Development in Nigeria: Promise on Hold? 9780367349486, 9780429328916

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Development in Nigeria

This book unravels the trajectories and dilemmas of development in Nigeria since its independence in 1960. Despite enormous human and material resources, development progress in Nigeria has not met expectations. By delving into the various factors that have influenced development efforts and initiatives, Development in Nigeria: Promise on Hold? aims to draw out lessons to help the country to achieve its potential. In many ways Nigeria typifies the African puzzle of near-misses, a neverending drive towards development with enormous promise but no real practical output. As in many states within Africa, these failures can be traced to structural inadequacies and the perennial weakness of public institutions. Problems which collectively undermine sustainable development and growth include political corruption, ethnicity, failure of public institutions, distributional injustice, fiscal centralism in a purported federal state, faulty democratic traditions, malevolent elite class, religious and social c­ onflicts, among others. By taking a comprehensive panoramic overview of the country’s historical experience as both a military dictatorship and democracy, Edlyne Eze Anugwom presents a nuanced, comprehensive and contemporary interrogation of the ever-dynamic forces and factors in Nigeria’s development project. This book’s incisive examination of Nigeria’s development aspirations over time will be of interest to students of Development and African Studies, as well as to practitioners and multilateral agencies involved in development planning and intervention in Nigeria who are looking for strategies for overcoming the challenges facing the country. Edlyne Eze Anugwom is Professor at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Routledge Studies in African Development

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Development in Nigeria Promise on Hold?

Edlyne Eze Anugwom

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Edlyne Eze Anugwom The right of Edlyne Eze Anugwom to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Anugwom, Edlyne Eze, 1969- author. Title: Development in Nigeria : promise on hold? / Edlyne Eze Anugwom. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge studies in African development | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2019058536 (print) | LCCN 2019058537 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367349486 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429328916 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Economic development–Nigeria. | Nigeria–Economic conditions. | Nigeria–Social conditions. | Nigeria–Politics and government. Classification: LCC HC1055 .A7253 2020 (print) | LCC HC1055 (ebook) | DDC 338.9669–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019058536 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019058537 ISBN: 978-0-367-34948-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-32891-6 (ebk) Typeset in Goudy by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To Princess Chinuru with love

Contents

List of tablesix Prefacex Acknowledgementsxii   1 Introduction: plethora of near misses and grandstanding rhetoric of nationalism

1

  2 Nigeria: country, nation and people

11

  3 Theorizing an obvious absurdity

26

  4 Between public trust and private profit: political corruption and development in Nigeria 

45

  5 An ever-malignant tumour: ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism in Nigeria

67

  6 The struggle with secularism: religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria

85

  7 Boom and bust: an economy in quagmire – oil and the diminishing of economic development prospects

103

  8 From election to selection: democracy, leadership and development in Nigeria

122

  9 The Niger Delta, oil conflict and the minorities question

143

viii  Contents

10 Beyond Bakassi: state, democracy and the resurgence of Biafran nationalism in Nigeria

160

11 Primordial loyalties, ethnonationalism and the general crisis of national identity

179

12 Resource distribution, marginalization and sectionalism: implications for democracy and development in Nigeria

196

13 Federalism and development in Nigeria: a balancing act or retreat from the norm

214

14 Conclusion: between unity and implosion

228

Index247

Tables

  2.1  Projected population of Nigeria by state (2016) 14   2.2  Geopolitical zones by states in Nigeria 21   4.1  Convictions by the EFCC (2013–2014) 56   4.2 Major milestones on corruption investigation/ prosecution by EFCC 57   7.1 Spread and trend in poverty levels in Nigeria (%) (1980–2004)107   7.2 Relative poverty incidence by educational level of head of household in Nigeria (%) (2009) 114   7.3 Electricity supply by region by hours by mean cost (2012/2013)115   7.4 Nigerian states by poor proportion share by total poor (%) 117   7.5 Percentage contribution to real GDP by some key sectors by year (1960–2009) 119   9.1 Distribution of political constituencies by state by the 1999 constitution 148 12.1  Revenue allocation formula in Nigeria 205 12.2  Horizontal revenue allocation in Nigeria 205

Preface

The writing of this book was as challenging as it was interesting and engaging. Without doubt, writing a sole author text that does significant justice to the issue of development in as large and heterogeneous a nation as Nigeria, is daunting and, obviously, beyond what I had done before. However, being Nigerian and living mostly in Nigeria all my adult life gave me both the passion and unique insights to address the subject of the book. Development must be recognized as having to do with sustained interventions, policies or practices within a given and conducive socio-political context, driven essentially by the overriding goal of qualitatively improving socio-political and economic situations for a majority of the members of the society concerned. In other words, it resonates with the greater good of the greater number through interventions or actions that are sustained or sustainable. It is largely a process of both incremental and radical transformations. The problem, or rather challenge, about Nigeria is not the large population of the country or even the heterogeneous social and ethnic groups in it. The challenge derives essentially from what can be labelled the diverse and disparate political history of both Nigeria and the distinct social groups in it. Nigeria seems to have run the cycle from colonialism, initial democracy to long reign of the military and current two decades of uninterrupted democracy. Within these different eras, its economy has moved from dependence on primary agricultural products to reliance almost solely on oil. The above scenarios have generated distinct development impetus and aspirations as well as plans and programmes. However, bestriding all these development programmes are the overwhelming domestic socio-political and international environments. Therefore, the success of development programmes and advances made towards development have been affected by different socio-political forces. The main thrust of the book, therefore, was to examine if not exhaustively, sufficiently, these forces and factors that have affected development in Nigeria since its independence in 1960. In spite of whatever perspective one adopts, there is almost a consensus that development in Nigeria has not kept pace with the enormous resources and potential in the country. At the independence of Nigeria in 1960, and

Preface  xi even up to the early 1970s, there was much global and even domestic optimism about the potential of the country to break from the ranks of the then “underdeveloped nations” and emerge as a leading developing nation soon enough. However, such optimism began to dim as economic mismanagement and structural incapacities reared their ugly heads. The sum outcome was that Nigeria began to be perceived as a country that had become ensnared by multiple structural problems and incommensurate development profile. Thus, the captivating appellation “giant of Africa” by which the country was once popularly referred became inverted to “sleeping giant of Africa” – an apt reference to the glaring disconnect between the country’s potential and its development achievements. In spite of the contested nature of the concept of development, there is no confusion regarding the recognition of significant improvements in any given human society, including Nigeria. In other words, while we may differ on the academic conceptualization of development and even its consistent specific indicators, there is no such confusion about identifying a developed society or that on the sure path to development. Nigeria is currently ranked among the developing nations of the world but its position here is consistently threatened and unsustainable without significant advances in the near future. Therefore, while some strides have been made in recent decades, the development profile of Nigeria has not changed in any radical sense and the old problems bedevilling development have seemingly refused to go away. Like dominant shadows, they have followed Nigeria’s journey of nationhood. Therefore, the interrogation of these forces that influence development in Nigeria logically becomes a critical primary step towards comprehending and resolving Nigeria’s development dilemmas over time. This book is therefore a modest contribution to the above tasks. Edlyne Anugwom Leipzig, Germany November 2019

Acknowledgements

I cannot possibly exhaust the list of those who have contributed directly or indirectly to this project or those who have offered support in one way or the other. But the ritual must be consummated as usual. I would therefore begin by expressing my appreciation to Prof. Dr. Dmitri van den Bersselaar for his usual support, encouragement and camaraderie as I struggled to complete the manuscript. I am also grateful to all staff of the Institute of African Studies, Leipzig where, incidentally, I put finishing touches to the manuscript of the book. This book would not have been possible or sensible without the insights drawn from other writers and scholars who have written on the same or similar subjects. Therefore, I am very grateful to these people. I also acknowledge the staff of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in Nigeria, especially those in charge of statistics and data who have always responded to my needs for primary data in this and other projects. The help of the Chief Statistician, Leo Sanni, in this regard is much appreciated. I am also gratefully beholden to my past and present students everywhere, especially those who consistently challenged me to do something like this. All the good people I encountered at Taylor and Francis who showed commendable patience and support along the way are equally appreciated. And of course, I salute my dearest wife and kindred spirit, Kene, for her usual support which I would never take for granted. To my children – UC, Dera, Osora, Ziko and Chinny I profess my love; you are all jewels in my crown.

1 Introduction Plethora of near misses and grandstanding rhetoric of nationalism

Overarching goal of the book The book examines multifarious factors that have directly or indirectly mediated development efforts in Nigeria since independence and from this standpoint provides thorough understanding on how despite enormous human and material resources, development has thus far eluded Nigeria. The above quest was primarily driven by the desire to identify factors that have dogged Nigeria’s development over time and from this perspective unravel new strategies for unleashing the enormous potentials of the country and putting it on a steady path to sustainable development. The basic assumption here is that Nigeria as a state project has neither lived up to expectations nor achieved development growth commensurate with its human and material resources. As has been succinctly argued, “after independence in 1960, Nigeria has been widely considered one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most prominent postcolonial states” (Heerten & Moses, 2014: 172). In other words, while much hope was placed on the Nigerian nation to lead the way in development on the continent, events so far indicate that almost the contrary has been the uncomfortable reality. Perhaps, the African social scientist, Kankwenda (1994) was referring to Nigeria when he contended some years ago that despite decades of trafficking in development paradigm and ideologies, development remains far-fetched in most parts of the African continent. Therefore, it would seem that in most major indicators of development, Nigeria remains too much like a promise on hold and often reflects a typical African puzzle of self-fulfilling destiny of near misses and perennial development doldrums. In alignment with what appears to be like the situation in many other African countries, the development failures in Nigeria may be traced to structural inadequacies and the incapacity of public institutions. Therefore, Nigeria has thus far failed to live up to its promises and undoubted potential, given abundant human and material resources. The above reality is what Osaghae (1998) alluded to when he likened Nigeria to a sleeping giant. In fact, that allusion is really a popular phrasing of the

2  Introduction evident development disappointment in the country. Incidentally, over two decades later, the nation still seems largely asleep rather than awake. In spite of an undoubted and often overflowing spirit of nationalism, Nigeria has literally frittered away numerous chances to initiate a sustainable development trajectory since independence. There is therefore the sense of near misses and the unending recalibration of the process of development as the public administration of the country is largely characterized by policy reversals and inconsistencies, all of which ironically devour the momentum of any development initiative in the country.

Development: a contested concept? Development can refer to both a state and a condition of a given society as well as a process, system or course of positive change in a society. In both cases, development is conceived as a dynamic and long-term process of structural transformation. But development is really in more senses than one an often-contested concept and process. Therefore, what constitutes development and how development should be measured is often a source of dissension among both scholars and practitioners. Apart from a general notion of improvement or the broad reference to growth, there is hardly popular consensus on the subject. All the same, it would seem ironic that despite differing opinions on what constitutes development, there is hardly any strong disagreement over what underdevelopment or lack of development entails. The controversy over development assumes an even more problematic angle when it is used in reference to a developing country like Nigeria. In this case, the evocation of the term, apart from the usual economic and social embodiments, may also generate political and nationalistic fervour. Therefore, over time, development, particularly in terms of the general situation of life in developing societies and the relationship between these societies and the rest of the world, has equally been politicized and often employed in pejorative senses. Development discourse also often embodies and veils ideological and even doctrinal leanings or aspirations. Thus, the invocation of development and its use in reference to a nation might embody meanings that are neither objective nor intellectually reasoned but are the perspective of the user of the concept or the outcome of the person’s ideological leanings. Perhaps, some of the contests about development result from the emergence of the notion as a generic term that makes general and broad statements about human wellbeing and social development. Thus, even though the concept is seen as old as civilization, its use as a generic construct in Western societies from Greco-Roman times elevated it almost to a doctrine (see Soares & Quintella, 2008) – a doctrine that focuses generally on the social wellbeing of human beings in society. The above situation persists despite the fact that economists, sociologists and development scholars have invested a lot of energy in specifying or

Introduction  3 explicating indicators of development. These indicators incidentally often generate their own contestations as some of these indicators are seen as directly tailored after the conception of reality by the West and even designed to undermine African autochthony and agency. It is in the light of this that the discourse of development in this book must start from a general notion of what this concept is and how it is applied in the case of Nigeria. The work of classical scholars and writers like Condorcet, Kant, Leibniz, Hegel, Marx and the social evolutionists gave the general impression that development is associated with progress, modernization and liberation in human society. In spite of the fact that some of these initial conceptions were evolutionary in nature, they also cohered with significant improvements in society. Without doubt, a new era in the usage or application of the concept occurred in the twentieth century. Pushing this new era were the Americans, beginning with President Harry Truman who saw it as a duty to avail the other nations of the world of America’s technical knowledge as well as foster capital investment in areas (of the world) needing development (see Soares & Quintella, 2008). Thus, the revolution in the practice of development and even the relations between the global North and South on this score was radicalized with the paternal proposal in the inaugural speech of Harry S. Truman as the thirty-third President of the United States. According to Truman: We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. (Truman, 1999: 591) This statement, apart from obvious positing development (West) as the direct opposite of underdevelopment (rest of the world), also saw the beginning of intellectual and institutional efforts led by the West in the ostentatious bid to address the “backwardness” of the other parts of the globe. The call to development reverberated in the developing and then mainly colonized parts of the world. For these nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia, the 1960s became eventually the decade of decolonization and the urgent need to foster development in these nations, then seen as third world countries, was initiated. Incidentally, the global concerns about the state of the emerging decolonized societies generated two significant outcomes. One was the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), expected to help in narrowing the development gap between the developing and developed countries of the

4  Introduction world; the other was the emergence and proliferation of modernization ­theories or perspectives, which saw development simply as making these nations like the West. While not belabouring the history of development, suffice it to state here that another turning point in the conception and pursuit of development occurred because of a report entitled “Our Common Future” published in 1987 by the World Commission for Environment and Development. The report, more commonly known and referred to as the Bruntland Report, was the culmination of a growing global concern with the use of natural resources and the influence of this on the environment and human survival in the years ahead. The key element of the Bruntland Report was without doubt the popularization of the idea of “sustainable development”. In other words, the focus now should not just be on development per se but on ­sustainable development, that is, that which takes care of the needs of today without jeopardizing the future. In fact, the report, with focus on sustainable development which is all about the pursuit of development without compromising or endangering the environment and the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, can be seen as the legitimate forerunner of present concerns around climate change. In other words, it is development in which pursuit of present needs does not compromise the ability of future generations equally to meet their own needs in an equally sustainable manner. Bruntland and his colleagues, however, did not invent the idea of sustainable development but the report elevated the notion into global significance and made it almost a mantra of development discourse and programming for many years. Even today, sustainable development is often a preferred way of referencing development that is conscious of the environment and pursued within the bounds of the greater good for the greater number. In spite of a plethora of definitions, one finds the conception of development along the lines of a process of progress, positive change and growth, which may be in terms of both economic and social improvements and the conscious efforts to establish ecological balance while in the pursuit and substance of the foregoing. In other words, development cannot be de-escalated as simple economic growth or something measured solely or mainly on ­economic indicators. Development, always implies a favourable change, a step from the simple to the complex, from the inferior to the superior, from worse to better. [Development] indicates that one is doing well because one is advancing in the sense of a necessary, ineluctable, universal law and toward a desirable goal. (Esteva, 1992: 10) Development is thus comprehensive and embodies both the economy and other spheres of society and must be conceptualized as a process that is

Introduction  5 highly conscious of the need to preserve the integrity of the environment or achieve ecological balance. Development, especially from a sustainable perspective, must of necessity involve clear social and economic inclusion, economic wellbeing and the conscious effort towards preserving natural resources or the environment. Development is thus comprehensive and multidisciplinary in nature. It is anchored on the realization of the interdependence and complementarity between economic, social and environmental spheres. Development is in this sense measured reliably by indicators which at the minimum embody these three elements. A critical element of development, especially from the angle of developing nations like Nigeria is that of social inclusion, that is, how economic development or growth embodies social inclusion. In such a context, impressive economic indicators in the midst of deepening poverty, deprivation and social and physical infrastructural decay means essentially the inversion of development. In addition, there is no arguing the fact that social development cannot happen without a good economic base; equally, it would be very difficult to achieve economic development in the midst of social blight or social pathologies. Social development, as implicated here, goes beyond social inclusion to include social justice, distributional justice, good and responsive governance, education, health etc. that define both democracy and citizenship in contemporary terms. Both social and economic development can only be made consistent and permanent when guided by the need to always maintain ecological balance, that is, environmentally sensitive development as well as inclusive growth. In agreement with the comprehensive and multi-sphere conception of development, the development economist, Michael Paul Todaro weighs in by arguing that development is not only or purely an economic phenomenon; it is rather a multidimensional process which involves the reorganization and reorientation of both the economic and social systems (Todaro, 1985). Todaro consistently held that development is both a physical reality and a state of mind. In this case, society utilizing some combinations of social, economic and political processes attempts to secure a better life for its members. He goes on to identify what can be called his core objectives of development. These include: raising peoples’ levels of living or what can be called quality of life – this would include an increase in incomes and consumption, food, available medical services, education and other critical needs through the appropriate growth processes; the society should also create conditions conducive to the growth of self-esteem – this is achieved through establishment of political, social and economic systems and accompanying institutions which foster and promote human dignity and respect; the society should also aspire towards increasing the freedom of people to choose through enlarging or increasing the range of their choice, for instance improving varieties of goods and services available to them.

6  Introduction Without doubt, Todaro’s conception and outlook on development can be criticized on a number of grounds, however my interest in it is the fact that it opens up the vista of development as a comprehensive phenomenon embodying a wide range of processes and institutions over time. In view of the foregoing, the book conceptualizes development mainly in terms of general qualitative improvement and responsive adaptation to the social environment. The above ideas resonate with the notion of sustainable development and the 1980 Brandt Commission (see Wionczek, 1981) conceptualization of development as a process, which while taking care of the needs of the present generation, does not in any way compromise or endanger the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The conceptualization of development along the above lines implicates an integrated approach, which includes economic, social (geopolitical) and environmental dimensions (see Lapeyre, 2004). In this manner, development is both widespread and comprehensive, especially when used in reference to a modern heterogeneous and multicultural society like Nigeria. In spite of the seemingly wide-ranging issues covered in the book, they are interrelated as elements of development in Nigeria. Nevertheless, more importantly, one conceives development as used in the book from a systemic perspective, that is, an interdependent and interconnected open system where an event in one sphere of society affects the others and the whole. In other words, development is conceived here as a systematic process of growth and sustainable improvement in all major spheres of society. It is neither a question of one aspect without the other nor a question of some aspects playing catch-up with the others. Thus, the existence of poor leadership, for instance, would affect general development planning and execution of development programmes. In the same manner, pervasive political corruption would take the steam out of even the best-conceived development programme. The existence of wide-ranging poverty impedes both the democratic process and implicates either a poor economy or a grossly lop-sided economy characterized by acute inequality and general deprivation. Pervasive and recurrent social conflicts without doubt would impinge on other spheres of development and limit the ability of the leadership or political system to deliver on the goals of development. It is axiomatic that genuine and sustainable development (defined along the lines of that which secures the growth and improvement of today’s generation without impeding the ability of future generations to enjoy even better improved growth or improvement) can hardly take root in an atmosphere of rancour.

Development in Nigeria: elusive in spite of nationalistic rhetoric As is obvious from the foregoing, the conceptualization of development here also involves a comprehensive approach anchored in two major concerns,

Introduction  7 which should be seen as embodying development aspirations of the country over time. These concerns are the ability of the Nigerian state to achieve significant improvements benchmarked against tackling poverty and the ability of the country to generate and sustain long-term growth in both economic and social development (including deepening democracy, rule of law and public accountability). In fact, these concerns around alleviating or tackling poverty and sustaining long-term growth may be seen as critical factors of development in Africa as a whole. In an insightful take on why it has been difficult for Nigeria to achieve significant economic and political performance since its independence, Scacco (2012: 323) contends that “the country’s ethnic diversity, colonial legacy and problematic civil-military relations are all overshadowed by the politically divisive impact of oil”. In other words, Scacco aligns with the once popular resource curse logic in explaining Nigeria’s development conundrum. In spite of the veracity of this assertion in the sense that the oil wealth has neither been well utilized nor allowed for focus on meaningful economic diversification, the problem of development in Nigeria goes far beyond the oil problem. It implicates socio-historical and political forces and problems which predate the emergence of oil and in fact could be seen as the origin of the failure to consummate the economic opportunities offered by oil, unlike the situation in a couple of states in the Middle East. There is no gainsaying the fact that development as a process in the developing world has been more or less hampered by the allure of fashionable slogans and short-term programmes that have flourished over time. Most of these programmatic slogans have been driven by multilateral and international development agencies. These slogans and programmes are usually short-sighted and have almost always fallen prey to the unconscious one-approach-is-the-key paradigm. In other words, they adopt a one-size-fitsall orientation that has failed to address the problem. In fact, in the case of Africa in general it has been contended that some of the approaches or efforts were mere palliatives and do not represent genuine development aspiration for the continent (see Amazio, 2012). Over time one has heard slogans or programmatic idioms ranging from the “big push” (big injections of capital as the panacea to the development challenge of the developing nations), the human capital approach (building good human capital especially in science and technology as the key), the green revolution (often called the agrarian revolution), appropriate or intermediate technologies approach to informal sector promotion (which unfortunately embodies a pejorative view of the economy of these nations), structural adjustment (a very popular and almost totally disastrous approach which hinged essentially on radicalization of the macroeconomies of these nations), sustainable development and inclusive growth. While these programmes or approaches are undoubtedly well informed, they are often short-sighted and short-termed. In the most obvious weakness, they gloss over or fail to appreciate the complexity of the development

8  Introduction challenges in these nations. For instance, the development challenge cannot be realistically overcome through an approach that focuses on a single perspective or even portions of the problem. This informs the wide-ranging issues tackled in this book. A good overview of these issues would convince one of the complexity of the challenges and how the present state of affairs in Nigeria has been produced by a concert of factors. Therefore, resolving the development challenge would require a clear understanding and nuanced appreciation of these factors that have been implicated in the journey of Nigeria to development and nationhood thus far. These factors encompass the economic, social and political spheres of the nation’s public life. They are as comprehensive as they are ostensibly often disparate. However, there is no denying the immanent or systemic nature and nexus between these factors. The subject of development even in the case of Nigeria is easily given to controversy. In this case, the divergence of opinions, theoretical preferences, ideological leanings and even prescriptions underline how contested and scientifically uncertain the study of development can get. However, my remit in this book is to provide different themes and factors that have over time influenced or retarded development in Nigeria. While there are suggestions in the book, these are cast neither in stone nor are they prescriptive in nature. In spite of the above, the conclusions and suggestions drawn in this book are directly derived from the state of the economy, governance and social progress (or lack of it) in Nigeria since its independence in 1960.

Method of the book Given the wide range of development issues and socio-political periods covered in the book, a robust methodology, which enabled the gathering of information from varied but complementary sources, was employed. Therefore, the book derived information from the following sources: a thoroughgoing desk review of existing literature on development and their different ramifications over time on Nigeria. The above enabled the identification of gaps in the extant literature, and made it possible for a critical and deep apprehension of the nature and dynamics of development over time in Nigeria especially from the perspective of socio-political factors that have driven and still drive development in the country. Second, the book also drew from documentary sources of data especially from public institutions and statutory bodies saddled with various components of development planning and implementation as well as data from such bodies as the National Bureau of Statistics; the World Bank; the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) etc. The information from the above sources provided the much-needed empirical dimension to the discourse; thus, they strengthened the contentions and arguments in the book. Finally, the book also depended on the content analysis of media articles and publications from the mainstream and grey media in Nigeria. Content

Introduction  9 analysis in this case was guided by the goal and objectives of the various individual chapters. However, the main goal of such analyses was to establish consistent themes and general patterns in the subjects covered. Articles and publications utilized here were mainly from contemporary media (newspapers, magazines and official bulletins) and excluded publications predating Nigeria’s independence in 1960 and articles that were obviously frivolous and riddled with personal opinion. Despite the absence of primary data from the above methodology, the information derived from the above sources were robust enough to provide reliable information and insight for the book.

Organization of the book The various topics covered in the book, apart from reflecting and representing recurrent themes in public governance and development in postcolonial Nigeria, are all critical, overlapping and interdependent factors. The above reality, which is much more than mere sophistry, enmeshes these themes as interlinked embodiments of development in Nigeria. However, in order both to enable comprehension and reinforce logic in presentation, the book is organized under five overriding thematic sections. Each of these is made up of relevant chapters that address similar concerns. In other words, arrangement of the various chapters of the book are grouped into five major thematic concerns made up of three chapters each, with the exception of the conclusion. These thematic concerns which are not absolutely exclusive are: 1

2

3

Introduction and agenda setting – This section is composed of three introductory chapters which provide the justification/rationale for the book; the theoretical perspectives identified as relevant to the theme of development in Nigeria; and a general overview of the geopolitical entity called Nigeria or context of the discourse. These chapters are: Introduction: plethora of near misses and grandstanding (Chapter 1); Nigeria: country, nation and people (Chapter 2); and Theorizing an obvious absurdity (Chapter 3). Governance and leadership – Here the focus is on the nature and ramifications of governance and leadership over time in Nigeria. The specific chapters under this theme are: Between public trust and private profit: political corruption and development in Nigeria (Chapter 4); From election to selection: democracy, leadership and development in  Nigeria (Chapter 8); Resource distribution, marginalization and ­sectionalism: implications for democracy and development in Nigeria (Chapter 12). Ethnicity and social conflict – This third theme sought the examination of recurrent centrifugal forces in Nigeria’s postcolonial history. The chapters here include: An ever-malignant tumour: ethnic virus and

10  Introduction

4

5

c­ entrifugal nationalism in Nigeria (Chapter 5); The struggle with secularism: religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria (Chapter 6); Beyond Bakassi: state, democracy and the resurgence of Biafran nationalism in Nigeria (Chapter 10). Economy and distributive justice – The focus in this theme was the examination of the nature of the Nigerian economy and the role of the distributive system in the country on its development. The individual chapters are: Boom and bust: an economy in quagmire – oil conflict and the diminishing of development prospects (Chapter 7); The Niger Delta, oil conflict and the minorities question (Chapter 9); Primordial loyalties, ethnonationalism and the general crisis of national identity (Chapter 11). Conclusion – This section contains the last two chapters of the book, namely: Federalism and development in Nigeria: a balancing act or retreat from the norm (Chapter 13); and Conclusion: between unity and implosion (Chapter 14).

References Amazio, Y.E. (2012). “An alternative African developmentalism: A critique of zero-sum games and palliative economics”. Africa Development, 37 (4): 117–140. Esteva, Gustavo (1992). “Development”, in Sachs, W. (ed.) The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books (pp. 6–25). Heerten, Lasse., & Moses, D. (2014). “The Nigeria-Biafra war: Postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide”. Journal of Genocide Research, 16 (2–3): 169–203. Kankwenda, M. (1994). “Marabouts and merchants of development in Africa”. CODESRIA Bulletin, 3: 9–15. Lapeyre, Frédéric (2004). The outcome and impact of the main international commissions on development issues. Working paper No. 30, Policy Integration Department World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization; Geneva: ILO. Osaghae, Eghosa (1998). Crippled giant: Nigeria since independence. London: C. Hurst. Scacco, Alexandra (2012). “Nigeria: What factors account for Nigeria’s poor economic development and political performance since independence”, in Samuels, D.J. (ed.) Case studies in comparative politics. New York: Pearson (pp. 320–364). Soares, Jair., & Quintella, R.H. (2008). “Development: An analysis of concepts, measurement and indicators”. Brazilian Administration Review, 5 (2): 104–124. Todaro, Michael (1985). Economic development in the Third World. London: Longman Truman, H.S. (1999). “Inaugural address”, in Copeland, L., Lamm, L.W., & Mckenna, S.J. (eds) The world’s great speeches. New York: Dover Publications (pp. 589–591). Wionczek, M.S. (1981). “The Brandt report”. Third World Quarterly, 3 (1): 104–118.

2 Nigeria Country, nation and people

Arriving at a chapter that does adequate justice to the description of the humongous nature of the spatial and political entity called Nigeria is challenging. This stems from the undeniable heterogeneity and complexity of Nigeria as a modern state, and the fact that exclusive focus on the above themes could well serve as the only remit of a book-length manuscript. In fact, there are quite a good number of historical materials along this line that seek to provide comprehensive and detailed narratives on Nigeria’s historical and social development over time (see for instance, Bourne, 2015; Falola & Heaton, 2008; Falola, 2005; Ade-Ajayi, 1983; Ikime, 1980; Isichei, 1976; Coleman, 1963; Buchanan & Pugh, 1958; Burns, 1955). However, my concern here is to provide a good overview of the geographical, historical and socio-political nature of Nigeria that would serve to position readers to appreciate the rest of the book and the arguments therein. There is no doubt that Nigeria represents the largest black nation on Earth and perhaps the biggest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. But these significant features have been more the problem rather than an impetus to development, as we shall see from the historical development and sociopolitical growth of the nation over time. In order to achieve some semblance of order and ease comprehension, this chapter is organized under three main sections. These are: overview of the geography and history of Nigeria; socio-political developments in post-colonial Nigeria; and heterogeneity as the source of recurrent threats of implosion since independence in 1960.

Social geography of Nigeria Nigeria, the largest or most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa is located in West Africa. It is a tropical rainforest region with swathes of desert in the North and is endowed with enormous natural and mineral resources ranging from the well-known oil deposits, iron ore, coal, lead/ zinc, lignite, bitumen, limestone, marble, bauxite, salt, barites to gas, clay and gemstone gypsum, etc. In fact, conventional wisdom has it that each region/zone and state in Nigeria can lay claim to at least a minimum of three

12  Nigeria: country, nation and people mineral resources in abundant or commercial quantities. Such states as Plateau, Ondo, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Benue, Edo, Kogi are literally over-flush with mineral resources and some of these states, especially Nasarawa and Plateau, have been the sites of artisanal mining that has recently been associated with insecurity in the Northern areas of Nigeria. According to Obaje (2009), reports from the Geological Survey of Nigeria have it that the country has about 34 known major mineral deposits scattered in different locations across Nigeria. Geographically, Nigeria is on the Gulf of Guinea in the West African subregion with an area of 923,768 square kilometres (made up of 910,768 square kilometres of land mass and 13,000 square ­kilometres of water). It is bordered by such other nations as Cameroun in the east, Benin in the west and Chad (in the northeast) and Niger (in the northwest) in the extensive fringes of the country. Prominent geographical landmarks in Nigeria include the famous River Niger which flows south through the eastern parts of Nigeria. River Niger, which is Africa’s third longest river (1,174 kilometres) rises from the Futa Jallon Mountains in East Sierra Leone, does a journey of over 4,000 kilometres before entering Nigeria from the northwest. River Niger then receives River Benue, which originates in the Cameroons at Lokoja (consequently called the Confluence town), and then flows for about 547 kilometres into the Atlantic Ocean (see NBS, 2011). The prominence and popularity of River Niger also draw from its main tributaries in many parts of Nigeria. These main tributaries include the Sokoto, Anambra and Kaduna Rivers. The River Benue on the other hand empties into Lake Chad and has Gongola and Katsina-Ala Rivers as major tributaries. These two rivers and their ­tributaries have been great sources of agricultural success in the country – apart from being home to abundant aquatic life, they have been the source of fertile soil and have provided the possibility of irrigation farming, especially in the North and Middle Belt of Nigeria. However, in recent times they have been the source of adverse climatic events, such as flooding and its attendant destruction. For instance, the massive overflowing of the River Benue in 2012 occasioned great destruction far beyond Lokoja and Kogi state where the menace originated. Apart from these key rivers, Nigeria boasts such prominent landmarks as the Lake Chad Basin (prominent for agriculture and recently speculated as harbouring large oil and gas deposits); Borno Plains, which extend to the Lake Chad Basin; Mambilla Plateau; the famous Obudu Plateau (housing the Obudu Cattle Ranch); the meandering waterways, extensive coastlines, creeks and estuaries of the Niger Delta; the 725-metre-tall Zuma Rock near Abuja, among many others. In addition to a federalist geopolitical structure of 36 states, the country can be divided into five major geographical areas each with its own distinctive geographical markers. These are: the low coastal zone along the Gulf of Guinea; the Niger – Benue River Valley (one of the most diverse ecological zones of the country); hills and plateaus of the north, bordering the coastal

Nigeria: country, nation and people  13 zone; broad steep plateaus with elevation beyond 1,200 metres stretching towards the core Northern areas; the mountain zone along the Eastern border, including the 2,419-metre-high Chappal Waddi, regarded as the highest point in Nigeria (see Phillips, 2004). Given its huge size, diverse topography (the Niger and Benue River valley; rugged highlands; mountains and coastal plains etc.) and extensive land area characterized mainly by lowlands and tropical forests with scattered hills in the south and arid lowlands, deserts, plains and mountains in the North, Nigeria enjoys four main climates. The climatic conditions typically change as one moves from the South of the country through the Middle Belt to the North. These are: a tropical monsoon climate (influenced by the monsoons from the Atlantic Ocean) in Southern areas of Nigeria, characterized by relative low temperatures which remain more or less constant in most places (with the exception of the excessive dry harmattan season in the Southeast and during the highest points of the rainy season usually between July and August when temperatures can dip lower and generate occasional colds); a tropical savanna climate which affects most parts of Western and Central Nigeria, usually marked by both a high rainy season and a dry season characterized by hot and dry weather accompanied by harmattan winds and typical dust-laden air masses from the Sahara Desert (the temperature here oscillates between a low of 18 and almost 37 degrees centigrade during the peak hot periods); a tropical dry climate, in the Northern parts of Nigeria, usually characterized by a more than eight month hot and dry season with temperatures often exceeding 40 degrees centigrade and little rainfall within the months of June and September; an Alpine or highland climate in the highlands of Nigeria, that is, areas lying over 1,520 metres above sea level, which is the typical climate in the Plateau area of Nigeria and endows the area with a cool mountain climate (in an exaggerated sense, it can be claimed that this area is the nearest in weather conditions to Europe). The National Population Commission (NPC) puts the population of the country in the 2006 census at 140, 431, 790 (over 140 million) with approximately 75 million of the population in the North and 65 million in the South. The 2006 population census, especially as it allocated figures between the North and South and among the states, has been a major source of contestation over the years (see Kolapo, Obasola, & Ibona, 2007; Bamgbose, 2009; Ayodele, 2007). In fact, it has even been alleged that the figures were the product of uncanny political permutations (see Onyeka, 2007). A particularly contentious element was the over 3 million difference between Kano (North) and Lagos (South) to the advantage of Kano. Even the 1991 census, which some may see as having been even better conducted than the 2006 version, was equally dogged by controversies. The controversies and contests over census figures should not be seen as strange since population has been utilized as a prominent allocator of national revenues in Nigeria since colonial days. Therefore, vested interest has developed among different social and ethnic

14  Nigeria: country, nation and people Table 2.1  Projected population of Nigeria by state (2016) S/N

State

Population (2016)

 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. NIGERIA

Abia Adamawa Akwa Ibom Anambra Bauchi Bayelsa Benue Borno Cross River Delta Ebonyi Edo Ekiti Enugu Gombe Imo Jigawa Kaduna Kano Katsina Kebbi Kogi Kwara Lagos Nassarawa Niger Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo Plateau Rivers Sokoto Taraba Yobe Zamfara FCT Abuja

3,727,347 4,248,436 5,482,177 5,527,809 6,537,314 2,277,961 5,741,815 5,860,183 3,866,269 5,663,362 2,880,383 4,235,595 3,270,798 4,411,119 3,256,962 5,408,756 5,828,163 8,252,366 13,076,892 7,831,319 4,440,050 4,473,490 3,192,893 12,550,598 2,523,395 5,556,247 5,217,716 4,671,695 4,705,589 7,840,864 4,200,442 7,303,924 4,998,090 3,066,834 3,294,137 4,515,427 3,564,126 193,392,517

Source: National Population Commission in National Bureau of Statistics (May, 2018).

groups in Nigeria to increase their population as this gives them significant advantage in the revenue allocation process. Other interesting social and demographic facts about contemporary Nigeria include (see Ade-Ajayi, Kirk-Greene, Falola, & Udo, 2019): population

Nigeria: country, nation and people  15 density of 220.6 persons per square kilometre (Ade-Ajayi et al., 2019); rural–urban population distribution of 49.7% and 50.3% respectively (as at 2019); 2015 literacy rate/percentage of population age 15 and above of 68.9% (male) and 49.3% (female) – average literacy rate is put at 59.6% by the World Population Review (2009); and GNI per capita of 2,080 US ($) (in 2018). However, according to the World Population Review (2019) quoting WHO data, Nigeria has the lowest life expectancy in West Africa (World’s third lowest) at 54.5 years of age; a situation attributed to disease and high child and maternal mortality.

Socio-political history and development over time Probably the area now called Nigeria was shaped by two main factors, namely, Islam and the slave trade. However, while Islam was/is a major determining factor in the Northern parts; the slave trade was a big influence in the South, particularly in the areas around and near the Bight of Biafra (Eastern region). The Othman Dan Fodiyo jihad (1804–1808) led eventually to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Caliphate was an extensive Islamic kingdom that at one point stretched across most of the West African region and even beyond (at the height of its domain, it had over 30 emirates under it). Quite a lot has been written and documented about the slave trade which almost depopulated the Southeastern areas of Nigeria. The slave trade involved the trade in human beings across the Sahara Desert through the Atlantic Ocean. Reportedly (see Lovejoy, 2011; Falola & Aderonti, 2010) the repugnant trading of human beings, which was led by Europeans and lasted a couple of centuries from 1470s (the Portuguese navigators got to the Niger Delta coasts of West Africa around 1471 and traded their own commodities for local produce and crafts including slaves) to 1860 when it was officially abolished, took out over 3.5 million people from the hinterlands of Nigeria to various plantations and domestic homes in Europe and settler territories and colonies in North and South America and the Caribbean. The impact of the slave trade was minimal in the North which, in addition to being some distance from the coast, was largely under Islamic dominion. Islamic law strictly forbids the enslavement of Muslims. Therefore, heathens in the North who felt threatened easily converted to Islam in order to avoid being enslaved. The area now called Nigeria even as late as the eighteenth century was still not a homogenous or united socio-political entity. Therefore, the groups occupying the North and South of this area had very different and even contrasting socio-historical experiences, lifestyles and cultural patterns between them and equally among groups within each area. The above differences, which colonialism could not heal but rather accentuated, with emphasis on the indirect rule system, largely explain the mutual suspicion and tense relations between socio-ethnic groups in postcolonial Nigeria of today.

16  Nigeria: country, nation and people Thus, while the pre-jihad Hausa states (including Borno) in the North experienced centuries of nomadic banditry, roguish and pillaging leadership in some areas, ecological disasters (especially associated with the Sahara Desert) and general political insecurity, the Southern areas became negatively radicalized through the slave trade and extensive trade with Europeans that engendered political, economic and social changes often challenging the solidarity of these groups and their moral fibre. The lucrative economics of both slave trade and trade in commodities with Europeans led to the ­emergence of new power hubs, especially in the Eastern parts, and the reinforcement of existing and pliable traditional institutions in the Western areas. Typical of these powerful kingdoms and hubs of influence were such constitutional monarchies as the Oyo (West) and the Aro (East) The Portuguese were the first white people to set foot in the area now called Nigeria. This happened in the fifteenth century. The first incursion of the English in the area occurred in 1553 when ships commanded by Captain Windham arrived the Bight of Benin (see Central Office of Information, 1960). Between this period and the 1885 Berlin Conference the area was the site of regular face-offs between competing European nations and influences ranging from the Portuguese and French to the British and German. The scrambling and buccaneering in this area of Africa was eventually settled by the amicable partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference and, shortly after, the abolition of slave trade through the implementation of the Act of 1807 by the United Kingdom. The Royal Niger Company emerged (in 1886) through a Royal Charter granted to it by the United Kingdom as the organizer, protector and manager of British interests in this area. In fact, the position of the company (which had been very active in tropical Africa even before the Berlin partition) was strengthened by the 1886 Charter which gave it a virtual monopoly in the whole of the area today called Nigeria. Thus, the British, “under the name of the Royal Niger Company … only traded with the interior by the Niger and Benue rivers, but brought local administrative services, law and order to the peoples of the area” (Central Office of Information, 1960: 7). The formal control of the territories under the Royal Niger Company by the British government had occurred in 1900 after the revocation of the Royal Charter a year earlier. Lord Lugard, a veteran of the European expansion scheme with previous experience in other areas such as East Africa, was appointed by the London Office for Colonial Affairs and became more or less the British Czar of this area, as he was given freedom by the British authorities to administer the area as he deemed fit. At the start of colonial rule there were the then Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria which were administered largely as separate entities. In 1900, Lord Lugard became the High Commissioner of the Northern Protectorate and embarked on the merger of the two protectorates. Lugard was successful in achieving the subservience of the powerful emirates in the

Nigeria: country, nation and people  17 North to the English Crown through a creative utilization of diplomacy (especially bargaining and leaving the rulers with significant power and influence over their local subjects) and force where necessary, as was the norm generally with the colonial enterprise in Africa. Incidentally, the innovative use of what became known as the indirect rule system enabled Lugard to achieve his goals. The indirect rule system was a unique administrative method employed by the British in administering Nigeria. It was a strategy that employed local or native political institutions in the discharge of colonial administration. These local institutions were usually answerable to the overlordship of colonial district administrators or officers. The indirect rule system was as much a product of economic exigency as it was a practical response to administering vast geographical areas that were also climatically unconducive to Europeans. As an economic option, the British wanted to save money and thus limited the wholesome importation of colonial administrators from England. Apart from the frugality of using colonial subjects and established institutions, the cost of importation usually far exceeded salaries alone but involved other expenses since these expatriates had peculiar needs ranging from special accommodation to medical care and even kitchen utensils that would need to be imported from England. In addition, the indirect rule system made practical sense especially in areas like the North where the history of centralized administration under the emirs dating back to the era of the jihad (and even before then in some areas) had produced already existing powerful leaders in the emirs, who were both political and spiritual leaders and who governed authoritatively. Apart from enabling easy administration, the emirate system had already produced a largely docile population and an effective system of taxation before the advent of Lord Lugard. However, the system was less successful in the West, and especially so in the East where centuries of a decentralized acephalous system made the subjugation of the people to a colonial indirect rule system difficult. Even though in many parts of the Igbo-dominated Southeast, colonial administrators appointed chiefs (often called warrant chiefs) where there were none (or where the leaders in place resisted ­colonial supremacy), such chiefs hardly achieved meaningful control and subservience of their supposed subjects. Such appointments by the colonial administration were eventually the source of conflict in some of these communities long after the termination of colonial rule. Eventually, and with the overcoming of the powerful emirs in the North, Lugard finally succeeded in amalgamating the two protectorates of the British in 1914, and the colonial administration of Nigeria as one entity took off. Common knowledge in Nigeria has it that it was Madam Lugard (Flora Shaw) who coined the name Nigeria, out of the historical landmark, River Niger. She originally proposed the name in an article published in the London Times of 8 January 1897 (Hill, 2012). Shaw, who was then an employee of The Times, eventually married Frederick Lugard in 1902. But

18  Nigeria: country, nation and people the name “Nigeria” officially first came up during a debate in the House of Commons in 1899 (see Central Office of Information, 1960). According to this account, “the first official recognition of the name ‘Nigeria’ came in a debate in the House of Commons on the Royal Niger Company Bill in July 1899” (Central Office of Information, 1960: 6). Prior to this period, the area, because of the prominence of the slave trade, was simply known as the “Slave Coast”. The colonial legacy of Nigeria benefitted from the idea of the so-called “dual mandate” of Lord Lugard. In candid appreciation of colonialism, Lugard tried to come clean by asserting that colonialism was not simply an act of perceived benign improvement of the social and ethnic groups in the hinterlands of Africa. Thus, colonialism in Nigeria, just like in other lands, hinged on a dual mandate which meant benefits for both the Europeans who were expending their resources (brains, capital and energy) and the ­colonized people themselves. Colonialism was strictly neither pure philanthropy nor crass exploitation of the colonized people. In other words, the British stood to reap profits from the colonized people while ostensibly enabling the colonized subjects to climb up to the higher planes of human civilization. As has been apprehended, by Lugard’s discourse, European imperialism rested on the premise that the resources of Africa, perceived dormant, could be productively marshaled and utilized by the more technologically advanced imperial nations of Europe for the mutual benefits of the colonizer and the colonized. (Encyclopedia.com, 2019) The idea of dual mandate, while resonating with the so-called civilizing mission of the colonizers, equally indicts the colonizers for the self-serving motives which drove the colonial enterprise in the first instance. Without doubt, colonialism was an enterprise steeped in exploitation of the colonized and privileged a racial profiling of the colonized people as innately ­inferior to their colonizers and as intellectually and socially incapacitated. These dodgy perceptions, as any thoroughgoing historical survey of colonial rule anywhere in the developing world would show, were buttressed or seemingly confirmed by the wholesale denigration of the cultures and ways of life of the colonial subjects. The dual mandate notion, which was embodied in a book of a similar title by Lord Lugard, was portrayed by the archetypical colonizer as providing the theoretical and moral justification for the colonial enterprise in British Africa (see Lugard, 1922/1965). While acquiescing to the obvious goal of exploitation as reward for investing resources in the colonies, the book went on to cast the colonized in various disparaging instances as infantile, intellectually backward, primitive and even atavistic. For instance,

Nigeria: country, nation and people  19 Lugard argues without equivocation that, “in character and temperament the typical African of this race – type is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline, and foresight, naturally courageous, and naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity” (Lugard, 1922/1965: 69). In addition to the above infantile characterization of the African, Lugard goes on to see significant manifestations of African culture as nothing but mere fetish relics and to deny the history of the colonized by dubiously contending that even attempts to overcome what he saw as the impenetrable mystery of the “claimed” history consisted “chiefly in conjectural migrations of tribes and mystical legends, except in so far as the history of the West African empires of Ghana, Melle, and Songhay have been recorded by the Arabic historians of the Moorish Empire” (Lugard, 1922/1965: 66). In the above take, Nigeria was by omission captured as part of the impenetrable mystery, where history before European contact ­consisted chiefly of conjectures and myths. But even more cogent to the colonial enterprise and the massive denigration of indigenous values and practices is the conception that colonial subjects suffered from fleeting memories, solely preoccupied with the present, with scarce recollection of the past and no concern for the future. Apart from the misguided othering which motivated Lugard’s perceptions, the whole attempt at justifying colonialism and elevating it to some lofty enterprise could not have been achieved simply by the negation of history, puerile characterizations of the colonial subjects and the amoral rendition of bigoted and racial opinions as make-belief facts. The thesis on the perceived assumed benevolence of colonial rule suffers even more damage with the assertion that “Britain ruled the country [Nigeria] much as its other colonies were administered, with the primary goal of extracting natural resources – such as palm oil, cocoa, and groundnut – rather than promoting local development” (Scacco, 2012: 326). This entails that colonial rule was primarily motivated by the same buccaneering zeal and exploitative greed as the Portuguese expeditions and slave trade before it. However, in spite of the above flaws and fallacies, Lugard’s book provided an insight into his driving motivations and largely explains the exploitation and dehumanization which characterized colonial rule in Nigeria and elsewhere. Incidentally, given Lugard’s pioneering role as official buccaneer of the British, the book, also referred to as “the Bible of Colonialism”, came to be the most recommended, referred to and prized reading for most Europeans involved with Africa, even military types, for decades after its publication in 1922 (see, Doty, 1996). The era of colonial rule lasted for about six decades and Nigeria was granted independence on 1 October 1960 by an Act of the British Parliament. By the same virtue, it became also a part of the British Commonwealth. Nigeria boasts of over 200 languages and over 250 ethnic groups (see Iwaloye & Ibeanu, 1997; Ade-Ajayi et al., 2019). The Nigerian sociologist,

20  Nigeria: country, nation and people Onigu Otite (1990) contends that there are about 374 ethnic groups in Nigeria. However, the three officially recognized and formally used languages are Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo while the English language (arising from British colonial influence) is the official language of the country and for instruction/ teaching in Nigerian schools. Other languages are spoken by other distinct ethnic groups. The languages in Nigeria can be classified into three broad linguistic groups, namely, Niger Congo (Kwa/kwa Igbo) – spoken by minorities in the Southern parts of the country especially bordering the Southeast; Ijoid – spoken by the dominant groups in the Niger Delta; Atlantic – Fula; Benue – Congo (Tiv, Igbo, Igala, Idoma, Nupe, Jukun, Yoruba, Gwari, Ibibio, Efik, Ekoi etc.); Afro-Asiatic (Bade, Hausa, Margi, etc.). While some of these languages are well advanced and developed due largely to usage, a lot of them, especially those spoken by tiny minority groups, are constantly under threat of becoming extinct. The Hausa language, which has emerged as the official language especially for commercial transactions and social engagements in the North since the early 1950s, is perhaps the most widely spoken language in Nigeria, boosted by the fact that the Fulani had gradually jettisoned their Fula language for Hausa (given the socio-religious merger of both groups dating back to the nineteenth-century jihad of Othman dan Fodiyo) and numerous minority groups in the extensive Northern areas of the country also willynilly took up the Hausa language in order to navigate official, commercial and social transactions in the North.

Contemporary Nigeria: heterogeneity and recurrent implosion threats Nigeria is a federation made up of 36 states and the federal capital territory, Abuja. In addition, the country is subdivided into six geopolitical zones, namely, the Northeast, Northwest, Northcentral, Southwest, South-south and Southeast. These geopolitical zones have numbers of states ranging from seven in the Northwest to five in the Southeast. The six geopolitical zones are political and ethnohistorical creations of the draconian regime of General Sani Abacha (1993–1998) and in spite of their names are not strictly and exclusively geographically contiguous entities. Their creation was driven by the desire to placate tensions and grievances around the distribution of resources and access to political offices. Despite the creation of these zones and their usage since 1999 for the distribution of political office among politicians, distribution of ministerial positions has been benchmarked on the 36-state structure engendering bogus cabinets and economic waste in governance, particularly with the ambiguous “Minister of State” position which is provided with neither clearly defined nor distinct responsibility by the substantive minister in each ministry. The perceived solidarity among the different groups that make up the Nigerian federation became precarious shortly after independence, as the

Nigeria: country, nation and people  21 Table 2.2  Geopolitical zones by states in Nigeria S/N

Geopolitical zone

States

1.

Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara

4.

Northwest (throne of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony and decisive political zone) Northeast (operating territory of Boko Haram and the ISWAP) Northcentral (or the so-called middle belt region of Nigeria) Southwest

5.

South-south

6.

Southeast (zone with least number of states, one of the drivers of resurgent Biafra agitation)

2. 3.

Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Rivers, Delta, Edo Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo

Source: author’s compilation.

conflict over political power and the intolerance of other groups led to a 30-month civil war, or what is known as the Biafra War. While a lot has been written about the war, it would appear that the predisposing factors arose mainly from the weakness and failure of the Nigerian state (arising from the structural incapacities that had been cemented over by colonial rule) as well as deep-rooted irreconcilable differences among these groups. As has been ­contended, while the civil war remains a watershed in the country’s history, the post-independent Nigerian state has been embroiled in persistent and­ ­development-retarding conflict among various ethnic and social groups (see Anugwom, 2018). A lot of these conflicts emanate from differences in religious beliefs (in spite of the definition of Nigeria as c­ onstitutionally a secular state) but are incidentally reinforced by ethnicity and ethnic considerations. Incidentally, these two factors in some form of conspiracy of social history, divide Nigeria into almost equal halves. Thus, while Muslims make up roughly 50% of Nigerians (some accounts argue for a slightly lower figure), Christians make up roughly 40%, while the remainder are occupied by traditional religionists, atheists and others. However, the Muslims are domiciled mainly in the geographical North and Christians are located mainly in the South of the country. The coincidence between geographical location and religion has been exploited in social conflicts that regularly pit the Muslim North against the Christian South. In addition, this demarcation between the North and the South has also generated a scenario in which the struggle over state resources and political power is equally ­similarly structured. In understanding the nature of politics in Nigeria and its implications for development, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the political class or

22  Nigeria: country, nation and people the prominent gladiators in the political space. In this sense, one finds the analytical characterization of the African political class by Ekeh (1975) very elucidating. Ekeh characterizes the political class in the continent as shifty, with little or no legitimacy but with excess power. According to him the reference to this class as “bourgeois” is to underscore the heavily economic but tangential political legitimacy of this group. In his words, it is chiefly to emphasize the lack of firm legitimacy on their part that I have used the term “bourgeois” to characterize these groups. The term connotes the newness of a privileged class which may wield much power, but have little authority; which may have a lot of economic influence, but enjoy little political acceptance. (Ekeh, 1975: 93) Incidentally, this characterization is very much apt in Nigeria where years of democracy have not meant much to the citizens. In other words, there still exists a major mismatch in the social contract between citizens and the Nigerian state. As already indicated, Nigeria is a constitutional federalism, a system seen as adapted to its noted heterogeneity and the need to ensure equity in distribution of resources and benefits of statehood. In such societies elsewhere, the rights of citizens, apart from being embodied in constitutional arrangements, are also secured through federalism as a system of government. In fact, the lure for federalism often emanates from its perception as a form of political arrangement that both grants the foundation of a formal state at the centre and ensures reasonable autonomy to the constituent units in the federation. In a way, federalism can be conceived as providing a double bind of protection for citizens who are saddled also with owing allegiance to both tiers of government. According to Wheare (1979) federalism entails a constitutional arrangement that divides the law-making powers and functions of the state between two levels of government that are taken as coordinate in status, implying that the centre and constituent units of a typical federation in all intents and purposes are equal in importance. However, the critical issue that arises in the case of Nigeria from the reading of Wheare is in the area of finance and resource distribution between the centre and constituent units. In the view of Wheare, financial subordination usually sounds the death knell of federalism. Therefore, in order to make the system work, each unit is ideally empowered to access and have control of its own ­sufficient financial resources. In Nigeria since independence, and especially since the emergence of oil as the main source of national revenue, this particular ideal of federalism has been slaughtered at the altar of “superior” economic logic, which makes the bogus claim that development can only be achieved by a lopsided fiscal allocation to the advantage of the centre.

Nigeria: country, nation and people  23 Both the federal structure of Nigeria which predates independence and the subsequent proliferation of state creation since the late 1990s were motivated by the need to avoid development and resource distribution imbalance while ensuring equity and allaying the fears of domination expressed by ethnic minority groups prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960. However, the creation of more states has neither engendered equitable development nor taken care of the perennial problems of socio-economic disparities; interethnic rivalry and conflict; and social inequality among regions and zones (see Aka, 1995). It is still debatable whether the inability of the political elites to lead Nigeria to the Eldorado of development emanates from a historical handicap or the lure of perverted modernism that engenders massive appetite for wealth and social balkanization as bases of sustaining political privilege. However, there is no doubt that the colonial experience played a role in bequeathing Nigeria with a postcolonial elite political and social class which, while excellent in aping the white man, has failed in either establishing enduring solidarity with the ordinary Nigerian citizens or forging ­alliances and enshrining values that would have championed sustainable development. Thus, as Ekeh (1975) contends, this class of elites suffers from intellectual poverty that has limited its ability to offer different ideas regarding moral principles from that of the colonizers. They are inordinately focused on the right to rule and the privileges and power of primitive acquisition which that now endows on politicians. Even though one can neither dispute nor hold a brief for the horrendous effects and denigration of Nigerian institutions and values caused by the colonial experience, these still do not justify or adequately explain the inability to enthrone significant development in the country after almost six decades of independence. In other words, the colonial experience created unusual alliances and supposed affinity among the vastly disparate social groups in the areas called Nigeria but there has now been time enough and resources with which to negotiate and renegotiate the precarious nationhood foisted on the people in Nigeria and, in the process, engender development. Therefore, while the colonial experience may have been ­overwhelming in the early post-independence decades, the nature of the Nigerian state over time and the capricious political elites it fosters should be seen as an outcome that cannot be adequately accounted for by the ­colonial experience alone. Nigeria celebrated 20 years of uninterrupted democracy on 12 June1 2019. It was a significant milestone for a country that had either had successive military regimes (1966–1979; 1983–1993; 1993–1999) or had democratic governance truncated by military coups (1979; 1983; 1993). The fact of an uninterrupted democracy however raises the larger question about how this period has occasioned general improvements in the quality of life of its citizens or has engendered development. The consensus of opinion, especially from unbiased observers and citizens, is that it has been a case of too

24  Nigeria: country, nation and people little within the period. In other words, the expectations of citizens and even hopes of outsiders for Nigeria in terms of development have hardly been met. Thus, Nigeria is still confronted with the same old problems of infrastructural inadequacy (decay of existing ones); massive corruption; insecurity (now even worse with terrorism and the herders/farmers conflict); divisive politics; weak public institutions etc. as well as other common or well-known vices like armed robbery; poor housing; environmental problems; kidnapping etc.

Note 1 12 June is symbolic since it marks the date in 1993 when an election considered the freest in Nigeria and when the Yoruba Billionaire business tycoon Moshood Abiola’s clear landslide victory was annulled by the military junta of Ibrahim Babangida. Therefore, by making 12 June the official Democracy Day in Nigeria, the government has sought to reclaim the freedom and unfettered choice which the election of Abiola, who beat his opposing contender even in his home state of Kano in the Northwest, signifies.

References Ade-Ajayi, J.F. (1983). Recent history of Nigeria, Africa: South of the Sahara. London: Europa Publications. Ade-Ajayi, J.F., Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Falola, T.O., & Udo, K.K. (2019). “Nigeria”. www.britannica.com (accessed 16 July 2019). Aka, Ebenezer (1995). “Regional inequalities in the process of Nigeria’s development: Socio-political and administrative perspectives”. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 10 (2): 61–80. Anugwom, E.E. (2018). From Biafra to the Niger Delta conflict: Memory, ethnicity and the state in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Ayodele, T. (2007). “Disquiet as population result affirms old pattern”. The Guardian (12 January): 26. Bamgbose, J.A. (2009). “Falsification of population census data in a heterogeneous Nigerian state: The fourth republic example”. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 3 (8): 311–319. Bourne, Richard (2015). Nigeria: A new history of a turbulent century. London: Zed Books. Buchanan, K.M., & Pugh, J.C. (1958). Land and people in Nigeria. London: London University Press. Burns, Alan (1955). History of Nigeria. London: Allen & Unwin. Central Office of Information (1960). Nigeria: The making of a nation. London: Central Office of Information (Reference Division). Coleman, J. (1963). Nigeria: Background to nationalism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Doty, R.L. (1996). Imperial encounters: The politics of representation in North South Relations. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Ekeh, P.P. (1975). “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17 (1): 91–112.

Nigeria: country, nation and people  25 Encyclopedia.com (2019). “Dual mandate Africa”, in Encyclopaedia of Western Colonialism since 1450. www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacstranscripts-and-maps/dual-mandate-africa (accessed: 17 July 2019). Falola, T. (ed.) (2005). Nigerian history, politics, and affairs: The collected essays of Adiele Afigbo. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Books. Falola, Toyin., & Aderinto, S. (2010). Nigeria, nationalism and writing history. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Falola, T., & Heaton, M.M. (2008). A history of Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hill, J. (2012). Nigeria since independence: Forever fragile?. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ikime, Obaro (1980). Groundwork of Nigerian history. Ibadan: Heinemann. Isichei. Elizabeth (1976). A History of the Igbo people. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Iwaloye, L.B., & Ibeanu, A. (1997). “The peoples of Nigeria”, in Okafor, F.U. (ed.) New strategies for curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub. (pp. 41–68). Kolapo, Y., Obasola, K., & Ibona, J. (2007). “Lagos protests election results, head for tribunal”. The Punch Newspapers (6 February): 2. Lovejoy, Paul (2011). Transformations in slavery: The history of slavery in Black Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lugard, L.F. (1922/1965). The dual mandate in British Tropical Africa. Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2018). Demographic statistics bulletin. Abuja: NBS (May). National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011). Annual abstract of statistics, 2011. Abuja: NBS. Obaje, N.G. (2009). “Solid mineral resources”, in Geology and mineral resources of Nigeria. Lecture notes in Earth Sciences, 120. Berlin: Springer. Onyeka, B.V. (2007). “It is tinted with political permutations”. Guardian (12 January): 28. Otite, Onigu (1990). Ethnic plurality and ethnicity in Nigeria: With comparative materials. Ibadan: Shaneson. Phillips, D.A. (2004). Nigeria. Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House Pub. Scacco, Alexandra (2012). “Nigeria: What factors account for Nigeria’s poor economic development and political performance since independence”, in Samuels, D.J. (ed.) Case studies in comparative politics. New York: Pearson (pp. 320–364). World Population Review (2019). Nigeria Population 2019. www.worldpopulationreview. com (accessed: 16 July 2019). Wheare, K.C. (1979). Federal government. London: Oxford University Press.

3 Theorizing an obvious absurdity

Introduction The job of theorizing or situating Nigeria’s development reality within a given theoretical frame is undoubtedly a difficult and even complicated matter. In a sense, Nigeria should be considered a paradox when its development is related to its abundant human and material resources. In spite of the above, the way to proceed would be to peruse the classical and extant development literature and arrive at a most tenable explanation or even quasi-explanation of Nigeria’s development conundrum. Development is conceived here as a comprehensive and total or radical change-cumimprovement and progress towards a desired state that can be sustained and improved over time. It is thus not strictly and simply about economic growth or economic indicators of development. As already indicated, such a conceptualization in the case of Nigeria, and similarly many other developing nations, may run on a false belief that economic growth is the only true and single indicator of development or that development is only measurable and achievable through economic indices and indicators seen as superior to and deterministic of other socio-political spheres. There is need for a perceptive recognition of the all-encompassing nature of development in Nigeria. In this sense, there is no need to easily pigeonhole development in one or another econometric or utilitarian economic universal but rather apprehend development as a qualitative (and even quantitative) improvement in general quality of life; physical and social environments; governance and values which benefit all members of the society. Generally, the theoretical apprehension of development from a social science angle has focused largely on the structural perspective in explaining a nation’s development status. This is especially telling for Nigeria and other African nations where the state is seen as the ultimate source of development in terms of not only its involvement in provision of physical infrastructure and building strong public institutions but also in terms of establishing the regulatory environment; monitoring and policing the achievement of development goals. The state is also in charge of regulating and enhancing relationships with external

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  27 bodies and, more critically, managing financial and fiscal structures that promote and sustain the drive towards development. Theories, which are usually systematic explanations and understandings of phenomena, are normally meant to account for social realities, that is, they should be as close as possible to the fact or truth (if not entirely and outrightly the truth) and equally reflect a rounded rational comprehension of a given social phenomenon. In addition, theories are also a set of reliable principles upon which real practice or action can anchored (as in designing intervention programmes for a given or target population or subpopulation). Such theories are used both as factual accounts of the situation in view and perspectives from which justifications are derived for the recommended or chosen line of action (particularly illustrated in the area of public health, social work and development project planning). Therefore, theorizing development would weigh more towards the enunciation of not only mere principles but proposing courses of action and offering legitimate accounts of why things are the way they are and even why such things may remain the same way for a considerable time. In Nigeria, theorizing development would entail relating development (or lack of it) in the country to the known universe of knowledge and extant theories. Such an exercise is deemed valuable not only in making sense of the phenomenon concerned but also in foregrounding the discourse of development within the ambit of existing knowledge and in the process enabling the discourse to speak from and to this knowledge universe. Undoubtedly, none of the existing classical or contemporary viewpoints (theories) on development was made or tailored specifically for Nigeria. Therefore, there cannot be a case of a snug fit between any theory and the complex realities of Nigeria. This entails that one approaches the exercise from the angle of what is best suited and is most robust from all the available candidates. Theories are proposals, often tested and grilled about how development can be achieved or even not achieved, as well as the institutional, national, economic and social forces that may dispose a nation towards sustainable development or constrain its movement towards such a goal, as the case may be. One of the justifications for examining the theories of development is drawn from the fact that, apart from being a long-standing academic tradition, such theories, far from providing explanations, are often used as guides for development planning and interventions. This is especially the case with reference to the global South where a general impasse in the development of many countries has made the area more or less the test laboratory of development theories and new development paradigms. While one contends with theoretically explaining and understanding development in Nigeria, it is imperative to appreciate that in some significant ways, development thinking has gone full circle. Incidentally, the success stories of nations in East Asia would persuade one that in spite of the usefulness of theories and paradigms, development can be achieved and

28  Theorizing an obvious absurdity sustained without essentially tagging on to one development thinking or the other. In other words, economic wonders have been performed in East Asia without necessarily relying on development thinking or even theory but on the experiments of “strong hand” politicians (Popov, 2010). This chapter, given its nature, depends on the critical perusal and examination of classical and extant social science literature for its information.

Modernization theory and thinking on development Generally, modernization theory is ascribed to the influence of three main historical occurrences and their challenge to social science scholarship, especially in terms of understanding and explaining social change. These three incidences include: the emergence of the US as a superpower and bastion of prosperity after the Second World War in 1945 which led to it midwifing and implementing the famous Marshall Plan1 of economic recovery targeted at many European nations (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands etc.) impoverished by the war; emergence of a global communist movement led by the Soviet Union that covered Eastern Europe, China, Korea (North) and subsequently some emerging nations in Africa; and, more crucially, the eventual demise of colonial regimes in Africa and other parts of the developing world. The emergence of these new nations created much for scholars to do, especially in terms of how to comprehensively explain these new societies and, more imperatively, chart a development course for them. In such a case, the new, prosperous European economies that seemingly grew overnight, largely as a result of the Marshall Plan, became more or less models of development while the struggles of the nations in the Soviet bloc became more or less exemplars of how not to proceed. Modernization theory was more or less a response to the perceived need to engender the transformation of many emerging nations in Africa and other parts of the developing world into modern societies along the lines of the experiences or perceptions of Western nations, especially the US and Europe. Modernization theory and thinking borrowed a lot from the existing tradition of comprehending social change or transformation from a largely evolutionary perspective and the organismic analogy, an overwhelming influence from the biological sciences that was then trending in the conception and understanding of social phenomenon and social change (see Nisbet, 1969). The obvious challenge of explaining and understanding the dynamics of development in order to chart a developmental trajectory overwhelmed the existing social thinkers of the late 1940s to early 1970s and forced a resort to the well-known organismic model. In other words, emerging nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America presented social scientists with new tasks of elaborating models for understanding and engendering socio-economic and political change and stability in these nations. As has been argued,

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  29 unable to rely for guidance in the design, execution, and interpretation of their research upon a previously accumulated literature, it is hardly surprising that social scientists engaged in this task should turn for assistance to the familiar intellectual traditions of Western thinking about the nature of social change. (Tipps, 1973: 200) Perhaps nothing more effectively captures the spirit of the modernization theory enterprise and paradoxically undermines its utility than the fact that it posits a grand narrative of change applicable or suitable for all emerging societies. As Huntington (1968: 52) apprehends the above weakness, modernization theory is “a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity”. Modernization theory was supposed to respond to the needs of new societies (in Africa and Latin America) to achieve economic growth and political stability or development. Perhaps, the most popular articulation of the modernization thesis is found in the ideas of the economist Watt Whitman Rostow. Rostow proposed a historical apprehension of development and more critically sought to show that “modernization and industrialization did not necessarily lead, as most of the Marxists of that time thought, to a society with a few millionaires and destitute, alienated masses; increasingly rapacious capitalists and increasingly resentful workers” (Solivetti, 2005: 719). It was the product of a seemingly thought-through solution to the development problems of the so-called third world countries and laid out how they can follow a five-stage successive route to the Eldorado of development. The five stages of development put forward by Rostow are classically evolutionary in nature and suggest an immutable path to development by these countries. These stages begin with the traditional stage and end with the stage of high mass consumption seen by Rostow as the epitome of capitalist modernization. These various stages are denoted by distinct characteristics and economic features (see Rostow, 1960; 1962; Baran & Hobsbawm, 1961; Hunt, 1989). The stages include the Traditional Society (the simplest and most primitive social organization with features ranging from limited production, low per capita output to dominance of agriculture and low social mobility); Precondition for Take-Off (the creeping in of progressive elements and the attempt of citizens to break free of the constraints of traditional society with features that range from new enterprises, increasing investment to development of credit institutions and decline in birth rate); the Take-Off stage (dynamic/radical change in society, usually triggered by such things as the revolutionizing of the political structure or sudden influx/infusion of new techniques and methods of production i.e. science and technology; its features range from development of a leading sector in the economy to existence of different frameworks in society); the Drive to Maturity (growth as a normal mode of life, society and economy are

30  Theorizing an obvious absurdity buoyant and heavy industries grow as a base of the economy; features range from change in occupational distribution, development of white-collar workers to entrepreneurial leadership); the Age of High Mass Consumption (the stage where durable consumer goods dominate, increased allocation to social welfare and security as well as a shift in emphasis from mere production to consumption with features ranging from pursuit of national power and global influence, welfare state to mass consumption of durable consumer goods). The reading of the voluminous literature on modernization theory suggests that it is a perspective underlined by the following assumptions: •• •• •• •• •• •

Homogeneity (similar tendencies among all societies to development). Irreversibility (process that cannot be terminated and route that leads to the peak of development). Increased capacity (to deal with various and numerous problems of nationhood). Progressive (desirable state or condition achieved over time). Peculiar values (denoted by dominant values that separate the modern from the traditional society). Systematic (social institutions are systematic and interdependent – a direct endowment from the functionalist imperative in sociology).

