Dictionary of Philosophy

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Dictionary of Philosophy edited by

Dagobert D. Runes

15th Edition, Revised

Philosophical Library New York

Copyright 1960 by Philosophical Library, Inc. 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y. All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 60-16583 Printed in the United States of America

CONTRIBUTORS INITIALS

NAMES

A.C.-ALONZO CHURCH

INITIALS

NAMF.S

/.R. W.-Juuus R. WEINBERG

A.C.B.-A. CORNELIUS BENJAMIN

K.F.L.-KURT F. LEIDECKER

A.C.E.-A. C. EWING

K.G.-KATHARINE GILBERT

A.C.P.-A. c. PEGIS

L.E.D.-LESTER E. DENONN

A.G.A.B.-ALBERT G. A. BALZ

L..M.H.-LEWIS M. HAMMOND

A.J.B.-ARCHIE J. BAHM

L.V.-LIONELLO VENTURI

B.A.G.F.-B. A. G. FuLLa

L.W.-LEDGER WooD

C.A.B.-CHARLES A. BAYLIS

M.B.-MAX BLACK

C.A.H.-CHARLES A. HART

M.T.K.-MORRIS T. KEETON

C.G.H.-CARL G. HEMPEL

M.B.M.-MARCUS B. �LLETT

C./.D.-C. J. DUCASSE

M.F.-MAX FISHLER

C.K.D.-C. K. DAVENPORT

.M.W.-MEYER W AXMANN

C.L.-CORLI SS LA.MONT

O.F.K.-OTTo F. KRAUSHAAR

D.C.-DORION CAIRNS

P.A.S.-PAUL A. SCHILPP

E.A.M.-ERNEST A. MOODY

P.0.K.-PAUL 0. KRISTELLER

E.C.-EMMANUEL CHAPMAN

P.P.W.-PHILIP PAUL WIENER

E.F.-ERICH FRANK

P.W.-PAuL WEm

E.H.-EUGENE HOLMES

R.A.-RUDOLF ALLERS

E.S.B.-EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

R.B.W.-RALPH B. WINN

F.L.W.-FREDERICK L. WILL

R.C.-RUDOLF CARNAP

F.K.-FRITZ KUNZ

R..M.J.-Ruws M. JoNEs

F.S.C.N.-F. s. c. NORTHROP

R.T.F.-RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

G.B.-GEORGE BOAS

S.v.F.-SIGMAR VON fERSEN

G.R.M.-GLENN R. MORROW

S.S.S.-S. s. STEVENS

G.W.C.-G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM

T.G.-THOMAS GREENWOOD

H.G.-HUNTER GUTHRIE

T.M.-THOMAS MUNRO

H.Go.-HEINRICH GoMPERZ

V.F.-VERGILIUS FERM

H.H.-HERMAN HAUSHEER

V./.B.-VERNON J. BOURKE

H.L.G.-H. L. GORDON

V.J.M.-V.

J.J.-lREDELL JENKINS

W.E.-W ALTER ECKSTEIN

J.

McGILL

/.E.B.-}OHN EDWARD BENTLEY

W.F.-WILLIAM FRANKENA

/./.R.-J. J. ROLBIECKI

W.L.-WILBUR LONG

/.K.F.-JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN

W.M.M.-WILLIAM MARIAs �LLSOFF

:_ osEPH MAIER ].Af._..:J

W.N.P.-W. NORMAN PITTENGER

/.A.F.-JosE A. FRANQUIZ

W.S.W.-WILLIAM s. WEEDON

/.M.S.-J. �ci>HERSON SoMERVILLE

W.T.C.-W. T. CHAN

ABBREVIATIONS AS.-Angio Saxon

Gr.-Greek

C.-Chinese

Lat.-Latin

Fr.-French

Heb.-Hebrew

Ger.-German

Skr.-Sanskrit q.v.-quod vide

[preface The aim of this dictionary is to provide teachers, students and laymen interested in philosophy with clear, concise, and correct definitions and descriptions of the philosophical terms, throughout the range of philo­ sophic thought. In the volume are represented all the branches as well as schools of ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy. In any such con­ spectus, it is increasingly recognized that the Oriental philosophies must be accorded ample space beside those of the western world. The great field that must be compressed within the limits of a small volume makes omissions inevitable. If any topics, or phases of a subject, deserve space not here accorded them, it may be possible in future editions to allow them room; I take this occasion to mvite suggestiops and criticism, to that end. Clarity and correctness would be more easily secured if there were concord among philosophers. Scarcely any two thinkers would define phi­ losophy alike; nor are they likely to agree as to the significance of its basic concepts.

The value of a one-volume dictionary, nonetheless, makes the

effort worthwhile. "Dictionaries are like watches," Samuel Johnson said; "the best can­ not be expected to go quite true, but the worst is better than none." I trust that the present volume will serve as reliably as the chrono­ meter of today, in the time-pattern of the philosophic world. I owe a debt of profound appreciation to every one of the many collaborators that have so generously contributed to the Dictionary. Espe­ cially do J wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Professors William Marias Malisoff and Ledger Wood. Needless to say, the final responsibility, as to the general plan of the volume, together with the burden of any short­ comings, rests solely upon the editor. THE EDITOR

LA.oaocpta Btou Kughi d'Llmore, i.e., Dia logues about Love, he con­ ceives, in Pl atonic fashion, love as the principle permeating the universe. I t emanates from God to the beings, and from the beings reverts back to God. It is possible that his conception of universal love exerted s_ome influence upo::i the concept of Amor Dei of Spinoza.-)\,1.W. Absolute: (Lat. absolvere to release or set free) Of this term Stephanus Chauvin in the Lexicon Philosophicum, 1 7 I 3, p2 observes : "Because one thing is said to be free from another in many ways, so al so the word absolute is taken by the phil osophers in many senses." In Medieval Scholasticism this term was variously used, for example : freed or abstracted from material con­ di�ions, hence from con tingency; hence applica­ ble to all being ; without limitations or restric­ tion s ; simply ; totally; independent ; uncondi­ tionally ; uncaused ; free from mer.ta! reserva­ tion. Much of this Medieval usage is carried over and expanded in modern philosophy. Absolute and Absolutely signify perfection, completeness, universali ty, non-relativity, exemption from lim­ itation or qual ification, unconditional ity ; hence also the ineffable, unthinkable, indeterminable ; strictly, literal ly, without reservation, not sym­ bolically or metaphorically. E.g. "Absolute truth,'' "absolute space," "absolute Ego,'' "ab­ solutely unconditioned,'' "absolutely true."-W.L. Absolute E go : In Fichte's philosophy; the Ego or Subject prior to its differentiation into an empirical (or historical) self and not-self.-W.L.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

2

Sec Idealism, Heg•l.-W.L. Metaphysics) Moat broadly, the terminus or ultimate referent of thought. The Unconditioned. The opposite of the Rela­ tive (Absolute). A distinction ia to be made between the singular and generic use of the term. A. While Nicholas of Cusa referred to Cod aa "the absolute," the noun form of this term came into common use through the writings of Schelling and Hegel. Its adoption spread in France through Cousin and in Britain through Hamilton. According to Kant the Ideas of Reason seek both the absolute totality of condi­ tions and their absolutely unconditioned Ground. Thia Ground of the Real Fichte idcnti1ied with the Absolute Ego (q.v.). For Schelling the Abso­ lute ia a primordial World Ground, a spiritual unity behind all logical and ontological opposi­ tions, the self-differentiating source of both Mind and Nature. For Hegel, however, ·the Absolute is the All conceived as a timeless, per­ fect, organic whole of self-thinking Thought. In England the Absolute has occasionally been identified with the Real considered as unrelated or "unconditioned" and hence as the "Unknow­ able" (Mansel, H. Spencer). Until recently, however, it was commonly appropriated by the Absolute Idealists to connote with Hegel the complete, the whole, the perfect, i'.e. the Real conceived as an all-embracing unity that com­ plements, fulfills, or transmutes into a higher synthesis the partial, fragmentary, and "sclf­ contradictory" experiences, thoughts, purposes, values, and achievements of finite existence. The specific emphasis given to this all-inclusive per­ fection varies considerably, i.e. logical wholc­ neaa or concreteness {Hegel), metaphysical com­ pleteness {Hamilton), mystical feeling {Brad- ' ley ), aesthetic completeness {Bosanquet), moral perfection (Royce). The Absolute is also vari­ ously conceived by this school as an all-inclusive Person, a Society of persons, and as an imper­ sonal whole of Experience. More recently the term has been extended to mean also {a) the All or totality of the real, however understood, and {b) the World Ground, whether conceived idealistically or materialisti­ cally, whether pantheistically, theistically, or dualistically. It thus stands for a variety of metaphysical conceptions that have appeared widely and under various names in the history of philosophy. In China: the Wu Chi {Non­ Bcing), T'ai Chi (Being), and, on occasion, Tao. In India: the Vcdantic Atman {Self) and Brahman (the Real), the Buddhist Bhutatathatti (indeterminate Thatncss), VigiiaptimaJra (the One, pure, changeless, eternal consciousness grounding all appearances), and the Void of N agarjuna. In Greece: the cosmic matrix of the Ionians, the One of the Eleatica, the Being or Good of Plato, the World Reason of Stoicism, the One of Nco-Platonism. In patristic and scholastic Christianity: the creator Cod, the Ens Reali88imum, En1 Pcrfectisaimum, Sui Cauea, and the God of mysticism generally (Erigcna, Hugo of St. Victor, Cusa, Boehme, Bruno). In mod­ ern thought: the Substance of Descartes and

Ab solute l deslism : Ab solute, The : (in

Spinor:a, the God of Malcbranchc and Berkeley, the Energy of materialism, the Space-Time of realism, the Pure Experience of phenomcnaliam, the Jing-an-sich (q.v.) of Kant. B. Generically "an absolute" or "the ab10lute" (pl. "ab1olutes11) means (a) the real (thing-in-itself) as opposed to appcarancc1 (b) substance, the aubstantival, reals {poucaaing aacity or self-existence) as oppo1cd to relations; (c) the perfect, non-comparative, complete of ite kind; {d) the primordial or uncaused; { c) the independent or autonomous. L ogic. (a) Aristotelian logic involves such absolutes as the three laws of thought and changcle18, objectively real claascs or 1pccic1. (b) In Kantian logic the categories and Jirin­ ciplcs of judgment arc absolutes, 1'.e. a priori, while the Ideas of reason seek absolute totality and unity. {c) In the organic or mctaphy1ical logic of the Hegelian school, the Absolute ia considered the ultimate terminus, referent, or subject of every judgment. Ethics and Axiology. Moral and axiological values, norms, principles, maxima, law1 arc con· eidered absolutes when universally valid objects of acknowledgment, whether conditionally or unconditionally (e.z. the law of the beat po•­ siblc, the utilitarian greatest happincaa principle, the Kantian categorical imperative). Aesthetics. Aesthetic absolutes arc standards, norms, principles of aesthetic taste considered aa objective, i.e. universally valid.-W.L. Ab solut ism : The opposite of Relativism. 1. Metaphysics: the theory of the Absolute {q.v.). 2. Epistemology: the doctrine that objective or absolute, and not merely relative and human, truth ia poHiblc. J. Axiology: the view that standards of value {moral or aesthetic) arc absolute, objective, superhuman, eternal. 4. Politics: Cult of unrcgtricted sovereignty lo­ cated in the ruler.-W.L. Ab solut i st ic Personal i sm: The ascription of personality to the Absolute.-R.T.F. Ab sorpt ion : The name law of absorption ia given to either of the two duallv . related theorems of the propositional calculus, v p [p p[p v q) = p, q] = p, or eithl'r of the two corresponding dually related theorems of the algebra of classes, a v {a '"' b) = a, a '"' (a '-' b) = 11. Any valid inference of the propositional calculus which amount1 to replacing A v AB by A, or A[A v BJ by A, or any valid inference of the algebra of classes which amounts to replacing A "' (A '"' B) by A, or A '"' (A v B) by A, is called absorption. Whitehead and Russell (Principia Mathema­ tica) give the name law of absorption to the theorem of the propositional calculu�,

[p

Abstract :

j

q]

=

[p

=

pq].

A. C.

(Lat. ab, from + trahcrc, to draw) A designation applied to a partial aspect or qual­ ity considered in isolation from a total object, which is, in contrast, designated concrctc.-L. W.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

Ab 1tracta : Such neutral, purely denotative en­

titie1 u qualities, number1, relation•, logical con­ cept•, appearing neither directly nor literally in time. (Broad)-H.H. Ab 1tractio imaginationi s : According to the Schola1tic1 a degree of abetraction below that of reason and above that of the 1en1e1, which do ab1tract from matter, but not from the preeencc of matter, whcrea1 the imagination ab1tract1 even from the prettnce of matter, but not from it1 11ppendices, or 1en1ible qualitie1.-J.J.R. Ab 1tract io inte l lectus seu rationis : According to the Scholastics the higheet degree of abstrac­ tion i1 that of rea1on which ab1tract1 not only matter and itl presence, but aho from its 11f>­ pendices, that i1, itl 1en1ible condition• and prop­ ertie1, con1idering essence or quiddity alone. -J.J.R. Ab straction : (Lat. ab, from + trahcre, to draw) The proce11 of ideally tcparating a partial aspect or quality from a total object. Also the result or product of mental 1b1traction. Abstraction, which concentrate• it1 attention on a 1ingle upect, differs from 11nalysis which conaiden all aspectl on a par.-L.W. In logic: Given a relation R which i1 tranai­ tive, symmetric, and refiei:ive, we may introduce or postulate new clements corresponding to the members of the field of R, in 1uch a way th:it the same new element correspond• to two mem­ bers r and 1 of the field of R if and only if :cRy (1ee the article relation). These new ele­ ments are theii' said to be obtained by abstraction with respect to R. Peano calla this a method or kind of definition, and speaks, e.g., of cardinal numbers {q.v.) as obtained from claucs by ab1traction with respect to the relation of equiva­ lence-two claues having the same cardinal number if and only if they arc equivalent. Given a formula A containing a free variable, uy :c, the proceu of forming a correeponding monadic function {q.v.) - denned by the rule that the value of the function for an argument b is that which A denotes if the variable :c i1 taken a1 denoting b-i1 also called 11bstrac­ tion, or functional abstraction. In this sense, abstraction is an operation upon a formula A yielding a function, and is relative to a particu­ lar system of intertrttation for the notations appearing in the formula, and to a particular tJariable, 11 :c. The requirement that A shall contain :c as a free variable is not euential: when A doe1 not contain :c as a free variable, the function obtained by abstraction relative to :c may be taken to he the function whose value, the same for all argument-, is denoted by A. In articles herein by the present writer, the notation A:t[A] will be employed for the func­ tion obtained from A by abstraction relative to (or, aa we may also say, with respect to) ;c. Ruuell, and Whitehead and Ruuell in PrincipUi Mathematica, employ for this purpose the for­ mula A with a circumflex A placed over each (free) occurrence of :t-but only for tro posi­ tional functions. Fregc (1893) uses a Greek vowel, say £, as the variable relative to which abstraction is made, and employs the notation

3

.!(A) to denote what is euentially the /unction in e:ctension (the ''Werthverlauf" in hi1 termi­ nology) obtained from A by abstraction relative to e. Thc!re is also an analogous proceu of func­ tional abstraction relative to two or more vari­ ables (taken in a given order), which yield1 a polyadic function when applied to a formula A. Closely related to the procc11 of functional abstraction ia the procesa of forming a clan by 11bstraction from a 1uitable formula A relative to a particular variable, ny :c. The formula A must be such that (under the given 171tem of interpretation for the notations appearing in A) A:t[A] denotes a propositional function. Then :c9(A) (Peano), or i (A) (Ruuell), denote1 the clan determined by thi1 propositional func­ tion. Fregc's .!(A) also belongs here, when the function corresponding to A (rdatively to the variable e ) is a propositional function. Similarly, a relation in extension may be formed by abstraction from a suitable formula A relative to two particular variables taken in a given order.-A.C. Scholz and Schweitzer, Die sogen11nnten Defi,,;. tionen ti11rch Abstrdtio n, Lcipzi$, 193�.-W. V. Quine, A S7sttm of Logi1tir, Cambridge, Mass., 1934. A. Church, review of the preceding, Bulletio of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 41 (193�), pp. 498-603. W. V. Quine, MAthematia1/ Lolic, New Yorlc, 1940. In psychology: the mental operation by which we proceed from individuah to concepta of cla11c1, from individual dogs to the notion of "the dog." We abstract features common to 1cvcral individuala, grouping- them thus together under one name. In Scholasticiam: the operation by which the mind becomes cognizant of the universal (q.v.) aa represented by the individual1. Aristotle and Thomas ascribe this operation to the active intellect (q.v.) which "illuminatet" the image (phantasm) and disengages from it the uni­ versal nature to be received and made in­ telligible by the pouible intellect.-R.A. Ab stractioni sm : (Lat. ab, from + traherc, to draw) The illegitimate use of abstraction, and especially the tendency to mistake abstraction• for concrete realities. Cf. W. James, The Mean-­ ing of Truth, ch XIII. Equivalent to A. N. Whitehead'• "Fallacy of misplaced concreteneu." -L.W. Ab stractum (pl. abstracta): (Lat ab + trahere, to draw) An abstractum, in contrast to a con­ cretum or existent ia a quality or a relation envisaged by an abstract concept (e.g. redness, equality, truth etc.). The abstractum may he con­ ceived either as an ideal object or as a real, subsistent universal.-L. W.

Ab uni versa li ad pa rticulare va let, s particu­ l ari ad universale non va l et consequentia :

Adage stating the validity of argument! making the transition from the general to the particular and denying the permiuibility of the convene proce11.-J.J.R. Academy: (Gr. akademia) A gymnasium in the suburbs of Athena, named after the hero Aca­ demua, whe:e Plato 1int ta'ught1 hence, the Platonic school of philosophy. Plato and his

4

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

immediate successors are called the Old Aca­ demy ; the !';ew Academy begins with Arcesi laus (c. 3 1 5-c. 241 B.C. ) , and is identified with its characteristic doctrine, probabilism (q.v. ). -G.R.M. Accident : (Lat. accidens) (in Scholastic ism) Has no independent and self-sufficient existence, but exists only in another being, a substance or an­ other accident. As opposed to substance the ac­ cident is called praedicamentale; as naming fea­ tures of the essence or quiddity of a being ac­ cidens praedicabile. Accidents may change, dis­ appear or be added, while substance remains the same. Accidents are either proper, that is neces­ sa rily given with a definite essence (thus, the "faculties of the soul" are proper accidents, be­ cause to sense, strive, reason etc., is proper to the sou l ) or non-proper, contingent like color or size.-R.A . In Aristotelian logic, whatever term can be predicated of, without being essential or peculiar to the subject (q.v . ) . Logical or predicable (q.v. )-opposed to property (q.v. )-is that qual­ ity which adheres to a subject in such a manner that it neither consti tutes its essence nor neces­ sarily flows from its essence; as, a man is white or learned. Physical or predicamental (q.v.)-oppos�d to substance (q.v.)-that \..·hose nature it is to exist not in itself but in some subject; as figure, quanlity, manner.-H.G. Accidental ism : The theory that some events are undetermined, or that the incidence of series of determined events is unpredictable (Aristotle, Cournot). Jn Epicu reanism (q.v.) such inde­ terminism was appl ied to mental events and specifically to acts of will. The doctrine then assumes the special form : Some acts of will a re unmotivated. See Indeterminism. A striking example of a more general accidentalism is Charles Peirce's Tychism (q.v. ) . See Chance, Conlingency.-C.A .B. Acervus argument : A Sophistical a rgument to the effect that, given any number of ston�s which are not sufficient to constitute a heap, one does not obtain a heap by adding one more · yet eventually, if this process is repeated, one has a heap.-C.A.B. Achilles argument : Zeno of Elea used a reductio ad absurdum argument against the possibility of motion. He urged that if we assume it possible we are led to the absurdity that Achilles, the fastest runner in Greece, could not catch a pro­ verbially slow tortoise. The a lleged grounds for this a re that during the time, ti-t2, which it takes Ach illes to traverse the distance between his position and that of the tortoise at time t1, the latter even at his slow rate of speed would have moved on a finite distance farther.-C.A.B. Cf. B. Russell, Scientific Method in Philos­ ophy; Lewis Carroll, "Achilles and the Tor­ toise," Mind. Acosmism : (Gr. kosmos, world) Theory of the non-existence of an external, physical world. See Sulljective Idealism.-W.L. Acquaintance, Knowledge by : (Lat. adcogni­ tare, to make known) The apprehension of a

quality, thing or person which is in the direct presence of the knowing subject" . Acquaintance, in the strict sense, is restricted to the immediate data o� experience but is commonly extended to include the things or persons perceived by means of such data. See Description, Knowledge by. -L.W. Acroamatic : Communicated orally. Applied espe­ cia lly to Aristotle's more private teachings to his select advanced students. Hence, esoteric, abstruse.-C.A.B. Act : (in Scholasticism) ( I ) Operation ; as, the intellect's act. Jn this sense, it is generally re­ ferred to as second act (see below). (2) That which determines or perfects a thing ; as rationality perfects animality. Commanded: An act, originating in the will but executed by some other power; as walking. Elicited: The proper and immediate act of the will, as love or hate. First: ( 1 ) The prime form of a thing, in the sense of its essence or integrity. The second act is its operation. Thus the physical evil of blind­ ness is the absence of the first act, i.e., a perfec­ tion due to man's integrity; while the moral evil of sin is an absence of the second act, i.e., a perfection demanded by righteous operation. (2) First act may also designate the faculty or principle of operation, as the will; while second act stands for its operations. Human : (humanus) Deliberate act ; e.g. paint­ ing. Of Man : (hominis) Indeliberate act; e.g. di­ gestion. Opposed to passive or suhjective potency (q.v. ) . Formal : A substantia l or accidental form thought of as determining a thing to be what it is rather than to be something else. E.g. the substantial form of fire determines the composite in which it exists, to be fire and nothing else. Likewise the accidental form of heat determines a body to be warm rather than cold. Informative: Form, or that which is like a form in some composite, e.g. the soul in man or knowledge in the intelligent soul.-H.G. Act-character : (Ger. Aktcharakter) In Husserl : Intentionality.-D.C. Action : (in Scholasticism) Immanent: The ter­ minus is received in the agent, as in a subject ; as contemplation. Transient : The terminus is received in a subject distinct from the agent ; as hall-throwing. -H.G. Activism : (Lat. activus, from agere, to act) The philosophical theory which considers activity, particularly spiritual activity, to be the essence of reality. The concept of pure act (actus purus) traceable to Aristotle's conception of divinity, was influential in Scholastic thought, and persists in Leibniz, Fichte and modern idealism.-L. W. Negatively, a repudiation of the intellectualistic persuasion that an adequate solution of the truth problem can be found through an abstract in­ tellectual inquiry. Positively, a view of action as the key to truth, similar to Fichte's view. The true and sound standard of action is an inde­ pendent spiritual life, independent in bringing

5

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

the world and life in accord with its values. Spiritual life grows by the active aid of human cooperation to ever higher dimensions. Spiritual being is achieved by the v ital deeds of indi­ viduals. { Eucken )-H.H. In the Personalistic sense act1v1sm applies not only to the continuous creative willing which u nderlies all reality but also to knowledge which calls for an unceasing divine activity which is a sort of occa sionalism. { M a lebranche : Recherche de la verite, Book I, Chap. XIV.) Charles Secretan : "To be is to act."-R.T.F. Act Psych ology : { Lat. actum, a thing done) A type of psychology t raceable to F. Brenta no, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte ( 1 874) which considers the mental act (e.g. the act of sensing a red color patch ) rather than the con­ tent {e.g. the red color) the proper subj ect mat­ ter of psychology. (See lntentionalism. )-L. W. Acts : In ethics the main concern is usually said to be with acts or actions, particularly voi­ untary ones, in their moral relations, or with the moral qualities of acts and actions. By an act or action here is meant a bit of behavior or conduct, the origination or attempted origina­ tion of a ch ange by some agent, the execution o f some agent's choice or decision (so th at not acting may be an act). As such, an act is often distinguished from its motive, its intention, and its maxim on the one hand, and from its con­ sequences on the other, though it is not always held that i ts moral qualities are i ndependent of these. Rather, it is frequently held that the rightness of an act, o r its moral goodness, or both, depend at least in part on the character or value of i ts motive, inten tion, maxim, or consequences, or of the life or system of which it is a part. Another question concerning acts in ethics is whether they must be free {in the sense of being pa rtia lly or wholly undetermined by previous ca uses ), as well as voluntary, in order to be moral, and, if so, whether any acts are free in th is sense. See Agent.-W.K.F. A ctual: In Husserl : see A ctuality. Actual : ( Lat. actus, act) 1 . real or factual { op­ posed to unreal and apparent) 2. quality which anything possesses o f h aving realized i ts poten­ tialities o r possibilities (opp osed to possihle and potential) . In Aristotle : see Energeia. A ctuality : Jn H usserl: 1 . { Ger. Wirklichkeit) Effective i ndividual existence in space and time, as contrasted with mere possibility. 2. ( Ger. Aktualitat) The character of a conscious process as lived i n by the ego, as contrasted with the "inactuality" of conscious processes more or less far from the ego. To say the ego , l ives i n a particular conscious p rocess is to say the ego is busied with the obj ect intended in that process. Attending is a special form o f being busied.-D.C. A ctual i ty : The mode of being in which things af­ fect or a rc affected. The realm of fact ; the field of happenings. Syn. with existence, sometimes with reality. Opposite of: possibility or poten­ tiality. Sec Energeia.-1.K.F. .Actus Purus : See A ctivism.-£.W. A d h oc : A dubious assumption or argument ar-

bitrarily introduced as explanation after the fact. Adeism : · Max Muller coined tht> term which means the rej ection of the devas, or gods, of ancient Indi a ; similar to atheism which denies the one God.-J.J.R. Adequatfon : { Ger. Adiiquation) In Husserl : veri­ fication ; fulfilment.-D .C. ( Lat. adequatio) In Aqui nas : relation of truth to being. h Ad yatman : ( Skr. adhi, over and atman, s.v.) A term fo r the Absolute which gained popula rity with the reading of the Bhagavad Gita (cf. 8. 3 ) a n d which Ralph Wa ldo Emerson rendered ap­ propriately "Oversoul" {cf. his essay The Over­ soul ) .- K.F. L. Adiap h ora : ( Gr. indifferent) A Stoic term desig­ nating entities which are morally indifferent.

-C.11..B.

Adler, Alfred : ( 1 870- 1 93 7) Originally a fo l ­

lower of Freud (see Psychoanalysis; Freud), he founded his own school in Vienna about 1 9 1 2. In contrast to Freud, he tended to mi nimize the role of sex uality and to pl ace greater emphasis on the ego. He investigated the feelings of in­ feriority resul ting from organic abnormality and deficiency and described the unconscious attempt of the ego to compensate for such defects.

(Study of Organic Inferiority and its Psychical Compensations, 1 907). He extended the con­

cept of the "inferiority complex" to include psychical as well as physical deficiencies and stressed the tendency o f "compensation" to lead to over-correction. ( The Neurotic Constitution,

1 912 ; Prohlems of Neurosis, 1930.)-L.W.

Adoption ism: A christological doctrine prominent

in Spain in the eighth century according to which Christ, inasmuch as He was man, was the Son of God by adoption only, acknowledg­ ing, however, that inasmuch as He was God, as was also the Son of God by nature and genera­ tion. The Church condemned the teaching. -1.J.R. Advaita : ( Skr. "non-duality") Tlie Vedantic { q.v .) doctrine of monism advocated by Sankara { q.v.) which holds the Absolute to be personal in rela­ tion to the world, especi ally the philosophically untutored, but supra-personal in itself {cf. n ir­ guna, saguna) ; the world and the in dividual to be only relatively, or phenomenally, real ; and salvation to consist in insight or fiiana (q.v.) after dispelling the maya {q.v.) of separateness from the divin e.-K.F.L. Adventitious Ideas : Those ideas which appear to come from without, from obj ects outs ide the mind. Opposite of i n nate ideas. Descartes' form of the ontological argument for God was built upon the notion of adventitious ideas.-V.F. Aeon : According to the Gnostics a being regarded as a subordinate heavenly power derived from the Supreme Being by a process of eman ation. The totality of aeons formed the spiritual world which was intermediary between the Deity and the material world of sensible phenomena, which was held to be evi l.-1.J.R. Aequilib rium i ndi fferentiae: The state or con­ dition of exact bala nce between two actions, the motives being of equal strength. Thomas Aquinas

6

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

held that in such a condition "actus haberi non potest, nisi remotJeatur indifferentia!' Thia is ef­ fected by a determination ab intrinseco, or ab eztrinseco, which disturbs the equipoise and maltet i t poseible for the agent to act.-J.J.R. (German aesthetiache Aesthetic Judgment : Urtdlekraft) The power of judgment exercised upon data supplied by the feeling or sense of beauty. Kant devotes the fi rst half of the Critique of Judgment to a "Critique of Aesthetic Judg­ ment." (See Katrtianism and Feeling. )-0.F.K. On the origin of the term, see &esthelics. Aesthetics : (Gr. aesthetikos, perceptive) Tradi­ tionally, the branch of philosophy dealing with beauty or the beautiful, especially in art, and with taste and standards of value in j udging art. Aleo, a theory or consistent attitude on such mattera. The word aesthetics was lint used by Baumgarten about 17 50, to imply the science of 1en1uou1 knowledge, whose aim is beauty, as contra1ted with logic, whose aim is truth. Kant used the term transcendental aesthe­ tk in another eenee, to imply the a priori prin­ ciple• of 1en1ible experience. Hegel, in the 1820'1, established the word in its present sense by hie writing• on art under the title of Aesthetik. Aesthetics is now achieving a more independ­ ent 1tatua a1 the subject (whether it is or can be a "science" is a disputed ieuue) which studies (a) work1 of art, (b ) the proceeses of producing and experiencing art, and (c) certain aspects of nature and human production outside the field of art--e1pecially those which can be considered 31 beautiful or ugly in regard to form and sen1ory qualities. (E.g., sunsets, tlowera, human beings, machine1.) While not abandoning its interest in beauty, artistic value, and other normative concepts, re­ cent aesthetica has tended to lay increasing em­ phaaia on a descriptive, factual approach to the phenomena of art and aesthetic experience. It differa from art history, a rcheology, and cultural history in atreuing a theoretical organization of materials in terms of recurrent types and tend­ encie1, rather than a chronological or genetic one. It differs from general psychology in focusing upon certain selected phases in psycho­ physical activity, and on their application to cer­ tain type• of objecta and situations, especially those of art. It investigates the forms and char­ acteristics of art, which psychology does not do. It differs from art criticism in seeking a more general, theoretical understanding of the arts than i1 usual in that subject, and in attempting a more con1i1tently objective, impersonal atti­ tude. It maintains a philosophic breadth, in comparing example• of all the arts, and in as1embling data and hypothc:aee from many 1ource1, including philosophy, psychology, cultural his­ tory, and the social sciences. But it is departing from traditional conceptions of philosophy in that writing labelled "aesthetics" now often in­ clude1 much detailed, empirical study of particu­ lar phenomena, instead of restricting itself a1 formerly to abstract discuuion of the meaning of beauty, the sublime, and other categories, their objective o r 1ubjective nature, their rela-

tion to pleasure and moral goodness, the pur­ pose of art, the nature of aesthetic value, etc. There has been controversy over whether such empirical 1tudie1 deserve to be called "aesthe­ tics", or whether that name should be reserved for the traditional, dialectic or 1peculative ap­ proach; but usage favors the extension in cases where the inquiry aim1 at fairly broad general­ izations. Overlapping among all the above-mentioned fields is inevi table, aa well ae great differencet in approach among individual writers. Some of these streaa the nature and varieties of form in art, with attention to historic types and 1tyle1 such as romanticism, the Baroque, etc., and in studying their evolution adopt the historian'• viewpoint to 1ome extent. Some 1tre11 the psy­ chology of creation, appreciation, imagination, aesthetic experience, emotion, evaluation, and preference. Their work may be claued a1 "aesthetics", "aesthetic psychology", or "psy­ chology of art". Within this psychological group, 1ome can be further distinguished a1 laboratory or statistical p1ychologi1t1, attempting more o r leu exact calculation and mea1urcment. Thie approach (sometimes called "experimental ae1thetica") follows the lead of Fech ner, whose 1tudie1 of aesthetic preference in 1876 helped to inaugurate modern experimental psychology ae well as the empirical approach to aeethetice. It has dealt leH with works of art than with preference for various a rbitrary, simplified linear 1hape1, color-combinations and tone-combina­ tions. If the term "experimental" is broadly under1tood as implying a general mode of inquiry baaed on observation and the tentative applica­ tion of hypotheses to particular c�see, it includes many studies in aesthetics which avoid quantita­ tive measurement and laboratory procedure. The full application of scientific method is still com­ monly regarded as impouible or unfruitful in dealing with the more subtle and complex phe­ nomena of art. But the progreu of aesthetic• toward scientific statue is being slowly made, through increaeing use of an objective and logi­ cal approach instead of a dogmatic or penonal one, and through bringing the results of other sciences to bear on aesthetic problems. Recent years h ave seen a vast increase in the amount and variety of arti1tic data available for the aeethetician, a1 a result of anth ropological and archeological resea rch and excavation, diveuified museum collections, improved reproductions, tran1lation1, and phonograph record1.-T.M. Aetiology: (Gr. aitiologeo, to inquire into) An inquiry into cau1e1. See Etiolozy.-Y.F. Aevitemity: (Lat. aevum, never-ending time) Eternity conceived 31 a whole, apart from the tlux of time 1 an endleu temporal medium in which objects and events are relatively fixed. -R.B.W. Affect: (Lat. ad + facere, to do) The inner mo­ tive as diatinquished from the intention or end of action. Cf. Spinou, Ethics, blc. III.-L.W. Affective: (Lat. affectio, from afficere, to affect)

7

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y The generic character 1uppo1edly 1hared by pleas­ ure, pain and the emotions a1 diatingui1hed from the ideational and volitional aspects of con1ciou1neu. See Affect.-L. W. Affinity (chemical) : A potential of chemical en­ ergy; driving force ; attraction. The term should be de.fined rigorously to mean the rate of change of chemical energy with changes in chemical ma11.-W.M.M. Affirmation of the consequent : The fallacy of affirmation of the consequent ie the fallacious inference from B and A => B to A. The law of affirmation of the consequent ie the theorem of the propositional calculue, q => [p => q].

A . C.

In traditional logic, A, I were called affirmatifle, and E, (aee logic, formal, § 4) . It is doubt­ thia distinction can be satisfactorily proposition• (or even to sentences)

Affirmative proposition :

propoeitiona O, netatfoe ful whether extended to A. C. g-enerally. A fortiori : A phrase aignifying all the more ; admitted be must applied to something which for a still stronger reaaon.-J.J.R. A.gama : (Skr.) One of a number of Indian trea­ ti1e1 composed aince the l et cent. A.D. which are outeide the Vedic (q.v.) tradition, but are regarded authoritative by the followers of Vieh­ nuiem, Shivaiam, and Shaktism. Amid myth­ ology, epic and ritualistic matter they contain much that ie philoeophical.-K.F.L. Agathobiotik: A good l i fe or the good life. -C.A.B. Agathology : (Gr.) The acience of the good. -C.A.B. Agent: In ethica an ag-ent i1 alway• a penon who is acting, or haa acted, or i1 contemplating action. Here it ie usually held that to be a moral agent, i.e. an agent to whom moral quali­ tie1 may be ascribed and who may be treated accordingly, one must be free and responsible, with a certain maturity, rationality, and sensi­ tivity-which normal adult human beings are taken to have. Ethics ie then concerned to determine when such an agent ie morally good or virtuous, when morally bad or vicious, or, alternatively, when he is acting rightly and when wrongly, when virtuously and when vici­ oully. See Act.-W.K.F. Agglutination: (Lat. ad + glutinare, to paste) Philologically, a method of formation in lan­ guage whereby a modification of meaning or of relation ia given to a word by adherence or incorporation of distinct parts or element1. -H.H. Aggregate : 1. In a general sense, a collection, a totality, a whole, a class, a group, a sum, an agglomerate, a cluster, a ma11, an amount or a quantity of something, with certain de.finite characteri1tic1 in each case. 2. In Logic and Mathematics, a collection, a manifold, a multiplicity, a 1et, an ensemble, an aeaemblage, a totality of elements (usually num­ bers or points) iatiefying a given condition or 1ubjected to de.finite operational )awe. According to Cantor, an aggregate ie any collection of tepa­ rate object• of thought gathered into a whol e ;

or again, any multiplicity which can b e thought one ; or better, any totality of de.finite ele­ ments bound up into a whole by means of a law. Aggregates have 1everal properties : for example, they have the "same power" when their respective elements can be brought into one-to-one correspondence ; and they are "enu­ merable" when they have the same power as the aggregate of natural numben. Aggregates may be fnite or in.finite 1 and the laws applying to each type are different and often incompatible, thus raising difficult philosophical problems. See One-One; Cardinal Number; Enumerable. Hence the practice to isolate the mathematical notion of the aggregate from its metaphysical implications and to consider such collections ae symbols of a certain kind which are to facilitat• mathematical calculations in much the same way as numbers do. In spite of the controversial nature of in.finite sets great progress has been made in mathematica by the introduction of the Theory of Aggregates in arithmetic, geometry and the theory of functions. (German, Man­ nigfalti1kei.1, Mente; French, Ensemble). 3. In logic, an "aggregate meaning" ii a form of common or universal opinion or thought held by more than one person. 4. In the philosophy of nature, aggregate haa various meanings: it is a mass formed into clusters (anat. ) ; a compound or an organized mass of individuah (zool. ) ; an agglomerate (bot.) ; an agglomeration of distinct minerals separable by mechanical mean• (geol. ) ; or, in general, a compound man in which the elements retain their e11ential individuality.-T.G. (in mathematics ) : The concept of an aggregate is now usually identified with that of a class (q.v.)-although as a historical matter this does not, perhaps, exactly represent Cantor's no­ tion.-A .C. Agnoiology : (Gr. agnoio + logos, discourse on ignorance) J. F. Ferrier ( 1 8 54) coined both this term and the term epistemology ae connoting distinctive areas of philosophic inquiry in sup­ port of ontology. Agnoiolog-y is the doctrine of ignorance which eeeke to determine what we are necessarily ignorant of. It is a critique of agnosticism prior to the latter's appearance. Ignorance is de.fined in relation to knowledge since one cannot be ignorant of anything which cannot pouibly be known.-H.H. Agnosticism : (Gr. agnostos, unknowing) 1 . (epist.) that theory of knowledge which a11erte that it ie impossible for man to attain knowledge of a certain subj ect-matter. 2. (theol.) that theory of religious knowledge which aHerte that it is impossible for man to attain knowledge of God. Agnosy : Ignorance, especially universal ignorance. H

-C.A.B.

Aham brabma asmi: (Skr.) "I am brahman",

the formula of the Brhadliranyaka Upanishad 1 .4. 1 0 , denoting the full coincidence of the hu­ man and divine, arrived at not 10 much by a spontaneous myatic insight as by logical deduc­ tion from the nature of world and self.-K.F.L. Ahamkira: (Skr.) Literally "I-maker", the prin-

8

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

ciple generating the consciousness of one's ego or personal identity ; the ground of appercep­ tion.-K.F.L. Ahanta : (Skr. "I-ness") Selfhood, state of being a n ego ; th e subj ect i n knowledge.-K.F.L. Ah i msii : (Skr. ) Non-inj ury, an ethical principle applicable to all living beings and subscribed to by most Hi ndus. In p ractice it would mean, e.g., abstaining from animal food, relinquishing war, rejecting all thought of taki ng life, regarding all living beings aki n . It has led to such va ried phenomena as the Buddhist's sweeping th e path before him or straining the water, the almost reverential attitude toward the cow, and Gan­ dhi's n on-violent resistence campaign.-K.F.L. Ahri man : ( M iddle Persian) Zoroaster, i n build­ ing upon a n ancient Inda-Iranian antecedent, expounded a thoroughgoing dualism in which Ormazd ( s.v.) is the good, Ahriman the evil principle, corresponding to the Christian God and Devil, locked in combat on all levels of thought and existence. I n that they are reciprocal and of a dialectic necessity, this dualism has, philosophically, the impli�ation of a monism which was, indeed, ethically and eschatologically elaborated in the Zoroastrian optimism that pos­ tulates the ultimate v ictory of Ahura Mazdiih ( s.v. ) or Ormazd.-K.F.L. A i : ( C. ) Love ; love for all people as a practical way to social welfare (chien a i ) (Mo Tzu, between 500 and 39 6 B.C.) ; love for all, which is identical with true manhood ( j e n ) ( Ha n Yii, 76 7-82+

A.D.) .-W.T.C.

Akiisa : ( Skr. ) "Ether" ; space ; in India n phi loso­

phy the continuum that is to be postul ated in connection with the paramiinus (q.v.) .-K.F.L.

Aksara : ( Skr. ) "Imperishab le'', a descriptive syno­

nym for hrahman (q.v . ) , the Absolute, in the Upanishads (q.v.) ; has also the mean i ng of "syllable".-K.F.L. Albert i sts : The appellation is con ferred on any disciple of Albertus M agnus. In particular it was applied to a group of Scholastics at the University of Cologne during the fifteenth and si xteenth centuries. It was the age of the struggles between the nomina lists and the real­ ists, who controlled the Univ ersity of Cologne, but were themselves split i nto factions, the Thomists and the A !bertists. The latter taught that the universalia in re and post rem were identic al, and that logic was a speculative rather than a practical science. The p ri ncipal Albertists were Heinrich von Kampen, Gerhard von Ha rderwyk, and Arnold von Lugde.-J.J.R. Albertus, Magnus : St., O.P. ( 1 1 93 - 1 2 8 0 ) Count of Bollstadt, Bishop of Ratisbon, Doctor U niversalis, was born at Lauingen, Bavaria, studied at Padua and Bologna, entered the Dominican Order i n 1 2 2 3 . He taught theology a t the Univ. of Paris from 1 24 5-4 8, when he was sent to Cologne to organize a new course of studies for his Order; St. Thomas Aquinas was his student and assistant at this time. Lati:r his time was given over to administrative duties and he was made Bishop of Ratisbon i n 1 260. In 1 262 he gave up his bishopric and returned to a life of writing, teaching and controversy.

Of very broad interests in science, phi losophy and theology, Albert popularized a great part of the corpus of Aristotelian and Arabic philo· sophic writings in the 1 3 th century. His thought i ncorporates elements of Augusti nism, Aris­ totelianism, Neoplatonism, Avicennism, Boe­ thianism into a vast synthesis which is not without intern al inconsistencies. Due to the lack of critical editions of his works, a true estimate of the v alue of his phi losophy is impossible at present. However, he must have had some in­ fluence on St. Thomas, and there was a l ively Albertinian school l asting i nto the Rena issance. Chief works : Summa de Creaturis, Comment. in IV Lih. Sent., Philos. Commentaries on nearly all works of Aristotle, De Causis, De intellectu

et intellig., Summa Theologiae ( Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, 38 vo l., Paris, 1 8 90-99 ) .-V.J.B.

Alcu i n : (c. 7 3 0-80+) Was born i n Northumbria

and studied at the School of York under Egbert. In 7 8 1 he was call ed to head the Pa latine School of Charlemagne. He died at St. Ma rtin of Tours. It is his general influence on the re­ vival of Ch�istian learning that is significant in the history of philosophy. His psychology is a form of simplified Augustinianism. His treatise, De animae ratione ad Eulaliam Virginem, is extant (PL l 0 I ) .-V.J.B. Alexander, S am uel : ( 1 8 5 9- 1 9 3 8 ) English thinker who developed a non-psychic, neo-rea listic meta­ physics and synthesi ; . He makes the process of emergence a metaphysical principle. Although his i nquiry is essentially a priori, his method is em­ pirical. Realism at his hands becomes a quasi­ materialism, an altern ative to absolute idealism and ordinary materialism. It aims to combine the absoluteness of law in physics with the abso­ lute unpredictability of emergent qualities. Whereas to the ancients and in the modern classical conception of physical science, the orig­ inal stuff was matter and motion, after Minkow­ ski, Einstein, Lorenz and others, it became in­ divisible space-time, instead of space and time, Thus nature begins as a four-dimensional matrix in which it is the mov ing pri nci ple. Materia lity, secondary qualities, life, mentality are all emer­ gent modifications of proto-space-time. Mind is the nervous system blossoming out into the capacity of awareness. Contemplative knowledge, where the object is set over against the mind, and the actual being, or experiencing, or en­ j oying of reality, where there is n o i nner duplic­ ity of subj ect and object, conetitute the two forms of knowledge. Alexander conceives the deity as the next highest level to be emerged out of any given level. Thus for beings on the level of life mind is deity, but for beings pos­ sessing minds there is a nisus or urge toward a still higher quality. To such beings that diml.v felt quality is deity. The quality nex t above any given level is deity to the beings on that level. For men deity has not yet emerged, but there is a nisus towards its emergence. S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity ( 1 92 0 ) .-H.H. Alexandr i an S chool : A convenient designation for the various religious phil osophies that flour-

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

ished at Alexandria from the first to the fourth centuries of the Christian era, such as Neo­ Pythagoreanism, the J ewish Platonism of Philo, Christian Platonism, and Neo-P latonism. Com­ mon to all these schools is the attempt to state Oriental religious beliefs in terms of Greek philosophy.-G.R.M. Alexandri sts : A term applied to a group of Aristotelians in Italy d uring the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Besides the Scholastic fol­ lowers of Aristotle there were some Greeks, whose teaching was tinged with Platonism. · An­ other group, the Averroists, followed Aristotle as interpreted by Ibn Rushd, while a third school interpreted Aristotle in the l ight of the com­ mentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, hence were called Alexandrists. Against the Averroists who attributed a vague sort of immortality to the active intellect, common to all men, the Alexandrists, led by Pomponazzi, asserted the mortality of the individual h uman soul after its separation from u niversal reason.-J.J.R. Al Farabi : Died 950, i ntroduced Aristotelian logic into the world of Islam. He was known to posterity as the "second Aristotle". He continued the encyclopedic tradition inaugu­ rated by Al Kindi. His metaphysical speculation in t!uenced Avicenna who found i n the works of his predecessor the fun damental notion of a distinction between existence and essence, the latter not implying necessarily in a conti ngent being the former which therefore has to be given by God. He also emphasizes the Aris­ totelian n otion o f the ''first mover". The con­ cretization of the universal n ature in particular things points to a creative power which has en dowed being with such a nature. Al Farabi's philosophy is dependent in certain parts o n Neo­ Platonism. Creation is emanation. There is an anima mundi the images of which become cor­ poreal beings. Logic is considered as the pream­ ble to all science. Physics comprises all factual knowledge, i ncluding psychology ; metaphysics and ethics are the other parts of philosophy. Cl. Baeumker, A lfarabi, Ueber den Ursprung der Wissensclzaften, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. d. MA. 1 91 6. Vol. XIX. M. Horten , Das Buch der Ringsteine Farabis. ibid. 1906. Vol. V.

-R.A.

Al G azali : Born 1 059 in Tus, in the country of Chorasan, taught at Bagdad, l ived for a time in Syria, died i n his home town 1 1 1 1 . He started as a sceptic i n philosophy and became a mystic a nd orthodox afterwards. Philosophy is mean­ in gful only as in troduction to theology. His at­ titude resembles Nee-Platonic mysticism and is a nti-Aristotelian. He wrote a detailed report on the doctrines of Farabi and Avicenna only to subject them to a scath i n g criticism in Destructio philosoplzorum where he points out the self­ contradictions of philosophers. His main works are theological. I n his writings on l ogic he wants to ensure to theology a rel iable method of procedure. His metaphysic1 also is mainly based on theology : creation of the world out of nothi ng, resurrection, and so forth. Cf. H. Bauer, Die Dogmatik Al-Ghazalis, 1 9 1 2.-R.A.

9

Algebraization: ( Ger. Algebraisier11ng) I n Hus­ serl : Substitution terminate ttrms) terms ) in which objective sense is

of al gebraic symbols (i nde­ for the words (determ inate the material content of an expressed. See Formalization. -D. C . Algebra of logi c is the name given to the Nine­ teenth Century form of the calculi of classes and propositions. I t is distinguished from the con­ temporary forms of these calculi p rimarily by the absence of formalization as a logistic system (q.v.) The propositional calculus was also at fi rst either absent or n o t clearly distinguished from the cl ass calculus ; the distinction between the two was made by Peirce and afterwards more sha rply by Schroder ( 1 891 ) but the identity of n otation was reta ined. Important n ames i n the history of the subject are those of Bo ole (q.v.), De Morgan (q.v.), W. S. Jevons, Peirce (q.v.), Robert Grassmann, John Venn, Hugh M acColl, Schroder ( q.v. ) , P. S. Poretsky-A .C. Al gedonic : ( Gr. a lgos, pain + hedone, pleasure) Term applied to feelings of p leasure or pain.

-L.W.

Algorit h m (or, less common ly, b.ut etymologically

m ore correctly, algorism) : In its original usage, this word referred to the Arabic system o f n ota­ tion for numbers and to the elementary opera­ tions of arithmetic as performed i n this n otation. I n mathematics, the word is used for a method or process of calculation with symbols (often, but not necessarily, n umerical symbols) accord­ ing to 1ixed rules whith yields effectively the solution of a ny given problem of some class of problems. A . C. Al K i nd i : Of the tribe of Kindah, lived in Basra and Bagdad where he died 873. He is the first of the great Arabia n foll owers of Aristotle whose in t!uence is noticeable i n Al Kind i's scientific and psychological doctri nes. He wrote on geometry, astronomy, astrology, arithmetic, music (which he developed o n arithmetical principles), physics, medici ne, psychology, me­ teorol ogy, po litics. He distinguishes the active intellect from the passive which is actual ized by the former. Discursive reasoning and demonstra­ tion he considers as achievements of a third and a fourth intellect. In o ntology h e seems to hypostasize the categories, o f which he knows 1ive: matter, form, motion, place, time, and which he calls primary _substances. Al Kindi inaugurated the encyclopedic form o f philosophi­ cal treatises, worked out more tha n a century later by Avicen n a ( q.v . ) . He also was the first to meet the violent hostil ity of the orthodox theologians but escaped persecution. A. Nagy,

Die philos. A bhandlungen des lacqub ben lshaq al-Kindi, Beitr, z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. ] 897, Vol. II.-R .A . All : All and every are usual verbal equivalents of th e universal quantifier. See Quantifier.-A.C. Al len, E th an : ( 1 7 3 7- 1 789) Leader of the Green Mountain Boys and of their famous exploits during the American Revolution. He is less known but nonetheless signi ficant as the earl iest American deist. His Reason, the Only Oracle

10

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

of Man ( l 7 84), expreased hie opposition to the trlditional Calvinism and its doctrine of original

sin. He rejected prophecy and revelation but believed in immortality on moral grounds. He likewise believed in free will.-L.E.D. Allgemeingiilti g : (Ger. allgemein + gelten, uni­ versally valid) A proposition or judgment which is universally valid, or necessary. Sucli proposi­ tions may be either empirical, i.e., dependent upon experience, or a priori, i.e., independent of a!I experience. In Kant's theoretical philosophy the necessary forms of the sensibility and under­ standing are declared to have universal validity a priori, because they are the sine qua non of any and a!I experience.-0.F.K. Al-Mukamis, David Ibo Merwan : Early Jew­ ish philosopher (died c. 9 3 7 ) . Hie philosophic work, Book of Twenty Tractates shows influence of the teachings of the Kalam (q.v.) 1 reasoning follows along tines similar to that of Saadia. MW Als Ob : ( Ger. as if) Fictional ; hypothetical ; postulated ; pragmatic. The term was given cur­ rency by Hana Vaihinger'e Die Philosophie des Als Ob ( 1 9 1 1 ), which developed the thesis that our knowledge rests on a network of artfully contrived fictions which are not veri1iable but pragmatically j ueti1iabie. White such 1ictions, employed in a!I 1ielde of human knowledge and endeavor, deliberately faiaify or circumvent the stream of immediate impreuione, they greatly enhance reality.-0.F.K. Alteration : (Lat. alter, other) In Aristotle'• phi­ losophy change of qual ity, as distinguished from change of quantity (growth and diminution ) and from change of place (locomotion) .-G.R.M. Altruism : (Alter: other) In general, the cult of benevolence; the opposite of Egoism (q.v.) . Term coined by Comte and adopted in Britain by H. Spencer. 1. For Comte Altruism meant the discipline and eradication of self-centered desire, and a life devoted to the good of others ; more par­ ticularly, eel11eu love and devotion to Society. In brief, it involved the self-abnegating love of Catholic Christianity redirected towards Human­ ity conceived as an ideal unity. As thus under­ stood, altruism involves a conscious opposition not only to egoism (whether understood as exceuive or moderate self-love), but aleo to the formal or theological pursuit of charity and to the atomic or individual istic social philosophy of 1 7th- 1 8 th century liberalism, of utilitarianism, and of French Ideology. 2. By extension the term has come to mean the pursuit of the good of others, whether moti­ vated by either self-centered or other-centered interest, or whether by disinterested duty. By some it is identi1ied with the protective and other-regarding feelings, attitudes, and behavior of animal life in genera l ; while by others its use ie restricted to mean such on the level of retlective intell igence.-W.L. Ambiguous middle, fallacy of : See quaternio -

.

.

terminorum.

Amechanical : Tenn applied

to psychologically

conditioned movements.

(Avenariua.)-H.H. Teacher of Plotinue and Origen and reputed founder of Neo-Platoniam.

Ammonius,

Saccus :

-M.F.

Amnestic :

Characterised by amneaia, losa of memory.-C.A.B. Amoral : Action, attitudes, state or character which is neither moral nor immoral, i.e., which ie out­ side the moral realm. Neither rirht nor wrong. Ethically indifferent. Non-moral. Non-ethical. See Moral, Immoral, Ethics.-A.J.B. Amphiboly : Any fallacy arising from ambiguity of grammatical construction (as di1tinguiehed from ambiguity of single words ), a premiH being accepted, or proved, on the basi1 of one inter­ pretation of the grammatical construction, and then used in a way which is correct only on the basis of another interpretation of the gram­ matical construction.-A .C. Ampliative : (Lat. am pl i a re, to make wider 1 Ger. Erweiterungeurteil ) Synthetic i 1erving to ex­ pand. In an ampliative j udgment the predicate adds something not already contained in the meaning of the subject-term. Contrasted with analytic or explicative.-0.F.K.

Anidi : (Skr. ) Beginninglesa,

aaid of the Absolute and the world.-K.F.L. Anagogic : ( Gr. mystical ) U1ually employed aa a noun in the plural, signifying an i nterpreta ti on of Scripture pointing to a de1tiny to be hoped for and a goal to be attained1 aa an adjective it means, pertaining to the kind of interpretation described above.-J.J.R. Analogies of Experience : (Ger. Analogien der

Erfahrung) Kant'• three dynamic principle• (1ub­ etantiality, reciprocity, and causality) of the un­ derstanding compriaing the general category of relation, through which 1enee data are brought into the unity of experience. (See Kantianism.) O.F.K. Analogy : (in Scnolastitism) Predication common to several inferiors of a name, which is accepted in different 1en1ee, in auch a manner, never­ thele88, that 1ome principle warranta ita com­

mon applicability. Accordingly as this principle is sought in the relations of cause and effect, proportion or proportionality there are distin­ guished various types of analogy. A nalogy of aJJribution : h had when the prin­ ciple of unity is found in a common concept to which the inferiors are related either by cause or effect. Moreover this common concept must refer principally and per se to a prime reality to which the inferion are analogous. Thua food, medicine and puiae are said to be healthy. In this case the common concept i1 health which applies principally and per se to the animal ; however, food, medicine and pulee are related to it through the various forms of cause and effect. Analogy of proportion : le had when the prin­ ciple of unity i1 found, not in the relationa of two or more to a common concept but in the interrelation of two concepts to themeelve1. Thie relation may be one of 1imilitude or order. Thus being i s pr�c!icated of substance and 9uan-

DICTION.A R Y OF PHILOSOPHY tity, n o t because of their relations t o a third reality which primordially contains this notion, but because of a relation both of similitude and order which they have to each other. Analogy of proportionaliJy : h had when the principle of unity is found in an equality of proportions. Thi1 analogy is primarily used be­ tween material and spiritual realities. Thus sight is predicated of ocular vision and intel­ lectual understanding "eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intelleclus est in mente".-H.G. Analogy : Originally a mathematical term, Anal­ ogia, meaning equality of ratio1 (Euclid VII Df. 20, V. Df1. 5, 6 ), which entered Plato's phi­ lo1ophy {Republic 5 34a6}, where it also ex­ prened the epistemological doctrine that sensed thing• arc related as their mathematical and ideal corrclatc1. In modern usage analogy was identified with a weak form of reasoning in which "from the similarity of two things in cer­ tain particulars, their similarity in other particu­ lars i1 inferred." (Century Die.) Recently, the analy1ia of acientific method has given the term new 1ignificancc. The observable data of science are denoted by concepts by inspection, whose c:implctc meaning is given by aomcthing immedi­ ately apprehendable ; its verified theory designat­ ing unob1ervable scientific objects is expreaaed by conccptt by postulation, whose complete mean­ ing is prescribed for them by the postulates of the deductive theory in which they occur. To verify 1uch theory relations, termed epistemic correlation• (J. Un. Sc. IX: 1 25-128), arc re­ quired. When these are one-one, analogy exists in a very precise sense, since the concepts by in1pcction denoting observable data are then re· lated a1 arc the correlated concepts by postula­ tion designating unobservable scientific objects. -F.S.C.N. Analogy of Pythagoras : (Gr. analogia) The equality of ratio1, or proportion, between the lcngth1 of the strings producing the consonant notes of the musical . scale. The discovery of these ratioa i1 credited to Pythagoras, who is also said to have applied the principle of mathe­ matical proportion to the other arts, and hence to have di1covcred, in his analogy, the secret of beauty in all its forms.-G.R.M. Analy1i1 : (Chemical) The identification and esti­ mation of chemical individuals in a mixture ; the identification and estimation of elements in a compound ; the identification and estimation of types of 1ub1tance1 in complex mixtures ; the identification and estimation of isotopes in an "element11.-W.M.M. Analysis, intentional : (Ger. intentionale Ana­ lyse) In Hu11erl : Explication and clarification of the c:uential 1tructure of actual and potential (horizonal) 1yntheaia by virtue of which objects are intentionally constituted. As noematic, in­ tentional analy1ia discovers, explicates, and clarifies, the focally and horizontally intended objective aen1e (and the latter'• quasi-objective 1ub1trate1) in iu mannen of givenneH1 po1ited­ ne11 1 etc., and yields clues to the corresponding noetic aynthe1ia. A1 noetic or constitutional, in­ tentional analy1i1 di1coven, isolates, and clari-

11

fie1 these synthetically constituted 1tructurea of conaciouaneu. See Phenomenoloiy.-D.C.

Analysis (mathematical) : The theory of real

numbers, of complex numbers, and of functions of real and complex numben. See number; con­ tinuity ; limit.-A .C. Analytic : (Gr. analytike) Aristotle's name for the technique of logical analysis. The Prior Analytics contains his analysis of the 1yllogi1m, the Posterior A nalytics his analysis of the con­ ditions of scientific or demonstrable knowledge.

-G.R.M.

In Kant. One of two division• of generjll logic (the other being Dialectic) which discovers by analysis all the functions of reason as exer­ cised in thought, thus disclosing the formal cri­ teria of experience and truth. (See Kantianism.) -0.F.K. Sec also Meaning, Kinds of. Analyticity : See Meaning, Kinds of; Truth, semantical ; Valid. Analytic Judgment : (Ger. analytisches Urteil) In Kant: A j udgment i n which the predicate con­ cept is included within the 1ubject concept, aa inalysis should or does diecloae. Such a ju4g­ ment docs not require veri1ication by experience 1 its sole criterion is the law of contradiction. (See Kantianism.)-0.F.K. Kant: The Ant'llytic, Transcendental : In section of the Critique of Pure Reason which deals with the concepts and principles of the 11ndr.rstanding. Its main purpose is the proof of the categories within the realm of phenomena. -A..C.E. Analytical J urieprudence : Theory of Au1tin, Markby, Holland, Salmond, etc., considering j urisprudence the formal science of positive law. Its main task is to analyze the neceaury notion• of law. Term coined by Henry Summer Maine. -W.E. Anamnesi11 : (Gr. an amnesia ) Calling to mind ; recollection ; in Plato, the proceaa wherebr the mind gains true knowledge, by recalling the vision of the Ideas which the soul experienced in a previous existence apart from the body.

