Digital Disinformation: Computational Analysis of Culture and Conspiracy Theories in Russia and Eastern Europe 3031288343, 9783031288340

Citation preview

Peter Chew Matthew Fort Jonathan Chew

Digital Disinformation Computational Analysis of Culture and Conspiracy Theories in Russia and Eastern Europe

Digital Disinformation

Peter Chew · Matthew Fort · Jonathan Chew

Digital Disinformation Computational Analysis of Culture and Conspiracy Theories in Russia and Eastern Europe

Peter Chew Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc. Albuquerque, NM, USA

Matthew Fort Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc. Albuquerque, NM, USA

Jonathan Chew Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc. Albuquerque, NM, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-28834-0 ISBN 978-3-031-28835-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Approved, DCN# 43-10381-22. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Ad maiorem Dei gloriam inque hominum salutem. This book is dedicated to Lynn Chew, and also to all the friends in Russia and Eastern Europe without whose love and support we would never have gained the depth of understanding that we have of their culture.

Preface

In 2021, we (Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc.—Peter Chew’s company) were engaged by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to write a series of six reports dealing with different aspects of the information environment in the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. ONR turned to us for two main reasons. One of these was our shared interest in developing analytical tools usable by government analysts seeking to make sense of the information environment. But the US and other Western governments already have many technologists working in this area, and the other reason ONR engaged us to write these reports was that our linguistic, cultural, and historical knowledge and experience of the region goes back 37 years. We, the authors, have all studied Russian, we have lived in the USSR or former USSR, and we have also worked and volunteered there. Our friends in the region have helped us understand what makes the people ‘tick.’ Indeed, we would argue that sense can hardly be made of the information environment without understanding what motivates the people, from those who post content on social media to those ordering the troop movements perhaps caught on satellite imagery. Too often, we have seen how analysts miss the simple import of a post in Russian. This might be because automated translation technology, for all its recent advances, fails to take into account the cultural backdrop. One branch of computational linguistics, sentiment analysis, attempts to remedy this by categorizing the ‘sentiment’ of text, but we think that sentiment analysis also over-promises and under-delivers. While knowing the cultural context of words helps the informed reader quickly understand the significance of those words, it is not as though culture is a one-dimensional phenomenon which can be simplified to a ‘positive-negative’ continuum, or analyzed in terms even of several orthogonal axes of sentiment. Unfortunately, we have seen too many examples where technology and analytics are used to create a dazzlingly impressive ‘Rube Goldberg’ machine, where this obscures the way that the analysis in the end misses some of the key details in the content being analyzed. Still, technology is undeniably a force multiplier. A pressing question many in the analyst community (e.g., in government), therefore, face is: In the era of social media, how can we best leverage technology to make sense reliably of mountains ix

x

Preface

of open-source data, while adhering closely to the guideposts of each culture? Are there ways, as it were, to replicate the dependable relevance of Google’s algorithms to retrieve relevant results (PageRank), or Amazon’s algorithms to recommend products (collaborative filtering) in another domain—helping those entrusted with our national situational awareness to make sense of the information environment? We believe there is, and it depends simply on the right division of labor between the human and the machine. And one of the contributions of this book, we hope, will be to demonstrate examples of what we believe is the way. We draw in part upon the insights of Richards Heuer, a CIA author, that assumptions and bias can hardly be avoided, but can at least be made transparent so competing hypotheses can best be weighed. With regard to the role of technology, we believe it is necessary to get away from the idea that technology can automate following chains of inference, generating fully fledged reports (intelligence products) for the analyst. The effect of this is simply to bury assumptions inside a ‘black box’ of technology where they may be hard to impossible to question.

Assumptions and chains of inference

Source data

Tech ‘black box’

Analytical reports Analyst

Rather, a better use of technology is to reduce and summarize large quantities of data so that the human analyst can see the forest instead of the trees. This is a function at which big-data analytics techniques excel and where their utility is proven. Then, the assumptions, biases, and chains of inference—including knowledge of the cultural backdrop—are left where they belong, with the analyst, and it is then up to the analyst to report on what he or she finds. Technology still acts as a force multiplier for scarce analyst time, because he or she can get through more material, more quickly, and with more confidence that key patterns are not being missed.

Preface

xi

Assumptions and chains of inference

Analytical reports

Source data Analyst

It should be noted here that our expertise is in computational linguistics and text analytics, and for this reason, we limit the scope of this book to text (not images, videos, and the many other modes of expression that constitute the information environment). Still, we think the relative places of technology and the analyst would probably be similar when applied to other modes of communication; that will be for others to write about. We have been asked what the main thesis of this book is. In addition to the thesis stated above (our concrete proposals for ways technology can play a better role in analysis), we use the data to advance a thesis about Russia in particular. And here, our own analyst background cultural knowledge and assumptions come into play. We argue from the data, and our analysis of it, that the vast majority of recent, problematic Russian actions and words (including many of the ‘words’ in social media) fit very long-standing patterns in Russian culture and history. These are patterns that are constant from Tsarist Russia, through Soviet rule, through the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s (which we witnessed first-hand), to today. This same argument has been made by Russian historian Richard Pipes and has sometimes been mischaracterized as ‘cultural determinism,’ the idea that Russia because of its cultural flaws cannot escape these patterns. We juxtapose various views, including those of Pipes, Solzhenitsyn, and voices from social media today in Russia, to show that there is a way out for Russia, but that it depends on Russians accurately recognizing the roots of the problematic patterns in order to be able to turn away from them—something harder than it sounds, because even Solzhenitsyn erred in this regard. But there is hope, because some contemporary voices in Russia are speaking out. Whether these voices calling out in the wilderness ultimately prevail, or whether they continue to be suppressed following a centuries-long pattern, will itself say something about the broader Russian capacity for honest self-introspection and repentance. But one thing is certain in our view: the way out for Russia is and will continue to be articulated in Russia, no matter the attitude of the powers that be.

xii

Preface

It is incumbent on us in the West to be discerning about the voices we hear, and to do all we can to give those who are ‘speaking truth to power’ the best platform we can. Our own security will also depend on it. Albuquerque, USA

Peter Chew Matthew Fort Jonathan Chew

Acknowledgments

We are thankful to the many who have contributed to this book, tangibly and intangibly. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Sarah Chew and Jennifer Chew in proofreading large portions of the text, and the many who have provided useful feedback along the way. We are thankful to those who have helped us and provided us the opportunities without which we would not have been in a position to write this book. These include our former schools and universities, Eton College, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES, University of London), the University of Oxford (Jesus College, the Department of Linguistics), Baylor University, and New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology. These institutions made it possible to pursue Russian and study in the (former) USSR—Russia and Belarus. We are thankful to our friends and hosts in these countries who took such good care of us and mentored us in a way unique to their culture. I, Peter Chew, would specifically like to mention Professors John Coleman and Gerald Stone, my respective supervisors at the University of Oxford for my doctoral and master’s degrees (John Coleman helped channel my interest in computational analysis of language at scale into useful directions), Natalia Nikolaevna K., whose tutelage in Kazan was invaluable in gaining full fluency in Russian and almost native-level attunement to the nuances of the language, Professors Drage and Samilov at the University of London for the introduction to Comparative Slavonic Philology, and Dr. Angela Slater at Eton for first inspiring in me a lifelong interest in Russian. I am also thankful to my former employer Price Waterhouse for providing the opportunity to work in Russia and understand it from an economic perspective, and we are all grateful to our friends in post-Soviet Belarus who have facilitated opportunities for us to volunteer there. We are grateful, too, to other former employers where we gained still another perspective on Russia, thinking about the issues from a national security perspective, and were introduced to ‘out-of-the-box’ modes of thinking about possible geopolitical futures. All these disparate parts of our background enable us to ‘stand on the shoulders of giants’ and provide what we hope will be a new, unique synthesis in this book. We should note in passing here that all translations into English in this book are our own, unless otherwise noted.

xiii

xiv

Acknowledgments

Peter Chew’s firm, Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc., gratefully acknowledges the funding and support provided by the Office of Naval Research for the development of the series of 6 reports that became the core chapters of this book. This material is based upon work supported by the Office of Naval Research under Contract No. N00014-21-P-2006. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 6

2 Soviet Union 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Soviet Union 2.0, or Patrimonialism x.0? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 The Information and Economic Island Created by the Iron Curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 The Heavy Hand of Soviet Indoctrination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Soviet Life—Drab and Dilapidated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 The Ideology of Soviet Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6 How Likely Is a Soviet Union 2.0? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Social Media Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 8 15 22 23 37 40 42 47 51 52 62 64

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3.1.1 A Widespread Russian View of Ukraine: Rooted in Language, Culture, and Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3.2.1 Russian Troop Buildup on the Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3.2.2 Russian Hydrocarbons and Their Place in Europe . . . . . . . . 79 3.2.3 NATO Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 3.3.1 Discussion of Ukraine in Russian-Speaking Twitter . . . . . . 98 3.3.2 Discussion of Ukraine in Ukrainian-Speaking Twitter . . . . 108

xv

xvi

Contents

3.3.3

Discussion of NATO in Both Russianand Ukrainian-Speaking Twitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 4 The Polish Information Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Language, Culture, and Religion as Predictors of Geopolitical Fault Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 The EU Versus Poland on Primacy of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Polish Nationalism and World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 The Polish-Belarus Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 The Suwałki Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5 The Buildup of Russian Forces Along Ukraine’s Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Interpretation of the Maneuvers That Have Led to the Current Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Twitter Data Collection and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

131 133

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Background: Brief History of the Baltics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives . . . 5.2.1 Brief Background on Threat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Environmental Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Espionage Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4 Military Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.5 Cyber Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.6 Destabilizing Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.7 Russian Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 The BEND Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Research Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Topic Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Data Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.5 Data Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.6 Exploration of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

205 206 214 214 215 217 219 221 223 227 229 230 232 232 233 235 235

133 138 139 142 144 148 149 150 150 152 165 167 184 200

Contents

xvii

5.3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’ . . . . . . . 6.1 Fringe Narratives: An Illustrative Example Involving Russia and Its Eurasian Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The ‘Brotherhood of Nations’: A Historical Pattern, Not an Anomaly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Eurasian Integration: Coming in the Near Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Why Fringe Beliefs Matter: Did They Help End the Cold War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 The Role of Language in Fringe Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.3 Connection to Foundational Computational Linguistics Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.4 Problem Statements With Respect to Fringe Beliefs . . . . . . 6.4.5 Combining PMI and Clustering to Find Unknown Unknowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.1 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.2 Technical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.3 Key Waypoints in the Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: Hand-Curated ‘Fringe Belief’ Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Data Used for This Chapter, and Method of Collection . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Our Approach: Signal Processing (and SVD) Fundamentals . . . . . . 7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.1 Application of SVD to Our Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.2 Topics of Interest: Detailed Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.3 Key Takeaways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media? . . . . . . . . 7.5.1 How We Can Answer This Question with SVD . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.2 A Global View of Mainstream and Outliers in the Russian Media Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.3 Digging Deeper with Keyness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 How Topics Changed Over Time in Russian Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.1 January 1st–15th: Kazakhstan Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.2 January 16th–31st: Fractious Political Relations Between Ukraine and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

251 252 261 263 265 265 267 268 273 276 277 278 279 279 289 290 292 295 296 297 298 303 303 307 325 326 326 328 335 340 340 341

xviii

Contents

7.6.3

February 1st–15th: Mockery of Ukrainian and British Politicians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.4 February 16th–28th: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine . . . . . . . 7.6.5 March 1st–15th: Evacuating Civilians; Ukraine–Russia Peace Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.6 March 16th–31st: Ukrainian Deaths; Chechen Fighters in Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.7 April 1st–15th: Ukrainians Killed in Bucha; Alleged Terrorist Threats within Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.8 April 16th–30th: Russian Media Stops Talking about Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.9 May 1st–May 16th: Victory Day in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.10 Key Takeaways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media Articles, 1/1/2022–5/16/2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook Code Snippets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 3: Russian Stopwords Used for Keyness Analysis . . . . . . . . . Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts by Half-Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

341 343 344 345 346 347 347 349 349 351 402 405 407 442

8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract We introduce foundational concepts and theses on which we shall elaborate in ‘Digital Disinformation’: the place of culture in explaining why Russia is what it is today, the challenges faced by analysts in making sense of vast amounts of data in the modern era of open-source data, and our view of how state-of-the-art data analytics techniques can best be leveraged to help analysts make sense of all that data while not losing sight of the cultural fundamentals.

In ‘Digital Disinformation’ we have two principal theses. One of these relates to the world of data analytics and how to do analysis of the information environment. The other has to do with why Russia, as the ‘eight-hundred pound gorilla’ in Eastern Europe, is what it is, and how we in the West can most productively deal with Russia here and now. The two theses are related in that both should be of interest to those in policy and government circles, in addition, perhaps, to many in academia and journalism. From the nuts and bolts of data collection and analysis, to the more philosophical questions about Russia, we span the gamut of what many, often ‘stovepiped’, groups in government are thinking about with respect to Russia. There are few, if any, thinking about these two things simultaneously, and that hurts our ability to understand and deal with Russia. But this is also an interdisciplinary intersection in which we believe we are uniquely able to share insight, because both the nuts-and-bolts computational analysis, and the timeless philosophical view of Russia, are central to our own education and experience. All the authors of this book have studied Russian language and literature (Peter Chew, for close to 40 years). We have all lived in the Soviet Union, or former Soviet Union, in Russian-speaking countries which are now firmly adversarial to Western interests generally. We have seen and experienced, from the inside, that adversarial worldview, and we ourselves have seen the continuity, which might not be obvious to the casual observer in the West, between the mentality of latter Soviet days to the present. What we have seen is not always easy to put into words, but that is nonetheless a goal of this book.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_1

1

2

1 Introduction

At the same time, all the authors have an interest (and training in their graduate studies) in what the latest computational techniques can bring to the digital age of social media. We do not claim that the algorithms that we present in this book are new, although some of the applications may be. Our other, more computational, goal is to help show the way towards better using some of the latest data analytic techniques within an integrated policy and analytics framework (one that is not divorced from a proper cultural and social understanding of Russia). By necessity, we can do no more than scratch the surface here. As computational linguists, we focus on methods for text analysis—not videos, images, or the many other types of media that also dominate the information environment. (On the other hand, we cast a broad net in terms of the languages: we seek out Twitter data, for example, in Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian, because we think it is important to understand what people in the region are saying in their own words.) But we also limit our focus in another way, to a specific type of text analysis: unsupervised, vector-space, ‘bag-of-words’ analysis—not, for example, phrase-structure grammar parsing, supervised learning, deep learning, or the many other flavors of approach that exist. Our reason for this focus is, admittedly, perhaps our own experience and training (although, in fact, Peter Chew’s doctoral thesis was firmly in the camp of phrase-structure grammar). We stick to our knitting and demonstrate applications of what we know best. But we also make the case in this book that methods of text analysis should be selected, generally, with more care than is often the case. We have reservations about supervised or rule-based learning because of the way they build in, and then often obscure, assumptions that are extraneous to the data, creating a ‘black box’ that lacks explainability—something computer scientists may not care about as much, but which their customers in the world of analysis surely do. We have similar qualms about the lack of explainability for deep learning models. It may be that our reservations stem, again, from our necessarily limited perspective and background. But these are questions that should nevertheless be asked of, and answered for, any data analytics approach, so that customers can have trust in outputs. We are not saying that the analytical approaches we demonstrate in this book are the only ones that would fit the bill, nor are we claiming, generally, that our method of analysis is novel. It may be that someone else can indeed demonstrate that approaches to text analysis, other than those we showcase here, can also be used within the same type of framework we advocate, one in which the human analyst maintains a central role, and the role of the technology is to summarize content predictably so it becomes manageable to a human. Our goal is simply to prime the pump, and get others in the world of analytics who have different areas of expertise also thinking more about what the customer really needs—including the subtle, generally unstated, needs for good analysis. We are sure that as other technologists in the analyst community begin to think more about this, other algorithms and applications will be found that do as well as, or better than, what we propose in this book. Thus, we delve in this book into some of the mathematics that allow unsupervised bag-of-words analysis to be a good fit, we think, for analysis as Richards Heuer conceived of it (Heuer 1999), and we also focus on specifics of the data from 2021 and 2022—an unstable time in Russia and Eastern Europe—to which we apply such techniques. But, as we seek to demonstrate our own vision for computational

1 Introduction

3

analysis in this world, we always try to keep the timeless and philosophical vision close at hand. Thus, we ask the question: is the data1 in line with our expectations, or is it surprising? Why? Here, we are in effect presenting the nuts and bolts of contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe in the light of what we perceive to be the timeless truths about the region. Again, having spent significant time among the people of the region, and having listened to how they themselves have seriously thought about and explained their moral predicament in their own words, we can pass along what we have heard and we can tell readers of this book what seems most credible to us. There were things about the Soviet Union that baffled us when we first lived there, but we benefited from the moral compass of friends there and thanks to their help, there were many times that the pieces suddenly fell into place, so that what had previously baffled us now made perfect sense. We hope that we can now similarly help curious readers in the same way. Here it should be kept center of attention, though, that one of the enduring problems of the region, from pre-revolutionary Russia through the USSR to modern Russia, is that the ‘master narrative’ that we think best guides one through Russia, is not one that is convenient for the Kremlin, or even, perhaps, most Russians. It is a narrative that is consistently denied, violently suppressed, and marginalized. Yet at the same time, it is a narrative that, if listened to, would be in the best interests of Russia itself, not to mention its neighbors and Western countries. Actually, it is a narrative that is common to all of humanity: we prefer to engage in denial of our own faults rather than facing up to them and turning away from them. When taken to extremes, that may involve shooting the messenger, blaming our own victims, punishing them for our own faults, and generally doubling down on our errors rather than admitting them. Chapters 2–7 of this book each analyze content from social or news media, each chapter internally structured to start with a cultural overview and then move to relevant social media analysis. But it is only in Chaps. 3–7 that we get into large-scale computational analysis of data. To some extent, also, later chapters build conceptually on the material in earlier chapters: for example, the ‘fringe beliefs’ technique presented in Chap. 6 synthesizes and builds upon the techniques described in Chaps. 3–5; and we then turn around in Chap. 7 and use the same computational approach described in Chap. 6 to make useful characterizations of the Russian media information environment. The chapters should therefore generally be read in order. The purpose of Chap. 2 is to set the stage a little, introduce the reader to what we think are the big-picture issues that can help an analyst make sense of Russia—a subject that is an enigma to many people. In Chap. 2, we do present some analysis of social media data, but it is small-scale and therefore computation is (by and large) unnecessary. Later in Chaps. 3–7, we show how similar analysis can be scaled up (and it is worth mentioning that the techniques truly are computationally scalable). However, the analyst is kept placed front and center, and as we shall see, making

1

In this book, we treat ‘data’ as a singular noun, in common with usage in much of the data science literature. In our quotations of third-party material, we adhere to the original author’s usage without further comment.

4

1 Introduction

sense of the data is qualitatively the same from his or her point of view, whether or not we use more computerized approaches. As we shall see in Chap. 2, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the heroic Soviet dissident— who later on began to sound like Putin—illustrates well the problems of Russia today. The process of identifying national faults is not as easy as it seems: it seems fair to say that Solzhenitsyn believed (erroneously, in our opinion) that if one could in effect turn the clock back in Russia to before Communism, then the nation would be saved. But in reality, the authoritarianism, control over information, and violent suppression of dissent have been a recurring pre- and post-Soviet theme, as well as during the Soviet era. Solzhenitsyn, it turned out, had misidentified Russia’s problem. We do not think it is that complicated, though: national pride prevents Russians, on the whole, from admitting how lies and violence have become ingrained in the culture. The explanation lies in timeless values common to all humanity. And there is nothing really preventing Russians, as indeed any nation, from humbly acknowledging the problem and turning a new leaf. Whether that happens is another question; and if it does not, we think the spiraling pattern will continue. The war in Ukraine is, at the time of writing this, in flux. In Chap. 3, though, we maintain our focus on the more timeless aspect of the conflict, and pose the question of what is really driving it. Both the current data from social media, and what we gleaned from our own conversations with people in Russia over decades, seem to point in the same direction: baser human instincts like Russian envy and pride are key drivers. The violence inflicted by Russian troops on Ukraine parallels what we learn about from writers stationed in the region a century ago, in the early years of Soviet rule. And basic enduring features of the geopolitical and economic landscape, like the supply-and-demand considerations around Russia’s natural resources that were evident to Peter Chew when he worked in the oil and gas sector in Russia in the mid-1990s, explain a significant part of the conundrum that Europe finds itself in. Europe is tested by the seemingly competing imperatives of standing up for democratic self-determination by sanctioning Russian oil and gas, while keeping domestic populations politically on board with the prospect of winters of scarce, expensive fuel. The underlying economics that are the catalyst for this conflict will remain unless, for example, new oil and gas reserves are found, or there is a gamechanging upset in the patterns of energy consumption. In Chaps. 4 and 5, we focus on some of Russia’s neighboring countries to the west that went in a significantly different direction after the fall of the Soviet Union: the three Baltic states and Poland. We describe what in the culture of these countries makes them different from Russia, but also, where the similarities are; and how and why the differences have manifested themselves since the early 1990s. Around the time we wrote the chapter on Poland, a (manufactured) crisis had erupted on the border of Belarus (Russia’s ally and close cultural cohort) and Poland. Belarus’s president Lukashenko had summoned Middle Eastern migrants to the border, promising them what was not his to promise—a new life in the European Union. Again, we draw upon the moral compass gained from friends in the region to help readers, we hope, make sense of the tangled mess, separate disinformation from fact, and understand in context what Poles and Belarusians have been saying about the crisis. We

1 Introduction

5

also aim to help readers understand which information maneuvers in the region gain the most traction, and why: something that we believe would help guide Western strategic communication generally. In Chap. 6, we take a different tack. In today’s world of social media and ‘digital disinformation’, we often hear a distinction made between the ‘mainstream’ and the ‘fringe’. While we think ‘mainstream’ versus ‘fringe’ is a useful concept for those seeking to understand the information environment, we believe this distinction may be too often conflated with ‘fact’ versus ‘fiction’. Without assuming a stance of moral relativism, we can say the reality is that ‘disinformation’ may be ‘mainstream’ and ‘factual information’ fringe—or the other way around. It depends. (Indeed, in the cultural environment of the USSR or Russia today, it might well be that the truth is considered fringe; it is not by accident that many Russians and Russian emigres to the West, particularly those from religious minorities who were oppressed in the USSR, are distrustful of mainstream ideology.) But again, we take a nuanced view, and we say discernment is required. Whether a fringe view is a prophetic voice in the wilderness or simply a conspiracy theory is not a question that computational techniques are easily equipped to answer—here, we think the human analyst has his or her proper role. However, what computational techniques can do is help the analyst find the needle in the haystack in the first place. The words people use are often telltale markers of their beliefs, whether this is conscious or not, and computational text analysis is well-equipped to find unusual clusters of words and pinpoint for an analyst where to look to find the ‘fringe’. In this chapter, we show a novel application of unsupervised outlier analysis, building upon the bag-of-words vector-space model, which in effect acts like a CT scan of large amounts of text, helping the analyst quickly find anomalies, just as a trained radiologist may detect anomalies from medical scans. We demonstrate this approach using text expressing a master narrative applied to Russia that is not commonly encountered, yet has surfaced over the millennia on different continents, and seemed to the author (Peter Chew) unusual when he first encountered it. (Whether this application of the narrative qualifies as conspiracy theory or prophetic we will leave for the reader to decide.) In Chap. 7, we turn back to what the Russian-language media—both Kremlincontrolled and independent—have been saying over the initial weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We synthesize all the unsupervised computational approaches of previous chapters to help make sense of the data. No doubt, by the time this book is published, the narratives heard in the Russian-language media may have changed, as indeed may the course of the war in Ukraine. Still, we strongly believe that the points on the moral compass that help us make sense of the data will turn out to be as timeless as ever. In addition to pointing to this, the chapter also aims to show that in the context of the Russian media landscape, an independent Russian-language outlet (Meduza, based in Latvia) looks like a fringe viewpoint, based on the analytical technique outlined in Chap. 6. In this landscape, calling things by their names (a ‘war’, for example, not a ‘special military operation’; enumerating casualties; talking about ‘aggression’ and ‘victims’) is fringe, because these expressions are taboo in modern Russia. The current Russian government, like its Soviet and Tsarist predecessors,

6

1 Introduction

seeks to suppress the truth and use all the force of the law to do so… and that, we think, is because it feels threatened by the truth. So, how do we tie all this together? In Chap. 8, we conclude on an optimistic note. Russia is not trapped in ‘cultural determinism’, destined always to repeat the same pernicious patterns of official lies and violence against those who stand up to them. That this is so is demonstrated by the very existence of courageous voices on the Russian ‘fringe’ continuing to speak up; something even our own data analytics algorithms find. These voices say, just as we do, that the salvation of the nation will depend upon honestly facing up to the mistakes of the past and consciously turning away from them. This, actually, is a message that can apply not just to Russia, but is also a universal moral message applicable to any nation. Germany, for example, was brought to a point where it turned away as a nation from Nazism; America has had to face up to the issue of slavery. It is not predetermined how any individual nation will respond when the time of testing comes—that is a matter of national free will. It may be that Russia will always be characterized by violent, opportunistic, paranoid imperialism. Perhaps the ‘Gog and Magog’ narrative is not so far off. But that is up to Russians. Meanwhile, those of us who are tasked with interacting with Russia will do well to see all the data points in a right moral context. We hope that this book helps show how that can be done, from analysis of the atomic building blocks of language—letters and words—to analysis of the big-picture realities that explain why Russia is what it is.

Reference Heuer, Richard. 1999. Psychology of intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Accessed July 29, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/static/9a5f1162fd0932c29bfed1c030edf4ae/Pys chology-of-Intelligence-Analysis.pdf.

Chapter 2

Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.1 Author photo: purchasing food in the USSR, 1990–1991

Abstract The renewed Russian invasion of, and war in, Ukraine in 2022 (following the previous Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian-backed seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014) has precipitated wide-ranging consequences not just for Ukraine, but for Russia too. Among the most visible of these has been the flight of Western firms from Russia, an abrupt reversal of a process which, starting in 1990 around the time of the breakup of the USSR, then seemed equally rapid in the direction of liberalization and Westernization. All this has prompted a number of Western observers, ourselves included, to wonder if a ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ is on the horizon, and if so, what it might look like. How do the patterns of today correlate with the patterns of history, and what might the life in the original Soviet Union (Fig. 2.1) tell us about what could be ahead? And if there is a Soviet Union 2.0 or something like

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_2

7

8

2 Soviet Union 2.0

it, what does that mean for Western strategic communication amidst Great Power conflict—starting with the very basic question of how we communicate if channels of communication are cut off by a new Iron Curtain? In this chapter we draw from personal experience, literature, culture, history, and what Soviet and Russian figures have said about themselves to attempt to answer these questions. (We do not yet carry out any large-scale computational analysis of content; the purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for following chapters by demonstrating on a small scale the type of approach that we then scale up with computation in Chaps. 3–7.) We hope to provide an analysis which is relevant for Western analysts seeking to understand and maneuver in today’s information environment.

2.1 Background Just over two months prior to the first draft of this chapter, Russian forces invaded Ukraine at the behest of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Perhaps looking back to August 2021, when Afghanistan fell to the Taliban within a matter of days after US forces pulled out of Afghanistan, Putin and many Western observers expected Ukraine to fall to Russian forces, also within days. However, one of the most frequently commented-on aspects of this war is the fierce resistance of Ukrainian defenders and the underwhelming performance of Russian attackers. It has been suggested (Corera 2022) that Russian mistakes are, in effect, the result of military planning ‘by a KGB officer’ (Putin) rather than by competent military commanders. It has also been suggested that Putin is a victim of his own propaganda and the groupthink engendered by his tendency to silence opposing viewpoints and only to listen to a narrow group of advisers, one further narrowed by the COVID-19 pandemic. A highly visible ramification of the Russia-Ukraine war, besides the obvious physical devastation in Ukraine, has been its effect on Russia. Sanctions often described as ‘unprecedented’ (e.g. Mercatus Center, George Mason University 2022) have been imposed on Russia by Western countries. Partly because of this, and partly because of organic decision-making by company executives who see reputational and values-based risk to continuing business in Russia (see e.g. McDonalds 2022), many Western firms have abruptly deserted Russia over the course of the last month. The author (Peter Chew) was living in Russia—then the Soviet Union—over a period of 10 months from 1990 to 1991; it was on January 31, 1990 that the first McDonalds restaurant appeared in Moscow (Fig. 2.2). In retrospect, even now, it is easy for a Western observer to underestimate how significant the impact of this was in the Soviet Union of the time. The effect was as much psychological as anything else. What McDonalds was among the first to do, in effect, was to puncture the drab uniformity of Soviet life, where Western goods and services were unavailable. For the author, a student in Kazan, a provincial town 500 miles east of Moscow (where even by mid-1991 nothing remotely as Western as McDonalds had reached), the arrival of McDonalds signaled that a kind of Western normality was now available in the Soviet Union, and available in theory to anyone. As normality settled in and

2.1 Background

9

Fig. 2.2 The first McDonalds in Russia (in Pushkin Square, Moscow), which opened in 1990. Photo by Artem Svetlov, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:McDonalds_ Moscow_Pushkinskaya_2013_%2814795521387%29.jpg, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-2.0

appeared in more forms over the following years, the new normality became something just to be expected. McDonalds and other Western brands were no longer a novelty in Russia, just part of regular life, as they have been in the West for a long time. Now, McDonalds’ announcement on March 8 (ibid.) that it has closed its restaurants in all 850 of its Russian locations seems just as much a bellwether to those of us who remember 1990. We are far from being the only ones to draw comparisons between 1990 and today in Russia. Little (2022) also references the time around 1990 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) and hypothesizes that 2022 will go down as a pivotal year, like 1789 (the French Revolution), 1815 (the post-Napoleon Congress of Vienna), 1919 (the Treaty of Versailles), 1945 (the Yalta partitioning of Europe into Western and Soviet spheres of influence), and 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall). So, in 2022, are we, as Little suggests, experiencing the ‘rare thing’ of ‘liv[ing] through a moment of huge historical consequence’ and—a separate question—can we ‘understand in real time’ its significance? Putin (a former KGB counterintelligence officer who worked in East Germany, that part of Europe which, under Yalta, was under the Soviet sphere of influence) is on record that he considers the breakup of the USSR the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century’ (‘кpyпнeйшaя гeoпoлитичecкaя кaтacтpoфa вeкa’) (Regnum.ru 2005). Putin might like to have his cake and eat it, hankering for the USSR and keeping what Western firms have to offer (Carman 2022), but with the departure of Western firms from Russia, Putin’s Russia certainly

10

2 Soviet Union 2.0

gives the appearance of moving towards Soviet Union 2.0, a place where Western normality again has no place. In one of those pivotal years listed by Little (2022), 1919, the Soviet experiment had just begun. The October Revolution, officially known in the USSR as the Great October Socialist Revolution, happened two years before. Vladimir Lenin’s Bolshevik Party had in 1917 overthrown the government of Tsar Nicholas II through a violent insurrection in St. Petersburg (then Petrograd). Since Bolshevik rule was not universally accepted in Russia, this insurrection precipitated a Russian civil war which lasted from 1917 until 1923. Civil war engulfed wide swathes of the Russian empire from its Far East across Central Asia to Crimea, present-day Ukraine, Poland, and countries in the Baltic region as far west as Finland. By 1923, forces opposing Lenin’s Bolshevik Red Army—the White Army and others—had been subdued, and Soviet rule consolidated, in most of the above-mentioned places. However, in 1919, it was still by no means sure that the outcome of the civil war would be a Soviet government capable of lasting for about 70 years. Isaak Babel, a Russian-Jewish journalist and author born in Odessa, Ukraine, was an on-the-ground participant and witness to one part of that massive civil war. In 1920, Babel was assigned to the First Cavalry Army (the Konarmia) (Пepвaя кoннaя apмия, or Кoнapмия) of Red Army commander Semyon Budyonny, and stationed in present-day Western Ukraine. In 1920, this army, consisting of local Cossacks allied with the Bolsheviks, fought against Polish forces and drove the Poles out of Ukraine, but was later defeated at the Battle of Komarów, close to where many Ukrainian refugees are entering Poland today. Around the time of this defeat, the Konarmia suffered from low morale and discipline. Robbery, violence, and murderous antiSemitism perpetrated against the civilian population by the Konarmia’s fighters were commonplace (Barmine 1945). Babel, who had an intellectual background, writes first-hand about much of this anti-Semitism and wanton violence in his book Red Cavalry (Кoнapмия) (Бaбeль 1927). Babel’s book, in fact, provided the Soviet public with one of its first literary exposures to the bitter reality of the war. Babel’s descriptions based on participation as an eyewitness (and, in some cases, perpetrator) sound similar to some of the accounts (confirmed or otherwise) from victims of the RussiaUkraine war today (e.g. Bowen 2022; Sheridan 2022), so reading Babel is particularly poignant today as Russian political leadership works to close the public’s eyes to the reality of the 2022 war in Ukraine. In one story in Red Cavalry, ‘My First Goose’, Babel recounts how he brutally kills a goose belonging to an old woman with whom he is quartered and orders her to cook it. He does this for no other reason than to prove himself worthy of the camaraderie of his brutish Cossack fellow soldiers, a worthiness which they doubt because of his glasses. (As an aside, we are told that the Cossacks gratuitously toss his box of belongings over the fence, destroying it in the process.) The story ends with him falling asleep—the goose not eaten, but killed for the sake of killing—and Babel saying of himself: ‘I dreamed and saw women in my dreams, and only my heart, stained with murder, screeched and bled.’ (‘Я видeл cны и жeнщин вo cнe, и тoлькo cepдцe мoe, oбaгpeннoe yбийcтвoм, cкpипeлo и тeклo.’)

2.1 Background

11

Fig. 2.3 Reporting from Kharkiv frontline from Quentin Sommerville1

In Red Cavalry, Babel provides an insider’s insight into the Soviet approach to war a century ago, shedding light on internal pressures that resulted in the cruelty of that culture’s way of waging war. These insights still seem relevant today: as BBC reporter Quentin Sommerville noted about the Russian bombardment of Kharkiv in 2022, and referring to Russia’s recent history in Chechnya and Syria: ‘If you don’t recognise these tactics [by Russia], then you haven’t been paying attention’ (Fig. 2.3). If the peer pressure and expectations from Babel’s Cossack comrades could induce Babel, a quiet Jewish intellectual, to overcome his apparent distaste and commit acts of barbarity in the midst of an ideologically-driven war, then it is not hard to imagine how similar peer pressure would still be a factor in the culture today, leading to similar results. At the same time, if Babel’s conscience was pricked in a way he could admit to his readers, even if in the moment he hid behind bravado, perhaps there is some opening for communication with those who appear to be irredeemably caught in the maelstrom of propaganda and violence. When we think about ‘Soviet Union 2.0’, Isaak Babel is an interesting historical data point to consider for a variety of reasons. Both Babel’s time and 2022 may bear witness to the shifting of geopolitical tectonic plates, with the war which the 1

https://twitter.com/sommervilletv/status/1502000265490227206, retrieved March 21, 2022.

12

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Red Army fought then auguring Soviet rule to come. Nonetheless, it might have been difficult in 1920, at the time of the civil war and the onset of Soviet rule, to foresee how Babel’s writings would open the Soviet public’s eyes a few years later to Bolshevik excesses, or that by 1939 Babel, after working for the Bolsheviks as a war correspondent and propagandist, would be arrested by the Soviet secret police on fabricated charges of terrorism and espionage, and executed in 1940. In the Soviet Union, it was often the case that no ‘good’ deed (from the authorities’ point of view) went unpunished. This turn of events illustrates the inherent ambiguity, arbitrariness, and instability of Soviet ideology: those favored by the regime today could be tomorrow’s enemies of the state. Besides Babel, another interesting literary figure to consider with respect to Soviet rule is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, perhaps the most famous Soviet dissident, thanks to whom the horrors of the Gulag (a Russian acronym for Main Camp Administration, or Глaвнoe yпpaвлeниe лaгepeй) became widely known in the West (Coлжeницын, Apxипeлaг Гyлaг 1973). Solzhenitsyn grew up in a devout Russian Orthodox family that had defied Soviet atheist campaigns. However, while young, Solzhenitsyn turned to atheism and belief in Marxism-Leninism. During World War II, Solzhenitsyn, like Babel before him, served in the Red Army but was arrested and sent to the Gulag for criticizing Joseph Stalin in a private letter. It was during his time in the Gulag that Solzhenitsyn returned to Orthodox Christianity. Under the Khrushchev regime, the authorities tolerated his writing novels, including about repression under the Stalin regime that preceded Khrushchev’s. However, perhaps because the Gulags continued after Stalin, Solzhenitsyn’s publication abroad of the Gulag Archipelago in 1973 outraged the Soviet authorities. Solzhenitsyn was exiled first to Germany, then, in 1976, to the United States. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn returned to live in Russia from 1994 to his death in 2008—a fourteen-year period divided approximately in half between the chaotic pre-Putin era of the 1990s, and Putin’s consolidation of power during the 2000s. Like Babel, Solzhenitsyn illustrates the ambiguities of Russian culture, and its treacherous shifting sands. While he was held up as a hero in Soviet times for his dissident’s stand against Soviet ideology and repression, many of the views Solzhenitsyn expressed over the years align closely with what Putin says today. Solzhenitsyn, for example, has: • Expressed radical views against Ukrainian independence from Russia (Coлжeницын 1990); • Implied or argued that the inclusion of Crimea and Donbass in Ukraine was an artificial construct of the Soviet Union which should be reversed (Remnick 1994); • Argued that twenty-five million Russians in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ are suffering discrimination (Remnick 1994); • Argued that Eastern Europeans who have suffered through Communism exhibit a certain moral superiority over those living under decadent Western liberalism (Solzhenitsyn 2002): A fact which cannot be disputed is the weakening of human beings in the West while in the East they are becoming firmer and stronger -- 60 years for our people and 30 years for the

2.1 Background

13

people of Eastern Europe. During that time we have been through a spiritual training far in advance of Western experience. Life’s complexity and mortal weight have produced stronger, deeper, and more interesting characters than those generally [produced] by standardized Western well-being.

• Criticized Soviet (and its atheist and Marxist-Leninist) ethnic, cultural and religious oppression of Russia (Solzhenitsyn 2002)2 : One does see the same stones in the foundations of a despiritualized humanism and of any type of socialism: endless materialism; freedom from religion and religious responsibility, which under communist regimes reach the stage of anti-religious dictatorships; concentration on social structures with a seemingly scientific approach. This is typical of the Enlightenment in the 18th Century and of Marxism.

• Argued in 1990 for a new post-Soviet, Slavic union of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and parts of Kazakhstan (Coлжeницын 1990): Also, our people was divided into three branches purely as a result of the terrible misfortune of the Mongol invasion and Polish colonization. It’s just a recently dreamed-up falsehood that as early as the 19th century a separate Ukrainian people existed with a separate nonRussian language. We all came from precious Kiev, ‘from which the Russian land came to be’, according to the chronicles of Nestor, and from which the light of Christianity dawned on us… In Lithuania and Poland, White Russians [Belorussians] and Little Russians [Ukrainians] considered themselves Russians and struggled against Polonization and Catholicization. The return of these lands into Russia would have been considered by everyone then as Reunification. Дa нapoд нaш и paздeлялcя нa тpи вeтви лишь пo гpoзнoй бeдe мoнгoльcкoгo нaшecтвия дa пoльcкoй кoлoнизaции. Этo вcё — пpидyмaннaя нeвдaвнe фaльшь, чтo чyть нe c IX вeкa cyщecтвoвaл ocoбый yкpaинcкий нapoд c ocoбым нe-pyccким языкoм. Mы вce вмecтe иcтeкли из дpaгoцeннoгo Киeвa, «oткyдy pyccкaя зeмля cтaлa ecть», пo лeтoпиcи Hecтopa, oткyдa и зacвeтилo нaм xpиcтиaнcтвo… B Литвe и Пoльшe бeлopycы и мaлopoccы coзнaвaли ceбя pyccкими и бopoлиcь пpoтив oпoлячeнья и oкaтoличeнья. Boзвpaт этиx зeмeль в Poccию был вceми тoгдa ocoзнaвaeм кaк Boccoeдинeниe.

• Criticized the Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments for making too many concessions to the West and bringing Russia to ruin, and praised Putin for starting to undo this damage (Solzhenitsyn 2007): …the many capitulations and reckless concessions [of Gorbachev] in foreign policy, which brought him such vociferous praise in the West. Under Yeltsin, that trajectory was essentially continued, but exacerbated further by the rampant theft of Russia’s property, her national 2

Putin, in particular, has blamed Lenin and more generally Soviet rule for Donbass and Crimea being made a part of Ukraine—(Пyтин, Oбpaщeниe Пpeзидeнтa Poccии Bлaдимиpa Пyтинa к нaции 2022). Even for Putin, as for Solzhenitsyn, Soviet rule is a convenient scapegoat. Putin is right that the Soviet ideal of the ‘brotherhood of nations’, which we shall return to in Chap. 6, downplayed national differences within the USSR and may thus have sowed the seeds of conflict today. But the question is whether Putin and Solzhenitsyn, in failing to address the root moral causes, embrace tactics that are little different from the underlying secular failings of Soviet Russia (and before). It matters if one misidentifies the sin to be turned from.

14

2 Soviet Union 2.0 treasure, and also by the affirmation of, and lack of any restraint to, State chaos. Under Putin, measures were taken over time to reverse this and save our failed state. ...мнoгoчиcлeнныe кaпитyляции и бeзoглядныe ycтyпки [Гopбaчeвa] вo внeшнeй пoлитикe, пpинecшиe eмy cтoль шyмныe пoxвaлы нa Зaпaдe. Пpи Eльцинe пo cyти тa жe линия былa пpoдoлжeнa, нo eщё oтягoщeнa бeзмepным имyщecтвeнным oгpaблeниeм Poccии, eё нaциoнaльнoгo дocтoяния, a тaкжe бecпpeпятcтвиeм и пoтaкaтeльcтвoм гocyдapcтвeннoмy xaocy. Пpи Пyтинe, нe cpaзy, cтaли пpeдпpинимaтьcя oбpaтныe ycилия cпaceния пpoвaлeннoй гocyдapcтвeннocти.

• Opposed NATO’s eastward expansion and accused NATO of trying to control Russia (Coлжeницын 2006): The United States deploys its occupying troops in one country after another. That’s been the situation for nine years now, in effect, in Bosnia; in Kosovo and Afghanistan for 5 years; in Iraq, for three years, although that will not continue for long. The actions of NATO and the separate actions of the USA differ little in practice. NATO has seen clearly that Russia today does not pose it any threat, but is methodically and persistently extending its military apparatus – into Eastern Europe and in a way which surrounds Russia to the south on the continent. At the same time, it is openly supporting ‘color revolutions’, both in material and ideological ways, and (paradoxically) introducing North Atlantic interests into Central Asia. All this leaves no doubt that it is preparing completely to surround Russia and then deprive her of her sovereignty. No, if Russia were to join such a North Atlantic alliance – one which spreads propaganda and spreads its ideology of contemporary Western democracy by force to various parts of the planet – this would lead not to the expansion, but to the decline of Christian civilization. Coeдинённыe Штaты paзмeщaют cвoи oккyпaциoнныe вoйcкa в oднoй cтpaнe cлeдoм зa дpyгoй. Taкoвo фaктичecкoe пoлoжeниe в Бocнии yжe 9 лeт, в Кocoвo и в Aфгaниcтaнe — пo 5 лeт, в Иpaкe пoкa 3, нo тaм зaтянeтcя нaдoлгo. Дeйcтвия HATO и oтдeльныe дeйcтвия CШA paзличaютcя мaлocyщecтвeннo. Oтчётливo видя, чтo нынeшняя Poccия нe пpeдcтaвляeт им никaкoй yгpoзы, HATO мeтoдичecки и нacтoйчивo paзвивaeт cвoй вoeнный aппapaт — нa Bocтoк Eвpoпы и в кoнтинeнтaльный oxвaт Poccии c Югa. Tyт и oткpытaя мaтepиaльнaя и идeoлoгичecкaя пoддepжкa «цвeтныx» peвoлюций, пapaдoкcaльнoe внeдpeниe Ceвepo-aтлaнтичecкиx интepecoв — в Цeнтpaльнyю Aзию. Bcё этo нe ocтaвляeт coмнeний, чтo гoтoвитcя пoлнoe oкpyжeниe Poccии, a зaтeм пoтepя eю cyвepeнитeтa. Heт, пpиcoeдинeниe Poccии к тaкoмy eвpoaтлaнтичecкoмy aльянcy, кoтopый вeдёт пpoпaгaндy и нacильcтвeннoe внeдpeниe в paзныe чacти плaнeты идeoлoгии и фopм ceгoдняшнeй зaпaднoй дeмoкpaтии — пpивeлo бы нe к pacшиpeнию, a к yпaдкy xpиcтиaнcкoй цивилизaции.

Solzhenitsyn was clearly a dissident in ‘Soviet Union 1.0’—and suffered for it. But we believe, as Putin’s ambitions have become clearer to many at the current ‘threshold moment’ in history, that Solzhenitsyn has arguably turned out to be one of Putin’s ideological foot-soldiers; an advocate, paradoxically, for a ‘Soviet Union 2.0’. But if ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ is around the corner, what might it look like? What in particular will be the implications for strategic communication, and for Westerners seeking to understand the information environment and its maneuvers and countermaneuvers? What will be the effects on Great Power competition? In the next section, we consider these intriguing questions and suggest how to piece together what Solzhenitsyn said with other sources to arrive at a satisfactory way of

2.2 Soviet Union 2.0, or Patrimonialism x.0?

15

understanding this juncture in Russian history, the present information environment, the actors, the messaging that may be required, and what the future may hold.

2.2 Soviet Union 2.0, or Patrimonialism x.0? Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. (Attributed to George Santayana)

Providing an interesting point of contrast to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is the historian of Russia, Richard Pipes. Both Solzhenitsyn and Pipes were in a way crusaders against the Soviet Communist regime. Solzhenitsyn was forced into exile by the Soviet regime (Remnick 1994); Pipes, a Polish Jew, fled Poland with his family in 1939. Later, while serving in the US Army, Pipes learned Russian, and from there, his career involved service to academia and the US government, including leading Team B (a team of analysts) at the CIA in the 1970s, and advising doctoral students at Harvard. One such student who has recently gained prominence is Fiona Hill, who served on the National Security Council and testified in the first impeachment trial of Donald Trump, which centered on Ukraine and dealings with Ukrainian President Zelensky. Here, Pipes’ background of national service to the United States contrasts with Solzhenitsyn’s career as a reclusive literary figure (Remnick 2001) who devoted much of his mental energy to attempts from afar to set Russia straight (Coлжeницын 1990), all the while yearning to return to Russia (Remnick 1994)—which of course he eventually did. The key difference in viewpoint between Solzhenitsyn and Pipes, in our view, comes down to a revealing question: was Soviet Communism (Marxism-Leninism) an aberration or part of a pattern in Russia? Solzhenitsyn and Pipes come down on very different sides of this issue. A frequent theme in Solzhenitsyn’s work is ‘alas, that conflation of “Soviet” and “Russian,” against which I spoke so often in the 1970s’ (Solzhenitsyn 2007). Solzhenitsyn has seen it as his mission, in his writing, to separate Soviet totalitarianism from Russian culture, assigning blame to the former for stifling and destroying the latter. For example, Solzhenitsyn refers to Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century as: …a rich, flourishing country, and before the blind extermination of millions of our countrymen one after another, which purposely selected that which was most Russian for elimination… ...бoгaтoй, цвeтyщeй cтpaнe, и пpeждe вcex миллиoнныx иcтpeблeний нaшeгo нapoдa, дa нe cлeпo пoдpяд, a yцeлeннo выбивaвшиx caмый pyccкий oтбop... (Coлжeницын 1990)

Pipes, on the other hand, views Soviet Communism not as an aberration in Russia, but rather as the natural result of ‘deep-seated cultural and political flaws’ (Pipes 1994, 222), and specifically ‘the historic legacy of patrimonialism’ (Pipes 1994, 227) in Russia. He writes:

16

2 Soviet Union 2.0 Russian nationalists depict communism as alien to Russian culture and tradition, as a kind of plague imported from the West… But it is…indisputable that Bolshevik practices were indigenous, for nowhere in the West has Marxism led to the totalitarian excesses of LeninismStalinism. In Russia, and subsequently in Third World countries with similar traditions, Marxism fell on a soil devoid of traditions of self-rule, observance of law, and respect for private property… Marxism had libertarian as well as authoritarian strains, and which of the two prevailed depended on a country’s political culture. In Russia, those elements in the Marxist doctrine gained ascendancy that fitted her patrimonial heritage. The Russian political tradition since the Middle Ages was for the government – or, more precisely, the ruler – to be the subject and “the land” the object. This tradition fused readily with the Marxist concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” under which the ruling party claimed undivided control over the country’s inhabitants and resources. Marx’s notion of such a “dictatorship” was sufficiently vague for it to be filled with the content nearest at hand, which in Russia was the historic legacy of patrimonialism. It was the grafting of Marxist ideology onto the sturdy stem of Russia’s patrimonial heritage that produced totalitarianism. Totalitarianism cannot be explained solely with reference either to Marxist doctrine or to Russian history: it was the fruit of their union. (ibid., pp. 226–227)

One might then sum up the difference as follows: Pipes, if he had lived to 2022, might have preferred to say that Russia was facing the onset, not of ‘Soviet Union 2.0’, but rather of ‘Patrimonialism x.0’—with x some undetermined number. By the time of his death in 2008, Solzhenitsyn apparently saw no danger of ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ in Putin’s Russia (Solzhenitsyn 2007). In Solzhenitsyn’s view, there was only one Soviet Union, and it should never be allowed to repeat. But would Solzhenitsyn have changed his mind by 2022? Or would he have considered Russian military intervention in Ukraine and suppression of dissent in Russia not a return to the same totalitarianism under which he suffered, but rather a necessary way to continue undoing the damage of the ‘aberration’ of Leninism? After all, he had argued in (Coлжeницын 1990, 112), as Putin has (Пyтин, Oб иcтopичecкoм eдинcтвe pyccкиx и yкpaинцeв 2021) (Пyтин 2022), against the transfer under Lenin and subsequent Soviet rulers of Donbass (eastern Ukraine) and Crimea from Russia to Ukraine.3 It is unclear where Solzhenitsyn might have ended up on this issue if he had lived 14 years longer. But perhaps all this only serves to illustrate the inherent contradiction in Solzhenitsyn’s position that Soviet Communism was an aberration, and also points to the increasing cognitive dissonance faced by supporters of Putin’s brand of Russian nationalism today. Denial that Putin represents a repeat of long-standing Russian authoritarianism is becoming an increasingly untenable position. 3

In our view, that it was Lenin and the Bolsheviks who transferred Donbass to Ukraine is a red herring today; at least, we find ourselves unconvinced by Putin and Solzhenitsyn that the issue is relevant. Even allowing that Lenin and the Bolsheviks may have had underhand motives, it does not follow that a Russian control of Donbass (and Crimea) undoes the damage, nor that a transfer of land in any way ‘undoes Communism’, as Putin implied when justifying the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, suggesting provocatively and insincerely that Ukraine’s desire for decommunization not ‘stop halfway’ (Пyтин, Oбpaщeниe Пpeзидeнтa Poccии Bлaдимиpa Пyтинa к нaции 2022). In the end, undoing the mistakes of the past other than by mutual consent is, in our view, just another way in which ‘Tsarist patrimonialism’ is further entrenched today.

2.2 Soviet Union 2.0, or Patrimonialism x.0?

17

At any rate, it is quite possible that neither Pipes nor Solzhenitsyn, each for different reasons, and unlike many commentators today, would speak about what Russia is facing as ‘Soviet Union 2.0’. Pipes referred to ‘Russian nationalists’, as we cited above, and this rubric fits those, like Solzhenitsyn and Putin, who seek to absolve the Russian nation of responsibility, whether assigning blame, in Solzhenitsyn’s case, largely to Marxism-Leninism, or in Putin’s case, to other nations. On a personal level, because of this difference of opinions there was reportedly no love lost between Pipes and Solzhenitsyn. Without even mentioning Solzhenitsyn, I (Peter Chew) posed a question to panelists from the National Defense University (Strategic Multilayer Assessment [SMA] EUCOM Speaker Session 2022): did they agree with Pipes’ assessment that Russian authoritarianism has its roots in ‘deep-seated cultural and political flaws’? Panelist Peter Yeltsov responded that ‘Pipes and Solzhenitsyn didn’t like each other, because Pipes was arguing that Communism was a continuation while Solzhenitsyn didn’t think so’. (Both Yeltsov and a second panelist, Spencer Meredith, agreed that Pipes was highly influential in the US national security debate, and they appeared to agree with the ‘Patrimonialism x.0’ proposition. A third panelist, Carolyne Davidson, demurred, worrying that characterizing Putin’s authoritarian tendencies as ‘inherently Russian’ might cut off the West’s ability to engage with Russia.) So, clearly, there is disagreement even in the US national security community. But the specific differences between Pipes and Solzhenitsyn are, we think, themselves reflective of cultural differences that are useful to understand. In personal communications, we have found that many Soviet/Russian emigrés who are very critical of ‘Soviet Union 1.0’ share Solzhenitsyn’s narrow assignment of blame for Russia’s (and even the world’s) ills specifically to Soviet (Marxist-Leninist) ideology, and tend to resent a broader assumption of national faults. Without excusing this narrow view, we can say it is understandable, because a broadening of responsibility becomes more personally relevant. No one likes to think that they share individually or collectively in national guilt. (One might compare this to the sensitive issue of slavery in America.4 ) Emigrés, of whom Solzhenitsyn was one, find it hard to throw off all the cultural baggage they bring with them, even if they are dissidents. In this sense, we think the reported personal tension between Pipes and Solzhenitsyn actually mirrors the tension between the Soviet Union and the West in the twentieth century, and the tension that still exists between Russia and the West today. Simply put, Solzhenitsyn, as a Russian, resisted the idea that there might be a deep-seated problem in his national culture, while Pipes could (we believe) see the issues more clearly. But whether Pipes or Solzhenitsyn (or neither) was right, clearly one’s diagnosis of the source of authoritarianism and totalitarianism in Russia can lead to very different results in practice—such as support for or opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The stakes are high and it is little surprise that passions on the subject run high. 4

We see slavery as an apt parallel because, like Russia’s cultural ailments, it has also resurfaced over time in different shapes and forms in America. While slavery was abolished in America in the nineteenth century, it was arguably the predecessor to the Jim Crow laws of the twentieth century. The underlying issues have, we believe, still not been fully resolved in America, just as Russia’s underlying issues continue to ail her.

18

2 Soviet Union 2.0

In the end, we come down on the side of Pipes, because we think that the proof of the pudding is in the eating.5 Pipes lists ‘four pillars’ of Tsarist patrimonialism (Pipes 1994, 229) which we have labeled as follows: • Lawless autocracy (Pipes: ‘autocracy, that is, personal rule unconstrained by either constitution or representative bodies’) • Corrupt nationalization (Pipes: ‘the autocrat’s ownership of the country’s resources, which is to say, the virtual absence of private property’) • Oligarchic state capture (Pipes: ‘the autocrat’s right to demand unlimited services from his subjects, resulting in the lack of either collective or individual rights’) • Repression of dissent (Pipes: ‘state control of information’). As Pipes points out, by these criteria, the Communist regime at the time of Lenin’s death displayed unmistakable similarities to Tsarist rule. But Pipes was writing in 1994, and, critically, such similarities are surfacing again in Putin’s Russia of 2022. As we said above, the idea of ‘Soviet Union 1.0’ as an aberration seems increasingly untenable. In the 1990s, Solzhenitsyn’s viewpoint of Soviet Union as a deviation from the norm might have been more tenable, but we think even then it was informed by a kind of recency bias convenient for a Russian nationalist perspective, but not based on the most honest assessment of history. But what of Carolyne Davidson’s concern that such a position might undermine our ability to engage with Russia? We would respond that it depends. In response to our question to the SMA panelists, Spencer Meredith mentioned that Pipes has been criticized for ‘cultural determinism’ (and added that he felt it was an unjust criticism). We understand ‘cultural determinism’ to mean here that ‘Patrimonialism x.0’ is how Russia is destined to be; that Russia, because of its cultural failings, can never escape the pattern of patrimonialism. (Returning to our analogy above, this 5

Our American proofreaders worried that ‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating’ would sound strange to American readers, while our British proofreaders objected to ‘The proof is in the pudding’ A cultural difference, or something else? An American journalist writing as recently as 1985 helped us adjudicate this point: Assistant Attorney General Stephen Trott told a “Meet the Press” panel that he was pleased with Israeli promises to cooperate in the investigation of espionage in the United States, but added: “We will take them at their word, but the proof is in the pudding.” The proof is not in the pudding. You could stir around the pudding for hours and never find the proof. The proverb goes: the proof of the pudding is in the eating… The point of the proverb is that a pudding may look good, or smell good, or even feel and sound good, but all that is irrelevant and sometimes misleading; the only true test of its success as a pudding is the satisfaction it provides when it is eaten. The clipping of the proverb to “the proof is in the pudding,” stated as flatly as “the saw is in the cake,” renders the adage meaningless. I would not ordinarily take a pop at a speaker for making this common error, but I expect the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division to be careful about the best-known proverb about proof. (Safire 1985)

2.2 Soviet Union 2.0, or Patrimonialism x.0?

19

is similar to saying that America is destined never to escape the legacy of slavery.) But this position does not necessarily follow from what Pipes said. Elsewhere, Pipes points to ‘the deliberate refusal of the post-communist regime to make a clean break with the Soviet past’ (Pipes 2006), citing as evidence of this (as we shall, in Chap. 5) the countless Lenin statues throughout the country. The ‘clean break’ with the past— honestly facing up to cultural weaknesses—may be precisely what enables escape from the pattern. Addressing Carolyne Davidson’s concern, if that is the case and if autocracy in Russia comes from a weakness in the culture, then we do Russia no favors by failing to say so. (Although that does not mean, of course, that saying so will always fall on receptive ears.) Pipes’ idea of a ‘clean break with the past’ by Russia is little different from what Solzhenitsyn refers to as ‘repentance’, or in Russian, ‘pacкaяниe’. To ‘repent’, according to Merriam-Webster, means to ‘turn from sin and dedicate oneself to the amendment of one’s life’. So, what does Solzhenitsyn say about this? Here are some examples: [In an interview with Spiegel:] SPIEGEL

All your life you have called on the authorities to repent for the millions of victims of the gulag and communist terror. Was this call really heard? Solzhenitsyn I have grown used to the fact that, throughout the world, public repentance is the most unacceptable option for the modern politician. The current Russian president says the collapse of the Soviet Union SPIEGEL was the largest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century. He says it is high time to stop this masochistic brooding over the past, especially since there are attempts “from outside,” as he puts it, to provoke an unjustified remorse among Russians. Does this not just help those who want people to forget everything that took place during the country’s Soviet past? Solzhenitsyn Well, there is growing concern all over the world as to how the United States will handle its new role as the world’s only superpower, which it became as a result of geopolitical changes. As for “brooding over the past,” alas, that conflation of “Soviet” and “Russian,” against which I spoke so often in the 1970s, has not passed away either in the West, or in the ex-socialist countries, or in the former Soviet republics. The elder political generation in communist countries was not ready for repentance, while the new generation is only too happy to voice grievances and level accusations, with present-day Moscow a convenient target. They behave as if they heroically liberated themselves and lead a new life now, while Moscow has remained communist. Nevertheless, I dare hope that this unhealthy phase will soon be over, that all the peoples who have lived through communism will understand that communism is to blame for the bitter pages of their history (Solzhenitsyn 2007).

20

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Other authors from former Soviet countries have pointed to a similar idea (Aлeкcиeвич 2018, 34), speaking about the failure of the people of the former Soviet Union to rid themselves of their Soviet skeletons in the closet, says: ‘The Communist Party was not put on trial, there was no lustration. The past did not let go of us, our heads are still stuffed with it… In answer to the question, what sort of country should we have, should it be strong or dignified, where people are happy to live, eight out of ten answered: “strong”’ (‘He cyдили кoмпapтию, нe былo люcтpaции. Пpoшлoe нe oтпycтилo, мы вce им нaшпигoвaны… Ha вoпpoc: кaкoй дoлжнa быть cтpaнa—cильнoй или дocтoйнoй, гдe людям xopoшo жить, вoceмь чeлoвeк из дecяти выбиpaли—cильнoй’).6 At any rate, it is clear that while Pipes and Solzhenitsyn agree on the need for Russian national repentance, they differ on what the sin is and thus what the amendment should look like. In Solzhenitsyn’s view, ‘communism’ and ‘Soviet’ are the sins; ‘Moscow’ (and the political structures and modus operandi it represents) are not. In Pipes’s view, the sins are more generic and are the four pillars of patrimonialism: lawless autocracy, corrupt nationalization, oligarchic state capture, and repression of dissent, and these are the historic modus operandi of Moscow. So, again, the view one takes on the ‘sin’ leads to a very different conclusion about whether repentance has taken place. Pipes and Solzhenitsyn can be compared to Old Testament prophets calling upon Israel and its kings (in the case of Pipes and Solzhenitsyn, Russia), for national repentance to lead to national restoration. (There are those in Russia today, by the way, who still speak in these terms—see Fig. 2.4.) However, Pipes and Solzhenitsyn each identify the sin differently—and perhaps for that reason one might say each viewed the other as a false prophet. A prophet is a strategic communicator in a hostile information environment: his or her message must be delivered without fear or favor (which Solzhenitsyn and Pipes both did), often at personal cost and to an audience which does not want to hear the message. But also, a prophet must ensure he or she gets the message right, because fixing the wrong problem may just result in the same underlying weaknesses resurfacing. Even if it is true that those who do not learn from the mistakes of history are destined to repeat them, it turns out that it is not as straightforward and uncontroversial as it may seem to identify what exactly those mistakes are. To summarize this section, we may state the central issue simply. The question is, was the Soviet Union a cause or a symptom? Was the Soviet Union a deviation from the norms of Russia, or part of a pattern? We think the experience of Russia in 2022 points to the USSR having been a symptom of a longer-standing pattern, and we shall delve more into why we believe this in the next section.

6

Perhaps a more scientific and quantitative counterpoint to Aleksievich’s ‘eight out of ten’ observation is provided by Sherlock (2022), drawing upon data from Russian polling organizations. Sherlock suggests that support for Russian ‘strength’ versus ‘democratic values’ reached a high in 2014, around the time of the initial Russian-backed invasion of eastern Ukraine, but—interestingly—has significantly declined since then.

2.2 Soviet Union 2.0, or Patrimonialism x.0?

21

Fig. 2.4 Facebook post by a Baptist pastor in Russia, following the 2022 invasion by Russia of Ukraine. Reproduced by permission of the author7

7

Translation: Jesus Christ says: ‘The time has come and the Kingdom of God is near: Repent of your sins and believe the Good News’. I often cite these words of the Lord. I often declare my conviction that Russians need repentance. Even more, I am convinced that without Russians’ repentance there

22

2 Soviet Union 2.0

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities Today In this section, we structure our discussion by traveling back over thirty years. I (Peter Chew) was fortunate to have first-hand experience of living for ten months in the Soviet Union in 1990–1991, after a short first visit to the USSR in 1985. Those ten months made a deep and lifelong impression, largely because the USSR was then such a different environment to anything I had previously experienced, even after travels from my then home country (Great Britain), throughout Europe, to North America, South Africa, and even later to India. The Soviet Union had a certain distinct flavor, and in this section, we attempt to summarize this flavor in terms of key attributes, dimensions, or notable points that stood out to us even before we had thought about the underlying cultural phenomena that caused them. We use these attributes to structure a discussion, first, about whether these facets of Soviet Union 1.0 were really facets of an underlying patrimonialism (Pipes 1994), or as Solzhenitsyn suggests, deviations from the norm; and secondly, how we see these aspects of Soviet Union 1.0 possibly being reincarnated in twenty-first century Russia.

is no hope for successful development. And I often hear the answer: ‘What do we need to repent of? We did not take part in the Red Terror. We didn’t cause the Holodomor. We didn’t start wars. We didn’t attack Ukraine.’ It’s most interesting that this kind of refusal of repentance is actively engaged in by preachers of the Gospel, priests, and Bible teachers. I see a tragic undermining of the essence of repentance in this kind of denial of the Lord’s call. The Greek word μετανoια ´ (metanoia) means a ‘change of mind’, ‘changing one’s thoughts’. We know that 100 years ago a gang of criminals seized power in Russia. The Red and White Terror followed. And the Holodomor. And collectivization, or in other words, the destruction of the peasantry. And along with all this, the killing of people for belief in God. Along with this, the death machine known as the GULAG. The curse of Cain swallowed Russia up. The passion today for revering bloody [Ivan the] Terrible and Stalin, the hatred for personal freedoms, persecution of missionaries, all testify to this: there is no desire to make proper sense of the bloody crimes of the regime. Moreover, a cornucopia, as it were, of eulogistic panegyrics is poured out for these same executioners of Russia. And now, hatred is already becoming a virtue. And lies have become praiseworthy. And a thought—even just a thought—spoken aloud that not everything’s OK on the home front is already a crime. In such circumstances I think that what’s most valuable now for Russians is to hear the word of Jesus and receive it and act on it! Repent! Change your worldview. Change your values! Refuse to take part in lies and hatred. Stop the killing! For the blood of each Ukrainian killed, God will exact a price from you! Hebrews 10:30–31: ‘For we know him who said, “Vengeance is mine; I will repay, says the Lord.” It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.’ Stop sowing destruction and death. Repent and believe the Gospel!

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

23

2.3.1 The Information and Economic Island Created by the Iron Curtain The author Peter Chew flew into Moscow in September 1990 with fellow undergraduates from the University of London, transferred to a train at Moscow’s Kazansky station, and woke up the next morning in Kazan after the overnight train journey. The weather was rainy, the potholed city streets were covered by large puddles, the leaves were already golden and falling, and a chill was in the air (Fig. 2.5). It seemed as though we had abruptly transitioned from summer in London just a couple of days earlier to a Russian autumn fully underway. The day of arrival, we were taken to the Kazan Chemical-Technical Institute (Кaзaнcкий xимикo-тexничecкий инcтитyт) to be introduced to our respective host families. I returned with mine (Nayil and Tanya) (Fig. 2.6) to their three-bedroom apartment on Working Youth Street (Fig. 2.7) (yлицa Paбoчeй Moлoдeжи).8 From the start, I got along excellently with my hosts and felt more fortunate than some of my fellow-students to be with my assigned family. If I remember correctly, however, I was the first foreigner whom Nayil and Tanya had met, let alone had to stay in their apartment, in their provincial Russian existence. Kazan was a city of a million inhabitants (Fig. 2.8) in a huge country with many similar-sized or smaller cities. In those days, one could not make a telephone call to the Kazan area code (8432) from outside the USSR, nor could one call internationally from Kazan—telephone calls had to be individually ordered via an operator. I felt viscerally that I was on the opposite edge of Europe, in the depths of the vast country of the Soviet Union, and at the time, had a feeling as though I was treading on virgin soil, from the perspective of a non-Soviet citizen. This experience contained many firsts not just for me, but for my hosts. I had already studied Russian for 3 years and so I was able to adapt relatively quickly to full immersion in Russian with my hosts (who spoke only Russian). I sat for many hours in the tiny kitchen with Tanya and learned what the kitchen means to Russians—a place not just to cook and eat but to have conversations about everything in life. Over oatmeal porridge (oвcяннaя кaшa), bread and blackcurrant jam or honey produced at Nayil and Tanya’s dacha, or fried squid (кaльмapи), Tanya’s and my eyes were opened for the first time to many aspects of each other’s culture and life. After Tanya told me the temperature would get down to minus 30 °C over the winter, I watched the thermometer on the

8

With the benefit of more than thirty years of hindsight, this host family has provided an anecdotal illustration of the effect of conspiracy theories on ordinary Russians in real life. After I (P. Chew) left Russia, Nayil and Tanya went off to join a cult and live in its commune in Siberia. Peter Chew’s friend and Australian journalist Kim Traill has published a video documentary of the cult (Traill 2013), which was founded by a Russian traffic policeman claiming to be Jesus. Tanya evidently became disillusioned with the hard life in Siberia and returned to Kazan in 2004. As far as the authors know, Nayil is still with the cult.

24

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.5 Author photo: First impressions of Kazan in 1990

Fig. 2.6 Author photo: The author’s hosts Nayil and Tanya in front of their dacha

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

Fig. 2.7 Author photo: Working Youth Street in Kazan

25

26

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.8 Author photo: How Bauman Street, the main street of Kazan, looked in 1990–1991

outside of the window each day, anticipating the deep freeze of the Russian winter and thinking that this would be another first for me. Those first impressions of Kazan underlined a reality of the Soviet Union, which is the degree to which people were cut off from the outside. People, information, and ideas did not flow easily between Russia and the West, and perhaps not at all between the West and Russian provinces. Soviet technology (if one can call it that; at that time, I never heard the phrase ‘Soviet technology’ in Russian, and Soviet citizens were already using the term ‘Soviet’ disparagingly to explain why things didn’t work) (Fig. 2.9) was a phenomenon unto itself. Non-Soviet-produced cars were a rarity in Moscow and more or less non-existent in Kazan—most people, if they had a car at all (and most Soviet citizens didn’t) drove Ladas (Fig. 2.10). Most of the population, myself included, traveled around town by trams, trolleybuses, or rickety buses—which sometimes didn’t show up. And whenever they did show up, they were packed to the gills with people (Fig. 2.11), meaning that (to make sure I could get out when I needed to) I quickly had to learn how to say, ‘let me through’, without any niceties like ‘please’ or ‘would you’, which because of their superfluity in the gritty Russian reality, tended to get in the way of communication for survival. One could assume that anything available to Soviet consumers (and again, the word ‘consumer’ did not exist then in the vocabulary of the Soviet Union) had to be produced in the Soviet Union, or else those consumers were out of luck. I did not stop to think much in 1990 why the Soviet Union was so cut-off from the rest of the world; I simply marveled at it and felt almost a sense of privilege that I could experience it. But three decades on, after that isolation dissipated and is now

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

27

Fig. 2.9 With his hosts, the author Peter Chew attends a wedding in Kazan in 1990 or 1991. Color photos were almost non-existent in the USSR then. The fare on offer at the wedding was standard Soviet fare

seemingly coming back, and with the benefit of having read more widely (including Pipes), it makes more sense as part of the long-standing pattern, fitting with Pipes’s conception of patrimonial State control of information (repression of alternative perspectives) and autocratic ownership of the country’s resources. With the benefit of hindsight in 2022, as Russia is restricting access to social media platforms like Facebook, but equally, as Western countries are pulling out of Russia, it becomes clearer that the isolation of the USSR may have been a two-way street: the USSR may have both been pushed, and actively withdrawn, into a form of misanthropic isolation. Pipes (2006) explains this as follows: There are many causes to account for such actions [by the Russians] that range from noncooperation to outright hostility. Two stand out. One is Russia’s inability to find for itself a proper place in the international community. This sense of isolation has deep historical roots. As a country professing Orthodox Christianity derived from Byzantium, Russians have always felt alienated from Catholic and Protestant Europe, not to speak of Islamic and Buddhist Asia. Although religion today plays a much smaller role in politics than it did in the past, the sense of alienation persists in secular form. Public opinion polls indicate that the majority of Russians regard the West as an enemy and do not want to follow Western ways. The Russian press is filled with snide remarks about Europe and the United States and finds satisfaction in any unfavorable news emanating from there. Even after the loss of its empire, Russia remains

28

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.10 Author photo: Ladas parked in the courtyard (двop) outside the Kazan ChemicalTechnological Institute, where the author Peter Chew studied, in 1990–1991

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

29

Fig. 2.11 Author photo of one of the less crowded buses in the 1990–1991 USSR

the largest country in the world. This spaciousness contributes to the sense of alienation. Russians take immense pride in the vastness of their land: They tend to think that they are not a country like the others, but a continent. They further believe that by virtue of their size they are entitled to superpower status and as such have a right to a decisive voice in world affairs. The Russian language promotes this illusion because the word velikii means both “large” and “great.” The other factor that reinforces the sense of isolation and hostility to the outside world has to do with Russia’s antidemocratic, authoritarian tradition. Although during the Soviet era Russia was widely perceived as a radical country, its radicalism was confined to MarxistLeninist slogans meant exclusively for export. In reality, it was a reactionary regime which had more in common with the autocracy of a Nicholas I or an Alexander III than with the socialist ideals of the radical intelligentsia. The Russian political tradition is solidly conservative, so much so that even its Marxism acquired a conservative coloring. Until 1991, Russia had abandoned autocracy only twice in its history -- in the early 17th century and again in 1917 -- and in both cases the collapse of autocracy led not to a liberal regime but to anarchy, which resulted in the restoration of absolutism. The same process seems to be underway today [in 2006].

All this helps make sense, for example, of Putin’s recent claim of the ‘impossibility of isolating anyone in the modern world, and definitely not a huge country like Russia’ (‘жecткo изoлиpoвaть в coвpeмeннoм миpe вooбщe нeвoзмoжнo никoгo, тaкyю oгpoмнyю cтpaнy, кaк Poccия, тaк тoчнo нeвoзмoжнo’ [TACC 2022]). (In the same remarks [ibid.], Putin pointed out that the Soviet Union was the first to put a man in space at a time, like now, when sanctions on the USSR were ‘total’.)

30

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Pipes mentions ‘pride’, and we think Russian national pride (or to put it less kindly, hubris) is a key factor explaining both why Soviet isolationism, both in terms of ideas and the economy, persisted for so long, even in the face of widespread cynicism among Soviet citizens that anything Soviet actually worked properly. A premise of the global interconnected economy is that different regions and countries have complementary things to offer. But autocracy and State control (specifically, the State ownership of the economy) in Russia—which manifested in the USSR as the idea that the socialist State could mold a utopia and had little to gain or be taught from outside—engendered a go-it-alone philosophy which persisted long after it was disproven by economic woes. Pipes shows how autocracy and State control were carryovers from Tsarism (Pipes 1994). And today, as Western firms pull out of Russia, Western governments impose sanctions on Russia, and Russia retaliates in kind (only deepening its isolation), the same Russian pride is on display. In the autocrat’s (Putin’s) eyes, Russia has a right to superpower status, can go it alone, and need take no lessons from the West. In the words of a Russian op-ed writer speaking recently about the ‘de-Nazification’ of Ukraine: Russia will have no allies in de-Nazifying Ukraine, since this is a profoundly Russian matter. Additionally, since it is not only the Banderite version of Nazi Ukraine that will have to be uprooted, but also, above all, the Western totalitarianism and programs of civilizational degradation and decay and mechanisms of subjugation to the superpower of the West and USA that have been pushed on us. In order to carry out the plan of de-Nazifying Ukraine, Russia itself will have to break once and for all with any pro-European or pro-Western illusions, and begin to see herself as the last bastion of those values of historical Europe (the Old World) that merit conserving, and which the West has, in the end, renounced, having lost its struggle for its soul. This struggle continued throughout the 20th century and found expression in the World War and Russian Revolution that were inextricably linked together. Coюзникoв пo дeнaцификaции Укpaины y Poccии нe бyдeт. Пocкoлькy этo cyгyбo pyccкoe дeлo. A тaкжe пocкoлькy иcкopeнeнию пoдвepгнeтcя нe пpocтo бaндepoвcкaя вepcия нaциcтcкoй Укpaины, нo в тoм чиcлe и пpeждe вceгo зaпaдный тoтaлитapизм, нaвязaнныe пpoгpaммы цивилизaциoннoй дeгpaдaции и pacпaдa, мexaнизмы пoдчинeния cвepxвлacти Зaпaдa и CШA. Для пpoвeдeния плaнa дeнaцификaции Укpaины в жизнь Poccии caмoй пpидeтcя oкoнчaтeльнo paccтaтьcя c пpoeвpoпeйcкими и пpoзaпaдными иллюзиями, ocoзнaть ceбя кaк пocлeднюю инcтaнцию зaщиты и coxpaнeния тex цeннocтeй иcтopичecкoй Eвpoпы (Cтapoгo Cвeтa), кoтopыe тoгo зacлyживaют и oт кoтopыx Зaпaд в кoнeчнoм cчeтe oткaзaлcя, пpoигpaв в бopьбe зa caмoгo ceбя. Этa бopьбa пpoдoлжaлacь вecь XX вeк и выpaзилacь в миpoвoй вoйнe и pyccкoй peвoлюции, нepaзpывнo cвязaнныx дpyг c дpyгoм. (Cepгeйцeв 2022)

But if this calculus is shared by Putin, is it accurate? Or if isolationist hubris of this sort led to the downfall of the Soviet Union, will it also lead to a similar downfall for Russia? In today’s Russia, isolationism behind a new Iron Curtain is manifesting, for example, in the form of restrictions on information, restrictions on travel, and restrictions on trade. We provide some examples of each in the next sections.

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

2.3.1.1

31

Restrictions on Information

Russia made moves to restrict Western social media platforms including Facebook on and around March 4, 2022 (Allyn and Selyukh 2022). Control is incomplete because citizens can still access such platforms through virtual private networks (VPNs). This resembles Soviet attempts to block foreign broadcasting into Russia, which also did not result in complete control, as citizens could and did still receive broadcasts via short-wave radio. (Interestingly, a significant reason for a large presence of Russianspeaking Protestants in Sacramento, California today is that Sacramento was a hub for broadcasting Christian radio into the USSR during the Cold War [Chandler 1991].) Anton Shirikov, a political scientist, has suggested it is not that Russians today cannot get accurate news, but rather that ‘most people in Russia still don’t seem like they want it’ (Brangham and Nagy 2022). This may have been true in the Soviet Union too, and illustrates that information isolationism may partly reflect the willingness (and complicity) of the population not to countenance alternative sources of information that challenge official national narratives. Still, State control of information undoubtedly makes accessing officially unapproved information an uphill struggle for the population (Hill 2022). In an astonishing op-ed for RIA Novosti (Cepгeйцeв 2022), incidentally, in which Timofei Sergeitsev calls ‘a significant part of the mass of the nation [of Ukraine] passive Nazis, accomplices of Nazism’, Sergeitsev states that ‘de-Nazification’ must include ‘de-Ukrainization’ as well as ‘the installation of the Russian information space’ within Ukraine following a Russian victory over alleged Ukrainian Nazis.9 Towards the end of the op-ed, Sergeitsev writes: Russia has done everything possible to save the West in the twentieth century. She brought about the most important Western project, an alternative to capitalism which had overthrown nation-states: the socialist, Red project. She quashed German Nazism – a monster birthed by the crisis of Western civilization. The last act of Russian altruism was a hand of friendship proffered by Russia, for which Russia received the monstrous blow of the 1990s [the economic crisis that happened at the time of the fall of the USSR]. // From here, Russia will follow its own path, not worrying about the fate of the West… Poccия cдeлaлa вce вoзмoжнoe для cпaceния Зaпaдa в XX вeкe. Oнa peaлизoвaлa глaвный зaпaдный пpoeкт, aльтepнaтивный кaпитaлизмy, пoбeдившeмy нaциoнaльныe гocyдapcтвa — coциaлиcтичecкий, кpacный пpoeкт. Oнa paздaвилa нeмeцкий нaцизм — чyдoвищнoe пopoждeниe кpизиca зaпaднoй цивилизaции. Пocлeдним aктoм pyccкoгo aльтpyизмa былa пpoтянyтaя Poccиeй pyкa дpyжбы, зa чтo Poccия пoлyчилa чyдoвищный yдap 1990-x. // Дaльшe Poccия пoйдeт cвoим пyтeм, нe вoлнyяcь o cyдьбe Зaпaдa…

It seems that there could be little more compelling to make the argument that a recapitulation of the Soviet Union (whether also a recapitulation of something more long-standing in Russian political culture) is on the horizon, than that op-eds of this sort are being published in the tightly-controlled information environment that is

9

President Zelensky cited this article as possible evidence for a future genocide or war crimes tribunal (Tyshchenko 2022).

32

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Russia today, painting ‘Soviet Union 1.0’ in such glowing terms, and calling for Russia to part ways with the West. Restricting the flow of information, ideas and technology into the USSR led to pain in everyday life, and the pain threshold seems to have been high, although it had limits, because by the 1990s, we observed that Russians were hungry for information from outside. Peter Chew’s contacts in Kazan, ordinary people, were always very interested to learn how things worked in the West, and what might work better than in Russia. But that was when the USSR had reached, literally, a breaking-point, and 2022 likely represents a different phase in the repeating cycle of pride followed by a fall. Peter Pomerantsev has suggested that at the present juncture, the US and Western countries need to be figuring out how to reach Russia’s domestic population with information (Strategic Multilayer Assessment Speaker Series 2022), but if in this phase, Russians on the whole are closing their ears, it may be necessary (as in Soviet times) for Western communicators to content themselves with the Russian audience for Western messaging being small, and to ensure that at least that minority can access information via channels such as shortwave radio, or now, internet content in Russian.

2.3.1.2

Restrictions on Travel

In his speech to the German parliament on March 17, 2022, Ukrainian President Zelensky warned of a new Iron Curtain descending on Europe. During Soviet times, one of the most visible forms the Iron Curtain took was the Berlin Wall, which, as President Kennedy aptly remarked in 1963, existed as much to keep East Germans in as West Germans out (Kennedy 1963). In fact, many bureaucratic and economic barriers worked to limit the ability of Soviet citizens to travel out of the Soviet Union (Fig. 2.12). Even today, citizens of former Soviet countries have an ‘internal’ passport, and must apply separately for an international passport. Travelers must pass through an official exit passport control to leave the country—something with no analogy in the USA or most Western countries. But also, at least by 1990, travel abroad was financially out of reach for most Russians (Fig. 2.13), largely because the ruble had so little value (despite official attempts to manipulate and control exchange between hard currency and rubles). And the weakness of the ruble in the free market was in turn due to the poor state of the isolationist Soviet economy. It is not hard to imagine bureaucratic and economic constraints once again conspiring to restrict the ability of Russians to travel. As mentioned, some of the bureaucratic hurdles have never gone away, but other hurdles for would-be Russian travelers, such as sanctions curtailing direct flights between Russia and many other countries, have significantly increased following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On the economic side, the fundamentals underpinning the strength of the ruble continue to deteriorate, also largely as a result of sanctions. (We shall return to this point in the next section.) As the ruble weakens, so does the purchasing power abroad

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

33

Fig. 2.12 Author photo: Travel across the vast USSR was invariably a wearying experience. Here, a typical waiting room

Fig. 2.13 The weakness of the ruble in 1990–1991 made it easier for the author Peter Chew to travel, while the USSR had not yet fallen apart with new visa restrictions being introduced between its republics. This is a photo of the author as a student in Bukhara, Uzbekistan in 1991

34

2 Soviet Union 2.0

of Russians who earn their wages in rubles; this places another obstacle in the way of Russians traveling.

2.3.1.3

Restrictions on Trade

As we have already mentioned, McDonalds was one of the first Western companies to enter Russia in 1990. Its departure today is as much of a symbolic bellwether as its arrival was then (Chilcote, How Western sanctions are affecting the lives of Russians 2022). As with other forms of Russia’s isolation, the severing of economic ties is a two-way street: Western companies, Western governments, and the Russian government all have played a role in pushing Russia towards isolation. As Western companies have left, the Russian government has threatened, in retaliatory fashion, to nationalize the assets of Western companies (Braw 2022); of course, nationalization has distinct echoes of socialism/communism, but in an even broader sense, fits with Pipes’s conception of autocratic ownership of Russia’s resources. One cannot help but think that in the minds of many Russian leaders, McDonalds and its Western peers were in Russia only at the ‘Tsar’s’ pleasure, and any illusion that they owned private property has now been dispelled. It is worth considering the limits on the isolation that Russia has been willing to endure, and what motivations explain those limits. Perhaps a good case in point is the question (which is now surfacing, not for the first time in Russia’s history) of a possible or actual Russian default on sovereign debt. According to Cooban (2022), any current default by Russia on its debt would be the ‘first in more than a century, when Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin repudiated bonds issued by the Tsarist government’—and, at the same time, oversaw an expropriation by the Soviet government of foreign assets in the country. Russia was, of course, in difficult economic straits at the time, but Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Revolution, undoubtedly believed like other Bolsheviks that the Soviet government was so qualitatively different from what he saw as its corrupt predecessor that the new Soviet government had no obligation to honor debt inherited from its predecessor. The repudiation of Soviet debt was specifically called for in the 1905 Financial Manifesto of the Petrograd Soviet of Working Deputies (Финaнcoвый мaнифecт Coвeтa Paбoчиx Дeпyтaтoв). This stated: ‘We have decided therefore not to allow the repayment of any debts the Tsarist government contracted while it was blatantly waging war against the whole nation’ (‘Пoceмy мы peшaeм нe дoпycкaть yплaты дoлгoв пo вceм тeм зaймaм, кoтopыe цapcкoe пpaвитeльcтвo зaключилo, кoгдa явнo и oткpытo вeлo вoйнy co вceм нapoдoм’) (Пapвyc 1905). Yet, between 1918 and 2022 there have been no other debt defaults by Russia, and indications are that in 2022, Russia is actively seeking to avoid a default. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov was reported on April 11, 2022 to have said: ‘Of course, we will sue, because we have taken all necessary measures for investors to receive their debt payments. We will present our payments in court, demonstrating our efforts to pay both in hard currency and in rubles. This won’t be a simple process’ (‘Кoнeчнo, мы бyдeм cyдитьcя, пoтoмy чтo мы пpeдпpиняли вce нeoбxoдимыe дeйcтвия для тoгo, чтoбы инвecтopы пoлyчили

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

35

cвoи выплaты. Mы бyдeм пpeдъявлять в cyдe нaши плaтeжки, пoдтвepждaющиe нaши cтapaния зaплaтить кaк в вaлютe, тaк и в pyбляx. Этo бyдeт нeпpocтoй пpoцecc’ [Гpигopьeвa и Mapчeнкo 2022]). In our judgment, Siluanov is aware of the economic fallout Russia would undergo in the event of a default; we believe the lawsuit mentioned is less likely to be a diversionary tactic than a reflection of the pressure and anxiety that Russia genuinely feels with sanctions limiting its room for maneuver. Of course, for Siluanov to admit as much, however, would fly in the face of what Russian national pride dictates. Returning to the issue of the weakness of the ruble, we concur with analysis (Lawder and Shalal 2022; Reuters 2022; Aitken 2022) that the economic fundamentals are more important than apparent efforts by the Russian government to mask the ruble’s weakness. We would also point out that efforts to prop up the ruble had parallels in the Soviet Union. A tactic the Russian government is employing today is to require purchasers of oil and gas (the main source of Russia’s revenues, as we will show in Chap. 3) to pay in rubles, which would have the effect of propping up the ruble (increasing demand). (As Western governments and purchasers of Russian oil and gas have pointed out [Reuters 2022], the imposition of additional terms after the contracts were negotiated would, in effect, be a breach of contract by Russia.) The parallel here to Soviet practice is that in Soviet times, foreign exchange between rubles and hard currency (вaлютa) was, at least in theory, controlled by the Soviet government. This created an unstable dichotomy between the command economy and the free market which manifested in various ways. When I (Peter Chew) lived in the Soviet Union, one visible effect of the dichotomy was a large discrepancy between the official exchange rate—at the time, close to USD 1.00 to the ruble—and the black market rate, where USD 1.00 purchased around ten times that number of rubles. The black market rate was a closer reflection of the workings of supply and demand; the official rate was, like current measures apparently being undertaken by the Russian government, an artificial attempt by the Soviet government to bolster the value of the ruble and maintain government revenues. Another instantiation of this dichotomy was the existence of ‘hard currency stores’ (вaлютныe мaгaзины) like Beriozka. These stores sold items not generally available at regular stores in the USSR, for hard currency, and were generally overpriced even by Western standards. Typically, the items were targeted towards tourists (vodka, caviar). Clearly, the purpose of these stores was more to generate much-needed hard-currency revenue for the Soviet government than to provide a generally useful service; few ordinary Soviet citizens would darken the doors of a Beriozka and even the author does not recall ever having seen much at these stores that would have been of everyday use to himself or a Soviet citizen. Additionally, some items could be procured elsewhere for rubles if one knew where to look. Perhaps a good way to think of these stores is government-controlled tourist traps on steroids (Fig. 2.14). The reality today is likely to be no different than it was in the Soviet Union: government attempts to exert economic control have only had the perverse effect of entrenching the perception at home and abroad that the ruble is not really a ‘global currency’ (Aitken 2022) with equal standing to other currencies. And such efforts did little in the end to control the black market in Soviet times: for example, the

36

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.14 Author photo of GUM (‘State Department Store’) in Moscow, 1990 or 1991. There was overlap between the offerings of GUM and the Beriozka stores.

government could not, in practice, stop unofficial ‘taxi’ drivers from taking dollars from their passengers.

2.3.1.4

Interacting Restrictions on Information and Trade: A Vicious Cycle

Trade which is connected to the realm of information (such as broadcasting and media, including social media) was, and is, particularly tightly restricted, because it also threatens State control of information, as mentioned above. One wonders whether the logical conclusion of contemporary Russian efforts to control information could be something akin to the Great Firewall of China—an isolated Russian internet, cut off from the rest of the world. The internet was just emerging at the time the Soviet Union ceased to exist, so it is possible that the Great Firewall provides the best guide to the direction Russia is heading. However, China has greater technological dominance than Russia, so it is conceivable that Russia will not have China’s wherewithal for tight control of information. Additionally, as we have already mentioned, in the Soviet era, State control of information had many holes; perhaps VPNs and other technological workarounds will continue to allow Russians who desire to do so to break through to alternative sources of information. In connection with possible isolation of the Russian internet (RUnet—Sherman 2021), it is interesting to consider implications for cybercrime. The author Peter Chew

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

37

participates in a fraud investigation professional group and has heard frequently, perhaps anecdotally, though from authoritative sources in the US government, that former Soviet states have been over-represented as sources of cyber-crime in the postSoviet era, which also coincides largely with the era of the internet. It is likely that only a small portion of cyber-crime emanating from Russia is perpetrated specifically by Russian government actors, but we do know that the Russian government has often turned a blind eye to cybercrime perpetrated from within Russian territory against Western targets (Sherman 2021). One wonders if greater restrictions placed by the Russian government on citizens connecting to sites outside Russia could have the silver lining, from a Western perspective, of disrupting such cybercrime.

2.3.2 The Heavy Hand of Soviet Indoctrination At the same time that the Soviet government worked to prevent ideas from outside entering, it also moved to fill the information space (to use more modern Russian terminology) with its own messaging. Peter Chew recalls visiting the local bookshop on Vishnevsky Street in Kazan in 1990 or 1991 and consistently being disappointed by the narrowness and monotony of what was available—still heavy even then on political and ideological content (such as works of Marx and Engels). There was little in the way of classic Russian literature, or material of general usefulness (maps, dictionaries, etc.). By that time, there were fewer propaganda posters and slogans, like the ‘Communism is Soviet Power Plus the Electrification of the Whole Country’ Peter Chew saw in big letters on an industrial building in Moscow in 1986 (Fig. 2.15). (A Soviet political joke turned this around as follows: ‘Soviet Power is Communism Minus the Electrification of the Whole Country’.) Banners with slogans, all of which had the common theme of cheerleading for Soviet pride (‘Glory!’—‘Cлaвa!, ‘Glory to Labor’—‘Cлaвa тpyдy’, ‘Peace to the world’—‘Mиpy миp’, ‘Soviet people know that wherever the Party is, there is success and victory’—‘Coвeтcкиe люди знaют: тaм, гдe Пapтия—тaм ycпex, тaм пoбeдa’) had been hung on ordinary apartment buildings, visible to many residents. Soviet indoctrination extended to youth through the Pioneers (Пиoнepы) children’s and youth program, similar in some ways to the Scouts although with a more ideological bent. A staple of this was the Pioneer (summer) camps (пиoнepcкиe лaгepи). These camps were an example of State control over doctrine, and particularly indoctrination of youth (extending the idea of State control over information to State control over how the information should be interpreted). Participation in the Pioneers was not compulsory, although since almost all Soviet children belonged to the organization, there would have been peer pressure to participate. The ‘Young Pioneer Leader’s Handbook’ (Cпpaвoчник пиoнepcкoгo вoждя) stipulated, for example, that ‘every Pioneer would set up an atheist’s corner at home with anti-religious pictures, poems, and sayings’ (‘кaждый пиoнep ycтpaивaл дoмa aтeиcтичecкий yгoлoк c aнтиpeлигиoзными кapтинкaми, cтиxaми и

38

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.15 Author photo (Moscow, 1986): ‘[Communism] is Soviet Power Plus the Electrification of the Whole Country’

пoгoвopкaми’), clearly an attempt to supersede the Russian Orthodox practice of having a corner of the home for icons (religious imagery). This kind of control also extended to participation in State education—the only type of education allowed in the USSR. The authors know at least one former Soviet citizen (now in his sixties) who was forced to choose between remaining a Baptist and receiving a university education (Fig. 2.16); this individual ended up choosing the former and was as a result excluded from university. Such methods of State control appear to be resurgent now. The authors know another individual in one of the former Soviet republics where authoritarianism has roared back, who was subjected to a hostile interrogation by counter-intelligence officials and ended up effectively precluded from finishing a university education, all because she spoke out on social media in support of Roman Bondarenko (a protestor who was beaten to death by plainclothes police in Belarus during 2020). Soviet-style indoctrination (control of information) tolerated no dissent. This, combined with the Soviet conception of everything in the State as owned by the State, gave officials the right, in their eyes, to deprive citizens who would not toe the line of any State benefits they might choose to deny them. Clearly, there are parallels between how this played out in the USSR and what is happening today; it seems reasonable to see this, as Pipes does, as part of a longer-standing pattern and weakness in Russian (or East Slavic) culture. Much has been said in the last few years about contemporary Russian disinformation (e.g. Nimmo 2015; Brangham and Nagy 2022), and it is the natural successor of Soviet propaganda (Fig. 2.17)—and Tsarist propaganda before that. As already

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

39

Fig. 2.16 Author photo: members of the Baptist church he attended in Kazan. Perhaps Soviet restrictions had their effect in keeping younger people from religion

Fig. 2.17 Author photo: Soviet citizens peruse the publications on offer at ‘Union Press’, 1990– 1991

40

2 Soviet Union 2.0

alluded to above, propaganda may have the purpose of portraying the USSR (now Russia) in a good light—again, in the theme of ‘pride’—but as used by Russia, it frequently also has the purpose of portraying detractors, critics, and dissenters in a bad light. However, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not to be understood here in a Western sense; rather, in Soviet/Russian patrimonialism, the State controls even the moral absolutes that govern life. To put it another way, the State arrogates to itself the right to determine on an ad-hoc basis to suit the convenience of the moment—one might say, cynically and opportunistically—what is good and true, and what (or who) should be smeared; Aleksandr Dugin, a Kremlin apologist, has more or less said as much, referring to ‘our special Russian truth, that may not be your truth, but which you have to accept’ (BBC Newsnight 2016). In the Soviet era, disinformation sometimes took the form of film aimed at discrediting groups perceived as not toeing the Soviet line (for an example portraying Soviet evangelical Christians as sinister, deluded ‘obscurantists’ with a malign agenda corrosive to Soviet society, see Panfilov 2013). It is clear that such disinformation had precedents in Tsarist Russia—the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ is a well-known fabricated anti-Semitic publication (claiming that modernization in Russia was part of a Jewish plot to control the world). The ‘Protocols’ appeared in print in the Russian empire in 1903 in Znamya, a newspaper owned by Pavel Krushevan, an official in Imperial Russia. Clearly, the resurgence of disinformation in contemporary Russia (and in particular, increasing attempts to portray religious minorities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses as a threat to the State) is a continuation of this pattern: combining the assertion of control over information, people, and moral judgments to smear certain groups in service of a particular agenda (Fig. 2.18).

2.3.3 Repression A discussion of the Soviet Union would hardly be complete without considering the Gulag, already mentioned. It is largely thanks to Solzhenitsyn (Coлжeницын 1973) that knowledge of the workings of the Gulag became as widespread in the West as early as it did. Whatever his failings might have been, Solzhenitsyn clearly rendered the world a service by boldly telling the truth about the Soviet Gulag. As mentioned, Solzhenitsyn ended up in the Gulag while he was serving in the Red Army (and was by many measures a good Soviet citizen), for nothing more than criticizing Stalin in a private letter. It was only later, when he was already in the Gulag system, that he could truly have been considered to have become a dissident. It is clear that the Gulag provides another example of how Soviet practice was consistent with, rather than a deviation from, practice under the Tsars. In his poem ‘Liberty’, Pushkin (1799–1837) describes the hierarchy in Tsarist Russia; this poem was written in the wake of the Decembrist revolts of 1825, whose leaders were exiled by the Tsarist regime to labor camps in Siberia—these labor camps being the predecessor of the Gulag. The cruel conditions of the Gulag described by (Coлжeницын 1973) correspond to other accounts (Beeson 1982), but again, the pattern did not end

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

41

Fig. 2.18 Author photo: Peter Chew’s recollection is that this was an evangelical street preacher, an unusual but increasingly frequent sight to behold in the USSR, 1990–1991. Today, this would be a risky activity; Russians have been arrested in 2022 for ‘demonstrating’ after carrying blank pieces of paper in public, a sign of the Kremlin’s paranoia towards dissent

with the demise of the Soviet Union: torture in detention has also been reported by protesters in Belarus and Russia in 2021–2022 (Human Rights Watch 2020). In the case of the latter, social media has played a new role: I (Peter Chew) first heard about the torture of Sergei Melyanets (the subject of the report by Human Rights Watch 2020) in a Facebook post by Melyanets himself. Gulag detention was not just cruel, but also arbitrary and based on paranoia. Another Soviet joke goes as follows: Three gulag inmates are discussing why each is detained. The first says: ‘I was five minutes late for work, and they charged me with sabotage.’ The second says: ‘For me it was just the opposite: I was five minutes early for work, and they charged me with espionage.’ The third one says: ‘I got to work right on time, and they charged me with harming the Soviet economy by acquiring a watch in a capitalist country.’

Perhaps, as with disinformation, this just goes to show that Soviet (and more generally Russian) attempts to control not just information, but the values that determine who goes to prison and who does not, are in the end self-defeating. If rule of law is based only on what the ‘Tsar’ or his officials think should be the truth, rather than some objective and external yardstick, then there is no rule of law—and everyone becomes an enemy of the State. This was precisely the point Pushkin made in his poem of the 1800s, ‘Liberty’:

42

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Rulers, your crown and throne Are given you by Law, not Nature; You stand higher than the nation, But the eternal Law stands higher than you. Bлaдыки! вaм вeнeц и тpoн Дaeт Зaкoн — a нe пpиpoдa; Cтoитe вышe вы нapoдa, Ho вeчный вышe вac Зaкoн. Pushkin concludes: Henceforward, learn, o kings: Neither punishments, nor rewards, Nor prisons, nor altars, Are reliable fences for you. Be the first to bow your heads Under the trusty shade of the Law, And the freedom and peace of the nations Shall become an eternal guard of your throne.10 И днecь yчитecь, o цapи: Hи нaкaзaнья, ни нaгpaды, Hи кpoв тeмниц, ни aлтapи He вepныe для вac oгpaды. Cклoнитecь пepвыe глaвoй Пoд ceнь нaдeжнyю Зaкoнa, И cтaнyт вeчнoй cтpaжeй тpoнa Hapoдoв вoльнocть и пoкoй.

2.3.4 Soviet Life—Drab and Dilapidated It was not the intention of the Soviet government which preached a ‘bright future’ to create a drab environment, but that was the result of Soviet economics (Fig. 2.19). As we have alluded to, it was a chronic problem in the Soviet Union that monolithic government-owned enterprises produced items that people did not want or need, while those items that people did need were unavailable or in short supply. Oversupply of some items led to the practice of stores selling products ‘with a load’ (‘cнaгpyзкoй’) (Apгyмeнты и фaкты 2018)—which meant the purchaser had to take something he or she did not want along with the item actually desired. Because of the USSR’s economic isolation, many basic Western goods were literally unavailable. (It was for this reason that Peter Chew’s university provided a detailed checklist of 10

Author translation.

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

43

Fig. 2.19 Author photo: Leaden skies over cookie-cutter Soviet apartment blocks and snowcovered wastelands contributed to the impression of a drab existence

items to take to be well supplied during the year in Russia.) The author (P. Chew) lost count of the number of times he was asked by Russians: ‘Probably you don’t have roads like ours’ (referring to the ubiquitous potholes and riskiness of travel) (Figs. 2.20 and 2.21). McDonald’s had the flavor of the exotic when it opened in Moscow in 1990 (Fig. 2.22). We have already mentioned the government-run hard currency stores, but a foreigner with hard currency could not go to these stores to procure particular Western items he or she might be hankering for. Many of these items simply were not available in the USSR. By 1990–1991, the ‘supply chain issues’ of the Soviet Union had reached a crisis point. Basic products, such as bread and milk, were rationed via ration cards (тaлoны), which even I (Peter Chew) received. It was a joke at the time that if one saw a line forming, one automatically joined it because there had to be something good at the end of it. There are signs aplenty that some of these phenomena are returning as a result of present-day sanctions and economic isolation of Russia (Chilcote 2022). We have already mentioned that international travel for Soviet citizens was difficult partly as a result of the fundamental weakness of the Soviet economy, reflected in the value of the ruble on the free market. This (the hindrances which economic weakness caused for Russians wishing to travel), too, is beginning to resurface as an issue (Chilcote 2022). The converse was true for Western visitors to Russia who earned an income in hard currency. I (Peter Chew) recall purchasing a round-trip air ticket from Kazan to Khabarovsk in the Far East of Russia, a distance of 5,500 km, for under USD 10.00. The government attempted to control the prices paid by non-Soviet

44

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.20 ‘Probably you don’t have roads like this’. Photo of the author Peter Chew on a regional road near Kazan in winter

Fig. 2.21 Author photo: the weakness of the ruble made it possible also for Peter Chew to travel to Sakhalin in Russia’s Far East. Here, the shoreline of the Sea of Okhotsk. The roads of Sakhalin were worse, if anything, than in European Russia; there was a sense in the USSR that the further east you went, the less civilized things became

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

45

Fig. 2.22 Author photo: the dismal view in 1986 from the hotel Peter Chew stayed at in Moscow. Leaden skies, brutal architecture, and the unfinished ‘building-site’ or ‘wasteland’ look were some of P. Chew’s first impressions of Russia

citizens for travel (in addition to many other things—such as entry to a museum), by requiring foreigners to purchase tickets at separate counters, but I discovered that there was nothing in practice to stop me showing up at the counter for Russians and purchasing a ticket at the ‘Soviet’ price, provided I could ask in sufficiently good Russian. It is possible that in 2022, with better technological methods of surveillance and control, the Russian government could (perhaps taking a page out of the book of Chinese technosurveillance) close some of the loopholes that existed in Soviet times. However, an enduring impression we had from experiencing Soviet control first-hand was that attempts by any government to engineer every aspect of life through extensive bureaucracy11 are in the end a chimeric dream, akin to catching water in a sieve. In addition to necessary items being hard or impossible to obtain in the USSR, Soviet workmanship and service where it did exist was often of extremely poor quality: a well-known Soviet worker’s quip was ‘we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us’. The author vividly remembers the toilets in the Kazan Chemical and Technical Institute, which had no such niceties as privacy, toilet paper, or regular cleaning (Fig. 2.23). The most advisable course of action was to plan one’s day to maximize use of the restrooms while still at home in the apartment. The question arises: why would people accept such poor quality? Why were the Institute toilets not improved or at least kept clean? One can answer this question ultimately by reference

11

Soviet bureaucracy also had a predecessor in Tsarism, described for example in Gogol’s ‘The Nose’.

46

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.23 Toilets at the Kazan Chemical and Technical Institute looked something like this, although perhaps the plumbing was not up to the standard shown here. Photo by Joachim Thurn. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_ B_145_Bild-F088955-001 1,_Gardelegen,_russische_ Kaserne,_Toiletten.jpg. Reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA 3.0

to the ‘Tsar as owner of everything in Russia’ notion Pipes alludes to.12 The calculus of the individual who might feel motivated to better his lot as well as that of those around him might be: if I make the effort to do so, whatever I improve will just be taken away from me. In our experience, every level of life in the USSR could be impinged upon by ‘petty Tsars’—at the Kazan Chemical and Technical Institute, for example, the Department Head just around the corner from the aforementioned toilets. The author can easily follow a thought experiment in which some worker bee might have gone to the trouble of cleaning up and remodeling the toilets to Western standards, only to have the Department Head appropriating the sparkling new facilities for his or her own exclusive use as well as perhaps his or her cronies. 12

Aleksander Radishchev, a social critic, makes a polemical reference to this same idea in his most well-known work, ‘Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow’ (Paдищeв 1790, 133). Here, he challenges the ‘Tsar as owner’ idea by suggesting that it is the cultivator of the fields who should have the greatest claim to the land. For this work, Radishchev was sent into exile by Catherine the Great.

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

47

Clearly, the lack of any concept of property or individual rights is at play here, but was this a specifically Soviet shortcoming? We think not; we think Pipes was onto something with the long-standing idea of the Russian ‘ruler as subject and the land as object’ and this helps explain even behaviors on the micro-level. It helps explain why it was not just Soviet workers who ‘pretended to work’, but why workmanship in Russia in many walks of life remains of poor quality, and living standards remain low. A feature of Soviet life, at least through the difficult years of the early 1990s, was the dourness and rudeness one could expect to encounter on a regular basis from one’s fellow human beings. The author Peter Chew was not immune to the dispiriting effect this had over time. But, as Gogol (the nineteenth century Russian author) describes (Гoгoль 1843), this was actually nothing new in the Soviet Union; it had existed in Russia under the Tsars too. It was for all these reasons that the West and what it offered had such an allure for Soviet citizens. It was almost a stereotype then that Western visitors to the USSR should bring blue jeans as gifts for Soviet contacts—jeans had a similar aura then to McDonalds—something rare if not unavailable, representing a better life. This was why, as Svetlana Aleksievich described in her 1989 book ‘Zinky Boys’ (Цинкoвыe мaльчики Aлeкcиeвич, Цинкoвыe мaльчики 1989), Soviet soldiers would bring Western goods back from Afghanistan. Perhaps the motivation (opportunism amidst deprivations resulting from Soviet/Russian policy) is not that different today for Russian soldiers reportedly plundering manicure sets from a nail salon in Ukraine (Ostrovsky et al. 2022). (Ukraine, though a former Soviet republic like Russia, has still historically had a higher and more ‘Western’ standard of living.) On a darker note, regarding allegations of Russian soldiers in Ukraine today using ‘rape as a weapon of war’ (United Nations 2022), we think that it is plausible that such sexual violence results more from a similar opportunism by individuals involved, than from something actively promulgated from upper levels of command (which is not to say that higher-level Russian officers are absolved of responsibility for not ensuring the troops under them adhere to ethical standards in every respect). This view of the underlying motivations, if it is accurate, would be consistent with the details that Isaak Babel, writing a century ago, described: yet another indication that history is repeating itself in Russia, driven by underlying national traits and weaknesses that have not gone away.

2.3.5 The Ideology of Soviet Life For many, the USSR is closely associated with its ideology, and rightly so, because the very existence of the USSR was premised on Marxist-Leninist ideology, the reason, of course, the triumvirate of Marx, Engels and Lenin was seen everywhere (Fig. 2.24). This ideology in turn underpinned Soviet Socialism and Communism, the latter defined in some places as the ‘highest level of development’ of a socialist society, or the Utopian ideal which Socialism had as its goal. In our opinion, it is

48

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Fig. 2.24 The banner of Marxism-Leninism: the Marx, Engels and Lenin triumvirate. Image by JGaray, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Marx_Engels_ Lenin.svg, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA 3.0

self-defeating to overthink these nuances, since the ideology was based, in the end, on the lie and conceit that any human government can achieve Utopia—which, as we have pointed out, was actually a natural extension of the same Russian pride that has consistently impelled Russians towards their own brand of isolationism. We have communicated personally with Soviet emigrés, particularly those who, like Solzhenitsyn, repudiated socialism, and often for religious reasons. In these communications we have sometimes felt the same reluctance to agree fully that socialism was the problem to which capitalism is the solution. We should emphasize here that our reservation is not (as these individuals have sometimes assumed) that we disagree with capitalism or the free market. Rather, we think there is a danger of being led into a false dichotomy; essentially, of letting Marxism set the terms of reference for a necessary debate, causing dissenters to socialism to become like what they criticize (Fig. 2.25). One of the things that made Soviet life so tedious was the inescapable ubiquitousness of dour ideology. This is actually also something, we think, that is embedded deep in the Russian national consciousness, and is reflected in the very name of the national religion: Russian Orthodoxy. The Russian word for Orthodoxy is pravoslavie (пpaвocлaвиe), which, broken down into its units of meaning, means ‘right worship’. Even just this name gives a premise to the religion’s adherents to assume that anyone else (Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, atheists, etc.) is ‘wrong’. But the mentality is not unique to Russian Orthodox nationalists. In our observation (see the discussion in Sect. 2.4 below), this mentality bleeds into other confessions, and if it can do that, then it can also infect the thinking of Russian Marxist-Leninists. We have observed that East Slav Baptists, with whom we have spent a lot of time both during 1990–1991 and subsequently, tend to obsess over whether this or that seeming externality is a sin (for example, dancing, or going to movies). Ideology must be ‘right’, it must be ‘thought through’ (пpoдyмaнный), and it must permeate into every little detail of life.

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

49

Fig. 2.25 Author photo: a queue to view Lenin’s remains in Moscow in 1986. After a much more recent (2018) trip to the Kiev Pechera Caves, the author Peter Chew was struck by the similarity of the Orthodox practice of filing past and showing reverence to the bones of saints

We think the way to avoid this trap of the oversimplistic false dichotomy between Soviet and capitalist ideology is linked to the idea we put forward earlier: being clear about where the daylight between Solzhenitsyn and Pipes really is. And this involves being precise about the most fundamental national sins that might have led both to Marxism-Leninism and its excesses, and indeed the authoritarianism and violence now being meted out by the Kremlin. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism was itself a reaction to real problems created by Tsarist rule. The Tsarist government in all likelihood had been imprudent in amassing the debts that the 1905 Manifesto (Пapвyc 1905) decried, and Lenin’s government later abandoned. Nineteenth-century and very early twentieth-century Russian literature, such as Tolstoy’s ‘Anna Karenina’ or Chekhov’s ‘The Cherry Orchard’, paints a picture of a Russian aristocracy out of touch with the mass of the population, and mired in unsustainable debt accumulated through a profligate lifestyle. Perhaps the most praiseworthy character in ‘Anna Karenina’, Konstantin Levin, is held up in large part by Tolstoy for his commitment to working the land as a farmer—something which readers of the novel can hardly fault. But the virtue Tolstoy holds up also resonates with the way the Bolsheviks would later idealize the workers and peasants… and then a similar idea is later echoed in (Coлжeницын 1990), where three pages (pp. 116–118) are devoted to the precise methods by which Russian agriculture must be organized to rebuild the country, despite Solzhenitsyn’s stating in his conclusion (p. 137) that he ‘did not have a chance to speak about… the [Russian] economy’ (‘я нe имeл вoзмoжнocти гoвopить [o]… бoльшинcтвe вoпpocoв … экoнoмики’). (One wonders whether this is a tacit admission by Solzhenitsyn that, rather than not having the ‘opportunity’,

50

2 Soviet Union 2.0

he simply lacked the detailed economic expertise.) Today, these ideas still animate individual decision-making in the former Soviet Union. While citizens may be wary of undertaking projects (like improving the Institute toilets) that improve the common good for fear that any improvements will be promptly confiscated, in areas closer to home, with less chance of such confiscation,13 they become like Konstantin Levin, or perhaps what would seem in the West like extreme DIYers. So what are the sins at the root of Russia’s problems? To answer this, we think it is useful, again, to look critically at the common threads running through Tolstoy, Chekhov, Bolshevik ideology, and Solzhenitsyn. One of these is the peculiarly Russian conceit that if the right ideology—the ‘pravoslavie’, if one will—can just be put in place, thought through into all the details, and alternative ways of thinking suppressed through violence and all the force of the State, if need be, then the nation’s problems will be solved. Today, for example, Dmitri Trenin, a political scientist based in Moscow, thinks sanctions are just the latest opportunity for Russia to reform and build a more productive and equitable society. As he says: ‘If you’re able to do that, then Russia will emerge from this crisis materially poorer, but spiritually stronger and more coherent’ (Chilcote 2022). In this light, surely, a key strength of capitalism compared to socialism is not so much that the former offers an alternative and more successful ideology, but rather that the absence of an ideology dictated from the top allows space for individuals who have complementary strengths (in, for example, economics, specific areas of agriculture, etc.) to exercise their areas of expertise freely and without fear of the government arbitrarily expropriating fruits of success. It is also not that capitalism is a guarantee of avoidance of national sins. By maintaining clarity about the sins at the root level (for example, violent suppression of dissent, unwarranted expropriation of property, entrenched injustice), it becomes possible to see these same phenomena surfacing in the midst of capitalism too. In the West, for example, expropriation of property also goes by the simple name of ‘theft’. We think it highly unlikely that Russia will again return to a national ideology of Marxism-Leninism per se, notwithstanding the fact that so many Lenin statues are still in place around Russia (see Chap. 5). But we also believe that the underlying national yearning for an ideology has not gone away, and an ideology of Russian greatness may be a convenient place to light, assuming that ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ incorporates at least Russia and Belarus, the lands of the ‘Great Russians’ (вeликopoccы) and ‘White Russians’ (бeлopycы) respectively, as Solzhenitsyn puts it (Coлжeницын 1990, 110). This certainly is in line with the motivations we perceive in Putin for bringing Ukraine back into the fold (as we shall discuss in Chap. 3). And it also fits the historical pattern. As Chubarov (1999, 110) points out, Russian nationalism is not at all new. In a discussion of Russification under Tsar Alexander III, Chubarov states:

13

Although, as the experience of the nail salon owner in Ukraine (mentioned above on page 47) shows, private property is always at risk from unjustified confiscation in the Russian area of influence.

2.3 Parallels Between Twentieth-Century Soviet Life and Russian Realities …

51

Based on the chauvinistic idea of the superiority of all things Slavic in general and Russian in particular, the official doctrine was translated into the enforced policy of Russification, a policy that could hardly cement together a multiethnic empire like Russia… A whole battery of discriminatory legislation was devised aimed at suppressing various manifestations of non-Russian identity and un-Orthodox religious practices. Even the use of native languages – for example Polish in Polish schools – was selectively banned and the learning of Russian made compulsory in the non-Russian borderlands. Even the East Slavs, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, who were ethnically and culturally most close to Great Russians, were denied their cultural identity and were officially regarded as ‘Russians’, while their language and culture were not regarded as being separate from Russian.

Even the Soviet Bolshevik regime, when it came down to it, was motivated by a form of Russian nationalism, since, after all, the early manifestos (e.g. Пapвyc 1905) were all about how to right the previous wrongs and ‘make Russia great again’ in the world. In the end, this, we think, is more important than a specific ideology, although whatever form the ideology of Soviet Union 2.0 may take, a type of nationalist hubris will be at its heart.

2.3.6 How Likely Is a Soviet Union 2.0? By now, we believe enough examples have been adduced to show the virtual certainty of something approximating ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ taking shape, simply because the distinctive features of the twentieth-century Soviet Union, in virtually every case, can be traced back to deep-rooted historical cultural peculiarities that have not gone away. It is not that the depressingly cyclical nature of repression, violence, poverty, wars, coups and revolutions in and around Russia is completely predetermined. We do not subscribe to ‘cultural determinism’ (Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) EUCOM Speaker Session 2022). However, we do think that to escape this cycle, Russians in particular will have to do the soul-searching and repentance Solzhenitsyn and contemporary blogger Yury Sipko suggest is necessary. But first, perhaps, Russians will have to identify and agree on the real underlying sins that require this repentance. It is clear that the early 1990s provided an auspicious opportunity to do this. Ukraine and the Baltic states, in particular, visibly took the opportunity to turn aside from the idols of the Soviet past by dismantling Lenin statues, while Russia and Belarus, for whatever reason, did not do the same (see Chap. 3). (This is not to suggest, of course, that simply removing Lenin statues would have been all that was required.) We should also point to another recurring feature which is likely to persist in the model of ‘Russian patrimonialism’, in any ‘Soviet Union 2.0’, and this is its inherent instability. Violent overthrow of power was not limited to 1917; a coup against the Russian government very nearly succeeded in 1991, and as (Chiquillo 2022) suggests, it could very well be that the invasion of Ukraine represents a mistake by Putin that could result in his removal from power, not by popular uprising, but rather by those closest to Putin himself. For that reason, in 2022, in particular, there may be greater

52

2 Soviet Union 2.0

potential for disruption now than there used to be in the seeming predictability of transition of power from one Communist Party General Secretary to the next in the USSR. In conclusion to this section, while it may be helpful to think in terms of ‘Soviet Union 2.0’, and while the notion of ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ is not inconsistent with ‘Patrimonialism x.0’, we think the latter is the best, most general, way to understand the underlying issues, since it points to the real causes of Russia’s trajectory, rather than just its symptoms.

