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Equity Research
November 17, 2020 | 07:14PM CST
Digital Currency
Reinventing the Yuan for the Digital Age
In ten years we expect DC/EP to reach 1 billion addressable users, Rmb1.6tn in issuance, Rmb19tn in annual Total Payment Value and account for 15% of total consumption payments. Incorporating digital currency wallets into bank apps will level the playing field in the Rmb 3tn revenue pool for retail finance by bringing consumers back to bank channels, thereby expanding their customer base and MAUs. This will likely slow the rate that banks have been ceding ground to fintech, and even reverse market share losses over the long-term if DC/EP gains in popularity. In the meantime, PAB and CMB will benefit most from DC/EP as they are best placed to commercialize returning app users thanks to their leading retail franchises, premium client bases, superior fintech capability and strategic focus on retail finance. Shuo Yang, Ph.D. +86 10 6627-3054 [email protected] Beijing Gao Hua Securities Company Limited
Yingqi Lin +86 21 2401-8691 [email protected] Beijing Gao Hua Securities Company Limited
Derek Su +852 2978-7436 [email protected] Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.
Goldman Sachs does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to www.gs.com/research/hedge.html. Analysts employed by non-US affiliates are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA in the U.S.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
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China is at the forefront of digital currency development and will likely be one of the first countries to issue a sovereign digital currency (known as “DC/EP”). As a gradual replacement for physical cash, in the early stages DC/EP will facilitate small payments for consumables such as meals, groceries and transport, but over time will expand to larger and more complex, value-added services such as government subsidies and cross-border payments. Even in a cashless environment, DC/EP will be an attractive alternative to fintech platforms given its anonymity, the ability to operate outside of wireless networks, and interconnectivity among different payment methods. Successful adoption will ultimately require government promotion, which has the wherewithal to drive a rapid uptake.
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Table of Contents PM Summary: Digital Currency — Reinventing the Yuan for the Digital Age
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China at the forefront of digital currency development
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Cash for the 21st Century
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Petty cash payments and red packets to start
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China already on the path to becoming cashless
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Boost competition, level the playing field for banks
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Gateway to banks’ retail finance channels; CMB and PAB best placed to capitalize
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Rmb 3tn revenue pool for retail finance by 2025, 9% CAGR
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Appendix
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Acronyms
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References
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Disclaimer for company logos
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Disclosure Appendix
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We would like to thank Piyush Mubayi, Elsie Cheng and Thomas Wang for their contributions to this report.
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20 FAQs on Digital Currency / Electronic Payment Will DC/EP reduce banks' balance sheet? Yes, if DC/EP is converted from deposits; No, if converted from cash.
What is the PBOC’s motivation to issue DC/EP? Address the challenges posed by other digital currencies (e.g. Libra), improve efficiency in the payment system, reduce the cost of cash.
What will its main application be? Facilitate small payments for consumables (e.g. meals, groceries, transport).
When will DC/EP be launched? No timeline has been provided. Testing has already started in four cities and DC/EP will feature at the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. An official launch looks most likely in 2023.
What is the “dual offline" transfer? Payments can still be made without mobile internet access or network connectivity (e.g. subway, airline, mountainous area).
Will DC/EP be anonymous? Yes, for small transactions. Large payments may require ID verification.
Do users need a bank account to use DC/EP? No, unless replenishing a DC/EP wallet.
Will the PBOC distribute DC/EP to customers? No, commercial banks will circulate DC/EP to consumers after the PBOC distributes it to commercial banks. Will DC/EP disintermediate banks? No, DC/EP will not pay interest, caps can be set on wallets and commercial banks will be the 2nd pillar in the two-tier issuance system. Is DC/EP a cryptocurrency? No, the DC/EP system will be built on a centralized ledger, not a blockchain.
Is DC/EP legal tender? Yes, it has the same legal status as Rmb cash.
Will DC/EP expand the PBOC's balance sheet? Not likely as DC/EP can be converted from bank deposit reserves.
Can DC/EP be used for government subsidies? Yes, real-time tracking can be used to monitor a transaction and it can be disabled once reaching the intended recipient. Will DC/EP pay interest? No, according to the PBOC.
Will DC/EP charge fees? Unlikely, but the PBOC could charge a fee to enable a negative interest rate on DC/EP. Is DC/EP necessary in an already cashless society? Yes, still DC/EP has advantages over fintech: anonymity, dual-offline transfers, inclusion and interconnectivity among payment methods.
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What is the PBOC's objective for DC/EP? A substitute for cash (M0).
Will banks be the only institutions operating DC/EP? Yes, as DC/EP is the digitalization of legal tender. However, fintech firms can add DC/EP as a payment method in their apps. Will take rates for consumption payments fall? No, take rates would be stable as DC/EP payments still need to use existing offline channels and infrastructure. What will be the impact on banks? Incorporating DC/EP wallets into bank apps will bring consumers back to bank channels, expanding their customer base and MAUs.
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
PM Summary: Digital Currency — Reinventing the Yuan for the Digital Age China at the forefront of digital currency development The People’s Bank of China has already started testing a central bank digital currency, known as Digital Currency/Electronic Payment (DC/EP), while most other countries are in the early stages of research and development. Although no official timeline has been announced, pilot testing recently commenced in four cities and digital currency will feature at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. If successful, China could be one of the first countries to issue a sovereign digital currency. With DC/EP to eventually replace physical cash, it will embed similar characteristics such as anonymity, offline payments, financial inclusion, and ease of use.
Cash for the 21st Century China’s DC/EP system will feature (1) two-tier issuance, with the PBOC issuing digital currency for commercial banks to distribute and interface directly with customers; (2) controllable anonymity, with DC/EP wallets independent of bank accounts for smaller transactions; and (3) centralized processing instead of a distributed ledger, meaning DC/EP will not be a cryptocurrency. Converting household deposits to DC/EP wallets will not result in banking-sector disintermediation as the objective of DC/EP is to replace cash not deposits, DC/EP wallets will not be paid interest, and most transactions will be small.
In the early stages, DC/EP will primarily facilitate small payments for consumables such as meals, groceries and transport. However, as safety, security and functionality improve over time, applications will expand to larger and more complex, value-added services such as traceable government subsidies and cross-border payments.
China already on the path to becoming cashless Use of cash at the point of sale and the M0 to M2 ratio in China is already among the lowest globally. Even in a cashless environment, DC/EP will have attractive features relative to current fintech offerings including anonymity, financial inclusion, the ability to operate outside of wireless networks, and interconnectivity among different payment methods. Successful adoption will require promotion from the government, which has demonstrated the wherewithal to drive a rapid uptake. As the second pillar of the DC/EP system, commercial bank networks will likely be mobilized in this process. In ten years we expect DC/EP to reach 1 billion addressable users, Rmb1.6tn (US$240bn) in issuance, Rmb19tn (US$3tn) in annual Total Payment Value (TPV) and Rmb162bn (US$24bn) in annual cost savings — although our forecasts could differ from actual figures given limited details, including the timing of a public launch. While direct cost savings to the financial system from replacing physical cash with digital currency will likely be small relative to bank earnings and GDP, DC/EP will reduce the invisible cost of cash and have a significant impact on China’s payment system.
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Petty cash payments and red packets to start
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China Financial Services
Boost competition, level the playing field for banks DC/EP will become the third pillar of China’s payments system alongside banks and fintech, and in the process, increase competition. By 2029, we expect DC/EP to account for 15% of total consumption payments (TPV of Rmb128tn) as fintech market share tapers off (albeit still dominating the space) and usage of cash and physical bank cards shrink. Within the payment ecosystem, commercial banks will be clear beneficiaries as they compete on a more level playing field, third-party payment digital wallet issuers will face stiffer competition in the long term (but limited in the early stages), third-party payment acquirers will benefit from higher volumes and increased demand for mobile payments, and software/hardware vendors will benefit from R&D outsourcing and hardware upgrades. We provide a list of companies that have already participated in DC/EP development or may have exposure to the DC/EP system once it rolls out.
Gateway to banks’ retail finance channels; CMB and PAB best placed to capitalize Incorporating digital currency wallets into bank apps will bring consumers back to bank channels, expanding their customer base, MAUs and stickiness. A 10% increase in the bank app users would lift revenues by 2%-5%. PAB and CMB are best placed to commercialize returning app users given their leading retail franchises, premium client bases, superior fintech capability and strategic focus on retail finance. We reiterate our Buy ratings on CMB-H/A (A on the Conviction List) and PAB.
Rmb 3tn revenue pool by 2025, fintech to continue capturing incremental market share We forecast a Rmb 3tn revenue pool for retail finance by 2025 (excluding mortgages) at 9% CAGR 20-25E as growth in payments and retail lending slows but wealth management and insurance agency remain brisk. Over the next five years, we expect Fintech to grow revenues at almost double the rate of banks as they continue to capture
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incremental market share across the retail finance ecosystem. The DC/EP roll-out will likely slow the rate that banks cede ground to fintech, and even reverse over the long-term, albeit in a more competitive environment.
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China at the forefront of digital currency development Chief Asia Economist Andrew Tilton explains the impact of a digital currency on China’s economy in his companion report “Asia Economics Analyst: China’s digital yuan and its macro implications
The People’s Bank of China has already started testing a central bank digital currency, known as Digital Currency/Electronic Payment (DC/EP), while most other countries are in the early stages of research and development. Although no official launch timeline has been announced, pilot testing recently commenced in four cities and digital currency will feature at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. If successful, China could be one of the first countries to issue a sovereign digital currency. With DC/EP to eventually replace physical cash, it will embed similar characteristics such as anonymity, offline payments, financial inclusion, and ease of use.
Pace of digital currency development accelerating globally Central banks have been researching Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) issuance
n
US Fed officials said in August 2020 that they have conducted in-house experimentation of a “hypothetical digital currency oriented to central bank uses” through the Federal Reserve Board’s Technology Lab in collaboration with MIT;
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Pilot testing of China’s DC/EP system recently commenced in four cities (Shenzhen, Suzhou, Xiong’an and Chengdu) and digital currency will feature at the Beijing Winter Olympics in 2022;
n
The ECB said in May 2020 that they have set up a task force to examine the viability of its own CBDC within the euro system;
n
Sweden’s Riksbank begun testing its e-krona project this year, although it is yet to provide any further updates.
COVID has accelerated digital payment adoption as a CBDC can also (1) function as a sanitized substitution for cash, and (2) be used for direct subsidy payments to individuals by governments.
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In March 2020, the US economic stimulus package draft bill for the House Democrats mentioned the creation of a “digital dollar” to aid individuals amid COVID, although this proposal was removed in a later version of the bill.
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An expert meeting hosted by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, a macroeconomic management agency under the State Council) noted that China’s CBDC development may be accelerated amid COVID and be used as a payment mechanism for special subsidies.
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since 2014-2015 following the melt up of cryptocurrencies (Exhibit 1). Facebook’s Libra proposal (a decentralized blockchain) in mid-2019 increased the urgency of central banks to research and develop a CBDC given concern about the impact to monetary sovereignty. This year in particular has seen significant progress:
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China Financial Services
Exhibit 1: China is at the forefront of CBDC development, and although no timetable for a public launch has been provided, will likely be one of the first central banks globally to issue a sovereign CBDC
Source: PBOC, Caixin, Xinhua, CNBC, Reuters, Bloomberg, various central banks
Exhibit 2: China and Sweden have started testing their CBDCs; other central banks are still in the R&D stage Central ba Central bank nk
P Project Prroject oject name name
P Progress Prrogress ogress
Details Det Details ai l s
China China
PBOC
DC/EP
Testing
In Aug. 2020 PBOC said DC/EP will be tested internally in Shenzhen, Suzhou, Xiong'an, Chengdu and Beijing Winter Olympics
Sweden Sweden
Riksbank
e-krona
Testing
In Jan. 2020 Riksbank said it started testing its CBDC
US US
Federal Reserve
Unknown
Research
Europe Europe
ECB
Unknown
Research
France France
Banque de France
Unknown
Research
In Jul. 2020 The Bank of France started working on CBDC experiment with eight firms
UK UK
BOE
Unknown
Research
In Mar. 2020, the BoE issued an in-depth discussion paper devoted to CBDCs
Japan Japan
BOJ
Unknown
Research
In Jul. 2020 the Bank of Japan has created a dedicated team to intensify its work on CBDC
Hong Kon Hong Kong g
HKMA
Unknown
Research
In Jan. 2020 HKMA and the Bank of Thailand published a report on a joint CBDC research project
Singapore Singapore
MAS
Ubin
Research
In Sep. 2019 the MAS successfully developed a blockchain-based prototype of cross-border payment
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Country/area Country/area
Fed official said in Aug. 2020 that they have conducted in-house experimentation through the Federal Reserve Board’s Technology Lab in collaboration with MIT In May 2020 the ECB said they have set up a task force to examine the viability of its own CBDC within the euro system
Source: Various central banks, Reuters, CNBC, Bloomberg
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Exhibit 3: An increasing number of central banks are engaged in developing a CBDC
Exhibit 4: EMs appear more motivated than DMs in issuing a CBDC Motivations for issuing a retail CBDC: average importance of central banks surveyed by BIS
Engagement in CBDC work: share of central banks surveyed by BIS
Advanced economies 81%
Emerging economies
Payment safety/robustness Domestic payment efficiency Financial stability
71%
Monetary policy implementation 65%
Cross-border payment efficiency Financial inclusion
2017
2018
Note: Sample of 66 central banks surveyed by BIS.