-G.R.M. Ananda : (Skr.) Joy, happineu, bliaa, beatitude, as­

sociated in the thinking of many Indian philoao­ phen with moksa (q.v. ) ; a concomitant of per­ fection and divine conaciousneu (cf. sat-cit­ iinanda ) .-K.F.L. Ananya : (Skr. "not other") Designating the non­ othernc11 of the cosmic principle from the indi­ vidual.-K.F.L. Anarchism : Thia doctrine advocates the abolition of political control within society: the State, it contends, ia man's greatest enemy--eliminate it and th.� evils of human life will disappear. Posi­ tively, anarchism envisages a homely life de­ voted to unsophisticated activity and filled with aimple pleasures. Thus it belongs in the "primi­ tive tradition" of Western culture and springs from the philosophical concept of the inherent and radical ,roodneaa of human nature. Modern anarchism probably owes not a little, in an in­ direct way, to the infiuence of the primitiviatic 1train in the thought of Jean Jacque1 Rouueau.

12

DICTIONAR Y O F PHILOSOPH Y

--- - ----- ------ ----

In a popular sense the word "a narchy" is often used to denote a state of social chaos, but it is obvious that the word can be used in this sense only by one who den ies the validity of anarch­ isr.i.-M.B.M. Anatta-vada : (Pali ) Theory (vada) of the non­ existence of soul (anatta), one of the funda� mental teachings o f Gautama Buddha (q.v.) who regarded all ideas about the soul or self wrong, in adequate or illusory.-K.F.L. Anaxagoras, of Klazomene : (about 430 B.C.) middle-aged man he settled in As a Athen s ; later he was accused of impiety and forced to leave the city. Anaxagoras taught that there is an infinity of simple substances, that is, such as a re only d ivisible into pa rts of the same nature as the whole. These "seeds" are distributed throughout the universe. Their com­ ing together gives rise to individual things, their sep a ration entails the passing away of in dividual things. To account for the cause of motion of these "seeds" or elemental substances Anaxagoras conceived of a special kind of mat­ ter or "soul-substance" which alone is in motion itself and can communicate this motion to the rest. Now, since the un iverse displays harmony, o rder and pu rposiveness in its movements, Anax­ agoras conceived this special substance as a mind­ stuff or an eternal, impe!'ishable Reason diffused throughout the universe. Anaxagoras was thus the fi rst to introduce the teleological principle into the explanation of the natural world. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy; Diels, Frag. d.

Vorsokr.-M.F.

Anaxi mander :

(6th Cent. B.C.) With Thales and Anaximenes he formed the Mi lesian School of Greek Philosophy ; with these and the other thinkers o f the cosmological period he sought the g round of the manifold p rocesses of nature in a single world-principle or cosmic stuff which he identified with "the Infinite". He was the fi rst to step out o f the realm of experience and ascribed to his "Infinite" the attributes of eter­ nity, imperishability and inexhaustability. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy; Diels, Frag. d.

Vorsokr.-M.F.

Anaximenes :

( 6th Cent. B.C.) With Thales and Anaxima nder he belongs to the Milesian School of Greek Philosophy ; as an Ionian he sought a cosmic material element which would explain the manifold p rocesses of the natural world and declared this to be air. Air, he felt, had the attribute of infinity which would account for the va rieties of nature more readily than water which his predecessor Thales had postulated. Cf'. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy ; Diels, Frag. d.

Vorsokr.-M.F.

Anergy :

The hypothesis interpreting sensations in terms of the infin ite phases of negative energy, which is motion less than zero. ( M on­ tague. )-R.H. Anglo- Cat h olic Ph ilosop h y : Anglo-Catholicism is the name frequently used to describe the Church o f England and her sister communions, including the Episcopal Church in America. As a religious system, it may he described as the maintenance of the traditional creda l, ethical and

sacramen tal position of Catholic Christian ity, with insistence on the incorporation into that general position of the n ew truth of philosophy, science and other fields of study and experience. Historically, the Angl o-Catholic divines (as in Hooker and the Caroline writers) took over the general Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy of the schools ; their stress, however, was more on the Pl atonic than the Aristotel ian side : "Platonism", Dr. Inge has said, "is the loving mother-nurse of Anglicanism." Statements of this position, modified by a significant agnosticism concern ing a reas into which reason (it is said) cannot pene­ trate, may be found collected in A nglicanism ( edited by More and Cross ). A certain em­ pi ricism has always marked Anglo-Catholic theological and philosophical speculation ; this is brought out in recent writing by Taylor (Faith of a Moralist), the writers in Lux Mundi ( edited by Gore) and i ts modern successor Essays

Catholic and Critical. In genera, Anglo-Catholic philosophy has been an incarnational or sacramental one, finding God in the Biblical revelation culminating in Christ, but unwilling to l imit his self-disclosure to that series of events. Incarnationalism p ro­ vides, it is said, the setting for the h istoric Inca rnation ; general revelation is on sacra­ menta l li nes, giving meaning to the particular sacraments. For Anglo-Catholic philosoph!cal theology, i n its central stream, the key to dogma is the cumulative experience of Christian people, tested by the Biblical revelation as source and standard of that experience and hence "classical" in its value. Revelation is the ultimate author­ ity ; the Church possesses a trustworthiness about her centra l beliefs, but statement of these may change from age to age. Sometimes this main tendency of Anglo-Ca tholic thought has been sharply criticized by thinkers, themselves An­ glicans (cf. Ten na nt's Philosophical Theology ) ; but these have, i n general, served a s useful warn­ ings rather than as normal expressions � f the Anglican mind. In very recent years, a new stress has been laid upon the dogmatic side of Christianity as ex­ pressed in li turgy. This has been coupled with a revived interest in Thomism, found both in older philosophers such as A. E. Taylor and in younger men like A. G. Hebert (cf. his Grace and Nature, etc. ) .-W.N.P. Angst : (Ger. d read) Concern or care, which arc the essence of dread. ( Heidegger.)-H.H. Anima Mund i : See : The World Soul, Bruno. An i mal i tarian i sm : A term used by Lovejoy in Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity for the b�lief that animals are happier, more admir­ able, inore "normal", or "natural", than human beings.-G.B. Animism � ( Lat. anima, soul ) The doctrine of the rea lity oi souls. 1. Anthrc, pology : (a) the view that souls a re attached to all things either as their inner p rin­ ciple of spontaneity or activity, or as their dwellers. (b) the doctrine that Nature is in­ habited by various grades of spirits. (s. Spi rit­ ism).

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

2. Biology, Psychology: the view that the ground

of life is immaterial soul rather than the mate­ rial body. 3. Metaphysics : the theory that Being is animate, l iving, ensouled ( s . Hylozoism, Personalism, .M onadism ) . 4 . Cosmology : the view that the World a n d the astronomical bodies possess souls (s. World Soul ).-W.L. Annih ilationism : The doctrine of the complete extinction of the wicked or impenitent at death. Edward White in England in the l ast century taught the doctrine in opposition to the belief in the eternal punishment of those not to be saved. -V.F. Anoetic : ( Cr. a + noetikos, from nous, the mind) Applied to pure sensations, affective states and other pre- [ [p => q] => q ] . (The associated form of inference from A and A => B to B is, however, known rather as

modus ponens.)

.A.

C.

The act of declaring a proposition or propositional form to be true (or to be neces­ sarily true, or to be a part of a system ). Assertori c : See Modality. Assertoric knowledge : Knowledge of what is actual or occurring, as opposed to knowledge of what might occur or is capable of occurring, or of what must occur; opposed to problematic knowledge and apodictic knowledge.-.A.C.B. Assoc i ati on : (Lat. ad + socius, companion) The psychological phenomenon of connection or union between different items in consciousness. The term has been applied to two distinct types of connection : (a) the 1'14tural or original con­ nection between sensations which together con­ stitute a single perception and (b) the acquired connection whereby one sensation or idea tends to reinstate another idea. The .first type of connection has sometimes been called simultane­ ous association and the second type successive association, but this terminology is misleading since successively apprehended sensations are

often conj oined into the unity of a perception, e.g. the bell which I saw a moment ago and the sound which I now hear, while, on the other hand, an idea may in certain cases be contempo­ raneous with the sensation or idea by which it is revived. The dual application of the term association to both natural and acquired asso­ ciation was made by J. Locke: "Some of our ideas," says Locke "have a natural correspond­ ence or connection with one another Besidea this there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to chance or cu1tom." Essay Concerning Human Understanding ( 1 690) Bk. II, ch. 33. The usage of later authors, however, tends to re· strict the term association to acquired connec­ tion ( (b) above) and to adopt some other cz­ pression such as cohesion, correlation (sec Correlation, Sensory) or combination (see Com­ bination ) to designate natural connections ( ( a) above) . A further distinction is drawn between two subvarieties of acquired association viz. spontane­ ous or free association, in which the revival of associated ideas proceeds by chance and voluntary or controlled association in which it is guided by a dominant purpose. The distinction between chance and voluntary association was also recog­ nized by Locke : "The 1trong combination of ideas not allied by nature makes iuelf either voluntarily or by chance." (Ibid.) The phenomenon of acquired association has long been recogniz.cd by philosophers. Plato cites czarnples of association by contiguity and similarity (Pluudo, 73-6) and Aristotle in his treatment of memory enumerated similarity, con­ trast and contiguity as relations which mediate recollection. (De Mem. II 6- 1 1 (45 1 b ) ) . Hobbes a l s o w a s aware of th e psychological im­ portance of the phenomenon of association and anticipated Locke's distinction between chance and controlled association (Leviathan ( 1 6 5 1 ), ch. 3 ; Human Nature ( 1 6 50), ch. 4). But it was Locke who introduced the phrase "associa­ tion of ideas" and gave impetus to modern association psychology. Following Locke, the phenomenon of associa­ tion was investigated by G. Berkeley and D. Hume both of whom were especially concerned with the relations mediating association. Berke­ ley enumerates similarity, causality and co­ existence or contiguity ( Theory of Vision Vin­ dicated ( 1 73 3 ) , § 3 9 ) ; H ume resemblance, con­ tiguity in time or place and cause or effect •





(En.7uiry Concerning Human Understanding

( 1 7-+8) , § 3 ; Treatise on Hu"'4n Nature ( 1 7 3 9 ), Bk. I, Pt. I, § 4) . English associa­ tionism is further developed by D. Hartley, Obseroations on Man ( 1 749 ), esp. Prop. XII, J. � ill, .Analysis of the Phen.{)mena of the H u"'4n Mind ( I 82 9), esp. Ch. 3 1 A. Bain, The Senses and the Intellect ( 1 855) ; J. S. Mill,

Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Phi­ losophy ( I 865 ). Continental exponcnu of as­ sociation psychology are E. B. de Condil!ac

(EIIai sur l'origines de cont'l4iIIances humaines)

( l i46) ; Traite de sensations ( 1 754), J. F. Her­ bart Lehrbuch du Psychologie ( 1 8 1 6 ) .-L.W.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

26

A ssociati on, Laws of : The psychological law1 in

accordance with which association takes place. The classical enumeration of the law1 of a110ciation is contained in Aristotle's De Memoria et Reminiscentia, II, 45 1 , b 1 8-20 which lists 1imilarity, contrast and contiguity as the meth­ ods of reviving memories. Hume (A Treatise on Human Nature, Part I, § 4 and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, § 3 ) 1lightly revi1ed the Aristotelian list by enumerating as the sole principles of association, resemblance, con­ tiguity in time or place and causality ; contrast was considered by Hume, "a mixture of causa­ tion and resemblance."-L.W. A 11soci ati oni sm : A theory of the structure and organization of mind which assrrts th at : (a) every mental state is resolvable into simple, dis­ crete components ( See Mind-Stuff Theory, Psy­ cliological Atomism) and (h) the whole of the mental life is explicable by the combination and recombination of these elemental states in con­ formity with the laws of association of idea1. (See Arsociation, Laws of). Hume ( Treatise on Human Nature, 1 7 39) and Hartley ( Ohsetva­ tiom on Man, 1 749) may be considered the founders of associationism of which J amea Mill, J. S. Mill and A. Bain are later exponents.-L.W. A ssociati on i st Psychology : See Associationism. -L.W. A ssociati ve law : Any law of the form, x o (y o z ) = ( x o y) o where o is a dyadic operation (function ) and x o y is the result of applying the operation to x and y (the value of the function for the argu­ ment1 x and y). Instead of the sign of equality, there may also appear the sign of the bicondi­ tional (in the propo1itional calculus), or of other relations having properties 1imilar to equality in the discipline in question. In arithmetic there are two associative laws, of addition 6nd of multiplication : x + (y + z ) = (x + y) + x X (y X z ) = (x X y) X Associative law1 of addition and of multipl ica­ tion hold also in the theory of real numbers, the theory of complex numbers, and variou1 other mathematical disciplines. In the propositional calculu1 there are the four following associative laws (two dually re­ lated pairs) : [ p v [ q v r] ] [ [ p v q) v r ] . [ p [ qr ] ] [ [ pq ] r ] . [p + [q + r] ] [ [ p + q] + r] . [ p S [ q = r ] ] - [ [p = q ] E r ] . Aho four corresponding laws in the algebra of daises. As regards exclusive disjunction in the propo1itional calculus, the caution should be noted that, although p + q is the exclusive disj unc­ tion of p and q, and although + obeys an as­ sociative law, neverthelesa [p + q ] + r i1 not the exclusive disj unction of the three proposi­ tions p, q, r-but i1 rather, "Either all three or A. C. one and one only of p, q, r.'' A !lllUmpt ion : A proposition which i1 taken or posed in order to draw inferences from it ; or the act of 10 taking, posing, or assuming a z,

z.

z.

_

_

_

proposition. The motive for an a11umption may be (but need not neceuarily be) a belief in the truth, or po1sible truth, of the propo1ition auumed ; or the motive may be an attempt to refute the proposition by reductio ad ahsurdum (q. v.). The word assumption ha1 alao 1ometimea been u1ed as a 1ynonym of axiom or postulale (see the article Mathematics) .-A.C. A st ika : (Skr.) "Orthodox"; one acknowledging the authority of the Veda (q.v.) .-K.F.L. A sti kiiya : (Skr.) Bodily or extended 1ub1tancc. In J aina philosophy only time ii not (anasti, the negation of asti) like a body (kaya), hence non­ extended.-K.F.L. A taraxi a : The Epicurean dactrine that the com­ plete peace of mind was a plea1urable 1tate of equilibrium. See Epicureanism.-E.H. A thei sm : ( Gr. a, no ; theo1, god) Two uses of the term : (a) The belief that there i1 no God. (b) Some philosophen have been called "athei1tic" because they have not held to a belief in a personal God. Atheism in thi1 sen1e means "not thei1tic.'' The former meaning of the term i1 a literal rendering. The latter meaning i1 a leu rigor­ ous use of the term although widely current in the history of thought.-V.F. Atman : (Skr.) Self, 1oul, ego, or I. Varioualy conceived in Indian philosophy, atomi1tically (cf. anu ), monadically, etherially, a1 the hypothetical carrier of karma (q.v. ), identical with the divine (cf. ayam alma hrahma; tat tvam asi) or differ­ ent from yet dependent on it, or aa a metaphy1i­ cal entity to be dis1olved at death and reunited with "the world ground. A1 the latter it i1 de­ fined a1 "smaller than the 1mall" (anor aniya�) or "greater than the great" (mahato mahiyan ), i.e., magnitudeles1 a1 well a1 infinitely great. -K.F.L. Atom i sm : ( a ) A1 contra1ted with synechi1m, the view that there are discrete irreducible elements of finite 1patial or temporal 1pan. E.g., the atomic doctrine of Democritu1 that the real world consists of qualitatively 1imilar atom1 of diverse 1hape1. Lucretius, D1 N11tura Rerum. See Epicurus. Cf. K. Laa1wit.z, Gesch. d. Atomismus. (b) As contrasted with the view that certain elements are necessarily connected, or even re­ lated at all, the doctrine that 1ome entitie1 are only contingently related or are completely in· dependent. In Ru11ell (Scimtiftc Method i� Philosophy), Logical Atomi1m i1 the view that relation1 are external and that 1ome true propo­ sition1 are without 1impler con1tituent1 in a given 1ystem, 1uch propo1ition1 are ''ba1ic" with re1pect to that 1ystem. In political pliilo1ophy, atomi1m is 1yn. of particulari1m. (c) A1 contrasted with the view that certain entitie1 are analynble, the doctrine that 1ome entities are ultimately 1imple. E.g., Ruaael1'1 doc­ trine t:Iiat there are certain 1imple, unanalyxable atomic propo1ition1 of which other proposition1 are constituted by compounding or generaliz:a­ tion.-C.A.B. A con1i1tent atomi1tic theory of nature or even of bodily 1ub1tance1 i1 hardly found in

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y medieval texts with the exception of William of Conchcs' Philosophi4 mundi and the Mutakal­

lcmins, a Moslem school of atomista.-R.A . Atomism, psychologi cal : Sec Psych ological

Atomism.

Atonement : Religious act

of expressing conscious­ ness of one's sins, peni tence, reconciliation, giv­ ing satisfaction. Spcci.fical ly, a theological doctrine meaning the reconciliation between God and man who had sinned against God, hence given offense to H im . This was effected through the Incarnation o f Christ, the Son of God, H i s suficrings a n d death o n the cross, w h o consc· quently i s the Saviour and Redeemer of the human race. This voluntary death and vicarious sacrifice constituted a full reparation for the sins of humanity and satisfied the debt to divine j ustice, thus making it again possible for men to attain eternal happiness i n heaven .-JJ.R.

(Lat. a d + tendere, to stretch) The concentration of the mind upon selected portions of the .field of consciousness _ thereby conferring

Attention :

upon the selected items, a pec uliar vividness and clarity. The .field of attention may be divided

into two parts : ( a ) the focus of attention, where the degree of concentration of attention i s maximal and (b) the fringe of attention, where the degree of attention gradually dimi.n ishes to zero at the periphery. Attention considered with respect to its gene­ sis, is of two types : ( a ) involuntary, passive or spontaneous atten­

tion, which is governed by external stimulus or internal association of i deas and (b) voluntary, controlled o r d i rected atten­ tion which is guided by the subject's purpose or intention.-L. W.

Attention, S pan of :

The number of simultaneous or successive items or· groups of items which can be attended to by a single act of thought ; the number varies from individual to individual and for the same individual a t different times.-L. W. Att i tude : (Ger. Eimtellung ) In H u sserl : A habitual positing or neutral intending by the ego. The natural attitude: the fundamental pro­ todoxic attitude o f the transcendental ego to­ wards the world. The n atural attitude underlies and enters into all other positings except those of the transcendental ego i n the transcendental­

phenomen ological attitude.-D.C.

Commonly, what i s proper to a thing ( Latin, ad-tribuere, to assign, to ascribe, to bestow) . Loosely assimilated to a quality, a property, a characteristic, a peculiarity, a circum­ stance, a state, a category, a mode or an acci­ dent, though there are differences among all these terms. For example, a quality is an in­ herent property (the qualities of matter), wh ile a n attribute refers to the actual properties of a thing only indi rectly known (the attributes of God ) . Another difference between attribute and quality i s that the former refers to the character­ istics of an i n fin ite being, while the latter is used for the charac!eristic s of a .finite being.

Attribute : 1 .

2. In metaphysics, a n attribute is what i s in­ dispensable to a· spiritual or material substa nce ;

27

or that which expresses the nature of a thing ; or that without which a thing is unthinkable. A1 such, it implies necessarily a relation to some

substance of which it i s a n aspect or conception. But it cannot be a substance, as i t does not exist by itself. The transcendental attributea are those �hich belong to a being because it is a being : there are three of them, the one, the true and the good each adding something positive to the idea of eing. The word attribute has been and

b

sti l l i s used more readily, with various implica­ tions, by substantialis t systems. In the 1 7th cc� ­ tury, for example, it denoted the actual mani­ [Thus, Descartes re­ festations of substance. garded extension and thought as the two u!ti­ mate, simple and original attributea of reali.ty, all else being modifications of them. With c ? nly Spinoza, extension and thought became known attributes of Deity, tach exprernng in a i n· the definite manner, though not exclusively, .finite essence of God as the only substance. The change in the meaning of substance after H u.me . and Kant i s best illustrated by this quotation Descartes from diverge ''We : from Whitehead by holding that what he has described as. pri­ m a ry attributes of physical bodies, arc really the forms of internal relationships between actual

?i

occasions and within actual occasions" ( Process 47 1 ) . ] The use of the notion of attribute however, is still favoured by contem­ inkers. Thus, John Boodin speaks of porary the .five attributes of reality, namely: Energy (source o f activity), Space (extension), Time

and Reality, ·p.

cli

(change ), Consciousness { active awareness), and Form (organization, structure). 3. In theodicy the term attribute i s used for the essential cha acteristics of God. The divine attributes arc the various aspects under which God is viewed, each being treated as a separate perfection. As God i s fre � from compositi ? n, we know him only i n a mediate and synthetic way

:

through his attributes. 4. In logic, an attribute i s that which is predi­ cated of anything, that which is affirmed or denied of the subject of a proposition. More c � tc gory specifically, an attribute may be either _ or a predicable ; but i t cannot be an 10d1v1du � l . materially. Attributes may be essential or acct·



necessary o r contingent. is an adjective, or an adjectival clause, or a n equivalent adj �nct to a subject referred expressing a characteristic through a verb. Becaus� o f this reference, an attribute may also be a substantive, as a clau­ dental

5.

ir. grammar, an attribuJe

but not a proper name as a rule. An is never a verb, thus differing from a predicate which may consist of a verb often having some object or quali fying words. 6. In natural history, what is permanent and essential i n a species, an indivi dual or in its parts. 7. In psychology, it denotes the way (such as name

attrib�te

intensity, duration or quality) in which sensa­ tions, feelings or images can differ from one another.

8. In art,

an

attribute

i s a material or a con­

ventional symbol, distinction or decoration.

-T.G.

28

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Attributes, differentiating : Are special, simple,

not essential to a substance, which if they bel ong to any complex substance as a whole belong also to i ts parts. ( Broad ) .-H.H. Auctoritas : St. Augustine distinguishes divine from human authority : A uctoritas autem partim

divina est, partim humana : sed vera, ftrma, summa ea est quae divina nominatur. Thus God

is the h ighest authority. It is distinctly ad­ vantageous to rely on authority : A uctoritati

credere magnum compendium est, nullus labor.

Both authority and reason impel us to learn :

Nulli autem duhium est gemino pondere nos impe/li ad discendum, auctoritatis atque rationis. -J.J.R.

Aufkliirung : I. In general , this German word

and its English equivalent Enlightenment denote the self-emancipation of man from mere author­ ity, prej udice, co�·'• ention and tradition, with a n insistence on freer thinking about problems un­ critically referred to these other agencies. Ac­ cording to Kant's famous definition "Enl ighten­ ment i s the liberation of man from his self­ caused state of mi nority, which is the incapacity of using one's understanding without the di rec­ tion of another. This state of minority is caused when its source l ies not in the lack ., under­ standing, but i n the lack of determination and courage to use it without the assistance of an­ other" (Was ist Aufkliirung ( 1 7 84). 2. I n its historical perspective, the A ufklarung refers to the cultural atmosphere and contribu­ tions of the 1 8 th century, especi ally in Germany, France !and England [ wh ich affected also Ameri­ can thqught with B . Franklin, T. Paine and the leaders of the Revol ution ] . It crystall ized ten­ dencies emphasized by the Renaissance, and quickened by modern scepticism and empiric ism, and by. the great scientific discoveries of the 1 7th century. This movement, which was repre­ sented by men of v a rying tendencies, gave an impetus to general learning, a more popul ar philosophy, empirical science, scriptural criticism, social and political thought. 3. More especially, the word A ufklarung is applied to the German contributions to 1 8th century cul ture. In philosophy, its principal rep­ resentatives are G. E. Lessing ( 1 729-8 I ) who believed i n free speech and i n a methodical criticism of religion, without being a free­ thi nker ; H. S. Reimarus ( 1 694- 1 768 ) who ex­ pounded a naturalistic philosophy and denied the supernatural origin of Christianity ; Moses M en­ delssohn ( 1 729-8 6 ) who endeavoured to mitigate prej udices and developed a popular common­ sense philosophy ; Chr. Wolff ( 1 679- 1 7 54), J. A. Eberhard ( 1 739- 1 8 0 9 ) who followed the Leibnizian rational ism and criticized successfully Kant and Fichte ; and J. G. Herder ( 1 744- 1 80 3 ) who was best a s an interpreter of others, but whose intuitional sug­ gestions have borne fruit i n the organic correla­ tion of the sciences, and in questions of language in relation to human nature and to national character. The works of Kant and Goethe mark the culmina tion of the German Enlightenment. Cf. J. G. Hibben, Philosophy of the Enlighten­ ment, 1 9 1 0:-T.G.

Augustinianism : The thought of St. Augustine of

Hippo, and of his followers. Born in 3 S4 at Tagaste in N. Africa, A. studied rhetoric i n Carthage, taught that subject there a n d i n Rome and M ilan. Attracted successively to Manichean­ ism, Scepticism, and Neo-Platonism, A. eventu­ ally found intellectual and moral peace with his conversion to Christi anity in his thirty-fourth year. Retu rning to Africa, he established numer­ ous monasteries, became a priest i n 3 9 1 , Bishop of Hippo in 395. Augustine wrote much ; On

Free Choice, Confessions, Literal CommenJary on Genesis, On the Trinity, and City of God, are his most noted works. He died in 430. St. Augustine's characteristic method, an i n­ ward empiricism which has li ttle in common with later variants, starts from things without, pro­ ceeds within to the self, and moves upwards to God. These three poles of the Augustinian dia­ lectic are polarized by his doctrine of moderate i lluminism. An ontological illumination is re­ quired to explain the metaphysical structure of thi ngs. The truth of j udgment demands a noetic i l lumination. A moral illumination is necessary in the order of willing ; and so, too, an illumi­ nation of art in the aesthetic order. Other il­ luminations which transcend the natural · order do not come with in the scope of philosophy; they prov i de the wisdoms of theology and mys� ticism. Every being is il lumi nated ontologically by number, form, unity and i ts derivatives, and order. A thing is what it is, in so far as it is more or less flooded by the light of these onto­ logical constituents. Sensation is necessary i n order to know mate­ rial substances. There is certainly an action of the external object on the body and a cor­ responding passion of the body, but, as the soul is superior to the body and can suffer nothing from its inferior, sensation must be an action, not a passion, of the soul. Sensation takes p lace only when the observing soul, dynamically on guard throughout the body, is vitally attentive to the ch�nges suffered by the body. However, an adequate basis for the knowledge of i ntel­ l ectual truth is not found in sensation alone. In order to know, for example, that a body is multiple, the idea of unity must be present al­ ready, otherwise its multiplicity could n ot be recognized. If numbers are not drawn i n by the bodily senses which perceive only the con­ tingent and passing, is the mind the source of the unchanging and necessary truth of numbers ? The mind of man is also contingent and muta­ ble, and cannot give what it does not possess. As i deas are not i nnate, nor remembered from a previous existence of the soul, they can be accounted for only by an immutable source higher than the soul. In so far as man is en­ dowed with an intellect, he is a being naturally i l l uminated by God, Who may be compared to an intelligible sun. The human intellect does not create the laws of thought ; it .finds them and submits to them. The immediate i ntuition of these nonnative rules does not carry any con­ tent, thus any trace of ontologism is avoided. Things h ave forms because they have numbers,

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

and they have being in so far as they possess form. The sufficient explanation of all formable, and hence changeable, things is a n immutable and eternal form which is unrestricted i n time and space. The forms or ideas of all things actually existing i n the world are in the things themselves (as rationes seminales) and in the Divine M ind (as rationes aeternae) . Nothing could exist without unity, for to be is no other tha n to be one. There is a un ity proper to each level of being, a unity of the m aterial indi­ vidual and species, of the soul, and of that union of souls in the love ·of the same good, which uqion constitutes the city. Order, a lso, is onto­ logically imbibed by all beings. To tend to being is to tend to orde r ; order secures being, disorder leads to non-being. Order is the d is­ tribution which a llots things equal and unequal each to its own pl ace and integrates an ensemble of parts in accordance with an end. Hence, peace i s defined as the tranquillity of order. Just as things have their being from their forms, the order of parts, and their numerical relations, so too their beauty is not something superadded, but the shining out of all their i ntelligible co­ ingredients. S. Aurelii Augustini, Opera Omnia, Migne, PL 32-47 ; ( a critical edition of some works wil l b e found in the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasti­ corum Latinorum, Vienna ) . Gilson, E., Introd. a l'hude de s. A ugustin, (Paris, 1 9 3 1 ) contains very good bibliography up to 1 927, pp. 3 0 9-3 3 1 . Pope, H ., St. Augustine o f Hippo, ( London, 1 93 7 ) . Chapman, E., St. A ugustine's Philos. of Beauty, (N. Y., 1 9 3 9 ) . Figgis, J. N., The Po­

litical Aspects of St. A ugustine's "City of God", ( London, 1 92 1 ) .-E.C.

Authenti ci ty : In a general sense, genuineness,

truth according to its title. It involves some­ times a direct and personal characteristic (White­ head speaks of "authentic feelings"). This word also refers to problems of funda­ mental criticism involving t itle, tradition, author­ ship and evidence. These problems are vital in theology, and basic i n scholarship with regard to the interpretation of texts and doctrines.

-T. G.

Authori tari ani sm : That theory o f knowledge

which maintains th at the truth of any proposi­ tion is aetermined by the fact of its having been asserted by a certai n esteemed individual or group of individuals. Cf. H. Newman, Gram­ mar of Assent; C. S. Peirce, "Fixation of Be­ lief," in Chance, Love and Logic, ed. M. R. Cohen.-A.C.B. Aut i st ic thi nk i ng : Absorption in fanciful or wish­ ful thinking without proper control by obj ective or factual materi a l ; d ay dreaming ; undisciplined imagination.-A .C.B. Automaton Theory : Theory that a l iving or­ ganism m ay be considered a mere machine. See

A utomatism.

Automat i sm : ( Gr. automatos, self-mov ipg) ( a )

I n metaphysics : Theory that animal a n d human

organisms are automata, tha t is to say, are m a­ chines governed by the l aws of physics and mechanics. Automatism, as propounded by Des-

29

cartes, considered the lower animals to be pure automata ( Letter to Henry M ore, 1 649) and man a machine contro lled by a rational soul ( Treatise on Man ) . Pure automatism for man as well as animals is advocated by La Mettrie (Man, a Machine, 1 74 8 ) . During the Nine­ teenth century, automatism, combined with epi­ phenomenalism, was advanced by Hodgson, H ux­ ley and Clifford. ( Cf. W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vo l. I, ch. V.) Behaviorism, of the extreme sort, is the most recent version of automatism (See Behaviorism). {b) In psychology : Psychological automatism is the performance of apparently purposeful ac­ tions, l i ke automatic writing without the super­ i ntendence of the conscious mind. L. C. Rosen­ field, From Beast Machine to Man Machine, N. Y., 1 94 1 . -L.W. A utomat i sm, C onsci ous : The automatism of Hodgson, Huxley, and Clifford which considers man a machine to wh ich mind or consciousness is superadded ; the mind of man is, however, c ausally ineffectual. See Automatism ; Epiphe­

nomenalism.-L. W.

A utonomy : ( Gr. autonomia, independence) Free­ dom consisting in self-determination and inde­ pendence of all external constraint. See Freedom. Kant defines autonomy of the will as subjec�ion of the will to its own law, the categorical im­ perative, in contrast to heteronomy, its subj ection to a law or end outside the rational will.

(Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, § 2.)-L.W.

A utonomy o f ethi cs : A

doctrine, usual ly propounded by intuitionists, that ethics is not a part of, and cannot be derived from, either meta­ physics or any of the n atural or social sciences. See Intuitionism, Metaphysical ethics, Naturalistic

ethics.-W.K.F.

A utonom y of the wi ll : (in Kant's ethics) The

freedom of the rational will to legislate to it­ self, which constitutes the basis for the autonomy of the moral law.-P.A.S. A utonymy : In the terminology introduced by Carnap, a word ( phrase, symbol, expression ) is autonymous if it is used as a name for i tsel f­ for the geometric shape, sound, etc. which it exemplifies, or for the word as a historical and grammatical unit. Autonymy is thus the same as the Scholastic suppositio materialis { q. v.), al­ A. C. though the viewpoint is different. Autotelic : (from Gr. autos, self, and telos end) Said of any absorbing activity engaged i n for its own sake (cf. German Selbstzweck ), such as higher mathematics, chess, etc. In aesthetics, ap­ plied to creative art and play which lack any conscious reference to the accomplishment of something useful. In the view of some, it m ay constitute something beneficent in itself of which the person following his art impulse (q.v.) or playing i� unaware, thus approaching a heterotelic (q.v. ) conception.-K.F.L. A venari us, R i chard : ( 1 843-1 896) German phi­ losopher who expressed his thought in an elaborate and novel terminology i n the hope of construct­ ing a symbolic language for philosophy, like that of mathematics-the consequence of his Spinoza

30

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

studies. As the most in fluential apostle of pure experience, the positivistic motive reaches in him an extreme position. Insisting on the biologic and eco nom ic function of thought, he thought the true method of science is to cure speculative e � ­ cesses by a return to pure experience devoid of all assumptions. Philosophy is the scientific effort to excl ude from knowledge all ideas not i ncl uded in the given. Its task is to expel all extraneous elements i n the given. His uncritical use of the category of the given and the nominalistic v iew that logical relations are created rather than discovered by thought, leads him to ban ish not only a nimism but also all of the categories, sub­ stance, causality, etc., as i nventions of the mind. Explaining the evolution and devolution of the prohlematization and deprohlematization uf numerous ideas, and aiming to give the na tu ral history of problems, Avenarius sought to show physiologically, psychologically and h istorica lly under what conditions they emerge, are chal­ lenged and are solved. H e hypothesized a Sys­ tem C, a bodily and ce_ntral nervous system upon which consciousness depends. R-val ues are the stimul i received from the world of objects. E­ values are the statements o f experience. The brain changes that continually oscillate about an ideal point of balance are termed Vitalerhaltungs­ maximum. The E-va lues are differentiated into elements, to which the sense-perceptions or the content of experience belong, and characters, to which belongs everything which psychology de­ scribes as feelings and attitudes. Av enarius de­ scribes in symbolic form a series of states from bal ance to bal ance, termed vital series, all de­ scribing a series of changes in System C. In­ equalities in the vital balance give rise to vital differences. According to h is theory there are two vital series. It assumes a series of brai n cha nges because paral lel series of conscious states can be observed. The independent vital series are physi­ cal, and the dependent vi tal series are psychologi­ cal. The two together are practically covariants. In the case of a process as a dependent vital series three stages can be noted : first, the appear­ ance of the problem, expressed as strain, rest­ lessness, desire, fear, doubt, pain, repentance, delusion ; the second, the continued effort and struggle to solve the problem ; and final ly, the appeara nce of the solution, characterized by abat­ ing anxiety, a feeling of triumph and enj oyment. Corresponding to these three stages of the dependent series are three stages of the i nde­ pendent series : the a ppearance of the vital differ­ ence and a departure from balance in the System C, the continuance with an approximate vital difference, and lastly, L'ie reduction of the vital difference to zero, the return to stabil ity. By rn:,iking room for dependent and independent ex­ periences, he showed that physics regards experi­ ence as independen t of the experiencing indi­ vidual, and psychology views experience as de­ pendent uoon the individual. He greatly in­ fluenced M ach and James ( q.v. ) . See Avenarius1 Empirio-criticism, Experience, pure. Main works :

Kritik der reinen Erfahrung; D er menschliche Welthegriff.-H.H.

Averroes : ( Mohammed ibn Roshd) Known to

the Scholastics as The Commentator, and men­ tioned as the author of ii gran co mmento by D ante ( I nf. IV. 6 8 ) h e was born 1 1 26 at Cordova (Spai n ) , studied theology, law, medici ne, mathe­ matics, and philosophy, became after having been j u dge in Sevilla and Cordova, physician to the khalifah Jaqub Jusuf, and charged with writing a commentary on the works of Aristotle. Al­ mansur, J usu f's successor, deprived him of his pl ace because of accusations of unorthodoxy. He died 1 1 98 in Morocco. Averroes is not so much an original philosopher as the author of a minute commentary on the whole works of Aristotle. His procedure was imitated later by Aquinas. In his interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics Averroes teaches the coeternity of a universe created ex nihilo. This doctrine formed together with the notion of a numerical u nity of the active intellect became one of the con­ troversial points i n the discussions between the followers of Albert-Thomas and the Latin Aver­ roists. Averroes assumed that man possesses only a disposition for receiving the intellect coming from without ; he identi fies this dis­ position with the possible intellect which thus is not truly intellectual by nature. The notion of one intellect common to all men does away with the doctrine of personal immortality. An­ other doctrine which probably was emphasized more by the Latin Averroists (and by the ad­ versaries among Averroes' contemporaries) is the famous statement about "two-fold truth", viz. that a proposition may be theologically true and philosophically false and vice versa. Aver­ roes taught that rel igion expresses the (higher) phil osophical truth by means of religious imagery ; the "two-truth notion" came appar­ ently into the Latin text through a misinterpreta­ tion on the part of the transl ators. The works of Averroes were one of the main sources of medi­ eval Aristotelianism, before and even after the original texts had been translated. The inter­ pretation the Latin Averroists found in their texts of the "Commentator" spread in spite of opp � sition and condemnati.on. See Averroism, Latin. Averroes, Opera, Venetiis, 1 5 5 3 . M. Horten, Die Metaphysik des Averroes, 1 9 1 2 . P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Lalin, 2d ed., Louvain, 1 9 1 1 .-R.A. Averro i sm, Latin : The commentaries on Aristotle written by Averroes ( Ibn Roshd) in the 1 2th century became known to the Western scholars in translations by M ichael Scottus, Hermannus Alemannus, and others at the beginning of the 1 3 th century. Many works of Aristotle were also known first by such translations from Arabian texts, though there existed translations from the Greek originals at the same time ( Grabmann) . The Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle was held to be the true one by ma ny ; but already Albert the Great pointed out several notions which he felt to be i ncompa tible with the prin­ ciples of Christian philosophy, although he relied for the rest on the "Commentator" and appar­ ently hardly used any other text. Aquinas, basing his studies mostly on a translation from the

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Greek trxts, procured for him by William of Moerbecke, criticized the Averroistic interpreta­ tion in many points. But the teachings of the Commentator became the foundation for a whole school of philosophers, represented 1irst by the Faculty of Arts at Paris. The most prominent of these schol-us was Siger of Brabant. The philoso­ phy of these men was condemned on March 7th, 1 27 7 by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, after a .first condemnation of Aristotelianism in 1 2 1 0 had gradually come t o b e neglected. The 2 1 9 theses condemned i n 1 277, however, contain also some of Aquinas which later were generally rec­ ognized as orthodox. The Averroistic proposi­ tions which aroused the criticism of the ecclesiastic authorities and which had been opposed with great energy by Albert and Thomas refer mostly to the following points : The co-eternity of the created word ; the n umerical identity of the intellect in all men, the so-called two­ fold-truth theory stating that a proposition may be philosophically true although theo­ logically false. Regarding the .first point Thomas argued that there is no philosoph ical proof, either for the co-eternity or against it ; creation is an article of faith. The unity of in­ tellect was rejected as i ncompatible with the true notion of person and with personal immortality. It is doubtful whether Averroes himself held the two-truths theory ; it was, however, taught by the Latin Averroists who, notwithstanding the oppo­ sition of the Church and the Thomistic philoso­ phers, gained a great influence and soon domi­ nated many universities, especially in Italy. Thomas and his followers were convinced that they interpreted Aristotle correctly and that the Averroista were wrong; one has, however, to admit that certain passages in Aristotle allow for the Averroistic interpretation, especiallv in regard to the theory of i ntellect. Lit. : P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'A!Jerroisme Latin au Xllle Siecle, 2d. ed. Lou­ vain, 1 9 1 1 ; M. Grabmann, Forschungen uher die lateinischen A ristotelesubersetzungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts,, Munster 1 9 1 6 ( Beitr. z. Geach. Phil. d. MA. Vol. 1 7, H . 5-6 ) .-R.A. Avesta : See Zenda!Jesta. Avi cebron : (or Avencebrol, Salomon ibn Ga­ birol) The .first Jewish philosopher in Spain, born in Malaga 1 0 20, died about 1 070, poet, philosopher, and moralist. His main work, Fons !Jitae, became influential and was much quoted by the Scholastics. It has been preserved only in the Latin translation by Gundissalinus. His doc­ trine of a spiritual substance individualizing also the pure spirits or sepa rate forms was opposed by Aquinas already in his first treatise De ente, but found favor with the medieval Augustinians also later i n the 1 3th century. He also teaches the neceuity of a mediator between God and the created world ; such a mediator he finds in the Divine Will proceeding from God and cre­ ating, conserving, and moving the world. His cosmogony shows a definitely Neo-Platonic ehade and assumes a aeries of emanations. Cl. Baeumker, A!Jencebrolis Fons !Jitae. Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philoa. d. MA. 1 892-1 895, Vol. I.

31

Joh. Wittman, Die Stellung des hl. Thomas !Jon Aquino zu Avencebrol, ibid. 1 900. Vol. Hi. -R.A. A vi cenna : ( Abu Ali al Hosain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina) Born 980 in the country of Bocchara, began to write in young years, left more than 1 00 works, taught in Ispahan, was physician to several Persian princes, and died at Hamadan in 1 03 7. His fame as physician survived his influ­ ence as philosopher i n the Occident. H is medi­ cal works were printed still in the 1 7th century. His philosophy is contained in 1 8 vols. of a comprehensive encyclopedia, following the tradi­ tion of Al Kindi and Al Farabi. Logic, Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics form the parts of this work. His philosophy is Aristotelian with noticeable N co-Platonic influences. His doctrine of the universal existing ante res in God, in rebus as the universal nature of the particulars, and post res in the human mind by way of abstraction became a fundamental thesis of medi­ eval Aristotelianism. He sharply distinguished be­ tween the logical and the ontological universal denying to the latter the true nature of fo� in the composite. The principle of individuation is matter, eternally existent. Latin translations attributed to Avicenna the notion that existence is an accident to essence (see e.g. Guilelmus Parisie� sis, De Uni!Jerso ). The process. adopted by Avicenna was one of paraphrasis of the Aristotelian texts with m any original tho'ughts interspersed. His works were translated into Latin by Dominicus Gundissalinus ( Gondisalvi) with the auistance of Avendeath ibn Daud. This translation started, when it became more gen­ erally known, the "revival of Aristotle" at the end of the 1 2th and the beginning of the 1 3th century. Albert the Great and Aquinas -pro­ fessed, notwithstandin g their critical attitude a great admiration for Avicenna whom the Ar� bs used to call the "third Aristotle". But in the Orient, Avicenna's influence declined soon overcome by the opposition. of the orthodo; theologians . Avicenna, Opera, Venetiis, 1 495 1 1 50 8 ; 1 546. M. Horten, Das Buch der Cene­ sun� der Seele, eine philosophische Enzyklopaedie A!Jecenna's; Xlll. Teil : Die Metaphysik. Halle a. S. 1 90 7- 1 909. R. de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l'A!Jicennisme Latin, Bibi. Thomist e XX Paris, 1 934.-R.A . Avi � yii : (Skr.) Nescience ; ignorance ; the state of mmd unaware of true reality ; an equivalent of maya ( q.v. ) ; also a condition of pure awareness prior to the universal process of evolution through gradual differentiation into the elements and factors of knowledge.-K.F.L. Avya kta : ( Skr.) "Unmanifest" descriptive of or standing for hrahman (q.v.) ' in one of its or "his" aspects, symbolizing the superabundan ce of the creative principle, or designating the condi­ tion of the universe not yet become phenomenal (aja, unborn ) .-K.F.L. Awareness : Consciousneu considered in its aspect of act ; an act of attentive awareness such as the sensing of a color patch or the feeling of pain is distinguished from the content attended to, the sensed color patch, the felt pain. The psy1

32

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

chological theory of in tentional act was advanced by F. Brentano (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte) and received its epistemological de­ vel opment by Meinong, H usserl, Moore, Laird and Broad. See lntentionalism.-L. W. Ax iolog i cal : ( Ger. axiolo gisch) In Husserl : Of o r perta ining to va lue or theory of value (the latter term understood as including dis­ value and value-indifference) .-D.C. Ax i olog ical eth i cs : Any ethics which makes the theory of obligation entirely dependent o n the theory of value, by making the determination of the rightness of an action wholly dependent on a consideration of the value or goodness of something, e.g. the action itself, its moti ve, or its consequences, actual or probable. Opposed to deontological ethics. See also teleological ethics.

-W.K.F.

Ax i olog ic Real i sm : In metaphysics, theory that

value as wel l as logic, qual ities as wel l as rela­ tions, have their bein g and exist extern al to the mind and independently of it. Applicable to the phil osophy of man�· though not a l l realists i n the history of philosophy, from P l ato to G. E. Moore, A. N. Whitehead, and N. Hartmann .-J.K.F. Axi ology : ( Gr. axios, of like value, worthy, and logos, account, reason, theory ) . M odern term for theory of value (the desired, preferred, good ), investigation of its n ature, criteria, and meta­ physical status. Had its rise in Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas ( Idea of the Good ) ; was developed i n Aristotle's Organon, Ethics, Poetics, and Metaphysics ( Book Lambda). Stoics and Epicureans i nvestigated the summum honum. Christian philosophy (St. Thomas ) built on Ari­ stotle's identification of highest value with final cause in God as "a living being, eternal, most good." In modern thought, apart from scholasticism and the system of Spinoza ( Ethica, 1 677 ) , in which va lues a re metaphysically grounded, the v arious va l ues were investigated i n separate sciences, until Kan t's Critiques, in which the rela­ tions of kn owledge to moral, aesthetic, and re­ l igious values were examined. Jn Hegel's idealism, mon•lity, art, religion, and phil osophy were made the ca pstone of his di alectic. R. H. Lotze "sought in that wh ich should be the ground of that which is" (M etaphysik, 1 879 ). Nineteenth century evolutiona ry theory, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics subjected value ex­ perience to empirical analysis, and stress was again laid on the diversity and relativity of value phenomena rather than on thei r un ity and metaphysical n ature. F. Nietzsche's A lso Sprach Zarathustra ( 1 883- 1 885 ) and Zur Genealogie der Moral ( 1 887 ) aroused new i nterest in the nature of va lue. F. Brcutano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis ( 18 89), identified value with love. I n the twentieth century the term a xiology was apparently fi rst a ppl ied by Paul Lapie (Logi­ que de la volonte, 1 902 ) and E. von Ha rtmann ( Grundriss der Axiologie, 1 908). Stimulated by Ehrenfels (System der Werttheorie, 1 897 ), Mei­ nong (Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchunl(en 11:ur

Werttheorie, 1 894- 1 899) , and Simmcl (Phifoso­ phie des Ge/des, 1 900). W. M. Urba n wrote the

first systematic treatment of axiology i n Eugl ish ( Valuation, 1 909 ), phen omen ological in method under J . M. Baldwin's in fluence. Meanwh i l e H. Miinsterberg wrote a neo-Fichtean system of va lues ( The Eternal Values, 1 909). Among important recent con tributions arc: B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value ( 1 9 1 2 ) , a free rein terp retation of Hege­ lianism ; W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God ( 1 91 8, 1 92 1 ), defending a meta­ physical theism ; S. Alexan der, Space, Time, and Deity ( 1 92 0 ) , rea l istic and naturalistic ; N. Hartmann, Ethik ( 1 926 ) , detailed analysis of types and laws of value ; R. B. Perry's magnum opus, General Theory of Value ( 1 926 ) , "its mea ning and basic princi pies construed in terms of interest" ; and J. Laird, The Idea of Value ( 1 929 ), noteworthy for historical exposition. A n aturalistic theory has been developed by J. Dewey ( Theory of J'aluation, 1 939), for wh ich "not on ly is science itsel f a vaiue . . . but it is the supreme means of the valid determi nation of all valuations." A. J . Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic ( 1 93 6 ) expounds the view of logica l positivism that value is "nonsense." J. Hessen, Wertphilosophie ( 1 937), provides an account of recent German axiology from a neo-scholastic standpoint. The problems of axiol ogy fall into four main groups, namely, those concerning ( I ) the nature

of value, ( 2 ) the types of value, ( 3 ) the criterion of value, and ( 4) the metaphysical status of value. ( I ) The nature of value experience. Is val ua­

tion fulfil lment of desire (vol untarism : Spi noza, Ehrenfels), pl easure (hedonism : Epicurus, Bent­ ham, Meinong ), interest ( Perry ) , preference ( M artineau ) , pure rational will ( forma li sm : Stoics, Kant, Royce ), ap prehen sion of tertiary qualities ( Santaya n a ) ; synoptic experience of the un i ty of personal ity (person ali sm : T. H. Green, Bowne), any experience that contributes to en­ ha nced life (evolutionism : N ietzsche), or "the relation of things as means to the end or con­ sequence actua l ly reached" ( p ragmatism, instru­ mentalism : Dewey ) . (2) The t)1pes of value. Most axiologists distinguish between in trinsic (consummatory) val ues (en ds ), prized for tht'ir own sake, and inst rumen tal (contributory ) va lues (means ) , which are causes ( whether as ec ononi ic goods or as natural even ts) of intri nsic values. Most intrinsic val ues are also instrumen tal to further value experience ; some instrumenta l va lues are neutra l or even disvaluable intrin sical­ ly. Commonly recognized as i n trinsic va lues a re the (morally) good, the true, the heautiful, and the holy. Values of play, of work, of association, and of bodily well-being are also acknowledged. Some ( with Montague) question whether the true is properly to be regarded as a value, since some truth is d isva luable, some neutra l ; but love of t ruth, regardless of consequences, seems to establish the value of truth. There i s disagreement about whether the holy ( religious value) is a un ique type (Schleiermacher, Otto ), or an atti-

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPHY

tude toward other val ues ( Ka nt, H iiffd ing), or a combination of the t wo ( H ocki n g ) . There is also disagreement about whether the variety o f values is irreducible (pl uralism) or whether a l l va lues a r e rationally related i n a hiera rchy or system (Plato, Hegel, Sorley ) , i n which values interpenetrate or coalesce into a total experi­ ence. ( 3 ) The criterion of value. The standard for testing values is influenced by both psy­ chological and l ogical theory. Hedonists find the standard in the quantity of pleasure derived by the individual (Aristippus) or society ( Bent­ ham ) . lntuition ists appeal to an ultimate in­ sight into preference ( M artineau, Bren tan o ) . Some idealists recognize an obj ective system o f rational norms or ideals a s criterion ( Plato, Wi ndelband ) , while others lay more stress on rational wholeness and coherence ( H egel, Bosan­ quet, Paton ) or inclusiveness (T. H . Green ) . Natural ists find biological survival or adj ustment ( Dewey) to be the stan d a rd. Despite differences, there is much i n common i n the results of the application of these c riteria. ( 4) The meta­ physical status of value. What is the relation of values to the facts investigated by n atural science ( Koehler), of Sein to Sollen (Lotze,

33

Rickert ) , of h uman experience of value to rea lity independent of man ( H egel, Pringle-Pattison, Spaulding ) ? There are th ree main an swers : ( i ) subj ectivism (value i s entirely dependent o n and relative to human experience of it : so most hedonists, naturalists, positivists ) ; (ii) logical obj ectivism ( v a l ues are l ogical essences or sub­ sistences, independent of thei r being known, yet with no existential status or action in rea lity ) ; ( i i i ) metaphysical obj ectivism (values-or n orms o r ideals-are integral, obj ective, and active con­ sti tuents of the metaphysically real : so theists, absolutists, and certain rea lists and natural ists like S. Alexan der and Wieman) .-E.S.B. Ax i om : See Mathematics. Axiomatic method : That method of constructing a deductive system consisting of deduc ing by specified rules all statements of the system save a given few from those given few, which a re regarded as ax ioms or postulates of the system. See Mathemalics.-C.A .B. Ayam iitma brahma : ( Skr.) "This self is hrah­ man", fam ous quota'tion from Brhadii ranyaka Upanishad 2.5 . 1 9, one of many alluding to the central theme of the Upanishads, i.e., the identity of the human and divine or cosmic.-K.F.L.

B Babism : An initially persecuted and later achia­

matizing religious creed founded in Persia prior to the middle of the last century. International in its appeal the number of its followers in­ creased largely in America. As a development against orthodox Mohammedanism, the Babis deny the finality of a ny revelation. The sect's former extreme pantheistic tendency and meta­ physical hairsplittings have been effectively sub­ ordinated to more pronounced ethical impera­ tives.-H.H. Background : (Ger. Hintergrund) In Husserl : The nexus of objects and objective sense ex­ plicitly posited along with any object ; the objective horizon. The perceptual background is part of the entire background in this broad sense. See Horizon.-D.C. Bacon, F ranci s : ( 1 5 6 1 - 1 626) Inspired by the Renaissance, and in revolt against Aristotelian­ ism and Scholastic Logic, proposed an inducti'lle method of discovering truth, founded upon em­ pirical observation, analysis of observed data, inference resulting in hypotheses, and verifica­ tion of hypotheses through continued observation and experiment. The impediments to the 11se of this method are preconceptions and prejudices, grouped by Bacon under four headings, or Idols: (a) The Idols of the Tribe, or racially "wish­ ful," anthropocentric ways of thinking, e.g. ex­ planation by 1inal causes, (b) The Idols of the ca'lle or personal prej udices, (c) The Idols of the 11-farket Place, or failure to define terms, (d) The Idols of the Theat.-e, or blind acceptance of tradition and authority. The use of the inductive method prescribes the extraction of the essential from the non­ essential and the discovery of the underlying structure or form of the phenomena under in­ vestigation, through (a) comparison of instances, (b) study of concomitant variations, and (c) exclusion of llegative instanas. This process is facilitated by the choice of prerogative, or, if possible, of solitary, instances in which the investigated data are comparatively isolated and unadulterated. But under the most favorable conditions inquiry must be a cautious, laborious, plodding, step by step affair, and re­ sults can never be more than provisional because of the possibility of undiscovered negative in­ stances. Bacon had no system of his own, but openly preferred the lonians, Atomists and Epicureans.

Bacon's theory of poetry also deserves con­ sideration. Whereas reason adapts the mind to the nature of things, and science conquers nature by obeying her, poetry submits the shows of things to the desires of the mind and overcomes nature by allowing us in our imagination to escape from her. Out of present experience and the record of history, poetry builds its narrative and dramatic fancies. But it may alto, in al­ legory and parable, picture symbolically scientific and philosophic truths and religious mysteries­ in which case it creates mythologies. Fr. Bacon, Works, 7 vols., 1 857, ed. Spedding and Ellie. -B.�.G.F. Bacon, Roger : ( 1 2 1 4-1 294) Franciecan. He recognized the significance of the deductive ap­ plication of principles and the necessity for ex­ perimental verification of the results. He was keenly interested in mathematics. Hie moat fa­ mous wcrk was called Opus majus, a veritable encyclo �aedia of the sciences of hie day.-L.E.D. Bacon ian M etho d : The inductive method aa ad­ vanced by Francia Bacon ( 1 5 6 1 - 1626). The pur­ pose of the method was to enable man to attain mastery over nature in order to exploit it for hie benefit. The mind should pass from particular facts to a more general knowledge of forms, or generalized physical properties. They are laws according to which phenomena actually proceed. He demanded an exhaustive enumeration of posi­ tive instances of occurrences of phenomena, the recording of comparative instances, in which an event manifests itself with greater or lesser in­ tensity, and the additional registration of nega­ tive instances. Then experiments should test the observations. See Mill's Methods.-J.J.R. Bahya, hen Joseph lbn Padudah : (c. 1 050) Philosopher and ethicist. The title of his work, The Duties of the Heart ( Heb. Robot #a-Leha­ bot), indicates its purpose, i.e., to teach ethical conduct. First part demonstrates pure concep­ tion of God, unity and attributes. His basic prin­ ciple of ethics is thankfulness to God, for Hie creating the wonderful worl d ; the goa I of re­ ligious ethical conduct is love of God. A second work ascribed to him is the To rot ha-Nefesh, i.e., Doctrines of the Soul, which deals primarily with the soul, but also with other subjects and evinces a strong neo-Platonic strain. See Jewish Philosophy.-M. W. Bii.h yii.numeya-vida : (Sier.) A Hinayana Bud-

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPHY

dhist theory ( vada), otherwise known as Sautran­ tika, based upon a realist epistemology. It as­ sumes the reality and independence of mind and object, which latter is inferred (anumeya) as being outside (bahya ) consciousness and appre­ hended only when the sensory apparatus func­ tions and certain physical conditions are fulfilled. -K.F.L. Bihyapratyak�a-vid a : (Skr.) A Hinayana Bud­ dhist theory ( vada ) of realism, otherwise known as Va ibhasika. It holds that objects exist outside (bahya) the mind and consciousness, but that they must be directly (pratyaksa) and not in­ ferentially (cf. Bahyanumeya-'Uada) known. K. F. L. Banausic : (Gr. banausos) Vulgar; illiberal ; ap­ plied particularly to arts, sciences, or occupations that deform the body or the mind.-G.R.M. Bapt i sm : A rite of dedication and induction of an individual into a circle of social and religious privilege. The rite is usually CJf a ceremonious nature with pledges given (by proxy in the case of infants), prayers and accompanied by some visible sign {such as water, �ymbol of purifica­ tion, or wine, honey, oil or blood ) sealing the bond of fellowship. In its earliest form the rite probably symbolized not only an initiation but the magical removal of some tabu or demon possession (exorcism - sl:e Demonology), the legitimacy of bi rth, the inheritance of privilege, the assumption of a name and the expectancy of responsibility. In Christian circles the rite has assumed the status of a sacrament, the super­ natural rebirth into the Divine Kingdom. Vari­ ous forms i nclude sprinkling with water, i mmer­ sion, or the laying on of hands. In some Christian circles it is considered less a mystical rite and more a sign of a covenant of salvation and consecration to the higher life.-V.F. Baroque : A style of art, produced especially in the XYilth century, considered by classicists a type of false art ; by romantictists a product of magic imagination.-L. V. Barth, Karl : { 1 8 8 6-) Swiss theologian, widely influential among current social pessimists. God, he holds, is wholly other than man, not apprehensible by man's reason nor attainable by human endeavor. Christianity is a revealed and supernatural religion. Man must trust God's plan of salvation or be doomed to utter ruin. God is the sole j udge and his j udgments are beyond ma n's attainments. The Ba rthian position is called "crisis theology" {crisis, the Greek word for j udgment) and "dialectical theology" (be­ cause of the emphasis upon the contradiction between God and this world ). For a sum�lrY of Barth's position see The Knowledge of God and the Seroice of God (I 939) .-V.F. Basic S entences, Protocol S entences : Sentences formulating the result of observations or percep­ tions or other experiences, furnishing the basis for empirical veri1ication or confirmation (sec Verification) . Some philosophers take sentences concerning observable properties of physical things as basic sentences, others take sentences concerning sense-data or perceptions. The sen­ tences of the latter kind are regarded by some -

35

philosophers as completely verifiable, while others believe that all factual sentences can be con1irmcd only to some degree. Sec Scientific Empiricisn;.-R.C. Bathm i sm : A name given by the Lamarckian E. D . Cope to a speci al force, or growth-force, which he regarded as existing and as exhibiting itself in the growth of organic beings.-W.F.K. Baumgarten, Alexan d er G ottl i eb : ( 1 7 1 4- 1 762) A German thinker of the pre-Kantian period and disciple of Ch ristian Wolff whose encyclo­ paedic work h� tried to continue. Among his works the best known is A.esthetica in which he analyzes the problem of beauty regarded by him as recognition of perfection by means of the senses. The name of aesthetics, as the philosophy of beauty and art, was introduced by him for the first time.-R.B.W. Becoming : ( Medieval) Any kind of change is actualization of potencies. It is often called, following Aristotle, a "movement", because mov­ ing is a striking instance of becoming, and be­ cause the thing "moves" from the lower level of potentiality to the higher of actuality. Actual­ ization is achieved only by a factor which is act itself. The act is in this sense prior to the potency not only in n ature but also in time. Sec Being, Dialectic, Hegel.-R.A.. Begging the Q uestion : The logical fallacy of assuming i n the premisses of an argument the very conclusion which is to be proved. Sec Petitio principii.-G.R.M. Begriffsgefiihl : (Ger. Literally, conceptual feel­ ing) The faculty of eliciting feelings, images or recollections associated with concepts or cap­ able of being substituted for them. Sometimes, the affective tone peculiar to a given concept. -0.F.K. Behavi ori sm : The contemporary American School of psychology which abandons the concepts of mind and consciousness, and restricts both animal and human psychology to the study of behavior. The impetus to behaviorism was given by tlic Russian physiologist, Pavlov, who through his investigation of the salivary reflex in dogs, de­ veloped the concept of the conditioned reflex. See Conditioned Reflex. The founder of Ameri­ can behaviorism is J. B. Watson, who formu­ lated a program for psychology excluding all reference to consciousness and con1ining itself to behavioral responses. (Behavior: Ji n Introduc­ tion to Comparative Ps)·chology, 1 9 1 4.) Think­ ing and emotion are interpreted as implicit be­ havior : the former is implicit or subvocal speech ; the latter implicit visceral reactions. A distinc­ tion has been drawn between methodological and dogmatic behaviorism : the former ignores "con­ sciousness" and advocates, in psychology, the ob­ jective study of behaviou r ; the latter denies consciousnesr entirely, and is, therefore, a form of metaphysi:al materialism. See A utomatism. -L.W. B ein it, hie rarchy o f : ( Scholastic) The Neo­ Platonic conception of a hierarchy of "emana­ tions" from the "One" persisted throughout the M iddle-Ages, though it was given another mean­ ing. Emanationism properly speaking is incom-

36

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

But the patible with the notion of c reation. mediev a l writers agree that there is a hierarchy, comp rising within the v i sible world i n a n imate beings, pla nts, an i m a l s , and rat ional beings, men ; a bove them r a n k the im material sub· sta nces (s ubsistent forms, a n gels) and fi n a l ly Cod Who, however, is so far dista n t from any created being that h e can not be p l a ced i n l i ne. Whatever is asserted of Cod is so only " a n a logi­ c a l l y" ( see Analogy). There i s a n a l ogy also be­ tween the grades of created beings ; their v a rious levels are not o f one k i n d , no transiti on exists between i n a n i mate and a n i m ate bodies, or be­ tween material and s p i ritual substa nces. Though the orig i n a l mea n i n g has been a ba n d oned, the term "e manation" is s t i l l used, even by A q u i n a s .