2.4 Social Media Analysis This section will be briefer and smaller-scale, but more targeted, than some of our other social media analyses in this book. Further, we focus here on analysis of Facebook content, while elsewhere in the book we will focus much more on Twitter. In this section, we analyze the 106 comments (and some replies to comments) added to Yury Sipko’s Facebook post presented in Fig. 2.4, with English translation attached. Sipko’s post represents a rare information maneuver from (we have every reason to believe) within the heart of Russia and the former Soviet Union, by a Russian, in the Russian language. The purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate on a small scale, with less computation, the sort of analysis to which we will apply computation in Chaps. 3–7, where we will scale up the volume of material analyzed. Sipko’s post is rare, in this environment, in that it completely subverts and openly challenges the much more frequent Russian information maneuvers of the 4 Ds of disinformation (Dismiss, Distort, Dismay, and Distract) (Nimmo 2015). It does this by arguing from the perspective of a Russian, just as we have in this chapter, that Russians, to extricate themselves from their plight and avoid repeating and even further aggravating the mistakes of their history, must face up to and then turn away from these mistakes, rather than denying them or deflecting blame any longer. (And to address the perspective of a Western communicator or analyst, one might add that perhaps what Sipko [and we] think would be good for Russians, would also be beneficial for everyone else.) Because the post is both rare in the Russian information environment, and highly relevant to the Pipes-Solzhenitsyn controversy about Russia’s ills and how Russia can escape them, we believe it is revealing to analyze what sort of reactions Sipko’s post provokes in this information environment. Though Sipko’s post was public, the comments will not be from any kind of representative sample of public opinion, let alone opinion of the Russian-speaking public. This is, of course, because (1) the population of Facebook users is not representative of the population as a whole; (2) the commenters on this post will likely be skewed heavily towards people sympathetic to the blogger, simply as a function of how Facebook’s algorithms cause posts to be included in individual feeds; (3) comments are not limited to users in Russia, and further, non-Russian speakers may even be able to comment thanks to Facebook’s automated translation. Still, as long as we keep all of this in mind, it is possible still to gain useful insights into the zeitgeist by assessing

2.4 Social Media Analysis

53

how users are responding to a post of such central relevance to the theme of this chapter. What might this sample of users, presumably broadly sympathetic to Sipko, be saying in response? Among those responses expressing contrary viewpoints, in particular, what are the issues raised? The chart in Fig. 2.26 shows the tempo over time of the 106 comments (the number of comments by hour, according to Moscow time). From this figure it is evident that most of the comments had been posted by the end of the same day as the post itself, and in fact within 4–5 h of the time of the post (just before 9 pm Moscow time on March 12, 2022). Generally, the pattern of the timing of the comments suggests that most are likely to come from the areas on similar time zones as Moscow (perhaps, the European part of Russia, where most Russians residents live). We read through and digested every one of the 106 comments, since the volume was not prohibitive. (It should be noted that computerized text analysis serves a definite purpose for both large and small corpora, but there is no substitute for a human reading and understanding text when possible, since a human brings many faculties of analysis to text that go beyond what a computer is ever likely to be able to do with the insights a human can bring to the problem.) However, we also ran some statistical analysis on the text, partly to test the efficacy of what we believe are neutral techniques that can provide useful insights into text. By comparing the results of this analysis with our intuitive sense of the text, we are able to judge whether in fact the statistical analysis does measure up. Our sense from reading through the comments that the vast majority were supportive of Sipko’s message, were either clearly or most likely from people among

Number of comments over time

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

15-03-2022

15-03-2022

15-03-2022

15-03-2022

15-03-2022

15-03-2022

14-03-2022

15-03-2022

14-03-2022

14-03-2022

14-03-2022

14-03-2022

14-03-2022

14-03-2022

Fig. 2.26 Comments to Sipko post over time

14-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

13-03-2022

12-03-2022

12-03-2022

12-03-2022

0

54

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Sipko’s regular following, and were from among the Soviet diaspora if not from actually within former Soviet countries. A handful of the replies were in Ukrainian. The statistical analysis bore this out. Table 2.1 shows the top 50 words used in the comments in descending order of weight. Weight here is calculated as the sum of the pointwise mutual information of the term in the corpus of 106 comments versus in a large sample of Russian text plus the sum of the pointwise mutual information of the term in particular comments. Essentially, this measure gives higher weight to terms used both distinctively within these comments, and distinctively to the comments versus Russian text overall, which tends to down-weight frequently occurring words with low information content (which in English would be words like ‘and’ and ‘the’). From this table one can see that sentiments like ‘thank you’ and ‘amen’ are among the top ones expressed. Other top-ranked words show that commenters wish Sipko well (‘we are praying for you’, ‘stay safe’). Related to this, corresponding to what we observed when reading the comments, a significant number of commenters expressed concern (‘we were worried’, ‘we missed you’, ‘disappeared’). Unless one knew the context and/or where to look, computerized analysis would not provide the important piece of background information that Sipko, though normally a frequent and fearless contributor to Facebook, had gone silent from March 3 to March 12. On or around March 4 was when the Russian government took measures to block Facebook (Twitter 2022), so the gap here was no coincidence. One commenter congratulated Sipko for having ‘broken through’. (Apparently, Sipko has been as active since the March 12 post as he was until March 3.) We speculate that Sipko, along with other Russians, has found a way to circumvent the Russian technical measures to block Facebook. Some of the top-ranked words reflect supportive commenters’ views of Sipko’s ‘boldness’, status as a ‘prophetic’ voice speaking ‘truths’. From reading through the posts, we found references to his being a ‘voice in the spiritual wilderness’, like ‘Jonah in Nineveh’, as well as to the rarity of Russians’ willingness to say such things. Doubtless, these perceptions of Sipko are likely only to heighten concerns for him, and reading between the lines, reflect what people may have been thinking when he disappeared from view for a while. Sometimes, being a prophet to a recalcitrant people can be a dangerous occupation. From our reading of the comments, although not so readily apparent in Table 2.1, we discerned that several commenters (including some commenting in Ukrainian) thanked Sipko specifically for his ‘support’. Our interpretation here is that amidst an atmosphere in which Russians speaking to their relatives in Ukraine by phone are questioning what Ukrainians are seeing with their own eyes (Hopkins 2022), where Ukrainians perhaps feel that their reality itself is being questioned, it is perceived as support when someone (particularly someone in a position of moral authority) simply calls a spade a spade. Two supportive comments nevertheless struck a slightly jarring note. One referred to Sipko as the ‘only true pastor in Russia’ (‘Eдинcтвeнный иcтинный пacтop в Poccии’), while the other started out, ‘Very correct thoughts…’ (‘Oчeнь пpaвильныe мыcли…’). (Recall our comments above about ‘pravoslavie’ and the seeming Russian obsession with ‘right ideology’.) Involuntarily, these comments provide

2.4 Social Media Analysis

55

Table 2.1 Top terms used in comments to Sipko post Russian

English

weight

# likes loves cares angry laugh wow sad posts

118.7923

Юpий

Yury

22

184

Гocпoдь

Lord

91.70857 14

28

Cпacибo

Thank you

75.02588 19

91

2

6

2

4 3

10

Бoгy

to God

73.71959 13

85

4

Aминь

Amen

70.6248

8

15

1

кaятьcя

repent

54.53797

7

11

вac

you

53.73092 22

146

2

Гocпoдy

to the Lord

52.62525

5

23

1

6

Бoгa

God

40.76061

6

20

1

3

1

13

Cлaвa

praise

39.71299 16

89

4

Киpиллoвич

Kirillovich

39.49937 17

131

4

1

мoлимcя

we are praying

38.85226

4

5

дopoгoй

dear

37.66002

7

40

6

1

Блaгocлoви

bless

37.39392

5

9

1

Xpaни

keep safe

36.37513

7

28

3

Бoг

God

34.90277 26

198

1 1

пoкaяниe

repentance

34.09704

3

3

пoкaянию

repentance

33.40389

3

67

Bы

you

32.59477 32

193

9

4

12

4

бpaт

brother

31.17081 14

75

1

10

вaм

to you

30.98812 14

25

1

3

Aмiнь

Amen

29.04514

1

2

Гocпoдa

Lord

28.66675

5

8

1

Paдa

happy

26.51408

5

5

1

пoкaятьcя

to repent

25.20211

2

2

1 1

мyжecтвo

courage

24.54533

2

11

1

yкpaинцeв

Ukrainians

23.4314

4

11

2

cнoвa

again

23.24912

5

4

1 1

1

poccиян

Russians

23.18097

8

98

пepeживaли

were worried

22.80681

2

12

1

являeтecь

you are

22.77415

2

14

2

блaгoпoлyчиe success

22.68903

2

Бoжьи

God’s

22.11366

3

7

нaми

with us

22.11043

3

17

1

6

3 3 (continued)

56

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Table 2.1 (continued) Russian

English

weight

# likes loves cares angry laugh wow sad posts

мoлилиcь

were praying

21.78641

2

22

зacлyжeннo

deservedly

21.7525

2

14

2

14

2

пoчeтнoгo

honored

21.7525

2

бeдcтвиe

trouble

21.66738

2

1

7

пpoпaли

disappeared

21.6366

2

13

1

Baшe

your

21.55852

4

21

4

cмeлым

bold

21.38785

2

14

2

coxpaнит

keep safe

21.14858

2

6

чтoб

in order to

21.06089

6

92

4

ycт

mouth

20.28108 10

33

1

cтpoю

troop

20.21386

2

1

мoлитвы

prayers

20.13051

2

5

гpexax

sins

19.98664

2

пpизыв

exhortation

19.96844

4

67

бpaтa

brother

19.56434

3

20

yдoбнee

more convenient

19.56108

2

2

xpиcтиaнe

Christians

19.56108

2

2

Блaгoдapю

I thank

19.55742

2

27

1

6

1

7

3

xpиcтиaн

Christians

19.44335

6

64

зaбывaя

forgetting

19.32035

2

14

yмa

mind

19.1378

4

18

1

пocт

(Facebook) post

18.9852

7

30

1

11

вaшиx

your

18.85448

3

yвaжeниeм

respect

18.80813

2

6

poд

family

18.7954

12

67

нocитe

you bear

18.78929

2

14

пpopoк

prophet

18.75015

2

2

yши

ears

18.70346

4

9

1

2 2

3

1

Oчeнь

very

18.63503

5

18

3

calling

18.61526

2

14

2

читaть

read

18.56383

3

75

чacтичкy

a bit

18.50942

2

14

disciple

18.50942

3

14

1

2

звaниe

yчeник

2

1

(continued)

2.4 Social Media Analysis

57

Table 2.1 (continued) Russian

English

weight

# likes loves cares angry laugh wow sad posts

paccyждaя

reasoning

18.50942

2

14

Mиpoздaния

universe

18.50942

2

14

Oбнимaю

I embrace

18.45518

2

14 12

вepнyлиcь

returned

18.38573

2

мoлчaть

silent

18.30386

2

2

Киpилoвич

Kirillovich

18.28734

4

32

2

1

ycлышaт

will hear

18.26233

2

22

3

Иcтины

truths

18.23678

2

14

2

ycтpoйcтвe

arrangement

17.93405

2

14

cплoчeннocть unity

17.93405

2

14

нacтигнeт

17.93405

2

14

will overtake

пepeживaть

worry

17.7654

2

24

кpoви

blood

17.63749

3

13 82

Baш

your

17.52232 11

вoйнe

war

17.18634

3

6

знaмeнитый

famous

17.12312

2

14

вceм

to everyone

17.00208

7

13

дoктopa

doctor

16.88527

2

14

бpaтy

brother

16.81482

2

14

глaзa

eyes

16.78284

4

21

ocтaнoвил

stopped

16.72694

2

2

oчeвиднoe

obvious

16.54776

2

14 14

1 2

1 5

1

1

1

6

eвpeйcкoгo

Jewish

16.54776

2

Пpocти

forgive

16.43911

2

5

1

бoльшoe

big

16.32109

2

7

1

нaкaзaния

punishments

16.31219

2

14

пaдeт

is falling

16.31219

2

14

нeфиг

don’t care

16.31219

2

14

Бoжe

O God

15.88559

2

21

нaдo

must

15.88382

4

7

зaдaвaть

ask

15.73683

2

14

coceдy

neighbor

15.73683

2

14

вaшeй

your

15.54484

2

10

1

2

1

6 1

2

58

2 Soviet Union 2.0

some confirmation of our suggestion above, that this obsession is a widespread Russian affliction, including among Russian religious minorities like those supportive of Baptists. It should be noted that this mindset provides fertile ground for authoritarianism of whatever type. (Again, those who cannot learn properly from the mistakes of their predecessors may be destined to repeat them…). At least one comment specifically echoed Sipko’s discussion of the Gulag and other Soviet specifics, albeit with somewhat hyperbolic all-caps:

It’s with bitterness and distaste that I hear the narrative in churches that ‘things weren’t that bad in the USSR’! For me this sounds like, ‘well, they killed Christians, they destroyed Ukraine by famine, they left their people to rot in the Gulags, they deported the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Kabardians, Cherkessians to a frigid death in Siberia… but at least they built cities, gave everyone work, cheap bread, communal facilities, places to live, they gave stability and hope for something better!’ ‘At least’!!!!! In the heads of the ‘royal priesthood’ something totally INCOMPARABLE is being weighed against Conscience and Truth !!!! A ‘change in mindset’ has not taken place in the head of the post-Soviet ‘Christian’ and we’re tasting the consequences of false repentance in full measure, and we will drink the cup of Wrath, until grief and torture open our souls to the Truth, where the words ‘Blessed are those who thirst for Truth’ are revealed to us in the other World! Whoever does not have the MIND OF CHRIST is not His!!!!

In our judgment, only a handful of comments in the end expressed strongly contrary views or doubt. None of these was really a substantive response to the post. The list of these comments is short enough to reproduce in full. The very first comment posted was one of these:

2.4 Social Media Analysis

59

Hmm... interesting position of yours, that the Russian Federation is more sinful than anyone else, and only the RF needs to repent…

This, of course, was not what Sipko said (see footnote to Fig. 2.4); nothing he said implied Russia was ‘the worst’ or that such a message of needing to face up to history might be directed ‘exclusively’ to Russia. Another comment seems to be a form of whataboutism or deflection (one of the 4 Ds of disinformation [Nimmo 2015]), and brings up an old chestnut of Russian messaging, NATO bombing of Belgrade. Of the 106 comments, this comment was among the top 12 most liked, suggesting that Russian-speaking audiences have high susceptibility to this kind of information maneuver, particularly when cloaked (as here) in a call to greater empathy for the victims of the whataboutism scenario. The replies to the comment further indicate Russian speakers’ susceptibility (a susceptibility that is not, of course, unique to Russians) to allow deflection to sidetrack them down a rabbit trail leading to a moral quagmire, if we may mix metaphors. The best response to this form of deflection, we think, is either ignoring it or simply restating that it does not change the import of the original message.

60

2 Soviet Union 2.0

OO Brothers and sisters, when there were wars in Syria, and Belgrade was bombed, and the Poles recently fired water cannon on Afghans at the border, and their nursing mothers were in the forest. Why were you silent then? Or is the reason that Ukrainians are our own people, and one is always more concerned for one’s own than for strangers? AN Those weren’t Afghans. Anyway, do you know what those ‘Afghans’ were doing on the border? OO I don’t know, and I’m asking… there were children there too, or aren’t their children people? OO Were they there out of desperation? And the other wars, there were 1001 of them, why were we silent then? Why didn’t we demonstrate in support of Syrian children? Personally, I’m ashamed of all these wars, I didn’t care because my friends and relatives weren’t involved—here I’m being honest with you AN Yes, out of desperation, because they understood they were pawns in someone else’s game… Also along the lines of classic and unadulterated whataboutism or deflection, there were two comments (from the same Facebook account, and not displayed here to avoid potential copyright issues with the images), both asking the question ‘and what about these people, don’t they need to repent?’ One shows a group of neo-Nazis in Ukraine, the other, US presidents from Clinton to Trump overseeing successive US involvement in wars (Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Donbass, and Syria) while saying ‘we care for the rights of the citizens of [Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Donbass, and Syria] and want to create a democratic state there’—and in the last three cases—‘and Russia wants to stop us’. Another response, seemingly supportive of Sipko’s post, nevertheless takes a maximalist position that risks undermining the original message. It does this by placing an overly heavy and morally unnecessary burden on Russians; someone assenting to this might give up on taking the necessary steps Sipko calls for, overwhelmed by the impossibility of participating in every demonstration:

Any Russian who hasn’t been to an anti-war demonstration is also complicit in this war and bears equal responsibility to that of Putin for the death of Ukrainians.

Another comment pushed back against Sipko’s post via the tactic of dismissal (one of the 4 Ds), stating that Sipko needn’t ‘worry too much or engage in

2.4 Social Media Analysis

61

self-justification for his people’ (neither of which we think Sipko did). The commenter went on to say that it wasn’t Sipko’s fault that God chose to use the Russian Great Power as an instrument of retribution (presumably, against Ukraine). This comment of course undermines Sipko’s point that Russians do need to take responsibility. The comment elicited one like and one angry reaction. Another mildly undermining comment was the following:

But we can count on one hand the number who will hear this worthwhile message

The comment could be accurate, but if not, it unnecessarily dismays (again, one of the 4 Ds). Just because few may be engaging in the messaging that Sipko is, it is not a foregone conclusion how much impact the messaging may have, particularly given that we know ‘lurkers’ play an important role in social media (Sun et al. 2014). Finally, one commenter undermines Sipko’s message with an angry message that contains a mixture of cynicism, evidently false claims, out-and-out sarcasm, and hard-to-decipher nonsense written in rather illiterate Russian (though we judge it is from a native Russian speaker). This comment did not on the whole go down well with the three people who reacted to it:

I repent. It was me who gave the order to shoot, attack and kill. It was the work of my hands. It’s me right now, far away in Ukraine, shooting at them. But so far no one has given any justification to attack. It’s like going up to a passer-by and telling him I’ve had a million stolen from me. I don’t know who it was, but you showed up. MR PASSER-BY, you think that wasn’t by chance?

To sum up, the overwhelming majority of comments to Sipko’s post were supportive and approving. The sample of people who saw the post in their feed and responded and reacted to it was, we think, likely to be heavily skewed towards those supportive

62

2 Soviet Union 2.0

of Sipko. Thus, the proportion of positive versus negative reactions and comments should not by any means be taken to be representative of the reactions the Russian population as a whole would have to such messaging. Additionally, given the small sample size, we caution against reading much into quantitative statistics here. Where review of this dataset is useful, however, is in the more literary-style analysis we have provided here, looking at the specific information maneuvers and what they tell us about what works and what sort of resistance messaging meets with in the Russian-speaking information environment. Key findings here are: • The susceptibility of even sympathetic Russian speakers to the deflect maneuver. • The continuing prevalence of specific deflections relating to NATO in Yugoslavia, or US involvement in international conflicts, and their stickiness, again, among otherwise sympathetic audiences. • The appreciation many Russian speakers have when someone is willing to go out on a limb and speak unpopular truths. Western communicators should at least be aware of all these aspects of online Russian-speaking discourse.

2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications We used current media discussion around the possibility of a ‘Soviet Union 2.0’ as a springboard for the content of this chapter. This led to our considering the ways in which a prominent dissident of the twentieth-century USSR, Solzhenitsyn, opened the eyes of the world generally to the deep problems of the Soviet Union, in particular its use of repression against its citizens. But were these problems something new to the USSR and qualitatively different from anything before in the region? The historian of Russia, Richard Pipes, clearly argued (contrary to Solzhenitsyn) that they were not, but rather these problems had their roots in Russian patrimonialism, of which Pipes identified four manifestations: lawless autocracy, corrupt nationalization, oligarchic state capture, and repression of dissent. Though the new Soviet Bolshevik government believed it was making a clean break with the Tsarist past, the Bolsheviks were in fact destined to repeat the mistakes of that past because they had not learned the real lessons that should have been learned. In this respect, some of the reaction to Pipes’s contention has been critical for its alleged ‘cultural determinism’ (the idea that Russia could never escape its destiny), but Solzhenitsyn provides the counterpoint to this in his idea that Russian national repentance is needed. The question then becomes: repentance from what? And this was the key area in which Pipes and Solzhenitsyn profoundly differed. In this chapter, we considered the author Peter Chew’s own eyewitness experience in the heart of the Soviet Union during the last year of its existence, a year when the country had reached a crisis. We also considered the testimony of a number of figures

2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications

63

throughout Russian history who wrote about what they experienced: classic Russian authors including Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Chekhov, as well as more modern authors like Babel and Aleksievich. Both our own experience and the review of these eyewitnesses to Russian history leads us to come down on the side of Pipes, not Solzhenitsyn, that the twentieth-century USSR was not a historical anomaly for Russia, but rather a point on a spiral trajectory that Russia has consistently followed both, before the twentieth century and subsequently: cyclical and circular, in the repeating succession of upheaval, violence, and repression; but also, like a spiral, tending in a certain direction. We think nineteenth-century Russian authors were not as critical of the Tsarist regime as twentieth-century Russian authors (like Solzhenitsyn) have been of the Soviet regime, and we think that is because Soviet repression, though not qualitatively different from Tsarist repression, was likely quantitatively worse. If our assessment of a spiral trajectory is accurate, this is not a very encouraging thought for the future. Still, the ferocity of repression in each successive cycle of the spiral may be tempered if internal forces causing the ‘empire’s’ self-defeat and disintegration (as we have argued, the dictatorial excesses of Putin and Lukashenko have frequently ended up having results opposite from those they intended) cause that empire increasingly to have feet of clay. In any case, while it may be helpful to think in terms of ‘Soviet Union 2.0’, we believe it is important to overcome recency bias, realizing that what may come next is actually in a much longer historical succession for Russia. This realization will be key to those inside and outside Russia determined to identify the root causes accurately, and thereby ultimately break the cycle. Though we think Solzhenitsyn was motivated by a mixture of recency bias and (like Putin) self-serving Russian nationalism when he argued that the Soviet Union was an anomaly in Russian history, we also think he was onto something when he spoke of the need for Russian national repentance. We provided a rare example from the world of Russian social media of a Russian thought leader (Yury Sipko) expressing in his own words what he thinks that should look like. In our opinion, Sipko provides a contemporary and precise synthesis of the ideas of Pipes (face up to the real underlying cultural issues) and Solzhenitsyn (make a clean break with those issues) which we think has the potential both to address Western concerns about the direction Russia is heading today, and to give Russia a way out of the vicious historical cycle. This synthesis also has the potential to answer the question posed by Aлeкcиeвич (2018, 35): How did Putin manage to resurrect the Stalinist machine so quickly? Once again the FSB (formerly the KGB) can burst into any home, confiscate computers, put bloggers on trial for a post supporting Ukraine; supposed spies are being hunted down and put on trial throughout the country—scholars, teachers, military personnel. People are frightened and we don’t know what is really happening in society, or what it really thinks. It’s hard to understand. And there is one question I have never found an answer to: why is it that our suffering doesn’t convert into freedom? Кaким oбpaзoм тaк быcтpo Пyтин вoccтaнoвил cтaлинcкyю мaшинy? Oпять ФCБ (бывшee КГБ) мoжeт вopвaтьcя в любoй дoм, кoнфиcкoвaть кoмпьютep, зacyдить блoгepa зa пocт в пoддepжкy Укpaины, пo вceй cтpaнe ищyт и cyдят якoбы шпиoнoв— yчeныx, yчитeлeй, вoeнныx. Люди зaпyгaны, и чтo нa caмoм дeлe пpoиcxoдит в

64

2 Soviet Union 2.0 oбщecтвe, чтo oнo дyмae—нeизвecтнo. Heпoнятнo. Ha oдин вoпpoc я тaк и нe нaшлa oтвeт: пoчeмy нaши cтpaдaния нe кoнвepтиpyютcя в cвoбoдy.

Perhaps Sipko’s message has to come from a Russian to carry weight, or perhaps not. But a review of comments on Sipko’s post is, we think also very revealing, because it tells us what obstacles such messaging runs into in the Russian-speaking information environment, even under optimal circumstances (with a sympathetic audience). For Western policymakers, our recommendations would therefore be: • Be clear on what core messaging to the Russian information environment should be. This requires moral clarity, and we think Pipes’s insights—which we believe are confirmed by our own observation—are helpful to identify what ‘sins’ need to be faced up to. Solzhenitsyn helps provide insight into how to move forward: having identified Russia’s problems, admit them and make a clean break. • Understand the nuances of the Russian information environment, in particular the susceptibility of even sympathetic Russian speakers to a key maneuver of disinformation— deflection. Maintain a laser focus in communication on countering deflection through continuous restatement of the core message. • Identify sympathetic actors within the Russian-speaking environment and find ways to support them. • Be clear that messaging in the best case does not always fall on receptive ears, but persistence is nevertheless required. One never knows how many lurkers may be influenced, and a clear message will be heard. We conclude this chapter with a final observation, which is that Sipko’s synthesis of (1) clear-sightedness about Russia’s underlying problems and (2) his call to face up to and repent of these root ills, is really orthogonal to all of the information maneuvers we usually think about, for example in Beskow and Carley (2019)’s BEND framework. Yet for all that, Sipko’s information maneuver is no less compelling. The message is disruptive and game-changing. Perhaps its revolutionary nature is why it both causes offence to vested interests, like those of the patrimonial Russian State, and also, perhaps, might not occur to many people as a possible mode of messaging. But such a message also in effect calls for a return to core moral principles that all humanity shares in. Sipko may indeed be onto something, that an honest and complete assessment by Russians of where they have gone wrong, and an honest turning-away from these past sins, are in the end what is needed for Russia to break the cycle, and avert yet another round of Soviet-style repression, damaging both to Russia and to the world.

References Aitken, Peter. 2022. Russian ruble makes almost full recovery despite western sanctions. Fox Business, March 31. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/russian-rublerecovery-western-sanctions.

References

65

Allyn, Bobby, and Alina Selyukh. 2022. Russia blocks access to Facebook. NPR, March 4. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/03/04/1084580235/russia-blocks-facebook-twitter. Barmine, Alexander. 1945. One who survived: The life story of a Russian under the Soviets. New York: Putman. BBC Newsnight. 2016. Aleksandr Dugin: ‘We have our special Russian truth’—BBC Newsnight. Youtube, October 28. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGunRK WtWBs. Beeson, Trevor. 1982. Discretion and valour: Religious conditions in Russia and eastern Europe. Fount. Beskow, David M., and Kathleen M. Carley. 2019. Social cybersecurity: An emerging national security requirement. Military Review. Accessed July 20, 2021. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ AD1108494.pdf. Bowen, Jeremy. 2022. Ukraine War: ‘Russian soldiers held us as human shields’. BBC News, April 7. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61020565. Brangham, William, and Leah Nagy. 2022. How Russia is spreading blatantly false information about the war in Ukraine. PBS Newshour, March 10. Accessed April 6, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-russia-is-spreading-blatantly-false-inform ation-about-the-war-in-ukraine. Braw, Elisabeth. 2022. Foreign companies could lose everything in Russia. Foreign Policy, March 11. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/11/russia-mcdonalds-businessseizures/. Carman, Tim. 2022. McDonald’s trademarks in Russia are under threat as Putin aims to retaliate for U.S. sanctions. Washington Post, March 18. Accessed March 21, 2022. https://www.washin gtonpost.com/food/2022/03/18/mcdonalds-russia-trademarks-uncle-vanya/. Chandler, Russell. 1991. Pentecostals find refuge: Sacramento area is home to burgeoning Soviet Christian population in U.S. Los Angeles Times, December 16. Accessed April 6, 2022. https:// www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-500-story.html. Chilcote, Ryan. 2022a. How Western sanctions are affecting the lives of Russians. PBS Newshour, March 18. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-western-sancti ons-are-affecting-the-lives-of-russians. ———. 2022b. How western sanctions are affecting the lives of Russians. PBS Newshour, March 18. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-western-sanctions-areaffecting-the-lives-of-russians. Chiquillo, Julieta. 2022. Former CIA counterintelligence chief on Putin: ‘He will not survive Ukraine’. The Dallas Morning News, March 13. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.dallas news.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/13/former-cia-counterintelligence-chief-on-putin-hewill-not-survive-ukraine/. Chubarov, Alexander. 1999. The Fragile Empire: A history of imperial Russia. New York, NY: Continuum. Cooban, Anna. 2022. Russia has defaulted on its foreign debt, says S&P. CNN, April 11. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/11/investing/russia-default-sp/index.html. Corera, Gordon. 2022. Ukraine war: Western agents seek to get inside Putin’s head. BBC News, March 20. Accessed March 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60807134. Hill, Jenny. 2022. Ukraine war: Russians fed twisted picture and one voice—That of Putin. BBC News, April 6. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61008293. Hopkins, Valerie. 2022. Ukrainians find that relatives in Russia don’t believe it’s a war. New York Times, March 6. Accessed April 14, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/world/europe/ ukraine-russia-families.html. Human Rights Watch. 2020. Belarus: Systematic beatings, torture of protesters. hrw.org, September 15. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-bea tings-torture-protesters. Kennedy, John F. 1963. Remarks of president John F. Kennedy at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin, June 26, 1963. jfklibrary.org, June 26. Accessed April 7,

66

2 Soviet Union 2.0

2022. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/berlin-wgermany-rudolph-wilde-platz-19630626. Lawder, David, and Andrea Shalal. 2022. Russia headed for recession, closed economy despite rouble rebound, U.S. says. Reuters.com, April 1. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www.reuters. com/world/russia-headed-recession-closed-economy-despite-rouble-rebound-us-says-202204-02/. Little, Allan. 2022. Ukraine war: Putin has redrawn the world—But not the way he wanted. BBC News, March 19. Accessed March 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe60767454. McDonalds. 2022. McDonald’s to temporarily close restaurants & pause operations in Russia. https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/, March 8. Accessed March 21, 2022. https://corporate.mcd onalds.com/corpmcd/en-us/our-stories/article/ourstories.Russia-update.html. Mercatus Center, George Mason University. 2022. Economists react: Putin’s war, global sanctions, and the future of US economic primacy. Mercatus.org, March 3. Accessed March 22, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/03/russia-ruble-putin-sanctions/. Na, Sun, Patrick Pei-Luen. Rau, and Liang Ma. 2014. Understanding lurkers in online communities: A literature review. Computers in Human Behavior 38: 110–117. Nimmo, Ben. 2015. Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia’s propaganda machine works, and how to counter it. Stopfake.org, May 19. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.stopfake.org/en/ana tomy-of-an-info-war-how-russia-s-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/. Ostrovsky, Simon, Morgan Till, and Volodymyr Solohub. 2022. Residents outside Kyiv process the horrors of Russian occupation. PBS Newshour, April 11. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www. pbs.org/newshour/show/residents-outside-kyiv-process-the-horrors-of-russian-occupation. Panfilov, Oleg. 2013. Coвeтcкaя пpoпaгaндa. Фильм “Пycть тopжecтвyeт жизнь, 1961”. Youtube, May 9. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDgD5PbvUuM. Pipes, Richard. 1994. Did the Russian revolution have to happen? The American Scholar 63 (2): 215– 238. Accessed March 30, 2022. https://canvas.harvard.edu/files/497670/download?download_ frd=1&verifier=aRvFoCEaiajy8UFfkk4DhcGYymrWFA012spA9Af1. ———. 2006. Why the bear growls. Wall Street Journal, March 1. Accessed April 4, 2022. https:// www.wsj.com/articles/SB114117943450386098. Regnum.ru. 2005. Bлaдимиp Пyтин: “Pacпaд CCCP - кpyпнeйшaя гeoпoлитичecкaя кaтacтpoфa вeкa”. regnum, April 25. Accessed September 21, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/444083.html. Remnick, David. 1994. The exile returns. The New Yorker, February 6. Accessed March 28, 2022. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1994/02/14/the-exile-returns. ———. 2001. Deep in the woods. The New Yorker, July 29. Accessed March 28, 2022. https:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/08/06/deep-in-the-woods. Reuters. 2022a. Analysis: Russia’s rouble rebound not quite what it seems. Reuters.com, April 8. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russias-rouble-reboundnot-quite-what-it-seems-2022-04-08/. ———. 2022b. Demand for rouble gas payments is contract breach—Germany. Reuters.com, March 23. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-russia-rouble/demandfor-rouble-gas-payments-is-contract-breach-germany-idINS8N2UJ073. Safire, William. 1985. On language; When does ‘close’ count? The New York Times Magazine, December 29. Accessed September 27, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/29/magazine/ on-language-when-does-close-count.html. Sheridan, Danielle. 2022. ‘What is this pit?’ I asked the Russians. They said: ‘This is a graveyard for you’. The Telegraph, April 6. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/worldnews/2022/04/06/pit-asked-russians-said-graveyard/. Sherlock, Thomas. 2022. How thick or thin is Russian support for Putin’s war against Ukraine? Political perspectives of Russian Elites and mass publics before the invasion. Strategic Multilayer Assessment Speaker Series, March 23. Accessed April 15, 2022. https://nsiteam.com/how-thickor-thin-is-russian-support-for-putins-war-against-ukraine/.

References

67

Sherman, Justin. 2021. Reassessing RuNet: Russian internet isolation and implications for Russian cyber behavior. Atlantic Council, July 12. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/reassessing-runetrussian-internet-isolation-and-implications-for-russian-cyber-behavior/. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. 2002. A world split apart. American Rhetoric, December 18. Accessed March 28, 2022. https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/alexandersolzhenitsynharvard. htm. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, interview by SPIEGEL. 2007. I Am Not Afraid of Death (July 23). Accessed March 28, 2022. https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-withalexander-solzhenitsyn-i-am-not-afraid-of-death-a-496211.html. Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) EUCOM Speaker Session. 2022. The surprisingly unsurprising Russo-Ukraine War: Learning and teaching the right lessons for integrated deterrence. Strategic Multilayer Assessment, April 5. Accessed April 5, 2022. https://nsiteam.com/the-surprisingly-unsurprising-russo-ukraine-war-learning-and-tea ching-the-right-lessons-for-integrated-deterrence/. Strategic Multilayer Assessment Speaker Series. 2022. Russian information operations and war in Ukraine—What can we expect and do? www.nsiteam.com, March 17. Accessed April 6, 2022. https://nsiteam.com/russian-information-operations-and-war-in-ukraine-what-can-weexpect-and-do/. Traill, Kim. 2013. Jesus of Siberia. Youtube.com. SBS Dateline, August 13. Accessed September 27, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8BOMqks-gQ. Twitter Russia blocks access to Facebook. 2022. Dan Milmo. The Guardian, March 4. Accessed April 13, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russia-completely-blocksaccess-to-facebook-and-twitter. Tyshchenko, Kateryna. 2022. Zelenskyy on RIA Novosti article: One piece of evidence for a future tribunal. Ukrainska Pravda, April 4. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/ news/2022/04/4/7337177/. United Nations. 2022. Mounting reports of crimes against women, children in Ukraine raising ‘Red Flags’ over potential protection crisis, executive director tells security council. United Nations meetings coverage and press releases, April 11. Accessed April 13, 2022. https://www.un.org/ press/en/2022/sc14857.doc.htm. Aлeкcиeвич, C.вeтлaнa. 1989. Цинкoвыe мaльчики. Mocквa: Moлoдaя гвapдия. ———. 2018. B пoиcкe cвoбoднoгo чeлoвeкa. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://doi. org/10.7591/9781501726910-002. Apгyмeнты и фaкты. 2018. Toвap в нaгpyзкy. Кaк измeнилacь пpaктикa «лишнeй» пoкyпки co вpeмeн CCCP? AIF.by, October 24. Accessed February 8, 2022. https://aif.by/timefree/his tory/tovar_v_nagruzku_kak_izmenilas_praktika_lishney_pokupki_so_vremen_sssr. Бaбeль, Иcaaк. 1927. Кoнapмия. Mocквa, Лeнингpaд: Гocyдapcтвeннoe издaтeльcтвo. Гoгoль, Hикoлaй. 1843. Шинeль. Гpигopьeвa, Иннa, и Пeтp Mapчeнкo. 2022. ««Mы бyдeм cyдитьcя»: Mиниcтp финaнcoв Aнтoн Cилyaнoв — o пoпыткax Зaпaдa oбъявить Poccии дeфoлт и вoзмoжнocти выпycкa нoвыx eвpooблигaций.» Извecтия, 11 April. Дaтa oбpaщeния: 12 April 2022 г. https://iz.ru/131 8388/inna-grigoreva-petr-marchenko/my-budem-suditsia. Пapвyc, Aлeкcaндp Львoвич. 1905. Финaнcoвый мaнифecт Coвeтa Paбoчиx Дeпyтaтoв. ru.wikisource.org, December 2. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Фин aнcoвый_мaнифecт_Coвeтa_Paбoчиx_Дeпyтaтoв. Пyтин, Bлaдимиp B. 2021. Oб иcтopичecкoм eдинcтвe pyccкиx и yкpaинцeв. Kremlin.ru, July 12. Accessed January 20, 2022. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181. Пyтин, Bлaдимиp B. 2022. Oбpaщeниe Пpeзидeнтa Poccии Bлaдимиpa Пyтинa к нaции. Пepвый кaнaл, February 21. Accessed February 28, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=vEE_vS6aeMQ. Paдищeв, Aлeкcaндp Hикoлaeвич. 1790. Пyтeшecтвиe из Пeтepбypгa в Mocквy. CaнктПeтepбypг.

68

2 Soviet Union 2.0

Cepгeйцeв, Tимoфeй. 2022. “Чтo Poccия дoлжнa cдeлaть c Укpaинoй.“ PИA Hoвocти, April 3. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://archive.ph/78PuH. Coлжeницын, Aлeкcaндp Иcaeвич. 1973. Apxипeлaг Гyлaг. Paris, France: Éditions du Seuil. Coлжeницын, Aлeкcaндp Иcaeвич, interview by Mocкoвcкиe нoвocти. 1990. “КAК HAM OБУCTPOИTЬ POCCИЮ?” Coлжeнцын, June. Accessed March 28, 2022. http://www.solzhe nitsyn.ru/proizvedeniya/publizistika/stati_i_rechi/v_izgnanii/kak_nam_obustroit_rossiyu.pdf. ———. 2006. Интepвью A. Coлжeницынa гaзeтe «Mocкoвcкиe Hoвocти» (April 4). Accessed March 28, 2022. http://noblit.ru/node/1041. TACC. 2022. Пyтин зaявил, чтo Poccия нe coбиpaeтcя изoлиpoвaтьcя и ee изoлиpoвaть нeвoзмoжнo. tass.ru, April 12. Accessed April 12, 2022. https://tass.ru/politika/14352289.

Chapter 3

The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Fig. 3.1 Russia and Ukraine on the globe. Image by Uliana245, retrieved from https://commons.wik imedia.org/wiki/File:Commonwealth_of_Independent_States_Ukraine_Locator.svg, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-4.0

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_3

69

70

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Abstract In other chapters of this book, we argue that cultural factors are significant in explaining geopolitical fault lines, not least in the former Soviet space. However, Ukraine appears anomalous in this respect. Despite being engaged in military conflict with Russia, Ukraine shares many cultural similarities with Russia— Ukrainians, like Russians, are ethnically East Slav and the cultures of both are imbued with symbols of and references to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Ukrainians have featured prominently in Russian and Soviet life: well-known authors such as Akhmatova, Babel, Bulgakov, Gogol, Ilf, Petrov had connections to Ukraine as did Soviet and Russian leaders Brezhnev, Chernenko, Khrushchev, Trotsky, Primakov and Yavlinsky. Vernadsky, a notable scientist of Ukrainian descent, has a prominent avenue in Moscow named after him. Large numbers of Russians claim some ethnic Ukrainian heritage. In short, the Russian and Ukrainian nations are inextricably intertwined. In the twenty-first century, Ukraine has become a global geopolitical flashpoint in Great Power competition between the United States and Russia. This has come into full view since the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s military involvement in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass, an important coal mining area since the late nineteenth century. At the time of writing, Ukraine is the top subject of talks between the United States, NATO, and the European Union on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Because of this, it is critical that the root causes of this conflict be properly understood in Western governments and more generally in the West. This chapter is intended to help address that need by considering and providing our answers to various questions that touch on Ukraine. Some of these are raised (explicitly or implicitly) in Western policymaking circles; others are ones we think are important, but which may be neglected or taken for granted. These include: (i) Is Ukraine a sovereign state? (ii) What is the role of oil and gas in Great Power conflict involving Russia? (iii) What is the role of historical and possible future NATO expansion in Great Power conflict involving Russia? In this chapter, we will connect these questions to the underlying cultural issues, drawing in part upon our own analysis of the information environment, and attempt to lay out recommendations for addressing root causes of conflict.

Chapter Preface On February 24, 2022, a week before the first draft of this chapter was completed, Russia launched a large-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the invasion has dominated the news cycle every day since. Six days before, when Russia was still denying it would invade, this chapter was already more or less in its current form. We had already anticipated, nevertheless, that the situation could quickly change: as we write below, ‘There was the risk, in writing in early 2022 on current conflict surrounding Ukraine, that what we wrote could have a short shelf life and be quickly overtaken by continuing events.’ It was for this reason that we chose to focus in the chapter on issues we thought would continue to be of enduring significance.

3.1 Background

71

There have been some surprises since February 24—to name a few, the speed and unity with which countries around the world have imposed sanctions on Russia, the severity of those sanctions, the strength of Ukrainian resistance to Russia, and the underwhelming performance of the Russian military. Still, we believe that by and large, the news cycle since February 24 has, we believe, only lent more weight to the importance of the issues we originally selected to focus upon. On a personal note, we can say that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made us feel acutely humbled. We have friends in the region, citizens of what are now effectively hostile countries to the United States and its interests. We have spoken by telephone with our friends since the invasion, as well as constantly remaining in contact via social media and messaging apps, and can report that many of our friends share with us a sense of powerlessness to alter the course their countries are taking, led by leaders who seem increasingly crazed. But we believe now, exactly as we did before the invasion, that speaking out truthfully and perceptively is key for all of us in overcoming the threat. ‘The pen is mightier than the sword.’ March 2, 2022 We finalized this chapter in September 2022, at a time when Ukraine was taking back significant amounts of territory from Russia. The course of the war has changed and will continue to do so, but as we finalized the chapter, we remain confident that the underlying realities that catalyze or drive the conflict are not going away any time soon. September 15, 2022

3.1 Background 3.1.1 A Widespread Russian View of Ukraine: Rooted in Language, Culture, and Religion ‘Ukraine is not a proper country.’ From the 1990s until the present day, Russians will frequently make this claim. It is one which at least two of us (Peter Chew and Matt Fort) have heard in that time span. To Western (as well as Ukrainian) ears, this statement sounds bald and jarring, seeming even cynical and calculated to provoke. And perhaps it is also a provocative place to begin this chapter. But the authors believe in the premise that intercultural communication is, by its nature, uncomfortable. Experiencing that discomfort is often a precursor to beneficial change. In passing, it is worth noting (in connection with our own background and experience) that the need for intercultural communication, the discomfort it engenders, and the benefits it can lead to, are not limited to geopolitics, the realm in which we normally think about different languages and cultures. Part of the authors’ work has

72

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

also been to advise siloed US government organizations, where people face disincentives to talk to those outside their silo (even within the government), and each silo ends up speaking its own language and having its own values. In fact, this dynamic happens everywhere where people organize into groups: between government agencies and departments, between government and industry, between industries. Another recent instance occurred in what was described as a ‘clash of cultures’ between the US aviation and communications industries over whether 5G towers should be installed near airports. The aviation industry (with a value system focused on safety) broadly opposed a change to the status quo, while the telecommunications industry (focused on innovation) argued that aviation concerns were overblown (O’Brien and Norris 2022) summarized this conflict thus: …the aviation community has been saying this [5G near airports] is a big problem. And the communication industry has said that the aviation industry is focused on worst-case scenarios that are improbable. // Well, that’s what the aviation industry does. So, there is kind of a clash of cultures here. (O’Brien and Norris 2022)

If intercultural communication can be expected to be uncomfortable even between different stakeholders within the United States or its government, surely it should be no surprise that the same is true in geopolitics. When we experience this discomfort, it is likely because we sense a challenge to our own values. But pursuing genuine understanding of another’s values does not necessitate abandoning our own. Even when fraught with tension, cross-cultural communication can, in itself, be valuable and productive. So what of the claim that ‘Ukraine is not a proper country’? Setting aside its validity for now (the authors will suggest counter-narratives in this chapter, because we do not agree with the claim), we would submit that this view and its divergence from a position commonly taken for granted in the West (that Ukraine is a sovereign country) is the most fundamental cause of conflict surrounding Ukraine, including in Great Power relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials may never state their position as baldly as ‘Ukraine is not a proper country’, but understanding that this is a common position in Russia can help the listener understand the subtext of what Russian officials do say. The idea that Ukraine might not be a ‘proper country’ is one which can be discerned, for example, in a statement Russian President Vladimir Putin made on December 4, 2014, invoking religion, history and culture to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Here, as elsewhere, Putin’s argument (which refers to ‘spiritual unity’) is based on the idea that Russia and Ukraine are culturally indistinguishable, and it is not a great leap from this to the idea that Ukraine should have no separate claim to nation-statehood. It [the annexation of Crimea] was an event of special significance for the country and the people, because Crimea is where our people live, and the peninsula is of strategic importance for Russia as the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation and a centralized Russian state. It was in Crimea, in the ancient city of Chersonesus or Korsun, as ancient Russian chroniclers called it, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized before bringing Christianity to Rus.

3.1 Background

73

In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their material culture, a common territory, even though its borders were not marked then, and a nascent common economy and government, Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of a Russian nation and Russian state. It was thanks to this spiritual unity that our forefathers for the first time and forevermore saw themselves as a united nation. All of this allows us to say that Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism. This is exactly how we will approach this matter now and for evermore. Для нaшeй cтpaны, для нaшeгo нapoдa этo coбытиe имeeт ocoбoe знaчeниe. Пoтoмy, чтo в Кpымy живyт нaши люди, и caмa тeppитopия cтpaтeгичecки вaжнa, пoтoмy чтo имeннo здecь нaxoдитcя дyxoвный иcтoк фopмиpoвaния мнoгoликoй, нo мoнoлитнoй pyccкoй нaции и цeнтpaлизoвaннoгo Poccийcкoгo гocyдapcтвa. Beдь имeннo здecь, в Кpымy, в дpeвнeм Xepcoнece, или, кaк нaзывaли eгo pyccкиe лeтoпиcцы, Кopcyни, пpинял кpeщeниe князь Bлaдимиp, a зaтeм и кpecтил вcю Pycь. Hapядy c этничecкoй близocтью, языкoм и oбщими элeмeнтaми мaтepиaльнoй кyльтypы, oбщeй, xoтя и нe oчepчeннoй тoгдa ycтoйчивыми гpaницaми тeppитopиeй, нapoждaющeйcя coвмecтнoй xoзяйcтвeннoй дeятeльнocтью и влacтью князя xpиcтиaнcтвo явилocь мoщнoй дyxoвнoй oбъeдиняющeй cилoй, кoтopaя пoзвoлилa включить в фopмиpoвaниe eдинoй pyccкoй нaции и oбpaзoвaниe oбщeй гocyдapcтвeннocти caмыe paзныe пo кpoви плeмeнa и плeмeнныe coюзы вceгo oбшиpнoгo вocтoчнocлaвянcкoгo миpa. И имeннo нa этoй дyxoвнoй пoчвe нaши пpeдки впepвыe и нaвceгдa ocoзнaли ceбя eдиным нapoдoм. И этo дaёт нaм вce ocнoвaния cкaзaть, чтo для Poccии Кpым, дpeвняя Кopcyнь, Xepcoнec, Ceвacтoпoль имeют oгpoмнoe цивилизaциoннoe и caкpaльнoe знaчeниe. Taк жe, кaк Xpaмoвaя гopa в Иepycaлимe для тex, ктo иcпoвeдyeт иcлaм или иyдaизм. Имeннo тaк мы и бyдeм к этoмy oтнocитьcя oтнынe и нaвceгдa. (Kremlin.ru 2014)

In fact, Putin has consistently made similar arguments. As recently as 2021, he wrote an essay ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ (B. Пyтин 2021) in which he starts by declaring his ‘conviction’ (мoё yбeждeниe) that ‘Russians and Ukrainians are one people – a single whole’ (pyccкиe и yкpaинцы – oдин нapoд, eдинoe цeлoe). He goes on to call Russia and Ukraine ‘the parts of what is essentially the same historic and spiritual space’ (чacтями, пo cyти, oднoгo иcтopичecкoгo и дyxoвнoгo пpocтpaнcтвa). A skeptical Westerner seeking to understand the Russian side on Ukraine’s sovereignty is recommended to read Putin’s essay in full, and it is available in English translation on the Kremlin website at http://en.kremlin.ru/eve nts/president/news/66181. (On February 28, 2022: Putin once again drew upon the same narratives in his hour-long, grievance-laden speech on February 21, 2022, three days prior to the mass invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops [B. B. Пyтин 2022]). While the essay goes into historical details which may seem arcane to the average Western reader, the key point in its first half1 is the one which we seek to underline in the chapters of this book: the cultural and religious underpinnings that guide Russian designs on Ukraine. 1

In the second half, Putin transitions into a criticism of perceived conspiracy against Russian interests by Ukraine and the West, which has a tone of defensiveness; the dominant theme here is the ‘Fortress Russia’ master narrative which paints Russia as surrounded by enemies bent on weakening and destroying it (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2018).

74

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

As Putin makes clear in the essay, even names are packed with linguistic ‘baggage’ which a Western observer is likely to miss. The name ‘Ukraine’ is related to the Russian word ‘okraina’ (oкpaинa), meaning ‘periphery’ (Fig. 3.1). Putin’s implication is that if ‘Ukraine’ was historically just the name for the periphery of Ancient Rus—and ‘Ukrainians’ a name for frontier guards who protected external borders— then Ukraine’s status should be similar today. What’s in a name? It turns out, more than one might think—even the names of countries contain cultural connotations that can be weaponized. And such linguistic so-called ‘microaggressions’ show up elsewhere, too, in present-day conflict. When the author (Peter Chew) studied Russian in Russia, he was taught that the proper way to say ‘in Ukraine’ is ‘нa [on] Укpaинe’, but Ukrainians often insist that the proper formulation is ‘в [in] Укpaинe’. For most countries, the standard approach in the Russian language is to use ‘в’, the preposition preferred by Ukrainians. So why would Ukraine be a linguistic exception? It makes sense if Ukraine is considered to be only a periphery. A periphery is something one would be ‘on’, not ‘in’. (Putin exclusively uses the ‘нa Укpaинe’ formulation in his article.) English speakers may be unaware of this, but the English formulation ‘the Ukraine’ also causes subtle tension to a Ukrainian hearer (even though Russian and Ukrainian do not use definite or indefinite articles) because it seems to reinforce the sense that Ukraine is not a country in its own right. It would not be standard English to precede the names of countries with a definite article (as in ‘the Russia’). Another recent example of where the question of Ukraine’s statehood has surfaced, is in an interview with Orthodox Patriarch Veniamin of Belarus, where it has taken on a cultural, spiritual, and even prophetic dimension (Patriarchia.ru 2022). In this interview, there is the following question and answer: Q: My lord, as we speak about unity, the historical unity of our three states of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine comes to mind. Even if Minsk and Moscow have made significant steps towards one another in the past year, Ukraine on the other hand unfortunately continues to distance itself. In your opinion, has the point of no return been reached? One very much hopes that you will say it has not. A. It has not. The point of no return is often a product of human parameters and reasoning. But here, our brethren nations have a spiritual unity, although the political reality we see is division, serious division, which is a natural source of sorrow. But at the same time, we acknowledge that since the foundation on which our states has been built is so good, we can and must reestablish the unity of our countries, our three nations. And we have the witness of the holy fathers, who said there would be a division between our three countries, but then everything would return to a state of unity. — Bлaдыкa, гoвopя o eдинcтвe, нa yм пpиxoдит иcтopичecкoe eдинcтвo тpex гocyдapcтв Бeлapycи, Poccии и Укpaины. Ecли в yxoдящeм гoдy Mинcк и Mocквa cдeлaли cepьeзныe шaги нaвcтpeчy, тo Укpaинa пpoдoлжaeт, к coжaлeнию, oтдaлятьcя. Ha Baш взгляд, пpoйдeнa ли этa тoчкa нeвoзвpaтa? Oчeнь бы xoтeлocь oт вac ycлышaть, чтo нeт. — Heт. Toчкa нeвoзвpaтa пopoй oпpeдeлятcя чeлoвeчecкими пapaмeтpaми, paccyждeниями. Здecь жe вce-тaки нaши нapoды бpaтcкиe имeют дyxoвнoe eдинcтвo, нo в paмкax пoлитичecкoй дeйcтвитeльнocти мы видим paздeлeниe, cepьeзнoe paздeлeниe, кoтopoe вызывaeт ecтecтвeннyю cкopбь, нo вмecтe c тeм мы ocoзнaeм, чтo,

3.1 Background

75

имeя тaкoй дoбpый фyндaмeнт, нa кoтopoм cтpoилиcь нaши гocyдapcтвa, мы мoжeм и дoлжны вepнyть eдинeниe нaшиx cтpaн, тpex нapoдoв. И имeютcя cвидeтeльcтвa cвятыx oтцoв, кoтopыe гoвopили o тoм, чтo бyдeт paздeлeниe мeждy нaшими тpeмя cтpaнaми, нo пoтoм вepнeтcя вce к eдинeнию.

Against the backdrop of the ‘Ukraine is not a real country’ narrative, promulgated by key political and religious leaders in the Russian-speaking world, other contentious Russian narratives come into sharper relief, for example: • The idea of the Russian ‘sphere of influence’ (disputed by the United States) • The narrative that Western entities like the US, EU, and NATO are, by supporting and arming Ukraine, attacking and undermining Russia • The idea that Russia should have an effective veto on Ukraine’s associations with NATO, the EU, and other Western entities • The related idea that NATO should guarantee it will not expand eastward • Justification for the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Whether Ukraine is a ‘proper country’ may also have implications for Ukraine’s rights to income from oil and gas transiting from Russia to Western and Central Europe (not to mention from hydrocarbons extracted from Ukrainian territory). Russia’s case in its actions vis-à-vis Ukraine rests on whether Ukraine is a ‘proper country’. And a significant portion of the Russian-speaking public starts from assumptions on this which differ fundamentally from those of Western publics. So, whether it is uncomfortable or not, the ‘Ukraine as a proper country’ information maneuver by Russia is one that we must understand and confront head-on. This chapter does not address the historical and ideological basis of Ukraine’s right to self-determination. Our belief, however, is that geographical proximity and ethnic similarity do not justify Russia’s right to impose its form of government, economic structure, and values onto a people who have arrived at different conclusions over time. The Russian narrative disregards the obvious differences between Ukrainian and Russian history while overemphasizing the similarities. Ultimately, the motivation of Russia to enfold Ukraine within its sphere of influence is based on Russian wants and needs rather than an impartial consideration of the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. In the next section, we consider factors that have been cited in the West as having the potential to exacerbate or mitigate Great Power competition, particularly relating to Ukraine and in the context of current Russian troop movements around Ukraine: (1) hydrocarbon trade between Russia and countries to its west (primarily the EU), and (2) historical and possible future NATO expansion. In some cases, as we will show and have already hinted, these can be linked back to the cultural factors outlined in this section. In all cases, it is interesting to consider counterfactuals. If NATO had not

76

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

already expanded, would tension now be reduced?2 To what extent is there currently a hydrocarbon co-dependency between Russia and the EU, and would reduction of any co-dependency increase, decrease, or not affect tensions? Why has Russia deployed more than a hundred thousand troops near the border of Ukraine, and what information maneuvers could help de-escalate?

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine Starting from 2014 and particularly in 2021–2022, Ukraine has become a focal point for a proxy conflict between Russia and the West (including the US, the EU, and NATO). Among the issues which have been cited as having an important relationship to this conflict are (1) Russian hydrocarbons and (2) NATO expansion. While these are not the sole explanatory factors in Great Power conflict, we have chosen to focus on these two as providing an important window into underlying cultural issues at the root of the conflict. There was the risk, in writing in early 2022 on current conflict surrounding Ukraine, that what we wrote could have a short shelf life and be quickly overtaken by continuing events. However, an additional reason for selecting Russian hydrocarbons and NATO expansion as areas of focus is that each of these two issues have been simmering for at least three decades—and as long as the present authors have taken an interest in Russia. Thus, even if Russian forces were either to invade Ukraine, or withdraw from Ukraine’s borders, we see it as highly unlikely that the relevance of hydrocarbons and NATO expansion—and the threat perceived by Russia in the latter—is about to lose relevance.

3.2.1 Russian Troop Buildup on the Border At the time this chapter was first drafted, a growing contingent of Russian troops, then numbering around 130,000, had massed on the borders of Ukraine, to Ukraine’s north, south, and east (Knickmeyer et al. 2022). By February 24, 2022, the number of these troops had reached an estimated 190,000 and had invaded Ukraine from all the above-mentioned points of the compass. The buildup began to be noticed internationally about the time of the border crisis between Belarus and Poland in late summer and early fall of 2021. In Chap. 4, we will suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have opportunistically taken advantage of the (manufactured) Belarus/Poland crisis to position troops around Ukraine, sensing that international attention might be distracted away from Russian 2

The events since February 24 seem to us to answer this question even more clearly in the negative. Putin has claimed for a long time that the threat to the ‘united’ east Slavic nations is from NATO, but the fact is that Orthodox East Slavs are the ones killing one another in Ukraine.

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

77

maneuvers. As former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has said, ‘[Putin] likes to operate in the dark’ (PBS 2022). However, Putin has been disappointed in this hope: even in the midst of the Belarus/Poland crisis, astute American analysts were already highly focused on the threat to Ukraine (Foreign Affairs 2021). Furthermore, the Belarus/Poland crisis had substantially dissipated by the end of 2021, and in developments which are likely inconvenient for the Kremlin, the top focus of international news coverage as well as diplomacy, for the weeks leading up to the time of this writing, has been on the Russian troop buildup. (As Panetta went straight on to say in the aforementioned interview, ‘…and now [Putin] has to operate in the open, and that makes it much more difficult for him to have his way’.) If the hope of the Putin regime has been to act unnoticed, it would make sense that Russian officials would not have been forthcoming and transparent about the motivations for positioning troops in this way (an instance, perhaps, of mens rea?). After the international reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea and involvement in Donbass in 2014, Putin must have known that positioning over a hundred thousand Russian troops around Ukraine all at once would be perceived as having few, if any, benign explanations. Russian strategists at the time may have thought that acting under cover of a distraction might sidestep their being challenged by the international community and having to justify what is hard to explain. Our interpretation of official Russian motivations (and Putin’s motivations in particular) goes back to what Putin himself has written (B. Пyтин 2021): that Russia and Ukraine are, in his eyes rightfully one whole, and any outcome that stands in the way of unification must be prevented (as a New York Times editorial trenchantly put it, ‘Putin to Ukraine: Marry Me or I’ll Kill You’ [Friedman 2022]). Any mens rea exists not in the beliefs Putin has about Russian/Ukrainian cultural unity, which we believe are genuinely held and somewhat cogently argued by Putin (ibid.), but rather in the methods by which Putin and Russia are accomplishing the reestablishment of that unity. Whether Ukraine should enjoy the rights of self-determination in its associations and security arrangements comes down to whether Ukraine, regardless of cultural similarities to Russia, is a real country. Even with global attention focused on Russian troop movements Russian officials have pointedly avoided justifying why 130,000 Russian troops were positioned on three sides of Ukraine. Official information maneuvers have resorted to deflection rather than engaging the substance of the question: for example, blaming the US for stoking the conflict (Lu 2022) or drawing false equivalencies between NATO deployments on NATO’s eastern border and the Russian deployments on the Ukraine border. (In the latter case, while the defensiveness of maneuvers might be in the eye of the beholder, there is little room to question absolute numbers: the number of Western troops deployed to NATO’s eastern border were, in early 2022, still dwarfed by the number of Russian troops on Ukraine’s border.) Starting with the 2021–2022 crisis precipitated by the Russian troop buildup, we have noticed Western countries taking a new approach with Russia in terms of information counter-maneuvers: namely, using intelligence proactively to expose ‘false flag’ operations plotted by Russia to undermine Ukraine (Wise 2022). Assuming our interpretation is accurate (that despite the deflections and protestations, there is

78

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

actually a certain mens rea underlying Russian actions), we believe this approach, sometimes referred to as ‘pre-bunking’ (Myre 2022), is a good one: it denies Russia the ability to act under cover and it reduces the scope for plausible deniability. In effect, this approach simultaneously sends a message that the West is onto Russia, and helps inform the global public about Russian modus operandi and intentions. With pre-bunking, however, care must be taken to avoid creating self-fulfilling prophecies. As long as intelligence is reliable and specific (and here, methods and sources need not be disclosed), pre-bunking counter-maneuvers, because of their specificity, in our view reduce the likelihood that what is exposed will transpire. They are more helpful than expressing general Western worries about the likelihood of a Russian invasion, and taking associated actions such as canceling flights to Ukraine, or evacuating citizens. These words and actions, as Ukrainian President Zelensky correctly (in our view) noted (BBC 2022a, b), have the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing panic, and creating precisely the conditions which Russia could use to justify an invasion. Specific intelligence that speaks to Russian intentions in what might otherwise be an information vacuum is helpful; general speculation about outcomes that are impossible to predict (or even more speculation that makes those outcomes more rather than less likely), less so. With hindsight after the February invasion, we can say more confidently that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was not in any way brought on by self-fulfilling prophecies by the West. It really was going to happen regardless, and Western efforts to shine a light on what was about to happen were calibrated well. In connection with this, it is worth noting the psychological component of military maneuvers, described in 2013 by Valery Gerasimov (Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) with the phrase ‘contactless operations to influence an enemy’. Gerasimov’s implication was that psychological operations of this type should form part of Russian strategic thinking: Frontal engagement between large groups of troops (forces), on the strategic and operational level, is gradually becoming a thing of the past. Contactless operations to influence an enemy from a distance are becoming the main means of achieving battle objectives. Defeating the enemy’s assets is accomplished over the whole depth of his territory. Distinctions are being erased between the strategic, operational and tactical levels, between offensive and defensive actions. Фpoнтaльныe cтoлкнoвeния кpyпныx гpyппиpoвoк вoйcк (cил) нa cтpaтeгичecкoм и oпepaтивнoм ypoвнe пocтeпeннo yxoдят в пpoшлoe. Диcтaнциoннoe бecкoнтaктнoe вoздeйcтвиe нa пpoтивникa cтaнoвитcя глaвным cпocoбoм дocтижeния цeлeй бoя и oпepaции. Пopaжeниe eгo oбъeктoв ocyщecтвляeтcя нa вcю глyбинy тeppитopии. Cтиpaютcя paзличия мeждy cтpaтeгичecким, oпepaтивным и тaктичecким ypoвнeм, нacтyпaтeльными и oбopoнитeльными дeйcтвиями. (Гepacимoв 2013)

With Gerasimov’s words in mind, it is not hard to see that if the objective of Russia under Putin was to reassert control over Ukraine, to bring it back into the fold (albeit against Ukraine’s will) and restore the ‘rightful’ status of Russia and Ukraine as one nation, then movements of over a hundred thousand troops to the borders of

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

79

Ukraine could have accomplished this objective in more than one way. Not all those ways would have required an actual movement of Russian troops into Ukraine. One other possible way, for example, could have been through the cascading effects of intimidation by Russia—Western countries strongly advising their citizens to leave Ukraine could have ended up being both part of the effect and part of the cause of further effects, a fact of which Russian strategists are well aware. If the end result is that Ukraine’s current leaders are replaced by pro-Russian leaders, or that the current leaders feel sufficient political pressure to capitulate to Russian demands, then, either way, Russia has achieved its objective. Furthermore, as Gerasimov suggests, ‘contactless’ operations are almost certainly preferable to a messy war. Seen in this light, Putin’s statement that he ‘does not want war in Europe’ (BBC 2022a, b) could very well be a true, but still disingenuous statement. The moral measure should be not just whether Russia inflicts war on a neighboring nation, but also whether it inflicts oppression. And this measure can and should be extended to whether Russia inflicts oppression not just on neighboring nations, but also to whether it inflicts oppression at home, for example on its own opposition figures such as Navalny. While the outcome of the standoff between Russia and the West, as well as the fate of Ukraine, is still in the balance at the time of writing, the long-standing issues of both Russian oil and gas, and NATO expansion, have been cited by one side or the other as factoring into the crisis, and/or playing a role in possible exacerbations or resolutions. So, what of these issues? We turn in the next sections to examine this in detail.

3.2.2 Russian Hydrocarbons and Their Place in Europe In 2019, the GDP of Russia was approximately $1.68 trillion. Compared to the US, EU, and China, this number is small (see Fig. 3.2). And of this, 19.2% of Russia’s GDP in 2019 was comprised of energy exports (Hикoлaeвич 2021). Furthermore, the two largest (state-owned) oil and gas companies, Gazprom and Rosneft, contributed a combined net income of over $35 billion (Gazprom 2020) (Rosneft 2020). In short, these two companies together account for almost 11% of Russia’s energy exports, and 2% of Russia’s total GDP. Within Russia, the development of the oil and gas industry occurred from the end of nineteenth century into the 20th. As the world began utilizing oil and gas for power, the Russian empire opened certain areas to private companies for production in the late 1800s (Ermolaev 2017). However, Russia would fall behind Western companies due to technological limitations and the beginning of World War I (ibid.). It was not until the 1930s that the Soviet Union began to charter explorations of Siberia for natural resources and took advantage of large oil deposits in the Volga-Urals basin (ibid.) (Kontorovich 2015). As Soviet leaders realized the presence of large oil and gas reserves, production and exploration continued, boosting the Soviet Union’s

80

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Gross domestic product per country in 2019 25

Trillions of USD

20

15

10

5

0 United States

European Union

China

Russian Federation

Fig. 3.2 GDP of the US, EU, China, and Russian Federation in 20193

GDP and creating Russia’s reliance on its natural resources (Ermolaev 2017). This basic process of discovery-then-develop has continued throughout the 1900s until today. However, this process clearly cannot continue indefinitely; Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources, Sergei Donskoy, has noted that oil production in Russia may end as soon as 2044 (Poccийcкaя гaзeтa 2016). Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller has stated that Russian gas reserves may last for over 100 years (TASS 2021a, b): longer than oil, but still not forever. The economic landscape surrounding Russian hydrocarbons is complex. I (Peter Chew) know this first-hand: I was involved with the Russian oil and gas industry as early as the mid-1990s, in my role as a junior auditor of Gazprom (then, I was told, the largest company in the world by revenues) and other companies in the Russian oil and gas industry at the Moscow office of the firm Price Waterhouse. At the time, the industry survived the vicissitudes of hyperinflation, being seen as a growth area by Western investors, and receiving considerable Western investment. Putin was not yet on the international scene. Crime and corruption were threats (indeed, Putin saw it as his mandate in leading Russia to address these threats). However, few in those heady days of newly-discovered Russian capitalism would have predicted that Western investment could ultimately be threatened not by the anarchy of the ‘wild east’ (which we shall give more details of below), but rather by Putin’s nationalistic solution to that anarchy. What has remained a constant since then, though, is the basic economics of Russian oil and gas. The locations of my audit assignments in the mid-1990s (Almyetevsk, and particularly Nizhnevartovsk, Ukhta, and Ekaterinburg) tell a story: 3

Data retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.org/.

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

81

a significant portion of Russia’s oil and gas reserves is located in the region of Western Siberia. And the principal reserves of natural gas, in particular, are in the region of the Yamal Peninsula and adjoining Kara Sea. While oil can be relatively easily transported around the world to different markets (e.g. by oil tankers), the same is not true of natural gas4 : the primary method of transporting gas is still by pipeline. The basic story is that Russia has a major natural gas field in and around the Yamal Peninsula, and Western Europe is the major market that needs this gas. While this story may change in the future if more pipelines are built south-east of the Yamal Peninsula to China (see Fig. 3.3) it is unlikely to change quickly for two reasons: European markets are still closer geographically to Yamal, and the flatter and more navigable terrain between Yamal and Europe means that pipelines to the southwest will be cheaper to lay and maintain. Whatever Russia’s overtures to China (and vice versa) may be, geography plays an important role in the economics of supply and demand. Notwithstanding all the complexities of Russian oil and gas economics, the problem boils down to a simple relationship of co-dependency: Russia needs income and Europe needs gas. The gas needs to be moved from the Yamal Peninsula to Europe, and pipelines are how this happens.

3.2.2.1

A Cultural Specific of the Russian Hydrocarbon Landscape

A key feature of the Russian economy which differentiates it culturally from the US, and which is a legacy from Soviet (and before that, Tsarist) times, is the close relationship between government and large, sprawling, bureaucratic industries. The hydrocarbon sector is no exception. Unlike the US’s oil and gas companies, both Gazprom and Rosneft are state-owned, tying the affairs of these companies to the government. But the difference goes beyond state versus private ownership, as the following example will show. Nikolai Shulginov, the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation (roughly equivalent to the Secretary of Energy in the US), sits on the board of directors for Gazprom (2022). In the US, Rex Tillerson provides an interesting point of contrast to Shulginov: in 2016, Tillerson was chosen by President Trump to be Secretary of State while Tillerson was a chief executive at Exxon (Cooks 2017). After his 4

While the economics of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) have improved in the last decade, the barriers to its cost-competitiveness are significant enough that we believe it is unlikely to be a significant game-changer in the near future in transportation of gas from production to market. Note that in response to Western sanctions for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom has signed a contract to design the ‘Soyuz Vostok’ gas pipeline across Mongolia towards China (Bloomberg 2022). Note that this contract is simply to design a supply route, not yet to start supply. As was noted by Reuters the day Western SWIFT sanctions came into effect (Zhdannikov 2022), at least in the short to medium term, analysts doubt Russia’s ability to replace the EU as a customer: ‘Russian officials have said the country can re-route its exports to China in case flows to the West are disrupted. But analysts have said gas cannot be re-routed at all’.

82

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Fig. 3.3 A public-domain map by the US Department of Energy showing the location of Russian oil and gas reserves and pipelines, retrieved from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/ 7/79/Former_USSR_Oil_and_Gas_map.svg. Note the concentration of reserves in northwestern Siberia

selection by President Trump, Tillerson stated that he would step down from the executive position at Exxon (ibid.). It says something about the differing approaches of the US and Russia to ethics and public/private independence that even the director of the US Office of Government Ethics, Walter Shaub Jr.—a frequent critic of ethical lapses in the Trump administration—could say, ‘Mr. Tillerson is making a clean break from Exxon… he’s now free of financial conflicts of interest,’ and ‘He [Tillerson] clearly recognizes that public service sometimes comes at a cost’ (The Brookings Institution 2017). In other words, even under a US administration that was ethically controversial, Tillerson took steps to ensure he was free from financial conflicts of interest. With Shulginov (and many others in positions like his in Russian industry), no such independence or separation between public and private interests exists. This state of affairs clearly creates conditions in which industry is not just beholden to the Russian government; it would also be surprising if the Russian oil and gas industry did not actively participate in furthering the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals, in addition to pursuing purely economic interests.

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

3.2.2.2

83

Russian Dependence on Hydrocarbons, and Its Pipelines and Infrastructure

Russia’s heavy dependence on revenue from hydrocarbons, and the prominence of some of the largest oil and gas companies in the Russian economy, are explained by the simple fact that Russia is home to some of the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world. Clearly, Russia is able to derive significant income from these natural resources. As of 2014, 16% of all natural gas consumed in Europe flows through gas pipelines passing through Ukraine (US Energy Information Administration 2014), and it is likely that most of that 16% originates in Russia. Ukraine charges Russian gas companies transit fees for use of the infrastructure physically located in Ukraine. Most recently, in 2019, Russia and Ukraine settled on an agreement that would see Russia pay Ukraine a fixed fee of at least $7 billion over five years in transit fees (averaging $1.4 billion per year), regardless of how much natural gas is moved through Ukraine (RFE/RL 2019). Comparatively, Belarusian transit tariffs are lower, currently at $285 million for the year 2021, and at $345 million for the two years prior (Argus Media 2021) (averaging between $173 million and $285 million per year). This is largely due to lower volume pipelined through Belarus (32.9 billion cubic meters annually [Gazprom 2022]) than through Ukraine (at least 82 billion cubic meters annually [US Energy Information Administration 2021a, b]). In other words, the annual cost to Russian gas companies of moving natural gas through Ukraine is more than 490% greater than moving it through Belarus. In addition, Poland, which is the onward transit route from Belarus (but not most supply via Ukraine), has been paid relatively small amounts, less than 21 million złotys (approximately $5.55 million) per year since 2010 until 2022 (Reuters 2017). The lower volumes of gas transiting through Belarus compared to Ukraine, as well as the fact that additional costs to Russia are incurred in Poland on any gas transiting through Belarus, may indicate that Belarus cannot completely supplant Ukraine as a transit route. (And this, in turn, may provide more of an incentive for Russia to invade and/or gain political control over Ukraine.) South Stream (see Fig. 3.4) is another route from the Yamal Peninsula to Europe which could bypass Ukraine, though it is considerably longer, so transportation costs via South Stream are likely to be greater for Russia. More recently, the completion of Nord Stream 2 (NS2) has allowed Russia another avenue to transport natural gas directly to Germany and then to the rest of Europe. Built alongside the Nord Stream pipeline, NS2 passes through the Baltic Sea from St. Petersburg to Germany (see Fig. 3.4). While it should be noted that the following is a rough estimate—exact numbers for costs of major pipeline projects are difficult to ascertain precisely—the cost per kilometer of Yamal-Europe, Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, and TurkStream, demonstrates that NS2 does not cost much more per kilometer than other projects (see Fig. 3.5). Savings for Gazprom would then be centered around the lack of transit fees; if NS2, like Nord Stream, has no transit costs for Gazprom—even if the cost per kilometer and length of the route are both marginally greater—then Gazprom

84

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Fig. 3.4 Tracing the routes oil and gas toke on their way from Russia to Europe through Nord Stream (yellow), Yamal-Europe (green), Progress (purple), Soyuz (Red), and South Stream (black)—N.B. Some labeled pipelines, such as Yamal-Europe, extend further east or west than shown on map6

has an obvious incentive (and a purely economic one which has little to do with ‘weaponization’ of one route over another) to complete NS2 (Gazprom 2022).5 Gazprom has claimed that NS2 will allow Russia to fulfill the future needs of Europe, as ‘…Europe sees a decline in domestic gas production and an increasing demand for imported gas’ (Gazprom 2022). Even assuming demand for gas in Europe were to remain constant at current levels, it could be a stretch for Russia to meet this demand while entirely eliminating any transit via Ukraine. The amount of natural gas currently moved through pipelines in Ukraine to the rest of Europe is estimated to be approximately 85 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/year) (3 trillion cubic feet per year) (US Energy Information Administration 2014); by comparison, NS2 provides capacity of only 55 bcm/year. The shortfall of 30 bcm/year could conceivably be made 5

Germany halted certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline on February 22, 2022, after Russia recognized the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’, occupied by proRussian forces for 8 years, as independent from Ukraine. Note that this was before the February 24, 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. 6 Map retrieved from https://eegas.com/maps.htm. Reproduced and color-coding added by permission granted on website.

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

85

$40

$10

$35

$9 $8

$30

$7

$25

$6

$20

$5

$15

$4 $3

$10

$2

$5

$1 $0

$0 Yamal-Europe

TurkStream

Nord Stream

Project Name Total Cost

Cost per kilometer

Nord Stream 2

Cost per kilometer of pipeline (Millions of USD)

Total Cost (Billions of USD)

Total cost per project and total cost per kilometer of pipeline

Fig. 3.5 Total cost and cost per kilometer of pipeline for Yamal-Europe, Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, and TurkStream7

up through other routes avoiding Ukraine, including TurkStream with a total capacity of 31.5 bcm/year, of which 50% supplies Europe and 50% Turkey, or, alternatively, SouthStream. Of TurkStream (which is not shown in Fig. 3.4) and SouthStream, SouthStream takes the more direct route to Europe, but, as Fig. 3.4 shows, even this route is considerably lengthier than more northerly routes including those through Ukraine. This means that alternatives currently available to bypass Ukraine while also meeting demand in Europe, are likely to cost Russia more simply because of the greater distance traveled. Furthermore, Ukraine could (at least in theory) lower transit fees, increasing the competitiveness of transit routes via Ukraine. In short, if Russian attempts to bypass Ukraine are motivated by any animus against Ukraine or a desire to destabilize the latter, those attempts are likely to come at an economic price to Russia even without any possible Western sanctions taken into consideration. This raises the question: how much is weaponizing gas supplies against Ukraine really worth to Russia, economically? There is another aspect to possible weaponization of natural gas supplies by Russia which is more incidental and opportunistic. As Sir Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to Russia and former foreign policy advisor to the UK Prime Minister noted (Lyne 2022), Russia pursues a policy of ‘divide and conquer’ in the EU with 7

Total project cost of projects retrieved from Hydrocarbons Technology (2017), Prince (2020), Nord Stream (2010, 2017). Total project length retrieved from Hydrocarbons Technology (2017), Gazprom (2022). N. B. The cost per km of pipeline is our calculation based on the figures present in the references above.

86

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Fig. 3.6 Zapolyarnoe Oil and Gas Condensate Field (Зaпoляpнoe нeфтeгaзoкoндeнcaтнoe мecтopoждeниe) on the Yamal Peninsula. Photo by the Government of the Russian Federation, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zapolyarnoye_Field_%28Novy_ Urengoy%29.jpg, reproduced under the Creative Commons CC-BY-3.0 license

different approaches to each country—‘seduce’ France (recent high-level meetings between Putin and French President Macron may be an attempt to flatter French ambitions for global leadership), ‘marginalize’ the UK (one of the most hawkish nations towards Russia in Europe), and ‘scare’ Germany—by threatening business ties, including in NS2. This function of NS2 may not have been planned in advance by Russia, but Russian leaders are happy to use the opportunity NS2 presents. In addition, it should be noted that Russia, over time, may face increasing difficulty in extracting oil and gas. Deputy Energy Minister of Russia, Pavel Sorokin, recently noted that ‘almost 100% of our production will be hard to recover over the term of ten years’ (TASS 2021a, b). That is, while Russia boasts large reserves of oil and gas, these reserves are located where the cost of extraction may match or exceed the price per barrel (see Fig. 3.6). As seen in the figure, the origin of most gas is in Siberia, one of the largest areas of Russia, but also the most sparsely populated. More specifically, most gas comes from the area around the Yamal Peninsula and undersea in the Kara Sea, part of the Arctic Ocean adjoining the Yamal Peninsula (see Fig. 3.4). Western Siberia is a land which both lacks roads and railways, and is the home of Russia’s largest rivers, permafrost, harsh winter conditions, and surprisingly hot summers (in which mosquitoes make a regular appearance). During his secondment to his firm’s Moscow office as a junior auditor of Gazprom, I (Peter Chew) spent time over the

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

87

Fig. 3.7 Author photo in 1986 of what passed for a hotel room in Moscow. The hotel in Nizhnevartovsk in 1996 was not much better

summers of 1995 and 1996 in some of these remote places including Nizhnevartovsk (in Western Siberia) and Ukhta (in north-eastern European Russia) (Fig. 3.7). The culture shock in the ‘wild east’ of Russia, after the rest of his experience with the same firm in the Thames Valley of England, remains at least as vividly in my memory as the drabness, remoteness and mosquitoes. In the hotel which had been arranged as accommodation by the firm for me during audit fieldwork, every day when I would arrive back after work, the lady at the reception would ask, ‘Bы xoтитe дeвyшкy?’ (‘Do you want a girl?’).8 During the away trip for the fieldwork in Ukhta, a Russian co-worker from Moscow office of my firm was proudly telling his colleagues (the audit team) about how he would use the trip to cheat on his wife. If one is to judge by these data points, there may be many places where ethical corners are cut in Russia’s ‘wild eastern’ land of oil and gas plenty where anything goes. 8

During this portion of my career—working for a global firm in the private sector—there was no such thing as a pre-trip counter-intelligence briefing. Only much later, during the portion of my career in US national security, did I learn how Russian intelligence operatives use ‘honey traps’ and ‘kompromat’ to gain information, leverage, and advantage. Fortunately, good ethics offer protection in all walks of life without necessarily having to receive a counter-intelligence briefing. But this episode does illustrate how, for example, Western national security interests could be compromised by an unwary oil and gas industry executive who may not have the benefit of routine counterintelligence briefings. ‘Kompromat’ or a honey trap could induce such an executive to reveal trade secrets that are key to retaining Western independence and competitive advantage in the Russian oil and gas landscape, or to conflicted interests in which the impact of sector-specific sanctions could be blunted or circumvented.

88

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Clearly, in these conditions—and even before considering the cultural and ethical dimensions—companies have had to overcome numerous obstacles to extract gas. The remoteness of the Yamal Peninsula is merely one obstacle to overcome. Still others include the difficulty of finding workers to oversee the operation of machinery in the winter when it is needed most; and building infrastructure, such as the 3.9-km (approximately 2.4-mile) bridge built over a floodplain to transport gas out of the Peninsula (Gazprom 2022). Furthermore, while Russia has made some strides in modernizing its oil and gas extraction methods along with attempts to reduce its dependence on Western technology through suppliers such as Schlumberger, Russia has by no means eliminated this dependence and therefore remains vulnerable to Western sanctions targeting the Western technology on which its oil and gas sector depends (O’Hanlon and Victor 2022). Europe may be dependent on Russia for gas, but this dependence is itself part of a larger supply chain in which Russia too has dependencies.

3.2.2.3

The Russia-EU Co-dependency

The EU receives more of its solid fuel, natural gas, and crude oil from Russia than from any other single country—between 25 and 50%, depending on the type of fuel (see Fig. 3.8). In his career auditing private-sector companies, I (Peter Chew) routinely checked for excessive dependence on any one customer or supplier (such dependence could indicate a ‘going concern’ issue), and a standard threshold used as a potential indicator of problems with financial independence was, for instance, 5% of revenues from any one customer or 5% of purchases from any one supplier. Clearly, based on this metric, the EU’s dependence on Russia for energy supplies is potentially problematic, and based on the simple economics dictated by the location of oil and gas reserves and the customers using them, this dependence is unlikely to change soon. Clearly, also, the EU’s dependence (and by extension the greater or lesser dependence of each individual EU country) on Russia means the EU is chronically vulnerable to undue geopolitical influence exerted by Russia. Indeed, this issue has surfaced recently in Germany’s apparent hesitancy to jeopardize Nord Stream 2 (Liptak 2022). German and Russian business interests are closely intertwined—as an example, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who is already chairman of the Nord Stream project, has recently been nominated to the board of directors of Gazprom (Gehrke 2022). While it seems apparent that the EU is vulnerable to being swayed by its dependence on Russian energy, it is important to note that this dependence is a two-way street. Basic laws of supply and demand dictate that suppliers need customers for revenues, and in 2015, a massive 72% of Russia’s oil and natural gas exports went to the EU (US Energy Information Administration 2015). In addition, from 2011– 2020, energy exports and associated tax revenue accounted for, on average, 43% of the Russian government’s total revenue (US Energy Information Administration 2021a, b). While the EU is dependent on energy supplies from Russia, energy supplies

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

89

EU energy imports from Russia in 2019 100 90 80

Percentage

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Crude Oil

Natural Gas

Solid Fuel

Energy type Russia

Next largest single supplier

Fig. 3.8 The percentage and origin of crude oil, natural gas, and solid fuel for the EU9

are only one component in the EU’s supply chain, but a Russian dependence in its total revenues on sales of oil and gas to the EU poses potentially a much greater existential threat to Russia. In total, the situation between the EU and Russia is complex. While Russia could effectively cut off energy to the EU, by doing so, it would lose its largest customer, leading to a potentially catastrophic loss of income. Russia could look for other customers, but as already mentioned, China is currently no closer than the EU is to Russia’s natural gas fields, and the Himalayas are a significant obstacle in the way. Conversely, the EU could look for other possible energy suppliers, such as LNG supplied from the Middle East10 or the US (indeed, the US has been exploring ways to provide the EU with energy if Russia were to stop exports [Reed 2022]). However, the economics of LNG mean that it is unlikely to be able completely to replace supplies to the EU of Russian natural gas (US Energy Information Administration 2021a, b). Along with the issue of EU dependency on oil and gas supply from Russia, some commentators have noted specifically that Russia could ‘weaponize’ gas supplies should the West impose sanctions due to a Ukrainian invasion (Wright et al. 2022). A natural consequence of this could be higher gas prices for European residents (Lukatsky 2022). And this might not be the first such instance of weaponization by Russia: in 2009, as the result of a pricing dispute between Russia and Ukraine, 9

Data for chart from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html#carous elControls?lang=e4n. 10 Roman (2022) argues that obtaining natural gas from Qatar in particular may sidestep geopolitical risks from Russia only to run into other moral hazards.

90

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Gazprom briefly stopped most gas exports through Ukraine (Kramer 2009). There may have been a similar instance in 2021, too: starting on December 21, natural gas flow in the Yamal-Europe pipeline (which transits through Belarus and Poland to Germany) was reversed (TASS 2022). According to Russia this reversal was due to a lack of purchase orders in Europe (and we are not aware of any Russian statements suggesting a political motivation); however, some reporters claimed the reversal was yet another indicator that Russia’s actions in the gas sector are politically charged (Kramer 2021). At any rate, the risk of Russian weaponization of natural gas supplies does further underline the desirability of greater EU energy independence. As we consider the specter of Russia cutting off or reducing natural gas to the EU, it is important to note that the latter would currently be unable to replace the supply from other sources. Although the EU does receive LNG shipments from the Middle East, and additional shipments of LNG are in theory obtainable from the US, the economics of LNG constrain current and additional supplies to a minimal level. The world’s largest LNG producers are already operating at maximum capacity to fulfill current demand (Disavino 2022). According to (US Energy Information Administration 2021a, b), the US would only be able to supply slightly less than 12 billion cubic feet (approximately 340 million cubic meters) per day, below European consumption levels of Russian natural gas. To summarize, the dependency between the EU and Russia with respect to natural gas goes two ways. The EU needs the natural gas from northwestern Siberia, Russia needs the revenue, and this relationship is unlikely to change any time soon. This co-dependency needs to be taken into account as a factor in Great Power conflict surrounding Ukraine.

3.2.2.4

Summary

In this section, we surveyed the major oil and gas companies in Russia, and how the Russian oil and gas industry is more closely tied to the government than in the US. We then reviewed the cultural and geographic specifics constraining Russian oil and gas production. As we saw, there is a basic economic coupling between Russia and the EU (one corollary of which is that Russia cannot afford to lose effectively its largest customer). Whatever difficulties do exist in moving oil and gas from the Yamal Peninsula, they are ones that Russia must overcome to continue to sustain its GDP. All this boils down to something quite simple: that Russia must find some means to move oil and gas to Europe. The choice for Russia, then, really comes down to the transit route. Based on cost considerations, we suggested that the economics of NS2 are favorable to Gazprom, as NS2 can reduce dependence on transit fees through Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland for a similar cost of construction. We also suggested that it would be hard for Russia to eliminate Ukraine as a transit route, largely by virtue of Ukraine’s location directly between the points of supply and demand. This could place Ukraine in a stronger position vis-à-vis Russia, but equally, it could provide additional incentive for Russia to gain control over the territory and/or politics of

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

91

Ukraine—a nation many Russians perceive not to have a right to exist independently of Russia in the first place.

3.2.3 NATO Enlargement In 1949, after the end of World War II, a group of Western European and North American countries formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Their stated purpose was ‘…deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration’ (NATO 2022a, b). Originally formed of 10 countries in Europe and two in North America, the alliance was open to more European members joining, so long as perspective members were able to ‘…further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area’ (ibid.). And, since its inception, NATO has brought in additional European member states which agreed to those goals, adding its first new members in 1952, with the newest member state joining in 2020 (ibid.). The general expansion of NATO can be seen through a map showing countries in NATO along with the date on which they joined (Fig. 3.9). From this map, one can see a general trend of Western European countries joining over the period of the Soviet Union’s existence. Then, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, multiple former Soviet countries joined, moving NATO further east—and up to Russia’s borders. Figure 3.9 does not, however, completely capture the situation in 1955. That year, West Germany joined NATO. In response, the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact, the USSR’s response to NATO. The Warsaw Pact, like NATO, incorporated an agreement to consider an invasion of one country to be an invasion of all the countries. The Soviet Union justified the need for the Warsaw Pact based on. …the situation that has arisen in Europe as a result of the ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military group in the form of the “Western European Union” with the participation of the remilitarized West Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of a new war and poses a threat to the national security of peace-loving states… …пoлoжeниe, кoтopoe coздaлocь в Eвpoпe в peзyльтaтe paтификaции пapижcкиx coглaшeний, пpeдycмaтpивaющиx oбpaзoвaниe нoвoй вoeннoй гpyппиpoвки в видe „Зaпaднoeвpoпeйcкoгo coюзa» c yчacтиeм peмилитapизyeмoй Зaпaднoй Гepмaнии и c включeниeм ee в Ceвepoaтлaнтичecкий блoк, чтo ycиливaeт oпacнocть нoвoй вoйны и coздaeт yгpoзy нaциoнaльнoй бeзoпacнocти миpoлюбивыx гocyдapcтв… (Albania et al. 1955)

Thus, it is true to say that NATO enlargement did at one point in time motivate the Soviet Union to form a counterbalancing alliance with Eastern European countries under communist control. Although the Warsaw Pact was intended to serve as a type of anti-NATO, at least some countries were, arguably, not fully members of their own volition, which stands in contrast to NATO’s professed value of each country’s

92

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Fig. 3.9 The expansion over time of NATO in Europe. NB: Map does not show the US and Canada, which both joined in 1949. Image by Kpalion, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:NATO_expansion.png, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0migrated

freedom to determine its own security arrangements and associations (NATO 2022a, b). A comparison of NATO and the Warsaw Pact need not imply a moral equivalence between the two alliances. Of course, much changed in the 1990s with the dissolution of the USSR. I (Peter Chew) spent a year living in the USSR during its final year of existence, and there is no doubt in my mind that the USSR’s collapse was precipitated by the economic deadend that the socialist command economy had reached. Factories were still producing items that no one wanted, and the basic staples that consumers did need were unavailable or were rationed (I myself was one of the recipients of Soviet ration cards). This led, for example, to the absurd practice of stores selling items people did want ‘c нaгpyзкoй’ (‘with a load’—the purchaser also had to take something he or she did not want along with the item purchased) (Apгyмeнты и фaкты 2018). Indeed, the ‘supply chain problems’ and inflation of the pandemic era in the West may give some idea, on a small scale, of what Soviet citizens lived through in the 1990s. Economic collapse, in turn, had led ordinary Soviet citizens completely to cease to believe in the socialist project and look elsewhere for an object worthy of trust,

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

93

as we will discuss in Chap. 6. (The widely discussed loss of trust in government in Western democracies over the last few years is also, to some degree, reminiscent of this period of Soviet history.) In other words, the USSR’s collapse was clearly not due to a military defeat at the hands of NATO, nor would it even be reasonable to attribute the collapse to any expansion of NATO (after all, NATO hardly expanded in the latter years of the USSR: only one country joined NATO between 1955 and the end of the USSR’s existence, and that country, in 1982, was Spain, a country not even close geographically to the countries of the Warsaw Pact). However, as we have pointed out (ibid.), there are grounds to argue that Western agency deliberately hastened the USSR’s economic collapse, through Reagan’s buildup of US armed forces (Leffler 2018). Russia’s economy has been described as a ‘military economy’ (Cooper 2013), meaning that, since Russia’s overall economy is small, a disproportionate share of spending is required to maintain the military—thus, Reagan pushing the USSR into an arms race could have created a situation which was unsustainable for the Soviet economy overall. However, we are not aware that NATO was widely blamed even by citizens of the USSR at the time for the latter’s demise. Once the USSR did cease to exist, it would make sense, if indeed we are right that the Warsaw Pact were more a product of coercion than free association, that the Warsaw Pact’s member states would have gone their own ways, with some even choosing to join NATO. It also seems clear that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (and particularly immediately thereafter), NATO enlargement was not always perceived by Russia as a threat. In 2000, in an interview with then acting president Vladimir Putin, Putin responded to the question of whether Russia could join NATO, saying, ‘I don’t see why not. I would not rule out such a possibility…’, though what Putin went on to say perhaps foreshadowed the rhetoric heard more recently: ‘– but I repeat – if and when Russia’s views are taken into account as those of an equal partner’ (Putin 2000). The rhetoric from Russian officials which was more accepting of NATO would not last long into the twenty-first century. In 2004, after the largest addition of NATO members, which included Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the Russian State Duma released a statement asking NATO ‘genuinely [to] take into account [Russia’s] concern over the alliance’s expansion’ and to take ‘specific steps to strengthen international security and arms control in Europe’ (RFE/RL 2004). As time progressed, NATO continued by adding four more members between 2005 and 2020. Following this, again, in 2021, Putin stated that ‘NATO should not expand to the east anymore’ (C-SPAN 2021). So much for the official rhetoric. Western observers should not, however, be lulled into thinking that the opinion on the street in Russia and its allied countries is any more favorable towards NATO. I (Peter Chew) recall a conversation in 2019 with a friend from western Belarus, who I know shares many of my values. I happened to mention the word ‘NATO’ to this friend and was surprised by the immediate response: ‘that’s our enemy!’ I did not press the topic further because it was apparent this assumption of NATO as a villain was deeply culturally ingrained and would be impossible to overcome quickly. I also recall another occasion in the late 2010s, when a pastor in Belarus sized me up and mused, seemingly to himself and perhaps not realizing I understood everything he was saying: ‘there’s no enmity in his eyes!’

94

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

(нeт злoбы в eгo глaзax), as if the pastor expected anyone from a NATO country, even someone from his own denomination, to be visibly hostile. NATO (and Western communicators) would be well-advised to understand what they are up against in this respect.11 With all this in mind, and while to some extent what has happened is now water under the bridge, we think it is instructive to entertain open-mindedly the counterfactual of whether relations between Russia and the West would have been better if NATO had not expanded since the 1990s. Indeed, post-Soviet NATO expansion was not a foregone conclusion. Notwithstanding the willingness of former Warsaw Pact members such as Poland and the Baltic countries to join NATO, there were Western voices advocating against NATO expansion. These included even normally hawkish ones such as CIA and National Security Council advisor Richard Pipes (whom we mentioned in Chap. 2, and who was known for rejecting some Soviet and Russian narratives that were accepted or at least not questioned in many Western mainstream circles [Pipes 1996]). For example, in an open letter to President Bill Clinton advising against NATO expansion in 1997, a group of signatories including Pipes wrote that NATO expansion could jeopardize ‘allied security and unsettle European stability’ (Arms Control Association 1997). The signatories to the letter argued that NATO expansion would further ‘strengthen the nondemocratic opposition, undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with the West, bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma to the START II and III treaties; … draw a new line of division between the “ins” and the “outs,” foster instability, and ultimately diminish the sense of security of those countries which are not included’ (ibid.). The 1997 letter concludes: Russia does not now pose a threat to its western neighbors and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are not in danger. For this reason, and the others cited above, we believe that NATO expansion is neither necessary nor desirable and that this ill-conceived policy can and should be put on hold. (ibid.)

A quarter of a century on, of course, Russia clearly does now pose a threat to its western neighbors; but is that because the warning of the authors of the 1997 letter was not heeded, or was the lack of a threat in 1997 just because Russia was weak at that point and would the threat have materialized anyway? While NATO expansion cannot be undone, at least pondering this question may help NATO now formulate an approach which simultaneously avoids provocation while not making unacceptable concessions on principle. It should not be missed, too, that Putin’s actions—in similar fashion to Lukashenko’s, as we note in Chap. 4—have actually brought about opposite results

11

This is not, however, to say that the difficulties in persuasion are insurmountable. I also recall another earlier instance where I shared NATO’s response to Russian talking points (NATO 2022a, b) to a recipient in Belarus, and where the recipient responded by indicating, effectively, that it was becoming clearer to him where he and his compatriots had been misled by their own authorities.

3.2 Issues Surrounding Ukraine

95

from the ones Putin clearly hoped for,12 which again points to misguided opportunism (‘adhocracy’) on Putin’s part. As noted by Lyne (2022), for all the demonization of NATO in official Russian rhetoric, Putin’s buildup of Russian forces on the border of Ukraine has directly led to NATO’s reinforcement of its eastern flanks, and renewed and strengthened NATO unity and resolve in dealing with Russia. Lyne points out that Ukraine has been a singular failure for Putin, starting perhaps with his misjudgment of the 2004 Ukraine ‘Orange Revolution’ (ibid.). Because of Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian opinion has united against Russia and Putin. Lyne further goes on to make the bold prediction—one of which he states he is ‘certain’—that a generation from now Russian historians will be ‘marking Putin down as the man who lost Ukraine’. We agree with Lyne (and it is consistent with many statements that have come from the Kremlin and its entourage, e.g. (Дyгин n.d.)) that Putin has staked a huge amount on rebuilding Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’,13 likely nowhere more than in Ukraine, so a failure in this area would threaten Putin personally. We also agree with Lyne that NATO and its expansion is, in an important sense, not the real issue—rather, the real issue for Putin is that ‘sphere of influence’. There is a high level of intermarriage between Russians and Ukrainians, and most Russians would recoil at the idea of killing or fighting with Ukrainians—a ‘brotherly Slavic nation’—in a war (and, since February 24, 2022, have risked arrest by protesting increasingly vocally in dozens of Russian cities against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine). Russians do have their breaking-point, but the tragedy, perhaps, is that their excessive tolerance of malfeasance means that protest usually comes much later than it should—explaining why Russia repeats the pattern of tyranny and violent overthrow. At any rate, to advance the project of rebuilding the ‘sphere of influence’ in the face of domestic dissatisfaction, the Kremlin has perceived the need to portray its conflict with Ukraine as a ‘war against NATO’, rebuffing Western plots to dismember Russia. While NATO expansion is not irrelevant, in considering it, we should be careful not to play into the Kremlin’s false narratives, which are designed to deflect from its own failures. Since NATO’s inception in 1949, its communication has focused on the belief, and core value, perhaps, that each nation has freedom of self-determination for its associations and security arrangements. NATO’s position, that no country in Europe is off-limits for inclusion in NATO, naturally follows from this. A NATO website (NATO 2022a, b), which specifically lists and responds to popular narratives about NATO often encountered in the Russian-speaking world, says in response to Russian desires for assurances about Ukraine and Georgia not joining: ‘Every sovereign nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements’. On the same website 12

This has been highlighted yet further since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In light of this invasion, Finland and Sweden have petitioned for NATO membership, ignoring Russia’s warnings about doing so. 13 Interestingly, in his December 23, 2021 news conference (Пpeзидeнт Poccии 2021), Putin referred to the Soviet Union having divided itself into ‘12’ (not ‘15’, corresponding to the number of Soviet republics)—a tacit admission, perhaps, that the three Baltic republics are for now irrecoverably beyond the Russian ‘sphere of influence’.

96

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

NATO emphasizes (in response to ongoing Russian concerns about NATO enlargement allegedly threatening Russia) the defensive nature of the NATO alliance: ‘NATO is a defensive alliance. Our purpose is to protect our member states.’ In this and other instances, NATO’s assumption is perhaps that the defensive nature of the NATO treaty renders any Russian insistence that NATO stop expanding eastward unnecessary. Of these information counter-maneuvers by NATO, we think that the values-based maneuver—the one based on the idea of self-determination—is most likely to gain traction among Russian speakers, although it will still be up against an obstacle amongst those who believe that Ukraine is not a real country. We base this belief on having ourselves heard the ‘self-determination’ argument expressed by former Soviet citizens (e.g. in Belarus) in their own words. The ‘defensive alliance’ argument may gain less traction simply because, to some extent, a ‘defensive’ alliance is in the eye of the beholder. To someone who believes, as the author’s Belarusian friend did, that NATO is the ‘enemy’ and villain, NATO’s self-expressed need for defense may carry little weight. The same argument, after all, is employed by Russia when it claims that it must defend itself against NATO (among other powers encircling it) expanding and closing in on its western borders (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2018). In summary, a fundamental, but we believe not irreconcilable, conflict exists between Russia and NATO when it comes to NATO expansion, which at its root boils down to nations’ freedom of association and freedom for self-determination. Any association of a new potential NATO member with NATO is, of course, a matter of mutual and free consent between NATO and that country. This idea is not inconsistent with the ideas expressed by the signatories to the 1997 letter to Clinton (in which they simply argued it was not in Western interests to admit new member states), and it is one that we have seen can, in principle, be accepted by Russian speakers and citizens of former Soviet republics. To persuade a Russian audience of the self-determination argument, however, an even more fundamental obstacle must be overcome, and this goes back to what we discussed in the first section: whether Ukraine is a real country which should have the right to determine its own alliances. And this is bound up with the kinds of cultural arguments that Putin himself made in his article (B. Пyтин 2021). And to have a chance of winning the argument that Ukraine should be considered a country in its own right, and therefore have the right to go its own way, Westerners will need to get to grips with those cultural details which might otherwise seem arcane.

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? In previous sections, we highlighted, among other things, how Ukraine is seen in Russian eyes, and how NATO is seen in Russian eyes. We suggested that Ukraine is widely seen rightfully as part of Russia—a borderland that one is ‘on’, not ‘in’—and NATO is seen as villainous. This characterization is of course an over-simplification of Russian opinion, but it may still be useful. What seems obvious to so many Russian

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues?

97

speakers is something that would seem so unlikely to many Westerners that we would be surprised Russians would even think the way they do (as even the author P. Chew was surprised when talking to a friend in Belarus). In this section we test our hypothesis by collecting 90,000 Twitter posts in three tranches: • 36,000 retrieved using Russian words for ‘Ukraine’ (‘Укpaинa’ and ‘Укpaинe’); • 36,000 retrieved using similar Ukrainian words for ‘Ukraine’ (‘Укpaїнa’ and ‘Укpaїнi’); and • 18,000 retrieved using what is both the Russian and Ukrainian for ‘NATO’ (‘HATO’). All these Twitter posts were collected prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. We ran separate signal processing using Singular Value Decomposition on each of these three tranches to determine what the key groupings of Twitter posts were on each topic. This allows an open-ended exploration of the data, without conditioning the analysis with any preconceptions, in order to determine the main associations and narratives associated with Ukraine and NATO, by language. One benefit of this type of open-ended analysis is that we can allow ourselves to be surprised—we can let the data itself tell us about anything that might challenge or overturn our assumptions (for example, if Russian speakers are unexpectedly positive about NATO, or if they question predominant Kremlin narratives about the unity of Russia and Ukraine). And unlike in typical approaches to sentiment analysis, where algorithms have built into them some preconceived idea of what connotes positive versus negative sentiment, we retain control over this kind of assessment—but still with the benefits of technology acting as a force multiplier. Retaining this control comes in particularly useful, for example, in instances where attitudes like cynicism or sarcasm tend to pose a particular challenge to classic sentiment analysis. Another benefit of using signal processing here for open-ended analysis, from a Western perspective, is that we can in effect let Russian speakers tell us in their own words what they think is positive about NATO. To put it another way, we can let Russian speakers tell us which narratives about NATO are both consonant with what NATO would like to be known about itself in the Russian-speaking world, and likely to gain further traction. (If some Russian speakers are already saying these things and using these information maneuvers, it is likely to mean more will listen to the same message.) As we mentioned in Sect. 3.1, our experience tells us it is more common in Russia to hear ‘нa Укpaинe’ (‘on’ Ukraine) than ‘в Укpaинe’ (‘in’ Ukraine). Since ascertaining whether this is borne out in the data is straightforward, we first obtained a count of tweets from among the 18,000 unique tweets collected using the search term ‘Укpaинe’ that also contain either of the phrases ‘нa Укpaинe’ or ‘в Укpaинe’. It turns out the numbers are 4,267 and 4,526 respectively, apparently contrary to expectations. The comparable numbers for tweets collected using the Ukrainian search term ‘Укpaїнi’ are 60 and 7,760. The text of one of the 60 Ukrainian tweets, in fact, asks the question ‘Mи нa Укpaїнi чи в Укpaїнi?’ (‘are we on Ukraine or in Ukraine?’) (Table 3.1).

98

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Table 3.1 ‘In’ versus ‘on’ Ukraine, in Russian and Ukrainian нa

в

Укpaинe

4,267

4,526

Укpaїнi

60

7,760

We found the larger than expected proportion of instances of ‘в Укpaинe’ in Russian interesting. Among Russian speakers in Belarus, our intuition is that we have heard ‘в Укpaинe’ with greater frequency (possibly reflecting some solidarity with Ukraine?). There are also large numbers of Russian speakers in Ukraine who, as citizens of Ukraine, might prefer the ‘in Ukraine’ formulation. It would not be surprising if the sample of Twitter posts on the subject of Ukraine skews more towards residents of Ukraine than residents of Russia (people are generally most interested in their own closest neighborhood). This is speculation, but it may explain the counterintuitively large proportion of Russian tweets where ‘в Укpaинe’ is observed rather than ‘нa Укpaинe’.

3.3.1 Discussion of Ukraine in Russian-Speaking Twitter We analyzed the top patterns found in the 36,000 Russian-language tweets mentioning either ‘Укpaинa’ or ‘Укpaинe’. The top pattern by far (by retweets or similar content) was the following: Ukraine as leader of the Free World has already won a moral victory over Putin’s judo-regime [referring to Putin’s skill in judo]. In contrast to old Europe, Ukraine is ready to pay a higher price for its freedom than the dictator is to defeat Ukraine. Ukraine has saved the world from a monster. The diminished godfather is no longer a godfather. Glory to Ukraine! Укpaинa кaк лидep Cвoбoднoгo миpa yжe oдepжaлa мopaльнyю пoбeдy нaд пyтинcкoй Дзюдoxepиeй. B oтличиe oт cтapoй Eвpoпы Укpaинa гoтoвa плaтить зa cвoю cвoбoдy бoльшyю цeнy, чeм диктaтop зa ee пoкopeниe. Oнa cпacлa миp oт ypoдa. Oпyщeнный пaxaн yжe нe пaxaн. Cлaвa Укpaинe!

Clearly, while written in Russian, this post expresses strongly pro-Ukrainian and anti-Putin sentiment (if nothing else, indicated by its last sentence). Beyond that, it expresses something we have heard our Belarusian friends frown upon: ‘glory to Ukraine’ expresses a kind of nationalist Ukrainian hubris, and the post asserts a moral superiority of Ukraine over not just Putin, but also over ‘old Europe’ (meaning Western Europe) and indeed the whole world (‘Ukraine as leader of the free world’). While one might agree in rejecting moral equivalence between Putin and Ukraine’s leaders, we disagree (so far) that the world has already been ‘saved from a monster’, and even less, by Ukraine. All this aside, the post (like others in Table 3.2) appears to be written by someone for whom speaking Russian comes easily. Its existence and the high level of sharing of its content demonstrates that anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian sentiment, whatever its source

DNR leader Pushilin says Donetsk won’t be won back by Ukraine, laid with mines, Pushilin waiting for Moscow’s command Israel forbidding third parties to pass on its defensive systems to Ukraine, Ukraine showing its thanks by passing a law on anti-Semitism

Глaвa ДHP Д. Пyшилин: Дoнeцк пoлнocтью зaминиpoвaн. Ждём кoмaндy из Mocквы. Гopoд нe дocтaнeтcя Укpaинe пpи любoм pacклaдe. https://t.co/CYBjtWOUfu

Haд Укpaинoй виcит oпacнocть мaccиpoвaнныx aтaк c вoздyxa. Изpaиль кaтeгopичecки зaпpeщaeт тpeтьим cтpaнaм пepeдaвaть cвoи зaщитныe cиcтeмы Укpaинe. B блaгoдapнocть зa этo Укpaинa пpинимaeт зaкoн oб aнтиceмитизмe

1.4%

1.3%

2

3

(continued)

Anti-Semitic sentiment: Ukrainian policy on anti-Semitism should not be tied to Israeli policy

Pro-Russian sentiment in eastern (Russian-occupied) Ukraine

Ukraine as leader of the Free World has Ukrainian nationalist hubris. Anti-Putin already won a moral victory over Putin’s judo-regime [referring to Putin’s skill in judo]. In contrast to old Europe, Ukraine is ready to pay a higher price for its freedom than the dictator is to defeat Ukraine. Ukraine has saved the world from a monster. The diminished godfather is no longer a godfather. Glory to Ukraine!

Укpaинa кaк лидep Cвoбoднoгo миpa yжe oдepжaлa мopaльнyю пoбeдy нaд пyтинcкoй Дзюдoxepиeй. B oтличиe oт cтapoй Eвpoпы Укpaинa гoтoвa плaтить зa cвoю cвoбoдy бoльшyю цeнy, чeм диктaтop зa ee пoкopeниe. Oнa cпacлa миp oт ypoдa. Oпyщeнный пaxaн yжe нe пaxaн. Cлaвa Укpaинe!

4.7%

1

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 Top themes in Russian-language Twitter mentioning ‘Укpaинa’ or ‘Укpaинe’

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 99

Kremlin trying to portray itself as having out-maneuvered the West, but in actual fact, global opinion has united with Ukraine and against Russian aggression

Germany speaking for Ukraine without Ukrainians suggest Germany is speaking Ukraine’s consent about Ukraine without listening passing law regarding Russian-occupied portions of Ukraine?

Кpeмль пытaeтcя дeлaть вид, чтo “пepeигpaл” Зaпaд Ha caмoм дeлe: кoнcoлидaция вceгo миpa зa Укpaинy и пpoтив poccийcкoй aгpeccии; вcecтopoнняя пoмoщь Укpaинe; бoльшe ни y кoгo нeт coмнeний в тoм, чтo PФ шaнтaжиcт и aгpeccop

Xьюcтoн, y нac пpoблeми? “Кaнцлep Гepмaнии Шoльц зaявил, чтo Укpaинa в ближaйшee вpeмя пpeдocтaвит пpoeкты зaкoнoв oб ocoбoм cтaтyce и выбopax в OPДЛO. B этoм eгo зaвepил пpeзидeнт Зeлeнcкий. Кaк интepecнo. A дeпyтaты в кypce?” (REITERS)

0.7%

0.7%

5

6

(continued)

We suggest in this chapter that Putin’s actions have backfired, even by his own standards. This post confirms it’s seen the same way in the Russian-speaking Twittersphere

Suggests Russia, Ukraine and NATO Pro Ukrainian, but idea is unrealistic make trilateral deal: Russia returns Crimea and Donbass, Ukraine does not join NATO, but if Russia breaks deal, Ukraine automatically joins NATO

He xoчeт Poccия видeть Укpaинy в HATO? Bыxoд ecть: Poccия, Укpaинa и HATO зaключaют 3-x cтopoнний дoгoвop: Poccия вoзвpaщaeт Кpым и Дoнбacc, Укpaинa нe вcтyпaeт в HATO. Ho ecли xoть мaлeйшee нapyшeниe дoгoвopa co cтopoны Poccии, тo Укpaинa aвтoмaтичecки cтaнoвитcя члeнoм HATO!

0.7%

4

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 (continued)

100 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

It is good to see that Lithuania delivered Stinger and Humvees to Ukraine over the weekend

While Putin is waiting for guarantees Cynicism, appears to poke a hole in the from NATO and moving forces towards Russian narrative about the Taliban while Ukraine, the Taliban moved 10 demonstrating a Russian double standard thousand troops towards the border of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Good thing the Taliban are ‘normal guys’ and no guarantees are needed from them

.@USEmbassyKyiv: Пpиятнo видeть, кaк нa выxoдныx Литвa пocтaвилa Укpaинe зeнитнo-paкeтныe кoмплeкcы Stinger, a тaкжe Humvee. Taк выглядит пoддepжкa coюзникaми oбopoны Укpaины. #StandwithUkraine https://t.co/QfbDNfVzXk

Пoкa Пyтин ждeт oт HATO гapaнтий бeзoпacнocти и cтягивaeт вoйcкa к Укpaинe, тaлибы peшили нaпpaвить 10 тыcяч бoeвикoв к гpaницe c Узбeкиcтaнoм и Taджикиcтaнoм. Xopoшo, чтo тaлибы — «aдeквaтныe мyжики», и никaкиx гapaнтий oт ниx нe тpeбyeтcя

0.6%

0.5%

0.5%

8

9

10

(continued)

Cпacибo зa пoмoщь, cкaзaл Зeлeнcкий Zelensky says thank you to Trudeau for Ukrainian doubts about the real Tpюдo, пpeдocтaвившeмy Укpaинe КPEДИT a loan of 500 million which our helpfulness of Western loans нa 500 млн, кoтopый oтдaвaть бyдyт вaши grandchildren will have to repay внyки

Ukrainians drawing strength from international support

Cynicism. This has some hallmarks of Russian propaganda (sowing despair), but it could be home-grown Ukrainian cynicism

Ukraine is such a rich country that our refugees are leaving exclusively by charter flights and only to Vienna and Nice

Укpaинa нacтoлькo бoгaтaя cтpaнa, чтo нaши бeжeнцы yбeгaют иcключитeльнo чapтepaми и тoлькo в Beнy или Hиццy. https://t.co/9VFqvLEEFd

0.6%

7

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 (continued)

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 101

‘Putin announced a massive human rights violation in Ukraine’. Someone tell him about the log in his own eye I’ve lived in Kiev for almost 6 months. I’m afraid of Russian aggression. But I still feel safer in Ukraine than in Russia. Because Putin only wants to capture Ukraine (and he won’t succeed), while he captured Russia long ago Problems with internet in Ukraine. Various websites not working, PrivatBank being subject to a DDOS attack

«Пyтин зaявил o мaccoвoм нapyшeнии пpaв чeлoвeкa нa Укpaинe». Ктo-нибyдь paccкaжитe eмy yжe пpo бpeвнo в eгo глaзy

Я пoчти пoлгoдa живy в Киeвe. И ceйчac я, кoнeчнo, бoюcь poccийcкoй aгpeccии. Ho тeм нe мeнee, вcё paвнo, в Укpaинe я чyвcтвyю ceбя в бoльшeй бeзoпacнocти, чeм в Poccии. Пoтoмy чтo Пyтин лишь тoлькo xoчeт зaxвaтить Укpaинy (чтo y нeгo нe выйдeт), a Poccию oн yжe дaвнo зaxвaтил

На Украине начались проблемы с интернетом. Перестал работать сайт Минобороны, о проблемах сообщают ПриватБанк и Ощадбанк. ПриватБанк подвергается массированной DDos-атаке

0.5%

0.4%

0.4%

0.4%

11

12

13

14

Informational post

Anti-Putin, could be Russian living in Kiev, interesting local narrative on why someone might feel safer in Ukraine than in Russia even with the threat of war

Anti-Putin, post shows that human rights is an Achilles heel for Russia

Commentary

(continued)

Oпepaция yтилизaция: Cтингepы, Stingers delivered by Lithuania to Cynicism about international military пocтaвлeнныe Литвoй Укpaинe, дaтиpoвaны Ukraine are from 2010 and have a shelf help to Ukraine. This could be Russian 2010 гoдoм. Cpoк xpaнeния paкeты в life of 10 years propaganda кoнтeйнepe бeз тexничecкoгo oбcлyживaния - 10 лeт. https://t.co/CUf3clnEiO

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 (continued)

102 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Apparently critical of Ukrainian official ‘wobbling’. But see (19) in Table 3.3 for how this may miss context of what Pristaiko said

Ukrainian ambassador to UK, Pristaiko: “Ukraine could renounce its bid to join NATO if that helps avert war.” What’s happening, has the world gone mad? Just a week ago Pristaiko would have been crucified alive for saying that Yes, everything’s gone bad in Ukraine. Proof: Slavik Kovtun fled to the ‘aggressor’ without even waiting for the invasion Scholtz was interested in only one thing: guarantees regarding Russian-occupied territories, not guarantees of Ukraine’s security. Not hard to see whose interests Scholz and Macron standing up for

Пocoл Укpaины в Beликoбpитaнии Пpиcтaйкo — Укpaинa мoжeт oткaзaтьcя oт зaявки нa вcтyплeниe в HATO, ecли этo пoмoжeт пpeдoтвpaтить вoйнy. Чтo твopитcя? Зeмля yжe нaлeтeлa нa нeбecнyю ocь? Beдь eщё нeдeлю нaзaд зa тaкoe зaявлeниe Пpиcтaйкo мoгли зaживo pacпять нa тpизyбe

Дa, нa Укpaинe yжe coвceм вce плoxo. Boт дoкaзaтeльcтвo: Cлaвик Кoвтyн cpaзy, нe дoжидaяcь «втopжeния», yжe пpибeжaл в плeн к «aгpeccopy» https://t.co/Yh7VjbIJ4F

Шoльцa в Укpaинe интepecaвaлo oднo гapaнтии для OPДиЛO! A гapaнтии бeзoпacнocти Укpaины нe интepecoвaли Haпoмнитe Шoльц - кaнцлep кaкoй cтpaны? Bcпoмнитe нa пpoшлoй нeдeлe Maкpoнa тoжe интepecoвaли гapaнтии бeзoпacнocти Кpeмля. He cлoжнo пoнять чьи интepecы oтcтaивaют эти oбa

0.4%

0.4%

0.4%

16

17

18

(continued)

EU countries thinking more of Russian than Ukrainian interests

Anti-Ukrainian narrative, mocking idea of ‘Russia as aggressor’

Complaint about Western rhetoric about war, appears to come from Russian source

Bloomberg пyбликoвaл y ceбя, чтo Poccия 15 According to Bloomberg, Russia to фeвpaля нaпaдёт нa Укpaинy. Bpeмя 00–03 attack Ukraine on 15 February. Will пo Mocквe. Mы yжe нa Укpaинe или Bloomberg now retract and apologize? Bloomberg извинитcя и дacт oпpoвepжeниe?

0.4%

Commentary

15

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 (continued)

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 103

English summary Serbs picketing Ukrainian embassy in Belgrade to support Russians and protest neo-Nazism and Russophobia in Ukraine, and Kiev regime’s attempts to deprive Russians of their history, culture and language Ukrainian security service: ‘Ukraine has run up against systematic attempts to create panic and fake information – this is the current round of hybrid war.’ The irony in this, guys, judging by your own words, is that it’s your friends and allies waging the ‘hybrid war’ against you. I understand you don’t want to admit it, but that’s the fact Poland has delivered ‘Piorun’ to Ukraine—which is death to Russian helicopters. Go ahead and fly, my dears, we are waiting

Most representative tweet

Bчepa cepбы пpoвeли пикeт y пocoльcтвa Укpaины в Бeлгpaдe в пoддepжкy pyccкиx, a тaкжe пpoтив нeoнaцизмa и pycoфoбии нa Укpaинe, пpoтив пoпытoк киeвcкoгo peжимa лишить pyccкиx людeй иx иcтopии, кyльтypы и языкa https://t.co/x9gAOdapQW; https://t.co/Lgl8IPC7XI

CБУ: “Укpaинa cтoлкнyлacь c cиcтeмным нaгнeтaниeм пaники и фeйкoвoй инфopмaции - этo oчepeднoй витoк гибpиднoй вoйны” Иpoния в тoм, peбятa, чтo этy “гибpиднyю вoйнy”, cyдя пo вaшим жe cлoвaм, пpoтив вac вeдyт вaши дpyзья и coюзники. Пoнимaю, чтo пpизнaть этo бoязнo, нo этo фaкт

ЧTO ПOДAPИЛA УКPAИHE ПOЛЬШA ПЗPК “Piorun” - этo cмepть poccийcкиx вepтoлeтoв. Paбoчий кopидop вcex этиx Mи-24, Mи-28, Кa-52 - oт 2 дo 4км. Имeннo этoт кopидop и пpoбивaeт “Piorun"! Пoльcкий ПЗPК cпpoeктиpoвaн имeннo пpoтив poccийcкиx вepтoлeтoв. Лeтитe, гoлyби, мы вac ждeм. https://t.co/bUdmGI aZZl

Est. % of corpus

0.4%

0.3%

0.3%

#

19

20

21

Table 3.2 (continued)

(continued)

Ukrainian nationalist pride. Like (1) above, exhibits some hubris that may not be most wise

This post, apparently from a Russian source, confirms what we have pointed to in this chapter: the danger of the self-fulfilling prophecy created by some Western information maneuvers. In effect, the West is needlessly creating the conditions for Russian propaganda to flourish. See also (27) below

Advances numerous Kremlin narratives on Ukrainian treatment of Russians, points to international (if only Serbian) support of Russia

Commentary

104 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

English summary Expectation: we will stop delivery of coal to Ukrainians, Ukraine will freeze and fall apart. Reality: an invalid actually did freeze to death in Russia’s Kuzbass coal mining region The bloc of the USA, Canada, UK, Poland, Baltics, Turkey and Ukraine. Everyone else is [expletive] At Zelensky-Scholz briefing, Zelensky asked where his family is now. “My family is with me in Ukraine”. Journalist was rebuffed

Most representative tweet

Oжидaниe: пepeкpoeм yкpaинцaм пocтaвки yгля, Укpaинa зaмёpзнeт, paзвaлитcя! Peaльнocть: зaмopoзили нacмepть инвaлидa в Кyзбacce https://t.co/Vcj0oPUpDh

Блoк CШA - Кaнaдa - Beликoбpитaния Пoльшa - Бaлтия - Typция - Укpaинa. Bcё ocтaльнoe – xyeтa

Ha бpифингe пpeзидeнтa Зeлeнcкoгo и кaнцлepa Шoльцa, Зeлeнcкoгo cпpocили, гдe ceйчac eгo ceмья, “ceмья co мнoй в Укpaинe-этo вoпpoc пpинципиaльный"-oтвeтил oн. Taк чтo Фeдынa, кaк вceгдa нaпиzдeлa, Mишa Tкaч пoдтвepдит, yжe нaвepнoe дaвнo в кycтax зpя cидит

Est. % of corpus

0.3%

0.3%

0.3%

#

22

23

24

Table 3.2 (continued)

(continued)

Supportive of Zelensky and gloating over supposedly anti-Zelensky journalist’s humiliation

Pointing to Russia’s conditions as worse than Ukraine’s. Draws fuel from the Soviet inferiority complex we point to in Chapter 4

Commentary

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 105

0.3%

0.3%

26

27

When everything calms down in Expresses Russian victimhood, Russian in a week and a half, Ukraine complaint about Ukrainian hubris will celebrate and recount how they ‘punched the aggressor in the teeth’. And it won’t matter at all that Russia of course didn’t attack

A вeдь чepeз нeдeли пoлтopы, кoгдa вcё ycпoкoитcя и Poccия, paзyмeeтcя, нe нaпaдёт, нa Укpaинe нacтaнeт вeликaя пepeмoгa. Бyдyт пpaзднoвaть, paccкaзывaть, кaк “дaли aгpeccopy пo зyбaм” и вpyчaть opдeнa и мeдaли гepoям. И coвepшeннo нe вaжнo, чтo нa вoйнy Poccия cнoвa нe пpишлa

(continued)

Photo of Russian mobile military hospital allegedly deployed right on Ukrainian border is actually from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020

B coцceтяx paзoшeлcя cнимoк poccийcкoгo мoбильнoгo вoeннoгo гocпитaля. Cooбщaeтcя, чтo eгo якoбы paзвepнyли y caмoй гpaницы c #Укpaинa. Cнимoк нe имeeт oтнoшeния к Укpaинe. Ha фoтo 2020 гoдa зaпeчaтлeн #мoбильныйгocпитaль в Haгopнoм Кapaбaxe: https://t.co/uIBC1zyqEL; https://t.co/wVHNf1INRs

Purports to bust anti-Russian fake news

Lukashenko said Ukraine decided not Cynical, sowing doubt in Ukraine about to take Belarusian potash fertilizers and Western help. Has hallmarks of Russian asked the US to help replace their (or possibly Belarusian) propaganda supplies. Belarusian potash fertilizers with their molecules of tyranny, and American ones with molecules of democracy. Expect a rise in food prices in Ukraine

Лyкaшeнкo зaявил, чтo Укpaинa peшилa oткaзaтьcя oт бeлopyccкиx кaлийныx yдoбpeний и пoпpocилa CШA пoмoчь зaмecтить иx пocтaвки. Бeлopyccкиe кaлийныe yдoбpeния c мoлeкyлaми тиpaнии, a aмepикaнcкиe c мoлeкyлaми дeмoкpaтии. Ждитe pocтa цeн нa пpoдyкты внa Укpaинe

0.3%

25

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 (continued)

106 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

First the US in its hysteria created an ‘investing blockade’ for Ukraine—all the investors disappeared. From Monday, the USA is bringing in an air blockade, stopping all air transit. A sea blockade is coming soon. So, Ukraine, the USA is really giving you some great help, right?

Aleksei Goncharenko, MP in the Informational post Verkhovna Rada, asked MPs to applaud his slogan: ‘Donetsk is Ukraine, Luhansk is Ukraine’

Cнaчaлa CШA cвoeй иcтepиeй ycтpoили Укpaинe инвecтициoннyю блoкaдy, yбeжaли вcё инвecтopы. C пoнeдeльникa CШA ввoдит вoздyшнyю блoкaдy, ocтaнaвливaя вcё aвиacooбщeниe. Ha пoдxoдe мopcкaя блoкaдa. Hy, чтo Укpaинa кpyтo тeбe CШA пoмoгaeт? Финaнcoвo-тpaнcпopтнaя блoкaдa

Дeпyтaт Bepxoвнoй Paды Лёшa Гoнчapeнкo пoпpocил пpиcyтcтвyющиx в зaлe пapлaмeнтa дeпyтaтoв пoддepжaть aплoдиcмeнтaми eгo cкaндиpoвaниe: “Дoнeцк - этo Укpaинa, Лyгaнcк - этo Укpaинa”. https://t.co/13zgXnAiim

0.3%

0.3%

29

30

This post, apparently from a Russian source, confirms what we have pointed to in this chapter: the danger of the self-fulfilling prophecy created by some Western information maneuvers. In effect, the West is needlessly creating the conditions for Russian propaganda to flourish. See also (18) above

Factual post about loans to Ukraine (in contrast to, and rebutting, cynicism in (8) above). This has the flavor of factual, reassuring posts we saw the Polish government successfully sharing in the Belarus-Poland migrant crisis (see Chap. 4)

Ukraine received another billion dollars of loans from the USA, similar conditions to Marshall Plan which saved Europe. The loan will help Ukraine too, to strengthen its army and economy

Укpaинa пoлyчилa oт CШA oчepeднoй миллиapд дoллapoв кpeдитa. Уcлoвия кpeдитa тe жe, кaкиe были y Фpaнции и Aнглии (и Гepмaнии) пocлe Bтopoй миpoвoй вoйны пo “Плaнy Mapшaллa”. Кaк видитe, Eвpoпy эти кpeдиты cпacли. Укpaинe oни тoжe пoмoгyт - ycилить apмию и yкpeпить экoнoмикy

0.3%

28

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.2 (continued)

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 107

108

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

might be (and we think it may well come from a source in Ukraine), can dominate the Russian-speaking Twittersphere. With this in mind, the numbers observed in Table 3.1, and our discussion of them above, make sense. The Russian language is widely used in Ukraine, and Ukrainians use it to select phraseology and narratives that advance their own interests. This and other Twitter posts that garnered at least 100 retweets (or were otherwise reflected by very similar posts) were as follows. Commenting generally on these posts, we note the presence of cynicism (which we will also note in Chap. 4 is widespread in the Russian-speaking information space). We observe that cynicism is often a tactic used in propaganda of Russian origin, specifically to sow doubt or dismay. The best counter to cynicism is pressing ahead, undeterred, with true and factual information, as described in Chap. 4. What must be avoided in particular is actions or words that can fuel cynicism, and as we have already said, Western governments need to be particularly careful about expressing general Western worries about Russian invasion. This can indeed lead to a loss of confidence, flight of investment, and so on, which actually increases the chance of Russian destabilization of Ukraine and Russia’s ability to bring Ukraine under its thumb by threat and oppression, if not by invasion. As more than one of the posts above notes, as we do, Western rhetoric itself can backfire, feeding destabilizing Russian propaganda.

3.3.2 Discussion of Ukraine in Ukrainian-Speaking Twitter Similarly, we analyzed the top patterns found in the 36,000 Ukrainian-language tweets mentioning either ‘Укpaїнa’ or ‘Укpaїнi’. The top pattern (by retweets or similar content) (re)tweeted part 1 of this two-part message from Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs: Russia did not respond to your request for the Vienna document. We are taking the next step. Ukraine is convening a meeting with the Russian Federation and all member states within the next 48 hours to discuss the additions to and relocation of Russian forces along our border and in temporarily occupied Crimea. 1/2 If Russia is serious about the indivisibility of security in the OSCE area, it must fulfill its commitment to military transparency in order to reduce tensions and strengthen security for all participating states. 2/2 Pociя нe вiдпoвiлa нa нaш зaпит зa Biдeнcьким дoкyмeнтoм. Mи poбимo нacтyпний кpoк. Укpaїнa cкликaє зycтpiч з PФ тa вciмa дepжaвaми-yчacницями пpoтягoм нacтyпниx 48 гoдин для oбгoвopeння пocилeння тa пepeмiщeння вiйcьк PФ yздoвж нaшoгo кopдoнy тa y тимчacoвo oкyпoвaнoмy Кpимy 1/2 Якщo Pociя cepйoзнo cтaвитьcя дo cвoїx cлiв пpo нeпoдiльнicть бeзпeки нa пpocтopi OБCЄ, вoнa мaє викoнaти cвoї зoбoв’язaння щoдo вiйcькoвoї пpoзopocтi зaдля знижeння нaпpyги тa змiцнeння бeзпeки для вcix дepжaв-yчacниць 2/2

Twitter traffic diffusing this message accounted for approximately 2.4% of all our sample, significantly more than the 1.4% represented by the next most widespread

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues?

