T h e P Q was hardly a one-issue party, h o w e v e r . It certainly cultivated s u p p o r t a m o n g voters w h o already desired i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t its leaders also sought out voters w h o w e r e not interested in Q u e b e c ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e as such in h o p e s of later converting n e w s u p p o r t e r s to a p r o - i n d e p e n d e n c e stance. In its campaigns, t h e P Q p r o m i s e d to e n d c o r r u p t i o n , inefficiency, a n d favoritism in local g o v e r n m e n t ; t o legislate u n i o n legislation, higher m i n i m u m - w a g e s t a n d a r d s , t h e partial nationalization of mines, a n d o t h e r social-democratic r e f o r m s ; t o r e d u c e u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d l a b o r strife; t o institutionalize e c o n o m i c planning for the region a n d gradually to p h a s e in a mixed e c o n o m y ; a n d t o legislate g r e a t e r use of F r e n c h within political institutions and in the business world. T h e P Q f u r t h e r p r o m i s e d that if it b e c a m e the province's g o v e r n m e n t , it would hold a n d a b i d e by a r e f e r e n d u m that a s k e d t h e v o t e r s if they w a n t e d the g o v e r n m e n t to n e g o t i a t e a "sovereignty-association" a r r a n g e m e n t with C a n a d a ' s f e d e r a l government. 1 2 W h a t t h e P Q h a d in mind by sovereignty-association was an ambiguous i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a r r a n g e m e n t . In theory, Q u e b e c would b e able t o decide almost all cultural, educational, fiscal, social welfare, a n d e c o n o m i c policies w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r e n c e f r o m the federal g o v e r n m e n t of C a n a d a . Q u e b e c would also b e completely responsible f o r its own d e f e n s e . A t t h e s a m e time, a f r e e - t r a d e relationship would b e m a i n t a i n e d with t h e rest of C a n a d a . T h e r e would also b e a c o m m o n C a n a d a - Q u e b e c c u r r e n c y and f o u r joint g o v e r n m e n t projects, such as A i r C a n a d a . T h e ambiguities in t h e P Q ' s n o t i o n of sovereignty-association a r o s e over such q u e s t i o n s as w h e t h e r Q u e b e c ' s g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d h a v e sufficient authority t o p r o t e c t the province's infant industries f r o m c o m p e t i tion f r o m o t h e r p a r t s of C a n a d a a n d w h e t h e r Q u e b e c w o u l d b e b o u n d by e c o n o m i c treaties signed by C a n a d a . O n such sensitive policy questions, which g o v e r n m e n t would h a v e final say: Q u e b e c ' s o r C a n a d a ' s ?

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Almost all observers agree that the obvious ambiguity or "softness" in the PQ's sovereignty-association proposal was intended to minimize the possible radical implications of the PQ's nationalist aspirations and thus maximize the electoral base of the party. By contrast, a direct proposal for independence might alienate non-nationalist voters.13 Again, it is worth remembering that almost all PQ leaders wanted a broad electoral base and therefore sought voters outside the region's pro-independence block. This inclusive electoral strategy apparently worked. Opinion surveys in 1976, for example, indicated that while almost one-third of PQ supporters did not favor independence they still supported the PQ because of its stand on economic and good-government issues such as foreign control of the economy and corruption in local government.14 Indeed, PQ supporters tended to be more concerned about foreign control of the economy, reducing labor strife, and implementing economic plans and less concerned about maintaining law and order and regenerating the influence of the Catholic church than were supporters for other major parties in the region.15 After the party captured control of the provincial government in 1976, the PQ's leaders walked a political tightrope. On the one hand, they feared scaring off non-nationalist constituencies by pursuing excessively ambitious proposals for decentralization. On the other hand, the party's leaders wanted to sustain the loyalty and enthusiasm of its many party activists, especially younger grassroots activists in Montreal, who believed a powerful independent regional government was needed if Quebec was to realize its economic, cultural, and political potential. Under growing pressure from its pro-independence activists and troubled by a Supreme Court of Canada's decision to overrule the government's francophone language policies, the PQ government decided in December 1979 to call for a sovereignty-association referendum. The PQ's chief opponent was the Liberal party. It argued in the Assemblée Nationale, Quebec's parliament, that the PQ's proposal for sovereigntyassociation was ridiculously impractical because the federal government in Canada neither had agreed nor was required to agree to view the results of a referendum as binding. The PQ spokespersons prudently had earlier prepared a defense of their position. During the dramatic parliamentary debate, which was televised and watched by a remarkably large audience, the Liberals often appeared disorganized and tongue-tied. The PQ spokespersons, in contrast, confidently predicted grand economic benefits resulting from a sovereignty-association arrangement and skillfully evaded the question of whether and how the federal government would respond to the referendum. Following a thirty-five-hour televised debate, the Assemblée Nationale approved the PQ's proposal, and the referendum was scheduled for May 20,1980. 1 6

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VOTER EDUCATION In G r e a t Britain, Spain, and Canada, groups favoring and opposing the proposals launched campaigns to inform and influence voters' decisions. In each country a different constellation of groups participated in the campaigns, and they participated with different amounts of enthusiasm. A three-week campaign period preceded the Scottish and Welsh referendums. Party involvement was generally incoherent, however, because within the major parties there was significant disagreement about whether and how to participate in the campaigns. The L a b o u r government, having been dragged into two referendum battles by its own rebellious backbenchers, never adopted a clear position toward either autonomy proposal. A s Scottish political scientist J a m e s Kellas kindly put it, " T h e Government's heart was not in the cause of devolution." 1 7 E v e n ministers within the Labour cabinet differed greatly in their feelings about whether the proposals should be supported. Almost all of the top civil servants in Whitehall advised the government to oppose devolution. Uncertain where to stand, the government sat out the campaign. One consequence was that official pamphlets discussing the pros and cons of regional autonomy were never published by the British government. This was unlike the extensive papers mailed to all Great Britain's voters before that country's referendum on E E C membership. It is doubtful that the Labour government, even if it had wanted to, could have generated enthusiasm among the vast majority of its own parliamentarians. Several figures within the Labour party had already begun to campaign vigorously against the proposals. In particular, there was considerable antidevolution campaigning undertaken by the so-called Gang of Six—a half-dozen staunchly anti-autonomy, high-ranking Labour parliamentarians who represented Welsh constituencies. A t the grassroots level, some Labour activists devotedly campaigned for the government's halfhearted yes position. Others, however, chose not to get deeply involved and instead watched the campaign either in bewilderment or with ambivalence. In Scotland, for instance, more than onethird of the local Labour organizations abstained from campaigning either for or against the devolution proposal. 18 Still other Labour activists worked for the maverick Labour no campaign. Scottish and Welsh nationalists were also divided, at least initially, over whether to campaign for proposals. A s noted, many nationalists believed that Labour's devolutionary proposals o f f e r e d highly limited legislative and administrative powers for the regional assemblies rather than the extensive legislative powers that many militant, especially younger, activists desired. More cautious nationalists tried to dampen dissatisfaction by asking whether a more far-reaching proposal would ever be

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legislated if the currently mild proposals lost in the upcoming referendums. Probably not, many soon concluded. Therefore, although the proposals for self-rule were disappointingly modest in the eyes of most nationalists, many nonetheless participated in yes campaigns. 19 The Conservatives were the only major party that officially opposed the Labour government's proposals for devolution. Even within this party, however, there was a maverick Conservative yes campaign. Conservative leaders understandably feared alienating voters in Scotland and Wales. The Conservatives therefore insisted that they were campaigning not against devolution, but against the details of the specific assembly schemes proposed by the Labour government. The political rhetoric during the referendum campaighs was greatly influenced by the ambivalence and lukewarm attitudes within the Labour and nationalist parties. Disappointed over the details of the proposals, Scottish and Welsh nationalists seldom focused on either the specific institutional arrangements being proposed or the policy benefits that might flow from regional assemblies. The nationalists instead focused on more abstract themes, arguing that the devolution proposals would enhance British democracy both by bringing rulers geographically closer to their constituencies and also by reducing the extensive power of Great Britain's appointed bureaucrats. 20 By rooting the debate in such abstract grounds, the nationalists inadvertently played into the hands of the antidevolutionists, who skillfully turned the prodevolution arguments about democracy on their heads. For example, opponents of devolution maintained that a new regional government in fact would not decrease the power of bureaucrats in British politics, but ironically would increase bureaucratic power by establishing new, regional tiers of civil servants. This would only further alienate citizens from their government. Moreover, a regional government would gravely weaken the institutional basis of local democracy in Great Britain, because towns and counties would have their resources and responsibilities transferred to regional governments. So government would be further removed from citizens' daily lives. The antidevolutionists also focused on the possible economic consequences of regional self-rule. Conservatives, for example, often argued that the expense of financing a new layer of government would necessitate either significant tax increases or the siphoning of funds from the central government's already underfinanced social service programs. Conservatives further warned that Labour candidates might easily capture the new Welsh and Scottish parliaments and use those governments either to implement unwise economic policies or to obstruct policies made in London for the well-being of all British citizens. The Labour party campaigners who opposed devolution in Wales added an ethnic wrinkle to the Conservatives' argument about the dangers

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of having members of the Labour party govern either Wales or Scotland. Allegedly, if a Welsh assembly were created, it soon would be dominated by members of the region's Welsh-speaking agrarian elite. Because of its upper-class background, this elite would ignore the daily needs of Wales's largely English-speaking urban workers and act only on behalf of the wealthy. Dozens of organized interest groups also tried to influence voters' thinking. Almost all Scottish and Welsh business associations campaigned against devolution, arguing that the likely tax increases needed to support the assemblies' activities would destroy both regions' already weak business climates. This would increase bankruptcies and joblessness. In Wales, a representative of the National Federation for the Self-Employed and Small Businesses declared that a regional assembly "can spell only gloom to the thousands of small shops and businesses which have been the main-spring of the Welsh economy."21 According to Kellas, "Some companies even threatened to remove themselves from Scotland if devolution came about." 22 The creation of regional governments was also opposed by many government employees, especially at the municipal level, because they feared it would reduce local government jobs and duties. Government workers therefore campaigned against the proposals and sometimes even helped finance anti-autonomy campaign organizations with public funds.23 Almost all unions that represented government workers (and there were almost 100,000 town hall employees in Wales alone) also went on record as opposing the proposals. The press also generally opposed the proposals.24 Almost all London newspapers predicted that devolution would be a first step to secession. Many Scottish regional papers initially supported devolution, but a number of traditionally prodevolution newspapers, such as the Scottish Daily Express, unexpectedly opposed the referendum proposal, partly on grounds that the powers of the proposed assembly were inadequate. On the front pages of Welsh newspapers, news about local strikes crowded out discussions of the upcoming referendum. A local newspaper strike during the midst of the campaign made information about the referendum even harder to acquire. The few editorials that did appear in Welsh newspapers tended to portray the upcoming referendum as Labour's bill. According to several scholars, this symbolic association damaged the proposal's reputation, because a vote against devolution was increasingly viewed as a vote against the highly unpopular Labour government and its seemingly inept handling of Great Britain's economic troubles.25 Some interest groups, of course, supported the devolution proposals. The Welsh Trade Union Council, for one, supported its region's referendum proposal partly out of fear that a decisive no vote would bring down the Labour government. Such an endorsement was a mixed blessing for

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t h e p r o d e v o l u t i o n forces, h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e of growing public hostility t o w a r d u n i o n s a n d t h e i r recent strikes. M o s t ministers in t h e C h u r c h of Scotland e n d o r s e d t h e devolution proposal. In general, h o w e v e r , t h e interest g r o u p s s u p p o r t i n g devolution lacked t h e financial resources, myriad of activists, a n d prestigious e n d o r s e m e n t s of t h e n o campaigns. D u r i n g t h e t h r e e - w e e k d e v o l u t i o n campaigns, public s u p p o r t f o r d e v o l u t i o n w a n e d in b o t h regions, particularly in Scotland, w h e r e early opinion polls h a d s h o w n that a large m a j o r i t y of eligible voters initially f a v o r e d devolution. 2 6 T h e reasons for the decline are multiple. P a r t y e n d o r s e m e n t s played a role, especially a m o n g Conservative v o t e r s w h o initially f a v o r e d d e v o l u t i o n and t h e n w e r e e n c o u r a g e d by p a r t y l e a d e r s t o v o t e against t h e proposal. 2 7 O p i n i o n polls also suggest that m a n y adults w e r e increasingly u n c e r t a i n a b o u t t h e possible economic c o n s e q u e n c e s of the devolution p r o p o s a l s and w e r e f e a r f u l a b o u t u n d e r t a k i n g political e x p e r i m e n t s d u r i n g economically t r o u b l e d times. 28 Finally, s o m e scholars believe that m a n y initial s u p p o r t e r s b e c a m e disillusioned a n d reconside r e d their stand as they b e c a m e m o r e familiar with t h e institutional details and political possibilities of the devolution proposals. O n e typical c o n c e r n was the possible d o m i n a t i o n of a Scottish assembly by the m o r e n u m e r o u s representatives f r o m Scotland's industrial belt and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g loss of p o w e r for t h e representatives f r o m rural districts. 29 T h e n e a r unity of the political parties in Spain stands in c o n t r a s t t o the extensive inter- a n d intraparty s q u a b b l i n g b e f o r e the British r e f e r e n dums. A l m o s t all m a j o r statewide p a r t i e s in Spain e n d o r s e d t h e r e f e r e n d u m p r o p o s a l s for self-rule for the traditional nations. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e then governing party, the U n i o n of t h e D e m o c r a t i c C e n t e r ( U n i ó n C e n t r o D e m o c r á t i c o , U C D ) , t h e P S O E ( t h e m a j o r opposition party), and t h e P C E all e n d o r s e d t h e a u t o n o m y p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e B a s q u e r e g i o n , C a t a l o n i a , a n d Galicia. In addition, all m a j o r nationalist p a r t i e s in Catalonia and t w o of the t h r e e largest B a s q u e nationalist g r o u p s e n d o r s e d the proposals. T h e B a s q u e r e g i o n ' s P e o p l e ' s Unity coalition ( H e r r i B a t a s u n a , H B ) was t h e only electorally p o w e r f u l nationalist o r g a n i z a t i o n that actively c a m p a i g n e d against t h e a u t o n o m y proposals. T h e H B was a recently f o r m e d electoral coalition indirectly c o n n e c t e d to a paramilitary wing of t h e B a s q u e H o m e l a n d and F r e e d o m ( E u z k a d i ta A s k a t a s u n a , E T A ) m o v e m e n t , an evolving and fissuring nationalist e f f o r t loosely held t o g e t h e r by visions of a f u t u r e B a s q u e socialist order. 3 0 T h e H B h a d e n j o y e d considerable electoral successes in t h e 1979 g e n e r a l and municipal elections and h a d b e c o m e the third largest electoral f o r c e in the region b e h i n d t h e long-established B a s q u e Nationalist p a r t y and Spanish Socialist party. T h e H B leaders insisted that all Spanish police a n d a r m e d forces b e r e m o v e d f r o m t h e territory a n d believed t h a t t h e specific w o r d i n g of t h e B a s q u e a u t o n o m y p r o p o s a l was t o o v a g u e t o b e satisfactory. T h e coalition's leadership f u r t h e r c o n t e n d e d that the p r o p o s a l , e v e n

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to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it was clearly stated, failed t o give t h e region a d e q u a t e self-rule. In t h e opinion of H B s p o k e s p e r s o n s , a good a u t o n o m y s t a t u t e would at m i n i m u m give t h e region i n d e p e n d e n c e in r e c o n s t r u c t i n g its e c o n o m y , direct r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies, a n d r e c o u r s e d u r i n g jurisdictional disputes with t h e Spanish g o v e r n m e n t to a constitutional court w h o s e b e n c h would include several m e m b e r s f r o m t h e B a s q u e c o u n t r y ' s highest court. W i t h o u t t h e s e a n d o t h e r promises, H B leaders said, t h e substantive impact of t h e a u t o n o m y p r o p o s a l would b e antiB a s q u e a n d a n t i w o r k e r . T h e H B electoral coalition, t h e r e f o r e , u r g e d voters t o b o y c o t t t h e r e f e r e n d u m , as m a n y h a d d o n e earlier d u r i n g the ratification of t h e Spanish constitution, so t h a t t h e r e f e r e n d u m ' s results could n o t legitimately b e r e a d as a sign of p o p u l a r approval. M e a n w h i l e , a paramilitary faction within E T A l a u n c h e d a c a m p a i g n of a r m e d attacks against Spain's a r m e d forces a n d p r o m i n e n t politicians. This faction h o p e d to p r o v o k e the Spanish police i n t o indiscriminate brutality against B a s q u e civilians that, in t u r n , would a n g e r t h e B a s q u e p o p u l a t i o n , f u r t h e r alienate B a s q u e voters f r o m t h e Spanish political system, and p e r s u a d e t h e m that t h e m o d i c u m of f r e e d o m p r o m i s e d in the a u t o n o m y s t a t u t e would not effectively p r o t e c t their interests. In the case of Galicia, almost all nationalist parties in t h e region disliked t h e w a t e r e d - d o w n substance of t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p r o p o s a l f o r regional self-rule. T h e y lacked significant electoral clout, h o w e v e r , jointly attracting less t h a n 12 p e r c e n t of the vote in t h e 1979 g e n e r a l elections. 3 1 In t e r m s of voting behavior, Galicia traditionally has b e e n o n e of the m o s t conservative regions within Spain. T h e w o r d i n g of its a u t o n o m y s t a t u t e t h e r e f o r e h a d b e e n largely decided by elected politicians of e i t h e r t h e highly conservative A P or t h e m o d e r a t e l y conservative U C D a n d not by nationalists. 3 2 T h e leaders of b o t h t h e A P a n d U C D w a n t e d only few, limited constitutional p o w e r s t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m M a d r i d to Galicia. A s a result, t h e w o r d i n g of the p r o p o s e d a u t o n o m y statute on the o n e h a n d explicitly r e f e r r e d to M a d r i d ' s s u p r e m e legislative authority a n d o n t h e o t h e r e n u m e r a t e d very few e c o n o m i c o r o t h e r policy a r e a s in which t h e regional g o v e r n m e n t would have legislative p o w e r . A n d a l u s i a was the only region in which a m a j o r s t a t e w i d e p a r t y o p p o s e d a r e f e r e n d u m for autonomy. 3 3 A s n o t e d , leaders of t h e governing U C D f e a r e d that extensive a u t o n o m y f o r A n d a l u s i a might o b s t r u c t swift a n d decisive actions by the central g o v e r n m e n t . M o r e o v e r , U C D l e a d e r s f e a r e d the growing popularity of their chief electoral rivals, t h e P S O E . Since F r a n c o ' s d e a t h , the P S O E electoral b a s e in A n d a l u s i a h a d b e e n steadily growing, and m a n y m e m b e r s of t h e U C D believed t h a t t h e Socialists m i g h t soon b e able to c a p t u r e a newly established regional g o v e r n m e n t in Andalusia, t r a n s f o r m it into a left-wing stronghold, and use it t o o b s t r u c t t h e controversial p r o g r a m of e c o n o m i c austerity that the U C D was pursuing. Finally, m a n y U C D leaders f e a r e d t h a t if A n d a l u s i a

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succeeded in attaining extensive amounts of policymaking authority, political leaders in other non-national territories might imitate the Andalusians and press for equal amounts of autonomy. Such an eventuality might lead to a far more confederal system of government in Spain than most U C D leaders thought was desirable. The decision by the U C D leadership to oppose autonomy for Andalusia split the party at the grassroots level. Many U C D activists in Andalusia openly supported autonomy. In part this was because many had been members of regionally based Andalusian parties prior to joining the U C D , and they retained a sense of regional loyalty. In addition, many local U C D activists feared that they would lose a significant amount of electoral support if they publicly opposed regional self-rule. After all, the proautonomy Andalusian Socialist party had come out of nowhere to win 11 percent of the region's votes, and almost all statewide parties in the region were appealing to residents' sectional sentiments. With such political considerations in mind, numerous U C D notables and activists resigned from their party and began to campaign for the proposal. Three-week campaigns preceded the referendums in the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia. In contrast to the Welsh and Scottish experiences, Spanish trade unions, business associations, church organizations, and most other major interest groups endorsed the proposals for regional self-rule. Most newspapers also supported this position. In the dramatic words of one high-ranking executive of a major Basque bank, " G o d liberate us from the Spanish administration! We presently are traveling on a road of concubinage and n e p o t i s m . . . . This country needs to be decentralized." 34 Opinion polls indicated sizable majorities in almost every socioeconomic group in the Basque country, and Catalonia supported autonomy. Even immigrants to the regions tended to support the autonomy proposals.35 In Galicia there was also considerable support in the towns and cities. A large number of rural residents, however, seemed indifferent to the vote. This disinterest, some scholars speculate, was partly attributable to the superficiality and vacuousness of the region's autonomy proposal. 36 There was consensus among major parties in Galicia, the Basque country, and Catalonia that the autonomy proposals should be ratified at the referendum. Only in Andalusia did the referendum campaign become bitter. A major source of the contention was the U C D ' s methods of campaigning against the autonomy movement. The U C D used its authority over state-run media, especially televised news, to reduce popular knowledge about, interest in, and support for the referendum. Newscasts repeatedly failed to report on day-to-day developments in the referendum campaigns, and public service debates over the referendum were scheduled for inconvenient hours. The Spanish government also arranged for the referendum campaign in Andalusia to last only two weeks.

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T h e pro-autonomy forces were hardly passive, however. T h e president of Andalusia's provisional government launched a hunger strike t o draw attention to the importance of the upcoming vote. M o r e than 2,000 street parties, informational meetings, and marches w e r e held by pro-autonomy groups; and more than 3 million pieces of pro-autonomy literature were distributed. 3 7 T h e P S O E alone held 1,500 informational meetings in 750 towns, while the relatively small Communist party printed m o r e than 100,000 pieces of pro-autonomy literature. 3 8 T h e Catholic church's leadership also campaigned for autonomy, declaring that "Andalusia cannot tolerate a degree of autonomy inferior to that given to other regions and nationalities." 3 9 Results f r o m Andalusian opinion polls indicated widespread and growing support for the autonomy proposal throughout the two-week campaign. Majorities favoring autonomy w e r e found in virtually every income group, although urban, middle-income residents were especially apt to support autonomy. Even about half the U C D identifiers favored 40

autonomy. T h e r e f e r e n d u m campaign in Q u e b e c informally began with the P Q government's early decisions on how to phrase the proposal. A f t e r analyzing opinion polls, strategists for the P Q government concluded that a sizable majority of Q u e b e c ' s residents wanted the province to have m o r e policymaking power, while only a little more than a third desired complete political independence from Canada. T h e party's leadership t h e r e f o r e chose ambiguous wording for the r e f e r e n d u m proposal. 4 1 They presented sovereignty-association as a way of conserving existing ties with Canada yet achieving a measure of independence. T h e r e f e r e n d u m ' s wording also intentionally sidestepped the sensitive questions of how much and what sorts of self-rule were being sought, since the proposal merely asked voters if they wanted the government of Q u e b e c to begin negotiations with C a n a d a ' s federal government. Sovereignty-association, in other words, was presented as an initial bargaining position. T h e actual n u m b e r and content of Q u e b e c ' s new powers would b e known only after negotiations were completed. Finally, the P Q ' s r e f e r e n d u m proposal included an explicit promise that a second r e f e r e n d u m would later be held to give residents an opportunity to review the results of the intergovernment negotiations. Thus, the proposal's wording implied that since any negotiated change would require popular ratification, voters need not fear that the province's representatives would seek an excessive range of p o w e r s for a Q u e b e c government. T o give the appearance of nonpartisanship, the advocates and opponents of sovereignty-association organized themselves u n d e r two umbrella groups. Each received $1.1 million f r o m public funds to finance its campaign. 4 2 B u t it was well known that the P Q dominated the p r o side and

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the Liberals the opposition. Once the referendum campaign formally began in April 1980, both sides hired advertising consultants, organized concerts and other media events, printed brochures, posted stickers, and canvased house-to-house. The opposing sides also held rallies throughout the territory, including even the small towns and villages in the remote eastern and northern areas. Sports personalities and entertainers endorsed the rival sides; federal civil servants, Inuits (Eskimos), small business, and other organized interest groups also campaigned. 43 Other than the business community's general suspicion of the PQ's periodic socialist rhetoric, there was no clear pattern to the pro and con endorsements by interest groups. The French-speaking community, for example, was divided over the wisdom of sovereignty-association. Many churchgoing rural francophones, in particular, were nervous about the growing power of the urban-based and social-democratic PQ. At the same time, some urban francophones feared that if there were negotiations over a sovereignty-association arrangement, the PQ might seek a greater economic independence from the rest of Canada than was desirable. 44 In this situation of rough parity between interest groups favoring and opposing sovereignty-association, perhaps the single most important campaigner was the popular and eloquent Liberal prime minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau. 45 Trudeau made four well-publicized campaign appearances in Quebec, during which he promised (in a misleading way, according to his nationalist critics) that if the sovereignty-association proposal were defeated, his government would acquire more powers for Quebec through reform of Canada's federal constitution. Trudeau also contended that the PQ's proposed method of securing greater self-rule through an ambiguously phrased referendum about sovereignty-association was Utopian because the leaders of Canada's other regions had already rejected the idea of negotiating economic association with a sovereign Quebec. H e argued that the advocates of sovereignty-association were woolly-minded idealists with "a sense of honour more highly developed than their sense of reality." 46 Finally, he accused PQ's leaders of intolerance toward English speakers and warned that under PQ rule an independent Quebec would resemble Cuba or Haiti because of endless economic problems and limited political freedoms for large numbers of citizens who do not speak French. Trudeau's arguments about an economic malaise were not unique. Opponents of sovereignty-association often raised questions about the economic implications of the referendum's proposal. They alleged that if Quebec had to survive on its own, severe economic dislocations would result because normal trade and currency relations with the rest of Canada would not immediately resume. For example, there soon would be shortages of petroleum, which Quebec imported from Canada's western prov-

