Democratization and Securitization : The Case of Romania [1 ed.] 9789047430834, 9789004177390

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Democratization and Securitization

International Comparative Social Studies Editor-in-Chief

Mehdi P. Amineh Amsterdam School for Social Sciences Research (ASSR)— University of Amsterdam and International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS)—University of Leiden Editorial Board

Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Simon Bromley, Open University, UK Harald Fuhr, University of Potsdam, Germany Gerd Junne, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Ngo Tak-Wing, University of Leiden, The Netherlands Mario Rutten, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Advisory Board

W.A. Arts, University College Utrecht, The Netherlands Chan Kwok-bun, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong S.N. Eisenstadt, Jerusalem, Israel L. Hantrais, Loughborough University, UK G.C.M. Lieten, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands L. Visano, York University, Canada

VOLUME 20

Democratization and Securitization The Case of Romania

By

Adina Marina Stefan

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009

On the cover: “Stairs” by Peter van Es This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stefan, Adina Marina. Democratization and securitization : the case of Romania / by Adina Marina Stefan. p. cm. — (International comparative social studies, ISSN 1568-4474 ; v. 20) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17739-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Democratization—Romania. 2. Post-communism—Romania. 3. National security—Romania. 4. Romania— Politics and government—21st century. 5. Romania—Social conditions—21st century. 6. Romania—Economic conditions—21st century. I. Title. II. Series. JN9636.S74 2009b 320.9498—dc22 2009016393

ISSN 1568-4474 ISBN 978 90 04 17739 0 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

To my family

CONTENTS Map and Tables .................................................................................. Foreword ............................................................................................. Acknowledgements ............................................................................ Abbreviations ......................................................................................

ix xi xiii xv

Introduction ........................................................................................

1

Chapter One The New Security Concept and the Democratization of Post-communist Societies .........................

9

Chapter Two

The Political Sector .................................................

67

Chapter Three The Societal Sector ...............................................

169

Chapter Four

The Environmental Sector ....................................

245

Concluding Remarks .........................................................................

297

Appendices ..........................................................................................

307

References ........................................................................................... Index ....................................................................................................

311 329

MAP Map of Romania ................................................................................ xviii Source: United Nations, Cartographic Section, Maps and Geographic Information Resourceshttp://www.un.org/Depts/ Cartographic/map/profile/romania.pdf TABLES Table 1.1: Types of states and vulnerabilities ................................ Table 1.2: Congruence between political culture and structure ...... Table 1.3: Elements that characterize majoritarian and consensus democracies ................................................................. Table 2.1: Relevant parties in Poland and Romania and their main ethnic basis ................................................................. Table 2.2: Romanian internet users after 2000 ............................. Table 2.3: Attitudes towards politics and authority ...................... Table 4.1: The distribution of contaminated sites according to the polluting agent .................................................................... Table A.1: Key ‘Investment-Heavy’ Directives .............................. Table A.2: Presidents, Majorities, and Prime Ministers in Romania 1990—March 2008 ..................................................

24 37 57 73 87 90 258 307 310

FOREWORD 1999 was a critical year for Romania. For almost three weeks in January, a miners’ riot which had all the characteristics of a coup d’état endangered the existence of the weak Romanian democratic institutions. Every day the miners reassessed their determination to march to Bucharest unless they had seen their demands fulfilled. Every day the media announced an imminent assault of the miners on the capital. Images of angry faces and violent clashes with the police forces invaded the TV news shows and tabloids. No barricade or obstacle was able to stop them. The miners were marching in disciplined rows and had organised patrols to observe the movements of the gendarmes. “It seems that only God, by letting it snow, can put an end to their well-organized move” remarked a reporter.1 That something like this could happen ten years after the collapse of communism astonished everybody. Politicians and media analysts busily debated the new international security challenges and predicaments, but nobody seemed to pay attention to internal security threats. This is how I realised that the disruptive potential of domestic vulnerabilities is sometimes underestimated in favour of external threats. When I started to write this book I was interested in security matters and securitization in Romania and in the role of defence structures in these processes. While doing my research, I came to the conclusion that I would have to expand my subject. The more I read about securitization and the circumstances that create a favourable environment for it, the more I realised that these were all elements typical of a democratic society. In Romania, in many cases, these elements were clearly in an embryonic stage, which rose questions about the possibility to identify elements particular to the securitization logic. As securitization cannot take place without public consent, it became obvious that the first investigation phase of my book would have to focus on the formation of a participatory political culture, that is, the emergence and development of a democratic system. In the absence of a democratic society it would be futile to search for securitization attempts.

1 Razvan Belciuganu quoted in Andreea Cascaval, Petru Zoltan, “Epopeea mineriadei din 1999”, Jurnalul National, 14 May 2008, www.jurnalul.ro.

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foreword

Moreover, not only defence structures play a role in these processes but also other political and non-political actors, leading me back, again, to participation and—implicitly—to democratization. Finally, while analysing securitization movements in Romania, many outcomes proved relevant to the development of a democratic culture in general, giving new significance to the link between democratization and securitization. None of the processes, namely, could register progress in the absence of the other. Consequently, the topic of my book had to include both democratization and securitization. In dealing with the Romanian case, I sometimes use very detailed examples. My intention is to offer readers the possibility to draw their own conclusions besides the ones presented by the author. Moreover, as the specialised literature referring to Romanian society is not very abundant, I aim at contributing to all those interested in Romania’s recent history and transformation. Another interesting point in this book refers to Romania’s integration in the European Union. The preaccession phase was marked by very vibrant activity especially among politicians. EU conditionality worked remarkably before 2007 (on 1 January 2007 Romania became an EU member) while it had almost no noticeable results afterwards. Moreover, the fight against high-level corruption and judiciary reform has even made few steps back. Romania is not an isolated case in this sense, other examples are Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, but this could mean that, in order to induce further sustainable and irreversible progress of the newcomers, the EU has to find other means of ensuring them (clearly, the safeguard clauses have not made enough impression on the local political class). Still, a great deal of progress has been registered in the last few years despite a tense and quarrelsome governing coalition. The independence of the judicial power, the fight against high-level corruption and the reform of the political class can be attributed to a strong political will that put things in motion, and to the maturation of non-governmental organizations that play their mediating role in society. Hence, my vision is that Romania is going through a constructive transformation that will eventually lead to a consolidated democracy. Adina Stefan Bucharest, December 2008—Amsterdam, January 2009

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For inspiration, guidance or support, I am indebted to: dr. Mehdi Amineh, prof. dr. Maria Cornelia Barliba, dr. Paul Blokker, Rein Brolsma, Cornel Codita, Mihai David, prof. dr. Dennis Deletant, prof. dr. Raymond Detrez, Sorin Ducaru, Gep Eisenloeffel, Iulian Fota, Doina Ghimici, Richard Gigengack, Roxana Carmen Girip, dr. Joost Herman, prof. dr. Herman Hoen, prof. dr. Henk Houweling, Constantin Dudu Ionescu, dr. Mihail E. Ionescu, prof. dr. Gerd Junne, prof. dr. Koen Koch, Ana Maria Mihaescu, Dan Pavel, prof. dr. Andrei Plesu, prof. dr. Hans Renner, prof. dr. Vladimir Tismaneanu, prof. dr. Razvan Mihai Ungureanu, prof. dr. Peter Volten, prof. dr. Jaap de Wilde, Senol Zevri, Roxana Zyman, and, last but not the least important, to my family.

ABBREVIATIONS ADA ALDE ANI ARA ATA CDR CEDIME-SE CEECs CFC CNA CNAC CNSAS CSOP CURS DNA EIA EP EPA EPP-ED

EU FDSN FIDESZ FRY FSN GHG ICDER IFC IGOs IMAS INI

Justice and Truth Alliance Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament National Integrity Agency ‘Architecture. Restoration. Archaeology’ Association Atlantic Treaty Association Democrat Convention of Romania Center of Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe—Southeast Europe Central and Eastern European countries chlorine-fluorocarbons National Audiovisual Council National Councils of Cultural Autonomy National Council for Study of the ‘Securitate’ Archives Centre for Market and Opinion Study Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology National Anticorruption Department Environmental Impact Assessment European Parliament Environmental Protection Agencies Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats in the European Parliament European Union Democratic National Salvation Front Hungarian Citizens’ Party Federal Republic of Yugoslavia National Salvation Front greenhouse gas Independent Centre for the Development of Environmental Resources International Finance Corporation Intergovernmental Organizations Institute of Marketing and Polls National Institute of Information

xvi INSOMAR IPPC ISPA LAA MAFWE MApN MF MI MPH MPs MPW MT NATO NGOs OLAF OSCE PAC PAR PC PD PDL PEPA PLD PNA PNG PNTCD PR PRM PDSR PKK PSD PSDR PSM PUNR PUR RMGC RON SAPARD SCND

abbreviations Research and Political Marketing Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession Local Agriculture Agencies Ministry of agriculture, forests, waters and environment Ministry of national defence Ministry of finance Ministry of industry Ministry of public health members of parliament Ministry of planning and public works Ministry of transport North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non Governmental Organizations European Anti-fraud Office Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Civic Alliance Party Romania’s Alternative Party Conservative Party Democratic Party Democrat-Liberal Party Priority Environmental Programme for Accession Liberal Democrat Party Anti-Corruption National Prosecuting Magistracy New Generation Party National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party proportional representation Greater Romania Party Party of Social Democracy in Romania Kurdistan Workers’ Party Social Democratic Party Romanian Social Democrat Party Socialist Labour Party Party of Romanian National Unity Romanian Humanist Party Rosia Montana Gold Corporation Romanian New “Leu” (national currency) Special accession programme for agriculture and rural development Supreme Council of National Defence

abbreviations SEA SRI UCM UDMR UN

Strategic Environmental Assessment Romanian Intelligence Service Magyar Civic Union Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania United Nations

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INTRODUCTION The last decade of the twentieth century brought with it a notable number of events that redesigned the geopolitical scene. The bipolar world came to an end and new actors emerged increasing the complexity of the international state system. Communism collapsed and a wave of democratization reached most of its former bastions. Important mutations can be noted along the whole state spectrum, from big/powerful to small/weak ones. The unification of Germany and the rise of Russia as an independent regional power while the United States of America was consolidating its leading position provoked a redistribution of power in the system. As active actors in world politics, not only states but also international organizations went through drastic transformations. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reassessed its goals and means in order to face the emerging challenges associated with all these metamorphoses.1 In the context of this changing state system, international security has started to refer to the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity. In seeking security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Security is “primarily about the fate of human collectivities, and only secondarily about the personal security of individual human beings”.2 Originally, this concept dealt mainly with military issues but the constantly changing security environment made the states face new challenges, thus demanding a different and more complex approach. In its broadest formulation, the term security goes well beyond military aspects. It can be understood both as a defence against external or internal threats as well as the overall socioeconomic wellbeing of a society and the individuals who compose it.3 The most representative contributions

1 As part of this process, NATO opened its doors to new members. In 1997, NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the Alliance. These countries became members de facto in 1999. New invitations were launched in November 2002 to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, which obtained membership in April 2004. 2 See Barry Buzan (1991), op. cit., p. 19. 3 See Douglas J. Murray & Paul Viotti, The Defence Policy of Nations: A Comparative Study (The Johns Hopkins University Press: London), 1994, p. 3.

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introduction

to this new theoretical framework come from Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, who identify five security sectors in which particular threats have to be dealt with: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental.4 According to them, in the process of securitization specific issues are taken beyond the established rules of the political game and framed “either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”.5 Moreover, a wide range of societal actors become directly or indirectly involved in these matters, from state institutions, political parties and politicians to governmental and non-governmental organizations, famous personalities, and mass media. The new theoretical approach towards security proved instrumental in exploring various aspects of these critical and convoluted changes. In South Eastern Europe, a multitude of crises that in some cases led to violent conflicts generated instability in their neighbouring areas. The former Yugoslavia, for instance, has gone through a wide range of disruptive experiences, from the revival of extremist nationalism and hatred to ethnic cleansing and segregation. The European political environment has become highly unpredictable and in deep need of more appropriate security arrangements. New threats and risks have emerged and spread rapidly, increasing the possibility of potentially dangerous developments occurring: terrorist actions, violent local conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms and drugs smuggling, illegal immigration, money laundering. In these fluctuating circumstances, the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)6 found themselves facing a titanic task: the radical transformation of all the layers of their societies while addressing the new security predicament. For these countries, the situation was even more complicated than for the Western democracies. To a certain extent, external threats stopped being considered the top priority in their security strategies: the internal vulnerabilities of the emerging democratic systems posed more serious problems. National security became increasingly conditioned by an amalgam of domestic political, societal and environmental issues.

4 Approach introduced in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1998. 5 Ibid., p. 23. 6 When referring to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the author includes Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

introduction

3

Among the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the transformation path, Romania is a case apart. The collapse of communism was violent there, with a popular outburst that claimed many innocent victims. From a “closed system”7 with almost no interaction with other countries, and after experiencing totalitarian rule, Romania had to undergo profound changes that included internal democratic reforms and building up external relations at the same time. As reality has shown, at the beginning of 1990s Romania lacked a developed civil society and the people had only the vaguest knowledge of democratic procedures. A strong attachment on the part of the population to the values that represent the building blocks of Western democracies, that is, respect for human rights, rule of law, free elections, market economy, had still to be developed. Civil society’s influence over the political sphere was missing as non-governmental organizations had still to evolve from an embryonic stage to full development. Political actors had to learn to serve the public interest and assume responsibility for their decisions while non-political ones had to become familiar with all the democratic means allowing them to control the ruling elite. At the same time, and closely related to these transformations, Romania had to find an appropriate solution to the new security challenges that in its case included the internal vulnerabilities emerging in the democratization process. The communist system had been a relatively stable political period although the lack of internal contestation was due to the repressive means used by the state’s secret police (‘Securitate’) against any dissident attempt. The collapse of the communist system was followed by a long period marked by political instability, societal unrest and environmental neglect. The correlation of all these with the unpredictability of the European environment resulted in a deterioration of Romania’s security. A clear link between democracy and security can be identified in this case. Without democracy, the creation of a secure environment that would benefit from the contribution of numerous actors is an impossible task. Also, without security, a democratic political culture cannot emerge and mature. Democracy and security are two mutually dependent variables that while evolving reinforce each other.

7 According to the definition given by Karl Popper for “closed systems” in his book Open Society and its Enemies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1966.

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introduction

Thus, finding solutions to the new security predicament and creating a democratic political culture have evolved as simultaneous processes. Democratization implies that numerous new actors become active participants in society. The topics that are open to participation cover all the domains of the public sphere. As this includes the multifaceted security issues, it follows that they should be subject to public debate. But a society that has undertaken the transition from a closed oppressive system to an open democratic one cannot smoothly and quickly adapt to these new rules. Thus, in the case of Romania, as its specifics have formed an intricate image with lots of question marks, the hard core of this book addresses a relevant aspect: to what extent have both the political and civil society actors contributed to the mutually dependent processes of democratization and securitization in Romania in the political, societal, and environmental fields since 1989. In order to reach an accurate conclusion, a gradual approach can be used. A first step was to investigate how advanced is the democratization process in Romania. Other points of concern refer to the elements of the securitization process that provide valuable information about the functioning of the democratic institutions in each of the three sectors studied. And, as democratization leads to an augmentation of the active actors in society, the analysis has to reveal to what extent these actors are actually allowed to participate in security matters. Before proceeding, some clarifications regarding our topic are necessary. Political participation is the activity undertaken by individuals aiming at influencing either who governs or the decisions taken by governments.8 As in a democratic political system the non-elite exercise control over the ruling elite, it is clear that participation represents a vital component of democracy. In authoritarian/totalitarian systems, participation is regimented due to the leadership’s fear of independent orientations that would turn against the regime. Thus, security matters are not open to public debate either, and the decision-making in this field is in the hands of very few. This is why investigating the contribution of various actors in security matters in Romania has actually to start with analysing whether there is an emerging democratic political culture that would allow it. The analysis of various securitization

8 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction (Palgrave), 2001, p. 111.

introduction

5

processes actually emphasizes the manner in which participation is understood by all the societal actors. The governing elite can allow or hamper the non-elite’s participation in sensitive security issues, thus forming a thorough image of how advanced democratization really is in Romania. Studying the participation of various actors in the two mutually dependent processes of democratization and securitization in Romanian society leads to outcomes of great importance for all postcommunist countries facing the same challenges. The political, societal and environmental sectors are the most productive areas of exploration to address the questions raised here. In these particular sectors the vulnerabilities of the system can evolve into viable threats to national security and, naturally, also endanger the democratization process. The political field is by far the most important as it encompasses a great variety of elements related to the formation of a democratic political culture. Moreover, the inheritance of the communist system with its highly centralised and inflexible structure implies that the main decisional power has remained—at least for a period—in the hands of the political elite. Thus, participation by other societal actors in the decision-making process is questionable. In fact, this field covers the organisational stability of the state and the main features of the system of government, allowing a thorough identification of their shortcomings. The societal field reveals the problems in the functioning of the relationship minority-majority. Minorities have to become active participants in all areas of public interest and their rights have to be respected and guaranteed. Otherwise, failing to integrate them may lead to an open conflict that would postpone if not cancel any chance for Romanian society to build a sound democracy and strengthen regional/international security. And, lastly, environmental risks cannot to be ignored as their emergence is facilitated by the poor standards and lack of alertness on the part of the population regarding their causes and possible consequences. An appropriate theoretical framework is necessary to interpret and analyse the empirical data in both the democratization and security fields. The first methodological approach introduces the characteristics of a democratic political culture. The classical framework provided by Almond and Verba is enriched with recent aspects developed by, among others, Robert Dahl, Arend Lijphart, Karen Henderson and Geoffrey Pridham. Thus, the theory on the building-up of a participant political culture contains elements significant to the democratization process.

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introduction

Concepts such as political culture, political participation and influence, civic culture, majoritarian and consensus government are presented in order to lay the foundation for the analysis. The main methodological aspects belong to the new security concept that covers the elements relevant at each level of analysis—international, national, individual—and the threats and vulnerabilities characteristic of each sector, that is, political, societal and environmental. The multisectoral approach developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde is of utmost importance in studying the securitization process through which an existential threat requiring emergency measures allows for exceptional actions that otherwise would have to follow the normal political procedures.9 Nevertheless, the secure environment so created still includes conflicts—except for those against which effective countermeasures have been taken. A better aim is then de-securitization: “the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere”.10 An important contribution has also been made by Robert Berki, whose work regarding the individual level of security provides critical linking components with the democratization process.11 Every sector studied includes a variety of issues that can be securitized by different actors when they meet with public consent. Although the sectoral method is meant to facilitate analysis, a viable and comprehensive conclusion can be drawn only by summing up the results. The selected methodology builds up a theoretical framework suitable to offer a comprehensive answer to our main question. The structure of this book follows the above-mentioned approach in order to provide a clear analysis and to point out the various aspects of the securitization process. The opening chapter deals with the theoretical building blocks, the security and, respectively, political culture and democratization theories. First, the elements related to securitization are presented because the structure of the book itself follows the logic of this theory. The political chapter first addresses the democratization process, as these findings are fundamental to the rest of the investigation. It deals with aspects such as formation of a multiparty system, role and beliefs of new elites, political participation, socio-political cohesion, and the development of civil society structures. In addition, 9

See op. cit., pp. 23–4. Ibid., p. 4. 11 Robert N. Berki, Security and Society: Reflections on Law, Order and Politics (London: J. M. Dent), 1986. 10

introduction

7

the ‘law and order’ aspect, the accountability of the elite to the people, and corruption are examined. However, the democratization process is directly linked to the political dimension of the security concept. Thus, the emphasis is on the vulnerabilities of the political system that have disruptive consequences in the security field. The societal chapter tackles the identity issues that become relevant in Romania’s case due to the presence of a significant ethnic cleavage. The manner in which the ethnic groups are integrated in society, the nationalist condition of both the minority and the majority and the relationship between the ethnic minority and its kin-state are the points of interest here. The next chapter concentrates on environmental matters and the role of various internal and external actors in the securitization processes. The impact of the vulnerabilities present in this field on democratization is analysed. The book ends with a concluding chapter that sums up the findings of all the rest answering the core question and defining some common trends and tendencies. Romania is struggling with all the necessary transformations in order to build up a participant/democratic political culture. There is a direct link between the role played by all the societal actors in this process and its pace. The stronger the participation and influence of the nonelite over the elite, the faster the consolidation of democracy. Although security matters are only a part of this process, they proved to be an instructive example of how participation is understood and dealt with by both the elite and non-elite in Romania. The framework set up here is instrumental for analysing the changes in all the post-communist countries in the security field. Although democratization might be more advanced in some of the Central and Eastern European countries, the fact remains that security issues in particular were not a subject for public debate in the communist period. Mentalities are changing at a much slower pace than institutions, so the degree to which all societal actors are allowed to participate in these sensitive security issues can be a valuable indicator of how advanced along the democratization path these countries really are. Therefore, the model proposed in this book combines two theoretical approaches in order to obtain a comprehensive result. The static democratic political culture theory benefits from the elements introduced through the more dynamic securitization processes. The multitude of internal factors selected for the analysis is meant to emphasize the mainly domestic capabilities, skills, and resources necessary to transform society. The external ones are taken into consideration only when their

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introduction

influence is determinant in inducing further progress. Taken as a whole, these particular elements have to highlight the mutually dependent relationship between security—with all its aspects—and democracy. If successful, this model can be applied to countries from South Eastern Europe or the former Soviet sphere where thorough analysis is needed periodically to register any additional progress in the transition to democracy. In this regard, Romania’s case with its conclusions aims at constituting a sound contribution.

CHAPTER ONE

THE NEW SECURITY CONCEPT AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES Introduction Building up an appropriate theoretical framework that would address properly the core question of this book is not an easy task. Any endeavour must take into account elements particular to two different approaches, that is, the broader security concept and democratic consolidation. Furthermore, there must be identified the factors that contribute directly or indirectly to the interactions between the processes of securitization and democratization. The investigation has to establish the necessary steps to be undertaken in order to create a comprehensive framework of analysis. At a superficial examination, the manner in which the two processes influence/condition each other cannot be determined. A thorough analysis has to encompass all those elements characteristic to both theoretical methods looking at how these relate to one another and their influence on the various developments studied. To begin with the security concept, the unusual challenges caused by a world going through a complex transformation imposed the adoption of a new definition of this. Not only operates security at various levels of analysis but also in various sectors, all these being interconnected as disruptive actions at a certain level or in a specific field have effects in one or more of the others. A multitude of threats—conventional and nonconventional—are present in all the sectors under investigation. Their consequences are not equally dramatic and, at the same time, depending on the type of object of study, internal threats (vulnerabilities) may weight more than external ones. Then, by invoking a security matter, a state official confers a sense of urgency to a threatening development, assuming the right to take appropriate measures to stop it. What securitization brings new refers to a three elements logic: real threats, emergency actions, and adoption of exceptional measures that would violate rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed. The aspect of utmost importance here is that this process is possible only with

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the consent of the audience which endows the elite with the power of breaking free the rules. Hence, the participative element is essential, numerous actors with different roles being involved in the act. At this point, we actually stepped into the theory on democratization: fostering a democratic society means putting the bases of a participant political culture. This implies a multiparty system, accountable political elites, respect for the rule of law, strong civic society able to influence the policies launched by the rulers. Everything refers to boosting participation at all the levels of the society. The process is neither smooth nor fast. In countries with an authoritarian experience, the relics of the past system might be so numerous and influential that they could hamper a proper democratic development. Moreover, if civil organizations fail to develop and perform their mediating function in the society, there will be practically no authentic control over the elites. There will be no constraining mechanisms to determine the state representatives to perform their duties and serve the public/national interest. Consequently, tackling the securitization issue would be meaningless if the audience has no possibility and power to influence the elite. In Romania’s case, the transition from a totalitarian system to a consolidated democracy presents common characteristics with the similar processes in other post-communist countries but it also has particularities generated by certain special circumstances. In this sense, the inheritance from the past and especially the specific factors rooted in the totalitarian experience have a great deal of relevance here. The high degree of anomie of the Romanian society, the absence of a pretransitional phase to democracy that would have produced new leaders and would have allowed the dissemination of knowledge on democratic procedures and rule of law, have had a strong influence on the pace of the democratization process. Clearly, under such circumstances, internal efforts are not enough to determine change, but as reality shows, they can be boosted by external factors. Particularly in the early stages of transition, international institutions have an instrumental role to play in helping post-communist societies to reach the point of sustainable and irreversible democratic progress. But, in order to be able to give a comprehensive answer to our core question, the framework for analysis including all the relevant factors has to be established. Thus, the present chapter examines two main theoretical contributions that will establish the guidelines for further investigation.

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1.1. The new security concept Definition and levels of analysis Security is a complex concept. Its complexity is the main reason why there are numerous definitions of it. For instance, at a national level, security is viewed in terms of the basic survival, welfare and protection of the state, while at an international level, the same concept defines the common security concerns between states. The different approaches regarding various aspects of the security concept go even further, however. To start with a very general point of view, the Oxford English Dictionary defines security as (a) the condition of being protected from and not being exposed to danger, (b) freedom from doubt or a state of self-assurance, certainty, well-founded confidence, and (c) freedom from care, anxiety and apprehension. Kinhide Mushakoji gives another broad definition of what he calls ‘human security’ that encompasses “all types of security which involve human individuals and/or groups, protected or protecting against all kinds of threat found in their human environments”.1 He also identifies the major impediments to the relevant dimensions of human security, such as ‘health security’ (parasitic diseases, new viruses including HIV, respiratory infections from polluted air), ‘environmental security’ (degradation of air, water, soil and forests), ‘personal security’ (conflicts, poverty and drugs-related crime, violence against women and children, terrorism), ‘community security’ (ethnic clashes) and ‘political security’ (violation of human rights). In the field of international relations, the last decade of the twentieth century brought a new approach to the security concept that gave rise to many debates among security specialists. The Cold War era, marked by the ‘security dilemma’ which prevented co-operation among the states, ended and the whole international climate changed.2 In distinguishing between traditional, narrow definitions and recent, broad conceptions of security studies, Stephen Walt, Edward Kolodziej, and Barry Buzan, among others, have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security, as well as about the scope

1 Kinhide Mushakoji, “From Hegemonic Insecurity to People’s Security”, paper presented at the International Forum on People’s Security in Okinawa, 1994. See www.focusweb.org. 2 A good illustration of how the ‘security dilemma’ prevents co-operation can be found in Robert Jervis, “Co-operation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, January 1978.

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of analytical approaches and empirical domains appropriate to security studies.3 Thus, the narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military forces by states. This contrasts with the distinction among military, political, economic, social and environmental security threats that affect not only states but also groups and individuals, as well as other non-state actors. This means that security operates at different levels and in various areas, its complexity increasing accordingly. Buzan makes the point that we can talk about security when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object—traditionally, but not necessarily, the state. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats.4 Traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming the right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.5 A brief look at how security operates at various levels will demonstrate which elements are relevant in each case. International level At the international level, security is defined within a framework of international politics that is no longer considered static and statecentred, but rather a dynamic process of interaction between individuals,

3 Of the authors mentioned here, Stephen Walt is a traditionalist regarding the security concept. For an extended view of the traditionalist versus new approaches in the security field, see Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2, June 1990, pp. 211–39; Edward A. Kolodziej, “What is Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War”, Arms Control 13, no. 1, April 1992, pp. 1–31; Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, International Affairs 67, no. 3, 1991, pp. 431–51; Ole Wæver et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s), 1993; James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, “Introduction: The Changing Definition of Security”, in Emil Kirchner, Cristoph Bluth, and James Sperling, eds., The Future of European Security (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub.), 1995, pp. 1–22; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1991; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1998. 4 See Buzan, op. cit. (note 4, Buzan, 1998), p. 21. 5 See Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), Old Security (New York: Columbia University Press), 1995.

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groups, states, and international institutions, all of them capable of self-transformation and adaptation to changing circumstances.6 In this regard, the concept of security implies the existence of threats that transcend national borders and exceed the defence capabilities of nation-states. Thus, the states are interdependent when facing this type of threat and this increases their propensity towards co-operation. As a first step, the states have started to develop adaptive strategies, such as arms reduction and the defensive restructuring of forces, aimed at promoting a more fundamental commonality of interests. This commonality of interests is even clearer in the non-military field, for instance, in the economic and ecological areas, where harmful situations happening in one state quickly spill over national boundaries. For example, the nuclear fallout following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 posed an immediate threat to the whole globe, and transnational capital flows inducing destabilization of national currencies or global recession following decreased demand in major markets are not phenomena that can be contained within the borders of individual states. Moreover, non-conventional risks to security, such as terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, organized crime and illegal immigration, tend to become increasingly problematic due to their rapid spread and the efficient organization of the criminal structures. These threats are sometimes even more difficult to face than conventional military ones. Consequently, co-operation between states in order to fight them is a sine qua non condition for creating a secure environment. The terrorist attack organized by Al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001 against the United States of America is proof of the fact that even the most developed states cannot prevent such tragedies from happening if they do not actively co-operate with others.7 At the same time, it has become obvious that terrorist actions have developed

6

There are several theories emphasizing the growth of global interdependence and the bias towards international co-operation. They include Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Post-war International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press), 1991; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph P. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1972; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence (Glencoe, IL: Scott, Foresman Publishers), 1987; Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1983; James R. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Continuity and Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1990. 7 For instance, information exchanges between national intelligence services on the activities of terrorist organizations could play an instrumental role in preventing such dramatic events from happening, or at least they can diminish the effects.

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a new dimension: they strike at the stability of the state, the authority of its institutions and at causing as many casualties as possible. The 11 September terrorist attack has had political, societal and economic consequences, while profoundly affecting many people from a psychological point of view as well. It also enforced the idea that, given the globalization trends present in all areas, no state is secure against such attacks. Although interdependence does not automatically abolish competitive politics between states, in some cases even boosting competition, nevertheless, as the world’s societies are highly intertwined, the options available to policymakers are limited and this provides a real incentive for co-operation in the pursuit of security. In this regard, it is clear that the surest route to security for one nation is pursuing security for all nations. Or, in the terms of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security, though a little idealistic, as humanity has become proficient in building weapons of mass destruction, “nations can no longer hope to protect their citizens through unilateral military measures”.8 Traditional security thinking is not efficient anymore and it should be replaced by common security policies. Such policies are justified by the fact that “all states, even the most powerful, are dependent in the end upon the good sense and restraint of other nations”.9 In order to build up common security policies, states have to identify which of the military, political, societal, economic and ecological circumstances in the international system might work to ameliorate the power-security dilemma. To be successful, new security policies must be far more comprehensive in addressing non-military matters than such policies have been in the past. We have seen how economic and ecological issues can become topics of interest for the international security agenda. At the same time, the aspect related to security at the individual level should be paid more attention and there should be more focus on its consequences for the whole of society. For security policy to be truly effective, it must extend beyond economic and environmental threats and pay attention to human rights and to the psychological and spiritual dimensions of people’s security. High levels of personal security 8

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, A World at Peace: Common Security in the 21st Century (Stockholm: The Palme Commission), 1989, pp. 6–7. 9 Ibid.

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facilitate openness to new ways of thinking (change of mentality) and to new forms of identity that transcend national, racial, class, gender and generational boundaries. National level It is difficult to present an accurate definition for the concept of security, mainly due to the ambiguity of the term and to the contradictions that exist between the different levels. For instance, Charles Schultze warns that “the concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive”.10 Nevertheless, many scholars have tried to create an articulated definition, arguing that, in addition to traditional threats, the concept of extended security also includes “non-military threats to the state’s range of policy options or the quality of life of its citizens and other problems, that threaten, directly or indirectly, to degrade the quality of life for the national community”.11 Jessica Mathews is very explicit in “broadening the definition of national security to include resources, environmental and demographic issues”.12 Pointing to the interrelated impact of population growth and resource security, she imagines a bleak future of “human suffering and turmoil”, conditions which seem to be ripe for “authoritarian governments” and refugees “spreading the environmental stress that originally forced them from their homes”.13 The recognition that the stability and safety of nations is shaped by multidimensional factors led to the argument in favour of an expanded definition of security, including also non-military issues. Richard Ullman considers that a threat to national security can be defined either as an action which endangers the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state drastically and over a relatively short period of time, or as an action which threatens to significantly narrow the range of policy

10 Charles L. Schultze, “The economic content of national security policy”, Foreign Affairs, 1973, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 529–30. 11 Definition given by Lester Brown and Richard H. Ullman and quoted in Richard Matthew, “Environmental Security: Demystification of the Concept: Clarifying the Stakes” in Environmental Change and Security Project Report (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center), 1995, no. 1, pp. 14–23. 12 Jessica T. Mathews, “Redefining Security”, Foreign Affairs 68, 1989, no. 2, pp. 162–179. 13 Ibid.

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choices available to the government of a state or to non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.14 If national security is considered a goal, the next problem is that this can never be achieved. This is the result of the impossibility of achieving absolute security in an anarchical international system. The achievement of total security by one state would certainly diminish the security of others. Thus, what an actor can realistically achieve is relative security, but this is a “permanently unsatisfactory condition” because “the factors which define a satisfactory relative level of security at any given moment are themselves ephemeral”.15 A satisfactory level of security varies for each state according to its particular characteristics. At the national level, the analysis focuses on the state, and more precisely on its social and political order. But states are exceedingly diverse despite their basic similarities and, because of this diversity, the particular nature of the national security problem differs substantially from state to state. All states are vulnerable to military and environmental threats. Nearly all are open to economic threats, and many also suffer from basic political and societal insecurities. The different components of the state appear vulnerable to different kinds of threat, which makes national security a problem in many dimensions rather than just a matter of military defence. The idea of the state, its institutions, and even its territory can all be threatened as much by the manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of military power.16 The large variety of national security problems leads to the necessity to distinguish between the types of states that are being analysed. According to Buzan, states vary not only in terms of their status as powers but also in terms of their degree of socio-political cohesion.17 When the idea and institutions of a state are both very weak, then that unit does not really qualify as a state in the same way as another state in which these elements are strong. Thus, weak or strong states will refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion and weak or strong powers will refer to the traditional distinction between states with respect to their military and economic capability in relation to each other. 14 Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining security”, International Security, 1983, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 133, (pp. 129–153) 15 Barry Buzan, 1991, op. cit., p. 331. 16 Barry Buzan introduced a descriptive model to guide exploration into the nature of state and national security. According to this, a state has three component parts: the idea of a state, its physical base and its institutions. See op. cit., pp. 65–6. 17 Ibid., p. 97.

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Socio-political cohesion deserves more attention for a better understanding of the types of states and societies dealt with in this book. As the focus is on pluralist societies, specifically new ones, conflicts between their different constituent groupings are inevitable. These can be caused, for example, by divergent class interests, political aspirations, or ethnic animosities. Every society creates ‘mediating institutions’ or ‘mediating structures’, mechanisms meant to prevent the clashes from becoming violent and to allow society to negotiate a settlement between the conflicting parties.18 In Western societies, many of these mediating institutions are subsumed under the term ‘civil society’. They are groupings based on voluntary association, standing outside and often pitted against the state. They have played and continue to play an important role in building up social cohesion. The beneficial role of civil society institutions was also highlighted at the end of 1989 in the struggle against communist totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. This kind of institution is supposed to mediate in the conflicts within societies but sometimes they have exactly the opposite effect. With regard to their purpose, civil society institutions are designed to protect the individual from alienation and the state from loss of legitimacy. But these same mediating institutions can have a different result, polarizing instead of mediating and thus destabilizing the social order. For instance, a movement propagating racial or ethnic hatred could have a devastating effect by creating conflicts and subverting social order. The crucial variable determining which of the two roles an institution will play turns on its specific interests. One point disputed by sociologists is important here, namely the issue of the degree of normative consensus that is necessary for social order. A central school of thought in sociology, represented among others by Emile Durkheim, has always pointed out that any society will fall apart unless it has a ‘collective conscience’, that is, a common body of norms adhered to by most of its people.19 These norms can be promulgated through formal institutions such as the state, a church, an ideological movement, but they can also just be normative traditions dispersed throughout a population. Against this view, it can be

18 The terms ‘mediating institutions’ and ‘mediating structures’ are used in Peter Berger (ed.), The Limits of Social-Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press), 1998. 19 See Emile Durkheim, Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1972, p. 125.

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argued that a modern society cannot aspire to such normative unit, and can function adequately without it as long as there is agreement on a set of procedures by which conflicting interests and ideologies can be arbitrated. In a democracy these procedures are institutionalized in the political and legal systems. It is in everyone’s interest to adhere to these procedures, and as long they are followed the resulting outcome will be deemed legitimate by all or nearly all concerned. Nevertheless, things are not that simple and it is easy to see that a society will sooner or later be in serious trouble if it is not held together by common normative orientations. When a society comes under a threat of whatever nature, the question of shared norms quickly attains a new urgency. As Durkheim put it, whenever members of a society are called upon to make sacrifices for a common goal/good, the presence of a ‘collective conscience’ is essential. There is an ongoing imperative for the good functioning of any society to reconcile the beliefs and values of individuals with the legitimacy of public order. When the gap between these two spheres of public life becomes too large, legitimacy is definitely undermined. The public order becomes progressively meaningless. Under threat, the society displays a lack of social cohesion that could become fatal, especially in the case of a weak state. In the case of a strong state, national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference. The idea of the state, its institutions and its territory are all clearly defined and stable. There are already well-functioning mechanisms for adjustment, change and transfer of power, and these gather sufficient support so that they are not seriously threatened from within the state. In the case of a weak state, only its territory, and sometimes not even that, may be sufficiently well defined to represent a clear object of national security. Very weak states possess neither a widely accepted and coherent idea of the state among their population, nor a governing power strong enough to impose unity in the absence of political consensus. Thus, in this case, these elements do not represent clear referent objects of national security. This distinction between states with serious domestic security problems and those whose primary security concerns are external is crucial to the understanding of national security. Although originally it was considered that national security should deal mostly with the external environment of a state and it has been applied to strong states which represented a clear referent object for study, the concept has been extended to the study of weak states which have to face internal threats/

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insecurities too. In this context, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for improving the prospects of achieving national security is to build up strong states.20 Weak states are not able to cope with their national security matters, they define the conditions of insecurity for most of their citizens and they affect the international security environment by exporting their instabilities to other weak states and, at the same time, prevent the formation of security communities.21 Individual level At the individual level, as in the case of the previous levels, security cannot be defined so easily, as it involves too many factors such as life, health, status, wealth, freedom. Robert Berki considers that “personal security, in the most rudimentary and primitive sense, must refer above all to the desire to live one’s life in conditions which preclude effective threats to this life coming from other persons directly, persons who are identifiable and who operate in the same vicinity as the person whose security is in question”.22 In the author’s opinion, personal insecurity is caused directly by the actions of others, i.e. strangers who are outside the own domestic circle. Thus, from the point of view of the individual person, society contains quite a number of ‘strangers’ and this is why personal security is a ‘social’ problem whereas ‘society’ is a personal problem.23 For the purposes of this book, it is useful to identify specific threats to individuals. Most of these threats arise from the fact that people find themselves bound to a human environment that generates unavoidable social, economic and political pressures. Societal threats come in a wide variety of forms and there are four basic types: physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civic liberties), and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation). The existence of these threats to individuals within society is illustrative of the great dilemma which lies at the root

20 The two World Wars, for instance, proved that it is not sufficient for strong states to exist in order to automatically have guaranteed peace. 21 “In a security community disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fears, or prepares for, either political assault or military attack of any of the others”. This definition can be found in B. Buzan, 1990, op. cit., p. 218. 22 Robert N. Berki, Security and Society: Reflections on Law, Order and Politics (London: J. M. Dent), 1986, pp. 9–10. 23 Ibid., p. 11.

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of much political philosophy: how to balance the individual’s freedom of action against the potential and actual threats which such freedom poses to others. Or, in another formulation, how to establish a fair boundary between the demand for increasing personal freedom and the necessity to enhance the constraints imposed by authority. The state is the one asked to solve these problems and is responsible for offering protection to its citizens. At the same time, it is clear that personal security is affected both positively and negatively by the state, and the grounds for disharmony between individual and national security represent a permanent contradiction. The individual citizen faces many threats that emanate either directly or indirectly from the state. Such threats can be divided into four general categories: those arising from domestic law-making and enforcement, those arising from direct administrative or political action by the state against individuals or groups, those arising from struggles over control of the state machinery, and those arising from the state’s external security policies.24 The issue considered by Berki as really important is the problem of ‘law and order’. In his own words, “personal security is the real key to the modern society, and the problem of the so-called law and order is the key to personal security”.25 The problem of personal security in the context of society can be defined as the threat posed to individuals by other individuals inhabiting the same social world. This person-to-person direct threat to individual life, health, tranquillity and possessions has been termed as the problem of ‘law and order’. The problem as perceived nowadays is a double-sided one, it is a problem not only for the forces of the law (the state) but also, at the same time and inseparably, a basic problem of the state and as presented by the state. What Berki argues is that in modern society the amount of ‘strangeness’ characterizing personal relationships has become appreciably higher, embracing more and larger social groups and diluting families and close personal relations. More and more people feel that the same kind of personal insecurity is threatening all: men, women, young and old, the rich and the powerful as well as the poor and weak. And at the same time the state itself, which is supposed to be the guardian of law and order, has suffered a definite lowering in estimation in the eyes of

24 25

See Buzan, 1991, op. cit., p. 44. See Berki, op. cit., p. 8.

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the population. The state is now revealed as too feeble, ill-equipped to deal effectively with the threat of criminal and political violence; it is infused with misleading ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ principles, soft on law-breakers, indifferent to the fate of victims. Still, the state is itself now seen as more threatening, more interfering, more in evidence as an absolute power. While more people suffer today as victims of direct, individual or group-oriented lawlessness, more people are as well finding themselves ‘aggressed’ by legislation, administrative justice and law enforcement. These are often matters of a bureaucratic nature and are typically related to taxation, social security and traffic regulations. Ordinary ‘law-abiding’ citizens think they need ‘law and order’ to provide protection against the threats posed by the ‘strangers’; but the same citizens find that their own relationship to ‘law and order’ has become confused, ambiguous. This will eventually lead to a gradual decrease in the authority of the state with direct implications for its capability to maintain and enforce ‘law and order’. The link between personal security and society also reveals some particular aspects. It has already been stated that society is negatively involved in security as it is defined: personal security has to do above all with contingent threats to the person issuing from other persons. But, in some sense and to some extent, security positively involves society. Basically, security expresses the most desirable value a person tries to achieve from the outside world, i.e. from the society, thus every person can be characterized as a security-seeker. The individual has a direct dependence on society for the attainment of his security. This dependence takes a variety of forms and, correspondingly, society in this respect displays a great multitude of appearances and manifestations, from single individuals, like friends, comrades, to formalized institutions. What happens is that people in modern societies have a basic need for power to provide for their own security through participation in social life, in “stable supportive groups” like the family, and “the sense of certainty that derives from shared adherence to beliefs about the nature of society and one’s place in it, and to norms governing social interaction”.26

26 Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press), 1970, p. 26.

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Moreover, in modern society an almost overwhelming and exclusive reliance in matters of personal security is placed on the state, on governmental and judicial officers, law-enforcement agencies and penal institutions. No wonder then that people see themselves primarily as “consumers of security”,27 hence the immediate link between personal security and the issue of ‘law and order’. Only by living within a society, among its members, and establishing all types of relations with them, does a person attain not only the position of a ‘security consumer’ but also of a ‘security provider’ towards those who surround him. At the same time, as Berki noticed, “too much reliance on the society just as much as too little involvement with society are inimical to the attainment of personal security, they are both irrational and self-defeating”.28 The elements to be considered at each level of analysis have now been established. Nevertheless, the levels cannot be isolated from one another as various factors at one level have important effects that can be traced in another. The national level of analysis has primacy and, consequently, with regard to the international and individual levels, the focus is only on the factors influencing the developments at the state level. As it turns out, the sectors of security and what elements of the levels of analysis operate in each case are more relevant in this context. A broader approach to the security concept has to examine the specifics of threats and vulnerabilities in every sector and build up a comprehensive view using these findings. In this sense, a close look at the elements characteristic to each sector is necessary to round off the level analysis. The security sectors: military, political, economic, societal, environmental In its aim to achieve the desired level of security, the state has to deal with a range of different threats and vulnerabilities. National security policy can either focus inward, seeking to reduce the vulnerabilities of the state itself, or outward, seeking to reduce external threats by addressing their sources. Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities that cannot specifically be separated. Of the many possible examples, Poland and Romania, for instance, are considered

27 N. C. M. Elder, “Conclusion” in P. Norton (ed.), Law and Order and British Politics (Farnborough, Gower Publications), 1984, p. 207. 28 See Berki, op. cit., p. 24.

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to be historically insecure. This implies that their vulnerabilities must be assessed in terms of size, economic underdevelopment and political instability while the threats posed to them come from their powerful, expansionist neighbours. Poland has always been threatened by Germany and Russia and, at a certain moment in time, even disappeared as an independent state from the map of Europe for over a century. Romania (the Romanian principalities) has been always faced by the threats posed by three expansionist neighbouring powers: Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. All her life, Romania has had to accept/seek the ‘protection’ of one of these powers against the others. For a comprehensive view of the connection between the type of state and the vulnerabilities, we can use the elements of analysis introduced by Buzan and presented earlier in this chapter.29 Table 1.1 indicates a classification of states based on a combination between their degree of socio-political cohesion and power status. As mentioned above, the range of potential national security issues is wide, stretching across the military, political, economic, societal and environmental areas. It is worth examining each of these sectors in order to identify the threats and vulnerabilities a state should take into consideration as a national security matter. Military threats remain at the core of the national security analysis. Military action can, and usually does, threaten all the elements of the state. It can cause losses in terms of territory, it can alter or even destroy institutions, and it can repress or obliterate the idea of the state. Military actions not only strike at the very essence of the state’s basic protective functions, but also endanger the layers of social and individual interest. Because the use of force can bring about major undesired changes very fast, military threats are traditionally given the highest priority in national security concerns. The level of military threat varies from the harassment of fishing boats, through punishment raids, territorial seizures and full invasions, to attempts to exterminate the attacked population by blockade or bombardment. The military threats can also be internal and in this case “military security is primarily about the ability of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity and, more controversially, the machinery of government in the face of challenges from its citizens”.30 The severe possible consequences of these

29 30

See Buzan, 1991, op. cit., p. 114. See Buzan, op. cit. (note 4, Buzan, 1998), p. 50.

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Table 1.1: Types of states and vulnerabilities Socio-political cohesion

Weak

Strong

Power Weak Strong

Highly vulnerable to most types of threats Particularly vulnerable to political threats

Particularly vulnerable to military threats Relatively invulnerable to most types of threats

threats explain the disproportionate emphasis given to military security even at a time when threats in other areas appear to pose greater and more immediate danger. Unlike military threats, political ones are aimed at the organizational stability of the state. They might vary from pressuring a government on a particularly policy, to overthrowing the government, to initiating secessionism, and disrupting the political structure of the state in order to make it vulnerable to a military attack. The most usual targets of political threats are the idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, together with the institutions which express it. Because the state is essentially a political entity, political threats can do as much damage as military ones, especially if the target is a weak state, but this does not imply that they do not represent a source of concern for strong and powerful states, too. Political threats aim at: 1) the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutive ideas and issues defining the state; 2) the external recognition of the state, that is, its external legitimacy. The distinction between strong and weak states is essential here, because it highlights different degrees of vulnerability to political threat. A strong state will typically be fairly invulnerable in the political sector; it will not be ethnically divided and thus not open to secessionist action. Its government will be neither separated from the general opinions of its citizens nor dependent upon suppressing views and information and therefore will be fairly invulnerable to external actors supporting opposition voices. The next area of analysis refers to societal threats. The idea of the state includes, among other elements, matters of language, religion and local cultural tradition which might need to be protected against seductive or abundant cultural imports. These threats could prove disruptive for a small or weak local culture. This is why the organizing

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concept in the societal sector is identity. A specific characteristic of societal threats is that they generally occur within states. If societal security relates to the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and ethnic identity and customs, then it has to be pointed out that threats to these values come more often from within the state than from outside it. Several issues are considered as threats to societal security, including migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition.31 Migration can have personal causes (economic opportunity, environmental pressure, religious freedom) or political ones (to homogenize the population of the state). A high number of immigrants can determine a change in the identity of the host population by a shift in its composition. Horizontal competition may reflect the unintended effects of interplay between large, dynamic cultures and small, traditional ones. It can become intentional, as in the rebuilding of occupied enemy states and in the cultural aspects of contemporary trade policy. In the case of vertical competition, people are pushed towards wider or narrower identities by the development of either an integrating project or a secessionist one. At any rate, integration projects that seek to shape a common culture to match the state may attempt to control some or all of the mechanisms of cultural reproduction (schools, churches, language rights). In more repressive situations, minorities might lose the ability to reproduce their cultures because the majority uses the state to structure educational, media and other systems to favour the majority culture.32 Focusing now on the case of a state-nation, here the tendency is to form a homogenous population by suppressing the existing ethnic minorities. In the communist period, the Baltic States and the Republic of Moldavia, for example, feared Russification. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians living in the former Soviet republics found out how inconvenient it could sometimes be to be part of an ethnic minority.33 Bulgaria officially recognised no ethnic minorities while it

31

Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 122. 33 The case of the Russian minority in Estonia is already very well known. Its members had to become Estonian citizens and learn the Estonian language. Although this is not a case in which an ethnic group was suppressed by the majority, it is a good example of how the wheel of history can turn. 32

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suppressed the existing Turkish and Macedonian ones.34 Turks have for decades harassed the Kurdish population, showing no flexibility and understanding for their situation. Even in a strong Western democratic state like Norway, it proved to be hard for the Sami minority to obtain positive solutions for their cultural demands.35 Finally, what can be noted regarding societal threats is that in some situations the suppression of ethnic minorities might lead, in the long run, to the creation of stronger and more viable states.36 The economic threats also present many problems which make them difficult to deal with within the framework of national security. The difficulty resides in the fact that many economic threats fall within the rules of the market-economy game, and therefore they cannot be classified as an attack on national security. This would simply favour increasing government intervention in the economy to a point where the market could no longer function. Nevertheless, it is possible to define three instances that link economic capability with military capability, the power and political stability of a state. This means that the consequences of an economic threat affect the military and political spheres. The first instance refers to the necessary supplies of key strategic materials on which the military capabilities of a state might rely. A threat to the security of supply becomes a national security issue when the strategic materials must be imported. Such a problem might lead to the decline of key military-related industries, thus affecting the national economy. Another instance establishes a direct link between the economy and the power status of a state in the international system. A decline of the national economy leads to important cuts in the state’s military capabilities. The same reasoning holds for a democratic 34 The post-communist Bulgarian Constitution (adopted on 13 June 1991) recognises no ethnic minorities but “citizens, for whom the Bulgarian language is not their mothertongue”. According to a study conducted in 1999 by the Center of Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe—Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), 9.45% of the Bulgarian population is Turkish and 0.3% is Macedonian. See www.cedime.net. 35 In Norway, there are 20,000 Sami out of a population of 4.3 million. In 1988, a constitutional amendment was adopted obliging the state authorities to assure the conditions allowing the Sami ethnic group to sustain and develop its language, culture and social life. Nevertheless, Mickael Svonni, researcher at Umea University, criticized current policies in Norway, as well as Sweden, which were allocating resources to Sami institutions without making any real effort to help this minority preserve its language, which is gradually disappearing (see www.samefolket.se, June 1998). 36 This was the case for the states formed in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I. See presentation in Chapter 3: The Societal Sector, the paragraph on The minority legal provisions in the inter-war period.

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state which does not enjoy sound and healthy economic growth. As its priorities are more of an economic nature, the state cannot allocate all the necessary resources to support the development of military capabilities.37 The last instance concerns the economic threats to internal stability which occur whenever states pursue economic strategies based on maximization of wealth through extensive trade. In the long term, the consequence of these policies is a high level of dependency on trade in order to support the social structures which emerge and develop during this process. In such cases, many states will be vulnerable to disruptions in the flows of trade and finance. The last area of concern is represented by the ecological threats which can damage the physical base of the state to such an extent that they can drastically affect the idea of a state and its institutions, too. Transfrontier pollution or chemical and oil waste spreading in the seas and rivers can affect the environment and its ecological balance for decades, resulting in huge damage to neighbouring states. The safe functioning of nuclear plants is another concern, not only for a limited zone but for the whole world because a serious accident poses an immediate threat to humankind. Thus, this type of threat is difficult to deal with in the framework of national security, being better fitted for a collective security approach. Nevertheless, a lack of environmental protection and care in one state could lead to serious accidents which, through their consequences, could endanger the environment in neighbouring states, such a situation ending by worsening the relations between the countries within that region. Making the new concept of security operational The new security agenda includes a wider range of issues than the traditional military and political ones. Expanding the security agenda is not a simple or a trivial act, nor is it without political consequences. It is not just about tacking the word security onto economic, environmental, and societal. Pursuing the wider security agenda requires giving very careful thought to what is meant by security and applying that understanding to a range of dynamics, some of which are fundamentally different from military-political ones.38

37

From this point of view, it is no wonder that one of NATO’s requirements regarding the admission of new members is that they should enjoy a sound economic growth able to support the costs of integration. 38 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, op. cit., p. 195.

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The approach developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argues that “security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization”.39 The authors do not try to analyse these acts or decide whether they take real threats into consideration. “Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena . . . and have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves”.40 The traditionalists in the security field argued that if the security agenda was widened, it would become more vulnerable to excesses of securitization than the traditional military one. This is true if we admit that, theoretically, there might be attempts to securitize any public issue. The process of securitization implies that “an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”.41 Securitization can be studied directly by examining discourse and political speeches. However, a discourse that introduces an issue as being an existential threat to a referent object “does not by itself create securitization”, the issue being securitized “only if and when the audience accepts it as such”.42 There are three important elements in this process: existential threats, emergency actions, and effects on the relations within the unit/state by breaking free of rules. In the event of an existential threat which requires an emergency action, the securitizing actor can violate rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed, all this being possible with the consent of the audience. What is important when analysing the securitization process is to understand who is the securitizing actor, what issues are taken into account, who is the referent object, why and with what consequences does this process take place, and under what circumstances. The referent object is defined as something that has to face an existential threat and has a legitimate claim to survival. The securitizing actors have the ability to securitize issues by declaring a referent object as being existentially threatened. The functional actors play key roles as they can significantly influence decisions in the field of security.43 When studying one of the

39

Ibid. See Buzan, op. cit. (note 4, Buzan, 1998), p. 204. 41 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 42 Ibid., p. 25. 43 For a comprehensive view on the referent objects and the actors, see op. cit., pp. 35–42. 40

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security sectors, the stress should be on the cause-effect nature of the issues to be securitized and on possible trends. Adopting this wider security agenda does not exclude the connections between the component sectors. Although each sector has specific features, different threats and actors, there are still many cross-linkages among them and this should be taken into consideration when building up the analysis. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde consider that: one way of looking at the sectors is to see them as identifying specific types of interaction. In this view, the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing, status and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.44

The aim of the multisectoral approach to security is to reduce complexity in order to facilitate analysis. Sectors are meant to provide distinctive patterns, but they lack the quality of independent existence. In the military sector there is little ambiguity about securitizing actors, that is, state representatives, due to the fact that the main referent objects for military security are states and would-be states. Before the end of the Cold War, the global level dominated this sector. At the beginning of the 1990s, a clear shift took place towards primacy for the focus on regional military security dynamics. In regions dominated by weak states such as the Balkans, there is a real prospect that the local level will become dominant, with securitization forming microregions. The environmental field benefits from the existence of two different agendas: the scientific agenda of the scholarly environmental community and a political agenda which consists of the public decision-making process and public policies that address how to deal with environmental concerns. As such, the political agenda reflects the overall degree of politicization and securitization. The scientific agenda underpins securitizing moves, while the political one addresses three areas:1) state and public awareness of issues on the scientific agenda; 2) the acceptance of political responsibility for dealing with these issues; 3) the political management questions that arise.45 Crucial for environmental security is

44 45

Ibid., p. 7. See Buzan, op. cit. (note 4, Buzan, 1998), p. 72.

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whether states, major economic actors and local communities embrace the scientific agenda. Securitizing moves at the global level have resulted in considerable politicization, but successful securitization has been limited and it has occurred mostly at a local level. Dealing with economic security is a difficult task and Buzan warns that care should be taken in “the use and reception of securitization attempts in this sector”.46 The liberals support the idea of separating the economic sector from politics, but it cannot be ignored that most of the security consequences of economic liberalism turn up in other sectors. The referent objects can range from individuals, classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself. As for the securitizing actors, they can be found at all levels, although the representatives of states and IGOs (Intergovernmental Organizations) and sometimes, more quietly, firms are generally the most effective. Whether or not the reason for securitization lies primarily in the economic sector, it is dependent upon the referent object and what constitutes an existential threat to this one. With societal security, this becomes increasingly important relative to other sectors. “Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community’.47 Hence, the concept of societal security is about collectives and their identity. The referent objects here are large groups that carry the loyalties and devotions of subjects to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this ‘we’ is threatened. Thus, the most important referent objects are tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, religions and race. According to these, securitizing actors could be representatives of a state elite, of a counter-elite trying to achieve secession or independence, of groups defending the cultural identity of the minority, or religious representatives. In all the cases, the media is an important actor that contributes significantly to the definition of the situations. Last but not least, political security is about the organizational stability of social order, the heart of this sector being non-military threats to state sovereignty. Among the principles to be securitized are human rights and other demands related directly to the conditions of

46 47

Ibid., p. 177. Ibid., p. 119.

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individuals.48 The main referent object of the political sector is the state, but there are other possible referent objects too: emerging supranational organizations such as the EU; tribes, minorities and clans which have strong political institutions although not of the formal type the international community recognizes; transnational movements that are able to mobilize supreme allegiance from their adherents. The securitizing actors are not difficult to identify: state leaders, official representatives of the EU, leaders of the strong societal-political units and/or those of transnational movements. Disaggregation into sectors provides a way of understanding the different qualities of security that are features of the wider agenda. Although some qualities of security are common across sectors, each sector also has its own unique actors, referent objects, dynamics, and contradictions that need to be understood in their own terms. The sectoral approach does not imply that there are no links between the sectors. In fact, there is too much overlap and interplay to allow them to be treated in isolation. This point rounds off the presentation of the factors that have to be analysed when approaching each security sector. The next step is to establish the theoretical framework regarding a democratic political culture. 1.2. Civic culture and new democracies Building up a democratic regime is not an easy task. It implies the existence of certain sine qua non elements of which a democratic political culture is among the most important. This particular type of political culture requires the societal actors to have a high level of education, information, competence, all of which are vital to ensure the complex participation in political life that characterizes a democratic regime. Since the collapse of communism, the CEECs have striven to become democratic countries and they have started to establish the necessary institutions. The separation of powers, political pluralism and free elections also became part of the new democratic system. However, an attempt to investigate whether these societies are real/viable democracies cannot rely on the presence of these elements alone. Without a democratic political culture these countries cannot be considered established democracies.

48

Ibid., p. 141.

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Why is it of utmost importance to establish whether these new democracies enjoy the existence of a democratic political culture? One of the well-known definitions of democracy states that in a democratic system “ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders”.49 In other words, democracy is characterized by the fact that the power over the meaningful decisions in a society is distributed among the population. This means that the citizen is expected to perform a certain role which consists of taking an active part in governmental affairs, being aware of how decisions are made, and making his opinions known. All of these define the huge difference between a citizen’s status in a communist society—a passive auditor—and his status in a democratic one—an active participant. The transition from one stage to another is not a rapid process and in every former communist country it is taking place at a different pace. Post-communist societies have had to face numerous disruptive tendencies: indifferent, sometimes even negative attitudes toward politics in general and toward political parties (and not only communist parties) in particular; intolerance toward differing interests and opinions; ethnic violence and discrimination against minorities; and the emergence of new autocratic tendencies.50

The way in which these processes develop depends on the starting point of each country (i.e. the characteristics of their societies at the moment when communism collapsed), elements of tradition related to political life, the rhythm of reforms in all domains, the eagerness and openness of the societal actors to learn about and perform their new roles in society. The security-related issues represent only some of the authoritative decisions which affect the lives of the citizens of a country and over which they should—in a democratic system—be able to exercise some control. Identifying some of the elements indicating this control in a country such as Romania would mean, in fact, identifying the very existence of characteristics indicating the emergence/development of a democratic political culture. This is why the study of this aspect is an essential part of the present book.

49

Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago), 1956, p. 3. Peter Volten, “Conclusion” in Peter Volten (ed.), Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies), 1990, p. 64. 50

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Political culture: definition and classifications ‘Political culture’ has been explained as “a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place”.51 Almond and Verba managed to introduce ‘political culture’ as the connecting link between micro and macro politics. In their view, “the relationship between the attitudes and motivations of discrete individuals who make up political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through the concept of political culture”.52 Therefore, the main constituents of political culture are the beliefs, opinions and emotions of individual citizens towards their form of government. Political culture was defined as “a particular incidence of patterns of political orientation in the population of a political system.”53 Thus, through concepts such as political subculture and role culture, special attitudes and propensities towards political behaviour can be identified in parts of the population, or in particular roles, structures or subsystems of the political system. These concepts allow us to decide what preferences in terms of political behaviour exist in the political system as a whole, and in its various parts, in special orientation groups, or at key points of initiative and decision-making in the political structure. As Almond and Verba put it, “we can relate political psychology to political system performance by locating attitudinal and behavioural propensities in the political structure of the system”.54 Therefore, political culture refers to specific political orientations that include not only opinions towards both the political system as a whole and its component parts, but also opinions regarding the role of the self in the system. In order to go further, another concept needs to be defined, i.e. political orientation which refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships.55 This concept includes: (1) ‘cognitive orientation’ which refers to knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles, the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and outputs;

51 Sidney Verba, “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture” in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton University Press), 1965, p. 513. 52 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton University Press), 1963, p. 33. 53 Ibid. 54 Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 33. 55 For an extended definition see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press), 1951, p. 53.

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(2) ‘affective orientation’ or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance; (3) ‘evaluational orientation’ which refers to the judgements and opinions about political objects.56 When dealing with the political system as a whole, we are confronted by feelings such as patriotism or alienation, cognitions and evaluations of a nation as weak or strong, and of a polity as democratic or socialistic. The orientations towards the political system are opposed to the orientations towards the self as a political actor. The next step is to deal with the component parts of the political system and here we can classify the objects as follows: (1) specific ‘roles’ and ‘structures’, such as legislative bodies, executives, or bureaucracies; (2) ‘incumbents’ of roles, such as monarchs, legislators and administrators; (3) particular public ‘policies’, ‘decisions’, and ‘enforcements’ of decisions. These structures, incumbents, and decisions can be involved in either the political or ‘input’ process or in the administrative or ‘output’ process. The political or input process is represented by the flow of demands from the society into the polity and the conversion of these demands into authoritative policies. Among the structures that are involved mainly in the input process are political parties, interest groups, and the mass media. The administrative or output process refers to the particular process by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced. Among the structures predominantly involved in this process are bureaucracies and courts. These definitions and classifications were used by Almond and Verba to identify three different types of political culture based on data related to what political objects individuals are oriented to, how they are oriented to them, and whether these objects are mainly involved in the input flow of policymaking or in the output flow of policy enforcement.57 There are three basic types of political culture: parochial, subject and participant.58 The political culture is characterized as parochial when individual orientation towards specialized political objects is almost non-existent. In these societies there are no specialized political roles and the parochial expects nothing from the political system. African 56

See G. Almond and S. Verba, op. cit., p. 15. For more details, see op. cit., pp. 16–7. 58 For the models of political culture including the orientations towards involvement in the political process, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (eds.), Comparative Politics Today: A World View (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co.), 1988, pp. 42–3. 57

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tribal communities fall within this category. But, as Almond and Verba remarked, pure parochialism is usually a theoretical design. Even in these tribal societies the orientations of individuals tend to be cognitive and neither affective nor normative. This means that although the remote tribesmen in an African country might be aware of the existence of a central political regime, they have no feelings towards it and they have not internalized any norms to regulate their relations to it. The second major type of political culture is the subject culture, in which individuals are orientated towards the output aspects of the system, but they totally ignore the input objects and the role of the self as an active participant. This means that the orientation is towards the administrative side of the system, the individual having a passive attitude towards the input side. The subject orientation in political systems that have developed democratic institutions is likely to be affective and normative rather than cognitive. It should be noted that pure subject orientation is likely to exist in a society where there is no differentiated input structure. A good example would in this case be a totalitarian society. The last major type of political culture, the participant one, designates a society in which individuals are orientated to the system as a whole and to both the input and output structures and processes. The members of this type of society tend to be orientated towards an active role of the self in the polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary from acceptance to rejection. This classification of political cultures does not imply that one orientation replaces the others. For instance, a participant culture does not rule out the parochial and subject patterns of orientation. The participant culture is an extra layer that may be added to and combined with the subject and parochial cultures. Thus the citizen of a participant polity is not only orientated towards active involvement in politics, but is subject to law and authority and is a member of more diffuse primary groups. All these orientations influence one another, so that adding participant orientations to the existent parochial and subject ones results in various changes. Moreover, the political cultures are not homogenous. We will find both subjects and parochials even in the political systems with predominantly participant cultures. The imperfections of the process of political socialization, personal preferences, and limitations in intelligence or in opportunities to learn will continue to produce subjects and parochials, even in well-established democracies.

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Thus there are two aspects regarding the cultural heterogeneity. The citizen is a particular mix of participant, subject and parochial orientations, and the political culture is a special mix of participants, subjects and parochials. Some problems related to these mixtures can be identified, and they refer to: (1) what concepts should be used to investigate the performance effectiveness of citizens within the political system; (2) what concepts should be used to determine the right proportion of citizens, subjects and parochials related to the effective performance of democratic systems.59 Regarding the latter issue, a key concept is the congruence between the political culture and the structure of the political system. A political culture is congruent with the structure of the political system when political cognition in the population is accurate and effect and evaluation are favourable. Generally, a parochial political culture would be congruent with a traditional political structure, a subject one would be congruent with a centralized authoritarian structure, and a participant culture would be congruent with a democratic political structure. But political systems change and, in such cases, culture and structure might become incongruent with each other. Taking this fact into account, we can classify political cultures as allegiant, apathetic or alienated.60 An allegiant political culture, whether of participant, subject or parochial type, implies that the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations to the respective polity objects approach unity, or perfect congruence between culture and structure. Almond and Verba used a very simple figure (see Table 1.2) to illustrate the variation of congruence between the political culture and structure. The symbols have the following significance: (+) means a high frequency of awareness, positive feeling or evaluation towards political objects; (–) means a high frequency of negative feelings or evaluations; (0) means a high frequency of indifference. Thus, congruence is strong when the frequencies of positive orientations approach unity and is weak when the frequency of positive feelings and evaluation approaches indifference or zero, even though people are aware of the characteristics of the political structure. The first column in Table 1.2 indicates an allegiant situation, which means that the orientations and institutions match and, consequently,

59 60

G. Almond and S. Verba, op. cit., p. 20. Ibid., p. 22.

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Table 1.2: Congruence between political culture and structure

Cognitive orientation Affective orientation Evaluative orientation

Allegiance

Apathy

Alienation

+ + +

+ 0 0

+ – –

Source: Almond and Verba (1963), op. cit., p. 22.

congruence is high. Beginning with the second column we have an increased degree of lack of congruence between political culture and structure. When the indifference point is passed, the negative effect and evaluation grow in frequency and, according to the third column, we have an alienate culture in which attitudes reject political institutions or structures. In terms of stability/instability, the first column describes a stable political culture while the last one describes a political culture with a high risk of instability.61 The concept of congruence between political culture and structures is not enough, however, to help in identifying the characteristics of specific political cultures. As suggested above, almost all political cultures are mixed. A very useful concept in this case is one defining ‘systemically mixed’ political cultures: these are cultures in which there are significant proportions of both simpler and more complex patterns of orientation. In these types of political culture there are inevitable strains between culture and structure and a clear tendency towards structural instability.62 Taking this into account, three types of systemically mixed political cultures can be distinguished: the parochial-subject culture, the subjectparticipant culture and the parochial-participant culture. In the parochial-subject culture the orientation of a substantial part of the population switches from the diffuse tribal or feudal authority to a more complex political system with specialized central governmental structures. This shift from one type of political culture to another might not reach the stage characterizing a fully developed subject culture. Consequently, we can have a variety of mixed subject-parochial cultures, from one extreme in which the parochial orientations are rather suppressed to another in which they are allowed to co-exist with the

61 A good illustration of the relationship between political culture and structure can also be found in G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., op. cit., pp. 50–2. 62 G. Almond and S. Verba, op. cit., p. 22.