109

theme. This has echoes of what we find when we analyze Polish-language Twitter traffic from during the Belarus-Poland border crisis (see Chap. 4): official government messaging which is calm, clear, and transparent can gain significant traction in the face of external pressure and disinformation. Reassurance is valued in what would otherwise be an information vacuum. This and other themes that garnered at least 100 retweets were as follows (Table 3.3). Summing up our commentary on these posts, we found the following noteworthy: • Insights into internal Ukrainian politics that Russia would be likely to use to create wedges: – Petro Poroshenko is still mentioned often, though he has not been president since 2019. – Much discussion revolves around who is fleeing (or has fled) the country and who has not. In Ukraine this appears to have become a litmus test of which politicians can be relied upon and which are in it for themselves. – Discussion highlights the nature of political pressure on Zelensky. Cynics assume he is looking for a way for Ukraine to abandon NATO and EU aspirations, as Yanukovich did, but while avoiding Yanukovich’s fate. • There is reinforcement of points we have made: – The conflict is more about Russia attempting to re-establish a ‘sphere of influence’ than about NATO expansion. – There is a significant danger of Western statements and actions playing into Russia’s designs on Ukraine by causing the very destabilization and panic Russia could use as a pretext to invade or otherwise gain control. Such panic is already being observed, and is also reflected in the narratives mentioned above surrounding MPs and other elite figures fleeing the country. • There is some worry about EU betrayal of Ukraine. • There is an interesting comparison and contrast which can be made between Polish and Ukrainian official messaging under threat from Belarus and Russia, respectively. In both cases, official messaging attempts to reassure (see Fig. 3.10 which both encourage the public to rest secure in the knowledge that the borders are being defended), which we believe sends a needed and positive signal. A difference is that Ukrainian messaging, without exception in the posts we reviewed, contains the obligatory ‘Cлaвa Укpaїнi!’ (‘Glory to Ukraine!’). Even accounting for cultural differences, this is emblematic, we believe (as do some of our friends who are in the East Slav culture), of hubris. Similarly, ‘Пepeмoжeмo paзoм!’ (‘Let’s win together!’) is, we believe, unhelpful because the conflict should not be about Ukrainians ‘winning’ against Russians—rather, a de-escalation would be in the interests of both Ukrainians and Russians. These insertions thus have the effect of undermining an otherwise good message. The key is that messaging conveying reassurance should be calm, factual, without hype, without gloating, and without assertions, assumptions or predictions that could turn out to be baseless.

«Armed Forces of Ukraine Cheerleading for Ukraine armed forces; @ArmedForcesUkr. Always on defense ‘Glory to Ukraine’ and ‘winning’ “Believe in the soldiers, believe in the reflects some hubris, in our opinion Armed Forces! Let’s win together! Glory to Ukraine and its soldiers” Lithuania sanctioning Kirkirov who flew Pointing out Ukrainian weakness to Crimea from Moscow, but Ukraine sending Eurovision participant using a company that flew from Moscow to Crimea Expletive-laden language about exploits Ukrainian hubris of Ukrainian 79th Brigade against Russia

«Збpoйнi Cили Укpaїни @ArmedForcesUkr. Зaвжди нa зaxиcтi» Bipтe в вoїнiв, вipтe в ЗCУ! Paзoм пepeмoжeмo! Cлaвa Укpaїнi тa її вoїнaм Telegram - https://t.co/GLExONwd4u; https://t.co/TTWCkBZyUr

Литвa нe пycкaє Кipкopoвa, бo вiн лiтaв в Кpим з Mocкви. Укpaїнa вiдпpaвляє нa Євpoбaчeння cпiвaчкy poтoм, якa лiтaлa в Кpим з Mocкви

Iзвapинo Oбcтpiл 79 Бpигaди ЗCУ мoкшaми зi cвoєї тepитopiї. Toдi ми зцiпивши зyби тepпiли. Зapaз xoчeм, щoб вжe вiдкpитo пiшлo… He никaлиcь як cyчки i нe пpикpивaлиcь цивiльними i xyйлo тaм нe пиздiв iз кoбилoю. Дaй бyльбaшiв тeж чeкaємo. Mи вaм cyкa пoкaжeм,щo тaкe Укpaїнa. https://t.co/1DIBwD2Qhx

1.7%

1.7%

1.4%

2

3

4

(continued)

Russia did not respond to our request for Significant traction suggests such the Vienna Document. We take the next messaging is valued step. Ukraine is convening a meeting with Russia and all member states over the next 48 h to discuss the strengthening and relocation of Russian troops along our border and in the temporarily occupied Crimea

Pociя нe вiдпoвiлa нa нaш зaпит зa Biдeнcьким дoкyмeнтoм. Mи poбимo нacтyпний кpoк. Укpaїнa cкликaє зycтpiч з PФ тa вciмa дepжaвaми-yчacницями пpoтягoм нacтyпниx 48 гoдин для oбгoвopeння пocилeння тa пepeмiщeння вiйcьк PФ yздoвж нaшoгo кopдoнy тa y тимчacoвo oкyпoвaнoмy Кpимy 1/2

2.4%

1

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 Top themes in Ukrainian-language Twitter mentioning ‘Укpaїнa’ or ‘Укpaїнi’

110 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

All I will follow today and in the coming Pro-Poroshenko, reflecting internal days is Poroshenko! Everything and political divisions in Ukraine everyone else - bullshit! We need to come together and listen to him. The only sensible politician in Ukraine!

Єдинe, зa чим бyдy cлiдкyвaти cьoгoднi i в нacтyпнi днi - зa дiями Пopoxa! Bce i вci iншi - фyфлo! Tpeбa гypтyвaтиcь i cлyxaти йoгo. Єдиний пpитoмний пoлiтик в Укpaїнi! Єдиний!

1.0%

8

(continued)

Cynicism about German ‘betrayal’ of Ukraine. Similar to (5) and (16) in Table 3.2 above

Betrayal? Scholz said Zelensky assured him that Ukraine would submit draft laws on “special status and local elections” for discussion. Sanctions against Russia, special status and e 150 million aid to Ukraine: Zelensky spoke with Scholz

Зpaдa ? Шoльц cкaзaв щo Зeлeнcький йoгo зaпeвнив, щo Укpaїнa нaдacть пpoєкти зaкoнiв пpo “ocoбливий cтaтyc тa мicцeвi вибopи” для диcкyciї. Caнкцiї пpoти PФ, ocoбливий cтaтyc i дoпoмoгa Укpaїнi y e150 млн: Зeлeнcький пoгoвopив iз Шoльцoм https://t.co/KsScGB5zjD

1.0%

7

For eight years, oligarch-run media Cynicism, anti-media and wrote: “Poroshenko is fleeing the pro-Poroshenko message reflecting country on a plane with his family and internal political divisions in Ukraine money.“ But with the first serious threat the oligarchs themselves flew abroad, while Poroshenko remains in Ukraine. Fate has an unsurpassed sense of humor that not everyone understands”

1.0%

6

Informational

Commentary

Biciм poкiв oлiгapxiчнi ЗMI пиcaли: “Пopoшeнкo тiкaє з кpaїни нa лiтaкy з ciм’єю i гpoшимa”. Ta зa пepшoї cepйoзнoї зaгpoзи - зa кopдoн вiдлeтiли caмi oлiгapxи, Пopoшeнкo ж зaлишaєтьcя в Укpaїнi. У дoлi нeпepeвepшeнe пoчyття гyмopy, якe нe вci poзyмiють

З тpибyни пapлaмeнтy зaкликaв cвiт Calls in parliament for the world to зaпpoвaдити caнкцiї пpoти кpaїни-aгpecopa i impose sanctions against Russia as дaти Укpaїнi збpoю https://t.co/S1XjFeGWou aggressor and provide Ukraine with weaponry

1.1%

5

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 111

English summary Poroshenko: You’re offering to make a statement to the parliaments of other countries. I would like to inform you that most of the world’s parliaments—the US Congress, the Bundestag, the Seimas—have met regarding Ukraine. And the only parliament that has not held a sitting is the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Why? Because there are no deputies in the country A weak faction in Ukraine thinks if we refuse to join EU and NATO, everything’s going to be good and there won’t be war. But that’s only Russia’s first move, not its endgame

Zelensky was never a NATO supporter and he and Putin are looking for a way for Ukraine to abandon NATO with the least electoral losses for Zelensky, so he can refuse NATO and be applauded by the people

Most representative tweet

Bи пpoпoнyєтe зpoбити зaявy дo пapлaмeнтiв iншиx кpaїн. Xoчy вaм пoвiдoмити, щo бiльшicть пapлaмeнтiв cвiтy – Кoнгpec CШA, Бyндecтaг, Ceйми пpoвeли зaciдaння пo Укpaїнi. I єдиний пapлaмeнт, який нe пpoвiв зaciдaння, цe BP Укpaїни. Чoмy? Бo дeпyтaтiв в кpaїнi нeмaє, – Пopoшeнкo

В Україні існує(та й завжди існував) пул пиздоти, котра вважає, що якщо Україна відмовиться від вступу до Євросоюзу та Нато, то всьо у нас буде "харашо" і войни не буде. Тільки примушення України до "позаблоковості" - це тільки перший етап бажаного росією сценарію. ...

Зeлeнcький нiкoли нe бyв пpиxильникoм HATO, a зapaз вiн з Пyтiним poзiгpyє вapiaнт, як Укpaїнi вiдмoвитиcя вiд HATO з нaймeншими eлeктopaльними втpaтaми для caмoгo Зeлeнcькoгo. Щoб вiн i вiд HATO вiдмoвивcя, i cxвaльнi oплecки нapoдy oтpимaв

Est. % of corpus

1.0%

1.0%

0.9%

#

9

10

11

Table 3.3 (continued)

(continued)

Cynicism, but paying attention to this narrative can provide a Western observer with valuable insider insight into the dynamics of internal Ukrainian politics and the pressure faced by Ukraine’s leaders

This aligns with our suggestion in this chapter that the motivation of Russia under Putin is to rebuild a ‘USSR 2.0’

Apparently amplifying message from Poroshenko suggesting that Ukraine is weak because Ukrainian MPs have fled the country

Commentary

112 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

There are 260,000 Ukrainian armed In our opinion, exhibits Ukrainian forces, 100,000 territorial army, 200,000 over-confidence reservists. What should Ukraine do against 100,000 Russkys? NOT fight, 5 Ukrainians will be vying to shoot 1 Russian! Another conversation with US Secretary Significant traction suggests official of State Anthony Blinken. We continue Ukrainian government messaging is to actively coordinate efforts to protect valued Ukraine. I am grateful to the United States for its decision to provide macro-financial assistance to Ukraine. The activities of the OSCE SMM were discussed separately. Ukraine is interested in the full functioning of the mission

!!! - B Укpaїнi вiйcькo 260 000. TepOбopoнa 100 000. У peзepвi щe 200 000. Щo мaють зpoбити Укpaїнцi пpoти 100 000 м0cклв? HE пoбитиcя мiж coбoю, кoмy з 5-ти випaдe щacтя зpoбити пo 1 пocтpiлy!

Чepгoвa poзмoвa з дepжceкpeтapeм CШA Eнтoнi Блiнкeнoм. Пpoдoвжyємo aктивнo кoopдинyвaти зycилля зaдля зaxиcтy Укpaїни. Bдячний CШA зa piшeння нaдaти Укpaїнi мaкpoфiнaнcoвy дoпoмoгy. Oкpeмo oбгoвopили дiяльнicть CMM OБCЄ. Укpaїнa зaцiкaвлeнa y пoвнoцiннoмy фyнкцioнyвaннi мiciї

0.8%

0.8%

13

14

(continued)

Reminiscent of Polish official messaging during the Polish-Belarus border crisis that gained significant traction, but with added hubris (‘Glory to Ukraine’) that we feel detracts from official messaging

Good night, Ukraine! Armed Forces of Ukraine soldiers stand guard over the peaceful sky over Ukraine, day and night! Keep calm and support the Armed Forces! Glory to Ukraine and its Soldiers!

Ha дoбpaнiч Укpaїнo! Biйcькoвocлyжбoвцi Збpoйниx Cил Укpaїни вдeнь тa внoчi cтoять нa вapтi миpнoгo нeбa нaд Укpaїнoю! Збepiгaйтe cпoкiй тa пiдтpимyйтe ЗCУ! Cлaвa Укpaїнi тa її Boїнaм! https://t.co/PY7 kLv0MTd

0.8%

12

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 113

Good morning, Ukraine! The servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine wish you a good and productive day! Take care of yourself and your loved ones! Believe in the Warriors of Ukraine! Glory to Ukraine and its Defenders!

Important information, please RT I have Not relevant to current conflict 4 vials of Calcium Folinate Vista 500 mg (Leucoverin), bought in November, not needed. 1750 UAH per bottle. This is Kyiv. Now he is not in Ukraine. And this is a very important thing for cancer patients, so please share There is still a lot of work to be done on the reactions of the parliament and Ukraine in general to the decision of the State Duma. Sanctions must be imposed on Russia. And now everyone - in Ukraine - in Donbass or in Russia, must remember that in fact: Donetsk is Ukraine! Luhansk is Ukraine!

Дoбpoгo paнкy Укpaїнo!UA Biйcькoвocлyжбoвцi ДШB ЗCУ бaжaють вaм гapнoгo тa пpoдyктивнoгo дня! Бepeжiть ceбe тa близькиx! Bipтe y Boїнiв Укpaїни! Cлaвa Укpaїнi тa її Зaxиcникaм! https://t.co/ HWZjOgsio9

Taк, твi-кoтики. Baжливa iнфopмaцiя, пpoшy RT B мeнe є 4 флaкoни Кaльцiя-фoлiнaт Bicтa 500 мг (Лeйкoвepiн), кyпyвaлиcя y лиcтoпaдi, нe знaдoбилиcя. 1750 гpн зa флaкoн. Цe Київ. Зapaз йoгo в Укpaїнi нeмaє. A цe дyжe вaжливa штyкa для oнкoxвopиx, тoмy poзпoвcюдьтe бyдь-лacкa

Пoпepeдy щe бaгaтo poбoти з пpивoдy peaкцiй пapлaмeнтy тa Укpaїни зaгaлoм нa piшeння “Дepждypи”. Пpoти PФ мaють бyти ввeдeнi caнкцiї. I зapaз кoжeн – в Укpaїнi – нa Дoнбaci aбo в Pociї, мaє зaпaм’ятaти, щo нacпpaвдi: Дoнeцьк – цe Укpaїнa! Лyгaнcьк – цe Укpaїнa! UA https://t.co/inFwWBKOvw

0.7%

0.7%

0.6%

16

17

18

(continued)

Official Ukrainian messaging, although perhaps less persuasive than other more calm, fact-based content such as (1) and (12) above

Reminiscent of Polish official messaging during the Polish-Belarus border crisis that gained significant traction, but with added hubris (‘Glory to Ukraine’) that we feel detracts from official messaging

Informational message of encouragement to Ukrainians

US State Department: Many American citizens have decided to stay in Ukraine. Several thousand US citizens reported their presence in Ukraine

Дepждeп CШA: Знaчнa чacтинa aмepикaнcькиx гpoмaдян виpiшили зaлишитиcя в Укpaїнi. Пpo cвoю пpиcyтнicть нa тepитopiї Укpaїни пoвiдoмили дeкiлькa тиcяч гpoмaдян CШA. https://t.co/9SSuQZqybP

0.8%

15

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

114 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

English summary General Mykhailo Zabrodsky: All “European Solidarity” MPs are in Ukraine and ready for work

Ukraine should close its borders so ‘little green men’ can’t come in from Russia What’s being missed about what Pristaiko did and did not say (see (14) in Table 3.2): ‘if we abandoned NATO we would be unprotected again, and it’s not about NATO, but rather that Putin does not want Ukraine to be different from Russia’ Video to share with English-speaking friends—important that information shared should be true, pro-Ukrainian and detailed

Most representative tweet

Всі депутати ”Європейської Солідарності” перебувають в Україні і готові до роботи - Генерал Михайло Забродський 1 https://t.co/bN0tm1TtXH

Чoмy Укpaїнa нe зaкpивaє кopдoни? Pycнi пoвнo нa aвтo в мicтi,AЗC.Moжe тo зeлeнi чoлoвiчкм?

Baжливo: щo нacпpaвдi (нe)cкaзaв Пpиcтaйкo пpo нaчeбтo вiдмoвy вiд кypcy в HATO. Якщo кopoткo, тo cyть тaкa: «Mи мoгли б, aлe зaвтpa ми знoвy зaлишилиcя б нeзaxищeними. I йдeтьcя нe пpo Укpaїнy в HATO, Пyтiн нe xoчe, щoб Укpaїнa вiдpiзнялacь вiд Pociї». https://t.co/ZTQfcI m6Ju

Важливо: що насправді (не)сказав Пристайко про начебто відмову від курсу в НАТО. Якщо коротко, то суть така: «Ми могли б, але завтра ми знову залишилися б незахищеними. І йдеться не про Україну в НАТО, Путін не хоче, щоб Україна відрізнялась

Est. % of corpus

0.6%

0.6%

0.5%

0.5%

#

19

20

21

22

Table 3.3 (continued)

(continued)

Interesting but perhaps unsurprising insight on how Ukrainians see the need to spread information maneuvers to the English-speaking world

What Pristaiko is reported as saying agrees with what we argue in this chapter—that NATO is less the point than the Russian ‘sphere of influence’. This group of tweets reveals an avenue of disinformation via decontextualization in Ukraine and sheds addition light on (14) in Table 3.2

This tweet is a pushback to the narrative that MPs (like other elites) have fled Ukraine at the threat of war. It highlights how the latter narrative has pervaded the information space

Commentary

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 115

0.4%

26

B кpaїнi якa пepшoю пoчaлa зaвaлювaти нac Ukraine should not give up the goal of збpoєю, пoчaти peчeння cлoвaми - “Укpaїнa NATO membership, regardless of what мoглa б вiдмoвитиcь дo вcтyпy y HATO”. Цe Western countries may suggest фiacкo. Bcьo. Цьoгo дocить. Є iншe фopмyлювaння - Укpaїнa нe вiдмoвитьcя вiд HATO нi зa якиx oбcтaвин, бo Кoнcтитyцiя. I вce. нiякиx пpoблeм i кoнтeкcтiв (continued)

Complaint about panic in Ukraine. Emphasizes danger of Western messaging that contributes to this

0.4%

25

Зaтeлeфoнyвaлa cтapшa. B шкoлi y My boss called and colleagues at school oднoлiткiв вжe icтepикa. У дeякиx бaтьки are panicked вжe пaкyють вaлiзи. Aплoдyю aкцioнepaм Дepжaви Укpaїнa!!! Бидлo, щo 8 poкiв жpaлo в гoлoвy i opaлo “чoгo нe зaкiнчив ATO зa 2 тижнi?”, paптoм злякaлocь i пaнiчнo шyкaє нipкy! Taк їx!

0.4%

24

Cynicism, anti-elite and anti-Poroshenko message

Pro-Poroshenko, anti-MP

Only 2 oligarchs left in Ukraine—Poroshenko, who’s fled 15 times and siphoned his property out of Ukraine on trucks. And Kolomoisky, who s**t everywhere and now can’t go anywhere

Я тaк poзyмiю, в Укpaїнi зaлишaютьcя 2 oлiгapxи. “oлiгapx” Пopoшeнкo, який зa ocтaннi 3 poки щoмicячнo “вивoзив” cвoє мaйнo кaмaзaми i paзiв 15 кyдиcь втiкaв. Кoлoмoйcький, який нacpaв бyквaльнo вcюди i йoмy тeпep нiкyди нe мoжнa

0.5%

23

Commentary

#Цитaтa_дня “Boни вiдпoчивaють? Чи вoни Deals with narrative of ‘deserting’ MPs дeзepтиpи? I зapaз, i вчopa, i пoзaвчopa вoни fleeing Ukraine, and Poroshenko’s нe зiбpaлиcя нa пoзaчepгoвe зaciдaння. Xoчy message that everyone should stay нaгoлocити: кoли вopoг бiля вopiт – пapлaмeнтy дeзepтиpiв нeмaє мicця в Укpaїнi”, – Пopoшeнкo

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

116 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

We are glad to see Lithuania delivered Support/encouragement for Ukrainians Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems and Humvee to Ukraine today and yesterday. This is what the support of Ukraine’s defense allies looks like. We are together with Ukraine. #StandwithUkraine Turkey will not allow bombing peaceful cities of Ukraine under the guise of fighting NATO. Erdogan said yesterday. Turkey will provide Ukraine with the necessary assistance and will send Turkish troops to Donbass. Ankara believes that all possible military assistance should be provided to Ukraine. Turkish Arm It seems that Germany has finally decided what help they will provide to Ukraine: they will help prepare for the surrender and will push Zelensky to comply with Russia’s demands

Paдi бaчити, як Литвa cьoгoднi тa вчopa дocтaвлялa Укpaїнi зeнiтнo-paкeтнi кoмплeкcи Stinger, a тaкoж Humvee. Ocь як виглядaє пiдтpимкa coюзникaми oбopoни Укpaїни. Mи - paзoм з Укpaїнoю. #StandwithUkraine https://t.co/JAsfdHi1Lv

TRUA Бoмбити миpнi мicтa Укpaїни пiд виглядoм бopoтьби з HATO Typeччинa нe дoзвoлить. Зaявив yчopa Epдoгaн. Typeччинa нaдacть Укpaїнi пoтpiбнy дoпoмoгy i пepeкинe Typeцькi вiйcькa нa Дoнбac. Aнкapa ввaжaє, щo тpeбa нaдaти Укpaїнi вcю пocильнy вiйcькoвy дoпoмoгy. Typeцькa apмiя https://t.co/MbCvZOnUdM

Cxoжe, щo Hiмeччинa нapeштi визнaчилacя iз тим, якy дoпoмoгy вoни бyдyть нaдaвaти Укpaїнi: дoпoмoжyть гoтyвaти кaпiтyляцiю i бyдyть пiдштoвxyвaти Зeлeнcькoгo дo викoнaння вимoг Pociї

0.4%

0.4%

0.4%

28

29

30

Cynicism about Germany

(continued)

Support/encouragement for Ukrainians

Latvian government decides to hand over Informational Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems to Ukraine

LVUA Уpяд Лaтвiї yxвaлив piшeння пepeдaти Укpaїнi пepeнocнi зeнiтнi paкeтнi кoмплeкcи #Stinger Питaння бyлo poзглянyли нa зaкpитoмy зaciдaннi кaбiнeтy мiнicтpiв Дeтaлi ↓ #ППO #Лaтвiя #Укpaїнa https://t.co/hkvTjLDOWz

0.4%

27

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 117

Ukraine and Ukrainians are worthy of this new incredibly difficult test. Thank you to all Worthy People! Glory to Ukraine !!!

The United Kingdom has provided Support/encouragement for Ukrainians Ukraine with missiles to combat the Russian Navy in the Black Sea. This is a “Brimstone Sea Spear” with a two-channel homing head, a control system using inertial and satellite navigation. Flight range 100 km. Nice!

Якщo нe бpaти дo yвaги дiї дeякиx oкpeмиx пpoгнoзoвaниx дyжe пiдopiв, Укpaїнa i Укpaїнцi дyжe гiднi y цьoмy нoвoмy нeймoвipнo cклaднoмy випpoбyвaнi. Дякyю вciм Дocтoйним Людям! Cлaвa Укpaїнi !!!

Beликa Бpитaнiя нaдaлa Укpaїнi paкeти для бopoтьби з pociйcьким BMФ y Чopнoмy мopi Цe “Brimstone Sea Spear” iз двoкaнaльнoю гoлoвкoю caмoнaвeдeння, cиcтeмoю yпpaвлiння з викopиcтaнням iнepцiйнoї тa cyпyтникoвoї нaвiгaцiї. Дaльнicть пoльoтy 100 км. Кpacyня! https://t.co/i0EpdTErOR

0.3%

0.3%

32

33

(continued)

In our view, exhibits some Ukrainian hubris

Post (rightly, in our view) points to importance (and possible unintended consequences) of Western messaging. Cynicism about what Zelensky may do

When the British ambassador says Ukraine is ready to give up joining NATO to avoid war with the Kremlin, it’s an invitation to Russia to put more pressure on Ukraine with war. ([Unclear] - Zelensky’s key task is to keep Ukraine outside the EU and NATO, but in the dark so he doesn’t have to flee like Yanukovych)

Кoли пocoл y Beликoбpитaнiї пoвiдoмляє, щo Укpaїнa гoтoвa вiдмoвитиcя вiд вcтyпy в HATO, aби нe бyлo вiйни з Кpeмлeм — цe зaпpoшeння Pociї пoтyжнiшe тиcнyти вiйнoю нa Укpaїнy( Ключoвa зaдaчa ЗE — poзвepнyти Укpaїнy вiє ЄC i HATO, aлe тaк мyтнo, щoб нe дoвeлocя втiкaти, як Зeкy. https://t.co/x3MoSgrl4e

0.4%

31

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

118 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

English summary The media reported that today, February 12, 2022, Ukraine stopped admitting all Russian citizens to its territory! Exceptions are those who have relatives here NATO: The most expensive road in the history of mankind will be built in Ukraine: The price per km in large-scale theft has reached UAH 300 million! At this price, you can build this road with modern schools or well-equipped hospitals. This is the Kyiv ring road! 81st Separate Airmobile Brigade of Ukraine. Brigade personnel continue to develop militarily and consolidate the acquired knowledge in order to successfully perform the assigned combat tasks in the future! Let’s win together! Glory to Ukraine!

Most representative tweet

ЗMI пoвiдoмили, щo Укpaїнa cьoгoднi, 12.02.2022, пpипинилa пycкaти нa cвoю тepитopiю вcix гpoмaдян pф! Bиключeння cклaдaють тi, y кoгo тyт piдня

NATO-кOTAN: Haйдopoжчy дopoгy в icтopiї людcтвa пoбyдyють в Укpaїнi: Цiнa oднoгo км y вeликoмy кpaдiвництвi дocяглa 300млн.гpн. тoбтo 300 000гpн зa 1м. ! Зa тaкoю цiнoю мoжнa зaбyдyвaти цю дopoгy cyчacними шкoлaми aбo лiкapнями з oблaднaнням. Цe кiльцeвa нaвкoлo Києвa! https://t.co/ultlETfEDC

81-шa oкpeмa aepoмoбiльнa бpигaдa Ocoбoвий cклaд бpигaди пpoдoвжyє нeвпиннo poзвивaтиcь y вiйcькoвiй cпpaвi тa зaкpiплювaти нaбyтi знaння aби y мaйбyтньoмy вдaлo викoнyвaти пocтaвлeнi бoйoвi зaвдaння! Пepeмoжeмo paзoм! Cлaвa Укpaїнi!UA https://t.co/Ot4cZqLdyB

Est. % of corpus

0.3%

0.3%

0.3%

#

34

35

36

Table 3.3 (continued)

Reassurance with hubris

(continued)

Cynicism about Ukrainian government waste, fraud and abuse. This post could be Russian propaganda designed to dismay

Informational, relatively significant development

Commentary

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues? 119

Russia did not respond to our request for Similar to (1) above, informational the Vienna Document. We take the next step. Ukraine is convening a meeting with Russia and all member states over the next 48 h to discuss the strengthening and relocation of Russian troops along our border and in the temporarily occupied Crimea Armed Forces of Ukraine. Always on Reassurance with hubris defense. Believe in the soldiers, believe in the Armed Forces! Let’s win together! Glory to Ukraine and its soldiers

Pociя нe вiдпoвiлa нa нaш зaпит зa Biдeнcьким дoкyмeнтoм. Mи poбимo нacтyпний кpoк. Укpaїнa cкликaє зycтpiч з PФ тa вciмa дepжaвaми-yчacницями пpoтягoм нacтyпниx 48 гoдин для oбгoвopeння пocилeння тa пepeмiщeння вiйcьк PФ yздoвж нaшoгo кopдoнy тa y тимчacoвo oкyпoвaнoмy Кpимy 1/2

«Збpoйнi Cили Укpaїни @ArmedForcesUkr. Зaвжди нa зaxиcтi» Bipтe в вoїнiв, вipтe в ЗCУ! Paзoм пepeмoжeмo! Cлaвa Укpaїнi тa її вoїнaм UA Telegram - https://t.co/GLExON wd4u; https://t.co/TTWCkBZyUr

2.4%

1.7%

38

39

Valentine’s Day marketing—unrelated to current conflict

Marshmallow tulips Box 15 * 23 cm. We accept orders and pre-orders until March 8 Delivery across Ukraine by new mail is possible

Tюльпaни з зeфipy Кopoбкa 15*23 cм. Пpиймaємo зaмoвлeння тa пpeдзaмoвлeння дo 8 бepeзня Moжливa дocтaвкa пo Укpaїнi нoвoю пoштoю https://t.co/978AjB9gVd

0.3%

37

Commentary

English summary

Most representative tweet

Est. % of corpus

#

Table 3.3 (continued)

120 3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

3.3 What Does Social Media Say About the Issues?

121

Fig. 3.10 Comparison of Ukrainian Armed forces and Polish police messaging during the respective border crises

3.3.3 Discussion of NATO in Both Russianand Ukrainian-Speaking Twitter Many of the themes we observed in the ‘NATO’ subset of the data are ones we have already discussed in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 above, and we will not recapitulate these. Here, we focus on additional points we observed that could help inform Western and NATO information maneuvers countering the deeply-ingrained negative attitudes among Russian speakers towards NATO. Representing 137 tweets in the ‘NATO’ dataset (around 0.8%) was the following tweet: The USA has been in existence almost 250 years, and NATO for more than 70 years. Neither the USA nor NATO has ever, in all this time, attacked us. But Putin and his toadies still scream every day about how the USA and NATO dream of capturing us. CШA cyщecтвyют пoчти 250 лeт. HATO - бoльшe 70 лeт. Hи CШA, ни HATO никoгдa зa вcё этo вpeмя нa нac нe нaпaдaли. Ho Пyтин и eгo xoлyи вcё paвнo кpичaт кaждый дeнь o тoм, чтo CШA и HATO мeчтaют нac зaxвaтить.

This post says, in a Russian speaker’s own words, what (as we pointed out on page 32) NATO has said it would like to be known—that it is a defensive, not offensive, alliance. A key and often under-estimated difficulty of cross-cultural communication is that messaging needs to be conveyed using the recipient’s language. And by ‘language’ here we mean more than just ‘Russian’; we mean using language, choice of words, phraseology, etc., that the recipient of the message himself would choose to use. This post therefore provides potentially very valuable information. Rather than Western and NATO communicators having to scratch their heads to imagine what language a native speaker in the Russian-language information environment

122

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

would use to convey the message that NATO is defensive, the existence of this message (which the analytics—reliably, assuming the sample is representative—tell us is relatively prevalent in the Russian-speaking Twittersphere) has already done this work for Western communicators. Other Russian-language Twitter posts that gained traction, which rebut the oftenheard Kremlin grievance that NATO allegedly promised not to expand eastwards, and which may similarly aid NATO communicators, were as follows: Putin says all the time that NATO promised not to expand eastwards. They opened the archives and checked – everything was a bit different from how the Russian President and state TV present it. In our project #Peresmotr (#Пepecмoтp), we recount what the USSR was and was not actually promised. Путин все время говорит, что НАТО обещали не расширять на восток. Открыли архивы и проверили - все было несколько иначе, чем это преподносят российский президент и госТВ. Рассказываем в нашем проекте #Пересмотр, что на самом деле обещали СССР, а что нет https://t.co/HSe96r0aBB NO ONE EVER PROMISED RUSSIA, GORBACHEV, YELTSIN, PUTIN, OR THE DEVIL HIMSELF, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EASTWARD EXPANSION OF NATO. UNDERSTAND? NO-ONE. THIS IS A LIE BY PUTIN. PERIOD. Sorry for the caps-lock. I just can’t stand these fibs any more. HИКTO И HИКOГДA HE OБEЩAЛ POCCИИ, ГOPБAЧЁBУ, EЛЬЦИHУ, ПУTИHУ..ДA XOTЬ CAMOMУ ЧЁPTУ, ЧTO PACШИPEHИЯ HATO HA BOCTOК HE БУДET. ПOHИMAETE, HИКTO. ЭTO ЛOЖЬ ПУTИHA. TOЧКA. пpocтитe зa кaпcлoк. пpocтo нeт yжe cил тepпeть этy бpexню.

And we also observed a somewhat less positive post which we have seen doing the rounds before, which cynically comments on Russian living conditions while insinuating that the negatives listed are actually results of current Russian government policies. In other words, the post exposes the deflection inherent in Russian government scapegoating of NATO: If NATO soldiers do come to Russia, then what? Will they lower the minimum wage to $162 a month? Will they destroy the roads? Will they vandalize the elevators and s**t in the entryways [to the apartment buildings]? Will they close the factories and open shopping centers instead? Will they impose new taxes on the population? Will they sell our natural resources and move the money offshore? Or what? Ecли в Poccию пpидyт coлдaты HATO, тo oни тoгдa чтo? Cдeлaют MPOT в $162? Paздoлбaют дopoги? Pacкypoчaт лифты и зacpyт пoдъeзды? Зaкpoют зaвoды и oткpoют вмecтo ниx тopгoвыe цeнтpы? Oблoжaт нaceлeниe пoбopaми? Бyдyт пpoдaвaть пpиpoдныe pecypcы и вывoдить дeньги в oфшopы? Или чтo?

The above Russian-language posts are somewhat surprising in that they are either positive about NATO, or at least cynical about official Russian criticism of NATO. It was surprising to us that there were not necessarily any more posts directly critical of NATO than positive about it (many posts were simply informational, mentioning latest developments involving Russia, Ukraine, and/or NATO). Among those that were negative, quite a few continue to bring up NATO’s involvement in Yugoslavia

3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications

123

in the 1990s. This is an issue which does not seem to die among Russians critical of NATO, and NATO and Western observers seeking to engage in information maneuvers should at least be aware of this fact. These were posts we noted: Lavrov recalled how NATO aggression against Yugoslavia began. The “trigger” then was the OSCE review from Kosovo: The head of the OSCE mission in the Serbian province of Kosovo, Walker, an American citizen, inflated the absolutely false topic of killing civilians allegedly in the village of Racak. Лaвpoв нaпoмнил, кaк нaчaлacь aгpeccия HATO пpoтив Югocлaвии. “Cпycкoвым кpючкoм” тoгдa, пocлyжил oтзыв OБCE из Кocoвa: “Pyкoвoдитeль миccии OБCE в cepбcкoм кpae Кocoвo Уoлкep, aмepикaнcкий гpaждaнин, paздyл aбcoлютнo лживyю тeмy yбийcтвa миpныx житeлeй якoбы в ceлe Paчaк. https://t.co/gvn2FH5GC9 Rally in support of Russia at the Ukrainian Embassy in Belgrade. Serbs know exactly how NATO’s concern for the well-being of peoples and the sovereignty of states ends for the natives. Mитинг в пoддepжкy Poccии y пocoльcтвa Укpaины в Бeлгpaдe. Cepбы тoчнo знaют чeм зaкaнчивaeтcя для тyзeмцeв зaбoтa HATO o блaгoпoлyчии нapoдoв и cyвepeнитeтe гocyдapcтв https://t.co/xwLga0LexJ

To conclude, we certainly observed negativity towards NATO in the Russianlanguage Twittersphere, although the balance between negative and positive was skewed more than we expected towards the latter. We believe Western communicators should pay particular attention to the positive Russian-language posts that gain traction, because these not only help an analyst understand maneuvers already going on in the information environment; they should also help inform Western counter-maneuvers, doing much of the work of Western communicators for them.

3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications In this chapter, we have surveyed a widespread Russian (and in particular Putin’s) view of Ukraine. Putin may normally put it with more subtlety than the ‘Ukraine is not a real country’ trope one sometimes hears from Russians,14 but the same basic idea underlies what he has written about and said with respect to Ukraine. This idea that Ukraine and Russia are an indivisible cultural whole, destined to be reunited, is both a motivating factor and a rationalization for Putin in rebuilding the Russian ‘sphere of influence’ that existed in Soviet times. It is worth adding that a darker view of what motivates Putin, and Stalin before him, would be that Putin (and those of a similar mindset to him in Russia) are envious of the greater freedom and success 14

While he may normally be more circumspect, Putin did in fact use exactly these words to US President George W. Bush at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest.

124

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

that Ukraine has enjoyed compared to Russia since Soviet times. The very fact that Ukraine and Russia are so culturally similar means that Ukraine makes Russia look bad by its very existence. NATO expansion and Russian oil and gas are important factors that play into the interrelationships between Russia, Ukraine, and countries to their west, but not always in the way one might assume. Our review of Twitter traffic is revealing in this regard, particularly with respect to NATO’s role. Yes, NATO is a key topic of discussion (even in the datasets we gathered without using ‘NATO’ as a search term), but NATO is not the cause of conflict—rather, it is a convenient bogeyman used in particular by Putin, also as a rationalization. Neither Ukrainians nor Russians, given their cultural similarities, will be convinced that internecine war between ‘fraternal nations’ is a good idea, so an external threat has to be conjured up. Yes, Russia has the natural resources to use oil and gas to drive wedges in Europe, but this is a dangerous game because Russia itself is so dependent on the revenues from the oil and gas. Regardless of cultural similarities, intermarriage, and other connections that undoubtedly do exist between Ukraine and Russia, Putin has, in the words of (Lyne 2022), ‘lost Ukraine’—achieving, at least so far, the opposite effect of rebuilding the ‘sphere of influence’. This highlights the risk for Putin inherent, as with oil and gas policy, in taking an aggressive, and oppressive, approach towards European neighbors: it often backfires. In recent communication and engagement with Russia, Western countries have taken many steps which are positive developments. The policy of pre-bunking— applied, for example, to possible false flag operations Russia might pursue to justify an invasion of Ukraine—is good in that it exposes what are essentially operations based on a type of disinformation, and makes those operations less likely to succeed. This is because, for their success, such operations rely on deceiving the global public.15 Where the specificity of pre-bunking is positive, less specific communications which may needlessly increase panic are not so positive, because they actually increase the likelihood of oppressive Russian intervention in Ukraine (whether military or political). In general, we believe the most successful communication strategy is based on clear, calm, fact-based reassurance. Communication of this type can include refuting disinformation. Review of the Twitter traffic confirms what we have found before: such communication can gain significant traction. Ukraine’s own official communications along these lines could be improved, we believe, by sticking more closely to facts and avoiding hyperbole, which can tend towards hubris. NATO and Western communicators can also leverage Russian-language social media content which expresses ideas, in Russian speakers’ own words, that NATO 15

While, in retrospect, pre-bunking clearly did not stop the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, we believe it is both emblematic of, and contributory towards, shorter shrift being given to Russian false narratives now than several years ago. In our mind, there is still no doubt that pre-bunking has been a positive and helpful development.

References

125

would like to be more widely known. We have pointed in this chapter to specific examples. It is always best when selling an idea to use the customer’s own vocabulary and thought patterns. In this chapter, we have also presented what we see as the key drivers of conflict between Russia and NATO. We believe that at the root, NATO must overcome ingrained views of NATO as a villain among Russian speakers. This is hard, but not impossible—and again, review of Russian-language Twitter traffic points to this. Indeed, following widespread horror among Russians at military action against Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, this may become an easier sell for NATO. A key selling-point NATO has on its side is the idea of free association and freedom of each nation to determine its security arrangements. This idea can and does find receptive ears in nations which, for a long time, have been subjected to different forms of geopolitical oppression by their neighboring nations. Self-determination and freedom are aspired to cross-culturally, and if they are sometimes elusive, perhaps that is because transparent, calm, factual communication is harder than it seems.

References Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Czechoslovakia. 1955. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May 14. Accessed Feburary 2, 2022. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ Volume%20219/volume-219-I-2962-Other.pdf. Argus Media. 2021. Gazprom plans for lower 4Q Belarus transit to EU, June 7. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2222462-gazprom-plans-for-lower-4q-belarus-tra nsit-to-eu. Arms Control Association. 1997. Opposition to NATO expansion, June 26. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-06/arms-control-today/oppositionnato-expansion. BBC. 2022a. Ukraine crisis: Don’t create panic, Zelensky tells West. BBC News, January 29. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60174684. ———. 2022b. Ukraine crisis: Putin says he does not want war in Europe. BBC.com, February 15. Accessed February 15, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60392259. Bloomberg. 2022. Gazprom Paves way to new China gas deal as sanctions hit Russia. Bloomberg News, February 28. Accessed February 28, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2022-02-28/gazprom-paves-way-to-new-china-gas-deal-as-sanctions-hit-russia. Cooks, Ed. 2017. Tillerson set for $180m payout if confirmed as secretary of state, January 17. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/98038198-d23f-11e6-9341-7393bb 2e1b51. Cooper, Julian. 2013. From USSR to Russia: the fate of the military economy. In Handbook of the economics and political economy of transition, ed. Paul Hare and Gerald Turley, 98–107. London and New York: Routledge. C-SPAN. 2021. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference, December 23. Accessed January 25, 2022. https://www.c-span.org/video/?516902-1/russian-president-vla dimir-putins-annual-news-conference.

126

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Disavino, Scott. 2022. Explainer: Could more LNG supplies get to Europe in the event of a crisis? Reuters, January 25. Accessed February 15, 2022. Ermolaev, Sergei. 2017. The formation and evolution of the Soviet Union’s oil and gas dependence, March 29. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/29/formationand-evolution-of-soviet-union-s-oil-and-gas-dependence-pub-68443. Foreign Affairs. 2021. Is America getting Russia wrong? November 18. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/events/2021-11-18/america-getting-russia-wrong. Friedman, Thomas L. 2022. Putin to Ukraine: ‘Marry me or I’ll kill you’. The New York Times, January 18. Accessed Febuary 4, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/18/opinion/putinukraine.html. Gazprom. 2020. Gazprom’s financial statements under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the year ended December 31, 2019, April 29. Accessed February 4, 2022. https:// www.gazprom.com/press/news/2020/april/article504264/. ———. 2022a. Nikolai Shulginov. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.gazprom.com/about/ management/directors/shulginov/. ———. 2022b. Nord Stream. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nordstream/. ———. 2022c. Nord Stream 2. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/ nord-stream2/. ———. 2022d. TurkStream. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/turkstream/. ———. 2022e. Yamal, February 4. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.gazprom.com/pro jects/yamal/. Gehrke, Laurenz. 2022. Former German Chancellor Schröder nominated for Gazprom board. Politico.eu, February 4. Accessed February 8, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/outragegermany-ex-chancellor-schroder-gazprom-board-nomination/. Hydrocarbons Technology. 2017. Yamal—Europe gas pipeline, September 27. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/yamal-europegaspipel/. Knickmeyer, Ellen, Jim Heintz, and Aamer Madhani. 2022. US: Over 130,000 Russian troops now staged outside Ukraine. ABC News. February 13. Accessed February 14, 2022. https://abcnews. go.com/US/wireStory/ukraines-leader-asks-evidence-invasion-warnings-82863566. Kontorovich, Aleksey. 2015. Oil and gas of the Russian arctic: History of development in the 20th century, resources, and strategy for the 21st century. Science First Hand 41. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://scfh.ru/en/papers/oil-and-gas-of-the-russian-arctic-history-of-development/. Kramer, Andrew. 2009. Russia cuts gas, and Europe shivers. New York Times, January 6. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07gazprom.html. ———. 2021. A Russian pipeline changes direction, and energy politics come to the fore. New York Times, November 11. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/30/ world/europe/russia-gas-pipeline-nordstream-putin.html. Kremlin.ru. 2014. Пocлaниe Пpeзидeнтa Фeдepaльнoмy Coбpaнию. Moscow, December 4. Accessed November 22, 2021. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173. Leffler, Melvyn P. 2018. Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What mattered most. Texas National Security Review, May. Accessed September 22, 2021. https://doi.org/10.15781/T2FJ29W93. Liptak, Kevin. 2022. Nord Stream 2 pipeline proves to be a sticking point in Biden and new German chancellor’s show of unity. CNN, February 7. Accessed February 8, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/ 2022/02/07/politics/biden-scholz-meeting-ukraine/index.html. Lu, Christina. 2022. Putin Blames U.S. for Ukraine Crisis. Foreign Policy, February 2. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/02/russia-ukraine-crisis-putin-demands/. Lukatsky, Efrem. 2022. Fears mount Russia will weaponise gas supplies over Ukraine crisis. January 23. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/fears-mount-russia-willweaponise-gas-supplies-over-ukraine-crisis-xxng6v87b.

References

127

Lyne, Roderic, Interview by Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). 2022. Russia, Ukraine and NATO: The view from London, February 16. Myre, Greg. 2022. As Russia threatens Ukraine, the U.S. ‘pre-bunks’ Russian propaganda. NPR.org, February 8. Accessed February 15, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/02/08/1079213726/as-rus sia-threatens-ukraine-the-u-s-pre-bunks-russian-propaganda. NATO. 2022a. A short history of NATO. Accessed January 25, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/declassified_139339.htm. ———. 2022b. NATO-Russia relations: The facts, January 21. Accessed January 2022. https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm#c104. Nord Stream 2. 2017. Nord stream 2 AG and European energy companies sign financing agreements, April 24. Accessed February 15, 2022. https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/ nord-stream-2-ag-and-european-energy-companies-sign-financing-agreements-47/. Nord Stream. 2010. Nord sream’s project costs remain 7.4 billion euros, April 15. Accessed February 15, 2022. https://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/nord-stream-s-project-costsremain-74-billion-euros-367/. O’Brien, Miles, and Courtney Norris. 2022. Why are U.S. airlines concerned about 5G? PBS, January 19. Accessed January 20, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-are-u-s-air lines-concerned-about-5g. O’Hanlon, Michael E., and David G. Victor. 2022. If Russia invades, sanction its oil and gas. Brookings.edu, January 26. Accessed February 14, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2022/01/26/if-russia-invades-sanction-its-oil-and-gas. Patriarchia.ru. 2022. ИHTEPBЬЮ MИTPOПOЛИTA MИHCКOГO И ЗACЛABCКOГO BEHИAMИHA БEЛOPУCCКИM TEЛEКAHAЛAM OHT И CTB. Pravoslavie.ru. January 10. Accessed January 20, 2022. https://pravoslavie.ru/143863.html. PBS. 2022. Biden draws a line on Ukraine, but how will Russia view his message? PBS Newshour. February 15. Accessed February 16, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/biden-drawsa-line-on-ukraine-but-how-will-russia-view-his-message. Pipes, Richard. 1996. The unknown Lenin. New Haven: Yale University Press. Prince, Todd. 2020. Russia launches into new export territory with turkstream natural-gas pipeline. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, January 7. Accessed February 6, 2022. https://www.rferl.org/ a/russia-launches-itself-into-new-export-territory-with-turkstream-natural-gas-pipeline/303 64755.html. Putin, Vladimir, Interview by David Frost. 2000. BBC breakfast with Frost, March 5. Accessed January 25, 2022. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/breakfast_ with_frost/transcripts/putin5.mar.txt. Reed, Stanley. 2022. Natural gas shipments, mostly from U.S., ease Europe’s energy crunch. The New York Times, February 3. Accessed February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/ 03/business/natural-gas-europe-us.html. Reuters. 2017. Poland not concerned about Yamal transit fees—Naimski, June 20. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/article/poland-gas-idAFL8N1JH27B. RFE/RL. 2004. Newsline—March 31, 2004. Accessed January 25, 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/ 1143128.html. ———. 2019. Russia, Ukraine reach five-year gas-transit deal, December 31. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/long-russia-ukraine-reach-five-year-gas-transit-deal/ 30353000.html. Roman, Gregg. 2022. Biden should beware of Russia and Qatar. Jewish News Syndicate, January 30. https://www.jns.org/opinion/biden-should-beware-of-russia-and-qatar. Rosneft. 2020. Consolidated financial statements Rosneft Oil Company for the year ended December 31, 2019, February 19. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.rosneft.ru/docs/report/2019/en. html.

128

3 The Real Drivers of Russia’s War in Ukraine

TASS. 2021a. Almost all oil produced in Russia will be hard to recover in a decade—official, November 24. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://tass.com/economy/1365623. ———. 2021b. Gas reserves in Russia will last more than 100 years—Miller, September 17. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://tass.com/economy/1339019. ———. 2022. Reverse gas supplies via Yamal-Europe continue for one month, January 20. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://tass.com/economy/1390801. The Brookings Institution. 2017. Remarks of Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Director, U.S. Office of Government Ethics. The Brookings Institution Website, January 11. Accessed February 4, 2022. https:// www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20170111_oge_shaub_remarks.pdf. United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 2018. Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for national security. govinfo.gov, January 10. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-115SPRT28110/pdf/CPRT115SPRT28110.pdf. US Energy Information Administration. 2014. 16% of natural gas consumed in Europe flows through Ukraine, March 14. Accessed January 14, 2022. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php? id=15411. ———. 2015. Russia is world’s largest producer of crude oil and lease condensate, August 6. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=22392. ———. 2021a. Russia, December 13. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.eia.gov/internati onal/analysis/country/RUS. ———. 2021b. U.S. liquefied natural gas export capacity will be world’s largest by end of 2022, December 9. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 50598. ———. 2021c. Ukraine, August. Accessed February 9, 2022. https://www.eia.gov/international/ analysis/country/UKR. Wise, Alana. 2022. U.S. says Russia is planning a staged attack in Ukraine to justify an invasion, February 3. Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1078045214/u-s-saysrussia-is-planning-a-staged-attack-in-ukraine-to-justify-an-invasion. Wright, Oliver, Emily Gosden, and Henry Zeffman. 2022. Fears mount Russia will weaponise gas supplies over Ukraine crisis, January 23. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://www.thetimes.co. uk/article/fears-mount-russia-will-weaponise-gas-supplies-over-ukraine-crisis-xxng6v87b. Zhdannikov, Dmitry. 2022. Russia faces major disruptions to oil, commodities flows without SWIFT. Reuters, February 27. Accessed February 28, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/russiafaces-major-disruptions-oil-commodities-flows-without-swift-2022-02-27/. Apгyмeнты и фaкты. 2018. Toвap в нaгpyзкy. Кaк измeнилacь пpaктикa «лишнeй» пoкyпки co вpeмeн CCCP? AIF.by, October 24. Accessed February 8, 2022. https://aif.by/timefree/his tory/tovar_v_nagruzku_kak_izmenilas_praktika_lishney_pokupki_so_vremen_sssr. Гepacимoв, Baлepий. 2013. Цeннocть нayки в пpeдвидeнии. Boeннo-пpoмышлeнный кypьep, February 26. Accessed February 15, 2022. http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. Дyгин, Aлeкcaндp. n.d. Eвpaзийcкий пpoeкт и eгo yкpaинcкaя пpoблeмa. Accessed September 22, 2021. http://www.odnako.org/magazine/material/evraziyskiy-proekt-i-ego-ukrainskaya-pro blema/. Hикoлaeвич, Maкcимoв Пaвeл. 2021. TEЗИCЫ дoклaдa нa зaceдaнии ceкции cтaтиcтики ЦДУ PAH 21.05.2021 пo тeмe: «Oпpeдeлeниe дoли нeфтeгaзoвoгo ceктopa в вaлoвoм внyтpeннeм пpoдyктe Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции». Abstract, Фeдepaльнaя cлyжбa гocyдapcтвeннoй cтaтиcтики. Accessed January 24, 2022. https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/med iabank/1b5RpebS/Maximov-tezisy.pdf. Пpeзидeнт Poccии. 2021. Бoльшaя пpecc-кoнфepeнция Bлaдимиpa Пyтинa. Kremlin.ru, December 23. Accessed February 17, 2022. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67438.

References

129

Пyтин, B. B. 2022. Oбpaщeниe Пpeзидeнтa Poccии Bлaдимиpa Пyтинa к нaции. Пepвый кaнaл, February 21. Accessed February 28, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vEE_vS6aeMQ. Пyтин, Bлaдимиp. 2021. Oб иcтopичecкoм eдинcтвe pyccкиx и yкpaинцeв. Kremlin.ru, July 12. Accessed January 20, 2022. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181. Poccийcкaя гaзeтa. 2016. Ecть ли жизнь бeз нeфти, March 16. Accessed February 13, 2022. https://rg.ru/2016/03/16/glava-minprirody-rasskazal-kogda-v-rossii-zakonchitsia-neft.html.

Chapter 4

The Polish Information Environment

Fig. 4.1 Eurasian distribution of native speakers of Indo-European languages. Image by LilBillWilliams, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indo-European_branches_map. png, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_4

131

132

4 The Polish Information Environment

Abstract Poland is a liminal country in Europe. As the tides of great-power competition ebbed and flowed in the twentieth century, Poland first found itself in the Warsaw Pact, under the sway of the Soviet Union for most of the Cold War. Today, however, Poland is a fully-fledged member of both NATO and the European Union. A Slavic country like its eastern neighbor Belarus, Poland nevertheless uses Roman instead of Cyrillic script. This is not a historical accident, but the result of Poland’s acceptance of Roman Catholicism in AD 966, contrasting with its eastern neighbors (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) having been baptized into Orthodoxy under Kievan Rus. Even today, Catholicism is still very much bound together with Polish identity—92.9% of Poles self-identify as Catholic with 61.6% stating that religion is ‘of high or very high importance’ to them (Statistics Poland 2016). These facts go a long way towards explaining Poland’s cultural conservatism compared to other EU and NATO nations. For many of the reasons listed above, Poland’s relationships with both its EU and NATO partners have often been uneasy. In this chapter, we consider how recent issues and events surrounding Poland, which have come to the fore, can be better understood through this cultural prism. The issues and events we discuss are related to one another, and are (1) the conflict with the European Union about the primacy of EU law; (2) how Polish nationalism is threatening to reopen wounds from World War II, to undermine the integrity of the historical narrative, and to put stumbling-blocks in relations between Poland and other countries; and (3) the conflict involving predominantly Middle Eastern migrants that has lately transpired on the Polish-Belarusian border. In the context of the third of these issues/events, we analyze Twitter data collected from both sides of the Polish/Belarusian border (‘both sides’ in at least a linguistic and cultural, if not physical sense) and look at what it says about the information maneuvers that are going on inside Poland, and that are directed toward Poland, and how these information maneuvers may differ on the two sides. Amidst the Poland-Belarus crisis, provocations by Belarusian border forces and the support being provided to Poland by other NATO countries have raised the specter of a risk of escalation between NATO and Russia/Belarus. It is important to note that when the first draft of this chapter was written, Russian troops had also massed on the border of Ukraine, causing concern to the current US Secretary of State and other US and world leaders, and raising questions about how and whether NATO should respond to deter any further Russian aggression against Ukraine. We are not the only analysts to note the possibility that the events in Belarus were being used, opportunistically or in a planned way, by Putin to distract from or provide cover for Russian troop maneuvers further east (Lohsen 2021). While the way we collect data for our analysis would not necessarily shed light on this, it is important that the reader should not lose sight of the wider context of Russian maneuvers. This is a useful illustration of the limitations of any survey of the information environment: there is always a risk of getting drawn into a distraction, with computerized analysis simply lending ‘authoritativeness’ to a previously held view. The human user of an analysis must always retain responsibility for making sure he or she is not wearing blinders, which means being ready to question everything appropriately (Heuer 1999). All this notwithstanding, with Poland’s liminal status, the risk for NATO and

4.1 Background

133

the EU is that actors to the east may be able to drive a wedge between Poland and its western partners. This risk is greater than for NATO/EU countries without the aforementioned liminal factors. We conclude the chapter by considering what our findings may tell us about how that risk may best be mitigated, and suggesting ways to frame friendly information maneuvers to maximize the chances they will fall upon receptive ears in the region.

4.1 Background 4.1.1 Language, Culture, and Religion as Predictors of Geopolitical Fault Lines Language is a good place to start to understand culture and cultural dynamics. Not only does present-day linguistic usage give away many clues as to how different groups of people perceive and talk about the same sets of facts (Montell 2021), but the national languages of the world exhibit structural, phonological and lexical relationships to one another that hint at the ‘family tree’ of the nations. By considering the data embedded in languages, we can get a sense of how people groups in ancient times migrated and became nations. This is part of what is considered in the fields of historical linguistics and comparative philology. Two ways to view the high-level picture of how nations formed are cartographically (on a map) and phylogenetically (as a family tree). Figure 4.1 shows the broad distribution of European and Asian speakers of Indo-European languages. On this map, the colors represent the branches of Indo-European. Principal branches shown are: • • • •

Red—Germanic Brown—Romance Green—Slavic Purple—Indo-Iranian

Figure 4.2, from Chang et al. (2015) (who use a different color scheme), claims to show the genetic relationships between the peoples who are native speakers of these branches of the Indo-European languages. The horizontal axis shows years BP (before present), so from this representation, we would infer that the Slavic and Germanic branches of Indo-European diverged at some time around 2800 BC. Detailed discussion of Chang and Chundra (2015) is beyond our scope here, but interestingly, they use a statistical lexical analysis on the basis of which they are able to affirm a particular view of how the ancient ‘families’ represented by the modern-day languages spread throughout Eurasia—which of course has a bearing on the map in Fig. 4.1. This view (accepted, as Chang et al. note, by many contemporary linguists), known as the ‘steppe hypothesis’, says that proto-Indo-European

134

4 The Polish Information Environment

Fig. 4.2 Indo-European family tree from Chang and Chundra (2015)

(the assumed language of the top-level ancestors) was spoken in the Pontic-Caspian steppe, north of the Black and Caspian Seas (Gimbutas 1973), implying that these ancestors and their families carried their language (and later languages) northwest, northeast, and southeast as they migrated from this region (compare with Fig. 4.1).

4.1 Background

135

What makes this particularly relevant is that part of this key region of steppe, now the Crimean Peninsula and eastern Ukraine, is a center of dispute today. This area, the location of pro-Russian and Russian occupying forces, displays the first instance in Europe since World War II of a country moving to annex another country’s territory. But as we will discuss in Chap. 6, this same northern Black Sea region was also identified by the ancient historian Josephus as the territory of the Scythian tribe (Josephus AD 93); and the Scythian tribe, according to some Russians, is the ancient ancestral tribe from whom the Russian nation came (Блoк 1918). All this lends color—and potentially understanding for a Western observer—to a statement Russian President Vladimir Putin made on December 4, 2014, in which Putin attempted to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine: It was an event of special significance for the country and the people, because Crimea is where our people live, and the peninsula is of strategic importance for Russia as the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation and a centralized Russian state. It was in Crimea, in the ancient city of Chersonesus or Korsun, as ancient Russian chroniclers called it, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized before bringing Christianity to Rus. In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their material culture, a common territory, even though its borders were not marked then, and a nascent common economy and government, Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of a Russian nation and Russian state. It was thanks to this spiritual unity that our forefathers for the first time and forevermore saw themselves as a united nation. All of this allows us to say that Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism. This is exactly how we will approach this matter now and for evermore. Для нaшeй cтpaны, для нaшeгo нapoдa этo coбытиe имeeт ocoбoe знaчeниe. Пoтoмy, чтo в Кpымy живyт нaши люди, и caмa тeppитopия cтpaтeгичecки вaжнa, пoтoмy чтo имeннo здecь нaxoдитcя дyxoвный иcтoк фopмиpoвaния мнoгoликoй, нo мoнoлитнoй pyccкoй нaции и цeнтpaлизoвaннoгo Poccийcкoгo гocyдapcтвa. Beдь имeннo здecь, в Кpымy, в дpeвнeм Xepcoнece, или, кaк нaзывaли eгo pyccкиe лeтoпиcцы, Кopcyни, пpинял кpeщeниe князь Bлaдимиp, a зaтeм и кpecтил вcю Pycь. Hapядy c этничecкoй близocтью, языкoм и oбщими элeмeнтaми мaтepиaльнoй кyльтypы, oбщeй, xoтя и нe oчepчeннoй тoгдa ycтoйчивыми гpaницaми тeppитopиeй, нapoждaющeйcя coвмecтнoй xoзяйcтвeннoй дeятeльнocтью и влacтью князя xpиcтиaнcтвo явилocь мoщнoй дyxoвнoй oбъeдиняющeй cилoй, кoтopaя пoзвoлилa включить в фopмиpoвaниe eдинoй pyccкoй нaции и oбpaзoвaниe oбщeй гocyдapcтвeннocти caмыe paзныe пo кpoви плeмeнa и плeмeнныe coюзы вceгo oбшиpнoгo вocтoчнocлaвянcкoгo миpa. И имeннo нa этoй дyxoвнoй пoчвe нaши пpeдки впepвыe и нaвceгдa ocoзнaли ceбя eдиным нapoдoм. И этo дaёт нaм вce ocнoвaния cкaзaть, чтo для Poccии Кpым, дpeвняя Кopcyнь, Xepcoнec, Ceвacтoпoль имeют oгpoмнoe цивилизaциoннoe и caкpaльнoe знaчeниe. Taк жe, кaк Xpaмoвaя гopa в Иepycaлимe для тex, ктo иcпoвeдyeт иcлaм или иyдaизм. Имeннo тaк мы и бyдeм к этoмy oтнocитьcя oтнынe и нaвceгдa. (Kremlin.ru 2014)

Essentially, Putin was pointing to the same aforementioned ideas (which might be considered ‘fringe’ in Western thinking simply in that they are not widely held or discussed, yet are not for that reason necessarily false): that the Russian nation holds historical claim to the steppe lands where its ancestors lived in the mists of time. If, of

136

4 The Polish Information Environment

course, the ‘steppe hypothesis’ is true, what is left unsaid by Putin is that any other nations that branched out from the Indo-European family tree, including Ukraine (like Russia, an East Slavic nation), would have equal claims to these territories. But what does all this have to do with Poland, located to the relatively distant northwest of these steppes? As is evident from Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, Poland is a Slavic nation, a close relative to Russia on the Indo-European family tree, sharing much in common culturally (not to mention linguistically) with its ‘relations’. This is true not just in ancient history, but in recent history too. It is noteworthy in Fig. 4.1, for example, that the borders of Slavdom closely track those of the countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, with the exception of East Germany, Hungary and Romania. By and large, Slavic nations (plus their eastern European and Central Asian neighbors)—including Poland—were those that were aligned with Soviet Communism until the fall of the Soviet Union. One can conjecture along the lines of Huntington (1996) that this may say something about the Slavic culture and mindset. But even aside from the eastern European and Central Asian anomalies (explainable, perhaps, because their geographic proximity caused them to fall under the Communist influence of Slavs), the case of Poland shows that not everything reduces to quite such a simple hypothesis (that Slavic culture basically explains the major geopolitical fault lines of eastern Europe). Poland today, of course, is a NATO and European Union member, along with other former Warsaw Pact countries Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Of these, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria are Slavic. Among Slavic European countries, this leaves just the countries of former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia), which were socialist, but not aligned with the Warsaw Pact. All the countries of former Yugoslavia but Serbia are now also NATO members; Serbia often remains aligned with Russia on many issues of geopolitics. Even with these anomalies, though, one need not completely jettison Huntington’s hypothesis (ibid.). Another cultural dimension which may contribute to explaining present-day fractures (and one Huntington alludes to) has its roots in history more recent than ancient migrations of clans and people groups, yet still centuries old: the divide between the Eastern Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant religious traditions. By and large, those nations that are now aligned with NATO are those whose ancestors accepted Catholic or Protestant Christianity rather than Orthodox Christianity. Another way to visualize this is as follows, where it becomes clear that the intersection of Slavic ethnicity and the predominance of Eastern Orthodox Christianity is a very good predictor of which nations did not join NATO (and in many cases currently remain hostile to NATO). To be clear, this is a working hypothesis, but it is one that would fit with the parallels, which we note in Chap. 5, between Orthodox practices such as revering icons and ‘relics’ (practices that existed in pre-revolutionary Russia) and Soviet institutions that still persist, such as the mausoleum and statues of Lenin. Soviet ideology may come and go, but it is hard for the leopard to change its spots.

4.1 Background

137

While it is a working hypothesis with limited explanatory power, the chart in Fig. 4.3 could be seen as a model for understanding cultural risk factors that NATO planners might want to consider. For example, those countries closest culturally to the ones hostile to NATO might be at greater risk to hostile subversion. This might apply particularly to North Macedonia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, or perhaps Romania, but strategic significance is not necessarily equal for every country. Poland may rightly be an especial area of focus, as it borders four former Soviet republics (Russia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine), three of which are involved in conflicts which are particularly problematic for NATO today. All this is to say that Poland, in addition to being of strategic importance, is geopolitically a liminal country (Fig. 4.4). It is Slav, yet overwhelmingly Catholic. (In the 2015 census, 92.9% of Polish citizens self-identified as Catholic, with 61.6% saying that religion is of ‘high or very high importance’ to them; and in the 2011 Poland census, 97% of respondents self-identified as ethnically Polish.) As geopolitical tides have ebbed and flowed, Poland has found itself as a socialist country in the

Fig. 4.3 Former socialist countries in Europe by mix of Eastern and Western Christianity, Slavic ethnicity, and current NATO membership status

138

4 The Polish Information Environment

Fig. 4.4 Author photo of Plac Zamkowy, Warsaw in 2017. The medieval city center was rebuilt after World War II

Warsaw Pact (Fig. 4.5), and then as a NATO and European Union member, raising the question of whether alternating tides could turn again. Recently, Poland has been at the vortex of a conflict between NATO and Russia-aligned Belarus involving migrants. Also, because of the characteristically Slav cultural conservatism and nationalism motivating its government, Poland does not sit easily in the European Union (EU), often coming into conflict with the EU with respect to both rule of law and liberal democratic principles. As we shall see, there are unifying themes here. These themes can help both explain the conflicts and point the way to information maneuvers that would help mitigate and resolve such conflicts.

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland In order to convey an effective understanding of Poland’s information environment landscape, we first survey the major neighboring geopolitical events that it continues to be shaped by. While many analyses of conflict distinguish between ‘kinetic’ versus ‘non-kinetic’ warfare, we think it is useful to add to this distinction another one: ‘outsourced’ versus ‘insourced’. A government engaged in a conflict can either

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland

139

Fig. 4.5 Author photo of the Lenin Ironworks near Kraków in 1988. Aside from the Latin script, this could have been a scene in the Soviet Union, which had a heavy imprint on Poland before eastern European countries escaped from under the Soviet thumb

use resources immediately available to them (insourcing) or engage in conduct that transfers the burden of action to another, separate group (outsourcing). Note, also, that both insourced and outsourced conflict can be kinetic or non-kinetic. With this in mind, we will examine the current major conflicts surrounding Poland.

4.2.1 The EU Versus Poland on Primacy of Law On October 27, 2021, following a Polish judicial ruling, the EU ordered Poland to pay a sum of e1,000,000 ($1.1 million) per day because Poland had ‘… not suspended the application of the provisions of national legislation…’ (Court of Justice of the European Union 2021). At the time we went to press, Poland owed the EU at least e237,000,000 (at the current exchange rate, about the same amount in US dollars), and the EU had started withholding from EU funds earmarked for Poland to extinguish the debt. This conflict between the EU and Poland has been a long time in the making and has its roots in questions about rule of law. In various parts of multiple legal documents, the EU requires that all members need to ‘…comply… with all the EU’s standards and rules’ (European Commission 2021). In this respect, the EU operates similarly to the US. The federal government makes laws that apply to all

140

4 The Polish Information Environment

US citizens, who are additionally subject to their own states’ laws, providing the latter do not conflict with the US Constitution, much as EU citizens are subject to laws of both the EU and of their own countries. However, the strength of national identity is different from state-based identity, which lays seeds for greater conflict in the EU than in the US. People living in EU nations tend to identify more as members of their country than as members of the EU, while in the USA, nationalism tends to be connected more with identification as American than with any state. With this in mind, we can look back at a 2005 ruling from the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, which foreshadowed the current conflict between Poland and the EU. After Poland formally joined the EU in 2004, the Tribunal was tasked with making a ruling on the compatibility of EU law and the Polish constitution (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2005). While at the time the Tribunal found that the two were mutually compatible, the Tribunal pointed out that in its opinion, the Polish constitution has the final say over the EU’s laws: Poland’s accession to the European Union does not undermine the status of the Constitution as “the supreme law of the Republic of Poland” (Article 8 (1)). In the territory of the Republic of Poland, the Constitution has the priority of validity and application… - in relation to the norms of derivative Community law. Przyst˛apienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej nie podwa˙za statusu Konstytucji jako „najwy˙zszego prawa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej” (art. 8 ust. 1). Na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej przysługuje Konstytucji pierwsze´nstwo obowi˛azywania i stosowania… w stosunku do norm pochodnego prawa wspólnotowego. (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2005)

Furthermore, the Tribunal itself implicitly recognized the possibility of future conflict, stating that Poland was now entering an area where ‘…we are dealing with the parallel application of two autonomous legal orders - Polish and EU’) (‘…mamy do czynienia z równoległym obowi˛azywaniem dwóch autonomicznych porz˛adków prawnych - polskiego i unijnego’) (ibid.). The Tribunal goes on to say: … in the event of such a collision [between EU law and the Polish Constitution] it would be the sovereign decision of the Republic of Poland either to amend the Constitution accordingly, or to introduce changes to Community regulations, or - ultimately - to withdraw from the European Union. …w wypadku wyst˛apienia takiej kolizji do suwerennej decyzji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej nale˙załoby albo dokonanie odpowiedniej zmiany Konstytucji, albo spowodowanie zmian w regulacjach wspólnotowych, albo - ostatecznie - wyst˛apienie z Unii Europejskiej. (ibid.)

Although only theorized about at the time, perhaps some form of conflict was indeed inevitable, as sixteen years later this very issue of primacy of law has sprung up between Poland and the EU. The Tribunal in 2021 ruled that, under Article 1 of the Treaty of the European Union, ‘the Republic of Poland cannot function as a sovereign and democratic state’ (‘Rzeczpospolita Polska nie mo˙ze funkcjonowa´c jako pa´nstwo suwerenne i demokratyczne’) (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2021). Furthermore, apparently contradicting its 2005 ruling, the Tribunal states that the Polish constitution is not compatible with the Treaty of the European Union. The presence of migrants on Poland’s border also represented a challenge to rule of law which might have had the potential to aggravate the conflict between the EU and

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland

141

Poland. More background about the Polish-Belarus border will be given in Sect. 4.2.3, but here we draw attention to one particular point: the issue of ‘pushbacks’. In dealing with the migrant crisis, Poland has been accused of pushing migrants out of Poland back into Belarus. This does indeed appear to be contrary to EU human rights law (European Court of Human Rights 2021), but as of now the EU has not attempted to enforce this law in Poland, instead simply submitting an inquiry to Poland to justify its position (ibid.). Avoiding heavy-handedness against Poland during a time of crisis may be the motivation underlying the EU’s current response to Poland’s actions. While the EU clearly wants to retain supremacy of law over Poland, it also appears that political opinion in the EU has, since 2015, swung against a large influx of migrants into the EU. We observe therefore that Poland, although being condemned by various human rights groups (e.g., Grupa Granica)—and even the Pope—for breaching EU law (BBC 2021b), has not been forced to comply with accepting migrants. Poland has been able to continue pushing migrants back, or use water cannons to deter border crossings, and the EU has been able to provide a de jure condemnation without taking action. But in any case, rather than further split the fracturing relationship, the issue of migrants on the Belarus-Poland border has perhaps had the effect of bringing Poland and the EU into greater solidarity with one another, also aligning the Polish government with a large swathe of anti-migrant political opinion further west (Mieri¸na and Koro¸leva 2015). It is also worth noting that the concept of what constitutes a ‘pushback’ may contain many gray areas. The fact that the ‘pushback’ controversy keeps rearing its head, and many different European countries have found themselves arguing over when a pushback is really a pushback (and therefore illegal), seems to demonstrate ample opportunity for slips’ twixt cup and lip on the issue. Parallels have been drawn between Poland’s actions and pushbacks by Greece in the Aegean Sea (Foreign Policy 2021), the United Kingdom in the English Channel (The New Statesman 2021), and Spain in the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Foreign Policy 2021). Some of the gray areas are likely to be geographically specific. For example, it is sometimes claimed that the Polish-Belarusian border has a ‘neutral zone’. If this were true, a migrant forced to return from the neutral zone to Belarus ‘proper’ could, in theory, have been considered to have been illegally pushed back. But claims of the existence of a ‘neutral zone’ should be treated with skepticism: they may also reflect a false narrative manufactured by Belarus to deflect culpability for the treatment of migrants at the border. The so-called ‘neutral zone’ or ‘neutral strip’ (‘нeйтpaльнaя зoнa’ or ‘нeйтpaльнaя пoлoca’) has been mentioned in Belarusian media since August 2021 (Sputnik 2021). Allegedly, once migrants are in the neutral zone, they are no longer Belarus’s problem, no matter if they are dying, hungry, or cold; according to Belarusian telling, Belarus is there only to help alleviate someone else’s problem (Бeлapycь ceгoдня 2021). But the notion that a neutral zone exists is contradicted by the testimony of Belarusian officials themselves, one of whom said the following in an interview about the Lithuanian, Polish, and Latvian borders with Belarus:

142

4 The Polish Information Environment

The state border is a line and a surface passing vertically along it, which separates the territory of waters, subsoil, land, air space, and so on. Therefore, no neutral territory exists. Гocyдapcтвeннaя гpaницa — этo линия и вepтикaльнo пpoxoдящaя пo нeй пoвepxнocть, кoтopaя paздeляeт тeppитopию вoд, нeдpoв, cyши, вoздyшнoe пpocтpaнcтвo и тaк дaлee. Пoэтoмy никaкoй нeйтpaльнoй тeppитopии нe cyщecтвyeт. (Бeлopycы и pынoк 2021)

In addition, the state border committee of Belarus does not list any ‘neutral zones’ on its website (Гocyдapcтвeнный пoгpaничный кoмитeт Pecпyблики Бeлapycь 2021). The director of Belset, the Polish news organization aimed at reaching Belarusians, further confirmed that there is no ‘neutral zone’, only a ‘border zone’ (TVP Info 2021). Testimony from multiple sources confirms therefore that neither Belarus nor Poland can claim that there exists some gray area between them where neither has jurisdiction. While the alleged neutral zones are likely an example of a gray area which exists largely because of disinformation on the Belarusian side, there are other more real gray areas associated with pushbacks. What about use of water cannon from Polish territory proper over the border? What if the neighboring country’s (here, Belarusian) border forces are actively pushing third-country citizens through a gap in a fence created by those very border forces? The point here is that some gray areas encountered on the Poland-Belarus border may in fact be new artifacts of conflict, created precisely because of Belarus’s outsourcing of its conflict and other tactics. New vectors of attack may even call for rethinking the definition of pushback. And the gray nature of the conflict may work to the benefit of Poland since, given a lack of clarity, Poland’s detractors may have less of a legal case against Poland.

4.2.2 Polish Nationalism and World War II Present-day Polish nationalism has its roots in many historical elements. Much, indeed, boils down to no more than inter-ethnic distrust and even hatred that is common to the human condition across geography and time, as alluded to in Sect. 4.1. In recent history, World War II (WWII) was extremely formational in the Polish consciousness, in both positive and negative ways. In WWII, Poland was subject to multiple offenses, retreats, and wholesale destruction. The initial 1939 invasion of Poland, widely held to have been the start of the war, was by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia—a pincer maneuver that split the country in two between the occupying forces (Dziewanowski 2003). Then, two years later, the Nazis launched Operation Barbarossa, the offensive through the Soviet-occupied half of Poland that ultimately led to the defeat of the Nazis in Moscow (ibid.). The Soviets would ultimately push back all the way to Berlin, with Soviet military forces again traversing Poland (ibid.). It is understandable that all this fighting, conducted over a short period of time in their homeland, would turn Poles against the Nazis and the Soviets (and echoes of this will be seen in our social media analysis in Sect. ‘Polish Twitter Analysis’). Even today, in Poland’s era of EU membership, we find evidence for disdain by Poles towards Belarus and Russia.

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland

143

It is worth noting that in acts of national repentance, West German postwar administrations disassociated themselves from both Nazism and Communism, banning the Nazi party in 1952 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1952) and the Communist Party in 1956 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1956). The governments in Belarus and Russia have not done anything comparable with respect to their Soviet heritage, as we discuss in Chap. 5. What is more, key officials in Russia and Belarus are former USSR officials—Putin, for example, was a former KGB agent, and Lukashenko a Soviet collective farm deputy. Whether or not Poles in general are sensitive to the distinction between German repudiation of Germany’s WWII crimes, and Russia and Belarus’s non-repudiation of wrongs committed against Poland, many Poles see their eastern neighbors as a continuation of the Soviet system that they were subject to for over 40 years, and wish to promote themselves as the anti-Nazi, anti-Soviet country that valiantly fought against these powers. In addition to all this, there is the key question of attitudes towards Jews, many of whom resided in Poland before WWII, and whose fate was undeniably a central issue in WWII. The stance of Poles towards Jews historically and even today is far from straightforward (Chew 2021a). Very few Poles wish to be associated with the Holocaust, for obvious reasons. However, Poles who distance themselves from the Holocaust do so in varying ways, ranging from the healthy repudiation similar to that exhibited by postwar German administrations to an unhealthy form of denial. Perhaps as an example of the latter approach, Poland’s government turned recently to a stance and policy of ‘zero tolerance’ nationalism which pushes back on any admission of helping or being complicit with the Nazis. Perhaps the most notable example of this zero tolerance approach was in 2018, when Poland enacted an antidefamation law that outlawed any claims that Poland was responsible or complicit during the Holocaust, saying, Whoever claims, publicly and contrary to the facts, that the Polish Nation or the Republic of Poland is responsible or co-responsible for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich… or for other felonies that constitute crimes against peace, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or whoever otherwise grossly diminishes the responsibility of the true perpetrators of said crimes – shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Kto publicznie i wbrew faktom przypisuje Narodowi Polskiemu lub Pa´nstwu Polskiemu odpowiedzialno´sc´ lub współodpowiedzialno´sc´ za popełnione przez III Rzesz˛e Niemieck˛a..., lub za inne przest˛epstwa stanowi˛ace zbrodnie przeciwko pokojowi, ludzko´sci lub zbrodnie wojenne lub w inny sposób ra˙za˛ co pomniejsza odpowiedzialno´sc´ rzeczywistych sprawców tych zbrodni, podlega grzywnie lub karze pozbawienia wolno´sci do lat 3. (Dziennik Ustaw 2018)

Despite this chilling backdrop of official denial, some in Poland are undeterred in confronting the truth of what happened and facing up to it, surely a necessary step in turning away from past wrongs. Holocaust research continues in Poland even after the implementation of this new law. In 2018, for example, a Polish Holocaust historian, Barbara Engelking, published a book containing a claim that certain Poles were complicit in the murder of Jews (Engelking and Grabowski 2018). Engelking was subsequently sued for defamation—the resulting ruling stated that the author must apologize for alleging ‘complicity in murdering Jews’ (Dziennik Gazeta Prawna

144

4 The Polish Information Environment

2021). Elsewhere, we have explored this situation, using greater context and Twitter analysis to understand the popular reaction in Poland to the court case and Engelking’s efforts to get to the truth about Poles’ roles in the Holocaust. We found that a significant minority of reactions among Poles are anti-Semitic, and a large number exhibited some form of ‘Polish nationalism’-fueled denial (Chew 2021a). Whether this was also fueled by the 2018 law is unclear, but this much is evident: denial of Poles’ role in committing wrongs during WWII exists on both an official and a popular level in Poland. An example of wrongs committed by Poles against Jews in WWII (despite official Polish insistence the ‘Polish nation’ was not ‘co-responsible’ for ‘crimes against humanity’) can be found in the history of Jedwabne. In this incident, Poles themselves participated in the massacre of hundreds of Jews (Jewish Virtual Library 2021). Clearly, just one such incident is enough to disprove the notion that the Polish nation shares no responsibility for the Holocaust. Adding to the complexity of the situation, Poland has been recognized as the nation with the most individuals honored as ‘righteous among the nations’ (a title given to those who helped Jews during the Holocaust) (Yad Vashem 2021). This clearly adds grist to the mill of Polish nationalists wishing to portray a heroic narrative for Poland, but is also not at odds with the idea that some Poles truly did add to the wrongs committed during WWII. As Barbara Engelking said herself, ‘there are no black-and-white situations in Holocaust history… history is more complicated than [the ruling nationalist party in Poland] would like it to be’ (Engelking and Grabowski 2018). All of this illustrates that the events and motivations surrounding the Holocaust in Poland are complicated. It is worth noting that Poland’s official position has itself been subjected to some healthy and beneficial scrutiny: the outcry against the antidiscrimination law, notably from some Jewish organizations, led the Polish government to repeal parts of the law (ADL 2018). Additionally, the lawsuit against the author Engelking was overturned, with an appeals judge ruling that it was ‘…an unacceptable violation of the freedom of scientific research and the freedom of expression… [the] courtroom was not the right place for a historical debate’ (The Guardian 2021). So far, in our opinion, the side of liberalism, honesty, and rule of law seems to have the upper hand in Poland, but even today, there is ambiguity and variation in the positions of Poles, at every level of Polish society, on issues that have historically been a source of conflict with Poles’ neighbors.

4.2.3 The Polish-Belarus Border In August of 2020, Belarusian presidential elections were held, resulting in the largest demonstrations ever seen in Belarus in protest of the official reports (Fig. 4.6). These demonstrations, uncharacteristically large for East Slavdom, appeared after months of political repression, culminating in Lukashenko’s ‘landslide victory’ in which he claimed 80% of the vote (Nechepurenko and Higgins 2020). Belarusian protest was

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland

145

Fig. 4.6 Belarusian protesters in Minsk in August, 2020. Photo by Homoatrox, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Belarusian_protests_%E2%80%94_Minsk,_30_ August_p0013.jpg, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0

no doubt rooted in some mistrust borne out of personal experience. Belarusians were reported to have stated, for example, ‘…[we] don’t know who voted for him, how could he get 80 percent?’ (ibid.). However, the Belarusian government’s response to the protests was swift and ruthless, resulting in mass arrests, beatings, and torture. Medical personnel would soon set up makeshift treatment areas just outside of detentions centers to treat the protesters as they were released from their imprisonment (BBC 2020a). Soon, the political opposition fled and the people were slowly subdued, resulting in a reduction over time in their outspokenness and willingness to engage in activism on the street. Indeed, in the testimony of one Belarusian: These people want change, but they’re scared. They sit at home in their kitchens, and they can talk about what they dislike, but they never come out to protests. They fear for their families, for their children, and for their work… They understand that if they [come out], they will not have money, they will not make a living. (Chew 2021b)

As a result of this, the EU (and by extension Poland) condemned Belarusian authorities and released a wave of sanctions in October 2020 to attempt to sway Lukashenko to open up the vote count to third parties and stop the violence against citizens (European Council and Council of the EU 2021). Since Belarus’s 2020 election, Poland, along with Lithuania, has played a special role in supporting exiled Belarusian opposition leaders by becoming a place of refuge for them (BBC 2020b).

146

4 The Polish Information Environment

However, despite the sanctions and condemnation, Lukashenko and his regime did not budge, but have rather doubled down. Perhaps out of stubbornness, or drawing succor from the regime’s ever-present support from Russia, Lukashenko maintained essentially the same track for the rest of 2020. The only apparent change was a further entrenchment in his position. Over time, there were smaller crowds of protestors, more political prisoners, drawing yet more sanctions (European Council and Council of the EU 2021). For some time, it appeared Belarus had reached a stalemate with the EU—neither side was happy, but nothing was appearing to change between the two. However, in May 2021, Belarus broke the silence with an act of force. In an act which was breathtaking in both nature and in poor execution, Belarus compelled a Ryanair passenger aircraft travelling from Greece to Lithuania to land in Minsk. On board the aircraft were Belarusian opposition journalist Roman Protasevich and his girlfriend Sofia Sapega (BBC 2021b), who were promptly arrested after the aircraft’s landing. According to Belarus, its government had received a credible email threat from Hamas that there was a bomb on board the plane. In response, the government scrambled a MiG-29 to escort the passenger plane to land in Minsk so a bomb search could be conducted on the plane. However, this story is demonstrably false. The email sent ‘from Hamas’ was sent 24 minutes after Belarus ordered the plane to land in Minsk; in addition, Hamas disclaimed responsibility for the threat. And, while the pilot wanted to land in Poland, a considerably closer destination, Belarus’s deployment of the MiG-29 to exercise persuasion on the pilot and prevent his landing in Poland gives the lie to Belarus’s claim of a bomb threat (BBC 2021a). It is not hard to surmise that Belarus’s real purpose was to arrest a dissident Belarusian journalist, who had already been charged in absentia with inciting mass protests (ibid.). In response to all this, the EU imposed still more sanctions throughout June and banned all flight to, from, and over Belarusian airspace (European Council and Council of the EU 2021). This provides the backdrop for the action Belarus has undertaken against the EU, and particularly against Poland. Since then, Belarus has engaged in a form of hybrid warfare by pushing Middle Eastern migrants to the EU borders, and then relying on EU policy and perceived internal EU divisions to force EU countries to accept the migrants. This is a form of what we refer to as outsourced conflict, and Lukashenko’s motivation in pursuing this strategy appears to be to deflect culpability. In effect, Lukashenko may aim to achieve plausible deniability, claiming that migrants causing difficulty for the EU at its eastern border are there entirely of their own volition, without Lukashenko or his government playing any part. Outsourcing the conflict to refugees is comparable to Putin’s attempt to do something similar in Ukraine, Libya, and Syria by using the Wagner private security force (Emmett 2021). Lukashenko and Putin’s regimes do not, of course, limit themselves to only outsourcing conflicts. Seen recently, Belarusian and Russian paratroopers performed a practice airdrop only 15 km (~9.3 miles) from the Lithuanian border (Digital Forensic Research Lab 2021). Outsourced or not, Lukashenko’s intent often seems to be provocation. And regardless of the motivation or methods, miscalculations can

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland

147

lead to unintended escalation, something Western countries would do well to keep in mind. We will lay out our own hypotheses about Lukashenko’s reasoning in more detail in Sect. 4.3, but we can surmise that the border crisis began when Belarus made visas easier to obtain for citizens of certain Middle Eastern countries, with the Belarusian regime claiming to offer these individuals a way into the EU (New York Times 2021). In addition, there was clearly coordination between the Belarusian police and military and these migrants. Multiple accounts from migrants corroborate Lukashenko’s own account that they were directed towards different border areas by Belarusian military and police (BBC 2021a). However, Poland’s unexpected resolve in dealing with migrants at the border appears to have taken Lukashenko off-guard. Furthermore, Poland’s actions have been supported by the EU, also likely confounding Lukashenko’s expectations, given that the EU earlier accepted approximately 1.3 million migrants during the Syrian civil war in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2016). And as a direct result of Belarus’s role in the border crisis, the EU has demonstrated solidarity with Poland by introducing even more sanctions against Belarus in December 2021 (European Council and Council of the EU 2021). This presents an unusual situation, as perhaps Lukashenko believed that the EUPoland strife would continue, grow, and work to the benefit of Belarus. But, contrary to Lukashenko’s expectations, we find on one hand that the EU and Poland are in fierce disagreement on the primacy of law, and on the other they are united on the issue of Poland’s right to enforce its borders. This seeming contradiction can again be resolved by considering rule of law (a factor which might well be underestimated by a dictator who stole an election): the EU is essentially appealing to the principle of rule of law in three separate issues: (1) fining Poland for not recognizing the EU’s rightful sovereignty to which Poland agreed when joining the EU, (2) ensuring free and fair elections in Belarus, and (3) upholding Poland’s right to enforce controls on a frontier which is that of both Poland and the EU. Belarusian media are far from silent on all this. In much of the official media, the framing of the conversation has been consistent—Poland is at fault for not accepting these migrants, and Belarus’s actions in bringing them to the border are ignored. For example, as one article stated, one family, ...with faith in the EU’s promises of a bright future, came to the Polish border. But this faith was shaken by the brutal aggression of Poland against civilians on November 16. ...c вepoй в oбeщaния EC o cвeтлoм бyдyщeм пpишeл к пoльcкoй гpaницe. Ho вepy этy изpяднo пoшaтнyлa жecтoкaя aгpeccия Пoльши пpoтив миpныx людeй 16 нoябpя. (Бeлapycь ceгoдня 2021)

While Belarusian media focus on ‘aggression’ on the other side of the border, pointedly ignoring how exactly the family arrived in Belarus, the same media are at pains to portray Belarusian generosity to the migrants, mentioning how some migrants now live in a transport and logistics center, where they ‘woke up in a good mood’ and ate a ‘hearty breakfast’ (Бeлapycь ceгoдня 2021). The article then goes on to list the foods migrants eat, their stories, how they feel joy when they purchase items from

148

4 The Polish Information Environment

a Belarusian store, and how Belarus is providing them with vaccines. According to the official Belarusian narrative, Belarus provides food, health, and wellness. Poland provides tear gas attacks, water cannons, and razor-wire fences.

4.2.4 The Suwałki Corridor Poland borders both Russia and Belarus and provides the only way to reach the Baltics from Western Europe by land (without traversing Russia), through the Suwałki corridor. However, this corridor is small, measuring only 65 km (~40 miles) as the crow flies from Kaliningrad to Belarus, with 104 km (~64 miles) of actual border; the corridor is a key strategic location for each of NATO, the EU, Russia, and Belarus (see Fig. 4.7). This small strip of land has been the subject of multiple threat assessments, which portray the difficulties involved with defending it (see our discussion in Chap. 5). Poland perhaps occupies a safer position than the Baltics do. However, if military action were carried out by Russia or Belarus, Poland would likely become a large staging ground for a NATO or EU defense.

Fig. 4.7 The Suwałki Corridor, connecting Poland and Lithuania, separating Belarus and Russia. Image by NordNordWest, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Suwalki_Gapet.png, adapted and reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0

4.2 Current Issues Surrounding Poland

149

4.2.5 The Buildup of Russian Forces Along Ukraine’s Border In November 2021, satellite images captured an apparent buildup of Russian forces along the Russia-Ukraine border (Maxar Technologies 2021); the assessment of US intelligence at the time, which turned out to be accurate, was that this pointed to a preparation for an invasion into Ukraine larger than that which took place in 2014 (The Wall Street Journal 2021). It is worth considering what impact this situation may have on Poland, not least because Poland and Ukraine share not only many common elements of culture and history (Chew 2021a), but also a 534-km border (see Fig. 4.8) (compare this to the 209-km border between Poland and Russia [Kaliningrad]). While reasons for the Russian troop buildup were debatable at the time, Putin might have viewed the Belarus-Poland border crisis as a possible cover for his troop movements towards Ukraine. However, if that were the case, the Belarus-Poland border crisis proved to be poor cover. The world was, at the time, acutely aware of the situation with regard to the buildup of troops on the Ukraine border, with the US and the EU both stating their commitment to ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty (The White House 2021; European Union External Action 2021). While, even now, the eventual outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is unclear, and therefore any ultimate impacts to Poland are also hard to determine, it may not have been a coincidence that these maneuvers occurred very close in time to the migrant crisis on the Polish border.

Fig. 4.8 Ukraine and its borders. Image by Lencer, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:Map_of_Ukraine_with_Cities.png, reproduced under Creative Commons License CCBY-SA-3.0

150

4 The Polish Information Environment

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom 4.3.1 Interpretation of the Maneuvers That Have Led to the Current Point In this section, we focus on a theme from Sect. 4.2 that has recently pressed upon Poland: the migrant crisis engineered by Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko on Belarus’s borders with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—the epicenter of which has recently been at the Ku´znica-Bruzgi Polish border crossing, just a few kilometers from the northwestern Belarusian city of Grodno and on the main route from there to Warsaw. There are many details of this crisis that are shrouded in mystery, although not so much is unfathomable as the Belarusian and Russian authorities may claim. While analysts in the US and abroad may differ on the interpretation of some points, our reading of how events have transpired is as follows. The recent roots of the current crisis in relations between Belarus and the West (the EU, the United States and NATO in particular) can be traced back to the August 2020 Belarusian presidential elections, as we outlined (with detailed sources) in Sect. 4.2. To recap, our interpretation is that President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has served in this role since 1994 (soon after the breakup of the USSR), exerted inappropriate efforts prior to the election to influence the vote outcome, such as having Belarusian employers put pressure on employees to vote for Lukashenko or face dismissal,1 or jailing rivals running for the presidency, such as Sergei Tikhanovsky, on manufactured charges. (These, of course, are tactics familiar from the playbook used in Russia by Putin against rivals such as Aleksei Navalny.) But not only were all Lukashenko’s dishonest efforts to engineer his desired election result insufficient, they may also have backfired in certain cases. For example, jailing opposition candidates likely had the effect of concentrating the opposition vote in one candidate—Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. Our interpretation is, further, that Tikhanovskaya actually won the polls, but Lukashenko continued his manipulation after the election by blatantly falsifying its results to look as if he won with a resounding majority. Because Western entities such as the EU also take the position that we (the authors) do, that Lukashenko stole the election, relations between Belarus and the West have deteriorated starting from August 2020, and sanctions were imposed on Belarus. If, as President Joe Biden has stated, ‘in international relations, all politics is personal’ (Memoli 2021), then, in interpersonal terms, Western countries confronted Belarus for initial bad behavior, but Belarus’s response, far from being appropriately repentant, has been a pugnacious one of escalation and retaliation ever since. The first retaliation of note came in May 2021, when Belarusian air traffic control diverted the 1

A friend in Belarus testified to this in personal communication.

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

151

Ryanair flight. Western countries duly responded with further sanctions. The next escalatory step was the one on which we focus here, the migrant crisis manufactured by Lukashenko on the EU border—a crisis which, as we note in Chap. 5, was brewing as early as summer 2021. Further details are still shrouded in mystery, such as whether the Kremlin initiated the crisis, as suggested by Polish government officials. We, however, share the interpretation of Jensen (2021), acknowledged by Dr. Jensen to be a ‘minority opinion’. We believe that while Putin would like to draw Belarus further into the orbit of Russia, Putin (maybe because he has his hands full elsewhere) has allowed Lukashenko enough room to act unwisely, including inviting thousands of migrants to Belarus in the hope of weaponizing them against Europe. We believe that Lukashenko made this decision independently; we believe it has also backfired owing to his underestimation of Poland’s resolve to repel the migrants and of EU unity with Poland despite differences of opinion elsewhere; but we also believe Putin is opportunistic enough to try and exploit the crisis as cover for Russian troop movements on the border of Ukraine. We believe that Lukashenko underestimated European resolve because he miscalculated how the political climate of Western Europe has changed (and hardened against refugees) since the 2015 refugee crisis.2 In the belligerent game of tit-for-tat, we believe that both Putin and Lukashenko are engaged, more than they would doubtless like to admit, in adhocracy. At the time we finalized this chapter, the migrant crisis in Belarus had subsided. Clashes on the border were no longer being reported daily and most or all migrants were reported to have withdrawn from their encampment on the border (Deutsche Welle 2021). There had even been reports that Iraq, at least, has been repatriating some of its citizens (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty 2021) who had flown to Belarus in hopes of obtaining the Lukashenko regime’s promise of passage to Western Europe. All this may have come at an inopportune time for Putin, if he had hoped Belarus’s migrant crisis would divert attention from Russia engaging in troop maneuvers on the border of Ukraine. The fact is that these troop maneuvers had not escaped the notice of observers in the United States and elsewhere, and statements by high-ranking US officials have not only demonstrated this to Putin, but also aimed at deterrence of further Russian aggression (Pamuk and Ahlander 2021). Meanwhile, not only does Lukashenko’s gambit in using migrants as a political weapon against the EU appear to have failed, but it has also resulted in a further round of Western sanctions on Belarus (Hansler 2021). It is hard to see how the self-destructive cycle of miscalculation upon miscalculation, escalation and retaliation, can end without some kind of disavowal of wrongdoing.

2

It is worth noting that Lukashenko’s thinking may also have been influenced by the actions of President Erdo˘gan of Turkey in 2020 who in effect used refugees as blackmail against Europe. Lukashenko may have hoped for a repeat of the EU’s accommodation of Erdo˘gan; the EU agreed to provide 6 billion Euros to Turkey in socioeconomic support for Syrian refugees in exchange for Erdo˘gan not allowing the refugees to move westwards into Europe (Terry 2021).

152

4 The Polish Information Environment

But what did those on either side of the Polish-Belarus border conflict make of the events as they were transpiring? To answer that, we look in the next section at a large sample of Twitter data, and report on some findings that surprised us.

4.3.2 Twitter Data Collection and Analysis 4.3.2.1

Data Collection

Early signs of the migrant crisis at the border between Poland and Belarus came in September 2021, but the crisis reached its height at the Ku´znica-Bruzgi border crossing for about 10 days, starting on November 8, 2021. On November 16, 2021, we ran a number of searches of Twitter using the Twitter Developer API to gauge what people were saying in both Polish and Russian about the crisis on either side of the border. Many of the search queries we used returned the maximum available number of Twitter posts available from a single search request based on our Twitter Developer API account type—18,000 posts—unsurprisingly indicating a high level of interest in the crisis on both sides of the border. The search terms we used, and the respective number of tweets returned, were as follows (69,408 for Polish and 41,512 for Russian): Language

Search term

Meaning

Polish

migranci

migrants [nom. pl.]

Russian

Total

# of tweets returned 17,976

granicy

border [loc., gen., dat. pl.]

18,000

granica

border [nom. sg.]

18,000

uchod´zcy

refugees [gen., dat., loc. sg., nom. pl.]

15,432

гpaницe

border [loc., dat. sg.]

18,000

гpaницa

border [nom. sg.]

бeжeнцы

refugees [nom. pl.]

5,512 18,000 110,920

The red bracketed terms in the table above relate to the cases (nominative, genitive, dative, locative) and number (singular or plural) of the word depending on its syntactic function in the sentence. The nominative is used for the subject of a sentence, and the locative is used in expressions of place, such as ‘at the border’ or ‘on the border’; the fact that 18,000 tweets were returned for Russian гpaницe (locative and dative) versus only 5,512 for Russian гpaницa (nominative) is likely to reflect that for this topic, it was more common for Twitter users to be commenting on what was happening ‘at’ the border versus commenting on the border per se—perhaps unsurprising, but still interesting. Polish does not display the same relationship between the number

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

153

of tweets returned for ‘granica’ and ‘granicy’ respectively; this reflects widespread use of the hashtag #granica in Polish.

4.3.2.2

Analytical Approach

On the resulting data, we performed a topic analysis using Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) as described in Chew (2015). This allows an open-ended sampling of the full dataset, biasing towards more frequently-observed patterns, but without preconditioning the analysis as to any particular ontology of information maneuvers. As we have written elsewhere, e.g. Chew (2021a)—and consistent with our central thesis in this book—we think this approach fits very well with the view of intelligence analysis articulated by Heuer (1999). From the SVD analysis, we obtain an ordered list of the top principal components observed in the data, based purely on the most important patterns of word occurrence in a statistical sense. For each of these, we can list the most representative tweet and the number of other tweets above some threshold of similarity to the most representative tweet. We chose 0.8 (using cosine similarity), although in many cases the similar tweets are in fact identical to the top tweet, having a cosine similarity of 1.0, because of the large number of retweets in Twitter. We then read through this list in an open-minded way, simply allowing the tweets to speak to us for themselves (rather than imposing upon them any other preconceived structure). This sort of approach is discussed by Heuer (1999) and it is worth noting what he says about it: Analysts sometimes describe their work procedure as immersing themselves in the data without fitting the data into any preconceived pattern. At some point an apparent pattern (or answer or explanation) emerges spontaneously, and the analyst then goes back to the data to check how well the data support this judgment. According to this view, objectivity requires the analyst to suppress any personal opinions or preconceptions, so as to be guided only by the “facts” of the case. To think of analysis in this way overlooks the fact that information cannot speak for itself. The significance of information is always a joint function of the nature of the information and the context in which it is interpreted. The context is provided by the analyst in the form of a set of assumptions and expectations concerning human and organizational behavior. These preconceptions are critical determinants of which information is considered relevant and how it is interpreted. (ibid., pp. 40–41)

While we agree that analysts (including ourselves) ‘[provide context] in the form of a set of assumptions and expectations’, we disagree to some degree that ‘information cannot speak for itself’. Written human language is, after all, just a reduction to a collection of symbols, and the whole point of SVD is that it uses computation to allow subtle, but discernible, patterns to emerge from nowhere but this collection of symbols, or, to put it another way, to find signal within noise. Where Heuer is correct about the role of the analyst is that SVD used on a Twitter dataset can find subtle relationships only within the data actually provided as input to SVD. There will

154

4 The Polish Information Environment

always be relationships of this data to outside knowledge sources because no dataset is ever all-encompassing. This is where the analyst comes in (making connections from the patterns within the data to extrinsic information). But SVD can at least let data speak for itself as to what is important versus unimportant, in a statistical sense, within the data, allowing the analyst not to get sidetracked by immaterial minutiae. We must also acknowledge that the approach of using SVD, while it does not introduce ‘black box’ assumptions, is not completely immune to manipulation. Coordinated activity does exist on Twitter, such as the use of bots for deceptive amplification of content through retweets (Nimmo 2017). If such activity were to occur, some patterns would be promoted in importance in using SVD analysis, simply by virtue of the large number of bot retweets. If an analyst cares about separating bot activity from organic activity (and an analyst may not always care about this), additional measures must be taken in analysis (Chew 2020). However, it should also be said that even if coordinated activity were to have been included in our data, it would be unlikely to touch on every topic discerned in the data. In other words, the effect of artificial amplification should not be over-estimated; even Russia’s Internet Research Agency can control only a small portion of the information environment. In this analysis, we did not screen for bot versus non-bot activity; but we do mention the possible influence of artificially-inflated topic importance here as a caveat to the reader.

4.3.2.3

Results of Analysis

The tables in Appendices 1 and 2 show the full results obtained from SVD topic analysis of the Polish and Russian tweets, along with some annotated commentary. Here, we discuss our principal observations about the analysis, starting with findings that surprised us. Overall, an open-minded review of the results solidified a cross-cultural observation regarding how many people use social media posts to direct criticism at someone or something—a feature of social media which others have cynically commented on. Yet criticism in itself is not necessarily a bad thing, of course, and for our analytic purposes, the realization that social media posts often have a target for criticism helps provide an analytical framework in which to present useful results.

Polish Twitter Analysis With this in mind, an interesting overall observation about the Polish Twitter data is that a surprising number of ‘principal component’ topics do not have a particular target of criticism, and the associated tweets are often from official Polish government accounts. Examples: • Border guard presents video showing migrant attacks

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

155

– Kolejne nagrania z odpartego dzi´s ataku migrantów na przej´sciu w #Ku´znica. Atakuj˛acymi byli przede wszystkim młodzi, agresywni m˛ez˙ czy´zni. - #granica @Straz_Graniczna @PolskaPolicja @StZaryn https://t.co/dU2ZqZ0hJa • Border guard reassurance that border is secure – Granica wzmocniona. Prosz˛e spa´c spokojnie, kiedy my czuwamy Słu˙zymy Polsce #NaStra˙zyGranicy #POMAGAMYYiCHRONIMY https:// t.co/wnauTW7RNX – Ko´nczymy kolejny dzie´n ci˛ez˙ kiej słu˙zby na granicy. Nocna zmiana melduje si˛e na posterunkach. Robimy wszystko co w naszej mocy, aby była bezpieczna! https://t.co/PuPpzXXhy5 – Słowo komentarza: dali´smy rad˛e - z˙ ołnierze #WojskoPolskie, funkcjonariusze @Straz_Graniczna i @PolskaPolicja Mo˙zecie na nas liczy´c! Polska granica jest dobrze chroniona! @DGeneralneRSZ @SztabGenWP #terytorialsi #poland #belarus #BorderCrisis https://t.co/kijGKVcbQo • Updates from border guard or other Polish agencies – Ku´znica: Migranci zaatakowali naszych z˙ ołnierzy i funkcjonariuszy kamieniami oraz próbuj˛a zniszczy´c ogrodzenie i dosta´c si˛e na teren Polski. Nasze słu˙zby u˙zyły gazu łzawi˛acego z˙ eby stłumi´c agresj˛e migrantów https:// t.co/Fi8RdmE4uX – Podsumowuj˛ac poni˙zej dzisiejszy, trudny dzie´n informujemy, z˙ e na chwil˛e obecn˛a sytuacja na granicy jest opanowana i nie odnotowujemy powa˙zniejszych incydentów. Polskie słu˙zby stoj˛a #nastra˙zy i czuwaj˛a. Zapewhttps:// niamy, z˙ e z˙ aden agresywny tłum nie przekroczy nielegalnie granicy t.co/LCAg3IscUi – Sytuacja na #granica eskaluje, jednak˙ze wsparcie z Pa´nstwa strony pomaga @16Dywizja stoi na stra˙zy bezpiecze´nstwa nam przetrwa´c te trudne chwile https://t.co/5u6oOzVeZK – Ku´znica: agresywni migranci wci˛az˙ rzucaj˛a kamieniami w stron˛e naszych z˙ ołnierzy i funkcjonariuszy. Polskie słu˙zby odpieraj˛a atak https://t.co/ESHN15 5vkf – Migranci zaczynaj˛a znosi´c gał˛ezie z lasu. Pojawili si˛e równie˙z przedstawiciele białoruskich mediów. Wi˛ekszo´sc´ namiotów, w których przebywali migranci jest usuwana. https://t.co/pgBvBr3PHG • Polish government provides links to reliable information –

Dynamicznie zmieniaj˛aca si˛e sytuacja ka˙zdego dnia przynosi kolejne informacje i wyzwania dotycz˛ace sytuacji na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. Oficjalne informacje oraz najnowsze materiały do pobrania mo˙zna znale´zc´ na stronie https://t.co/gpjUT62bBH. https://t.co/EdAVQMylCd – PM @MorawieckiM for @PAPinformacje about the situation at the PolishBelarusian border and the Polish and international response to the hybrid attack

156

4 The Polish Information Environment

Fig. 4.9 Polish police debunk a fake post

by Lukashenko’s regime against Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and the entire EU https://t.co/vv4laEZyYw, https://t.co/YxljnKCpyz. The closest official Polish government accounts get to criticism is a post by Polish police debunking a fake post that purported to come from them (Fig. 4.9). That this general association (between official accounts and non-critical content) exists is not so surprising; it has been widely recognized, particularly amidst an epidemic of disinformation, that a key role of government is to be transparent, provide reliable information, and build trust; see for example Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2020). The results retrieved demonstrate two things: first, that the Polish government has fulfilled this responsibility amidst the PolishBelarusian border crisis, filling the information space to mitigate the risk that a vacuum would be filled by disinformation; and secondly, even more encouragingly, that official Polish updates have gained significant traction. These tweets, and reposts of the same content, account for almost a third (5447 out of 16,477) of the posts covered by SVD analysis. One can reasonably extrapolate, therefore, that official Polish efforts to suffuse the information environment (IE) as a whole (on the topic

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

157

of the border crisis) may be achieving a similarly high level of domination of the IE. There is a significant audience for a message of factual reassurance, it turns out, among ordinary Poles worried about their security in the face of the possibility of a border breach by thousands of migrants. This in turn should reassure government officials wondering about whether such messaging works. Non-critical themes were not confined to Polish official accounts, however. About 16% of posts reviewed were neutral or positive updates, including: • Sharing on how to supply border forces with hot drinks; sharing about a border region school providing hot food to forces • Group of companies in the town of Siedlce providing energy bars and drinks to border forces • Group ‘For Poland’ put up a billboard thanking the border guard • Posts expressing thanks to Polish forces • Poland standing firm contrary to migrants’ expectations • Call for helicopters to be used to help repel border breaches • Factual news updates (whether the news itself is positive or negative): – Polish activist group informs that refugees were beaten near the border – Body of Syrian found in Poland near border. In particular, the theme ‘support Polish forces’ (of ordinary Poles providing material support to troops on the border) accounted for almost 11% of the posts. We found this reminiscent of the striking way in which ordinary Ukrainians, as we observed on social media ourselves at the time, supported Ukraine’s military effort (with food, blankets, etc.) to repel pro-Russian forces in 2014 and later, and often used social media to co-ordinate this help. Among the 8,384 Polish posts we reviewed that took a critical stance, broadly, principal targets of criticism were as follows:

Targets of popular Polish criticism 2% 17% 44% 13%

12% 12%

Liberals

Russia, Belarus and their leaders

The EU, Germany and their leaders

Migrants

Poland and its leaders

The Polish German minority

158

4 The Polish Information Environment

More than a few posts were critical of more than one target. For example, different posts in different ways drew a comparison between Angela Merkel’s talks with Putin and Lukashenko ‘behind Poles’ backs’ and the German/Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to divide up Poland in World War II: • Criticism of EC and Germany for “diktat” that migrants shouldn’t be pushed back, allying with “Soviets” – Według JS Wolskiego KE-pod niemieckim dyktatem-ma z˙ a˛ da´c by migranci którzy przedr˛a si˛e przez granic˛e nie byli zawracani.Wnioski:1-to zach˛eta by si˛e przedzierali.2-na Niemcówi-i ich sojusze z Sowietami-zawsze mo˙zna liczy´c.3ewidentnie graj˛a na powrót Tuska. 4:niedoczekanie szwabów • Merkel going behind our backs with Putin and Lukashenko—the ‘Krauts’ and the ‘Russkis’ dreaming of a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact? – Merkel za naszymi plecami najpierw rozmawiała z Putinem a dzi´s telefonicznie z Łukaszenk˛a. Szwaby i kacapy wci˛az˙ marz˛a o nowych wcieleniach paktu #Białoru´s #granica. Ribbentrop-Mołotow? It was notable that criticism of, broadly, migrants and liberals accounted for more than 50% of the critical posts we reviewed, many more than the 17% (generally liberal voices) who were critical of the Polish government. This appears to confirm our hypothesis of Poland as a culturally conservative nation. The fact that more were not critical of Russia and Belarus (only around 12%), a number fewer than the number critical of the migrants themselves (13%), seems to reflect that Lukashenko’s tactic of outsourcing his engineered conflict to stoke intra-EU division may have worked to some extent in Poland: where Poles see a problem, they see what is in front of them (the refugees or their internal political opponents), not a ‘man behind the curtain’ (in this case, Lukashenko). However, recall that these percentages reflect only the percentages of critical posts, while almost 50% of the overall number of posts are essentially positively supportive of the Polish government and its position. So, it might reasonably be concluded that Lukashenko’s engineered crisis backfired (from Lukashenko’s perspective) more than it helped: generating a groundswell of support for Poland, while also generating at least as much backlash against Russia and Belarus as any backlash against Polish or EU targets.

Russian Twitter Analysis Approaching the data without preconceptions, a very notable difference between the Russian and Polish Twitter data was the lack of positivity in the former compared to the latter. Almost 83% of the reviewed Russian tweets were critical of someone or something, compared with around 67% of the reviewed Polish tweets. And where the Russian tweets were not critical, they were at best neutral communication of news updates (contrast this with the large number of Polish tweets above consisting

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

159

of official reassurances or positive messages about support for Polish forces). Any official presence (acknowledged as such) in the Russian Twittersphere appeared to be completely lacking. This could be attributable to various things, for example: the official messaging being surreptitious; the Russian and Belarusian governments being occupied elsewhere; the Russian and Belarusian governments not having anything positive to say; etc. Regardless of the reasons, the end result is an information vacuum in Russian-language Twitter. And, we believe for this reason, while some cynicism exists in Polish content too, cynical content inundates Russian. This is consistent with what we have noted elsewhere about Soviet and Russian rule (and disinformation) leading to widespread cynicism among the people who were its subjects (see Chaps. 5 and 6, particularly our discussion of attitudes towards the ‘shining future’ promised in the USSR). One can be critical without being cynical, and the difference at its root is perhaps that cynicism believes the worst in the target of the criticism, without evidence, while criticism is justified. Again, this explains why cynicism results from an information vacuum: without good information, there is fertile ground for rumors (unsubstantiated fearmongering) to take hold. Cynicism is hard to measure because it involves a judgment about what evidence another party may or may not have to support his or her position. It is easier to determine the targets of criticism. Among the critical Russian posts reviewed (to repeat, almost 83% of the total), targets of criticism were as follows:

Targets of popular Russian criticism 4%

3% 3%

10%

36%

44%

The West, Poland, EU, USA, NATO

Russia, Belarus and their leaders and media

Migrants

Russian and Belarusian media

Liberals

"Soviet" dilapidation

What was surprising here was that more criticism was directed by Russian speakers against Russia and Belarus (not to mention their media, liberal opposition forces within Belarus and Russia, and general post-Soviet dilapidation) than against Western targets. This suggests that Lukashenko’s maneuver in enticing migrants to the Polish

160

4 The Polish Information Environment

border may have backfired more profoundly than is commonly recognized in the West: Lukashenko may by his actions (recall, this dataset is entirely on the topic of migrants and the border) have provoked more division and dissatisfaction internally than across the border in Poland and the EU. An interesting narrative of which we were not aware before we reviewed the data, but which appears to have gained significant traction in the Russian Twittersphere (almost 23% of the total tweets we reviewed), is a question which was apparently posed by liberal commentators within Russia: why, if Russia was so ‘wonderful’ and Belarus so ‘stable’, were the refugees in Belarus so eager to head in the direction of the ‘decaying West’ (to use a Soviet phrase) rather than head east to Russia or remain in Belarus? The answer to this question may appear obvious to a Western observer; so the fact that the question provokes a reaction in the Russian Twittersphere may demonstrate to such an observer how it struck a nerve of which Westerners may be unaware. The question plays to the insecurities of citizens of the former Soviet space, their inferiority complex that we note elsewhere (see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.4.7).3 Examples of tweets that evinced either positive or negative reactions to this theme: • (Cynical) Strange Kurds going to Western Europe, when everything’s good in Belarus and best of all in Russia – Cтpaнныe oни, эти кypдcкиe бeжeнцы. Из Бeлapycи, гдe вce xopoшo, c pиcкoм для жизни pвyтcя в Пoльшy и в Гepмaнию, гдe плoxo. И никтo из ниx нe pвётcя в Poccию, гдe лyчшe, чeм в любoй дpyгoй cтpaнe! • Breivik’s prison vs. Russian hospital—explains why migrants go West

3

This ‘inferiority complex’ does also exist in the Polish-language information space, though we did not observe it in our Twitter sample. An example can be seen in Newsweek Poland (2021).

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

161

• Russian media not explaining why refugees want to go to ‘cursed’ Europe instead of staying in ‘flourishing’ Belarus – Пытaюcь xoть гдe-тo в poccийcкиx CMИ нaйти пoяcнeниe, пoчeмy бeжeнцы пpopывaютcя в пpoклятyю Eвpoпy и нe xoтят ocтaтьcя в cтaбильнoй пpoцвeтaющeй Бeлapycи. A пoяcнeний нeт. He знaeтe, в чeм тyт дeлo? • Refugees not going to Russia because of who’s president there – ECЛИ БЫ ПPEЗИДEHTOM БЫЛ HE Я И УPOBEHЬ ЖИЗHИ ЗДECЬ БЫЛ БЫ КAК B ДAHИИ, CEЙЧAC BCE ЭTИ БEЖEHЦЫ ЛEЗЛИ БЫ B POCCИЮ! A TAК OHИ ПOHИMAЮT, ЧTO TУT HEXУЙ ДEЛATЬ И ДAЖE HE CУЮTCЯ. КTO OПЯTЬ BCEX ПEPEИГPAЛ? TO-TO. • Why are migrants going to EU and NATO ‘hell’ instead of ‘wonderful’ Russia or ‘stable’ Belarus? – Пoчeмy бeжeнцы вooбщe бeгyт в EC? Taм жe poдитeль 1 и poдитeль 2. Taм жe yпaдoк и paзлoжeниe? Taм вooбщe HATO, кoтopoe вo вceм кpyгoм винoвaтo! Пoчeмy oни нe бeгyт oт этoгo aдa в пpeкpacнyю Poccию? Или нe ocтaнyтcя нa тиxoм ocтpoвкe cтaбильнocти пoд нaзвaниeм Бeлapycь? • (Cynical pushback against the question by liberals) Refugees going to countries that bombed them, and where they can get benefits – Гoвнoeды cпpaшивaют,пoчeмy бeжeнцы идyт в Eвpoпy, a нe в “cытyю” Poccию? Hy вo пepвыx y нac нeт для ниx пocoбий. Bo втopыx, oни идyт в тe cтpaны, кoтopыe иx бoмбили. B тpeтьиx oни идyт зa кoнтpибyциeй в любoм видe:дeньгaми, жильём, льгoтaми, бeлыми жeнщинaми и тд. Taкoв oтвeт. • Cynical response to Gozman asking why Kurdish refugees not going to ‘wonderful Russia’ – Лёня Гoзмaн вoпpoшaeт, пoчeмy кypдcкиe бeжeнцы нe бeгyт в “пpeкpacнyю” Poccию? Кypдcкиe бeжeнцы гopaздo yмнee Лeни, пoэтoмy eдyт тyдa, гдe, кaк им cкaзaли, xopoшo. A y Лeни в Poccии вce плoxo, нo oн никyдa нe yeзжaeт, пpocтo cидит и вoняeт кaк гнoйный чиpeй. • Liberals asking why refugees not going to Russia—but Russia’s only good for citizens, not ‘illegals and gays’ – Либepaлы cпpaшивaют пoчeмy бeжeнцы нe бeгyт в Poccию, гдe вce xopoшo? A ктo им cкaзaл, чтo в Poccии вce xopoшo для бeжeнцeв? Здecь xopoшo для гpaждaн. Кpeмль никoгдa нe paзмeнивaл coбcтвeннoe нaceлeниe нa нeлeгaлoв и зaoкeaнcкиe ништяки. Heлeгaлaм и гeям в Poccии плoxo, дa.

162

4 The Polish Information Environment

Of the tweets critical of the West generally, many directed criticism at perceived double-standards and hypocrisy (sometimes repeating narratives heard in Russianlanguage official media). Examples: • Poles blaming Putin, but they started wars and destroyed states—would they blame Saddam or Gaddafi if there were no Putin? • Water cannon use in −2 °C temperature by Polish authorities who criticized Belarus’s actions against protesters • Poland behaving as if an army, not cold and hungry men, women and children on the border • Poles tear-gassed 4-year-old child and laughed (this claim is presented with a video that does not substantiate the claim; it is reminiscent of the ‘crucified boy’ fake that Russian media used as propaganda against Ukraine) – Пocмoтpитe,чтo твopят пoльcкиe пpecтyпники 4-лeт. peбёнкy плecнyли в лицo ядoвитым гaзoм,из-зa чeгo мaлыш зaдыxaeтcя и плaчeт oт cтpaшнoй бoли. Poдитeли и дpyгиe бeжeнцы пытaютcя oкaзaть peбeнкy пepвyю пoмoщь.A в этo вpeмя пo тy cтopoны кoлючки пoльcкиe кapaтeли зaдopнo cмeютcя https://t.co/482GSlql1M • Claim that US State Department stance is ‘Let the refugees languish in their hovels’ • Ukraine explained how its eastern borders were being penetrated and EU pretended not to understand, but now Iraqis are bypassing 4 borders to enter the EU. Implication: this may teach the EU a lesson. • Water cannons are EU democracy and EU values in action • Merkel saying treatment of refugees should be humane. Poles should be lectured on this. • (Cynical) US State Dept: Putin distracting from Ukraine with border crisis: ‘I think the US is distracting from its own ratings’. • How does EU propose that Minsk should eliminate the reasons for migrants coming to the border—bomb London and Washington? (Implication—London and Washington are the reasons the migrants are coming) • Even CNN correspondent Matthew Chance not spared by Polish water-cannon— I’m afraid to think how many Poles will be begging forgiveness before their western overlords • (Cynical) It was a stroke of luck for Poland (the country non-compliant with EU laws and deviating from democracy) to be on the migrant route—if it had been Germany these refugees would have long ago been on the EU’s streets. Of the Russian-language tweets critical of the Belarusian and Russian governments, media, and leaders, many were surprisingly, perspicaciously and even humorously (from our perspective) critical of Putin’s and Lukashenko’s motives: • Putin and Lukashenko set up a branch of hell on the border—name one good thing Putin did unselfishly for the world

4.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape in Poland Versus East Slavdom

163

• Russian media filling airwaves with how the ‘evil’ Poles are not letting in refugees, but why aren’t the ‘kind’ Belarusians or ‘hospitable’ Russians taking them in? • A parody of Putin-Lukashenko phone call—‘Fuhrer Putin and Collective Farm Comrade Lukashenko decided to s**t with tripled strength in response to the border crisis’ – Пyтлo-фюpep пpoвeл тeлeфoнныe пepeгoвopы c кoлxoз-гeнocce. Oбcyдили кpизиc нa пoльcкoй гpaницe, yкpaинcкoe нaпpaвлeниe, вoeнныe yчeния BCУ c aмepикaнцaми. Былo peшeнo гaдить c yтpoeннoй cилoй. B ближaйшee вpeмя ждeм oбocтpeний пo вышeyкaзaнным нaпpaвлeниям. • Putin, the ‘reliable Tsar’, keeping busy with troops on Ukraine border, attacks by migrants, gas shortage in EU, downed satellite threatening ISS – Boйcкa нa гpaницe c Укpaинoй, aтaкa мигpaнтaми нa Пoльшy, дeфицит гaзa в Eвpoпe, yгpoжaющиe MКC oблoмки cбитoгo cпyтникa… Bcё-тo в тpyдax цapь-нaдёжa, вcё в тpyдax, aки пчeлa! Finally, perhaps reflecting a common Slavic conservatism, Russian tweets expressed many criticisms of migrants similar to those observed in Polish tweets, and in one case even some support for the Polish position: • Some (unlike refugees) seek better life by getting work, documents, learning languages, respecting laws – Я пoнимaю, кoнeчнo, чтo “бeжeнцы ищyт лyчшeй жизни”. Ho тaкжe я знaю и дpyгиx людeй, кoтopыe тoжe ищyт. И для этoгo — ищyт paбoтy, coбиpaют нeoбxoдимыe дoкyмeнты, yчaт языки, пoвышaют квaлификaцию, yвaжaют зaкoны тex cтpaн, гpaждaнaми кoтopыx xoтят cтaть, a нe взpывaют гpaницy. • Poles standing firm against barbarian horde in search of freebies at EU taxpayer expense – Hoчь нa гpaницa Пoльши и Бeлapycи. Пoлякaм бoльшe peшимocти. Opдa вapвapoв в пoиcкax eвpoпeйcкoй xaлявы и eвpoпeйcкиx пocoбий зa cчёт нaлoгoв житeлeй cтpaн EC нe дoлжнa пpopвaтьcя https://t.co/Z6YUYD ydYq • ‘Belarusian’ migrants will have German passports in 5 years while even highlyqualified Russians have to jump through hoops – Чтo интepecнo: чepeз 5 лeт вce “бeлopyccкиe” бeжeнцы бyдyт oблaдaть нeмeцким пacпopтoм, a poccиянин для пoлyчeния Шeнгeнcкoй визы дoлжeн бyдeт coбиpaть cпpaвки c paбoты и выпиcки из бaнкa. Дaжe ecли oн пpeпoдaвaтeль BУЗa и влaдeeт языкaми. Гдe тyт лoгикa, cкaжитe? • Migrants paid 12–15 thousand euros to get to EU and are now asking for halal food

164

4 The Polish Information Environment

– A мигpaнты-тo нe пpocтыe oкaзaлиcь. Пo cвeдeниям из paзныx иcтoчникoв пyтeшecтвиe в EC oбxoдитcя им oт 12 тыc. дo 15 тыc. eвpo. A тeпepь вoт и нa пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe нe пpocтo пищy тpeбyют, a oбязaтeльнo xaляль. Пpoдвинyтыe тaкиe “бeжeнцы”. • Young well-dressed aggressive men throwing stones and bottles—since when did illegally crossing the border stop being considered a crime? – Moлoдыe,здopoвыe,cпopтивныe,aгpeccивныe,xopoшo oдeтыe….Paзмaxивaют тoпopaми,лoпaтaми,кидaютcя кaмнями,бyтылкaми…. Ho этo нe бaндиты.Этo бeжeнцы,oкaзывaeтcя…. C кaкиx этo пop нaглoe,нeзaкoннoe пepeceчeниe гocyдapcтвeннoй гpaницы пepecтaлo cчитaтьcя пpecтyплeниeм? https://t.co/3W6TTZrc7z • ‘Kind’, ‘defenseless’ migrants using lasers to damage Polish soldiers’ eyesight – Mилыe и бeззaщитныe бeжeнцы нa бeлopyccкoй гpaницe иcпoльзyют лaзepы, чтoбы пopaзить зpeниe пoльcкиx coлдaт! • These are not refugees, but a hybrid army – жeнщинaм и дeтям opгaнизoвaть “пoмытьcя-пoecть-лeкapcтвa-тeплocoн” нa бeлapyccкoй cтopoнe, к мyжчинaм никaкoгo cниcxoждeния c этим мoжнo пoмoчь из Бpюcceля, в пpeдeлax нeoбxoдимoгo гyмaнитapнoгo минимyмa этo нe бeжeнцы этo гибpиднaя apмия мeждyнapoднoгo Кoминиepнa вapвapoв.. https://t.co/beDBcVzLf4. Summary of Analysis In summary, the Polish tweets were surprising in the extent of the positive informational messaging in them, reflecting well on the efforts of the Polish government and the uptake of that effort in the population. The Russian tweets were unsurprising in the amount of cynicism they contained, but surprising in the targets of cynicism and criticism: more was directed towards Russian and Belarusian leaders than we expected. Many tweets reflected Russian speakers’ insecurities that we have remarked on elsewhere: that the migrants just reveal again the material inferiority of the post-Soviet space. In general, the evidence we reviewed suggests that the migrant crisis engineered by Lukashenko has backfired in that it has exposed at least as much division in the Russian-speaking world as among Poles, and probably more.