Even though a favoured explanation at its peak – and Rostow’s work was seen in some quarters as a good response to the Marxian ideology of the Communist Soviet Union that lampooned capitalism and its ability to improve the quality of life of ordinary citizens – modernization theory has long been jettisoned as a veritable theoretical view. A good number of weaknesses undermine the theory. In the first place, the theory seems to suggest that development is simply a case of becoming modern by aping the West. It also suffers from projecting the faulty assumption of one best or only viable route to development, that is, the Western route. In other words, it is essentially evolutionary in nature and projects the European model as the only authentic route to development. Thus, it was in effect a unilineal conceptualization of social transformation and change. In today’s worldview, it is unforgivably a unilineal evolutionary thinking on development that undermines creativity and is pejorative of the agency of other nations and peoples outside the West. Modernization theory in essence focused on the process of becoming modern; and anchored on the argument that modern societies (meaning the US and Western Europe) are more productive, democratic, with bettereducated citizens and enjoy a robust welfare system. In fact, a lot of the above derives from the structural differentiation and specialization inherent in modern society. Smelser (1963) sees this structural differentiation as a peculiar characteristic of modern society, which enables the clear delineation and definition of functions and political roles as well as national institutions

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  31 attuned to the needs of society. However, while structural differentiation improves functional capacity, Smelser argues that it equally generates problems of integration and coordination of the activities of the various institutions needed in that context.

The dependency perspective The dependency theory arose as both a critique of modernization theory and the effort to overcome its weaknesses especially with reference to the experiences of the newly independent nations of the world. In other words, it is seen largely as an improvement over the modernization theory of development. It seeks, as the name suggests, an unravelling of the dependency syndrome that has dogged the development bids of the developing nations; and, more critically, how these developing nations, in spite of ­independence, are attached to the apron strings of the developed nations and are, in the process, in the stranglehold of the political and economic domination of the developed nations of the world. The dependency viewpoint was largely seen as a counterintuitive radical proposition to modernization theory. The mere fact that it questions the existing and taken-for-granted benignity of the West made it attractive to emergent nationalist figures, radical political elites and scholars in Africa. To a lot of these people, dependency theory was a breakthrough in ideas regarding development and went beyond the pejorative traditional society equivalence created for the developing nations mainly through R ­ ostow’s influential work, and saw the development problem from a broader global perspective in which the West can be seen as culpable for much of Africa’s development dilemma. Some scholars generally perceive that there are about three threads in the dependency theory (see Shareia, 2015; Reyes, 2001; Amin, 2010, 1977 for more insights especially on the law of value), that is, it is not by any means a uniform or single thread of narrative on development. There is therefore the global historical materialism model (Marxian oriented and anchored on the notion of value i.e. that the value of labour within the capitalist system is jaundiced under its production regime). It seeks to contend that there is an unequal price for labour among countries and at the global level. Given a cheaper labour price, there is the likelihood and scenario of the appropriation of the value produced by cheap labour in the global South by capitalists in the global North. In other words, the monopoly capital of the developed world exploits the cheap labour price vis-à-vis production at the peripheries to assuage their consumption appetites and need for more profits. The “dependencia” model originated in the Latin Americas and was mainly a counter-narrative to the Communist Party’s assertion in the 1950s that the area was feudal. Therefore, the model argues that these countries were part of global capitalism right from the era of colonialism. However,

32  Theorizing an obvious absurdity given the nature of colonialism, these economies were built or established as peripheries to the global capitalist system. The World Systems model (often now treated as a full theory on its own), saw the failures and incapacities of the local and domestic (read national) as the direct effect of the global. In other words, it argues that the domestic or national development outlook is a direct outcome of the fact that it is structured, conditioned and determined by the global. The first school or strand that focuses on labour value from the Marxian perspective is the Marxist school of dependency theory. The Latin America inspired dependencia model and the world systems approach are seen as the structural school of dependency theory. The major difference is perhaps in the sense that the structural, while identifying the fault lines or failures of the global development scene, seemingly believes that the system could be radically tweaked to achieve better development outcomes for the developing nations. However, the Marxist school, in typical Marxian logic, sees the existing global order as innately and irredeemably exploitative and as having inherent distortions and inequalities that periphery nations cannot escape; therefore there is need to focus on the generation of a new social system anchored in socialism. Therefore, the theory is largely an amalgam of three or four main major threads of arguments that link the situation of the developing world to the nature, influence or deterministic hold of the global capitalist system. Equally, it sees the developing nations mainly as peripheries or frontiers of the developed or as the setting for crude capitalist exploitation and opportunism. However, some general ideas or common notions underline the different conceptions of dependency. These include: •• •

•

•

Capitalism is, and has always been, global in outlook and nature (implying that globalization may not be something new or entirely different from capitalism after all). Inadequacy of the cardinal assumptions of orthodox economics (the assumption that every independent nation enjoys relative economic autonomy, which grants it the right to make or choose economic policies without let or hindrance, is seen as largely a fallacy that cannot be borne out by historical experiences of countries in the developing world and even by contemporary events. Therefore, the economy of a given nation is best apprehended through an analytical frame that includes the global economy and relations of the country with other nations). The naivety of orthodox economics that the developing countries with good economic planning and political will can catch up with the developed nations (this thinking is seen as incognisant of the effects of globalization, especially its polarizing tendencies and the increasing distance it creates between the developing and developed nations of the world). Dependency makes some interesting claims about the unequal engagement between the global North and South that are still valid. For

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  33 instance, most developing countries have become dumping grounds for goods produced in the West and sites of outsourcing where cheap labour ensures maximum returns to capital. Nevertheless, while radical dependency theory may seem similar to typical Marxist perspectives, there are sharp differences. Generally, dependency views the world largely from a binary geographical perspective, that is, the developed (Western world) and the developing world; it also holds capitalism culpable for the sharp differences between the two worlds and claim that the developing world, in a lopsided global relationship, produces the surplus enjoyed in the developed or First World countries. But Marxism sees the origin of surplus value in the relations between capital and labour in the production process; it makes no spatial distinction between different areas of the world but rather a distinction between labour and capital in the capitalist production process everywhere in the world. Dependency sees the distinction between the developed and the developing world as critical to its analysis. In this sense, the developed or First World countries are engaged in an exploitative capitalist-driven relationship with the developing world and, in the process, enduring ­ international dependence patterns are established. According to Todaro (2000), in this frame of analysis Third World countries are under the rule (or dominance) of the politics, institutions and economies of the developed countries of the world. Dependency makes a few common assumptions about the relationship between the developed countries and their peripheries. These include: capitalism generates a labour regime which undermines the domestic economies of developing nations; this in turn reduces economic growth and sets in motion a process of economic and social inequality (still a problem today where in spite of significant growth in some of these countries, social inequality has even grown alongside such growth); given the limited productivity of the domestic economy, the state fails in its role of providing social welfare services. The above results in a scenario where the cry for help of these nations generates the aid of their developed partners usually in the form of foreign investments, trade concessions (better conditions of trade for primary products which are what these developing countries have to offer) and loans. All these, incidentally, further entrench the influence and dominance of these developed nations and hinder genuine domestic economic growth. Even though the dependency theory arose to overcome the deficiencies of the modernization theory, the two still share a number of similarities. These include: a focus on development circumstances of the so-called Third World; a high abstraction methodology which uses the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis; employment of polar opposite structures in analysis – tradition versus modern (modernization theory), core versus periphery ­ (dependency theory) (see Friedrichs, 1970).

34  Theorizing an obvious absurdity

The world systems analysis (WSA) of development The world systems theory owes a lot to the ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein (1987, 1974, 1979) and is built on the overriding assumption that the world economy is nothing but an international hierarchy or system of unequal relations in which wealth or resources are taken from the periphery or semi-periphery to boost economy and lifestyles in the developed or core countries. It deals with different manifestations of capitalism in a global perspective. Even though it allows the analysis of relationships between nations, it does so with a global prism that pits the world into  the two distinct groups of the core versus the periphery or semi-periphery. The world systems theory sees the developed countries generally as the “core” countries that dominate and determine the rules of engagement in international trade and economic relations. It contends that existing ­international trade specialization and the transfer of resources from the developing to the core militates against development in these countries and generates what can be called a process of “peripheralization” (see ­Szymanski, 1982). Perhaps, the strong point of the world systems theory is that it really puts forward a discourse that covers the whole world, including the ­socialist nations (see Reyes, 2001). It therefore sought, among other things, to overcome the limitations of the dependency theory that appears to speak more to the relationship between former colonies and their colonial masters than the whole world. The theory sees inequality as a constant of the relationship between the core and the peripheries and this inequality can be understood through identifying different cultures and the role the state plays in international relations. In the views of Wallerstein, world systems should be seen as a multi-cultural system under a single division of labour, whose primary feature is the pool of labour in which different areas are interdependent and in an exchange relationship. World-systems theory, with an initial sociological bias, is the product of the realization of the changing global economic circumstances between the late 1960s and the 1970s. Some of the influential circumstances in its emergence include the appearance of the East-Asian Tigers (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore etc.); the increasing decline of revolutionary Marxism; and declining American hegemony in the global capitalist economy. These factors called attention to a new approach to apprehending development, especially with reference to the so-called Third World nations. Wallerstein, who is one of the strongest pillars of this theoretical tradition, had studied the development challenges of the emerging African independent nations and came to realize that development in these nations can only be explained and probably achieved through cognisance of the global capitalist economy and politics. In effect,

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  35 Wallerstein and his followers recognized that there are worldwide conditions that operate as determinant forces especially for small and underdeveloped nations, that the nation – state level of analysis is no longer the only useful category for studying development conditions, particularly in Third World countries. (Reyes, 2001: 7) In spite of the array of writings (see Wallerstein, 1979, 1984, 1991, 1998, 2004; Chase-Dunn, 1989, 1982; Sanderson, 2005; Navarro, 1982; Szymanski, 1982) which has sought to capture the world systems theory or world systems analysis (WSA), the core and relatively original (to this viewpoint) notions can be captured thus: ••

••

••

••

The analysis or theory begins with the overarching notion that world history shows the existence of many world systems. These systems are social networks characterised by a high degree of functional autonomy, extensive division of labor, many different societies and cultures, all captured within these systems. It strongly argues that the world systems should be the basic unit of analysis of development in the world. Therefore, whatever occurs within the various components (societies/nations) of the world systems should be taken as reflective of their embeddedness (or positions) in the system, and by their relations with external bodies (other societies/nations) and not really a direct product of their own internal characteristics. The world systems can be seen as comprised of world economies and world empires. Whereas world economies refer to world systems with multiple political units and no centralization or unification therein, world empires on the other hand are world systems, which are militarily and politically unified. History shows that world economies, which are usually fragile, have the tendency of either disintegrating or converting ultimately into world empires. The WSA or world system theory captures the capitalist world economy as existing in the form of a hierarchical structure made up of three major components or units, namely: the core (this unit dominates the world economy. It is also the most economically developed and technologically advanced with very strong military units. The core focuses on a “leading sector” economic production); the periphery (defined as the most technologically backward. Composed of weak states that are equally economically underdeveloped, and mainly focused on the production of primary goods or raw materials for export, it also depends on the use of “coerced” labour for such production); the semi-periphery (this is taken as the middle or intermediate zone with features of both the core and the periphery). Apart from delineating this hierarchy, the WSA posits that it is a constant and permanent feature of capitalism. The semi-periphery plays the crucial role

36  Theorizing an obvious absurdity

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of stabilizing the system and enabling the world economy to endure in the above form. Therefore, in the typical capitalist world economy (which is the existing economy now), the core or the First World countries dominate and exploit the semi-periphery and the semi-periphery in turn exploits the periphery, making the periphery the worse-off zone in the world systems. WSA also calls attention to the fact that the capitalist world economy is dynamic in nature. To this end, it can be described as a broadening or expanding system, that is, with time it will incorporate more and more of the societies of the world outside the system into the system. This process of growth or expansion will endure until it attains its ecological limits. In the same vein, the capitalist world economy is a deepening or ever-evolving system. This entails that it changes its structural organization over time in ways that are both directional and determinate. As a result, the evolutionary dynamics of the system are anchored on the logic of ceaseless (endless) capital accumulation, which explains the insatiability of capital for profits and new markets. The WSA predicts the eventual demise of the capitalist world economy. The demise would be in the form of internal combustion since the system contains (and produces) the contradictions that would eventually lead to its disintegration, probably by the twenty-first century. The theory optimistically hopes that it would be replaced by a global socialist system or universal socialism, which is expected to be more rational and humane than the exploitative and dominating capitalist system.

An important attribute of the world systems school is that it goes beyond the traditional polar realities or bimodal traditions of both modernization and dependency theories to focus on a trifocal approach. This approach recognizes the core, semi-periphery and the periphery and, obviously benefitting from the historical experience of the Asian tigers, the world systems school sees the probability for both upward and downward mobility within the world or global economy. The world systems theory is in some respects similar to, and even seen as outcome of, the dependency viewpoint though it makes a universal or global claim on systematic exploitation and disadvantages. In spite of the above, it claims equally that there is no peculiar set of processes in the theory that applies to all economies. This means that even though the issue of disadvantage may be common to the developing world within the ambit of the existing global international trade system, there is the possibility for different regimes of experience and engagement with the global system based on the nation concerned. In spite of the advent of what can be called new studies of dependency or the remaking of the theory to take cognisance of new developments especially among states in the developing world, it is still too-tenuous to apprehend the development challenges of a state like Nigeria. The main new development in the framework of the theory is characterized as recognition

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  37 of the significant margin of autonomy of governments of these relatively new states to pursue their own agenda (see Cardoso & Faleto, 1979; Fagen, 1983) even within the undoubted influence of the dominant powers. While the case of autonomy of these states remains unquestioned, especially ­concerning domestic policies and programmes without international repercussions, the global economy nowadays is so much tied together that genuine economic growth or development can hardly be fostered acting all alone. The fact remains, as we have seen since the 2000s, that the powerful nations (USA, China, Russia, powerful European nations like Germany and France) are, as ever, strategic and inventive in ensuring that they ensnare the weaker nations and keep them tied to their apron strings one way or the other. In fact, the situation where the US and China, as large economic blocs as they appear, still need each other and make serious efforts at steadying economic relations and building mutual trade rapport, underlines the inevitable fact that smaller nations are trapped in economic designs of the bigger and more influential nations. Therefore, nations like Nigeria, which depends largely on a petroleum mono-economy, would find real autonomy almost impossible and invariably limited by benign internationalism. However, the above does not imply that Nigeria cannot foster more robust and productive growth and development routes but these can neither be anchored on the old ideas of dependency nor advanced by ­blustering externalization of all development ailments.

Globalization and neo-liberalism While dependency theory focuses especially on the relations among nations especially between a given developing nation and a developed nation (or two), especially its colonial master or ideology mentor (the Soviet Union for example) and sees patterns of capitalist exploitation in such relations as similar everywhere in the world, it does not privilege uniform global systems of exploitation. This is from where the globalization perspective takes off, that is, the imagining of a worldwide or global system of capitalist exploitation. The globalization perspective to understanding development is much similar to the world systems theory, especially as both adopt universal or global frames of analysis. The major difference exists in the fact that globalization posits an all-encompassing span of influence that places even more emphasis on cultural communications and new technologies as conduits of this influence than simply a view of the economy and processes of production (including the role of capital). It thus privileges cultural communication as one of the most important forces of globalization and this communication is buoyed by the increasing flexibility of technologies to connect people all over the world (see Kaplan, 1993). In another frame, communication systems, which are the hallmarks of the era of globalization, increasingly engender commonalities and similar effects that homogenize markets all over the world (see Levitt, 1983).

38  Theorizing an obvious absurdity In an effort to achieve a succinct conceptualization of globalization, James Roseneau (1997) relates it to the idea of localization. According to him, any technological, psychological, social, economic, or political development that foster the expansion of interests and practices beyond established boundaries (territorial or jurisdictional) are both sources and expressions of the processes of globalization just as any development in these realms that limit or reduce interests are both sources and expressions of localizing processes. (Roseneau, 1997: 361) Therefore, apart from relating the local to the global, Roseneau seeks to reaffirm the prevailing orthodoxy of globalization as implying both development and the avenue to development. However, the definition of globalization along the above lines may replicate the old ethnocentrism of such a theory as modernization since it tends to suggest that the best route to development nowadays is through globalization and globalization is powered and driven by the West. While globalization may be seen as representing something entirely new or radically different from other processes of international interaction before it, there is equally good judgement in understanding that globalization is in a sense an outgrowth, elongation and metamorphic outcome of these previous relations or, at the worst, it has drawn incentives from these earlier forms of international economic and capitalist engagements. In this frame of reference, notions that globalization represents the re-emergence of capitalism, is the second advent of capitalism, the uncanny reconfiguration of modernization (modernism also), are all-plausible to a reasonable extent. But such an exercise in historical synonyms may detract from ­capturing the logic, nature and essence of globalization, especially from the African standpoint. Thus, “while globalization can be linked to, and invariably implies the process of global interaction initiated centuries ago, it t­ypifies radically different phenomenon in both degree of interaction and the nature of this interaction” (Anugwom, 2001: 82). Globalization embodies the ascendancy of capitalism as a critical element but the ascendancy has been made possible by developments in information and communication technologies since the 1980s. Therefore, simply reducing globalization to past forms of interaction undermines the leading role of communications and the financialization of capital in the process. But just like in the other forms of global interaction, the desire of capital for profits and the maximization of gains have been very prominent. Therefore, in spite of its multi-dimensional nature, globalization has been excessively driven by the economic rationale or logic. This fact is particularly the situation in the case of the developing nations in Africa and other places. Here, globalization has done exceedingly well in opening up economies to

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  39 external dominance and influence and encouraging the spread of social and work values supportive of this goal of unfettered boundaries for capitalism. Incidentally, such an opening-up of the developing world has in most cases seemed impervious to the social and political crises in some of these places, except when they threaten the interests of global capital. Perhaps a good appreciation of the peculiar status of globalization in understanding development can be aided by envisioning that what makes it a buzzword of contemporary international relations discourse is its significant difference in both scope and quality or intensity from other processes of unifying interaction among nations in world history. In other words, globalization may not be easily reduced to merely another phase in relations among countries of the world. While the above may seem contested, there is no doubt that globalization as we know it today embodies a paradox not easily found in other previous forms of global interaction. It typically unites and fragments at the same time; and while involved in the process of spreading universalism or unitarism it equally creates and reinforces regional blocs at the same time (Cerny, 1997; Held & McGrew, 1993). There is no gainsaying that the contradictions in globalization often generate debates and polemics on how best to conceptualize it. The above ambivalence is further exacerbated by the fact that globalization is both a political and academic concept and can be legitimately invoked as a process and state of things. Despite the above observations, some largely incontrovertible facts about globalization loom large. Some of these include: an encompassing or comprehensive nature (i.e. globalization has political, social, economic and cultural manifestations); ability to penetrate the entire modern world or what has been dubbed “de-territorialization”, or what some scholars would prefer to label the “deconstruction of spatial reality” (van Binsbergen, 1997); or even what has been captured as the “advent of a borderless world” (Ohmae, 1990); a clear potential and capacity to be stretched to encompass all major spheres of public life; an overbearing influence over the developing nations of the world; the creation of inequality and imbalance among nations of the world; and a tendency towards producing both positive and negative outcomes for groups/nations at the same time. Without doubt, there is some value in the argument that globalization essentially represents nothing new or that it is much more like a modern fad (see Graham & Neu, 2003). In this sense, there is always the temptation to see globalization as not really denoting a radical departure in the history of international interactions among nations, especially in terms of the ­lopsided relationship between the global North and South. An over-reliance on such a frame of thought, whatever its good points, may accidentally lead to the inability to fathom the determining influence and penetrating reach of globalization. Thus, even if one concedes to the argument that globalization is old, its new manifestations – reflected mainly in the forms of global financialization (in the sphere of the global economy) and potent technologypowered social media (with significant impacts in social and public spheres

40  Theorizing an obvious absurdity within and across borders) – cannot be easily ossified. In spite of the fine arguments of scholars such as Samir Amin (even Amin recognizes the overpowering role of financialization nowadays),2 globalization now is more of the new, rather than much of the old lopsided relationship between the global North and South.

The (new) political economy approach One would argue that in appreciating general development in Africa, especially concerning development policy-making and development programme implementation, the political economy perspective seems still very apt. In this case, political economy would not just privilege how the African economy has functioned as the periphery of the global economic system but also how the politics and dynamics of global powers have affected the development of the continent. According to Gilpin (1987: 8), the parallel existence and mutual interaction of “state” and “market” in the modern world create “political economy”; without both state and market there could be no political economy. In the absence of the state, the price mechanism and market forces would determine the outcome of economic activities; and this would be the pure world of the economist. In the absence of the market, the state or its equivalent would allocate economic resources; this would be the pure world of the political scientist. Thus, political economy privileges the interaction of state and market. It is that common arena between politics and economics in the modern world. So political economy from the perspective of Gilpin (1987) asks such questions as how the state and its associated political processes affect the production and distribution of wealth; equally germane to the political economy approach is how political decisions and interests influence the actual allocation of economic resources and activities, as well as how such decisions emanating from the political sphere influence the distribution of the costs and benefits of economic activities in the modern state. There are a couple of approaches or schools of thought in the general political economy perspective. Some of these include: liberalism (Gilpin, 1987; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2014; Segrillo, 2012); economic nationalism, which is more or less the opposite of the liberalism approach since it argues that the primary function of the state should be to promote the economic power of the state rather than a primary focus on the welfare of citizens (see Viner, 1958; Hawtrey, 1952; Sen, 1984). In other words, the state is superior and should play a prominent and overriding role in the economy as a means towards engendering social cohesion and wealth creation; the Marxist approach, which is overtly influenced by the seminal ideas of Karl Marx and treats capital with suspicion and as source of exploitation of the

Theorizing an obvious absurdity  41 individual within the economic system (see Israel, 1971; Beilharz, 2005); New Institutional theory (see North, 1997, 1990; Lang, 2018; Lecours, 2005), which focuses on the role and place of institutions in the society, and conceptualizes institutions from a core sociological angle as relating to values, beliefs and norms that underline both economic activities and even the state itself. Among all these approaches liberalism privileges the primacy of market forces in the economic arena and in decisions regarding the economy. Therefore, while the interaction between the state (politics) and the economy remains, the economy is more or less superior and market forces propel critical decisions. As important as the above seem, there is need to now consider new forms and shapes of political economy with a basis and an anchor in the domestic politics and power dynamics of African nations such as Nigeria. While international political economy perspectives loom large, especially in the recent resurgence of the strong-arm diplomacy and economic tactics of the USA and Russia, there is no denying the fact that domestic political considerations, constraints and interests have hamstrung development in Africa in the last few decades. These factors have either limited the scope and effectiveness of development initiatives or in most cases made futile the attempt of development programmes to achieve their goals. This is way beyond the 1970s and 1980s economic nationalism framework where the political class was largely bellicose about reclaiming the economic space from former colonial masters and their allies and in the process often fell prey to the unguarded adventurism of political zeal and popularity. In such a situation, economic nationalism was motivated by a penchant for change of ownership of firms and multinational corporations and not really by due consideration of the impact on the larger economic spheres and the long-term development goals of these countries. Without doubt, those years are long gone, but the political economy angle to development remains. Perhaps we can now imagine a new form of political economy (neo-political economy) in which the endless and largely fruitless pursuit of development can be largely associated with the nature of politics, political elites and political decisions in the continent in the last three decades. Nevertheless, the liberal or neoliberal perspective or liberalism seems to be the trending approach in today’s world and especially pertinent in characterizing the development of Nigeria. However, such liberalism in the case of Nigeria has equally been influenced by other socio-structural factors such as primordial forces and the unending battle with institutional and political corruption, among others. Thus, in apprehending Nigeria’s peculiar development challenge, the liberalism mode or liberalism may reflect, as Segrillo (2012) contends, an elitist doctrine geared towards protecting the economic interests of the powerful in the society. Apart from clear cases of bad politics, other manifestations of this form of new political economy could be seen in the continual ascendancy of

42  Theorizing an obvious absurdity primordial factors/considerations in the economy; excess political corruption (which jeopardizes goals and objectives of development programmes and their implementation); the syndrome of the arrogant all-knowing rulers; declining professionalism and technocracy in the civil/public service; lack of project/programme continuity; impulsive and emotive dispensation towards development planning; bogus governance structures (that get in the way of planning); unsustained economic development plans; politically motivated capital plight etc. The bottom line is that the problem of development in Africa as a whole cannot be divorced from the political culture and nature of politicking in the continent. This is as true of the situation in Nigeria as in that of so many other African nations. The political class and elites must be made culpable and held accountable for the development challenge in the country and this is largely captured in the new political economy perspective.

Notes 1 The Marshall Plan is also known as the European Recovery Programme (which was put in place in April 1948). It was a plan enacted by the 80th United States Congress and aimed at rehabilitating the economies of 17 Western and Eastern ­European countries after the Second World War. The broad goal was to create and nurture stable economic conditions within which stable democracies would thrive and foreclose the possibility of anarchy. It was a successful plan as it set the stage for over three decades of record economic prosperity and stability in most of these countries. Eventually, a lot of Eastern European countries, following the lead of the Soviet Union, did not participate in the programme. It was named after George C. Marshall the US Secretary of State who first mooted the idea of the plan. 2 See Amin and Luckin (1996).

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Theorizing an obvious absurdity  43 Chase-Dunn, C. (1989). Global formation: Structures of the World-economy. Oxford: Blackwell. Fagen, R.R. (1983). “Theories of development: The question of class struggle”. Monthly Review, 35 (4): 13–24. Friedrichs, R. (1970). A sociology of sociology. New York: Free Press. Gilpin, R. (1987). The political economy of international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Graham, C., & Neu, D. (2003). “Accounting for globalization”. Accounting Forum, 27 (4): 449–471. Hawtrey, R. G. (1952). Economic aspects of sovereignty. London: Macmillan. Held, D., & McGrew, A. (1993). “Globalisation and the liberal democratic state”. Government and Opposition, 28 (2): 261–288. Hunt, Diana (1989). Economic theories of development: An analysis of competing paradigms. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Huntington, Samuel P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press Israel, J. (1971). Alienation: From Marx to modern sociology. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Lang, T. (2018). “Institutional theory, new”, in Ritzer, G., & Rojek, C. (eds) The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology 2018. Book 10/2. London: John Wiley. Lecours, A. (2005). “New institutionalism: Issues and questions”, in Lecours, A. (ed.), New institutionalism: Theory and analysis. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (pp. 3–25). Kaplan, B. (1993). Social change in the capitalist World. Beverley Hills, CA: SAGE. Levitt, T. (1983). The marketing imagination. New York: Free Press. Navarro, V. (1982). “The limits of World-systems theory in defining capitalist and socialist formations”. Science and Society, 46: 77–90. Nisbet, Robert (1969). Social change and history: Aspects of the western theory of development. New York: Oxford University Press. North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. North, D.C. (1997). “The contribution of the new institutional economics to an understanding of the transition problem”. WIDER Annual Lectures 1, Helsinki: WIDER/UNU. Ohmae, K. (1990). The borderless World: powers and strategy in the interlinked economy. New York: Harper. Popov, Vladimir (2010). Development theories and development experience: Half a century journey. Working Paper No. 153, Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School. Moscow: CEFIR/NES. Reyes, Giovanni (2001). “Four main theories of development: Modernization dependency, World systems and globalization”. Nomadas: Revista Critica de Ciencias Sociales y Juridicas http://pendientedmigration.ucm.es/info/nomadas/4/gereyesi.htm (accessed: 22 July 2019). Ritzer, G., & Stepnisky, J. (2014). Sociological theory. 9th ed. Singapore: McGraw-Hill Education LLC. Roseneau, J.N. (1997). “The complexities and contradictions of globalisation”. Current History, 96 (613): 360–364. Rostow, W.W. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A non-Communist manifesto. London: Cambridge University Press.

44  Theorizing an obvious absurdity Rostow, W.W. (1962). The stages of economic growth. London: Cambridge University Press. Segrillo, A. (2012). “Liberalism, Marxism and democratic theory revisited: Proposal of a joint index of political and economic democracy.” Brazilian Political Science Review, 6 (2):8–27. Sen, G. (1984). The military origins of industrialization and international trade rivalry. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sanderson, S.K. (2005). “World systems analysis after thirty years: Should it rest in peace?” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46 (3): 179–213. Shareia, Bubaker F. (2015). “Theories of development”. International Journal of Language and Linguistics, 2 (1): 78–90. Smelser, N.J. (1963). The sociology of economic life. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Solivetti, L. M. (2005). “W.W Rostow and his contributions to development studies: A note”. The Journal of Development Studies, 41 (4): 719–724. Szymanski, A. (1982). “The socialist World system “, in Chase-Dunn, C.K. (ed.) Socialist states in the World system. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE (pp. 57–84). Tipps, D. C. (1973). “Modernization theory and the comparative study of societies: A critical perspective”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15 (2): 199–226. Todaro, M.P. (2000). Economic development. New York: Longman. van Binsbergen, W.M.J. (1997). Virtuality as a key concept in the study of globalisation. Working Paper 2, Amsterdam: WORTO Research Programme. Viner, J. (1958). The long view and the short: Studies in economic theory and policy. New York: Free Press. Wallerstein, I. (1974). “The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: Concepts for comparative analysis”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (4): 387–415. Wallerstein, I. (1979). The capitalist World economy: Essays. London: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, I. (1984). The Politics of the World-economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, I. (1987). World-systems analysis. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Wallerstein, I. (1991). Geopolitics and geoculture: Essays on the changing World-system. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, I. (1998). Utopistics: Or historical changes of the twenty-first century. New York: New Press. Wallerstein, I. (2004.) World-systems analysis: An introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

4 Between public trust and private profit Political corruption and development in Nigeria

Introduction I focus largely on political corruption here because a cursory examination reveals that even though bureaucratic and systemic or generalised corruption are equally rife in Nigeria, political corruption incidentally provides the needed incentive or objective condition for these other forms of corruption to thrive in a democratic setting. In other words, political corruption numbs the corruption sensitivity of government and militates against the development of the moral platform from which to fight other forms of corruption. This premise is very functional if we realize that despite all the noise about a private-sector-driven economy and globalization, Nigeria as a developing country is still a state in which the citizens expect government to take the lead in institutional reforms. The above explains why in Nigeria, and in many other African nations, the people also see corruption as the explanation behind failures in public service delivery, and the failure of government to live up to expectations. Thus, the apparent inability of African governments to offer public health that is of good quality and affordable, the appalling state of many school classrooms and the lack of textbooks, and the long time it takes for basic infrastructural improvements to be achieved, are all blamed on corruption. (van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011: 741) In such a society, the action of government matters a lot and even legislation on corruption and its enforcement is still the preserve of the government. As a result, any meaningful fight against corruption must start from the government and this can only happen when there is a significant change from the way and the manner in which government is currently run. In other words, lack of transparency in government and an open system of graft in political circles feed corruption elsewhere in society. There is consensus in the extant literature that like most other nations in Africa, corruption is either a major problem in Nigeria or it is intractable

46  Political corruption and development (see Akinsola, 2006; Akinpelu, Ogundeye, & Agbeyangi, 2013; Agese, 1990; Brownsberger, 1983; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Mbaku, 1996). Therefore, there is no gainsaying that development challenges in Nigeria can be linked largely to the menace of corruption over the years. No matter however corruption is defined, it coheres with some common or underlying semantics. These include the abuse of entrusted power/position; the utilization of entrusted power for private gain; the appropriation of public spheres or offices for personal gain etc. The definition is always in tandem with the abuse of privilege or position for one’s private and often inordinate gains and which, more often than not, get in the way of efficient service delivery or efficient allocation of resources as well as engender mediocre decisions and choices. Corruption in the everyday sense may include such behaviours and practices as embezzlement of funds, bribery (including solicitation and receipt), nepotism, cronyism, over-invoicing or inflation of contract values, patronage, manipulation and bending of rules, etc. One common and innovative way of distinguishing corruption is to make a difference between horizontal and vertical corruption (Konie, 2003). In this case, while vertical corruption refers to corrupt practices in public and formal spheres like those by decision makers, leaders, managers, principal office holders etc., horizontal corruption is that performed by common people, or the entire populace, who do not necessarily occupy official positions. However, a much more commonly used method is to differentiate between three forms of corruption, namely, political corruption (seen as the most pervasive and common in Africa and elsewhere for that matter); bureaucratic corruption (second to political corruption and found within the public/civil service spheres); general/generalized corruption (corruption by the larger populace who are neither in political or public offices and especially indicative of a growing culture of corruption within a given nation or society). The net negative impact of corruption may be in derailing genuine needdriven policies and programmes. In this case, development becomes a victim of the corruption-induced ineptitude and mediocrity characterizing governments. It stands to reason that corruption which puts personal or private gain before public interest militates against development-driven policy implementation and project execution. But even more interesting is that there is almost consensus in the literature that a democracy which relatively throws open the business of governance to citizens creates a great bulwark against corruption. While corruption remains a big problem in Nigeria and undermines development efforts, it may be overstating the case and aping the racially induced problematization of corruption in Africa to contend like Akanle and Adesina (2015: 421) that, “corruption is so pervasive in the country that it would be nearly correct to opine that it is a way of life”. On face value, one would be tempted to assume from the above sentiments that all Nigerians are corrupt and they legitimize the Western-induced prevalence

Political corruption and development  47 of belief that Africa is a continent of corruption where things do get done through that system and so Africa, in effect, works (see Chabal & Daloz, 1999). This very negative approach refuses to recognize that corruption is universal and that Africa’s (nay Nigeria’s) daunting challenges are not really simply and easily explainable through the insistence on the existence of a corrupt way of life in the continent. However, it would appear, in the case of Nigeria, as its contemporary history reveals, that democratic dispensations actually exacerbate corruption. For instance, in 2001 Nigerians were jolted by the realization of the enormity of political corruption in the country. This came on the heels of the Acting Auditor General’s Report for 2001. According to this very insightful report, more than ‎₦23 billion was lost in ten major ministries in 2001 alone (see Newswatch, 2003). Thus, democracy may have heightened the high level of graft and scheming in government and consequently given rise to a counter-wave of corruption in other areas of public life. In view of this premise, the level of general corruption in Nigeria may be seen as partially reflecting the level of political corruption in the country. This chapter therefore critically examines the nexus between corruption as a major social pathology and development in Nigeria. It depends for its information on the desk review of extant literature and documentary sources of data.

The theoretical discourse on corruption Many approaches have been employed by scholars and public policy analysts in the attempt to explain corruption. Out of the very impressive array of such explanations I can only cipher out four dominant perspectives which, even though not totally exhaustive and mutually exclusive, bring some form of order to the effort to achieve broad theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. The four approaches are: The public choice theory or rent-seeking approach This approach is premised on the assumption that public officials and politicians are self-seeking and selfish. Therefore, corruption is the outcome of the interaction between citizens or business people and politicians and public officials whose behaviours are built essentially on narrow self-seeking motives (see, for instance, Philip, 1997). In this case, public officials and politicians use their official positions to appropriate rent or personal gain from clients whether ordinary citizens or members of the business community. The public choice approach is, all the same, based on a straightforward assumption of self-interest which glosses over the supposed interventive role of the state and even the developed civil society in combating corruption. But even more telling is the assumption that politicians and public

48  Political corruption and development officials are inherently corrupt. Thus, public officials, in some cases, may become corrupt in the attempt to adapt to the pressures and demands of the office, especially in Nigeria where systemic corruption prevails. The pluralist multi-tiered approach This thinking is favoured largely by political scientists who are prone to argue that corruption is the product of lack of durable political institutions, unencumbered political space, political choice or free will and an underdeveloped civil society. In other words, this approach believes that the existence of developed political institutions and culture would hinder ­corruption. In this logic, there is the assumption that viable political institutions or democracy cures all ailments, including corruption. Therefore, the bulwark against corruption is the development of viable democracy. But this approach neglects the fact that the institutionalization of democracy and democratic culture have failed to seriously address corruption in many states. India would serve as a ready example in this case. Again, political reforms are not really efficacious on their own except when followed by the will and determination to enforce them. In some cases, reforms have only existed as propaganda tools in the hands of politicians seeking to make political gain out of a supposed anti-corruption stance. The functionalist perspective This approach, which has a mainly sociological orientation, is premised on the assumption that corruption serves some useful purpose for the society concerned. Accordingly, corruption is seen as a veritable means of maintaining the existing power structures in the society and as a means of effecting political control. In other words, corruption is perceived as very effective in maintaining stability and order in the political process of society. This orientation, even though with some good points, can be seen as equally anchored on very weak assumptions. In the first place, the assumption of a generality of benign corruption or the existence of corruption that is benevolently geared towards maintaining the existing power equation, is really misleading. Second, it does not make the critical distinction between political and economic corruption or between entrenched and elite corruption and seems unbothered about varying degrees of corruption in various societies and within societies. The political economy perspective The political economy perspective contends that corruption can be realistically explained in terms of differences in the political power of groups in the society and the resources allocated by the state (Khan, 1996). It focuses essentially on the dynamics of power and agency rather than the

Political corruption and development  49 self-interest or functional relevance often imbued in corruption. Moreover, this perspective shows acute awareness of the complex nature of corruption and contends that a good understanding of the phenomenon should be anchored in historical experience and the political realities of the society concerned. But more fundamental is that a political economy view of corruption in developing societies would invariably throw up the involvement of international forces and agencies in such countries since their political economies imperatively tie in with the roles of foreign agencies and persons. But all the same, this approach might run the risk of seeing corruption and its eradication as solely the business of government and influential groups in society or the uncritical assumption that corruption in developing societies can be fully explained by international factors. Any of the above assumptions would hinder the effective mobilization of civil society against corruption.

Nature and origin of corruption: culture versus colonialism Any meaningful conceptualization of corruption in Nigeria may have to take cognizance of the traditional antecedents of that concept. In this regard, corruption may be seen as having antecedent in the notion of “awuf”. Awuf is really the pidgin English version of the concepts of bribery and corruption. Amadi (1982) sees awuf as denoting bribery, corruption or any other gain obtained through trickery, or dishonest and sharp practice in Nigeria. But awuf, like the current corruption, is all about exploiting one’s official or public office for private gain. Equally crucial in the understanding of corruption in present-day Nigeria are the concepts of “kola” and “expression of gratitude” or “thank you”. The whole idea of kola, or offering something tangible to the one from whom favour or service is sought, is often traced to the African tradition of offering something to one who visits you. In fact, this is the same practice as that of the European who offers wine or tea to a guest. Even in cases where the guest comes with some form of kola or gift (as in the case of one visiting his in-laws or a young person visiting a very old relation), it is usually presented after the host has presented his own kola. But where this very hospitable and innocent act is inversed and used in justifying corruption or bribery, it is often inferred that one does not go to the house or office of a “big person” without kola even though both parties are well aware of the fact that the so-called kola (usually in the form of money or some expensive item) is meant to commit the receiver into performing the service demanded of him. Apart from its flawed traditional logic, kola offered as inducement is usually in the form of a reasonable amount of money or an expensive gift item, unlike the normal kola which can be in the form of the very cheap common kola nut or a shot of locally brewed

50  Political corruption and development gin (both inexpensive and culturally symbolic to the people concerned) (see van den Bersselaar, 2007 for the significance of such items in Nigeria). The display of gratitude or appreciation for some favour or deed from another person can be seen as more or less a universal human attribute. In this case, people often express their gratitude to the doer of a good deed either through word of mouth or a symbolic gift. In traditional African society, it is usually expected that once someone does a good deed for another, that other person should express gratitude. In fact, among the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria, this worldview is captured in the saying “eto onye akidi, ya gwota ozo”, which literally means that when you praise the doer of a good deed, he is motivated to do more; that is, it is behaviour reinforcement. The foregoing discussion of the traditional basis of gratitude and appreciation suggests that corruption which is a public sector or modern society menace differs starkly from these cultural practices and expectations. The debate on whether there is anything in African culture that breeds corruption seems largely laid to rest with the submission that it is a syncretic manifestation of the need to bridge the gap between two otherwise incompatible systems in the form of the traditional and the colonial inspired formal patterns of organization (see De Sardan, 1999; van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011; Mbaku, 1996). It is therefore neither of the two alone. However, a deeper reflection would reveal that even the contemplation of a cultural element to corruption in a country like Nigeria is acutely flawed in the face of the diversity and heterogeneity of the nation. With over 200 ethnic and ­language groups with disparate historical origins and norms, the thesis of common culture is hardly justifiable in Nigeria. All the same, corruption is not a new entrant into the public sphere in Nigeria. Corruption predated the independence of Nigeria and has origins in the colonial era (see Tignor, 1993) in which a distinct division between the public and private spheres became established. The definition of c­ orruption along the lines of the exploitation or abuse of public office for private gains presupposes that it could not have been a problem in the traditional precolonial society where no such clear-cut distinction existed between the private and public spheres. Generally, it has been posited that the first accusation of corruption in Africa dates back to the 1940s and it became a much more commonly identified social malaise beginning from the 1960s when coup plotters began to invoke it as justification for overthrowing governments (see van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011). In effect, van den Bersselaar and Decker (2011) have located the origins of corruption in Africa in both the colonial and post-colonial eras but contend that it first sprouted in the colonial era. However, Mbaku (1996) makes a very crucial distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption, which is really important in the understanding of corruption in Nigeria. Hence, while bureaucratic corruption involves the efforts of civil servants to enrich themselves through illegal or unapproved means, political corruption is that used by political coalitions to capture the apparatus of state or maintain a monopoly hold on power.

Political corruption and development  51 Despite this, it is necessary to point out that in Nigeria, as experience with a long reign of military dictators has shown, the two forms of corruption are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, the utilization of such devious means as election rigging, vote buying, manipulation of results, thuggery etc. to achieve political gains invariably emboldens civil servants to solicit for bribes. In fact, even in the military era, the utilization of various forms of inducements to achieve legitimacy and acceptance equally spread a mentality of seeing public office as a means to dubious wealth among civil servants in Nigeria. It is only natural that a political or military leadership that is corrupt produces a matching corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy. There is also the utilization of corruption as a tool to further the exploitative agenda of the global North in their interactions with Africa, beginning from colonial contact. As has been observed, corruption has become highly problematized in postcolonial Africa where vacuous metaphors bordering on vile and rueful descriptions are used on Africans by the West or their representatives. The invocation of corruption as the be-all and explain-all of both development and public affairs in Africa creates the impression that corruption either exists only in the continent or is the only social malaise in Africa, both of which are socio-historically wrong. In fact, it has been argued that African corruption is nothing but a Western invention that emerged as a post-colonial construct (Apata, 2019). The tendency to overtly “Africanize” corruption has its roots in the immediate post-colonial context where the departing colonialists and their overlords in Europe were intent on rubbishing the emergent African nationalist and bureaucratic elites. In fact, a popular leader of the nationalist movement in Nigeria who later became the country’s first president saw this tendency much earlier. He thus expressed a realization of the racialized nature of corruption discourse and stated, “being Black people does not mean that we are impervious to justice and decency. Being White does not make colonial Governors paragons of perfection” (Nnamdi Azikiwe quoted in van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011: 748).

Public officials, politics and corruption in Nigeria A good view of the entrenchment of corruption in Nigeria would show that it has persisted largely because it serves the needs of the ruling class and other privileged members of the society. In fact, in Nigeria political corruption has emerged as a sure route to power and legitimacy. Hence, both erstwhile military rulers and present political leaders use corruption in various ways to remain in office and to buy the acceptance of the people. As a result, the argument of Mbaku (1992, 1994), that incumbent politicians and leaders are not genuinely interested in the eradication of corruption because it represents an important avenue and means of settling supporters, is very valid in the case of Nigeria.

52  Political corruption and development Some Nigerian scholars have tried to explain the pervasiveness of c­ orruption in Nigeria’s public and political life. But the most dominant viewpoint is that corruption in Nigeria can be traced to the struggle for power and the use of primordial attachments in allocating the resources of the state. In this sense, Agbese (1992), while examining the forced foray of the military into power in Nigeria, argues that in post-independence Nigeria, all political groups have been engaged in struggle to capture the apparatus of the state so as to use it to amass wealth for themselves. He goes further to pinpoint that this situation, which ensures the effective lock-out of other groups from the system, invariably throws up bribery to incumbent public officers or members of the dominant group as the only point of entry for those locked out. This sentiment echoes an earlier contention that the transformation of the post-independence state in Africa into a tool for the enrichment of members of political dominant groups is a significant contributor to corruption (see Ihonvbere & Ekekwe, 1988). Thus, political corruption in Nigeria can be explained to an extent ­(pre-1999) through the nature and dynamics of the formation of political elites in the country. The dominance of kinship, ethnicity and primordial affiliations in political elite development, alliance building and quest for power over the years in Nigeria helped create a situation where the elites feel beholden and bound to these nodes. They are therefore led to service and to oil them in order to achieve, advance or sustain power (see for instance Ekeh, 1975; Joseph, 1991 on interesting discourse along these lines). However, as Akanle and Adesina (2015) rightly comprehend, the primordial factors are now in serious decline as the bases of political advancement or patronage. Politicians have now built linkages and networks that transcend the usual primordial and ethnic lines. The uniting factor in this case may be the common lure of basic accumulation and patrimonial linkages to sustain this crude desire. In order to appreciate the influence of corruption and its widespread nature in Nigeria, it is important to bear in mind that corruption per se is self-perpetuating or regenerating. In this sense, corruption becomes, after a period of time, ingrained in the body politic and social life of a nation. In this case, it becomes a normal way of doing business. People accept corruption thus as nothing more than the normal thing. At this stage, corruption becomes endemic. Collier (2000) points out four routes through which corruption became ingrained in Africa. These are: over-regulation of private activity (which gives enormous powers to bureaucrats over private sector activities); expanded public sector employment (kin connections and other subjective criteria are used in recruitment rather than need and merit); expanded public procurement (contract award for percentage benefits); and weakened scrutiny (the almost non-existence of agencies and restraint and lack of scrutiny of the political process). However, in the case of Nigeria, only two of these factors can be considered really significant. These are, first, over-regulation of private activity

Political corruption and development  53 which gives enormous powers to government officials and bureaucrats to extort money from people in the private sector. In fact, widespread bureaucratic corruption in Nigeria can be linked to the power of regulation of private activities which even the most junior of bureaucrats in local government employment enjoys over both formal and informal business activities in the private sector. This power is built essentially on the complexity of regulations (arising mainly from the massive number of such regulations) and the state of flux in meaning or outright ambiguity of such regulations. Second, the lack of scrutiny, especially of national political process and office holders (from the president to local government chairmen) has given rise to enormous political corruption. As recent history of Nigeria shows, the coffers of the nation have been bled dry by former rulers who have exploited this lack of scrutiny. The lack of scrutiny does not necessarily arise from the non-existence of relevant corruption laws but from the lack of will on the part of the political leadership to implement such laws and the weakness of civil society to demand otherwise. The above creates the impression that corruption is then a sort of merry-go-round in Nigeria. The interest in corruption in contemporary times draws from its perceived negative impact on development in developing countries. Donor agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have more or less linked the poor net result of development aid and assistance to entrenched corruption in public offices in developing nations. Mbaku (1996) argues that the economies and markets of the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia were overwhelmed by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and incompetence. To this end, it is expected that a radical reduction of corruption in these countries can enhance development. Nigeria happens to be one of the countries seen as characterized by entrenched or systemic corruption (see Johnston, 1996). It has been pointed out that one of the fundamental problems with Nigeria is that of corruption in high places (see Achebe, 1983). One of the factors often seen as creating an atmosphere conducive to the growth of corruption is lack of transparency in government and public offices. Hence, it can be safely assumed that transparent conduct of the business of government and public offices would go a long way in lessening corruption. It is in this regard that democracy, with its emphasis on transparency and probity, is usually expected to usher in a less corrupt environment for the business of government and public office. In other words, corruption in Nigeria may have been heightened by years of military rule that gave little regard to the need for openness in the conduct of government business. It thus follows that the emergence of democracy in the country may have created the needed space for less corruption in public offices. But this is really more of an ideal than a reality, as the current state of corruption in Nigeria shows. As a matter of fact, the reverse of the above expectation seems more likely. One of the reasons behind the perpetuation of corruption in Nigeria over time is the glaring inability of leaders to see the magnitude of the

54  Political corruption and development problem and its impact on poverty and general development. A good case of this form of leadership insensitivity can be glimpsed from the views of the Second Republic President of Nigeria, Shehu Shagari, that corruption in the country has not reached alarming proportions (see, Achebe, 1983: 38). In spite of the above denial, corruption may have become a way of life for Nigerians in public positions and political offices. Little wonder, Egwu (1995) contends, that the nation’s wealth is systematically plundered and looted by the very group that is supposed to safeguard it for future generations. The former dictator Sanni Abacha used the wealth of the nation as if it were his personal estate. He was reported to have bribed people with money and gifts in order to hang on to power (see Tempo, 1994: 1). In addition to numerous cases of outright bribery, the leadership had invested in unviable projects, padded contract awards and issued bogus oil leases in a bid to enrich itself. Obviously, this leadership insensitivity and culpability have made the enforcement of regulations futile. The dearth of enforcement of regulations on corruption is aptly shown by the fact that in a total of 23 categories of offences for which offenders were imprisoned between 1980 and 1984, corruption was glaringly absent (see National Bureau of Statistics, 1986: 48; Igbo & Anugwom, 2002: 111). The apparent poser then becomes: is it possible to have witnessed no corruption in Nigeria for five years? This is highly unlikely. Therefore, the culture of permissiveness of corruption, or its perception nowadays as a normal way of life, is responsible for this situation. In fact, this thinking led Chambliss (1975: 170) earlier on to contend, “in Nigeria, the acceptance of bribes by officials is blatantly public and virtually universal”. Even though government in Nigeria has from time to time embarked on corruption eradication, the sincerity and commitment of government in this has always been suspect. This suspicion is generated by the perceived vacuous success of such actions and the fact that corruption clean-ups often become a disguise for political victimization. It might be that the Nigerian leaders, just as in some other African countries, are using the corruption crusade to further their political careers while at the same time discrediting former regimes. As Mbaku (1996) argues, politicians in Africa regularly use corruption clean-up campaigns to perpetuate their reigns, destroy the reputation of opposition leaders and garner support from the population.

Institutional fight against corruption in Nigeria The three bodies statutorily in charge of corruption in Nigeria are the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC); the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB); and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The EFCC is, however, the strongest of the three and entrusted with the wider or broader mandate on anti-corruption activities all over the nation and in all sectors. Equally, the EFCC has been

Political corruption and development  55 the body that has literally been in the eye of the storm and has stirred up a couple of controversies through its activities since its inception. The EFCC was established in 2003 (though its Establishment Act came out in 2004) largely as a response to international pressure, especially from the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). The FATF named Nigeria as one of the main nations that has been uncooperative in global efforts to fight money laundering. The Commission’s bold mission statement is to rid Nigeria of economic and financial crimes as well as act as domestic coordinator of the global war against money laundering and terrorism financing. In all, the mandate of the agency was designed to be expansive and covers virtually all aspects of corruption and financial crimes in Nigeria. Despite criticisms, the popular discourse of the EFCC has it that it sees its efforts as more often than not hampered or slowed down by the judiciary, which has been less than eager to convict those brought before the courts. While one cannot hold a brief for the judiciary in this matter, it seems reasonable that those charged with criminal offences, including corruption, should be granted the means to prove themselves innocent, that is, the courts must go through the normal process and establish reasonable grounds for conviction in each case. The above having been said, one cannot easily dismiss or discountenance the narrative of the EFCC on the role of the judiciary, given the recent allegations and established corruption among members of that body (see Das, 2018; Salihu & Gholami, 2018). In effect, the role of the judiciary in the fight against corruption has been suspect and even often pro-corruption (Akanle, 2009; Ige & Ige, 2006; HRW, 2011). There is evidence, therefore, of the prevalence of corruption among the judiciary and a few sitting judges have faced the wrath of the law over this in recent years. As the HRW (2011) captures it, even in the absence of clear corruption, the weak judicial system in the country hampers the prosecution of corruption cases. In the report, it argues that “Nigeria’s weak and overburdened judiciary offers seemingly endless opportunities for skilled defence lawyers to secure interminable and sometimes frivolous delays” (HRW, 2011: 1) in the cases brought by the EFCC. That a court led by a judge could, amazingly, dismiss 170 criminal charges against a former governor in the South-south in spite of evidence of the attempt by the individual concerned to influence the investigation with bribery says a lot about the role of the judiciary in the corruption fight in Nigeria. As Table 4.1 clearly shows, available evidence would reveal a mixed bag of outcomes and even raise some questions regarding the fight against corruption by the EFCC. There are hardly any high-profile convictions in the information on convictions in the two years referred to (maybe the situation has changed but there is no public evidence of this). Despite the regular investigation and interrogation of high-profile citizens by the EFCC, it has found it difficult to secure significant high-profile convictions, especially for political corruption.

56  Political corruption and development Table 4.1  Convictions by the EFCC (2013–2014) Year

Number of convictions

Frequent offences

Typical punishments

2013 2014

105 126

Range from false From reprimand (very limited), pretence, forgery, six moths jail term to seven to conversion of ten years’ imprisonment often customers’ money to without fine; forfeiture (as criminal additional fine); fines of misappropriation, various sums of money often criminal conspiracy, determined by severity of criminal breach of offence and the judge in trust and money question laundering

Sources: https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/convictions/89-convictions/3944-2013-convictions; https:// efccnigeria.org/efcc/convictions/89-convictions/3945-2014-convictions; accessed: 19 August 2019

However, the upward improvement in the rate of convictions from 105 in 2013 to 126 in 2014 shows that the EFCC may have the capacity for an effective fight against corruption. The figures in the table are prior to the 2015 change of power at the centre in Nigeria. Given the stated commitment of the government since 2015 to fight corruption and the massive support it has given the EFCC, the situation may have changed or improved. Nevertheless, before the change of government to another party at the centre in 2015, the EFCC made some good strides in investigating high-­profile Nigerians, especially members of the political class, for offences bordering mainly on corruption while in office. The tempo however increased drastically from 2015 when the then new government of Muhammadu Buhari made a public pronouncement that the fight against corruption remains a big part of its agenda for change. Table 4.2 below captures this in summary: In spite of the impressive roll-call of prominent Nigerians (the list keeps increasing) that have had run-ins with the EFCC, the number of convictions in that category has been less than impressive. This is actually the main source of continuous criticisms against the commission. Apart from the convictions of such people as Alamieyeseigha; Bode-George; Igbinedion; Orji Uzor Kanu; Metu and a few others in the high-profile list, the remaining cases have either dragged on endlessly or have even vanished out of the public domain. However, there is a need for the EFCC to publicize its accomplishments and challenges, as the case may be. It is disheartening that the most current data (August 2019) on the EFCC website regarding convictions date back to 2014. One wonders why there has been no published conviction figures since 2015. Lapses like this, which may even be structural1 in nature, can call into question the integrity of the fight against corruption. The EFCC has also obviously been constrained by the fact that it is not independent. The fact that the appointment of the chair of the commission is usually appointed by the president has often been cited as a strong

Political corruption and development  57 Table 4.2  Major milestones in corruption investigation/prosecution by EFCC 2005–2014

2015–2019

Prosecution of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha (former governor of Bayelsa state, 1999–E2005) and his conviction for corruption in 2007; Senator Iyabo Obasanjo – Bello (daughter of former President Olusegun Obasanjo); Olabode George (chieftain of the People’s Democratic Party); former governors, Lucky Igbinedion (Edo State); James Ibori (Delta State) etc. Investigation of former presidents over the power sector/energy reforms; investigation and/or arraignment of some other governors including Chimaroke Nnamani (Enugu); Orji Uzo Kalu (Abia); Rochas Okorocha (Imo); Akinwummi Ambode (Lagos); Josiah Dariye (Plateau); Jolly Nyame (Taraba); Raymond Dokpesi; Sambo Dasuki (former CSO to President Jonathan); Olisa Metuh (PDP chieftain); Alex Badeh (former army chief); Femi Fani – Kayode (former Aviation Minister); Ayodele Fayose (Ekiti) etc.

Source: author’s compilation.

i­ndication of partisanship by the commission. In other words, the President and his close allies may unduly influence the commission. The running battle over the confirmation of the appointment of the chair of the EFCC between the President and the National Assembly (the Senate) between 2016 and 2019 does nothing to dissuade one from a belief in partisanship. However, the recent investigation of prominent members of the ruling party (APC) (people like Rochas Okorocha and Akinwummi Ambode, for instance) seems to dampen the enthusiasm behind such claims of partisanship against the commission. As the HRW (2011) reports, EFCC faces severe structural and institutional challenges in the efforts to fight corruption in Nigeria. In view of the above structural incapacities, some of the strategies to both strengthen the EFCC and completely depoliticize it would include: •• •• •• •

Independence (appointment of the chair of the commission and prominent members by an independent committee or through the Nigeria Judicial Service Commission). Establishment of a corruption tribunal with power to convict, though the Supreme Court should still function as the court of last resort for those convicted by the tribunal. Dedicated courts and judges within the existing judicial system solely for EFCC cases. Establishment of timelines for prosecution of EFCC cases in order to alleviate problem of judicial delays, especially countless adjournments.

Corruption and development in Nigeria The negative impact of widespread corruption on development cannot be really over-emphasized. In spite of the benevolent claim that corruption

58  Political corruption and development may serve as a means of easily overcoming stubborn and rigid bureaucracy, it nevertheless exerts a net negative impact on both the economy and general development. In fact, in one study in Uganda, it was discovered that payments extorted corruptly discourage investment three times more than ordinary taxation (Fisman & Svensson, 1999). In this sense, the inability of foreign direct investment and other development aids to yield desired results may be explained partially by corruption. Corruption, apart from reducing the volume of aid and foreign investment, distorts economic priorities, since only projects with high corruption yields for public officials are favoured. Corruption impacts negatively on development since it takes away resources for development; impacts on effectiveness of development aids; hinders the smooth functioning of government; and even militates against the development of the private sector and private capital as well as eroding public confidence in institutions critical for development and growth of democracy (see Kaufman, 2009; Ahunwan, 2002; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008; Leautier, Petkoski, & Jarvis, 2006; Akanle & Adesina, 2015; Anugwom, 2003). In Nigeria, the extortion of money from contractors carrying out government projects has become almost institutionalized. This reality is captured in the expression “kick-back” or “ten per cent”. In this case, public officials only approve those projects in which they are guaranteed their usual ten per cent or kick-back, which is in most cases paid up-front. This practice, which originated in the 1970s, has eaten deep into the moral fabric of ­Nigeria’s public service. Often the ten per cent value of any contract is automatically allocated to the chief public officer (mostly a minister or cabinet member) in charge of the sector concerned. This corrupt practice, apart from distorting genuine development priorities in the execution of contracts, also inflates the amount of money expended on any project since contractors are usually advised to build this ten per cent into the cost of the project through the padding of expenses. In addition, the quest for 10 per cent and graft often creates a situation whereby maintenance of facilities is ignored, since maintenance, differently from awarding a new contract, does not have high corruption yield potentials (see Collier, 2000). This is no less the case in Nigeria where roads and other physical infrastructure are allowed to seriously deteriorate so that the government of the day can award new contracts at over-inflated values and make its own ten per cent. In further probing of the relationship between corruption and development in Nigeria it may be useful to bear in mind the contribution of David Osterfield. In the views of Osterfield (1992), in a heavily regulated economy, two distinct types of corruption can be delineated. These are “expansive corruption” that involves activities that improve the competitiveness and flexibility of the market and “restrictive corruption” which limits opportunities for productive and socially beneficial exchange. In his thinking, public sector corruption is of the restrictive type and involves the illegal appropriation of public resources (and positions) for private use.

Political corruption and development  59 In Nigeria, this sort of restrictive corruption has become more widespread in the last two decades. However, expansive corruption, which may ordinarily mean corruption mainly in the private sector, has equally grown as corruption becomes a way of life. The case of Nigeria aptly demonstrates that corruption in developing nations cannot be easily categorized into mutually exclusive types, since it takes corruption in one area to reinforce sharp practices in the other. In other words, it is actually a corrupt private sector that would fall for inducements as a way of negotiating public sector services. While conceding that bribery, especially where well applied, can effectively limit bureaucratic bottlenecks and improve the speed of service delivery, it also creates a culture of mediocrity and favouritism that is very harmful in the long run. Thus, while bribery may mitigate the harmful effects of government regulation, it can lead to the domination of the market by inefficient firms and organizations with the right connections and sleights of hand. The impact of corruption on development in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. It has been very severe. This has not been helped by the long reign of successive suppressive military junta and irresponsible public office holders. In other words, a major cause of the still-born development of Nigeria can be seen as corruption. This does not in any sense amount to a denial of the reality of some form of corruption in almost all known societies but rather a pointer to the very high rate of corruption in the state as a developing country. As Robinson (1998: 2) opines: while corruption is a feature of all societies to varying degrees, it is a particular concern for developing countries because it undermines economic growth, discourages foreign investment and reduces the resources available for infrastructure, public services and anti-poverty programmes. Implied in the above is that poverty can seriously undermine general progress in a society and make economic planning futile. And in the dearth of economic planning or lack of it, development becomes unpredictable and fortuitous. Interestingly, corruption equally undermines the democratic process; breeds general distrust of democratic or electoral processes; limits electoral choice; and creates a situation whereby the populace holds democratic institutions and political elites to be caricatures of public wishes and citizens’ choices. Thus, as rightly contended, corruption may be seen as the main clog in the development of democracy in most of Africa (Dreher & Schneider, 2010). Perhaps the above sentiments are borne out by the wideranging conflicts and disputes that regularly mar electoral exercises in many parts of the continent. Corruption militates against the electoral process, and even the lure of corruption that electoral offices promise in the continent

60  Political corruption and development is equally a big motivation for involvement and participation in the electoral process. Therefore, in spite of consensus that links democracy with development (see, for instance, Siegel, 2007; Piccone, 2007); this connection can only be borne out where and when democracy overcomes corruption. In this sense, the optimistic linkage between democracy and development is seriously eroded by corruption (see Bardhan, 1997; Puri, 2006). The situation of Nigeria and other struggling democracies aptly portrays the severe limitations corruption can place on development. Perhaps Nigeria’s case is further worsened when one appreciates that despite achieving a remarkable feat (by its usual standards) of two decades of uninterrupted democracy (1999–2019), its democracy is really what may be termed nominal democracy. In this sense, democratic culture and its associated values are still neither deeply rooted nor widespread. In other words, in spite of democracy, there are still considerable limitations on individual rights and liberties, especially with reference to accessing the political space and the assurance of the evident domination of the will of the people in the electoral process at all levels.

Tackling corruption in Nigeria: within and beyond domestic malfeasance It is fashionable and even tenable to argue that corruption pervades every sector in Nigeria and impacts negatively on development programmes and interventions (see Kaufmann, 2009; Hope & Chikulo, 1999). There is ­obviously no contesting the fact that widespread corruption undermines development initiatives and militates against realizing programme objectives. However, there is also the need to realize that when it comes to development planning and the effectiveness of foreign aid or interventions, the conditions of such externally driven efforts are often debilitating and even feed on the assumed atmosphere of corruption in the country. There is also the fact that even in project development and execution, foreign or multinational firms have readily colluded with local politicians and businesspersons either to deliver shoddy jobs or even collect monies for projects not executed. A good illustration of this problem is in the road construction industry where between 1999 and 2014 there was a cyclical pattern of mobilization to site by construction firms. But the real construction work usually gets abandoned a few months after the normally highly publicized mobilization and commencement of work. This process was repeated on a number of occasions and on different road projects in the country. These were the situations in the repairs or reconstruction of the Onitsha to Enugu to Port Harcourt expressway, and the Lagos to Ibadan expressway, to mention a few in that period. Even more to the point is the recent culpability of the expatriate firm Petro-Tim (an energy company owned by Frank Timis, a Romanian-Australian businessman) in a corruption

Political corruption and development  61 scandal regarding energy contracts in Senegal; the same firm has been ­fingered as engineering corrupt practices in such other African nations as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (Niang, 2019). The firm, according to Niang, operates through entering into dubious alliances with presidents and their relations to win tenders that are very unfavourable to African countries. This mirrors the same antics of the construction firms that were involved in physical infrastructure, energy and industrial contracts in Nigeria between 1999 and 2014, including road repairs/­ construction, energy reform contracts, and even the laughable turn-around maintenance of petroleum refineries. Be the above as it may, dealing with corruption in Nigeria should start with a realization of the hydra-headed and widespread nature of the problem. Corruption has incidentally eaten deep into the moral fabric of the entire Nigerian society and therefore requires a much more committed approach in tackling it. The fight against corrupt should involve the participation of different stakeholders, society and a variety of approaches. But even more than this is the fact that for corruption to be dealt with, the adverse effects must be brought to bear on the moral conscience of the people. In this case, there should be a groundswell disavowal of the evils of corruption by society at large. This goes beyond using it as a propaganda tool or as a weapon to discredit former administrations and thus win cheap popularity by the government in power. Corruption must be projected by government and organized civil society as a social problem that requires amelioration through collective social action. There is equally the need for high-level political commitment and will to tackle corruption which should go beyond mere rhetoric. The leadership must exhibit a high level of responsibility and a genuine wish to fight corruption. Any reasonable fight against corruption can scarcely be waged where the leadership perceives it as a smokescreen to achieve popularity. Even more imperative is the resolution of the leadership to deal with corruption in spite of whoever might be involved. A responsible and responsive leadership needs to work in league with a society alert to corruption. Civil society, including the mass media, should act as a watchdog on the government’s fight against corruption. Also, civil society can be seen as very instrumental in reversing the worldview of corruption as normal in contemporary Nigerian society. Incidentally, Nigeria boasts a well-developed mass media and NGOs that can serve as vanguards of the anti-corruption crusade. It is certainly civil society acting in concert with government and its anti-corruption agencies that can successfully keep corruption firmly in the moral conscience of the people. Without doubt, a critical obstacle to tackling corruption exists in the way the people of a given society perceive and relate to corrupt practices and those who indulge in these practices. Thus, a good fight against corruption would depend extensively on how the people as a whole perceive the menace and react to it. In a situation where corruption is seen as nothing

62  Political corruption and development wrong or even accepted as a route to acquiring the good things of life, eradicating or minimizing it will always be difficult. In other words, when people tend to believe, especially by their actions, that there is nothing wrong or untoward about corruption, it will persevere. The HRW (2011) reports how a former chieftain of the PDP in the Southwest was enthusiastically welcomed back to society after serving a jail term of over two years for corruption. The cheery welcome even involved such highly placed citizens as a former president of the country from that zone. The raucous welcome and joy over such a matter may give the impression that corruption is welcome and that serving a short jail term for it is no big deal. In addition, as has been argued, “corruption in Nigeria and in many African countries is glamorized and incentivized rather than punished. When corrupt officials are caught, they are fined less than the stolen amount and let off to enjoy the balance” (Akanle and Adesina, 2015: 431). Rose-Ackerman (1999), makes an interesting and equally intriguing assertion that corruption can be viable but anti-corruption initiatives are more likely to succeed with the support of ordinary citizens and the business community, especially those with considerable influence than without. The above thinking is probably workable in Nigeria where even current efforts at the fight against corruption have not received the support of a good number of ordinary citizens (who see it as political) and hardly any visible support from the significant members of the business community. Perhaps, if such notable business figures as the Dangotes and the Otedolas would make a clear and effective support of the anti-corruption efforts, a big difference may be made. This thinking has the support of the prominent economist Jeffrey Sachs who believes that the rise of domestic interest in the form of an independent private sector can help hold governments accountable (see Sachs, 2005). Therefore, interventions in developing economies should focus on growth and not necessarily governance in order to promote the emergence of such domestic interests. Another time-tested panacea for tackling corruption is the existence of strong and working public institutions. Strong and resilient institutions should embody and perpetuate values and norm choices consistent with ridding society of corruption. In Nigeria, institutions are glaringly weak and often do the bidding of those in power or those in charge of them. Without strong institutions and time-honoured values, it would be difficult to win the corruption war or achieve the level of ethical and value reorientation consistent with a minimally corrupt society.