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inces. Without access to traditional markets in other parts of Canada and without agricultural and petroleum imports, opponents predicted that Quebec's economy would soon collapse. Advocates of autonomy made the predictable counterarguments. They insisted that economic growth would result from a sovereignty-association arrangement because of the region's largely untapped export potential, underutilized hydroelectric potential, and already advanced industrial base. Any dislocation and joblessness would b e minimal and temporary and would soon be offset by the appropriateness of economic policies designed by regional policymakers highly sensitive to local needs and aspirations. During the campaign period, the P Q ' s leadership was fairly confident that the proposal would receive support from the party's past supporters, who were primarily urban, white-collar, public-sector, and francophone families. Therefore, the PQ's yes campaign courted more conservative middle-class voting blocks, with a particular emphasis on rural families and small capitalists whose livelihoods depended on the rough-and-tumble private sector. This required modifications of the P Q ' s traditionally social-democratic program, which had emphasized increased planning by the government. P Q leaders now argued that the province had a native entrepreneurial dynamism, but it was currently fettered by rules and regulations imposed by Canada's federal government. A powerful Quebec government would reduce interference in the market and leave enterprises freer to generate regional prosperity. During the two-month campaign, spokespersons for the yes campaign made a few tactical blunders that, some observers believe, affected the referendum's outcome. First of all, a highly visible P Q feminist, who was also a member of the provincial cabinet, used a negative stereotype of traditional housewives in a campaign speech. She derogatorily referred to such housewives as " Y v e t t e s " and insinuated that women who planned to vote no in the upcoming referendum were culturally backward Yvettes. T h e activist had intended to shame women listeners into supporting the P Q ' s sovereignty-association proposal, but the stinging rhetoric backfired. Influential newspapers in the region depicted the negative stereotype as evidence of the activist's intolerance toward housewives. Outrage spread, and a pro housewife mobilization, the " Yvette movement," emerged and denounced the P Q and its sovereignty-association proposal. With its numerous marches and demonstrations, the Yvette movement soon monopolized headlines in local newspapers and captured the imaginations and hearts of many Quebec residents. 47 Ironically, the PQ's campaign was further hurt by its leaders' normally low-key, highly polite campaign style designed not to offend any social group. 4 * Since its inception, the P Q had taken great pains to maintain an image of respectability. Unlike other militant nationalist groups of the

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1960s, the P Q had carefully avoided participation in extraparliamentary demonstrations and combative rhetoric. Fearing that broadsides and invectives might backfire, PQ activists eschewed mean-spirited statements. Local Liberal activists slung a considerable amount of mud during the campaign, sometimes even equating the PQ's "hidden" political agenda with fascism. P Q activists, however, appealed to voters' economic hopes and interests and provincial pride. Through positive and patiently argued higher appeals, the yes side could win, or so the P Q leaders believed. Opinion polls indicated that popular support for sovereignty-association oscillated considerably during the referendum campaign. Before the referendum proposal was introduced in December 1979, about 37 percent of the province's eligible voters supported sovereignty-association, 47 percent opposed it, and 16 percent expressed no opinion. During the first weeks of campaigning that immediately followed the televised parliamentary debate, almost 50 percent of the eligible voters had favorable attitudes toward the proposal, with slightly more than 40 percent opposing the proposal, and with less than 10 percent of eligible voters reporting no opinion. After a month of formal campaigning, eligible voter support for sovereignty-association had declined and stood on a par with opposition. By the end of April, eligible voters expressing approval for the proposal were in the minority. They trailed those expressing disapproval by 10 percent, with another 10 percent of the voters reporting no opinion. 49 Popular opinion toward sovereignty-association had come full circle. Many voters' understanding of the substance of the proposal was fuzzy, however. Less than 40 percent of the Québécois interviewed by poll takers could correctly articulate what the PQ meant by sovereignty-association, and about 25 percent openly admitted that they did not know what the phrase meant. 50 Although the vast majority of residents were willing to make judgments about sovereignty-association when queried by pollsters, few were confident of the exact meaning of the phrase. There were many causes for the shifting tides of public opinion concerning the PQ's proposal. It is likely, as some scholars have argued, that short-term factors such as Trudeau's skillful oratory, the Yvette affair, and the PQ's nonassertive rhetorical style influenced voters' opinions. It is also conceivable that, over time, the ambiguity of the referendum's proposal made some citizens edgy; for as we have seen, voters frequently lacked a clear picture of what economic and political consequences might result from a yes vote. VOTER PARTICIPATION

Popular participation in the referendums on regional self-rule varied considerably. Voter turnout in Scotland and Wales was quite low, far

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below the typical regional turnouts for British general elections. The Spanish referendum turnouts were generally higher than those in Scotland and Wales. Furthermore, the difference between turnouts in preceding general elections and turnouts in the referendums was far less dramatic in the Spanish cases than in the British ones. Quebec had the highest voter turnout among the referendums considered here. The turnout in Quebec's referendum also exceeded those of recent general elections. In Scotland, the average voter turnout for general elections during the 1970s had been around 76 percent of the electorate. Election turnouts in Wales had been slightly above 78 percent. 51 Slightly less than 63 percent of the electorate voted in the Scottish referendum; slightly less than 59 percent of the Welsh electorate participated in the Welsh referendum. 52 So in the two regions, referendum turnouts were roughly 15 percent lower than turnouts at general elections. One could argue that these comparatively low turnout figures partly support a common proposition in the literature on referendums: that most citizens are politically apathetic by nature, tend to be preoccupied with private concerns even during referendums, and without directions from parties are seldom informed, interested voters. This proposal, as we mentioned earlier, is often advanced by critics of referendums who emphasize the political incompetence of voters. Competing interpretations of the low turnouts are possible, however. First of all, it is possible that some voters stayed home not because of apathy or indifference but because they remained dissatisfied with the alternatives that the government had offered. The substance of the Labour government's watered-down devolution proposals, after all, satisfied few political activists—including many members of the Labour party and the nationalist parties. Perhaps many Scottish and Welsh voters also were ambivalent and chose neither to vote against the government's offer for regional self-rule nor to embrace it in the form the government had designed. Instead, many citizens chose to stay home. It is also possible that the low turnout was more the result of the major parties' contradictory mobilization efforts than it was due to voters' innate apathy. Almost all parties were internally divided over the devolutionary proposals. Consequently, their voter-mobilization efforts were often halfhearted. Indeed, different wings of the party were at times working at cross purposes: some urged voters to support devolution, some urged voters to defeat the proposal. It is not unreasonable to speculate, therefore, that a larger than normal proportion of voters stayed home because they were exposed to contradictory instructions and conflicting information. Finally, the low turnouts may have been a by-product of economically uncertain times. Great Britain was in the midst of a recession during the late 1970s. The economic downturn was especially severe in Scotland and Wales. Moreover, there had been recent and bitter industrial struggles

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that had lowered many residents' standard of living and had divided the nation. Founding a new system of government is always a leap into the dark. To try to create a new political order when so many economic arrangements are being shaken requires remarkable courage, because the long-term implications of a major change in political arrangements are unclear and disaster may result. Thus, because they were already living amid highly uncertain economic times, Scottish and Welsh voters arguably and understandably were hesitant about making a potentially momentous constitutional decision. Referendum turnouts in Spain were remarkably consistent across the country's geographically and sociologically diverse regions. Seldom did more than 60 percent of eligible voters in a region participate in the referendum; seldom did less than 55 percent do so, as Table 6.2 details. The referendum turnout in each Spanish region was only moderately lower than was the turnout for the most recent general election. In the Basque country, for example, the turnout for the autonomy referendum was 57 percent, while the turnout for the 1979 general election was 65.9 percent. 53 The referendum turnout in Catalonia was 60 percent, while the 1979 general election turnout was 67.6 percent. 54 In both cases, the difference between the referendum turnouts and general election turnouts was less than 9 percentage points, noticeably smaller than the differences found in either Scotland or Wales. An anomalously low turnout did occur in Galicia, however, where less than 30 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots. In light of local

Table 6.2. V o t e r Turnout in Spanish A u t o n o m y Referendums Referendum Date

Region

October 1979 October 1979 February 1980 December 1980 October 1981

Basque Country Catalonia Andalusia Galicia Andalusia

Percentage of Eligible Voters Casting Ballots 57 60 64 29 54

Sources: Antonio Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum de Iniciativa Autonómica del 28 de Febrero en Andalucía," Revista de Estudios Políticos 15 (May-June 1980), p. 189; Mike Newton, "The Peoples and Regions of Spain," in Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics After Franco, edited by David S. Bell (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 110, 118; Robert P. Clark,"The Question of Regional Autonomy in Spain's Democratic Transition," in Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic Transition and a New International Role (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 145.

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history, t h e low t u r n o u t is n o t entirely surprising. Galicia traditionally h a s h a d c o m p a r a t i v e l y low t u r n o u t s in almost all elections. F o r e x a m p l e , less t h a n 50 p e r c e n t of t h e G a l l e g o e l e c t o r a t e v o t e d in the 1979 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s . T h i s w a s t h e l o w e s t t u r n o u t in all of S p a i n . Still, t h e r e f e r e n d u m ' s t u r n o u t of less t h a n 30 p e r c e n t was unusually low, even by G a l l e g o standards. A s scholar M i k e N e w t o n points out, the low t u r n o u t f o r the a u t o n o m y r e f e r e n d u m in 1980 was partly d u e to "general public disillusion" with t h e small a m o u n t of a u t o n o m y being considered. 5 5 T h e issue was t o o t a n g e n tial t o p e o p l e ' s lives t o ignite interest. Local social conditions, h o w e v e r , p r o b a b l y also c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e citizens' inertia. Galicia has the lowest literacy r a t e a m o n g Spain's regions and is t h e least industrialized and most i m p o v e r i s h e d region in Spain. R e s e a r c h o n voting b e h a v i o r a n d political culture suggests that illiteracy a n d chronic p o v e r t y o f t e n inhibit voting, partly b e c a u s e t h e y n u r t u r e feelings of p e r s o n a l helplessness and futility that, in t u r n , can debilitate o n e ' s faith in t h e efficacy of political action. 5 6 Intraregional d i f f e r e n c e s in r e f e r e n d u m t u r n o u t s within C a t a l o n i a and A n d a l u s i a indirectly c o r r o b o r a t e this s o c i o e c o n o m i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Galicia's unusually low t u r n o u t . If Galicia's social conditions contribu t e d t o v o t e r s ' passivity, it follows that low t u r n o u t s should h a v e also occurred in o t h e r regions w h o s e rural a r e a s have social conditions similar t o those of Galicia. Scholars h a v e in fact f o u n d s o m e s u p p o r t i n g evidence in b o t h C a t a l o n i a a n d A n d a l u s i a . In these regions, unlike in Galicia, a considerable a m o u n t of regional self-rule was b e i n g decided. Overall t u r n o u t in t h e two provinces was higher t h a n in Galicia, b u t within the two, voting was noticeably h i g h e r in u r b a n areas t h a n it was in p r e d o m i nantly rural districts, w h e r e b o t h literacy rates a n d s t a n d a r d of living a r e quite low. 57 In c o m p a r i s o n to t u r n o u t rates in G r e a t Britain a n d Spain, participation in Q u e b e c ' s sovereignty-association r e f e r e n d u m was r e m a r k a b l y high, with 84 p e r c e n t of the e l e c t o r a t e voting. E v e n in t e r m s of local political history, this is a r e m a r k a b l y high level of p o p u l a r participation, easily surpassing t h e 76 p e r c e n t t u r n o u t in t h e 1979 g e n e r a l elections. 5 8 P a r t of t h e explanation for the comparatively high t u r n o u t in Q u e b e c m a y involve t h e region's relative prosperity a n d e c o n o m i c stability, especially in c o m p a r i s o n to the d e e p recessions a n d industrial dislocations occurring in Scotland, Wales, a n d Spain d u r i n g t h e late 1970s. T h e P Q a n d Liberal party also t o o k consistent a n d strong stands d u r i n g t h e r e f e r e n d u m a n d vigorously p u r s u e d votes, unlike t h e o f t e n c o n f u s e d a n d f r a g m e n t e d campaigns in G r e a t Britain. Finally, the P Q r e f e r e n d u m , unlike m o s t r é f é r e n d u m s in Spain, could n o t b e p r e d i c t e d . T h e anticipated closeness of the vote arguably p r o d d e d additional citizens t o go t o their polls.

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DETERMINANTS OF VICTORY T h e results of the regional self-rule referendums were, like the turnout rates, quite diverse. In both Quebec and Wales, the proposals were defeated by surprisingly large margins. The proposals almost always easily passed in Spain. Most of the voters in Scotland supported the Labour government's devolution proposal, but it was defeated because of the controversial 40 percent rule. A s noted, voter turnouts in Scotland and Wales were relatively low in comparison to turnouts in general elections. T h e low turnout proved significant because of the 40 percent rule, which stipulated that in order for the devolution proposal to pass, the number of yes votes had to be equal to or greater than 40 percent of all registered voters. In Scotland, the turnout was only 64 percent. Therefore, to pass, the proposal needed to receive approximately twice as many yes votes as no votes. This did not happen. Fifty-two percent of the voters cast yes ballots, but they represented only 33 percent of the region's total electorate. Within Scotland, support for devolution was especially strong in the industrial belt that runs along the Clyde River. The industrial belt is also a Labour party stronghold, although some SNP candidates with socialist beliefs had recently made inroads there. In many rural and most outlying areas of Scotland, the proposal was not as strongly supported and was sometimes defeated. According to Vernon Bogdanor, many rural residents believed that the regional assembly proposed by the Labour government would be monopolized by urban, Labour party interests to the detriment of more traditional, rural communities. Out of sectional interests, therefore, many rural residents voted no. 59 In Wales, the proposal was soundly defeated: only one voter in five supported the bill. Even in the two nationalist counties, where Welsh was commonly spoken and where Welsh nationalists had been recently elected to Parliament, the proposal lost by similar lopsided ratios of two to one. 60 In the four counties that had been Labour party strongholds and also had been home districts for the outspoken Gang of Six opposition leaders to devolution, only 17 p e r c e n t of t h e v o t e r s s u p p o r t e d t h e L a b o u r government's proposal. 61 The results in Spain stand in sharp contrast to the Scottish and Welsh experiences. Almost every autonomy proposal in Spain easily passed. Ninety-five percent of the voters in the Basque country opted for autonomy; 88 percent did so in Catalonia; 75 percent in Galicia; and 87 percent in Andalusia. These consistent and impressive victories are partly explained by the breadth of the interparty coalitions that supported the proposals. As mentioned, a considerable amount of negotiation and consensus building among elites preceded the presentation of the proposals to the voters. By the time the referendums were held, only a few parties

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openly opposed the proposals, with the most obvious cases being the U C D in Andalusia and the H B in the Basque country. Results of referendum-day polls indicate that most citizens w h o voted yes had also voted in earlier elections for one of the parties that endorsed the autonomy proposals. Conversely, most of the citizens polled w h o voted no reported supporting either the highly conservative A P , the B a s q u e H B , or the Andalusian U C D . So, partisan loyalties seem to b e a partial explanation for the voters' behavior. Still, party allegiance was only o n e of several factors influencing voters' behavior; according to some polls, supporters of the H B and Andalusian U C D frequently b r o k e ranks during the r e f e r e n d u m s and voted yes. 62 Andalusia was a curious exception to the overall p a t t e r n in Spain. It was the only region w h e r e the r e f e r e n d u m proposal technically failed to pass. This resulted f r o m the procedural requirement that majorities of all eligible voters in every province approve the proposal. Large majorities of those who cast their ballots approved of the proposal in all eight Andalusian provinces. In one province, however, the proposal was not approved by a majority of all eligible voters. T h e r e were constitutional ambiguities about whether these results m e a n t passage or failure, and the U C D government interpreted the constitution to support the government's position and declared that the r e f e r e n d u m had b e e n defeated. N o n - U C D politicians in A n d a l u s i a i m m e d i a t e l y p r o t e s t e d t h e government's strict interpretation of the law governing the r e f e r e n d u m and argued that autonomy had been strongly supported throughout the region and that, therefore, the r e f e r e n d u m ' s results should b e treated as morally binding on the Spanish parliament and government. T h e r e was, f u r t h e r m o r e , troubling evidence of ballot tampering by the U C D government. For example, there were reports of poll watchers allowing voters to cast multiple no votes and of n o ballots mysteriously being cast by deceased citizens. B o m b a r d e d by protests in parliament and embarrassed by a growing scandal, the government agreed to a second r e f e r e n d u m , which the pro-autonomy forces won even more handily than they had in the 1979 referendum. While the story of the Spanish r e f e r e n d u m s is o n e of repeated victories for groups favoring regional self-rule, the r e f e r e n d u m story f r o m Q u e b e c is o n e of disappointing defeat for the P Q . During the campaign, opinion polls periodically showed a majority of citizens supporting regional self-rule, and m a n y P Q activists had faith that their position would win. On the day of the r e f e r e n d u m , however, 40.5 percent of the citizens w h o cast ballots voted yes and 59.5 percent voted no. T h e r e was a fairly clear partisan pattern to the r e f e r e n d u m voting. Most citizens w h o voted yes also had voted f o r the P Q in recent elections, while n o voters tended to have voted for parties other than the PQ. 6 3 T h e r e is, f u r t h e r m o r e , some opinion poll data suggesting that partisan loyalty

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f r e q u e n t l y o v e r r o d e policy p r e f e r e n c e s in d e t e r m i n i n g h o w a citizen v o t e d . O n e study f o u n d t h a t 16 p e r c e n t of t h o s e w h o cast ballots f o r sovereignty-association o p p o s e d any increase in regional self-rule. T h e y h a d v o t e d yes t o s u p p o r t their party, t h e P Q . M e a n w h i l e , 28 p e r c e n t of those w h o voted against sovereignty-association actually desired significantly g r e a t e r regional self-rule b u t v o t e d n o t o d e m o n s t r a t e supp o r t of p a r t i e s o t h e r t h a n t h e PQ. 6 4 Interestingly, unlike t h e votes in Spain w h e r e m a n y n o n - B a s q u e s p e a k e r s and n o n - C a t a l a n s p e a k e r s either v o t e d for regional a u t o n o m y o r abstained, large n u m b e r s of n o n f r a n c o p h o n e s in Q u e b e c v o t e d in t h e r e f e r e n d u m a n d v o t e d overwhelmingly against sovereignty-association. G i v e n the n o n f r a n c o p h o n e s ' m o r e t h a n 90 p e r c e n t opposition t o sovereignty-association, the p r o p o s a l n e e d e d s u p p o r t f r o m a very large m a j o r ity of F r e n c h s p e a k e r s t o p a s s . O n l y a b o u t 50 p e r c e n t of t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g voters w h o went to t h e polls cast yes ballots, h o w e v e r . F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g voters in the countryside w e r e especially reluctant to s u p p o r t t h e P Q ' s proposal, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e of o n g o i n g hostility to the P Q ' s highly u r b a n , p r o growth, a n d semisocialist p l a t f o r m a n d rhetoric. 6 5 It appears, t h e n , t h a t the sovereignty-association p r o p o s a l that was spons o r e d by t h e economically r e f o r m - o r i e n t e d P Q simply h a d t o o n a r r o w a partisan backing a n d too qualified a linguistic a p p e a l to win.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFERENDUMS O n c e the r e f e r e n d u m ballots h a d b e e n c o u n t e d , did m u c h c h a n g e ? W e r e the r e f e r e n d u m s e m p t y spectacles that dazzled o b s e r v e r s b u t did n o t significantly alter public policy, or w e r e t h e r e noticeable c o n s e q u e n c e s following f r o m the proposals' d e f e a t s o r ratification? A l t h o u g h the Scottish and Welsh r e f e r e n d u m s did not immediately p r o d u c e any long-term c h a n g e in the constitutional rights a n d political status of t h e two regions, t h e r e f e r e n d u m s h a d i m m e d i a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s for G r e a t Britain's preexisting system of parties and p a r t y rule. F r u s t r a t e d a n d a n g e r e d by t h e entire r e f e r e n d u m process, the S N P w i t h d r e w its p a r l i a m e n t a r y s u p p o r t f r o m t h e L a b o u r party. This action facilitated the success of a C o n s e r v a t i v e - s p o n s o r e d vote of n o c o n f i d e n c e , which in t u r n provided an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r P r i m e Minister M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r and h e r Conservative g o v e r n m e n t t o e n t e r office a n d retain p o w e r for over a decade. T h e t w o nationalist parties, in the m e a n t i m e , w e r e reeling internally f r o m the decisive d e f e a t s of the devolution proposals. A c c u s a t i o n s of i n c o m p e t e n c e w e r e m a d e within b o t h parties; factional purges comm e n c e d within t h e SNP; a n d m a n y y o u n g nationalists left politics altogether. V o t i n g for Scottish and Welsh nationalist candidates, m e a n w h i l e ,

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declined sharply, with the Plaid Cymru losing two of its three parliamentarians in the 1979 general elections and the SNP losing nine of its eleven. Aspirations for regional self-rule did not die, however. Opinion polls taken immediately following the defeat of the devolution proposals showed that many residents in the two regions expected that the British Labour government would propose a new decentralization plan. Few anticipated that the issue would be dropped altogether by the Thatcher government. 66 From this nadir, opinion polls during the 1980s showed that public approval for devolution grew steadily in both regions. This encouraged many Labour activists in Scotland and Wales, including the former members of the antidevolution Gang of Six, to embrace extensive regional self-rule in hopes of weakening the Conservatives' hold in Parliament. 67 In Spain, the four autonomy referendums clearly helped redefine the government's political agenda. After the referendums, the clarification and development of relationships between Madrid and the multiplicity of regional governments became a dominant issue in Spanish politics. Questions about the exact extent of the regions' educational, labor, economic, and social service policymaking powers had to be clarified; and bitter battles between Madrid and the regional governments ensued. 68 Political leaders in Spain, however, ceased to use referendums to help decide autonomy policy. Instead, intergovernmental relations were refined through ongoing and seemingly endless negotiations between the central government and coalitions of politicians from each region, with Spain's constitutional court system playing an increasingly important role in adjudicating differences. The failure of Quebec's sovereignty-association referendum combined with the sudden death of René Lévesque, the PQ's highly skilled leader, resulted in the party's rapid organizational disintegration and electoral decline. Just as the failures of the devolution proposals in Wales and Scotland led to widespread disappointment within the Plaid Cymru and SNP, many younger activists in the PQ who had hoped that Quebec's self-rule would lead to widespread social and political change dropped out of nationalist politics; and some dropped out of politics altogether. 69 The impact of the world recession further reduced the saliency of autonomy in this especially hard-hit industrialized and exporting region. Since the referendum's defeat, Canadian leaders repeatedly have tried through initiatives at the federal level of government to preserve Canadian unity while advancing the linguistic rights and economic interests of French Canadians. Various constitutional revisions have been proposed to give provincial governments new powers. These ideas, however, have faced strong opposition from leaders of English-speaking provinces. Objections have been especially virulent in western Canada, where leaders maintain that too many scarce resources and political rights have already been granted to Quebec while the western provinces' eco-

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n o m i c n e e d s h a v e b e e n r e p e a t e d l y neglected. T h e belief of regional elites t h a t their provinces are being unfairly exploited by o t h e r provinces within t h e f e d e r a t i o n is a p p a r e n t l y also c o m m o n p l a c e a m o n g C a n a d i a n citizens. In e a c h province, t h e citizenry generally "sees itself as altruistic b u t exploited by o t h e r s and disliking t h e m for it." 70 M e a n w h i l e , opinion polls in Q u e b e c have shown a steady increase in f a v o r a b l e a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d i n d e p e n d e n c e . In 1978, only 12 p e r c e n t of t h e residents in Q u e b e c a p p r o v e d of s e p a r a t i o n f r o m C a n a d a . By 1991, h o w ever, 42 p e r c e n t of t h e residents in Q u e b e c s u p p o r t e d separation. 7 1 T h u s , despite the d e f e a t of t h e P Q ' s r e f e r e n d u m , the question of redesigning C a n a d a ' s constitutional o r d e r clearly remains a lively one. A s o n e C a n a dian political scientist h a s p o i n t e d out, the words of Yogi B e r r a s e e m a p r o p o s in t h e c o n t e x t of Q u e b e c ' s ongoing struggles for g r e a t e r self-rule: " I t ain't over 'til it's over." 7 2

RECENT REFERENDUMS IN THE SOVIET UNION M a n y citizens of t h e t h e n Soviet republics of Estonia, L i t h u a n i a , a n d Latvia v o t e d d u r i n g 1991 in w h a t local g o v e r n m e n t officials cautiously called opinion polls. T h e officials avoided calling the votes r e f e r e n d u m s largely b e c a u s e their constitutional standing within the Soviet U n i o n was unclear and b e c a u s e an a p p a r e n t violation of the Soviet constitution could p r o v i d e the K r e m l i n with a p r e t e x t for a full-scale invasion of t h e r e p u b lics. 73 N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e s e "opinion polls" were in effect advisory r e f e r e n d u m s t h r o u g h which citizens of the republics could express w h e t h e r t h e y desired i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n . T h e s e instances of direct d e m o c r a c y b o t h resembled a n d d i f f e r e d f r o m the r e f e r e n d u m s held in G r e a t Britain, Spain, and C a n a d a a d e c a d e earlier. O n e striking similarity was the s u d d e n rise of nationalist p a r t i e s immediately p r i o r t o t h e r e f e r e n d u m s . In 1990, elections were held f o r t h e p a r l i a m e n t s of t h e t h r e e Soviet republics. P r o - i n d e p e n d e n c e c a n d i d a t e s w o n a surprisingly large n u m b e r of seats—so many that nationalist p a r t i e s b e c a m e t h e p r e m i e r electoral forces within the republics. In c o n t r a s t , t h e r e p u b l i c s ' C o m m u n i s t parties, which h a d b e e n staunchly a n t i - i n d e p e n d e n c e , s u f f e r e d n u m e r o u s election-day losses. S o m e individual C o m m u n i s t s r e s p o n d e d t o these w i d e s p r e a d s e t b a c k s by a d o p t i n g a p r o - i n d e p e n d e n c e p o s t u r e in o r d e r to retain a m o d i c u m of popularity a n d t o b e m o r e competitive in later elections. 7 4 L i t h u a n i a ' s C o m m u n i s t p a r t y o p e n l y a d v o c a t e d Lithuanian self-rule a n d r e n a m e d itself t h e L i t h u a n i a n D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y despite heavy p r e s s u r e f r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n ' s C o m m u n i s t party. T h e c o u r a g e of the L i t h u a n i a n D e m o cratic Party in resisting pressure f r o m Moscow quickly resuscitated its sagging popularity.