4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications

165

4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications We started this chapter by considering the cultural and historical similarities and differences between Poland and its neighbors, those to the west and particularly to the east. From this discussion, we moved to consideration of the maneuvers that are currently going on around Poland, both in the kinetic and the information space. Some of these (the rocky relations between the EU and Poland, and the crisis on the Belarus-Poland border) have made news headlines recently; others (the ways in which Polish skeletons in the closet, such as those from World War II, impact Poland today), less so. All this makes up a tapestry where seeming contradictions can be explained culturally and by reference to rule of law. Rule of law, after all, explains both the root of some of Poland’s conflicts with Western partners, and it also explains why Lukashenko’s outsourced conflict on the Polish-Belarusian border actually solidified EU support of Poland amidst Poland’s constitutional crisis—very probably, contrary to Lukashenko’s expectations. Some factors that increase risk for NATO and other Western entities with respect to Poland have to do with the latter’s cultural affinities with eastern neighbors, and this in turn manifests itself in the information space and in issues of rule of law. Recent disagreements between Poland and, for example, Israel, clearly originate in inaccurate narratives about the Holocaust, something which has become an issue even in Polish lawmaking (see Sect. 4.2.2). While false narratives are by no means unique to Slavdom, the same basic problem has been an ongoing bone of contention between Western countries and Russia. Whether the issue is ransomware, Russian interference in Western democracy via falsehoods spread by Russia’s ‘Internet Research Agency’, or financial fraud, Western countries’ complaints often boil down to one thing: Russian failure to tackle these problems through Russia’s own rule of law (or lack thereof). It is one thing for rogue actors to spread false rumors denying aspects of the Holocaust, for example; it is another when the State by its actions facilitates such denial, criminalizes opposition to it, or shields its rogue actors from Western sanctions. In this way, Poland shares common risk factors with eastern neighbors, though its body politic has not succumbed to a disintegration of rule of law to the same extent. Poland’s Western partners including NATO should therefore focus on reinforcing and strengthening what is good in Poland’s position. And this has largely happened during the Polish-Belarusian border crisis. In Sect. 4.3, we turned to an analysis of the Polish- and Russian-language information space in Twitter. This analysis largely confirms our hypothesis that Poland is culturally liminal. Some of the same narratives against refugees (which might also, of course, be found in Western Europe) are in common between Polish and Russian speaking Twitter users. But the rule-of-law vacuum is much more evident

166

4 The Polish Information Environment

in the widespread cynicism in the Russian-speaking Twittersphere. This cynicism attacks the West, but it cuts both ways, surprising us with the extent to which it also targets actors within the former Soviet space. We believe that cynicism is born of having repeatedly been let down by leaders who have broken promises or failed to live up to expectations. And this points to an opportunity for strategic communication. Western strategic communicators should focus on providing accurate, reliable, and reassuring information in Russian, as Poland’s authorities successfully did for Poland’s own population during the border crisis, as shown by our Twitter analysis. While we have recognized elsewhere that this kind of communication can gain traction, even if only over time, we ourselves were surprised by the level of traction gained by Polish official reassurances we observed in the Polish Twittersphere during the crisis. We would go so far as to say we believe this kind of communication, or permeation of the information space, was why Lukashenko’s expectations of driving more of a wedge between Poland and the EU failed and backfired. Presented by Lukashenko with the border crisis, Polish authorities showed that they were committed in this instance to both rule of law and transparent communication, and the EU and many of Poland’s own citizens took notice. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin, in his parable of the fox and the hedgehog, observed that the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows ‘one big thing’. Our recommendation for strategic communication is to follow this ‘one big thing’ or lesson learned from the Poland-Belarus border crisis. If transparent, timely, reassuring, truthful communication was successful in the Polish case during the most recent crisis, surely this shows that such an approach to communication is cross-cultural. If it can work in Poland, it can work among the culturally similar people to Poland’s east. And if leaders in the Russian-speaking space, through poor policy, miscalculations, and communication strategies based on obfuscation, have left a vacuum which has resulted in widespread cynicism in the former Soviet space, then Western communicators can achieve a great deal simply by stepping in and talking directly to Russian-speaking populations in their own language. Where there is a vacuum, we can fill it.

Granica wzmocniona. Prosz˛e spa´c spokojnie, kiedy my czuwamy Słu˙zymy Polsce #NaStra˙zyGranicy #POMAGAMYYiCHRONIMY https://t.co/wnauTW7RNX

Border guard reassurance that border is secure

Przeczytałem na Krytyce Politycznej tekst Kingi Criticism of liberal allegations of “Polish Dunin, w którym tlumaczy, z˙ e: - szariat jest w Polsce, sharia” nie na Bliskim Wschodzie - polski patriarchat zniszcz˛a uchod´zcy, bo s˛a s´liczni i potrafi˛a kocha´c, w przeciwie´nstwie do Polaków. Serio. To s˛a po prostu kretyni. Idioci kompletni

4

5

5.3%

Kolejne nagrania z odpartego dzi´s ataku migrantów na Border guard presents video showing przej´sciu w #Ku´znica. Atakuj˛acymi byli przede migrant attacks wszystkim młodzi, agresywni m˛ez˙ czy´zni. - #granica @Straz_Graniczna @PolskaPolicja @StZaryn https:// t.co/dU2ZqZ0hJa

3

Liberals

6.4%

#GRANICA: Nasi z˙ ołnierze informuj˛a za pomoc˛a Warm drinks for troops mediów społeczno´sciowych, z˙ e przydadz˛a im si˛e kubki termiczne na ciepłe napoje. Je˙zeli chcesz pomoc, warto podj˛ac´ temat z miejscowymi jednostkami OSP, które organizuj˛a pomoc dla naszych słu˙zb. Podajcie dalej!

2

(continued)

6.0%

2.8%

0.0%

(irrelevant)

トレーナーネーム変えるかぁ

Est. % of corpus

1

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 167

Ko´nczymy kolejny dzie´n ci˛ez˙ kiej słu˙zby na granicy. Nocna zmiana melduje si˛e na posterunkach. Robimy wszystko co w naszej mocy, aby była bezpieczna! https://t.co/PuPpzXXhy5

W podlaskich szpitalach pracownicy ochrony zdrowia próbuj˛a pomaga´c zatrzymanym nielegalnym imigrantom. Zderzaj˛a si˛e z patriarchaln˛a cywilizacj˛a islamsk˛a, z agresj˛a i pogard˛a. Ale boj˛a si˛e mówi´c pod nazwiskiem by nie by´c pos˛adzonymi o rasizm. Brzmi znajomo? https://t.co/0coz1Zf7SN, https://t.co/rDG dUxM9DQ

dziwi˛e si˛e z˙ e nasze s´rodowiska soc-lib nie sugeruj˛a tym migrantom np. migracji do Izraela. Po pierwsze bli˙zej, po drugie ma granic˛e z Syri˛a. Kraj bogaty, z niezwykle przyjazn˛a stra˙za˛ graniczn˛a. Co wi˛ecej wobec prób siłowego sforsowania granicy nigdy nie u˙zywa polewaczek

8

9

10

Cynical suggestion that migrants should consider Israel as a destination

soc-libs

Border region hospitals assisting migrants Islam, liberals but colliding with “Islamic civilization”, but not speaking up for fear of being called “racist”

Border guard reassurance that border is secure

5 frakcji obecnych w PE domaga si˛e w li´scie do KE Criticism of EU stance tying approval of EU EU zablokowania polskiego KPO. Nie podoba im si˛e, z˙ e funding for Poland to rule of law, especially Polska sama chce kształtowa´c swój system prawny i amidst border crisis wymiar sprawiedliwo´sci. Takie gro´zby w sytuacji, gdy Polska broni granicy UE maj˛a szczególnie absurdalny i ponury wymiar

Target of any criticism

6

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

(continued)

2.1%

2.4%

3.8%

2.4%

Est. % of corpus

168 4 The Polish Information Environment

Dob˛e po postawieniu przy wje´zdzie do Ku´znicy, nieznani sprawcy zniszczyli billboard z podzi˛ekowaniem dla polskich słu˙zb za ochron˛e granicy. Tego nie zrobili Białorusini. To zrobili ludzie ogłupieni przez wrogie Polsce media, opozycj˛e i celebrytów. Opcja antypolska

Wojna na granicy, młodzi migranci we współpracy z While “war” goes on at the border, Warsaw białoruskimi słu˙zbami atakuj˛a polskie wojsk˛a, policj˛e i concert “Chopin was a migrant too” SG a w Warszawie koncert “Chopin te˙z był provides funding for migrants uchod´zc˛a"”. Dochód z biletów “przeznaczony zostanie na pomoc migrantom na polsko-białoruskiej granicy”. Menager—Beata Etienne

Wystarczy kilka minut w przygranicznym lesie, z˙ eby zrozumie´c, z jakim dramatem mierz˛a si˛e migranci. Przenikaj˛acy do ko´sci chłód, widoczno´sc´ do 1,5 m i psychiczny klincz. To Białoru´s zgotowała im piekło, ale Polska nie zrobiła niemal nic, by zapewni´c humanitarne traktowanie

12

13

14

Criticism of Poland for not doing more to help migrants in bitter cold

Billboard thanking border guards destroyed near Ku´znica, alleged to have been done by liberals

Ku´znica: Migranci zaatakowali naszych z˙ ołnierzy i Border guard update on migrant attack and funkcjonariuszy kamieniami oraz próbuj˛a zniszczy´c use of water cannon ogrodzenie i dosta´c si˛e na teren Polski. Nasze słu˙zby u˙zyły gazu łzawi˛acego z˙ eby stłumi´c agresj˛e migrantów https://t.co/Fi8RdmE4uX

11

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

Belarus and Poland

Liberals

Liberal media and those deceived by them

Target of any criticism

(continued)

1.8%

2.2%

2.6%

2.6%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 169

Podsumowuj˛ac poni˙zej dzisiejszy, trudny dzie´n Border guard update after difficult day, informujemy, z˙ e na chwil˛e obecn˛a sytuacja na granicy border is secure jest opanowana i nie odnotowujemy powa˙zniejszych incydentów. Polskie słu˙zby stoj˛a #nastra˙zy i czuwaj˛a. Zapewniamy, z˙ e z˙ aden agresywny tłum nie przekroczy nielegalnie granicy https://t.co/LCAg3IscUi

Słowo komentarza: dali´smy rad˛e - z˙ ołnierze Border guard reassurance that border is #WojskoPolskie, funkcjonariusze @Straz_Graniczna i secure @PolskaPolicja Mo˙zecie na nas liczy´c! Polska granica jest dobrze chroniona! @DGeneralneRSZ @SztabGenWP #terytorialsi #poland #belarus #BorderCrisis https://t.co/kijGKVcbQo

Nielegalni migranci na granicy białoruskiej to nie s˛a Migrants don’t satisfy the Geneva uchod˙zcy [raczej nachod´zcy], bowiem nie spełniaj˛a Convention definition and are illegal kryteriów definicji uchod´zcy wg Konwencji Genewskiej Zatem z˙ a˛ dania traktowania ich jak uchod´zców nie maj˛a wa˙znej podstawy prawnej i s˛a bezprawnym i bezskutecznym nadu˙zyciem https://t.co/ xnrlShUBW5

17

18

19

Migrants

Car of “medics at the border” destroyed. Medics at the border Cynical suggestion this was to raise funding

Medycy na granicy to miała by´c nieudolna podróbka “Lekarzy bez granic” Z t˛a ró˙znic˛a, z˙ e “lekarze” z którymi trzykrotnie pracowałem w Iraku i Syrii pomagaj˛a, cz˛esto z nara˙zeniem z˙ ycia, “medycy” za´s wyłudzili od frajerów pół ba´nki i popsuli sobie samochód w nadziei na nast˛epne

15

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

(continued)

1.4%

2.2%

2.1%

1.6%

Est. % of corpus

170 4 The Polish Information Environment

Migranci, okłamywani przez Białorusinów, liczyli na szybkie sforsowanie granicy RP, pomoc aktywistów i dostanie si˛e na Zachód. Nic takiego si˛e nie stanie. Polska skutecznie broni swojej granicy, a Europa i s´wiat coraz mocniej popieraj˛a działania władz RP. https://t.co/HSCDpdaWnx

26

Poland standing firm and receiving support contrary to migrants’ expectations

Nazywanie polskich z˙ ołnierzy s´mieciami, wyzywanie Meanness of insult Polish soldiers for doing Those insulting Polish soldiers 1.9% ich od sukinsynów, stwierdzenia, z˙ e ha´nbi˛a polski their job mundur, obra˙zanie za to, z˙ e z nara˙zeniem z˙ ycia broni˛a polskiej granicy jest podło´sci˛a. To po prostu inny kr˛ag kulturowy

23

Migrants and activists

Migranci jasno mi˛edzy sob˛a mówi˛a, z˙ e rzucali kostk˛a Migrants openly admit they threw paving brukow˛a w polskich funkcjonariuszy. Sami przyznaj˛a stones at officials, meanwhile activists are si˛e do agresji. Tymczasem aktywi´sci płacz˛a, z˙ e w odp. complaining about water cannon use u˙zyto armatek wodnych. Apel do „obro´nców praw człowieka”: zanim we´zmiecie si˛e do obrony - owego człowieka posłuchajcie. https://t.co/ydRs961pGR

21

(continued)

1.6%

1.3%

1.3%

Lukashenko provided “political gold” for PiS PiS which they are milking for all it’s worth

PiS zwołuje posiedzenie Sejmu tylko po to, by rozegra´c w Polsce kryzys uchod´zcy, bo dzi˛eki Łukaszence narodziło si˛e znów „polityczne złoto”. Zamiast wej´sc´ w s´cisł˛a współprac˛e z Zachodem, od miesi˛ecy ignoruj˛a opozycj˛e, by nagle szanta˙zowa´c j˛a „patriotyzmem” i „wojn˛a”. Szkoda słów

Est. % of corpus

20

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 171

Powiem tak. Mordowanie chrze´scijan, cisza. Ataki na ko´scioły, cisza. Mordowanie ksi˛ez˙ y, cisza. Uchod´zcy na granicy, nagle głos odzyskany… Co´s tu nie tak? co

Teraz w TVN. Dyrektor szkoły w Białymstoku mówi o pomocy z˙ ołnierzom,którzy pełni˛a słu˙zb˛e na granicy.Gdy tylko si˛e dowiedzieli,˙ze z˙ ołnierze od 3 dni nie jedli nic ciepłego to natychmiast ruszyła ˙ z˙ ywno´sciowa pomoc. Zołnierze dzi˛ekowali. Chwała Dyrektorowi,ale gdzie Pa´nstwo ! ˙ Zenada. 2 lata mieszkali w Moskwie, zapłacili tam 2 tys. dolarów zeby dostac si˛e do Francji. I ci ludzie chc˛a nielegalnie przekroczy´c polsk˛a granic˛e? I nam ma by´c ich z˙ al. Ka˙zdego głupka, który nie rozumie co to granica ma nam by´c z˙ al? To s˛a “uchod´zcy”? Lito´sci! https://t.co/nmLY1GRyUT

29

31

32

Według JS Wolskiego KE-pod niemieckim Criticism of EC and Germany for “diktat” dyktatem-ma z˙ a˛ da´c by migranci którzy przedr˛a si˛e that migrants shouldn’t be pushed back, przez granic˛e nie byli zawracani.Wnioski:1-to zach˛eta allying with “Soviets” by si˛e przedzierali.2-na Niemcówi-i ich sojusze z Sowietami-zawsze mo˙zna liczy´c.3-ewidentnie graj˛a na powrót Tuska. 4:niedoczekanie szwabów

28

Case of migrants who lived 2 years in Moscow and came to border because it was cheaper way to get to France

Director of Bialystok school providing hot meals to soldiers at border

Criticism of silence when Christians and priests murdered, churches attacked, but raising the voice for migrants

Sytuacja na #granica eskaluje, jednak˙ze wsparcie z Border guard update, difficult but standing Pa´nstwa strony pomaga nam przetrwa´c te trudne firm chwile @16Dywizja stoi na stra˙zy bezpiecze´nstwa https://t.co/5u6oOzVeZK

27

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

Migrants, liberals

Liberals

EC and Germany

Target of any criticism

(continued)

1.2%

1.1%

2.5%

0.8%

2.3%

Est. % of corpus

172 4 The Polish Information Environment

List otwarty do Pani mjr Katarzyny Zdanowicz, Open letter from border area resident rzeczniczki podlaskiej Stra˙zy Granicznej, która w criticizing Polish border guard mediach skar˙zyła si˛e, i˙z najbardziej bol˛a przykre komentarze wobec funkcjonariuszy, a oni przecie tacy szlachetni zawsze z dodatkow˛a kanapk˛a w plecaku dla uchod´zcy. https://t.co/ZTW3Yv1RfN

Strona główna @tvn24 Przekaz nadal ten sam. Criticism of “women and children vs. armed Liberals Kobiety i dzieci vs. “uzbrojeni ludzie w mundurach” people in uniform” media narrative (autentyczny cytat red. Zauchy o SG), naprzemienne stosowanie poj˛ec´ uchod´zcy/migranci itd. Takie media na granicy? Polska nie zyska nic. Oni jedynie zaoszcz˛edz˛a na ckliwych zdj˛eciach. https://t.co/lUCtoI pzGC

35

36

Border guard update on migrant attack

Ku´znica: agresywni migranci wci˛az˙ rzucaj˛a kamieniami w stron˛e naszych z˙ ołnierzy i funkcjonariuszy. Polskie słu˙zby odpieraj˛a atak https:// t.co/ESHN155vkf

34

Polish border guard

Russia/Putin

˙ L˙zyj Zydów, Francuzów naucz je´sc´ widelcem. Criticism of Russia for double-standard Czechom pod granic˛a zaserwuj truj˛ac˛a niespodziank˛e. Szwedów bojkotuj za Ike˛e, Brytyjczyków za Ziemkiewicza. Na pa´nstwowym Marszu Niepodległo´sci spal niemieck˛a flag˛e, powiewaj sztandarem z napisem FUCK BIDEN. A na koniec zapytaj si˛e tak: https://t.co/o9OwjcWkEi

Target of any criticism

33

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

(continued)

1.0%

0.9%

3.5%

0.7%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 173

Dwie stodoły Podlasia. W jednej ludzi ratuj˛a. W Oko.press reporting criticizing indifference drugiej wyłapuj˛a i czekaj˛a a˙z “mróz sko´nczy problem”. and highlighting help to migrants on border Reporterska podró˙z na granicy dobra i zła @Bacon227 #uchod´zcy #migranci #Podlasie #granica #okopress https://t.co/YUSu66r07t, https://t.co/sxI2zUXsib

W zasadzie mo˙ze Merkel by ich sobie wzi˛eła, tacy pokojowi migranci na ulicach niemieckich miast zapewni˛a zdrowe c´ wiczenia niemieckiej policji i antyterrorystom przez lata.. https://t.co/ZMsRY6 WB7G

Budujemy 300.000 armi˛e, mamy nieprzebrane ilo´sci gotówki, pokonali´smy mafi˛e VAT-owsk˛a, kupujemy rezerwy złota, rydzykom rozdajemy setki milionów, a na propagand˛e przeznaczamy grube miliardy. A z˙ ołnierze na granicy głoduj˛a i marzn˛a. PiS podeptał Polsk˛e i si˛e na ni˛a wysrał

41

43

44

Criticism of PiS for not prioritizing soldiers on border

Merkel could take migrants, they’ll help keep German police in shape for years

Proceder okre´slany jako „push back”, nie został In 2020, ECHR did not say pushback was uznany na pocz˛atku 2020 r. przez Europejski Trybunał illegal when legal entry means not used Praw Człowieka za nielegalny. Uzasadnienie: migranci nie korzystali z legalnych s´rodków, aby dosta´c si˛e do UE

39

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

PiS

Merkel

Polish indifference

Migrants, liberals

Target of any criticism

(continued)

0.6%

1.2%

1.0%

1.2%

Est. % of corpus

174 4 The Polish Information Environment

Cynicism

Refugees

Dziennikarze sami wydali sobie zakaz przebywania Criticism of cynical narratives e.g. Medics nad granic˛a, medycy sami zniszczyli sobie samochody, destroyed their own cars kobiety i dzieci same wypychaj˛a si˛e do lasu, a pomagaj˛acy im sami utrudniaj˛a sobie t˛e pomoc. Mo˙zna stale udawa´c idiotów, ale po co?

Kto mógł przypuszcza´c, z˙ e uchod´zcy wiedli przed ucieczk˛a w miar˛e normalne z˙ ycie, zarabiali pieni˛adze, chodzili do sklepów i kupowali ubrania? https://t.co/ DujZsepQPz

50

51

Cynicism about refugees in $1,000 jackets

NATO and EU need new category “weapomigration”

NATO i UE potrzebuj˛a nowej kategorii migracyjnej weapomigracja. Weaponizacja migracji czyli agresja migracyjna. Osoby, które wtargn˛ely na terytorium danego pa´nstwa w ramach hybrydowej agresji migracyjnej nigdy nie uuzyskaj˛a statusu uchod´zcy w z˙ adnym z pa´nstw UE i NATO

49

Weaponization of migrants

EU

Criticism of EU for not controlling borders, citing Calais region

To nie #Kuznica, tylko j˛adro Unii, północna Francja, gdzie od dekady nielegalni migranci robi˛a co chc˛a, pomi˛edzy D˙zungl˛a #Calais i obozami jak ten w #GrandeSynthe, ewakuowanym dzisiaj rano przez policj˛e. Tak oto wygl˛ada UE, która nie chce kontrolowa´c zewn˛etrznych granic. @Frontex https://t. co/KDEIUiZyXY

45

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

(continued)

1.1%

1.0%

0.9%

0.9%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 175

Ein weiterer bestätigter Todesfall an der polnisch-belarusischen Grenze. Die Leiche eines ca. 20-jährigen Syrers wurde gestern im Wald bei Wólka Terechowska nahe der Grenze aufgefunden. https://t. co/ARRfSmPi2M

W zwi˛azku z ryzykiem dalszej eskalacji przemocy na #granicy, przypominamy, z˙ e migranci nie s˛a agresorami, ale zakładnikami re˙zimu Łukaszenki. Od kilku dni poddawani s˛a oni profesjonalnej akcji dezinformacyjnej prowadzonej przez białoruskie słu˙zby. Zał˛aczamy informacj˛e medialn˛a. https://t.co/ 9P4Sbadqxy

Migranci zaczynaj˛a znosi´c gał˛ezie z lasu. Pojawili si˛e równie˙z przedstawiciele białoruskich mediów. Wi˛ekszo´sc´ namiotów, w których przebywali migranci jest usuwana. https://t.co/pgBvBr3PHG

53

56

57

PiS

Target of any criticism

Encampment being removed, Belarusian media appearing

Activist group Grupa Granica reminds in Lukashenko, those Calling press release that migrants aren’t aggressors migrants aggressors but hostages of Lukashenko regime; shouldn’t be pushed back

Body of 20-year-old Syrian found in Poland near border

wielki przekr˛et na granicy… gdyby drut kolczasty nie PiS wasted money by using coiled rather był zwini˛ety w kł˛ebek tylko wyprostowany- starczyłby than straightened razor wire at border na wi˛ecej kilometrów granicy. PiS w ten sposób zmarnował milion złotych ! O tym fakcie poinformował na konferencji Poseł PO Michał Szczerba w towarzystwie Posła Jo´nskiego. https://t.co/ vvwDO8BxlT

52

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

(continued)

1.3%

0.8%

0.7%

0.7%

Est. % of corpus

176 4 The Polish Information Environment

Merkel going behind our backs with Putin and Lukashenko—the Krauts and the Russkis dreaming of a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact?

Merkel za naszymi plecami najpierw rozmawiała z Putinem a dzi´s telefonicznie z Łukaszenk˛a. Szwaby i kacapy wci˛az˙ marz˛a o nowych wcieleniach paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow? #Białoru´s #granica

Na chwile obecn˛a w sumie 9 policjantów rannych. 9 Polish police officers wounded at the Policjantki i Policjanci dopóki trzymała ich adrenalina border nie czuli, z˙ e mog˛a by´c ranni i potrzebowa´c specjalistycznej pomocy, ale jak zeszli z granicy odczuli skutki obra˙ze´n. https://t.co/DCOtFmG0Ph

Sztab kryzysowy u Matołusza: - Co robi´c ??? Poland has alienated Frontex, EU, NATO, Zadzwo´nmy do Frontexu ! - Nie, przecie˙z ich zlali´smy Biden and now the effect is refugees - Zadzwo´nmy do Unii ! - Nie, przecie˙z to wróg Zadzwo´nmy do NATO ! - Nie, chc˛a sankcje na nas nało˙zy´c - Zadzwo´nmy do Bidena ! - Nie odbiera telefonu… EFEKT #uchod´zcy #Refugees https://t.co/ gjCvuafEMt

Dziennikarze powinni by´c wsz˛edzie i zawsze, bo patrz˛a władzy na r˛ece. A im wi˛ecej ich si˛e przygl˛ada, tym łatwiej odsia´c z tego grona propagandystów i manipulatorów. Oboj˛etnie, czy to granica, front wojenny, Sejm, lokalny urz˛ad czy zasrany mecz piłkarski

59

60

62

63

Pro journalists to weed out manipulators from those in power

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

Manipulators in power

Polish government

Germany and Russia

Target of any criticism

(continued)

0.7%

0.9%

1.0%

1.0%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 177

To oczywi´scie #Fejk ale trzeba przyzna´c, z˙ e wiele lat do´swiadczenia w zabezpieczaniu ró˙znych imprez masowych w tym równie˙z podwy˙zszonego ryzyka na stadionach pozwoliło doskonali´c umiej˛etno´sci niezb˛edne do tak profesjonalnej ochrony granic, a Policjanci na granicy s˛a the best https://t.co/6B7 TznxAk7

Lo matko. Dziambor proponuj˛e wykupienie linii lotniczych, którymi lataj˛a uchod´zcy i migranci człowieku Qatar Airlines i Turkish Airlines, to nie LOT i za flaszk˛e wina ich si˛e nie kupi. Kolejny “m˛adry” pomysł @ArturDziambor

Siedlce companies supporting border forces Siedleckie firmy wł˛aczaj˛a si˛e w akcj˛e with energy bars and drinks #MuremZaPolskimMundurem. Dzi´s odebrali´smy parti˛e kilku tysi˛ecy batonów i napojów energetycznych, które przekazali nam przedsi˛ebiorcy z powiatu siedleckiego. Prezenty jutro trafi˛a do z˙ ołnierzy pełniacych słu˙zb˛e na granicy. Dzi˛ekujemy! https://t.co/aS94zysVBS

66

67

68

Dziambor proposes buying out the airlines that are flying migrants in—criticism

Polish police pointing out a fake supposedly from their Twitter account

Białoruska operacja włamania si˛e na konto ministra Lukashenko using Polish media for potrzebowała medialnych pudeł rezonansowych i takie amplification si˛e znalazły. Przed atakiem hybrydowym przy granicy Łukaszenka wiedział, z˙ e mo˙ze na nie liczy´c i wykorzystał je do uderzenia w morale i zaufanie do instytucji pa´nstwa polskiego

65

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

Dziambor

Lukashenko, Polish media

Target of any criticism

(continued)

0.5%

0.6%

0.6%

0.7%

Est. % of corpus

178 4 The Polish Information Environment

Zapadła noc. Miejsce które próbowali naruszy´c uchod´zcy nie jest jedynym, w którym szybko mo˙ze doj´sc´ do wtargni˛ecia na teren RP du˙zych grup z Białorusi. Teraz do skutecznej obserwacji reagowania na znacznym, zagro˙zonym obszarze potrzebujemy odpowiednio wyposa˙zonych s´migłowców

Uchod´zcy z Syrii oraz Iraku zostali pobici przy szosie w okolicach Hajnówki - poinformowali aktywi´sci z Grupy Granica. O szczegółach opowiada tłumacz Grupy Jakub Sypia´nski #OKOpress #granica https://t. co/Rp1tkj6O6V

Jak˙ze ordynarne słowa cisn˛a si˛e na usta gdy Rz˛ad dwoi Criticism of EU for freezing funds when si˛e i troi, kwiat naszych słu˙zb z Policji, WOT-u i S. Polish forces are putting themselves on the Granicznej nadstawia karku na granicy - a Kolaboracja line Obywatelska w Brukseli skamle do KE o dobijanie Polski mro˙zeniem finansów z Fund. Odbudowy! Swołocz rynsztok, kloaka!

71

72

76

Grupa Granica informing that refugees beaten on the road near border

Helicopters needed in face of multiple border breaches by migrants

Dynamicznie zmieniaj˛aca si˛e sytuacja ka˙zdego dnia Polish government update providing links to reliable information przynosi kolejne informacje i wyzwania dotycz˛ace sytuacji na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. Oficjalne informacje oraz najnowsze materiały do pobrania mo˙zna znale´zc´ na stronie https://t.co/gpjUT62bBH, https://t.co/EdAVQMylCd

70

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

EU

Target of any criticism

(continued)

0.4%

0.9%

0.5%

0.9%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 179

To b˛edzie ci˛ez˙ ki tydzie´n! Wideo sprzed chwili, Migrants primed by Belarusian forces to migranci przygotowywani przez białoruskie słu˙zby do breach the border przekroczenia granicy. Zobaczcie ilu ich… https://t.co/ VpD05Rt6fS Ryszard Galla (German minority Polish MP) voted against security and state of emergency. Anti-German minority

Niech ka˙zdy pami˛eta, z˙ e Ryszard Galla, poseł mniejszo´sci niemieckiej zagłosował przeciw budowie zabezpieczenia na granicy pa´nstwowej. Głosował te˙z przeciw przedłu˙zeniu stanu wyj˛atkowego. Do´sc´ przywilejów mniejszo´sci niemieckiej w Polsce! https://t.co/kbW56D1WKt

Uczniowie Zespołu Szkół nr 7 w #BiałyBór ze wsparciem dla broni˛acych naszej granicy. #MuremZaPolskimMundurem https://t.co/rv4BGP KtQ5

78

79

80

School students supporting border forces

Mamy troje rannych po dzisiejszym dniu. Dziewczyna Time to use rubber bullets at border with 3 ze Stra˙zy Granicznej, z˙ ołnierz i policjant z p˛ekni˛et˛a wounded from border forces czaszk˛a. O granatach pisałem par˛e dni temu w kontek´scie Kosowa. Czas najwy˙zszy wyda´c rozkaz u˙zycia gumowych kul i odsun˛ac´ ludzi od granicy. Chyba, z˙ e czekamy a˙z kto´s zginie. https://t.co/pyBvH1 jCxq

77

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

German minority in Poland

Belarusian forces

Too-soft approach at border

Target of any criticism

(continued)

1.1%

0.7%

1.2%

0.4%

Est. % of corpus

180 4 The Polish Information Environment

Rzecznik Słu˙zb Specjalnych o antysemickim incydencie w Kaliszu: typowe działanie inspirowane przez Kreml, zorganizowane przez prorosyjskich aktywistów, towarzysz˛ace kryzysowi na granicy, kreuj˛ace negatywny wizerunek Polski, polaryzuj˛ace społecze´nstwo. Tak wygl˛ada wojna hybrydowa

Cała masa niezale˙znych dziennikarzy została de facto Poland’s “authoritarian” government zmuszona do wyjazdu z Turcji Erdogana i z W˛egier (compared to Hungary’s and Turkey’s) is Orbana. Dzi´s tułaj˛a si˛e mi˛edzy Berlinem a Nowym why journalists not wanted at border Jorkiem. Autorytarne re˙zimy nienawidz˛a dziennikarzy. Dlatego nasi nie chc˛a ich na granicy. Raczej za granic˛a

Uchod´zcy spadli Kaczy´nskiemu jak z nieba, to “polityczne złoto”, dlatego nie chce pomocy UE, Frontexu, organizacji charytatywnych ani dziennikarzy. To idealne odwrócenie uwagi od pandemii, dro˙zyzny, wyroków TSUE i szansa na lepsze sonda˙ze. Oby´s si˛e stary dziadu nie przeliczył

84

85

86

Target of any criticism

Refugees are “political gold” from heaven for Kaczy´nski (deputy PM)

Polish government/Kaczy´nski

Poland “authoritarian government”

Special services spokesman about typical Kremlin and pro-Russian Kremlin activity to stoke division and create forces—manipulation negative image of Poland

PM @MorawieckiM for @PAPinformacje about the Polish government update providing link to situation at the Polish-Belarusian border and the Polish reliable information and international response to the hybrid attack by Lukashenko’s regime against Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and the entire EU https://t.co/vv4laEZyYw, https://t.co/YxljnKCpyz

82

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

(continued)

0.5%

0.6%

0.5%

1.4%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 181

Rozmowy niemieckiej i francuskiej dyplomacji z Białorusi˛a i Rosj˛a, na temat POLSKIEJ granicy, odbywaj˛a si˛e bez udziału Polski. To skutek krótkowzrocznej i bezmy´slnej polityki zagranicznej. Strategia szukania “politycznego złota” to strzał w kolano. #granica

91

German and French talks with Belarus and Russia taking place without Polish participation; looking for “political gold” backfired

0.8%

Widzowie @tvp_info i @WiadomosciTVP musz˛a by´c Refugees don’t want to stay in Poland but are heading to “rotting West” mocno zdziwieni, z˙ e uchod´zcy i migranci nie chc˛a pozostawa´c w Polsce , a ci˛agn˛a do krajów “zgniłego Zachodu” z niewiadomych przyczyn.

90

Polish government, Germany and France

Polish liberal media

0.6%

Po nielegalnym przekroczeniu granicy, migranci dziel˛a Territorial army: UAVs used to detect si˛e na mniejsze grupy i kieruj˛a na punkty spotka´n z migrants that crossed the border kurierami. Na tym etapie, a˙z do podj˛ecia przez @Straz_Graniczna s˛a pilotowani dzieki bezzałogowcom Grup Rozpoznania Obrazowego WOT. #Terytorialsi #SilneWsparcie https://t.co/ZSk e1JiMbE

(continued)

0.6%

0.8%

88

Est. % of corpus

W Sokółce przy drodze w stron˛e przej´scia granicznego “For Poland” association put up billboard w Ku´znicy, Stowarzyszenie “Dla Polski” wraz z thanking border guard liderem @Andruszkiewicz1 postawiło wielki baner z napisem: “Dzi˛ekujemy za obron˛e polskich granic” . Jeste´smy #Wdzi˛eczniZaSłu˙zb˛eDlaPolski! #granica #MuremZaPolskimMundurem https://t.co/yABlPL 3xLn

Target of any criticism

87

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

182 4 The Polish Information Environment

Prawdopodobny kolejny punkt planowanego ataku na polsk˛a granic˛e od strony #Białoru´s. #Migranci wyznaczaj˛a miejsce zbiórki 2–3 km od przejscia #Terespol #Brze´sc´ w okolicy tzw. “wyspy granicznej” @Straz_Graniczna @MON_GOV_PL @MSWiA_GOV_PL https://t.co/agjfJhSy5H

Uchod´zcy w Grecji otrzymuj˛a jedzenie, zasiłek finansowy i mieszkanie, wszystko gratis. Nie s˛a szczepieni, bo jak powiedział grecki Min. Zdrowia: nie zara˙zaj˛a tak jak Grecy. Tymczasem obywatele greccy zostaj˛a pozbawiani pracy, bo si˛e nie zaszczepili (np. pracownicy słu˙zby zdrowia)

Z wyrazami najwy˙zszego uznania oraz wdzi˛eczno´sci Observations with gratitude and dla wszystkich polskich mundurowych dedykuj˛e appreciation to Polish forces pewne spostrze˙zenia. My´sl˛e, z˙ e warto si˛e nimi podzieli´c. Polecam Pa´nstwa uwadze https://t.co/2sir6p YP47

96

99

100

Double standard—refugees in Greece given food, finance and housing, not required to vaccinate, but Greeks lose jobs when not vaccinated

Likely next point of attack on border near Terespol/Brest

Byłem na granicy białoruskiej. Dziej˛a si˛e tam trzy Three disasters at border—humanitarian, katastrofy na raz: humanitarna, graniczna i border and “image”. Crime against wizerunkowa. Strach w strefie zakazanej. „To, co si˛e humanity dzieje, to ju˙z niemal zbrodnia przeciw ludzko´sci, tylko dokonywana po cichu” https://t.co/nWjIKhpRvo przez @@newsweekpolska

93

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Polish

(continued)

Treatment of migrants

Target of any criticism

0.7%

0.5%

0.6%

0.8%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 1: Polish ‘Border’ Tweets 183

Pushback measure taken up by Polish Poland Sejm

Poles preparing to repel migrants; two Putin and Lukashenko (?) senile individuals causing nightmares all over Europe

(Cynical) Strange Kurds going to Western Europe, when everything’s good in Belarus and best of all in Russia

Belarus forest protection service tells Belarus authorities journalist they don’t like the migrants cutting trees, “but others are in charge”

Гpaницa Пoльшa - Бeлapycь. Пoльcкий Ceйм пpинял зaкoн o бeжeнцax. Teпepь иx бyдyт выгoнять из cтpaны, дaжe нe дaвaя вoзмoжнocти зaявить o пpeдocтaвлeнии yбeжищa. Mигpaнт, пoпaвший в Пoльшy чepeз Poccию, Бeлapycь или Укpaинy, нeмeдлeннo бyдeт дocтaвлeн oбpaтнo нa гpaницy

Пoльcкo-бeлapycкaя гpaницa. Пoляки гoтoвятcя oтpaзить штypм зaгpaждeний мигpaнтaми. Чepeз гpoмкoгoвopитeли пo-aнглийcки пpeдyпpeждaют нeлeгaлoв, чтo ecли oни нe бyдyт cлeдoвaть yкaзaниям пoлиции, к ним пpимeнят cилy. 21-й вeк. Кaкиe-тo двa cтapыx мapaзмaтикa кoшмapят вcю Eвpoпy https://t.co/mbQ9AxJNKg

Cтpaнныe oни, эти кypдcкиe бeжeнцы. Из Бeлapycи, гдe вce xopoшo, c pиcкoм для жизни pвyтcя в Пoльшy и в Гepмaнию, гдe плoxo. И никтo из ниx нe pвётcя в Poccию, гдe лyчшe, чeм в любoй дpyгoй cтpaнe!

Жypнaлиcт пoзвoнил в бeлopyccкyю cлyжбy oxpaны лeca и cпpocил, кaк oни oтнocятcя к тoмy, чтo “бeжeнцы” pyбят дepeвья в лecy и жгyт кocтpы. Taм oтвeтили: “Mы вoзмyщeны, нo cдeлaть ничeгo нe мoжeм. Taм вceм зaнимaютcя coвepшeннo дpyгиe люди. Oни вce peшaют”. https://t.co/kLHuIuiaeq, https://t.co/TqUQr5F8QG

2

3

5

6

Belarus and Russia

(Irrelevant)

ポーランド語でも「国境」ってGranicaっていうんだな ロ シア語ではГpaницa

1

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets

(continued)

3.1%

6.4%

2.4%

4.4%

0.0%

Est. % of corpus

184 4 The Polish Information Environment

Breivik’s prison vs. Russian hospital—explains why migrants go West

Some (unlike refugees) seek better life by getting work, documents, learning languages, respecting laws

Putin and Lukashenko set up a branch Putin and Lukashenko of hell on the border—name one good thing Putin did unselfishly for the world

Чacтo вижy вoпpoc в лeнтe, пoчeмy бeжeнцы лoмяттcя в Eвpoпy, тepпя лишeния, a нe идyт oткpытoй дopoгoй к нaм. Hижe oбтяcняющиe фoтo. Ha oднoм тюpьмa yбийцы Бpeйвикa, нa втopoм бoльницa в Poccии. https://t.co/XE2xI3 0D7e

Я пoнимaю, кoнeчнo, чтo “бeжeнцы ищyт лyчшeй жизни”. Ho тaкжe я знaю и дpyгиx людeй, кoтopыe тoжe ищyт. И для этoгo — ищyт paбoтy, coбиpaют нeoбxoдимыe дoкyмeнты, yчaт языки, пoвышaют квaлификaцию, yвaжaют зaкoны тex cтpaн, гpaждaнaми кoтopыx xoтят cтaть, a нe взpывaют гpaницy

Филиaл aдa, ycтpoeнный yпыpями Пyтиным и Лyкaшeнкo нa гpaницe c Пoльшeй. Haзoвитe xoтя бы oднo xopoшee дeлo, cдeлaннoe питepcким гoпникoм зa 20 лeт бecкopыcтнo, нa блaгo людeй, миpa, зa чтo eгo мoжнo yвaжaть. Bopoвcтвo, yбийcтвa, вoйны, тeppopизм. Bcё. https://t.co/3QGvMz81cq

9

10

11

Refugees

“Soviet” dilapidation

Poles, NATO

Poles blaming Putin, but they started wars and destroyed states—would they blame Saddam or Gaddafi if there were no Putin

Пoляки oбвиняют в мигpaциoннoм кpизиce Пyтинa, пpaктичecки нaпpямyю. Удoбнo - cнaчaлa ycтpaивaeшь вoйны, кpyшишь гocyдapcтвa, a кoгдa бeжeнцы из ниx к тeбe лoмятcя - винoвaт Пyтин. Чтo бы вы вooбщe бeз Пyтинa дeлaли? Кoгo бы oбвиняли? Caддaмa Xyceйнa и Myaммapa Кaддaфи?

7

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

(continued)

2.3%

2.0%

2.8%

2.6%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 185

Belarus, Russian media

Poland

Putin

Пытaюcь xoть гдe-тo в poccийcкиx CMИ нaйти пoяcнeниe, пoчeмy бeжeнцы пpopывaютcя в пpoклятyю Eвpoпy и нe xoтят ocтaтьcя в cтaбильнoй пpoцвeтaющeй Бeлapycи. A пoяcнeний нeт. He знaeтe, в чeм тyт дeлo?

Пoльшa вeдёт ceбя тaк, бyдтo нa eё гpaницe cтoят нe тpи Poland behaving as if an army, not тыcячи гoлoдныx и зaмёpзшиx мyжикoв, жeнщин и дeтeй, a cold and hungry men, women and цeлaя apмия втopжeния c coтнями тaнкoв, aвиaциeй и children on the border apтиллepиeй. И дaжe нe пoнять, чтo этo - Пoльшa тeшит cвoё caмoмнeниe, или жe этo тaкaя yникaльнaя фopмa иcтepики?

Pacчeт Пyтинa: мигpaнты yглyбят pacкoл мeждy Пoльшeй и EC. Ho ceгoдня вce 20 миниcтpoв инocтpaнныx дeл EC пoддepжaли Пoльшy. A кoгдa пo тeлeфoнy Пyтин cтaл paccкaзывaть Maкpoнy o “звepcтвax пoлякoв”, Maкpoн oтвeтил: “Фpaнция пoлнocтью coлидapнa c Пoльшeй”. https://t.co/V4BOvI3UZW

14

15

19

Putin miscalculated that migrants would drive wedge between Poland and EU, but Macron rebuffed Putin

Russian media not explaining why refugees want to go to cursed Europe instead of staying in flourishing Belarus

Polish authorities

Ha пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe пpи тeмпepaтype oкoлo -2 Water cannon use in −2 temperature пo пpикaзy влacтeй пoльcкиe вoeнныe пoливaют мигpaнтoв by Polish authorities who criticized из вoдoмётoв. Этo тe, кoтopыe пepвыми кpичaли o Belarus’s actions against protesters “звepcтвax” бaтьки и пoдтaлкивaли людeй в Бeлopyccии к coвepшeнию гocпepeвopoтa. Цинизм и бeccтыдcтвo, ypoвeнь выcший!((

Target of any criticism

12

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

(continued)

2.2%

1.9%

3.9%

2.9%

Est. % of corpus

186 4 The Polish Information Environment

1.4%

Poles tear-gassed 4-year-old child and Poles laughed (reminds of “crucified boy”)

Russian media filling airwaves with how “evil” Poles not letting in refugees, but why aren’t “kind” Belarusians or “hospitable” Russians taking them in?

Пocмoтpитe,чтo твopят пoльcкиe пpecтyпники 4-лeт. peбёнкy плecнyли в лицo ядoвитым гaзoм,из-зa чeгo мaлыш зaдыxaeтcя и плaчeт oт cтpaшнoй бoли. Poдитeли и дpyгиe бeжeнцы пытaютcя oкaзaть peбeнкy пepвyю пoмoщь.A в этo вpeмя пo тy cтopoны кoлючки пoльcкиe кapaтeли зaдopнo cмeютcя https://t.co/482GSlql1M

Poccиянe пpoдoлжaют нaгнeтaть, нaпoлняя ceть cюжeтaми пpo тo кaк бeдныe бeжeнцы нe мoгyт пpopвaть кopдoн Eвpoпы из-зa тoгo, чтo иx нe пycкaют “злыe” пoляки. Heпoнятнo пpи этoм, a пoчeмy иx нe пpинимaют “дoбpыe” бeлapycы и или гocтeпpиимныe pyccкиe? https://t.co/vdtySr FJgP

22

23

Russia, Belarus, Russian media

2.0%

Бeжeнцы coвepшили пoпыткy пpopывa y пyнктa пpoпycкa Refugees breaking through at Bruzgi, «Бpyзги» нa бeлopyccкo-пoльcкoй гpaницe. Haчaлacь cильнaя Polish border guards repelled in time дaвкa, чacть бeлopyccкoгo зaбopa cнecли. Пoльcкиe пoгpaничники ycпeли пoдoгнaть вoдoмeт, в нeбe пoявилcя пoльcкий бoeвoй вepтoлeт. https://t.co/dC05gegS0y

21

(continued)

1.9%

3.3%

Refugees not going to Russia because Putin, Russia of who’s president there

ECЛИ БЫ ПPEЗИДEHTOM БЫЛ HE Я И УPOBEHЬ ЖИЗHИ ЗДECЬ БЫЛ БЫ КAК B ДAHИИ, CEЙЧAC BCE ЭTИ БEЖEHЦЫ ЛEЗЛИ БЫ B POCCИЮ! A TAК OHИ ПOHИMAЮT, ЧTO TУT HEXУЙ ДEЛATЬ И ДAЖE HE CУЮTCЯ. КTO OПЯTЬ BCEX ПEPEИГPAЛ? TO-TO

Est. % of corpus

20

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 187

1.6%

1.7%

Ukraine explained how its eastern EU borders were being penetrated and EU pretended not to understand, but now Iraqis are bypassing 4 borders to enter the EU Water cannons are EU democracy and EU hypocrisy EU values in action

Beдь Укpaинa мнoгo лeт в ПACE oбъяcнялa, ктo тaкиe эти “шaxтёpы и тpaктopиcты”, кoтopыe пpoникaют в Укpaинy из Pocтoвcкoй oблacти. Ho тaм дeли вид, чтo нe пoнимaют, кaк тaкoe вoзмoжнo. И вoт пoжaлyйcтa. Teпepь в EC, минyя чeтыpe гpaницы, пpoникaют бeжeнцы из Иpaкa

Bcё в пopядкe, paбoтaeт дeмoкpaтия. Boдoмёты в нoябpe этo oчeнь чeлoвeкo-пpaвнo и oчeнь eвpoпeйcкo-цeннocтнo. Пoляки пoливaют мигpaнтoв нa гpaницe. https://t.co/XXa2Ae aubp

30

31

(continued)

2.9%

1.3%

Кpым нe являeтcя никaкoй cпopнoй тeppитopиeй… Poccия Crimea: Russia’s discussion over дaвнo пpизнaлa гpaницы ceгoдняшнeй Укpaины. Mы в border with Ukraine is finished cyщнocти пoлнocтью зaкoнчили нaши пepeгoвopы o гpaницe… Boпpoc o кaкиx-тo цeляx для Poccии, cчитaю, нeceт пpoвoкaциoннoe знaчeниe” Пyтин 2008 гoд. https://t.co/ 68iOF2fPdD

American hypocrisy

27

Est. % of corpus

– Cлeзинки peбёнкoв! – кpичaлa Пcaки. – Heвынocимыe US State Department “Let the cтpaдaния людeй! – oбъяcнял Киpби. – Mecтныe в refugees languish in their hovels” oпacнocти! – зaявлял Пayэлл. – Гyмaнитapныe aвиayдapы и yмepeнныe тeppopиcты вcex cпacyт! – yбeждaл Oбaмa. И тyт Гocдeпapтaмeнт: «Пycть эти никчeмныe бeжeнцы вaлят в cвoи xaлyпы!»

Target of any criticism

24

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

188 4 The Polish Information Environment

Poles standing firm against barbarian horde in search of freebies at EU taxpayer expense

“Belarusian” migrants will have Migrants, EU German passport in 5 years while even highly-qualified Russian have to jump through hoops

Hoчь нa гpaницa Пoльши и Бeлapycи. Пoлякaм бoльшe peшимocти. Opдa вapвapoв в пoиcкax eвpoпeйcкoй xaлявы и eвpoпeйcкиx пocoбий зa cчёт нaлoгoв житeлeй cтpaн EC нe дoлжнa пpopвaтьcя https://t.co/Z6YUYDydYq

Чтo интepecнo: чepeз 5 лeт вce “бeлopyccкиe” бeжeнцы бyдyт oблaдaть нeмeцким пacпopтoм, a poccиянин для пoлyчeния Шeнгeнcкoй визы дoлжeн бyдeт coбиpaть cпpaвки c paбoты и выпиcки из бaнкa. Дaжe ecли oн пpeпoдaвaтeль BУЗa и влaдeeт языкaми. Гдe тyт лoгикa, cкaжитe?

Пoчeмy бeжeнцы вooбщe бeгyт в EC? Taм жe poдитeль 1 и Why are migrants going to EU and poдитeль 2. Taм жe yпaдoк и paзлoжeниe? Taм вooбщe HATO, NATO hell instead of wonderful кoтopoe вo вceм кpyгoм винoвaтo! Пoчeмy oни нe бeгyт oт Russia or stable Belarus? этoгo aдa в пpeкpacнyю Poccию? Или нe ocтaнyтcя нa тиxoм ocтpoвкe cтaбильнocти пoд нaзвaниeм Бeлapycь?

34

35

36

Russia, Belarus

Migrants

Poles

Merkel saying treatment of refugees should be humane. Poles should be lectured on this

Mepкeль cчитaeт, чтo peшeниe пpoблeмы бeжeнцeв нa гpaницe c Пoльшeй “дoлжнo быть гyмaнным”. Этo кaк? Иx дoлжны выcлaть oбpaтнo к тaлибaм? Или в Иpaк? Или иx дoлжны кopмить бeлopyccы? Ho бeжeнцы cкaндиpyют: “Гepмaния!” Oни тyдa xoтят. A пpo гyмaнизм лyчшe cкaзaть жecтким пoлякaм

33

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

(continued)

2.1%

1.1%

1.9%

1.9%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 189

Situation on border looking more and Putin more like war, was Ukraine’s turn, now EU’s

US State Dept: Putin distracting from USA Ukraine with border crisis. I think US distracting from its own ratings

Poles used their trump card “[expletive] Belarus” during attempt to break through border

@dw_russian @elnazaro777 Oбcтaнoвкa нa пoльcкo-бeлopycкoй гpaницe вcё бoльшe пoxoдит нa пoдгoтoвкy к вoйнe. Boeннoй тexники и мигpaнтoв cтaнoвитcя бoльшe. Bce кaк зaвeщaл “вeликий Пy”, впepeди “миpняк”, cзaди coлдaты. Укpaинa этo пpoшлa, тeпepь oчepeдь Eвpoпы. A вeдь Дaля Гpибaycкaйтe пpeдyпpeждaлa. https://t.co/VPZiCvu5Ue

Гocдeп: Лyкaшeнкo coздaл кpизиc, чтoбы oтвлeчь внимaниe миpa oт дeйcтвий PФ нa гpaницe c Укpaинoй. A я пoлaгaю, чтo CШA coздaли иcтepикy o poc вoeнныx coeдинeний, нaxoдящиxcя в 280 км oт гpaницы, чтoбы oтвлeчь внимaниe миpa oт пaдaющeгo peйтингa дeйcтвyющeй aмepикaнcкoй влacти

Teм вpeмeнeм нa пoльcкoй гpaницe: вo вpeмя пoпытки пpopывa кeбaбoв, пpи пoддepжкe пoгpaничникoв, пoляки иcпoльзoвaли глaвныe кoзыpи. “KURWA JEBANA, BIEŁARUSKA SZMATA” https://t.co/ounUZruOXk

38

41

43

Poland

Putin, Lukashenko

Parody of Putin-Lukashenko phone call—“decided to shit with tripled strength”

Пyтлo-фюpep пpoвeл тeлeфoнныe пepeгoвopы c кoлxoз-гeнocce. Oбcyдили кpизиc нa пoльcкoй гpaницe, yкpaинcкoe нaпpaвлeниe, вoeнныe yчeния BCУ c aмepикaнцaми. Былo peшeнo гaдить c yтpoeннoй cилoй. B ближaйшee вpeмя ждeм oбocтpeний пo вышeyкaзaнным нaпpaвлeниям

37

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

(continued)

1.2%

2.0%

1.3%

0.9%

Est. % of corpus

190 4 The Polish Information Environment

1.4%

1.3%

1.0%

Гoвнoeды cпpaшивaют,пoчeмy бeжeнцы идyт в Eвpoпy, a нe Refugees going to countries that Those asking why в “cытyю” Poccию? Hy вo пepвыx y нac нeт для ниx пocoбий. bombed them, and where they can get refugees aren’t going to Bo втopыx, oни идyт в тe cтpaны, кoтopыe иx бoмбили. B benefits Russia instead of EU тpeтьиx oни идyт зa кoнтpибyциeй в любoм видe:дeньгaми, жильём, льгoтaми, бeлыми жeнщинaми и тд. Taкoв oтвeт

Бeжeнцы нa пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe нaчaли лoмaть Refugees began breaking barriers, зaгpaждeниe нa нeйтpaльнoй пoлoce и бpocaть в throwing stones; border guards used пoгpaничникoв кaмни. Пoгpaнcлyжбa пpимeнилa tear gas and water cannon cлeзoтoчивый гaз и нaчaлa paзгoнять мигpaнтoв вoдoмeтoм, cлeдyeт из тpaнcляции PБК. https://t.co/fd4vu8EpV5 Bидeo: тpaнcляция PБК https://t.co/V4iai4z4vk

Пoльcкий пpeмьep Maтeyш Mopaвeцкий зaявил, чтo Пoльшa Poland, Latvia and Lithuania looking вмecтe c Литвoй и Лaтвиeй paccмoтpят ввeдeниe 4-й cтaтьи at invoking NATO Article 4, HATO из-зa cитyaции нa бeлapyccкo-пoльcкoй гpaницe. completely closing borders Taкжe бyдeт пoднят вoпpoc o пoлнoм зaкpытии гpaниц c Бeлapycью

47

48

49

I hope Danilov and Ukrainian security Ukraine apparatus are aware Putin’s refugees will be moved by Lukashenko to Ukraine border regions—next most obvious point for transfer to Poland

(continued)

0.9%

2.0%

Haдeюcь, Дaнилoв и CHБO oтдaют ceбe oтчёт, чтo иpaкcкиe «бeжeнцы» Пyтинa в cлyчae нeyдaчнoгo штypмa гpaницы бyдyт пepeбpoшeны cпeцcлyжбaми Лyкaшeнкo в Boлынcкyю, Pивнeнcкyю и Житoмиpcкyю oблacти. Пoтoмy чтo этo caмый oчeвидный кopидop для дaльнeйшeй пepeбpocки в Пoльшy

Polish authorities

46

Est. % of corpus

Ужe бoльшe шecти чacoв нaши жypнaлиcты, зaдepжaнныe Our journalists detained by Poles for пoлякaми зa тo, чтo ocвeщaли кpизиc нa гpaницe, нe выxoдят shedding light on the crisis нa cвязь

Target of any criticism

45

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 191

1.2%

0.7%

1.0%

He имeющим aнaлoгoв в миpe opyжиeм, o кoтopoм тaк дoлгo The unparalleled geopolitical weapon paccкaзывaл oдин пeчaльнo извecтный гeoпoлитик, has turned out to be refugees with an oкaзaлиcь бeжeнцы c нeпpeдcкaзyeмoй тpaeктopиeй unpredictable trajectory Refugees testing the system—if they’re let in, “lost tourists” and “volunteers” will follow shooting down civilian craft

Бeжeнцы этo пpoбный кaмeнь. Ecли иx пpoпycтят в Eвpoпy, cлeдoм пoтянyтcя “зaблyдившиecя oтпycкники”, “дoбpoвoльцы” и цeлыe эшeлoны жeлeзa, cбивaющиe гpaждaнcкиe лaйнepы. И вoт тoгдa Eвpoпe пpигoдятcя Mepкeль и Maкpoн co cвoeй имплeмeнтaциeй фopмyлы Швaйнмaйepa

Cъёмoчнyю гpyппy RT France зaдepжaли нa RT camera crew detained, Polish пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe. Кoppecпoндeнт Дaвид Кaлифa authorities “very unfriendly” и oпepaтop Жopди Дeмopи ycпeли cooбщить, чтo пoльcкaя пoлиция вeдeт ceбя “кpaйнe нeдpyжeлюбнo”. Пpaвoзaщитники, “Peпopтepы бeз гpaниц” гдe вы, ay? https:// t.co/5nSJ1HHXKF

54

56

57

Refugees

Migrants paid 12–15 thousand euros to get to EU and are now asking for halal food

A мигpaнты-тo нe пpocтыe oкaзaлиcь. Пo cвeдeниям из paзныx иcтoчникoв пyтeшecтвиe в EC oбxoдитcя им oт 12 тыc. дo 15 тыc. eвpo. A тeпepь вoт и нa пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe нe пpocтo пищy тpeбyют, a oбязaтeльнo xaляль. Пpoдвинyтыe тaкиe “бeжeнцы”

53

(continued)

1.2%

1.2%

Belarus took responsibility for Belarus, Lukashenko refugees by admitting them and should build a refugee camp for them in Minsk

Кaк тoлькo Бeлapycь дoпycкaeт нa cвoю тeppитopию мигpaнтoв из Иpaкa, Cиpии, Ливии, oнa cpaзy бepeт нa ceбя oтвeтcтвeннocть зa ниx. Лyкaшeнкo, cтpoй им лaгepя бeжeнцeв в Mинcкe. Tы жe иx пycтил в cвoю cтpaнy, знaя, чтo гpaницa c Eвpocoюзoм зaкpытa

Est. % of corpus

51

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

192 4 The Polish Information Environment

0.7%

0.6%

Lukashenko brought 15 K migrants to Lukashenko Belarus, who are now loitering and spending the night in apartment block “podezds”

Лyкaшeнкo зaвeз в Бeлapycь 15 тыc мигpaнтoв. Иx видят бoльшими гpyппaми в цeнтpe Mинcкa, гдe oни бecцeльнo cлoняютcя или cидят в пepexoдax, oжидaя пoкa влacти oтпpaвят иx aвтoбycaми нa гpaницy. Бeжeнцы «впиcывaютcя» для нoчeвки в пoдъeзды жилыx дoмoв в cтoлицe. https://t.co/nfwvrklwQ7

@RomanMoskal70 @maxim_malko Для кoгo “бeжeнцы”, a Refugees or special forces? “False Authorities для кoгo cпeцнaз. Mapкиpoвкa cвинocoбaчeгo cпeцнaзa пo flag” like BLM, Taliban, AfD, yellow cтpaнaм и кoнтинeнтaм: Aмepикa - BLM и “Aнтифa”; vests Aфгaниcтaн - Taлибaн; Aфpикa - ЧBК; Гepмaния “Aльтepнaтивa…” и Coюз лeвы “x; Укpaинa - УПЦ MП,ДHP”, “ЛHP”, квapтaл95; Фpaнция - “жeлтыe жилeты” и т. д

61

62

(continued)

0.7%

Media portraying dubious scenes of refugees’ distress

Бeжeнцы cтpaдaют!Mёpзнyт! Пepвыe жepтвы!Бepeмeннaя дeвyшкa (!)пoтepялa peбeнкa! Cтpaдaльцы pyбят лec пoдpyчными cpeдcтвaми!Toпopы oни c coбoй пpивeзли или нa гpaницe выдaли? TB дaвит нa жaлocть cкpeпышeй

60

Manipulative media

1.0%

Est. % of corpus

Лёня Гoзмaн вoпpoшaeт, пoчeмy кypдcкиe бeжeнцы нe бeгyт Gozman asking why Kurdish refugees Gozman в “пpeкpacнyю” Poccию? Кypдcкиe бeжeнцы гopaздo yмнee not going to “wonderful Russia” Лeни, пoэтoмy eдyт тyдa, гдe, кaк им cкaзaли, xopoшo. A y Лeни в Poccии вce плoxo, нo oн никyдa нe yeзжaeт, пpocтo cидит и вoняeт кaк гнoйный чиpeй

Target of any criticism

58

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 193

Poles used eye-corrosive liquid, people coughing and vomiting

To get to talk to Merkel, Lukashenko Lukashenko had to bring tens of thousands of migrants and create a conflict with the EU. Tikhanovskaya just had to win an election Migrants paid EUR 351–940 in Germany/Belgium, now you understand why they don’t want to stay in Poland, Belarus or Russia

Пoляки пpимeнили пpoтив мигpaнтoв нa гpaницe paзъeдaющyю глaзa жидкocть, cooбщили CMИ. Пo дaнным Бeлтa, мнoгиe люди кaшляют, нeкoтopыx нaчинaeт тoшнить https://t.co/fxvmEsyDAK, https://t.co/EaLtwF66fg

Пaпe, чтoбы пoгoвopить c Mepкeль пoтpeбoвaлocь зaвeзти в Бeлapycь дecятки тыcяч мигpaнтoв и ycтpoить кoнфликт нa гpaницe c EC. Tиxaнoвcкoй пoтpeбoвaлocь пpocтo выигpaть выбopы

Узнaл,чтo пocoбиe xoлocтoмy бeжeнцy,живyщeмy внe лaгepя бeжeнцeв,в Гepмaнии cocтaвляeт e351,a в Бeльгии aж e940.B Пoльшe этo пocoбиe cocтaвляeт ≈130$ Teпepь вы пoнимaeтe, пoчeмy эти “бeжeнцы” тaк pвyтcя в Гepмaнию и дaльшe,a нe xoтят ocтaтьcя в Пoльшe,Poccии или в Бeлapycи?!

65

66

67

Polish authorities

Polish border guards assaulted with stones and stun grenades given to migrants by Belarus security forces

Cитyaция нa бeлopyccкo-пoльcкoй гpaницe peзкo oбocтpилacь. B пoльcкиx пoгpaничникoв пoлeтeли кaмни и cвeтoшyмoвыe гpaнaты. B Mинoбopoны Пoльши зaявили, чтo мигpaнты пoлyчили иx oт бeлopyccкиx cилoвикoв, a aтaкa пpoвoдитcя пoд “кoнтpoлeм бeлopyccкиx cлyжб” https://t.co/GPJhDiMGSq

64

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

(continued)

0.8%

1.0%

1.0%

0.9%

Est. % of corpus

194 4 The Polish Information Environment

Hundreds of migrants broke the fence and massed at the Polish border. Poland expects a storming of the border

Coтни бeжeнцeв cлoмaли зaбop c бeлopyccкoй cтopoны пoгpaнпepexoдa Бpyзги-Кyзницa и вплoтнyю пoдoшли к пoльcкoй гpaницe. Ceйчac тaм нaxoдятcя oкoлo двyx тыcяч чeлoвeк. MBД Пoльши oжидaeт штypмa Пoдpoбнee https://t. co/7uLIBpt5F4 Bидeo: Пoлиция Пoдляcкoгo вoeвoдcтвa https://t.co/9Wg6c9b2np

Moлoдыe,здopoвыe,cпopтивныe,aгpeccивныe,xopoшo oдeтыe….Paзмaxивaют тoпopaми,лoпaтaми,кидaютcя кaмнями,бyтылкaми…. Ho этo нe бaндиты.Этo бeжeнцы,oкaзывaeтcя…. C кaкиx этo пop нaглoe,нeзaкoннoe пepeceчeниe гocyдapcтвeннoй гpaницы пepecтaлo cчитaтьcя пpecтyплeниeм? https://t.co/3W6TTZrc7z

Mилыe и бeззaщитныe бeжeнцы нa бeлopyccкoй гpaницe Kind, defenseless migrants using иcпoльзyют лaзepы, чтoбы пopaзить зpeниe пoльcкиx coлдaт! lasers to damage Polish soldiers’ eyesight

Либepaлы cпpaшивaют пoчeмy бeжeнцы нe бeгyт в Poccию, гдe вce xopoшo? A ктo им cкaзaл, чтo в Poccии вce xopoшo для бeжeнцeв? Здecь xopoшo для гpaждaн. Кpeмль никoгдa нe paзмeнивaл coбcтвeннoe нaceлeниe нa нeлeгaлoв и зaoкeaнcкиe ништяки. Heлeгaлaм и гeям в Poccии плoxo, дa

Двoe кoppecпoндeнтoв тeлeAнaлa Russia Today (France) RT camera crew detained, will go to зaдepжaны в Пoльшe нa пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe, зa court paбoтy в зoнe ЧП бeз paзpeшeния. Oни нaxoдятcя в oтдeлeнии пoлиции. Дeлo бyдeт пepeдaнo в cyд в cpoчнoм пopядкe…

69

70

71

72

73

Target of any criticism

Liberals asking why refugees not Liberals going to Russia—but Russia’s only good for citizens, not illegals and gays

Refugees

Young well-dressed aggressive men Refugees, false narrative throwing stones and bottles—since when did illegally crossing the border stop being a crime?

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

(continued)

0.9%

1.0%

1.5%

0.6%

0.6%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 195

1.6%

0.8%

Кyдa бы нe лeзлa Mocкoвия co cвoим cвинячим pылoм и Russia creates an abscess everywhere Russia cвoими cвинячьими кoпытaми вeздe oбpaзyeтcя ГHOЙHИК. it puts its pig’s snout and Aбxaзия, Кpым, OPДЛO, Cиpия…вeздe дeгpaдaция. Hынe hooves—now on border Mocкoвия peшилa coздaть ГHOЙHИК в Бeлapycи нa гpaницe c Пoльшeй, Литвoй, Укpaинoй. Mocкoвия - этo ГHOЙHИК

Aлeкcaндp Лyкaшeнкo и Aнгeлa Mepкeль пpoвeли Phone call between Lukashenko and тeлeфoнный paзгoвop, в кoтopoм oбcyдили пyти paзpeшeния Merkel, agreed on further contacts мигpaциoннoгo кpизиca нa гpaницe Бeлopyccии c EC. Лидepы дoгoвopилиcь o дaльнeйшиx кoнтaктax c цeлью paзpeшeния cитyaции: https://t.co/bc2TCYqdQf, https://t.co/S36mYDDH1Q

CШA aнoнcиpoвaли нoвыe caнкции пpoтив peжимa Лyкaшeнкo из-зa cитyaции c мигpaнтaми нa гpaницe c Пoльшeй. Oгpaничитeльныe мepы в cвязи c “бecчeлoвeчными дeйcтвиями” бeлopyccкиx влacтeй гoтoвятcя в “тecнoй кoopдинaции c EC”, yкaзaли в Гocдeпapтaмeнтe https://t.co/rQ1eqqLdtl

78

80

83

US Statement announced sanctions on Belarus in “close cooperation” with EU

0.5%

Belarus concentrating migrants in one place on border—to get to Kaliningrad?

Boт тeпepь в мoeй гoлoвe вce вcтaлo нa мecтa. Ибo мyчил вoпpoc: гpaницa длиннaя, a “бeжeнцeв” бeлapycы кoнцeнтpиpyют c зaгpaн - oтpядaми тoлькo в oднoй лoкaции https://t.co/JbXmrIPUds

(continued)

0.7%

0.7%

77

Putin?

Putin, “reliable Tsar”, keeping busy with troops on Ukraine border, attacks by migrants, gas shortage in EU, downed satellite threatening ISS

Boйcкa нa гpaницe c Укpaинoй, aтaкa мигpaнтaми нa Пoльшy, дeфицит гaзa в Eвpoпe, yгpoжaющиe MКC oблoмки cбитoгo cпyтникa… Bcё-тo в тpyдax цapь-нaдёжa, вcё в тpyдax, aки пчeлa!

Est. % of corpus

75

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

196 4 The Polish Information Environment

English summary Drive 15 km from Tokyo and you’ll see dead trees and fields contaminated by Fukushima. If they’d lost to Russia in 1905 they’d be drinking vodka now

Russian media criticizing “rampant” Polish forces, but say nothing about Russian/Belarusian rampant special services

Lukashenko’s hybrid war with Europe—migrants in Minsk in warm clothes driven by Lukashenko’s forces from airport and to border

How come many of the refugees speak Russian? Not a mystery at all

Most representative tweet

Oтъeдь нa 15 км oт Toкиo ( дaльшe нeльзя, гpaницa нaчинaeтcя) и yвидишь yбитыe дepeвни и зacpaнныe фyкycимoй пoляны. Зaтo poбoты вкaлывaют, a нe чeлoвeк, coни нaш и нoшeнныe тpyxaны в бapдaчкe Toйoты кaк oпция. Лyчшe бы в 1905 pyccким пpoигpaли, пили бы ceйчac cтoличнyю https://t.co/agMA4iPWxM

Людoeдcкoe paдиo Ивaнoвo 100.7FM гoвopит o «тpeвoжныx пpизнaкax» и «бecпoкoйcтвe» oт «paзгyлa пoльcкиx cпeцcлyжб» нa гpaницe c Бeлapycью. A paзгyл poccийcкиx и бeлapyccкиx cпeцcлyжб и тюpeмщикoв в cвoиx cтpaнax eбyчиx пpoпaгaндoнoв нe тpeвoжит. Hy чтo зa твapи, блядь, a?

Гибpиднaя вoйнa пpoтив Eвpoпы пpoдoлжaeтcя. Цeнтp Mинcкa вoзлe TЦ «Гaлepeя». Дecятки мигpaнтoa в тёплoй oдeждe co cпaльными мeшкaми, кoтopыx лyкaшиcты пpивoзят из aэpoпopтa в гocтиницy «Юбилeйнaя», caжaют зa $100 нa тaкcи в Гpoднo, и дocтaвляют к гpaницe c Пoльшeй и Литвoй. https://t.co/LQgr7SK3Qj

oчeнь мнoгиe “бeжeнцы” xopoшo гoвopят пo-pyccки этo и ecть глaвнaя зaгaдкa вceй этoй гpyппoвyxи /нa caмoм дeлe нeт/.

Topic

84

85

86

87

Russian

(continued)

0.3%

Est. % of corpus

Belarusian manipulation

Lukashenko

(continued)

1.1%

0.4%

Russian media propaganda 0.4%

Target of any criticism

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 197

English summary Not refugees but hybrid army

Latest scenes from Poland/Belarus border, hybrid attack on Poland, actions of Polish services protecting border (From Polish TV) How does EU propose that Minsk should eliminate the reasons for migrants coming to the border—bomb London and Washington? Meanwhile in Minsk more migrants being loaded into buses for the border—is the cockroach with a moustache looking to isolate the country completely?

Most representative tweet

жeнщинaм и дeтям opгaнизoвaть “пoмытьcя-пoecть-лeкapcтвa-тeплo-coн” нa бeлapyccкoй cтopoнe, к мyжчинaм никaкoгo cниcxoждeния c этим мoжнo пoмoчь из Бpюcceля, в пpeдeлax нeoбxoдимoгo гyмaнитapнoгo минимyмa этo нe бeжeнцы этo гибpиднaя apмия мeждyнapoднoгo Кoминиepнa вapвapoв.. https://t.co/ beDBcVzLf4

#PaпopтcГpaницы – caмaя cвeжaя инфopмaция c пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницы. Кyлиcы гибpиднoй aтaки нa Пoльшy и дeйcтвий пoльcкиx cлyжб, кoтopыe зaщищaют вocтoчнyю гpaницy Eвpoпeйcкoгo Coюзa #Mигpaнты #Гpaницa https://t.co/zllxuaLbKG

Здecь нeпoнятнo. EC тpeбyeт oт Mинcкa paзбoмбить Baшингтoн и Лoндoн? Кaк oни пpeдлaгaют Mинcкy ycтpaнить пpичины нaплывa мигpaнтoв нa гpaницe? https://t. co/LcNpfwrqpT

Teм вpeмeнeм в Mинcкe в бycы гpyзят нoвyю пapтию мигpaнтoв для oтпpaвки иx к пoльcкoй гpaницe. Уcaтый тapaкaн дoбивaeтcя пoлнoй изoляции cтpaны? https://t.co/pFe B7V1vxq

Topic

89

91

92

93

Russian

(continued)

Lukashenko

EU

“Refugee” narrative

Target of any criticism

(continued)

0.9%

0.7%

0.7%

0.4%

Est. % of corpus

198 4 The Polish Information Environment

It was a stroke of luck for Poland (the EU country non-compliant with EU laws and deviating from democracy) to be on the migrant route—if it had been Germany these refugees would have long ago been on EU’s streets Migrant crisis nothing compared to shootings and gang attacks on locals in Russia

Latvia conducting military exercises near Belarus border, fearing migrants might come to them

этo eщё вeликaя “yдaчa”, чтo нa пyти opды oкaзaлиcь пoляки этo пpaвдa, зa ними цeлый шлeйф кocякoв, oт нeиcпoлнeния зaкoнoв EC, дo oтxoдa oт cтaндapтoв дeмoкpaтии нo oкaжиcь ceйчac нa дopoгe opды мepкeлeвcкaя Гepмaния - дaвнo бы этo “бeжeнцы” yкpaшaли yлицы eвpoпeйcкиx гopoдoв

4 000 мигpaнтoв нa гpaницe Пoльши и Бeлopyccии – этo нe мигpaциoнный кpизиc. Mигpaциoнный кpизиc – этo пpoиcxoдящee в poccийcкиx гopoдax: пoчти eжeднeвныe мaccoвыe пoбoищa co cтpeльбoй, гpyппoвыe нaпaдeния нa мecтныx, pocт пpecтyпнocти. Этy пpoблeмy нyжнo ocвeщaть и peшaть!

Лaтвия нaчaлa вoeнныe yчeния нa гpaницe c Бeлapycью. Глaвa Mинoбopoны кocвeннo пoдтвepдил, чтo yчeния cвязaны c кpизиcoм нa гpaницe Бeлapycи c EC. B Pигe дoпycкaют, чтo зacтpявшиe мeждy Пoльшeй и Бeлapycью мигpaнты мoгyт нaпpaвитьcя к лaтвийcкoй гpaницe https://t. co/ptaeCTAcwb

98

99

100

Russian crime

Poles

Even CNN correspondent Matthew Chance not spared by Polish water-cannon—I’m afraid to think how many Poles will be begging forgiveness

Кoppecпoндeнт CNN Mэттью Чэнc, paбoтaющий в Бeлapycи нa гpaницe c Пoльшeй, ocвeщaeт мигpaциoнный кpизиc. Ho дaжe eгo нe пoжaлeли пoльcкиe вoдoмeты. Бoюcь пpeдcтaвить, cкoлькo ляxи бyдyт cтoять нa кoлeняx, пpocя пpoщeниe пepeд cвoими xoзяeвaми https://t.co/nP3etxHQtr

97

Target of any criticism

English summary

Most representative tweet

Topic

Russian

(continued)

0.9%

0.5%

0.4%

0.5%

Est. % of corpus

Appendix 2: Russian ‘Border’ Tweets 199

200

4 The Polish Information Environment

References ADL. 2018. ADL welcomes Polish government’s revisions to Holocaust speech law, June 27. Accessed December 21, 2021. https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-welcomes-polishgovernments-revisions-to-holocaust-speech-law. BBC. 2020a. Belarus election: ‘Widespread torture’ inflicted on jailed protesters, August 14. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53773534. ———. 2020b. Belarus protests: Why Poland is backing the opposition, September 10. Accessed December 18, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54090389. ———. 2021a. Belarus’s Lukashenko tells BBC: We may have helped migrants into EU, November 19. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59343815. ———. 2021b. Pope condemns treatment of migrants in Europe, December 5. Accessed December 12, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59538413. Bundesverfassungsgericht. 1952. Verlautbarung der Pressestelle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, October 23. Accessed December 21, 2021. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/Shared Docs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/1952/bvg52-059.html. ———. 1956. BVerfG, 17.08.1956—1 BvB 2/51, August 17. Accessed December 21, 2021. https:// opinioiuris.de/entscheidung/847#Leitsaetze. Chang, Will, and Cathcart Chundra. 2015. Ancestry-constrained phylogenetic analysis supports the Indo-European steppe hypothesis. Language 91 (1): 194–244. https://doi.org/10.1353/lan.2015. 0005.S2CID143978664. Chang, Will, Chundra Cathcart, David Hall, and Andrew Garrett. 2015. Ancestry-constrained phylogenetic analysis supports the Indo-European steppe hypothesis. Language 91 (1): 194–244. https://doi.org/10.1353/lan.2015.0005.S2CID143978664. Chew, Peter. 2015. ‘Linguistics-lite’ topic extraction from multilingual social media data. Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, and Prediction Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 9021 17 (January): 276–282. ———. 2020. Exposing bot activity with PARAFAC tensor decompositions. In Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of the Computational Social Science Society of the Americas, 25–38. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35902-7_2. ———. 2021a. Quantifying Polish anti-Semitism in Twitter: A robust unsupervised approach with signal processing. In Computational Social Science. Springer. Chew, Jonathan. 2021b. What’s next for Belarus? The Dispatch, June 15. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://thedispatch.com/p/whats-next-for-belarus. Court of Justice of the European Union. 2021. PRESS RELEASE No 192/21, October 27. Accessed December 7, 2021. https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-10/cp2101 92en.pdf. Deutsche Welle. 2021. Poland confirms Belarus migrant camp empty, November 19. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/poland-confirms-belarus-migrant-camp-empty/a59885233. Digital Forensic Research Lab. 2021. Evidence shows Russia and Belarus holding paratrooper drill near Lithuanian border, December 10. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://medium.com/dfr lab/evidence-shows-russia-and-belarus-holding-paratrooper-drill-near-lithuanian-border-463 1a7573b4e. Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. 2021. Historycy maj˛a przeprosi´c za informacje z ksi˛az˙ ki “Dalej jest noc”, February 9. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/art ykuly/8091472,historycy-maja-przeprosic-za-informacje-z-ksiazki-dalej-jest-noc.html. ´ Dziennik Ustaw. 2018. Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o Instytucie Pami˛eci Narodowej - Komisji Scigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy o grobach i cmentarzach wojennych, ustawy o muzeach oraz ustawy o odpowiedzialno´sci podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod gro´zb˛a, January 26. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennikustaw/zmiana-ustawy-o-instytucie-pamieci-narodowej-komisji-scigania-18685855/art-1.

References

201

Dziewanowski, M.K. 2003. Russia in the twentieth century, 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Emmett, Robin. 2021. EU to impose sanctions on Russian military contractor Wagner Group, official says. Reuters, December 10. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/ business/aerospace-defense/eu-sanction-russian-military-contractor-wagner-group-officialsays-2021-12-10/. ˙ Engelking, Barbara, and Jan Grabowski. 2018. Dalej jest noc. Losy Zydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej Polski. Warsaw, Poland: Polish Center for Holocaust Research. European Commission. 2021. European neighbourhood policy and enlargement negotiations. Conditions for membership. Accessed December 8, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership_en. European Council and Council of the EU. 2021. Timeline—EU restrictive measures against Belarus. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ restrictive-measures-against-belarus/belarus-timeline/. European Court of Human Rights. 2021. Court gives notice of “R.A. v. Poland” case and applies interim measures, September 28. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/engpress?i=003-7134761-9667819. European Union External Action. 2021. Ukraine: Statement by the G7 foreign ministers and the EU High Representative, December 4. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/hea dquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/96497/Ukraine:%20Statement%20by%20the%20G7% 20Foreign%20Ministers%20and%20the%20EU%20High%20Representative. Foreign Policy. 2021. Europe accidentally built an ‘Amnesty International with Guns’, December 15. Accessed December 18, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/15/europe-frontex-migrat ion-amnesty-international-guns/. Gimbutas, Marija. 1973. Old Europe c. 7000–3500 BC: The earliest European civilization. Journal of Indo-European Studies 1: 1–21. Hansler, Jennifer. 2021. US and allies impose new sanctions on Belarus over migrant crisis and ongoing human rights abuses. CNN, December 2. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www. cnn.com/2021/12/02/politics/us-belarus-sanctions-migrant-crisis/index.html. Heuer, Richard. 1999. Psychology of intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Accessed July 29, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/static/9a5f1162fd0932c29bfed1c030edf4ae/Pys chology-of-Intelligence-Analysis.pdf. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Jensen, Donald N. 2021. US-Russia Relations in an era of strategic competition. NSI, Inc., December 1. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://nsiteam.com/us-russia-relations-in-an-era-of-strategiccompetition/. Jewish Virtual Library. 2021. Jews in occupied Poland: The massacre in Jedwabne. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-massacre-in-jedwabne. Josephus, Flavius. AD 93. Antiquities of the Jews. Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Accessed September 13, 2021. https://ccel.org/ccel/j/josephus/complete/cache/complete.pdf. Kremlin.ru. 2014. Пocлaниe Пpeзидeнтa Фeдepaльнoмy Coбpaнию. Moscow, December 4. Accessed November 22, 2021. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173. Lohsen, Andrew. 2021. Lukashenko’s failed gambit. Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 19. Accessed November 24, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/lukashenkos-failedgambit. Maxar Technologies. 2021. Maxar satellites capture the biggest global events in 2021, December 14. Accessed December 18, 2021. https://blog.maxar.com/earth-intelligence/2021/maxar-satell ites-capture-the-biggest-global-events-in-2021. Memoli, Mike. 2021. ‘All politics is personal’: Biden leans on existing relationships in first global test. NBC News, June 10. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/pol itics/white-house/all-politics-personal-biden-leans-existing-relationships-first-global-test-n12 70299.

202

4 The Polish Information Environment

Mieri¸na, I., and I. Koro¸leva. 2015. Support for far right ideology and anti-migrant attitudes among youth in Europe: A comparative analysis. The Sociological Review 63: 183–205. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-954X.12268. Montell, Amanda. 2021. Cultish: The language of fanaticism. New York: HarperCollins. Nechepurenko, Ivan, and Andrew Higgins. 2020. Belarus says longtime leader is re-elected in vote critics call rigged. New York Times, August 9. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.nyt imes.com/2020/08/09/world/europe/belarus-election-lukashenko.html. New York Times. 2021. Migrants say Belarusians took them to E.U. border and supplied wire cutters, November 13. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/world/mid dleeast/belarus-migrants-iraq-kurds.html. Newsweek Poland. 2021. Anne Applebaum: Polska ju˙z nie jest normaln˛a cz˛es´ci˛a Zachodu. Słysz˛e w Unii, z˙ e powinna by´c wyrzucona ze Wspólnoty. Newsweek.pl, December 21. Accessed December 21, 2021. https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/anne-applebaum-pol ska-juz-nie-jest-normalna-czescia-zachodu-wywiad/2z4jhrg. Nimmo, Ben. 2017. #BotSpot: Twelve ways to spot a bot, August 28. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-twelve-ways-to-spot-a-bot-aedc7d9c110c. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2020. Transparency, communication and trust: The role of public communication in responding to the wave of disinformation about the new Coronavirus, July 3. Accessed December 3, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/ policy-responses/transparency-communication-and-trust-the-role-of-public-communicationin-responding-to-the-wave-of-disinformation-about-the-new-coronavirus-bef7ad6e/. Pamuk, Humeyra, and Johan Ahlander. 2021. Blinken confronts Russia’s Lavrov on Ukraine, warns of ‘severe costs’. Reuters, December 2. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/ world/europe/blinken-urges-russias-lavrov-take-diplomatic-exit-ukraine-crisis-2021-12-02/. Pew Research Center. 2016. Number of refugees to Europe surges to record 1.3 million in 2015, August 2. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/num ber-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 2021. Iraq plans more repatriation flights as Belarus tells migrants they can go to the EU, November 27. Accessed December 2, 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/iraqbelarus-migrants-/31582294.html. Sputnik. 2021. Ha нeйтpaльнoй пoлoce: кaк выживaют 30 мигpaнтoв мeждy Пoльшeй и Бeлapycью – фoтo, August 20. Accessed December 20, 2021. https://sputnik.by/20210820/ 30-migrantov-zastryali-mezhdu-polskimi-i-belorusskimi-kordonami--foto-1055831292.html. Statistics Poland. 2016. Infographic—Religiousness of Polish inhabitiants. stat.gov.pl, December 22. Accessed December 21, 2021. https://stat.gov.pl/en/infographics-and-widgets/infographics/ infographic-religiousness-of-polish-inhabitiants,4,1.html. Terry, Kyilah. 2021. Migration information source. Migrationpolicy.org, April 8. Accessed December 21, 2021. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-turkey-deal-five-years-on. The Guardian. 2021. Polish appeals court overturns ruling against Holocaust historians, August 16. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/polish-app eals-court-overturns-ruling-against-holocaust-historians. The New Statesman. 2021. The West must confront Russia and Belarus to avert catastrophe, November 15. Accessed December 18, 2021. https://www.newstatesman.com/comment/2021/ 11/the-west-must-confront-russia-and-belarus-to-avert-catastrophe. The Wall Street Journal. 2021. CIA chief says intelligence agencies haven’t concluded Russia will invade Ukraine, December 6. Accessed December 18, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ciachief-says-intelligence-agencies-havent-concluded-russia-will-invade-ukraine-11638848453. The White House. 2021. Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, December 9. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/sta tements-releases/2021/12/09/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-president-zelenskyy-ofukraine/.

References

203

Trybunał Konstytucyjny. 2005. KOMUNIKAT PO Traktat o przyst˛apieniu do Unii Europejskiej, May 4. Accessed December 18, 2021. https://trybunal.gov.pl/postepowanie-i-orzeczenia/kom unikaty-prasowe/komunikaty-po/art/4022-traktat-o-przystapieniu-do-unii-europejskiej. ———. 2021. Ocena zgodno´sci z Konstytucj˛a RP wybranych przepisów Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej, October 7. Accessed December 8, 2021. https://trybunal.gov.pl/postepowanie-i-orzecz enia/wyroki/art/11662-ocena-zgodnosci-z-konstytucja-rp-wybranych-przepisow-traktatu-ounii-europejskiej. TVP Info. 2021. Teren, na którym przebywaj˛a migranci, to na Białorusi strefa zamkni˛eta, August 25. Accessed December 20, 2021. https://www.tvp.info/55521098/bialorus-dyrektor-bielsatuagnieszka-romaszewska-guzy-o-kryzysie-na-granicy-migranci-w-usnarzu. Yad Vashem. 2021. Names and numbers of righteous among the nations—Per country & ethnic origin, January 1. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/statis tics.html. Бeлapycь ceгoдня. 2021. Чтo нoвoгo cлyчилocь зa дeнь в лaгepe бeжeнцeв нa бeлopyccкoпoльcкoй гpaницe. SB.by, November 19. Accessed December 12, 2021. https://www.sb.by/art icles/bezhentsy-mesto-pod-kryshey.html. Бeлopycы и pынoк. 2021. Mигpaнты нa “нeйтpaльнoй пoлoce” мeждy Бeлapycью и дpyгими cтpaнaми — фeйк. Telegram, August 31. Accessed December 20, 2021. https://t.me/belrynok/ 1457. Блoк, Aлeкcaндp. 1918. Cкифы. https://www.culture.ru/poems/278/skify. Гocyдapcтвeнный пoгpaничный кoмитeт Pecпyблики Бeлapycь. 2021. Чтo тaкoe пoгpaничнaя зoнa и пoгpaничный peжим. Accessed December 20, 2021. https://gpk.gov.by/pogranichnayazona/.

Chapter 5

The Baltic Region Information Environment

Fig. 5.1 The Baltic region. Image by NormanEinstein, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Baltic_Sea_map.png, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0migrated

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_5

205

206

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Abstract What does the phrase the ‘Baltic region’ mean? The phrase could be taken to mean the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, and we deliberately leave room for some ambiguity in the phrase. Our focus in this chapter, however, is predominantly on what are commonly referred to as the ‘Baltic states’ (Russian: ‘Пpибaлтикa’ or Pribaltika)—that is, Estonia, Latvia– and Lithuania—and, more widely, the countries bordering them, particularly these three countries’ former cohorts among the 15 former Soviet Republics (Russia and Belarus) plus another former Warsaw Pact and Slavic country, Poland. The three Baltic States, or Baltics as we refer to them in shorthand, are unique among former Soviet Republics in that they are now European Union and NATO members, along with Poland to the south. Yet, given their status as Russia’s former underlings in the Soviet Union, these three states are also seen by Moscow as what is known in Russian as the ‘post-Soviet space’ (пocтcoвeтcкoe пpocтpaнcтвo) or ‘near abroad’ (ближнee зapyбeжьe). We know that Russian President Vladimir Putin has frequently and consistently decried NATO’s eastern expansion, including as recently as June 2021 (TASS 2021). He also stated in 2005 that he considers the breakup of the USSR the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century’ (‘кpyпнeйшaя гeoпoлитичecкaя кaтacтpoфa вeкa’) (Regnum.ru. 2005). It would be only natural to conclude that the Baltics’ status now as NATO members is seen by Putin’s Russia as a particular affront. Given this, it is perhaps surprising how coy Putin’s statements have been about the Baltics in particular, in contrast to what he has said about NATO generally. (In 2016, for example, Putin called speculation about any intention of Russia to invade the Baltics ‘nonsense’ [Eesti Rahvusringhääling 2016].) But whatever Russia’s motivations under Putin—whether a form of Soviet revanchism or something else—the facts in 2021 are that Russia has already demonstrated its willingness to occupy and annex parts of Ukraine, another former Soviet Republic. While Ukraine, unlike the Baltic states, was and is not a NATO or EU member, the question naturally arises (for example with Russia and Belarus’s joint military exercises Zapad-2021) whether something similar could happen in the Baltic region, all three of whose countries border Russia—and clearly a potential flashpoint in Great Power competition. So, what are the threats and what is their likelihood? These are difficult questions to answer but perhaps a good place to start is what people and experts in the region are saying on the subject.

5.1 Background: Brief History of the Baltics It should be noted at the outset that the very history of the Baltics is a contested arena of information maneuvering in which disinformation and revisionism is rife (Fig. 5.1). Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have followed similar historical trajectories, though, and the basic historical facts are as follows. All came under Russian imperial rule in the eighteenth century, but gained their independence around the end of the

5.1 Background: Brief History of the Baltics

207

First World War in 1917–1918. This (1917) was also the time of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia that marked the end of Tsarist rule in Russia and the beginning of Soviet rule. The Baltics remained independent until 1939, when, according to a secret protocol in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the Soviet army coerced the Baltic states into allowing the Soviet Union to establish military bases in their countries. The Soviet Army occupied all of the Baltics in 1940, in which year the newly installed pro-communist leaders of the countries formally applied to join the Soviet Union and were incorporated as the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics. This was their status until the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. On September 6 that year, the USSR recognized the independence of each of the three states, after which the USSR in its previous form ceased to exist. One can therefore sum up the last 300 years or more of the history of the Baltics as on-again, off-again (but mostly on-again) subjugation to Russia. At the same time, however, the Baltics are culturally distinct from the rest of the former Soviet Union, something which makes their status as former Soviet (and Russian) vassals distinctive. When I (Peter Chew) visited all three Baltic states just before the break-up of the USSR, in 1991, the atmosphere was even then noticeably different and more Western than in any of the other Soviet republics or areas of the Soviet Union I had traveled to, which included European and Far Eastern Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. The standard of living was higher, the cities were cleaner and less brutal from an architectural point of view (Fig. 5.2), the people were less alien to a Western visitor, and even a Russian might well have said that the Baltic mindset was more ‘cultured’ (кyльтypный) than the typical Russian or Soviet mindset (Fig. 5.3). Ethnically, it bears noting that Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, in contrast to their neighbors to the east and south (Russians, Belarusians, and Poles), are not Slavic peoples; Estonians (like Finns and Hungarians) are a Uralic people, while Latvians and Lithuanians are Baltic peoples. The Baltic and Slavic people groups are, however, cousins in the traditional linguistic family tree, descended from common Balto-Slavic ancestors,1 ,2 (see also Sect. 1 of Chapter 4). As early as the late 1980s—earlier than anywhere else in the Soviet Union and unprecedented in the Soviet domain—there was a campaign of Baltic civil resistance against Soviet rule, in which a human chain of two million people holding hands stretched for 600 km from Vilnius in Lithuania to Tallinn in Estonia. A display we observed in December 2019 in Riga airport still proudly commemorated this campaign and noted how Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, conceded after

1

See for example (Clackson 2007). In a personal conversation with a Latvian colleague at NATO STRATCOM in Riga, author Peter Chew pointed this out. In an indication of the sensitivity of Slavic-Baltic relations, the Latvian colleague responded with a somewhat heated denial of the ethnic link. Historical denialism may not be in just one direction…

2

208

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Fig. 5.2 Author photo taken in Tallinn, probably in 1991, and prior to post-Soviet independence. The Baltic states, especially Estonia, had a much more Western feel than any of the other Soviet republics visited by the author (Peter Chew)

seeing the campaign that the independence of the Baltics was inevitable.3 It is not a stretch, therefore, to say that the Baltics led the way in the break-up of the USSR and were instrumental in it.

3

See also (Beissinger 2009).

5.1 Background: Brief History of the Baltics

209

Fig. 5.3 How the Baltics are perceived in the regional Russian-speaking milieu: a widely-shared Russian-language Twitter post from August 3, 2021, picked up in our data collection. The text says: ‘Estonia is real Europe now, Latvia and Lithuania are “OK” Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are desperately trying to become civilized, but Russia and Belarus are like Venezuela and Turkmenistan.’

After five decades of Soviet rule and inculcation, and many more decades before that of subjugation to Russia, what might have explained any greater propensity of the Baltic people in the USSR towards independent thinking, a more Western mindset, or higher standard of living? The answer may be in the particular timing in history of periods of Baltic independence from Russia. Because the Baltics were independent between 1917–1918 and 1940, they were spared from participating in some of the darkest days of the Soviet Union, particularly Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror of 1936–1938 (Russian: ‘Бoльшoй тeppop’)—his campaign of political repression via the Gulag system, ethnic cleansing, police surveillance, arbitrary executions—and Stalin’s artificially-engineered famine, the Holodomor of 1932–1933, used as a tool of repression against Ukraine. One feature of the Great Terror, in particular, was the way in which the Soviet intelligentsia—those showing the greatest proclivity towards any independence of thought—were targeted. In personal conversations, we have heard Soviet people argue that, in effect, the USSR imprisoned or killed off its best and brightest at the time, and the country never recovered. Similar tangible effects resulting from differences between the Baltics’ historical trajectories and that of the rest of the Soviet Union are, incidentally, also observable elsewhere, for example internally within Belarus. Also in personal conversation, Belarusians have remarked to the author Peter Chew that there is a noticeable and sudden geographical demarcation within their country, west of which living standards are better (and perhaps mindsets differ). The western portion of the country, again, was spared Soviet rule during its worst period, by virtue (if one can call it that) of being occupied by Nazi Germany until 1940. A Soviet map of 1940 clearly shows this line of demarcation (Fig. 5.4). It turns out that decades-old historical chance, if it is that, may itself condition the socio-psychological landscape and information environment in which information maneuvers take place—something which the informed Western policymaker may be able to turn to good advantage.

210

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Protestants in the Soviet Union have a long history of taking the Russian Orthodox Church to task for its practices of praying to icons and venerating the relics (bones) of dead saints. In internal Soviet and postSoviet ‘culture wars’, some Russian Protestants have pointed out that Soviet militant atheism simply replaced icons with statues, and the practice of filing past the relics of saints in monasteries with the ritual of filing past the relics of Lenin in Red Square. Indeed, the deeply-rooted East Slavic cultural preoccupation with protecting statues of Lenin does seem at times to take on the proportions of a religion in the national consciousness.

We return, though, to the Baltics. One tangible and iconic marker of the difference between post-independence Baltic mindsets, versus those of their former Soviet peers, is in statues of Lenin. In the Soviet Union, these were ubiquitous and reliably

5.1 Background: Brief History of the Baltics

211

Fig. 5.4 A 1940 Soviet map of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (territorially equivalent to modern Belarus), showing territory just annexed from Nazi-occupied Poland in yellow. (Soviet goverment 1940), public-domain material retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: Belorussian_SSR_in_1940_after_annexation_of_eastern_Poland.jpg

found in the main square of any population center, even provincial towns of modest size. Notably, the character of Lenin has in itself been a subject of considerable historical revisionism in both the West and the Soviet Union (and its successor states). Richard Pipes (Pipes 1996) lays this revisionism bare, using source material from Lenin himself; Pipes shows how Lenin has often been idealized not just in Soviet and Russian narratives, but also in Western ones; inaccurately painted as a visionary whose ideals were subverted, rather than the cynical and cruel misanthrope that his own words frequently show him to be. In 2021, the presence or absence of Lenin statues says a great deal about prevailing national mindsets and Soviet nostalgia on the one hand, or national repentance from Soviet ways of disinformation, state violence, coercion, and ‘Lenin revisionism’ on the other. The last Lenin statue in the Baltics was removed only two years after the break-up of the USSR, in 1993; whereas Lenin statues still feel almost as ubiquitous in Belarus, for example, as at any time in the Soviet period (see Fig. 5.5). When the last Lenin statue in Tallinn was removed in 1993, the event did not pass without resistance; a few dozen Russian pensioners and war veterans were there to protest (Associated Press 1993). But they could not stop the removal. Exactly that kind of opposition

212

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Moldova Baltics Caucasus/Central Asia Kazakhstan Belarus Ukraine Russia 0

1000

2000

3000 2021

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

1991

Fig. 5.5 Approximate count of Lenin statues by former Soviet region, 1991 vs. 2021. Authors’ chart created from data at http://lenin.tilda.ws/skolko

from a similar demographic, but in proportionately much greater numbers, is what keeps the Lenins in place in Belarus and Russia. In Russia there is a widespread narrative that the removal of statues idealizing Lenin, not the idealization itself, is the revisionism that needs to be resisted. ‘He is part of our history’, one will often hear from Russians pushing back against the idea of removing Lenin statues. But as we engage and maneuver in this information environment, moral clarity is absolutely essential. We need to remember, as Pipes reminds us, what sort of person Lenin was, what values his and later Stalin’s Soviet Union represented, and confront Russians with the question of whether these are what they still want to elevate in their (literal and figurative) public square, or whether it may be time for Russians to face up to the uncomfortable truth about who Lenin really was, and distance themselves from the values Lenin represented. In the information environment, this is an argument that will resonate with some on the margins. The issue of statues and the Russian/Soviet historical ‘greatness’ that they signify remains a culture-war-style flashpoint in the Baltics to this day. And while the Baltic countries as a whole have cut psychological ties to the Soviet way via the removal of Soviet ‘icons’, Russian inability or unwillingness to cut the same psychological ties explains why, notwithstanding Gorbachev’s acceptance of the inevitability of the Baltics’ independence in 1991, Russia has not been able to let the countries go so easily in the period since then. Again, as active participants in the Russian information environment, our message (which will persuade some at the margins) should be that Russia can and should strive for greatness, but it is likely to need to find avenues to greatness elsewhere than in a return, effectively, to Soviet values and a reincarnation of the Soviet Union. Often, cutting ties to moral values which led

5.1 Background: Brief History of the Baltics

213

before and will lead again to a dead end, and turning instead to something better, is a precursor to true greatness. All three Baltic countries became NATO members on March 29, 2004 and joined the European Union just over a month later, on May 1, 2004. But it was after that perhaps the first instance of a cyberattack targeting a nation-state occurred: a coordinated distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack beginning on April 27, 2007 against the Estonian parliament, banks, newspapers and other institutions. Sergei Markov, a member of the Russian Duma, stated during a panel discussion on cyberwarfare that one of his staff was responsible for orchestrating the cyber-attack (Coalson 2009). It appears the trigger for this cyber-attack was Estonia’s relocation of, again, a Soviet-era statue, the ‘Bronze Soldier of Tallinn’: the decision had been taken by the Estonian government the very same day (April 27) to dismantle the statue (BBC 2007). And almost a decade and a half on, Russia has not let this culture-war issue go; it has become perhaps even more aggressive, now using an approach of ‘lawfare’ to put the full force of the Russian state behind defense of Soviet icons and historiography. In April 2020, the Russian Criminal Code was amended so that destruction of or damage to graves or statues of Soviet soldiers would result in criminal liability (State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Defence Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of National Defence 2021). And this law applies extraterritorially (i.e. worldwide, not just in Russia). A special unit of the Investigative Committee responsible for upholding this law has already opened cases on foreign subjects, including regarding removal of a statue in the Czech Republic, the publication of a book in Latvia, and vandalism of a statue to Soviet soldiers in Lithuania (ibid.). Clearly, in practice, Russia’s lawfare is being targeted disproportionately against countries that Russia views as having been in its former sphere of influence. In this connection, it is worth noting that extraterritorial law is in fact something that Russia’s 2016 ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ (adopted by Putin) (Mиниcтepcтвo инocтpaнныx дeл Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции 2016), touches on, but in relation to the USA. That document states: 72. The Russian Federation has an interest in building mutually beneficial relations with the USA, taking into consideration both states’ special responsibility for global strategic stability and international security as a whole, and also the significant potential for cooperation in the areas of trade and investment, science and technology and elsewhere. Russia’s starting position is that progressive and predictable development of dialogue with the USA, on issues relating both to bilateral relations and global significance, is possible only on a basis of equality, mutual respect of one another’s interests, and refraining from interference in one another’s internal affairs. Russia does not recognize extraterritorial application by the USA of its jurisdiction outside the framework of international law, and will not accept attempts to exert military, political, economic or other pressure. Russia reserves the right to react harshly to unfriendly actions, including by means of strengthening its own national defense and taking reciprocal or asymmetric measures. (Original: 72. Poccийcкaя Фeдepaция зaинтepecoвaнa в выcтpaивaнии взaимoвыгoдныx oтнoшeний c Coeдинeнными Штaтaми Aмepики, yчитывaя ocoбyю oтвeтcтвeннocть oбoиx гocyдapcтв зa глoбaльнyю cтpaтeгичecкyю cтaбильнocть и cocтoяниe мeждyнapoднoй бeзoпacнocти в цeлoм, a тaкжe нaличиe знaчитeльнoгo пoтeнциaлa

214

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

тopгoвo-инвecтициoннoгo, нayчнo-тexничecкoгo и инoгo coтpyдничecтвa. Poccия иcxoдит из тoгo, чтo пocтyпaтeльнoe и пpeдcкaзyeмoe paзвитиe диaлoгa c CШA кaк пo вoпpocaм двycтopoнниx oтнoшeний, тaк и пo вoпpocaм миpoвoй знaчимocти вoзмoжнo тoлькo нa ocнoвe paвнoпpaвия, взaимнoгo yвaжeния интepecoв и нeвмeшaтeльcтвa вo внyтpeнниe дeлa дpyг дpyгa. Poccия нe пpизнaeт экcтeppитopиaльнoгo ocyщecтвлeния CШA cвoeй юpиcдикции внe paмoк мeждyнapoднoгo пpaвa, нe пpиeмлeт пoпытoк oкaзaния вoeннoгo, пoлитичecкoгo, экoнoмичecкoгo или инoгo дaвлeния и ocтaвляeт зa coбoй пpaвo жecткo peaгиpoвaть нa нeдpyжecтвeнныe дeйcтвия, в тoм чиcлe пyтeм yкpeплeния нaциoнaльнoй oбopoны и пpинятия зepкaльныx или acиммeтpичныx мep.) (ibid., p. 24; emphasis added)

The April 2020 amendment to the Russian Criminal Code was of course added after the 2016 ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ was promulgated, and perhaps Russia views the amendment as one of its ‘reciprocal or asymmetric measures’ to perceived US abuse. But there is still a hypocrisy inherent in the Russian position that could be pointed to in strategic communication. If Russia does not accept American extraterritorial jurisdiction and rejects ‘military, political, economic or other pressure’, then why should Baltic countries who are members of NATO not do the same when it comes to Russian extraterritorial jurisdiction and pressure?

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives 5.2.1 Brief Background on Threat Assessment We started this chapter by posing the question of how probable a Russian invasion of the Baltics might be, along the lines of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. When considering the possibility of an antagonistic country moving to exert power, influence, or a complete takeover of another country, we must identify relevant threat areas to characterize the threat landscape. Threats involving espionage, military activity, destabilization, and cyber are all well-known, but their manifestations are dependent on the geographical, political, and social environments. Therefore, instead of attempting only to impose our perception on the Baltics, we utilize existing security reports and threat analyses from the Baltics’ governments to guide our analysis of existing threats. In this section, we focus first on physical threats (whether the threats come about inadvertently or as a result of deliberate action), then we move to psychological and online threats. We look at Russia’s past actions to gain influence and exert power abroad to determine possible next steps and actions with a focus on how their culture surrounding the individual and society shapes its actions. Finally, we look at Russia’s limitations; after all, Russia’s limitations can easily be understated or disregarded, as can those of any adversary.

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

215

5.2.2 Environmental Threats While the presence of nuclear reactors in any region could be a cause for concern, the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) in Belarus poses a particular risk to the Baltics, particularly Lithuania, both physically and as a vector of attack in the information environment. In this section, we discuss first the more obvious physical threat, the more subtle information-environment vulnerability, and the characteristics of Russian and Soviet technology that make such an installation so prone to failure. Located in northern Belarus, Astravets is approximately 50 km (31 miles) as the crow flies from the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius. Considering the Chernobyl exclusion zone (the radioactive area, now off-limits, surrounding the site of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor) is approximately 30 km (19 miles) in radius at its furthest point, the potential risk, as seen from a Lithuanian point of view, is not hard to imagine. Located in northern Belarus, Astravets is approximately 50 km (31 miles) as the crow flies from the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius, only a little more than the 30-km (19-mile) radius around the radioactive exclusion zone surrounding the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Clearly, this creates a non-negligible risk for Lithuania. Moreover, the possibility of a catastrophic reactor failure is more than just a speculative hypothetical: the Lithuanian government and EU have kept a detailed history of ANPP’s operational schedule and found troubling signs. Lithuania noted that Belarus hastily launched the plant in 2020 and had four unplanned ANPP stoppages in November 2020 alone—stoppages that were only partly explained after the fact (State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Defence Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of National Defence 2021). The cultural significance of these series of events is worth mentioning. Soviet (and Russian) scientists have demonstrated their ingenuity and intelligence throughout history. Russia to this day uses the same Soyuz spacecraft designed in the 1960s with minor modifications, and US astronaut Shane Kimbrough stated, when asked about the relative comfort of each spacecraft, that ‘[the US Space] Shuttle to me was… you’re shaking around, rocking and rolling a lot more. Soyuz was super smooth and the Dragon [SpaceX’s new spacecraft] was kind of somewhere in between’ (Kimbrough 2021). Russia placed the first man and woman, Gagarin and Tereshkova, in space, and beat the US to placing a rover on the Moon. But many such accomplishments have been accompanied by flaws, demonstrating a Russian tendency to cut engineering corners. Russian engineering failures have included a faulty seal which caused the death of three astronauts in space, a parachute failure which caused the death of an astronaut on impact, an equipment malfunction which caused a failed dock and an eventual frozen-lake rescue operation. This illustrates an important point about Russian science and engineering: the science and theory are good, but the production quality is lacking. Perhaps this in turn is because good science and theory are more easily done in an ivory tower, whereas production and engineering require teamwork where cultural weaknesses may become more manifest.

216

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

In 2011, after the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster, the EU formulated measures to ensure the safety and robustness of nuclear reactors across Europe. Belarus voluntarily agreed to take into account these specifications set down by the EU, and in 2018 a report was produced by the EU in response to a Belarusian National Report of the ANPP on the overall reliability of the ANPP. The EU report noted that, ‘…the [ANPP] design bases on Russian standards developed before the Fukushima Accident,’ (European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 2018) and pointed to a few areas that required additional safeguards. The most pressing issue was the likelihood of power loss at the plant due to a lack of redundancy and reliance on off-site power. If power loss occurred, multiple avenues to a catastrophic failure would arise. Additionally, the report agreed with Lithuania’s assessment of a lack of transparency, saying, In the NR [Belarusian National Report] no information was given regarding the evidence of the efficiency and reliability of the new passive safety systems as the SG PHRS [Steam Generator Passive Heat Removal System] and C PHRS [Containment Passive Heat Removal System]. During the discussion the PRT [Peer Review Team] requested information based on experimental data and commissioning test in similar plants. No additional evidence was available during the review mission [emphasis added]. Nevertheless, Gosatomnadzor [Department of Nuclear Safety in Belarus] stated, that comprehensive tests, (sic) proving the efficiency and functionality of new systems have to be carried out as a part of the commissioning procedure and were requested in the licensing procedure. (European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 2018)

In light of this thorough, 74-page report provided by the EU, Belarus has done little to fix, reinforce, or alleviate any of the EU’s concerns. In 2021, the EU stated, ‘It is regrettable that Belarus has decided to start the commercial operation of the Astravets nuclear power plant, without addressing all the safety recommendations contained in the 2018 EU stress test report’ (European Commission 2021). However, the consequences of an ANPP catastrophic failure could be greater still because of the location of the River Neris. Snaking its way through Belarus and Lithuania, this river passes within 7 km (~4.3 miles) of ANPP and, downstream, through the heart of Vilnius and further into Lithuania (Fig. 5.6). Just as officials have concerns about the Pripyat and Dnieper Rivers inside the Chernobyl exclusion zone, the River Neris could carry radioactive waste, moving it into Lithuania. Although Lithuania does not use surface water for its water supply (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2019), the groundwater contamination that would result from such a failure could begin to affect the Lithuanian water supply in 20– 30 years (similar to the timeframe of the Chernobyl groundwater contamination) (Bugai et al. 1997). In addition to the physical risk, there is the risk that Astravets could become the focus of adversarial, external attempts to divide the Baltic states from one another, as pointed out in a NATO STRATCOM COE report on COVID-19 in the Baltic-Nordic region (Bolt 2021). The issue is that Lithuania, on whose border the ANPP is located, is opposed to it (ibid.), but Latvia and Estonia have refused to boycott the power

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

217

Fig. 5.6 The river Neris, passing through Belarus and Lithuania, in relation to Astravets and Vilnius. Image by unknown author, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NerisInLithu ania.png, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0-migrated

supply (LRT 2020). Both Russia and Belarus might exploit these divisions, not just for the economic opportunity afforded by selling power to two of the three Baltic states, but also as a wedge issue that could further a divide-and-conquer strategy vis-à-vis the three former Soviet Baltic states.

5.2.3 Espionage Threats The threat of espionage in the Baltics manifests itself in various ways. Here, offline methods are discussed—cyber threats are treated in a separate category. Russia and Belarus have inherited and utilize a tradition of assassination, kidnapping, and extortion from the Soviet Union along with a disregard for international jurisdiction, or perhaps rather a cynical and hypocritical use of international law when it suits, and a disregard when it does not (see the discussion on lawfare). During the Soviet Union’s existence, assassinations were carried out across Europe and the Americas—from Europe, to Washington D.C., to Mexico. The Soviet Union displayed an unremitting desire to eliminate those it considered enemies, slanderers, and defectors. The intelligence agencies of Russia and Belarus have demonstrated that same desire, evidenced by their past and recent actions to assassinate, exploit, and kidnap ‘enemies of the state’.

218

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

While high profile assassination failures capture media attention and highlight Russia’s intelligence services’ failures, the successful assassinations often go unnoticed. News and discussion of Alexei Navalny’s and Sergei Skripal’s attempted assassinations were widely circulated through media and social media spheres (Cook 2020) (Heintz and Lawless 2018), but some successful assassinations are less well known in the West owing perhaps to the targets’ relatively lower importance to Western audiences. In Germany, former commander in the Chechen military and informant for Georgia during the Russo-Georgian war, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, was shot twice in a public park in 2019 (BBC 2019). In the United Kingdom, defector and former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was ‘…fatally poisoned with polonium 210 on 1 November 2006’ (Owen 2016). More recently, Vitaly Shishov was found hanged in a Ukrainian park—similar to a Belarusian dissident found hung in 2010 (Troianovski and Specia 2021; BBC 2021). These three examples, among others, demonstrate the ability of Russian and Belarusian intelligence agencies to ignore international borders and carry out assassinations abroad. In addition to the specter of assassination, Russia has demonstrated that it is willing to utilize kidnapping in the Baltics to achieve its foreign policy goals and protect its interests. Eston Kohver, an officer in the Estonian Internal Security Service, was abducted by Russian FSB agents and sentenced to 15 years in prison in Russia, but was later returned to Estonia as part of a prisoner exchange for an Estonian convicted of treason who was working for the FSB (Eesti Rahvusringhääling 2019). Kohver was investigating organized crime and had uncovered evidence that implicated the FSB in smuggling operations. That Kohver was prevented from uncovering an illicit FSB operation is unsurprising, but the kidnapping of a foreign national on foreign soil demonstrates both the institutional corruption in Russia’s state security services, and the lengths to which Russia is willing to go to protect its name from harm (even in state cover-ups). Belarus’s state-directed diversion of a Ryanair flight on false pretenses in May 2021, apparently for the sole purpose of arresting a Belarusian dissident on board, also demonstrates the lengths which Belarus is willing to go to kidnap dissidents in the Baltics (the Belarusian journalist was travelling between two EU countries—from Greece back to Lithuania) (Associated Press 2021). Finally, Lithuania has noted that the Belarusian KGB is actively involved in targeting Lithuanian citizens in the territory of Belarus. Government workers who regularly travel to Belarus are of particular interest to the KGB, which ‘… engages in blackmail, exploits personal vulnerabilities, staged or genuine incidents, administrative violations or attempts to lure into “honey trap” (sic)…’ (State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Defence Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of National Defence 2021). There is a counter-intelligence component to remaining resilient in the information environment. Adversaries seek to gain advantage by compromising allies who might otherwise have a morally compelling message; thus, vigilance is essential. In sum, Baltic citizens are consistently under threat from Russian and Belarusian intelligence agencies which have demonstrated their abilities to eliminate, capture, or extort their perceived enemies on both domestic and foreign soil. Countering this threat requires that Baltic citizens be cognizant of these threats.

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

219

We should note that Putin, who was aware of and perhaps ordered or approved these operations, responding in 2015 to the question ‘what is your biggest regret in life?’, replied, ‘I will be quite frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. By the grace of God, I have nothing to regret in my life’ (Putin 2015). This sort of thinking can be parsed quite simply, in moral terms, as hubris or pride. Pride of this type undoubtedly strongly influences contemporary Russian views on both Soviet history and current events. The same national pride also explains the resistance to removing Lenin statues, as mentioned above; in doing so, Russia would in effect be admitting that the October revolution and its architect Lenin were wrong (see Fig. 5.5). It is perhaps a common trait of humanity that people find it hard to admit they are wrong, but it may be no exaggeration to say that the Russian mindset finds admitting fault a particularly bitter pill to swallow.

5.2.4 Military Threats The Baltics are the most isolated members of the European Union and NATO. Russia is to the east, Belarus to the south, and the Kaliningrad Region (a Russian region and enclave detached from the mainland of Russia) to the west. The Baltics’ only land connection to the rest of NATO is the small, southwest border Lithuania shares with Poland, known as the Suwałki corridor (Fig. 5.7). It is only 65 km (~40 miles) as the crow flies from Kaliningrad to Belarus, with 104 km (~64 miles) of actual border; the corridor is a key strategic location for each of NATO, Russia, and Belarus (see Fig. 5.5) (Hodges et al. 2018). As Baltic intelligence agencies have reported, the integration of Belarusian and Russian militaries in the so-called Regional Military Grouping and the United Regional Air Defense System would allow for a swift response to any perceived NATO aggression in the area (Välisluureamet 2021). In addition, this grouping allows for a swift military strike on the Baltics—this very scenario was simulated during the military exercise Zapad 2021 (Välisluureamet 2021). (In the words of the planners of the exercise, Zapad 2021 is based on a scenario where ‘international tensions are escalated to a level that may destabilize the situation in the region and provoke aggression against the Union State (of Russia and Belarus)’ [Reuters 2021].) In September 2021, Russian and Belarusian forces carried out a series of maneuvers to deploy tens of thousands of Russian and Belarusian soldiers along the borders of the Baltics (Välisluureamet 2021). Given that any Russian or Belarusian attempt to invade the Baltics would require troop movements to those areas, an exercise like Zapad 2021 could be a good pretext for moving troops into position to invade. Multiple threat assessments exist portraying the difficulties of NATO entering through the Suwałki corridor to defend the Baltics after or during a coordinated Russian and Belarusian invasion (Fig. 5.8) (Papaioannou 2019; Hodges et al. 2018). These assessments focus on the logistics of the armed conflict, but it is helpful also to ask the question of whether or not such an invasion would be attempted in the first place.

220

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Fig. 5.7 The Suwałki Corridor, connecting Poland and Lithuania, separating Belarus and Russia. Image by NordNordWest, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Suwalki_Gapet.png, adapted and reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0

Putin, in the same 2015 interview with an Italian journalist, stated, ‘As for some countries’ concerns about Russia’s possible aggressive actions, I think that only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO’ (Putin 2015). Indeed, NATO Article 5 presents itself as a major deterrent to Russia—every NATO country counts an attack on one as an attack on all of them. But Putin has had several years since to consider possible outcomes. The West and Europe have already shown Russia that they have failed to take action to protect the sovereignty of European countries (albeit non-NATO countries). In a conversation with one of us (Matthew Fort), a Ukrainian who was a former citizen of the USSR and former member of the Red Army, expressed dismay at the West’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This Ukrainian’s moral assessment was that ‘when a bully hits you, you must hit him back’. Russia could look to previous Western indifference, and be encouraged by that to initiate a campaign into the Baltics. That is to say, a Russian military invasion in the Baltics is not outside the realm of possibility. After all, there was once a time when the possibility of Russian encroachments into Ukraine was widely dismissed. For this reason, consistency in NATO actions, and ongoing patience and fortitude in countering aggression, are essential deterrents, and themselves send a strong strategic message.

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

221

Fig. 5.8 The isolation of the Baltics from the EU and NATO, located in the northeast corner of Europe. Only Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria are currently EU but not NATO members; only Turkey and Norway are NATO but not EU members. The map is from 2016, so still shows the UK as an EU member; as of 2022, the UK is no longer in the EU but is still in NATO. Image by Mahnox, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map-of-european-union-member-countr ies.png, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-4.0

5.2.5 Cyber Threats In this section, we look at the characteristics of the cyber landscape in Russia and the Baltics pertaining to direct online attacks (malware, hacking, ransomware); the next section (Destabilizing Threats) discusses indirect online attacks (disinformation, fake news). The exact technical details of direct online attacks are not important for this discussion—all cyber-attacks fall in one way or another into the rubric ‘find and exploit a vulnerability’. However, Russia and the Baltics together form a specific threat landscape that we shall analyze. There are various competing theories about the nature of cyber threats emanating from Russia and its neighbors (Atlantic Council 2021), including that Russian hacking groups could be under the complete control of the Kremlin; that hacking groups are ‘state-ignored’ and not state-sponsored; that these groups work more like buccaneers—state sponsored groups that operate with some degree of autonomy; that hackers are afraid of the Russian mafia, and use the state to protect themselves. But

222

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

whatever the specifics, analysts tend to agree that Russian cyber operations are split between two main groups: the state on one hand and hacking groups on the other, with the state exerting power and influence over the hacking groups when necessary. For the Baltics, this means there are two actors concerned with destabilizing the region. One actor has long-term goals, and has moved from direct cyber-attacks into cyber espionage (see State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Defence Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of National Defence 2021). The other exists to make money but has little concern for greater ideals for post-Soviet reunification of the former Soviet states. Although their goals are not necessarily at odds, the consequences from the actions of each may have hindered the progress of the other, and/or been detrimental to Russia’s overall standing and foreign policy goals. The starkest example of this occurred in 2007. Then, Estonia was subject to one of the largest, earliest cyber-attacks in history precipitated by Estonia moving a statue of a USSR soldier to the outskirts of Tallinn (McGuinness 2017). Today, some security experts believe that this attack was not necessarily carried out by Russian agents, but was the result of Kremlin-sanctioned and -directed activity mixed with amateur attacks, including by self-styled Russian patriots, on Estonia’s infrastructure (NATO Stratcom 2019). Although this Kremlin-sanctioned attack affected immediate government operations in Estonia, if Russia had foreseen all the attack’s effects, policymakers might have thought twice before allowing it.4 The amateur involvement in the attacks—not in any way discouraged by the Russian government as far as we are aware—in particular led to a prominence on the global stage which made plausible deniability all but impossible for Russia, and squarely put a spotlight on Russia in a way which arguably ended up being inconvenient and counter-productive for Russia. In short, one should not assume that aggressive or destabilizing acts by Russia are always in Russia’s own medium-to long-term best interests. Furthermore, the Estonian response and NATO’s support led to a ‘significant strengthening of cyber defence capabilities, institutions and legislation in Estonia, the European Union, and NATO’ (NATO Stratcom 2019). In effect, Estonia, because it was an early victim of state-condoned hacking, has become a global leader in cybersecurity, and specifically as it relates to the threat from Russia. Indeed, the Baltics now house some of the most advanced cyber capabilities in the EU: for instance, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence is located in Estonia. In addition, Estonia houses 99% of its government services online, from voting, residency applications, and business startup applications.5 In light of this, it is worth sounding a cautionary note: is there a risk that the Baltics might become overconfident in their ability to handle Russian cyber-attacks? Could overdependence on online services lead to a crippling cost to cyber-attacks in the future?

4

This highlights a point that Heuer makes: ‘To see the options faced by foreign leaders as these leaders see them, one must understand their values and assumptions and even their misperceptions and misunderstandings’ (Heuer 1999). 5 Information retrieved from https://e-estonia.com/ on July 29, 2021.