Conclusion A very apt epithet and comprehension of the corruption debacle in Nigeria is encapsulated in the notion that “when you fight corruption, corruption fights back” (see Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011). This sentiment, though not original, captures to a large extent the exasperation and frustration of those

Political corruption and development  63 who have dared focus on the crusade against corruption over the years in Nigeria. In fact, a good number of leaders in the country, including even the military (unpopular for corruption and authoritarianism), have always bemoaned the huge obstacle against any fight against corruption constituted by those with a stake in the continuation of business-as-usual in Nigeria. The flak that the government of Buhari has received from other politicians and some citizens over its stated commitment to fight corruption would indicate that some prominent citizens and groups are against any fight against corruption that would in any way imperil their interests or threaten their wealth or sources of wealth. Therefore, to fight corruption in Nigeria is neither a tea party nor a walk in the park. It needs single-minded commitment and resolute determination to uproot the cankerworm of corruption no matter whose ox is gored in the process. The main issue is that such a crusade against corruption should not be tainted by political considerations, as some would allege against the Buhari attempt. It also should not be construed as a means of settling personal and political scores. The conviction of people should be based on clearly established grounds and through impeccable judicial processes so that people are not wantonly criminalized under the guise of fighting corruption. A combination of the government and an alert civil society can fruitfully tackle the massive corruption in Nigeria by utilizing a multi-layered or multi-pronged approach. According to Collier (2000) only concerted action on different fronts at the same time can tackle corruption in Africa. This is no less the case in Nigeria. It stands to reason that where corruption is widespread or systemic, a single strategy will not suffice since it requires a total reversal of what has been seen as normal. Apart from the utilization of a number of regulatory and statutory mechanisms for dealing with official corruption, the means test can also come in handy in the larger society. In this case, assets owned by individuals should be tested against the means or resources available to such people. This means test will be very useful in checking the sudden flight to stupendous wealth of political office holders in Nigeria. The prevailing practice is for new office holders to voluntarily declare their assets on the assumption of office and when vacating office. But the assets declaration exercise has become a meaningless ritual flouted openly and even wantonly disregarded. The means test can empower law enforcement agencies to carry out periodic checks on current and former political office holders. Those who fail the test should be made to face the wrath of the law. The fight against corruption should be seen as a coordinated and multipronged one. Therefore, all possible strategies, ranging from strict enforcement of existing regulation to moral persuasions and social ostracism, should be deployed. Vital to the case of Nigeria is a close scrutiny of the complex processes of governance. In addition to decentralization of government and the devolution of authority, there is a crucial need for the

64  Political corruption and development ­ rocesses of government and even the selection/election of leaders to be open p to public scrutiny and accessible to even those without fat wallets. A situation where aspiring political office holders pay tens of millions of Naira to obtain party nomination forms can only hinder access and engender the desire to recoup one’s expenses once in office. In other words, monetizing the selection process is a sure way of equally monetizing the position later on.

Note 1 Those close to the commission have often talked about the legal frustrations it encounters in dealing with high profile cases. The “Dasukigate” case is illustrative here. No significant result has been achieved from this protracted litigation so far.

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Political corruption and development  65 Brownsberger, W.N. (1983). “Development and governmental corruption – Materialism and political fragmentation in Nigeria”. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21 (2): 215–233. Chabal, B., & Daloz, J.P. (1999). Africa works: Disorder as political instrument. London: James Curry. Chambliss, W.J. (1975). “The political economy of crime: A comparative study of Nigeria and U.S.A”, in Taylor, I. et al. (eds) Critical criminology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (pp. 167–180). Collier, P. (2000). “How to reduce corruption.” African Development Review, 12 (2): 191–205. Das, Vasudev (2018). “Judicial corruption: The case of Nigeria”. Journal of Financial Crime, 25 (4): 926–939. De Sardan, J.P.O. (1999). “A moral economy of corruption in Africa”. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (1): 25–52. Dreher, A., & Schneider, F. (2010). “Corruption and the shadow economy: An empirical analysis”. Public Choice, 144 (1/2): 215–238. Egwu, E.U. (1995). “The psycho-dynamics of corruption in Nigeria,” in Onuoha, J., & Ozioko, J.O.C. (eds) Contemporary issues in social sciences. Enugu: Auto-Century (pp. 126–147). Ekeh, P.P. (1975). “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17 (1): 91–117. Ekpu, R. (2001). “Corruption”. Newswatch Magazine (July 30). 34 (4): 41. Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (1999). “The effects of corruption and taxation on growth: Firm level evidence.” Mimeograph series, World Bank: Development Research Group. Hope, K.R., & Chikulo, B.C. (1999). Corruption and development in Africa: Lessons from country case- studies. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2011). Corruption on trial? The record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (25 August). www.hrw.org/ report/2011/08/25/corruption-trial/record-nigerias-economic-and-financial-crimescommission (accessed: 21 August 2019). Igbo, E.U.M., & Anugwom, E.E. (2002). Social change and social problems: A Nigerian perspective. Nsukka: AP Express Pub. Ige, A., & Ige, A. (2006). “The imperative of a virile judiciary in democratic governance in Nigeria”, in Oyekanmi, F., & Soyombo, O. (eds) Society and governance: The quest for legitimacy in Nigeria. Lagos: Irede Printers (pp. 157–176). Ihonvbere, J., & Ekekwe, E. (1988). “Dependent capitalism, structural adjustment and democratic possibilities in Nigeria’s Third Republic.” Afrika Spectrum, 1 (1): 273–292. Johnston, M. (1996). “The search for definitions: The vitality of politics and the issue of corruption.” International Social Science Journal, 149: 321–335. Joseph, Richard (1991). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaufman, D. (2009). “Aid effectiveness and governance: The good, the bad and the ugly”. Development Outreach, 11 (1): 26–29. Khan, M. (1996). “A typology of corrupt transactions in developing countries.” IDS Bulletin, 27 (2): 12–21. Konie, G. (2003). “National Reconciliation”. The Post (Zambia), July, 23: 11. Leautier, F., Petkoski, D., & Jarvis, M. (2006). “Can private sector action tackle corruption?” Development Outreach, 8 (2): 2–7.

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5 An ever-malignant tumour Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism in Nigeria

Introduction Even though one can convincingly argue that ethnicity has lost a significant portion of its valence as a tool for political mobilization on the national political scene, it is still a strong barometer of relations between the different ethnic groups in Nigeria. Thus, it still exerts considerable influence in party politics and elections at the substate levels. There is, however, an optimistic observation that at the national level, political elites since 1999, or even 1993 (with the historic victory of MKO Abiola in the 1993 presidential elections), have been able to build political alliances that transcend ethnic boundaries. This is not simply like the case in the immediate postcolonial era where a political party that is strongly based in one majority ethnic group would seek alliance with one of the ethnic minority groups in order to win elections at the national level. These days, the alliance is multi-ethnic to the extent that one can argue that politicians are now more focused on crude personal aspirations and common interests in building alliances and networks than on ethnic and other primordial factors. However, civic relations among the different groups in Nigeria are still coloured by ethnicity. As a result, ethnicity and ethnic relations loom large in any thorough examination of the contemporary political history of Nigeria. A good number of viewpoints have been offered in the attempts to explain both ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Africa. Some of the popular views in this regard include the five models of African polities offered by Lemarchard (1994); the theory of prebendal politics (Joseph, 1991, 1983); the resource curse notion (see Auty, 1993; Ross, 2004); the relative scarcity of resources notion (see Homer-Dixon, 1994; Myers, 1993); the pluralist perspectives (see Chazan, 1992; Bayart, 1986); the political economy perspective (see Mamdani, 1995, 1996); the relative deprivation thesis (see Anugwom, 2007). These viewpoints offer penetrating insights and explanations regarding ethnicity and the nature of conflict in modern African states including Nigeria. However, ethnicity appears like a hydraheaded and dynamic monster in Nigeria.

68  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism As any cursory observer of events in Nigeria in the last five years would readily concede, there is a palpable air of Fulani ethnic group ascendancy. This ascendancy has been seen as the force behind the recurrent herders versus farmers conflict in the Southern parts of the country (including also parts of the political Middle Belt such as Kogi and Benue states). These conflicts even though having a long history in Nigeria have become more rampant, brazen and deadlier since 2015. Some observers ascribe these conflicts to the current dispensation in which the president is of Fulani extraction (and owns cattle himself). In other words, even though the president has not canvassed for the unruly and violent behaviour of some herders, these herders may be taking advantage of the fact that he is of their ethnic group, that is, an ethnic group with the reins of power. There is no doubt, as was the case in the Boko Haram insurgence (see Anugwom, 2019) that some of the alleged horrendous acts of the Fulani herdsmen may have been perpetrated by other criminal elements hiding under the umbrella of the persistent Fulani herders–farmers clashes. Be that as it may, the situation is that while the ethnic factor may have taken a back seat in national political alliance, it is still a factor in intergroup relations and, more critically, impacts on government policies as well as the perception of them by citizens (see, Anugwom, 2018). Therefore, ethnicity still remains a significant challenge to nation building and development in Nigeria. It is equally a factor of mobilization at the grassroots and still engenders pervasive centrifugal nationalism which impacts negatively on national integration and development. Hence, the ethnic factor, while having roots in colonial contact (see Nnoli, 1978) has not diminished significantly in the post-colonial era. Even though the different language and ethnic groups in Nigeria have been presented in Chapter 2 of this book, it is still important to reiterate that Nigeria is a heterogenous state with over 200 ethnic and even more language groups (see Otite, 1990; Iwaloye & Ibeanu, 1997). However, these groups have been the focus and anchor of intergroup relations and access to national resources. In fact, the situation was so bad that Nigeria in the first three decades of independence was awash with ethnic conflicts that were more often than not conflated with religious conflicts (see Anugwom & Oji, 2004). Undoubtedly, the immediate beneficiaries of these development retarding conflicts were the political elites and their allies who stoked the embers of ethnic differences as mobilization tools for accessing and sustaining their hold on power (see Nnoli, 1978; Sklar, 1967; Ibrahim & Pereira, 1993; Osaghae, 1994; Ukiwo, 2005; Anugwom, 2018, 2000). In other words, ethnicity “became [and is still] a yardstick for measuring contribution to the national development effort and especially for allocating and distributing power and national resources” (Anugwom, 2000: 61). Ethnicity as well as ethnic schism, as history has shown, does not exist in a vacuum but are rather the products of interaction between people of different geo-ethnic backgrounds in the quest for some scarce resources

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  69 (see Nnoli, 1978; Anugwom, 1997). In spite of this, the ethnic fervour can become heightened and threatening of national cohesion when political combatants perceive it as a good tool with which to access political office. Against the foregoing, this chapter examines the nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations in Nigeria and their implications for development. It is anchored on the assumption that development efforts and policies are often bedevilled by primordial factors and ethnicity in national political life. The chapter draws information from the content analysis of relevant publications as well as the critical perusal of existing literature.

Ethnicity: conceptual and theoretical matters According to Nnoli (1978) ethnicity is a social phenomenon that is associated with interaction between different ethnic and social groups. Ethnic groups are mainly social groups that are distinguished from others by common social properties or features. These may range from common history, religion/belief system to dressing, diet and language. However, it would appear that language and common ancestry (belief in it) are the most consistent denominators of ethnic groups, followed by common history and religion. While ethnic groups are often located within the same geographical area, spatial commonality or contiguity is not an enduring feature of an ethnic group over time. In Nigeria, the case of the Ijaw ethnic group is instructive. The Ijaw are scattered over seven states in Nigeria but are all members of the common Ijaw ethnic group. The same can be said about even such other groups as the Yoruba (the Yoruba are in fact also located in neighbouring Benin Republic) and the Hausa and Igbo. However, while language may appear the most consistent marker of an ethnic group, it is not always consistent or immutable in this regard (see, Iwaloye & Ibeanu, 1997; Anugwom, 1997). Without doubt, a small ethnic group may over time be literally swallowed by the language of the neighbouring bigger or more prominent ethnic group. This phenomenon was the case in the North of Nigeria where the colonial administrators adopted Hausa as the official language of the Northern protectorate. Hausa soon enough endangered the language of other ethnic minorities within that region. Also, over time, a language spoken by a minority group may become extinct and eventually faze out of living memory. So many languages in Africa have been victims of this tendency. Therefore, ancestry emerges as a strong contender for the most consistent and reliable marker of the ethnic group. It is against this realization that the definition of the ethnic group given by the classical sociologist Max Weber remains insightful for our definition or distinction of an ethnic group. According to Weber, we shall call “ethnic groups” those human groups that entertain a ­subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of

70  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. (Weber, 1978: 389) In other words, Weber does not believe that the ethnic group must be distinguished by objective biological characteristics. For him what is prominent is the belief of ethnic group members regarding their common ancestry, that is, those who see themselves as members of a given ethnic group must believe in this same ancestry. Weber’s thinking ultimately privileges the prominence of common historical origin, especially the myth of origin in the definition or marking out of the ethnic group. Ethnic groups are therefore to be mainly distinguished based on common ancestry. Common ancestry more often than not invokes imaginations of common culture or shared cultural practices. Unlike Weber, Barth (1969), limited the role of a common culture in his own conception of the ethnic group. For him, rather than mere focus on cultural homogeneity, we should concern ourselves with how the ethnic group employs such cultural properties in differentiating itself from others. In other words, he argues that ethnic groups should not be simply characterized by their consistent cultural content but rather by how they employ such cultural markers in signifying boundaries between them and others around them. For him, therefore, the ethnic boundary or significant cultural markers define the ethnic group. The above seems to suggest some points of divergence but also convergence between Weber and Barth, since common ancestry may necessarily spawn common cultural practices or beliefs and the tracing of common ancestry is often a marker deployed in setting a group apart from the others. In an effort possibly to clear up the confusion between these two viewpoints, Horowitz (1985) came up with the notion of “putative descent” (an attempt to qualify the use of ancestry). For him, ethnicity is built on the myth of common or collective ancestry but the ancestry carries with it, traits that the members of the group believe are innate. This entails, as he also contended, that both ascription and the idea of affinity resulting from it are implicated in the concept and notion of ethnicity. It is important to realize that even though this definition is related to Weber’s conception, it still leaves room for social group heterogeneity. But as has been well-noted, the definition by Horowitz, “stipulates that ethnic identity need not be based on some characteristic that was definitively acquired at birth, but merely the ‘myth’ of a common ancestry based on traits that are ‘believed’ to be innate” (Hecquer, 2014: 9–10). However, one finds the more encompassing and relative recent conceptualization of the concept by Chandra (2012a, 2012b) very interesting here. In this case, while Chandra employs the logic of both Weber and Barth in privileging

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  71 ancestry and major elements of culture, he seems to realize that it would be dangerous to delineate an ethnic group at all times and in all places with the same one or two social variables. For Chandra, descent-based attributes would mean, “attributes associated with or believed to be associated with [the person’s] descent” (Chandra, 2012b: 59). In this sense, such features as the individual’s physical features, language, name and religion/belief system may be markers of ethnic group membership. Without doubt, these attributes, apart from the physical feature (plastic surgery can change this), are not immutable. It would appear that ethnic group membership might be defined by more than just one attribute among language, culture, religion, historical experience, physical features, dominant spatial location etc. but what would seem to matter the most is the belief and subjective definition of the members of that group vis-à-vis significant others. In other words, the factors that are prioritized would have to do eventually with whether ethnicity is employed or deployed in a primordial sense of shared commonalities in which descent (ancestry), language, belief, cultural practices may be prioritized (the Yoruba ethnic group with its Oduduwa myth of descent, and the Igbo, to an extent, would belong here) or whether it is employed constructively or strategically, in which case such factors as common political history, common religious history/shared religious beliefs, associational variables etc. would be used as dominant markers and distinctions of the group from others (in Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group welded together by the Uthman Dan Fodiyo jihad would seem a good example of this). Theoretically, ethnicity is largely a dynamic concept. This means that in some cases, it has the capacity to change and reconfigure itself over time. Nevertheless, while the theoretical dynamism of ethnicity remains valid, its usage as an analytical tool is often imbued with a tendency towards grand narratives. This is especially likely in the sphere of political development in many African countries where there may be the temptation to relate all development malaise to the ethnic virus. Such a tendency may arise even in the face of the fact that a direct cause-and-effect relationship is usually difficult to establish. One common practice in the extant literature is to make a distinction between primordial ethnicity and instrumental ethnicity. In the first case, ethnicity signifies those who believe that they are members of an identified social group with common social or cultural characteristics that differentiate them from others (a usage that is often symbolic and driven by some sense of pride in common identification); in the latter case, ethnicity is seen as instrumentalized in the sense that it is used constructively in the quest for resources usually in a heterogeneous society. More critical is that ethnicity is usually invoked when ethnic differences or even commonalities are used in social relations with members of other ethnic groups, mostly in the bid to gain some advantage. This utilization

72  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism features prominently in the access to political and economic resources in a heterogeneous society or state. Thus, “ethnicity should be seen as arising in any situation where a group of people, no matter how small, with different cultural and linguistic attributes from those of its neighbours; uses these as the basis of solidarity and interaction with others” (Anugwom, 2000: 64). Solidarity here is mainly deployed as a mobilizational tool in the public arena. It privileges a situation whereby people prioritize ethnic similarity over and above other considerations. In its heightened form, as is obvious from the postcolonial history of Nigeria (examples would include the civil war; long history of military rule; recurrent socio-ethnic conflicts), it sponsors ethnic nationalism over state-centred nationalism. In other words, people see themselves primarily as members of a given ethnic group before membership of the national group (Nigeria). In this situation, the ethnic group becomes the point of primary allegiance and is seen as more valuable (or important) than the state. That would explain why the state is then perceived as a distinct sphere of pillage and the traditional setting perceived as point of patronage and accountable behaviour (see Ekeh, 1975 for a better analysis of this general tendency in his notion of two publics). In spite of the foregoing, the literature suggests four theoretical understandings of the phenomenon of ethnicity. These different theoretical ­arguments are anchored on what defines the ethnic group or/and how and when ethnicity is invoked or utilized. The four theoretical views are the  existentialist, instrumentalist, constructive and situational ethnicities. The existentialist perspective is anchored on the primordial leanings of the group defined as a distinct ethnic group and focuses mainly on common cultural properties or attributes of the group such as language, beliefs, cultural practices and even common ancestry. Ethnicity becomes instrumentalized when, even though it may be initially based on the above properties, it over time acquires what can be called a utilitarian tone, that is, there is a strategic emphasis on the emotive character of ethnicity in the bid to access resources in a plural or heterogeneous society. Political scientists often stress the constructive nature or utilization of ethnic group membership or non-membership, as the case may be. In this sense, constructive ethnicity refers to ethnicity as largely a social construct which is inherently dynamic (changes over time) and is mainly exploited or manipulated by political and social elites in advancing their interests within society. Such ethnicity is not so much driven by common primordial features or characteristics as it is driven by the selfinterest of the elites to utilize the ethnic base to advance their selfish interests. It is really easy to argue that the above utilization of ethnicity is perhaps the most dangerous and detrimental to development in Nigeria. The invocation of ethnicity can also be seen as situational. In this sense, it becomes a rallying force; a focus of survival and solidarity. The ethnic factor is invoked in this case when the group is threatened or is facing

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  73 severe competition or even threat of survival. For instance, the oil conflict in the Niger Delta region did a lot for the resurgence of both Ijaw and Ogoni ethnic identities; on a global level, the Rohingyas, who have become endangered in Myanmar, have also reinvigorated their ethnicity in the quest for survival and decent treatment. In spite of the above distinctions, it is necessary to state that these different conceptions of ethnicity are neither mutually exclusive nor fixed in time. Therefore, ethnicity at a particular point may be understood from more than one of the above theoretical viewpoints and may also serve more than one of the above purposes over time. In effect, the importance of the classification becomes mainly heuristic.

Ethnicity: a colonial heritage or a postcolonial state misadventure While ethnicity in Africa has been attributed to the colonial contact (see Nnoli, 1994, 1978), it was not really the word or expression that the colonial masters chose to describe the locals they met in Africa. Their preferred word was “tribe” or its derivative form, “tribalism”. However, tribe was mainly used in a pejorative sense by the colonial masters (Anugwom, 2000) and was intended to represent Africans and their institutions as primitive and barbaric. According to Mafeje (1971), tribalism is nothing but an anachronistic misnomer and a highly suspicious distinction utilized to separate Africans from other people. It would imply the African as barbaric in relation to others (the Western civilized). Tribalism consequently lost its intellectual flay and social descriptive valour. It is now largely considered unacceptable and intellectually sterile to use it to refer to or describe ­Africans and other groups for that matter. Be that as it may, the colonial legacy is often seen as sowing the main seeds of ethnic distinctions and regional cleavages in Nigeria. The colonial administration, while paying lip service to “Nigerianization”, also felt safer ensuring that the North and South of the country were perennially distinct. This is in spite of the amalgamation that was supposedly a unification of these two former protectorates into one entity. According to Oyovbaire (1983), the amalgamation entailed neither a unification of colonial policies nor the evolvement of an integrated or uniform administration in Nigeria. Thus, “despite this purported amalgamation, the British continued to run the two halves of the country – North and South – as separate political and administrative entities with little common linkage outside of common economic infrastructure like roads, railways and a common currency” ­ (Mustapha, 2004: 3). In effect, the colonial administration maintained the differences and ­separation in real terms between the North and South of the country. This policy was reinforced unwittingly with colonial prejudice and the partisanship of the colonial administrators themselves who stereotyped the South

74  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism and North as composed of unruly savages and backward and ignorant people respectively and the gulf which existed between the colonial administrators of the two territories was the butt of the jokes of educated Nigerians in the 1930s (Afigbo, 1989). The colonial distinction and practice were really very crucial in further entrenching the existing differences between these groups. According to Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) ethnicity is not so much a matter of shared traits or commonalities, significant as these are, but is rather the outcome of the interplay between external categorization and self-identification. Ethnicity is, thus, not just reflective of how an individual or group identifies itself but also how the individual or group is identified within a plural society. Despite where one locates these common traits or characteristics (markers) of members of a particular ethnic group as different from others in the society, there is the sense of having common identity by both the members of this group. In the same vein, the larger society equally distinguishes the group from the others using these social markers. In most cases, the classification and categorization of ethnic and social groups originate from powerful agencies and institutions of the state, intellectual and political elites, religious bodies and cultural groups. In Nigeria, as already argued, ethnicity and the regional divisions in the country, along the lines of similar socio-cultural and linguistic affinities, were initiated formally by the colonial administration. It was motivated at that point by both administrative needs and the political goal of colonialism to hinder any extensive ­integration of local people. Going by the colonial political map, which incidentally kept to primordial commonalities among social groups in Nigeria, the East became the bastion of the Igbo ethnic/language group and other minority groups living in the same geographical area; the West was carved out as the bastion of the Yoruba; and the North was the domain of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic/linguistic group as well as other minority groups within that geographical area. The colonial division, while it did not create the original socio-­ cultural distinctions between these groups, reinforced such distinctions and reaffirmed them as key variables in relating to and accessing the formal state. The above colonial legacy has been lampooned by Nnoli (1978) who argued that the colonial administrators promoted ethnicity in Nigeria through policies of indirect rule, categorization of Africans by tribe, and the promotion of residential segregation between natives and settlers in the urban areas in different parts of the federation. These divisions, borne out of administrative convenience on the part of the British, equally established socio-cultural distinctions among the regions and even within regions, since the administrative districts and provinces within each of these regions were created in consonance with perceived socio-cultural and linguistic affinities. Therefore, ethnic groups in Nigeria are clearly structured more along the lines of socio-cultural distinctions (similar myth of origin; ancestry; language; cultural values and beliefs; religion etc.) than strictly on the lines of geographical continuity or other bases of similarity.

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  75 Therefore, the British colonial administration policy that emphasized different arrangements for different regions exacerbated divide-and-rule tactics that ultimately widened the gap between the diverse cultural groups (Abubakar, 1997). The division was further entrenched by the various constitutions emanating from the colonial powers. For instance, the MacPherson constitution has been, specifically, pinpointed by Abubakar (1997) as faulty on this premise. In support of this view, Dunmonye (1990) argued that the MacPherson constitution produced a skewed federation in which the North exercised dominance over the other regions. This dominance was often justified by colonial administrators on the bases of geographical size and population. Thus, the colonial era constitution and other forms of regulations of that period were marked by an orientation that created three different and distinct regions along the lines of the three main ethnic groups in the country. The above was further complicated by the existence of different by-laws and legislation for the regions. These practices did not just create or entrench a divisive mentality but militated against any form of unity or reasonable homogeneity among the three regions and their citizens in the country. It would then be logical for one to state that given the nature of political space created and nurtured by the colonial constitutions, the political parties that emerged in Nigeria’s first republic relied primarily on mobilizing primordial sentiments and putting ethnic considerations far above any form of nationalistic or patriotic loyalty. In addition, the ethnic nature of these parties also benefitted from the fact that they emerged largely from distinct socio-cultural associations. Hence, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) had roots in the cultural group known as “Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa” and the Action Group (AG) had roots in the Yoruba “Egbe Omo Oduduwa”. It was the ethnic nature and primordial bend of these political parties that contributed to the series of events that undermined the first republic and ultimately produced the civil war (see Anugwom, 2018). However, it is expedient to state here that the fragile nature of the national government of Tafawa Balewa’s NPC necessarily led to a reliance on the military, that is, the first republic government did not command nationwide acceptance or legitimacy and had to depend on the coercive force of the military. This undemocratic dependence on the military, apart from giving the military some prominence in governance, created the impact in the larger society that the military could be trusted as the rightful custodians of the country’s unity and an alternative institution to democracy. In entrusting the role of enforcers to the military, the politicians of the first republic inexplicably ignored the fact that, just like any other institution in the emergent nation, the military had been equally ethnicized. As Oyediran (1979) contends, the root of the ethnicization of the Nigerian military can be traced back to 1958 when recruitment was largely based on regional allocation or quota. In other words, military personnel were

76  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism chosen, promoted and posted based on ethnic considerations and not on core professional attributes. In this situation, it was not difficult to foresee the debacle caused by the army in its chaotic intervention bid in 1966 and how this mismanaged trust threw the country into the unfortunate path of civil war. However, it can be equally argued that the crisis, which finally snowballed into the war in 1967, started with the inability of the first republic or immediate postcolonial indigenous leaders to run the affairs of state as astute and de-ethnicized political leaders. It was their shoddy performance and ethnic chauvinism that roused the army and set the stage for the eventual misadventure of the military class in Nigeria’s governance.

Elites, politics and ethnicity in Nigeria Crucial to the apprehension of the influence of ethnicity or ethnonationalism in resource allocation and social conflict in Nigeria is an understanding of the nature and evolvement of the Nigerian political elites. The typical state political elites in Nigeria are those who have mobilized and utilized ethno-regional and primordial loyalties in accessing and even appropriating political power at the centre. For these elites, ethnonationalism or ethnic mobilization is critical to the acquisition of power in Nigeria and even after acquiring such power, the unpredictable political terrain entails that these political elites still maintain some form of reciprocity with their primordial groups. Graf (1988) captured the above situation by contending that the dominant Nigerian elites evolved from fractious, ethnoculturally-centred and self-interested groupings. Therefore, the process of the formation of the elites in Nigeria was dependent on their ability to meet the demands of their ethno-regional or local political constituencies, which ultimately formed the political ladder for accessing power at the centre of the federation. This process, which was more evident in Nigeria’s first and second republic politics, has subsisted till now. It has become somehow more institutionalized in party politics with the adoption of the so-called zoning system by prominent political parties. The zoning system, as the name suggests, allocates and rotates critical political offices between different ethno-geographical groups in Nigeria. The flipside of building political bastions in one’s primordial base is that political elites who are usually mindful of the need to stay in power ensure that considerable resources from the federal government are invested in their ethno-regional groups. This is often seen as payback and a way of oiling that primordial political machinery in order to avoid loss of political relevance. Not doing this would be tantamount to political naivety and entail the loss of the considerable psychological buffering provided by the primordial locality. Without doubt, part of what lies behind the sustenance of the imagination of ethnicity in politics and its determining role in the state project, is people’s expectation that those from their ethnic group who attain power

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  77 and gain control at the centre will ensure that there are dividends accruing to their kinsmen and the group as a direct outcome. There is, in this sense, a web of expectation that generates a common feeling among group members that accessing power by one of their own automatically means some flow of national resources or “goodies” to the group. This web of expectation, which often holds the political elites hostage, has been perceived by Berman (1998). In his words, The politics of political tribalism and moral ethnicity become linked to the ability of the “big men” of ethnic communities holding positions in the state to obtain for the districts and regions a significant share of the large-scale collective benefits of development in infrastructure projects of roads, schools, dispensaries, etc. as well as the more individual rewards apportioned through the discrete personal contacts of the back verandah. (Berman, 1998: 335) In spite of widespread ethnicity in Nigeria, it has not, in real terms, commonly benefitted members of any given ethnic group. In this situation, the real direct beneficiaries of ethnicity at the enclaves or communities have been the cronies and immediate kinsmen of the political office holders at the centre rather than the community or region at large. As a result, the actual benefits accruing to the ethnic region have not been proportionate to the expectations of the region. All the same, it would appear that the symbolic benefits of having one’s ethnic group member or kinsman in an exalted political position at the centre often overshadows a rational calculation of the actual benefits accruing to the ethnic enclave concerned. So, while the expectations remain and exert pressure on the position holder, the imaginings of ethnicity and collective destiny on which it thrives are not significantly blunted by the inability to meet these expectations. It is not surprising that the desire to benefit one’s ethnic enclave often obscures and hinders policy making and implementation, since the political elites also see the ethnic imagination as providing a buffer from allegations of both corruption and the inefficient allocation of state resources. Given a colonial history of different socio-political administration for each major zone of the country and the sponsorship of one group against another in the hey-days of the nationalist struggles in Nigeria, the emergent political class, obviously suffering from a dearth of vision, fully embraced ethno-sectional identities in their ambition to achieve political power. Thus, Nigeria’s three prominent first-republic political parties vividly captured the ethnic nationalism with which Nigeria approached and embraced independence. These political parties – Northern People’s Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG) – were all ethnic mouthpieces of the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, respectively. The real pan-Nigeria political party of that era was the shortlived National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons.

78  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism The point remains that there is perceptible conflict of allegiance between the primordial base of the political elites and the nation as a whole. In other words, political elites are often in a dilemma over which allegiance comes first. But the ethnic project, and even the dilemma therein, have somehow benefitted the desires of the ethnic majority groups to sustain dominance. Thus, while mouthing the need for integration or homogeneity, they are also acutely aware that ethnic politics and the heterogeneity it fosters benefits them and their ethnic groups. Oha (1999) uses semiotic logic in the effort to capture the dilemmatic vacillation between state-driven homogenization and heterogeneity which favours the goals of Nigeria’s ethnic majorities to secure control and advance their own groups’ agenda under the umbrella of the homogenization of Nigeria. The feeble attempts at homogenization seem very contradictory of the fact that social realities make the project of homogenization inconsistent with political and social realities of the country and the diversity of groups in it. As a result, Nigeria, as a text, is multi-voiced and resistant to monologism. Homogenizations in the plural nation, tend to assist the so-called “major” ethnocultural groups in securing control of, and in maintaining, a monologic and non-neutral centre, while pretending to protect multi-cultural rights. (Oha, 1999: 214)

Ethnicity and nation-building in Nigeria Probably the observation that “economic policy making in Sub-Saharan Africa has been greatly influenced by ethnicity – including via policies to manage or, even worse, to exploit ethnicity. In the process, ethnicity has been promoted, not abated” (Johnson, 2005: 66), applies more aptly to Nigeria than most other places in the continent. In this sense, the act of governance, and politics in general, has been one giant process of ethnic manipulation and exploitation. Ifeka (2001) argues that the post-independence history of Nigeria has been dotted by different conflicts between the centre and the periphery. These conflicts, which are mostly over resource allocation, have invariably pitted ethno-regional groups against each other in the quest for improved resource allocation. In Nigeria, the popular notion “national cake” is often used figuratively to denote distributable national resources within the federation. Therefore, the struggle for the national cake has been a prominent and recurrent feature of intergroup relations in Nigeria. This endemic and often subterranean struggle has structured both politics and relations between the different groups (see Anugwom, 2003). The Niger Delta region has been one area that has consistently rejected the perceived domination of ethnic majority groups and the exploitative use of the oil resources in the region. Part of this rejection galvanized the

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  79 youth-led conflict that raged for years in that oil-rich region. The conflict has been perceived as necessary especially by the younger generations from the region who have seen insurgency as a formidable tool in the struggle of the oil-producing minorities for fair and just treatment from the Nigerian state. Therefore, “the insurgency rides on the groundswell of popular anger linked to the alienation, dispossession, and neglect of the ethnic minority people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, by the transnational forces of ‘fossil fuel’ capitalism” (Obi, 2010: 220). In very simple terms, the conflict is perceived within the region largely as the struggle of ethnic minorities to overcome the burden of domination by majority ethnic groups. Thus, the struggle is seen in popular narratives in the area as collective effort aimed at stopping the alienation of the region from the socio-political and economic processes in Nigeria as well as avoiding the expropriation of resources in the region which are used in developing other areas of Nigeria. It would appear that the bug of sectarian conflict also afflicted other ethnonational groups in Nigeria, who also began campaigns for their groups ascendancy in Nigeria’s socio-economic and political space. This soon led to a proliferation of ethnic militant organizations in different parts of the country. These ethnic militant associations are both the product and reflection of Nigeria’s peculiar structural character and political history. Put differently, these associations, whether in the form of the resurgent Biafra outfits such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) or Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), feed on the well-known ethnic fervour in Nigeria’s political experience (see Joseph, 1991; 1983; Nnoli, 1978; Anugwom, 2000; 2007) and equally reflect the endemic and systemic dysfunction of the modern Nigerian state. It is then evident that nationbuilding is impaired when social groups are pulling in disparate ethnically determined directions. In other words, ethnicity and the consciousness around it are negative influences on nation-building.

Ethnicity and development: matters arising In the opinion of Anugwom (2000), ethnic conflict is one of the greatest obstacles to meaningful development in the whole of Africa. Ethnicity generates unnecessary rivalries and conflict that undermine the solidarity needed for development in many nations in Africa. However, in Nigeria, this sort of competition and rivalry among various ethnic groups is seen as a product of colonial contact. The ethnic factor, however, did not diminish with the advent of independence; rather, it became a yardstick for measuring contribution to national development efforts and especially for allocating and distributing power and national resources. (Anugwom, 2000: 61)

80  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism In other words, the state in Nigeria and its elites are deeply entrenched in ethnic practices. As such, ethnic identity plays a role in resource allocation at the centre of Nigeria’s federal state. All the same, there is no doubt that in Nigeria ethnic divisions and their play in politics through time have made ethnicity a factor that can hardly be ignored by any thoroughgoing analysis of socio-political realities or development in contemporary Nigeria. Nigeria emerged from a colonial past that was riddled with distinctions and contestations between ethnic groups as well as a postcolonial era that has heightened such distinctions and created minority ethnic groups as subordinate groups to be dominated in socioeconomic and political spheres. There has been, and there is always, that tension in the relationship between the ethnic majority groups and the ethnic minority groups in the country. The tension has been recently doused to an extent with the emergence of Jonathan Goodluck (a member of an ethnic minority) as President of Nigeria between 2010 and 2015. However, the tension, goes back to the colonial days and almost marred the march towards independence when a commission was set up to examine the palpable fears of ethnic minorities in the federation. As has been earlier apprehended, the British divided Nigeria into three regions corresponding with the major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West, and Igbo in the East), thus setting the stage for ethnic cleavages and politics, including the agitation of ethnic minorities against perceived ethnic majority domination. (Obi, 2010: 225) Nevertheless, expression of ethnicity and ethnic group dissatisfaction is nowadays captured in the notion of marginalization. Interestingly, there are always cries and counter-cries of marginalization in the country. In some cases, those perceived as having benefited most from the Nigerian state also cry out about marginalization. It has become a political expression and a rallying cry for primordial mobilization among different groups in the country. It is, in this way, a mobilization cry for demanding more from national resources. However, there are two inescapable facts to be ascertained from the widespread cries about marginalization. These are: there is certainly ethnic marginalization in the way and manner Nigeria’s public resources, or commonwealth, are administered; and the cries suggest a dominance of centrifugal tendencies in the perception of national realities and development initiatives. Therefore, aspiring towards development would also entail building a nation devoid of the existence of both imagined and apparent ethnic marginalization. There is no gainsaying the fact that ethnicity undermines both development and democracy. Democracy is often seen as inevitable for sustainable development. It creates the optimum social condition for the achievement

Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  81 of development. However, “development has not been possible where there are marked divisions or intense conflicts between groups in a given society. Therefore, ethnic conflicts negate the development function of democracy and may ultimately attack the roots of democracy in a society” (Anugwom, 2000: 69). The efforts to achieve development in Nigeria, and in any other society, must be foregrounded on social conditions that are devoid of deep ethnic and sectarian differences and the conflicts webbed around them.

Conclusion Addressing the ethnic virus in the Nigerian federation in order to strengthen the spirit of development among the various social and ethnic groups in it must begin by instituting measures to redress the vestiges of ethnicity and practices that sustain them. In this regard, the process must start from deleting the present practice of asking for one’s state of origin (rather than residence) in such official documents as employment forms, university admission forms, contract bids/tender, lease applications, elections at all levels etc. It is apparent now that, “while some of these [practices] may be innocuous in themselves, they are often utilized by ethnically parochial bureaucrats and government functionaries in perpetuating ethnic cleavages and marginalization in the Nigerian society” (Anugwom, 2000: 76). Another critical suggestion in line with the above is to institutionalize de-ethnicization policies in state administration by making it compulsory for state governments in Nigeria to appoint at least two members of ethnic groups from outside the state, but who have lived there for over seven years, into the state executive council as commissioners. Lagos state has long started the practice of including members of other ethnic groups, who though not indigenous to the state have lived a considerable length of time there, into the core administrative arms and units of the state. Other states need to follow the example of Lagos and start this practice which resonates with the slogan of “one Nigeria” and more crucially signifies efforts to integrate and provide for the peculiar needs of such ethnic group members in the domestic diaspora. There is a need to strengthen the existing tools of national integration and equity such as the national quota system and the federal character ­principle which nominally seek to ensure that public offices, resources, employment in federal bureaucracy and other valuable public goods are distributed equitably in the federation. A recent survey (Anugwom, 2018) shows that these mechanisms neither work well nor are trusted by the Nigerian public. There is therefore need for a serious rethink of how these tools should be applied, and when, in order to ensure that the goals for establishing them (the least of which is equitable distribution) are met. In addition, there is a need for public office holders, especially prominent politicians, to refrain from, or at least decrease, public narratives of

82  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism difference among social groups in Nigeria. The unnecessary emphasis on what differentiates rather than what unites will always dog the efforts to achieve integration and development. Also, the need for strong and effective institutions cannot be overemphasized here. Strong institutions are necessary to effect development and more critically confer public trust and confidence in the process of governance and development. It also goes in tandem with having responsible and responsive government that cannot merely articulate development programmes and goals but can provide visionary and transformative leadership in the attempt to achieve them.

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Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism  83 Chandra, K. (2012a). “Introduction”, in Chandra, K. (ed.) Constructivist theories of ethnic politics. New York: Oxford University Press (pp. 1–51). Chandra, K (2012b). “What is ethnic identity? A minimalist definition”, in Chandra, K. (ed.) Constructivist theories of ethnic politics. New York: Oxford University Press (pp. 52–97). Chazan, N. (1992). “Africa’s democratic challenge”. World Policy Review, 9 (2): 279–307. Dunmonye, R.A. (1990). “Critical analysis of party systems and ethnicism in Nigeria”, in Amadi, I.E.S., & Hinjari, W. (eds) Party systems, democracy and political stability in Nigeria. Ibadan: NPSA. Ekeh, Peter (1975). “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement”. Comparative Studies in History and Society, 17 (1): 91–119. Graf, W.D. (1988). The Nigerian state: Political economy, state, class and political system in the post-colonial era. London: James Currey. Hecquer, Oliver (2014). The calculus of ethnicity. MSc Thesis, Leiden University: Department of Political Science. Homer-Dixon, T. (1994). “Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: Evidence from cases”. International Security, 19 (1): 5–40. Horowitz, D.L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Ibrahim, J., & Pereira, C. (1993). On dividing and uniting: Ethnicity, racism and nationalism in Africa. Dakar: CODICE, CODESRIA. Ifeka, C. (2001). “Oil, NGOs and youths: Struggles for resource control in the Niger Delta”. Review of African Political Economy, 28 (87): 99–105. Iwaloye, L.B., & Ibeanu, A. (1997). “The peoples of Nigeria”, in Okafor, E.U. (ed.) New strategies for curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub. (pp. 41–68). Johnson, O.E.G. (2005). “Addressing ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa: Institutions and agency. Constitutional Political Economy, 16 (1): 49–69. Joseph, Richard (1983). “Class, state and prebendal politics in Nigeria”. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 21 (3): 21–38. Joseph, Richard (1991). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the second republic. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lemarchard, R. (1994). Burundi: Ethnocide as discourse and practice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Mafeje, A. (1971). “The ideology of tribalism”. Journal of Modern African Studies, IX (2): 253–262. Mamdani, M. (1995). “A critique of the state and civil society paradigm in Africanist studies”, in Mamdani, M., & Wamba-dia-Wamba, E. (eds) African studies in social movements and democracy. Dakar: CODESRIA. Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mustapha, A. R. (2004). Ethnic structure, inequality and governance of the public sector in Nigeria. UNRISD. Myers, N. (1993). Ultimate security: The environmental basis of political stability. New York: N.N Norton. Nnoli, O. (1978). Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension. Nnoli, O. (1994). Ethnicity and its management in Africa: The democratization link. CASS Occasional Monograph, No. 2. Lagos: Malthouse Pub.

84  Ethnic virus and centrifugal nationalism Obi, Cyril (2010). “Oil extraction, dispossession, resistance and conflict in Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta”. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 30 (1–2): 219–236. Oha, Obododinma (1999). “Cross-cultural conversations and the semiotics of ethnocultural domination in Nigeria”. African Anthropology, VI (2): 206–219. Osaghae, Eghosa (1994). Ethnicity and its management in Africa. Lagos: Malthouse. Otite, O. (1990). Ethnic pluralism and ethnicity in Nigeria. Ibadan: C.I. Shaneson. Oyediran, O. (1979). “Background to military rule”, in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.) Nigerian government and politics under military rule, 1966–79. London: Macmillan. Oyovbaire, S.E. (1983). “Structural change and political processes in Nigeria”. African Affairs, 82, 326: 3–28. Ross, M. (2004). “What do we know about natural resources and civil war”. Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3): 337–356. Sklar, R. (1967). “Political science and national integration – A radical approach”. Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (1): 1–11. Ukiwo, Ukoha (2005). On the study of ethnicity in Nigeria. CRISE Working Paper No. 12. Oxford: University of Oxford Department of International Development. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

6 The struggle with secularism Religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria

Introduction This chapter examines the impact of recurrent Islamic fundamentalist or sectarian conflicts on secularism in Nigeria. Even though Nigeria is defined constitutionally as a secular state, the actual practice of secularity has often been affected by the divisive influence of religion. Such negative impact of religion has been presented preponderantly in the form of Islamic sectarian conflict. Thus, while the preponderant population of Muslims in Nigeria are peaceful and practice the faith in peaceful manners, there have regularly been fundamentalist or sectarian sects of the faith bent on pursuing agendas that are either inimical to nation building or/and breed conflicts. Without doubt, such conflicts, which flare up now and then, may be expected to influence the nature and practice of secularity in the country. Incidentally, familiarity with the modern history of Nigeria beginning from the early nineteenth-century jihad shows that religious conflict or violence is a consistent factor in the development of the nation. The influence of religion in this regard has been essentially negative and antithetical to state-building efforts. As a matter of fact, the threat which religious conflicts portend for Nigeria’s development has often been appreciated by commentators who see the coterminous division of the country along geographical and religious lines into North and South as a harbinger of an unending nationhood dilemma for the country. Thus, Awofeso (1987: 18) is of the view that “history had completed its conspiracy on Nigeria by bequeathing two world religions on the country: Christianity in the south, Islam in the north”. Probably, the history of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria can be seen as embodying the basic question: what is the compatibility of the pure Islamic faith with a non-Shari’a socio-political environment. In other words, to what extent can true Muslims practice their faith to the fullest in a non-Shari’a or secular setting epitomized by Nigeria? These questions loom large when one realizes that the quest for Shari’a, and perhaps a sociopolitical system tailored strictly on Islam, have become recurrent planks of violent and destructive fundamentalist activism in Nigeria’s political

86  Religious conflicts and violence history. These religious conflicts are as historically rooted as they are contemporaneous. According to Kukah (1993), the Shari’a project, which can be traced to the pre-colonial Jihad of Usman Dan Fodiyo, aims at building a Nigerian state in which politics and governance would be determined by the rules of Islamic religion. The “Boko Haram” group and its splinter faction the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), represent the latest embodiments of the violent and puritan desire of fundamentalist Islam in Nigeria. Boko Haram, at face value, is against all forms of Western education or Western civilization broadly, which it sees as the roots of evil in today’s society; ISWAP also shares this perspective but differs from its parent in terms of its d ­ isavowal of the killing of fellow Muslims and the need for international collaboration. These groups, as alluringly different as they may appear, are essentially in tandem with other previous forms of fundamentalist religious agitation in the Islamic North of Nigeria. In spite of the difference between these groups, I will refer only (except where otherwise indicated) to Boko Haram (which embodies both tendencies) in this discourse. Apart from the longer provenance of Boko Haram, that name is still the umbrella name and nomenclature for insurgency and terrorism in popular culture and usage in Nigeria. Boko Haram has antecedents in the earlier Islamic fundamentalist activism in Nigeria. This does not deny the fact that it deserves closer scrutiny since as Soyinka (2009) argues, it is likely the expression of a malignant outcrop of fanaticism and intolerance. The need for a careful assessment of the effect of Islamic fundamentalist movements on Nigeria’s secular claims cannot be over-emphasized since these movements have at various points in the nation’s history raised questions about the corporate existence of the nation. It is not strange then that religious uprisings like the recent “Boko Haram” is seen in some quarters as the reflection of a Nigerian state overwhelmed by the challenges of nation-building. However, Boko Haram, which can be seen as largely a mutation of earlier forms of Islamic irredentism and fundamentalism that can be dated back to the early nineteenth century, calls attention to the need for interrogation of the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on Nigeria’s secularity. Such an exercise demands a deep and far-reaching analysis, which would not rely on the orthodox explanation of Islamic fundamentalism as simply a matter of the socio-economic or political dysfunction of the Nigerian state. Thus, one should be cognizant of the fact that the regular invocation of social inequality as the determinant of religious altercations is inadequate since social inequality, even though a significant fraction of the totality of causative factors, is only one element in the causes (see Soyinka, 2009). Therefore, the recurrent incidence of religious fundamentalism in Nigeria and the danger it portends to the continuing secularity of the Nigerian society demand new insights. As has been acknowledged in the extant literature, negative ethnic and religious factors have been implicated as ­

Religious conflicts and violence  87 ­etriments to the flourishing of both development and democracy in d Nigeria (see Nnoli, 1978; Osaghae, 1994; Otite, 1990). In view of the foregoing, the chapter contributes to an understanding of the seeming porosity of secularism in Nigeria and to the larger global debate on Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, it examines the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism to secularity in Nigeria. Paramount to these concerns is to ascertain how Islamic fundamentalism has taken the force out of development initiatives and impacted negatively or otherwise on governance in Nigeria. The chapter relies mainly on the voluminous information in the extant literature and documentary data. It also draws from previous insights in recent publications on similar subjects (see Anugwom, 2019a, 2019b, 2018).

Conceptualizing Islamic fundamentalism It may be important to point out at this juncture, and as many moderate Muslims would contend, that Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, and probably elsewhere, often takes root, and derives justification, from not directly the Koran but from the interpretations of the Holy Book offered by fiery clerics and fundamentalist sects. While it is often difficult to make the difference clear to the non-Muslim, the Islamic fundamentalists in Nigeria largely owe justification and rationale for their atrocities to their own understanding of the Hadiths (pronouncements and injunctions ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed but not contained strictly in the Koran. They are seen as tools which aid the understanding of the Koran especially in matters of Jurisprudence and Islamic history) and the influence of the radical Wahhabi Salafi cult which came into Nigeria from Saudi Arabia. It is important now to indicate that the chapter takes its conceptualization of Islamic fundamentalism from the insightful characterization set out in The New Dictionary of Theology (Komonchak, Collins, & Lane, 1993). In this case, it denotes essentially organizational and ideological uniqueness or separateness from other existing religious movements. Interestingly, Islamic fundamentalism in this case insists on both the unassailable authority of the scripture and the absolute necessity of righteous living. However, it goes on to place emphasis or importance on the right doctrine and more crucially the imperative of organized warfare against the forces of modernism. Islamic fundamentalism thus insists on absolute righteousness, makes enormous efforts at offering what it sees as strict and concrete life-guiding interpretations of the scripture as well as encouraging a militant approach to guide this truth, and preaches both the desirability and necessity of warfare against forces of modernism (defined mainly as enemies of the faith and oppressors of believers). The potency of fundamentalism is perhaps strengthened by the popularity of sects in the Islamic religion. A sect ordinarily is a subset of a belief system, which holds reverently to a specific or peculiar interpretation of the

88  Religious conflicts and violence religious creed or even liturgy. In this sense, sects are common elements in most religions and are often ways of improving the faith of members, increasing regular members’ participation and generating the passion for meaningful and positive interventions in the lives of the members of the sect or the religion concerned as a whole. Thus, while the Catholic Church preaches piety and compassion for the poor, Mother Teresa of Calcutta saw the need to further interpret or extend this compassion of the church in new ways as well as tie piety and religious dedication around devotion to the poor. While the group she founded does not represent a sect, and this may be a poor analogy, it serves to show how religion allows room for devoted members to extend beliefs and creeds in diverse ways. However, sectarianism is peculiar in the case of Islam for two main reasons. First is that the copious mention of the word “Ta’ifa” (a part splitting from the whole) which occurs more than 20 times in the Koran (see Khuri, 1990) may have inadvertently established sects as common and acceptable manifestations of the religion of Islam. Also related to this is the fact, as any scholar of Islam would attest, that Islam is a highly dynamic and proliferating religion. This entails that there is also a high degree of interpretation and new insight guiding the faithful at each epoch in the development of the religion. Therefore, in line with the noticeable dynamism of Islamic thought and practice, there has been enormous growth and even proliferation of sectarianism. Such sects are characterized by peculiar and idiosyncratic orientations different from the main body. Hence, while all adherents belong to Islam, some are members of given sects that promote and hold strongly to peculiar interpretations and teachings of the scripture. Islamic fundamentalists are essentially militant subscribers to these peculiar interpretations or teaching seen by members as valid and representative of the core significance of the faith. In addition to being overtly militant or zealous, sect members share a common disposition characterized by belief in the justification of warfare and violence as a means to achieving the desired goals of the group, which are ostensibly religious in nature. However, while these fundamentalists claim to be largely driven by religious ideologies and would want to be seen as religious matadors, the evidence would suggest that such religious ideologies are more often than not a subterfuge for political aspirations. Therefore, while these sects are visibly motivated by religious needs, they also embody political aspirations, whether driven by the belief that the practice of pure Islam is untenable under an ­“un-Islamic” political structure or simply the megalomania of leaders who manipulate appealing religious ideologies for political purposes. The main and popular sects in modern Islam (which have reproduced many other variants of themselves) are the Sunni and the Shiites (Shi’a). While the Sunni can be seen as largely moderate and driven by the desire to integrate both religion and society, the Shi’a are much more puritanical and believe in the practice of pure and unadulterated Islam as well as the need to

Religious conflicts and violence  89 guard Islam from being adulterated by society. Khuri (1990), points out another fundamental difference between the two sects. This is in the fact that while the Sunnis have designated family roots or lines that would produce the imam or caliphs of the faith, much in the mould of the Levites in the Old ­Testament of the Christian Bible, the Shi’a believe that the only conditions for such an exalted position is excellence in Islamic teaching and traditions, that is, anybody can aspire to become an imam in spite of their family background or roots. Interestingly, the dan Fodiyo Jihad in Nigeria has more imprints of the Shi’a tradition than Sunni since dan Fodiyo was motivated by displeasure with the adulterated practice of Islam in the ancient Hausa kingdoms. There has been quite a proliferation of sects in Nigeria’s Islam especially since the country’s surreptitious membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the 1980s. Hence, such sects as the Derika, Salafi, Izala, Tijjaniya, Kablu, Quaddiriya, Muslim Brotherhood etc. are quite active in Nigeria now. As would be expected, these sects often engage each other in squabbles and even jostle for membership. Often, particular mosques or places of worship are associated with given sects and in such situations only members of that given sect and those sympathetic to it would worship there.

Theorizing the secular state in Nigeria within the context of Islamic fundamentalism Concerning the operation of a strict secular order, the Nigerian state is a paradox. Therefore, the state, while laying claims to modernity and secularism, is also a counter-imagery of modernism since it blurs the distinction between private and public resources and between the secular and the sacred. Thus, the state can be, to a reasonable extent, found culpable of undermining and threatening the survival of secularity in the country. Nevertheless, the effect of religion on the secularity question in Nigeria can be addressed largely from the nature of citizenship fostered by the ­Nigerian state. Generally, there are two competing ideas of citizenship in the contemporary social science debate. These are the liberal perspective and the pluralist viewpoint. The liberal perspective, which is often seen as ideal, is anchored on a view of citizenship as reflecting the legal membership of a nation-state. In this case, individuals are perceived as having equal moral worth and government is expected to accord equal respect to ­individuals (Rawls, 1971; Anugwom, 2005). In effect, this means that individuals have equal rights and entitlements in spite of ethnic or religious affiliations. Interestingly, the liberal viewpoint underplays the importance of both ethnic and religious factors since all rights and entitlements ideally emanate from and are guaranteed by the state. The liberal perspective logically gives rise to constitutions that have no peculiar obligation to any subnational or religious grouping. As a result, such constitutions usually guarantee equal rights and opportunities for all

90  Religious conflicts and violence citizens irrespective of social, cultural, religious, geographical or ethnic backgrounds. It is in such a circumstance that the nation-state is conceived typically as the arena of citizen formation and practice (Halisi, Kaiser, & Ndegwa, 1998). Directly resulting from this is that primordial orientations such as ethnicity and religion become largely irrelevant while the nationstate becomes the bastion of solidarity for all citizens. In opposition to the liberal notion, pluralists contend that the modern state is multinational and as such subnational membership, both ethno-religious and otherwise, should be the building block for political membership in the wider state arena (see Ejobowah, 2000). Incidentally, this viewpoint, while recognizing the importance of the subnational community in providing a primary identity to the individual, may promote a consciousness of this primordial group that breeds religious separatism. However, the pluralist notion of citizenship, which is anchored largely on the recognition of the subnational level, and even religious affiliations, which imbue citizens with primary identity before the larger nation-state, may in reality approximate the Nigerian scenario. In other words, while constitutional instruments and even leadership rhetoric at the centre favour a largely liberal perspective, Nigerians, due to historical and social conditions of existence, still show a predisposition towards identifying themselves first as members of subnational groups and religions before claiming to be Nigerians. In such a situation, even the best efforts at secularization and a liberal constitution are regularly undermined by primordial factors such as ethnicity and religion to which people feel they owe primary obligation before the nation-state. Of course, the declining relevance of the state, in terms of failure to guarantee minimum security to its citizens and engage in productive and equitable socio-economic development that addresses the ever-widening gap between the rich and poor as well as deepening urban poverty, make substate allegiance and identification common among citizens. Thus, Nigeria, then, can be seen largely as a modern state in which primordial and clannish loyalties hold sway. Therefore, people see their allegiance and commitment to their ethnic or social group of origin as paramount and superior to national allegiance. This problem is by no means peculiar to Nigeria. Indeed, it is quite common in Africa. The problem has been traced to the fact that African states did not discard the characteristics of ethnic kingdoms before they were granted independence. (Anugwom, 2008: 169) The above has also not been helped by the seeming inability of the government after five decades of independence to deliver on the rule of law without pandering to ethnic, religious and sectional interests, which incidentally rekindles endless primordial loyalties among its citizens, and groups (see Idowu, 1999).

Religious conflicts and violence  91 The secularity of Nigeria must be appreciated against the nature of preindependent Nigeria and the fears of domination that threatened the merger of the different ethnic groups into one nation-state. Shortly before independence, Nigeria’s multi-ethnic nature was the source of bickering and primordial politicking. The political equation and contest at that time pitted the three major ethnic groups – Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo – against each other. In this situation, the ethnic minorities were largely excluded. Eventually, the obvious marginalization of the ethnic minorities and their agitation against it led to the establishment of the popular ­Willinck’s Commission by the colonial government. The aim of the commission was to look into the fears of the minorities. However, the Commission rejected the secession of the minorities, but recommended measures for integrating them into the mainstream of Nigerian politics. The secular state concept, which recognizes no state religion or belief system and guarantees freedom of belief, was seen as appropriate in the effort to cement over the cracks in Nigeria’s weak federation. The overarching basis of Nigeria’s unity, as clearly perceived by the founding fathers, and even the colonial administration, was the recognition of basic differences among the various groups, but the building of a nation anchored on positive consolidation of diversity, that is, turning diversity into strength. In spite of the foregoing, many politicians, especially from the core North, are averse to any reference to Nigeria as a secular state. This derives from a belief that the use of the term “secular” may be understood to mean “irreligiosity”. As a result, in the debates on the Shari’a issue, before the promulgation of the 1979 constitution, many politicians from the North proposed that Nigeria should be called a “multi-religious state”. However, in a Nigerian nation pockmarked by primordial or ethnic loyalties and mutually distrustful intergroup relationships, other politicians from outside the North viewed this suggestion as a ploy to eventually make Nigeria an Islamic state. This sentiment was a direct product of the view in some parts of the North that adopting the description “secular state” would be eventually tantamount to the imposition of state restrictions on Islam.

An enduring history of Islamic fundamentalism Mohammed “Maitatsine” Marwa was the leader of the Maitatsine movement, which unleashed terror throughout the North of Nigeria between 1980 and 1992 in the aptly named Maitatsine uprisings. Maitatsine, which Mohammed Marwa adopted as his nickname in the Hausa language, means “the one who damns”. This was in clear reference to his public speeches, which were composed of curses and incendiary outbursts against the ­Nigerian state and non-Muslims. Reports have it that Marwa came from Marwa, a town in North-eastern Nigeria (purportedly part of Cameroon at some time before Nigeria’s independence).1 He claimed to be a prophet and Mujaddid in the mould of Uthman dan Fodiyo who he equally saw as his

92  Religious conflicts and violence model. Marwa had run-ins with the colonial administration before ­independence and was exiled from Nigeria, but returned after Nigeria’s ­independence.2 Despite being arrested by the Nigerian authorities in 1975 for slander and public abuse of political authorities, Marwa’s preaching began to gain traction. He subsequently attracted the sympathy of other notable religious leaders in Kano and beyond. Given his customary ranting and disdain for constituted authority and public institutions, he quickly attracted a large following among the youth, unemployed urban dwellers, the poor and others marginal to the socio-­ economic spheres of the society. His followers became known also as Yan Tatsine because of their militaristic and confrontational posture. These young people soon began acting out their frustrations and the teachings of Marwa by involving themselves in altercations and clashes with the police and even other religious figures seen as opposed to the ideas of the movement. In the bid to live true to the image of his model, dan Fodiyo, Maitatsine took part in the violent activities of this group. It was in one of such activities that he eventually lost his life in a clash with security forces in 1980. However, his death only served to spread the influence of the organization and deepen its animosity towards government and other citizens as well as to transform Marwa into a martyr for the group. In spite of Marwa’s death, the group engaged in terror and religious killings between 1980 and 1992 in such Northern states as Kano, Borno, Kaduna, Adamawa, Katsina, Gombe and Bauchi states. The violence of the group led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives before the uprisings ended in 1992. The ideology propagated by Maitatsine had more in common with the Shi’a sect than any other. His basic belief was in the need for the establishment of unadulterated worship of Islam. For him, Islam has been corrupted by modernization or the influence of Western values and lifestyles as well as the modern state. Nevertheless, Marwa was not just an Islamic rabblerouser but was a charismatic and emotive speaker who could easily sway any crowd of believers. Thus, “he [Marwa] was a Qur’anic teacher and preacher. Forceful, persuasive and charismatic, he rebelled against many popular opinions among Kano Islamic circles, denouncing certain parts of the Holy Qur’an and even criticizing Prophet Muhammad” (Falola, 1998: 143). Marwa claimed to be an annabi, that is, one with divine power and a mandate to save the world. However, interesting in the later case of the Boko Haram, was that Marwa equally opposed most aspects of modernization and all Western influence. In view of the above, Boko Haram’s Islamic ideology is reminiscent of the ideologies of both the jihad and the Maitatsine before it. However, unlike the other teachers and acknowledged authorities on the Koran, Mohammed Yusuf who founded the Boko Haram was a secondary-school dropout who nevertheless made spirited attempts to study the Koran in neighbouring countries such as Chad and Niger. This notwithstanding, Yusuf espoused ideas that saw Westernization as abhorrent. In 2001, Yusuf

Religious conflicts and violence  93 established a sect, which initially went by the name “Yusufiyya”. The sect began gradually to attract members across the Northern states and even beyond. However, religious sectarianism, whether in the guise of the Shari’a movement or others like the Boko Haram, are not new entrants into the political scene in Nigeria. Even though Usman (1987) argues that the Shari’a debate in the 1977/8 Constituent Assembly saw the intrusion of religion into politics in Nigeria, the behaviour and utterances of Nigerian leaders concerning religion may have undermined the growth of Nigeria as a secular state. Put differently, the overt involvement of the government and its officials in religious matters may have undermined secularity in the country (see Williams, 1997). Also, very high in the threats to secularity in Nigeria in recent times is the official promulgation in October 1999 of Islamic Shari’a as the customary and criminal law code of tiny Zamfara state in the North of Nigeria. This transformation of Shari’a from customary law only for Muslims to criminal law applicable to all people living in the state and the other states of the North that quickly followed suit in adopting Shari’a, remains a watershed in the history of secularity in Nigeria (see Anugwom, 2008, 2019a). Historically, the Shari’a was a response to the need to generate a set of laws that could be uniformly and strictly applied to all Muslims. This need was seen as necessary in the context of the emergent Muslim empires that brought together large number of people from diverse backgrounds under one entity. Initially, the Shari’a referred to a set of rules codified into law. Such rules were the product of a select group of Muslim scholars. These rules were developed in accordance with the scripture and injunctions of the Prophet Muhammad. It was comprehensive right from its onset and focused on classifying human acts and activities as mainly “forbidden”, “objectionable” and “recommended”. According to Goldschmidt and Davidson (2006), these rules sought to encompass all spheres of life from those governing commerce and crime to rules about marriage, divorce, property, hygiene and other aspects of interpersonal relationships. Boko Haram sees itself as defined by Shari’a and advocates the introduction of Shari’a law in the whole of Nigeria. In spite of a long precolonial and colonial background (see Keay & ­Richardson, 1996) the imposition of the Shari’a in a good number of states in the North since 1999/2000 is extremely radical and confrontational. This is because unlike the colonial version of the law, the new form of Shari’a covers the whole gamut from customary to criminal law (hitherto the exclusive preserve of civil courts). This blanket imposition of Shari’a and the fact that non-Muslims in these states in the North are subject to the dictates of Shari’a courts entail a fundamental departure from the spirit of both the 1900 colonial recognition of the law and the Nigerian constitution. Be the above as it may, the structure of average Northern Nigeria society was instrumental to the success of Maitatsine and Yusuf in garnering

94  Religious conflicts and violence f­ollowers. In this sense, the popularity of Islamic education, especially the wide acceptance of the Almajeri institution that made young people itinerant, and homeless students of the Koran and Arabic, may have created a mass of willing and eager people that could be easily swayed and manipulated to do the bidding of scholars and authorities of the religion. In addition, Islamic fundamentalists exploited the existing historical disdain of Northern society for Western education. In the Northern parts of Nigeria, right from the inception of colonial rule, there was a marked distinction between schools providing Western education (makarantan boko), on the one hand, and, on the other, the Koranic schools (makarantan allo) as well as those providing purely religious instruction (makarantan addini). Typically, students or pupils in the latter schools were seen as wiser and truer to Islam and were socially valued. The above perception regarding the superior and enduring value of Islamic education was reinforced by the colonial administration, which saw the shielding of the North from Western education as imperative to the need to have pliable subjects. For instance, Lord Lugard is credited with stating that the need to prevent the utter disrespect for the British that was beginning to emerge among colonial subjects in the South of Nigeria led to the curtailment of Western education in the North (see Sanusi, 2007). Predictably, in the absence of Western education, Islamic parochial education, which encourages intolerance of Westernization and parochialism, proliferated in the North.