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Almost immediately following the 1990 elections, the parliament of each Baltic republic declared its wish to secede from the Soviet Union and form a sovereign state. Soon thereafter, Soviet tanks rolled into the republics' capitals and forcibly repressed pro-independence demonstrators. These actions apparently were taken with the prior approval of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, who feared that the republics' declarations of independence might spawn secessionist movements throughout the Soviet Union, encourage a right-wing backlash within the Communist party, jeopardize already controversial liberal economic reforms, and greatly harm the Soviet Union's international stature. Prior to the central government's military action, the republics' parliaments had opposed holding referendums on independence on grounds that the election process had invested the parliaments with sufficient authority to decide the issue of independence. 75 This common stand changed, however, after Soviet troops had entered the capitals, surrounded government institutions, and attacked and even killed Baltic citizens. Fearing an imminent full-scale military invasion and martial law, the local parliaments quickly called for referendums to substantiate their citizens' desire for national independence before world opinion. As was true in the Quebec referendum, the advisory referendums in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were never recognized by the central government. Gorbachev maintained that the Baltic parliaments were ignoring constitutionally established procedures for securing independence. He advised the republics' parliaments to work patiently through the Soviet system, utilizing legal procedures of petition and review. From the nationalists' perspectives, a problem with Gorbachev's recommendation was that the established appeals procedure could take five years to complete and could result in significant reductions in the republics' territories. Moreover, Gorbachev's deep distrust of decentralization was well known, so a favorable outcome to the appeals procedure was hardly guaranteed. The wording of the three republics' referendums did not ask voters if they approved the creation of a specific type of political order that had particular powers, procedures, and institutional arrangements. Voters instead were asked a more abstract question: " A r e you in favor of a democratic, independent Latvia (or Estonia, or Lithuania)?" Potentially divisive questions about institutional arrangements—such as what fiscal, educational, and economic powers an independent republic should have, or how minorities' rights should be protected—were thus sidestepped. Organized interest groups, including Soviet trade unions, the Catholic church, and diverse ethnic associations, participated in informational campaigns prior to the republics' referendums. Opponents of the proposals prophesied that independence would lead to economic collapse and terrible hardships for all. Allegedly, the economies of the Baltic republics

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w e r e t o o intertwined with those of t h e o t h e r Soviet republics to i g n o r e their t r a d e , fiscal, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , m o n e t a r y , a n d tariff policies. O n l y c o o r d i n a t i o n by a centralized interrepublic g o v e r n m e n t could e n s u r e e c o n o m i c h e a l t h in t h e Baltics, o p p o n e n t s claimed. Critics f u r t h e r a r g u e d that if the Baltic republics b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t , ethnic minorities, particularly e t h n i c Russians a n d Poles, w o u l d b e c o m e second-class citizens suffering, a m o n g o t h e r things, linguistic discrimination at school and at work. G o r b a c h e v himself charged that t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s w e r e t h i n l y v e i l e d e x p r e s s i o n s of " n a t i o n a l i s t totalitarianism." 7 6 Parenthetically, it should b e n o t e d that ethnic discrimination was n o t an entirely imagined p r o b l e m invented by p r o - S o v i e t d e m a g o g u e s . T h e E s t o n i a n Citizens' C o m m i t t e e and s o m e o t h e r i m p o r t ant Baltic nationalist organizations w a n t e d citizenship rights restricted t o direct d e s c e n d a n t s of t h o s e w h o w e r e citizens of the Baltic republics p r i o r to their 1940 i n c o r p o r a t i o n into t h e Soviet Union. 7 7 A d v o c a t e s of i n d e p e n d e n c e naturally o f f e r e d a d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e of w h a t would h a p p e n if i n d e p e n d e n c e was attained. T h e y alleged t h a t t h e republics n o longer would have to follow M o s c o w ' s poorly i n f o r m e d directives a n d e c o n o m i c policies a n d would, t h e r e f o r e , b e f r e e t o e n a c t policies a p p r o p r i a t e f o r each republic. This would also avoid inefficiencies caused by c o r r u p t i o n within the C o m m u n i s t party. A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , separatists claimed, g o v e r n m e n t officials would b e far m o r e sensitive t o r e g i o n a l e c o n o m i c n e e d s b e c a u s e t h e y would b e a c c o u n t a b l e t o a regionally e l e c t e d g o v e r n m e n t . T h e result of all t h e s e c h a n g e s w o u l d be prosperity. M a n y a d v o c a t e s of i n d e p e n d e n c e also tried to reassure e t h n i c m i n o r ities that citizenship in their new c o u n t r y would b e e x t e n d e d t o t h e m o n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e was achieved. Most church leaders in ethnic-minority enclaves, f o r instance, tried to discredit x e n o p h o b i c a r g u m e n t s and u r g e d a yes vote on i n d e p e n d e n c e . C o m p a r e d to the t u r n o u t for t h e British and Spanish r e f e r e n d u m s , the m o r e t h a n 80 p e r c e n t t u r n o u t s for each of the t h r e e advisory r e f e r e n d u m s was quite high. 78 T h e exceptional t u r n o u t levels are especially r e m a r k a b l e given G o r b a c h e v ' s r e p e a t e d c o n d e m n a t i o n s of the votes and t h e p r e s e n c e in the streets of Soviet tanks and soldiers. P e r h a p s as i m p o r t a n t as the t u r n o u t levels was t h e almost religious spirit of t h e participants. M a n y voters w e r e so impressed by t h e p o t e n t i a l historical significance of their acts that they b r o u g h t children t o t h e polls to watch t h e event. D e c l a r e d o n e elderly voter a f t e r casting h e r ballot, " W e are m o v e d to tears this day." 7 9 L a r g e majorities voted yes in each republic. Seventy-seven p e r c e n t of E s t o n i a n voters s u p p o r t e d i n d e p e n d e n c e ; 78 percent of Latvia's voters did so; and 91 p e r c e n t v o t e d yes in Lithuania. 8 0 In each of the t h r e e republics,

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the i n d i g e n o u s e t h n i c p o p u l a t i o n s v o t e d in f a v o r of i n d e p e n d e n c e by an o v e r w h e l m i n g r a t i o of nearly 9:1. Surprisingly, m a n y R u s s i a n s a n d o t h e r non-Baltic residents also v o t e d f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e . In s o m e R u s s i a n enclaves, large m a j o r i t i e s of voters u n d e r s t a n d a b l y e i t h e r cast n o ballots o r silently p r o t e s t e d b y staying away f r o m t h e polls. In o t h e r enclaves, however, t u r n o u t was as high as its republic's average. E v e n m o r e r e m a r k ably, in s o m e ethnic districts t h e yes vote was as high as 98 percent. 8 1 W e e k s later, t h e Soviet g o v e r n m e n t tried t o offset t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l impact of t h e republics' r e f e r e n d u m s by holding a r e f e r e n d u m on r e f o r m ing t h e f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e while retaining t h e unity of t h e Soviet U n i o n . Soviet l e a d e r s c a m p a i g n e d h a r d , h o p i n g t h a t a large yes vote would delegitimize t h e results of the earlier Baltic r e f e r e n d u m s . T h e exact substance of t h e Soviet r e f e r e n d u m was difficult to identify, h o w e v e r . T h e p r o p o s a l r e a d : " D o y o u consider it necessary to p r e s e r v e t h e u n i o n of Soviet Socialist R e p u b l i c s as a r e n e w e d f e d e r a t i o n of e q u a l , sovereign republics in which h u m a n rights and f r e e d o m s of any nationality will b e fully g u a r a n t e e d ? " G o r b a c h e v m a i n t a i n e d that t h e r e f e r e n d u m p r o m i s e d b o t h a s t r o n g e r c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t in certain policy a r e a s a n d g r e a t e r self-determination f o r t h e republics in o t h e r areas. Boris Yeltsin, a charismatic R u s s i a n l e a d e r and G o r b a c h e v ' s chief rival, a r g u e d that the p r o p o s a l ' s p h r a s i n g was so o b s c u r e a n d a m b i g u o u s that it was almost meaningless. E v e n t o the extent that m e a n i n g was clear, h o w e v e r , it reinforced t h e principle of an overriding central g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , in Yeltsin's opinion, t h e r e f e r e n d u m was " a i m e d at t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of the imperial, unitary n a t u r e of t h e u n i o n and its c u r r e n t political system a n d allows for only superficial renovation." 8 2 D u r i n g t h e r e f e r e n d u m campaign, G o r b a c h e v used state-run television and C o m m u n i s t p a r t y n e w s p a p e r s to rally s u p p o r t . G o v e r n m e n t and party publications and c a m p a i g n literature associated a vote f o r t h e unity proposal with security and prosperity, while they associated a n o vote with chaos and b l o o d s h e d . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e d r a w i n g on t h e f r o n t page of Pravda on t h e eve of t h e r e f e r e n d u m showed two hands. O n e h a n d , next to t h e w o r d yes, held grain; t h e o t h e r hand, next t o the w o r d no, held bullets. 83 T h e yes c a m p a i g n was g o v e r n m e n t f u n d e d a n d relied heavily on television t o convey its message. T h e n o campaign was dispersed, grassroots b a s e d , and u n c o o r d i n a t e d . It also lacked access t o statewide electronic m e d i a . Yeltsin, f o r e x a m p l e , was b a r r e d f r o m c a m p a i g n i n g on s t a t e television. T o t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s surprise, t h e yes vote was q u i t e w e a k , especially in u r b a n a r e a s . In M o s c o w , L e n i n g r a d , and K i e v — t h e t h r e e largest cities in t h e Soviet U n i o n — a n d o t h e r m e t r o p o l i t a n c e n t e r s , t h e r e f e r e n d u m b a r e l y p a s s e d a n d occasionally failed. F u r t h e r m o r e , t u r n o u t in

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m a n y u r b a n and industrial a r e a s was b e t w e e n 50 and 65 p e r c e n t , which was low by Soviet standards. 8 4 In t h e U k r a i n e a n d s o m e o t h e r republics, t h e local p a r l i a m e n t s a d d e d subsidiary q u e s t i o n s t o the g o v e r n m e n t ' s ballots. T h e s e local additions a s k e d q u e s t i o n s such as w h e t h e r t h e voters desired their republic's indep e n d e n c e f r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n . In the western U k r a i n e , a small m a j o r i t y of v o t e r s s u p p o r t e d G o r b a c h e v ' s unity proposal. B u t a m u c h larger p e r c e n t a g e ( 8 0 % ) of t h e voters s u p p o r t e d an i n d e p e n d e n c e p r o p o s a l , which explicitly r e f e r r e d to t h e creation of a U k r a i n i a n a r m y and currency. A s a result, e v e n t h o u g h G o r b a c h e v ' s p r o p o s a l was s u p p o r t e d by a m a j o r i t y of t h o s e w h o v o t e d and w o n a technical victory, it was considerably overs h a d o w e d by the larger victories of t h e s u p p l e m e n t a r y p r o - i n d e p e n d e n c e votes. 8 5 F u r t h e r diluting G o r b a c h e v ' s victory, the t h r e e Baltic r e p u b l i c s — A r menia, G e o r g i a , a n d M o l d a v i a — r e f u s e d to participate in t h e r e f e r e n d u m . U n a b l e t o use public buildings in the Baltic republics, t h e Soviet g o v e r n m e n t r e s o r t e d t o placing ballot b o x e s within military bases. M o r e o v e r , local g o v e r n m e n t s in several o t h e r republics r e w o r d e d t h e original r e f e r e n d u m q u e s t i o n that a p p e a r e d on t h e ballots so that it s o u n d e d far less appealing t o voters. In the end, only f o u r republics carried o u t t h e r e f e r e n d u m exactly as the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t wished. G o r b a c h e v was n o t totally unsuccessful, however. T h e r e f e r e n d u m easily passed with over 90 p e r c e n t of the vote and t h e t u r n o u t o f t e n e x c e e d e d 75 p e r c e n t in Kazakhistan, U z b e k i s t a n , and the o t h e r e x t r e m e l y p o o r , r u r a l republics of central Asia. T h e strength of t h e yes vote in this region is partially a result of the considerable strength, resources, a n d authority of the C o m m u n i s t parties in t h e Asian republics. 8 6 T h e e c o n o mies of t h e A s i a n republics are also heavily d e p e n d e n t on i m p o r t s f r o m and t r a d e with o t h e r Soviet republics. T h e r e f o r e , voters may have h a d an e c o n o m i c incentive to s u p p o r t the unity of the Soviet Union. 8 7 T h e p e r s o n a l rivalry b e t w e e n G o r b a c h e v and Yeltsin was a n o t h e r factor t h a t possibly influenced the g e o g r a p h i c variance in t h e vote on Soviet unity. A l t h o u g h the r e f e r e n d u m was p u r p o r t e d l y a b o u t preserving the unity of the Soviet U n i o n , m a n y voters saw the r e f e r e n d u m as a vote on the relative merits of the t w o leaders. N o t surprisingly, Yeltsin solidly outpolled G o r b a c h e v in Svendlovsk, Yeltsin's h o m e region, w h e r e almost 70 p e r c e n t of the voters rejected t h e unity p r o p o s a l and instead indirectly v o t e d f o r their f a v o r i t e son. 88 By t h e time t h e ballots h a d b e e n c o u n t e d , it was clear t h a t t h e a m o u n t of s u p p o r t f o r t h e Soviet r e f e r e n d u m on unity was so u n e v e n a n d qualified that it could hardly bolster e i t h e r the slumping popularity of G o r b a c h e v or the d e t e r i o r a t i n g a u t h o r i t y of t h e central g o v e r n m e n t of t h e Soviet U n i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e results of the r e f e r e n d u m failed t o delegitimize

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the results of t h e e a r l i e r r e f e r e n d u m s on i n d e p e n d e n c e f o r E s t o n i a , Latvia, a n d L i t h u a n i a . T h e r e f e r e n d u m results s u g g e s t e d t h a t b o t h t h e Soviet r e g i m e a n d G o r b a c h e v w e r e o u t of s t e p with p o p u l a r o p i n i o n . Within a year, Gorbachev's crumbling leadership would be challenged by a c o u p . T h e last i n d e p e n d e n c e r e f e r e n d u m held in w h a t was s o o n to b e c o m e the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n , occurred in the U k r a i n e on D e c e m b e r 2,1991. T h e p r e a m b l e to the r e f e r e n d u m q u e s t i o n r e f e r r e d explicitly to the A u gust 1991 a t t e m p t e d c o u p against G o r b a c h e v . T h e ballot p r e s e n t e d t h e c o u p as a justification f o r U k r a i n i a n s to reconsider their political standing. T h e r e f e r e n d u m c a m p a i g n was h a r d fought, partly b e c a u s e of t h e imm e n s e e c o n o m i c resources of t h e territory and also b e c a u s e of t h e location of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s o n U k r a i n i a n soil. T h e a d v o c a t e s of i n d e p e n d e n c e envisioned a radically self-reliant U k r a i n e t h a t would h a v e full control over its e c o n o m i c resources, currency, and use of w e a p o n s a n d that would c o o r d i n a t e e c o n o m i c and foreign policy t h r o u g h bilateral treaties with t h e o t h e r f o r m e r Soviet republics. O u t s i d e political leaders, such as Yeltsin and G o r b a c h e v , w a r n e d the U k r a i n i a n s not to s u p p o r t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e p r o p o s a l as written b e c a u s e it would m a k e c o o r d i n a t i o n of e c o n o m i c policy a m o n g t h e f o r m e r Soviet republics e x t r e m e l y difficult. B o t h sides tried to mobilize v o t e r s u p p o r t by a p p e a l i n g t o the voters' e c o n o m i c worries t h r o u g h countervailing predictions of e c o n o m i c collapse if i n d e p e n d e n c e was or, alternately, was n o t s u p p o r t e d b y the voters. T h e two sides also a p p e a l e d to ethnic loyalties. T h e p r o - i n d e p e n d e n c e forces used indigenous n o n - R u s s i a n languages in m a n y c a m p a i g n rallies, while t h e a n t i - i n d e p e n d e n c e forces w a r n e d ethnic Russians that an indep e n d e n t U k r a i n e would discriminate against n o n - U k r a i n i a n speakers. A s in t h e o t h e r i n d e p e n d e n c e r e f e r e n d u m s , t u r n o u t was quite high. O v e r 80 p e r c e n t of all U k r a i n i a n voters cast ballots, and in several districts t u r n o u t e x c e e d e d 90 p e r c e n t . T h r o u g h o u t t h e republic, o v e r w h e l m i n g majorities of voters s u p p o r t e d i n d e p e n d e n c e . E v e n in ethnic-Russian enclaves, m a j o r i t i e s v o t e d f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e . S u p p o r t f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e also cut across class b o u n d a r i e s , with relatively well-off u r b a n districts, working-class districts, s e a p o r t communities, and f a r m i n g t o w n s all giving m a j o r i t y s u p p o r t for independence. 8 9 A f t e r t h e results w e r e in, t h e r e was considerable d e b a t e a b o u t w h a t the voters h a d a p p r o v e d . G o r b a c h e v m a i n t a i n e d that t h e r e f e r e n d u m f o r an i n d e p e n d e n t U k r a i n e was c o m p a t i b l e with a r e v a m p e d Soviet U n i o n , while Yeltsin f o r e s a w a n e w c o n f e d e r a c y in which t h e U k r a i n e and Russia would b e t h e p r i m a r y leaders. B u t L e o n i d K r a v c h u k , t h e newly elected p r e s i d e n t of t h e U k r a i n e , viewed t h e vote as a p p r o v i n g a m o r e radical f o r m of self-rule. In his words, " A n e w U k r a i n e has b e e n b o r n . A g r e a t historical e v e n t has occurred which will n o t only c h a n g e t h e history of t h e

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U k r a i n e , b u t t h e history of the world." 9 0

REFERENDUMS ON SELF-RULE: PARTY COALITIONS A N D REFERENDUM OUTCOMES R e f e r e n d u m s h a v e b e e n used r e p e a t e d l y since the mid-1970s in struggles over national self-rule within a wide r a n g e of a d v a n c e d industrialized societies. This p h e n o m e n o n has also b e e n evident in o t h e r p a r t s of t h e world, as discussed in C h a p t e r 3. B o t h s u p p o r t e r s and o p p o n e n t s of regional self-rule have advocated the use of r e f e r e n d u m s , b u t in almost all cases t h e y w e r e p r o p o s e d by political actors w h o m o m e n t a r i l y saw t h e m selves at a disadvantage. L a b o u r activists in W a l e s and Scotland w h o f e a r e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p r o p o s a l for devolution, A n d a l u s i a n politicians w h o believed M a d r i d was neglecting their calls for regional self-rule, and L i t h u a n i a n s w h o faced t h r e a t e n i n g t a n k s all l o o k e d t o r e f e r e n d u m s as an alternative to a decisionmaking process that they felt was stacked against t h e m . O n e might generalize that in struggles o v e r regional self-rule, r e f e r e n d u m s a r e typically used d e f e n s i v e l y — n o t as political w e a p o n s of first choice. T h e r e f e r e n d u m s on regional self-rule also illustrate the m a n y possible a b u s e s of t h e r e f e r e n d u m process. S o m e t i m e s to e n s u r e t h a t t h e y win the struggles, political leaders carefully w o r d p r o p o s a l s to m a x i m i z e the p r o p o s a l s ' chances of b e i n g passed o r d e f e a t e d . T h e case of Q u e b e c ' s sovereignty-association r e f e r e n d u m and t h e m o r e recent a n d vaguely stated Baltic r e f e r e n d u m s serve as examples. L e a d e r s also f r e q u e n t l y have t a m p e r e d with p r o c e d u r a l rules in o r d e r to affect the o u t c o m e . Recall, for instance, the 40 p e r c e n t rule in G r e a t Britain, the a b b r e v i a t e d c a m p a i g n p e r i o d and ballot-box fixing in A n d a l u s i a , a n d the local republics' m o d i fications of t h e original ballot d u r i n g the Soviet U n i o n ' s r e f e r e n d u m on unity. T h e s e m a n i p u l a t i o n s deviate f r o m s o m e c o m m o n p l a c e pictures of r e f e r e n d u m s as fair, impartial applications of d e m o c r a t i c ideals b u t should not b e surprising, m u c h less shocking. N o r d o they c o n d e m n direct d e m o c racy. R e f e r e n d u m s , a f t e r all, a r e political p h e n o m e n a : they affect public policy and t h e r e f o r e p e o p l e ' s conditions and interests. B e c a u s e p e o p l e a r e affected, they h a v e a s t a k e in t h e o u t c o m e of r e f e r e n d u m s a n d will try to affect t h e result by s o m e t i m e s manipulating the process as well as d e b a t i n g t h e issue and casting their votes. Besides illustrating s o m e of t h e s e a m i e r sides of past r e f e r e n d u m politics, this review of British, Spanish, C a n a d i a n , a n d Soviet r e f e r e n d u m s has s h o w n h o w electoral u p h e a v a l s — o f t e n in t h e f o r m of u n p r e c e d e n t e d surges of s u p p o r t f o r nationalist p a r t i e s — h a v e usually p r e c e d e d t h e use of direct d e m o c r a c y in deciding q u e s t i o n s of regional self-rule. R e f e r e n d u m s w e r e initiated a n d used by t h e rapidly growing p r o n a t i o n a l i s t forces

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in some cases to increase their moral leverage vis-à-vis the state. Several cases also show that incumbent governments tried to weaken the growing appeal of nationalists by using referendums to legitimize a limited transfer of power to regional governments. W e can say, therefore, that dramatically changing electoral fortunes and calculations of political self-preservation seem to have been the key conditions affecting the timing of the referendums. In all the cases under consideration, political parties and a myriad of groups tried to inform and mobilize voters during the referendum campaigns. Religious orders, economic associations, political personalities, and sports and entertainment celebrities typically participated in the referendum campaigns. Activists tried to influence voters' behavior by discussing a broad range of issues, not simply by discussing the potential international implications of decentralization and possible independence. Through discussions of economic prosperity (or disaster) and overt appeals to ethnic and partisan loyalties and xenophobic sentiments, campaigners tried to change voters' opinions. Furthermore, opinion polls have shown that many voters' evaluations of the proposals did in fact change. Voters often were using highly parochial concerns, especially economic ones, to decide policies pregnant with international significance. The intensity of the mobilization efforts by established parties and interest groups, or the lack thereof, had obvious impact on the outcome of the vote. The case of the British Labour government's failure to campaign for the devolution proposals is one obvious example. A contrasting illustration is provided by the intense, antidevolution effort of the G a n g of Six, without which the extent of the failure of Welsh devolution would be difficult to imagine. Moreover, aspects of the campaigns that might at first glance appear tangential to relative merits of the written referendum proposal, such as the popularity of advocates such as Trudeau or Yeltsin, seem to have had impact on how some people voted. It would be misleading, though, to focus narrowly on the efforts of single individuals and groups when trying to explain the outcomes. T o o many counterexamples come to mind. The governments' embarrassing failures in the Andalusian and Soviet-unity referendums illustrate that vigorous campaigning by party-run governments cannot ensure the referendum results they desire. Nor can biased coverage by state-run electronic media ensure that a proposal will be passed or defeated according to the government's wishes. Rather than focusing on individuals or specific groups as determinants of the outcome of referendums, the observer w h o wishes to predict outcomes on the basis of a few variables might be wiser to compare the relative size and the breadth of the coalitions campaigning for and against a referendum proposal. Generally speaking, the side supported by the broadest coalition of political parties and interest groups emerged victo-

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rious at the polls. Consider the example of Spain, where the a u t o n o m y proposals had b e e n designed and supported from the beginning by broad coalitions of electorally strong parties. T h e self-determination proposals for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were also designed by parliaments c o m p o s e d of diverse parties. In contrast, the referendum proposals in Quebec, Scotland, and Wales w e r e d e f e a t e d — s o m e t i m e s very easily. In n o n e of these cases did extensive interparty consultation, compromise, and negotiation p r e c e d e the announced proposal for regional self-rule. T h e popular vote, in other words, o f t e n — b u t not a l w a y s — e c h o e s the earlier jarring or harmonious sounds of interelite politics. Elites can increase the likelihood that a proposal for regional self-rule will b e passed, but only through a syncretic, noncombative style of politics. B r o a d coalition building before the a n n o u n c e m e n t of the referendum's proposal s e e m s a precondition for victory.