Being :

-R.A. In

early

Creek

phil osophy

either to change, or Becom i n g, Being. Accord i n g to Parmeni des

is

opposed

or to Non­ and his dis­

ciples o f the E l ea tic School, everything re a l belongs to t h e category o f Being, as the o n l y possible obj ect of thought. Essentially t h e same reas o n i n g a ppl ies also to material rea l i ty in which there is no thing but Bei ng, one a n d Con­ ete r n a l . and a l l - i nc l u s i v e contin uous, sequently, he conc lud�d, the coming into bei ng a n d pas s i n g away co nstituting change a re il­ lusory, for that which is-not can not be, and that which is c a n n ot cease to be. J n rej ect ing ( Leuk ipp us, Eleatic monism, the mater i a l i sts Democr itus ) asserted that the very ex istence of thin gs, their corporea l n a t ure, i n sofar as it i s subj ect to change and m otion, n ecessa rily presupposes the other than Being, that is, No n-Being, or Void. Thus, i n stead of regard­ ing space as a continuum, they saw in i t the very source of d i scontinuity and the fo undation of the atomic structure of substance. Plato accepted the fi rst part of Parmen ides' a rgument, n a mely, that referring to thought as d i stirn;t from matter, a n d m a i n tai ned that , though Be­ coming is i n deed an apparent cha racteristic of everyth i n g sens o ry, the t rue a n d ult imate rea l i ty, that o f I deas, i s changeless and of the n a ture Aristotle achieved a com p rom ise o f Being. among all these n o t i o n s and conten ded that, though Rei n g, a s the essence of things, is etern a l i n itself, nevertheless it m a n i fests itself oniy i n cha n ge, i n sofar as "ideas" o r "forms" have no existence i n d ependent of, o r tran­ sce nd ent to, the rea lity of thi ngs and m i n d s . The mediev a l thinkers n e v e r revived t h e c o n ­ troversy as a whole, though at ti mes they emph:isized Rei n g, as i n Neo-Platonism, at times Becoming, as in Aristote l i a nism. With the rise o f new in terest in nature, begi n n i n g with F . Jbcon, Hobhes and Locke, t h e problem grew once more i n im portance, espec i a l l y to empiricism. of oppon ents rationa lists, the Spinoza r!'garded change as a ch a racteristic of rr:odal existence and assumed in this con nection a position distantly s i m i l a r to that o f P l ato. H egel formed .i new ans wer to the problem i n d ec l a ring that n a ture, striving to exc lude c o n tradictions, h a s to "negate" them : Being and Non- Bei n g a re "moments" of the same cosmic

process which, a t its

fou n dation, a rises out of

Beir.g con t a i n i n g Non-Being wit h i n itsel f and leadi ng, factua l ly a n d l og ic a l ly, to their syn­ thetic union in Becom i n g .-R .B. W. I n scholasticism : The Eng lish term trans­ l a tes three Latin terms which, in Scholasticism, have d i fferent significations. Ens as a noun i s the most general and most simple predicate ; as a participle it is an essen t i a l predicate only in re­ gard to Cod in Whom existence and essence are one, or Whose essence i m p l ies existence. Esse, though used sometimes in a wider sense, usually means existence which is defined as the actus essendi, or the re a l i ty o f some essence. Esse quid or essentia designates the specific nature of some bei ng or thi ng, the "bei n g thus" o r the quid dity. Ens is divid ed into real a n d mental bei n g (ens rationis) . Though the l a tter a l so has properties, i t is said to h a v e essence only i n a n improper way. Another d i v i s i o n i s i n t o actual and potential being. Ens is cal led the fi rst of all concepts, i n respect t o ontology a n d to psy­ chology ; the l a tter statement of Aristotle a p­ pears to be confi rmed by develo pmental psy­ chology. Th ing (res) a n d ens a re synonymous ; a res may be a res extra mentem or o n l y rationis. Every ens is : someth i n g, i.e. has quiddity, one, true, i.e. corresponds to its p roper n a ture, a n d g o o d . These terms, n a m i n g aspects which are o n ly vi rtua l ly distinct from ens, a re said to be convertible with ens and with each other. Ens is an a n a l ogical term, i . e. it is not predicated i n the same m a n n e r o f every k i n d o f being, accord­ ing to A qu i n as. I n Scotism ens, however, is considered a s u n ivocal and a s a pplying to Cod i n the same sense a s to created beings, though they be disti nguished as entia ab alio from Cod, the ens a se. See Act, A nalogy, Potency, Trans­

cendentals.-R.A. In Spi noza'• sense, t h a t which "is", pre­ without qualification · - the emin ently and source and ul timate subj ect o f all di stinc­ tions. Being is thus d i v i ded i n to that which is "in itsel f" and "in a n other" (Ethica, I, Ax. 4 ; see a l so "substance" a n d 'mode", Defs. 3 a n d 5). B e i n g is l i kewise disti nguished w i t h respect to "fin ite" and " i n fi n ite", under the qua l i fica­ tion s of absolute a n d relative ; thus Cod i s de­ fi n ed (Ibid, I, Def. 6) as " Being absolutely i n fi n ite". Spi noza seems to suggest that the term, Being, has, i n the strict sense, no proper definition ( Cog. Met., I , 1 ) . The main char­ acteristics of Spi noza's treatment of this notion a re ( i ) h i s clea r-headed separation of the prob­ lem� of existence a n d Being, and ( i i ) h i s care­ ful lv worked out d i stinction between ens reale . a n d �ns rationis by mea ns of which Spinoza endeav o r s to j u stify the on tological argument ( q . v . ) i n the face of criticism by the l a ter Schol astica.-W.S. W.

Belief :

Acquiescence in the existence of objects (e.g. external things, other m inds, Cod, etc.) or assent to ti1e truth of propositions (e.g. scienti fic, moral, aesthetic, or metaphysical stateme nts). The bel ief i :t objects is frequently i m mediate and non-i nferenci al ; the belief i n rropositiona usua l ly rests on reflection and i n ference.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Theories of belief may be cl assi fied as : { a ) affective {b) intellectual and {c) volitional. Hume's theory that belief is a feeling of vivid­ nese attaching to a perception or memory but not to a fiction of the imagination is an example of {a) (An Enquiry Concerning Human Under­ standing, § 5 Pt. I I ) . Bain and James Mill rep­ resent {b), while W. James represents (c). ( Tiu Will to Believe, Etc., 1 89 6 ) .-L. W. In scholasticism : means either faith or opinion. Opinion is a statement lacking evidence. Faith is a supernatural act, due to God's grace, re­ ferring to things reason finds beyond its capacity of proof, though not contradicting its principles. Statements capable of experimental p roof are not objects of faith.-R.A. Beneke, Friedri ch E duard : ( 1 798- 1 8 54) A German thinker of Kantian tradition modified by empiricism ; his doctrines exerted considerable influence upon the psychology and educational theory of the 1 9th century. M ain works : Er/ahrungseelenlehre, 1 820 ; Physik d. Sitten, 1 822 ; Metaphysik, 1 822 ; Logik als Kunstlehre des Denk ens, 1 8 3 2; Lehrbuch d. Psych. als Naturwiss., 1 8 3 3 ; Erz.iehungslehre, 1 8 3 3 ; Pragmatische Psychol., 1 8 5 0.-R.B. W. Benthamism : N ame conventionally given to the uti litaria nism of Jeremy Bentham ( 1 748- 1 8 3 2 ) who regarded the greatest happiness of the great­ est number as the supreme ethical goal of human society and i ndividual men. The morality of men's actions is determined experimentally by their utility, which means the power of an action to produce happiness. The moral quality of any action is estimated in accorda nce with its pleas­ ant or painful consequences ; for the sovereign masters of man are pleasure, the only good, and pain, the only evil. Ethics becomes a matter of calculation of consequences.-1.J.R. Bentham, Jeremy : ( 1 748- 1 8 3 2 ) Founder of the English Uti litarian School of Philosophy. In Jaw, he is remembered for his criticism of Black­ stone's views of the English constitution, for his examination of the legal fiction and for his treatment of the subj ect of evidence. In politics, he is most famous for his analysis of the prin­ ciples of l egislation and, in eth:cs, for his great­ est happiness p rinciple. See Hedonic Calculus ; Utilitarianism. J. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1 7 8 9 ; Outline of a New Sys­ tem of Logic, 1 82 7 ; Deontology.-L.E.D. Berdyayev, Nikolai A l exandrovitch : ( 1 8 74-) Is a contemporary Russian teacher and writer on the philosophy of rel igion. He was horn in Kiev, exiled to Vol ogda when twenty-five ; threatened with expulsion from the Russian Orthodox Church in 1 9 1 7, he became professor of philosophy at the Univ. of Moscow. In 1 922, he was expelled from the Soviet Union and he went to Berl in, where he established his Academy of Religious Philosophy. He moved his school to Paris and established a Russian review called Puti ( The Way)� Hie thought resembles that of the Christian Gnostice ( see Gnosticism) , and it owes a good deal to German idealism and

37

myaticiam { Boehme). He is a trenchant critic of systems as diverse as Communism and Thom­ istic Scholasticism. His most noted works are : Smyisl lstorii (The Meaning of History), Ber­ lin, 1 923 ; Novoye Srednevyekovyt (tranal. a a The End of Our Time, N. Y.1 1 93 3 ), Berlin, 1 924 ; Freedom 11nd the Spirit, N. Y., 1 93 5. V. J. Bourke, "The Gnosticism of N . Berdyaev", Thought, XI ( 19 3 6 ) , 409·22.-Y.J.B. (d. 1 9 48 ) Bergson, H enr i : ( 1 8 5 9- 1 94 1 ) As the moat in­ fluential of modern temporaliu.ic., anti-mechanit­ tic and spiritualistic metaphysics, Bergson'• writi ngs (Les domues immidiates J, l'ex­ pirience, Matiere ti Mimoire, L'ftloluJioff Cf'ill­ trice, Le rire, lntrodu,tio" a llJ mttaphysif11U, Les deux sources de la morale ti de llJ religioff, etc. ) were aimed against the dogmatic and crude naturalism, and the mechanistic and atatic materialism which reached their heights in the second half of the last century. The vital center of hir doctrine is duratiop rather than intuition. Duration is the original thing in itself, the �•substance" of philosophic tradition, except that to Bergson it is a specific experience, revealed to the individual i n immedi­ ate experience. All things, consciousness, matter, time, evolution, motion and the absolute are so many specialized tensional forms of duration. The phrase elan vital sums up his vitalistic doc­ trine that there is an original life force, that it has passed from one generation of living beings to another by way of developed individual or­ ganisms, these being the connecting links be­ tween the generations. Bergeon regards aa pseudo-evol utionary the effort to arra nge all liv­ ing beings into a grand uni-linear aeries. True or creative evolution is pluri-dimensional, i.e., the life force is conserved in every line of evolu­ tion of living beings, causing all of the numer­ ous varieties of living forms, creating all new species, and dividing itself more and more as it advances. As the vital impetus is not moving towards any fixed, predetermined and final end, a n immanent teleology is within the life force itself. It is an error to see Bergson's phi losophy as being exclusively an intuitive c ritique of knowl­ edge. Such a mode of exposition constructs of his thought a mere "ism", a species of intui­ tionalism. Bergson was the fint to try to give the term intuition a scientific basis. He transformed and regrounded the static pat­ tern of the older forms of intuitionism by giv­ ing it a biogenetic and psychologically dynamic j ustification. Intuitive knowledge is not l imited to the favored few, is not a private, purely 10l ipsistic affair; but is a genera' property of all thinking minds. Bergson's conception of intui­ tion represents a fusion of scientific - objectivity and a rtistic directness. Moreover, it is a serious wide-spread error of interpretation to consider Bergson as an anti­ intellectualist. His alleged anti-intellectualism should be considered as a protest against taking the static materialism and apatialization of New­ ton's conception of nature as being anything but a high abstraction, as a rejection of the ex-

38

DICTIONA R l: OF PHILOSOPHY

treme claims of mechanistic and m aterialistic science, as an effort o f reason to transcend itself in harmony with the greatest idealistic think­ ers, as an effort of thinkers to stress the dynamic nature o f reality, and as a persistent criticism of reason, a continuation of the Kantian tradi­ tion. · His much misread conception of intuition may be viewed as akin to Spinoza's intuitio, to wit : a completion rather than a rej ection of reason.-H.H. Berkelei ani sm : The ideal istic system of phi losophy o f George Berkeley ( 1 68 S- l 7 53 ). He thought that the admission of an extramental world would lead to materialism and atheism. Hence he denied the existence of an independent world of bodies by teaching that their existence con­ sists in perceptibility, esse is percipi. The cause of the i deas in our mind is not a material sub­ stance, but a spiritual being, God, who com­ municates them to us i n a certain order which we cal l the laws of nature. Things cannot ex ist unless perceived by some mind. Berkeley ac­ knowledged th e existence of other spirits, or minds, besides that of God .-J.J.R. Berke l ey, G eorge : ( 1 685-1 7 5 3 ) Pluralistic ideal­ ist, reflecting upon the spatial attributes of dis­ tance, size, and situ ation, possessed, according to Locke, by external objects in themselves apart from our perception of them, concluded that the discrepancy between the visual and the tac­ tual aspects of these attributes robbed them of all objective validity and reduced them to the status of secondary qualities eJCisting only in and for consciousness. Moreover, the very term "matter," like all other "universals," is fou nd upon analysis to mean and stand for nothing but complexes o f experienced qualities. Indeed, "existence" except as presence to consciousness, is meaningless. Hence, nothing can be said to exist except minds ( spirits) and mental content ( ideas ). Esse = percipi or percipere. At the same time, Berkeley, trusting the ex­ ternal reference of i ndividual eJCperience, argues from it the eJCistence of a universal mind ( God) of which the content is the so-called objective world. Finite spirits are created by God, and their several experiences represent his communication to them, so far as they are able to receive i t, of his divine experience. Reality, then, is composed of spirits and ideas. The physical aspects of the world are reducible to mental phenomena. Matter is non-existent. G. Berkeley, Treatise on the Principles of

Human Knowledge, 1 7 1 0 ; Three Dialogues Be­ tween Hylas and Philonous, 1 7 1 3 ; De Motu (critique of Newtonian mechanics), 1 720 ; 11.l­ ciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, 1 73 3 ; Siris, 1 744.-B.A.S.F. Bernard of Chartres : ( died c. 1 1 30) Has been

called the "most perfect Platonist of his century" by John of Salisbury (Metalogicus, IV, 3 5, PL 1 99, 938) but he is known only at second-hand now. H e taught in the school of Chartres from 1 1 1 4-1 1 1 9 and was Chancellor of Chartres from 1 1 1 9-1 1 24. According to John of Salisbury, Bernard was an eJCtreme realist in his theory of universals, but he taught that the forms of

things (formae nativae) are distinct from the exemplary Ideas in tlie Divine Mind. A treatise,

De expositione Porphyrii has been attributed to

him. He is not to be confused with Bernard Silvestris of Chartres, nor with Bernard of Tours. E. Gil son, "Le platonisme de Bernard de C.'', Revue Neoscolastique, XXV ( 1 92 3 )

5-1 9 .:..._ V.J.B. •

Best : The p rinciple of the best of all possible

worl ds : according to Leibniz, the world which exists is the best possible because God's wisdom makes him know, his goodness makes him choose, and his power always makes him produce the best possible. See Optimism.-J.M. Bewusstsei n Ueberhaupt : German expression meaning "consciousness in general" that is, con­ sciousness conceived as a real entity over and above individual conscious centers. See Conscious­

ness.-L. W.

Bhagavad G ita : (Skr. the song, gita, of the

Blessed One) A famed philosophic epic poem, widely respected in India and elsewhere, repre­ sen ting Krishna embodied as a charioteer impart­ ing to the King Arj una, who is unwilling to fight his kinsmen in battle, comprehension of the mysteries of existence, clearly indicating the rela­ tionship between morality and absolute ethical values in a Hindu phil osophy of action.-K.F.L. Bhakti : ( Skr. division, share) Fervent, loving de­ votion to the object of contemplation or the divine being itself, the almost universally recog­ nized feeling approach to the highest reality, in contrast to vidya (s.v.) or jiiana (s.v.), sanc­ tioned by Indian philosophy and productive of a vol uminous literature in which the names of Rarna nanda, Vallabha, N anak, Caitanya, and Tulsi Das are outstanding. I t is distinguished as apara (lower) and para (higher) hhakti, the former theistic piety, the latter phrlosophic medi­ tation on the unmanifest brahman (cf. avyakta). -K.F.L. Bhii�ya : (Skr. speaking) Commentary. Bheda : ( Skr. different, distinct) Non-identity, par­ ticul arly in reference to any philosophy of dual­ ism which recognizes the existence of two op­ posed principles or admits of a difference between the essentially human and the Abso­ lute.-K.F.L. Bhediibheda : (Skr. "different [yet) not different") A phil osophy admitting the point of view of hheda ( s.v.) as well as that of ahheda (s.v.), depending on the mental and spiritual attain­ ment of the person.-K.F.L. Bhuta : (Skr. become) The "has-become'', or the ultimate element or concrete thing as it has evolved from the abstract, metaphysical unity through a process of infinite particularization and limitation.-K.F.L. Bhutatathatii : (Skr .) "So-ness", the highest state conceivable by the Vij ii ana-vada (s.v.) in which there is a complete coincidentia oppositorum o f beings and elements of knowledge ; directly identified with the Adi-Buddha, or eternal Bud­ dha, in Vaj rayana Buddhism.-K.F.L. Biconditional : The sentential connective =:, "if and only if." See Logic, formal, § 1 .-A.C. Binom i c forces : Extra-biological forces, which

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y in rluence the direction and development of l i fe.

defin itely

mental forces which affect l iving organisms in

tory ;

I.e.

all

physical, chemical and

any way. seems

vitaliets

that

wards.

the

to

be

an

creative

Nonetheless

exception

life-force

n atural

The

analysis

spoken

of

as

scientific to

ap plication

biological

"mathematical

to their

evolves

selection

enced by binomic forces.-C.K.D.

Biometry : matical

environ­

The second law of thermo-dynamics

to

view

other

is

of

problems

up­

in flu­

mathe­

( a lso

biophysics"

and

"mathematical biochemistry"). The j ournal

metrika wa1

Bio­

founded by Karl Pearson.-W.M.J.f.

A philosopher in the French "spiritualistic" tradition of �t a i n e de Biran and Boutrou.i:, who in his essays L'.dction

Blondel, Mauri ce : ( 1 8 6 1 - 1 9 3 9) ( 1 89 3 ) ,

defended

and

an

Le Proch de l'lntellige�e ( 1 92 2 ) , activistic

psychology

and

meta­

physics. "The Philosophy of Action" is a vol un­

taristic

gards

and

the

ideali stic

philosophy which, as re­

relation of thought

to action, seeks

to compromise between the e.i:tremes of intellec­ tualism

and

pragm atism.

La Pensee ( 1 9 H ) ,

book

earlier

activistic

In

his

Blonde!

philosophy

more

reta i n s

combined

stronger theological emphasis.-L. W.

Bod h isattva : of wisdom Gautama

( Skr.) "Exi stence

holy man.-K.F.L.

Body :

such

(.bodhi)",

Buddh a

( s.v.) ;

Here taken i n

as

recent

(satroa) was

with

his

a

i n a state

attained

a Buddhist wise

by

and

the sense of the material

organized substance of man contrasted with the mind, soul or spirit, th us leading to the problem of the relation between body and mind, one of

the most persistent problems of philosophy.

39

precludes

it.

No

known

theory can

meet all objections and prove entirely satisfac­ the problem sti l l

persista.

Spinoza, Mind.-1.J.R.

See De1carte1, was

Gorliu,

Of

Boehme, Jacob : ( l 5 i 5- l 62+)

of poor parents, received little formal schooling, studied th e B ible and the works of H e be­ Pastor Valentine Weigel assiduously.

the eon

came noted as a mystic, theosophist, and i n his own

day

H e wrote trans lated

was in

his

called

German works

the

German Philosopher. early followers

but his

i n to

Latin,

hence

it

is

d i fficult to disti n guish h i s person al thought from

that of his school.

He thought that all rea lity,

ev en God, contains a duality of good and evil,

the universe a n d man's soul are nothing with­

out God. H e has had much influence on later German and Russian mysticism. Chief works ;

Aurora, Vierug Fragen von der Seele, A-f)'!­ terium lvfagnum, Von der Gnadenu:ahl. Deus­ sen, J. Boehme, iiber sein Leben u. seine Philos. ( Kiel,

1 8 9 7 ) .-V.J.B.

Boeth ius : (+i0-525)

An in fluential commentator

o n Aristotle and Cicero, who, i n his own th i n k­ ing, reflected a strong i n fluence of Xeo-Platon­

ism

and

Augustinia n ism.

Bolzano, Bernard : losopher

Consolatione

De

(Migne PL,

Philosophiae

and

63-4, 69- 7 0 ) .-R.B.W. ( 1 78 1 - 1 848 ) Austrian phi­

mathematician.

Professor o f the

I 8 0 5 - 1 82 0,

philosophy of religion at Prague,

he

was compelled to resign i n the latter year be­

cause

of

his

rationalistic

tendencies

in

theol­

ogy, and afterwards held no academic position. Hie

of

Wissenschaftrlehre

1 8 3 7,

while

it

is to

Of

be classed as a work on traditional logic, con­

mind, o r d o e s not adequately distinguish the psy­

which ha,·e since become important in symbolic

cour-�

any

theory

which

chical from the physical, pects

of

the

same

identifies

body

and

regarding both as as­

real i ty,

eludes

difficulties presented by th e problem.

some of the Both mate­

rialism and idealism may be considered as forms

of psycho-physical moniam. Materialism by deny­ ing

th e

reducing

real

existence

mind

to

a

of apiritual

function

of

beings

matter,

and

and

apiritualism, or that species cal led idealism, which

regards bodies simply as contents o f conscious­

ness,

really

evade

th e

main

issue.

All

those,

however, who frankly acknowledge the empiri­

tains

significa n t

logic

and

p ublished

anticipations

mathematics.

In

of

his

many

ideas

posthumously

Paradoxien des Unendlichen ( 1 8 5 1 )

he a p pears as a forerunner in some respects of

Cantor's theory of tra nsfinite numbers. .d. C. W. Dubislav, Bolzarro al1 Vorla11fer dtr matht· Philosophisches Jahrbuch der matirchtrz LoF,ik. Gorres·Gescllschaft. vol. 44 (193 1 ) . p p . 448-4 56. H. Scholz, Dit W11urrrchaft1leh rt Bolu rzoJ , A b­ handlungen der Fries'schen Schule, n. s. vol. 6

( 1937 ) . pp. 399-4i2.

Bonaventure, S t. : ( 1 22 1 - 1 2i4)

Was

born

at

Bagnorea, near Viterbo, and his name origi nall y

cally given dual ity of mind a n d organism, are

was

tion between them.

u n der Alexande r of H ales, and took his l icen­

obliged to struggle with the problem of the rela­ The two most noted rival

theories attempting a n a n swer are interactionism

and p a rallelism.

The first considers both body

and mind as substa n tial beinga, in fluencing each

other, hence causally related. The aecond holds that physical processes and mental processes accompany

each other without any i n teraction or interference

whauoever, consequently they cannot be causally related.

The Scholastics advance the doctrine of

the human composite con sisting of body and soul

John

ciscans i n

of

Fidanza.

1238,

studied

He

j oined

the

Fran­

at the Univ. o f Paris

tiate in 1 248. He taught theology in Paris for seven years and received his doctorate i n 1 2 5 7.

In

his

this

year he was made Superior-General of

Order a n d he taught no more.

H i s chief

Commentaria in IV L. Sententiarum, ltinerarium mentir in Deum, Quaertiones Dis­ putatae ( Opera Omnia, ed. crit., I 0 vol. Quar­ works a re :

acchi,

tinian,

1 8 82-1 902). with

His

philosophy

is

Augus­

some Aristote l i a n modi fications in

united into one substance and nature, constitut­

his theory of i n tellection and matter an d form.

tions of which man is capable must be ascribed.

ory,

one agent, formed of two component elements.

Augustine.

ing the human person or self, to whom all ac­

There can be no interaction, since there is but This theory, like interactionism, makes provision

for survival, even immortality, while par0allelism

But his Divine Ei:empl ari sm, Illumina tion the­ and

tendency

to

stress

th e

psychological

importance of the human will, derive from St.

Bon BC. The law of composition is the theorem of the propositional calc;ilus : A. C. [p ::> q] [-p :::l r] :::l [p :::l qr] . Composition an'd Divis ion, fallac i es of : Semi­ formal l ogical fallacies. I n the fal lacy of com-

position it is assumed that what characterizes individuals qua individuals will likewise char­ acterize groups of these same i ndividuals qua groups. In that of division what is taken as va lidly applying to the group :is a whole is then assumed to apply with e')ual validity to the i ndividuals constituting said g roup. Cal led semi-formal because they invo!ve passing from the distributive to the collective use of terms and v ice versa.-C.K.D. Compossi b ility : Those things are compossible i n Leibniz's phi losophy which are literally "co­ possible," i.e., which may exist together, which belong to the same possible world. Since meta­ physical possibil ity mea ns for Leibniz simply the absence of contradiction, two or more th ings are compossible if, and only i f, their joint ascription to a single world involves no con­ tradiction. All possible worlds are held by Leibniz to have general laws analogous to those of our own actual world. Compossibility for any set of things, consequently, involves their capacity to be brought u nder one and the same general system of laws. That this last prov\sion is important follows from the fact th at Leibniz affirmed all simple predicates to be compatible. -F.L.W. Compound : (l at. con + ponere, to place ) A complex whole formed by the union of a num­ ber of pa rts in contrast to an element which is a simple unanalyzable pa rt. A mental com­ pound is a state of mind formed by the com­ bination (see . Combination) of simple mental elements, either conscious or unconscious.-L. W. Compound Theory of Mind : The conception of mind as a compound of psychological elements ana logous to a chemical compound. See Psy­

chological

A t o mism.-L. W.

Comprehension : ( Lat. com + prehendere, to

grasp) The act or faculty of understa nding, i ntellectual grasp, or insight. Comprehension may be achieved va riously by : ( I ) unifying and relating manifold facts or ideas ; (2) deducing something from premises ; ( 3 ) accommodating new facts or ideas to established knowledge ; ( 4) seeing a thing or idea in its p roper or significant contex t ; (5) relating a fact or idea to something known, universal and subj ect to law. Comprehension carries sometimes the .spe­ cial connotation of thorough understanding. Logic: The sum of characteristics which connote a class notion symbolized by a general term. Also, the features common to a number of in­ stances or objects. Thus, the con:iotation (q.v.) or intension (q.v.) of a concept. See Intension. -0.F.K. Compresence : ( Lat. com praes entia from praesse, to be present) The togetherness of two or more items, fo r example, the coexistence of several elements i n the unity of consciousness. In the terminology of S. Alexander (Space, Time and Deity), an unique kind of togetherness which underlies cognition.-L. W. Comte, Auguste : ( 1 7 98- 1 8 5 7 ) Was born and l ived during a period when political and social conditions i n France were highly unstable. In reflecting the spirit of his age, he rose against

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

the tendency p revalent among his predecessors to p ropound philosophic doctrines in disregard of the facts of nature and society. His revolt was directed particularly against traditional metaphysics with its endless speculations, count­ less assumptions, and futile controversies. To his views he gave the name of positivism. Ac­ cording to him, the history of human ity should be described i n terms of three stages. The fi rst o f these was the theological stage when people's interpretation of rea lity was dominated by super­ stitions and prej udices ; the second stage was metaphysical when people attempted to compre­ hend, and reason about, reality, but were un­ able to support their contentions by facts ; and the third and final stage was positive, when dogmatic assumptions began to be replaced by factual knowledge. Accordingly, the history of thought was cha racterized by a certain succession of sciences, expressing the turning of scholarly interest toward the ea rthly and human affai rs, namely : mathematics, astronomy, physics, chem­ istry, biology, and sociology. These doctrines were discussed i n Comte's main work, Cours de philosophie positive.-R.B. W. Conat i on : ( Lat. conatio, attempt) Referring to voluntary activity.-V.F. Conatus : The drive, force, or urge possessed by a thing which is directed towards the preservation of its own being. Since, for Spinoza, all things are animated, the term is used by hi � i n a broader meaning than that accorded it, for ex­ amp le, in the Stoic philosophy. Spinoza main­ tains that there is no conatus for self�destruction (Ethica, III, 4; see a l so IV, 20 Schol., etc.) ; rather, the conatus relates to a thing's "power of existence", and he thus speaks of it as a kind of amour propre {natuurlyke Lie/de) which characterizes a specific thing. See Short Tr., App. II.-W.S. W. Conceivability : The quality or condition of tak­ ing i nto and holding an idea in mind. It has come to mean any affection of the mind or any apprehension, imagining or opinion of the mind. It is a necessary though not sufficient criterion for the truth of said idea or affection, etc. -C .K.D . Concept : In logic syn. either with propositional function (q. v.) generally or with monadic propositional function. The terminology asso­ ci ated with the word function i s n ot, however, usually employed in con nection with the word concept; and the l atter word may serve to avoid ambiguities which have arisen from l oose or variant usages of the word function (q. v.) ; or it may retlect a difference in point of view. A. C. In scholasticism : the "word of the mind" (verbum mentis) by which the possible in­ tellect expresses (therefore also i n l ater writers species expressa) the universal nature disengaged by the active intellect from the phantasm and tra nsm itted as species intelligibilis to the possible intellect.-R.A . In Kan t : In the strict sense, a ny generic or class term, excl usive or relational terms or categories. Sometimes, loosely, a ny general

61

or abstract representation.-0.F.K. In H usserl : 1 . An expressible sense. 2. An eidos as intended.-D.C. C oncept i on : (Lat. concipere, to take together) Cogn ition of abstracta or uni versals as dis­ tinguished from cognition of concreta or pa rticu­ l ars. ( See Abstractum. ) Concepti on, as a mode of cognition, may or m ay not posit real or subsistent uni versals corresponding to the con­ cepts of the mind. See C onceptualism ; Con­

ceptual Realism.-L. W.

Conceptua li sm : A solution of the problem of uni­

versals which seeks a compromise between ex­ treme nominalism {generic concepts a re signs which apply indifferently to a n umber of par­ ticulars) and extreme realism (generic concepts refer to subsistent un iversals) . Conceptualism offers vari ous interpretations 'of conceptual ob­ j ectivity : (a) the generic concept refers to a class of resembling particula rs, (b) the object of a concept is a uni v�rsal essence pervading the particulars, but having no reality apart from them, ( c) concepts refer to abstracta, that is to say, to i deal objects envisaged by the mind but having no metaphysical status.-L. W. See Scholasticism. C onceptua l Rea li sm : Theory which asc.-ibes ob­ j ectivity of some sort to conceptual cognition ; i ncl udes extreme or Platonic realism and con­ Conceptualism but excludes nominalism. See ·

reptualism.-L. W.

Concom i tance : ( Latin concomitantia, accompani­

ment), literally the act or state of being asso­ ciated, the term has received wide currency in logic, particularly since John Stuart Mill clear­ ly formulated the method of concomitant varia­ ti ons, as the concurrent existence, appearance or disappearance of certain characters which, under circumstances, admit but do not necessarily postulate causal i nterrelatedness.-K.F.L. Precise conj unction or accompaniment, spatial or temporal.-C.A.B. Concrete : Anything that is specific or individ­ ual. The term is opposed to "general" or to "abstract", terms which stress common char­ acteristics or qualities considered apart from their specific setting.-V.F. Concrete Un i versa l : In Hegel's system a cate­ gory is concrete when it possesses the basic character o f the real, i.e. tension, change dialectical opposition. S uch a un iversal com­ prises a synthesis of two opposite abstractions ; and with one exception, it in turn becomes an abstract member of a pair of logical opposites u nited or "sublated" in a higher category. The lowest of such dynamic or concrete un iversals is Becoming, which is a dialectical synthesis of Being and Not-Being. The only absolutely con­ crete universal, however, is Reality itself, the Wo rld Whole, conceived as an a ll-incl usive, organic system of sel f-thinking Thought. 2. Nco-idealism (q.v.) i n Italy i ntroduces a second type of concrete universal whose elements l ack the character of dialectical opposition and logical abstractness.-W.L. C oncreti on : (Lat. concresco, to grow together) A uniting or growing together.-V.F.

62

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Sa n tayana calls u niversals "concretions of dis­ course." (Life of Reason, vol. I (Reason in

Common Sense) ).

C oncupiscence : ( Lat. con + cupere, t o desire

wholly or altogether) Desire for pleasure or de­ l ight of the senses ; as such it is a desire wh ich is natu ral, necessary and proper to man. But when th is desire operates i ndependently of, or contrary to the right rule of reason, then con­ cupiscence is a bad habit or vice, contrary to natu re, and thus opposed to the vi rtue of tem­ perance or "notl,i ng in excess." In an exten ded sense, concupiscence may ap ply to desire for obj ects arousing appetites other than those of the senses.-L.M.H. C oncurrence : The doctrine of Augustine that be­ fore the Fall it was possible for man not to sin, but he needed Cod's help, adjutorium sine quo non. After the Fall man needs Cod's grace or concurrence which acts with him, adjutorium quo, with which he must co-operate. · The term a lso signi fies, concursus, or the gene ral co­ operation of God, the primary cause, with the activity of all c reatures, as secondary ca uses. -1.J.R. Concursus dei (or divinus) : (Lat. Divine con­ current activity ) The divine activity in its re­ lation to the 1in i te causes i n the development of the world and the free will of man. The term suggests that divine activity runs parallel with the activity of th i ngs and creatures. The concursus dei is differently conceived depending on whether the stress is laid o n the divine action or on the action of secondary causes.

-H.H.

Con dignity : A characteristic of merit which im­

plies equality and p roporti onality between service rendered and its recompense, to wh ich there is a claim on the ground of j ustice. Merit of this desc ription is cal led condign merit, or meritum de c on digno .-1.J. R . Condil lac, Etienne : ( 1 7 1 5- 1 7 8 0 ) French sensa­ tional ist. Successor of Locke. In his Traite des sensations, he works out the details of a system based on Lorkean foundations in wh ich all the human facul ties are reduced i n essence to a sensory basis. Un derstanding, in all i ts phases, is deemed n othing more than the com­ parison or multiplication of sensations. He is important today for his having followed the lead of Locke in pointing the way to psychology to pro1it by observa tion and experience.-L.E.D . E. Con dillac, Traiti des systemes, 1 846 ; Traiti des sensations, I S 5 4 ; L ang ue des calculs, 1 8 58. C ondition: ( Lat. conditio, agreement, conditio ri ) I . The if-clause i n an implicative proposition. 2. Cause (q.v. ) . 3 . Necessary cause (q.v.) as opposed to sufficient caus:!.-A .C.B. C onditional : The senten tial connective ::> . See L o gic, formal, § 1 . A sentence o f the form A :::i B (or a proposi­ tion expressed by such a sentenc�)-verbally, "if A then B"-fll a y be cal led a conditional sentence (or proposition ) . A . C. Con diti onal Immortality : A teaching a ffirming that immo rtality is a gift of God conferred on

believers in Christ, who become the children of God, and denyi ng that the human soul is im­ morta l by nature.-1.J.R . Conditional Morality : Any system of morals wh ich has for i ts basic princi ple what Kant calls a hypothetical imperative, e.g., a system of morals which reasons that we should act in certa in ways because such actions will bring us happi ness, assum ing that we want happi ness. See Hypothetical imperatives.-W.K.F. Conditioned Reflex : See Conditioned R espo nse. Con d itioned Response : Resp!insc of an organ­ ism which, origi nally prod uced by its "natur�I" stimul us, is subsequently produced in the absence of the original stimulus by a substitute or "con­ ditioning" stimulus. Thus if S represents an original stimulus (in Pavlov's experiment, the presentation of food to a dog) and R is the natura l response ( the salivary flow of the dog) and i f s' is a conditioning stimulus associated with S ( the ringing of a bel l at the time of presenting food to the dog) then R , produced by S' in the absence of S is said to be a con­ ditioned or c onditional response. See Behavior­

ism.-L. U'.

Conditiones sine qui b us non : A ph rase desc rip­

tive of such accompanying conditions without the presence of which i t is impossible for a cause to produce an effec t ; conditions for which there a re no substitutes.-J.J.R. Conduct : ( Lat. co nducere, to bring together) ( a ) Volunta ry behavior of any sort, actual or i n­ tended. Action for which a person may be held responsible. Subject-ma tter of eth ics which seeks to determ ine right and wrong action or proper and improper conduct. Deportment. (b) In psychology : Behavior of a living or­ gan ism reacting to environmental stimuli. See Be ha vic,rism.-A .J.B. Con fi gurat ion : (Lat. con1igurare from con, to­ gether and 1igurare, to form) A structural pat­ tern a t the physical, physiological or psychologi­ cal level. The term has been suggested to translate the German Gestalt. See Ge ualt

P.• vchology.-L.W.

Con fi guration i sm : A suggested Engl ish equivalent for Gesta lt Psychology. See Gestalt Psy cho l o gy .

Con fi rmation, C on fi rma b le : See Vuificalion 3, 4. C onflict : The psychological phenomenon of struggle between competing ideas, emoti ons or tendencies to action. J. F. Herbart (Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 1 8 1 6 ) enunciated a doctrine of conflict of ideas i n accorda nce with which ideas opposed to the mind's dominant ideas a re sub­ merged below the threshold of consciousnc:ss. The doctrine of conflict has been revived by recent psychoanalytic psychology (see Psych o­ analysis) to account for the relegation to the subconscious of ideas and tendencies intolerable to the consc ious mind.-L. W. C onfucius : ( K'ung Ch'iu, K'ung Ch ung·ni, K'ung Fu-tzu or G rand Master K'ung, 5 5 7-479 B. C. ) Was born of a poor and common fam ily in the state of Lu (in present Shangtung ) , a descendant of the people of Sung. His father died soon after his birth. When he grew up, he was put i n charge of :i. granary, then cattle

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

and sheep, and then public works in his native state. Later he became Grand Secretary of Jus­ tice and then Chief Minister. He regained some territory lost to a neighboring state purely bv his moral force, executed a minister who created disorder, and brought peace to the land to the extent that things lost on the highways were not stolen. In 496 B.C., he began 14 years of travelling from state to state, offering his service. He was politely consulted by pri nces and dukes, but no one would put his moral doctrines into practice. He was even sent away from Ch'i, threatened in Sung, driven out of Sung and Wei, and sur­ rounded between Ch'en and Ts'ai. When in difficulty, he exclaimed, "Heaven has endowed me with a moral destiny. What can Huan Tuei (who threatened him) do to me ? " Eventu­ ally he retired to Lu to study, teach and write. He lived in the time when the moral and cultural traditions of Chou were in rapid de­ cline. Attempting to u phold the Chou culture, he taught poetry, history, ceremonies and music to 3,000 pupils, becoming the first Chinese edu­ cator to offer education to any who cared to come with or without tuition. He taught litera­ ture, h uman conduct, being one's true self and honesty in social relationships. He wrote the chronicles called Spring and Autumn. His tacit j udgments on social and political events were such that "un ruly ministers and vill ai.nous sons were a fraid" to repeat their evil deeds. He severely disciplined himself and practiced what he taught. He loved poetry, ceremonies and music. He was serious, honest, polite, filial­ ly pious towards his mother, stern toward his son, and friendly to his pupils. His most re­ li able teachings are found in the Lun Yu ( Analects), aphorisms recorded by his fol lowers.

-W.T.C.

Confused : ( Ger. verworren) In H usserl : Not

given distinctly, articulatedly, with respect to implicit components. In Descartes, sensations are confused ideas.-D.C. C onfusi on : (l ogical) May be due to the am­ biguity which is always a possible accompanimen t of the use of words or terms with respect to their several meanings. It may also refer to any logical misapprehension which results in a semi-formal or material fall acy.-C.K.D. Congru i ty : A characteristic of merit which im­ plies an intrinsic disproportionality between ser­ vice rendered and its recompense, to which there is no claim on the ground of j ustice, but on that of equity alone. Merit of this description is called congruous merit, or meritum de congruo. -1.J.R. Conj ugat ion : ( Lat. con + j ungere, yoke together) (a) Grammar: The inflections of a verb. (b) Biology : The union of male and female plant or animal. (c) Logic: Joining the extreme terms of a syllogism by the middle term ; j oining dissimilar things by their common characteristics or by analogy. (d) Ethics : Conj ugations or pairings of the passions : love and hate, desire and avoidance,

pleasure and sadness, etc.

63

Synonymou3 with

connexio. (e) Metaphysics : In Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., the pairings of opposites in the simple bodies : dry and hot (fire), hot and moist (ai r), moist and cold (water), cold and dry (earth ) .

-L.M.H.

Conj unct ion : See Logic, formal, § 1 . Connexi ty : A dyadic rel ation R is called con­

nected i f, for every two different members x, y of its field, at least one of x Ry, yRx holds. C onnotat i on : 1. The sum of the constitutive

notes of the essence of a concept as it is in itsel f and not as it is for us. This logical prop­ erty is thus measured by the aum of the notes of the concept, of the higher genera it implies, of the various essential attributes of its nature as such. This term is synonymous with i nten­ sion and comprehension ; yet, the · distinctions between them h ave been the object of contro­ versies. 2. J. S. Mill identifies connotation with signi fication and meaning, and includes in it much less than under comprehension or inten­ sion. The connotation of a general term (si ngu­ lar terms except descriptions arc non-connota­ tive) is the aggregate of all the other general terms necessarily impl ied by it as an abstract possibility and apart from exemplification in the iictual world. It cannot be determined by de­ notation because necessity does not always refer to singular facts. Logicians who adopt this view distinguish connotation from comprehension by including in the latter contingent characters which do not enter in the former. Comprehen­ sion is thus the intensional reference of the concept, or the reference to un iversals of both general and sin gular terms. The determination of the comprehension of a concept is helped by its denotation, considering that reference is made also to singular, contingent, or particular objects exhibiting certain characteristics. In short, the connotation of a concept is its i ntensional refer­ ence determined intensiona ily ; while its com­ prehension is its intensional reference extension­ ally determined. 3. It may be observed that such a distinction and the view that the connota­ tion of a concept contains only the notes which serve to define it, involves the nominalist prin­ ciple that a concept may he reduced to what we a re actually and explicitely thinking about the several notes we use to define i t. Thua the connotation of a concept i s much poorer than its actual content. Though the value of the concept seems to be saved by the recognition o f its com­ prehension, it may be argued that the artificial introduction into the comprehension of both necessary and contingent notes, that is of actual and potential characteristics, con fuses and per­ verts the notion of connotation as a logica l prop­ erty of our idc::a s. See lntension.-T.G. C onsc i ence : ( Lat. conscientia, knowledge) Any emotionally-toned experience in which a tend­ ency to act is inh ibited by a recognition, socially conditioned, that suffering evil conacqucncca is likely to result from acting on the impulse to act.�A .J.B. Consc iental i sm : The doctrine that contends that

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DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

the ent1t1es we apprehend must be necessarily menta l, idealistic ; that the real objects are reali­ ties of consciousn ess.-J/.H. Consc i ent i al i sm : (Lat. conscientia + al, per­ taining to conscien ce) Originally denoting sim­ ple consciousness without ethical bea ring, the term conscience came in modern times to mean in contrast to consciousness, v iewed either as a pu rely i ntel lectual function f or as a generic term for mind, a function of distinguishing between right and wrong. With the rise of Christianity the term came to be described as an in dependent source of moral in sight, and with the rise of modern ph ilosophy it became an inner faculty, an innate, primeval thing.-H.H. Conscious : (Ger. hewusst) In H usserl : l . Broadest sense : noematically intentio nal ; con­ scious of something. A process may be "con­ scious" in this sense even if it is not "conscious" in the following sense. 2. Narrower sense : "Actua l ", belonging to the cogito. _As l iving i n a process that is "conscious" in this second sense, the ego is also said to be "conscious", "awake", and "conscious of" (awake to ) the intentional object o f the process. As objects of processes that are conscious (in either of the first two senses ) , objects are occa sion ally re­ ferred to as "conscious".-D.C. Consc i ous I llusion Theory : The theory that conscious self-i llusion, sembla nce and del iberate make-believe are constant factors in art and art apprec iation which free the individual momen­ tari ly from the practical and h um-drum and thus enhance and refresh his life. See Konrad Lange,

Die hewusste Selhsttauschung als Kern des aestlzetischen Genusses, 1 8 9 5 .-0.F.K.

Consc i ousness : ( Lat. conscire, to know, to be

cognizant of) A designation applied to conscious mind as opposed to a supposedly unconscious or subconscious mind ( See Subconscious JI.find; Un­ conscious JI.find), and to the whole domain of the physical and n on-mental. Consciousness is gen erally considered an indefinable term or rather a term definable only by direct intro­ spective appeal to conscious experiences. Th e indefinability of consciousness is expressed by Sir Wi lliam Hami lton : "Consciousness cannot be defined : we may be ourselves fu"ly aware what consciousness is, but we cannot without con fusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clea rly apprehend. The reason is plain : consciousness lies at the root of all knowl­ edge." (Lectures on Metaphysics, I, 1 9 1 . ) Ladd's frequently quoted definition o f conscious­ ness succeeds only in indicating the circum­ stances under which it is directly observ able : "Whatever we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that is to be conscious." The analysis of consciousness proceeds in two principal direction s : (i) a distinction may be drawn between the act of consciousness and the content of consciousness and the two may even be considered as separable ingredients of con­ sciousness, and (ii) consciousness is an alyzed into its three principal functions : cogn ition, affection

and conation. · Loc ke, Reid and others restricted conscious­ ness to the reflective apprehension of the mind of its own processes but this usage has been abandoned in favor of the wider definition indi­ cated above and the term introspection is used to designate this special kind of consciousness. See B ehaviorism.-L. W. (Ger. Bewusstsein) J n Husserl : 1. N oematic intentionality in general. The in­ tentional constituting of the temporal stream­ of-consciousness itself is an instance of "con­ sciousness" in this broad sense, though it is in trinsically prior to the constituted stream. 2. Th e stream of subjective process, or any part of it, as having th e characteristic of noematic intentionality. 3. The stream of "actua l" sub­ ject! v � process, or any part- of it; the "ego cogito , .-D.C. Consc i ousness, F i eld of : The sum-total of items embraced within an individual 's consciousness at any given moment. The total field consists of: ( a ) the focus, where the concentration of atten­ tion is maximal and (b) a 'margin, periphery or fringe of a diminishing degree of attention which gradually fades to zero.-L. W. Consc i ousness-in-general : ( Kant's Bewusstsein Ueherhaupt) Consciousness conceived as purely logical, objective, un iversal, necessarily valid, in contrast to the eccentricity, particularity, subjec­ tiv ity, irrationality, and p rivacy of the psycho­ logical consciousness. See Kant.-W.L. Consectar i um : ( Lat. consecta rius) Peculiar to the philosoph ical vocabulary of Cicero, it means an inference, a conclusion. It is the substantive for the ph rase "that follows logically".-H.H. Consen sus gentium : ( Lat. agreement of people) A criterion of truth : that which is universal among men ca rries the weight of truth.-V.F. Con sent : Agreement or sympathy in feeling or thought.-V.F. Consentience : ( Lat, con + sentire, to feel) Con­ scious unity existing at the level of sensation after the subtraction o f all conceptual and in­ terpretative unity. Consentience incl udes both : ( a ) the intra-sensory un ity of a single sensory continuum (e.g. the visual, tactu al or auditory) and (b) the in ter-sensory unit embracing the di­ verse sensory continua. Consentience plays .in im portant role in the psychological doctrine of the presentation-continuum of J. Ward and G. F. Stout. An allied concept is the sensory organiza­ tion of Gestalt Psychology. See Gestalt Psy­

chology.-L. W.

Consequence : (Ger. K onuquenz) Jn Husserl :

The relation of formal-analytic inclusion which obtains between certain noematic senses. Co.i sequence : See Valid. Consequence-log i c : ( Ger. K onuquenzlogik) Consistency-logic (Logik der Widerspruchslosig­ keit) ; pure apophantic analytics (in a strict sense) ; a level of pure formal logic in which the only thematic concepts of validity are con­ sequence, inconsequence, and compatibility. Con­ sequence-logic incl udes the essential content of traditional syllogistics and the discipl ines mak­ ing up formal-mathematical analysis.-D.C.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Consequent : See A ntecedent. Consil i ence : Whewell calls "consil ience of induc­

tions" wh at occu rs when a hypothesis gives us the "rule and reason" not only of the class of facts contemplated in its construction, but a l so, unexpectedly, of some class of farts altogether diffe rcnt.-C.J.D. Consistency : ( 1 ) A logistic system ( q. v.) is consistent i t there is no theorem whose negation is a theorem. See Logic, formal, §§ I , 3, 6 ; also Proof theory. Since this definition of consistency is relati ve to the choice of a particular notation as repre­ senting negation, the following definition is sometimes used instead ; ( 2) A logistic system is consistent if not every formula ( n ot every sentence ) is a theorem . In the case of many familiar systems, under the usual choice as to which notation represents negat i on, the equiva­ lence of this sense of consistency to the previous one is immediate. Closely related to ( 2 ) , and appl icable to lo­ gistic systems conta ining the pure propositional calculus (see Logic, formal, § I ) or a n appropri­ ate part of it, is the n otion of consistency in the sense of E. L. Post, according to which a system is consistent if a formula composed of a single propositional va riable ( say the formula p) A . C. is not a theorem. Consistency proofs : See Proof theory, and Logic formal, §§ I , 3, 6. Constant : A constant is a symbol employed as an u nambiguous name-disti ngui shed from a va ri­ able ( q. v . ) . Thus i n ordinary numerical algebra and i n real number theory, the symbols x , y, z are variables, while 0, I , 3, �1, 7r1 e are constants. · !n such mathematical contexts the term constant is often restricted to unambiguous ( n on-variable) n ames of numbers. But such symbols as +, =1 < m ay also be called constants, · as denot ing pa rticular functions and relations. I n va rious mathematical contexts, the term constant will be found applied to letters which sh ould properly be called variables ( according to our account here ) , but ·which are thought of as .constant relatively to other va riables appear­ i ng. The actual distinction in such cases, as revealed by logistic formalization, either is be­ tween free and bound variablt.-s, or concerns the order and manner in which the va riables are bound by quanti fiers, abstraction operators, etc. In mathematics, the word constant may also be employed to mean simply a number ( "Euler's constant"), or, in the physical sciences, to mean a physical quantity ( "the gravitational constant," A . C. "Planck's constant"). Constituted : (Ger. konstituiert) In Husserl ; Resu ltant from constitutive synthesi s ; i n tention­ ally synthetized. See Constitution.-D.C. Constitution : (Ger. Konstitution) In Husserl : I. Broader sense : Intentionality in its character as producing, o n the one hand, i nten tionally identical and different objects of consciousness with more or less determinate objective senses an d, o n the other hand, more or !es� abiding ego-habitudes (see Habit) is said to be "con-

65

its products, "constituted" ( q.v. ). The synthetic strncture of t h e consti tutive proc­ ess, regarded either as a static or as a tem­ porally genetic a ffair, is ca lled the constitution of the in ten tional object. 2. Narrower sense ; The structure of i n tenti onality in its character as rational , i.e., as p roduct ive of valid objects and correct, j ustified, habits (convictions, etc. ) . See Evidence a n d Reason.-D.C. Constitutive : Of the essential n ature ; i nternal ; componen t ; i nherent. I nternal relations a re constitutive because they a re integral parts or elements of the natu res which they relate ; whereas ex ternal, n on-constitutive relations may be altered w i thout change in the essential natures of the related entities. In Kant : Whatever enters into the structure of actual experience. Thus, the ca tegories a re con­ stitutive of knowledge o f n ature because they a re necessary conditions o f any experience or knowledge whatever. In contrast, the tran s­ cendent Ideas ( God, the total Cosmos, and the i '.11mortal Soul ) are .not constitutive of anythi ng, si nce they do not serve to define o r compose real objects, and must be restricted to a regula­ tive and speculative use. See Crit. of Pure Reason, Transc. D ialectic, Bk. II, ch. II, Sec. 8.

stitutive";

-

0FK .

.

.

Construct, Imaginative : ( Lat. construere, to bui l d ) See Construction, Psychological.