From Boko Haram to ISWAP: The new kids on the block The Jamaatul Alsunnah Lida Awati Wal Jihad (Boko Haram or JAS) The group popularly called Boko Haram is the Jamaatul Alsunnah Lida Awati Wal Jihad. The group emerged around 2001 and 2002, first as a selfstyled group calling itself the Yusuffiya, and operated mainly from the old railway quarters in Maiduguri, Borno state before the major clash with the armed forces in 2009. Around 2005 the group became known in popular parlance as Boko Haram in reference to the constant decrying of Boko by its leader, Muhammed Yusuf (see Roelofs, 2015). At the onset, nobody paid attention to this group. By 2009, the group had amassed a good number of followers and sympathizers in all rungs of society including security operatives, politicians and even scholars. Thus, it amassed ideological sympathizers and made inroads into national and state political hierarchies. The group came to national prominence following the big clash with security agencies in 2009 in Maiduguri during which its leader lost his life. In the beginning, Muhammed Yusuf localized his ideology and launched vitriolic attacks on other notable Islamic scholars in the North and against

Religious conflicts and violence  95 established political and state institutions, which he saw as akin to the ­Maitatsine creed as the root of the rot engulfing Islam in Nigeria. Equally fundamental to both the ideology of Maitatsine and that of Yusuf was an unshakeable belief that pure Islam is not attainable without the Shari’a and the control of the political structure. In spite of the debate around its ideology, the name Boko Haram that became a popular alias for the movement is largely indicative of its ideology. Boko Haram is simply the amalgam of the Hausa words, Boko, which literally translates into “Western or foreign” and Haram which is an Arabic derivative for “forbidden”. In view of the name, the loose agenda of the group, at least until 2009, may have been to replace the Western style state and its values with an Islamic structure and values. In other words, “the mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where ‘orthodox Islam’ is practiced. Orthodox Islam according to him (Muhammed Yusuf, leader of the sect) frowns at western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful” (Lawal, 2009: 34). Nevertheless, with the increasing attention it drew from the security agencies, the group later changed its modus operandi in significant ways. The group eventually went beyond Maiduguri, the Borno state capital, in its operations to include the whole of the Northeast and even other areas of the North including the federal capital Abuja. It subsequently changed from the guerrilla tactics it had initially employed to the invasion of communities, use of explosives and engagement of the military Joint Task Force (JTF) in gun duels. It would appear that after the death of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, the group shifted from its initial fight against the injustice of the Western-style government against Muslims to engagement in a vendetta against politicians, government officials, clerics and houses of worship. It thus morphed into a largely terrorist organization and lost its ideological veneer in the views of some observers (see Galadima, 2011). The Boko Haram reached a crescendo in its influence and operations between 2010 and 2013. In that period, it had an almost free reign of terror in the Northeast and beyond and literally toyed with an ill-motivated and structurally deficient Nigerian military. In addition, the response of the Nigerian government then was as uncoordinated as it was undermined by corruption and other structural incapacities (see Anugwom, 2019a). However, the tide turned beginning from 2015/2016 with a better-coordinated response from the Nigerian state and the splitting of the group, which eroded its capacity. In spite of the above, the fact that Shekau, the current leader of Boko Haram, remains alive and the group still exists implies that the conflict is far from being over. There is no arguing that, the Boko Haram remains a phenomenon whose manifestation is the fulfillment of earlier threats posed by the atrocities of fundamentalists. The Boko Haram ideology is in tandem with the ones expressed by the late

96  Religious conflicts and violence Mohammed Maitatsine, Kala Kato, and other fiery clerics whose teachings tended to derive its strength from the Hadith. (Galadima, 2011: 1) The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) In terms of contemporary and current developments, the ISWAP deserves mention since it has literally taken the thunder from its parent group, Boko Haram, and become the most potent terrorist threat in Nigeria and to an extent in the neighbouring states of Cameroun, Chad and Niger. The group is rapidly growing in both power and influence. It operates territorially along the banks and various islands of Lake Chad. However, it stretches its operations beyond these areas from time to time. Unconfirmed estimates are that the group has over 3,500 members while the original Boko Haram membership shrunk to about 2,000. The ISWAP surfaced initially, perhaps as a red herring when, in March 2015, the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, this allegiance, as Anugwom (2019a) has argued, came at a time when the group was under the heavy cosh of the better coordinated attack of the Nigerian military. It was thus more or less a cry for help as the group faced annihilation. Nevertheless, the ISWAP, which was the name proposed for Boko Haram after the allegiance and which was duly accepted by ISIS, was hijacked a year later by a faction led by the veteran campaigner Mamman Nur3 and Abu Musab al-Barnawi (reportedly son of Boko Haram founder, Mohammed Yusuf). This splinter group, or the new ISWAP, became the one recognized by the ISIS eventually and has grown over time in its membership, status in the terrorist community and even visibility among rural communities in the Lake Chad area. It is believed that Nur has been executed as a result of an internal power struggle. Also, the al-Barnawi now in charge is said to be another, different from the founding al-Barnawi (ICG, 2019). Operationally, the ISWAP has shown remarkable difference from the Shekau group and has tried to recreate the original Yusuf approach that endeared the Boko Haram to the locals at some point in the past. In summary, the ISWAP has favoured the use of guerrilla warfare, that is, a hit-and-run approach in its attacks, and have tried to avoid frontal confrontation with the Nigerian army. It has adopted a social welfare approach, that is, it has prioritized social provisioning and addressing the socio-­ economic gaps left by the lack of real presence of the government in rural communities where it operates. Thus, “it digs wells, polices cattle rustling, provides a modicum of health care and sometimes disciplines its own personnel whom it judges to have unacceptably abused civilians” (ICG, 2019: 1). Generally, it is seen as treating local Muslims better than the Boko Haram led by Shekau and disavowing the so-called Takfir which presented the Boko with justification for killing fellow Muslims.

Religious conflicts and violence  97 The split in the Boko Haram was driven by a couple of factors including doctrinal differences (Boko Haram was all for the Takfir which allowed the killing of fellow Muslims, a practice ISIS did not favour and which ISWAP abhors); personality clashes (especially old rivalry between Shekau and Nur); the international connection (Shekau wanted the Boko Haram as Yusuf left it – a home-grown and domestically focused group; the ISWAP/ Nur preferred linkage to global terrorist groups and agenda); Shekau’s leadership style (seen as too autocratic, mercurial and brutal; a leader who commanded more fear than respect from lieutenants, far from the humane and collegiate disposition of late Yusuf).

Islamic fundamentalism and secularity in Nigeria: historical and contemporary trends The disconnect between secularity in Nigeria and Islam may be seen as having immediate roots in the jihad led by Uthman dan Fodiyo. The jihad was both a religious and political liberation effort and can be related to the nature and founding of the religion by the Prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century in Mecca. Prophet Muhammad’s spiritual drive was ­partially fuelled by socio-economic passion and the vision of Islam as the combination of spirituality with politics, economics and social mores (see Ali, 2003; Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2006). Therefore, Islam, from its humble origins in Mecca and within the vision of its founder, did not envision any separation between religion and politics. It would seem that Islam is largely inconsistent with secularism. The common definition of Islam as a total way of life embodies the incontrovertible nature of Islam as a belief system that permeates and guides believers in all spheres of life. The Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime therefore played the role of both political and religious leader and had unquestioned authority in both spheres. However, the struggle for political power at the demise of Muhammad which led to the first split in Islam between the Sunni (those loyal to the Umayyad Dynasty founded by Mu’awiyah) and Shia (followers of the fourth Caliph, Ali) muddied the waters of the inseparability of religion and politics. Despite this, fanatical and even some orthodox Muslims have always hankered after establishing the ideal Muhammadian order wherever the faithful are in the majority. Probably, enabling the further distinction between religion and politics in Islam was the expansionist ambitions of Islamic leaders after Muhammad who went on to conquer neighbouring states and establish vast geographical empires. This expansion created the need for warlords for these conquests, and the maintenance of order in the vast empires necessitated a gradual distinction between the religious leaders (caliphs) and the political leaders (Emirs, Sultans). Nevertheless, this separation was neither clearly formalized nor legalized. Therefore, in some cases one still confronted situations where both authorities were crystallized in the form of a very powerful Caliph or Sultan who had unquestioned authority over both spheres.

98  Religious conflicts and violence Still, in some other instances, what existed was a loose separation in spheres of activity and power. In other words, there was an opaque distinction between the two that allowed the negotiation and diminishing of this thin line at the whims and caprices of charismatic and powerful individuals. For instance, in the case of the old Sokoto caliphate in Nigeria, in most cases the spiritual authority was subordinated to the political authority. The guiding belief was that power emanates from Allah and those with political power are already spiritually endowed and favoured. Thus, a political leader like the Sultan could also be a spiritual leader at the same time. Mohammed Ayoob has shown how the practice of subordinating spiritual authority to political power characterized the early periods of the postMuhammad Islamic society. According to him, “the distinction between temporal and religious affairs and the temporal authority’s de facto primacy over the religious establishment continued throughout the reign of the three great Sunni dynasties – the Umayyad, the Abbasid, and the Ottoman” (Ayoob, 2008: 11). Be the above as it may, the realities of the modern state made a separation of authority and roles between the political and the religious spheres inevitable. Such a separation has always been de facto in nature, but embraced by forward-thinking realists who are cognizant of the fact that the needs of the modern state can only be confounded by an insistence on the amalgam of both spheres. However, this fact has not always been sufficient to persuade Islamic Fundamentalists desirous of pure Islam of the futility of a return to the Muhammadian era. Perhaps nowhere is this dilemma more apparent than in Nigeria where the desire for extreme puritanical religious and political powers has generated tension and threatened the secularity of the state. While the notion of the indivisibility of religion and politics in Islam (see Lewis, 1990; Huntington, 1968) may seem valid especially with reference to the vision of Muhammad, historical developments show the emergence of a robust distinction between the two spheres in many Islamic states. This reality has, however, not really hindered fanatical clerics and fiery scholars from advocating Islam both devoid of this distinction and anchored on unadulterated Shari’a. It makes sense to speculate that if the British had not arrived on the scene, the Hausa-Fulani caliphate may have spread Islam to all corners of what is today known as Nigeria. The defeat of the powerful caliphate by the British and subsequent colonial rule halted the progress of the jihad. Despite this, the post-colonial political experience of Nigeria has been marred by the question of the Shari’a, that is, in terms of compatibility or otherwise of pure Islamic faith with a non-Shari’a socio-political environment represented by a secular Nigerian state. The impact of religion on national life in any given state can be influenced by the nature of the state, and more critically by its response to matters of religion. In Nigeria, the overwhelming influence of religion in national life can be related, in part, to the inability of successive Nigerian

Religious conflicts and violence  99 g­ overnments to live up to the ideals of a modern secular state. As has been argued, in spite of a clearly stated claim, the involvement of the government in religious matters and religious bodies puts a lie to this (see Williams, 1997).

Conclusion There is a need to apprehend both the political and religious aspirations which drive Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. Without doubt, many observers are wont to point out that it derives essentially from the quest for political resources or power especially between the North and South of Nigeria. In this sense, it has also been related to the marginalization of people from the political and economic spheres of society. It is plausible that beyond the lure for political power, the increase in Islamic fundamentalism may also represent a general dissatisfaction with the political situation in Nigeria, that is, frustration with the inability of the ruling elites to deliver on much-needed economic and social reprieve for citizens. In addition to the above, there is a need, in the examination of secularity in Nigeria today, to equally focus on how pervasive socio-economic inequality may feed the potential for religious conflict among the people. For instance, it has been shown that a great gap in socio-economic status sponsors the belief that even rich Muslims are unbelievers, as exemplified in the philosophy of the Maitatsine Movement responsible for perhaps the greatest number of Islamic religious conflicts in the history of Nigeria (see Udoidem, 1997). In other words, religious conflict may easily become a metaphor for economic competition as well as the desire to violently e­ stablish an economic level playing field by those left behind (see Odey, 2000; Anugwom, 2008). Therefore, the role of the state in social provisioning and stemming the tide of socio-economic inequality as guarantee of s­ ecularity becomes interesting in the effort to stem religious and sectarian conflicts. However, the economic explanation of Islamic fundamentalism has its limits. While, in the case of Nigeria, we see Islamic fundamentalist elites, from dan Fodiyo to Yusuf drawing their followers and foot soldiers from the mass of the unemployed youths, urban poor and disgruntled peasants, one should also acknowledge the fact that these people lack both the articulation and tenacity of purpose to drive these movements. They are, in ­Nigerian popular culture lingo “o-yes members”, that is, they simply do as their leaders tell them. Therefore, the challenge and solution may lie in focusing more on the leaders than the followers, that is, profiling the leaders of these groups and relating this to the nature of these ever-dynamic organizations as a critical step towards arriving at any tenable solution. Without doubt, the government needs to step up its act, especially in terms of positively responding to economic and social privation among urban youth who more often than not are easily sucked into all sorts of redemptive acts that promise a better tomorrow. It is logical to expect that dealing with Islamic fundamentalism without dealing with the social and

100  Religious conflicts and violence economic conditions that produce and reproduce willing soldiers for these movements would be largely futile. Even in the absence of fiery Islamic fundamentalist and radical preachers, massive urban youth unemployment will always produce willing young people that may always find other, and perhaps even more, volatile avenues to let off steam. One good way of dealing with Islamic fundamentalism, which has not been used in Nigeria, is a proactive policy of containment. This would entail containing the menace of Islamic fundamentalism before it transforms into a national security threat such as Boko Haram. For instance, both the Maitatsine and Boko Haram existed for many years with their leaders engaged in provocative ranting and inciting public speeches before the onset of violence. There should be a robust system to check hate speech and inciting religious preaching at all levels of society. The lack of proactive containment creates room for these movements to amass supporters and make inroads into the political and power structure thereby garnering supporters in high places. This positions them to engage in long-drawn-out terror and violence. Another approach that needs to be fully exploited is the regular and even forceful reinforcement of secularity by the federal government. This is a constitutional provision that has often been sacrificed at the altar of parochial sentiments and ethno-religiosity. One clear point, which emerges from the discussion thus far, is that, the promotion and sustenance of secularity in a modern nation like Nigeria must constantly deal with the particularism of religion and the anti-secular pull of fundamentalist religions. Secularity, in this situation, may not only be the non-promotion of state religion but more critically seek accommodation with religious trends such as Islamic fundamentalism, which actively contradict secularism. In other words, the conception of modernity or even secularity as essentially the negation of religion or religion as a social force structurally impaired by modernity (see Willaime, 2006; Dawson, 2006) can no longer work. There is no point belabouring the fact that the secular credentials of Nigeria have been undermined by religion. However, even more troubling is that conflicts woven around religion have bred both disunity and parochial nationalism that undermine development in the country. In addition, as the current fight with both the Boko Haram and ISWAP clearly shows, enormous material and human resources have been expended on these conflicts. The colossal monetary and human resources funnelled into the war with these religious insurgent groups in the last ten years could, for instance, radically transform the education or health system in Nigeria to excellent standards.

Notes 1 Another account has it that Muhammed Marwa was an Islamic scholar who migrated to Kano, Nigeria from the town of Marwa in Northern Cameroon in 1945 (see Danjibo, nd).

Religious conflicts and violence  101 2 In Danjibo’s (nd) account, he was actually expelled from Kano by the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido, for his abusive and provocative ranting against the emirate institution and the political class in the city. Whatever the case, Marwa reappeared in the mid-sixties after Nigeria’s independence and carried on with his habitual tirade against both religious and political authorities. 3 Nur should be seen as the main driver of the fractionalization of Boko Haram. He was, like Shekau, one of the very close and trusted lieutenants of Boko Haram founder, Yusuf. He was thus unhappy to have been beaten to the leadership position by Shekau when Yusuf died. As most scholars and analysts of terrorist groups would agree, the undoing of Shekau was the inability to deal with the obvious Nur problem soon after assuming the mantle of leadership. Perhaps, Shekau was too focused on the challenge from the Nigerian military to bother about Nur or, more likely, he feared the repercussions of such a move against Nur who obviously commanded significant loyalty in the group and beyond.

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102  Religious conflicts and violence Goldschmidt, Arthur., & Davidson, L. (2006). A concise history of the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview. Halisi, C.R.D., Kaiser, P., & Ndegwa, S. (1998). “Guest editors introduction: The multiple meanings of citizenship – rights, identity and social justice in Africa”. Africa Today, 45 (3–4): 337–349. Huntington, Samuel (1998). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Idowu, W.O. (1999). Citizenship status, statehood problems and political conflict: The case of Nigeria. Nordic Journal of Africa Studies, 8(2): 73–88. ICG (International Crisis Group) (2019). Facing the challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Report No. 273/Africa www.crisisgroup.org/africa/westafrica/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province (accessed: 16 October 2019). Keay, E., & Richardson, S. (1966). The native and customary courts of Nigeria. London: Sweet & Maxwell. Khuri, F. I. (1990). Imams and Emirs: State, religion and sects in Islam. London: Saqi Books. Komonchak, Joseph A., Collins, M., & Lane, D.A. (1993). The new dictionary of theology. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press. Kukah, M.H. (1993). Religion, politics and power in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum. Lawal, Abdulrafiu (2009). “Rage of the Puritans”. Tell Magazine (Nigeria) (10 August: 34. Lewis, Bernard (1990). “The roots of Muslim rage”. The Atlantic, 10 September: 9–11. Nnoli, O. (1978). Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension. Odey, J.O. (2000). The sharia and the rest of us. Enugu: Snaap Press. Osaghae, E. (1994). Ethnicity and its management in Africa: The democratization link. Lagos: Malthouse. Otite, O. (1990). Ethnic pluralism and ethnicity in Nigeria. Ibadan: C.I. Shaneson. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Roelofs, P. (2015). “Framing and blaming: Discourse analysis of the Boko Haram uprising, July 2009” in de Montclos, M.P. (ed.) Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria. Leiden/Ibadan and Zaria: African Studies Centre and IFRA (pp. 110–131). Sanusi, L.S. (2007). “Politics and sharia in Northern Nigeria”, in Soares, B., & Otayek, R. (eds) Islam and Muslim politics in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Soyinka, Wole (2009). “The precursors of Boko Haram”. The Guardian, Thursday 24 September. Udoidem, S. (1997). “Religion in the political life in Nigeria: A survey of religionrelated crises since independence”, in Okafor, F.U. (ed.) New strategies for  curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension (pp. 152–183). Usman, Y.B. (1987). The manipulation of religion in Nigeria, 1979–1987, Kaduna: Vanguard Pub. Willaime, Jean-Paul (2006). “Religion in ultramodernity”, in Beckford, J.A., & Walliss, J. (eds) Theorising religion: Classical and contemporary debates. Aldershot: Ashgate (pp. 77–90). Williams, P. (1997). “New measures to ensure an effective separation of state and religion in Nigeria”, in Okafor, F.U. (ed.) New strategies for curbing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension (pp. 184–201).

7 Boom and bust An economy in quagmire – oil and the diminishing of economic development prospects

Introduction The focus on the economy here would be from largely political-economy and economic-sociology perspectives. These two approaches privilege the examination of the role and impact of politics, political constraints and considerations on economic development in Nigeria as well as the context provided by Nigeria’s peculiar society, its normative values and the inversion of such values in the economy. In other words, far from a typical economistic approach focused on the familiar interplay between numbers and models which while esoterically persuasive tells no real story, one is inclined to offer a panoramic view conditioned by the prevalent politics, political culture and social realities of postcolonial Nigerian society. Thus, the chapter seeks to tease out the subsisting nature of Nigerian politics and society that has dogged economic growth and development. Apart from a focus on the apparent conditions that determine the size and effectuality of foreign direct investments (FDIs), the chapter also examines the nature of economic policy planning and implementation that have over the years failed to lead to the desired goal as well as the overbearing impact of non-economic factors. As has been argued, sustained economic growth is essential for long-term development in any country (see Udeaja & Obi, 2015). In other words, pursuing the goals of development also entails the sustained effort to achieve economic growth. There can be no real or sustainable development without economic growth. Economic growth is thus a necessary condition for development in any nation or society. Prior to the dominance of oil from the mid-1970s, agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy and contributed over 60% of GDP. Even with the dominance of oil nowadays, agriculture is still the second largest contributor to RGDP in Nigeria. According to such authors as Ogen (2003) and Lawal (1997), agriculture was the engine of the Nigerian economy in the immediate independence and civil war era. During this period (1960–1970), Nigeria emerged as the world’s second largest producer of cocoa and the largest exporter of palm kernel as well as one of the largest producers and exporters of palm oil. However, these commodities are by

104  Boom and bust ­ efinition primary products and were exported in their raw forms to cound tries outside Nigeria, especially Western nations. As a result, these feats in agriculture and crop production did not generate concomitant growth and the development of the manufacturing or industrial sector. The economy was, as a result, dependent on earnings from primary agricultural products, which are subsequently transformed into finished secondary products abroad, and some shipped back to the country as consumer goods at ­exorbitant cost. Literally, the Nigerian economy, apart from over-reliance on oil (which has led to the establishment of a rentier economy and concomitant political elites dependent on rent) has also been bedeviled by the dearth of enabling fiscal and social contexts for real improvement. Therefore, the chapter, drawing from the literature, interrogates the nature and character of the Nigerian economy over time. Given the largely unstable and unpredictable nature of the economy, in spite of massive oil resources, one assumes that the economy is literally in a quagmire. In this case, the stupendous wealth derived from oil over the years has not had any lasting detectable effects on the economy and the people. The rentier economy associated with oil has been the foundation of social conflict and contention that have marred development. This line of thinking surely opens up the path to the orthodox “resource curse” logic which in effect posits a stunning inverse relationship between natural resource endowment and development particularly in developing nations of the world. Therefore, it would seem appropriate within the chapter to examine the aptness of resource curse in describing the unending development quandary in Nigeria in spite of undoubted oil and gas wealth. In other words, does “resource curse” explain the development dilemma in Nigeria or its continuous fledgling economy? It would be naive and overstretching the imagination to expect resource curse alone to be the answer to all the troubling questions of Nigeria’s development malaise. Even though the economy, apart from oil, is also dependent on export of other agricultural products and other primary resources, a myriad of other factors must be implicated. Crucially, economic development in most ideal cases is a product of mere incrementalism, that is, building on what is there over a long period. This suggests both policy consistency and pursuit of established development plans. Every administration must therefore build naturally on what has been put in place or established by its predecessors and establish other frameworks for preceding regimes to follow as well. It thus allows both progressive additions and innovation in the development process since the general goal remains the same. Quite a number of perspectives or determinants have been indicted in the examination and understanding of economic growth and development. These range from knowledge capital as key determinant of economic growth (see Romer, 1986); the role of human capital (see Lucas, 1988); role of public infrastructure (see, Barro, 1991, 2003); to the influence of horizontal/

Boom and bust  105 vertical innovations (see Romer, 1990). However, the impact of non-economic factors such as institutions, economic structures, political systems, legal frameworks as well as socio-cultural factors impinging on economic growth or development (see Lipset, 1959; North & Thomas, 1973; G ­ ranovetter, 1985; Knack & Keefer, 1997) seem more plausible and telling in the peculiar case of Nigeria. In other words, one sees in the situation of Nigeria the dominance and strong role of non-economic factors in the explanation of development challenges. While macro- and micro-economic policies and programmes have not been very consistent and outstanding in propping up the goals of rapid development in Nigeria, these have been in turn undermined by socio-political and non-economic factors. These factors provide the general conditions which, in most cases, take the impetus out of good economic policies, and even explain why there is a culture of policy inconsistency and reversals in the country. Pure economic factors, just like other matters, are subjected to non-economic and even primordial considerations. Therefore, economic development in Nigeria must be apprehended within the context of the role of these non-economic factors especially when it is realized that both socio-cultural factors and political considerations/system provide the critical background for the emergence of good economic policies and the success and sustenance of such policies over time. There can hardly be any significant economic growth without the political will to push through such policies as well as the necessary public institutions to work as vehicles of implementation, streamlining and downstreaming such policies.

Between economic growth and economic development in Nigeria Even though the economic development of Nigeria remains far from expected given its enormous human and material resources, there have been some improvements, especially if economic development is approached from the Basic Needs Approach (BNA). This approach emphasizes meeting up with society’s demands in such critical areas as nutrition, health, education and provision of portable water. According to Ekong and Onye (2012: 11), government policies as measured by its spending on health, education, agriculture and water have been partly effective and sub-optimal in Nigeria. For development policy to be effective, it must be targeted at meeting the basic needs of the people which include nutrition, education, health and access to safe and portable water, among others. The strides forward in these areas have received impetus from such current government programme drives or initiatives as the school feeding programme (which aims at providing one meal a day at school for children from poor

106  Boom and bust families); the M-power initiatives (which provide both learning opportunities and monthly stipends for unemployed young people); the trader money programme which aims at providing minimal non-collateralized credit for artisans and petty traders, among others. However, these initiatives, while capturing lofty objectives, have been, as usual, negatively influenced by operational and implementation problems; political considerations (especially suspicion that they may be strategies for wooing voters by the party in government); and the important weakness that in typical policy inconsistencies, these programmes do not really build on the programmes introduced by prior administrations in the country. In addition, the education sector of the economy has not received the level of attention it deserves for a country aiming for growth in a global economy now powered by the knowledge economy and dominance of artificial intelligence. A scenario whereby education consistently receives less than 10% of the yearly budgetary allocation, which equally compares poorly with the allocation to defence (for a country neither at war nor threatened by one, even though beset with severe domestic security challenges), is not consistent with development in today’s age. Therefore, Nigeria’s famed human capacity development has come mainly from individual and private prioritization of education and not really from a well-funded education sector. In addition to the above realities, the economic development process raises serious questions about how equity in resource allocation and development programmes has been pursued. Therefore, while the regular windfalls from oil may paint the picture of stupendous national wealth and apparent per capita income increases, the real concern would be with how such wealth is distributed. This brings up the question of the critical difference between economic growth and economic development in Nigeria. There is always the tendency to use the notions of economic growth and economic development interchangeably. However, while economic growth may be both indicator and condition for economic development, the two concepts are not the same. In this sense, economic development is a much more comprehensive and people-reflective process than mere economic growth, which in typical economic jargon focuses mainly on increase in per capita income in the population. In other words, economic growth refers to increase in per capita income sustained over a period in a given society. Economic development, however, is concerned with both per capita income improvement and other indicators of improvement and, more critically, distribution. Thus, it is not solely about per capita income increases but equally about the distribution of infrastructure, equity in growth, sources of such growth, public institutions and even economic governance, among others. Economic development focuses on qualitative and quantitative growth or improvements in all critical sectors of the state – political, economic and social institutions as well as the actual distribution of income among the

Boom and bust  107 population. It seems to embody the incontrovertible fact that real development is both multi-sectoral and comprehensive and coheres with how equity or issues of inequality are tackled in the process of development since the growth in per capita income does not on its own tell us a lot about who gets what or how such income improvements are distributed in the society. This fact is especially important in developing societies such as Nigeria where inequality looms large and the gap between the very rich and the acutely poor is more or less on a consistent increase. In cognizance of this reality, economic policies and development programmes should embody strategies for improving equity and engendering inclusive growth, that is, growth that includes or creates opportunities for all groups in the society to improve themselves or tap into the growth in the larger society in order to meet their own aspirations towards better life. Table 7.1 below seems to underline the critical issue of income distribution among different groups in the country. Thus, one notices a higher incidence of poverty in the North in relation to the South of the country. This difference is especially stark and acute in the case of comparison between the South and the North East and North West geopolitical zones. The recurrent insurgence and security challenges in the North have often been related to the poverty level in that area. This challenges development policies and programmes in Nigeria to embody effective strategies for addressing inequality. The above also implies that a critical challenge to economic development in Nigeria is the problem of equity in the society. Therefore, there is a need for the emphasis to shift radically towards inclusive development or growth and deliberate programmes to narrow the socio-economic disparity among members of society. The focus on achieving inclusive economic development often finds expression in the notion of the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) to development (see Ekong & Onye, 2012). Table 7.1  Spread and trend in poverty levels in Nigeria (%) (1980–2004) Levels

1980

1985

1992

1996

2004

NATIONAL  Urban  Rural

27.2 17.2 28.3

46.3 37.8 51.4

42.7 37.5 46.0

65.6 58.2 69.3

54.4 43.2 63.3

ZONE   South South   South East   South West   North Central   North East   North West

13.2 12.9 13.4 32.2 35.6 37.7

45.7 30.4 38.6 50.8 54.9 52.1

40.8 41.0 43.1 46.0 54.0 36.5

58.2 53.5 60.9 64.7 70.1 77.2

35.1 26.7 43.0 67.0 72.2 71.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2012.

108  Boom and bust

Development planning as a route to economic development in Nigeria Economic development efforts in Nigeria have over the years been anchored on the so-called economic development plans. These, as the name indicates, are broad blueprints and programmes perceived as congruent with the economic development of Nigeria. These plans privilege deliberate and conscious allocation of national resources in order to achieve rapid and sustained economic growth. The overriding goals of the plans are to minimize wastage and inefficient allocation of resources, improve the sectoral allocation of resources, efficiently and prudently deploy and manage resources as well as achieve the overall objective of economic growth and national development. These plans, apart from being aspirational in nature also embody specific programmes and policies. These policies specify projects and actions needed to achieve economic development within each plan period. Probably the first (even though not so described in nomenclature) development plan in Nigeria emerged in the form of the colonial era Township Ordinance Act (1917) which classified settlements into first- to third-class settlement areas. The aim was to enable the allocation of resources for infrastructural development. However, in typical colonial mentality the first-class settlement areas, such as Lagos, were also areas heavily or solely occupied by expatriate civil servants and administrators and received the lion’s share of infrastructural allocation and development (see Olayiwola & Adeleye, 2005). However, real postcolonial development planning in Nigeria took off with the promulgation of the First National Development Plan (1962–1968). This first plan, which debuted soon after independence, was motivated by the desire to put Nigeria on a sustainable path towards economic growth. Its overriding goal was to put the nation on the path of accelerated economic growth through the prioritization of agriculture and industrial development and emphasized the training of a required work force or human capacity to underpin the above goals. The Second Development Plan (1970–1974) emerged immediately after the Nigerian civil war and had its objectives influenced by the needs of a country emerging out of that threeyear civil war. As a result, the focus of the plan was on reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure destroyed by the war. Apart from the above, the plan also sought to provide more infrastructure and to reposition the country among the comity of nations in Africa and beyond. This plan was subsequently followed by the Third Development Plan (1975–1980) which focused on economic diversification and the indigenization of the economy of the nation. It sought to respond to the realization that over-dependence on oil is not sustainable and the awareness that the critical and commanding heights of the domestic economy were in the control of foreign capital and interests including in the oil sector. The Fourth Development Plan (1981–1985) was targeted at harnessing the enormous

Boom and bust  109 resources of the country for the development of its people and consolidating the achievements of prior plans. In this sense, it sought to tackle poverty through reduction in unemployment; achievement of balanced and equitable development; and the optimum or maximum utilization of human and material resources in the country. This plan was supposed to be followed by the Fifth Development Plan of another five years’ duration, as usual. However, the then government of Ibrahim Babangida chose a different path with a two-decade perspective on development planning (1989–2008). The  20-year perspective became operationalized in the form of disparate three-year development rolling plans; the first being the 1989–1991 rolling plan. This marked a radical change in the period of national development planning. Without doubt, the overall aim was to achieve the much-needed continuity and accumulation in the nation’s development planning. The now contemporaneous envisioning of development planning debuted with the post-Babangida era. Therefore, the supposed Sixth Development Plan was in effect the start of the era of “visions” in the nation’s development planning. It began with the Vision 2010 Development Programme launched on 18 September 1996. The aim was to transform the country development-wise and put it on the firm path towards achieving development status by the year 2010. It also aimed, perhaps in consolidation of the thinking of international development agencies, to empower the dominance of the private sector as the engine or driver of the economy within the context of a competitive efficient and market-driven economy. Another version of the Vision strategy emerged in the form of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (2004–2007). It was, on paper, an internally generated strategy aimed at poverty reduction, value-reorientation of the people and overall socio-economic development of Nigeria. As a contemporary linchpin of development, it sought to tackle poverty, achieve economic revival and unleash the vast human resources of the country towards development under a democratic context. It also embodied and aspired towards massive job creation and drastic reduction of unemployment. Currently, Nigeria is implementing the so-called Vision 20:2020 development programme, which is a complicated and overtly ambitious plan. It is a long-term economic plan, which aims at socio-economic development and growth strategies for the period 2009 to 2020. The implementation would be through a number of medium-term development plans. It hopes to launch Nigeria into sustainable economic and social development and bring about the emergence of accelerated economic development and a prosperous country. Equally, it aims at leveraging Nigeria’s enormous resources in building a prosperous and united nation within the context of a mutually dependent and interconnected world at large. While most of these plans were fantastic documents and embodied informed ideas about moving the nation forward, they were undermined by implementation bottlenecks, structural challenges and the rapid change of

110  Boom and bust policies and primordial factors, which have militated against the achievement of the goals of these programmes. In other words, while planning is critical to success, the real issue has to do with keeping faith with such plans and surmounting the political will and moral courage to see them through. In Nigeria, these have unfortunately being in short supply. Therefore, there has been an enormous gap between these robust development blueprints and development-oriented activities and projects. In effect, while development planning remains good practice, the impact of the plans has, however, been so far minimal in Nigeria. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that 1986 was a watershed in Nigeria’s economic development. It was the year that the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) – which aimed at reducing public expenditure; unproductive public sector spending; and making the private sector the engine of the economy as well as the commercialization and privatization of government-owned enterprises which were traditionally bedeviled by corruption, unproductive investments and general inefficiency – was introduced. The SAP was at the behest of the Bretton Woods Institutions, which saw it as the cure for Nigeria’s macro-economic woes and development problems. The programme, in spite of the good reception it received internationally failed to provide the much-needed economic cure. As Anugwom (2011a: 1) strongly contends in the case of Nigeria, privatisation a much touted program from the regime of Ibrahim ­Babangida (1985 to 1993) to the second coming of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 to 2007) did not act as the much expected economic elixir but rather became a process of transferring public wealth into the hands of opportunistic political and economic elites. Thus, the public expectation driven by the narratives of Bretton Woods that privatization would, among other things, usher in economic growth, provide more jobs and raise general quality of life, came to nought. Even the small progress made towards liberalizing the economy ended up in only providing avenues for the political elites and their cronies to pursue their selfish interests and in the process undermine any economic benefit that would have accrued from the programme. Incidentally, the largely unsuccessful SAP was also adopted in a couple of other African and Latin American countries through the advice and prodding of the Bretton Woods Institutions.

Rentier economy, resource curse and the Dutch disease: familiar framings of economic development in Nigeria The so-called resource curse, in general outlines, is the view that natural resources may in reality be more of a curse than an economic blessing in a

Boom and bust  111 given country. The root of the notion lies in the conviction that resourcerich nations are ultimately not more developed than less endowed nations or states. Such countries, in spite of their rich resource endowments, are less developed on average than the less endowed especially in terms of economic development and growth of democracy. Even though the resource curse notion has been used in the analysis of some developed resourceendowed nations in the West, the typical exemplars have been drawn from developing countries in Latin America and Africa, including Nigeria. Resource curse, or the paradox of plenty, has been used primarily in ­reference to countries rich in oil, mining and gas extraction. It coheres on the belief that resource-rich nations face peculiar social, economic and political challenges that may yield negative development outcomes despite the abundance of natural resources. Instructively, the notion implies that these peculiar challenges are as much the outcomes of resource endowment as they are created or reinforced by it. In addition, in specific terms, resource endowments often betray democracy by producing authoritarian regimes. They often generate conflict between groups over access and control of these resources; environmental degradation that is often massive and extensive; weak public institutions that facilitate corruption or the personification of oil wealth by the elites; inefficient resource allocation and expenditure arising from both the unpredictable nature of the market for these resources and the profligacy of those in authority. The situations of a couple of African and Latin American nations suggest that natural resources endowment may not directly result in economic development or general improvement in quality of life of citizens. The above reality reflects the core of the resource curse notion (see Badeeb & Lean, 2016; Ross, 2012; Polterovich, Popov, & Tonis, 2010; Torvik, 2009; Stijns, 2005; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Sachs & Warner, 2001) which seem to capture the fact that there is no predictable positive relationship between natural resources endowment and development or even economic growth. Instead of yielding positive outcomes in these nations, such endowments have often been the source of internecine conflict and civil war in a good number of cases. More critically, resource curse is associated with the production of the so-called Dutch Disease, which is perhaps very germane to economic development and our concern here. W. Max Corden and Peter Neary originally developed the notion of the “Dutch Disease” as a classic economic model in 1982. It is generally about the interaction between the non-tradable goods sector and the two tradable goods sectors, namely, the lagging sector (manufacturing) and the booming sector (e.g. oil) (see Corden and Neary, 1982 for details). They detail how resources (including labour) inevitably shift from the lagging sector to the booming sector of the economy. Thus, the Dutch Disease (see Ismail, 2010; Lam & Watchekon, 2003) is essentially about the tendency of this natural resource (oil) sector to hurt other sectors of the economy, especially the manufacturing sector. As already stated, it

112  Boom and bust does this by shifting both labour and capital to the oil sector, causing inflation and/or exchange-rate appreciation as well as encouraging both unconscious and conscious neglect of these other sectors, as all focus remains on oil/extraction. Apart from Nigeria, other illustrations of the Dutch affliction include Trinidad and Tobago, Iran, Venezuela, Iraq and even Russia. The idea of resource curse has recently been criticized as taking a dim view of African states and more critically of often masking the international dynamics of economic power and political relations that may underline the so-called African development dilemma. According to Niang (2019), resource curse downplays global structural imbalances and equally neglects the role of predatory capitalism, which has negative effects on resource-rich developing countries with export-oriented economics. In fact, she goes on to argue in much stronger terms, “there is no such thing as a ‘resource curse’, only bankrupt policy choices that are heavily dependent on extraction – an economic model which encourages foreign patronage and rent-seeking behaviours that naturally lead to corruption” (Niang, 2019: 2). Nevertheless, a critical Achilles heel of the Nigerian economy is the rentier nature of the oil-based economy. Thus, Nigeria presents a model of a rent-seeking economy (see Torvick, 2002). Rent seeking in this case refers to the sharing of natural wealth or produce without necessarily contributing to it (see Beblawi, 1987). In this situation, the oil endowment in Nigeria has invariably shifted attention from other productive sectors of the economy to the rent-seeking oil sector. This largely explains Nigeria’s embeddedness in mono-economy and the lip service consistently paid by the political elites to diversification of the economy. The rentier state that Nigeria often reflects is one that is dependent almost solely on external ­revenues derived from extractive industries (Kuru, 2002). Such dependence, apart from producing a patrimonial elite class, leads to a situation whereby the domestic productive economy is hindered and stultified as every focus is on the extractive industry that generates enormous external income. However, the rentier economy equally comes in most cases with typical mismanagement of the economy and the privatization of extractive state wealth by privileged members of the society and their international collaborators. In the case of Nigeria, the rentier framework has over the years produced an enduring collaboration between the state and multinational oil corporations to the detriment of the welfare of ordinary citizens and even development of society. This obvious collaboration and neglect of citizens have been the drivers of conflict in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region where militant youth, for decades, took up arms against these multinational firms and the Nigerian state. The rentier economy, as is obvious from the above, is mainly tailored to benefit the elites, especially those in possession of state power and their collaborators and cronies. In other words, political and economic elites are the typical beneficiaries in the rentier state framework and thus have a stake in ensuring that the status quo endures rather

Boom and bust  113 than improving the productive base of the economy or working towards achieving even distribution of national wealth. Even without the devious strategy of an oppressive elite class, the easy and often stupendous income from an extractive resource such as oil can easily breed complacency in economic planning and management that is evidently ruinous in the end. There is obviously the temptation to try to explain Nigeria’s economic doldrums from the angle of the resource curse and this has been done ­adequately in the extant literature. However, the resource curse notion, while it pinpoints the undeniable fact that oil in the case of Nigeria has been the harbinger of more conflicts than any other issue with the possible exception of religion,1 may unintentionally generate a one-dimensional explanation of what is obviously a multi-pronged and complex problem in Nigeria. It is equally expeditious to consider that it would be unthinkable that the significant level of infrastructural development (at least in such major cities as Abuja, Lagos, Kaduna, Port Harcourt etc.) in the country could be achieved without oil revenues. However, the adequate understanding of the economy of Nigeria should go beyond resource curse and oil though the over-dependence on oil has no doubt led to the neglect of the imperative to develop other sectors of the economy. Apart from generally funneling Nigeria into a perpetual mono-economy, the dependence on oil has also created a rentier economy in which political leaders and elites generally focus on how to extend their crude accumulative tendencies in the oil economy rather than think about alternatives. Therefore, while oil at the onset created optimism regarding the development of a viable economy in Nigeria, it has over time, much akin to the resource curse logic, been the source of many other negative forces that have negated the development of the country. These negative influences of oil as identified in the extant literature include the hindering of democracy (Ross, 2001); poor economic development (Karl, 1997); predatory state marked by poor governance (Moore, 2004) and ample social conflicts (see Anugwom, 2011b; Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, & Okhonmina, 2007; Idemudia & Ite, 2006). The result of the apparent underutilization of the resources or income from oil has been a poverty profile in Nigeria that belies the dividends from oil over the years. Apart from the statement that Table 7.2 makes about the high poverty level of households in Nigeria, it portrays other very interesting facts about the country and in particular economic development as well as the distribution of income in the country. Thus, while education expectedly has a positive impact on household poverty, this impact weakens as one acquires higher educational qualifications. At this stage, there is an inverse relationship between education and poverty. Therefore, people with such higher degrees as doctorates are, on average, poorer than those with a Master’s degree. This may be explained by the fact that the possession of a doctorate degree may in reality limit the job options available to the individual especially as most of such qualifications imply narrow specializations that

114  Boom and bust Table 7.2 Relative poverty incidence by educational level of head of household in Nigeria (%) (2009) Qualification

National None FSLC MSLC Voc or Comm JSS SSS “O” level “A” level NCE or OND nursing BA or HND Technical/Professional Master’s Doctorate

Deflated

Non-Deflated

Poor

Non-poor

Poor

Non-poor

65.0 75.4 62.0 53.1 67.3 70.3 53.6 61.9 47.8 43.5 70.1 18.6 28.3

35.0 24.6 38.0 46.9 32.7 29.7 46.4 38.1 52.2 56.5 29.9 81.4 71.7

64.9 75.4 61.8 52.4 67.3 69.7 53.6 61.9 47.9 42.9 70.1 18.6 28.3

35.1 24.6 38.2 47.6 32.7 30.3 46.4 38.1 52.1 57.1 29.9 81.4 71.7

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2012.

pigeonhole one in a specific section of the labour market, a fact that may apply to other nations apart from Nigeria.

Major constraints to economic development in Nigeria One critical nemesis of economic growth or development in Nigeria is the unsustainability of a significant manufacturing sector. Real manufacturing in Nigeria has stagnated for many years now and has remained largely below 5% of GDP. This unfortunate situation results largely from the dearth of critical support infrastructure, especially power. As Table 7.3 shows, electricity supply in Nigeria is still grossly inadequate to meet the operating needs of serious manufacturing in the country. In this situation, manufacturing firms in Nigeria are left to depend on alternative and, in most instances, costly sources of electricity. A recent report showed that the manufacturing sector in Nigeria has a high dependence on alternative sources of power. Thus, compared to other sectors of the economy, manufacturing has a 78.30% dependence on alternative source of power between one and five hours daily (NBS/SMEDAN, 2010). This is the highest for any sector in Nigeria. As Ogunleye (2017), shows in a recent study there is a myriad of problems bedeviling the traditional power sector in the country. These problems, which generally produce unpredictability of the power sector, make it impossible for the sector to be the anchor of the manufacturing sector in

Boom and bust  115 Table 7.3  Electricity supply by region by hours by mean cost (2012/2013) Region

Hours of electricity per week

Mean cost of electricity

North Central North East North West South East South South South West Urban Rural NIGERIA

40.2 36.4 21.1 21.5 52.7 34.9 35.4 34.8 35.2

18,532 21,479 16,240 28,536 16,452 32,798 28,220 18,779 24,633

Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2016.

the country. The findings of Ogunleye are consistent with the report of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) which contends that electricity generation in the country is characterized by excess capacity and inadequate supply. In this case, peak energy demand is often only a third of installed capacity because of non-availability of spare parts and poor maintenance of the national grid. Even the so-called reforms in the energy sector, which have been mainly in the privatization of the supply (consumer) side, have been very unsatisfactory and mired in large-scale corruption. So, there is the seemingly endemic problem of both inadequate energy generation and the need for alternative sources of energy supply. These alternatives are obviously expensive and cost-intensive and hence negatively affect industrial development. Without reliable and sustainable energy or power, real manufacturing activities can barely take place and even the attempts at manufacturing are generally undermined by the exorbitant cost of energy alternatives (such as diesel-powered generators) and other needed infrastructure ranging from good roads to regular water supply. In effect, manufacturing in Nigeria has, over the years, become very expensive and even frustrating for organizations. A critical indicator of the reality of the above is the fact that a good number of manufacturing concerns have relocated manufacturing activities to neighbouring countries such as Ghana with relatively more stable power. In addition, the severe decline of the textile industry (once the mainstay of the domestic economy of such Northern areas of Nigeria as Kano and Kaduna and a large employer of labour in that region) bears testimony to the fact that manufacturing has declined over the years rather than improved. There is no gainsaying the fact that a robust economy can hardly be built on a poor manufacturing sector and dependence on primary products. Another major constraint to economic development has been the noticeable culture of policy inconsistencies and even outright reversals over the years.

116  Boom and bust In other words, Nigeria has not shown abiding commitment to economic policies and programmes, especially within the long run. Even policies that would have yielded good results have been jettisoned midway, or even reversed, and new ones pursued. As a result, there can hardly be long-term planning and policies are not given the timeframe that would enable them yield good results and outcomes for the economy. Equally problematic is the low exchange rate of the Nigerian currency (Naira) to other major international currencies such as the Dollar, the Euro and the Pound. The Naira has been on a record downward spiral over the years, reaching a ridiculous low in 2015/2016 (when at some point it was exchanging at 450 Naira to 1 US Dollar). It now oscillates between 350 and 360 Naira to the Dollar (2019). This fact further entrenches the country deeper as a weak or fragile economy. Without doubt, if the country has a good manufacturing or industrial sector, the weakness of the currency could have been a blessing since it would have generated massive exportation of goods from the country and in the process improved the international trade balance of the nation and gains therein. Yet another limitation to economic development is the continuous abysmal rate of FDIs to the economy. In fact, the contribution of FDIs to the country’s GDP has been low in the last couple of decades. Even though there was a spike to 6% in 2006 (which is not impressive in the overall scheme of things and development needs of Nigeria), the FDI has been very unimpressive. In spite of a profile of huge natural resources endowment and a very large population, all of which should ideally spur investors to see the country as investment destination, the prevailing culture of policy inconsistencies, corruption, and security challenges have prevailed on the choice of investment destinations by international investors, who see Nigeria as largely unpredictable despite its strong pull factors. In addition, a crucial impediment in the economic development of Nigeria can be seen in the neglect of the other sectors of the economy, as all focus is riveted on the oil sector. The above entails that Nigeria survives on an oil mono-economy and has failed over the years to diversify. Even though there has been consistent recognition of the need to diversify and grow the economy in other sectors, the efforts towards these have been neither consolidated nor pursued in a committed manner. Being an oil economy that is dependent on extractive income from oil and gas, the notion of Dutch Disease can be legitimately invoked to explain or underscore Nigeria’s focus on only oil and its negative impact generally. Currently Nigeria is ranked as the eleventh highest producer of oil on earth. It produces about two million barrels a day (by 2017) (Stebbins, 2019). However, in spite of being ranked among the 15 highest global oil producers, Nigeria’s GDP per capita, put by the same source at $5,887, is by far the lowest of all the other big oil producers. In fact, the GDP per capita is about a third of the next lowest, Brazil, at $15,553.

Boom and bust  117 Table 7.4  Nigerian states by poor proportion share by total poor (%) State

Abia Adamawa Akwa Ibom Anambra Bauchi Bayelsa Benue Borno Cross River Delta Ebonyi Edo Ekiti Enugu Gombe Imo Jigawa Kaduna Kano Katsina Kebb Kogi Kwara Lagos Nassarawa Niger Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo Plateau Rivers Sokoto Taraba Yobe Zamfara FCT (Abuja) Rural Urban National

2003–2004

2009–2010

Total Population

Absolute Extreme Total poor poor population

Absolute poor

Extreme poor

2.6 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.3 1.1 3.1 2.9 2.2 2.9 1.3 2.5 1.3 2.3 1.7 2.8 3.2 4.4 6.6 4.2 2.3 2.4 1.6 2.6 1.5 2.7 2.6 3 2.4 3.9 2.3 3.6 2.7 1.7 1.6 2.3 0.7 56.3 43.7 100

1.7 2.8 4.2 2 4.5 0.7 3.2 2.7 2.3 3.2 1.2 2 1.3 1.8 1.9 2 4.8 3.7 6.1 4.8 3.3 3.4 2.2 6.7 1.5 2.8 2.1 2.9 1.7 2.3 2.4 3.2 3.2 1.6 2.2 3 0.6 64.4 35.6 100

1.6 2.8 2.3 2.5 4.5 0.8 2.9 2.9 2 2.5 2 2.3 1.5 2.2 2.2 1.8 4.3 4.4 7.6 5.1 2.7 2.5 1.9 4.2 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.3 1.5 3.3 2.6 2.8 3.6 1.8 2.2 2.5 1 70.3 29.7 100

1.2 3.2 2.3 1.8 4.9 0.7 2.7 2.7 2 2.7 2.4 2 1.4 2.4 2.8 1.5 5.5 4.3 8.8 5.3 2.4 2.7 1.9 2.7 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.1 1.2 2.6 2.5 2.2 4.2 1.7 2.6 2.5 1 74.1 25.9 100

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2012.

1.3 3.2 2.1 1.2 5.3 0.5 2.9 2.3 2.2 3.4 1.1 1.8 1.1 1.4 2 1.7 6.3 3 5.5 5.1 3.9 4.6 2.9 7.7 1.3 2.4 1.9 2.7 1.3 1.7 2.3 2.8 3.7 1.5 4.1 3.3 0.5 67.7 32.3 100

2 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.3 1.2 3 3 2 2.9 1.5 2.2 1.7 2.3 1.7 2.8 3.1 4.3 6.7 4.1 2.3 2.3 1.7 4.6 1.3 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.4 4 2.2 3.7 2.6 1.6 7.1 3.2 1.3 63.8 36.2 100

118  Boom and bust

Conclusion In spite of marginal improvements in the 2019 World Bank ease of doing business index (which focuses on regulations and practices affecting business in different countries in the world), which is a better outing from the very poor score in 2018, Nigeria’s economy is still largely struggling. The fact that economic development in Nigeria has been challenging over the years understates the enormous human and material resources in the country. Apart from a generally acknowledged human capital base, Nigeria is endowed with numerous natural resources ranging from oil and gas, bauxite, zinc, gold, iron ore to coal, limestone, lead etc. Incidentally, these endowments have not aided the much-needed economic growth or development in the country. Nigeria’s economy has over the years grown in fits and starts. Typically, a few years of promise are soon blighted by years of decline and retardation. This scenario is despite the fact that the country is among the top earners from oil globally, and has earned stupendous income from oil since it came to prominence in the 1970s. It has been aptly argued that Nigeria’s economic aspirations have remained that of altering the structure of production and consumption patterns, diversifying the economic base and reducing dependence on oil, with the aim of putting the economy on a path of sustainable, all-inclusive and non-inflationary growth. The implication of this is that while rapid growth in output, as measured by the real gross domestic product (GDP), is important, the transformation of the various sectors of the economy is even more critical. (Udeaja & Obi, 2015: 28) The above sentiments embody both the challenge and goals of economic growth and general development in Nigeria. In this sense, the diversification of the economy away from the overdependence on oil is critical for the future of Nigeria. This would entail in reality the radical transformation of other sectors of the economy and the achievement of inclusive growth, which is very fundamental to the aspiration towards development in Nigeria. As Table 7.5 depicts, manufacturing, which is ideally the driver of the economy in any society aspiring towards economic growth and development, is apparently not contributing enough to RGDP in the case of Nigeria. Thus, with the exceptions of 1970 and 1980 it consistently contributed less than 5% of RGDP. It is a simple logic that without a strong or robust manufacturing or industrial sector, the growth of the economy remains doubtful and largely unpredictable. Instructively, in spite of the over-reliance on oil as the basis of Nigeria’s mono-economy, agriculture still contributes significantly to Nigeria’s RGDP. In spite of

Boom and bust  119 Table 7.5 Percentage contribution to real GDP by some key sectors by year (1960–2009) Sector

1960

1970

Agriculture Crude oil Manufacturing

64.27 0.44 4.58

44.74 20.61 11.04 21.41 7.53 11.05

Building/ construction

4.45

5.24

1980

9.69

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2009

32.70 35.89 5.99

31.52 37.46 5.50

34.19 33.24 4.92

35.83 32.45 4.24

41.19 24.26 3.79

41.84 16.05 4.19

1.65

1.63

1.86

1.95

1.52

1.93

Source: adapted from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2009.

the CBN’s Statistical Bulletin (2009) Nigeria’s export profile is overdominated by oil exports. This is why the country depends on oil almost solely for external revenues. From about 50% share of total exports in 1970, the share of oil exports has remained consistently over 90% since the mid-1970s. Perhaps one can characterize Nigeria’s economy, like that of most of the nations in the continent, along the lines of the negative impact of extractivism (see Niang, 2019). This entails that within the global context, the economies of Africa are nothing but points of extraction of both natural and human resources while still mired in poverty, development incapacity and a bleak future. The apparent outcome of such a scenario is that the continent is bled dry of the resources and capacity to enthrone sustainable development while serving as the extraction zone of global capitalism. Globalization has incidentally further entrenched the precarious position of nations such as Nigeria within the global economic structure. It is instructive that while the US and Europe currently promote and pursue an immigration regime that targets the best human resources from Africa, they at the same time treat the marginal citizens from this continent with disdain and malignancy bordering on the perception of these hapless citizens of Africa (mostly ­ fleeing from oppressive and deadly conditions in their home countries) as subhuman.

Note 1 For instance, the havoc caused by such fundamental religious sects as the Maitatsine group, the Boko Haram, ISWAP, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and other low scale religious groups.

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Boom and bust  121 North, D.C., & Thomas, R.P. (1973). The rise of the western world: A new economic history. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ogen, O. (2003). Patterns of economic growth and development in Nigeria since 1960. Lagos: First Academic Pub. Ogunleye, E.K. (2017). “Political economy of Nigerian power sector reforms”, in Arent, D., Arndt, C., Miller., & Tarp, F. (eds) The political economy of clean energy transitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (pp. 391–409). Olayiwola, L.M., & Adeleye, O.A. (2005). “Rural infrastructural development in Nigeria: Between 1960 and 1990 – problems and challenges”. Journal of Social Science, 11 (2): 91–96. Osaghae, E., Ikelegbe, A., Olarinmoye, O., & Okhonmina, S. (2007). Youth militias, self determination and resource struggles in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria. www. ascleiden.nl/pdf/cdpnigeriaRevisedOsaghae(1)2.pdf (accessed: 16 November 2009). Polterovich, V., Popov, V., & Tonis, A. (2010). Resource abundance: A curse or blessing? United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Working Paper No. 93, New York: UN-DESA. Romer, P. (1990). “Endogenous technological changes”. Journal of Political Economy, 98: S71 – S103. Romer, P. (1986). “Increasing returns and long-run growth”. Journal of Political Economy, 94: 1002–1037. Ross, M. (2001). “Does oil hinder democracy”. World Politics, 53: 325–361. Ross, Michael (2012). The oil curse. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Sachs, J.D., & Warner, A.M. (2001). “The curse of natural resources”. European Economic Review, 45 (4): 827–838. Stebbins, Samuel (2019). “These 15 countries, as home to largest oil reserves, control the world’s oil”. USA Today (22 May) https://eu.usatoday.com/story/ money/2019/05/22/largest-oil-reserves-in-world-15-countries-that-control-theworlds-oil/39497945/ (accessed: 22 November 2019). Stijns, J.P. (2005). “Natural resources abundance and economic growth revisited”. Resources Policy, 30 (2): 107–130. Torvik, R. (2002). “Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare”. Journal of Development Economics, 67, 455–470. Torvik, R. (2009). “Why do some resource abundant countries succeed while others do not?” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 30 (2): 107–130. Udeaja, E.A., & Obi, K.O. (2015). “Determinants of economic growth in Nigeria: Evidence from error correction model approach”. Developing Country Studies, 15  (9): 27–42.

8 From election to selection Democracy, leadership and development in Nigeria

Introduction This chapter establishes a nexus between democracy, leadership and development in Nigeria. There is no gainsaying the fact that in all societies in the world today the quality of political leadership is a crucial determinant of the rate or state of development. This emanates from the fact that it takes articulate leadership to initiate and sustain development policies as well as successfully implement them. Perhaps nowhere is this nexus between leadership and development more apparent than in the developing world, including in Nigeria. Therefore, the concern with the leadership in Nigeria is largely predicated on the realization of the coterminous linkage between good leadership and development in human society. In this sense, the dilemmatic and elusive nature of development in Nigeria, despite decades of self-rule and experimentation with different versions of governance and development paradigms, requires that scholars and public affairs analysts engage in both reinterrogating and reassessing the nexus between leadership and development in Nigeria. The focus on leadership, especially in a heavily challenged society such as Nigeria, should benefit from the attempt to delineate the traits or features of the effective or good leader. In the views of Bennis (2007: 5), all exemplary leaders have six competencies: They create a sense of mission, they motivate others to join them on that mission, they create an adaptive social architecture for their followers, they generate trust and optimism, they develop other leaders, and they get results. Perhaps, the most important of these qualities in the case of Nigeria would be the generation of trust and optimism and the development of other leaders. In other words, the leader infuses trust and optimism in spite of how things appear through a committed and motivated vision that is consistent and transcends narrow or selfish prisms. In addition, the leader is not just about today, the leader is also about tomorrow. While they do not

Democracy, leadership and development  123 have to handpick their successors in the best traditions of democracy, they should ensure that the conditions exist to enable the best or most qualified to naturally emerge. Therefore, leaders are not just judged by what they have done or even failed to do but equally by the legacies they have established to ensure the unencumbered progression of society to some desired end – development. Even though leadership occurs and emerges in different spheres of life, the discussion of leadership more often than not focuses on political leadership. In this sense, leadership is an essential feature of all government and governance: weak leadership contributes to government failures, and strong leadership is indispensable if the government is to succeed. Wise leadership secures prosperity in the long run; foolhardy leadership may bring about a catastrophe. (Mascuilli, Molchanov, & Knight, 2009:3) In spite of where leadership occurs, it implicates dealing with specific events, goals and people towards some stated end(s). Thus, leadership is ideally involved with innovative adaptation, objectives, followers or members (in the case of organizations) and the organizational means or routes for achieving goals as well as dealing with challenges and problems thereof (see Nye, 2008; Drucker with Maciariello, 2008, Grint, 2005 etc.).Cursory observation indicates that leadership malaise is widespread in Africa since most nations in the continent have had their development truncated by poor leadership.1 The malaise of leadership incapacity and its impact on development in Nigeria is largely reflective of the problem within the larger African context. Therefore, post-independence leaders in Africa not only personalized power but also privatized the state for the purpose of primitive accumulation, clientelism, repression of all forms of opposition. Instead of using the state for initiating development, African leaders utilized it as a vehicle for terrorizing the citizenry, thereby leading to the disengagement of the populace from the public realm. (Agbaje and Roberts, 2000: 154) Little wonder such African leaders as the late Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), late Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and late Nelson Mandela (South Africa) had in the past identified leadership as a bulwark to development in the continent. Incidentally, while we may have gone beyond the pejorative expression of Afro-pessimism or the crude reference to Africa as the dark continent and arrived at the magic century when Africa is expected to take the leap into rapid development, African nations in general continue to present what may be called daunting development challenges to the rest of the

124  Democracy, leadership and development world. Nigeria is by no means an exemption in this case but rather mirrors the troubling inability to achieve development in spite of much optimism and resources endowment. From the foregoing observations, the relative failure of Nigeria to achieve sustainable development makes the discourse of leadership a subject that should be on the front burner of public and intellectual dialogue. Therefore, this chapter undertakes an examination of the nexus between leadership and development within the context of democracy in Nigeria depending essentially on both cursory observations and evidence in the extant literature.

Overview of theoretical perspectives on leadership As Bennis (2007) remarked, it is a cliché now to argue that there is no single or universal definition of leadership. However, this does not stop the efforts at pinpointing and underlining the qualities of good leadership and the role of leadership in societal transformation. However, Bennis equally asserts that leadership is not purely an academic discourse. It cannot be summarily characterized or represented by the usual articulate, neat and flowing semantics of typical academic discussion. Implied in this idea is that leadership involves both articulation and performance of expected and assigned roles. In fact, some people may see leadership as mainly performative; in this case, what defines leadership is not the academic categories we build or the neat heuristic devices we employ in understanding what people in positions of leadership or authority do but rather what actually is involved in the process of leadership. Nevertheless, in order to give an overview of the extant theories of leadership, I adopt the orientation that these various theories and perspectives can be classified into three main theoretical themes, namely, leadershipfocused theories; situational theories; and social dynamic perspectives (see Callahan, Whitener, & Sandlin, 2007; Callahan & Rosser, 2007). As the names imply, each of them focuses on some delimited aspects of the leadership complex. The leadership-focused theories usually try to describe or characterize leadership through the expected characteristics and behaviours of leaders. This was actually the earliest conception of leadership and is captured in such theoretical viewpoints as the trait theory of leadership (which tries to understand why some people emerge as leaders while others do not and suggests that such people are endowed with special traits which enable them to do so); leadership style perspectives (another behavioural orientation to leadership which contends that leadership can be categorized into two types of behaviour, namely, task and relationship i.e. leaders are either task-oriented or relationship-oriented. It however suggests that effective leaders are those that combine the two); leadership skills approach; and leadership power approach (which argues that though power is conceptually distinct

Democracy, leadership and development  125 from leadership, it is the base of leadership and exists in five essential forms, namely, reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert). The theories in the situational perspectives include contingency, path-goal and situational leadership theories and they generally approach leadership from the point of view that the situation itself informs leadership behaviour (see Fiedler, 1964). Finally, the social dynamic perspectives argue that social dynamics of interactions or interchange between leaders and ­followers are important in defining leadership and its effectiveness. Emblematic of this perspective are such theoretical viewpoints as transformational leadership, leader–member exchange and team leadership. The transformational leadership approach has become, perhaps, the most popular in recent studies of leadership and is anchored on the extent to which the leader influences and transforms both followers and situations. It equally centres on the unique traits or characteristics of the leader, the situational contexts and critically the relationship between the leader and the followers in these contexts. Transformational leaders are like specially endowed individuals who possess the ability to bring out the best in followers and who are almost intrinsically motivated to make the best out of situations which confront them. In this sense, such leaders are change-oriented and often overtly focused on tasks and results. In spite of the insights provided by the foregoing discourse on leadership, I believe that a more realistic take on the discourse of leadership in Nigeria is captured in the four primary defining themes of leadership put forward by Hackman (2006). Thus, leadership is about what you are (leadership traits and attributes); how you act (influence or power over people and situations); what you do (roles that define the leader); and how you work (collaborations and partnerships between the leader and followers). While these themes are critical in examining the leadership issue in Nigeria, recent experiences in governance in the country suggest that the last theme is perhaps largely absent. Therefore, a big obstacle to good leadership in Nigeria is the disconnect between leaders and followers both in the definition of development problems and in setting agendas for development.

Etymologizing and categorizing leaders In addition to the theoretical apprehension of leadership shown above, there is often the tendency to overcome the strictures of theory by focusing on types and categories of leaders. Such classification is mainly anchored on the attitudes, behaviour and functions/roles of leaders. There is often the difference between the so-called adaptive leader and the innovative leader. In typical logic, the adaptive leader, as the term suggests, simply responds or reacts to issues whether local or global and hopefully adapts largely to existing institutional patterns and procedures. On the other hand, the innovative leader is a maker or creator of things; the innovative leader

126  Democracy, leadership and development aims to invoke radical and new changes in response to existing problems as well as engage in radical revision of patterns and procedures. In addition, other characterizations of leaders are also used in the literature. Leaders can be captured in binary oppositions that emphasize their strongest and weakest features. Thus, we have such oppositional style characterizations as effective versus ineffective; bad versus good leaders; formal versus informal; strong versus weak leaders (Kellerman, 2004; Greenstein, 2006; Tucker, 1995, 1987; Deutsch, 1978). The categorization of leaders around some major indicators of behaviour or attitude to administration – such as charismatic, innovative, transformative, bureaucratic etc. – was popular in the recent past in the literature and academic studies of leadership as human endeavour and a critical social role. However, the categorization of leaders around these attributes, while having undoubted analytical value, flies in the face of empirical realities emerging from the study of leaders and leadership over time. It would appear that the effective or “good” leader is mainly transformative and dynamic in terms of approach over time. In this case, the leader may be likened to a stream, which is broad in some places, narrow in others; deep in some places and shallow in others. So, such leaders can be characterized as innovative in some cases; adaptive in some other cases; as well as even transformative and charismatic in other cases or at other times. The above simply points to the fact that the most enduring feature of the effective leader, apart from behaviour traits and personal dignity, might be dynamism, that is, the ability to change and respond appropriately to both the times and the situations involved. This might relate to the idea of Sheffer (1993) that dominant leaders are those who are innovative, introduce new ideas or novel orientations, and promote major changes for better or worse that alter the social environment. Probably, in line with the above, the leader needs to aspire to be effective in all circumstances. The effective leader is by definition the leader that has the vision to choose the means that bring about the desired goal or outcome. Such a leader, by implication, possesses the knowledge, wisdom, or creativity needed in setting goals and means towards achieving the goals. It may in some cases be a simple matter of innovative adaptation, that is, devising new means to overcome old problems or achieve elusive goals of the past. Such leadership is often anchored on correct ethical orientation, in which case the means chosen are in congruence with such concerns as protecting human rights; freedom; equality or equity; environmental sustainability; long-term development vision; responsive approach to ­governance etc.

Nature and dynamics of leadership in Nigeria There is no doubt that leadership values are both the outcome and reflection of culture. In this sense, development challenges or leadership as a

Democracy, leadership and development  127 factor in development cannot be divorced from the cultures of Nigeria, whether defined in a limited way as that of a specific ethnic or social group or as the predominant values that define “Nigerianness”. The main issue becomes to assess if these values or culturally inspired ethos of leadership can be seen as inconsistent with progress. This is in spite of whether progress is defined parochially as more or less Westernization or even more broadly as the process of improving the quality of life of Nigerians and generating social progress within a systematic and predictable framework (embodying policies, actions and prudent utilization of resources). There is no gainsaying the fact that what is in vogue in the social and human sciences is the tendency to replicate or copy Euro-Americanism as a development paradigm. However, there is a need to critically re-examine our culture(s) and the nature of leadership in view of the axiom that a people often end up with the leaders it deserves. Thus, it might be even more fruitful to assess the extent to which extant political leadership in Nigeria is consistent with the ideal cultural values of the nation. Obviously, there is no disputing the fact that in spite of the heterogeneity of indigenous cultures in Nigeria, there are enough cultural references for good and effective leadership. A strong notion in the discourse of leadership in Nigeria is that the country since independence approximates to one in which a group of people forcefully impose a leader on the generality of the people (see Afegbua and Adejuwon, 2012). In other words, the leadership selection process in Nigeria is severely circumscribed and does not offer the people the chance to make an unfettered choice over who leads them. Strangely, this fact remains incontrovertible in spite of democracy. In this sense, candidates for general elections in the political parties are produced through a selection process rather than a democratic process. Thus, those who emerge are usually cronies or favourites of the top leadership echelons of the parties rather than the popular choice of the card-carrying members of these parties. Therefore, the critical issue might be the effectiveness of the political culture and the political process in Nigeria to create space for the emergence of good leaders. Thus, what one sees in Nigeria is a situation where ideal democracy has been polluted and undermined by a political culture that has vitiated the power of democracy to reflect positively on development and a political process that often throws up leaders who can neither articulate nor represent the development aspirations of the ordinary citizens. In such a situation, leaders are no longer agents of development accountable to the people but rather sectional leaders who are driven by narrow motives and have the wrong perspective on the goals of leadership.