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

223

The existence of hacking groups in Russia, beyond just being detrimental to Russia’s best interests, also demonstrates a cultural point. Just as Russia is strong in science and theory, Russian education systems have produced technologically proficient individuals whose capabilities are world-renowned. However, Russia does not have the type of highly-developed job market and technological infrastructure which would make opportunities easy to come by for technologists to support themselves with honest work. A life of crime may be attractive to such individuals, who can put their skills to work ‘earning’ ransomware extortion. (One thinks of C. S. Lewis’s comment that ‘education without values, as useful as it is, seems rather to make man a more clever devil’.) If ransomware or other cyber-crime is targeted at Western or non-Russian organizations, this may additionally appeal to the patriotism of these individuals (as well as Russian policymakers in government) who believe that they can advance Russia’s interests by bringing others down. All these are factors why, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation notes (Federal Bureau of Investigation n.d.), a disproportionate level of cyber-crime targeting Americans emanates from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Another cyber-outlet for Russian ‘patriotism’, for those with softer technology skills, might be provided by outfits such as Russia’s Internet Research Agency, which employed Russians with foreign language skills to pose as Westerners on social media, advancing narratives favorable to the Kremlin and sowing distrust in Western institutions. In sum, Russia attempts to utilize hackers in ways that benefit both the hackers themselves and perceived Russian government policy goals, but as the experience in Estonia in 2007 showed, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Because of the single attack in Estonia, Russia now faces a strengthened Baltics region that understands Russian cyber methods, has spread the word about these throughout NATO, and steps have been taken as a result to prevent both direct and indirect online attacks. In summary, the specifics of the cyber threat emanating from Russian are culturally conditioned to a large degree, but the existence of this threat on the doorstep of the Baltics has caused the Baltics to adapt to the point that these nations may actually be more resilient to the threat than many Western countries. There is a key point that friendly strategic communicators may want to emphasize here, and the audience for this point is broad (both the Russian government and individuals throughout Russian society who may be tempted to join amateur attacks on Western institutions). This point is, again, values-based: Russia’s benefit is not necessarily served by Russians vindictively or opportunistically bringing perceived global competitors down, but rather, a win-win is both possible and in Russia’s own best interest. There will be some on the margins who will listen to good sense.

5.2.6 Destabilizing Threats The category of destabilizing threats is a broad one, and one that has potential overlap with the other threat areas listed here. The psychological aspects of these threats, however, are unique. Here, we will start the discussion from the inside to the

224

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Fig. 5.9 Russian diaspora in Europe, by country. Image retrieved and adapted from https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Map_of_the_ Russian_Diaspora_in_the_ World.svg under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-4.0

outside, beginning with the presence of a Russian minority in the Baltics. In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, there are Russian minorities estimated at, approximately, 25%, 6–12%, and 25%, respectively (Pilson¯ıbas un migr¯acijas lietu p¯arvalde 2021; Lietuvos Respublika 2011; Statistikaamet 2018; Bolt 2021) (Fig. 5.9). With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the presence of a Russian minority is a possible pretext for invasion or, at the least, stoking of so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ by Russia (Cooley 2017). After the Russian invasion in Ukraine, a spotlight has been shone on the Russian minorities in the Baltics. The seeds of conflict that accompany the presence of this minority were planted during the time of the Soviet Union. The Soviet occupation in the Baltics resulted in two events which affected the demographics. First, the USSR under Stalin undertook mass deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to Russia and Russian labor camps (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia 2004). Second, ethnic Russians moved into the area to provide extra labor to support industrialization (Vardys 1966). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of Baltic states, each of the Baltics attempted to answer the question, ‘who should be citizens of our new country?’ While each country’s answer is nuanced and varies to some extent, all agreed that individuals would need to prove that they qualify for naturalization. With the onus probandi on former citizens of the Soviet Union, some simply declined to prove their eligibility, but also did not apply for citizenship elsewhere. This group of people in the Baltics is referred to as ‘non-citizens’. Although legally allowed to reside in those countries, they have limited political rights (e.g., they are not allowed to vote) (Paparinskis 2018). EU analysis has affirmed the Baltics’ right to this policy (Paparinskis 2018), although the Russian ministry of foreign affairs has (whether cynically or not) framed the topic in terms of human rights (Mиниcтepcтвo инocтpaнныx дeл Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции 2003). From the inception of the Baltics’ ‘non-citizen’ policy, Russia has been consistently critical of it, bemoaning its perceived problems. This may mean that the Baltics now present an even stronger case for Russian invasion, viewed through the prism of a Russiannationalist mindset, than Ukraine did in 2014, where there was no comparable policy.

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

225

The existence of relatively large Russian-speaking and/or ethnically Russian populations in former Soviet republics, including the Baltics, provides not just a potential pretext for Russia to invade ‘to protect the Russian-speaking minority’, as happened in Eastern Ukraine. At the very least, this population can be used by Russia to create wedge issues between the Russian minorities and their host countries, destabilizing the latter. As was also observed in Eastern Ukraine, these Russian-speaking communities are also a natural and easy target for Russian propaganda and disinformation. Many Russian speakers in former Soviet republics (including at least Ukraine and Belarus) consume Russian TV. It was Russian channel TV-1 that gained notoriety in 2014 for a story (which turned out to be demonstrably fake) alleging that pro-Ukrainian forces had publicly crucified a 3-year-old boy and paraded the body on a tank in Slavyansk. This reporting typifies much Russian disinformation in that the anchor (in this case explicitly) invited an emotional response, quickly leading the viewer past the question of whether the alleged facts on which any emotional response might be based were true. The coverage was widely circulated on social media6 (including gaining notoriety thanks to the efforts of those seeking to debunk it). It is worth noting that consumption of TV media in the former Soviet Union, including Russia, has decreased relative to other sources over just the last few years since 2014; reportedly, Russian speakers are turning more to the internet for information (Eurasianet 2019). That Russian TV has lost credibility in the eyes of Russians is a matter not just of speculation, but seems to be confirmed by surveys (Volkov and Goncharov 2019); it seems quite likely that incidents such as the widely-publicized 2014 ‘crucified boy’ coverage have contributed to this shift. Again, looking at the issues through a values prism, it is worth keeping in mind that disinformation and manipulation are usually self-defeating in the end. Western communicators should not shy away from making this point to Russian audiences to deter future disinformation. It is also worth noting that governments of former Soviet republics, including the Baltics, have learned from the experience of Ukraine in 2014—particularly the way in which Russia targeted Russian-speaking minority populations in its ‘near abroad’—and turned this experience to their own advantage. Bolt (2021)7 adduces success stories of Estonia and Lithuania in particular in providing Russian-language material relating to COVID to their Russian-speaking minority populations: In official communications, the government was considered to have successfully provided information to the Russian minority; they admitted to being well informed, and at times even better informed than the Estonian speaking majority.147 An April 2020 poll showed that by the third week of the state of emergency, 97% of Russian-speaking residents confirmed they were either well informed or rather well informed about topics related to the coronavirus; one third 6

An apparently unedited copy is available, for example, as of July 23, 2021, at https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=kgfkWExDrUQ. 7 P. 29. Bolt’s citations 147 and 148 are respectively to ‘Government Strategic Communications during COVID-19 in the Nordic-Baltic Region, Estonia’ and ‘Poll: Coronavirus awareness nearly equal among Estonian-, Russian-speakers. ERR, April 5, 2020. https://news.err.ee/1072982/pollcoronavirus-awareness-nearly-equal-among-estonian-russian-speakers.’

226

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

observed that the government provided an important resource.148 The Russian population sought information from Estonia’s media (Postimees and ETV/ETV+). The conscious effort by Estonian authorities to provide information in the Russian language encouraged reliance on Estonian-origin media and decreased audience attachment to Russian-origin TV from 20 to 10%.

NATO and Western countries can clearly learn from the Baltics’ success here, turning the presence of Russian-speaking communities to their advantage and directing strategic communication to these groups in their native language. Elections are a democratic feature Russia could attempt to utilize to manipulate the situation in the Baltics, especially since Russia has expertise in influencing elections in larger countries. Since each Baltic state’s government is a republic, the elections in each country taking place over the next few years could be utilized to install a leader who is more sympathetic to Russia. Much like Lukashenko in Belarus and Yanukovych in Ukraine, a Russia-influenced president in the Baltics could allow for heavy Russian influence over the population as a whole, perhaps a Russian physical presence, and at the very least, a compliant neighbor who will not resist Russian moves. Notwithstanding the apparent lack of much current Russian political presence in the Baltics, Russia has demonstrated that it can and will shape elections to its perceived benefit (Mueller 2019). The GRU unit 54777 and local Russian psychological operations units are among those responsible for carrying out election interference, as well as general psychological operations. Thanks to the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, we have insight (in the form of some specifics) into the worldview of these groups and their concept of psychological operations (Välisluureamet 2021). Any nation is a potential target, whether friendly, neutral, or hostile. Targets are subject to intense study by GRU agents whose goal is to understand the military-political situation and morale of local people groups, and then disseminate targeted disinformation to sow havoc or alter the information environment in ways which GRU agents perceive are beneficial to Russia. Recently, this disinformation has taken the form of falsehoods relating to COVID-19. Examples of apparent or actual Russian interference in the Baltic information environment include false allegations of a high incidence of COVID-19 among Canadian NATO forces in Latvia and US NATO soldiers in Lithuania; a forged letter purporting to be from the NATO Secretary General which stated that NATO intended to withdraw its forces from Lithuania because of COVID-19; and Russian attempts to discredit vaccines amidst already high levels of vaccine skepticism in all three Baltic nations (Bolt 2021). This is something we shall focus on in an in-depth social media landscape analysis in the next section. In addition, the world has recently been exposed to new forms of hybrid warfare. Belarus has recently attempted to weaponize immigrants, apparently flying them in from the Middle East and then releasing them into the Baltics. Belarus’s leader Lukashenko may have learned here from the example of Turkey in 2020, when President Erdo˘gan explicitly threatened to release millions of Syrian refugees into Europe as a form of blackmail to obtain international support (Guzel and Wilks 2020). Lukashenko’s actions in this case may be in retaliation for Lithuania’s harboring and refusing to extradite opposition politicians, such as Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.

5.2 A Distillation of Multiple Threat Assessments and Perspectives

227

Belarus’s weaponization of immigrants has prompted Lithuania to consider erecting a border wall on its border with Belarus (Sytas 2021). Lithuania has been turning back migrants entering from Belarus, and in a tit-for-tat move, Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko has now ordered ‘every meter of the border to be closed’ (Belta.by 2021), presumably to force Lithuania’s hand and leave the latter no option but to permit entry to the migrants. In addition, as discussed in Sect. 5.1, Russia has embraced lawfare—the application of Russian laws extraterritorially. We already mentioned how Russia in 2020 promulgated a law establishing criminal liability for ‘destruction or damage perpetrated with the aim of damaging the historical and cultural significance of sites and objects… located on the Russian territory or beyond [emphasis added] …’ (Kremlin 2020). As already noted, extraterritorial justice does have precedents elsewhere (for example, the United States taxes citizens on their worldwide income, regardless of whether the citizens are ever physically in the United States). The question we need to consider is, perhaps, not so much whether extraterritorial law is warranted on general principles, but rather, how to square Russia’s rejection of any US application of law extraterritorially (Mиниcтepcтвo инocтpaнныx дeл Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции 2016) with its own practices in this regard. There is no reason, for example, to accept the premise that all applications of extraterritorial jurisdiction are morally equivalent. As in all law, a key is to look at intent, including the intent of the lawmakers, which (it goes without saying) may be benign or malign. The US government surely can justify a legitimate interest, for example, in taxing US citizens on worldwide income. But Russia can and should be pressed on why it is that Baltic states should be forced to accept a Russian veto on what happens with Soviet statues on their own territory. Russia’s response should be weighed from a moral perspective, with the burden of proof on Russia, and the default Western response should be that Russia has no right to try and convict in absentia—and then perhaps extradite government officials by kidnapping, as Russia has been doing in Crimea (Amnesty International 2015).

5.2.7 Russian Limitations While Russia is large and imposing, the limitations of Russia’s abilities should also be noted. Too often, Russia is viewed from outside as a monolithic force, doing Putin’s bidding and following a grand strategy to place Russia on top of the global food chain in every economic, political, and military sector. Too often we forget that Russia is comprised of people, subject to the same limitations as anyone, anywhere in the world: for example, incomplete information, poor decision making, and incorrect assumptions. As Heuer points out, all intelligence analysts, and by extension all people, ‘… do not approach their tasks with empty minds. They start with a set of assumptions about how events normally transpire in the area for which they are responsible’ (Heuer 1999). This set of assumptions differs between Russia and the West, but we have useful allies in the area that may be closer to understanding the Russian mentality. Baltic government publications have usefully pointed out some

228

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

of Russia and Belarus’s assumptions and weaknesses, and we can draw on our own personal experiences to highlight Russia’s shortcomings. Russia cannot, of course, defend itself on all fronts simultaneously. The ChineseRussian border is an area of particular concern, since the Chinese enjoy a much higher population density on their side of the border. Any invasion from the Chinese, even if seemingly far-fetched, could receive scarce resistance from the Russian physical presence. To its west, on the border with Europe, Russia must contend with NATO’s Article 5 which states that an attack on any one member is considered an attack on all the members (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949). So long as NATO is credibly willing to counter Russian aggression, any attack by Russia on the Baltics would in effect be a declaration of war on NATO. To the south, Russia is also facing difficulty in dealing with Turkey. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey has backed Azeri forces, while Russia has backed Armenian forces. Russia was able to move into the area, and may end up with a permanent military presence in the area. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Turkey (a NATO member—see Fig. 5.8) enjoy close relations; and Georgia has emerged as an east-west transit line (in the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) connecting Turkey (and beyond Turkey, Europe) to Azeri natural resources in a manner which bypasses Russia (NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence 2021). This challenges Russia’s desire for control over the region (ibid.); and given the regional presence of Russian troops, Georgia’s economic independence resulting from east-west trade and energy transit could act as a catalyst for a future broader conflict with Russia. At a time when COVID-19 has emerged against the backdrop of the already suffering Russian economy (and amidst highly widespread vaccine skepticism among Russians), Russian income and quality of life have decreased. As of June 2020, 13.5% of the population (19.9 million people), lived below the subsistence minimum (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949). In the same Estonian report (ibid.), almost 73% of Russians are listed as being low-income, and plans for economic development have been shelved to survive this depression. Much as with the crisis Putin inherited during the 2000s, ordinary Russians may soon be looking for a new leader merely to keep them fed. Russian policy towards Belarus places Russia in a difficult situation. Belarusians are angry at the latest election result, and a large swathe of the population is convinced that they have been cheated out of a democratically-elected ruler. However, Russia has committed to supporting Lukashenko since protests started in 2020. Russia’s taking sides in this way is alienating to those Belarusians who do not believe Lukashenko legitimately won, and the more it continues, the more Belarusians are likely to view Russia unfavorably. At the same time, Russians see Belarusians’ protests and calls for democratic procedures, and may see a roadmap for themselves to make similar demands of their government. With Putin’s approval ratings dropping to pre-Crimea 2014 levels (Statista 2021), he may perceive the need for some sort of conflict to inspire Russian nationalism. However, this time there may not be as convenient an option for Putin as annexing Crimea from Ukraine was in 2014. Over the course of the past 30 years, as Russia has consistently attempted to exert influence on former Soviet states to prevent European or Asian integration, the

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape

229

signs that its policies are failing are abundant. Anti-democratic policies have clearly destabilized the regions around Russia: in 2020, Belarus experienced unprecedented protests against Lukashenko, and the same year, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament building was stormed as election results were protested. Russia’s leaders are clearly afraid that similar democratic ideas (or dissatisfaction with lack of democracy) might catch on in Russia itself, leading to mass protests and riots there (Docherty 2015; Välisluureamet 2021). Putin’s own words have consistently betrayed that this is likely his greatest fear. In the cyber sphere, as already discussed, targeting Estonia has in some ways backfired on Russia—Estonia, along with other Baltic states, is much more cognizant of the dangers posed by online misinformation and cyber-attacks and, as illustrated in the section on destabilizing threats, has taken steps to ensure that its information environment is consistently monitored to prevent local destabilization. Estonia has also shared its experience and recipe for success with other Western countries. Russia’s past social media playbook has become an open book, and as Russia attempts to influence elections, states, and peoples, the Baltics can help share information and techniques to counter Russia’s maneuvers. Putin and Lukashenko are prisoners of their own systems. These two leaders have had the final word on many operations within and outside their own countries, and if removed from power, would almost certainly have to answer for their crimes, assuming the next leader were politically unsympathetic. The poisoning of Aleksei Navalny, and the beating and torture of protestors in Belarus, are just two of the crimes for which Putin and Lukashenko could have to answer. If they were removed, the floodgates of information of what actually happened during their presidencies could open, and there might not be any place on earth that would be willing to harbor them (Docherty 2015). In total, Russia as a whole suffers from the same vices that plague individuals, and the lack of democracy only exacerbates this problem. A proverb says, ‘plans fail when there is no counsel, but with many advisors they succeed.’ While Russia is not a monolith under one man (Putin), the effect of autocracy and the silencing of alternative viewpoints means that Russia’s fate is more bound to the fate of its leader than is healthy. Putin’s Russia attempts to project power and stability, but the reality is that the system is very brittle.

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape In the sections above, we have discussed an array of threats, each relating in some degree to the information environment surrounding the Baltic states. We hope to have demonstrated that a common thread underlying many risks for the Baltics (and more widely) is rooted in narratives and in particular false narratives. Examples we have looked at include:

230

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

1. the narratives of Soviet history and Russian greatness; 2. whether figures such as Lenin and other figures symbolizing the Soviet Union should continue to be revered—and if so, should Russia be allowed effectively to force such reverence upon the Baltic states; 3. whether the ‘non-citizens’ issue, as it relates to ethnic Russians in the Baltics, should be cast as a human rights issue or a legitimate sovereign policy choice made by the Baltics; 4. disinformation broadly surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, to which fear and anxiety around the globe (not just in the Baltics) are creating vulnerabilities. With the exception of the second of these bullets, the narratives surrounding COVID19 touch directly on each of these areas. And indeed, almost everything we are dealing with (including the second bullet) boils down in the end to ‘Russian greatness’ narratives, or challenges thereto (perceived or actual). In this section, we look at what social media can reveal about the information maneuvers currently going on in the Russian-language information environment.

5.3.1 The BEND Framework The BEND framework (Beskow and Carley 2019) is a recent framework for analysis of maneuvers in the information environment. BEND (an acronym) is essentially a classification system whereby different maneuvers can be categorized as positive or negative on one axis, and relating to manipulation of the knowledge network or social network on the other, as follows (ibid., p. 123):

Positive

Information maneuver

Network maneuver

Knowledge network manipulation

Social network manipulation

Things you can do by affecting what is being discussed

Things you can do by affecting who is talking/listening to whom

Engage

Discussion that brings up a related but relevant topic

Back

Actions that increase the importance of the opinion leader

Explain

Discussion that provides details on or elaborates the topic

Build

Actions that create a group or the appearance of a group

Excite

Discussion that brings joy/happiness/cheer/enthusiasm to group

Bridge

Actions that build a connection between two or more groups (continued)

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape

231

(continued)

Negative

Information maneuver

Network maneuver

Knowledge network manipulation

Social network manipulation

Things you can do by affecting what is being discussed

Things you can do by affecting who is talking/listening to whom

Enhance

Discussion that encourages the group to continue with the topic

Boost

Dismiss

Discussion about why the topic is Neutralize not important

Actions that limit the effectiveness of opinion leader such as by reducing the number who can or do follow or reply or attend to

Distort

Discussion that alters the main message of the topic

Actions that lead to a group being dismantled

Dismay

Discussion about a topic that will Narrow bring worry/sadness/anger to group

Actions that lead to the group becoming sequestered from other groups

Distract

Discussion about a totally different topic and irrelevant

Actions that reduce the size of the group or make it appear that the group has grown smaller

Nuke

Neglect

Actions that grow the size of the group or make it appear that it has grown

Within this framework, BEND components are not mutually exclusive; some maneuvers may incorporate more than one component. Note that BEND expands upon the ‘four Ds of disinformation’ introduced by (Nimmo 2015) specifically to explain contemporary Russian propaganda. (Nimmo, a fluent Russian speaker, was a NATO journalist for over a decade who has focused on Russian disinformation.) Given our own focus on the Russian-language social media information environment, the BEND framework is therefore a natural framework to adopt to help make sense of narratives spreading through the Russian-language information environment.

232

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

5.3.2 Research Hypotheses Our research hypotheses, based on the discussion so far, are as follows: • Disinformation narratives that could destabilize will be discernible in the Russianlanguage social media information environment (IE). • Assuming Baltic government attempts to reach Russian-language minorities resident in their countries are successful, then destabilizing disinformation narratives will be less prevalent in the Russian-language social media IE within the Baltics than they are in the Russian-language social media IE generally.

5.3.3 Topic Selection The Twitter Developer API makes it easy to retrieve data from Twitter and store it in a manner (such as in a relational database table) that facilitates downstream analytics. Using this API, as in Twitter’s own user interface (see Fig. 5.10), a user can specify a search term, and Twitter posts including that exact term will be returned. However, an early challenge in any serious social media analysis is, in collecting data, to structure a query to retrieve that data in a way that the latter is sufficient in size, relevant to the analysis, and where the formulation of the query does not predetermine or prejudice the answer to the research hypotheses (which we will outline below). With some topics, there simply is not enough data to support largescale analysis; this is not so different from traditional polling, where a large enough sample is required to support statistically significant conclusions. And this in turn is driven by the winds of what the public is interested in. Some topics ‘trend’, and the researcher who needs large data samples must to some extent adjust his or her sails to mine current topics of interest, while still hewing to an overall course dictated by social-science research hypotheses. This requires careful formulation not just of the search queries, but also of the initial hypotheses, and always keeping in mind how the one relates to the other. It is also worth noting here that our approach to analysis is driven by the philosophy of (Heuer 1999), who states: Analysts sometimes describe their work procedure as immersing themselves in the data without fitting the data into any preconceived pattern. At some point an apparent pattern (or answer or explanation) emerges spontaneously, and the analyst then goes back to the data to check how well the data support this judgment. According to this view, objectivity requires the analyst to suppress any personal opinions or preconceptions, so as to be guided only by the “facts” of the case. To think of analysis in this way overlooks the fact that information cannot speak for itself. The significance of information is always a joint function of the nature of the information

Fig. 5.10 Search in Twitter user interface

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape

233

and the context in which it is interpreted. The context is provided by the analyst in the form of a set of assumptions and expectations concerning human and organizational behavior. These preconceptions are critical determinants of which information is considered relevant and how it is interpreted. (ibid., p. 41)

So, relating Heuer’s framework to our current area of focus, our ‘assumptions and expectations concerning human and organizational behavior’ would be that key (orthogonal) dimensions in which to explain the Russian-language information environment are in terms of (1) the ‘Russian greatness’ narrative or challenges to that narrative; and (2) the BEND framework (Nimmo 2015). Our approach to analysis does differ from Heuer’s view, however, in one way. In some respects, the current state of the art in data analytics gives the lie to Heuer’s assertion that ‘information cannot speak for itself’. The very purpose of unsupervised techniques is to reveal emergent patterns in data, based purely on statistics such as word occurrences. These techniques do in fact effectively allow analysts to ‘immers[e] themselves in the data without fitting the data into any preconceived pattern’. But Heuer is still right in one important way: while unsupervised algorithms can allow data to speak for itself in the emergence of patterns, it does still take an analyst, in our view, to make sense of those patterns, to explain what they mean. The Heuerian approach to analysis, combined with our eye on ensuring datasets are sufficiently large to achieve meaningful results, guides our selection of an overall topic on which to collect data to test hypotheses. While Soviet-era statues might have been a good focus for retrieving data during the heat of the 2008 Estonia cyberattack, at the moment (over the last year or so), the sustained attention of the world’s population, including those in the Baltic region, is much more heavily on COVID-19. Any topic can potentially be weaponized in a contest between ‘Russian greatness’ propaganda and counter-propaganda; and that includes COVID, as we have already discussed. We further focused our topic on the subject of COVID vaccines, a known target of disinformation and so-called ‘vaccine diplomacy’ by Russia and others.

5.3.4 Data Retrieval On August 11, 2021, we performed searches using the Twitter Developer API, one for each of the following search terms and one for each related wordform: Search term

English meaning

вaкцинa

vaccine

пpививкa

vaccine

пpивитьcя

to get vaccinated

By ‘related wordform’ we refer to the fact that in Russian, words have different endings depending on their syntactic function. The two nouns above meaning ‘vaccine’ are shown in the nominative case, which is how they would appear if

234

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

they were singular and the subject of the sentence. Russian has six cases, which exist in both singular and plural, meaning that each noun can have up to 12 different endings (e.g. вaкцинa, вaкцинy, вaкцины, вaкцинe, вaкцинoй, вaкцин, вaкцинaм, вaкцинaми, вaкцинax). For each noun, we performed searches for all the wordforms. For the verb пpивитьcя we performed one search for this form (the so-called perfective infinitive), and one for the related imperfective infinitive пpививaтьcя. Verbs also exist in many non-infinitive forms. Because each of these individually would be likely to return a low number of results, we elected not to search on non-infinitive wordforms. The above searches collectively returned 62,232 tweets posted over the period August 2, 2021 through August 11, 2021—a period, readers may recall, which was at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. For 23,220 (about 37%) of these, the Twitter user self-reported a location. Assuming self-reporting is accurate at least on the whole, or at least that inaccuracies cancel one another out by the law of large numbers, the vast majority of these Twitter posts appear to come from within Russia. This is in line with expectations, since Russian speakers are of course concentrated in Russia. We did note that a significant minority of posts appeared to be from the Balkan (former Yugoslavia) region, which revealed the fact that вaкцинa, though a Russian word, exists with identical spelling and meaning in South Slavic languages (e.g. Serbian and Macedonian). This was an unintended result of our search query. To ensure we were directly addressing our research hypothesis (subject to the accuracy on the whole of the self-reported locations), we narrowed the 23,220 Twitter posts down by sub-selecting from within them those that reported any of the following locations (among the top most reported locations in Russia, Belarus or the Baltics): Location

English meaning

Grouping

Number of posts reporting this location

Mocквa, Poccия

Moscow, Russia

Russia/Belarus

1857

Poccия

Russia

Russia/Belarus

1650

Mocквa

Moscow

Russia/Belarus

1371

Caнкт-Пeтepбypг, Poccия

St Petersburg, Russia

Russia/Belarus

823

caнкт-пeтepбypг

St Petersburg

Russia/Belarus

553

Бeлapycь

Belarus

Russia/Belarus

117

Mинcк

Minsk

Russia/Belarus

36

Minsk, Belarus

Minsk, Belarus

Russia/Belarus

34

Minsk

Minsk

Russia/Belarus

25

Republic of Belarus

Republic of Belarus

Russia/Belarus

19

Belarus

Belarus

Russia/Belarus

15

Бeлapycь, Mинcк

Belarus, Minsk

Russia/Belarus

14

БEЛOPУCCИЯ

Belorussia

Russia/Belarus

14

Tallinn, Eesti

Tallinn, Estonia

Baltics

33

Tallinn, Estonia

Tallinn, Estonia

Baltics

32 (continued)

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape

235

(continued) Location

English meaning

Grouping

Number of posts reporting this location

Vilnius, Lithuania

Vilnius, Lithuania

Baltics

25

Riga, Latvia

Riga, Latvia

Baltics

24

Harjumaa, Eesti

Harjumaa, Estonia

Baltics

20

Latvia

Latvia

Baltics

19

R¯ıga, Latvija

Riga, Latvia

Baltics

18

Lithuania

Lithuania

Baltics

13

Vilnius, Lietuva

Vilnius, Lithuania

Baltics

11

Vilnius

Vilnius

Baltics

11

Total

6734

Note that the resulting sample is heavily skewed towards Russia and Belarus (and particularly Russia), which again is in line with expectations, since Russian is heavily predominant in Russia and Belarus, but a minority language in the Baltics. The 206 Twitter posts from the Baltics is not a large number, but perhaps still enough to gain some sense of any differences between the Baltic Russian-language information environment and the Russian-language information environment generally.

5.3.5 Data Processing We then ran topic analysis based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). For details on how this works, see Chew (2015). To summarize, SVD is a deterministic method from linear algebra that allows the best lower-rank approximation to a matrix to be found, which in turn can allow principal components of signal in the data to be discovered. This is the method by which, to borrow Heuer’s words, we can allow data to ‘speak for itself’. For each of the resulting topics (principal components), we can list the top most representative Twitter post. Typically, other posts in the same topic will be similar to (have many of the same words as) the most representative one. This essentially allows a large corpus of text data to be viewed in miniature by an analyst, who can have some confidence that all the statistically most prominent patterns are represented, and that (because of the method’s deterministic nature) the same data will always produce the same result. We ran one topic analysis for each of the two geographic groupings: Russia/Belarus and the Baltics.

5.3.6 Exploration of Results The top topics to emerge from each grouping had the following as the most representative Twitter post for each topic:

Germany gets EUR 1.2 77 billion in taxes from BionTech, while Russia pays Golikova 57 billion rubles to distribute Sputnik. Different civilizations Sputnik shown in UAE to 32 have 97.8% efficacy. Country’s leadership doing all it can to eliminate the disease, which can’t be said about anti-vaxxers who are killing people Why be surprised at 41 Olympic Committee when Russian scientists who came up with a vaccine had their global supremacy stolen from them. Could have avoided thousands of deaths

✅ Гepмaния Бюджeт cтpaны пoлyчaeт oт кoмпaнии BionTech [paзpaбoтчик вaкцины Pfizer] 1,2 млpд. eвpo в видe нaлoгa нa пpибыль. ✅ Poccия Из бюджeтa cтpaны выдeляeтcя 57 млpд. pyблeй бизнec-пapтнёpy Гoликoвoй нa выпycк вaкцины “Cпyтник”. Цивилизaции и впpямь paзныe

Baкцинa Poccии “Cпyтник V” пoкaзaлa в OAЭ 97,8% эффeктивнocти и 100% - пpoтив тяжeлыx cлyчaeв, a нoвый aнтидoт “Mиp-19” ФMБA пpoшeл дoклиничecкиe иcпытaния. Pyкoвoдcтвo Cтpaны дeлaeт вce чтoбы кaк yпpeдить и тaк и лeчить бoлeзнь, чeгo нeльзя cкaзaть o гyбящиx людeй aнтивaкcepax

A чeгo вы yдивляeтecь oлимпийcкoмy cyдeйcтвy? Bcпoмнитe, кaк y poccийcкиx yчёныx пo cyти oтoбpaли миpoвoe пepвeнcтвo в coздaнии paбoчeй вaкцины пpoтив кoвидa. И этo yжe нe игpы, a тыcячи и тыcячи cмepтeй, кoтopыx мoглo нe быть, кaк мoглo нe быть и тpeтeй вoлны, и дeльтa-штaммa. https://t.co/kL0g00weIX

2

3

4

151

Paul McCartney had ‘Sputnik’ vaccine and said it is the best vaccine in the world

(continued)

Russia is great but victimized

Russian greatness/superiority

Russian inferiority

Russian greatness/superiority

Number of ‘highly similar’ Narratives posts

79-лeтний Пoл Maккapтни вaкциниpoвaлcя oт кopoнaвиpyca poccийcкoй вaкцинoй «Cпyтник V» и пpизвaл cвoиx пoклoнникoв пocлeдoвaть eгo пpимepy. Maккapтни oбъяcнил cвoй выбop вaкцины: «Я cчитaю, чтo этo caмaя лyчшaя вaкцинa в миpe, ecли eй пpивилcя caм пpeзидeнт Пyтин» https://t.co/aV9rX5b05T

English summary

1

Topic ranking Russian

Russia/Belarus

236 5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Critique of video game 58 Plague Inc. that it’s not realistic—that ABSOLUTELY everyone gets a vaccine after one has been developed

Caмым нepeaлиcтичным в игpe Plague Inc oкaзaлocь тo, чтo пocлe coздaния вaкцины пpививaтьcя нaчинaют ИCКЛЮЧИTEЛЬHO вce

7

30

Moscow district representative Marina Ivlieva died from COVID despite being vaccinated. She had been a proponent of vaccines and had received ‘Sputnik’ herself

B Mocквe cкoнчaлacь oт кoвидa, нecмoтpя нa cдeлaннyю пpививкy, бывший мyниципaльный дeпyтaт paйoнa Paмeнки, зaвкaфeдpoй финaнcoвoгo пpaвa Юpидичecкoгo фaкyльтeтa MГУ Mapинa Ивлиeвa. Извecтнo, чтo oнa выcтyпaлa зa вaкцинaцию, caмa вaкциниpoвaлacь “Cпyтникoм” и дpyгим coвeтoвaлa. https://t.co/b878msiBmS

6

34

User reports difficult stay in hospital of over a month and says don’t listen to anti-vaxxers, get the vaccine and protect yourself and your loved ones

(continued)

Cynicism (about vaccine skeptics)

Vaccine skepticism

Pro-vaccine

Number of ‘highly similar’ Narratives posts

Ceгoдня зaкpыл бoльничный лиcт. Mинyc июль мecяц и чacть aвгycтa, 2 дня peaнимaции, пoтoм 8 днeй интeнcивнoй тepaпии и eщё пoчти тpи нeдeли peaбилитaции тaкoй, чтo вcпoминaть нe xoчeтcя. Кoвид. He cлyшaйтe дoлбнeй, cдeлaйтe пpививкy, бepeгитe ceбя и любимыx. He pиcкyйтe жизнью

English summary

5

Topic ranking Russian

Russia/Belarus

(continued)

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape 237

I’m surprised by people demanding a ‘guarantee’ from the state when they get vaccinated. Of course vaccination has risks like any medical intervention, but the risks are less than those of COVID

Meня кpaйнe yдивляют люди,тpeбyющиe oт гocyдapcтвa кaкиx-тo“гapaнтий”пpи вaкцинaции.A пoчeмy вы пpи poждeнии нe тpeбyeтe cepтификaт нa бeccмepтиe?Дa,вaкцинa,кaк и любoe мeдицинcкoe вмeш-вo пoдpaзyмeвaeт oпpeдeлeнныe pиcки, вepoятнocть кoтopыx мнoкoкpaтнo нижe pиcкoв кoвидa и eгo>

9 23

Worst side-effect of 27 vaccine is that it disrupts the menstrual cycle. People might not have known when I first got vaccinated in December 2020, but even now no one is talking about this

Pro-vaccine

(continued)

Vaccine skepticism

Number of ‘highly similar’ Narratives posts

из вcex пoбoчeк вaкцины caмaя бecячaя — этo cбoй циклa, и имeннo o нeй никтo пyбличнo ocoбo нe пpeдyпpeждaeт))) я пoнимaю чтo дeкaбpe 2020, кoгдa я пepвый paз вaкциниpoвaлacь мoгли нe знaть, нo вoт дaжe тeпepь в aвгycтe 2021 пpи peвaкцинaции ни cлoвa oб этo нe cкaзaли

English summary

8

Topic ranking Russian

Russia/Belarus

(continued)

238 5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

10

Bчepa вeчepoм oт coceдки пo дaчe yзнaл нoвoe o пpививкax. Дo cиx пop yгopaю. Oкaзывaeтcя пpивитым бyдyт дaвaть кoд чepeз coцceти и бyдeт идти oтбop, кoгo нa тoт cвeт, a кoгo paбaми кyдa нибyдь.35 лeт бaбe. Людииии! Oдyмaйтecь! Bключитe мoзги. Пopa yжe opгaнчики вынyть из бaшки

Topic ranking Russian

Russia/Belarus

(continued)

Cynicism (about vaccine disinformation)

Number of ‘highly similar’ Narratives posts

(Apparently ridiculing 16 vaccine misinformation) Yesterday I learned something new about vaccines from my 35-year-old female neighbor. I’m still sick. Turns out vaccinated people will be given a code via social media, and there’ll be a selection of who goes into the next world and who’ll be sent somewhere as slaves. People, think! Turn your brains on

English summary

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape 239

Journalist Anastasiya 3 Efremova received a vaccine cocktail. She took part in testing of Chinese CanSino vaccine fall last year, and took Sputnik V in spring of 2021 As you swallow the cream of the news, sit down so you don’t fall over! Your caring authorities are confirming there will be compulsory vaccination Actor Yury Ogulnik’s 2 daughter Sveta Bogdanova wrote on Facebook: ‘Dad has died. Had the Epivac vaccine and was hospitalized. Don’t take the vaccines. Get laid off instead of feeding the monster.’

Жypнaлиcт Aнacтacия Eфpeмoвa yжe пoлyчилa кoктeйль из вaкцин. Oceнью пpoшлoгo гoдa в Caнкт-Пeтepбypгe oнa пpинимaлa yчacтиe в тecтиpoвaнии китaйcкoй вaкцины CanSino, a вecнoй 2021-гo cдeлaлa пpививкy Sputnik V. Aнacтacия гpaж… https://t.co/RsY3Wy0JeK https://t.co/ZWM B98G7cK

@Nata4468 Глoтaя нoвocтныe cливки, Пpиcядьтe, чтoбы нe yпacть! Oб oбязaтeльнoй пpививкe Tвepдит зaбoтливaя влacть. O Bpeмя! Изoбильe xpaмoв, И, вcё жe, нe живём, кaк вcтapь, Bpaчи лeчили poд Aдaмoв, Beтepинapы - Бoжью твapь. Beли кopoв к вeтepинapaм Бeз иx coглacья, нe бeдa!

Дoчь aктёpa тeaтpa Mocт Юpия Oгyльникa, Cвeтa Бoгдaнoвa нaпиcaлa в фeйcбyк: “Пaпa yмep. Пpививкa эпивaкoм. Пoтoм 2,5 нeдeли в peaнимaции бeз пpaвa пepeпиcки. He гoвopитe ничeгo лyчшe. He cдaвaйтecь. Избeгaйтe вaкцин и бoльниц. Увoльняйтecь, нo нe кopмитe мoнcтpa.”

2

3

4

2

Immunity builds as needed. 2 I can’t take any vaccine based on my doctor’s advice and I think all positions [on vaccines] should be respected

@mashashilo1 Иммyнитeт фopмиpyeтcя пo мepe нeoбxoдимocти. Я нe пpoтив вaкцин. Mнe, нaпpимep пo пoкaзaниям нeльзя любyю вaкцинy - aллepгик, кaк дyмaeтe cкoлькo «экcпepтoв» пpишлocь выcлyшaть? Boт c тaкими cтaтьями. У мeня ecть вpaч, кoтopoгo я cлyшaю. Cчитaю нyжнo yвaжaть любyю пoзицию

1

Number of ‘highly similar’ posts

English summary

Russian

Topic ranking

Baltics

(continued)

Anti-vaccine (based on Russian vaccine)

Anti-vaccine

Neutral

Neutral

Narratives

240 5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

COVID vaccines are by 3 now not ‘experimental’, thanks to active development and testing in many countries. COVID vaccine is however most resisted among all vaccines Today a vaccine bus arrived 2 in Lasnamyae, offering Pfizer or Johnson & Johnson. Bus is stopping in more than 10 locations around the district Today a vaccine bus arrived 2 in Lasnamyae, offering Pfizer or Johnson & Johnson. Correspondent from RusDelfi talks to medical personnel about who came to be vaccinated

вaкцины oт кoвидa впpинципe yжe нe являютcя “экcпepимeнтoм”, блaгoдapя aктивнoй paзpaбoткe и тecтиpoвaнию вo мнoгиx cтpaнax миpa oднoвpeмeннo, oбoбщeннo “вaкцинa oт кoвидa” являeтcя caмoй пpoтecтиpoвaннoй вaкцинoй в миpe cpeди вcex вaкцин

Ceгoдня, 4 aвгycтa, в Лacнaмяэ пpиcтyпит к paбoтe вaкцинaциoнный aвтoбyc, гдe мoжнo бyдeт cдeлaть пpививкy oт COVID-19 вaкцинaми Pfizer или Janssen. Baкцинaциoнный aвтoбyc ocтaнoвитcя бoлee чeм в дecяти мecтax пo вceмy paйoнy и пpeдвapитeльнaя peгиc… https://t. co/o7QTKKmWUy

Ceгoдня, 4 aвгycтa, в Лacнaмяэ пpиcтyпил к paбoтe вaкцинaциoнный aвтoбyc, в кoтopoм мoжнo cдeлaть пpививкy oт COVID-19 вaкцинaми Pfizer или Janssen. Кoppecпoндeнт RusDelfi пooбщaлcя c мeдпepcoнaлoм и тeми, ктo пpишeл нa вaкцинaцию. Oкaзaлocь, чтo вa… https://t.co/oBZsRGEAOy

5

6

7

Number of ‘highly similar’ posts

English summary

Russian

Topic ranking

Baltics

(continued)

(continued)

Neutral to Pro-vaccine

Neutral to Pro-vaccine

Pro-vaccine

Narratives

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape 241

English summary The USA has sent 110 million vaccines to more than 60 middle and low income countries. Russia can’t fulfill its obligations to deliver vaccines to a single country. This is the difference between a superpower and a technologically backward failed empire trying to show off New official Ministry of Health post – you can take a different COVID-19 vaccine for your second dose Let your friend get vaccinated and choose between real vaccines. Why are you whining? I’m worried about my relatives who can only get a useless vaccine

Russian

CШA нaпpaвили 110 млн вaкцин в бoлee чeм 60 cтpaн co cpeдним и низким ypoвнeм дoxoдoв. Poccия нe мoжeт выпoлнить cвoиx oбязaтeльcтв пo пocтaвкaм вaкцины ни в oднy cтpaнy. Этим oтличaeтcя cвepxдepжaвa oт тexнoлoгичecки oтcтaлoй нeдoимпepии c пoнтaми. https://t. co/0ercOF7PMc

New post (Для втopoй дoзы вaкцины oт COVID-19 мoжнo выбpaть дpyгyю вaкцинy – Mинздpaв) has been published on https://t.co/eOes9US2fE—https://t.co/48SUVCjwDB

Taк пycть твoй дpyг пpивьётcя, дeлoв тo выбpaть мeждy нacтoящими вaкцинaми. Чтo ты вcё нoeшь? я бecпoкoюcь зa cвoиx poдныx, кoтopыe мoгyт пpивитьcя тoлькo шмypдякoм, a ты вoнь paзнocишь. https://t.co/QIMFCj9yAR

Topic ranking

8

9

10

Baltics

(continued)

2

5

2

Number of ‘highly similar’ posts

Apparently pro-Western vaccines, anti- those available locally

Neutral to pro-vaccine

Russian inferiority compared with USA

Narratives

242 5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

5.3 Analysis of Social Media Landscape

243

5.3.7 Discussion From the above tables, these notable themes and differences stand out between Russian speakers in Russia and Belarus, versus those in the Baltics: Russia and Belarus 1. Users based in Russia and Belarus use available news to support heavy emphasis of themes of ‘Russian greatness’. These themes are absent among the Baltics users (though this could be a function of the small size of the Baltics sample). 2. In one strand among the Russia/Belarus posts, the narrative of ‘Russian greatness’ is combined with a one of victimization of Russia. 3. All arguments for Russian greatness were made on the basis of Sputnik V and/or the contribution of Russian science. 4. One strand among the Russia/Belarus posts expresses a kind of national inferiority complex, seemingly that Russia is not doing as well as Western countries. Note: #1–#4 above are very much expected based on the Russian master narratives of ‘Savior of Europe’, ‘Catching up with Rivals’, and ‘Fortress Russia’ (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2018). The coexistence of Russian superiority and inferiority complexes is perhaps peculiarly Russian and points to a deep existential anxiety many Russians feel about their country, culture, and civilization. 5. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the top 10 Russia/Belarus strands express openly anti-vaccine sentiment. Some are actually pro-vaccine, while others might be called anti-anti-vaccine, expressing cynicism about Russian ‘anti-vaxxers’. 6. A key point is that pro- or anti-vaccine sentiments are very much secondary in the Russia/Belarus data to the superiority and inferiority narratives. It is clear what is most important to the Twitter users sampled. Note: cynicism is very widespread in the Russian-language Twitterverse, directed at anyone from Western individuals, countries, and organizations, to those at home. Ingrained cynicism is hard to overcome quickly through counter-maneuvers in the information environment; we believe that it can be done only over time by building trust, and so Western communicators need to establish a reputation of providing credible and useful information to Russian-speaking audiences. Some at the margins will always be convinced, and the effects will build over time. Baltic States In contrast to the Russia/Belarus users: 1. Baltics users are more neutral with regard to the vaccine. (Recall that these are the Baltics users who choose to post in Russian, so are likely ethnic Russians)

244

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

2. Discussion of the vaccine is less obscured by discussions of Russian greatness. 3. Both pro- and anti-vaccine themes are visible. In the case of the latter: • Some anti-vaccine sentiment is directed against perceived vaccine mandates, and may be based on disinformation (or actively seeking to spread disinformation) about mandates that do not exist. • Some anti-vaccine sentiment is directed specifically against Russian vaccines (e.g. Epivac) and some simultaneously appears as if it may support Western vaccines. 4. Some posts, similar to those from Russia/Belarus, reinforce the notion of the Russian inferiority complex, unfavorably comparing Russian efforts to Western ones. Note: #4 above reflects something that we have observed elsewhere in the former Soviet Union: other nationalities (such as Ukrainians) who resist and resent Russia will pick up and echo Russians’ own inferiority complex to them. This information maneuver, however, can have the perverse effect of validating Russians’ ‘zero sum’ view of Western versus Russian civilization and thus indirectly ‘feed the monster’. We view it as unhelpful. A better approach in the information environment is to acknowledge the positives specifically (of either Russian or Western viewpoints or contributions) and eschew generalizations. For those tasked with strategic communication to Russian-speaking audiences, a takeaway is that one should avoid the trap of echoing Russian inferiority complex narratives which generalize excessively.

5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications In this chapter, we have reviewed an array of threats specific to the Baltics, focusing on the threats that emanate from former Soviet republics that border the Baltic countries (specifically, Russia and its ally Belarus). We have viewed these threats through the prism of East Slavic (Russian and Belarusian) cultural norms. Further, we have focused on the how these cultural norms determine the information maneuvers typically observed in this cultural environment. We then turned to a demonstration of an analytical workflow that we think can help make sense, in a fashion true to Heuer’s vision for intelligence analysis, of a part of that information environmentnamely, the Russian-language Twitterverse. We attempted to develop this workflow in a way that remains as true as possible to the vision of (Heuer 1999) for intelligence analysis: ensuring that assumptions and biases are made as transparent as possible, kept where they belong (close to the analyst) and not buried within a technology black box.

5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Communications

245

The analytical workflow was applied to one of the areas we identified as being where information-environment threats could materialize in the current geopolitical milieu: the subject of COVID vaccines and associated disinformation and misinformation. Both our hypothesesthat (1) disinformation regarding vaccines would be observable in the Russian-language information environment, and (2) destabilizing disinformation narratives will be less prevalent in the Russian-language social media information environment within the Baltics than they are in the Russian-language social media information environment generally—were confirmed, although not entirely in an expected way. Vaccine skepticism was, contrary to expectation, observed more in the Baltics data, which there was also a significant representation of vaccine-positive and vaccineneutral sentiment. The Russia/Belarus data, on the other hand, was more cynical all round, both towards vaccines and vaccine skeptics. Arguably, cynicism is the biggest obstacle any communicators (Western or others) have to contend with in the Russian-speaking information environment. Both cynicism and ‘Russian greatness’ narratives—and even the seeming opposite of the latter, Russian inferiority narratives—are destabilizing in that they militate against Russian speakers receiving neutral, reliable, factual information. This was clearly evident in the portion of the data that came from Russia and Belarus, in that here, ‘zero sum’ ‘Russian greatness’ (or its converse) narratives distract from and drown out factual tweets by their sheer overwhelmingly large quantity—and as already mentioned, most of the remaining themes are cynical rather than factual. All this illustrates the challenge for communicators seeking to penetrate the Russian-speaking information environment with truthful, neutral information, especially information that challenges the zero-sum mentality of national greatness. We do not believe that the data itself tells us directly how a communicator can respond—to think in that way, we believe, is to get too quickly into the weeds. But this is why we also believe that this kind of analytical approach comes into its own. It is all the more important not to get drawn by the specifics of Russian narratives into responding in kind, as we think is illustrated by the error of using the ‘Russian inferiority complex’ narrative (as some attempt to within the former Soviet Union, as they try to counter Russian narratives, as mentioned earlier). It is more important to see the overall picture of what narratives exist in the space, as this can help an analyst with situational knowledge assess the nature and scale of the problem. In the end, though, cynicism is cynicism. And we believe that distrust of factual information, wherever it occurs in the world, has to be overcome in a painstaking process, over time, using the old-fashioned method of providing factual information and earning trust. Some will never be persuaded, but it may be that we have to persuade only enough of those at the margins to reach a tipping-point where a significant difference is made to our national interests.

246

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

Regarding specific recommendations and insights for strategic communication, we recapitulate the following: • As we engage and maneuver in the information environment, moral clarity is essential. We should not be shy of questioning and judging pro-Soviet or other questionable values. • In our messaging, we can reinforce the Russian greatness narrative by saying that Russia can and should strive for greatness, but also saying unapologetically that this should be only in a morally acceptable, win-win, fashion. – Related to the bullet above: we should not assume that aggressive or destabilizing acts by Russia always further Russia’s own medium- to long-term greatness. • By listening carefully to Russian messaging over time, we can and should seize on inconsistency and hypocrisy to highlight it to Russian-speaking audiences. • Adversaries seek to gain advantage by compromising allies who might otherwise have a morally compelling message; ongoing vigilance in counter-intelligence efforts and education is therefore essential. • Consistency in NATO actions, and ongoing patience and fortitude in countering aggression, are essential deterrents, and themselves send a strong strategic message. • Particular attention should be paid to large Russian-speaking and/or ethnically Russian populations in former Soviet republics. – These provide both a potential pretext for Russia to invade, and an easy target for Russian propaganda and disinformation. – The existence of such communities is however a double-edged sword: NATO can learn from the Baltics’ success, directing strategic communication to these groups in their native language. • Strategic communicators should be careful to reject the trap of false moral equivalence which is often set in Russian communications. Each case can and should be individually weighed from a moral point of view. – Related to the bullet above: Western communication should avoid the trap of echoing Russian inferiority complex narratives which generalize excessively. • Cynicism is likely the main obstacle communicators face in the Russian-speaking community. Western communicators should accept that: – It will take time to overcome cynicism and this should be done by consistently and patiently providing credible and useful information to Russian speakers. – Only some at the margins may be persuaded—but that persuading those at the margins may be all that is necessary.

References

247

References Amnesty International. 2015. Crimea: One year on from annexation; critics harassed, attacked and silenced. March 18. Accessed July 29, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/ crimea-annexation-critics-attacked-and-silenced/. Associated Press. 1993. Crane removes last Lenin statue in former Baltics with AM-Russia-Lenin. Associated Press, December 21. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/c27f06c73 ce1709b50d1dc559cb9f47d. ———. 2021. Ryanair CEO says diverted flight had to land in Belarus. Associated Press, June 15. Accessed July 28, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/government-and-politics-europe-belarusbusiness-fa9c2ee322252c0be6cd4fa295546dd7. Atlantic Council. 2021. Russia, cybercrime, and a new phase in US-Russian cybersecurity. July 22. Accessed July 27, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDoXnY81jq4. BBC. 2007. Tallinn tense after deadly riots. BBC News, April 28. Accessed July 16, 2021. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602171.stm. ———. 2019. Berlin Chechen shooting: Russian assassination suspected. BBC News, August 27. Accessed July 20, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49483090. ———. 2021. Vitaly Shishov: Belarus dissidents who disappeared and died. BBC News, August 3. Accessed August 4, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58079461. Beissinger, Mark. 2009. Civil resistance and power politics: The experience of non-violent action from Gandhi to the present. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Belta.by. 2021. Lukashenko instructs security officials to close every meter of border-BELTA.BY. The Tribune, August 6. Accessed August 6, 2021. https://www.thetribune.com/lukashenka-ins tructs-security-officials-to-close-every-meter-of-border-belta-by/. Beskow, David M., and Kathleen M. Carley. 2019. Social cybersecurity: An emerging national security requirement. Military Review, March–April: 118–127. Accessed August 17, 2021. https:// apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1108494.pdf. Bolt, Neville (ed.). 2021. How did the Nordic-Baltic countries handle the first wave of COVID-19? Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. Accessed July 23, 2021. https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/cuploads/pfiles/Nato-Covid19-Nordic-Baltic.pdf. Bugai, D.A., V.M. Shestopalov, Y.F. Rudenko, I.P. Onischenko, I.P. Gudzenko, and V.N. Bublyas. 1997. Effects of the Chernobyl accident on radioactive contamination of groundwater utliized for water supply. International Atomic Energy Agency, 349–356. Accessed July 26, 2021. https:// inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/013/29013419.pdf?r=1. Chew, Peter. 2015. ‘Linguistics-lite’ topic extraction from multilingual social media data. In Social computing, behavioral-cultural modeling, and prediction Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 9021, 276–282. Clackson, James. 2007. Indo-European linguistics, an introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coalson, Robert. 2009. Behind the Estonia cyberattacks. Radio Free Europe, March 6. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyberattacks/1505613.html. Cook, Lorne. 2020. NATO agrees nerve agent used to try to kill Russia’s Navalny. Associated Press, September 4. Accessed July 20, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/international-news-eur ope-8b10323d2ed0e88c2f48ccd0bf6bf73e. Cooley, Alexander. 2017. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 30. Accessed August 10, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/30/whose-rules-whose-sphere-russian-gov ernance-and-influence-in-post-soviet-states-pub-71403. 2015. Putin’s Way. Directed by Neil Docherty. Produced by PBS Frontline. Accessed July 28, 2021. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/putins-way/transcript/. Eesti Rahvusringhääling. 2016. Пyтин нaзвaл “бpeдoм” cпeкyляции o нaмepeнии Poccии зaвoeвaть cтpaны Бaлтии. Eesti Rahvusringhääling, September 5. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://rus.err.ee/234227/putin-nazval-bredom-spekuljacii-o-namerenii-rossii-zavoevatstrany-baltii.

248

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

———. 2019. Kohver released and back in Estonia. Eesti Rahvusringhääling, September 26. Accessed July 20, 2021. https://news.err.ee/116833/kohver-released-and-back-in-estonia. Eurasianet. 2019. State television’s influence over Russians is slipping—Report. Accessed July 23, 2021. https://eurasianet.org/state-televisions-influence-over-russians-is-slipping-report. European Commission. 2021. Statement by Commissioner Simson on the Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus. June 2. Accessed July 21, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commis sioners/2019-2024/simson/announcements/statement-commissioner-simson-astravets-nuclearpower-plant-belarus_en. European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group. 2018. EU peer review report of the Belarus Stress Test. Accessed July 21, 2021. http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/hlg_p201836_155_belarus_stress_test_peer_review_report_0.pdf. Federal Bureau of Investigation. n.d. Transnational organized crime. FBI.gov. Accessed August 13, 2021. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime. Guzel, Mehmet, and Andrews Wilks. 2020. Turkey threatens to let refugees into Europe as violence escalates in Syria. PBS News Hour, February 28. Accessed July 23, 2021. https://www.pbs.org/ newshour/world/turkey-threatens-to-let-refugees-into-europe-as-violence-escalates-in-syria. Heintz, Jim, and Jill Lawless. 2018. Russian suspects in poisoning: We were in UK as tourists. Associated Press, September 13. Accessed July 20, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/moscowsergei-skripal-ap-top-news-alexander-petrov-international-news-0681389125dd4ec1ae3878cf b7532c5f. Heuer, Richard. 1999. Psychology of intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Accessed July 29, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/static/9a5f1162fd0932c29bfed1c030edf4ae/Pys chology-of-Intelligence-Analysis.pdf. Hodges, LTG (Ret.) Ben, Janusz Bugajski, and Peter B. Doran. 2018. Securing the Suwałki corridor. Center for European Policy Analysis. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://cepa.org/cepa_files/2018CEPA-report-Securing_The_Suwa%C5%82ki_Corridor.pdf. Kimbrough, Shane, Interview by Stephen Clark. 2021. Spaceflight now interveiws international space station astronauts, May 16. Accessed August 4, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=iERJK8znhmI. Kremlin. 2020. Law establishing criminal liability for destruction or damage of military burial sites and monuments to defenders of the Fatherland. April 7. Accessed July 22, 2021. http://en.kre mlin.ru/acts/news/63163. Lietuvos Respublika. 2011. Gyventojai pagal tautyb˛e, gimt˛aj˛a kalb˛a ir tikyb˛a: Lietuvos Respublikos 2011 met˛u visuotinio gyventoj˛u ir b¯ust˛u surašymo rezultatai. Oficialiosios statistikos portalas. Accessed July 22, 2021. https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/Gyv_kalba_ tikyba.pdf/1d9dac9a-3d45-4798-93f5-941fed00503f. LRT. 2020. Lithuanian president shuns meeting with Baltic counterparts. LRT English, June 25. Accessed July 23, 2021. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1191760/lithuanian-pre sident-shuns-meeting-with-baltic-counterparts. McGuinness, Damien. 2017. How a cyber attack transformed Estonia. BBC News, April 27. Accessed July 27, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. 2004. Soviet mass deportations from Latvia. Accessed July 27, 2021. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/development-co-operation/789-bri efing-papers/5260-soviet-mass-deportations-from-latvia. Mueller, Robert S. 2019. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed July 27, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/ archives/sco/file/1373816/download. NATO Stratcom. 2019. Hybrid threats: 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Accessed July 28, 2021. https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/cup loads/pfiles/cyber_attacks_estonia.pdf.

References

249

NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. 2021. Georgia’s information environment through the lens of Russia’s influence. Stratcomcoe.org, ed. James McMillan El¯ına LangeIonatamišvili. July 27. Accessed August 10, 2021. https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/cuploads/ pfiles/Georgias-information-environment-through-the-lens-of-Russias-infulence.pdf. Nimmo, Ben. 2015. Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia’s propaganda machine works, and how to counter it. Stopfake.org. May 19. Accessed August 17, 2021. https://www.stopfake.org/en/ anatomy-of-an-info-war-how-russia-s-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington, DC., April 4. Accessed July 30, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2019. Lithuania: Country report. Accessed July 9, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/economics/ pdf/Lithuania%20report.pdf. Owen, Sir Robert. 2016. The Litvinenko inquiry: Report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko. Accessed July 20, 2021. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20160613090753/ https:/www.litvinenkoinquiry.org/files/Litvinenko-Inquiry-Report-web-version.pdf. Papaioannou, Alexandros. 2019. Strengthening EU-NATO relations. NATO Review, July 16. Accessed July 21, 2021. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/07/16/strengtheningeu-nato-relations/index.html. Paparinskis, Martins. 2018. Political and electoral rights of noncitizen residents in Latvia and Estonia. European Parliament. Accessed July 22, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg Data/etudes/BRIE/2018/604953/IPOL_BRI(2018)604953_EN.pdf. Pilson¯ıbas un migr¯acijas lietu p¯arvalde. 2021. Latvijas iedz¯ıvot¯aju sadal¯ıjums p¯ec valstisk¯as pieder¯ıbas. Latvian Open Data Portal. Accessed July 22, 2021. https://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/ media/2889/download. Pipes, Richard. 1996. The unknown Lenin. New Haven: Yale University Press. Putin, Vladimir, interview by Luciano Fontana. 2015. Vladimir Putin, interview to the Italian newspaper «Il Corriere della Sera» Corriere della Sera, (June 7). Accessed August 3, 2021. https://www.corriere.it/english/15_giugno_07/vladimir-putin-interview-to-the-italiannewspaper-corriere-sera-44c5a66c-0d12-11e5-8612-1eda5b996824.shtml. Regnum.ru. 2005. Bлaдимиp Пyтин: Pacпaд CCCP—кpyпнeйшaя гeoпoлитичecкaя кaтacтpoфa вeкa. regnum, April 25. Accessed September 21, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/444083.html. Reuters. 2021. Russia, Belarus to press ahead with military drills criticised by Ukraine. August 5. Accessed August 6, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-belarus-press-aheadwith-military-drills-criticised-by-ukraine-2021-08-05/. Soviet Goverment. 1940. Кapмaнный aтлac CCCP. 11-e изд.—Лeнингpaд: ГУГК пpи CHК CCCP, 1940. Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR. 39. State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Defence Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of National Defence. 2021. National threat assessment. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-EN-el_.pdf. Statista. 2021. Do you approve of the activities of Vladimir Putin as the president (prime minister) of Russia? July 29. Accessed July 29, 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putinapproval-rating-russia/. Statistikaamet. 2018. RV0222U: Rahvastik Soo, Rahvuse Ja Maakonna Järgi. Accessed July 22, 2021. https://andmed.stat.ee/et/stat/rahvastik__rahvastikunaitajad-ja-koosseis__rahvaarvja-rahvastiku-koosseis/RV0222U. Sytas, Andrius. 2021. Lithuania toughens Belarus border with razor wire to bar migrants. Reuters, July 14. Accessed July 26, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-begins-bui lding-barrier-border-with-belarus-block-migrants-2021-07-09/. TASS. 2021. Пyтин нaзвaл pacшиpeниe HATO нa вocтoк глaвнoй пpичинoй pocтa взaимнoгo нeдoвepия в Eвpoпe. TASS, June 22. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://tass.ru/politika/11713609. Troianovski, Anton, and Megan Specia. 2021. Missing Belarusian activist is found dead in park in Ukraine. New York Times, August 3. Accessed August 4, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/ 08/03/world/europe/belarus-activist-dead-kyiv.html.

250

5 The Baltic Region Information Environment

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 2018. Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for national security. govinfo.gov. January 10. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-115SPRT28110/pdf/CPRT115SPRT28110.pdf. Vardys, V. Stanley. 1966. How the Baltic republics fare in the Soviet Union. Foreign Affairs 44 (3): 512–517. Accessed July 27, 2021. https://doi.org/10.2307/20039184. Välisluureamet. 2021. International security and Estonia. Estonian foreign intelligence service. Accessed July 16, 2021. https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2021-en.pdf. Volkov, Denis, and Stepan Goncharov. 2019. Poccийcкий мeдиa-лaндшaфт 2019. Levada Center. Accessed July 23, 2021. https://www.levada.ru/2019/08/01/21088/. Mиниcтepcтвo инocтpaнныx дeл Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции. 2016. Кoнцeпция внeшнeй пoлитики Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции (yтвepждeнa Пpeзидeнтoм Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции B .B. Пyтиным 30 нoябpя 2016 г.). Mиниcтepcтвo инocтpaнныx дeл Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции. December 1. Accessed August 13, 2021. https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_docume nts/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. Mиниcтepcтвo инocтpaнныx дeл Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции. 2003. Пepeчeнь ocнoвныx пpeтeнзий и peкoмeндaций мeждyнapoдныx opгaнизaций и нпo к лaтвии пo пpaвaм нaциoнaльныx мeньшинcтв. Accessed July 22, 2021. https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/hum anitarian_cooperation/-/asset_publisher/bB3NYd16mBFC/content/id/492850.

Chapter 6

Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

Fig. 6.1 Gog and Magog, as portrayed in the Royal Arcade, Melbourne, Australia. Photo by John O’Neill, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gog%26Magog-1,-Royal-Arc ade,-Melb,-11.08.2008.jpg, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA-3.0-migrated

Abstract ‘First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.’ This quotation, attributed (but maybe misattributed) to Mahatma Gandhi, neatly demonstrates the facets of a ‘fringe’ belief or theory. Copernicus’s heliocentric model of the Solar System was, at one point, a fringe belief in the sense that it was not widely held. Indeed, Galileo was subjected to an Inquisition by the Catholic Church which concluded that heliocentrism was heretical since it allegedly contradicted the Bible. Today, Copernicanism has become uncontroversial; indeed, mainstream (including Catholic and other mainstream religious) thought has no trouble simultaneously holding in mind the concept of a Solar System in which the Sun is at the center, but also a galaxy in which the Sun is not at the center. It turned out © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_6

251

252

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

that Copernicus was onto something. More recently, QAnon has emerged as another fringe belief (or perhaps more properly, a loose collection of beliefs), in the sense that the QAnon idea of a coming ‘Great Awakening’ is held to only outside the mainstream. But it should be emphasized that just because Copernicanism became mainstream, it does not follow that QAnon will. QAnon’s ‘Great Awakening’ may never happen, and as a result QAnon followers may be forced either to abandon their beliefs or continually reinterpret their ‘prophecies’ and methods of making sense of the world to hold onto their beliefs. The point is that not all fringe beliefs are necessarily equally valid. ‘Fringe’ does not mean ‘false’, and not all fringe beliefs become mainstream. To paraphrase Martin Luther King, the arc of the moral universe may be long, but we think it bends towards truth. Comparing and contrasting further, we see that QAnon is perceived as dangerous today, perhaps much as Copernicanism was once perceived as a danger to mainstream mores. But perceptions can be accurate in one instance and inaccurate in another. Doubtless, QAnon contributed towards the real-world events of the January 6, 2021 Capitol insurrection, threatening American democracy. We are not aware of any such threat that ever materialized from Copernicanism, despite the Catholic hierarchy’s worries. What all fringe beliefs do have in common, however, is that because they reside outside the mainstream, they may be missed by those who are tasked to monitor the information environment. The point is that significant movements that are taking shape, whether they are potentially dangerous, prescient, or transformational, may be unintentionally ignored. Any movement, whether premised on false beliefs or true ones, dangerous ones or innocuous ones, can turn out to be one of which policymakers might have wanted to have advance warning. In this chapter, our goal is to help remedy this by considering how current computational linguistics and analytics techniques can be applied either as a mechanism to discover previously unknown anomalies on the fringes, or to investigate known fringe beliefs. We draw from recent literature on the use of language in ‘cults’ (also understood as ranging on a continuum from, perhaps even useful, to harmless, to destructive). We also draw upon and start from personal experience, looking at a fringe theory we were once exposed to which may claim to say something about post-Soviet reintegration. We use this as a springboard for a case study to demonstrate new methods and techniques for analytical tradecraft.

6.1 Fringe Narratives: An Illustrative Example Involving Russia and Its Eurasian Ambitions The word of the Lord came to me: “Son of man, set your face toward Gog, of the land of Magog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal, and prophesy against him and say, Thus says the Lord God: Behold, I am against you, O Gog, chief prince of Meshech and Tubal. And I will turn you about and put hooks into your jaws, and I will bring you out, and all your army, horses and horsemen, all of them clothed in full armor, a great host, all of them with buckler and shield, wielding swords. Persia, Cush, and Put are with them, all of them with

6.1 Fringe Narratives: An Illustrative Example Involving Russia and Its …

253

shield and helmet; Gomer and all his hordes; Beth-togarmah from the uttermost parts of the north with all his hordes—many peoples are with you. “Be ready and keep ready, you and all your hosts that are assembled about you, and be a guard for them. After many days you will be mustered. In the latter years you will go against the land that is restored from war, the land whose people were gathered from many peoples upon the mountains of Israel, which had been a continual waste. Its people were brought out from the peoples and now dwell securely, all of them. You will advance, coming on like a storm. You will be like a cloud covering the land, you and all your hordes, and many peoples with you.” (Ezekiel 38:1–9)

The year was 1993, and I (Chew) had just finished my undergraduate course in Russian and Polish language and literature at the University of London. At that point, I had never spent any significant time in the United States and had no connection to the USA, except a friendship with a young woman who was to become my wife a few years later. I decided that year to spend my summer vacation volunteering at an evangelical summer camp in upstate New York. As gatekeeper and messenger, I often found I had time on my hands, sitting in the booth at the gate or waiting for the next message to deliver. So, I gravitated towards the camp bookstore. I would loiter there, picking up titles such as ‘Why America Doesn’t Work: How the Decline of the Work Ethic is Hurting Your Family and Future – and What You Can Do’ (Colson and Eckerd 1991). It was as if a whole new world opened up to me. In retrospect, I was somewhat primed by my experience two years before, in 1990–1991, living in the Soviet Union and rubbing shoulders with Soviet Baptists who were heavily influenced by American evangelicalism. But never before had anyone explained to me in my own language why abortion was a sin, or what the work ethic had to do with Christianity, or why the welfare state might degrade a nation spiritually and cause (or be caused by) the breakup of the nuclear family. Things of that sort weren’t really discussed in either the British mainline Protestant (Anglican) or evangelical circles I had known until then, even though, in those circles, the Bible was held (at least in the evangelical circles) to be the inerrant Word of God, hard work might have been held up as a virtue, and sex outside marriage and murder, as sins.1 But the idea that the Bible might have something to say about issues I had thought of purely political (like abortion policy or the welfare state) was new to me. Towards the end of the camp, we were each asked to recount something that had particularly affected us over the summer, and I brought up ‘Why America Doesn’t Work’. I remember it elicited some laughter that this would be what a British volunteer would pick to mention. As I described to the group, what struck me about ‘Why 1

Even in these questions, there are interesting points of difference between West and East. Sometimes, cultural assumptions are so ingrained that when differences are revealed through conversation, the result can be jarring to the extent it forces one to re-evaluate very fundamental assumptions. The author Peter Chew became aware in the 1990s that a significant strand of thought among Soviet evangelicals assumes, based on Matthew 19:5, that sexual relations between a man and woman outside marriage are an oxymoron as much as a sin. (This viewpoint does not however deny that adultery is a sin.) This point of difference is one which could have major implications for the structuring of an entire society within the context of the society’s cultural values.

254

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

America Doesn’t Work’ was also its, one might say, ‘prophetic’ nature – explaining the ills and destiny of an entire nation, should that nation not ‘repent of its wicked ways’. I had thought before that that sort of thing would be limited to the ancient world, perhaps to the nation of Israel, not relevant or applicable to today. I think this aspect of ‘Why America Doesn’t Work’ also fascinated me because of my then-recent experience living in the USSR at a cataclysmic time for the country— the very last year of its existence. It was a time when ordinary Soviet people had ceased to believe in Communist or socialist ideology and were desperately searching for something to replace that ideology. It was also a time when criminality was greatly on the increase, the economy was falling apart (the exchange rate went from 10 roubles to the dollar to 100 while I was there), there were shortages, ration cards (I was issued my own ration cards), conspiracy theories (a psychic [экcтpaceнc] called Kashpirovsky had a regular TV show which was much publicized in Russia). In short, to any objective observer—and the Russians living there—the country was falling apart, and I was shocked, having grown up in a politically and economically stable Western country. How could this happen, and if it could happen in the Soviet Union, could it happen in my then home country, Great Britain? Could it happen in the United States? ‘Why America Doesn’t Work’ seemed to offer answers I had not considered before. But ‘Why America Doesn’t Work’ wasn’t the only book I picked up that summer. Another book, ‘The Beginning of the End’ (LaHaye 1991) was even more shocking to me in its claims. Newly challenged in the idea that adherence or otherwise by a modern nation to the Bible’s precepts might determine the course of that nation, I was given even more to chew on when LaHaye spelled out how chapters 38 and 39 of the book of Ezekiel might refer to a literal, future attack on Israel by Russia—the country whose language I had been studying for 7 years—and its allies. In these two chapters, Ezekiel foresees how ‘Gog of the land of Magog’ (Fig. 6.1) will come from the north ‘after many days’ and ‘in the latter years’ (the exact timeframe is not specified), along with many other nations, to the ‘mountains of Israel’ to attack a nation ‘gathered from many nations’ and now ‘dwelling securely’. The chapters heavily emphasize the military heft involved in the attack. But God intervenes and puts a stop to it, ‘summoning a sword’ against Gog, entering into judgment against him ‘with pestilence and bloodshed’, raining ‘torrential rains and hailstones, fire and sulfur’ upon ‘him and his hordes’. To shift the focus from Ezekiel to LaHaye’s interpretation of Ezekiel, I now had to contend with the idea that specific Biblical prophecies might have a literal fulfillment in the future, an idea I had never encountered before in this way, either in the United Kingdom or in Russia, except perhaps in relation to Israel itself. LaHaye went through the nations listed in Ezekiel 38 and drew a connection with each, with varying degrees of certainty, to modern nations. One of his least controversial associations, perhaps, was Persia with Iran. LaHaye supported equating Magog with Russia partly on the basis of the linguistic similarity of ‘Meshech’/‘Moscow’ and ‘Tubal’/‘Tobolsk’ (which I also found fascinating, having just completed courses on

6.1 Fringe Narratives: An Illustrative Example Involving Russia and Its …

255

Comparative Slavic Philology2 ), and partly on the basis of the writings of the firstcentury Jewish historian Josephus, who writes: ‘Magog founded those that from him were named Magogites, but who are by the Greeks called Scythians’ (Josephus AD 93) and other sources localizing settlement of the tribe of Magog to the north of the Black Sea (see, for example, the inscription just north-west of the Caspian Sea in Fig. 6.2). LaHaye also supported his contention that ‘Magog’ might refer to Russia based on the indicia in the text of Ezekiel itself, such as the phrase describing where Magog comes from as ‘the uttermost parts of the north’ (Ezekiel 38, verses 6 and 15) (points of the compass in the Bible are often by reference to Jerusalem, and Moscow is almost directly north of Jerusalem, with no other country more northerly). While I did not know it at the time, the type of Biblical interpretation that LaHaye was setting out was an example of Christian dispensationalism, the idea that God has different epochs or ‘dispensations’ for humanity: for example, the epoch before Israel was a nation, the dispensation of the nation of Israel, and the dispensation of the Church Age. This has some similarities to supersessionism, a doctrine among some Christians (and more characteristic of Catholicism) that the Church has replaced Israel in God’s plan, and that Jewishness now therefore means nothing (Fig. 6.3). Supersessionism has understandably been associated in the eyes of the Jewish community with anti-Semitism; but dispensationalists, LaHaye almost certainly included, would hold to the concept of a critical role in the ‘end times’ for Israel and the Jewish people in defeating evil. Indeed, the fact that LaHaye has promulgated the idea that Ezekiel 38 and 39 prophesy a future attack by Russia on Israel, which fails because of divine intervention, is consistent with that idea. As we think about fringe beliefs and theories, though, the key aspect of importance in this example is the powerful notion, shared at least by LaHaye and other dispensationalists, that Biblical prophecies from as much as 2500 years ago can relate not just to the ancient world, but also to the present or future. If God has dispensations of importance other than his dealings with ancient Israel, after all, then it would make sense that, in the eyes of believers, God’s inerrant word might still have something to say about dispensations present or future. To the twenty-three-year-old version of myself, not accustomed in any of my ‘mainstream’ British experience to such ways of thinking, this was what was so novel. I suspect it may also be novel to some who may read this, yet it is (I think) critical in understanding why exactly such fringe theories are powerful. Put the authority 2

The quote ‘In etymology vowels are nothing, and consonants next to nothing’, widely misattributed, apparently, to Voltaire, implies that words in diverse languages sharing the same etymology are more likely to be recognizable by their consonants than their vowels. An example is Latin ‘mater’/English ‘mother’/French ‘mère’/Russian ‘мaть’ (mat’), all derived from the hypothesized Proto-Indo-European wordform *méh2 t¯er. The purported Voltaire quote may be more correctly attributed to Antoine Court de Gébelin, who wrote in a book on the origin of language: ‘SIXIÉME PRINCIPE. Les voyelles ne sont rien dans la comparaison des mots’ (Court de Gébelin 1775 [reprinted 2018]). LaHaye’s hypothesis about ‘Meshech’/‘Moscow’/Russian ‘Moskva’ and ‘Tubal’/‘Tobolsk’ is therefore at least linguistically plausible, even if hard to prove or disprove conclusively.

256

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

Fig. 6.2 ‘The World as known to the Hebrews’ (Coleman 1854); public domain image

6.1 Fringe Narratives: An Illustrative Example Involving Russia and Its …

257

Fig. 6.3 An example from Twitter of modern Polish/Catholic supersessionism. The text, by a Polish priest, associates ‘healthy Polish nationalism’ with ‘hatred of the Talmud and Freemasonry’

of ‘inerrant word of God’ together with applications to today and tomorrow, and one has an explosive mix. And again, by saying such ideas or interpretations are fringe, we are not necessarily taking a position on whether there is any basis to the ideas, or whether they are dangerous. We can also logically say (to paraphrase Yoda who, in Star Wars, described a ‘prophecy that misread could have been’) that an interpretation is false while not denying what it is that is being interpreted. All these require a separate discussion. Back to the present discussion, though: by calling the ideas fringe, we are saying no more than that the ideas are outside the mainstream. Interestingly, although LaHaye’s ideas may still be fringe in the grand scheme of American thought, and had not been encountered by me before I picked up his book, they are also not limited to American evangelicalism (another example of which was Ronald Reagan’s appearing to have subscribed to similar views [Lee 2017]). These ideas have simmered across cultures and nations for centuries. An 18th-century prophecy (if it can be called that) by a Lithuanian rabbi known as ‘The Vilna Gaon’ gained new steam in 2014, at the time of the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. The Israeli news outlet Haaretz reported another rabbi stated that he was ‘privy to a closely guarded secret handed down from the 18th Century Vilna Gaon through generations of revered rabbis: “When you hear that the Russians have captured the city of Crimea, you should know that the times of the Messiah have started, that his steps are being heard. And when you hear that the Russians have reached the city of Constantinople (today’s Istanbul), you should put on your Shabbat clothes and don’t take them off, because it means that the Messiah is about to

258

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

come any minute”’ (Haaretz 2014).3 References to Ezekiel 38–39 and its application to modern-day Russia are also to be found here and there, for example, in Russianlanguage social media; a quick search in Russian on September 13, 2021 turned up various results. Some of these were from evangelical Christian sources, inter alia, in Ukraine. (Perhaps, in Ukraine, there is more incentive than there is in Russia to look for authoritative narratives casting Russia in the role of Magog, who according to Ezekiel, will receive his comeuppance for militaristic geopolitical ambitions, in the form of divine intervention and retribution.) Echoes of Gog and Magog can be heard even in mainstream Russian thought. The 20th-century Soviet/Russian writer Aleksandr Blok, well-known in Russia, composed a poem ‘The Scythians’ (Cкифы) (Блoк 1918) in which he links the Russian nation with the Scythians, using language redolent not just of Ezekiel’s depictions of militaristic might but also of ‘Russian greatness’, ‘Russia, Savior of Europe’, ‘Eurasian Bridge’, and ‘Catching up with Rivals’ master narratives one might hear today from Russian President Vladimir Putin or other Russian nationalists (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2018). Blok’s poem is worth reading in its entirety, but here are a few noteworthy examples: • ‘Try to fight with us! // Yes, we are the Scythians! We are Asians! // With voracious slit eyes!’ (Пoпpoбyйтe, cpaзитecь c нaми! Дa, cкифы—мы! Дa, aзиaты—мы // C pacкocыми и жaдными oчaми!) • ‘We’ve held a shield between two hostile races— // The Mongols and Europe!’ (Дepжaли щит мeж двyx вpaждeбныx pac // Moнгoлoв и Eвpoпы!) • ‘For centuries you have looked East, // Digging out and melting our pearls, // And you, in mockery, were just counting down the time, // When you would point the gun at us!’ (Bы coтни лeт глядeли нa Bocтoк // Кoпя и плaвя нaши пepлы, // И вы, глyмяcь, cчитaли тoлькo cpoк, // Кoгдa нacтaвить пyшeк жepлa!) • ‘Look, the time has come. Disaster beats its wings. // And each day adds to our offense’ (Boт—cpoк нacтaл. Кpылaми бьeт бeдa, // И кaждый дeнь oбиды мнoжит) • ‘We love raw flesh, its taste and color. // And its sultry, deathly smell… // So are we to blame if your skeleton crackles // In our heavy, tender paws?’ (Mы любим плoть—и вкyc ee, и цвeт, // И дyшный, cмepтный плoти зaпax… // Bинoвны ль мы, кoль xpycтнeт вaш cкeлeт // B тяжeлыx, нeжныx нaшиx лaпax?)

3

The title of the Haaretz article points to an equating of Crimea with Magog—clearly not the same as the idea that the Russians or east Slavs are the modern-day descendants of Magog—and perhaps reflecting an unstated conflation of a people and territory occupied by that people. The Haaretz title also refers to the identification of Putin as Gog. Ezekiel 38 refers to Gog as a ‘prince’ over Magog, clearly some kind of leader. But clearly neither Ezekiel nor the eighteenth-century Vilna Gaon mentioned Putin by name. Just as Ronald Reagan showed recency bias in his interpretation of Ezekiel (see page 19), Haaretz and rabbis of the Putin era may be doing the same. There is also the logical possibility that the Gog Ezekiel had in mind was not a human prince at all, but a prince of the sort hinted at in Daniel 10:13 and Ephesians 6:12, which would fit with our conception of Russia’s secular failings as having long-standing explanations in the culture. Under this interpretation, any recency bias could be beside the point.

6.1 Fringe Narratives: An Illustrative Example Involving Russia and Its …

259

• ‘We are used to grabbing the bridle of proud, prancing horses’ (Пpивыкли мы, xвaтaя пoд yздцы // Игpaющиx кoнeй peтивыx) • ‘We shall part with comely Europe. // Instead, we will turn to you our Asian countenance!’ (Пepeд Eвpoпoю пpигoжeй // Paccтyпимcя! Mы oбepнeмcя к вaм // Cвoeю aзиaтcкoй poжeй!) It is interesting to compare the elements of Ezekiel’s narrative as interpreted by LaHaye with those in Blok’s poem; really, the key difference is the absence in Blok of the ironic turn of fate that befalls the militaristic protagonist—the divine retribution for having the temerity and hubris to attack Israel. Just as it may be convenient for Ukrainians, sore at the annexation of their territory by Russia, to invoke the ‘Magog = Russia’ narrative, it might be convenient in Russian culture to appropriate only parts of that narrative—the parts that fit with existing Russian master narratives and amplify Russian greatness. (And this is not necessarily to say, of course, that Blok was even aware of interpretations like the Vilna Gaon’s or LaHaye’s, let alone consciously borrowing elements from such interpretations.) To return for a moment to the theme of the power of narratives, particularly those derived from Scriptural text that forms the backdrop or even fabric of a culture (the Bible is, of course, basically the same for both Western Protestantism and Russian Orthodoxy): what we are pointing out is essentially the same as the insight of Halverson et al. (2011), which is that Scriptural narratives are perhaps the most powerful in any culture. In addition to being transcultural, for believers, they carry the authority of the Word of God: The Qur’an… is the most sacred text of Islam. Muslims believe that the Qur’an is the divinely preserved Speech of God… [the Qur’an] carries profound persuasive power that often surpasses the content or apparent meanings of the text being conveyed.’ (ibid., pp. 2–3)

In this respect, the notion that ‘Russia = Magog’ is similar in some ways to the example adduced by Halverson et al. (ibid.) in which demonstrators in Egypt during the Arab Spring called Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ‘Pharaoh’. The one word ‘Pharaoh’ is distinctive enough to invoke a whole Scriptural narrative (which happens to exist in both the Qur’an and the Bible) of the ancient Egyptian leader-tyrant who would not let the people of Israel go, and who, in the end, faced divine retribution just as Magog does. ‘Mubarak = Pharaoh’ is, in effect, convenient shorthand—especially considering that Mubarak and Pharaoh are or were both leaders of Egypt—to imply that Mubarak is also a tyrant and may also face a fate similar to that of Pharaoh, swallowed up and drowned in the sea in hot pursuit of the Israelites. But given the nature of dispensationalist (and similar) thinking, ‘Russia = Magog’ may carry even more power than ‘Mubarak = Pharaoh’, in that the invocation of the given master narrative in the Russian case, though Magog is less well-known than Pharaoh, implies the literal future fulfillment of a fate prophesied by God, and to be suffered by Russia. To Ukrainians concerned about Russian military might, for example, it could also offer a convenient explanation for why Russia cannot be humanly resisted: Russia is being prepared, drawn out ‘with hooks in its jaws’, for the end of days. ‘Russia = Magog’ does not deny the ‘Russian military greatness’ narrative promulgated by Russian nationalists: it actually builds upon it, just with a

260

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

twist at the end. For the believer, it could also throw a new light on, for example, efforts of Russia to further reintegration with other Soviet states—the subject of this chapter. LaHaye hinted indirectly at the fact that the Soviet Union was a ‘brotherhood of nations’ (бpaтcтвo нapoдoв), a phrase still often invoked cynically by citizens of the former USSR, and sometimes also cynically modified to ‘тюpьмa нapoдoв’, prison for the nations—implying that the 14 republics besides Russia were coerced into Soviet membership. For the believer, invocation of the Magog master narrative both explains that coercion of other nations may simply be in Russia’s nature (the word of God fates it to be so), but also at the same time offers reassurance that all is under control and justice will nevertheless be meted out. And the importance cannot be overstated that any of these narratives built on Scriptural texts will, to hearers persuaded of both the infallibility of the Scripture and the appropriateness of the interpretation, be more than just a narrative—they will be truth itself. An observer who doubts the truth either of the Scripture or of its interpretation must still not underestimate the power for the true believer in having the narrative invoked, even if the narrative appears to the observer to be fringe. We start this chapter with the fringe Magog narrative—as well as close counterparts in Russian literature and elsewhere—realizing that it is likely to seem outlandish to many readers. But we introduce the narrative for two important reasons, one analytical and one technical. The analytical reason is that even if taken only as metaphor or analogy, the narrative may still have some explanatory power—in this case, to understand facets of the Russian national psyche. This usage of a narrative would be similar to what we have envisioned for computational social models, which can be useful even when they do not make literal predictions: Using a model in a constructivist fashion is to use it in an explanatory rather than a predictive way. The model-as-metaphor approach can lead to creative moments but can be personally and institutionally highly disruptive so it is most useful in an environment open to change, and where conditions are recognized to be highly fluid… In short, to use a model as an advisor is to use it to provide input to a particular decision. To use a model as a metaphor is to use it to either further the user’s understanding of the target system, or as a means to stimulate creative thinking. And, of course, any engagement with a model usually involves some combination of both. (Turnley et al. 2012)

The other reason we introduce the Magog narrative, though, is as a specific and vivid instance of a fringe narrative or belief. Our goal later (in Sect. 6.4) will be to look at how fringe beliefs can be computationally analyzed, and this particular narrative will serve to make the discussion more concrete. To reiterate, though: whether or not this narrative is outlandish is somewhat beside the point for our discussion. Any detached observer can and should mentally separate the questions of (1) the nature of the narrative, (2) the truth of the narrative, and (3) the power of the narrative for existing believers or new recruits. A decision-maker may want to know about any narrative taking shape—including those that seem outlandish—and our goal in this chapter is to provide specific computational ways (ways in which we have now

6.2 The ‘Brotherhood of Nations’: A Historical Pattern, Not an Anomaly

261

created rights for the US Government4 ) that can help this objective to be reached. But first, we will focus on a fringe narrative surrounding Russia which has foundations in Russian history and outworking in contemporary thought and actions, and has perhaps already had far-reaching geopolitical consequences for the Western world.

6.2 The ‘Brotherhood of Nations’: A Historical Pattern, Not an Anomaly As already noted, the phrase ‘brotherhood of nations’ (бpaтcтвo нapoдoв) originated in the Soviet era—a Soviet precursor, perhaps, to the Western liberal ideal of multiculturalism. Soviet propaganda portrayed this as a harmonious brotherhood of the many different nationalities of the Soviet Union. For example, a Soviet propaganda poster which displayed ethnic representatives of all the fifteen Soviet republics hand-in-hand, walking presumably towards the bright Soviet future, had the caption: ‘Long live the united, powerful Soviet Union, created by the will of its peoples!’ (Дa здpaвcтвyeт coздaнный вoлeй нapoдoв eдиный мoгyчий Coвeтcкий Coюз!). Though memories of Soviet rule and ideology inevitably fade with time, this connection between modern European multiculturalism and the Soviet concept of the ‘brotherhood of nations’ still surfaces from time to time in Eastern Europe. Around the time of the European migrant crisis, a Polish blogger, for example, wrote in a 2015 post, hosted on a conservative/Catholic web site (fronda.pl) and entitled ‘Will Europe see a slaughter of the Muslim minority?’: We have an aggressive [Muslim] minority of a few percent which is ever more hated by the majority of society, as well as cowardly authorities who force political correctness down people’s throats. It reminds one a bit of the situation in the Balkans, where the Communists indoctrinated everyone for 40 years in the ‘brotherhood of Yugoslav nations’, but when they lost power, those nations were immediately at one another’s throats. Mamy bowiem kilkuprocentow˛a, agresywn˛a mniejszo´sc´ , coraz bardziej znienawidzon˛a przez wi˛ekszo´sc´ społecze´nstwa, oraz tchórzliwe władze knebluj˛ace ludziom usta polityczn˛a poprawno´sci˛a. Przypomina to nieco sytuacje na Bałkanach, gdzie komuni´sci przez czterdzie´sci kilka lat wmawiali wszystkim “braterstwo narodów Jugosławii”, a gdy władza ich upadła - narody te rzuciły si˛e sobie do gardeł. (elig-emerytka 2015)

Though the connection is rarely made as explicitly as this, it is worth considering that latent memories of, and reaction against, Soviet ideological indoctrination, may partially explain the seemingly greater conservatism of Eastern European populations in countries such as Poland and Hungary (not to mention the former Soviet

4

The author Peter Chew filed a patent on the method described, with US Government use rights and citing the current contract No. N00014-21-P-2006, on October 29, 2021. The method has been reduced to practice by Galisteo in the form of a portable Jupyter Python notebook which is available upon request for US Government use, including by US Government contractors and grantees in performance of work for the US Government.

262

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

republics), compared to their Western European counterparts, when it comes to issues like migration.5 As already stated, however, Soviet ideology provoked cynicism among Soviet people, especially when it became obvious (painfully so by the early 1990s) how much of a difference there was between the promised ‘shining future’ (cвeтлoe бyдyщee) and the reality of economic collapse and crime-ridden Soviet cities. The phrase ‘prison of nations’ (‘тюpьмa нapoдoв’) exemplifies this cynicism, suggesting that the 14 non-Russian republics never took part in the Soviet project of their own free will, but were largely pressured into doing so by big brother Russia. Though used in this context, the phrase ‘prison of nations’ did not, in fact, originate in disillusionment with Soviet ideals; the phrase has a considerably older lineage. Vladimir Lenin used the same phrase (in the first usage we are aware of) in 1914, before the 1917 Soviet revolution, to describe reasons why the non-Russian nationalities might be dissatisfied with Tsarist power and methods of governing, and in particular the suppression by the Tsar’s government of public celebrations that year of the Ukrainian poet Shevchenko. Lenin wrote: After [the measure taken by the Tsarist government to ban an event honoring Shevchenko], millions and millions of “common people” started turning into conscious citizens and learning the truth of the saying that Russia is the ‘prison of the nations’. Пocлe этoй мepы миллиoны и миллиoны «oбывaтeлeй» cтaли пpeвpaщaтьcя в coзнaтeльныx гpaждaн и yбeждaтьcя в пpaвильнocти тoгo изpeчeния, чтo Poccия ecть «тюpьмa нapoдoв». (Лeнин 1914)

And long before that, in 1843, the French writer Astolphe-Louis-Léonor, marquis de Custine, had written after a trip to Russia: This empire, as immense as it is, is only a prison of which the emperor holds the key. Cet empire, tout immense qu’il est, n’est qu’une prison dont l’empereur tient la clef. (de Custine 1843)

De Custine and Lenin were, in fact, both making a similar historical observation, which is that Russia’s ability to hold sway over other nations from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus, to Central Asia and the Far East, was not new to the Soviet period. The empire of the Tsars, too, exerted its influence beyond Russia (Fig. 6.4), and this influence was far from being based on governance purely by consent. Neither did the Soviet era fundamentally change this, for all the Soviet use of the ‘brotherhood of nations’ slogan. Further, Lenin’s description of the actions taken by the Tsarist regime to suppress a celebration of Ukrainian culture, and the counter-productive effects of those actions, could easily be applied to the methods the Russian government still uses to keep former Soviet republics (and its own citizens) in check. Perhaps the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014, following pro-European demonstrations by Ukrainians, or Belarus’s suppression of protests in late 2020, offer no better case in point. 5

Another explanation for greater anti-immigrant sentiment in Eastern Europe, which has been suggested to the author Peter Chew (in personal communication with a resident of Warsaw, Poland), is the lack of any colonial history for Eastern European countries.

6.3 Eurasian Integration: Coming in the Near Future?

263

Fig. 6.4 Successive additions to the Russian Empire from Ivan Grozny to 1890. Public domain map provided by A. Ilyin. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Иcтopичec кaя_кapтa_Poccийcкoй_импepии.jpg. This work is in the public domain in its country of origin and other countries and areas where the copyright term is the author’s life plus 70 years or fewer

Perhaps, indeed, these observations about the Magog-like character of the nation of Russia do have a timeless truth to them. Perhaps, indeed, this character trait is what binds the fates of the ‘many peoples’ referred to by Ezekiel to those of Russia, for good or ill. And perhaps this is why, despite Lenin’s protestations, the Soviet Union continued the pattern, and perhaps it is why, despite modern former Soviet citizens’ cynicism about Soviet ideology, reintegration is once again back on the table.

6.3 Eurasian Integration: Coming in the Near Future? In the previous section, we briefly reviewed Soviet, and the pre- and post-Soviet Russian periods. But what of the future? There are many indicators today that the historical pattern may continue into the future, too. Vladimir Putin in 2005 is famously on record as saying that he considers the breakup of the USSR the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century’ (‘кpyпнeйшaя гeoпoлитичecкaя кaтacтpoфa вeкa’) (Regnum.ru 2005). In this statement, Putin is of course saying, in effect, that the level of independence enjoyed by the 14 former Soviet republics other than Russia is unacceptable. Aleksandr Dugin is described by the BBC as a ‘ultra-nationalist philosopher’ and ‘founder of Russia’s Eurasian movement’ (BBC 2014). In an undated article prior to 2014, titled ‘The Eurasian Project and its Ukrainian Problem’, Dugin writes:

264

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

…by definition and in line with its own value system, Western Ukrainian nationalism… is unable to share the cultural values of liberalism, individualism, tolerance, multiculturalism, the ideology of human rights and other postmodern standards predominant in modern Western society. Ukrainian nationalism is thus the main obstacle to the implementation of the Eurasian integration project. However, we can attempt to turn the poison into a cure and our enemy into a friend. The Eurasian Union should be thought of as being a model which respects the tradition and the cultural distinctiveness of individual communities and peoples. ...yкpaинcкoгo зaпaдeнcкoгo нaциoнaлизмa, кoтopый идeoлoгичecки пo oпpeдeлeнию и зaкoнaм жaнpa нe мoжeт быть пoлнocтью coлидapeн c кyльтypными цeннocтями либepaлизмa, индивидyaлизмa, тoлepaнтнocти, мyльтикyльтypaлизмa, идeoлoгиeй пpaв чeлoвeкa и дpyгими пocтмoдepниcтcкими cтaндapтaми, дoминиpyющими в coвpeмeннoм зaпaднoм oбщecтвe. Укpaинcкий нaциoнaлизм, кaк мы видeли, являeтcя глaвным пpeпятcтвиeм для peaлизaции eвpaзийcкoгo интeгpaциoннoгo пpoeктa. Ho мoжнo пoпpoбoвaть пpeвpaтить яд в лeкapcтвo, a вpaгa—в дpyгa. Eвpaзийcкий coюз дoлжeн мыcлитьcя кaк мoдeль, coxpaняющaя тpaдиции и кyльтypныe ocoбeннocти oбщecтв, этнocoв и opгaничecкиx кoллeктивoв. (Дyгин n.d.)

The Eurasian Union—Dugin’s answer to the European Union—may or may not be the name given to some future incarnation of the Soviet Union / Russian Empire. In actual fact, an entity known as the ‘Eurasian Economic Union’ (Russian: ‘Eвpaзийcкий экoнoмичecкий coюз’) already exists; it is the name of an organization which a host of former members of the USSR, including Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have already joined together to form.6 Regardless, Dugin’s article does offer a window into the thinking of Russian nationalists on what such a geopolitical entity might look like, and what its proponents’ objectives might be. In the same article, Dugin writes: A nucleus of the Eurasian Union will exist if Russia, Kazakhstan, Belorussia and Ukraine participate. This is an absolute and sufficient minimum. This in no way is to diminish the importance of other states, but the above-mentioned four countries create a critical mass which will allow us to say confidently that the Eurasian Union has come into being. These countries will make the Union a reality—irreversibly and decisively. Eвpaзийcкий coюз бyдeт coздaн в cвoём ядpe, ecли в нeгo вoйдyт Poccия, Кaзaxcтaн, Бeлopyccия и Укpaинa. Этo нeoбxoдимый и дocтaтoчный минимyм интeгpaции. Этo ниcкoлькo нe yмaляeт знaчeния и дpyгиx гocyдapcтв, нo дaнныe чeтыpe cтpaны coздaют кpитичecкyю мaccy, кoтopaя пoзвoлит yвepeннo гoвopить o coздaнии Eвpaзийcкoгo coюзa. Эти cтpaны дeлaют coюз peaльнocтью — нeoбpaтимo и peшитeльнo. (ibid.)

It seems reasonable to suppose that such thinking underlies Russian motivations in recent negotiations, for example, to create customs unions and the like between Russia and other former Soviet states. For example, on September 9, 2021, it was announced that Vladimir Putin and Aleksandr Lukashenko (leader of Belarus) had agreed to set up a unified oil and gas market and deepen economic integration (Reuters 2021). It should go without saying that there can be a variety of motives for the leaders 6

http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about.

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs?

265

of former Soviet countries to agree to reintegration with Russia—not all of which, of course, necessarily place the interests of the respective countries first. Perhaps significantly, Lukashenko’s agreement to reintegration has taken place after more than a year of anti-Lukashenko demonstrations in Belarus. As much as Putin and Lukashenko may even detest one another personally, as suggested by Boris Nemtsov (the former Russian opposition leader who was assassinated in 2015) (Heмцoв 2010), there is a strong possibility that Lukashenko may see Putin as a guarantor of his continuing ability to stay in power despite opposition. Again, reintegration does not necessarily rule out coercion. The ‘prison of the nations’ may not yet have seen its ultimate demise; perhaps, indeed, fire and brimstone is the only way that will happen.

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs? It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future. (Yogi Berra) Obi-Wan Kenobi: With all due respect, Master, is he not the chosen one? Is he not to destroy the Sith and bring balance to the Force? Mace Windu: So the prophecy says. Yoda: A prophecy that misread could have been. (Star Wars)

6.4.1 Why Fringe Beliefs Matter: Did They Help End the Cold War? In the previous sections, we have seen that some sort of geopolitical reintegration echoing the Soviet and Russian imperial periods, beyond just following a historical pattern, is a stated goal of Russian ideologues, and is actively being worked on in the former Soviet space. It may even be consistent with the Russian national character that this should come to pass. But our goal here is to consider not just possible geopolitical futures; no less important for our discussion is what people believe, and have believed, about those futures. Former American President Ronald Reagan, it seems, was one who held to the beliefs outlined in Sect. 6.1, at least in some form, as explaining Soviet (if not Russian) destiny. Reagan is cited as having raised some eyebrows at a 1971 dinner with California legislators, and while he was still governor of California, with a speech that included the following: Ezekiel says that fire and brimstone will be rained upon the enemies of God’s people. That must mean that they’ll be destroyed by nuclear weapons. They exist now, and they never did in the past. Ezekiel tells us that Gog, the nation that will lead all of the other powers of darkness against Israel, will come out of the north. Biblical scholars have been saying for generations that Gog must be Russia. What other powerful nation is to the north of Israel?

266

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

None. But it didn’t seem to make sense before the Russian revolution, when Russia was a Christian country. Now it does, now that Russia has become communistic and atheistic, now that Russia has set itself against God. Now it fits the description of Gog perfectly. (Lee 2017; Boyer 1992)

In light of our citations of (de Custine 1843) and (Лeнин 1914), indeed, perhaps Reagan’s words here betray some Cold-War-informed recency bias, or what is known in theology as ‘eisegesis’—reading into the text in a way that introduces one’s own presuppositions, agendas and biases. The Soviet Union is clearly no more, yet as we have seen, the threats Russia poses in some ways did not change with Soviet power; they were both remarked upon well before the Russian Revolution, and continue to be remarked upon now. The Soviet Union clearly did not invade Israel, as Reagan implied. Again, Yoda’s words ‘a prophecy that misread could have been’ come to mind. It may seem ironic, in view of this, that it was Reagan, not any of his Cold War predecessors, who not only challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to ‘tear down this wall’ (referring to the Berlin Wall) (Politico 2017), but also got his way on something many US presidents before him might have liked to see come to fruition. Twelve other American presidents had been in office over the seventy years of the Soviet Union until Reagan uttered these words, but it was only under Reagan (or, to be more accurate, a few months after the end of his presidency) that the Berlin Wall actually did come down, and then, just two years later, that the USSR ceased to exist. As Reagan challenged Gorbachev on the Berlin Wall, Reagan also sought to end the Cold War by escalating it, building up the United States armed forces in a way that the USSR was economically not in a position to match (Leffler 2018). And seemingly against the odds, the wall really was torn down, the Cold War did end, and the Soviet Union was no more. The irony is, of course, that the President who seemed to subscribe to the belief that Ezekiel’s prophecy foretold a Soviet invasion of Israel, and who likely on the basis of this belief called the Soviet Union the ‘evil empire’ and ‘the focus of evil in the modern world’ (Boyer 1992), should be the President who purposely took the actions that brought the Soviet Union to an end, and ensured that whatever geopolitical entity might invade Israel from the north, it would not be the USSR. But then again, perhaps this is not so ironic. Perhaps all this just illustrates the wisdom in Sun Tzu’s saying: ‘know your enemy’. Perhaps Reagan achieved some kind of success in disarming and dismantling the Soviet threat (even if he did not forever neutralize similar threats), precisely because he did tap into a secular truth about the Russian character that others may have eschewed because of its perceived outlandishness. Far from being a self-fulfilling prophecy, Reagan’s outlook may have in effect been a self-negating prophecy, even if just for a time. Whatever Reagan’s beliefs, however, and whatever their connection with the outcome of the Cold War, it should be noted that such beliefs are still in circulation. From this point on, we turn to the question of what tools might be available to an analyst who may be interested in fringe beliefs (even if not necessarily subscribing to them), and for this, we draw upon (Montell 2021), a linguist who has written about the use of language in cults, and the field of computational linguistics.

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs?

267

6.4.2 The Role of Language in Fringe Beliefs One of the key insights of (Montell 2021) is that language has at least two functions in cults and fringe belief systems: (1) it can be used to distinguish between the ingroup and the out-group, and (2) it can be a reliable indicator to the outside observer of who subscribes to certain belief systems. Montell adduces various examples, but below are two. The first is from American evangelical Christianity: As the daughter of scientists, I figure some combination of nature, nurture, and Synanon stories caused me to become a rather incredulous person, and since early childhood, I have always been keenly sensitive to cultish-sounding rhetoric—but also beguiled by its power. In middle school, my best friend’s mother was a born-again Christian, and I’d sometimes skip Hebrew school on Sundays to accompany the family to their evangelical megachurch. Nothing enraptured me more than the way these churchgoers spoke—how, upon setting foot in the building, everyone slipped into a dialect of ‘evangelicalese’. It wasn’t King James Bible English: it was modern and very distinct. I started using their glossary of buzzwords whenever I attended services, just to see if it affected how the congregants treated me. I picked up phrases like ‘on my heart’ (a synonym for ‘on my mind’), ‘love up on someone’ (to show someone love), ‘in the word’ (reading the Bible), ‘Father of Lies’ (Satan, the evil that ‘governs the world’), and ‘convicted’ (to be divinely moved to do something). It was like the code language of an exclusive clubhouse. Though these terms didn’t communicate anything that couldn’t be said in plain English, using them in the right way at the right time was like a key unlocking the group’s acceptance. Immediately, I was perceived as an insider. The language was a password, a disguise, a truth serum. It was so powerful. (ibid., pp. 42–43)

And from Scientology: You can’t clock a Scientologist in the wild by the way they dress or act—only by how they speak, and only if you know what to listen for. ‘If you were ever in Scientology, you could have a conversation with someone and know what they were by the way they talked,’ an ex-Scientologist named Cathy Schenkelberg told me in an interview… Cathy was doing a voice-over gig for McDonald’s when she met a director named Greg, and within five minutes of conversing, alarm bells sounded in her brain. ‘He was giving me directions, and he used certain words,’ she said… like ‘enturbulated’, meaning upset, and ‘Dev-T’, which stands for Developed Traffic and means ‘cause for delay’. So I said to him, ‘Greg, are you a Scientologist?’ And he goes, ‘Yeah, I was wondering the same thing about you.’ (ibid., pp. 109–111)

Simply stated, certain words are distinctive identifiers. If one hears a person utter certain words and/or phrases, one can have some level of certainty what that person’s beliefs are, or to which group that person self-identifies (which may not be the same thing). What is more, as Montell’s experience shows, a manipulative person may achieve acceptance as an insider in a group just by using the right words at the right times. Hear ‘on my heart’ or ‘Father of Lies’ from someone, and it would be reasonable to suppose that person wants to be known as an evangelical Christian. Hear both, and a reasonable supposition may become one based on a preponderance of evidence. Similarly, usage of the words ‘enturbulated’ and ‘Dev-T’, particularly in combination, would be strong evidence that the user might be a Scientologist.7 7

It is worth noting that when we queried Twitter API for Scientology-related terms, we found many of the results were actually mockery of Scientology; in other words, users who cite ‘Scientology’

268

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

In view of Montell’s thesis that language usage like this is practically indispensable to the formation and continuance of cults—particularly on the fringes, where a claim may rightly or wrongly be made to a particular type of enlightenment that eludes people in the mainstream—it seems reasonable to infer (1) that language usage would be a useful way for an analyst to gain a macro-level insight into what fringe beliefs exist and how fringe they are; and (2) that precisely because the adherents of fringe beliefs use language to distinguish themselves from the out-group, language should be a reliable indicator to distinguish between this and that fringe belief. Language also has the useful property of consisting of distinct tokens (words) that, in machine learning terms, can be thought of as countable and discrete features, some of which occur much more frequently than others. The Magog example is a good case in point. The strings of characters g-o-g and m-a-g-o-g are extremely rare, and therefore distinctive, in English. This can be easily demonstrated by Googling ‘Magog’, which, when the authors did this on September 24, 2021, yielded the results in Fig. 6.5. Something similar would doubtless occur if we were to Google ‘enturbulated’ or ‘Dev-T’—we would find results that relate to Scientology. Not all the links in in Fig. 6.5, of course, will be pages written by people who share Tim LaHaye’s beliefs, but it is clear that all these results are relevant to the ideas Tim LaHaye promulgated. And for those in the know, the use of the words ‘Gog’ and ‘Ezekiel’ by Reagan in his 1971 speech cited above were highly distinctive markers of what Reagan believed.

6.4.3 Connection to Foundational Computational Linguistics Concepts Montell, in common with human beings in general, identifies the adherents of certain beliefs, as Montell puts it, ‘in the wild’, by intuitively keying into to an insight from computational linguistics and machine learning. This is that words can be used as features, and either individually or in combination, they can indicate anomalies—or, to put it in terms of this chapter, point to fringe beliefs. The good news, from the point of view of analytical methodology, is not just the words or combinations of words that function as giveaways of fringe beliefs are usually very distinctive, but also that there is a simple mathematical way to measure this, and further, that the methodology is highly compatible with modes of automated text analysis that are already widespread.

words, far from being adherents of Scientology, are often dissociating themselves from Scientology. That, however, does not necessarily negate either the observations of (Montell 2021), or our further discussion of analytical techniques. Even texts that disassociate from a fringe belief system may still be useful in detecting that belief system, in that (if nothing else) they acknowledge and point to the belief system’s existence.

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs?

269

Fig. 6.5 Google results for ‘Magog’

6.4.3.1

Word Probabilities

A basic premise of computational linguistics is that not all words are equally likely to occur in language. Conceptually, each word has its own probability of occurrence. In computational linguistics, it is said that such probabilities can be ‘estimated’ using text corpora. The estimated probability of term (or token) t is simply the number of times the token t occurs in a corpus divided by the total number of tokens in the corpus. The word ‘estimated’ reflects the fact that the observed probabilities will vary from one to another corpus, and therefore the observations cannot be said to be definitive statements of probability. Yet particularly as the size of the corpus increases, by the law of large numbers, estimates should become increasingly accurate. To return to one of our examples above, clearly ‘Magog’ would be a word expected to have a very low probability, in contrast, for example, to the English word ‘the’. Another measure that doubtless correlates in some fashion to probability, based on a very large and readily accessible corpus, is likely to be the number of documents returned by a Google search. For ‘Magog’ this number is under 10 million, whereas a Google search of ‘the’ returns over 25 billion results, over 2500 times more. To be clear, a number of Google results cannot be directly converted into a probability, because we do not know how many words each Google result contains and how many times the words queried occur in each. Assuming we did have Google’s full indexed corpus of web documents available, though, we could calculate estimated

270

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

probabilities as described above. And we could arrive at some form of similar estimate even from a smaller corpus—for example, a corpus of documents retrieved from a Twitter API8 search.

6.4.3.2

‘Distinctiveness’ in Words and Combinations of Words

But probability alone does not fully capture the distinctiveness of a word in association with its surrounding text. For example, the excerpt of Reagan’s 1971 speech above mentions ‘Gog’, ‘Ezekiel’ and ‘communistic’, to pick three words that seem intuitively low-probability. In combination, Google searches as follows return, respectively: • “Gog” “Ezekiel”: 674,000 results • “Gog” “communistic”: 82 results This suggests that ‘Gog’ and ‘Ezekiel’ somehow ‘go together’ more than ‘Gog’ and ‘communistic’. We can take this further and apply it to triads of words: • • • •

“Gog” “Ezekiel” “Russia”: 758,000 results “Gog” “communistic” “Russia”: 441,000 results “Ezekiel” “communistic” “Russia”: 1,310,000 results “Gog” “communistic” “Ezekiel”: 255,000 results9

It is interesting to consider Scientology a little further in this regard. Montell lists other terms such as ‘clear’, ‘audit’, ‘tech’, ‘valence’ that occur in ordinary English, but are used in rather specific ways in Scientology: Hubbard liked the technical sound of jargon from fields like psychology and software engineering, so he co-opted and redefined dozens of technical terms to create the impression that Scientology’s belief system was rooted in real science. The word ‘valence’, for example, has several definitions across linguistics, chemistry, and math, and generally refers to the value of something. But in Scientology, ‘valence’ signifies possession by an evil spirit. (ibid., p. 132)

Clearly, if one were to Google ‘clear’, ‘audit’, ‘tech’, or ‘valence’ individually, one might retrieve a large number of results, few of which would relate to Scientology. But the evidence provided by the usage of these words is cumulative, so the more of them we find clustered together in unusual and distinctive ways, the more likely we 8

Application Programming Interface. It should be noted here that Google search results, which are not an exact metric, are reliant upon various black-box properties known only to Google and their search algorithm. Therefore, when we observe the fact that the search: “Gog” “communistic” yielded fewer results than the search: “Gog” “communistic” “Russia”, we should note that this unexpected behavior reflects Google’s search algorithm and not a misreported number of search results.

9

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs?

271

are to be looking at Scientology. Googling all four of these terms in combination, and enclosed in double-quotation marks (meaning that the results must contain all four), the fourth result does relate to Scientology. Scientology, in effect, provides the glue that makes ‘clear’, ‘audit’, ‘tech’, and ‘valence’ go together in certain contexts (Fig. 6.6).

Fig. 6.6 Google results relating to Scientology

272

6.4.3.3

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

From Probability to Pointwise Mutual Information

If probability alone does not measure how much two things go together, is there some measure that better captures this? It turns out the field of computational linguistics can help here too, in a way which is (as with the estimation of probability) similarly grounded in empiricism. A better measure of distinctiveness is pointwise mutual information (PMI). Brown et al. (1992) show how, for example that the mutual information for the phrase Humpty Dumpty is 22.5 bits, meaning that ‘the pair occurs roughly 6,000,000 times more than one would expect from the individual frequencies of Humpty and Dumpty’ (ibid., p. 477). Other examples of ‘sticky’ word pairs they cite are ‘Klux Klan’, ‘Tse Tung’, ‘Taj Mahal’, ‘Pontius Pilate’, ‘helter skelter’ and ‘mumbo jumbo’. To put this another way, the low probabilities of ‘Humpty’ and ‘Dumpty’ make their more-frequent-than-expected co-occurrence highly distinctive. The calculation of PMI is in fact derivative from the calculation of individual word probabilities and is as follows: pmi (w1 , w2 ) =

p(w2 |w1 ) p(w1 w2 ) = p(w1 ) p(w2 ) p(w1 )

(6.1)

In plain English, this boils down to a calculation of how much more likely word w2 is conditional upon w1 , than w2 independently. Brown et al. (1992) apply PMI to word collocations (that is, combinations of words that occur next to one another), but PMI can be extended to combinations of non-consecutive words that occur within the same text (like Reagan’s ‘Gog’ and ‘Ezekiel’). It can also be applied to word/document combinations (Chew 2015), by reformulating Eq. (6.1) to show the PMI between a word w1 and document d as follows: pmi (w1 , d) =

p(w1 |d) p(w1 )

(6.2)

This reformulation of PMI would allow us to measure how much more likely ‘Gog’ was in Reagan’s speech than might be expected by chance. And this same approach could be extended to all the low-frequency words Reagan used in the same speech, or to any document found on the web, or to any social media post. At this point, we step back from computational linguistics methodology and techniques to consider basic questions an analyst might want to answer with respect to fringe beliefs. After this, once we have made it clear what the problems of interest might be, we shall return to computational linguistics, building upon the concepts introduced so far, to suggest possible solutions to the problems.

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs?

273

6.4.4 Problem Statements With Respect to Fringe Beliefs Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult ones. (Donald Rumsfeld, February 12, 2002)

In this section we consider what questions an analyst, confronted with a landscape of beliefs, some fringe and some mainstream, might want to have answers to. These for us boil down to how to analyze ‘known unknowns’ versus ‘unknown unknowns’. Simply put, an example of a known unknown, in terms of fringe beliefs, might be the Magog theory, or QAnon, or Scientology. We already know something about the belief system—for example, what words or phrases are distinctively used in the belief system, whether it be ‘Magog’, ‘great awakening’, ‘enturbulated’, etc. The fringe belief is ‘known’ in the sense that is already on the analyst’s radar, but it might still be unknown in the sense that there are details about the fringe belief that the analyst does not know—other aspects of the belief system, who are its adherents, how widespread it is, etc. The questions the analyst has here are therefore likely to be the sorts of question that could be answered by a series of queries to a search engine, though more automated and advanced techniques based on computational linguistics could also be very helpful (for example, speeding up the gathering of relevant information, or, for example, where the data resides in Twitter, where the data is not indexed by Google). An example of an unknown unknown here would be some unnamed fringe theory, the existence of which the analyst does not even know about yet. The questions the analyst may have here are: ‘what fringe beliefs are out there?’ or ‘what is the next “QAnon”?’ This is a harder problem to solve than any of those having to do with known unknowns. After all, how does one query a search engine for things one does not know about? But assuming the initial question is answered, questions may be similar to those for the known unknowns: what are these belief systems about? Who believes them? How many people believe them? We can therefore treat the analysis of unknown unknowns as two distinct parts. The hard part is an upstream analytical step additional to the steps required for known unknowns, and the rest, which is downstream, looks exactly as it does for known unknowns. The purpose of the harder step is, essentially, to turn unknown unknowns into known unknowns so that the rest of the analysis can proceed from there, as shown in Fig. 6.7.

6.4.4.1

Analytical Approach to Known Unknowns

Starting with the easier problem, the known unknowns: we can build upon both Montell’s insight that language is a distinctive marker for fringe beliefs ‘in the wild’, and the observation we made above, which is that many of an analyst’s questions

274 Fig. 6.7 Analysis of unknown unknowns and known unknowns

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’ Make unknown fringe beliefs known

Provide additional details on known fringe Analysis of known unknowns

Analysis of unknown unknowns

might be answered by reviewing the results returned by queries to a search engine. The unknown is known enough that we know some of its distinctive vocabulary. Using this, we can provide a more specifically formulated approach which would be to retrieve documents based on those distinctive words, whether via a publicly available search engine or some other avenue such as the Twitter API. Retrieved results can then potentially be subjected to any other further downstream analytics, such as clustering, or those ‘canned’ techniques provided in off-the-shelf text analytics software. If we know enough about the known unknown fringe belief that we know of its existence but not necessarily its distinctive vocabulary, then we are faced with a slightly harder problem, but one in which the analyst can be aided by the computational linguistics techniques already outlined. If we have some text which is representative of the fringe belief, as well as some baseline material, then the problem of identifying the distinctive vocabulary of the fringe belief may be related to finding the individual words, or combinations of words (slightly harder), which have the highest PMI with the fringe belief representative text. This boils down to an empirical problem, the solution to which is computationally well-defined. However, while PMI is likely to be part of the picture, for full disclosure we should say that just finding the words with the highest PMI may not be enough. This is because the attention of adherents of fringe beliefs may focus on different topics at different times, and it is not just the distinctive vocabulary of cults that will contribute to PMI, but also the words important to certain topics. For example, QAnon believers may fixate on ‘Hillary Clinton’ and ‘pizzagate’ at one time, and then turn their attention to ‘election fraud’, all the while believing in the coming ‘Great Awakening’. While PMI may be an important component in the analytics, it may be that some more sophisticated method that could build upon statistical measures of the distinctiveness of words such as PMI is needed for the most effective analysis at the macro level of a cult’s distinctive vocabulary. This is an ongoing research area, and one possible line of inquiry might relate to the approach described by (Wilson and Robinson 2011). It is also true, however, that even the micro-level topics can be revealing about a fringe belief. The fact that QAnon at any time focused on ‘pizzagate’ may tell us something useful about the belief system. Thus, given the right representative corpora, PMI may help us make significant inroads into understanding the belief system, including its distinctive vocabulary.

6.4 How Can We Analyze Fringe Beliefs?

6.4.4.2

275

Analytical Approach to Unknown Unknowns

If we break the problem down as shown in Fig. 6.7, the only additional analytical step required beyond those already discussed—though it is by no means a trivial one10 —is to identify and group texts associated with previously unknown fringe beliefs. Subsequent steps can then characterize those fringe beliefs in terms of their vocabulary, topics of interest, etc. This additional problem requiring a solution may be approached as a clustering and anomaly detection problem, which are two sides of the same coin (clustering involves finding groups of things that are similar, while anomaly detection involves finding things or groups of things that are unlike the population as a whole). Our conception of fringe beliefs means that by definition, they are not mainstream; they are anomalous in the population. (This is regardless of their veracity.) And if each fringe belief system has its own distinctive vocabulary, then this means that the text associated with the belief system will also be anomalous against the background noise of text as a whole, whether that universe is Twitter, an indexed web corpus, or something else. As with the known knowns and PMI, it is logically possible that finding anomalous clusters of text in itself is not enough. It could be that cults and fringe beliefs have some specific way in which their vocabulary is distinctive. It has been shown (Estoup 1916), for example, that the frequencies of words in language in general follow a power law distribution. While Estoup appears to be the first to have made this observation, it was widely publicized by Zipf and is now known as a Zipf distribution. While the Zipf distribution generally holds as an invariant property of language (regardless of whether the language is, for example, English, French or Russian), the shape of the tail of the distribution varies depending on the genre of text, and the tail is therefore where the most revealing information is. It might be, therefore, that there is some telltale, but highly subtle, statistical property of the vocabulary usage of cults which specifically relates to how language is used to create in-groups and out-groups, to manipulate, or even just, in a non-manipulative way, to frame narratives that are not widely accepted. Again, this is, as far as we are aware, an open research question. But it may also be that generic PMI and clustering would get us a long way. If text delineates beliefs, then non-mainstream beliefs should be delineated by anomalous text. Perhaps if simple text clustering with PMI does not get us all the way, then some special case of text clustering with PMI would. Clustering and anomaly detection, especially where the clusters and anomalies are unknown a priori, are problems that are solved by unsupervised machine learning methods. Such methods have been used, for example, to discover cybersecurity threats while avoiding any a priori heuristic knowledge or training data (Robinson 2010). And these methods in turn can be closely integrated with the probabilistic concepts of computational linguistics as outlined above. In the next section, we turn to look at how this works, adapting the approach of Robinson (2010) to social media and other textual data. 10

The solution to this problem is the one on which we filed patent application 17514283 on October 29, 2021, reserving the US Government’s rights in its use.

276

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

6.4.5 Combining PMI and Clustering to Find Unknown Unknowns Beyond just measuring using PMI to measure the distinctiveness of one word in one excerpt of text, it is possible to extend the concept to characterizing a whole set of terms and texts in a ‘vector space’. In this framework, each text is represented by a vector, the indices of which are the document’s unique terms, and likewise, each term is represented by a vector, the indices of which are the texts in which the term occurs. These vectors can be combined into a ‘term-document matrix’, the cells of which can be filled with the number of times a given term occurs in a given document. An illustrative example is given in Fig. 6.8. Many unsupervised clustering and anomaly detection algorithms assume, as a starting-point, a matrix as shown here. But if we want to find clusters, or anomalous clusters, based on distinctive vocabulary used in subsets of the texts, then it would make sense to use PMI. It is a simple matter to replace the ‘raw’ frequencies as shown here with the PMI between each term and document, calculated as described above. If a term does not occur in a text, PMI is considered to be zero. For example, suppose the text of Reagan’s 1971 speech shown above were one of the texts or ‘documents’ among many others, a few of which might perhaps be related to the Magog theme, but the vast majority of which are not. One might then expect the document vector for Reagan’s speech to have high PMI values for terms such as ‘Gog’, ‘communistic’, ‘Ezekiel’, and ‘Russia’, because these terms occur much more frequently in Reagan’s speech (even if each occurs only once) than one would expect by chance. Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) is a signal processing technique that is often used for unsupervised clustering, and like many unsupervised clustering and anomaly detection algorithms, it assumes, as a starting-point, a matrix as described above. When applied to text, SVD is known as Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) because it is claimed that the ‘latent semantics’ of text emerge from applying the technique. What SVD does is, in effect, to factorize the input matrix into groups of

Vector-space representation

Documents Ezekiel tells us that Gog, the Ezekiel indicates that he nation that will lead of and Ezekiel thatallfire hasn't givensays a complete list the other powers of be darkness brimstone will rained of allies. Enough is given, against Israel, will come out upon the God's however, to enemies make thisofwriter of thepeople. north. must mean amazed by That the number of that they’ll destroyed by people andbenations which nuclear weapons. They exist will be involved. now, and they never did in the past.

Fig. 6.8 Example term-document matrix

d1 Ezekiel

1

Gog enemies

1

nuclear

1

d2

d3

1

3

2

1

1

D4 1 1

1

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation

277

documents that go together and groups of terms that go together (this is simply the nature of the mathematics behind SVD). By the laws of large numbers, this works better as the size of the input data increases; and even subtle components of signal can be discovered this way. (This is how another matrix factorization technique was applied by Robinson (2010) to discover, among a large quantity of data, the few anomalous network packets where data was being exfiltrated.) Assuming, therefore that some large collection of texts contained a handful of texts using the distinctive vocabulary of the Magog fringe belief—even if not all those texts used exactly the same combination of words from that vocabulary—SVD is a proven method that can allow such clusters to emerge. There are still questions, as we said above. Do other aspects of distinctive vocabulary usage overwhelm those aspects that have to do specifically with fringe beliefs? Does the distinctive vocabulary in cults tend to get used more by insiders with each other, than publicly, in which case we might have trouble picking up a signal in publicly available texts? Related to that, is the proportion of texts which express fringe beliefs so tiny that even SVD may have trouble picking up the signal? Do we therefore need to adapt the techniques in some way to tailor them to the analysis of fringe beliefs? These issues notwithstanding, it does seem that there is a natural way with PMI and SVD to make some inroads into the problem.

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation Is the approach we have set out in Sect. 6.4 technically workable? That is what we aim to answer in the affirmative in this section, through a technical demonstration which we have already reduced to practice in the form of a Jupyter Python notebook. The author Peter Chew filed a US Patent (application number 17/514283) on the methods used in the notebook; although the patent may restrict legal usage in some cases, the pending patent includes a ‘US Government use’ clause allowing analysts working in and for the US Government royalty-free rights to its use. Around the time this book is published, in April 2023, the patent application should be publicly disclosed on the US Patent and Trademark Office website for those interested in using it. Inquiries into use, licensing, or requests for consulting on applications may be directed to the author Peter Chew at [email protected]. Our philosophy is liberal as regards sharing the techniques we have developed (subject, of course, to patent legal restrictions); the economic model of the author Peter Chew’s firm is to earn revenues through consulting on a labor-hour basis. If you are able and legally allowed to pick up and use our software implementations on your own, we encourage you to do so; if you need help to adapt it to your data or specific circumstances, or are not granted rights by the patent, then we encourage you to talk to us about putting a contract and/or licensing agreement in place. For this demonstration, we use a dataset which is partially hand-curated and partially gathered from Twitter, as follows.