NOTES 1. Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, "Economic Changes and Surges in Micro-Nationalist Voting in Scotland and the Basque Region of Spain," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31/2, p. 319; François-Pierre Gingras and Neil Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec: The Transition of Ideology and Political Support," in Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years, edited by Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke (Durham: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 302-303. 2. Jim Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 189. 3. Bulpitt, Territory, p. 190. 4. On the rival schools of reasoning within the Labour party on referendums and devolution, see Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System: The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 47-56; Barry Jones and Rick Wilford, "Further Considerations on the Referendum: The Evidence of the Welsh Vote on Devolution," Political Studies 30/1, pp. 17-19; Denis Balsom and Ian McAllister, "The Scottish and Welsh Devolution Referenda of 1979: Constitutional Change and Popular Choice," Parliamentary Affairs 32/3, pp. 395-397; Jack Brand, "Political Parties and the Referendum on National Sovereignty: The 1979 Scottish Referendum on Devolution," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 13/1, p. 33; and James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 151-153. 5. On the Conservatives' thesis that referendums can and should be used to prevent radical change, see Bogdanor, People and the Party System, pp. 11-33. 6. Kellas, Scottish Political System, pp. 148-151; Balsom and McAllister, "Scottish and Welsh Devolution," p. 407; Bogdanor, People and the Party System, p. 57; Paul Luke and David Johnson, "Devolution by Referendum? A Look at the Welsh Situation," Parliamentary Affairs 29/3, p. 337.

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7. Arnold J. James and John E. Thomas, Wales at Westminister: A History ofth - Parliamentary Representation of Wales, 1800-1979 (Llandysul, U.K.: Gomer Press, 1981), p. 269. 8. For further discussions of the constitutional processes for designing and passing autonomy statutes, see Mike Newton, "The Peoples and Regions of Spain," in Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics After Franco, edited by David S. Bell (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 100-108; Robert P. Clark, "The Question of Regional Autonomy in Spain's Democratic Transition," in Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic Transition and a New International Role, edited by Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), pp. 143-151. 9. For further discussion of the origins and evolution of the Andalusian movement for autonomy, see Newton, "Peoples and Regions of Spain," pp. 119-123; Jack Brand, "Andalusia: Nationalism as the Strategy for Autonomy," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 15/1-2, pp. 1-10; Antonio Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum de Iniciativa Autonómica del 28 de Febrero en Andalucía," Revista de Estudios Políticos 15 (May-June 1980), pp. 175-194. 10. Brand, "Andalusia," p. 10. 11. For a comparison of the P Q and earlier nationalist parties, see Gingras and Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec." 12. For discussions of the PQ's syncretic platform, see Gingras and Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec"; and Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current History 72/426, p. 154. 13. See, for example, Peter T. Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec," Current History 79/460, p. 137; Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," p. 154; and Gingras and Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec," p. 304. 14. Gingras and Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec," p. 317. 15. Gingras and Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec," pp. 318-319. 16. For a colorful and insightful description of the debate over the referendum, see Graham Fraser, PQ: René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984), pp. 217-218. 17. Kellas, Scottish Political System, p. 153. 18. Balsom and McAllister, "Scottish and Welsh Devolution," p. 398. 19. Jones and Wilford, "Further Considerations," p. 21; Kenneth O. Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 403. 20. For detailed discussions of the arguments used in the Scottish and Welsh referendum campaigns, see J. Barry and R. A. Wilford, "The Welsh Veto: The Politics of the Devolution Campaign in Wales," Working Paper Number 39 of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1979; Jones and Wilford, "Further Considerations," pp. 397-409. 21. Barry Jones and R. A. Wilford, "The Welsh Veto," p. 20. 22. Kellas, Scottish Political System, p. 157. 23. Jones and Wilford, "The Welsh Veto," pp. 29-32. 24. For brief descriptions of the media's coverage of the referendum, see Jones and Wilford, "Further Considerations," pp. 23,26; Kellas, Scottish Political System, p. 157; Balsom and McAllister, "Scottish and Welsh Devolution," p. 399. 25. See, for example, Jones and Wilford, "Further Considerations," p. 24;

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Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation, p. 404. 26. Balsom and McAllister, "Scottish and Welsh Devolution, pp. 401-403, 408; Jones and Wilford, "The Welsh Veto," pp. 33, 35-36; Hugh Berrington, "Centre-Periphery Conflict and British Politics," in Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe, edited by Yves Meny and Vincent Wright (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 194-195. 27. For interpretations of the changes in Scottish and Welsh public opinion on the topic of devolution that emphasize the role of party endorsements, see Balsom and McAllister, "Scottish and Welsh Devolution"; Brand, "Political Parties." 28. Brand, "Political Parties," pp. 39, 42; Berrington, "Centre-Periphery Conflict," p. 194. 29. Bogdanor, People and the Party System, p. 58. 30. For brief histories and ideological analyses of ETA and the Herri Batasuna, see Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 3-119; Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), pp. 145-200. For useful overviews of the Basque referendum campaign, see Javier Cuercora Atienza and Alberto Pérez Calvo, "En Torno al Referéndum del Estatuto de Autonomia del Pais Vasco," Revista de Estudios Politicos 12 (November-December 1979), pp. 179-196; Newton, "Peoples and Regions of Spain," pp. 112-116. 31. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 349. 32. For useful discussions of the Galician referendum campaign, see Newton, "Peoples and Regions of Spain," pp. 116-118; Gunther et al., Spain After Franco, pp. 249-251. 33. For useful discussions of the Andalusian referendum campaign, see Newton, "Peoples and Regions of Spain," pp. 120-122; Brand, "Andalusia," pp. 6-8; Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," pp. 177-185. 34. Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, p. 106. 35. Gunther et al., Spain After Franco, p. 322. 36. For example, Newton, "Peoples and Regions of Spain," p. 118. 37. Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," p. 181. 38. Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," pp. 182-184. 39. Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," p. 184. 40. Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," p. 185. 41. This argument is suggested, for example, by Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec," pp. 136-137. 42. Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec," p. 137. 43. For detailed descriptions of the Quebec campaign, see Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec"; Fraser, PQ, pp. 190-240; John Fitzmaurice, Québec and Canada: Past, Present and Future (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 295-307. 44. On the city-country split in PQ support, see Gin gras and Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec." On the urban voters hesitating to support sovereignty-association, see Fitzmaurice, Québec and Canada, pp. 305-306; Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec," pp. 137,144. 45. For an interpretation of the campaign that stresses the importance of

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Trudeau, see Fitzmaurice, Québec and Canada, p. 301; Fraser, PQ, pp. 224-228. 46. Fraser, PQ, p. 225. 47. For discussions of the Yvette movement, see Fraser, PQ, pp. 222-224; Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec," p. 137. 48. The problems of the PQ's grave, sincere, and almost dull campaign style have been discussed by Fraser, PQ, pp. 224,229-233. 49. For various measurements of the constant changes in public opinion during the campaign, see Fitzmaurice, Québec and Canada, pp. 300-301; Fraser, PQ, pp. 219-220,234; Sherrill, "Separatism and Quebec," pp. 36-37. 50. Jon H. Pammett, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, and Lawrence LeDuc, "Political Support and Voting Behavior in the Quebec Referendum," in Kornberg and Clarke, Political Support in Canada, pp. 331-332, 350. 51. William Miller, The End of British Politics? Scot and English Political Behaviour in the Seventies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 130; James and Thomas, Wales at Westminster, p. 123. 52. Bogdanor, People and the Party System, pp. 51, 57. 53. Francisco José Llera Ramo, "Caracterización Sociopolítica del Sistema de Partidos de la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca y Navarra," Revista de Estudios Políticos 20 (March-April 1981), p. 63. 54. Mario Caciagli, Elecciones y Partidos en la Transición Española (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, 1986), p. 124. 55. Newton, "Peoples and Regions of Spain," p. 118. 56. See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980). 57. Equipo de Sociología Electoral, "El Referéndum del Estatuto de Autonomía en Cataluña," Revista de Estudios Políticos 12 (November-December 1979), p. 200; Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," p. 185. 58. Vincent Lemieux and Jean Crête, "Quebec," in Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980: A Study of the General Elections, edited by Howard R. Penniman (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 220. 59. Bogdanor, People and the Party System, p. 58. 60. Balsom and McAllister, "Scottish and Welsh Devolution," p. 401. 61. Jones and Wilford, "Further Considerations," p. 25. 62. On the imperfect correlations between party voting and referendum voting, see Porras Nadales, "El Referéndum," pp. 185-191; Cuercora Atienza and Perez Calvo, "El Torno," pp. 194-196. 63. Fitzmaurice, Québec and Canada, p. 304; Pammett et al., "Political Support," pp. 339-340. 64. Pammett et al., "Political Support," pp. 339-340. 65. Fitzmaurice, Québec and Canada, pp. 305-306. 66. Miller, The End of British Politics? pp. 252-253. 67. For a discussion of the rise of devolutionary sentiment and politics in Scotland during the 1980s, see James G. Kellas, Scottish Political System and "Prospects for a New Scottish Political System," Parliamentary Affairs 42/4, pp. 519-532. 68. For an overview of the political struggles over autonomy after the refer-

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endums, see Clark, "The Question of Regional Autonomy." 69. On youth's declining involvement in nationalist politics, see Gérard Pelletier, "Quebec: Different But in Step with North America," Daedalus 117/4, pp. 270-274; Léon Dion, "The Mystery of Québec," Daedalus 117/4, pp. 301-302. 70. Joel Smith and Allan Kornberg, "The Quebec Referendum: National or Provincial Event?" in Clark and Kornberg, Political Support in Canada, pp. 374, 379. 71. World Opinion Update 15/3, p. 26. 72. Rory Leishman, "Quebec and the Constitution: Completing the Patriation Process," in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, edited by R. D. Oiling (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), p. 410. 73. On the efforts to depict the referendums as "opinion polls," see New York Times, February 6,7,9,1991. 74. On the Communists' responses to nationalists' victories, see Martha Brill Olcott, "The Lithuanian Crisis," Foreign Affairs 69/3, pp. 30-46; Steven L. Burg, "European Republics of the Soviet Union," Current History 89/549, pp. 321-324, 340; Economist, February 17,1990. 75. As Olcott points out, it was the Soviet Union's leadership that initially wanted a referendum held, not the Baltic nationalists. Apparently, centrists like Gorbachev believed that either an independence proposal would be voted down or the size of the no vote would be so large as to render the project of independence impractical. 76. New York Times, February 9,1991. 77. Burg, "European Republics," p. 322. 78. Washington Post, February 10,1991; March 4,1991. 79. New York Times, February 10,1991; March 4,1991. 80. Washington Post, February 10,1991, March 4,1991. 81. On the ambivalence of ethnic minorities in the Baltic republics toward the idea of independence, see Olcott, "The Lithuanian Crisis," p. 41; Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1991, March 4, 1991; New York Times, February 10, 1991; Washington Post, March 4,1991. 82. On Yeltsin's and Gorbachev's disagreements over the unity referendum, see Chicago Tribune, March 16,18,1991; Los Angeles Times, March 16,1991. 83. Chicago Tribune, March 19,1991. 84. Chicago Tribune, March 19,22,1991. 85. Chicago Tribune, March 20,1991; New York Times, March 19, 20,1991. 86. Chicago Tribune, March 20,1991. 87. Chicago Tribune, March 22,1991. 88. Chicago Tribune, March 19,1991. 89. New York Times, December 2,1991, Hartford Courant, December 2,1991. 90. Hartford Courant, December 2,1991.

7

Referendums and International Politics: The United States The call in the United States to utilize referendums as a tool for resolving international issues and making foreign policy has grown louder with each passing crisis since the late 1960s. Twice in that time, large numbers of U.S. citizens have been given the opportunity to express their views in international-issue referendums. One group of referendums focused on Vietnam, the other on nuclear weapons. 1 During the Vietnam War, several end-thewar initiatives were proposed and voted upon locally. In the 1982 election, a nuclear freeze initiative appeared on the ballot in ten states and fortynine cities. This latter group of referendums was particularly significant because fully 30 percent of the American people had an opportunity to vote on the freeze as a new foreign policy direction. Because the United States has no national referendum mechanism, these votes were not binding on national decision makers. Yet, they anticipated, and arguably helped promote, major shifts of direction in U.S. foreign policy, if not actual changes in the way that policy is formulated. Compared to the other countries we have discussed in previous chapters, the United States offers its citizens few if any opportunities to influence foreign policy directly between elections. However, the Vietnam and nuclear freeze initiatives, although locally administered, captured national attention and ultimately influenced U.S. foreign policymakers. Thus, they warrant our attention as possible bellwethers of political change in the United States' foreign policy process. While it is still premature to predict when national referendums might become a formal part of U.S. politics, the Vietnam and nuclear freeze initiatives were clear steps in that direction. Additional steps toward the introduction of national referendums were taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s. During these two decades, the Court gradually articulated a much more significant place for referendums in the "normal" politics of the United States. By allowing the use of referendums to decide a number of local and statewide issues, the Court effectively "deradicalized" referendums and opened wider the door for national initiatives. Because much of the recent history of referendums in the United States is legal history, we will begin this chapter by exploring the series of 151

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c o u r t decisions t h a t h a v e f u n d a m e n t a l l y changed U.S. r e f e r e n d u m politics. T h o u g h t h e courts h a v e yet t o consider the issue of a n a t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s decisions in o t h e r cases m a k e it clear t h a t n o constitutional c h a n g e is r e q u i r e d to a d o p t a n a t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m process. A f t e r w e h a v e traced t h e judicial j o u r n e y of a possible n a t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m in t h e U n i t e d States, w e will again t a k e u p o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s in t h e context of t h e V i e t n a m and nuclear f r e e z e ballots of the last decades.

THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, A N D DIRECT LEGISLATION G i v e n t h e populist heritage of r e f e r e n d u m s in the U n i t e d States, it is n o t surprising t h a t t h e r e f e r e n d u m device has o f t e n b e e n viewed as an excessively democratic, even radical m e t h o d for m a k i n g political decisions. A s early as 1847, a f e d e r a l j u d g e n o t e d in Rice v. Foster that as a n a t i o n , A m e r i c a n s chose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n direct d e m o c r a c y institutions to g u a r d against "rashness, precipitancy, and misguided zeal; a n d t o p r o t e c t t h e minority against t h e injustice of t h e majority." 2 M o r e recently, P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n suggested in a 1982 speech that s u p p o r t e r s of the f r e e z e initiative w e r e "inspired not by the sincere, honest p e o p l e w h o want peace, b u t by s o m e w h o w a n t the w e a k e n i n g of A m e r i c a and so are m a n i p u l a t i n g h o n e s t p e o p l e and sincere people." 3 This f e a r of direct d e m o c r a c y s t e m s partly f r o m t h e elitist attitude of conservatives reminiscent of t h e eight e e n t h - c e n t u r y British thinker, E d m u n d B u r k e . A m e m b e r of P a r l i a m e n t , B u r k e c o n t e n d e d that " t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e betrays his c o n s t i t u e n t s if h e sacrifices his j u d g e m e n t to their opinions." 4 H o w e v e r , as w e n o t e d in C h a p t e r 2, r e f e r e n d u m s are increasingly accepted as n o n t h r e a t e n i n g t o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t . M a n y r e a s o n s explain this shift in the U n i t e d States. S o m e have to d o with the s h e e r n u m b e r s of r e f e r e n d u m s n o w on local and state election ballots in every election, m a k i n g t h e m s e e m less mysterious and t h r e a t e n i n g . B u t increased use of r e f e r e n d u m s c a n n o t by itself account for the altered envir o n m e n t of opinion a b o u t their use. T o u n d e r s t a n d why r e f e r e n d u m s n o w e n j o y legitimacy as part of n o r m a l politics in the U n i t e d States, we n e e d also to explore their legal a n d constitutional p e d i g r e e as progressively a d u m b r a t e d by t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t . T h r o u g h o u t its history, and especially during t h e past t w e n t y years, t h e C o u r t has b e e n t h e m a j o r player in the gradual a c c e p t a n c e of r e f e r e n d u m s as a n o r m a l p a r t of politics in the U n i t e d States. Surveying this normalization process is a necessary first step b e f o r e w e apply o u r p r o p ositions a b o u t r e f e r e n d u m s t o politics in o n e of the few remaining W e s t e r n d e m o c r a t i c countries w i t h o u t a national r e f e r e n d u m . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t has m a d e decisions in t h r e e a r e a s affecting t h e political and constitutional status of r e f e r e n d u m s . First, t h e C o u r t has

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made it clear that state laws adopted by referendum are subject to the same judicial review and determination of constitutionality as any law passed in the traditional way. Second, the Court has stipulated that legislating via referendum is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Third, the Court has concluded that individuals and, significantly, corporations, have few restrictions on the amount of financial resources they may expend to promote or defeat a referendum issue. Referendums and Judicial Review Since its articulation in Marbury v. Madison (1803), the power of judicial review has been exercised by the Supreme Court over legislation at both federal and state levels. This power has functioned as a check on presidential and congressional authority and has worked to increase federal supremacy over the states. Today, this unwritten power of the Court is accepted as part of our constitutional system, although individual exercises of judicial review often still stir controversy. What has been less clear, however, is whether the Court may use the nullifying power over legislation passed by the people themselves in referendums. The Court has considered cases arising from referendums as far back as Phillips v. Payne in 1875,5 but it did not consider power of judicial review over referendums until Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph v. Oregon in 1912.6 In Pacific, the Court declined to determine whether a state law concerning licensing fees that had been enacted by state popular vote initiative was indeed constitutional. The Court maintained that the question of the legality of such initiatives was a political, rather than a justiciable, matter relating to the structure and political character of state government and thus was not open to review. Later that year, it again upheld the political question designation and also extended the nonjusticiability criterion to local referendums in Kiernan v. City of Portland.1 Beginning in the late 1960s, the Court issued a series of opinions that reassessed its role regarding judicial review of referendum-generated state law. Beginning with the 1967 case of Reitman v. Mulkey, the Court has used the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass judgment on the constitutionality of a variety of state and local practices in the areas of taxation, housing and zoning, busing, and amending state constitutions. 8 In Reitman, the Court invalidated California's Proposition 14, a constitutional amendment approved by referendum that banned state interference with the right of residential property owners to rent, sell, or lease to whomever they pleased. The Court held that complying with referendum results would involve official state action that was discriminatory on the basis of race and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Court further extended its right of review two years later in Hunter v. Erickson, Mayor of Akron.9 Again on the grounds of unconsti-

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tutional racial discrimination, the Court invalidated an Akron charter amendment, approved by referendum, that required further city referendums before any transfer or use of property on the "basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry." The Court majority stated that the charter amendment unfairly burdened racial minorities and, therefore, violated the equal protection clause. Two years later, the Court allowed similar zoning ordinances to stand if they turned on economic rather than racial distinctions. In the case of James v. Valtierra, the Court upheld restrictive zoning ordinances that required referendums to approve de facto economic segregation through low-income housing projects. 10 Here the Court decided that the question was not one of equal protection, but of the right of local home rule and of the people to hold referendums. On the latter score, Justice Hugo Black delivered the majority opinion that "provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." Finally, the Court decided two cases in 1982 involving state referendums regarding busing that cemented the Court's right to review laws and state constitutional amendments promulgated through referendum votes.11 Although these decisions took different views of the right of states and localities to regulate busing via referendum vote, their combined authority completed the Court's expanded authority over referendums. It was now clear that laws enacted by referendums shared an essential feature of constitutionality with laws passed by legislatures: they were both subject to judicial review. To those who feared an unrestrained and uncontrollable public able to pass at will legislation that could not be overruled except by the action of elected political leaders, the Court's expansion of its power meant that referendums were less threatening to the political order. Referendums and the Power to Delegate Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states that "all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Does this mean that legislation by referendum constitutes a delegation of legislative authority away from Congress, a move that would on its face seem unconstitutional? The answer from the Supreme Court is an unequivocal no. It is true that the Court has never decided this question at the national level, even though it has heard and decided many cases involving the act of delegation. It is also the case that when a possible national referendum process was last debated in Congress in the late 1970s, both proponents and opponents assumed a constitutional amendment would be required to institute the referendum without violating Article I, Section 1. They were wrong, however, and the Supreme Court has already denied the

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validity of their assumption. It has enunciated the basic principle that referendums do not represent delegations of legislative authority. This means that, in the Court's view, instituting a national referendum would not require the extraordinary measure of constitutional amendment. Indeed, the referendum should already be a part of normal politics. The Court's language in the 1976 case City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. clearly indicates it would support the constitutionality of a national referendum. 12 Eastlake was a zoning case similar to Hunter v. Erickson and James v. Valtierra and concerned a town charter provision stating that rezoning could be undertaken only with prior approval of 55 percent of the voters in a citywide referendum. The Court upheld the charter provision on grounds explicitly relating the nature of referendums to the constitutional requirement of nondelegation of legislative authority. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger defended the power of the people to legislate via referendum as a basic democratic right. Furthermore, he argued that there were two reasons why this right could not be construed as a delegation of power from the legislature. First, it is a power the people have never lost even though they have established legislative bodies. Specifically, the chief justice held that a referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of power. Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 39 (J. Madison). In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature. 13

As seventeenth-century English political philosopher John Locke had argued, the establishment of a representative government does not presume the transference of the rights of the people to the government. Instead, what is transferred is only the execution of those rights. Thus, the right of the people to give itself laws is never actually lost or given up. So in the case of referendums, as Burger points out, no additional delegation of the right back to the people is required. It is a right already reserved to the people through the Tenth Amendment and has never been transferred anywhere else.14 The chief justice also articulated a second reason why referendums do not constitute a delegation of legislative power. Before Eastlake, whenever the Court had found unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority, there had always been a basic difference drawn between those cases and those involving referendums. As Burger pointed out in Eastlake, unconstitutional delegations, where they have existed, have always designated "a narrow segment of the community, not the people at large" as the recipient of the power to legislate.15 Only the people as a whole possess

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the untransferable right of legislation. Any delegation to but a part of the whole people is suspect; but any supposed delegation to the whole is not, because it is not delegation at all. The Eastlake decision therefore effectively alters the entire constitutional discussion of referendums. Though the case, and therefore Burger's opinion, does not explicitly involve Congress or a national referendum, the implications of Burger's logic is inescapable for every level of government. The people in their political organization have never lost the right to legislate themselves. They have merely loaned that right and power, so to speak, to Congress and other legislative bodies. Thus, the people have the power reserved to them to reclaim the exercise of that right at any time. This is the meaning of the Tenth Amendment, and indeed of democracy itself—the right of the people to govern themselves. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the chief interpreter of the Constitution, referendums at any level of government should be understood as an unexceptional part of U.S. politics.

Referendums, Money, and Politics It often seems cynical to emphasize the role of money in U.S. politics. Still, its place cannot be denied, though Congress has tried various ways to downplay its effect in electoral politics. Since its inception during the Progressive Era, the referendum has been viewed as a way to give political voice to Americans regardless of their social or economic status. Especially today, in the era of federal matching funds for presidential races, fund-raising political action committees (PACs), and millionaire senators, referendums appear to their supporters as the common voters' access to decisionmaking. Referendums seem ironically out of sync with the apparent historical movement of U.S. politics toward capture by the moneyed set. At least, that is how referendums appeared before a landmark Supreme Court decision in 1978 in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts}6 Bellotti gave judicial license to the flood of big-time money into referendum politics. As appellant in the case, the Bank of Boston argued that its constitutional right of freedom of speech had been denied by enforcement of a state law preventing it from making expenditures or contributions "for the purpose o f . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." 17 The Bank of Boston had wanted to spend money to defeat a referendum question seeking to establish a state income tax. The state statute forbade such expenditure, and the Massachusetts attorney general had persuaded a state court to issue an injunction against the bank. The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the statute; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision.