Recurrent decimals in leadership incapacity in Nigeria Quite a lot of problems or issues can be raised as the underlying causes of leadership incapacity in Nigeria. While some of these problems derive from the inherent structure of Nigeria as largely a colonial creation, others are

128  Democracy, leadership and development outcomes of a flawed political culture in which primordial allegiance overrides nationalism and where there is overwhelming focus on distributional privileges rather than production strategies. Some of these salient factors in the perpetuation of leadership failure include: Democracy and negative political culture Those who are wont to be sympathetic argue that a critical impediment to democracy and emergence of good leadership in Nigeria is the dearth of an effective and result-oriented political culture. For them, the problem is that multi-ethnicity and heterogeneity are weaknesses in the effort to build a reliable political culture and advance the quest for good leadership, which such a reliable political culture facilitates. Emblematic of this thinking are the sentiments of Kukah that in view of the multifarious or variegated nature of Nigeria’s ethnic landscape the building of a good or reliable political culture is an uphill task. According to him, “what we have are different worlds, different cultures and civilizations, all accidentally holed up together in one polity. How, they say, can we weld all these groups together into one people to have one political culture” (Kukah, 1999: 28). At first glance, one can dismiss this line of reasoning since there are copious examples of states that have been able to build credible democracies and good political cultures in spite of ethnic and even racial divergence or difference. Perhaps the United States of America is one classical illustration of the ability to overcome these problems. However, in spite of the US example and even ironically with reference to it, the issues of ethnicity and primordial differences become great challenges when they limit both the vision and capacity of national leaders and unduly influence the working of the state itself and the process of leadership selection. There is apparently no gainsaying the fact that the US became a success story in this regard because its leaders have over time shown greater allegiance to the state than to their ethnic or other affiliations and more critically have shown an unshakeable belief in the national credentials of the country. Therefore, Kukah’s assertion becomes critical when one realizes that even the so-called founding fathers of the Nigerian nation had little or no faith in the Nigerian nation and made utterances that showed them primarily as members of their ethnic groups rather than leaders of Nigeria (see Awolowo, 1947: 47–48; Balewa, 1947: 208). Even among the colonial masters the porosity of the Nigerian nation and lack of faith in its corporate entity was also palpable. Hence, a former colonial Governor of Nigeria, in 1948, during a presentation to the joint meeting of the Royal Empire Society in London, stated: “it is only the accident of Suzerainty which has made Nigeria one country. It is still far from being one country or one nation socially or even economically” (Arthur Richards’s address to the Joint Meeting of the Royal Empire Society in London in 1948). These sentiments, incidentally expressed years before

Democracy, leadership and development  129 Nigeria’s independence in 1960, played a crucial role in moulding and framing the political class as ethnic and sectional champions rather than true nationalists and leaders. Sycophancy and political corruption Also very crucial in evaluating leadership in Nigeria is the role of sycophancy in the crisis of leadership and leadership values in Nigeria. In view of the popular African proverb that “he who claps for a bad dancer asks for more nauseating footsteps from him”, one may ask: to what extent has sycophancy or unexamined praise-singing played a role in the evolvement of the modern Nigerian leader? In many societies in sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria, unmerited praise-singing has been taken to new heights. As one observes in the case of Nigeria, the political process often throws up a coterie of professional sycophants whose trademark is to sing to high heaven the perceived achievements of the leaders even where there is glaring evidence of the paucity of such leadership in responding to the needs of the people. Actually, the existence of such praise-singers has often deluded Nigerian leaders and made them impatient with those who are either critical or objective in assessing them. There is no doubt that while sycophancy resonates with modern political leadership in Nigeria, it has a net negative effect on the ability of the leadership to generate development or sustain social progress. However, while sycophancy is the preoccupation of those with direct or indirect access to the principal (leader), how does one explain the case of someone who in every aspect (socio-economic and politically) has no such access? This situation fits perfectly into the classical Marxian notion of false consciousness, a meta-narrative that leaves us in no sense any closer to appreciating how the phenomenon plays out in real life. Achille Mbembe has done a good job of capturing this misguided support that invariably feeds the capacity for failure in African leadership. Therefore, the misguided effort to blame the other for Africa’s problems has been a bulwark against moving forward in the continent (Mbembe, 2002). Sycophancy reverberates with political corruption, which is a strong albatross around the neck of the possibility of the emergence of credible electoral and political process in Nigeria. In fact, the development dilemma in Nigeria cannot be totally dissociated from corruption, which has become very pervasive and over-influential in the public processes of the country. The inability of Nigeria to improve the quality of life of its citizens in spite of the tremendous revenues from oil can be directly linked to political corruption and the frittering away of revenues earned by the leadership. The hollowness and corruption of the Nigerian leadership in managing the oil proceeds is probably well captured by Jerome, Adjiboloso and Busari (2005) who, utilizing the OPEC Factsheet, argues that revenues from oil and gas in Nigeria go mostly to 1% of Nigerians to the detriment of the remaining 99%.

130  Democracy, leadership and development The fact is that corruption has been seen by international development agencies and the Bretton Woods Institutions as a fundamental cause of the development problem in most developing nations especially in Africa (see Anugwom, 2003). Achebe (1983) contends that corruption in Nigeria has gone from being alarming to being fatal. For him, to keep the average Nigerian away from corruption is like trying to keep a goat away from eating yam. In addition, nowhere is this corruption more pervasive than in the political system where corruption and sleight of hand dictate outcomes and processes. In line with the above, it has been argued elsewhere that, “democracy, as it currently obtains in Nigeria, is heavily tinted with corruption. This is the direct outcome of the rent-seeking and opportunistic behaviour of the political class. In such a situation development has become even a more receding target” (Anugwom, 2005a: 70). Hence, Nigeria’s political class, like their supporters, may like democracy – but they like power and office and their spoils even more. They prefer constitutional arrangements which enable them to compete for office and allocate positions and their rewards among themselves and their associates. (Othman & William, 1999: 15) In a very insightful presentation, Ogbeidi (2012) demonstrates how widespread corruption has been the hallmark of successive Nigerian governments since independence in 1960. In fact, he shows with strong empirical evidence that corruption, rather than abating, increased with each successive government in Nigeria and contends that it reached a climax with the government of the late Sani Abacha. In his view, General Abacha and his family alongside his associates looted Nigeria’s coffers with reckless abandon. The extent of Abacha’s venality seemed to have surpassed that of those notorious African rulers, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now called the Democratic Republic of Congo). (Ogbeidi, 2012: 9) Therefore, the leadership by the political class in Nigeria has succeeded in entrenching corruption by consistently providing fertile ground and an environment conducive for the phenomenon to thrive at the expense of national socio-economic, cultural and political development. An enduring politics of clientelism A critical shortcoming of the political process in Nigeria, which has so far undermined the emergence of a democracy consistent with development needs, is the politics of clientelism. The American political scientist Richard Joseph saw this tendency as the reason for the inability of the state in Nigeria to sustain an effective and responsive political culture. In characterizing this

Democracy, leadership and development  131 tendency as the reign of prebendal politics in Nigeria, he sees Nigeria as mainly dominated by clientelism in politics. According to him, An individual seeks out patrons as he or she moves upward socially and materially; such individuals also come to accept ties of solidarity from their own clients which they view as fundamental to the latter’s security and continued advancement as well as their own. Clientelism is the very channel through which one joins the dominant class and a practice which is then seen as fundamental to the continued enjoyment of the prerequisites of that class. (Joseph, 1992: 55) In spite of the fact that the above sentiments privilege the notion of class in the Nigerian political system, it may be instructive to understand that while clientelism may approximate class as a social and, more critically, a political group in Nigeria, it is also anchored deeply on primordial relations and thus ethnic, kinship, familial and even religious commonalities become interesting variables in accessing and retaining political power as well as enjoying the privileges therein in Nigeria. Even in the current dispensation, clientelism has endured in the political process and is often times captured in the popular notion of “godfatherism” and the often-misused concept of grassroots politics, which I see largely as a euphemism for ethnic and kinship politicking. In other words, there is the strong emergence of patrimonial politics as a dominant feature of contemporary politics in Nigeria. In other words, the government in Nigeria over the years has displayed a patrimonial tendency, basically characterized by client/patron relationship and the pursuit of private accumulation through state offices. In this sense, political offices are seen by the occupants and their close associates as avenues toward capital accumulation. (Anugwom, 2005b: 16) Patrimonialism, apart from the mockery it makes of the political and democratic processes, hinders genuine development and limits the effectiveness of leadership and the concomitant ability to generate and sustain development in any state. Perception of the state as object of pillage Another problem with political leadership in Nigeria can be seen in its perception of the state as an instrument of pillage and power as the exercise of the authority to accumulate. In the views of Castells (1998), many of the economies of societies in Africa have been severely undermined by the misappropriation of capital, which is a feature of the predatory state, which

132  Democracy, leadership and development represents a state patrimonialized by political elites for their own personal profit. In fact, this orientation is often seen as a generalized trait of African leadership. Thus, Nigerian leaders have, through the years, shown a remarkable tendency to perceive state power as some form of legal entitlement to unfettered economic prosperity. Hence, in seeking power, they are more motivated by the extent to which the power sought will give them the opportunity to enrich themselves and their cronies (including kinsmen at times) than by a genuine desire to provide service and better the lot of their countrymen. As Ogbeidi (2012) argues, the emphasis for political leadership in Nigeria has been on personal aggrandizement and self-glorification, which has made corruption a euphemism for explaining political leadership in Nigeria in relation to the management of national wealth. The late Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake provided a very insightful take on this tendency when he stated, the control of the state therefore offers the opportunity of a life time to rise above general poverty, a rare opportunity to acquire wealth and prestige, to be in a position to redistribute jobs, contracts, scholarships and gifts to relatives and political allies. Hence, the high propensity among political elites to invest in the goal of controlling the state. (Ake, 1976: 67) True to this statement, which Ake made a considerable time ago, today’s leaders in Nigeria still generally perceive the acquisition of power as an investment and, in line with the logic of investment, it is expected that it pays handsomely too. In other words, political leadership is hardly motivated or sustained by the desire to serve or the burning aspiration to improve the quality of life of citizens but largely by the desire to enrich oneself and one’s associates. However, the bane of leadership in Nigeria can be linked to the experience and emergence of the political elites within the colonial dispensation. The basic argument is that the political elites emerged within the colonial context as a largely fragmented class that were often more engrossed in fighting each other than in being united against an identified common enemy, that is, the colonial state. This fragmentation is seen largely as a product of both the exclusiveness of that class, that is, they saw themselves as privileged vis-à-vis other members of the society and, more critically, defined their ethnic basis as the most important fulcrum of support. Thus, the separatist identity and ideology based upon ethno-regional solidarity dominated the politics of decolonization, particularly in its hey days. This was eloquently reflected in the character and ideology of pan-ethnic and regional nationalist organizations, which mushroomed in the last two decades of colonialism. (Onyishi, 2003: 95)

Democracy, leadership and development  133 The ethnic inclination of the political class at this point may be related to the existing tendency of the colonial administration to use ethnic differences as the building block of a divide-and-rule strategy, which it saw as helpful in eliminating the possibility of a united front against colonialism. Perhaps, Ake again succinctly captures the dilemma of the emergent political class just before Nigeria’s independence. According to him, it was the case of a group which, while interested in getting rid of the colonial masters, was also trying to make sure that the other groups or elements of the political elites did not reap rewards from the exit of the colonial rulers. In his words, while agitating to overthrow the colonial regime, the constituent elements of the coalition were also trying to block one another from appropriating it. Increasingly, their attention turned from the colonial regime to one another, and eventually the competition among groups came to dominate life, while the colonial power, resigned to the demise of colonialism, became a referee rather than the opponent. (Ake, 1996: 4–5)

Leadership as antidote to development in Nigeria Though commonly used, the idea and concept of leadership is prone to some predictable ambiguity, especially in reference to political or state leadership. In this case, while the political system is usually unequivocal about who the leader is (constitutional provisions clearly spell this out at different levels and equate each level with responsibilities or roles in the process of governance), the confusion emerges in trying to evaluate the performance of the political leader in real terms or in ways that can be easily comprehensible to all. This type of second-level analytical challenge or ambiguity is not found in relation to leadership in the sphere of business. Therefore, the leaders of businesses or corporations can be easily and objectively evaluated on performance, based essentially on profits and tangible goals achieved, which are usually directly measured or reliably inferred through proxies. Even without an economics- or business-oriented education the average citizen can follow or understand the progress or otherwise of a given corporation.2 In other words, even where the performance of a corporate leader cannot be directly measured or inferred from the profit margin, such other quantifiable or measurable phenomena such as asset base, employment growth, tax returns, customer base etc. still emerge as proxy variables or reliable indicators of performance (see Anugwom, 2010). This fact may explain why business analysts in the twenty-first century are not necessarily bothered by the classical backache of determining leadership styles in organizations. Thus, in view of the rampant speed of change, technological leaps and ever shifting dynamism in today’s business environment what

134  Democracy, leadership and development matters essentially is performance or profit margin and not really how jovial or friendly the boss is to the rank and file. The above clear-cut ­performance evaluation is hardly consistent with the political sphere. However, corporate leadership and political leadership share a common attribute in the sense that leaders must appear convincing and instrumentally elicit the respect and trust of followers. This is clearly distinct from the case in many African nations where political leadership is built around subjective factors, which are related neither to the performance of the leaders nor the objective assessment of the state on critical development indicators. Perhaps nowhere is this sheepish leadership adoration given more vent than in contemporary Nigeria where the decadence of leadership often creates more opportunities to be appropriated by predator-like ­followers who promote an aura of infallibility upon which the leadership regularly feeds (Anugwom, 2010). Political leadership, unlike organizational or even religious leadership (where number of miracles performed and growth in membership or branches opened may be critical indicators of leadership success), is not really or easily amenable to evaluation on measurable and objective indicators (even GDP growth may not have any relationship to the quality of political leadership. China has consistently posted a formidable GDP while not being a good example of democracy and in spite of having one of the worst human rights records in modern history). In spite of this, one can still talk about the level of GDP growth, especially as a crude indicator of leadership performance, economic growth, domestic manufacturing capacity, industrial capacity utilization, inflationary trend etc., all of which have been reduced by modern economic sophistry to cut and dried quantifiable attributes. As interesting as these indicators appear, they are in fact relative measures and represent minor components of a much larger picture. In fact, as Nigeria shows, growth in these indicators may not always impact directly on the quality of life of all citizens. Though Angola was once seen as the fastest growing economy in Africa, largely due to a major oil boom, it is still located in the bottom globally in terms of socio-economic conditions of citizens (see Ben-Ari, 2014; GarciaRodriguez, Garcia-Rodriguez, Castilla-Gutierrez, & Major, 2005). Actually, one verdict on the Angola case is worth mentioning here. In spite of real GDP growth of +19 per cent in 2007 and +11.5 per cent3in 2008 and a global acknowledgement as a world growth champion between 2006 and 2008 (Santiso, 2008), socio-economic conditions and general poverty in Angola remained one of the severest in Africa in the period. Without question, the problem of leadership in Angola, just as in Nigeria, has ensured that the economic growth represented in the GDP did not trickle down to the population.4 Hence, GDP growth or capacity utilization improvement does not automatically impact positively on citizens and more crucially does not always produce the same or similar perception of leadership performance among

Democracy, leadership and development  135 citizens (Anugwom, 2010). Ironically, the above observation (the paucity of GDP as indicator of leadership performance) may work to the benefit of the typical Nigerian leader who can always rely on sentiments and crude primordial affiliations in building support and popular networks. Nevertheless, the stark reality is that economic performance, as good as it is, does not always produce positive developments in the other spheres of society. As already hinted, economic growth, as in the case of China, may sometimes be at the expense of human rights or, as in the case of the new Russia, at the expense of individual freedom; or even, in the anachronistic case of Saudi Arabia, imply the death of democracy.

Towards a rethink: genuine democracy, leadership and development There is no gainsaying the fact that development in Nigeria can only be achieved with a rethink of both the nature and focus of leadership as well as the process of producing leaders. In other words, democracy needs to move from providing opportunity for selection for a few powerful elites to enabling a free and fair process of election by all citizens. The essence of democracy is captured in the sentiments that a democracy, then, is a political system in which people exercise power to the extent that they are able to change their governors, but not to the extent of governing themselves. The only way the sovereign people can maintain the degree of power they need and are capable of wielding, is not to give their governors unlimited power. (Sartori, 1987: 66) However, as noble and endearing as the above statement sounds, it only pans out well where the people are given the unfettered power to exercise this right and are periodically empowered to choose their leaders in free and fair processes. This is still far from being the case in Nigeria where elections are often rituals of confirming the wishes of those in power or authority and thus inhibit both free process and the rights of the people themselves to choose who and how they should be ruled. In assessing democracy and development in Nigeria, it may be important to understand that the key features of liberal democracy are what makes it possible to generate or create conducive space for development. However, such critical features of liberal democracy are instrumental to the extent that leaders see them as desirable and protect or promote them in the process of governance. Some of these features are: promotion of civil liberties (especially the rights of the individual members of the society i.e. freedom of speech, assembly, press and beliefs); sanctity of rule of law as critical to protecting individual rights, curbing the excesses of the governors and providing means of redress for members of society; periodic elections that are credible

136  Democracy, leadership and development vehicles for affirming and reaffirming the rights of the people to choose who governs them; emergence of political opposition and healthy electoral process that abhors one-party systems and dictatorship of all forms; existence of pressure groups (including trade unions) that often bring pressure to bear on government as well as influence government; responsible and assertive civil society; affirmation of the tripod of equality, liberty and probity in actions and procedures; and the promotion of capitalism as an ideal economic organizing principle (it still remains largely arguable if real liberal democracy can be fostered in any other economic system). Without much doubt, the present system of democracy in Nigeria is still far from possessing the above features and the non-existence of these features in the Nigerian case makes the phrase “nominal democracy” applicable to Nigeria. In this sense, Nigeria is still a democracy in the making. However, the mere label of nominal democracy obscures the fact that the inability of the polity to measure up to the ideal features of liberal democracy is a product of the fact that the leaders have conveniently seen the status quo as consistent with their personal and egoistic disposition to national leadership. In other words, issues like the obvious lack of credible opposition,5 the ­limitations of the rule of law and, more crucially, an electoral process that is far from being an affirmation of the wish of the electorate, all work towards entrenching the power base of self-interested political elites who can neither articulate genuine development initiatives nor provide effective leadership. There are also observations in some quarters that democracy can hardly be promoted in Nigeria given the current nature of the Nigerian state. In other words, there is a close relationship between the failure of democracy and the incapacity of the state in Nigeria. In fact, the renowned Catholic clergyman Matthew Kukah contends, one of the greatest problems underlining state failures in Africa is the nature and perception of the state itself. What is it, how do people experience it, how do they relate to it, how do they gain access to it and how do they feel excluded from it. (Kukah, 1999: 15–16) The fact remains that the state in most of Africa means quite a lot of things to the people but none of these meanings approximate the ideal and essential nature of the state elsewhere in the world. Hence, for the political elites, the state represents an object for pillage, the control of which offers limitless opportunities for self-aggrandizement and prosperity; and for a lot of the ordinary people the state is framed as a charitable institution and the provider of jobs, infrastructure and other goodies that people define as necessary to life. In other words, the perceptions of the state among both the political elites and even the ordinary people are largely from the point of view of what can be gained from the state as well as how to use the institutions of the state to achieve parochial personal and group interests.

Democracy, leadership and development  137

The 2019 experience and the need for reform of the electoral process As can be imagined, the announcement of visa bans for politicians and officials who were seen as perpetrating massive violence and electoral offences during the 2019 general elections by the US Department of State in July 2019 was heralded by some observers as a testimony to the irregularities that characterized the general elections in 2019. Beyond the gleeful reception of the news by the main opposition presidential candidate and his party, the point remains that the two main political parties at different levels and in different locations caused the problems in the elections. In fact, if there were real losers, apart from the long-suffering citizens, who should feel sour, they are the smaller political parties that had neither the structure nor resources with which to foment trouble during the process. Anyone who witnessed the elections and the massive charade and dramas before and immediately afterwards would bear testimony to the above. The electoral umpire, INEC, in spite of organizational hiccups and logistic problems here and there, did a fair job within the institutional framework in which it found itself. Without doubt, there is much room for improvement in the system and there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of electoral and election management in Nigeria. Therefore, there is a need for a major revision of the electoral laws or reformation of the electoral process. The reform should as a matter of necessity include the goal to ensure and sustain true independence of the electoral body. There may be a need for the establishment of an independent electoral services commission (much like the one in the judicial arm) which would be responsible for appointing key officers of the electoral body at national and state levels. In such a situation, the duty of the President or Governors becomes to ratify appointments made by this body. While a lot of attention has been focused on the INEC and national elections because of their dominant significance, the elections organized at state level are nothing but a pure travesty of democracy and shambolic representations of democracy. The so-called State Independent Electoral Commissions, in almost all the states of the federation, are nothing but parodies of electoral umpireship. Another reform that would have a salubrious effect on the system is to limit the number of political parties or improve (tighten, if you like) the conditions for registering new parties. In this case, Nigeria needs to refrain from counting the numbers, that is, a crass assumption that a bogus number of political parties endows the system with any semblance of legitimacy, freedom of association and openness. This is really the privileging of quantity over quality. What matters is not merely the number of political parties but the number of genuine and well-grounded political parties in existence. One would agree that over two-thirds of the 90-plus number of parties that contested the 2019 presidential election have no right to be on the ballot paper at all. There is therefore a need to take a second look at the

138  Democracy, leadership and development criteria for registration of political parties and arrive at benchmarks and standards that ensure that registered political parties are, to all intents and purposes, serious contenders. Such parties should have resilient structures (not ones that disappear immediately after election or cannot survive an electoral trouncing), visibility and resources (material and human) to compete in the harrowing Nigerian electoral process. In effect, these reforms would strengthen Nigeria’s democracy if pursued with commitment. There is therefore the need to go beyond gleeful posturing and assumed self-vindication to focus on how to right the anomalies and foster an electoral process anchored on rule of law, electoral freedom, transparency and legitimately valid outcomes – valid outcomes that capture and express the will and choice of the electorates exercised without coercion and constraints. Such outcomes may not necessarily be measured either by the acceptance of the losers or the magnanimity of the winners but by its legitimacy from the perspective of the people themselves.

Conclusion Even though we generally abhor and condemn what we perceive as bad leadership, there is a lesson to be learnt in it for good leadership. Defining the characteristic features or traits of the bad or ineffective leader may help in establishing pointers to good leadership. Therefore, Kellerman’s (2004) distinction between the incompetent and the corrupt leader serves a useful function in both the analytical and practical understanding of leadership. Nevertheless, even the problem of bad or corrupt leaders gets complicated when thrown into the normal dynamics of the interface between bad leaders and followers. In other words, the bad leader may tell tales about the followership and the followership may be indicative of the type of leader in charge. The above nexus is what Lipman-Blumen sought to capture in the revealing work titled, The Allure of Toxic Leaders (2006). The effort here is to underline the fact that bad leaders do not just naturally emerge or chose themselves; they are invariably chosen one way or the other by the followers. Even though her reasons for why people chose bad leaders may not suffice, the point remains that leaders, bad or good, tell a story about the followership and largely about the societal or organizational context in which such leaders have emerged. It is really only axiomatic that the leader of today was once the follower or supporter of yesterday. This may really bring home the uncomfortable truth that you cannot realistically divorce the bad leader from the followers. The discourse on leadership in Nigeria often proceeds with a convenient glancing over of the fact that leadership forms a tandem with its followership. In very simple sense, there is the idea of followership each time leadership is invoked. Thus, political leadership or governance reverberates with ­followership. Political leadership implicates followership as well as group tasks or goals to be achieved in any institutional or cultural context

Democracy, leadership and development  139 (see  Nye, 2008 Tucker, 1995). The reality of the conflation between leadership and followership may be the logic behind the popular axiom that a people get the leaders they deserve. There is apparently no gainsaying the fact that followers often colour the leadership and vice versa. But more importantly, leaders influence the attitudes, beliefs, needs and demands of the followers in the same way that followers affect the leaders’ governance style and effectiveness as both groups transform or change the social environment (see, Tucker, 1995, 1987; Wildavsky, 2006; Kellerman, 2004; Rosseau, 1987; Mant, 1999; Blondel, 1987). The contention that, “leadership, seen as a process, is caused by the following” (Mant, 1999: 6) seems not only apt but also summative of the influence of leaders on followers and the other way around. The above sentiments are largely emblematic of the Nigerian scenario where both leaders and followers (including citizens) need “re-conscientizing” and re-socialization to the ideal goals of the commonwealth. In effect, leaders transform events or course of events. They are those able to modify the course of events (see Blondel, 1987; Wildavsky, 2006). Political leaders, which is our concern here, are special cadres of social leaders, that is, leadership is a particular rubric of the social system (see Grint, 2000, 2005). Leadership in this sense coheres with dealing with a unique set of power relations as well as influences that are brought to bear over a wide range of national and international issues (including emerging issues such as climate change and denuclearization) tailored by both high ideological and ethical standards. In effect, political leadership, even though with considerable authority invested in the leader, is all-embracing and subject-extensive. Perhaps, the peculiar nature of political leadership is ­ well-elaborated in the contention, while many of us have power over a group, perhaps for relatively long period, and may be leaders as a result, political leaders exercise this power over an area comprising foreign affairs, defense, the economic and social wellbeing of citizens, even culture and the arts. (Blondel, 1987: 15) Generally, the problem of development in Nigeria, apart from the pillage of colonial rule, has its roots in the inability of the leaders to plan and the lack of commitment to the pursuance of economic and development plans to their logical conclusion. Even the critical efforts at industrialization that were made in the 1970s and 1980s were eventually thwarted by an overwhelming feeling of nationalism and a peculiar African tendency towards big government which stagnated private-sector growth and cast the government as provider of economic largesse through employment generation. Further worsening these tendencies and often reinforcing of them was the failure of the first- and second-republic leaders to provide leadership devoid of primordial consideration and partisanship. Therefore, the emergence of a zero–sum game in the name of national politics distorted focus and generated

140  Democracy, leadership and development a backward mentality that saw allegiance to the kinship group and the ethnic group as crucial to political and economic survival. In view of the foregoing, there is no contesting the fact that leadership failure is consistent with development failure and development dilemmas. Therefore, the discourse of leadership, and especially its distinction from “rulership”, which involves the emergence of over-ambitious individuals typically possessed by overwhelming egos that create the mentality and disposition that the individual is the state and that the state cannot endure or survive without the individual, is imperative in understanding the factors underlying perennial underdevelopment in Nigeria. “Rulership” is imbued with a short-term perspective that sees only primordial links as those that can be trusted and maintained. Therefore, there is a need to move forward from rulership to leadership in Nigeria in the bid to generate development and provide opportunities for growth and progress. The notion of leadership is morally superior to rulership and embodies the ability to promote the general good of society without pandering to sectional and primordial factors. Whereas good leadership is consistent with the pursuit of the desirable goals of all sections of the society, poor leadership invokes ethnicity and delimited identity considerations in making decisions and administering the state. Nigeria has unfortunately, through a political process built on a ritualistic selection of leaders among the political elites, been saddled with rulership rather than genuine leadership. The process of democracy or the democratic culture in Nigeria needs to be thoroughly radicalized in order to take elections away from the periodic rituals of selection to opportunities for people to choose leaders who fit the bill and those they perceive as capable of generating and sustaining development in the country.

Notes 1 For instance, one of the most poignant illustrations of the modern African leader was portrayed by the French scholar, Jean Bayart, who in The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, (1993) depicted the physique of the average African leader as one with “stomach protruding from excess eating”. In effect, African leaders are corrupt megalomaniac figures whose physical shapes are distorted by unbridled consumption fuelled by reckless dipping of hands into the public till. 2 This actually explains why all Americans can comprehend the colossal failure of Lehman Brothers but a great majority could not understand the second tenure of George Bush (Jnr) in the White House. In the same analogy, while Nigerians can easily comprehend the failure of a state electricity monopoly like the PHCN, a lot of them cannot fathom the dismal failure political leadership has been for decades in the country. 3 These should be considered modest estimates of growth since the figures from inside Angola are far higher. 4 The IMF estimates that the GDP of Angola increased by over 16% in 2008 but leadership corruption and mismanagement has meant that Angola is ranked 157 out of 179 countries in the 2008 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2007).

Democracy, leadership and development  141 5 Currently, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has faltered and moved from being a ruling party to becoming the opposition. However, some observers have faulted the PDP on the grounds that its opposition credential is not built on a clear ideological difference from the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) and the fact that some of the so-called heavyweights in the PDP are erstwhile APC chieftains and vice versa.

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142  Democracy, leadership and development Garcia-Rodriguez, J.L., Garcia-Rodriguez, F.J., Castilla-Gutierrez, C., & Major, S.A. (2015). “Oil, Power and Poverty in Angola”. African Studies Review, 58 (1): 159–176. Grint, Keith (2000). The arts of leadership. New York: Oxford University Press. Grint, Keith (2005). Leadership: Limits and possibilities. New York: Macmillan. Hackman, M (2006). “The challenge of defining leadership: The good, the bad and the ugly”. Paper presented at the International Leadership Association Conference (November), Chicago, IL. Jerome, A., Adjiboloso, S., & Busari, D. (2005). “Addressing oil related corruption in Africa: Is the push for transparency enough?” Review of Human Factor Studies, 11 (1): 7–32. Joseph, Richard (1992). Prebendal politics in Nigeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kellerman, B. (2004). Bad leadership: What it is, how it happens, why it matters. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Kukah, M. H. (1999). Democracy and civil society in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lipman-Blumen, J. (2006). The allure of toxic leaders: Why we follow destructive bosses and corrupt politicians – and how we can survive them. New York: Oxford University Press. Mant, Alistair (1999). Intelligent leadership. London: Allen & Unwin. Masciulli, Joseph., Molchanov, M.A., & Andy Knight, W.A. (2009). “Political leadership in context”, in Molchanov, M. (ed.) The Ashgate research companion to political leadership. London: Routledge (pp. 3–27). Mbembe, A. (2002). “African modes of self-writing”. Public Culture, 14 (1): 239–273. Nye, Joseph (2008). The powers to lead. New York: Oxford University Press. Ogbeidi, M.M. (2012). “Political leadership and corruption in Nigeria since 1960: A socio-economic analysis”. Journal of Nigeria Studies, 1 (2): 1–25. Onyishi, Anthony (2003). “Environment and democracy in Nigeria”, in AkpanUmana, O. (ed.) The art and science of politics: Essays in honour of Alhaji Ghali Umar Na’Abba. Port Harcourt: Footsteps Pub, (pp. 88–104). Othman, Shehu., & William, G. (1999). “Politics, power and democracy in Nigeria”, in Hyslop, J. (ed.) African democracy in the era of globalization. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. Rosseau, Jean-Jacques with Cress, D. (1987). Basic political writings. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. Santiso, J (2008). “Sovereign development funds: Key financial actors in the shifting wealth of nations”, in Rietveld, M. (ed.) New perspectives on sovereign asset management. London: Central Banking Pub. (pp. 173–193). Sartori, G. (1987). Democratic theory revisited. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Sheffer, G. (ed.) (1993). Innovative leaders in international politics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Tucker, Robert (1987). Political culture and leadership in the USSR: From Lenin to ­Gorbachev. New York: Norton. Tucker, Robert (1995). Politics as leadership. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002). Human development report 2007/2008. New York: UNDP. Wildavsky, Aaron (2006). Cultural analysis (edited with Introduction by Brendon Swedlow). London: Transaction.

9 The Niger Delta, oil conflict and the minorities question

Introduction This chapter examines the nature of majority versus minority ethnic group relations in Nigeria. It uses the Niger Delta region that has been in the main frame of such discourse in the nation in the last four decades as a case in point. Even though often spoken of and referred to as the “Niger Delta” because of its geographical location, the region is in fact home to many ethnic minority groups in Nigeria. Some of these groups include: Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Ibibio, Annang, Efik, Urhobo, Ikwerre, Ukwuani, Isoko, Kalabari, Okrika, Obolo, Oron etc. There are over 30 distinct ethnic groups in the region and the population currently exceeds 30 million. Therefore, its usage as the representation of the relations between ethnic majority groups and ethnic minorities in Nigeria is apt. The importance of the region derives mainly from the fact that it is the source of the oil upon which the Nigerian economy depends. Oil is, and has been, the sustenance of Nigeria’s typical mono-economy for over four decades. Apart from the grouse of the Niger Delta over the environmental impact of oil exploitation in the region and the irresponsibility of transnational oil corporations (TNOCs) in the region, there is the larger dissatisfaction over the distribution of the nation’s resources, especially the oil income. The latter has created what can be seen as a conflict-prone resource distribution process. Therefore, the resource distribution process in postcolonial Nigeria has been largely incendiary in nature with reference to the oil-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria. The outcome was a youth-driven conflict which raged in the region for decades.1 Nevertheless, the past oil conflict in the region was generated by dissatisfaction with the resource distribution system in Nigeria. The Niger Delta’s dissatisfaction with its treatment over the oil that is in its region can be seen as emblematic of the relations between minority and majority ethnic groups in Nigeria since a critical plank of the situation is the control of power at the centre mainly by people from the majority ethnic groups. While there appears relative peace now, the prospect of future conflict arising from discontent with resource distribution in Nigeria’s federal state seems very likely. In other words, even though there is relative peace in

144  Oil conflict and the minorities question the Niger Delta now as a result of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDR), the root drivers of the youth conflict which raged for over a decade in the region are yet to be satisfactorily addressed. The evaluation of the Amnesty Programme has seen it as fundamentally and structurally flawed (see Ikelegbe, 2006; Davidheiser & Naiyaana, 2010; Joab-Peterside, 2010). However, other scholars, while cognizant of the possible recurrence of violence in the region, argue that the programme, all the same, has achieved noticeable peace and cessation of kidnapping and attacks on oil facilities in the region (Ibaba, 2011). The above means that the conflict, rather than being totally resolved, has assumed a latent nature with the undoubted potential of derailing Nigeria’s federal state at any time. The contention in the region, which has been framed largely in terms of control and access to the vast oil resources in that largely littoral region, became manifested prior to the year 2000 mainly in terms of armed conflict between youth militants and the forces of the federal government of Nigeria.2 In spite of the Amnesty Programme, which has achieved some measure of success, the conflict and the distributive issues that generated the conflict are still in existence. The dissatisfaction with the resource distribution process is by no means limited to the Niger Delta since other ethnic groups in other geopolitical zones are also harbouring grievances over perceived inequity of the process. Interestingly, even some of the major ethnic groups feel equally short-changed in some critical areas of the resource distribution process.3 Equally interesting is that the Niger Delta conflict assumes prominence on two major grounds, namely, the importance of oil to Nigeria’s mono-­ economy, and the nature of oil conflict as typifying the interface between ­hegemonic and extractive interests and local interests. According to Cyril Obi, “the crisis in the Niger Delta is perhaps much worse considering the level of violence and militarization, and the intersection of local and global hegemonic and extractive interests involved in the struggle for the control of the oil-rich region” (Obi, 2006: 2). Despite producing a former president of Nigeria, the citizens of the Niger Delta region still see the revenue distribution system in Nigeria as contradictory of the principles of federalism, particularly in the sense of the central or federal government appropriating the lion’s share. There is the perception that primordial considerations (especially ethnic and religious factors) are utilized in the horizontal allocation of revenue and resources to the subunits of the federation. Also, allocation is seen as manipulated to satisfy the greed and corrupt tendencies of political elites. In this sense, there exist two fundamental dimensions of revenue allocation or sharing in Nigeria. The first dimension is based on institutions and tiers of government which the federal government is at the helm of affairs. While the second dimension is the issue of individuals and groups appropriating national revenue for themselves by corrupt and unjust means. (Ebienfa, 2011: 1)

Oil conflict and the minorities question  145 As the foregoing indicates, there is a fundamental divergence between ­ igeria’s federalism and the centralization of revenue (see Olowonomi, 1998). N Nigeria’s federalism is in reality enmeshed in an unworkable and conflictprone resource distribution system. Therefore, this chapter, relying largely on an analysis of documentary data, examines the tripod nexus between ethnic minorities (Niger Delta) and the ethnic majority groups and oil conflict. This is perceived largely through the resource distribution lens and social conflict webbed around it in the contemporary history of Nigeria as well as the appreciation that such a conflict-prone relationship negates development.

Resource control and distribution as critical to the agitation of minorities Ideally, a good resource distribution system in a federal state, apart from bearing testimony to the distributive principle implicated in the idea of federalism, must aspire to meet the objectives of national unity, economic growth, equitable and balanced development as well as economic autonomy and self-sufficiency of substate units. The dissatisfaction of the ethnic minorities with the resource distribution process in Nigeria, including access to power, has brewed an agitation for what is called resource control in the region. Resource control or struggle underlines the desire of the groups there to have effective control of the rich oil resources in their environment as well as determine development priorities and needs themselves. Thus, resource control or the agitation of the different ethnonational groups from the Niger Delta region for the evolvement of a more equitable and fair resource distribution mechanism in Nigeria has been a perennial and emotionally charged issue in Nigeria’s national life in the past three decades. Ojo (2010: 15) contends, “it [resource control] is an issue which has been politicized by successive administrations in Nigeria both Military and civilian regimes”. The question of how the resources in a federal state like Nigeria are divided among the various subunits is one with the potency of undermining both the unity and the survival of the Nigerian state. In the absence of such unity, and with the recurrent threat to its nationhood, Nigeria can neither initiate nor successfully consummate, meaningfully, development targets. The process of resource allocation in a federal system is anchored on three principles or levels of distribution, namely: vertical revenue allocation (between the centre and the constituent units in the federation) including how federally generated or collected revenue are shared; a horizontal revenue distribution system which deals with how the proportion of the revenues going to the substate units should be shared among these units; and the principle of simulation or conditional grant, made to address given problems or undertake specific projects. Therefore, as the above indicate, the distribution system in a federal state has the inbuilt capacity to address the problems of even development,

146  Oil conflict and the minorities question social development and distributive injustice. Resource allocation when well managed can be a tool of balanced development and cohesion in any federal state. As Ojo (2010: 17) argues “revenue allocations can foster national integration. However, when misused, it engenders political altercations and contestations which destabilize the political economy and tend to undermine the efficacy of federalism in fostering political accommodation and economic development”. According to Suberu (1995, 1996), the contentions and debates around revenue distribution or sharing in Nigeria have revolved around three main issues, namely: the relative proportion of federally collected revenues in the federation account that should be allocated to the centre (federal government), the state (subnational units), the localities and the increasingly popular special funds; a horizontal revenue sharing system, that is, acceptable and appropriate formula for the distribution of centrally devolved revenues among the states and local government areas; a percentage of ­ ­federally collected mineral revenue that should go back to the oil producing states/communities on the basis of the principle of derivation and compensation for ecological or environmental damage. In terms of the agitations of the Niger Delta region the concern has been with the first issue (vertical revenue allocation) and the second (horizontal allocation) which impacts on the third (derivation and ecological risk) (see Anugwom, 2018). Nevertheless, the horizontal allocation is often the one seen as imbued with ethnonational considerations and easily manipulated in terms of the criteria chosen and the percentage weight of such criteria. Such criteria as demography (population) and landmass (which are in reality benchmarks of colonial era revenue distribution) are seen as anti-equity and against the oil-producing areas. These have incidentally become the most contentious sources of disharmony between states themselves as well as between the states and the federal government. These contentions are produced and reinforced by the fact that, as Olopoenia (1998) contends, the revenue-sharing formula has been continually manipulated in the interests of interregional and interethnic cross-subsidization. The Niger Delta grievances, while centred on the access and control of the oil resources in the region, also cover other issues that impinge on the general development of the region. These issues, however, revolve around environmental degradation; redistribution of oil revenues; political autonomy for the region; marginalization of the region and control of the vast oil resources in the region (see Inuwa, 2010). Without doubt, problems associated with resource distribution have the capacity to affect Nigeria’s nationhood and even its democracy. Therefore, while federalism may seem attractive, given Nigeria’s multi-ethnic composition, the corruption of this principle in fiscal policies may spell doom for the development of sustainable democracy; in this situation one may perceive the setting of the stage for interethnic schisms and conflicts (Anugwom, 2001). This type of conflict in the case of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta

Oil conflict and the minorities question  147 region has been anchored on the resolve for severance or redefinition of federalism in Nigeria. Soremekun (1995), from a historical perspective, ­ argues that between 1970 and 1994, oil and the revenue from it has been the greatest obstacle to democracy in Nigeria. This means that there is a certain nexus between the sustainability of any governance arrangement and the manner in which revenue or resources are distributed. The above has been borne out in the conflict-prone and fragile state-building process in the ­Nigerian federation. As Olowonomi (1998) contends, there is a fundamental divergence between Nigeria’s federalism and the centralization of revenue.

Federalism and framing of the Niger Delta problem There is no doubt that the question of how the resources in a federal state such as Nigeria are divided among the various units in the federation has the potency of undermining both the unity and survival of the Nigerian state. Furthermore, the nature and conditions of the financial and economic relations between different units in the federal system, especially one that is anchored on a multi-ethnic society such as Nigeria, is crucial to her continued existence. Therefore, a good resource distribution system in a federal state, apart from bearing testimony to the distributive principle captured in the idea of federalism, must aspire to meet the objectives of national unity, economic growth, social development, balanced development, economic autonomy and self-sufficiency of substate units. Thus, the manipulation of the resource system in the bid to meet parochial and ethnonational interests militates against the evolvement of an equitable and just allocation system in the federation. The failure to anchor the federal system on a realistic fiscal decentralization principle easily generates conflict among the federating units and more critically questions the tag of federalism as applied to such a state. The proponents of the federal system of government would readily agree that it is anchored on the principles of devolution and decentralization especially in terms of financial autonomy between the centre and the constituent units. The recurrent discord that one observes in the resource distribution system in Nigeria underlines the fact that the Nigerian state is yet to get it right in the spirit of federalism. While Nigeria purports to run a federal structure, the revenue and resource distribution system is in reality more centralized than decentralized (see Anugwom, 2001). Nevertheless, it is important to state that the Niger Delta grouse goes beyond mere revenue allocation. Equally, it borders on how other valuable social and political resources are distributed, namely the actual distribution of infrastructure, road contracts, hospitals, industries, etc. and even the recruitment of personnel into plum and top jobs in federal bureaucracy. A good example of this state-led marginalization is often seen in the allocation of political positions among the different states and ethnic groups. As Table 9.1 clearly

148  Oil conflict and the minorities question shows, the Niger Delta, in spite of economic prowess, has consistently assumed a minor political position:4 One can see from Table 9.1 that out of the total 109 senatorial seats and 360 federal constituency seats in the National Assembly, the nine Niger Delta states occupy only 27 and 81 seats respectively. In spite of the fact that senatorial seats are based on equal representation for all states, inequity crops up in representation in the second chamber of the National Assembly (House of Representatives) where the nine Niger Delta states only get 22.5% of the total number of representatives. This situation seems largely inconsistent with the fact that in the last three decades the region has consistently produced over 80% of the nation’s external earnings through its oil deposits. But the issue of marginalization is perhaps more acute when one compares the representation of Bayelsa (with five constituencies) with that of a typical Northern state like Katsina (with 15 constituencies). Incidentally, Bayelsa state contributes more than any other state to national wealth. However, the position of Bayelsa state5 may be justified given its population and even land mass, but the same scenario prevails in some other states in the South of the country when compared with those in the core North. In view of the foregoing, the dissatisfaction of the people of the Niger Delta region with the prevailing resource distribution system is driven by Table 9.1  Distribution of political constituencies by state by the 1999 Constitution State

No. of senatorial const.

No. of federal const.

State

No. of senatorial const.

No. of federal const.

Abia Adamawa Akwa Ibom Anambra Bauchi Bayelsa Benue Borno Cross River Delta Ebonyi Edo Ekiti Enugu Gombe Imo Jigawa Kaduna

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

8 8 10 11 12 5 11 10 8 10 6 9 6 8 6 10 11 16

Kano Katsina Kebbi Kogi Kwarra Lagos Nasarawa Niger Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo Plateau Rivers Sokoto Taraba Yobe Zamfara

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

24 15 8 9 6 24 8 10 9 8 9 14 8 13 11 6 6 7

Source: adopted from Nwankwo, 2003.

Oil conflict and the minorities question  149 both memories of the past roles of the state and its key agents and the present non-committal stance of the Nigerian state to any radical change or alteration in the resource distribution system. The above may have engendered the need and inevitability of the resource control struggle, that is, a struggle framed within the aspirations of the people for resource control and self-determination. It would seem reasonable to contend that while there may be relative peace in the Niger Delta now, the perception of injustice or inequity in resource distribution portends the capacity to generate fresh conflicts.

Revenue allocation system and the grouse of the Niger Delta minorities Accounts in the literature (Phillips, 1971; Mbanefoh & Egwaikhide, 1998; Omitola, 2005; Olaloku, 1979; Anugwom, 2001, 2018; Adesina, 1998) suggest that the revenue allocation system could probably be seen as the most dynamic and frequently tinkered with public policy of successive ­governments in Nigeria. In this sense, between the colonial government’s inauguration in 1946 of the Phillipson Commission and now, over ten commissions and committees have been used by different governments in dealing with the contentious question of revenue distribution in the country. The constant tinkering underlines the continued dissatisfaction of Nigerians with the system and possibly the urge of the government to politicize the process. Even without necessarily delving too deep into these commissions and committees, they encapsulate an intriguing and interesting history of revenue allocation or distribution in Nigeria. Be the above as it may, the overview of the revenue distribution system and history here benefits from insights gathered from Anugwom (2018); Mbanefoh & Egwaikhide (1998); Olaloku (1979); Adesina (1998). A summary of revenue distribution in the early postcolonial years of the country would show that the spirit of the Raisman and Tress Commission of 1958 formed the basis of revenue allocation until the end of the 1960s. Interestingly, the efforts of the Dina Committee that came afterwards were literally wasted. This was because its recommendation that the federal tier should control larger revenues was not implemented. This shows a predilection by the Nigerian government towards minimizing the relevance of its own constituted policy committees over time when it comes to actual policy-making. Nonetheless, the lack-lustre attitude to implementation effectively created a lacuna that enabled the military government to centralize revenue allocation. This attempt was given legal backing through Decrees 15 of 1967; 13 of 1970 and 6 of 1975 all of which established a fiscal policy centralized at the federal level. These Decrees were hinged on a progressive enlargement of the DPA and the reduction of derivation. (Anugwom, 2001: 4)

150  Oil conflict and the minorities question Nevertheless, the next major development in revenue allocation occurred with the revenue allocation Act of 1981 which was subsequently amended through the Revenue Amendment Decree No. 36 of 1984. This Act, while in tune with the horizontal principles of the previous Act, introduced a new vertical allocation formula, namely: federal government – 55%; state governments – 32.5%; localities (LGAs) – 10%; and special grants – 2.5%. The administration of Ibrahim Babangida, in a likely belated effort to abide with the recommendations of the Dina Committee, created a permanent Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). This body was mandated to oversee revenue sharing and mobilization in the country, deriving its authority from Decree No. 49 of 1989. The creation of the RMAFC is a significant development since it marks a change from the use of ad hoc commissions and committees that were more or less the norm in the past. The RMAFC began by proposing key recommendations which were accepted by the government in December 1989. The body recommended the following vertical allocation formula: federal government – 50%; state ­governments – 30%; local governments – 15%; special funds – 5%; while for among the federating states or units the formula was: equality of states – 40%; population – 30%; landmass – 10%; social development – 10%; internal revenue effort – 10%. With reference to the derivation principle, the commission allocated 2% of the revenue from mineral exploitation in ­proportion to the mineral extracted from each state and also 1.5% to be administered by the federal government for the development of the mineralproducing areas in the country. But given the transfer of responsibility for primary education to the local government areas, there was need for an amendment of the formula. The amendment took the form of Decree No. 3 of 1991 in which the vertical sharing formula became: federal government – 50%; state government – 25%; local government – 20%; special funds – 5%. This formula was reviewed again in June 1992 and thus became – federal ­government (48.5%); state government (24%); localities (LGAs) (20%); and special funds (7.5%). The system witnessed another major review through the National Constitutional Conference of the late General Sani Abacha (1993–1998). It established a special committee to look into revenue distribution and after receiving memoranda and inputs from various groups in the country, the committee came up with the following recommendations: federal government (33%); state government (22.5%); local government (20%); federal capital territory (Abuja) (1%); stabilization account (5%); economic development (2%); derivation (11%); Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) (6%); with regard to the horizontal allocation or sharing of revenue among the federating states it came out with: equality of states (30%); population (40%); social development (10%); internal revenue effort (10%); and land mass and terrain (10%). In addition, the commission went ahead to recommend 13% for derivation to be lumped together with

Oil conflict and the minorities question  151 any amount for funding of any agency for the development of the states benefitting from derivation. This means that the derivation allocation includes also the amount of funding for any such agency. However, while the above recommendations of the constitutional conference committee were considered relatively radical, especially as they sought to reduce the revenue accruing to the federal government and improve the fiscal strength of the states and local government areas in the spirit of fiscal decentralization, they were never implemented. The 1999 Nigerian constitution which emerged from the constitutional conference established by the transition administration of Abdulsalam Abubakar (June 1998–28 May 1999) adopted a formula similar to that of 1992, namely, federal government (48.5%); state government (24%); local governments (20%); and special funds (7.5%). However, the RMAFC, in line with provisions of the Constitution (1999) which grants it power to review the revenue allocation formula and principles from time to time in tune with changing realities, soon came up with a new vertical sharing/ allocation formula, namely, federal government (41.3%); state government (31.0%); local governments (10%); special funds (13%); and on the horizontal distribution: equality (4.5%); population (2.5%); population density (2%); internal revenue effort (8%); landmass (5%); terrain (5%); rural roads and waterways (1.5%); portable water (1.5%); education (4%); health (3%). The commission also recommended that 60% of the derivation fund be allocated to the states in the mineral-producing areas and 40% to the local government areas in these areas. This review attracted the flak of the oilproducing states and other states in the South of Nigeria on the RMAFC who saw the recommendation as unrealistic and inequitable especially as they perceived an over-concentration of federally collected revenues in the federal government, which was seen rightly as undermining the principle of federalism. Rejection of the above resource distribution formula, especially by the oil-producing states, eventually made these states seek redress in the courts. The views of these states were that giving them substantial control over resources found in their geographical areas, as was the case in the 1960s, would enable them to access more resources for the development of their areas and mitigate environmental and ecological damages occasioned by mineral exploration and exploitation in these areas. As a result, these states sought for the courts to give the right interpretations of the relevant sections of the constitution on resource distribution. The subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court in this matter necessitated a change in the formula thus: federal government (46.43%); state government (33.20%); local governments (20.73%). But in an interesting case which probably shows the severe politicization of the process that generates both dissatisfaction and imaginings of primordial considerations in the resource distribution system in the country, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) set aside the recommendations of the RMAFC and in its place issued an executive order

152  Oil conflict and the minorities question in line with section 315 of the 1999 Constitution for revenue distribution until the approval of a new formula by the National Assembly. As would be expected, the order was biased in favour of the federal government and gave it a huge 54.68% in the vertical allocation of revenue in the country. True to character, the process of allowing the National Assembly to legislate on a new formula was dogged endlessly by political intrigue and buck-passing between the federal executive and legislature over the matter. Current vertical allocation, according to Salami (2011), without special funds and which took off from 2002, is on the following formula: federal government (52.68%); state (26.72); local governments (20.60%). Under this framework, the derivation principle which had suffered terribly under military regimes in the country is now back on board at 13% of the revenue from oil produced on-shore from the nine oil-producing states. The citizens of the Niger Delta region do not just see the revenue distribution system in Nigeria as unjust in the sense of the federal government appropriating the lion’s share but as equally influenced by primordial considerations in the horizontal allocation of revenue and resources to the subunits of the federation. In addition, they perceive the process as ­ manipulated to satisfy the greed and corrupt tendencies of the political elites. Hence, the contention that, there exist two fundamental dimensions of revenue allocation or sharing in Nigeria. The first dimension is based on institutions and tiers of ­government which the federal government is at the helm of affairs. While the second dimension is the issue of individuals and groups appropriating national revenue for themselves by corrupt and unjust means. (Ebienfa, 2011: 1) Since the emergence of oil as the economic mainstay of the federation, the revenue distribution system in Nigeria has been perceived in some quarters as unjust to the Niger Delta ethnic minorities. The unjustness is ­particularly captured in the fact that the system has been manipulatively utilized in undermining the derivation principle in revenue allocation. As a result, the various revenue allocation processes and commissions since the 1970s have been perceived as mainly conduits of injustice against the Niger Delta minorities. These commissions have been accused of neglecting or maligning the interests of the ethnic minorities. In this sense, instead of derivation that hitherto benefits the regions, the commissions lay emphasis on Need, Population, Landmass, Balance Development, Equality of states, National minimum standard etc. to the detriment of the goose that lays the golden egg. Without mincing words, the implication is the deliberate and criminal transfer of the oil wealth out of the Niger Delta to develop other regions. (Ebienfa, 2011: 5)

Oil conflict and the minorities question  153

The politics of derivation and the grouse of the Niger Delta The derivation principle as a critical component of resource allocation was first mooted by the Phillipson Commission of 1946 that saw it as the principle through which a region would benefit from its non-declared revenue according to the proportion of its contribution to the central revenue (Adebayo, 1988). This principle was thus conceived to be both compensatory and cognizant of the proportionate contribution of the area concerned to the pool of national wealth especially in a federal state. In a new federation, derivation is one of the fundamental principles utilized in guiding revenue allocation (see Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). Thus, the main feature of derivation in this case is its ability to allocate federal revenue to the various units on the basis of total, or some proportion, of taxes assumed to have been paid by the citizens of the units. As a result, the derivation principle may thus be seen as having the ability, due to its relationship to taxes and compensatory features, of overcoming feelings of alienation by members of any unit within a state or federation. Despite its good intentions, the history of revenue allocation in Nigeria, particularly in connection with the derivation principle and the Niger Delta problem, appear both intriguing and problematic. Prior to the emergence of oil as the main foreign-exchange earner, the revenue allocation principle was mainly on the basis of derivation. Although oil export began in Nigeria in 1958 after the Oloibiri discovery, it was only around 1980 that the share of oil revenue in the national income rose to 80% (see Ikein & Briggs-Anigboh, 1998) from about 27% in ten years before then (in 1970). This entails that oil became a prominent revenue earner in Nigeria from 1980 and has been on the ascendancy since then. In fact, it still constitutes over 80% of externally earned national revenue. However, while the revenue from oil was on the increase, the percentage of revenue allocated through derivation to the oil-producing states kept decreasing. In spite of the above, it would be a historical fallacy to argue that the oil-producing states never enjoyed 50% derivation allocation. However, this was before 1971 when oil contributed only about 3% of national revenue, and still ranked far below the agricultural products (groundnut; cocoa; palm oil) at that time. Probably the worst experience of the oil-producing areas in relation to the derivation principle commenced in the late 1970s. The 1979 Constitution conferred the rights over onshore and offshore minerals on the federal government. This enabled the federal government to drastically slash the derivation allocation to a paltry 5% during the Shehu Shagari administration (1979–1983). It was further reduced to 3% by the military administration of Ibrahim Babangida (1984–1993); and even below the 3% margin by the Abacha government which succeeded Babangida. In effect, any cursory observer would perceive that the wielders of political power at the centre

154  Oil conflict and the minorities question allowed the derivation principle a larger scope only when the revenue from oil was not massive (1965–1970); but this quickly changed for the worse when oil jumped far ahead of all other export commodities in revenue yield in Nigeria. Therefore, the derivation share of national revenue distribution plummeted through the issuance of decrees and other arbitrary laws especially by the military that held sway for most of the period in question (see Anugwom, 2001). According to Ojo (2010: 31), “the most acrimonious issue in Nigeria today involves the increasing strident campaign for economic restitution and ecological rehabilitation by the country’s oil producing ethnic minority communities around the Niger Delta Region in the south”. He goes on to contend that, with the dramatic expansion in petroleum export revenue since the 1970s in Nigeria, the sharing policies have either downgraded or sometimes eliminated the principle of derivation as criteria of entitlement for oil producers in the federation. Predictably, the citizens of the Niger Delta have often seen their predicament from the perspective of a willful act of government driven by the wish of ethnic majority groups to systematically downgrade the importance of derivation in resource distribution. In the views of Ebienfa (2011: 1), “the displacement of agricultural products by oil as the focal point of national revenue, and the attendant relegation of the principle of derivation in revenue allocation, is the root cause of the revenue debacle in Nigerian federalism”. Implied in this sentiment is the fact that agricultural products derived from the ethnic majority enclaves were hitherto prioritized in the allocation but the emergence of oil as the prime external revenue earner changed the situation. This situation derived essentially from the fact that oil is mainly located in the domains of ethnic minority groups. The matter of the appropriate rate or scale of the derivation component of revenue allocation is now largely a constitutional issue since the current 13% in effect was specified in the constitution. Thus, the 1999 Constitution in section 162 (2) stipulated that the principle of derivation should always be reflected in any revenue distribution formula in Nigeria and that this should not be less than 13% of the revenue accruing to the federation directly from any natural resources. Interestingly while the 1999 Constitution stipulates a 13% minimum standard, the government in Nigeria has through time shown little desire to go beyond the minimum benchmark. This desire persists in spite of the apparent enormous development needs in the Niger Delta region. In apprehending the injustice encapsulated in the decline of derivation in revenue distribution in Nigeria, the Niger Delta minorities are also often disposed to contend that even during the so-called glorious days of the derivation principle (when primary agricultural products were the main revenue earners) in the 1960s and early 1970s, the people of the region did not benefit significantly. This is because the political system favoured the ethnic majority groups in the former regional structure of Nigeria and thus

Oil conflict and the minorities question  155 ensured that ethnic minorities had virtually no real say in things. For instance, it can be said that the Western Ijaws in the present Delta state were minorities in the Yoruba-dominated Western region and suffered exclusion even from the fabled free education policy of the Action Group in power in the Western region then. The group was equally largely neglected in terms of other development and infrastructural considerations in the region. The above treatment is perceived even as rife, probably with the exception of Port Harcourt, the capital of River state. But Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa state now, was a provincial headquarters prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960 but was not connected to the national electricity grid until as late as 2007, many decades after other cities had been enjoying that privilege.

Appraisal of the Niger Delta agitation from outside the region One dominant factor in the revenue allocation crisis in Nigeria is the multiethnic or heterogeneous character of the nation. Given the heterogeneity and complexity of Nigeria, the competition for resources among these different ethno-social groups would therefore occur in ethnically contextualized situations (see Suberu, 1998; Williams, 1980). It is normal to expect that ethnic heterogeneity and the interpretations of revenue allocation along ethnic lines would generate enduring political conflicts and contestations in the country. It is ironic to realize that federalism emerged in Nigeria as a check on both economic statism and ethnic pluralism. The ethnic factor has been prominent in revenue allocation and the relations between ethnic majority and minority groups in the nation. As a result, the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region have perceived the fiscal policy in Nigeria as motivated by ethnic considerations and politics (see Okilo, 1980; Olowonomi, 1998). But more germane here is that whatever merits the Niger Delta demands have are too easily rubbished on the altar of ethnicity. In other words, a good number of people outside the region are either unsympathetic to the Niger Delta cause or see it as ill-motivated and unjustified. Undoubtedly, not all sections of the country are in agreement with the contentions of the Niger Delta or are sympathetic to the plight of the people of the region. In other words, such people do not see the region as having a genuine grievance against the Nigerian state. But the ethnonational base of some of those who are highly critical of the region’s claims might incidentally underline the contention (even from the region) that public affairs and governance in Nigeria are consistently perceived through an ethno-regional lens. Emblematic of such belief is the contention of Usman (2000) who came out with a version of the “organic theory of the state”. According to him, groups with recognized identity within a state cannot now use such identity as the basis of laying claim to natural resources

156  Oil conflict and the minorities question found in their areas. In his argument, if everybody took exclusive control of the natural resources in their enclave, such as the Niger Delta region, then those states upstream from the delta and in the Niger-Benue basin should also exercise exclusive ownership and control of River Niger and its sediments drained away from this area to form the delta and its hinterlands. Thus, in the same sense of ownership, these upstream states equally deserve their share from the revenues realized from the export of both crude oil and gas in relation to their vegetation, dead bodies, animals and soil which have all contributed to the formation of the crude oil and gas for hundreds of thousands of years in the Niger Delta region. Somewhat similar to the contention of Usman (2000) regarding the claims of the Niger Delta; other authors such as Phillips (1971), Teriba (1966) and Hicks and Phillips (1951) have earlier posited that the derivation principle tends to favour wealthy regions to the detriment of those not wealthy. The emergence of oil as the main revenue earner in Nigeria has not really undermined this argument since Phillips (1971) has seen derivation as excessively favouring the oil-producing states. However, Okilo (1980) contends that the grouse of the oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta comes from the change in the derivation principle which coincided with the prominence of oil. It was this thinking that informed the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990). In that historic document, the Ogonis made a case for a revenue system that would recognize “the goose that lays the golden eggs”. Apparently, the contestations of the Niger Delta region are not devoid of justification. Thus, some scholars have posited that the derivation principle in the country would have persisted as the main basis of fiscal federalism had the majority ethnonational groups also been the oil-producing areas (see Mbanefo and Egwaikhide, 1998; Okilo, 1980) in Nigeria.

Conclusion From the foregoing, it is obvious that the struggle of the Niger Delta region has been framed along the lines of demands for major institutional reforms in Nigeria’s federalism and framework of oil exploitation-cum-access. The prominent demands in this regard include amendment of the constitution to make mining and exploration of minerals joint federal and state responsibility; vesting the rights over mineral land rents and oil royalties in the communities or states from which these resources are derived (this would necessarily entail the abrogation of the obnoxious Land Use Decree of 1978), unlike the subsisting situation in which the federal government exercises such rights; the payment of a significant percentage or proportion of federally collected petroleum profits tax to the oil-producing areas in accordance with the principle of derivation; and development of an institutional arrangement for appropriate compensation to the oil communities for environmental and ecological degradation as a consequence of oil exploitation, in addition to the evolvement of good measures to protect the

Oil conflict and the minorities question  157 environment from the risks of oil exploitation (this would certainly hinge on pressurizing TNOCs to protect the environment of their host communities in their operations) (Anugwom, 2001, 2007; Suberu, 1996). Some of the above desires, especially community involvement in the oil industry, improvement of local content and environmental responsibility in oil exploitation, would have been significantly tackled by the proposed oil industry bill which has so far had a very protracted incubation in the National Assembly. Thus, the much-delayed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) is perhaps one of the routes to meeting some of the undeniable grievances of the Niger Delta ethnic minorities. It is hoped that the PIB when passed into law by the Nigerian parliament would inter alia increase the local content of the downstream petroleum sector; enthrone a more environmentally sensitive oil exploitation regime; and involve the communities in the oil exploitation process at all levels. However, the much anticipated PIB has been in the National Assembly now for years. It is likely that the prevailing politics of resource allocation and distribution has made its passage an uphill task for Nigeria’s law-makers. There is no gainsaying the fact that contentions and conflict over who gets what proportion of the oil wealth in Nigeria have dissipated energy for national development and vitiated the emergence of intergroup harmony and cohesion needed to push through measures that would engender development. One manifestation of the frequent struggle over oil resources and intergroup conflict in resource allocation has been the glaring lack of social cohesion at the national level. As most sociologists would readily concur, cohesion when built on the acceptance of the sanctity of rules and regulations and the inevitability of social order and interdependence in social functioning is a sine qua non for development. In this sense, there is a relationship between social cohesion and national development in multi-ethnic and heterogeneous societies. The above is still largely true in spite of the fragmentation and individualization in the global arena nowadays.

Notes 1 Things have simmered down since the coming on board of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme (popularly called Amnesty Programme) since 2009. However, the youth groups and the consciousness that powered the erstwhile endemic conflict in the region remain alive. 2 Represented by a heavily funded joint military force known as Operation Restore Hope. 3 For instance, the Igbo ethnic is still agitating over the fact that the geopolitical zone of the group, that is, Southeast, has the least number of states among the six zones in Nigeria. Popular view has it that the dissatisfaction of the area in this regard is one driving force of the resurgence of Biafran nationalism 4 This is in spite of the fact that the President of Nigeria (2009–2015) was an Ijaw from the Niger Delta region. While this remains an undoubted watershed in the

158  Oil conflict and the minorities question political history of Nigeria, it has neither squarely addressed nor obliterated the decades of perceived socio-economic and political marginalization of the people of the region. 5 In fact, the plight of the state is even more pronounced in the area of job creation and employment. According to the Nigeria Economic Summit Group, Bayelsa state has the highest unemployment rate in Nigeria at 38.4%, followed, incidentally, by another high oil-producing state, Akwa Ibom, at 34%, which compares unfavourably with the situation in such other non-oil-producing states as Plateau (7.1%) and Kaduna (11.6%) (Vanguard, 30 March, 2011).

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Oil conflict and the minorities question  159 Mbanefoh, G., & Egwaikhide, F. (1998). “Revenue allocation in Nigeria: Derivation principle revisited”, in Amuwo, K., Suberu, R., Agbaje, A., & Herault, G. (eds) Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan, Spectrum. Nwankwo, O.B. (2003). Institutional design and functionality of African democracies: A comparative analysis of Nigeria and Uganda. Berlin: Tenea Verlag. Obi, Cyril (2006). Youth and the generational dimensions to struggles for resource control in the Niger Delta: Prospects for the nation – state project in Nigeria. CODESRIA Monograph Series, Dakar: CODESRIA. Ojo, Emmanuel (2010). “The politics of revenue allocation and resource control in Nigeria: Implications for federal stability”. Federal Governance 7 (1): 15–38. Okilo, Melford (1980). “The derivation principle and national unity”. Daily Times (19 July): 4. Olopoenia, A.A. (1998). “Political economy of corruption and underdevelopment”. Faculty Lecture, University of Ibadan (7 October). Ibadan: Vantage. Olowonomi, G.D. (1998). “Revenue allocation and economics of Federalism”, in Amuwo, K., Suberu, R., Agbaje, A., & Herault, G. (eds) Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan, Spectrum. Omitola, B.O. (2005). “Revenue allocation, resource control and the Nigerian political economy”, in Akinsanya, A., & Ayoade, J.A. (eds) Reading on Nigerian government and political economy. Ijebu-Ode: Gratia Associates Int. Phillips, A.O. (1971). “Nigeria’s federal financial experience.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 9 (3): 389–408. Salami, Adeleke (2011). “Taxation, revenue allocation and fiscal federalism in Nigeria: Issues, challenges and policy options”. Economic Annals, LVI (189) (April–June): 27–50. Soremekun, Kayode (1995). “Oil and the democratic imperative in Nigeria”, in Olowu, D., Soremekun, K., & Williams, A. (eds) Governance and democratization in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books (pp. 97–109). Suberu, R.T. (1996). Ethnic minority conflicts and governance in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum and IFRA. Suberu, R.T. (1995). “Federalism, ethnicity and regionalism in Nigeria”. Paper presented at the Conference on the Dilemma of Democracy in Nigeria; University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S (10–12 November). Suberu, R.T. (1998). “States creation and the political economy of Nigerian federalism”, in Amuwo, K., Agbaje, A., Suberu, R. & Herault, G. (eds) Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books/IFRA. Teriba, O. (1966). “Nigerian revenue allocation, 1952–1965: A study in intergovernmental fiscal and financial relations”. Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 8 (3): 361–382. Usman, Bala (2000). “The misrepresentation of Nigeria: The facts and figures”. www.waado.org/nigerdelta/Essays/BalaUsman/Usman-misrepresentation.html (accessed: 12 July 2011). Vanguard Newspaper Online (2011). “Unemployment uppermost in oil-rich region – NESG”. (March, 30). www.vanguardngr,com (accessed: 15 September 2019). Williams, G. (1980). State and society in Nigeria. Idanre: Afrografika Pub.