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subject orientations. Thus change from a parochial to a subject culture may stabilise at different stages for various societies and produce different political, psychological, and cultural mixes. The subject-participant culture implies a shift from the subject culture to the participant one. Almond and Verba suggest that the way in which the shift from the parochial to a subject culture is solved greatly affects the way in which this second type of shift takes place. In the transition from a subject to a participant culture, the parochial communities, if they survive, may contribute to the development of a democratic infrastructure. In the mixed subject-participant culture a relevant part of the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist set of self-orientations, while most of the rest of the population continue to be orientated toward an authoritarian governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientations. This kind of cultural mix leads to structural instability and even changes in the cultural patterns themselves. The persisting subject subculture represents a permanent challenge to the participant-oriented stratum of the population and does not allow the latter to become a competent, self-confident, experienced body of citizens. Instead, they are usually democratic aspirants, accepting the norms of participant culture but with a sense of competence which is not based on experience or on the sense of legitimacy. Moreover, the structural instabilities that often accompany the mixed subject-participant culture, the inefficiency of the democratic structure and of the governmental system tend to produce alienated orientations among the democratic population. The mixed subject-participant culture, if it persists over a long time, also changes the character of the subject subculture. Given the fact that society experiences periods of authoritarian and democratic ruling, during the latter periods the authoritarian-oriented groups must compete with democratic ones within a formally democratic framework. The result of this competition can be seen in the changes registered by the subject subculture, although not to such a degree as to become a democratic one. Here is an example to illustrate this: although the totalitarian communist regimes adopted the democratic infrastructure, though in a highly distorted form, this did not help them become democratic regimes. The last type of systemically mixed political cultures is the parochialparticipant one. Almond and Verba identified the problem of cultural

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development as being present in many emerging nations, where the predominant culture is parochial. The structural norms that have been introduced are usually participant and they would require, for congruence, a participant culture. Thus, the problem is to develop input and output orientations simultaneously. Most of these political systems, threatened by parochial fragmentation, suffer from instability, oscillating between taking the path towards either authoritarianism or democracy. There is no structure on either side to build on, no bureaucracy resting upon loyal subjects, nor an infrastructure arising from responsible and competent citizens. Although the problems might seem insoluble, there are factors that can help the emergence and development of participant cultures in this case.63 Civic culture Civic culture is an allegiant participant culture, where individuals have a positive orientation towards the input structures and input process. In the terms that have been already discussed, a civic culture is a participant political culture in which there is congruence between the political culture and structure. In this type of culture, participant political orientations combine with and do not replace the subject and parochial ones. Although individuals become participants in the political process, they do not give up their orientation as subjects nor as parochials. Moreover, in a civic culture the subject and parochial orientations are congruent with the participant ones. The non-participant traditional political orientations tend to limit an individual’s commitment to politics. In fact, these orientations balance the participant ones well. Although it is true that participant attitudes play a major role in civic culture, so do non-participant ones such as trust in other people and social participation in general. The persistence of these traditional attitudes and their mixture with the participant orientations lead to a balanced political culture in which there is political activity, involvement and rationality balanced by passivity, tradition, and commitment to parochial values. Almond and Verba found in their study that Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States of America came very close to the ideal model of civic culture. But their conclusions were drawn at the

63

For more information, see Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 26.

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beginning of the 1960s and various events that took place in subsequent decades have imposed a revision of these results. The Vietnam war in the 1960s, the oil crises in the 1970s, the anti-nuclear movement and the rise of the ecologist groups in the 1980s, privatization and cutbacks in the welfare state in the 1990s, all these have left their mark on many liberal democracies, including Great Britain and the USA.64 The results consisted of a sharp decline of population trust in government, thus indicating a shift away from the civic culture towards a more sceptical and critical attitude to politics.65 Nevertheless, the stability of the political system in these countries was not under threat. The accumulated discontent was directed mainly towards the performance of the governing institutions and leaders and not towards the democratic process itself. Thus, commitment to democracy’s ideals is still strong although confidence in the legislature, civil service and police forces fell in most of the democratic countries.66 What can be concluded is that whether or not stable democracy needs the precise participation-passivity balance expressed in Almond and Verba’s notion of civic culture, what is certain is that established democracies need, acquire and develop a bank of political capital to sustain them through difficult times.67 Political culture and political structure Taking all the new concepts into account, any polity may be described and compared with other polities from the points of view of its structural-functional characteristics and, respectively, its cultural, subcultural, and role-cultural characteristics. One of the most important aspects of the problem regarding political stability and change is the relationship between political culture and political structure. As these are not necessarily congruent, the trends in political cultural and structural development that may affect the match between culture and structure have to be

64

See for more details Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1980. 65 The trust in the government fell in Great Britain from 39 per cent in 1974 to 22 per cent in 1996. At the same time, in the USA, three-quarters of Americans trusted the federal government in 1964 while by 1996 only a third did so. For the data, see Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction (Palgrave), 2001, p. 80. 66 P. Norris, “The Growth of Critical Citizens and Its Consequences” in P. Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance (Oxford and N.Y.: Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 227. 67 See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1993.

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identified. Another aspect emphasized by Almond and Verba’s research is that “the specific learning of orientation to politics and of experience with the political system” had not been paid the attention it deserved by scholars.68 Such learning involves political feelings, expectations and evaluations that result mainly from political experiences rather than from the simple projection into the political sphere of basic needs and attitudes that are the product of childhood socialization. The relationship between political culture and structure within a systemically mixed culture is clear and dramatic. In the parochialsubject, the subject-participant, and the parochial-participant cultures we are dealing with societies that are either undergoing rapid systemic cultural-structural change or they have stabilized in a condition of subcultural fragmentation and structural instability. Fragmentation of political culture is also associated with general cultural fragmentation (e.g., the sharp division between the modernizing urban society and the traditional countryside; between the industrial economy and the traditional agrarian economy). Some scholars have demonstrated that in these rapidly changing and fragmented societies, cultural heterogeneity and discontinuity in socialization lead to psychological confusion and instability.69 The historical dimension of democratic political culture The historical dimension of democratic political culture refers to the influences of the historical inheritance upon the democratization process in post-communist societies. Such influences cannot be ignored because they provide a necessary context for the transition to a new system. The previous type of regime is also an important determinant for the process of building up democracy.70 In most cases, a ‘pre-transition’ phase can be identified in which the power of the dictatorship decreases, begins to disintegrate and thus the course is set for a possible regime change. An authoritarian regime may break up due to various causes: military defeat, basic economic failure, disintegration of the dominant coalition. These causes are not mutually exclusive and may

68

Almond and Verba, 1963, op. cit., p. 34. See Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building (New Haven), 1962, pp. 52–3, 287. 70 Geoffrey Pridham, “Democratic transition in theory and practice” in Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives (London: Routledge), 1994, pp. 16–22. 69

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interact to produce a negative dynamic: for instance, policy failure, for example economic, may lead to strategic divisions between hardliners and soft-liners in the ruling coalition. Invariably, this pre-transition phase is marked by some form of liberalization of the authoritarian regime, which makes limited concessions to domestic or international pressure. Liberalization is usually an attempt made by an authoritarian regime to control change. It may stimulate democratization as a result of which authoritarian leaders lose control. Alternatively, a failure to liberalize or liberalize enough could lead to an accumulation of problems, producing an explosive type of transition.71 Another element of the historical dimension is the legacy of an authoritarian period for a democracy, implying its effects on national political culture. These can be severe, particularly in the event of longlasting authoritarian regimes. In some cases, there may even be preauthoritarian legacies, involving some representative institutions such as parties and associations that have survived from earlier democratic systems. It seems that previous democratic experience “affects deeply the new democratic arrangements; it is part of the historical memory of the people preserved, in turn, by the mechanism of political socialization”.72 Such factors have an important role to play during the democratization period, especially if they have been maintained during the authoritarian period. Cultural patterns may persist autonomously, even for long authoritarian periods. These have consequences for the establishment of new democracies, for the resumption of pluralistic politics and maybe also for the course and length of the transition period.73 Variation in type of previous regime is determinant too, for this can condition the nature of democratic transition. For instance, limited pluralism under authoritarian rule is likely to provide a basis for early democratic activity. The degree of penetration of the state as well as of society, especially by totalitarian-type systems, affects both the emergence of democracy and its mode of transition.

71 See Leonardo Morlino, “Democratic establishments: a dimensional analysis” in Enrique A. Baloyra (ed.), Comparing New Democracies (Boulder: Westview), 1987, pp. 55–74. 72 Ibid., p. 18. 73 See Geoffrey Pridham, op. cit., pp. 16–22.

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Therefore, the distinction between state and regime is important not only for identifying the source of the democratic initiative, but also for understanding the further political change.74 Democratic transition is more likely to be successful where state and regime can be distinguished from each other. Where the distinction is not easily drawn—because of fusion between the two in a military dictatorship, or totalitarian penetration of the state by the regime, or confusion between the two under personal ruling—special problems are likely to emerge in the process of democratization.75

In addition, the type of previous regime will certainly determine the kind of political reaction—at both elite and non-elite levels—to the new political system. This tends to encourage an anti-authoritarian/ totalitarian value system that could be essential for a time in promoting legitimacy for a new democracy, such as in discrediting alternative systems. In this context, Putnam’s analysis of Italy proved that the historical dimension of the political culture is relevant for assessing the extent to which the past can influence the present.76 He shows how cultural variations within Italy influenced the effectiveness of the regional governments created in the 1970s: some of them proved stable and capable of adopting and implementing innovative policies while others had poor performances. According to Putnam, the answer to these differences lies in the political culture. The most successful regions rely on a positive political culture—that is, a tradition of trust and co-operation which results in high levels of what he terms ‘social capital’.77 The least effective governments are found in areas lacking any tradition of collaboration and equality. Here social capital is scarce and the poor performance of the regional governments has led to further diminution. Putnam considers that the variations in the amount of social capital in the regions are rooted in the historical development of each area. Thus, the more effective governments in the North have a tradition of communal selfgovernment dating from the twelfth century while the less successful

74

Ibid. Robert Fishman, “Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe’s transition to democracy”, World Politics, April 1990, p. 434. 76 R. Putnam, op. cit. 77 Social capital refers to a culture of trust and co-operation which makes collective action possible and effective. In fact, it describes the ability of the community to develop the ‘I’ into the ‘we’. See R. Putnam, op. cit. 75

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in the South have a long history of feudal, foreign, bureaucratic and authoritarian rules.78 To conclude, Putnam’s study illustrates how a supportive social environment built up through the centuries enhances the performance as well as the stability of a political system. Political influence and political participation In a democratic political system, citizens exercise control over elites. Both the elites and non-elites support the norms which give this control legitimacy. The problem that arises is how democratic is a nation. This can be assessed by measuring the degree to which the citizens control the decision-makers. A measure of this control is represented by the political influence, i.e. the influence exercised by non-elites over elites. The political influence of a group or individual over a government decision represents the degree to which governmental officials act to benefit that group or individual because the officials believe that they would risk deprivation if they do otherwise.79 The deprivation can refer to loss of votes, risking jobs or positions or having to stand up to criticism. The definition takes into account both the outcomes of the decisions and the reasons the decision-makers have. The important aspect here is related to the reasons why the decision-makers to behave in a certain way. When these people act because they fear the consequences of not acting according to the wishes of a certain group, then this group can be considered politically influential and a participant in the decision-making process.80 An individual who can exert such influence is considered ‘politically competent’ and as long has he believes he can exert such influence, he is ‘subjectively competent’. Directly linked to the concept of political influence is political participation which describes the activity undertaken by individuals in order to influence either who governs or the decisions taken by governments.81 Classical forms of political participation include voting in national or administrative elections and involvement in formal and non-political organizations. Non-conventional forms of participation include demonstrations, sit-ins and sit-downs, boycotts and political strikes. Such newer modes of participation are usually in pursuit of broad, not class-based, objectives: nuclear disarmament, feminism and 78 79 80 81

Ibid. See Almond and Verba, 1963, op. cit., p. 180. Ibid., p. 181. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op. cit., p. 111.

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the environment are only a few of the so-called ‘new politics’ concerns. ‘New politics’ represents a challenge to the legitimacy and decisions of the government. Its aims are to make statements and express identities, not just achieving the precise regulatory objectives which characterize the activity of interest groups. While voting in national elections represents an activity in which a majority of citizens engages, any other form of political participation involves only a minority of activists. It seems that activists are outnumbered by parochials everywhere—people who neither vote nor even follow politics through the media. We have to note that in liberal democracies people select the form as well as the extent of their political involvement and participation is voluntary. In authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, political participation is seen as a threat to those in power and this is why there is a tendency to restrain its extent and to control its expression. Although in communist countries political participation was more extensive than in many democracies, it was to a greater extent regimented, that is, the elite controlled citizens’ involvement in politics. The aim of regimented participation was to mobilize the masses behind the regime and it had no interest in influencing the decision-makers or policies of the government.82 This particular situation has hampered the emergence of genuine political participation in the post-communist countries. The main problem is that the East European citizens had little to no experience of voluntary association and this was true for both the elite and the non-elite. Even countries like Czechoslovakia that had experienced a certain degree of liberalization under the communist regime faced serious problems in this regard: more active participation was reduced again after the short period of post-1989 exhilaration and the traditionally detached attitudes of the population towards public involvement were continued.83

In these countries, the relationship between state and society has to be completely reshaped and this can be done by building civil society

82

Ibid., p. 117. M. Illner, “Local Democratization: the Czech Republic after 1989” in D. Rueschmeyer, M. Rueschmeyer and B. Wittrock (eds.), Participation and Democracy: Comparisons and Interpretations (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M. E. Sharpe), 1998, pp. 51–82; p. 75. 83

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structures in order to create opportunities for people to participate in collective activities. Politicians’ beliefs and citizens’ beliefs In order to fully understand the reasons which lie behind the actions of the decision-makers and the way these are related to the type of political culture in which they function, a brief look should now be paid to the politicians’ beliefs. Some of these beliefs can crucially affect the chances of a society to build a democratic system. To begin with a nearly self-evident one, the greater the belief within a country in the legitimacy of the institutions of democracy, the greater the chances for democracy.84 To believe in the institutions of democracy means to believe in the legitimacy of both public contestation and participation, these having an important role in shaping the relations between the rulers and the rest of the society. Beliefs about or attitudes towards authority play a fundamental role when building a new political system. In this regard, beliefs about the nature of authority relationships between government and the governed are crucial to the emergence of different types of regimes. For instance, if most of the inhabitants of a country believe that the proper relationship between them and the government is a complete hierarchical one, of rulers to subjects, the chances for a hegemonic regime are very high. Given such views, there is no place for public contestation. On the other hand, if there is a widely spread belief in democratic authority relationships among the population of a country, then the emergence of a democratic system is almost certain. Another set of beliefs are those referring to the expectations about the effectiveness of different regimes in dealing with critical matters. Confident expectations regarding the performance of the government can be reversed by failure, causing some people to lose confidence in ‘the system’ and become alienated, cynical, or radical.85 In the case where beliefs about the effectiveness of government are uncertain or shallow, as is often true with new democratic regimes, inefficiency and poor performance by the government is a viable danger, this being responsible for the population’s shift towards a more authoritarian

84

See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (Yale University Press), 1971, p. 129. Robert A. Dahl gives the example of France and the United States of America in this regard in op. cit., pp. 146–7. 85

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regime and even a dictatorship.86 The beliefs about governmental effectiveness may reinforce, weaken, or alter the predominant beliefs about authority. If a government is perceived as effective, its successes are likely to enhance the prestige of the authority patterns it embodies. If the government is perceived as ineffective, a failure would only weaken the beliefs about its authority. A further element of belief that is often underlined is “the extent to which members of a political system have trust and confidence in their fellow political actors”.87 Dahl indicates three ways in which mutual trust favours the emergence of a democratic system while extreme distrust favours an authoritarian regime.88 First, democracy requires building up two-way communication channels and this is impossible if people do not trust one another. Second, people join together freely and form efficient organizations in order to promote their goals only if there is a certain level of mutual trust between them. Finally, conflicts are more likely to take place between people who distrust one another. Public contestation requires a lot of trust in one’s opponents. There should always be room for compromise and that is not possible without trust. We shall now take a look at the beliefs of the people who are not involved in the decision-making process, the extent to which citizens in a state perceive themselves as competent to influence the government and how this affects their political behaviour. Although the individuals’ perception of their own political ability may not reflect the objective situation, this does not prevent them from attempting to use it. Consequently, a subjectively competent citizen is more likely to be an active citizen. But, if the ordinary citizen perceives that government policy is far outside his sphere of influence, he is unlikely to attempt to influence that policy, and decision-makers do not have to worry about a potential pressure that could be brought to bear on them. The existence of a belief in the influential potential of citizens may affect the political system even if it fails to affect the political activity of the ordinary man. If decision-makers are convinced that the citizens are able to participate, they are likely to behave differently than if such a belief did not exist. Even if individuals do not act according to this belief, decision-makers may act on the assumption that they can, and 86

Dahl lists the examples of Italy, Germany and Spain in the period between WWI and WWII. See op. cit., p. 147. 87 Sidney Verba, op. cit., p. 535. 88 See Dahl, op. cit., pp. 150–52.

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in this way be more responsive to the demands of the citizens than they would be if the possibility of participation did not exist. The belief that co-operation with other people is both possible and effective political action has a direct influence on political participation. People’s beliefs that they are able to engage freely and easily in co-operative actions are obviously related to trust. A lack of mutual trust does not encourage co-operation. In a democracy, the citizens have to be able to co-operate with one another in order to exert influence over decision-makers. This co-operation is necessary if we think in terms of both the amount of influence the ordinary man can expect to have and the results of his influence on governmental decisions. An ordinary man can have only a small influence over the government. This influence can be increased till it becomes notable only when it is exerted in concert with other people. From the governmental point of view, non-co-operative and completely individualistic influence attempts can only have dysfunctional results. Trying to meet every individual request would result in chaos. Almond and Verba make the point that the government is, in fact, able to respond to the aggregated demands of the citizens, the aggregation of interests implying co-operation among the people.89 This aggregation of interests suggests a propensity to work together with other people and, in such a case, a citizen is more inclined to become involved in political activity than he would be if he saw himself as an isolated political actor. These associative interest groups are able to work in a democratic political system. There the individual perceives himself as able to set up structures for the purposes of influencing the government. Those structures represent a form of influence that had not been committed to politics before the politically challenging situation arose. Therefore, in these societies the informal groups make attempts to penetrate and control the governments. This represents a meshing together of polity and community rather than an assimilation of community into the polity, as happened in the totalitarian systems. In such systems, the government attempted to influence the individual: family and friendship groups were penetrated by the state to support its propaganda and control. Consequently, the situation is the opposite of that in the

89 Almond and Verba (1963), op. cit., p. 196. Dahl mentions the same idea, see op. cit., p. 153.

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democratic system: the totalitarian state attempts to fully control the informal groups. One last aspect should be mentioned here: citizens who believe that they can influence decision-makers by using the formal organizations represent a low proportion of the population.90 Although it is true that the formal organizations such as political parties play a relevant intervening role between the individual and his government, nevertheless, it seems that when it comes to the support that individuals believe they can get in a challenging political situation, they think much more often of resorting to the informal groups of which they are members than to the formal ones to which they are affiliated. The fact that formal organizations are rarely invoked by individuals who are trying to influence the government does not imply that these organizations are politically irrelevant. They still may affect an individual’s political influence, for he may have more influence over governmental officials merely by being a member of such a group, even if he makes no kind of attempt to influence them. Political communication The process of transition from a communist regime to a democratic one is unthinkable without the establishment of independent mass media. In the communist states, political communication was understood as propaganda and agitation. These two elements dominated the flow of information and, as the communist states became inert, so the propaganda became empty ritual. Eventually, the only function of the propaganda was to show the population that the party still ruled; all its grandiose messages were contradicted by the dramatic realities of immediate experience. If the fact that the radio, television, cinema, newspapers and even art were subdued to the communist parties is taken into consideration, it is easier to understand that the establishment of independent media in the new democracies has been a complex task. Once communism collapsed, the independence of the media seemed obvious due to the lack of censorship, the different attitudes of the

90 Result mentioned by Almond and Verba (1963), op. cit., pp. 191–92. This result is also mentioned, among others, by P. Mair and I. van Biezen, “Party Membership in Europe, 1980–2000” in Party Politics, no. 7, 2001, pp. 5–22. Thus, people’s involvement in formal politics has been low for the last four decades which shows that their perception that they could influence the decision-makers through this form of political association is rather negative.

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journalists and the multitude of choice between numerous newspapers, radio stations and, after some time, TV channels. This situation was in evident contrast with the media under the communist regimes. But it can hardly be considered that the position of the mass media in post-communist countries is as strong as in consolidated democracies. Governing parties have continued to control the broadcasting media and, as the national TV and radio channels covered all the country, they have been used as propaganda vehicles in the legislative elections on more than one occasion. The establishment of commercial broadcasting brought some balance and created a more competent audience. The written media has faced the same problems since political entrepreneurs used the ownership of newspapers to maximize their influence. Moreover, journalists themselves were poorly trained and insecure in employment. To conclude, in many new democracies the leaders have been tempted to manipulate and even control the media despite their rhetorical commitment to free speech.91 The freedom of the media is a clear test of whether a political system is democratic. Civic culture and democratic stability In civic culture, the individual has to perform an active role as a citizen but, at the same time, his subject and parochial roles do not disappear. The participant role is added to the subject and parochial roles. This means that an active citizen maintains his traditional, non-political ties, as well as his more passive role as a subject. A civic culture is particularly appropriate for democratic political cultures that are also a mass of contradictions. For instance, the maintenance of a proper balance between governmental power and governmental responsiveness represents an essential but, at the same time, difficult task for a democracy. On the one hand, a democratic government must be able to govern; it must have power and leadership and make decisions. On the other hand, it must be responsible to its citizens. After all, in a democracy there must be some way by which the governmental elites can be forced to respond to the desires and demands of the citizens. An answer to this issue is provided by the structure of the electoral system. An electoral system designed to turn power over to a particular elite for a limited period of time can achieve a balance between power

91 See A. Milton, The Rational Politician: Exploiting the Media in New Democracies (Aldershot: Ashgate), 2000.

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and responsiveness: the elites obtain power, yet this power is limited in time. There is the concern for the next elections, the elections themselves and there are other formal and informal checks, too. For this system to work, there must be more than one party to make the choice between the elites meaningful and there must be a mechanism which allows the elite group to exercise effective power (in a two-party system the victorious party gets all the power; in a multiparty system the power is won by a coalition of parties). Taking this into account, the structure of the electoral system as well as the type of constitutional system are relevant issues for building up a stable democracy. In the post-communist societies, the existence of several important aspects relevant to politics, such as socioeconomic, religious, culturalethnical, urban-rural, regime support and foreign policy, have led to the formation of a multiparty system. Not all of these aspects are present with the same intensity in all the former communist countries and this fact has determined certain differences in their electoral systems. Because of the short time that parties have had to form, their organization and structure seldom resembles those in Western Europe.92 Herbert Kitschelt lists the emergence of three main types in post-communist societies: programmatic parties, charismatic parties (that rely on votes earned due to their leader’s image), and clientelistic parties (a form of ‘patronage organization’ providing benefits to their followers).93 The form taken by the party system depends on a number of factors: the institutional framework, the type of former communist rule, the duration of previous periods of democratic rule, and the levels of economic backwardness, which are linked to the timing of industrialization.94 The idea is that the emergence of effectively operating multiparty systems represents a major feature of the consolidation of new democracies and the establishment of the conditions for their continuing development.95 As for the type of constitutional system, many scholars have argued the merits and the shortcomings of parliamentary and presidential

92 See for details Karen Henderson, Post-Communist Politics: An Introduction (London: Prentice Hall), 1997; G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., op. cit. 93 Herbert Kitschelt, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-party Cooperation (Cambridge University Press), 1999, pp. 449–50. 94 Ibid., pp. 451–55. 95 See Geoffrey Pridham, “Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of the role of political parties” in G. Pridham (ed.), op. cit.

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systems, respectively.96 To discuss only one aspect, it seems that the risks posed by a presidential system are greater in a new and weak democracy. In a well-developed civil society, political parties, interest groups, strong legal checks and well-defined institutional roles can control some of the dangers of a presidential system. This is not the case in the post-communist societies where such structures are rare. Without them there is the possibility of authoritarianism re-emerging, or democracy becoming ‘delegative’.97 The concept of ‘delegative democracy’ describes imperfect transitions to democracy. A democratic system implies the existence of a political system that is representative of the people because of elections, and where the people’s representatives are accountable to their electorate during their period in office. A delegative democracy only satisfies the first part of this definition. Leaders are elected through free elections, but “whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office”.98 Thus, democracy is represented by the regular, periodic transfer of power by elections, but the only constraints on the use of power are the limits imposed on a leader’s actions by other elite members.99 In this case, we cannot expect (too much) responsiveness from the ruling elite. However, it is true that a presidential system can provide strong leadership. The complex demands of a complicated transition require a strong executive to oversee the reform process. A presidential system may be more likely to produce this than the fragmented parliaments elected in countries with no strong party system.100 Where presidents are reformers, the power of their position allows them to push through reforms that do not necessarily have either elite or mass support. On the other hand, a president who is linked to the old communist elites

96

See the contributions in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press), 1994, Arend Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford University Press), 1992, Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge University Press), 1994, Matthew Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal (Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies), 1993. 97 Guillermo O’Donnell, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospect for Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press), 1994, p. 59. 98 Ibid. 99 See Karen Henderson, op. cit., p. 169. 100 See Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (Cambridge: Polity Press), 1993.

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can use the power of his position to slow reform and dull one or other aspect of the revolutionary change. Old power structures are consequently preserved. These processes can also occur in parliamentary systems, but are less likely to take extreme forms. Parliamentary systems share power more than presidential ones and they allow for a broader range of input into the political process. This means that they create the possibility to negotiate. Pressure to moderate or accelerate change can be introduced directly into the policy-making process in an institutionalized fashion through parliament and its specialized committees by representatives of various political, social and economic interests. Thus, “parliamentary alliances and bargaining can stimulate pacts that may stop or boost policy in the short term and act to stabilise politics in the medium to long term”.101 A last important issue here is the relationship between the tension generated within the power-responsiveness relationship and political culture, particularly civic culture. This tension has a parallel in the conflicting demands made upon the citizens of a democratic system. In order for the elites to be responsive to ordinary citizens, they have to make their point of view known to the elites, they must become involved in politics to be aware of the elites’ responsiveness, and they must be influential in order to enforce responsive behaviour from the elites. But as the elites’ aim is power itself, in this case the attitudes expected from the ordinary man are contradictory. If elites have to be powerful and make authoritative decisions, then the involvement, activity, and influence of ordinary men have to be limited. The ordinary citizen must turn power over to the elites and let them rule. The need for elite power requires the ordinary citizen to be relatively passive, uninvolved and deferential to elites. Thus, according to Almond and Verba, the democratic citizen is asked to pursue “contradictory goals: he must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential”.102 The results obtained by Almond and Verba led them to the conclusion that a civic culture is particularly appropriate for a democratic political system. It is not the only form of democratic political culture, but it seems to be the most congruent with a stable, democratic system.103 But

101 102 103

K. Henderson, op. cit., p. 170. Almond and Verba, 1963, op. cit., p. 479. See ibid., p. 498.

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how can civic culture emerge and develop in a new democracy? The evolution of such a political culture in the West suggests two necessary conditions: (1) a civic culture is the result of a gradual political development which took centuries and was relatively crisis-free, untroubled, and unforced; (2) it developed by fusion—new patterns of orientations did not replace the old ones but rather merged with them. The problem in the new democracies is that there is no possibility to have a gradual process of the same kind as in Great Britain and the United States.104 People have to learn to play a participant role in politics when they have only recently become subjects or parochials. Demanding problems of social change must be faced and solved all at once. And, an even more important element in some cases, creating national boundaries and national identity must take place at the same time. A slow political development may foster a civic culture, but the new democracies lack precisely the time which would afford them the chance to develop this type of participant culture. Almond and Verba suggested some possible substitutes for the gradual process of political change which leads to the formation of civic culture. In this regard, all forms of political socialization are extremely important. Political socialization concerns the acquisition of emotions, identities and skills as well as information.105 The main dimensions of socialization are what people learn (content), when they learn it (timing and sequence) and from whom (agents).106 A primary factor here is education, which is considered to be “the most important determinant of political attitudes”.107 Education can train individuals in the skills of political participation, they can be taught how to gather information, they can be brought into contact with the mass media, they can learn the formal structure of politics as well as the importance of governmental and political institutions, and they can be informed about the explicit norms of democratic participation and responsibility. But all these things refer only to the cognitive skills related to participation. Building up other channels of political socialization may supplement what education cannot provide. These channels foster the transmission or diffusion of the mixed pattern of attitudes characteristic of a civic culture. Moreover, having to deal with a multitude of socializing 104 105 106 107

For explanations, see Almond and Verba, 1963, op. cit., pp. 493–500. See Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, op. cit., p. 88. Ibid. Almond and Verba, 1963, op. cit., p. 501.

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agencies can train the individual to deal with various roles at the same time, to schedule and balance his political orientations. Some of the most important socializing agencies are the family, the workplace, and voluntary associations. The channels of socialization increase as the family becomes more participant and open to the political process, as the occupational structure changes with the political system, and with the development of a structure of voluntary associations. Nevertheless, education and an increase in the socialization channels are still not sufficient to build up a civic culture. An affective commitment to the political system and a sense of political community also have to be developed. New democracies have to develop system affection and a sense of ability among people to co-operate with one another. This implies a need for a unifying, symbolic event or act that would create a sense of national identity and a commitment to the political system that is shared by all the strata of the population. To all these, a high level of political cognition has to be added. This can be done by expanding educational opportunities, and by exposure to mass media, political parties, and voluntary associations. Governmental performance, too, has a crucial effect on the growth of a civic culture. The development of a stable political commitment may influence the ability of the political system to produce output that satisfies the expectations of the members of the system. Only in this way can a stable and balanced commitment to the system be created and maintained. All these, together, also taking into account the resources of each country, may lead to the creation of a civic culture. In this context, it must be emphasized that civic cultures are very rare, most existing democracies actually enjoying a sound form of democratic political culture.108 As the next section will demonstrate, the variety of democratic political cultures is provided by a combination of different characteristics of two basic types. Patterns of democracy At this point, the theoretical grounds established by Almond and Verba can be successfully expanded with elements from Arend Lijphart’s recent

108 See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (eds.), Comparative Politics Today: A World View (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co.), 1988, p. 42. Such a political culture contains a substantial proportion of participant population—over 60 per cent—the rest being subjects and parochials, and represents the model of a modern industrial democracy.

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contribution on patterns of democracy.109 He introduces the concepts of majority/majoritarian and consensus democracy and investigates the way they can be applied to 36 countries. The majoritarian pattern concentrates the political power in the hands of a simple majority while the consensus one attempts to divide, disperse and limit power in various ways. At the same time, the first pattern promotes exclusiveness, competition and antagonism while the latter is based on inclusiveness, negotiations and compromise.110 According to Lijphart, there are ten variables that mark the differences between the two patterns. Five of them characterize the executive power and the party system while the rest define the type of government—federal or unitary. The empirical data analysed by the author indicate that a democratic regime is characterized by any combination of these ten elements between the extreme forms represented by the pure majoritarian and, respectively, consensus democracy. Table 1.3 is a comparison of the elements of each pattern.111 Many political sciences scholars equate the majoritarian pattern with democracy, refusing to recognize the consensus democracy as an alternative type.112 What Lijphart argues is that pure majoritarian systems are very rare (United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Barbados) and most democracies fit into the consensus pattern. Moreover, it seems that consensus government is more democratic that the majoritarian one as it has better results with regard to democratic representation, the tolerance and generosity of public policies, or the performances of the federal institutions and central banks.113 This is why the new democracies should opt for the consensus pattern despite the fact that in some cases the institutional and cultural traditions might present serious obstacles to this. Such a situation can be overcome if, returning to Almond and Verba, we take into account that political culture and political structure are variables in a “complex multidirectional system”.114 This means that congruence between the two variables can be reached either through a consensus culture that would lead to the setting up of consensus institutions, or through the establishment of consensus 109 Arend Lijphart, Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare si functionare in treizeci si sase de tari (Iasi: Polirom), 2000. 110 Ibid., p. 26. 111 Ibid., pp. 26–7. 112 Ibid., p. 29. Lijphart quotes Stephanie Lawson and Samuel Huntington in this sense. 113 Ibid., p. 274. 114 Almond and Verba, 1963, op. cit., p. 35.

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Table 1.3: Elements that characterize majoritarian and consensus democracies Patterns of democracy

Majoritarian

Consensus

Elements Executive-parties dimension

Federal-unitary dimension

single party government

coalition government

executive power dominant over the legislative one

executive and legislative powers in balance

bi-party system

multiparty system

majority electoral system

proportional representation electoral system

plurality of interests groups

corporate and co-ordinated system of interest groups

centralized and unitary government

decentralized and federal government

single legislative chamber

two legislative chambers equally powerful

flexible constitutions that can be modified by a simple majority

rigid constitutions that can be modified only by extraordinary majority

legislation checked for constitutionality by the legislative power

legislation checked for constitutionality by constitutional or supreme courts

central banks dependent independent central banks on the executive power

institutions that in time would produce a consensus culture. Thus, in the case of the new democracies based on a majoritarian tradition, the adoption and building up of consensus institutions can trigger the emergence of an appropriate political culture.115 The international dimension of democratization Most of the theoretical approaches presented thus far examine the internal factors and circumstances favouring democratization. The

115

See Lijphart, op. cit., 2000, pp. 279–80.

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external influences play a consequential part too and they should not be overlooked when analysing this process. Laurence Whitehead suggests three main aspects under which international factors may be analysed: contagion, control and consent. The contagion hypothesis establishes “a binary classification of countries according to some simple and schematic objective tests”, and then observes “the geographical distribution of the countries classified as democratic, and how it changes over time”.116 The study in this case requires no identification of actors and no investigation of the channels of transmission. However, there seem to be strong arguments in favour of an international contagion effect that operates in various political regimes contributing to their democratization. In contrast with this statistical method, the control assumption takes into consideration the roles of the external actors, their motives and actions. Whitehead points out that “two-thirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins, at least in part, to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without”.117 A dominant power can promote democracy through direct or indirect actions in a certain area. Indirect systems of control include aid and various economic concessions, actions of political support or disapproval, and perceptions related to military force. Even a declining power might be interested in creating an international environment less threatening to its own interests in the long run, allowing, in consequence, the spread of democratization in its own sphere of influence.118 A third alternative is represented by consent, in which case the analysis deepens to incorporate the actions and objectives of domestic groupings too, as well as “the interactions between internal and international processes”.119 The democratization of a society cannot take place without the support or involvement of a wide range of political and social groupings. There are four aspects essential here: the territorial limits of successive democratizations, the international structures responsible for generating consent for such regime changes, the emergence of national democratic actors, and the role of international demonstration effects.120 116 Laurence Whitehead, “Three International Dimensions of Democratization” in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization (Oxford University Press), 1996, p. 5. 117 Ibid., p. 9. 118 British decolonization and Soviet disintegration are examples in this case. 119 Laurence Whitehead in op. cit., p. 15. 120 Ibid., p. 16.

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A comparison between this hypothesis and the others indicates that the consent assumption presents a higher complexity and requires a more elaborate analysis as it deals with a greater variety of elements. Philippe Schmitter adds a fourth category to the three presented above, the most recent and rapidly expanding form of international influence—conditionality. Multilateral institutions are the main actors in this case and they attach “specific conditions to the distribution of benefits to recipient countries”.121 Although in the past this type of behaviour was characteristic of the International Monetary Fund, since 1990 the practice has spread. More organizations make the achievement of membership, for instance, conditional on fulfilling a set of requirements, among which democratization (or elements belonging to this process) is a sine qua non. This is the case for the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all of which accept post-communist countries as new members provided that they adopt democratic procedures. After looking into all these ‘sub-contexts’ of the international context, Schmitter draws a conclusion that links the international dimension to the national political results: regardless of the form (control, contagion, consent, and conditionality) that it takes, external intervention will have a greater and more lasting effect upon the consolidation of democracy than upon the transition to it.122

This happens because the unpredictability of the situations during the transition phase and the rapid pace of the transformations do not allow information to reach the outside world in real time thus enabling efficient interference. On the other hand, during the consolidation phase of the democratization process, political and social life are settled and the actors are well known, so it is much easier for an external power to influence the internal developments towards a desired outcome.123 These findings are essential to this book with regard to the assessment 121 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies” in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization (Oxford University Press), 1996, p. 30. 122 Ibid., p. 40. 123 In the consolidation phase, the relevant domestic actors are reduced in number and variety, and their positions and capabilities are better known than during the transition to democracy. It is easier then for foreign powers to intervene as they can do it with greater deliberation and selectivity, the risks of backing the wrong forces being considerably diminished. See for further explanation, ibid.

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of the interference of various external factors in the democratization process in Romania as well as their effects. 1.3. Security aspects and democratization in Romania In the post-communist world, the transition to democracy is particularly problematic because the establishment of democratic institutions has to take place at the same time as economic reforms. In addition, the monolithic nature of the communist societies had removed all autonomous social institutions except, in some cases, the Church. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s the former communist countries had to urgently find solutions for a list of problems which they had to face simultaneously: the establishment of democratic institutions, the building up of a market economy, solving social and ethnic problems, and coming to terms with the past, which mainly implied dealing with the crimes of the former communist regimes. Claus Offe has pointed out that East Central Europe faced a ‘triple transition’, a model that can be extended to all the former communist countries. According to this model, there are “three hierarchical levels of decision-making”.124 The first level, which is also the main one, includes decisions about “who we are, i.e. a decision on identity, citizenship, and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation-state”.125 This involves the longest period of time, since nations tend to last for centuries, and decisions are mainly affected by emotive factors such as passions, virtue, honour, and patriotism. The second level relates to the constitution or the institutional framework of the regime, which is established using reason and involves decisions that would normally stretch over decades. The last level refers to the everyday politics of deciding on “who get what, when and how—in terms of both political power and economic resources”.126 Here, decisions relate to interest rather than reason or emotion, but governments and the laws they pass often last for a few years only. The enormous challenge for post-communist societies lies in the fact that they have to face simultaneous transformations on all three of these levels—the

124 Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience (Cambridge: Polity Press), 1996, pp. 869–70. 125 Ibid., p. 871. 126 Ibid.

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‘triple transition’—which, in turn, places huge burdens on the state’s decision-making apparatus. As the core question of this book refers to the participation of both the political and civil society actors in the mutually dependent processes of democratization and securitization in Romania, the elements particular to this case have to be identified and analysed. To begin with, certain aspects have to be taken into account when approaching the securitization logic. The analysis focuses on the national and individual levels, with the international one relevant only in determining the external factors that influenced the security policy formulation and transition to democracy. The multisectoral approach facilitates the investigation, the fields of interest in this case being the political, societal and environmental sectors. The reasons for selecting these specific sectors are rooted in the internal and external factors influencing Romanian society. On the one hand, the country does not face any military threat and the economic sector is to a great extent still under the control of the political one. So, the consequences of a possible economic threat can be found in the political sector and treated as such. On the other hand, the main vulnerabilities of this country are political. Then there are the aspects which belong to the societal sector related to identity and ethnic groups that are relevant for this book. Finally, the environmental issues are also too important to be neglected due to the poor ecological standards here. When dealing with Romanian society, we have to identify the referent objects, the securitizing actors and the functional actors for each of the selected sectors. The roles of the various actors have to be determined in order to understand how they influence the securitization processes and with what outcomes. Sometimes decision-makers, especially in young democratic countries, might be tempted to declare an issue a threat to national security only to gain the right to deal with it using less democratic control and constraint. At the same time, security issues (real or imaginary) are often mentioned by state representatives only to distract public attention from the dramatic problems related to the economic reforms. The word ‘security’ has been used so frequently and related to so many things of a different nature that it has the tendency to become a platitude. To move on to the theory of democratization, the elements to be considered here are different. In the terms introduced at the beginning of this chapter, Romanian society has to make the transition from a

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subject political culture to a participant one. The totalitarian type of society that existed in this country in the communist years is best described as a subject political culture because of several characteristics. A rather small minority of the citizens became involved in the one-party system, which penetrated society, oversaw it, and decided its policies too. Most of the rest of the citizens were mobilized as subjects by the party, the bureaucracy and the government-controlled mass media. Only very few citizens could have been unaware of the government and its influence on their lives—isolated farmers living in the mountains, for instance. Hence, this society mainly consisted of subjects who were orientated towards the output side of the system and had a passive attitude towards the input side. This represents the starting point of the transitional road for Romania. At the other end lies a society with a civic culture within a consolidated democratic system. This implies the existence of a participant political culture in which there is congruence between the political culture and structure. Moreover, the participant orientations of the citizens are well balanced by the non-participant traditional political ones, leading to the development of a very stable democratic system. For Romania, reaching this final point is still far in the future, if she ever does. At the moment, the best description for the type of political culture existing in this country is the subject-participant one. Unlike other postcommunist countries, in Romania, due to the toughness of the regime and the high degree of anomie in society, there was no pre-transitional phase in the terms defined above. Such a pre-transitional phase, which in Poland, for instance, can be identified with the emergence of the Solidarity movement, played an important role in preparing the ground for establishing a democratic system. It also formed new leaders who had nothing to do with the communist regime. Thus, the shift from a subject political culture to a participant one was a gradual process in Poland’s case. Nothing similar happened in Romania. The violent rupture with the past was a sudden event and it found the people totally unprepared for democracy. Consequently, it was not difficult for leaders belonging to lower levels of command in the former communist hierarchy to take over. Furthermore, it can be noted that although a significant part of the Romanian population has started to develop participant orientations, most of the rest of the people, for different reasons, have continued to be orientated towards an authoritarian governmental structure. This cultural mix leads to structural instability and does not allow

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the participant part of the population to fully develop. Moreover, the inefficiency of the new democratic structure and of the governmental system and the failure of the reforms and transformations undertaken, has tended to produce alienated orientations in the democratic population. All this could lead to a reinstallation of an authoritarian regime, with dramatic consequences for the process of building up a democratic political culture. Of the issues that must be investigated, both socio-political cohesion as well as the existence of strong ‘mediation structures’ are essential, that is, civic-society institutions which are “crucial for long-term peaceful and stable development of democracy in Eastern Europe”.127 Romania’s case is interesting in this sense because, although it has a lot of similarities with other post-communist countries, the development of its democratic institutions has taken place at a much slower pace. In this context, the focus is on the process of setting up democratic institutions, and on the economic and social transformations which impact on the democratization of Romanian society. Aspects related to law and order, accountability, political participation and influence are crucial as well. The historical dimension has to be considered not only because of the legacy of the communist decades, but also because of the elements of political culture that might have survived from the pre-communist period. And, finally, probably one of the determinant factors in this case, the behaviour and roles of the new elite have to be analysed. The behaviour and beliefs of the elite often hamper progress towards a consolidated democracy. The development of a democratic political culture in post-communist societies cannot be successfully completed without a change in mentality and this takes a lot longer than building up democratic institutions. This process will be to the benefit of the whole region because “in the long term, a flourishing democratization process in the East part of Europe will reduce the dangers of instability”.128 Conclusions This chapter has set up the theoretical framework for analysing the empirical data related to this book’s topic. The two methodological 127 128

See Peter Volten, op. cit., p. 65. Ibid., p. 68.

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approaches used here refer to the new security concept and the democratic political culture. The new security concept operates not only at different levels of analysis but also in various sectors, enlarging and enriching the traditional definition of security in military terms. Numerous societal actors play active roles in each of these sectors, some of them being directly responsible for the securitization moves, as securitizing actors, others having more limited roles as functional ones. The logic of securitization as introduced by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde implies an existential threat that requires emergency actions that have to be accepted by public opinion to ensure the success of the securitizing move. Threats are specific to each sector and they have to be dealt with accordingly. The complexity of this approach increases when introducing aspects related to personal security as well as the external influences relevant at the national level. The second methodological approach refers to the democratic political culture. Various elements regarding political culture and its characteristics establish the basic ground for further investigations. In analysing the path undertaken by a society to build up a participant political culture, the new elite, its beliefs and actions play a key role as these can have disruptive effects on the process. The manner in which the elite is accountable to the non-elite, matters related to political participation and influence, the functioning of state institutions and the way in which the ‘law and order’ issue is tackled, are all elements that can provide valuable indications regarding the strengths or vulnerabilities of the system. Moreover, the democratization process has an international dimension that is relevant especially with regard to conditionality. This has consequential outcomes when it boosts the transformations at the national level. However, the focus is on the dynamics of the internal changes while conditionality is tackled only as a facilitating factor, though a very important one depending on the sector. Studying Romanian society through a security lens highlights several aspects. The new security concept offers the opportunity to analyse various areas of society leading to a comprehensive assessment regarding its progress. As the next chapters will demonstrate, the vulnerabilities that new democratic countries have to face are far more important than the threats: political instability, democratic institutions lacking authority, political elite unwilling to accept change, corruption, problems with national minorities, poor environmental standards, and the list goes on and on. As will be evident, all the vulnerabilities are directly connected with malfunctions at the society level. This situation classifies

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the new democracies as weak states and, under such circumstances, the handling of security issues becomes extremely relevant. Then, the participation of various societal actors in security matters becomes part of a much broader process: democracy exists where political participation and influence can be exercised by the non-elites in all areas of society. Finally, a democratic political culture cannot develop outside a secure environment which brings stability and economic progress. As a matter of fact, the transformations in the security field in postcommunist societies and the development of a democratic political culture go hand in hand. These two processes condition and reinforce each other in every sector of society. The chances are that Romania will not be able to reach the point where it can enjoy a civic culture and it will have to settle for the second-best option.129 The purpose of this dissertation is to depict the elements that would allow the identification of the possible outcomes of the transition process that this country is experiencing. The focus is on security matters, a critical issue in the democratization process. This new approach to security allows a sectoral study of the society. Concentrating on the political, societal and environmental sectors should also lead to valuable conclusions regarding the development of a democratic political culture in Romania. As a first step in this process, the focus of the next chapter is on the political sector.

129

See footnote 105.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL SECTOR Introduction In the political sector, the organizational stability of the state is endangered. Here, the vulnerabilities that new democratic countries like Romania have to face might prove far more important than the threats: political instability, crises of authority, political elite unwilling to accept change, corruption, feeble civil society, ethnic tensions, poor environmental standards. Such a situation is specific to a weak state and, under these circumstances, security issues become extremely relevant. An additional factor has to be considered in this context. Security-related matters were a taboo topic for the majority of society in the communist era. Information and decision-making in this field were the prerogative of a few members of the political elite with no interference from the rest of the population. In a democratic society, on the other hand, political participation and influence are exercised by non-elites in all matters. Thus, participation by various societal actors in the security field represents part of the democratization process. This can be regarded as a fair indicator of the progress made by a post-communist society in undertaking the reform path. In this light, it is easier to justify the necessity to explore the emergence and development of a democratic political culture in Romania. A discussion, even on a superficial level, about the participation of non-elites in security-related matters makes no sense in the absence of a democratic framework. The link democracy-security becomes even more obvious if we take into account that a democratic political culture cannot develop outside a secure environment that is bound to bring political stability and economic progress. Consequently, this chapter focuses first on the elements characteristic to the democratization process followed by the findings related to the security field. The investigation begins by analysing the elements of continuity regarding the political culture in historical perspective. The formation of a multiparty system and the role of the parties in society represent the topic of the next section. Political participation, socio-political cohesion,

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and the development of civil society structures are also relevant indicators referring to the emergence of a democratic political culture. The ‘law and order’ aspect, personal security, and corruption are helpful in forming a comprehensive view on how advanced the democratization process in Romania is. Without a clear image of this issue, it would be pointless to investigate the manner in which society participates in setting up new security strategies or influences decisions in security-related matters. Thus, the second part of this chapter focuses on the political dimension of the security concept. The analysis addresses the threats identified in Romania’s security strategy and the people’s involvement in the process of defining them. The securitizing actors, referent objects and functional actors have to be identified, together with what issues are taken into account and under what circumstances. Then, the question is whether a security complex is taking shape between the securitizing actors and the audience and with what consequences. A brief overview of the main theoretical aspects of the transition to democracy is thus necessary to establish a more specific framework of analysis. This marks the path of the political sector investigation.1 2.1. Theoretical overview of transition Post-communist societies are not formally constituted democracies— elite loyalties are not yet confirmed and may well be questioned while the various political, societal and economic challenges inherent in a transition process are daunting. The political cultures of these countries do not necessarily provide a reasonable basis for system support. Initial steps on the path to democracy may be an occasion for euphoria, but the overall process is usually the source of considerable disorientation at both elite and mass levels. Currently, the political sector is by far the most important part of this process for several reasons. Post-communist societies experienced decades of a centralized decision-making process in which all the different levels of society were governed by political decisions. This implies that people’s mentalities were shaped in this manner, so they are still used to expecting signals regarding various transformations from the political class. In this regard, the decisions on the transformation of the society, democratization process, and economic reform have to be taken at the political level. Finally, it takes a 1 The data analysed in this sector covers the period between 1990 and the end of 2007.

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very strong political will to carry out the demanding task represented by the deep transformation of a society. The emergence and development of a democratic political culture faces many obstacles and the process might never reach the point of a consolidated democracy. Political culture refers to individual political orientations that include both opinions of the political system and its component parts and opinions concerning the role of the self in the system. In other words, people have to acquire knowledge about the political system, they display certain feelings towards it and they make judgements regarding its performance. The post-communist societies had a subject political culture during the communist period and this means that individuals were orientated towards the output aspects of the system, totally ignoring the input ones and the role of the self as an active participant. The transition from the subject political culture to a participant one, which characterizes a democratic system, is not a smooth process as it deals with the necessity of provoking a major change of mentality at both elite and non-elite levels. Therefore, a successful transition involves the spread of positive orientations towards a democratic structure, the acceptance of norms of civic obligation, and the development of a sense of civic competence in a substantial part of the population. This is no easy task and there are several factors that could play a determining role in this process. The crucial element in this respect is represented by the political parties. They are directly responsible for organizing free elections, drawing up constitutions and government policy-making, establishing elite loyalties to the new regime, promoting democratic values through practice and rhetoric and thus contributing to system legitimization. Political parties are not merely channels for control of power by democratic elites. They also provide a guarantee that power will not necessarily be monopolized, as there are competing groups among the democratic elites and their effectiveness gives weight to constitutional mechanisms of control on executive power. At another level, parties are an essential guarantee of the durability of political pluralism and may therefore act as a stimulant to the development of an active civil society. If parties fail to perform their role for various reasons, the whole process of democratization is at stake. The same is true if the process of crystallization and maturation of the new elites is delayed. The emergence of these elites is an indication of the degree of their attachment to democratic rules. Their beliefs and performance are also crucial elements in establishing a democratic political

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culture. The matters referring to socio-political cohesion, personal security and the influence ‘law and order’ has on these are instrumental in investigating the switch from a subject culture to a participant one in post-communist societies. Furthermore, development of civil society, people’s participation in political life, elite accountability for their acts and decisions are relevant factors in this process. All these elements have to be connected, if possible, to the existing pre-communist situation and the communist one, which represent the historical legacy. Therefore, security matters are first analysed within a political framework defined by several features. As briefly mentioned above, in a communist society people had no say in security matters or the choices made by the rulers for national security. Thus, finding elements that would indicate that there are debates on security matters and that these issues are being dealt with by the establishment in an open and transparent manner would mean that a participant political culture is taking shape in Romania. Further, post-communist societies have to face new external challenges while simultaneously dealing with the internal vulnerabilities highlighted by the transition process. Finally, building strong democratic political cultures and coping with the different aspects related to security matters are—in fact—two sides of the same coin. At this point, the first step would be to depict elements that indicate the emergence of a democratic political culture. 2.2. The historical dimension of political culture To start with the legacy of the past, the nature of the authoritarian regime in Romania helps to explain many of the characteristics of the transition process to democracy. A brief look at Romanian pre-communist society indicates that there was a tradition of dominance by the collective over the individual, of the state over the citizens which, after the Second World War, the communists were able to turn to their advantage. It is true that Romania enjoyed a long period of uninterrupted constitutional rule (a constitutional monarchy from 1881 to 1938), but the oligarchy was reluctant to widen the political process to include other social groups. Although there was a multiparty system, the parties were not based on coherent ideologies or programmes but on personalities and clans. Nevertheless, the parliamentary system functioned satisfactorily until the late 1930s, when King Carol II proclaimed his royal dictatorship and dissolved the parties and the parliament.

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Attitudes toward the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Union were never sympathetic. The centuries of dominance by neighbouring empires—Tsarist, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman—only increased the Romanian people’s wish to assert their national identity. Consequently, nationalism was booming and the communist aims promoted by the Soviet Union, which claimed to represent the interests of the workers regardless of their nationality, were considered as a lethal threat to the existence of the new nation-state. This being the case, the communist ideas did not manage to gain more than a tiny number of supporters. Being anticommunist in Romania—a state whose integrity was questioned by the Soviet Union—was the same as fighting for national survival. But, despite the unifying tendencies of a nationalist nature, the country was displaying mounting political tensions in the domestic life. The land reforms of the early 1920s failed to induce an increase in the peasants’ living standards. Unemployment was continuously rising which created the ideal conditions for the spread of political extremism and led to explosive social movements. The new democratic institutions, which included parliament and an independent judicial power, were too fragile to contain these radical attacks. In addition, this period was marked by an increased political instability, elections being organized almost every year. Under these circumstances, the fascist movement set up in Romania in the early 1920s, the Iron Guard, exploited the social frustrations and manipulated religious symbols while promising the spiritual purification of the country’s corrupted political life.2 It mobilized the Romanians against ethnic minorities and militated for dictatorship as the most appropriate form of government.3 Another interesting feature regarding the pre-communist political culture in Romania refers to the party formation in the period between the wars. This was co-determined by ethnicity, class, ideology and religion. In fact, this was the situation in all of Eastern Europe where ethnicity was the defining split, to which all other splits were

2

At first, this movement took the name ‘Legion of Archangel Michael’ which was later changed into the ‘Iron Guard’. In 1934, the political party ‘Everything for the country’ emerged from this movement. 3 For an interesting perspective on pre-communist political life in Romania, see Sorin Alexandrescu, Paradoxul roman (Bucuresti: Univers), 1998; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: The Free Press), 1992.

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subordinated. A typical characteristic all over the region was the existence of parallel party systems for each ethnic group, a tendency that was reinforced by constitutional provisions, which paved the way for extreme multi-partyism. Table 2.1 presents the party systems in Poland and Romania classified according to ethnicity and party families. The comparative perspective indicates that Romania was no isolated case in this regard. What one can remark from the data is an extremely high level of ethnic distribution and political fragmentation. For instance, in Poland 92 parties were registered by 1925, about half of which were ethnically Polish.4 As can be seen in the brief elements presented above, Romania enjoyed a certain degree of democratic political life before the installation of the communist regimes. But the authoritarian/totalitarian ruling that followed had a different influence over the Romanian political culture than in other Central and Eastern European countries. Nicolae Ceausescu, the leader of the country since 1965, managed to monopolize all the political power. Although his leadership started with many promises of liberalization—he loosened party control over cultural life and had developed a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union, he was displeased to notice at the beginning of the 1970s that the domestic relaxation had contributed to the awakening of limited but increasingly powerful critical orientations among the population. Thus, though he continued to pursue a foreign policy different from Moscow’s that made him pose as an opponent of Soviet imperialism and earned him praise from the Western democracies, Ceausescu strengthened the secret police and transformed the communist party’s bureaucracy into an instrument for the implementation of his decisions. He lost touch with the political group of the communist elite that had helped him to consolidate his power and he did not tolerate any form of criticism or questioning of his authority. At the same time, his wife’s political role became increasingly important, reaching the point at which she totally dominated the Romanian political scene. Under these circumstances, a personal dictatorship had developed in Romania which made even minimal constraints upon the ruler’s behaviour by his entourage impossible. There was no opposition 4

Tomas Hellen, Sten Berglund and Frank Aarebrot, “The challenge of history in Eastern Europe” in Sten Berglund, Tomas Hellen and Frank H. Aarebrot (eds), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.), 1998, p. 22.

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Table 2.1: Relevant parties in Poland and Romania and their main ethnic basis Country

Poland

Ethnicity/ Social Agrarian Liberal Conser- NationalParty Family Democratic vative ist (ethnic defence)

Polish Ukrainian Belorussian German Jewish Romania Romanian Magyar Jewish German

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X

X

X

X X X X

X X X

X X X X X X X X X

Source: Berglund, Hellen and Aarebrot, The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, p. 209.

either within the higher or the lower ranks of nomenklatura who were mostly servile. Among the population, any attempts at opposition were smashed. This was the case with the coalminers strike in Valea Jiului in the summer of 1977 or the workers’ demonstration in Brasov in November 1987. Dissidents were either forced to leave the country after continuous harassment or, if they chose to stay, they were kept under strict police surveillance. Thus, they did not manage to form a powerful nucleus of opposition forces to the regime and their attempts to fight it were not able to mobilize the population. The severe anomie present among the Romanian population prevented any formation of a coherent opposition to the totalitarian regime. It seems that for five decades Romanian society had taken refuge in a kind of ‘moral emigration’ which transformed most of the citizens into parochials or subjects to a tyrannical system.5 The widely spread feelings among the people were of a disruptive nature, preventing co-operation: lack of interest and commitment to the life of the community, no involvement in any type of event, distrust of neighbours and friends, obsessive concern with the procurement of the daily food, pursuit of personal interests even at the expense of others. Moreover, the lack of trust and respect for authority was as often present among the citizens as the fear of the secret police. This specific situation characterized the deep gap between 5

See Daniel Barbu, Republica absenta (Bucuresti: Nemira), 1999, p. 55.

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the totalitarian institutions and the rest of society, giving rise to what Daniel Barbu called “a geographical paradox: most of the Romanians, while living in Romania, had never got involved in what happened in their own country”.6 Therefore, so many decades of lack of social involvement and participation deprived the Romanian population of knowledge and orientation towards political life. Here there was no liberalization preceding the democratization process, no autonomous social groups were permitted to exist and, consequently, no tendencies of political opposition could develop. A very eloquent view of the situation in Romania after the 1970s can be provided by a comparison with the case of Poland. In the same period, Polish society was torn by social and political tensions but the communist leaders refused to confront them, restoring demagogy and using corruption to preserve their power. The Solidarity union emerged as an independent organization able to articulate social demands for rapid political and economic change. It questioned the monopolistic position of the communist party and proposed a programme for building a pluralist society. The development of such a movement would have been unthinkable under strongly centralized communist rule. The birth and then the recognition of Solidarity were possible due to the population’s awareness of the dominant power’s loss of authority. Moreover, this social movement had become powerful incredibly fast, incorporating not only workers but also intellectuals, students, and peasants. Its demands were also supported by the Catholic Church which, although it did not interfere directly in the political struggle, tried to encourage communication between the government and the opposition. This never happened in Romania in the communist period where the Orthodox Church acted more as a silent supporter of the regime, even when Ceausescu destroyed villages and churches or when he starved the population. Although the early 1980s in Poland were marked by the proclamation of martial law by General Jaruzelski’s government, and Solidarity was banned and its leading activists jailed, the movement managed to survive. It was able to create a counterculture, including publishing houses, filmmaking, numerous newspapers, and other forms of autonomous social activism that in time dramatically diminished the repressive potential of the system. When, after 1985, Jaruzelski tried

6

Ibid.

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to undertake some reforms under the influence of the de-Stalinization and liberalization programme started in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev, it was already too late and the gap between the government and the ever-growing civil society continued to widen. In the words of J. F. Brown, it was as if two different societies, totally unconnected, were conducting separate activities: the ‘official’ society consisting of the regime establishment and its supporters, and the ‘alternative’ society opposed to the former and better organized than ever.7 Thus, even in the dramatic conditions under the military regime, Poles enjoyed a certain degree of freedom that allowed them to become involved in autonomous activities, a situation that Romanians never experienced under Ceausescu’s dictatorship. The difference between the two regimes lay in the impact of the Polish social movements on the establishment: although Solidarity was temporarily defeated, “it had created a sense of political community and mutual trust that could not exist in the atomized space of a traditional totalitarian polity”.8 This pre-transitional phase in Poland, marked by liberalization of political life, created the circumstances that allowed a participant culture to evolve and develop. More and more citizens became acquainted with the norms of a pluralist society and democratic ideas, civil society institutions emerged and were able to offer an alternative model of societal organization and, equally important, new leaders were formed. Consequently, at the end of the 1980s Polish society was prepared to undertake more drastic reforms and go through a democratization process that would, eventually, lead to the formation and maturation of a sound democratic political culture, while Romanian society was totally unprepared for such a complex change. 2.3. The formation of a democratic political culture in Romania Formation of a multiparty system The development of party systems in post-communist societies is particularly relevant for the establishment of a democratic political culture. There are four relevant elements to be highlighted here: the legacy of the past, the role of the new political elites, the inter-party

7 J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), 1988, p. 197. 8 Vladimir Tismaneanu, op. cit., 1992, p. 123.

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relationships, and the relationship between parties and society.9 As the formation and role of new elites is going to be investigated in another section, the focus here will be on the other elements and especially on the relationship between parties and society. The electoral system plays an important role in the process of party formation. For instance, where a majoritarian system tends to promote the development of a two-party system, proportional representation (PR) normally leads to the presence of a higher number of parties in parliament. Before the 2000 elections, Romania had a PR system in which parties had to reach a threshold of 3 percent and electoral coalitions 5 percent in order to be awarded seats in parliament. The threshold was raised to 5 percent for parties and 8 percent for coalitions during the 2000 elections. The decision was taken in order to prevent some extremist parties from entering the parliament. However, it worked against the former coalition in power because the Democrat Convention, the coalition formed by a few parties and associations around the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD), did not manage to reach the 8 percent threshold. The first electoral system adopted in Romania after 1989 presented several relevant characteristics which had a great influence on the formation of the new political elite. First, parliamentary representatives were elected from lists proposed by the parties and the only difference between the two chambers—Chamber of Deputies and Senate—was the number of votes necessary to be elected. The functions of the chambers and of their members were the same, which led to delays in law adoption procedures, endless mediations between the parliamentary commissions, and confusion among the electorate. Moreover, the people had started to feel increasingly estranged from their representatives because they seldom knew more than few individuals in each party. Most of the time, the rest of the parliament members were activists serving the interests of their party for which they were rewarded accordingly. Incidentally, the increase in the threshold did not prevent one extremist party from entering again the parliament. Hence, at the 2000 elections, the Greater Romania Party gained an incredible 23 percent of the vote and became

9

See Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis, “Introduction: Stabilizing fragile democracies and party system development” in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge), 1996, pp. 8–10.

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the main party in opposition.10 This party stopped being just an irritating presence on the political scene and became a real danger to the democratization process in Romania. At the beginning of 2008, after three years of forceful debates, the electoral system suffered a drastic transformation. The parliament approved on replacing the PR system with a uninominal one which implies selecting individual candidates from each district. According to this law, a member of the Chamber of Deputies will be chosen from a constituency with 70,000 voters and a senator will need to win in a constituency of 160,000 voters.11 There will be an electoral threshold for each party of 5 percent, and votes that go to parties that do not reach the threshold will be redistributed proportionally among the winners. Cristian Radulescu, a member of the Democratic Liberal Party, considered this act as “a first step toward bringing more credibility to Romanian politicians” as it was fulfilling one of the population’s requests.12 Nevertheless, not everybody was happy with this change. Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the leader of the Greater Romania Party that voted against it, said the new system would allow only “Mafioso parties”, that is rich and powerful ones, to enter parliament.13 One last aspect regarding the electoral system is relevant in this context. The presidential elections were held till 2004 inclusively at the same time with the legislative ones. According to the 2003 amendment to the Romanian Constitution, the presidential term became five years instead of four, meaning that in the future, legislative and presidential elections will be held separately, only coinciding every 20 years.14 The official argument behind this change was the avoidance of a potential hiatus

10 The Greater Romania Party gained 3.8 percent in the 1992 elections and 4.5 in 1996. See www.election.ro. 11 The national territory is divided into 42 electoral districts, corresponding to the 41 counties plus Bucharest. Each electoral district contains a number of single member districts (SMDs) corresponding to the number of deputy/senator seats for that district. Up to 95 percent of the number of mandates will be the same as in the 2004 elections, thus there will be 330 uninominal colleges for the Chamber of Deputies and 135 for the Senate. The intention behind the new system apparently is to exclude ‘independent’ local political bosses dominating the system by having a party threshold and requiring a high (absolute) majority for SMDs. 12 “Romania’s parliament approves electoral system change”, International Herald Tribune, 4 April 2008, www.iht.com. 13 Ibid. 14 Constitution of Romania, Chapter 2, article 83, paragraph 1: “The term of office of the President of Romania is five years, being exercised from the date the oath was taken.” See site of the Chamber of Deputies, www.cdep.ro.

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of the institutional power every four years. The model was inspired by already existing constitutional systems.15 Consequently, the president cannot play an active role in the legislative elections in order to boost the chances of ‘his’ party to get a better position in the next legislature. Nevertheless, his part in the political life cannot be reduced to “a simple, symbolic and artificial exercise”.16 Article 84 of the Constitution lays down political neutrality among the president’s obligations but does not forbid him to express his political sympathies: The Constitution does not forbid the president to maintain his relationships with the political party that provided him support throughout the elections or with any other political parties. [. . .] It is obvious that in order to put his programme into practice, the president may carry out a dialogue with the political party of which he used to be a member or with a completely different political party that could provide support in terms of the implementation of this programme.17

The parliamentary elections held at the end of 2008 are going to be an interesting test in this sense. The formation of a party system faced various problems. At the beginning of the 1990s, the political scene was dominated by the National Salvation Front (FSN), which was set up at the end of 1989 and organized the first free elections in May 1990. Its competitors at that time were mainly the historical parties—Christian Democrats, Liberals and Social Democrats—which lacked charismatic leadership, control over the new levers of power, a coherent message and the time to get organized by May 1990. The historical parties were invoking the legitimacy given to them by their pre-communist existence on the political scene while refusing to recognize the FSN. They considered the Front as a formation of ex-communists building a limited democracy in order to preserve the power and privileges of groups related to the former regime. This situation only gave them limited support at home despite the fact that they enjoyed some backing from the West. Under these circumstances, it was easy for the FSN to consolidate its authority. It moved towards holding early elections that made it impossible for the weak and fragmented opposition to organize itself. It used all the

15 M. Constantinescu, I. Muraru, A. Iorgovan, Constitutional Revision. Explanations and Comments (Bucharest: Rosetti Publishing House), 2003, p. 72. 16 Advisory Opinion No. 1/2007, Constitutional Court, Monitorul Oficial no. 258, 18 April 2007. 17 Ibid.