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In what became a very controversial decision, the Court accepted three important claims that have affected referendums ever since. First, the Court declared that corporations are individuals with individual rights, including rights of free speech. Moreover, the corporation's speech was especially protected in this instance because it "is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." 18 Second, the Court argued that since the "people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments," corporations had a proper, even essential, role to play in referendum politics.19 The corporations provided, the Court argued, a needed second opinion or alternative point of view. This further justified the expenditure of corporate funds to defeat the proposition. Third, the Court declared that even huge expenditures of corporate funds in referendum battles did not violate congressional provisions for campaign spending. 20 There is an intrinsic difference between elections and referendums, the opinion asserted, since "referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office." 21 Thus, the threat of corruption that such financial largesse so clearly poses for free elections "simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue." 22 Therefore, the Court refused either to apply campaign finance law to corporate activity in referendum politics or to limit in any way the amount of money a corporation (or anyone else) could spend in a referendum campaign. By legitimating the impact of big money in referendums, the Court did two seemingly contradictory things. It both bestowed unique political status on referendums and paved the way for their acceptance as noncontroversial political devices. Unlike the major players in elections, referendum participants were now exempted from cumbersome campaign financing and disclosure statutes. At the same time, this made referendums more palatable to the part of the electorate more likely to be opposed to them: established political actors with more money than votes. The referendum no longer looked like the progeny of the Progressive Era. It is somewhat ironic, then, that the increasing use and acceptance of referendums have distanced them from their original progressive goal. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has played a major role in this evolution. Whether the normalization of the referendum as an noncontroversial political practice is ultimately good for either referendums or democracy itself remains for our discussion, though scholars are not in agreement on this score. 23 But one general result of the Court's decisions is that the players in referendum politics now largely resemble those in electoral

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politics. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, there are some new specialists, such as professional signature gatherers and proposition framers, that come with referendum politics. 24 But, as we will also conclude, they simply join the ranks of political elites that already populate U.S. politics. In short, referendum politics in the United States is no longer radical. Its juridical evolution has resulted in laws reviewable by the courts, as are laws that result from legislative action. The use of referendums does not constitute a loss of power through delegation from the legislature. A n d referendums are open to manipulation by elites and by money—just like normal politics in the United States. Does this mean that referendum politics has gained acceptance at the price of its soul as a participatory democratic practice? That is one of the questions our propositions about referendums seek to answer. It is to those propositions that we now return.

REFERENDUMS ON VIETNAM AND THE NUCLEAR FREEZE The Court decisions in the Hunter, Eastlake, and Bank of Boston cases fundamentally altered the nature of referendums in the United States. A s those cases are all relatively recent, the number of international-issue referendums that manifest that new nature is quite small. Two recent referendums that do fit into the new clothes with which the Court dressed referendum politics are the various, late 1960s local initiatives on the Vietnam War and the state and local votes on the freezing of nuclear weapons in 1982. The Vietnam Referendums of 1966-1968 A s we saw in Chapter 2, the U.S. House of Representatives defeated the Ludlow amendment by a narrow margin in 1937, even though polls showed that nearly three-fourths of the American people favored its stipulation that war could be declared only by national referendum. 2 5 Since that time, no statewide (or national) plebiscites have been held on the topic of war. Between 1966 and 1968, however, several cities and towns held local referendums on the issue of the continuation of the Vietnam War. These votes obviously were not binding in any national policy sense, and how well they measured public sentiments about the war is open to question. Nevertheless, they offer some interesting and unexpected findings in light of our propositions about international-issue referendums. Referendums about the war were held in seven cities: Dearborn, Michigan; San Francisco, California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Madison, Wisconsin; Mill Valley, California; Lincoln, Massachusetts; and Bev-

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erly Hills, California. Voters in all of them displayed slightly more support for withdrawal of U.S. troops than most public opinion surveys suggested. Support for an end to U.S. participation in the war ranged from 39 percent of the voters in Cambridge to 57 percent in Dearborn. 2 6 T h e D e a r b o r n voters actually voted twice on the issue, the first time in the midterm elections in 1966, when only 41 percent supported withdrawal. Thus the two-year period between referendums in D e a r b o r n actually increased support for a policy change, though the second vote was subsequent to the decision by President Johnson to limit bombing to North Vietnam. 2 7 The locations of these referendums f o r the most part support the proposition that interest group activity was responsible both for the timing of the referendums and for their results. Except for Dearborn and Beverly Hills, these cities are college towns and/or bastions of liberal politics. Students and local celebrities from the entertainment industries played significant organizational roles in circulating petitions to place referendum issues on the ballots. Though there was growing dissension within President Lyndon Johnson's Democratic party by 1968, it is significant that candidates for public office did not disagree widely on the Vietnam issue. This was true even for the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates and meant, as Benjamin Page and Richard Brody point out, that the 1968 election was itself not a referendum on Vietnam issues, since "in reality there was little difference between the candidates" concerning war policy. 28 W e should not, of course, discount the role that antiwar Democrats Eugene McCarthy and R o b e r t Kennedy played in changing war policy, but actual candidates after the nomination process at most levels of government downplayed their position on the war until the 1970 and 1972 elections. Thus, dissatisfaction with war policy, though it clearly existed, was not notably related to the positions of political candidates in the election year. But overall national disillusionment with the war does not really explain the timing of the referendums, since they were not held in a sociologically random set of U.S. cities. What is ironic is that the motivating force behind holding the referendums was interest group success among voters assumed to be in favor of continuing the war effort. It was widely assumed at the time that only students and assorted radicals actually opposed the war, whereas middle-class voters—and especially working-class citizens (the so-called "silent majority")—were solidly behind the war effort. What the referendums in Dearborn especially made evident, however, and what was also true in all the other referendums except in Cambridge, was that socioeconomic status was inversely related to support for the war. Disapproval of the war, Harlan H a h n ' s correlation coefficients indicate, "appeared to be related to working-class rather than

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to high-status characteristics. In most communities, as the proportion of voters possessing relatively low-status attributes grew, the vote against the Vietnam War also tended to mount. 29 The role of working-class voters in the Vietnam referendums also supplies somewhat unexpected responses to other of our propositions concerning educational level among participants and about who votes in referendums. Knowledge about the war was not great for most voters on war issues; though, again, working-class voters expressed greater confidence in the accuracy of their opinions. Hahn and Sugarman point out that "upper middle class voters expressed little confidence in their own evaluations of the issue and tended to borrow ideological rationalizations from either proponents or critics of the war." 30 Blue-collar voters, on the other hand, had considerably more first-hand experience with the war either as soldiers or relatives of soldiers, as is well documented, and thus claimed to know more about the issues involved.31 Whether such personal intimacy with the war itself constituted a higher educational level about the issues is debatable. What is certain is that support for holding the referendums was nearly unanimous among such groups, and that participation in the referendums was much higher among blue-collar voters than it was among higher socioeconomic status groups. 32 It is difficult to generalize about who won in the Vietnam referendums or about the overall significance of these mostly small-city plebiscites on the eventual ending of the war. Except for San Francisco, none of the referendum localities was a major media outlet, and none of the referendums generated heavy media coverage. Though they all were referendums on current government policy, for the most part government officials and (especially) local candidates avoided comment on the referendum issues themselves. U.S. participation in the war eventually ended, however, and that occurred in part because public opinion swung solidly against it. But the impact of the referendums is unclear, other than speculation that they laid the groundwork for future participation by citizens in the foreign policy process. Harlan Hahn agrees with this assessment, contending: Since many [opinion poll] respondents may have become aware that their opinions will have less impact on international than on domestic issues, perhaps their replies have been shaped by special influences or constraints that have not affected policy preferences on other issues. Increased opportunities for direct popular participation in the development of foreign policy, therefore, could have a major effect on public attitudes toward war. 33

By the early 1980s, the referendum experiences during the Vietnam War provided a model for a new referendum campaign aimed at changing the public attitudes toward a different kind of conflict—thermonuclear war.

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The Nuclear Freeze Referendums T h e n u c l e a r f r e e z e m o v e m e n t in t h e early 1980s was unlike any o t h e r in U.S. history. Y e t , it h a s b e e n c o m p a r e d to m a n y : abolitionism in t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, w o m e n ' s s u f f r a g e a n d p r o h i b i t i o n in t h e early twentieth century, a n d civil rights a n d the antiwar m o v e m e n t in t h e 1960s. 34 It r e s e m b l e s each of these in some ways b u t r e m a i n s u n i q u e a m o n g t h e m f o r its u s e of t h e r e f e r e n d u m and t h e s p e e d of its organizational e f f o r t . This was a m a s s m o v e m e n t that l a u n c h e d a n d s t r e a k e d across t h e political sky like o n e of t h e w e a p o n s it a i m e d at freezing. In a m e r e five years, it galvanized political opinion, w o n votes, o v e r c a m e a p o p u l a r p r e s i d e n t ' s jingoistic scorn, a n d was a p p r o v e d by the U.S. H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . B u t it l a n d e d with a thud as its electoral a n d congressional success resulted in a mainly symbolic victory f o r disarmament. 3 5 By 1986, it h a d largely d i s a p p e a r e d as b o t h a m o v e m e n t and an idea, while n u c l e a r stockpiles c o n t i n u e d t o grow. M a n y aspects of t h e f r e e z e campaign placed it solidly within t h e tradition of o t h e r U.S. political movements. 3 6 In its origins it relied heavily on b o t h a h a n d f u l of charismatic leaders and an already established n e t w o r k of politically active groups, in this case m a d e u p of a variety of p e a c e a n d social justice activists. T h e f r e e z e c a m p a i g n lived a n d died with t h e m e d i a , b o t h p e r h a p s m o r e quickly t h a n past m o v e m e n t s . T h e f r e e z e e f f o r t b e g a n as a grassroots c a m p a i g n unaffiliated with any particular p a r t y o r elected leader, b u t it eventually won t h e e n d o r s e m e n t of a wide a n d bipartisan array of elected officials. Finally, coming f r o m outside n o r m a l political channels, the f r e e z e idea swept the n a t i o n and successfully f o r c e d its way o n t o the political a g e n d a . O n c e t h e r e , it followed a d e e p l y f u r r o w e d p a t h t o w a r d political obscurity a n d irrelevance. T h e r e is, however, o n e aspect of the f r e e z e m o v e m e n t that sets it a p a r t a n d p r e v e n t s us f r o m dismissing it as just a n o t h e r short-lived, one-issue political m o v e m e n t . It was tied to the r e f e r e n d u m and initiative device, which it used m o r e successfully t h a n any o t h e r m o v e m e n t in U.S. history. In doing so, t h e f r e e z e campaign o f f e r e d m o r e A m e r i c a n s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to v o t e on an issue of foreign policy and international politics t h a n they h a d ever h a d b e f o r e . In the process, the f r e e z e raised t h e p r o s p e c t of an e n d u r i n g c h a n g e in the substance of d e m o c r a c y in t h e U n i t e d States. By t h e e n d of t h e r e f e r e n d u m c a m p a i g n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f r e e z e , roughly 30 p e r c e n t of t h e U.S. e l e c t o r a t e h a d b e e n a f f o r d e d t h e o p p o r t u nity t o express their views on nuclear policy via the ballot box. T h e r e f e r e n d u m s t o o k place in the 1982 elections in ten states, t h e District of C o l u m b i a , and forty-nine cities and counties. 3 7 Sixty p e r c e n t of t h o s e voting a p p r o v e d t h e f r e e z e propositions; t h e only d e f e a t was in A r i z o n a . A f t e r t h e r e f e r e n d u m s , P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n effectively d r o p p e d his opposi-

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tion to t h e idea a n d d e n i e d h e h a d e v e r associated the f r e e z e with subversive Soviet influences. In May 1984, t h e U.S. H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s passed a m u c h diluted version of a f r e e z e proposition, and later in t h e year, D e m o c r a t i c presidential c a n d i d a t e W a l t e r M ó n d a l e p r o m i s e d a f r e e z e on n e w w e a p o n s if elected. H e lost, a n d s u p p o r t for the f r e e z e m e l t e d away at virtually all levels, b o t h public and g o v e r n m e n t a l . But, as w e will see, a n e w process f o r decisionmaking r e m a i n e d , t h e substance of which could potentially include b o t h domestic a n d foreign policy questions.

Origins, Conduct, and Significance of the Freeze Referendums In examining o u r propositions a b o u t r e f e r e n d u m s with r e f e r e n c e t o the f r e e z e campaign, it is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that this national r e f e r e n d u m m o v e m e n t p r o c e e d e d without constitutional o r statutory m a n d a t e . It h a p p e n e d b e c a u s e t h e p e o p l e m a d e it h a p p e n . This is t h e defining characteristic of initiatives, of course, b u t in this instance t h e relative u n i m p o r t a n c e of elected l e a d e r s h i p — o r even n o n e l e c t e d b u t traditional l e a d e r s h i p — o u t in f r o n t at the start of t h e f r e e z e campaign is striking. Certainly t h e r e was d i s a g r e e m e n t within Congress and b e t w e e n Congress a n d the W h i t e H o u s e a b o u t d e f e n s e policy, specifically nuclear d e t e r r e n c e strategies. B u t o t h e r t h a n S e n a t o r M a r k H a t f i e l d ' s 1979 a m e n d m e n t t o t h e (ultimately u n r a t i f i e d ) S A L T II treaty calling for a f r e e z e on p r o d u c tion of existing w e a p o n s , w i d e s p r e a d congressional s u p p o r t — n o t to mention l e a d e r s h i p — o n the f r e e z e issue did n o t really exist. 38 T h e m o m e n t u m f o r a nuclear f r e e z e and for the r e f e r e n d u m s supporting it c a m e f r o m two sources: t h e public at large and a small g r o u p of leaders w h o r e p r e s e n t e d a new b r e e d of political elites. T h e latter are particularly interesting f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t of r e f e r e n d u m politics, since they occupy a role in politics ill-defined by traditional offices or interest g r o u p affiliations. Yet, in the f r e e z e c a m p a i g n they showed g r e a t success in mobilizing public s u p p o r t for their issue, and in the process they carried traditional polite elites in their w a k e . B e f o r e looking at this new kind of political opinion leader, we n e e d to n o t e the r o l e of t h e public itself b e f o r e a n d during the f r e e z e campaign. Public opinion s u p p o r t e d a f r e e z e on building nuclear w e a p o n s , b u t it was not the precipitating cause of t h e f r e e z e r e f e r e n d u m s . Yet, the m o v e m e n t would have s o o n withered without an early and enthusiastic public following (and resulting m e d i a coverage). But, as political scientist E v e r e t t L a d d points out, t h e f r e e z e campaign h a d n o t b e e n p r o m p t e d by a recent change in a t t i t u d e within t h e public mind a b o u t nuclear w e a p o n s . A c c o r d i n g to L a d d , the public a t t i t u d e in t h e U n i t e d States t o w a r d such w e a p o n s has always b e e n b o t h c o m p l e x a n d distinctly ambivalent. A m e r i c a n s never learned to "love t h e b o m b , " and in fact their attitudes t o w a r d it h a v e c h a n g e d very little in f o u r d e c a d e s of living in its shadow. 3 9 Since the very

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beginning of nuclear time in 1945, approximately 20 percent of the electorate "categorically opposed making, much less using, the bomb. In November 1946, Gallup found that 21 percent of the populace thought their country 'should stop making atom bombs and destroy all those we have now.' Only 42 percent of Americans believed in October 1948 'that in the long run atomic energy will do more good than harm.'" 40 Thus, the origins of the freeze movement lie in forty years of anxiety within U.S. public opinion concerning the use and effects of nuclear warfare. These amorphous fears and deep-seated loathing did not by themselves spawn the freeze campaign; but they did supply a receptive environment for a new approach toward nuclear strategy and toward how that strategy should be made. This new approach was largely developed by two people, who worked independently at first, then collaborated to make the freeze referendums happen. The idea of the freeze itself is often credited to Randall Forsberg, a once little-known, thirty-eight-year-old defense analyst. Her 1980 pamphlet, "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," began discussion of a new, comprehensive freeze proposal to halt all production of existing weapons and to bar the development of new ones. The idea of using referendums to achieve the freeze began with another Randall, Randall Kehler, who organized the first freeze referendum in three western Massachusetts senate districts in 1980. The story of Forsberg's "Call" has been told in several places.41 A graduate student in arms control at MIT in the late 1970s, Forsberg was frustrated both with the academic and peace-activist communities for their approaches to arms control. She asserted that within these settings there was no "attempt to undertake a systematic investigation of the conflicting assumptions held by scholars, educators, and activists about the causes of war and the possible route to a stable, disarmed peace."42 What was needed, she urged, was a proposal ambitious enough to unite the panoply of peace groups already in place around the country, sophisticated enough to be respectable within the arms control community, and yet simple enough to appeal to the typical U.S. citizen. Her offering, a mere four pages long, became that proposal and that rallying point. The preamble to the "Call" makes its objectives clear: To improve national and international security, the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race. Specifically, they should adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. This is an essential, verifiable first step toward lessening the risk of nuclear war and reducing the nuclear arsenals. 43

At the time of Forsberg's "Call," Randall Kehler was already involved in some 1980 freeze referendums in state senate districts in western

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Massachusetts. His p r o p o s a l followed that of S e n a t o r H a t f i e l d , b u t it was n o t as c o m p r e h e n s i v e o r as sophisticated in n a t u r e as t h e o n e o u t l i n e d by t h e "Call." Still, t h e r e f e r e n d u m s w o n with a 59 p e r c e n t vote, e v e n t h o u g h R o n a l d R e a g a n carried thirty of thirty-three towns in the districts. 44 Within a m o n t h of the N o v e m b e r election, p e a c e and d i s a r m a m e n t g r o u p s a r o u n d t h e c o u n t r y h a d h e a r d of b o t h the " C a l l " a n d t h e M a s s a c h u s e t t s r e f e r e n d u m results a n d h a d started t o organize similar campaigns. In M a r c h of 1981, as M c C r e a a n d M a r k l e r e p o r t , t h e First N a t i o n a l Strategy C o n f e r e n c e of t h e N u c l e a r W e a p o n s F r e e z e C a m p a i g n m e t in W a s h i n g ton, D . C . It was a t t e n d e d b y 300 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of various activist g r o u p s f r o m thirty-three states. 4 5 F r o m t h e r e the issue t o o k off with dizzying speed, h e a d e d f o r t h e m a j o r r e f e r e n d u m votes in t h e g e n e r a l election of 1982. T h a t the f r e e z e m o v e m e n t could accelerate so quickly f r o m so m o d e s t a beginning m a k e s it obvious t h a t this was a national political issue waiting t o b e b o r n . By 1981 a n d 1982, so m a n y national interest groups, religious organizations a n d d e n o m i n a t i o n s , political action c o m m i t t e e s , citizen groups, and just plain citizens h a d signed on to the e f f o r t that it was a b l o c k b u s t e r political h a p p e n i n g . T h e f r e e z e was only very briefly the p r o p e r t y of liberal p e a c e groups. By 1982 it h a d a mass b a s e of s u p p o r t , h a d a t t r a c t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of politicians at every level, a n d was widely followed by t h e media. T h e f r e e z e m o v e m e n t was clearly not the result of d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t factions, b u t of a d e e p antipathy t o w a r d nuclear w e a p o n s in the public at large, joined with a novel idea supplied by a n e w set of political elite. It was g r a f t e d o n t o an organizational i n f r a s t r u c t u r e — already in place in 1980—that was s o m e w h a t s u b t e r r a n e a n in that it did not revolve a r o u n d e i t h e r political parties or interest groups. A n d t h e f r e e z e m o v e m e n t relied heavily on the m e d i a to e d u c a t e voters, to get t h e m to participate at least by voting, and t o m a k e t h e issue persist a f t e r t h e r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e over. T h e m e d i a c o o p e r a t e d to a d e g r e e sufficient to m e e t the first two of t h e s e goals; t h e third was never accomplished. T h e m e d i a played a d r a m a t i c role in b o t h the rapid ascent of the f r e e z e as an issue a n d in its precipitous p l u m m e t f r o m the public a g e n d a . T h e f r e e z e as a r e f e r e n d u m m o v e m e n t d i f f e r e d f r o m the V i e t n a m W a r ballots in several ways, n o t t h e least of which was the n a t u r e of its m e d i a coverage a n d its i n t e n d e d target g r o u p . T h e role of television in the V i e t n a m W a r has b e e n well d o c u m e n t e d , b u t the m e d i a focused on the e v e n t itself, n o t on the ballots s u r r o u n d i n g it. T h a t is, t h e substance of the issue—the w a r a n d its e f f e c t s — p r o v i d e d t h e story; t h e procedures of decisionmaking concerning the war, including the r e f e r e n d u m votes, were largely ignored by the press. T h e opposite was t r u e for the f r e e z e issue. A s noted, U.S. ambivalence concerning n u c l e a r w e a p o n s was n o t h i n g new. W h a t was novel was this

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new m e c h a n i s m f o r expressing nuclear fears. T h e p r o c e s s — t h e f r e e z e m o v e m e n t a n d r e f e r e n d u m s — w a s t h e story. W h a t this m e a n t f o r m e d i a c o v e r a g e was t h a t it would last only as long as t h e process itself persisted, that is, until t h e r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e over in 1982. A r g u a b l y , t h e real impact of the f r e e z e was n o t felt until 1984, w h e n national a n d state f r e e z e political action c o m m i t t e e s n u m b e r e d thirty-four in all, raised a n d s p e n t $3.4 million in 244 H o u s e and twenty S e n a t e races, a n d directed the w o r k of 25,000 volunteers. H o w e v e r , as C h r i s t o p h e r P a i n e notes, by t h a t time the m e d i a h a d m o v e d on. A c c o r d i n g to Paine, In the news media the set of serious interlocking arms control proposals known as "the freeze" was treated like the political equivalent of the hula hoop: the sudden feast of coverage was matched only by the instant famine when the media-pack moved on, leaving behind the partially digested remains of an issue and a movement struggling to recover from a drastically "oversold" condition The freeze movement, for example reached its peak of organization, expenditure, and political influence during the 1984 election, long after the media had lost interest in it. 46

T h a t t h e press is a fickle lover is not a revelation in U.S. politics. W h a t is significant a b o u t the f r e e z e affair, however, is that m e d i a attention m a d e the r e f e r e n d u m s a great success as events, if not as policy. In a sense, t h e eventual f r e e z e legislation a p p r o v e d by the U.S. H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s was n o t t h e significant legacy of t h e m o v e m e n t , a l t h o u g h the success of the f r e e z e r e f e r e n d u m s h e l p e d p e r s u a d e representatives to v o t e f o r t h e congressional measure. 4 7 M o r e i m p o r t a n t was the f r e e z e e f f o r t ' s achievem e n t , with t h e m e d i a ' s help, of establishing the use of international-issue referendums. This ascendancy of process o v e r substance as o n e legacy of t h e f r e e z e should not b e t a k e n cynically as evidence of the meaninglessness of voting in r e f e r e n d u m s . T h a t so m a n y middle-class A m e r i c a n s w e r e swept along in the f r e e z e m o v e m e n t , and that they asserted their p r e s e n c e in t h e r e f e r e n d u m s , was t h e r e a s o n that t h e m e d i a — a n d ultimately C o n g r e s s a n d t h e p r e s i d e n t — p a i d a t t e n t i o n to the issue. U n l i k e t h e V i e t n a m antiw a r r e f e r e n d u m s , t h e f r e e z e was a white-collar p h e n o m e n o n , " m a d e u p of family p e o p l e , business and professional p e o p l e , t h e clergy, e d u c a t o r s , and scientists," occupying " c o m m u n i t y centers, t o w n halls, church b a s e ments, a n d living r o o m s all over t h e country." 4 8 This d e m o g r a p h i c profile is the o n e t h e m e d i a and the politicians h o p e to see w h e n looking f o r c o n s u m e r s a n d voters. It is possible, of course, that t h e involvement of such a wide p o r t i o n of the U.S. m i d d l e class in s u p p o r t of the f r e e z e h a d to d o with t h e fact that t h e initiative petitions only s u p p o r t e d pursuing a policy of m u t u a l freeze. T h e w o r d i n g of t h e petitions did not stipulate t h a t a f r e e z e b e i m m e d i a t e l y e f f e c t e d . In o t h e r words, the c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e success of

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the referendums would only be continued "talking" about the freezing of nuclear weapons—first in Congress, then in conjunction with the Soviet Union—not the actual implementation of a freeze. Some rational choice theorists make much of this distinction between "expressive" and "consequentialist" voting, arguing that when, and in this case because, "votes are words and not deeds," the appeal of the freeze was wide because its approval would cost the middle- and upper-class voters little in terms of security or wealth. 49 Thus, the rational choice argument concludes, the freeze success does not indicate a willingness on the part of voters actually to make policy in this participatory democratic way, but only to encourage talking about policy. W e will take up this criticism again in the last chapter, since it applies broadly to many international-issue referendums in Europe as well as potentially in the United States. But it is important here to understand how much the rational choice position misconstrues the meaning and substance of democracy. Talking is an (and perhaps the) essential feature of democratic politics. Thus continued talking is not an insignificant consequence of any decision, regardless of whether it is made by referendum or legislative action. Furthermore, referendums institutionalize political talking—they make political discussions more than mere grumbling or cocktail party small talk. They make political discourse part of the substance of political decisionmaking. That the freeze referendums succeeded for a time in stimulating discussion of nuclear weaponry among a large portion of the U.S. public was, then, no small accomplishment. The success of the freeze should therefore not be measured only by its impact on the nuclear arms race. That race has slowed because of a complex set of circumstances, only one of which is the effect of public opinion as expressed through the freeze campaign. The singular effect of the freeze campaign was to introduce U.S. voters to direct involvement in foreign policymaking. In so doing, the movement's enduring impact should be assessed according to the likelihood of this decision process being used again. FOREIGN POLICY REFERENDUMS IN THE UNITED STATES The Vietnam and freeze referendums succeeded in a variety of ways. Both were supported by a large number of voters, in most cases a clear majority of those casting ballots. Both overcame initial derogation by elected leaders as "radical" or "unrealistic" idealizations of political possibility. Both anticipated and contributed to eventual policy outcomes in the "real" world of politics. It should not be forgotten that these referendums were instances of mass political leadership—what they put to the decision of the voters became the policy of the leaders thereafter. As political