2019
0
1
2
3
4
Note: 1 = not so important; 2 = somewhat important; 3 = important; and 4 = very important. Sample of 66 central banks surveyed by BIS.
Source: BIS Source: BIS
PBOC likely one of the first central banks to issue a CBDC
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The PBOC is leading progress globally in developing a CBDC, starting on-the-ground testing of its digital currency system (Exhibit 5), known as DC/EP (Digital Currency/Electronic Payment) this year. Research started as early as 2014 and by 2015 a prototype had been devised. By mid-2020, several Chinese banks had tested the mobile app internally. Although no official launch timeline has been provided, pilot testing has already started in four cities (Shenzhen, Suzhou, Xiong’an, and Chengdu) and digital currency will feature at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. As of early October, it was reported that the PBOC opened 113,000 consumer digital wallets and nearly 9,000 corporate wallets in its pilot programs, with DC/EP already used for more than RMB 1.1 bn worth of transactions. If its pilot programs are successful, the PBOC may be one of the first central banks globally to issue a CBDC. Exhibit 5: The PBOC has been researching CBDC as early as 2014, on-the-ground testing has already started in four cities
Source: PBOC, Caixin, Xinhua
Key central bank considerations in issuing a digital currency The underlying benefits of CBDCs are generally policy goals that central banks aim to 17 November 2020
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achieve in the design process, while the concerns are generally risks they are trying to avoid. Benefits include: n
Competition with other currencies. There have been numerous discussions on how cryptocurrencies may influence financial stability by circumventing capital controls and even replacing legal tender, particularly in emerging economies with relatively unstable currencies. The most recent challenge to financial sovereignty has come from Facebook’s Libra program as its large global user base has the potential to disrupt elements of the financial system. On the other hand, issuing a CBDC can reinforce the competitiveness of legal tender with other currencies.
n
Improving efficiency and reducing costs. The printing and operating cost of cash can be a considerable expense for an economy, and illicit activities and tax evasion are facilitated by using cash. Beyond that, the inefficiencies of existing domestic and cross-border payment systems (as evidenced by high cost and slow speed) suggest significant room to improve. A CBDC can be an efficient and low-cost alternative to existing payment methods.
n
Promote financial inclusion: According to the World Bank, the unbanked population (>20%) in some emerging economies is much higher than in developed countries (€100 account for only 17% of total cash volume... Volume of Euros in circulation by denomination
Volume of US cash in circulation by denomination
€ 200, 1% € 500, 4% $100 note, 32%
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Exhibit 52: $100 and $1 notes together account for 60% of total currency in US circulation by volume
$1 note, 28%
€ 5, 10%
€ 100, 12% € 10, 13%
$2 note, 3% $50 note, 4%
€ 20, 18% € 50, 42%
$5 note, 7% $20 note, 21%
$10 note, 5%
As of 2019
As of 2014
Source: Federal Reserve
Source: ECB
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Exhibit 54: ...while in Japan, ¥10,000 notes account for 63% of total cash volume
Exhibit 55: Large denomination notes ($100 and above) represent over 80% of total US currency in circulation by volume... Value of US cash in circulation by denomination
Volume of Japanese Yen in circulation by denomination
$5 note, 1% $2 note, 0% $1 note, 1% $10 note, 1%
¥500, 2%
$20 note, 11% ¥1,000, 30%
$50 note, 5%
¥10,000, 63% ¥2,000, 1%
$100 note, 81%
¥5,000, 5%
As of 2014
As of 2019
Source: BOJ
Source: Federal Reserve
Exhibit 56: ...as is the case in the EU...
Exhibit 57: ...and Japan
Value of Euros in circulation by denomination € 5, 1%
Coins, 3%
€ 10, 2%
Value of Japanese Yen in circulation by denomination Coins, 5%
€ 20, 6%
¥500, 0% ¥5,000, 3% ¥1,000, 4% ¥2,000, 0%
€ 500, 30%
€ 50, 35%
€ 200, 4%
As of 2014
As of 2014
Source: ECB
Source: BOJ
Exhibit 58: China’s M0 value is around 65% that of the US...
Exhibit 59: ...but due to foreign exchange differences, China’s M0 volume may be more than four times that of the US...
M0 value
M0 volume vs. M0 amount: China as % of US
US$ tn
China
0.8
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
M0 volume
US
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
485%
1.1
M0 amount
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.3
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¥10,000, 87%
€ 100, 19%
506%
500%
504%
480%
472%
480%
463%
450%
451%
1.1
0.7
72%
2010
2011
2012
Source: Federal Reserve, PBOC
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2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2010
78%
2011
79%
2012
81%
2013
78%
2014
76%
2015
72%
2016
69%
2017
68%
2018
65%
2019
Source: Federal Reserve, PBOC
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Exhibit 60: ...as such, China’s currency printing cost to M0 (in US$) may be much higher, even after adjusting for purchasing power differences
Exhibit 61: We estimate the annual production cost of the Renminbi is Rmb12bn (US$2bn) Estimated new currency production cost
Estimated new currency production cost / M0 (in US$) China 0.22%
0.23%
0.24%
0.23%
China
US
US 2.29
0.21%
0.20%
0.21% 0.18%
2.04
0.18%
2.14
2.08
2.02
1.90
1.79 0.16%
1.93
1.76
US$ bn
1.43
0.06%
2010
0.07%
0.06%
2011
2012
0.06%
2013
0.06%
2014
0.05%
2015
0.05%
2016
0.04%
2017
0.05%
2018
0.60
0.65
0.72
0.72
0.71
0.69
0.67
0.66
0.80
0.64
0.04%
2010
2019
Note: We assume a lower production cost for the same volume of cash for China by adjusting the ratio with the purchasing power parity factor from the World Bank (~1.6x as of 2019).
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Note: Production cost of currency is derived by multiplying the production cost/M0 ratio by M0. Source: Federal Reserve, National Bureau of Statistics of China, World Bank, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Source: Federal Reserve, World Bank, NBS, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 62: The PBOC bears 3% of the total cost of cash with commercial banks bearing 40% Countries
Central bank
Share of cash costs by each sector Commercial Retailers Households bank
% of GDP
Source
Share of cash costs Norway
3%
40%
27%
30%
0.1%
Norges Bank (2014)
Sweden
3%
39%
34%
14%
0.4%
Riksbank (2007)
Netherlands
2%
48%
0.4%
Netherlands Central Bank (2005)
16%
0.5%
Reserve Bank of Australia (2007)
0.6%
National Bank of Belgium (2006)
21%
0.6%
Bank of Uruguay (2019)
54%
Australia
50% 30%
Belgium
2%
47%
Uruguay
2%
13%
51% 64%
China
3%
40%
57%
0.4%
GS estimates
162
231
406
GS estimates
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Estimated share of cash costs
Estimated value of cash costs (Rmb bn) China
12
Note: We calculate the PBOC’s share of cash cost using comparable data from the central banks of Norway and Sweden as both countries have a low portion of cash usage like China Source: Norges Bank, Riksbank, Netherlands Central Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), National Bank of Belgium, Bank of Uruguay, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
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Boost competition, level the playing field for banks DC/EP will become the third pillar of China’s payments system alongside banks and fintech, and in the process, increase competition. By 2029, we expect DC/EP to account for 15% of total consumption payments (TPV of Rmb128tn) as fintech market share tapers off (albeit still dominating the space) and usage of cash and physical bank cards shrink. Within the payment ecosystem, commercial banks will be clear beneficiaries as they compete on a more level playing field, third-party payment digital wallet issuers will face stiffer competition in the long term (but limited in the early stages), third-party payment acquirers will benefit from higher volumes and increased demand for mobile payments, and software/hardware vendors will benefit from R&D outsourcing and hardware upgrades. We provide a list of companies that have already participated in DC/EP development or may have exposure to the DC/EP system once it rolls out.
Centralization of deposits for client reserves, processing payments n
Licensing. The PBOC has not granted any Third Party Payment licenses since 2015, and has canceled ~30 licenses since 2016 (Exhibit 63).
n
Centralized deposits for client reserves: From 2017, Third Party Payment institutions have been required to deposit the full client reserve (monetary capital received in advance to handle the payment business on behalf of the client) with the PBOC.
n
Centralized processing of payments at NetsUnion: From June 30, 2018, all non-bank payment institutions’ network payment business (involving bank accounts) have been processed through NetsUnion, which acts like a clearing house.
n
One QR code for all: According to the PBOC’s FinTech Development Plan (2019-2021) published in September 2019, the interconnection of QR codes (one QR code for all) will be completed by the end of 2021.
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Over the last few years, the PBOC has introduced several measures: (Exhibit 127):
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 63: Since 2016, no new Third Party Payment licenses have been issued and 32 have been canceled
Exhibit 64: Fintech players have achieved mutual recognition of their QR codes with a few banks, however “One QR code for all” will be completed by the end of 2021
No. of Third Party Payment licenses New licenses
Cancellations
120
269 101
Existing licenses No. (RHS) 300
266
250
96
100
269
247
238
237
237
250
197 200
80 60
150
53
101 100
40
19
20 0
19
0
0
0
0
2011
2012
2013
2014
2
2
2015
0
3
2016
50
9 1
0
0
0
2017
2018
2019
0
0
0
2020
Source: PBOC
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 65: Centralized deposits of client reserves increased to 100% in 2019; total client reserves were Rmb1.6tn as of Aug. 2020 Centralized client reserve of Third Party Payment institutions Centralized client reserve
% of centralized client reserve required by PBOC 120%
2,500
100%
2,000
Rmb bn
1,500
Proportion of centralized deposit of client reserve increased
80%
60%
1,000
500
20%
0% Mar-17 Apr-17 May-17 Jun-17 Jul-17 Aug-17 Sep-17 Oct-17 Nov-17 Dec-17 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 Apr-18 May-18 Jun-18 Jul-18 Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18 Nov-18 Dec-18 Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20
0
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40%
PBOC required centralized deposit of client reserve
Source: PBOC
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Exhibit 66: The government has introduced several measures over the last few years, including: (1) centralized deposits of client reserves; and (2) centralized clearance of payments at NetsUnion
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
DC/EP will reduce costs, boost competition and improve connectivity
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Reduce the cost of cash. We forecast a ~15% substitution rate for cash by DC/EP in ten years, which will cut the processing cost of cash (printing, transport etc.) for banks and the PBOC and reduce demand along the cash management industry chain.
n
Introduce competition. We expect DC/EP to become the third pillar of China’s payments system alongside banks and fintech payments, introducing new competition into the system. That said, initially at least we expect the DC/EP take rate paid to banks and other service providers in offline consumption to be in line with the current ecosystem (Exhibit 68), since DC/EP would need to leverage the existing infrastructure and provide incentives to related parties.
n
Increase interconnectivity of existing payment methods. In addition to the “one code for all” policy that promotes the interconnection of QR codes, we expect DC/EP to enhance the connectivity of existing payment methods because it will be a DC/EP a widely-accepted digital legal tender that becomes a “bridge” for all parties.