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advantages of its dominant position, such as the control over printing presses and transportation, use of radio and television. The latter was essential, particularly in a country where television shaped the outlook of millions of people, many of them poorly educated and living in small towns and villages where no other sources of information were available.18 Neither of the two opposition leaders who challenged Ion Iliescu, the leader of FSN, in the 1990 presidential elections was able to gather significant support. Their unsuccessful attempt was due to their parties’ inability to define a common programme in order to win the elections and govern together and their failure to run a single presidential candidate against Iliescu. Moreover, their electoral campaign concentrated exclusively on an anticommunist message that failed to make the distinction between the demolition of the old system and the culpability of all the millions of former communist activists who had joined the party out of convenience rather than conviction.19 Consequently, these parties and their candidates were not able to challenge the Front’s popularity and they did not manage to gather enough votes in the elections to force the Front to form a coalition.20 One thing became clear in time: Iliescu did not intend to manage a drastic change of society, he favoured so-called ‘communism with a human face’. At the same time, he displayed a bias towards achieving as much power as possible to enable him to control all the important state institutions. As the leader of FSN, he expressed the hope that this would not be “a party formation” and instead would be permitted to work out “a platform of national unity around objectives that are not party objectives but national objectives”.21 Silviu Brucan, a former communist who publicly broke with Ceausescu before 1989, argued that pluralism in post-communist societies did not mean the building of a multiparty system but merely the development of democratic mechanisms within

18 See for assessments of the 1990 Romanian elections Tom Gallagher, “Romania: The Disputed Election of 1990”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 44, 1991, pp. 79–93. 19 For further information, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The Quasi-Revolution and its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceausescu Romania” in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, 1993, pp. 310–345. 20 On 20 May 1990, Ion Iliescu was elected President of Romania with 85 percent of the votes cast, while the FSN received 65 percent of the votes and was able to govern with a very comfortable majority. See www.election.ro. 21 Speech delivered on the 28 January, 1990.

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the ruling party.22 He referred to the FSN as an “enlightened vanguard” which acted as a national pedagogue and he stated that Romanian transition to democracy would take at least two decades, during which a paternalistic regime was necessary to hold the nation together.23 His line of argument is confirmed not only by the behaviour of the new political elites, as we have already seen, but also by the mentality of many of the first-time voters, who were not adjusting easily to pluralist circumstances. This was mostly the case in the villages, where the pattern of life left little space for private initiative, so that the idea of rival well-organized parties competing for power could easily be seen as menacing and disruptive. Authoritarian rule for over forty-five years meant that many Romanians, at least at the beginning of the 1990s, were more at ease with the existence of one political party. These were the circumstances under which the party system took shape in Romania. The process led to the formation of parties that did not manage to perform certain important functions that contribute to the establishment of a sound democratic system. The parties lacked a clear ideology and were more interested in the struggle for power than in developing a comprehensive model of social life. Also, they proved unable to promote adequate policies, generally limiting their contribution to importing—more or less coherently—the ones set up by different organizations (the acquis communautaires, for instance) or to designing policies to serve the interests of their clientele. Leading on from this, the parties failed to play their role as agents of interest aggregation. They should have acted as a filter between society and state, transforming a multitude of specific demands into more manageable packages of proposals. Furthermore, the parties were unable to form or prepare enough candidates for public office. At least until 2000, instead of training and promoting their own specialists, the parties in power were recruiting existing ones from the parties in opposition, only to lose them again when losing the ruling position. And, finally, as the parties were not able to fulfil their role in society, this also negatively affected their ability to form workable coalitions. The coalitions were mainly seen by their members as a means to remain in power as long as possible and were hardly based on a commonality of objectives transferred

22 M. Calinescu and V. Tismaneanu, “The 1989 Revolution and Romania’s Future”, Problems of Communism, no. 38, 1991 (January–April), p. 52. 23 Ibid.

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into a sound political and economic programme. There were parties that lost some of their electorate due to their choice to form a coalition with a former ‘enemy’.24 At the same time, new parties that came into power behaved exactly like their predecessors and failed to keep any of their promises. Thus, there was no striking difference between their actions and those of the former ruling parties. The relationship between parties and society The relationship between parties and society is the ultimate test of how democratic consolidation is beginning to develop. Many parties, especially new ones with no historical traditions, suffer initially from a lack of articulated links with society. Moreover, the demands of system-building may result in party leaders neglecting this aspect of party activity. It is important whether these parties act as agents of social integration or division and whether they help to promote the legitimacy of the new democratic system. Another relevant element is the parties’ ability and willingness to encourage citizen participation in political life. Generally, many of the new democracies’ parties lack cohesion, mass membership, and even an ideology when they are compared with West European ones. They tend to be elite parties rather than mass ones, led by political entrepreneurs unconstrained by a large party membership. According to Lewis, “parties have developed hesitantly and incompletely throughout much of East Europe—and in some countries to no great extent at all”.25 Moreover, other political analysts suggest that there may even be advantages in the political flexibility of soft party structures: The absence of sunk costs in large membership organizations enables East European democracies to enjoy the ‘advantages of backwardness’ and frees its politicians from devoting their energies to fighting armies of party functionaries who attend to empty organizational shells.26

24 In Romania, the most dramatic case is represented by the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD) that, after winning the elections in 1996, had to form a coalition with the Democrat Party to which it had been continuously opposed beforehand. A part of PNTCD’s electorate was not able to accept this political decision and, in time, the party lost some support. 25 P. Lewis, Political Parties in Postcommunist Eastern Europe (London and N.Y.: Routledge), 2000, p. 6. 26 H. Kitschelt et al., Postcommunist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Competition (Cambridge and N.Y.: Cambridge University Press), 1999, p. 396.

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In Romania’s case, several common characteristics can be identified for all the existing parties, historic or new ones. Perhaps the most important of these are their weak roots in society: membership is low even for the most popular party, the Social Democrat Party (PSD27—they claimed to have 40,000 members in 1992 when they were more popular than now).28 Parties in post-communist societies lack ‘core voters’, that is, social groups that form a firm base of support, and this situation results in a high degree of electoral volatility. Some parties even learn to use this to their own advantage, as is the case with the PSD which, while it can hardly be considered a fully established party lacking a clear ideology, is able to rapidly adapt its message to the current orientations of the electorate. For a long period, almost all the parties displayed no signs of internal democratic life or even sporadic consultation between the different levels. The younger generation was barely represented among the leaders of the parties. Although the democrats (PD) were somehow an exception to this situation, submitting lists with people of a lower average age in the administrative and legislative elections, they did not appoint young people in relevant positions within the party. The most reluctant parties in this sense were the historic ones in which the generation conflict was particularly sharp and it led to numerous splits. The PNTCD and PNL29 in particular lost a lot of support among the young electorate due to their inflexible position regarding the acceptance of younger people at the top of the party. The liberals changed this attitude in 1999 and started to gain support from the younger generations, and thus they managed to get 11 percent of the vote in the 2000 elections, becoming the main force in the democratic opposition. A severe problem for the historic parties in the first years was their failure to establish a presence in the countryside and smaller towns. Support for Iliescu’s party was very strong in these areas and the local authorities were usually on its side blocking the attempts of its rivals to get in touch with these communities. The situation changed significantly after 1996 when the Christian democrats came to power.

27 The Social Democrat Party (PSD) was set up in the spring of 2001 after a merger between the winner of the 2000 elections, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR)—Iliescu’s wing of the FSN, and the historic Romanian Social Democrat Party (PSDR). 28 V. Tismaneanu, op. cit. (article 1993), p. 317. 29 PNL—National Liberal Party.

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An essential role was played in this process by the independent media. The fact is that the opposition would have not gained power in 1996 if it had not been for PRO TV, an independent commercial television channel that started to broadcast at the end of 1995. PRO TV enjoyed strong financial support and managed to expand very rapidly so that in only few months it covered the whole country. It gave a chance to the opposition to make its voice heard to the same extent as the governing parties that were enjoying full coverage of their activities through the national television channel, TV1. This managed to create a balance in people’s knowledge about all the parliamentary parties, their ideologies, programmes, actions, and so on. As everywhere else in the world, in Romania too the proven ability of television to shape political attitudes and preferences made it a key political weapon. Thus, all the politicians and political parties try to get into the news as often as possible. The national television channels TV1 and TV2 have proved supportive to whoever is in power and this means that opposition representatives have considerably fewer opportunities to be seen. As more and more commercial channels have been set up and they have succeeded in attracting large segments of the population, the fight to influence/control this manipulative means has also become sharper. Since 2000, the PSD has also tried to extend its dominance over the commercial channels at the expense of the opposition parties. The good thing is that for a while some powerful ones enjoying large audiences (e.g. Antena 1) have remained outside its influence. Unfortunately, this situation did not last long as the president of Antena 1 television channel—Dan Voiculescu—also happened to be the leader of a very little but ambitious political party: the Conservative Party (PC). This was set up in 1991 under the name of the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR) but it had never been able to attract enough support to enter parliament on its own. Voiculescu had managed to build up a real media empire before he formally gave control of his companies to relatives.30 He also retired from the leadership of PC (he is still its honorific president) but he retains significant influence in the party and Romanian mass-media. Voiculescu has always been a controversial person: since the beginning of the 1990s he had been

30 He founded two newspapers—Jurnalul National and Gazeta Sporturilor, three television channels—Antena 1, Antena 3 and Euforia TV—and a radio channel, Romantic FM. All these are part of the Intact Trust.

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accused of collaboration with the former Securitate and keeping silence over Ceausescu’s foreign bank accounts.31 In this sense, the National Council for Study of Securitate Archives officially confirmed in June 2006 that Dan Voiculescu had indeed collaborated with the Securitate. In the political life, he is a rather unreliable partner switching sides according to the advantages he can obtain at a given moment, but his considerable influence in the media makes his partnership appealing. Before the 2000 elections, PC/PUR formed an electoral alliance with PSD which was de facto the vehicle that brought it into the parliament. Since that moment, Antena 1 had ceased its relatively independent broadcasting and started to support PSD. After 2000, the fact that most of the TV channels chose one or another party’s side polarized even further the political life. Undoubtedly, PSD’s political control over the national TV channels and several commercial ones during its ruling period (2000–2004) represents an extreme case. Almost without exception, PSD’s leaders have been presented in a positive of neutral context. In most of the cases, the TV reporter’s critical attitude targeted the members of the opposition.32

With the coming of the opposition in power after 2004, the situation has changed but not necessarily into a positive one. As the governing coalition has experienced internal frictions almost since its formation and there have been permanent tensions between various institutions (presidency vs. government, presidency vs. parliament), the unique control over the mass media has been replaced by more control centres. Consequently, political pressures originating in the upper ranks of the political class intensified. The approaching of the 2008 elections increased media’s worth, thus

31 It was believed that Ceausescu had used in the 1980s a Romanian-Cypriot firm, Crescent, to transfer in foreign accounts a great deal of money. Dan Voiculescu was Crescent’s director in that period. As for the ‘Securitate’, this term designated Ceausescu’s secret police. 32 See the report “Freedom of the Media in Romania” made by the Media Monitoring Agency—Catavencu Academy, in “Televiziunea romana este controlata politic”, 9AM News, 30 March 2005, www.9am.ro.

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the political elite had no hesitation to exercise this sort of control where the law allows it—the national TV channels, CNA33—or to block several necessary legal reforms.34

The latest information means that has registered an unbelievable growth in terms of market penetration during the last years is the internet. If in 2000 almost no Romanian politician was an active user and the parties had no comprehensive websites to present their ideologies and programmes, at the beginning of 2008 the situation is completely different. There is an abundance of specialised websites offering thorough information on the voting process, candidates and electoral districts.35 Then, various civil society organizations have been interested in the moral profile of the candidates participating in the administrative and legislative elections.36 Therefore, they launched the RomaniaCurata.ro portal that seeks to observe the new political class, local and central administration in what regards the integrity, corruption and fulfilment of the commitments to the European Commission on judiciary reform.37 And, last but not least relevant, the politicians themselves are present in the virtual space through personal blogs although in many cases these are rather a fashion product than a political communication instrument. Many of the political bloggers have no idea how to reach their target—the electorate, how to introduce themselves and their programmes, they do not update the existing information and do not react to the visitors’ comments. Under such circumstances, the blog is useless and even detrimental to the candidate’s image since it does not attract extra voters but rather discourage them. The reason behind this intensification of the modalities to communicate in the virtual space rests in the explosive growth of the Romanian internet users registered after 2004. If in 2000 the International

33 CNA—National Audiovisual Council of Romania—is the only regulator for the audiovisual sector in Romania. It is formed by 11 members who are appointed by the parliament based on the proposals made by the presidency, government and the two parliamentarian chambers. Thus, they are not always immune to political pressures. 34 See the report “Freedom of the Media in Romania—2007” made by the Media Monitoring Agency—Catavencu Academy, May 2008, www.mma.ro. 35 See, for instance: www.votuninominal.ro, www.infovot.ro, www.thinkopolis.eu, www.votezi.ro, etc. 36 There are six non-governmental organizations and a union in this group: Freedom House Romania, Timisoara Association, Romanian Academic Society, Centre for Independent Journalism, Group for Social Dialogue, Advocacy Academy, and, respectively, the Alfa Cartel. 37 See the anti-corruption portal www.RomaniaCurata.ro.

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Telecommunication Union announced a number of 800,000 Romanian internet users, at the beginning of 2008 their number reached 12 million representing 53.9 percent penetration of the market.38 As it can be noticed from the data in the Table 2.2, the number of users is more than double at the beginning of 2008 in comparison to 2007. Therefore, the interest of the Romanian politicians for using this new media tool in their electoral fight is understandable, the problem remains that very few of them have the necessary know-how and skills to transform it into a valuable product. As for the active political bloggers, a positive aspect is for sure the fact that they regularly update the readers about their initiatives and pursuits.39 From this point of view, the blogs of the Romanian Members of the European Parliament are useful as they bring further light on the European Union’s activity and on the contributions of the Romanian representatives.40 Political participation People’s participation in political life can develop very fast if encouraged by the parties. But this is not always the case. In Romania, two distinct periods can be remarked: an initial phase marked by revolutionary effervescence when everybody thought that problems could be solved by street pressure, followed by a much calmer period in which the society has started to construct other means to influence the political elite. Thus, the beginning of the 1990s was characterized by continuous turbulence and demonstrations that brought many of the political issues into the street. Among the most important demonstrations were anticommunist ones that had specific objectives and sometimes even managed to launch pertinent proposals. Unfortunately, they failed to result in civil society structures able to continue the fight with the political class on a different level. These demonstrations eventually stopped, on the one hand because people noticed that after a certain moment in time they were not managing to influence the authorities in this manner any more. On the other hand, Romania had the sad experience of some violent miners’ demonstrations in which this social

38 According to Internet World States—Usage and Population Statistics, www .internetworldstates.com. 39 President Traian Basescu and the former prime minister and candidate to presidency, Adrian Nastase, have been active bloggers since the 2004 electoral campaign. Other active political bloggers: Elenea Udrea, Nicu Ilie (PD/PDL), Diana Tusa, Adrian Popa (PNL), Vasile Dancu, Dan Mihalache (PSD), Zsolt Nagy (UDMR). 40 Several of these are: Adina Valean, Renate Weber, Corina Cretu, Gabriela Cretu.

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Table 2.2: Romanian internet users after 2000 Year 2008 (March) 2007 (August) 2006 2004 2000

Users 12,000,000 5,062,500 4,940,000 4,000,000 800,000

Percent of the population 53.9 % 23.9 % 23.4 % 18.7 % 3.6 %

Source: Internet World States, March 2008, www.internetworldstates.com

group was manipulated by the party in power (Iliescu’s party) against its opponents demonstrating in the street. People’s appetite for this kind of political game faded away from late 1991, also because living standards were worsening so that their attention switched to the daily problems of survival. Nevertheless, the early 1990s in Romania were marked by a few important events related to the emergence of civil society institutions and their relationship with different parties. The first evolved as a reaction to the National Salvation Front’s attempt to control all the power levers and to reinstall former high-ranked communist activists in power. Thus, in March 1990 the FSN was challenged by the publication of the ‘Timisoara Proclamation’, a political statement written by some young intellectuals in the town of Timisoara. Article 8 of the ‘Proclamation’ was of utmost significance, calling for a modification in the electoral law in order to prevent former communist activists and ‘Securitate’ officers from holding government jobs and running for parliamentary seats. Furthermore, the document opposed the right of those who had served the communist regime to stand for the office of President. The Proclamation’s goals were adopted by independent groups and associations and, at the end of April, thousands of students, workers and intellectuals seized the University Square in Bucharest, where they organized a sit-in to protest against the government’s refusal to meet these demands. People demonstrated day and night for democracy, freedom, and truth in a spot that was designated as ‘the zero kilometre of a country freed from communism’. The opposition parties supported these demonstrations, but Iliescu and the FSN took a strong stand against them and used police force to intimidate the participants. As the demonstrations continued, in June 1990 Iliescu asked for the miners’ help, initiating an explosion of hatred and violence. Despite the attempts made by the ruling party to annihilate the emerging civil society, this continued to

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organize itself. In November 1990, the Civic Alliance was formed, which tried to unite the dispersed forms of extra-parliamentary opposition. Led by well-known cultural and political personalities, the Alliance announced its commitment to creating a democratic political culture in Romania by means of education and dialogue.41 Moreover, in 1991, a core group of the Alliance’s prominent activists decided to form the Civic Alliance Party (PAC) as its political branch.42 Although received by part of the electorate with a lot of hope, PAC did not manage to exist for long on the political scene, as it was formed of intellectuals who were unable to adapt to the rules of the domestic political game. After 1996, a very small group of intellectuals became involved in the transformation process required by the first alternation in power and an even smaller one maintained a critical objective view on the government’s activities. All these failures gave rise to the idea that intellectuals were unable to respect the requirements of institutional behaviour.43 There are a few reasons why the attempts by the civil society groups at the beginning of the 1990s to attract large popular support and persuade people to join them in the fight against the previous communist structures were unsuccessful. First, the population considered that the communist regime had disappeared together with the death of the dictator Ceausescu and his wife because people had been members of the Communist Party from convenience and not from conviction. Thus, only a few people thought that communism could still be seen as a real threat to the fragile emerging democracy. Second, the message of the civil society groups was too radical and uncompromising to be able to build a large consensus. Ordinary people considered it rather dangerous because they saw in it a possible slide into anarchy. Third, although the Civic Alliance did not identify itself as a political formation, the political activities of its members and its political implications confused the population who did not perceive it as a civic structure. 41 Two hundred and sixteen personalities supported the Alliance in November 1990. Among its leading activists were Ana Blandiana, Petre Mihai Bacanu, Mihai Sora, Marian Munteanu, Nicolae Manolescu, Stelian Tanase. Marian Munteanu, the President of the Students’ League of the University of Bucharest, a well known anti-communist militant, was elected the first President of the Civic Alliance in December 1990. See www.aliantacivica.ro. 42 In July 1991, at the first Congress of the Civic Alliance, the foundation of PAC was announced. Nicolae Manolescu was elected president and Stelian Tanase, Alexandru Popovici and Nicolae Constantinescu vice-presidents. See www.aliantacivica.ro. 43 See A. Mungiu-Pippidi, Politica dupa comunism (Bucuresti: Humanitas), 2002, p. 58.

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Thus, its supporters were a small group. Moreover, the representatives of these structures sometimes had a too intellectual message to catch the attention of a large public. Good communication with the rest of society would have required less sophisticated speech. Finally, these groups were mainly formed of people in favour of transforming Romania into a constitutional monarchy again. This was not a view accepted by the large majority of the population, which had been indoctrinated for decades against pluralism and monarchy. Nevertheless, these attempts also had a beneficial result: they managed to wake up the civic conscience, especially of young people. Participation began to take a different shape after 1996 once numerous civil society structures had emerged and started to perform typical activities. These helped citizens to acquire more knowledge about democracy and political life. It should be emphasized, however, that this was the case mainly for the urban population. As far as the parties were concerned, although the new coalition in power and the new president—Emil Constantinescu—had very strong ties with the Civic Alliance, they did not select their advisors and counsellors from this organization, thus failing to dismantle the still surviving communist structures and to build stronger ties between the establishment and the rest of the society. The development of the participant orientations among the population twelve years after the political regime had changed highlights the state of transition to democracy in Romania.44 The model uses two variables, parochial and subject orientation, respectively, in the form of two questions. As it results from Table 2.3, by combining the answers to these questions, we obtain four categories of people. The findings are certainly illustrative. The small group of participant respondents were actively involved in political life, live in big cities and kept themselves informed about all political matters. The abstinent ones followed political events but were apathetic about their course. The relatively large group of parochials included people from small cities, farmers, and wealthier respondents. As the empirical data indicated, in 2002 the subject orientations were still widely spread among the Romanian population and they designated the most frustrated social category,

44

The model proposed by Almond and Verba has been used.

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Table 2.3: Attitudes towards politics and authority Question 1: ‘Politics has no relevant influence over my life’

Question 2: ‘People like me can do very little to influence political actions’

False True

False 18% (participant) 10% (abstinent)

True 39% (subject) 33% (parochial)

Source: A. Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit., p. 89.

displaying very low levels of trust in state institutions and high levels of social envy.45 Supplementary data can be presented to support these findings. In a poll taken in June 2002, 88 percent of the respondents indicated that “if the government took a decision that negatively affected their lives, they would not be able to do anything about it”.46 This again indicates that subject orientation was prominent in Romanian society. The weak participation is also illustrated by the very low scores on other two indicators: only 8 percent of the respondents had submitted at least one petition and 11 percent had taken part in legal demonstrations.47 As in a well-established democracy these indicators are over 50 percent for citizens who sign petitions and 30 percent for those taking part in legal demonstrations, it is obvious that in the Romanian society participation is still in its infancy. Few years later, in 2005, the situation was only slightly changed. From the respondents to an opinion poll, 14 percent had participated in a political meeting, 8 percent in a political demonstration and 8 percent had personally contacted a politician.48 This persisting lack of interest regarding direct participation could be explained by the still high number of people who think that they have no influence at all on political decisions: 25 percent from the voting citizens indicate that they have no influence on the decisions taken at local level while 54 percent think that they can exercise only little influence.49 At the same time, 31 percent of the Romanians are convinced that they have 45

The findings are commented on in A. Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit., pp. 88–92. Poll taken by the Institute for Marketing and Polls (IMAS) in June 2002, see www.imas.ro. 47 Ibid. 48 See Public Opinion Barometer made by Gallup Romania in collaboration with the Foundation for an Open Society, May 2005, www.gallup.ro. 49 Ibid. Only 15 percent consider that they have a great deal of influence on the political decisions taken at local level. 46

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no influence on the important decisions taken at national level and 51 percent declare that they might be able to influence them only at a little extent.50 An important cause of this situation can be identified in the lack of encouragement shown by the political elite towards involving the non-elite actors in the decision-making process. A closer look at the politicians’ beliefs and behaviour will indicate how severe this phenomenon is. New elites and politicians’ beliefs The formation of a multiparty system is influenced by the behaviour of the new elites. They also have an essential role to play in the democratization process as a whole and this is why the way in which the new elites emerge is important. At the same time, their beliefs can affect the chances of a society to build a democratic system. These new elites constitute role models for the rest of the society and, therefore, their behaviour is followed by citizens who have not yet developed participant orientations towards the system. Furthermore, they have not gathered sufficient knowledge to adopt a critical position towards the political class and they might still not be aware of their possibilities to influence the decision-makers. This is why it is important to know what type of elites are evolving in post-communist societies and what their beliefs are. In Central and Eastern European countries, five types of political actors can be identified as constituents of the new transitional elite.51 According to Attila Agh these are: politicians of morals (those with roots in the former opposition), politicians of historical vision (who showed up on the political scene just before the transfer of power but who also, due to their grasp of the historical nature of that turning-point, served to link post-communism with the period preceding communist rule), politicians by chance (a relatively large group of individuals who became prominent mainly because of the inherent confusion of the situation), the old nomenklatura (active politicians of the communist period who moved into alternative political circles), and the beginnings of a new professional elite (some of these politicians might have emerged from positions held under the former regime). Romanian society is no exception to this, covering all these categories of politicians. In particular, 50

Ibid. Only 11 percent consider that they have a great deal of influence on the political decisions taken at national level. 51 See Attila Agh, “From nomenclatura to clientura: the emergence of new political elites in east-central Europe” in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis, op. cit., p. 48.

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the members of the old nomenklatura are present in high numbers and their beliefs and behaviour have influenced the transformations at all levels of society. When studying the new Romanian political elite, we have to take four distinct periods into account: the first from the Revolution in December 1989 to November 1996, the second from November 1996 to November 2000, the third from November 2000 to November 2004, and the fourth beginning in December 2004 and still underway at present. This classification is justified by the relevant changes that took place after the collapse of the communist regime and the general elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004, respectively. Not only the governing elite belonged to different parties, the presidents also had opposed political orientations. As until 1996 and from 2000 till 2004 the same person was elected president, that is, Ion Iliescu, it is interesting to investigate whether there have been any changes with regard to his beliefs and behaviour.52 For the sake of clarity, these periods are here called Iliescu 1, Constantinescu, Iliescu 2, and Basescu.53 A. 1990–1996 (Iliescu 1 period) The first free elections held in 1990 were won by Ion Iliescu, who was already well known to the wider public. He was a veteran communist who had been minister of youth and secretary of the party’s central committee in charge of ideological matters up to 1971 when Ceausescu replaced him. Although he disagreed with the increasingly doctrinaire policies, Iliescu never engaged in public criticism of the regime and, therefore, cannot be described as a dissident in the sense of a Havel or Walesa. Iliescu appealed mainly to the rural population who saw him as a reliable leader. He knew how to address the public in order to win its trust. He promised people that he would protect them against the severe effects of a painful transition period and this was precisely what the electorate wanted to hear. More than once, his speeches had nationalistic undertones. In 1992, he managed to be re-elected when running against a representative of the opposition, Emil Constantinescu,

52 Ion Iliescu was elected President in May 1990, September 1992, and November 2000. As there was no interruption in his presidency before the end of 1996, I refer to this period as a single one although general elections were held in 1992 too. 53 Emil Constantinescu won the presidential elections held in November 1996 and Traian Basescu won the presidential elections held in November 2004.

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who lacked the appropriate political training to fight Iliescu.54 Iliescu’s appetite for power was patent and he tried to use all the formal and less formal possibilities to keep the state institutions, including that of the prime minister, under control. His name is closely linked to one of the most negative phenomena in Romania’s post-communist history, that is, the miner riots. Some of these had dramatic consequences for the democratization process.55 Iliescu’s behaviour in the early 1990s is perfectly complemented by that of the political ruling elite. The main players on the political scene were parties of leftist orientation displaying little respect for democracy and democratic procedures. Although democratic institutions were set up, the separation of powers was non-effective if we take into account that the presidency had a lot of informal power, that the executive governed—in various periods—through ordinances for avoiding parliamentary control, and that the judiciary was politically influenced. Most of the people forming the ruling party before 1996 were former communist activists or politicians by chance which means that they had either communist orientations or they no firm political beliefs. Many were using the opportunity offered by their membership of a governing party in their own best interests. At the same time, the elite that formed the opposition was too divided and had too little access to the public television channels to be able to seriously question this orientation. A final point here is that building up a genuine co-operation with civil society structures and supporting the transparency of state institutions were never among the priorities of this governing elite. It is not surprising, then, that during the ‘Iliescu 1’ period, the main issues in the collective memory were not publicly discussed: the crimes of the communist regime, the Securitate archives, and the truth about the 1989 Revolution. Tismaneanu was calling the PSD “the party of national amnesia” for avoiding the organization of public debates on these major themes for Romanian society.56

54 At the elections held in September 1992, Ion Iliescu defeated Emil Constantinescu in the second round of the presidential elections by winning 61.4 percent of the votes cast. See www.election.ro. 55 There were five miner riots led by Miron Cozma and Iliescu was involved in some way or another in all of them: two took place in January 1990, one in June 1990, another in September 1991, and the last one, which is also discussed further on in this chapter, in January 1999. 56 Vladimir Tismaneanu—dialogue with Mircea Mihaies, Incet, spre Europa (Iasi: Polirom), 2000, p. 85.

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This period also experienced the formation of the first coalition. Iliescu’s party won the elections in 1992 but it did not manage to obtain an absolute majority and had to look for partners.57 Three small parliamentary parties were involved in the government: the Socialist Labour Party, the Greater Romania Party and the Party of Romanian National Unity.58 The first two were formed by former communist propagandists and retired Securitate officers while the last one included retired military personnel and promoted a nationalist and anti-Hungarian ideology. The coalition, called by the media the ‘Red Quadrilateral’, functioned well as its members shared the same beliefs: aversion to democratization and economic reform, attachment to the communist past, disregard for the political opposition. It broke up in early 1996 when the PSD realized that its close association with extreme nationalist parties that had also communist roots was affecting its image abroad. If the governing elite does not believe in democratic institutions then it does not encourage public participation and contestation and, consequently, has little or no respect for civil society institutions. This is precisely what happened in Romania in this period: the population was not encouraged in any way to associate and form civic society structures in order to exercise influence over the political class. The spontaneous public demonstrations of the early 1990s failed to produce new leaders or more than a few civically active groups and, because of the lack of positive reaction from the political elite, people lost their appetite for this type of demonstration.59 They did not have much opportunity to get a deep knowledge of democratic practices and, especially in the rural areas, this was quite superficial. The participant orientations developed slowly, although in the urban areas the process was faster than in the rural ones. Nevertheless, society was still predominantly formed by subject individuals. These facts lead to another set of beliefs regarding the expectations about the effectiveness of the regime when dealing with critical matters. The expectations related to democratization, economic reform and European integration were high at the beginning of the 1990s. Most of 57

PSD won 34.31 percent of the vote. See www.election.ro. These parties entered parliament for the first time in 1992. Their scores were: the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) 8.8 percent, the Greater Romania Party (PRM) 4.7 percent, and the Socialist Labour Party (PSM) 3.81 percent. See www .election.ro. 59 These aspects were discussed in the sections on The relationship between parties and society and Political participation. 58

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the people hoped for a good performance of the state institutions but almost seven years of immobility at the elite level only deepened the complex crises that society was trying to overcome and created a lot of disappointment. Some facts and figures will help to illustrate this: in March 1996, 52 percent of the population thought that things were going in the wrong direction as compared to 43 percent in December 1994; the dissatisfaction with government policy regarding living standards grew from 86 to 92 percent between 1994 and 1996; in the same period, the percentage of citizens thinking that they were worse off than a year before had grown from 41 to 46 percent.60 The new political elite did little to help the democratic institutions to perform their roles: legislation was ambiguous and difficult to enforce, many civil servants proved incompetent and/or corrupt, political debates seemed endless while none of the drastic changes required by reform were undertaken. The continuous erosion of their credibility was, under these circumstances, unavoidable.61 On the other hand, the citizens were also not able to exercise control over their representatives: they were used to being abused by state institutions, and even if they had wanted to react/complain, they had no idea where, to whom, or how to do it. The lack of civic competence displayed by the citizens allowed the new political elite to take decisions with very little public constraint.62 One last important belief is the trust that political actors have in their political colleagues, even if they are members of an opposing party. Romanians had lived for decades under a regime in which trust was scarce. The secret police were so efficient at creating and preserving an environment characterized by fear and distrust that many people lost the ability to trust others. This state of affairs led to dramatic situations at the elite level in the early post-communist years: lack of dialogue between the opposition and those in power, lack of tolerance for different opinions, suspicion regarding any action by the opposite party, continuous quarrels. At the non-elite level, people were facing the same feelings of distrust and this was another thing that prevented

60 More results can be found on the site of the Open Society Foundation (Fundatia pentru o Societate Deschisa), www.fsd.ro. The data are from polls taken between 1994 and 1996 by the Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Poll, Institute of Marketing and Polls, Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology. 61 Between December 1994 and March 1996, citizens’ negative opinions about the activities of the government, parliament and judiciary grew from 59, 66, and 52 percent to 64, 68, and 54 percent, respectively. Ibid. 62 See A. Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit., pp. 97–8.

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them from gathering and forming civic structures. Distrust is associated with high levels of frustration, social envy and scarcity of resources (not only material but also educational).63 In addition, the lack of trust was also one of the causes of the low credibility invested in the institutions run by the political class. B. 1996–2000 (Constantinescu period) The second period dealing with the new political elite covers Emil Constantinescu’s presidency. Constantinescu was a university professor and a representative of civil society.64 After he had lost to Iliescu in 1992, he ran again in 1996, this time recording an impressive success. Among the things that made this victory possible, the maturation of the electorate was one of the most relevant. Some of the PSD’s traditional supporters changed their political views as they were disappointed with its poor performance. They decided to give the opposition a chance. And, equally important, Constantinescu’s programme was revolutionary, aiming at faster and deeper reforms at all levels of society, to fight against corruption, and to fulfil the necessary conditions for achieving NATO and EU membership. He promised a real change and the people went for it. Nevertheless, he started to face serious problems from the very beginning of his mandate. Emil Constantinescu was a member of the Civic Alliance when he became the Democrat Convention’s candidate for president. He had control over none of the governing parties and therefore he could not rely on strong parliamentary support. He also lost control of the government when he attempted to replace party activists with technocrats.65 Constantinescu was not properly prepared to administrate the radical changes he had promised, nor was he successful in keeping any of his campaign promises. After the postponements and delays of the Iliescu 1 period, President Constantinescu should have formed a coalition

63 For a question related to trust requiring a multiple answer, 58.6 percent of the respondents indicated that “one can trust only those related to him/her”, 43.1 percent that they “have trust in the rest of the people”, and 66.9 percent that they do not trust the state. See A. Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit., p. 86. 64 He was one of the prominent members of the Civic Alliance. 65 In 1997, Constantinescu wanted some of the key positions in the government to be filed by technocrats who would remain outside political disputes and would undertake faster reforms. Valentin Ionescu at the Ministry of Finance and Ilie Serbanescu at the Ministry of Reform managed to stay in office for only two months before the governing parties forced their resignation.

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whose first task would have been to dismantle the surviving communist structures that were hampering reforms at all levels of society. With little support from the parties, he failed in this endeavour, too. Constantinescu recognised his failure to fulfil people’s expectations and, only few months before the November 2000 elections, he announced that he would not be a candidate for a new presidential mandate. His decision was rather unhelpful as it meant that the party that supported him at that time (Christian Democrats) had to look for another presidential candidate able to win the trust of a large part of the electorate in a unreasonably short time to have a chance. To the utter amazement of the population, the new ruling elite was as bad as the old one. The coalition had no coherent action programme and this led to numerous hesitations and postponements. Then, their behaviour proved that they were as concerned with primarily serving their own interests as the former governing elite. Political infighting within the coalition was taking up most of the energy and attention of its members at the expense of promoting effective policies and serving the public interest. President Constantinescu was inefficient in performing his role of moderator between the parties as he had little influence over any of them. In spite of all this, some things were achieved: two important generals were convicted for their involvement against the revolutionaries in the December 1989 events; a National Council for Studying the ‘Securitate’ Archives was set up and it started to function; some of the state institutions were partly ‘cleaned’ of former secret police agents. The problem was that everything was only half done and, after constant postponements, by the time some things had been accomplished, people were convinced that this governing elite was as inefficient and unwilling to pursue the reform path as the former one had been. Consequently, the population’s expectations regarding the government’s performance diminished drastically. Constantinescu’s presidency did little to increase to the trust in either elite or non-elite levels. His hesitant behaviour and weakness in dealing with the political parties cost him in terms of citizen trust. When he won the 1996 elections, he had 45 percent of the people’s trust, only to sink to 17 percent in 2000.66 His drama is better understood when compared to Iliescu’s share of people’s trust: in 1996, at the end of his

66 See the polls taken in November 2000 and October 1996 by the Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology, www.curs.ro.

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mandate, he had 45 percent, the same amount Constantinescu had at the beginning of his mandate (!!). As the period had been marked mainly by quarrels and disputes between the parties forming the coalition or between the government and the opposition, the relationships at this level continued to be marked by distrust. At the other extreme, there were signs that the state had become politically vulnerable and this could have been reflected by the attitude of the population. The high levels of distrust in the state institutions indicated that people did not perceive their activities as serving their needs. Distrust in the government rose to 85 percent, in parliament to 88 percent and in the judiciary to 75 percent, levels that had never been reached before.67 Only the church and the military continued to bask in high percentages of people’s trust.68 According to the polls, people thought that Romania was heading in the wrong direction, the privatization was affected by corruption and was being implemented too slowly.69 In contrast, the main threats they had to face were high prices, illness, an open conflict in the area, and possible social riots.70 The crisis in authority became deeper and deeper. Politicians again proved unable to offer solutions to this problem. The population’s expectations as regards the efficiency of state institutions dropped even further. In November 2000, only 4 percent were satisfied with the government’s measures against corruption, 10 percent with its activities in the health sector, and 6 percent with its actions to reduce unemployment.71 This acute authority crisis was such as to indicate that public orientations became either alienated or radical, as the results of the 2000 elections were to prove.

67 See the poll taken in November 2000 by the Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology, www.curs.ro. 68 Poll taken by INSOMAR, see Curentul, 17 March 2000. The people trust: the church 88 percent, the military 83 percent, mass media 71 percent, police forces 52 percent; under 40 percent are the president, the government, and the parliament and political parties, scoring respectively 14 percent and 13 percent. 69 See Curentul, 27 November 1998, a poll that indicates that Romanians think that their country is going in the wrong direction (63 percent) and that privatization is affected by corruption (68 percent). 70 See Azi, 26–27 June 1998, a poll that indicates that Romanians fear high prices (34 percent), illness (28 percent), an open conflict in the area (17 percent), and possible social riots (3 percent). 71 See the poll taken in November 2000 by the Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology. For comparison, in October 1996 at a poll taken by the same institution the results for the same issues were 8 percent, 27 percent and, respectively, 13 percent. See www.curs.ro.

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C. 2000–2004 (Iliescu 2 period) The result of four years of government by Christian Democrats was that an important part of the population felt betrayed and became radical: during the November 2000 presidential elections, 28 percent of the voters chose Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a notorious extremist who had never before gained more than 4 percent. Moreover, his party, the Greater Romania Party, gained 23 percent of the votes cast for parliament and constituted the main force in the opposition between 2000–04. In the second round, Vadim Tudor ran against Ion Iliescu and the bitter irony was that even the most unyielding political enemies of Iliescu made public appearances to plead his case against Tudor. Under these circumstances, Iliescu became the last defender of democracy against an extremist demagogue who wanted to install a dictatorship. Iliescu’s comeback marked the beginning of a new period in Romanian political life that, for one thing, enjoyed more stability. At the presidential level, it can be said that four years of opposition were a lesson from which Iliescu learned a few things. His speeches became more moderate, he avoided any association with former nationalist supporters, and he kept a lower profile than before 1996. He also seemed more relaxed in his interventions and more interested in assuming a mediating role, as running for another presidential mandate was no longer possible.72 Still, from time to time, Iliescu showed his real colours again by attacking the mass media for using communication to “create hysteria” and by accusing journalists of “using their pencils as bullets”, concluding that “these should be isolated”.73 He also denounced the mass media for not presenting ‘objectively’ the achievements of the government.74 Moreover, he again became involved in new conflicts over power and influence with the prime minister, Adrian Nastase, in the same spirit as during his former presidential mandates. When the prime minister placed some specialized offices and agencies under his direct control (e.g. the National Agency for Security), Iliescu commented that this act did not lead to “a concentration of the power in the prime minister’s hands” as it was only a “provisory solution” and 72 The Constitution (1991) stipulates that “no one may hold the office of President of Romania for more than two terms at the most”. See Article 81, paragraph 4. The article is unchanged in the new Constitution (2003), www.gov.ro. 73 Cristian Oprea, Catalin Dumiterescu, “Iliescu afirma ca unii ziaristi ar trebui izolati”, Evenimentul zilei, 25 January 2002, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 74 See “Tatukul Iliescu invata presa cum sa stea cu botul pe labe”, Ziua, 6 June 2002, www.ziua.ro.

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that “in fact, in Romania, the president has considerably more power” that in other post-communist states.75 Further disputes between the two personalities were rooted in their desire to maintain control over the PSD and Nastase’s idea to create the legal conditions that would allow Iliescu to again be a candidate for the presidency.76 There are other aspects indicating that, in fact, Iliescu had hardly changed his convictions and his temperate attitude might be seen as an attempt to create a democratic image for the history books. For instance, he intervened in Cozma’s favour, the miners’ leader who was sentenced in 1999 to eighteen years in prison for endangering the rule of law in 1991. As already mentioned, in one way or another, Iliescu was associated with all the miners’ riots and the fact that he publicly stated that Cozma’s punishment was exaggerated also raises questions regarding his possible interest in the matter.77 Iliescu motivated his position arguing that “Miron Cozma was not the only one responsible for the charges made against him, he was just one of the active factors”.78 It is interesting that the president had a different attitude in 2001, when Cozma asked him for a reprieve: at that time he rejected the request. In an interview for a Jewish newspaper, Iliescu minimised the significance of the Holocaust by underlining that it “was not only the Jewish people. Many others, including Poles, died in the same way”.79 He went even further arguing that “in Romania, during the Nazi regime, the Jews and communists were treated in the same manner” which is at the very least inexact.80 These declarations created diplomatic tension between

75 Ibid. For similar news, see Romania Libera for the same date, www.romania libera.ro. 76 At that time, the revision of the Constitution was in process and Adrian Nastase proposed that the president should be elected by the parliament instead of by the citizens. This would have transformed Romania in a parliamentary democracy and would have drastically limited the president’s power. If Iliescu accepted the candidature under those circumstances, Nastase would have got rid of his main competitor in the PSD and would have enjoyed considerable power as prime minister. See Ziua, “Dragoste si putere”; “Iliescu ar trebui sa mai aiba dreptul la un mandat”, 28 August 2002. The same ideas can be found in the news on Mediafax (23 to 28 August 2002). See www .ziua.ro, www.mediafax.ro. 77 See “Gratierea lui Cozma, de la declaratii la realitate”, Cotidianul, 23 July 2003, www.cotidianul.ro. 78 Ibid. 79 See “Iliescu irita Israelul”, Evenimentul zilei, 26 July 2003, and “Iliescu pune la incercare nervii comunitatii evreiesti”, Cotidianul, 26 July 2003, www.evenimentulzilei .ro, www.cotidianul.ro. 80 Ibid.

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Romania and Israel. Consequently, the Jewish Foreign Affairs Ministry asked the Romanian Ambassador in Tel Aviv to clarify whether they also represented the official position of the Romanian government. This type of intervention may be explained by “Iliescu’s attempt to regain the support of the extreme nationalists and anti-Semites in the intelligence services and some political parties”81 in his fight for power with the prime minister. In fact, Iliescu had not changed his convictions over the years, although he was putting more effort into creating a new image. For more than a decade his bad leadership has affected Romanian society’s decisive progress towards democracy. With regard to the new governing elite, the PSD came into power again but this time changes occurred especially in the attitude of its leaders and, most importantly, at the executive level. Many of the ministers were dynamic and professional, without a communist past and oriented towards the West. The government also enjoyed more political stability as it only included representatives of the PSD and political fights between the ministers were rare. Although the PSD did not win a majority of seats, it managed to gain enough support in parliament by forming a legislative coalition with the UDMR, the party of the Hungarian minority. Thus, parliament’s authority grew alongside the main events referring to the functioning of the coalition taking place there. This all was instrumental in raising the efficiency of the government, at least in what concerns the adoption of the legislation and its adaptation to EU standards. The activity of parliament also suffered modifications that aimed to speed up and simplify the adoption of legislation.82 A committee for the daily agenda was established to decide upon the issues/documents that would be discussed and parliamentary committees were also allowed to meet during the plenary sessions of the chambers. In addition, the amendments to a law could be sent directly to the appropriate committee instead of presenting them first in a plenary session. But, with these aspects, we have practically come to the end of the good points. The PSD was still very often accused of showing “little

81 Armand Gosu, historian, in “Iliescu irita Israelul”, Evenimentul zilei, 26 July 2003, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 82 See the Regulations regarding the organization and functioning of the Romanian Senate in Monitorul Oficial, part I, no. 58, 2 February 2001; Decision regarding the modification and completion of the regulations of the Chamber of Deputies, in Monitorul Oficial, part I, no. 21, 15 January 2001.

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respect for the rule of law”, involvement in the judicial power, and corruption.83 The executive powers tried to carry on their activities outside parliamentary control. The government emergency ordinances that did not need parliamentary approval became more abundant than ever after 2000. This fact was criticized not only by the opposition but also by international organizations in their annual country reports. The EU pointed out that: The Executive’s practice of legislating through emergency ordinances [. . .] has reduced the transparency of the legislative process, has limited the opportunity for adequate consultation on draft laws, and has contributed to a situation of legislative instability.84

Although in 2003 the government decided to limit their number, “ordinances are still used excessively by the Executive and often in cases where there are no obvious grounds for urgency”.85 Parliament’s activities did not improve noticeably despite the modifications regarding its functioning. These gave more power to the majority group to establish the daily agenda and the priority of the problems to be discussed. Also, the amendments of the opposition were ignored more than once. Too little was undertaken in order to diminish and eventually eliminate these shortcomings. D. 2004—beginning of 2008 (Basescu period) The presidential elections from November 2004 were won by Traian Basescu, a politician who had held few governmental offices and had been elected twice as mayor of Romania’s capital, Bucharest. He is no ceremonious and decorative figure, on the contrary, he is famous for being outspoken and down-to-earth. As a mayor of Bucharest, he embarked on a programme of rapid renovation and transformation of the city and the successful outcomes help him build up the image of a skilled ‘can-do’ person. Basescu became also famous for being one of the very few politicians who strived to keep up the promises they had made in the electoral campaign.86 With such a record and by using a

83 See Amnesty International Report 2002—Romania (covering the events in the period January–December 2001), www.amnesty.org. 84 2003 Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession issued by the EU, November 2003, p. 16, www.europa.eu. 85 Ibid. 86 In 2000, when running for the mayor office in Bucharest, he offered his electors a single page of urgent problems to be managed as top priorities: removal of the kiosks

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frankly speech as well as his sense of humour, Traian Basescu was able to defeat his opposing candidate, the prime minister Adrian Nastase, contrary to all the forecasts made by the opinion polls that had declared the latter’s victory. During his campaign, Basescu stated time and again that he wanted to be “an involved president”, actively taking part in the political life within the limits established by the Constitution.87 He also emphasised that Romania’s integration in the EU is “a major goal in terms of foreign policy” and, in order to achieve it, he would make every effort to “unite the Romanian nation, both Romanians here and abroad”.88 And not least important, Basescu set “the fight against corruption” as his first and foremost priority. “Corruption in the upper echelons will be considered a threat to national security”, maintained the Justice and Truth Alliance leader promising to end up with the system created by the Social Democrat Party.89 As it happened in 1996 when Constantinescu had been elected, this new president was invested with a large capital of trust. Constantinescu failed to build upon that trust and he had to leave declaring himself defeated by the system. Basescu had to prove that he is different and that he can take consistent action in his fight to eradicate corruption. In this context, his accomplishments are numerous and significant for the further transformation of the Romanian society and the country’s confirmation as a stability pole in the region. Traian Basescu managed to bring up on the domestic public agenda relevant topics such as the imperious necessity of judiciary reform, adoption of the uninominal vote in the legislative elections, condemnation of the communist regime, and organization of early elections to obtain a stronger parliamentary majority. In the foreign policy, he launched the idea of the internationalization of the Black Sea in order to increase the security of this region, strengthened the relations with the Republic of Moldova, established the Bucharest-London-Washington axis, stated the necessity for the

that sprung up all over the city, crackdown of illegal advertising billboards, renovation of schools, handling the problem of the stray dogs, rebuild Bucharest’s old town. 87 See President Basescu’s blog, www.basescu.org. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. The Justice and Truth Alliance (Alianta Dreptate si Adevar—ADA) is an electoral alliance formed by the liberals and democrats prior to the 2004 elections. It supported Traian Basescu in the presidential elections and although it scored less than PSD (31.5 percent), the new elected president designated as prime minister the other leader of ADA, the liberal Calin Popescu Tariceanu.

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EU members to adopt a common strategy in their negotiations with the Russian company Gazprom to diminish its increasing influence on the European energy market. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the new president enjoys confrontational situations. He scores high in the public opinion when he has to act in tensional circumstances and, very important for his popularity levels, he is very often the winner. Basescu’s most popular fight has been with the prime minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu, leader of the Liberal Party and former partner of electoral alliance. Soon after winning the 2004 elections, they placed themselves on divergent positions on almost any topic giving raise to conflicts that have been rather disruptive for the Romanian political life and society as a whole. For instance, organizing early elections in 2005 was one of President Basescu’s favourite themes with a view of forming a more solid parliamentary majority that would weaken the influence of the Social Democrat Party. The prime minister opposed this project as the liberals feared a strengthening of the Democrat Party, especially if supported by President Basescu in the 2009 elections, at their expenses.90 As for the measures to reform the political elite, the president has encouraged since 2005 the adoption of the uninominal vote (majoritarian parliamentary system) and replacement of the existing bicameral parliament with a unicameral one.91 Although the liberals had never declared themselves opposed to these projects, they had neither undertaken decisive steps in order to put them in practice. This fact was used repeatedly by Basescu to threaten with the organization of a referendum on these issues, which would have again increased his popularity as the civil society and population had been repeatedly asking for a drastic reform of the political class. The prime minister has adopted in most of the cases a defensive attitude in relation to the president, avoiding a direct confrontation and using other members of the Liberal Party to attack him or answer his attacks. One of the few direct strikes launched by the liberals against Traian Basescu happened in the summer of 2006 when PNL asked the withdrawal of the Romanian troops from Iraq knowing that this pro-

90 If early elections had taken place in 2005, than the next legislative ones would have had to be held in 2009, the year of the presidential elections. Consequently, the democrats would have benefited from Basescu’s popularity at the expenses of the liberals. 91 The uninominal vote was adopted at the beginning of 2008. See the subchapter on Formation of a multiparty system.

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posal was backed by a large part of the population.92 The liberals tried to affect the president’s image but the situation turned like a boomerang against them. The proposal was the result of a rather political and not institutional decision. Calin Popescu Tariceanu’s party was accused that had tried to subordinate state policy to its own interest and had used instruments such as national security and foreign policy to attack its political opponent. The prime minister used populist arguments to support the withdrawal of the troops emphasizing the high costs required by their maintenance and the rising human losses while the president invoked moral arguments such as complying with the existing commitments, showing seriousness and credibility. The proposal was not adopted by the governing institutions being eventually rejected by the SCND.93 The 2004 elections registered the coming in power of a coalition formed by PNL, PD, UDMR and PUR. The liberals and democrats had already been partners in the electoral Justice and Truth Alliance when they managed to secure the Hungarians’ party support and—more surprisingly—that of the Humanist Party to form the governing coalition.94 However, PNL and PD were neither natural ideological and programmatic allies nor had they a long record of peaceful cohabitation to build upon. Their alliance was purely circumstantial both being animated by a strong desire to put an end to PSD’s ruling. At the same time, the animosities between president Basescu—the democrats’ former leader—and prime minister Tariceanu—the liberals’ president—had strong echoes in the lower echelons of both parties generating further cleavages and endless disputes. Moreover, following growing internal tensions, PNL split in December 2006, when Teodor Stolojan announced the formation of the Liberal Democrat Party (PLD).95

92 “Relatia presedinte-premier in 2006”, Institutul PRO, 22 December 2006, www .institutulpro.ro. 93 SCND—Supreme Council of National Defence, see further in the text. 94 The Romanian Humanist Party (Partidul Umanist Roman) participated in the 2004 elections by forming an electoral coalition with the Social Democratic Party (PSD). They won 36.8 percent of the votes cast for the lower chamber and respectively 37.2 percent of those cast for the upper one. The new elected president—Traian Basescu—appointed the Justice and Truth Alliance to form the government and PUR decided to join it at the expenses of their electoral partner, PSD. 95 Teodor Stolojan is the former president of PNL and prime minister in 1991–92. He was excluded from PNL in October 2006 together with other liberal MPs. At that time, he was an economic adviser to president Basescu. The dissidents acknowledged their concerns about the pressure exerted on party and government policy by various

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The new party had attracted the support of 29 members of the parliament (MPs) and eight heads of county associations by January 2007 and its leaders indicated that it would cooperate at any time with PD, but not with PNL’s leadership. PLD went alone in the elections for the European Parliament—the first European elections after Romania obtained EU membership on 1 January 2007—and with 8 percent won after only few months of existence proved to be a potential serious competitor for both centre-right parties, PNL and PD. Nevertheless, PLD had lasted independently for less than one year: in December 2007, it merged with PD into the Democrat-Liberal Party (PDL), which took over PD’s ideology and became a committed supporter of president Basescu. UDMR’s presence in the government after the 2004 elections was no surprise as the Hungarians’ party has been a member of every ruling coalition since 1996. This party’s experience in government with PNL and PD, in both periods,96 has been by far not so positive and productive as its association with PSD when UDMR had obtained significant concessions.97 Cohabitation has been at any rate easier with the liberals than with the democrats that have been consistently obstructive about the draft law on minority status and over the appointment of county prefects. The last member of the new ruling coalition, PUR, represents an odd option for a partner in this situation as it had been a long-standing ally of the PSD joining it on the electoral lists in both the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections. President Basescu argued in 2005 that early elections were necessary to rid the government of the “immoral solution” of relying for a majority on PUR’s support.98 On increasingly bad terms with the PD, PUR announced in December 2006 that it was leaving the governing coalition and joining the opposition. Being forced for the second time to join the opposition ranks, the Social Democratic Party has started a period of internal reorganizainterests and business figures, including Dinu Patriciu, a very influent businessman and PNL member who is a close confidant of Mr Tariceanu. 96 This refers to the 1997–2000 coalition and, respectively, the coalition formed after 2004. 97 These are presented in Chapter 3: The Societal Sector. 98 “PUR—prezenta la guvernare”, Institutul PRO, 31 January 2005, www.institutulpro .ro. Traian Basescu considered inopportune a government including PUR/PC as this party had exaggerated demands in exchange for its participation in the ruling coalition. In addition, Basescu had militated against corrupted politicians and the controversial PC leader, Dan Voiculescu, was a bad choice at that time for a government meant to fight corruption with priority at the highest level.

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tion.99 A party congress held in 2005 registered the removal of the party’s founder, Ion Iliescu, from the leadership and the appointment of the former foreign minister, Mircea Geoana, as leader.100 This was a compromising solution among the various existing internal groupings in PSD. Once with the coming of a new leader, the party was expected to undertake a drastic reformation and get rid of the corrupted leaders and members that made it lose popular trust during the years. This was not the case as Geoana enjoyed only partial support within the party and had limited influence over its structures. Consequently, his actions provoked often fierce reactions on Iliescu’s side101—completely dissatisfied with his lost of power status within the party—and on Adrian Nastase’s side—eager to obtain the party’s nomination for the next presidential elections.102 After his appointment, Mircea Geoana chose to use some of the controversial influent party members in his fight against Nastase, as he knew that many of these had old personal disputes with the former prime minister.103 He also tried to contain Iliescu’s and Nastase’s influence within the party by promoting his own supporters as leaders of PSD’s local branches. As a consequence, the quarrels within PSD have started to be more present in the public area while the evident cleavages among different groupings announced a possible rupture in this party, too. An analysis of the Romanian political spectrum cannot ignore the nationalist element. We have seen how, in the 2000 election, the ultranationalist PRM won 20 percent of the popular vote and became the second-largest party in the parliament, benefiting from the electorate’s disillusionment with all the left and right actors on the political scene. With support for this party drastically falling, his leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, tried in 2004 to soften his extremist image. He apologised

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The first time was between 1997 and 2000. On April 21, 2005. 101 For instance, during one of the PSD’s National Executive Committee meetings, Ion Iliescu stated in his well-known communist style: “Those who find themselves only circumstantially at the party’s leadership should stop talking about reform, new people and renewal of the political class. Through such declarations we do nothing but offend our roots, we offend those who won the electoral wars in 1990, 1992 or 2000.” (See Florin Negrutiu, “Iliescu l-a certat pe Geoana ca ‘jigneste baza partidului’ ”, in Gandul, 15 May 2007, www.gandul.info. This was a direct attack on Mircea Geoana who had militated for the reform of the political class. 102 The next presidential elections are held in 2009. 103 Some of these are: Ion Iliescu, Marian Oprisan, Dan Ioan Popescu, Sorin Oprescu, Marian Vanghelie, Radu Mazare. 100

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for the ‘verbal excesses’ targeting different personalities and for pamphlets criticizing Jews. In his effort to show that “he has never been, he cannot be and will never be an anti-Semite”,104 Tudor even hired an Israeli firm to manage his electoral campaign.105 This strategy did not produce the desired effect and PRM shrunk to 13 percent being the main loser in the 2004 elections. As expected, once the elections were gone, Tudor revived his traditional ultra-nationalist speech looking for extra votes from those disillusioned with government policies and defectors from PSD. However, since 2006, PRM has had a serious competitor in the New Generation Party (PNG) founded by George Becali. PNG emerged on the political scene in January 2004 with an extreme nationalistic, xenophobic and homophobic agenda, being in fact—similar to PRM—a one man’s party, created to support and promote its unquestionable leader. Becali also declared himself a follower of the Romanian Legionnaire Movement which had been active before the World War II. The PNG polled around 9 percent in 2006, some of its new supporters choosing to switch sides from PRM that had become less appealing after more than fifteen years of nothing but revanchist speeches. Nevertheless, the final test for PNG and its leader would be to enter parliament in the 2008 elections. The end of 2004 marks the beginning of an even more disturbing and quarrelsome period than 1997–2000 was. This time there have been fierce disputes not only among the partners of the governing coalition, but also between the president and a part of the ruling elite, between the opposition and the president and/or his supporters, and even within the major opposition party, PSD. The presence of more antagonist characters active on the political scene than beforehand is a cause for this situation. At the same time, personal enmity has been often inflicting many conflicts especially between the president and his detractors. The fact that Traian Basescu’s main goal—declared over and over during the electoral campaign and after his election as a president—has been the fight against corruption cannot be ruled out as a weighty reason for a more restless political life than ever before. Many political influent figures felt threatened more than ever before

104 Corneliu Vadim Tudor interviewed by Paul Grigoriu, Romanian Broadcasting Corporation—Romania Actualitati Channel, 23 November 2003, reproduced in Romania Mare, no. 704, 9 January 2004, www.romare.ro. 105 C. V. Tudor hired Arad Communication led by Eyal Arad who had also worked for the right wing party Likud of the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.

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by Basescu’s determination to clean up the elite of corrupted personages. In terms of trust, confidence in the fellow political men is almost inexistent and the ad-hoc alliances have personal gains or revenge as final purpose. The most remarkable in this sense is the anti-presidential coalition reuniting parties with antagonist ideologies—liberals (PNL) versus social-democrats (PSD), Hungarian minority party (UDMR) versus ultra-nationalists (PRM)—all animated by a common objective: Traian Basescu’s demission.106 E. Some conclusions regarding the post-communist political elite The set of beliefs displayed by the political elite in Romania shaped a certain type of behaviour that was consistent with its lack of respect for democratic procedures. The ruling elite did nothing before 1996 to encourage public participation in the political life or the formation of associative interest groups. Although the new elite then tried to promote democratic values and encourage the development of civil society, its decisions lacked coherence and determination, especially in the fight against corruption, one of the priority issues of public opinion. This is why it is not surprising that the behaviour of the political elite, despite having no communist roots, led to the radicalization of more than a quarter of Romanian society. Although since 2000 the number of associative organizations has continued to increase, they were either ignored or countered by the political institutions and enjoyed few opportunities to actually influence the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the progress made in this field has had some encouraging consequences.107 From today’s perspective, we can conclude that Romanian politicians from whatever party prove to have little or no attachment to democratic procedures and public interest. In the first three periods under review here, those in power have acted arrogantly, placing themselves above the law. Their behaviour and the fact that they did not honour their promises indicate that they felt no responsibility towards those who had voted for them. The problem of accountability was more acute than ever. For over ten years, politicians had only been sanctioned for how

106 President Traian Basescu was suspended in April 2007 by the parliament. See for an analysis subchapter on Three cases of malfunctioning of important democratic institutions. 107 These are presented in the security part of this chapter and the Environmental Chapter.

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they fulfilled their tasks at the elections. Under these circumstances, political influence was hardly possible and this was reinforced by the fact that most of the people did not know their rights or how to take action against the ruling elite. Political culture was still dominated by subject orientations as citizens could not exercise control over the input part of the process of policy formulation. The only type of control over the elite was the elections, but as the way in which a member of parliament voted was secret, people had no way of finding out how their representatives defended their interests. The lack of transparency regarding MPs’ work relegated this democratic institution to a decorative role and impeded it from assuming the core role that it normally has in a consolidated democracy. After 2004, more young politicians have been present in the political life proving to be dynamic and professional. Although the irritating continuous quarrels held the first pages of the tabloids and TV news, the executive and legislative processes were not hampered by these as it had happened in the past. In addition, the political life has known the activity of several strong non-governmental organizations that have managed to keep the public opinion thoroughly informed on all the politicians’ initiatives and their possible consequences. They also assumed the watch dog role in what regards the integrity of the members of the political elite signalling any corruption act or attempts to block/influence the judicial activity. As we are going to see further, these organizations have had this time some strong allies—the president, judicial bodies, ministers—who managed to induce modifications of the accountability aspect too. A necessary one was the adoption of a new electoral system—the uninominal vote for the members of both chambers of the parliament—which will bring more transparency in the MP’s activity and builds closer ties with his/her electors. Nevertheless, although the situation has started to change in the last few years, progress is slow. Thus, accountability is an important issue that has to be carefully looked into. The accountability aspect The way in which elites understand their responsibility to society has an indisputable role in shaping their actions. In post-communist societies, this aspect of a democratic system has been ignored or barely acknowledged. At both elite and non-elite levels there is noticeable inertia towards accepting this principle, and the tougher the communist regime, the greater the inertia. In Romania, for instance, the only times

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that this issue was publicly mentioned were marked by the installation of a new governing coalition which immediately started to investigate the activities of the former one. Nevertheless, even these actions had little result and they only succeeded in increasing public discontent with the performance of the political class. Romania is an illustrative case study in the sense that when building a democratic system, the responsibilities of political representatives and institutions tend to be diverse. At least till 2004 it was far from clear who was responsible for certain decisions, or who was accountable to whom. Although the law might be specific in this respect, practice often demonstrated otherwise. The Romanian Constitution, for instance, stipulates that: The Government is politically responsible for all of its activities only to Parliament. Every member of the Government is politically and jointly answerable with the others for the activities and acts of the Government.108 It is only the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the President of Romania that shall have the right to demand that criminal prosecutions be brought against members of the Government for acts committed in the exercise of their office.109

But “the cases of liability, and penalties applicable to members of the government shall be regulated by a law on ministerial responsibility”.110 The Constitution was adopted through referendum in December 1991, but a law on ministerial responsibility was not passed before June 1999, though each new party/coalition in power had enumerated it among its priorities. Nevertheless, the law has evident limitations stipulating that “only the Chamber of Deputies, Senate and President have the right to ask for the criminal prosecution of members of the Government”.111 Although this was certainly a repetition of the provisions in the Constitution, it was equally unconvincing. It is still impossible to imagine, at least for the time being, that the governing elite would incriminate one of its own members. As a matter of fact, none of the ministers in office since 1989 has ever faced the judiciary, in spite of accusations and sometimes even proof offered by the media and the opposition

108 Constitution of Romania, Article 108, paragraph 1. It is the same in the new Constitution (2003), www.gov.ro. 109 Ibid., paragraph 2. 110 Ibid., paragraph 3. 111 Law 115 on Ministerial Responsibility in Monitorul Oficial no. 300, 28 June 1999.

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of the time regarding the various illegal actions of some ministers.112 As we are going to see further, after 2004 there have been important changes in this sector too. The matter of responsibility is also related to the failure to establish a clear separation of powers in practice. Some of the problems start at the top—the presidency. Romania has a semi-presidential system (it could also be called ‘semi-parliamentarian’) in which the president is directly elected by the voters and enjoys certain powers, such as the designation of a prime minister and the appointment of a government (on the basis of a vote of confidence by parliament), participation in certain meetings of the government (those debating matters of national interest), specific and relatively limited powers in matters of foreign policy and defence. However, the first two presidents who had led Romania since the fall of the communist regime were engaged into actions that exceeded their formally established powers. This has resulted in troubled relationships with the prime minister. For example, Iliescu got rid of the independent and increasingly disturbing Petre Roman, who favoured faster economic reforms, by pretending that Roman had resigned his position. This the latter has always denied.113 In his turn, Emil Constantinescu ‘persuaded’ two prime ministers to resign: Victor Ciorbea, who failed to keep the governing coalition under control, and Radu Vasile, against whom no clear accusation was formulated. In none of these cases was parliament asked for a vote of confidence: the president used his informal powers to determine a change of prime minister. What is worrying is that both the former high-ranked communist, Iliescu, and the representative of the anti-communist opposition who fought against all the undemocratic actions of Iliescu’s rule, Constantinescu, behaved in the same manner. In fact, the presidential institution is constructed in such a way that it bears a striking resemblance to the executive power: the president has his own army of counsellors for every matter who keep in close touch with the other branches of power. More than once in the post-communist period, the presidency has acted in a manner that polarized the parties involved in a crisis 112 There is a single exception to this situation: Traian Basescu, now president of Romania, surrendered his parliamentary immunity while he was minister of transport, in 1995, in order to be able to face charges of corruption and defend himself. The accusations were proved false. 113 The controversial act took place in September 1991, during powerful miner riots. The leader of the miners, Miron Cozma, informed President Iliescu that the miners demanded Roman’s resignation.