10 Beyond Bakassi State, democracy and the resurgence of Biafran nationalism in Nigeria

Introduction While quite a voluminous literature exists on Biafra, the Nigeria–Biafra civil war and how it was fought (see, Waugh & Cronje, 1969; Forsyth, 1969; Ekwe-Ekwe, 2007; Korieh, 2012; Heerten, 2015: Njoku, 2013; Achebe, 2012; Ebiem, 2014; Korieh & Ezeonu, 2010; Anugwom, 2019; Gould, 2011; Streamlau, 1977; Kirk-Greene, 1973, 1975; Onuoha, 2011), my concern here is to unravel how the nascent resurgence of Biafra impacts on development in Nigeria and, more critically, how the resurgence reflects a development paradigm that has been neither inclusive nor rooted in the equity of different ethno-social groups. Though a major thread in the accounts of the civil war is that the Igbo ethnic group was not given conducive conditions for reintegrating into Nigeria after the war (a recurrent example is the 20 pounds each Biafran received at the end of the war irrespective of their savings in Nigerian banks prior to the war), another set of writers hold the contrary position. In other words, there is equally an opinion in the literature which lauds the integration process after the war and even sees the reintegration exercise by the Gowon led Nigerian government as exemplary (see Gboyega, 1997; Streamlau, 1977). In spite of the above ambivalence, one wonders why issues of marginalization, exclusion and distributive injustice have become consistent planks of ethnonationalist agitation in post-war Nigeria and not just among the Biafran activists but also the Niger Delta militants and other minority groups. Ethnic militant associations, in spite of what appears to be a nascent entry into Nigeria’s socio-political space, are really mutations of previous forms of delimited subnational groups or associations. In other words, present ethnic militant associations, while not exactly replicas of similar associations in the past, can be linked evolutionarily to the past. Therefore, these associations may be products of the same allegiances and sentiments that gave rise to such earlier militant organizations in Nigeria as the Zikist Movement, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, the Isaac Boro founded Niger Delta Front, the Boys O’Yea Traders Movement in Onitsha, Ikemba Front of the Second Republic etc. However, what is fundamental is that almost all these associations, while

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  161 embodying ethnonationalism, were produced by dissatisfaction with dominant development strategies in Nigeria either in the pre- or post-colonial periods. Therefore, these associations either sought for redress of development imbalance in the Nigerian state or embodied delimited socio-political aspirations without and beyond the Nigerian state. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic democracy in Nigeria (from 1999), there has been what may be termed a proliferation of ethnic militant associations. A cursory observation of the socio-political realities of presentday Nigerian society would undoubtedly reveal that these associations are strong bases of solidarity, power contestations and articulations of civil society’s perceptions of development and distribution of state resources. In other words, these associations may be perceived as critical challenges to the formal state apparatus and the imagery of nationalism emanating from there. More than this, these associations, as critical observation would reveal, are mainly reactions of civil society to the prevailing socio-political system in the country. Given the dynamism of these associations and their sustenance over time, they simply do not just portray socio-economic restiveness but probably deep-seated dissatisfaction with Nigeria’s current democracy and development strategies. Also, these associations, while existing as articulation channels of civil society and public imageries of democracy, may equally be watchdogs of the formal state apparatus and in this case often aspire to bridge the gap in the delivery of social services or at least function as domains of contradictory narratives of democracy, development and social provisioning. Therefore, even more evident in Nigeria nowadays are ethnic militant associations, which in many geographical regions of the country are interrogating Nigeria’s development and democracy as presently constituted. Hence, there are cries of marginalization right from the oil-rich Niger Delta zone to the Northeast zone of Nigeria. Be the above as it may, these associations function mainly in the sphere of popular culture and are reflective of the subaltern imagery of democracy and development in Nigeria. Imbued in this assertion is the suggestion that these associations have both political and social motives. Therefore, ethnic militant associations, while feeding on the ethnic fervour that has characterized Nigeria’s political and democratic experience (see Joseph, 1987, 1999; Nnoli, 1978; Anugwom, 1997, 2000), are major diversions from the normal ethnic mobilization in the country. Generally, urban social movements and the struggles that characterize them should rightly be seen as outcomes of economic, political, spatial and development dynamics which ultimately may be set in motion by the demands of capitalist expansion (see Katznelson, Gille, & Weir, 1982) or in the case of Nigeria by a massive dissatisfaction with the way and the manner in which the state is run. Hence, these associations, which have come to dot the socio-political landscape of Nigeria, should be interrogated in cognizance of the essential socio-political character of the Nigerian

162  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism nation-state in transition from a mixed economy to extreme capitalism. But beyond mere neo-liberal capitalism debate is the issue of the relevance of democracy, especially the development strategy it embodies to the aspirations of the people. The democratic enterprise in Nigeria was heralded by a messianic expectation bordering on the realization of a long-promised development Eldorado and the goodies therein. However, events would now tend to suggest that democracy has been anything but messianic. In fact, the “millennial expectation” (see Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000) which heralded democracy has been dashed by the political elites who have seen democracy as a subterfuge for greedy and primordial aspirations that generate and reinforce inequity among groups and, in the process, deepen underdevelopment. Therefore, democracy and development in Nigeria have become reflections of the wish of pathological state elites and fundamental contradictions of popular expectations or the subaltern imagery of governance. Ethno-militant associations thus carry the burden of actualizing the development aspirations of the populace while at the same time serving as critical indicators of the sore points of democracy and state-building in Nigeria. Perhaps very typical of this type of association, which functions as the bastion of displaced state nationalism and the symbol of perceived marginalization in the South Eastern zone of Nigeria, are the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). These associations merit attention because, in spite of perceived structural and ideological weaknesses, they represent the most potent and critical threat to Nigeria’s democracy and the questioning of its conventional development wisdom. In this sense, the unanticipated consequences of these associations may be negative and disruptive. But even more fundamentally worrisome is the fact that they provide rallying points for identity, solidarity and allegiance at the grassroots. Hence, the Nigerian nation-state faces a counteracting nationalism defined essentially on the basis of ethnicity and the expectations of Biafra. The implications of this for national development and democratic consolidation deserve close scrutiny. The rekindled quest for a new Biafra or the resurgence of Biafran nationalism is a crucial development issue since it resonates with the familiar cries of marginalization, resource conflict, distributional injustice and ethno-­ religious crisis that have dogged Nigeria’s growth as a sovereign nation over the decades. While the resurgence of Biafran nationalism mirrors a dysfunction of the state in Nigeria, it also calls attention to the need to radically tinker with the development paradigm pursued in the state in the last few decades. In other words, Biafra now does not necessarily call attention to the ­balkanization of Nigeria but rather a committed process of redemption anchored on negotiated outcomes that “redresses and rebalances our failing federation by ensuring equity for all its citizens” (Moghalu, 2017: 2). This chapter depends on documentary sources of data and the content analysis of relevant newspaper articles and literature for its information. The above implies that the chapter was dependent on a thoroughgoing and incisive

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  163 examination of published and unpublished documentary information and newspaper articles for data. Without doubt, quite a lot has been written on Biafra and the resurgence of Biafran nationalism since the advent of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria in 1999. The activities of such groups as Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Must Be Society (BIAMUS), Biafra Actualization Forum (BAF), and, more recently, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), have generated a robust body of literature on the subject of Biafra and Biafran nationalism – a plethora of newspaper articles as well as reports and opinion pieces in mainstream and grey media on these subjects. The above sources served collectively as a mine of information upon which this chapter depended.

Theoretical understanding of separatist urban movements in the modern state project While ethnic militant associations can be seen within the larger and varying context of ethnicity in plural societies, they should equally be seen as urban movements and struggles for socio-economic and political space in the development process. In fact, adopting an instrumental-cum-Marxist orientation, Katznelson et al. (1982) perceive urban movements as the products of the economic, political and spatial developments consequent upon capitalist expansion. This perspective is particularly cogent in the Nigerian scenario where urbanization in its contemporary connotation can be seen as the creation of the colonial enterprise. In other words, unlike what obtains in most Western societies, urbanization in Nigeria was neither preceded nor called into being by industrialization, rather it was created by colonialism (see Hicks, 1998; Mabogunje, 1968; Crowther, 1976; Coleman, 1986). This situation created a scenario whereby urban movements in Nigeria, rather than being aggregations motivated by the needs of the industrial workers to protect their interests within and outside the workplace, are first and foremost ethnically motivated movements geared towards enthroning ethnic political interests and resisting the overtly capitalist tendencies of the state. It was in recognition of this character that Omeje and Umoh (2001) argued that the Marxist instrumentalist perspective of urban movements can be applied to the Nigerian situation. However, while associations such as MASSOB and IPOB have remained largely urban movements in the Southeast of Nigeria, they embody political aspirations beyond the mere economics of global capitalism. In this sense, these associations, while pushing forward a separatist agenda, justify their goals on the basis of perceived development imbalance and social inequity in post-civilwar Nigeria. For them, the development paradigm pursued since the end of the war reflects gross inequity and marginalization that raises fundamental questions about the viability of the Nigerian state project. In furtherance of the Marxist orientation, Castells (1978a, 1978b) justifies the nature of these associations as embodiments of both struggles and

164  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism movements that attempt to question the logic of the urban system. Implied in this reasoning is that these associations act as informal socio-political alternatives. No wonder Igbo (2001) sees the advent of ethnic militant associations in urban Nigeria as a direct product of the failure of the state and its agencies in the area of providing needed security of lives and property without which economic growth and development are impossible. But even more insightful in the case of Nigeria are the five schematic models of polities in Africa put forward by Lemarchand (1994). These are ethnoregional hegemonies; totalizing polities; neo-patrimonial rulerships; factionalized state system; and liberalized transitional polities. Hence, Nigeria might approximate Lemarchand’s model of an ethno-regional polity. In this sense, Nigeria’s socio-political history has been marred by ethnic and regional politics (see Nnoli, 1978; Otite, 1990; Osaghae, 1994; Suberu, 1991; Joseph, 1999). Nigeria may be viewed along the lines of an ethno-regional hegemony given the resurgence of ethnic and other primordial identities even in the era of democracy. The increasing incidence of social conflict in all major parts of the country, the rise of the politics of marginalization and regional blocs show a state where ethnic feelings and identity are at a peak. However, while the ethno-regional factor seems overriding it should not be taken as totally unlocking the intricacy of Nigeria’s state politics and its never-ending journey to development. Therefore, the overwhelming greed and pathological orientation of political elites who depend on the corrupt oiling of political machinery and prebendal networks with state resources equally depict Nigeria as a neo-patrimonial state. Ethnic militant associations that are nothing but forms of ethnic-based mobilization for balanced development have emerged as political and social alternatives to the formal state. In this case, these associations, apart from being metaphors for development failures of the state are also symbolic of the emergence of “quasi-nationalism” based on allegiance to ethno-regional affiliations. This is actually in tune with the earlier contention of Jackson (1990), that African states are largely “quasi-states” in which the majority of citizens identify with local groups that they are familiar with. But even more crucial is the inability of the formal Nigerian state to engender objective nationalism based on the spirit of fairness, freedom and equity. In this sense, the failure of the state in the reckoning of the civil society may have created the objective conditions for the proliferation of ethnic militant associations. It might be the above scenario that has given impetus to the re-emergence of Biafran nationalism among Southeastern Nigerians in the last ten years.

From MASSOB to IPOB: the defining nature and features of resurgent groups In an interesting empirical study, Ibeanu, Orji and Iwuamadi (2016) have connected contemporary Biafran resurgence and separatist agitations to the

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  165 Nigeria–Biafra war (1967–1970) and argue that these recent events are related to such antecedent factors as the grievances which drove the war, how the war was fought and grievances fostered by the manner of the postwar settlement. In their words, “that body of evidence strongly suggests that developments that occurred before, during and after the Biafran war engendered particularly deep grievances which have created a sense of communal suffering and collective victimhood among the Igbo” (Ibeanu et al., 2016: ii). In other words, separatist associations are driven by perceived grievances related to the civil war and its aftermath. These associations, while embodying ethnonationalist aspirations, are also highly political. These associations, even though shunning partisan politics, have remained politically focused but more action-oriented in embodying popular political aspirations and imagery. Their emergence and acceptance by quite a significant number of the larger Southeast society may indicate a growing dissatisfaction with the formal Nigerian state. Equally interesting is the political awareness and mobilization which have characterized these associations. These are remarkable developments in cognizance of the existence of formal political apparatus for representing the interests of the people in Nigeria’s democracy. The forays of these associations into the informal political arena may thus signal both a distrust of the political elites in the zone and the critical questioning of the development paradigm of the state. This really brings to the fore the question of nationalism. The ethnic nature of these associations and their usage in perpetuating the ethnic agenda may be a manifestation of delimited or narrowed nationalism. In other words, nationalism is being redefined on the basis of ethnicity that secures the needs of each ethnic group and repositions the centre as a domain for negotiated trade-offs between the different ethnic groups. It is important to point out that a reinvention of nationalism along these lines may be in tune with the contemporary modifications of ethnicity in plural societies. In fact, as Ottaway (1999) posits, it is unrealistic to wish away ethnic and religious identities since they are not really residues of the past but a live force in today’s politics not only in Africa but elsewhere in the world. It would appear that these associations within the context of civil society are carving out spheres of influence and refocusing citizens’ nationalism on the ethnic group. This development in a multi-ethnic or plural society such as Nigeria may derive from the failure of the nation-state to impact positively on all citizens in spite of ethnic identity and thus engender ethnic neutral nationalism (see Idowu, 1999; Synder, 1993) built on perceived evenness and equity in development. The probable end result of the failure of the multi-ethnic state to perform impartially and relevantly may be the resort towards ethnic or primordial affiliations by citizens. This may actually provide one cogent explanation of the resurgence of ethnic militant groups in contemporary Nigeria. Be that as it may, a cursory survey of the predominant membership of these associations may reveal that they

166  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism represent largely citizens marginal to mainstream socio-political and economic spheres. This realization raises a very crucial issue regarding the nature of these associations. Thus, it may be interesting to ascertain the extent to which these associations are indicative of the prevailing socio-economic inequality or development imbalance in Nigeria. The MASSOB, which is reminiscent of the Nigeria–Biafra civil war of 1967 to 1970 takes mainly as its objective the realization of the sovereign state of Biafra which was destroyed by the triumph of the federal Nigerian forces in the civil war. While the influence of the association so far has not been on a sufficiently massive scale to portend another civil war, it has lasted till now and has displayed an uncanny ability to withstand the force of the Nigerian state. Apart from the age difference between the founder of MASSOB, Ralph Uwazuruike, and the much younger leader of the IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, the IPOB has been much more volatile and not really shy of violence, unlike the MASSOB that advocated peaceful protests. As observed by Omeje (2005), even though MASSOB was borne out of violence, it had eschewed acts of violence, opting for peaceful protests influenced by its leader who, schooled in India, is enamoured of the philosophy of nonviolence of the father of modern India, Ghandi. Also, the difference in age of the founders and the relative nascent nature of IPOB have made it possible for it to exploit the social media in this age of technological innovations to propagate its messages and win converts. In fact, IPOB debuted within the ambit of the famed Radio Biafra, broadcasting out of London and through the internet. In spite of the excessive debunking of the Nigerian state and crass aspersions to its statehood claims,1 the online radio achieved fame and recognition among pro-Biafra supporters and sympathizers. Radio Biafra became the launch pad and forerunner of the IPOB under the leadership of a resolute young man who never witnessed the civil war. In spite of espousing peaceful protests, the IPOB has been implicated in a number of violent protests and clashes with law enforcement especially shortly before and after the detention of Nnamdi Kanu. These associations aspire more or less to self-governance for the Southeastern zone of Nigeria and not just another Bakassi Boys Vigilante2 uprising. Both of these associations can be seen as direct products of the peculiar structural and political character of the Nigerian state and have remained largely urban movements. Apart from their urban locations, their membership is drawn largely from predominantly urban youth and marginal citizens trying to survive on the urban fringes of Nigeria’s volatile economy. Thus, the structural and political contexts of Nigeria may have bred a situation whereby ethnic and other primordial factors are the organizing bases of urban social movements (see Osaghae, 1991; Suberu, 1991, 1996; Mahmood, 1993). But whatever is the organizing or cohering factor, urban social movements or ethnic militant associations in this case have been very instrumental in highlighting the relative position of different groups in

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  167 national political and social life. Thus, one agrees with the contention of Omeje and Umoh (2001: 290) that contemporary urban movements have brought to prominence the social conditions of specific groups and segments of society. More often than not, such social conditions have to do with systematic deprivation, marginalization, alienation and oppression of demographically smaller groups by their relatively larger and more powerful counterparts in society. The issue of marginalization has been on the front-burner of the recent political dispensation in Nigeria. Democracy in Nigeria has been threatened and is still under threats arising from perceived marginalization of some socio-ethnic groups in the nation (see Anugwom, 2000).

The Nigerian state, democracy and Biafran nationalist groups Separatism and conflicts around it in Nigeria can be traced to the nature of the Nigerian state. In this regard, scholars such as Asobie (1997) and ­Fadahunsi (1997) have blamed the skewed federal state in Nigeria, while Idowu (1999) contends that the emergence of a Nigerian state in which one ethnic group is favoured in development creates a situation where sectional interests take precedence over national interests. This notwithstanding, Ake (1992) has argued earlier that most countries of the South are in the strong grip of centrifugal forces and the politicization of the existing division creates the condition for violence and conflict or struggle over resources. But Jackson (1990) contends that the ethnic problem in most of Africa can be traced to the fragile nature of most African states at the onset. He argues that these states were essentially “quasi-states” from the onset, in which citizens easily identified with their primordial and primary social groups. This identification is often heightened in a democracy and breeds a form of competing nationalisms, that is, the state versus the primordial or ethnic group. This scenario works against both genuine development and democracy and as Mazrui (1996: 11) contends: democratization movements have begun to gather stem on the African continent; unfortunately, they have also led to intra-nation conflict, especially when political divisions are exacerbated by ethnic divisions. Unscrupulous politicians have little compunctions about utilizing the ethnic rivalries to boost their own electoral fortunes. Unfortunately, such rivalry, instead of being confined to constitutional and political channels has been channeled into physical violence. However, the activities or influence of ethno-militant associations are not strictly limited to their urban bases. Thus, these associations have been able

168  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism to make a significant impact on both the rural peripheries and the international community. This widening of scope of influence has given these associations the dynamism to articulate a wide range of needs and to pose real threats to the credibility of the formal state within the context of the representation of civil society. Thus, the MASSOB and IPOB in their activities have sought to position themselves within popular imagery in the Southeast as viable alternatives to the Nigerian state. In viewing the impact of ethnonationalism in Nigeria, it would be important to appreciate that such aspirations towards separatism and delimited nationalism can be the outcome of the politics of exclusion. In this sense, such nationalism would be expected to heighten in the face of intensification of exclusion (see Joireman, 2003). In other words, the pursuit of development paradigms that are neither inclusive nor anchored on equity would surely be counter-productive and ironically undermine the sought-after development. Separatism has resulted from the discomfort of ethnonational groups with the state of affairs in democratic Nigeria. In this specific instance, resurgent Biafran nationalism may have profited from the attempts to reintegrate South easterners after the war and subsequent political developments in the country. As Amadiume (2000) argued, in spite of the alluring “no victor no vanquished” slogan with which the civil war ended, post-war events in Nigeria suggest that the former Biafrans, especially the dominant Igbo ethnic group, were ­reabsorbed into Nigeria as more or less a conquered people. The above ­sentiments were re-echoed by Onu (2001) who argues that the Biafra resurgence which one sees in groups such as the MASSOB, a youth driven and radical organization of succeeding generations of those who fought the war, denotes a perception that the existing political situation in Nigeria consigns the Igbo to a lower status in the comity of ethnic nationalities that make up the federation. In an insightful take, Ikpeze (2000) has itemized four distinct areas of the marginalization of the Igbo in contemporary Nigeria. These are: economic strangulation (which is mainly reflected in the economic re-entry of the Igbo into Nigeria after the war; the change of currency by the Nigerian government during the war rubbished Igbo savings and possession of the Naira and the 20-pound ceiling subsequently placed on the bank deposits of these people in Nigerian banks before the war made it difficult for this enterprising and commerce-oriented people to re-enter the economy); also the subsequent indigenization of multinational corporations shortly after the war ensured that given the general penury amongst the Igbo immediately after the war, only members of the other ethnic groups could benefit from this process; politico-bureaucratic emasculation (lop-sided appointments that were often conceived as biased against the Igbo and South easterners in general) and military ­neutralization (lack of appointment into high military commands and positions) and ostracism.

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  169 In summary, perceived examples of marginalization against the Igbo (see Ikpeze, 2000; Ojukwu, 2005; Onu, 2001; Duruji, 2009) include: a

b c d e f

g h

i

The 20-pound ceiling on savings left in Nigerian banks by fleeing Igbo people at the onset of the war. No matter the amount of money that was saved by these people before the war, they were given a paltry 20 pounds at the end of the war. The indigenization policy of the federal government shortly after the war when the Igbos were financially incapacitated. A deficient federal infrastructure and amenities in the zone (indirectly boosting the massive migration of the people from this area). Discrimination in location of industries and federal facilities. Ecological neglect. The abandoned property saga, that is, Igbo who had landed property in the other parts of the country before the war but who fled to the Eastern heartlands during the war have found it almost impossible to reclaim their property after the war. In a good number of cases, especially in neighbouring Rivers state (now South-south zone), such properties were appropriated by the indigenes and there has been no systematic and formal effort by the state to investigate this injustice. The easy target of ethno-religious violence which the Igbo in the North has become. These violent actions are recurrent and exact a heavy toll on Igbo lives and property in the North. The Southeast zone has the least number of states in the zone in comparison with the other five geopolitical zones with implications for the allocation of resources (there are seven states in the North West; six states in the other four zones; and only five states in the Southeast zone) Systematic “minoritization” of the Igbo mainly through political marginalization, manipulated census figures and scarce number of appointments of people from this zone in topmost bureaucratic and military positions.

But in examining the civil war, Ukiwo (2009) has argued that the secessionist attempt by Biafra was triggered by state violence rather than cultural divisions and that such a pattern of state-sponsored or endorsed violence has continued to foster ethnonationalism in Nigeria. This argument by Ukiwo would have been pertinent within the context of Nigeria’s history of military governance. These days, state-fostered or generated violence has become rather subtle and nuanced through targeting the kingpins of ethnic nationalist aspirations and agitations. The above remodelling of state violence has been utilized in the case of the leader of the IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, who was incarcerated for six months on charges of treason. The incarceration of Kanu while it inadvertently increased his national visibility and generated massive protests, was instrumental in ultimately degrading the Biafran agitation and robbing the IPOB-driven struggle of whatever little focus it had achieved.

170  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism

Trajectories of relevance: development dynamics and the resurgence of Biafran nationalism in Nigeria The roots of the development imbalance driving current agitations can probably be traced also to the immediate post-war efforts at reintegration of the Eastern parts of the country. In spite of being rich in rhetoric and acronym, the efforts of the federal government towards reintegration and rehabilitation of the citizens of the erstwhile Biafra republic has been severely criticized (see Heerten & Moses, 2014; Anugwom, 2018; Ibeanu et al., 2016; Jorre, 1972). The late erstwhile rebel leader Odimegwu Ojukwu lampooned the efforts of the federal government thus: what we have today is a white-imposed solution to satisfy white economic interests. There has been no solution to the problems that divide the two countries. The war was supposedly fought for unity; let Nigeria proceed and unite. Reports so far indicate a marked reluctance or unwillingness on the part of the federating force to federate. The basic needs of the people are not met; no food, no medicine, no shelter, no money. (Tamuno & Ukpabi, 1989: 82) As has been apprehended elsewhere, since the 1970s, the core of Igbo grievances has moved beyond the question of insecurity of lives and properties to economic disempowerment and political marginalization. There are several economic policies and actions of the government which are perceived to be punitive and designed to economically disempower the Igbo. (Ibeanu et al., 2016: 17) In a related sense, some observers argue that Biafra resurgence nowadays in Nigeria has to do with the inefficiency of the post-war transitional programme which failed to address human rights abuses committed against the people of the seceding republic of Biafra and that the memories of these injustices are still fresh in the people’s mind even fifty years after the war (Ugorji, 2017). Also, emblematic of the development imbalance in Nigeria which the resurgence of Biafra reflects, is the fact that elites from the Eastern parts of the country (Biafra) while not really in support of the all-out separatism being advocated by IPOB and others consistently argue for more inclusive development or political policies based on equity. For these elites, such things as greater political, economic and social inclusion are critical to addressing gross development lacuna among groups that often resembles systematic victimization. This desire, often encapsulated in the cries of marginalization, is however not peculiar to either the Igbo ethnic group or the

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  171 Eastern parts of Nigeria. While the cries of marginalization have been more or less consistent in the last three decades, they have become heightened in the current administration of Muhammadu Buhari (2015–). Political opponents of the administration and opposition parties have argued that appointments into key positions in the armed forces, government bureaucracies and political offices have been skewed in favour of a geo-ethnic group to the disadvantage of the others. Thus, it has been contended that, “given that the federal government has failed to address the issues of development in the southeast, new waves of agitation and a renewed call for another Biafran independence have emerged from the region and within the diaspora communities abroad” (Ugorji, 2017: 5). It would appear that the development challenge which the activities of such groups as the MASSOB and, more recently, IPOB have raised about how Nigeria is managed has also attracted the attention of others who, while not in support of secession or independence of Biafra, certainly endorse a radical restructuring of Nigeria. The above has been captured by one observer who ascribes the recent debates on restructuring Nigeria which was also a campaign issue in the recent (February 2019) elections in Nigeria3 to the activities of Nnamdi Kanu’s IPOB. Thus, Kanu’s activities through his Radio Biafra and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) have inspired a national debate about the nature of the federal structure of Nigeria. Many other ethnic groups and some Igbos who do not support the independence of Biafra are proposing a more decentralized federal system of government whereby the regions or the states will have more fiscal autonomy to manage their affairs and pay a fair share of tax to the federal government. (Ugorji, 2017: 8) Conceding to the above, a high-profile political elite from the East has equally seen the new spirit of Biafra as a metaphor for development imbalance in the polity which has generated a huge clamour for restructuring of the country (Ekweremadu, 2017). In his words, all these point to the fact that there is widespread dissatisfaction over how Nigeria is presently constituted and run. The South-east region, in particular, has, no doubt, been at the worst receiving end of the structural imbalances with ripples of disequilibrium in the distribution of resources and opportunities since the end of the civil war in 1970. (Ekweremadu, 2017: 1) Optimists on the side of the resurgence of Biafra and their many sympathizers may see the recurrent quest for Biafra since 1999 as reflective of the belief of Biafra’s civil leader, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, even at the end of the war in 1970, that Biafra will live forever. According to Ojukwu,

172  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism Biafra was borne out of the blood of innocents slaughtered in Nigeria during the pogroms of 1966. Biafra will ever live, not as a dream but as the crystallization of the cherished hopes of people who see in the establishment of this territory a last hope for peace and security. Biafra cannot be destroyed by mere force of arms. (Ojukwu quoted in Kirk-Greene, 1973: 456) But while the Biafra of old was largely orchestrated inter alia by what Ukiwo (2009) called state violence (especially depicted in the pogroms in the North shortly before the war) and the excessive centrifugal bend of the Nigerian state, the resurgence of Biafra nowadays owes much to a development paradigm that fosters marginalization and exclusion as well as the inability to manage the memories of the tragic episode of the war (see Anugwom, 2019).

Memory, development imbalance and the New Biafra There is no doubt that memory plays a significant role in the resurgence of Biafran nationalism (see Anugwom, 2018). Separatist groups like the IPOB have been able to work on what can be called the emotional and sentimental relation to the activities that led to the war and how the East has been marginalized as a result of losing the war. In fact, those who are now the ringleaders of the resurgence of Biafra are mainly either those who were not born before the war or were too young to fight the war. However, they still share a common bond with the atrocities of the past and the perceived marginalization of the people of the erstwhile Biafra in post-war Nigeria. The memory of the war, apart from the tales and narratives in popular culture, has also been given wide berth in the considerable volume of literature on the war since the 1980s. These publications have, advertently or otherwise, reawakened the memories of the war and refreshed the grievances. As has been aptly stated, although the authors of these books and monographs often claimed that their objective was not to reopen old wounds, representation of gory accounts of violence against the Igbo, the pre-war pogrom, wartime air strikes and starvation techniques, and post-war abandoned property saga, cumulatively reawakened a persecution complex among the Igbo. (Ukiwo, 2009: 27) Current Biafran activists have adroitly manipulated and profited from the above situation in winning converts and mobilizing a good portion of the population of the East to its goal. But as these new-age Biafra activists leverage the affective and emotional baggage of the war in present Nigeria

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  173 for their goals, they also have to deal with the negative sentiments and affront of other Nigerians beyond the Southeast who generally disown the Biafra aspiration of Easterners. The above clearly played out in the 6 June 2017 eviction notice given to Igbo living in the North of Nigeria by a group of Northern youth organizations, probably under the aegis of the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum. These Igbo were given until 1 October to leave the North as they would be subjected to acts of violence and forced eviction beyond that date. This was a direct response to the Biafra agitation led by the IPOB which was at its height at that period. But beyond the schism between two conflicting affective orientations as shown above is the fact that the development paradigm pursued in Nigeria since independence has done little to douse the flame of polarization in the country. It would appear that the dissatisfaction with the way and manner in which Nigeria is run has further heightened and entrenched ethnic and religious polarization and, in the process, mitigated development aspirations. But apart from the understandable animosity towards the new Biafra aspirations by other sections of Nigeria, the political elites in the Southeast region have seen no reason to support the resurgence of Biafra and, apart from opting for calls to restructure, these elites are often openly hostile or indifferent to Biafran agitation. As Egwonwu (2004) contends, most of these elites saw these activists as irritants and undesirable elements. In spite of the best efforts of genocide scholars, the war is too often apprehended in the memory of Southeasteners as reflecting the genocidal intentions of the federating army. However, the general denial of the genocide bend of the war owes much to the conclusion of prominent genocide scholars such as Robert Melson and Leo Kuper, that its nature did not qualify it as genocide (see Heerten and Moses, 2014), as it drew from the systematic denial and counter-propaganda of the federal government of Nigeria. In fact, the then Nigerian leader, Yakubu Gowon, in his speeches to the effect that the war was specifically against Ojukwu and his ilk rather than the generality of the people of Eastern Nigeria (see Ukiwo, 2009) was part and parcel of this scheme. In spite of the above, the predominant conception of the war in the Eastern parts of Nigeria, especially its antecedent massacres of the Igbo in the North in 1966,4 and even the way it was waged, especially the food blockade imposed by the federating forces, has been more along the line of systematic genocide than otherwise among many Igbo then and now. Even Igbo elites have in the main propagated narratives of the war as also a pogrom against the Igbo. In other words, “Biafran elites also termed the 1966 massacres “pogroms” and explicitly invoked Jewish and Armenian precedents, linking them to long-standing ethnic antipathies against Igbos living in ­northern Nigeria in particular” (Heerten and Moses, 2014: 185). Be the above as it may, the debate on whether the war was a case of genocide has been well-advanced by the insights provided by Heerten and Moses (2014), though there still remain some grey areas, such as the

174  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism pre-war massacres mentioned above and the atrocities/killings committed by Nigerian soldiers against helpless civilians in the mid-western town of Asaba. Thus, even if all claims by the Igbo fall flat, there is sense in the need to really go back and interrogate the actors and actions of that dark era. As has been argued, whether the massacres, bombings and famine are named as genocide or not, dealing with the history of the war is important for an understanding of the fabric of postcolonial Nigeria and of the international order in which the conflict emerged and unfolded. (Heerten & Moses, 2014: 192) The recourse of the Igbo to the resurgence of Biafra, or to a strong push for radical state restructuring in Nigeria, may be viewed in some quarters as the outcome of a development approach that has been marred by inequity and imbalance. In other words, at the onset of Nigerian statehood, the Igbo were among the strongest advocates of unity under a federal arrangement in the country. As has been noted, “prior to the war, the Igbo were the group with the strongest commitment to federalism, and the two coups that immediately preceded the Civil War represented attempts to reassert federalist principles amid growing ethnic wrangling and political crisis” (Ukiwo, 2009: 11).

Conclusion: towards equity and inclusive development The resurgence of Biafran nationalism, apart from underpinning the inability of Nigeria to deal with the memories of the past (see Anugwom, 2018) and learn useful lessons from the unsavoury past is a veritable source of social conflict and dissention that undermine development and weakens the needed solidarity to anchor sustainable and broad-based development in Nigeria. The country called Nigeria resembles too much a hotchpotch of ethnic nationalities that creates a scenario where too often the building of solidarity and conviviality for development is jeopardized. The above reality may be the driver of many of the sectional conflicts and agitations in the nation, which have the cumulative effect of impeding development and taking the steam out of development initiatives. Therefore, the discourse on Biafra should be anchored squarely on the need to achieve a development framework built on equity, social and distributional justice and fiscal autonomy of the component units of the Nigerian federation. One solution currently touted for bailing out Nigeria from its development doldrums and, especially, curtailing separatist agitation, is to restructure the country. Restructuring has become quite fashionable among the political class in the last five years. For some of them, restructuring, apart from addressing inequity, would help stabilize Nigeria so that the country

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  175 can get on with the task of achieving real development (see Moghalu, 2017). As has been posited, the Nigerian government must engage the agitations and address and redress, their root causes that lie in decades of self-evident marginalization that the Igbo have experienced in post-civil war Nigeria. These hurt feelings and the suspicions they breed have not just hampered the progress of nation-building in Nigeria. They are creating the foundations of certain state failure. (Moghalu, 2017: 1) The above entails that development may remain largely a mirage until the imbalance and inequity which characterize current efforts are addressed. While restructuring remains a critical part of achieving the goals of even and balanced development in Nigeria, there is a need, especially from the resurgence of Biafra, for concerted efforts to deal with the memories of the war (see Anugwom, 2018) and reclaim state-centred nationalism. In addition, structural incapacities (political corruption, nepotism, poor electoral systems etc.) and prevailing weak institutions must be tackled in order to put Nigeria on the path towards sustainable development.

Notes 1 The reference to Nigeria as a zoo seems quite uncharitable and reflects use of hate speech. 2 The defunct Bakassi Boys security outfit was purely a vigilante outfit which arose to fill the vacuum in the provision of state security in the zone (see Igbo, 2001). 3 The main opposition party at the federal level, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), made restructuring a key plank of its campaigns and the good showing of the party in the Southeast, where it won in almost all the five states in that zone, may be connected to the desire of the people there for at least a restructuring of Nigeria. Thus, while the political elites from the Eastern parts of the country have not shown open support for groups such as MASSOB and IPOB, they have advocated for restructuring as a way of dealing with some of the grievances driving the resurgence of Biafra. 4 In fact, the unexplainable failure of the federal government of Nigeria to institute a judicial investigation of these massacres and the Asaba massacre during the war casts some reasonable doubt on its genuine intention. The above remains one of the strongest planks of the suspicion of genocide in the war especially among the Easterners.

References Achebe, Chinua (2012). There was a country: A personal history of Biafra. New York: Penguin. Ake, C. (1992). The new world order: A view from the South. Lagos: Malthouse. Amadiume, I. (2000). “The politics of memory: Biafra and intellectual responsibility”, in Amadiume, I., & An-Na’im, A. (eds) Politics of memory: Truth, healing and social justice. London: Zed Books (pp. 38–55).

176  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism Anugwom, E.E. (1997). “Ethnic conflict and governance in Nigeria: Lessons from the past”, in Olisa, M.S.O. (ed.) Proceedings of the conference on inter-group conflicts, inter-Group wars and African development. Nsukka: University of Nigeria. Anugwom, E.E. (2000). “Ethnic conflict and democracy in Nigeria: The marginalisation question”. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 15 (1): 61–78. Anugwom, E.E. (2018). From Biafra to the Niger Delta conflict: Memory, ethnicity and the state in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Anugwom, E.E. (2019). The Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria: Perspectives from within. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Asobie, A. (1997). Quoted in Tempo (3 July). Castells, M. (1978a). City, class and power. London: Macmillan. Castells, M. (1978b). “Urban social movements and the struggle for democracy: The citizens movement in Madrid”. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2 (1–4): 133–146. Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J.L. (2002). “Millennial capitalism: First thoughts on a second coming”. Public Culture, 12 (2): 291–343. Coleman, J.S. (1986). Background to nationalism. London: Broburg & Wistrom. Crowther, M. (1976). West Africa under colonial rule. London: Hutchinson. Duruji, M.M. (2009). “Social inequity, democratic transition and the Igbo nationalism resurgence in Nigeria”. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 3 (1): 54–65. Ebiem, Osita (2014). Biafra and Boko Haram: Ending the genocides through multistate solution. New York: Free Press. Egwuonwu, A. (2004). “New strategies for a new war”. Nigeria–Biafra War Memorial Lecture (29 May). www.kwenu.com/biafra/memorial2004/egwuonwu-lecture.htm (accessed: 10 October 2012). Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert (2007). Biafra revisited. Dakar/Reading: African Renaissance. Ekweremadu, Ike (2017). “Biafra: The legal, political, economic, and social questions”. Address presented at the Meeting of South-East Governors, National Assembly Members, Ohaneze Ndi Igbo and Igbo Leaders. www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/­ biafra-legal-political-economic-social-questions (accessed: 23 February 2019). Fadahunsi, A. (1997). “Fiscal federalism in Nigeria”. Tempo (3 July): 9 and 12. Fanon, F. (1961). The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Forsyth, F. (1969). The Biafra story. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Gboyega, A. (1997). “Nigeria: Conflict unresolved”, in Zartman, W. (ed.) Governance as conflict management: Politics and violence in West Africa. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, (pp. 149–196). Gould, Michael (2011). The struggle for modern Nigeria: The Biafran war 1966–1970. London: I.B Tauris. Heerten, Lasse and Dirk Moses (2014). “The Nigeria-Biafra war: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide”. Journal of Genocide Research, 16 (2–3): 169–203. Heerten, Lasse (2015). “‘A’ as in Auschwitz, ‘B’ as in Biafra: The Nigerian civil war, visual narratives of genocide and the fragmented universalization of the holocaust”, in Fehrenbach, H., & Rodogne, D. (eds) Humanitarian photography: A history. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hicks, J.F. (1998). “Enhancing the productivity of urban Africa”. Paper presented at the International Conference on Human Settlements, Geneva (6–8 July). Ibeanu, O., Orji, N., & Iwuamadi, C.K. (2016). Biafra separatism: Causes, consequences and remedies. Enugu: Institute for Innovations in Development.

The resurgence of Biafran nationalism  177 Idowu, W.O. (1999). “Citizenship status, statehood problems and political conflict: The case of Nigeria”. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 8(2): 73–88. Igbo, E. (2001). “Urban crime situation in Nigeria”, in Ezeani, E., & Elekwa, N. (eds) Issues in urbanization and urban administration in Nigeria. Enugu: Jamoe. Ikpeze, N. (2000). “Post-Biafran marginalization of the Igbo in Nigeria”, in Amadiume, I., & An-Na’im, A. (eds) Politics of memory: Truth, healing and social justice. London: Zed Books. Jackson, R. (1990). Quasi-State: sovereignty, international relations and the third world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joireman, S.F. (2003). Nationalism and political identity. London: Continuum. Jorre, John D. (1972). The Nigerian civil war. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Joseph, R. (1987). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the second republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joseph, R. (1999). “Autocracy, violence and ethnomilitary rule in Nigeria”, in Joseph, R. (ed.) State, conflict and democracy in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (pp. 359–376). Katznelson, I., Gille, K., & Weir, M (1982). “Race and schooling: Reflections on the social bases or urban movements”, in Fainstein, N.I. & Fainstein, S.S. (eds) Urban policy under capitalism. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1975). The genesis of the Nigerian civil war and the theory of fear. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Korieh, Chima (ed.) (2012). The Nigeria-Biafra war: Genocide and the politics of memory. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press. Korieh, Chima., & Ezeonu, I. (eds) (2010). Remembering Biafra: Narrative, history, and memory of the Nigeria-Biafra war. Glassboro, NJ: Goldline and Jacobs Pub. Lemarchand, R. (1994). Burundi: Ethnocide as discourse and practice. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. Mabogunje, A. (1968). Urbanization in Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press. Mahmood, Y. (1993). “Human rights and Zangon-Kataf”. Citizen (15 February): 36–39. Mazrui, A. (1996). “Africa in political purgatory: The crossroads between a collapse and redemption”. Paper presented at the International Conference on Africa – Crisis and Challenges; Institute for the Advancement of Journalism, Johannesburg, South Africa. Moghalu, Kingsley (2017). “Between Biafra and restructuring Nigeria”. www.­ vanguardngr.com/2017/06/biafra-restructuring-nigeria (accessed: 23 February 2019). Njoku, Carol (2013). “A paradox of international criminal justice: The Biafra genocide”. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48 (6): 710–726. Nnoli, O. (1978). Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension. Ojukwu, C.C. (2005). “The Politics of integration and marginalization in nation-building: The Igbo question in Nigerian politics”. UNILAG Journal of Politics, 2 (1): 130–153. Onu, A. (2001). “Ethnicity and conflict management: A case study of MASSOB movement in Nigeria”. UNESCO/ENA Africa at Crossroads: Complex Political Emergencies in the 21st Century. MOST-Ethno-Net Publication. www.ethnonet ­africa.org/pubs/crossroadsonu.htm (accessed: 18 April 2008). Osaghae, E.E. (1994). Ethnicity and its management in Africa. Lagos: Malthouse. Omeje, K. (2005). “Enyimba enyi: The comeback of Igbo nationalism in Nigeria”. Review of African Political Economy, 32 (106): 630–636.

178  The resurgence of Biafran nationalism Onuoha, Godwin (2011). Challenging the state in Africa: MASSOB and the crisis of self-determination in Nigeria. Munster: LIT. Omeje, K., & Umoh, B. (2001). “Urban movements and politics in Nigeria”, in Ezeani, E., & Elekwa, N. (eds) Issues in urbanization and urban administration in Nigeria. Enugu: Jamoe. Osaghae, E. (1991). “Ethnic minorities and federalism in Nigeria”. African Affairs, 90 (359): 237–258. Otite, O. (1990). Ethnic pluralism and ethnicity in Nigeria. Ibadan: C. Shaneson. Ottaway, M. (1999). “Ethnic politics in Africa: Change and continuity”, in Joseph, R. (ed.) State, conflict and democracy in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (pp. 299–318). Streamlau, J. (1977). The international politics of the Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Suberu, R (1996). Ethnic minority conflicts and governance in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum and IFRA. Suberu, R (1991). “Ethnic minorities and the crisis of democratic governance in Nigeria”, in Olowu, D., Williams, A., & Soremekun, K. (eds) Governance and democratisation in West Africa. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA. Synder, J. (1993). “Nationalism and the crisis of the post-Soviet state”. Survival, 35(1): 1–12. Tamuno, Tekena & Ukpabi, S. (eds) (1989). Nigeria since independence: The first 25 years, Vol. VI – The civil war years. Ibadan: Heinemann. Ugorji, Basil (2017). Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB): A revitalized social movement in Nigeria. Mimeo, New York: International Centre for Ethno-Religious Mediation. Ukiwo, Ukoha (2009). “Violence, identity mobilization and the reimagining of Biafra”. Africa Development, XXXIV (1): 9–30. Waugh, A., & Cronje, S. (1969). Biafra: Britain’s shame. London: Joseph.

11 Primordial loyalties, ethnonationalism and the general crisis of national identity

Introduction Ethnonationalism in Nigeria implicates some enduring primordial loyalty that may have generated a deep crisis of identity. In this case, Nigerians are often torn between allegiance to their primordial or socio-geographical group and the larger Nigerian state. However, even more fundamental is that in most cases, primordial loyalty is placed ahead of or imagined as the superior source of identity. One’s primordial or ethnic base is also seen as where one contributes and builds rather than the state. The state by implication becomes constructed as the arena of ethno-inspired contest and of jostling over both resources and power. Given that Nigeria operates a lopsided federalism where excess political power and fiscal authority is concentrated at the centre of the federation, the contest for power at the centre has become heightened over time. This situation, apart from having dire implications for the smooth functioning of ideal federalism, has made the contest over power at the centre acute and a winner-takes-all affair in which all arsenals, including primordial forces, are deployed. Therefore, Nigeria is literally a nation beset with ethnonational patriotism. In this case, people’s allegiances and preferences are primarily for their ethno-social and geographical group rather than the larger Nigerian state. Ethnonationalism underscores both the fragile unity and nationalism in the Nigerian state and equally calls attention to why the state-building project has been frustrated by centrifugal forces. The emergence of ethnonationalism in Nigeria can be traced historically to the run-up to independence in 1960 and the formation of the First Republic. In this sense, both political party formation and emergence of political elites were influenced unduly by regional and primordial factors. The early political parties were in reality outcomes or direct mutations of ethno-social groups and most of their leaders were also prominent actors in these groups prior to independence. Reinforcing the descent into ethnonationalism is that the elites have, over time, found it to be a critical platform both for accessing and for consolidating power, especially at the centre of the Nigerian federation.

180  Ethnonationalism Perhaps the high point of the ethnonational bug occurred between 1966 and 1967, when a fractious relationship and ethnically driven contentions over power came to the boil and led eventually to the civil war. Since the end of the war in 1970 the Nigerian state, while maintaining a commendable semblance of nationalism, has been thoroughly influenced in almost all spheres of public life by ethnonationalism. As Anugwom (2018) argues, ethnonationalism has undermined Nigeria’s federalism and created a scenario where the development actions of the state (federal government) are perceived and appraised through ethnonational prisms. In specific terms, the over-five decades of independence in Nigeria has not really helped overcome the ethnonational problems or the enduring legacy of ethnicity as a consistent variable in interethnic and national relationships. Ethnonationalism has found ready vehicles in the obvious proliferation of ethnonational associations and groups in Nigeria. These groups can be located both in the ethnic majority groups and in the ethnic minority groups and often function as cultural subterfuges for the political aspirations of these groups within Nigeria. These groups have interestingly grown in significance and popular relevance more than the Nigerian state. Therefore, instead of withering away or declining in importance over time in postcolonial Nigeria they have instead grown and even become more relevant, especially as embodiments and drivers of ethnonational goals and group aspirations. Despite the existence of these groups in both ethnic majority and minority groups in the country, I will focus on the most visible and influential of these groups, which are also those in the three major ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani; Yoruba; Igbo. These groups are the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) with a youth wing known as Arewa Consultative Forum Youth Congress and an allied militant organization known as the Arewa People’s Congress (APC); the Afenifere Group (largely associated with the two factions of the Odu’a People’s Congress – OPC as militant and youth wings though the OPC often operates distinctly from the Afenifere); and the Ohaneze Ndigbo (associated in some sense, at least aspirationally, with the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the nascent Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Nigeria’s development over the years has been negatively influenced by  ethnonationalism or the overt dominance of ethnicity-driven socio-­ geographical or regional blocs in national life. It has created a situation whereby the necessary solidarity for development has been sabotaged as people put ethnonational and sectional interests before and above national interest. Development programmes and critical national institutions including key state bureaucracies are mired in primordial considerations and influences. Even more than the above, is that in a typically bifurcated imagination, there may be the conscious and unconscious development of two standards of relationship between the ethnic/primordial collective (seen as the real and very relevant bastion of both identity and allegiance) and the nation-state (seen as the source of pillage of resources for servicing the

Ethnonationalism  181 primordial collective or enclave). In other words, there is inherently the sense of two different publics and different standards of treatment and relationship to each (see Ekeh, 1975). Therefore, this chapter, depending on a thorough desk review, would interrogate the nature and influence of ethnonational groups on development in Nigeria. These groups with antecedent roots that in some cases predate the independence of Nigeria1 have remained key rallying points and bastions of primordial solidarity that often pits the ethnonational group against the state in Nigeria.

Ethnicity, ethnonationalism and strategizing for resources in the society Ethnonationalism, even though signifying distinct tendencies, is associated with ethnicity or ethnic affiliation. Ethnicity as already elaborated in a previous chapter is based on perceived commonalities among a given social group (see Sklar, 1967; Nagel, 1995; Barth, 1969). Ethnic groups are characterized and marked out from each other by mainly primordial features shared by the members of the group. But more than the above is the role of common history, association and belief in the perceived similarity or commonality of the members of the group. As has been stated, ethnic groups as groups, “held together by the belief in their common origins, provides a basis for the creation of a community” (Mbaku, 2001: 61). It is also important to realize that ethnicity, as a socio-political attribute, is dynamic and malleable over time. This entails that ethnic loyalty and membership may change over time and can be deviously invoked to suit changing circumstances. Equally worth noting is the contention that ethnic membership may be created by both choice and ascription (Barth, 1969). In this sense, an individual may choose to identify with a given group or may be defined (especially by birth or other features) by the society as a member of a given ethnic group. Be the above as it may, ethnonationalism is anchored on ethnicity and common political history, aspiration or other common primordial affiliations. In a very simple sense, it is the conflation of these affective loyalties and nationalism and the strategic utilization of this mixture in the quest to access or sustain one’s hold on valuable resources, that is, economic and political resources in the society. The above suggests that ethnonationalism is usually invoked strategically in a utilitarian sense in the pursuit of goals of the group. It implies the definition of the ethno-social or geographical groups as the foundation of identity of the individual. In other words, the individual believes that she is primarily a member of a given social group and even act out such belief in interaction or engagement with people from other groups and perceived outsiders. Thus, ethnonationalism crops up in the context of multiculturalism or more appropriately in the context of heterogeneity. It is always prominent

182  Ethnonationalism and easily invoked in societies or states with many other groups, especially when such groups are disproportionate in size and thus there is the motivation for groups to ensure they derive their commensurate share from the commonwealth. For some other groups the desire is to ensure that they are not swallowed up or marginalized by bigger groups. To buttress the role of heterogeneity in both ethnonationalism and ethnicity, the case of a country such as Tanzania seems apt. The famed non-prominent ethnic schism in Tanzania derives essentially from its unique constellation of ethnic and social groups. In this situation, no group in the country has more than 15% of the country’s population. Therefore, majoritarian domination becomes almost impossible, since all groups are small and collaboration across ethnic lines becomes inevitable as each group recognizes its powerlessness without the others. Identifying or associating with one’s ethnic group is apparently harmless. However, ethnonationalism by definition involves a comparative and relational utilization of ethnic or regional origin. In the first place, it implicates a conscious comparison of the situation (defined mainly in terms of benefits from the state) of the group with that of significant others in the society. Second, it equally resonates with relating the group to the society or state at large, and in the process a conscious preference for the ethnonational group over the state, and in its most prominent manifestation, sees the larger social entity, like the state, as relevant and important to the extent it ensures the survival and relative advantage of the group concerned. Without doubt, ethnicity is related to ethnonationalism and the difference between the two seems tenuous. However, ethnicity differs from ­ethnonationalism, since it is anchored on shared and common membership of a given group. It is also mainly adopted as the basis of identity and can be strategically deployed in the contest for resources in a multi-ethnic or plural society. However, ethnonationalism implicates allegiance and loyalty that are over and above the nation-state and spurs actions that undermine the state while perceived as in furtherance of the goals of the ethno-social group. The ethnonational group may in reality be the coalescence of a group of ethnic groups that share historical experiences and pursue similar political aspiration within a state. In effect, ethnonational groups, while embodying ethnic groups, are more critically grouped or delineated based on geo-social contiguities-cum-positioning and historical experiences within the state concerned. For instance, the Middle Belt of Nigeria and the Niger Delta region can be considered bastions of ethnonationalism in the minority enclaves of independent Nigeria. However, each of them contains a number of distinct ethnic groups but shows allegiance to the Middle Belt or Niger Delta as a distinct social entity within Nigeria. Thus, ethnonationalism often embodies also the political aspiration to supersede the state eventually and encourages the pillaging of the state or its resources for the primordial social group.

Ethnonationalism  183 In other words, the state may even be conceived as an arena for pillage and the zone of contestations over resources accruing to the primary group with other people from other groups. It is in the above manifestation that ethnonationalism becomes detrimental and militates against both the social compact and solidarity essential to development in a heterogeneous society. Nigeria, given its constellation of major (big) and minor (small) ethnic or social groups presents the typical heterogeneous framework for unbridled ethnonationalism. However, it must be mentioned that mere heterogeneity of the state does not automatically breed or foster ethnonationalism. Therefore, what is paramount is that the fostering or promotion of ethnonationalism lies mainly in the nature of the state concerned, its political culture and leadership (political elites). Ethnonationalism as a prominent plank of political competition in Nigeria may be theoretically underpinned by the notion of instrumentalism. This privileges the instrumental (value-driven; gain-spurred) deployment of ethnonationalism in a society. Ethnonationalism is instrumentalized as offering the platform for achieving both the goals of the group concerned and the goals of the individual, especially political elites. Political elites in Nigeria, right from the immediate independence era and immediate postcolonial political manoeuvres and recomposing, have shown a deep tendency towards employing ethnic and primordial factors in accessing power. This tendency is often seen as directly emanating from the inability of these elites to foster crosscutting ideologies upon which to anchor their political and leadership aspirations (see Obi, 2002). In this situation, ethnicity and the avowed loyalty to the ethno-social group become the rungs of an attractive ladder for climbing to political office, as well as for sustaining such positions. Incidentally, this form of political contest proliferated over time and came to define the political landscape. Perhaps, change began to emerge in the 1990s when political aspirants such as MKO Abiola of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP) were able to cross hitherto seemingly sacrosanct ethno-religious lines to appeal to many voters. The ability of Abiola and his running mate, Babagana Kingibe, who ran under a Muslim/Muslim ticket of the SDP to win overwhelmingly in the June 1993 presidential elections in the Christian South of Nigeria, was without doubt a watershed in Nigeria’s electioneering history, as it showed electorate discernment beyond primordial forces that had hitherto been the bane of genuine elections in Nigeria. In spite of the well-commended and acknowledged free and fair nature of the 1993 election, it was annulled eventually by the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida on grounds that were as superficial as they were contrived by the military junta then in power. The annulment of the election, which brewed enormous social unrest in the country and even led to the emergence of ethno-social groups in the West of Nigeria (Abiola’s region), can be seen as a vindication of the fact that the military itself was not above the ethnic veneer of public life in post-colonial Nigeria.

184  Ethnonationalism

Pre-independence politics and growth of ethnonational associations Just as in the case of ethnicity, ethnonationalism is often associated with the colonial era and the nature of intergroup relationship generated by that era. According to Agbese (2003) the colonial era created the “we” versus “them” and the North versus South mentality that has been carried over into the postcolonial era (see, also, Ekeh, 1975; Diamond, 1988; Nnoli, 1978; Coleman, 1958 for how the colonial administration in various policies and governance style laid the foundation for ethnonationalism to proliferate). In an interesting note, it has been argued that, while the different ethnicnationalities in Nigeria united against a perceived common enemy in the form of colonial rule and fought for its independence, after independence in October 1960 the country began to split against itself along ethno-­ cultural and religious cleavages (Olasupo, Olusola, Oladeji, & Ijeoma, 2017). Thus, while colonialism presented these groups with a common foe in the form of the colonial government, the end of colonial rule and the scramble to occupy the power vacuum created therefrom made these groups turn against themselves. However, under colonialism mobilization on the basis of ethnonational groups was targeted at resisting colonial rule and its policies. While such mobilization presented a good platform for the resistance and struggle against imperial colonial rule, it also functioned to perpetrate the divideand-rule agenda of the colonial regime that saw the dismemberment of the constituent units or groups in Nigeria as necessary to retaining its hold on power and domination while colonialism lasted. Colonial policies and administrative instruments strategically emphasized social and ethnic demarcations as well as promoted imbalances or differences in development programs among different groups. For instance, in the area of education, while the colonial regime favoured a Western-oriented modern education system for the South, it promoted or allowed a largely Islamic education system for the North and saw this as furthering its desire to maintain a strong hold on these groups while achieving the aims or goals of colonialism. The colonial regime’s motive in this case was mainly driven by the desire not to isolate traditional Northern elites who held strongly to a long tradition of Islamic learning which predated colonialism. However, apart from the unusual colonial government’s respect for the wish of traditional leaders the main desire was to get the necessary and willing collaboration of these traditional elites without whom the famed indirect rule system would not have worked. Decades of centralized administration under the emirs and a system of taxation on cattle well before the advent of colonial contact, made the traditional political system congruent with the indirect rule system that functioned through the utilization of exiting traditional institutions in direct governance of the locals.

Ethnonationalism  185 This system came highly recommended, since it saved cost in the administration of the colonies for the colonial office in London and equally limited the exposure of more British bureaucrats and administrators to the malaria bug in the hinterlands of colonial Nigeria. The success which the indirect rule system recorded in the North, unlike the case in the South of the country, is often related to the obvious quid pro quo regarding education and social life between the Europeans and the Northern traditional elites. This was considered by the pioneer colonial governor of Nigeria, Lord Lugard, as imperative to the success of the indirect rule system. Thus, “given that indirect rule depended on the goodwill and active connivance of the Northern oligarchy, Lord Lugard had to assuage these fears by promising to keep the missionaries and their schools out of the North” (Anugwom, 2019: 84). However, while the above scenario worked wonders for indirect rule in Nigeria and helped the colonial regime in bottling up the perceived impetuosity that Western education had produced in the South, it was the beginning of the imbalance in Western education between the North and South. This imbalance has often been a source of tension and dissension in the nation-building efforts in Nigeria, especially in the run-up to independence and early postcolonial life. Incidentally, the democratic space in the country since 1999 has given a wide berth to the expression of centrifugal tendencies by ethnonational groups. This is to be expected, since the liberal political atmosphere and associational public life promoted by democracy generally grants space to the expression of divergent viewpoints, including even dissenting opinions among groups and citizens. Even what may be largely termed nominal democracy in Nigeria has created a significant role for the rule of law and constitutionalism that empowers freedom of speech and association. However, before the era of democracy, ethnonational sentiments and centrifugal tendencies were largely muted under the military. While such tendencies have been part of the political and social life of independent Nigeria, the military regimes before 1999 sought to coercively restrain such tendencies. In other words, the atmosphere of repression under the military regimes then had a very restrictive influence on the expression of ethnonationalism, except those represented and embodied by the military institution itself. In this case, the assumption that the military successfully reined in ethnonationalism should be considered ambivalent to a large extent from the larger Nigerian scenario since the military itself as an institution in Nigeria has equally been influenced by ethnicity and ethnonationalism. Apart from ethnicity playing a role in the recruitment and promotion of military personnel, the military regimes before 1999 were seen as embodying the political aspiration of a section of the country to rule the rest forever. In specific terms, given that these leaders were mainly from Nigeria’s Northern region, there was the feeling among some Southerners that the military as a coercive institution still represented the political aspirations and hegemony of the North. While this suspicion remains both plausible and yet unproven,

186  Ethnonationalism there is no doubt that given the overflowing ethnonational tendencies in the society, the military as an institution of that society cannot be seen as totally free of ethnic tendencies and their influence on public life in Nigeria.

Prominent ethnonational groups in postcolonial Nigeria In line with the goals of this chapter, there is a need to offer an overview of the prominent ethnonational groups in the country. While there are, no doubt, very militant and highly visible ethnonational groups among ethnic minorities in Nigeria, the focus here is solely on the prominent groups in the ethnic majority areas that obviously exert influence on national sociopolitical life. Strangely, these groups are considered very relevant even among the ethnic majority groups that have largely monopolized power in the centre. In other words, these groups, unlike the ones in the minority enclaves, are not primarily motivated by self-identity struggles or desire for political independence, as they are anchors of the political aspirations of these groups within the Nigerian state. They also function as the basis of both lobbying and agitation for more benefits from the commonwealth; however allegiance to these groups is seen as superior to that owed the Nigerian state. The state is then perceived as relevant to the extent it enables these groups achieve their desires.

The Arewa Consultative Forum and the Arewa People’s Congress The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) was founded in March 2000 by a group of traditional leaders and other prominent citizens from the North of the country in a bid to promote the political goals and aspirations of the North. The group is seen as generally emanating immediately from the  desire of the Northern political elites not to allow the erosion of the ­relative political advantage of the North over other groups in Nigeria in the context of the re-emergence of democracy in Nigeria in 1999. It was seen as the anchor and embodiment of the North’s political aspiration in democratic Nigeria. The ACF is both a social and political organization and presents a formidable umbrella for the protection of perceived political interests of the North especially in relation to the larger politics of Nigeria and the position of the North vis-à-vis other sections of the country. A former InspectorGeneral of Police, Alhaji Muhammadu Dikko Yusuf, is the chairman and currently heads the forum. The name “Arewa” simply means the “North” in the Hausa language, which is the official lingua franca in the northern areas of Nigeria. The ACF, which seeks to promote the interests of the North in Nigeria, especially its political hegemony, has been the fulcrum and motivation of

Ethnonationalism  187 radical and militant activism expressed mainly by youth groups associated with it. Perhaps most prominent in the above case is the Arewa People’s Congress (APC). The APC declared itself militant from the onset and is dedicated to the promotion of the interests of the North especially the Hausa-Fulani groups within the context of the Nigerian federation. Even though both the APC and ACF do not agitate for the balkanization of Nigeria, they both espouse views and adopt positions that show the superiority of their allegiance to the North over that they owe the Nigerian state. Moreover, a critical study of the activities and especially statements of the leading members of these groups would show that they see Nigeria’s existence as mainly justifiable through their areas’ gains from the union. The sectional politics of the ACF has produced, or led to the emergence of, fiery youth groups that have been the focus of militant ethnonationalism. These groups have been outrightly confrontational and more or less intolerant of opinions they consider anti-North. A recent high point of such outrageous militancy occurred in 2017 when these groups gave the Igbo living in the North of the country a deadline to leave the area or run severe risks to both their lives and properties in the North. These amorphous groups – which include Arewa Citizens Action for Change, Arewa Youth Consultative Forum, Arewa Youth Development Foundation, Arewa Students Forum and Northern Emancipation Network – signed the so-called Kaduna Declaration issued on 6 June 2017 in which they declared war on the Igbo from the Southeast and gave the Igbo until 1 October 2017 to leave the North or face severe reprisals (see Sahara Reporters, 2017). They also asked Northerners living in the Southeast to leave the area before the same deadline. These groups argued that they were reacting to the activities of the IPOB, which they saw as confrontational and unwelcoming. Be the above as it may, the test case of the solidarity of the ACF occurred in 2009 at the height of the crisis over then President Musa Yar’Adua who was severely ill. The illness of Yar’Adua, elected president in 2009 after the eight- year stint of the Yoruba Southerner Olusegun ­Obasanjo, threatened the desire of the North to also rule the country for its own reciprocal eight years (said to be part of a consensus among the political elites arising especially from the post-1993 election crisis). However, Yar’Adua’s deputy was a Southerner from the minority South-south zone and the persistent illness of the President, especially towards the end of 2009, opened up the possibility of his deputy taking over the reins of power in the spirit of the 1999 constitution. To its credit, the ACF eventually supported the handing over of power to the deputy president and stated this unequivocally in February 2010 as Yar’Adua’s condition further deteriorated. This position of the ACF rocked its foundations and some prominent members of the group left in protest. Yar’Adua eventually succumbed to his illness and his deputy Jonathan Goodluck went on to assume the office. The departed ACF members, including the highly influential and founding member Alhaji Tanko Yakassai, have gone back to the fold. The group has

188  Ethnonationalism been fingered as contributing to the electoral successes of current President Muhammadu Buhari (a Northerner) in both 2015 and 2019.

The Afenifere and Oodu’a People’s Congress Respected physician Frederick Faseheun formed the Oodu’a People’s Congress (OPC) in 19942. Frederick Faseheun expressly wanted to actualize the mandate of M.K.O Abiola. He felt that other Yoruba and national organizations involved in the actualization bid were not doing enough. The extent of Faseheun’s contribution in this regard is perhaps evinced by the fact that he was eventually jailed for 19 months between December 1996 and June 1998 by the military government of the late General Sani Abacha. Therefore, the OPC was the organized crystallization of the disenchantment of the peoples of the Western region of Nigeria with the unwarranted and reasonably unjustifiable annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election won by a Yoruba man. While the OPC shares a semblance of originality with the Afenifere, which aimed at uniting the Yoruba and ­promoting its interests in Nigeria, it debuted as mainly a much more youthdriven, vociferous and militant organization. Both the Afenifere and the OPC can be seen as drawing impetus from the older Yoruba Egbe Omo Oduduwa, which was vibrant in the run-up to Nigeria’s independence and the immediate postcolonial era. The Egbe Omo Oduduwa was the staging ground of the Yoruba-dominated Action Group (AG) political party of the First Republic. The Afenifere, which is the contemporary Yoruba ethnonational association, was formed by a group of Yoruba elites as a socio-cultural organization in 1993 (see Ighodaro, 2001). The founding members of the group include Abraham Adesanya (who became its first leader); Bola Ige (erstwhile governor of Oyo state and Minister of Power); Lateef Jakande (former Lagos state governor); Olu Falae (former presidential aspirant); Femi Okuroumu; Reuben Fasoranti among others. Its full name, which pays tribute to the earlier Yoruba group, is the Egbe Omo Afenifere. The organization is today led by Reuben Fasoranti, with the outspoken Yinka Odumakin as its spokesman. However, much of the valence of the OPC as a formidable organization derives from the splinter arm of the organization led by the then youthful Gani Adams, who stated that it was a militant group and showed a willingness to adopt violent and confrontational strategies in pursuit of the Yoruba agenda within Nigeria. This splinter group of the OPC was formed in 1999 and was motivated by the belief of Adams and his associates that the original OPC had gone soft, especially since the prison experience of Faseheun. As a result, the militant OPC was involved in a couple of ­skirmishes with other ethnic groups, especially the Hausa Fulani group within the Lagos area. Even in the current dispensation, where a majority of the Southerners sees the menace of Fulani herdsmen as politically motivated, the Gani Adams faction of the OPC has risen to the challenge by threatening

Ethnonationalism  189 fire and brimstone, as was its style in the 1990s and early 2000s. There is the feeling in Nigeria’s popular culture that the eventual ascension to office of Olusegun Obasanjo as a civilian president in 1999 was made possible by both the political posturing of the OPC and the resolve of the North to placate the West and redeem Nigeria’s fledgling nationality from imminent disintegration. The Afenifere, even though described as a pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organization, has been highly political in nature and seeks to promote the political interests of the Yoruba in Nigeria. It was thus heavily involved in the massive protests against and condemnation of the annulment of the 12 June 1993 election. It also provided the push and motivation for the eventual formation of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), a very vocal and militant pro-democracy group formed in 1994 that assiduously worked towards the eventual return of democracy to Nigeria in 1999. However, NADECO drew membership from across groups in Nigeria with an interest in the enthronement of democracy and disdain for draconian military rule. It was thus not strictly a Yoruba affair in spite of the preponderance of Yoruba among its membership. The NADECO provided the platform upon which Abiola declared himself president on 11 June 1994. Founding members of the group include Cornelius Adebayo, Ebitu Ukiwe, Michael Ajasin, Balarabe Musa, Ayo Opadokun, Ndubuisi Kanu among others.

The Ohaneze Ndigbo The Ohaneze Ndigbo, or commonly called Ohaneze, though founded as early as 1976, re-emerged in the 1990s as a prominent socio-political organization of the Southeastern region. The group does not define itself as a political organization but rather as a socio-cultural organization of all Igbo in Nigeria and the diaspora. However, in recent times, and arising from political realities in Nigeria, its main goal has been, and remains, the addressing of the apparent marginalization of the Igbo since the end of the civil war within the federation of Nigeria. A very important highlight in the history of the group was in 1999 when it submitted a very articulate and elaborate memorandum to the Oputa Panel (Human Rights Violations Investigation Panel established by the government of Olusegun Obasanjo and headed by late Justice Chukwudifu Oputa) in 1999. The memorandum captured the essentials of perceived Igbo marginalization in Nigeria, especially since the end of the civil war in 1970. According to a pro-Biafra news outlet, News Mirror, the pan-Igbo sociopolitical organization Ohaneze Ndigbo forwarded a highly interesting petition to the Oputa Panel in its sitting in Enugu. In the said petition, the group essentially focused on what it saw as the marginalization and injustice meted out to the Southeasterners and which are negative consequences of the Nigerian civil war to the people of the Southeast decades after its end. For the group, marginalization in this case entailed,

190  Ethnonationalism Purposeful denial of rights of some members of a group by some other members of the group who control the power of allocation of resources. Marginalization must be understood as fundamentally different from marginality, which means deprivation of rights through self-inflicted underdevelopment. In all realms of public endeavor, Ndi Igbo have the requisite manpower and natural resources. But their rights to a fair share of Nigeria’s resources have been denied them by Federal Authorities. (News Mirror, 2001: 3–4) On the other hand, injustice implied that the republican spirit of the Igbo and their individual drive, best expressed in a flair for free competition in all spheres of national life, have been handicapped and snuffed out by the disposition of the national leadership and their policies towards the group since the end of the war. The petition also pointed to the Holocaust-like extermination of the Igbo before and during the war. It went on to argue that this massacre was well planned and systematic, with the tacit support of Nigeria’s government; thus, it was tantamount to genocide. After enumerating specific cases of injustice against the region, the organization ended the petition by arguing, what would have been dismissed as unfortunate excesses of revengeful excitement in the flush of victory soon settled into a policy of marginalization and disempowerment of Ndi Igbo. Successive governments maintained a disturbing continuity of a policy of strangulation of Ndi Igbo in spite of all rhetoric to the contrary. (News Mirror, 2001: 5) In spite of the existence of the Ohaneze, Igbo ethnonationalism and political aspirations have been mainly driven by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) led by Raph Uwazuruike and the more contemporaneous youthful Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) led by Nnamdi Kanu. These groups have been the drivers of resurgent Biafran nationalism and envision the re-emergence of Biafra, which they see as the only solution to perceived marginalization of the Igbo in Nigeria. A critical difference between the Ohaneze and the other ethnonational groups discussed here is that Ohaneze has shown little or no support for radical Igbo youth groups, especially the IPOB and even the MASSOB before it. There is apparently no love lost between Ohaneze and the IPOB that sees Ohaneze as a reactionary group of politicians seeking relevance within a jaundiced Nigerian state.