Construction : ( Lat. const ructio, from construere,

to bui l d ) The mental process of devising imagi­ n ative constructs o r the products of such con­ structional activities. A construction, in contrast to a n ordinary hypothesis which professes to represent an actual state of affairs, i s largely a rbitrary and fictional.-£. W. Construction, Psychological : (In contrast to Logical) A framework devised by the com­ mon-sense, sci enti fic or phi losophical imagin a­ tion for the i ntegration of d iverse empirical data. In contrast to a n hypothesis, a construc­ t ion is not an inference froin experience but is an a rbitrary scheme which, though presumably not a true picture of the actual state of affairs, satisfies the h uman i magination and promotes further i nvestigation. Perceptual objects, space and time, physical atoms, electrons, etc. as well as phi losoph ical world-views, have by certain philosophers been called logical constructs. ( Cf. B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, Ch. IV. )-L. W. C ontemplation : ( Lat. contempla re, to gaze at­ tentively) (a) In the mystical sense: Knowl­ edge consisting i n the partial o r complete iden­ tification of the knower with the object of knowledge with the consequent loss of his own individual ity. In H ugo of St. Victor ( I 0961 1 4 1 ), Contemplatio is the third and highest stage of kn owledge of wh ich cogitatio and meditatio are the two earlier levels. (b) In recent epistemology : Contemplation is knowledge of a n object i n contrast to enjoy­ ment which is the m inds' direct self-awareness. ( Cf. S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, p. 1 2 .)-L.W. Content of Consciousness : ( Lat. contentus

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DIC TIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

from continere, to contain ) The totality of qualitative data present to consciousness in con­ trast to the act of apprehending such data. See Act Psychology ; Datum.-L. W. Contextual definition : Sec incomplete symbol. Contiguity, Associat i on by : A type of associa­ tion, recognized by Aristotle, whereby one of two states of mind, which have been coexistent or successive, ten ds to recall the other. This type of association has sometimes been con­ sidered the basic type to which all others are re­ ducible. See Association, Laws of.-L. W. Continence : In Aristotle's ethics the moral con­ dition of a person able to control his bodily desires by reason . Aristotle distinguishes con­ tinence from temperance i n that the former implies a conflict between bodily desires and rational choice, whereas in the temperate man there is no such conflict.-G.R.M. Contingency : ( Lat. contingere, to touch on all sides) In its broadest philosophica l usage a state of affairs is said to be contingent if it may and also may not be. A certain event, for example, is contingent i f, and only if, it may come to pass and also may not come to pass. For this reason contingency is not quite equivalent in meaning to possibility (q.v . ) , for while a pos­ sible state of affairs is one which may be, it may at the same time be necessary, and hence it would be false to say that it may not be. In this broad sense contingency appears a l­ ways to imply a reference to some basis in rela­ tion to which a given thing may be said to be contingent ; and i n v iew of the two referents most commonly empl oyed it is possible to dis­ tinguish two chief types: ( 1 ) logical contingency, and ( 2 ) physical contingency. The first is contingency with respect to the laws of logic, the second contingency with respect to the laws of nature. A given state of affairs, e.g., the existence of a snowflake with a given shape, is logically contingent in that the laws of logic do not suffice to establish that such a thing does or does not exist. This same state of affairs would not ordinarily be held to be physically con­ tin gent, however, for, although the laws of nature al one do n ot suffice to determine that there is such a snowfl ake, still it would be held on the general hypothesis of determinism that, given the specific conditions under which the water was frozen, it was determined by physical laws that a snowflake would exist and tha t it would have this shape and no other. A narrower, less philosophical employment of "contingent" emphasizes the aspect of depend­ ence of one state of affairs upon another state of affairs in accordance with the laws of nature. In this usage an event A is said to be contingent. upon B when the occurrence of A depends upon the occurrence of B ; and it is usually implied that the occurrence of B is itsel f uncertain. -F.L. W. In metaphysics : The opposite of determinism, which holds that free acfr, ity may enter causally into natural processes. See Boutroux.-R.T.F. Leibniz distinguished contingent truths ( ve­ rith de fait) from necessary truths of reason

(vhith de raison ) ; Hume ( q.v.) regarded all causal assertions as conti ngent upon certain habits of the mind. See Cause, Probability. Continuant : "That which conti nues to exist v. hile its states or relations may be changing" (] ohn­ son, Logi [ B J � -A v B. [AJ :::> [ B J � - [A - B ] . A s nominal definitions these are inconsistent, since they represent [AJ :::> [ B J as standing for different formulas : eithe r one, but not both, could be used in a devel opmen t of the proposi­ tional calculus. But the co rresponding seman ti­ cal defi nitions would be identical if-as would be possible-our interpretation of the proposi­ tional calculus were such that the two definientia had the same meaning for any particular A and B. In the formal development of a logistic sys­ tem, si nce no reference may be made to an in­ tended interpretation, semantical definitions are precluded, and must be replaced by correspond­ ing nominal definitions. Of quite a different kind are so-cal led real definitions, which are not conventions for intro­ ducing new symbols or no tations-as syntactical and semantical definitions are-but are proposi­ tions of equiva lence (m aterial, formal, etc . ) be­ tween two ::bstract entities (propositions, con­ cepts, etc. ) of which one is cal led the definien­ dum and the other the definiens. Not all such propositions of l'('"•iva ltnce, however, are real definitions, but only thr '.! in which the defi niens

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

embodies the "essential nature" (eseentia, ovo-le1) of the de.finiendum. The notion of a real definition thus has all the vagueness of the quoted phrase, but the following may be given as an example. If all the notations appearing, including => ., have their usual meanings (re­ garded as given in advance), the proposition expressed by (F) (G) [ [ F (x) ::i . G (x) ] := (x ) [ - F( x) v G ( .r ) ] ] is a real definition of formal implication-to be contrasted with the nominal definition of the notation for formal implication which is given in the article Logic, formal, § 3. Thia formula, expressing a real definition of formal implica­ tion, might appear, e.g., as a primitive formula in a logistic system. (A situation often arising in practice is that a word--or symbol or notation-which already has a vague meaning is to be given a new exact meaning, which is vaguely, or as nearly as pos­ sible, the same as the old. This is done by a nominal or semantical definition rather than a real definition ; nevertheless it is usual in such a case to speak either of defining the word or of defining the associated notion.) Sometimes, however, the distinction between nominal definitions and real definitions is made on the basis that the latter convey an assertion of existence, of the definiendum, or rather, where the definiendum is a concept, of things falling thereunder (Saccheri, 1 697 ) ; or the distinction may be made on the basis that real definitions involve the possihility of what is defined ( Leib­ niz, l 684). Ockham makes the distinction rather on the basis that real definitions state the whole nature of a thing and nominal definitions state the meaning of a word or phrase, but adds that non-existents (as chimaera ) and such parts of speech as verbs, adverbs, and conj unctions may therefore have only nominal definition.-A .C. Defi ni t ion of a term : (in Scholasticism) Nomi­ nal : Is discourse (la'nguage, speech, oratio ) by which the meaning of a term is explained. Positive : That which rev ;als the essence of a thing in positive terms, e.g., man is a rational animal. Negative : That which states the nature of a thing in negative terms, e.g. God is not mortal, not corporeal, etc. Cf. La Logique de Port­ Royal, Pt. I, ch. XII. De l nterpretat i one : ( Gr. peri hermeneiaa) The second treatise in the Aristotelian Organon, dealing with the logical analysis of j udgments and propositions. See A ristotelianism.-G.R.M. Dei sm : (Lat. deus, god) Two uses of the term : (a) By many writers the term covers the view that God has no immediate relation with the world ; God indeed is responsible for the world but for reasons unknown or conjectured God has no commerce with it; accordingly, the sup­ plications and hopes of men are illusory and fruitless. This doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "absentee landlord" view. Thomas Hardy's famous poem "God Forgotten" is an

75

illustration. Deism, it is clear, is a form of th dam. (b) Deism is a term referring collectively and somewhat loosely to a group of religious thinkers of the 1 7th ( and 1 8th ) century in England and France who in attempting to j us­ tify religion, particularly Christianity, began by establishing the harmony of reason and revela­ tion and developed what, in their time, was regarded as extreme views : assaults upon tradi­ tional supernaturalism, external revelation and dogmas implying mysteries, an� concluding that revelation is superfluous, that reason is the touchstone to religious validity, that religion and ethics are natural phenomena, that the traditional God need hardly be appealed to since man finds in nature the necessary guides for moral and religious living. Not all deists, so called, went toward the more extreme ex­ preeaiona. Among the more important English deists were Toland, Collins, Tindal, Chubb and Morgan. Voltaire ( 1 694- 1 778) influenced by English thought is the notable example of deism in France. On the whole the term represents a tendency rather than a achool.-V.F. Delus i on : (Lat. de + ludere, to play) Erroneous or non-veridical cognition. The term is prop­ erly restricted to pe:-ception, memory and other non-inferential forms of knowledge but is at times extended to include inferential beliefs and theories. See V�ridical. The two principal types of delusion are : ( a ) illusion or partially delu­ sive cognition, e.g. the ordinary distortions of sense and memory which nevertheless have a basis in fact, and (b) hallucination or totally delusive cognition such as dreams, pseudo-mem­ ories, etc. to which nothing corresponds in fact. See Illusion ; Hallucination.-L. W. Dem i urge : ( Gr. demiourgos) Artisan ; craftsman ; the term used by Plato in the Timaeus to desig­ nate the intermediary maker of the world. G.R.M. Democri tus of Abdera : ( c. 460-3 60 B.C. ) De­ veloped the first important materialist philoso­ phy of nature, unless we are to count that of Leukippua. His i n11uence was transmitted by Lucretius' poem till the centuries of the Renais­ sance when scholars' attention began to turn to­ ward the study of nature. He taught that all substance consists of atoms, that is, of indivisible and imperceptibly small particles. The variety of atomic forms corresponds to, and accounts for, the variety of material qualities ; the finest, smoothest, and moat agile atoms constitute the substance of mind. Human perception is ex­ plained by him as an emanation of tiny copies of sensible things ( eidola ), which, through their impact upon the atoms of mind, leave impres­ sions responsible for facts of memory. Dieh, Fragm der Vorsokr, 4a ; F. A. Lange, Gesch. der Materialismus, bd. I.-R.B.W. Demonology : Referring to a study of the wide­ spread religious ideas of hostile superhuman beings called demons. These creatures were generally thought of as inhabiting a super- or under-world and playing havoc with the for-

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tunes of man by bringing about diseases, mental twists and calamities in general. Ridd ing an individual supposedly held in possession by such a demon was an ancient practice ( tt:chnically known as "exorcism") and continued in some Christian liturgies even to our own day. De­ monology as a theory of demonic behavior throve among the Egyptians, Babylomans, Assyrians, Persians> post-exilic Hebrews, Jews, Greeks and many scattered peoples including the hoary ancients. Elaborate demonic ideas appear in the Mohammedan religion.-V.F. Demonstration : ( Lat. de + monstrare, to show) Proof of a proposition by disclosure of the deductive processes by which it can be inferred. -A .C.B. De Morgan, Augustus : ( 1 806- 1 8 7 1 ) English mathematician and logician. Professor of mathe­ matics at University College, London, 1 8281 83 1 , 1 8 36-1 866. His Formal Logic of 1 847 contains some points of an algebra of logic essentially similar to that of Boole (q. v.), but the notation is less adequate than Boole's and the calculus is less fully worked out and applied. De Morgan, however, had the notion of logical sum for arbitrary classes-whereas Boole con­ templated addition only of classes having no members in common. De Morgan's laws (q. v.) -as they are now known-were also enunciated in this work. The treatment of the syllogism is original, but has since been susperseded, and does not constitute the author's real claim to remembrance as a logician. (The famous con­ troversy with Sir William Hamilton over the latter's charge of plagiarism in connection with this treatment of the syllogism may therefore be dismissed as not of present interest.) Through his paper On the syllogism, no. IV in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philo­ sophical Society, vol. 10 (read April 23, 1 860), De Morgan is to be regarded as the founder of A. C. the logic of relations. Sophia Elizabeth De Morgan, Memoir of Augu1tu1 De Morgan, London, 1 882 . De Morgan' s laws : Are the two dually related theorems of the propositional calculus, .- [ p v q] = [.-p --qJ, .- [ pq ] = [ .-p v -' q] , or the two corresponding dually related theorems of the algebra of classes, -(a '-' h) = -a "' -h, -(a "' h) = -a '-' -h. In the propositional calculus these l aws (to­ gether with the law of double negation) make it possible to define conjunction in terms of negation and (inclusive) disj unction, or, alter­ natively, disj unction in terms of negation and conj unction. Simila rly in the algebra of classes logical product may be defined in terms of logical sum and complementation, or logical sum in terms of logical product and complementa­ tion. As pointed out by Lukasiewicz, these laws of the proposition al calculus were known already (in verbal form) to Ockham. The attachment of De Morgan's name to the corresponding laws

of the algebra of classes appears to be histori­ cally more correct. Sometimes referred to as generalizations or analogues of De Morgan's laws are the two dually related theorems of the functional calculu1 of first order, .- (Ex)F (x) := (x) .-F (x) , .- (x) F (x) := ( Ex) .-F (x) ,

and similar theorems in higher functional cal­ culi. These make possible the definition of the existential quantifier in terms of the universal A. C. quantifier (or inversely). Denial of the antece d ent : The fallacy of denial of the antecedent is the fallacious inference from .-A and A => B to .-B. The law of denial of the antecedent is the theorem of the proposi­ tional calculus, .-p A. C. [p ::::> q ] . Denom i nati on : ( Lat. denominatio) Literally : a naming of something from some other thing. In Scholastic logic, it is the operation of apply­ ing a term to a subject, when the term is de­ rived from something to which the subject is related. Thus a substance may be denominated by deriving a name from its accidents. Extrinsic denomination is dependent upon wholly external relationship. See Denotation.-V.J.B. Denotati on : The subjects (i.e., those entities which possess attributes) of which a term may be predicated ; e.g., the term "man" denotes Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. (J. S. Mill) "Denotation" in this sense should be distin­ guished from "extension" in the sense in which that signifies the subclasses of the class deter­ mined by the term. The former indicates the various individual instances in which a common nature is manifested ; the latter signifies the variety of kinds over which the predication of :l term may extend. ( H. W. B. Joseph.)-C.A.B. In common usage, "denotation" has a less special meaning, denote being approximately synonymous with designate (q.v.). A proper name may be said to denote that of which it is a name. Or, e.g., in the equation 2+2=4, the sign + may be said to denote addition and the sign = to denote equality (even without neces­ sarily intending to construe these signs as proper names) Concerning Frege's distinction between sense and denotation see the article Descript1°ons.-i1.C. Denotation is semantical concept, ace Semiotic 2.-R.C. Dense order: See Continuity. Deontolog i cal eth i cs : Any ethics which does not make the theory of obligation entirely depend­ ent on the theory of value, holding that an action may be known to be right without a consideration of the goodness of anything, or at least that an action may be right and be known to be so even though it does not fiow from the agent's best motive (or even from a good one) and does not, by being performed, bring into being as much good as some other action open to the agent. Opposed to axiologi­ cal ethics. Also called formalism and intuition­ ism. See lntuitionism.-fV.K.F. Depersonal i zation : A personality disorder in which the subject's own words and actions as::::>



DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

sume for him a character of strangeness ur un­ real ity ; i n its extreme form, the subject is obsessed with the fear of c omplete dissolution of personality. The English term is an appro­ priation of the French depersonnaliz.ation.-L. W. Depro b lematization : ( Ger. Deproblematisierung ) The gradual cessation of the former problemati­ cal tone of any obj ect or idea. ( Avenarius. )

De S anctis, Francesco :

-H.H.

Bo rn at M orra lrpina ( Avellino), March 28, 1 8 1 7 . D ied at Naples, December 1 9, 18 83. Imp risoned and exiled be­ cause liberal, 1 8 48. Professor in Zurich and later in Naples. M i nister of Public Ed �cation. His History of Italian Literature ( 1 8 7 0 ) is still considered fundamenta l. Applied Hegel's idealism to literary criticism. Gave a new i nterpretation to poets' sentiments and ideals, and linked them to the civil history of Italy. New Italian idealism of about 1 900 was based on his thought.-L. V. Descartes, Rene : See Cartesianism. Description, Knowledge b y : ( Lat. de + scri­ bere, to write) Knowledge about things i n con­ trast to direct acquain tance with things. See A cquaintance, Knowledge by. Description is opposed to exact definition in the Port Royal Logic (Part II, ch. XVI ) . Among the first to contrast desc ription and acquaintance was G. Grote (Exploratio Philosophica, p. 60. See also W. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. r, pp. 22 1 ff. and B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, ch. V. ) -L . W. Descriptions : \Vhere a formula A containing a free variable-say, for example, x--means a true proposition (is true ) for one and only one v alue of x, the notati on ( 1x) A is used to mean that v alue of x. The approximately equiva lent English phraseology is "the x such that A"-or simply 'the F," where F denotes the co ncept (monadic propositional func tion) obta ined from A by abstraction ( q. v .) with respect to x. Th is notation, or i ts sense in the sense of Frege, is called a description. In Principia Mathematica descriptions (or notations serv ing the same purpose i n context) are introduced as incomplete symbols (q. v. ) . Russell maintains that descriptions not only may but must be thus construed as i ncomp lete sym­ bols-briefly, for the following reaso ns. The alternative is to construe a descri ption a s a proper name, so that, e.g., the description the author of Waverley denotes the man Scott and is therefore synonymous with the n ame Seo/I. Rut then the sentences "Scott is the author of Waverley" and "Scott is Scott" ough t to be synonymous-which they clearly are n ot (al­ though both are true). M o reover, such a de­ scription as the King of France cannot be a proper name, since there is no King of France whom it may denote ; nevertheless, a sentence such as "The King o f Fr:ince is ba ld" should be construed to have a meani ng, since it may be falsely asserted or bel ieved by one who falsely asserts or believes th at there is a King of France. Frege meets the same difficulties, without con-

77

strL :ng desc riptions as incomplete symbo ls, by distinguishing two kinds of meaning, the sense ( S iun) and the denotation (Bedeutung ) of an expression ( formula, phrase, sentence, etc . ) . Scott a n d the author o f Waverley have the same denotation, namely the man Scott, but not the same sense. Th e King of France has a sense but no denotation ; so l i kewise the sentence, The King of France is bald. Two expressions hav­ ing the same sense must have the same denota­ tion i f they have a denotation. When a con­ stituent part of an expression is replaced by another part having the same sense, the sense o f the whole is not altered. When a constituent part of an expression is replaced by another having the same den otation, the denotation of the whole (if any ) is not altered, but the sense may be. The den otati o n of an (unasserted) declarative sentence (if any) is a truth-val ue, whereas the sense is the thought or content of the sentence. But where a sentence is used in indirect discourse (as i n saying th at so-and-so says that • • •, believes that • . • , is glad th at • . •, etc.) the meaning i s differen t : in such a context the den otation of the sentence is th at which would be its sense i n direct discourse. ( In quoting some one in ind irect discourse, one reproduces neither the l iteral wording nor the truth-value, but the sense, of what he said. ) Frege held it to be desirable in a formalized logistic system that every formula should have not only a sense hut also a denotation-as can be arranged by arbitrary semantical co nven­ tions where necessary. When this is done, Frege's sense of a sentence nearly coi ncides with proposition ( i n sense (b) of the article A lonzo Church of that title herei n ) . G. Frege, Ober Sinn u nd Bedeutung, Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic und philosophische Kriti k, n. s., vol. 1 00 ( 1 892 ) , pp. 2 5 - 50 . B . Russell, O n de­ noting, Mind, n. s., vol . 14 ( 1 90 5 ) , pp . 479-4 9 3 . Designate : A word, symbol, or expression may be said to designate that obj ect (abstract or �on­ crete) to which i t refers, or of which it· is a name or sign. See Name relation.-A.C. Designated values : See Propositional calculus,

many-valued.

Designatum :

The designatum of a word, symbol, or expression is that which it designates (q. v . ) .

Destiny :

A. C.

(Fr. destiner, to be intended ) Future necessity ; the legal outcome of actuality. Divine foreordai nment, or the predetermined and un­ alterable course of events. Defined by Peirce ( 1 8 3 9- 1 9 1 4) as the embodiment of genera ls in existence.-1.K.F. Determination : ( Lat. determinare, to limit) The lim itation of a reality or thought to a narrower field than its original one. In a monistic phil­ osophy the original, single principle must be consi derrd as na rrowed down to various genera and species, and eventually to individual exist­ ence i f su�h be admitted, in order to i ntroduce that differentiation of reality which is required i n a multiple world. In Platonism, the Forms or Ideas are ?ne for each type of thing but are "determined" to multiple existence by the addi­ tion of matter ( Timaeus). Neo-Platonism is

78

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

even more interested in real determination, since the One is the logic al antecedent of the Many. Here determin ation is effected by the i ntroduc­ tion of neg ations, o r privations, into succe,sive emanations of the One. With Boeth ius, medi­ aeval philosophy became concerned with the determi na tion of being-i n-general to an actual manifold of th ings. In Boethianism there is a fusion of the question of real determination with that of logical limitation of concepts. In modern thought, the problem is acute i n Spin oz­ ism : un iversal substa nce (substantia, n atura, Deus) must be reduced to an ap parent manifold through attributes, modes to the individual. Determination is said to be by way of nega­ tion, according to Spi noza ( Epist. 50), and this means that un iversal substance is in its perfect form indetermina te, but i s thought to become determinate by a sort of logical loss of absoh.:c perfection. The theory is brought to an al most absurd simplicity i n the Ontology of Chr. Wolff, where being i s pic tured as successively deter­ mi ned to genera, species and i ndividual. De­ termi nation is also an important factor in the developmental theories of Hegel and Bergson .

-V.J.B.

Determinism : ( Lat. de + terminus, end) The

doctrine that every fact in the universe is gu ided entirely by law. Contained as a theory in the atomism of Democ ritus of Abdera (q.v.), who reflected upon the impenetrabi lity, transla­ tion and impact of ma tter, and thus al lowed only for mechanica l ca usation . The term was applied by Sir Wi lliam Hamilton ( 1 7 8 8-1 856) t o t h e doctrine of Hobbes, to distinguish i t from an older doctrine of fatalism. T h e doc­ trine that all the facts in the physical u niverse, and hence also i n human history, arc absolutely dependent upon and conditioned by their ca uses. In psychology: the doctrine that the will is not free but determined by psychical or physical conditions. Syn. with fa talism, necessitarianism, desti ny.-J.K.F. Deus ex machine : Literally, the god from the machine ; an allusion to the device whereby in a ncient drama a god was brought on the stage, sometimes to provide a supernatural solution to a dramatic difficulty ; hence any person, thing, or concept artificia lly introduced to solve a difficulty .-G.R.M. Deustua, Alej and ro : Born in Huancayo, Jun in ( Peru ) , 1 849. Professor of Phi losophy at the University of San Marcos in Lima, Peru. Ac­ cording to Dcustua, there arc two kinds of free­ dom, the Static and the Dy namic. The former accounts for the cosmic order and harmony of phenome na. Dynamic liberty, however, is, above all, creativ i ty and novelty. The world, not as it i s ontoiogically, but as we experience it, that is, as it comes within the area of con­ sciou sness, results from a Hegelian contraposition of the two types o f freedom. In this contraposi­ tion, the synthesis is always more of the nature of dynamic freedom than it is static. With these presuppositions, Deustua finaliy works up a kind of practical philosophy lead ing up to an axiol ogy which he himsel f fi nds implied in his

concept of freedom. The following are among Deustua's most importa nt works : Las Ideas de

Orden Lihertad en la Historia del Pensamiento Humano ; Historia de las ld�as Esthicas ; Es­ thica General; Esthica A plicada.-J.A .F. Dewey, John : ( 1 8 59-) Leading Americ an phi­

losopher. The spirit of democracy and an abid­ ing faith i n the efficacy of h uman intelligenc e run through the many pages he has presented i n the diverse fields of metaphysics, epistemol ogy, logic, psychology, aesthetics, religion, ethics, politics and education, i n all of which he has spoken with authority. Progressive education owes i ts impetus to his guidance and its tenets largely to his formulation. H e is the chief ex­ ponent of that branch of pragmatism known as in�trumentalism. Among his main works are :

Psychology, 1 8 86 ; Outline o f Ethics, 1 89 1 ; Studies in Logical Theory, 1 903 ; Ethics ( Dewey and Tufts), 1 908 ; How We Think, 1 9 1 0 ; lnflu�nce of Darwin o n German Philosophy, 1 9 1 0 ; Democracy and Educatior., 1 9 1 6 ; Essays in Experimental Logic, 1 9 1 6 ; Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1 920 ; Human Nature and Conduct, 1 922 ; Experience and Nature, 1 92 5 ; The Quest for Certainty, 1 929 ; A rt as Experience, 1 933 ; Logic : The Theory of Inquiry, 1 939. Cf. J. Ratner, The Philosophy of 1ohn Dewey, 1 940 ; M. H. Thomas, A Bibliography of John Dewey, 1 8 82- 1 93 9 ; The Philosophy of John Deu.:ry,_ ed. P. A . Schilpp ( E va nston, 1940 ) . (d. 1 9 5 2 )

Dharma : ( Skr. ) Right, virtue, duty, uugc, law, soc ial as well as cosmic.-K.F.L.

D b yana : (Skr.) Meditation or the full accord of

thinker and thought without interference and without being merged as yet, the last but one stage i n the attainment of the goah of Yoga (q.v. ) .-K.F.L. Diagram : A line dra w i ng ; commonly used i n logic to represent class relationships. Sec Euler, and Venn.-C.A.B. Dialectic : ( Gr. dia + legcin, discourse) The beginning of di alectic Aristotle is said to have attributed to Zeno of Elea. But as the art of debate by question and answer, its begi nning is usually associated with the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues. As conceived by Plato h im­ self, di alectic is the science of first principles which differs from other sciences by dispensing with hypotheses and is, consequently, "the cop­ i ngstone of the sciences"--the highest, because the clearest and hence the ultimate, sort of knowledge. Aristotle disti ngui shes between dia­ lectical reas oning, which proceeds syllogistically from opini ons generally accepted, and demon­ strative reasoning, wh ich begins with primary and true premises ; but he holds that dia lectica l reasoning, i n co:ltrast with eristic, is "a proccn of criticism wherein lies the path to the prin­ ciples of all in quiries." In modern philosophy, dia lectic has two special mean i ngs. Kant uses i t :is th e name of that part of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft which deals critically with the special difficulties (antinomies, para logisms and Ideas) arising out of the futile attempt ( trans­ cendental illusion ) to apply the categories of the Understanding beyond the only realm to

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

which they can apply, namely, the realm of ob­ j ect• in apace and time (Phenomena). For Hegel, dialectic i1 primarily the di1tingui1hing characteristic of speculative thought-thought, that i1, which exhibits the structure of it1 sub­ ject-matter (the universal, 1y1tcm) through the construction of synthetic categories (1ynthc1i1) which resolve (sublatc ) the opposition between other conflicting categoric• (theses and anti­ thc1c1) of the aamc aubjcct-mattcr.-G.W.C. Dialectical material i sm : The school of philoso­ phy founded by Marx and Engels and developed by many 1ub1cqucnt thinkers. Ontologically, its materialism mean• that mat­ ter, nature, the observable world is taken "with­ out rc1crvation1," a1 real in its own right, neither deriving ite reality from any 1upcrnatural or transcendental source, nor dependent for ite existence on the mind of man. It is considered scientifically evident that matter is prior to mind bc)th temporally and logically in the 1cn1c that mind never appears except as an outgrowth of matter, and must be explained accordingly. Space and time arc viewed as forms of the exist­ ence of matter. The term dialectical cxprcs1c1 the dynamic interconnectedness of things, the universality of change and its radical character : everything poeecssing any sort of reality is in process of 1clf-transformation, owing to the fact that it1 content i1 made up of opposing factors or forces the internal movement of which interconnects everything, changes each thing into something else. Mechanism in the scnec of non-dialectical materialism a1 well as metaphyaics i n the sense of idealistic ontology arc thus rejected. The position taken is that investigation re­ veals basic, recurrent patterns of change, ex­ pressible as laws of materialist dialectics, which are seen as relevant to every level of existence, and, because validated by past evidence, as in­ dispensable hypotheses in guiding further investi­ gation. These are : ( 1 ) Law of interpenetration, unity and 1trifc of opposites. (All existences, being complexea of opposing clementa and forces, have the character of a changing unity. The unity ia considered temporary, relative, while the procl"as of change, expressed by interpenetra­ tion and atrife, is continuous, absolute.) (2) Law of transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. (The changea which take place in nature are not merely quantitative; their accumulation eventually precipitates new quali­ tica in a transition which appears aa a sudden leap in comparison to the gradualnesa of the quantitative changes up to that point. The new quality is considered as real as the original quality. It is not mechanically reducible to it : it i1 not merely a larger amount of the former quality, but something into which that haa de­ veloped.) ( 3 ) Law of negation of negation. (The aeries of quantitative changes and emerg­ ing qualities is unending. Each state or phase of development is considered a 1ynthe1is which resolves the contradictions contained in the pre­ ceding synthcsia and which generates its own contradictions on a different qualitative level. )

79

These law1, connecting ontology with logic, arc contraetcd to the formaliatic !awe of identity, difference and excluded middle of which they are considered qualitatively enriched reconstruc­ tion&. Again1l me ontology of the separatenesa and self-identity of each thing, the dialectical laws emphasize the interconncctedncn of all things and aclf-developmcnt of each thing. An A all parta of which arc alwaya becoming non-A may thua be called non-A aa well aa A. The formula, A is A and cannot be non-A, bccomca, A is A and alao non-A, that is, at or during the same instant: there is no instant, it is held, during ·which nothing happcna. The view taken i1 that theae consideration• apply a1 much to thought and concepts, aa to things, that thought ia a process, that ideas gain their logical con­ tent through intcrconnectcdnesa with other ideaa, out of and into which they develop. Con1cquently, the dialectical method meana basically that all thing• must be investigated in terma of their histories ; the important consid­ eration is not the state i n which the object ap­ pears at the moment, but the rate, direction and probable outcome of the changes which arc tak­ ing place a1 a result of the conflict of forces, internal and external. The necessity of observa­ tion and prediction in every field ia thus on­ tologically grounded, according to dialectical materialism, which not only rejects a priorism, holding that "nature i1 the test of dialectics" (Engela : Anti-Duhring), but claims to cxpresa with much more fidelity than formal logic, with its cmphaai1 on unmoving form rather than changing content, the basis of the method mod­ ern science actually uses. There is an equal re­ j ection of tMory without practice and practice without theory. One may assert that the human brain, capable of forming ideas, docs ao not prior to or independently of the rest of the natural world, but in rclatio11 to it, moved and stimulated by its manifold content. ldcaa reflect things, but the reflection, like everything else, ia dialectical, not inert, but active. Ideas grow out of and lead back to thinga, sometimes very circuitously 1 thinga may be reflected fancifully, by abatraction or in new combinationa aa well aa directly. While there is a perfectly objective reality to reflect, the reflection is never perfect : truth ia absolute, but knowledge relative. The aocial theory, termed hiatorical material­ ism, repreaents the application of the general principles of materialiat dialectica to human society, by which they were first suggested. The fundamental changes and stages which aociety haa passed through in the courae of its complex evolution are traced primarily to the influence of changea taking place in its economic baae. Thia base baa two aapecta : material forces of produc­ tion (technics, instrumentalities) and economic relation• (prevailing syatcm of ownership, ex­ change, diatribution). Growing out of thia baae ia a 1ocial auperatructurc of lawa, governmenta, arts, 1cience1, religiona, philoaophiea and the like. The view taken ia that society evolved ae it did primarily because fundamental changes in

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

80

the economic base resulting from conflicts of in­ terest i n respect to productive forces, and in­ volving radical changes i n economic relations, have compelled accommodating changes in the social superstruct ure. Causal action is traced both ways between base and superstructure, but when any "higher" i nstitution threatens the position of those wh o hold controlling economic power at the base, the test of their power is victory in the ensuing contest. The role of the individual in history is acknowledged, but is seen i n relation to the movement of underlyi ng forces. Cf. Plekh anov, Role of the Individual

in History.

The general direction of social evolution, on this v iew is from classless, collectivist forms (primitive comml'nism) to class forms (slave­ master, serf-lord, worker-capitalis t) to classless, socia list, communist forms on the modern level of h ighly complex technics. Classes a re defined as groups having a n tagonistic econ omic relation­ ships to the mea ns of p roduction. The resultant conflict of i nterests is called the class struggle, which , i nvolving the means and way of l i fe, is ca rried on i n all fields, often unconsciously. I t is held that society has not accomplished many basic t ransformations peacefully, that fundamental changes i n the economic system or the social superstructure, such as that from medi� eval serf-lord to modern worker-capitalist econ­ omy, have usually involved v iolence wherein the cl ass struggle passes into the acute stage of revo­ lution because the existing law a rticulates and the state power protects the obsolete forms and minority-interest c lasses which must be super­ seded. The evolution of capitalism is considered to have reached the point where the accelerati ng abundance of which i ts technics are capable is frustrated by economic relationships such a s those involved i n i ndi v idua l own ership of productive means, hiring and firing of workers in the light of private profits and socially unplanned produc­ tion for a money market. It is held that only techn ics collectively owned and production so­ cially plann ed can provide employment and abunda nce of goods for everyone. The view taken is that peaceful atta inment of them i s poss ible, but will probably be violently resisted by privi­ leged minorities, provoking a contest of force in which the working cl ass maj ority will ev entually triumph the world over. The working class, i n coming to power, is seen to establish its own state form, based upon the dictatorship of the p roletariat, which is mai ntai ned so l ong as a state is necessary, and which is con­ sidered to extend democracy to the maj o ri ty by establishing col lective ownership of the means of production. Th i s fi rst stage is defined as social­ ism, the economic p rinciple of which is, "from each according to ability, to each according to work performed". The secon d stage i s defined as communism, the economic principle of which is, "from each according to abi lity, to each accord­ ing to need" ( Marx : "Cotha Program"). In its fullest sense, on a world wide scale, this stage is cons i dered to i nclude an economy of abundance made possible by soeial utilization of

un restricted p roduction, a d isappearance of the antagonism between town and coun try and that between mental and physical labor, and, be­ cause i rreconcilable class conflicts w i l l h ave ceased to ex ist, a "withering away" ( Engel s : A nti-Diihring) of the state as an apparatus of force. What will remain will be a state-less "admi nistration of things." The general theory of hi storical materia lism claims to be a methodol ogical basis for all specific social sciences, as well as for aesthetics Cf. Trotsky : Literature and and ethics.

Re'Uolution.

Art, to dialectical ma teri alism, is an acti vity of human beings which embodies a reflection of the reality surrounding them, a reflection which may be c onscious, unconscious, reconstructive or deliberately fantastic, and which possesses posi­ tive aesthetic value i n terms of rhythm, figure, color, image and the like. Art is good to the extent that it is a fai thful and aesthetic reflec­ tion of the reality dealt with. Accordin gly, p roletarian o r socialist realism ( q.v.) is not photographic, static, · but dialectical, conscious that a ny given period or subj ec t i s moving into i ts future, that class society is becoming c lass­ less society. Th is realism is optimistic, involv­ ing a "revolutionary romanticism". The central ethical conception, called p role­ tarian humanism, sees the source and signifi­ cance of all va lues in mankind and, accepting general ends l ike j ustice, brotherhood, the p rin­ ciple of all for each and each for all, sees the main problem as that of reconstructi ng social institutions so as to permit the functioning of such prin ciples i n respect to the whole people. It is held that only cl assless society, where there is productive employment and security for all, will permit all to lead the good life. See Marx, Engels, Lenin, So'Uiet philosophy, also, separate entries for detailed definitions o f speci fic terms. Bibliography : M a rx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (complete works of l\l a rx and Engels currently adding to its volumes). M a rx, Karl : Capital.

Contribution to the Critique of Political Econ­ omy. Value, Price and Profit. Class Struggles in France. Paris Commune ( fo r exten sive bibli­ ography of Marx, see Karl Marx ) . E ngels, Friedrich : A n ti-Duh ring. Dialectics of Nature.

Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy. Origin of the Family, Pri'Uate Property and the State. Marx and En­ gels: German Ideology. Communist Manifesto. Lenin, V. I . : Collected Works. Selected Works. /l,faterialism and Empirio-Criticism. State and Re'Uolution. Filosofskie Tetrady ( Philosophical

Notebooks ) . Many of Len i n 's briefer phi losophi­ cal writi ngs may be found in Selected Works, vol. XI.-1.M.S. Dia Ile Ion : A 'Uicious circle (q. v.) in definition.

Diallelus : A 'Uicious circle (q. v . ) in proof.

A . C.

A. C. Dia logic method : The presentation of a thesis o r a rgument in dialogue form.-C.A.B. I nference from one premiss of a (categorical ) syllogism to the disj unction of the

Dialogism :

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DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPHY

conclusion and the negation of the other premiss is a dialogism. Or, more general ly, if the in­ ference from A and B to C is a valid i n ference, th at from A to C v ,_, B may be called a dialo­

A. C. gism. Dianoetic Virtues : (Gr. aretai dianoetikai) In

Aristotle's ethics the virtues or excellences of the dianoia ; intel lectual virtues. The dianoetic vi rtues are distinguished from the moral vi rtues in having for their end the explicit apprehen­ sion of rational princip l es, whereas the moral vi rtues are concerned w i th the rational control of the sensitive and a ppetitive l ife. See A ris­

totelianism; Dianoia ; Nous; Phronesis.

-G .R . M . Dianoia : ( Gr. dianoi a ) The faculty or exercise of thinking, as exhibited especially in the dis­ criminating and conj oining or disj oining of concepts; the discursive understa nding · (Aris­ totle) .-G.R.M. Diaspora : Literally the Greek word signifies a scattering or dispersion. Name given to . the countries through which the J ews were dis­ persed after being exiled or deported from thei r homeland and also to the Jews living in those la nds. Also appl ied to converts from Judaism to Christi anity of the early Church living out­ side of Palestine.-1.J. R . Dichotomy : ( Gr. dicha, in two ; temno, to cut ) Litera l ly, a division in to two parts. In a specific examp l e : the view that man consists of soul and body. The earlier view of the Old Testament writers ; also, a v iew found in certa in expres­ sions of St. Paul. See also Trichotomy.-V.F. Dictum de omni et nullo : The leading prin­ ci ples of the syll ogisms in Barbara and Celarent, vari ously formulated, and attributed to Aris­ totle. "\Vh atever is affirmed ( denied) of an entire class or kind may be affirmed (denied } of any part." The four moods of the iirst figure were held to be directly validated by this dictum, and this was given as th e motive for the traditional reductions of the last three syl­ logistic figures to the iirst. See also A ristotle's

dictum.-A .C. Didactics : ( Gr. didaktikos, taugh t) The branch of education concerned with methods of teaching and i nstruction. In theology and rel igion didac­ tics in contradistinction to catechetics, is i nstruc­ tion in fundamentals of religious doctrine.

-L. W. Diderot, Denis : ( 1 7 1 3- 1 7 84) He was editor-in­

chief of the French Encyclopaedia and as such had a fa r reaching i nfluence i n the Enlighten­ ment. His own views changed from an initial deism to a form of materia lism and ended in a pa ntheistic na tura lism. He displayed a keen in­ terest i n science and may be viewed as a fore­ runner of positivism. He issued severe polemics against the Christian religion. De la suffisance de la f'eligion naturelle, 1 747 ( publ . 1 77 0 ) ; Lettre sur les aveugles . . . ( 1 i49 ), Le Reve d'Alembert, 1 769 (pub! . 1 8 3 0 ) ; La religieuse,

1 760 ; Le neveu de Rameau, 1 i6 1 ; Jacques le fataliste, 1 77 3 . Cf. J. Morley, Diderot and the Encyclopedists, 1 8 78, 2d ed. 1 886.-L.E.D. Difference : ( i n Schol asticism) Common : That

which makes a di stinction ( or division) by some separable accident, as when we say that this per­ son is sitting and that one standing. By this di fference a person ca n differ not only from another but also from himself, as one who is now old differs from himself as he was when young.-H.G. Dilemma : See Proof by cases, and Logic, formal,

� 2. Dilettantism : Opposite of professionalism.

It coi!tributed to art appreciation because it op­ posed the too intel lectual rules ot traditional taste, particularly i n Rome, 2nd century ; in France and Engla nd, 1 8 th century.-L. V. Dilthey, Wilhelm : ( 1 8 3 3- 1 9 1 1 ) A devoted stu­ dent of biography, he constructed a new meth­ odology and a new interpretation of the study of society and culture. He formulated the doc­ trine of Verstehungs-psychologie, which is basic to the study of social ends and val ues. He was the founder of Lebensphilosophie. Being the first humanistic philosopher historian of his age, he led in the comprehensive research in the history of i ntellectual development. Main works : Einleitung in die Geistesu:essenschaflen,

1 8 8 3 ; Der Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 1 90 5 ; Das Wesen der Philosophie, 1 90 7 ; Der A ufbau der geschichtlichen iVelt in der Geistesu:issen­ schaften, 1 9 1 0 ; Die Typen der Weltanschauung, 1 9 1 I ; Gesammelte Schriften, 9 vols., 1 922-3 5 . H.H.

Dimension : (scienti fic) I . Any l inear series or order of elements. 2. Any quantity of a given kind, capable of increase or decrease over a certain range ; a variable. 3. In the physical system : mass, length and time .-.1 . C.B. Dimensions of Consciousness : ( Lat. dimensus, pp. of dimentire, to measure off) Pervasive ana mutua lly irreducible features o f conscious proc­ esses such as quality, intensity, extent, duration and intentionality. ( Cf. E . H . Titchener, Lec­

tures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and A ttention, Leet. I V ; E. G. Boring, The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness, Ch . 3.) -L. W. Ding an sich : (Ger. thing in itself) A Kantian

term refe � ring to what lies beyond human ex­ perience and observation. "Things in them­ selves" are transcendent, not transcendental or applicable to any human experience. The "thing i n i tsel f" exists independent and apart from a l l knowledge. I t h a s an in dependent rea lity apart from the subjectivity of human knowledge. H.H. Diogenes Laertius : (also B.C.) A late biographi­ cal doxographer, to whom is owed most of the biographical and source material of Pre-Socratic philosophy. Cf. R. Hope, Diog. Laertius-E.H. Dionysian : The art impulse in which life is re­ lived, in which l i fe's j oys and pains are re­ experienced. The dynamic and passionate of the will of l i fe and power. (Nietzsche.)-H.H. Diori sm : The Greek term in Plato's usage sig­ ni fies division, distinction ; in that of Aristotle, distinction, definition, which is a lso the mean­ ing today. ·In mathematics, a statement of the

82

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPHY

conditions needed in order to solve a problem.

-J.J.R.

Di rect k nowl e d ge : A thing is said to be known directly when our cognition terminates in and

refers immediately to the th ing itself; a thing is known reflexly, when our cognition terminates in and refers immediately to the image or con­ cept of the thing p reviously known. E.g. I know man directly upon seeing him, but upon seeing his image, I know him reflexly, because then I know him through the cogn ition t:, ..., hen th.: nature of the effect which is prm1ucn J , is fo und in the cause itsel f ; thus heat is contained formally i n fire, because fire also contains in itself the heat which it produces. An effect is contai ned virtually in its cause when the cause can indeed produce such an effect, but the n ature of the effect is not found i n the cause itself, e.g. the statue is con tained virtually in th� artist. Lastly, a n effect is contained emi­ nt'ntly in its cause, when the cause is much more pertect than the effect and is without the im-

perfections which are found in th e effect. E.g. God eminently contains the perfectiona of crea­ tures.-H.G. Founded : ( Ger. fundiut) In Husserl : 1. The cha racter of one noetic-noematic stratum as presupposing the presence o f another, the found­ ing stratum. 2. The cha racter of an act or an act-correl3te as containing founded and founding strata. E.g., intending something as a tool is founded i n i nten ding "the same" as a material thi n g ; correlatively, the tool-sense is founded in the mere-thing-sense.-D.C. Four E lements : The four primary kinds of body recognized by the Greek philosophers, viz. lire, air, water, and earth.-G.R.M. Frank, Philipp : (b. I S84) A member of the "Vienna Circle,'' who has made his home in the U. S. He has been avowedly in fluenced by M ach. His major work lies on the borderline between philosophy and physics and he makes an effort "to employ only concepts which will not lose their usefulness outside o f physics." Ph. Frank, Between Physics and Philosophy ( Ha rvard, 1 94 1 ) .-R. B. W. Freedom : ( Kant. Ger. F reiheit) The autonomy or self-determin ation of rational beings. Kant considers the rea lity of freedom an indubitable, a lbeit an i nexplicable, fact, and places i t at the fulcrum of his entire system, theoretical as well as practical. See Kantianism.-0.F.K. Freedom, S ense of : The subjective feeling of an agent either a t the moment of decision or in retrospect that his decision is free and th at he might, if he had chosen, have decided diffr�· ently. This feeling is adduced by Free-Willists as empirical evidence for their position but is i nterpreted by their opponents as a subj ective illusion. See Free-Will.-L.W. Free-wi ll : The free-will doctrine, opposed to de­ termin ism, ascribes to the human will freedom in one or more �f the fol lowing senses : ( a ) The freedom of indeterminacy is the will'e alleged independence of an tecedent con­ ditions, psychological and physiological. A free-will in this sense is at least partially un­ caused or is not related in a uniform way with the agent's character, motives and ci rcumstances. ( b ) The freedom of alternative choice which con sists in the supposed ability of the agent to choose among alternative possibilities o f action a nd (c) The freedom of sel f-determin ation con­ sisting i n decision independent of external con­ straint but in accvrdance with the inner motives and ideals of the agent. See Determinism, /n­

determinism.-L. W.

Frege, (Friedrich Ludwig) Got tlob, UHll-

1 92 5 , German mathematici;m . rnd logician. Professor of matho:: m atics at the C'nivC'rsity of Jena, 1 8 79- 1 9 1 8 . Largely unknown to, or mis­ understood by, his contemporaries, he is now regarded by many as "beyond question the greatest logician of the i'."inetcenth Century" ( quotation from Ta rsk i ) . He must be regarded -after Boole (q. v. )-as the second founder of symbolic logic, the essen tial steps in the passage from the algebra of logic to the logistic

113

DICTIONA R Y OF PHJLOSOPH Y

method (see the a rticle Logistic system ) having been taken i n h;s Begri!Jsschrift of 1 879. In this work there :ippear for the first time the propositional calculus in substa ntially its modern form, the notion oi propositional function, the use of quantifiers, the exp!icit statement of primitive rules of inference, the notion of an h ereditary property and the logical analysis of proof by mathematic a l i nduction or recursion ( q. v . ) . This last is perhaps the most important element i n the definition of an i nductive cardi­ nal number ( q. v . ) and provi ded the basis fo r Frege's derivation of arithmetic from logic in his Grundlagen der A rithmetik ( 1 8 8+) and Grun dgeutze der .'1.rithmetik, vol. I ( 1 8 9 3 ) , and vol. 2 ( 1 90 3 ) . The first volume of Grund­ gesetze der Arithmetik is the culmin ation of Frege's work, and we find here many importa nt further ideas. In particul ar, there is a careful distinction between using a formula to express someth ing else and naming a formula i n order to make a syntac tical statement about i t, quot:.­ tion marks bei ng t.:sed in o rder to distinguish the name of .a formula from the formula i tself. In a n appendix to the second volume of Grund­ gesetze, Frege acknowl edges the presence of a n i nconsistency i n his sy>tem through w h a t is now known as the Ru ssel pa radox (see Pa ra ­ do"e;, logical ), as had been called to his at­ tention Lv Rusoell when the book was nearly A. C. through the press. . P. I:. B. Jourdain, Go:r/ob F�ege, The Quar­ terly Journal oi Pure a nd Applied Mathema t1c_s , vol . 43 ( 1 9 1 2 ) , pp. 2 3 7 - 269. H: Sc_holz, _ Was. 111 em 1'alkul und u·.:zs hat Frege fur_ nn_e pu nk tlt ch e Beamwr,rtung dieser F r.Jg A1, B2 => A2, An, provided we , Bn , An are exhaustive and know that Ai, A2> , B,. are mutually exclusive-i.e., pro­ B1, Bs, . v An and vided we have also A1 v A2 v , -- [ Bn-1Bn ] . This -- [B1B2], -- [ B1Ba ] , form (or set of forms) of valid inference of the propositional calculus is Hauher's law.-A.C. H e d on ic : Possessing pleasurable or pain ful affec­ tive quality. See Algedonic.-L. W. H e donic Calculus : View, ascribed to Jeremy Bentham, that the ends of mankind may be calculated by determining the preponderance of the pleasurable over the painful in order to evaluate the useful. See Utilitarianism.-L.E.D. H e donism, E thical : (Gr. hedone, pleasure) A doctrine as to what entities possess intrinsic value. According to it pleasure or pleasant con­ sciousness, and this a lone, has posit ive ultimate value, that is, is intrinsically good and has no parts or constituents which are not intrinsically good. The contrary hedonic feeling tone, dis­ pleasure or unpleasant consciousness, and this alone has negative ultimate value, that is, is intrinsically bad and has no parts or constitu­ ents which are not intrinsically bad. The in•

:::>





.



.



:::>







.

:::>



.







DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

trms1c value of all other entities is precisely equivalent to the intri nsic value of thei r hedonic components. The total value of an action is the net i ntrinsic value of all its hedonic con­ sequences. According to pure hedonism either there are no differences of quality among pleas­ ures or among displeasures or else such differ­ ences as exist do not affect the i ntrinsic values of the different hedonic states. These values vary only with the intensity and duration of the pleasure or displeasure. Ethical Hedonism is usually combined with a teleological view of the nature of right action. It may be combined with Ethical Egoism as in the view of Epicurus, or with Ethical Uni­ versalism, as in the views of J. Bentham, J. S. Mill, and H. Sidgwick.-C.A.B. H edonism, Psychological : ( Gr. hedone, pleas­ ure ) Theory that psychological motivation is to be explained excl usively in terms of desire for pleasure and aversion from pain. (See W. James' criticism of psychological hedonism, The Prin­ ciples of Psych ology, I I pp. 549 ff.) Psychologi­ cal hedonism, as a theory of human motivation in contrast with ethical hedonism which accepts as the criterion of moral ity, the pleasure-pain consequences of an act.-L. W. Hedonist i c Aest h etics : Theories reducing beauty to the pleasure of seeing, hearing and playing, to the satisfaction of sensual enjoyment.-L. V. H edoni st i c Paradox : A paradox or apparent inconsistency in hedonistic theory arising from ( 1 ) the doctrine that since pleasure is the only good, one ought always to seek pleasure, and (2) the fact that whenever pleasure itself is the object sought it cannot be found. H uman nature is such that pleasure normally arises as a n accompaniment of satisfaction of desire for any end except when that end is pleasure itself. The way to attain pleasure is not to seek for it, but for someth ing else which when found will have yielded pleasure through the finding. Likewise, one should not seek to avoid pain, but only actions which produce pain.-A.J.B. Hege l , G eorg W i l h e l m Fri edrich : Born at Stuttgart i n 1 7 70 and died at Berl in in 1 8 3 1 . H e studied theology, philosophy and the classics at Tiibingen, 1 78 8-93, occupied the conven­ tional position of tutor in Switzerland and Frankfort on the Main, 1 7 94- 1 800, and went to Jena as Privatdocent in philosophy in 1 80 1 . He was promoted to a professorship at Jena in 1 805, but was driven from the city the next year by the incursion of the French u nder Na­ poleon. He then went to Bamberg, where he remained two years as editor of a newspaper. The next eight years he spent as director of the Gymnasium at Niirnberg. In 1 8 1 6 he accepted a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, from which position he was called two years later to succeed Fichte at the University of Berlin. While at Jena, he co-operated with Schelling in editing the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, to which he cont ributed many arti­ cles. His more important volumes were pub­ lished as follows : Phiinomenologie des Geistes, 1 80 7 ; Wissenschafl der Logik, 1 8 1 2- 1 6 ; Ency-

1 23

klopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, 1 8 1 7 ; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Reents, 1 820. Shortly after his death his lectures on the philosophy of religion, the his­ tory of philosophy, the philosophy of history, and aesthetics were published from the collated lecture-notes of his students. His collected works in nineteen volumes were published 1 8 3 2-40 by a group of his students.-G.W.C. Hegelianism : As expoun ded in the writi ngs of Hegel, Hegelian ism is both a doctrine and a method. The two are held to be logically in­ separable : the method is precisely the formula­ tion of the doctrine, and the doctrine is pre­ cisely the detailed expression of the method. This integration of the two aspects of the phi­ losophy presents a formidable obstacle to i n­ terpretation and to summary presentation of Hegelianism as conceived by its founder. The method is, of course, the dialectic. On its formal side, it is constituted by the triadic dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In h:s logical writings Hegel is very fond of ma­ nipulating this formal apparatus, which he does in great deta il. From his practice here one might be led to suppose that i n his opin ion the dialectic itself constitutes the essence of the method. In his other writings, however, little if any use is made of the schematism, except for the purpose of presenting the larger patterns of the subject-matter ; and in his remarks on method its formal aspect is hardly referred to. In these remarks Hegel is concerned with em­ phasizing the logical structure underlying the machinery, namely, the relationship of con­ trariety and its resolution. Everywhere, the method is grounded in system ; and the transi­ tion from thesis and an tithesis to synthesis is held to be necessitated by the structure of the system within which it is grounded. Conse­ quently the dialectical advance exhibits pari passu the structure of the system which is its matrix ; the synthesis is positive throughout. This characteristic of the method, its "holding fast the positive in the negative,'' is what Hegel calls its negativity ; and this characteristic is to him the essence of the dialectic. The sort of system which grounds the method is not the sort within which the principle of contradiction obtains. Contradictories cannot be dialectically resolved ; between them there is no ground of synthesis. But such systems a re ab­ stract, that is, exemplified only in formal deduc­ tion s ; they are lacking in factual content. Dia lectical analysis is possible only within sys­ tems which are factual, that is, constituted by statements of fact and statements of possibility grounded in fact. Here the principle of con� trariety, not the principle of contradiction, ob­ tains ; and dialectical analysis is i dentical with the resolution of contraries. Here, and here alone, is the dialectical method applicabl e ; and it alone is applicable here. Thus the method is the delineation of sys­ tems which are real, and the doctrine of reality nothing other than a detailed statement of the result. Such a statement is the nnal category

124

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

of dialectical analysis, the A bsolute Idea; this is the "truth" of Being. What this category is i n detail can be speci fied o n ly by the method whereby i t is warra nted. I n general it is the structure of fact, possibil ity and v a l ue as deter­ mi ned by dia lectical negation. It is the all­ comprehensive system, the "whole,'' which ha r­ moniously includes every statement of fact, pos­ sibil ity and value by "sublating" ( thro ugh dia­ lectical negation) every such statement within its own structu re. I t is also of the nature of "subj ect" in contradist i nction to "substance" as defined by Spinoza ; Hegel sometimes speaks of it as A bsolute Spirit. If this doc trine is to be called absolute idea l ism, as i s customary, its dis­ tinguishing cha racteristic should not be sub­ merged in the name : the system which is here identified with real ity is structured precisely as discl osed in the process of dia lectical n egation wh ich exhibits it. The l a ter thinkers commonly referred to in the histo ries as Hegelians fall mai nly into two groups. One is the group more or l ess indiffer­ ent to the method of Hegel and in terested pri­ marily i n the ramifications o f his doctri n e ; the other is the group committed in principle to the method, to its "negativ ity" a n d not to its ca tego ries, a n d concerned by its mea ns to build independently. The early Hegelians in Ger­ many belong to the f� rmer group ; outstanding representatives of the la tter are the recent Brit­ ish a n d American phi l osophers sometimes cal led neo-Hegel ians. See H egel-Archiv, ed. G. Lasson ; K. Fischer, Hegel's Leben, Uk rke und Lehre, 2 vols. ( 1 90 1 , 1 9 1 1 ) ; W . Dilthey, Gesamm Sehr. I V ; B . Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of Hegel, 1 9 1 5 ; G. Lasson, Hegel als Geschichts­ philosoph, 1 920 ; Th. H aering, Hegel sein Wollen u. s. Werk, I ( 1 9 2 9 ) ; II ( 1 9 3 9 ) ; H . Glockner, Hegel ; S . Hook, F r o m Hegel t o Marx, 1 9 3 8 .-G. W.C. Heidegger, Martin : ( 1 8 89-) Tra ined in Hu s­ serl's radical structura l an alysis of pure con­ sciousness, Hei degger sha res with phenome­ nol ogy the effort to methodica lly an alyze and describe the conceptual meanings of single phe­ nomena. H e a imed at a phenomenological analysis of human exi stence in respect to its temporal a n d historical character. Concentrating on the Greek tradition, and endeavoring to open a totally different approach from that of the Greek th inkers to the problem of being, h e seeks t o find his way back to an i n n e r i nde­ pendence of philosophy from the special sciences. Before a start can be made in the radical analysis of human existence, the road has to be cleared o f the obj ections of phil osoph ical tradi­ tion, science, logic and common sense. As the moderns have forgotten the truths the great thinkers discovered, have lost the abi lity to penetrate to the real o rigins, th e recovery of the h a rd-won, original, uncorru pted insights o f man into metaphysical real ity, is only possible through a "destruc tive" analysis o f the tradi­ tional ph ilo sophies. Ry this recovery of the hid­ den sources, Heidegger aims to revive the gen-

uine phil osophizing which, notwithstanding ap­ pearances, has vanished from us in the Western world because of autonomous science serious disputing of the position of phil osophy. As human rea lit•· is so struc tured that it discloses itsel f im med (ately, he writes really .in i dealistic philosophy of homo faber. But instead of being a rationalistic idealist reading reason i nto the structure of the really real, h e takes a mo re avowedly emoti onal phenomenon as the center o f a new solution o f the Seinsfrage. Under Kierkegaard's i n fluence, he pursues an "existen tial" analysis o f human exi stence i n o rder t o discuss t h e original philosophical ques­ tion of being in a new way. He explores many hi therto unexpl ored phenomena wh ich ontol ogy disrega rded. Sorge (concern ) , being par ex­ cellence the st ructure of consciousness, is ele­ va ted to the ul timate. Concern has a wholly special horizon of being. D read ( A ngst), the feeling of being on the v erge of nothi ng, repre­ sents an eminently transcendental instrument of knowledge. Heidegger gives d read a content d i rected upon the obj ec tive worl d. He unfolds the essence of d read to be Sorge (concern ) . As concern tends to become obscured to itsdf by the d istracted losing of one's selfhood in the ca res of daily life, its remedy is in the consideration of such experiences as conscience, forboding of death a n d the existential conscious ness of ti me. By elevating Sorge to the basis of a l l being, h e ra ised something un iversally human to the fun damental principle o f the world. It is only after an elementary an alysis of the basic con­ s titution of human exis tence th a t Heidegger ap­ proaches his u l timate p roblem of Being and Time, i n which more complic ated structu res such as the existential significance of death, con­ science, and the power of resolute choice explain the phenomena o f man's position i n daily life and history. Main works : Kategorien--tJ. Bedentungslehre d. Duns Scotus, 1 9 1 6 ; Sein u. Zeit, 1 927 ; Was ist Metaphysik ( ; Kant u. d. Probl. d. /.!eta ; 1 92 9 ; Vom Wesen des Grundes, 1 929 . See J. Kra ft, Von Husserl zu H . , 1 9 3 2 .-H.H. Helvetius, Claude Ad rien : ( 17 l S- l '."' 7 l ) A French phi losopher, he developed on the basis of Co ndillac's sensationalism his superficial material­ istic phil osophy. His theories of the original mental equa l ity of individuals, of the egoism or self­ interest as the sole moti v e of human action, and of the omnipotence of ed ucation, stress the basic determin ing influence of ci rcumstances. C. A. Helvetius, De ! 'Esprit, 1 7 5 8 ; De l'Homme , de ses facultes et de son education, 1 7 72.-H.H. Heraclitus : ("The Obscure") Of Ephesus, about 5 3 6-470 B.C. I n opposi tion to the M i lesians, from whom he is separated by a generation, he held that thete is nothing abiding in the world. All things and the universe as a whole a r e in constant, ceaseless flux; n othing is, only change is real, all is a continuous passing a way. For this reason the world appeared to him to be :in ever-l iving fi re, a consuming movement in which only the orderliness of the succession of thi ngs,

1 25

DICTIO.YA R Y OF PHILOSOPHY or,

as

Heraclitus

called

it,

the

" reason"

or

soul

is

unita ry,

"destiny" of the wo rld remains a l w ays the same.

philosophy,

Heraclitus

thus

foreshadowed

the modern

mental.

ception

the

u n i formity of

natural

of

con­

law.

Cf.

D i els, Frag. d. l ' o r, I, ch. 1 2 .-M.F.

H erbart, Johann Friedrich : ( l 7 i 6 - l S + l ) known

as

the

"father"

of

scientific

Best

pedagogy

indi visible ;

is

By

neither denying

Herbart

combatted

separate

faculties.

science,

a n alytical a n a lysis

the

nor

to

division

i n c l u ding

of

Psychology is

experi­

psychology, mind

i n to

the

mere

not

description of the m i n d , but the working out of its mathematica l l aws.

centra l ly based upon psychology, a general tenet

ldeas,

he

argued,

a rise

origi n a l ly

from the

tha t still has weight today, Herbart occupies as

collisi on between "rea ls" or things.

educatio nal

of force, they were al wa�·s i n mi;1d and deter­

philosorhical

strikin gly simi lar

theorist

a

to th at of J ohn

pos1t1on

Dewey, the

Fichte,

his

master's

method

of

E x p b i n i n g ideas a s forces acting very much as

deduc ing everyth ing from a single, a l l -embrac­

the electrons

ing

ready i n

p rinci p le,

a x iom ciple

th at

he

obstina tely

everything is

o f iden tity.

He

is

not f r e e i n

p r i nciple reverted and

and

to

the

the p r in­ from h i m

freedom.

As

the s e n s e o f possessing a

i n depen dent to

is,

departed

i n t h e principle o f idealism man

adhered

wh a t it

als o

of

the

the Kantian

e n v i ronment,

doc trine

that

he

beh i n d

u n derlying t h e w o r l d of a p p e a r a n c e there

is a p l u ra l i ty of real thi n gs i n themselves that a re independent of the operations of mind upon them.

Deserv i n g

cred-it

for

having

developed

the realism that was l a tent in Kan t's philosophy, he conceived the "reals" so as to do away with the contradictions i n the concepts of experience. The necessity for assuming a p l u r a l i ty o f "reals" a rises

as

a

resul t

of

removing the

contradic­

tions i n our experiences of change a n d of things possessing

several

qual ities.

Herbart

calls

the

method he applies to the resolution of th e con­ tradictions existing between the empirical ly de­

of

modern

c o nsciousness

physics,

play

and

the

new

ideas

"rea l s " is a question esse n tia l

differen t

of. thought only, a n d i n ­

for t h e " r e a l s " themselves.

It i s the

cha nges in these relations that form the process

X oth ing

of change i n the world of experience.

c a n be ultimately real of which two contradic­ tory p redica tes

can

be

asserted.

To

predicate

u n i ty a n d m u l ti plicity o f a n object is to predi­ cate contradictions.

Hence u l timate real ity must

be absolutely u n i t a ry and

a l s o without cha nge.

The metarhysically interpreted c o n t radiction tem.

was

abstract

therefore central

in

law

of

h i s sys­

I n capabil ity o f knowing the proper nat ure

edge.

Herbert

tion,

even

himself made

though

"apperceiving

most

mass".

He

our

own

inner

states, yet h i s

v i ew of t h e "reals" accords better with m a te­ r i a l i stic a tomism.

The "rea l s " a re simple a n d

u n ch a ngeable i n n a tu re. M etaphysics in

and

psychology

Herbart's view.

a lso

phil osophy.

science from

in

the

physical

psychology

are

not

d i s tinct

In his day psychology was It

was

sti l l

sense

th a t

science.

It

repud i a ted

it

a

metaphysical

is

differentiated

w a s only

phi losophy.

later

that

Accep ting

Kan t's ch a l l enge t o m ake psychology a m a the­ matical science, he de veloped a n elaborate sys­ tem the

of mathema tical least

fruitful

mathematical calcula tion,

science

not

constructions

p hase

of

his

psychology

experiment.

As

that

p roved

system.

As

can

use

the

mind

a

only or

the

term

famous

be­

process of education.

] . F. Herbart, Hauptpunkte d. Logik, 1 8 0 8 ; Hauptpunkte d. Metaphysik, 1 8 06 - 1 8 0 8 ; A ll­ gem. prakt. Philos., 1 8 0 8 ; Lehrh. z. Ps)·chologie, 1 8 1 6 ; Psycho[. als Wissensch. neu gegriindet au/ Erfahrung, 1Hetaphysik u. Jfathematile, 1 8 2+ ; Allgemeine l�!etaphysik, 1 8 2 8 -9. See Siimmtliche Werke, 1 9 vols. {ed. Fluegel, 1 8 8 7- 1 9 1 2 ) .-H.H.