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and failed to perform its constitutionally established function, that is, to mediate between the powers of the state as well as between the state and society. The continuous interference of the presidency in executive matters and its influence over the appointment of the ministers, with the designated prime-minister often having little or nothing to do with the selection of the ministerial team, placed the government de facto in a subordinate position to the president. Some analysts speak of a “two executives” structure that has been functioning since 1989 and, due to its advantages, may continue.114 One of the institutions that has been used to increase the presidential powers is the Supreme Council of National Defence (SCND) which was set up in 1990 with the purpose of co-ordinating security policy.115 The president is the head of the SCND and thus he has managed to extend his powers behind their constitutional limits due to the opportunity to control the agencies subordinate to the SCND. It should be noted that the Romanian Constitution gives parliament the power of control over fundamental foreign policy decisions and that the way in which the SCND was established has strengthened the presidential institution to the prejudice of parliament. In fact, the Constitution adopted in 1991 has a very concise reference to this institution which sets the limits of its attributions: The Supreme Council of National Defence shall unitarily organize and co-ordinate in a unitary manner the activities concerning the country’s defence and national security.116

114 See See Margriet Drent, David Greenwood, Sander Huisman and Peter Volten, Organizing National Defences for NATO Membership: The Unexamined Dimension of Aspirants’ Readiness for Entry, (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies), 2001, pp. 108–10. On the same topic, see Peter Volten, “Romanian Security and Defence Policy Reform from Western Perspective”, in The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics (Bucharest), October 2002, vol. 2, no. 4. 115 See Law no. 39 on the set up, organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defence in Monitorul Oficial no. 142, 13 December 1990. This means that the SCND was set up before the Constitution was adopted in 1991. 116 The Romanian Constitution, Chapter V, Article 118 (1991). Art. 72 (e) mentions that “an organic law shall regulate the organization of the Supreme Council of National Defence” (organic laws are passed with a two-thirds majority). The new Constitution (2003) reformulates Article 118: “The Supreme Council of National Defence organizes and co-ordinates unitarily the activities concerning the country’s defence and national security, participation in preserving the international security and collective defence in systems of military alliances, as well as in peace-keeping or peace-enforcing actions”. See www.gov.ro.

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Before 1996 there was no attempt to modify the law on the functioning of the SCND in the light of the constitutional provisions, and although the coalition that came to power at the end of 1996 included such an objective in its programme, it has never been achieved.117 The Romanian Constitution sets clear limits on the presidential powers that, in fact, bring the Romanian constitutional system closer to a parliamentary system than to a semi-presidential one. With regard to their extra powers, both President Iliescu and President Constantinescu found it necessary to maintain the functioning of the SCND within the original legal framework. After 2000, more projects were drawn up regarding a new law governing the functioning of the SCND. The one adopted in June 2002 emphasizes the SCND’s role as an “autonomous administrative institution” concerned with national defence and security matters and its ability to issue decisions “which are binding for all the public administrative authorities and institutions to which they are addressed”.118 Its activities are verified by parliament through only one report a year and the president of the country is also the head of the SCND.119 Thus, the president’s powers are not reduced to their constitutional limitations at all. Actually, with the election of Traian Basescu as president, the things have changed in one aspect: all the actions he has undertaken were transparent. President Basescu has done exactly what he promised, he has been “an involved president” making maximal use of all his constitutional prerogatives. He launched critical attacks towards the prime minister, members of the government, parliamentarians, magistrates etc. on key issues such as independence of the judiciary, reform of the political class and constitutional system, early elections. He used SCND to increase his power and as support in his fight against corruption in the highest political echelon. Hence, at his first participation in a SCND meeting, Basescu announced the main threats to national security: terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, the frozen conflicts in Romania’s neighbourhood, bad governing and corruption at the highest level.120 Moreover, he suspended several ministers under

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See Ciorbea Government’s Programme on Foreign Affairs, Bucharest (1996). Law no. 415 on the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defence in Monitorul Oficial no. 494, 10 July 2002, Chapter 1, Articles 1 and 3. 119 Ibid., Chapter 1, Article 2 and Chapter 3, Article 1, paragraph 1. 120 Liliana Nicolae, “Coruptia ameninta securitatea nationala”, BBCRomanian.com, 25 February 2005, www.bbc.co.uk. 118

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investigation for corruption acts and, equally relevant, he established the free access of the public to the files of Ceausescu’s secret police, the Securitate. With such a record, little wonder that President Basescu and Prime Minister Tariceanu have not been able to co-operate: the “two executives” structure has been more evident than ever though, this time, with remarkable positive results.121 There are other signs that clearly indicate that the separation of powers in Romania is still a desideratum. All post-communist governments have had to rely on wafer-thin parliamentary majorities that, particularly in the case of a coalition, easily malfunctioned because of endless struggles between the constituent parties. This means that executive initiatives have failed because they could not gather the necessary parliamentary support. The solution to this situation was simple, though: avoid the parliamentary debate and approval by promoting executive orders that are official acts that do not need the involvement of the legislative power. The opposition criticized Iliescu’s use of this type of behaviour but, once in power, did exactly the same thing, especially during Radu Vasile’s mandate as prime minister (1999). These practices also continued after 2000. Such a definition of the act of governing opens the door to abusive decisions and diminishes the role of the parliament by cutting off its control powers over the legal character of this type of measure. To further complicate matters, the judiciary has been politically influenced. The appointments of judges and general attorneys in different positions have been based on political criteria in all the periods. The immovability which was supposed to protect the judges from political pressures lost its original sense and many judges were violating the law under the protection of this provision. Some examples could indicate the extent of this phenomenon. For instance, prime minister Adrian Nastase has said that a law approved by parliament in the former legislature should not be applied anymore because it was going to be modified. Equally, the decisions through which generals Chitac and Stanculescu were sent to prison for crimes against the revolutionaries in December 1989 were suspended.122 These events ensured that the political influence over the judiciary was common knowledge in Romania. 121

The Appendices include Table A.2 with an overview of the presidents, parliamentary majority and prime ministers between 1990 and the beginning of 2008. 122 See “Opozitia ataca puterea la baioneta”, Cotidianul, 9 May 2001, www.cotidianul.ro.

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In a popular poll by the newspaper Ziua on whether the judiciary was politically influenced in Romania, more than 98 percent of the readers answered affirmatively.123 After 2004, there is at least in what concerns the judiciary a remarkable improvement. In April 2005, Romania signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Union and the Commission’s yearly report acknowledged the country’s progress in the field of justice reform. Minister of Justice Monica Macovei managed to induce several radical changes that were in line with the EU requirements for membership. In June 2005, a law-package meant to improve the performance of the judiciary was adopted after a vote of confidence in the Parliament (Law on the Superior Council of the Magistracy, Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, and Law on the Statute of Magistrates). The package included many positive elements and together with the existing legislation offered sufficient guarantees for the magistrates’ personal and institutional independence. Moreover, in 2005 the Romanian authorities focused more on the law implementation process than on simply passing new legislation. In 2006 the positive trend continued and Minister Macovei’s fight for reform was highly praised by EU authorities.124 Nevertheless, this development ended once that Macovei was dismissed at the beginning of 2007.125 Her successor, the liberal Tudor Chiuariu, had been the adviser of the liberal businessman Relu Fenechiu and, afterwards, the head of the prime minister’s Antifraud Fight Department. Already since his appointment as minister of justice the

123 The situation became so severe that international organizations and institutions mentioned it in their country reports as one of Romania’s main shortcomings. Thus, the USA State Department Report pointed out that the judicial system is “weak, inefficient, and attacked by an endemic corruption” (USA State Department Report on the respect for human rights in Romania, 2001—www.state.gov) while the European Parliament noted that “the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary continues to be worrying” (The European Parliament Report on Romania, 2001—www .europarl.europa.eu.). 124 The “Report on Romania’s preparedness for EU accession” of September 2006 recommended that Romania should join EU on 1 January 2007 based on the “significant progress” made “in the fight against high-level corruption” and “reform of the justice system”. Nevertheless, in order to make certain that “sustainability and irreversibility of the recent progress” is ensured, safeguard measures were included in the Accession Treaty, “which can be taken up to three years after accession”. See for both documents EU’s website, www.ec.europa.eu. 125 She lost her position when prime minister Tariceanu decided to cease the cooperation with the democrats and form a cabinet only with the liberals and UDMR.

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media had expressed its doubts126 that Chiuariu would have the capacity and skills to follow in the steps of Monica Macovei who “was the architect of judicial reforms that earned Romania entry to the European Union on 1 January 2007”.127 Indeed, 2007 marked a step back in the reform of this sector as the independence of the judiciary was constantly under threat. The government and some parliamentarians repeatedly tried to gain control over the judiciary and terminate anticorruption investigations against politicians. For instance, in May 2007, Minister Chiuariu attempted to dismiss the chief prosecutor of Criminal Section II of the National Anticorruption Department (DNA), prosecutor Doru Tulus, who was in charge of several sensitive political files. Mr. Tulus had already indicted eight members of the parliament and was working on other cases involving top governmental or opposition politicians. Senator Verestoy Attila and deputy prime minister and UDMR leader, Marko Bela, themselves under investigation, were among those who asked for measures to be taken against DNA.128 Pressures came also from the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies, Bogdan Olteanu (PNL), and respectively, the Senate, Nicolae Vacaroiu (PSD), who tried to interfere with or stop several DNA inquiries.129 And, finally, prime minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu stated that especially the liberal leaders were “hunted” by DNA, warning of those who “use their public offices to act as a political police”.130 He gave the example of four liberal ministers who had to be dismissed in order to be investigated for various charges, all of them being “wrongly indicted” according to Tariceanu.131 The media and civil society organizations launched numerous signals that the political elite attempted again to restrict the independence of the judiciary. The Initiative for a Clean Justice, an alliance of various Romanian NGOs, warned that DNA faced serious threats being on

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See Cristian Patrasconiu, “Justitia merge mai departe?”, Cotidianul, 3 April 2007, www.cotidianul.ro. 127 See “Romania gets a new government”, International Herald Tribune, 2 April 2007, www.iht.com. 128 See “Fronda ministrilor contra DNA” in Ziua, 24 May 2007, www.ziua.net. 129 See Dorin Petrisor, “Vacaroiu il reclama pe Tulus la CSM”, Cotidianul, 29 May 2007, and Liliana Nastase and Ionel Stoica, “CSM respinge cererea lui Olteanu de a fi audiati procurori in parlament”, Adevarul, 25 May 2007; www.cotidianul.ro, www .adevarul.ro. 130 See “Tariceanu acuza vanatoarea DNA”, in Jurnaul National, 26 September 2007, www.jurnalul.ro. 131 Ibid.

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the verge of dismantling.132 But, even more important, public reactions in favour of DNA came from prosecutors and criminal investigation officers working for DNA, and from several other associations of the legal branch.133 Another key comment here is that, if EU conditionality worked remarkably prior to Romania’s accession, boosting efforts to meet all the requirements, once that the country obtained membership, the judiciary reform and fight against corruption have been slowed down, the politicians showing no fear that the EU could activate the safeguard clauses. Obviously, EU officials have to launch very firm messages and undertake determined actions when dealing with Romanian politicians. Socio-political cohesion and civil society In the complex process of dismantling communist structures and building new democratic ones, conflicts between different social groupings are unavoidable. These conflicts are supposed to be mediated by special structures that together form what is known as ‘civil society’. One of the major challenges Romania had to face at the beginning of the 1990s was precisely the formation of a civil society. This process inevitably developed slowly due to the innumerable and sometimes insurmountable obstacles. The continuous quarrels between the power represented by the FSN/Iliescu’s party and the opposition led to even more adversity and inflexibility, even more when some civil society groups joined the latter. Leading members of the Civil Alliance had considerable influence in the Democratic Convention of Romania and were responsible for Emil Constantinescu’s appointment as candidate for the presidency in 1992 as well as in 1996. The inflexibility of the opposition parties supported by civic associations ruled out any compromise with Iliescu’s governing elite. This was a good thing in forming their anticommunist image, but nothing but obstruction garnered them little support from the population whose perception was that they were nothing but troublemakers. Their inability to communicate their goals, intentions and policies to the public and the biased attitude of some civil structures seriously hampered the efforts to build bridges between the opposition and society. In the early 1990s, civil society organizations acted as agents 132

See “Anticorruption under threat”, Report made by the Initiative for a Clean Justice, published in October 2007 on the website of Freedom House Romania, www .fh.eurolobby.ro 133 Ibid.

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of polarization instead of performing a mediating role between the political class and the rest of society. Under these circumstances, many people in Romania were under the impression that the opposition as well as the civic structures were something undesirable. The parties in power until 1996 did nothing to change this perception because it suited them very well. In addition, the emergence and development of civil society institutions has taken place in paradoxical circumstances: according to the Romanian legislation, the activity of any non-governmental organization is under the control of a ministry, that is, the government.134 Two things are made clear: (1) in Romania we are dealing with a state eager and determined to exercise its control over civil society; (2) society still has little knowledge about the role of civic structures and their characteristics. It makes no difference how many civil society institutions Romania has as long as their activities have no impact. As for the NGO partnerships with the government, an Office for Relations between Government and NGOs was established in order to set up consultative groups at local and central levels and to consult NGOs on issues of specific and general interest. At least till 2004, NGOs were not given much power for decision-making in their partnership with the government. Granting NGOs a greater role in the decision-making process would result in improvements to societal services that are so badly needed. Sometimes the dubious nature of organizations leads to strange situations, as in the case of the former Euro-Atlantic Centre in Bucharest. This Centre was set up in 1991 by governmental decision and subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.135 Its purpose was to facilitate the establishment of communication channels between Romania and the Euro-Atlantic community. Later, the Centre was registered as an associate member of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), an organization formed by non-governmental structures in the NATO member countries and NATO partners.136 However, the Centre’s status remained

134 According to the Draft Law on Associations and Foundations from January 1997. The main law that regulates the emergence of NGOs in Romania is Governmental Ordinance no. 26 on associations and foundations. See Monitorul Oficial no. 39, 31 January 2000. 135 Governmental Decision no. 555 on the establishment and functioning of the Euro-Atlantic Centre, in Monitorul Oficial no. 176, 29 August 1991. 136 Few clarifications are necessary. The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) brings together voluntary organizations in the NATO member states and its partners, which support the activities of NATO and of the individual governments of member and

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the same—a governmental organization—which represents quite an exceptional position in ATA. Its dependence on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes it seem more like a private club than a centre open to society. Of course, budgetary controls affect its activities. Between 1997 and 2000 there were attempts to clarify its status and transform it into a civic structure, but it was difficult to identify the appropriate legal form and, as there were always other priorities to attend to, the settlement of this matter has been postponed. This ambiguity was ‘solved’ in 2001 when the Euro-Atlantic Centre simply ceased to exist. Its place was taken by the Euro-Atlantic Council-Romania, which is an informal association consisting of four non-governmental organizations: NATO House, the ‘Manfred Wörner’ Association, the Eurisc Foundation, and the ‘George C. Marshall’ Association.137 Everything would have been in order if only the status of NATO House had not been (again!) ambiguous. NATO House was set up in March 2002 with governmental funds in order to publish promotional material on Romania—NATO 2002, and to organize joint activities with prestigious think-tanks from abroad and representatives of civil society on topics related to Euro-Atlantic integration.138

It is declared to be a non-governmental and non-profit organization and its “founding members comprise a wide and diverse group of individuals from public life, NGOs, mass media, law, public administration, as well as business leaders”.139 Yet it is sponsored “through funds from the 2002 budget of the General Secretariat of the Government”.140 The question is thus how independent this organization can be if it has been

partner countries in promoting the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO Handbook, 1998, chapter 15). When referring to a NATO partner country, we refer to a country that is enrolled in the Partnership for Peace Programme which was launched by NATO in 1994. According to ATA’s constitution, the partner countries are associate members of ATA and they may become full members when their countries become NATO members. 137 The Euro-Atlantic Council-Romania was restructured on 24 May 2002 signing in new members. It is recognized as an associate member representing Romania in ATA. 138 Governmental Decision no. 275 on the financing of some projects to support Romania’s candidature to NATO and of some projects approved by the Interministerial Council for external image, in Monitorul Official no. 213, 28 March 2002, Article 1, paragraph (1). 139 See the official website of NATO House, www.casanato.org. 140 See Governmental Decision no. 275, op. cit., Article 1, paragraph 2.

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established and is financed by the government. In fact, this time it is hard for the establishment representatives to pretend that they were not aware of the differences between governmental and non-governmental organizations.141 The act seems to be another attempt made by those in power to keep the civil society structures under control. The political class has also become extremely polarized. Although the results of the 1992, 1996 and 2004 elections forced parties to seek the formation of a workable coalition government, their divergent interests and priorities made cohabitation barely possible. With the coming to power of the PSD at the end of 2000, there was only a slight improvement in the situation. Although the government was formed only by one party, the PSD structure covered four different interest groups with conflicting interests, all of which were powerful.142 President Ion Iliescu had influence over one of them with representatives in the intelligence services, the parliament and the government. The Prime Minister Adrian Nastase controlled two, but with divergent goals (one dominated the party organization and the other had members in the government and administration). The fourth one was more independent and formed by businessmen who had benefited from the privatization process.143 The fact that the PSD lacked a clear ideology and it had mainly recruited people concerned with their personal interests transformed it into an unmanageable structure. With a very low margin of parliamentary support and with ministers who represented various interests groups, the governing actions suffered from a lack of coherence and dynamism. The new governing coalition—PD, PNL, UDMR and PC—had shown its weak foundations almost since its formation at the end of 2004. The democrats and the liberals had never experienced a peaceful cohabitation and the growing personal animosities between the leaderships of the two parties made cooperation impossible. The necessary incorporation of PC in the government invoked by President Basescu as an “immoral solution” further sharpened the disputes within the coalition, but also between PC and the president. The coalition members had different views as well on the imperative reforms that had to be undertaken. 141 By 2002, the establishment had employed highly educated civil servants who did not lack the knowledge and expertise on democratic principles and societal actors, including non-governmental organizations. 142 See the analyses by Dan Pavel in Ziua: “PSD si debandada grupurilor de interese”, 27 May 2002, and “Revirimentul presei si retractarile puterii”, 3 June 2002, www .ziua.ro. 143 Ibid.

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In this sense, a reform package including measures like the confiscation of unlawfully acquired assets by the state and their transfer to the pension system did not meet PC’s approval. Consequently, in December 2006, PC left the government and joined the opposition. His leader, the media mogul Dan Voiculescu, had been blamed for having accumulated his wealth illegally, which he has always denied. The remaining members of the governing alliance managed to promote an impressive programme comprising a drastic judicial reform and anti-corruption measures, which became a requirement for EU membership. The programme gave rise to the possibility of taking action against former ministers. The independent Minister of Justice Monica Macovei took a tough stand and brought charges against former leading politicians.144 Her anti-corruption policy measures and the perseverant attempts to depoliticise de judicial power generated commotion in the parliament as several of its members and some influent businessmen became targets of the investigations. Subsequently, she had to face attacks from both the opposition as well as members of the ruling party PNL. Monica Macovei pointed out that “many politicians care about their personal situation and assets, and those of their friends, and not what Brussels says.”145 Since the country joined the European Union on 1 January 2007, she added, “we are in, and they know Romania cannot be expelled.”146 Once that the democrats left the government in April 2007, minister Macovei was dismissed too. Actually, PD leaving the government marked the official ending of the PD-PNL electoral Justice and Truth Alliance. Following this, the minority government formed by PNL and UDMR had to rely on support from the opposition social democrats. PSD party leader Mircea Geoana said that the party would support the coalition so that “the national institutions can function at least minimally.”147 In fact, for all the further reforms that Tariceanu government would strive to adopt,

144 Monica Macovei—a former barrister and human rights activist—is one of the most popular representatives of the Romanian civil society. Strongly backed by President Traian Basescu, she was appointed Minister of Justice at the end of 2004 and is responsible for Romania’s radical reforms of the judicial power and anti-corruption measures. She earned firm support in the European Commission being recognized as one of the artisans of Romania’s successful accession in the EU. 145 See Matthew Brunwasser, “Crusading justice minister is excluded from Romania cabinet” in International Herald Tribune, 3 April 2007, www.iht.com. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid.

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PSD’s support would have to be negotiated. The first act of good cooperation between the two was the suspension of president Basescu by the parliament amid allegations he abused his authority. The suspension, carried by 322 votes to 108, took place about three weeks after the expelling of Basescu’s supporters from the government and was initiated by PSD. This development is an escalation of the long-running feuding between the president and the prime minister and its immediate effect was a further polarization of the Romanian society. As many polls indicated, populist and extremist parties were the winners of the long-lasting turbulent political disputes in Romania. And, even more disturbing, this situation threatened to jeopardize the continuation of EU integration. If little had to be expected from the political parties in terms of boosting socio-cohesion, one crucial initiative for the whole society came from the presidency. Since the fall of the communist totalitarian regime in Romania, civil society has urged the governing elite to publicly condemn communism and its criminal regime. Such an act was an unreachable goal under Iliescu’s ruling, he himself a former important ideologue of the Communist Party.148 When Emil Constantinescu came in power in 1996, he was expected to regard the condemnation of communism as one of his priorities as he was a representative of the anti-communist layers of the society. He failed to do so and the process had been left to the care of a future administration. Traian Basescu came in power after Iliescu’s last presidential mandate when he had to face increasing internal as well external pressures: from the civil society and respectively—from the Council of Europe whose parliamentary assembly had adopted at the beginning of 2006 a resolution condemning the region’s former communist governments.149 The act called on all of the former communist states “to reassess the history of communism and their own past” and condemn their former governments “without any ambiguity.”150 In March 2006, President Basescu decided to form the Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship with historians, sociologists, former dissidents and eminent intellectuals to provide him

148 He served as the head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee. 149 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1481 (2006): “Need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes”. 150 Ibid.

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with an authoritative report on the communist regime in Romania.151 He appointed Vladimir Tismaneanu as its president, a political science professor at the University of Maryland (USA), specialized in the theory of political systems, analysis of the ideologies and revolutionary movements of the 20th century. Traian Basescu appeared before the parliament in December 2006 to present the 660 pages report which framed communism as an “illegitimate and criminal regime” that deeply affected the interests, rights and security of its people.152 He accompanied the presentation with a statement that said “as head of the Romanian state, I explicitly and categorically condemn the communist system of Romania”.153 According to this report, several of the former communist officials responsible for inflicting and preserving this criminal system are also to be found among today’s politicians, including ex-President Ion Iliescu and extreme nationalist leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor. These were, unsurprisingly, the most vocal opponents to the findings of this commission. Vadim Tudor and his party colleagues booed President Basescu throughout his speech while representatives of PSD, though not as violent in their behaviour as the PRM parliamentarians, dismissed the report as futile and lacking credibility.154 PSD president Mircea Geoana stated that the document was presented at a time when Romania did not need such fuss as the country was about to join the European Union.155 His statement was rather astonishing since the presentation of this report gave the younger PSD members (represented actually by Geoana) the opportunity to cut links with the old communist guard still present in their party. PSD’s honorific president, Ion Iliescu, refused to participate when the results of the report were officially announced and declared that its contents suffered of “neo-Stalinism” and “McCarthyism”.156

151

See the presidential Press Communiqué on 5 April 2006, www.presidency.ro. The 18 members of the Commission were: Sorin Alexandrescu, Mihnea Berindei, Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, Radu Filipescu, Virgil Ierunca, Sorin Ilieşiu, Gail Kligman, Monica Lovinescu, Nicolae Manolescu, Marius Gheorghe Oprea, Horia-Roman Patapievici, Dragos Petrescu, Andrei-Nicolae Pippidi, Romulus Rusan, Levente Salat, Stelian Tanase, Cristian Vasile, Alexandru Zub. 152 See Mediafax, 18 December 2006. 153 Ibid. 154 See Mediafax, 19 December 2006, www.mediafax.ro. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. “Basescu e obsedat de dosare, la fel ca Elena Ceausescu”, 20 December 2006.

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The importance of the condemnation of communism in Romania is relevant not only historically—to break up completely and irreversibly with the past, but also for the progress of the society towards a sound democratic system. The crimes of one of the most atrocious totalitarian systems have never been officially investigated and blamed and those who acted as real pillars of the system have never been formally incriminated. Therefore, it is not amazing that the Romanian political elite still includes so many former communist activists. To a greater extent, many of these can be found in PSD but no party is totally clean of such activists and none has genuinely attempted to free its ranks from them. The presidential report opened the way to further investigation and gives the political elite the opportunity to get rid of the communist remains by adopting for instance a lustration law. At the same time, the report’s findings can be used in schools to educate young generations in such a way that they would understand the democratic values by comparison. The numerous conflicts on the one hand, and confusing legislation on the other, have important consequences for democratization. First, political fights over power and influence among and within the parties led time and again to political instability or, at least, to postponements and delays in the decision-making process. Second, the new institutions have not grown into strong democratic ones and they lack authority. Moreover, the civil society structures have also been weak and failed to perform their mediating role in society or presenting a counterweight to the political structures. A changing trend has been registered since 2004, several NGOs and civic personalities being actively involved in fighting corruption and militating for an independent judiciary power. Finally, society is still polarized at all levels. This casts serious doubt on its ability to undertake the necessary efforts in order to speed the political, social, and economic reforms. At the institutional level, it must be emphasized that every time Romanian society was asked to make sacrifices, a call to nationalism was used in order to obtain a determined answer. It was not difficult to invoke nationalist ideas as long as society was just recovering from a communist ordeal. The nationalist message is too well known and the conservators—that is, the former communist activists—make use of it to stop reforms by inciting large popular demonstrations (such as the famous ‘We will not sell our country!’ heard everywhere in the early 1990s and meant to prevent/avoid privatization). Moreover, nationalist speeches were often used to divert public attention from the dramatic

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economic and social situations. Nevertheless, this kind of message has not always worked and, before the 1996 elections, when Iliescu’s party used it in order to gather as much support as possible, the result was not the expected one: people did not fall for it anymore and Iliescu lost the elections. Four years later, a well-known nationalist-extremist leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, and his Greater Romania Party scored 23 percent by intensively using a message surprisingly different from their usual one. The message had only occasional nationalist accents because Vadim Tudor had learned from the people’s reactions and orientations in the last few years that this type of speech had less impact than previously. So, the good thing that came out of all these years was that Romanians learned to be circumspect about nationalist declamations. The problem here is that in order to achieve a high degree of sociopolitical cohesion, the population should be asked to adhere to a set of norms that characterizes the rule of law in a democratic regime. The political class is the one that sets the behaviour model in this sense, and if the elite shows little respect for legislation, the rest of society is very likely to follow suit. Moreover, the Romanian collective conscience was haunted by nationalist fantasies under Ceausescu’s rule and, as a consequence, it should have been the new political elite’s task to settle this matter. Instead of doing so, the politicians continued to play the nationalist card as long as it proved to be successful. In this case, it is the duty of civic structures to construct socialization channels for improving communication with the citizens, aimed at enlarging people’s knowledge about democratic procedures and developing their respect for them. The still persistent subject orientations hamper the development of participant ones as long as people are not educated and encouraged to become active citizens. Democratic consolidation would thus be an unreachable goal for a long period. ‘Law and order’ and personal security The ‘law and order’ issue constitutes a problem not only for weak states with a low level of social cohesion but also for strong ones with deep-rooted democratic institutions. The difficulty of finding solutions for this problem is directly linked to its complexity. In nascent democracies like Romania the problem involves more aspects which run much deeper than in mature democracies. In this regard, the rapport between the state and an individual is relevant as it is related to the concept of personal security. When looking at the nature of the

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state in Romania, some striking characteristics can be observed. These form a comprehensive image of the degree of personal security enjoyed by each member of the society. The Romanian state is a structure with an extended bureaucracy that right from the start discourages citizens from seeking help in solving their problems. Many of the people in this bureaucracy still have an old mentality according to which they are there to serve the state and not the citizen. The state institutions have a low capacity to transform and adapt to new circumstances. This situation has its roots in a traditional rigid obedience to a superior in rank that leads to lack of initiative and institutional immovability and inflexibility. Moreover, even eighteen years after the fall of the communist regime, the Romanian state still has a centralized structure. Although it is true that every state has a tendency to control society, this tendency is balanced by different social structures. In Romania, it seems that the post-communist state has inherited all the appetite for control of the former communist state, displaying an allergic reaction towards areas that are not centrally controlled or which could develop autonomously. The circumstances regarding the establishment of civil society institutions speak for themselves.157 The Romanian state is perceived by its citizens as “repressive” due to its inability to exercise a protection function against the internal threats/ problems the citizens have to face.158 However, the description of the post-communist Romanian state as a repressive one that is insecure for individuals deserves clarification because is directly linked to the ‘law and order’ issue. A very annoying matter for the majority of Romanians is the fiscal policy, which has created discontent because the population has no idea how the tax money is redistributed. The process clearly needs transparency and a full explanation from the government so that citizens cease to feel exploited. People are also unsatisfied with the way in which the police forces have fulfilled one of their main tasks—the protection of individuals against the criminal actions of other members of society. Often the very defenders of the law have proven to be corrupt and protecting criminals. Looking at another institution that is supposed to serve the citizen, the activities of the intelligence services are questionable as long as there is little transparency about them. 157

See the discussion in this chapter in the section on Socio-political cohesion and civil society. 158 See Vladimir Tismaneanu in dialogue with Mircea Mihaies, Incet, spre Europa (Iasi: Polirom), 2000, pp. 157–61.

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As there are an impressive number of such services, it is also possible to wonder about their purpose and effectiveness. To refer to one example, the miners’ march on Bucharest in January 1999 seems to have taken the authorities by surprise. They were unable to strongly intervene. The police forces were powerless and invisible but this came as no surprise when it was discovered that several police generals were involved in this action.159 When these services brutally intervene in the private life of a citizen invoking a national security matter and the citizen can rely on no law to protect him against this intrusion, the repressive nature of the state becomes obvious.160 This brings us back to the ‘defunct’ Securitate. The fall of the communist system did not provoke a sudden reorientation of former Securitate workers as it did not change the convictions of many communist activists overnight. The traces of this structure can be discerned in different institutions and they are responsible for many social and political crises Romanian society has faced since its rebirth. Perhaps the most illustrative declaration in this regard was made only recently and for the first time by such an authority as the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Radu Timofte. According to him, there are people working for this institution who are opposing Romania’s integration into NATO and the EU by blocking the necessary reforms that would align the country with western standards. He made it clear that these people would be fired. “We have people who are opposing the integration plans for Romania. They will not be found in this institution anymore.”161 Timofte stated that 15 percent of SRI employees came from the former Securitate. He revealed another striking situation, too: there were other state structures in which people who opposed Romania’s orientation towards the West could be found. In his opinion, “if these people were not there, we [Romania] would have joined NATO and the EU a long time ago”.162 This might be considered too optimistic: the presence of old mentality workers is not the only cause of Romania’s failure

159 The implications of this case are the subject of a special section in this chapter, Two cases of securitization in Romania. 160 Interesting in this sense was the debate proposed by the ‘Horia Rusu Foundation’ on “National security versus personal security”. See the official website of the Foundation, www.horiarusu.ro. 161 See “Avem oameni in SRI care se opun integrarii”, Evenimentul Zilei, 24 May 2001, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 162 Ibid.

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to integrate sooner with the Euro-Atlantic and European structures. However, it was certainly not an easy obstacle to overcome. Since Timofte made this declaration, the presence of former Securitate workers in various state institutions has been continuously paid attention by the media. It became clear that Romania would have no hope of being invited to join NATO before first cleaning its institutions of Securitate remnants who had worked against the Alliance in communist times. In November 2002, at its summit in Prague, NATO launched a new wave of enlargement and Romania was among seven invitees. The government promised that restructuring would be completed by the time that membership became effective.163 Even representatives of public opinion got involved in this matter and one of the most notorious actions was the publishing on the Internet of a list of 1,600 names of former Securitate officers who filled key positions in the present intelligence services or who are well-known businessmen.164 The list was an appendix to the so-called “Armageddon 7” report, the last in a series about the abuses of different state institutions.165 The written media became involved in this campaign and published large parts of the reports but the government undertook no effective measures. Everything has been kept at a declarative level166 although the media had published the names of people in high positions and evidence regarding their past activities as Securitate agents.167 An even more worrying fact is that some of the survivors of this oppressive instrument used by the communist power have a very bad

163 Each of the parliaments of the 19 NATO members had approved the new candidates offered membership before the NATO Summit held in Brussels on 2 April 2004. Actually, Romania became a NATO member at that date. 164 See “Armageddon 7”, in Ziua, Evenimentul Zilei, Adevarul, 28 March 2002, www .ziua.ro, www.evenimentulzilei.ro, www.adevarul.ro. 165 Although these reports were anonymous, due to the classified information they included, the conclusion was drawn that their authors had been working for top representatives of the coalition that had been in power between 1996 and 2000. Consequently, after some investigation, President Constantinescu’s chief of cabinet, Mugur Ciuvica, was placed under arrest. This proved to be a mistake by the authorities as he was later freed without being charged. 166 For instance, the presidential adviser for national security, Ioan Talpes, declared after the meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defence that people who had been involved in political police activities or had worked for the KGB would not be found in the state institutions. See “Dupa ce Ion Iliescu le-a luat apararea, CSAT decide epurarea securistilor”, Evenimentul Zilei, 6 April 2002, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 167 See for instance “Doi responsabili ai actualelor servicii secrete au facut Politie Politica”, 10 April 2002, and “SRI recunoaste”, 7 June 2002, Ziua, www.ziua.ro.

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influence on young people who are preparing themselves to serve Romanian society by working for the intelligence services. Dan Pavel, a Romanian political analyst, wrote in an open letter about his experience with the students at the National Institute of Information (INI) when he was invited to participate in a debate with some other personalities. His speech on the relationship between the intelligence services and civil society was received with expressions of virulent nationalism from students who praised the patriotic nature of the former Securitate, stating that it had worked for the national interest. Pavel tried to draw the authorities’ attention to this situation, which in his opinion had two main causes: (1) some of these students came from families of former Securitate workers, high-ranking communists, militia forces, etc., so they were already educated in this spirit; (2) some of the professors at INI were supporters of the former regime who had not changed their mentality over the years, so they were bound to educate new generations according to their beliefs.168 Clearly, the parliament has the indisputable power of control over the intelligence services and it has to find ways of effectively exercising it. This has to include the institutions in which future intelligence officers are being educated and formed, otherwise Romanian society will grow divided, each of its parties having a different agenda of interests and objectives. Perhaps the most important step in this regard was the setting up of the National Council for Study of the ‘Securitate’ Archives (CNSAS) in March 2000. Its aim is to facilitate citizens’ access to their own files and to identify actions that would expose the ‘Securitate’ as a political police.169 But, since it started its activities the CNSAS has not yet any appropriate headquarters that would allow it to take over the archives of the former Securitate that are currently in the custody of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). Moreover, while its activities are carried out under parliamentary control, the law does not specify which of the commissions should be in charge. Thus, the CNSAS report on activities was sent to three parliamentary commissions: the judiciary, human rights, and the SRI, respectively. This situation created a lot of confusion. Although the CNSAS had some impressive results, especially

168 See “Scrisoare deschisa” in Dan Pavel, Leviathanul bizantin: Analize, atitudini si studii politice (Iasi: Polirom), 1998, pp. 169–173. The situation is further discussed by Vladimir Tismaneanu in dialogue with Mircea Mihaies, op. cit., pp. 57–58. 169 Law no. 187 on citizens’ access to their personal files and the revealing of the ‘Securitate’ as a political police, in Monitorul Oficial no. 603, 9 December 1999.

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with regard to the verification of the candidates in the legislative and administrative elections and facilitating citizens’ access to their own files, the investigation regarding the activities of the Securitate as a political police was unsatisfactory. The members of the Council had diverging opinions on the necessity to set up hearings with the officers identified as having been involved in political police activities.170 In 2006, President Basescu managed to determine SRI to hand in the Securitate archives to CNSAS and the population got free access to these. To sum up, it is clear that in Romania’s case the very institutions which represent the concept of law and order and have been designated to protect the individual from all attacks on his safety and security were exactly the ones which have been the least prepared to do so. These institutions represent the state, so it is only right that citizens have started to perceive the state as their enemy due to the very low degree of protection it can offer. Moreover, according to the citizen, the state is solely responsible for all the problems he has to face, consequently this has led to a continuous decrease in citizens’ respect for state authority. The political elites also are considered guilty for failing to produce results which would have improved the living standards of society, and they have lost credibility in the eyes of many citizens. The fact that they were not willing to assume responsibility for their mistakes and misconduct led the people to very bitter conclusions regarding the benefits of a democratic system. Not surprising then that at the 2000 elections 28 percent of the vote went to a man who promised to install a dictatorship of ‘law and order’. This was Vadim Tudor, a nationalist who knew how to adapt his speeches to people’s wishes and who profited from all the mistakes of a weak and inefficient power. To conclude, the negligible interest of the political class in the public well-being, the inefficiency of the state in providing security and safety for its citizens and a still embryonic civil society led to the radicalization of an important part of Romanian society (25 percent) and the alienation of another relevant part (almost 44 percent of the population with the right to vote did not do so in the 2000 legislative elections). Furthermore, the endless struggles and conflicts present in the political life after 2004 have had their share in the additional growth of the

170 See Teodora Georgescu—“Colegiul lui Onisoru, luat la palme in Comisia SRI”, Evenimentul Zilei, 26 September 2002, www.evenimentulzilei.ro.

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number of alienated citizens, those decided not to vote anymore or undecided reaching 50 percent at the end of 2006.171 Corruption Although a matter which can certainly be regarded as falling under law and order, corruption deserves a separate discussion. It not only has a detrimental effect on any attempt to reform a society, but also negatively affects people’s image of the benefits of a democratic system. In Romania, the situation is worse than ever before as none of the governments has ever undertaken any serious or profound measures against corruption. It would have been very difficult to do so as each party/coalition in power would have had to begin with its own members. Although after 1996 the electoral campaigns abounded with promises to fight and eradicate corruption, very little had actually happened in this regard before 2004. It was even more difficult to assess which institutions should have been responsible for fighting it when the structures for this purpose in established democracies (judiciary, police etc.) had members who are corrupt in Romania. The situation became even more dramatic after 2000, when the PSD came back to power. The Social-Democrat Party is an amalgam of various interest groups with no concerns linking them beyond those regarding the protection and immunity of all their activities. If they attempt to extend their influence, they inevitably collide with one another and give rise to open scandal. This was the case with many of the accusations of corruption that have resulted from different regional organizations of the party since the beginning of 2002.172 These were merely quarrels between groups with divergent interests dissatisfied with their power status in the party. As the written media were very assiduous at revealing acts of corruption at most levels of the governing party, it became obvious that any serious attempt to efficiently fight this phenomenon would have to start within the PSD’s structures. To force this party into such an undertaking, a very active and strong civil society is needed. But, as has been shown, this was precisely what

171

“Evolutii in sondaje”, Institutul PRO, 25 October 2006, www.institutulpro.ro. See, for instance, “Pentru ca magistratii ‘nu fac ce vor ei’, seful pesedistilor gorjeni apara primarii acuzati de coruptie”, 5 June 2002, “Sorin Oprescu cere anchetarea ministrului sanatatii”, 14 June 2002, “Mica Sicilie a lui Oprisan”, 1 July 2002, in Evenimentul Zilei; see also Stelian Tanase—“Enigma PSD”, 3 July 2002, “Politica, viol si santaj”, 4 July 2002 in Cotidianul, www.evenimentulzilei.ro, www.cotidianul.ro. 172

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Romania was lacking. The extent of the problem remained severe and was the main topic of every new report drawn up by international organizations on Romania.173 This does not mean that there have been no attempts to contain and diminish this phenomenon. For instance, in 1998, President Constantinescu set up the National Council to Fight against Corruption and he opened declared a campaign against corrupt officials. The result of this campaign was highly disappointing: the Council was basically inefficient, lacking the appropriate mechanisms for such an endeavour. A new institution was set up in the summer of 2002 with the same purpose as the Council: the Anti-Corruption National Prosecuting Magistracy (PNA). The PNA functions as “an autonomous structure within the Ministry of Public Information, it is headed by a general attorney”174 and is hierarchically “under the authority of the minister of justice”.175 This organ has been empowered to conduct activities of “criminal prosecution for preventing, revealing, and sanctioning acts of corruption”, as well as criminal enquiries and technical activities related to these.176 But since the beginning of its activity there have been deficiencies that affected its functioning. Of the 75 prosecutor positions in the PNA’s structure, only 70 percent have been filled.177 Most of these prosecutors were young and lacked the appropriate experience, so they had to be hired on the basis of special exemptions. They were supposed to investigate famous corrupt characters while receiving low payment for their job and no guarantees for their safety or that of their families.178 A serious point of concern was the PNA’s subordination to the minister

173 All the reports published in 2002 mention corruption as the main problem Romania has to take measures against. See Human Rights Watch Report on Romania in 2001, www.hrw.org; USA Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Romania, 2001, www.state.gov; European Commission Report on Romania 2001, www.europa.eu.; European Parliament Report on Romania 2001, www.europarl .europa.eu. 174 Emergency Ordinance no. 43 on the Anti-Corruption National Prosecuting Magistracy in Monitorul Oficial no. 244, 11 April 2002, Chapter 1, Article 1, paragraph 3. The Ordinance was amended and adopted by the Romanian Parliament through Law no. 503 regarding the approval of the Emergency Ordinance of the Government no. 43/2002 on the Anti-Corruption National Prosecuting Magistracy, published in Monitorul Oficial no. 523, 18 July 2002. 175 Ibid., Article 1, paragraph 4. 176 Ibid., Article 3, paragraph 1a. 177 See “Infiintat cu mare pompa, PNA se ocupa de infractiuni marunte”, Cotidianul, 24 September 2002, www.cotidianul.ro. 178 Ibid. A PNA prosecutor’s monthly salary amounted to about USD 500.

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of justice, that is, to a member of the ruling party, thus the opposition had no control over it, a situation that could easily have led to the setting up of a new political police structure.179 Nevertheless, the PNA started its activities by investigating a number of magistrates, parliament members, and businessmen whose identities were not revealed so as not to obstruct the inquiries.180 The effectiveness of this structure meant to fight corruption was very soon the subject of concern. Not only the media raised questions about the viability of this institution, but also other civil society structures. The Anti-Corruption Alliance is an organization based on a partnership between the mass media, non-governmental organizations, and the unions. It performs actions such as evaluating the corruption levels in some counties, compiling a database including the acts of corruption and their consequences, conducting surveillance of the responsible institutions for taking action against corruption, and assessing the fulfilment of their duties. “If we find cases where the written media provided sufficient evidence regarding certain offences and the responsible institutions ignored them, the Alliance shall submit penal complaints” declared Ovidiu Budusan, the legal expert of the organization.181 With regard to the PNA’s activities, it was considered that it could not be efficient as long as the judiciary was far from being independent.182 A last point has also to be discussed here. It is clear even to the political representatives in Bucharest that the situation regarding corruption in Romania is well known abroad. From declarations made by people such as the Director of the Goethe Institute that “in Romania corruption functions with a German efficiency”183 to more precise assessments like the one by Transparency International in which Romania scored 2.6 on the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2002 (0 indicates a highly corrupted country while 10 indicates a clean one), a wide range of foreign officials and organizations have showed their worries in this

179 See “Parchetul Anticoruptie, in curtea Rodicai Stanoiu”, Evenimentul Zilei, 5 June 2002, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 180 See “Societatea civila se arunca in lupta impotriva coruptiei”, Evenimentul Zilei, 28 September 2002. 181 Ibid. See also “Ovidiu Budusan: ‘Nu cred ca vom fi ignorati!’ ”, Evenimentul Zilei, 23 September 2002, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 182 Ibid. 183 See the declaration made by Hans-Georg Thonges, the Director of the Goethe Institute in Bucharest, at the symposium on “Mechanisms and means to prevent corruption in a democratic system”, www.goethe.de/ms/buk.

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regard.184 The interesting thing is that public opinion in Romania has been influenced by the signals about corruption coming from the media and from abroad. Whereas up to 2002 all polls indicated that what people feared most was poverty, inflation, unemployment, a war in the neighbouring area, social riots and criminality, the beginning of 2002 registered a change in the public agenda. Without exception, corruption has since held the top position among the people’s concerns. Most of the respondents to some polls believed that corruption increased with the coming of PSD in power (53 percent)185 and many stated that it would be even higher the next year (43 percent), while 52 percent thought that the government was trying more than the 1996–2000 one to reduce it.186 At the top of the list of the most corrupted professionals were placed policemen (30 percent), followed by magistrates (26 percent), parliamentary representatives (23 percent), government members (14 percent), politicians (13 percent), physicians (11 percent), civil clerks and mayors (each with 6 percent), and businessmen (4 percent).187 Members of the PSD governing elite denied even proven accusations and supported one another with great obstinacy. Several events referred to a number of ministers in whose cases the mass media and opposition parties provided convincing evidence of corruption. One of them, the Minister of European Integration, came to the attention of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) and in fact was accused of making members of her family the beneficiaries of various PHARE funds when she was in office.188 The reactions of Prime Minister Nastase and President Iliescu to these accusations were emotional rather than authoritative, and bore no relation to what should have been expected of them. According to Nastase, Ms Puwak “is an admirable person” and she should not be bothered before the EU Report on Romania was released, so that “we [Romania’s government] are allowed to negotiate calmly and achieve

184

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2002 (August 2002), www.transparency.org. 185 Poll by the Institute of Marketing and Polls (IMAS) in June 2002. See www.imas.ro. 186 Data from the poll by Metro Media Transilvania in June 2002. See www.mmt.ro. 187 Ibid. 188 The accusation was made by the Popular Action Party (Emil Constantinescu’s new party) in July 2003 and referred to funds used in 2001 by businesses belonging to Ms. Hildegard Puwak’s husband and son. See, for instance: Liviu Avram—“Ministrul Hildegard Puwak si-a reglat conturile cu Registrul Comertului, dar umbla tot cu ocaua mica”, Adevarul, 1 August 2003; “Puwak acuzata de trafic de influenta”, Ziua , 30 July 2003. Ms. Hildegard Puwak was appointed Minister of European Integration in 2000 when the PSD came into office. www.adevarul.ro, www.ziua.ro.

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our interests”.189 Iliescu declared in a press conference that “Ms Puwak is not a corrupt but a correct person” and that “he has trust in Minister Puwak’s decency and correctness”.190 Ironically, President Iliescu made this declaration after he had spoken to the European Parliament on problems that Romania faced at that moment, saying that finding responses to these meant “efficiently and firmly reprimanding corruption and red tape, giving a professional status to the public servant that should no longer be used for rewarding political clients”.191 Obviously, the solutions to the vulnerabilities Romanian society faces were, at least in theory, well known by the president. There was still a big step to be taken to put them in practice. The fight against corruption has been one of the top priorities of the Romanian authorities newly installed at the end of 2004. President Basescu himself won the elections with a very strong anti-corruption and reform platform. Taking decisive action against this social plague was compulsory as EU was closely monitoring Romania and corruption eradication was an essential accession prerequisite. In fact, EU had imposed a special safeguard clause on Romania that permitted accession to be delayed a year if requirements in this field were not met.192 The main body involved in this complex process was the National Anti-corruption Department (DNA) set up in 2002 (the former PNA) and reorganized in October 2005.193 DNA is a prosecution office with exclusive and unlimited attributions regarding the fight against corruption at high level, inclusively in indicting MPs. At the releasing of DNA report on 2006, its chief prosecutor Daniel Morar presented an impressive list of investigated and indicted personalities: seven parliamentarians, one minister, two state secretaries, two counsel presidents, one prefect and two mayors.194 In most of these cases, the acts of corruption were linked to the prerogatives of the

189

See “Premierul Nastase a descoperit vinovatii in scandalul Puwak: ziaristii”, Adevarul, 30 August 2003, www.adevarul.ro. 190 Cristian Oprea—“Beuran si Puwak nu sunt ei coruptii din Romania!”, Evenimentul Zilei, 24 September 2003, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 191 See “Speech delivered by Mr Ion Iliescu, President of Romania, to the Plenary Meeting of the European Parliament in Strasbourg”—Strasbourg, 23 September 2003 (The Department of Public Communications), www.presidency.ro. 192 See note 124. 193 Romanian Government, Emergency Ordinance no. 43/2002. DNA is independent in relation with all the other public institutions. 194 See “Raport privind activitatea desfasurata de Directia Nationala Anticoruptie in 2006”, www.pna.ro.

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suspects’ positions. In 2006, DNA also charged five magistrates, four judges and a prosecutor.195 The list included as well numerous customs and police officers indicted for corruption or for obstructing justice during investigations.196 According to the report, of the 360 defendants indicted, 149 had important, leading or control positions.197 As it resulted, DNA prosecutors solved more than 1,000 files out of a total of 2,600 in 2006.198 Out of the 1,092 solved cases, 127 were sent to trial, representing 929 crimes.199 President Traian Basescu, who attended the official release of the report, called on prosecutors to disregard “media pressures” and to break the criminal relationships between politicians and businessmen.200 Probably one of the most interesting developments in this period is the fact that some of the ministers in office were suspended at DNA’s request after thorough investigations of their activity. Such are the cases of the Minister of Communications—Zsolt Nagy—and the Minister of Justice—Tudor Chiuariu—both accused of abuse against public interest while in office. Decebal Traian Remes, Minister of Agriculture, was prosecuted for influence trafficking while the Minister of National Defence, Teodor Atanasiu, was accused of illegal acts regarding several public acquisitions made by the respective ministry. Last but not least relevant, Codrut Seres, Minister of Economics, was charged with spying activities. Nevertheless, till the end of 2007, none of these were facing a trial as the legislation still seems to give many possibilities to delay a final penal decision.201 For instance, in November 2007, the Minister of Justice Chiuariu, still in office at that moment, issued an emergency ordinance in order to modify the law on ministerial accountability, which was rejected on grounds of unconstitutionality.202 Another 195

Ibid. Ibid. The number of customs officers indicted by the DNA in 2006 increased eight times compared to 2005, that is 24 compared to 3. As for police officers, 54 were investigated in 2006 compared to 24 in 2005. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 200 See Paul Ciocoiu, “Corruption down in Romania but still an issue”, Romania News Watch, 12 April 2007, www.romanianewswatch.com. 201 For all these cases, see collections of Adevarul and Cotidianul during 2007. 202 See “PDL cere demisia lui Chiuariu, acuzandu-l ca a vrut sa salveze ministrii corupti ai PNL”, Adevarul , 28 November 2007, www.adevarul.ro. Minister Chiuariu proposed in this ordinance the set up of a presidential commission formed by politically independent personalities and magistrates to investigate and decide on the prosecution of former or still in office ministers. Not only that such a commission would have 196

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obstacle in the process of bringing to trial corrupted ministers is their presence in the parliament, since several of the former ministers have been elected as parliamentarians. They cannot be brought to court unless two thirds of the total number of parliamentarians decide so. With a minority government formed by PNL and UDMR relying on the legislative support of PSD and, occasionally, of PC, former ministers such as Adrian Nastase and Miron Mitrea (both in PSD), or Codrut Seres (PC) will never be deferred to justice. At least, not as long as they remain members of the parliament. An important issue in this field is the establishment of a National Integrity Agency (ANI). This was a key point of Minister Macovei’s anticorruption program and the European Commission especially insisted on its creation as ANI is to ensure a higher degree of integrity among politicians. The Agency should be an independent institution with the resources and jurisdiction to verify the official declarations of assets and interests of public officials. However, the law on the establishment of ANI, which had been submitted to the parliament by the Minister of Justice Macovei, suffered essential modifications. The parliamentarians’ amendments to this law transformed the independent agency into a subordinate body to the Senate.203 Thus, the senators decide on the activity and budget of the institution that is in charge with controlling their assets.204 They also eliminated the incompatibilities introduced by Minister Macovei, inclusively the one which states that a parliamentarian, while in office, cannot exercise the profession of lawyer or notary. Then, the verification of assets goes no further than the first degree relatives205 while ‘the Macovei variant’ of the law specified that this should go till the relatives of third degree for politicians and, respectively, of fourth degree for magistrates.206 In fact, under this new formulation, the law on the creation of ANI is only a “subterfuge”, an artificial solution meant to present the European Commission a new achievement,

duplicated the activity of DNA but also the president has already the constitutional right to suspend a member of the government and ask for his prosecution. 203 See Law no. 144 on the establishment, organization and functioning of the National Integrity Agency, Articles 14 and 18, in Monitorul Oficial no. 0359, 21 May 2007. 204 Ibid. Article 15. 205 Ibid. Article 41. 206 Rodica Culcer, “Triumful politicii”, Revista 22, 18 May 2007, www.revista22.ro.

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without disturbing the interests of those who illegally obtained their wealth. Far from creating a momentum in the fight against corruption and conflict of interests, it actually confirms the triumph of transition politics over these.207

As we have seen, the polls indicate that precisely those institutions supposed to be involved in the eradication of corruption were perceived as having the highest number of corrupt employees. The question is whether under such circumstances these institutions can be expected to play an active and positive role in the democratization process. There is a real danger that the radicalization or alienation of a relevant part of the population is increasing. At the same time, institutions supposed to fight corruption such as the DNA cannot be successful as long as they are politically influenced. In this regard, its activity improved remarkably when reorganised as an independent structure. As shown, progress can still be determined by factors of both external and internal nature. Conditionality is a powerful aspect and NATO as well as the EU can be regarded as democratization triggers: becoming a member of either of them was impossible unless certain conditions were fulfilled—chief among them the setting up of a democratic system. In the pre-membership phase, they also represented important guiding and advisory bodies. After Romania’s accession into NATO, the important battle was to obtain the invitation to join the EU in 2007. The Romanian political elite knew that genuine efforts had to be made to reach this goal. At the internal level, civil society and a renewal of the political class played important roles in this regard. The strengthening of civil society structures became a fact while the maturation of the democratic opposition, that is, the liberals (PNL) and the democrats (PD), was determinant for producing a new alternative to power at the legislative elections in 2004. They secured power by promising a tireless fight against corruption and an independent judiciary. Thus, democratization could continue in a more permissive environment, so that the process leads eventually to democracy. What type of political culture has Romania? The data we have analysed indicate that the historical inheritance from the pre-communist period has had little influence on the democratization process in Romania. With the exception of a few parties that have

207

Ibid.

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their roots in the period between the wars and imposed themselves on the political scene in the 1990s as profoundly anticommunist structures, there was not too much else in terms of continuity. And given the characteristics of the communist regime in Romania—totalitarian, with a high degree of anomie at the societal level, and repressive towards any attempt towards independent behaviour and thinking—it is hardly surprising that most of the values of that inter-war society have been lost. Under these circumstances, the formation and maturation of the party system is inevitably a slow process. The parties that have governed the country since the end of 1989 did not manage to perform certain important functions for contributing to the establishment of a sound democratic life. They lacked a clear ideology for a long time, became involved in endless struggles for power, and proved unable to promote adequate policies, or form and prepare enough candidates for public office. Some parties did go through a maturation process (PD and PNL) but the main party on the political scene (PSD) is still an amalgam of divergent interest groups. Furthermore, civil society structures were not encouraged to develop and their influence on political life was weak until few years ago. The state tends to keep as many structures as possible under its control, but more and more independent action can be noticed especially in the urban areas, with important consequences in all the fields. Nevertheless, the levels of participation are still below the requirements of a functional democracy. In relation to the multiparty system, a new political class has developed. Until 1996 when the first alternation of power took place, the governing elite showed a steady disregard for democratic procedures. Things started to change at that point, new politicians emerged promoting more liberal and democratic views, though their actions often lacked coherence and determination. Still, accountability seems to be the most important factor because there were hardly any mechanisms through which an official could be held responsible for his/her actions as long as he/she was in office. Fortunately, this aspect has registered consistent improvement since 2004. In what regards socio-political cohesion, citizens have not enough models to follow. They need some values—democratic ones—to adhere to, but if the political class does not set the behaviour model in this sense, and if it shows little respect for legislation, the rest of society is very likely to follow the same path. It is also up to the civic structures to construct socialization channels for improving communication with citizens, aiming at widening people’s

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knowledge of democratic procedures and developing their respect for them. Perhaps the most dramatic findings refer to the law and order aspect, personal security and corruption. In Romania, the very institutions that represent the concept of law and order and are designated to protect the individual from all attacks on his safety are the least prepared to do so. The judiciary has been for a very long period politically influenced, policemen are corrupt, the public administration suffers from bureaucracy and corruption, and the politicians often serve their own interests at the expense of public ones. Only in the last few years have things started to change, especially under external influence (pressures exercised by integration in NATO and the EU) and a more active civil society, though still shy and not very persuasive. The measures undertaken to fight corruption have also started to produce results, hence things begin to look brighter for Romania. Findings indicate that a democratic political culture is emerging. The process needs more catalysts to pick up speed and cancel out the delays. And the necessary catalysts are political willingness and a strong civil society. Both of them are increasingly present in Romanian political life. 2.4. The political dimension of security At this point, this book will now focus on issues that are presented as veritable threats in the political sector, their referent object, the securitizing and functional actors, the reaction of the audience, all of which are part of the securitization process. In the event that a security complex has formed between the securitizing actors and the audience on a specific matter, it would be interesting to know whether any attempts to desecuritizing that issue have been made in order to transfer it into the political sphere. Romania’s security strategy from the perspective of the new security concept Romania is situated at the crossroads of key geographical areas with different characteristics creating a dynamic political map. The western part of Central Europe is going through a process of integration with the Euro-Atlantic and European structures, enjoying stability and rapid transformation; the eastern part is still influenced by Russia, while at the same time different nations are trying to define their own identity; the South-East zone is facing instability, secessionist tendencies and ethnic

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conflicts whose consequences threaten to affect the whole region. Under these circumstances, the necessity to adopt a new security strategy that will acknowledge the important changes in the international security environment and emphasize the necessity to take action in order to diminish the state’s vulnerabilities was more than evident. Romania’s new security strategy was launched in June 1999.208 The strategy proved that the specialists responsible for constructing it took into consideration both the complex transformations in the international security environment and the elaborate multisectoral security concept. For the first time, the national security strategy was directly connected with citizen safety, in other words, to individual security. It also explicitly stated that although Romania does not face any immediate military threat, the non-conventional risks to security have multiplied and are difficult to eradicate. The strategy presented the national objectives, identified the risks to security and announced the modalities to cope with them. Integration in NATO and the European Union was underlined as the country’s main objective. In addition, Romania’s national interests are to guarantee human rights and Romanian citizens’ safety, to consolidate democracy, preserve the Romanian state, develop the connections with Romanians living outside Romania, and Romania’s participation in supporting European stability and security.209 Taking into account that national security strategy is “the art and science of developing, applying, and co-ordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security”,210 it should be noted that the Romanian strategy is merely an enumeration of principles and lacks the identification of specific legislative, financial, political, military and administrative actions that would transpose these principles into practice. The problem starts with the way that Romania’s national interests are respected and promoted by the political elite. However, reality has shown that politicians have little respect for the pledges they have made. Personal security is suffering greatly according to the findings presented in an earlier section. The democracy is fragile, the

208 A new Security Strategy was adopted at the end of 2007. As this chapter gathers data prior to that moment, this is not included here. 209 “Romania’s Strategy of National Security”, (Bucharest: Military Publishing Centre), June 1999, pp. 4–5. 210 See USA Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, www.dtic.mil.

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separation of powers is still a desideratum while the accountability of the political class to the electorate is quasi non-existent. Furthermore, despite the abundance of speeches on the situation of Romanians living outside Romania, little has been done to improve connections with them and help them preserve their identity. A look at the text of this document directly reveals that the risks to Romania’s security are presented in an ambiguous manner.211 In the terms of the strategy, the main risks to Romania’s national security are: * the existence, in Romania’s space of strategic interest, of regional or sub-regional tensions and military conflicts which can expand, as well as of uncontrolled and destabilizing accumulations of forces and fighting techniques * the uncontrolled proliferation and dissemination of nuclear technology, weapons of mass destruction, armaments, and other unconventional arms * the prolongation of certain internal difficulties of an economic, financial or social nature which drastically and vitally affect the functioning of Romanian society * the expansion of terrorist and transnational organized crime networks and activities (financial-economic criminality, trans-border illegal traffic of people, drugs, strategic and radioactive materials, armaments, etc.) * the deterioration of the environment due to disregard of ecological norms and the existence of high risk units near the national borders * the restriction of Romania’s access to certain vital resources for its population and economy * activities that can affect the Romanian state and its democratic institutions, which lead to separatism, xenophobia, intolerance, and ethnic and religious conflicts. Some other risks for Romania’s security could include uncertainty regarding the politico-military developments in the region, large scale population migration, Romania’s isolation from the informational global society due to lack of informational infrastructures.212

An evident shortcoming is that the strategy does not straightaway indicate what “Romania’s space of strategic interest” is. Defining Romania’s geostrategic position would have helped not only in understanding her interests in the area but also the type of threats and their imminence. 211

For a thorough analysis of these risks, see Adina Stefan, ‘The New Security Concept and Romania’s Case’ in Kurt W. Treptow (ed.), Tradition and Modernity in Romanian Culture and Civilization, (Iasi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2001), pp. 29–46. 212 “Romania’s Strategy of National Security”, pp. 5–6.

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The internal risks are mixed up with the external ones creating much ambiguity regarding their causes and the modalities to face or prevent them. In fact, the emphasis is on external risks while the internal vulnerabilities fail to include any political aspects that would endanger democratic consolidation in Romania. There is no clear identification of the crises that Romanians may have to cope with, or how and with what means. Equally, the non-conventional risks to security are paid only superficial attention by the authors. Romania, like the rest of the post-communist societies, represents an optimum emerging market for their proliferation. Facing them successfully is doubly important, first because its position at the gates of the Occident makes it a transit territory, and second, because if it wants to integrate in the EU, a strict and efficient control of the Eastern borders is essential. Several examples underline the seriousness of this situation. Especially since the Al-Qaeda attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, terrorism has become the most important enemy for most countries, an enemy more difficult to fight as the war against it has nothing in common with the strategy and tactics of a conventional war. As all the Western states have strengthened their mechanisms of control against suspect persons and organizations, post-communist countries have become even more attractive for these criminal groups as they lack the appropriate financial and logistic means to fight them. Thus, Romania is no exception to this situation, different criminal activities taking place on its territory.213 The clearest example of the mixing of terrorist and organized crime activities is provided by the PKK, a Kurdish extremist separatist structure.214 This organization controls several international drug trafficking channels which cross Romanian territory. The money obtained from these activities is used to finance different terrorist actions and the group’s logistics. The Turkish criminal organizations considered Romania a much safer place for them, especially after the Turkish government started a tough offensive against the heroin laboratories

213 An overview of terrorist organizations active on Romania’s territory can be found in the Romanian Intelligence Service’s Rapport for 1998–1999, www.sri.ro. Also, in January 2002, Jane’s Intelligence Review published an article about Romania’s fight against international terrorism after 11 September 2001. See Radu Tudor, “The Romanian Antiterrorist Brigade expands co-operation in the fight against terrorism” in Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2002, www.janes.com. 214 See Radu Tudor , “Mafia drogurilor finanteaza organizatiile teroriste din Romania”, Ziua, 11 February 2002, www.ziua.ro.

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in the summer of 1999. With the support of some Romanian citizens, several of these laboratories moved onto Romanian territory.215 This information refers mainly to international terrorist and criminal groups functioning in Romania. A different point of view centred on domestic terrorism was launched by an important representative of the specialized protection agencies. According to General Gabriel Naghi, the continual decline in living standards, generalized corruption, and the stagnation of political and economic reforms are facilitating conditions for the emergence and development of political radicalism, criminality, and domestic terrorism.216 The accumulation of discontent and frustrations among the population, multiplied by the poor performances of the ruling elite and the weakness of state institutions, are further catalysts in this process. As shown earlier, Romania faces many of these shortcomings at present. These are only a few of the things that should have been particularly mentioned or emphasized in Romania’s security strategy. In a democratic state, the security strategy should place the citizen at its core and only afterwards the state. Moreover, such a document cannot ignore the mutations in the international security environment at both conceptual and practical level, but this is still not enough to be successful. Those who construct it must be aware that they have to offer a clear image of the country’s security complex situation and how this can be handled to the advantage of both the state and its citizens. Furthermore, the strategy should benefit from the assistance of both political actors and non-political ones. Civil society through its representatives should be part of the process of security strategy formulation. This would be an encouraging sign that a participant political culture is taking shape in Romania. Participation of civil society in the formulation of a security strategy in Romania In August 1998, President Emil Constantinescu presented a draft document entitled ‘Romania’s Strategy of National Security’ which had been drawn up by the Supreme Council of National Defence. The document was made available to the political forces and public opinion to be

215

Ibid. See “Terorismul romanesc”, Ziua, 22 April 2002, www.ziua.ro. General Gabriel Naghi was at that time the Head of the Guard and Protection Service. 216

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analysed and, if necessary, modified, before being approved by parliament. It was the first time in Romania that a political figure presented a document highly important to the national security of the country for public debate. The action made evident that some political actors were beginning to understand the role of civil society in democratic life. It was recognition of the fact that civil society should be allowed to participate in the decision-making process. Although this ‘participation’ meant ‘consultation’, the political forces could not ignore the opinions solicited from citizens, especially since, in one way or another, their reaction is bound to affect the legitimacy of their leadership. Following the president’s proposal many articles appeared in the newspapers and reviews, some with critical remarks about different aspects that had been included or absent. Political analysts, journalists specialized in security and foreign policy matters, political representatives of the institutions involved in the process of security strategy formulation wrote about this topic or participated in debates that analysed the same issue.217 The new strategy launched in June 1999 took into consideration many of the observations regarding the previous text made by the civil society representatives. For instance, the draft document mentioned the following internal vulnerabilities/risks: aggravation of some major economic-financial imbalances, expansion of corruption and all types of organized crime activities, amplification of the authority crisis, proliferation of extremist manifestations, worsening of living standards and disregard for ecological norms.218 All these vulnerabilities were accurately identified and it is logical to have expected to find them also in the final formulation of the strategy. This did not happen. Not only were internal and external risks mixed up together in the final document, any reference to corruption, political vulnerabilities, or domestic environmental risks disappeared from it too. The document contains the same ambiguity with regard to the practical modalities of facing the identified risks. Although after the public 217 For instance, see the following articles: Sorin Rosca Stanescu—“Isi va asuma Vasile marele risc?”, Ziua, 20 August 1998; Cornel Nistorescu—“Romania in razboi cu ea insasi”, Evenimentul Zilei, 28 August 1998; Gabriel Hizo—“Strategii incomplete”, Curentul, 19 October 1998. Another illustrative event was the seminar “Romania’s Security Strategy Discussed by the Civil Society” organized by the ‘Manfred Wörner’ Association in Bucharest, 2 September 1998. 218 See “Strategia de securitate a Romaniei e supusa dezbaterii publice”, Libertatea, 20 August 1998, www.libertatea.ro.