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m o m e n t s in t h e U n i t e d States, they w e r e d e m o c r a t i c inversions: followers leading leaders, t h e m a n y guiding t h e elite. Yet, b o t h m o v e m e n t s also partially failed in that they achieved only s h o r t - t e r m , largely symbolic victories that fell s h o r t of their p r o c l a i m e d goals. F u r t h e r m o r e , a n d m o r e significantly, they did not extensively c h a n g e t h e m a n n e r in which foreign policy is m a d e in t h e U n i t e d States. A r e f e r e n d u m is a process t h a t w h e n e m p l o y e d should alter t h e s u b s t a n c e of d e m o c r a c y . A s w e a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 1, participation is n o t just a m e t h o d , b u t t h e point, of d e m o c r a c y . T h u s , symbolic victories a l o n e a r e n o t e n o u g h . T o succeed in m a k i n g politics m o r e d e m o c r a t i c , r e f e r e n d u m s m u s t s p a w n m o r e r e f e r e n d u m s — p a r t i c i p a t i o n m u s t m a k e f u r t h e r participation b o t h m o r e a p p e a l i n g and m o r e effective. T h e V i e t n a m a n d f r e e z e r e f e r e n d u m s r e m a i n the only two widespread U.S. e x p e r i m e n t s in p o p u l a r policymaking (even advising) for international politics. This failure of foreign policy r e f e r e n d u m s to r e p r o d u c e themselves in the U n i t e d States must lie at least partly with their " n o r m a l i z a t i o n " as political devices. By m e a n s of several controversial decisions, the S u p r e m e C o u r t has r e n d e r e d r e f e r e n d u m s b o t h m o r e possible a n d less m e a n i n g f u l as m e t h o d s of decisionmaking. T h e decisions in t h e Bellotti a n d Meyer cases c h a n g e d the source of m o n e y and the n a t u r e of elitism in r e f e r e n d u m politics b u t did not affect their a m o u n t s . A l r e a d y in s t a t e a n d local r e f e r e n d u m s , t h e effects of these decisions are being felt, as c o r p o r a t i o n s and r e f e r e n d u m specialists t a k e the field. R e c e n t elections in California o f f e r e d ballots that carried u p to fifty initiative and r e f e r e n d u m p r o p o s i tions on t h e m and r e q u i r e d the distribution of i n f o r m a t i o n b o o k l e t s of h u n d r e d s of pages to explain the issues to voters. T h o u g h t h e r e is evidence that voters were not o v e r w h e l m e d and, in fact, s h o w e d c o n s i d e r a b l e sophistication in their decisions, t h e f u t u r e of r e f e r e n d u m s as m e t h o d s of participatory decisionmaking for international affairs s e e m s p e r h a p s even m o r e controversial and cloudier now t h a n i m m e d i a t e l y following t h e f r e e z e successes. 5 0 T h a t conclusion is ironic given the p r e s e n t n a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs, w h e r e d e m o c r a c y ' s praises are being sung in m o r e places t h a n ever a r o u n d t h e globe and w h e r e , as we h a v e seen in t h e p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s , r e f e r e n d u m s a r e increasingly being used in c o u n t r i e s with less (or at least m o r e r e c e n t ) claim to the title of " d e m o c r a c y " t h a n t h e U n i t e d States. It is with a discussion of t h e s e final ironies that we close o u r e x p l o r a t i o n of the place of r e f e r e n d u m s in t h e relations b e t w e e n " d e m o c r a t i c " states.

NOTES 1. There have been other, smaller-scale instances where citizens have voted on international-issue referendums. In 1989, for example, Maine voters were given

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the opportunity to protest the U.S. Navy training launches of cruise missiles in their state. Also in the late 1980s, several communities, including Cambridge, Massachusetts, Chicago, and San Francisco, voted in referendums to declare themselves "nuclear-free zones." 2 . 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479 (1847). 3. See Pam Solo, From Protest to Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 94; Frances B. McCrea and Gerald E. Markle, Minutes to Midnight (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989), chapter 5; David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1990). 4. Edmund Burke, Collected Works 89 (7th ed., 1881), p. 96. 5. 92 U.S. 130 (1875). 6.223 U.S. 118 (1912). 7. 223 U.S. 151,164 (1912); these cases are also discussed in Harlan Hahn and Sheldon Kamieniecki, Referendum Voting (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), chapter 1. 8. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 9.393 U.S. 385 (1969). 10. 402 U.S. 136,141 (1971). 11. Crawford v. Board of Education, 102 U.S. 3211 (1982); Washington v. Seattle, 102 U.S. 3187 (1982). 12.426 U.S. 668 (1976). 13. City ofEastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), p. 672. 14. City of Eastlake, p. 675. 15. Eastlake, p. 677, emphasis added. 16.435 U.S. 765 (1978). 17. Bellotti, p. 768. 18. Bellotti, p. 768. This general line of thinking was not new. The Court has sometimes found corporations to be constitutionally protected, as in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,244 (1936). 19. Bellotti, p. 791. 20. The Court had upheld these provisions for electoral campaigns in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,17 (1976). 21. Bellotti, p. 790. 22. Bellotti, p. 790. 23. See David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). 24. The impact of these new elites and their practices on referendum politics has yet to be fully measured. In Meyer v. Grant, 108 U.S. 1886 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a Colorado law prohibiting the use of professional signature gatherers was unconstitutional, on the grounds that it was an unacceptable limitation on political speech. Some have argued that the Court's decision effectively altered the nature of referendums, rendering them ineffective as alternatives to elitist, money-dominated politics as usual. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Robert M. Stern, "The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal," paper presented at the American Political Science Association convention, August 1989. See also, Larry L. Berg and C. B. Holman, "The Initiative Process and Its Declining Agenda-setting Value," Law and Policy 11 (October 1989), pp. 451^169.

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25. Richard Dean Burns and W. Addams Dixon, "Foreign Policy and the 'Democratic Myth': The Debate on the Ludlow Amendment," Mid-America 47 (October 1965), pp. 288-306. 26. Harlan Hahn, "Correlates of Public Sentiments About War: Local Referenda on the Vietnam Issue," American Political Science Review 64/4 (December 1970), pp. 1189-1190. 27. Hahn, "Correlates," p. 1190. 28. Benjamin I. Page and Richard A. Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," American Political Science Review 66/3 (September 1972), p. 985. 29. Hahn, "Correlates," p. 1190. Hahn, in Table 1, p. 1191, shows correlation coefficients ranging from .83 in Dearborn to .57 in Madison between low socioeconomic characteristics and the vote against U.S. participation in the war between 1966 and 1968. Only in Cambridge is the correlation reversed, showing decreasing support for the war as SES increased. 30. Harlan Hahn and Albert Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam," War/Peace Report (May 1967), p. 15. 31. James Davis, Jr., and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "Selective Service and Military Manpower: Induction and Deferment Policies in the 1960s," in Political Science and Public Policy, edited by Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 83-121. Also see, "Negroes and Military Service—Latest Facts," U.S. News and World Report, August 15,1966, pp. 60-63. 32. Hahn and Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam"; Hahn, "Correlates," p. 1190 and passim. 33. Hahn, "Correlates," p. 1187. 34. James Clotfelter, "Disarmament Movements in the United States," Journal of Peace Research 23/2 (1986), pp. 97-102. 35. Most analyses hold that constituency opinion, and therefore presumably the referendums, did not significantly influence later action in the executive and Congress. Member ideology, for example, was the key variable in congressional voting on freeze, according to James McCormick, "Congressional Voting on the Nuclear Freeze Resolutions," American Politics Quarterly 13 (1985), pp. 122-134. A recent, contrary view that argues that "constituency preferences exercised considerable influence on the [congressional] disposition on the freeze issue" is L. Marvin Overby, "Assessing Constituency Influence: Congressional Voting on the Nuclear Freeze, 1982-1983," Legislative Studies Quarterly 16/2 (May 1991), p. 297. 36. There is a growing literature placing the freeze movement in the context of social and political movements in U.S. history. See, for example, Clotfelter, "Disarmament"; McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight; Seymour Feshbach and Michael J. White, "Individual Differences in Attitudes Towards Nuclear Arms Policies: Some Psychological and Social Policy Considerations," Journal of Peace Research 23/2 (June 1986), pp. 129-141; Kim Salomon, "The Peace Movement— An Anti-Establishment Movement," Journal of Peace Research 23/2 (June 1986), pp. 115-128; Ulrike C. Wasmuht, " A Sociological Survey of American Peace Movements," Alternatives 9/4 (Spring 1984), pp. 581-591. 37. The states (and the percentage of voters favoring the freeze) were Arizona (41%), California (52%), Massachusetts (74%), Michigan (57%), Montana (57%), New Jersey (66%), North Dakota (58%), Oregon (62%), Rhode Island

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(59%), and Wisconsin (75%). 38. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, pp. 101,113 (note 8). 39. Everett Carll Ladd, "The Freeze Framework," Public Opinion 5/4 (August-September 1982), 20-41. 40. Ladd, "Freeze Framework," p. 41. 41. In addition to McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, see J. Bentley, The Nuclear Freeze Movement (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984); Keith B. Payne and Cohn S. Gray, The Nuclear Freeze Controversy (Boston: University Press of America, 1984); Solo, From Protest to Policy. 42. Quoted in McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, p. 98. 43. Quoted in McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, p. 100. 44. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, p. 102. 45. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, p. 103. 46. Christopher E. Paine, "Lobbying for Arms Control," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41/7 (August 1985), p. 126. 47. Overby, "Assessing Constituency Influence," pp. 108-109. 48. Douglas C. Waller, "The Impact of the Nuclear Freeze Movement on Congress," in The Nuclear Weapons Freeze and Arms Control, edited by Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), p. 48. 49. Susan Feigenbaum, Lynn Karoly, and David Levy, "When Votes Are Words Not Deeds: Some Evidence from the Nuclear Freeze Referendum," Public Choice 58 (September 1988), pp 201-216. 50. Lowenstein and Stern, "The First Amendment."

8

Democratic World Politics: Performance and Prospects There can be no doubt that the role of referendums in democratic politics is slowly but steadily increasing. What is less sure is whether this is a trend we should welcome. As we mentioned in Chapter 4, those who judge the expanding role of referendums in policymaking tend to adopt one of three theoretical positions. First, there is the pessimistic view advanced by foreign policy realists. They warn that direct democracy facilitates uninformed policymaking and therefore can be used by demagogues for self-interested ends. Everyday citizens, realists argue, are not adequately trained to handle intricate questions involving treaties, defense, international trade, and so forth. Such complex policy questions require careful deliberation, patience, wisdom, and experience. If, therefore, referendums continue to be widely used, foreign policy will soon become reflections of (at best) people's moral enthusiasm and (at worst) people's headless passions. Meanwhile, demagogues, skillfully manipulating popular passions, will become highly influential. The result will be wild swings in a country's foreign policy, corresponding to voters' superficial thinking and demagogues' mypoic and unscrupulous search for power. The realist perspective is not the sole theoretical position from which to decry the use of referendums in deciding international issues. Some advocates of participatory democracy also have advanced a pessimistic view that rests on a dismal picture of contemporary industrial societies. These theorists argue that until more radically participatory traditions evolve in advanced industrial societies, referendums will produce more harm than good. Allegedly, such nondemocratic characteristics of advanced industrial societies as the anonymity and loneliness of urban life, the staggering inequalities of wealth and income within all modern economies, the impact of electronic mass media on people's thinking, and the repetitiveness and overspecialization within bureaucratized organizations render everyday citizens unready to cast ballots in a thoughtful and responsible way. Citizens are too impoverished, frustrated, fearful, and inexperienced to act in politics in a deliberate, reflective manner. Instead, the managers of corporations, directors of the electronic media, and a few other officials in the "command posts" of modern society regularly manipulate the referendum process to their own advantage by playing on voters' 171

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insecurities and resentments. Despite their purportedly democratic meaning, referendums are another weapon in the arsenal of the socially and politically powerful. Not all observers, however, view referendums as either facades or dangers. Some analysts advocate referendums on grounds that they facilitate the participation of everyday people in politics, indirectly enrich policymaking by introducing concerns that government officials often overlook, and allow the people to assert their will against the preferences of the elites. According to these democratic defenders of referendums, they seldom have been tools of demagogues, the wealthy, or political elites. Citizens are not passive clay that can be easily shaped by elites. Citizens think for themselves and typically use referendums to draw elites' attention to overlooked grievances. We thus have three very different assessments about the meaning of modern referendums. Each viewpoint describes referendums in a very different light. Each encourages us either to decry and oppose the current wave of direct democracy in international affairs or to applaud and support it. How well do these alternative pictures of referendums represent recent historical experience, as explored in the preceding chapters? TIMING OF REFERENDUMS

If we look first at the timing of recent referendums, it appears that the pessimists are partly correct. In many countries, organized political parties and incumbent government leaders are the primary impetus behind international-issue referendums. Self-regarding calculations of how to maintain institutional power largely explain why referendums on E E C membership were called in Norway, Denmark, and France, and why referendums on Scottish and Welsh devolution and EEC membership were called in Great Britain. Referendums often are called by leading politicians who face sudden and immediate threats to their careers. For instance, elites' beleaguered positions partially help explain why referendums on Soviet unity and on the Baltic republics' independence occurred when they did. Timing is not always controlled by government leaders, however. Sometimes referendums are constitutionally required, as the Irish EEC vote was. The U.S. nuclear freeze initiatives remind us both that elites' struggles may also be quite peripheral to the holding of a referendum, and that sometimes referendums are products of grassroots agitation over which government leaders have a miniscule role. The Andalusian autonomy referendum and the Danish EEC referendum further illustrate how electoral tides can entice elites to advocate referendums on momentarily popular issues, and in Quebec, a young, opposition party came to power

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in part because it had promised pro-independence voters that it would utilize a referendum on sovereignty-assocation. In the cases just cited, the idea of a policy referendum enjoyed a groundswell of popular support before state officials openly called for a popular vote. In sum, although the argument that referendums are by-products of elite politicking contains much truth, it is only partly true. Referendums are not always proposed by politically beleaguered elites and then presented as a fait accompli to the citizenry. On several occasions, nonelites have been the primary impetus for an international-issue referendum. VOTER EDUCATION A key issue in deciding on the advisability of referendums is whether voters in international-issue referendums are as politically ignorant and as easily manipulated as some critics maintain. It is true that political leaders have often phrased proposals in slanted and ambiguous ways. Consider the cases of the N A T O referendum in Spain, the sovereigntyassociation referendum in Quebec, or the Soviet-unity referendum. And sometimes, pluralities of voters do not fully understand the meaning and policy implications of a r e f e r e n d u m proposal, as occurred during Quebec's sovereignty-association referendum. So, apparently voters in referendums are sometimes confused and poorly educated about issues, and in part this is because leaders often try to manipulate the question to their advantage. Still, whenever voters are asked in surveys to explain why they cast their ballots as they did, many can cite highly pragmatic considerations—such as the possible economic implications of a government policy. This suggests that voting is not always a simple, mechanical response to political leaders' cues but in part a reflection of voters' deliberation. Furthermore, the periphery's triumph over the wishes of the international business community and the ruling class during Norway's E E C referendum, and the inability of the González government and Gorbachev's state apparatus to secure victories in controversial referendums over regional self-rule show that voters are hardly passive clay in the hands of determined elites. Finally, the documented swings in public opinion during the Swiss referendum over U N membership and the Quebec sovereignty-association referendum suggest that voters do not follow lockstep behind established business and political leaders. Of course, there are several countries in which partisan cues have correlated strongly with voting behavior. Referendums in Canada, Spain, and Great Britain come to mind. But even in these cases, many voters did not follow their parties' recommendations. So again, the picture of an overwhelmingly passive electorate during referendums needs significant modification.

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What about the impact of modern electronic media? It would be foolish to argue that the media plays no role in how people vote in foreign policy referendums. As Todd Gitlin has cogently pointed out, the more a given policy option is foreign to the day-to-day experience of a citizen, the more he or she depends on mass media to clarify and define issues.1 Still, while voters have been influenced by media reports and endorsements, there have been dramatic cases of voters disregarding media messages. Recall both the inability of the González government, despite its control over television, to determine the outcome of the Andalusian vote and Gorbachev's failure to produce an overwhelming victory during the Soviet-unity vote. These cases demonstrate that the voters' political opinions are not simply created by the media. There is always some unpredictability and independence in voters' thinking, and even if only a minority of voters do not blindly follow media, party, and elite endorsements, this minority can be large enough to determine the outcome of a referendum, especially in a close vote.

VOTER PARTICIPATION

With very few exceptions, such as the autonomy referendum in Galicia, majorities of eligible citizens participate in referendums. Generally speaking, the turnout at a referendum is not as high as in proximate general elections. Nonetheless, over half of all eligible voters cast their ballots in almost every international-issue referendum. Are citizens adequately educated and informed about the issues? As we have seen, evidence from recent surveys supports diverse answers. On the one hand, many voters (sometimes as many as a third of those queried in a given survey) have admitted not knowing the issues involved in a particular referendum or, when questioned, appear significantly misinformed about the substance of the referendum's proposals. On the other hand, over half of those polled have shown knowledge of some of the central issues posed by a referendum proposal ("central issues" as defined by the designers of the surveys). When questioned after casting their ballots, many voters have demonstrated familiarity with specific aspects of proposals—in particular, the possible economic consequences of a contemplated policy. So on the basis of opinion poll evidence, we can conclude that most voters in referendums are somewhat, even if not fully, informed. An alternative method of determining voters' ability to think about international issues is to look at either voters' formal education or their relative socioeconomic status, which can be used as an indirect indicator of formal education. It could be argued that poorly educated voters have

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greater difficulty in analyzing and judging the issues involved in a foreign policy question than do well-educated citizens. The more formal education a voter has, the easier it will be for him or her to assimilate information and to weigh the relative benefits and costs of policy proposals in a prudent, deliberate manner. Plausible counterarguments come quickly to mind, however. For example, in the Vietnam War referendums, it was common for a less formally educated person, subject to a country's draft, to appreciate the costs of military undertakings more vividly and accurately than a highly educated person who was exempt from that draft. In comparison to the citizenry at large, the people who vote in international-issue referendums are disproportionately from the economically and educationally advantaged strata in society. Conversely, the most economically dispossessed and least-educated strata tend to be statistically underrepresented among the citizens who vote in these referendums. Obviously, almost all voters lack career diplomats' detailed knowledge of foreign history, foreign languages, and foreign leaders. There is little evidence, however, that voters lack the modicum of formal education necessary to think about referendum issues, to listen to experts' opinions, and to balance a polity's competing goals and concerns. In short, available sociological evidence does not justify viewing most voters in referendums as completely uninformed or as educationally unable to become informed. In fact, it is one of the purposes of referendums to add to citizens' civic education. DETERMINANTS OF VICTORY

Do demagogues, the wealthy, and the politically powerful typically win referendums, as critics of referendums often contend? As discussed in Chapter 6, on regional self-rule, it seems that government officials generally lose referendums unless they first build a broad coalition among major parties and interest groups. Stated differently, the passage of a government-sponsored referendum rests largely on the government first securing support from a broad range of influential political and social organizations. Unless political leaders take into account the viewpoints of powerful institutions, the passage of a given referendum proposal is doubtful. Even the development of a grand coalition of major political and social forces, however, does not guarantee the passage of a referendum proposal. Norway's EEC vote illustrates that a broad coalition of major political and economic groups can be defeated by a broad alliance of politically and economically marginal groups in a country. The Swiss referendum on joining the UN followed a similar pattern. Thus, although intraelite cooperation can influence a referendum vote, the outcomes of

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referendum votes are not as easily controlled by government officials and the inordinately wealthy as some critics of referendums contend. The role of demagoguery also is exaggerated by critics of referendums. Although Trudeau in Quebec, González in Spain, Pompidou in France, and Gorbachev in the Soviet Union sensationalized policy implications, vilified opponents, and utilized personal appeals during campaigns, they were not all successful in securing victories for their positions. Demagoguery, scapegoatism, and mudslinging clearly occur in referendums. But in light of the failures of demagogic tactics, such as González's failure in Andalusia and Gorbachev's questionable victory in the Sovietunity referendum, claims that most voters are easily manipulated by demagogues are not fully supported by the available evidence.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REFERENDUMS Realists often express fears that referendums signal the disappearance of diplomacy and expertise in foreign policymaking, while other critics warn that referendums will lead to policies that promote the interests of the economically and politically powerful. Defenders of referendums counter that as referendums become more commonplace, foreign policies will become more stable and judicious because everyday people are much more fearful of military adventures and rapid changes in the economic environment than are political leaders. All these views seem to oversimplify the policy consequences of direct democracy. Consider the realists' dire warnings. While there has been an obvious increase in the use of international-issue referendums in recent decades, there is no evidence that diplomacy and expertise no longer play central roles in policymaking. The vast majority of foreign policy decisions remain exclusively in the hands of diplomatic experts and career politicians. Most of the time, referendums have been used to supplement, not to supplant, elites' policymaking. Sometimes, referendums have been used to promote the interests of economically advantaged groups in a society, as in the case of the autonomy referendums for the already economically advantaged Basque and Catalan regions of Spain. But referendums also sometimes have been used successfully by economically disadvantaged groups, as was the case in Norway's E E C referendum and Andalusia's autonomy referendums. There are also many cases in which it is far from clear that the interests of the wealthy and the interests of the nonwealthy are incompatible. In the Welsh and Scottish devolution referendums, for example, most big businesses and most beleaguered small businesses tended to oppose the proposals' passage. While it could be argued that the referendums' out-

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c o m e b e n e f i t e d big businesses, it could equally b e plausibly a r g u e d t h a t smaller e c o n o m i c interests w e r e victorious. A s f o r r e f e r e n d u m s leading t o caution a n d conservatism in foreign policy, as s o m e d e f e n d e r s of r e f e r e n d u m s c o n t e n d , t h e r e c o r d o n c e again s e e m s mixed. T h e r e a r e s o m e cases in which t h e results of r e f e r e n d u m s h a v e s u p p o r t e d t h e status quo: t h e Q u e b e c sovereignty-association refere n d u m and t h e British devolution r e f e r e n d u m s c o m e t o m i n d . B u t t h e r e a r e m a n y cases in which r e f e r e n d u m s h e r a l d e d a radically n e w direction in i n t e r n a t i o n a l policy—for instance, t h e r e f e r e n d u m s o n regional selfr u l e in Spain, t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e r e f e r e n d u m s f o r t h e Baltic republics of t h e Soviet U n i o n , t h e a n t i w a r r e f e r e n d u m s in t h e U n i t e d States, a n d the D a n i s h E E C r e f e r e n d u m . So, r e f e r e n d u m s s e e m n e i t h e r first a n d f o r e m o s t a conservative policymaking p r o c e d u r e n o r an inherently radical one. R e f e r e n d u m s can lead to both novel innovation and policy continuity.