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Once DC/EP is rolled out nationwide over the next few years, we expect it to bring about several important changes to the payment industry:
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Exhibit 67: DC/EP will become the third pillar of the payment industry value chain alongside bank cards and Third Party Payments
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 68: Although there are no details about the fee structure of DC/EP, we expect it to be akin to app-based payments as the operating framework is similar
Note: Our take rate forecasts are a rough estimate based on our channel checks and may vary due to merchant discounts and other factors. Source: iResearch, PBOC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
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Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Leveling the playing field in payments Rise of fintech payments driven by mobile payment penetration The surge in Fintech digital wallets in recent years has been driven by increased penetration of mobile payments. As shown in Exhibit 69, the TPV of Third Party Payment Institutions (fintech) grew 10-fold over 2015-2019 to reach Rmb250tn (US$37tn), with growth slowing to 20% yoy in 2019 as penetration had already reached a very high level. Of that, mobile payments increased from 43% (of third party payments) in 2015 to 90% in 2019 (Exhibit 70). Among different types of payments, 54% of TPV is from transfers, 20% from consumption and 22% from finance (Exhibit 73). AliPay and Tenpay dominate the third party payment landscape, together accounting for over 90% in terms of TPV (Exhibit 74). Exhibit 69: Third Party Payment transaction value reached Rmb251tn in 2019...
Exhibit 70: ...with mobile payments accounting for the vast majority
Third Th Third ird pa party rty pa payment yment vvalue alue 3rd party payment transaction value
Third Th Third ird pa party rty pa payment yment vvalue: alue: m mobile obile vvs. s. de desktop sktop
Growth YoY (RHS)
300
Mobile
120% 100%
101%
Desktop
250
250
100%
25%
19%
13%
10%
87%
90%
2018
2019
208 80%
Rmb tn
200 143
150
44%
49%
57%
60%
45%
99 40%
100 49 50
75%
81%
20% 20%
25
51%
43%
0%
0 2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2014
2015
2016
2017
Source: PBOC
Source: PBOC, iResearch
Exhibit 71: Growth in Third Party Mobile Payment transaction value has slowed in recent years, but was still a healthy 19% in 2019
Exhibit 72: Growth in Third Party Desktop Payment transaction value declined in 2019 Third Th Third ird party party mobile mobile desktop desktop payment payment value value
Third Th Third ird pa party rty m mobile obile pa payment yment vvalue alue 3rd party payment transaction value: mobile 250
392%
191
200
3rd party payment transaction value: desktop
Growth YoY (RHS) 450% 226 400%
383%
35
25
200%
100 103%
50 6
150%
105% 19%
0
50% 0%
2014
Source: PBOC, iResearch
17 November 2020
2015
2016
2017
2018
70%
29
25 47%
20
2019
60% 50%
40%
40%
20
30% 15
10
20%
12 4%
8
10%
100%
58%
12
Rmb ttn Rmb n
Rmb Rm Rmb b ttn n
250%
120
80% 28
50%
350%
150
Growth YoY (RHS)
68%
30
300%
59
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Third party desktop payment value: by transaction type Third
0% 5
-14%
0
-10% -20%
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Source: PBOC, iResearch
47
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 73: 54% of Third Party Payment transaction value is from transfers, 20% from consumption and 22% from finance
Exhibit 74: Alipay and Tenpay together account for over 90% market share in Third Party Payments (in terms of TPV) Third party mobile payment market share
Third Th Third ird party party payment payment value: value: by transaction transaction type type Transfer
Finance
Consumption
Alipay
Others
7%
34%
26%
16%
12%
19%
22%
18%
22%
Tenpay
Others 5%
6%
6%
40%
39%
39%
52%
55%
54%
54%
2016
2017
2018
2019
10%
11% 16%
31%
21%
10%
38% 20%
32%
82% 62% 33%
32%
2014
2015
2016
Source: iResearch
61%
57%
54%
2017
2018
2019
2014
74%
2015
Source: iResearch
Consumption payments to see banks and fintech aggressively compete
Consumption payments will be where banks and fintech providers compete most aggressively as this is what consumers access most frequently, providing a gateway to other retail finance businesses. Third Party Payment systems have overwhelmingly become the platform of choice (Exhibit 77) — as of 2019, we estimate 68% of consumption payments came from the digital wallets of Third Party Payment providers, compared to only 12% for bank cards (excluding digital wallet binding payments, Exhibit 79). On the flipside, bank cards have dominated the transfer payment space relative to fintech payment platforms (Exhibit 78). Fintech platforms have several advantages over bank cards when users make consumption payments:
17 November 2020
n
Their ecosystems (e-commerce, instant messaging, food delivery) drive significant user stickiness;
n
QR code payments at the point-of-sale are more convenient than physical credit cards, with fintech platforms rapidly able to expand coverage of offline merchants (by providing printed QR code cards at a low cost and offering subsidies) in recent years.
48
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Financial payments are categorized as: (1) consumption (online and offline); (2) transfers; and (3) finance (e.g. wealth management and retail lending). Among these categories, consumption is the major source of income for Third Party Payment (3PP) providers given the higher take rate than transfers and finance; thus consumption payments are regarded as “commercial payments” by payment institutions.
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 75: Growth in bank card transactions value fell to only 3% in 2019
Exhibit 76: The vast majority of bank card payment value comes from transfers Bank card payment value: by transaction type
Bank card payment value Bank card transaction value
1,000 900
Growth YoY (RHS)
800
886
862
49%
742
60%
Cash deposit
Cash withdrawal
Property & wholesale
Consumer goods & services
3% 7%
50%
762
Transfer
2% 6%
2% 6%
2% 7%
2% 9%
2% 11%
70%
73%
74%
75%
75%
670
700
40%
tn Rmb Rm Rmb b tn
600 450
500
58%
30%
400 300
13%
11%
200
20%
6% 3%
3%
100 0 2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
10%
17% 11%
9%
16%
9%
0%
11%
10%
9%
7% 7%
6% 6%
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2019
Source: PBOC
Source: PBOC
Exhibit 77: Third Party Payment providers have captured the lion’s share of consumption payments (compared to bank cards)
Exhibit 78: Transfer payments, on the other hand, are dominated by bank cards Transfer Tr Transfer ansfer pa payment: yment: bank bank card card vvs. s. tthird hird party party payment payment
Consumption pa Consumption payment: yment: ban bankk c card ard vvs. s. tthird hird pa party rty pa payment yment
3rd party transfer+finance payment
3rd party consumption payment Bank card consumption payment (ex. property & wholesale)
60
55
600
50
20
14
12
5
18
17
19
20
400 262
300
171
200
8
63
100 8
0
188
123 15
0 2014
Source: PBOC, iResearch
17 November 2020
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
10
13
15
Rmb ttn Rmb n
Rmb ttn Rmb n
30
560
543 471
500
39
40
Bank card transfer payment 665 650
700
Source: PBOC, iResearch
49
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 79: Consumption payments will see banks and fintech aggressively compete; Third Party Payment platforms account for 68% of consumption payments vs. only 12% for bank cards (excluding digital wallet binding payments); Rmb
Note: Transaction value in Rmb; data as of 2019. 1) Assumes 60% bank card transactions are via third party payments; 2) Calculated by subtracting bank card & third party payments from total offline consumption; 3) Assumes services consumption is 50% of goods consumption value. Source: PBOC, iResearch, NBS, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
DC/EP to capture 15% of consumption payments in ten years, 3PP share to taper and stabilize
17 November 2020
n
Slowing growth in fintech (Third Party Payments) to an 8% CAGR in 2020-2029, a sharp decline from 57% in 2015-2019, given the already high penetration (68% in 2019, rising to 82% in five years). As DC/EP is fully rolled out and rises to 15% of consumption payments, we expect the market share of fintech to taper off and stabilize at ~80%.
n
Wider declines in physical bank card payments (-6% CAGR in 2020-2029E vs. -1% in 2015-2019); after adding back payments through fintech platforms, we expect bank card payments to see a 7% CAGR in 2020-2029E. Excluding the binding of digital wallets, we expect bank cards to comprise only 3% of consumption payments in 2029, a sharp drop from 12% in 2019.
n
Cash payments to decrease at a 7% CAGR in 2020-2029E (vs. -13% in 2015-2019) as it is gradually replaced by DC/EP and other means of mobile payments. We expect cash to account for only 5% of total consumption payments in 2029, from ~20% in 2019, as China steadily heads towards a cashless society.
50
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Based on our forecast that DC/EP will reach Rmb19tn (US$3tn) in annual TPV, a 42% CAGR in 2025-2029 (Exhibit 46) and 15% of social consumption, we forecast (Exhibit 80-Exhibit 81):
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 80: DC/EP will be the fastest growing means of payment within the consumption landscape (in terms of TPV) China consumption payment value: by means of payment Cash
DC/EP
Bank card (ex. fintech overlap)
Fintech 128 119 111
CAGR: 7%
91 85 10
79
10
73 68
CAGR: 11%
65
61 13
55
8
49 22
44
10 0 5
10 1 5
2 4
8
28
58
8 8
13
7 3
3
14
-13%
16
-7%
4
DC/EP
4
4
42%
N/A
Bank card (incl. fintech overlap)
64
70
75
83
79
87
93
98
7%
Bank card (ex. fintech overlap)
-1%
51
46
8
10
7
10%
7
7
9
Cash
6
6
31
28
3 3
8
20-29E CAGR*
19
104 97
15-19 CAGR
6
-6% Fintech
32
57%
17
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E
8%
Unit: Rmb tn Note: *25-29E for DC/EP
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Wind, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 81: DC/EP to account for 15% of consumption TPV in ten years
China consumption payment value breakdown: by means of payment DC/EP
Bank card (ex. fintech overlap)
5%
5%
12%
11%
9%
6%
13%
12%
7%
13%
2% 4%
4% 3%
10%
13%
14%
15%
7%
1% 6%
7%
9%
3%
3%
3%
3%
20% 36%
58%
Fintech
3%
15-19 chg.
20-29E chg.* Cash
-46ppt
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Cash
-18ppt
12%
57%
DC/EP
64% N/A
+15ppt
12% Bank card (incl. fintech overlap) -1ppt
78%
12% 16%
79%
81%
82%
82%
81%
80%
78%
78%
77%
68%
19%
+56ppt
2016
2017
-9ppt
Fintech
31%
17%
2015
Bank card (ex. fintech overlap) -10ppt
52%
26%
-1ppt
2018
2019
2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E
+12ppt
Note: *25-29E for DC/EP
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Impact across China’s payment system The rising penetration of DC/EP will impact China’s payment system in a number of 17 November 2020
51
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
ways: n
Commercial Banks: Commercial banks will be the only institutions permitted to operate in DC/EP exchange as it is the digitalization of legal tender. This will effectively level the playing field with fintech platforms, enabling banks to once again compete head-to-head with them in consumption payments. Binding a DC/EP wallet to a bank account may increase customer stickiness to bank mobile apps, as well as promote other banking services such as wealth management and retail lending, which we discuss in the next section. So far, the big four banks and other banks have participated in DC/EP R&D and tested the DC/EP wallet in 2020.
n
Third Party Payment providers (digital wallet issuers): Fintech platforms will eventually face new competition from banks in the payment space, although this is likely to be limited over the next few years as the adoption of DC/EP will only be gradual. It is also possible that fintech firms will add DC/EP as a payment method in their apps. In the long term, even if take rates face downward pressure from intensified competition, leading Third Party Payment players could still supplement lower commissions with higher payment volumes and value-add services such as marketing, fintech and SaaS (Exhibit 82).
n
Third Party Payment providers (acquirers): The take rate paid to acquirers will continue to be stable as DC/EP payments will still need to use existing offline channels and infrastructure (such as QR code scanners). We think this will benefit leading acquirers given higher payment volumes and increased demand by merchants for mobile payments.
n
Software/hardware vendors: Vendors should also benefit from the PBOC, commercial banks and Third Party Payment institutions outsourcing DC/EP R&D, and from hardware upgrades.