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debate the modifications suffered by the draft text of the security strategy were not the most inspired ones, the merit of this event is too important to be overlooked. For the first time in Romania, various societal actors—political analysts, the mass media, politicians from the entire political spectrum, non-governmental organizations, experts—were involved in drawing up a document of national interest. 2.5. Two case studies of securitization in Romania Although the new Romanian security strategy failed to distinguish between internal and external risks to security and avoids mentioning the existence of political vulnerabilities, it does not mean that they were not present. The investigation of two cases may lead us to some interesting conclusions regarding the attempts of Romanian politicians to securitize certain issues. The first case refers to the severe political crisis that affected Romania’s performances in every area at the beginning of 1998. One of the parties forming the coalition in power, the Democratic Party (PD), accused the prime minister, Victor Ciorbea, a member of the Christian Democrat Party (PNTCD), of being unable to manage the economic reforms and lacking the political will to impose the necessary measures. These accusations were amplified by the people’s discontent with the apparent immobility and lack of decision of the government in pursuing the reforms. The failure of the prime minister to keep open all the communication channels with public opinion also gave people the feeling that the government was not doing very much, if anything. It would have been in Romania’s interests to solve this crisis as soon as possible, but it turned out differently. The members of the coalition, more precisely the PD and PNTCD, started a real war of accusations involving the entire political class and the media. The PD was accused of using blackmail to gather more electoral support in earlier elections. The PNTCD was accused of sticking to a prime minister who was inefficient and unable to keep the coalition under control. The crisis took almost three months to resolve at huge cost to Romania: it lost its international credibility, foreign investors who were initially waiting for the resolution of the crisis lost patience and started to retire from the Romanian market, the price of shares was constantly falling and the Leu (Romanian currency) depreciated against the American dollar (USD). Moreover, the Romanian market suddenly became unattractive

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to potential foreign investors.219 Nevertheless, the prime minister stubbornly refused to acknowledge his inability to control the coalition, let alone to resign. As the crisis continued, more and more voices were heard stating that the severe political instability had serious consequences for Romania’s international credibility. The first remarks in this regard came—naturally—from the opposition. Adrian Nastase, vice president of the Social Democrat Party (PDSR at that time), declared that the only solution was early elections. That would have led to a parliament with a new, hopefully clear mandate and possibly to the formation of a much more stable government. He accused the government of irresponsibly generating political instability.220 The other parties in the opposition used the same arguments, but what is even more important is that representatives of the government started to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation. In fact, it became clear that there were factions in the prime minister’s own party, the PNTCD, that were no longer supporting him and would have liked to see him replaced. Nicolae Ionescu Galbeni, the PNTCD vice president and one of the leaders of its conservative wing, stated that his party would consider forming a new coalition with those parties that could agree upon the government’s economic programme.221At this time, even the prime minister himself was referring more and more to Romania experiencing political instability.222 The situation encouraged the media and political analysts to speculate about its possible conclusions and a very strong reaction came from three technocrats who were part of the government itself. Daniel Daianu (Minister of Finance), Andrei Plesu (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Ilie Serbanescu (Minister of Reform) underlined in an open letter that

219

Declarations by different analysts concerning the Romanian capital market: Robert Peloiu—SVM Monynvest, Sorin Oprescu—Bucharest Investment Group, Valentin Ionescu—Austro-Rom in Ziua, 29 March 1998, www.ziua.ro. 220 Declarations made at the end of January 1998, see Adevarul, 20 January 1998, www.adevarul.ro. See also the Declaration of the PSD on 27 January 1998, www.psd.ro. 221 “Galbeni vede posibilitatea crearii unei noi coalitii”, Ziua, 2 February 1998, www .ziua.ro. Ion Diaconescu, the PNTCD President, declared the same a few weeks later. See “Taranistii s-au plictisit de certurile din coalitie”, Evenimentul Zilei, 23 February 1998, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 222 Declarations made at the end of February and beginning of March 1998, see for instance Claudiu Saftoiu—“Victor Ciorbea ii ataca din toate pozitiile pe fostii ministri PD”, Evenimentul Zilei, 27 February 1998, www.evenimentulzilei.ro.

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the reform seems to be a simple pretext for negotiating the decision-making positions (seats in the government). The probability of earlier elections grows and this paralyses innovative thinking and bold action.

According to them, the “political agitation provoked much confusion” and “a context of prolonged instability, indecisiveness and corruption”.223 What can be seen here is a vulnerability of the state organization that affects the security of the country as a whole. Political instability for such a prolonged period in a fragile democratic system is a security issue, and even the state representatives themselves (prime minister and representatives of the government in this case) finally announced it. They also acknowledged the possibility of crisis measures, like earlier elections or formation of another coalition. This put them into the position of securitizing actors helped in their interventions by the members of the opposition who, through their declarations, influenced the whole process. They had the role of functional actors. The population only grew impatient as the crisis became prolonged and considered Victor Ciorbea’s role as negative, ultimately calling for his resignation. The perceptions of insecurity and instability increased over time and, when President Constantinescu required Ciorbea to step down (only the day before, the prime minister had openly declared that he would never do so), it became clear that the country needed a government that would rapidly regain its lost credibility and begin the recovery. To conclude, the ‘democratic’ political elite installed in government at the end of 1996 proved totally unable to conduct democratic decision-making. Their inability to promote dialogue, mutual respect, or reasonable relations between the governing partners led to a severe and prolonged political instability that ultimately affected national security. The second case is even more dramatic than the first one. It refers to the miners’ riots during January 1999—ten years after the Revolution— that directly threatened the rule of law in Romania. Under the pretext of social demands, the miners of Valea Jiului started to march towards Bucharest damaging many things on their way. The leader was the same one who led the former miners’ riots in the early 1990s, Miron Cozma, and who had never been convicted for his actions. The authorities did nothing and became evident that something was going wrong when the gendarme forces failed to oppose the miners who continued to vandalise and devastate public places. The public was astonished and 223

See “Reforma a devenit un simplu pretext”, Ziua, 30 March 1998, www.ziua.ro.

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terrorised; the media urged the state to intervene immediately. As it turned out: (1) the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) failed to provide detailed information about this explosive situation; (2) the opposition supported the miners during their riots; (3) high-ranked commanders of the public order forces were supporting the miners which explains why the reaction of the police was practically non-existent. The severity of the situation was acknowledged by the president himself who declared that “this is a brutal attack against the public order forces and the rule of law” and invoked the state institutions to perform their duties and bring the situation back to normal.224 After three days of fights between thousands of miners and gendarme and police forces, it became obvious that more resolute decisions were necessary. President Constantinescu had meetings with all the leaders of the parliamentarian parties with the exception of Greater Romania and presided over an emergency meeting of the SCND. Only then the following measures were undertaken: (1) the government issued the Ordinance on the state of siege and the state of emergency; (2) the prime minister decided to personally meet the heads of the miners’ rebellion and to negotiate a mutually satisfactory agreement; (3) in case of the prime minister’s failure, the president was supposed to immediately declare the state of emergency. Emergency actions were also taken: military troops were dislocated in the area, the minister of internal affairs was replaced, some high-ranked commanders of the gendarme and police forces were fired and sent to trial for not performing their duties in good faith. Civil society was of course not insensitive to these developments. The mass media had developed a share sense of democracy and constantly accused the instigators for using their blind instruments to undermine the rule of law.225 When the miners’ riots reached their high point and the public order forces failed to perform their basic functions, that is, protecting the citizens and the democratic institutions against destructive actions, more than 10,000 people led by important personalities

224 See Lumea Magazin, year vii, no. 2 (70), 1999. Documentary: “Romania in defileu”, www.lumeam.ro. 225 See, for instance, “Lovitura de stat: Ultima sansa e Armata” (22 January 1999), Sorin Rosca Stanescu—“Trei obiective immediate pentru justitie: scoaterea PRM in afara legii, declararea Ligii Minerilor ca organizatie terorista si anchetarea tuturor complicilor din Politie si Jandarmerie” (25 January 1999), in Ziua. For more information in this regard, see the collections of Curentul, Cotidianul, Romania Libera, between 21 and 25 January 1999, www.ziua.ro.

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marched in silence in Bucharest. The messages of their manifestation were “Democracy. No Dictatorship. Miron Cozma—arrested”.226 They supported the actions of the state institutions defending democracy. “Till today, only one voice has been heard: the one of the violence. Today, there can be finally heard the one of justice and democracy” said the prominent writer and philosopher, Horia Roman Patapievici, who was among the leaders of the marching columns.227 Not only did the public support the emergency actions undertaken by the president but it also asked for a drastic punishment of those guilty for the escalation of force. The media started to show more and more evidence of what seemed to look like a planned coup d’état carefully organized by opposition parties. SRI was eventually able to indicate that members of the Greater Romania Party and the Socialist Party of Labour participated in the riots, but it failed to indicate whether these parties actually organized them. After the riots were smothered, new evidence came into light about the direct implication of former Securitate officers, members of Vadim Tudor’s party, in organizing these manifestations.228 The emergency actions undertaken by the president to preserve the democratic order and rule of law that had been endangered won the approval of the population. In this process of securitization the referent object was the state’s instability as a whole that was successfully solved by authoritative action on the part of the president. This success did not last long because of the failure of state institutions to bring to justice all those involved in the plot and the uprising. Public opinion was not satisfied with the manner in which this situation was handled in the end and many made their dissatisfaction public. Miron Cozma was caught and sentenced to 18 years in prison229 but the members of the opposition

226 “Societatea civila cere fermitate institutiilor statului”, Curentul, 23 January 1999, www.curentul.ro. 227 Ibid. 228 Information was provided by the former spokesman of the Ministry of Defence, lt.(r.) Alexandru Mihai Stoenescu, and senator Serban Sandulescu, member of the parliamentary commission on Defence, Public Order and National Security. See “Fostul purtator de cuvant al MapN sustine ca SRI stie de implicarea PRM, PSM si PS in mineriada din ianuarie”, Ziua, 19 February 1999, and “Senatorul Sandulescu afirma ca minerii au beneficiat de ajutorul unor fosti informatori ai Securitatii”, 22–23 March 1999, www.ziua.ro. 229 In 1999, Miron Cozma was sentenced for undermining the state’s authority in 1991 (!!!) when he had led the miner riots that had provoked the overthrow of Petre Roman’s government. On 12 December 2003, he was also found guilty with undermining the rule of law in Romania in the miner riots of January 1999 and got ten years of

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who supported and encouraged these unconstitutional manifestations remained well and safe. This proves once again that the Romanian state is still too weak to treat all its citizens as equal for national law. One who was more equal than others was Corneliu Vadim Tudor who continuously instigated to anti-governmental revolt, popular insurrection and disobedience of the military and police forces.230 Another leader apparently disappointed with the outcomes of the manifestations was Ion Iliescu who did not cease to denounce the use of power and to regret the arresting of Miron Cozma. Both these opposition members acted as actors in conspiracy, influencing the events, even though not legally liable. Nonetheless, the failure to take measures against them was resented by most vocal representatives of the public otherwise silent. Journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu wrote about the former crimes of Miron Cozma and his accomplices, reminding the public that this was not the first time that the miners violated the constitutional order; the political analyst Dan Pavel accused the government and judiciary that they showed little concern for the national interest, in particular the urgency of democratic consolidation and the rule of law in Romania. They simply failed to declare the parties that instigated and supported those riots illegal, especially the Greater Romania Party and Socialist Labour Party.231 2.6. Three cases of malfunctioning of important democratic institutions Both cases presented above focused on political instability as vulnerability still displayed by the system jeopardizing its security. But political

prison. See “ ‘Locotenentii’ lui Cozma—cate cinci ani de puscarie” , Romania Libera, 13 December 2003, www.romanialibera.ro. 230 Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the leader of the Greater Romania Party, has never been sued, although he was accused of involvement in the planning and financing of the miner riots. ‘Initiative 2003’, a civic association founded in September 2003, handed in to the government a five hundred pages file containing all the reasons for which the Greater Romania Party should be declared illegal and its leader sent to trial. The file also includes sound evidence in this sense. See “Cererea de declarare a neconstitutionalitatii PRM a ajuns pe masa Guvernului”, Romania Libera, 31 October 2003, www.romanialibera.ro. 231 See Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Atentie la instigatori si complici!”, in Ziua, 18 February 1999, and Dan Pavel, “Puterea, opozitia si interesul national”, in Ziua, 18 October 1999, www.ziua.ro. See also Cornel Nistorescu, “Fantomele tranzitiei”, in Evenimentul Zilei, 19 February 1999, www.evenimentulzilei.ro, Stefan Augustin Doinas—“Un nou tip de cenzura?”, Cotidianul, 10 December 2001, www.cotidianul.ro.

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instability is not among the officially acknowledged internal threats to state security. The sources of this political instability however are within the state mechanisms and institutions themselves making the situation more serious and complicated. It is a vicious circle because they cannot be addressed by one and the same players in government. Three other cases are instrumental in this respect in underlying the dangers of ‘who is guarding the guards’. The first case refers to the implications of the Kosovo crisis for the Romanian political system. In order to fully understand the different reactions registered on this occasion, some historical background is necessary. In the communist period, Romanians were taught to believe that they had a reliable neighbour during the centuries in the Serb people with whom they had shared interests (fighting the expansion of Ottoman dominance or other great powers). They were forced to believe that they were surrounded by enemy neighbours and their only friend was the Serb nation. Only few people were aware that in June 1940 when the Soviets invaded Romania and took over Bessarabia and afterwards, when the Hungarians took over Transylvania, the Serbs were at the south-western border of Romania preparing to invade the Banat.232 This myth of uninterrupted friendship was perpetuated by the existing situation after the fall of the communism. Trading relations rapidly developed between the two banks of the Danube River. The benefits for the local population were huge especially during the secession war in Yugoslavia when illegal trafficking of gas was boosting. These were the circumstances in which Romania was asked by NATO to grant permission for the Alliance’s air forces to enter her airspace. The Supreme Council for National Defence (SCND) discussed the request and took a decision that was consistent with Romania’s commitments and objectives. The counsellor to the president on security matters, Dorin Marian, declared that NATO aircrafts were allowed to cross Romania’s airspace but “only in emergency situations”, mainly in the case of “technical malfunctions or search-and-rescue missions”.233 He further underlined that this decision could not be considered as 232 Bessarabia is the nowadays Republic of Moldavia, Transylvania is the western historic province of Romania, and the Banat is in the south-western part of Romania. In June 1940, after the ultimatum given to Romania by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia placed 100 Renault tanks at the border with Romania preparing for an invasion. See Mihail E. Ionescu, Dupa hegemonie (Bucuresti: Scripta), 1993, pp. 57–8. 233 “Culoar aerian pentru NATO in spatial mioritic”, Evenimentul Zilei, 12 October 1998, www.evenimentulzilei.ro.

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supporting aggression to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and, consequently, could not be interpreted as a violation of the Yugoslavian-Romanian Treaty which stipulates that none of the contracting parties shall allow that its territory is used by a third party to commit an aggression against the other contracting party and shall not give any kind of assistance to such a third party.234

The decision of the SNCD was presented to the parliament for approval and it gave rise to an avalanche of declarations and manifestations of pros and cons. The opposition parties rejected this proposal for reasons such as the fact that the decision was against Romania’s national interests and “it should have clearly been stipulated that Romania would neither get military involved nor offer any kind of military facilities”.235 They went so far as to insist that Romania had no obligation to get even indirectly involved in the Kosovo crisis.236 Nationalistic accents were also present in their arguments expressing fears that what was happening in Kosovo might occur in Romania too as an ethnic group (read Hungarian) represent a majority of the local population (read the Szekely land).237 Even one of the coalition parties though, admittedly, with a small number of deputies, had hesitations in supporting the SCND’s proposal stating that Romania should adopt a neutral position in the case of a military intervention in Kosovo. . . . Nevertheless, if NATO asks for a Romanian military participation and we are going to reject this, all Romania’s efforts to apply to NATO for membership are going to be annulled.238

234 Article 7 of the Treaty. See Law 112 for the ratification of the Treaty on friendship, good-neighbourly and co-operative relations between Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concluded on 16 May 1996, in Monitorul Oficial no. 250, 16 October 1996; www.just.ro/legislatie. 235 PSD declaration made in October 1998, see official site, www.psd.ro. 236 PUNR declaration; see “Peuneristii vor ca Parlamentul sa decida in privinta Kosovo”, in Ziua, 13 October 1998, www.ziua.ro. 237 Declarations made among others by Adrian Nastase, former minister of foreign affairs, at that time prime-minister, and Gheorghe Tinca, also a PSD member, former minister of defence (March 1994–December 1996). The politicians referred to the Harghita and Covasna counties (the Szekely land) where the Hungarian population forms the majority. See “Parlamentul—vot decisiv pentru Kosovo” in Evenimentul Zilei, 14 October 1998, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 238 Varujan Vosganian, leader of the Romania’s Alternative Party (PAR), in “PAR o tine una si buna cu neutralitatea”, Ziua, 13 October 1998, www.ziua.ro.

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In addition to this opposition in parliament, there were public manifestations against Romanian’s involvement in the crisis supported by some mass media. Not surprisingly, the Serb minority living on Romania’s territory also protested against this decision.239 Although the SCND proposal was adopted by the parliament (244 votes ‘pro’ and 160 ‘contra’), the situation shows a disastrous split in the political elite on a foreign policy issue which should not have raised any problem given the Romanians’ overwhelming orientation towards integration into NATO. The second case also indicates cleavages at the political level, this time inside one state institution. At the end of October 2000, just before the general elections, a controversial association was set up, that is, the National Association of Romanian Military. Most of its twenty-eight founding members were retired officers but others were active members of the Romanian military. The most important figure was the Chief of the Romanian General Staff, General Mircea Chelaru. Notably, many of the retired officers had been members of the Military Superior Political Council, a body through which the Communist Party controlled the military before 1989. Some of these people were suspected of being closely related to the KGB. The purpose of the new association was to participate in the settlement of major problems the country faces and to support those institutions that deal with the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country and have a role in improving the people’s living standards.240

Moreover, the founding paper of this association pointed out bitterly that “the militaries are totally ignored” on the ground of the military is an apolitical institution.241 At the same time, “a crowd of political, economic and criminal profiteers infiltrate everywhere, including the system of the military institutions’.242 Clearly, it is not the duty of any public association including militaries, policemen and secret services employees to fight corruption, antisocial activities, criminality or any other wrongdoing; nor to deal 239 See “Sarbii din Romania spera ca Parlamentul nu va vota solicitarea CSAT”, Evenimentul Zilei, 14 October 1998, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 240 See Cornel Nistorescu—“Inainte, mars!”, Evenimentul Zilei, 1 November 2000, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 241 Ibid. 242 Ibid.

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with malfunctions “in the formation of new generations”.243 These are the concerns of the government and democratic institutions. But the fact that a public organization considers it appropriate to handle these raises the question regarding the capability of the democratic institutions themselves. Can they actually deal with the security risks and threats that Romania has to face? Furthermore, if there are discontents regarding the way these institutions function, an association of dissatisfied military is the most suspected by politicians and political parties invoking fears of coups and forceful interference in politics. Thus, many analysts considered this association to represent a threat to the democratic consolidation in Romania.244 Moreover, due to the fact that it also comprised active professional officers, it threw a shadow of doubt over the functioning of the Romanian military institution, the armed forces and the ministry of defence, as well as over their democratic sympathies and attitudes.245 Taking into consideration that the Army next to the Church have been the most trusted institutions in Romania since 1989 scoring over 80 percent in every poll, this development is very worrying because the military may see their act as legitimated. It shows also that this institution has still to overcome a mindset of reminiscent communism. Neither the Iliescu ruling nor the Constantinescu one considered the cleaning of the Army, the police forces and the secret services of former political officers a priority. Some of these people were involved in activities that could only undermine citizens’ trust in democratic values and institutions. Under these circumstances, maybe the most incredible thing related to the set up of this association was that everything was done in the open, all the necessary approvals were asked for and obtained, the Romanian Intelligence Service seemed to have known that something was wrong with this organization and, though it informed the president and other state institutions, nobody did anything to stop these developments. The public debates only had started after the association took shape. The consequences of the scandal were relevant: (1) it became evident that mentality and people change at a slow pace in the

243

Ibid. See M. Drent, D. Greenwood, S. Huisman and P. Volten, op. cit., p. 117. 245 See Dan Pavel, “Mai putem avea incredere in Armata?” in Ziua, 6 November 2000; Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Complotul generalilor este si anti-statal, si anti-NATO” in Ziua, 3 November 2000; Valentin Paunescu, “Un gest nervos al Romaniei . . .” in Curierul National, 3 November 2000. 244

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military too, although the Romanian Army was always considered an elite group; (2) the democratic institutions are hardly aware of where the risks to the state’s political stability lay; (3) the association was dissolved and the Chief of the General Staff resigned. The legal system worked eventually and solved in an appropriate manner the challenges raised by this association. Drastic reforms in the military began with Ioan Mircea Pascu’s appointment as minister of defence at the end of 2000. To be ready to join NATO in the second wave of enlargement, Romania had to undertake radical transformations.246 Minister Pascu openly admitted that there was much to be done regarding the de-politicization, growth of professionalism, and enhancement of civilian expertise in the military. During his office, bold reforms have been adopted in this sense.247 Conditionality played a key role in constraining the Romanian government to undertake real reforms in order to fulfil the Alliance’s criteria for accession.248 The Membership Action Plan was designed precisely in order to offer the candidates a regular process of evaluation and consultations that would guide their preparations for admission. It gives them the opportunity ‘to show that they have met a number of eligibility criteria and are capable of satisfying certain expectations and requirements’.249 Alongside with external conditionality, domestic constraints put pressure on the government too. A new failure to obtain membership could have boosted the extremist nationalist orientations that had always promoted the idea of a Western conspiracy against the Romanians. Therefore, Romania’s chances of faster democratization and modernization would be considerably diminished for a while. The combination of external conditionality and internal constraints proved

246 For an analysis of the state of Romania’s compliance with NATO’s criteria for membership at that moment, see Adina Stefan, Romania’s Engagement in Subregional Co-operation and the National Strategy for NATO Accession, (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies), December 1999. 247 For an extensive assessments of these reforms, see M. Drent, D. Greenwood, S. Huisman and P. Volten, op. cit., pp. 117–123. 248 These criteria were first mentioned in a 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and can also be found on NATO official site: functioning democracy based on a market economy; treatment of minority groups in accordance with OSCE guidelines; good neighbourly relations and overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance and to achieve interoperability with other members’ forces; commitment to democratic civil-military relations. See www.nato.int. 249 See M. Drent, D. Greenwood, S. Huisman and P. Volten, op. cit., p. 1.

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successful: Romania managed to qualify for NATO membership as it undertook the necessary reforms. The third and last case is of a different nature. The governing coalition formed after the 2004 elections has experienced an incredible number of disputes and conflicts among its constituents or between some of these and an external party. Practically, the continuous feuding between President Basescu and Prime Minister Tariceanu enrolled public institutions, organizations (political or non-governmental), personalities, and journalists on one side or another. The coalition managed to survive until its main goal was reached, that is, Romania’s accession in the EU. Three months afterwards, the relations between PNL and PDL broke down and a minority government was formed that had to rely on the support of the opposition to pass reform legislation through the parliament. About three weeks later, the legislative suspended President Traian Basescu with 322 votes to 108 amid allegations of abusing his powers and constitutional breach. He was accused of exceeding his authority by criticising judges, influencing prosecutors and ordering the secret services to monitor ministers’ phones.250 Under Romanian law, a referendum must be held within 30 days from the suspension for impeachment to follow. The decision of the parliament was regarded differently by various political and civic groups or personalities, from Romania or abroad, in terms of significance and implications. Andrei Plesu, prominent writer, former minister of foreign affairs and former advisor of President Basescu, condemned the parliament stating that “in all the years of its fragile democracy our country has been led by faceless voting robots who wave their hands between naps while the demagogues keep talking”.251 Vladimir Tismaneanu, professor of political sciences and president of the Commission for the condemnation of the communism, explained this ‘Parliamentary putsch’ through Mr. Basescu’s unremitting fight against corruption and his support for transparency in dealing with the secret police archives from Romania’s dark, totalitarian times. When the president last year called the former

250 Basescu was accused of 19 constitutional violations. See “Propunere de suspendare din functie a Presedintelui Romaniei, Traian Basescu”, 12 February 2007, official website of the Romanian Senate, www.senat.ro. 251 “Andrei Plesu on the twilight hours in the Romanian Parliament”, Dilema veche, 23 April 2007, www.dilemaveche.ro.

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communist regime “illegitimate and criminal,” he made himself many enemies among the old nomenklatura.252

European Union representatives also took position in this matter. Mr. Hannes Swoboda of the European Parliament’s Socialist Group expressed concern about Romania’s stability. The country’s party leaders, including the prime minister, must look for the stability of the country in this critical situation. The suspended president must contribute to a peaceful, democratic solution to the crisis.253

Mr. Joseph Daul, chairman of the centre-right EPP-ED group (in which PDL is a member as well) pointed out that Basescu has made an important contribution to Romania’s path, thus facilitating its accession to the EU. At the moment, the procedure of impeachment of a sitting president in a member state country against the decision of the Constitutional Court creates rather than solves problems.254

Mr. Graham Watson, leader of the ALDE group in the European Parliament, was rather confident that the suspension of the President would not diminish the momentum of the reform process. I don’t think the present political situation will affect the way the reforms are going in Romania, as the areas in which reform is essential are under the command of the prime minister, and not the president. I would see the reforms continue, maybe even becoming easier, as the president won’t be there anymore.255

As it can be remarked, even the European representatives took sides with one party or another. A completely different tone had Mircea Geoana, the leader of the opposition Social Democrats that had instigated the move against Basescu. He saw the vote for suspension as “a victory for Romanian

252 Vladimir Tismaneanu si Paul Dragos Aligica, “Romania’s Parliamentary Putsch”, Wall Street Journey, 20 April 2007, www.online.wsj.com. Tismaneanu refers to the official condemnation of the communist regime by President Basescu at the end of 2006. 253 See “Romania braces for elections after president’s ousting”, 20 April 2007, www .euractiv.com 254 Ibid. EPP-ED is the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats in the European Parliament, see www.epp-ed.eu. 255 Ibid. ALDE is the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament where PNL, prime minister Tariceanu’s party, is a member. See www.alde.eu.

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democracy even if it is a difficult moment’.256 Prime Minister Tariceanu discovered that there were more crucial issues to be addressed, thus ’”the parliament should go back to work as soon as possible, as on its agenda there are important projects for continuing the integration process, especially the ANI law”.257 He added: “We cannot afford to have the decisive laws for the European future to be postponed, not even for five minutes, over political confrontations”.258 The most vehement incriminations came from nobody else than Dan Voiculescu, the leader of the conservators, a declared enemy of Traian Basescu. He accused the latter of populism and demagogy and of “thinking like a communist”.259 President Basescu’s suspension by the parliament triggered a multitude of reactions and, unavoidably, further polarization at all the society layers. But polarization is not the only negative effect of this initiative. The whole procedure implies several steps: the parliament launches a proposal to suspend the president, the Constitutional Court analyzes it and gives an advice which is not binding, thus the parliament can ignore it and continue the procedure. Once the president suspended, he can wait for the organization of a referendum that could lead to his impeachment (in case that the people approve on his suspension), or he can resign and then early presidential elections have to be organized. What happened in this case is that after the parliament proposed the suspension, the Constitutional Court looked into the matter and cleared Basescu, ruling that the accusations against him did not amount to “serious violations of the constitution”.260 Moreover, the Court found that: the president, given his prerogatives and legitimacy, can express political opinions and options, make remarks or criticise the functioning of public authorities and their representatives, propose reforms or measures he considers beneficial to the national interest. Nevertheless, president’s 256 See “Romanian Parliament votes to suspend President”, 20 April 2007, www .romanianewswatch.com. 257 See note 203. 258 Ibid. 259 See “Nu va multumim, domnule Basescu, nu ati facut nimic bun pentru Romania”, 19 April 2007, www.realitatea.net. 260 According to Article 95 of Romania’s Constitution (revised), “in case of serious acts which breach the Constitution, the President of Romania can be suspended by the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, in joint session, with the vote of the majority of parliamentarians, after consulting the Constitutional Court”. See Advisory Opinion no. 1 from 5 April 2007, in Monitorul Oficial no. 258, 18 April 2007, www.ccr.ro.

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opinions, remarks, partialities or requests have no decisional character and produce no juridical effects, the public authorities being exclusively responsible for following or ignoring them.261

Actually, by this act the Constitutional Court gives a sound justification to Basescu’s active role on the Romanian political scene, supporting his own declarations that he would be an ‘involved president’. At this point, the parliament had decided to ignore the recommendation of the Court and carried on with the suspension procedure. The problem here is that, on receiving the Court’s motivation on its ruling, the legislative decided to ignore it and continue its action without providing any grounds to support this. The parliament chose not to follow the juridical counsel of the country’s highest constitutional authority and adopted a political decision. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court comes again in action to “ascertain the existence of the circumstances that justify the interim in exercising the office of Romania’s President and communicates its findings to the Parliament and Government”.262 Hence, the Court is called to verify the circumstances that led to the president’s suspension, which triggered the interim office, that is, whether the conditions for suspension are met. And, there is again an unexpected development as the Court establishes, “through a decision”, the existence of the circumstances that justify the presidential interim office.263 Clearly, this juridical act—a ‘decision’—has a different weight than the ‘consultative opinion’ given at the beginning of the procedure and, therefore, its contents should be the result of a careful and comprehensive examination. That cannot be the case since the decision was given precisely one day after the parliament’s vote for suspension and—even more important—as it canceled the Court’s own early findings and motivations against this act. The hasty and surprising ruling of the Constitutional Court is rather a symptom of lack of independence in its activity. Many of its members had been for years PSD activists and the ties with the former political fellows might still be strong. Then, the de facto independence of all the judicial bodies in Romania has started with the coming in power of Traian Basescu and the appointment of Monica Macovei as minister of

261

Ibid. According to Article 146, paragraph 1, g of Romania’s Constitution (revised). See www.ccr.ro. 263 Decision No. 1, Constitutional Court, 20 April 2007, in Monitorul Oficial no. 269/2007, www.ccr.ro. 262

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justice. Both were fervent supporters of measures and laws that would have insured that the judiciary power is not politically influenced. In this sense, in 2005–06 was registered a remarkable progress appreciated not only by the Romanian society but also by foreign institutions, i.e. the European Union. Nevertheless, the magistrates and all the other employees of this branch have to adapt psychologically to this new condition, which might prove difficult for some people who had been working for a long time in a system strictly controlled by the political sector. At this stage, a weak point of the institution that is the highest guarantor regarding the observance of the Constitution in Romania is represented by its own constituents. Traian Ungureanu, a well known political commentator, made a biting characterization of the situation created after the suspension of President Basescu, which is the right of the Parliament, but it crashed the clear opinion of the Constitutional Court—the institution that guarantees the existence of the rule of law in Romania. In other words, by suspending the Court’s competency, Basescu’s suspension put the bases of the future extralegal regime of the Romanian state. What does this mean?264

The extralegal regime installed by an oligarchic group accepts abuses, with the formal preservation of institutions. Accepts theft, in the feeble presence of the magistrates, vicious campaigns, with the enslaved presence of the media, the permanent privilege, within a false market economy. [. . .] This is the democratic paradise that will be aggressively inaugurated, in case that Basescu will be removed through referendum or other means.265

The institutional crisis came to an end once that Traian Basescu was reconfirmed as president through a popular referendum.266 Practically, the results of the referendum confirmed what has already been known for some time: Basescu was and remained the most popular Romanian

264 Traian Ungureanu, “Ce vrea Coalitia pentru un Parlament furat”, Cotidianul, 23 April 2007, www.cotidianul.ro. 265 Ibid. 266 According to the Central Electoral Office, 74.48 percent out of the 44.45 percent of the voting Romanians who participated in the referendum on 19 May 2007 opposed to Basescu’s demission. See Romanian Global News, 22 May 2007, www.2007 .rgnpress.ro.

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politician.267 Nevertheless, the fact that a deep institutional crisis can emerge with rather little difficulty gives a severe signal regarding the soundness and well-functioning of the Romanian constitutional system. First, if one accepts the fact that the Constitutional Court cannot verify whether the conditions for suspension are met, then this institution plays a purely decorative role, which hampers its function of guardian of the Constitution. In this case, the suspension of the president has an exclusive political nature, which contravenes to the constitutional provisions.268 Actually, the suspension procedure has a politico-juridical character in the first phase, but becomes exclusively juridical in the end since both the involved authorities—the president and the parliament—have the same juridical legitimacy. The only solution is then the analysis of the facts that has to be undertaken by the judiciary, and in this particular case, by the Constitutional Court. Disregarding its role and ignoring its rulings, especially when these actions come from another state power—the legislative, which is one of the rule of law pillars—undermines the constitutional system and slows down the further consolidation of democracy in Romania. When President Basescu was suspended by the parliament, which practically marked the apogee of an incessant political crisis, the polls indicated several interesting things. If before the suspension more than 90 percent of the respondents thought that the Romanian political life had been marked by endless scandals, afterwards the percent fell to 79.7 as the people expected a calming down of the political fights.269 A worrying observation was made at the beginning of the year when almost 70 percent of the voting population declared to having very little if no interest in politics.270 Moreover, the population’s agenda at that moment focused mostly on social problems or living standards in

267 Since 2004, he has been constantly on the first place in the polls in terms of public trust and popularity. For instance, in a poll made by CURS in October 2005, Basescu was the most popular politician with a score of 60 percent, followed by Mircea Geoana (PSD) with 55 percent and Calin Popescu Tericeanu (liberal prime minister) with 42 percent. See “Basescu se mentine in topul popularitatii”, 13 October 2005, www .hotnews.ro. In September 2007, the top of most popular Romanian politicians was as follows (according to IMAS): Traian Basescu with 55 percent, Gigi Becali (leader PNG) with 31 percent, Teodor Stolojan (leader PLD) with 29 percent. See “55 percent dintre romani au incredere in Basescu”, 3 October 2007, www.ziare.com. 268 See Article 95, op. cit. 269 “Sondajul national ‘Polis’”, Institutul PRO, 25–27 May 2007, www.institutulpro.ro. 270 “Sondajele evalueaza primele efecte ale scandalului ‘biletelul’ ”, Institutul PRO, 27 February 2007, www.institutulpro.ro.

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contrast to the topics under dispute on the political scene.271 The population had already given negative indications regarding the intention to participate in the elections, more than 50 percent intending to boycott them.272 Given the continuous turbulences in the political life and the detachment of the political parties from their electorate, the growing percent of alienated people is not surprising. Another problem is the fact that, with a turnover under 50 percent in the legislative elections, the legitimacy of the parliamentarian parties can be questioned since half of the voting population would have declined its right to vote. Finally, after the scandal around the President Basescu’s suspension, multiple solutions regarding political reform were positively acknowledged by the people. For instance, 77.1 percent considered that a lowering of the parliamentarians’ number would contribute to the improvement of the political life, while 73.8 thought that a stronger co-operation between the president and the political parties was needed.273 Other solutions indicated were: adoption of the uninominal vote (67.8 percent), changes in the political behaviour of PSD (49 percent), modification of the Constitution (42.5 percent), reforms within PNL (39.3 percent), more direct participation of the citizens through referendum to the governing of the country (36.2 percent), adoption of the lustration law (31.7 percent) and, in the end, increase of the presidential powers (28.6 percent).274 Clearly, the reform of the constitutional system gathers a great deal of support while an increase of the powers the president already enjoys is not seen by many as necessary, indicating that, for the greatest part of the population, returning to an authoritarian system is no longer desirable. The cases looked into are meant to indicate that political instability cannot be regarded as a minor issue. At both the elite and non-elite levels the old mentality persists and represents a serious obstacle in the process of democratic consolidation. One thing is evident: there have been more than eighteen years in which these people had the opportunity to change their mentality and to adopt the democratic values. Who did not show the slightest sign in this sense by now, and

271 Ibid. For instance, a quarrel between the president and prime minister around a note that the latter had sent to the former asking for interference with the judiciary in favour of his friend Dinu Particiu, the oil magnate, who was under investigation. 272 “Evolutii in sondaje”, Institutul PRO, 25 October 2006, www.institutulpro.ro. 273 Op. cit., Institutul PRO, 25–27 May 2007, www.institutulpro.ro. 274 Ibid.

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this refers especially to the elite members who had all the opportunities to do it (access to the latest information, numerous contacts with representatives of Western democracies, contacts with other Romanian elite members of democratic orientation etc.), cannot be expected to do so from now on. Such people are now even more dangerous than in the early 1990s because they can postpone for a long time the democratic institutional consolidation. Moreover, in the last years a low degree of confidence in the democratic institutions has been registered at the non-elite level precisely due to all the delays and unsuccessful attempts of the ruling elite to make the institutional and economic reform. As it was emphasized earlier, the disappointment led to lack of confidence that, on its turn, led to alienation or radicalization of an important part of the Romanian society. The lack of political leadership leads to a situation in which there is no security of the state or of its people. All these circumstances make the political instability a serious issue when analysing the vulnerabilities of the Romanian democratic regime. Conclusions The findings of this chapter offer already a partial answer to this book’s core issue. Many of the accomplishments and shortcomings of the democratization process in Romania have been in relation to Romania’s political culture and past. Some aspects have to be emphasized again due to their relevance for the political dimension of security. One major problem is that the political elite have displayed beliefs and undertaken actions that were inconsistent with the democratic principles. The situation is by and large visible especially among the members of the biggest Romanian party, PSD, which has not gone through a phase of soul-searching and purification, only through a partial rejuvenation. Thus, it is still an amalgam of interest groups that more than once have proved to have opposite interests and even ideologies. Consequently, it negatively affected PSD’s coherence in governing. The situation also favoured the persistence of corruption at high levels as compromises had to be made among the interest groups to be able to hold on to power. Opposed to this, the democrats and liberals went through a maturation phase which, despite their quarrelsome and troubled governing experience, has favoured relevant successes and a visible improvement of the executive performance.

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The study of the four ‘presidential’ periods revealed several characteristics of the nascent Romanian democracy. ‘Iliescu 1’ was marked by stagnation. Most of the messages of those in power had nationalist and even communist accents. Political elite lacked respect for democratic procedures and did nothing to encourage public participation in the decision-making process or the formation of associative interest groups. The ‘Constantinescu’ period failed to meet the public expectations regarding faster and more determined reforms and fight against corruption. The anti-communist elite put more energy in political fights than in promoting the public interest. Although everything was half-way done, the roots of further transformations were actually formed in this period. However, the population was discontent with the numerous postponements and incoherencies in the governing act and it sanctioned the ‘democratic’ elite at the next elections. ‘Iliescu 2’ was marked by more determination in ruling, more observance of the democratic procedures and an increase of associative organizations though they still enjoyed little opportunities to influence the political elite. The PSD government, as opposed to its performance during ‘Iliescu 1’ period, proved more attached to political and economic reforms, more dynamic and professional. Despite all these, accountability was almost non-existent and corruption got to levels never reached before. The judiciary was still politically influenced, the numerous scandals generated by controvertible decisions seriously affecting the trust of the public opinion in this institution. The ‘Basescu’ period is maybe the most outstanding of the four as it proves that political willingness and determination at the elite level in pursuing reforms can produce very rapidly drastic changes. Whether they are irreversible is another question. Chances are in favour as long as new generations of young professionals attached to democratic values get involved in the decision-making processes at all the society levels. Nevertheless, President Basescu has registered very impressive achievements, based on an active involvement in the political life, which made maximal use of his constitutional prerogatives. At the same time, the perpetuation of the ‘two executives’ situation through all the periods has led to competitive actions between presidency and government that had disturbing outcomes for the whole society. Nevertheless, certain progress has been made and it can be assessed that Romania is now in the post-transitional phase in what regards the political sector. Political pluralism is functional, various parties with

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different orientations were alternately in power, and at the individual level, the citizen’s rights were consolidated. From the point of view of the democratization theoretical approach results that the Romanian democracy is at the beginning of the phase of maturation. The political dimension of security brings additional elements into the problem. On the positive side, an exceptional situation involving the co-operation between the political institutions and civil society has to be pointed out here. The public was invited to comment on the strategy of national security and, even more surprising, aspects mentioned by representatives of the civil society are included in the final text of the strategy. This was an act of direct political participation in a sensitive sector of the political agenda. Nonetheless, there are still many citizens who think that a strategy of national security falls entirely within the responsibility of the government.275 Another positive aspect refers to the effects of conditionality when combined with domestic determination to pursue reforms. NATO membership was obtained by Romania after genuine military and democratic reforms to insure compliance with the Alliance’s criteria for integration. Similarly, the possibility of joining the EU influenced the ruling elite to undertake very consistent efforts to meet the accession requirements. Conditionality has indeed the potential to boost internal transformations. The cases of securitization disclose several vulnerabilities of the democratic system in Romania. To begin with, the case of political instability reveals the fragility of a governing coalition that was built up on the basis of percentages won in the elections and not on a sound programme adequate capabilities. The ministerial offices were awarded mostly to good party activists rather than specialists. The prime minister was the president’s choice and enjoyed little support in his own party. At a certain point, this became clear as part of his party’s members were in favour of his resignation. He chose to openly acknowledge the severe political instability quite late in the process, after members of the coalition, of his party, and civil society representatives had already done it. Its effects, especially in what regards the foreign investments, the financial market, and Romania’s credibility abroad had a negative influence

275 It is, for instance, the case of a Romanian University professor who argued that the public opinion has no saying in the process of drawing up a strategy of national security. The remark was made at a conference in Iasi, Romania, in July 2000.

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on the democratization process. Even more important, the population’s trust in the efficiency of the state institutions sank dangerously. The second case—the miner riots of 1999—highlights another vulnerability of the system. The President acknowledged openly the danger of the situation and undertook exceptional measures. All these took place with the support of a relevant part of the civil society. But, a security complex did not take shape in this case due to the failure of the governing elite to punish all those involved in undermining the rule of law. This failure triggered the discontent of the civil society and the protests of mass media. In the end, the population ceased to support the actions of the governing elite. The state institutions proved too weak to eliminate some extremist parties from the political scene after these had been involved in unconstitutional actions.276 So, these issues could not be solved within the framework of the normal political life, which means that de-securitization could not take place. The additional cases presented here underline the idea that the state institutions in Romania present malfunctions that can severely affect the democratization process through delays in their relevant activities. As the elements brought up by the security approach show, democratic institutions are not fully efficient and they suffer sometimes of internal malfunctions generated by the still present old communist mentality. Despite all these shortcomings, an ascending trend can be noticed in what regards the encouragement of the societal actors to participate in the political sector of security. With the maturation of the democracy in Romania, this trend is bound to gain in importance. But, there are certain actors for whom political participation might be vital for asserting their goals and then pursuing them. Ethnic groups, for instance, do not always enjoy the rights and freedoms of the majority, their chances to influence the political elite being sometimes almost non-existent. Democratization should be inclusive regarding these groups, and the next chapter analyses whether this is the case in Romania. The focus remains on the security matters.

276

See the paragraph in this chapter on Two case studies of securitization in Romania.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIETAL SECTOR Introduction The societal approach to security has identity as organizing concept. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever type define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a group. The referent objects in the societal sector are various large groups whose representatives can create a socially powerful argument regarding a threat to the identity of the respective group.1 Thus, these can be tribes, clans, nations, ethnic minorities, civilizations, religions, or race. In our case, the referent objects are represented by nation or ethnic minorities. Analysing the degree of participation of all the actors in security matters in Romania, one cannot overlook the pertinence of the societal aspects to this topic. Representing 10.5 percent of the Romanian population,2 the ethnic minorities should—according to international standards—enjoy the necessary rights and conditions to maintain their identity and, at the same time, to actively participate in the transformations at all the levels of society. Furthermore, the relationship between the minority and its kin-state or between the kin-state and Romania is also relevant. Democratization is bound to facilitate the integration process of the ethnic groups in society, but this takes place neither smoothly nor fast. The findings in the chapter on the political sector have underlined the obstacles on the road to a democratic political culture. In addition to these, challenges specific to the societal sector, in particular nationalism, deserve special attention due to their potential disruptive consequences.

1 For additional information, see Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe (London: Pinter), 1993. 2 According to the 2002 census, Romania’s population encompasses the following nationalities: Romanian 89.5 percent; Hungarian 6.6 percent; Roma (Gypsy) 2.5 percent; German 0.3 percent; Ukrainian 0.3 percent; other (including Croats, Serbs, Turks and Jews) 0.8 percent. Thus, the ethnic minorities represent 10.5 percent of the population. See the official site of the National Institute of Statistics, www.insse.ro.

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In close connection to all these, political participation, political influence and the behaviour and beliefs of the minority elite’s representatives help in linking the societal sector to the political one and thus acknowledging the roots of certain tensions which, if disregarded, could lead to political instability. The majority’s ability to respond to the minority’s demands in a way that would create no privileges, but it would build the necessary environment for preserving its cultural identity, is of utmost importance. The problems that Romania has faced in identifying the way of properly handling the ethnic minorities’ matters allowed the emergence of nationalist politicians in both parties. These, by making use of extremist views which were instigating to hatred and chauvinism, endangered many times the efforts of the rest of the society towards positive developments. This chapter aims at drawing some relevant conclusions regarding the opportunities offered to ethnic minorities in Romania and their participation in security matters. It opens with an overview of the main theoretical aspects and a refinement of few necessary concepts. The next section focuses on the historical developments in the 20th century, as the roots of some of today’s problems belong to this period. The elements of the securitization process are then presented in the societal context: actors involved and their roles, disputed issues between minority and majority, external influences, various securitization attempts and their outcomes. In addition, the possibility of a segregation attempt in Romania is looked into in relation to the rest of the findings. The concluding part underlines the relevance of the results in this area for the whole research.3 3.1. Refinement of some concepts and a theoretical overview A first aspect that has to be mentioned is that there are different ways of identifying groups that have conflicting interests. For instance, in Romania’s case, the cleavage urban-rural is an important one: the rural population is more conservative, more conformist, less inclined to associate and less inclined to contest the local authorities than the urban population. No matter how well informed and convinced about their evaluations of certain issues, people in the rural areas tend to conform

3 The data analysed in this sector covers the period between 1990 and the beginning of 2008.

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themselves easier to the norms and rules imposed by the government.4 At the same time, the low levels of trust in the new institutions and the benefits of associative structures led to a limited membership of local associations. The establishment does not face an organized structure powerful enough to influence the political decision-making process.5 The local authorities such as the mayor, the local counsellor and the priest are considered reliable as appreciated leaders who contribute to the well being of the community.6 More than 47 percent of the Romanian population live in the rural areas7 and, if we take into account their more conservative political orientation, it is easy to understand the success of the neo-communists in the early 1990s and their ability to maintain their stronghold since then. Although the transformation pace (that is, accepting new, non-traditional aspects, norms or methods) is slower in the country, there is no ground to expect conflicts between rural and urban identity groups that would endanger national security. Another issue needs to be clarified too. The political chapter looked into a situation that was potentially threatening for Romania’s security, that is, the miners’ riot of January 1999. There had been five riots of this sort since 1990, all of them led by the same person. Although it could be at a first glance expected that identity was the basis of these conflicting situations, in particular differences in income, education and political sophistication, reality is different. First, not all the miners in Romania were involved in the riots but only a part of them, those of Valea Jiului who are also poorer in comparison with the miners from other parts of the country. They include also people who came in the area looking for a job as they had no training to do anything else or they had a low level of education. As said, their actions were prompted every time by one and the same person, Miron Cozma, a charismatic person able to manipulate this local mass of people. But he also needed support to impose various political and social requests to the government and thus acted mostly as the instrument of some politicians. It should not be 4 Eurobarometru Rural (December 2002) made by Gallup—Romania at the initiative of the Foundation for an Open Society (a Romanian civil society institution), p. 10; www.gallup.ro. 5 Ibid., p. 18. The results indicate that 59 percent of the rural population “does not trust most of the other people” and only 35 percent of the households include one person who is a member of an association; www.gallup.ro. 6 Ibid., p. 20. According to the results, the mayor is credited with 63 percent, the member of the local council with 23 percent and the priest with 24 percent. www .gallup.ro. 7 According to the 2002 Census, the National Institute of Statistics, www.insse.ro.

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forgotten that he has been closely associated to Ion Iliescu though none of them ever admitted it openly.8 In the late 1990s Cozma confessed to be a member of the extremist Greater Romania Party. Once he was put in jail, the uproars and protests among the miners came to an end. So, no real identity conflict (of the type ‘we against the others’) can be depicted in this case either. Turning now to the ethnic issues, these do embody potentially explosive aspects that deserve a special attention. Ethnic minorities represent the referent object in the case of the societal security sector. The Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1134 (1990) of the Council of Europe distinguishes between ethnic groups and immigrants, migrant workers, and refugees and defines national minorities as separate or distinct groups, well defined and established on the territory of a state, the members of which are nationals of that state and have certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of the population.9

Many local tensions/conflicts are the result of so-called vertical competition between nation-states and minorities. Vertical competition can mean either integration projects or secessionist movements. In the first case, we deal with projects that aim at shaping a shared culture to sustain the nation-state and which addresses some or all of the institutions of cultural survival: schools, churches, language rights. Under repressive circumstances, ethnic minorities might be totally assimilated when the majority uses the state to structure educational, media and other systems to favour the majority culture. In the second case, under secessionist movements, people are pushed towards a narrower identity, rejecting the majority culture. Society can react to such threats in two ways, that is, through activities carried on by the community itself or by attempting to place the issue on the state agenda, moving it into the political sector. In these situations, representatives of the minority elite are instrumental in making known the attitudes and opinions of the group in the process of defending its cultural identity. The manner in which the concept of ‘assimilation’ is used deserves an explanation. Traditionally, assimilation has been defined as “a

8

In the Political Sector Chapter, the miner riots and Iliescu’s interference in favour of Cozma’s reprieve are presented. See paragraphs on Two case studies of securitization in Romania and, respectively, New elites and politicians’ beliefs (C: ‘Iliescu 2’ period). 9 Council of Europe, Document 6294 (1990), www.coe.int.

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mechanism for socializing culturally diverse groups into common normative expectations so that they can join the native mainstream”.10 This approach has limits in that it imposes majority norms and values on a minority that wants to preserve the cultural identity. A more modern approach alters this point of view and handles the issue no longer from the majority’s perspective that expects the ethnic minority to abandon its culture, but from the minority point of view as to how far and how fast it is prepared to assimilate. This approach makes distinction between political and economic integration, on the one hand, and cultural assimilation, on the other.11 Thus, if the question is merely one of political and economic integration, which is openly offered by the majority, the potential for conflict is reduced because the minority members are expected to have no objection to integrate themselves in this way. The minority will feel less pressured to abandon its (pre-existing) identity and cultural assimilation is left to a more long-term and inevitable generation change. It is this more differentiated notion of the concept which implies that assimilation will never be total that is preferred by the authorities. In that way a mixture of cultural traditions that are both indigenous and imported emerge in the societal context. The analysis of the referent objects in the societal sector has to begin with the nation. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, the representatives of opposition political forces of nationalistic orientation use preponderantly in their speeches the term of ‘nation’. The reasons behind this situation can be depicted in the fact that it is difficult to argue that those in power imperil the security of the state; on the contrary, it is easier to argue that the nation is endangered by others and the current leaders do not display enough concern to this matter. Consequently, this rhetoric would present as justified the necessity to bring the nationalist politicians in power.12 In addition to all these, it has to be emphasized the relevant role played by the media in defining the main elements of the societal crises. Its unsophisticated stories are helpful in identifying the parties involved in conflicts and their causes. 10 Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “Gaining the Upper Hand: Economic Mobility among Immigrants and Domestic Minorities” in Racial and Ethnic Studies no. 15, 1992, p. 492. 11 See Volker Berghahn, “Germans and Poles, 1871–1945” in Keith Bullivant, Geoffrey Giles and Walter Pape (eds.), Germany and Eastern Europe: cultural identities and cultural differences (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi B.V.), 1999, p. 20. 12 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op. cit., pp. 123–4.

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There are certain elements that distinguish a national minority group. Language plays a key role although there are situations in which the members of an ethnic group do not speak a different language from the rest of the population, as it is the case with many of the Gypsy communities. Furthermore, if a language has developed sufficiently and an ethnic group has established some type of political organization, an existing nation-state often officially recognizes the minority language, allowing it to be taught in various educational institutions, depending upon the political influence exercised by the group who speaks it. Religion also plays a central role in distinguishing minority groups and, in some case, it represents a characteristic of ethnicity. To go even further, for becoming politically conscious, an ethnic group has to follow a series of developments. Firstly, there is the cultural development relying on the maturation of a literary language which boosts the theatrical, literary and musical fields. Support from the existing state plays an essential part in this process. As for political ethnicity, it becomes possible with the backing of an ethnic media and the stereotypes which it perpetuates. In this sense, participation in the political life represents the highest level of ethnic consciousness. Activism can take various forms, the minorities building up political organizations through which they try to promote their purposes of achieving autonomy and, sometimes, independence. How do these characteristics fit in the process of building a democratic political culture? According to George Schöpflin, there are three key elements composing “the democratic nationhood”: civil society, the state and ethnicity.13 Not only that they are interdependent, but their continuous interaction determines a dynamic reformulation of all three. What we are particularly interested in is whether ethnicity can undermine democracy. Schöpflin argues that this can be the case “when either the state or civil society, or both, is too weak to contain it, and hence ethnic criteria are used for state and civic purposes”.14 Minorities are seen as hostile and aiming at secession, therefore they are not allowed to share power with the majority. When a minority has to face harsh measures that endanger its cultural reproduction, it may become less inclined to consent to be ruled by the majority. In

13 14

George Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power (London: Hurst & Co.), 2000, p. 35. Ibid., p. 43.

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such situations, the political debates are completely ethnicised and no satisfactory settlement can be achieved between the parties. Moreover, any possibility to build up a minority-majority relationship based on trust is undermined and all these “make good governance impossible to institute”.15 Each of the post-communist countries has experienced to a certain degree this state of facts and in some of them acceptable settlements for the ethnic minorities have been designed with positive results. But the problems differ from country to country and specific circumstances need particular regulations. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are hardly homogenous in what regards their population, but the percentages representing ethnic minorities differ across the region. For instance, Poland has nowadays less than 2.5 percent of her population belonging to ethnic minorities,16 while in Hungary there is a significant difference between the official number and the one estimated by the minority organizations, 2.05 percent and, respectively, 8.1 percent.17 As the Romanian population includes 10.5 percent of national minorities, societal threats could prove disruptive and could slow down the country’s progress towards democratic consolidation. This situation has historical roots: the year of 1918, when Great Romania was founded through the unification of the Romanian principality with Transylvania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, brought not only benefits to Romania but also a sensitive problem, that is, a sizeable Hungarian minority. For decades before the 1990s, the relationship between Romania and Hungary had been rather inimical if not conflicting and only after the fall of the communist regimes there has been a significant progress towards normalization. At the same time, Romania registered internal tensions in dealing with her most relevant ethnic minority. Finding the right solutions to these issues is of great importance in reaching a high degree of social-cohesion, developing participant orientations among a relevant part of the population and establishing sound and efficient civil society structures.

15

Ibid., p. 133. At present, Poland’s population includes the following nationalities: Poles 97.6 percent; German 1.3 percent; Ukrainian 0.6 percent; Belorussian 0.5 percent (1990 estimation). See www.insidepoland.com.pl. 17 The numbers are according to the 1990 Census. See the official site of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, www.meh.hu. 16

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It must be underlined that Romania makes an interesting case because of her geographical position. At her Eastern borders, the Republic of Moldavia has faced problems with her Russian minority and even an open conflict in the Transdnister area without being able to identify the solution that would settle the existing tensions. Further to the East, the Caucasus have been the scene of violent clashes after the collapse of the Soviet Union, displaying sustained ethnic strife and proving that in countries where democracy is not rooted at all, nationalism can emerge as the new organizing principle for authoritarian rule, with sombre consequences for the regional stability. To the South, the Balkans have been experiencing an explosion of inter-community hatred and savagery which begun with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian crisis, continued with the Kosovo conflict and extended into FYR of Macedonia. The whole area has been in turmoil, fact that is hardly surprising taking into account that the ethnic elites proved tragically inept at peacefully resolving their differences. What has to be underlined is that Romania lies in an area where nationalism has been part of political culture for centuries. 3.2. Ethnic minorities in Romania: a historic overview The situation of the most relevant ethnic group in Romania, namely the Hungarian minority, is addressed here. The reason for focusing only on this group is the fact that the continuous tensions between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority also affected Romania’s relation with Hungary. At the same time, Hungary’s initiatives regarding its co-nationals abroad have created more than once problems between majority and minority leading to accumulation of mistrust in each other’s intentions. All these aspects have historic roots, so that their analysis is necessary for understanding the current situation. Consequently, the particularities of the Hungarian-Romanian relationship after the formation of the Romanian modern state are presented further. Equally, the way this has been influenced by the international legal settlements after World War I and since is dealt with in this section. Romania and its Hungarian minority When Great Romania was formed in 1918, one of the principalities that were incorporated in the new state was Transylvania which had

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a sizeable Hungarian population.18 To understand the implications of this act for both parties involved, historic data related to the pre-1918 period is illustrative. For centuries under Habsburgic/Austro-Hungarian ruling, the Romanians in Transylvania had fought for equal status and equal rights with the rest of the inhabitants. Although they accounted for more than 50 percent of the population, Romanians were considered a ‘tolerated’ ethnic group. Only at the beginning of the 19th century, when a national conscience had taken shape, their struggle started to get the characteristics of a national movement. At the same time, the situation had worsened considerably beginning with 1867 when Transylvania lost its autonomous status and was incorporated by Hungary. The government in Budapest adopted a law which proclaimed the existence of a sole nationality in Hungary, the Hungarian one, trying to totally assimilate the rest of ethnic groups by forcing them to embrace the official nationality. Romanians reacted by getting better organized: the Romanian National Party was officially recognized in 1881 and it played an essential role in the fight for assertion of the Romanians’ national identity and in organizing the resistance to the denationalization projects. Moreover, in 1892, Romanians’ national struggle culminated in the Memorandum Movement in which a group of Romanians’ representatives drew up an official memorandum and sent it to Vienna, to the emperor Franz Iosef I. The document informed the European public opinion on the Romanians’ claims and warned it regarding the intolerance to the national problem shown by the government in Budapest. And the situation of the national minorities in the Austro-Hungary was quite dramatic if we take into account the policy of pressing towards exceeding the 50 percent by the Hungarian population all over the territory of the Empire.19 The censuses of 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910 as well as the reforms in the education system at all the levels from kindergarten to university, were useful instruments in the process of Hungarization of the Gypsies, Jews, and members of other national minorities.

18 According to the 1910 Hungarian census, in Transylvania there were 53.8 percent Romanians, 28.6 percent Hungarians, 10.8 percent Germans, the rest being other minorities. See Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans (Cambridge University Press), 1983, vol. 2, p. 73. 19 See historian Dan A. Lazarescu, “Geografia i-a apropiat, destinul i-a indepartat” in Lumea Magazin, no. 4 (72), 1999, www.lumeam.ro.

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The end of the World War I with the triumph of the self-determination right of the people was seen by the Romanians on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains as the most appropriate moment to fulfil their national aspiration. The government of Romania (principality formed through the union of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1859) had been also very active in this regard and it tried to obtain the great powers guarantees for supporting Romania’s union with Transylvania. Thus, Romania maintained her neutrality in the first two years of war and joined the conflagration only in 1916, after the conclusion of a treaty with France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy which had recognized Romania’s right to claim Transylvania with Banat and Bukovina. But the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires in 1918 precipitated the events and Romanians did not wait for an international settlement: in Bessarabia, formerly incorporated by the Tsarist Empire, the country’s Parliament voted the unification with Romania on 9 April 1918, and the National Council in Bukovina did the same on 28 November 1918. The last act of this remarkable event in Romania’s history was concluded on the 1st of December of 1918, when, in Alba-Iulia, in the presence of more than 100,000 delegates, the National Assembly voted Transylvania’s union with Romania. Thus, when the International Peace Conference started in Paris in January 1919, the formation of the Great Romania was a fait accompli. The Trianon Treaty concluded between the winning powers and Romania on 4 June 1920 had only to acknowledge an existing situation. It is understandable that Hungary was not at all prepared to cope with these important territorial losses. First, it lost prestige, political influence and international status. Second, to a certain degree Hungary was dependent on the primary resources in which Transylvania was highly abundant. After 1920, Hungary could not dispose anymore of the mines exploitation of ferrous and rare minerals (gold, copper, lead etc.), salt and methane gas suffering a great economic loss. But, there are more than the political and economic reasons behind Hungary’s inability to cope with the Trianon terms. The strongest felt is well illustrated by the British historian Dennis Deletant who argues that both Hungarians and Romanians consider Transylvania as part of their ancestral territory.20 Romanians’ and Hungarians’ national utopias and

20 See Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989 (London: Hurst & Co.), 1995, p. 107.

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ideals are overlapping while the apprehension of the common development is based on tradition and myths. The native land is the referent object for the ethnic identity for both Romanians and Hungarians. This perception was developed and augmented in the communist years in both countries with the help of the Romanian and Hungarian historiography whose role was to legitimise national claims over the cohabited native land. So, from this point of view, it is not surprising that both peoples attribute Transylvania a deeper and more sentimental significance than it really has. In the inter-war period, in order to be able to cope with the administrative necessities of her increased territory, Romania tried to apply the model of the unitary centralized state.21 Her Hungarian minority was now subject to a nation it had formerly ruled and considered inferior people. It was difficult if not impossible for the Hungarians to rapidly adjust to such a change and had the situation allowed for more autonomy, they still would have had problems accepting it. The Hungarian minority—aided and abetted by its revisionist kinstate—used any pretext to complain against the existing order.22 That is why Hungary’s invasion in Northern Transylvania on 30 August 1940, with Germany’s approval, was regarded by the Hungarians as an act of justice. Needless to say that the same act has a complete different meaning for the Romanians and often compared to ‘a knife thrust into Romania’s heart’. The end of the World War II found Romania into her present borders, after a successful battle for regaining Transylvania. The problem of her national minorities could not have been solved in the same way as for Poland—through the exchange of population. Moreover, in the first years of the communist regime, some administrative decisions were imposed by the Soviet occupation that used al type of designs in order to exercise political-ethnic control and manipulate the states in its sphere of influence. One of these was the set up of the Hungarian Autonomous Region which nowadays is referred to by many Hungarians of Romania as a plan that allowed their rights to be respected and .

21 This is the Jacobin model of the unitary centralised state which contains national minorities while its official language is French, and in which the educational system is centralised from the kindergarten to the university, allowing no autonomous system to develop. 22 In a ‘kin-state’ the national minority from another state forms the majority of the population. See Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1998, p. 69.

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guaranteed. This is, in fact, a “double fraud” because, first of all, not all of them had their rights guaranteed but only a minority, that is, those in ruling positions, and second, their rights as they were designed by the Soviets were in fact privileges.23 The rest of the Hungarian population did not enjoy the same special treatment and suffered altogether with the Romanian one. These privileges disappeared after the experiment had stopped and the state started to apply a policy of Romanization: transmutations of population from the Hungarian highly populated areas, replacement of the decision-making persons, replacement of managers and placement of Hungarians in less important positions, control of the police and army forces by the Romanian communist party leaders etc. At the same time, the rise of nationalist Romanian historiography was also an attempt of the leaders to form a homogenous population, especially after 1966 when Ceausescu declared that Romania could not be described anymore as a “multicultural state” but as a “united national” one. At the end of the 1980s, the situation of all Romanian citizens, being them of whatever ethnic origin, was so deteriorated that nationalist speeches could not have made any difference. Hungarians and Romanians together rose against dictatorship in December 1989 when the years of common deprivations and lack of freedoms had vanished ethnic differences at least in this region. The minority legal provisions in the inter-war period After the World War I, the victorious powers became aware that the principle of self-determination designed a new map were countries continued to be ethnically mixed. Not only did national groups intermingle within their traditional territories but relevant amounts of the former imperial ruling elites—as, for instance, the Germans and Hungarians—remained in the new formed states where they resented their loss of power and privileges. The potential for ethnic unrest was too obvious not to force the League of Nations and the winning powers to look for an appropriate solution. All the new states including the ones that had lost the war had to accept national minority obligations as part as their admission to the League. These obligations were included as specific provisions in specially drawn treaties for each country.

23 See Interview with Dan Clucer, “Observatii despre problematica Ardealului” in Asymetria, no. 1, May 2000.

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In this regard, few things are to be noticed: (1) the national minority rights included civil and political liberties, religious freedoms, language rights and a minimal degree of cultural protection; (2) the provisions of these treaties were guaranteed by an international organization, namely the League of Nations. In theory, the League should have been successful in objectively handling the national minorities’ issues and should have benefited by the support of the international public opinion. In practice, the task was to difficult to cope with, especially by a fable organization as the League and, when the guarantees failed to be kept, the League’s credibility drastically shrank under the criticism and accusations from all sides. Nevertheless, the system is interesting because it was the starting point for a more sophisticated and viable set of measures in the future. We are mainly interested in the treaty concluded with Romania which included provisions common to more new formed states such as: citizenship rights; civil and political rights; religious freedoms; use of national minority language in public places and publications; allocation of public funds for education, religious or charitable purposes in areas where there was a considerable proportion of citizens belonging to a national minority.24 But the treaties also included specific stipulations referring to situations characterizing each new state. So, special rights were granted to those minorities considered to have a vulnerable position as it was the case of the Jews, the Szekelys, and the Saxons in Romania. The Romanian treaty stipulated that Romania agreed to grant Romanian citizenship to any Jew inhabiting her territory who did not posses another citizenship.25 This treaty also granted local autonomy in religious and educational problems to the Szekely and Saxon minorities in Transylvania.26 As the further developments showed, granting rights and creating an organism to watch over their application was not enough in order to secure peaceful coexistence among the states. The imperial minorities after the formation of new states, Germans and Hungarians, were characterized by a strong national self-consciousness and they enjoyed the support of kin-states that were highly dissatisfied with the settlement at the end of the World War I, namely Germany and Hungary. As a

24 25 26

See J. Jackson Preece, op. cit., p. 75. Ibid. Ibid.

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result, these minorities were the most frequent petitioners addressing to the League of Nations. For instance, 30 percent of all League petitions came from German minority members challenging Poland’s national practices.27 They saw the League as a means to discredit the newly established states and to advance their separatist goals. At the same time, they deliberately addressed petitions to the League which they were aware that were unlikely to be solved. This was the surest way to discredit the League’s procedures. If this was the attitude of minorities towards the League, the attitude of the new states was no better. Generally, the countries which were bound by national minorities treaties saw in this situation an exceptional one and they repeatedly called for the generalization of the minorities provisions to bind all states members of the League. The fact that the great powers rejected these claims only strengthened the treaty-bound states perception that these treaties were in fact limiting their sovereignty. They were considered as instruments through which their enemies—the kin-states of their national minorities—could interfere in their internal affairs and could eventually change the existing territorial settlement. In fact, the League minority system came to an end on 13 September 1934 when Poland renounced its treaty obligations. Following this unilateral action, the system became increasingly inefficient until it was finally destroyed by the outburst of the World War II. However, the system represents an interesting experiment for the inter-war period despite all its limits and failures. One should notice that national minority rights were considered as consolation prizes awarded to those nations who were unhappy with the post-war settlement in Central and Eastern Europe. The most relevant limitation of this system was that there were no common standards of government conduct drawn up, which made many of the treaty-bound countries to consider the system as unjust. The winning powers of 1919 never truly regarded the principle of national self-determination as applicable to all the members of the international community nor did they establish national minority rights as universal standards for the government of those nations that existed within the territory or the colonial dominions of another nation’s state. All these shortcomings made the League of Nations minority system, eventually, inefficient.

27

Ibid., p. 84.