H erbartiani sm :

The

rhil osoph ical,

but

particu­

l a rly the psrchological and pedagogical doctr ines

(q.v.)

as exro und ·

in modifie d a n d developed form by his dis­

ci ples, no tably �f . Lazarus and H . Steinthal in

psychology, T. Zi l le r and W. Rein in_ peda gogy, �L D robisch in religious philosophy and

In

America,

bart,

his

efficacy

shortl ived

disciples

concepts method,

but

movement

w i th the of

strove

spec i a l

doctrine a

was

ethics.

and 1 8 90- 1 9 1 0 ) a n d c o n fi n ed ma inly t o education ( Char les De­ Garmo a n d Charles A. Mc:\lu rry ). Like Her­ in fluential,

the

for

a cla rification

emphasis of

vigorous

{ about

on

apperception,

mathema tica l

approacr

of

scienti fic and

the

even

in

th eir psychology v. hich was dominated by asso­ less

with

i .e.

c a use the term is a psych ological factor in the

ciational th i n k i n g ; yet they

a n a l ogous

The

of appercep­ for

became

whether they a re spiritual or materi a l .

h e conceived i n his system that the "reals" a re

less

famous

o f these "reals" equals the ina bility of kn o·.,·i n g A l though

al­ role

are to be apperceived,

of Johann Friedrich H erbart

the

ideas

i n corporated with the o l d ideas to form knowl­

ed

between

the

important

ideas a l ready p resent a re th-: a pperceiv i n g ideas

the

relation

an

w i th regard to new ideas j ust appea rin g.

rived concepts, the method of relations, that is acciden tal

Once they come

to mind through the senses, they a re never lost.

nestor o f Ameri c a n philosophy. Objecting t o

mined by it by their energies.

As centers

discarded more or

the master's doctrin e of reals.-K.F.L.

H erder, Johann Gottfri ed :

( 1 7+4- 1 8 0 3 ) A fo under of modern religious human ism, he ex­

plained human h i story as a consequence of the nat ure

d

ment.

Eeld imp licitly to the vi ew th at society

is

man

basicaJ;y

an

and o f m a n 's physical envi ron­ organic

whole.

Accounted

for

the d i ffere1•ces in c u l t ure and ins t i tutions of d i f­ ferent peop1es as being d ue to geogra phical con­ di tions.

A l �1ough

history

is

a

process

of the

education o f ·he human s;>ecies, i t has n o defi­ n i te goal o f perfection a n d development.

The

vehicle of living c u l t u re is a distinct l'olk or Nation with its ciistinct l a nguage and traditions. As a child o f the Enl ightenment, H e rder had a b l i n d faith in na ture,

in m a n a n d in the u l ti­

mate

reason

].

development G.

oi

Herder, ldeen

z.

and j ustice. Philos. d. Gesch.

· ·J.

1 26

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Menschheit, 1 7 84-9 1 ; Gott. Gesprache iibe:• Spino"'41s System, 1 78 7 ; Briefe Beforderung d. Humanitat, 1 79 3 ; Metakritik, 1 799 ; Kalli­ gone, 1 800 ; last two works directed against Kant's Critiques (q .v .).-H.H . H ered i tary property : See Recursion, proof by. H ermeneut i cs : The art and science of interpret­ ing especially authoritative writings ; mainly i n application t o sacred scripture, and equivalent to exegesis.-K.F.L. H errenmoral : ( German ) A concept popularly used as a blanket term for any ruthless, non­ Christian type of morality justly and unjustly l inked with the ethical theories of Friedrich Nietzsche (q.v. ) as laid down by him especially in the works of his last productive period fraught as it was with iconoclast vehemence against all plebeian ideals and a passionate de­ sire to establish a new and more virile aristo­ cratic mora lity, and debated by many writers, such as Kaftan, Kronenberg, Staudinger, and Hilbert. Such ideas as will to power, the con­ ception of the superman, the apodictic primacy of those who with strong mind and unhindered by conventional interpretations of good and evil, yet with lordly lassitude, a re born to lead­ ership, have contributed to this picture of the morality of the masters (Herren ) whom Nietz­ sche envisaged as bringing about the revaluation of all values and realizing the higher European culture upon the ruins of the fear-rr.otivat.ed, passion-shunning, narrowly moral world of his day.-K.F.L. H eterogeneity : ( Lat. Heterogeneitas) The con­ dition of having different parts ; diversity of composition ; distinction of kind. Hamilton's !aw : "that every concept contains other con­ cepts under it ; and therefore, when divided proximately, we descend a lways to other con­ cepts, but never to i ndividuals ; in other words, things the most homogeneous-similar-must in certain respects be heterogeneous-dissimilar." Employed by H. Spencer ( 1 820- 1 90 3 ) to denote the presence of differentiation i n the cosmic materia l. Opposite of: homogeneity (q. v.). -1.K.F. H eteronomy : (Cr. hetero, other + nomos, law) See Autonomy. H eteronomy of E nds : ( Kant) Just as autonomy of the will is that state of affairs in the l i fe of a rational being in which the will is deter­ m ined in its choices by no ends other than it­ self, so heteronomy of the wilJ is the state i n which t h e w i l l is determined b y ends other than itself, e.g. happiness or gain either for self or others. In autonomy the will is its own end, and is determined only by its own laws. Autonomy of the wilJ is the supreme principle of morality, Kant affirms, and hetero­ nomy is the source of all spurious principles of morality. F�r i n heteronomy the will, being at­ tracted by external ends, is obeying laws not of its own making. Jn autonomy, however, the will obeys only its own Jaws ; it makes only those choices of action which may also be re­ garded as instances of laws of its own choosing. The principle of the Autonomy of the W"i ll, 2.

and the Categorical Imperat ive, are thus one and the same thing.-F.L. W. Hetero-psychological Ethics : Ethics based on mental categories other than the conscience, as contrasted with idio-psychological ethics, or ethics based on the inner facts of conscience. I ntroduced as terms into ethics by J. Martineau ( 1 80S-1 899) in 1 8 8 5 .-J.K.F. Heterotelic : ( from Cr. heteros, another, and telos, end ) Said of any activity having a con­ scious or implied reference to the accomplish­ ment of some end. In aesthetics applied to creative art and play i n which a useful purpose may be discerned or may constitute the motive. See also A utotelic.-K.F.L. Heterozetesis : ( Cr. heteros, other + zetein, in­ quiry ) In logic, ignoratio elenchi, an argument which does not prove the conclusion wanted. The fallacy of irreleva nt conclusion ; the gen­ eral name for fallacies due to irrelevancy. -J.K.F. H euri stic : ( Cr. heuriskein, to discover) Serving to find out, helping to show how the qualities and relations of objects are to be sought. In Kant's phi losophy, applying to ideas of Cod, freedom and immorta lity, as being undemon­ strable but useful i n the interpretation of things and events in time and space. Jn methodology, aiding in the discovery of truth. The heuristic method is the analytical method. Opposite of: ostcnsive.-J .K.F. H exis : ( Cr. hexis) Jn Aristotle's philosophy a state or condition of a thing ; particularly an acquired di sposition or habit, not easily changed, and affecting the welfare of its possessor, such as the moral virtues and the intel lectual skills. -G.R.M . Hierarchy of types : See Logic, formal, § 6. Hilbert, David, 1 8 62-, German . mathematician. Professor of mathematics at the University of Gottingen, 1 89 5-. A maj or contributor to many branches of mathematics, he is regarded by many as the greatest mathematician of his generation. His work on the foundations of Euclidean geometry is contained i n his Gr tmdlagen du Geometrie ( 1 st edn., 1 899, 7th edn., 1 93 0 ) . Concerning h is contributions t o mathematical logic and mathematical philosophy, see the ar­ A . C. ticles mathematics, and p r oof theory. Ge1ammelte A b handlun�en, three volumes, with by logic mathematical work his of an account P. Bernays, a nd a life by 0 . Blumenthal, Berlin, in

1932-1935.

H illt'l of Verona : ( 1 220- 1 29 5 ) Physician and

philosopher. His principal philosophic work, the Tagniu!e ha-Nefesh ( Heh. ) The Reward of the Soul, is devoted to two problems, that of the soul ar:d that of reward and punishment. In his theory ,1 f the soul he follows partly Averroes (q.v. ) a nd assumes with him that the un iversal Active Intel lect acts upon the soul of the indi­ vidual and helps to realize its powers. He re­ jects, thougn, the farmer's view of immortality which consist� of a union of the human intellect with the univtrsal Active Intellect.-M. W. H indu E thics : See India n Ethics. Hindu Aesthetics : See lndia n Aesthetics.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

H i ndu Ph ilosophy : See Indian Philosophy. H i stori cal material i sm : The social philosophy

of dialectical materialism. The appl ication of the genera l principles of dialectical materialism to the specific field of human history, the de­ velopment of human society. One of the chief problems Marx dealt with was that of ihe basic causal agent in the movement of human history. He states his thesis as follows : "In the social relations which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are in­ dispensible and independent of their will. These relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production . . . . At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come in confl ict with the existing rela­ "tions of production, or-what is but a legal ex­ pression for the same thing-with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In consider­ ing such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material trans­ formation of the economic conditions of produc­ tion which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, re­ ligious, aesthetic or phi losophic-in short, ideo­ logical forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and 1ight it out." ( Marx : Con­ tribution lo the Critique of Political Economy, p. 1 2. )-1.M.S. H i stori c i sm : The view that the history of any­ thing is a sufficient explanation of it, that the values of anything can be accounted for through the discovery of its origins, that the nature of anything is entirely comprehended in its de­ velopment, as for example, that the properties of the oak tree are entirely accounted for by an exhaustive description of its development from the acorn. The doctrine which discounts the fallaciousness of the historical fall acy. Applied by some critics to the philosophy of Hegel and Karl Marx.-J.K.F. H i storiography : (Gr. his tor + graphein, to write ) The art of recording history (q.v.). History : ( Gr. histor, learned ) Ambiguously userl to denote either (a) events or (b) records of the past. The term historiography (q.v . ) is used for (b). Also ambiguous in denoting natural as well as human events, or records of either. H i story of Art : Vasari ( 1 6th century) began the history of the artists. Winckelmann ( 1 8th centu ry) began the history of art, that is of the development of the elements comprised in works of art. The history of art today is directed to­ wards a synthesis of the personalities of the artists and of their reaction to tradition and environment.-L. V: H i story, Philosophy of : History investigates the theories concerning the de,,elopment of man as a social being " ithin the limits of psychophysical

1 27

causality. Owing to this double purpose the phi­ losophy of history has to study the principles of historiography, and, 1irst of all, their back­ ground, their causes and underlying laws, their meaning and motivation. This can be called the metaphysics of history. Secondly, it concerns itself with the cognitive part, i.e. with historic understanding, and then it" is called the logic of history. While in earlier times the philosophy of history was predominantly metaphysics, it has turned more and more to the methodology or logic of history. A complete philosophy of history, however, ought to consider the meta ­ physical as well as the logical problems i n­ vol ved. I. Logic of History : The historica l objects under observation (man, l i fe, society, biological and geological conditions) are so diverse that even slight mistakes in evaluation of items and of the historical whole may lead to false re­ sults. Tl).i s can be seen from the modern logic of history. In the 1 8th century, G. B. Vico contended, under the deep impression of the lawfulness prevail ing in natural sciences, that historical events also follow each other accord­ ing to unswerving natural Jaws. He assumed three stages of development, that of fantasy, of will, and of science. The encyclopedists and Saint-Simon shared his view. The individual is immersed, and driven on, by the current of social tendencies, so that Comte used to speak of an "histoire sans noms". His three stages of development were the theological, metaphysical, and scientific stage. H. Spencer and A. Fouillee regard social life as an organism unfolding it­ self ac,cording to immanent l aws, either of racial individuality (Gobineau, Vocher de Lapauge) or of a combination of social, physical, and personal forces (Taine ). The spirit of a people and of an age outweigh completely the power of an i ndividual personality which can work only along socially conditioned tendencies. The development of a nation always fol lows the same laws, i t may vary as to time and where­ abouts but never as to the form (Burkhardt, Lamprecht) . To this group of historians belong also 0. Spengler and K. Marx: "Fate" rules the civil ization of peoples and pushes them on to their final destination. Idealists regard such an equalization of physical laws and psychological, historical laws as un­ tenable. The "typical case" with which physics or chemistry analyzes is a result of l ogical ab­ straction ; the object of history, however, is not a unit with uni versal traits but something indi­ vidual, in a singular space and at a particular time, never repeatable under the same circum­ stances. Therefore no physical laws can be formed about it. What makes it a fact worthy of his­ torical interest, is j ust the fullness of live activ­ ity in i t ; it is a "val ue", not a "thing". Granted that historical events a re exposed to intluences from biological, geological, racial and traditional sources, they are always carried by a human being whose .singularity of character has assimi­ lated the forces of his environment and sur­ mounted them. There1 is a reciprocal action

128

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

between man and soci ety, but it is a l ways per� sonal i n itiative and free productivity of the in­ dividual which account for history. Denying, therefore, the logical p rimacy of physical laws in history, does not mean law lessness, and that is the standpo int of the logic o f history in more recen t times. Wjndelband and /-/. Rickert estab­ l ished a nother kind o f h i storical Jrder of law�. On their view, to u n derstand history one must see the facts in thei r relation to a universally a p­ p licable and transcendental system of va lues. Val ues "are" not, they "hold" ; they a re not " facts but realities o f our reason ; they a re not developed but discovered. According to Max Weber h istorical facts form an i deally typical, transcendental whole which, although seen, can never be fully explained. G. Simmel went fur­ ther i nto metaphysics : "life" i s declared an his­ torical category ; it is the indefinable, l ast rea lity ascen ding to central v alues which shaped cul­ tural epochs, such as the medieval idea o f God, o r the Renaissance-idea of Na tu re, only to be tragically disappointed, whereupon other values rise up, as humanity, l i berty, technique, evolution and others. This opposition of n a tural sciences ( Natur­ wissensclzaften ) and cultural or socio-historic-ii sciences ( Geisteswissensch aften ) is characteristic of i dealistic phi losoph ies of h istory, especially of the modern Germ a n variety. See M a x Weber, Gesamm. A ufriitze z. Sozio u. Sozialpolitik, 1 922 ; W. Windelband, Gescliichte u. Natur­ wissensclzaft, 1 8 94 ; H. Rickert, Die Grenzen d. Naturwiss. Begriffsbildung, eine logische Ein­ leitung i. d. lzistor. Wissensclzaften, 1 8 99 ; Di lthey (q.v. ) ; E. Troeltsch, Der Historismus u. s. Probleme, 1 92 2 ; E. S pranger, Die Grund­ lagen d. Geschichteswissensch. , 1 9 0 5 . F o r the opposing, more empirical approach and criticisms of the idealistic, o rganismic philos­ ophies of history, see M . M a ndelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, 1 9 3 9 ; F . J . E. Teggart, The Method o f Histo ry ; Ph. P. Wiener, "Methodology in the Philos. of Hist.", lo ur. of Philos. (June 5, 1 94 1 ) . I I. Metaphysics of History : The metaphysical in terpretations of the meaning of history a re either supra-mundane or i ntra-mu dane ( secu­ l a r ) . The o l dest extra-munda ne, or theologica l, i nterpretation has been given by St. Augustine ( Civitas Dei ) , Dante (Divina Commedia ) and J. Milton ( Paradise L ost and Regained). A l l h i s­ toric events a re seen as having a bea ring upon the redemption of mankind th rough Christ which will find its comp letion at the end o f this world. Owing to the secul a ristic tendencies of modern times the E n lightenment Period considered the fi n al end o f human history as the achievement o f public welfare th rough the power of reason. Even the ideal o f "humanity" of the c lassic humanists, a d vocated by Schiller, Goethe, Fichte, Ro ussear1, Lord By ron, is only a va riety of the phil osophy of the E n l ightenment, and in the same l in e of thought we find A. Comte, H. Spencer ("human mora l " ) , Engels and K. The Germa n Ideal ism of Kant and Marx. liege/ sa w in history the material ization o f the

"moral reign of freedom" which achieves its perfection i n the "obj ective spirit o f the State". As in the earlier systems of historical l ogic m a n l ost his individual ity before t h e forces of natural l a ws, so, according to Hegel, he is nothing but an i nstrument of the "idea" which develops itself th rough the three dialectic stages of thesis, anti­ thesis, and synthesis. ( Example : Absolutism, Democracy, Constitutio nal Atonarchy.) Even the great h istorian L. v. Ranke could not break the captivating power of the Hegel ian mechan­ ism. Ranke pl aces every hi storical epoch into a rel ation to Cod and attributes to it a p urpose and end for itself. Lotze and Troeltsch. fol­ lowed i n his footsteps. Lately, the evolutionistic interpretation of H. Bergson i s much d iscussed and disputed. H;s "vital i mpetus" accounts for the p rogressivenes s of l i fe, but fails to i nterpret the obvious setbacks and decadent civilizations . Accordi � g to Kierkegaard a n d Spranger, merely human ideals prove to be too narrow a basis for the ten dencies, accompl ishments, norms, and defeats of h istoric l i fe. It all points to a supra­ mundane i n tell igence which unfolds i tsel f in h istory. Tha t does not make superfluous a natural interp retation, both v iews can be com­ bined to understand history as an endless struggle between God's will and human will or ' non-wi l l i ng, for that ma tter.-S.v.F. Ho : ( a ) Harmony ; being "neither too weak n o r t o o strong." "When the passions, s u c h as j oy, anger, grief, and pleasure, have not awakened, that i s our central self, or moral being (chung ) . When these passions a waken a n d each a n d a l l attain d u e measure and degree, t h a t is ha rmony, or the moral order (ho ) . Our central self or moral being is the great basis of existence, a nd harmony or moral o rder is the un iversal law i n the world." See Chung. (b) Change and transformation i n the p roper order. ( c ) Peace ; meekness ; amiabil ity.--W.T.C. Ho : Co-existence, one of the proofs o f agreement. See Mo che.-W. T. C. Hobbes, Thomas : ( 1 5 8 8 - 1 679) Considering knowledge empirical in o rigin and resul ts, and philosophy inference o f causes from effects and vice versa, regarded ma tter and motion as the least c ommon denominators of all our percepts, and bodies and their movements as the only subj ect ma tter of philosophy. Conscious ness in its sen sitive and cogni t i v e aspects is a j a rring of the nervous system ; i n its affectional and voli tional, motor aspects, a kick-back to the j a r. Four subdivisions o f philosophy cover all physi­ cal and psych ological events : geometry describ­ ing the spatial movements o f bodies ; physics, the effects of moving bodies upon one anothe r ; ethics, the movements o f nervous systems ; politics, the effects of nervous systems upon one a nother. The ii rst law o f motion appears in every o rganic body in its tendency, which in man becomes a natural right, to self-preserva­ tion and sel f-assertion. Hence the p rimary condition of a l l o rganic as of a l l inorganic hod ie� is one of coll ision, conflict, and war. The second law o f motion, in its orga nic ap-

1 29

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

plication, impels men to reli nquish a portion of thei r nat ural right to self.assertion in return for a similar relinquishment on the part o f their fell ows. Thus a component of t h e an tag· on istic forces of clashing indi vidua l rights a n d wills is established, embod ied in a social con· tract, or treaty of peace, which is the basis of the state. To enforce this social covenant en­ tered i nto, pursuant to the second l a w of mo· tion, by individuals n aturally at war in obedi· ence to the first, sovereignty must be set u p aad exercised through government. Government is most efficie n t when sovereignty, wh ich has in a ny case to be delegated in a community o f any size, is delegated to one man-an a bsolute mona rch-rather than to a group of men, or a parliament. M ain works : De curpore ( O n bodies ) ; De

homine (On Man ) ; De cive ( On the slate ) ; The Elements of Law, 1 640 ; Leviathan, 1 6 5 0 . -B.A .G.F. H ocking, William E rnest : ( 1 8 73·) Professor in the Department of Phil osophy at H a rv a rd. Has endea v ored to blend idea l ism with pra,e-· matism while making some concessions to real­ ism, even as i n current theory he strives for a reconc il iation between la issez fa i re l iberalism a nd collectivism throu,e-h a mi dground found in the worth o f the i n dividual in a "commotive union in the coagent state,'' a notion comparable to the "conj unct self" of Geo rge Herbert Palmer only with a more individualistic em­ phasis and a current fl a v or. Among h is wo rks are : The Meaning of God in Human Experi­

ence, Alan and the State, T)•pes of Philosoph)', Lastit:g Elements of Individualism , and Living Religions and a World Faith.-L.E.D. Hod�son, Shadworth : ( 1 8 S 2- 1 9 1 3 ) English writer who had no profession an d who held no public office. He displ ayed throughout a long l i fe a keen devotion to ph il osophy. He was among the fo unders of the Aristotel i a n Society and served as its p resident for fourteen yea rs. H i s earlier work was resh aped in a mo numenta l four vol ume treatise called The l'vf eta physic of Experience. He v iewed h imself as correcting and completing the Kantian position in his com­ pa ratively materialistic approach to reality with a recog nition o f the un seen world prompted by a practical, moral compulsion rather tha n specu­ lati ve convictio n.-L.E.D. Hoff ding, Harald : ( 1 8 4 3 - 1 9 3 1 ) Danish philoso· pher at the University of Copenhagen and bril­ l ia n t a uthor o f texts in psychology, history of phi losophy and the philosophy of rel igion. He held that the world of real ity as a whole is un­ knowable a l though we m ay believe that conscious experience and its u n ity a fford the best keys to unlock the meta physical riddle. His system of thought is classified on the positive side as a cautious ideal istic mon ism (his own term i� "critical m onism " ) . Main work s : Philosophy of Religion, 1 90 1 ;

Kierkegaard ; Rousseau ; Histor)' of llJ odern Philosophv.-V.F. Holbach, Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d ' : ( 1 7 2 3 1 7 8 9 ) O n e of t h e Encycl opedists {q.v.) and a

prominent materialist. He is the probable au thor of Le systeme de la Nature, known as "the Bible of Atheism."-R.B. W. Holism : See Emergent Evolutioniim. Holy : ( AS. halig) The symbolically universal v a l ue of things. Th a t aspect of value which reflects the tota lity, or Cod. The tota lity of val ue.-J.K.F. Hominism : ( Lat. homo, M a n ) German term (proposed by Win delban d ) for pragmatic human­ ism or psychologism.-W.L. H omoeomeries : ( Cr. homoiomere) In Aristotle's philosophy those bodies that are di visible into pa rts qualitatively identical with one a nother and with the whole, such a s the metals and the tis sues of livin g orga nisms ; in distinction from bodies whose pa rts are qualitatively unlike one an oth er an d the wh o l e, such a s the head of an animal or the leaf of a plan t.-G.R .M. See A rwxagoras. H omogeneity : (Lat. homogeneitas) The condi­ tion o f haying similar parts ; u n i fo rmity of compos ition ; i dentity o f k i n d. H a m i l ton's Law of, "th a t however di fferent any two concepts may be, they both are subordin a te to some higher co ncept-things most u n l ike must i n some re· spects be like". Employed by H. Spencer ( 1 820. 1 9 0 3 ) to den:ite the absence of d i fferentiation in the cosmic ma teri a i . Op posite o f : heterogeneity

(q.v. ) .-J.K.F. Homotheism : {Lat. homo, man ; C r. theos, god ) a n other name for anthropomorphism {q.v.) coined by Ernst H a ckel. H owison, George Holmes : ( 1 8 34- 1 9 1 6 ) A teach­ er at the Un iversity of C a l i fornia. He regarded the tendency of monistic thinking as the most v icious in contemporary ph il osophy. Op posed absol ute idealism or cosmic theism for its thoroughgoing mo nism because of its destruction of the impli­ ca tions of experience, i ts reduction to solips ism and its resolution into pa ntheism. H is "person· al istic ideal ism", u n l i k e absol ute ideal ism, did not neg3te the uniqueness and the mQral nature of finite selves. Moreover, a priori conscious­ ness is a human, not a divine original conscious· ness within the individual mind.

-H.H. H sian l! : ( a ) Phenomenon. (b) Form o r image. (c) Seconda ry M odes (or Form s ) , namely, Maj or Yang, M i nor Yang, Major Yin, a n d Mi nor Y i n , which a r e en,e-en dered b y t h e Two Primary M odes, Yin a n d Yang, products of the Great Ultimate (T'ai Ch i ) . ( d ) Hexagram, which, in the system of changes ( i ) , is a symbol representing a phe­ nomenon noted or perceived in n a ture, and su ggestive of an idea o r form according to wh ich a thing or a n activity m ay be real ized. -W. T.C.

H siao : Filial piety ; iove of parents ; serving and snoporting one's parents i n the best way. It is "the standard of Heaven, the principle of F.�rth, a nd the basis fo r the conduct of Man," "the hasis of moral ity and the root of cul ture." "It be�ins with serving one's parents, extends to the d uties towards o ne's sovereign, and ends

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

130

in the establishment of one's personal char­ ' acter." "It -is the begin ning of moral ity, as respect for elders (ti) is the order of morality ; " i t i s "the actuality o f benevolence ( j e n ) " as respect for elders is "the actual ity of righteous­ ness ( i ) ." As such "it involves loving kind­ ness to relatives, respect to associates, bene­ volence to friends, and good faith to acquaint­ ances." "True manhood (jen) means to make filial piety the basis of ma nhood ; righteousness ( i ) means to give it proper application ; being true to the nature of the self ( chung) means to make it the central moral ideal ; moral order { I i ) is to put it to actual practice, and truth­ fulness ( hsi n ) means to make it strong."

-W.T.C.

H s iao i : "The little u n it" is the smallest that has nothing with i n (Sophists. )-H.H.

itself.

See

Pien cht.

H s iao jen : ( a ) The in ferior man, the small man,

the mean man, the vulgar man. The opposite of the superior man. See Chun trr,u. (b) Common man ; little man ; uneducated man ; particula rly as d istinguished from the ruling class and the literati.-W.T.C. H siao ku : Minor cause. See Ku. H s iao t 'i : The senses which man shares with animals are "the part of man which is small", making him not merely an inferior man, but a mere animal. Not man's nature, but hie animal nature. ( Mencius. )-H.H. H s iao t'ung i : The little similarity-and-differ­ ence ; a great similarity differs from a little similarity. See Pien cM. (Sophists.)-H.H. H siao yao yu : The happy excursion, that is, roaming outside of the rea lm of matter, follow­ ing nature, and drifting in the In.finite, result­ inA in transcendental bliss. (Chuang Tzu, be­ tween 399 and 295 B.C.)-W.T.C. H si ch'ang : Practicing the Eternal ; i .e., "seeing what is small," "preserving one's weakness," "employing the light," and "reverting to en­ J ;gbtenment to avoid disaster to life." { Lao

Tzu.)-W.T.C.

H s i en : The Confucians and Mohists demand that

people of "superior moral character" should be rewarded and put in power, irrespective of their previous achievements ; or "better", someone above the normal level of human capacity, al­ most a sage.-H.H. H s i n : ( a ) Heart ; mind. (b) The original or intuitive mind of man which is good ( Mencius). (c) H uman desires (the hsin of man as different from the hsin of the Confucian Moral Law or tao). { d ) The Mind which is identical with the Grea t Ul timate (T'ai Chi ) . (Shao K'ang-chieh,

1 0 1 1 - 1 077.)

{e) One aspect of the Nature (h sin g ) . "When the Na tu re is viewed from its goodness, it is the Moral Law (tao ) ; when it is viewed from its essence, it is the Destiny (ming ) ; when it is ,·iewed from its natural state or spontaneity, it is Heaven (T'ien ) ; and when it is viewed from its manifestations, it is the Mind (hsi n ) ." ( Ch'eng 1-ch 'u:m, 1 03 3- 1 1 07.)

( f ) "The pure and refined portion of the vital force, ch'i." Being such it "has the Great Ultimate as its Reason {Ii) and Yin and Yang as its passivity and activity." It is the spiritual faculty or consciousness of man. (Chu Hsi,

1 1 30- 1 200.)

( g ) The mind conceived as identical with the Universe and Reason { I i ) . (Lu Hsiang­ shan, 1 1 39-1 1 93 . ) ( h ) The m i n d conceived as identical with . Reason {Ii) and intuition. (Wang Yang-ming,

1 473-1 529.)-W.T.C.

H s i n : (a) Good faith, one of the Five Cardinal

Confucian Virtues {wu ch'ang) ; honesty ; sin­ cerity ; truth ful ness ; truth. (Confucianism.) "Actualization of honesty (chung)." (Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1 032- 1 086.) See Chung. {b) Belief ; trust. {c) Power, or the efficacy of the essence of Tao. { Lao Tzii.)-W.T.C. H sin cha i : "Fasting of the mind" is a state of pure experience in which one has n o intellectual knowledge, i n which there is immediate presen­ tation ; the attainment of the mystical state of unity. (Ch uang Tzu between 399 and 295 B.C.) -H.H. H s i ng : The nature of man and things, especially h uman nature, understood as "what is inborn," or "what is created." It is what is imparted by Heaven, whereas what is received by man and things is fate (ming). The original state of the nature is tranquil. In i ts aroused state, when it comes into contact with the external world, it becomes feelings ( ch'ing ) . T o Kao Tzu, contemporary o f Mencius, h uman nature is capable of being good or evil ; to Mencius ( 3 7 1 -289 B.C.), good ; to Hsiin Tzu (c 3 5 5-c 2 3 8 B.C.), evil ; to Tung Cchung-shu ( 1 7 7- 1 04 B.C. ), potentially good ; to Ya ng H siung {d. 1 8 B.C. ), both good and ev i l ; to Han Yii ( 676-824 A.D.), good in some people, mixed in some, and evil in others ; to Li Ao (d. c 844), ca pable of being "reverted" to its original goodness. To the whole Neo-Con­ fucian movement, what is inborn is good, but due to external influence, there is both goodness and evi l. Chang Heng-ch'ii ( 1 020-1 077 ) said that human nature is good in all men. The difference between them lies in their sk ill or lack of ski l l in returning to accord with their original nature. To Ch'eng I-ch'uan ( 1 0 3 31 1 0 7 ) and Ch'eng Mi ng-tao ( 1 0 32-1 1 93 ) , man'� n ature is the same a s h i s vital force (ch'i ) . They are both the principle of life. In principle there are both good and evil in the vital force with which man is involved. Man is not born with these opposing elements in his nature. Due to the vital force man may become good or evil . Chu Hsi ( 1 1 30-1 200) regarded the nature as identical with Reason (Ii). Sub­ jectively it is the nature ; objectively it is Reason. It is the framework of the moral order (tao), with benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (ssu tuan) inherent in it. Evil i� due to ma n's failure to preserve a harmonious relation between his nature-principles. W3ng Yang-ming ( 1 473-1 529 ) identified the nature

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

with the mind, which is Reason and originally good.-W.T .C. H s i ng ( erh) h s i a : What is within the realm of corporea lity. See Hsing (erh ) shang. H si ng I i h sueh : Philosoph y of the Nature and Reason of man and things. See Li hsueh. W.T.C. H s i ng m i ng ( c hi a ) : The school which advocated governmen t by law ( which includes punishmen t, hsing) and insisted on the correspond ence of names (ming) to reality, as represented by Shen Tzii (fourth century B.C.) , Han Fei Tzii (d. 233 B.C.), etc. Another name for the Legalist School ( fa chia ). When hsing is in­ terpreted in the sense of shape to which n ames must correspond, the term is also applied to the Sophists (ming chia ) .-W.T.C. H sing (erh ) shang : What is above corporeality, such as The Moral Law (tao), Reason (Ii), etc., the general principle of which is the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi ) , as contrasted with what is within the realm of corporeality, such as the vital force (ch'i ), a material thing (ch'i ), etc., the general principles of which are the active (yang) and passive (yi n ) cosmic forces. (Con­ fucianism and Neo-Confucianism.)-W . T.C. H siu sh en : Cultivating one's personal life, which involves i nvestigation of things, extension of knowledge, sincerity of the will, and rectifica­ tion of the heart, and which results in the har­ mony of family life, order in the state, and world peace. (Confucianism.) -W. T.C. H su : ( a ) Emptiness ; non-existence, a major cha racteristic of Tao. (b) Emptiness of mind in the sense of abso­ lute peace and purity (Taoism) , and also in the sense of "not allowi ng what is already in the mind to disturb what is coming into the mind." ( Hsun Tzii, c 3 3 5-c 2 8 8 B.C. )-W. T.C. Hsuan : ( a ) Mysterious ; profound ; abstruse. (b) Another name for Tao, understood i n the sense of " Mystery of mysteries, the gate to all existence." (Lao Tzii.) (c) The Supremely Profound Principle. See T'a hsiian. (d) The heaven s.-W. T.C. H suan c hi ao : The Doctrine of Mystery, another name for the Taoist religion.-W.T.C. Hsuan c hi eh : Emancipation, to let nature take its course, to be at home with pleasant situations and at ease with misfortune, and not to be affected by sorrow and j oy. (Chuang Tzii, be­ tween 399 and 295 B.C.)-W.T.C. Hsuan h sue h : The system of profound and mys­ terious doctrines, with special reference to Tao­ ism from the third to the fifth centuries A.D. -W.T.C. H suan te : (Profound Virtue) "The Way pro­ duces things but does not · take possession of them. It does its work but does not take pride in it. It rules over thi ngs but does not domi­ n ate them. This is called Profound Virtue." (Lao Tzii.) Profound Virtue and Mysterious Power, through the cultivation of one's original nature and the returning to the character of Tao. Thus one "becomes identiiicd with the .Ccginning,

131

attains emptiness and vastness, and enters into mystic union with the Universe." (Chuang Tz.ii, between 3 99 and 295 B.C.)-W.T.C. H suan hung : The Religion of Mystery, another name for the Taoist religion.-W.T.C. Hsuen men : The School of Mystery, another name for the Taoist religion.-W.T.C. H sun Tzu : ( Hsun Ch'ing, Hsun Kuan, c. 3 3 5286 B.C.) For thirty years travelled, offered his service to the various powerful feudal states, and succeeded in becoming a high officer of Ch'i and Ch'u. A great critic of all contemporary schools, he greatly developed Confucian ism, be­ came the greatest Confucian except Mencius. Both Han Fei, the outstanding Legalist, and Li Ssii, the premier of Ch'in who effected the fi rst unification of China, were his pupils. (Hsun Tzu, Eng. tr. by H. H. Dubs : The Works of Hsun Tze.)-W. T.C. H su wu : ( a ) Emptiness and n on-existence re­ ferring to Tao which is so full and real that it appears to be empty and n on-existent. "It ie in the empty and . the non-existent where Tao is found." ( H uai-nan Tzii, d. 1 22 B.C.) (b) Absence of desire and egotism. (Taoism) -W.T.C. H ua·: Change, whether n atural or infra-natural ; transformation ; the culmination of the process of change (pien ) ; change from non-ens to ens; sudden change.-W.T.C . H ua i -nan Tzu : ( Liu An, Prince of H uai-nan, d. 1 22 B.C. ) Grandson of the founder of the Han dynasty, was a man of Confucian traditions with Taoist inclinations. Thousands of scholars, experts and Taoist magician-priests gathered around him. When his rebellion failed, he com­ mi tted suicide, leaving Huai'-nan Hung-lieh (par­ tial Eng. tr. by E. Morgan : Tao the Great Luminant) and other works now extinct. -W.T.C. Huang Lao : The teachings of the Yellow Em­ peror and Lao Tzu which emphasized the nour­ ishing of one's original nature and which were very influential in the H a n dynasty (206 B.C.220 A.D. ).-W.T.C. H uang T 'i en : August Heaven, identical with Shang Ti.

H ugo of S t. Vi ctor : ( 1 096-1 1 4 1 ) He was among

the leading mystics and presented his summary of theological a rguments in his contribution to the popular summa of the so-called summists in his "Summa sententiarum."-L.E.D.

Hu i z i nga, Joh an : ( 1 8 72- ) Professor of Philoso­

phy at the University of Leyden, Holland. He has been a pronounced exponent of the philoso­ phy of culture which he describes as a condition of society i n which there is a harmonious bal­ ance of material and spiritual values and a h a :� onious ideal spurring the community's ac­ _ t1v1t1es to a convergence of all efforts toward the attainment of that ideal. His best known work i s Homo Ludens.-L.E.D.

Human i sm : ( Lat. humanus, human) ( a ) Any

view in which the welfare and happiness of mankind in this li fe is primary.

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

132

( b ) The Ren aissance revolt a ga in s t r e l i g i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s o n k n o w l e d g e , w i t h :i. rev i v a l of c l assical lea r n i n g a n d a st ress on man's enj oy­ ing this ex istence to t h e utmost. (c) A t we n tie t h -c e n t u ry phi losophy-n atu ralis­ tic Human ism-or relig ion that rej ects belief i n a l l forms o f t h e supern:l t ural ; t h a t considers the greater good of a l l h u m an i t y on this earth as the sup reme ethi c:il go a l ; a n d t h a t rel ies on the methods of reason, science a n d democracy for the solution of h u m a n problems. Auguste

Comt e's Pos i ti v ism and British Uti l i t a r i a n i sm were forerun ners of n a tur a l i s t i c Human ism, which i n i ts ge nera l position i s close to Naturalism and M a teri:ilism. In the t:n i ted S tates, Human ism recei\'es oqranizational support t h rough the Ame r­ i c a n H u m a n i s t A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d in the world at hrre th rou.irh the I n t e r n :i t i o n a l H u m a n i s t .i n d E L h i c a ! l" n i o n .

( d) A n outmoded f o r m o f P r a gm at i sm pro­ '"u:ided by th e O x ford d o n , F. C. S. S c h i l l e r , :ind em ,_ h :i s i 1 ; ng suh_iecti\'e rlem e n ts. See PragmatJ S m . ( e) A c :i d c m i c or Li t e r a r y H u m a n i s m f o u n d e d 111 t h e c:arly n i n e t e e n - th i r t i e s hy P ro f e s s o r s I r v i n g J; . 1 hC:l 1 Lt :inJ P a u l E l m e r M n re. This s h o r t - l i •: e d movem..r.t urged a rt'tu rn to the classic• in e d u ­ C J t i o n ind exp0u n ded a sti lted m o r a l i t y of

"decorum. "-C .L.

H-umcm • .: .. ��n.,;rn : ( Lat. Anr

rt•

v ; e,., ir. "' h ich i n t e r.- gt

central.

m � n u$, human ) C\·, ra the r t h a n G o d or 1 " a t ur e is the C n·a: be • n :: wo r t h y o f wor6hip. ( d ) Theol oifical doct:inc oenyi n l{ the .:i i Y ! C i tr of Ch r i s t .-A .J . .8.

H uman

n a t u re : The l i m i t e d ran �e ,... , :. ,, 'Tl � n possib i l i t i e s . The h u m a n t r n d e n cy t � F ( x ) .. Many wri ters understand, however, by the law of i dentity a semantical principle-that a word or other symbol may (or must ) have a fi xed referent in its various occurrences in a given context (so, e.g., Ledger \Vood in his The A nalysis of Knowledge). Some, it would seem, con fuse such a semantical pri'lciple with a p ropo­ sition of formal logic.-A.C. Identity-philosophy : In general the term has been a ppl ied to any theory which fai led to dis­ tinguish between spirit and matter, subj ect and object, regarding them as an undifferentiated unity ; hence such a philosophy is a species of monism. In the history o f philosophy it usually signi fies the system which has been cal led lden­ titatsphilosophie by Fried rich Wilhelm Schelling, who held that spirit and nature are fundament­ ally the same, namely, the Absolute. Neither the ego nor the non-ego a re the ultimate principles of being ; they a re both relative concepts which are contair.ed i n something absolute. Th is is the supreme principle of Absol ute Identity of the i deal and the real. Reasoning does not lead us to the Absolute which can only be attained by immediate intellectual intuition. In it we find the etern al concepts of thi ngs and from it we can derive everything else. We a re obliged to conceive the Absolute Identity as the indiffer­ ence of the ideal and the real. Of course, this is God in \Vhom all opposites a re united. He is the unity of thought and being, the subj ective and the objective, form and essence, the general and infinite, and the pa rticular and finite. This teaching is si milar to that of Spinoza.-J.J.R. ldeogenetic Theory : ( G r. eidos, i dea + genesis, origi n ) Theory of Brentano (see Brentano, Franz) and other phenomenologists (see Phe­ nomenology) which holds that j udgment is an original act of consciousness di rected towards presentations. The term is a translation of the German ideogenetische Urteile.-L. W. Ideological : 1 . Pertaining to the school of Con­ dillac and his French followers o f the early 1 9th century. 2. Pertaining to theories determined by cul­ tural environment or non-rational interests. 3. Idle, unrealistic, fancifu!.-W.L. side

Identity :

Ideology : A term invented by Destutt de Tracy

fo r the anal ysis of generaj ideas into the sensa­ tions from which he beli eved them to emanate. The study was advocated as a substitute for metaphysics. The term was used i n a derogatory sense by Napoleon to denominate all phi losophies whose in fluence was republ ican. In recent times the English equivalent has come to mea n : ( 1 ) in some economic determinists, ineffectual thoughts as opposed to c ausally efficacious behavior, ( 2 ) a ny set of general ideas or phil osophical pro­ gram.-G.B. ldeo-motor Action : (Gr. eidos, i dea + motus, motion ) Bodily action d i rectly induced by the prevalence of a n idea i n the mind and consid­ ered by W. James as the basis of vol ition. (See W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vo l. II, pp. 522 ff.)-L.W. Idio-psychological Ethics : Ethics based on the inner facts o f conscience, as contrasted with hetero--psych ological ethics, or ethics based on mental categories other than the conscience. In­ troduced as terms into eth ics by J. Martineau ( 1 8 0 5 - 1 899) in 1 8 8 5 .-J.K.F. Idol : ( Gr. eidolon, and Lat. id ol um, image or likeness) Democritus ( 5 th c. B.C.) tried t.o ex­ plain sense perception by means of the emission of little particles (eidola) from the sense object. This theory and the term, idolum, are known throughout the later middle ages, but i n a pej orative sense, as indicating a sort of "second­ hand" knowledge. C. Bruno is usually c redited with the earliest Latin use of the term to name that which leads phi losophers into error, out this is an unmerited honor. The most famous usage occurs in F. Bacon's Novum Organum, I, 3 9-6 8 , where the four chief causes of human error in phi losophy and science are called : the Idols of the Tribe (weakness of understanding in the whole human race), of the Cave ( indi­ vidual prej udices and mental defects), of the Forum (faults of language in the communica­ tion of ideas ), and of the Theatre ( faults a ris­ i ng from received systems of philosophy ) . A very simi lar teaching, without the term, idol, had been developed by Crosseteste and Roger Bacon in the 1 3 th century.-V.J.B. Ignorance : ( Lat. in, not + noscere, to become acqua inted with ) Partial or complete absence of knowledge.-A.C.B. lgnoratio elenchi : The fall acy of irrelevance, i.e., of proving a conclusion which is other than that required or which does not contradict the thesis which it was undertaken to refute. A. C. kuan : The "one thread" or central principle that runs through the teachings of Confucius. See Chung yung. Th is is interp reted a s : (a) The Confucian doctrine of being true to the p rinciples of one's n ature (chung) and the benevolent exercise of them in relation to others (shu), by Confucius' pupil, Tseng Tzu. (b) The central p rinciple of centrality and harmony (chung yung) by which all human a ffairs and natural phenomena may be under­ stood. (Early Confucianism . ) (c) " M a n a n d things forming o n e organic

DIC TJO.VA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

unity," there being n o discrimination between the self and · the n on-self. (Ch'eng I-ch 'uan, 1 0 3 3 - 1 1 0 7.) (d) Since rity (ch'eng), which i s the way of Heaven, indestructible, by which all things are in their proper places. Sincerity is the th read that runs through all affairs and things ; and being true to the p ri nciples of one's nature and the benevolent exercise of them i n relation to others is the way to try to be si ncere. (Chu Hsi, 1 13 0 - 1 200.) ( e ) The "one" is the G reat Ultimate in gen­ eral and the "thread" i s the Great Ultimate i'l each thing. ( Ch u Hsi.)-W. T.C. lllative : H aving to do with i n ference.-A.C. Illicit importance, fal lacy o f : The mistake o f assuming that because a proposition is self­ evident, it is therefore important.-H.H. Ill icit process of the major : In the categorical syllogism (Logic, f11rmal, § 5), the conclusion ca nnot be a r ropc-si:ion E or 0 unless the maj or term appears in i ts r remiss as distributed-i.e., as subj ect of a p roposition .'1 or E, or the predicate of a p roposition E or 0. Violation of th is rule is the fal lacy of illicit process of the major. -A . C. Il licit process of the m inor : In the categoric al syl logism (logic, formal, § 5 ) , the conclusion cann ot be :! r ropos::iol! A or E un less the minor term arpears in it� r remiss as distr:"buted-i.e., as the !t:bj ect of a ;: roposition A o r E, ".l r inc - redi��te of a prC1posi tion E o r 0. Violation of th:s ru!e is the faliacy of ill:"cit process of the

Illum ination : Source o f contempl ation ; trans­ figuntion of emotional life for the attainment of measure and ha rmony ( Schleiermacher ). -L. r.

Illusion : ( Lat. in + ludere, to p lay) An i llusion

of sense is an erron eous perception a rising from a mi•interp retation of d ata of sense because they a re p rnduced under unusual condi tions of per­ ception, physical, physi ological or psychological. Illusion contrasts with ha llucination i n which the sensuous ininedients are totally absent. See Delusion ; H allucinatio-i.-L. lV. I l l u sionism : The view that the spatial-temporal external world is merely a veil of m a d , a pha nta smagoria. !I< ot only is everything i llusion, deception, appearance, but exi stence itself has n o real v a lue. ( Schopenhauer. )-H.H. Image : ( Lat. i mago, likeness) A sensory qual ity reinstated by the m i n d in the absence of sensory stimulation.-L. W. Medieval : Image and Similitude are frequent­ ly used by the medieval scholars. Neither of them needs mean copy. Sometimes the terms are nearly synonymous with sign in general. The alteration of the sense o rga n s when affected by some external obj ect is an image of the latter (species sensibilis) ; so is the memory image or phantasm. The intelligible s pecies resulting from the operation of the active intellect on the phantasm is not less an image of the universal natu re th an the c oncept and the word exp ressing the la tter is. Im ages i n the strict sense of copies or pictures are only a particular case of image o r

141

similitude in general. T h e idea that Scholasticism believed th at the mind contains literally "copies" of the obj ective world is mistaken interpretation due to m i sundersta nding of the terms.-R.A . Im ageless Thought : Concep tual meani ngs not embod ied in sensuous ima gery. The existence of imageless thought was a subj ect of controversy among American and German psych ologists about 1 9 1 0 ; i mageless thought was affirmed by Kiil pe, and B iihler, but was rejected by Tit­ chener.-L. lV. I m agination : I magination designates a mental p rocess consisting of: (a) The revival of sense images derived from earlier perceptions (the reproductive imagination), and (b) the com­ bin ation of these elementary im ages in to new uni ties (the c reative or productive imagination . ) T h e c reative i magination i s of t w o kinds : ( a ) t h e fa ncy which i s relati vely spontaneous a n d uncontrol led, and (b) t h e constructive imagina­ tion, exemplified i n science, i nvention and rhi­ losorhy " h ich is controlled by a dominant plan or purpose.-L. lV. Imitation : In aesthetics, the general theory th at a rtistic c reation is primari ly an imitative or revelatory p rocess, and the work of a rt an imitation o r representation. Such theories- hold that the a rtist discovers, and in his work imi­ tates, real Forms, and not physical objec ts ; art is conceivr.d as a revelation of 11 spiritual rea lm, and so as the exhibition of the essential character of the partic ular obj ect represented. The work of art reveals adequately the essence which the rhys ical thing manifests inadequately. In modern expressionistic theory, imi tation is conceived a s servile reproduction of obvious ex­ ternal qualities, a mere copying of a pa rticu l a r, and so is denounced.-/.J. Immanence : (late Lat. lmmanere, to rema in i n ) The state of being imm anent, present, or in dwelling. I. In Medieval Sch olasticism a ca use is imma nent whose effects are exclusively within the agent, as opposed to transient. 2. For Kant the immanent i s experiential a s opposed to non­ experiential or transcendent. 3. I n modern metaphysics and theology immanence signifies p resence (of essence, being, power, etc.), a s op­ posed to absence. According to pantheism the essence of God or th Absolute i s completely immanent in the world, i.e. is identical with i t. Acc ording to Deism God is essentially absent or transcendent from the world. According to im­ manent theism He is both i mmanent (in pres­ ence and activity) and transcendent (in essenc e ) with respect to it. .:\1ysticism in i t s broadest sense posits the mutual i mmanence of the human and the divi ne.-W.L. Imma nence phi losophy : I n Germany an ideal­ istic type of philosophy represented by \Vilhelm Schuppe ( 1 8 3 6- 1 9 1 3 ) , which combines elements of British empi ricism, Kant, and Fichte. It re­ j ects any non-conscious thing-i n-itself, and iden­ tifies the Real with conscious ness considered as a n i nseparable union of the "I" and its obj ects. The categories a re restricted to i dentity-differ­ ence and causal ity. To the extent th at the con­ tent of fi nite consciousness is common to all or

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DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

"trans-subjective" 1t 1s positeri as the object of a Wo rld Consciousness or Bewusstsein Ueber­ haupt. Consequently the World is "immanent" in each finite consciousness rather than essen­ tially transcendent.-W.L. Immanent and Transient Activity : In logic, the activity of the mind which produces n o effect upon the object of knowledge is called imma­ nen t ; that which does have such a n effect is c alled transient (or transitive ) . According to Kant, the immanent use of the understanding is val id, since it deals only with subject-matter furn ished by the senses ; while the transcendent effort to conceive of things as they are in them­ sel ves is illegitimate. In Christian theology, Jesus was created by an immanent act, and the world by a transient act.-J.K.F. Immanent Th eism : Doctrine that God is both immanent and transcendent with respect to the World. Thi s view differs from Pantheism (q.v.) by denying th at God's essence is identical with that of the World.-W.L. Im materialism : Doctrine of the non-existence of material or ·orporeal reality. Pu re I dealism. -W.L. Immateriality : tSchol astic) Immaterial substances are the human soul and the subsistent forms, th� angels. The rational faculties of the human soul, intel lect and will are ca lled imm aterial a � d believed to need no bodily organ for their performances, although they depend on the senses for their activi ties. Their immaterial ity is proved by their ca pacity of becoming cog­ nizant of the univf'rsals and of reflection on their own performances.-R.A. Immediacy : (Lat. in + medi us, middle) Im­ mediacy is used in two senses : ( a ) Contrasted with representation, immediacy is the direct presence to the mind of the object of knowledge. See Presentational immediac)'. (b) Contrasted with mediation, immedi acy consists in the absence or mi nimal and sub­ merged presence of inference, interpretation and .. construction in any process of knowledge. In this sense perception and memory a re relatively immed iate whereas scientific and philosophical theories are mediate.-L. W. Immediate inference : See Logic, formal, § 4. lmmoralism : M oral ind ifference ; in general the combating of traditional morality. (Nietzsche.)

-H.H.

Immortality : ( Lat. i n + mortalis, mortal ) The

doctrine that the soul or personality of man survi ves the death of the body. The two prin­ cipal conceptions of immortal ity a re : (a) tem­ poral immortality, the indefinite continuation of the individual mind after death and (b) eter­ nity, ascen sion of the soul to a higher plane of timelessness. Immortal ity is properly speaking restricted to post-eidstence (survival after death ) but is ex­ tended by the theory o f transmigration of souls. (See Metempsychosis) to include pre-existence (life before birth ) . The arguments f o r immorta lity fall into four groups : ( a ) Metaphysical arguments which attempt

to deduce immortal ity from properties of the soul such as simplicity, independence of the body, its knowledge of eternal truth, etc. (b) Valuational and moral arguments seek to derive the immortality of the soul from its supreme worth or as a presupposition of its moral nature. ( c ) Empirical arguments which adduce as evidence of immortality, automatic writi ng, mediumship and other spiritualistic phenomena. -L.W.

I mmutability : Changelessness, or the state or

quality of not being susceptible to a ny altera­ tion. An a ttribute of God denoting that His na ture is essentia lly inc apable of any i nternal ch ange whatsoever.-J.J.R. lmpersonalism : The mechanistic conception of the unconditional regula rity of nature in me­ cha nics, physics, and the sciences of the living organism. Opposite of Personalism.-R.T.F. Implication : See Logic, formal, §§ 1 , 3 ; Strict

implication.

Importation : The form of valid inference of the

proposition al calculus from A ::::> [B ::::> C] to AB ::::> C. The law of importation is the theo­ rem of the propositiona l calculus : A. C. [p ::::> (q ::::> r ] ] ::::> [ pq ::::> r]. Imposition : In Scholastic logic, grammatical terms such as noun, pronoun, verb, tense, con­ iugation were classed a s terms of second im­ position, other terms as of first imposition. The latter were subdivided into terms of first and second intention (q. v.).-A.C. Im predicative defi nition : Poinca rc, in a pro­ posed resolution ( 1 90 6 ) of the paradoxes of Burali-Forti and Richard (see Paradoxes, logi­ cal ) , introduced the principle that, in making a definition of a particular member of a ny class, no reference should be al lowed to the totality of members of that class. Definitions in viola­ tion of this principle were called impredicative (non prUicatives) and were held to involve a vicious circle. The prohibit ion against impredicative defini­ tion was incorporated by Russel l into his rami­ fied theory of types ( 1 90 8 ) and is now usually identified with the restriction to th e ramified theory of types without the axiom of reducibil­ ity. (Poincare, however, never made his prin­ ciple exact and may have intended, vaguely, a less severe restriction than this-as indeed some passages in later writings would indicate.) A. C. H. Poincar�. Les mathlmatiqueJ et la lo 1J iq11e, Revue de M�taphysique et de Morale, vol. 14 ( 1 906 ) , po. �94 · 3 1 7 . R . Carnap, The Logical Symax of Language, New York and London, 1 937. Impression : Act or process of affecting ; effect or influence of such, especi ally psychological ; im­ mediate or momentary effect ; stimulation of neural processes apart from its effect ; immediate effect in consciousness of neural stimulation ; immediate, uninterpreted datum of consciousness, especially of aesthetic objects ; sensuous image ; relatively vivid perceptu al datum as against a fainter idea. Sf'e Hume.-M. T.K. I mpressionism : As a genera l a rtistic movement, the thrMv that art should strive only to reveal

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

the felt quality of an object, 1cene, or event; i.e. the total effect that it creates in the artist. Specifically in painting, the general idea under­ lying practice i1 to render the immediate visual appearance of the object, independently of it1 phy1ical structure and it1 meaning for the mind. Empha1i1 i1 placed on capturing ephemeral 1ur­ face a1pects of thing• ae di1do1ed by changes i n light, neglecting any 1uppo1ed real thing which undergoe1 the1e change1 and underlies these aspect1.-/.J. In and f or itsel f : (Ger. an und fur 1ich) An sich i1 the given primary, latent, undeveloped im­ mediacy. The bare intrinsic and inherent euence of an obj ect. Fur sich i1 a greater, developed intensity of immediacy; an objed genuinely in­ dependent either of con1ciousneu or of other thing• ; 1omething for itself. In and for itself belongs to the Absolute alone. Ita auerted in­ dependence i1 the developed result of its nature and ae a 1yatem of internal relation• it i1 inde­ pendent of external relationa.-H.H. Incomplete sym b ol : A symbol (or expre11ion) which ha1 no meaning in isolation but which may occur a1 a constituent part in, and con­ tribute to the meaning of, an expreuion which does have a meaning. Thua-ae ordinarily em­ ployed-a terminal parenthe1i1 ) i1 an incom­ plete 1ymb�l ; likewise the letter A which ap­ pean in the notation for functional 11hstraction (q. v. ) ; etc. An expreuion A introduced by contextual defi­ nition-i.e., by a definition which conatruea particular kinda of e:cpre11ion1 containing A, as abbreviation• or 1ub1titute1 for certain expres1ion1 not containing A, but provides no such construction for A itself-is an incomplete sym­ bol in this sense. In Principi11 Mathematica, notations for claues, and description• (more correctly, notations which serve some of the purposes that would be served by notations for clasaea and by description•) are introduced in this way by contextual definition. A. C. Whitehead and Russell , Prindy, or after the destruc­ tion o f the body. (Broad. )-H.H. Instrumental value : See Value, Instrumental. Integra l : A whole composed of parts. Belonging to a whole as one of its parts. Anything com­ posed of distinguishable parts. Complete, un­ touched. In mathematics, related to integers ; the result of integration.-1.K.F. Integrat ion : ( La t. integrare, to m a k e w ho l e } The act of making a whole out of parts. In mathe­ matics, a limiting process which �ay be de­ scribed in v ague terms as summing up an infinite number of infinitesimals, part of the calculus. In psychology, the combination of psycho-physical elements into a complex unified organization. In cosmology, the synthetic philos­ ophy of Spencer holds that the evolutionary process is marked by two movements : integra­ tion and differentiation. Integration consists in the development o f more and more complex organizations. Inverse of: differentiation (q.v.). -1.K.F. Intellect : ( Lat. intellectus from intellegere, to understand) The cognitive faculty of the mind as it operates at higher abstract and conceptual levels.-L. W. St. Augustine distinguished the intellect from reason ; aliud est intellectus, aliud ratio. Intellection would be impossible without reason : lntelligere non valemus, nisi rationem kaheamus. The intellect is the soul itsel f : Non enim aliquid aliud est quam anima, sed aliquid animae est intellectus. It rules the soul : ln­ tellectus animam regit, ad ipsam animam perti­ nens. Sometimes the intellectus is called intelli­ gentia. Both the intellect and reason are in nate in the mind ; me7's cui ratio et intelligentia naturaliter ine st. Reason seeks knowledge or science, scientia, while the intel lect, which is higher, aims at wisdom, sapientia, or the con­ templation of eternal things, and especially God. -1.J.R. Whence, in the typical Schol:istic or me­ dieval notion, intellect is an immaterial faculty of the soul, that is, its operations are performed without a bodily organ, though they depend on the body and its senses for the material from which they receive rheir first impulse. Nothing iB in the Intellect that has not been p revious l y in the senses. The impressions received by the external senses are synthesized by the internal sensus communis which forms an image or phantasm ; the phantasm is presented to the

147

intellect by imagination, memory and the vis cogitativa co-operating. The internal 1enac1 are conceived as being bound to organic function• of the brain. The intellect operates in a two­ fold manner, but is only one. As active intellect (intellectus agens) it "illum i n ate• " the phan­ tasm, dise� gaging there from the universal na· tu re ; as p a ui vc int ell ect (int. possihilis) it i1 informed by the result of this ab1tractivc opera­ tion and develops the concept. Conccpta are united into j udgments by c ombin a ti o n and divi­ sion (assertion and n eg a tion ). Judgm en ts are related to each other i n sy ll ogi s tic reasoning or by the abbreviated form of enthymeme. Aquinas denies to the intellect the capacity o { becoming aware of particulars in any direct way. Th e in­ tellect knows of them ( e.g. when asserting : Socrates is a man ) only i n d i rectl y by reflecting on its own operations and finally on · the phan­ tasm which served as starting point. Proposi­ tions, however, have no d i rectly corresponding phantasm. Later Scholastics credit the intellect with a direct knowledge of pa rtic u l ars (Suarez) . See Abstraction, Faculty.-R.A. Intellectual i sm : ( aesthetics) a. The " I nte l lectu al Principle" is supreme beauty (Plotinus). b. "Intel lectual Intuition" t urned objective i1 esthetic intuition (Schclling).-L.V. Intellectual v i rtues : Sec Dianoetic virtues. Intell i gence : (Lat. int�lligentia, from intellegere, to understand) The capacity of the mind to meet effectively-through the employment of memory, imagination and conceptual thinking­ the practical and theoreti ca l problems with which it is confronted. I n tell igence is more i nc l u si ve than intellect" which is p ri m arily conceptual. See Intellect. In Dewey (q.v . ) 1 intelligence is the basic instrument, to be contrasted with fixed habit, traditional customs, and the sheer force of political or bureaucratic power as means of settling social issues.-L. W. Intell igence, creati ve : A te rm denoting the presence of se l f-co n sci ous ness, sel f-d i recti on a p d purpose in the creative processes of the world. Syn. in Personalism for God, elan vital, b ut in naturalism of Dewey, divorced from such association.-R. T.F. Intelligib le : ( I ) U nde rstan dabl e 1 com p reh en si ­ ble ; knowable ; meaningful ; (2) Orderly; logi­ cal ; coheren t ; rational ; ( 3) Communicable; e x­ pressible ; (4) Having unity of principle ; cap­ able of complete rational explanation or under­ s tand in g ; cap a bl e of causal explanation 1 ( 5 ) Clear t o natural o r pure reason ; apprehensible by the intellect (q.v.) only as against appre­ hensible through the senses; conceptual aa agai nst perceptual ; c oncep tual l y describable or explainable ; ( 6 ) Capable of being known syn­ optically or as it is in i tse lf or in euence ; capable of being known through itself aa against by agency of so m ethi ng else ; graspable by i n ­ tuition ; self-explanatory) ( 7) Capable of beinr appreciated or sympathized with ; (8) Super­ sensibl e ; of the nature of m i n d, reason, or their higher powers.-M. T .K. Intensi on an d extensi on : The i•le111ion of a

1 48

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

conce pt consists of the qualities or p roperties which go to make up the concept. Th e exten­ sion of a concept consists of the thi ngs which fa l l under the concept ; or, accord ing to another definition, the extension of a concept consists of the concepts which are subsumed under it ( determine subclasses ) . This is the old distinc­ tion between in tension and extension, and co­ incides approxim ately with the distinction be­ tween a monadic propositional function (q. v.) in intension and a class (q. v . ) . The words intension and extension are a lso used in connec­ tion with a num ber of distinctions related or analogous to this one, the adj �ctive extensional being appl ied to notions or points of view which in some respect confine attention to truth-val ues of propositions as opposed to meanings consti­ tuting propositions. In the case of (i nterpreted) calculi of propositions or p roposi tional functions, the adj ective intensional may mean that account is taken of moda lity, extensional that all func­ tions of propositions which appear a re truth­ functions. The extreme of the extensional point · of view does away with propositions altogether and retains only truth-values in their place.