ELUSIVE EVIDENCE A N D CURRENT DEBATES B o t h the h e r a l d s and J e r e m i a h s w h o c e l e b r a t e a n d b e m o a n t h e growing use of r e f e r e n d u m s in foreign policy can cite historical evidence to s u p p o r t their position. T h e p r o b l e m f o r b o t h the a d v o c a t e s a n d critics is that t h e historical r e c o r d is m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n they c a r e t o a c k n o w l e d g e . Stated s o m e w h a t differently, the e x p e r i e n c e of international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s has thus far b e e n filled with p a r a d o x . P o w e r struggles a m o n g elites h a v e b e e n the p r i m a r y i m p e t u s b e h i n d the h o l d i n g of s o m e r e f e r e n d u m s , b u t certainly n o t all. S o m e voters in s o m e r e f e r e n d u m s a r e poorly i n f o r m e d . Yet, in most r e f e r e n d u m s , m a n y voters are i n f o r m e d and reflective. Elites' e n d o r s e m e n t s , p a r t y loyalties, a n d press c o v e r a g e can influe n c e the o u t c o m e of r e f e r e n d u m s b u t s e l d o m can fully d e t e r m i n e t h e o u t c o m e . Participation in r e f e r e n d u m s is hardly universal, a n d usually the m o r e formally e d u c a t e d and m o r e affluent m e m b e r s of a society particip a t e . N o n e t h e l e s s , participation in r e f e r e n d u m s is almost always o v e r 50 p e r c e n t of t h e e l e c t o r a t e a n d s o m e t i m e s m u c h h i g h e r t h a n that, and less a f f l u e n t a n d less formally e d u c a t e d voters o f t e n p a r t i c i p a t e in significant numbers. International-issue r e f e r e n d u m s , in short, a r e contradictory p h e n o m ena. They seem neither unambiguously "good" nor purely "bad." They are far f r o m t h e institutional p a n a c e a s that s o m e o b s e r v e r s desire and expect. B u t t h e y are also f a r f r o m the disasters that s o m e critics perceive. Like legislative elections a n d t o w n meetings, t h e y a r e f o r m s of p o p u l a r self-rule t h a t h a v e b o t h attractive a n d unattractive f e a t u r e s . T h e y theref o r e easily give rise to a m b i v a l e n t feelings a m o n g c a r e f u l observers. Given t h e multiple characteristics of international-issue r e f e r e n d u m s ,

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are their benefits worth their risks? T o answer this question, we need to place it within the context of both a changing international political reality and an evolving democratic theory. A s we have seen, referendums have played a large role in both. DEMOCRACY AND THE REAL PRESENT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS A s this book was being written, the world of international politics was being convulsed by change. Though it is difficult to characterize all the remarkable events in 1990 and 1991 that set Eastern E u r o p e and the Soviet Union to boil, it is certainly true that all of them effervesced around the idea of democracy. W e may not be experiencing Fukuyama's "end of history," but we are certainly living what for many has been a long-anticipated future. The extension of democratic institutions and the prospect of long-term peace among the superpowers are no longer merely idealistic visions of the past or future; they are the real present of international politics. In the midst of this rush to democracy, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that events in Europe, China, South Africa, and elsewhere manifest the evolution of democracy, not the triumph of one particular brand of it. Whatever democratic forms mature in what is now the Commonwealth of Independent States will not be the same as those in the West. Democratic institutions can assume many shapes and a variety of procedures, and those best suited to one culture may not serve a society whose traditions are very different. In other words, there are now new laboratories of liberty, and all democratic societies can learn from whatever new experiments are carried out in democratizing nations. As we have seen in Chapter 6, the Soviet Union employed a democratic device not universally utilized by Western democracies: the national referendum. Furthermore, its advisory independence referendums anticipated a consequence of momentous international import. They signaled the dissolution of the Soviet Union and also, therefore, the beginning of a new international world order. Thus, both democracy and international politics will experience defining moments in the immediate future, and their redefinitions will be the result of what seemed only a few years ago to b e an unlikely symbiosis. As we have seen, in many parts of the world referendums have appeared as a preferred mechanism of the new order, and not only as progenitors of domestic policy, but also as agents of change in foreign affairs as well. A s such, they challenge both the meaning of international politics and of democratic practice. These are two developments worth probing as we

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close o u r exploration of t h e place of direct d e m o c r a c y in t h e relations b e t w e e n states.

International Politics in a New Democratic Order E v e n t s in t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e challenged t h e realist a c c o u n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics. A s w e h a v e c h a r a c t e r i z e d realism, it m a k e s t w o f u n d a m e n t a l claims. T h e first is t h a t international a n d domestic politics a r e t w o s e p a r a t e r e a l m s d e f i n e d by t w o sets of principles in n o necessary relation to e a c h o t h e r . T h u s , the f o r e i g n policy of a d e m o c r a t i c c o u n t r y a n d a totalitarian o n e might n o t b e widely dissimilar, t h o u g h their d o m e s t i c policies might well be. Second, w h e r e a s d o m e s t i c politics is t h e r e a l m of n o r m a t i v e principles and deeply held values, b o t h of which might vary greatly across d i f f e r e n t cultures, the d o m a i n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics is of p o w e r , interest, and necessity, d e f i n e d similarly by all players o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene. E v e n if it w e r e n o t clear b e f o r e , t h e failed Soviet c o u p of A u g u s t 1991 left little d o u b t that d e m o c r a c y denies t h e first t e n e t of realist politics. Largely m o t i v a t e d by a drive t o k e e p t h e republics in line, t h e c o u p a t t e m p t a n d its a f t e r m a t h d e m o n s t r a t e d that t h e success of d e m o c r a t i c values can m e r g e d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics into a successful devolution m o v e m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , p r e s s u r e in t h e U n i t e d States t o recognize t h e newly i n d e p e n d e n t republics c a m e f r o m citizens with relatives or ethnic histories in t h e Soviet states. P r e s i d e n t G e o r g e B u s h acquiesced. In two short weeks, several n e w actors s t r o d e o n t o the international stage. T h e y are t h e p r o d u c t s of d o m e s t i c dissent in t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d a r e recognized internationally (including m e m b e r s h i p in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ) at least in p a r t b e c a u s e of t h e internal politics of n a t i o n alism a n d ethnicity. This conflation of domestic a n d international politics also j e o p a r d i z e s t h e second t e n e t of realist theory. T h e a p p e a l of d e m o c r a c y as a political f o r m hinges n o t on t h e p r o m i s e of increased n a t i o n a l p o w e r a n d i n t e r n a tional influence. N o r d o e s d e m o c r a c y p r o m i s e g r e a t e r security f o r citizens. R a t h e r , d e m o c r a c y o f f e r s us liberty and risk, o p p o r t u n i t i e s to succeed a n d fail, the f r e e d o m to t a k e control of o u r own lives, a n d t h e right of o t h e r s to ignore us as they p u r s u e their o w n plans. D e m o c r a c y is a b o u t values a n d ideals, n o t p o w e r . If d e m o c r a c y as an idea is a m a j o r f o r c e in t h e c u r r e n t e r u p t i o n s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics, t h e n i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics is n o longer exclusively t h e d o m a i n of p o w e r , interest, a n d necessity. W e should b e uneasy as we d r a w this conclusion. I n t e r n a t i o n a l politics in a new d e m o c r a t i c o r d e r m a y m a k e us wistful for t h e days of realpolitik. T h o u s a n d s of d i p l o m a t s h a v e h a d d e c a d e s of e x p e r i e n c e with p o w e r politics o n t h e international scene; f e w citizens h a v e yet h a d t h e c h a n c e t o

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m a k e foreign policy democratically. T h o s e that h a v e d o n e so h a v e left a mixed record of achievement. In the previous c h a p t e r s w e h a v e seen t h a t r e f e r e n d u m s h a v e n o t always b e e n p r a i s e w o r t h y p r o c e s s e s by w h i c h t o m a k e f o r e i g n policy. T h e F r e n c h r e f e r e n d u m c o n c e r n i n g m e m b e r s h i p in t h e E E C p r o d u c e d a w o e f u l l y low level of citizen i n t e r e s t , e v e n t h o u g h t h e v o t e r s m a y h a v e s h o w n insight in t h e i r r e f u s a l t o p a r t i c i p a t e in P r e s i d e n t P o m p i d o u ' s political sideshow. M o r e d i s c o n c e r t i n g w a s t h e p e c u l i a r p a r o c h i a l i s m t h a t British v o t e r s b r o u g h t t o t h e r e f e r e n d u m s on W e l s h a n d Scottish d e v o l u t i o n . W i t h issues of i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d a l a r g e r r o l e in t h e w o r l d at stake, m a n y v o t e r s w e r e p r i m a r i l y s w a y e d by a r g u m e n t s a b o u t taxes and t h e e f f e c t on p r i c e s at t h e local store. T h e s e private interests are legitimate c o n c e r n s t o b e sure, a n d t h e y exhibit t h e mixing of domestic a n d international c o n c e r n s so typical of a nonrealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of international politics. T h e y give new m e a n i n g to the old cliché that "all politics is local." B u t the allure of private interests raises the question of w h e t h e r ordinary citizens h a v e it within t h e m t o "get outside of t h e m s e l v e s " sufficiently to consider t h e effect of their decisions o n p e o p l e living on the o t h e r side of t h e world. By definition, foreign policy affects p e o p l e unfamiliar t o us, whose habits we m a y n o t k n o w a n d w h o s e values we may not u n d e r s t a n d . If p o w e r and self-interest a r e n o l o n g e r to b e t h e c u r r e n c y of international politics in a d e m o c r a t i c , postrealist world, h o w are voters to decide issues collectively? It is possible, presumably, that r e f e r e n d u m s may n o t d e n a t u r e international politics at all—that citizens will b e c o m e realists a n d a d o p t the c r e d o of self-interest and p o w e r politics in their democratically arrived-at foreign policy decisions. If so, t h e n r e f e r e n d u m s will not really alter the substance of international politics but only its p r o c e d u r e s a n d t h e n u m b e r of players in the policy process. This may be e n o u g h f o r believers in participatory d e m o c r a c y w h o remain wary of t o o m u c h citizen involvm e n t , b u t it would still b e t o o m u c h d e m o c r a c y for realists a n d t o o little for strong d e m o c r a t s . Yet, events of the last two years dispute this most ironic of neorealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of c u r r e n t foreign policy. T h e world of i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics is d i f f e r e n t t o d a y — t h e Berlin Wall has b e e n d e m o l i s h e d a n d L e n i n ' s statue toppled. Positive liberty has an undeniable cachet in the E a s t as well as t h e West, t h o u g h b o t h cultures are getting a c q u a i n t e d with it again as a real political value. T h e s e events have c h a n g e d international politics by introducing t h e values of and yearnings for real d e m o c r a c y i n t o t h e decision process. T h a t citizens t h r o u g h o u t t h e world are e m b r a c i n g new decision m e c h a n i s m s (like r e f e r e n d u m s ) now o p e n to t h e m s h o u l d not surprise us. R a t h e r , we should recognize that within t h e new e n v i r o n m e n t of international politics, democratic practice is also amenable t o redefinition.

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Democratic Practice in a New International Order T h e dramatic stirrings of democracy throughout the world are witness to the appeal of positive liberty as a preeminent political goal. Indeed, in countries like the newly independent republics once within the Soviet Union, the achievement of autonomy is likely to mean somewhat less negative liberty in the form of "freedom from" such things as poverty and instability. T h e use of referendums in these independence movements, as well as in other countries discussed in previous chapters, illuminates the intrinsic connection between this particular democratic practice and the goal of positive liberty. Demands for that liberty by definition mean that individuals must have a voice in decisions that affect their lives, and those decisions are increasingly international in scope. Thus, the evolution of democracy is in the direction of increased opportunity for all citizens to participate in its practice. As we have seen, not all observers cheer this evolution. Realists especially fear that international politics decisions will b e made cavalierly, by citizens without experience or dispassionate knowledge and motivated by emotion or sentimental moralism. Some strong democrats also fear such developments. They worry that without a wider environment of constant political participation, referendum decisions will reflect potentially harmful, xenophobic responses from citizens insufficiently accustomed to being taken seriously in political decisions. These are legitimate fears that we have taken seriously throughout this chapter and this book. In these final few pages we need to explore how democratic practice must also evolve in order to assuage those fears. The realists, of course, must begin by acknowledging a new political reality. T h e political map of the world has changed, certainly, but so has the method of these changes. Not only in Germany and the Soviet Union, but also in the United States' antiwar and nuclear freeze movements, real changes were brought by those untrained in the dispassionate, bloodless sophistication of diplomacy. Also, in at least some of the referendum campaigns we have studied in this book, raucous street-level politics led to significant policy changes. Furthermore, strong democrats such as Peter Bachrach, wary of too fast a move toward the use of referendums in international politics, should consider that here is a widening of positive liberty especially suited to educating citizens about how to look beyond their parochial, potentially xenophobic attitudes. Bachrach may indeed be correct in his belief that without more experience in decisionmaking, citizens are simply too selfabsorbed to render mature, morally responsible decisions. B u t the education must start somewhere, and where better than in international-issue referendums, where the question is precisely that of how we as citizens

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Politics

should interact with those of other cultures. In light of the events of the past two years, most citizens in the West now realize that people in the East believe in the same political goals as they, have the same democratic yearnings, and experience the same emotional responses to liberty. For the first time in a long time, citizens have seen through the official rhetoric about "evil empires" and "capitalist exploiters" to the common humanity they share with the common citizens of other countries. This is a knowledge born of emotion, it is true, but of a peculiarly democratic sort. There is no better time to allow citizens a voice in the international politics decisions that will affect the lives of their fellow lovers of democracy in other countries. Still, some voice lessons are clearly indicated by our study of referendums in the previous chapters. The practice of referendums needs refinements. Though these will be provided partly by experience and further research, we can make some suggestions about how the "talk" of democracy might proceed through the referendum device. First of all, the education of citizens is both a requirement and a goal of well-designed referendums. The same is true for democratic politics as a whole, of course, but referendums pose some special problems. Information about referendum issues needs wide dissemination in as balanced a form as possible. As we have seen, different countries approach this need in various ways, but some do seem more successful than others. The Danish public financing of referendum efforts on both sides of the issue succeeds well in informing the public of its choices and is less susceptible to cynical manipulation of public attitudes evident in referendum campaigns in other countries such as France and the United States. Furthermore, the Danish approach treats referendums more like elections, where public funding is provided for candidates for office, thereby bestowing the same level of importance on both types of ballot. The Danes also provide a model for the role of money in referendum campaigns. As we saw in our study of the United States' limited experience with large-scale referendum movements, when the Supreme Court removed all spending limits on private contributions to referendum campaigns, the r e f e r e n d u m s themselves b e c a m e less m e a n i n g f u l as instruments of democratic decisionmaking. Inexperience may provide an excuse for such a lapse, but the Court's decision needs overturning. Spending limits in U.S. electoral campaigns verify the need for restricting the influence of private money in politics. That need is at least as great in referendum politics. Finally, the education of citizens in referendums comes not only from campaign literature, but also from discourse in a wider sense. If democracy presumes a public sphere in which discussion takes place, referendums as a democratic device need to find ways to further that discourse. Certainly, political leaders and the media have roles here. Referendum movements

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are sometimes, as in t h e case of t h e f r e e z e , instances of political leadership being p r o v i d e d by citizens r a t h e r t h a n by elected officials o r by o t h e r opinion leaders such as t h e press. B u t such cases m i g h t indicate t h e b r e a k d o w n of electoral l e a d e r s h i p r a t h e r t h a n its essential n a t u r e , a n d o u r exploration of r e f e r e n d u m s in N o r w a y , Ireland, a n d e l s e w h e r e show h o w political leaders can f u r t h e r t h e d e m o c r a t i c discourse of r e f e r e n d u m s . T h e mechanics of r e f e r e n d u m s can also b e designed t o maximize discussion and reflection a b o u t t h e issues at stake. H o l d i n g r e f e r e n d u m s at regular intervals a n d on preassigned days might h e l p institutionalize t h e m as an essential f e a t u r e of n a t i o n a l politics. Also, h o l d i n g two votes on any m a j o r r e f e r e n d u m issue, with an interval of s o m e w e e k s o r e v e n m o n t h s b e t w e e n t h e m , o f f e r s a possibility f o r discussion f r a m e d by preliminary a n d final m o m e n t s of decision. This " w a v e " m e t h o d of r e f e r e n d u m s has rarely b e e n e m p l o y e d , t h o u g h t h e t w o V i e t n a m r e f e r e n d u m s in D e a r b o r n , Michigan, essentially followed this p a t t e r n , and, as w e saw in C h a p t e r 7, t h e second vote was a c c o m p a n i e d by a dramatically h i g h e r voter a p p r o v a l rate. O t h e r r e f i n e m e n t s a i m e d at e n h a n c i n g public consideration a n d a t t e n t i o n are also possible. F o r instance, a sophistication on the " w a v e " would b e t o submit r e f e r e n d u m q u e s t i o n s t o t h e public with a set of alternative answers f r o m which t o choose. A f t e r a sufficient p e r i o d of time for public discussion a n d deliberation by citizens, a s u b s e q u e n t ballot would t h e n choose b e t w e e n the t o p two o r t h r e e vote-getters on the first ballot. W e should r e m e m b e r that as d e m o c r a t i c institutions t a k e r o o t in an ever-growing n u m b e r of countries, their growth a n d m a t u r e f o r m will b e dictated as m u c h by the singular cultures of e a c h country as by any general blueprint a b o u t the mechanics of democracy. T h u s , o u r m o d e s t p r o p o s a l s are only speculative and are, n o d o u b t , at least partly influenced by the d e m o c r a t i c culture of t h e U n i t e d States. W e h a v e t a k e n a c o m p a r a t i v e a p p r o a c h in this b o o k expressly t o avoid stipulating any o n e m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y o r of r e f e r e n d u m politics as the best o r only legitimate o n e . T h e r e f o r e , w e conclude it n o w in d e m o c r a t i c fashion by w e l c o m i n g all proposals f o r r e f e r e n d u m design, n o m a t t e r their source. B e c a u s e this is clearly a time for new e x p e r i m e n t s in d e m o c r a c y in m a n y p a r t s of t h e world, we await the p r o d u c t s of a r e j u v e n a t e d d e m o c r a t i c imagination. L o o k i n g b a c k w a r d a few d e c a d e s f r o m n o w , we m a y decide that these e x p e r i m e n t s took place d u r i n g d e m o c r a c y ' s "Machiavellian M o m e n t . " This is t h e creative time w h e n , J. G . A . P o c o c k tells us, t h e world m o m e n tarily shrugs off t h e authority of r a n d o m f o r t u n e o v e r its affairs a n d submits t o t h e g o v e r n o r s h i p of h u m a n s and t h e i r institutional creations. 2 If this is o n e of those r a r e m o m e n t s , it is not o n e controlled by any singular " P r i n c e , " b u t by t h e collective will of p e o p l e united in their d e m a n d s for democracy. T h a t will a n d t h o s e d e m a n d s cover all aspects of d e m o c r a t i c life, d o m e s t i c and international, a n d they will b e h e a r d directly.

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NOTES 1. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media and the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 1-18. 2. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

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Index Aaland Islands, 35 Abdulali, Nasrin, 9n, 27n Africa: and referendums, 46-47 Agricultural Marketing Board (Ireland), 82 Air Canada, 119 Aitkin, Don, 53-54,56n Alaska, 42 Alexandria County, VA, 43 Algeria, 35-36,50 Alianza Popular, 78,80,85,96, 97,103-104,118,125,135 Allenstein,35 Almond, Gabriel A., 149n American Political Science Association, 11 Andalusia, 36, 117-118, 124-127, 132-133, 134135, 144, 148n, 172, 174, 175-176 Argentina, 48 Arias, Incendo Felix, 106n, 108n Arizona, 49,169n Armenia, 36,55n, 142 Aruba, 47 Asia: and referendums, 4546 Assemblée Nationale, 111, 120 Athens, 27 Aubert, Jean-François, 56n Austen, John, 4,54n Australia, 34,39-40,53-54 Austria, 35, 55n; and EEC membership, 104 Authoritarianism, 1,12,17; and war, 2-3,12. See also Totalitarianism Avignon, 31 Bachrach, Peter, 57,58,59, 63,64-65,68n, 69n, 181 Balsam, Dennis, 146n, 147n, 148n,149n

Barber, Benjamin, 18-19, 29n, 30n,60,68n,69n Barry, J., 147n, 148n Basque country, 36, 111, 116-118, 124-127, 132133,134-135,176 Beagle Channel treaty, 48 Belgium, 35 Bell, David S., 147n Berg, Larry, L. 168n Berlin, Isaiah, 16-17,28n Berne, 31 Berrà, Yogi, 138 Berrington, Hugh, 148n Beverly Hills, CA, 159 Black, Hugo, 154 Bloom, Allan, 8n Bogdanor, Vernon, 53,56n, 58, 68n, 77, 105n, 134, 146n,148n,149n Bolt, Ernest C.,Jr.,56n Boule, 14,21 Bourassa, Robert, 41 Brand, Jack, 146n, 147n, 148n Bristow, Stephen L., 94, 108n Britain In Europe, 84 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 51,84 Brody, Richard, 159,169n Bryan, William Jennings, 44 Buckley v. Valeo, 168n Bulpitt, Jim, 113-114,146n Bundestag, 102 Burke, Edmund, 168n Burg, Steven L., 150n Burger, Warren, 155 Burns, Richard Dean, 56n, 168n Bush, George, 179 Butler, David, 4, 7, 8, 9n, lOn, 54n, 56n, 84, 104n, 106n,107n,108n Caciagil, Mario, 149n

195

California, 153,167,169n Callaghan, James, 75 Cambio 16, 80,85,95-96 Cambridge, MA, 159,168n Cameroon, 47 Cameroon, British, 46 Cameroon, French, 47 Campbell, Sally Howard, 9n, 12,28n Canada, 40-42, 111; and Newfoundland referendum, 50; and Quebec referendum, 112, 118-121, 127-130, 131, 133, 135136, 137-138, 144-145, 146,172-173,176,177; Supreme Court of, 120 Canadian Unity Information Office, 55n, 105n, 106n,107n Canals, Ramon Maria, 106n, 107n, 108n Caribbean: and referendums, 47-48 Catalonia, 36,116-118,124127,132-133,134,176 Cavour, Conté Di, 32 Chicago, 168n Chile, 48 China, 178 Christian Democratic party, 99 Christian People's party, 73 Chunkath, A., 54n City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 155, 156,158,168n Clark, R o b e r t P., 147n, 148n,150n a a r k e , Harold, 146n, 149n Clausewitz, Karl Von, 20 Clotfelter, James, 169n Codding, George A., Jr., 55n Cohen, Avner, 29n Cohen, Carl, 69n

196

Index

Common Market: and British Membership, 20, 77. See also European Economic Community Communism, 1 Communist party: in France, 87,103; in Norway, 103; in Soviet Union, 138, 139, 140,142; in Switzerland, 99 Communista de España, Partido, 118,124 Congress, 43, 44-45, 153, 154-155, 156-160, 161162,165 Connecticut, 42,43 Conservative party: and devolution, 112-113, 115116,122-124,136,137; and EEC membership, 50, 71, 72,75-77,94 Constitutions, 49-50,53,72, 73, 74, 81, 116, 117-118, 135,152-158,162 Copenhagen, 88,93 Cortes, 78-79, 104, 105n, 116-118 Costa Rica, 55n Council of Ministers, 79 Crawford v. Board of Education, 168n Crete, Jean, 149n Croatia, 36 Cronin, Thomas, 8, 9n, lOn, 56n,69n Cuba, 128 Cuercora Atienza, Javier, 148n,149n Cyprus, 45 Czechoslovakia, 35 Dail, 91 Danzig, 35 Davis, James, Jr., 169n De Gaulle, Charles, 50, 71, 72,90,100 Dearborn, MI, 159,183 Defense policy, 3; in democratic n a t i o n s , 23; in United States 22, 23, 43, 151,152,161-166,172 Delamuraz, Jean-Pascal, 39 Delaware, 42 Democracy, 1-6, 7, 11-12, 14-19; and behavior, 1112; and citizen participation, 11 ; and constraint, 12; degree of, 12; desirability, 13; and foreign policy, 2326; freedom, 15; and international politics, 20-27,

179-183; and nondemocracies, 11-12; and nuclear deterrence, 23; and peace, 2-3; and politics, 26; and positive liberty, 19; and referendums, 49, 57-68, 155, 156-158, 166; and relative passivism, 12; theory, 12-13; and war, 2-3, 12. See also Direct democracy, Egalitarian democracy, Indirect democracy, Liberal democracy, Procedural democracy, Representative democracy, Strong democracy, and Tory democracy Democratic party (Lithuania), 138 Democratic party (U.S.), 159,162 Denmark, 9n; and E E C membership, 8,35, 50,51, 52,71,72,74-75,81,82-83, 88, 93, 100-101, 172, 177, 182; and other referendums, 35 Deploige, Simon, 32,55n Devolution, 8, 36, 52-53, 112-116, 121-124, 130132,134,172,176,177,180 Diario 16, 85,97 Dion, Leon, 150n Diplomacy, 21-22,24-26,27 Direct democracy, 3-6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20-27, 31-54, 57-68, 71-104, 151-167, 171-183; arguments against, 20, 57-68, 152; arguments for, 20,5768; history of, 7,31-54; use of term, 55n. See also Participatory democracy and Referendums Direct legislation, 19-20 District of Columbia, 161 Dixon, W. Addams, 56n, 168n D o l b e a r e , K e n n e t h M., 169n Domestic issues: international referendums and, 6, 24, 27, 178, 179. See also various countries Dougherty, James E., 29n Doyle, Michael, 9n, 27n Dresang, Dennis L., 68n EEC News, 82

Egalitarian democracy, 2 Egypt, 46,47 Eisinger, Peter K., 68n El Pais, 80,85,86,97 Elections, 20, 26, 61-62, 67, 111,131,152,157,159 Elites, 12,13,138; control of, 13; and foreign policy, 2425; and public opinion, 12; and referendums, 40, 5768, 71-104, 122-123, 134135,146,162,164,171-173, 175-176,177,182-183 Elklit, J0rgen, 93, 105n, 106n, 107n Emmons, Juliann, 28n Equatorial Guinea, 46 Estonia, 36, 55n, 112, 138141,143,146 Estonian Citizens Committee, 140 European Economic Community, 50, 50-51, 71-78, 81-85, 87-95, 100-103, 104n; and Austrian membership, 104; and British membership, 8, 20, 50, 5152,71,72,75-77,81,82,8384, 88-89, 93-95, 100, 101-102,121,172; and Danish membership, 8, 50, 51, 52,71,72,74-75,81,82-83, 88, 93, 100-101, 172, 177, 182; and European Currency Unit, 102; and European Parliament, 102; and France, 8,50,52,71,72-73, 81,87,90-91,100,102-103, 172, 180, 182; and Irish membership, 8, 50, 51, 71, 72,81-82,83,87,91-92,100, 183; and Norwegian membership, 8,50,51,71,72,7374,81,82,83,87-88,92,100, 103,172,173,175,176,183; and Spanish membership, 78, 95; and Swedish membership, 104; and Swiss membership, 104. E u z k a d i ta A s k a t a s u n a (ETA), 124-125,148n Fairlie, Henry, 69n Falk, Richard, 22-23,30n Faroe Islands, 36 F e d e r a l A g r e e m e n t of 1815,32 Federal Assembly, 49-50,80 Federal Council, 80,98-99 Federated States of Micro-