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3.3. The logic of securitization in the societal sector In the societal sector, the analysis has to start with an important aspect defining the post-communist societies, namely nationalism. This is directly linked to identity—the organizing concept in this field—and, depending on its form, it can represent a serious vulnerability of a certain society. Nationalism is actually part of the environment in which issues are settled between majority and minority and that is why its roots and effects cannot be ignored. In this sense, this subchapter opens with an examination of Romania’s and Hungary’s nationalist condition. Then, an analysis of the main actors representing the Hungarian minority points out aspects related to their beliefs and political influence. Identifying the issues under dispute between the Hungarian minority and Romanian majority leads to reflections on the role of securitizing actors and the success of securitization moves in this sector. The nationalist condition of the new democracies The collapse of the communism and the outburst of ethnic conflicts in the 1990s have put radical nationalism against liberalism and civil society. As the political essayist Vladimir Tismaneanu emphasized, radical nationalism gets its strength from its ability to become a substitute for lost certainties; it caters to painful collective anxieties, alleviates angst, and reduces the individual to one lowest common denominator: the simple fact of ethnic belonging.28

But this extreme form of nationalism is not present everywhere in the post-communist Europe though nationalist trends characterize all the new democracies. The differences are rooted in the national evolution experienced by each nation, in other words, the modality in which ethnic group identity was transformed into national group identity. In Western Europe, formation of states and modernization triggered the complex process of nation building. The members of a society living within the borders of a state started at a certain point to define themselves as a nation. The agents of this ideological and behavioural change were lawyers, government officials, journalists, politicians, entrepreneurs, members of the professions. The fact that an organized society

28 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-communist Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1998, p. 67.

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with institutions able to undertake the modernization task had already existed, was an essential facilitating condition in this process. According to the sociologist Gyorgy Csepeli, in this type of society “belonging to the nation became a democratic basic right instead of the privilege of an estate”.29 A relevant stage of this evolution was the focus of the nation-state on the citizen as member of its society. Acquiring citizenship was virtually possible for every member of a given society within a nation-state which meant that every citizen was able to get involved in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the society. Such a development ensured the neutralization of the influences of ethnic allegiance and eliminated the possibility of ethnic conflict. In Central and Eastern Europe, the nation building process took a different path. Here, some ethnic groups were split among more states while others lived together within the framework of multinational empires (Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman). In this area, the idea of nation preceded the process of modernization, entailing differentiation in political, economic, social and cultural factors. The points of reference in this case were not the state institutions but the mother tongue and cultural inheritance as main constituents of the ethnic identity. It is understandable why the development of the mother tongue had such an instrumental role in the nation building process in Central and Eastern Europe. The process focused on language reform, literature, theatre, development of linguistics and arts, thus the agents involved in nation building belonged to the national intelligentsia. Membership to the nation in this case is necessarily defined in terms of culture and kinship as it is not able to locate its essence in anything else. Thus, social cohesion among the members of the society is far more fragile than in the nation-state case and, consequently, the sense of insecurity among the individuals is higher, requiring exclusive norms for membership.30 Nevertheless, these patterns of national evolution do not provide sufficient information to formulate a coherent answer regarding the possible threats represented by nationalism and national minorities to the security of a new democracy and its consolidation. Whether these societies “are hostages to their past, doomed eternally to re-enact old 29

György Csepeli, National Identity in Contemporary Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press), 1997, p. 11. 30 In Csepeli, for instance, a thorough explanation of this process can be found. See op. cit., pp. 14–24.

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animosities and conflicts” could be investigated by “distinguishing between varieties of nationalism: the inclusive versus the exclusive, or the liberal versus the radical”.31 Thus, nationalism will take an inclusive civic form when elites do not perceive democratization as a threat, and when mass-media and governing institutions are already well established before the majority of the population achieves political participant orientations. Under these circumstances, nationalist politicians are far less motivated to pursue divisive doctrines. Nationality can be acquired and any form of defining the membership to that particular society on ethnic basis is rejected. Civic nationalism does not “create, often out of myths of past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland”,32 it rejects the sentimental interpretation of historic deeds and, in fact, it has a critical approach towards national traditions and attempts of history mystification. Moreover, it is not xenophobic and is inclusive in what regards minorities. Tismaneanu makes another remark about the nature of civic nationalism in Central and Easter European countries. According to him, this is also anticommunist and this leads to an increased sensitivity towards the national minorities’ problems and acceptance/promotion of rights of particularity and diversity.33 As opposed to civic/liberal nationalism, we have the ethnic or illiberal version that encompasses a diversity of forms, all of which sharing features of a collectivist interpretation of the nation, an exaltation of tradition and traditional institutions, a cultivation of heroic mythologies of the past, and a distrust of Western liberal values as ‘alien’ to the local communal ethos.34

Conservative nationalism is mostly associated with Christian democracy and folk traditionalism. It promotes pre-modern values and condemns the financial capital and industry for destroying the pure ethno-religious community. Although it formally accepts the importance of individual rights, it exaggerates the influence of the Church, the inheritance of the past, and the malefic impact of liberal culture and institutions. In fact, this nationalist trend places the sovereignty of the people as a whole above the rights of the individuals. A second

31 32 33 34

Vladimir Tismaneanu, op. cit. (1998), p. 74. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan), 1961, p. 330. See op. cit. (1998), p. 75. Ibid., p. 76.

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type of radical nationalism is represented by the so-called ethnocentric populism which can be found mainly in the Balkans, but also in other post-communist countries, mainly in Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. It takes advantage of the co-existence of a weak and still undeveloped civil society and the survival of former repressive institutions such as the secret police, for instance. Ethnocentric populism does not have a clear ideological orientation, the slogans and messages are adapted to the immediate interests of the power elite. With the same purpose, the leaders promoting this political orientation get allied with extremists when this helps them reaching their goals and later on get rid of them very easily if this helps them pose as real democrats. Moreover, some forms of ethnocentric populism display chauvinistic elements and have a strong authoritarian character, advocating a dictatorship to properly handle the people’s problems and put an end to corruption. The third form covers both nostalgic ethnocentrism and liturgical nationalism which promote the idea of ‘national democracy’ and try to rehabilitate the inter-war extreme right movements. A strong characteristic of these types of nationalism is the definition of ethnic belonging in terms of religious affiliation. In addition to this, they reject liberal values, individual rights, and market competition.35 What has to be emphasized regarding all these trends in the nationalist movements is that they can be found, to a certain extent, in all the post-communist societies. They are not excluding each other and thus more of these trends can be identified at the same time in one country’s political life. However, it cannot be said that all these forms of nationalism represent essential obstacles in the process of democratization. While radical nationalism has a high disregard for liberal values and institutions and sometimes promotes authoritarian ruling, civic nationalism might be a constructive orientation in the post-communist societies, taking into account its ability of offering to the individual a sense of security and of belonging to the community during the dramatic transitional period of democracy-building. The fact that is also inclusive in what regards national minorities is of further use for peacefully solving all the contradictions and tensions in this sensitive area. The collapse of the communist regime in Romania did not bring the disappearance of the nationalist myths fabricated and nourished by

35 See Vladimir Tismaneanu for a description of these nationalist trends. Op. cit. (1998), pp. 74–81.

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totalitarian rule. A historiography ‘adapted’ to the political goals of the communist rulers had already formed several generations and the civil society structures had been almost non-existent to fight these trends. The Romanian society embarked in the democratization process with nothing from the former regime to cling to but ‘national fantasies’ which gave the people some sense of cohesion and belonging.36 At the beginning of the 1990s, the nationalist orientation gained ground among the population at the expanse of the liberal-democratic one. Several important reasons that smoothened the way for the emergence of ethnocentric populism in the Romanian political life come to mind: isolation from the democratic world, anomie and no civil society under a totalitarian rule, new political elite rooted in the communist nomenclature, disappointment with the apparent lack of benefits brought by democracy and with elite’s performances, boost of nationalistic rhetoric. Although the Hungarian society did not reach the degree of totalitarian ruling experienced by the Romanian one, it was not protected against nationalist extremist manifestations and populist accents. The new political class used nationalist slogans in the electoral campaigns in order to attract a wide electoral support and a part of the population fell for this strategy. Especially before 1994, the foreign policy of the Antall government was focused on the situation of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries which caused a great deal of troubles between Hungary and the surrounding states.37 The problems lead back to the settlement of the Trianon Treaty. A relevant part of the Hungarian population still sees its consequences as having negative implications, this moment representing “the most sensitive spot in the historical consciousness of the Hungarian nation”.38 According to Csepeli, “coping with the trauma caused by the negative consequences of the World War I” was all the more difficult due to the long communist period during which it was not possible to discuss these matters openly.39 The collapse of the communist system in both countries has brought a great variety of changes among which the necessity to co-operate in order to reach common goals or face new challenges is a

36 ‘Fantasies’ is used in the sense defined by V. Tismaneanu in op. cit. (1998), see its introductory part. 37 Jozsef Antall, leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, was prime minister of Hungary between 1990–1993. 38 György Csepeli, op. cit., p. 191. 39 Ibid., p. 192.

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top priority. That is why the next subchapter investigates the relationship between the Hungarian minority and Romanian majority in the democratic context, the security aspects related to it, and its influence on the Hungarian-Romanian relations at regional level. The Hungarian minority of Romania: representatives, their beliefs and political influence A. Behaviour and beliefs of the Hungarian minority representatives before the 2000 elections As it has been already mentioned, the great majority of the Hungarian minority of Romania can be found in Transylvania. This ethnic group is not really homogenous and this factor has a particular influence on political attitudes and behaviour. In fact, there can be identified three categories: those living in the Szekely land where they represent 70 to 80 percent of the population; those living in central Transylvania where they count for 35–40 percent; those scattered along the borders with Hungary. From all these categories only the third one covers members of the Hungarian minority who are close in the culture and values to those in Hungary. The permanent interaction with the Romanian population and state has reshaped the identity of the rest of the Hungarians. George Schöpflin noticed how Hungarians of Romania claimed that “their Hungarian identity is far more authentic than those of Hungary itself ” and he considered this an important sign that they do not support reunification with Hungary.40 It might be true but this does not exclude claims for a special autonomous status, in fact, it only reinforces them. Though there are some pertinent cleavage lines dividing the Hungarian minority, particularly these social differences are not politicised. At all the legislative and administrative elections after 1989, the Hungarians voted substantially for the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), but the existence of parties established on ethnic basis is not something new in Romania’s political life.41 UDMR was set up at the end of 1989 and it includes territorial organizations, social groups and movements. This situation inevitably leads to the existence of various ideological and sociological orientations within the union.

40

George Schöpflin, op. cit., pp. 412–13. See the Political Sector Chapter, paragraph on The historical dimension of political culture. 41

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UDMR’s declared basic goals are the preservation and development through self-determination within the state borders of the traditions, language and culture of Romania’s Hungarian national community, and the modernization of Romania’s society, economy, and public administration. The Union intends to achieve its objectives by establishing and consolidating its own educational, cultural and other institutions guaranteeing the preservation of its self-identity.42 UDMR has been present in both chambers of the parliament since 1990 and, in this context, one important development marked the 1996–2000 legislative period: for the first time in Romania’s history, a party representing the interests of an ethnic group was offered to join the coalition and to share responsibility not only for the decisions regarding the improvement of the situation of its own national minority but of the Romanian society as a whole. Although the coalition had ups and downs and went through few serious political crises, it managed to maintain a certain degree of stability and, especially in 1999 and 2000, it had also some notable successes mainly in the financial field and economic reform. UDMR was an active participant in this process, reaching an agreement with the rest of the coalition members (Christian democrats, liberals and democrats) on the government programme which included provisions consistent with the Union’s goals. Consequently, relevant progress was made in few areas: the use of the minority language in public administration (emergency governmental decree 22/1997), the right to be educated in the mother tongue from the kindergarten to the university (new law on education), protection of civil and freedom rights (ombudsman law), and restitution of the former commonly owned, church, or community landed properties (state fund law, and law on the restitution of agricultural lands and forests). Nevertheless, these laws were either left in a draft status and were not brought before parliament for approval (the law on public administration gave rise to conflicts over the posting of bilingual signs) or their carrying out had been delayed due to the sensitivity of the topic (the situation of the confiscated churches and community properties). The main problem in this period remained the dispute over Hungarians’ request to set up a higher education institution based on the model of the Bolyai University, an independent state-funded Hungarian-language university,

42

The goals can be found listed at UDMR’s official web site, www.rmdsz.ro.

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which had been functioning in the city of Cluj-Napoca till its enforced shut down in 1959. As for UDMR’s direct participation in the government, the coalition agreed that each of its member parties would be present proportionally in both central and local administrations. UDMR got two ministers, six secretaries of state and at the public administration level it had two prefects, eight deputy prefects and also held leading positions in county institutions. Moreover, in order to establish an even closer relation between the national minorities and the majority and to ensure a better representation of their demands, some changes were made in the government structure. These resulted in the establishment of a separate body, the Office for Minority Protection headed by a minister with political authority over its regional branches. State secretariats dealing with the special questions of minority education and culture were created within the ministry of education and the ministry of culture. These changes were warmly supported by UDMR and they gave the national minorities reasons to expect a more flexible and open-minded attitude from the government in dealing with their requirements. B. Behaviour and beliefs of the Hungarian minority representatives between 2000 and 2004 The Social Democratic Party (PSD) won the 2000 elections though not with the majority of the votes, so it had to form a minority government. Its options in forming the government were limited: a coalition or an understanding with the extremist Greater Romania Party that would have ensured at least parliamentary support was not desirable due to the declared democratic views of PSD’s leaders and the disastrous experience the alliance with extremist nationalists had brought to this party in 1992–1996.43 The parties that had had the power before November 2000 rejected the idea of forming a coalition with PSD, but two of them were in favour of granting parliamentary support under certain conditions. Nevertheless, after few months in which the liberals and PSD attempted to conclude a protocol in this sense, the issue was dropped

43 The Romanian government did not enjoy international credit before 1996 due to its reliance on extremist parties’ support. In fact, Romania was regarded with a lot of distrust because of this situation. The concessions Iliescu’s party had to make at that time to the extremists prevented progress regarding rapid democratization, economic reform and an improvement of the situation of the national minorities. Consequently, its internal support also diminished and it lost the 1996 elections.

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as no satisfactory compromise had been reached. The only chance for PSD was UDMR and—to the amazement of many observers—UDMR accepted to enter a legislative coalition.44 This was not an easy decision for the Hungarian leaders especially due to PSD’s history of relying on extremist parties and encouraging nationalist rhetoric. PSD itself includes a more conservative group whose nationalist views are already well known. Moreover, UDMR has been always advocating fast economic reforms while PSD had never been really eager to undertake a genuine reform of the Romanian economy. These obstacles were yet rapidly overcome and a protocol was concluded between the two parties. Meanwhile PSD went through a period of reorganization and it made efforts to adopt a social-democrat ideology that would allow it to join the Socialist International. Its new leader, Adrian Nastase, was well known to the public as one of the reformers in the party. As a designated Prime-Minister, he came with a competent and efficient team of ministers which was an encouraging sign the more so because, in the former PSD government, party activists rather than experts held ministerial positions. Nastase was in favour of concluding a protocol with UDMR for an additional reason: he was aware of how instrumental such an act would be in reshaping PSD’s image as a democratic party, sharing Western values and getting rid of the communist inheritance. This protocol had some significant consequences, beginning with the parliament adoption of the law on public administration allowing ethnic minorities to use their native language in local administrations in those regions where they account for more than 20 percent of the population.45 They can address public administration officials in their mother tongue either orally or in writing and are entitled to receive bilingual replies. The law was promulgated by President Iliescu shortly after the country’s Constitutional Court rejected an appeal filed by a group of 73 deputies from the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) who had attacked the legislation as unconstitutional. Another important point negotiated by UDMR with PSD was the restitution of

44 The term ‘legislative coalition’ designates an agreement according to which a party grants parliamentary support to a coalition or a party in power without holding positions in the government. See Dan Pavel, “Coalitia PSD-UDMR si relatia romanomaghiara”, Ziua, 3 September 2001, www.ziua.ro. 45 Law no. 215 on the public administration, in Monitorul Oficial no. 204, 23 April 2001.

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the forests in Covasna and Harghita to their former owners.46 So far for the achievements of the agreement; there were also negative outcomes of a particular sort. The protocol did deepen the gap between two wings within UDMR, the leading moderate one (Bela Marko, Gyorgy Frunda), and the radical one (Tibor Toro, Imre Borbely, Gyorgy Tokay). The danger of a split among UDMR members had existed before the 2000 elections, but amounted to a crisis after the protocol with PSD. The radical wing accused the moderates that through this understanding with PSD “UDMR would have to renounce to one of its main goals, that is, autonomy”.47 It is not a secret that most of the Union members agree on the issue of autonomy for Hungarians living in Romania even if this is an unconstitutional position according to Romania’s Supreme Court. Another sensitive point which gave rise to speculations and anger was that the members of the Council of UDMR’s Representatives did not receive the full text of the protocol concluded with PSD for approval: the appendix which included the positions in the central and local administration promised by PSD to UDMR was not made public.48 Eventually, after intense disputes, the protocol was approved by the Council with no vote against and only nine abstainers.49 This did not solve the crisis inside the Union. The continuous predilection of UDMR’s moderate wing for compromising with PSD led to the worsening of this situation. The radicals decided that they should take over the political leadership of UDMR and, to this end, they tried to attract the support of other groups within the Union. The man who was designated by some of the participants to replace the current leader Bela Marko was the Bishop Laszlo Tökes.50 The radical representatives even stipulated that, in order to reach their goals, they were counting on the support offered by different groups from Hungary.51 The things

46

Covasna and Harghita are the two Romanian counties forming the Szekely land where the majority of the population is Hungarian. 47 Toro Tibor, leader of the radical group within UDMR, made this point at the meeting of the Council of UDMR’s Representatives on 20 January 2001. See “Sfarsitul lui Tökes?”, Cotidianul, 22 January 2001, www.cotidianul.ro. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Bishop Laszlo Tökes had been at the core of the events in Timisoara that preceded the 1989 Revolution in Romania and he became a prominent figure of post-communist political life. 51 The information was first published in the Hungarian newspaper Népszabadság and then in the Romanian Ziua, 23 August 2001, www.ziua.ro.

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did not work as smoothly as the initiators of this coup planned because Tökes was not eager to become UDMR’s leader (at least, not at that moment) and he was not considered by all the radical members as the most appropriate candidate. There were groupings inside the radical wing that were not supporting these actions.52 Some representatives feared that they could serve only the interests of external circles: it was well known that the governing Hungarian Citizens’ Party (FIDESZ) was losing popularity and, with the coming elections, the Hungarian prime-minister Viktor Orban might have thought useful to add a new topic to the electoral disputes.53 A more decisive step towards splitting was undertaken in March 2003 when the radicals formed the Reformist Block—a movement still within the UDMR but totally opposed to the Union’s politics.54 Since then, UDMR and the Reformist Block have behaved as two entities with separate agenda.55 Returning to the protocol between UDMR and PSD, an important consequence is the fact that UDMR’s credibility and image have been affected by the way it understood to support PSD’s initiatives. Thus, at the beginning of April 2001, UDMR’s votes in the parliament were instrumental in passing the law on the budget for 2001. The strangest thing happened on this occasion: UDMR voted in unison with its irreconcilable enemy—Greater Romania Party. This represented a negative signal to the public opinion and the former coalition colleagues as well. The liberals bitterly commented that, taking into account the way UDMR voted and the fact that it did it only after they were promised the restitution of the forests to their former owners, “the existence of a

52 See, for instance, the declaration of Konya Hamar Sandor, the leader of UDMR Cluj which usually followed the radical orientation, who characterised such actions as “profoundly disappointing” and completely useless to the Union in its attempts to reach its stated goals. See “Puciul din UDMR se vede de la Cluj ca o diversiune”, Ziua, 24 August 2001, www.ziua.ro. 53 Ibid. 54 See “UDMR, in pragul sciziunii”, Evenimentul Zilei, 10 March 2003, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 55 Actually, the situation was predictable as during 2002 the contradictions between the radicals and the moderates within UDMR had continued showing no sign of a possible reconciliation. See the collections of Ziua, Adevarul, and Evenimentul Zilei in this period. Accusing the obedience of UDMR’s leaders towards the governing party (PSD), Laszlo Tökes pointed out that “there is no difference anymore between UDMR’s leaders and PSD’s” which led to a “worrying depreciation of the moral advantage possessed by the Hungarian community ten years ago”. See “Nu mai e nici o deosebire intre liderii PSD si cei ai UDMR”, Mediafax, 26 August 2002, www.mediafax.ro.

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voting machine is obvious and it forms the strangest alliances. All the arguments were eliminated through the guillotine of the vote”.56 Another disturbing event happened only one month later when the Liberals and Democrats initiated a motion on the economic policy of the Nastase government. The official act required the urgent adoption of the appropriate measures which would guarantee the property right, the creation of a special fund for crediting the activity of small and medium-size enterprises, the speeding up of the privatization process, the elimination of bureaucracy in the relations between the state and commercial companies.57 UDMR supported PSD again, not withstanding its own liberal goals regarding the acceleration of the economic reform and ensuring the full protection and guarantee of private property. When at the end of 2001 the EU concluded that “Romania does not have yet a functional market economy”,58 UDMR must take the blame for it too. The Liberals sharply condemned the position of UDMR: for example, senator Radu F. Alexandru remarked that as long as UDMR had been part of the governing coalition (1996–2000), it acted as “an honest party fully devoted to Romania’s national interests” while “now it made a clear option for protecting only the interests of a minority”.59 Political confusion did not stop there. Despite its traditional attitude in favour of democracy and the rule of law, UDMR turned against its own political beliefs and supported PSD in its actions meant to gain control over the mass media. When the yearly reports on the activity of the Romanian Radio Broadcasting and, respectively, Television Corporations were presented in the parliament, though it has been for the first time in ten years when these institutions had a relevant profit, the representatives of PSD, UDMR and PRM did not approve on them.

56 See “PDSR, PRM si UDMR au sarbatorit la ‘Marriot’ ”, Evenimentul Zilei, 13 April 2001, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 57 “Prima motiune la adresa noii puteri,” Evenimentul Zilei, 14 May 2001, www .evenimentulzilei.ro. 58 Conclusion of the “2001 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession” of the European Commission (13 November 2001). The same conclusion can be found in the 2002 Report too (9 October 2002). The Report of 2003 remarks in a slightly more positive tone that “Romania can be considered as a functioning market economy once the good progress made has continued decisively” (p. 44). See the official site of the European Union, www.europa.eu. 59 From the speech presented during the debates regarding the motion initiated by the liberals and democrats. See “Liberalii sustin ca UDMR tradeaza interesele Romaniei,” Ziua, 16 May 2001, www.ziua.ro.

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This fact allowed the party in power to replace the directors of these corporations (who had been appointed by the former coalition) with obedient people towards the new governing elite. Both the Liberals and Democrats exposed this situation as being part of an articulated plan of PSD and its allies which aimed at getting under their control certain public institutions.60 Not only that PSD managed to get control over the national television channels but it also expanded its influence over most of the private television ones. The private radio stations enjoy more freedom but their interests for advertising and obtaining various facilities force them to be precocious. Another subject of PSD’s ‘conquering campaign’ was ROMPRES, the national news agency, which was transferred under the ministry of public information, being politically, financially and administratively controlled by the government.61 The liberals drew up a law for placing this agency under the direct control of the parliament but PSD and UDMR managed to postpone over and over the discussions on its provisions.62 This can be hardly interpreted as a normal political compromise because it does not regard a common matter but a constitutional one, the freedom of mass media. Containing the liberty of the media would affect the whole society, the Romanian majority as well as the national minorities. Instead of having a positive influence on the governing party (PSD), UDMR seems ‘infected’ with the undemocratic practices which used to be in PSD’s habit.63 The advantages of such a strange alliance might be tempting for short or even medium-term, but UDMR leadership paid little attention to its effects in the long-term. More and more members of various groupings within the Union are dissatisfied with its current orientation and the splitting seems more likely than ever. This would implicitly lead

60 See “Jurnalistii din Radio protesteaza fata de votul din Parlament”, Cotidianul, 12 June 2001, www.cotidianul.ro. 61 ROMPRES had been subordinated to the General Secretariat of the Government before being transferred under the ministry of public information in January 2001. 62 After more than one year of disputes between the power and opposition, the Law on the organization and functioning of ROMPRES was finally adopted by the parliament in April 2002. The Law places ROMPRES under the direct control of the parliament. Still, for a long time, President Iliescu refused to promulgate it (see “Prin modificarile propuse la Legea ROMPRES, Ion Iliescu vrea sa faca din ziaristi ‘turnatori’ ”, Evenimentul Zilei, 22 October 2002, www.evenimentulzilei.ro). It finally became effective in 2003 (Law no. 19 in Monitorul Oficial no. 034, 22 January 2003). 63 See editorial of Dan Pavel, “Mass-media: a patra putere a PSD”, Ziua, 15 October 2001.

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to a diminished electoral support and, as UDMR always relays on the Hungarian ethnic minority to get votes that count for around 7 percent, its parliamentary representation would suffer too. What UDMR got in return for its support only helped PSD to improve its image and to pose as a democratic party showing concern for national minorities. The Union clearly needs better negotiators because PSD got support for passing or blocking important laws while UDMR got a great deal of promises, the law on public administration, and some forests and religious buildings back.64 These are important matters for the Hungarian minority but it proves a serious lack of common and political sense to achieve them at any costs. Especially when such costs imply giving up democratic principles and beliefs. These actions badly affected UDMR’s image as a democratic organization and its credibility as a reliable actor when it comes to defending the rule of law. In the end, all these compromises might turn against the very own group whose interests UDMR is supposed to represent and protect. The Hungarian nationalists become more vocal than ever and, instead of being a linking bridge between the Romanian majority and Hungarian minority, UDMR will only manage to polarise the society serving in this way the interests of the extremist groups of both sides. Romanian as well as Hungarian extremists initiated nationalist manifestations and got involved in endless quarrels and accusations mainly before 1996. The co-optation of UDMR in the government between 1996 and 2000 showed to the large public another face of this organization: it ceased being seen as a conspirator and it gained the confidence of many people by promoting democratic values and serving the national interests. Moreover, the co-operation between the two neighbour countries—Romania and Hungary—developed rapidly and led to a closer relationship than ever before in their history. But, after PSD’s coming in power, UDMR’s new political orientation and some highly controversial initiatives of the Hungarian government had a negative impact on these encouraging developments. Reactivation of the Hungarian nationalism in Romania is another factor which might have a bad influence on these relations and also on the degree

64 See Law no. 501 on the retrocession of some buildings that belonged to religious cults in Romania, in Monitorul Oficial no. 561, 31 July 2002.

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of social cohesion among Romania’s population itself. The following events come to illustrate this situation. Bishop Laszlo Tökes is UDMR’s honorary chairman and a member of its radical wing. He had been an active critic of the government’s attitude towards national minorities before 1996 and he came back into media’s attention once that UDMR decided to support PSD. It has to be mentioned that his popularity is not what it used to be, not even among his own ethnic group. The fact that he was exposed as a former ‘Securitate’ informer on the basis of hard evidence, though he had always denied it, damaged seriously his credibility.65 Nevertheless, he still enjoys a certain amount of audience especially among the more radical groupings of the Hungarian minority and his position as an honorary chairman in UDMR gives certain weight to his declarations. He was from the beginning not enthusiastic about UDMR’s protocol with PSD denouncing its limited solutions to the Hungarians’ problems. Later on, he became extremely critical towards the leadership of the Union accusing it of “alienation from the Hungarians’ goals”, of experiencing an “unprecedented moral crisis” and being “totally assimilated by PSD”.66 But the alarming fact resides in Tökes’ attitude towards well known Hungarian extremist leaders: on 15 March 2001, at the celebration of Hungary’s national day in the city of Salonta (Romania), Laszlo Tökes showed up together with Istvan Csurka, the leader of the extremist Hungarian Life and Justice Party. Tökes launched virulent accusations towards the Romanian politicians of Hungarian descent while Csurka called on all the Hungarians to fight “those threatening our lives”.67 UDMR’s local leaders and officials avoided to be associated in any way with the Csurka-Tökes tandem and were conspicuously absent from the audience. Though the Union’s leadership discussed afterwards the possibility of taking actions against the behaviour displayed by its honorary chairman, nothing has been done in this respect and this fact only encouraged the Romanian nationalists in their vehement speeches against Hungarian conspiracy.

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“Associated Press a castigat procesul cu Laszlo Tökes”, 6 November 2001, Evenimentul Zilei, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 66 See “Criza si in UDMR”, Cotidianul, 2 April 2001, www.cotidianul.ro. 67 See “Tandemul Tökes—Csurka a sarbatorit 15 martie la Salonta”, Ziua, 16 March 2001, www.ziua.ro.

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C. Behaviour and beliefs of the Hungarian minority representatives after the 2004 elections One issue that has been for years of crucial consequence to the Hungarian minority and its representatives was the adoption of a minorities law. Since the end of 2004 when UDMR had joined the coalition formed by PNL-PD-PC, it has constantly militated for imposing its own variant of this law. This project included provisions that give the minorities’ organizations more power than the central administration has. The most controversial chapter—Chapter V—addresses cultural autonomy and envisages the set up of National Councils of Cultural Autonomy (CNAC), which are “autonomic administrative authorities with juridical personality”.68 Every minority can set up such councils enjoying a great deal of competencies, some of them quite questionable. For instance, CNAC elaborate the strategies and set the priorities regarding the education of national communities in their mother tongue, provision which allows CNAC to create programs of education in the mother tongue of the respective minority different from those adopted by the ministry for education and research and outside its control.69 The same ministry will not be able to appoint or replace the management of the state institutions of education in the mother tongue of national minorities as well as the cultural ones, without the approval of the CNAC of the respective minorities.70 Although the project of the minorities law contains no provision regarding territorial autonomy, there are two paragraphs that create the framework for the extra protection of certain areas. Hence, there are forbidden any normative or administrative measures which could induce “the alteration of the ethnic component of certain areas inhabited traditionally by certain ethnic minorities”.71 Moreover, “it is forbidden to alter the borders of the administrative-territorial units, that is, the electoral districts, at the expenses of the weight of national minorities.”72 Obviously, the main beneficiary of these provisions would be the Hungarian minority. The law would in this way guarantee the inclusion of 68 Project regarding the “Law on the statute of national minorities in Romania”, Chapter V, Article 61. See website of the European Centre for Minority Issues, www .ecmiromania.org 69 Ibid., Articles 18 and 58. 70 Ibid., Article 18. 71 Ibid., Article 14, paragraph 2. 72 Ibid., Article 14, paragraph 3.

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the Mures, Covasna and Harghita counties in the same development region, based on the ethnic and not the economic criterion.73 UDMR’s problem was that they got very little support for their variant of the minorities law although, in the beginning, their coalition partners had not been too vocal with their criticism. Harsh reactions came from the radical representatives of the Hungarian minority in Romania, the Magyar Civic Union (UCM), who declared that the law sets up director positions and does not include provisions that would allow the establishment of education institutions in the Hungarian language.74 Also, in their view, this law gave the representative organizations of the ethnic minorities the right to participate in the elections and facilitated their access to state funds.75 Laszlo Tökes was very blunt, accusing the initiators of not including any reference to territorial autonomy in their project, but only to the cultural one.76 The parliamentarian opposition was also very critical. Ioan Rus, president of PSD Cluj, asserted that: while in Europe the borders disappear, it is absolutely dramatic for the Hungarians in Romania to militate for separation and to base their requests on the principle of positive discrimination.77

He announced that if the law was adopted by the parliament, PSD would appeal against it at the Constitutional Court. The Conservative Party threatened that would not vote the law unless few amendments were included that would give the same rights to the Romanians of the areas where they are a minority and, respectively, if in these areas the Romanians do not get official places in the local councils.78 The democrats had an ambiguous position at the beginning of 2005 deriving from the fact that, in the coalition protocol, UDMR’s partners had accepted to support its legislative initiatives. Nevertheless, as UDMR had not insisted in obtaining a sound engagement on the specific text of

73

The Romanian counties where the Hungarian minority has the highest weight. Kiss Istvan, the spokesman of UCM, in Benone Simionescu, “Legea minoritatilor imparte functii, nu institutii”, AMOS News, 28 December 2005, www.2005.informatia.ro. 75 George Jiglau, Valentin Malaescu, “N.U. pentru autonomie”, Ziua de Cluj, 24 October 2005, www.hotnews.ro. UCM is the former radical wing of UDMR and its electoral support is very small. That is why its members find that the provisions of the minorities law create advantages for UDMR at their expanses. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 74

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their minorities law, PD came with particular objections to the project. Emil Boc, PD’s president, declared that its party was against the set up of CNACs as they were in fact “parallel institutions” to the existing administrative ones.79 The liberals, through their vice-president Teodor Melescanu, stated that they “would support any formula that allows the law to be adopted”, having no objections to cultural autonomy or the CNACs and implying that the disagreement in the coalition rested on PD and UDMR.80 This was not entirely true since the minister of culture, the liberal Mona Musca, had rejected several times the project arguing that the law was giving too many facilities to UDMR in the national minorities matter. She even pointed out that the law would get to the Government only after she had read “it word by word till the end and approve on its contents, when there are no other aspects that breach the Constitution or the non-discrimination principles”.81 Since the beginning of its participation in the new governing coalition, UDMR lobbied feverishly to get its project on the minorities law adopted. This law confirms UDMR’s condition of an ethnic organization that represents and pursues mainly the interests of a small part of Romania’s population, the Hungarian minority. The long period of compromising policy adopted by the Union while present in the government dissatisfied many of its supporters who had expected more categorical results. UDMR was thus under threat to lose a part of its electorate to UCM and—eventually—not being able to reach the 5 per cent threshold to enter parliament.82 In order to regain its electorate, the Union had to adopt a more radical tone on key issues for the Hun-

79 Bogdan Bratescu, “Statutul minoritatilor: conditie pentru integrare”, 17 December 2005, www.presa-zilei.ro. 80 Ibid. 81 Andreea Dinescu, “UDMR nu face troc cu legea minoritatilor”, Gardianul, 16 May 2005, www.gardianul.ro. 82 The Magyar Civic Union (UCM) was set up in January 2004 as an association of Hungarian political and cultural organizations and it positions itself as an alternative to UDMR. Its main goal is to achieve the territorial autonomy of the Szekely land. At the end of 2004, UCM attempted to become a political party, but its official registration was rejected by a tribunal following UDMR’s contestation regarding the validity of the support signatures for UCM. Its own website, www.polgariszovetseg .ro, presents a great deal of information over the programs, initiatives and goals of UCM but—unfortunately—only in Hungarian, missing therefore the opportunity to introduce its political platform to a larger public (the variants of the website in English and Romanian are not accessible). See for summary data www.en.wikipedia .org/wiki/Hungarian_Civic_Party

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garian minority (i.e. the theme of territorial autonomy, the set up of a state sponsored university in the Hungarian language). The problem rises also from the manner UDMR understood to launch the project of the minorities law, adopting an inflexible attitude regarding the partners’ and opposition’s amendments. Then, when after numerous debates in the parliament, within the coalition and in the media the project still failed to be adopted, UDMR started a campaign of political pressures. Senator Eckstein Kovacs Peter stated: We cannot accept tricks of the kind used in the Senate when a part of the coalition senators did not vote and consequently the project was rejected. Either the law passes or we reconsider our position towards the coalition.83

His colleague Antal Arpad Andras was more uncompromising and asked the government to assume responsibility on the project of minorities law, otherwise being little chance to see it adopted.84 The same attitude was reiterated half a year later: Marko Bela emphasized that “our partner deceived us regarding the project of the minorities law” and therefore UDMR would necessarily analyze its position in the coalition and government after 1 January 2007 (i.e. the datum when Romania was to obtain UE membership).85 Further, at a certain moment the tensions in the parliament around the minorities law were so intense that PSD decided to boycott the work in commissions on this project until the government would present a point of view regarding the autonomy issue.86 In reply, UDMR’s representatives decided not to attend the meetings of the Permanent Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies.87 Marton Arpad, the leader of the UDMR deputies, warned that: would be a critical matter if the Romanian political class concludes that there is no need for a minorities law. When more than 10 per cent of the citizens declared their affiliation to a national ethnic group, this can lead to nothing else but more sparks in the Romanian society.88

83 Georgeta Filip, “Santaj UDMR: ori legea minoritatilor, ori anticipate”, Curierul National, 12 November 2005, www.curierulnational.ro. 84 Ibid. 85 Claudia Cristofan, “Santaj UDMR: Ne-au inselat! Daca nu schimba ceva, plecam din coalitie!”, Gardianul, 26 July 2006, www.gardianul.ro. 86 Loredana Lupascu, Madalina Mandita, “UDMR paraseste Biroul Permanent al Camerei Deputatilor. Statutul minoritatilor provoaca un nou scandal in coalitie”, Cronica Romana, 9 November 2006, www.cronicaromana.ro. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

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UDMR representatives did not try to put pressure on the rest of the Romanian ruling elite only from inside, they undertook several problematic actions also outside Romania’s borders. In 2005, the European Parliament (EP) introduced an amendment in the report on Romania made by Pierre Moscovici asking the authorities to “pass the law on minorities as soon as possible respecting the political criteria”.89 Furthermore, EP “reiterates that additional measures need to be taken to ensure the protection of the Hungarian minority in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and self-governance”.90 While the chief of the PD observers at the EP, Marian Jean Marinescu, declared that the Moscovici report did not ask for specific provisions to be included in the minorities law, Marton Arpad stated that, given this report, no responsible politician could wipe out the “cultural autonomy” of the project.91 For a while, UDMR attempted to convince the Romanian public opinion and politicians that the adoption of the minorities law was a precondition for Romania’s EU membership and made pressures for the text to be accepted in their variant. Nevertheless, in September 2006, the “Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania” was issued confirming the fact that both countries were to join the EU on 1 January 2007.92 At the subchapter on the “Protection and integration of minorities” there was mentioned that: the draft law on the statute of national minorities and setting up the principles of equality and nondiscrimination and multi-culturalism, is still being discussed in parliament. This legislative process needs to be followed closely.93

Thus, cultural autonomy did not constitute a prerequisite for integration. Cultural or territorial autonomy became instruments of conflict prevention in the states’ strive to accommodate the requests and needs of their national minorities. However, only few of the EU members have regions that enjoy this status and the success of some of the models 89 European Parliament, Rapporteur: Pierre Moscovici, “Report on the extent of Romania’s readiness for accession to the European Union”, A6–0344/2005, 25 November 2005, www.europarl.europa.eu. 90 Ibid. 91 Bogdan Bratescu, op. cit. 92 European Commission, “Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania”, COM (2006) 549, Brussels, 26 September 2006, www.europa.eu. 93 Op. cit., p. 40.

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is doubtful.94 After the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, numerous ethnic conflicts burst out and proved to be difficult to control. Hence, the Western democracies found necessary to create an international framework for handling matters related to national minorities. OSCE and the Council of Europe have set up models that established the minimal standards in this field for countries that wanted to obtain EU membership. Autonomy is not to be found among these conditions but, of course, is up to every country to decide on further regulations that would improve the situation of its own minorities. The point of utmost importance here is that these further regulations have to meet the acceptance of the majority otherwise they create internal tensions and lead ultimately to conflict. Another doubtful action came this time from of a prominent leader of UDMR, Frunda Gyorgy, whose project on territorial autonomy for the national minorities of the member states of the Council of Europe was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly.95 According to the text of this document, the Assembly invites the Committee of Ministers to: 16.3. take the appropriate measures in order to make sure that the member states reject any attempt to promote the ethnic purity of the state or to organize the territory and the administration of the state on an ethnic basis, with the exception of affirmative measures which aim to achieve a fair representation of the national minorities in their country’s administration, at central and local level; 16.4. invite the member states to bring into line their constitutions with the contemporary democratic European standards which call on each state to integrate all its citizens, irrespective of their ethno-cultural background, within a civic and multicultural entity and to stop defining and organizing themselves as exclusively ethnic or exclusively civic states.96

The expression “with the exception of affirmative measures” from paragraph 16.3 implies inclusively ‘cultural and territorial autonomy’, thus

94 For instance, Estonia adopted a law that insures the cultural autonomy of its national minorities. Some EU members insured a certain degree of territorial autonomy to various regions: Spain to Catalonia and the Basque Land, Italy to South Tirol, Great Britain to Scotland and Wales, Belgium to Flanders. 95 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1735 (2006), see paragraph 16.2: The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers “invite the member states to promote in their national legislation the recognition of the cultural rights of minorities, inter alia, on the basis of Recommendation 43 (1998) on territorial autonomy and national minorities”. See www.assembly.coe.int. 96 Ibid.

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this document comes to reinforce UDMR’s political fight to impose the adoption of the minorities status in Romania. The next paragraph asks for the modification of all the European constitutions which define the nation either on ethnic basis or citizenship. The document attempts to enrich the package of minimal standards in the field of national minorities and also extend it to all the European countries. Nonetheless, the content has to be judged in the context of the initiator’s attitude and declarations. Frunda Gyorgy, the chief of the Romanian parliamentarian delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, also a Romanian senator paid from public funds, declared live on a TV channel: I do not represent Romania at the Council of Europe. I am the chief of the Romanian delegation elected by ten members who represent Romania at the parliamentary level.97

It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind this declaration as long as the representatives of the Council of Europe “are appointed by the national parliaments from among their members”.98 Hence, they are without any doubt official representatives of a certain country and, in a larger sense, they are ‘the voice’ of its people. Actually, the media accused Frunda of rather representing through his actions the foreign policy of the neighboring Hungary. Hungarian diplomacy has been very active in assisting the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries to obtain autonomy and, with this aim, to attract as much international support as possible.99 Indeed, from Frunda’s attitude can be concluded that he serves the interests of a very small group (i.e. the Hungarian minority in Romania) in the international institutions, which is not compatible with his Romanian senator status. According to the Constitution, “in exercising their mandate, the senators and deputies are serving the people”.100 Not only that his declarations provoke further polarization in the Romanian society, but they also affect negatively the relations among the politicians who have to trust each other in order to co-operate in working, ultimately, for the public/national interest.

97 Declaration made live by Frunda Gyorgy on the National TV channel, in a telephonic dialogue with Cosmin Gusa, leader of the National Initiative Party. See “Frunda: ‘Eu nu reprezint Romania!’ ”, Ziua, 4 February 2006, www.ziua.ro. 98 See “PACE—The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe”, www .assembly.coe.int. 99 See op. cit., Ziua, 4 February 2006. 100 Romanian Constitution (revised), Article 69, paragraph 1. See www.gov.ro.

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Finally, the last issue of relevance at this point refers to UDMR’s attitude in the process of President Basescu’s suspension. At the beginning of 2007, Laszlo Borbely, UDMR’s vice-president, declared categorically that his party did not support the president’s suspension as this was “unmotivated and unjustified. I think that this is just a game of image of PSD and nothing else”.101 Nevertheless, when the suspension procedure was initiated, UDMR came with a different approach: Beforehand, we had declared that we would not support it. Meanwhile, the things have changed. However, the facts remain the same, there are no violations (i.e. of the Constitution).102

pointed out UDMR senator Eckstein Kovacs Peter. The day before the parliament’s joint session, the Union had still an unclear point of view, Marko Bela stating that there was a problem related to the president’s attitude but there were other parliamentarian means to determine him to respect the Constitution.103 Nevertheless, the next day, in front of the parliamentarians and media, he warned on the danger of a “ ‘personality cult’ revival in Basescu’s Romania”.104 Thus, eventually, UDMR voted in favor of Basescu’s suspension. As it results, the last governing period has been a difficult one for UDMR although one would be tempted to think that once it had joined the ruling coalition, it has been in the position to easily fulfill its goals. Actually, with all the tensions, quarrels and mutual accusations among the members of the coalition, or between these and the opposition, or debates involving the president, UDMR remained somehow in the shadow and its demands did not seem to have a sense of urgency. At the same time, UDMR had to face serious competition for the same electorate for the first time since its set up. The emergence of the radical UCM was no good news for the Union and they have found each other on divergent positions since the very beginning. Then, some of the prominent Hungarian leaders inclusively Marko Bela have been investigated for fraud or accusations of corruption by DNA, showing that corrupted politicians can be found practically all over the political

101 “UDMR il tine in brate pe Basescu”, Antena 3 TV channel, 28 January 2007, www.antena3.ro. 102 Florin Ciornei, Clarice Dinu, “Suspendarea presedintelui Basescu nu se justifica”, Evenimentul Zilei, 9 April 2007. 103 Alina Paula Oprea, Matei Dobrovie, “Maine, ‘Ziua Z’ in Parlament: Presedintele Basescu, fata cu suspendarea”, Cronica Romana, 18 April 2007. 104 Ibid.

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spectrum. And, finally, facing UCM’s accusations of compromising too much without any notable result and being in danger of losing a part of its electorate and, consequently, the parliamentarian positions, UDMR leaders had to radicalize their message and adopt a more aggressive tone. Unfortunately, they have chosen to threaten the Romanian majority with nothing else but segregation.105 One thing has to be emphasized here: Romanian and Hungarian nationalist manifestations are mutually reinforcing each other leading to the polarization of the society. The situation is not as severe as it used to be at the beginning of the 1990s because people have learned more about democratic practices and have been exposed to new approaches regarding the role and the treatment of national minorities. But the nationalist factor can still prove disruptive when it is handled by irresponsible politicians for serving interests which have nothing in common with the society’s well-being or political stability or, as a matter of fact, national security. As long as there are still political actors who present minorities as a risk factor and representatives of minority groups who talk about how imperious necessary autonomy is in order to fight assimilation, progress stalls. The standards Romania ensures for national minorities and what has still to be done in this context represent a permanent topic of discussion between the government and the minorities’ representatives. Nevertheless, there are still certain issues that pose a high risk to the positive development of the Hungarian-Romanian relations and these are related to specific constitutional provisions, the set up of a independent state-funded Hungarian-language university and an official document of the Hungarian Parliament reflecting Hungary’s concerns for its co-nationals abroad—‘Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries’. In order to get a clear picture of how these problems influence the relations between Hungary and Romania, as well as between majority and minority in Romania, the Romanian legislation related to national minorities is analysed. Romanian legislative and institutional framework for the national minorities There is a twofold reason for investigating the legislative and institutional framework for the national minorities in Romania. On the one hand, national minorities represent a relevant part of the Romanian

105

See subchapter Ethnic segregation: is that a real threat to Romania’s security?

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people and the way in which their freedoms and rights are protected is also an indication of how advanced is the democratization process in Romania. On the other hand, building up a proper environment that allows the national minorities to preserve their identity while being actively involved in the transformations at every level of the society, would avoid the accumulation of tensions between minority and majority and, eventually, the outburst of an open conflict. As such developments have taken place in some neighbouring countries around Romania with dramatic consequences for their stability and the regional security, it is of utmost importance to investigate how this potential risk to security is dealt with in Romania’s case. To begin with the provisions of the 1991 Constitution, this: recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities, to the preservation, development, and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity106

and asserts that the Romanian state is “the common and indivisible homeland for all its citizens, without any discrimination of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion”.107 Another provision guarantees the participation of the ethnic groups’ representatives in the political life stipulating that “the organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain in the elections the number of votes for representation in parliament, have the right to one deputy seat each”.108 The specific conditions in which this constitutional provision is applied are described in the electoral law.109 Thus, in the Chamber of Deputies representatives of national minorities have been present during each of the legislatures (1990–1992, 1992–1996, 1996–2000, 2000–2004, and since 2004), while the Hungarian minority, given its large number, managed to form its own group in both the Chamber and Senate.110

106 The Constitution of Romania, 1991, article 6, paragraph 1. The Constitution adopted in October 2003 does not modify this article. See www.gov.ro. 107 Ibid., article 4, paragraph (2). It remains unmodified in the new Constitution. See www.gov.ro. 108 Ibid., article 59, paragraph (2). It remains unmodified in the new Constitution. See www.gov.ro. 109 Law no. 68 on the election to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, in Monitorul Oficial no. 164, 16 July 1992. 110 The national minorities (other than Hungarian) represented in the Romanian Parliament are: Armenians, Slovaks and Czechs, Bulgarians, Turk-Tartars, Ukrainians, Germans, Russian-Lippovans, Greeks, Serbs, Gypsies, Turks, Poles, Italians.

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At the institutional level, some particular bodies deserve a special attention. One of the institutions concerned with matters regarding ethnic groups and their rights was the Council for National Minorities, set up in 1993. It encompassed representatives of organizations of the national minorities, as well as representatives having the rank of secretary of state or general director of the main specialized public administration bodies. The Council was established as “a consultative body of the Government of Romania” whose goal was the examination of specific problems regarding national minorities and it “shall have competence over the legislative, administrative and financial problems referring to the exercise of rights” of the citizens belonging to these groups.111 The activity of this institution had been hardly a topic of the headlines due mainly to its consultative status which did not allow it to get directly involved in the process of identifying solutions to minorities problems. In 1997, the new government formed by the former opposition parties (Christian-democrats, liberals, democrats and Hungarians) decided to set up the Department for the Protection of National Minorities, subordinated to the prime minister and with specific attributions such as: to draw up and approve laws and regulations in the national minorities’ field; to establish and maintain relations with domestic and international governmental and non-governmental institutions with similar activities; to promote and organise programmes designed to encourage the preservation and development of various ethnic groups’ identity.112 Again, the Council for National Minorities had only a consultative status, reduced to assisting the Department in its work by issuing recommendations and proposals.113 The main difference in this period came from the fact that the Hungarian representatives were members of the government sharing the responsibility for its decisions and undertakings. Thus, the issues related to the national minorities were openly discussed and the

111 Governmental Decision no. 137 on the organization and operation of the Council of National Minorities, in Monitorul Oficial no. 074, 12 April 1993, Article 1. 112 Governmental Decision no. 17 on the set up, operation and organization of the Department for the Protection of National Minorities, in Monitorul Oficial no. 017, 5 February 1997, article 2, paragraphs a, b, c, i, j. 113 Ibid., paragraphs b, d, e. Article 9, paragraph 1 of the same Decision stipulates that the Council for National Minorities is subordinated to the Department for the Protection of National Minorities.

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parties involved showed more incentive towards reaching a compromise than before 1997. The results have been already mentioned.114 After the 2000 elections, a new modification at the institutional level took place. The Department for the Protection of National Minorities became part, as a Department for Interethnic Relations, of the recently set up ministry of public information, with the same attributions as before.115 This time, the activity of the Council for National Minorities was slightly modified though the institution maintained its consultative status being now subordinated to the ministry of public information. The Council shall “establish relations with the organizations of the citizens belonging to the national minorities” and, with this aim, it should “co-ordinate and support the activity” of these organizations, draw up proposals regarding the allocation of budgetary funds for them and recommend measures that would improve the legislative framework for national minorities.116 In November 2001, the government decided to increase the power of the Council by directly involving the representatives of the national minorities in solving the specific problems of these social groups and in putting in practice the decisions taken by the government in the field of interethnic relations. In the educational field, the legislation specifies that for children and students of the national minorities shall be created the conditions to follow general education in their mother tongue.117 With the aim of ensuring an appropriate development of this process, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high-schools, colleges and training schools are set up, in which the teaching is made in the language of the minorities. In certain situations, there are only few classes or sections of an educational institution which enjoy this. The decision to set up a school, section or class in this regard depends on the option of parents

114 See The Hungarian minority of Romania: representatives, their beliefs and political influence in the present chapter, paragraph on the results of UDMR’s participation in the governing coalition. 115 Governmental Decision no. 13 on the organization and operation of the Ministry of Public Information, in Monitorul Oficial no. 016, 10 January 2001. 116 Governmental Decision no. 589 on the set up of the Council for National Minorities, in Monitorul Oficial no. 365, 6 July 2001; Article 1 and Article 3, paragraphs a, b, c, d. 117 According to the Law no. 84 on education, in Monitorul Oficial no. 167, 31 July 1995. The draft of a new Law on education had been already drawn up in the former legislature (1996–2000) but, as there were still few issues under negotiation with the representatives of the Hungarian minority, the Law has not been yet submitted to the parliament’s approval.

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or students to learn in their mother tongue and on the weight of the school population belonging to the respective national minority from that town or village. Various universities and post-graduate institutions also offer the possibility to join special sections or groups in which the education is given in the language of national minorities. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is guaranteed by the Constitution.118 After December 1989, the Church regained its autonomy and all the religions can pursue their activities without any interference from the state. The financial resources are provided by the government but the religious groups have also their own economic basis: vicarages, buildings, agriculture land, publishing houses, candle factories, shops for accessories of worship, etc. In the communist period, all the religions were denied the possibility to offer social aid. Nowadays, they are actively involved in providing religious assistance in shelters, orphanages, penitentiaries, hospitals, and in the military. As for the access to culture and information, national minorities are financially supported by the state in creating and developing cultural institutions meant to help them preserve their ethnic, linguistic and religious identity. In this regard, the state assists institutions such as theatres, libraries, museums and it supports the publishing of books and press, as well as the broadcasting of radio and TV programmes in the mother tongues of the minorities. To conclude with, the investigation of the legislative and institutional framework for national minorities in Romania indicates that—at least, theoretically—the various ethnic groups enjoy the necessary rights and freedoms that allow them to preserve and develop their identity. In fact, the 2002 Report of the European Commission underlined that one of the most important achievements of the Romanian society is that “positive developments continued to take place with regard to the treatment of minorities”.119 Nevertheless, there are still certain issues under dispute between the majority and the minority and this comes from few gaps in the legislation, as well as a different understanding of the way in which the legal standards are put in practice as shown in the next section. In addition, the attempt of a kin-state to get involved in the matters related to the protection of its co-nationals living outside 118

The Constitution of Romania, 1991, Article 29. It stays the same in the new Constitution. See www.gov.ro. 119 See the “2002 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession” of the European Commission (9 October 2002), www.europa.eu.

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the borders can be disruptive for the relations between majority and minority in the other countries. Issues under dispute between majority and minority in Romania A. Romania—a national state Since 1998, intense discussions among the parliamentary parties on a further modification of the Constitution have taken place and a revision of it was decided for 2003. The main changes included the containment of the parliamentary immunity, the extension of the presidential mandate from four to five years, lowering the necessary amount of signatures supporting a public legislative initiative from 250,000 to 100,000, a clear stipulation that property is guaranteed, various provisions regarding the replacement of ministers and how the primeminister can be revoked.120 But there were also several requests made by some representatives of the national minorities among whom the Hungarians were the most active. According to her fundamental law, “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State”.121 UDMR has always rejected the characterization of Romania as a national state and advocated the modification of the constitutional provisions in this sense.122 Bela Marko, UDMR’s leader, pointed out that by declaring Romania a national state only one interpretation was allowed: we live in a state that belongs to a sole nation. In other words, the Romanian state belongs exclusively to the Romanian nation and not also to the national minorities.123

At the same time, the Hungarian representative mentioned that UDMR “does not contest the unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian state”.124 As it turned out, the extremist group within the Union had far more drastic proposals regarding the modification of the Constitution

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See The Constitution of Romania, October 2003, www.gov.ro. The Constitution of Romania, 1991, Article 1. 122 UDMR’s moderate wing agreed in the end with maintaining the ‘national state’ formulation in the new Constitution. This act drew a new dividing line between UDMR’s moderates and extremists. See the Constitution of Romania, 2003, Article 1, paragraph 1, www.gov.ro. 123 See “Un nou cantec de leagan de la Marko Bela pentru Nastase”, Cotidianul, 31 August 2001, www.cotidianul.ro. 124 Ibid. 121

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on the issues related to national minorities. In the opinion of this group’s leaders, “a grave shortcoming of the Constitution” resided in the fact that “it does not recognize the existence of the national minorities’ communities and it does not guarantee their right to identity”.125 Thus, according to them, the fundamental law should guarantee the right of the national minorities to cultural autonomy which includes the use of the mother tongue, the autonomy in the educational and cultural fields, the juridical nature of the autonomous institutions, and, moreover, should state the veto right in matters related to national minorities.126

Another proposal stipulated that “urging to the modification of the borders by illegal means is forbidden”, the leaders’ justification for choosing this formulation being the fact that, in their opinion, was legally more accurate than “urging to territorial separatism is forbidden”.127 It is anyway clear that the meaning of the two statements is different: while the one proposed by the Hungarian representatives does not forbid, implicitly, the urge to use legal means in this matter, the latter formulation excludes any actions aiming at the modifications of frontiers. It can be argued that there are international instruments and documents that were specially designed to prevent such situations. Moreover, the Basic Treaty between Hungary and Romania concluded in September 1996 includes provisions through which both parties recognize their current border. Nevertheless, nothing can guarantee that, given to the situation in Southeast Europe, circumstances that would allow legal modifications of the frontiers could not occur. Meanwhile, the speeches of few Hungarian groupings in favour of full autonomy and collective rights have a disturbing result for the Romanian society as a whole: enhances the majority’s distrust in the constructive intentions and proposals coming from national minorities, especially the Hungarians. Declarations such as: “the autonomy of the Romanian areas inhabited by Hungarians is the only solution to solve the problems of this minority” and “it doesn’t matter what Bucharest thinks about this,

125 Toro Tibor and Zslot Szilagy at a press conference of UDMR’s reformed group. See “Reformistii UDMR si-au prezentat viziunea asupra revizuirii Constitutiei”, Ziua, 26 September 2001, www.ziua.ro. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid.

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we have to think at what is better for the Hungarians” only make the things worse.128 States’ rejection of granting collective rights has its reasons: in international relations, the traditional bearers of collective rights are the states which makes them alert in guarding their prerogatives and powers. And, consequently, international organizations whose members are states are reluctant in adopting standards that would include the recognition of collective rights for national minorities.129 Thus, Romania is not the only country reluctant to grant collective national minority rights, especially when the proposal is supported by Hungary which, as a kin-state, might be thought to harbour irredentist or at least interventionist aspirations. For instance, Romania claimed that behind such ideas one could identify the implicit assumption that “a state would have the right to protect the rights of minorities in other states with which it shares the same language, culture, or ethnic origin”.130 This would infringe the stipulations of the UN Charter that mentions among its fundamental principles “the sovereign equality of all its members”.131 Taking into account the continuous mistrust shadowing the relations between Hungary and Romania and their dramatic historic experience, such an attitude on Romania’s side can be defined as legitimate. Recent events hampered the promising progress made in the last years in establishing close co-operative relationships between these countries. B. Matters related to education Although the right of minorities to education in the mother tongue is guaranteed through the Constitution and the necessary conditions for ensuring its exercise were created, the issue under dispute is the establishment of a state funded Hungarian-language university. All the governments rejected this request as unjustified by the estimated number of students and, consequently, being a luxury that an extremely tight education budget as Romania’s cannot afford. Their decision also took into account the existence of a multitude of universities including special sections that provide education in the mother tongue of 128 Declarations made by Szasz Jeno, mayor of Odorheiul Secuiesc (Romania), at the Balvanyos Summer University. See “Primarul din Odorhei cere autonomie teritoriala pentru maghiari,” Ziua, 25 July 2002, www.ziua.ro. 129 For a good illustration of this situation, see Jennifer Jackson Preece, op. cit., pp. 124–139. 130 Ibid., p. 127. 131 UN Charter, article (2). See UN official site www.un.org.

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national minorities as it is, for instance, the case of the multicultural University Babes-Bolyai in Cluj. The fact that the Chamber of Deputies rejected two proposals made by UDMR to establish a Hungarian state-funded University in Cluj did not discourage the initiators. In the spring of 2001, a private Hungarian University—‘Sapientia’—was set up in Miercurea-Ciuc. The University has 450 students and is entirely financed by the Hungarian government. The activity of the Sapientia University has already come to media’s attention but not in a fortunate way. Two journalists working for the Hungarian television channel Duna TV were the guests of the university where they presented a documentary on the “threat” posed by “the expansion of the Orthodox Church” to the “Szekely land and the Magyar identity”.132 The fact that in Odorheiul Secuiesc was founded an orphanage was considered part of the Romanization process of Transylvania.133 According to those present, this process should be fought with broad manifestations of protest and a more active involvement of the Reformed priests in organizing these actions. Lanyi Szabolcz, the Dean of ‘Sapientia’, proudly pointed out that the presentation of the documentary at the University was not an accidental choice: “Educating so many young Hungarians, the future will belong to us”.134 This high education institution is actually promoting the polarization of the society and the urge to intolerance. Such a fact can be understood only by remembering the character of the Romanian-Hungarian relations which was historically rather tensed if not conflicting. The conflict still persists in some peoples’ minds (both Hungarians and Romanians) and educating young generation in the same spirit can only prolong an unprofitable and tensed relationship, with negative consequences for the regional security and stability. C. Actions undertaken by Hungary regarding its co-nationals in the neighbouring countries Till the beginning of 2001, Hungary’s actions regarding its co-nationals abroad had not been present among the issues creating disputes with its neighbours. In Romania’s case, the relationship had been developing rapidly and with positive results for the parties, forcing the nationalists 132

See “Ungurii din Transilvania s-ar simti opresati de ‘expansiunea Bisericii Ortodoxe’ ” , Ziua, 9 November 2001. See also Romania libera, same date. www.ziua.ro. 133 See 134 Ibid.

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on both sides to look for different ‘enemies’. The declarations of Jozsef Antall from early 1990s calling himself prime minister of 15 million Hungarians had been forgotten as well as the violent clashes from Targu-Mures in early 1990 in which Hungarians were wounded.135 But new initiative of the Hungarian government in 2001 to protect her minorities in the neighbouring countries gave rise to additional tensions in the region. The document entitled “Act on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries” goes beyond the international standards regarding the protection of national minorities and not in a manner consistent with the rules and regulations of the European integration process. For instance, though the Act stipulates that it was drawn up taking into consideration the European integration endeavours of the Republic of Hungary and in-keeping with the basic principles espoused by international organizations, and in particular by the Council of Europe and by the European Union, regarding the respect of human rights and the protection of minority rights,136

the law introduces provisions which exceed the framework of the acquis communautaires. Expanding the work right to citizens of certain countries which at that moment were outside the Schengen space was at least questionable. The right to work in Hungary was given on the basis of affiliation to an ethnic group and this went against a fundamental principle of the EU law stating that “any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”.137 Article 1: (1) This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine.[. . .]

135 The case of the famous Hungarian writer Süto Andras who was seriously injured by Romanians is very well known. The case of the Romanian Mihaila Cofariu who was beastly beaten by Hungarians is known only in Romania, Cofariu being no famous personality. The clashes took place immediately after the Romanian Revolution, in mid March 1990, and the parliamentary investigation that was initiated afterwards failed to bring light in what refers to the causes of these dramatic events and their initiators. 136 “Act LXII of 2001on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries” issued by the Hungarian government, preamble. See official site of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.hu. 137 Treaty establishing the European Community, article 1. See official site of the European Union, www.europa.eu.

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chapter three Article 15: (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may be employed in the territory of the Republic of Hungary on the basis of a permit. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorization of employment of foreign nationals in Hungary, with the exception that the work permit can be issued for a maximum of three months per calendar year without the prior assessment of the situation in the labour market. A separate legal rule may allow for the issuing of work permits for longer periods of time under the same conditions.138

At that time, both Hungary and Romania were not yet members of the EU but candidates for integration, with Hungary among the most advanced countries from the point of view of the accession preparations. This law was a step back for Hungary’s readiness to achieve EU membership also because, according to article (1), it was applied to all Hungary’s neighbours except for Austria. Although Austria also has a Hungarian minority, it was excluded from the text of the law due to a sole reason: Hungary, an EU candidate, could not afford to start a conflict with an EU member. Nevertheless, the fact that the other countries were not yet EU members did not justify Hungary’s different attitude towards them. Another shortcoming of the law is the fact that it reinstates the blood principle, jus sangue, common in the 19th century. The Act promotes the interests of “the Hungarian nation as a whole” encompassing all the ethnic Hungarians regardless of their citizenship or resident country.139 Thus, the law is based on the ethnic definition of the nation, promoting the principle of blood relation among people having the same ethnic origin and giving no consideration to the political criterion. Consequently, in the opinion of the initiators, the law could be applied wherever a member of the nation lives, even if this implies an extra-territorial application. This definition is retrograde being no longer accepted in the international law which uses the political definition for the nation, that is, the nation is the assembly of the state’s citizens regardless of their ethnic origin, mother tongue or religion. According to the Hungarian Act, citizens of other countries receive on the basis of declaring themselves ethnic Hungarians a ‘Certificate of Hungarian Nationality’ which grants them special rights and gives

138 “Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries”, articles 1 and 15. 139 Ibid., preamble.

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them access to social assistance provided by the Hungarian state.140 The procedures regarding this certificate are handled by the Hungarian state, but the rights deriving from it are valid abroad Hungary too. The persons who are requiring this certificate have to possess a recommendation which has been issued by a recommending organization representing the Hungarian national community in the neighbouring country concerned, and being recognized by the Government of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organization.141

This organization representing the Hungarian minority is supposed to “certify that the applicant is of Hungarian nationality” and is responsible for the administrative work required to draw up the necessary recommendation that would help the petitioner to obtain the ‘Certificate of Hungarian Nationality’.142 The countries whose citizens are the subject of this law had not been consulted before the Act was adopted. Thus, although this law has extraterritorial application and it involves non-governmental organizations operating on the territory of Hungary’s neighbouring countries, the Hungarian government has never attempted to obtain the consent of these states. Moreover, its beneficiaries are not only ethnic Hungarians but also persons of other ethnic origin who are part of the applicant’s family (husband/wife, children). So, the law applies to people belonging to the majority or other minorities in Hungary’s neighbouring countries, creating ethnic discrimination among the citizens of the respective states that enjoy these ‘privileges’ and those who do not.143 In what regards the provisions that respect the international legal standards for national minorities, the Act includes a wide range of financial measures meant to assist the Hungarian families if their children are enrolled in a school that provides education in their mother tongue. There are also listed the conditions offered to Hungarian youth from the neighbouring countries in order to be educated in a specialized institution in Hungary.144 Moreover, there are offered particular facilities for the public transportation, while children up to six years and persons over sixty-five years benefit of free travelling.145 140 141 142 143 144 145

Ibid., articles 1 and 21. Ibid., article 20, paragraph 1. Ibid. Ibid., article 1, paragraph 2. Op. cit., articles 4–6, 8–14. Ibid., article 7.

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The Act gave rise to various reactions and expectations. To start with, the Romanian government tried to point out from the very beginning to the Hungarians its opinion on the Act. Prime-minister Nastase referred to the discriminatory character of this law emphasizing that “if the EU accepts this regulation as legitimate, then we are going to be interested in the situation of the Romanians around our borders, too”.146 Mircea Geoana, the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, remarked that the Hungarian Act set up new standards for the protection of the national minorities and Romania could accept them only if they were to be adopted first at the European level.147 Nevertheless, minister Geoana considered that “it is not normal to create customarily new legislation to the benefit of only one minority” and “to grant the right to work on the grounds of ethnic criteria”.148 As the Hungarian government rejected any consultation or negotiations regarding the sensitive issues in the law, Romania applied to the international organizations to provide advice and guidance in the matter. Thus, it asked the European Commission for Democracy through Law for an analysis of the standards for national minorities established through this Act. As for the Act’s target group, the opinions among the representatives of the Hungarian minority were different, but most of them saluted the adoption of this document. Ervin Szekely, UDMR deputy, considered that “the fact that the Hungarian state desires to award a prize to those assuming their identity is a questionable measure”.149 In his opinion, this Act would officially exclude from the Hungarian minority those people who, for different reasons, do not want to ask for a ‘Certificate of Hungarian Nationality’ while it would facilitate the appearance of “false” Hungarians attracted by the financial benefits.150 Another UDMR member characterized the Act as “an obstacle against emigration”.151 Kovacs Csabo, UDMR deputy, considered the law as a promise that was finally put in practice: in the electoral campaign, FIDESZ had promised to grant double citizenship to all the Hungarians living

146 See “Statutul maghiarilor naste dispute in tarile vecine Ungariei”, Ziua, 25 April 2001, www.ziua.ro. 147 See “Ce-i bun in Europa, e bun si in Romania”, Evenimentul Zilei, 19 September 2001, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 148 Ibid. 149 See “Parlamentarii UDMR vad diferit statutul maghiarilor din afara Ungariei”, Ziua, 4 May 2001, www.ziua.ro. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. See declarations of Asztalos Ferenc on the Act.