Ethnonationalism and development in Nigeria The enormous insecurity challenge in Nigeria and the inexplicable incapacity of the state and its security agencies to deal with the violence in the last

Ethnonationalism  191 ten years may lead one to the conclusion that the nature of the state itself may be the driver of such violence and dissension. In other words, there is seemingly the unavoidable perception that Nigeria’s weak state (characterized by a plethora of structural inadequacies) may be facilitating a scenario in which political and social violence are taken as legitimate political and social actions. This situation, apart from consolidating militant ethno-social groups, equally makes ethnonationalism a point of reference for allegiance. For instance, the recent menace of Fulani herdsmen in the South of Nigeria has emboldened and spurred on ethnonationalism built around such ethnonational groups in Southern Nigeria as the OPC, Ohaneze and the Biafra resurgence group, IPOB. Ethnonationalism becomes a major issue in the context of an ethnicized state in which citizens perceive the state and its prominent agents and agencies as under the clutches of primordial forces (see Anugwom, 2018). Incidentally, Nigeria fits the above bill and its political elites have over the years shown a predilection towards primordial politics and the deployment of primordial factors in the contest for power especially at the centre. Very interesting here is to appreciate the nature of the post-colonial Nigerian state, which lacks the capacity to deal with the multiple challenges of diversity confronting it. Accordingly, the state, from inception, had both limited autonomy and capacity for arbitration of the claims of competing ethnic and social groups (see Ake, 1996a, 1996b). The state itself is thus caught up in the contest as both the arena of ethnicized competition and the ultimate prize of such contestations. In a somewhat ambivalent manner one may be led to contend that ethnonational agitations are largely benign and are not inherently targeted towards the collapse of the state but rather to the reconstruction or re-composition of the state in Africa. In other words, ethnonational agitations do not betray the ideal of the state and the collective solidarity imbued in it but are efforts to rid the African state of the vestiges of colonialism and remake them on terms that reflect the genuine aspirations and desires of the people. Despite whatever good points one may find in this interesting viewpoint, its value is eroded by the fact that such ethnonational agitations have not only undermined the state but have vitiated the solidarity and conducive atmosphere needed for the achievement of meaningful growth and development in these states. Nigeria represents a good example of this frame, that is,  where ethnonationalism has not only invalidated the state project but  equally cast adrift the efforts to enthrone meaningful development or growth. Ethnonationalism erodes the essence of the modern idea of the state, especially its perception as embodying the fulcrum of nationalism. Ideally, nationalism implicates the existence of a nation (defined more less along the lines of the state as a political entity often composed of different or distinct social groups that came together to share their commonwealth and subsume their differences under the rubric of the state as a superior entity)

192  Ethnonationalism or a nation-state. In this sense, nationalism is found among members of a nation who are a group of people that perceive themselves to be “a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry” (Kellas, 1998: 3). Equally, a political ideology which promotes primary identity and allegiance is embodied in the state. Even though a political entity, the nation creates the sense both of belonging and of oneness among members that should trump or supersede any other form of identity. It is in this sense that nationalism creates a “wefeeling” among members which is also the basis of distinguishing these people from others or members of other nations. As Hoffman and Graham (2009) argue, nationalism should reflect a body of doctrine, theory or beliefs regarding the nation, especially the historical significance and moral importance of the nation concerned. It is in this frame of thought that the nation encompasses ethnic and social groups and portends superior morality regarding interpersonal and intergroup existence within the orbit of a political entity. The idea of the nation-state captures the above realities and coheres with the perception that it blurs or enervates ethnic cleavages and in the process builds strong attachment to the state by the different ethno-social groups now composed in the state. While not indulging in the finer arguments and theoretical expositions about the nation or nation-state here, it is adequate to state that ethnonationalism as the basis of primary allegiance and even locus of identity erodes the essence of the modern state since ethno-social groups in joining the state are expected to be literally shorn of this primordial tendency. At a minimum, such groups, while maintaining their identity relative to others within the same state, are expected to espouse superior or primary allegiance to the state. The triumph of ethnonationalism over the notion of the state or state-­ oriented nationalism in Nigeria obviates the whole idea of nationalism and militates against development. As Smith (1991) argues, nationalism is not about all members of the nation being alike or similar but, more importantly, they should be above, and superior to, other forms of solidarity and bond. Therefore, the bond one shares with the primordial group should not be higher or above that of the nation or state, which embodies this superior nationalism. The superiority of ethnonationalism over state nationalism is often invoked as a critical distinction between developed and developing societies. In this sense, the developed society is one in which primordial loyalty and allegiance are subservient to and even derived from the nationalism of the state, while the developing society is one in which primordial loyalty overrides national or state focused loyalty. At best in such societies, individuals are in a dilemma over which loyalty is superior or comes first. In its ideal form, nationalism recognizes the reality of ethnic formations or subnational groups but holds that these should not violate the state formation process. In the views of Gellner (1983), nationalism is anchored on a form of political legitimacy, which recognizes that ethnic boundaries

Ethnonationalism  193 should cut across political boundaries. Implied here is that the ethno-social group is usually a sub-entity within the state and should neither erase the state nor be the basis of nationalism and political legitimacy. Therefore, the overshadowing of the Nigerian state by ethnonational groups and their desires obfuscates the development process and casts the state as hostage to the centrifugal desires of these different groups in Nigeria. The valence of ethnonationalism in the political space is probably promoted by the fact that candidates in elections often have no other credible credentials or qualities for the office they aspire to, apart from being from the geo-social group in which the political constituency is located. In other words, they are attracted towards deploying ethnic idioms and appeals to market their candidature. This situation derives from and is sustained by the apparent multi-party system (and single candidate membership) electoral tradition in Nigeria as well as the carving out of electoral constituencies and pooling units based on ethno-social contiguities. As has been argued, the case is so because most of the constituencies in Nigeria are coterminous with ethnic homeland. As such, it is easy for candidates to contest elections without any program but their ethnic credentials of being “the son of the soil”. (Duruji, 2010: 96) In sum, ethnonationalism, which privileges the prominence of particularistic desires within a nation, may negatively influence development. As the situation in Nigeria amply demonstrates, quite a lot of energy that would have gone towards national development is invested in these groups. In addition, these groups reflect ready lines of intergroup conflict and centrifugal tendencies that erode the national solidarity needed for development. Without doubt, development is severely impeded in a situation whereby ethnonational allegiances are seen as superior to national allegiance and the state is often perceived as the object of pillage to service the needs of substate entities and ethnonational desires.

Conclusion In spite of the dampener of ethnonationalism on the state project, it may still be plausible to contend that ethnonationalism in Nigeria has not been outrightly destructive. This is especially reasonable given that in spite of heightened and consistent ethnonationalism the Nigerian state (regardless of the major aberration of the civil war) has persevered for over five decades now. In other words, ethnonationalism in Nigeria is fundamentally not geared towards the collapse or total negation of the state. Arising from the above is that ethnonational agitations may be framed within two major dimensions.

194  Ethnonationalism These are the agitations that could be termed largely benign or innovatively driven and the agitations that are driven by the desire to unmake the state. In Nigeria, ethnonationalism has been mainly more benign than otherwise. In this situation, these groups are driven essentially by the need to improve the allocation that accrues to the substate entities (states and LGAs) as well as the agitation for restructuring3 of the Nigerian state along the lines of more autonomy for substate entities and the move towards real fiscal federalism. Opposed to the above model of benign ethnonationalism is the destructive or counter-political ethnonationalism, which is mainly driven by the desire to remake, reconstitute or even nullify the existing state. Good examples of this form of ethnonationalism can be seen in the form of ethnonational fervour and allegiance that enabled Eritrea to carve itself out of Ethiopia; the same or similar thing occurred in the case of the Southern Sudan and Sudan and the ongoing agitation by the Oromo in Ethiopia; the Southern Cameroon in Cameroon etc. These ethnonational agitations are principally motivated by the desire or goal of these substate groups to seek completely different autonomy and identity outside the context or orbit of the state where they are currently located. In spite of the above distinction, the mere existence and persistence in the case of Nigeria of ethnonational groups that influence national sociopolitical issues and decisions speaks volumes about the nature or depth of nationalism in such a state. In addition, the distinction or gap between the benign and counter-political ethnonationalism can be easily bridged in times of acute hardship or national socio-political emergencies. The civil war in Nigeria actually portrays the above reality and shows how dissatisfaction with political events in the state could easily motivate and drive forces destructive of the state project. In addition, while these groups define themselves in most cases as socio-cultural organizations, their activities and postures do not support this. Therefore, these groups have evidently functioned mainly as political advocacy and pressure groups for particular socio-geographical zones and have often opposed state-centric policies and moves perceived as against the interests of the group concerned. It is in the above sense that their proliferation and activities in Nigeria should bother those with interests in the building of a more united and prosperous nation.

Notes 1 For instance, the ACF is seen as rising from the ashes and inspiration of the defunct First Republic Northern dominated political party – Northern People’s Congress; while Afenifere equally embodies the aspirations of the earlier Yoruba socio-cultural group – the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. 2 Dr. Frederick Faseheun passed away in December 2018 at the age of 83 in Lagos. 3 This issue has featured prominently in public discourse in Nigeria in the last two decades and was even a prominent plank of electioneering campaigns by political parties in the recent 2019 elections.

Ethnonationalism  195

References Agbese, P. (2003). “Managing ethnic relations in a heterogenous society: The case of Nigeria”, in Mbaku, J., Agbese, P., & Mwangi, K. (eds) Ethnicity and governance in the Third World. Aldershot: Ashgate (pp. 125–148). Ake, Claude (1996a). Democracy and development in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Ake Claude (1996b). “The political question”, in Oyeleye, O. (ed.) Governance and development in Nigeria: Essays in honour of Billy Dudley. Ibadan: Oyediran Consult Int. (pp. 22–32). Anugwom, E.E. (2018). From Biafra to the Niger Delta conflict: Memory, ethnicity and the state in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Anugwom, E.E. (2019). The Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria: Perspectives from within. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Barth, Frederick (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries. Boston, MA: Little Brown. Coleman, J. (1958). Nigeria: Background to nationalism. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Diamond, Larry (1988). Class, ethnicity and democracy in Nigeria. New York: Syracuse University Press. Duruji, M. (2010). “Democracy and the challenge of ethnonationalism in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Interrogating institutional mechanics”. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 15: 92–106. Ekeh, Peter (1975). “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17 (1): 91–112. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hoffman, J., & Graham, P. (2009). Introduction to political theory. London: Pearson Longman. Ighodaro, John (2001). “Afenifere was formed 1993 in chief’s house – Akande”. Vanguard Newspaper (29 November). Kellas, J. (1998). The politics of nationalism and ethnicity. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Mbaku, John (2001). “Ethnicity, constitutionalism and governance in Africa”, in Mbaku, J., Agbese, P., & Mwangi, K. (eds) Ethnicity and governance in the Third World. Aldershot: Ashgate (pp. 59–101). Nagel, Joane (1995). “Resource competition theories”. American Behavioural Scientist, 38 (3): 442–458. News Mirror (2001). “Igbo insist on justice, warn on break-up if marginalization continues”. News Mirror, 3 (5): 5. Nnoli, O. (1978). Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension. Obi, C. (2002). “Ethnic minority agitations and the spectre of national disintegration”, in Falola, T. (ed.) Nigeria in the twentieth century. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Olasupo, Olusola., Oladeji, I.O., & Ijeoma, E.O. (2017). “Nationalism and nationalist agitation in Africa: The Nigerian trajectory”. Review of Black Political Economy, 44: 261–283. Sahara Reporters (2017). “Northern youths declare war on Igbos in the North, ask them to ‘leave’ within three months” (6 June 2017). www.saharareporters.com (accessed: 20 September 2019). Sklar, R. (1967). “Political science and political integration”. Journal of Modern African Studies, V (1): 6–8. Smith, A. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin.

12 Resource distribution, marginalization and sectionalism Implications for democracy and development in Nigeria Introduction While Nigeria celebrated its twentieth year of uninterrupted democracy in June 2019 with fanfare, it would be naive to assume that it has fully come out from the group of nations characterized as operating nominal democracy. Therefore, the celebration should elicit sober reflections on how to strengthen democratic practices and more critically stem the tide of centrifugal forces that regularly threaten not only democracy but even the continuation of the Nigerian nation. Without contest, one main source of centrifugal tendencies or sectional impulses in the federation is the resource distribution system, which has been dogged with contentions since Nigeria’s independence. Resource allocation or distribution has always been a controversial issue in heterogeneous or multi-cultural societies, especially in the developing world. However, the problem of resource allocation assumes a conflict dimension where sectional interests or ethno-regionalism become crucial negotiating blocks in state elite formation. The contest over resources in Nigeria has focused essentially on access to political power at the centre of the federation and oil wealth, since Nigeria’s national economy is oil dependent. Despite the focus of Nigeria’s over 200 ethnic groups on oil as a single earner of reasonable foreign exchange, the Nigerian state has failed woefully in either ensuring social justice or improving lives with the enormous wealth from oil. Therefore, in the views of Cohen (1999), oil has become the source of conflicts, claims and counter-claims engendered by both poverty and neglect. It is this neglect in the midst of wealth that generates social conflict and reverses patriotism to the state to allegiance to primordial ethnonational groups by citizens who see the state as largely irrelevant to their daily aspirations. Leaders in negotiating political power and in dispensing economic benefits also cash in on this form of primordial allegiance, which pits the different ethno-regional groups against each other. In the light of the sectional bend of leadership, the resource allocation process is often subjected to serious scrutiny by contending groups. This scrutiny results from either a distrust of the actions of political elites or where the actions

Resource distribution and marginalization  197 of political actors and the state have been interpreted as biased (see Anugwom, 2005). The above politics of resource distribution invariably makes democracy a zero–sum game where the winners take all, to the detriment of those marginal to state power. Nevertheless, democracy has thus far equally failed to address the contentious resource allocation process in Nigeria’s federalism. The dissatisfaction of different groups in the federation over the resource allocation process has fostered different forms of ethnonationalities; prominent among them in recent times has been the Niger Delta and Southeast militants.1 In this case, ethnonational associations may have become the bastion of popular solidarity and a beacon of hope for the less privileged. Obvious in the foregoing is that the critical dissonance between the expectations of democracy and the reality of democracy has further entrenched people’s faith in sectional or ethno-regional groups. Even more worrisome is that the existing gap between the popular or subaltern imagery of democracy and that of the political elites has been instrumental in breeding conflict and social unrest, which are often seen as means of either resisting social injustice or achieving social justice. However, prominent in the conceptions of such groups is the casting of the state in Nigeria as an agent of marginalization or exclusion of some groups from the nation’s socio-political and economic distribution processes. This fact is perhaps poignantly illustrated in the case of the groups in the Niger Delta in the contention, “the region produces immense oil wealth and has become the engine of Nigeria’s economy. But it also presents a paradox, because these vast revenues have barely touched the delta’s own pervasive local poverty” (UNDP, 2006: 9). Therefore, the state in Nigeria has been accused of using systematic marginalization to exclude groups that are distant from the locus of state power (see Anugwom, 2004; Lubeck, Watts, & Lipschutz, 2007). The conflict around resource allocation in Nigeria, as already indicated, is anchored on ethnic or geo-ethnic cleavages. In this case, the different ethnic groups or geopolitical groups see themselves as embroiled in a stiff competition for national resources given the basic truism that such resources are both valuable and scarce. This is in tune with the contention of Nnoli (1978) that conflict as an aspect of ethnicity is more pronounced in societies where interethnic competition for scarce resources is the rule. This is particularly the case when inequality is accepted as the de facto reality in governance and wealth is valued. In such an asymmetrical society, competition and rivalry may be seen as normal pathways to moving up the societal ladder. Against the foregoing discussion, this chapter examines the issue of resource distribution and its influence on democracy in Nigeria. Without doubt, the nexus between the two affects general development in the country. Information for the chapter was derived from the extant literature and perusal of documentary data.

198  Resource distribution and marginalization

Perspectives on sectional politics and marginalization One credible explanation of ethnonationalism, especially in heterogeneous societies such as Nigeria, is the sociological notion of relative deprivation. In this sense, restiveness and dissatisfaction over resource allocation derives from a rational comparison between a group’s shares and benefits and those of significant others. In this process of comparison, a negative balance between either perceived contribution and benefit, or between the group’s share and that of another group seen as contributing same or less, breeds psychological dissonance which easily generates conflict. Deprivation, apart from being instructive in studying individual action, has been found useful in explaining the emergence and persistence of social movements (see Igbo and Anugwom, 2002). However, even more poignant in the case of Nigeria is the resource mobilization thesis (see Kitschelt, 1986). In this framework, ethnonational movements as we have in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in the West and in the East may be seen as civil society’s rational and popular response to new situations and opportunities in Nigerian society. In other words, these groups are embodiments of new forms of political participation and resource negotiation, which aim towards both creating and tapping political and other resources in Nigeria’s democracy. Equally germane in the examination of the oil–state nexus in Nigeria is the popular resource curse notion. This notion, with roots in the discipline of economics (see Sachs and Warner, 2001; van Wijnbergen, 1984; Torvik, 2002, 2001) argues that natural resources endowment alone does not automatically mean development, since there are many cases of areas that were not well-endowed, resource wise, that have achieved more development than the resource-rich states. However, very critical is the argument that such rich natural resources have often been the source of development disruptive conflicts. Therefore, implied here is that resource endowment may, in the absence of prudent management and responsible governance, be the source of social problems militating against development in a society such as Nigeria. Also interesting in the explanation of the oil and democracy nexus in Nigeria is the rentier state framework of analysis. As Kuru (2002) argues, a rentier state does not depend on the surplus production of the domestic economy but rather on externally generated revenues (rents) usually from extractive industries like oil. Nevertheless, more crucial in terms of analysis is that the rentier state’s economy depends essentially on rents since a significant or overwhelming proportion of GDP is derived from rents from extractive industry. Thus, rents dominate national income distribution usually at the detriment or decline of the real productive sectors of the national economy (see Frynas, 2000). Be the above as it may, the overwhelming focus of all social groups and individuals on the rent from the extractive industry, or oil in the case of Nigeria, ultimately produces a set of rentier elites who sustain and further

Resource distribution and marginalization  199 entrench the rent-dependence of the state rather than trying to facilitate the growth of the productive or real sectors of the economy. In other words, the rentier elites are “the hegemonic forces whose institutional roles or economic interests are interfaced with the system of extraction and distribution of rents” (Omeje, 2006: 3). Apart from the overwhelming dependence on rent from the extractive industry and the stagnation of other productive sectors of the economy, the rentier state, as the case of Nigeria shows, ultimately generates corruption, which is often the logical outcome of the ­distribution of rents especially in developing societies where the underdevelopment of public institutions encourage easy subversion, neglect and contamination of official or formal channels.

The state in Nigeria and the notion of marginalization It can be persuasively argued that the state in Nigeria has all the main essentials of a predatory state patrimonialized by power or political elites for their own selfish ends. However, the construction of the patrimonial state elites as the model in Nigeria may raise questions about the influence of ethno-regional factors. The two phenomena are not mutually exclusive since the dominance of ethno-regionalism easily produces myopic political elites who establish an ethnic patrimonial network as the basis of power2. At the same time, ethno-regional background is often viewed as critical in power bargaining and negotiation at the centre, hence opportunistic politicians would always pay at least cosmetic attention to it. In the case of Nigeria, where leadership even in the military era has not been free from ethnic stranglehold (see Anugwom, 2000), ethno-regionalism becomes a critical career launch pad for many politicians. In Nigeria, the expression “marginalization” has become popular in capturing a perception of cheating or unfair treatment in the resource allocation process by social groups in the country (see Okilo, 1980; Ifeka, 2001; UNDP, 2006). Marginalization is akin to the concept of relative deprivation. In this sense, marginalization only results when a group compares its lot with that of another or others and feels cheated or unfairly treated. Thus, marginalization emanates from a peoples’ perception of their treatment in the allocation process. They feel cheated either in terms of the resources allocated to other people or in terms of a discrepancy between their contribution and the share allocated to them. However, marginalization from an analytical point of view may be seen as either real or apparent. Apparent marginalization can also be seen as marginality. Marginalization is visited upon a particular group not essentially on objective criteria but is rather deployed as a systematic or structurally unfair system of treatment of a given group by other politically or economically stronger groups in a plural or heterogeneous society. On the other hand, marginality results from the shortcomings or inadequacies of the group concerned, rather than the deliberate action of some

200  Resource distribution and marginalization out-group. The in-group in this case lacks the needed ability, capacity or will to acquire what some other group(s) in the same nation has acquired. It is, in a manner of speaking, a self-inflicted form of marginalization. Therefore, marginalization is the deliberate disempowerment of a group of people in a federation politically, economically, socially and militarily by another group or groups which during the relevant time frame wield power and control the allocation of material and financial resources at the centre of the federation. (The Nsukka Analyst, 1994: 1) On the other hand, marginality infers the relative or absolute lack of power to influence a defined social entity, while being the recipient of the exercise of power by others (Adedeji, 1993). The above distinction is very imperative in examining the claims and counter-claims of marginalization by different ethno-regional groups in contemporary Nigeria. Thus, while such groups as the South-south minorities (core of the Niger Delta) and the Southeast zone, for instance, may make genuine claims of marginalization in resource allocation since they have not assumed power in the centre for over four decades now, others cannot readily substantiate such claims.3 Also even a cursory observer of events in Nigeria would readily concede that the Niger Delta region is one of the most impoverished in the country in spite of being the richest in resources and the source of Nigeria’s enormous oil wealth. In spite of this, other groups in Nigeria have probably seen the case of the Niger Delta region as that of marginality. This perception may be responsible for the half-hearted manner with which the government has approached the Niger Delta dilemma for many years. These other groups in power conveniently perceive the Niger Delta as suffering from self-inflicted marginalization or marginality, in which case its fate in the Nigerian federation has been determined by its relative incapacity in the national arena. The quirky logic here is that the region has not been constitutionally barred from achieving its desired status and may have fallen behind based on some objective criteria. The above reasoning is both illogical and out of tune with socio-­ economic and political realities in today’s Nigeria where both law making and enforcement are subject to primordial criteria and where access to national resources is mediated by complex social and political factors that make a caricature of objectivity. In this situation, marginalization is a systematic tool and is often built into regulations, which formalize it and give it a tinge of objectivity.4 However, critical to our discussion here is that marginalization, where it really exists, is not just a debilitating psychological condition but equally confines a given group to helpless irrelevance in a typical heterogeneous society.

Resource distribution and marginalization  201 As Axtmann (1998) observes, the main feature of marginalization is the ability to make regions and countries irrelevant. In this sense, marginalization does not just underline social inequity but more critically engenders a structural incapacity to question and change the status quo. This incapacity, which consigns a group to irrelevance, often vitiates trust in the ability of the formal state structure to offer redress and equally makes the adoption of unorthodox approaches or conflict attractive in breaking out of marginalization. The perception of social conflict as a viable option becomes even more likely in societies like Nigeria where marginalization has been seen as a systematic and deliberate ploy at the disposal of the central government.

Resource distribution, social conflict and the state Social conflict generally should be conceived as capable of taking the steam out of even the best-planned development programmes. Therefore, social conflicts are antithetical to societal development and this is especially the case where such conflicts become endemic. In the case of Nigeria, social conflicts have, since independence, remained more or less a feature of the political life of the nation. These conflicts, apart from those driven by religion, are mainly outcomes of contests over resources and power among various ethno-regional groups in the country. Hence, part of the cause of the perennial development dilemma in Nigeria, in spite of an abundant resource base, has been the inability of the component ethno-regional groups to achieve enduring harmony. Definitely, the spectre of resource or power-induced social conflicts is not a unique Nigerian phenomenon, since it can be rightly seen as a characteristic feature of post-independence Africa and the genesis of some of the wars of attrition which have rocked development in sub-Saharan Africa in contemporary times. Social conflict in the African continent has assumed severe negative dimensions leading ultimately to armed conflict, civil strife, instability and economic distortion. These conflicts have taken a huge toll on the development of the continent and apart from generating and sustaining a pervasive feeling of Afro-pessimism globally have equally led to extensive human suffering, poverty and general insecurity of life and property. Nevertheless, the conflicts between different ethno-regional groups in Nigeria have been created and perpetuated by the inability of the modern state in Nigeria to either create effective structures for managing the country’s vast resources or effectively infuse fairness and social justice into the allocation process. Therefore, the state has a crucial role to play in abating social conflict. In fact, the action of the state may ameliorate, or alternatively even reinforce, the basis of conflict between different groups. The perception of cheating or deprivation in the allocation process, often couched in the notion of marginalization of the disadvantaged group, is undoubtedly the harbinger of social conflict.

202  Resource distribution and marginalization The nexus between marginalization and social conflict has been unmasked by Nolutshungu (1996), who argues that marginalization makes people vulnerable and is a major expression of insecurity. Basic psychology leads us to understand that the feeling of insecurity generally produces actions targeted at either eliminating or reducing the insecurity by dealing with its source. In a multi-ethnic or plural society, marginalization creates insecurity or a severe feeling of vulnerability that is easily channelled into conflict.

Echoes of dissatisfaction: marginalization and revenue distribution in Nigeria Since the annulment of the June 1993 presidential elections in Nigeria by the Ibrahim Babangida military junta, there have been insistent cries of marginalization by various groups in Nigeria (see The Nsukka Analyst, 1994). These cries did not abate with the introduction of democracy from 1999, rather they have intensified (see Anugwom, 2005, 2004; Ifeka, 2001; UNDP, 2006). Incidentally, the various ethnic groups see themselves as the victims and point accusing fingers at each other. Perhaps the allegations of marginalization have reverberated loudest among the ethnic groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria who basically see structural unfairness in the allocation of resources in Nigeria, especially as it concerns the region which is seen as not getting enough, both in comparison with the wealth derived from there and the share of other sections of the federation. The citizens of this region have alleged that an ethnic conspiracy among the three major ethnic groups5 in charge of state power at the centre has been responsible for the marginalization of the region from both the economic and political processes at the centre.6 As Anugwom (2000) argues, the ethnic factor, even though associated with colonial contact, did not diminish with the achievement of independence in Nigeria; it rather became a yardstick for measuring both contribution to and allocation of national resources to various groups in the federation. It is this process of allocation that breeds the feeling of marginalization, especially where groups perceive a discrepancy between their contribution and benefits. Therefore, the question of marginalization of ethno-regional groups in the nation is related to the process adopted by the state in ensuring equitable distribution of resources. The process, in this case, entails the actual method used in the allocation of resources and how this represents an objective formula taking into consideration both the contributions and needs of the different groups. However, more fundamental is that marginalization internally within a state is driven by the mismanagement of the economy and the pursuit of wrong development paradigms which polarize different groups. Also, crucial to our discussion here is the contention of Nolutshungu (1996) that the state is central to the process of marginalization. This,

Resource distribution and marginalization  203 according to him, results from the fact that since states preside over diverse and often-unequal societies, they are simply not consistently responsive to all sections of their societies, and the interests of the state are not equally consistent with popular interests or interests of all groups in it. In other words, the state willingly or otherwise creates the environment of marginalization. This thinking is quite interesting in the case of the modern Nigerian state where countless state sponsored initiatives7 have failed to address or mitigate perceptions and feelings of marginalization. It is obvious that the cry of marginalization, especially from the Niger Delta ethnic minorities and the Igbo, is the outcome of dissatisfaction with the resources allocation system. These groups have seen their benefits or share of national resources as relatively unfair and, in an ironic sense, inconsistent with their contributions to the national revenue or resource base. The above sentiments and their implications for statehood and democracy in Nigeria have been seen as catastrophic and reminiscent of the events leading to the civil war of the 1960s (Odey, 2000). It must be pointed out, however that the whole concept and the allegations of marginalization have been politicized over time in Nigeria. Hence, marginalization has become more or less a political catchphrase for negotiating favourable allocation of resources in the federation, especially political power at the centre (see Ujomu, 2003). Therefore, marginalization in Nigeria can be seen as a reality, perception, threat or opportunity, all related to scarce economic and political resources in the country. In real terms, while at least the perception and threat of marginalization exists in the Northcentral, Southeast and Northeast zones, there is undoubtedly real marginalization of the core Niger Delta region or South-south zone of the federation. The other zones of the federation may have simply adopted marginalization in order to either maintain a dominant position or further increase their benefits.

Conspiracy theory, elite formation and marginalization Germane to the understanding of the influence of ethno-regionalism in resource allocation and agitation is an appreciation of the nature and process of evolvement of the Nigerian political elites. The typical state political elite in Nigeria is someone who has successfully mobilized and utilized ethno-regional and primordial loyalties in appropriating state power. Such sectional mobilization is critical to acquisition of state power in Nigeria and even after acquiring the power, the unpredictable political terrain entails that political elites still maintain some form of reciprocity with their primordial groups. Perhaps the above was captured in the submission of Graf (1983) that the dominant Nigerian elites evolved from fractious, ethnoculturally centred and self-interested groupings; hence elite formation in Nigeria was dependent on the ability of the elites to meet the demands of

204  Resource distribution and marginalization their ethno-regional or political constituencies. Nevertheless, this scenario has another side in which the elites, mindful of the need to endure in power, ensure that considerable resources from government are invested in their ethno-regional groups. To do otherwise, would be tantamount to political naivety. However, as Ifeka (2000) contends, the post-independence history of Nigeria has been dotted by different conflicts between the centre and the periphery. This type of conflict, which is usually over resources allocation, has invariably pitted ethno-regional groups against each other in the quest for improved resource allocation. The popular term “national cake” is used in Nigeria to denote the distributable national resources. Thus, the struggle for the national cake has been a prominent and recurrent feature of the Nigerian state and has structured both politics and relations between the  different groups. Incidentally, almost all ethno-regional groups in the country have at one time or the other felt cheated in the revenue allocation process. But even more instructive is that quite a good number of social conflicts in the country have been related to either struggle over or dissatisfaction with resource distribution (Anugwom, 2005). It is the high stakes in resources allocation that have coloured both social conflicts and politics in Nigeria. Thus, in contemporary Nigerian politics, ethnonationalism has become a plank of power in which different ethno-regional groups have seen themselves as involved in unending contest for valuable and scarce national resources. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has become even more dominant in the case of ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region who have seen ethnonationalism as a crucial means of overcoming perceived marginalization by the Nigerian state. Given Nigeria’s largely mono-economy, which relies on oil from the Niger Delta, resources distribution or allocation is a critical component of politics and sectional allegiance in the region. The recourse to militancy in that region in the recent past emanated from a strong belief in the region that resources allocation in Nigeria’s federal state is politically orchestrated by the political elites in charge of state power to favour their majority ethnic groups to the detriment of the oil-producing minorities from whose enclave the wealth is derived (see Anugwom, 2005; Akpobari, 2007). Following directly from the above is the notion of conspiracy, which fuelled resource control struggles in the region. The conspiracy notion finds vent in the thinking that the decline of the principle of derivation8 as a component of resource allocation to subnational groups (states) in Nigeria is a deliberate ploy to lower the resources allocated to the oil minorities even as the wealth derived from that area increased. This situation is seen as very different from the scenario in the 1960s and early 1970s when primary agricultural products from the ethnic majority areas were the source of national wealth and derivation was a critical component of resource allocation. In line with this thinking, it has been argued that the imbalance in revenue or resource allocation and the general plight of the Niger Delta

Resource distribution and marginalization  205 region is a direct outcome of the ethnic politicization of the allocation process (Okilo, 1980). In a cruder sense, some indigenes of the Niger Delta see the present resource allocation system as simply fraudulent since it ensures the channelling of wealth derived from the region into developing other regions (see Tempo, 1999: 10).

The negation of statutory revenue allocation system in Nigeria It would be deceitful to assume that various governments in Nigeria have not made efforts towards dealing with revenue contentions in Nigeria. The option of a permanent statutory body in charge of revenue allocation and fiscal matters in the country as a sure solution to the problem had roots in the military administration of Ibrahim Babangida. Incidentally, despite the loftiness of the idea, its operation has left many Nigerians unsatisfied and even the goals behind it largely unachieved and unachievable within the sectional and ethno-regional political contexts of democracy in Nigeria. Perhaps, it would not be amiss to contend that such a statutory approach has added even more spice into the revenue allocation controversy in Nigeria. In spite of the efforts of the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission, revenue allocation in Nigeria is still largely dependent on the formula in Table 12.1 emanating from a Presidential Order with origins in the government of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007). Within the same context, the horizontal allocation formula, which is ostensibly on development and felt needs of the different states in the country, is benchmarked on the same order (see Table 12.2). Table 12.1  Revenue allocation formula in Nigeria Federal government State governments Local governments Total

52.68 26.72 20.60 100%

Source: author’s compilation.

Table 12.2  Horizontal revenue allocation in Nigeria Factor/criterion

Percentage allocation (%)

Equality Population Landmass/terrain Internally generated revenue Social development (education, health and water) Total

40 30 10 10 10 100

Source: author’s compilation.

206  Resource distribution and marginalization Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution recognizes the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) as the statutory body to determine revenue allocation in Nigeria. The RMAFC is empowered (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Third Schedule, Part 1N: 32) to: (a) Monitor the accruals to and disbursements of revenue from the Federation Account. (b) Review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities (provided that any revenue formula which has been accepted by an Act of the National Assembly shall remain in force for a period not less than five years from the date of the commencement of the Act). (c) Advise the Federal and State governments on fiscal efficiency and methods by which their revenue can be increased. (d)  Determine the remuneration appropriate for political office holders, including the President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers, Commissioners, Special Assistants, Legislators and holders of the offices mentioned in sections 84 and 124 of this constitution. (e) Discharge such other functions conferred on the commission by this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly. Thus, the functions of the body include also setting salaries and compensations for political office holders, their appointees and others in that ­category. Incidentally, in addition to the secrecy behind how much federal legislators and senators are paid, such remunerations were not really set by the RMAFC. In other words, political expediency, accumulative tendencies of politicians and endless contention among groups have made it impossible for the body to effectively discharge its duties and live up to the constitutional mandate behind it. In spite of its strategic position and the fact that it was conceived as a sure mechanism for ensuring equity in resource allocation and thus curtailing endless controversies regarding it in Nigeria, the commission has not satisfactorily achieved any of its main goals

Primordial politics, resources distribution and development A recurrent factor in the resource distribution process in Nigeria is the penchant for those in charge to make it a winner-takes-all affair and prioritize their selfish and group interests over and above national interests and development aspirations. In other words, what mattered for the contending political and military elites over time in Nigeria was what would benefit them as individuals and what would benefit their own social or ethnic groups. This tendency to prioritize self-survival and one’s social or ethnic

Resource distribution and marginalization  207 group’s interest over others, in spite of rules and conventions, is often seen as mirroring both an African and Nigerian orientation to the common patrimony of the nation-state. A consensus among many observers of contemporary events in Nigeria is that ethno-religious conflicts have emanated largely from the tendency of the elites to exploit such differences in pursuit of their own selfish goals, especially the desire to acquire political power and cling to it. Such a goal has been very well displayed in the process of resource distribution in which who gets what slice of the proverbial “national cake” has been riddled with primordial ­considerations and leadership profligacy. Hence, the political elites have obviously, and even labouriously, fanned the embers of religious and ethnic factors in the pursuit of their own ends and primitive acquisitive goals. The behaviour of the elites in this manner has not only reinforced but also exacerbated the perennial divisions and conflict among social groups in the process of distribution of resources. Equity mechanisms, such as the quota system and the federal character principle, have been ostensibly rubbished on the altar of the selfish and greedy acquisitiveness of the elites. Without doubt, the biased and corrupt or self-seeking elites can neither mediate nor adjudicate a distribution process anchored on equity or justice. The opportunity envisaged in the political system as a window to overwhelming wealth and unbridled dipping of hands into public coffers for private gains or enrichment has made the quest for political power very intense. Politics is no longer a call to service or a process through which effective policies are utilized to improve the quality of life of citizens but as a route to amass instant wealth and means of survival even for the most dumb or dubious of citizens. It then becomes a high-stake zero–sum game in which there are often no holds barred. The acquisition of this power gives the individual an assumed or appropriated authoritative right to national resources. It is little wonder that politicians and aspiring politicians have become a dominant demographic category and political parties, as avenues for realizing the goal of power, have also proliferated. This explains why there has been exponential growth of political parties from about 50 in 2009 to 91 registered political parties in the 2019 elections (see INEC, 2019). Most of the 91 political parties are without any discernible political structure and lack clearly defined ideology or values. All that matters, it would seem, is for them to provide a platform from which to acquire all-valuable power and the reckless route to the national treasury such power confers on the individual concerned. Thus, it has been contended that in both the African sense and the Nigerian sense, the focus on one’s selfish desires is carried to an extreme whereby authoritative allocation of resources is utilized without cognition of or deference to the existing rules; in this case, politics in the country has become a route for a mindless appropriation of state resources to serve the individual’s own interests (see Agagu, 2011). Therefore, leaders in Nigeria are typically seen as engrossed in intense pursuit of political domination and self-survival to the detriment of broader development goals.

208  Resource distribution and marginalization In the above frame of things, development and development planning play secondary role to the personal desires of the leaders and their stubborn will to project and promote the triumph of their group’s interest over the national interest. Apart from indicating the selfish and egoistic paradigm of leadership, the above generates a situation where development planning becomes an exercise in futility and resource allocation is manipulated by the desires of the leaders. In such an atmosphere, development becomes far from a purposed programme and process of transformation sustained over time but reflects an elusive process devoid of commitment, benchmarks and verifiable goals.

Going beyond the political norm From the presentation so far, it may be right to argue that, “the marginalisation of some sectors of Nigerian society have led to a series of ethnic, class, political and religious conflicts which have beset the country, vitiating its potential for development”(Ujomu, 2003: 23). In this sense, addressing the marginalization of some sections of the country in the resource allocation process becomes germane to the drive to foster and sustain democracy. There is certainly no gainsaying the fact that genuine democracy can hardly exist in the context of perceived marginalization and social conflicts emanating from it.9 In spite of the above, the involvement of the state in either ameliorating or reinforcing marginalization or social inequity often depends on the ruling or elite class usually in charge of regulating resource allocation in a modern democracy. Marginalization is mainly a product or the outcome of failure of the ruling class through either commission or omission to ensure and promote equity in the public sphere. But even more penetrating is that marginalization in the case of Nigeria appears to be a ploy for maintaining ruling-class privileges and group domination. Hence, addressing marginalization may entail curtailing elite domination and restructuring the structural privileges of social groups. Therefore, the observation by Fatton (1992), that the existence of a ruling class means essentially the existence of a state whose main function is the preservation and promotion of the economic, social and political structures of ruling class domination, is apt in this case. As a result, a fundamental panacea to the problem or conflicts over resource distribution in Nigeria is for the state to act in ways that would be perceived as impartial, that is, the state should be seen as an impartial arbiter or unbiased distributor of national resources. Leaders need to aspire to live beyond sectionalism and primordial inclinations and enforce a system of resource distribution guided by fairness and equity for all constituent groups in the federation. There is also the need for an improvement in the derivation component of national resource allocation. In view of the fact that oil exploitation in

Resource distribution and marginalization  209 Nigeria has meant gross environmental degradation which has destroyed the ecological balance in the Niger Delta region (see Anugwom, 2011), an enhanced derivation formula that allocates at least 30% of revenues to areas from where they are derived would go a long way in assuaging the feelings of marginalization of the people of the region. It would also be a way of “giving back” to the environment that yields the oil. The need to curb official and political corruption in the process of resource allocation and governance in general as a way of ensuring an effective and productive management of the national economy cannot be overemphasized. Apparently, a critical source of doubt about the improving indicators of the economy from government institutions such as the Central Bank of Nigeria is the fact that on average the quality of life of Nigerians has not shown any remarkable improvement. Perhaps the billions of Naira stolen from the national treasury during the military junta of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha and the enormous pilferage of the treasury by the present democratic leaders at different levels10 would have been better utilized in addressing the myriad of social problems in the country. The above calls attention to the evolvement of a resource distribution formula that takes adequate cognizance of the contribution of each geopolitical zone to the national revenue as was the case in the immediate ­post-colonial period when Nigeria depended on proceeds from primary products. Also, given the undoubted environmental degradation associated with oil exploration in the region, there is a crying need for the oil firms to invest more towards environmentally friendly oil exploitation as well as to devote a reasonable chunk of the money they have made so far from the region to environmental reclamation. Therefore, remediation efforts, like the ongoing one in Oloibiri in the Niger Delta region, should be factored into the resource distribution or allocation system in Nigeria. This may entail provision over a couple of years in revenue distribution for reclaiming the degraded environment as well as improving social provisioning and socio-economic regeneration in the region. Equally, the recent and ongoing insurgence in the Northeast of Nigeria, in addition to its devastating social and economic impacts, has called attention to the deplorable socio-economic situation of young people in the region ab initio. While the inauguration of the Northeast Development Commission is commendable, there is a need to institutionalize allocation and development paradigms that encapsulate all social and demographic groups in the country.

Conclusion Even though Nigeria’s rentier economy is a big problem in terms of the development of the other sectors of the national economy, the distribution of revenues and other resources has been negatively mediated by the patrimonial state structure of the nation, which makes equitable and fair process

210  Resource distribution and marginalization of resource distribution impossible. The profligacy of elected state officials, especially state governors, whether seen simply in the length of their disturbing convoys11 while on private or official travel or in the large retinues of advisers and assistants attached to their positions, establishes the fact that the state is owned and personalized by politicians. In this situation, even the meagre resources which some states are allocated are frittered away on the dubious and flamboyant lifestyles of elected politicians and the ever-increasing costs of governance. There is no gainsaying that the patrimonial nature of the Nigerian state has made resource mobilization on an ethno-regional basis the obvious choice of political elites and their acolytes in power. Therefore, the idea and cries of marginalization in resource distribution has become a favoured rallying tool of political and economic mobilization by ethno-regional groups marginal to the mainstream of the states’ political and economic processes. However, even beyond the above is that perceived inequity in the revenue allocation process gnaws at the soul of democracy and hampers development. Apart from the perception of marginalization as breeding usually destructive social conflicts, it also makes the building of unity impossible and vitiates the consensus imperative to even development in a heterogeneous society such as Nigeria. Moreover, a robust and equitable resource distribution system or distributional justice is sine qua non to the achievement of the goals of federalism. In other words, federalism depends as much on how power is shared among constituent units as it depends on how the fiscal relationships between these units are anchored on the true principles of federalism.

Notes  1 While the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) are the only significant militant groups in the Southeast, there has been a plethora of militant groups in the South-south zone of Nigeria (though some of these became moribund after the 1999 Amnesty). Prominent among these are the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND); Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA); Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF); Allied Force (AF); Arogbo Freedom Fighters (AFF); Secondary Fighters of Egbema; The Nembe 1895 Movement; SPARCO GBELEBA of Agalabiri; Enough is Enough Movement; SEA; Adaka Marine; Tarelayefa Bates (SPACO-LEE); Meinbutu; Niger Delta Defence and Security Council; Ijaw Strike Force; Ijaw Guerrilla Movement; Ijaw National Guard; Niger Delta Vigilante; Adaka Boro’s Youth of Opobo; White House Brothers; Kirimanis; Ijaw National Guard; Niger Delta Guerrilla Movement; Ijaw Strike Force etc. While some of these groups are well organized and with considerable membership, others are loose grab-and-run operations, organized by young people in the oil region  2 In May 2005, when former President Obasanjo was facing a serious impeachment threat from the House of Representatives, one member of the House

Resource distribution and marginalization  211 reportedly contended: “It does not matter what the President may be accused of, he is a Yoruba man from my state and I will fight for him” (Odey, 2005: 40).  3 The only exception here is the fortuitous one-term presidency of Jonathan Goodluck. It never would have happened but for the untimely demise of former President Musa Yar’Adua in office.  4 For instance, the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978 ensure that the oil deposits in the Niger Delta belong exclusively to a distant federal government. But these laws, while applying to the whole federation, make no impact in other areas without oil or mineral deposits in significant quantity. However, more worrisome is that these laws do not predate the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the Niger Delta but were enacted after the discovery to invest the oil wealth in the area on a federal government controlled by others. In this way marginalization is formalized and given an objective hue.   5 Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo.   6 In fact, a one-time governor of one of the states in region (River state), Melford Okilo, had argued vehemently that it was unfair to use the oil money from the region to develop other regions of the country, especially the North, to the detriment of the region producing the wealth, and attributed this to the decline of the derivation principle in revenue allocation and more primarily to the domination of state power by the ethnic majorities (see Okilo, 1980).   7 These initiatives, starting from the setting up of a commission by the colonial government in Nigeria to look into the fears of the minorities before independence to the post-colonial era federal character and quota system, have seemingly failed to address accusations and counter-accusations of bias in resource allocation and possession of power at the centre.  8 The Derivation Principle is an allocation formula aimed at compensating the regions or states from which national revenues are derived. At its height in the 1960s and 1970s, when primary products such as groundnut, cocoa and palm oil derived from the ethnic majority groups, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, were the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, a 50% derivation formula was used in revenue allocation between the federal government and constituent regions. In that case, each of the three regions got half of the revenue derived from the primary product in its area.   9 Marginalization as an exclusion or short-changing of some groups in Nigeria has not just bred conflict but has been used as a justification for the overthrow of government. Thus, Gideon Orkar the leader of a failed coup attempt against the then military government of Ibrahim Babangida saw his major motive as the “desire to free the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the South” (Vanguard, 2000). 10 The sensibilities of Nigerians were assaulted late in 2006 by accusations and counter-accusations between the president and his vice-president over pilferage of the Petroleum Development Trust Fund (PDTF) money. Since the inception of democracy in 1999, no fewer than four governors have been disgraced or hounded out of office on allegations of massive corruption and misappropriation of public fund. 11 See, for instance, the disturbing story and pictures that went viral towards the end of October 2019 about a state governor in the South-south region who enrolled in a postgraduate course in law and attends lectures in a convoy of about 20 SUVs – rather pathetic and axiomatic of the profligacy and mental defection of leadership in Nigeria.

212  Resource distribution and marginalization

References Adedeji, A. (1993). Marginalisation and marginality: Context, issues and viewpoints. In Adedeji, A. (ed.) Africa within the World. London: Zed Books (pp. 1–16). Agagu, A.A. (2011). “The Nigeria state and its development efforts: Whose agenda?” in Agagu, A.A., & Ola, R.F. (eds) Development agenda of the Nigerian state. Akure: Lord Keynes Pub. Akpobari, N.C. (2007). War in the Niger Delta: Saro Wiwa’s prophecy. The Week, 25 (3): 25–26. Anugwom, E.E. (2000). Ethnic conflict and democracy in Nigeria: The marginalisation question. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 15 (1): 61–78. Anugwom, E.E. (2004). “Ethnicity, federalism and revenue allocation in a democratic Nigeria: the Niger Delta problem”. Africa Insight, 34 (2/3): 23–30. Anugwom, E.E. (2005). Oil minorities and the politics of resource control in Nigeria. Africa Development, xxx (4): 87–120. Anugwom, E.E. (2011). “Something mightier: Marginalization, occult imaginations and the youth conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta”. Africa Spectrum, 46 (3): 3–26. Axtmann, R. (1998). “Globalisation, Europe and the state: Introductory reflections”, in Axtmann, R. (ed.) Globalisation and Europe: Theoretical and empirical investigations. London: Pinter (pp. 2–3). Cohen, R. (1999). Inside Mobiland. Tempo, 12 (2): 21 January, p. 22. Fatton, R. (1992). Predatory rule: state and civil society in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Frynas, J.G. (2000). Oil in Nigeria. Hamburg: Lit Verlag. Graf, W. (1983). “African elite theories and the Nigerian elite consolidation: a political economy analysis”, in Barongo, Y. (ed.) Political science in Africa. London: Zed Press (pp. 189–210). Ifeka, C. (2001). “Oil, NGOs and youths: Struggles for resource control in the Niger Delta”. Review of African Political Economy, 28 (87): 99–105. Ifeka, C. (2000). “Conflict, complicity and confusion: Unravelling empowerment struggles in Nigeria after the return to democracy”. Review of African Political Economy, 83: 115–123. Igbo, E.U.M., & Anugwom, E.E. (2002). Social change and social problems: A Nigerian perspective. Nsukka: AP Express Pub. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (2019). Political parties. www. inecnigeria.org/political-parties (accessed: 17 July 2019). Kitschelt, H. (1986). “Political opportunity structures and political protests”. British Journal of Political Science, 16: 57–85. Kuru, A. (2002). “The rentier state model and Central Asian studies: The Turkmen case”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 1 (1): 51–71. Lubeck, P., Watts, M., & Lipschutz, R. (2007). “Convergent interests: U.S. energy security and the “securing” of Nigerian democracy”. International Policy Report (February), Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy. Nnoli, O. (1978). Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub. Nolutshungu, S. (1996). Margins of insecurity: minorities and international security. New York: University of Rochester Press. Odey, J. (2005). Democracy and the ripples of executive rascality. Enugu: Snaap Press. Odey, J. (2000). The sharia and the rest of us. Enugu: Snaap Press.

Resource distribution and marginalization  213 Okilo, M. (1980). “The derivation principle and national unity”. Daily Times, 19 July, p. 4. Omeje, K. (2006). High stakes and stakeholders: Oil conflict and security in Nigeria. Aldershot: Ashgate. Sachs, J., & Warner, A. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45: 827–838. Tempo (1999). Truce of a kind. 21 January, p. 22. The Nsukka Analyst (1994). “Marginalisation in Nigerian polity”. The Nsukka Analyst, 1 (2):1–7. Torvik, R. (2002). “Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare”. Journal of Development Economics, 67: 455–470. Torvik, R. (2001). “Learning by doing and the Dutch disease”. European Economic Review, 45: 285–306. Ujomu, P. (2003). “Institutionalised marginality, social conflicts, and the quest for national unity in an African nation-state: a theoretical examination”. Africa Development, xxviii (3&4): 22–35. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006). Niger Delta human development report. Abuja: UNDP. Vanguard Newspaper (2000). “Coup Speech”. 14 March, p. 5. Van Wijnbergen, S. (1984). “The ‘Dutch Disease’: a disease after all?” Economic Journal, 94: 41–45.

13 Federalism and development in Nigeria A balancing act or retreat from the norm

Introduction Nigeria is defined as a federation operating under the federalism principle. As presently constituted, this means the existence of three-tiers of government, namely, the federal (centre), the state and the local government. Each of these tiers is constitutionally recognized with defined roles and expectations. The above arrangement has characterized Nigeria’s postcolonial experience of government. However, as any keen observer would readily apprehend, federalism in Nigeria seems to have failed to address the goals or desires behind its adoption. In other words, it may be seen as a defective or handicapped form of federalism. That Nigeria’s version of federalism is defective is almost an axiom to keen observers and scholars of the nation’s socio-political developments over the years. In current parlance, the defection in the system is aptly captured in the clamour for “true federalism” or “functional federalism”. Some scholars have taken the discourse a notch further by characterizing Nigeria’s federalism as in reality “fiscal centralism” in which there is no fiscal federalism as one would understand it (see Anugwom, 2001). In other words, even though Nigeria has been defined constitutionally (over time since the 1950s) as a federation or federal state, the working of the state has not in reality shown this federalism, either in the relationship between the centre and the constituent units or in the fiscal and political power balance between these two critical planes of federalism. In fact, one of the most influential scholars of federalism, Kenneth Wheare, probably had Nigeria in mind when he stated, “a country may have a federal constitution, but in practice it may work that constitution in such a way that its government is not federal” (Wheare, 1963: 20). Therefore, that a given nation has adopted the federal system in its constitution does not make it a federal state in reality, since the working of the government may negate federalism. This entails that it is one thing to adopt a federal constitution and another, much more difficult task to ensure that the working of the state reflects the spirit of federalism. Such a task, as the experience of Nigeria has shown may be difficult and present daunting challenges to

Federalism and development  215 nationality and state-building. Hence, the discrepancy between the constitutional provision of federalism and the working of the government may be the source of conflict and dissension among social groups that can undermine the process of development. Nevertheless, since 1954, Nigeria has kept faith with federalism by putting it as the anchor of its subsequent constitutions, including the current 1999 Constitution. According to Adamolekun (1991: 1), “the federal system adopted in 1954 comprised a national government and three regional governments: Eastern, Northern, and Western. The Eastern and Western Regions became self-governing in 1957, followed by the Northern Region in 1959”. However, from our concern here, the squeezing of the fiscal capacity of subunits has severely limited their development impact on their areas. Even development at the national level is also negated by conflicts and contentions over resources resulting directly from the perception of a skewed ­federalism by the constituent units. Some of these units, as recent developments show, often lack the financial capacity to discharge their statutory responsibilities. This picture compares poorly with the situation elsewhere in the world. Therefore, in a situation whereby, “as against the average of 31.8 and 35 percent of total national revenue raised by Brazilian and Indian states, the Nigerian states are raising a mere 10 percent on the average” (Ojo, 2010: 19), social conflicts which can undermine the state building project are privileged. Against the foregoing, this chapter examines the nature and functioning of federalism as a governance principle in Nigeria. It depends essentially on the review of extant literature for its information and is premised on the understanding that the inappropriate working of federalism or its conscious subversion over time in Nigeria constitutes a huge obstacle to both development and economic growth. Therefore, a critical reappraisal of the system is deemed very imperative to the goals of even or equitable development in the country.

Nature of federalism and its justification in Nigeria The most popular and thus regularly invoked definition of federalism is that put forward by Wheare (1963). According to him, the federal principle is the “method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent” (Wheare, 1963: 10). In other words, the federal principle recognizes more than one locus of power and the division of power between two or more units or levels of government in coordinate and independent ways. Thus, while these units have independent power spheres, they are also coordinate in nature, that is, enjoy equal significance though in cooperation with each other. In fact, the notion that federalism as a political principle, which is anchored on the constitutional diffusion of power between a central ­government and constituent governments in order to achieve both self-rule

216  Federalism and development and shared rule (Elazar, 1987), seems very pertinent. In effect, federalism embodies both self-rule and shared common rule, and envisages power ­diffusion that enables both coordination and cooperation in the running of a given state. The existence of the so-called federal states without evident federalism has led to the thinking that federation may not always cohere with federalism. Thus, there is often the tendency to point out the subtle difference between a federation (defined as a state with at least two tiers of government but in which the centre is inherently superior and exercises overriding power) and federalism which may seek to underline the fact that a federation is not strictly or always a federalist state. This nuanced understanding should not undercut the fact that in most cases a federation is by implication still anchored on the same ideology or philosophy of federalism (see King, 1982). Therefore, the main benefit of highlighting the difference would also be primarily in underlining the fact that some federations with aspirations towards federalism are in reality far from this ideal. For Tamuno (2003: 13), federalism refers to “that form of government where the component units of a political organization participate in sharing powers and functions in a cooperative manner through the combined forces of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity, among others”. In this sense, it is a form of government that accords formal and constitutional recognition to the various ethnocultural groups in a nation while building on the apparent diversity of these groups to enact a united national or central government. The central government then shares both powers and functions in clearly defined ways with these sub-central governments or other tiers. Nigeria was a unitary state until 1954, when the Lyttleton Constitution redefined it as a federation operating under the constitutional frame of federalism. The decision was no doubt informed by the recognition of the ethnic and social diversity of the emergent Nigerian state. It was therefore believed that federalism offered the best option to accommodate and manage Nigeria’s diversity. Without doubt, the ethno-social split among the first-generation nationalist fighters and political parties in the run-up to independence had impressed upon the colonial administrators the need for a united centre and effective substate units. This would create opportunity for both development at the critical three tiers of government while creating room for the various groups to actualize and develop along peculiar trajectories at the substate levels. It was along the lines of creatively recognizing and building on the socio-cultural and other differences in Nigeria that federalism became a viable and attractive framework. As Babalola (2013) argues, federalism in Nigeria is cognizant of the socio-cultural conditions in the country. In effect, the three-tier federal structure put forward in the 1954 constitution was a reflection of the cultural, social, political and historical differences, especially among the ethnic majority groups in Nigeria.

Federalism and development  217 It must be mentioned that the desire for federalism at the onset in Nigeria was not motivated by any dubious or devious plan or manipulation. Nevertheless, the desire, far from the above, was an attempt to actually build upon the huge diversity in the country. It was an effort to recognize this diversity and equally use it as a source of strength in building a united and virile state. Therefore, federalism was adopted or made attractive because of a number of factors that define Nigeria. These factors include the obvious heterogeneity of the country which signified socio-cultural differences; the considerable size and population of Nigeria; different historical experiences between these groups; fear of domination expressed especially by minority ethnic groups (in fact, the ethnic minorities in the run-up to independence expressed these fears in a forceful way that led to the establishment of a special commission to look into the fears of these minorities). The above factors convinced the colonial administration, and even the nationalist leaders, that any form of unitary government would hardly work for the nation. Federalism provided the option that seemed consistent with the overriding need to build unity in spite of the glaring diversity in the country. In typical logic, federalism was apprehended as a government system that seeks to build national unity and authority while at the same time maintains the relative autonomy and rights of the constituent units in it. The ideals that spurred this desire were subsequently undermined by unfolding realities in the postcolonial Nigerian state. Among the historical factors that marred the working of true federalism in Nigeria’s First Republic, were: the ethnicization of political power and the nature of political competition in the First Republic; and the three-year civil war (related in very significant measure to the first factor) and the intrusion of the military into the governance of Nigeria. Perhaps, federalism, especially the relationship between the federal government (centre) and the states (substate), was literally sabotaged and ravenously eroded by the military regimes that came on board from 1966.

Federalism at work in Nigeria As already indicated, the downgrading or erosion of federalism in Nigeria can be traced largely to the incursion of the military into the governance of the country beginning from the first military coup in 1966. This coup ended Nigeria’s First Democratic Republic. Prior to this advent of the military into governance, the constituent units or tiers of the Nigerian ­federation in the spirit of federalism enjoyed enormous political and economic power. It was the high point of the dependence of Nigeria on external revenues generated from such primary products as groundnut, cocoa and palm oil. These revenues provided substantial wealth that generated massive physical and infrastructural developments in the then regions of Nigeria. However, the army, soon after taking power, did away with the

218  Federalism and development regional arrangement, created states in their stead and embarked on the centralization of political and economic powers, which logically may ­ be more consistent with the strict hierarchical and regimented structure of the military than any other arrangement. The desire of the army to further centralize both power and revenues received a boost with the increasing external revenue profile of oil and ultimately became a fait accompli with the 1973 global oil crisis that created a boom in oil revenues for Nigeria and other oil-producing economies in the world. The fact that the military kept power for a long time meant that federalism as a principle became further eroded. In this sense, even the short advent of civilian government between 1979 and 1983 did little to stem the tide of erosion of federalism as a governance principle even though it remained constitutionally upheld. By the commencement of Nigeria’s Third Republic in 1999 (after years of military rigmaroles and postponements of democratic rule), federalism had suffered massive defects and government had become too overtly centralized as a consequence. The federal character principle, which aims towards ethnic balance through equitable distribution of resources including employment and promotions in federal civil service and parastatals, has often been understood as meaning the allocation to federal establishments based on equality among states. While the principle aims at both ethnic balance and equity, the equality demand has often been prioritized and clamoured for by different actors from various states. It would seem that the federal character principle, which has been at the base of the application of federalism in Nigeria, is rooted in the desire to enforce citizenship rights and sense of belonging for all Nigerians irrespective of ethno-regional origin. As the 1979 constitution has it, the federal character principle embodies the, ­“distinctive desire to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation”. The above sentiments were equally captured in the current 1999 Constitution when it states unequivocally, The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria … ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or its agencies. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Section 14.3) In other words, the principle seeks to capture the full expression of citizenship, equity and access to all Nigerians. However, the practice or implementation has so far been a different thing. Thus, the federal character principle (and its accompanying quota system), as good as it seems in the pursuit of equity, often generates problems of implementation and raises the dilemma

Federalism and development  219 between meritocracy and affirmative action. In the former case, there is often the tendency to take the federal character principle to mean equal representation for all states or ethnic groups at all cost rather than the more workable and effective equity principle. Also, as in most other cases even beyond Nigeria (affirmative action policies are usually fraught with application problems even in the developed nations of the world), the federal character principle more often than not sacrifices meritocracy in the pursuit of representation of all sections of the country. This fact has often been glaring in the federal civil service where less qualified candidates from some areas of Nigeria are offered positions at the point of either recruitment or promotion over and above more qualified candidates from other sections of the country. The same even applies in the case of entrance into public universities where candidates from the so-called educationally disadvantaged states are given admission places with scores (marks) sometimes as low as 50 marks below the merit cut-off mark. These practices, and more especially the wrong interpretation and application of the principle, have led to massive abuse and the obvious defeat of the core goals of the federal character principal. In a recent study among people in the Southeast and South-south of Nigeria, the federal character principle was largely lampooned by respondents as entrenching and perpetuating inequity among socio-ethnic groups rather than working towards equity as expected (Anugwom, 2018). These respondents were of the overwhelming consensus that the set of measures aimed at addressing equity and fear of domination by ethno-regional groups have been abused and implemented in ways that secure and perpetuate the hegemony of some groups to the disadvantage of others. The propensity of misusing the principle and the rampant abuse of its implementation led Bisi Onabanjo, a former governor of Ogun state, Southwest Nigeria to reportedly state, “it is a sad fact of national life today that favouritism and preferential treatment for selected groups have become institutionalized through the quota system and the brazen abuse of the policy of reflecting the federal character” (Bisi Onabanjo, 1983 quoted in Suberu, 1988: 432). In the above sense, the quota system was meant to reflect the diversity of the nation, that is, embody its character as a federal state made up of diverse socio-ethnic groups. However, the application of the policy has not lived up to the lofty goals behind it and may be one sure source of the dissatisfaction with the nation’s version of federalism. Apart from the federal character principle which has so far functioned as the flagship of the equity project in Nigeria’s federalism, other innovations such as the zoning of critical political offices or rotational principle (especially the top political offices in the federation – President, Vice President, and to a certain degree Senate President) and state/local government ­creations have been mooted and utilized. Even though the notion of rotational presidency is not captured in Nigeria’s constitution, it has become a

220  Federalism and development prominent basis of the allocation of political offices among political parties since the advent of the Third Republic in 1999. In other words, though the constitution of Nigeria does not endorse the idea of rotational presidency (or any other position for that matter) it all the same sought to make provisions to ensure a significant semblance of interethnic equity in such appointments and, more critically, ensure that no one can become president without having broad geo-ethnic support in the nation. In fact, the requirement that the person should win significant votes in at least two-thirds of the 36 states in Nigeria was targeted at such broadbased support for the office. Thus, one cannot become president by winning only in one’s own ethno-regional group alone. However, the idea of rotation, which is the creation of the major political parties, has been thus far benchmarked on the six geopolitical zones of the country. While rotation goes beyond the position of the president to include other juicy or powerful positions at the centre, everyone, especially the politicians, are well aware that the jewel in the crown remains the presidency. In view of that, the rotation of that position in the two major parties in the coming 2023 elections may remain the litmus test of the veracity of the intention of the political class to enthrone national equity beyond personal ambitions. Another tool which has been used over time, even though with attendant controversies, has been the creation of states. Even though the current 36-state structure seems adequate and may have stretched the cost of political administration in the country, there is still the perception of imbalance among the geopolitical zones in this regard. Thus, while there are seven states in the Northwest zone of the country, there are only five states in the Southeast zone. This number, five states, is the least among all the six zones and has generated agitations among political elites and Biafra resurgence groups in that zone. The clamour for the restructuring of the federation being championed by political elites in the Southeast zone is largely anchored on dissatisfaction with this situation. Without doubt, the number of states in each zone has far-reaching implications for the share of that zone in the allocation or distribution of national resources including revenue allocation. As Suberu (1992) aptly captures it, the states have become in Nigeria the accepted structures through which a considerable proportion of national wealth is shared. Therefore, having fewer states in comparison with other zones means that the zone in question gets less of the proverbial national cake.

The clamour for true federalism: pitch from mainly ethno-social groups in the South It is understood that the over-centralization of political power, especially fiscal power, in a supposedly federal system such as Nigeria can herald diverse negative effects apart from simply undermining the ideal principles of federalism. For instance, the effects of the excessive concentration of

Federalism and development  221 r­evenues in the centre have become obvious since the advent of Nigeria’s Fourth and Fifth Republics. The second tier of government in Nigeria (states) has displayed glaring financial incapacity to the extent that a good number of them cannot independently meet their recurrent financial obligations. In fact, since 2015 these states have found it increasingly difficult not only to balance their budgets but even to pay the salaries of civil servants regularly. Even most recently (2019) the federal government had to provide bailout funds to enable these states to at least pay accumulated civil ­servants’ salaries. In effect, over-centralization of political and fiscal power has made the second tier of government largely incapable of effectively meeting its own constitutional responsibilities. The situation is largely the same, or even worse, in the case of the local governments in Nigeria (third tier of government). The clamour for moving Nigeria towards the desired federalist state has come from various ethno-social groups particularly in the Southern areas of the country. First mooting such calls in the dying days of the Babangida military junta especially after the annulment of the 1993 elections were Yoruba political elites. These elites detected an ethnic agenda to the annulment of an election perceived as generally free and fair and which was won by a Yoruba man. Even though the group still contains elements who seriously clamour for true federalism, the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba) as president between 1999 and 2007 largely muted such calls from the group especially within that period. However, since the return of power to the North from 2015, the Yoruba elites have once again taken up the call, in spite of the fact that the deputy president and perhaps second mostpowerful man in Nigeria comes from the Yoruba ethnic group. The Igbo group, on the other hand, had taken up this call since the mid1970s emergence of the Igbo socio-cultural group, Ohaneze. It has anchored its calls on the perceived marginalization of the region from political power, resource allocation and distribution of development projects in Nigeria, a situation it relates to the fact that the region lost the civil war and has been strategically alienated from power at the centre. The Southern minority groups, especially those in the Niger Delta oil region, have taken the clamour to new levels by agitating for resource control. These groups, represented through time by Ogoni and Ijaw elements, would rather have a federal structure anchored on resource control in which these groups would exercise full control of the rich oil resources in the region and then make contributions from revenues derived from these resources to the federal government in order to enable the central government to perform its critical responsibilities. However, in spite of achieving some significant benefits through an increase in the derivation component of revenue allocation (though still very different from the expectation), establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and current rehabilitation programmes under the auspices of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, the desire for

222  Federalism and development resource control remains unmet. Northern elites in Nigeria can be largely characterized as not involved in the recent clamour for true federalism. In other words, they seem the least perturbed among all groups in Nigeria. Their body language suggests a satisfaction with the status quo. Moreover, the strident attacks of such Northern intellectuals as Bala Usman (see Usman, 2000) on the resource claims and justification of the Niger Delta agitations would suggest that the Northern section of the country (with the possible exception of minority ethnic groups there) are largely comfortable with the current situation. As a motivation for the clamour for the so-called true federalism in Nigeria, one can cite the case of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria that is also the bastion of ethnic minority groups. The sharing or distribution process concerning the Niger Delta epitomizes a strong malaise with Nigeria’s federalism. Ideally, federalism entails effective power and rolesharing in a formal state structure between the central government and subcentral governments. The above entails that a federal system exists when there is a layer of institutions between a state’s center and its localities, when this layer of institutions features its own leaders and representative bodies, and when these leaders and bodies share decision making power with the center. (Bermeo, 2002: 98) Critical in this sharing arrangement is the financial or fiscal empowerment of the constituent units. As a result, federalism also involves fiscal autonomy for the constituent units of the federation. Where this condition is not met, the federal structure in question may face threats of implosion regularly. In other words, a federal system which refuses to be guided by the ideal norms of equitable and fair resource allocation between its units is invariably bogged down by perennial intra-state conflicts until appropriate changes are made or else the polity in question may disintegrate (Adebayo, 2001). In other words, a federal state is built around fiscal decentralization or what has been called fiscal federalism. In this form, the federal state shares fiscal policy-making with the constituent units or regions/states, which includes the nature of revenue allocation desired (see Anugwom, 2001).