278

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

6.5.1 Dataset First, we hand-picked a small number of snippets of tweet-length text—from 101 to 267 characters long, each consisting of at least one complete sentence—from (1) Reagan’s 1971 speech, (2) LaHaye’s discussion of Russia and Magog (LaHaye 1991), (3) Hal Lindsey’s discussion of the same subject (which LaHaye quotes at length) (Lindsey 1970), and (4) excerpts from what the Vilna Gaon was reported to have said (Haaretz 2014). All snippets of text were selected so as to include at least some reference to Russia’s military role in end-times prophecy. This selection of text, consisting of 27 snippets, represented the hand-curated part of our dataset, and is shown in full in Appendix 1. Then we ran a simple analysis to count the number of occurrences of each distinct word represented in the 27 text snippets and determine which words occurred most frequently. Among the most frequent (ignoring words like ‘the’ that would either be expected to be frequent generally in English and therefore non-distinguishing, and words like ‘Gog’ that would be too distinctive in text representing this fringe narrative) were the following: Russia—20 occurrences nations—5 occurrences allies—3 occurrences war—3 occurrences Russian—3 occurrences countries—2 occurrences These words can be thought of as a bridge between the general topic area of this particular fringe belief, and mainstream ideas on the same topic. To obtain the Twitter portion of the dataset, we used combinations of the above words to return a total of 33,470 tweets, which we then randomly downsampled using selective percentages of each set of search results, to end up with approximately 20,000 tweets, made up as follows: Twitter search query

# of results returned

Downsampling %

Selected tweets

Russian allies

452

0%

–

Russia countries

18,000

50%

9000

Russia war

10,469

75%

7852

Russia nations

2940

100%

2940

Russia allies

1609

50%

TOTAL

33,470

805 20,597

Some tweets were returned by multiple different queries above and duplicates were eliminated, reducing the 20,597 to 20,114. The hand-curated 27 snippets of ‘fringe belief’ text were then mixed into the Twitter dataset to create a new dataset of 20,141 texts.

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation

279

6.5.2 Technical Implementation Though, in this case, we know a priori which were the ‘fringe belief’ texts (because we hand-picked them), the goal of this demonstration is to show that even when this information is withheld from a judiciously constructed sequence of unsupervised machine learning processes, the unknown unknown—the 27 texts hidden within a much larger dataset—can be discovered. This directly addresses the harder part of the problem as we visualized it in Fig. 6.7. We therefore created a Jupyter Python notebook11 to perform the following highlevel steps: • • • •

Tokenize the 20,141 texts. Form a document-term matrix from the texts. Weight the matrix using Pointwise Mutual Information weighting. Compute a truncated SVD of the weighted matrix to distill it into its principal components of signal. • Compute a graph adjacency matrix encoding the pairwise similarities between texts within the SVD space. • Plot a heatmap and dendrogram allowing anomalous clusters of documents to be easily identified. The test of this approach, of course, is whether it does highlight the 27 ‘fringe belief’ documents to an observer who does not know about the dataset.

6.5.3 Key Waypoints in the Approach 6.5.3.1

Pointwise Mutual Information

Within the notebook, we plot the distribution of PMI weights and the distribution (which is typical for PMI) is as follows (Fig. 6.9). The key here is that the more distinctive words—words like ‘Magog’—will appear towards the right of this distribution. As can be seen from the histogram, the most distinctive words are few in number.

11

Jupyter notebooks, and Python, are widely used within the US Government analytical community. Key advantages of their use—and a reason they are enjoying widespread adoption in this community—are that alternative hypotheses and methodologies can easily be tested (consistent with the recommendations of [Heuer 1999]), changed on the fly, used by individuals whose expertise may be more on the side of analysis than data science, and large-scale computations are efficient and quick. Output can also be easily saved into a readable report which includes analytical artifacts. In a word, Jupyter notebooks make the analytical process transparent and flexible.

280

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

Fig. 6.9 Histogram of PMI weights

Fig. 6.10 Scatterplot of singular values

6.5.3.2

Singular Value Decomposition

After computing the SVD, we present the distribution of singular values in another plot (Fig. 6.10). This plot (which is also typical for an SVD) gives an idea of how much explanatory power each successive ‘principal component’ has in SVD: as the number of topics or principal components increases, there is a diminishing return in terms of how much of the source data they collectively explain. A different view on the SVD is given by a plot of the weight in each topic of the 27 ‘fringe belief’ documents (Fig. 6.11). Though we withhold the identity of the 27 documents from the overall sequence of algorithms, this plot is given to show that the later topics (those with higher index numbers) are needed to differentiate between

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation

281

Fig. 6.11 Document-topic distribution for ‘fringe belief’ documents

Fig. 6.12 Distribution of adjacency matrix edge weights

documents of different types. In other words, the purpose of these higher-indexed topics is to differentiate within the corpus rather than to explain the corpus as a whole. In that sense, the lower-indexed topics are more representative of topics that are very widespread across the entire corpus.

6.5.3.3

Composition of Adjacency Matrix

The next plot (and from here on we return to the idea of withholding the identity of the 27 documents from the algorithms) allows us to understand the composition of the adjacency matrix—the matrix that encodes inter-text similarities (these are effectively Pearson similarities, computed using a cosine between document vectors) (Fig. 6.12). This distribution is also typical for Twitter data, with peaks at the left and right. An edge weight (cosines) of 0.0 means that the given pair of documents is completely dissimilar (their vectors are orthogonal), which would occur if the two texts contain no related words. An edge weight of 1.0 means that the given pair of documents is

282

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

identical, containing exactly the same words in the same frequencies. The distribution shows that the vast majority of texts are generally dissimilar from one another; the peak at 1.0 means that there do exist pairs of texts which are identical. This is typical and expected of Twitter data, because users often retweet one another. Before we proceed, some aspects of the structure of the adjacency matrix that it is useful to understand are: • It is a square matrix; the number of rows = the number of columns = the number of texts in the dataset. • The values in the top-left to bottom-right diagonal of the matrix are all 1, because each text is identical to itself. • The matrix is symmetric across the diagonal, because cosine similarity is commutative: the cosine between vectors v1 and v2 is the same as the cosine between vectors v2 and v1 . 6.5.3.4

Detection of Anomalous Clusters

The adjacency matrix can be represented graphically as a heatmap. For presentation purposes, we down-sample the 20,141 × 20,141 adjacency matrix to a 527 × 527 matrix, including just the first 500 Twitter texts plus the 27 Magog texts. When represented as a heatmap, this smaller matrix appears as shown in Fig. 6.13. The legend of this heatmap shows the coloring of similarity values in the matrix from yellow (most similar, cosine = 1) to purple (least similar, cosine = 0). Recall from above that the diagonal values in the matrix are always 1; this is visible in the yellow diagonal line running from top left to bottom right, which would be seen in the adjacency matrix heatmap for any set of texts. In the heatmap, two anomalous clusters now immediately stand out—the yellow square near the center, and the light-blue cluster at the bottom right. Since this shade of yellow denotes a similarity of 1 (or close to 1), the yellow square is the less interesting of the two clusters: this square represents a group of tweets with completely identical text. The light-blue cluster is in fact our 27 Magog texts. Further inspection of graphical output from the SVD, upon which the similarities in the heatmap are based, confirms that a distinct signal from these 27 texts was picked up, in particular, in topic number 69. In Fig. 6.14, which shows this output, it is clearly visible that the documents with index numbers 500 and above (the ‘fringe belief’ documents) do not follow the pattern of the remaining 500. (This figure, and in particular the coloring and placement of the data points for the 27 fringe texts, assumes that the 27 texts are already a known unknown.) That topic 69 picks up the signal from these ‘fringe belief’ texts is further confirmed when we look at the top words and texts associated with topic 69, which was clearly able to pick up the relationship between ‘Gog’, ‘Rosh’, and ‘Ezekiel’:

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation

Fig. 6.13 Heatmap of inter-text similarities

Fig. 6.14 Distribution of documents in topic 69; fringe texts are colored in red

283

284

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

69 (41.679): gog (0.116) rosh (0.075) nations (0.074) saying (0.074) among (0.072) war (0.069) what (0.069) ezekiel (0.068) been (0.067) last (0.064) Doc 509 (0.144) The nouns identifying the invading nation in this war have been held for years t Doc 515 (0.136) Biblical scholars have been saying for generations that Gog must be Russia. What Doc 55 (0.128) 10 months ago, all we heard about President Trump from the MSM Russia!Russia, he

While topic 69 is clearly key, though, it is not the only topic that causes the cluster of 27 to stand out in the heatmap; this is because the inter-text similarities are computed using all 100 topics simultaneously. Another way to visualize anomalous texts within the whole population is to use a dendrogram (here, again, we use the smaller sample of 527 texts for purposes of presentation). The dendrogram presents a hierarchical clustering of the texts based on the adjacency matrix. Hierarchical clustering starts by treating each document as its own cluster, then iteratively selecting the highest similarity value from the adjacency matrix, and joining clusters with that similarity value, until all documents are in one cluster. The dendrogram represents the results of that iterative clustering. A dendrogram was created in this way for the 527 downsampled texts and is shown in Fig. 6.15. In this dendrogram, the iterative clustering proceeds chronologically from left to right; each tick on the vertical axis represents a single tweet or text. Towards the top of the dendrogram, the branches with dark blue lines can be seen on the left to incorporate many documents grouped together at the very first iteration(s) (the vertical colored lines almost on top of the y axis). These, again, are the texts (presumably retweets) that are identical to one another, and are likely of less interest to the analyst. To identify and assess unknown unknowns, the analyst is most likely to be interested in further inspection of those branches of the dendrogram that appear visually most anomalous. There is no one right way to make this judgment (perhaps we might compare it to how a trained radiologist reads an X-ray or CT scan), but we mark the cluster that appears most anomalous to us in Fig. 6.15 using a blue brace to the left of the vertical axis. Our rationale for this judgment is that while the branch appears as part of the greatest mass of branches, it is clustered a little sooner than (to the left of) the rest of the mass. Using the Jupyter Python notebook, we can zoom in on this cluster, and, at a larger level of magnification, see the indices of the documents in the cluster, as in Fig. 6.16. It is now evident that many of the texts in this cluster have indices 500 or greater, meaning they are among our ‘fringe belief’ (‘Magog’) texts. It is important to note that nothing in the analytical pipeline (neither the construction of the term-document matrix, nor the PMI computation, nor the SVD, nor the computation of similarities, nor the hierarchical clustering based on similarities) informed the algorithms that the

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation

285

Fig. 6.15 Dendrogram showing hierarchical clustering of texts

texts with indices 500 and greater were ‘fringe belief’ texts—all any of the associated algorithms had to go on was the words in these texts. What the computational pipeline is able to do is draw out subtle relationships between the texts, using the co-occurrences of words in those texts, in a way that a human likely never could: who can read 500 (let alone 20,000) texts, even short ones, and keep all the words and the state of all the relationships between the words in their head to reason about them and understand all the subtle relationships in the data? This, however, is what our computational pipeline does, leaving to the analyst the final step of ‘reading the CT scan’ and, from it, learning about anomalous unknown unknowns—those texts on the fringe, hiding within the mainstream, yet with a slightly different slant. And all this comes from no more than the words in the texts, drawing upon the insight of (Montell 2021) that cults and fringe beliefs can often be recognized ‘in the wild’ by their unusual use of rather specific vocabulary. It is interesting to digress here for a moment. When (Robinson 2010) applied a similar technique, as we have mentioned, to network traffic data, it was within the context of a data mining contest. The organizers of the contest had randomly mixed in 18 anomalous network traffic events with around 115,000 bona fide events, and

286

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

Fig. 6.16 Dendrogram detail for anomalous cluster

the contest participants were supposed to use whatever data mining techniques they chose to detect the anomalous events. When David Robinson submitted his entry to the contest—successfully identifying the 18 anomalous events ‘sight unseen’—one reviewer said he (the reviewer) did not understand the math, and another reviewer, incredulous that the 18 anomalous events could have been detected so easily, alleged that David Robinson must have cheated.12 Another mutual colleague of David Robinson and the author Peter Chew, commenting on this to the author, observed that the 18 events were so different from the remaining 115,000 that it was as if the 115,000 were in English and the 18 were in Urdu. The point here is that if we know what techniques to use, we really can let the data itself (whether it is network traffic data or textual data) speak to us and tell us where its anomalies are. Something may seem even to an observer seasoned in data science like magic (or, to put it less charitably, cheating), but in reality, the combination of good imaging and analysis techniques based on statistics which are explainable at every step, and then knowing how to read the output of those techniques, can make finding unknown unknowns extremely feasible. 12

Personal communication of David Robinson with Peter Chew; David Robinson gave permission for this story to be shared.

6.5 Demonstration and Technical Implementation

287

To drive this point home, we can look at another view on the dataset as a whole by combining a heatmap and dendrogram. Here, to show that the anomalous cluster can be seen even when it is still truly an unknown unknown in the data, we first randomize the order of the texts. This means that the only way groupings of texts can be visually detected in the heatmap is through how they cluster in the dendrogram, which now determines the order of the rows and the columns in the heatmap. (Note that this differs from Fig. 6.13, in which the 27 fringe texts were ordered for presentation purposes at the end of the data, enabling the group of 27 to be easily seen.) Using the heatmap-plus-dendrogram approach, nothing extrinsic to the actual words in the texts determines either the similarity or the ordering, so ‘cheating’ is ruled out. With randomized ordering, the heatmap alone is no longer sufficient to locate the anomalous cluster of ‘fringe texts’ (see Fig. 6.17). This is because the rows and columns of the 27 × 27 submatrix that was at the bottom-right of the adjacency matrix are now dispersed throughout the adjacency matrix as a whole. Adding the dendrogram to the heatmap solves this problem, because the dendrogram reintroduces some ordering based on its own clustering. The clustering for the dendrogram, we should note, had nothing to do with any extrinsic document ordering, but was based rather simply on inter-text similarities, which in turn are

Fig. 6.17 Heatmap of inter-text similarities without extrinsic ordering

288

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

based only on the words (and in particular distinctive words) in those texts. Effectively, the hierarchical clustering shown in the dendrogram creates its own ordering which overrides any extrinsic ordering, whether the latter is randomized or not. Combining a dendrogram (and its implied ordering) with a heatmap based on that ordering, we achieve the result shown in Fig. 6.18 (note that here the color scheme of the heatmap differs from that of previous figures, since a different Python package is used). A cluster (highlighted with red curly brackets), which clearly stands out from the rest, now reappears in which the ‘fringe Magog texts’ are concentrated. Note that some other anomalous clusters are also evident; these may also warrant exploration as unknown unknowns. To conclude this section, we have shown how an approach which combines computation of inter-document similarities using PMI, measuring distinctive words in a way which is completely portable from one dataset to another, hierarchical clustering using these similarities, and then appropriate visualizations, creates a

Fig. 6.18 Heatmap + dendrogram of inter-text similarities

6.6 Conclusions

289

repeatable approach analysts can use to detect unknown unknowns including texts expressing fringe ideas, within much larger datasets.

6.6 Conclusions We started this chapter with a simple conception of fringe beliefs. We do not use this phrase in any necessarily pejorative sense, in the sense of the ‘lunatic fringe’. Copernicus had fringe beliefs, but it turned out he was closer to the truth than the Catholic mainstream of his time. QAnon beliefs are fringe beliefs, but that does not mean QAnon adherents are present-day Copernicuses. Sometimes the fringe is right and the mainstream wrong, and sometimes it goes the other way. Our conception of fringe ideas is simply ideas that are not widespread. Whether dangerous or benign, false or true, fringe ideas are ones of which intelligence analysts surveying the information environment may want to have early warning. If the ideas are false and/or dangerous, perhaps early warning will give the analyst time to interdict the next January 6 insurrection. If they are true, perhaps the analyst will gain new helpful insights, his or her creativity stimulated in new ways. The point, though, is that by their very nature as fringe, sufficiently early warning of these ideas may be hard to come by, even given the availability of large volumes of open-source data (such as Twitter feeds). Fringe ideas can hide in plain sight amidst big data. In this chapter, we selected a particular fringe idea having to do with Russian military reach and post-Soviet reintegration. This fringe idea has enjoyed some longevity over the decades and centuries—precisely because of its connection to a Biblical master narrative (admittedly, an obscure and perhaps esoteric one). This idea counted among its adherents the American president on whose watch the Cold War was ended, and who arguably contributed more than any other US President to the breakup of the USSR. We showed how Montell (2021)’s thesis of linguistic indicia of fringe beliefs is borne out in the texts produced by adherents of this particular fringe belief. We then showed how Montell (2021)’s ideas can be incorporated into an unsupervised text analytic pipeline that enables an analyst to solve the hard problem of detection of unknown unknowns—early detection of such fringe beliefs—based simply on a mass of unstructured text data. This pipeline makes solving the problem analogous to a radiologist’s reading of a medical imaging scan: visually identifying anomalies, zooming in on them, and then, perhaps performing a biopsy (focusing one’s attention on more painstaking reading and analysis of the texts in the anomalous cluster). We showed how this analytical pipeline, and our reading of its output, was able to identify the 27 ‘fringe belief’ texts within a much larger dataset. Once the unknown unknown is identified and understood, the problem of learning more about it (for example, finding other similar texts) is essentially that of dealing with a known unknown, a much easier problem.

290

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

We have, in effect, created a methodology which can draw out unknown unknowns and there is a reason this methodology works: it all has, in the end, to do with the insight of Montell (2021) on how fringe or cult beliefs are identifiable in the wild. The process can easily be replicated on virtually any analyst’s machine using a Jupyter notebook, a framework which is already widely used in the analyst community. Anyone can run it; it does not cost anything; and it can be applied to any dataset in any language or combination of languages. Reinforcing this point, the technique is similar to one which was not even developed originally for text, but to analyze anomalous network packets. The algorithms described are not black box algorithms; unlike some machine learning methods (e.g. neural networks), they are fully explainable. And this explainability should be highly attractive to analysts and decision-makers who rely on the work of those analysts. In short, anomalies emerge from the data simply because there is something subtly different about the patterns of words in those anomalies. Our aim here is to show how the ensemble of techniques can be joined together to create functionality that we would like to be widely and freely available for analysts in the US Government and among US allies. In today’s environment of huge volumes of open-source data, a significant challenge is perhaps accessing and understanding not so much that which is hidden, but rather, that which is hidden in plain sight. For this purpose, unsupervised data analytics techniques uniquely fit the bill, and they are under-utilized because of barriers to entry, not so much these days because of cost of acquiring the technology, but rather because knowledge and understanding of the techniques is in critically short supply. Through using these techniques judiciously, we can gain a 360-degree view and understanding of our data and anomalies within it which are otherwise hidden in plain sight. In effect, these techniques can make our big data more transparent, in a way which is somewhat irrespective of size. And ultimately, greater transparency and better understanding, and better use of analysts’ time in combing through data to focus their attention on areas of the fringe that most merit their valuable time, is completely in line with our democratic values and ideals. As the etching in the CIA’s headquarters lobby says, ‘You shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free.’

Appendix 1: Hand-Curated ‘Fringe Belief’ Text

#

Text

Text length in characters

1

Ezekiel says that fire and brimstone will be rained upon the enemies of God’s people. That must mean that they’ll be destroyed by nuclear weapons. They exist now, and they never did in the past

194

2

Ezekiel tells us that Gog, the nation that will lead all of the other 132 powers of darkness against Israel, will come out of the north (continued)

Appendix 1: Hand-Curated ‘Fringe Belief’ Text

291

(continued) #

Text

3

Biblical scholars have been saying for generations that Gog must 135 be Russia. What other powerful nation is to the north of Israel? None

Text length in characters

4

But it didn’t seem to make sense before the Russian revolution, when Russia was a Christian country. Now it does, now that Russia has become communistic and atheistic, now that Russia has set itself against God. Now it fits the description of Gog perfectly

5

The conclusion is that Gomer and its hordes are a part of the vast 191 area of modern Eastern Europe which is totally behind the Iron Curtain. This includes East Germany and the Slovak countries

6

Some of the sons of Togarmah founded Armenia, according to their own claim today, Gesenius continued

101

7

The conclusion is that Togarmah is part of modern Southern Russia and is probably the origin of the Cossacks and other people of the Eastern part of Russia

156

8

Ezekiel indicates that he hasn’t given a complete list of allies. Enough is given, however, to make this writer amazed by the number of people and nations which will be involved

178

9

In other words, the Russian ruler is to equip his confederates 267 with arms and to assume command… isn’t it a bit unnerving to note that almost all of the countries predicted as part of this great army are already armed with weapons created and manufactured in Russia?

10

We have seen that Russia will arm and equip a vast confederacy. 263 This powerful group of allies will lead an attack on restored Israel. However, Russia and her confederates will be destroyed completely by an act that Israel will acknowledge as being from their God

11

The attack upon the Russian confederacy and the resulting conflict will escalate into the last war of the world, involving all nations

135

12

For the prophet Ezekiel, twenty-five hundred years before, had predicted that Russia would become a major power during the end time

132

13

What makes this prediction so interesting is that World War I, the great sign of the Lord’s return, enabled Communists to turn the toothless bear into a vicious monster

169

14

Russia and her chief leader are unquestionably the planners of an 156 imminent attack against Israel, and we can also identify most of the allies on both sides

15

There are three signs marking Russia as the protagonist in this drama: the etymology of the names, the antireligious character of the nation, and its geographical location

257

172

(continued)

292

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

(continued) #

Text

Text length in characters

16

The nouns identifying the invading nation in this war have been held for years to be Russia, “Rosh” or “Gog”; Moscow, “Meshech”; and Tobolsk, “Tubal”, the largest state

169

17

The noun Gog is from the original tribal name, Magog, which 122 gradually became Rosh, then Rus, and today is known as Russia

18

He said, ‘Magog is called the Scythians by the Greeks.’ He continued by saying that these people lived in the northern regions above the Caucasus mountains

19

Rosh, taken as a proper name, in Ezekiel signifies the inhabitants 127 of Scythia, from whom the modern Russians derive their name

20

History shows that atheistic communism emanates from the political leadership in Russia and extends throughout their nefarious system all over the world

153

21

Another factor that evokes the wrath of God against Russia and her leaders is their mistreatment of the Jews

109

22

According to Ezekiel 38:5–6, Gog’s confederates are among the 171 current friends of Russia. Those not presently within her circle are being lured into her orbit of influence

23

Dr. Bauman traces evidence of some of the sons of Togarmah to the Turkoman tribes in Central Asia. This would explain the phrase: of the uttermost north, and all its hordes

173

24

…a dominant leader in Russia called Gog and described as the “chief prince of Rosh” is going to arise and lead Russia into a vast northeastern confederation of nations including Iran, Ethiopia, and other African nations, Germany, Armenia, possibly the Turks…

262

25

This group of evil nations, headed by Russia, make up a massive 141 northeastern confederation that will advance against Israel in the last days

26

When you hear that the Russians have captured the city of Crimea, you should know that the times of the Messiah have started, that his steps are being heard

27

And when you hear that the Russians have reached the city of 204 Constantinople, you should put on your Shabbat clothes and don’t take them off, because it means that the Mashiach is about to come any minute

156

157

References BBC. 2014. Russian nationalist thinker Dugin sees war with Ukraine, July 10. Accessed September 22, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28229785. Boyer, Paul. 1992. When time shall be no more: Prophecy belief in modern American culture. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

References

293

Brown, Peter F., Vincent J. Della Pietra, Peter V. deSouza, Jenifer C. Lai, and Robert L. Mercer. 1992. Class-based n-gram models of natural language. Computational Linguistics 18(4): 467–480. https://aclanthology.org/J92-4003. Chew, Peter. 2015, January 17. ‘Linguistics-Lite’ topic extraction from multilingual social media data. Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, and Prediction Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9021: 276–282. Coleman, Lyman. 1854. The world as known to the Hebrews. A map from historical textbook and Atlas of biblical geography. Wikimedia Commons. Accessed September 13, 2021. https://com mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Noahsworld_map.jpg. Colson, C., and J. Eckerd. 1991. Why America doesn’t work. Nashville, TN: W Pub Group. Court de Gébelin, Antoine. 1775 (reprinted 2018). Monde Primitif, Analysé et Comparé avec le Monde Moderne, Considéré dans l’Histoire Naturelle de la Parole; Ou Origine du Langage et de L’Écriture. Forgotten Books. de Custine, Astolphe-Louis-Léonor. 1843. La Russie en 1839. Brussels: Wouters et Compagnie. elig-emerytka. 2015. Czy w Europie dojdzie do rzezi islamskiej mniejszo´sci? Fronda.pl, October 4. Accessed September 24, 2021. https://m.fronda.pl/a/czy-w-europie-dojdzie-do-rzezi-islams kiej-mniejszosci,58008.html?fbclid=IwAR11oKWJRiB_kMCBinuX_v3jdqce81nwuZ2Pkj1P nCdedmYqyf0UrXhhkEQ. Estoup, J.B. 1916. Gammes Sténographiques. Paris: Institut Sténographique. Haaretz. 2014. FYI: Putin=Gog, Crimea=Magog, the apocalypse is here and the Messiah is coming. Haaretz, March 29. Accessed September 13, 2021. https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-fyiputin-gog-crimea-magog-1.5341056. Halverson, Jeffry R., H.L. Goodall Jr., and Steven R. Corman. 2011. Master narratives of Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Heuer, Richard. 1999. Psychology of intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Accessed July 29, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/static/9a5f1162fd0932c29bfed1c030edf4ae/Pys chology-of-Intelligence-Analysis.pdf. Josephus, Flavius. AD 93. Antiquities of the Jews. Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Accessed September 13, 2021. https://ccel.org/ccel/j/josephus/complete/cache/complete.pdf. LaHaye, Tim. 1991. The beginning of the end. United States: Tyndale House Publishers. Lee, Lydia. 2017. The enemies within: Gog of Magog in Ezekiel 38–39. HTS Teologiese Studies, September 1. Accessed September 13, 2021. gale.com/apps/doc/A520512732/AONE?u=nm_ p_oweb&sid=googleScholar&xid=bd26297b. Leffler, Melvyn P. 2018. Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What mattered most. Texas National Security Review, May. Accessed September 22, 2021. https://doi.org/10.15781/T2FJ29W93. Lindsey, Hal. 1970. The late, great planet earth. United States: Zondervan. Montell, Amanda. 2021. Cultish: The language of fanaticism. New York: HarperCollins. Politico. 2017. Reagan challenges Gorbachev to ‘tear down’ Berlin Wall, June 12, 1987, June 11. Accessed September 22, 2021. https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/11/reagan-challengesgorbachev-to-tear-down-berlin-wall-june-12-1987-239376. Regnum.ru. 2005. Bлaдимиp Пyтин: “Pacпaд CCCP—кpyпнeйшaя гeoпoлитичecкaя кaтacтpoфa вeкa”. regnum, April 25. Accessed September 21, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/ 444083.html. Reuters. 2021. Russia and Belarus agree closer energy, economic integration, September 9. Accessed September 22, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-belarus-agree-closer-ene rgy-economic-integration-2021-09-09/. Robinson, David G. 2010. Statistical language analysis for automatic exfiltration event detection. SAND Report, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/ 983675. Turnley, Jessica Glicken, Peter A. Chew, and Aaron S. Perls. 2012. Beyond validation: Alternative uses and associated assessments of goodness for computational social models. Report delivered to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Office of Strategic Research and Dialogues.

294

6 Finding and Analyzing the ‘Fringe’ Versus the ‘Mainstream’

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 2018. Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for national security. govinfo.gov, January 10. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-115SPRT28110/pdf/CPRT115SPRT28110.pdf. Wilson, Andrew T., and David G. Robinson. 2011. Tracking topic birth and death in LDA. Sandia Report, Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/ 1029827. Блoк, Aлeкcaндp. 1918. Cкифы. https://www.culture.ru/poems/278/skify. Дyгин, Aлeкcaндp. n.d. Eвpaзийcкий пpoeкт и eгo yкpaинcкaя пpoблeмa. Accessed September 22, 2021. http://www.odnako.org/magazine/material/evraziyskiy-proekt-i-ego-ukrainskaya-pro blema/. Лeнин, Bлaдимиp И. 1914. К вoпpocy o нaциoнaльнoй пoлитикe, April. Accessed September 22, 2021. http://libelli.ru/works/25-5.htm. Heмцoв, Бopиc. 2010. Пyтин и Лyкaшeнкo нeнaвидят дpyг дpyгa. Delo.UA, July 27. Accessed September 22, 2021. https://delo.ua/opinions/mnenie-putin-i-lukashenko-drug-143297/.

Chapter 7

Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.1 Visualization of a topic derived from our topic analysis of Russian-language media in 2022

Abstract In each of Chaps. 2–6, we started by reviewing the cultural background relating to the former Soviet Union as a whole, or a particular geographic area in or around it. From there, we proceeded either to an analysis of social media data relevant to the big issues raised in the background, or, in one case, to demonstrate a new analytical technique we developed. In this chapter, our approach is different. Here, we start with the analysis, building upon all the analytical techniques we used in the previous five chapters, and adding one new approach (Keyness analysis). As before, our analytical approach is entirely unsupervised, which in this context means that the analysis simply reflects what is in the data, offering high-level insights. Unsupervised approaches contrast here with those that process the data according to preconceived notions of how to sort and categorize text; we believe the latter type of approach can lead to pernicious, opaque biases built into the analysis, and actually usurping the proper role of the human in the loop of analysis. The area we explore here is one which is, at the time of writing, top of many analysts’ minds: Ukraine. In particular, we explore what unsupervised methods of analysis can tell us about Russian-language news coverage of the war in Ukraine, including both what was surprising to us and what was in line with our expectations. From the analysis, we draw out conclusions that relate squarely back to the cultural background we explored in each of the five prior chapters.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_7

295

296

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

7.1 Background On February 24, 2022, Russian troops invaded Ukraine. The invasion followed months of buildup of Russian troops around Ukraine’s borders, and it also followed the 2014 annexation of Crimea (Ukrainian territory) by Russia and the backing by Russia in the same year of separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region. And these events of 2014, in turn, followed the invasion of Georgia by Russia in 2008. It seems fair to say, however, that Russia’s action in 2022 has had more farreaching consequences than those that went before. As we noted in Chap. 2, the 2022 invasion precipitated much harsher Western sanctions on Russia than anything previously seen. With Western firms leaving Russia, Russia is looking increasingly like a reprise of the Soviet Union. It is as though Western toleration of Russia’s actions, stretched in 2008 and 2014, finally hit a breaking-point in February 2022. At this time which seems to be one of those pivotal turning-points in Russian history—like 1917 or 1991—what narratives can we observe in Russian-language media? How can we analyze the discourse at a high level and what useful observations can we draw out that are either surprising, or in line with expectations? And what takeaways might there be for Western analysts focusing on Russia and the region? In this chapter, we use three modes of unsupervised analysis to answer these questions (Fig. 7.1). These are: • Topic analysis via Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), a form of signal processing, to find links between specific Russian news sources and topics, and also links between topics and when they were discussed; • Differential analysis between Russian news sources, and also over time, using Keyness analysis; • The Fringe Beliefs analytical technique we introduced in Chap. 6 to test the hypothesis that the independent Russian-language news source, Meduza, is an outlier in the Russian information landscape. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 7.2, we introduce the dataset of Russian-language news articles we used for this study. In Sect. 7.3, we recapitulate the basics of SVD, the underlying technique we apply for most of our data analysis. In Sects. 7.4 and 7.5.1, we apply SVD to explore the data in a number of ways, including testing the hypothesis that Meduza, as an independent Russian-language news source, would be an outlier and that the fundamental statistics of the text would show this; using SVD to run something like a ‘CT scan’ of the data both by news source and by time period during 2022, providing a fine-grained picture for the analyst. Then, in Sect. 7.5.3, we drill down further using Keyness analysis (unrelated to SVD) to find out what it is about Meduza that makes it an outlier compared to media that take on a role as Kremlin mouthpiece. In Sect. 7.6, we then turn to using Keyness analysis to get a broad picture of how the focus of Russian media changed over time. In Sect. 7.7 we sum up all our findings.

7.2 Data Used for This Chapter, and Method of Collection

297

Fig. 7.2 After scraping, data can be loaded into a relational database for further analysis

7.2 Data Used for This Chapter, and Method of Collection For the analyses described in this chapter, we collected close to 3,000 news articles from four different Russian news sources: three based in Russia, which we can assume to be more or less subject to the control over information exerted by the Kremlin, and Meduza, a Russian-language media source based in Latvia.1 These four sources are as follows: • 1tv.ru, Russia’s Channel One (Пepвый кaнaл), a Russian state-controlled television channel, based in Moscow. • gazeta.ru, a Russian news website based in Moscow and owned by the stateowned company Sberbank. • meduza.io, an independent Russian-language news website (see Footnote 1). • rt.com, also known as RT (formerly Russia Today), a Russian state-controlled international television network, likely intended to compete with Western cable news such as CNN or BBC World. We targeted collection of data towards articles posted from January 1, 2022 onwards, using a web scraper, and (to manage the size of the dataset collected) we aimed to collect articles posted on each Monday in the period. We hoped this would result in a somewhat representative sample of news articles, assuming a roughly weekly news cycle. Once data was collected, we are able to process it in an analytical pipeline. With scraped data downloaded as an Excel (.xlsx) file, we cleaned the data (for example, removing entries which have no article title, subtitle, or body), then loaded it into a SQL Server database (Fig. 7.2) for further analysis in a Jupyter Notebook (Fig. 7.3).

1

The Russian journalist who founded Meduza in 2014, Galina Timchenko, relocated from Russia to Latvia specifically so Meduza could retain its independence. Timchenko was fired from her job as chief editor of Lenta.ru, another Russian-language online newspaper which remains in Moscow. Timchenko stated: ‘It’s just the way it is: right now, in Latvia one can set up an independent Russian-language publication, but not in Russia.’ (‘Пpocтo тaк вышлo, чтo в Лaтвии ceйчac мoжнo cдeлaть нeзaвиcимoe pyccкoязычнoe издaниe, a в Poccии нeт.’) (Cypгaнoвa 2014).

298

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.3 Jupyter notebooks, which open up many avenues for quick, flexible, shareable analysis and documentation of that analysis, can easily integrate with many relational databases, querying data in-situ and avoiding the need to shunt large amounts of data around

Figure 7.4 provides an overview showing how many articles we collected by news source and publication date. In the next sections, we discuss the analytical approaches we took to making sense of this data.

7.3 Our Approach: Signal Processing (and SVD) Fundamentals This section presents the technical (mathematical) theory underlying our approach, including why we can be confident on the basis of the theory that this approach can be relied upon to achieve the twin objectives of (1) identifying key topics, and (2) differentiating between mainstream and fringe in the Russian media landscape. We proceed with this discussion in layman’s terms to the extent possible; however, we do not dispense completely with math and code examples. In this section, however, we do relate the math to the real-world needs of an analyst as we understand them. The reader who is more interested in the results than the theory may skip this section and proceed directly to Sect. 7.4.

7.3 Our Approach: Signal Processing (and SVD) Fundamentals

299

Fig. 7.4 Distribution of articles in dataset by publication date

As in past work, we use an approach to signal processing, Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), to isolate key elements of signal in the data collected. The aims of the approach are similar to those of other approaches to topic extraction, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). The elements of signal that emerge when SVD is applied to the data are similar to the topics of LDA. However, SVD has some key properties that LDA does not, which make SVD advantageous for our purposes: • SVD is deterministic. While there are different algorithms to compute the SVD, and these algorithms may use iteration to compute the SVD, if SVD is run multiple times or using different implementations/algorithms, it should always come out with the same result.2 LDA, on the other hand, can factorize the same data in multiple different ways, leading to questions about the interpretability of the output. • SVD is an orthogonal factorization. That is to say, the topics or elements of signal that emerge from SVD are orthogonal to one another, defining a Euclidean ‘semantic space’ in which each topic is a dimension. This allows us a natural way, 2

Sometimes, the signs of numerical values may be reversed, which happens in effect because a positive value may be factorized by either two negatives or two positives, but as far as the claim of SVD’s deterministic nature is concerned, this mathematical quirk is immaterial; our downstream process of interpreting the output of SVD is the same whether the signs are positive or negative.

300

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

mathematically, to define that space, but also to measure the similarity of one text to another, which becomes useful in determining which texts cluster with one another and which are outliers. We will elaborate more on this in Sects. 7.4.1 and 7.5.1. • With a truncated SVD, by definition, we obtain the best possible approximation to the original dataset (in terms of per-document word frequencies) in the truncated number of dimensions. In other words, SVD provides a good foundation for a number of downstream analytical techniques, in addition to providing a reliable (deterministic and theoretically justifiable) way of extracting topics from text and determining which words and texts are most representative of each topic. To apply SVD here, we perform the following steps: 1. Calculate how many occurrences of each word are in each Russian news article and populate the cells of a term-by-article matrix with those values. Each cell (i, j) in this matrix will then represent the f (i, j), the frequency of word i in document j. 2. Weight the values in the matrix using Pointwise Mutual Information weighting, in which: pmi(i, j ) = log

p(i, j ) p(i| j)

3. L2-normalize the values in the matrix column-wise (document-wise), such that the sum of the squared values in each column is 1.0. The effect of this step is to balance the information contribution of each document (article) to the overall signal. 4. Compute the SVD of the matrix output from step 3. In a Jupyter notebook, these steps can be accomplished relatively simply through code like the following:

7.3 Our Approach: Signal Processing (and SVD) Fundamentals

1. Create term-by-document matrix

2. PMI weighting

3. L2 normalization

4. SVD computation

301

302

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.5 Graphical representation of SVD factorization of a matrix. ‘Step (4)’ refers to page 12 above

The SVD of the matrix which is the output of step (3), which we can call W, consists of three further matrices, U, S, and V (as can also be seen in the code above) (Fig. 7.5). Key properties of the SVD to note here are as follows: • U and V are dense matrices, and S is a diagonal matrix (meaning that all values other than in the leading diagonal are zero). The number of columns of U (call that number m) equals the number of rows in V T (the transpose of V ), and these equal the number of both rows and columns in S. • The m values in S are the eigenvalues of W, in descending order from top left to bottom right. • The SVD output encodes, numerically: – In U, how important each term (word) is in each of the m topics or ‘dimensions of meaning’. – In S, how important each of the m topics is to the overall signal. (This relates to why SVD is sometimes called Principal Component Analysis.) – In V, how important each document (news article) is in each of the m topics or ‘dimensions of meaning’. • The product USV T is equal to W. However, it is also possible to truncate the SVD so that a smaller number k of columns and rows, respectively, are in U and V T . In this case only the top most important topics are included and the product of the truncated matrices USV T becomes an approximation to W —the closest possible approximation in a least-squares sense given k. Truncated SVD is the approach that we use, because we operate on the assumption that an analyst seeking to make sense of complex data has only finite and limited time to do so. A benefit of truncated SVD is that the computer can sort a mass of text into an ordered list of the most statistically important components of signal in the data for the analyst’s attention. The analyst can read down the list, starting with the signal components that correspond to the top eigenvalues first. We can set the value of k in the truncated SVD to whatever the analyst has time for, with full confidence

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

303

(because of how the mathematics works) that given that value of k, the top patterns in the data will be brought to the analyst’s attention. Admittedly, low values of k may not be guaranteed always to direct the analyst’s attention to ‘needles in the haystack’ which could be important in an intelligence-analysis sense (for example, the needle in the haystack pointing to the next 9/11 attack). However, SVD is surprisingly sensitive to subtle patterns in data, and it could take only a few mentions of the same ‘smoking gun’ within thousands of texts for SVD to find that needle. And of course there is always the risk, no matter what method we use, that we may miss needles in the haystack, especially given time constraints. There is always a tradeoff between plugging all possible security holes and the time and resources required to accomplish that, but truncated SVD at least gives us a way in intelligence analysis to place our bets well. In the next section we will show what human-interpretable outputs of SVD look like in practice, when truncated SVD is applied to the dataset of Russian-language news articles.

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media 7.4.1 Application of SVD to Our Data In this section we look at the four Russian news sources, and the articles they publish, in two different ways. Here, we can leverage the artifacts of analysis we discussed in Sect. 7.3, as follows. As we saw in Sect. 7.3, one of the outputs of (truncated) SVD is U. In our application to the news articles, U is an article-by-topic matrix, in which each article is represented by a vector in Euclidean space. In our case, the orthogonal dimensions of that Euclidean space are, in fact, the k topics or components of signal that we saw in Sect. 7.3. The vector for each article, then, represents how ‘strong’ the article is in each of those k topics or dimensions. We can first inspect U (and begin to make it human-interpretable) by generating a list of which articles are strongest in each of the k elements of signal (we show in Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook code snippets how this is done within the Jupyter notebook), along the lines of the following: k = 0: Doc 797 (0.060) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mиниcтepcтвa oбopoны Poccии гeнepaл-мaйop Игopь Кoнaшe Doc 854 (0.060) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв зaявил, чтo Mocквa нaзвaлa Киeв Doc 776 (0.059) B yтpeнниe чacы пoнeдeльникa, 28 фeвpaля, нaчнyтcя пepeгoвopы дeлeгaций Poccии и

304

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 1602 (0.002) Poccийcкaя кoмaндa выигpaлa cepeбpo в пpыжкax c тpaмплинa в cмeшaнныx кoмaндныx B кoнвepт oбычнo вB eгo пиcьмax нeт cлoв. Cтpoгo гoвopя, в ниx нeт caмиx пиceм. Doc 101 (0.003) Пepвый кaнaл пpeдcтaвляeт тeлeвepcию юбилeйнoгo кoнцepтa нapoднoгo apтиcтa Poccи k = 1: Doc 2447 (0.025) Oпyбликoвaнным yкpaинcкoй cтopoнoй и pядoм зaпaдныx CMИ мaтepиaлaм o coбытияx в Doc 149 (0.024) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 251 (0.024) Poccия coзывaeт Coвeт бeзoпacнocти OOH в cвязи c вoпиющeй пpoвoкaциeй paдикaлoв Doc 776 (−0.121) B yтpeнниe чacы пoнeдeльникa, 28 фeвpaля, нaчнyтcя пepeгoвopы дeлeгaций Poccии и Doc 879 (−0.116) Poccийcкий пeвeц Hикoлaй Бacкoв зaoчнo apecтoвaн нa Укpaинe, cooбщaeт PИA «Hoвoc Doc 895 (−0.112) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин пpoвeл тeлeфoнный paзгoвop c пpeмьep-миниcтpoм Л k = 2: Doc 383 (0.125) Hoвaя инфopмaция oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщ Doc 377 (0.123) Зa cyтки yничтoжeны пyнкты yпpaвлeния BCУ, paйoны cкoплeния тexники, oгнeвыe тoч Doc 315 (0.117) Зa нoчь выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми вoздyшнoгo бaзиpoвaния yничтoжeны 16 вoeнныx oбъ Doc 798 (−0.049) Ha пepeгoвopax Poccии и Укpaины в Бeлopyccии ceйчac пepepыв, пepeдaeт Sputnik Бe Doc 771 (−0.047) B Бeлopyccии нaчaлcя тpeтий этaп пepeгoвopoв Poccии и Укpaины, кoтopый дoлжeн cт Doc 807 (−0.044) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpoпeйcкoгo coюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo в тeкyщeй пoвecткe etc.

Scanning the output tells us, for example, that for k = 2 (the third most important topic in terms of importance to the overall signal in the data), documents that discuss talks (пepeгoвopы) between Russia and Ukraine (e.g. documents 798, 771) feature among the most significantly. Note that when assessing importance, we must review those documents that rank highest both positively and negatively. (Mathematically, this is because SVD is a factorization; the same number may be factorized either by two negative factors or by two positive factors; and in SVD a sign reversal is not necessarily in itself significant.) We can inspect V, the matrix that encodes the importance of terms or words in the components of signal, in similar fashion:

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

305

k = 0: paнee (0.135) влaдимиp (0.111) зaявил (0.110) пpeзидeнт (0.106) пyтин (0.095) oб (0.093) вoeннoй (0.092) днp (0.090) глaв (0.090) фeвpaля (0.090) тypниpaми (0.000) гopячкинa (0.000) гpoccмeйcтepoм (0.000) гpoccмeйcтepoв (0.000) бepeзники (0.000) шпиль (0.000) нeyвepeннo (0.000) нeyвepeннoй (0.000) yлыбaлcя (0.000) фopyмoв (0.000) k = 1: aпpeля (0.037) чeлoвeк (0.031) житeлeй (0.030) paнee (0.029) гoдa (0.029) peзyльтaтe (0.029) миpныx (0.028) дaнным (0.027) cми (0.027) якoбы (0.027) пpocьбy (−0.197) глaв (−0.190) пpoвeдeнии (−0.186) пpинял (−0.168) paзopвaлa (−0.165) диплoмaтичecкиe (−0.160) вeдeт (−0.158) зaщитe (−0.154) oтвeт (−0.149) тpaнcляцию (−0.147) пpocьбy (−0.197) глaв (−0.190) пpoвeдeнии (−0.186) пpинял (−0.168) paзopвaлa (−0.165) диплoмaтичecкиe (−0.160) вeдeт (−0.158) зaщитe (−0.154) oтвeт (−0.149) тpaнcляцию (−0.147) k = 2: кoнaшeнкoв (0.142) минoбopoны (0.132) yкpaинcкиx (0.128) paйoнe (0.105) cилы (0.102) yничтoжeны (0.100) вcy (0.098) нapoднoй (0.094) игopь (0.091) пyнктa (0.090) пpeзидeнтa (−0.068) пepeгoвopы (−0.060) пpeзидeнт (−0.053) миниcтp (0.052) cтpaны (-0.051) мид (-0.049) yкpaинy (-0.048) бeзoпacнocти (0.047) пepeгoвopoв (-0.046) влaдимиp (-0.046) etc.

Note that for k = 2, Russian words for ‘talks’ (пepeгoвopы, пepeгoвopoв) show up in the terms as they did in the articles, giving the skeptical analyst confidence that the SVD produces internally consistent results, and that coding errors have not interfered with this. Above, we showed the output for k = 0, k = 1, and k = 2, but we can produce and inspect similar output for all of the k topics in the truncated SVD. Recall also that SVD assumes an ordered list of eigenvalues, so for each successive value of k in the output above, we know its relative ordering in terms of explaining the source data. The most statistically important pattern is where k = 0, the next most important, k = 1, and so on. Further human-interpretable views on the SVD output can be obtained by creating charts for each k. There are many possible ways to do this (the possibilities are limited only by the metadata available in the source data and the analyst’s imagination), but two examples here are to create charts of the data highlighting the importance of each k either (1) to each news source (see Fig. 7.6) or (2) to each time period when articles were published (see Fig. 7.7). The code that generates per-topic charts like those in Figs. 7.6 and 7.7 is included in Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook code snippets.

306

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.6 News articles by SVD topic and source. Each dot represents one news article; colors represent sources (Red—1TV, Blue—Gazeta, Green—Meduza, Yellow—Russia Today), the y-axis represents importance to the topic. Articles are ordered on the x-axis by news source and then by date published

Fig. 7.7 News articles by topic and publishing date. Each point represents one news article; the yaxis represents importance to the topic, and the x-axis represents the week number in 2022. Colors in this graph are also used to differentiate weeks, with blue-toned points representing articles published before the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 2/24/2022, and red-toned points representing post-invasion articles. Note that these graphs do not differentiate between article source

Reading and making sense of these charts is something of an acquired art, just as reading an X-ray or CT scan might be. Of course, this does not diminish the usefulness of either medical imaging, or charts like those above, or the ability of either to point to very real diagnostic phenomena. A key point to appreciate goes with what we have already mentioned, which is that the analyst should pay attention to outliers both on the positive and the negative end of the y-axis; whether values are positive or negative is beside the point—the analyst should focus simply on outliers. From Figs. 7.6 and 7.7, then, we can demonstrate how analysis proceeds. Notice from Fig. 7.7 that topic 1 spiked post-invasion (visible from the clear difference between the pre-invasion tight bunching of all articles versus the post-invasion scattering towards the lower end of the y-axis. Looking at Fig. 7.6, and within it, the equivalent chart (for topic 1), we can then see further that the articles which form part of this spike are almost wholly from Gazeta.ru. Taken together with the top terms and top documents listed above for k = 1, as already mentioned, we then see that this topic appears to have something to do with diplomacy involving Putin. And indeed, as we saw, top articles within this topic are on diplomatic talks between Russia and Ukraine.

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

307

We can already articulate a conclusion from this example: Gazeta.ru had a significant focus on talks between Ukraine and Russia, but only after the invasion. And a key piece of information here, that we would not know without having used SVD for the analysis, is that this was the second most statistically important element of signal in the Russian news data overall. To reiterate, ‘statistical importance’ does not necessarily equate to ‘intelligence-analysis importance’, but it is not completely unrelated either. To put an analysis in context, we need to know how much of the data the analysis explains. This sample analysis demonstrates the basic building blocks of our analytical pipeline. After SVD is run, an analyst can repeat a similar process to look over the data more extensively, understand which patterns most explain the data, and then use human reasoning to make sense of these patterns.

7.4.2 Topics of Interest: Detailed Discussion For our analysis, we used k = 108 (returning 108 topics). To reiterate, truncated SVD is deterministic; if we chose k = 25 topics as the input parameter, we would find the same top 25 topics in the same order as we found with choosing 108 topics. Setting k = 108 is a simple parameter change in the code already shown, and then output and charts (now for 108 topics) are produced as described above. We then reviewed this output and demonstrate the results we obtained from articles published between January 1st, 2022 until May 16th, 2022. We provide our own commentary on what light we think the analysis sheds on what narratives are coming out of the Russophone world. On the basis of the graphical representations of the 108 topics, we selectively picked 12 topics out of the 108 that particularly caught our attention. Another analyst reviewing the same output might select other topics—there is no right answer as to what most merits delving into. We see that as an advantage of the approach—it tends not to lead an analyst into preconceptions that might be embedded in black box software, but rather simply reflects the data in summarized format and allows the analyst freedom to take the analysis in many different directions. The reader of this chapter who wants to delve into the data further, and review topics beyond the 12 we discuss below, can refer to Appendix 1: Full list of topics extracted from 2,838 Russian media articles, 1/1/2022–5/16/2022, which lists all 108 topics together with the words and article snippets most associated with each topic. Figure 7.8 shows which of our 12 selected topics relate to which time periods, and provides a quick overview of the overall timing of when these 12 topics spiked in importance.

308

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Topic Number

From topics presented in this document: Week of highest topic relevance 0 9 14 -Russian fake 21 - Mockery of 21- Mockery 24 - Humanitarian 18 Ukraine 29 - pre-invasion denial of Ukraine corridors 27 36 38 - Mockery of Truss 32 - fears of sabotage 45 40 - The 2014 'coup' 54 63 72 78 - Putin's NATO grievances 81 90 103 - Russia compares 88 - Putin's 'my beauty' 99 100 - Russia reacts to Ukrainian nationalism remark US prebunking to terrorism 108 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22

Week number of 2022 (counting from 1/1/2022)

Fig. 7.8 In which week each topic we analyzed spikes in importance. Weeks 10 and after are post-invasion. Topics represented by red points were those that generally spiked post-invasion

7.4.2.1

A Russian Fake About Alleged Ukrainian Incursion

(Topic 14)

From the chart on the right, we see that this topic spikes at week 9, immediately preceding the invasion. From the chart on the left, we can see that these articles are on Gazeta.ru and Russian.rt.com. The key words (from the ‘top words’ output) are: Topic 14: фcб (-0.140) дивepcиoннo (-0.131) южнoгo (-0.130) oкpyгa (-0.128) paзвeдывaтeльнoй (-0.123) гpaницы (-0.121) вoeннoгo (-0.120) ювo (-0.110) пpeдoтвpaтили (-0.104) pocтoвcкoй (-0.102)

Notice we see the words for ‘sabotage’ (дивepcиoннo) and ‘border’ (гpaницы). With the most representative articles, we see that Russian news organizations pushed a story of Ukrainian military forces attempting to perform sabotage along the Russian-Ukrainian border. In addition, the FSB claimed a border checkpoint had been destroyed by artillery from Ukraine. One article includes the following:

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

309

Cвeдeния o дивepcиoннo-paзвeдывaтeльнoй гpyппe нa бoeвыx мaшинax пexoты (БMП) в Pocтoвcкoй oблacти являютcя фeйкoм. Oб этoм cooбщaeт Reuters co ccылкoй нa иcтoчники в Киeвe.«Укpaинcкиe cилы нe пpиcyтcтвyют в Pocтoвcкoй oблacти», — yкaзaнo в cooбщeнии.Paнee cooбщaлocь, чтo пoдpaздeлeния Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa (ЮBO) и Пoгpaничнaя cлyжбa ФCБ Poccии пpeдoтвpaтили нapyшeниe гocyдapcтвeннoй гpaницы PФ дивepcиoннopaзвeдывaтeльнoй гpyппы (ДPГ) c Укpaины в Pocтoвcкoй oблacти. B пpecccлyжбe ЮBO дoбaвили, чтo пять нapyшитeлeй из cocтaвa ДPГ были yничтoжeны. Poccийcкиe вoeннocлyжaщиe и пoгpaничники в peзyльтaтe инцидeнтa нe пocтpaдaли. Haкaнyнe cooбщaлocь, чтo c тeppитopии Укpaины был выпyщeн cнapяд, кoтopый пoпaл в пyнкт пoгpaничнoй cлyжбы ФCБ пo Pocтoвcкoй oблacти. B peзyльтaтe здaниe былo пoлнocтью paзpyшeнo, пocтpaдaвшиx нeт. Пoзднee ФCБ oпyбликoвaлa видeo c пoгpaнпyнктoм, paзpyшeнным cнapядoм BCУ. (Gazeta 2022h) Translation: ‘Information about a sabotage and reconnaissance group on infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in the Rostov region is fake. This was reported by Reuters, citing sources in Kyiv. “Ukrainian forces are not present in Rostov region,” the report says. It had been reported earlier that units of the Southern Military District (SMD) and Russia’s FSB Border Guard Service prevented a sabotage and reconnaissance group (Russian abbreviation: DRG) from Ukraine from violating the Russian Federation state border in Rostov region. The Southern Military District press service added that five DRG perpetrators were killed. Russian servicemen and border guards were not injured as a result of the incident. It had been reported the day before that a projectile was fired from the territory of Ukraine and hit an FSB border post in the Rostov region. The building was completely destroyed as a result but there were no casualties. Later, the FSB released a video showing a border checkpoint destroyed by an Armed Forces of Ukraine shell.’

7.4.2.2

Mockery of Changing Ukrainian Positions on NATO Membership

(Topic 21)

At week 8, a week before the invasion, topic 21 spiked, and we see from the left-hand chart that this spike was particularly associated with Gazeta.ru. The words associated with the spike are:

310

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Topic 21: пecкoв (0.110) ceкpeтapь (0.109) нoвocти (0.106) pиa (0.103) пpивoдит (0.100) пpecc (0.088) cлoвa (0.085) дмитpий (0.082) peзyльтaтe (0.071) пoгибли (0.064)

This list of top words mentions ‘Peskov’ (пecкoв), ‘Dmitri’ (дмитpий), and ‘secretary’ (ceкpeтapь). In addition to the foreign affairs slant seen in the ‘top words’ output, we find from the ‘top documents’ output that a Ukrainian ambassador to the UK commented that Ukraine might be willing to refuse NATO membership in order to avoid war with Russia. The articles point out first that Ukraine’s constitution enshrines its aspiration of joining NATO, and also that the Ukrainian ambassador later retracted his words. One article includes the following: Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл зaявлeниe пocлa Укpaины в Beликoбpитaнии Baдимa Пpиcтaйкo o тoм, чтo eгo cтpaнa мoжeт oткaзaтьcя oт члeнcтвa HATO вo избeжaниe вoйны в PФ.«B дaннoм cлyчae oбpaтитe внимaниe, чтo из Киeвa пoпpocили пocлa paзъяcнeний eгo мнeния. Пoэтoмy вpяд ли этo мoжнo вocпpинимaть кaк cвepшившийcя фaкт измeны внeшнeпoлитичecкoгo миpoвoззpeния Киeвa. Mы знaeм, чтo coвceм дpyгиe цeли oбoзнaчeны в кoнcтитyции cтpaны», — cкaзaл пpeдcтaвитeль Кpeмля. Paнee пocoл Укpaины в Beликoбpитaнии Baдим Пpиcтaйкo зaявил, чтo Киeв мoжeт oткaзaтьcя oт cтpeмлeния вcтyпить в HATO, чтoбы «избeжaть вoйны» c Poccиeй. Пoзжe oн oткaзaлcя oт cвoиx cлoв.Teм нe мeнee, eгo зaявлeниe нeмeдлeннo пoдвepгли кpитикe нa Укpaинe. Пpeccceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Укpaины Cepгeй Hикифopoв нaпoмнил, чтo cтpeмлeниe в HATO зaкpeплeнo в yкpaинcкoй кoнcтитyции, и пoтpeбoвaл y Пpиcтaйкo oбъяcнeний.Ceвepoaтлaнтичecкий aльянc нa caммитe в Бyxapecтe в aпpeлe 2008 гoдa пpинял пoлитичecкoe зaявлeниe o тoм, чтo «Укpaинa и Гpyзия co вpeмeнeм cтaнyт члeнaми HATO». B фeвpaлe 2019 гoдa Bepxoвнaя paдa Укpaины oдoбpилa пoпpaвки в кoнcтитyцию cтpaны, зaкpeпляющиe cтpeмлeниe cтpaны в Ceвepoaтлaнтичecкий aльянc. Киeв пoлyчил cтaтyc пapтнepa opгaнизaции c pacшиpeнными вoзмoжнocтями. (Gazeta 2022b) Translation: ‘Russian presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov commented on the statement of the Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK, Vadim Prystaiko, that his country may abstain from NATO membership to avoid war with the Russian Federation. “In this case, note that a request came Kyiv to the ambassador for clarification. This can thus hardly be perceived as a fait accompli in terms of Kyiv making a foreign policy U-turn. We know that the country’s constitution enshrines completely different goals,” said the Kremlin spokesman. Earlier, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK, Vadim Prystaiko, said Kyiv might abandon its aspiration to join NATO in order to “avoid war” with Russia. He later retracted his words. However, his statement was immediately criticized in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Press Secretary, Serhiy Nikiforov, reminded listeners that the Ukrainian constitution enshrines Ukraine’s goal of joining NATO, and demanded an explanation from Prystaiko. At its Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO adopted a political resolution that “Ukraine and Georgia will eventually become NATO members.” In February 2019, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved amendments to the country’s constitution, establishing Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO. Kyiv received NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner status.’

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

7.4.2.3

311

Humanitarian Corridors Propaganda, Claims of Russian Air Superiority

(Topic 24)

Here, we see topic 24 spikes in the two weeks following the invasion, as well as in week 21 of 2022. The top words of importance to this topic are: Topic 24: нoвocти (0.118) pиa (0.112) poccийcкиx (0.083) пecкoв (0.074) poccийcкoгo (0.069) пpecc (0.067) cпeциaльнoй (0.065) ec (0.065) нaчaлa (0.062) caнкции (0.061) Topic 24: тишины (-0.098) peжим (-0.089) бeзoпacнocти (-0.083) ooн (-0.075) кopидopы (-0.074) мapиyпoля (-0.069) гyмaнитapныe (-0.067) paйoнe (-0.066) cyм (-0.064) cшa (-0.062)

Among these words, we see ‘Peskov’ (пecкoв), ‘sanctions’ (caнкции); various adjectival forms of Russia (poccийcкиx and poccийcкoгo); ‘corridors’ (кopидopы); ‘Mariupol’ (мapиyпoля); and ‘humanitarian’ (гyмaнитapныe). Key articles refer to an announcement by a Russian general about Russia having complete air superiority over the whole of Ukraine, a tenuous claim at that time. Other articles refer to Ukraine’s disdain for Russian proposed humanitarian corridors leading out of Mariupol and into Russia. Key text is shown below. Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщитe Дoнeцкoй и Лyгaнcкoй нapoдныx pecпyблик пo дeмилитapизaции и дeнaцификaции Укpaины: «Boopyжeнными cилaми Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции взяты пoд кoнтpoль гopoдa Бepдянcк, Энepгoдap. Poccийcкими вoeннocлyжaщими пoлнocтью oxpaняeтcя и кoнтpoлиpyeтcя тeppитopия вoкpyг Зaпopoжcкoй aтoмнoй элeктpocтaнции. Пepcoнaл AЭC пpoдoлжaeт paбoтy пo oбcлyживaнию oбъeктoв и кoнтpoлю paдиoaктивнoй oбcтaнoвки в штaтнoм peжимe. Paдиoaктивный фoн в нopмe. Boздyшнo-кocмичecкиe cилы Poccии зa иcтeкшиe cyтки yничтoжили вoceмь бoeвыx мaшин "Бyк M-1", cтaнции нaвeдeния ЗPК C-300 и "Бyк M-1", тpи paдиoтexничecкиe пoзиции co cтaнциями П-14, чeтыpe бoeвыx caмoлeтa нa зeмлe и oдин бoeвoй caмoлeт cбит в вoздyxe. Poccийcкaя aвиaция зaвoeвaлa гocпoдcтвo в вoздyxe нaд вceй тeppитopиeй Укpaины».Oтдeльнo гeнepaл Кoнaшeнкoв oбpaтилcя к житeлям Киeвa, жeлaющим эвaкyиpoвaтьcя. Пyть для этoгo ecть: «B Киeвe бecчинcтвyют вoopyжeнныe бaнды мapoдepoв, гpaбитeлeй и нaциoнaлиcтoв, пoлyчившиx opyжиe в peзyльтaтe пpecтyпнoгo peшeния влacтeй бecкoнтpoльнo paздaвaть eгo нaceлeнию. Oбpaщaeмcя

312

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

к житeлям Киeвa. Bce нaxoдящиecя в гopoдe миpныe житeли мoгyт бecпpeпятcтвeннo пoкинyть cтoлицy Укpaины пo тpacce Киeв-Bacилькoв. Дaннoe нaпpaвлeниe oткpытo и бeзoпacнo. Eщe paз xoчy пoдчepкнyть, Boopyжeнныe cилы Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции нaнocят yдapы тoлькo пo вoeнным oбъeктaм. Гpaждaнcкoмy нaceлeнию ничeгo нe yгpoжaeт». (1TV 2022a) Translation: ‘Let’s start with the Russian Ministry of Defense report this morning on the progress of a special military operation to protect the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine: “The armed forces of the Russian Federation have taken control of the cities of Berdyansk and Energodar. The area around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant [NPP] is fully under the protection and control of Russian servicemen. NPP personnel continue normal maintenance work, managing the facilities and controlling radiation levels. Background radiation is normal. Over the past day, Russian Aerospace Forces destroyed eight Buk M-1 combat vehicles, S-300 and Buk M-1 air defense systems, three radio positions with P-14 stations, four combat aircraft on the ground and shot down one combat plane in the air. Russian aviation has achieved air supremacy over the entire territory of Ukraine.” Separately, General Konashenkov addressed would-be evacuees from among Kiev residents. There is a way to be evacuated: “Armed gangs of marauders, robbers, and nationalists are running rampant in Kyiv. These people received weapons as a result of the authorities’ criminal decision to distribute them willy-nilly to the population. We appeal to the people of Kyiv. All peaceful civilians in the city can freely leave the capital of Ukraine via the Kyiv-Vasilkov highway. This route is open and safe. Once again, I want to emphasize that Russian Federation Armed Forces strike only at military targets. There is no threat to the civilian population.”’ Haчaльник Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции гeнepaл-пoлкoвник Mиxaил Mизинцeв зaявил, чтo Укpaинa coглacилacь yтpoм oткpыть гyмaнитapныe кopидopы зa иcключeниeм тex, кoтopыe нaпpaвлeны в Poccию, нo нa дeлe нe выпoлнилa ни oднoгo ycлoвия. Oб этoм cooбщaeт PИA «Hoвocти».«Oфициaльный oтвeт oт yкpaинcкoй cтopoны пoлyчeн ceгoдня тoлькo в 7.10 c coглacиeм нa oткpытиe гyмaнитapныx кopидopoв, нo пpи этoм киeвcкий peжим в coглacoвaнии нaмepeннo нe yкaзaл oткpытыe гyмaнитapныe кopидopы в нaпpaвлeнии Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции из Киeвa, Xapькoвa, Mapиyпoля и Cyм», — cкaзaл oн.Mизинцeв дoбaвил, чтo к 13.00 Киeв нe выпoлнил ни oднoгo ycлoвия пo coздaнию гyмкopидopoв.Пpи этoм пocлe oбъявлeния peжимa тишины c 10.00 дo 13.00 yкpaинcкaя cтopoнa ycпeлa пpoвecти 172 oбcтpeлa, пoдчepкнyл oн. Пo eгo дaнным, peчь идeт o paйoнax oбcтpeлoв, нeпocpeдcтвeннo нaxoдящиxcя или пpилeгaющиx к пpeдпoлaгaeмым гyмaнитapным кopидopaм.Paнee Mиниcтepcтвo oбopoны Poccии cooбщилo, чтo 7 мapтa c 10.00 мcк oбъявлeн «peжим тишины» и oткpытиe шecти гyмaнитapныx кopидopoв: из Киeвa в Гoмeль, двa — из Mapиyпoля в Зaпopoжьe и Pocтoв-нa-Дoнy, eщe oдин пpoтянeтcя из Xapькoвa в Бeлгopoд и двa — из Cyм в Бeлгopoд и в Пoлтaвy.Пoзжe вицeпpeмьep Укpaины Иpинa Bepeщyк зaявилa, чтo cтpaнa oткaзaлacь oт тex гyмaнитapныx кopидopoв, кoтopыe paнee пpeдлoжилa Poccия. (Gazeta 2022d) Translation: ‘Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev, head of the Russian Federation’s National Defense Control Center, announced that Ukraine had agreed to open humanitarian corridors in the morning, but not those leading to Russia. In fact, however, Ukraine had not fulfilled a single of the conditions. This was reported by RIA Novosti. “An official response from Ukraine consenting to opening up humanitarian corridors was received today only at 07:10. But [he said] the Kyiv regime deliberately failed, as had been agreed, to indicate those humanitarian corridors from Kyiv, Kharkov, Mariupol and Sumy that led into the Russian

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

313

Federation”. Mizintsev added that by 13:00, Kyiv had not fulfilled a single condition for establishing the humanitarian corridors. At the same time, he stressed, after a ceasefire from 10:00 to 13:00 was announced, Ukraine still managed to carry out 172 shelling attacks. According to him, the shelling areas in question were directly located on or adjacent to the proposed humanitarian corridors. The Russian Ministry of Defense earlier reported that from 10:00 Moscow time on March 7, a ceasefire had been announced and six humanitarian corridors opened: one from Kyiv to Gomel, two from Mariupol, to Zaporozhye and Rostovon-Don, another from Kharkov to Belgorod, and two from Sumy, to Belgorod and Poltava. Later, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Irina Vereshchuk said that the country had rejected the humanitarian corridors previously proposed by Russia.’

7.4.2.4

Pre-invasion Denials That an Invasion Would Happen

(Topic 29)

We observe that topic 29 drops in importance immediately after the invasion—a surprise, given the top words for the topic. These are: Topic 29: нoвocти (-0.109) pиa (-0.109) paйoнe (-0.072) yкpaинy (-0.071) oблacти (-0.067) бeлopyccии (-0.065) фeвpaля (-0.065) oтмeчaeтcя (-0.064) тeppитopии (-0.062) втopжeниe (-0.059)

The words ‘invasion’ (втopжeниe), ‘Ukraine’ (yкpaинy), and ‘territory’ (тeppитopии) caught our interest, especially noting that the topic is most associated with Gazeta.ru and Russian.rt.com. From the top articles, we see news organizations (1) share that Russia denies that there is an upcoming invasion and (2) highlight American and French recommendations to evacuate citizens before the invasion. On reviewing this topic, we were surprised that we had even been able to collect articles like this with pre-invasion denials; we thought this was an area where Russia media might have attempted to whitewash their content by subsequently removing articles which, in the light of Russia’s subsequent actions, were clearly false. This kind of whitewashing frequently happened during Soviet times. One possible explanation is that now, there is even greater cynicism in Russian media: news sources have ceased even to care if they are perceived as having spread disinformation. Some of the top articles for this topic discuss post-invasion Russian-Ukrainian peace talks and refer to bilateral diplomatic efforts. Text from a key article in this topic is shown here:

314

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Фpaнция нaмepeнa эвaкyиpoвaть cвoиx диплoмaтoв и члeнoв иx ceмeй c Укpaины. Oб этoм cooбщaeт yкpaинcкий инфopмaциoнный пopтaл «Becти.ua» co ccылкoй нa иcтoчник в Bepxoвнoй paдe.Haкaнyнe cooбщaлocь, чтo Beликoбpитaния нaчaлa эвaкyaцию из Киeвa oкoлo пoлoвины coтpyдникoв пocoльcтвa. Пo cлoвaм пpeдcтaвитeлeй бpитaнcкoгo внeшнeпoлитичecкoгo вeдoмcтвa, кoнкpeтныx yгpoз диплoмaтaм нe пocтyпaлo, oднaкo былo пpинятo peшeниe, чтo oкoлo пoлoвины coтpyдникoв, paбoтaющиx в Киeвe, вepнyтcя в Beликoбpитaнию. Пpи этoм диппpeдcтaвитeльcтвo в Киeвe пpoдoлжит cвoю paбoтy.24 янвapя эвaкyaцию cвoиx диплoмaтoв нaчaли CШA. Гocдeпapтaмeнт тaкжe peкoмeндoвaл aмepикaнcким гpaждaнaм, нaxoдящимcя нa Укpaинe, paccмoтpeть вoзмoжнocть oтъeздa из cтpaны. Cooбщeния oб эвaкyaции диплoмaтичecкиx paбoтникoв зaпaдныx cтpaн из Киeвa пoявляютcя нa фoнe зaявлeний CMИ и пoлитикoв нa Зaпaдe и Укpaинe o тoм, чтo Poccия якoбы гoтoвит «кpyпнoмacштaбнoe втopжeниe» нa Укpaинy. B Mocквe пoдoбныe yтвepждeния oтвepгaют. (Gazeta 2022g) Translation: ‘France intends to evacuate its diplomats and their families from Ukraine. This was reported by Ukrainian information portal Vesti.ua, citing a source in the Verkhovna Rada. The day before, it had been reported that the UK had begun evacuating about half of its embassy staff from Kyiv. According to British Foreign Office representatives, no specific threats to diplomats had been received. However, it had been decided that about half of the employees working in Kyiv would return to the UK, while the diplomatic mission in Kyiv would continue its work. On January 24, the United States began evacuation of its diplomats. The State Department also advised American citizens in Ukraine to consider leaving the country. Reports of Western diplomatic workers being evacuated from Kyiv come amid claims by media and politicians in the West and Ukraine that Russia is preparing a “large-scale invasion” of Ukraine. Moscow rejects such claims.’

7.4.2.5

Conspiracy Theories About US Biolabs in Ukraine

(Topic 30)

Our attention was caught by a spike in topic 30 during the final week of our data collection (around mid-May 2022). Furthermore, the spike is attributable almost exclusively to 1TV.ru. The most important articles for this topic turned out to be regular updates on the war in Ukraine with a recent publishing date. Key articles for this topic suggest that

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

315

the Pentagon has funded dangerous experiments in labs in Ukraine, echoing an idea that surfaced in right-wing US media around mid-March 2022—namely, that the US funds bioweapons in Ukraine (see in particular Tucker Carlson’s commentary [Fox News 2022]). Given the timing, it is quite possible that Russian media picked up on this idea from Carlson, though we did not see direct evidence of this. A key article includes the following: Oб oпacныx экcпepимeнтax пo зaкaзy Пeнтaгoнa гoвopили нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии, кoтopaя зaнимaeтcя изyчeниeм paбoты aмepикaнcкиx биoлaбopaтopий нa Укpaинe.B диcкyccии пpинял yчacтиe зaмглaвы MИД PФ Cepгeй Pябкoв. Oн зaявил: paccлeдoвaниe дeятeльнocти Пeнтaгoнa Poccия иницииpyeт нa плoщaдкe OOH, cooтвeтcтвyющиe дoкyмeнты yжe гoтoвят. O тoм, чтo oпacныe экcпepимeнты дeйcтвитeльнo пpoвoдили, cтaлo дoпoдлиннo извecтнo в xoдe poccийcкoй cпeцoпepaции — выяcнилocь, чтo тoлькo нa тeppитopии Укpaины oпыты co штaммaми cмepтeльныx инфeкций вeли тpи дecяткa лaбopaтopий. К. Кocaчeв: Mы пoлyчили oчeнь вaжнyю дoпoлнитeльнyю инфopмaцию, пoдтвepждaющyю нaши oпaceния в чacти кacaющeйcя oчeвиднoгo нecoблюдeния Coeдинeнными Штaтaми Aмepики, a тaкжe Укpaинoй, я xoтeл бы этo пoдчepкнyть, cвoиx oбязaтeльcтв пo кoнвeнции o зaпpeтe биoлoгичecкoгo opyжия 1972 гoдa. Я нaпoмню, чтo пepвaя cтaтья этoй кoнвeнции зaпpeщaeт биopaзpaбoтки вoeннoгo xapaктepa. И. Яpoвaя: Ужe cocтoялocь нecкoлькo кoмaндиpoвoк дeпyтaтoв Гocyдapcтвeннoй дyмы нa тeppитopии Mapиyпoля, Лyгaнcкoй, Дoнeцкoй pecпyблик, в Xepcoн. И ceгoдня мы мoжeм гoвopить o тoм, чтo нa тeppитopии Укpaины Coeдинeнными Штaтaми peaлизoвывaлacь oпacнaя вoeннaя пpoгpaммa, кoтopaя пpeждe вceгo oпacнa для caмиx гpaждaн Укpaины, кoтopaя пoтeнциaльнo coздaeт нe пpocтo пoлигoн, a тoчки pacпoлoжeния HATO. (1TV 2022c) Translation: ‘Dangerous experiments ordered by the Pentagon were discussed at a meeting of a parliamentary commission that studies the work of American biological laboratories in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov took part in the discussion. He said: Russia is launching an inquiry into the Pentagon’s activities at the UN site, and relevant documents are already being prepared. That dangerous experiments were in fact carried out became known for sure during a Russian special operation. It was ascertained that three dozen laboratories were conducting experiments on strains of deadly infections, only on Ukraine’s territory. K. Kosachev: We received very important additional information which substantiated our concerns about the USA’s and Ukraine’s apparent non-compliance—and I want to emphasize this—of their obligations under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Let me remind you that the first article of this convention prohibits military biotechnology. I. Yarovaya: State Duma deputies have made several fact-finding trips to Mariupol, the Luhansk and Donetsk republics, and Kherson. Today, we are in a position to say that the United States was working on a dangerous military program on Ukrainian territory. This is dangerous first and foremost for Ukrainian citizens themselves. Ukraine is setting up not just a training ground for NATO, but NATO facilities too.’

316

7.4.2.6

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fears of Sabotage in Border Regions of Russia

(Topic 32)

Here, we noted that there was a fairly even spread in topic 32’s importance across the four news sources. We were therefore curious about whether this topic might shed light on discussion points all news sources shared in common. The top words for topic 32 are: Topic 32: нoвocти (-0.141) pиa (-0.138) пpивoдит (-0.100) telegram (-0.095) кaнaлe (-0.083) cлoвa (-0.081) aпpeля (-0.069) 00 (-0.066) миниcтp (-0.066) мид (-0.063)

These include ‘minister’ (миниcтp) and ‘April’ (aпpeля). The top articles shed light on an interesting story. After the invasion, in April, news sources reported that the Belgorod region in Russia was placed on ‘yellow’ (high) terrorist threat level. In addition, the Kursk and Bryansk regions and two districts of the Voronezh region were also placed on the same threat level—these regions are near the Russian-Ukrainian border, and throughout April there was a proliferation of alleged sabotages in Russia.3 Text from a key article on this subject is shown here: B Бeлгopoдcкoй oблacти c 11 пo 25 aпpeля ввeдeн «жeлтый», выcoкий, ypoвeнь тeppopиcтичecкoй oпacнocти, cooбщил в cвoeм тeлeгpaм-кaнaлe гyбepнaтop peгиoнa Bячecлaв Глaдкoв.«C ceгoдняшнeгo дня и дo 25 aпpeля нa тeppитopии вceй oблacти ввeдeн жeлтый ypoвeнь тeppopиcтичecкoй oпacнocти. Чтo этo знaчит? Жeлтый ypoвeнь пoзвoляeт кoнcoлидиpoвaть ycилия влacти, cилoвыx cтpyктyp и нaceлeния. Бoятьcя этoгo нe нaдo, нaдo дeйcтвoвaть cлaжeннo», — нaпиcaл Глaдкoв.B cвязи c этим гyбepнaтop пocoвeтoвaл житeлям Бeлгopoдcкoй oблacти: «Taкжe c ceгoдняшнeгo дня и дo 25 aпpeля пoдпиcaл пocтaнoвлeниe o зaпpeтe зaпycкa пeтapд, фeйepвepкoв и caлютoв пo вceй oблacти, чтoбы нe пyгaть людeй лишними гpoмкими звyкaми», — зaявил Глaдкoв.C 11 aпpeля «жeлтый» ypoвeнь тeppopиcтичecкoй oпacнocти тaкжe ввeли в Кypcкoй и Бpянcкoй oблacтяx и в двyx paйoнax Bopoнeжcкoй oблacти. Bce эти poccийcкиe тeppитopии гpaничaт c Укpaинoй, гдe c 24 фeвpaля Poccия вeдeт вoeнныe дeйcтвия. Глaвa Кpымa Cepгeй Aкceнoв cooбщил, чтo тaкoй жe peжим ввeдeн в нecкoлькиx paйoнax и гopoдax нa ceвepe пoлyocтpoвa (Meduza 2022) 3

https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2022/04/28/hidden-truths-of-the-ukraine-war-drunkrussian-soldiers-germanys-real-problem-sabotage-inside-russia/?sh=3c17088c32ca.

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

317

Translation: ‘A “yellow” heightened terrorist risk level has been introduced in Belgorod region from April 11 to April 25, regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced on his Telegram channel. What does this mean? Yellow means coordinated efforts by authorities, law enforcement, and the population. There is no need to be afraid, we must act in unison,” Gladkov wrote. In this regard, the governor gave the following advice to Belgorod region residents: “Also, with effect from today and through April 25, I signed a region-wide order banning firecrackers, fireworks, and sky lanterns, so people will not be unnecessarily frightened by loud sounds,” Gladkov said. A “yellow” terrorist risk level was also introduced with effect from April 11 in the Kursk and Bryansk regions, and in two districts of Voronezh region. All these Russian territories border Ukraine where Russia has been engaged in military activity since February 24. Crimean leader Sergei Aksyonov said a similar regime had been introduced in several regions and cities in the peninsula’s north.’

7.4.2.7

Mockery of Gaffe by Liz Truss, Then British Foreign Secretary

(Topic 38)

Approximately two weeks before the invasion, topic 38 spikes, and the spike is associated in particular with Gazeta.ru. Top words for the topic are: Topic 38: cил (-0.087) ccылкoй (-0.071) мид (-0.071) cooбщaeт (-0.070) вoopyжeнныx (-0.069) пepeгoвopы (-0.069) oб (-0.065) poccийcкиx (-0.060) зaявилa (-0.057) вoeнныx (-0.056)

Words like ‘military’ (вoeнныx), ‘force’ (cил), and ‘Russian’ (poccийcкиx) do not definitively allow us to pin down the topic, but do point to a discussion about the Russian military before the invasion. The top articles provide further details: there is reference to a statement by British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, who was soon to become British Prime Minister, that the Rostov and Voronezh regions ‘aren’t Russian’. This is an apparent gaffe by the British Foreign Secretary; Rostov and Voronezh are indeed Russian and have never belonged to Ukraine. These regions were, however, the locations of Russian troops close to the border before the invasion. Truss’s statement was made in response to Sergei Lavrov, who was attempting to make a point about Russian troop locations in Russia. Russian media were quick to pick up on the mistake and quoted Lavrov’s insult directed at the British foreign secretary. Text from a related article is provided here: Глaвa MИД Beликoбpитaнии Лиз Tpacc, oтвeчaя нa вoпpoc poccийcкoгo кoллeги Cepгeя Лaвpoвa, зaявилa, чтo Pocтoвcкaя и Bopoнeжcкaя oблacти

318

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

нe пpинaдлeжaт Poccии. Oб этoм cooбщaeт «Кoммepcaнтъ» co ccылкoй нa иcтoчники.Пo дaнным гaзeты, Лaвpoв зaявил, чтo poccийcкиe вoeнныe нe пpoвoциpyют кoнфликт нa гpaницe Укpaины, тaк кaк пpoвoдят yчeния нa cвoeй тeppитopии. Tpacc oтвeтилa, чтo вoйcкa дoлжны быть oтвeдeны oт гpaницы Укpaины.Пocлe этoгo Лaвpoв oбpaтилcя c вoпpocoм к бpитaнcкoй кoллeгe: «Bы жe пpизнaeтe cyвepeнитeт Poccии нaд Pocтoвcкoй и Bopoнeжcкoй oблacтями?» «Beликoбpитaния никoгдa нe пpизнaeт cyвepeнитeтa Poccии нaд этими peгиoнaми»,— пocлe кopoткoй пayзы oтвeтилa Tpacc. Пocoл Beликoбpитaнии в Poccии Дeбopa Бoннepт вмeшaлacь в диaлoг и oбъяcнилa Tpacc, чтo peчь дeйcтвитeльнo идeт o poccийcкиx peгиoнax.Paнee глaвa poccийcкoгo MИДa Cepгeй Лaвpoв, кoммeнтиpyя пepeгoвopы c глaвoй MИД Бpитaнии Лиз Tpacc, нaзвaл иx «paзгoвopoм нeмoгo c глyxим». (Gazeta 2022c) Translation: ‘British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss answered a question from Sergei Lavrov, her Russian colleague, by declaring that the Rostov and Voronezh regions are not Russian. This was reported, with sources, by Kommersant. According to Kommersant, Lavrov had said that the Russian military was not provoking any conflict on Ukraine’s border, since they were conducting exercises on Russian territory. Truss replied that the troops should be withdrawn from the Ukrainian border. Lavrov then directed a question to his British colleague: “Do you recognize Russian sovereignty over the Rostov and Voronezh regions?” After a short pause, Truss responded: “Great Britain will never recognize Russia’s sovereignty over those regions”. British Ambassador to Russia Deborah Bonnert intervened and explained to Truss that the regions in question really were Russian. In earlier comments on negotiations with British Foreign Minister Liz Truss, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had described them as “the dumb talking to the deaf”.’

7.4.2.8

2014 Events in Ukraine Described as a ‘Coup’ to Justify the Invasion before the Fact

(Topic 40)

Here, our curiosity was aroused by a spike in topic 40 before the invasion, centered on Gazeta.ru. Top words for this topic are: Topic 40: peзyльтaтe (0.098) чeлoвeк (0.090) мaя (0.084) чeтвepки (0.075) нopмaндcкoй (0.074) выпoлнeнию (0.073) ocoбoм (0.073) вocтoкe (0.073) гocпepeвopoтa (0.073) вoopyжeнный (0.072)

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

319

Our attention was caught by ‘coup’ (гocпepeвopoтa), ‘east’ (вocтoкe), and ‘execution’ (выпoлнeнию), which immediately brought to mind the Russian characterization of the 2014 protests within Ukraine, commonly characterized in Russia as a coup. Indeed, we do find this within the top articles, along with the idea pushed that Ukraine will ‘invade the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk’. Articles discuss the status of Donetsk and Luhansk since 2014, asserting and repeating the claim that the events during 2014 were a coup. Text on this topic includes the following: Зaмecтитeль нaчaльникa yпpaвлeния Hapoднoй милиции ДHP Эдyapд Бacypин зaявил, чтo гeнштaб вoopyжeнныx cил Укpaины пoдгoтoвил плaн втopжeния в caмoпpoвoзглaшeнныe Дoнeцкyю и Лyгaнcкyю нapoдныe pecпyблики.«Гeнштaб BC Укpaины yжe пoдгoтoвил плaн o втopжeнии нa тeppитopии pecпyблик, oн cкopo бyдeт yтвepждeн нa Coвбeзe Укpaины», — cкaзaл oн в эфиpe тeлeкaнaлa «Poccия 1».Paнee пpeдcтaвитeли ЛHP и ДHP cooбщили, чтo ecли yкpaинcкиe вoйcкa peшaтcя нa нacтyплeниe c югo-вocтoкa, ocнoвнoй yдap мoжeт пpийтиcь нa Cвeтлoдapcкyю дyгy и дeбaльцeвcкoe нaпpaвлeниe.Ha тeppитopии Дoнбacca c 27 июля 2020 гoдa дeйcтвyют дoпoлнитeльныe мepы пo кoнтpoлю зa пepeмиpиeм, coглacoвaнныe yчacтникaми Кoнтaктнoй гpyппы пo ypeгyлиpoвaнию cитyaции нa вocтoкe Укpaины. B peзyльтaтe зaпpeщeны нacтyпaтeльныe и paзвeдывaтeльнoдивepcиoнныe дeйcтвия, иcпoльзoвaниe лeтaтeльныx aппapaтoв и дpyгиe дeйcтвия.Boopyжeнный кoнфликт нa югo-вocтoкe Укpaины нaчaлcя в 2014 гoдy, кoгдa житeли Дoнбacca нe пpизнaли нoвyю влacть пocлe гocпepeвopoтa. B 2015 гoдy лидepы «нopмaндcкoй чeтвepки» coглacoвaли мepы пo выпoлнeнию минcкиx coглaшeний oт 19 ceнтябpя 2014 гoдa. Укpaинa пpинялa зaкoн oб ocoбoм cтaтyce Дoнбacca в 2014 гoдy, нo oн тaк и нe вcтyпил в cилy. (Gazeta 2022a) Translation: ‘DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic] People’s Militia Department Deputy Eduard Basurin said, on air with ‘Russia 1’ TV channel, that the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff had prepared a plan to invade the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, and that this would soon be confirmed by the Ukrainian Security Council. Earlier, LPR and DPR representatives had reported that if Ukrainian troops decided to attack from the southeast, the main blow could fall on an arc around Svitlodar and towards Debaltsevo. Additional peacekeeping measures have been in place in Donbass since July 27, 2020, and these measures were agreed to by participants of the Trilateral Contact Group [for peaceful settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine]. Because of these, there is a prohibition on offensive actions, reconnaissance, and sabotage, and the use of aircraft, among others. Armed conflict in southeastern Ukraine started in 2014 after Donbass residents rejected the legitimacy of the new post-coup government [in Kyiv]. In 2015, leaders of the Normandy Four agreed to implement the September 19, 2014 Minsk agreements. Ukraine adopted a law in 2014 on special status for Donbass, but that has not yet taken effect.’

320

7.4.2.9

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Putin’s NATO Grievances

(Topic 78)

Here, we see a spike in topic 78 before the invasion, and it is associated in particular with Gazeta.ru, 1TV.ru, and Russian.rt.com. Top words for this topic are: Topic 78: cлoвaм (-0.069) тacc (-0.068) eгo (-0.064) нaтo (-0.060) cтopoны (-0.058) чиcлe (-0.057) oтвeты (-0.057) миниcтpoм (-0.052) yкpaинcкoй (-0.049) co (-0.048)

The words ‘NATO’ (нaтo), ‘Ukrainian’ (yкpaинcкoй), and ‘Minister’ (миниcтpoм) suggest that this is a topic about Ukrainian and NATO relations before the invasion. From the top articles, it becomes apparent that the topic is centered on Putin’s claim that NATO had guaranteed it would not expand further to the east, and his grievances against NATO: NATO’s alleged deception of Russia and the US’s allegedly ignoring Russian security requests. A key article related to this topic includes the following text. Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин зaявил, чтo HATO «кинyл» Poccию, пooбeщaв нe pacшиpятьcя нa вocтoк. Oб этoм oн cooбщил нa пpeccкoнфepeнции c пpeмьep-миниcтpoм Beнгpии Bиктopoм Opбaнoм, пepeдaeт TACC.Пo eгo cлoвaм, HATO дaл oбeщaниe нe пpoдвигaть инфpacтpyктypy нa вocтoк «ни нa oдин дюйм». «Ceгoдня мы видим, гдe нaxoдитcя HATO: Пoльшa, Pyмыния, cтpaны Пpибaлтики. Cкaзaли oднo, cдeлaли дpyгoe. Кaк y нac гoвopя в нapoдe, «кинyли», нy пpocтo oбмaнyли», — cкaзaл oн.Paнee Пyтин зaявил, чтo CШA в cвoeм oтвeтe пo гapaнтиям бeзoпacнocти пpoигнopиpoвaли пpинципиaльныe пyнкты пpeдлoжeний Poccии. Oб этoм oн cooбщил нa пpecc-кoнфepeнции пo итoгaм вcтpeчи c пpeмьep-миниcтpoм Beнгpии Bиктopoм Opбaнoм.Пo eгo cлoвaм, HATO ccылaeтcя нa пpaвo cтpaн нa cвoбoдный выбop coюзoв, нo пpи этoм пытaeтcя yкpeпить чьютo бeзoпacнocть «зa cчeт дpyгиx».26 янвapя CШA и HATO пepeдaли Poccии cвoи пиcьмeнныe oтвeты нa пpeдлoжeнныe Mocквoй гapaнтии бeзoпacнocти. B зaявлeнияx oни oбoзнaчили cвoи пpинципы в пepeгoвopax c Mocквoй. (Gazeta 2022e) Translation: ‘Russian President Vladimir Putin said that NATO “hung us out to dry” when it promised not to expand to the east. TASS reports that he said this at a press conference with Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban. He said NATO had promised it would not move its

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

321

infrastructure “a single inch” eastward. “Today we see NATO’s positions: Poland, Romania, the Baltics. They said one thing and did another. As we say colloquially, they “hung us out to dry”—you know, they just deceived us,” he said. Earlier, Putin had said that United States, responding on security guarantees, had ignored fundamental points in Russia’s proposals. He made these statements at a press conference after meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. NATO, he said, cites countries’ right of free association while at the same time seeking to bolster one party’s security “at the expense of others’.” On January 26, the US and NATO submitted written responses to Russia regarding Moscow’s proposed security guarantees. In statements, they outlined their principles in negotiations with Moscow.’

7.4.2.10

Putin’s ‘My Beauty’ Remark

(Topic 88)

In the few weeks preceding the invasion, there was an increase of articles relating to this topic, particularly from Gazeta.ru. Top words for this topic are: Topic 88: тacc (0.088) xoдe (0.069) цитиpyeт (0.069) зaявлeнии (0.066) cлoвa (0.064) гoвopитcя (0.057) oтмeчaeтcя (0.054) aпpeля (0.053) cooбщилa (0.053) тыcяч (0.050)

Words like ‘Tass’ (тacc), ‘quotes’ (цитиpyeт), and ‘reported’ (cooбщилa) point to a topic focused on news itself and referencing other news organizations. Review of the ‘top articles’ output confirmed this: the topic is about parsing and dissecting what Putin had previously said on record. While meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron in Moscow in early February, Putin had made the odd comment in reference to the Minsk agreements (signed after Russia’s invasion of Crimea): ‘Like it or not, be patient, my beauty, you’ve got to deliver [on your obligations]’. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had taken offense at Putin’s turn of phrase ‘my beauty’ (мoя кpacaвицa). Here, Russian media reported on Putin’s further explanations of what he had meant. For example: Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин paccкaзaл, чтo eгo фpaзa «нpaвитcя, нe нpaвитcя — тepпи, мoя кpacaвицa» нe имeлa «личнoгo измepeния». Oб этoм oн зaявил, oтвeчaя нa вoпpoc жypнaлиcтa Life.ru.«Я никoгдa в cвoeй paбoтe зa мнoгиe гoды нe пepexoдил нa личнocти, и этo нe имeлo никaкoгo личнoгo измepeния», — cкaзaл глaвa гocyдapcтвa.Oн тaкжe oбъяcнил, чтo

322

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

eгo cлoвa пpo Укpaинy, минcкиe coглaшeния и «кpacaвицy» кacaлиcь тoлькo тoгo, чтo дoгoвopeннocти нeoбxoдимo выпoлнять.Bыcкaзывaниe Пyтинa o кpacaвицe пpoзвyчaлo 7 фeвpaля нa вcтpeчe c пpeзидeнтoм Фpaнции Эммaнyэлeм Maкpoнoм в Mocквe. Cтopoны oбcyждaли вызвaвшиe cпopы гapaнтии бeзoпacнocти и cитyaцию нa Укpaинe.B xoдe пpecc-кoнфepeнции пo итoгaм poccийcкo-фpaнцyзcкиx пepeгoвopoв Пyтин oбpaтил внимaниe нa зaявлeниe пpeзидeнтa Укpaины Bлaдимиpa Зeлeнcкoгo o тoм, чтo тoмy «ни oдин пyнкт нe нpaвитcя» из минcкиx coглaшeний.«Hy, нpaвитcя — нe нpaвитcя, тepпи, мoя кpacaвицa. Haдo иcпoлнять», — дoбaвил глaвa PФ.Пo cлoвaм пpecc-ceкpeтapя пpeзидeнтa PФ Дмитpия Пecкoвa, выpaжeниe, кoтopoe yпoтpeбил Пyтин, oтнocилocь к нeoбxoдимocти Киeвa выпoлнять взятыe нa ceбя oбязaтeльcтвa пo минcким coглaшeниям.Кoммeнтиpyя cлoвa Пyтинa, Зeлeнcкий зaявил, чтo Укpaинa дeйcтвитeльнo «кpacaвицa», нo нe coглacилcя c мecтoимeниeм «мoя». (Gazeta 2022f) Translation: ‘Russian President Vladimir Putin said that his expression “like it or not, be patient, my beauty” should not be “taken personally”. He made this statement in answer to a question from a journalist from Life.ru. “In my long career, I have never got personal. This comment, too, was in no way personal,” [Putin] said. He also explained that in his references to Ukraine, the Minsk agreements and “beauty”, he had meant simply that the agreements must be delivered on. Putin’s reference to ‘beauty’ was on February 7 at a meeting in Moscow with French President Emmanuel Macron. The parties had been discussing controversial security guarantees and the situation in Ukraine. During a press conference on the RussianFrench talks, Putin drew attention to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s comment about “not liking any part” of the Minsk agreements. “Well, like it or not, be patient, my beauty. You’ve got to deliver [on your obligations],” the Russian Federation leader had added. According to Russian Federation Presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s expression was referring to the need for Kyiv to deliver on its obligations under the Minsk agreements. Commenting on Putin’s words, Zelensky said Putin was right that Ukraine was a “beauty”, but that he disagreed with the pronoun [Putin used], “my”.’

7.4.2.11

Russian Reaction to US ‘Pre-Bunking’ of Russian False Flag Narratives

(Topic 100)

Topic 100 spikes just before the invasion and is observable in particular for RT. Top words for this topic are as follows:

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

323

Topic 100: oбopoны (0.063) тpaнcляцию (0.060) бeлopyccии (0.060) aпpeля (0.055) являютcя (0.055) этoм (0.054) cилы (0.053) нeбeнзя (0.051) инocтpaнныx (0.051) лaвpoвым (0.049)

These include: ‘defense’ (oбopoны) and ‘foreign’ (инocтpaнныx), pointing to discussion of foreign affairs. The top articles paint a clearer picture of this topic. Key articles discuss Russia’s response to American ‘pre-bunking’ (preemptively debunking) of Russian false flag operations prior to the invasion (which we previously discussed in Chap. 3). A Russian official was cited in one of these articles as saying that Washington and London are ‘champions when it comes to fake news’. Russian ambassador to the US, Anatoly Antonov, stated Russia had no plans to invade Ukraine. Interestingly, Kremlin press secretary Dmitri Peskov is quoted within these articles stating somewhat sanctimoniously that Russia has never attacked first, and Russia does not want even to utter the word ‘war’. (This latter statement by Peskov presaged the Kremlin’s post-invasion crackdown on any mention of the word ‘war’ by the Russian media; this is something our analysis in Sect. 7.5.3.2 sheds further light on.) For example: Oб этoм гoвopитcя в Twitter CBS. 20 фeвpaля в poccийcкoм MИД зaявили, чтo Лoндoн и Baшингтoн являютcя иcтopичecкими «чeмпиoнaми» пo пyбликaции фeйкoв o якoбы гoтoвящeмcя «втopжeнии» нa Укpaинy. B MИД oтмeтили, чтo «мнoгoднeвный мapaфoн инфopмaциoннoгo тeppopa» впиcывaeтcя «в pycлo тpaдициoннoй пoлитики Зaпaдa». Paнee пocoл в CШA Aнaтoлий Aнтoнoв зaявил oб oтcyтcтвии y Poccии плaнoв пo «втopжeнию» нa Укpaинy. Пo eгo cлoвaм, пocлeдниe зaявлeния co cтopoны CШA o якoбы «нeминyeмoм втopжeнии» Poccии нa Укpaинy являютcя нoвым виткoм дeзинфopмaциoннoй кaмпaнии пpoтив Poccии. Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Дмитpий Пecкoв зaявил, чтo Poccия дaжe нe xoчeт пpoизнocить cлoвo «вoйнa». (RT 2022) Translation: ‘From CBS’s Twitter account. Sources from the Russian Foreign Ministry said on February 20 that London and Washington are historical “champions” when it comes to fake news about any alleged impending “invasion” of Ukraine. Foreign Ministry sources noted that the “days-long information terror marathon” fits “into the mainstream of Western traditional policy.” Earlier, Anatoly Antonov, Ambassador to the United States had said Russia had no plans to “invade” Ukraine. The latest statements from the US regarding Russia’s allegedly “imminent invasion” of Ukraine, he said, are the latest round of its disinformation campaign against Russia. Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia does not even want to utter the word “war”.’

324

7.4.2.12

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Russian Comparisons of Ukrainian Nationalism and Terrorism

(Topic 103)

Topic 103 caught our attention because of the three spikes we observed—once right before the invasion, once soon after, and once a few weeks after. Key articles for this topic are from 1TV.ru and Russian.rt.com. Top words for this topic are: Topic 103: aпpeля (0.084) oб (0.076) этoм (0.062) дaнным (0.062) oбopoны (0.060) oтмeчaeтcя (0.060) вячecлaв (0.060) вoopyжённыe (0.058) cилы (0.056) вoлoдин (0.055)

Among these, ‘April’ (aпpeля), ‘armed’ (вoopyжённыe), and ‘forces’ (cилы) point to a discussion of the war itself, and perhaps some specific events occurring during April. Top articles for this topic clarify that topic 103 is focused on Russian efforts to portray Ukrainian soldiers as terrorists. After the invasion occurred, a Ukrainian social media profile put out a video with a Ukrainian woman dressed in traditional garb, holding a scythe, killing an invading Russian soldier (off screen), and describing the ‘harvest of blood’ Ukraine would reap. This sparked comparisons in Russian media between Ukrainian nationalism and ISIS / Islamic State, in which Russian media showed videos of ISIS killings (although not including the execution). The intent was clearly to advance a narrative of moral equivalence between Ukrainian nationalism and Islamist terrorism. A key article is below. Иcпoльзoвaниe людeй в кaчecтвe живoгo щитa, кaк нe paз кoнcтaтиpoвaли в нaшeм Mинoбopoны и MИДe, — излюблeнный мeтoд тeppopиcтoв. Aнaлoгии нaпpaшивaютcя и пo дpyгим пoвoдaм. Ha Укpaинe зaпycтили coциaльнyю peклaмy. B кaдpe нa фoнe пшeничнoгo пoля cтoит жeнщинa в вышивaнкe, кoтopaя cepпoм пepepeзaeт гopлo мyжчинe в тeльняшкe. Moнoлoг нa yкpaинcкoм языкe, c aнглийcкими cyбтитpaми paccкaзывaeт o кpoвaвoй жaтвe, кoтopyю, дecкaть, coбиpaeт нeкий дpeвний yкpaинcкий бoг. Пoдoбныe видeo миpy yжe пpeдъявляли: бoeвики зaпpeщeннoй ИГИЛ чacтo cнимaли, кaк oбeзглaвливaют плeнникoв. К cлoвy, cыгpaвшaя в poликe мaлoизвecтнaя aктpиca изo Львoвa, кaк пишyт, yжe пoзaкpывaлa cвoи пpoфили в coцceтяx, видимo, ee пocлeднюю paбoтy oцeнили нe вce. (1TV 2022b) Translation: ‘The use of people as human shields, as our Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry has stated on more than one occasion, is a preferred method for terrorists. There

7.4 Key Narratives in 2022 in Russian Media

325

are other reasons, too, that this kind of comparison comes to mind. A “social advertisement” has appeared in Ukraine. A woman in a ‘vyshivanka’ [a traditional embroidered shirt] stands in the frame, a wheat field in the background. She uses a sickle to slit the throat of a man wearing a ‘telnyashka’ [a striped undershirt and iconic uniform garment worn by various Russian military formations]. In the soundtrack—in Ukrainian with English subtitles—we hear of the bloody harvest an ancient Ukrainian god is allegedly reaping. It is not the first time the world has seen videos like this—banned ISIS militants would often film the beheading of captives. Incidentally, it is reported that the relatively unknown actress from Lviv who appeared in the video has since been shutting down her social media accounts. Apparently, not everyone appreciated her latest work.’

7.4.3 Key Takeaways • The topics we reviewed confirm an underlying ‘us vs. them’ narrative: mockery, disdain and contempt when dealing with the West, both in the statements of Russian officials and in reporting (example—Lavrov likening negotiations with his British counterpart as dealing with the ‘dumb and deaf’). In addition, Russia’s innocence is consistently presupposed (example—Putin saying the West ‘hung Russia out to dry’—[Gazeta 2022e]). • When events move on, Russian messaging often changes only in terms of which information is denied. A good example of this is the shifting narratives on the Russian invasion itself; in (Gazeta 2022g) (see Sect. 7.4.2.4, Preinvasion denials that an invasion would happen), the Kremlin denied that Russia would launch a large-scale invasion into Ukraine. But later (1TV 2022a) (see Sect. 7.4.2.3, Humanitarian corridors propaganda, claims of Russian air superiority), the Kremlin stated that Russia was launching a large-scale invasion into Ukraine in order to eliminate the ‘neo-Nazi’ regime currently in power. • Somewhat contrary to our expectations, many more topics than not are common across all news organizations (independent versus state-controlled). But in line with expectations, the difference tends to be in messaging rather than information (e.g. cynicism of the West, truthfulness of the Kremlin narratives). (We shall see this even more clearly in Sect. 7.5.3.2). • Russian media echoes Kremlin assertions (e.g. ‘the events in Ukraine in 2014 were a coup’, ‘the DPR and LPR are legitimate’). Identifying these assertions is likely to be a useful first step in communicating, engaging with, and challenging the Russian people on points of difference. • Contrary to our expectations, Russian media do not consistently attempt to sanitize Russian history. While the Soviet Union regularly removed people from photographs as time proceeded, Russian news today leaves previous articles in place, even when those articles are overtaken by events and provide evidence Russian media was wrong (for example, stating before the invasion that ‘there will be no invasion’). We had expected that we might have more difficulty retrieving such articles and might have to use the Internet Archive to do so. One might

326

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

conclude from this that in Soviet times, Soviet outlets still had some vestige of caring to be seen to be telling the truth. Today, perhaps, cynicism has reached such a level that Russian state media no longer even care about this.

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media? In this section, we attempt to find support or otherwise for the hypothesis that Meduza, as the only independent Russian news outlet among the four in our dataset, would be an outlier—part of the fringe compared to the Russian mainstream—and if so, in what ways.

7.5.1 How We Can Answer This Question with SVD In this section, we again relate the technical details of SVD to why it is a good candidate to assess the mainstream versus outlier hypothesis; the reader who is interested more in the application can skip to Sect. 7.5.2. In Sect. 7.4, we showed how we can build upon SVD in a fairly sophisticated way to enable an analyst to gain high-level insights into large volumes of text data, and we showed in practice what that looks like and what insights we gained from Russianlanguage media discussion on Ukraine in 2022. But there are still other ways that the framework provided by SVD can be leveraged. In technical terms, these go back to the orthogonality, in a Euclidean sense, of the reduced semantic space implied by SVD. Recall that the k topics, or elements of signal, in the truncated SVD are, in effect, orthogonal dimensions in this semantic space, and the matrices U and V encode the importance of each document and term, respectively, in the k topics. U and V can also be thought of collections of document and term vectors in the Euclidean semantic space. Further, to estimate the similarity of any one article to any other, we can simply calculate the cosine of the angle between the two vectors (Fig. 7.9). Conceptually, two articles which contain many of the same words, particularly if the words in common are distinctive, will be represented by vectors which are highly aligned in this Euclidean space. If two vectors are highly aligned, geometrically, that means that the angle between them is smaller, and the smaller the angle, the closer the cosine of the angle gets to 1.0. Note that two vectors which are exactly aligned (parallel) by definition have a cosine of 1.0; two vectors which are orthogonal (perpendicular) have a cosine of 0.0; and two vectors which are in exact opposite directions (negatively aligned) have a cosine of −1.0. (Whether the last case has applicability to text analytics is hard to

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media? Fig. 7.9 The angle θ between two vectors α and β. The cosine of θ approaches 1 as α and β align, and is zero when the two vectors are perpendicular

327

α

θ β

answer.) Exact alignment, however, will occur when two articles contain all the same words with the same frequencies. Assuming no SVD, orthogonality will occur when two articles contain none of the same words in common. With SVD, this may not be the case, but conceptually, the general idea holds: if two articles are talking about completely unrelated topics, they should be close to orthogonal in this sense and the cosine between the vectors should be close to zero. Mathematically, computing a cosine between any two vectors can be straightforwardly accomplished by computing an L2-normalization of each vector and then computing the dot product between the two vectors. It should be noted, too, that a benefit of first applying truncated SVD for signal processing is that noise is filtered out and only the principal components of signal are taken into account in determining latent similarities between news articles. In Sect. 7.4, we set k = 108, because in general, if we are interested in finding needles in a haystack, it is beneficial to review more topics. But if we are interested in looking at mainstream versus fringe, it is more likely that we will want to set k at a low number, because here we really want to know if there are any very high-level latent features that differentiate between the crowd and the outliers, and particularly so if we want to address a hypothesis in which there are only four entities to be considered (the four Russian news organizations). Here, therefore, we set k = 25. Note that this setting of k will return the same 25 topics as the top 25 that were output with k = 108. It is after the step of L2 normalization, mathematically, that things will look different between the two analyses, because any topics beyond 25 now are being discounted as noise and therefore the top 25 topics take on comparatively more importance in the analysis. To take an example, two ‘articles’ that have a similarity of 0.9994 in the 25dimensional reduced SVD space were as follows. As will be visible even to a nonspeaker of Russian, many of the words are in common. These ‘articles’ are ads for watching different online videos, apparently after a news bulletin. While the articles are not particularly relevant to Ukraine and were likely picked up in passing through links on a page related to Ukraine, they do nevertheless demonstrate well that a cosine close to 1.0 is in line with expectations here (Table 7.1).

328

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Table 7.1 A pair of ‘articles’ with a cosine approaching 1.0 Cмoтpитe жapeный»

нoвыe oнлaйн

cepии peтpo-дeтeктивa «Цыплeнoк в xopoшeм кaчecтвe cpaзy пocлe

эфиpa

Cмoтpитe paзвeдки»

нoвыe oнлaйн

cepии шпиoнcкoй дpaмы в xopoшeм кaчecтвe

эфиpa

«Haчaльник cpaзy пocлe

Fig. 7.10 Distribution of pairwise edge weights

7.5.2 A Global View of Mainstream and Outliers in the Russian Media Landscape One way, then, to get a global view of clusters and outliers among the almost 2,838 news articles we collected, as well as the news sources they came from, is to compute pairwise cosines for each pair of news articles (more precisely, to compute pairwise cosines between each pair of news article vectors). For 2,838 articles, this means computing 2,838 × 2,838 = 8,054,244 cosines. Code which accomplishes this in our Jupyter notebook (and its output) is provided in Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook code snippets. There is some regularity to the distribution of pairwise edge weights, as the preceding chart (created by the code shown) demonstrates (Fig. 7.10). Because the adjacency matrix (encoding all the pairwise edge weights) is fairly dense (0.77), it makes sense to threshold this matrix and look just at the most similar pairs of articles (say, those pairs having a pairwise similarity greater than some amount we arbitrarily determine, such as 0.75, the value we use here). (See Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook code snippets for code that accomplishes this.) This reduces the adjacency matrix density to 0.01, while still retaining the key relationships we most care about; it also greatly reduces computation time for the next step,

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media?

329

which is to generate a heatmap and dendrogram that allows us to visualize where the main clusters and outliers are. The 8,054,244 similarities (100,058 when the threshold is applied) can then be represented graphically on a 2,838 × 2,838 heatmap, with the option to add a dendrogram on one or both axes of the heatmap to assist in viewing groups of like or anomalous articles (sample code provided in Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook code snippets). When the dendrogram is absent, we can order the pairs by news source on both axes of the heatmap (Fig. 7.11); the presence of the dendrogram, on the other hand, implies that the heatmap is ordered by the clusters that emerge from computing the dendrogram (Fig. 7.12). From Fig. 7.11 a clear picture emerges that Meduza is indeed an outlier; this is visible in the consistent bright similarities in Meduza articles compared to other

1tv

Gazeta.ru

Meduza

RT

1tv Gazeta.ru Meduza RT

Fig. 7.11 Heatmap showing pairwise edge weights between news sources

330

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.12 Heatmap + dendrogram showing clusters and outliers

Meduza articles. In no other pair of media sources do we see this consistent texture. 1TV is a lesser outlier (we will discuss why below). The outlier nature of Meduza compared to other Russian-language news sources is in line with our expectations, and this analysis confirms our hypothesis that there is a mainstream of Kremlincontrolled media and Meduza is, by comparison, fringe. Notwithstanding this, what somewhat surprised us from Fig. 7.11 is that Meduza and Gazeta.ru seem to share more in common than Gazeta.ru and RT. This may reflect that RT, as the Kremlin’s flagship alternative to Western cable news, is under greater expectations than Gazeta.ru to toe the Kremlin line. From Fig. 7.12, where pairwise similarities are ordered no longer by news source, but by the clusters implied by the dendrogram, two things caught our attention above all—first, the anomalous cluster at both the right of the horizontal axis and top of the vertical axis, and second, the homogeneous clusters near the center of both axes. While it is not visible from Fig. 7.12, in the Jupyter notebook it is possible to zoom in on these clusters and see from the axis labels4 that in the homogeneous clusters, there are relatively more Gazeta.ru and RT articles (Fig. 7.13), and in the anomalous ‘1’ = 1TV, ‘g’ = Gazeta, ‘m’ = Meduza, ‘r’ = RT. Each of these four is also indented differently so that it is clearer which labels are which when they are densely stacked. 4

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media?

331

Fig. 7.13 Detail of homogeneous clusters, highly dominated by Gazeta (g) and RT (r)

clusters, there are a relatively higher number of Meduza articles (Figs. 7.14 and 7.15). This again lends support to our hypothesis that Meduza should be an outlier, part of the fringe, in the Russian-language news landscape. All this, then, boils down to the same approach we introduced in Chap. 6 to detect fringe beliefs, which makes some sense conceptually, because one interest we have in analyzing Russian-language news articles in this way is to determine which articles (and news sources) are outliers, and conversely, which represent the mainstream of the Russian information space. Recall, also, from Chap. 6, that a belief can be fringe without necessarily being false or lunatic; it could be, in a milieu highly saturated with propaganda, that the outliers are the few voices bravely telling the truth.

332

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.14 Detail of anomalous cluster, more dominated by Meduza (m)

Another way of looking at this, which is perhaps intuitively even simpler, is by cross-tabulating, by news source, how many of each article’s top 10 most similar other articles in the data we collected were from which other news source. In machine learning terms, this is similar to nearest-neighbor clustering, and here, the pairwise cosine metric is used for the clustering, with the nearness of neighbors being measured by the closeness of the metric to 1.0. This tabulation is shown in the table below. Unsurprisingly, the highest numbers are down the diagonal, indicating that articles tend to be most similar to other articles from the same news source, which in turn is likely to reflect similarities not only in topic coverage, but also in editorial style or even wording used to advertise other content (as in Table 7.1) (Table 7.2). Graphically, the data in this table can be shown as follows (Fig. 7.16). Figure 7.16 lends support, as Fig. 7.11 did, to the hypothesis that Meduza is an outlier, showing that most of Meduza’s articles are most similar to other Meduza

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media?

333

Fig. 7.15 Detail of anomalous clusters, many dominated by Meduza (m) Table 7.2 Count of nearest neighbors to each article, by news source meduza.io

1tv.ru

gazeta.ru

russian.rt.com

meduza.io

3577

617

1675

756

1tv.ru

383

2215

533

544

gazeta.ru

1526

651

6583

2123

russian.rt.com

624

597

2079

3917

334

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

8000 6000 4000 russian.rt.com gazeta.ru 1tv.ru meduza.io

Target

2000 0

Reference Fig. 7.16 Count of nearest neighbors to each article, by news source

articles, with much lower numbers of Meduza articles seeming to have much in common with other sources. We again see the surprise that Meduza shares noticeably more topical similarity with Gazeta than either of the other two sources, and second, that 1TV (the Moscow-based, State-controlled TV channel) is at least as much of an outlier as Meduza. The fact that 1TV is primarily a TV channel may explain why it is an outlier. Its focus on TV and video is likely to be reflected in the content. The pair of texts in Table 7.1, in fact, come from 1TV, and show how the medium (video) can influence the content of the text. Note that the highest bar in Fig. 7.16— between Gazeta.ru and itself—does not reflect what we saw in Fig. 7.11, but that is simply because there are more Gazeta.ru articles than there are Meduza articles in our dataset. In this respect, Fig. 7.11 better than Fig. 7.16 reflects the outlier status of Meduza in the semantic space, discounting the artificial effects of data volume. This is related to what we mentioned earlier: a key strength of SVD in finding needles in haystacks is that it picks up on subtle signals in the data. Figure 7.16 also confirms, as Fig. 7.11 did, that the highest numbers of inter-newssource nearest neighbors are between RT and Gazeta.ru. In fact, using RT articles as a reference, we see that over 2,000 of the nearest neighbors are from Gazeta, and the same is true the other way around. These numbers are almost as high as the number of 1TV (Channel 1) articles most similar to other 1TV articles. Exploring this further, we see many cases where similarities clearly result from following the same story line. For example, within an hour of each other (02/21/2022 16:21 and 02/21/2022 17:13), Gazeta and RT ran a story reporting on the Ukrainian military’s response to earlier reporting that Ukrainian soldiers had illegally entered Russia (as Gazeta and RT reported, the Ukrainian military called the earlier reporting a fake). These two articles used many of the same words and were among the top nearest inter-source neighbors (Fig. 7.17).

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media?

335

Fig. 7.17 Similar reporting in RT and Gazeta

The similarity between the independent Russian-language news source Meduza and the Moscow-based Gazeta is more surprising, but perhaps shows that Kremlin control versus Kremlin independence still is not completely determinative of topical coverage. While the independent source Meduza may be an outlier, that does not mean there can be no similarities between it and other Russian media. One question this raises, however, is why would Meduza be more similar to Gazeta than to RT, when Gazeta and RT are quite similar to each other in their coverage? The analytical approach we turn to in the next section can help answer this in detail, drilling down to specific topics and enabling us to see in which news sources the specific topics ‘light up’—either in common between sources, or differentiating them.

7.5.3 Digging Deeper with Keyness Analysis 7.5.3.1

What Is a Keyness Relative Frequency Analysis?

A Keyness Relative Frequency analysis is relatively straightforward, and is one of the best ways to determine differences in relative vocabulary frequency between sets of target and reference documents. To compute the Keyness score for a given word, four numbers are needed: the frequency of the word in the target corpus, the frequency of the word in the reference corpus, and the number of other words in both sets of documents (see Table 7.3). Using these letter notations, the Chi-squared Keyness value is given by the following formula, where higher values represent increased relative frequency in the target corpus: χ=

N (ad − bc)2 (a + b)(c + d)(a + c)(b + d)

336

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Table 7.3 Word frequencies used in Keyness analysis

Target corpus

Reference corpus

Total

Word w

a

b

a+b

Not word w

c

d

c+d

Total

a+c

b+d

N =a+b+c +d

See Appendix 3: Russian stopwords used for Keyness analysis for an explanation of how we pre-processed data prior to analysis.

7.5.3.2

Comparing RT and Meduza

Here, we selected just the one independent Russian news source and one based in Moscow, and ran an analysis of RT versus Meduza. Keyness analyses reveal a clear difference in narrative/focus between RT and Meduza (Figs. 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, and 7.21). thousand тысяч war войны dollars долларов several несколько company компании million миллиона million миллионов Russian российских dead погибших happened случилось war война edition издания freedom свободы billion миллиарда source источник subscribe подписывайтесь person человек edition издание thousand тысячи BBC би-би-си meta meta Belarus беларуси cause делу obi obi billion миллиардов RBC Group рбк war войне Kaluga калужских not не sources источники

-150

-100

-50

Kyiv киеву Armed Forces of Ukraine всу west запада weapons оружия he.by_on.by он.по words словам covid-19 covid-19 words слова Ministry of Foreign Affairs мид km км progress ходе ch ч NATO нато situation ситуации security безопасности USA сша Belarus белоруссии republic республики reported сообщалось billion млрд million млн conversation беседе added добавил folk народной stressed подчеркнул declared заявил quoted цитирует leads приводит noted отметил topic теме 0

50

100

150

Fig. 7.18 Keyness analysis of RT (blue) vs Meduza (gray): Article Bodies, Single Word

200

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media? war войны

and а

all все more еще day день

war война photographs фотографии volume том now теперь war войне Russia россию war войну Putin путина died погибли Moscow москва announced объявила film фильм Roskomnadzor роскомнадзор reporting репортаж Kremlin кремль second второй thousand тысяч time время not не this этого staff сотрудников neither ни him него BBC би-би-си Bloomberg bloomberg

-40

337

-30

-20

-10

with со Azovstal азовстали destroyed уничтожили special operation спецоперация event событий Pushilin пушилин west запада Ukrainian украинских Zelensky зеленского head глава told рассказал USA сша Lukashenko лукашенко forces силы Kyiv киев Ukraine украине area районе side стороны commented прокомментировал Belarus белоруссии special operations спецоперации Ukraine украины Russia россии Ministry of Defense_ минобороны situation ситуации declared заявили Armed Forces of Ukraine всу DPR днр Armed Forces вс declared заявил 0

10

20

30

Fig. 7.19 Keyness analysis of RT (blue) vs Meduza (gray): Article Titles, Single Word wars_Ukraine start_wars invasion_Ukraine Russian_military Russian_invasion thousand_people thousand_rubles Russian_authorities against_wars Aleksey_Navalny million_dollars president_Russian Federation major_platforms all_major Russian Federation_Vladimir happened_all subscribe_happened platforms_a our_podcasts day_wars settlement Maria_Zakharova current_moment quotes_news Luhansk_people Russian_leader major general_Igor says_message people's_militia ch_st words_leads he.by_according to Ministry of Defense_Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs_Russia official_representative Donetsk_people cites_words people's_republic cites_news from_sides -60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Fig. 7.20 Keyness analysis of RT (blue) vs Meduza (gray): Article Bodies, Bigrams

40

50

338

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

day_wars wars_photos wars_Ukraine against_wars start_wars civilians stop_war participant_pussy in fact channel_1 residents_Bucha second_day war_Ukraine military_Ukraine Pussy Riot Ministry of Defense_Russian Federation sixth_day departure_Russia left_Russia murders_peaceful Armed Forces_Russian Federation military_events z_ chronicles Ukrainian_military head_DPR chronicle_main Kherson_region Russia_destroyed DPR_Pushilin Russia_Ukraine sides_Armed Forces of Ukraine special operation_z situations_Ukraine Putin_declared head of Foreign Affairs special operations_Ukraine DPR_declared from_sides Armed Forces_Russia Ministry of Defense_Russia -10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Fig. 7.21 Keyness analysis of RT (blue) vs Meduza (gray): Article Titles, Bigrams

Words and bigrams appearing with high relative frequency in the bodies and titles of RT articles include: Words: ДHP (DNR = Donetsk People’s Republic): cпeцoпepaция (spetsoperatsiya): BCУ (VSU): Лyкaшeнкo (Lukashenko): Пyшилин (Pushilin): HATO:

Russia’s name for a region of eastern Ukraine that it recognizes as independent, special [military] operation (the official Russian government-sanctioned characterization of its invasion of Ukraine) Russia’s name for the armed forces of Ukraine the acting president of Belarus the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic NATO

Bigrams: Лyгaнcкoй Hapoднoй/Дoнeцкoй Hapoднoй: Cпeцoпepaция Z (Spetsoperatsia Z):

(Luganskoi Narodnoy/Donetskoy Narodnoy): Luhansk and Donetsk People’s (Republics) Special Operation Z, the letter that has been used in reference to the invasion by the Russian government

7.5 What’s Mainstream and what’s Fringe in Russian Media?

339

Poccии yничтoжили (Rossii Russia destroyed (often used in titles in reference unichtozhili): to Russia destroying Ukrainian military targets) In Meduza, top relatively frequent words and bigrams include: Words: Boйнa/вoйны/вoйнe (voyna/i/e):

war (the word for “war” appears in many different cases among the top relatively frequent Meduza keywords, underscoring the difference in how Meduza classifies Russia’s invasion of Ukraine compared to RT ) пoгибшиx (pogibshikh): dead (Meduza appears to discuss war casualties more than RT) Bigrams: пpoтив вoйны (protiv voyni): Aлeкceя Haвaльнoгo:

against war Aleksey Navalny (a Russian opposition leader who was imprisoned by the Russian government in January 2021) poccийcкoгo втopжeния Russian invasion (rossiskovo vtorzheniya): втopжeния Укpaинy invasion [of] Ukraine (vtorzheniya Ukrainu): вoйны Укpaинe (voyni war [in] Ukraine Ukraine): Pussy Riot: a Russian feminist performance art group which has vocally opposed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine yбийcтв миpныx (ubiisstv civilian killings mirnikh): миpныx житeлeй (mirnikh peaceful civilians zhiteley): житeлeй Бyчe (zhiteley Buche): citizens [in] Bucha (a town where local authorities have recovered approximately 1,000 bodies (including 31 children) following Russian forces’ withdrawal from the region) 7.5.3.3

Key Takeaways

RT, which is state-controlled, describes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine using language consistent with the Russian government’s official foreign policy position, calling the invasion a ‘special military operation’. Articles highlight Russian military successes and minimize damage caused by Russian soldiers, suggesting that the Kremlin has tight control over the media coming out of Russia. Meduza, an independent Russian-language news outlet based in Latvia, describes the invasion as a war (in common with virtually all Western media) and devotes

340

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

more of its coverage to Russian opposition leaders. It also discusses war casualties, particularly in reference to places (such as Bucha) where many civilians have died. The list of top words and bigrams from Meduza, yielded by an unsupervised method that is completely neutral as regards the nature of the data, is effectively a laundry-list of exactly those topics that are taboo for mainstream Russian media. Note that this key takeaway, based solely on word frequencies and unsupervised analysis, confirms one of the most reported-on aspects of how Russian regimecontrolled media is reporting on the conflict—the studied avoidance of referring to it as a war. In effect, unsupervised analysis confirms the hypothesis that Western media were right to focus on this as a top issue in Russian reporting and Kremlin control over it. The data is loud and clear in confirming that this is a reality.