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outside Hungary’s borders. The deputy regarded this Act as a much diluted materialization of the electoral promises.152 Attila Kelemen, the leader of the UDMR group in the Chamber of Deputies, recommended Romania to show the same interest in protecting her minorities in the neighbouring countries, but considered that Hungary should have consulted the involved countries before adopting the law.153 The representatives of the reformed group were, as expected, a lot more dramatic. To use only the illustrative words of their leader, Toro Tibor, this law “is the only one that can fight assimilation if it is strategically exploited”.154 Another Hungarian deputy regarded this law as the appropriate manner to “settle a political and historical situation, in which the borders of a nation do not coincide with the borders of its nation-state”, considering any political interpretation as “tendentious”.155 Various international organizations made their point of view known regarding this matter that led to a rapid degradation of the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. The European Commission for Democracy through Law provided a substantiated opinion on the Hungarian Act.156 The Commission stated that its report took into consideration the manner in which the provisions of the analysed Act are consistent with the principles of territorial sovereignty of States, pacta sunt servanda, friendly relations amongst States and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the prohibition of discrimination.157

The Commission underlined that the “responsibility for minority protection lies primarily with the home-States” while “kin-States also play a role in the protection and preservation of their kin-minorities, aiming at ensuring that their genuine linguistic and cultural links remain strong”.158 In Venice Commission’s opinion, this Act

152

Ibid. Ibid. 154 “Reformistii raman in UDMR”, Ziua, 28 May 2001. 155 Deputy Konya Hamar; op. cit., 4 May 2001. 156 The European Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as the Venice Commission) is an advisory body to the Council of Europe. 157 “Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State” adopted by the Venice Commission at its 48th Plenary Meeting, (Venice, 19–20 October 2001). See Council of Europe’s official site: www.coe.int. 158 Conclusions of the Report of the Venice Commission (Venice, 19–20 October 2001). 153

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chapter three aims at conferring a preferential treatment to certain individuals, i.e. foreign citizens with a specific national background. It thus create a difference in treatment (between these individuals and the citizens of the kin-State; between them and the other citizens of the home-State; between them and foreigners belonging to other minorities), which could constitute discrimination—based on essentially ethnic reasons—and be in breach of the principle of non-discrimination.159

The OSCE also issued an official statement regarding the Act characterizing the law as a source of conflict between Hungary and its neighbours. Rolf Ekéus, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, indicated that “the protection of national minorities rights is the obligation of the state where the minority resides”.160 He emphasized that “it is a basic principle of the international law that the state can act only within its jurisdiction which extends to its territory and citizenry”.161 Thus, when states undertake unilateral measures regarding national minorities “without the consent of the state of residence”, the result might be “tensions and frictions, even violent conflict”.162 As for European Union’s reaction, the European Commission’s annual report on Hungary’s progress towards integration points out that: some of the provisions laid down in this law apparently conflict with the prevailing European standard of minority protection, as determined in a Report adopted by the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law.163

As it can be noticed, the EU’s Report on Hungary specifically relates to the findings of the Venice Commission stipulating that: unilateral measures granting benefits to kin-minorities living in and citizens of other states are only legitimate if the principles of territorial sovereignty of States, pacta sunt servanda, friendly relations among States

159 “D: Assessment of the compatibility of the domestic legislation on the preferential treatment of kin-minorities with the European standards and with the norms and principles of international law”, paragraph d), of the Report of the Venice Commission (Venice, 19–20 October 2001). See Council of Europe’s official site: www.coe.int. 160 Press release of Rolf Ekéus, OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, 26 October 2001. See OSCE’s official site: www.osce.org. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 “2001 Regular report on Hungary’s progress towards accession” drawn up by the European Commission, 13 November 2001. See official site of the European Union, www.europa.eu.

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and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the prohibition of discrimination, are respected.164

The report further remarks that the Act will need to be aligned with the acquis at the latest upon accession, since it is currently not in line with the principle of non-discrimination laid down in the Treaty.165

It also recommends Hungary to resume negotiations with the neighbouring countries in what regards the implementation of this document.166 Günther Verheugen, the European Commissioner for enlargement, made the same remarks during the debates in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The Hungarian government reactions to the comments and criticism on the provisions of the Act were very different from institution to institution. As long as the law had not been yet analysed by the international organizations, Hungary ignored or firmly rejected the objections of her neighbouring countries and their complaints of not being consulted in drawing up this document. The opinion provided by the Venice Commission did not change this attitude either. On the contrary, the Hungarian minister of Foreign Affairs Janos Martonyi considered it in Hungary’s favour, choosing to ignore the clear amendments included in the concluding part of the report.167 The text cannot be judged as a positive appreciation of the Hungarian Act and the attitude of the Hungarian minister can be attributed only to the fact that the Venice Commission’s report is not legally binding. The MFA spokesman Gabor Horvath, considered that the remarks of the OSCE’s High Commissioner could not be applied in any way to either Hungary or the Act.168 As a matter of fact, the official declaration adopted by the participants of the Hungarian Standing Conference “notes with satisfaction” the findings of the Venice Commission and considers that the provisions

164

Ibid. Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 According to the Hungarian news agency MTI quoted by Mediafax, 22 October 2001, www.mediafax.ro. 168 “Ungaria nu se simte vizata de criticile OSCE”, Ziua, 31 October 2001, www .ziua.ro. 165

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of the Act are “interpreted in a positive fashion”.169 Furthermore, the declaration stipulates: The Commission’s Report confirms that the Act, building on European values, is in conformity with European thought and practice, as well as the general principles of international law. [. . .] . . . given the findings of the Report of the Venice Commission, there is no need to amend the Act.170

What changed this determination to ignore the evidence was EU’s opinion. In 2002, the European Union was to invite ten of the candidate countries among which Hungary to join it. In this case, Hungary could not have chosen to overlook the recommendations of EU’s annual country report. After its release, the Orban government declared that it was already considering some changes in the provisions of the Act, mainly in what regards its extra-territorial effects. At the same time, the Hungarian officials ceased to be reluctant to negotiating the modifications of the Act with the neighbouring countries.171 Consequently, a Memorandum between the Hungarian and Romanian governments was concluded on the elimination of the extraterritorial and discriminatory elements in applying the Act to Romania.172 This agreement put an end to a long period of tension and mistrust between the two countries providing the grounds for an even closer co-operation on matters of mutual interest. 3.4. Ethnic segregation: is that a real threat to Romania’s security? A securitization move and its consequences The worsening of the Hungarian–Romanian relations in 2001 and the too often manifested radical attitude of many representatives of the Hungarian minority did not remain without response among the Romanian majority. The most worrying reactions came from the Romanian officials. A first astonishing declaration was made by the

169 “Final Statement of the Fourth Session of the Hungarian Standing Conference”, Budapest, 26 October 2001. See official site of the Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs, www.mfa.gov.hu. 170 Ibid. 171 See “La intalnirea cu Viktor Orban, Nastase are toti asii in maneca”, Cotidianul, 15 November 2001, www.cotidianul.ro. 172 The Memorandum was concluded on 22 December 2001. See comments made by Mediafax, 4 January 2002, www.mediafax.ro.

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Romanian Minister of Internal Affairs, Ioan Rus, who, while presenting the party document ‘The Social Democrat Programme for Transylvania’, mentioned that “lately the concept of ‘internal homeland’ established on the territory of Covasna, Harghita and Mures173 is more and more used”.174 The Hungarian population in this area is supposed to assume together with Hungary a major role in the development of economic control over Transylvania. The plan elaborated by the Hungarian state is implemented by non-governmental and governmental organizations with the help of some private and state-owned enterprises and banks.175

According to the Romanian minister, Romania will not accept the co-sovereignty over Transylvania which is too often displayed by Budapest. In Harghita and Covasna, the Romanians are discriminated for the simple fact that they are not ethnic Hungarians.176

Ioan Rus concluded by underlying that the Romanian state had lost its authority over this area.177 To all these, we have to add the prejudices deeply rooted in the minds of both ethnic groups against each other. Alina Mungiu Pippidi, a political analyst, noticed that prejudices of both the Romanian nationalists and the citizens from the Szekely land mirror each other perfectly. They are both based on stereotypes: the Romanian stereotype of the Hungarian as a traitor citizen who has to be kept under constant surveillance and the Hungarian stereotype of the Romanian state which takes from Hungarians to give to Romanians.[. . .] Of course, self-government is seen as the solution of all problems.178

It was only natural for such grave statements to be followed by numerous reactions. Radu Timofte, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), supported the minister’s allegation regarding the fact that the Romanian state lost its authority over the Szekely land.179 He stated 173

Romanian counties where the population is in majority Hungarian. “The Social Democrat Programme for Transylvania” launched on 27 October 2001 by the Social Democrat Party (PSD). See PSD’s official site, www.psd.ro. 175 Ibid. 176 Declaration at the conference in Cluj where “The Social Democrat Programme for Transylvania” was launched, 27 October 2001. See “Ion Rus denunta ‘amestecul Budapestei in interesele Romaniei’ ”, Evenimentul Zilei, 29 October 2001. 177 The remark refers to the counties mentioned earlier. See “Ofensiva transilvana”, Cotidianul, 29 October 2001, www.cotidianul.ro. 178 Alina Mungiu Pippidi, Subjective Transylvania: A case study of post-communist nationalism, 21 October 1999, www.osi.hu/ipf/publications. 179 See “Istoria receta a scandalului”, Ziua, 22 November 2001, www.ziua.ro. 174

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that it was very likely for that declaration to be based on information provided to the state institutions by SRI.180 To top this situation, president Ion Iliescu considered that the statements made by the two officials were well-grounded.181 A special attention was given to this topic in the report of the parliamentary control committee on SRI’s activity. The president of this committee, Ioan Stan, presented the risks to national security among which the autonomy-reaching process taking place in Harghita and Covasna was regarded as the most threatening.182 The committee pointed out several facts that would support this conclusion. The mechanisms and institutions for setting up “an autonomous territorial unit able to carry on political and social-economic activities without maintaining any major links with Bucharest” are already operational.183 The actions meant to lead to the separation of the area follow two plans: they take advantage of the administrative decentralization while initiating a de-Romanization process through excluding the Romanians from the local decision-making positions. The actions in the educational, cultural and religious field meant to preserve the Hungarians’ ethnic identity are, in fact, intended to consolidate the region’s status as part of the Magyar nation.184 The conclusion of the committee was that: though till now the federalization plans of Romania did not have the impact expected by their initiators, the growth in violence of this type of messages cannot be ruled out in the mid-term.185

The interesting thing is that these attempts of securitizing the Szekely’s land autonomy issue were not successful. To begin with, the political class was divided on the matter, the opposition forces contesting the allegations of the power. UDMR had, as it was expected, a defensive reaction, considering the allegations of the power representatives as part of a concerted campaign aiming at negatively affecting the relations among Romanians and Hungarians. According to UDMR’s leader, Bela Marko, the members of the parliamentary SRI committee spread “false and extremely dangerous information” and their report presented “the

180

Ibid. Ibid. 182 See “Romania descoperita”, 22 November 2001, and “SRI dinamiteaza PSD”, 23 November 2001, in Cotidianul, www.cotidianul.ro. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 181

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yearnings of the Hungarian minority to education, culture and wellbeing as affecting the integrity of the Romanian state while they are, in fact, legitimate and natural”.186 Moreover, Bela Marko criticized the aggressive attack against favouring the Hungarian capital flow in the Szekely land which he considered as an obstacle towards economic development.187 Karoly Szabo, UDMR senator, called for a parliamentary debate on the allegations included in the report, as well as “an analysis of intelligence services role in misinforming public opinion”.188 The Union representatives mentioned that such accusations might influence the relation with PSD: only after analysing the results of the protocol concluded with the governing party, UDMR will have to decide whether continues the co-operation or not.189 Given the gravity of the allegations made by the minister of internal affairs and the director of SRI, this postponement is at least strange, especially for UDMR that represents the interests of the Hungarian minority and militates for its rights. The parties forming the democratic opposition had critical positions on PSD representatives’ statements. The democrats considered them as “an attempt made by PSD to distract public opinion’s attention from the real problems Romania has to face”.190 If such allegations were real, PD would think that a parliamentary debate on this topic was more appropriate than a declaration made during a press conference.191 PD’s representatives also mentioned that, in their opinion, the relations among Romanians and Hungarians had been artificially tensioned by politicians and they criticized UDMR for “ceasing to represent the Hungarians’ interests and being more concerned with governing together with PSD”.192 The same line of reasoning was adopted by the liberals who asked the prime minister to come in front of the parliament and to present the information he had about this case. Such an act was imperious as “it is for the first time in Romania’s modern history when, in peace time, the government in Bucharest cannot exercise its

186 See “Scandalul Har-Cov a incendiat scena politica”, Evenimentul Zilei, 23 November 2001, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Liviu Negoita, PD vice-president, in a press conference on 22 November 2001. See “PD vede o diversiune a PSD”, Ziua, 23 November 2001, www.ziua.ro. 191 Ibid. 192 Adrian Videanu, PD vice-president, in a press conference on 22 November 2001. See Ziua, 23 November 2001, www.ziua.ro.

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authority in two of the country’s counties”.193 If this situation proved to be real, in PNL’s opinion, PSD should resign admitting that it was not able to govern.194 PNL declared that if the prime minister refused to present the situation to the parliament, it would initiate a motion against the government in order to force the formation of another government.195 Representatives of the civil society did not give credit to the allegations coming from various officials. Stelian Tanase, one of the well known Romanian political analysts, declared that PSD’s representatives “had not thought too well” before talking about the deterioration of state’s authority in Harghita and Covasna.196 If this was a fact, then “the state officials themselves must be blamed for such a situation”.197 This type of allegations was characterized as “imprudent” by the political analyst who considered them a diversion used by the government in order to distract people’s attention from the difficulties they have to cope with every day.198 In conclusion, Tanase underlined that PSD “followed some short-term tactical goals without acknowledging that it was playing with fire”.199 Around the same period, a new event took place that was meant to confirm some politicians’ fears regarding possible secessionist attempts. A group of thirteen Transylvanian intellectuals, Romanian and Hungarians, sent to the media a “Memorandum on Romania’s regional construction”.200 They also sent the document to the Romanian Parliament, political parties, the European Parliament, and the Committee of Regions trying to launch a public debate on the necessity to change Romania’s administrative organization. The Memorandum included a number of interesting points: 1) “the project regarding the regional

193 Radu F. Alexandru, leader of PNL’s Senate group, for Mediafax, 23 November 2001. See www.mediafax.ro. 194 See op. cit., Evenimentul Zilei, 23 November 2001, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 195 Ibid. 196 Stelian Tanase in an interview given to BBC on 21 November 2001. See www .bbc.co.uk/romanian. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 200 The initiators of the document were: Antik Sandor, Agoston Hugo, Bakk Miklos, Mircea Boari, Alexandru Cistelecan, Marius Cosmeanu, Caius Dobrescu, Hadhazy Zsuzsa, Molnar Gusztav, Ovidiu Pecican, Szokoly Elek, Traian Ştef, Daniel Vighi. See www.provincia.ro.

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structuring of Romania has nothing in common with any kind of secessionism or irredentism”;201 2) the excessive centralization of the present administrative system inherited from the communist period favours corruption and bureaucracy; 3) the new regional construction should be based on either the regions of economic development or the historic provinces, each of these having a regional council or, respectively, a regional parliament; 4) it was underlined that “assuming regional identities on a civic basis contributes, in multi-ethnic regions like Banat, Transylvania or Dobrogea, to the development of a transethnical identity” that would help the Romanian society in overcoming any nationalist-extremist nostalgia and manifestations.202 The political class had an almost unanimous position, rejecting the proposals of the Memorandum with characterizations ranging from “unhappy formulation”203 and “an absurd idea”204 to “an aberration, a new escalation of the irredentist politics” promoted by “the scum of the Romanian intellectuals”.205 But the most important reaction came from the prime minister who, in very tough terms, accused the initiators that their proposals of reinstating the Romanian historic provinces served secessionist interests. Nastase emphasized that the real topics for a national debate had nothing to do with the ideas of the Memorandum and warned that, “the moment the initiators start a certain type of actions against the Romanian unitary national state, we shall react with the state institutions too”.206 President Iliescu had a similar kind of message, stating that the Memorandum was a “diversion” and “the political parties and civil society should be preoccupied with the current problems of the country such as the reform of the national economy”.207 It is not difficult to depict in these reactions both the nationalist views formed during the communist regime and still unaltered by more than a decade of democratic practices, as well as the influence of a tensed

201

‘Memorandum on Romania’s regional construction’ in Provincia, December 2001, www.provincia.ro. 202 Ibid. 203 Valeriu Stoica, PNL President, in “Formula de stat regional e una nefericita”, Ziua, 12 December 2001, www.ziua.ro. 204 Viorel Pana, PD Senator, in “O idee absolut absurd”, see ibid. 205 Corneliu Vadim Tudor, PRM President, in “Niste gunoaie ale intelectualitatii romanesti”, see ibid. 206 Adrian Nastase, Romania’s Prime-Minister and PSD President, in “Nastase pune la zid Memorandumul”, see ibid. 207 Ion Iliescu, Romania’s President, in “Ideea descentralizarii scoate din minti puterea”, Ziua, 13 December 2001, www.ziua.ro.

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relation with Hungary at that moment. Also, the rejection of a public debate on a topic proposed by the civil society groups indicates exactly how much consideration PSD has for the initiatives originating from other societal actors than the governing elite. A more serious concern has to be remarked here as well. ‘Making a confusion’ between two terms that actually mean different things (regionalization and secession) helped those in power to avoid a debate on a sensitive issue when they were not prepared to handle it. Government’s fear of losing control over the administrative and financial local centres through decentralization is what pointed out to the ‘repressive’ nature of the Romanian state.208 The Memorandum event is only strengthening this conclusion. Although the positions of the representatives of the government may seem inflexible, after only half a year they turned around completely. The Minister of Public Administration, Octavian Cozmanca, declared that: the government will propose by 2004 a regional division of the country that implies the actual set up of the regions with representatives who are directly elected by the population, in the spirit of the principles of the European Charter on regional autonomy.209

The prime minister expressed the same idea and, as if the Memorandum initiative had never existed, he invited the civil society to participate in “a large debate on regionalization, regional development, and decentralization”.210 The main reason for this change resides in the fact that, at the beginning of 2002, Romania opened negotiations with the European Union on the regional policy chapter. The beneficial influence of conditionality has to be emphasized again in this regard. As the proceedings related to the European integration were advancing, the establishment’s representatives were forced to give up topics that used to bring them electoral gains. The year 2003 brought a serious attempt of a Hungarian extremist group to obtain territorial autonomy, but, paradoxically, the representatives of PSD did not try to securitize this situation. After months of internal disputes among the different orientations within UDMR,

208

See Chapter 2: The Political Sector, the ‘Law and Order’ and personal security sub-chapter. 209 See “Regionalizarea Romaniei”, Ziua, 8 October 2002, www.ziua.ro. 210 Ibid.

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the radicals set up the Szekely National Council, a civic structure that sees the achievement of the territorial autonomy as necessary not only to protect the Hungarians’ national identity but also to the development of the stability and security in the area.211

The structure elaborated a draft law on the declaration of the territorial autonomy of the Szekely land and decided to send it to the parliament for approval.212 During all these months, the nationalist group within UDMR had announced several times openly its intentions to take action for obtaining the territorial autonomy of the Szekely land, but this time the reactions of the PSD representatives were half-hearted.213 They were far from the accusations made in 2001 against the same idea for which no serious grounds had been produced at that time by those in power. Especially that, in 2003, the external Hungarian support for the initiatives of the Szekely National Council was openly manifested.214 Nevertheless, it seems that the problem is addressed by the legal institutions.215 Returning to the attempts made by PSD to securitize a sensitive issue related to national minorities and the reactions of the political class and civil society to these, it results that the de-securitization process failed in this case. First of all, PSD failed to argument its position: no clear violations of laws were indicated, no guilty persons nominated and no measures that would be undertaken by the government to reinstall its authority in the Szekely land were announced. The declarations were not well-grounded and, thus, not credible. Second, the threats coming 211 Declaration of Csapo Jozsef, elected president of the Szekely National Council, in “Radicalii maghiari au proclamat autonomia ‘Tarii Secuilor’ ”, Adevarul, 27 October 2003, www.adevarul.ro. 212 Ibid. 213 See several articles in this regard: “Liderii Opozitiei din UDMR vor autonomia Tinutului Secuiesc”, 8 August 2003, “UDMR nu recunoaste Consiliul National al Secuilor”, 9 September 2003, in Romania Libera, “CNM, alternativa politica la UDMR?”, 8 August 2003, “Contradictii in interiorul comunitatii maghiare”, 3 September 2003, “UDMR este un apendice al PSD”, 7 September 2003, in Evenimentul Zilei. www .romanialibera.ro, www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 214 FIDESZ’ leaders, the biggest opposition party in Hungary, declared their support for the territorial autonomy of the Szekely land at the National Council of the Magyars in Transylvania. See “Tökes dezbina comunitatea maghiara din Transilvania”, Romania Libera, 19 December 2003, www.romanialibera.ro. 215 For instance, the General Attorney of the Prosecuting Magistracy at the Supreme Court of Justice declared that the case is under investigation. See Mihai Toader—“Scandalul Consiliului National al Maghiarilor”, Ziua, 30 April 2003, www.ziua.ro.

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from greater autonomy granted to a region of the country were not unambiguously identified: from PSD’s declarations one might think that decentralization of public administration and granting educational and cultural rights to national minorities are threatening state’s authority when, in fact, these are ingredients of a democratic society. Third, the fact that many political and civil society representatives did not fall for a new nationalistic trap indicates that there has already taken place an important change in the mentality of the new elite regarding the role of national minorities in the society. Consequently, PSD could not rely on a wide audience to support its allegations. The question is why did PSD act so differently in 2003 when actually the matter was more critical than before? Several developments provide the answer here. In two years of ruling, the governing party has learned a little bit more about democracy. As long as the disputes around autonomy looked more like internal fights for power within UDMR, and as long as no law was violated, it was no place for interference. It has also understood that showing a democratic face abroad to the European Union instances and, afterwards, using nationalistic propaganda at home to score better in the polls, would drastically damage its credibility. Moreover, the Hungarian minority and its political elite have proved to be sharply divided on this issue, so the act could have not been presented as a conspiracy of the whole ethnic group against the integrity of the Romanian state. Looking at the range of unsolved problems between majority and minority in Romania, the roots of PSD’s attitude in 2001 might be easier identified. Although the legislative and institutional framework for national minorities in Romania reflect the European standards, not all the requests of these groups could be met. One example is the state-funded Hungarian language university which is not affordable given the current budgetary constraints and it is not justified by the estimated number of students. There are also different other aspects such as granting collective rights through the Constitution that are a lot more sensitive and are not even included yet among the European regulations in the matter. At the same time, in 2001, it was not clear to PSD how reliable UDMR was as a political ally. And, Hungary’s initiative regarding its minorities abroad raised further questions regarding UDMR’s loyalty and goals. But, it has to be emphasized that the Union proved to be a trustful partner for PSD. Obviously, it was no trouble-free decision for UDMR’s moderate leadership to support PSD’s government. There have been certain rel-

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evant gains since 2001,216 but the costs of this strange alliance not only that significantly affected UDMR’s credibility but also deepened the gap between its inner political orientations. The radical wing became more aggressive and discontent than ever before, to the point that its political line is opposed to the official one. This situation can have no profitable results for UDMR and the Hungarian minority. An actual split is bound to affect the presence of this minority in the Parliament as none of the resulting political organization might be able to exceed the 5 percent threshold.217 The disappearance of an ethnic political organization from the political scene would be a weighty loss for the Romanian democracy because many things improved in this field thanks to its activity as partner in the coalitions. In addition, UDMR experienced tensed relations with its former governing allies due to the support it granted to PSD in matters that were not always consistent with democratic practices.218 Nevertheless, this will not represent an obstacle for the present democratic opposition to including UDMR in a future governing coalition. As for the external interferences, Hungary’s initiative to exceed the existing standards related to the protection of its kin-minorities in the neighbouring countries was at least a misjudged action. This created additional tensions and friction among Hungarians and Romanians at two levels: it negatively affected the relations between the two states and it poisoned the relation between majority and minority in Romania. The extra-territorial and discriminatory aspects of the “Act on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries” were evidently contravening with different provisions of the international law, but these are not the most serious shortcomings of the document. It was drawn up and then adopted without consultations with the interested parties which, in this case, were the neighbouring countries covered by the Act’s provisions. Especially in Romania’s case, this situation was of a nature to raise questions about the Hungarian government’ intentions. Since 1996,

216 For instance, the new Constitution grants the right to use the mother tongue and an interpreter in the judiciary (Article 127) and the right to set up confessional education structures (Article 32). These issues were high on UDMR’s agenda. 217 UDMR has always scored around 7 percent in the legislative elections. This percentage will diminish if new competitors addressing to the same population segment show up on the political scene. 218 See, for instance, the attempt of the government to take over ROMPRES, in this chapter, sub-paragraph on Behaviour and beliefs of the Hungarian minority representatives between 2000 and 2004.

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the relations between the two countries have grown closer than ever and they have managed to develop a genuine partnership. Moreover, their relationship during the last years set up a model for ethnic reconciliation in the neighbourhood of an area tormented by nationalistic conflict and hatred. Thus, the unilateral measures undertaken by Hungary surprised—and in the most unpleasant way—the Romanian part, bringing back the distrust and suspicion that had characterized this relationship for centuries. Reality shows that the Hungarian nationalist attitudes reinforce the Romanian ones which, at their turn, reinforce the Hungarian ones and so on. The worsening stages of the situation follow a spiral leading to the point where no consultations or compromise would avoid a conflict. That is why PSD’s allegations regarding the fact that the Romanian state lost its authority over the Szekely land are, in this light, understandable though not excusable. Conditionality played again a consequential role. Guided and advised by various international organizations, the two countries resumed negotiations in good faith and managed to overcome the tensed situation created by their nationalistic viewpoints and undertakings. Kosovo’s independence: Is this a precedent for the Szekely land? Having to face increasing dissatisfaction with its politics from its own electorate and sharp accusations from its direct competitor, UCM, UDMR had to adopt a more aggressive strategy in order to maintain its dominant position in the Hungarian community. The Union’s failure to convince all the coalition partners after 2004 to support the minorities law and the endless public discussions around this topic created the image of a weak UDMR with no influence on the Romanian political scene. Moreover, its capability to efficiently promote and defend the interests of the Hungarian minority was questioned by other organizations of the Hungarian minority. Laszlo Tökes has repeatedly reproached the Union’s leaders that they pursued their own interests at the expense of those of the Hungarians and that they gave up the goal of autonomy, being nothing else but an annex of the power.219 When, finally, UDMR came with the minorities law, the radicals considered its variant unwelcomed since it had included no provision regarding territorial autonomy, being therefore too soft. UCM did not

219 “Radicalii maghiari echivaleaza autonomia cu integrarea europeana”, Divers Association, April 2005, www.divers.ro.

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want the Hungarians in Romania to find themselves in the same situation as the Romanians in Hungary, who are in “an advanced stage of assimilation”.220 Therefore, “UCM will continue to militate for territorial autonomy”.221 Under these circumstances, Marko Bela, UDMR’s president, launched a tough message in favour of the Szekely land’s territorial autonomy and recognition of Hungarian as the official language of this area.222 A first necessary step in this sense would be the modification of the Constitution which defines Romania as a national state and establishes Romanian as its official language.223 These are actually issues that have been inflaming the Romanian political scene for years with no acceptable compromise for both majority and minority to be found yet. In support for his request, Marko Bela explained that cultural or territorial autonomy is a kind of decentralization as well, at a time when the decentralization process was intensely carried on in the whole country. This implies that all the local communities can preserve their traditions, language, decide on education and cultural issues and are also able to take decisions on the budget, which will not be established in Bucharest anymore.224

What Marko Bela deliberately neglected here is that autonomy goes much further than decentralization, defining in fact a self-governing area with respect to local or internal affairs. But his speech had a positive echo among the Hungarian local representatives and inhabitants of the Szekely land who settled on organizing local referendums in favour of autonomy.225 The pressures continued also at the external level where senator Frunda Gyorgy came again with a project that would have facilitated the Hungarian minority’s road to obtaining autonomy. Frunda’s new proposal at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe included the adoption of a European protocol on the protection of national minorities that would contain several fundamental principles: the right to belong to a national minority, the use of mother tongue in

220

Benone Simionescu, op. cit., 28 December 2005. Ibid. 222 Doina Anghel, “UDMR pretinde autonomie teritoriala si limba maghiara oficiala”, Ziarul Financiar, 25 September 2006, www.zf.ro. 223 Ibid., according to Marko Bela. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 221

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all the public institutions, the right to participate in the political life, the right to decide on matters referring to national minorities, as well as the right to cultural, respectively, other kind of autonomy.226 The Romanian senator was convinced that “through openness, good-will and tolerance” the best solution would be found, “which would insure to national minorities extended rights, respectively a sounder political, social and ethnic stability in all the member states”.227 While the Hungarian representatives show a moderate, elegant and co-operant attitude when lobbying for their goals abroad, their tone is completely different on the Romanian political scene. UCM’s president of the Sfantu Gheorghe area, Gazda Zoltan, warned that the borders artificially established through the Trianon Treaty were modified and thus justice was done, only the Magyar people has not found its justice yet. We are going to start a more resolving fight, we have been moderated till now in our fight for autonomy.228

In what regards the obligation of all pupils to pass the same bachelor examination at the Romanian language and literature topic, Gazda filled in a complaint at the National Council for Fighting Discrimination insisting that such an act is “pure discrimination” since “for the Hungarian pupils Romanian is a foreign language”.229 Hungary plays an important role in supporting its co-nationals from the neighbouring countries in their applications for autonomy. Its politicians from either power or opposition have frequently sent messages of encouragement or even undertook determined actions to assist these communities. Zsolt Nemeth, FIDESZ deputy in the Hungarian parliament, declared that “Hungary will lobby at the European institutions to support the requests of the Hungarians abroad” and he mentioned that several initiatives had been already launched such as backing the actions in favour of territorial autonomy, issuing double citizenship and drawing up a law on the Magyars’ statute, all meant to “develop the national identity of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian area”.230

226 Raluca Papadopol, “UDMR obsedata de autonomie teritoriala”, Ziua, 7 October 2006, www.ziua.ro. 227 Ibid. 228 “Uniunea Civica Maghiara isi radicalizeaza politica pentru autonomia teritoriala”, Romania Libera, 31 May 2007, www.romanialibera.ro. 229 Anna Kovacs, “UCM cere ca limba romana sa fie considerate limba straina”, Gardianul, 30 June 2007, www.gardianul.ro. 230 Op. cit., Divers Association, April 2005, www.divers.ro.

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Even the highest Hungarian authority, President Solyom Laszlo, stated that, in his opinion, the Hungarian minority in Romania is a part of the Hungarian cultural nation, in the same way that the Romanians living in Hungary are part of the Romanian nation. Cultural autonomy is a right unanimously recognized in today’s Europe, as well as the other forms of autonomy of a minority, and if the respective minority wants it, then territorial autonomy is also possible, and Hungary supports all these constitutional actions.231

What really made the Hungarians in Romania more enthusiastic than ever over their chances to fulfil their autonomy dream was the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.232 Immediate reactions of support with Kosovo’s inhabitants were coming from many Hungarian leaders. Gazda Zoltan, for instance, considered that as long as the important powers of Europe and the United States recognized Kosovo’s independence, “then these states have to support the autonomy of the Szekely land too”.233 Andrassy Arpad, the Secretary of the Permanent Bureau of the Szekely National Council, pointed out that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence “should be a precedent that accelerates the solving of the problem regarding the autonomy of the Szekely land”.234 He also insisted that the patience of the Szekely people is endless and refers to their rights and liberties, to getting back these things. The problem of autonomy has lasted for five centuries. There was once total autonomy, I could say, and this is what we want to get back.235

And finally, Csaba Ferencz, vice-president of the Szekely National Council, saw Kosovo as a very clear example “that if the community

231

Adrian Popescu, Eva Galambos, “The Hungarian President considers that the territorial autonomy of the Hungarians is not unconstitutional”, Gandul, 14 February 2007, www.gandul.info. 232 The Assembly of Kosovo approved on a declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. Among the countries recognizing Kosovo’s independence immediately after its proclamation were: the United States of America, Germany, Albania, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, China. Russia protested against it and, useless to say, Serbia refused to recognize it. 233 “Precedentul Kosovo tinde sa surpe fundamentele statului national unitar roman”, Civic Media Association, 18 February 2008, www.civicmedia.ro. 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid.

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wants to live under self-government, we have to declare very loudly our will”.236 Despite the fact that many international officials insisted time and again that Kosovo’s independence set no precedent, it is difficult to imagine that this act would not restore the frozen conflicts outside the European Union’s borders as it is the case, for instance, of Transdnistria in Moldavia. Unsurprisingly, Romania, a member of the EU and sharing the Eastern frontiers with Moldavia, joined Russia, the Slovak Republic and Serbia in refusing to recognize Kosovo. Various arguments were invoked in this matter, pro as well as against considering Kosovo a precedent. Ms. Condoleeza Rice, United States Secretary of State explained that Kosovo was “a special case” since the unusual combination of factors found in its situation—including the context of Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration—are not found elsewhere . . . Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent for any other situation in the world today.237

The same arguing line is reinforced by the statement to the UN Security Council of the British Ambassador John Sawers who pointed out that the unique circumstances of the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the unprecedented UN administration of Kosovo make this a sui generis case, which creates no wider precedent.238

On the other hand, international law specialists refer to a set of extreme conditions under which the privilege of secession exists. Accordingly, any attempt to claim legal secession must at least show that: • the secessionists are a ‘people’ (in the ethnographic sense); • the state from which they are seceding seriously violates their human rights; and • there are no other effective remedies under either domestic law or international law.239

236

“Kosovo secuiesc”, Stiri ROL.ro, 5 April 2008, www.stiri.rol.ro. “US Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State”, statement of Secretary of State , Ms. Condoleeza Rice, Washington DC, 18 February 2008, www.state.gov. 238 See “Ban Ki-moon urges restraint by all sides after Kosovo declares independence”, UN news Centre, 18 February 2008, www.un.org. 239 Christopher J. Borgen, “Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition”, in The American Society of International Law ASIL Insights, volume 12, issue 2, 29 February 2008, www.asil.org. 237

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The problem emerges from the ambiguity of defining the Kosovars as a ‘people’. The modern state practice “tended to treat a ‘people’ as a complete ethnic nation (not just a fragment of an ethnic group that exists elsewhere)”.240 As opposed to this, those recognizing Kosovo’s independence “seem to be defining ‘people’ as a homogenous ethnic enclave”.241 The direct implication here would be that the Kosovar Albanians are then “an ethnicity unto themselves” and not “just a part of the Albanian ethnic group”.242 Borgen warns that the international community may be creating precedent that we will see cited by other ethnic enclaves seeking separation, be they Russians in Abkhazia or Krajina Serbs. Previously, neither of these groups was viewed as having a strong claim for the privilege of secession, as neither of these groups is a ‘nation’ in the ethnographic sense, but rather fragments of Russian or Serb ethnic group. But their arguments may be strengthened, and one of the bulwarks of international law against facile secessions may be weakened, if the facts of the Kosovo claim are not carefully and narrowly construed.243

These considerations regarding the case of Kosovo bring a new light on the Szekelys claim to territorial autonomy. From the legal point of view, there has to be remarked that independence is not the same as autonomy, while the former implies a government able to take decisions in internal as well as external matters, the latter refers to self-governing in respect to local issues. Then, the Szekelys do not identify themselves as an ethnic group without any ties to the Hungarian nation (at least, not openly, because it seems that the Szekelys consider themselves as being a separate ethnic group)244 and, equally important, they cannot

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Ibid. Ibid. 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 Officially, they are a Hungarian-speaking ethnic group mostly living in the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mures in Romania, with a significant population also living in Tolna, Hungary. There are various theories regarding their origins: descent from the Huns (this theory lost scholar currency in the 20th century); descent from Avar, Gepid or Turkic tribes; and, finally, Magyar origin and in this case the cultural differences would stem from centuries of the Szekelys’ relative isolation in the mountains. See “Szekelys”, Classic Encyclopaedia (based on the 11th Edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1911), www.1911encyclopedia.org. Nevertheless, the representatives of the Szekelys do not mention openly their belief in a separate origin from the Magyars out of political reasons: to avoid losing support of those who identify themselves as Hungarians, and to avoid to further inflaming the Romanian political scene by talking about a self-standing ethnic group. These 241

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invoke any situation of serious human rights violations by the Romanian state against their ethnic group. As a matter of fact, the Szekelys are pressing for greater autonomy to the chagrin of the Romanians living in the Szekely land, who as local minority have fewer rights than the Hungarians do as a nationwide minority. There are serious concerns regarding the manner in which the local Hungarian majority insures and respects the rights of the outnumbered Romanians. Rodica Parvan, a Romanian member of the Sfantu Gheorghe town council, explained that subsidies to churches and schools, which are largely segregated, are distributed unequally by the Hungarian-dominated local government.245

Another dramatic situation is in Odorheiul Secuiesc where the local Hungarians including official representatives have made pressures (sometimes of a violent form) to close down the only existing high school offering education in the Romanian language.246 Here, the conflict between the Hungarian majority and Romanian minority knew dramatic moments. The extremely aggressive behaviour reached alarming levels when a Greek-catholic nuns mission offering shelter to orphans in the area was attacked by a group of Hungarians led by the mayor, Szasz Jeno, under the pretext that the mission put the basis of a Romanian colony in the heart of the Szekely land.247 For a while, the mission had to function under the protection of the Gendarmerie. The complaints of the Romanian minority living in the Szekely land refer to the government’s attitude toward their problems as well. They say that the Government in Bucharest has subordinated their interests in exchange for Hungarian

would for sure raise questions whether autonomy is the Szekelys’ ultimate goal and not—actually—independence. 245 Nicholas Kulish, “Kosovo heartens a Hungarian enclave in Romania”, International Herald Tribune, 3 April 2008, www.iht.com. 246 Gheorghe Badea, “Romanii din Odorheiul Secuiesc in pericol de a-si pierde identitatea nationala”, Evenimentul, 23 January 2008, www.evenimentul.ro. The facts refer to the ‘Marin Preda’ high school which offers education to all the Romanian children in the area, those from the Greek-catholic mission ‘St. Joseph House’ and also to Hungarian children who want to get an education in the Romanian language in order to increase their chances of getting a job somewhere else in Romania, where Hungarian is not spoken. 247 Ibid. These facts took place on 27 May 1999. Since then, the Greek-catholic mission has been continuously on trial with the local authorities regarding the legal functioning of the mission in the respective area. The mayor Szasz Jeno promised to his voters to set up a Hungarian University on the site where the mission is carrying on its activity.

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parliamentary votes.248 As indicated elsewhere in this book, UDMR’s support has been indeed at times of utmost importance for the success of various legislative initiatives of the ruling coalition/party. Reality shows without any doubt that the Hungarian politicians have changed their attitudes over the last few years. On the domestic political scene, the moderate speeches were replaced by a more aggressive tone including a pointed message in favour of autonomy. Abroad, the Hungarian representatives complain incessantly of the Romanian state which, in their view, has failed to make sure that their community enjoys the necessary rights and freedoms.249 The means have also been diversified; political pressures are more often present while UDMR joins ad-hoc coalitions even with its enemies in pursuing a maximization of its members’ benefits. Corruption is also present among the Hungarians’ elite and UCM, which does not enjoy a large support yet, might attract more votes in the future as its leaders have an uncompromising attitude and are not under investigation for corrupted acts like some of UDMR’s leaders. The radicalization of UDMR’s messages and actions has another reason as well. Despite their incessant complaints, cultural autonomy is already a reality for all the ethnic minorities in Romania although not officially proclaimed. Moreover, the Szekely land enjoys a high degree of autonomy at the expenses of the Romanians living in the area who have fewer rights than the nationwide Hungarian minority has. If the Hungarians/Szekelys had shown understanding towards the local minorities’ demands and needs and had allowed them in good faith to preserve their cultural inheritance, their demands would have been understandable though not necessarily acceptable. As long as they do not set an exceptional model in this sense, their attitude is pure hypocrisy. Actually, UDMR’s leaders are aware that during the years they have fulfilled a great deal of their agenda. Therefore, autonomy remains the only goal that could justify their existence as an ethnic party on the political scene.

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Nicholas Kulish, op. cit. One of the initiatives of the Szekely National Council at the beginning of 2008 was to request the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to sent a special assessor to evaluate the situation of the Hungarians living in the Szekely land. Tamas Sandor, UDMR deputy of Covasna, declared that the request was based on the fact that the Hungarians living in Romania “do not have all their rights guaranteed”. See “UDMR se plange ca minoritatea maghiara nu are garantate toate drepturile”, Stiri ROL.ro, 26 February 2008, www.stiri.rol.ro. 249

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The societal sector raised a series of issues more sensitive to deal with than the political one. But then, aspects related to identity and ethnicity usually are much so due to their reliance on shared cultural characteristics and a profound sense of belonging. Historic aspects have proved to play a crucial role: they are part of the cultural inheritance of both minority and majority and have shaped mentalities and behaviours to such an extent that a long period of time is needed to provoke changes at this level. Attachment to another set of beliefs such as the democratic ones can replace in time nationalist and intolerant orientations, but this has to be supported by both political and civil society structures. External influences and pressures, common interests and new challenges can be instrumental in speeding up this process as well. At the moment, nationalist orientations are still strong in most post-communist societies and they can re-emerge at both elite and non-elite levels. This chapter investigated the variety of actors active in the societal field, the extent of their political participation, and the elements of the securitization processes that give an indication over democratization in Romania. Looking into the beliefs and behaviour of the Hungarian representatives, their participation in the decision making process has grown in importance after 1989 to the effect that they were part of a governing coalition or they supported one while trying to achieve their goals. The problem is that lately these goals have been pursued at any cost, many times the democratic attachment showed till 2000 by the Hungarian leaders being in great sufferance. This led to an irreconcilable situation between different groups within UDMR, the political organization of the Hungarian minority, with a radicalization of the nationalist wing which led to its split. In turn, nationalist orientations on the Hungarian side also reinforced the Romanian ones, giving raise from time to time to mistrust, tensions and aggressive behaviour on both sides. Some issues are still under dispute between minority and majority even though Romania has improved noticeably its legislative and institutional framework in what regards national minorities. However, the fact that, in a post-communist country, an ethnic political organization managed to govern together with parties representing the majority of the population is a most remarkable thing. This has been going on for almost eleven years and there is no serious reason to believe that it will not continue after the 2008 elections. Although this fact does not solve all the existing problems between

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minority and majority, it has some exceptional results. It set up a model of co-operation that forces both majority and minority representatives to come often in contact with each other. Dialogue clearly paves the way to more tolerance towards the opposite group. At the same time, the majority was constantly forced to find solutions to the minority’s requirements in order to get political support. So, actually, the co-operation led to relevant progress in the field. This co-operation boosted the clarification process within UDMR, the moderate and the radical wings having for a while irreconcilable agenda. As result, the nationalist orientations on both sides lose (potential) supporters. All these facts influenced positively the democratization process that had much to win: participation of various groups (including ethnic ones) in the government, augmentation of dialogue, co-operation, tolerance, and mutual trust, strengthening of the social-cohesion, more inclusive policies towards the national minorities. Issues become complicated when the kin-state also gets involved in the complex relationship between minority and majority. Hungary’s initiative related to the protection of its kin-minorities in the neighbouring countries was clearly exceeding the existing international standards and it created additional tensions and friction between Hungarians and Romanians. The efforts put by both countries in the last years to improve their relations and their achievements have been in jeopardy for almost a year, poisoning the minority-majority relationship too. Consequently, the Romanian government made a securitization move, warning about the threat to national security put by the Hungarian minority attempts to obtain autonomy for the Szekely land. As this move was not supported by evidence, the opposition parties and civil society did not embraced it and the securitization attempt failed. This is a good indication that the years of efforts for building up close relations between two parties that used to see each other as enemies managed to shake some old mentalities. Moreover, when no action/event tensed the relationship between Romania and Hungary, a real attempt of the representatives of the Szekely land to obtain territorial autonomy did not produce a securitization move and it became the task of the appropriate state institutions to deal with it. In this sense, the radicalization of the Hungarian leaders’ messages militating for territorial autonomy has its roots in the attempt to justify UDMR’s presence in the political life. Unfortunately, this time the aggressive and uncompromising demands have had an echo among the rest of the Hungarian minority, inflaming the relations between majority and minority. The solution for reinstalling

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mutual trust rests in granting de jure cultural autonomy to all the ethnic minorities while thoroughly explaining what this concept really is to the rest of the population. Of course, this might not determine the Hungarian leaders to give up their demands for territorial autonomy, but it could cancel a part of the popular support as their electorate might find cultural autonomy satisfactory enough. The beneficial role of conditionality has been underlined several times in this chapter. Perhaps Hungary and Romania would have been able in the end to reach by themselves a satisfactory compromise, but the advice and guidance received from the Council of Europe, OSCE and European Union surely speeded up the process. This represents a positive development for the whole region. And, once the tensions between the two countries were solved, the relation between the Hungarian minority and Romanian majority has become more relaxed too. Also, the negotiations with the EU on various chapters forced the Romanian political elite to give up nationalistic attitudes and approach in a flexible manner issues such as decentralization and regionalization. Related to this sector, the main conclusion would be that, although there can be identified vulnerabilities and problems that might have a dangerous development under certain circumstances, there is not enough ground for securitization. The attempt of the radical Hungarian group to obtain territorial autonomy indicates that de-securitization is a fact in the societal field. The political elite did not present it as an existential threat, no special measures were needed to handle it, the government did not interfere as long as no law had been violated, and the civil society accepted this state of facts. This suggests that the normalization of the minority-majority relations is no longer a goal but a reality. Therefore, the aspects related to national minorities in Romania’s case could be very well solved within the normal political sphere. Romania’s case with its sizeable Hungarian minority brought up some interesting points. National minorities are—through their representative organizations—direct participants in the decision making process having the capabilities to influence it towards a desired outcome. Sensitive issues regarding ethnic identity and cultural preservation do not need to be securitized as Romania has managed to adopt inclusive policies towards its national minorities. Nevertheless, these facts represent only the beginning of a complex process of transformation that has to reach all the layers of the society, and, eventually, change the old mentalities. Such important achievements open the way to similar results in other

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sectors too. For instance, the environmental one has suffered of continuous neglect not only during the communist regime but also after its collapse. The last years have registered a change also in this sector, but to what extent is this revolutionary enough to allow various actors to influence the decision making in this field, remains to be analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR Introduction The environmental issues have only recently been included among the security concerns.1 This does not imply that their effects or consequences are less disruptive than those related to the political or societal sectors discussed previously. In fact, this situation only points out to a relevant aspect: the environmental threats have become more serious to the extent that they have imposed the emergence of securitizing moves in this field, too. For instance, to refer only to one significant development, research studies have been concerned with the way in which “environmental scarcity” contributes to social breakdown and violence.2 These focused primarily on developing countries and took into account the possible spread of the disruptive tendencies to the more developed areas.3 A possible continuation of these studies would look into the role of democracy when added to the environmental scarcity—violence binomial. It is easier, in this light, to emphasise the relevance of the environmental sector for the present book. While the importance of the political and societal fields is almost self-evident, the case of the environmental one needs further clarification. There are several reasons for giving it a special attention: the Chernobyl-type of lessons showed that a disruptive environmental threat does not stop at the borders of the country where it emerged from; poor ecological standards can have dramatic effects over large areas and populations in long-term; post-communist societies have displayed a very incipient if not totally lacking environmental awareness, which means that the formation of a new mentality in this sense will take time. Thus, in a post-communist country the possible environmental risks could be rooted in the poor standards, the inadequate legislation 1 The importance of the environmental issues has gradually grown after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. 2 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 4. 3 Ibid.

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and inappropriate mechanisms of enforcement. The generalized lack of public awareness is a further facilitating circumstance in this case. The consequences of such a threat when becomes effective might also affect the neighbouring countries, tensing the political relations with these. As educating and shaping new attitudes regarding the environment matters is a time consuming process, any factor that would speed up the process is beneficial. An internal factor is represented by the development of a democratic political culture. Democracy can help people mobilise and build up institutions that would play a positive role in increasing public sensibility towards environmental issues. At the same time, these institutions might be able to put pressure on the political elite to adopt higher ecological standards and to actually enforce them. The process will surely develop and strengthen people’s awareness in what regards the environmental field. Another factor, this time external, is clearly the European Union: any candidate country that wished to achieve membership had to align its legislation to the EU’s, and this includes the adoption of strict regulations in the environmental field. The process had useful influences at the elite level in the beginning while inducing a more rapid transformation at the non-elite one afterwards. Under these circumstances, the environmental aspects cannot be ignored when addressing the security risks in the emerging Romanian democracy. This chapter introduces first a refinement of the concept of environmental security that is followed by an analysis of the risk factors and threats and their consequences. Then, a special attention is given to environmental aspects related to Romania’s accession in EU such as capacity building and legislation approximation. The focus is next on the actors in the field: their variety, roles, and the outcomes of their activity. In what regards the influence of the external actors, EU’s role in this sector is pointed out. The last part of the chapter analyses a securitization move that, given its elements, transforms the environmental sector into a highly consequential one for the democratization process in Romania.4

4 The data analysed in this sector covers the period between 1990 and the beginning of 2008.

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4.1. Environmental security—refinement of the concept The environmental sector presents a high level of complexity due to the variety of issues it covers. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde formulated a comprehensive agenda including disruption of ecosystems (climate change, deforestation, various forms of pollution, etc.), energy problems (depletion of natural resources, various forms of pollution related to management disasters, scarcities and uneven distribution), population problems (population growth, epidemics and poor health conditions, declining literacy rates, massive migrations, unmanageable urbanization), food problems (poverty, famines, overconsumption, loss of fertile soils and water supplies), economic problems (protection of unsustainable production modes, social instability, structural asymmetries and inequity), civil strife (war-related environmental damage, violence related to environmental degradation).5 Most of these issues can also be found on the agenda of other sectors, but here they are considered from the environmental point of view. A distinctive feature of this sector is that it contains a high number of unsuccessful securitization moves in comparison with other sectors. Usually, when political and economic practices show little concern for environmental matters, their advocates tend to exaggerate the importance of those issues. It is many times not the actual disasters but their prediction that leads to securitization. Thus, though the propensity for dramatic securitizing moves is more often to be met in this sector that in others, the actions which actually lead to the adoption of extraordinary measures—defining in this way a successful securitization—are less comparatively.6 The possible threats fall into three categories: 1) threats to human civilization from the natural environment that are not caused by human activity (earthquakes, volcanic events, large meteorite strike); 2) threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made seem to pose existential threats to (parts of ) civilization (greenhouse gas emissions and the effects of other industrial emissions on the ozone layer; exploitation beyond the carrying capacity of smaller ecosystems, etc.); 3) threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures when the changes made do not seem to pose existential threats to civilization (depletion of various 5 6

See Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op. cit., pp. 74–5. For a more extensive view on the topic, see ibid., pp. 73–4.

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mineral resources, for instance, can be solved by technological progress, etc.).7 The second category of threats is the reason for debating the environmental security topic. Most of these threats originate in the explosive growth of both the world population and economic activity. The population and, respectively, economic activity concentrations tend to exceed the existing carrying capacity of ecosystems at both global and local levels. The “carrying capacity” is identified as “the total patterns of consumption the earth’s natural systems can support without undergoing degradation”.8 One would be tempted to designate the environment as such, or well defined parts of it, as the main referent object in this field. But, in all the debates a high concern for the preservation of the existing levels of civilization can also be depicted, which means that the ultimate referent object of environmental security is the risk of losing achieved levels of civilization. The whole idea behind most of the environmental debates is whether the ecosystems that are crucial to preserve the achieved levels of civilization are sustainable. A very general definition states that environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all the other human enterprises depend.9

“Human enterprise” designates another referent object and, in relation to it, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde identify a paradox: the societies can be secured from environmental threats only by changing them.10 Thus, in this sector we deal with two different types of referent objects, the environment itself and the civilization and environment considered as a whole. Besides the securitizing actors, the functional ones play key roles. A first set of functional actors covers the economic ones whose activity is directly linked to the quality of environment and that are profitmaking oriented. The environmental debates are concerned with how these actors operate and setting acceptable limits to the exploitation of ecosystems.11 Another category of functional actors is represented by the governments and some IGOs. Governments establish the environmental regulations for the economic actors and are responsible

7 8 9 10 11

Ibid., pp. 79–80. Ibid., p. 81. Barry Buzan, op. cit., (1991), pp. 19–20. Op. cit., p. 76. Ibid., p. 79.

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for their enforcement. They can also support the set up of structures related to environmental security at local or international level and can determine a further development of the international law. At the same time, governments also share some of the roles and responsibilities of economic actors. Finally, other relevant actors in this field are the NGOs. Unlike the other sectors, here and especially at the international level, NGOs such as Greenpeace or the World Wildlife Fund have a major part to play in securitizing the environment. At the national level, NGOs can mobilise the public opinion against official attempts to securitize certain environmental issues and can organize support for others. They can also raise awareness of an issue by informing the population in the target communities and can even undertake research on sensitive matters when possible. They are instrumental in educating the population in what regards the preservation and development of the environment. Environmental threats do not prove to be disruptive only at the international and national level, they may have devastating consequences at the individual level, too. Poor ecological standards favour the appearance of situations such as severe poisoning of waters, soil and atmosphere. The result is a worsening of the local community wellbeing noticeable in, for instance, a growing incidence of respiratory and digestive diseases. The individual perceives this kind of situation as a direct threat to his/her safety and, when the state does not take immediate and drastic measures to improve it and to protect the individual against further attacks, the state itself is considered responsible for that threat (it does not produce it, but it neither does anything to stop it). In extreme cases, when poisoning has systematically taken place for many years, the local community might experience a steady decrease of life expectation and high infantile mortality rates. Examples of this sort are provided in the next paragraphs, when the focus is on the environmental risks Romania has to face. 4.2. Environmental risks in Romania As a former communist country, Romania inherited from the totalitarian regime, among other things, a widely spread lack of concern for environmental matters. During the communist period, forced large scale industrialization and urbanization, highly polluting technologies and very poor education in the field had negatively affected not only various ecosystems but also the population’s well-being. The situation has not changed drastically after 1989, though some progress has been noticed.

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In fact, after the state had given the land back to its former owners (or their heirs) at the beginning of the 1990s, the high fragmentation of the ground led to inappropriate exploitation, excessive deforestation, abuses and corruption associated with this process.12 This means that agricultural areas or parts of natural reservations got a new destination and some new buildings with it; lakes were incorporated into private proprieties to which they had never belonged; and, in the best cases, some of the new landowners did not do anything with their property, so many terrains have been deserted and invaded by weeds for years. This situation added to the generalized disregard for the environmental problems and, the fact that the ruling elite had no initiative to change the things, prolonged the existent status quo. Although environmental issues have not been publicly debated, they are severe enough to deserve public attention. The main document in the security field—the Strategy of National Security, adopted in 1999—acknowledges the deterioration of the environment due to the non-observance of ecological standards as well as the existence in the proximity of the national borders of certain high risk objectives13

among the main threats to Romania’s security. But, the same document does not indicate any methods to face these risks.14 A thorough investigation of the Romanian representatives’ official positions shows that environmental issues have been seldom referred to and only in the last few years the situation has gradually changed. Especially since Romania became an official candidate for integration in the EU, the necessity to align her legislation to the Union’s and to adopt the acquis in all the fields has made the ruling elite more sensitive to these matters. Consequently, the official documents issued by the government focus on the risk factors in the environmental field and on the measures to be undertaken in order to face them. But, though some of the problems are dramatic, no attempts to mobilise the population to fight them have been made.

12 13 14

Law 18 on the Landed Property, in Monitorul Oficial no. 037, 20 February 1991. Romania’s Strategy of National Security, Bucharest, 1999, p. 6. Ibid.

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Water, air and soil pollution A first and highly concerning matter refers to the quality of groundwater which in many Romanian regions is in a critical state. The investigations show that the groundwater is polluted by: oil products; products resulting from industrial process; chemical, agriculture, domestic, zootechnic products, etc.15 The sources which are responsible for this severe condition are: the inadequate design, execution and use of the irrigation systems in some areas; the atmospheric rainfall contaminated by nitrogen oxides (NO ); the surface water (rivers, lakes) in which nitrates loaded wastewater was discharged; the overuse of fertilisers on the agricultural lands; the lack of minimum public facilities in some parts of the rural area produced an intensive aquifer layer contamination by organic matter, ammonia and bacteria. The immediate consequence is that groundwater resources hold a high risk of pollution, both on the long and short term. For this reason, in many areas these cannot be used as sources of water supply for the population. Moreover, the pollution of these waters is often an almost irreversible phenomenon and their treatment is extremely difficult or even impossible, with serious consequences when used as drinking water.16 Air quality in the urban settlements is also worrying. These tend to have a more polluted environment than the rural areas due to the large scale industrial activities and high traffic. Many times, it is not only the rush hour traffic which is responsible for a higher concentration of carbon monoxide (CO),17 but also some additional elements such as: the traffic organization, fluency and structure; emission factors; local meteorological factors; heavy motor vehicles as well as means of transport with limited mobility. In Bucharest, which is classified as an average polluted city, though measures have been undertaken to improve all the traffic conditions, the level of pollution is still significant. According to a study undertook by the Joint Research Centre of the EU in 26 European cities, in Bucharest 3,000 people die every year due to the high levels of air pollution.18 The problem is severe as 2

15

“State of the environment”, Bucharest, 2001. Ibid. The document mentions some of the hot spots for the pollution of surface and ground waters: Ploiesti, Ticleni, Videle, Moreni (oil products); Ocna Mures, Cacica (salt); Baia Mare, Hunedoara (heavy metal ions); Valea Calugareasca, Bacau (heavy metal ions, phosphates); Bacau, Iasi, Timisoara (nitrites, nitrates, phosphates). 17 Carbon monoxide (CO) is the main air pollutant. 18 See Reports on the official site of the Institute for Environment and Sustainability, part of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, www.ies.jrc.cec.eu. Details can be find in the projects FP6 2112 and FP5 63. 16

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the average annual increase rate of the number of motor vehicles (7.2 percent) leads to considerable increases (6.2 percent on the average) of the daily traffic.19 These increases trigger an augmentation of the pollution level correspondingly. Several geographical areas have a high risk of air pollution. The environmental quality indicators are exceeded systematically, as compared to the official standards, thus inflicting severe harm to the environment, and resulting subsequently in hazards to human health, economy and the local natural assets.20 The main air pollutants can be grouped in three categories, according to their effects on the population’s health state: irritating, carcinogen, and system toxic. The consequences, especially for the well-being of the local communities, can be very serious: from slight alterations of health to chronic diseases and cancer. It can even affect the next generations by causing either transmissible hereditary mutations or congenital malformations. This situation has been registered already for many years and should produce a lot of concern. A document issued by the Romanian ministry of public health and family listed air and water pollution among the main causes for the degradation of the individual well-being and even mortality in some areas.21 For instance, Romania has one of the highest mortality rates from tuberculosis in Europe and the areas where the incidence of this illness is higher coincide with the areas with high air pollution.22 Of 19

Op. cit. Ibid. To have a general idea about the severity of the situation, I list the hot spots for air pollution: – Copsa Mica, Zlatna, Baia Mare: areas polluted mainly by heavy metals (copper, lead, cadmium), sulphur dioxide and suspended particles originating from non-ferrous metallurgy; – Hunedoara, Calan, Galati: areas polluted mainly by iron oxides, ferrous metals and depositing particles originating from iron and steel works; – Ramnicu Valcea, Onesti, Savinesti, Stolnicei, Ploiesti: areas polluted mainly by hydrochloric acid, chlorine and volatile organic compounds originating from the chemical and petrochemical industries; – Targu Mures: area polluted mainly by ammonia and nitrogen oxides originating from the fertilisers industry; – Braila, Suceava, Dej, Savinesti, Borzesti: areas polluted mainly by sulphur dioxide, carbon disulphide, sulphured hydrogen originating from the cellulose, paper and synthetic fibre producing industries. From “State of the environment”, Bucharest, 2001. 21 “The White Book of Healthcare”, December 2000, see the official website of the ministry of healthcare and family, www.ms.ro. 22 While in Europe in 1999 the mortality average from TBC was 2.2, in Romania was 9.5. In areas with high air pollution (Baia Mare, Timis, Mures, Galati, Calarasi, Olt, Giurgiu, Gorj etc.) the mortality from TBC in 1999 was between 12.3 and 19.63. Op. cit., www.ms.ro. 20

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course, air pollution is not the only factor to be blamed for the spread of the TBC disease, but it is most certainly a facilitating one. Urban waste also contributes to the environmental degradation. In Romania, household waste—that is, the most significant share of urban waste—is not collected selectively, so the capitalization of recyclable materials cannot take place (paper, cardboard, glass, metal, plastic matter). More than 90 percent of the urban waste is disposed of in waste dumps located in the outskirts of the towns. In 1999, the number of urban waste dumps was of 303, representing almost 25 percent of the total number of waste disposal places in the country. These deposits extend over almost 1,236 ha, which represents 9 percent of the total area that is affected by waste dumping. Most urban waste dumps are mixed (60 percent), accepting both household and industrial waste (usually not hazardous) for storage. More than 40 percent of these waste dumps do not have any facilities to ensure the protection of the environment while 45 percent of them are simply enclosed with fences. Furthermore, the activities at these waste dumps are carried out improperly. Sometimes municipal waste dumps accept to store illegally hazardous industrial waste. The mixing of such types of waste may result in a noxious stuff that would infiltrate and pollute the surface and ground waters or the soil, thus affecting the health of the population dwelling in that area. The social problem presented by the urban waste needs time and financial resources for an appropriate solution.23 Accidental pollution and its consequences Accidental pollution events are major environmental accidents which may occur in relation to any structure of the environment. A comprehensive analysis of such accidents should take into account the polluted environment, the pollutant and the causes that led to the occurrence of the incident. Under all circumstances, the consequences of such environmental accidents hold significant social, ecological and economic implications. Therefore, the concern and involvement of society, and environment specialists in particular, are of consequence for the prevention and immediate intervention to remove the damages produced by such accidents. Accidental pollution may be caused by: technology-

23 The data in this paragraph are from the “State of the environment”, Bucharest, 2001.

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related factors and human neglect; oil products, due to breaches along the pipelines; traffic accidents; natural causes. In Romania, 855 cases of accidental pollution occurred in 2000, mainly due to the inadequate operation of equipment and technological facilities, the faulty control of operations, the use of technically obsolete equipment, as well as due to the lack of an accurate control by managing boards and higher management instances. In some districts, such accidents were facilitated by the ineffective activity of environmental and water inspections. Although the number of pollution accidents is considerable, only a few have caused severe damage, yet a concerning increase of the share of such severe incidents has been noticed. The most damaging cases of accidental pollution involving spill over of cyanides and heavy metals occurred in the district of Maramures (January 2000—SC Aurul SA Baia Mare, and March 2000—SM Baia Borsa—Novat decantation pond), both causing trans-boundary effects. As the Tisa river stretches along Romania, Hungary and F.R. of Yugoslavia before flowing into the Danube, all these countries were affected by the accidents but to different extents. The effects were also of different types, but the most remarkable thing was that they produced no casualties or serious illnesses among the populations. The long-term health impacts of the accidents are likely to relate to the heavy metals added into the sediments and soils of the Tisa ecosystem. The environmental impact of these accidental pollutions was particularly serious in Romania and Hungary. For instance, plankton in the Somes river (Romania) and upper Tisa river in Hungary was completely destroyed, and in the middle and lower reaches of the Tisa between 30–60 percent of plankton were damaged by the passage of the pollution plume.24 The fauna also was strongly affected. The Hungarian authorities reported a total of 1,240 tonnes of fish that were killed as a result of the spill.25 The quantity of dead and dying fish observed near Baia Mare and on the Somes river system in Romania were very small comparatively. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that the ice cover prevented dead and dying fish from being seen and these were then washed downstream to Hungary where they were collected. In addition, previous pollution of this section of the river had reduced

24 “Report of the International Task Force for Assessing the Baia Mare Accident”, December 2000, see the official website of the European Union, www.europa.eu. 25 Ibid.

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the numbers and diversity of fish there. Investigations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia indicated that the general fish population did not seem to have been significantly adversely affected by the spill. The spill at Baia Borsa posed the greatest risk of medium-term impacts. Heavy metals persist in the environment and ‘bio-accumulate’ in living organisms. As a result, even relatively low concentrations can pose a threat to ecosystems and human health over the medium to long-term. According to the investigations, the majority of the heavy metals contained within the sediments from Baia Borsa have remained within 6–10 km downstream of the Novat dam.26 Over time, they can be expected to migrate slowly downstream during flood events and become dispersed throughout the river system. This residual threat of heavy metal contamination needs to be the subject of ongoing monitoring and research. The immediate social-economic impacts have affected differently the communities living along the river basin in Romania, Hungary, and F.R of Yugoslavia. These concern losses in: direct employment; the fisheries sector; tourism; immediate recovery costs; industry and investment prospects. In Baia Mare and Baia Borsa immediate job losses were low as the plant was only temporary closed and the mining continued. The fisheries sector suffered the biggest immediate losses especially in Hungary where commercial fishing is an essential activity along the river and the pollution led to a six month ban. All three countries suffered losses in tourism. The impact was again stronger in Hungary where there is important tourist income from holiday-makers from countries such as Austria and Germany. The Europe-wide media publicity of the pollution triggered a massive cancellation of holidays. The immediate costs of coping with the effects of the accidents include the cost of providing alternative drinking water supplies, the costs involved in dead fish disposal, monitoring the state of the river, and the taxes and revenues foregone by the local and national authorities. In addition, considerable expenditure was incurred by the extra administrative costs of public information, surveying, and investigation.27 The prospects for further development in the affected area are not encouraging. The longer-term effects of the pollution may be felt on the level of investment which the area so badly needs. The outskirts

26 27

Ibid. See ibid. for extra information.