Impediments to federalism in Nigeria As has been argued, the defects in Nigeria’s federal system have been the sources of agitation, as the country resembles a federation, which while operating a federal constitution appears to work in practice as a unitary state (see Babalola, 2017). In other words, Nigeria, in spite of its definition as a federal state, is characterized by centralizing tendencies, which invest disproportionate higher power and fiscal authority on the central government.

Federalism and development  223 Therefore, the mere constitutional specification or enactment of federalism does not really mean that federalism is automatically in existence in any state. There is thus a huge difference between enacting federalism as a constitutional desire and the practice of federalism. As has been argued, that a federation exists (in name) should not blind one to the absence of federalism (Erk, 2004). In this case, federalism may in reality capture merely a desire that has not found purchase in the running or administration of the state by its leaders. The existence of such a gulf between desire and real functioning of federalism may be explained, especially in a developing state such as Nigeria, by a good number of factors (in addition to purely structural incapacity). These factors inter alia include: i Ethnicity and primordial politics in the state; both malaise that are heightened and sharpened in a defective federal state. ii Elite manipulation of both the governance process and primordial sentiments for their selfish ends. iii Power quest of the political elites which may elicit the desire to jettison federal principles; a carry-over of decades of military rule which cast the leader as one with unbridled power and authority all over the nation. iv History of distrust among groups; lack of trust in this case may be heightened in a mono-economy, especially the rentier type operating in Nigeria where the emphasis is on sharing or distribution of revenues from oil. v Ethnonationalism, which makes the ethno-regional group the anchor of the primary allegiance of the citizens in the so-called federalism; the centre becomes literally imagined as a zone of pillage over which elites from different ethnonational groups claim a stake and contest for resources. Following from the above, the federal state in Nigeria can be largely characterized as weak since it is marked by such tendencies as structural incapacity, corruption, poor performance and even inability to establish real control over security and law and order as well as act in ways that generate violence from groups in it (see Agbu, 2004; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999). The obvious lack of control or inability to secure monopoly over violence has been glaringly displayed in the recent history of insurgence (Boko Haram; ISWAP; Niger Delta youth militants; Fulani cattle herders etc.) and violent banditry in the country.

Towards a workable federalism in Nigeria: some posers Federalism as a form of government is often recommended because it is largely congruent with many traditional forms of political authority in Africa. In this case, it allows distinct groups to retain significant authority in their domains even while surrendering utmost sovereignty and authority

224  Federalism and development to a central government. In other words, federalism recognizes the jealously patented autonomy of constituent units building a larger state structure. In this manner, federalism shares some features with traditional ­governance system in a number of African societies in which the total submission of all powers and autonomy to a central figure or authority is far from the norm. Federalism is also seen as an antidote to the habitual tyranny and authoritarianism of a leadership with all powers over an extensive state structure. The fact that the federal structure shares power and authority with constituent units limits the tendency to become authoritarian. In other words, the federal system limits both the scope and extent of authority of the leader. In this sense, federalism promotes both power-sharing and devolution of authority. However, the above function or advantage of federalism can only be realized when federalism entails fiscal federalism. It is in this sense that federalism in Nigeria raises questions regarding consistency with the ideal expectations of federalism. There is no gainsaying the fact that federalism is workable even in the developing world context of Nigeria. In this case, India and Brazil provide two examples of workable federalism based on fiscal federalism that guarantees significant autonomy and significant independent revenue generating powers on sub-units. For instance, the sub-federal units or states raise about 35% of their total revenue, which finances 51% of their expenditures in India (see Ojo, 2010). Even Brazil shows the same pattern of decentralization of the fiscal system and empowering substate units to raise the revenue for over half of their expenditures and thus becoming important players in fiscal federalism (see Adebayo, 2001). These two are very instructive for Nigeria since these countries were also at one time emergent economies also bogged down, like Nigeria, by the challenges of a rapidly increasing population, huge land mass and a heterogeneous population exhibiting ethno-linguistic and religious diversity. However, the development of fiscal federalism in Nigeria has assumed a largely inverse nature since the passages of time seem to weaken the fiscal authority of the constituent units. While there were some significant independent fiscal powers on the parts of the centre and the states or regions between 1954 and 1966 in the area of tax autonomy, most of these taxes have either been removed entirely or taken over by the central government, beginning in 1967. Such autonomous powers being removed from the subfederal units in Nigeria are, according to Adebayo (2001), evident in such acts as: standardization of personal income tax rates throughout the country; introduction of uniform and federally regulated fuel prices throughout the country, depriving the states of the power to charge petroleum sales taxes; and federal government take-over of all off-shore oil royalties and rents. This last act has produced the erosion of the derivation criteria or principle in revenue allocation, which has nose-dived from about 50% to a current 15%.

Federalism and development  225 Apart from the apparent dependence on the federal centre, which the above situation breeds, there is also a growing and excessive power of the federal government, which has made politics and the desire to assume leadership at the centre a zero–sum game. Perhaps nothing portrays this unwholesome dependence more than the fact that in 2015 alone, more than half of the 36 states in Nigeria depended on the federal government for bailout funds with which to pay their civil servants. Currently, the states in the country are poised for a face-off with the labour centre (NLC) over their insistence on reducing the minimum wage of workers in these states.1 There is no doubt that Nigeria’s mono-economy, which has produced an over-reliance on oil, has generated a rentier mentality that impacts on the perception of governance at all levels. In this case, there has been thorough expectations of the goodies of federalism brewed largely by an excessive focus on “sharing” of both resources and revenues from oil. The focus, as it appears, is on how each constituent unit can maximize its share of the national cake, thus promoting a federalism of sharing. There is a need for a change of orientation, from sharing the proceeds from oil to increasing the national cake through economic diversification at both the federal and the state levels. The states could utilize some of the time expended on endless clamouring for “more” on seeking creative ways of improving their revenue base (not merely through the elementary and counter-productive increment in tax burden for hapless citizens). Nigeria remains a country with abundant natural resources and one of the most developed human capacities in the continent. A change from hankering after oil rents and focusing on these two endowments even at the level of the state may be a way out of the endless contestations over resources. In addition, in the spirit of true federalism, there is a need for a tinkering of the mineral exploitation laws to enable the states to tap into these resources while not overriding the goal of protecting the environment.

Conclusion Federalism as a system of government and relationship between the constituent social groups that make up Nigeria debuted with the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution. It was more or less the realization by the colonial administrators (as they packed their bags) that the centrifugal tendencies in the then emergent Nigerian nation could only be kept at bay by federalism which, while building a strong centre, also creates federating units that are equally strong and share powers with this centre. As already highlighted, even though the military began the unfortunate erosion of Nigeria’s federalism, the political elites, through their quest for excessive powers, have helped in no small measure to perpetuate this situation. In this sense, federalism as an innovative political devise that embodies both tolerance of diversity and compromise has been thwarted

226  Federalism and development by “inordinate premium on political power” (Suberu, 1988: 438) on the part of the political elites in Nigeria. Perhaps, while the need for restructuring of Nigeria’s federalism and seriously tweaking its functioning to address evident flaws and the clamour for some socio-political and ethnic groups remain valid, there is equally the imperative to appreciate that federalism may still offer the best option for Nigeria. Thus, as Babalola (2017: 5) argues, a weakening of the federal centre may not be a bad idea but Nigeria needs a federal system that would ensure the relative supremacy of the central government vis-à-vis the state governments. The size of the federation, as well as its ethnic diversity and economic disparity, requires a relatively strong federal government that would be able to regulate the competition for national resources. Therefore, while one concurs with the need for the restructuring of the Nigerian federal structure in order to achieve the goals of federalism, it is also important to do the above in very cautious and guided ways so that the nation does not fall into the trap of ethno-entrepreneurs and opportunistic political irredentists. In other words, the re-jigging of federalism, especially along the lines of ensuring equity in state creation between the different geopolitical zones and improving the financial capacity of these states mainly through committed fiscal federalism, should not undermine Nigeria’s nationhood. Rather such changes should be creatively utilized as fulcrums of achieving sustainable and equitable development in the country in the end. Nevertheless, while such relative strength of the central government may be justifiably necessary, there should equally be strong constitutional bulwarks against the abuse of such strength. More critically, committed efforts should be made to ensure that there are robust impediments to discourage building upon the relative stronger strength of the federal or central government to annul the required coordinate principle of federalism in Nigeria.

Note 1 The minimum wage of ‎₦18,000 a month (equivalent to $90) was promulgated by law in 2010 and there was the provision then that it would be reviewed after five years (2015) in order to ensure that it keeps pace with inflationary trends. Already, it has been reviewed upward in 2019 to ₦30,000 (about $85, given the erosion of the exchange value of the Naira); but it is yet to be implemented, so effectively ₦18,000 is still the minimum wage.

References Adebayo, A. (2001). “Mastering Nigeria’s conflict: The imperative of restituting true federalism”. Nigerian Tribune, (April, 12), p. 13.

Federalism and development  227 Adamolekun, L. (1991). “Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria”. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21 (4): 1–11. Agbu, O. (2004). Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria. Research Report No. 127. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute. Anugwom, E.E. (2001). “Federalism, fiscal centralism and the realities of democratization in Nigeria: The case of the Niger Delta”. MOST Ethno-Net Publications: Africa at Crossroads: Complex Political Emergencies in the 21st Century, 2001, www. ethnonet-africa.org/pubs/crossroadsedl.htm (accessed: 11 July 2011). Anugwom, E.E. (2018). From Biafra to the Niger Delta conflict: Memory, ethnicity and the state in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Babalola, Dele (2017). “Nigeria: A federation in search of federalism”. 50 Shades of Federalism. http://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/nigeria-federation-searchfederalism/ (accessed: 3 October 2019). Babalola, Dele (2013). “The origins of Nigerian federalism: The Rikerian theory and beyond”. Federal Governance, 8 (3): 43–54. Bermeo, Nancy G. (2002). “The import of institutions”. Journal of Democracy, 13 (2): 96–110. Elazar, Daniel (1987). Exploring federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press. Erk, Jan (2004). “Austria: A federation without federalism”. Publius, Vol. 34 (1): 1–20. King, Preston (1982). Federalism and Federation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (1999). “Ethnicity and state politics in Africa”. African Journal of International Affairs, 2 (1): 31–59. Ojo, Emmanuel (2010). “The politics of revenue allocation and resource control in Nigeria: Implications for federal stability”. Federal Governance, 7 (1): 15–38. Suberu, R.T. (1988). “Federalism and Nigeria’s political culture: A comment”. African Affairs, 87 (Issue 348): 431–439. Tamuno, T.N. (2003). “Nigerian federalism in historical perspective”, in Amuwo, K., Agbaje, A., Suberu, R., & Herault, G. (eds) Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Usman, Bala (2000). “The misrepresentation of Nigeria: The facts and figures”. www.waado.org/nigerdelta/Essays/BalaUsman/Usman-misrepresentation.html (accessed: 12 July 2011). Suberu, R.T. (1992). Ethnic minority conflicts and governance in Nigeria. Ibadan: IFRA. Wheare, Kenneth (1963). Federal government. London: Oxford University Press.

14 Conclusion Between unity and implosion

Introduction A couple of years ago, Kankwenda (1994) argued that despite prolific trafficking in development ideologies in the African continent, development remains elusive. The above sentiments still apply largely to Nigeria where in spite of various economic blueprints and templates over the years, sustainable development remains a big challenge. The situation of Nigeria is, however, not really akin to that of many other resources-deprived African nations since the country has enormous human and material resources. Apart from the well-known oil and gas reserves, Nigeria is equally blessed with significant deposits of some of the other well-priced and sought-after mineral resources. In addition, the country has a well-developed human resources capacity, seen as one of the best in the continent. Therefore, the struggle to achieve growth and commensurate development remains largely a troubling affront to keen observers. It would appear that Nigeria’s challenges, apart from overbearing international capitalist configurations, have more to do with the management of the nation’s resources than with the dearth of resources for its development. In the best law of economics, valuable resources are usually scare. And this is no less the case in the Nigerian situation where available resources may be dwarfed by the vast needs of the country. However, the undisputed fact is that there has hardly been commensurate relationship between the resources that have accrued to Nigeria and development in the country. As Ajakaiye and Jerome (2011) argue, economic stagnation, declining welfare, and social instability have undermined Nigeria’s development for most of the postindependence period in spite the fact that it generated about US$500 billion in oil revenues in the past three decades. In other words, the windfall from oil has not had the expected impact on the nation’s growth or general development. Even though more money has accrued to the total derived from oil since the above assertion, the development scenario has neither improved much nor commensurately. Be the above as it may, a perplexing issue that has pockmarked the country’s postcolonial history is the overwhelming influence of centrifugal

Conclusion  229 forces and the lack of cohesion among the various socio-ethnic groups in the nation. It would be instructive in this regard to appreciate that the unity or common basis of Nigeria’s nationhood was an idea scoffed at and seen as purely colonially driven by the first-generation nationalist leaders in Nigeria. In this sense, the nation known as Nigeria has often been seen as dubious or superficial even by some of those who were its earliest political leaders. Typical of this form of entrenched doubt about its nationality are the popular sentiments of the late Yoruba sage Obafemi Awolowo. According to him, Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are not “Nigerians” in the same sense as there are “English”, “Welsh”, or “French”. The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. (Awolowo, 1947: 47–48) The above sentiments were soon followed by a similar outburst from Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, the leader of the First Republic Northern People’s Congress (NPC) who asserted that Nigeria exists as a country only on paper; that it is far from being united and its unity is only a British intention (see Balewa, 1947). While there is no doubt that this book has focused on a wide range of discussions or topics on development in contemporary Nigeria, it approaches the task of conclusion by identifying some crosscutting and recurrent themes and building the conclusion around these themes. This thematic style was adopted in order to ease both articulation and comprehension. Nevertheless, the non-inclusion of any theme already discussed somewhere in the book herein does not signify that such a theme matters little to the apprehension of development in Nigeria; rather it shows the struggle of the author to deal with the myriad issues implicated in a thorough development discourse of Nigeria.

Colonial experience, extremism and the roots of centrifugalism in Nigeria The menace of religion, especially the fundamental version of Islam in the North, owes as much to the deeply heterogeneous nature of Nigeria and political divisions championed by the elites on both sides of the Niger, as to the connivance of the colonial enterprise in Nigeria. The use of the indirect rule system by the British (which was a huge success in the North of Nigeria) was anchored on an agreement in the North between the powerful emirs who controlled vast expanses of territories before the colonial adventure and the Lugard-led colonial team. Thus, the colonial masters governed mainly through the emirs who also retained considerable political power

230  Conclusion and benefits of office while accepting colonial British authority. It was some kind of localized suzerainty that allowed the emirs enough room to exercise power and almost total domination over customary and religious matters including the Shari’a. It was a good bargain for both sides. However, “as part of the bargain, the British agreed to limit the spread of European culture in the northern region, closing the entire area to Christian missionaries and severely limiting the possibility for local children to attend English style schools” (Scacco, 2012: 326). Hence, while missionary schools and associated Western lifestyles proliferated in the South, the North pursued a course of education along the lines of the Islamic religion and the Shari’a that limited the exposure of its citizens to external influence while remaining British colonial subjects. It thus became just a question of time before a collision occurred between the two different lifestyles in the two areas of Nigeria. As has been argued elsewhere, the colonial North society waxed strong in both undisturbed pursuit of Islamic knowledge and way of life while side by side with an overriding Western structure. It was thus no surprise that even before the departure of the British in 1960, the tension that had been building over the years between trado-religious Northern system and the supposed superior Western system was on the verge of eruption. (Anugwom, 2019: 40) The disparate exposure to Western education and influence meant that the North and South took different development paths. Thus, while the North amassed Islamic knowledge and learning therein, the South embraced Western education and civilization (from Europe). Therefore, after a few decades of colonial rule, there became noticeable and significant imbalance in human development between the two regions. These differences were acute in the area of the acquisition of Western education and the enabling civic values therein. As has been reported, while by the year 1950 the South had produced hundreds of people with university degrees, the North had only one person with a university degree (Osaghae, 1998). These differences created a situation whereby Southern elites were the first into nationalist politics and the liberation struggles that culminated in the 1960 independence, and were a reasonable chunk of the colonial civil service bureaucracy that staffed government offices even in the North. The embrace of Western education by the North later on was motivated by the desire to reclaim these positions in the colonial civil service and ensure the non-domination of the area by the emergent Southern elites as the country headed towards independence. This explains why while the Southeast and Southwest became formally self-governing in 1957 (the year Anthony Enahoro proposed Nigeria’s independence); the North only ­conceded to self-governance in 1959. This was even after obtaining some concessions from the British, including at least half of the seats in the

Conclusion  231 national parliament and the use of such criteria as population and land mass in allocation of revenues from the centre. The above colonially induced development imbalance has dogged Nigeria’s efforts at national cohesion and the unity necessary for sustained development of the country.

History, leadership and development There is possibly no contesting the fact that Nigeria has hardly lived up to its potential as a resource-blessed nation and the once-touted giant of Africa. This situation has led to the development crisis in the country, which is often ascribed to inept political leadership. In fact, the renowned Nigerian writer, Chinua Achebe, in The Trouble with Nigeria (1983), identified leadership failure as the bane of development in Nigeria. In his view, the trouble with Nigeria, is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land, climate, water, air, or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to their responsibility. (Achebe, 1983: 1) The above take on the issue of leadership in Nigeria is perhaps more apt now than when it was first mooted. According to Anugwom (2010), leadership equally exacts a moral burden on those who assume such positions in human society. In this situation, leaders are especially tasked with being honest, morally upright and conscientious and acting in no way as to squander public trust and financial resource or undermine the confidence and trust of the people on the social and political institutions that make society governable. Such confidence and trust are essential in rallying support and commitment to development agendas. There is no gainsaying the fact that the imagination of the state and its elites as agents of ethnicity or the perception of ethnicity as a crucial factor in the conduct or role of the state breeds division and undermines the credentials of leaders (see Ogbeidi, 2012). Thus, the examination of leadership, whether in Nigeria or elsewhere in the modern world, revolves around the ability of the leaders to meet the above expectations, create institutions which are supportive of them, and equally be guided by ideological or normative references or values seen as consistent with these expectations and the task of generating and sustaining development initiatives. It is within this frame that the leader is deemed capable of leading the group towards the achievement of positive goals, which affect all people in the society. As has been argued in the case of Nigeria, “political leadership is personal rather than national; and corruptly converts national resources into its project of primitive accumulation. Ethnic diversity is manipulated to

232  Conclusion stay afloat to the detriment of national cohesion” (Ake and Onoge, 1995: 53). In addition, the problem of leadership in Nigeria especially in the democratic dispensation can be related to the dearth of political will or the inability of the political class to put national interests over and above clannish, selfish and ethnic interests. A good understanding of political will can be provided in the contention that it is, “the compelling force for sound leadership quality, the ability to do what is right, what is relevant, and what is attainable within the context of patriotic nationalism. Political will very often means personal or group sacrifices” (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012: 150). In view of the foregoing, there is no contesting the fact that leadership failure is consistent with development failures and development dilemmas. Therefore, the discourse of leadership and especially its distinction from “rulership”, which involves the emergence of over-ambitious individuals typically possessed by overwhelming egos that create the mentality and disposition that the individual is the state and that the state cannot endure or survive without the individual, is very imperative in understanding the factors underlying perennial underdevelopment in Nigeria. “Rulership”, as I see it here, invokes essentially reactionary memories of the past and is imbued with a short-term perspective, which sees affective links as only those that can be trusted and maintained. Guided by this perception, such leaders favour ethnicity and other primordial factors as key ingredients in the act of governance and role performance by the state. The development question in Nigeria is still much of a paradox. Nigeria’s rate of development apparently has not kept pace with the incontrovertible fact that the country is one of the richest in terms of natural resources in the whole of Africa. Nigeria is home to some of the choicest and most valuable natural resources in Africa, ranging from fossil fuels, precious metals, uranium, copper to mineral ores, iron ores etc. This is in spite of the fact that a thorough mapping of the natural resources in Nigeria has not been done yet. It is likely that such an exercise may overwhelm even the most generous estimation of the quantity and diversity of natural resources endowment in the country. Despite the above, there are severe development problems and a dearth of basic infrastructure in more than one third of the geographical area of Nigeria. This is in spite of many development plans and economic initiatives since the 1960s. In other words, decades of experimenting with both internally and externally generated development frameworks have not had any meaningful impact in the lives of over 70% of Nigerians. The above scenario has not been ameliorated in any significant sense by either Nigeria’s frontline position in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) or the still struggling Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (formerly the Millennium Development Goals). Despite the undeniable fact that mainly leadership issues and other internal and external constraints may have hampered these initiatives, these blueprints for development further suffer from self-inflicted weaknesses. However, the

Conclusion  233 NEPAD, just as the Bretton Woods institutions nurtured MDGs and SDGs, has done little tangible to help Nigeria and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa come to grips with their development dilemma,1 especially in a world where economic globalization has further worsened the industrial capacity of most African nations, including Nigeria. Nevertheless, the development question in Nigeria may be linked to the ahistorical discourse of development in the country. A commonly accepted fact is that history is often not seen from its interpretative potency in charting the course of the future and facing the challenges of the present but rather as a tourism-related vocation where emphasis is on learning the skills and practices through which antiques, museums and archives are packaged in order to attract badly needed foreign exchange. Hobsbawm (2002) underlines this mentality appropriately by arguing that modern globalizing society is anti-historical and is run on two basic principles inured to history, namely, the problem-solving approach of technology, which sees the past as largely irrelevant, and the “feverish” buy-it-now orientation of the consumer society. In addition to the consumerism of globalization, Hobsbawm points to the relegation of history from its practical context and relevance to the realm of decoration, entertainment and leisure. Thus, the above approach of the globalizing society, “wishes to cut off people from their past and cut them off from each other” (Hobsbawm, 2002: 24–25), and this is both anti-historical and un-sociological – an approach to reality in the name of the newfound multiculturalism, de-territorialism and cosmopolitanism that can hardly generate development in Nigeria. The historicization of development in Nigeria would entail learning from and building on the past, as well as emboldening the role of an incremental approach to growth and the social improvement of the society.

Nigeria, the global order and development It would seem there is no need to advance the well-known argument that while Nigeria is no island and can hardly be insulated from global developments, its development depends largely and decisively on the role of internal actors and processes. This brings up the issue of leadership again. Nigeria needs leaders who would function as champions of development and would have the creativity and capacity to transform the undoubted potentials of the country into real development gains. In this sense, while the Bretton Woods Institutions retain their undoubted global oversight and advisory roles, the development desires and processes of the nation should not be surrendered, as they were in the 1980s and 1990s, to these external bodies. As the SAP experience showed and as is apparent from the present era of neoliberal globalization, these institutions are more often than not primarily concerned with enthroning and sustaining the hegemony of global capitalism. The above does not demand isolation from the world or crave for a cocoon unaffected by global developments. This is not possible in any

234  Conclusion remote sense and may in fact be more destructive of the state in a rapidly interconnected global world. It, however, calls for creative, adaptive and astute leadership. As has been argued, the challenges for Africa’s [Nigeria’s] intellectuals, leaders and assorted friends is to map out modes of integration into the unfolding global system that will maximise, not further marginalise, the interests of the continent’s [country’s] peoples and polities, economies and environment, societies and cultures. (Zeleza, 2002: 10) In other words, Nigeria needs to chart a growth pattern that maximizes its benefits from the global system. It needs to pursue a development paradigm that sustainably and positively affects its people and its social and physical environment. However, for the above to be achieved, the nation needs regular self-appraisal and critical reflection bordering on identifying the wrong steps of the past and the incapacities or deficiencies of the present. Therefore, a focus on the factors and structural issues that have so far militated against development in Nigeria is imperative to the bid to reposition Nigeria for development. It is also counter-developmental to seek any form of solace or justification in references to the negative influences of colonialism. In other words, the failures and incapacities of the postcolonial Nigerian state cannot be adequately explained by colonialism, especially after six decades of independence from that experience. Such an attempt is denigrating of the capabilities and creative energies of the people of Nigeria. It is simply a case of the denial and undermining of agency, since there has been time enough to set the country on a steady and upward trajectory towards development. The reversals and hiccups suffered by the country on the journey to development has much more to do with internal socio-structural factors than with the colonial experience. Without doubt, colonialism left many scars on Nigeria’s psyche and even sowed the seeds of some of the recurrent problems the country encounters but it neither killed nor extinguished agency. Some of the other hitherto developing nations, such as India and Malaysia, had similar experiences but have been able to surmount their problems over time. There is no doubt that Nigeria, like most other states in Africa, has now exited the “developmentalism” phase of growth of the 1960s and 1980s when development, seen mainly in terms of physical infrastructure, bogus national development planning, nation-building and unity, was the mantra and yardstick for measuring both policy and leadership. In the misguided notion that governance hardly mattered, authoritarian leadership was accepted in many of these states (including decades of military rule in Nigeria) under the guise that this was imperative to nation-building and unity. Looking back now, the ideology of developmentalism and the ­policies it generated, would seem like an idiom for wasted years. In many

Conclusion  235 instances, as Nigeria’s battle with economic management, which led to the SAP of the mid-1980s showed, there were mainly cycles of hope and agonizing reversals. In effect, even when tenuous, the positive relationship between democratic governance and general development seems largely evident. Even as international capitalism and its neoliberal economic framework create spectres of human suffering, migration crises and conflict in many parts of Africa, there is no gainsaying the fact that individual freedom, human rights, inclusive socio-political and economic regimes and participation are all central to the pursuit of sustainable development. Therefore, one critical route for Nigeria to follow in the pursuit of development is the deepening and extension of democratic governance, that is, real democratic governance built on the above factors and benchmarked on leadership accountability, strong institutions and drastic reduction in corruption at all levels of the society.

Economic mismanagement, security and the challenge of resource distribution Part of the reasons for the escalation of social conflicts and militant ethnonationalism in Nigeria, especially over resources, has been the attitude of security agencies themselves that have readily served the personal interests of those in control of state power. Both the military regimes of Sani Abacha and Ibrahim Babangida as well as the democratic government of Olusegun Obasanjo all exhibited a myopic and slanted view of national security. In this case, national security was seen as largely unrelated to external threats but rather determined by the whims of the holders of power. In this situation of security perversion, conflicts have been exacerbated and reinforced by the actions of security agencies that have often resorted to punitive violence in order to ingratiate the leadership. Incidentally, the above approach has largely continued in Nigeria and creates a scenario where security agencies are primarily beholden to the leaders and their whims rather than the general security of citizens. The upsurge in the activities of ethnic militant associations, vigilante groups and civil society vanguards has been attributed to the failure of the security agencies of the state. Therefore, one may see the rise in the number of these extra-state security organs as a product of the failure of a state agency such as the police to maintain law and order. For instance, Igbo (2001), sees the Bakassi Vigilante Group, which was popular in the recent past in the Southeast, as arising to fill the vacuum created by the gross failure of state security agencies. Therefore, while dissatisfaction with resource allocation has bred misgivings among different ethno-regional groups in the country, the porous nature of national security has more readily transformed these grievances into open conflicts in a few places. Equally interesting in the above regard is that the misconstrued notion of national security as essentially regime security or the personal security of

236  Conclusion rulers and their cronies has made Nigeria even more insecure (Ujomu, 2002). This warped notion of security, which guarantees no basic individual or group security, has not been helped by the endemic intolerance and rivalry between different ethno-regional groups in the country. Nevertheless, one other source of the perception of marginalization is the inability of national political leaders to manage the economy in a productive or efficient manner to improve the wellbeing of the populace. The Nigerian economy may be seen as one that is still in transition or even as typically reflecting dependent capitalism. However, this may not be a major factor anymore since economic mismanagement, massive political corruption and leadership profligacy have done more harm to Nigeria’s economic growth than any perceived international capitalist conspiracy. Thus, the main problem has been neither the underdeveloped or dependent nature of the economy nor the obvious inequality in the international economic order; rather the major problem has been the failure of indigenous political elites to sincerely manage the nation’s resources and live above the lure of economics of self-interest. This explains why the average quality of life in Nigeria is very different from expectations based on the stupendous oil wealth that has accrued to the country in the last three decades. Economic mismanagement has easily bred widespread poverty, especially among inhabitants of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria (see UNDP, 2006). In spite of the massive oil wealth which has been derived from this area for over four decades, the UNDP sees it as the poorest in comparison with other regions with oil wealth, even in the developing world. Thus, the oil revenue has not had a positive impact on the lives of Nigerians; rather what obtains is a situation of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer (see Calvocoress, 1997). The dissatisfaction of people with their lot has easily given vent to ethnonational and militant associations as bastions of solidarity and struggle among the people. This phenomenon has been more noticeable in the Niger Delta region where ethno-militant groups contesting access and ownership of petroleum resources in the area were embroiled in violent conflict with the Nigerian state for a long time. The groups argue that the Nigerian state, in a typical predatory manner, steals the resources from the area and uses such in developing other areas which contribute little or nothing to the national economy and also line the pockets of leaders (see Okilo, 1980; OYC in Tell, 2007 for variants of this thinking). Therefore, a valid cause of the hostile relationship between groups in the country and the state is the failure of the national economy to impact positively on the wellbeing of citizens. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the excruciating poverty which is the lot of the people of the Niger Delta region (UNDP, 2006) and equally a common phenomenon among young people in the Northeast. The theatre of insurgency which the zone has been in the last decade has been related to the severe impoverishment of citizens there.

Conclusion  237 Apart from group pressure and ethnicity, another factor behind the social injustice often ascribed to the resource distribution process in Nigeria is the tendency of leaders to play god and equate themselves with the state. This process of personalization of power, which started with the military, has endured even in democracy and breeds a mentality of the leader as a resource benefactor who decides what each group gets on the basis of political patronage and cult hero worship. As has been argued, “when power is fully personalized as is gradually becoming the case in Nigeria, what results is that the destiny of the person of the leader and that of the country or state he/she presides over are conflated” (Ochonu, 2004: 27). This situation, which has become largely the reality in Nigeria, now confuses the thinking of the leadership and encourages the dispensation of largesse through a process determined largely by the leader. The appropriation of state resources, either for vainglory or for selfish desires on the part of the leader, cripples any effort at an equitable resource allocation or distribution and easily breeds corruption and rivalry between different ethno-regional groups all seeking for greater patronage and largesse from the powers that be.

Federalism and renegotiation of unity Federalism has the prospects of nipping ethnicity, corruption and nepotism in the bud (see Noyoo, 2000) when it is properly operated. Therefore, there is a need for a proper definition and functioning of federalism in Nigeria. Such a definition should be along the lines of what obtains in other countries such as the US, India and Brazil. Therefore, the issue in the case of Nigeria does not just lie with the adoption of the federal system of government but rather how this federation is structured and exhibited to the letter in all matters bordering on political and economic resource distribution between the constituent units and between these units and the centre. It is along these lines that the skewed and authoritarian fiscal centralism in operation in Nigeria should be replaced with a fair instrument that takes cognizance of contribution, needs and size. Even though the conventional wisdom is that federalism is a key element for building ethnic rapport and harmony in multi-ethnic Nigeria, there is equally no doubt that the optimism around federalism can only be realized when it is effective or workable, that is, when it takes cognizance of the needs and aspirations of the constituent units in the federation as well as functions to engender and sustain the intergroup consensus necessary for development. As a result, while there is much sense in the sentiments that “every single longstanding democracy in a territorially based multilingual and multinational polity is a federal state” (Stepan, 1999: 19); one cannot help comprehend that the critical issues would revolve around commitment to the true spirit of federalism (especially fiscal federalism in the case of Nigeria) and effective or strong institutions more than mere adoption of federalism by any given state.

238  Conclusion Undoubtedly, federalism remains attractive in view of Nigeria’s heterogenous make-up and the long history of contentions among the various social and ethnic groups in the country. Apparently, the development dilemma in Nigeria has not emanated from federalism per se but the inability to foster ideal or true federalism over the years. Therefore, efforts towards advancing Nigeria’s development and repositioning it to achieve its huge potential must include efforts towards enthroning the ideal principles and spirit of federalism.

Of patrimonialism and knowing all about Nigeria’s development challenges One common way of describing or understanding Nigeria’s development challenge is to invoke the notion of neopatrimonialism, which is often generalized for Africa as a whole (see Medard, 2002; Hoffman & Nolte, 2013; Pitcher, Moran, & Johnston, 2009; Ikpe, 2009; Wai, 2012; Kew, 2010). However, such an easy and convenient label or descriptor can lead to a simplification of what is obviously a complicated and complex issue. Another problem with such labels is that they often sound like the final word, that is, there is no need for further introspection and reflection; all that needs to be known is now unravelled (smug knowingness that often baffles). Such a perspective equally has the tendency of disabling efforts to unravel the nature of a problem in order to facilitate understanding and possibly foster resolution. Therefore, the development challenge in Nigeria goes beyond such simple labels, irrespective of how fashionable or evocative they sound in the global academic or social science community. However, more dubious and challenging of agency is that some of the advocates of neopatrimonialism suggest that the governance situation in Africa at large is mainly inured to radical improvements even over time. In other words, there is a predilection towards semi-scientific justification of Afro-pessimism, and the existence of such things as corruption are even glorified as simply emblematic of how Africa really works (see Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Neopatrimonialism, like some other social science concepts, is often so elastic in conceptualization that it privileges operational difficulties and may even encourage inaccurate science. It has been used to underscore a couple of negative practices that undermine governance and development ranging from regionalism, despotism, patronage to cronyism, political corruption and factionalism (including a couple of others in-between). For Clapham (1985) neopatrimonialism refers to a form of organization or set-up in which patrimonial relationships pervade political and administrative systems that are formally anchored on rational-legal lines (a reflection of the influence of the Weberian logic of rational-legal authority in modern society). In other words, the neopatrimonial organization is that in which there are embodiments of the modern and traditional or affective inclinations in daily usages and practices (see Hyden, 2000). So, while the Nigerian

Conclusion  239 state remains a modern entity with all the necessary rules and regulations, its functioning, especially governance, is permeated with primordial and affective dispositions that effectively encumber the functioning of the state. It must be mentioned that the new-found usage of neopatrimonialism took the concept away from its original conception as largely a phase in development in which there was the necessary mixture of both the traditional and the modern, that is, a transitional phase (see Eisenstadt, 1966). However, the glaring failure of many African states in the 1980s, including Nigeria, after the great promises of the 1970s, engendered the intellectual retooling and re-emergence of neopatrimonialism as an explanation of the development challenges of African countries. Without doubt, even though neopatrimonialism still has its adherents, its remaking may be related to the emergence of the popular dependency theory (see Chapter 3 of this book) which focused on the role of external factors in bedevilling development in Africa and other developing parts of the world. Thus, neopatrimonialism re-emerged as a counter-narrative to dependency. The above underlines both the insidious and the nebulous nature of the concept in unravelling the nature of development in Nigeria. Again, neopatrimonialism, like the resource curse notion, conveniently forgets or downplays the fact that much of the internal woes in Africa including massive political corruption, and programme infidelity can be related to the role of extractivism powered by global forces beyond these countries. Equally undermining the analytic utility of neopatrimonialism is the fact that it privileges grand narratives; or it is more or less a catch-all concept (see Kelsall, 2011; Erdman & Engel, 2007). Without doubt, neopatrimonialism provides good insights (namely, focus on factors like corruption, cronyism, clientelism, factionalism etc.) into the development challenge in Nigeria and Africa in general. However, it remains a largely inadequate and fatalistic conception of realities; it can also lead to the type of prescriptive knowingness that has influenced the attitude of the West to Africa. Nevertheless, “neopatrimonializing” development and governance in Africa remains strong and influential globally. In this sense, the easy acceptance by researchers and policy makers of the school’s [neopatrimonialism] claims in the absence of empirical evidence suggests that there are strong preconceptions and prejudices about African politics [and development by implication] that are unlikely to be dispelled by a more accurate measurement of the phenomenon in question. (Mkandawire, 2015: 39) Be the above as it may, the overarching focus in this book has been on examination of the various factors that affect development in Nigeria. It has been done without necessarily making a determined effort to compartmentalize

240  Conclusion these factors in terms of them being internally or externally driven or imposed. This is because the development challenges of Nigeria, like most other nations in Africa, can be related to both internal and external factors. However, in fairness to the influence of agency, one still sees the challenges as largely lying within the capacity of Nigeria and Nigerians to address. The external forces may seem daunting and even compelling but building internal cohesion and consistent development momentum can overwhelm these forces, as the cases of some of the Asian tigers have made clear.

Towards a theoretical explanation of the development conundrum in Nigeria The understanding and explanation of development in Nigeria can be achieved through a largely new political economy lense. This new political economy perspective recognizes the role of external influences and global capitalism especially as embodied in globalization but sees a bigger chunk of the problem as lying within the domestic political and social spheres of the production and reproduction of political and social elites as well as the impact of these on development and growth. Nigeria can be likened to living under a toxic political economy populated by the whims and caprices of a predatory political class whose definition and conceptualization of state policies and programmes have been exceedingly influenced by egocentric and primordial desires. In effect, one sees a certain form of the primordialism of state power much akin to the ideas of prebendalism expressed a few decades ago by Richard Joseph (Joseph, 1987; 1998). Regrettably, Nigerian politics and its political culture and class have not progressed much further than the dismal picture painted by Joseph. However, a major departure in recent times is the obvious retreat of ethnicity as the fundamental glue of political organization and association. Perhaps, starting from the historic electoral showing of the late Moshood Abiola in the 12 June 1993 Presidential election to the Goodluck Jonathan victory in 2011 and even the balkanization of the core North in terms of states won by the two leading presidential candidates in the 2019 elections, the role of ethnicity has gradually declined. Nowadays, political alliances and organization are built more on homogenous lucre and the perceived need for each other’s machinations than on ethnicity. Such alliances, which are now forged on corruption, limited sectional interests and personal desires, have grown across ethnic and language divides. However, the other component of Richard’s idea in which prebendalism is manifested in the personal and factional appropriation of public offices still holds water. Predatory politics is driven by the desire for benefits and an overriding need to utilize the political platform for satisfying the economic and political desires of the office holder, their political cronies and select relatives. In such a situation, corruption becomes rife and development policies plans or programmes are held hostage and strangled or stagnated by the inordinate

Conclusion  241 desires of political office holders, self-serving bureaucratic associates and plethora of hangers-on and acolytes. Development in Nigeria must also be understood and explained through the impact of federalism and the oil mono-economy in the state. The operation of a federal structure that is devoid of its key element of fiscal autonomy (see Chapter 13 on federalism) have in the democratic setting created more avenues for plundering of oil rent by the political class. In other words, the multiplicity of government levels, including the largely comatose but corruption-riddled local government system, has opened up many channels for the appropriation of resources and plundering of the commonwealth by the politicians. In most local government areas and even some states, the business of governance and pursuit of development have been reduced to a monthly ritual of sharing public revenue. Some local government areas are only busy shortly before and immediately after the receipt of monthly allocation from the federal coffers. Perhaps, as has been contended, “the Nigerian federal system operates almost exclusively as a mere mechanism for the intergovernmental distribution and ethno-political appropriation of centrally collected oil revenues” (Suberu, 2013: 79). One finds the notion of patrimonial economics privileged by Thomas Piketty (2014) very interesting in the analysis of development in Nigeria. It, however, falls short in two critical ways, namely, its usefulness can only be achieved by elongating the term to include an overriding political patrimonialism driven by egocentric economist motives; and the fact that the concepts of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, in spite of their origin, have been employed in a contemporary form that sees the development and governance challenges as entirely internally generated. In other words, they seem to align towards the exoneration of the global political and economy systems from the development doldrums in Africa. This orientation does not tell even half of the story. In spite of the above, there is no gainsaying the fact that development in Nigeria is bedevilled by a generalized self-serving and primordial tendency, which has captured the political class and its growing population of hangers-on on a mission of pillage and plundering of the state. In such a situation, while development is idealized and ostensibly targeted, actions and policies are primarily subservient, accountable and amenable to the egocentric desires of the leadership.

Concluding thoughts In looking at ways through which development can be pursued in Nigeria, one would call attention to the 2002 Human Development Report (Human Development Report, 2002) of the UNDP. The Report addresses the broad issues of democracy and democratic consolidation as critical agents of development. However, the six challenges that the report raises in this

242  Conclusion regard are still as crucial in Nigeria’s development (and many of the nations in Africa as well) now as they were then. These challenges are: •• A system of representation, with well-functioning political parties and interest associations. •• An electoral system that guarantees free and fair elections as well as universal suffrage. •• A system of checks and balances based on the separation of powers, with independent judicial and legislative branches. •• A vibrant civil society, able to monitor government and private business – and provide alternative forms of political participation. •• A free, independent media. • Effective civilian control over the military and other security forces. (UNDP, 2002: 4) While Nigeria has made progress in the first challenge regarding political parties and interest groups, the electoral system is still to satisfactorily guarantee free and fair elections. In fact, the inability to get the electoral process right, especially in terms of building the trust of the electorate, has been very recently perceived as likely to lead to the disintegration of Nigeria (see Jega, 2019). In the same instance, there have been many concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary in recent times. According to the 2018 UNDP Human Development Report, Nigeria is still ranked in the category of countries with low human development and is actually 157 out of the 189 countries ranked. However, Nigeria shares this unenviable category with other less resource-endowed countries such as Benin, Tanzania, Sudan, Malawi, Yemen, Haiti, etc. Even if one is tempted to describe Nigeria’s development history in the evocative terms of Wolfgang Sachs as “a ruin in the intellectual landscape. [Where] Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development” (Sachs, 1992: 1), there is still great hope and discernible assurance in the vast and still largely undiminished potential of the country. Therefore, Nigeria can still get it right, development-wise. However, for Nigeria to emerge from the doldrums of underdevelopment there is still a major role for government in both participation and regulation of economic activities. The state must function in such ways that it does not impede private-sector growth but equally stems the tide of economic adversity and the uncertainty of citizens. It should equally lead the way in development planning and the enunciation of pathways to both economic growth and sustainable development. In other words, there is now, more than ever before, the imperative of the complimentary roles of the state and markets in the development project in Nigeria. But the complementarity should also espouse the protection of those who find themselves marginal to socio-economic processes in the society. While the above sentiments capture in essence what one would consider the pathway to meaningful and sustainable development in Nigeria, I must

Conclusion  243 point out that this does not entail a return to the old thinking about the developmental state per se. Rather there is the recognition in the case of Nigeria and many other developing nations with either weak or emerging public institutions and severe social welfare needs, that development cannot be fully embodied in and empowered through market forces. There is no gainsaying the fact that in spite of the dominance of globalization, the neoliberal reforms and governance framework it has promoted globally cannot generate sustainable development in Africa. In other words, while recognizing the need for an economy predicated on market forces or the need for an economy driven by the private sector, there is today more than ever the urgent need for a welfare-oriented state that takes care of the fallouts of such a neoliberal economy. In other words, the state which promotes solely the capitalist individualistic model of social life is not the desirable state mode for many nations in Africa including Nigeria. This conclusion derives from not only the enormous social problems and deprivation in the continent but equally from the need to factor the African socio-cultural viewpoint into the process of development. Perhaps the above thinking was captured very much earlier by Lumumba-Kasongo when he contended that given the nature of an African society that is “essentially communal, with a high level of tolerance of differences among various peoples and nations, it is possible to learn from a social democracy approach to development rather than from an individualistic capitalist model of development” (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2002: 102). Incidentally, Lumumba-Kasongo more or less reaffirmed this viewpoint in a later publication on the welfare state within the context of globalization in the continent. Thus, he still argued, “the concept of welfare is still relevant, and thus should provide the epistemological and social basis for rethinking African democracies” (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2006: 1). For Nigeria, this is instructive, as current and unfolding national realities call attention to the need for systematic social provision by the state even as efforts are radicalized to advance economic growth dependent on the powers of the private sector and market forces. It is thus not a matter of one or the other but the ability to establish a complementarity that advances the long-term interests of Nigeria and its citizens. From the foregoing, there is an urgent need for the radical rethinking of development in Nigeria by all stakeholders, especially from the perspective of a growth process that embodies both distributional justice, equity and the recognition of socio-ethnic differences within the framework of common goals and aspirations. And critical to this venture would be the strengthening of federalism, re-imagination of leadership, promotion of anti-corruption strategies, recognition and protection of the rights of minorities and prudent utilization of economic resources within the framework of broad-based, inclusive and productive development planning.

244  Conclusion

Note 1 The World Bank World Development Indicators estimate for Africa indicates that an additional 46 million people will fall into severe poverty; 53 million will become poor; and child mortality will rise significantly between 2009 and 2015 in the continent. This means that in the world-order dynamics characterized by globalization, Africa is yet to chart a reliable course towards development.

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Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables. Abacha, Sanni 20, 54, 130, 150, 153, 188, 209, 235 Abbasid dynasty 98 Abiola, Moshood 24n1, 67, 183, 188–189, 240 Abubakar, Abdulsalam 75, 151 Achebe, Chinua 130, 231 Action Group (AG) political party of the First Republic 75, 77, 155, 188 Act of 1807 16 Act of 1981 150 acts of violence 166, 173 adaptive leader 125 administration, of Nigeria: under colonial rule 17; under emirs 17 Afenifere Group 180, 188–189 African development dilemma 112 Afro-pessimism, justification of 123, 201, 238 Age of High Mass Consumption 30 agrarian revolution 7 Ake, Claude 132–133, 167 al-Barnawi, Abu Musab 96 All Progressives Congress (APC) 141n5 Allure of Toxic Leaders, The (2006) 138 American hegemony, decline of 34 Amnesty Programme 143–144 annabi 92 anti-corruption, promotion of 48, 54, 61–62, 243 Arewa Citizens Action for Change 187 Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) 180, 186–188; sectional politics of 187; solidarity of 187 Arewa People’s Congress (APC) 180, 186–188 Arewa Students Forum 187

Arewa Youth Consultative Forum 173, 187 Arewa Youth Development Foundation 187 artificial intelligence 106 artisanal mining 12 Awolowo, Obafemi 229 awuf, notion of 49 Ayoob, Mohammed 98 Azikiwe, Nnamdi 51, 123 Babangida, Ibrahim 109, 110, 150, 153, 183, 202, 205, 209 Bakassi Boys 175n2; Vigilante uprising 166 balkanization of Nigeria 162, 187, 240 Berlin Conference (1885) 16; partition of Africa at 16 Biafra Actualization Forum (BAF) 163 Biafra Must Be Society (BIAMUS) 163 Biafran nationalism, in Nigeria: among Southeastern Nigerians 164; development dynamics in 170–172; ethnicity and expectations of 162; ethnic militant associations 160; ethnonationalist aspirations 165; Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) 162; from MASSOB TO IPOB 164–167; memory and development imbalance 172–174; Niger Delta militants 160; Nigerian state and democracy 167–169; quasinationalism, emergence of 164; resurgence and separatist agitations 162–164, 172; separatism and conflicts 167; theoretical understanding of 163–164; towards

248  Index Biafran nationalism, in Nigeria continued equity and inclusive development 174–175; Zikist Movement 160 Bible of Colonialism 19 Bight of Benin 16 Bight of Biafra 15 Boko Haram 86, 92, 94–95; agenda of 95; atrocities of 95; driver of fractionalization of 97, 101n3; guerrilla tactics 95; influence and operations between 2010 and 2013 95; Islamic ideology of 92; justification for killing fellow Muslims 96; membership of 96; modus operandi of 95; Yusufiyya sect 93–94 Boro, Isaac 160 Boys O’Yea Traders Movement 160 Brandt Commission (1980) 6 Bretton Woods Institutions 110, 130, 233 bribery 46, 49, 52, 54–55, 59 British administration, of Nigeria: discharge of 17; indirect rule system 17; termination of 17 British Africa 18 Bruntland Report (1987): idea of “sustainable development” 4; key element of 4 Buhari, Muhammadu 56, 63, 171, 188 capitalist exploitation, patterns of 32, 37 capitalist world economy 35–36 centrifugalism, in Nigeria: roots of 229–231 Christianity 85 citizenship, notion of 5, 89–90, 218 civil liberties, promotion of 135 civil-military relations 7 Civil War 21, 72, 75–76, 103, 108, 111, 160, 165–166, 168–169, 171, 174, 180, 189, 193–194, 203, 217, 221 clientelism, politics of 123, 130–131, 239 Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) 54 “coerced” labour, use of 35 colonial civil service 230 colonial experience, in Nigeria 23, 214, 229–231, 234 colonial legacy, of Nigeria 7, 18, 73–74 colonial supremacy 17 conflict-prone resource distribution process 143 Constituent Assembly of Nigeria 93 constitutional monarchies 16 contemporary Nigeria 14, 20–24, 61, 80, 134, 165, 168, 200, 204, 229

corporate leadership 134 corruption: Achebe’s views on 130; of Nigerian leadership 129; in relation to management of national wealth 132; sycophancy and political 129–130 corruption tribunal, establishment of 57 cultural values, of the nation 74, 127 dan Fodiyo, Uthman 15, 20, 71, 86, 89, 91–92, 97, 99 “Dasukigate” case 64n1 democracy, in Nigeria 196; primordial allegiance 196 “dependencia” model, of global development 31–32 derivation, principle of 146, 149–151, 156, 204, 208–209, 224; and grouse of Niger Delta 153–155 developmentalism, ideology of 234 development in Nigeria: challenges of 36; conceptualization of 6–8; corruption and 57–60; dependency perspective for 31–33; dilemma of 31; genuine democracy and 135–136; impact of globalization and neoliberalism on 37–40; modernization theory and thinking on 28–31; nature of 26, 239; political economy approach to 40–42; problem of 7; socio-political history and 15–20; Take-Off stage 29; theoretical frame of 26, 240–241; world systems analysis (WSA) of 34–37 Dina Committee 149, 150 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDR) see Amnesty Programme distributive injustice 146, 160 division of labour 34 division of power 215 Drive to Maturity 29 dual mandate, idea of 18 Dutch disease, notion of 110–114, 116 ease of doing business index 118 East-Asian Tigers 34 ecological degradation 156 ecological disasters 16 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 8, 54–55; appointment of the chair of 57; convictions by 56; major milestones in corruption investigation/

Index  249 prosecution by 57; timelines for prosecution of cases 57 economic development, in Nigeria: associated with oil resources 104; Basic Needs Approach (BNA) to 105; blueprints for 108; developmentoriented activities and projects 110; development planning as a route to 108–110; economic growth and 105–107; Fifth Development Plan 109; First National Development Plan (1962–1968) 108; Fourth Development Plan (1981–1985) 108; framings of 110–114; impact of noneconomic factors on 105; key determinant of 104; leadership as antidote to 133–135; macro- and micro-economic policies 105; major constraints to 114–116; National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 109; political constraints in 103; “resource curse” logic for 104; role of human capital in 104; role of non-economic factors in 105; role of public infrastructure in 104; Second Development Plan (1970–1974) 108; Sixth Development Plan 109; social conflict and contention 104; Third Development Plan (1975–1980) 108; Vision 2010 Development Programme 109; welfare of ordinary citizens 112 economic diversification 7, 108, 225 economic growth, notions of 4, 26, 29, 33, 37, 59, 103–106, 108, 110, 114, 118, 134, 145, 164, 236, 242–243 economic inequality 33 economic mismanagement, in Nigeria 235–237 economic nationalism 40–41 economic power 40, 217–218; international dynamics of 112 economies of societies, in Africa 131 education system, in Nigeria: Islamic education 184; Western-oriented 184, 230 elections, in Nigeria 183 electricity supply, by region, by hours and by mean cost 115 emergent economies 224 endorsed violence 169 environmental degradation 111, 146, 209 equitable development, goals of 23, 109, 215, 226

ethnic affiliation 181 ethnic-based mobilization, for balanced development 164 ethnic differences 68, 71, 133, 243 ethnic diversity 7, 226, 231 ethnicity, perception of 231 ethnic militant associations, in urban Nigeria 79, 160, 163–164, 166, 235 ethnic militant groups, resurgence of 165 ethnic minorities 79–80, 91, 143, 145–146, 180, 186, 203–204, 217, 222; language of 69; majority ethnic group alliance with 67; marginalization of 91; of Niger Delta 152, 154–155, 157; prior to Nigeria’s independence 23 ethnic nationalities 72, 77, 168–169, 174 ethno-entrepreneurs 226 ethno-militant associations 162, 167 ethnonational agitations 191, 193–194 ethnonationalism, in Nigeria 168–169, 223; Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) 186–188; Arewa People’s Congress 186–188; crisis of identity and 179; and development in Nigeria 190–194; development of 180; intergroup relationship 184; political competition 183; pre-independence politics and growth of 184–186; prominent groups in postcolonial Nigeria 186; relation with ethnicity 181–183; repression under the military regimes 185; spheres of public life 180; and strategizing for resources in the society 181–183; superiority of 192 ethno-regional hegemony 164 ethno-regionalism, dominance of 196, 199 ethno-regional polity, Lemarchand’s model of 164 ethno-religious violence 169 Euro-Americanism 127 European Recovery Programme see Marshall Plan, of economic recovery exclusion, politics of 168 export-oriented economics 112 extortion of money, from contractors 58 extremism, in Nigeria 229–231 false consciousness, Marxian notion of 129 Faseheun, Frederick 188, 194n2 federal bureaucracy 81, 147

250  Index federalism, in Nigeria: clamour for true federalism 220–222; constitutional provision of 215; defection in 214; defined 214; desire for 217; ethnosocial groups in the South 220–222; factors influencing 223; fiscal federalism 224; functioning of 223; idea of 147–149, 151; impact of 241; impediments to 222–223; nature of 215–217; need for restructuring of 226; philosophy of 216; renegotiation of unity 237–238; towards a workable 223–225; working of 217–220 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) 55 financialization of capital 38 First Republic Northern People’s Congress (NPC) 229 First World countries 33, 36 fiscal centralism, idea of 214, 237 fiscal decentralization 147, 151, 222 fiscal federalism, development of 156, 194, 214, 222, 224, 226, 237 followership, idea of 138–139 forced eviction 173 foreign direct investment (FDI) 58, 103; contribution to country’s GDP 116 Fourth Republic democracy, in Nigeria 161 freedom of speech and association 185 Fulani herdsmen, menace of 68, 188, 191 genocide 173–174, 190 Geological Survey of Nigeria 12 geopolitical zones, by states in Nigeria 20, 21, 107, 144, 169, 209, 220, 226 global capitalism 31, 119; economics of 163; hegemony of 233 globalization: dependency theory of 37; and neo-liberalism 37–40 global North 3, 31–32; interactions with Africa 51 global South 3, 27, 31, 32 Goodluck, Jonathan 80, 187, 211n3, 240 governance of Nigeria 217 grassroots politics, concept of 131 green revolution 7 gross domestic product (GDP) 118 guerrilla warfare, use of 96 Hadiths 87, 96 Hausa-Fulani caliphate 98 House of Commons: Royal Niger Company Bill (1899) 18

human capacity development 106 human capital 7, 104, 118 human development: Human Development Index (HDI) 140n4; Human Development Report 241–242; imbalance in 230 human rights abuses 170 Igbo ethnic group 160; denial of rights 190; development imbalance and 170; disempowerment of 190; ethnoreligious violence 169; Holocaust-like extermination of 190; insecurity of lives and properties 170; marginalization against 169, 189, 221; minoritization of 169; Ohaneze (socio-cultural group) 221; policy of strangulation of 190; resurgence of Biafra 174 Ikemba Front 160 Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) 54 Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) 162–163, 164–167, 171, 180, 187, 190; Biafra agitation led by 173 indivisibility of religion and politics in Islam, notion of 98 innovative leader 125 insurgency and terrorism, in Nigeria 86 interethnic schisms and conflicts 146 international capitalism 235 International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 53 intra-state conflicts 222 Islamic education, popularity of 94, 184 Islamic fundamentalism, in Nigeria 15, 85, 94; conceptualizing of 87–89; enduring history of 91–94; historical and contemporary trends of 97–100; impact on Nigeria’s secularity 86, 97–100; obligation before the nationstate 90; religious separatism 90; secular state within context of 89–91 Islamic religion: parochial education 94; religious conflicts 99; rules of 86–87, 99, 230 Islamic Shari’a 93 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 96–97 Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) 86, 96–97; Shekau group 96; use of guerrilla warfare 96

Index  251 Jamaatul Alsunnah Lida Awati Wal Jihad see Boko Haram jihad 17, 92, 97; of Usman Dan Fodiyo 86 Joint Task Force (JTF) 95 Joseph, Richard 130 Kaduna Declaration (2017) 187 Kanu, Nnamdi 166, 169, 171, 189–190 knowledge capital 104 knowledge economy 106 kola, concept of 49 Koranic schools (makarantan allo) 94 Kukah, Matthew 128, 136 Lake Chad 12, 96 Land Use Decree of 1978 156 languages in Nigeria 19–20 Latin America 3, 28–29, 31–32, 110–111 leadership incapacity, in Nigeria: democracy and negative political culture 128–129; divide-and-rule strategy 133; perpetuation of 128; politics of clientelism 130–131; recurrent decimals in 127–133; state as object of pillage 131–133; sycophancy and political corruption 129–130 leadership, in Nigeria 122, 231–233; as antidote to development 133–135; categorization of 126; corporate 134; definition of 124; democracy and emergence of 128; discourse of 124–125, 127; emergence of good leaders 127; etymologizing and categorizing 125–126; failure of 231; generalized trait of 132; impact on development 123; leader-member exchange 125; leadership incapacity 127–133; nature and dynamics of 126–127; overview of theoretical perspectives on 124–125; personal aggrandizement and self-glorification 132; political 127, 134, 137–138; positions of 124; qualities of 124; relationship-oriented 124; religious 134; role in societal transformation 124; task-oriented 124; team leadership 125; trait theory of 124; transformational 125 Lehman Brothers 140n2 Lugard, Lord 16–17, 94, 185, 229; dual mandate of 18 Lyttleton Constitution (1954) 216, 225

Maitatsine Movement 91, 99 Mandela, Nelson 123 marginalization: allegations of 202; conspiracy theory of 203–205; counter-claims of 200; of ethnoregional groups 202; feature of 201; process of 202; in public sphere 208; in resource allocation 200; revenue distribution and 202–203; and social conflict 202, 208 Marshall Plan, of economic recovery 28, 42n1 Marwa, Mohammed “Maitatsine” 91–92; ideology of 95; teachings of 92 Marxist school of dependency theory 32 Middle Belt of Nigeria 12, 182 military governance, in Nigeria 149, 169, 188, 211n9 Millennium Development Goals 232 Mohammed, Prophet 87, 92–93, 97 money laundering 55; global war against 55 mono-economy 37, 112–113, 116, 118, 143, 204, 223, 225, 241 Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 162, 163, 168, 171, 180, 190; nature and features of 164–167 M-power initiatives 106 Mujaddid 91 multi-cultural societies 196 multinational corporations, indigenization of 41, 168 multi-religious state 91 Muslims, enslavement of 15 Naira (Nigerian currency), exchange value of 116 naming of Nigeria 17–18 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 8, 54, 115 National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) 189 National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 109 nationalism, idea of 192 National Population Commission (NPC) 13 national resources, in Nigeria: distribution of 220; mapping of 232; Oloibiri oil discovery 153; plans and economic initiatives 232; quantity and diversity of 232 national revenue distribution 154

252  Index national wealth 106, 113, 132, 148, 153, 204, 220 nation-building efforts, in Nigeria 185 nation-state, idea of 33, 89–91, 162, 180, 192, 207 neo-liberal capitalism 162 neopatrimonialism, concept of 238–239, 241 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 232–233 News Mirror 189 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 221 Niger Delta Front 160 Niger Delta region 200; agitation of minorities 145–147; allocation of resources in 202; appraisal of agitation from outside the region 155–156; conflict-prone relationship 145; ecological balance in 209; environmental impact of oil exploitation 143; ethnic minorities in 152, 155; ethnonational groups in 145; ethnonationalism in 182; federalism and framing of 147–149; Oloibiri oil discovery 153; politics of derivation 153–155; resource control and distribution 145–147; revenue distribution system in 152; revenue‑sharing formula 146; zone of contestations over resources 183 Nigeria–Biafra war (1967–1970) 160, 165, 189 Nigerianness, definition of 127 Nigerian state: battle with economic management 235; and Biafran nationalist groups 167–169; development challenges 238–240; emergence of 167; global order and development 233–235; notion of marginalization 199–201 Nkrumah, Kwame 123 Northeast Development Commission 209 Northern Emancipation Network 187 Northern Nigeria society 93–94 Northern youth organizations 173 Nur, Mamman 96 Obasanjo, Olusegun 110, 151, 187, 189, 205, 221, 235 Obi, Cyril 144 Oduduwa, Egbe Omo 71, 75, 160, 188 Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990) 156 Ohaneze Ndigbo 180, 189–190

oil-based economy 112 oil conflict: crisis in Niger Delta 144; nature of 144 oil export 119, 153 oil industry bill 157 Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) 150 oil mono-economy 116, 241 oil-producing states 151–153, 156 oil revenues, redistribution of 146 oil royalties and rents 224; plundering by political class 241 oil-state nexus, in Nigeria 198 Ojukwu, Odimegwu 170, 173 Oodu’a People’s Congress (OPC) 180, 188; Gani Adams faction of 188–189 Oputa Panel (Human Rights Violations Investigation Panel) 189 organic theory of the state 155 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 89 orthodox Islam 95 Othman Dan Fodiyo jihad (1804–1808) 15, 20 Otite, Onigu 20 Ottoman Empire 98 “Our Common Future” report (1987) see Bruntland Report (1987) patrimonial economics, notion of 241 patrimonialism, notion of 131, 238–240, 241 patriotic nationalism 232 People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 141n5, 175n3 peripheralization, process of 34 personal income tax, standardization of 224 Petroleum Development Trust Fund (PDTF) 211n10 Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 157 petroleum mono-economy 37 Phillipson Commission (1946) 149, 153 Piketty, Thomas 241 political constituencies by state, distribution of 148 political corruption, in Nigeria 6, 45; Acting Auditor General’s Report for 47; anti-corruption stance 48, 62; bribery 49; bureaucratic 46; culture versus colonialism 49–51; definition of 50; development and 57–60;

Index  253 economic and financial crimes 55; expansive 58; fight against 56, 61–62; functionalist perspective of 48; generality of 48; institutional fight against 54–57; involvement of public officials in 51–54; nature and origin of 49–51; negative impact of 57; net negative impact of 46; origins of 50; pervasiveness of 52; pluralist multitiered approach 48; political economy perspective to 48–49; prevalence of 55; problematization of 46; public choice theory 47–48; rent-seeking approach 47–48; restrictive 58; social malaise 50; tackling of 60–62; theoretical discourse on 47–49; utilization of 51; way of distinguishing 46 political leadership 51, 53, 76, 97, 113, 122–123, 127, 129, 131–134, 138–139, 140n2, 229; need for reform of the electoral process 137–138 political parties, registration of 138 political positions, allocation of 147 political power, over-centralization of 220 political process, in Nigeria 130; notion of class in 131 political victimization 54 political violence 191 politics in Nigeria, nature of 21–22, 93, 131, 204 population, of Nigeria 14 Port Harcourt 60, 113, 155 poverty levels, in Nigeria: educational level and 114; level of households 113, 114; spread and trend in 107; states by poor proportion share by total poor 117 prebendal politics, in Nigeria 67, 131 predatory capitalism 112 Presidential Amnesty Programme 221 productive management, of national economy 209 psychological dissonance 198 public infrastructure, role in economic development 104 public sector employment 52 quality of life 5, 23, 26, 30, 110–111, 127, 129, 132, 134, 207, 209, 236 quasi-nationalism, emergence of 164 quasi-states 164, 167 Qur’an 92

racial profiling, of colonized people 18 radical restructuring, of Nigeria 171 Radio Biafra 166, 171 Raisman and Tress Commission (1958) 149 relative deprivation, concept of 67, 198–199 religious conflicts and violence, in Nigeria: debates on the Shari’a issue 91; fanaticism and intolerance 86; history of 86; Islamic fundamentalism and see Islamic fundamentalism, in Nigeria; in Islamic North of Nigeria 86; Maitatsine movement 91; obligation before the nation-state against 90; proliferation of sects in 89; secularity and 91; Shari’a project 86; terror and religious killings 92; threats to secularity 93 religious fundamentalism, in Nigeria 86 religious ideologies 88 religious instruction (makarantan addini) 94 religious leadership 134 religious sectarianism 93 rentier economy 104, 110–114, 209 rent-seeking economy 112 resource allocation 196; conflict around 197; conspiracy in 204; ethnic politicization of 205; imbalance in revenue 204; influence of ethnoregionalism in 203; marginalization in 200; national resource allocation 208; negation of 205–206; restiveness and dissatisfaction over 198; social conflict and 201–202 resource curse, notion of 7, 67, 104, 110–114, 198, 239 resource distribution system, in Nigeria 145, 149; dissatisfaction of the ethnic minorities with 145; importance of derivation in 154; political norm in 208–209; primordial politics and 206–208 revenue allocation, in Nigeria 149–152; derivation component of 221, 224; dimensions of 144; formula of 205; and grouse of the Niger Delta minorities 149–152; horizontal 205; marginalization and 202–203; principle in 152; problems associated with 146; process of 145; Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 205–206

254  Index Revenue Amendment Decree No. 36 of 1984 150 revenue distribution system 144–145, 149, 152 Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 150–151, 205–206 revenues from oil and gas, in Nigeria 129 revolutionary Marxism, decline of 34 River Niger 12, 17, 156 Roseneau, James 38 Rostow, Watt Whitman 29, 31 Royal Charter 16 Royal Empire Society, London 128 Royal Niger Company 16 Royal Niger Company Bill (1899) 18 rulership, notion of 140, 164, 232 Sachs, Jeffrey 62 salaries of civil servants 221 school feeding programme 105 sectional politics and marginalization, perspectives on 198–199 secular state, concept of 21, 85, 89–91, 93, 99 self-esteem, growth of 5 self-evident marginalization 175 self-rule, idea of 122, 215–216 separatist urban movements, in the modern state project 163–164 shared rule, idea of 216 Shari’a courts 93 Shari’a project, in Nigeria 86 Shekau, Abubakar 95–97 Slave Coast 18 slave trade 15–16, 18–19; abolition of 16 social conflict 201; in African continent 201; incidence of 164; nexus with marginalization 202, 208; resource distribution and 201–202 Social Democratic Party (SDP) 183 social development 2, 5, 7, 11, 109, 146, 147, 150 social geography, of Nigeria 11–15 social inclusion, idea of 5, 170 social inequality 23, 33, 86 social inequity, in post-civil-war Nigeria 163, 201, 208 social justice 5, 196–197, 201 social transformation, concept of 30 social violence 191 social welfare and security 30

socio-cultural organization 188–189, 194 socio-economic inequality 99, 166 Sokoto Caliphate, in Nigeria 15, 98 Southeastern zone of Nigeria 166 Soviet bloc 28 State Independent Electoral Commissions 137 state-oriented nationalism, in Nigeria 192 state-sponsored violence 169 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 110 sub-Saharan Africa 1, 11, 78, 129, 201, 233 sustainable development 124, 242; idea of 4, 6, 27 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 232 Tafewa Balewa, Abubakar 75, 128, 229 terrorism financing 55 Third World countries 3, 29, 33, 35 Todaro, Michael Paul 5–6, 33 tourism-related vocation 233 Township Ordinance Act (1917) 108 trade in commodities, with Europeans 16 Traditional Society 29–31 transformational leaders 125 transnational oil corporations (TNOCs) 143, 157 Trouble with Nigeria, The (1983) 231 Truman, Harry S. 3 Umayyad dynasty 97–98 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 3 universal socialism 36 urbanization, in Nigeria 163 urban social movements 161, 166 Usman, Bala 222 Uwazuruike, Ralph 166, 190 Vision 20:2020 development programme 109 Wahhabi Salafi cult 87 Wallerstein, Immanuel 34–35 warrant chiefs 17 Western education, in Nigeria 86, 94–95, 185, 230 Wheare, Kenneth 22, 214–215 Willinck’s Commission 91

Index  255 World Bank 8; World Development Indicators 244n1 World Commission for Environment and Development: Bruntland Report (1987) 4 world systems analysis (WSA) of development 34–37 World Systems model 32

World War II 28 Yakassai, Alhaji Tanko 187–188 Yan Tatsine 92 Yar’Adua, Musa 187 Yusuf, Mohammed 92, 94–96 Zikist Movement 160