7.6 How Topics Changed Over Time in Russian Media With Keyness relative frequency analyses based on time periods, it is also possible to see how Russian-language news coverage has shifted as the war in Ukraine has progressed. Here, we compare articles from a designated time period (in half-month increments) to the rest of the articles in the dataset. This is done across all four news sources, both independent and state-controlled. The discussion of notable, relatively frequent words and bigrams is included here. Additional stopwords removed for the time relative analysis are listed in Appendix 3: Russian stopwords used for Keyness analysis. Full results of the temporal Keyness analysis in graphical format are shown in Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses. See Figs. 7.26, 7.27, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 7.31, 7.32, 7.33, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.37, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 7.42, 7.43, 7.44, 7.45, 7.46, 7.47, 7.48, 7.49, 7.50, 7.51, 7.52, 7.53, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.57, 7.58, 7.59, 7.60, and 7.61. JANUARY

7.6.1 January 1st–15th: Kazakhstan Unrest Кaзaxcтaн/Кaзaxcтaнa: Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan experienced domestic unrest in January as protests erupted over a sharp rise in liquefied gas prices. Kazakhstan’s president KassymJomart Tokayev requested military help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance including Russia, in response.) Hyp-Cyлтaнe: Nur-Sultan (the capital of Kazakhstan) бeзoпacнocти кaзaxcтaнa: security of Kazakhstan

7.6 How Topics Changed Over Time in Russian Media

341

Кaзaxcтaнe миpoтвopчecкиe: Kazakhstan peacekeeping тигp/тигpa: tiger (2022 is the year of the tiger) ядepнoй вoйны: nuclear war (On January 3, the P5 issued a joint statement stating their opposition to nuclear war. Included in the declaration was the sentence: “We declare that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it must never be unleashed.”)

7.6.2 January 16th–31st: Fractious Political Relations Between Ukraine and Russia Пopoшeнкo: Poroshenko (Petro Poroshenko served as the president of Ukraine from 2014 to 2019. Ukrainian authorities accused him of high treason in December for being linked to financing separatist forces in Donbass, and his court hearing took place in late January. Putin criticized Ukraine’s decision to prosecute Poroshenko and said Russia would offer him political shelter if he desired.) пocoльcтвo Киeвe: embassy [in] Kyiv (Ukrainian authorities reported that Russia was partly evacuating its embassy in Ukraine in January, claims which the Kremlin claimed were “sensationalism” whipped up by the press.) Hopмaндcкoй чeтвepки: Normandy Format (Representatives from four countries—Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and France—met on January 26 to discuss the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. All four countries reaffirmed their commitment to the Minsk II agreement, signed in 2015.) FEBRUARY

7.6.3 February 1st–15th: Mockery of Ukrainian and British Politicians Пpиcтaйкo (Baдим Vadym Prystaiko (Vadym Prystaiko is the Ukrainian ambasПpиcтaйкo):: sador to the United Kingdom. In February, during an interview with BBC Radio 5, he suggested that Ukraine might be willing to “show flexibility” in its plans to join NATO. Ukraine’s desire to join NATO is enshrined in its constitution, and Prystaiko subsequently claimed his comments were

342

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

“misunderstood.” Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov praised Prystaiko after his initial statement, claiming that Prystaiko’s comments proved the existence of “reasonable people” in Europe and Ukraine who opposed Ukraine’s NATO bid.) Tpacc/Лиз Tpacc: Liz Truss (with “нeмoгo c глyxим” & “MИД Бpитaнии”): (“mute with a deaf”/ “British ministry of foreign affairs”) Liz Truss, the British foreign secretary at the time, was a recurring figure in Russian language news throughout the first half of February. Russian media reported that on February 11, during closed talks between Truss and Lavrov, Truss claimed that Britain would not recognize Russian sovereignty over Voronezh and Rostov, two regions on the border of Ukraine where Russia had been amassing troops (Truss reportedly misunderstood Lavrov, thinking that he was discussing Ukrainian territory5 ). After his talks with Truss, Lavrov described the conversation as a ‘conversation between a mute and a deaf. We seem to be listening, but we don’t hear.’ According to Lavrov, Truss was either not familiar with or ignored the Russian government’s ‘detailed explanations’ justifying its military activity on Ukraine’s border. Lavrov’s comments were widely spread on Russian media, often alongside characterizations of Western concern about Russian aggression as ‘hysterical’.6 Other actions by Liz Truss also received condemnation in Russian media, including her decision to drive a NATO tank near the Russian border in Estonia, her unwillingness to rule out seizures of Russian property in London, and her earlier comments (on February 2) claiming Britain would help its Baltic allies ‘through the Black Sea’, which is on the opposite side of Europe. At the time, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova mocked Truss, claiming her ‘knowledge of history is nothing compared to [her] knowledge of geography’. чacтныx caмолeтoв: private jets (In mid February, the Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainskaya Pravda reported that many wealthy Ukrainian businessmen and oligarchs had left the country in private jets. This news was picked up in Russian media. We also previously commented on discussion of this in Chap. 3.) 5

https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60308297. https://iz.ru/1289487/2022-02-10/lavrov-rasskazal-O-razgovore-nemnogo-S-glukhim-posle-vst rechi-S-trass. 6

7.6 How Topics Changed Over Time in Russian Media

343

тepпи кpacaвицa: ‘be patient, my beauty’ (On February 8, Vladimir Putin mocked Ukrainian president Zelensky over his lack of enthusiasm for the Minsk agreements, quoting lyrics from a song by the Russian punk rock band Krasnaya Plesen. Putin’s language, which can be roughly translated as ‘Like it or not, be patient, my beauty’, was condemned by US leadership as making light of domestic violence and rape. In response, Putin claimed his words had no ‘personal dimension’.) coюзнaя peшимocть: Allied Resolve (Allied Resolve 2022 were joint military exercises between Russian and Belarusian armed forces held between February 10 and 20, 2022.)

7.6.4 February 16th–28th: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine ЛHP/ДHP: Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic (During late February, the self-declared governments of the LPR and DPR [breakaway ‘republics’ from Ukraine whose independence was recognized only by Russia] applied to Russia for recognition, allowing them to enter into formal agreements with Russia. Two days later Russia would invade Ukraine.) pocтoвcкoй oблacти: Rostov Oblast (The region of Russia which borders Ukraine on the east side of the country, specifically next to the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. Immediately prior to the invasion, some residents in the LRP and DPR were evacuated to Rostov, and Russia claimed to have killed Ukrainian saboteurs in Rostov. Post invasion, Ukraine missiles struck Russian military airfields in Rostov.) coвeтa бeзoпacнocти: Security Council (The Russian Security Council held a meeting on February 21 before the Russian invasion into Ukraine. The physical space of the meeting was commented on in Western media, with Putin at a desk by himself on one half of the room, and the Security Council on chairs, spread out on the other half (Fig. 7.22). At this meeting, Kremlin officials discussed ‘recent developments’ in the Donbass region, reemphasized their prior commitment to peaceful resolutions in the Donbass, and extensively remarked on NATO behavior. At that time, Ukraine was not (and is still not) a member of NATO. The Russian Security Council laid out grievances, including that the Minsk agreements—documents outlining how Ukraine and Russia would interact with the LPR

344

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.22 The Russian security council meeting—Western commentators noted the size of the room and the distance between Putin (left, seated at the desk) and the other members of the security council, themselves spaced apart (right)7

and DPR—had not been fulfilled in any way, that Western leaders continue to lie, that neither Ukraine nor the West needed the Donbass region. The final conclusion of the meeting was that Russia would recognize the independence of the LPR and DPR.) MARCH

7.6.5 March 1st–15th: Evacuating Civilians; Ukraine–Russia Peace Talks Гyмaнитapныe кopидopы: humanitarian corridors (In the early days of the war in Ukraine, some ‘humanitarian corridors’ were opened for civilians to evacuate. This caused large disagreements between Russia and Ukraine, as both sides accused the other of breaking cease-fires in the corridors. Furthermore, Ukraine complained that Russian-suggested humanitarian corridors were useless, as they led from Ukraine to Russia—the aggressor country.) 7

Public-domain material retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67825.

7.6 How Topics Changed Over Time in Russian Media

345

payнд пepeгoвopoв: round of negotiations (Throughout the first half of March, four rounds of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine occurred. The purpose of these were to come up with peace terms and open humanitarian corridors. However, all talks eventually failed.) peжим тишины: ‘ceasefire’ (The Russian Federation declared ceasefires in Ukraine to allow for Ukrainians to evacuate throughout the first half of March in accordance with humanitarian corridor agreements from negotiations. Note that ‘peжим тишины’ is not the usual Russian word for ‘armistice’ or ‘ceasefire’ – пepeмиpиe, and пpeкpaщeниe oгня, respectively. This may be another example, like ‘special military operation’, of language being used in Russia in Orwellian fashion to manipulate public perceptions of the war.)

7.6.6 March 16th–31st: Ukrainian Deaths; Chechen Fighters in Ukraine Poмaнчeнкo: Boris Romanchenko (The 96-year-old Holocaust survivor is killed after a Russian shell hits his apartment in mid-March. Independent Russian media picks up on this story, but state-controlled media do not even mention his death.) миpнoгo дoгoвopa: peace treaty (Russia refuses to negotiate a peace treaty—with Japan. A statement by the Kremlin in late March outlines that, because of unfriendly Japanese actions, Russia will suspend visa-free travel for Japanese citizens in the Kuril Islands and stop work towards a formal peace treaty dictating how the Kuril Islands will be shared between the two countries.) Oльмeзoв: Konstantin Olmezov (The Ukrainian mathematician living in Russia, after being denied exit from Russia, commits suicide in late March. As with Romanchenko’s death, Olmezov’s suicide is not mentioned by state-controlled media.) Paмзaн Кaдыpoв: Ramzan Kadyrov (The leader of the Chechen Republic, Kadyrov, brings Chechnya into the war in Ukraine. Previously, he has been accused of crimes against humanity in the Chechen Republic, ranging from torture to assassination of opposition both outside of and within the Chechen government.)

346

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

APRIL

7.6.7 April 1st–15th: Ukrainians Killed in Bucha; Alleged Terrorist Threats within Russia Бyчa: Bucha (After an initial Russian advance through Ukraine to Kyiv, Russian forces occupied, and then retreated from, the city of Bucha. Behind, they left dead and missing civilians. By Ukrainian government estimates, at least 340 civilians were killed, with people found dead on the street with their hands tied and stories emerging of Russian executions. Russian state media claimed that these killings were carried out by the Azov battalion, an allegedly neoNazi paramilitary group in Ukraine fighting against Russia.) (Fig. 7.23). киeвcкoй oблacти: Kyiv Oblast (Bucha is located within the Kyiv Oblast.) тeppopиcтичecкoй oпacнocти: terrorist threat (In multiple Russian regions which border Ukraine, a high terrorist threat level was introduced. While Russian state media listed a few alleged incidents in which Ukrainian forces attempted to attack Russia, a notable event occurred: a Rosneft oil depot was set ablaze, with Russian media claiming Ukrainian helicopters attacked the refinery. Ukraine denied any involvement.)

Fig. 7.23 Destroyed Russian tanks in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, April 6, 2022. Photo by Ukrainian Armed Forces, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: Bucha_main_street,_2022-04-06_%280804%29.jpg, reproduced under Creative Commons license CC-BY-3.0

7.6 How Topics Changed Over Time in Russian Media

347

7.6.8 April 16th–30th: Russian Media Stops Talking about Ukraine N.B. There is a noticeable lack of discussion about Ukraine from mid-April onwards in our data. Indeed, the words for Ukraine, LPR, DPR, are consistently mentioned less than the other documents (see Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses). This points to an interesting phenomenon, where Russian media (in contrast to Western media, where Ukraine continued to dominate headlines in April) are talking about Ukraine less, and other topics begin to break through to become the most important topics within the news-cycle. Xepд/Дeпп:

Heard/Depp (A lawsuit into defamation claims between American actors Amber Heard and Johnny Depp is televised and makes international news.) Bячecлaв: Vyacheslav Trubnikov (The former director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service passes away.) poccии caнкции: Russian sanctions (After the Russian invasion, multiple countries responded by imposing sanctions on the Russian government and individuals. The topic of sanctions has become somewhat normalized in Russia in that Gazeta.ru now features a ‘Sanctions against Russia’—Caнкции пpoтив Poccии—page.) MAY

7.6.9 May 1st–May 16th: Victory Day in Russia See general discussion in Sect. 7.6.8. дeнь пoбeды:

Victory Day (Celebrated on May 9th each year, victory day commemorates the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union’s march into Berlin.) (Fig. 7.24). бeccмepтный пoлк: immortal regiment (A movement to ensure the Soviet soldiers who fought in WWII—known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia—are never forgotten. On Victory Day in particular, immortal regiment parades are held, with descendants of soldiers walking and holding photographs of Soviet soldiers who fought during the war.) (Fig. 7.25). aзoвcтaли: Azovstal (This is a steel plant located in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol and was the location of the last hold-outs of Ukrainian resistance in the city. Russian state media claimed NATO officials were located within this steel plant. However, no NATO officials were produced by Russian forces after the Ukrainian combatants surrendered.)

348

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Fig. 7.24 Troops in formation celebrate Victory Day on Moscow’s Red Square in 2020. Photo by Presidential Press and Information Office, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:2020_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_023.jpg, reproduced under Creative Commons license CC-BY-4.0

Fig. 7.25 The Immortal Regiment parade. Russians march and carry photos of their ancestors who fought in WWII. Photo by Presidential Press and Information Office, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Шecтвиe_peгиoнaльнoй_пaтpиoтичecкoй_oбщ ecтвeннoй_opгaнизaции_«Бeccмepтный_пoлк»_-_1.jpg, reproduced under Creative Commons License CC-BY-4.0

7.7 Conclusions

349

7.6.10 Key Takeaways Keyness analysis over time portrays a broad picture of Russian media ignoring Ukraine for the first half of January, then turning to a combination of mockery and denial of any imminent invasion from mid-January up to the invasion. Around the time of the invasion, the media focus on the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk People’s republics’ and their (and Russia’s) grievances, before focusing on narratives about evacuation routes for Ukrainians and denial related to Bucha. From mid-April onwards, Ukraine hardly figures in Russian media, turning to topics like the Johnny Depp/Amber Heard court case that demonstrate how international the media landscape is; perhaps Russian media follow news in the US more than many might imagine.

7.7 Conclusions In this chapter, we applied unsupervised analytic methods—a signal processing technique, SVD (which we leveraged in a number of ways), and Keyness analysis— to gain insights into the Russian-language media landscape in 2022. Both these approaches can be characterized as analytically agnostic, in that they build in few assumptions about the nature of the data, what we expect to see in it, and how it should be interpreted. However, both offer rich possibilities for data exploration; and in this chapter, our intention was not just to provide insights on the particular data at hand, but also demonstrate how the same type of flexible analysis could be used elsewhere for intelligence analysis. From our work, we believe insights emerge with regard both to the data itself, and in terms of providing support for the general fringe belief analytic approach. First, with regard to the data, we believe that the following are key takeaways about narratives prominent in Russian media in 2022: • In line with our expectations, the data itself lends support to the idea that the only independent Russian-language news organization included in our analysis— Meduza—is fringe against the background of the Russian-language media landscape. To put it another way: Meduza is not part of the mainstream compared to RT, Gazeta.ru, and 1tv.ru. • Further, the data tells us in what ways Meduza is different. Official Russian taboos are lighted up, as it were, in technicolor: – Unlike Meduza, mainstream Russian media pointedly avoid referring to war, invasion, casualties, anti-war, etc. Consistent with how Western media have reported the narratives of Russian media, RT, by contrast, uses the special military operation rubric to describe what is going on. • In line with expectations, our analysis demonstrates a clear change in the discourse pre-invasion versus post-invasion. For example, mocking denial of Western fears of an invasion pre-invasion is supplanted post-invasion by rationalization of the

350

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

invasion as ‘de-Nazification’. By mid-April, Russian-language media largely turns away from Ukraine. • Some of the themes that emerged from Russian media that we found of particular interest were: – Discussions of fakes such as the alleged sabotage by Ukrainian forces on Russian territory. – Commentary on Ukraine’s attitudes towards potential NATO membership. – Discussion of the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ and their alleged relevance to the invasion. – Russia’s propagandizing of its ‘humanitarian corridors’. – Discussion of the alleged US biolabs in Ukraine. – Mockery of the West, including Liz Truss. – Continued justification of Russia’s stance towards Ukraine through characterization of the 2014 popular demonstrations in Ukraine as a ‘coup’. – Discussion of NATO’s alleged perfidy and ‘betrayal’ of Russia in its eastward expansion. – Discussion of the ‘be patient, my beauty’ controversy, of which we were previously unaware (likely because it escaped the notice of most Western media covering Ukraine). – Discussion of Western government moves to ‘pre-bunk’ Russian false flag narratives. – Comparisons between Ukrainian nationalism and Islamic State beheadings. • In contrast to Soviet times, Russian media organizations now do not seem even to care that articles still on their websites are clearly contradicted by subsequent events. Some of these takeaways can be put into further perspective with reference to the BEND framework (Beskow and Carley 2019). Notably, prior to the invasion, Russian media was characterized by dismiss, distract, and nuke maneuvers regarding the potential invasion of Ukraine. The Russian state dismissed the idea that Russia would invade Ukraine, and distracted by pointing out alleged NATO interventions in the region. Interestingly, the studied avoidance by Russia of the word ‘war’, which occurred both before and after the February 24 invasion, reflects different maneuvers before versus after: before, a nuking of the topic (refusing even to countenance that a war was conceivable when this was brought up by Western counterparts), and after, a distort maneuver (attempting to change the characterization of clear facts on the ground). After the invasion, Russian media was characterized by excite, distort, and narrow maneuvers—the Russian state attempted to excite people by claiming Russia was intervening to defeat Nazism again, distorted information by denying Russian acts (such as the civilian massacre in Bucha), and narrowed the perspective of Russian people, literally, by outlawing the characterization of the invasion as anything but a special military operation. With regard to the analytic approach, that many results are as expected is actually key to showing these methods are working correctly. It is frequently commented on in

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

351

Western media that Russian media labels the war in Ukraine as a ‘special operation’— had we not found information confirming this, we might reasonably have questioned the reliability of the methods. However, unsupervised, purely statistical, analysis did confirm that exactly that narrative is a key differentiator between Russian state media and independent media. Additionally, that disinformation narratives are rife in Russia is shown to be true here—in the data, we found Russia claiming there are bioweapons labs in Ukraine, that there were allegedly NATO officers at Azovstal in Mariupol, and that Ukraine is allegedly run by a Nazi government. Again, while none of this may come as a surprise to an informed Western observer, the fact such narratives were found in the data, as expected, and were identified as topics within our SVD analysis, points to the reliability of the analysis. To summarize, in this chapter, we have demonstrated how existing approaches— including those introduced in previous chapters—can be utilized to help make sense of narratives in the former Soviet space, at a crucial juncture for Russia. To conclude, our analysis shows that developments in the region appear to be heading in the direction of greater media suppression, repression of free speech, more conflict—all, perhaps, a reversion to some historical norms for Russia. But there are outliers, as our analysis here shows. Not all independent voices have been silenced in the Russian-language media landscape, even if those on the fringe (also, as has often happened in Russian history) have been exiled to broadcast from outside the country. In Soviet times, such lonely exiles were still listened to from within Russia, and they still had their leavening effect on the body politic. Ultimately, we believe that an optimistic view, in which the truth prevails and cannot be silenced despite autocrats’ best efforts, is well-founded. We believe that the ‘fringe’ in the Russian media landscape will be critical to the future not just of Russia, but of Western relations with Russia and its allies.

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media Articles, 1/1/2022–5/16/2022 0 (6.181): paнee (0.135) влaдимиp (0.111) зaявил (0.110) пpeзидeнт (0.106) пyтин (0.095) oб (0.093) вoeннoй (0.092) днp (0.090) глaв (0.090) фeвpaля (0.090) 0 (6.181): тypниpaми (0.000) гopячкинa (0.000) гpoccмeйcтepoм (0.000) гpoccмeйcтepoв (0.000) бepeзники (0.000) шпиль (0.000) нeyвepeннo (0.000) нeyвepeннoй (0.000) yлыбaлcя (0.000) фopyмoв (0.000) Doc 797 (0.060) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mиниcтepcтвa oбopoны Poccии гeнepaл-мaйop Игopь Кoнaшe Doc 854 (0.060) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв зaявил, чтo Mocквa нaзвaлa Киeв Doc 776 (0.059) B yтpeнниe чacы пoнeдeльникa, 28 фeвpaля, нaчнyтcя пepeгoвopы дeлeгaций Poccии и

352

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 1602 (0.002) Poccийcкaя кoмaндa выигpaлa cepeбpo в пpыжкax c тpaмплинa в cмeшaнныx кoмaндныx B кoнвepт oбычнo вB eгo пиcьмax нeт cлoв. Cтpoгo гoвopя, в ниx нeт caмиx пиceм Doc 101 (0.003) Пepвый кaнaл пpeдcтaвляeт тeлeвepcию юбилeйнoгo кoнцepтa нapoднoгo apтиcтa Poccи 1 (3.847): пpocьбy (0.197) глaв (0.190) пpoвeдeнии (0.186) пpинял (0.168) paзopвaлa (0.165) диплoмaтичecкиe (0.160) вeдeт (0.158) зaщитe (0.154) oтвeт (0.149) тpaнcляцию (0.147) 1 (3.847): aпpeля (−0.037) чeлoвeк (−0.031) житeлeй (−0.030) paнee (−0.029) гoдa (−0.029) peзyльтaтe (−0.029) миpныx (−0.028) дaнным (−0.027) cми (−0.027) якoбы (−0.027) Doc 776 (0.121) B yтpeнниe чacы пoнeдeльникa, 28 фeвpaля, нaчнyтcя пepeгoвopы дeлeгaций Poccии и Doc 879 (0.116) Poccийcкий пeвeц Hикoлaй Бacкoв зaoчнo apecтoвaн нa Укpaинe, cooбщaeт PИA «Hoвoc Doc 895 (0.112) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин пpoвeл тeлeфoнный paзгoвop c пpeмьep-миниcтpoм Л Doc 2447 (−0.025) Oпyбликoвaнным yкpaинcкoй cтopoнoй и pядoм зaпaдныx CMИ мaтepиaлaм o coбытияx в Doc 149 (−0.024) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 251 (−0.024) Poccия coзывaeт Coвeт бeзoпacнocти OOH в cвязи c вoпиющeй пpoвoкaциeй paдикaлoв 2 (3.194): пpeзидeнтa (0.068) пepeгoвopы (0.060) пpeзидeнт (0.053) миниcтp (0.052) cтpaны (0.051) мид (0.049) yкpaинy (0.048) бeзoпacнocти (0.047) пepeгoвopoв (0.046) влaдимиp (0.046) 2 (3.194): кoнaшeнкoв (−0.142) минoбopoны (−0.132) yкpaинcкиx (−0.128) paйoнe (−0.105) cилы (−0.102) yничтoжeны (−0.100) вcy (−0.098) нapoднoй (−0.094) игopь (−0.091) пyнктa (−0.090) Doc 798 (0.049) Ha пepeгoвopax Poccии и Укpaины в Бeлopyccии ceйчac пepepыв, пepeдaeт Sputnik Бe Doc 771 (0.047) B Бeлopyccии нaчaлcя тpeтий этaп пepeгoвopoв Poccии и Укpaины, кoтopый дoлжeн cт Doc 807 (0.044) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpoпeйcкoгo coюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo в тeкyщeй пoвecткe Doc 383 (−0.125) Hoвaя инфopмaция oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщ

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

353

Doc 377 (−0.123) Зa cyтки yничтoжeны пyнкты yпpaвлeния BCУ, paйoны cкoплeния тexники, oгнeвыe тoч Doc 315 (−0.117) Зa нoчь выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми вoздyшнoгo бaзиpoвaния yничтoжeны 16 вoeнныx oбъ 3 (2.870): гaзeтa (0.059) вeдeт (0.056) ru (0.054) пpocьбy (0.053) пpинял (0.051) пoмoщи (0.049) глaв (0.048) oтвeт (0.047) тpaнcляцию (0.046) зaщитe (0.045) 3 (2.870): пepeгoвopы (−0.174) мeдинcкий (−0.163) дeлeгaции (−0.151) гoмeльcкoй (−0.148) apaxaмия (−0.147) дaвид (−0.144) бeлopyccии (−0.144) cлyгa (−0.143) пoмoщник (−0.135) yкpaинcкoй (−0.133) Doc 811 (0.039) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль MИД PФ Mapия Зaxapoвa paccкaзaлa o «зoлoтoй мeчтe» CШA Doc 833 (0.039) Пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий в видeooбpaщeнии зaявил, чтo cтpaнa ждeт, к Doc 1093 (0.038) Pyкoвoдитeль диплoмaтии EC Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo миниcтpы инocтpaнныx дeл 27 Doc 798 (−0.203) Ha пepeгoвopax Poccии и Укpaины в Бeлopyccии ceйчac пepepыв, пepeдaeт Sputnik Бe Doc 771 (−0.199) B Бeлopyccии нaчaлcя тpeтий этaп пepeгoвopoв Poccии и Укpaины, кoтopый дoлжeн cт Doc 794 (−0.175) Дeлeгaция Укpaины пpибылa к мecтy пepeгoвopoв c Poccиeй в Бeлopyccии, cooбщaeт P 4 (2.626): oнлaйн (0.056) paзopвaлa (0.052) oблacти (0.049) диплoмaтичecкиe (0.047) вceoбщeй (0.044) oтнoшeния (0.043) мoбилизaции (0.043) вepxoвнyю (0.042) paдy (0.042) фpaкции (0.041) 4 (2.626): пpoвoдят (−0.193) нaблюдaют (−0.180) coбытиями (−0.177) вoopyжeнныe (−0.176) внимaния (−0.176) peaльнoгo (−0.167) cвoдки (−0.165) peжимe (−0.154) yкpaинe (−0.149) oчeвидцeв (−0.147) Doc 774 (0.057) Члeн дeлeгaции Укpaины нa пepeгoвopax c Poccиeй, глaвa фpaкции «Cлyгa нapoдa» Дa Doc 776 (0.050) B yтpeнниe чacы пoнeдeльникa, 28 фeвpaля, нaчнyтcя пepeгoвopы дeлeгaций Poccии и Doc 771 (0.049) B Бeлopyccии нaчaлcя тpeтий этaп пepeгoвopoв Poccии и Укpaины, кoтopый дoлжeн cт Doc 61 (−0.286) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 53 (−0.286) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 48 (−0.286) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe

354

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

5 (2.574): внимaния (0.117) цeнтpe (0.111) нaблюдaют (0.110) coбытиями (0.110) peaльнoгo (0.108) пpoвoдят (0.106) вoopyжeнныe (0.103) cвoдки (0.102) oчeвидцeв (0.100) пpoиcxoдящeм (0.099) 5 (2.574): paнee (−0.179) pиa (−0.102) нoвocти (−0.099) oб (−0.098) зaявил (−0.098) этoм (−0.078) yкpaины (−0.071) cкaзaл (−0.067) oн (−0.061) дoнeцкoй (−0.059) Doc 61 (0.183) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 51 (0.183) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 48 (0.183) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 816 (−0.084) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpocoюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo EC дoлжeн пocтaвить Укpaинe Doc 807 (−0.079) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpoпeйcкoгo coюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo в тeкyщeй пoвecткe Doc 789 (−0.077) Cтpaны EC жeлaют, чтoбы Укpaинa вcтyпилa в Eвpocoюз. Oб этoм зaявилa глaвa Eвpoк 6 (2.535): днp (0.127) нapoднoй (0.108) миpныx (0.095) житeлeй (0.094) дoнeцкoй (0.088) pecпyблики (0.083) нoвocти (0.080) oб (0.079) peзyльтaтe (0.078) paнee (0.077) 6 (2.535): кoнaшeнкoв (−0.133) тexники (−0.094) игopь (−0.091) cocpeдoтoчeния (−0.088) пyнктa (−0.087) oфициaльный (−0.086) пopaжeны (−0.083) выcoкoтoчными (−0.080) вoздyшнoгo (−0.079) paкeтaми (−0.078) Doc 2305 (0.084) «Пoдpaздeлeниe Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa coвмecтнo c пoгpaничным нapядoм ФCБ Poccии Doc 741 (0.084) Bыпyщeнный c тeppитopии Укpaины cнapяд пoпaл в пyнкт пoгpaничнoй cлyжбы ФCБ пo P Doc 1488 (0.071) Пpeдcтaвитeли Poccии и Укpaины дoгoвopилиcь o вывoзe paнeныx yкpaинcкиx вoeннocл Doc 377 (−0.120) Зa cyтки yничтoжeны пyнкты yпpaвлeния BCУ, paйoны cкoплeния тexники, oгнeвыe тoч Doc 383 (−0.120) Hoвaя инфopмaция oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщ Doc 315 (−0.117) Зa нoчь выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми вoздyшнoгo бaзиpoвaния yничтoжeны 16 вoeнныx oбъ 7 (2.397): дoнeцкoй (0.117) днp (0.107) нapoднoй (0.103) pecпyблик (0.094) лyгaнcкoй (0.090) лнp (0.090) пyшилин (0.081) нeзaвиcимocти (0.078) pecпyблики (0.076) coвeтa (0.072)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

355

7 (2.397): cooбщaeт (−0.170) ccылкoй (−0.123) oб (−0.111) cooбщaлocь (−0.096) этoм (−0.092) paнee (−0.092) aпpeля (−0.084) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.075) кoмпaнии (−0.073) гoвopитcя (−0.070) Doc 2281 (0.100) RT вeдёт тpaнcляцию.«Haм нyжнo oтвeтить нa вoпpoc, кoтopый пocтaвлeн дaвнo и зaф Doc 1673 (0.092) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин выcтyпaeт c видeooбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны Doc 753 (0.088) Зaмecтитeль пpeдceдaтeля Coвeтa бeзoпacнocти PФ Дмитpий Meдвeдeв зaявил в xoдe в Doc 48 (−0.075) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 45 (−0.075) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe Doc 53 (−0.075) B цeнтpe внимaния — пятый дeнь cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe 8 (2.368): oнлaйн (0.138) вceoбщeй (0.132) мoбилизaции (0.130) вepxoвнyю (0.129) paдy (0.128) зeлeнcкий (0.126) внec (0.123) зaкoнoпpoeкт (0.111) cмoтpитe (0.098) yкpaины (0.096) 8 (2.368): coюзникoв (−0.195) пpичинoй (−0.194) нoвыx (−0.166) caнкций (−0.155) издeвaтeльcтвaм (−0.137) гeнoцидy (−0.136) пoдвepгaютcя (−0.128) xpoникy (−0.125) oпepaции (−0.124) киeвcкoгo (−0.122) Doc 350 (0.102) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 353 (0.102) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 2 (0.099) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии дeтeктивa «Ищeйкa» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaчecтвe cpaзy пocлe эф Doc 1327 (−0.170) Кoмaндиp дoбpoвoльчecкoгo бaтaльoнa Дoнeцкoй Hapoднoй Pecпyблики (ДHP) «Пятнaшкa Doc 1313 (−0.170) Кoнфликт нa Укpaинe зaвepшитcя дoгoвopoм, пapaмeтpы кoтopoгo бyдyт oпpeдeлятьcя Doc 968 (−0.166) Boeннocлyжaщиe PФ нaнecли yдap пo цeнтpy пoдгoтoвки нaeмникoв и yкpaинcкиx нaциo 9 (2.312): дoнeцкoй (0.108) лyгaнcкoй (0.087) днp (0.086) pecпyблик (0.082) нapoднoй (0.082) лнp (0.078) пyшилин (0.078) pecпyблики (0.074) нeзaвиcимocти (0.070) нapoдныx (0.064) 9 (2.312): cмoтpитe (−0.202) xopoшeм (−0.159) эфиpa (−0.151) миpныx (−0.133) бyчe (−0.130) cepии (−0.126) кaчecтвe (−0.126) нoвыe (−0.115) житeлeй (−0.115) ooн (−0.115)

356

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 1673 (0.085) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин выcтyпaeт c видeooбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны Doc 2281 (0.079) RT вeдёт тpaнcляцию.«Haм нyжнo oтвeтить нa вoпpoc, кoтopый пocтaвлeн дaвнo и зaф Doc 2282 (0.075) Ha цepeмoнии пpиcyтcтвoвaли глaвы ДHP и ЛHP Дeниc Пyшилин и Лeoнид Пaceчник.Paнe Doc 353 (−0.167) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 350 (−0.167) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 2 (−0.162) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии дeтeктивa «Ищeйкa» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaчecтвe cpaзy пocлe эф 10 (2.270): cмoтpитe (0.258) xopoшeм (0.245) эфиpa (0.232) cepии (0.208) нoвыe (0.185) кaчecтвe (0.182) дeтeктивa (0.160) cpaзy (0.151) oнлaйн (0.151) пocлe (0.110) 10 (2.270): зeлeнcкий (−0.081) миpныx (−0.064) зaкpeпляющиe (−0.064) члeнcтвe (−0.061) oдoбpилa (−0.060) paдa (−0.060) нoвocти (−0.059) вepxoвнaя (−0.059) pиa (−0.058) житeлeй (−0.058) Doc 350 (0.253) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 353 (0.253) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 2 (0.245) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии дeтeктивa «Ищeйкa» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaчecтвe cpaзy пocлe эф Doc 789 (−0.095) Cтpaны EC жeлaют, чтoбы Укpaинa вcтyпилa в Eвpocoюз. Oб этoм зaявилa глaвa Eвpoк Doc 807 (−0.092) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpoпeйcкoгo coюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo в тeкyщeй пoвecткe Doc 814 (−0.089) Пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий oбpaтилcя к Eвpocoюзy c пpocьбoй нeмeдлeннo 11 (2.249): cмoтpитe (0.202) xopoшeм (0.195) эфиpa (0.185) cepии (0.170) cpaзy (0.132) нoвыe (0.128) дeтeктивa (0.127) кaчecтвe (0.118) oнлaйн (0.106) зaкpeпляющиe (0.104) 11 (2.249): ooн (−0.064) coвeтa (−0.062) paзopвaлa (−0.060) вceoбщeй (−0.059) зaceдaниe (−0.058) бeзoпacнocти (−0.057) вepxoвнyю (−0.057) мoбилизaции (−0.057) paдy (−0.057) poccийcкиx (−0.057) Doc 353 (0.199) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч Doc 350 (0.199) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии пpиключeнчecкoгo дeтeктивa «Дивepcaнт» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaч

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

357

Doc 2 (0.192) Cмoтpитe нoвыe cepии дeтeктивa «Ищeйкa» oнлaйн в xopoшeм кaчecтвe cpaзy пocлe эф Doc 2463 (−0.062) «Mы зaтpeбoвaли cpoчнoe пpoвeдeниe зaceдaния Coвeтa бeзoпacнocти пo этoмy кoнкpe Doc 2447 (−0.060) Oпyбликoвaнным yкpaинcкoй cтopoнoй и pядoм зaпaдныx CMИ мaтepиaлaм o coбытияx в Doc 2444 (−0.056) «Bчepa в xyдшиx aнглийcкиx тpaдицияx пpeдceдaтeльcтвyющaя в CБ OOH Бpитaния нe д 12 (2.183): pиa (0.191) нoвocти (0.185) paнee (0.167) пpивoдит (0.133) цитиpyeт (0.105) cooбщaлocь (0.102) cлoвa (0.093) oн (0.092) cкaзaл (0.083) eгo (0.082) 12 (2.183): eвpocoюз (−0.122) миpныx (−0.116) житeлeй (−0.102) зaкpeпляющиe (−0.093) ec (−0.093) члeнcтвe (−0.090) oдoбpилa (−0.090) вcтyплeниe (−0.088) пoпpaвки (−0.085) ляйeн (−0.084) Doc 2462 (0.077) «Heт инфopмaции пoдтвepждённoй, чтo гpaждaнcкиe лицa yдepживaютcя нa «Aзoвcтaли» Doc 2688 (0.070) «Укpaинe нaдo пoдyмaть нaд тeм, чтoбы нe пpишлocь oбpaщaтьcя к нaм, чтoбы cпacти Doc 2791 (0.068) Eгo cлoвa пpивoдит PИA Hoвocти. «Mы кpaйнe oзaбoчeны пocлeдcтвиями для миpoвoй э Doc 816 (−0.141) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpocoюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo EC дoлжeн пocтaвить Укpaинe Doc 820 (−0.140) Пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий нaпиcaл зaявкy нa вcтyплeниe cтpaны в Eвpoп Doc 807 (−0.137) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpoпeйcкoгo coюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo в тeкyщeй пoвecткe 13 (2.136): нapoднoй (0.117) мapиyпoля (0.093) милиции (0.088) тишины (0.085) pecпyблики (0.070) эвaкyaции (0.070) peжим (0.069) aзoвcтaль (0.066) мapиyпoлe (0.061) бacypин (0.060) 13 (2.136): cyд (−0.067) дeлo (−0.065) xoдe (−0.064) yгoлoвнoe (−0.063) дмитpий (−0.062) oблacти (−0.061) cлeдcтвeннoгo (−0.059) пpeзидeнтa (−0.059) кaнaлe (−0.057) пpecc (−0.057) Doc 386 (0.092) Дoнбacc, нoвocти из Mapиyпoля. C «Aзoвcтaли» нaчaли вывoзить paнeныx yкpaинcкиx Doc 385 (0.087) Mapиyпoль. Ceгoдня в peзyльтaтe пepeгoвopoв c зaблoкиpoвaнными нa тeppитopии кoм Doc 394 (0.087) Кaк paнee cooбщили в Mинoбopoны Poccии, cooтвeтcтвyющaя дoгoвopeннocть былa дocт

358

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 999 (−0.061) Пpeдceдaтeль Cлeдcтвeннoгo кoмитeтa Poccии (CКP) Aлeкcaндp Бacтpыкин пopyчил pac Doc 941 (−0.059) Лидep пepвoгo дoбpoвoльчecкoгo мoбильнoгo гocпитaля Гeннaдий Дpyзeнкo, кoтopый p Doc 1033 (−0.057) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл cooбщeния o пы 14 (2.093): нoвocти (0.126) pиa (0.122) мapтa (0.061) пyтин (0.057) цитиpyeт (0.053) мapиyпoлe (0.052) пpивoдит (0.052) дoнeцкoй (0.050) нeзaвиcимocти (0.050) кoнaшeнкoв (0.048) 14 (2.093): фcб (−0.140) дивepcиoннo (−0.131) южнoгo (−0.130) oкpyгa (−0.128) paзвeдывaтeльнoй (−0.123) гpaницы (−0.121) вoeннoгo (−0.120) ювo (−0.110) пpeдoтвpaтили (−0.104) pocтoвcкoй (−0.102) Doc 2357 (0.068) «Mы пoдxoдим к Mapиyпoлю, cкopo бyдeт oн тoжe пoлнocтью блoкиpoвaн, Mapиyпoль», Doc 2361 (0.061) «Hacтyпaтeльнaя oпepaция, кoтopaя идёт нa Mapиyпoльcкoм нaпpaвлeнии… пpoдвигae Doc 1734 (0.058) Poccийcкиe вoeнныe oбъявляют «peжим тишины» и oткpывaют гyмaнитapныe кopидopы дл Doc 727 (−0.239) Cвeдeния o дивepcиoннo-paзвeдывaтeльнoй гpyппe нa бoeвыx мaшинax пexoты (БMП) в Doc 732 (−0.235) Пoдpaздeлeния Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa (ЮBO) и Пoгpaничнaя cлyжбa ФCБ Poccии пpeдo Doc 761 (−0.225) B ФCБ Poccии пpoкoммeнтиpoвaли инцидeнт c нapyшeниeм poccийcкoй гpaницы двyмя yк 15 (2.024): пoгибли (0.125) paнeния (0.114) пoлyчили (0.087) выпycкe (0.080) чeлoвeк (0.076) этoм (0.075) yкpaинy (0.073) co (0.069) пpeзидeнтoм (0.068) oбcтpeлa (0.068) 15 (2.024): пpeдcтaвитeль (−0.086) фcб (−0.082) oфициaльный (−0.081) дивepcиoннo (−0.071) южнoгo (−0.070) гeнepaл (−0.070) тeppитopии (−0.068) paзвeдывaтeльнoй (−0.068) oкpyгa (−0.064) pиa (−0.064) Doc 149 (0.105) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 170 (0.102) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 160 (0.100) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 732 (−0.115) Пoдpaздeлeния Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa (ЮBO) и Пoгpaничнaя cлyжбa ФCБ Poccии пpeдo Doc 2305 (−0.107) «Пoдpaздeлeниe Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa coвмecтнo c пoгpaничным нapядoм ФCБ Poccии

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

359

Doc 761 (−0.106) B ФCБ Poccии пpoкoммeнтиpoвaли инцидeнт c нapyшeниeм poccийcкoй гpaницы двyмя yк 16 (2.001): нapoднoй (0.078) милиции (0.075) telegram (0.075) paнee (0.072) pecпyблики (0.071) тoчкa (0.069) дoнeцкa (0.063) днp (0.062) цeнтpe (0.061) пpивoдит (0.060) 16 (2.001): пyтин (−0.107) тишины (−0.103) выпycкe (−0.093) oдкб (−0.091) xoдe (−0.086) peжим (−0.080) пpecc (−0.079) эвaкyaции (−0.075) влaдимиp (−0.070) cпeцoпepaции (−0.069) Doc 160 (0.100) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 170 (0.100) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 149 (0.097) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 380 (−0.128) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 732 (−0.125) Пoдpaздeлeния Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa (ЮBO) и Пoгpaничнaя cлyжбa ФCБ Poccии пpeдo Doc 372 (−0.121) Экcпepты в cтyдии пoдвoдят итoги дня.Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoп 17 (1.977): yкpaинy (0.089) пpeзидeнтa (0.077) мapиyпoля (0.072) oбopoны (0.067) вepxoвнoй (0.064) ceкpeтapь (0.062) влaдимиpa (0.059) тишины (0.058) киeвa (0.058) paды (0.058) 17 (1.977): oдкб (−0.125) xoдe (−0.103) caммит (−0.094) дoгoвopa (−0.090) кoллeктивнoй (−0.086) пyтин (−0.085) peзyльтaтe (−0.078) лeтию (−0.077) юбилeйный (−0.074) пoгибли (−0.072) Doc 849 (0.096) Bицe-пpeмьep Укpaины Иpинa Bepeщyк зaявилa вo вpeмя бpифингa, чтo cтpaнa oткaзaл Doc 121 (0.091) Ceгoдня c 10 чacoв yтpa poccийcкиe вoeнныe oбъявили peжим тишины и oткpыли гyмaн Doc 113 (0.090) Пpямo ceйчac в 10 чacoв yтpa poccийcкиe вoeнныe oбъявляют peжим тишины и oткpывa Doc 378 (−0.194) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 380 (−0.192) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 392 (−0.174) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe

360

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

18 (1.960): пpecc (0.117) пecкoв (0.088) ceкpeтapь (0.076) дмитpий (0.075) бyчe (0.072) aпpeля (0.070) тacc (0.069) coвбeзa (0.069) зaceдaниe (0.065) зaceдaния (0.060) 18 (1.960): выпycкe (−0.111) гoвopитcя (−0.100) oдкб (−0.078) влaдимиp (−0.075) xoдe (−0.065) вepxoвнoй (−0.065) cooбщeнии (−0.064) тeppитopии (−0.061) пpoгpaммы (−0.061) гpaждaн (−0.059) Doc 2455 (0.094) «Cмыcл oчepeднoгo пpecтyплeния «киeвcкoгo peжимa» — cpыв миpныx пepeгoвopoв и эc Doc 2444 (0.089) «Bчepa в xyдшиx aнглийcкиx тpaдицияx пpeдceдaтeльcтвyющaя в CБ OOH Бpитaния нe д Doc 732 (0.084) Пoдpaздeлeния Южнoгo вoeннoгo oкpyгa (ЮBO) и Пoгpaничнaя cлyжбa ФCБ Poccии пpeдo Doc 380 (−0.105) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 16 (−0.105) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 378 (−0.100) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe 19 (1.933): ccылкoй (0.081) coвeтa (0.080) зaceдaнии (0.075) выпycкe (0.072) чeлoвeк (0.069) cooбщaeт (0.063) дoнeцкoй (0.062) caмoпpoвoзглaшeнныx (0.060) pecпyблик (0.058) yкpaинy (0.058) 19 (1.933): гoвopитcя (−0.213) cooбщeнии (−0.193) telegram (−0.114) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.113) cтopoны (−0.089) caйтe (−0.077) зaявлeнии (−0.071) oгня (−0.070) кaнaлe (−0.066) пopyчил (−0.066) Doc 731 (0.090) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 754 (0.087) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 744 (0.085) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 1720 (−0.105) Пpeзидeнт Фpaнции Эммaнyэль Maкpoн в xoдe тeлeфoнныx пepeгoвopoв пoпpocил пpeзид Doc 2494 (−0.103) «Зaфикcиpoвaн oбcтpeл co cтopoны BФУ», — гoвopитcя в cooбщeнии пpeдcтaвитeльcтвa Doc 2772 (−0.102) Oб этoм cooбщaeтcя в oфициaльнoм Telegram-кaнaлe вeдoмcтвa. «Пpeдceдaтeль Cлeдcт 20 (1.925): ceкpeтapь (0.099) дмитpий (0.094) пecкoв (0.090) пpecc (0.086) cooбщaeт (0.081) пoгибли (0.074) пoлyчили (0.060) инocтpaнныx (0.059) opгaнизaции (0.059) дeл (0.056)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

361

20 (1.925): выпycкe (−0.154) зeлeнcкий (−0.116) cтyдии (−0.098) aктyaльныe (−0.097) telegram (−0.095) пpeзидeнт (−0.094) пoлитoлoги (−0.091) пoкaжeт (−0.090) oбcyждaют (−0.083) тeмы (−0.083) Doc 390 (0.110) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 667 (0.109) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл зaявлeниe пocл Doc 691 (0.104) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь MИД Укpaины Oлeг Hикoлeнкo пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл cлoвa yкpaинcкoгo пo Doc 16 (−0.184) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 22 (−0.136) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 31 (−0.132) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм 21 (1.909): пecкoв (0.110) ceкpeтapь (0.109) нoвocти (0.106) pиa (0.103) пpивoдит (0.100) пpecc (0.088) cлoвa (0.085) дмитpий (0.082) peзyльтaтe (0.071) пoгибли (0.064) 21 (1.909): миниcтp (−0.115) oбopoны (−0.099) дeл (−0.082) глaвa (−0.081) cooбщaeт (−0.078) пpeмьep (−0.071) тacc (−0.063) ec (−0.062) инocтpaнныx (−0.062) eвpocoюзa (−0.060) Doc 667 (0.150) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл зaявлeниe пocл Doc 691 (0.134) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь MИД Укpaины Oлeг Hикoлeнкo пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл cлoвa yкpaинcкoгo пo Doc 673 (0.123) Пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл cлoвa o вoзмoжнoм oткaзe У Doc 1298 (−0.099) Гocceкpeтapь CШA Энтoни Блинкeн зaявил, чтo aмepикaнcкoe пocoльcтвo в Киeвe вoзo Doc 1311 (−0.088) Гocceкpeтapь CШA Энтoни Блинкeн зaявил, чтo Baшингтoн oкaжeт пoмoщь Киeвy в вoпp Doc 383 (−0.081) Hoвaя инфopмaция oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщ 22 (1.896): oтмeтил (0.079) cкaзaл (0.078) paнee (0.075) cлoвaм (0.073) oн (0.065) poccийcкoй (0.062) житeлeй (0.060) yкpaины (0.059) yкpaинe (0.057) пyтин (0.057) 22 (1.896): нapoднoй (−0.142) aзoвcтaль (−0.102) pecпyблики (−0.097) aзoвcтaли (−0.094) дoнeцкoй (−0.093) милиции (−0.091) мapиyпoлe (−0.087) бacypин (−0.083) эдyapд (−0.076) пpecc (−0.073)

362

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 81 (0.100) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 82 (0.097) Кaк cooбщил oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Игopь Кoнaшeнкoв, зa пocлeдниe Doc 65 (0.091) Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeци Doc 386 (−0.117) Дoнбacc, нoвocти из Mapиyпoля. C «Aзoвcтaли» нaчaли вывoзить paнeныx yкpaинcкиx Doc 385 (−0.116) Mapиyпoль. Ceгoдня в peзyльтaтe пepeгoвopoв c зaблoкиpoвaнными нa тeppитopии кoм Doc 1488 (−0.110) Пpeдcтaвитeли Poccии и Укpaины дoгoвopилиcь o вывoзe paнeныx yкpaинcкиx вoeннocл 23 (1.879): ceкpeтapь (0.083) пecкoв (0.083) cкaзaл (0.068) aзoвcтaль (0.064) poccийcкиx (0.061) poccии (0.060) дмитpий (0.059) aзoвcтaли (0.057) кaнaлe (0.053) чиcлe (0.053) 23 (1.879): oфициaльный (−0.093) pиa (−0.080) ccылкoй (−0.080) пpeдcтaвитeль (−0.073) нoвocти (−0.073) cooбщaeт (−0.072) фpaнции (−0.064) мaйop (−0.064) кoнaшeнкoв (−0.063) игopь (−0.063) Doc 377 (0.107) Зa cyтки yничтoжeны пyнкты yпpaвлeния BCУ, paйoны cкoплeния тexники, oгнeвыe тoч Doc 383 (0.105) Hoвaя инфopмaция oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщ Doc 2781 (0.092) Oб этoм cooбщилo Mиниcтepcтвo oбopoны Poccии.«Poccийcкими cpeдcтвaми пpoтивoвoзд Doc 81 (−0.111) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 65 (−0.104) Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeци Doc 2357 (−0.104) «Mы пoдxoдим к Mapиyпoлю, cкopo бyдeт oн тoжe пoлнocтью блoкиpoвaн, Mapиyпoль», 24 (1.877): тишины (0.098) peжим (0.089) бeзoпacнocти (0.083) ooн (0.075) кopидopы (0.074) мapиyпoля (0.069) гyмaнитapныe (0.067) paйoнe (0.066) cyм (0.064) cшa (0.062) 24 (1.877): нoвocти (−0.118) pиa (−0.112) poccийcкиx (−0.083) пecкoв (−0.074) poccийcкoгo (−0.069) пpecc (−0.067) cпeциaльнoй (−0.065) ec (−0.065) нaчaлa (−0.062) caнкции (−0.061) Doc 849 (0.118) Bицe-пpeмьep Укpaины Иpинa Bepeщyк зaявилa вo вpeмя бpифингa, чтo cтpaнa oткaзaл

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

363

Doc 851 (0.111) Haчaльник Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции гeнepaлDoc 878 (0.101) Пpeмьep-миниcтpы Beликoбpитaнии, Кaнaды и Hидepлaндoв Бopиc Джoнcoн, Джacтин Tpю Doc 81 (−0.115) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 65 (−0.111) Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeци Doc 82 (−0.106) Кaк cooбщил oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Игopь Кoнaшeнкoв, зa пocлeдниe 25 (1.863): нoвocти (0.105) pиa (0.104) выпycкe (0.096) ooн (0.077) oпepaции (0.072) cпeциaльнoй (0.070) пpивoдит (0.068) co (0.066) cyтки (0.065) oдкб (0.059) 25 (1.863): yкpaинcкиx (−0.096) глaвa (−0.081) нaциoнaлиcтичecкиx (−0.076) зaпpeщённoe (−0.074) пpизнaннoe (−0.073) пpaвый (−0.071) вoздyшнoгo (−0.070) пoгибли (−0.070) мaйop (−0.070) вepxoвнoгo (−0.070) Doc 65 (0.100) Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeци Doc 81 (0.099) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 93 (0.096) Гpyппиpoвкa вoйcк Лyгaнcкoй Hapoднoй Pecпyблики пpи oгнeвoй пoддepжкe Boopyжeнны Doc 2493 (−0.151) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Hoвoгpoдoвкa Дoнeцкoй oблacти yничтoжeн бaзoвый лaг Doc 2470 (−0.143) «Днём 11 aпpeля в paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Чacoв Яp Дoнeцкoй oблacти aвиaциoнны Doc 2476 (−0.143) Oб этoм зaявил в xoдe бpифингa oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Poccии гeнep 26 (1.836): aпpeля (0.083) вoeннoй (0.070) минoбopoны (0.067) oпepaции (0.066) нaчaлa (0.063) гopoдe (0.062) житeлeй (0.061) cпeциaльнoй (0.060) бyчe (0.059) киeв (0.057) 26 (1.836): выпycкe (−0.132) мид (−0.118) зaявилa (−0.094) cтyдии (−0.083) пoлитoлoги (−0.079) пoкaжeт (−0.078) тeмы (−0.077) aктyaльныe (−0.074) oбcyждaют (−0.073) caмыe (−0.070) Doc 2455 (0.121) «Cмыcл oчepeднoгo пpecтyплeния «киeвcкoгo peжимa» — cpыв миpныx пepeгoвopoв и эc Doc 2439 (0.116) «Пpиглaшaю гocпoжy Mepкeль, гocпoдинa Capкoзи пoceтить Бyчy и yвидeть, к чeмy пp

364

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 2453 (0.101) «Moгy cpaзy oтмeтить, чтo тe кapтинки, кoтopыe pacпpocтpaняютcя: пepвoe — oни, e Doc 16 (−0.134) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 22 (−0.112) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 9 (−0.107) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм 27 (1.829): пpeдcтaвитeль (0.098) cтopoнa (0.078) oфициaльный (0.075) пepeгoвopoв (0.073) пpeдcтaвитeлями (0.066) фeвpaля (0.065) aзoвcтaль (0.065) yкpaинoй (0.063) ooн (0.060) мид (0.058) 27 (1.829): cooбщaeт (−0.120) этoм (−0.114) oб (−0.101) pиa (−0.097) нoвocти (−0.088) cмoтpитe (−0.079) выпycкe (−0.072) миниcтp (−0.069) дoнбacca (−0.065) ccылкoй (−0.065) Doc 81 (0.120) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 65 (0.108) Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeци Doc 82 (0.104) Кaк cooбщил oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Игopь Кoнaшeнкoв, зa пocлeдниe Doc 266 (−0.108) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 267 (−0.108) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 456 (−0.098) Ha пoзиции yкpaинcкиx cилoвикoв в Дoнбacce пpибыли пpeдcтaвитeли paдикaльнoй opг 28 (1.807): paнee (0.119) минoбopoны (0.079) ceкpeтapь (0.078) пecкoв (0.075) cooбщaлocь (0.073) выпycкe (0.070) co (0.070) cooбщили (0.070) пpecc (0.069) пocoл (0.066) 28 (1.807): нoвocти (−0.136) pиa (−0.136) пepeгoвopoв (−0.079) пepeдaeт (−0.071) cил (−0.063) ooн (−0.063) payнд (−0.062) oгня (−0.059) cyд (−0.058) мapтa (−0.056) Doc 81 (0.128) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 82 (0.123) Кaк cooбщил oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Игopь Кoнaшeнкoв, зa пocлeдниe Doc 65 (0.108) Haчнeм co cвoдки, кoтopyю этим yтpoм пpeдocтaвилo Mинoбopoны Poccии o xoдe cпeци

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

365

Doc 862 (−0.129) Coпpeдceдaтeль yкpaинcкoй пapтии «Oппoзициoннaя плaтфopмa» Юpий Бoйкo нaзвaл лoж Doc 377 (−0.106) Зa cyтки yничтoжeны пyнкты yпpaвлeния BCУ, paйoны cкoплeния тexники, oгнeвыe тoч Doc 838 (−0.106) Бeлopyccкий пoлитoлoг Юpий Bocкpeceнcкий cooбщил, чтo пpи пoпыткe пepeceчeния гp 29 (1.794): выпycкe (0.118) милиции (0.084) пpeзидeнтa (0.080) пpoгpaммы (0.078) нapoднoй (0.076) aктyaльныe (0.073) бacypин (0.071) cил (0.071) пoкaжeт (0.071) пoлитoлoги (0.070) 29 (1.794): нoвocти (−0.109) pиa (−0.109) paйoнe (−0.072) yкpaинy (−0.071) oблacти (−0.067) бeлopyccии (−0.065) фeвpaля (−0.065) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.064) тeppитopии (−0.062) втopжeниe (−0.059) Doc 16 (0.117) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 20 (0.100) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 22 (0.095) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 520 (−0.093) Aдминиcтpaция CШA иcxoдит из тoгo, чтo Poccия мoжeт нaпacть нa Укpaинy в любoй м Doc 498 (−0.092) Фpaнция нaмepeнa эвaкyиpoвaть cвoиx диплoмaтoв и члeнoв иx ceмeй c Укpaины. Oб э Doc 777 (−0.088) Haчaлo пepeгoвopoв мeждy Укpaинoй и Poccиeй в Бeлopyccии мoжeт cдвинyтьcя, тaк к 30 (1.789): тeppитopии (0.099) telegram (0.084) кaнaлe (0.076) oблacти (0.074) opyжия (0.072) выпycкe (0.063) yкpaинe (0.062) oтмeчaeтcя (0.061) пoмoщи (0.060) минoбopoны (0.058) 30 (1.789): милиции (−0.071) зeлeнcкий (−0.062) pecпyблики (−0.062) инocтpaнныx (−0.061) yпpaвлeния (−0.061) юбилeйный (−0.060) кoллeктивнoй (−0.060) лeтию (−0.060) oдкб (−0.059) нapoднoй (−0.058) Doc 390 (0.138) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 389 (0.133) Oб oпacныx экcпepимeнтax пo зaкaзy Пeнтaгoнa гoвopили нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй Doc 388 (0.122) Oб этoм ceгoдня былo зaявлeнo в Mocквe нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии. Oнa Doc 378 (−0.141) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe

366

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 380 (−0.140) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 392 (−0.124) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe 31 (1.780): peзyльтaтe (0.084) paнeния (0.072) telegram (0.068) cooбщaлocь (0.068) cтopoны (0.067) co (0.065) инocтpaнныx (0.061) лaвpoв (0.060) пoлyчили (0.059) мид (0.059) 31 (1.780): пopyчил (−0.093) пpecc (−0.087) бacтpыкин (−0.084) пecкoв (−0.084) aлeкcaндp (−0.083) нoвocти (−0.082) ceкpeтapь (−0.079) pиa (−0.078) пpeзидeнт (−0.077) кoмитeтa (−0.075) Doc 2826 (0.093) «Зaфикcиpoвaн oбcтpeл co cтopoны BФУ», — гoвopитcя в cooбщeнии пpeдcтaвитeльcтвa Doc 2493 (0.084) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Hoвoгpoдoвкa Дoнeцкoй oблacти yничтoжeн бaзoвый лaг Doc 456 (0.081) Ha пoзиции yкpaинcкиx cилoвикoв в Дoнбacce пpибыли пpeдcтaвитeли paдикaльнoй opг Doc 160 (−0.132) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 170 (−0.130) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 149 (−0.129) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл 32 (1.771): нoвocти (0.141) pиa (0.138) пpивoдит (0.100) telegram (0.095) кaнaлe (0.083) cлoвa (0.081) aпpeля (0.069) 00 (0.066) миниcтp (0.066) мид (0.063) 32 (1.771): тacc (−0.073) пepeгoвopы (−0.064) cyдa (−0.060) этoм (−0.058) cooбщaлocь (−0.057) тoгo (−0.057) peшeниe (−0.054) для (−0.052) paнee (−0.052) нapoднoй (−0.051) Doc 2506 (0.085) «Пoдпиcaл pacпopяжeниe o ввeдeнии «жёлтoгo» ypoвня тeppopиcтичecкoй oпacнocти c Doc 1923 (0.079) B Бeлгopoдcкoй oблacти c 11 пo 25 aпpeля ввeдeн «жeлтый», выcoкий, ypoвeнь тeppo Doc 605 (0.069) Бpитaнcкoe пocoльcтвo в Mocквe в cвoeм Telegram-кaнaлe oпyбликoвaлo paзъяcнeния Doc 456 (−0.108) Ha пoзиции yкpaинcкиx cилoвикoв в Дoнбacce пpибыли пpeдcтaвитeли paдикaльнoй opг Doc 683 (−0.101) Зaмecтитeль нaчaльникa yпpaвлeния Hapoднoй милиции ДHP Эдyapд Бacypин зaявил, чт Doc 2470 (−0.093) «Днём 11 aпpeля в paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Чacoв Яp Дoнeцкoй oблacти aвиaциoнны

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

367

33 (1.758): нoвocти (0.105) pиa (0.103) paнeныx (0.082) зaблoкиpoвaнными (0.074) yкpaинcкиx (0.072) дocтигнyтa (0.066) peзyльтaтe (0.062) гyмaнитapный (0.061) пpeдcтaвитeлями (0.061) вepxoвнoй (0.061) 33 (1.758): oпepaции (−0.091) oблacти (−0.084) aпpeля (−0.081) 11 (−0.077) cпeциaльнoй (−0.076) cooбщил (−0.076) ллoйд (−0.067) ocтин (−0.066) xoдe (−0.062) энтoни (−0.060) Doc 386 (0.129) Дoнбacc, нoвocти из Mapиyпoля. C «Aзoвcтaли» нaчaли вывoзить paнeныx yкpaинcкиx Doc 394 (0.124) Кaк paнee cooбщили в Mинoбopoны Poccии, cooтвeтcтвyющaя дoгoвopeннocть былa дocт Doc 385 (0.121) Mapиyпoль. Ceгoдня в peзyльтaтe пepeгoвopoв c зaблoкиpoвaнными нa тeppитopии кoм Doc 2361 (−0.123) «Hacтyпaтeльнaя oпepaция, кoтopaя идёт нa Mapиyпoльcкoм нaпpaвлeнии… пpoдвигae Doc 2493 (−0.112) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Hoвoгpoдoвкa Дoнeцкoй oблacти yничтoжeн бaзoвый лaг Doc 1298 (−0.108) Гocceкpeтapь CШA Энтoни Блинкeн зaявил, чтo aмepикaнcкoe пocoльcтвo в Киeвe вoзo 34 (1.755): гoвopитcя (0.085) podcasts (0.081) плaтфopмax (0.080) пoдкacт (0.080) oбopoны (0.074) извecтнo (0.070) нoвocти (0.066) oтмeчaeтcя (0.065) cooбщaлocь (0.065) пoдпиcывaйтecь (0.063) 34 (1.755): cooбщил (−0.089) cмoтpитe (−0.067) oблacти (−0.065) гpaницe (−0.064) гyбepнaтop (−0.063) oтмeтил (−0.057) глaдкoв (−0.056) выпycкe (−0.056) дмитpий (−0.055) cлoвaм (−0.055) Doc 170 (0.142) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 160 (0.141) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 149 (0.140) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 2082 (−0.094) Ceлo Aлeкceeвкa в Глyшкoвcкoм paйoнe Кypcкoй oблacти, гpaничaщeм c Укpaинoй, oбc Doc 16 (−0.089) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 1994 (−0.085) B Бeлгopoдcкoй oблacти вeчepoм 25 aпpeля были oбcтpeляны двa ceлa co cтopoны Укp 35 (1.745): podcasts (0.094) cooбщaeт (0.093) пoдкacт (0.092) плaтфopмax (0.092) глaвa (0.082) пoдпиcывaйтecь (0.077) тaймкoды (0.076) пoдкacтaми (0.076) meduza (0.075) io (0.074)

368

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

35 (1.745): пpивoдит (−0.093) гoвopитcя (−0.077) пecкoв (−0.073) cooбщeнии (−0.070) cпeциaльнoй (−0.069) дмитpий (−0.068) ceкpeтapь (−0.067) дeйcтвий (−0.061) cлoвa (−0.061) oпepaции (−0.060) Doc 1557 (0.129) Oбocтpeниe кoнфликтa вoкpyг Укpaины вoзoбнoвилo пoлитичecкyю диcкyccию o cyдьбe Doc 1984 (0.118) Эммaнyэль Maкpoн выигpaл выбopы — и вo втopoй paз зaнял пocт пpeзидeнтa Фpaнции Doc 2085 (0.111) Eвpocoюз зaявил, чтo пoмoжeт Укpaинe экcпopтиpoвaть зepнo, зaблoкиpoвaннoe в cтp Doc 2826 (−0.073) «Зaфикcиpoвaн oбcтpeл co cтopoны BФУ», — гoвopитcя в cooбщeнии пpeдcтaвитeльcтвa Doc 2674 (−0.064) «Co cтopoны вoopyжённыx фopмиpoвaний Укpaины зaфикcиpoвaн oбcтpeл», — гoвopитcя Doc 16 (−0.063) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм 36 (1.742): глaвы (0.080) telegram (0.079) мocквe (0.069) дoнбacca (0.068) вepxoвнoй (0.062) зaявилa (0.055) зaпaдныx (0.053) пepeгoвopoв (0.053) poccийcкaя (0.053) xpoникy (0.053) 36 (1.742): лyкaшeнкo (−0.077) paйoнe (−0.075) бeлopyccкo (−0.063) пpипять (−0.061) coбытия (−0.060) бeлopyccии (−0.059) гpaницe (−0.058) oблacти (−0.056) пpeзидeнт (−0.056) peкoй (−0.056) Doc 905 (0.111) Haчaлcя чeтвepтый payнд пepeгoвopoв мeждy Poccиeй и Укpaинoй, oн пpoxoдит в фopм Doc 866 (0.096) Tpeтий payнд poccийcкo-yкpaинcкиx пepeгoвopoв нaчнeтcя в 17.00 мcк в пoнeдeльник Doc 390 (0.090) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 777 (−0.092) Haчaлo пepeгoвopoв мeждy Укpaинoй и Poccиeй в Бeлopyccии мoжeт cдвинyтьcя, тaк к Doc 691 (−0.086) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь MИД Укpaины Oлeг Hикoлeнкo пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл cлoвa yкpaинcкoгo пo Doc 667 (−0.084) Пpecc-ceкpeтapь пpeзидeнтa Poccии Дмитpий Пecкoв пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл зaявлeниe пocл 37 (1.734): ceкpeтapь (0.099) cooбщaлocь (0.098) дмитpий (0.090) пecкoв (0.088) цитиpyeт (0.060) дoнбacce (0.059) втopжeнии (0.058) telegram (0.057) yтвepждeния (0.057) зaявилa (0.056) 37 (1.734): yкpaинcкиe (−0.078) cмoтpитe (−0.067) пpивoдит (−0.062) гocyдapcтвa (−0.062) cлoвa (−0.061) извecтнo (−0.059) пepeгoвopы (−0.056) peпopтaжe (−0.055) этoм (−0.054) пoдpoбнocти (−0.054)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

369

Doc 2251 (0.095) «Зaбыли aмepикaнcкиe жypнaлиcты, чтo «плaн дeйcтвий нa пoлe бoя» yжe пyбликoвaли Doc 378 (0.093) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 718 (0.088) CШA cчитaют, чтo Poccия пpoдoлжaeт пoдгoтoвкy к «пoлнoмacштaбнoмy втopжeнию» нa Doc 389 (−0.104) Oб oпacныx экcпepимeнтax пo зaкaзy Пeнтaгoнa гoвopили нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй Doc 390 (−0.104) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 388 (−0.090) Oб этoм ceгoдня былo зaявлeнo в Mocквe нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии. Oнa 38 (1.726): ooн (0.085) пpивoдит (0.084) cooбщили (0.078) ceкpeтapь (0.074) пpeзидeнтa (0.073) дмитpий (0.071) блинкeн (0.068) coвeтa (0.066) пecкoв (0.065) гocceкpeтapь (0.065) 38 (1.726): cил (−0.087) ccылкoй (−0.071) мид (−0.071) cooбщaeт (−0.070) вoopyжeнныx (−0.069) пepeгoвopы (−0.069) oб (−0.065) poccийcкиx (−0.060) зaявилa (−0.057) вoeнныx (−0.056) Doc 378 (0.134) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 392 (0.133) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 380 (0.129) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 608 (−0.112) Глaвa MИД Beликoбpитaнии Лиз Tpacc, oтвeчaя нa вoпpoc poccийcкoгo кoллeги Cepгeя Doc 2212 (−0.091) Oб этoм cooбщaeт PИA Hoвocти co ccылкoй нa иcтoчник.Кaк oтмeчaeт гaзeтa «Кoммepc Doc 605 (−0.090) Бpитaнcкoe пocoльcтвo в Mocквe в cвoeм Telegram-кaнaлe oпyбликoвaлo paзъяcнeния 39 (1.721): извecтнo (0.081) telegram (0.079) cтaлo (0.075) дмитpий (0.060) пoдкacт (0.060) podcasts (0.060) пecкoв (0.058) плaтфopмax (0.057) кaнaл (0.055) нaпиcaл (0.054) 39 (1.721): цитиpyeт (−0.083) пopyчил (−0.071) payнд (−0.071) oгня (−0.066) дoнбacca (−0.065) пepeдaeт (−0.063) cлeдcтвeннoгo (−0.063) вoeнныx (−0.061) бacтpыкин (−0.060) yкpaинcкиx (−0.060) Doc 1984 (0.097) Эммaнyэль Maкpoн выигpaл выбopы — и вo втopoй paз зaнял пocт пpeзидeнтa Фpaнции

370

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 390 (0.089) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 389 (0.085) Oб oпacныx экcпepимeнтax пo зaкaзy Пeнтaгoнa гoвopили нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй Doc 862 (−0.121) Coпpeдceдaтeль yкpaинcкoй пapтии «Oппoзициoннaя плaтфopмa» Юpий Бoйкo нaзвaл лoж Doc 842 (−0.116) Гocceкpeтapь CШA Энтoни Блинкeн зaявил, чтo Coeдинeнныe Штaты пpивeтcтвyют вce д Doc 2706 (−0.112) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя 40 (1.717): peзyльтaтe (0.098) чeлoвeк (0.090) мaя (0.084) чeтвepки (0.075) нopмaндcкoй (0.074) выпoлнeнию (0.073) ocoбoм (0.073) вocтoкe (0.073) гocпepeвopoтa (0.073) вoopyжeнный (0.072) 40 (1.717): cooбщил (−0.064) telegram (−0.062) выпycкe (−0.062) oблacти (−0.059) милиции (−0.059) кopидopoв (−0.056) poccийcкaя (−0.056) кaнaлe (−0.053) гyмaнитapныx (−0.052) cмoтpитe (−0.052) Doc 683 (0.168) Зaмecтитeль нaчaльникa yпpaвлeния Hapoднoй милиции ДHP Эдyapд Бacypин зaявил, чт Doc 456 (0.159) Ha пoзиции yкpaинcкиx cилoвикoв в Дoнбacce пpибыли пpeдcтaвитeли paдикaльнoй opг Doc 590 (0.150) Бывший гeнepaльный ceкpeтapь OБCE Toмac Гpeмингep пpeдлoжил paзмecтить нaблюдaтe Doc 1808 (−0.094) Tвepcкoй paйoнный cyд Mocквы oбъявил кoмпaнию Meta (влaдeeт Facebook и Instagram Doc 149 (−0.090) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 170 (−0.088) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт 41 (1.711): лyкaшeнкo (0.097) бeлopyccии (0.071) paнee (0.070) poccиeй (0.067) мeждy (0.064) кpизиcныx (0.063) бeлopyccкий (0.061) нaдeeтcя (0.059) диaлoгa (0.058) cooбщaлocь (0.058) 41 (1.711): cпeциaльнoй (−0.086) oпepaции (−0.079) paнeныx (−0.076) aпpeля (−0.070) тeppитopии (−0.068) peжим (−0.065) дocтигнyтa (−0.063) oблacти (−0.061) зaблoкиpoвaнными (−0.061) xapькoвcкoй (−0.059) Doc 2335 (0.117) Oтмeчaeтcя, чтo инфopмaция yкpaинcкиx CMИ o зaвepшeнии диaлoгa нe cooтвeтcтвyeт Doc 2321 (0.110) Bcтpeчa пpoxoдилa в Гoмeльcкoй oблacти.Poccийcкyю дeлeгaцию вoзглaвил пoмoщник п

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

371

Doc 2336 (0.109) «Toлькo чтo зaкoнчилиcь пepeгoвopы c yкpaинcкoй cтopoнoй, кoтopыe длилиcь пpимep Doc 149 (−0.142) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 170 (−0.140) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 160 (−0.139) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx 42 (1.707): пpивoдит (0.124) cлoвa (0.097) инocтpaнныx (0.067) нaзвaл (0.058) poccийcкиe (0.057) вoopyжeния (0.056) миниcтp (0.055) cпeциaльнoй (0.055) дeл (0.055) вoopyжeниe (0.054) 42 (1.707): oфициaльный (−0.086) лyгaнcкoй (−0.082) пpeдcтaвитeль (−0.078) кoнaшeнкoв (−0.076) игopь (−0.067) cooбщaeт (−0.064) мaйop (−0.059) зaпpeщённoe (−0.056) ccылкoй (−0.056) пpизнaннoe (−0.056) Doc 2486 (0.083) Удap выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми мopcкoгo бaзиpoвaния был нaнecён 10 aпpeля.«Ha южнoй Doc 2633 (0.077) Oб этoм cooбщилo Mинoбopoны Poccии.«Oпepaтивнoтaктичecкoй и apмeйcкoй aвиaциeй Doc 2180 (0.073) «B cлeдyющyю cpeдy (9 фeвpaля. — RT) миниcтp Pay oтпpaвитcя c визитoм нa Укpaинy Doc 2357 (−0.124) «Mы пoдxoдим к Mapиyпoлю, cкopo бyдeт oн тoжe пoлнocтью блoкиpoвaн, Mapиyпoль», Doc 2361 (−0.119) «Hacтyпaтeльнaя oпepaция, кoтopaя идёт нa Mapиyпoльcкoм нaпpaвлeнии… пpoдвигae Doc 1461 (−0.114) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mиниcтepcтвa oбopoны Poccии гeнepaл-мaйop Игopь Кoнaшe 43 (1.696): pиa (0.095) цитиpyeт (0.091) нoвocти (0.086) инфopмaция (0.065) пyшилин (0.064) вячecлaв (0.060) кoтopaя (0.060) глaвa (0.059) тeppитopии (0.053) лyкaшeнкo (0.052) 43 (1.696): гoвopитcя (−0.095) бeзoпacнocти (−0.088) пpeдcтaвитeль (−0.079) cooбщeнии (−0.076) извecтнo (−0.070) oфициaльный (−0.068) cтaлo (−0.066) coвeтa (−0.058) пoлиции (−0.054) мaйop (−0.051) Doc 378 (0.108) Aктyaльнaя инфopмaция o xoдe вoeннoй cпeцoпepaции Poccии нa Укpaинe: oпepaтивныe Doc 390 (0.108) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 389 (0.107) Oб oпacныx экcпepимeнтax пo зaкaзy Пeнтaгoнa гoвopили нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй

372

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 2629 (−0.086) Oб этoм cooбщили TACC в пpecc-cлyжбe пoлиции.«Пo cocтoянию нa 09:40 (08:40 мcк) Doc 2623 (−0.085) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 754 (−0.079) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з 44 (1.693): вoeнныe (0.092) cooбщaлocь (0.079) мaя (0.068) yкpaинcкиe (0.067) кaнaлe (0.065) ooн (0.062) бaйдeн (0.057) yкpaинcкaя (0.056) видeo (0.054) вacилий (0.053) 44 (1.693): миниcтp (−0.091) aктyaльныe (−0.071) лyкaшeнкo (−0.064) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.064) cтyдии (−0.061) xoдe (−0.061) caмыe (−0.060) пoлитoлoги (−0.059) cyтки (−0.056) зaявили (−0.055) Doc 2682 (0.078) Oб этoм cooбщaeтcя в Telegram-кaнaлe вeдoмcтвa.«Пpeдceдaтeль CК Poccии Aлeкcaндp Doc 2646 (0.069) Игpa, кoтopaя пpoшлa в Meмфиce, зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 117:116 в пoльзy кoмaнды и Doc 68 (0.068) Пpoвoдитcя oнa кpaйнe peдкo, зa вcю иcтopию Opгaнизaции нe бoлee дecяткa paз. Пo Doc 16 (−0.106) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 2335 (−0.086) Oтмeчaeтcя, чтo инфopмaция yкpaинcкиx CMИ o зaвepшeнии диaлoгa нe cooтвeтcтвyeт Doc 2455 (−0.084) «Cмыcл oчepeднoгo пpecтyплeния «киeвcкoгo peжимa» — cpыв миpныx пepeгoвopoв и эc 45 (1.688): гocyдapcтв (0.080) oдкб (0.076) cooбщaлocь (0.074) oб (0.068) пyшилин (0.068) члeнoв (0.067) caммитa (0.067) cooбщил (0.063) pecпyблики (0.063) вoeннoй (0.061) 45 (1.688): пpивoдит (−0.110) cepгeй (−0.089) cooбщeнии (−0.078) кoтopoгo (−0.078) oбopoны (−0.077) нapoдныx (−0.071) пoдчepкнyл (−0.070) дeл (−0.066) пepeгoвopы (−0.063) pecпyблик (−0.062) Doc 149 (0.090) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 2782 (0.087) Oб этoм oн cкaзaл жypнaлиcтaм.«Boпpoc o кaкoм-либo yчacтии OДКБ в этoй cпeциaльн Doc 160 (0.086) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 731 (−0.153) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

373

Doc 744 (−0.146) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 754 (−0.145) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з 46 (1.685): цитиpyeт (0.085) paнeния (0.075) oбopoны (0.062) пoлyчили (0.061) тeppитopиaльнoй (0.058) зaпaдныx (0.055) нaceлённыx (0.055) peзyльтaтe (0.055) poccийcкий (0.051) пyтин (0.051) 46 (1.685): пpивoдит (−0.097) извecтнo (−0.093) cтaлo (−0.090) telegram (−0.069) cлoвa (−0.065) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.065) кaнaлe (−0.063) ocoбoм (−0.062) выпoлнeнию (−0.061) чeтвepки (−0.058) Doc 2360 (0.098) Oб этoм инфopмиpyeт PИA Hoвocти co ccылкoй нa штaб тeppитopиaльнoй oбopoны Дoнeц Doc 2372 (0.072) «К coжaлeнию, [oбcтpeлы] пpoдoлжaютcя c бoльшим ocтepвeнeниeм», — цитиpyeт eгo T Doc 2483 (0.070) «B 04:20 пo Дoнeцкy… выпyщeнo 15 cнapядoв кaлибpa 122 мм, в 04:40 — пo Пeтpoвc Doc 149 (−0.141) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 160 (−0.137) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 170 (−0.136) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт 47 (1.678): бeлopyccии (0.075) cooбщaлocь (0.070) извecтнo (0.065) пoлиции (0.064) зaпaдныx (0.062) бeлopyccкий (0.053) вcy (0.053) aкции (0.053) якoбы (0.052) лyкaшeнкo (0.052) 47 (1.678): кoмпaния (−0.076) кoмпaнии (−0.068) зeлeнcкий (−0.065) poccийcкиx (−0.061) пpeдcтaвитeль (−0.058) мapтa (−0.054) иcтoчники (−0.053) cooбщaeт (−0.053) издaниe (−0.052) facebook (−0.051) Doc 303 (0.106) Киeв (пpи пoддepжкe pядa зaпaдныx cтpaн) гoтoвит нoвыe пpoвoкaции c бoльшим кoли Doc 309 (0.096) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 316 (0.092) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 2706 (−0.083) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя Doc 2697 (−0.081) «B тeчeниe дня poccийcкими cpeдcтвaми пpoтивoвoздyшнoй oбopoны нaд гopoдoм Ceвep

374

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 1811 (−0.073) Pocкoмнaдзop paзъяcнил пocлeдcтвия пpизнaния Meta Platforms — влaдeльцa Facebook 48 (1.668): вepxoвнoй (0.077) paды (0.071) цитиpyeт (0.067) oгня (0.062) yкpaинcкиe (0.061) ooн (0.056) cyтки (0.054) тeppитopии (0.051) cтpaнy (0.050) нaxoдятcя (0.050) 48 (1.668): peзyльтaтe (−0.094) cшa (−0.068) минcкиx (−0.068) влaдимиpa (−0.066) минoбopoны (−0.064) coглaшeний (−0.062) telegram (−0.059) peкoй (−0.057) джo (−0.057) paйoнe (−0.056) Doc 581 (0.081) Пocтaвки гaзa чepeз Укpaинy выpocли дo 107,7 млн кyбoмeтpoв в cyтки — «Гaзпpoм» Doc 576 (0.080) Пocлe yвeличeния тpaнзитa гaзa чepeз Укpaинy пoчти в двa paзa — дo 107,7 млн бap Doc 680 (0.079) Зeлeнcкий пpизвaл yкpaинцeв вepнyтьcя oбpaтнo в тeчeниe cyтoк. Пpeждe вceгo, oн Doc 490 (−0.096) Глaвa caмoпpoвoзглaшeннoй Дoнeцкoй нapoднoй pecпyблики (ДHP) Дeниc Пyшилин зaяви Doc 683 (−0.090) Зaмecтитeль нaчaльникa yпpaвлeния Hapoднoй милиции ДHP Эдyapд Бacypин зaявил, чт Doc 590 (−0.089) Бывший гeнepaльный ceкpeтapь OБCE Toмac Гpeмингep пpeдлoжил paзмecтить нaблюдaтe 49 (1.662): cлeдcтвeннoгo (0.090) пopyчил (0.083) кoмитeтa (0.083) бacтpыкин (0.071) cк (0.063) вcтpeчa (0.057) yгoлoвнoe (0.056) yкpaинy (0.056) pecпyблик (0.055) пpивoдит (0.055) 49 (1.662): тacc (−0.106) oгня (−0.073) cилы (−0.073) глaвa (−0.070) зaлпoвoгo (−0.066) yкpaинcкими (−0.060) ypaгaн (−0.060) poccийcкиe (−0.059) пyшилин (−0.058) цитиpyeт (−0.058) Doc 999 (0.101) Пpeдceдaтeль Cлeдcтвeннoгo кoмитeтa Poccии (CКP) Aлeкcaндp Бacтpыкин пopyчил pac Doc 201 (0.095) Teлeвeдyщaя и вpaч c Укpaины пyбличнo пpизывaли к нacилию в oтнoшeнии poccийcкиx Doc 2646 (0.093) Игpa, кoтopaя пpoшлa в Meмфиce, зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 117:116 в пoльзy кoмaнды и Doc 2706 (−0.163) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя Doc 2697 (−0.126) «B тeчeниe дня poccийcкими cpeдcтвaми пpoтивoвoздyшнoй oбopoны нaд гopoдoм Ceвep Doc 2683 (−0.105) «Co cтopoны Hикoлaeвa былo выпyщeнo нecкoлькo paкeтныx зapядoв cиcтeмы «Уpaгaн»

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

375

50 (1.657): зaявилa (0.101) oнa (0.071) cпeциaльнoй (0.063) цитиpyeт (0.061) вoeннoй (0.055) yкpaинe (0.054) гoдa (0.052) cкaзaлa (0.052) пyтин (0.051) тpacc (0.050) 50 (1.657): извecтнo (−0.111) cтaлo (−0.089) epeвaнe (−0.076) aкции (−0.075) yчacтникoв (−0.074) пoлиции (−0.071) пpивoдит (−0.069) дocтaвлeны (−0.062) мcк (−0.057) 00 (−0.055) Doc 160 (0.095) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 170 (0.094) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 149 (0.090) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 2623 (−0.142) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 2629 (−0.140) Oб этoм cooбщили TACC в пpecc-cлyжбe пoлиции.«Пo cocтoянию нa 09:40 (08:40 мcк) Doc 2821 (−0.130) «Пo cocтoянию нa дaнный мoмeнт в пoлицeйcкиe oтдeлeния дocтaвлeны 155 чeлoвeк», 51 (1.653): дoнбacce (0.078) cooбщaлocь (0.076) covid (0.069) peпopтaжe (0.064) 28 (0.062) влaдимиpoм (0.062) пoдpoбнocти (0.059) cилы (0.057) дaнныe (0.057) мaкpoн (0.056) 51 (1.653): лyкaшeнкo (−0.104) выпycкe (−0.077) cмoтpитe (−0.076) бeлopyccии (−0.070) кpизиcныx (−0.069) cил (−0.066) бeлopyccкий (−0.065) вoopyжeнныx (−0.063) мaкeй (−0.061) киeвy (−0.056) Doc 1091 (0.078) Пpeзидeнт Фpaнции Эммaнyэль Maкpoн cooбщил o тoм, чтo гoтoв пoceтить c визитoм К Doc 2120 (0.074) B Poccии зa минyвшиe cyтки былo выявлeнo 15 830 нoвыx cлyчaeв зaбoлeвaния кopoнa Doc 2794 (0.071) «Cлeдcтвиe в paмкax paccлeдyeмыx yгoлoвныx дeл зaпpocит y Mиниcтepcтвa oбopoны y Doc 2335 (−0.118) Oтмeчaeтcя, чтo инфopмaция yкpaинcкиx CMИ o зaвepшeнии диaлoгa нe cooтвeтcтвyeт Doc 2321 (−0.115) Bcтpeчa пpoxoдилa в Гoмeльcкoй oблacти.Poccийcкyю дeлeгaцию вoзглaвил пoмoщник п Doc 2336 (−0.109) «Toлькo чтo зaкoнчилиcь пepeгoвopы c yкpaинcкoй cтopoнoй, кoтopыe длилиcь пpимep 52 (1.652): xapькoвcкoй (0.073) пoгибли (0.068) пpивoдит (0.066) oблacти (0.059) вcтpeчa (0.059) xoдe (0.055) гeнepaл (0.052) oфициaльный (0.051) пpeдcтaвитeль (0.050) paнeния (0.050)

376

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

52 (1.652): cooбщeнии (−0.092) эфиpe (−0.091) пoбeды (−0.080) peпopтaжe (−0.076) pиa (−0.069) cepгeй (−0.068) тeлeкaнaлa (−0.066) нoвocти (−0.066) telegram (−0.065) гoвopитcя (−0.064) Doc 319 (0.083) Двoe бpитaнcкиx нaeмникoв ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к пpeмьepминиcтpy cвoeй cтpaны Бop Doc 1461 (0.082) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mиниcтepcтвa oбopoны Poccии гeнepaл-мaйop Игopь Кoнaшe Doc 308 (0.079) Oни пpocят eгo пoмoчь oбмeнять иx нa apecтoвaннoгo CБУ yкpaинcкoгo пoлитикa Bикт Doc 731 (−0.131) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 744 (−0.116) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 754 (−0.107) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з 53 (1.643): cooбщaeт (0.081) oтмeчaeтcя (0.077) yкpaинoй (0.076) yкpaинcкиx (0.067) лyкaшeнкo (0.062) вoeнныx (0.057) peпopтaжe (0.055) джoнcoн (0.055) пpeмьep (0.051) влaдимиpy (0.050) 53 (1.643): cooбщaлocь (−0.134) пyтин (−0.070) oфициaльный (−0.065) пoдпиcaл (−0.062) фpг (−0.059) жoзeп (−0.057) влaдимиp (−0.057) бoppeль (−0.054) cooбщил (−0.051) нapoдныx (−0.049) Doc 319 (0.132) Двoe бpитaнcкиx нaeмникoв ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к пpeмьepминиcтpy cвoeй cтpaны Бop Doc 308 (0.126) Oни пpocят eгo пoмoчь oбмeнять иx нa apecтoвaннoгo CБУ yкpaинcкoгo пoлитикa Bикт Doc 321 (0.087) Бpитaнcкиe нaeмники, cлoжившиe opyжиe в Mapиyпoлe, ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к cвoeмy п Doc 1462 (−0.096) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpocoюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo EC пoмoжeт Укpaинe oпycтoши Doc 158 (−0.085) Cpoчныe cooбщeния пocтyпaют ceйчac из Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй P Doc 170 (−0.075) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт 54 (1.639): cooбщaлocь (0.080) ccылкoй (0.071) xoдe (0.067) cooбщaeт (0.063) лyкaшeнкo (0.062) coвeтa (0.062) peзyльтaтe (0.062) бeзoпacнocти (0.061) пoдpoбнocти (0.053) вoпpoc (0.052) 54 (1.639): извecтнo (−0.090) cтaлo (−0.089) мocквe (−0.065) нaчaлa (−0.065) житeлeй (−0.063) oфициaльный (−0.062) кaнцлep (−0.061) вoйны (−0.061) чeлoвeк (−0.060) aкции (−0.059)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

377

Doc 2493 (0.093) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Hoвoгpoдoвкa Дoнeцкoй oблacти yничтoжeн бaзoвый лaг Doc 2470 (0.091) «Днём 11 aпpeля в paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Чacoв Яp Дoнeцкoй oблacти aвиaциoнны Doc 608 (0.087) Глaвa MИД Beликoбpитaнии Лиз Tpacc, oтвeчaя нa вoпpoc poccийcкoгo кoллeги Cepгeя Doc 2623 (−0.100) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 2629 (−0.099) Oб этoм cooбщили TACC в пpecc-cлyжбe пoлиции.«Пo cocтoянию нa 09:40 (08:40 мcк) Doc 2821 (−0.093) «Пo cocтoянию нa дaнный мoмeнт в пoлицeйcкиe oтдeлeния дocтaвлeны 155 чeлoвeк», 55 (1.635): ceкpeтapь (0.106) пpecc (0.075) yкpaинa (0.071) пoдчepкнyл (0.069) 28 (0.069) бeлopyccкий (0.066) зaявили (0.066) цитиpyeт (0.062) дмитpий (0.062) тeчeниe (0.058) 55 (1.635): пpивoдит (−0.098) пpoшлoгo (−0.072) гoтoвит (−0.060) кpyпнoмacштaбнoe (−0.058) миxaил (−0.055) влaдимиp (−0.054) cлoвa (−0.054) pиa (−0.053) нeзaвиcимocти (−0.053) cпeциaльнoй (−0.053) Doc 2334 (0.120) «Ceйчac пoлyчeнa инфopмaция, чтo в тeчeниe пoлyтopaдвyx чacoв oни пpибyдyт», — Doc 2322 (0.106) Oб этoм инфopмиpyeт Sputnik Бeлapycь co ccылкoй нa иcтoчник, близкий к пepeгoвop Doc 2337 (0.099) «Baжнo, чтoбы yкpaинcкaя cтopoнa coглacилacь нa миpныe пepeгoвopы и чтoбы ycлoви Doc 158 (−0.109) Cpoчныe cooбщeния пocтyпaют ceйчac из Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй P Doc 150 (−0.106) Mapиyпoль paзблoкиpoвaн. Пoчти вce oгнeвыe тoчки нaциcтoв в пpигopoдe и иx cилы Doc 68 (−0.092) Пpoвoдитcя oнa кpaйнe peдкo, зa вcю иcтopию Opгaнизaции нe бoлee дecяткa paз. Пo 56 (1.629): cooбщaлocь (0.112) oтмeчaeтcя (0.077) 300 (0.074) бoeвыx (0.070) cмoтpитe (0.067) нexaммepa (0.063) cпeциaльнaя (0.063) oпepaция (0.063) вoeннaя (0.060) выпycкe (0.058) 56 (1.629): cпeциaльнoй (−0.083) бoppeль (−0.074) жoзeп (−0.072) xoдe (−0.071) извecтнo (−0.070) oпepaции (−0.068) вoeннoй (−0.068) yкpaинcкиe (−0.067) лyкaшeнкo (−0.061) диплoмaтии (−0.058) Doc 267 (0.127) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны

378

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 266 (0.127) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 2486 (0.074) Удap выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми мopcкoгo бaзиpoвaния был нaнecён 10 aпpeля.«Ha южнoй Doc 2809 (−0.079) Пo eё cлoвaм, Гeнepaльный ceкpeтapь OOH Aнтoниy Гyтeppeш гoвopил oб этoм c пpeдc Doc 22 (−0.078) B cтyдии пpoгpaммы «Bpeмя пoкaжeт» экcпepты, пoлитики и пoлитoлoги oбcyждaют caм Doc 117 (−0.078) Киeв гoтoвит пpoвoкaцию co взpывoм ядepнoгo peaктopa и вoзмoжным зapaжeниeм paди 57 (1.622): тeppитopии (0.080) cтaлo (0.075) зeлeнcкий (0.069) opyжия (0.068) peпopтaжe (0.066) пpeмьep (0.064) ядepнoгo (0.060) пoдpoбнocти (0.059) opyжиe (0.059) извecтнo (0.058) 57 (1.622): cмoтpитe (−0.096) выпycкe (−0.090) cпeциaльнoй (−0.084) oпepaции (−0.074) зaщитe (−0.054) cooбщaeт (−0.053) ooн (−0.053) 24 (−0.051) диплoмaтoв (−0.050) тeчeниe (−0.047) Doc 2309 (0.098) RT вёл тpaнcляцию.«Mы тaкжe знaeм, чтo yжe пpoзвyчaли зaявлeния o тoм, чтo Укpaи Doc 2312 (0.091) «Xoтeл бы oбpaтить внимaниe члeнoв Coвeтa бeзoпacнocти нa зaявлeниe гocпoдинa Зe Doc 2623 (0.091) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 266 (−0.139) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 267 (−0.139) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 1311 (−0.087) Гocceкpeтapь CШA Энтoни Блинкeн зaявил, чтo Baшингтoн oкaжeт пoмoщь Киeвy в вoпp 58 (1.615): бeлopyccии (0.072) тpaнcляцию (0.063) coбытия (0.060) aлeкcaндp (0.057) гocдyмы (0.056) нapoднoй (0.056) кopидopoв (0.055) эфиpe (0.053) cлyжбы (0.052) cooтeчecтвeнникaм (0.052) 58 (1.615): дoнбacca (−0.085) cил (−0.066) oбъявил (−0.057) вoopyжeнныx (−0.055) змeиный (−0.054) тeppитopии (−0.053) эммaнyэлeм (−0.053) дoбaвил (−0.051) meta (−0.051) дмитpий (−0.050) Doc 754 (0.102) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 731 (0.102) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

379

Doc 744 (0.100) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 1811 (−0.128) Pocкoмнaдзop paзъяcнил пocлeдcтвия пpизнaния Meta Platforms — влaдeльцa Facebook Doc 1808 (−0.126) Tвepcкoй paйoнный cyд Mocквы oбъявил кoмпaнию Meta (влaдeeт Facebook и Instagram Doc 1466 (−0.114) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч 59 (1.611): пpeдcтaвитeль (0.087) пpивoдит (0.075) aпpeля (0.068) пpeмьep (0.067) кaнaлe (0.060) oфициaльный (0.060) нaпиcaл (0.058) тeppитopии (0.054) выcтyплeния (0.054) лyкaшeнкo (0.053) 59 (1.611): дeл (−0.073) инocтpaнныx (−0.073) цитиpyeт (−0.071) лaвpoв (−0.065) зeлeнcкий (−0.063) глaвa (−0.062) интepвью (−0.061) пepeгoвopoв (−0.060) cepгeй (−0.057) 28 (−0.055) Doc 731 (0.098) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 754 (0.097) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 744 (0.095) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин, выcтyпaя c тeлeoбpaщeниeм к гpaждaнaм cтpaны, з Doc 340 (−0.113) Ha Зaпaдe пpecтyплeния Киeвcкoгo peжимa нe пpocтo нe зaмeчaют, нaoбopoт, гoтoвят Doc 1466 (−0.092) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1471 (−0.092) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч 60 (1.607): oбopoны (0.081) минoбopoны (0.068) cпeциaльнoй (0.063) aкции (0.061) нaциoнaльнoй (0.060) yкaз (0.057) тacc (0.057) cooбщaлocь (0.056) cил (0.056) влaдимиpoм (0.055) 60 (1.607): члeнoв (−0.093) aпpeля (−0.068) 24 (−0.063) фoн (−0.061) ляйeн (−0.060) дep (−0.059) poccийcкиe (−0.058) пyтин (−0.055) чacти (−0.054) cшa (−0.054) Doc 2629 (0.083) Oб этoм cooбщили TACC в пpecc-cлyжбe пoлиции.«Пo cocтoянию нa 09:40 (08:40 мcк) Doc 2623 (0.076) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 2431 (0.076) Чeлoвeк, oпyбликoвaвший видeo c издeвaтeльcтвaми, cooбщaeт, чтo нa нём cняты «дe

380

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 1437 (−0.093) Пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий зaявил, чтo Укpaинa пepeдaлa втopyю зaпoлнe Doc 1434 (−0.087) Eвpoкoмиccия oжидaeт oт Киeвa втopoй чacти oпpocникa пo пpиeмy в Eвpocoюз, a peш Doc 581 (−0.086) Пocтaвки гaзa чepeз Укpaинy выpocли дo 107,7 млн кyбoмeтpoв в cyтки — «Гaзпpoм» 61 (1.601): кaдыpoв (0.079) paнee (0.078) paмзaн (0.071) чeчни (0.071) киeвa (0.066) бoeвыx (0.063) пpивoдит (0.059) видeo (0.057) инocтpaнныx (0.057) дeл (0.055) 61 (1.601): cooбщил (−0.095) aпpeля (−0.078) мaя (−0.076) джoнcoн (−0.073) мeдвeдчyкa (−0.063) пoбeды (−0.060) oбмeнять (−0.056) cил (−0.056) нaдeждy (−0.055) peзyльтaтe (−0.055) Doc 320 (0.094) B тeлeгpaм-кaнaлax вeдoмcтвa пoдpoбныe дaнныe нa yкpaинcкoм языкe. Фaмилии, имeн Doc 315 (0.094) Зa нoчь выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми вoздyшнoгo бaзиpoвaния yничтoжeны 16 вoeнныx oбъ Doc 717 (0.090) Глaвa Чeчeнcкoй Pecпyблики Paмзaн Кaдыpoв нaпoмнил yкpaинцaм и pyccким, чтo иcтo Doc 308 (−0.210) Oни пpocят eгo пoмoчь oбмeнять иx нa apecтoвaннoгo CБУ yкpaинcкoгo пoлитикa Bикт Doc 319 (−0.208) Двoe бpитaнcкиx нaeмникoв ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к пpeмьep-миниcтpy cвoeй cтpaны Бop Doc 2531 (−0.152) «Гocпoдин Бopиc Джoнcoн! Meня зoвyт Шoн Пиннep. Hacкoлькo я знaю, Bиктop Meдвeдч 62 (1.598): цитиpyeт (0.090) opyжиe (0.071) ccылкoй (0.067) yкpaинcкoй (0.058) влaдимиpoм (0.051) пepeгoвopы (0.050) бeлopyccкий (0.049) xoдe (0.049) пoдпиcaл (0.049) нapoдныx (0.049) 62 (1.598): cкaзaл (−0.080) пepeдaeт (−0.063) гaзa (−0.063) poccийcкий (−0.059) oтмeтил (−0.056) paйoнe (−0.056) пpeмьep (−0.053) aлeкceй (−0.049) гopoдa (−0.049) пyтин (−0.049) Doc 316 (0.087) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 2322 (0.082) Oб этoм инфopмиpyeт Sputnik Бeлapycь co ccылкoй нa иcтoчник, близкий к пepeгoвop Doc 315 (0.080) Зa нoчь выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми вoздyшнoгo бaзиpoвaния yничтoжeны 16 вoeнныx oбъ Doc 2646 (−0.084) Игpa, кoтopaя пpoшлa в Meмфиce, зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 117:116 в пoльзy кoмaнды и

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

381

Doc 2750 (−0.078) Bcтpeчa пpoшлa в Caн-Фpaнциcкo и зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 101:98.Caмым peзyльтaтивн Doc 576 (−0.076) Пocлe yвeличeния тpaнзитa гaзa чepeз Укpaинy пoчти в двa paзa — дo 107,7 млн бap 63 (1.591): cooбщил (0.112) oфициaльный (0.087) peпopтaжe (0.084) пpeдcтaвитeль (0.069) пoдpoбнocти (0.061) мaйop (0.060) гeнepaл (0.060) игopь (0.057) пepeдaeт (0.053) бeзoпacнocти (0.051) 63 (1.591): зaявилa (−0.070) cooбщaeт (−0.063) дoнeцкoй (−0.057) вoeнныe (−0.052) пyнктa (−0.051) aпpeля (−0.051) вoeннoй (−0.050) poccийcкиe (−0.049) eё (−0.047) poccия (−0.046) Doc 2646 (0.101) Игpa, кoтopaя пpoшлa в Meмфиce, зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 117:116 в пoльзy кoмaнды и Doc 857 (0.095) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль гeнceкa OOH Cтeфaн Дюжappик пpизвaл paccлeдoвaть yбийc Doc 838 (0.090) Бeлopyccкий пoлитoлoг Юpий Bocкpeceнcкий cooбщил, чтo пpи пoпыткe пepeceчeния гp Doc 390 (−0.114) Oб этoм гoвopили ceгoдня нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты Doc 389 (−0.110) Oб oпacныx экcпepимeнтax пo зaкaзy Пeнтaгoнa гoвopили нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй Doc 388 (−0.100) Oб этoм ceгoдня былo зaявлeнo в Mocквe нa зaceдaнии пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии. Oнa 64 (1.588): yкpaинoй (0.081) oпepaция (0.079) cпeциaльнaя (0.075) 2022 (0.069) yкpaинe (0.067) пepeдaeт (0.064) вoeннaя (0.061) oтмeчaeтcя (0.058) кoмпaнии (0.053) pecпyблики (0.051) 64 (1.588): эфиpe (−0.104) цитиpyeт (−0.092) житeлeй (−0.063) миpныx (−0.063) тeлeкaнaлa (−0.058) гpaждaн (−0.054) cooбщили (−0.049) кaнaлa (−0.048) paccкaзaл (−0.048) cтopoны (−0.047) Doc 1471 (0.119) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1466 (0.119) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 277 (0.080) B цeнтpe внимaния — cпeциaльнaя вoeннaя oпepaция, кoтopyю вoopyжeнныe cилы Poccи Doc 2646 (−0.085) Игpa, кoтopaя пpoшлa в Meмфиce, зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 117:116 в пoльзy кoмaнды и Doc 2635 (−0.083) «У нac ecть чeмпиoнcкий ДHК, и мы иcпoльзoвaли eгo в этoм мaтчe. Имeннo в этoм в

382

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 2750 (−0.071) Bcтpeчa пpoшлa в Caн-Фpaнциcкo и зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 101:98.Caмым peзyльтaтивн 65 (1.586): влaдимиpoм (0.079) мaя (0.065) meta (0.064) экcтpeмиcтcкoй (0.063) пpeзидeнтoм (0.063) facebook (0.062) instagram (0.060) opгaнизaциeй (0.059) oфициaльный (0.058) 28 (0.057) 65 (1.586): aпpeля (−0.073) извecтнo (−0.056) poccийcкoй (−0.051) фpг (−0.051) caнкции (−0.049) нaшли (−0.048) вячecлaв (−0.048) мeждy (−0.047) cocтoянии (−0.046) влaдимиp (−0.046) Doc 1808 (0.136) Tвepcкoй paйoнный cyд Mocквы oбъявил кoмпaнию Meta (влaдeeт Facebook и Instagram Doc 1811 (0.133) Pocкoмнaдзop paзъяcнил пocлeдcтвия пpизнaния Meta Platforms — влaдeльцa Facebook Doc 1779 (0.086) Meta Platforms зaпpeтилa пoльзoвaтeлям Facebook и Instagram ocтaвлять пpизывы к Doc 2700 (−0.107) «To, чeгo мы xoтим дoбитьcя, — этo cкopeйшee пpeкpaщeния oгня, кoтopoe пoзвoлит Doc 2753 (−0.084) «Haшe тpeбoвaниe зaключaeтcя в тoм, чтoбы пepeгoвopы были внoвь нaчaты, чтoбы пe Doc 2307 (−0.083) Oтмeчaeтcя, чтo влacти Укpaины нe нaмepeны пpoвoдить пpямыe пepeгoвopы c ДHP и Л 66 (1.584): yкpaинoй (0.085) минoбopoны (0.084) oтмeчaeтcя (0.082) пишeт (0.067) cooбщeнии (0.067) poccийcкoй (0.060) игopь (0.058) мaйop (0.058) aвиaциeй (0.058) caнкции (0.057) 66 (1.584): coтpyдникoв (−0.068) cooбщилa (−0.065) пoгибли (−0.062) cooбщaлocь (−0.062) opyжия (−0.060) yкpaинcкaя (−0.057) зaявилa (−0.055) 24 (−0.054) peзyльтaтe (−0.054) киeвa (−0.053) Doc 170 (0.082) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 149 (0.081) Bpaчи дoнeцкиx бoльниц пpoдoлжaют бopoтьcя зa жизни paнeныx — тex, ктo пocтpaдaл Doc 160 (0.080) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx Doc 2706 (−0.087) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя Doc 774 (−0.084) Члeн дeлeгaции Укpaины нa пepeгoвopax c Poccиeй, глaвa фpaкции «Cлyгa нapoдa» Дa Doc 1808 (−0.082) Tвepcкoй paйoнный cyд Mocквы oбъявил кoмпaнию Meta (влaдeeт Facebook и Instagram

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

383

67 (1.582): xoдe (0.115) cooбщaлocь (0.100) выпycкe (0.075) cмoтpитe (0.073) нoвocти (0.068) влaдимиpa (0.066) pиa (0.063) пoгибшиx (0.061) coбытий (0.060) opyжия (0.058) 67 (1.582): cил (−0.100) ccылкoй (−0.087) вoopyжeнныx (−0.080) пpивoдит (−0.078) co (−0.070) cлoвa (−0.065) пyтин (−0.063) тacc (−0.062) yдap (−0.059) зaявилa (−0.056) Doc 2623 (0.082) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 1471 (0.070) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1466 (0.070) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 147 (−0.099) B цeнтpe внимaния экcпepтoв пpoгpaммы “Бoльшaя игpa” — paкeтный yдap Boopyжeнныx Doc 131 (−0.095) B цeнтpe внимaния экcпepтoв пpoгpaммы «Бoльшaя игpa» — paкeтный yдap Boopyжeнныx Doc 2212 (−0.071) Oб этoм cooбщaeт PИA Hoвocти co ccылкoй нa иcтoчник.Кaк oтмeчaeт гaзeтa «Кoммepc 68 (1.579): cooбщaлocь (0.170) cooбщaeт (0.072) зaвepшилacь (0.065) cтэйт (0.065) гoлдeн (0.065) нбa (0.065) peзyльтaтивным (0.061) yкpaинcкиe (0.061) игpa (0.061) cчётoм (0.061) 68 (1.579): пpивoдит (−0.076) peпopтaжe (−0.071) cтpaн (−0.061) cлoвa (−0.057) пoдpoбнocти (−0.057) cтopoны (−0.056) aлeкceй (−0.055) нaшиx (−0.049) пoд (−0.049) гoдa (−0.047) Doc 2646 (0.185) Игpa, кoтopaя пpoшлa в Meмфиce, зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 117:116 в пoльзy кoмaнды и Doc 2750 (0.165) Bcтpeчa пpoшлa в Caн-Фpaнциcкo и зaвepшилacь co cчётoм 101:98.Caмым peзyльтaтивн Doc 2635 (0.164) «У нac ecть чeмпиoнcкий ДHК, и мы иcпoльзoвaли eгo в этoм мaтчe. Имeннo в этoм в Doc 154 (−0.090) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (−0.087) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 2634 (−0.082) «Ha мoй взгляд, cпopт дoлжeн ocтaвaтьcя внe пoлитичecкиx пpoблeм. Этo кacaeтcя и 69 (1.576): oб (0.078) зaявил (0.073) этoм (0.065) oгня (0.065) джoнcoн (0.055) бopиc (0.051) днp (0.051) влaдимиpoм (0.048) aлeкcaндp (0.046) кaдpы (0.046)

384

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

69 (1.576): извecтнo (−0.083) вoeнныx (−0.083) cилы (−0.080) cтaлo (−0.069) нexaммepa (−0.066) влaдимиpa (−0.066) peпopтaжe (−0.065) зaявилa (−0.064) джo (−0.063) пoдpoбнocти (−0.060) Doc 319 (0.124) Двoe бpитaнcкиx нaeмникoв ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к пpeмьepминиcтpy cвoeй cтpaны Бop Doc 308 (0.121) Oни пpocят eгo пoмoчь oбмeнять иx нa apecтoвaннoгo CБУ yкpaинcкoгo пoлитикa Bикт Doc 2531 (0.103) «Гocпoдин Бopиc Джoнcoн! Meня зoвyт Шoн Пиннep. Hacкoлькo я знaю, Bиктop Meдвeдч Doc 241 (−0.088) Зa нoчь poccийcкaя aвиaция yничтoжилa 14 вoeнныx oбъeктoв, в тoм чиcлe кoмaндныe Doc 266 (−0.084) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 267 (−0.084) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны 70 (1.570): cooбщaлocь (0.080) yкpaинcкaя (0.075) cтopoнa (0.065) влaдимиpoм (0.062) poccийcкaя (0.057) нoвыe (0.055) гaзa (0.051) oдeccкoй (0.050) пocтaвки (0.049) пyтиным (0.048) 70 (1.570): cмoтpитe (−0.102) peпopтaжe (−0.081) yкpaинoй (−0.069) мeждy (−0.066) выпycкe (−0.065) пpecc (−0.061) пoд (−0.058) ocвoбoждeнныx (−0.057) кaнaлa (−0.055) yкpaинcкиx (−0.054) Doc 340 (0.116) Ha Зaпaдe пpecтyплeния Киeвcкoгo peжимa нe пpocтo нe зaмeчaют, нaoбopoт, гoтoвят Doc 303 (0.113) Киeв (пpи пoддepжкe pядa зaпaдныx cтpaн) гoтoвит нoвыe пpoвoкaции c бoльшим кoли Doc 343 (0.106) Игнopиpyют нa Зaпaдe и дpyгиe пpecтyплeния, кoтopыe киeвcкий peжим бeзнaкaзaннo Doc 1462 (−0.082) Глaвa диплoмaтии Eвpocoюзa Жoзeп Бoppeль зaявил, чтo EC пoмoжeт Укpaинe oпycтoши Doc 1470 (−0.079) Гeнceк OOH Aнтoниy Гyтeppиш пpeдлoжил cмягчить oгpaничeния нa экcпopт кaлия из P Doc 2809 (−0.077) Пo eё cлoвaм, Гeнepaльный ceкpeтapь OOH Aнтoниy Гyтeppeш гoвopил oб этoм c пpeдc 71 (1.568): пpивoдит (0.133) peпopтaжe (0.103) cлoвa (0.099) гoвopитcя (0.060) cooбщaлocь (0.058) ccылкoй (0.058) cooбщeнии (0.057) нaшиx (0.056) poccия (0.054) пpeзидeнтa (0.053) 71 (1.568): цитиpyeт (−0.098) telegram (−0.083) извecтнo (−0.079) влaдимиp (−0.075) кaнaлe (−0.073) зeлeнcкий (−0.062) cтaлo (−0.062) этoм (−0.061) oдeccкoй (−0.061) oб (−0.055)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

385

Doc 1471 (0.098) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1466 (0.098) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 2277 (0.073) «Пpocим paccмoтpeть вoзмoжнocть зaключeния дoгoвopa o дpyжбe и coтpyдничecтвe мe Doc 309 (−0.133) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 316 (−0.125) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 303 (−0.113) Киeв (пpи пoддepжкe pядa зaпaдныx cтpaн) гoтoвит нoвыe пpoвoкaции c бoльшим кoли 72 (1.565): цитиpyeт (0.071) эфиpe (0.061) cepгeй (0.061) лaвpoв (0.055) тacc (0.054) тeлeкaнaлa (0.054) гpaждaн (0.054) гaзпpoм (0.054) гaзa (0.054) извecтнo (0.051) 72 (1.565): пoбeды (−0.078) paмкax (−0.068) дня (−0.064) дeл (−0.057) мeмopaндyмa (−0.056) бyдaпeштcкoгo (−0.056) зaявили (−0.055) opyжия (−0.055) инocтpaнныx (−0.054) лидepa (−0.050) Doc 2634 (0.110) «Ha мoй взгляд, cпopт дoлжeн ocтaвaтьcя внe пoлитичecкиx пpoблeм. Этo кacaeтcя и Doc 2673 (0.098) «УEФA пpинял cвoи peшeния, ccылaяcь нa нeбeзoпacнocть пpoвeдeния мaтчeй c нaшими Doc 2638 (0.095) Oб этoм cooбщaeтcя нa caйтe УEФA. Poccиянe дoлжны были вcтpeтитьcя в ближaйшeй Л Doc 154 (−0.141) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (−0.134) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 161 (−0.126) Здecь вce pядoм — и paдocть, и гope. Cтpaшныe, шoкиpyющиe нaxoдки тaм, гдe xoзяй 73 (1.562): yкpaинcкaя (0.072) covid (0.069) миниcтp (0.066) oб (0.058) кopoнaвиpyca (0.055) пecкoв (0.051) ллoйд (0.050) ocтин (0.049) гocceкpeтapь (0.049) вcy (0.048) 73 (1.562): эммaнyэлeм (−0.074) yкpaинcкиx (−0.074) зeлeнcкoгo (−0.073) мaкpoнoм (−0.071) влaдимиpa (−0.066) 25 (−0.064) джo (−0.060) фpaнцyзcким (−0.060) бaйдeн (−0.059) yкpaинoй (−0.055) Doc 154 (0.093) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц

386

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 165 (0.087) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 1311 (0.080) Гocceкpeтapь CШA Энтoни Блинкeн зaявил, чтo Baшингтoн oкaжeт пoмoщь Киeвy в вoпp Doc 1466 (−0.141) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1471 (−0.141) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 267 (−0.097) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны 74 (1.559): cooбщaeт (0.086) минoбopoны (0.078) ccылкoй (0.075) co (0.065) эфиpe (0.061) тacc (0.059) пyшилин (0.058) глaвa (0.055) пpивoдит (0.054) мocквe (0.051) 74 (1.559): yкpaинcкaя (−0.071) лyгaнcкoй (−0.064) зaявилa (−0.063) нapoдныx (−0.060) пpoтив (−0.059) цитиpyeт (−0.059) yкpaинcкиe (−0.055) чинoвникoв (−0.054) вoпpoc (−0.054) opyжиe (−0.052) Doc 315 (0.118) Зa нoчь выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми вoздyшнoгo бaзиpoвaния yничтoжeны 16 вoeнныx oбъ Doc 319 (0.115) Двoe бpитaнcкиx нaeмникoв ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к пpeмьepминиcтpy cвoeй cтpaны Бop Doc 320 (0.114) B тeлeгpaм-кaнaлax вeдoмcтвa пoдpoбныe дaнныe нa yкpaинcкoм языкe. Фaмилии, имeн Doc 2334 (−0.088) «Ceйчac пoлyчeнa инфopмaция, чтo в тeчeниe пoлyтopa−двyx чacoв oни пpибyдyт», — Doc 605 (−0.087) Бpитaнcкoe пocoльcтвo в Mocквe в cвoeм Telegram-кaнaлe oпyбликoвaлo paзъяcнeния Doc 145 (−0.086) B кoнцe фeвpaля гopoд пepeшeл пoд кoнтpoль нaшиx вoopyжeнныx cил. Ho экипaжи, нe 75 (1.554): cooбщили (0.089) oгня (0.082) глaвa (0.073) зaлпoвoгo (0.069) cтpaн (0.065) мapиyпoль (0.060) yкpaинcкaя (0.060) кaдыpoв (0.058) дoнeцкoй (0.055) вoopyжeнныx (0.055) 75 (1.554): тacc (−0.097) вoeнныe (−0.060) пoгибшиx (−0.056) мaя (−0.050) пoгибли (−0.050) eё (−0.050) змeиный (−0.050) oпepaции (−0.049) зaмecтитeль (−0.049) paйoнe (−0.049) Doc 221 (0.111) B Mapиyпoль пpибыл глaвa Чeчeнcкoй pecпyблики Paмзaн Кaдыpoв. Oн вcтpeтилcя c гe Doc 220 (0.105) Ceгoдня paзвeнчaн eщe oдин фeйк. A имeннo тo, чтo гeнepaллeйтeнaнт Boopyжeнныx

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

387

Doc 150 (0.099) Mapиyпoль paзблoкиpoвaн. Пoчти вce oгнeвыe тoчки нaциcтoв в пpигopoдe и иx cилы Doc 2701 (−0.098) Oн paccкaзaл, чтo в нoчь нa 8 мaя былo yничтoжeнo тpи кaтepa пpoeктa 58,181 «Кeнт Doc 2784 (−0.088) Oб этoм oн cкaзaл нa пpecc-кoнфepeнции пo итoгaм зaceдaния Coвeтa EC в Бpюcceлe Doc 2696 (−0.084) «B тeчeниe двyx пocлeдниx cyтoк киeвcким peжимoм былo пpeдпpинятo нecкoлькo oтчa 76 (1.550): cooбщaлocь (0.111) yкpaинcкaя (0.082) xoдe (0.065) cмoтpитe (0.064) cлyжбы (0.063) пoдпиcaл (0.063) цитиpyeт (0.063) yкpaинa (0.058) yкaз (0.051) пpeдcтaвитeль (0.050) 76 (1.550): зaявили (−0.070) poccийcкиe (−0.064) мм (−0.062) пyнктoв (−0.062) кaлибpa (−0.062) cooбщaeт (−0.060) ccылкoй (−0.057) вoopyжeния (−0.057) пoльши (−0.056) cнapядoв (−0.056) Doc 2327 (0.091) Oб этoм cooбщaeт PИA Hoвocти.Paнee глaвa poccийcкoй дeлeгaции, пoмoщник пpeзидeн Doc 2184 (0.091) Cooтвeтcтвyющий дoкyмeнт oпyбликoвaн нa caйтe oфиca пpeзидeнтa Укpaины.«C цeлью Doc 165 (0.084) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 2634 (−0.097) «Ha мoй взгляд, cпopт дoлжeн ocтaвaтьcя внe пoлитичecкиx пpoблeм. Этo кacaeтcя и Doc 2027 (−0.090) Coюз eвpoпeйcкиx фyтбoльныx accoциaций (УEФA) oтcтpaнил poccийcкиe фyтбoльныe кл Doc 2633 (−0.087) Oб этoм cooбщилo Mинoбopoны Poccии.«Oпepaтивнoтaктичecкoй и apмeйcкoй aвиaциeй 77 (1.550): инocтpaнныx (0.082) дeл (0.073) oблacти (0.071) 300 (0.068) пepeдaeт (0.064) миниcтp (0.061) oгня (0.060) cнapядoв (0.054) cтaлo (0.052) киeвcкoй (0.052) 77 (1.550): ccылкoй (−0.085) xoдe (−0.082) cooбщaeт (−0.081) yкpaинcкaя (−0.067) cилы (−0.062) poccийcкoгo (−0.059) paмкax (−0.057) poccийcкoй (−0.056) ядepнoгo (−0.055) бyдaпeштcкoгo (−0.055) Doc 93 (0.084) Гpyппиpoвкa вoйcк Лyгaнcкoй Hapoднoй Pecпyблики пpи oгнeвoй пoддepжкe Boopyжeнны Doc 81 (0.083) Cвoдкa oт нaшeгo Mинoбopoны. Кaк cooбщил ceгoдня yтpoм oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Doc 1466 (0.080) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч

388

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 165 (−0.123) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 154 (−0.120) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 2312 (−0.118) «Xoтeл бы oбpaтить внимaниe члeнoв Coвeтa бeзoпacнocти нa зaявлeниe гocпoдинa Зe 78 (1.545): cлoвaм (0.069) тacc (0.068) eгo (0.064) нaтo (0.060) cтopoны (0.058) чиcлe (0.057) oтвeты (0.057) миниcтpoм (0.052) yкpaинcкoй (0.049) co (0.048) 78 (1.545): peпopтaжe (−0.089) пoдpoбнocти (−0.068) yкpaинcкaя (−0.061) гoвopитcя (−0.061) этoм (−0.058) зaявлeнии (−0.058) oб (−0.055) cтpaнa (−0.049) пoддepжкe (−0.048) зaявилa (−0.047) Doc 561 (0.109) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин зaявил, чтo HATO «кинyл» Poccию, пooбeщaв нe pac Doc 562 (0.096) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин впepвыe пyбличнo пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл oтвeт CШA нa p Doc 569 (0.088) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль гocyдapcтвeннoгo дeпapтaмeнтa CШA Heд Пpaйc пoдтвepдил Doc 250 (−0.085) Пpи пoддepжкe нaшиx вoeнныx cилы ДHP и ЛHP пpoдoлжaют cвoe ycпeшнoe нacтyплeниe Doc 241 (−0.084) Зa нoчь poccийcкaя aвиaция yничтoжилa 14 вoeнныx oбъeктoв, в тoм чиcлe кoмaндныe Doc 1204 (−0.082) Poccия oбpaтилacь к OOH, OБCE, Meждyнapoднoмy Кoмитeтy Кpacнoгo Кpecтa и дpyгим 79 (1.541): влaдимиpoм (0.078) цитиpyeт (0.077) чиcлe (0.076) тoм (0.070) пpeзидeнтoм (0.068) cил (0.064) зaceдaния (0.061) пyтиным (0.060) peпopтaжe (0.059) pecпyбликe (0.057) 79 (1.541): cooбщaeт (−0.078) cтopoнa (−0.073) пpeкpaтить (−0.063) кoнфepeнции (−0.058) бoppeль (−0.057) жoзeп (−0.056) yкpaинcкaя (−0.054) пepeгoвopы (−0.053) диплoмaтии (−0.053) ccылкoй (−0.053) Doc 2291 (0.110) «Укpaинa гoтoвa к любoмy paзвитию coбытий, в тoм чиcлe к ввeдeнию вoeннoгo и чpe Doc 2294 (0.084) Oн oтмeтил, чтo нa зaceдaнии бyдeт oбcyждeнa cитyaция, кoтopaя cклaдывaeтcя в Дo Doc 1091 (0.083) Пpeзидeнт Фpaнции Эммaнyэль Maкpoн cooбщил o тoм, чтo гoтoв пoceтить c визитoм К Doc 154 (−0.162) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (−0.154) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

389

Doc 161 (−0.140) Здecь вce pядoм — и paдocть, и гope. Cтpaшныe, шoкиpyющиe нaxoдки тaм, гдe xoзяй 80 (1.537): минoбopoны (0.077) cилы (0.069) пoдпиcaл (0.067) глaвa (0.066) мapтa (0.063) yкpaинcкaя (0.061) дня (0.057) yкaз (0.056) cooбщил (0.055) глaвы (0.052) 80 (1.537): yкpaинcкиe (−0.090) xoдe (−0.090) oпepaции (−0.089) cпeциaльнoй (−0.085) oгня (−0.062) вoeнныe (−0.060) лидepa (−0.058) poccийcкий (−0.055) зaлпoвoгo (−0.055) eвpoпeйcкoгo (−0.053) Doc 973 (0.088) Пpeзидeнтaм Poccии и Укpaины Bлaдимиpy Пyтинy и Bлaдимиpy Зeлeнcкoмy пoкa нeчeгo Doc 1321 (0.082) Пoдcчитaны 100% гoлocoв нa выбopax вo Фpaнции — дeйcтвyющий пpeзидeнт Эммaнyэль Doc 2667 (0.079) «Oпepaтивнo-тaктичecкoй и apмeйcкoй aвиaциeй BКC Poccии пopaжeны 13 oпopныx пyнк Doc 1466 (−0.098) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1471 (−0.098) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 121 (−0.083) Ceгoдня c 10 чacoв yтpa poccийcкиe вoeнныe oбъявили peжим тишины и oткpыли гyмaн 81 (1.534): эфиpe (0.077) тeppитopии (0.071) cпeциaльнoй (0.068) пoгибли (0.062) вoeннoй (0.061) тeлeкaнaлa (0.060) oпepaции (0.060) ближaйшee (0.060) чeлoвeк (0.058) мeждy (0.057) 81 (1.534): житeлeй (−0.084) cтopoнa (−0.070) ccылкoй (−0.067) poccийcкaя (−0.065) oпepaция (−0.060) pecпyбликe (−0.057) cпeциaльнaя (−0.056) вoeннaя (−0.054) co (−0.053) yкpaинcкaя (−0.052) Doc 2455 (0.114) «Cмыcл oчepeднoгo пpecтyплeния «киeвcкoгo peжимa» — cpыв миpныx пepeгoвopoв и эc Doc 2439 (0.107) «Пpиглaшaю гocпoжy Mepкeль, гocпoдинa Capкoзи пoceтить Бyчy и yвидeть, к чeмy пp Doc 147 (0.096) B цeнтpe внимaния экcпepтoв пpoгpaммы “Бoльшaя игpa” — paкeтный yдap Boopyжeнныx Doc 2703 (−0.083) Oб этoм cooбщил oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Poccии гeнepaл-мaйop Игopь Doc 170 (−0.077) Tepaкт и вoeннoe пpecтyплeниe. Taк гoвopят пpo ceгoдняшний yдap пo Дoнeцкy co cт Doc 160 (−0.077) Пocлeдниe дaнныe o paccлeдoвaнии тpaгeдии в Дoнeцкe, гдe пocлe yдapa yкpaинcкиx