A. C.

The Po rt-Royal Logic, translated by T. S. Baynes (see Introduction hy the translator). Lewis and Langford, SJmbolic Logic, New York and London, 1 9 3 2 . R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, New York and London, 1 9 3 7 . Intensive quantity : Any quantity which is such that there exists no known physical process of addition by which a greater quantity of the kind in question cou ld be produced from a lesser quantity ; opposed to extensive qua ntity (q.v. ). -A.C.B. Intent : ( Lat. intensus, pp. o f intendere, to stretch)

The act of directing the mind towards an ob­ ject. See Intentionality.-L. W. Intention : In Scholastic logic, first intentions­ were properties or c l asses of, · a nd relations !-�­ tween, concrete thin gs. Second in tentions were properties or classes of, and relations between, fi rst intentions. This suggests the begin ning of a simple hi er­ archy of types (see Logic, formal, § 6 ) , but actu­ ally is not so, because no "third intentions" were separated out or distinguished from second. Thus the general concept of class is a second i ntention, altho'.lgh some pa rticular cl asses may al so be second intenti ons. Thomas Aquinas (q. v. ) defined logic as the science of second intentions appl ied to fi rst in­ tenti ons. A. C. Intentional ism : Theory of mind and k nowledge which considers intentiona lity a distinctive if not the defining characteristic of mind and the basis for mind's' cognitive and conative func­ tions. See Intentional Theory of Mind.-L.W. Intentionality : ( Lat. intentio, from intendere, to stretch) The property of consciousne9s whereby it refers to or intends an object. The inten­ tional object is not necessarily a real or existent thing but is merely that which the mental act is ahout. Intentiona lity is the modern equivalent of the Scholastic intentio.-L.W.

( Ger. lntentionalitat) ln H usserl : ! . (broadest sense ) The character o f anything as "i ntend ing" or pointing beyond itse l f ; self-transcendence. 2. (most frequent sense) The character of consciousness as pointing beyond itself, as consciousness of something, and as having its horizon of co-intendings : noetic in­ tentionality. 3 . The cha racter of an object other thanconsciousness itself as pointing beyond itself, e.g., to its objective background or to something that it represents or in dicates : ohjective inten­ tionality. 4. The character of a modality as pointing back to the original of which it is intrinsically a modi fication. See phenomenology.

-D.C. Intentionally : (in Schola sticism) Same as men­ tal ly.-H.G.

Intentional Theory of Mind : The definition of mind in terms of intentional ity (See Intention­ ality) which origi nated in the Scholastic doc­ trine of intentio, was rev ived by F. B rentano (Psychologie vom empirischen Jtandpunkte, 1 8 74) though his influence has become a char­ acteristic theory of German phenomenol ogy. See

Phenomenology.-L. W. lnteract ionism : See Interaction Theory. Interaction Theory : ( Lat. inter + actio, action)

A dual istic theory of the body-mind relation, ad vanced by Descartes ( 1 596- 1 650), which as­ serts a two directional causal influence between mind and body. See Mind-Body Relation.

-L.W. Interest : ( Lat. interest, it concerns, 3rd pen.

sing. of interesse, to J>e between) The char­ acteristic attitude of the mind toward any object which attracts and absorbs its attention. See

Attention.-L.W. Interna l : Inside a th ing (or person ) .

Of the thing itself. The rel ation of part to whole or of whole to part. ( a ) In logic : compare inten­ sion. (b) In metaphysics : the doctrine of in­ ternal relations, that all relations are i nternal, that is, monism. (c) In epistemology: subjective. Opposite of external.-1.K.F. Interoceptor : See Receptor. lntersubj ective : Used and understood by, or valid for different subjects. Especial ly, i. lan­ guage, i. concepts, i. knowledge, i. confirmabil­ ity ( see Verificatio n) . The i. character of science is especially emphasized by Scientiiic Empiri­ cism (q. v., I C) .-R.C. lntersubjective cognition : See lntersuhjective

Intercourse. Intersubjective intercourse : ( Lat. inter + sub­ iectus) Knowledge by one subj,.ct of an�ther subject or the other's conscious states. (See J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, pp. 1 64-70 ). -

L . W.

Intra-ordinal Laws : Connecting properties of

ag­

gregates of the same order. Laws connecting the characteristics o f l iv ing orga nisms. ( Broad.) -H.H. Intrinsic : ( Lat. inter, between + aecua, beside) Having internal val ue. Value in the relation of parts to whol e.-1.K.F. Intrin sic goodness : The property of being good in itsel f or good as an end (and not as a

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

means merely) or desirable for its own sake. Sometimes identi fied with the property of bei ng desi red for its own sake. According to G. E. Moore a th ing is i n tri n sically good i f i t would be good even i f i t existed quite alo ne.-W.K.F. Introcept i on : (in Personalism ) The coalescence of the world of obj ective values with his own substance by which a person attains rea lity. -R . T.F. Introj ection : (Lat. i n tro. w i thin + j acere, to th row) I n Epistemol ogy, theory of the knowl­ edge process, that obj ects of knowl edge are rep­ resented i n consciousness by images. A name given by R. Avenarius ( 1 843- 1 8 96) to the doctrine of perception which he rejected. The doc tri ne of represen tative perception. In psy­ chology, the asc ription to material objects d some of the properties of life. M ore spec i fic:i l h, in psycho-analysis, the act of absorbing other personalities into one's own, of assuming th:it extern al events a re i ntern al. Opposite cf: pro­ j ection.-1.K.F. Epistemological theory of Descartes, Locke, Berkelev0 that the individual mind is confi ned to the c i rcle of its i deas, and that it cognizes an external world a n d other mind! only by an o utward proj ection of i ts i n ner representa­ tions. The term was employed by Aven a rius, (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1 8 8 8 ) v. h o criti­ ci zed the theory a n d proposed as an alternative h is own theory of pure experience which em­ phasizes the essential solidar:ty between knowing subj ect and object known a n d has been intro­ duced i nto Engl ish philosophy by Ward, Stout and othe rs.-L. W. I ntrospection : ( Lat. i n tro, w i th i n + spicere, to look ) Observation di rected upon the self or i ts mental states and operations. The term is the modern equivalent of "reflection" and "inner sense" as employed by Locke and Kant. Two types of in trospecticn may be d istinguished : ( a ) t h e d i rect scrutiny of conscious states a n d processes at the time of their occurrence ( See Inspectio n ) , and ( b) the recovery of past states and processes by a retrospective act.-L. lV. lntrosp�ctionism : The st:indpoint in psvchology which a d vocates the employment of the i ntro­ spective method.-L. W. I nt rospect i ve :\Ic:thod : The method in ps�·chol­ ogy, \• hich, in opposition to the obj ective method of Beha,•iorism ( Sec 8eh.J'1.'i orism) �elies l a r.;d�· upon intn,spective ohsnv:ition. See ln tr o spe c­ tion.-L. W.

A term gener a ! i .• �mpJo,·cd by � r i r. o >Z 1 in a m o re tech nical st::is..: th.1 ;1 that founJ in tht" Cartesi.in phil osophy ( sec J.:.=·g. ,z.{ [hr. I ng., I I I ) . It is pri mar! lv u�ed ry S p i n ,na ;n C•'n­ nection with "scicnti.:. z ri!11iti�·a" or knowled�e "of the thi rd kind" (Ethica, r r . +O, S,hol. 2 ) . I n tuition d this sort is absolutely cata:r. a :i J infalli:-- k ; i n cont rast to reason ( r.uio, q.\· . ) , i t p roduces t h e h ighest peace and v i rtue of the mind ( l!uJ, \', 25 and 2 7 ) . Also, as over against ratio, i t \'ields a n adequate knowleJ,.-e of the essenc� of things, and thus enables us to knnw and lo\'e God, th rough v. h ich knO\' : ... ,J q" to mean ccif p then q,'' or "not both p and not-q'') , the sign = to denote the biconditional ("P = " to mean "P if a n d only if q," or cceither q p and q or not-p and not-q"), and the sign to " denote alternative denial q" and up = q" are sometimes read as " P impliel q" and " fl is equivalent to q" respectively. Theae readings must, however, be used with caution, since the terms implication and equivalence are often used in a 1en1e which involve• some re­ lationship between the logical forms of the propositions ( or the 1entence1} which tliey con· nect, whereas the validity of p => q and of p =: q requires no such relationship. The conn.cc-

I

I

DJCTJONA/ff OF PHILOSOPHY

tive ::i i s also said to stand for "material im­ plication," distingu ished from formal implica­ tion (§ 3 below) and strict implication (q. v . ) . Simil arly the con nective = is said t o stand for "material equivalence." It is possible in various ways to define some of the sentential connectives named above in terms of others. In particular, if the sign of alternative denial is taken as primitive, all the other connectives can be defined in terms of this one. Also, i f the signs of negation and inclusive disj u nction a re taken as primitive, a l l the others c a n be defined in terms of these ; likewise if the signs of negation and conj unc­ tion are taken as prim itive. Here, however, for reasons of naturalness and symmetry, we prefer to take as primitive the three connectives, de­ noting negation, con j u nction, and inclusive dis­ j u nction. The remaining ones are then defined as follows : A I B -+ ,_,A v ,._,B. A ::i B -+ ,_,A v B. A := R -+ [B ::i AJ [A ::i B ] . A + B � [ - B ] A v [-A ] B. The capital roman letters here denote arbitrary formulas of the proposi tional calculus (in the technical sense defined below) and the arrow is to be read "sta nds for" or "is an abbreviation for." Suppose that we have given · some specific list of propositiona l symbols, which may be infinite in number, and to which we shall refer as the fundamental propositional symbols. These are not necessarily single letters or characters, but may be expressions taken from any l anguage or system of notation ; they may denote particular propositions, or they may contain vari ables and denote ambiguously any proposition of a certain form or class. Certain restrictions are also nec­ essary upon the w:ry i n which the fundamental propositional symbols can contain square brackets [ ] ; for the present purpose i t will suffice to suppose that they do n ot contain square brackets a t all, although they m"ay contain parentheses or other kinds of brackets. We call formulas of the propositional calculus ( relative to the given list of fundamental propositional symbols) all the expressions determined by the four fol lowing rules : ( 1 ) all the fundamental propositional symbols are formulas ; (2) if A is a formula, ,_, [A] is a formula ; ( 3 ) if A and B are for­ mulas [A) [ B ] is a formul a ; (4) if A and B are formulas [A] v [B] is a formula. The formulas of the propositional calculus as thus defined will in general contain more brackets than are necessary for clarity or freedom from ambiguity ; in practice we omit superfluous brackets and regard the shortened expressions as abbreviations for the full formulas. It will be noted also that, if A and B a re formulas, we regard [ A ] I [ B ] , [ A ] ::i [ B ] , [A) = [ B ] , a n d [ A ] + [ B ) , n o t a s formulas, but a s ab­ brevia tions for certain formulas in accordance with the above given defin itions. In order to complete the setting up of the propositional calculus as a logistic system (q. v. ) it is necessary to state primitive formulas and primitive rules of inference. Of the many pos-

171

sible ways of doing this we select the foll owing. If A, B, C are· any formulas, each of the seven fol lowing formulas is a primitive formula : [A v A] ::i A. A ::i [B ::i A B ] . A :;, [A v BJ . AB ::i A. A B :;, B . [A v B] :;, [ Il v A ] . [ A ::i B J :;, ( [ C v A ] ::i [ C v BJ ] . (The complete l ist o f primitive formulas i s thus infinite, but there are j ust seven possible forms of primitive formulas as above.) There is one primitive rule of inference, as follows : Given A and A B to infer B. This is the inference known as modus ponens (see below,

§ 2).

The theorems o f the proposi tional calculus are the formulas which can be derived from the primitive formulas by a succession of applica­ tions of the primitive rule of inference. In other words, (a) the primitive formulas a re theorems, and (b) if A a n d A ::i B are theo­ rems then B is a theorem. An in ference from premisses A1, A2, • • • , A,. to a conclusion B is a valid inference of the propositional calculus if B becomes a theorem upon adding Ai, A2, • • • , An to the list of primitive formulas. In ' other words, ( a ) the inference from Ai, A2, • . . , A,. to B is a valid inference if B is either a primitive form ula or one of the formulas A1, A1, • • • , A.., and (h) if the inference from A1, Aa, • • • , A,. to C and the inference from A1 Aa, • • . , A,. to C :::> B arc both valid infer­ ences then the inference from A1, A2, • • • , A,. to B is a valid inference. It can be proved that the inference from Ai, A:i, • • • , A,. to B is a valid inference of the propositional calculus if ( obviously) , and only if (the deduction theo­ rem), [A1 :::> [A1 :J .• • • [A,. :::> BJ • . • ] ] is a theorem of the p ropositional calculus. The reader should distinguish between theo­ rems about the proposi tional calculus-the de­ duction theorem, the principles of duality (be­ low), etc.-and theorems of the proposi tional calculus i n the sense j ust defined. It is con­ venient to use such words as theorem, premiss, conclusion both for propositions ( i n whatever l anguage expressed) and for formulas represent­ ing propositions i n some fixed system or calculus. In the forfgoing the list of fundamental propositional symbols has been left unspecified. A case of special importance is the case that the fundamental propositional symbols are an infin ite l ist of variables, p, q, r, • . • , which may be taken as representing ambiguously any propo1i­ tion whatev er-or any proposition of a certai n class fi x e d in adv ance (the class should b e closed under t h e operations o f negation, con­ j unction, and incl usive disjunction ) . In this case we speak of the pure propositional calculus, and refer to the other cases as applied proposi­ tional calculus ( although the application may be to something as abstract in character a1 the pure propositional ca lculus itself, as, e.g., in the case of the pure functional calculus of first order ( § 3 ) , which contains an appl ied propositional calculus ). In formulating the pure propositional ca lculus the primitive formulas m ay (if desi red ) be re-

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DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

duced to a finite number, e.g., to the seven listed above with A, B, C taken to be the particular variables p, q, ,.. A second primitive rule of inference, the f'ule of substitution, is then re­ quired, allowing the inference from a fo rmula A to the formula obtained from A by substitut­ ing a formula B for a particu lar variable in A (the same formula B must be substituted for all occurrences of that variable in A). The defini­ tion of a theorem is then given in the same way as before, allowing for the additional primi­ tive rule ; the defin ition of a valid in ference must, however, be modified. In what follows {to the end of § 1) we shall, for convenience of statement, confine attention to the case of the pure propositional calculus. Similar statements hold, with minor modifica­ tions, for the general case. The formulation which we have given pro­ vides a means of proving theorems of the propositional calculus, the proof consisting of an explicit finite sequence of formulas, the last of which is the theorem proved, and each of ,, hich is either a primitive formula or inferable from preceding formulas by a single application of the rule of inference (or one of the rules of inference, i f the alternative formulation of the pure propositional calculus employing the rule of substitution is adopted ) . The test whether a given finite sequence of formulas is a proof of the last formula of the sequence is effective­ we have the means of always determining of a given formula whether it is a primitive for­ mula, a nd the means of always determining of a given formula whether it is inferable from a given fin ite list of formulas by a single ap­ plication of modus ponens (or substitution). In­ deed our formulation would not be satisfactory otherwise. For in the contrary case a proof would not necessarily carry conv iction, the pro­ poser of a proof could fairly be asked to give a proof that it was a proof-i n short the formal analysis of wh"at constitutes a proof ( i n the sense of a cogent demonstration) would be incomplete. However, the test whether a given formula is a theorem, by the criterion that it is a theo­ rem if a p roof of it exists,· is not effective­ since failure to find a proof upon search might mean lack of ingenuity rather than non-existence of a proof. The problem to give an effective test by means of which it can always be deter­ mi ned whether a given formula is a theorem is the decision p,.oblem of the propositional cal­ culus. This problem can be solved either by the process of reduction of a formula to dis­ junctive normal form, or by the tf'uth-tabz,. decision pf'ocedure. 'Ve state the latter in detail. The three primitive connectives (and con­ sequently all connectives definable from them) denote tf'uth-functions - i.e., the lf'uth-flalue (truth or falsehood) of each of the propositions -p, pq, and p v q is uniquely determined by the truth-values of p and q. In fact, -P is true if p is false and false if p is true ; pq is true if 'P and q are both true, false otherwise ; p v q is false if "/> and q are both false, true otherwise.

Thus, given a formula of the (pure ) proposi­ tional calculus and an assignment of a truth­ value to each of the variables appearing, we can reckon out by a mechanical process the truth-value to be assigned to the entire formula. If, for all possible assignments of truth-values to the variables appeari ng, the calculated truth­ value corresponding to the entire formula is truth, the formula is said to be a tautology. The test whether a formula is a tautology is effective, since in any particular case the total number of different assignments of truth-values to the variables is finite, and the calculation of the truth-value corresponding to the entire for­ mula can be carried out separately for each possible assignment of truth-values to the vari­ ables. Now it is readily verified that all the primi­ tive formulas are tautologies, and that for the rule of modus ponens { and the rule of substitu­ tion) the oroperty holds that if the premisses of the inference are tautologies the conclusion must be a tautology. It follows that every theo� rem of the propositional calculus is a tautology. By a more difficult argument it can be shown also that every tautology is a theorem." Hence the test whether a formula is a tautology pro­ vides a solution of the decision problem of the propositional calcul us. As corollaries of th is we have proofs of the consistency of the propositional calculus (if A is anv formula, A and -A cannot both be tautologies and hence can not both be theorems) and of the completeness of the propositional calculus ( it can be shown that if any formula not already a theorem, and hence not a tau­ tology, is added to the l ist of primitive formulas, the calculus becomes inconsistent on the basis of the two rules, substitution · �nd modus ponens). As another corollary of this, or otherwise, we obtain also the following theorem about the propositional calculus : If A = B is a theorem, and D is the result of replacing a particular occurrence of A by B in the formula C, then the inference from C to D is a valid inference. The dual of a formula C of the propositional calculus is obtained by interchanging conj unc­ tion and disj unction throughout the formula, i.e., by replacing AB everywhere by A v B, and A v B by AB. Thus, e.g., the dual of the for­ mula - [ pq v -r] is the formula - [ [p v q] ....:,,.] . In forming the dual of a formula which is expreSlle d with the aid of the defined con­ tives, I, .� 1 :=, +, it is convenient to remem­ ber that the effect of interchanging conj unction and (inclusive) disju nction is to replace AIB by -A -B, to replace A � B by ,..,A B, and to interchange = and +· It can be shown that the following principles of duality hold in the propositional calculus (where A* and B* denote the duals of the formulas A and B respectively) : ( I ) if A is a theorem, then -A*· is a theorem ; ( 2 ) if A � B is a theorem, then B* � A* is a theorem ; ( 3 ) if A = B is a theorem, then A* = B* is a theorem. Special names have been given to certain

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

particular theorems and forms of valid inference of the p ropositional ca lculus. Besides § 2 fol­ lowing, see : absorption ; affirmation of the con­

sequent ; assution ; associarive law; commutative law; composition ; contradiction, law of ; De Morgan's laws; denial of the antecedent; dis­ triburive law; double negation, law of; excluded middle, law of ; exportation; Hauber's law; identity, law of; importation ; Peirce's law; proof by cases; reductio ad absurdum ; reflexivity ; tautology ; transitivity; transposition.

Names given to particu l a r theorems of the propositional calculus a re usually thought of as applying to l aws embodied i n the theorems rather th a n to the theorems as formulas ; hence, in particular, the same n ame is applied to theo­ rems differing only by al phabetical changes of the variables appearin g ; and frequently the name used for a theorem is used also for one or more forms of valid i n ference associated with the theorem. Similar rema rks apply to names given to pa rticular theorems of the functional calculus o f first order, etc. Whitehead and Russell, Principia M4thematica, 2nd edn . , vol . 1, Cambridge, Engfand, 1925. E. L. Post, Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions, American Journal of Mathematics, vol. 43 ( 1 92 1 ) . pp. 163-185. W. V. uine, Elementa

� '/. r 1 1 1Re�h;r���t?�u:0fa Ni'heo';;� �e �a .DJ�o�;��:,i�n: Warsaw, 1 930. Hilbert and Ackermann, Grund­ ziige der theoretischen Logik, 2nd ed n . , Berlin, 1938. Hilbert and Bernays, Grundlage n der .Mathematik, vol. 1, Berlin, 1934 ; also Supple­ ment Il l to vol. 2, Berlin, 1939. 2. H YPOTH ETICAL SYLLOGISM, DISJU NCTIVE SYLLOGISM, DILEMMA a re n ames traditiona lly

given to certain forms of inference, which m ay be identi fied as follows with certain p a rticul a r forms of v a l i d inference o f t h e p ropositional calculus (see § 1 ) . The hypothetical syl logism has two kinds o r moods. Modus ponens i s t h e inference from a major premiss A ::> B and a minor premiss A to the conclusion B. Modus tollens is the in­ ference from a maj or p remiss A ::> B and a minor premiss --B to the conclusion -A. The disj unctive syllogism has also two moods. Modus tollendo ponens is any one of the four following forms of inference : from A v B and ,_,B to A ; from A v B and - A t o B ; from A + B and -- B t o A ; from A + B and - A t o B. Modus ponendo tollens is either of the follow­ ing forms of i n ference : from A + B and A to --B ; from A + B and B to ,..., A . In each case the fi rst p remiss named is the major premiss and the second one the minor p remiss. Of the di lemma four kinds are disti nguished. The simple constructive di lemma has two maj or premisses A => C and n => C, minor premiss A v B, conclusion C. The simple destructive di lemma has two maj or premisses A ::> B and A ::> C, minor p remiss ,_, B v --c, conclusion -A. The complex constructive dilemma ha� two maj or premisses A ::> B and C ::> D, minor premiss A v C, conclusion •B v D. The complex destructive dilemma has two major

1 73

premisses A ::::i B and C ::> D, minor premiss ,..., B v -D, conclusion .-A v --c. ( Since the concl usion of a complex dilemma must i nvolve inclusive disj unction, i t seems that the tradi­ tional account is best rendered by employing inclusive disj unction throughout. ) The inferences from A ::> B and C => A to C ::> B, and from A ::> B and C ::> ,_, B to C ::> ,_,A are cal led pu re hypothetical syllo­ gisms, and the above simpler forms of the hypothetical syll ogism are then di stinguished as mixed hypothetical. Some recent w riters apply the names, modus ponens and modus tollens respectively, also to these two forms of the pure hypothetical syllogism. Other variations of usage o r ad ditional forms are also found. Some writers include under these heads forms of inference which belong to the functional cal­ culus of fi rst order rather than to the proposi­ tional calculus. F. Ueberweg, System der Logik, 4 t h ed n., Bonn, 1 874. H . W. Joseph, An Introduction lo Logic, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1916. R. M . Eaton, General Logic, New York, 1 931 . S. K . Langer, An 1nlroduction Jo SJmboJic Logic, 1937, Appen· dix- A.

B.

3. THE FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS OF FIRST ORDER is the next disci pline beyond the proposi­

tional calculus, according to the usual treatment. It is the fi rst step towards the hiera rchy of types ( § 6) and dea l s, in addition to unanalyzed p ropositions, with propositional functions (q. v . ) of t h e lowest o rder. I t employs the sentential connectives of § l, and i n addition the un iversal quantifier (q. v.), w ritten (X) where X is any individual variable, and the existential qua nti­ fier, written (EX) where X is any individual va riable. (The E denoting existen tial quantifi­ cation is more often written inverted, as by Peano and Whitehead-Russell, but we here a dopt the typogra phically more c onvenient usage, which also has sanction. ) For t h e interpretation of t h e calculus w e m u s t presuppose a certa in domain o f individuals. This may be any well-defined non-empty do­ main, within very wide limits. Di fferent possible choices of the domain of individuals lead to different interpretati ons o f the calculus. In order to set the calculus up fo rmally as a logistic system, we suppose that we ha\'e given four l ists of symbols, as follows : ( 1 ) an i � fin �te l is � 0�1 individua � variables x, >" z, t, . 1 x , y , z , t , x , • • • , which denote ambiguously any individual ; (2) a list of propositional va r i­ ables p, q, r, 1, p', • • • , representing ambiguously any proposition of a certain appropriate class ; ( 3 ) a list of functional variables F1, G1, H1, . . • , F2, G2, H2, . • . , Fs, Ga, Ha, • • . , a v a riable with subsc ript n representing ambiguously any n­ adic p ropositional function of individua ls ; ( 4 ) a list of functio n.� ! constants, which denote par. ticular p ropositional functions of individuals. Ther.e shall be a n effective notational criterion associating with each functional constant a positive integer n, the functional constant de­ noting an n-adic propositional function of in­ dividuals. One or more o f the li sts (2), ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) may b e empty, but n o t both ( 3 ) and (4)

174

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

sha ll be empty. The list ( I ) is required to be infinite, and the remaining lists may, some o r a l l of them, b e infinite. Fina l ly, no symbol shall be duplica ted either by appearing twice in the same list or by appearing in two different lists ; and no functional constant sh all contain braces [ ] (or either a left brace o r a right brace ) as a consti tuent part of the symbol. When (2) and ( 3 ) are complete-i.e., con­ tain all the variables i n d icated above (an in­ finite number of propositional variables and for each positive i n teger n a n infinite n umber of functional va riables with subscript n )-a nd ( 4) i s empty , we shall speak of the pure func­ tiona l calculus of fi rst order. When (2) and ( 3 ) are empty and ( 4 ) is not empty, we sha l l speak of a simple applied functional calculus of first order. Functional variables and functional constants are together ca lled functional .symbols ( the ad­ j ective functional being here understood to refer to propositional fun ctions ) . Fu nctional symbols are cal led n-adic if they a re either functional variables with subsc ript n or functional constants denoting n-ndic propositiona l functions o f indi­ vidu als. The formulas of the funct ional calculus of first order ( rel ative to the given l i sts of symbols ( ! ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , (4) ) are a l l the expres­ sions determined by the eight fol lowing rules : ( I ) a l l the p ropositional variables are formu las ; (2) if F is a mon adic func tional symbol and X is an in dividual variable, ( F ] ( X ) is a for;nula ; ( 3 ) if F is an n-adic functional symbol and X1, X2, . . • , Xn a re individual variables (which may or may not be all di ffere n t ) , ( F] (Xi, X2, . . . , Xn) is a form ula ; ( 4) if A is a formula, -f A ] is a formula ; ( 5 ) if A and B are for­ mulas, (A] [ B ] is a formula ; (6) if A and B a re formul as, [ A ] v [ B ] is a formula ; ( 7 ) i f A is a formula and X is an in dividual va riable, { X ) [A] is a formula ; ( 8 ) if A is a formu la and X i s an individual variable, {EX) ( A ] is a formula. J n practice, we omit superfluous brackets and braces {but not parentheses) in writing formu b s, :r nd we omit subscri pts on functional variables in cases where the subscript is sufficiently indicated by the form of the formula i n which the functional va riable ap­ pears. The sentential connectives I, ::::> , =:, +, a re i ntroduced as abbreviations in the same way as in § I for the propositional calculus. We make further the fol lowing defini tions, which are also to be const rued as abbrev iations, the a rrow being read "stands for" : (A ] :::> x [ B J -+ (X) [ [ A] ::::> [ B J ] . (A ] =:x [ BJ -+ (X ) [ (A ] =: [ B J ] . [ A ) A r. [ BJ -+ (EX) [ [A] ( B ] ] . ( Here A and B are any formulas, and X is any individual variable. Brackets may be omitted when superfluous. ) I f F and G denote monadic p ropositional functions, we say that F ( X ) ::::> x G ( X ) expresses formal implication of the func­ tion G by the function F, and F (X) = x G ( X ) expresses formal equivalence of t h e t w o func­ tions (the adj ective formal is perhaps not well chosen here but has become establ ished i n use ) . A sub-/ormula of a given formula is a con-

secutive constituent part of the g iven formula which is itsel f a formula. An occurrence o f an individual variable X in a formula is a hound occurrence o f X if it is an occurrence in a sub­ formula of either of the forms (X) (AJ or (EX ) [A ] . Any other occurrence of a vari able i n a formula is a free occurrence. We may thus speak of the hound variables and the free vari­ ables of a formula. (Whitehead and Russell fol lowing Peano, use the terms apparent vari� ables and real variables, respectively, i nstead o f hound variables and free variables.) l f A, B, C a re any formulas, each of the seven foll owing formulas is a primitive formula : [A v A] :::i A. A :::i [B ::::> AB ] . A :::i [ A v BJ . A B ::;) A. A B ::::> B. (A v B ] ::::> [ B v A ] . [A :::i B J => [ [ C v A] :::i ( C v B J ] . l f X i s any individual variable, a n d A is any formula not containing a free occurrence o f X and B is any formula, each of the two fol lowin formu las is a primitive formula : [ A => x B ] ::::> [ A => ( X ) B ] . [ B => x A ] ::::> [ (EX ) B => A ] . If X and Y are any individua l variables (the same or different ) , and A is any formula such that no free occurrence o f X in A is in a sub­ form ula of the form (Y) [ C] , and B is the formula resul ting from the substitution o f Y for a l l th.: free occurrences of X in A, each of the two following formulas is a p"rimitive for­ mul a : (X)A => B. B => (EX)A. There are two pnm1t1ve rules o f in ference : ( l ) Given A and A ::::> B to infer B { the rule o f modus ponens) . (2) Given A lo infer ( X )A, where X is any individual variable (the rule o f generalization). In applying the rule of gen­ eralization, we say that the variable X is



generalized upon. The theorems of the functional calculus of

first order are the fo rmulas which can be derived from the primitive fo rmulas by a succession of appl ications o f the primitive rules of inference. An i n ference from premisses Ai, A2, • • • , A,. to a conc lusion B is a valid inference of the func­ tional calculus o f first order i f B becomes a theorem upon adding Ai, A2, • • • , An to the list of primitive formulas and at the same time restricting the rule o f general ization by requir­ ing that the va riable generalized upon shall not be any one o f the free in d ividual variables of Ai, A2, • • . , An. It can be proved that the in­ ference from Ai, A2, . . • , An to B is a valid i n ference of the functional calculus o f first order if (obviousl y ) , and only i f (the ded.,ction theo­ rem), [A1 ::::> [ A2 ::::> • • • (An ::::> BJ • • • JJ is a theorem of the functional calculus of fi rst order. It can be proved that i f A = B is a theorem, and D is the resul t o f replacing a particular occurrence o f A by B in the formula C, then the in ference from C to D is a valid inference. The consistency o f the functional ca lculus of fi r•t order can also be proved without great difficulty. The dual of a formula is obtained by inter­ changing conj unction and { i nclusive) d isj unction

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY throughout and at the same time interchang ing universa l quanti fication and existential quanti fica­ tion throughout. { In doing this the different symbols, e.g., functional constants, al though they may consist of several characters in succession rather than a single cha racter, sha ll be treated as uni ts, and no change shall be made inside a symbol. A similar remark applies at all places where we speak of occurrences of a particu lar symbol or sequence of symbols in a formula, and the like.) It can be shown that the following principles of duality hold {where A• and B• denote the duals of the formulas A and B re­ spectively) : ( 1 ) if A is a theorem, then ,_A• is a theorem ; (2) if A => B is a theorem, then B• => A• is a theorem ; ( 3 ) if A = B is a theorem, then A• = B• is a theorem. A formula i s said to be in prenex normal form if all the quan.tifiers which it contains stand together at the beginning, unseparated by negations (or other sentential connectives ), and the scope of each quanti fier { i.e., the extent of the bracket [ ] following the quantitier) is to the end of the entire formula. In the case of a formula in prenex normal form, the succession of quantifiers at the beginning is called the prefix; the remaining portion contains no quanti­ fiers and is the matf'ix of the formula. It can be proved that for every formula A there is a for­ mula B in prenex normal form such that A = B is a theorem ; and B is then called a pre ;,ex

normal form of A. A formula bf the pure functional calculus of

first order which contains no free individual variables is said to be satisfiable i f it is possible to determine the underlying non-empty domain of individuals and to give mean ings to the proposition al and functional va riables contained -namely to each propositional variable a mean­ ing as a particular proposition and to each n­ ad ic function al variable a meaning as an n-adic propositional function of individuals (of the domain in question )-in such a way that ( under the accepted meanings of the sentential connec­ tives, the quantitiers, and application of £Unc­ tion to argument) the formula becomes true. The meaning of the last word, even for abstract, not excluding infinite, domai ns, must be pre­ supposed-a respect in which this definition differs sh arply from most others made in this article. It is not difficu lt to find examples of formulas A, containing no free individual variables, such that both A and ,_A are satisfiable. A simple example is the formula {x)F(x). More instruc­ tive is the following example, [ (x) {y) {e) [ [,...,, F (x, x) ] [F(x, y)F(y, s:) :l

F (x, z) ] ] ] [ (x) (Ey)F(x, y ) ] ,

which i s satiKfiable in an infinite domain of individuals but not in any finite domain-the negation ia aatistiable in any non-empty domain. It can be shown that all theorems A of the pure functional calculus of tirst order which contain no free individual va riables have the property that ,_A is not satistiable. H ence the pure functional calculus of tirst order is not complete in the strong sense in which the pure

1 75

propositional calculus is complete. Godel has shown that the pure functional calculus of tirst order is complete in the weaker sense that if a formula A contains no free individual vari­ ables and ,_A is not satistiable then A is a theorem. The decision problem of the pure functional ca lculus of tirst order has two forms ( I ) the so-called proof-theoretic decision problem, to tind an effective test ( d ecision procedure) by means of which it can always be determined whether a given fo rmula is a theorem ; ( 2 ) the so-called set-theoretic decision problem, to tind an effective test by means of which it can always be determined whether a given formula containing no free individual va riables is satis-­ tiable. It follows from Godel's completeness theorem that these two forms of the decision problem are equivalent : a solution of either would lead immediately to a solution of the other. Church has proved that the decision problem of the pure functional calculus of tirst order is unsolvable. Solutions exist, however, for sev­ eral important special cases. In particular a de­ cision procedure is known for the case of for­ mulas containing only monadic function va ri­ ables {this would seem to cover substantially everything considered in traditional formal logic prior to the introduction of the modern logic of relations ) . Finally w e mention a variant form o f the functional calculus of tirst order, the functional calculus of first order with equality, in which the list of fu nctional constants inclu des the dya­ dic functional constant = , denoting equality or identity of individuals. The notation [X] = [Y] is introduced as an abbreviation for ( = ] (X, Y), and primitive formulas are added as fo llows to the list already given : if X is any individual va riable, X = X is a primitive for­ mula ; if X and Y a re any individual variables, and B results from the substitution of Y for a particular free occurrence of X in A, which is not in a sub-fo rmula of A of the form (Y) [C], then [X = Y] => [A => B] is a primitive formula. We speak of the pure functional cal­ culus of first order with equality when the lists of propositional v a riables and functional va riables are complete and the only functional constant is =; we speak of a simple applied functi onal calculus of tirst order with equality when the li sts of propositional variables and functi onal vari ables are empty. The addition to the functional calculus of first order of individual constants (denoting particular individuals) is not often made-unless f:.mbols for functions from individuals to indi­ viduals (so-called "mathematical" or "descrip­ tive" functi ons) are to be added at the same time. Such an addition is, however, employed in the two following sections as a means of representing certain forms of inference of tradi­ tional logic. The addition is rea lly non-essen­ tial, and requires only minor changes in the definition of a formula and the list of primitive formulas {allowing the a lternative of individual

1 76

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

constants at certain places where the above given formulation calls for free individual v a riables ). Whitehead and Rum�ll. Principia Mathematica, 2nd edn . , vol. 1, Cambridge, England, 192 5. J . Herbrand, Recherches sur la Theoru d e la Demon­ K. Godel, Die Voll­ stration, Warsaw, 1930.

stu ndigkeit der Axiome des logischen Fu11ktionen­ kalku/J, Monatshefte fiir Mathematik und Physik,

vol . 37 ( 1930 ) , pp. 349-360. Hilbert and Acker· mann, Gru ndziige der theoretiJchen Logik, 2nd edn., Berlin, 1938. Hilbert aud Bernays, Grund­ /agen der Mathematik, vol . l, Berlin, 1934, and vol. 2, Berlin, 1939. 4. OPPOSITION, IMMEDIATE U: FERENCE. The four traditional kinds of categorical propositions -all S is P, no S is P, some S is P, some S is not P--customa rily designa ted by the letters A , E, I, 0 respectively-may convenien tly be represented in the functional calculus of first order ( § 3) by the four forms S ( x) P ( x), ::::i .,

S ( x) => ., .-P (x) , S (x) /\ e P (x) , S (x ) /\ /11 .-P (x), S and P being taken as functiona l con­

stants. ( For brevity, we shall use the notations S, P, S (x) =>., P (x), etc., alike for certai n formulas and f o r t h e propositional functions o r propositions expressed b y these formulas.) This representation does not reproduce faith­ fully all particulars of the traditional account. The fact is that the traditional doctri ne, having grown up from various sources and under an inadequate formal a nalysis, is not altogether coheren t or even self-consistent. \Ve here select what seems to be the best representation, and simply note the four following points of di­ vergence� ( l ) We have defined the connectives and h ., in terms of universal and existential quanti.fi cation, whereas the traditional account might be thought to be more closely reproduced if they were t.•'., P ( x ) ] and [ ( Ex) S (x) ] [S (x) => ., .-P (x) ] respectively. The question con­ cerning the choice between these two i nterpreta­ tions is known as the problem of existential import of propositions. We prefer to introduce (Ex ) S (x ) as a separate premiss at those places where it is required. ::::> ,,

Given a fixed subj ect S and a fixed predicate P, we have, according to the square of opposi­ tion, that A and 0 a re contradictory, E and I are c o nt radic to ry , A a n d E are contr ary, I and 0 a re rnbc o ntra ry , A and I a re s u balt ern , E and 0 are subaltern. The two propositions in a contradictory pair cannot be both true and can­ not be both false (one is the exact nega tion of the other). The two propositions in a subaltern pair are so related th at the first one, together with the premiss (Ex)S (x), implies the second (subalternation ) . Under the premiss (Ex) S ( x), the contrary pair, A , E, cannot be both true, and the subcontrary pair, I, O, cannot be both false. Simple conversion of a proposition, A, E, I, or O, consists in intercha nging S and P with­ out other change. Thus the converse of S (x) P ( x) is P (x) S (x), and the converse of S ( x) - P (x) is P (x) .-S (x). In mathematics the term converse is used primarily for the simple converse of a proposition A ; loosely also for any one o f a number of trans­ formations similar to this (e.g., F (x ) G (x) H (x) may be said to have the converse F (x) H ( x) G (x) ). Simple conversion of a � roposition is a valid in ference, in general, only Ill the case of E a n d /. Conversion per a c c ide n s of a proposition A , P ( x ) , yields P (x) /\ ,,, S ( x) . 1 .�., o f S (x) Obversion of a proposition A, E, I, or O con­ sist � in replacing P by a functional constant p which denotes the negation of the propositional function ( p roperty) denoted by P, and at the same time inserting - if not a l ready present or deleting it if presen t. Thus the obverse of S ( x) => ,, P (x) is S (x ) - p (x) (the obverse of "all men are mortal" is "no men are im­ mortal"). The obverse of S (x) - P (x) is p ( x ) ; the obverse of S (x) /\ ., P (x) � (x) is S (x ) /\ ., --p ( x ) ; the obverse of S (x) /\ .- P ( x ) is S (x ) /\ ., p ( x ). The name im m ediaie inference is given to certain inferences i nvolving propositions A , E, I: 0. These include obversion of A, E, I, or O, simple con version of E or I, conversion per a ccide n s of A, subalternation of A, E. The three l ast require the additional premiss (Ex )S (x ) . Other immed iate inferences (for which the terminology is not wholly uniform among different writers ) may be obtained by means of sequences of these : e.g., given that a l l men are mortal we may take the obverse of the converse of the obverse and so infer that all immo1 tals are non-men (cal led by some the contrapositive, by others the obverted contrapositive). The immediate inferences not involving ob­ \'ersion can be represented as valiu i n ferences in the• functional calculus of first order but obversion can be so represented onlv in a� ex­ tended calculus embracing functionai ab. .,

::::i .,

::::i .,

::::i .,

:::> �

::::> .,



::::i .,

=> ,,

::::i .,

::::> .,



Ax [ - P (x) ] .

F . Ueberweg, Sys/em der logik, 4th cdn ., Bonn, 18i4. H. W. B. Joseph, A n Introduction lo Logic, 2nd edn . , Oxford, 1916. R. M. Eaton, General Logic, New York, 193 1 . Bennett anJ

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPHY

New York, 1939. s . CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM is the name given to certain forms of valid inference ( of the functional calculus of first . order) which involve as premisses two ( formulas representing} cate­ gorical propositions, having a term in common -the middle term. Using S, M, P as minor term, middle term, and maj or term, respectively, -we give the traditional classification into figures and moods. In each case we give the maj or premiss first, the minor premiss immediately after it, and the conclusion last ; in some cases we give a third (existential) premiss which is suppressed in the traditional account. Because of the admission of singular propositions under the heads A, E, two different forms of valid inference appear in some cases under the same figure and mood-these singular forms are sepa­ rately listed. First Figure Barbara : M ( x) ::::> • P (x), S (x) ::::> • M (x), Baylis,

Formal Logic,

S (x) =>• P (x) .

Celarent : M (x) => • .- P (x), S (x) => • M (x), S (x)

::i

..

.-P (x ) .

Darii : M (x) :::> • P (x), S (x) It. • M (x), S (x) /\ . P (x) .

Ferio : M ( x) => ..,. .-P (x), S (x) /\ • M (x), S (x) /\ ,, .-P (x) .

Second Figure Cesare : P (x) :::> • .-M (x), S (x) ::::> • M (x), S (x) =>• .-P (x).

Camestres : P (x) :::> • M (x), S (x) :::> • .-M (x), S (x) :::> • .-P(x).

Festino : P (x)

::i ., .- M (x), S (x) It. • M (x) , S (x) It. • .-P (x) . Baroco : P (x) :::> • M (x ) , S (x) /\ • .-M (x) , S (x) fl • .-P(x).

Darapti : M (x)

Third Figure

::::> • P (x), M (x) ::::> • S (x), (Ex) M (x), S (x) It. • P (x). Disamis : M (x) It. • P ( x), M (x) ::::> • S (x), S (x) /\ • P (x) . Datisi : M (x) ::::> • P (x), M (x) /\ • S (x), S (x) /\ • P ( x) . Felapton : M (x) ::::> • .-P (x) , M (x) ::i . S (x } , (Ex)M (x), S ( x) /\ • .-P (x) . Bocardo : M (x) /\ • ,.....p (x), M (x) ::::> • S (x), S (x) /\ • .-P (x) . Feriso or Ferison : M (x) => ., .-P (x), M (x) /\ • S (x), S (x) It. • ,...., p (x).

Fourth Figure Bamalip or B ramantip : P (x) :::> • M (x), M (x) ::::> • S (x), (Ex) P ( x), S (x) /\ • P (x).

Calemes or Camenes : P (x) ::::> • M (x), M (x) ::::> • ,..., S (x), S (x) ::::> • ,..., p (x).

Dirnatis or Dimaria : P (x) A • M (x), M (x) ::::>

• S (x), S (x)

/\

• P (x).

Fesapo : P (x) ::::> • .-M (x), M (x) ::::> • S (x), ( Ex)M (x), S (x) /\ • ,..., p (x).

Fresison : P (x) ::::> • ,..., M (x), M (x) /\ • S (x), S (x) /\ • ,..., p (x) ,

Singular Forms in the First and Second Figures

Barbara : M ( x) => . P (x), M (A), P ( A ) . Celarent : M (x) :::> • .-P (x) , M (A), .-P(A). Cesare : P (x) ::::> • ,..., M (x), M ( A ) , ,..., p (A) . Camestres : P (x) ::i . M (x), ,..., M (A ) , ,..... p (A) .

1 77

T'1e five moods of the fourth figure are some­ times characterized instead as indirect moods of the first figure, the two premisses (major and minor) being interchanged, and the names be­ ing then given respectively as Baralipton, Ce­ lantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, frisesomorum. (Some add the five "weakened" moods, Barbari, Cela­ ront, Cesaro, Camestros, Calemos, to be obtained respectively from Barbara, Celarent, Cesare, Carnestres, Calemes, by subalternation of the conclusion.) Other variations in the names of the moods are also found. These names have a mnemonic significance, the first three vowels indicating whether the major premiss, minor premiss, and conclusion, in order, are A , E, I, or 0 ; and some of the consonants indicating the traditional reductions of the other moods to the four direct moods of the first figure: Tht Port-Ro yal Logic, translated by_ T. S. Baynes, 2nd edn. , London, 185 1 . F. Ueberweg, System der Logik., 4th edn., Bonn, 1 874. H. W. B. Joseph, A n Introduction 10 Logic, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1916. R. M. Eaton, General Logic, New York, 193 1 . H. B. Curry, A mathematical tret#· menl of the r11les of the syllo gism, Min d , vol. 4' ( 1 936 ) , _pp. 209-2 16, 4 16. Hilbert and Acker­ mann, Gr11ndzilgt der lhtorelischen Logik, 2nd edn., Berlin, 1938. Bennett and Baylis, Pormal Logic, New York, 1939. 6. THEORY OF TYPES. In the functional cal­ culus of first order, variables which appear aa arguments of propositional functions or which are bound by quantifiers must be variables which are restricted to a certain limited range, the domain of individuals. Thus there are certain kinda of propositions about propositional func­ tions which cannot be expressed in the calculus. The uncritical attempt to remove this restric­ tion, by introducing variables of unlimited range ( the range covering both non-functions and functions of whatever kind ) and modifying ac­ cordingly the definition of a formula and the lists of primitive formulas and primitive rules of inference, leads to a system which is formally inconsistent through the possibility of deriving in it certain of the logical parado xes ( q. v.). The functional calculus of first order may, how­ ever, be extended in another way, which in­ volves separating propositional functions into a certain array of categories (the hierarchy of types), excluding propositional functions which do not fall into one of these categories, and­ besides propositional and individual variables­ adrnitting only variables h aving a particular one of these categories as range. For convenience of statement, we confine at­ tention to the pure functional calculus of first order. The first step in the extension consists in introducing quantifiers such as (F1), (EF1), (F2), (EFa), etc., binding n-adic functional variables. Corresponding changes are made in the definition of a formula and in the lists of primitive formulas and primitive rules of. in­ ference, allowing for these new kinds of bound variables. The resulting system is the functional calculus of second order. Then the next step consists in introducing new kinds of functional variables ; namely for every finite ordered set k, l, m, p of i non-negative integers (i = • • •

,

178

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

1 , 2 , 3, . . . ) an i n finite t l "' • • • P, c t l m ables F

which tional

list of function a l vari­ • • • ', , each of

denotes ambiguously function

may be any

for

any i-adic

which

(k- 1 )-adic

the

fi rst

p roposi­

a rgument

propos itional function

of individuals, the second argume nt any

(l- 1 )­

a die

p ropositi o n a l ' function of i ndiv idua ls, etc. (if one of the integers k, l, m, . . . , p ia 1 the correspo n d i n g a rgument i s a proposition-if 0, an i n d i v i d ua l ) . Then quanti fiers are in troduced binding these new kinda of functional v a ri ables ;

and ao on. The procesa of alternately introducing new kinda o f functional vari ablea (denoting propositional functiona which take aa argumente propositional fu nctions of kinds for which vari­

ables have al ready been i n troduced) a n d quanti­ fiers binding the n e w kinds of functi onal va ri­ ables, with app ropriate extension a t each etage o f the definition o f a formula and the l i ata of primitive fo rmulas and primitive rules o f in­ ference, may be conti nued to i n fi n i ty. This leads to what we may c a l l the functional calculus of

o,.der- omega, embodying the (so-called simple) tlu o ry of typn In the functional c a l c u l i of second and higher orders, we may i ntroduce the definitions :

X

where

=

X

Y -+ ( F ) [F (X)

and

same type and

Y

F

::::i

F( Y) ] ,

are any two variable s o f the

is a monadic functional vari­

able of appropriate type. The notation

X

=

Y

may then be interpreted as denoting equal ity or identitt.

The functi onal

j uat

described)

calculus of order omega

can

be proved

{as

to be consiitent

by a straightforward genera l i zation o f the meth­

od

employed

by

H i l bert

and

Ackermann

to

prove the consistency of the functional calculus of first order.

For m a n y purposes, however, i t i s necessary to add to the function a l c a lculus of order omega the axi o m of infinity, requi ring the domain of individuals to be i n fi n i te.-This i s most con­

single additional primitive formula, which may be described by refe r r i n g to § 3 above, taking the fo rmula, which i s there g i v e n as an example of a for­ ven iently

done

by

adding

a

m u l a satisfiable i n a n i n fi n ite domain of indi­ v i duals but not i n any fi n ite domain, and pre­ fi x i n g the quantifier ( EF ) with scope extending to the end o f the formula. This form of the axio m

of

i n fi n ity,

however,

is

con siderably

stronger (in the absence of the a x i om of choice )

th an the " I n fi n a x " of Whitehead a n d Russe l l . Other primitive formulas

{ p ossibly i n v o l v i n g

n e w primitive n o t a t i o n s ) which m a y be a dded

correspond to the a x iom o f choice (q. v.) or are

designed to intr oduce clasu1 {q. v.) or de u r ip­

tions {q. v . ) Functional abstraction ( q. v . ) may be i ntroduced by means of additional primitive formulas or primitive rules of in­ ference, or i t may be defi ned with the a i d of descriptions. Whitehead and Russel l employ the a x i om of i n fi nitv and the a x i om of choice but avoid the necessity of spec ial primitive formulas i n connection with classes and descriptions by in troduc ing classes and descriptions as i n com­ plete symbo ls abo

With the aid of the ax iom o f infinity a n d a

method of dealing with classes and de11eriptiona,

the no n-negative integere may be introduced i n any one of v a rious ways {e.g., following and

Russel l ,

arithmetic

aa

fin ite

cardinal

Frege

numbe n ) ,

and

( e l ementary number theory) derived

forma l ly with i n

the system.

With the further

addition of the axiom of choice, analysia

( real

number theory) may be likewise derived.

No proof of con1iltency of the functional cal­

Cl'lus of order omega

(or even of lower order)

with the ax iom of i n fin i ty added is known, ex­ cept by methods invo l ving assumptiona so strong as to destroy any maj or significance.

According to an impo rta n t theorem o f Godel,

the functional calculus o f order omega with the axiom of i n fi n i ty added, i f conaistent, i a

plne

in

the

contai n i n g no

sense

tha t there · are

incom­ A

formulae

free va riables, auch that neither

A nor -A is a theorem.

The aame thing- hold1

of any logistic system obtained by adding new

pri mitive

form u l a 1

and

p rimitive

rulea

of

i n­

ference, provi ded only that the effective (recur·

aive)

character

o f th e

the ayatem ia retained.

formal

construction

of

Thus the system is not

only i ncomplete but, in the indicated aenee, in­

completable.

The same thing

holda a l ao o f a

l a rge variety of logistic systems which could be

considered as acceptable subatitutea for the func­ tional ca lculua of order omega with ax iom of i n fi n i ty ; in particular the Zermelo act theory ( 9 below) is in the aame aenae incomplete and incompl etable.

§

The form a l ization a a a logiatic ayatem of th e fu nctional calculus o f o r d e r o m e g a w i t h axiom of in finity leads, by a method which c a nnot

be

given

pl icate d )

here,

to

a

proposition

(defin ite of

but quite com­

arithmetic

which

is

equiv alent to--in a certa in aenae, exp reaae-the

consistency of the system.

Thia proposition .o f arithmetic can be repreaented within the ayatem

by

a

formula A containing

and the

completeness theorem can

the system a l though

no

free variables,

fo ll owing aecond form of Godel'a in­

its

then

be proved :

If

i s consistent, then the formula A, meaning

is

a

true proposition of

a r i th metic, is not a theorem of the syatem.

We

might, of course, add A to the system as a new

p rimitive formula-we would then have a new system, whose consistency would correspond to a new p roposition of arithmetic, represented by a new formula

B

( c ontaining no free variables ) ,

and we w o u l d s t i l l hav e in t h e n e w system, i f consistent, t h a t B was not a theorem . Whitehead and Russdl, Principia MAthtmatica, 3 vols . , Cambridge, England, 1st edn. 1 9 1 0· 1 3 , 2 n d edn. 1925-27. R. Carnap, A bri11 der Logi1tii, Vienna. 1 929 . W. V. Quine, A Sy11em of Logi1tic, Cambridge, Mass., 1934. Hilbert Jnd Ackermann, G r undrige der theoretiuhtn Logii, 2nd edn ., Berlin, 1938. A . ChUJch. A formulation of the 1im�le theory of type1, The Journal of Symboli.c Logic, vol. 5 ( 1940 ) , pp. 56-68. -- A . Tarski, Einig e Betracht11ng_en · i b er die Begri6e Jer c.>­ Wider1 fm.ch1 freiht11 11nd der c..l ·Voll1tantii ieit , Monatshefte fii r Mathematik und Physik� vo . 40 ( 1 9�3 ) , pp. 97· 1 1 2 . G. Gcntzen, Dre Wider. der 1p r 11cln f r e iheit Mathematische Stuf u• l ogii , 2'cit�r l-irift. vol. 4 1 0 936) . f'P· 3 �7·366. -- K . Godel. Ober formal 11nent1,heidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica 11ru:I verwaru:lttr Sy1teme

f

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y Monatshefte fiir Mathematik und Physik, vol. 38 ( 1 93 1 ) . pp. 1 7 3 - 198. J. B. Rosser, ExltnJiom of some theorems of GOdtl and Ch11rch, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 1 ( 1 936 ) , pp. 8791. J. B . Rosser, An hrformal 1xpo1i1ion of proofs of Godel's 1heortms and Ch11rch ' 1 1heorem, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4 ( 1939 ) , pp . H-60. Hi lbert and Bernays, Gr11ndlagen dtr Ma1h1ma1ik , vol. 2, Berlin, 1939. 7. ALGEBRA OF CLASSES deals with classes ( q. v . ) whose members are from a fi xed non­ empty class called the unive rse of discour1e, and with the operations of complementation, logical sum, and logical product upon such classes. (The classes are to be thought of as determined by propositional functions having the universe of discourse as the range of the independent variable.) The universal claaa V comprises the entire uni verse of discourse. The null (or empty) class A has no members. The complement -a of a class a has as memben all those elements of the universe of discourse which are not members of a (and those only). In particu lar the null class and the universal cl ass a re each the complement of the other. The logical sum a v h of two classes a and h has as members all those elements which are mem­ bers either of a or of b, not exc luding elements which are members of both a and h (and those only). The logical product a r. h of two cl asses a and h has as members all those ele­ ments which are members· of both a and h (and those only)-in other words the logical product of two classes is their common pa rt. The e:c­ pressi1Jtis of the 'algebra of classes are built up out of class variables a, h, c, • • • and the sym· bols for the universal class and the null class by means of the notations for complementation, logical sum, and logical product ( with paren­ these s ) . A formula of the algebra of classes consists of two expressions with one of the symhols = or =F between. ( a = h means that a and h are the same cl ass, a =F h that a and h are not :he same class. ) While the algebra of classes can be set up as an indepc:ndent logistic system, we shall here describe it instead by reference to the functional calculus of firs. order ( § 3 ), using two monadic fu ncti onal constants, V and A, a nd an infinite list of monadic functional variables Fi, Ci, Hi, correspondin.ir in order to the class vari­ • • • ables a, b, c, . . . respectively. Given any ex­ pression A of fr • al gebra of classes, the cor­ responding formu;.i A:t: of the functional cal­ culus i1 obtained hv replacing complementation, logical sum, and lu�ical product respectively by negation, i nclusive disj unction, and conjunction, and at the same time rf'placing V, A, a, h, c, • • • respectively by V \ ,__ ) , A (:c), Fi (:c), G1 (:c) , Hi (:r), . • . • Given any formula A = B of the algebra of classes the corresponding formula of the functional calculus is At = • Bt. Given any formula A 9'= B of the algebra of classes, the corresponding formula of the functional cal­ culus is -- CAt =• B:l:]. A formula C is a theorem of the algebra of classf's if and only if the inference from (:r)V (:c) and (:c) .-.A (:c) to ct (where ct corresponds to C ) is a valid inference of the functional calculus. The in-

179

ference from premisses D1, D,, • • ., D,. to a conclusion C is a valid inferenc e of the algebra of classes if and only i f the inference from (:c) Y ( :c), (:c)-A (:c), D1t, D.:J:, . . . , D...t to ct is a valid inference of the functional cal­ culus. Th is isomorphism between the algebra of classes and the indicated part of the functional calculus of fi rst order can be taken as repre­ senting a parallelism of meani ng. In fact, the meani ngs become identical if we wish to con­ strue the functional calculus in extension (ace the article propositional function) ; err, inversely, if we wish to construe the algebra of classes in inte nsio n, instead of the usual construction. If we deal only with formulas of the algebra of classes which are equations ( i.e.1 which have the form A = B), the above description by reference to the functional calculus may be re­ placed by a simpler description using the applied propositional calculus (§ I ) whose fundamental propositional symbols are :ci;:V, :ri;:.A, :c£a1 :ir£b, :ci;:c, • • • • Given an equation C of the algebra of dasses, the corresponding formula ct of the propositional calculus is obtained by repl acing equality ( = ) by th e biconditional ( = ), re­ placing complementation, logical sum, and logi­ cal product respectively by negation, i ncl usive disj ur.ction, and conj unction, and at the same time replacing V, A, a, h, c, . . . respectively by :ci;:V, :c£A 1 :c£a 1 :c£b1 :cu, • • • • An equation C is a theorem of the algbera of classes if and only if the inference from :c£V, ,_. :ci;:A to ct is a valid inference of the propositional calculus ; analc•gously for valid inferences of the algebra of tlasses in which the formulas involved are equations. As a corol lary of this, every theorem of 1 the pure p ropositional calculus (§ J ) of the form A = B has a corresponding theorem of the algebra of classes obta ined by replacing the princi pal occurrence of :=:= by =, elsewhere re­ placing negation, inclusive disj unction, and con­ j u nction respectively by complementation, logical sum, and logical product, and at the same time replacing propositional variables by clasa vari­ ables. Li k�wise, every theorem A of the pure propositional calculus has a corresponding theo­ rem B = V of the algebra of classes, where B is obtained from A by replacing negation, in­ clusive di,junction, and conj unction respectively by complementation, logical sum, and logical product, and rep lacing propositional "· ariable. by class variables. The dual of a formula or an expreuion of the algf'bra of classes is obtained by i nterchang­ iag logical sum and logical product, and at the same time interchanging V and .A. The principle Gf duality holds, that the dual of every theorem i� also .l theorem. The relation of cl ass inclusion, c: , may be introduced by the defiaition : A c: B -. A "' -B = A. Instead of algebra of clasus, the term Boo lu.11 algebra is used primarily when it is intended that the formal syatem shall remain unin· terpreted or that interpretation, other than that

180

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

described above shall be admitted. For the re­ lated idea of a Boolean ring see the paper of Stone cited below. E . Schroder, Algebra der Logik., vol. I , vol. 2 part 1, and vol. 2 part 2, Leipzig, 1 890, 1 891 , 1905. E. V. Huntington, Sets of independem pouulates for the algebra of logic, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 5 ( 1904 ) , pp. 288-309. S. K. Langer, An Int x YeX. z c: y -+ XeZ => x XeY. Here X, Y, and Z are to be taken as individual v ariables ("individual" in the technical sense of § 3 ), and X is to be determined according to an explicit rule so as to be different from Y and Z. The Zermelo set theory may be formulated as a simple applied functional calculus of .first order (in the sense of § 3 ), for which the do­ main of individuals is coipposed of classes, and the only functional constant is t1 primitive for­ mulas (additional to those given in § 3) being added as follows :

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

[xE•

=•

xEy]

aiooality)

(Et) [ xu ing)

(Et ) [x EI

=•

= y. (Axiom of e:z:tco­

r;

[ x=y

=•

summation)

:::l

x=z] ] . (Axiom of p ai r­

v

(Ey } [xEy] [yu:] ].