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
We summarize listed companies that have already participated in the DC/EP system or will likely have exposure to it (Exhibit 85). Exhibit 82: Third Party Payment ecosystem provides value-added service to merchants
Source: Yeahka, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
52
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 83: Traditional bank card payment take rates have declined while take rates for app-based payments have increased
Exhibit 84: Yeahka’s tech-enabled revenue contribution rose to 18% in 1H20
Yeahka payment take rate Overall
App-based payment
Yeahka tech-enabled business revenue contribution
Traditional payment
Profit contribution
Revenue contribution
20.8 24.3%
18.6
17.3
bps
16.4
18.1% 13.9
12.9
12.4
9.5
9.5
8.4%
8.8
17.8%
13.9
8.1
4.0%
7.8%
2.5%
1.7%
2017
2018
2019
1H20
2017
Source: Company data
2018
2019
1H20
Source: Company data
Exhibit 85: Listed companies that have participated in DC/EP development, or in the case of third
Commercial Banks
Company name
Details of engagement
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited
601398.SH/1398.HK
Participated in the DC/EP R&D and tested the DC/EP wallet in 2020
China Construction Bank Corporation
601939.SH/0939.HK
Participated in the DC/EP R&D and tested the DC/EP wallet in 2020
China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited
601998.SH/3998.HK
Participated in the DC/EP R&D and tested the DC/EP wallet in 2020
Agricultural Bank of China Limited
601288.SH/1288.HK
Participated in the DC/EP R&D and tested the DC/EP wallet in 2020
Postal Savings Bank of China Co.,Ltd.
601658.SH/1658.HK
Involved in the DC/EP project in 2020
Bank of Communications Co.,Ltd.
601328.SH/3328.HK
Involved in the DC/EP project in 2020
China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited
601998.SH/0998.HK
Involved in the DC/EP project in 2020
Lakala Payment Co.,Ltd.*
300773.SZ
Business includes providing payment service to merchants
N/A
Yeahka Limited*
9923.HK
Business includes providing payment service to merchants
N/A
Huifu Payment Limited*
1806.HK
Business includes providing payment service to merchants
N/A
Digital China Information Service Company Ltd.*
000555.SZ
Participated in DC/EP R&D and testing of one commercial bank
Company disclosure
Huafon Microfibre(Shanghai)Co., Ltd.*
300180.SZ
Its subsidiary Weifutong has participated in DC/EP R&D and testing of one commercial bank
Company disclosure
GRG Banking Equipment Co., Ltd.*
002152.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
Shenzhen Sunline Tech Co., Ltd.*
300348.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
Feitian Technologies Co.,Ltd.*
300386.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
XGD INC.*
300130.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
Global Infotech Co.,Ltd.*
300465.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
Shenzhen Forms Syntron Information Co., Ltd.*
300468.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
Guangzhou Kingteller Technology Co.,Ltd.*
002177.SZ
Did research in to DC/EP in 2019-2020
Company disclosure
Third Party Payment providers (acquirers)
Software/hardware vendors
Info source
PBOC
Caixin
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Main areas
Note: *Denotes Not Covered companies. Source: PBOC, Caixin, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
53
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Gateway to banks’ retail finance channels; CMB and PAB best placed to capitalize Incorporating digital currency wallets into bank apps will bring consumers back to bank channels, expanding their customer base, MAUs and stickiness. A 10% increase in the bank app users would lift revenues by 2%-5%. PAB and CMB are best placed to commercialize returning app users given their leading retail franchises, premium client bases, superior fintech capability and strategic focus on retail finance. We reiterate our Buy ratings on CMB-H/A (A on the Conviction List) and PAB.
DC/EP will bring customers back to bank apps, opening a gateway to other products Local branches were once the main channel through which banks acquired retail
DC/EP will level the playing field in retail banking. Banks will be the only institutions permitted to operate DC/EP — even digital currency wallets held with fintech firms will need to be linked with bank accounts to convert deposits and cash to DC/EP. With DC/EP embedded into bank apps, we expect customers to return to bank channels, increasing their customer base, MAUs and customer stickiness. Should DC/EP gain traction, banks should be able to recapture lost market share and grow revenues across payments, consumer lending (and deposits), wealth management, and insurance (Exhibit 88).
17 November 2020
54
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
customers. However, with digital wallets the dominant platform for consumption payments (Exhibit 81), fintech firms have swelled their customer base by linking their payment services with frequently used applications such as e-commerce and instant messaging. For the most part, bank apps have struggled to compete, with MAU typically less than 1/10th that of the top fintech apps due to fewer apps/services and less cutting edge design and functionality (Exhibit 86). CMB, on the other hand, has enjoyed considerable success in migrating its retail banking products to online from offline, with wealth management sales through its app rising to 78% of total sales in 1H20 from 43% in 2017 (Exhibit 87). We put this down to its strong retail franchise and fintech capability.
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 86: MAUs for bank apps have been significantly lower than fintech
Exhibit 87: CMB’s app has become the main channel to sell its wealth management products CMB’s wealth management sales value by channel
Mobile app MAU ranking 1,200 1,000
MAU As of Aug. 2020
On app
App MAU/ bank retail customers (RHS) 33%
991
30%
29%
35%
28%
25%
22%
41%
30%
800
Offline
40%
57%
mn
20% 600
15%
11% 6%
10%
5%
400
72%
5% 0%
200
69
65
54
43
41
37
33
32
CCB
ABC
CMB
CMB credit card
BOC
PSBC
PAB
-5%
78%
59% 43%
-10%
0 Wechat ICBC
Source: Analysys, Company data
2017
2018
2019
1H20
Source: Company data
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
A 10% increase in bank app users would boost revenues by 2-5%; PAB and CMB the largest beneficiaries To gauge the impact of DC/EP on bank revenues and earnings we look at the potential increase in active app users for four banks that comprehensively disclose retail banking metrics — two large banks (ICBC and PSBC) and two retail-focused joint-stock banks (CMB and PAB): n
17 November 2020
ICBC and PSBC have a high number of retail customers (650mn and 605mn, respectively) but a low percentage using their mobile apps (56%/43% for ICBC/PSBC, Exhibit 89). On the other hand, CMB and PAB have fewer customers but their mobile app penetration rate is much higher (71%/92%) given their greater emphasis on developing fintech applications across their businesses. 55
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 88: DC/EP rollout would open a new gateway for banks to grow their retail banking businesses
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
n
PSBC, CMB and PAB derive a higher portion of revenue and profit from retail banking than ICBC, whose strength is in corporate banking (Exhibit 90).
n
CMB has the highest average retail revenue/profit per retail customer (Rmb990/Rmb369) thanks to its premium client base, which has close to Rmb40,000 AUM (excluding deposits) per user (Exhibit 91).
n
A 10% increase in the number of bank app users would increase revenues by 2%-5% and earnings by 2%-8% (Exhibit 92), depending bank app penetration, focus on retail banking and average income per user. PAB and CMB would be the biggest beneficiaries of a DC/EP rollout (with earnings increasing 8% and 3%, respectively) given their leading retail franchises.
Exhibit 89: ICBC and PSBC have a large number of retail customers, but the % of app users to total customers is low
Exhibit 90: PSBC, CMB and PAB derive more revenue and profit from retail than ICBC Banks’ retail revenue & profit as % of total
App penetration rate of retail customers Retail customers
App users
App users/retail customers 92%
2,000 1,800 1,600
71%
1,400 56%
mn
1,200
43%
1,000 800
650
605
600 361
400
260
200
Retail revenue % 100%
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20% 144
102
97
89
10%
0%
0 ICBC
PSBC
CMB
PAB
Retail profit % 89%
64%
64%
58%
53% 40%
45% 39%
20% 10% 0% ICBC
PSBC
CMB
PAB
As of 2019
Source: Company data
Source: Company data
Hypothetical boost of bank revenue & profit assuming 10% increase in app users
Average retail revenue, profit & AUM per retail customer Retail revenue
Retail profit
2,000
AUM ex. Deposit
8%
30,000 14,412 6,342
1,000
3,003
1,005
10,000 824
0
800
525
400 200
-10,000
461 188
20,000
292
258
5% Rmb
1,400 Rmb
Impact on profit
40,000
1,600
600
Impact on revenue
50,000
40,415
1,800
1,200
Exhibit 92: PAB and CMB would benefit the most from an increase in app users given their leading retail franchises
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 91: CMB has the highest retail revenue and profit per user, thanks to high AUM
4% 2%
3%
3%
3%
2%
-20,000 -30,000
64
0
-40,000 ICBC
As of 2019 Source: Company data
PSBC
CMB
PAB
ICBC
PSBC
CMB
PAB
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Bank valuation in a DC/EP world: Retail banking vs. Fintech Retail banking and fintech have comparable product offerings in payments, lending, wealth management and insurance. With DC/EP to level the playing field between banks and fintech, we recast our retail banking forecasts and derive and implied valuation for 17 November 2020
56
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
CMB’s and PAB’s retail banking businesses using a SOTP. Our target P/PPOP multiples for CMB and PAB (6.00x/3.00x) imply a 16x/13x P/E for their retail banking business, which looks reasonable compared with global peers. n
We recast our retail banking forecasts by applying key growth drivers such as app MAU, average AUM/TPV/loan balance per user and take rate (Exhibit 94), to our retail banking forecasts (Exhibit 95-Exhibit 96). Our estimates for corporate banking are unchanged.
n
We value corporate banking by applying ICBC’s target P/B multiple (0.8x) to CMB and PAB’s corporate book value, based on their corporate business assets and assuming the same leverage ratio for retail banking.
n
Deducting corporate banking valuation from overall valuation implies a valuation for CMB and PAB’s retail banking business of 16x/13x 2021E P/E, around the mid-range of global peers (Exhibit 98).
n
We then deduct the valuation of their lending segments (based on average target multiples for Capital One and American Express) from the above retail banking valuation to derive a valuation for CMB and PAB’s non-lending retail business: 17x/14x P/E.