Index nesia, 48 Federation of Arab Republics, 46 Feigenbaum, Susan, 170n Fernandez Ordonez, Francisco, 95 Feshbach, Seymour, 169n Fianna Fail, 91 Fine Gael, 91 Findley, John H., 29n Finland, 9n; and referendums, 35,55n First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 156-157, 158,167,168n F i t z m a u r i c e , J o h n , 148n, 149n Folketing, 50,74-75,93,101 Foreign policy, 3, 6, 13, 27, 57-68; and democracy, 23, 27,57-58; and France, 28n; and Japan, 28n; and referendums, 13,27,57-68,71104, 151-153, 158-167, 171-183; and United States, 21,23-25,28n, 151153, 158-167; and West Germany, 28n Forsberg, Randall, 163 Fowler, Robert Booth, 68n Fraga, Manuel, 78,96,104 France; and Constitution, 50; and E E C , 8,50,52,71, 72-73, 81, 87, 90-91, 100, 102-103,172,180,182; and f o r e i g n policy, 28n; at J e n n a , 9n; a n d p u b l i c opinion, 28n; and referendums, 31, 35, 38, 46, 50; and Revolution, 9n Franco, Francisco, 78, 95, 118,125 Fraser, Graham, 147n, 148n, 149n Freedom, 21; democratic, 15; individual, 15; political, 15. See also Liberty Freud, Sigmund, 63 Fukuyama, Francis, 1-2,8n, 9n, 11,27n,28n, 178 Galacia, 36, 116-118, 124127,132-133,134,148n Gallagher, Michael, 108n Gaullist party, 73,102 Gaventa, John, 149n Gax, 38 Gazey, Penelope J., 55n Georgia, 36,55n, 142 Germany, 35,55n, 102,181;

German reunification, 38; and referendum in Upper Silesia, 51. See also West Germany Gerry, Elbridge, 43 Ghana, 46 Gibraltar, 36,97 Gil, Frederico, 105n, 108n Gilbert, Alan, 30n Gilpin, Robert, 29n Gingras, François-Pierre, 146n,147n,148n Gitlin, Todd, 69n, 174,184n Gladitsch, Nils-Peter, 92, 107n Glasnost, 1 Glanzier, Kenneth M., 147n González Marques, Felipe, 50, 54, 78-80, 95-96, 9 6 97,103,173-174,176 Goodhart, Philip, 32, 54n, 55n, 69n, 84, 105n, 106n, 107n Gooch, Anthony, 108n Gorbachev, Mikhail, 1, 3637, 139-143, 150n, 173174,176 Government: and citizenry, 14; distrust of, 5; popular and peace, 3; representative, 3,13,155; and role in referendums, 48, 49-50, 51-52,58-68,71-104,151167,176 Gray, Colin S., 170n Great Britain, 111; and E E C membership, 8,50,51-52, 71,72,75-77,81,82,83-84, 88-89, 93-95, 100, 101102, 121, 172; and other referendums, 35, 36, 40, 41, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53; and referendums in Scotland and Wales; 112-116,121124, 130-132, 134, 136137,172,173,176,177,180 Greece, 13,14-15,31 Green, Philip, 68n Greenland, 35,88 Grossjean v. American Press, 168 Grossman, Joel B., 68n Guam, 48 Guinea, 46 Gunther, Richard, 148n Gutmann, Amy, 30n Hahn, Harlan, 29n, 159-160, 168n,169n Haiti, 128

197

Haltzel, Michael H., 147n H a n s e n , P e t e r , 83, 105n, 106n,107n Hassner, Pierre, 8n Hastings, Elizabeth Hann, 108n Hastings, Philip K., 108n Hatfield, Mark O., 162,163164 Heath, Edward, 75-76 Hegel, Georg W.F., 9n Held, David, 9n Hellevik, Ottar, 92,107n Herri Batasuna, 124-125, 135,148n Himmilfarb, Gertrude, 8n Hobbes, Thomas, 21 Holm, Hans-Henrik, 9n Holman, C.B., 168n Hoist, Johan Jorgen, 108n Horton, John E., 69n Howe, Geoffrey, 101-102 Hume, David, 43 Hungary, 35 Hunter v. Erickson, Mayor of Akron, 153-154, 155, 158 Huntington, Samuel P., 9n, 28n Iceland, 35 Independent Alliance Party, 99 India, 45,55n Indiana, 44 Indirect democracy, 11, 13, 15,16,20. See also Representative democracy Industrial Development Authority (Ireland), 82 Initiatives, 7,49-50,161; use of term, 55n. See also Referendums Interest groups: and referendums, 19, 59, 90, 123124, 126, 129, 139-140, 145, 156-158, 159-160, 164,175-176,177 "Intermestic" issues, 6 International Development Association, 38 International issues, 11-12; definition 6-7; and realism, 57-58; and referendums, 6-7, 13-14, 20-27, 32-34, 34-54, 57-68, 71104, 111-146, 150-167, 171-183. See also International politics International politics: an-

198

Index

cient description of, 29n; and realism, 57-58; and referendums, 20-27, 3 2 34, 34-54, 57-68, 71-104, 111-146, 150-167, 1 7 1 183. See also International issues International relations, 5, 11, 12, 13-14, 20-26; and r e f e r e n d u m s , 20, 24-26. See also Neorealism, Realism, and Realpolitik Iran, 1,104 Iraq, 104 Ireland; and E E C membership, 8, 49, 50, 51, 71, 72, 81-82, 83, 87, 91-92, 100, 172, 183; and other referendums, 40,53 Israel, 55n Italy, 91; and referendums, 31-32 Jamaica, 47 James, Arnold J., 147n James v. Valtierra, 154,155 Japan: and foreign policy, 28n; and public opinion, 28n; and referendums; 37, 55n Jenkins, Roy, 76 Jenna, 9n Jensen, Jane, 149n Johnson, Lyndon B., 159 Johnson, Paul, 146n Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 Kamieniecki, Sheldon, 168n Kant, Immanuel, 2,11 Karoly, Lynn, 170n Kazakhstan, 142 Kehler, Randall, 163-164 Kellas, J a m e s , 121, 123, 146n,147n, 149n Kennan, George F., 21 Kennedy, Robert, 159 Khomeni, Ayatollah, 1 Kiernan v. City of Portland, 153 Kilgour, Marc D., 27n King, Anthony, 75-76, 7 6 77,84,105n, 106n, 108n Kipnis, Kenneth, 29n Kirchheimer, Otto, 69n Kitzinger, Uwe, 84, 106n, 107n. 1 08n Klaget rt, 35 Koll- n e l m u t , 38,102 Ko r. :>erg, Allan, 146n, 150n

Kravchuk, Leonid M., 37, 143-144 Kremlin, 6,37,138 Kristol, Irving, 8n Kurile Islands, 37 La Vanguardia, 80,85,97 Labor unions: in Australia, 40; in Ireland, 91; in Great Britain, 123-124; in Spain, 126 L a b o u r party (U.K.); and devolution, 112-113, l l S l l ó , 121-124,131,134,136, 137, 144, 145; and E E C membership, 50, 71, 72, 75-77,94 Labour party (Norway), 73, 103 Ladd, Everett Carli, 162163,170n Lapolambara, Joseph, 69n L a s c h , C h r i s t o p h e r , 68n, 69n Latin America: and referendums, 47-48 Latvia, 36, 55n, 112, 138141,143,146 League of Nations, 35,39 Lebon, Gustav, 63 Leduc, Lawrence, 149n Lee, Eugene C., 55n, 68n Legislatures; and referendums, 19,48,154-155,156, 158 Leigh, Michael, 105n Leischman, Rory, 150n Leleu, Claude, 56n, 87, 9091,102,104n, 107n, 108n Lemieux, Vincent, 149n Levesque, René, 41,137 Levy, David, 170n Liberal democracy, 1,9n, 25, 58 Liberal party: in Canada, 53, 120, 128,130,133; in Norway, 103; in Switzerland, 99; in U.K., 50,94 Liberty, 16-20, 178, 179, 180-183. See also Freedom, Negative liberty, and Positive liberty Libya,46 Lifton, Robert J., 30n Lincoln, MA, 159 Listhaug, Ola, 107n Lithuania, 36,55n, 112,138141,143,144,146,150n Llera Ramo, Francisco José, 149n

Locke, John, 13,155 Loomis, Burdett A., 68n Lowenstein, Daniel Hays, 29n,168n, 170n Ludlow, Louis, 44,56n, 158 Luke, Paul, 146n Luxembourg, 35 Maastricht, Treaty of, 102 McAllister, Ian, 146n, 147n, 148n,149n MacCallum, Gerald, 28n McCarthy, Eugene, 159 McCormick, James, 169n McCrea, Francis B., 164, 168n,170n Madison, WI, 159 Madison, James, 13,15,55n, 56n,65,155 Magleby, David, 8, 9n, 29n, 30n, 58,68n, 69n, 168n Maine, 167-168n Major, John, 101-102 Malaya, 45-46 Malta, 35,46 Mandela, Nelson, 6 Manning, Bayless, lOn Mansbridge, Jane J., 28n, 68n, 69n Maoz, Zeev, 9n, 27n Marbury v. Madison, 153 Marckle, Gerald, 164,168n, 170n Marienwerder, 35 Marques, Alvaro, 56n Marshall Islands, 48 M a r t i n u s s e n , Willy, 103, 108n Massachusetts, 42, 43, 49, 156-157,164,169n Media; and r e f e r e n d u m s , 51-52,61,63-64,67,81,82, 84-86, 90-91, 94, 97-98, 123,126,128,129,141,160, 161, 164-165, 171, 174, 182-183 Meech Lake Accord, 41 Meny, Yves, 148n Merelman, Richard M., 68n Metz, 31 Mexico, 55n Meyer, David S., 168 Meyer v. Grant, 167,168n Meyers, Diana T., 29n Michigan, 42,169n Mill Valley, CA, 159 Miller, Steven E., 170n Miller, William, 149n Moldavia, 55n, 142 Monarchy, 15

Index

Mondale, Walter, 162 Montesquieu, Baron de, 4243 Montana, 169n Morality, 20, 25, 60, 62, 66, 181 Morgan, T. Clifton, 9n, 12, 28n Morgenthau, Hans, 21 Moriarty, Janet, 106n Morocco, 46 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 8n Mulroney, Brian, 41-42 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 22-23. See also Nuclear deterrence theory Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 46 Natal, 46 National Federation for the Self-Employed and Small Businesses (U.K.), 123 National interest, 21,25 National Interest, The, 1 National Referendum Campaign (U.K.), 84 Nationalism, 1, 31, 90, 95, 111,112-146 Negative liberty, 16-17,18, 181

Neorealism, 29n, 180 Netherlands, 55n Netherlands Antilles, 47 Nevitte, Neil, 146n, 147n, 148n New England town meeting, 16,21 New Jersey, 169n New Zealand, 34,39-40 Newfoundland, 40-41 Newton, Mike, 133, 147n, 148n,149n Nicholson, Sir Harold, 30n Nigeria, 47 Noam, Eli M., 29n Normal politics, 155-156, 167 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 91; and Spanish membership, 6,8,50-51,54, 71,72, 7780, 85-86, 89-90, 95-98, 103-104,106n, 173 North Dakota, 169n North Schleswig, 35 Northern Ireland, 36,53,95 Norway: and E E C membership, 8, 5 0 , 5 1 , 7 1 , 7 2 , 73-

74, 81, 82, 83, 87-88, 92, 100,103,172,173,175,176, 183; and other referendums, 35 Nuclear deterrence theory, 22-23. See also M A D Nuclear freeze movement, 22, 43, 151, 152, 161-166, 172 Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, 164 Olcott, Martha Brill, 150n Oiling, R.D., 150n Ordre Nouveau party (France), 87 Oregon, 169n Overby, L. Marvin, 169n, 170n Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph v. Oregon, 153 Page, Benjamin L., 9n, 159, 169n Paine, Christopher E., 165, 170n Panama Canal, 47-48 Pakistan, 45 Palau, 48 Pallares, Francesco, 106n, 107n,108n Pammett, Jon H., 149n Panama, 47-48 Paris, 31 Parliament, 40, 41, 52, 71, 75-77, 112-116, 134, 137, 152 Participatory democracy, 13,19,57-58,166,180; optimistic theories of, 57-68, 171-183; and positive liberty; 16, 17-18, 19, 26, 27; realism versus, 13, 20-23, 27n, 28n, 29n, 57-68; wary theories of, 57-68, 171183. See also Direct dem o c r a c y and S t r o n g democracy Pateman, Carole, 17-18,29n Payne, Keith B., 170n Peiro, Luis, 106n Pelletier, Gerard, 150n Penniman, Howard R., 55n, 149n People's party (U.S.), 42 Perestroika, 1 Perez Calvo, Alberto, 148n, 149n P e r e z R o y o , J a v i e r , 97, 108n,109n

199

Pericles, 27 Petersen, Nikolaj, 93,105n, 106n, 107n Petitions, 49,165 Pfalzgraff, Robert L., Jr., 29n Philips v. Payne, 43-44,55n, 153 Philippines, 45 Pierce, Roy, 107n Plaid Cymru party (U.K.), 112,113,116,137 Plebiscites, 25-26, 31. See abo Referendums Pluralism, 16 Pocock, J.G.A., 183,184n Poland, 35,51 Political action committees (PACs), 156,164,165 Political culture, 3,179 Political parties: and referendums, 19,50,51-52,58, 59-60, 62, 71-104, 112146,164 Politics: concept of, 14-19, 20; e l e c t o r a l , 26; and money; 156-158. See abo Interest groups, International politics, Legislatures, Normal politics, and Political parties Pompidou, Georges, 50, 52, 71, 72-73, 81, 87, 90, 100, 102-103,176,180 Porras Nadales, Antonio, 147n,148n,149n Positive freedom, 66. See abo Positive liberty Positive liberty, 16, 17-18, 19,26,27,57,66,180,181; and the individual, 17. See abo Liberty Positive participation, 1617 Prevost, Gary, 56n, 105n, 108n Procedural democracy, 2 PS, 11 Public good, 3, 20, 24-25; and referendums, 60. See abo Public interest Public interest, 3,20,24-25; and referendums, 60. See abo Public good Public opinion, 6,12,24-25; in Canada, 120, 130, 135, 138; in Denmark, 74-75; in France, 28n, 81; in Great Britain, 76, 77, 84-85, 94,

200

Index

101, 115, 124, 137; in Japan, 28n; in Norway, 7 3 74; in Spain, 79-80,86,9798,126; in Switzerland, 98; in United States, 28n, 162163; in W e s t G e r m a n y , 28n Puerto Rico, 47 Quebec, 8, 41-42, 52, 118121, 127-130, 131, 133, 135-136, 137-138, 1 4 4 145, 146, 148n, 172-173, 176,177 Québécois, Parti, 41-42,53, 111, 118-121, 127-130, 133, 135-136, 137-138, 148n, 149n, 172-173; and Catholic Church, 119,120; ideology of, 119,127-129; and sovereignty association, 127-130; tactics of, 120, 129; and "Yvettes," 129,130,149n Racism, 2,153-154 Radical Democratic party, 99 Radical Liberal party, 75 Ranney, Austin, 4, 7, 8, 9n, lOn, 54n, 55n, 56n, 69n, 104n,169n Reagan, Ronald, 96, 152, 161,164 Realism, 11,13, 20-23,27n, 28n, 29n, 57-68, 179, 180; and democracy, 22,57-58; and moralism, 21-22; and nuclear deterrence theory, 22-23; and référendums, 57-68,171-172,176,181 Realpolitik, 60,179. See also Realism Recall, 42; use of term, 55n Referendums, 3—4, 5, 6-7, 13, 14, 15, 18-27, 31-54, 57-68, 71-104, 111-146, 151-167, 171-183; advisory, 7, 25-26, 50-51, 115; arguments for, 18-19, 20, 2 4 - 2 6 , 5 7 - 6 8 , 181-183; binding, 7, 50-51; and citizenry, 7,18,57-68,71-104, 121-133,161-162,164,171173,173-174,174-175,180, 181; criticisms of, 19,57-68, 152,171-172, 182-183; decision criteria, 52, 63-64; and demagogues, 63,64-65, 67, 176; determinants of

victory, 63-64,67,90-100, 134-136, 175-176; global spread of, 3-4; and GrecoRoman world, 3; history of, 31-54; and independence, 46-47, 48, 53, 112146,178, 181; and money, 156-158, 181-182; negative vote, 52; in nineteenth century, 3; and the Pacific, 48; participation, 61-63, 67, 86-90, 130-133, 140142, 160, 165-166, 167, 169n, 173-174, 174-175, 177; procedures, 48-54; run-off, 52; significance of, 67-68, 100-104, 136-138, 167, 176-177; and Soviet Asian Republics, 142; timing, 57-60, 66-67, 72-81, 172-173; turnout, 52-53, 61-63,67,86-90,130-133, 134, 140-142, 143-144, 159, 161, 165-166, 169n, 177,180; in twentieth century, 3,34-54; use of term, 7,55n; voter education, 20, 1 7 3 - 1 7 4 , 181-182; a n d " w a v e m e t h o d " , 183; wording, 53-54, 80, 96, 127,139,141,144 Reitman v. Mulkey, 153 Relative passivism; and democracy, 12 Representative democracy, 3,13,19, 20. See also Indirect democracy Republican party (U.S.), 44, 159 Rhode Island, 169n Rice v. Foster, 152 Rights, 20,37,155 Ringdal, Kristen, 107n Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 28n Robertson, C.L., 106n Rodriguez, Emilio A., 105n Rome, 31; Treaty of, 71 Rosow, Stephen J., 30n Rossiter, Clinton, 28n Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 13, 16 Rummel, R.J., 9n, 12, 27n, 28n Russett, Bruce M., 9n, 27n Russia, 37,140-141 Saar, 35 Sabah,45 Sadat, Anwar, 47 Sakamato, Yoshikazu, 9n

Sakhalin Islands, 37 San Francisco, 159,168n Sani, Giacomo, 148n Sarawak, 45 Savoy, 38 Schmidt, David D., 56n, 68n Schuman, Maurice, 90 Schumpeter, Joseph, 14,28n Schwebach, Valerie, 12,28n Scotland, 95, 111; and devolution, 8, 36, 52-53, 112116, 121-124, 130-132, 134, 136-137, 144-145, 146,172,176,180 Scotland, Church of, 124 Scottish Daily Express, 123 Scottish Nationalist party (SNP), 111, 112,113, 134, 136-137 Serbia, 36 Shabad, Goldie, 148n Shapiro, Robert T., 9n Shatalin, Stanislav, 37 Sherman, Roger, 43 S h e r r i l l , P e t e r T., 147n, 148n,149n Shevardnadze, Eduard, 38 Sikkim, 45 Singapore, 45-46 Singer, J. David, 9n Single European Act, 100 S i u n e , K a r e n , 83, 105n, 106n,107n Siverson, Randolph M., 28n Slovenia, 36 Small, Melvin, 9n, 83, 105n, 106n,107n Smith, Joe L., 150n Smith, Thomas B., 56n Social D e m o c r a t party (Denmark), 74-75,93 Socialist Election Alliance (Norway), 103 Socialist party: in Denmark, 74-75, 93; in France, 87, 103; in Switzerland, 99 Socialist P e o p l e ' s p a r t y (Norway), 103 Socialista Andaluz, Partido, 118,126 Socialista Obrero Espanol, Partido, 72, 78-80, 96, 97, 103-104,118,124,125,127 Socrates, 14 Solo, Pam, 168n Sopron, 35 Sotelo, Calvo, 78 South Africa, 6,46,104 South Dakota, 42

Index

South Schleswig, 35 Southern Rhodesia, 46 Soviet Union, 1-2, 8, 112, 166,178,181; as Commonw e a l t h of I n d e p e n d e n t States, 178; and référendums, 34, 36-38,138-144, 146, 172, 173-174, 176, 177,179 Spain, 111; and Constitution, 117-118; and Constitutional Court, 125, 137; and E E C , 78, 95; and nationalist referendums, 112, 116-118, 124-127, 131, 132-133, 134-135, 137,172, 176; and N A T O membership, 6, 8, 50-51, 54, 71, 72, 77-80, 85-86, 89-90, 9 5 - 9 8 , 103-104, 106n, 173; and other referendums, 8,35,46 Stâlberg, Krister, 9n Stanovich, Stephen, 8n Starr, Harvey, 8n Stein, Gertrude, 11 Stern, Robert M.,29n, 168n, 170n Storting, 73,92,103 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II), 162 Strong democracy, 19, 29n, 57-68,181. See also Direct democracy and Participatory democracy Sugarman, Albert, 169n Swayne, Noah, 43-44 Sweden, 35,104 Switzerland, 4, 104; a n d other referendums, 32-34, 38-39, 50, 52, 55n, 86; and U N membership, 8,38,71, 72, 80-81, 86, 90, 98-100, 104,173,175 Syria, 46 Texas, 42 Thatcher, Margaret, 101102,136,137 Thomas, John E., 147n T h o m p s o n , K e n n e t h W., 29n,30n Thompson, Wayne E., 69n Thucydides, 27,29n Tiananmen Square, 1,6

Times (London), 84 Togoland, British, 46 Togoland, French, 46 Torrijos, General Omar, 47-48 Tory democracy, 68n Totalitarianism, 1, 27, 140. See also Authoritarianism Toul, 31 Trade Union Congress (Ireland)^ T r a n s p o r t and G e n e r a l Workers Union (Ireland), 91 Trudeau, Pierre, 128, 130, 176 Tulchin, Joseph S., 105n, 108n Turkmen SSR, 37 T V E , 85-86 Ukraine, 35,37,38-39,55n, 142-144 Unión de Centro Democrático, Partido, 78-79,89, 124,125-126,135 United A r a b Republic, 46 United Nations, 46, 50, 59; and Swiss membership, 8, 38-39,71,72,80-81,86,90, 98-100,104,173,175,179 United States, 5, 8, 9n, 13, 20,25,65,96,182; Constitution, 152-158; and Department of State, 24; and foreign policy, 21, 23-25, 28n, 151-153, 158-167, 179; judicial review, 153154; and money in politics, 155-156; and normal politics, 155-156; and nuclear freeze movement, 22,151, 152, 161-166, 167, 172, 181, 183; and public opinion, 28n,56n,162-163; and referendums, 35, 41, 4 2 45,47-48,49,56n, 59,151167; Supreme Court of, 151-167, 182; and Vietnam War, 42, 151, 158160,167,177,181,183 Upper Silesia, 35 Uzbekistan, 142 Valen, Henry, 103, 107n, 108n

201

Valles, J o s e p h M., 106n, 107n,108n Vaud, 39 Verba, Sidney, 149n Verdun, 31 Vietnam War, 42, 43, 44, 151, 152, 158-160, 167, 175,177 Virgin Islands, 35,48 Virginia, 43 Wales, 95; and devolution, 8, 36, 53, 112-116, 121124, 130-132, 134, 136137, 144-145, 146, 172, 176,180 Waltz, Kenneth N., 21,29n Walzer, Michael, 23,30n Washington v. Seattle, 168n Wasmucht, Ulrike C., 169n Watergate, 44 Weiner, Myron, 69n West Germany: and foreign policy, 28n; and public opinion, 28n, and referendums, 38. See also Germany West Indies Federation, 47 Western Australia, 40 White, Michael J., 169n Wiestetler, Leon, 8n Wilcox, Delos F., 68n W i l d h a b e r , V o n Luzius, 106n Wilford, Rich, 146n, 147n, 148n,149n Wilson, Harold, 71,75-77 Wilson, James, 43 Wisconsin, 169n Wotton, Henry, 30n Wright, Vincent, 81, 102103, 104n, 106n, 107n, 108n,148n Ya, 79-80 Yeltsin, Boris, 2, 37, 141, 142,145,150n Yew, Lee Kwan, 45-46 Yugoslavia, 35,104 Zakheim, Dov S., 105n Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto, 146n,148n Zurich, 32

About the Book and the Authors Though democratic politics has sprung up where it never before existed, and democracy is now no longer the exception, but the rule, the representative form of democracy that prevails today may not be the ultimate form of democratic governance. The use of the referendum/initiative process, for example, has grown dramatically in Western democracies in the twentieth century. And not only are citizens sometimes deciding domestic policy questions, they also have begun to acquire an authoritative voice on international issues. This book examines the growth, use, and impact of international-issue referendums and discusses current debates over the promise and perils of direct democracy. Comparing more than twenty international-issue referendums, the authors explore the political contexts that give rise to referendums, the dynamics and rhetoric of referendum campaigns, influences on voters' participation and decisions, and the effect of referendums on national foreign-policy traditions. They offer both empirical and normative conclusions. The authors' specialties in international relations, comparative government, and political theory result in a book that has an especially broad appeal across the political science discipline. John T. Rourke is professor of political science at the University of Connecticut and author of numerous articles and books, the most recent of which is Making Foreign Policy: The United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Richard P. Hiskes is associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut. His most recent book is Science, Technology, and Policy Decisions, which he wrote with Anne L. Hiskes. Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh is associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut and author of A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics.

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