(Axiom of

(Et) [ xEI

=•

x c: ]

(Et) [xEt

=•

[xEz] A ] . (Axiom of subset forma­

sets )

tion )

z

(Axiom of the set of sub­

.

y = y'] ] ] [y1EZ ::;) ,, [ [ x E)" ] [xEy1] ( Et) [yEz :::l ' [ x"Ey :::l • " (Ex ') [ [ xEy ] [xa] = • x=x'] ] ] . (Axiom of choice) (Et) [za] [x'Et :::l • ' (Ey) [yEt] [ xEj' = • x=x'] ] . [yEz

:::l

:;) a

::;) 1'

(Axiom of infin ity)

[yEz :::l (Ex') [A E: x=x'] ] (Et) [xEt s. (E)·) [yEz)A] . 1

a

:::l

(Axiom of replacement) I n the axfom of subset formation, A i s any formula not containing t as a free varibale (in general, A will contain x as a free variable) . Io the axiom of replacement, A is any formula which conta ins neither t nor x' as a free vari­ able (in general, A will contain x and y aa free variables). These two axioms are thus represented each by an infinite list of primitive: formulas-the remaining axioms each by one primitive formula. The axiom of extensionality as above stated has (incidentally to its principal purpose) the effect of excluding non-dasses entirely and assuming that everything is a class. This as­ sumption can be avoided if desired, at the cost of complicating the axioms somewhat--one method would be to introduce an additional functional constant, expressing the property to be a class (or set), and to modify the axioms accordingly, the domain of individuals being thought of as possibly containing other things besides sets. The t'reatment of sets in the Zermelo set theory differs from that of the theory of types in that all sets are "individuals" and the rela­ tion E (of membership in a set) is significant as between a::iy two sets-in p articular, xu ia not forbidden. (\Ve are here using the words Jet and class as synonymous.) The restriction which is imposed in order to avoid paradox can be aeeo in connection with the axiom of subset formation. Instead of this axiom, an uncritical formulation of axioms for eet theory might well have included (Et) [ xEt = • A], asserting the existence of a set t whose members are the sets x satisfying an arbitrary condition A expressible in the notation of the system. This, however, would lead at once to x Ex the Russell paradox by taking A to be and then going through a process of inference which can be described briefly by saying that x ia put equal to t. As actually proposed, how­ ever, the axiom of subset formation allows the use of the condition A only to obtain a set t whose members are the sets x which a'e mem­ bus of a P,-N.Jiously given ut and satisfy A. This is not known to lead to paradox. The notion of an ordered pair can be intro­ duced into the theory by definition, in a way ,_,

z

181

which amounts to identifying the ordered pair (x, y ) with the set which has two and only two 'members, x' and y', x' being the eet which has x as its only member, and / being the set which has x and y as its only two members. (This is one of nrious similar possible meth­ ods. )' Relations in extension may then be treated as sets of ordered pairs. The Zermelo set theory has an adequacy to the logical development of mathematics com­ parable to that of the functional calculus of order omega ( § 6 ) . Indeed, as here actually formt:lated, its adequacy for mathematics ap­ parently exceeds that of the functional calculus ; however, this should not be taken as an essen­ tial difference, since both systems a re incomplete, in accordance with Godel's theorem (§ 6), but are capable of extension. Besides the Zermelo set theory and the func­ tional calculus (theory of types), there is a third method of obtaining a system adequate for mathematics and at the same time--it ia hoped--consistent, proposed by Quine in his book cited below ( 1 9+0) .-The last word on these matters has almost certainly not yet been A l o n z o Chu'Ch said. Einleitu r.g in die 1\fengenlehre, A. Fraenkel. 3rd edn . , Berlin, 1 928. W. V. Quine, Set-theoretic fou ndations jo, logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, ••ol. l ( 1936 ) . pp . 4 5-57. Wilhelm Acker­ mann, ,Menger.theo,,tuche Begrundung du Lcgik, Ma thematische Annalen, vol. 1 1 5 ( 1937 ) . pp. l · 22. Paul Bernays, A system o f axiomatic set theory, The Journal of Svmbolic Logic, vol. 2 ( 1937 ) , pp. 65-77, and vol . 6 ( 1 94 1 ) , pp . 1-17. W. V. Qume, Mathematica/ Lcgic, New York, 1940 . Logic, symbolic, or mathematical l o gic , or logistic; is the name given to the treatment of formal logic by means of a formalized logical language or calculus whose purp ose is to avoid the ambiguities and logical inadequacy of ordi­ nary language. It is best characterized, not . a! a separate subject, but as a new and powerful method in formal logic. Foreshadowed by idea! of Leibniz, J. H. Lambert, and others, it had its substantial historical beginning in the Nine­ teenth Century algebra of logic (q. v.), and re­ ceived its contemporary form at the hands of Fregc, Peano, Russell, Hilkrt, and others. Ad­ vantages of the symbolic method are greater exactneu of formulation, and power to deal with formally more complex material. See also logisl:°c sy ste m . A. C. I. Lewis, A Su,.1e7 of S) m h olic Logic, C. Berkeley, Cal., 1918. Lewis and Langford, S)m­ bolic u �ic, New York and London, 1932. S. K. Langer, .i n 1 nuoduction to S)mholic Logic, Boston and New York, or London, 1937. W. V. Quine, ,Mathemathal Logic, New York, 1940. A. Tarski lntroductior. to Logic and to the Meth odology o i Deductire Sciences, New York, 194 1 . W. V. Quine, Elem!nta'y Logic, Boston and New York, 194 1 . A . Church, A bibliography o{ s) m bolic logic. The Journal ot Symbolic Logic, vo . 1 (1936 ) , pp. 1 2 1-218, and vol. 3 0938 ) , pp. 178- 2 1 2 . J . M. B o ch e n s ki, Non Lezioni d i Logict: Simbolica . Rome, 1938. R . Carnap, Abrin der Logiltik, Vienna, 1 929. H.. Schoh. Geuhichte du Lo gik , Berlin, 193 l. . Hilbert a�. d Ackermann, Grundzuge du theo,el/Jchen Lcgik, 2nd edn . , Berlin, 1938. Logic, traditional : the name given to those parts and that methcd of treatment of formal logic which have come down substantially unr;

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changed from classical and medieval �imes. Traditional logic emphasizes the a nalym of propositions i nto subj ect and predicate and the associated classification i nto the four forms, .d , E , I , O ; and i t is concerned chiefly .with topi� s immediately related to these, i ncluding . opposi­ tion immediate inference, and the syllogism (see logi� , formal) . Associated with traditional logic are also the three so-called laws of thought­ the Jaws �f identity (q. v . ) , contradiction (q. v.) and excluded middle (q. v. )-and the doc­ tri �e that these l aws a re in a special sense fundamental presu ppositions of reasoning, or even (by some) that all other p rinciples of logic can be derived from them or a re mere elabora­ tions of them. Induction (q. v.) has been added in comparatively modern times (dating from Bacon's Novunz Organum) to the subject matter A. C. of traditional logic. A . Arnauld and others, IA Logiqu e ou I' 1 rt de Pemer, better known as the Port_-Royal Logic, �st edn., Paris, 1 662 ; reprinted, Paras, 1 878 ; English translation by T. S. Baynes, 2nd edn., London, 18) 1 . F. Ueberweg, Sy1tem der Log1k und GeJchichre der logiJcherr Lehrerr, !st edn . , Bonn , 1 8 )7 ; 4th edn . , Bonn, 1 874. C. Prantl , G_eschi ch t e dl'-r Logik im Abendlande, 4 vols., Le1pz1g, 1 8 5 5 1 870 ; reprinted, Leipzig, 1 9 2 7 . H. W . B. Joseph, An lmroduction 10 Logic, 2 nd edn. , Oxford, 1 9 16. F. Enriques, Pe r la Storia del/a Logica, Bologna, 1 9 2 2 · English translation by J . Rosenth al, New York'. 1 9 2 9 . H. Scholz, Geschichte der Logik, Berlin, 1 9 3 1 . Logical Empirici s m : See Scientific Empiricism I. Logical machines : Mechanica l devices or in stru­ ments designed to effect combinations of propo­ sitions, or premisses, with which the mechanism is suppl ied, and derive from them correct logical conclusions. Both p remisses and conclusions may be exp ressed by means of conventio nal symbols. A contrivance devised by Wi lliam Stan ley Jevons i n 1 869 was a species of logical abacus. An­ other constructed by John Venn i n 1 8 8 1 con­ sisted of di agrams which could be manipulated i n such a manner that appropri ate consequences appeared. A still more satisfactory machine was designed by Allan M a rquand in 1 882. Such devices would indicate that the inferential proc­ ess is mechanical to a notable extent.-1.J.R. Logical m eaning : See meaning, kinds of, 3 . Logical Positivism : See Scientifia Empiricism. Logical truth : See Meaning, kinds of, 3 ; and

Truth, semantical. Logistic : The old use of the word logistic to

mean the art of calcul ation, or common a rith­ metic, is now nea rly obsolete. I n Seventeenth Century English the corresponding adjective was also sometimes used to mean simply logical. Leibni z occasionally employed logistica (as also logica mathematica ) as one of various a lternative names for his calculus ratiocinalor. The modern use of logistic (French logistique) as a synonym for symbolic logic (q. v . ) dates from the Inter­ national Congress of Philosophy of 1 904, where it was p roposed i ndependently by Itelson, La­ lande, and Couturat. The word logistic has been employed by some with special reference to the Frege-Russell doctrine that mathematics is re­ ducible to logic, but it would seem that the better usage makes it simply a synonym of sym­

bolic logic.

A. C.

L. Couturat, ll�e Congres de P hilosophi,, Revue de Metaphys1que et de Morale, vol. 12 ( 1 904 ) , see p. 1 04 2 . • Logistic system : The formal construction of a logistic system requi res : ( 1 ) a l ist of primitive symbols (these a re usually taken as ma rks but may a lso be sounds or other th inge-th� mu1t be capable of instances which are, recogna.iably, the same or different symbols, and capable of utterance in which instances of them are put forth or arranged in an order one after an­ other) 1 ( 2 ) a determination of a c lass of for­ mulas, each formula being a finite sequence of primitive symbols, or, more exactly, each f� r­ _ a re finite mula being capable of instances which sequences of instances of primitiv e symbols (gen­ eral izations a llowing two-dimensional arrays of p rimitive symbols and the like are non-essen­ tial) ; ( 3 ) a determination of the circumsta ?ces under which a fin ite sequence of formulas 1s a proof of the last formula in the sequence, �ie last formula being then cal led a theorem (again we shoul d more exactly speak of proofs as hav­ ing instances which are fi nite sequences of in­ stances of formulas) ; ( 4) a dete rmination of the ci rcumstances under which a finite sequence of formulas is a proof of the last fo rmula of the sequence as a consequence of a certa in set of formulas (when there is a proof of a for­ mula B as a consequence of the set of fo rmulas Ax, A2, • • • , An, we say that the inference fr?m the premisses Ai, A1, . • . 1 An to the conclusion B is a valid inference of the logistic system ) . It i s not excl uded that the class o f proofs i n the sense o f ( 3 ) should b e empty. B u t every p roof of a formula B as a consequence of a n empty . set o f formulas, in the sense o f ( 4 ) , must also be a proof of B in the sense of ( 3 ) , a n d conversely. Moreover, i f to the proof o f a formula B a s a consequence of Ax, � • • • , An a re prefixed in any order proofs of Ax, At, . • . , A,., the entire resulting sequence of formulae must be a proof of B; more general ly, i f to the proof of a formula B as a consequence of Ax, A2, • • • 1 An a re prefixed in a ny order proofe of a subsf'.t of Ai, A2, . • • 1 An as consequencee of the remainder of Ax, A1, • . • , An, the entire resulting sequence must be a p roof of B as a consequence of this remainder. The determi n ation of the circumstances under which a sequence of formulas is a proof, or a proof as a consequence of a set of formul as, i1 usually made by means of: ( 5 ) a l ist of primi­ tive formi;las; and (6) a l ist of primitive rules of inference each of which prescribes that under ce .' tain circumstances a formula B shall be an imi-iedialt! consequence of a set of formulas Ax, A21 • • • , An. The list of primitive formula• may be empty-this is not excluded. Or the primi1ive fo rmu!as may be included under the head of p rimitive rules of i n ference by allowing the cast n=O i n ( 6 ) . A proof is then defined as a finite sequence of formulas each of which is either a p rimitive formula or a n immediate consequence of preceding formulae by one of the p rimitive rules of inference. A proof as 11 to• sequence of a set of formulas Ax, At, • • • 1 A.. is in some cases defined as a finite &equence of

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

formulae each of which i1 cithc:r a primitive , A.., or an im­ formula, or one of Ai, � mediate consequence of preceding formulae by one of the primitive rules of inference ; in other ca1c1 it may be desirable to impose cer­ tain restrictions upon the application of the primitive rules of inference (e.g., in the caac of the functional calculus of first order-l ogic for11141, § 3-that no free variable of Ai, A2, • • . , A,. shall be generalized upon) . A logistic system need n o t b e given any meaning or interpretation, but may be put for­ ward merely as a formal discipline of intcrc1t for its own sake ; and in this case the word• proof, theorem, valid inference, etc., a rc to be dissociated from their every-day meanings and taken purely aa technical terms. Even when an interpretation of the syatcm i1 intended, i t i1 a requirement of rigor that no use shall be made of the interpretation ( a1 such) in the de­ termination whether a sequence of symbols i1 a formula, whether a sequence of formulae i1 a proof, de. The kind of an interpretation, or auignmcnt of meaning, which is normally intended for a logistic system is indicated by the technical ter­ minology employed. This is namely such an interpretation that the formulas, aome or all of them, mean or exprcaa propositions ; the theo­ rems cxprcu true propositions ; and the proofs and valid inference& represent proofs and valid inferences in the ordinary sense. ( Formulas which do not mean proposition& may be in­ terpreted aa names of things other than proposi­ tions, or may be interpreted aa containing free vari ables and having only an ambiguous denota­ tion--sec varia ble. ) A logistic system may thus be regarded as a device for obtaining-or, rather otating-an objective, external criterion for the validity of proofs and inferences (which are expressible in a given notation ). A logistic system which has an interpretation of the kind in question m ay be expected, in gen­ eral, to have more than one such interpretation. It i s usually to be required that a logistic 1yatem shall provide an effective criterion for recognizing formulas, proofs, and proofs aa a consequence of a set of formulas ; i.e., it shall be a matter of direct observation, and of follow­ ing a fixed set of directions for concrete opera­ tions with symbols, to determine whether a given finite sequence of primitive symbols is a formula, or whether a given finite sequence of formulas i1 a proof, or is a proof as a con­ seuqence of a given set of formulas. If this requirement is not satisfied, it may be necessary -e.g.-given a particular finite sequence of for­ mulas, to seek by aome argument adapted to the special case to prove or disprove that it satisfies the conditions to be a proof (in the technical sense) ; • i.e., the criterion for formal recognition of proofs then presupposes, in actual application, th:ot we already know what a valid deduction is (in a sense which is stronger than that merely � f the ability to follow concrete directions in a particular case ) . See further on thia point logic, formal, § I . •





,

183

The requirement of effectivencu does not compel the lists of primitive symbols, primitive formulas, and primitive rules of inference to be finite. It ia sufficient if there arc effective criteria for recognizing formulas, for recognizing primi­ tive formulas, for recognizing application& of primitive rules of inference, and (if separately needed) for recognizing auch restricted applica­ tions of the primitive rules of inference aa arc admitted in proofs as a consequence of a given act of formulas. With the aid of Godel's device of represent­ i ng sequences of primitive aymbols and acqucncca of formulas by means of n umbers, it ia possible to give a more exact definition of the notion of effectiveness by making it correspond to that of recursiveness (q. v . ) of numerica l functions. E.g., a criterion for recognizing primitive for­ mulas ia effective if i t determines a genetal recursive monadic function of natural numbers whose value is 0 when the a rgument i s the n umber of a primitive formula, 1 for any other n atural number as argument. The adequacy of this technical definition to represent the intuitive notion of effectiveness as described above i1 not immediately clear, but i s placed beyond any real doubt by developments for details of which the reader is referred to Hilbert-Bernays and Turing ( aee references below). The requirement of effectiveness plays an im­ portant role in connection with logistic systems, but the necessity of the requirement depends on the purpose in hand and it may for some pur­ poaea be abandoned. Various writers have pro­ posed non-effective, or non-construct ive, logistic systems ; in some of these the requirement of finiteness of length of formulas is also aban­ doned and certain infinite sequences of primitive symbols are admitted as formulas. For particular examples of logistic systems ( all of which satisfy the requirement of effective­ ness) see the article logic, formal, especially A lonzo Church § § 1 1 3, 9 . R. Carnap The Logical Syntax of Language, New York and London, 1 9 3 7 . H. Scholz, Was isl ein Kalkul und was hat Frege fur tin1 ,

punktliche Beantworlung dieur Frage ,geltiilel?, Semester-Berichte, Munster i. W., summer 193), Hi lber t and Bernays, Gru ndla gen d1r Mathematik, vol. 2, Berlin, 1939. A. M. Turing, On computable numbers, with an application lo the Entscheidungsproblem , Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, ser. 2 vol. 42 ( 1 937 ) , p p . 2 30-265. and Correction, ibid. , ser . 2 vol. 43 ( 1 937 ) , pp. 544 - 546. A . M . Turing, Computa bility a nd >..-definabi/i1y, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2 ( 1 937 ) . pp. 1 5 3 - 1 6 3 .

pp. 16-H.

Uogomachy : ( Gr. logos, word + mache, battle)

A contenticm in which words are involved with­ out their references. A contention which Jacka the real grounds of difference, or one in which allegedly oppc.scd views are actually not on the same level of c!iscourse. A battle of words alone, which ignores their symbolic character.-1.K.F. Logos : ( Gr. logos) A term denoting either rea­ son or one of the expressions of reason or order in words or things ; such as word, discourse, definition, formula, p�inciple, mathematical ratio. In its most important sense in philosophy it refers to a cosmic reason which gives order and

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intelligibi lity to the world. In this sense the doctrine first appears in Heraclitus, who affirms the reality of a Logos analogous to the reason in man that regulates all physical processes and is the source of all human l aw. The conception is developed more fully by the Stoics, who con­ ceive of the world as a l iving unity, perfect in the adaptation of i ts parts to one another and to the whole, and an imated by an immanent an d pu rposive reason. As the creative source of th _� s cosmic un ity and perfection the world-reason 1s cal led the semi nal reason (logos spermatikos ), and is conceived as containing within i tself a multitude of logoi spermatikoi, or intelligible and purposive forms operating in the world. As regu lating all things, the Logos is i dentified with Fate (heima rmene ) ; as directing all things toward the good, with Providence (prono ia) ; and as the ordered course of events, with Nature (physis ) . In Ph ilo of Alexandria, in whom Hebrew modes of thought mingle with Greek concepts, the Logos becomes the immaterial in­ strument, and even at times the personal agency, through which the creative activity of the trans­ cendent God is exerted upon the world. In Ch ristian philosophy the Logos becomes the sec­ ond person of the Trinity and its functions arc identified with the creative, illuminating and re­ demptive work of Jesus Christ. Finally the Logos plays an important role in the system of Plotin us, where it appears as the creative and form-giving aspect of Intell igence (Nous), the second of the three Hypostases.-G.R.M. Lombard, Peter : (c. 1 1 00-c. 1 1 60 ) Was the author of the Four Books of Sentences, i.e. a compi lation of the opinions of the Fathers and early teachers of the Catholic Church concerning various points in theology. He was born at Lumello i n Lombardy, studied at Bologna, Rheims and the School of St. Victor i n Paris. He was m ade Bishop of Paris i n 1 1 5 9. The Lihri IV Sententiarum was used as a textbook in Catholic theology for more than two cen­ turies, hence it has been commented by all the great theologians of the 1 3 th and 1 4th cen­ turies. The Franciscans of Quaracchi have pub­ l i shed a critical edition in 2 vols. ( Quaracchi,

1 9 1 6 ) .-V.J.B. Lotze, Rudolph H ermann : ( 1 8 1 7- 1 8 8 1 ) Em­

pi ricist in science, teleological idealist in phi­ losophy, theist in rel igion, poet and artist at heart, Lotze conceded three spheres : Necessary truths, facts, and v alues. Mechanism holds away in the field of n atura l science ; it does not gen­ erate meaning but is subordinated to value and reason which evolved a specific plan for the world. Lotze's psycho-physically oriented medi­ cal psychology is an applied metaphysics in which the concept soul stands for the unity of experience. Science attempts the demonstration of a coherence in na ture ; being is that which is in relationshi p ; "thing" is not a conglomeration of qualities but a unity achieved through law ; mutual effect ·or in fluence is as little explicable as being : It is the monistic Abslute working upon itself. The ultimate, absolute substance, God, is the good and is personal, personality

being the highest value, and the most valuable is also the most real. Lotze disclaimed the abil­ ity to know all answers : they rest with God. Unity of l aw, matter, force, and all aspects of being produce beauty, while aesthetic experience consists in Einfiihlung. M ain works : Meta­ physik, 1 841 ; Logik, 1 842 ; Medezinisclu Pry­ chologie, 1 842 ; Gesch. der Aesthetik im Deutschland, 1 8 68 ; Mikrokosmos, 3 vols., 1 8 5 664 (Eng. tr. 1 8 8 5 ) ; Logik 1 8 74; Metaphysik, 1 8 79 (Eng. tr. 1 8 84 ) .-K.F.L. Love : (in Max Scheler) Giving one's self to a "total being" ( Gesamtwesen) ; it therefore dis­ closes the essence of that being ; for this reason love is, for Scheler, an aspect of phcnomonelogi­ cal knowledge.-P.A..S. Lovejoy, Arthur 0. : ( 1 873-) Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Johns Hopkins University. He was one of the contributors to "Critical Real­ ism." He wrote the famous article on the thirteen pragmatisms (J our. Philos., Jan. 1 6, l 9G8 ). Also critical of the behavioristic ap­ proach. His best known works are The Revolt against Dualism and his recent, The Great Chain of Being, 1 9 3 6. The latter exemplified L's method of tracing the history of a "unit­ idca." A. O. L. is the first editor of the Journal of the History of Ideas ( 1 940-). He is an authority on Primitivism ( q.v.) and Ro­ manticism (q.v.).-L.E.D. (d. 1 962) Lowenh e i m 's th eorem : The theorem, first proved by Lowenheim, that if a formula of the pure fu nctional calculua of fi rst order (see Logic, for­ mal, § 3 ), containing no free individual vari­ ables, i s satisfiable (see ibid.) at all, it is satis­ fiable in a domain of individuals which i s at most enumerable. Other, simpler, proofs of the theorem were afterwards given by Skolem, who also obtained the generalization that, if an enumerable set of such formulas arc simultane­ ously satisfiable, they a re simultaneously satis­ fiable in a domain of individuals a t moat enumerable. There follows the existence of an interpreta­ tion of the Zermelo set theory (see Logic, formal, § 9 )--consistency of the theory assumed-accord­ ing to which the domain of sets is only enumer­ able ; although t,here a re theorems of the Zermelo set theory which, under the usual interpretation, assert the existence of the non-enumerable in­ finite. A l ike result may be obtained for the func­ tional calculus of order omega (the-0ry of types) by utilizing a representation of it within the Zermelo set theory. It is thus in a certain sense impossible to postulate the non-enumerable infinite : any act of postulates designed to do so will have an un­ intended interpretation within the enumerable. Usual sets of mathematical postulates for the rea l n umber system ( see numher) have an ap­ pearance to the contrary only because they arc incompletely formalized (i.e., the mathematical .:oncepts a re formalized, while the underlying logic remains unformalized and indefinite). The situation described in the preceding para­ graph is sometimes called Skolem's paradu, al-

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

though i t i s not a paradox i n the aense of formal aelf-contradiction, but only in the sense of b-eing unexpected or at variance with preconceived ideas.-A . C. Th. Skolem, Sur la portit du thiortmt dt Uwmhtim-Slolnn, Les Entretieos de Zurich sur !es Fondements et la Methode des Sciences Mathe­ matiques, Zurich 194 1 , pp . 25-52. Lucretius, Caru s : (98-54 B.C.) Noted Roman poet, author of the famous didactic poem Dt Natura Rtrum, in six books, ·which forms an interesting exposition of the philosophy of Epi­ cureanism.-.M.F. Lu H siang- shan : ( Lu Chiu-yiian, Lu Tzii-ching, 1 1 39-1 1 9 2 ) Questioned Ch'eng I-ch'iian's in­ terpretation of Confucianism when verr young, later often argued with Chu Hsi, and claimed that "the six {Confucian) classics are my foot­ notes." This official-scholar served as transition from the Reason School (Ii hsiieh) of Xeo­ Confucianism to the Mind School {hsin hsiieh) of Xco-Confucianism. His complete works, Lu Hsiang-shan Ch'Ur causal necessity. The theory excludes both ph} s ical indeterminacy (chance) and psychical in determin acy { freedom ) . �ecc1sitari anism, as a theory of cosmic necessity, t:c­ comCl in its special application to the human will, determinism. Sec Deurminism.-L. W. Neeessity : A state of affairs is said to be neces­ sary if it cannot be otherwise than it is. I n ­ asmuch as the grounds of an assertion of thi1 kind may in general he one of three very d is­ tinct kinds, it is customary and valuable to dis­ tinguish the three typcJ of necessity affirmed as ( I ) logical or mathematical n ecessity, (2) physi­ cal necessity, and ( 3 ) moral necessity. The distinction between these three was tint worked out with precision by Le:bniz in his Theodich. Logical, physical, and moral nccc1Sity are founded in logical, physical, and mora l law1 respectively.. Anything is logically necClsary th e denial of which would violate a law of logic. Thus in ordinary commutz.tivc algebra the im­ plication from the postulates to ah·ha is logi­ cally necessary, since i ts denial would "iolate a logical law {v iz. the commutative ru le) of this system. Simila rly, physically necessary things arc Lhose whose den ial would v iolate a physical or

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DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

natural law. The orbits of the planets are said to be physically necessary. Circula r orbits for the planets are logically possible, hut not physi­ cally possible, so long as certain physical laws of motion renrain true. Physical necessity is also referred to as "causal" necessity. As moral laws differ widely from logical and physical laws, the type of necessity which they generate is considerably different from the two types previous defined. Moral necessity is ill us­ trated in the necessity of an obligation. Fulfill­ ment of the obligation is morally necessary in the sense that the failure to fut.fill it would violate a moral Jaw, where this law is regarded as embodying some recognized value. If it is admitted that values are relative to individuals and societies, then the Jaws embodying these values will be simil arly relative, and likewise the type of thing which these laws will render morally necessary. While these three types of necessity are gen­ erally recognized by philosophers, the weighting of the distinctions is a matter of considerable divergence of view. Those who hold that the distinctions are all radical, sharply distinguish between logical statements, statements o f fact, and so-called ethical or value statements. On the other hand, the attempt to establish an a priori ethics may he regarded as an attempt to reduce moral necessity to logical necessity; wh ile the attempt to derive ethical evaluations from the statements of science, e.g. from biology, is an attempt to reduce moral necessity to physical or causal necessity.-F.L. W. Negation : The act of denying a proposition a! contrasted with the act of affirming it. The affirmation of a proposition p, j usti.fies the nega­ tion of its contradictory, p', and the nega­ tion of p j usti.fies the affirmation of p'. Con­ trariwise the affirmation of p' j ustifies the negation of p and the negation of p' j ustifies the affirmation of p.-C.A .B. The negation of a proposition p is the proposition --p (see Logic, formal, § 1 ) . The ne­ gation of a monadic propositional function F is the monadic propositional function >..x [ --F(x) ] ; similarly for dyadic propositional functions, etc. Or the word negation may be used in a syn­ tactical sense, so that the negation of a sentence A. C. ( formula) A is the sentence --A. Negative proposition : See affirmative proposition. Negative Sensation : Term used by Wundt to designate sensations produced by stimuli below the threshold of positive sensation. See Limits of Sensation. The term has largely been dis­ carded because the existence of such sensations is now genera lly denied.-L. W. Nei shen g : Often used as referring to the man who attained to complete sel f-cultivation, sage­ hood. (Confucius.)-H.H. Nei tan : Internal alchemy, as a means of nour­ ishing life, attaining Tao and immortality, in­ cluding an elaborate system of breathing tech­ nique, diet, and the art of preserving unity of thought (tsiin i, tsiin hsiang, tsiin ssu) . Also cal led t'ai hsi. For external alchemy, see lVai tan. (Taoist religion.)-W.T.C.

Neo-Confuciaoism : See Li hsiieh and Chinese philosophy. Neo-Critici sm : The designation of his philoso­ phy used by Cournot, and in the early stage .of his thought by Renouvier, who later changed to Personalism as the more .fitting title. See also Monadology, The New.-R.T.F. Neo-Hegeliaoism : The name given to the re­ vival of the Hegelian philosophy which began in Scotland and England about the middle of the nineteenth century and a little l ater extended to America. Outstanding representatives of the movement in England and Scotl and are J. H. Sti rling, John and Edw.ard Caird, T. H. Green (perhaps more under the influence of Kant), F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, R. B. Haldane, ]. E. McTaggart and, in America, W. T. Har­ ris and Josiah Royce. Throughout, the repre­ sentatives remained indifferent to the formal aspects of Hegel's dialectic and subscribed only to its spirit-what Hegel himself described as "the power of negation" and what Bosanquet named the argumentum a contingentia mundi. -G.W.C. Neo-ldealism : Primarily a name given un­ officially to the Italian school of neo-Hegelianism headed by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gen­ tile, founded on a basic distinction that it pro­ poses between two kinds of "concrete universals" (s.v.). I n addition to the Hegelian concrete uni­ versal, conceived as a dialectica l synthesis of two abstract opposites, is posited a second type in which the component elements are "concretes" rather than dialectical abstracts, i.e. possess rela­ tive mutual independence and lack the character­ istic of logical opposition. The living forms of Mind111 both theoretical and practical, are uni­ versal in this latter sense. Thia implies that fine art, utility, and ethics do not comprise a dia­ lectical series with philosophy at their head, i.e. they are not inferior forms of metaphysics. Thus neo-Idealism rejects Hegel's panlogism. It also repudiates his doctrine of the relative inde­ pendence of Nature, the timeless transcendence of the Absolute with respect to the historical process, and the view that at any point of his­ tory a logically .final embodiment of the Absolute Idea is achieved.-W.L. Neo-intuitionism : See Intuitionism. Neo-Kantianism : A group of Kantian followers who regard the thing-in-itself or noumenal world as a limiting concept rather than, as did Kant, an existent, though unknowable realm. Reality is for the N eo-Kantians a construct of mind, not another realm. Even Kant's noumenal world is a construct of mind. The phenomenal world is the real and it is the realm of ideas. Hence Neo-Kantianism is a form of idealism. Hermann Cohen, a Neo-Kantian, spoke of the world as the creative act of thought. This idealism is sometimes termed "positivistic." -V.F. Neology : Literally, the introduction of new words or new meani ngs. In theology the neologist is the heretic who introduces a new doctrine. In the latter sense, the rationalist was called a neologist by the traditional theologian.-V.F.

DICTIONA RY OF PHILOSOPH Y

Neo- M ohism : See Mo cM and Chinese philoso· phy.

Neo- Platon i sm : New Platonism, i.e. a school of

philosophy established perhaps by Ammoniua Saccus i n the second century A.D., in Alexandri a, ending as a formal school with Proclus in the fifth century. See Plotinism.-V.J.B. Neo-Pythagoreanism : A school of thought initi­ ated in Alexandria, according to Cicero, by N igidius Figulus, a Roman philosopher who died in 45 B.C. It was compounded of traditional Pythagorean teachings, various Platonic, Aris­ totelian and Stoic doctrines, including some mys­ tical and theosophical elements.-J.J.R. Neo- S cholasticism : See Scholasticism . Nescience : ( Lat. nesciens, ignorant) A state of ignorance such as is professed by the agnostic. See Agnosticism.-L. W. Nestorians : A Christian sect dating from the 5 th century. Nestorius, a patriarch of Constantinople 428-43 1 ) opposed the designation "Mother of God" ( a declaration of Origen's ) applied to Mary, the mother of Jesus. He said that Christ had two distinct natures and that Mary, a human being, could not have delivered anyone but a human. The emphasis is upon the genuine human nature and the exemplary value of Christ. Nestorianism was not only a Christo­ logical viewpoint and the only cause for much theological dispute ; it was also a part of a political and ecclesiastical feud between bishops east and west. The council of Ephesus in 43 1 declared the view heretical. N everthelesa the N estoria n churches spread widely and continues until our present time in Asiatic Turkey and Persia.-V.F. Neti, neti : ( Skr.) "Not this, not that", famous pa1Sage in the Brhadaral)yaka Upanishad 2.3.6 el al. loc., giving answer to questions as to the nature of hrahman (q. v.), thus hinting its in­ definahility.-K.F.L. Neutralism : A type of monism which holds that reality is neither mind nor matter hut a single kind of stuff of which mind and matter are but appearances or aspects. Spinoza is the classical representative.-H.H. Neutral Monism : Theory of American New Realism, derived from W. James essay "Does Consciousness Exist ? ", Journal of Philosophy, 1 904, which reducea the mental as well as physi­ cal to relations among neutral entities (i.e. entities which are in themselves neither mental nor physical ) . The theory is qualitatively monis­ tic in its admission of only one kind of ulti­ mate reality vi'L. neutral or subsistent entities hut is numerically pluralistic in acknowledging a multiplicity of independent reala.-L. W. New Academy : Name commonly given to what i1 also called the Third Academy, started by Carneades ( 2 1 4- 1 2 9 B.C.) who substituted a theory of probability for the principle of doubt which had been introduced into Plato's School by Arceailaua, the originator of the Second or Middle Academy. The Academy later veered toward eclecticism and eventually was merged with Neo-Platonism.-J.J.R. New Realism : A school of thought which date1

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from the beginning of the twentieth century. It began as a movement of reaction against the wide influence of ideali,tic metaphysics. Where­ as the idealists reduce everything to mind, thi1 school reduced mind to everything. For the New Realists Nature is basic and mind is part and parcel of it. How nature was conceived (whether materialistic, neutralistic, etc. ) was not the important factor. New Realists differed here among themselves. Their theory of knowledge was strictly monistic, the subject and object are one since there is no fundamental dualism. Two schools of New Realists are recognized : ( a ) English New Realists : Less radical in tliat mind was given a status of its own char­ acter although a part of its objective environ­ ment. Among distinguished representative• were : G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, S. Alex­ ander, T. P. Nunn, A. Wolf, G. F. Stout. (b) American New Realists : M ore radical in that mind tended to lose its special statue in the order of things. In psychology this school moved toward behaviorism. In philosophy they were extreme pan-objectivists. Distinguished representatives : F. ]. E. Woodbridge, G. S. Fullerton, E. B. McGilvary and six platformiatt (so-called because of their collaboration in a volume The New Realism, published 1 9 1 2 ) : E. B. Holt, W. T. M a rvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, E. G. Spaulding. The American New Realists agreed on a gen­ eral platform but differed greatly among them­ selves as to theories of reality and particular questions.-V.F. Newton ' s Method : The method of procedure in natural philosophy as formulated by Sir Isaac Newton, especially in his Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Book III). These rules a re as fol­ lows : "I. We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. II. There­ fore to the same natural effec�s we must, as. far as possible, assign the same causes. III. The qualities of bodies, which admit neither inten­ sion nor remission of degrees, and which a re found to belong to all bc,dies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the uni­ versal qualities of all bodies whatsoever. IV. In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phaenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phae­ nomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions". To this passage should be appended another statement from the closing pages of the same work : "I do not make hypotheses ; for whatever is not de­ duced from the phaenomena is to be called an hypothesis ; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or me­ chanical, have no place in experimental philoso­ phy."-A.C.B. Nicht- lch : ( Ger. non-ego) Anything which i1 not the subjective self. Fichte accounted for the not-self in terms of the ontologically posited

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DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

1ubjective self. The not-sel f is the external, outer world opposed to the cgo.-H.H. Nicolai, Friedrich : ( 1 73 3- 1 8 1 1 ) Was one of the followers of Leibniz-Wolffian school which developed an eclectic reconciliation of rational­ ism and empiricism in a popular form that served to lay a foundation for the Kantian criti­ cal ph ilosophy.-L.E.D. Nicomachus : Of Gerasa in Arabia, a Neo-Py­ thagorean (q.v.) philosopher of the second cen­ tury.-M.F. Nidrii : (Skr.) Sleep. In Indian philosophy, par­ ticularly the Yoga (s.v.), not considered void of mental activity.-K.F.L. Nietzsc he, Friedrich : ( 1 844- 1 900 ) Nietzsche's discovery and description of "resentment", to mention only one of his maj or achievements, stamps him as one of the philosophical psy­ chologists of the last century. His critique of the antiquated and false values of the educated mid­ dle class led pre-war generations to the pursuit of anethics of more realistic ideals. See Super­ man. He was the first to recognize a fundamental critical difference between the philosopher and the scientist. He found those genuine ideals in the pre-Socratic period of Greek culture which be regarded as essential standards for the deep­ ening of individuality and real culture in the deepest sense, towards which the special and natural sciences, and professional or academic philosophers failed to contribute. Nietzsche wanted the philosopher to be prophetic, originally forward-looking in the clarification of the prob­ lem of existence. Based on a comprehensive critique of the history of Western civilization, that the highest values in religion, morals and philosophy have begun to lose their power, his philosophy gradually assumed the will to power, self-aggrandizement, as the all-embracing prin­ ciple in inorganic and organic nature, in the development of the mind, in the i ndividual and in society. More interested in developing a philosophy of life than a system of academic philosophy, his view is that only th at life is worth living which develops the strength and integrity to withstand the unavoidable sufferings and misfortunes of existence without flying into an imaginary world. His major works are : Thus Spake Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and Genealogy of Morals.-H.H.

Nihil est in intellectu quod DOD prius fuerit in sensu : ( Lat.) Nothing is in the intellect

which was not first in sense. All the materials, or content, of higher, intellectual cognition are derived from the activity of lower, sense cogni­ tion. A principle subscribed to by Aristotle, St. Thomas and Locke ; opposed by Plato, St. Au­ gustine and Leibniz ( who qualified the proposi­ tion by adding : nisi intellectus ipse, i.e. except for what is already present . as part of the in­ nate nature of the intellect, thus making it pos­ sible for Kant to suggest that certain forms of sensibility and reason are prior to sense experi­ ence).-Jl.J.B. Nihil ex nihilo : (Lat.) Nothing comes from

nothing ; a negative statement of the principle of sufficient reason.-Jl.J.B. Nihilism : The doctrine that nothing, or nothing of a specified and very general class, exists, or is knowable, or is valuable. Thus Gorgias held that ( I ) Nothing exists ; (2) Even if something did exist it could not be known ; ( 3) Even if it were known this knowledge could not be com­ municated. Schopenhauer's pessimism and denial of the Will expresses a nihilistic attitude toward the so-called values of the world. As a social doctrine Nihilism is the belief that progress is possible only through the destruction of all social and political organizations. See Anarchism. -C.A.B. Nih ilism, ethical : The denial of the validity of all distinctions of moral value. As this position involves in effect the denial of possibility of all ethical philosophy, it has seldom been taken by philosophers. In the history of thought, how­ ever, a less pure ethical nihilism sometimes appears as an i ntermediate stage in a philosophy which wishes to deny the validity of all previ­ ous systems of value as a preliminary to sub­ stituting a new one in their places.-F.L.W. Nim b iirka : An Indian thinker and theologian of the 1 2th century A.D., of Vedantic (q.v.), Vishr.iuite persuasion, who assumed the world and the human soul to be essentially and eter­ nally different from Vishnu, yet constituting a certain unity with him because of complete de­ pendence.-K.F.L. Nirgui:ia : (Skr.) "Devoid of qualities" (cf. gu�), predicated as early as the Upanishads (q.v.) of the Absolute as its in-it-self aspect (cf. sagu�). The highest reality is conceived to be of such fulness, such transcendence that it has no part in the manifold of the phenomenal which is mere miiyii (q.v.) in S ankara's (q.v.) philosophy in so far as it is esoteric.-K.F.L. Nirviil}a : (Skr. blown out) The complete extinc­ tion of individuality, without loss of conscious­ ness, i n the beatific rej oining of the liberated with the metaphysical world-ground. A term used principally by Buddhists though denoting a state the attainment of which has been coun­ selled from the Upanishads (q.v.) on as the summum bonum. It is invariably defined as a condition in which all pain, suffering, mental anguish and, above all, samsiira (q.v. ) have ceased. It is doubtful that complete extinction of life and consciousness or absolute annihila­ tion is meant.-K.F.L. Nisus : The creative principle of emergent evolu­ tion. See Emergent Evolution.-R.B.W. Nitya-viida : (Skr.) The Vedlintic (q.v.) theory (vada) which asserts that reality is eternal ( nitya), change being unreal.-K.F.L. Niyema : (Skr.) The imposing on onesel f of good and kind habits, including bathing, eating clean food, steeling the body, contentedness, cheer­ fulness, study, and piety.-K.F.L. Noema : (Ger. Noema) In Husserl : The objective sense of a noesis, together with the character of the sense as posited in a certain manner, as given or emptily intended in a certarn manner, etc. For every dimensiQn of the noesis there is

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

a corresponding dimension of the noema. See note under noesis.-D.C. Noemat i c : ( Ger. noemaJisch) In Husserl : Of or pertaining to noema. NoemaJic unu : see Senu. -D.C. Noesis : (Cr. Noesis) In Husserl : 1. That current in the stream of consciousness which is intrinsically i ntentional in that it points to an object as beyond itself. The noesis animates the intrinsically non-intentional hyletic current in the stream. ( See Hyle) . 2. A particular in­ stance of the ego cogiJo. Note ; I n Husserl 's usage, noesis and noema are very rarely re­ stricted to the sphere of "thinking" or "in­ tellect" (however defined) but are rather ex­ tended to all kinds of consciousness.-D.C. In Creek philosophers : The exercise of nous, or reason ; the activity of intellectual apprehen­ sion and intuitive thought. See Nous; Aris­ totelianism.-G.R.M. Noet i c : The character some entities have due to their resulting from the activity of nous or reason. Thus those concepts which are non­ sensuous and non-empirical but are conceived by reason alone are noetic ; the noetic aspects of reality are those which are knowable by reason. In a more general sense, "noetic" is equivalent to "cognitive".-C.A.B. ( Ger. noetisch ) In 'Husserl : Of or per­ taining to noesis. See note under noesis.-D.C. Nolition : ( Lat. nolo, I am unwilling) The state or act of negative volition.-V.J.B. Nominal : Having to do with names, nouns, words, or symbols rather than with that which would ordinarily be regarded as symbolized by these verbal forms. See Nominalism.-C.A.B. Nominal ism : (Lat. n ominalis, belonging to a name) In scholastic philosophy, the theory that abstract or general terms, or universals, repre­ sent no objective rea l existents, but are mere words or names, mere vocal utterances, "flaJus vocis''. Reality is admitted only to actual physi­ cal particulars. Universals exist only post res. Opposite of Realism (q.v.) which main­ tains that universals exist ante res. First sug­ gested by Boethius in his 6th century Latin translation of the Introduction to the Categories (of Aristotle) by Porphyry (A.D. 23 3-304). Porphyry had raised the question of how Aris­ totle was to be interpreted on this score, and had decided the question in favor of what was later called nominalism. The doctrine did not receive any prominence until applied to the Sacrament of the Eucharist by Berengar in the 1 1 th century. Berengar was the .first scholastic to insist upon the evidence of his senses when examin ing the nature of the Eucharist. Shortly after, Roscellinus, who had broadened the doc­ trine to the denial of the reality of all uni­ versals and the assertion of the sole reality of physical particulars, was forced by the Council of Soissons to recant. Thereafter, despite Abe­ lard's unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the doc­ trine with realism by finding a half-way position between the two, nominalism was not again explicitly held until William of Occam ( 1 2801 349) revived. it and attempted to defend it

211

within the limits allowed by Church dogma. I n the first frankly nomi nal istic system Occam dis­ tinguished between the real and the grammatical meanings of terms or universals. He assigned a real status to universals in the mind, and thu1 was the .first to see that nominalism can have a subjective as well as an objective aspect. He maintained that to our intellects, however, everything real must be some particular indi­ vidual thing. After Occam, nominalism as an explicitly held doctrine disappeared until re­ cently, when it haa been restated in certain branches of Logical Positivism.-J.K.F. Non-Being : ( I ) Non-existence or the non-exist­ ent ; absence or privation of existence or the existen t ; (2) absence of determinateness or what is thus indeterminate ; ( 3) unreality or the un­ real-either lack of any reality or wh;it is so lacking ( absence, negation, or privation of real­ ity), or lack of a particular kind of reality or what is so lacking ; otherness or existents of another order of reality than a specified type ; failure to fulfill the defining criteria of some category, or what so fails ; ( 4) a category en­ compassing any of the above. Confusion of non· existence and unreality renders paradoxical the question whether non-being is.-M.T.K. Non cause pro cause, or false · cause, is the fallacy, incident to the method of proof by reductio ad absurdum ( q. v.), when a contradic· tion has been deduced from a number of assump· tions, of inferring the negation of one of the assumptions,, say M, where actually it is one or more of the other assumptions which are false and the contradiction could have been deduced without use of M. This fallacy was committed, e.g., by Burali-Forti in his paper of 1 8 97 (see Paradoxes, logical) when he inferred the exist­ ence of ordinal numbers a, b such that a is neither less than, equal to, nor greater than b, upon having deduced what is now known as Burali-Forti's paradox from the contrary assump­ tion : he had used without question the assump­ tion that there is a class of all ordinal numbers. A. C. Non-centre theory : Ascribes the unity of mind to the fact a number of contemporary mental events are directly interrelated in certain char­ acteristic ways. (Broad) .-H.H. Non-contra di ct i on, law of : Same aa Contradic­ tion, law of (q. v.).-A.C. Non-ego : The outer world that has no inde· pendent self-existence. ( Fichte) .-H.H. Non- E uclidean geometry : Euclid's postulates for geometry i ncluded one, the parallel postulate, which was regarded from earliest times (perhaps even by Euclid himself) as less satisfactory than the others. This may be stated as follows ( not Euclid's original form but an equivalent one) : Through a given point P not on a given line l there passes at most one line, in the plane of P and l, which does not intersect l. Here "li ne" means a straight line extended infinitely in both directions ( not a line segment). Attempts to prove the paral lel postulate from the other postulates of Euclidean geometry were unsuccessful. The undertaking- of Saccheri

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( 1 7 3 3 ) to make a proof by reductio ad absurdum of the parallel postulate by deducing conse­ quences of its negation did, however, lead to hie developing many of the theorems of what is now known as hyperbolic geometry. The pro­ posal that this hyperbolic geometry, in which Euclid's parallel postulate is replaced by its negation, is a system equally valid with the Euclidean originated with Bolyai and Lobachev­ sky (in dependently, c. 1 825 ). Proof of the self­ consistency of hyperbolic geometry, and thus of the impossibility of Saccheri's undertaking, is contained in results of Cayley ( 1 8 59) and was made explicit by Klein in 1 8 7 1 ; for the two­ dimensional case another proof was given by Beltrami in 1 868. The name non-Euclidean geometry is applied to hyperbolic geometry and generally to any system in which one or more postulates of Euclidean geometry are replaced by contrary as­ sumptions. (But geometries of more than three dimensions, if they otherwise follow the postu­ lates of Euclid, are not ordinarily called non­ Euclidean.) Closely related to the hyperbolic geometry is the elliptic geometry, which was introduced by Klein on the basis of ideas of Riemann. In this geometry l ines are of finite total length and close? , and every two coplanar lines intersect in . _ a unique point. Still ether non-Euclidean geometries are given an actual application to physical space - or rather, space-time-in the General Theory of Relativity. Contemporary ideas concerning the abstract nature of mathematics ( q. v.) and the status of applied geometry have important historical roots in the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. A. C. G. Saccheri, Euc/idn Vindicatus, translated into Enelish by G. B. Halste?1 Chicago and London, 1920. H . P . Manning, N o n- Euclidean Geom etry, 1 90 1 . ]. L. Coolidge, The Elements of No ,,.. Euclidean Geometry, Oxford, 1909. Non-Natural i st ic ethi cs : Any ethical theory which holds that ethical properties or relations are non-natural. See N on-natut>al properties, lntuitionism.-W.K.F. Non-Natural Propert ies : A notion which pl ays an important part in recent intuitionistic ethics. A non-natural property is one which is neither natural, as yellow and pleasantness are, nor . metaphysical, as absoluteness and being com­ manded by God are. It is, then, a property which is apprehended, not by sensation or by introspection, but i n some other way, and which is somehow non-descriptive, non-expository, or non-existential. It is also said sometimes, e.g. by G. E. Moore and W. D. RoH, to be a consequential property, i.e. a property which a thing has in virtue of its having another prop­ erty, as when an experience is good in virtue of being pleasant. See lntuitionism.-W.K.F. Non sequ i tur is any fallacy which has not even the deceptive appearance of valid reasoning, or in which there is a complete lack of connection between the premisses advanced and the conclu­ sion drawn. By some, however, non sequitur is

identified with Aristotle's fallacy of the con­ sequent, which includes the two fallaciea of denial of the antecedent (q. v.) and affimution of the consequent (q. v.). .d. C. Nooloty : ( Gr. nous, Mind ; logos, Science) A term variously used, but without common accept­ ance; for the science of mind or of its noetic function. According to several 1 7th century German writers (Colovius, Mejerus, Wagnerue, Zeidletus) it is the science of the first principlca of knowledge. Crusius identified it with psy­ chology. According to Kant it is the rational­ istic theory of innate ideas. For Bentham "noological " is a synonym of logical_ Noology is the field of mental science in which the will does not function in the production of mental events ; that branch of psychology concerned with the field of purely mental change. For Hamil­ ton it is the science of the noetic, i.e. the func­ tion and content of intellectual intuition or pure reason. Eucken distinguished noological method from the psychological and cosmological. lte object is the Spiritual Life, i.e. the source of Reality, and the self-contained goal in which man participates. For H. Gomperz it is the science that mediates between logic and psy­ chology .-W.L. Norm : ( Lat. norma, rule) (a) General : Stand­ ard for measure. Pattern. Type. (b) In ethice: Standard for proper conduct. Rule for right action. (c) In axiology: Standard for j udging value or evaluation. (d) In aesthetics : Stand­ ard for j udging beauty or art. Basie for criti­ cism. (i;) In logic: Rule for valid inference. (f) In psychology: Clau average test score. &JB Normat i ve : ( Lat. normatue, pp. of normo, square ) Constituting a standard 1 regulative. Having to do with an established ideal. In scientific method : concerning those science• which have subject-matters containing valuea, and which set up norms or rules of conduct, such as ethics, aesthetics, politics. The ideal formulation of any science. Opposite of: empiri­ cal.-J.K.F. Nota notae est nota rei i ps i us : ( Lat.) That which falls within the comprehension of a "note", i.e. a known component of a thing, also falls within the comprehension of the thing 1 an attempted formulation of the supreme prin­ ciple of syllogistic reasoning on the basis of comprehension rather than extension ; Kant is said to have offered this principle in place of the famous extensivist rule, the dictum Je omni et nullo (q.v.) .-V.J.B. Notat ions, logi cal : There follows a list of some of the logical symbols and notations found in contemporary usage. In each case the notation employed in articles in this dictionary is given first, afterwards alternative notations, if any. PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS (see Logic, fomul, § I, and strict implication) : pq, the conjunction of p and q, "p and ., formal implication with respect to x. See definition in the article logic, formal, § 3. =:z, formal equivalence with respect to See definition in logic, formal, § 3. A 1'· See defi nition in logic, formal, § 3. => "'II> or => z,,,-- f ormal implication with re­ spect to x and y. Similarly for formal implica­ tion with respect to three or more variables. =z11, or =:z,,,--formal equi valence with respect to x and y. Similarly for formal equiva­ lence with respect to three or more variables. ABSTRACTION, DESCRIPTIONS (see articles of those titles) : Xx, functional abstraction with respect to so that XxM may be read "the (monadic) func­ tion whose value for the argument x is M." i , class abstraction with respect to x-so that i M may be read "the class of x's such that M." An alternative notation, instead of i , is x9. i y, relation abstraction with n:: s pect to x and y-so that iy M may be read "the relation which holds between x and y if and only if M." ( x), description with respect to x--so that ( x) M may be read "the x such that M." E ! is employed in connection with descrip­ tions to denote existence, so that E ! ( 1 x ) M may be read "there exists a unique x such that M." r­

1

1

OTHER NOTATIONS :

F (x ), the result of application of the ( mona­ dic, propositional or other) function F to the argument x--the value of the function F for the argument x-"F of x." Sometimes the paren­ theses are omitted, so that the notation is Fx.­ See the articles function, and propositional func­ tion. F (x, y ) , the result of application of the ( dyadic) function F to the argllments x and y. Similarly for larger numbers of arguments. x = y, the identity or equality of x and y, "x equals y. " See logic, formal, §§ 3, 6, 9. x =I= y, negation of x = y. I- is the assertion sign. See assertion, logical. Dots (frequently pri nted as bold, or bold square, dots) are used in the punctuation of logi­ cal formulas, to avoid or replace parentheses. There are varying conventions for this purpose. � is used to express definitions, the definien­ dum being placed to the left and the definiens to the right. An alternative notation is the sign = (or, in connection with the propositional calculus, = ) with the letters Df, or df, written above it, or as a subscript, or separately after the definiens. Quotation marks, usually single quotes, are employed as a means of distinguishing the name of a symbol or formula from the symbol or formula itself (see syntax, logical) . A symbol or formula between quotation marks is employed as a name of that particular symbol or formula. E.g., 'P' is a name of the sixteenth letter of the English alphabet in small italic type. The reader will observe that this use of quota­ tion marks has not been followed in the present article, and in fact that there are frequent in­ accuracies from the point of view of strict preaer-

215

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y vation of the di1tinctio n between a 1ymbol i u n ame. These in accu racies a re

and

i n v olved

of too

a character to be removed by merely 1upplying quotation marks a t appr opriate places. But it i 1 thought t h a t there i 1 no poi n t at which real doubt will a �i1e a s to the meaning intended.

.dlonzo Church

Nothing :

Literally,

not

a

thing.

Kant, emptiness of concept, According min ate

that

to

Hegel,

notion

According

immedi ate,

of being .

to

object or intu i tion .

the

According

indeter­

to

Peirce,

which possene1 con trary attributes.

-1.K.F. In tran slation into l ogical

the word

notation,

is usually to he represented by the nega­ tion of a n existenti a l quantifier. Thus " nothing

nothing

property F''

has the

Notion :

"- (E.r)F(.r)." -.d.C.

becomes

( Ger. Begriff) T h i s is a technical term i n

t h e writi n gs of H egel, and a s there used it has a dual

reference.

On

one

side,

it

refers

to

essence or n ature of the object of thought ;

the on

the other s i de, it refers to the true thought of that essence or n ature. Notion

are

part of the

These two

emphasized

Logic

at

of the

aspect!

length

in

the third

(The Doctrine of the Noti o n ) ,

where it i s dia lectica l ly defined a s t h e synthesis of

Being

and

Essence

under

the

form

(Die ldu).-G. H'.C. Notion es communes : Cicero's tra n s l a tion phrase koinai ennoiai, by which the Stoics

of the

Idea

of the desig­

n a ted such notions a s good, e\· i l, and the exist­ ence of God, which they regarded to

all

men,

( physikai) or

and

as,

in

(emphytai),

impl a n ted

perhaps, i n the

sense

Noumenal World :

as commo n

sen se,

some

n a tural

though not,

of being l i tera l ly i n n ate.

-W.K.F.

The rea l world a s opposed to

the a p pearance world.

Kant s a i d of the nou­

men a l realm th at i t cannot be known .-l'.F.

Noumenon : or power ence

is

( Gr. noumenon ) In Ka n t : An object transcending

theoretically

postulated

experience

problematic

practical

by

reason.

whose exist­ but

In

must

be

theoretical

terms K.rnt defined the noumenon positively as "the object of a non-sensuous intu i tion," nega­ ti,·ely a s

a n object of the sensuous i n tui­

"not

tion ; " but since

den ied the existence of any

he

but sens':.lous intuitions, the noumenon rem a ined a n u nknowable "x". however,

the

I n his p ractica l philosophy,

postulation

of a

noume n a l

realm

is necessary i n order to explain the possibility of freedom. See Kantianism.-0.F.K.

Noun :

I n English and other n a tural l a nguages, a

word

serving

as

(q.v.) .-.i .C. Nous : ( G r. nous)

a

proper

::'I.find,

or

common

name

espec i a l ly the highest

part of mind, viz. reason ; the faculty of intel­ lectual

( a s distinct from sensible ) apprehension

and of intuitive thought.

In its restricted sense

nous

denotes

of

first

p rinciples

eternal

the of

intelligible

facu lty science,

ap prehending

the

substa n ces,

forms,

being.

is

regarded

the

a n d i s thus dis­

tingu ished from d i sc u rs i ve thought. nous

and

the

In

this sense

a s the essence of the

divine

I n m a n Aristotle dis tinguishes between

pauive

the nou1 pathetikos, or

rea son,

and

a

higher active reason, cal led nous poietikos, which etern al, and which i s

by the cornmentaton alone is trul y d i vine and rel ated to the nous pathe­

as form to matter.

tiko1

.d ristoulianism.

See

-G.R.M. Null class : See Logic, fonn4l, § 7 . Numbe r : The n umber S)"Stem of mathematical analysi1 may be described as fo l l ows-with refer­ ence, not to hi storical, but to one possible loKi­ cal order. First a re the

non-negative integers 0, I, 2, 3,

which the operations of addition and multi p lication are determined. They are ordered •





1

for

not greater than-which we shall by R-to that, e.g., ORO, ORJ, 2R3, 3R 3,

by a relation denote

57 R2 I 8,

etc.

These are extended

introducing, for every

by

a, b, · wi th b a/b, subj ect to

pair of non-negative integers ferent from

0, the

fraction

following conditions ( w hich can be shown

dif­ the

to

be

( I ) a/ 1 = a; ( 2 ) a/b = c/d if and only if ad = be ; ( 3 ) a/b R c/d if and only i f ad R be ; (4) a/b + c/d = (ad + bc)/bd ; ( 5 ) (a/b) (c/d) = ac/bd. The result­ ing system is that of the non-negative rational numbers, which a re compactly ordered but not contin uou sly ordered ( s ee continuity) by the re­ consisten t ) :

l ation

(as extended ) .

R

Then the next s t e p

is

t o i n troduce, f o r every

r, a

non-negative rational number negative rational nu mber

( I ) -r

d i tio n s :

-s

=

--r ,

correspon ding

subject to the con­

r

if and only if

=

s;

( 2 ) -r = s i f and only i f r = 0 and s = O ; ( 3 ) -r R - s i f and o n l y i f s R r ; (4) -r R s ; ( 5 ) s R -r if and only if r = 0 and s = O ; ( 6 ) -r + s = s + -r = either t, where

r + t = s, or -t where s + t = r; ( 7 ) -r + -s = - (r + s) ; (8) ( -r)s = s (-r) = - (rs) ; (9) (- r) (-s) = rs. Here r, s, t a re

v a riables whose o n a l numbers.



mg

both

negative

range i s the non-negative ra­ The extended system, compris­

non-negative r a tional

ration a l

numbers

rational n :i mb us-which

is

numbers the

and

system

of

are compactly ordered

but not contin uously ordered by the relation

R

( a s extended ) . If we system

make

minimum

the

of ration a l

numbers

exten sion

which

the order contin uous, the system of res ul ts.