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 93: Retail banking offerings are similar to fintech
Note: As of 2019 Source: Company data
17 November 2020
57
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 94: Reconsidering drivers for retail banking: Growing customer base key to driving banks’ revenues and earnings
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
58
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 95: Recast financial model for CMB’s retail business: Mid-teens revenue growth in 2020-2025E
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
PAB Retail business Retail revenue Growth yoy I. Lending business Growth yoy as % of total retail revenue NIM/take rate Loan balance Growth yoy II. Non-lending business Growth yoy as % of total retail revenue 1. Payment/transaction fee Growth yoy Take rate(bps) TPV Growth yoy 2. Wealth management fee Growth yoy Take rate(bps) Non-deposit AUM Growth yoy AUM Growth yoy Private bank AUM Non-Private bank AUM Retail net profit Growth yoy
2017 47 42% 27 33% 59% 3.2% 849 57% 19 55% 41% 19 49% 4.5 41,593 26% 3 11% 41 771 39% 1,087 36%
2018 62 33% 39 42% 63% 3.4% 1,154 36% 23 19% 37% 25 36% 4.2 59,566 43% 3 9% 36 980 27% 1,417 30% 458 959
2019 80 29% 50 30% 63% 3.7% 1,357 18% 30 29% 37% 30 20% 4.8 63,114 6% 5 29% 32 1,420 45% 1,983 40% 734 1,249
2020E 90 12% 56 12% 63% 3.5% 1,603 18% 34 13% 37% 34 13% 4.7 72,753 15% 5 18% 31 1,722 21% 2,474 25% 1,040 1,435
2021E 101 13% 63 12% 62% 3.4% 1,875 17% 38 14% 38% 39 14% 4.7 83,885 15% 6 19% 30 2,113 23% 3,093 25% 1,452 1,641
2022E 115 14% 71 13% 62% 3.3% 2,171 16% 44 14% 38% 45 14% 4.6 96,745 15% 8 20% 29 2,617 24% 3,866 25% 1,997 1,868
2023E 131 14% 81 13% 62% 3.3% 2,482 14% 50 15% 38% 51 14% 4.6 111,606 15% 9 21% 28 3,261 25% 4,825 25% 2,707 2,118
2024E 151 15% 94 16% 62% 3.3% 2,799 13% 58 15% 38% 58 14% 4.5 128,788 15% 11 21% 27 4,073 25% 6,005 24% 3,615 2,390
2025E 178 18% 112 20% 63% 3.6% 3,112 11% 66 15% 37% 66 14% 4.5 148,660 15% 13 21% 26 5,083 25% 7,437 24% 4,752 2,685
16 68%
17 9%
19 14%
21 7%
23 11%
26 13%
31 17%
36 19%
45 23%
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 96: Recast financial model for PAB’s retail business: Mid- to high-teens revenue growth through 2025E
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
59
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 97: After decomposing valuation into retail and corporate, target P/PPOP multiples for CMB and PAB (6.00x/3.00x) imply 16x/13x P/E for their retail banking business... Net profit Book value Valuation P/E 2021E P/B 2021E 2021E 2021E
Note
CMB Total
109
765
1,303
12.0x
1.7x
Our target valuation is based on 6.0x P/PPOP
65
273
997
15.5x
3.7x
Backed-out from total target valuation minus corporate valuation
Lending business
32
-
426
13.5x
-
Non-lending business
33
-
571
17.4x
-
44
492
306
6.9x
0.6x
35
369
382
11.0x
1.0x
Our target valuation is based on 3.0x P/PPOP
23
138
301
13.0x
2.2x
Backed-out from total target valuation minus corporate valuation
Lending business
5
-
53
10.1x
-
Non-lending business
18
-
248
13.9x
-
12
231
81
6.9x
0.4x
Retail business
Corporate business
Based on average target P/E of COF and AXP Backed-out from retail valuation minus lending business valuation Based on target P/E of ICBC
PAB Total Retail business
Corporate business
Based on average target P/E of COF and AXP, then apply 25% discount Backed-out from retail valuation minus lending business valuation Based on target P/E of ICBC
Comps Capital One (COF)
9.3x
0.8x
Target price implied valuation
American Express (AXP)
17.6x
4.3x
Target price implied valuation
Paypal (PYPL)
86.7x
10.4x
Target price implied valuation
Visa (V)
40.0x
14.8x
Target price implied valuation
MasterCard (MA)
45.9x
83.8x
Target price implied valuation
BlackRock (BLK)
21.3x
3.0x
Target price implied valuation
Alliance Bernstein
11.7x
0.5x
Target price implied valuation
ICBC
6.9x
0.8x
Target price implied valuation
CMB (Retail)
15.5x
3.7x
Calculated target valuation
PAB (Retail)
13.0x
2.2x
Calculated target valuation
In Rmb bn. As of Nov. 11, 2020 Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 98: ...which looks reasonable compared with global peers Target price implied P/E and P/B P/E 2021E 86.7
P/B 2021E
83.8
40.0 21.3
14.8
10.4
17.6 3.0
Paypal
MasterCard
Visa
BlackRock
15.5
13.0
4.3
3.7
American Express
CMB (Retail)
11.7 2.2
PAB (Retail)
9.3 0.5
0.8
6.9
Alliance Capital One Bernstein
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
45.9
0.8
ICBC
The valuations are our target price implied multiples Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
CMB, PAB best placed to capitalize on DC/EP; reiterate Buy ratings (CMB-A on the CL) Among China banks, PAB and CMB are best placed to commercialize returning app users from the roll out of DC/EP given their:
17 November 2020
n
leading retail franchises: PAB and CMB have the strongest retail franchises, especially in wealth management.
n
premium client bases: AUM (ex. deposits) of CMB and PAB are 6x/2x larger than ICBC (Exhibit 91).
60
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
n
advanced fintech capability: both banks enjoy higher mobile app penetration of their retail customers (71%/92% for CMB/PAB, Exhibit 89) than peers.
n
strategic focus on retail banking: CMB regards its retail business as the “main body” of its overall business, while over the last few years PAB has made the digital transition in retail banking one of its key corporate strategies.
As such, we expect both to steadily recapture or increase their market share across most retail finance categories. Exhibit 99: CMB to claw back market share in wealth management, and to a lesser extent, payments
Exhibit 100: PAB to steadily gain market share in payments and, to a lesser extent, wealth management PAB: retail income market share in each segment
CMB: retail income market share in each segment Lending
Wealth mgmt.
18% 15%
15%
14%
10%
7%
9%
16% 14%
10%
16%
17%
6%
2016
2017
17%
Lending
Wealth mgmt.
17% 14% 14% 13%
14%
12%
11%
10%
8%
7%
7%
7%
6%
6%
7%
2018
2019
2020E
11%
11%
11%
11%
9%
9%
8%
8%
7%
2021E
7%
2022E
9%
7%
2023E
7%
2024E
5%
8%
2025E
11%
11%
6%
6%
9%
7% 6% 6%
6% 6%
Payment
Insurance sales
5%
4%
4%
4%
2016
2017
2018
6%
5%
5%
2019
2020E
5%
2021E
6%
6%
2022E
7%
6%
2023E
7% 7%
2024E
7% 7%
2025E
Note: revenue as % of all banks
Note: revenue as % of all banks
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
As the leading retail banks in China that will benefit the most from the digital currency rollout, we reiterate our Buy ratings on CMB H/A (A- on the Conviction List) and PAB. Neither has participated in early testing of the DC/EP system (so far this has been limited to the big four state owned banks), however, along with all other commercial banks, we expect both will operate DC/EP in the official launch and benefit once uptake increases over time. With DC/EP still at the testing stage and timing for a full roll out yet to be determined, we make no changes to our 2020-2022E earnings forecasts, CAMELOT-derived valuation or ratings.
17 November 2020
61
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Payment
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 101: China banks valuation Company
Ticker
Currency
Closing Price
TP
Upside
P/E P/B EPS growth P/PPOP ROE Div yield Target 21E Rating P/PPOP 2020E 2021E 2020E 2021E 2020E 2021E 2020E 2021E 2020E 2021E 2020E 2021E
H-share ICBC
1398.HK
HK$
4.68
6.69
43%
3.50x
Buy
4.5x
4.5x
0.5x
0.5x
1%
2%
0.0x
0.0x
12%
11%
6.7%
6.9%
BOC
3988.HK
HK$
2.76
3.60
30%
2.50x
Neutral
3.8x
3.8x
0.4x
0.4x
1%
1%
0.0x
0.0x
12%
11%
8.1%
8.2%
CCB
0939.HK
HK$
6.00
8.35
39%
3.50x
Buy
4.6x
4.5x
0.6x
0.5x
4%
4%
0.0x
0.0x
13%
13%
6.7%
6.8%
ABC
1288.HK
HK$
2.88
3.90
35%
2.75x
Neutral
4.0x
3.9x
0.4x
0.4x
7%
0%
0.0x
0.0x
12%
11%
8.1%
8.2%
BoCom
3328.HK
HK$
4.22
4.47
6%
2.00x
Sell
3.4x
3.4x
0.4x
0.3x
0%
2%
0.0x
0.0x
11%
10%
8.8%
9.0%
PSBC
1658.HK
HK$
4.21
6.12
45%
3.25x
Buy
4.8x
4.4x
0.5x
0.5x
3%
9%
0.0x
0.0x
11%
11%
6.7%
7.3%
CMB
3968.HK
HK$
49.30
56.34
14%
6.00x
Buy
10.7x
9.8x
1.6x
1.4x
6%
9%
0.0x
0.0x
15%
15%
2.9%
3.2%
CEB
6818.HK
HK$
2.93
3.43
17%
1.50x
Neutral
3.4x
3.4x
0.3x
0.3x
1%
0%
0.0x
0.0x
10%
9%
8.1%
8.1%
CQRCB
3618.HK
HK$
3.34
3.44
3%
1.75x
Neutral
3.6x
3.5x
0.3x
0.3x
-8%
1%
0.0x
0.0x
10%
9%
5.6%
5.7%
4.0x
3.9x
0.4x
0.4x
1%
2%
0.0x
0.0x
12%
11%
6.7%
7.3%
5.4%
Median (H) A-share ICBC
601398.SS
Rmb
5.00
6.14
23%
3.50x
Buy
5.7x
5.6x
0.7x
0.6x
1%
2%
3.0x
2.9x
12%
11%
5.3%
BOC
601988.SS
Rmb
3.23
3.31
2%
2.50x
Neutral
5.2x
5.2x
0.5x
0.5x
1%
1%
2.6x
2.4x
12%
11%
5.7%
5.8%
CCB
601939.SS
Rmb
6.48
7.66
18%
3.50x
Buy
5.9x
5.8x
0.7x
0.7x
4%
4%
3.1x
3.0x
13%
13%
5.2%
5.3%
ABC
601288.SS
Rmb
3.19
3.57
12%
2.75x
Neutral
5.2x
5.2x
0.6x
0.5x
7%
0%
2.6x
2.5x
12%
11%
6.1%
6.1%
BoCom
601328.SS
Rmb
4.59
4.62
1%
2.25x
Sell
4.4x
4.3x
0.5x
0.4x
0%
2%
2.4x
2.3x
11%
10%
6.9%
7.0% 5.2%
PSBC
601658.SS
Rmb
4.71
5.62
19%
3.25x
Buy
6.3x
5.8x
0.7x
0.7x
3%
9%
3.1x
2.7x
11%
11%
4.8%
CMB
600036.SS
Rmb
43.84
51.68
18%
6.00x
Buy*
11.2x
10.2x
1.6x
1.5x
6%
9%
5.8x
5.2x
15%
15%
2.8%
3.0%
CEB
601818.SS
Rmb
4.05
4.19
3%
2.00x
Neutral
5.6x
5.6x
0.5x
0.5x
1%
0%
2.2x
2.0x
10%
9%
4.9%
4.9%
Industrial
601166.SS
Rmb
17.91
20.18
13%
2.50x
Buy
5.6x
5.3x
0.7x
0.6x
1%
6%
2.5x
2.2x
13%
13%
4.1%
4.4%
PAB
000001.SZ
Rmb
17.83
19.71
11%
3.00x
Buy
11.2x
9.9x
1.2x
1.1x
9%
13%
3.2x
2.8x
11%
11%
1.4%
1.6%
HuaXia
600015.SS
Rmb
6.28
6.23
-1%
1.50x
Sell
4.5x
4.6x
0.3x
0.3x
-2%
-2%
1.6x
1.5x
8%
7%
7.6%
7.4%
BONB
002142.SZ
Rmb
34.58
30.51
-12%
6.00x
Neutral 13.1x
11.8x
1.7x
1.5x
4%
11%
8.2x
7.1x
14%
14%
1.3%
1.8%
BONJ
601009.SS
Rmb
8.07
9.29
15%
3.25x
6.1x
5.8x
0.8x
0.7x
-9%
5%
3.2x
2.8x
13%
12%
4.8%
5.2%
5.7x
5.6x
0.7x
0.6x
1%
4%
3.0x
2.7x
12%
11%
4.9%
5.2%
Median (A)
Buy
Note: *Denotes stock is on our Conviction List. Priced as of Nov. 17, 2020. TPs are on a 12-month time frame. Risks: slow roll-out and less adoption of DC/EP than expected, worse asset quality, margin erosion and corporate governance issues.
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
62
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Rmb 3tn revenue pool for retail finance by 2025, 9% CAGR We forecast a Rmb3tn revenue pool for retail finance by 2025 (excluding mortgages) as growth in payments and retail lending slows but wealth management and insurance agency remain brisk. Over the next five years, we expect Fintech to grow revenues at almost double the rate of banks as they continue to capture incremental market share across the retail finance ecosystem. The DC/EP roll-out will likely slow the rate that banks cede ground to fintech, and even reverse over the long-term, albeit in a more competitive environment.
Retail finance revenue CAGR over the next five years (2020-25) by segment: n
9% in total, well below 23% annual growth in 2015-2019, as government policies to curb household leverage significantly impact retail lending (2020-25E CAGR of 9% vs. 2015-19 CAGR of 30%).
n
8% for payments (almost half that in 2015-19 of 18%) as peak penetration of mobile payments caps growth from new users.
n
9% for lending, much lower than 30% in 2015-19 given aforementioned government measure to curb household debt.
n
Mid-teens (12%/14%) for wealth management and insurance sales income (CAGR in 2020-25) given robust and sustainable asset allocation demand from the household sector.
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Below, we discuss our assumptions for each segment as well as our methodology.