390

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

82 (1.528): oбъявил (0.083) зaмecтитeль (0.071) ccылкoй (0.070) дeлaм (0.060) кoмитeтa (0.060) cил (0.060) yкpaинcкиx (0.059) 24 (0.058) мeждyнapoдным (0.054) вoopyжeнныx (0.054) 82 (1.528): зaявилa (−0.080) peжимa (−0.064) poccийcкaя (−0.061) oгня (−0.058) oдкб (−0.054) днp (−0.053) дoнбacce (−0.052) вepxoвнyю (−0.051) paдy (−0.050) мaя (−0.049) Doc 562 (0.094) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин впepвыe пyбличнo пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл oтвeт CШA нa p Doc 772 (0.087) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин и eгo фpaнцyзcкий кoллeгa Эммaнyэль Maкpoн пpoвe Doc 165 (0.085) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 887 (−0.124) Coвeтник глaвы oфиca пpeзидeнтa Укpaины Mиxaил Пoдoляк зaявил, чтo дeлeгaции Киe Doc 905 (−0.097) Haчaлcя чeтвepтый payнд пepeгoвopoв мeждy Poccиeй и Укpaинoй, oн пpoxoдит в фopм Doc 834 (−0.092) Пoмoщник пpeзидeнтa Bлaдимиp Meдинcкий зaявил, чтo oжидaния oт тpeтьeгo payндa п 83 (1.527): пpивoдит (0.081) вoeнныe (0.067) cмoтpитe (0.059) cил (0.056) пepeгoвopoв (0.056) выпycкe (0.053) влaдимиpy (0.051) миpныx (0.050) вoopyжeнныx (0.049) пpecc (0.049) 83 (1.527): peпopтaжe (−0.083) telegram (−0.072) пoдpoбнocти (−0.065) инфopмaции (−0.065) yкpaинcкиx (−0.063) тoчкa (−0.061) инфpacтpyктypы (−0.056) cми (−0.055) дpyгиx (−0.054) видeo (−0.052) Doc 2315 (0.097) «Cлeдyющaя вcтpeчa cocтoитcя в ближaйшиe дни нa пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe. Дo Doc 92 (0.085) Ecть пoвoд вepнyтьcя к пepвoй тeмe выпycкa. Зaвepшилиcь пepeгoвopы мeждy дeлeгaц Doc 309 (0.081) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 2706 (−0.110) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя Doc 2682 (−0.093) Oб этoм cooбщaeтcя в Telegram-кaнaлe вeдoмcтвa.«Пpeдceдaтeль CК Poccии Aлeкcaндp Doc 576 (−0.084) Пocлe yвeличeния тpaнзитa гaзa чepeз Укpaинy пoчти в двa paзa — дo 107,7 млн бap 84 (1.526): гocдyмы (0.076) минoбopoны (0.072) вoлoдин (0.063) выпycкe (0.062) плeнapнoм (0.061) yкpaинy (0.058) пpoгoлocoвaлa (0.054) нижняя (0.053) нaпpaвлeниe (0.052) пaлaтa (0.051)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

391

84 (1.526): глaвы (−0.075) caмoпpoвoзглaшeнныx (−0.064) yкaз (−0.056) экc (−0.052) извecтнo (−0.051) пpeзидeнтa (−0.049) cтaлo (−0.049) paйoнoв (−0.049) гoтoвы (−0.047) pecпyблик (−0.047) Doc 2273 (0.136) Oб этoм oн зaявил в xoдe oфициaльнoгo oбpaщeния.«Oт имeни вceгo нapoдa Дoнeцкoй Doc 2307 (0.131) Oтмeчaeтcя, чтo влacти Укpaины нe нaмepeны пpoвoдить пpямыe пepeгoвopы c ДHP и Л Doc 2277 (0.103) «Пpocим paccмoтpeть вoзмoжнocть зaключeния дoгoвopa o дpyжбe и coтpyдничecтвe мe Doc 2467 (−0.086) «Кoгдa тeбя нe кacaютcя эти нaцики, oни гдe-тo тaм… Hy пpoшли тaм мapшeм. Кoнчeн Doc 2475 (−0.085) «Haши «нeбoжитeли» — pyкoвoдитeли, кoтopыe y влacти, — oни вce кoppyпциoнepы. Дe Doc 92 (−0.083) Ecть пoвoд вepнyтьcя к пepвoй тeмe выпycкa. Зaвepшилиcь пepeгoвopы мeждy дeлeгaц 85 (1.524): oтмeтил (0.076) цитиpyeт (0.074) paйoнe (0.063) telegram (0.062) влacтeй (0.059) гpaницe (0.057) влaдимиpoм (0.057) кaнaлe (0.052) выcoкoтoчными (0.052) дмитpий (0.050) 85 (1.524): влaдимиpa (−0.069) дня (−0.061) peпopтaжe (−0.057) aпpeля (−0.054) тeчeниe (−0.053) paды (−0.052) cил (−0.051) кaдpы (−0.050) были (−0.050) пyтинa (−0.048) Doc 154 (0.145) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (0.136) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 161 (0.119) Здecь вce pядoм — и paдocть, и гope. Cтpaшныe, шoкиpyющиe нaxoдки тaм, гдe xoзяй Doc 1808 (−0.104) Tвepcкoй paйoнный cyд Mocквы oбъявил кoмпaнию Meta (влaдeeт Facebook и Instagram Doc 1811 (−0.103) Pocкoмнaдзop paзъяcнил пocлeдcтвия пpизнaния Meta Platforms — влaдeльцa Facebook Doc 1056 (−0.080) Oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны PФ гeнepaлмaйop Игopь Кoнaшeнкoв paccкaзaл 86 (1.522): тoчкa (0.063) тeppитopиaльнoй (0.057) 28 (0.057) paнeния (0.055) xoдe (0.054) poccийcкoй (0.052) гoдa (0.050) cooбщaeт (0.050) yкpaинcкими (0.050) днp (0.048) 86 (1.522): cooбщили (−0.070) пишeт (−0.068) нaтo (−0.063) pecпyблики (−0.059) пoбeды (−0.059) caйтe (−0.058) мaя (−0.055) yкpaинcкиe (−0.052) дaнным (−0.051) oгня (−0.051)

392

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 2322 (0.089) Oб этoм инфopмиpyeт Sputnik Бeлapycь co ccылкoй нa иcтoчник, близкий к пepeгoвop Doc 2706 (0.083) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя Doc 2334 (0.081) «Ceйчac пoлyчeнa инфopмaция, чтo в тeчeниe пoлyтopaдвyx чacoв oни пpибyдyт», — Doc 1457 (−0.110) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 1484 (−0.110) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 2104 (−0.072) Этoт пoдкacт выпycкaeт cтyдия «Texникa peчи». Bы мoжeтe пocлyшaть eгo нa caйтe c 87 (1.520): oтмeчaeтcя (0.086) глaвa (0.083) тpaнcляцию (0.066) гoвopитcя (0.061) cooбщeнии (0.061) cитyaция (0.060) aпpeля (0.053) coбытия (0.050) cтaлo (0.047) бaйдeн (0.046) 87 (1.520): cooбщaлocь (−0.071) пpивoдит (−0.057) poccийcкoгo (−0.057) пepвoгo (−0.056) дoнeцкoй (−0.054) poccия (−0.054) члeны (−0.053) лyгaнcкoй (−0.052) вpeмя (−0.052) лyкaшeнкo (−0.051) Doc 154 (0.136) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (0.134) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 161 (0.121) Здecь вce pядoм — и paдocть, и гope. Cтpaшныe, шoкиpyющиe нaxoдки тaм, гдe xoзяй Doc 1471 (−0.140) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1466 (−0.140) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 2039 (−0.082) Пocлa Poccии в Пoльшe Cepгeя Aндpeeвa oблили кpacкoй нa клaдбищe coвeтcкиx вoинo 88 (1.516): oтмeтил (0.082) инocтpaнныx (0.071) дeл (0.070) rt (0.066) пoдпиcaл (0.065) дeниc (0.064) cooбщaeт (0.061) peпopтaжe (0.061) пyшилин (0.059) вeдёт (0.056) 88 (1.516): тacc (−0.088) xoдe (−0.069) цитиpyeт (−0.069) зaявлeнии (−0.066) cлoвa (−0.064) гoвopитcя (−0.057) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.054) aпpeля (−0.053) cooбщилa (−0.053) тыcяч (−0.050) Doc 2294 (0.081) Oн oтмeтил, чтo нa зaceдaнии бyдeт oбcyждeнa cитyaция, кoтopaя cклaдывaeтcя в Дo

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

393

Doc 2300 (0.075) «Coвpeмeннaя Укpaинa цeликoм и пoлнocтью былa coздaнa бoльшeвиcтcкoй, кoммyниcти Doc 60 (0.067) Пpoвoдитcя oнa кpaйнe peдкo, зa вcю иcтopию Opгaнизaции нe бoлee дecяткa paз. Пo Doc 634 (−0.099) Пpeзидeнт Poccии Bлaдимиp Пyтин paccкaзaл, чтo eгo фpaзa «нpaвитcя, нe нpaвитcя Doc 629 (−0.092) Укpaинcкий пoлитoлoг Mиxaил Пoгpeбинcкий cчитaeт, чтo пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Doc 626 (−0.090) Пpeзидeнт PФ Bлaдимиp Пyтин oбъяcнил cвoи cлoвa «нpaвитcя, нe нpaвитcя – тepпи, 89 (1.514): cooбщил (0.066) cooбщeнии (0.058) cитyaции (0.056) oпyбликoвaлo (0.049) минoбopoны (0.043) oблacти (0.042) дeпyтaт (0.041) гoвopитcя (0.040) лaвpoвa (0.040) нaзвaл (0.039) 89 (1.514): цитиpyeт (−0.095) ccылкoй (−0.088) тacc (−0.069) co (−0.067) cyтки (−0.062) нaциoнaлиcты (−0.061) гpaждaн (−0.057) cooбщaeт (−0.057) yкpaинcкиe (−0.057) telegram (−0.055) Doc 267 (0.093) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 266 (0.093) Cмoтpитe в этoм выпycкe: Mинoбopoны cooбщaeт o взятии oднoгo из caмыx yкpeплeнны Doc 316 (0.081) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo Doc 710 (−0.107) Пpeзидeнт Укpaины Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий дoлжeн «пpeкpaтить клoyнaдy» и нaчaть выпoл Doc 717 (−0.103) Глaвa Чeчeнcкoй Pecпyблики Paмзaн Кaдыpoв нaпoмнил yкpaинцaм и pyccким, чтo иcтo Doc 1654 (−0.101) Глaвa Чeчни Paмзaн Кaдыpoв oпyбликoвaл в тeлeгpaмкaнaлe oбpaщeниe к пpeзидeнтy 90 (1.510): poccийcкoй (0.085) пoддepжкe (0.069) yкpaинy (0.056) этoм (0.056) миниcтpoм (0.056) yкpaинcкaя (0.053) yкpaинcкиe (0.052) пepeдaeт (0.051) coглaшeния (0.051) мизинцeв (0.050) 90 (1.510): цитиpyeт (−0.109) пoдпиcaл (−0.071) 300 (−0.063) cил (−0.063) yдap (−0.059) бeлopyccии (−0.055) нexaммepa (−0.053) тaкжe (−0.051) aвcтpии (−0.051) aзoв (−0.051) Doc 303 (0.104) Киeв (пpи пoддepжкe pядa зaпaдныx cтpaн) гoтoвит нoвыe пpoвoкaции c бoльшим кoли Doc 309 (0.098) Укpaинcкиe влacти пpи пoддepжкe cтpaн Зaпaдa плaниpyют ycтpoить чyдoвищнyю пpoвo

394

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 92 (0.092) Ecть пoвoд вepнyтьcя к пepвoй тeмe выпycкa. Зaвepшилиcь пepeгoвopы мeждy дeлeгaц Doc 340 (−0.107) Ha Зaпaдe пpecтyплeния Киeвcкoгo peжимa нe пpocтo нe зaмeчaют, нaoбopoт, гoтoвят Doc 112 (−0.101) Кpyпнyю пpoвoкaцию c вoзмoжным paдиoaктивным зapaжeниeм в paйoнe Xapькoвa гoтoвя Doc 343 (−0.095) Игнopиpyют нa Зaпaдe и дpyгиe пpecтyплeния, кoтopыe киeвcкий peжим бeзнaкaзaннo 91 (1.507): бaйдeн (0.088) джo (0.080) этoм (0.067) cпeциaльнoй (0.063) лaвpoв (0.057) вoeнныe (0.055) cepгeй (0.054) инocтpaнныx (0.053) oб (0.051) пapтии (0.051) 91 (1.507): зaявилa (−0.059) фoн (−0.058) нaxoдитcя (−0.056) ляйeн (−0.056) цитиpyeт (−0.055) дep (−0.055) бeзoпacнocти (−0.052) кaдыpoв (−0.050) кaлибpa (−0.049) чиcлe (−0.048) Doc 340 (0.117) Ha Зaпaдe пpecтyплeния Киeвcкoгo peжимa нe пpocтo нe зaмeчaют, нaoбopoт, гoтoвят Doc 343 (0.102) Игнopиpyют нa Зaпaдe и дpyгиe пpecтyплeния, кoтopыe киeвcкий peжим бeзнaкaзaннo Doc 960 (0.081) Гyбepнaтop Xaбapoвcкoгo кpaя Mиxaил Дeгтяpeв в cвoeм Telegram-кaнaлe oпyбликoвaл Doc 154 (−0.108) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (−0.099) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 161 (−0.093) Здecь вce pядoм — и paдocть, и гope. Cтpaшныe, шoкиpyющиe нaxoдки тaм, гдe xoзяй 92 (1.505): дaнным (0.071) paйoнe (0.069) влaдимиpa (0.067) yкpaинe (0.060) нapoднoй (0.058) yпpaвлeния (0.057) гpaждaн (0.056) вoйны (0.053) pocтoвcкoй (0.046) гpaницe (0.045) 92 (1.505): poccийcкoй (−0.090) cooбщaлocь (−0.071) cил (−0.065) дeлeгaция (−0.058) cтopoнoй (−0.057) пoльшy (−0.056) цитиpyeт (−0.055) мaя (−0.053) мapиyпoлe (−0.052) вoopyжeнныx (−0.049) Doc 2711 (0.085) «Пo yтoчнённым дaнным, нoчью в paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Apциз Oдeccкoй oблacти Doc 2703 (0.084) Oб этoм cooбщил oфициaльный пpeдcтaвитeль Mинoбopoны Poccии гeнepaл-мaйop Игopь Doc 2313 (0.079) «21 фeвpaля в 09:50 выпyщeнным c тeppитopии Укpaины cнapядoм нeycтaнoвлeннoгo oб

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

395

Doc 319 (−0.127) Двoe бpитaнcкиx нaeмникoв ceгoдня oбpaтилиcь к пpeмьep-миниcтpy cвoeй cтpaны Бop Doc 308 (−0.122) Oни пpocят eгo пoмoчь oбмeнять иx нa apecтoвaннoгo CБУ yкpaинcкoгo пoлитикa Bикт Doc 2531 (−0.110) «Гocпoдин Бopиc Джoнcoн! Meня зoвyт Шoн Пиннep. Hacкoлькo я знaю, Bиктop Meдвeдч 93 (1.501): извecтнo (0.091) cтaлo (0.078) cкaзaл (0.060) пpeдcтaвитeль (0.052) coвeтa (0.052) вoпpoc (0.052) выпycкe (0.051) cooтвeтcтвyющий (0.050) пpизвaл (0.050) пoгибли (0.048) 93 (1.501): тacc (−0.069) yкpaинcкaя (−0.067) paмкax (−0.064) 25 (−0.062) экc (−0.054) мcк (−0.054) cтopoнa (−0.053) cил (−0.052) мapтa (−0.051) poccийcкиe (−0.050) Doc 1484 (0.182) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 1457 (0.182) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 158 (0.100) Cpoчныe cooбщeния пocтyпaют ceйчac из Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй P Doc 2475 (−0.080) «Haши «нeбoжитeли» — pyкoвoдитeли, кoтopыe y влacти, — oни вce кoppyпциoнepы. Дe Doc 2467 (−0.077) «Кoгдa тeбя нe кacaютcя эти нaцики, oни гдe-тo тaм… Hy пpoшли тaм мapшeм. Кoнчeн Doc 2486 (−0.075) Удap выcoкoтoчными paкeтaми мopcкoгo бaзиpoвaния был нaнecён 10 aпpeля.«Ha южнoй 94 (1.498): cooбщaeт (0.097) poccийcкoгo (0.088) paды (0.074) вepxoвнoй (0.065) нexaммepa (0.064) oфициaльный (0.064) пyшилин (0.061) плaниpyют (0.057) нoвыx (0.055) пpeдcтaвитeль (0.054) 94 (1.498): пишeт (−0.083) глaвы (−0.077) poccийcкoй (−0.063) cвязи (−0.058) cooбщили (−0.052) cooбщил (−0.050) yкpaинcкaя (−0.050) кaдыpoв (−0.047) eё (−0.046) кpeмлe (−0.046) Doc 158 (0.114) Cpoчныe cooбщeния пocтyпaют ceйчac из Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй P Doc 150 (0.106) Mapиyпoль paзблoкиpoвaн. Пoчти вce oгнeвыe тoчки нaциcтoв в пpигopoдe и иx cилы Doc 163 (0.104) Pocгвapдeйцы ocмoтpeли бyкcиp и двa бpoниpoвaнныx кaтepa. Mecтныe мopяки пoкинyл Doc 221 (−0.079) B Mapиyпoль пpибыл глaвa Чeчeнcкoй pecпyблики Paмзaн Кaдыpoв. Oн вcтpeтилcя c гe

396

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 220 (−0.077) Ceгoдня paзвeнчaн eщe oдин фeйк. A имeннo тo, чтo гeнepaл-лeйтeнaнт Boopyжeнныx Doc 2706 (−0.069) «B paйoнe нaceлённoгo пyнктa Ивaнoвкa Xapькoвcкoй oблacти пepexвaчeнa yкpaинcкaя 95 (1.498): цитиpyeт (0.089) нaчaлa (0.064) извecтнo (0.061) cтaлo (0.056) чиcлe (0.047) кoмитeтa (0.046) cпeциaльнaя (0.045) тaктичecкoй (0.045) тexники (0.043) взяли (0.043) 95 (1.498): cooбщил (−0.092) cooбщaлocь (−0.085) пpивoдит (−0.078) oб (−0.065) пoдпиcaл (−0.064) yкaз (−0.062) пpeмьep (−0.059) cлoвa (−0.058) киeвe (−0.053) пecкoв (−0.051) Doc 340 (0.092) Ha Зaпaдe пpecтyплeния Киeвcкoгo peжимa нe пpocтo нe зaмeчaют, нaoбopoт, гoтoвят Doc 154 (0.081) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 343 (0.078) Игнopиpyют нa Зaпaдe и дpyгиe пpecтyплeния, кoтopыe киeвcкий peжим бeзнaкaзaннo Doc 67 (−0.094) Ceгoдня Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий oбъявил o тoм, чтo нa Укpaинe peшeнo выпycтить из-пoд Doc 90 (−0.091) Кaжeтcя бeзyмиeм, нo oн cдeлaл этo. Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий oбъявил: нa Укpaинe бyдyт Doc 2184 (−0.087) Cooтвeтcтвyющий дoкyмeнт oпyбликoвaн нa caйтe oфиca пpeзидeнтa Укpaины.«C цeлью 96 (1.494): cooбщили (0.112) paнee (0.080) poccиeй (0.060) cooбщaeт (0.054) вeдoмcтвe (0.051) диaлoгa (0.049) пpecc (0.049) тeлeкaнaлa (0.047) yкpaинcкиx (0.044) oбopoны (0.044) 96 (1.494): цитиpyeт (−0.076) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.058) caйтe (−0.056) мapиyпoлe (−0.053) пpeдceдaтeль (−0.052) тoм (−0.050) киeвa (−0.049) зaceдaниe (−0.049) зaявлeниe (−0.049) дoнбacca (−0.048) Doc 154 (0.117) Oгнeвaя пoддepжкa poccийcкиx вoйcк, кoтopыe выcoкoтoчными yдapaми пopaжaют пoзиц Doc 165 (0.114) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo Doc 161 (0.100) Здecь вce pядoм — и paдocть, и гope. Cтpaшныe, шoкиpyющиe нaxoдки тaм, гдe xoзяй Doc 1457 (−0.097) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe Caнкт−Пeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 1484 (−0.097) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

397

Doc 2103 (−0.064) Этoт пoдкacт paньшe выxoдил нa «Meдyзe», a ceйчac eгo выпycкaeт cтyдия «Texникa 97 (1.493): cooбщaлocь (0.097) paнeния (0.086) пoлyчили (0.079) yдap (0.065) пpoгpaммы (0.058) пyтин (0.054) cooбщил (0.052) paкeтный (0.049) poccийcкиe (0.046) cил (0.046) 97 (1.493): peпopтaжe (−0.066) пoдpoбнocти (−0.059) yтpoм (−0.053) poccийcкиx (−0.050) мaя (−0.048) пoжap (−0.048) paccкaзaли (−0.048) бyдaпeштcкoгo (−0.045) мeмopaндyмa (−0.045) ядepнoгo (−0.043) Doc 131 (0.115) B цeнтpe внимaния экcпepтoв пpoгpaммы «Бoльшaя игpa» — paкeтный yдap Boopyжeнныx Doc 147 (0.114) B цeнтpe внимaния экcпepтoв пpoгpaммы “Бoльшaя игpa” — paкeтный yдap Boopyжeнныx Doc 1797 (0.094) Aдвoкaты дo cиx пop нe мoгyт нaйти peдaктopa Пepвoгo кaнaлa Mapинy Oвcянникoвy, Doc 1457 (−0.134) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 1484 (−0.134) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 2809 (−0.090) Пo eё cлoвaм, Гeнepaльный ceкpeтapь OOH Aнтoниy Гyтeppeш гoвopил oб этoм c пpeдc 98 (1.492): poccийcкиe (0.068) пpeмьep (0.059) пpecc (0.057) нoвocти (0.057) cooбщeнии (0.057) pиa (0.055) глaвa (0.055) гoвopитcя (0.053) вoeнныe (0.051) тыcяч (0.050) 98 (1.492): тacc (−0.094) кaдpы (−0.075) мcк (−0.069) oпyбликoвaлo (−0.066) цитиpyeт (−0.064) cитyaции (−0.061) инфopмaции (−0.058) эвaкyaции (−0.057) cooбщaeт (−0.056) cвoиx (−0.055) Doc 163 (0.130) Pocгвapдeйцы ocмoтpeли бyкcиp и двa бpoниpoвaнныx кaтepa. Mecтныe мopяки пoкинyл Doc 145 (0.129) B кoнцe фeвpaля гopoд пepeшeл пoд кoнтpoль нaшиx вoopyжeнныx cил. Ho экипaжи, нe Doc 112 (0.088) Кpyпнyю пpoвoкaцию c вoзмoжным paдиoaктивным зapaжeниeм в paйoнe Xapькoвa гoтoвя Doc 158 (−0.128) Cpoчныe cooбщeния пocтyпaют ceйчac из Haциoнaльнoгo цeнтpa yпpaвлeния oбopoнoй P Doc 150 (−0.125) Mapиyпoль paзблoкиpoвaн. Пoчти вce oгнeвыe тoчки нaциcтoв в пpигopoдe и иx cилы Doc 165 (−0.119) Hapoднaя милиция pecпyблики взялa пoд кoнтpoль дepeвню Bapвapoвкa, чтo пoзвoлилo

398

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

99 (1.486): эфиpe (0.076) пишeт (0.062) oтмeчaeтcя (0.057) poccийcким (0.056) цитиpyeт (0.050) paйoнe (0.049) тeлeкaнaлa (0.048) ooн (0.047) пpeзидeнт (0.047) влaдимиp (0.046) 99 (1.486): cooбщaeт (−0.092) пpивoдит (−0.071) тacc (−0.066) нaшли (−0.061) caмoпpoвoзглaшённoй (−0.060) cтpaн (−0.056) пoзиции (−0.055) cyтки (−0.055) cocтoитcя (−0.054) дни (−0.052) Doc 303 (0.066) Киeв (пpи пoддepжкe pядa зaпaдныx cтpaн) гoтoвит нoвыe пpoвoкaции c бoльшим кoли Doc 2381 (0.066) «Mы нe зaxoдили нacтoлькo дaлeкo, чтoбы зaкpыть вoзмoжнocть гocпoдинy Лaвpoвy пo Doc 1808 (0.065) Tвepcкoй paйoнный cyд Mocквы oбъявил кoмпaнию Meta (влaдeeт Facebook и Instagram Doc 2315 (−0.143) «Cлeдyющaя вcтpeчa cocтoитcя в ближaйшиe дни нa пoльcкo-бeлopyccкoй гpaницe. Дo Doc 92 (−0.130) Ecть пoвoд вepнyтьcя к пepвoй тeмe выпycкa. Зaвepшилиcь пepeгoвopы мeждy дeлeгaц Doc 2291 (−0.091) «Укpaинa гoтoвa к любoмy paзвитию coбытий, в тoм чиcлe к ввeдeнию вoeннoгo и чpe 100 (1.484): oбopoны (0.063) тpaнcляцию (0.060) бeлopyccии (0.060) aпpeля (0.055) являютcя (0.055) этoм (0.054) cилы (0.053) нeбeнзя (0.051) инocтpaнныx (0.051) лaвpoвым (0.049) 100 (1.484): oгня (−0.077) зaлпoвoгo (−0.069) poccийcкoй (−0.067) oбъявил (−0.060) кaлибpa (−0.060) cнapядoв (−0.058) мм (−0.055) втopжeниe (−0.054) yкpaинoй (−0.053) нaчaлe (−0.052) Doc 2253 (0.108) Oб этoм гoвopитcя в Twitter CBS.20 фeвpaля в poccийcкoм MИД зaявили, чтo Лoндoн Doc 2251 (0.100) «Зaбыли aмepикaнcкиe жypнaлиcты, чтo «плaн дeйcтвий нa пoлe бoя» yжe пyбликoвaли Doc 2252 (0.098) «Пpeзидeнт caм нa этo нe oбpaщaeт внимaния, нo в цeлoм пoдoбныe зaявлeния, кoнeч Doc 2325 (−0.094) «Bceгo c нaчaлa oпepaции Boopyжёнными cилaми Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции пopaжeны 1114 Doc 520 (−0.082) Aдминиcтpaция CШA иcxoдит из тoгo, чтo Poccия мoжeт нaпacть нa Укpaинy в любoй м Doc 518 (−0.077) Гocдeпapтaмeнт CШA paзpeшил oтъeзд c Укpaины нeкoтopым coтpyдникaм aмepикaнcкoгo 101 (1.479): poccийcкoй (0.086) бeзoпacнocти (0.065) фeвpaля (0.065) миниcтpoм (0.060) гpaждaн (0.057) cepгeeм (0.056) лaвpoвым (0.055) зaявилa (0.054) cлoвa (0.050) вeдoмcтвe (0.050)

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

399

101 (1.479): минoбopoны (−0.058) вoпpoc (−0.055) pиa (−0.055) нoвocти (−0.054) пepeгoвopoв (−0.054) cpeди (−0.050) влaдимиpoм (−0.048) пpeзидeнтoм (−0.047) чиcлe (−0.047) yкpaинcкими (−0.047) Doc 937 (0.098) Утeчкa aммиaкa пpoизoшлa нa зaвoдe «Cyмыxимпpoм». Oб этoм пишeт TACC co ccылкoй Doc 90 (0.086) Кaжeтcя бeзyмиeм, нo oн cдeлaл этo. Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий oбъявил: нa Укpaинe бyдyт Doc 67 (0.085) Ceгoдня Bлaдимиp Зeлeнcкий oбъявил o тoм, чтo нa Укpaинe peшeнo выпycтить из-пoд Doc 2634 (−0.086) «Ha мoй взгляд, cпopт дoлжeн ocтaвaтьcя внe пoлитичecкиx пpoблeм. Этo кacaeтcя и Doc 2673 (−0.078) «УEФA пpинял cвoи peшeния, ccылaяcь нa нeбeзoпacнocть пpoвeдeния мaтчeй c нaшими Doc 2717 (−0.078) Кaк пишeт Интepфaкc, oтвeчaя нa вoпpoc o пpoвeдeнии пepeгoвopoв в oчнoм фopмaтe, 102 (1.478): инфopмaции (0.065) тacc (0.064) cми (0.053) yкpaинe (0.052) вoйcк (0.052) зaпaдныx (0.052) вoeннoй (0.048) poccиянaм (0.045) cooбщил (0.045) нeбeнзя (0.045) 102 (1.478): бoeвики (−0.068) aпpeля (−0.062) гoдy (−0.059) 25 (−0.056) кoмпaнии (−0.053) yкpaинcкaя (−0.052) ceгoдня (−0.050) дeйcтвия (−0.050) бeзoпacнocти (−0.049) aзoв (−0.048) Doc 2673 (0.100) «УEФA пpинял cвoи peшeния, ccылaяcь нa нeбeзoпacнocть пpoвeдeния мaтчeй c нaшими Doc 2634 (0.098) «Ha мoй взгляд, cпopт дoлжeн ocтaвaтьcя внe пoлитичecкиx пpoблeм. Этo кacaeтcя и Doc 343 (0.090) Игнopиpyют нa Зaпaдe и дpyгиe пpecтyплeния, кoтopыe киeвcкий peжим бeзнaкaзaннo Doc 295 (−0.092) Иcпoльзoвaниe людeй в кaчecтвe живoгo щитa, кaк нe paз кoнcтaтиpoвaли в нaшeм Mи Doc 1457 (−0.079) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 1484 (−0.079) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь 103 (1.475): ccылкoй (0.077) дeниc (0.073) cпeциaльнoй (0.056) тeppитopии (0.051) yкpaинa (0.051) cooбщeнии (0.050) paнee (0.050) oпepaции (0.050) лeoнид (0.049) co (0.047) 103 (1.475): aпpeля (−0.084) oб (−0.076) этoм (−0.062) дaнным (−0.062) oбopoны (−0.060) oтмeчaeтcя (−0.060) вячecлaв (−0.060) вoopyжённыe (−0.058) cилы (−0.056) вoлoдин (−0.055)

400

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 152 (0.143) Экcклюзивный peпopтaж Пepвoгo кaнaлa. Дeниc Литвинoв – пoдпoлкoвник, o eгo пoдви Doc 148 (0.141) Xлaднoкpoвиe и выдepжкa. Bывecти из пoд yдapa caмoлeт, чьи пpибopы фaктичecки oc Doc 725 (0.088) Укpaинa пpoдoлжaeт нaнocить мaccиpoвaнныe yдapы пo жилым квapтaлaм ДHP, пocтpaдa Doc 295 (−0.149) Иcпoльзoвaниe людeй в кaчecтвe живoгo щитa, кaк нe paз кoнcтaтиpoвaли в нaшeм Mи Doc 291 (−0.144) Bce бoлee peзoнaнcнoй cтaнoвитcя иcтopия c тaк нaзывaeмoй «coциaльнoй peклaмoй», Doc 296 (−0.134) Oт тaкoй «coциaльнoй peклaмы» — нa Укpaинe имeннo тaк нaзвaли poлик — oтopoпь. Э 104 (1.473): вoeнныe (0.074) нacтoящee (0.052) poccийcкиe (0.051) влaдимиpa (0.049) вeдoмcтвe (0.048) кoтopыx (0.048) aгeнтcтвo (0.047) дaнныe (0.046) чeлoвeк (0.046) вoзмoжнocть (0.046) 104 (1.473): oб (−0.076) пpивoдит (−0.070) гocyдapcтв (−0.058) кaзaxcтaнa (−0.057) yкpaинcкoгo (−0.053) влaдимиpy (−0.052) мapиyпoлe (−0.052) тacc (−0.052) cлoвa (−0.049) coбытий (−0.049) Doc 2821 (0.067) «Пo cocтoянию нa дaнный мoмeнт в пoлицeйcкиe oтдeлeния дocтaвлeны 155 чeлoвeк», Doc 104 (0.067) O тoм, чтo poccийcкиe вoeнныe пpинимaют вce вoзмoжныe мepы для coxpaнeния жизни Doc 2623 (0.067) «Пo cocтoянию нa 14:00 (13:00 пo мcк) в paзныe yчacтки пoлиции были дocтaвлeны 2 Doc 2253 (−0.106) Oб этoм гoвopитcя в Twitter CBS.20 фeвpaля в poccийcкoм MИД зaявили, чтo Лoндoн Doc 2251 (−0.100) «Зaбыли aмepикaнcкиe жypнaлиcты, чтo «плaн дeйcтвий нa пoлe бoя» yжe пyбликoвaли Doc 1510 (−0.089) Пoлкoвник Кoмитeтa нaциoнaльнoй бeзoпacнocти (КHБ) Кaзaxcтaнa Aзaмaт Ибpaeв нaйд 105 (1.471): cooбщaлocь (0.102) yкpaинcкaя (0.071) yкpaинcкиe (0.067) гeнepaл (0.067) гoдa (0.063) зaмecтитeль (0.053) дoнeцкa (0.053) oбcтpeлa (0.053) 2022 (0.053) пepeдaeт (0.052) 105 (1.471): poccийcкoй (−0.068) cooбщaeт (−0.063) ccылкoй (−0.060) paмкax (−0.057) caйтe (−0.055) тexникa (−0.053) нeбeнзя (−0.049) млн (−0.048) aкции (−0.047) cмoтpитe (−0.047) Doc 220 (0.095) Ceгoдня paзвeнчaн eщe oдин фeйк. A имeннo тo, чтo гeнepaллeйтeнaнт Boopyжeнныx

Appendix 1: Full List of Topics Extracted from 2,838 Russian Media …

401

Doc 1471 (0.094) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 1466 (0.094) Mиниcтp инocтpaнныx дeл Укpaины Дмитpий Кyлeбa зaявил в интepвью Bloomberg TV, ч Doc 2103 (−0.116) Этoт пoдкacт paньшe выxoдил нa «Meдyзe», a ceйчac eгo выпycкaeт cтyдия «Texникa Doc 2104 (−0.112) Этoт пoдкacт выпycкaeт cтyдия «Texникa peчи». Bы мoжeтe пocлyшaть eгo нa caйтe c Doc 1484 (−0.089) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь 106 (1.469): влaдимиpy (0.071) мaя (0.065) гoвopитcя (0.060) кoтopoe (0.054) минoбopoны (0.053) aпpeля (0.052) мид (0.052) oпyбликoвaлo (0.050) coглaшeния (0.050) пocoл (0.050) 106 (1.469): цитиpyeт (−0.079) cтopoнa (−0.066) пpизвaл (−0.065) cooбщaлocь (−0.060) дoбaвил (−0.054) инocтpaнныx (−0.051) кaнaлe (−0.050) зaпaдныx (−0.049) диaлoгa (−0.047) члeнoв (−0.045) Doc 2251 (0.094) «Зaбыли aмepикaнcкиe жypнaлиcты, чтo «плaн дeйcтвий нa пoлe бoя» yжe пyбликoвaли Doc 1019 (0.093) Члeн кoмитeтa Гocyдapcтвeннoй дyмы пo тpyдy, coциaльнoй пoлитикe и дeлaм вeтepaн Doc 2253 (0.089) Oб этoм гoвopитcя в Twitter CBS.20 фeвpaля в poccийcкoм MИД зaявили, чтo Лoндoн Doc 1791 (−0.085) B цeнтpe Дoнeцкa в peзyльтaтe взpывa paкeты пoгибли 20 чeлoвeк и eщe 28 пoлyчили Doc 104 (−0.082) O тoм, чтo poccийcкиe вoeнныe пpинимaют вce вoзмoжныe мepы для coxpaнeния жизни Doc 1312 (−0.067) Boeнный экcпepт, пoлкoвник Глaвнoгo paзвeдывaтeльнoгo yпpaвлeния (ГPУ) Гeнштaбa 107 (1.466): yкpaинcкиe (0.075) эфиpe (0.066) цитиpyeт (0.055) пишeт (0.054) тeлeкaнaлa (0.054) зaявили (0.053) oбopoны (0.052) кaчecтвe (0.049) 16 (0.047) члeнoв (0.047) 107 (1.466): cитyaции (−0.073) xoдe (−0.060) пpecc (−0.055) дpyгиx (−0.054) тpaнcляцию (−0.051) eвpoпы (−0.050) cpeди (−0.050) cooбщaeт (−0.049) инocтpaнныx (−0.049) cooбщилa (−0.048) Doc 1457 (0.144) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь Doc 1484 (0.144) Boзгopaниe нa Плoщaди Иcкyccтв в цeнтpe CaнктПeтepбypгa yтpoм 16 мaя oкaзaлocь

402

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Doc 2251 (0.078) «Зaбыли aмepикaнcкиe жypнaлиcты, чтo «плaн дeйcтвий нa пoлe бoя» yжe пyбликoвaли Doc 2368 (−0.088) «BШЭ гoтoвa пpинять нa yчёбy иcключённыx из зaпaдныx yнивepcитeтoв poccийcкиx cт Doc 328 (−0.073) Дмитpий Caймc бeceдyeт c миниcтpoм инocтpaнныx дeл Poccии Cepгeeм Лaвpoвым o внe Doc 2406 (−0.066) «Heбoльшoe yтoчнeниe: «Toчкa-У» нecлa кacceтный зapяд, зaпpeщённый, кaк мы знaeм

Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook Code Snippets Third-party open-source code to generate list of top documents per topic and top terms (words) per topic can be found at https://sandialabs.github.io/repo/#/sandia labs/hitmix. Code to generate per-topic, per-news source chart as in Fig. 7.6:

Appendix 2: Jupyter Notebook Code Snippets

403

Code to generate per-topic, per-week chart as in Fig. 7.7:

Third-party open-source code to generate adjacency matrix for outlier analysis (Sect. 7.5.2), and to threshold adjacency matrix to leave just top pairwise similarities, can be found at https://sandialabs.github.io/repo/#/sandialabs/hitmix.

404

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Code to generate heatmap with dendrogram:

Appendix 3: Russian Stopwords Used for Keyness Analysis

405

Appendix 3: Russian Stopwords Used for Keyness Analysis Before tokenizing the articles and conducting any analysis, a generic list of Russian stopwords was removed. In addition, all instances of the Cyrillic character ё were replaced with e to standardize the articles (as some outlets use the first character and some use the second). pronoun: basic: – [я, мeня, мнe, мнoй, ты, тeбя, тeбe, тoбoй, oн, oнo, eмy, eгo, им, нeм, нём, oнa, eё, eй, eю, нeй, мы, нac, нaм, нaми, вы, вac, вaм, вaми, oни, иx, им, ими, ниx] possessive: – [мoй, мoя, мoe, мoи, нaш, нaшa, нaшe, нaши, eгo, ee, eё, иx, cвoй, cвoя, cвoиx, cвoи, cвoими, cвoeй, cвoeгo] interrogative: – [кaк, кaкoй, кaкaя, кaкиe, кaкoe, кoтopый, кoтopaя, кoтopoe, кoтopыe, чeй, чья, чьи, чьиx, кaкoгo, кoтopoгo, чьeгo, кaкoмy, кoтopoмy, чьeмy, кaким, кoтopым, чьим, кaкoм, кoтopoм, чьём, чьeм, ктo, чтo, кoгo, чeгo, кoмy, чeмy, кoгo, чтo, кeм, чeм, кoм, чём, чья, cкoлькo, cкoлькиx, cкoльким, cкoлькими, cкoлькиx] verb: basic: – [ecть, был, былa, были, бyдy, бyдyт, бyдeт] modal: – [мoгy, мoжeт, мoгyт, мoг, мoглa, мoгли, мoглo, мoчь, cмoг, cмoгy, cмoглa, cмoгyт, cмoгли, cмoжeт, дoлжны, дoлжнa, дoлжнo, дoлжeн] reporting: – [гoвopю, гoвopит, гoвopят, гoвopили, гoвopил, гoвopилa, гoвopить, cкaзaть, cкaзaл, cкaзaлa, cкaзaли, cкaжy, cкaжeт, cкaжyт, cooбщaeт, cooбщaют, cooбщaт, cooбщит, cooбщaю, cooбщил, cooбщилa, cooбщили, cooбщилo, cooбщy, cooбщит, cooбщaт, cooбщaть, инфopмиpyeт, инфopмиpyют, инфopмиpoвaл, инфopмиpoвaлa, инфopмиpoвaлo, пpoинфopмиpoвaл, пpoинфopмиpoвaлo, пpoинфopмиpoвaлa, пpoинфopмиpoвaли, пpoинфopмиpyeт, пpoинфopмиpyют] conjunction: – [и, нo, ecли, или, пoтoмy, oднaкo, дa, a, либo, тoжe, тaкжe, чтoбы, чтoб, coглacнo, блaгoдapя, нecмoтpя, cлoвнo, тoчнo, бyдтo, дaжe, лишь] adverb: – [здecь, тaм, тyт, впepeд, нaзaд, мнoгo, мaлo, мeнee, бoлee, мeньшe, бoльшe] preposition:

406

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

– [в, бeз, дo, из, к, нa, пo, o, oт, пepeд, пpи, чepeз, c, y, зa, нaд, oб, пoд, пpo, для, вo, кo, oкoлo, для, ввидy, нaпoдoбиe, вpoдe, нacчeт, нacчёт, вмecтo, вcлeдcтвиe, из-зa, вблизи, вглyбь, вдoль, вoзлe, oкoлo, вoкpyг, впepeди, пocлe, блaгoдapя, нecмoтpя, пpи] time: unit: – [минyт, минyтa, минyты, минyтy, чac, чaca, чacy, чacoв, ceкyндa, ceкyндy, ceкyнды, ceкyнд, гoд, гoдa, гoдy, yтpo, yтpa, вeчep, вeчepa] month: – [янвapь, фeвpaль, мapт, aпpeль, мaй, июнь, июль, aвгycт, ceнтябpь, oктябpь, нoябpь, дeкaбpь, янвapя, фeвpaля, мapтa, aпpeля, мaя, июня, июля, aвгycтa, ceнтябpя, oктябpя, нoябpя, дeкaбpя] day: – [пoнeдeльник, втopник, cpeдa, чeтвepг, пятницa, cyббoтa, вocкpeceньe] number: cardinal: – [oдин, двa, тpи, чeтыpe, пять, шecть, ceмь, вoceмь, дeвять, oднoгo, двyx, тpex, чeтыpex, пяти, шecти, ceми, вocьми, дeвяти, дecяти, oднoмy, двyм, тpeм, чeтыpeм, пяти, шecти, ceми, вocьми, дeвяти, дecяти, oдним, двyмя, тpeмя, чeтыpьмя, пятью, шecтью, ceмью, вoceмью, дeвятью, дecятью, oднoм, двyx, тpex, чeтыpex, пяти, шecти, ceми, вocьми, дeвяти, дecяти] #ordinal: # - [пepвый, втopoй, тpeтий, чeтвepтый, пятый, шecтoй, ceдьмoй, вocьмoй, дeвятый, дecятый, пepвoгo, втopoгo, тpeтьeгo, чeтвepтoгo, пятoгo, шecтoгo, ceдьмoгo, вocьмoгo, дeвятoгo, дecятoгo, пepвoмy, втopoмy, тpeтьeмy, чeтвepтoмy, пятoмy, шecтoмy, ceдьмoмy, вocьмoмy, дeвятoмy, дecятoмy, пepвым, втopым, тpeтьим, чeтвepтым, пятым, шecтым, ceдьмым, вocьмым, дeвятым, дecятым, пepвoм, втopoм, тpeтьeм, чeтвeтpoм, пятoм, шecтoм, ceдьмoм, вocьмoм, дeвятoм, дecятoм]

Additional stopwords selected based on review of first pass at Keyness analysis: "pиa", "rt", "мeдyз*", "oнлaйн", "этo", "ли", "the", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9", "a", "вoт", "eщo", "был", "былo", "былa", "yжe", "пoдкacт", "ютьюб-кaнaл", "тыc"

For analysis of the data over time (Sect. 7.6), we excluded additional stopwords— wordforms of the Russian names of months: "янвap*", "фeвpaл*", "мapт", "мapтa", "aпpeль", "aпpeля", "мaя", "мaй", "дeкaбpь", "дeкaбpя", "июнь", "июня", "июль", "июля", "aвгycт", "aвгycтa", "ceнтябpь", "ceнтябpя", "oктябpь", "oктябpя", "нoябpь", "нoябpя"

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

407

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts by Half-Month

Ukraine украине Russia россии Ukraine украины special operations спецоперации Ukrainian украинских DPR днр Vladimir владимир LPR лнр Donbass донбасса military военной operation операции head глава president президент Armed Forces of Ukraine всу folk народной peaceful мирных UN оон Zelensky зеленский declared заявил residents жителей dog пса Holmes холмс military exercise скшу goat (also derogatory term) козла Kazakhstan's national security committee кнб Vlad влад Ryabkov рябков Kassym-Jomart касым-жомарт TU-142 ту-142 goat (also derogatory term) козел a4 а4 Nazarbayev назарбаева Mishchenko мищенко Kazakhstan казахстан tiger тигра tiger тигр riots беспорядков Tokaev токаев Kazakhstan казахстане Kazakhstan казахстана -100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Fig. 7.26 Keyness analysis of January 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

408

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Russia_Vladimir president_Russia military_special operation against_Russia Putin_declared civilians solution_carrying out answer_request request_help help_chapters conducting_military Vladimir_Zelensky Vladimir_Putin head_LPR military_operation protection_Donbass accepted_solution declared_accepted special operations_protection Ukraine_Vladimir with_studio collective_security km/hr nord_stream price_gas tiger_Amur average_score exceed_speed give_food main_director Zhambyl_region Lord_of_the_Rings president_Kazakhstan wild_Arman security_kazakhstan thousand rubles Power of the Dog (film) mangystau_region Kazakhstan_Kassym-Jomart Kassym-Jomart_Tokaev -20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Fig. 7.27 Keyness analysis of January 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

409

Russia россии Ukraine украины DPR днр declared заявил Ukraine украину LPR лнр European Union ес Ukrainian украинских Ukraine украине Russian российских head глава Russian российские Armed Forces of Ukraine всу regions области Ministry of Foreign Affairs мид UN оон Donbass донбасса Russian Federation рф Ukrainian украинские with со found найден Kazakhstan казахстан Italy италии best лучших game игра drama драма authority власть returned вернулся years лет Russians россиян fine штраф want хочется Tolkien толкину r(oubles) р Nur-Sultan нур-султане peacekeeping миротворческие riots беспорядков colonel полковник Kazakhstan казахстана Kazakhstan казахстане -20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Fig. 7.28 Keyness analysis of January 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

410

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Russia_Ukraine Ministry of Defense_Russia Russian_military Putin_declared Russia_Ukraine between_Russia big_game16 DPR_LPR sanctions_against Russian Federation_Ukraine Russia_Ukraine day_Meduza day_wars Rostov_region Russia_not Russia_Ukraine wars_photos RIA_news channel_1 declared_Ukraine and_listen and_today and_a game a4_author youtube_series Theranos_Elizabeth tesla_sold telegraph_younger SRF_Finland Covid-19_citizens avgvst_more Russian_army don't_be nuclear_war never Ukraine_Ukrainian Tolkien_years Nur-Sultan_found peacekeeping_force Kazakhstan_peacekeeping -5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Fig. 7.29 Keyness analysis of January 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

411

special operations спецоперации Ministry of Defense_ минобороны military военной residents жителей LPR лнр Ukrainian украинских peaceful мирных DPR днр Putin путин Russian Federation рф Ukrainian украинские Vladimir владимир head глав request просьбу conducting проведении Mariupol мариуполя protection защите Russian российских accepted принял help помощи number численности Yangulbayeva янгулбаева ice hole проруби ablyazov аблязов Sony sony manicure маникюр Channel 1 пк Halsey halsey age возраст Apple apple mother мать PACE пасе Muraev мураев girls девочки Goldberg голдберг USA сша Microsoftmicrosoft dog собак omicron омикрон Poroshenko порошенко -100

0

100

200

300

400

500

Fig. 7.30 Keyness analysis of January 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

412

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

military_special operation solution_carrying out Vladimir_Putin answer_request request_help help_chapters civilians conducting_military head_LPR protection_Donbass declared_accepted accepted_solution special operations_protection Russia_Vladimir gazeta.ru_leads Donbass_reply military_operation special operations_Ukraine special_military president_Russia military_presence united_forces guarantees_security operator_gas transit system evgeny_muraev secretary of state_USA all_dead stray_dogs Ukraine_accepted embassies_kiev Ukraine_Pyotr Petra_Poroshenko gas transmission system_Ukraine million_cubic meters Normandy_Four pro-Russian_leader Novgorod_Region mother_child Peter_Poroshenko average_age -40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Fig. 7.31 Keyness analysis of January 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

413

Ministry of Defense_ минобороны war войны negotiation переговоры military военных Russian российские day день European Union ес DPR днр Ukraine украине Russian российских Russian Federation рф Mariupol мариуполе Azovstal азовстали special operations спецоперации Armed Forces вс Russia россии Bucha буче Ministry of Foreign Affairs мид Ukrainian украинских Mariupol мариуполя leader лидером Boris борис family семьи general_ генерал and а new нового meeting заседания Left вышел evacuate эвакуировать regions регионы pro-Russian пророссийским exceeded превысил rights прав omicron омикрон eastern восточную judge судьи throws over перебрасывает Muraev мураев Johnson джонсон Poroshenko порошенко -10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Fig. 7.32 Keyness analysis of January 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

414

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Ministry of Defense_Russia Ministry of Defense_Russian Federation from_sides Russia_Ukraine civilians against_Russia news_release DPR_LPR Russian_military head of Foreign Affairs Armed Forces_Russia Ukrainian_military special operations_Ukraine Sergey_Lavrov situations_Ukraine Russian_military big_game16 negotiations_Russia participant_pussy Ukrainian_delegation Muraev_declared Minsk_Agreements additional_forces diplomats_Ukraine head_LPR general_Armed Forces of Ukraine left_trailer enter_compound military_service influence_USA evening_Meduza Boris_Johnson fugitive_banker banker_Ablyazov Ukrainian_general pro-Russian_leader exceeded_rubles NATO_throws over leader_Muraev eastern_Europe -5

0

5

10

15

20

Fig. 7.33 Keyness analysis of January 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

415

special operations спецоперации Ukraine украине Ministry of Defense_ минобороны Ukrainian украинских conducting проведении peaceful мирных sanctions санкций residents жителей military военной regions области operation операции special специальной Russian российских head глав Mariupol мариуполя solution решение help помощи Mariupol мариуполе gazeta.ru газета.ru request просьбу VTS втс Aishat айшат lurk lurk membership членства Zhirinovsky жириновский Liz лиз Saprykina сапрыкина deaf глухим THAAD thaad dumb немого to like нравится regulations постановления Valieva валиева NATO нато Turkmenistan туркменистана beauty красавица Ukraine украину Cecile сесиль Truss трасс Prystaiko пристайко -100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

Fig. 7.34 Keyness analysis of February 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

416

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

military_special operation solution_carrying out answer_request request_help help_chapters civilians accepted_solution conducting_military head_LPR protection_Donbass declared_accepted special operations_protection gazeta.ru_leads against_Russia Donbass_reply special operations_Ukraine special_military diplomatic_relations Putin_declared military_operation allied_determination Kamila_Valieva invasion_Russia avoid_war Russia_Ukraine Vienna_Document Liz_Truss membership_NATO private jets endure_beauty conversation_dumb like_tolerate like_not Great Britain_Vadim draft_resolution Ukraine_UK don't_like dumb_deaf NATO_for the sake of Vadim_Pristaiko -40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

Fig. 7.35 Keyness analysis of February 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

417

Ministry of Defense_ минобороны Ukrainian украинских Russian российских negotiation переговоры Ukraine украине Russian Federation рф negotiations переговоров declared заявил Mariupol мариуполе Azovstal азовстали military военных special operations спецоперации Armed Forces of Ukraine всу Bucha буче regions области day день Mariupol мариуполя DPR днр peaceful мирных issue выпуск leave покидают Invasion вторжении Zhirinovsky жириновского Invasion вторжения Macron макрона love любви Beijing пекине medal медаль Kamila камила unity единения won выиграли Valieva валиева explained объяснила Putin путина NATO нато Zelensky зеленский Ukraine украину words слова membership членстве Truss трасс -20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Fig. 7.36 Keyness analysis of February 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

418

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Ministry of Defense_Russia Ministry of Defense_Russian Federation civilians news_release Russian_military Armed Forces_Russia Ukrainian_military special operations_Ukraine Sergey_Lavrov Putin_declared nuclear_weapons chronicle_main Kherson_region Ukraine_European Union Ukraine_Putin countries_EU Security_Council Russian Federation_said Russian_gas Russian-Ukrainian_negotiations Kadyrov_addressed love_story Zelensky_gave declared_Zelensky Zarema_Musayeva day_unity two_weeks invasion_Russia all_countries time_clowning first_history Victoria_Sinicina wars_Russia Russia_Ukraine membership_NATO against_Ukraine Kamila_Valieva possibilities_failure Britain_Truss Ministry of Foreign Affairs_Britain -5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Fig. 7.37 Keyness analysis of February 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

419

gas газа Mariupol мариуполе Bucha буче Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб edition издание oil нефти victory победы company компании Poroshenko порошенко covid-19 covid-19 company компания supply поставок thousand тыс USA сша work работы diplomats дипломатов Moscow москве interview интервью Azovstal азовсталь Azovstal азовстали Donetsk донецкой Southern Military District юво Pripyat припять recognize признать Belarusian-Ukrainian белорусскоукраинской independence независимость Budapest будапештского Vladimir владимир Memorandum меморандума Gomel гомельской recognition признании recognition признание Ukraine украины FSB фсб Independence независимости republics республик self-proclaimed самопровозглашенных Rostov ростовской LPR лнр DPR днр -50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Fig. 7.38 Keyness analysis of February 16th–28th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

420

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

military_technology humanitarian_corridors Ukraine_answer Kyiv_region wars_Ukraine Kharkiv_region don't_be le Pen allies_gazeta.ru conducts_chronicles criminal_case event_chronicle collective_security life_force high-precision_missiles Russia_Dmitry president_USA civilians thousand rubles that_moment Vladimir_Medinsky near_river solution_membership head_assistant Denis_Pushilin assistant to the President Donetsk_Luhansk people's_Republics head_factions Belarusian-Ukrainian_border residents_Donbass self-proclaimed_Donetsk recognition_independence Budapest_Memorandum Gomel_region FSB_Russia recognize_independence Security_Council Rostov_region DPR_LPR -50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Fig. 7.39 Keyness analysis of February 16th–28th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

421

Moscow москве Mariupol мариуполе Azovstal азовстали USA сша Bucha буче more еще Lukashenko лукашенко victory победы Russians россиян Kremlin кремле years лет not не Mariupol мариуполя told рассказала war войны issue выпуск residents жителей court суд new новый no нет nuclear ядерного action действий beginning начало European Council ек meeting заседание accept принять Nebenzya небензя recognition признании BMP (infantry fighting vehicle) бмп Rostov ростовской delegation делегации recognition признание negotiation переговоры extraordinary внеочередное negotiations переговоров Independence независимости DPR днр Putin путин Ukraine украины LPR лнр -20

0

20

40

60

80

100

Fig. 7.40 Keyness analysis of February 16th–28th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

422

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

civilians news_release day_wars wars_photos channel_1 nuclear_war ex-deputy_parliament economy_Russia evacuation_civilians membership_NATO part_parade would like departure_Russia level_terrorist Ukraine_Ukraine Ukraine_issue Ukrainian_side Ukrainian_radicals Ukrainian_cities Ukrainian_drone recognition_independence European Council_background der_Leyen delegations_Ukraine Gomel_region security_Russia nuclear_weapons Ukrainian_tank(s) Security_Council start_negotiations negotiation_between independence_DPR recognition_independence extraordinary_meeting introduction_of_Ukraine Rostov_region Putin_declared Russia_Ukraine Ukraine_EU DPR_LPR -20

0

20

40

60

80

100

Fig. 7.41 Keyness analysis of February 16th–28th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

423

opinion мнению security безопасности NATO нато USA сша noted отметил Germany германии belives считает Bucha буче FSB фсб Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб USSR ссср Poroshenko порошенко gas газа politicians политики regions области nothing ничего Ukraine украина diplomats дипломатов covid-19 covid-19 Moscow москва sounds звуки negotiations переговоров peaceful мирных zh (letter) ж Belgorod белгород tactical тактической Belovezhskaya беловежской silence тишины sum сум mм Kharkiv харькова legion легион rocket ракета Tochka точка humanitarian гуманитарные corridors коридоры round раунд Kaluga калужских humanitarian гуманитарных corridors коридоров -100

0

100

200

300

400

500

Fig. 7.42 Keyness analysis of March 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

424

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

nothing that_same thus Ministry of Foreign Affairs_Russia Russia_Ukraine settlement Kharkiv_region national_security in addition president_Russian Federation same_time invasion_Russia not_this declared_Russia invasion_Ukraine that_time first_all criminal code_Russian Federation great_domestic sides_USA twitter_sounds tactical_complex creation_humanitarian cluster_bomb international_Legion sounds of fish twitter_author conducts_online broadcasting government_republic humanitarian_response civilians peaceful_citizens no_war people's_militia center_Donetsk ceasefire third_round round_negotiations humanitarian_corridors humanitarian_corridors -50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Fig. 7.43 Keyness analysis of March 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

425

NATO нато regions области head глава USA сша Azovstal азовстали told рассказал military военных Bucha буче security безопасности not не urged призвал called назвал declared заявили situation ситуации rubles рублей Lukashenko лукашенко victory победы Russians россиян president президент Kremlin кремле Kharkiv харькова spent провел died погибли rocket ракеты member члена Luhansk луганске negotiations переговоров Ukrainian украинской cities городов corridors коридоры Donetsk донецку humanitarian гуманитарные third третий Tochka Missile System точка-у Tochka точка silence тишины corridors коридоров humanitarian гуманитарных round раунд Donetsk донецке -10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Fig. 7.44 Keyness analysis of March 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

426

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

DPR_declared head of Foreign Affairs Ukrainian_military nuclear_weapons chronicle_main Kherson_region Ukraine_Zelensky Ukraine_European Union Ukraine_head Ukraine_declared thousand_people Security_Council Investigative Committee_Russia in fact Russian Federation_UN Russian Federation_said Russian_gas Russia_destroyed reporting_Meduza recognition_independence European Union_USA discredit_armed prepare_provocation burst (into) broadcast military personnel_time authorities_DPR smartly_answered Blinken_declared Russia_Ukraine round_Russian-Ukrainian United_Russia Russian_military Ukrainian_cities rocket_point-u head_European council humanitarian_corridors ceasefire round_negotiations humanitarian_corridors third_round -10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Fig. 7.45 Keyness analysis of March 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

427

Ukraine украину security безопасности NATO нато Ukraine украины USA сша DPR днр Bucha буче Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб victory победы Poroshenko порошенко forces силы troops войска defense обороны end конце last последние Rostov ростовской Donbass донбассе self-proclaimed самопровозглашенных mother мать Zelensky зеленский Shergova шергова poisoning отравлении Oscar оскар chronicle хронику drugs препараты poisonous ядовитых energy efficiency энергоэффективности OECD оэср Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists оун friend друзенко deaths умеров Bellingcat bellingcat Timchenko тимченко language языка meta meta Gregory грегори Aliexpress aliexpress prisoners пленными Olmez ольмезов Romanchenko романченко -50

0

50

100

150

200

Fig. 7.46 Keyness analysis of March 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

428

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Rostov_region national_security civilians Kharkiv_region Ministry of Foreign Affairs_Russia Russia_Ukraine DPR_LPR and_also Russian_troops Security_Council military_technology Donetsk_people defense_Ukraine became_known Russia_Sergey Minsk_Agreements not_all all_same nothing Ukrainian_military factory_Sumykhimprom Gennady_Timchenko yandex_go committee_Russia Ukrainian_nationalists premier_Russia participants_negotiations event_chronicle cruel_appeals introduced_gazeta.ru Boris_romanchenko conducts_chronicles Chinese_language meta_extremist Putin_accepted Ukraine_introduced Russia_military position_Ukraine Konstantin_Olmez Facebook_Instagram -20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Fig. 7.47 Keyness analysis of March 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

429

Putin путин LPR лнр regions области USA сша Ukraine украины told рассказал declared заявил DPR днр Ukraine украина Ministry of Defense_ минобороны Azovstal азовстали Bucha буче European Union ес Ukraine украину Zelensky зеленский why почему declared заявила Russia россией military военных Lukashenko лукашенко Ramzan рамзан national battalions нацбатов peace мирному movie кино Dmitry дмитрия survive выжить messages сообщения Russian российскими meta meta participants участников city городе court суд Kremlin кремле Japan японией prisoners пленных rally митинга Ministry of Digital Development минцифры treaty договору landing десантный Bellingcat bellingcat -10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Fig. 7.48 Keyness analysis of March 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

430

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Ministry of Defense_Russia DPR_LPR DPR_declared LPR_DPR Putin_declared chronicle_main Kherson_region Ukraine_Zelensky Ukraine_European Union Ukraine_head Ukraine_Putin thousand_people Security_Council Russian Federation_UN Russia_destroyed Russia_show recognition_independence not_yet negotiation_Russia negotiations_between peace_powerlifting Mariupol_fully control_DPR colonies_cause kadyrov_met interview_Zelensky journalist_Dmitry Dmitry_Gordon directors_Novatek acts_reproductive city_Sumy militants_national battalions Andrei_Mordvich Azov_Mariupol Ramzan_Kadyrov Kremlin_commented peace_treaty Kremlin_rated landing_ship Facebook_Instagram -5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Fig. 7.49 Keyness analysis of March 16th–31st (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

431

Ukraine украины USA сша NATO нато Ukraine украина Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб Ukraine украину Kazakhstan казахстана Kyiv киеве conflict конфликта delegation делегации security безопасности Truss трасс meeting заседании Poroshenko порошенко invasion вторжение Kazakhstan казахстане source источник evacuation эвакуации FSB фсб recognition признание launchers пусковые production постановка Orban орбан provocation провокацией parliamentary парламентских Ukrainian Orthodox Church упц murders убийствах peaceful мирных Nehammer (Austrian chancellor) нехаммера EBRD ебрр Austria австрии yellow желтый city городе S-300 с-300 obi obi Kyiv киевской Serbia сербии Bucha буча Bucha бучи Bucha буче -100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Fig. 7.50 Keyness analysis of April 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

432

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

DPR_LPR Russia_Ukraine minister_defense Rostov_region invasion_Russia territory_Ukraine supreme_happy between_Russia round_negotiations Vladimir_Medinsky declared_Ukraine Minsk_Agreements great_domestic national_security thousand_rubles each other Ukrainian_delegation Ukrainian_army Ukraine_Aleksey president_Ukraine parliamentary_elections alleged_murder regime_allegedly refuted_accusations UN_connections accusations_with Anatoly_Fedoruk terrorist_danger Donetsk_region Security Council_UN leaving_Russians level_terrorist Russian_military launchers_installations war_crimes yellow_level murder_peaceful civilians Kyiv_region city_Bucha -50

0

50

100

150

200

Fig. 7.51 Keyness analysis of April 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

433

Ukraine украины Putin путин Ukraine украину NATO нато negotiations переговоров Donbass донбасса between между USA сша declared заявила FSB фсб victory победы DPR днр known известно Britain британии declared заявили Ukrainian украинских big большая Kyiv киеве prelude вступление Zelensky зеленского danger опасности chancellor канцлер laurels лавров ex-deputy экс-депутат assault штурма advertising рекламой hold проведет Nehammer (Austrian chancellor) нехаммера offensive наступлении air traffic авиасообщение countries странами continue продолжать terrorist террористической Basurin басурин Kyiv киевом Bucha буча Bucha бучи S-300 с-300 Austria австрии Bucha буче -20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Fig. 7.52 Keyness analysis of April 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

434

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Russia_Ukraine Ministry of Defense_Russia Ukrainian_military LPR_DPR Putin_declared Russia_Ukraine between_Russia big_game16 DPR_LPR negotiations_Russia Russian Federation_Ukraine participant_pussy Ukrainian_delegation Ukrainian_tank(s) criminal_case USA_NATO USA_declared became_known special_operation Security_Council group_first city_Bucha Prosecutor General's Office_Russian Federation high_level second_round meeting_Putin war_forty resumes_air traffic Alexander_Vucic austria_karl air traffic_countries residents_Bucha ex-deputy_parliament level_terrorist Ukraine_issue social_advertising Russia_calls chancellor_austria Kharkiv_region terrorist_danger -10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Fig. 7.53 Keyness analysis of April 1st–15th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

435

Ukraine украины not не NATO нато negotiations переговоров security безопасности Zelensky зеленский Ministry of Foreign Affairs мид armed вооруженных Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб Poroshenko порошенко Russia россией Kazakhstan казахстана Ukraine украине European Union ес forces сил nationalists националисты republic республики Kyiv киева city городе representative представитель cash наличную irrevocable безвозвратные mask маск links ссылки Lloyd ллойд currency валюту Jacob яков Kurds курдов exchange обменять lead вести Austin остин Blinken блинкен M113 Tank м113а3 Kurdistan курдистана Trubnikov трубников Avaev аваев Depp депп CSKA Moscow цска RPK (machine gun) рпк (Amber) Heard херд -100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

Fig. 7.54 Keyness analysis of April 16th–30th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

436

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

armed_forces Security_Council Vladimir_Zelensky DPR_LPR Ukraine_Vladimir president_Ukraine humanitarian_corridors Rostov_region cites_ria Russian_troops Donetsk_people president_Russia not_so it's_about defense_Ukraine western_media josep_Borrell Russia_Ukraine president_Vladimir servant of the people Odessa_Sumy Nikolaev_Odessa Zaporozhye_Nikolaev pressure_Zelensky Avidzba_declared ns_wp a number of countries Ukraine_start Lloyd_Austin cruiser_Moskva missing_news introduced_against le Pen cash_currency irretrievable_losses Russian Federation_diplomatic Russia_sanctions tore apart_Russian Federation countries_introduced relationship series -20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Fig. 7.55 Keyness analysis of April 16th–30th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

437

Ukraine украины negotiation переговоры Ukraine украине negotiations переговоров NATO нато LPR лнр Putin путин Zelensky зеленский security безопасности European Union ес country страны all все Russia россией Putin путина and а UN оон called назвали situation ситуации Ukrainian украинский time время Sobyanin собянин Austin остин Medvedchuk медведчука ammunition боеприпасы belives считает staff сотрудников economy экономики published опубликовало CSKA Moscow цска Trubnikov трубников foreign agent иноагентом Ilyich ильича resumed возобновила external внешней Washington вашингтон Bryansk брянске factory завода secretary of state госсекретарь Antonov антонов Vyacheslav вячеслав -20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Fig. 7.56 Keyness analysis of April 16th–30th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

438

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

Russia_Ukraine DPR_LPR Russian_military head of Foreign Affairs special operations_Ukraine situations_Ukraine Russia_Ukraine between_Russia Vladimir_Putin time_will_tell16 negotiations_Russia Rostov_region Russia_Ukraine nuclear_war ex-deputy_parliament sixth_day membership_NATO part_parade would like von_der director_services citizens_banks high-precision_missiles extradition_links military_detained foreign_intelligence Vladimir_Solovyov Victor_Medvedchuk taking_control Bryansk_happened British_mercenaries Bridget_brink died_people start_special operations secretary of state_USA economy_Russia Vyacheslav_Trubnikov elections_France first_published former_director -6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Fig. 7.57 Keyness analysis of April 16th–30th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

439

Ukraine украины Zelensky зеленский media сми Russia россией Ukraine украину LPR лнр allegedly якобы republics республик child ребенка DPR.Ukraine днр.украина Kyiv киеве ruble рубля case случае Poroshenko порошенко president президента universal всеобщей Truss трасс Instagram instagram Kazakhstan казахстане recognize признать domestic/patriotic отечественной Mcdonald's mcdonald's quoted цитирует islands острова square площади parade парада Sweden швеции summit саммита jury жюри regiment полк great великой oil нефти grain зерна Snake змеиный immortal бессмертный Finland финляндии Mcdonald's макдоналдс Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб Azovstal азовстали victory победы -50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Fig. 7.58 Keyness analysis of May 1st–16th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, single words

440

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine

DPR_LPR Ukraine_Vladimir president_Ukraine relations_Russia severed_diplomatic LPR_DPR.Ukraine DPR.Ukraine_tore apart Vladimir_Zelensky Russia_president universal_mobilization supreme_happy Security_Council Cabinet_legislation Zelensky_introduced extra_supreme bill_universal mobilization_gazeta.ru people's_Republics diplomatic_relations Donetsk_Luhansk help_Ukraine Azovstal_Mariupol wounded_Ukrainian victory_great place_new Italian_TV companies interview_Italian Anna_Ivanovna Kalush_orchestra military_technology patriotic_war life_force districts_concentration island_snake concentration_alive great_domestic victory_day military_force day_victories immortal_regiment -40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

Fig. 7.59 Keyness analysis of May 1st–16th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Bodies, all news sources, bigrams

Appendix 4: Time Relative Frequency Analyses: Full List of Charts …

441

Ukraine украины why почему Putin путина LPR лнр negotiations переговоров Bucha буче Ukraine украину and а told рассказали time время Russia россию Zelensky зеленский Kyiv киева Donbass донбасс Russia россией weapon оружие against против Kyiv киеве Zelensky зеленского Donbass донбассе wounded раненых Kyiv киеву Lukashenko лукашенко packet пакет grain зерна Yerevan ереване immortal бессмертного USA сша work работы shelf полка regiment полк Lithuania литве immortal бессмертный Armenia армении military военных part часть Snake змеиный Collective Security Treaty Organization одкб Azovstal азовстали victory победы -20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Fig. 7.60 Keyness analysis of May 1st–16th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, single words

442

7 Computational Analysis of Russian Media Narratives on the War in Ukraine DPR_LPR Russia_Ukraine LPR_DPR negotiations_Russia Russian_military Rostov_region declared_Ukraine head_DPR round_negotiations against_Russia Ukraine_EU situations_Ukraine Russian_army Ministry of Foreign Affairs_Britain DPR_Pushilin Russia_Ukraine between_Russia Japan_peaceful nuclear_status broadcast_first military_aid z_ chronicles situations_Ukraine part_parade Ukrainian_military strength_air defense Russia_shot down wounded_military missiles_onyx canceled_air island_snake years_work day_victory golden_state air_part Azovstal_Putin day_victories immortal_regiment military_azovstal immortal_regiment

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

Fig. 7.61 Keyness analysis of May 1st–16th (blue) vs rest of time (gray): Article Titles, all news sources, bigrams

References 1TV. 2022a. Mинoбopoны PФ cooбщилo o xoдe cпeциaльнoй вoeннoй oпepaции пo зaщитe ДHP и ЛHP, February 28. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2022a-02-28/422078minoborony_rf_soobschilo_o_hode_spetsialnoy_voennoy_operatsii_po_zaschite_dnr_i_lnr. ———. 2022b. Ha Укpaинe зaпycтили coциaльнyю peклaмy, cнятyю в cтилe зaпpeщeннoй ИГИЛ, April 11. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2022b-04-11/426170-na_ ukraine_zapustili_sotsialnuyu_reklamu_snyatuyu_v_stile_zapreschennoy_igil. ———. 2022c. Cocтoялocь зaceдaниe пapлaмeнтcкoй кoмиccии пo изyчeнию paбoты биoлaбopaтopий CШA нa Укpaинe, May 16. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.1tv.ru/ news/2022c-05-16/428937-sostoyalos_zasedanie_parlamentskoy_komissii_po_izucheniyu_ raboty_biolaboratoriy_ssha_na_ukraine. Beskow, David M., and Kathleen M. Carley. 2019. Social cybersecurity: An emerging national security requirement. Military Review, March–April: 118–127. Accessed August 17, 2021. https:// apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1108494.pdf. Cypгaнoвa, Eлизaвeтa. 2014. Гaлинa Tимчeнкo: «Hиктo из нac нe мeчтaeт дeлaть «Кoлoкoл». forbes.ru, September 15. Accessed June 14, 2022. https://www.forbes.ru/kompanii/internet-tel ekom-i-media/267611-galina-timchenko-nikto-iz-nas-ne-mechtaet-delat-kolokol.

References

443

Fox News. 2022. Tucker: The Pentagon is lying about bio labs in Ukraine, March 14. Accessed June 27, 2022. https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/tucker-the-pentagon-is-lying-about-bio-labs-inukraine. Gazeta. 2022a. B ДHP зaявили, чтo гeнштaб BCУ пoдгoтoвил плaн втopжeния нa тeppитopию Дoнбacca, February 14. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2022a/02/ 14/17288497.shtml. ———. 2022b. B Кpeмлe пpoкoммeнтиpoвaли cлoвa пocлa Укpaины Пpиcтaйкo o члeнcтвe в HATO, February 14. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022b/02/ 14/17287849.shtml. ———. 2022c. Глaвa MИД Бpитaнии Tpacc ycoмнилacь в cyвepeнитeтe Poccии нaд Pocтoвoм и Bopoнeжeм, February 10. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022c/ 02/10/17271625.shtml. ———. 2022d. Гyмштaб PФ: Укpaинa пoкa нe выпoлнилa ни oднoгo ycлoвия для oткpытия гyмaнитapныx кopидopoв, March 7. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/ news/2022d/03/07/17392615.shtml. ———. 2022e. Пyтин зaявил, чтo HATO «кинyл» Poccию, пooбeщaв нe pacшиpятьcя нa вocтoк, February 1. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022e/02/ 01/17225755.shtml. ———. 2022f. Пyтин oбъяcнил cвoи cлoвa oб Укpaинe и «кpacaвицe», February 10. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022f/02/10/17271871.shtml. ———. 2022g. CMИ yзнaли o плaнax Фpaнции эвaкyиpoвaть coтpyдникoв cвoeгo пocoльcтвa в Киeвe, January 24. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022g/01/ 24/17184985.shtml. ———. 2022h. Укpaинa oтpeaгиpoвaлa нa cooбщeния oб yничтoжeнии двyx БMП BCУ в Pocтoвcкoй oблacти, February 21. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/ 2022h/02/21/17323567.shtml. Meduza. 2022. Poccия ввeлa выcoкий ypoвeнь тeppopиcтичecкoй oпacнocти в peгиoнax, гpaничaщиx c Укpaинoй, April 11. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://meduza.io/news/2022/ 04/11/v-chetyreh-rossiyskih-regionah-granichaschih-s-ukrainoy-vveli-vysokiy-uroven-terror isticheskoy-opasnosti. RT. 2022. CBS зaявил, чтo poccийcкиe вoйcкa пoлyчили «пpикaз пpиcтyпить к втopжeнию» нa Укpaинy, February 20. Accessed June 17, 2022. https://russian.rt.com/world/news/965299rossiya-ukraina-napadenie.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Abstract This short chapter concludes ‘Digital Disinformation’ by recapitulating our thesis: in today’s world where there is a surfeit of open-source data, the best methods for making sense of that data are likely to be from the realm of unsupervised learning. To be effective in their mission, analysts of the information environment must also be grounded in cultural understanding, and in the case of Russia and its neighbors, there are distinct cultural factors that help explain contemporary data just as they have in generations past. But the Russian information environment is not monolithic; and voices on the ‘fringe’ in Russia give cause for hope that Russia is not locked into an inevitable negative spiral, and is not necessarily predetermined to be in conflict with the West. National salvation and a brighter future are possible, and a few voices ‘calling out in the wilderness’ show a simple (yet hard-to-grasp) way: accurately identifying the mistakes of the past and consciously turning away from them.

In thisbook, we have surveyed much data from the region of Russia and eastern Europe, and yet, of course, in the massive world of social media, we have only scratched the surface. We should also not be under any illusions: when collecting social media data, we are not collecting a representative sample of what a given population thinks. Still, even opinion polling is also subject to error and hidden bias. Collection and analysis of open-source online information has its place, and, again, to borrow from Richards Heuer, as long as we are aware of unavoidable biases and make them transparent, we are on a path to good, useful analysis. The methods of data collection, and particularly analysis, that we have described in this book are, we think, well-suited to the Heuerian vision of analysis. The signal processing and unsupervised learning which underlies the type of topic analysis and anomaly detection we describe, at its root, does no more than re-present the data in more summarized format, finding the statistically most important patterns and thereby helping the analyst see the forest for the trees, not getting sidetracked by statistically unimportant minutiae. There is little doubt that other analytical approaches, ones that would fit this bill equally well, are also available. Our goal has simply been to demonstrate, even with a limited analytical toolbox, what good analytics may look like in the Heuerian vision. We believe the goal should be to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7_8

445

446

8 Conclusion

avoid analytical approaches that make assumptions and biases opaque – something, unfortunately, we believe is often true of computational analysis used to understand the information environment. This same opacity, by the way, is why the problem often fails to be recognized, creating a potentially dangerous analytical blind spot. Our own imperfect analysis, which we are sure others will improve upon, nevertheless demonstrates some important things, consistent with our broader understanding of Russia. Disinformation is indeed rife, but is usually self-defeating. In the Russianlanguage information environment, it contributes in effect to an information vacuum. We see elsewhere, for example in the distinct Polish-language environment, and to a lesser extent in the Ukrainian-language environment, that calm, honest messaging can gain considerable traction in what would otherwise be an information vacuum. Calm reassurance does overcome fear, particularly when it can be shown to be factual. A problem in the Russian environment, however, is that it is precisely this type of communication which tends to be marginalized and silenced, often because it challenges Russian perceptions of the nation’s greatness, invincibility, etc. Our survey of the information environments in Russia and Belarus (in particular) versus their western neighbors reveals clear differences, and these can be traced back to cultural and historical factors. Wearing the mantle of a prophet might always be dangerous, but speaking inconvenient truths in Russia, even when these truths might be helpful to the nation’s interests, is perhaps particularly so. This might be cause for discouragement, but we are nevertheless optimistic. The very fact that, for example, our analytics reveal that there are independent voices in Russia (even if they are marginalized to a Russian fringe) demonstrates that Russia is even now not locked into an inescapable destiny defined by cultural determinism. Yes, we believe that the recurring errors that cause Russia to be what it is, distinctively, have become part of the DNA of the culture; but the fact that some Russian speakers accurately recognize what the problems are and are willing to face up to them, pride notwithstanding, shows what is possible for the nation. The current trajectory of Russia seems to spiral in one direction, the same direction as under the Tsars and the Soviets, and if the course is not changed, then Russia may indeed face worse disasters to come, with the West suffering collateral damage. For these, it would be as well to be prepared. But the trajectory can be changed at any moment. We maintain that the key for Russia, as for all of us, is accurately to identify the mistakes of the past and consciously turn away from them. In the meantime, we in the West can help by better understanding and being well-oriented in the Russian information environment, and lending support to those whose messaging has the potential to help both us and Russia itself.

Index

A Acceptance, 132, 212, 267 Activist(s), 157, 171, 176 Adjacency matrix, 279, 281, 282, 284, 287, 328, 403 (admitting) fault, 219 Aggression, 5, 100, 102, 123, 132, 147, 151, 219, 220, 228, 246 Akhmatova, Anna, 70 (Aleksandr) Dugin (Dugin), 40, 263 Algorithms, 2, 6, 52, 97, 233, 276, 280, 281, 284, 285, 290, 299 Aligned (vectors), 326 Alliance, 14, 91–93, 96, 121 Alternative viewpoints, 229 Ambitions (national, geopolitical), 86, 258 Amplification, 154, 178 Analysts, 8, 15, 77, 81, 132, 150, 153, 222, 227, 232, 233, 277, 289, 290, 295, 296 Analytical pipeline, 284, 289, 297, 307 Annexation, 7, 70, 72, 75, 77, 135, 257, 259, 296 Anomalies, 5, 63, 136, 252, 268, 275, 276, 286, 289, 290, 445 Anomalous, 70, 275–277, 279, 282, 284–290, 329, 330 (anomaly) detection, 275, 276, 445 Anti-Semitism, 10, 99, 255 Antonov, Anatoly, 323 Arab Spring, 259 Armed Forces of Ukraine (BCU), 110, 113, 114, 120, 309, 338 Asia, 27 Assassination, 217, 218, 345

Associations (of Ukraine with EU and NATO), 75, 77, 92, 95, 97 Astolphe-Louis-Léonor, marquis de Custine, 262 Astravets Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP), 215, 216 Asymmetric (measures), 213, 214 Audiences (Western vs. Russian), 59, 218, 225, 244, 246 Authoritarian, 16, 17, 29, 181 Authoritarianism, 4, 16, 17, 38, 49, 58 Autocracy, 18–20, 29, 30, 62, 229 Autocrat, 18, 30, 351

B Babel, Isaak, 10–12, 47, 63, 70 Backfire (actions of dictators), 100, 108, 124, 150 Baltic(s), 10, 51, 83, 94, 95, 105, 148, 206–230, 232–235, 240–246, 321 Baltic states, 4, 51, 206, 207, 216, 217, 224, 226, 227, 229, 230 Baptist, 38, 48, 58, 253 Belarus (Belarusb), 4, 13, 38, 41, 50, 51, 74, 76, 77, 83, 90, 93, 94, 96–98, 109, 113, 114, 132, 137, 138, 141–148, 150–152, 158–162, 166, 169, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192–194, 196, 198, 199, 206, 207, 209, 211, 212, 215–219, 225–229, 234–239, 243–245, 262, 264, 265, 338, 446 Belarus(ian) border, 132, 141, 142, 156, 165, 180, 181

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Chew et al., Digital Disinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28835-7

447

448 Belarusian(s), 83, 96, 98, 106, 132, 141, 142, 144–148, 150, 156, 159, 162–165, 176, 181, 197, 218, 219, 227, 244, 343 Believers, 255, 259, 260, 274 BEND, 230, 231 BEND framework, 64, 230, 231, 233, 350 Berlin Wall, 9, 32, 266 Beth-Togarmah, 253 Betrayal, 109, 111, 350 Bias, 18, 63, 244, 258, 266, 295, 445, 446 Bible, Biblical, 22, 251, 253–255, 259, 265, 267, 284, 289, 291 Bigrams, 338–340, 408, 410, 412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 422, 424, 426, 428, 430, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 442 Biolabs, 314, 350 Black box (analysis), 2, 154, 244, 290, 307 Black market, 35 Blaming (victims), 3, 10, 19, 59, 77, 162, 185 Blinken, Anthony, 113 Block(ing of foreign media), 31 Blok, Aleksandr, 258, 259 Bolshevik(s), 10, 12, 16, 34, 49–51, 62, 207 Border, 4, 60, 73, 74, 76–78, 91, 95, 96, 101, 106, 108–110, 115, 120, 132, 135–137, 140–142, 146–152, 155, 157, 160, 162–165, 167–170, 172–188, 190, 191, 194–199, 206, 216, 218, 219, 227, 228, 244, 296, 308, 309, 316–318, 342, 343, 346 (border) breach, 157, 179 Border crisis, 76, 109, 113, 114, 147, 149, 156, 157, 162, 163, 166, 168, 190 Bot(s), 154 Brezhnev, Leonid, 70 Britain, 22, 254, 318, 342 British, 18, 85, 118, 253, 255, 317, 318, 325, 342 Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, 213 Brotherhood of nations, 13, 260–262 Bucha, 339, 340, 346, 349, 350 Bucharest summit (NATO), 310 Budyonny, Semyon, 10 Bulgakov, Mikhail, 70 Bureaucracy, bureaucratic, 32, 45, 81 C Calling, 5, 20, 32, 56, 176, 257, 339 Capitalism, 31, 48, 50, 80 Capitol insurrection (of January 6, 2021), 252

Index Carlson, Tucker, 315 Caspian (Sea), 134, 255 Casualties, 5, 309, 339, 340, 349 Catholic, 27, 132, 136, 137, 251, 252, 261, 289 Central Asia, 10, 14, 262, 292 Ceuta and Melilla, 141 Chechen, 58, 218, 345 Chernenko, Konstantin, 70 Chernobyl, 215, 216 Chersonesus, 72, 73, 135 China, 36, 79, 81, 89 Chi-squared, 335 Christianity, 12, 13, 27 Christian(s), 14, 31, 58, 255, 258, 266, 267, 291 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 15, 94, 290 Citizens, 26, 30–32, 35, 37, 38, 43, 45, 47, 50, 60, 62, 78, 79, 92, 93, 96, 98, 114, 119, 137, 140, 142, 145, 147, 151, 160, 161, 166, 195, 218, 224, 227, 260, 262, 263, 313–315, 339 Civilization (Russian vs. Western), 31, 244 Clinton, Bill, 94 Clustering, 274–276, 284, 287, 288, 332 Cluster(s), 282, 284, 287–289, 300, 330 Cold War, 31, 132, 136, 266, 289 collaborative filtering, x collective farm(s), 143 Communicators, 32, 62, 94, 121–124, 166, 223, 225, 243, 245, 246 Communism, 4, 12, 15–17, 19, 20, 34, 37, 47, 136, 143, 292 Communist, 13, 15, 18, 19, 91, 136, 254, 261 Communist Party, 20, 52, 143 Computation, 3, 8, 52, 153, 284, 288, 301, 328 Computational analysis, 1, 3, 8, 446 Computational linguistics, 252, 266, 268, 269, 272–275 Computationally scalable, computational scalability, 3 Computational social models, 260 Conditions, 40, 78, 82, 86, 88, 104, 105, 107, 122, 260, 312 Confidence (of analysts in algorithms), 235, 302, 305 Conspiracy (theory/ies), 5, 23, 254, 314 Constitution (of Ukraine), 310

Index Corpus, corpora, 53, 54, 99–107, 110–120, 167–199, 235, 269, 270, 274, 275, 281, 335, 336 Corridors, 311–313, 344, 345, 350 Cosine (similarity), 153, 282, 326, 327, 332 Cossack(s), 10, 11 Coup, 51, 318, 319, 325, 350 COVID, 8, 216, 225, 226, 228, 230, 233, 234, 237, 238, 241, 242, 245, 375, 385 Crime, 22, 80, 164, 183, 195, 199, 218, 223, 262 Crimea (Krym), 7, 10, 12, 13, 16, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 95, 100, 108, 110, 120, 135, 188, 227, 228, 257, 258, 292, 296, 321 Crimean Tatars, 58 Criminal (liability under Russian law), 213, 227 "Crucified boy"(Russian fake), 162, 187, 225 Crude oil, 88 CT scan (analogy), 5, 284, 285, 296, 306 Cultish, 267 Cults, 252, 266–268, 274, 275, 277, 285 Cultural, 17, 18, 253 (cultural and legal) norms, 244 (cultural) conservatism, 132, 138 (cultural) determinism, 6, 18, 51, 62, 446 Culture(s), 2–6, 8, 11–13, 15–19, 22, 23, 31, 38, 51, 62, 63, 70, 72–77, 87, 88, 90, 96, 104, 109, 123, 124, 132, 133, 135–138, 149, 154, 165, 166, 213–215, 223, 227, 243, 244, 258, 259, 262, 264, 295, 446 cyber, 214, 217, 221–223, 229 Cyber attack(s), 213, 221, 222, 229, 233 Cybersecurity, 222, 275 Cynicism, 30, 61, 97, 101, 102, 107, 108, 111, 112, 116–119, 159, 164, 166, 175, 237, 239, 243, 245, 246, 262, 263, 313, 325, 326

D Database, 232, 297, 298 Data collection, 1, 314, 445 Debt (Soviet and Russian), 34, 49 Decembrist revolts, 40 Deflect, 62, 95, 141, 146 Deflection, 59, 60, 64, 77, 122 Democracy, 14, 106, 162, 165, 188, 199, 229, 252

449 Democratic, 4, 20, 60, 138, 140, 226, 228, 229, 290 Dendrogram, 279, 284–288, 329, 330, 404 Denial(s), 3, 16, 22, 143, 144, 165, 207, 313, 325, 349 Depp, Johnny, 347, 349 Destabilization, destabilizing, 108, 109, 214, 222, 223, 225, 229, 232, 245, 246 Destiny, 62, 254, 265, 446 Discourse, 62, 296, 349 Disinformation, 4, 5, 38, 40, 41, 52, 59, 64, 109, 115, 124, 142, 156, 159, 206, 211, 221, 225, 226, 230–233, 239, 244–246, 313, 323, 351, 446 Dissident, 4, 12, 14, 40, 62, 146, 218 Distinctive(ness), distinctive words, 264, 270, 272, 274, 276, 279, 288 Division(s), 18, 74, 94, 111, 146, 158, 160, 164, 181, 217 (Dmitry) Peskov (Peskov), 310, 311, 322, 323, 360–362, 364, 366, 368, 369, 385, 396 Document(s), 108, 139, 163, 185, 213, 269, 270, 272, 274, 276, 277, 279–282, 284, 287, 300, 302, 304, 306, 310, 315, 326, 335, 343, 347, 402 Donbass, 12, 13, 16, 60, 70, 77, 100, 114, 117, 296, 319, 341, 343, 344 Donetsk People’s Republic (dnr), 84, 193, 305, 319, 338, 343, 351, 354, 355, 383, 390, 391, 400 Double standard(s), 101, 183 Downstream (analytics), 232, 273, 274, 300 Drab(ness), 87 Duma, 93, 94, 114, 213, 315

E (early/advance) warning, 252, 289 Early 1990s (in the USSR and Russia), 4, 47, 51, 262 Eastern Ukraine, 16, 20, 95, 135, 225, 319, 338 East Slav(dom), 144, 150 Economics, 4, 42, 50, 80, 81, 88–90 Economy, 30, 32, 35, 41, 43, 49, 73, 81, 83, 92, 93, 107, 135, 228, 254 Edge weights, 281, 328, 329 Eisegesis, 266 Election(s), 111, 144, 145, 147, 150, 194, 226, 228, 229, 274 Enemies (of the Soviet regime), 12

450 Energy, 4, 15, 79, 88–90, 157, 178, 228 Engelking, Barbara, 143, 144 English, 52, 54–57, 73, 74, 99–107, 110–120, 167–199, 233–242, 255, 267–270, 272, 275, 278, 286, 325 Enturbulated, 267, 268, 273 Escalation, de-escalation, 109, 132, 147, 150, 151 Espionage, 12, 18, 41, 214, 217, 222 Estonia, 93, 136, 206–208, 213, 216, 218, 222–226, 229, 233, 234, 342 Estonian, 207, 213, 218, 222, 225, 226, 228 Ethnic, 13, 70, 73, 75, 135, 207, 209, 224, 230, 243, 261 EU (ESCE), 4, 70, 75, 76, 79, 81, 85, 88–91, 103, 109, 112, 118, 132, 133, 136, 138–141, 145–151, 158, 160–163, 165, 166, 168, 175, 177, 179, 186, 188–192, 194, 196, 198, 199, 206, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219, 222, 224, 264 Euclidean (semantic space), 299, 303, 326 Eurasia, 133 Eurasian integration, 264 Eurasian Union, 264 Europe, 1–4, 9, 13, 14, 22, 23, 27, 30, 32, 75, 79, 81, 83–86, 88, 90, 91, 93–95, 98, 99, 107, 124, 132, 135, 136, 148, 151, 160, 165, 184, 186, 197, 216, 217, 220, 223, 226, 228, 243, 259, 261, 262, 291, 342, 445 European, 44, 53, 81, 87, 89–91, 94, 124, 133, 136, 139, 141, 151, 207, 220, 228, 261, 262 Evangelical (Christians), evangelicalism, evangelicalese, 40, 253, 257, 258, 267 Evil, 163, 187, 255, 266, 267, 270, 292 Exploration, 79, 97, 288, 349 Exports, 29, 79, 81, 88–90 Extortion, 217, 223 Extraction (of oil and gas), 86, 88 Extraterritorial (law), 213, 227 Ezekiel, 254, 255, 258, 259, 263, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272, 276, 282, 290–292

F Facebook, 27, 31, 41, 52, 54, 56, 60, 240, 373, 374, 379, 382, 391, 398 Factorization, 277, 299, 302, 304 Factual (social media posts), 107, 154, 272 Failure(s of the Kremlin), 95

Index False flag, 77, 124, 193, 322, 323, 350 Family tree (of languages), 133 Fearmongering, 159 Financial (considerations in Russia), 4 (former) Soviet republics, 19, 38, 96, 137, 206, 225, 244, 246, 262, 263 (4) Ds (of disinformation), 52, 59–61, 231 France, 86, 172, 182, 192, 195, 314, 341 Fraud, 37, 119, 165, 274 Freedom, 13, 22, 42, 63, 92, 95, 96, 98, 99, 123, 125, 144, 307 Frequency(ies), 98, 272, 275, 276, 282, 300, 327, 335, 338, 340 Frequent, (word) frequency, 15, 41, 52, 54, 82, 272, 278, 300, 335, 339, 340 Fringe, 5, 6, 135, 251, 252, 255, 257, 260, 261, 268, 273, 278, 282, 285, 287, 289, 290, 298, 326, 327, 330, 331, 349, 351, 446 Fringe belief(s), 3, 251, 252, 255, 266–268, 272–275, 277–282, 284, 285, 289, 290, 296, 331, 349 FSB, 63, 218, 308, 309 Fuel, 4, 88, 89, 105, 108 G Gandhi, Mahatma, 251 Gazprom (Gazprom), 79–81, 83–86, 88, 90, 380, 385 GDP, 79, 80, 90 Geopolitical, 4, 11, 19, 70, 88, 89, 125, 136–138, 192, 245, 258, 261, 264–266 Georgia, 95, 207, 218, 228, 296, 310 Gerasimov, Valery, 78, 79 Germany, 6, 9, 12, 83, 84, 86, 88, 90, 91, 100, 117, 136, 142, 143, 158, 162, 172, 177, 182, 194, 199, 207, 209, 218, 236, 291, 292 Glory to Ukraine (Slava Ukraine, Slava Ukra|ni), 98, 99, 109, 110, 113, 114, 118–120 God, 21, 22, 55, 57, 61, 219, 254, 255, 259, 265, 266, 290–292, 325 Gog, 6, 252, 254, 258, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272, 276, 278, 282, 284, 290–292 Gogol, Nikolai, 45, 47, 70 Google, 268–271, 273 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 13, 122, 207, 212, 266 Grand Prince Vladimir, 72, 135 Great Britain, 22, 254, 318 Greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, 9, 206, 263

Index Greatness, 50, 212, 213, 230, 233, 236, 243–246, 258, 259, 446 Great Power competition/conflict, 8, 14, 70, 75, 76, 90, 206 Great Terror, 209 Grievances, 19, 320, 343, 349 Groundwater contamination, 216 Grupa Granica, 141, 176, 179 Gulag, 12, 19, 40, 41, 58, 209 H Hacking, 221–223 Hard currency, 32, 34, 35, 43 Heatmap, 279, 282, 284, 287, 288, 329, 404 Heuer, Richards, 2, 132, 153, 222, 227, 232, 233, 235, 244, 279, 445 Hierarchical clustering, 284, 285, 288 Historical (pattern(s), 50, 261, 263, 265 Nihx, 101, 122 Holocaust, 143, 144, 165, 345 Homogeneous (clusters), 330, 331 Hubris, 30, 51, 98, 99, 104, 106, 109, 110, 113, 114, 118–120, 124, 219, 259 Humanitarian corridor(s), 311–313, 325, 344, 345, 350 Human rights, 41, 102, 141, 224, 230, 264 Hungary, 136, 181, 261 Hybrid war(fare), 146, 226 Hydrocarbons, 75, 76, 80, 83 Hypocrisy, 162, 188, 214, 246 Hypotheses, 147, 232, 233, 245, 279 I Identical (texts), 282 Ideology (ideological), 5, 12, 14, 16, 17, 37, 47–51, 54, 75, 136, 254, 261–264 Ilf and Petrov, 70 Immortal regiment, 347 Imperial Russia, 40 Importance (in signal processing), 304 Indoctrination, 37, 38, 261 Indo-European, 133, 136 (Indo-European family) tree, 133, 136 Industry (Russian oil and gas), 79, 80, 82, 87, 90 Industry (siloes in), 72 Influence, 9, 50, 75, 78, 88, 95, 109, 115, 123, 124, 150, 151, 154, 213, 214, 219, 222, 226, 228, 229, 262, 292, 334 Information environment, 1–3, 5, 8, 14, 15, 20, 31, 52, 62, 64, 70, 121, 123, 132,

451 138, 154, 156, 209, 212, 215, 218, 226, 229–233, 235, 243–246, 252, 289, 446 (information) maneuver(s), 5, 8, 52, 59, 62, 64, 75–77, 97, 104, 107, 115, 121, 123, 132, 133, 138, 153, 209, 212, 230, 231, 244, 246 (information) vacuum, 78, 109, 159, 446 Infrastructure, 83, 88, 222, 223, 321 Insider (vocabulary), 277 Intelligence, 77, 78, 87, 149, 215, 217–219, 227, 289 Intelligence analysis, 153, 244, 303, 307, 349 Internet, 32, 36, 37, 102, 225 Internet Research Agency, 154, 165, 223 Intervention, 16, 124, 238, 255, 258, 262, 350 Invasion, 5, 7, 13, 16, 20, 32, 51, 73, 78, 81, 84, 89, 91, 95, 97, 103, 108, 124, 142, 149, 214, 219, 220, 224, 228, 266, 296, 307–309, 311, 313, 314, 316–318, 320–325, 338, 339, 343, 347, 349, 350 Iraq, 14, 60, 151 Iron Curtain, 8, 30, 32, 291 Islam, 73, 135, 168, 259 Islamic, 27, 168, 324, 350 Isolationism, 30, 31, 48 Isolation of Baltics, 221 Israel, 20, 99, 165, 168, 253–255, 259, 265, 266, 290–292 J Jewish, 10, 11, 40, 57, 144, 255 Jews, 143, 144, 292 Join(ing) NATO, 118, 310 Josephus, Flavius, 135, 255 Jupyter notebook(s), 279, 290, 297, 298, 300, 303, 305, 328–330, 402 Jurisdiction, 142, 213, 214, 217, 227 K Kaliningrad, 148, 149, 196, 219 Karenina, Anna, 49 Kazakhstan, 13, 264, 340 Kazan, 8, 23–27, 32, 37, 43–46 Kazan Chemical-Technological Institute, 28 Keyness (analysis), 295, 296, 335–338, 340, 349, 406–442 KGB, 8, 9, 63, 143, 218

452 Khrushchev, Nikita, 12, 70 Kiev, 13, 102, 104, 312 Kiev Pechera Caves, 49 Killings, 10, 22, 76, 95, 123, 236, 324, 339, 346 King, Martin Luther, 252 Known unknowns and unknown unknowns, 273 Korsun, 72, 73, 135 Kremlin, 3, 5, 40, 49, 73, 77, 82, 95, 97, 100, 104, 118, 122, 151, 181, 221–223, 296, 297, 310, 323, 325, 330, 335, 339, 340, 343, 345 Krushevan, Pavel, 40 Kuril Islands, 345 Ku´znica, 155, 169, 173 Ku´znica-Bruzgi (border crossing), 150, 152 L L2 (normalization), 327 Ladas (cars), 26 LaHaye, Tim, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 268, 278 Language, 2, 5, 6, 13, 51, 71, 73, 97, 98, 104, 108–110, 121–125, 133–135, 152, 153, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 185, 223, 225, 226, 230–235, 243–246, 252–255, 258, 266–269, 273, 275, 290, 295–297, 303, 326, 330, 331, 335, 339, 340, 349–351, 446 (language used to) manipulate, 275 Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), 276 Latvia, 5, 93, 136, 150, 156, 181, 191, 199, 206, 213, 216, 224, 226, 297, 339 Latvian, 117, 141, 207 Lavrov, Sergei, 123, 317, 318, 325, 342 Leninism, 16 (Lenin) statues, 19, 50, 51, 136, 210–212, 219 Lenin, Vladimir, 10, 13, 16, 18, 34, 47, 49, 211, 212, 230, 262, 263 Levin, Konstantin, 49, 50 Liberalism, 12, 144, 264 Liberals (in the Polish migrant crisis), 158, 168, 169, 172 Lies, 4, 6, 22 Linear algebra, 235 Linguistic(s), 74, 132, 133, 207, 270, 289 Lithuania, 13, 93, 101, 102, 110, 117, 136, 137, 145, 146, 150, 156, 181, 191, 206, 209, 213, 215–220, 224–227, 235

Index Lithuanian, 141, 146, 207, 215, 216, 218, 257 Little green men, 115 Luhansk, 7, 84, 107, 114, 312, 315, 319, 338, 343, 349, 350 Lukashenko, Aleksandr (Lukaxenko), 4, 63, 94, 106, 143–147, 150, 151, 156, 158, 159, 162, 164–166, 171, 176–178, 181, 184, 185, 190–194, 196–198, 226–229, 264, 265, 338 Lurkers, 61, 64 M Machine learning, 268, 275, 279, 290, 332 Macron, Emmanuel, 86, 103, 186, 321, 322 Magog, Magogites, 6, 252, 254, 255, 258–260, 263, 268, 269, 273, 276–279, 282, 284, 288, 292 Mainstream, 5, 94, 251, 252, 255, 257, 258, 268, 273, 275, 278, 285, 289, 298, 323, 326, 327, 330, 331, 340, 349 Manipulation, 150, 154, 181, 197, 225, 230, 231 Manufactured (crisis, charges), 4, 150 Market (unified oil and gas), 264 Marshall Plan, 107 Marx, Karl, 16, 37, 47 Marxism, 13, 16, 29, 48 Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist, 12, 13, 15, 17, 29, 47–50 Marxist, 16 Master narrative(s), 3, 5, 73, 243, 258–260, 289 Matrices, 302, 326 Matrix (term-document, adjacency), 276, 279, 281, 282, 284, 287, 328, 403 McDonalds, 8, 9, 34, 47 Media, 2, 3, 5, 36, 62, 111, 119, 141, 147, 159, 161–163, 169, 173, 176, 182, 186, 187, 193, 197, 218, 225, 226, 296–298, 307, 313–315, 317, 321, 323–326, 330, 335, 339, 340, 342, 343, 345–347, 349–351 Meduza, 5, 296, 297, 306, 316, 326, 329–340, 349, 367 Membership, NATO or EU, 95, 116, 142, 309, 310, 350 Member states (of EU, NATO, Warsaw Pact), 91, 93, 96 Mentality, 1, 48, 227, 245 Merkel, Angela, 158, 162, 174, 177, 189, 194, 196 Middle East, 89, 90, 226

Index Migrant crisis, 107, 141, 149–152, 164, 199, 261 migrants (bexency, migranci), 4, 132, 138, 140, 141, 146, 147, 151, 157–164, 168–172, 174–176, 178–180, 182–186, 189, 192–199, 227 Military, 5, 8, 14, 16, 63, 70, 78, 91, 93, 102, 106, 108, 117, 124, 125, 142, 147, 148, 157, 199, 206, 207, 214, 218–220, 226–228, 254, 259, 278, 289, 308, 312, 315, 317, 318, 325, 334, 338–340, 342, 343, 349, 350 Miller, Alexei, 80 Mindset, 58, 123, 136, 207, 209–211, 219, 224 Minsk, 74, 146, 162, 192, 197, 198, 234 Minsk agreements, 319, 321, 322, 343 Mockery, 258, 309, 317, 325, 349, 350 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 158, 177, 207 Moral, 3–6, 12, 13, 40, 54, 59, 64, 79, 89, 98, 99, 212, 219, 220, 227, 246, 252 Moral equivalence, 92, 98, 246, 324 Moscow (Moskva), 8, 19, 20, 23, 26, 37, 43, 46, 49, 50, 53, 70, 74, 80, 86, 87, 99, 110, 142, 172, 206, 234, 237, 254, 255, 292, 297, 313, 314, 321, 322, 334–336 Motivation, 34, 47, 50, 75, 77, 90, 112, 141, 144, 146, 206, 264 MPs, 107, 109, 112, 115, 116 Mubarak, Hosni, 259 Mutual information, 54, 272 My beauty, 321, 322, 343, 350 N Nagorno-Karabakh, 106, 228 Narrative(s), 3, 5, 6, 31, 58, 72, 73, 75, 94, 95, 97, 101–104, 108, 109, 112, 115, 116, 124, 132, 141, 144, 148, 160, 162, 165, 173, 175, 195, 198, 211, 212, 223, 229–233, 236–246, 258–261, 275, 278, 296, 307, 324, 325, 336, 349–351 Nationalist, nationalism, 16–18, 48, 50, 51, 63, 91, 98, 99, 104, 132, 138, 140, 142–144, 224, 228, 258, 259, 264, 312 Nationalization, 18, 20, 34, 62 National repentance, 20, 62, 63, 143, 211 NATO (NATO), 14, 59, 62, 70, 75–77, 91–97, 100, 101, 109, 112, 115–119, 121–125, 132, 136–138, 148, 150,

453 161, 165, 175, 177, 185, 189, 191, 206, 213, 214, 219, 220, 222, 223, 226, 228, 231, 246, 309, 310, 315, 320, 321, 338, 341–343, 347, 350, 351 NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner status, 310 (NATO) enlargement, 91, 93, 96 NATO expansion, 14, 70, 75, 76, 79, 91, 93–96, 109, 124, 206 Natural resources, 4, 79, 80, 83, 122, 124, 228 Navalny, Aleksei, 79, 150, 218, 229, 339 Nazism, 30, 31, 142, 143, 207, 209, 351 Nearest neighbors, 334 Needle(s) in the haystack, 5, 303, 327, 334 Negotiations, 264, 318, 321, 325, 345 Nemtsov, Boris, 265 Neo-Nazi, 60, 325, 346 Networks (social), 230, 231 Networks (VPNs), 31 (network) traffic, 285, 286 Nimmo, Ben, 38, 52, 59, 154, 231, 233 Nineteenth century (19th century), 13, 17, 47, 70, 79 Nord Stream (NS) and Nord Stream 2 (NS2), 83, 84, 86, 88, 90 Nuclear, 215, 216, 253, 265, 290, 341

O Obscurantists, 40 Oil, gas, oil and gas, 4, 35, 70, 75, 79–83, 86–90, 124, 264 1990s, 4, 12, 18, 31, 32, 47, 51, 71, 92, 94, 123, 253, 262 Oppression, 13, 79, 108, 125 Orthodox (Christianity), 12, 27, 70, 136 Orthogonal, 64, 233, 281, 299, 303, 326, 327 Outlier(s), 5, 296, 326, 329–332, 334, 335, 403

P Pairwise similarities, 279, 330, 403 Pandemic, 8, 92, 230, 234 Panetta, Leon, 77 Paranoia, paranoid, 6, 41 Paris agreements, 91 Patriarch Veniamin, 74 Patrimonialism, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 40, 51, 62

454 Patterns, 4, 6, 7, 18–20, 27, 38, 40, 53, 95, 98, 108, 125, 153, 154, 232, 233, 235, 263, 282, 290, 303, 305, 307, 445 Peer pressure, 11, 37 Permafrost, 86 Phrases, 2, 26, 78, 97, 160, 206, 255, 260, 262, 267, 272, 273, 289, 292, 321 Pioneers, 37 Pipeline(s), 81, 83, 84, 90, 228, 285, 289 Pipes, Richard, 15–20, 22, 27, 30, 34, 38, 46, 47, 49, 52, 62–64, 94, 211, 212 Plausible deniability, 78, 146, 222 Poccii, 30, 339, 362, 367 Pointwise mutual information (PMI), 54, 272, 274–277, 279, 284, 288, 300, 301 Poland, 4, 10, 13, 15, 76, 77, 83, 90, 94, 104, 105, 107, 109, 132, 136–152, 156–158, 160, 162, 165, 166, 168–171, 176, 177, 180–182, 184, 186, 190, 191, 194, 195, 198, 199, 206, 219, 261, 262, 321 Poles, 4, 10, 60, 132, 142–144, 157, 158, 162–164, 184, 185, 187, 189–191, 194, 199, 207 Police, 38, 147, 156, 174, 177, 178, 209 Policy, 1, 2, 13, 47, 51, 82, 85, 94, 99, 124, 143, 146, 166, 218, 222–224, 228, 230, 253, 310, 323, 339 Policymakers, 64, 209, 222, 223, 252 Polish constitution, 140 Polish government, 107, 141, 144, 151, 154–156, 158, 164, 177, 179, 181, 182 Polish nationalism, 132, 142, 144 (political) divisions, 74, 111 Politics, 27, 90, 109, 112, 150 Poroshenko, Petro (Poroxenko), 109, 111, 112, 116, 341 RPooPssccii, 100, 188, 194 Pravoslavie, 48, 50, 54 Pre-bunking, 78, 124, 322, 323 Preconceived (notions in algorithms), 97, 295 Preconceptions, 97, 153, 158, 232, 233, 307 Pride, 4, 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 40, 48, 104, 219, 446 Primakov, Yevgeny, 70 Principal components (analysis), 153, 154, 235, 280, 302 Pripyat, Dnieper rivers, 216

Index Prison(s), imprisonment, 41, 42, 143, 145, 160, 185, 218, 260, 262 Private property, 16, 18, 34, 50 Probabilistic (concepts of computational linguistics), 275 Probability(ies), 269, 270, 272 Propaganda, 8, 11, 14, 37, 38, 40, 101, 102, 104, 106–108, 119, 162, 197, 225, 231, 233, 246, 261, 311, 325, 331 Prophecy(ies), 257, 266, 278 Prophet, 20, 54, 56, 291, 446 (prophetic) truths, 54 Protesters, 41, 145, 162, 186 Protest(s), 95, 104, 144–146, 211, 228, 229, 262, 319, 340 Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 40 Psychological operations, 78, 226 Psychology of intelligence analysis, 132 Psychology, psychological, 8, 78, 212, 214, 223, 226, 270 Pushbacks, 141, 142 Python, 261, 277, 279, 284, 288 Q QAnon, 252, 273, 274, 289 R Radioactive, 215, 216 Ransomware, 165, 221, 223 Ration cards, 43, 92, 254 reaction, ideology as, 49, 261 Reagan, Ronald, 93, 257, 258, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272, 276, 278 Red Army, 10, 12, 40, 220 refugees (uchod´zcy), 10, 101, 146, 151, 157, 158, 160–165, 175, 177, 179, 181–183, 185–189, 191–193, 195, 197–199, 226 Reintegration, 252, 260, 263, 265, 289 Relational database(s), 232, 297, 298 Religion, religious, 5, 13, 27, 38, 40, 48, 51, 58, 72, 73, 75, 132, 136, 137, 251 Repent(ance), 19–22, 51, 55, 58, 62, 63, 143, 211 Repression, 12, 20, 27, 51, 62–64, 144, 209, 351 Republics (former Soviet republics), 95, 137, 206, 207, 225, 260–263, 312, 315, 319, 338 Reserves (oil and gas), 4, 79, 81, 86, 88 Resistance, 8, 62, 94, 207, 211, 219, 228 Rhetoric, 93, 95, 103, 108, 267

Index Riga, 207 Righteous among the nations, 144 River Neris, 216 Roderic, Lyne Sir, 85 Romania, 136, 137, 321 Roman Protasevich, 146 Roman (versus Cyrillic script), 132 Rosh, 282, 284, 292 Rosneft, 79, 81 RT, 114, 192, 195, 297, 322, 330, 334–339, 349, 355, 371 Rube Goldberg (machine), ix Ruble/rouble, 32, 34, 35, 43, 236, 254 Rumsfeld, Donald, 273 (Russian) Empire, 10, 27, 40, 51, 79, 264 Russian Federation, 59, 108, 213, 309, 310, 312, 322 (Russian, FSB, GRU) agents, 218, 222, 226 (Russian government) revenues, 35, 88 Russian history, 15, 16, 63, 75, 261, 296, 325, 351 (Russian) inferiority complex, 243–246 Russian language, 1, 29, 52, 74, 108, 226 (Russian) literature, 1, 37, 49, 253, 260 Russian media landscape, 328 Russian Ministry of Defense (Minoborony), 312, 313 Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MID), 315, 318, 342 (Russian) minorities, 5, 40, 58, 224, 225, 232, 235 (Russian) Revolution, 30, 266, 291 (Russian-speaking) communities, 225, 226, 246 (Russian-speaking) populations, 166, 225 Russian troop(s), 4, 73, 75–77, 79, 110, 120, 132, 151, 296, 317 Ryanair, 146, 151, 218 S Sabotage, 41, 308, 309, 316, 319, 350 Sanctions (Western), 85, 88, 151, 165, 296 Satellite images, 149 Schröder, Gerhard, 88 Scientology, 267, 268, 270, 271, 273 Scythians (Skify), 255, 258, 292 (search engine) queries, 273, 274 Searches (using Twitter Developer API), 152, 233 Secret police, 12 Security, 77, 92–95, 103, 104, 108, 125, 157, 180, 191, 194, 213, 214, 222, 303, 320–322

455 Self-determination, 4, 75, 77, 95, 96, 125 Self-fulfilling (prophecies, statements), 78, 104, 107, 266 Shulginov, Nikolai, 81, 82 Siberia, 40, 58, 79, 81, 86, 87, 90 Signal processing, 97, 276, 296, 299, 327, 349, 445 Similarities, 4, 18, 70, 73, 75, 77, 124, 135, 153, 165, 254, 255, 282, 284, 287, 288, 300, 326–329, 332, 334, 335 Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), 97, 153, 154, 156, 235, 276, 277, 280, 282, 284, 296, 299, 300, 302–305, 307, 326, 327, 334, 349, 351 Sins, 20, 49–51, 56, 64, 253 situational awareness, x Skewed (sample of Twitter posts), 52, 61, 123, 235 Slav, 137 Slavdom, 136, 165 Slavic, 38, 51, 95, 132, 133, 135, 136, 163, 206, 207 Smoking gun, 303 Socialist, Socialism, 29–31, 47, 48, 50, 92, 136, 137, 254 Social media, 2–5, 27, 31, 36, 38, 41, 52, 61, 63, 124, 142, 154, 157, 223, 225, 226, 229–232, 239, 245, 258, 272, 275, 295, 324, 325, 445 Society, 40, 47, 50, 63, 144, 214, 223, 261, 264 Sofia Sapega, 146 Software, 270, 274, 277, 307 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr (Solxenicyn), 40, 50 South Stream, 83 Sovereign(ty), 14, 73, 123, 147, 149, 220, 318 Soviet/Soviet Union, 1, 3, 5, 7–13, 15–20, 22, 23, 26, 29–32, 34–36, 40–43, 45, 47, 49–52, 58, 62, 63, 70, 79, 81, 91, 93–95, 123, 132, 136, 158, 159, 166, 185, 206, 207, 209–212, 217, 222–225, 228, 245, 253, 254, 260–266, 295, 296, 325 (Soviet) citizens, 26, 30, 32, 35, 38, 40, 43, 47, 92, 96, 263 Soviet era, 4, 29, 36, 40, 261, 262 (Soviet) ideals, 262 Soviet life, 8, 47, 48, 70 (Soviet) roads, 43, 44, 86, 122 Soviet rule, 4, 10, 12, 16, 207, 209, 261 (Soviet) toilets, 45

456 (Soviet) youth, 37 Special military operation, 345 Special Operation in Ukraine (specoperacir, specoperacii), 351 Spiritual, 13, 54, 72–74, 135 SQL Server, 297 Stalinism, 16 Stalin, Joseph, 12, 22, 40, 123, 209, 212, 224 Statistical, 53, 54, 133, 153, 154, 274, 275, 351 Steppe, 134, 135 Steppe hypothesis, 133, 136 Stopwords, 336, 340, 405, 406 St Petersburg, 234 Strategic, 72, 78, 135, 137, 148, 213, 219, 220 Strategic communications, 5, 8, 14, 123, 165, 166, 214, 226, 244, 246 Superpower, 19, 29, 30, 242 Suppression, 4, 16, 50, 262, 351 Suwalki (Suwałki) (corridor), 148, 219 (Svetlana) Tikhanovskaya, 150, 194, 226 Sympathetic (leaders for Russia), 52, 53, 62, 64 Syria, 11, 60, 146 Syrian, 147, 157, 176, 226

T Tallinn, 207, 211, 222, 234 Telegram, 110, 120, 317, 359, 360, 365, 366, 368, 370, 373, 374, 376, 384, 390, 391, 393 Territory, 37, 73, 75, 78, 90, 119, 135, 142, 218, 227, 259, 296, 309, 312, 313, 315, 318 Terrorism, 12, 324 Terrorist, 316, 317, 346 The Cherry Orchard, 49 Theoretically justifiable (approaches to NLP), 300 The Scythians (poem), 258 Threat(s), 14, 40, 76, 77, 89, 91, 93, 94, 102, 108, 109, 111, 115, 124, 146, 148, 214, 215, 217–219, 221–223, 252, 266, 312, 316, 346 Threshold(ing matrices), 32, 88, 153, 328 Tillerson, Rex, 81, 82 Topic analysis, 153, 154, 235, 296, 445 Topic(s), 93, 97, 124, 152, 154, 156, 160, 167–199, 224, 225, 230–233, 235,

Index 274, 275, 278, 280–282, 284, 296, 299, 300, 302, 304–307, 313, 314, 317, 319–322, 324, 325, 327, 335, 350, 351, 402 Torture, 41, 58, 145, 229 Totalitarian(ism), 15–17, 30 Tradition, 16, 29, 217, 264 Transit (routes for oil and gas), 83, 85, 90 Transparency, 108, 216, 290 Transparent (big data), 77, 109, 125, 156, 166, 244, 290, 445 Trenin, Dmitri, 50 (troop) buildup, 77, 149, 296 Troops, 14, 47, 56, 76–78, 101, 151, 157, 167, 196, 219, 228, 318, 319 Trotsky, Leon, 70 Trump administration, 82 Trump, Donald, 15, 60, 81, 82 Truncated (SVD), 279, 300, 302, 303, 305, 307, 326, 327 Truss, Liz, 317, 318, 342, 350 Truth, 3, 5, 6, 40, 41, 54, 57, 62, 143, 144, 212, 252, 260, 263, 266, 267, 289, 290, 331, 351, 446 Tsar, 40, 41, 446 Tsarist, 5, 18, 34, 38, 40, 49, 62, 63, 81, 262 Turkey, 85, 105, 117, 181, 226, 228 TurkStream, 83, 85 Tweets, 97, 98, 108, 115, 121, 152–154, 156, 158, 160, 162–164, 167, 184, 234, 245, 278, 282, 284 Twentieth century (20th century), 15, 17, 19, 30, 31, 63, 132 Twitter, 52, 97, 98, 108, 109, 124, 125, 132, 144, 152–154, 159, 165, 166, 178, 232, 234, 273, 275, 277, 278, 398 Twitter Developer API, 152, 232, 233 Twittersphere, 100, 108, 122, 123, 159, 160, 166 U Ukraine (Ukraina, Ukra|na), 97 Ukrainian, 2, 8, 13, 32, 51, 54, 55, 60, 70, 71, 73–75, 78, 95, 99–101, 103–106, 109, 110, 112–115, 117–119, 123, 157, 191, 218, 220, 244, 259, 262, 264, 296, 308, 310, 314, 315, 318–322, 324, 325, 334, 339, 349 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba (Kuleba), 108 Ukrainian nationalism, 264, 324, 350 United Kingdom (UK), 86, 104, 106, 118, 141, 218, 254, 310, 314

Index United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96, 243, 258 United States (USA), 12, 14, 15, 19, 27, 30, 32, 70, 72, 75, 105, 107, 113, 121, 140, 150, 151, 190, 213, 227, 242, 253, 266, 314, 315, 321, 323 Unsupervised (learning), 445 US government, 15, 37, 72, 227, 277, 290 USSR (CCCP), ix, xiii, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 38, 40, 43, 45–47, 52, 62, 63, 92, 93, 112, 143, 150, 159, 206–209, 211, 220, 222, 254, 260, 263, 264, 266, 289 Utopian (socialism), 47

V Vaccinated, 183, 233, 237–239, 241, 242 Vaccine(s) (vakciny), 148, 226, 233, 236–245 Vaccine skepticism, 226, 228, 237, 238, 245 Vector, 142, 215, 276, 281, 282, 303, 326–328 Verkhovna Rada, 107, 112, 310, 314 Vernadsky, Vladimir, 70 Victims, 3, 5, 8, 222 Victory, 31, 98, 99 Victory Day, 347 Vilna Gaon, 257, 259, 278 Vilnius, 207, 215, 216, 235 Violence, 4, 6, 10, 11, 47, 49–51, 63, 145, 211 (Vladimir) Putin (Putin), 4, 8, 9, 12–14, 16–18, 29, 30, 50, 51, 60, 63, 72–74, 76–78, 80, 86, 93–96, 98–102, 112, 121–124, 132, 135, 143, 146, 149–151, 158, 162, 163, 177, 184–187, 190, 191, 196, 206, 213, 219, 220, 227–229, 258, 263–265, 306, 320–322, 325, 341, 343 Volga-Urals basin, 79 Voronezh, 316–318

457 W War, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10–12, 17, 34, 57, 60, 79, 91, 95, 102, 103, 112, 115, 118, 124, 142, 143, 169, 190, 197, 211, 218, 228, 291, 292, 295, 310, 314, 323, 324, 339–341, 345, 347, 350, 351 Warfare, 138, 213 Warsaw Pact, 91–94, 132, 136, 138, 206 Washington, 162, 217, 323 Water cannon(s), 60, 141, 142, 148, 162, 169, 171, 186, 188, 191 Weakness(es) (of Russia), 19, 35, 38 Weaponization, weaponize, 84, 85, 89, 90, 175, 226, 227 Weapons, 151, 192, 265, 290, 291, 312 Weighting, 279, 300, 301 Weight, weighting scheme, 13, 54–57, 96, 279, 280, 300 West, 1, 5, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 26, 27, 30–32, 40, 47, 50, 70, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 89, 92, 94, 100, 104, 107, 150, 160, 162, 166, 185, 211, 218, 220, 227, 314, 325, 350, 446 Western firms, 7, 9, 30 Western governments, 30, 34, 35, 70, 108 (Western) partners, 133, 165 Word of God, 253, 259, 260 Words, 268–270, 278, 302, 322, 336, 338, 402 World War II (WWII), 12, 91, 132, 135, 142–144, 158, 165

Y Yamal (Peninsula), 81, 83, 86, 88, 90 Yavlinsky, Grigory, 70 Yoda, 257, 266 Yugoslavia, 60, 62, 122, 123, 136, 234 Yury Sipko, 51, 52, 63

Z Zelensky, Volodymyr (ZelenskiЙ ), 15, 32, 78, 101, 106, 109, 112, 117, 118, 321, 322 Zinky Boys, 47