Addition

and

render

real numbers

m u l tipl ication

numbers a re un iquely determined

of the

will

by

of

real

the mean­

i ngs a l ready given to a d d i ti o n a n d multiplication of ration al addition

numbers

of,

and

the requirement

o r m u l ti p l i c a ti on

by,

a

fixed

that real

number (on right or left) shall be a conti nuous function ( see

contz'nuity ) .

Subtraction a n d divi­

sion may be i n troduced a s i n verses

of

a d d i tion

a nd m u l ti p lication respectively.

complex numbers a re introduced a+bi, "' here a a n d b a re r�a l num­

Finally, the a s numbers

bers. There i s no ordering relation, but add i tion and mult ipli cation a re determined a s fol lows :

(a+bi) + ( c+di) = (a + c) + (b + d)i. (a+hi) (c+di) = (ac - bd) + (ad + bc)i. ! n p a rticu lar i ( i.e., o + t i) mul ti p l ied by itself ts - I. A n umber of the form a+Oi may be

2 16

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

identified with the real number a; other complex numbers a re called imaginary numhers, and those of the form o+hi are cal led pure imagi­

naries.

(It is, of course, n ot possible to define i as "the square root of - 1 ." The foregoing state­ ment corresponds to taking i as a new, unde­ fined, symbol. But there i s an alternative method, of logical construction, i n which tlie complex numbers are defined as ordered paira (a, h ) of real numbers, and i is then defined a1

(0, 1 ) .)

In a mathematical development of the real number system or the complex number system, an appropriate set of postulates may be the start­ ing point. Or the non-negative integers may first be introduced ( by .postulates or otherwise­ see arithmetic, foundations of) and from these the above outlined extensions may be provided for by successive logical constructions, in any one of several alternative ways. The important matter is not the. definition of

numher (or of particular numbers), which may

be made in various ways more or less indiffer­ ently, but the internal structure of the number

system.

For the notione of carditJal numhe,., f'elation­ numher, and ordinal number, see the articles of these titles. .Alom:o Church R. Dedekind, Essays o n the Theory of Numbers, translated by W. W. Beman Chicago, 1 90 1 . E.

V. Huntington, A set of postula.Jes for real alg elHa, Transactions of the American Mathematical So­ ciety, vol . 6 ( 1 90, ) , pp. 1 7 - 4 1 . E. V. Hunting·

ton, A set of po1tulates for ordinary complex al ­ g_ebra, ibid ..• pp . . 2�9-2 29. E. Landau, Grundlagen ti er A nalysts, Le1pz1g, 1 930.

Numinous : A word coined from the Latin "nu­

men" by Rudolf Otto to signify the absolutely unique state of mind of the genuinely religious person who feels o r is aware of something mysterious, terrible, awe-inspiring, holy and eacred. This feeling or awareness is a mysterium tremendum, beyond reason, beyond the good or the beautiful. This numinous is an a priori category and is the basis of man's cognition of the Divine. See his book The Idea of the Holy ( rev. ed., 1 925 ) .-Y.F. Nunez Regiieiro, Manuel : Born in Uruguay,

March 2 1 , 1 883. Professor of Philosophy at the National University of the Literal i n Argentine. Author of about twenty-five books, among which the following are the moat important from a philosophical point of view : Fundamentos de la .Anterosofia, l 92 5 ; .Anterosofia Racional, 1 926 ; De Nuroo Hahlo Jes us, 1 92 8 ; Filosofia Integral,

1 932 ; Del Conocimiento y Progreso de Si Mismo, 1 934 ; Tratado de Metalogica, o Funda­ mentos de Una Nueva Metodologia, 1 93 6 ; Suma Contra Una Nueva Edad Media, 1 93 8 1 Metafisica y Ciencia, 1 941 ; L a Honda In­ quietud, 1 9 1 5 ; Conocimiento y Creencia, 1 9 1 6.

Three fundamental questions and a tenacioua effort to answer them run throughout the entire thought of Nunez Regiieiro, namely the three questions of Kant : What can I know ? What must I do ? What c an I expect 1 Science aa such does not write finis to anything. We experience in science the same realm of con­ tradictions and inconsistencies which we ex­ perience elsewhere. Fundamentally this chao1 is of the nature of dysteleology. A: the root of the con11ict lies a crisis of values. The problem of doing ia above all a problem o f valuing. From a point of view of values, life ennoblea itself, man lifts himself above the trammels of matter, and the world becomes meaning-full . h there a possibility for the realization of thia idea 1 1 Has this plan ever been tried out 1 Hia­ tory offers us a living example: The Fact of Jesus. He is the only possible expectation. In him and through him we come to fruition and fulfilment. Nunez Regiieiro's philosophy ia fundamentally religioue.-J•.A .F. Nyiya : ( Skr.) One of the great aystema of In­ dian philoeophy { q.v.) going back to the Nyaya­ sutras of Gotama {q.v . ) and dealing with the logical approach to reality i n a science of rea­ soning and epistemology designed to accompliah the practical aims of all Indian speculation. H aving established perception (pratyak!a) , in­ ference {anumana), comparison {upamatkl) and testimony {iahdao aa aourcea of valid know!� edge or truth, a doctrine of logical realism ia arrived at i n which the objective world is con­ ceived independent o f thought and mind.

-K.T.L.

0 O bj ect : ( Lat. objectus, pp. of objiccre, to throw

over against) In the widest sense, object is that towards which consciousness is directed, whether cognitively or conatively The cognitive or cpi­ atcmological object of m ind is anything per­ ceived, imagined, conceived or thought about. Sec Epistemological Object. The conative object is anything desired, avoided or willed.-L.W. O bjectivatioo : Sec Obiectiviu. O bjective : ( a ) Possessing the character o f a real object existing ind ependently o f the knowing mind in contrast to subjective. See Subjective. (b) In Scholastic terminology beginning with Duns Scotus and continuing into the 1 7th and 1 8th centuries, objective designated anything existing as idea or representation in the mind without independent existence. (cf. Descartes, Meditations, Iii ; Spinoza, Ethics, I, prop. 30 ; Berkeley's Siris, § 292.) The change from sense (b) to (a) was made by Baumgarten. See R. Eucken, Geschichte der Philosophischen Ter­ minolo l;e, p. 68.-L . W . O bj ective idealism : A name for that philosophy which is based on the theory that both the sub­ ject and the object o f know led ;e a re equally real and equally manifestations of the absolute or ideal. Earlier employed to describe Schell­ ing's philosophy. Used independently by Charles S. Peirce ( 18 39- 1 9 1 4) and A. N. Whitehead (l 86 1 -) to describe their varieties of realism. Subjective idealism supposes the world to con­ sist of exemplifications of universals which h ave their being in the mind. Objective idealism supposes the world to consist of exemplifications of universals which have t.'1eir being independent of the mind.-1.K.F. O bjective Reference : The self-transcendence of an immediately given content whereby it i1 directed toward an object. Sec Ohiect.-L. W. Obj ective Relativism : Epistemological theory which ascribes real objectivity to all perspec­ tives and appearances of an object of perception. (See A. E. Murphy, "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead," Philosophical Review, Vol. XXXVI, 1 927.)-L.W.

O bj ective rightnes s : An action is objectively

right if it is what the agent really should do, and not merely what he thinks he should do. Sec SuhiectitJe rightness.-W.K.F. bj O ective test : Any test, whether standardized or not, which meets the requirements of a meas­ uring instrument, permitting no reasonable doubt as to the correctness or incorrectness of the answers given.-J.E.B. O bjectivi sm : 1 . Realism (q.v.). 2. Objective Idealism (q.v.). 3. Logic, Aesthetics, Ethics : The view that the mind possesses objects, norms, or meaning• of universal validity. The opposite of subjec­ tivism, psychologism, solipsism, individualitm ( q.v.).-W.L. Obj ectivism, epistemologica l : Doctrine main­ taining that everything apprehended is inde­ pendent of the apprehender. ( Montague.) -H.H.

O bjectivi stic ethics : The view that ethical truths

are not relative, that there are certain actions which are right or certain objects which are good for all individuals alike. See Relativism. -W.K.F. O bjectivize : The rpental process whereby a sensation which is in the first instance, a subjec­ tive state, is transformed into the perception of an object. Sec lntroiection.-L. W. O bj ect language : A language or logistic system L is called ohiect language relatively to another language (metasystcm ) L' containing notation• for formulas of L apd for syntactical propcrtic1 of and relations between formulae of L ( pol· sibly also semantical properties and relations). The language L' is called a syntax langll4ge of L. Sec Name relation; Syntax, Logical; Truth semantical.-A.C. O b ligation : Thia may be aaid to be pr�·sent when­ ever a necessity of any kind is laid upon any one to do a certain thing. Here the term "obli­ gation" may refer either to the neceaaity of hia doing the act or to the act which it is ncccaaary for him to do. Always, in any case of obliga,

218

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

tion, there is a kind of necessity for someone to do something. This is true in all cases in which one says, "I was obliged to do that", "I have an obligation to him", "You ought to do so and 10 111 "It is our duty to do such and such". It follows that obligation involves a relational structure. One never has an obligation simply, one always has an obligation to do a certain thing. An act is never simply obligatory, it is always obligatory for someone to do. The necessity involved in an obligation may be of various kinds-sheer physical compulsion, social pressure, prudential necessity, etc. Thus not all obligation is moral, e.g. when one says, "The force of the wind obliged me to take cover". The question is: what sort of necessity is involved in moral obligation ! Is moral obli­ gation hypothetical or is it categorical ! Hypo­ thetical obligation is expressed in such sentences as "If you want so and so, e.g. happiness, then you must or should do such and such." Here the necessity or obligatoriness is conditional, depend­ ing on whether or not one desires the end to which the action enj oined is conducive. Cate­ gorical obligation is expressed by simple sen­ tences of the form, "You ought to do such and such". Here the necessity of doing such and such is unconditional. Many moralists deny that there are any cate­ gorical obligations, and maintain that moral obligations are all hypothetica l. E.g., John Gay defines obligation as "the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy." On such views one's obligation to do a certain deed reduces to one's desire to do it or to have that to which it conduces. Obligation and motiva­ tion coincide. Hence J. S. Mill identifies sanc­ tions, motives, and sources of obligation. Other moralists hold that hypothetical obliga­ tions are merely pragmatic or prudential, and that moral obligations are categorical (Kant, Sidgwick). On this view obligation and motiva­ tion need not coinc ide, for obligation is inde­ pendent of motivati on. There is, it is said, a real objective necessity or obligation to do cer­ tain sorts of action, independently of our desires or motives. Indeed, it is sometimes said (Kant, Sidgwick) th at there is no obligation for one to do an action unless one is at least susceptible to an inclination to do otherwise. This categorical necessity or obligation is re­ garded by the moralists in question as something peculiar. It is not to be identified with physical, causal, or metaphysical necessity. It is com­ patibie with and even requires freedom to do otherwise. It is a "moral" necessity. "Duty", says Kant, "is the necessity of acting from re­ spect for the (mora l ) law." It is a unique and indefi nable kind of necessity, and the relational structure which is involved cannot be explair:ed in any other terms ; it must be intuited to be understood (T. Reid, Sidgwick, W. D. Ross ) . See Ethics, Value, Sanctions.-W.K.F. Oblivescence : ( Lat. oblivesci, to forget) The gradual obliteration of a memory.-L. W. Ob servation : ( Lat. ob + servare, to save, keep, observe) The act of becoming aware of objects

through the sense organs and of interpreting them by means of concepts. See Sensation. -A.C.B. O b servational Judgment : Any j udgment, par­ ticular or general, which is based on observation or experience, but especially, and more strictly, any particular j udgment based on sense-percep­ tion, e.g. "That is a round tower."-W.K.F. O b version : See Logic, formal, § 4. Occasion : (Lat. occasio, a happening) The agency of action. The proximate or historical cause. Any actual thing or event considered as the his­ torical cause of another. The occasion of any­ thing is its antecedent reference ; the cause, its logical reference. Syn . with actual. See Cause, Chance.-1.K.F. Occasional causes, the doctrine of : The doc­ trine that in some or in all cases of apparent causal connection, the apparent cause does not itself actually bring about the apparent effect, but only serves as the occasion on which some other agent or force brings about that effect. Thus Malebranche and the other Occaseionalists held that in all cases where mind and body seem to be causally connected, the truth is not that the one is acting on the other (which is impossible because they differ essentially in kind), but that an event i n the one is taken by God as a n occasion · for his producing an event in the other. Again, Schopenhauer maintained that every natural cause is only an occasional cause for the man ifestation of the Will. -W.K.F. Occas ionalism : A theory of knowledge and of voluntary control of action, in which mind and matter are non-interactive but events i n one realm occur in correspondence with events in the other realm. Thus, God sees to it that an idea of n oise occurs in a mind on the occasion of the occurrence of a physical noise ; or, He makes a physical event happen when a mind wishes it. See Psycho-Physical Parallelism. 1 -V.J.B. Ockham i sm : A term in common use since the early 1 5 th century, i ndicating doctrines and methods associated with those of the English Franciscan theologian William of Ockham (died 1 3 49 ). It is currently applied by neoscholastic writers as a bla nket designation for a great variety of late mediaeval and early modern at­ titudes such as are destructive of the metaphysi­ cal principles of Thomism, even though they may not be directly traceable to Ockham's own writings. Three senses of "Ockhamism" may be dis­ tinguished : ( I ) Logical, indicating usage of the terminology and technique of logical analysis developed by Ockham in his Summa totius logicae; in particular, use of the cpncept of supposition ( suppositio ) in the significative anal­ ysis of terms. ( 2 ) Epistemological, indicating the thesis that universality is attributable only to terms and propositions, and not to things as existing apart from discourse. ( 3 ) Theological, indicating the thesis that no theological doc­ trines, such as those of God's existence or of the immortality of the soul, are evident or demon-

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

atrable philosophically, so that religious doctrine rests solely on faith, without metaphysical or scienti fic support. It is in this sense that Luther is often called an Ockhamist. Bibliography : B. Geyer, Ueberwegs Grundriss d. Gtsch. d. Phil., Bd. I I ( 1 1 th ed., Berlin 1 928), pp. 5 7 1 -6 1 2 and 7 8 1 -786 ; N. Abbag­ nano, Guglielmo di Ockham (Lanciano, Italy, 1 9 3 1 ) ; E. A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (N. Y. & London, 1 93 5 ) ; F. Ehrle, Peter QOn Candia ( Muenster, 192 5 ) ; G. Ritter, Studien 2ur Spaetscholastik, I-II (Heidelberg, 1 9 2 1 - 1 922).-E.A.M. Om, aum : ( Skr.) Mystic, holy syl lable as a sym­ bol for the indefinable Absolute. See Ak[ara, v ac, Sabda.-K.F.L. Omniscience : In philosophy and theology it means the complrte and perfect knowledge of God, of Himself and of all other beings, past, present, and future, or merely possible, as well as all their activities, rea l or possible, including the future free actions of human beings.-J.J.R. n u m b e r but One : Philosophical ly, not equivalent to unit, unity, individuality, in contradisti nction from multiplicity and the mani­ foldness of sensory experience. In metaphysics, the Supreme Idea (Plato), the absolute fi rst principle ( Neo-platonism), the universe ( Par­ menides ), Being as such and divine in nature (Plotinus), God ( Nicolaus Cusanus), the soul (Lotze ) . Religious philosophy and mysticism, beginning with Indian philosophy (s.'1. ), has favored the designation of the One for the meta­ physical world-ground, the ult:mate reality, the world-soul, the pri nciple of the world conceived as reason, nous, or more personal ly. The One may be conceived as an independent whole or as a sum, as analytic or synthetic, as p rinciple or ontologically. Except by mysticism, it is rarely declared a fact of sensory experience, while its transcendent or transcendental, abstract nature is stressed, e.g., in epi$temology where the "I" or self is considered the unitary background of person al experience, the identity of self-con­ sciousness, or the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifoldness of ideas (Kant). -K.F.L. One-one : A relation R is one-many if for every y in the converse domain there is a unique x such that xRy. A relation R is many-one if for every x in the domain there is a unique y such that xRy. (See the a rticle relation.) A relation is one-one, or one-to-one, if it i s at the same time one-many and many-one. A one-one rela­ tion is said to be, or to determine, a one-to-one correspondence between its domain and its con­ verse domain. A. C. On-handedness : ( Ger. Vorhandenheit) Things exist in the mode of thereness, lying passively in a neutral space. A "deficient" form of a more basic relationship, termed at-handedness (Zuhandenheit). ( Heidegger.)-H.H. Ontological argument : N ame by which later authors, especially Kant, designate the alleged proof for God's existence devised by Anselm of Canterbury. Under the name of Cod, so the argument runs, cv�ryone understands that greater

219

than which nothing can be thought. Since any­ thing being the greatest and lacking existence is less then the greatest having also existence, the former is not really the greater. The great­ est, therefore, has to exist. Anselm has been reproached, already by his contemporary Gau­ nilo, for unduly passing from the field of logical to the field of ontological or existential reason­ ing. This criticism has been repeated by many authors, among them Aquinas. The argument has, however, been used, if in a somewhat modi­ fied form, by Duns Scotus, Descartes, and Lcib­ niz.-R.A . Ontological Object : ( Gr. onta, existing thing1 + logos, science) The real or existing object of an act of knowledge as distinguished from the epistemological object. Sec Epistemological Object.-L.W. Ontologism : ( Gr. on, being) In contrast to psychologism, is called any speculative system which starts philosophizing by positing absolute being, or deriving the existence of entities inde­ pendently of experience merely on the basis of their being thought, or assuming that we have immediate and certain knowledge of the gro0und of being or God. Generally speaki ng any ra­ tionalistic, a priori metaphysical doctrine ; specifi­ cally the philosophies of Rosmini-Serbati and Vincenzo Gioberti. As a philosophic method censored by skeptics and criticists alike, as a scholastic doctrine formerly strongly supported, revived in Italy and Belgium in the 1 9th cen­ tury, but no longer countena nced.-K.F.L. Ontolog y : ( Cr. on, being + logos, logic ) The theory of being qua being. For Aristotle, the First Philosophy, the science of the essence of things. Introduced as a term into philosophy by Wolff. The science of fundamental pri nci­ ples ; the doctrine of the categories. Ultim ate philosophy ; rational cosmology. Syn. with meta­ physics. See Cosmology, First Principles, Mt?a­ physics, Theology.-J.K.F. Operation : (Lat. operari, to work) Any act, mental or physical, constituting a phase of the refiective process, and performed with a view to acquiring knowledge or information about a certain subject-matter.-A.C.B. I n logic, · see Operationism. In phi losophy of science, see Pragmatism, Scientific Empiricism. Operationi sm : The doctrine that the meaning of a concept is given by a set of operations. 1. The operational meaning of a term (word or symbol ) is given by a semantical rule relat­ ing the term to some concrete p rocess, object or event, or to a class of such processes, objcctt or events. 2. Sentences formed by combining operation­ ally defined terms into propositions arc opera­ tionally mean ingful when the assertions are tc1t­ ablc by means of performable operations. Thu1, under opcration11 rules, terms have semantical significance ; prorositions have empirical signifi­ cance. Operationism makes explicit the distinction between fo rmal (q.v. ) and empirical sentencc1.

220

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Formal propos1t1ons arc signs arranged accord­ i ng to syntactical rules but l acking operational reference. Such propositions, common in mathe­ matics, logic and syntax, derive their sanction from convention, whereas an empirical proposi­ tion is acceptable ( l ) when its structure obeys eyntactical rules and (2) when there exists a concrete procedure (a set of operations) for de­ termining its truth or falsity (cf. Verification). Propositions purporting t o b e empirical are sometimes amenable to no operati onal test be­ cause they contain terms obeying no definite semantical rules. These sentences are some­ times called pseudo-propositions and are said to be operati onally mea n i ngless. They may, how­ ever, be "meani ngful" in other ways, e.g. emo­ tiona l ly or aesthetica lly {cf. Meaning) . Unlike a formal statement, the "truth" of an empirical sentence is n ever absolute and its oper­ ational confirmation serves only to increase the degree of its validi ty. Simil arly, the semantical rule comprising the operational defini tion of a term has never absolute precision. Ord i narily a term denotes a class of operations and the pre­ cision of its definition depends upon how defi­ nite are the rules govern ing i nclusion in the class. The difference between Operationism and Logical Positivism ( q.v.) i s one of emphasis. Operatio n ism's stress of empi rical matters de­ rives from the fact th at it was first employed to purge physics of such concepts as absolute space and absol ute time, when the theory of relativ ity had forced upon physicists the view that space and time are most profitably defined in terms of the operations by which they are measured. Although different methods of meas­ uring length at first give rise to different con­ cepts of length, wherever the equivalence of certain of these measu res can be established by other operations, the concepts may legitimately be combined. In psychology the operational criterion of meanin gful ness is commonly associated with a behavioristic point of v iew. See Behaviorism. Since only those propositions which are testable by public and repeatable operations are admissi­ ble in science, the definition of sucli concepts as mind and sensation m ust rest upon observable aspects of the o rganism or its behavior. Opera­ tional psychology deals with experi ence only as it is in dicated by the operati on of differential beh avi or, including verbal report. Discrimina­ tions, or the concrete differential reactions of organisms to in ternal or external environmental states, are by some authors regarded as the most basic of all operations. For a di scussion of the role of operational defi nition in phys ics, see P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, (New York, 1 928) a n d The Nature o f Physical Theory ( Princeton, 1 9 36 ). "The extension of operationism to psy­ chol ogy is discussed by C. C. Pratt in The Logic of Modern Psychology ( New York, 1 939"). F o r a discussion and annDtated bibl iography relating to Operationism and Logical Posi­ ti vism, see S. S. Stevens, Psychology and the

Science of Science, Psych of. Bull., 3 6, 1 939, 22 1.

263 .-S.S.S.. Ophelimity : N o u n derived from the Greek,

ophel imos useful, employed by Vilfredo Pareto { 1 84 8- 1 923 ) in ec onomics as the equi va lent of util ity, or the capacity to provide satisfaction .

-J.J.R.

Opinion : ( Lat. opinio, from opinor, to think)

An hypothesis or proposition entertained on ra­ tional grounds but concerning which doubt can reasonably exist. A belief. See Hypothesis, Cer­

tainty, Knowledge.-1.K.F.

Opposition : ( Lat. oppositus, pp. of oppono, to

oppose) Positive actual contradiction. One of Aristotle's Post-predicaments. In logic any con­ trariety or contradiction, illustrated by the "Square of Opposition". Syn. w i th : conflict. See

Logic, formal, § 4.-J.K.F. Opt i mism : { Lat. optimus, the best) The v iew

inspired by wishful thinking, success, faith, or philosophic reflection, that the world as it exist• is not so bad or even the best possible, life is good, and ma n's destiny is bright. Philosophi­ cally most persuasively p ropounded by Leibniz in his Theodicee, according to which God in his wisdom would have created a better world had he known or willed such a one to exist. Not even he could remove moral wrong and evil un less he destroyed the power of sel f­ determin ation and hence the basis of morality. All systems of ethics that recognize a supreme good (Plato and many ideal ists ), subscribe to the doctri nes of progressivism (Turgot, Herder, Comte, and others ) , regard evil as a frag­ mentary view {Josiah Royce et al. ) or ill usory, or believe i n i ndemnification ( H enry David Thoreau ) or mel ioration (Emerson ), are in­ clined optimistical ly. Practica lly all theologies a dvocating a plan o f crea tion and salvation, are optimistic though they make the good or the better depen dent on moral effort, right tliinking, or belief, promising it in a future existence. Metaphysical specul ation i s optimistic if it pro­ vides for perfection, evolution to something higher, more valuable, or makes room for har­ mon ies or a teleol ogy. See Pessimi.rm.-K.F.L. O rder : A class is said to be partially ordered by a dya dic relation R if it coinci des with the field of R , and R is transitive and reflexive, and xRy a n d }'Rx never both hold when x and y are d i fferent. If i n addition R is connected, the class is sa i d to be ordered (or simply ordered ) by R, and R i s call ed an ordering relation. Whitehead and Russell apply the term serial re!ation to relations which are transitive, irre­ flei ive, and connected (a n d, in consequence, also asymmetric ) . However, the use of serial rela­ tions in this sense, instead orderin g relations as j ust oefi ned, is awkward i n connection with the notion of order for unit cl asses. Exam�les : The relation not greater than among 1 ea) numbers is an ordering relation. The relat1 'ln less than among real numbers is a serial rel at:on. The real numbers are simply ordered by t!ie former relation. In the algebra o f cl asses (logic formal, § 7), the classes are

DICTIONA R Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

partially ordered by the relation of class i nclu­ sion. For explanation of the terminology used in making the above definitions, see the articles connexity, reflexitlity, relatfon, symmetry, transi­ tivity. A. C. Order type : See ,.elation-number. Ordinal number : A class b is well-ordered by a dyadic relation R if it is ordered by R (see order) and, for every class a such that a b, there is a member x of a, such that xRy holds for every member y of a; and R is then called a well-ordering relation. The ordinal number of a class b well-ordered by a relation R, or of a well-ordering rel ation R, is defined to be the relation-number (q. v . ) of R. The ordinal numbers of finite classes (well­ ordered by appropriate relations) are called finite ordinal numbers. These are 0, 1, 2, (to be distinguished, of course, from the finite cardinal numbers 0, 1 , 2, . . . ) . The first non-finite (transfinite o r infinite) ordinal number is the ordinal number of the class of finite ordinal numbers, well-ordered in their natural order, 0, 1 , 2, ; it is usually denoted by the small Greek letter omega. A. C. G. 1..antor, Contrib11tions to' the Fo u nding of the Thel>f'y of T,.an1finite Nu mb ers, translated and with an iatroduction by P. E. B. Jourdain, Chi­ cago and Loadon, 1 9 1 5 . (new ed. 1941 ) Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, vol . 3. Orexi s : ( Gr. orexis) Striving ; desire ; the cona­ tive aspect of mind, as distinguished from the cognitive and emotional ( Aristotle).-G.R.M. Organici sm : A theory of biology that life con­ sists i n the organization or dynamic system of the organism. Opposed to mechanism and vitalism.-1.K.F. Organism : An individual animal or plant, bio­ logically interpreted. A. N. Whitehead uses the term to include a lso physical bodies and to signi fy anything material spreading through space and enduring in time.-R.B. W. Organismic Psychology : ( Lat. oriranum, from Gr. organon, an instrument) A system of theo­ retical psychology which construes the structure of the mind in organic rather than atomistic terms. See Gestalt Psychology ; Psychological Atomism.-L. W. Organization : ( Lat. organ um, from Gr. organon, work) A structured whole. The systematic unity of parts in a purposive whole. A dynamic sys­ tem. Order in something actua!.-J.K.F. Organon : ( Gr. organon ) The title traditionally given to the body of Aristotle's logical treatises. The designation appears to have originated among the Peripatetics after Aristotle's time, and expresses their view that logic is not a part of philosophy (as the Stoics maintained ) but rather the i nstrument (organon) of phi lo­ sophical inquiry. See A ristotelianism.-G.R.M. In Kant. A system of principles by which pure knowledge may be acquired and established. Cf. Fr. Bacon's Novum Organum.-0.F.K. Oriental Philosophy : A general designation used loosely to cover philosophic tradition exc:

.

.







.

221

elusive of that grown on Greek soil and includ­ ing the beginnings of philosophical speculation in Egypt, Arabia, I ran, India, and China, the elaborate systems of India, Greater India, China, and Japan, and sometimes also the religion­ bound thought of all these countries with that of the complex cultures of Asia M inor, extend­ ing far into antiquity. Oriental philosophy, though by no means presenting a homogeneous p icture, nevertheless shares one characteristic, 1.e., the practical outlook on life (ethics linked with metaphysics) and the absence of clear-cut distinctions between pure speculation and religi­ ous motivation, and on lower levels between fo_lklo_re, folk-etymology, practical wisdom, pre­ sc1entdic speculation, even magic, and 1lashes of philosophic 'insight. Bpnds with Western, par­ ticularly Greek phi losophy have no doubt existed even in ancient times. Mutual i n1luences have often been conj ectured on the basis of striking similarities, but their scientific establishment is often difficult or even impossible. Comparative philosophy (see especially the work of Masson­ Our!el) provides a useful method. Yet a thor­ ough treatment of Oriental Philosophy is pos­ sible only when the many languages in which it is deposited have been more thoroughly studied, the psychological and historical elements i nvolved in the various cultures better investi­ gated, and translations of the refevant docu­ ments prepared not merely from a philological point of view or out of missionary zeal, but by competent philosophers who also have some iinguistic training. Much has been accomplished in this direction i n Indian and Chinese Philoso­ phy ( q.v.) . A great deal remains to be done however before a definitive history o f Oriental Philosophy may be written. See also Arabian, and Persian Philosophy.-K.F.L. Origen : ( 1 8 5-2 54) The principal founder of Christian theology who tried to enrich the ecclesiastic thought of his d ay by reconciling it with the treasures of Greek 'philosophy. Cf. Migne PL.-R.B.W. O rmazd : ( New Persian) Same as Ahura Mazdah (q.v. ), the good principle i n Zoroastri anism, and opposed to Ahriman (q.v . ) .-K.F.L. Orphic Literature : The mystic writings, extant only in fragments, of a Greek religious-philo­ sophical movement of the 6th century B.C., allegedly started by the mythical Orpheus. In their mysteries, i n which mythology and ra­ tional thinking mingled, the Orphics concerned themselves with cosmogony, theogony, man's original creation and his destiny after death which they sought to i n1luence to the better by pure living and austerity. They �aught a sym­ bol ism in which, e.g., the relationship of the One to the many was clearly enunciated, and believed i n the soul as involved in reincarna­ tion. Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Plato were in1luenced by them.-K.F.L. Ortega y Gasset, Jose : Born in Madrid, May 9, 1 8 8 3 . At present in Buenos Aires, Argen­ tine. Son of Ortega y Munillo, the famous Spanish j ournalist. Studied at the College of Jesuits in Mira1lores and at the Central Uni-

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DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

versity of Ma drid. In the latter he presented his Doctor's dissertation, El Milenario, in 1 904, thereby obtaining his Ph.D. degree. After studies in Leipzig, Berlin, Marburg, under the special influence of Hermann Cohen, the great exponent of Kant, who taught him the love for the scienti1ic method and awoke in him the in­ terest in educational philosophy, Ortega came to Spain where, after the death of Nicolas Sal­ meron, he occupied the professorship of meta­ physics at the Central University of Madrid. The following may be considered the most im­ portant works of Ortega y Gasset: Meditaciones del Quijote, 1 9 1 4 ; El Espectador, I-VIII, 1 9 1 6-

El Terna de Nuestro Tiempo, 1 92 1 ; Espana lnvertebrada, 1 922 ; Kant, 1 924 ; La Deshumanizacion del 4 rte, 1 9 2 5 ; Espiritu de la Letra, 1 927 ; La Rebe/ion de las Masas,, 1 929 ; Goethe desde Adentro, 1 9 3 4 ; Estudios sobre el Amor, 1 9 3 9 ; Ensimismamiento y Alteracion, 1 9 3 9 ; El Libro de las Misiones, 1 940 ; Ideas y Creencias, 1 940 ; and others. 1 93 5 ;

Although brought up in the Marburg �school of thought, Ortega is not exactly a neo-Kantian. At the basis of his W eltanschauung one 1inds a denial of the fundamental presuppositions which characterized European Rationalism. It is life and not thought which is primary. Things have a sense and a value which must be affirmed independently. Things, however, are to be con­ ceived as the totality of situation• which con­ stitute the circumstances of a man's life. Hence, Ortega's first philosophical principle : "I am my­ self plus my circumstances". Life as a problem, however, is but one of the poles of his formula. Reason is the other. The two together function, not by dialectical opposition, but by neceHary coexistence. Life, according to Ortega, doee not consist i n being, but rather, in coming to be, and as such it is of the nature of direction, pro­ gram buildi ng, purpose to be achieved, value to be realized. In this sense the future as a time

dimension acquires new dign ity, and even the present and the past become articulate and meaning-full only in relation to the future. Even History demands a new point of departure and becomes militant with new visions.-J.A.F. Orthodoxy : Beliefs which are declared by a group to be true and normative. Heresy is a departure from and relative to a given ortho­ doxy.-V.F. Orthos Logos : See Right Reason. Ostensible Object : ( Lat. ostendere, to show) The object envisaged by cognitive act irrespec­ tive of its actual existence. See Epistemological

Ohject.-L.W. Ostensive : (Lat. ostendere, to show) Property

of a concept or predicate by virtue of which it refers to and is clarified by reference to ite instances.-A .C.B. Ostwald, Wilhelm : ( 1 8 5 3 - 1 9 3 2) German chem­ ist. Winner of the Nobel prize for chemistry in 1 909. In Die Uberwindung des wissenschaft­ lichen Materialismus and in Naturphilosophu, his two best known works in the field of philosophy, he advocates a dynamic theory in opposition to material ism and mechanism; All properties of matter, and the psychic as well, a re special forms of energy.-L.E.D. Oupnekhat : Anquetil Duperron's Latin transla­ tion of the Persian tra nslation of 50 Upanishads (q.v.), a work praised by Schopenha.uer as giv­ ing him complete consolation.-K.F.L. Outness : A term employed by Berkeley to expreH the experience of externality, that is the ideas of apace and things placed at a distance. Hume used it in the sense ·of distance. H amilton under­ stood it as the state o f being outside of con­ aciousneu i n a really existing world of material thinga.-J.J.R. Overindividual : Term used by H. Miin sterberg to tranelate the German iiberindividuell. The term ie applied to any cognitive or value object which transcends the individual subject.-L. W.

p ( Lat. pagus_, village) The term prob­ ably reverts to the designation of villagers who had not yet been reached by the missionary propaganda emanating from populous centen. fourth-century Christians employed the term to refer to those faiths and practices outside the circumference of the Christian faith.-V.F. Pa i chi s : The " Hundred Schools," referring to the various tendencies of thought in philosophy, logic, ethics, law, politics, diplomacy, economics, agriculture, military science, etc., in the third. and fourth centuries B.C. with Chi Hsia as a center.-W.T.C. Pain : See Pleasure. Pa i nt i n g : A plane surface covered with colors as­ sembled in a given order ( M. Denis, 1 890 ) .

Pagan i sm :

Pa l ey, William : ( 1 743-1 80 5 )

-L.V.

Was a n English churchman well known for a number of works in theology. He is also widely remembered in the field of ethics. His Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy passed through many editions and served as a text book at Cambridge for many years. As an advocate of the doctrine of expediency, he gave impetus to the later Utilitarian School. H e main tained that the beneficial tendency is what makes an action right. See Utilitarianism. Cf. W. Paley, Horae

Paulinae, 1 790 ; View of the Evidences of Christianity, 1 794 ; Natural Theology, 1 802. -L. E.D .

( Gr. palin, again ; genesis, birth) Literally, a new birth or regeneration. A re­ birth of ideas and events (in a philosophy of history) ; a new birth of individuals (in the­ ology ).--V.F. Panaeti us : ( 1 80- 1 1 0 B.C. ) A prominen: Stoic philosopher whose thought was influenced by the Skeptics ; in his attempt to adapt Stoicism to practical needs of· life, he abandoned some of the more speculative n otions current among his predecessors. Influenced Cicero and Augustine.

Pal i ngenes i s :

-R.B.W.

( Skr.) A quasi philosophical system of Vishr:iuism (q.v.) based upon the Agamas

Parcaratra :

(q.v.).-K.F.L. Pan-en th e i sm : ( Gr.

pan, all ; en, in ; theos, god ) The term for the view that God interpenetrates :verything without cancelling the relative inde-

pendent existence of the world of ent1t1es ; moreover, while God is immanent, this imma­ nence is not absolute (as i n pantheism) ; God is :nore than the world, transcendent, in the sense that though the created is dependen t · upon the Creator the Creator is not dependent upon the created. God thus is held to be the highest type of Unity, viz., a Unity in Multiplicity. The term is employed to cover a mediating position between pantheism with its extreme immanence and a theism of the type which tends to extreme transcendence.-V.F. Pan logi sm : ( Cr. pan, all + logos, word ) The doctrine that the world is the actualization of Mind or Logos. Term a pplied to Hegel's theory of Reality. See Hegel.-L.W.

Pa n-o bj ecti vi sm :

(Cr. pan, all + Lat. objectus, of obj icere, to throw over against) An ex­ treme forf1' of epistemological realism which attributes real ohjectivity to all objects o f knowl­ edge, veridical and non-veridical alike. See PP·

Epistemological Realism.-L. W.

Panpneumat i sm : According to Ed. v. H artmann (q.v. ) a synthesis of panlcgism and pantheism (q.v.).-K.F.L. Pan psych i sm : (Cr. pan, all ; psyche, soul) A

form of metaphysical idealism, of which Leib­ niz's theory of monads is the classical example, according to which the whole of nature consists of. psychic c,.11ters similar to the human mind. -L. W. Pan- S atan i sm : The vague belief that the world is somehow identified with the devil. Name given to pantheism by Herbart. Otto Liebmann ( 1 840- 1 9 1 2) regarded Schopenhau.-r's philosophy as a sort of Pan-Satanism .-1.J.R. Pan th e i sm : (Gr. Pan, all ; Theos, t;od ) 1. The doctrine that reality comprises a sing le being of which all things are modes, moments, members, appearances, or projections. 2. As a religious concept Pantheism is to be distinguished from Immanent Theism and Deism by asserting the essential immanence of God in the creatures. See Monism, ldealism.-W .L. Panth ei sm, med i eva l : True pantheistic ideas arc rare in medieval literature. The accusation raised against Scotua Eriugena seems unfounded and was caused more by his writings being

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quoted as authorities by the followers of Amalric of Bene ( 1 206-7) whose views were condemned in 1 2 1 0. His writings are lost ; he apparently taught the identity of Creator and creature and ca lled God the essence o f all beings. A con­ temporary was David of Dinant of whom still less is known ; he identi fied, as it seems, God with prime matter. Master Eckhardt too has been accused of pantheism and some modern authors have believed to find confirmation in his writings. A more thorough study of them, especially of the Latin texts, shows this to be a misinterpretation.-R.A . Pantheisti c Personalis m : The doctrine that reali ty consists of a Supreme Personality o f which t h e world of persons a r e parts. The Divine Personality h aving no separate existence from its creation. See also Critical Personalism,

Mono-Personalism.-R.T.F. Paracelsus, Theophrast us Bombast : ( 1 49 3 1 54 1 ) Of Hohenheim, w a s a physician who endeavored to use philosophy as one of the "pillars" of medical science. H is philosophy is a weird combination of Neo-Platonism, experi­ mentalism, and superstitious magic. He rejected much of the traditional theory of Galen and the Arab physicians. His works (Lahyrinthus, Opus

paramirum, Die grosu Wundarznei, De natura rerum) were written in Swiss-German, trans­

lated into Latin by his fol lowers ; recent investi­ gators make no attempt to distingu ish his per­ sonal thought from that of his school. Thorn­ dyke, L., Hist. of Magic and Experimental

Science (N. Y., 1 94 1 ), V, 6 1 5 -6 5 1 .-V.J.B. Paraclete : ( Gr. parakaleo, to call to one's a i d )

One w h o is called t o assistance. More specifi­ cally : the designation of the function of the Holy Spi rit, the third embodiment of the Ch ristian Trinity.-V.F. Paradigma : The Latin form of the Greek noun, which denotes model. Pl ato ca lled his ideas in the world of ideas, models on which were pat­ terned the things of the phenomenal world. -J .J . R. Paradoxes, logical : The a ncient paradox of Epimenides the Cretan, who said that all Cre­ tans were liars ( i.e., absolutely incapable of telling the truth ) , was known under numerous variant forms in ancient and medieval times . The medieval name for these was insoluhilia. A form of this paradox due to Jourdain ( 1 9 1 3 ) supposes a card upon the front of which arc written the words, "On the other side of this card is written a true statement"-and nothing else. It seems to be clear that these words con­ stitute a significant statement, si�ce, upon turn­ ing the card · over one must either find some statements written or not, and, in the former case, either there will be one of them which is true or there will not. However, on turning the card over there appear the words, "On the other aide of this card is written a false etate­ ment"-and nothing else. Suppose the statement on the front of the card is true ; then the state­ ment on the back must be true 1 and hence the statement on the front must be false. Thia i1 a proof by reductio ad ahsurdum that the state-

ment on the front of the card is false. But i f t h e statement on the front is falae, then the statement on the back must be false, and hence the statement on the front must be true. Thu1 the paradox. A related but different paradox is Grelling'• ( 1 908 ) . Let us distinguish adjectives - i.e., words denoting properties � as autological or heterological according as they do or do not have the property which they denote ( i n pa rticu­ lar, adj ectives denoting properties which cannot belong to words at all will be heterologica l ) . Then, e.g., the words polysyllabic, common, significant, prosaic are autological, while new, alive, useless, ambiguous, long a re heterological. On their face, these definitions of autoloiical and heterological are unobjectionable (compare the definition of onomatopoetic as similar in sound to that which it denotes). But paradox arises when we ask whether the word hetuologi­ cal is autological or heterological. That paradoxes of this kind could be relevant to mathematics first became clear in connection with the paradox of the greatest ordinal number, published by Burali-Forti in 1 897, and the para­ dox of the greatest cardinal number, published by Russell in 1 903. The first of these had been discovered by Cantor in 1 895, and communicated to H i lbert i n 1 8 96, and both are mentioned in Cantor's correspondence with Dedekind of 1 899, but were never published by Cantor. From the paradox of the grea"test ca rdinal number Russell extracted the simpler paradox concerning the class t of all clasol:s x such that ,....., xex. (Is it true o r not that let ? ) At 1irat sight this paradox may not seem to be very relevant' to mathematics, but it must be remem­ bered that it was obtained by comparing two mathematical proofs, both seemingly val id, one leading to the conclusion that there is no great­ est cardinal number, the other to the conclusion that there is a greatest cardinal number.-Rueaell communicated this simplified form of the para­ dox of the greatest cardinal number to Frege in 1 90 2 and published it i n 1 90 3 . The same para­ dox was discovered independently by Zermelo before 1 903 but not published. Also to be mentioned are Konig'a paradox ( 1 90 5 ) concerning the least undefinable ordinal number and Richard's paradox ( 1 90 5 ) concern­ ing definable and undefinable real numbers. Numerous solutions of these paradoxes have been proposed. Many, however, have the fault that, while they purport to find a fiaw i n the arguments leading to the paradoxes, no effective criterion is given by which to discover in the case of other (e.g., mathematical) proofs whether they have the same fiaw. Russell's solution of the paradoxes i s em­ bodied in what is now known as the ramified theory of types, published by him in 1 908, and afterwards made the basis of Principia Mathe­ matica. Because of its complication, and becauae of the nece11ity for the much-disputed axiom of retl�ihility, thi1 ha1 now been larKely abandoned in favor of other 1olution1. Another aolution - which ha. recen tly been

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

widely adopted-is the simple theory of types { see Logic, formal, § 6 ) . This was proposed as a modification of the ramified theory of types by Chwistek in 1 9 2 1 and Ramsey in 1 926, and ado pted by Carnap i n 1 929. Another solution is the Zermelo set theory ( see Logic, formal, § 9 ) , proposed by Zermelo in 1 90 8, but si nce considerably modi fied and im­ proved. Unlike the ramified theory of types, the simple theory of types and the Zermelo set theory both require the distinction ( first made by Ramsey ) between the paradoxes which i nvolve use of the name relation (q. v . ) or the semantical concept of truth (q. v . ) , and those which do not. The paradoxes of the first kind {Epimenides, Grell­ ing's, Kon ig's, Richa rd's) are solved by the supposition that notations for the name relation and for truth {hav ing the requisite formal prop­ erties ) do not occur in the logistic system set up-and in principle, it is held, ought not to occur. The paradoxes of the second kind { Burali-Forti's, Russell's ) are solved in each case in another way. Alonzo Church G. Frege, Grundgeserze der Arithmetik, vol. 2, Jena , 1903 (see Appendix ) . B. Russell The Prin· ciple1 of Mathematics, Cambridge, Engfand, 1903 ; 2nd edn., London, 1 937, and New York, 1938. Grelling and Nelson, Bemerkungen zu den Para­ doxieen vo n RuJSell und Bura li Forti Abhandl ungen der Fries'schen Schule, n.s. vol . 2 ( 1908 ) , pp. 301-334. A. Riistow, Der LUgner (Dissertation Erlangen 1908 ) Leipzig, 1910. P. E. B. Jourdain, Tales with phi/os ophical morals, The Open Court, vol. 27 ( 191 3 ) , pp . 3 1 0 - 3 1 5 . Paral lelism : {philosophical) A doctrine adv anced to explain the relation between mind and body according to which mental processes vary con­ comitantly with simulta neous physiological proc­ esses. This general description is appl icable to all forms of the theory. More st rictly it a s­ sumes that for every menta l change there exists a correlated neural change, and it denies any causal relation between the series of conscious processes and the series of processes of the nervous system, acknowledging, however, causa­ tion within each series. It was designed to obviate the diffic u l ties encountered by the diverse interaction theories. Moreover, no form of paral lelism admits the existence o f a spiritual substance or a substantial soul. Some regard consciousness as the only reaiity, the soul which is but an actua lity, as the sum of psychic acts whose unity consists in their coherence. Others accept the teach ing of the fundamental identity of mind and body, regarding the two corresponding series of psychical and physical processes as aspects of an unknown series of real processes. Thus mind and body are but appearances of a hidden under­ lying unity. Finally there are those who hold that the series of conscious states which con­ stitute the mi� is but an epiphenomenon, or a sort of by-product of the bodily organism. See Mind-Body Relation.-].J.R. Paral lelism, psychophysical : ( Gr. parallelos, from para, beside - a llelon, of one another) A dualistic solution of the mind-body problem {see Mind-body relation) which asserts, in its extreme form, a perfect one-to-one correlation -

,

225

between the system of physical events in nature and the system of psychical events in mind. In more · moderate and restricted form, paral­ lelism asserts only a correl ation between all psychoses. (mental events in an individual mind) and all or some neuroses ( neural events in the individual's body). Thus there may exist physicci-chemica l and even neural processes in the body having no psych ical correlates. The term parallelism was introduced by Fechner (Zend-Avesta, Bk. III, ch. XIX, D) but the doctrine appeared in Spi noza (Ethics, Bk. II ; prop. 7 schol. and props. 1 1 and 1 2 ).-L. W. Paralogism : (Gr. paralogismos) A fallacious syllogism ; an error in reasoning. See Sophism. -G.R.M. In Kant's system the paralogisms a re argu­ ments alleging to prove the substantiv ity, sim­ plicity and eternality of the soul or pure ego. See Kantianism.-0.F.K. Paramai:iu : {Skr.) An exceedingly (parama) or i n finitely small or magnitudeless thing (cf. a�u), a discrete physical entity playing a similar role i n Indian philosophy as ions, electrons, or protons i n modern physics.-K.F.L. Piiramarthika : ( Skr.) Relating to spiritual, es­ sential, or absolute matters.-K.F.L. Parapsychology : ( Gr. para, at the side of + psyche, soul + logia from logein, to speak) The investigation of prescience, telepathy and other alleged psychical phenomena which seem to elude ordinary physical and physiological ex­ planation. The term was proposed by Boirac ( 1 893 ) and was adopted by Florunay and Oesterreich. See A. Lalande, Vocabulaire de la philosophie, Vol. II, p. 646. See Prescience, Telepathy.-L.W. Parii:iama-vada : (Skr.) Theory of evolution ex­ pounded by the Sankhya ( q.v . ) , according to which the disturbed equilibrium between two primary substances (prakrti and puru!a) is re­ sponsible for change.-K.F.L. Parmenid es : 6th-5th century B.C., head of the Eleatic School of Greek Philosophy ; developed the conception o f "Being" in opposition to the "Becoming" of Heraclitus. To think at all we must postul ate something which is ; that which is not cannot be thought, and cannot be. Thought without being or being without thought are im­ possible, and the two are therefore identical. At the same time the "Being" of Parmenides is that which fills space ; non-being is empty space. Empty space therefore cannot be, and if empty space or the "Void" cannot be then the plurality of individual things is equally not real since this results from the motion of the "full" in the "void". There is thus for Parmenides only one "Being" without inner differentiation ; this alone really is, while the particularity of individual things is appearance, illusion. Homogeneous and unchangeable "Being" is the only reality.-M.F. Parmenides' ma in extant work is a poem "On Truth." Parousia : {Gr. presence) In Plato's philosoEhy, the presence of the Idea in the thing which, in turn, pa rtakes of the Idea ; in theology, the presits

226

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

ence of Christ a fter h is prophesied return to ea rth .-K.F.L. Parsimony, Law of : N ame given to v arious statements of a general regulative principle of economy of thought, or effort, io the use o f means to attain a purpose ; l i k e tha t o f Wi l liam of Ockham ( d ied about 1 3 4 9 ) , called Ockham's razo r : Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. It is i n terpreted in the sense that the least possible number of assumptions a re to be made in the attempt to expla i n ascertained facts. I t has been supposed that the same prin­ ciple o f simp l icity prev ails in the physical cos­ mos, since appa rently nature employs the fewest possible mea ns effec tively to attain the ends wh ich are intended.-1.J.R. Particula r : ( Lat. pars, a part) A member of a class as opposed to the property which de­ fines the c lass ; an i n d i v idual as opposed to a universal .-A .C.B. Pa rticular proposition : In traditional logic, propos itions A, E (excepting singular forms, ac­ cording to some) were called universal and I, 0, particular. See Logic, formal, � 4.-A .C. Particulate : A n adjec tive which means, having the form o f minu te particles, or assuming such a form. Also a verb now a lmost obsolete which sig nified, to d i vide into parts mental ly, or to sepa rate into rea lly existing particles. Formerly it also meant, to particularize.-1.J.R. Parva Nat ural ia : The name traditionally given to a series of short t reatises by Aristotle on psy­ chological and biological topics: viz. De Sensu

et Sensibili, De lv1emo ..ia et Reminiscentia, De Somno, De Somniis, De Divinatione per Som­ nium , De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae, De Vita et Jl,forte, De Respiratione.-G.R.M. Pascal, Blaise : ( 1 62 3-1 662 ) French phil osopher, mathematician and scientist. He conducted sc ien­ tific researches including experiments on at­ mospheric pressure a n d in vented an ingen ious calculating machi ne. He turned from preocc upa­ tion with the scientific to the study of man and his spiritual problems and fou nd faith as a sounder guide than reason. At this stage of his thought, theology becomes central. These thoughts are developed in his Provincial Let­ te?rs and in his posth umously publ ished master­ pi eces of style, the Pensees.-L.E.D. Passive E m piricism : The doctrine that knowl­ edge comes by way of experience with the em­ phasis upon the nega tive cha racter of the mind. The mind can act only u pon the stimulus of contact with the world outside itsel f. John Locke furnishes an example of this view. See

Tabula rasa.-V.F. Past : That part of t ime, continuously growing,

which includes all the events \\ h :ch ha ve a l ready ha pper.ed. The ir relat:onsliip with othe r past events is general ly rega rded as fixed.-R.B. W . Past-Time : All the extent of time preceding � givi:n event or exper ience ; th e term is occasion­ ally confined to that extent of preceding time \\ hich is relev ant to a giv en event or experience. Obviously enough, pa st-time i s not a pernunrnt condition un rela ted to the succession of events : anyth ing that is past has hC'en present and a lso

future before i t became p resent. The ontological status of the past is uncertain, insofar as i t has no ex istence at the moment when it is cal led past yet cannot be designated as unconditionally non-existent i n the sense appl icable to fiction or un truth .-R .B . W. Patanjali : The author of the Yogasutras (q.v.), not identical with the famous Hindu grammarian by the same name.-K.F.L. Patripassianism : ( Lat. pater, father ; patior, suf­ fer ) The teach ing that Cod suffers. In Christian thought this view was held by Sabel lius (ti. first half of thi rd century) in connection with the sufferings of Jes us conceived to be Cod mani­ fested.-V.F. Patristic Philosophy : The a dvent of Christian revel ation introd uced a p rofound change i n the h istory of philosophy. New facts about Cod, the world and man were j ux ta posed to the con­ clusions o f pagan philosophy, while reason was at once presented with the p roblem of reconcil­ ing these facts with the pagan position a n d the task of constructing them i nto a new science cal led theology. In general , pa tristic p h i losophy is d i fferenti­ ated from medieva l and modern phil osophies in that it failed to distinguish adequately between the conclusions of reason and the facts of revela­ tion. Ph i l osophy, theology and the truth s of religion made one amorphous body o f truth. However, three stages m ark the development of patristic thought. ( I ) From dawn of Christian Era to 200 : The Fathers of this period, most of them converts from pagan ism, proclaimed the Ch ristia n religion as "the true ph ilosophy." Thei r works were mostly apologetic in nature, directed either against pagan prej udices and misconceptions or the religious speculations of Gnosticism. (2) From 200 to circa 450 : With the catechetic school of Alexandria and in par­ ticul ar with Clement a n d Origen, the work of reconciliation between Helleni stic phi losophy and the Christian religion formally begins. This period is cha racterized by the formulation of Christi an t ruths in the terminol ogy and frame­ work of Creek thought. It ends with the gigan­ tic synthesis of Augustine ( 3 H-43 0 ) , whose fuslon of Neo-Platonic though t and Ch ristian truth molded sol'iety a n d furn ished the tradition, cul ture and mental background for Christian Europe up to the end o f the 1 4th cen tury. ( 3 ) From 4 5 0 l o the 8th century : During this period there is a general decline until the Car­ lovingian renaissance. G reat names a re not lacking, such as those of Pseudo- Denis the Areopagite, John Damascene, Boethius �nd Isi­ dore of Sev i l l e ; however, the originality and spiritual elevation of a n Augustine a re not to be found. The period i s generally characterized by the elaboration and systematization of truths a l ready formularized. P l atonic and Neo-Pl atonic infl uences predom inate, though Aristotle's logic holds an honored pl ace throughout this pre­ Scholastic era. Cf. M ig ne's Patrologiae Latinae.

-H.Gu. Patterns of learning : Reaction modes, physio­ logical habit &ystems.-1.E.B.

DICTIONAR Y OF PHILOSOPH Y

Pea no, Giuseppe, 1 8 5 8 - 1 9 32, Italian mathemati­

cian. Professor of mathematics at the University of Turin, 1 890- 1 932. His work in mathematical logic marks a transition stage between the old a lgebra of logic and the newer methods. It is inferior to Frege's by present stan dards of rigor, but nevertheless contains importa nt advances, among which may be mentioned the d isti nction between class inclusion ( c ) and class member­ ship ( E )-which had p reviously been con fused­ and the i ntroduction of a notation for formation of a c lass by abstraction (q. v.). His logical notations are more convenient than Frege's, and many of them are sti l l in common use. Peano's first p ublication on mathematical logic was the introduction to his Calcolo Geometrico, 1 8 8 8 . H is postulates for a ri thmetic ( see arith­ metic, foundations of) appeared i n his A rith­ metices Principia ( 1 8 8 9 ) and in revised form i n Sul concello di numero ( Rivista di Matematica, vol. l ( 1 89 1 ) ), and were repeated in successive volumes (more p roperly, editions) of h i s Formu­ laire de Mathematique s ( 1 894- 1 90 8 ) . The last­ named work, written with the aid of coll abora­ tors, was i ntended to provide a reduction of all mathematics to symbolic notation, and often the encyclopedic a spect was stressed a s much as, or more than, that of logica l ;rn alysis. Peano i s known also for other contributions to mathematics, including the discovery o f the a rea-filling curve which bea rs his na me, and for his a dvocacy of Latino sine flexione a s an int!!�­ national la nguage. A. C. P. E. B . Jourdain, Giuseppe Peano, The Quar­ terly Journa f of Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 43 ( 1912 ) , pp . 270-3 14. Giu;eppe Pearro, supplement to Schola et Vita , Milan, 1 928. U. Cassina, Vita et opera de Giuseppe Peano, Schola et Vita , vol . 7 ( 1932 ) . pp. 1 1 7-1 48. E. Stamm, Jozef Pea no , Wiadomo5ci Maternatyczne, vol. 36 ( 1933 ) . pp. 1-56. U. Cassina, l'o p era 1cientifica di Giuseppe Pea no , Rendiconti de! Seminario Matematico e Fisico di Milano, vol. 7 ( 193 3 ) , pp. 323-389. U. Cassina , l" oeune philo1ophique de G . Peano, Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, vol. 40 ( 1933 ) , pp. 481-49 1 . Peirce, Charles Sanders : American Phil osopher. Born in Cambridge, Mass. on September 1 0 th , 1 8 39. Harvard M .A . in 1 862 and Sc. B. i n 1 8 63. Except f o r a brief ca reer as lecturer i_n philosophy at H a rvard, 1 864-65 and 1 869-70, and in logic at Joh n s Hopkins, ! 8 79-84, he did no formal teaching. Longest ten ure was with the U nited States Coast and Geodetic Sur­ vey for thi rty years beginning in 1 8 6 1 . Died at Milford, Pa. in 1 9 1 4. He had completed only one work, The Grand logic, published posthumously ( Coll. Papers). Edited Studies in logic ( 1 8 8 3 ) . No vo lumes published during his lifetime but a utho r o f m a ny lectures, essays and reviews in periodicals, particularly i n the Popular Science Monthly, 1 87 7-78, and in The Monist, 1 89 1 -93, some of "' hich have been repri nted in Chance, lot1e and logic ( 1 923 ), edited by Morris R. Cohen, a n d, together with the best of his other work both publi shed and un pub­ fohed, in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce ( 1 9 3 1 -3 5 ), edited by Cha rles Ha rtsh orne and Paul Weiss. He was most in fluenced by Kant, w h o ha d, he thought, raised all the re le-

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vant phil osophica l problems but from whom he differed on al most every solution. He was ex­ cited by Darwin, whose doctrine of evol ution coinci ded ·with his own thought, and di sciplined by laboratory experience in the physica l sciences "' h ich inspired his search for rigor and demon­ stration throughout his w ork . Felt h i msel f deep­ ly op posed to Descartes, whom he accused of being responsi ble for the modern form of the nominal istic error. Fa vorably i nclined toward Duns Scotus, from whom he derived his realism. Philosophy is a sub-class of the science of dis­ covery, in turn a branch of theoretical science. The function o f philosophy is to explain and hence show un ity i n the va riety o f the universe. All phi losophy takes its start i n logic, or the relations of signs to the i r objects, and phenom­ enology, or the brute experience o f the obj ective actual wot Id. The conclusions from these two studies meet i n the three basic metaphysical cate­ gories : quality, reaction, and representation. Qual ity is firstness o r s ponta neity ; reaction is secondness or actuality ; and representation is thirdness or possibil ity. Realism (q.v . ) is explicit in the d istinction of the modes of being : actuality as the field of reactions ; possibility as the field of quality (or values ) and representa­ tion ( or relations ) . He was much concerned to establ ish the realism of scientific method : that the postulates, implications and conclusions of science are the results of inquiry yet presup­ posed by it. He was respon sible for pragmatism as a method· of philosophy : that the sum of the practical consequences w h ich result by neces­ sity from the truth of an in tel lectual conception consti tutes the entire meaning o f that concep­ tion. Author of the ethical principle that the limited duration of all fin ite things logica lly demands the identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community of persons :ind things. I n his cosmology the flux o f actua 'ity left to itself develops those systematic cha racter­ i stics which are usually associated with the realm of possibil ity. There is a logical contin uity to chance events which through i ndefin ite repetition beget order, as illustrated in the tendency o f all things to acquire habits. The desire of all things to come together i n this certa in order renders love a kind of evoluti onary force. Exerted a strong i n fluence both on the American prag­ matist, William J ames ( 1 842- 1 9 1 0 ) , the instru­ mentalist, John Dewey ( 1 8 59-), as well as on the idea l ist, Josiah R oyce ( 1 8 1 '- 1 9 1 6 ), an,l many others.-J.K.F. Pei rce's law : The theorem of th e propositional ca lcul us, ::i

::i

A. C. [ [ p ::i q ] p] p. Pelagianism : The teaching of Pelagius of Britain

w h o was active during the first qua rter of the fifth cent ury in Rome, North Africa , and Pales­ tine. He denied original sin and the necessity of ba ptism in order to he freed from it. Death wa s not a pun ishment fur sin, and men can he saved w i thout the aid of divine grace. By j us­ tification men are purged of their sins through f.1ith a lone. Pel:igius was notably in !iuenced by Stoic doctrines. He an