17 November 2020
63
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 102: China retail finance TAM: Rmb 3tn revenue pool by 2025 (excluding mortgages), 9% CAGR 2015 2016 Total retail Total retail finance finance revenue revenue (banks, (banks, fintech fintech & others) others)
2017
2018
2019
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
2024E
2025E
15-19
20-25E
CAGR
CAGR
30% 14% 18% 13% 12% 23%
9% 10% 8% 12% 14% 9%
CAGR
CAGR
31% 9% 11% 9% 9% 20%
10% 8% 6% 12% 14% 9%
Change
Change
3 ppt -16 ppt -21 ppt -10 ppt -9 ppt -7 ppt
1 ppt -5 ppt -7 ppt -3 ppt -2 ppt -1 ppt
CAGR
CAGR
113% 50% 75% 36% 21% 58%
20% 13% 12% 16% 15% 15%
Change
Change
5 ppt 17 ppt 21 ppt 11 ppt 9 ppt 9 ppt
5 ppt 5 ppt 7 ppt 4 ppt 2 ppt 5 ppt
R ev en u e Revenue Lending Non-lending Payment Wealth mgmt. agency Insurance sales Total
Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn
366 386 226 106 53 752
496 403 233 95 75 899
821 523 325 114 84 1,344
936 585 390 126 69 1,521
1,031 661 440 137 85 1,693
1,099 700 443 161 97 1,800
1,207 779 495 172 112 1,986
1,339 856 537 192 127 2,194
1,470 943 583 215 144 2,413
1,605 1,042 636 243 164 2,647
1,750 1,151 688 276 187 2,900
Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn
261 341 214 87 40 602
317 325 192 76 57 642
530 400 248 89 64 930
662 431 282 99 49 1,092
766 477 323 99 56 1,243
816 493 314 113 66 1,308
905 542 346 119 76 1,447
984 589 370 134 85 1,573
1,083 642 397 150 95 1,725
1,195 702 427 168 107 1,897
1,321 770 459 191 120 2,090
% % % % % %
71% 88% 94% 82% 75% 80%
64% 81% 82% 79% 77% 71%
64% 77% 76% 78% 76% 69%
71% 74% 72% 79% 71% 72%
74% 72% 73% 72% 66% 73%
74% 70% 71% 70% 68% 73%
75% 70% 70% 69% 68% 73%
74% 69% 69% 70% 67% 72%
74% 68% 68% 69% 66% 71%
74% 67% 67% 69% 65% 72%
75% 67% 67% 69% 64% 72%
Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn Rmb bn
3 34 13 8 13 37
11 69 41 11 17 80
22 114 78 16 20 136
41 145 107 18 20 186
62 173 117 26 29 235
83 195 129 35 31 278
104 224 148 39 36 329
125 253 166 45 42 378
150 285 186 50 49 435
173 322 209 57 57 495
187 361 229 65 67 548
% % % % % %
1% 9% 6% 8% 25% 5%
2% 17% 18% 11% 23% 9%
3% 22% 24% 14% 24% 10%
4% 25% 28% 14% 29% 12%
6% 26% 27% 19% 34% 14%
8% 28% 29% 22% 32% 15%
9% 29% 30% 23% 32% 17%
9% 30% 31% 23% 33% 17%
10% 30% 32% 23% 34% 18%
11% 31% 33% 23% 35% 19%
11% 31% 33% 23% 36% 19%
Banks a n ks B Revenue Revenue Lending Non-lending Payment Wealth mgmt. agency Insurance sales Total Market Market rket share share Ma Lending Non-lending Payment Wealth mgmt. agency Insurance sales Total Fintech i n t ec h F Revenue Revenue Lending Non-lending Payment Wealth mgmt. agency Insurance sales Total Market Market rket share share Ma Lending Non-lending Payment Wealth mgmt. agency Insurance sales Total
Note: 2015-19 CAGR for wealth management is 2016-19 due to the high base in 2015; retail lending does not include mortgages; insurance’s bank sales only includes life bancassurance while fintech sales includes both life and P&C Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 104: Fintech to grow revenues at almost double that of banks as they capture incremental market share across the retail finance ecosystem China fintech firms retail finance revenue pool
China banks retail finance revenue pool Insurance sales
Wealth mgmt. agency
Lending
Payment
2,090 1,897
1,725 CAGR: 20%
1,243 1,308
1,092 99
930
113
119
1,573 85 134
642
89
87 261
76 317
530
214
192
248
662
282
766
323
816
314
905
984
1,083
107 168
120 191
370
397
Wealth mgmt. agency
Lending
9%
1,195
427
CAGR: 15%
14% 378
Wealth mgmt.
1,321
459
329
12%
235 186
6%
29
136
10%
Payment
11%
278
CAGR: 58%
Lending
31% 346
Insurance sales
20-25E CAGR
Insurance sales
9%
99 602
95 150
15-19 CAGR
Payment
15-19 CAGR
20-25E CAGR
548
CAGR: 9%
1,447
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 103: Banks to grow retail finance revenues at a 9% CAGR in 2020-2025
41
80 22
37 41
78
107
62 117
31 35 83 129
36 39 104
42 45
495
435
57
49
57
Insurance sales 67 65
21%
50 173
187
150
36%
166
186
16%
Lending
125
113% 148
15%
Wealth mgmt.
209
229
20%
Payment
75%
12%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E2021E2022E2023E2024E2025E
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Unit: Rmb bn
Unit: Rmb bn
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Payments: Rmb 688bn revenues by 2025, 8% CAGR n
17 November 2020
TAM: Rmb 1.8tn TPV by 2025, including consumption payments (the main source of income), transfers and other types of low-fee payments. For banks, only the TPV of bank cards have been included in this calculation.
64
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
n
TAM growth: 8% CAGR in 2020-25 (6% for banks, 12% for fintech), down from a 13% CAGR in 2015-19 given the high penetration rate of mobile payments.
n
Take rate: Flat by 2025 as DC/EP unlikely to pressure fee rates, at least initially.
n
Revenue: Rmb 688bn revenues by 2025 on an 8% CAGR, calculated by multiplying TPV by the take rate.
n
Market structure: Banks to account for the lion’s share (73% TPV, 67% revenues), although fintech to incrementally capture market share (28% of TPV in 2025 from 22% in 2019, and 33% of revenues in 2025 from 27% in 2019).
n
Impact of DC/EP: Minimal direct impact to the revenue pool in 2025 as the fee structure for banks and fintech is unlikely to change in the near-term. At the very least, the pace at which banks cede market share should slow. Over the long-term however, competitive pressure could intensify if DC/EP gains in popularity and usage increases.
Exhibit 105: Retail payments TAM: Rmb 688bn revenues by 2025, 8% TPV CAGR 2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
2024E
2025E
15-19 CAGR
20-25E CAGR
Retail payment Retail payment TPV TP TPV V Banks
Rmb tn
670
742
762
862
886
860
946
1,021
1,106
1,201
1,305
7%
7%
Fintech
Rmb tn
24
79
148
220
251
276
318
356
398
446
491
80%
12%
Total
Rmb tn
694
821
910
1,082
1,137
1,136
1,263
1,377
1,505
1,648
1,796
13%
8%
Banks
Rmb tn
14
15
17
19
20
20
22
23
25
27
30
10%
7%
Fintech
Rmb tn
8
13
17
32
46
51
58
64
70
75
79
57%
9%
DC/EP
Rmb tn
-
-
-
-
-
-
0
1
2
3
7
N/A
N/A
Total
Rmb tn
21
28
34
51
66
70
80
87
95
102
109
33%
9%
Banks
bps
3.2
2.6
3.3
3.3
3.6
3.6
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.5
N/A
N/A
Fintech
bps
5.2
5.2
5.2
4.9
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
N/A
N/A
Total
bps
3.3
2.8
3.6
3.6
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.8
N/A
N/A
Banks
Rmb bn
214
192
248
282
323
314
346
370
397
427
459
11%
6%
Fintech
Rmb bn
13
41
78
107
117
129
148
166
186
209
229
75%
12%
Total
Rmb bn
226
233
325
390
440
443
495
537
583
636
688
18%
8%
Consumption TPV Consumption TPV
Overall take Overall take rrate at e
Revenue Revenue
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Note: red numbers are GS assumptions. Source: Wind, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 106: Retail payment value to grow 8% annually through 2025
Exhibit 107: Fintech to account for almost 30% of TPV by 2025 China retail payment value breakdown
China retail payment fee income Fintech
Banks
15-19 CAGR
Fintech
20-25E CAGR
CAGR: 8%
7% 688
12%
16%
19%
636 495 440
325 226 13 214
233
117 107
148
166
229 186
209
282
75%
323
314
346
93%
370
397
28%
28%
28%
427
88%
84%
81%
78%
75%
74%
Fintech
72%
72%
72%
-19ppt
11%
+3ppt
Banks 73%
459
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
+3ppt
6%
Unit: Rmb bn
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
27%
12%
Banks
78
248
26%
20-25E chg.
+19ppt
129
41 192
537
443
390
25%
15-19 chg.
Fintech
583 CAGR: 18%
22%
Banks
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
65
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 108: Payment fee income to grow at the same rate as payment value through 2025
Exhibit 109: Fintech to account for a third of payment fee income by 2025 China retail payment fee income breakdown
China retail payment fee income Fintech
Banks
15-19 CAGR
Fintech
20-25E CAGR
CAGR: 8%
18%
688 636 495 440
443
117
129
390 325 226
233
13
41
214
192
107
148
537
166
229 186
209
282
323
314
75%
24%
28%
27%
29%
30%
31%
32%
33%
33%
Fintech +3ppt
12% 94% 82%
346
20-25E chg.
+21ppt
Banks
78
248
15-19 chg.
Fintech
583 CAGR: 18%
Banks
6%
370
397
427
76%
72%
73%
Banks
71%
70%
69%
68%
67%
67%
459
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
11%
-21ppt
+3ppt
6%
Unit: Rmb bn
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Source: PBOC, iResearch, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
n
TAM: Rmb 28tn balance by 2025, which excludes mortgages.
n
TAM growth: 11% balance CAGR in 20-25E, down from 30% in 15-19 (9% for banks, 20% for fintech) as the government targets household leverage.
n
Take rate: Interest rate to remain stable in the coming years, though visibility is low as this depends on changes in monetary policy. Take rate for fintech (in loan facilitation) to remain steady at ~3%.
n
Revenue: Rmb 1.8tn by 2025 on an 9% CAGR (10% for banks, 20% for fintech ex.P2P, 3% for others including P2P), calculated by multiplying lending balance by the interest rate (or take rate).
n
Market structure: Banks to continue dominating (66% lending balance by 2025, 75% income), with fintech to double its market share off a very low base (24% of lending balance in 2025 from only 15% in 2019; and 11% of income in 2025 from 6% in 2019) as the share from other financial institutions (FIs) including P2P shrinks as they are less competitive in acquiring customers.
n
Impact of DC/EP: Minimal direct impact in the near-term as retail lending is determined by a variety of factors such as growth in consumption and housing, lending appetite and government policies. Over the long-term however, the DC/EP rollout may help banks recapture some lost market share as customers increasingly use bank apps embedded with DC/EP (increasing their customer base, MAU, and stickiness).
66
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Retail Lending: Rmb 1.8tn revenues by 2025, 9% CAGR
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 110: Lending TAM: Rmb 1.8tn revenues by 2025 (excluding mortgages), 11% balance CAGR 2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
2024E
2025E
15-19 CAGR
20-25E CAGR
Retail lending Retail lending Lending Le Lending nding balance balance Banks
Rmb tn
4
5
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
17
18
26%
9%
Fintech (ex. P2P)
Rmb tn
0
0
1
1
2
3
4
4
5
6
7
113%
20%
Others
Rmb tn
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
22%
6%
Total
Rmb tn
5
7
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
26
28
30%
11%
Banks
%
6%
6%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
N/A
N/A
Fintech (ex. P2P)
%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
N/A
N/A
Others
%
12%
12%
12%
11%
11%
10%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
N/A
N/A
Total
%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
6%
6%
6%
6%
N/A
N/A
Banks
Rmb bn
261
317
530
662
766
816
905
984
1,083
1,195
1,321
31%
10%
Fintech (ex. P2P)
Rmb bn
3
11
22
41
62
83
104
125
150
173
187
113%
20%
Others
Rmb bn
102
168
269
234
204
201
198
229
238
237
242
19%
3%
Total
Rmb bn
366
496
821
936
1,031
1,099
1,207
1,339
1,470
1,605
1,750
30%
9%
Take Ta Take ke rate r at e
Revenue Revenue
Red numbers are GS assumptions; does not include mortgages. Source: Wind, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 111: Lending balance to grow 11% annually through 2025 (down from 30% in 2015-19)
Exhibit 112: Fintech to account for almost a quarter of lending balance (excluding mortgages) by 2025, up from only 15% in 2019
China retail lending balance Fintech (ex. P2P)
China retail lending balance breakdown
Bank 15 1 5--19 19 CAGR CAGR
CAGR: 11% 23 21
19
CAGR: 30%
17 15 13
11
5
7
2
8 4
5
2015
2016
2017
2 1
10
2018
2 2 2
11
3
2 4
28 26
3
3
17%
Others
22%
6%
13
6
6%
7%
16 1 6--19 19 chg. chg.
16%
13%
13%
11%
12%
11%
10%
10%
11%
15%
18%
20%
22%
23%
24%
24%
4
14
17
Others -4ppt
113%
15
20 2 0--25E chg. chg.
-3ppt
Fintech ex. P2P
Fintech
20% 81%
+13ppt 73%
72%
73%
18
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
26%
72%
69%
68%
66%
65%
65%
66%
+9ppt
Banks
9% -9ppt
Unit: Rmb bn
Source: Wind, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
21%
Bank
5
Banks 12
21%
Fintech (ex. P2P)
7
3
3
Other FIs
20 2 0--25E CAGR CAGR
2015
2016
2017
2018
-6ppt
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Source: Wind, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
67
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Other FIs
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 113: Growth in retail lending income to slow to 9% annually through 2025 as government measures to curb household leverage take hold
Exhibit 114: Fintech to increase market share at the expense of other financial institutions; banks to account for the lion’s share
China retail lending income Other FIs
Fintech (ex. P2P)
China retail lending income breakdown
Bank 15--19 15 19 CAGR CAGR
CAGR: 9% 1,470 1,339
1,207
CAGR: 30% 936
821 234
496
1,031 204 62
1,099
201 83
168 530
261
317
2015
2016
198 104
2017
816
905
242 237 187 173
Others
19%
28%
34%
33%
3%
25%
4%
20% 6%
Fintech (ex. P2P)
18%
16%
8%
9%
17% 9%
Bank
16 1 6--19 19 chg. chg.
16%
15%
14%
10%
11%
11%
3%
Fintech ex. P2P
125
113%
20 2 0--25E chg. chg.
Others
-8ppt
150
984
1,083
1,195
1,321
662
766
2018
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Banks
31%
-6ppt
Fintech
20%
+5ppt
269
366 102
238 229
1,750 1,605
Other FIs
20 2 0--25 25E E CAGR CAGR
71%
64%
64%
71%
74%
74%
75%
74%
74%
74%
+5ppt
75% Banks
10% +3ppt
Unit: Rmb bn
Source: Wind, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
2015
2016
2017
2018
+1ppt
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Source: Wind, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
n
TAM: Rmb 130tn AUM by 2025, including bank WMPs, mutual funds, private funds etc. We exclude trust channels and brokers in this calculation.
n
TAM growth: Mid to low teens in TPV (12% through 2025E from 14% CAGR in 2016-19) thanks to robust asset allocation demand from households.
n
Take rate: Stable management fee (for asset management products) and agency fee. Notably, the blended take rate on agency AUM (AUM multiplied by agent share in each channel) is impacted by new volume sold each year.
n
Revenue: Rmb 276bn revenues by 2025 on an 12% AUM CAGR, calculated by multiplying AUM by channel share and take rate.
n
Market structure: In terms of agency income, fintech to steadily take market share from banks and brokers (23% by 2025 from 19% in 2019) as higher app usage and better connectivity increase customer penetration and stickiness, benefiting fintech firms in particular as wealth management continues to shift online. In terms of AUM, bank WMPs, mutual funds and private funds will continue to expand their market share, accounting for ~80% of the space by 2025. Fintech firms do not have assets under management.
n
Impact of DC/EP: Minimal direct impact in the near-term as most fintech firms have an edge over most banks in terms of their app connectivity, functionality and design. Over the long-term however, DC/EP may help banks recapture market share as customers migrate back to traditional bank channels as they increasingly use bank apps embedded with DC/EP.
68
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Wealth Management: Rmb 276bn revenues by 2025, 12% CAGR
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 115: Wealth Management TAM: Rmb 276bn revenues by 2025, 11% AUM CAGR 2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
2024E
2025E
16-19 CAGR
20-25E CAGR
Wealth mg Wealth mgmt. mt. Wealth mgmt. mt. AU AUM M Wealth mg Bank WMP
Rmb tn
17
23
22
22
23
26
29
32
36
41
47
8%
12%
Mutual fund
Rmb tn
8
9
12
13
15
18
20
22
25
28
31
15%
13%
Private funds
Rmb tn
5
8
11
13
14
16
18
21
24
28
32
28%
14%
Brokers
Rmb tn
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
6%
6%
Trust Total
Rmb tn
7
10
14
13
14
14
15
15
16
17
17
18%
4%
Rmb tn
40
52
61
63
68
75
84
93
104
116
130
14%
11%
Bank WMP
%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
N/A
N/A
Mutual fund
%
1.6%
1.3%
1.2%
1.2%
1.2%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
N/A
N/A
Private funds
%
2.7%
2.1%
2.0%
2.0%
2.0%
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
N/A
N/A
Brokers
%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.1%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
N/A
N/A
Trust Age A Agency gency ncy AUM AUM
%
2.7%
2.1%
2.0%
2.0%
2.0%
1.8%
1.6%
1.6%
1.6%
1.6%
1.6%
N/A
N/A
Banks
Rmb tn
27
34
37
37
38
42
47
52
59
66
75
9%
12%
Fintech
Rmb tn
2
3
4
5
7
9
10
11
13
14
16
44%
14%
Brokers & others Total
Rmb tn
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
5
13%
11%
Rmb tn
30
39
43
44
48
54
60
67
75
85
96
12%
12%
Banks
bps
32
22
24
27
26
27
25
25
25
25
26
N/A
N/A
Fintech
bps
49
38
36
36
36
40
40
40
40
40
40
N/A
N/A
Brokers & others Total
bps
66
48
41
42
44
44
41
41
41
41
41
N/A
N/A
bps
35
24
26
29
29
30
29
29
29
29
29
N/A
N/A
Banks
Rmb bn
87
76
89
99
99
113
119
134
150
168
191
7%
12%
Fintech
Rmb bn
8
11
16
18
26
35
39
45
50
57
65
26%
16%
Brokers & others Total
Rmb bn
11
9
9
9
12
13
13
14
16
18
20
6%
9%
Rmb bn
106
95
114
126
137
161
172
192
215
243
276
9%
12%
Mgmt. fee rate r at e Mgmt. fee
Blended take rate r at e Blended take
Agency ncy fee fee income income Agency Age
Note: Red numbers are GS assumptions. For the 2015-19 CAGR calculation we use 2016-19 due to the high base in 2015 Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 116: Growth in AUM to expand to 12% through 2025 thanks to robust asset allocation by households
Exhibit 117: Market share for Bank WMPs, mutual funds and private funds to continue rising over the next five years
China Chi China na wealth wealth mgmt. mgmt. product product AUM Brokers
Private funds
Chi China China na wealth wealth mgmt. mgmt. product product AUM AUM breakdown breakdown
Mutual fund
Bank WMP
16--19 16 19 CAGR CAGR
104 93
61
63
14
13
11 12
13
52 40 7 5 8
10 8 9
17
23
2015
2016
75 68 14 14
15 15
14 16
13
15
18
22
22
23
26
2017
2018
18 20 29
28
22
32
31
36
-4%
13% 6%
Private funds
28
Private funds
Mutual fund
Bank WMP
21%
19%
23%
21%
20%
19%
18%
16%
15%
14%
13%
21%
15%
18%
20%
21%
21%
22%
22%
23%
24%
47
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
17%
+1ppt
-1ppt
17% 19%
14%
21%
22%
23%
24%
24%
24%
24%
24%
-7ppt
13%
12%
-1ppt
Private funds
+6ppt
+4ppt
Mutual fund 44%
44%
2015
2016
36%
36%
35%
35%
2017
2018
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
34%
34%
35%
35%
36%
Bank WMP 0%
20 2 0--25E 25E chg. chg.
24%
Mutual fund 41
16 1 6--19 19 chg. chg.
Brokers
Brokers
24
25
18%
17
32
21
Brokers
Trust 4%
10%
17
16
84
CAGR: 9%
116
Trust
Trust
130 CAGR: 12%
20 2 0--25E CAGR CAGR
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Trust
+4ppt
+2ppt
Bank WMP -10ppt
+2ppt
Unit: Rmb tn
Source: PBOC, SAC, CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
17 November 2020
Source: PBOC, SAC, CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
69
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 118: Agency income to grow 12% annually through 2025, consistent with AUM growth
Exhibit 119: Fintech to capture almost a quarter of agency income by 2025
China wealth mgmt. product agency income Brokers & others
Fintech
China wealth mgmt. product agency income breakdown
Banks 16 1 6--19 19 C CAGR AGR 276
CAGR: 12% 215 192 CAGR: 13%
106
11 8
114 95 9 11
9 16
87
76
89
2015
2016
2017
126
161 137
9 18
12 26
99
99
2018
13 35
172 13
14
16
243 18
20
65
Brokers & others
20 2 0--25E 25E CAGR CAGR
Brokers & others
10%
10%
8%
8%
11%
14%
16 1 6--19 19 chg. chg.
8%
7%
7%
7%
7%
19%
22%
23%
23%
23%
23%
23%
-1ppt
Fintech
16% 82%
168
Brokers & others -1ppt
36%
150
20 2 0--25E chg. chg.
Fintech
57
45
134
Banks
8%
50
39
119
14%
Fintech
8%
9%
8%
Banks
113
7%
79%
78%
79%
191
+8ppt 72%
70%
69%
70%
69%
69%
Banks
9%
12% -7ppt
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
+4ppt
69%
Unit: Rmb bn
Source: PBOC, SAC, CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
2015
2016
2017
2018
-3ppt
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Source: PBOC, SAC, CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Insurance sales: Rmb 187bn revenues by 2025, 14% CAGR TAM: Rmb 2.4tn insurance sales by 2025, which excludes tied-agents, independent brokers, and direct sales. Of note, bank sales data here only includes life bancassurance while fintech sales includes both life and P&C.
n
TAM growth: addressable Insurance sales CAGR to accelerate to 14% in 2020-25E (from 10% in 2015-19) as fintech (15% CAGR) and banks (14%) capture market share from agents and direct sales etc. However, total insurance sales volume including agents etc. to slow (9% in 2020-25E from 15% in 2015-19) following tightened regulations for high-yield products.
n
Take rate: we expect the take rate of life bancassurance to be stable at ~6% while the take rate of fintech to slightly trend up due to change in sales mix (fintech has higher take rate as it mainly sells P&C products).
n
Revenue: Rmb 187bn revenues by 2025 on a 14% sales CAGR, calculated by multiplying insurance premiums by channel share and take rate.
n
Market structure: In terms of sales volume, banks and fintech to capture market
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
n
share from agents and others (28% and 7%, respectively by 2025 from 21% and 5% in 2019), driven by stronger sales of savings products and non-auto P&C insurance. n
17 November 2020
Impact of DC/EP: Minimal direct impact in the near-term as this does not impact consumers’ purchasing behaviors. Over the long-term, DC/EP may help banks to compete on savings product sales if customers return to bank channels and MAUs increase.
70
Goldman Sachs
China Financial Services
Exhibit 120: Insurance sales TAM: Rmb 187bn revenues, 14% sales CAGR through 2025 2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
2024E
2025E
15-19 CAGR
20-25E CAGR
Insurance Insurance Insurance s Insurance sales al e s Banks
Rmb bn
665
958
1,058
803
898
1,077
1,239
1,387
1,554
1,740
1,949
8%
14%
Fintech
Rmb bn
92
117
139
123
200
224
258
296
342
396
460
21%
15%
Total
Rmb bn
757
1,075
1,197
926
1,098
1,301
1,497
1,684
1,896
2,136
2,409
10%
14%
Take Ta Take ke rate r at e Banks
%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
N/A
N/A
Fintech
%
15%
15%
15%
16%
15%
14%
14%
14%
14%
14%
15%
N/A
N/A
Total
%
7%
7%
7%
7%
8%
7%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
N/A
N/A
Banks
Rmb bn
40
57
64
49
56
66
76
85
95
107
120
9%
14%
Fintech
Rmb bn
13
17
20
20
29
31
36
42
49
57
67
21%
15%
Total
Rmb bn
53
75
84
69
85
97
112
127
144
164
187
12%
14%
Revenue Revenue
Note: Red numbers are GS assumptions. Bank agency only includes life bancassurance while fintech agency includes both life and P&C Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 121: Insurance sales volume to grow 9% annually through 2025, at a slower pace than in 2015-19
Exhibit 122: Agents to steadily give up incremental market share to fintech and banks over the next five years
China insurance sales volume Agents & others
China insurance sales volume breakdown
Fintech
Banks
CAGR: 9%
15--19 15 19 CAGR CAGR
Agents & others
20 2 0--25E CAGR CAGR
Fintech
Banks
15 1 5--19 19 chg. chg.
20 2 0--25E chg. chg.
7,030
6,418
Agents & others
Agents & others
5,864 5,362 CAGR: 15%
4,264
4,516
4,889
2,021
2,461 2,876
3,166
1,671 92 665
117 958
139 1,058
123 803
200 898
69%
65%
67%
76%
74%
71%
69%
69%
68%
67%
66%
-9ppt
+5ppt
4,621
3,658 3,802
3,096 2,428
7%
17%
3,215
224
3,392
258
3,678
3,968
4,281
296
342
396
Fintech
Fintech 15%
21%
4%
460
1,554 1,740 1,949 1,077 1,239 1,387
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Banks
27%
8%
4% 31%
29%
3%
5%
21%
21%
5%
5%
6%
6%
6%
7%
24%
25%
26%
26%
27%
28%
14%
Unit: Rmb bn
+2ppt
+1ppt 4%
Banks +7ppt
-6ppt
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Note: bank sales only includes life bancassurance while fintech sales includes both life and P&C
Source: CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Source: CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Exhibit 123: Insurance agency fees to grow 14% annually for banks and 15% for fintech through 2025
Exhibit 124: Banks to still comprise 64% of institutional agency fees by 2025
China insurance institutional agency fees Fintech
China insurance institutional agency fees breakdown
Banks
15--19 15 19 CAGR CAGR
25%
164 144 127 112 97 75 53
17
85
84 69 20
40
57
49
23%
24%
29%
Fintech
15 1 5--19 19 chg. chg.
34%
32%
32%
33%
34%
35%
36%
Fintech +2ppt
15%
42 36
66
20 2 0--25E chg. chg.
+9ppt
21%
75%
Banks
29
56
Banks
49
20 64
67
31
13 57
Fintech
20 2 0--25E CAGR CAGR
187
CAGR: 14%
CAGR: 12%
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Note: bank sales only includes life bancassurance while fintech sales includes both life and P&C
76
85
95
107
120
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
9%
77%
76%
Banks
71%
66%
68%
68%
67%
66%
65%
64%
-9ppt
-2ppt
14%
Unit: Rmb bn
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Note: bank sales only includes life bancassurance while fintech sales includes both life and P&C
Note: bank sales only includes life bancassurance while fintech sales includes both life and P&C
Source: CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
Source: CBIRC, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
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Exhibit 125: Total Addressable Market (TAM) methodology and assumptions Business segment Business segment
Revenue Revenue
Market Ma Market rket size s i ze
Market Ma Market rket share share
Take rrate Take at e
Payments Pa Payments yments
TPV x Take Rate
Bank Card/Fintech TPV: ~7%/12% CAGR 20-25E
Based on growth projections
~4/5 bps Take Rate for Bank Card/Fintech TPV based on company disclosures; expect take rate to be flat in 20-25E
Retail Lending Retail Lending
Loan Balance x Interest Rate (banks)/Take Rate (fintech)
Bank Retail Loans: ~10% CAGR 20-25E; Fintech Retail Loans: ~13% CAGR 20-25E
Based on growth projections
7% Interest Rate for Bank Consumer Loans; 3% Facilitation rate for Fintech Loans
Wealth Wea Wealth lth Management Management
AUM x Channel Market Share x Take Rate
Bank WMP/Mutual Funds/Private Funds/Brokers Trust: ~12%/13%/14%/6%/4% CAGR 20-25E
Share of Bank/Fintech/Broker & other channels based on market share of leading institutions; we expect fintech to steadily gain share from banks and brokers
Take Rate = Average Management Fee Rate x estimated share paid to sales channels
Insurance Sales Insurance Sales
Premium Sales x Channel Market Share x Take Rate
Insurance Premium: ~9% CAGR 20-25E
Share of Bank/Fintech and Agency channels based on CBIRC data and our channel checks; we expect fintech and banks to capture share from agents
~6%/20% Take Rate for banks/fintech based on company disclosures and our estimates
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
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Appendix
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Exhibit 126: Key events in China’s payment industry
Source: PBOC, Caixin, Sina, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Gao Hua Securities Research
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Main Ma Main in areas a r ea s
Network Ne Network twork payment payment
Time Time
Key p Key points oints
The Administrative Measures on Network Payments by Nonbank Payment Institutions
Payment Pa Payment yment industry industry regulations regulations
Dec-15
A real-name management system shall apply when the payment institutions provide the network payment services
Notice on the Transfer of the Network Payment Business of Non-bank Payment Institutions from the Direct-Connection Mode to the NetsUnion Platform
Jun-18
Starting from June 30, 2018, all the non-bank payment institutions’ network payment business involving bank accounts shall be processed through the NetsUnion
Notice on Further Strengthening the Rectification of Unlicensed Operation of Payment Business
Nov-17
The PBOC would impose greater penalties to the unlicensed entities engaging in the payment business, and would cut off the payment business channels used by such unlicensed entities
The Administrative Measures on Depository of Client Reserve of Payment Institutions
Jun-13
Payment institutions shall deposit the full monetary capital (client Reserve) received in advance to handle the payment business on behalf of the client to the special deposit account opened by payment institutions with the depository bank
The Notice on the Implementation of Centralized Deposit of Client Reserve of the Payment Institution
Jan-17
Payment institutions shall deposit the client Reserve with a certain proportion to the special deposit account of the appointed authority; interest shall not be paid on the client Reserve
Guidelines for Deposit of Part of the Client Reserve in the PBOC by Payment Institutions
Mar-17
The branch of the PBOC at the place of the depository bank shall open a special savings account to handle the deposit of client Reserve.
Notice on Adjustment of Centralized Deposit Proportion of Client Reserve by Payment Institution
Dec-17
The centralized deposit proportion shall be increased from 0% to ~40% from February to April 2018
Notice on 100% Centralized Deposit of Client Reserve by Payment Institution
Jun-18
The centralized deposit proportion shall be increased to 100% by Jan. 2019
Media reports (Caixin etc.)
Dec-19
PBOC started paying annual interest rate of 0.35% on client reserve
The Administrative Measures on Depository of Client Reserve of Payment Institutions (draft)
Apr-20
An update of the 2013 regulation based on centralized deposit of client reserve
The Administrative Measures on Payment Insitution Industry Security Fund(draft)
Oct-20
9.5%-12% of interest paid to payment institutions by PBOC will be deposited in the Industry Security Fund (Rmb 1bn maximum)
Notice on the Improvement of Pricing Mechanism of Bankcard Transaction Fee
Mar-16
The original rules that the acquiring processing fees were shared among issuing banks, bankcard acquirers and UnionPay in the proportion of approximately 70%, 20% and 10% respectively were cancelled; Issuing bank’s service fees, the rate level of which shall be no more than 0.35% of the transaction amount by debit cards and no more than 0.45% of the transaction amount by credit cards; The interchange fee rates charged by bankcard clearing institutions to bankcard acquirers shall not be higher than 0.0325% (not more than RMB3.25 for a single charge amount)
Notice on the Management of Bankcard Acquiring Outsourcing
Jun-15
The verification of merchant qualification, execution of acceptance agreement, transaction processing of acquiring services, fund settlement, risk monitoring, the acceptance of generation and management of terminal secret keys, and error and disputes settlement, shall not be outsourced
The Administrative Measures on Bankcard Acquiring Services
Jul-13
Relevant business compliance requirements for non-bank payment institutions to engage in bankcard acquiring business, including setting up and sending acquiring transaction information according to the regulations
The Implementation Measures of the PBOC for Protecting Rights and Interests of Financial Consumers
Dec-16
Non-bank payment institutions must protect the personal financial information of consumers
Rules for the QR Payment Business Standard
Dec-17
A non-bank payment institution which conducts QR payment business shall obtain the relevant license as required and conduct the business in a standard manner
FinTech Development Plan (2019-2021)
Sep-19
QR Code Interconnection is promoted in 2019-2021
The Measures for Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing of Payment Institutions
Mar-12
Payment institutions which have obtained the Payment License shall carry out the obligations of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing in accordance with the law
Management Measure on Large and Suspicious Transactions Reporting for Financial Institutions
Dec-16
Payment institutions shall fulfill their obligations of reporting large transactions and suspicious transactions and formulate internal management systems and operational regulations and procedures for reporting large transactions and suspicious transactions
Management Ma Management nagement of client rreserve client eserve
Bank card Bank ca rd transaction transaction pricing pricing
Bank card Bank ca rd acquiring acquiring
Consumers Consumers protection protection
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
Exhibit 127: Key regulations for China’s payment industry
QR p payment a ymen t
Anti-money Anti-money laundering a laundering and nd anti-terrorism anti-terrorism financing financing
Source: PBOC, Xinhua, Caixin
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Acronyms AML: Anti Money Laundering BIS: Bank of International Settlements CBDC: Central Bank Digital Currency CFT: Counter Financing of Terrorism DC/EP: Digital Currency/Electronic Payment ETC: Electronic Toll Collection IMF: International Monetary Fund KYC: Know Your Customer NBS: National Bureau of Statistics NDRC: National Development and Reform Commission NetsUnion: China Nets Union Clearing Corporation NFC: Near Field Communication P2P: Peer-To-Peer PBOC: People’s Bank of China QR Code: Quick Response Code TPV: Total Payment Value
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WMP: Wealth Management Product
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References 1. Zhou Xiaochuan, Talk on Central Bank Digital Currency in Caixin Summit (in Chinese), October 2019. 2. Fan Yifei, Policy implication of digital Renminbi’s positioning as M0 (in Chinese), September 2020. 3. Fan Yifei, Theoretical foundation and framework choice of China’s Central Bank Digital Currency (in Chinese), September 2020. 4. Yao Qian, Study on the application of digital fiat currency in peer-to-peer investment and lending (in Chinese), 2018. 5. Yao Qian, Central bank digital currency prototype system experiment (in Chinese), 2018. 6. Yao Qian, Digital Currency and Bank Accounts (in Chinese), April 2017. 7. Yao Qian, Blockchain and Central Bank Digital Currency (in Chinese), April 2018. 8. Yao Qian, Optimization of monetary policy based on Central Bank Digital Currency (in Chinese), April 2020. 9. Mu Changchun, Digital Currency and Libra (online course, in Chinese), September 2019. 10. Mu Changchun, Talk on DC/EP in CF40 Forum in Yichun (in Chinese), August 2019. 11. BIS, Impending arrival – a sequel to the survey on central bank digital currency, January 2020. 12. Bank of England, Central bank digital currency: opportunities, challenges and design, March 2020.
a2810045d5314637bdba4864b34fcf51
13. Kenneth Rogoff, Costs and benefits to phasing out paper currency, May 2014. 14. Federal Reserve, Comparing Means of Payment: What Role for a Central Bank Digital Currency?, August 2020. 15. IMF, The Rise of Digital Money, July 2019. 16. BIS, Central bank digital currencies, March 2008. 17. FSB, Enhancing Cross-border Payments, April 2020. 18. BIS, World Bank, Payment aspects of financial inclusion in the fintech era, April 2020.
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Investment Banking Relationships
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64%
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Rating Distribution Buy
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