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of Baia Mare are heavily industrialized with ageing polluting industry, and the Maramures county contains many abandoned, and potentially dangerous, tailings ponds. In Hungary, the Tisa/Somes catchment area is well behind the rest of Hungary in terms of economic prosperity. Both regions require new investment in non-polluting industry, but the impact of the accidents can be expected to reduce the economic attractiveness of the area. Thus, the first requirement for any serious effort to re-develop the Tisa river basin is to create conditions of ‘environmental security’ in the upper reaches of the river system. The restoration of confidence among potential investors can be best effected by a co-operative effort between the Romanian and Hungarian authorities, in the context of a joint programme for the sustainable development of the region, the effects would also extend to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.28

This case proves that the effects of trans-boundary pollution can be more serious for the neighbouring countries than for the one hosting the responsible agent. Such events can affect dramatically the political relationship between those countries having implications for the regional stability and security.29 Few years after this dramatic situation, the things look encouraging. The number of polluting accidents really decreased and, in terms of gravity, none has reached by far the devastating effects of the Baia Mare accident. The cases of pollution with trans-boundary effects have been very rare and without long term consequences. For instance, during 2006, 205 accidental polluting cases were registered and managed by the commissars of the National Environmental Guard30 especially in the oil extraction and processing sector. The fines applied to the polluters amounted to 1,692,150 RON31 while in one single situation the

28

Ibid. The Hungarian government pointed out that the responsibility for this cases of transboundary pollution was Romania’s and that it intended to ask for damages. See “Ungaria da in judecata ‘Esmeralda’, ‘Aurul’ si ‘Remin’”, 19 March 2000, Evenimentul Zilei. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister, declared that “Hungary is determined to ask the international community to put pressure on Romania to conclude bilateral agreements on environmental protection”. In “Razboiul mediului”, 13 March 2000, Evenimentul Zilei. www.evenimentulzilei.ro. 30 See for details subchapter Romania: Environmental aspects related to the EU accession and roles of the actors in the field. 31 RON (Romanian New “Leu”) is Romania’s national currency (1 EURO is approx. 3,6 RON; the data is from 2007). 29

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environmental permit of the polluting company was cancelled.32 A year later, in Romania were registered 350 cases of accidental pollution. The highest number of cases took place in the Muntenia region where the soil was affected in more than 70 percent of the situations, mostly with oil products.33 The National Environmental Guard managed 187 cases and applied fines amounting to 1,785,500 RON.34 In 2006, there were two cases of transfrontier pollution, both involving Serbia. The first one was produced by the Serbian Prahovo petrochemical company that spilled over in the Danube an “undetermined amount of waste water and oily substances”.35 The Danube transits Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria before reaching the Black Sea, thus several counties in Romania and Bulgaria were affected by the spill over originating from the Prahovo company. Given the size of the accident, this case was legally solved at the ministerial level of the involved countries. Another accidental pollution occurred at the Serbian Pancevo petrochemical company and it involved the reemission of toxic gases originating in the evaporation and burning of benzene and its derivates. The Mehedinti Agency for Environmental Protection undertook immediate monitoring of the air quality in the area but the normal levels of various toxic gases were not exceeded.36 At the end of 2006, the National Agency for Environmental Protection finalized an inventory of the contaminated areas at national level listing 1,339 contaminated sites representing a total surface of 99,297.38 hectares (approx. 993 km2). Table 4.1 presents the nature of the polluting activity and, respectively, the number of contaminated sites by each of these. Metallurgy and agriculture remain two of the main polluters in terms of size of the contaminated areas and their

32 SC Paponi SRL Barlad spilled over oil residues in the waste zone of the city of Husi. The company is penal responsible for the damages and it also lost its environmental permit. See the website of the National Agency for Environmental Protection, “Rapport on the State of the Environment in 2006”, www.anpm.ro. 33 See the website of the National Agency for Environmental Protection, “Rapport on the State of the Environment in 2007”, www.anpm.ro. 34 Ibid. 35 According to the rapport of the Romanian-Serbian Hydro-technical Commission. See the website of the National Agency for Environmental Protection, “Rapport on the State of the Environment in 2006”, www.anpm.ro. 36 Mehedinti is the Romanian county in the neighborhood of the Serbian Pancevo. The monitored toxic gases were: ammonia, nitrogen monoxide, nitrogen dioxide. See the website of the National Agency for Environmental Protection, “Rapport on the State of the Environment in 2006”, www.anpm.ro.

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Table 4.1: The distribution of contaminated sites according to the polluting agent Activity Energetic industry Oil industry Mining industry Chemical industry Petrochemical industry Metallurgical industry Machinery building industry Building materials industry Glass industry Paper industry Textile industry Food processing industry Agriculture activities Rural waste Urban waste Other activities TOTAL

Number of sites

Surface (ha.)

38 330 197 42 14 43 9 6 3 7 1 5 25 430 180 9 1,339

4,317.14 2,268.48 4,250.97 2,215.75 736.41 71,380.75 13.16 204.51 0.64 2.21 0.5 15.48 12,676.42 639.32 1,269.62 32.43 99,287.38

Source: Data from “Report on the State of the Environment in 2007”, National Agency of Environmental Protection, www.anpm.ro

drastic effects. Metallurgy affects large areas with emissions originating from production units of pesticides and fertilisers, or oil refineries.37 In addition, pollution caused by the mining industry has aggressive effects on the soil and water due to the heavy metals (especially cooper, zinc, lead, cadmium) that are present in the contaminated area for a long period. These together with sulphur dioxide emissions dramatically impinge on the well-being of local inhabitants and fauna on a ray of 20–30 kilometres around the polluting agent. The soil too is affected by a growth of its acid contains, which triggers a reduction of the nutritional elements, destruction, erosion and sliding, dehydrated vegetation etc. The oil industry as well is among the main polluters, most of the accidental pollution cases involving oil and salty water spill over from the oil exploitations, refineries, transport and pipes. This type of pol-

37 Several industrial units responsible for pollution in the metallurgy and mining sectors are: Romplumb Firiza SA, Phoenix Baia Mare, Sometra Copsa Mica, Ampellum Zlatna SA, the iron-and-steel plants of Galati and Hunedoara etc. See “Rapport on the State of the Environment in 2007”, www.anpm.ro.

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lution negatively affects the ecologic balance of the soil and the quality of the internal water. Finally, urban and rural waste management is still a problem, causing the removal from the farming circuit of 18,000 hectares of agriculture terrain.38 Conclusions regarding the environmental risks in Romania These are the main risks in the environmental sector for Romania and, though none of them has the proportions of a cataclysm threatening to destroy at once thousands of lives and irremediably affect the ecosystems, some of them might have dramatic consequences in the long-run. For instance, systematic pollution of the air, soil and water, deforestation, might have incalculable effects on the well-being of the population and the healthy development of the environment. Romania already has one of the lowest life expectations in Europe (65.46 for men and 73.32 for women) and environmental risks are for sure among the causes for this situation.39 How come then that there are almost no securitizing moves in this field? It is not the fact that the ruling elite does not acknowledge the magnitude of the problem. President Iliescu considered that the main environmental issue affecting Romania relates to the Danube and the Danube Delta which suffer from a continuing depreciation of the fish population.40 The minister of water and environmental protection mentioned the storing up of urban waste among the most severe problems the population has to face.41 Finally, another political representative assessed the quality of the water as a dramatic problem and noticed that ‘a high number of the existing treatment plants are not appropriately maintained or used which leads to an almost 50 percent of the total amount of wastewater discharged into the natural receivers without being first properly treated’.42 It is, thus, clear that at the ruling elite level exists a certain degree of concern regarding the 38

See the website of the National Agency for Environmental Protection, “Rapport on the State of the Environment in 2007”, www.anpm.ro. 39 “The White Book of Public Health”, December 2000, see official site of the ministry of public health and family, www.ms.ro. The figures are for the period 1996–1998. 40 Speech of Ion Iliescu, Romania’s President, on the International Environment Day, 4 June 2001, see www.presidency.ro. 41 Speech of Aurel Constantin Ilie, Minister of Waters and Environmental Protection, on the International Environment Day, 4 June 2001, www.mappm.ro. 42 Speech of Florin Stadiu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Waters and Environmental Protection, 17 October 2001, at the Seminar on “Water and Sustainable Development”, Bucharest; www.mappm.ro.

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risks in the environmental field. But, why does this not produce any attempt of securitization? The answer is directly connected with the problem of responsibility. The analysis in the political field indicated that there are always other actors who can be blamed for the shortcomings and failures of the complex reform processes: the ruling elite avoids systematically to assume responsibility for these pointing out to the opposition, for instance, as the one to be blamed. In the societal sector, the scapegoat is represented by the national minorities. But, in the environmental sector it is not that simple to put the blame on somebody else. First of all, because most of the economic agents which are among the main polluters are still state owned. Thus, the way they are managed and their outcomes are directly connected to the state, that is, the government. Even if some of the polluting agents are private enterprises, the environmental permits are issued by state agencies as a result of a—theoretically—thorough inspection. Then, when polluting accidents take place, the state is the one asked to apply appropriate sanctions. So, whatever the case, the final responsibility falls on the state, in other words, those in power. Or, the ruling politicians are not eager to point an accusing finger to themselves. Especially when there is a lot to be done and the situation in the field is very sensitive, as it is the case with the environmental sector. This state of facts has been also facilitated by population’s little awareness regarding the consequences of such situations. Nevertheless, the things have started to change though at a slow pace. The government has undertaken some relevant measures in order to improve the situation. Relevant efforts were aimed at adapting the Romanian legislation to the EU’s, but a special attention was given to improving the institutional structure, identifying new financial resources for supporting, where necessary, the acquisition of non-polluting technologies, the development of coercive measures as means to prevent accidental pollution.43 However, for a very long time the fines in the cases of accidental pollution have not been indexed to inflation and the maximum one amounted around 320 USD.44 This could not induce 43 See “Conclusions regarding the activity in the field of environmental protection in 2001”, Report of the ministry of waters and environmental protection, www .mappm.ro. 44 The level of the fines was established by the Governmental Ordinance no. 15, in Monitorul Oficial no. 024, 31 January 1996. As a matter of fact, in March 2002, the minister of waters and environmental protection came with a proposal for adjusting these fines as to amount approximately 480 USD for a private person and 4,800 USD

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among the polluting agents a strong motivation to change anything. But, with the constraints imposed by the EU, the decision-makers had to speed up the rate of the transformations in this field for the benefit of both Romania’s population and environment. Thus, the next subchapter focuses on the conditionality aspect, that is, EU’s influence on the developments in the environmental sector in Romania prior to the country’s integration. 4.3. EU environment legislation and instruments of pre-accession to support the approximation in the candidate countries Approximation of the EU environmental requirements poses a major challenge to the candidate countries.45 European Union’s official documents such as Agenda 200046 and the “Communication on Accession Strategies for Environment”47 underlined a worrying situation: the standards in environmental protection in Central and Eastern Europe, compared with the member states, were extremely low. Initial estimates of the cost of all investments needed to comply with the EU environmental requirements for drinking water supply, wastewater management, large combustion plants, and waste management were around 120 billion Euros for the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe alone. The Commission therefore has stressed the need for realistic national, long-term strategies for implementation of the acquis and has encouraged countries to mobilise significant domestic and foreign financial resources—especially private funding—to ensure compliance. Agenda 2000 proposed further that EU would allocate substantial Community financial assistance for environmental investments in candidate countries, particularly through the new Instrument for Structural Policies for an economic agent. Nevertheless, the amounts for the latter group were far too small to induce a higher preventive behaviour among the possible polluting agents. In 2005 the level of the fins was adjusted again. The last adjustment was made in 2007 through the Emergency Ordinance no. 68, in Monitorul Oficial no. 446, 29 June 2007, which established the highest level for fines in case of polluting activities at 12,500 Euro for private persons and, respectively, at 25,000 Euro for juridical ones. 45 Cyprus and Malta applied for EU membership in 1990. Hungary and Poland submitted their applications in 1994, followed shortly by Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria in 1995, and Slovenia in 1996. In 1999, Turkey’s application was also formally accepted. All these countries except for Turkey have now (2007) EU membership. 46 COM (1997) 2000, www.europa.eu. 47 COM (1998) 294 final, www.europa.eu.

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for Pre-Accession (ISPA) as well as the revised PHARE programme and the new pre-accession instrument for agriculture and rural development (SAPARD). ISPA, which became operational in 2000, grants over 500 million Euros per year for environmental investments over the period 2000–06. Nevertheless, EU support and other external assistance only met a small proportion of the total needs. Ministries of environment in the candidate countries are usually responsible for preparing the implementation plans that are then adopted by the governments of each country. However, in many candidate countries, ministries of environment have traditionally not been responsible for identifying compliance gaps and preparing such detailed investment plans. This added to the difficulties candidate countries faced in preparing concrete and realistic implementation strategies. Expenditure on environmental protection increased in most candidate countries prior to accession. However, this expenditure for most countries was still only a fraction of the needed investments. Commission services estimated that candidate countries needed to spend on average between 2 and 3 percent of GDP yearly for full implementation. For several countries this did not present major problems, especially given the high growth rates emerging in the late 1990s. But investment needs differed considerably between countries: a thorough study estimated that the proportion of GDP needed ranged between 2 percent for the Czech Republic and 11 percent for Bulgaria.48 In 2000, GDP investment expenditure ranged only from 0.6 to 3 percent.49 Sources of funding included loans from the international financial institutions, bilateral grants and credit schemes, commercial bank loans, foreign direct investment, and revenue generated from consumer charges, fees or taxes. Post-accession periods of transition have been necessary for the heavy-investment directives. However, the transition requests have to be supported by implementation programmes, which need to include intermediate targets and milestones which can be monitored after the date of accession. Candidate countries were asked to prepare the financing plans necessary for the accession negotiations. Moreover, sectoral plans, together with their National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis, formed the blueprints for countries’ pre-accession efforts. The 48 “Bulgaria: the Challenges of Complying with EU Environmental Directives”, World Bank, October 2000, p. 8, www.worldbank.org. 49 Ibid.

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candidate countries benefiting from ISPA also prepared national ISPA strategies for infrastructure in the environment and transport sectors. These strategies often represented a first step towards implementation planning for the environmental acquis. Despite this, considerable gaps remained in the candidate countries’ programmes for implementation. The process of identifying, preparing, financing and implementing the many environmental investment projects needed for EU membership developed slower than expected. Furthermore, the establishment of new institutions and administrative systems to carry out the measures necessary for achieving compliance with the environmental acquis was also lagging. Therefore, candidate countries had to intensify efforts to produce detailed and realistic alignment and investment schedules. The Commission’s technical assistance to help with the development of implementation and environmental financing strategies included the “Priority Environmental Programme for Accession” (PEPA). Launched in 1999, the main role of the programme was to support the development of implementation plans for the investment-heavy directives and ensure that countries had a prioritized list of projects to be implemented over the following years (see Table A.1 of the Appendices). The PEPA programme focused, in the beginning, on investment planning, while in the subsequent years more attention has been given to the development of long-term priority projects. The ‘investment-heavy’ directives deserved a special concern due to a couple of reasons: 1) the experience of implementing these directives in the member states has already posed relevant challenges; 2) they need the greatest number of projects and the biggest share of investment funds in comparison with other directives. Given the current status of the environmental infrastructure in the candidate countries and the financial resources available, it is clear that certain directives will be particularly difficult to implement. The Appendix 1 contains a list of the key investment-heavy directives in the fields of water, waste management, air pollution and industrial pollution. Relevant data referring to the environmental infrastructure in the candidate countries provide a better illustration of the extent of financial assistance needed in this sector. For instance, in 2001, the compliance status of this infrastructure with the specific directives was far from being in keeping with EU requirements. The infrastructures includes large combustion plants, Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) installations, landfill and water supply connections, that needed

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to be put in place. The wide range of problems between different countries was noticeable; where there are 141 IPPC installations in Estonia, there are 1,500 in the Czech Republic, 1,000 in Hungary and 4,000 in Poland. There were five landfills in Cyprus, but over a thousand non-compliant waste dumps in Romania. Percentages of wastewater treated ranged from 30 percent to 77 percent: Romania had 30 percent, Hungary 34 percent, Slovenia 35 percent, while the Czech Republic had 68.6 percent and Estonia 77 percent. There were large gaps still between towns and rural areas in sewage and drinking water facilities.50 Thus, the situation of the environmental infrastructure in the candidate countries increased the range of problems that asked for considerable human and financial efforts for meeting EU’s requirements. Directive requirements for institutional roles and responsibilities A crucial role in the environmental sector has to be played by the institutions concerned with permitting, inspection and enforcement aspects. Although the EU environmental acquis makes a few explicit references to detailed institutional arrangements, the national legislation sets up standards to be met, procedures to be followed, etc. Thus, a member state has to decide by itself which would be the most appropriate structures to meet the established standards and requirements. The competent authorities in the environmental sector have numerous tasks to perform, such as: planning, monitoring, reporting, licensing, quality assurance, designations, inspection, public information, enforcement and dealing with emergencies. These structures can be established either at national or local level, according to the functions they have to carry out. For instance, inspection of petrol stations can be best undertaken locally. Nevertheless, the national authorities have to be enabled by specific legislation to intervene when the local ones fail to act appropriately. Some of the tasks performed by the competent authorities are significant. To begin with, permitting requires systematic and transparent procedures to be adopted so that the organizations involved can take decisions in a coherent manner all over the country.51 The permits must clearly state what is and what is not permitted

50 The data used in this paragraph is from COM (2001) 304 final, see official site of the EU, www.europa.eu. 51 Permitting is explicitly required for: new vehicles (air control directives); discharges to waters (dangerous substances and urban waste water treatment directives); treating, storing or tipping waste; incineration, shipment or disposal of waste (waste

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and what improvement programme may be needed. In the IPPC field, it would be advantageous to work with integrated permits. Though it is not necessary that one institution assesses all the conditions of the permit (air, water, waste, energy efficiency), co-ordination among the respective structures is essential in order to perform efficiently. Another important task refers to inspection/enforcement and, in some cases, the permitting authority may be the same as the enforcing one.52 When they are separated, it is necessary that both work closely together so that information from inspections can be used in revision of permits.53 In certain situations, the details of the permit depend on thorough environmental and technical issues, then the role of the inspector is instrumental for the process. Though under these circumstances the permitting authority takes the final decision, this is reliant on the findings of the enforcement authority. Any enforcement procedure should aim to be effective, yet proportionate. The legislation should establish penalties appropriate to the gravity of the infringement, it should also be clear to whom these apply and the application must be consistent. Finally, monitoring constitutes, alongside with permitting and enforcing, an essential task of the competent authorities.54 The institutions have to establish clear procedures for monitoring and adopt appropriate record keeping procedures to provide documented advice to any type of inquires. It is necessary that all details of monitoring procedures

management directives); industrial activities (IPPC directives). For specific Directives, see Appendices. 52 Inspection/enforcement is required for: road-worthiness testing of vehicles (air directives); facilities for disposal, recovery, incineration of waste; landfill sites; sites for disposal of waste oils and sewage sludge (waste management directives); verifying compliance (IPPC directives). Inspection/enforcement is an implicit activity in the water control as the states must ensure compliance with discharge limits. For specific Directives, see Appendices. 53 In April 2001, the Recommendation (2001/331/EC) providing for minimum criteria for environmental inspections came into force. This document establishes a range of specific criteria for the operation of individual inspections. It is important that institutions charged with the responsibility of undertaking inspections within the member states and candidate countries have sufficient capacity to meet these requirements. 54 Monitoring is required for: urban air quality (air directives); assessment of water status for all surface and ground waters; urban waste water treatment, nitrates and bathing waters (water directives); waste types going to landfills and incineration; transport of hazardous waste; specific contaminants and content of sewage sludge (waste management directives); emissions from industry; activities in the plants; emissions and mass-balance assessments (IPPC directives). For specific Directives, see Appendices.

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contained in EU legislation are compared closely with domestic practice and changes made accordingly. This may relate to sampling frequency, analytical procedures used or parameters monitored. For performing monitoring tasks, the institutions have to be equipped with skilled field and laboratory technical staff and analytical facilities. In some cases, self-monitoring activities might be permitted with benefits for both the economic agent and competent authorities. The monitoring costs are then passed to the agent that (supposedly) becomes more aware of the impact of its activity on the environment. However, the enforcement institutions have to accredit those companies (their laboratories) or consultants. It is also important that the self-monitoring is undertaken honestly. A large company may be very careful of its public image and work attentively to ensure self-monitoring is objective, accurate and effective. A small agent may feel less of such pressure. The institutions involved in these tasks cannot work efficiently without closely co-operating with one another. Environmental monitoring information is needed in both permitting and enforcement and it is usual that this function is attached to the enforcement authority, so that, for instance, it can assess whether changes in the environment are taking place. Monitoring information should be routinely available to the permitting authority. The enforcement authority may also be empowered to establish guidelines for environmental objectives in a given area that may be referred to by the permitting authority. There is also necessary to have a good co-ordination between the local authorities and the law enforcement agencies. The authorities which are responsible for the implementation of the environmental legislation must be supported by the enforcement authorities in their activity. A good co-ordination may be also achieved by setting up integrated institutions or joint bodies involved in implementing the environmental acquis. The candidate countries had to go through various transformations in order to comply with EU requirements. It was not only a matter of adopting new legislation, but also building up the appropriate institutions and structures to implement it, upgrading old research devices or, in most of the cases, providing laboratories with new technological equipment, and training/educating specialists for a great variety of fields. Due to the existing poor standards, large investments were required in order to ensure a full compliance. At the same time, programmes designed to increase public awareness regarding environmental issues had to be developed while all the competent authorities provided information to the public concerning their aims, activities and results. More

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than in other fields, the transformations in the environment sector have a high chance of being successful if both a top-down approach and a bottom-up process take place in parallel. A good illustration in this sense is presented by Romania’s case. 4.4. Romania: Environmental aspects related to the EU accession and roles of the actors in the field In Romania, serious concern about environmental matters has started to show up after the country submitted her application for EU membership in 1995. These concerns have grown over the years and they led to some relevant progress in the field, although there is so much to be done that it will take long-term considerable and sustained efforts to meet the European Union’s standards. The investments in the field have increased steadily, especially due to the assistance given through various international programmes. The quota of the GDP allocated to the environmental sector was also bigger every year, for instance, from 0.47 percent in 2000 to 1.73 percent in 2001.55 Nevertheless, the financial efforts were still insufficient to cope with the gravity of the problems and more sponsoring sources had to be identified. It had been estimated that Romania needed around 22,000 million Euros to comply with the EU environmental acquis, which clearly indicated the extent of the problems to be solved.56 Since negotiations for Romanian’s accession to EU were officially launched on 15 February 2001, the co-operation with the Union’s specific bodies has intensified with clear and immediate results especially in the legislation approximation. Legislation that supports the introduction of waste framework Directives, regarded by the European Commission as implementation priorities, was concluded in the next couple of years: law on the management of waste57; law on management of industrial

55 “Assessment and conclusions on the activity in the environment protection in 2001”, January 2002, official site of the Romanian Government, www.gov.ro. 56 The amount was first mentioned in “Compliance Costs for Approximation of EU Environmental Legislation in the Central and East European Countries”, (EDC Ltd, EPE asbl.), April 1997 www.europa.eu. The same amount (22,000 million Euro) can be found in a document issued by the ministry of waters and environmental protection, “National Plan for Environmental ISPA Implementation”, 2000, www.mappm.ro. This suggests that (very) little has been done in this field between 1997–2000. 57 Emergency Ordinance no. 78 on the management of waste, in Monitorul Oficial no. 283, 22 June 2000.

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recyclable waste.58 There were also adopted the law on the protected areas59 and the law on air protection.60 In total, in 2001 there were adopted 19 laws and 18 governmental decisions in the environmental sector. The year 2002 has started with a further intensification of the law-drafting process. By 1 April 2002, 30 governmental decisions and 17 ministerial ordinances were adopted. In addition, from 16 drafts of new laws, the priority ones on the quality of drinking water61 and, respectively, on the prevention and integrated control of pollution62 were adopted. Thus, the adaptation of the legislation and the transposition of the EU acquis took place at a fast pace. The institutions responsible for all the aspects referring to the implementation of the acquis had to be adapted to the requirements posed by these. Among their tasks, assessing environmental security risks and facing them were not the least important. The ministry of agriculture, forests, waters and environment (MAFWE) that was set up in June 2003 has the main responsibility for implementing the environmental acquis.63 But, according to the field of interest, the MAFWE shares this responsibility with other ministries. Ministry of public health (MPH) is concerned with Urban Wastewater Directive, Nitrates Directive, Air Quality Directives. Ministry of industry (MI) is responsible for the implementation of provisions related to the industrial sector (Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, the IPPC Directive) and develops legislation and policies on fuel quality. Ministry of planning and public works (MPW) has the primary responsibility for ensuring that infrastructure required for the implementation of heavy-investment Directives is developed. Ministry of transport (MT) drafts legislation and policy for regulating air emissions from transportation. Ministry of finance (MF) takes the decision on the budget allocated to environmental protection and has the power to veto MAFWE proposals. Finally, the

58

Emergency Ordinance no. 16 on the management of the recyclable industrial waste, in Monitorul Oficial no. 066, 7 February 2001. 59 Emergency Ordinance no. 236 on the protected areas, in Monitorul Oficial no. 625, 4 December 2000. 60 Emergency Ordinance no. 243 on air protection, in Monitorul Oficial no. 633, 6 December 2000. 61 Law no. 458 on the quality of the drinking water, in Monitorul Oficial no. 552, 29 July 2002. 62 Law no. 645 on the prevention, reduction and integrated control of pollution, in Monitorul Oficial no. 901, 12 December 2002. 63 In 2005 this institution changed its name into ministry of environment and sustainable development. Its new website is www.mmediu.ro.

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Environmental Inspection Agencies are responsible for inspection and enforcement. An Inter-Ministerial Committee on European Integration was created with the main task of drafting legislation. The governmental scheme was restructured in June 2003 and, if by that date it included among others a ministry of waters and environmental protection and a separate ministry of agriculture, the new ‘improved’ structure gathered the two ministries under the same office: the ministry of agriculture, forests, waters and environment.64 Suddenly, two sensitive and demanding matters that required specific solutions were put together without any sound argumentation. Both agriculture and environmental protection demanded extra attention in Romania’s case as the standards were still poor in these fields. A first problem was the budget for the new ministry, which obviously was smaller that would have been the one of the former two ministries, had they been still separated. Then, when accessing the official website of the new ministry, one notices that most of the information regards agriculture. The former ministry of environmental protection had an instructive site, with reports on the state of the environment in Romania, information about the progress in the transposition of the European legislation, details regarding different projects such as the “Clean Romania Programme”.65 As most of the population knew little about the various aspects of environmental protection, the data provided by the website would have helped at least those who had access to this information means. At the same time, it was a useful source for journalists that would have disseminated it. It was also a fair indicator of the transparency promoted by this institution. As it results, a government restructuring that replaced some ministers and reduced the number of ministries without firing any employees cannot be regarded as a serious decision. It actually cancelled part of the good things achieved at the institutional level in this field.66 64 Governmental Decision no. 736 on the organization and functioning of the ministry of agriculture, forests, waters and environment, in Monitorul Oficial, part I, no. 495, 9 July 2003. 65 These documents are quoted in the present paper as parts of the analysis were made before June 2003. 66 I have to underline that the reasons presented by the prime minister Nastase for undertaking this restructuring in June 2003 are justified neither by the moment nor by the disappearance of some ministries. He invoked “a better co-ordination of the decision-making process” and “an augmentation of the governmental managerial capacity and efficiency”. At the same time, the negotiations with the EU required “an institutional reshaping in many fields” because Romania had to intensify the actions

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Local institutions also have certain responsibilities related to the environmental acquis. There are forty-two Environmental Protection Agencies (EPA) concerned with permitting, inspection, enforcement and monitoring; Local Authorities (LA) involved in managing environmental infrastructure (i.e. wastewater treatment works, sewage networks, and landfills), identifying and proposing environmental projects for investment, granting development permits and ensuring environmental services to the population; Local Agriculture Agencies (LAA) responsible for the Nitrates Directive; Apele Romane (Romanian Waters) which has 11 branches corresponding to river basins, responsible for preparing water management plans and programmes.67 Extensive as it is, the list includes even more structures that, either at local or at national level, have a saying in the implementation of the environment responsibilities. As concerns water quality, these are: the National Institute for Meteorology, Hydrology and Water Management; the Romanian Research Marine Institute Constanta; Institute for Research and Design Danube Delta. In the field of air quality, there are two national structures, the Institute of Public Health responsible for air quality monitoring and the Standards Institute which develops fuel quality standards. These numerous institutions with responsibilities in this field have troubles in co-ordinating their efforts in order to avoid duplications and delays. Inter-ministerial communication had improved since the set up of the Inter Ministerial Committee but there was still much to be done for ensuring constant and mutual support. For instance, extensive ambient environmental monitoring was undertaken by a Department of MAFWE and by the EPAs. However, this was also complicated by a separate network operated by the ministry of health. This situation represented an unnecessary waste of financial and human resources.

that “would have guaranteed it the status of a functional market economy”. (See “Declaration of the prime minister Adrian Nastase to the parliament”, 19 June 2003, www .gov.ro) These reasons are generally valid and should represent a continuous aim of the government. A reduction of the number of ministries cannot guarantee any success if other aspects that are affecting the governing act are not dealt with (see the conclusions of the chapter on The Political Sector in this sense). 67 In 2005, through Governmental Decision no. 459 on reorganization and functioning of the National Agency for Environmental Protection (set up in 2004) , the National Agency for Environmental Protection was reorganized and eight regional environmental agencies were set up corresponding to the regions established by Law no. 315/2004 on regional development in Romania (in Monitorul Oficial no. 0577). See Monitorul Oficial no. 462, 31 May 2005. The forty-two EPAs were preserved too.

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In what regards the employees, the MAFWE had around 605 people68, which, in fact, covers the sum of the employees of the former two ministries that formed it.69 Nevertheless, the staff working in the environmental protection was not sufficient as the budget restrictions did not allow a larger number. The salaries were low and this made recruitment difficult, especially in what referred to young specialists with high training and skills. In general, staff had limited experience in the fields of: legislation drafting, transposition, application of economic instruments to environmental protection, human and project management, also working with other stakeholders (i.e. NGOs, private sector). The situation of the local structures was dramatic as it has been impossible for a heavily constrained national budget to support the purchasing of new adequate technological equipment for all the fortytwo EPAs. Each of these had around fifty staff who, in most of the cases, lacked adequate training and expertise: for instance, assessment of actual air emissions and the main activities related to water quality were never made under the communist regime. However, it was proposed that the unmanageable forty-two agencies were reduced to eight Regional Protection Agencies.70 The decentralization of the budget required the EPAs to adopt self-financing mechanisms. For a period, permitting was not charged but the situation could change. However, there is always a danger that financial need rather than environmental integrity would represent the main criterion behind permitting. Budget decentralization also affects local authorities, which, since 2001, have had responsibilities for implementing investment-heavy Directives such as the Urban Wastewater Directive. Such a responsibility is challenging taking into account their low budgets. Attracting investments in the environment area is a completely new aspect for these structures and they only seldom manage to succeed. The problems did not stop here. If the different tasks of the competent authorities were taken into account, more shortcomings were

68

Op. cit., Article 16, paragraph 1. According to the Governmental Decision no. 17 on the organization and functioning of the ministry of water and environmental protection, in Monitorul Oficial no. 014, 10 January 2001, Article 4, the ministry had 200 employees. According to the Governmental Decision no. 362 on the organization and functioning of the ministry of agriculture, alimentation and forests, in Monitorul Oficial no. 273, 23 April 2002, Article 16, this ministry had 385 employees. 70 See note 733). The EPAs did not disappear, the eight newly created regional ones are coordinating EPAs activity. 69

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identified. There was no integrated permitting and this induced a lot of delays and inconsistencies.71 The number of activities subject to permitting was large and this created a big number of permit applications, which were processed without sufficient consideration of the potential environmental impacts of the activity proposed. Compliance with the permits should have been regularly monitored and inspected by the EPAs. In reality, due to under-staffing and limited laboratory capacity, industrial polluters were required in the permits to monitor and report on their emissions. This has rarely happened so emissions were derived through calculations rather than measurement and monitoring. Not only the little expertise and experience forced the enterprises into this conduct, but also their lack of financial means. In what regards the institutions responsible for inspection and enforcement, these have been the EPAs and Environment Inspection Agencies. The latter ones were poorly equipped and ineffective. While they were able to undertake basic inspection activities, they were severely constrained by the lack of adequate equipment which is instrumental in reaching objective assessments. This only hampered feedback to permitting as there was little point in changing permit conditions if compliance could not be ensured. The Inspection Agencies could levy administrative penalties for non-compliance. Fines were levied on a case-by-case basis. However, as it has already been mentioned, these were in the past too low to cause an effective deterrent. The creation of the Environmental Fund72 and Administration of the Environmental Fund are positive developments in this sector.73 The fund became operational and it collected the revenues generated through the application of economic instruments to environmental protection in order to distribute them afterwards to specific activities in the field (investments, research). The priority projects are considered those with a relevant role in the transposition of the acquis such as: 71 The procedure and activities subject to permitting were established through the Law no. 137 on environmental protection, in Monitorul Oficial no. 304, 30 December 1995. However, the integrated permit can be obtained beginning with 2005. It is issued on the basis of Governmental Orders no. 818/2003 (in Monitorul Oficial no. 0800) and, respectively, no. 1158/2005 (in Monitorul Oficial no. 1091) by the Regional Agencies for Environmental Protection. 72 Law no. 73 on the Environmental Fund, in Monitorul Oficial no. 207, 11 May 2000, amended by the Emergency Ordinance no. 93, in Monitorul Oficial no. 347, 29 June 2001. 73 Governmental Decision no. 1174 on the set up and functioning of the Administration of the Environmental Fund, in Monitorul Oficial no. 789, 12 December 2001.

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control and reduction of air, water and soil pollution; protection of natural resources; waste management and recycling; treatment and/or elimination of toxic waste; protection and preservation of ecosystems.74 As for the Administration of the Environmental Fund, this was subordinated to the ministry of agriculture, forests, waters and environment and its main task is to create the appropriate conditions for an efficient management of the Environmental Fund.75 But, since its set up in the autumn of 2001and till 2003, the Fund had not financed any project whatsoever. The deadline for submitting proposals was February 2003, but none was selected due to the governmental restructuring. The institutional change shows here its negative side: it delayed a process that, due to its expected consequences, could be considered among the priorities. A last important development worth mentioning here is the creation of the National Environmental Guard which became fully operational only in 2004.76 It set up a well-functioning national network consisting of a General Commissariat, forty-one regional environmental commissariats, the Bucharest and, respectively, the ‘Delta Dunarii’ natural habitat commissariats. The Guard has attributions regarding the control, verification, and monitoring of all the environmental activities, participates in the actions meant to diminish or eliminate the major effects of polluting accidents on the environment, applies sanctions in accordance to the legislation in the field.77 As seen above, this institution has succeeded in managing efficiently the polluting accidents during the last years and, through a thorough verification and monitoring activity, it prevented many others to happen.78 To sum up, Romania had a too wide network of responsible institutions which lacked the means to work efficiently. Their activity also overlapped and this gave raise to delays and a dilution of responsibility. As it shows the case, institutional restructuring done without aiming at the improvement of efficiency, transparency and quality of the services, should better be avoided. It can damage even the little progress

74 Press communiqué of the ministry of waters and environmental protection, 9 November 2001, www.mappm.ro. 75 See op. cit. (note 73). 76 Decision no. 1167 on the set up of the Environmental Guard, Monitorul Oficial no. 789, 12 December 2001. 77 See “Atributii ale garzii de mediu”, official website of the National Environmental Guard, www.gnm.ro. 78 See subchapter on Accidental pollution and its consequences.

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achieved during the years. While competence for the main requirements of the acquis was mostly decided upon, technical equipment capacity was extremely limited and experts’ number and training were severely constrained. The fact that Romania had major capability shortcomings did not affect only the domestic social life and ecosystems but also the neighbouring countries. For instance, cases of accidental transboundary pollution inflicted on Romania’s relation with Hungary. That is one of the situations which can be remedied and prevented with the involvement of different domestic and international organizations. These functional actors can play a positive role in the field. Functional actors The environmental sector is characterized by the presence of various functional actors to a greater extent than other sectors. The securitizing actors who were constantly noticed in the political and societal fields are best described as ‘shy’ and silent in the environmental one, at least at the national level. On the contrary, the functional actors, that is, those who can influence in a decisive way the course of events in a given field, play key roles. Most of the above sub-chapters analysed the influence of the EU on the developments in the environmental sector in Romania. The positive results of this conditionality are clear, especially at the political elite level: adoption of appropriate legislation, beginning of adaptation of the institutional network, more awareness regarding environmental issues at the decision-making level, clear prioritization of the projects and more focused efforts to attract private and international investment. Altogether, a more rapid pace of reform in this field which speaks undoubtedly about the EU’s positive part in this regard. The outcomes of the roles of various actors are easy to identify when looking into specific aspects related to trans-boundary air pollution. An example is illustrative here. During 2000, the Environmental Inspection Agency of Alexandria, which surveys the area of Turnu-Magurele, monitored the activity of the economic agent S.C Turnu S.A and concluded that this polluted the environment with more substances that exceeded the prescribed limits.79 Some of the pollutants were recorded by the Bulgarian air quality monitoring system as well, and the situation was reported by the Bulgarian authorities to the Romanian ones. As a consequence, the minister of water, forest and environmental

79

Both Alexandria and Turnu-Magurele are Romanian towns.

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protection and the local Inspection Agency warned the economic agent to adjust its production cycle so that the emissions complied with the standards in force. Not all the consequences of accidental trans-boundary pollution are so easy to remedy and, as the case of Aurul SA has shown, sometimes the ecosystems can be dramatically affected for years. Such situations can be best solved in the framework provided by specific international documents. In this respect, Romania became part of the Convention for long-range trans-boundary air pollution in February 1991.80 Later, eight protocols were concluded, concerning the methods of limitation and reduction of some pollutants. These documents aim at making a major difference regarding the environmental preservation and Romania has already signed several of them at the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, without appropriate means for monitoring and inspection and without severe non-compliance measures, there is little chance to avoid serious trans-boundary pollution to happen. More progress is registered in another field. Romania joined the Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer (1985), the Montreal Protocol regarding substances that deplete the ozone layer (1987) as well as the Amendment adopted later in London (1990).81 It also ratified the Amendments to the Montreal Protocol adopted in Copenhagen (1992)82 and, respectively, in Montreal (1997),83 the latter providing for the setting-up of a licence award system for the production, import and export of substances that deplete the ozone layer, in order to prevent the illicit traffic of these substances. As a result, beginning with 1 July 1999, a process of gradual elimination of chlorine-fluorocarbons (CFC) at national level had started and went on for one year. At the same time, further measures were undertaken, such as the implementation of non-polluting technology and adoption of additional instrumental legislation in the field: the control on the 80 The “Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution” was signed by Romania on 14 November 1979 and ratified through Law no. 8, in Monitorul Oficial no. 018, 26 January 1991. 81 All these international documents were ratified through Law no. 84, in Monitorul Oficial no. 292, 15 December 1993. 82 Governmental Ordinance no. 24 on the acceptance of the Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on the substances that deplete the ozone layer, adopted in Copenhagen on 25 November 1992, in Monitorul Oficial no. 038, 29 January 2000. 83 Law no. 150 on the acceptance of the Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on the substances that deplete the ozone layer, adopted in Montreal on 15–17 September 1997, in Monitorul Oficial no. 181, 10 April 2001.

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trade with CFC substances was established84 and there were imposed restrictions on the use of substances which destroy the ozone layer.85 Consequently, Romania managed to fit into the limits settled in the framework of the Montreal Protocol. A last point is represented by the process that led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (December 1997). Romania became a contracting party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in June 1992.86 This document sets as primary objective the stabilization of the quantity of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere, at a level that would prevent any drastic disorder of the climate. As a result, Romania set up a National Committee for Climate Change subordinated to the ministry of water, forest and environmental protection in order to closely supervise the developments in the field.87 According to the Convention, Romania agreed to reduce the emissions by 2000, at the level of reference of 1989. It also attended the negotiations regarding climate change which led to the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol (1997), when the concrete data and means for the accomplishment of the objectives were established.88 The Protocol establishes the terms and the rules of monitoring the gases that determine the greenhouse effect for the Earth. Its provisions stipulate that, by 2012, the medium quantity of GHG (six gases in particular) should be reduced with 5.2 percent below the level registered in 1990. In Romania’s case, the commitment provides for a reduction of the emissions with 8 percent in comparison with 1989, for the period 2008–2012. The objectives of the Kyoto Protocol can be achieved through actions such as: industry has to become a low-energy-consumer, shifting from the use of fossil fuels with a high carbon content (coal) to fuels with a low concentration of carbon (natural gases) or alternate fuels; the energy sector must be restructured so that it becomes more efficient and less pollutant; transportation must use low consumption and less pollutant means of transport; the construction sector must be energy efficient;

84 Governmental Ordinance no. 89 on the trade with and introduction of restriction in the use of chlorine-fluorocarbon substances that deplete the ozone layer, in Monitorul Oficial no. 423, 31 August 1999. 85 Law no. 159, in Monitorul Oficial no. 486, 5 October 2000. 86 The Convention was ratified by the Romanian Parliament through Law no. 24, in Monitorul Oficial no. 119, 12 May 1994. 87 The Committee was set up in November 1996. 88 Romania ratified the Kyoto Protocol through Law no. 3, Monitorul Oficial no. 081, 16 February 2001.

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the equipment and the products must have low energy consumption; forests have to be protected and even extended. One can imagine that such ambitious tasks cannot be met by a country as Romania by her own, given the fact that it is already facing a complex and difficult reform and has insufficient financial means to cope with all the needs. Thus, a set of market mechanisms was established, including transferable marketing licenses and the common application of the provisions, in co-operation with other countries. Using the mechanism of transferable marketing licenses, joint implementation projects were perfected and carried on with the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Sweden. Another one was developed together with the World Bank. This part underlines the role of international organizations as functional actors for the progress in the environmental field. At this stage, their involvement cannot be considered totally efficient if it only sets up a legislative framework without forcing internal adaptation to these requirements. In other words, international conventions should include provisions that have the power to trigger the setting up of appropriate enforcement mechanisms at the national level. Nevertheless, the range of functional actors is broad but the effects of their actions are not always necessarily positive. One other group is represented by the polluting agents themselves whose lack of environmental concern can affect severely communities and ecosystems. A last group includes the domestic NGOs and Romania has more than 200 of these organizations only in the environmental field.89 The question is whether their activity exercises any influence over the decision-makers. Domestic NGOs and their participation in environmental matters If the number of NGOs in the environmental field is impressive, it has to be remarked that these structures have been oriented for years chiefly towards local activities. In most of the cases, no publicity accompanied their actions and they had almost no national impact. Their initial field of concern was youth education in environmental protection issues and usually they lacked the financial means to promote their objectives. Despite all these, the things have registered a more positive trend since the beginning of 2002. The fact that the government has been negotiating this chapter with the European Union was a facilitating factor in

89

See www.ngo.ro.

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this regard. Then, it seems that the population has acquired a growing interest in environmental issues. For instance, one third of the citizens interviewed by the Centre for Market and Opinion Study (CSOP) declared that the state of the environment in Romania has worsened in the last ten years.90 Also, more than half of the subjects considered that the government has to be held accountable for implementing specific objectives regarding environmental protection.91 This increase of the population’s awareness in what refers to environmental issues has, for sure, something to do with situations such as the Baia Mare accidental pollution and the Rosia Montana project.92 These circumstances characterise the context in which the relationship between the government and NGOs is investigated. Co-operation with the ministry of waters and environmental protection, though it had improved since 2001, was not satisfactory from the NGOs point of view.93 One reason of discontent was that the ministry had sent to the European Union the chapter on environment without consulting first the NGOs on its content.94 Another refers to the fact that although the transposition of the EU legislation in this field proceeded at a fast pace, the ministry did not respect its obligation to inform the public opinion about the provisions and effects of this legislation.95 The general idea is that the adoption of the necessary acquis communautaires in the environmental field has progressed without problems, but the information and education of the citizens regarding their contents has been practically non-existent. According to the NGOs representatives, this indicated the state’s institutions lack of consideration for the civil society and public opinion. And, although the ministry of environmental protection organized several consultations with the NGOs, other

90

Poll made by the Centre for Market and Opinion Study (CSOP). See Mediafax, 27 August 2002, www.mediafax.ro. 91 Ibid. 92 The accidental pollution at SC Aurul SA Baia Mare took place in January 2000 (see subchapter on Environmental risks in Romania). The Rosia Montana case is dealt with in the following subchapter. 93 Here it is covered the period till June 2003 when, following a governmental restructuring, the ministry of waters and environmental protection ceased to exist. 94 Interview with Lavinia Andrei—president of the ‘Terra Mileniul III’ organization, Formula AS, no. 525, July 2002. 95 Interview taken to Senol Zevri, project manager at Mare Nostrum, Constanta (Romania) in August 2002.

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ministries, such as the ones of tourism or industry, were reluctant in doing the same.96 The co-operation between NGOs and local authorities is not a success either. One example refers to the initiative of Constanta city hall to build an incinerator of medical waste (which is a good idea) in a middle of a residential area, next to a kindergarten (which is—to say at least—an inadequate location). This type of incinerator emits dioxin that is a highly poisoning stuff. The local NGOs were not consulted about this plan and, when they protested against the location of the incinerator, the official answer of the city hall was that the project had all the necessary authorizations, including the environmental ones.97 As this proved true, the only possible explanation is that they were obtained by using political pressure.98 The case was subject to a trial. Another example refers to Bucharest: without consulting the inhabitants of an area, its district city hall decided to lease 12.1 hectares of a park to a firm which wants to build there a business centre.99 The action of leasing this terrain is illegal as the district city halls have only the right to administrate the parks on their territory, these being owned by the city hall of Bucharest.100 Consequently, the mayor of Bucharest took legal action against the district mayor who initiated and facilitated this project. The main problem in the environmental field is that the NGOs have still a limited activity. A cause for this situation could be that they lack the appropriate financial resources: collecting funds from domestic sponsors for environmental purposes is a very difficult task when these ones, more than once, cannot afford any extra expenses. In addition, many times the NGOs do not carry on those campaigns that are necessary at a certain moment, but those that are on the sponsors’ agenda.101 Another cause is the fact that the local authorities (city halls, inspection agencies) have failed to involve the NGOs in joined programmes in this field. The reason is directly linked to the local authorities’ interests: personal gains are more important than eco-

96

See interview with Lavinia Andrei in op. cit. See the press review in July-August 2002 on the official site of Mare Nostrum— Centre of Information, Education and Resources for the Black Sea, www.cier.ro. 98 See interview with Senol Zevri, August 2002. 99 Dan Coste, “Hotie la primarie”, Ziua, 28 June 2002, www.ziua.ro. 100 Magda Severin, “Basescu se teme ca Dracula Park sa nu se mute in Titan”, Ziua, 2 July 2002, www.ziua.ro. 101 See interview with Senol Zevri, August 2002. 97

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logical projects.102 Joined programmes would increase public awareness regarding environmental problems and could help in changing some behavioural patterns (disregard for waste management, waste recycling, air, water and soil quality protection). Finally, mass-media get involved in environmental campaigns mainly if there is a scandalous situation they can profit from.103 In response to the NGO’s criticism, the government undertook several measures. More than 70 percent of the transposition of the European legislation was completed by August 2002.104 Nevertheless, the minister of environment himself admitted that although the transposition has been going on well, the implementation is quite difficult.105 One useful instrument created by the government is the Compliance Programme that stipulates periods of maximum five years for all the 870 big industrial polluters to comply with all the environmental aspects. Otherwise, they risk to be shut down.106 Then, the “Clean Romania Programme” was launched in April 2002 and aims at gathering all the forces from various social and political areas— government, unions, and local authorities—to initiate and implement projects that would provide a much cleaner environment for the population.107

The NGOs are missing from this enumeration, although they are mentioned at the paragraph on “who takes part in the programme”.108 Going further, the objectives of the programme are: to ensure the environmental protection and preservation according to the requirements of sustainable development; to implement the integrate management of the waste; to increase the education and awareness levels of the population in what regards the environmental protection.109

The Programme includes a brief subchapter on the partnership with the NGOs that represents one of the manners in which it will be imple-

102

Ibid. Ibid. 104 Interview with Petru Lificiu, Minister of Waters and Environmental Protection, Formula AS, no. 522, July 2002. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 “Clean Romania Programme”, see the official website of the ministry of waters and environmental protection, www.mappm.ro. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 103

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mented. This subchapter presents (exactly!) four NGOs that, mainly through information and education campaigns, participate in the project. There is no data regarding how these NGOs were selected and why is their number so limited. As it turned out, some NGOs found out about the Programme from the mass-media: neither had they been consulted during its elaboration, nor had been asked to participate in the implementation phase.110 Others had received a draft of the document but this was not accompanied by any letter of request or explanation from the ministry of environment, so they did not know what was expected from them.111 Such a behaviour suggests that the government was still far from treating NGOs as equal partners and was not encouraging a large participation of these structures in its programmes. Moreover, it is questionable how fair was the selection of those NGOs which were accepted in certain projects: it was not clear on what criteria this took place. Launching programmes in which only a privileged group of NGOs are invited to participate cannot set the basis for a genuine partnership between government and civil society. However, a positive trend in this field has to be remarked, that is, the access of many environmental NGOs to the internet and their efforts to keep the public opinion informed about their activity. These websites contain information on legislation, the EU requirements, sustainable development, relevant international and national events and their outcomes. But, they also draw a signal on every law infringement in this field, every potentially dangerous situation regarding environmental protection, they draw up reports, organize campaigns, carry on various projects, offer counselling.112 For all those citizens who have access to a computer connected to the internet, these websites are important sources of information. In addition, they can be used in the same way by journalists from the rest of mass-media to disseminate information on topics of interest. They play a consequential role in improving the population’s knowledge in the field, but more is needed in this sense. For the moment, the number of NGOs in the environmental field is remarkable and many of them can make a difference in long-term 110 For instance, this is the case of Mare Nostrum, one of the most important NGOs in the environmental field in Romania. See interview with Senol Zevri, August 2002. 111 This is the case of the Centre of Ecological Advice, in Galati. See interview with Senol Zevri, August 2002. 112 See, for instance, the website www.ngo.ro powered by StrawberryNet -The Environmental Electronic Network. StrawberryNet promotes environmental protection, sustainable development, democracy and human rights in Romania.

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by training and educating new generations to preserve the environment. In order to be able to exercise influence over the government, domestic NGOs have to start using bolder methods that would gain public opinion’s support. They have to exploit certain sensitive issues for putting pressure on the political elite to become responsive to their demands. Equally, local NGOs have to attract mass-media on their side if they want to be successful. This bottom-up process when combined with the top-down approach imposed by the EU’s conditionality can lead to a more rapid pace of reforms for the benefit of the Romanian society. The following securitization case in the environmental field points out the beneficial role of the NGOs in warning the public opinion and state institutions about the disastrous ecological consequences of certain projects oriented only towards a fast financial gain. 4.5. A securitization case in the environmental field One of the most controversial cases in the environment field in Romania is related to a gold mining in Rosia Montana.113 In 1997, the Canadian company Gabriel Resources Ltd. leased for three million USD the terrain on which the future mining would be located. Together with Mininvest Deva that represents the Romanian state, it formed the Rosia Montana Gold Corporation (RMGC) in which the Canadian company holds 75 percent of the shares. According to an estimative study made by the company, the mines in Rosia Montana contain reserves of more than 300 tonnes of gold and, respectively, 1,600 tonnes of silver. But, in five years since the acquisition of the terrain, the company has not asked for an official approval of the feasibility study regarding the environmental impact. It has also not promoted a transparent policy regarding its plans showing no interest in informing the public opinion about all their possible consequences. Moreover, since the beginning of 2002, its employees have started to approach the local inhabitants trying to convince them to conclude contracts through which, if they agree to move, the company will offer them financial damages. Such a behaviour gave rise to suspicions regarding the manner in which Gold Corporation intended to exploit the gold and silver deposits. A number of non-governmental organizations warned that the company had no intention to use environmental friendly technology

113

Rosia Montana is situated in the Apuseni Mountains, Alba county, Transylvania.

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and was determined to undertake intensive mining activities. Greenpeace declared that the Canadian company would use 5,000 tonnes of cyanide every year for exploiting the deposits. It is supposed to build a decantation pond with a dam of 75 meters high. Abrud, a little town of 13,000 inhabitants, is located exactly under the dam. Although the company insists that no leakage from the pond will take place, Greenpeace considers that the specific meteorological conditions in the area would surely facilitate these. It seems that the company wants to implement this project by any means. Despite the fact that there is no approved environmental impact study, 38 contracts of relocation have been already concluded.114 But Greenpeace has not been the only non-governmental organization involved in the fight with this presumptive future polluter. Another one, Alburnus Maior, organized a local manifestation against RMGC at which it had gathered 15 NGOs and 400 inhabitants of the Rosia Montana area, all of them worried about the environmental consequences of the project.115 People were highly concerned with its implications: There are necessary only 30 grams cyanide in order to kill 150,000 inhabitants of the county. The 200,000 tonnes of cyanide that are going to be used in the Apuseni Mountains could kill ten times all the world population.116

In addition, as more than 2,000 people from the surrounding villages have to be displaced and over 900 houses torn down, the social impact is considerable, too. In an interview, Lavinia Andrei—president of Terra Mileniul III—emphasized that the Rosia Montana project is an example of totally unsustainable development. It is the worst thing that could happened to the environment.117

She was concerned with the attitude of the Romanian establishment that had undertaken no action to stop the project. This gave rise to a feeling of despair among the local inhabitants.

114 Declaration made by Herwig Schuster, Greenpeace’s campaigns organizer in the field of toxic products. See “Greenpeace se opune exploatarii Rosia Montana”, Ziua, 30 July 2002, www.ziua.ro. 115 “Rosia Montana la ora desteptarii”, Formula AS, no. 527, August 2002, www. formula-as.ro. 116 Ibid. 117 Interview with Lavinia Andrei—President of the ‘Terra Mileniul III’ organization, Formula AS, no. 525, July 2002, www.formula-as.ro.

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chapter four The people of Rosia Montana cry, shout, and have no idea what to cling to, whom to approach, what to do. They completely lost their trust in the state institutions.118

The actions supported by diverse NGOs were not limited to organizing manifestations and informing the domestic mass media, they went even further. These organizations managed to get in contact with James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, and present to him the devastating effects of the Rosia Montana mining project. As the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the investment division of the World Bank, had been asked by Gabriel Resources Ltd. to participate in a 250 million USD loan for implementing this project, the action of the NGOs proved disruptive to the Canadian company. “Wolfensohn, in an unusual intervention, directed IFC Executive Vice President Peter Woicke to drop loan negotiations” with the company.119 The situation was presented into a totally different light by Frank Timis, president of Gabriel Resources Ltd. He stated that IFC procedures for granting a credit would have postponed for a long time the implementation of the project and, consequently, by mutual agreement, the parties ceased negotiations.120 According to Timis, no environmental problems related to the project were mentioned. Thus, this will go on, “we have all the necessary resources to carry it out and transform the area into the development core of the whole region”.121 Despite these calm and optimistic declarations, for the first time Gold Corporation decided to follow the legal procedures and, eventually, it submitted the plans regarding the exploitation project to the proper authorities in order to obtain the necessary environmental permit.122 It also announced that in the following months it will organized seminars, analysis and clarification meetings, and two public debates regarding the details of the Rosia Montana project.123 After a five-years silence in which the representatives of the company totally ignored the mass media and

118

Ibid. See information on the World Bank’s official site, www.worldbank.org. “Romanian Gold Mine Loan Blocked by World Bank Chief ”, Press Review, 11 October 2002. 120 Iftimie Nesfantu—“La Rosia Montna s-a declansat razboiul rece”, in Cotidianul, 12 October 2002, www.cotidianul.ro. 121 Ibid. 122 The project was submitted to the Technical Analysis Commission of the Environmental Inspection Agency, Alba County, on 22 October 2002. See Mediafax, 23 October 2002, www.mediafax.ro. 123 Ibid. 119

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avoided/refused to release information about their intentions, such a sudden turn is at least suspect. The fact that the state institutions undertook no measures during this period to constrain the company to account for its plans, also encouraged RMGC in its behaviour. Actually, in May 2002, Petru Lificiu, the Minister of Environmental Protection, declared that Gold Corporation had made no attempts to clarify the environmental aspects of the project. He also launched an extravagant idea: It could be that the company would not extract gold there. It is possible that the relocation of the population from the area is done only in order to support some stock exchange speculations, and so Rosia Montana would remain untouched.124

As the civil society actions became more and more visible and various NGOs as well as the local inhabitants started to put pressure on the government to adopt a firmer attitude, the minister’s declarations adopted a different tone. He emphasized that the evaluation of the environmental impact of the Rosia Montana project will get a special attention, and if this does not respect the European standards, we cannot authorize it.125

After Gold Corporation submitted its project for official approval and the World Bank’s decision not to support the project was known, the tone became even tougher. First, Lificiu stated that the parliament should be the one to give the environmental assent in this case because the implications of the project at the national level are extraordinary.126 Second, he pointed out that according to the experts’ assessment, from Rosia Montana are going to be loaded “approximately 70 tipper trucks of 100 tonnes per hour. There is going to be a hell”.127 Then, Romania’s benefit from this exploitation would be of maximum 12–20 million USD a year which is not an impressive amount.128 In short:

124 Luminita Moroianu , “Ministerul Mediului nu crede in febra aurului de la Rosia Montana”, Ziua, 30 May 2002, www.ziua.ro. 125 Interview with Petru Lificiu, Minister of Waters and Environmental Protection, Formula AS, no. 522, July 2002, www.formula-as.ro. 126 Petru Lificiu, Minister of Waters and Environmental Protection, in a press conference. See “Proiectul de la Rosia Montana trebuie sa obtina acordul de principiu al Parlamentului”, Curierul National, 11 November 2002, www.curierulnational.ro. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid.

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chapter four Taking into account the ecological implications of this investment project, we are going to set up a commission of international experts, with Hungarian representatives too, to analyse it. If this respects the environmental standards, including those regarding the long term impact and ecological reconstruction, we shall give it our assent. We do not want to cease this project because it has some positive aspects too, but until now the effects have been catastrophic.129

One year after this declaration, the situation was only slightly clearer. There have been more state representatives or institutions that expressed their disapproval with the characteristics of the project. The President of the Romanian Academy pointed out that “the project is a catastrophe for the Apuseni Mountains”130 as “the risks are higher than the benefits”.131 The prime minister Nastase mentioned that this project is not a priority and the risks of putting it in practice are very high. [. . .] We should not give ourselves the status of an economic colony.132

A parliamentary commission was set up to study the case and to draw up a report that will be instrumental in helping the government to take a decision regarding the authorization of the project. Some civic organizations have continued to militate against the intentions of Gold Corporation trough the campaign ‘Save Rosia Montana!’ that promotes Ardeal’s sustainable development and environment preservation. Among them, the Romanian Institute for Peace from Cluj made a documentary that was broadcast in Bucharest in order to increase public awareness on this topic in the capital.133 Over few months, a meeting was organized in the University Square in Bucharest with impressive participation of the civic organizations.134 In opposition to this manifestations against

129

Ibid. Eugen Simion, President of the Romanian Academy, in “Academia Romana: Rosia Montana, o catastrofa pentru Apuseni”, Ziua, 6 March 2003, www.ziua.ro. 131 Ibid., in “Academia nu sustine Rosia Montana”, Ziua, 8 May 2003, www.ziua.ro. 132 “Guvernul Nastase se leapada de proiectul Rosia Montana”, Curierul National, 6 June 2003, www.curierulnational.ro. 133 “Documentarul “Rosia Montana nu mai are timp” la Cinemateca si la Club A”, Curierul National, 7 March 2003, www.curierulnational.ro. 134 Among others, there were present: ‘Alburnus Maior’ Association, ‘21 December 1989’ Association, European Horizon, Romanian Institute for Peace from Cluj, ‘Terra—Milenium III’, The European Movement. See Christian Levant—“SRI si SIE chemate sa vorbeasca in scandalul Rosoia Montana, ” Evenimentul Zilei, 21 June 2003, and Veronica Marinescu—“Rosia Montana nu e jucaria aventurierilor,” Curierul National, 17 June 2003, www.evenimentulzilei.ro, www.curierulnational.ro. 130

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the project, the miners’ unions affiliated to the Meridian Confederation strongly supported it, arguing that it would create a lot of new jobs, reinvigorate the mining industry, boom the economic development in the area and trigger further investments.135 Meanwhile, Gold Corporation changed its executive board, has continued the relocation plans of the population of Rosia Montana, and it declared to be in process of rethinking the project to make it compatible with the environmental, technological and social requirements in the field.136 Once the ‘Save Rosia Montana!’ campaign was launched by Alburnus Maior, it became very rapidly the biggest initiative of the Romanian civil society, supported by forty Romanian non-governmental organizations, the Romanian Academy, universities, churches and public personalities. The campaign has covered multiple actions from legal ones, lobbying at international institutions, and petitions and memoranda sent regularly to the Romanian authorities, to cultural events meant to attract the public opinion, touristic promotion of the area and press conferences. Practically, Alburnus Maior took action against any attempt of RMGC to avoid the necessary legal procedures in obtaining the permits that would allow it to start mining. In this sense, RMGC tried to obtain the environmental licence for the modification of the Areal Urbanism Plan for RMGC Industrial Development zone through a simplified procedure, which involved neither the submission of an environmental rapport nor public consultations. However, following pressures from non-governmental organizations from both Romania and Hungary, the Romanian authorities decided in October 2006 that this procedure had to abide by the European Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA).137 Given the considerable size of the project, this needed to comply also with the requirements of the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a

135

See declarations of Ion Popescu, President of the Meridian Unions Confederation, in “Sindicatele sustin proiectul de la Rosia Montana,” Ziua, 10 September 2003, www.ziua.ro. 136 Bogdan Costache—“Avizul de mediu pentru Rosia Montana va fi acordat printr-o hotarare de guvern”, Curierul National, 28 May 2003, www.curierulnational.ro. 137 The European Directive 2001/42/EC, known as the “Strategic Environmental Assessment”, requires a formal environmental assessment of certain plans and programs which are likely to have significant effects on the environment. Parties which prepare these plans/programs must make a rapport on their likely significant environmental effects, consult environmental authorities and the public, and take the rapport and the results of the consultations into account during the preparation process and before the plans/programs are adopted. See www.ec.europa.eu

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Trans-boundary Context.138 In September 2007, the Hungarian Ministry of Environment announced that Hungary would participate in this SEA procedure in accordance to the regulations established by the Espoo Convention.139 This would involve public consultations in Hungary as well, not only in Romania where the project was supposed to be carried on. Only that, in August 2007, RMGC stated that it finished the planning of the project and the environment rapport necessary according to the SEA procedure. Consequently, Alburnus Maior and the Independent Centre for the Development of Environmental Resources (ICDER) notified the environmental authorities mentioning that, in this phase, the preconditions referring to public participation were not met.140 The two organizations asked for a resumption of the procedure and that RMGC was fined.141 Following this contestation, the authorities decided that the public consultations phase had to be resumed and they fined the company for not fulfilling all the legal requirements. Various non-governmental organizations registered other major successes too. Thus, ICDER managed to obtain the suspension of RMGC’s urban certificate reasoning that the local environment would suffer irreversible damages by the enforcement of this act.142 Subsequently, the ministry of environment and sustainable development decided to suspend the EIA procedure for the mining project and assessed that any urban certificate issued by the Alba County council duplicating this act is suspended de jure.143 Based on this document, the licensing procedure for the Rosia Montana project has been stopped for an

138 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)—singed on 25 February 1991 in Espoo and entered into force in 1997. The Espoo Convention is a key step to bringing together all stakeholders to prevent environmental damage before it occurs. Romania ratified this Convention through Law no.22/2001. See www.unece.org 139 “Fodor Gabor announces his participation in a new environmental impact assessment procedure on Rosia Montana”, Save Rosia Montana Campaign, 13 September 2007, www.rosiamontana.org 140 “Press Release by ICDER on Illegalities of EIA Procedure”, Save Rosia Montana Campaign, 9 August 2007, www.rosiamontana.org 141 Ibid. 142 “RMGC’s urban certificate has been suspended”, Save Rosia Montana Campaign, 21 July 2007, www.rosiamontana.org 143 The Alba County council issued over the years (between 2002 and 2007) several urban certificates with the same contain for RMGC. All of them were eventually cancelled by the court after ICDER or Alburnus Maior had taken legal action against them. See the presentation of all phases of the case on www.rosiamontana.org

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unlimited period by the respective ministry.144 In another legal action undertook this time by Alburnus Maior, the Brasov Court of Appeal gave a definitive decision (after several years of judicial fights) cancelling the archaeological discharge certificate issued by the ministry of culture and cults, which allowed RMGC to exploit the Carnic Massif.145 Not only has the Carnic Massif one of the richest golden reserves in the region but also very well preserved antic mining networks from the Dacian as well as Roman times.146 Although Carnic is protected under Romanian legislation as cultural patrimony of national interest, the ministry for culture and cults issued the archaeological discharge certificate, which directly removed Carnic’s protected status.147 The ministry exceeded its powers in this case since it is not the competent authority to allow mining activities on archaeologically protected areas and, in addition, it based its decision on the recommendation for discharge made by the Director of Romania’s National History Museum who had actually distorted the results of the archaeological research.148 In their attempt to protect the cultural heritage of Rosia Montana and its surroundings, non-governmental organizations went further and tried to prevent the destruction of local buildings representing “historical monuments of an exceptional national value”.149 RMGC had already destroyed 120 of the 138 buildings for which it had obtained demolition permits issued by the Mayor of Rosia Montana.150 The permits were in fact illegal as all the houses demolished in this village had been included in protection areas of historic monuments.151 Moreover,

144 “The licensing procedure for Rosia Montana is stopped for an unlimited period”, Save Rosia Montana Campaign, 13 September 2007, www.rosiamontana.org 145 “Carnic saved!!!”, Save Rosia Montana Campaign, 27 November 2007, www .rosiamontana.org. 146 Ibid. Actually, according to the C14 analysis made by the mining museum in Bochus (Germany), the Rosia Montana mines are the oldest in Europe dating even prior to the building of Rome. See “The History of Rosia Montana”, Save Rosia Montana Campaign, www.rosiamontana.org 147 Carnic is protected by Law 5/2000 on the approval of the national territory organizational plan, Section III: Protected areas. See Monitorul Oficial no. 0152 of 12 April 2000. 148 Op. cit., Save Rosia Montana Campaign, 27 November 2007, www.rosiamontana .org. 149 “Press Release: Including among the Historical Monuments the valuable buildings threatened by the activity of RMGC”, ‘Architecture. Restoration. Archaeology’ Association, 9 October 2007, www.simpara.ro. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid.

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RMGC undertook the demolitions before being able to secure all the necessary permits to initiate the mining project. Consequently, the ‘Architecture. Restoration. Archaeology’ Association (ARA) requested at the Alba County Office for Culture, Religious Affairs and National Cultural Heritage the listing of fifty significant buildings from Rosia Montana and Cornea villages as historic monuments.152 According to the law, the buildings are already granted the status of historic monuments during the assessment process and cannot be destroyed or deteriorated.153 Moreover, their owners are obliged to maintain and preserve them and to apply for permits to the ministry of culture and cults in case that they intend to do any construction works on these properties.154 What needs to be added here is that most of these houses are owned by RMGC, which had to stop demolition and wait for the assessment process to be finalized. The legal actions undertaken by civil society organizations have been of utmost importance for the success of this case and they have been accompanied by thorough information campaigns meant to attract public opinion support. These enlightened a large audience eager to get acquainted to all the details and phases of the Rosia Montana case. Moreover, these campaigns represented a key instrument in increasing people’s awareness on environmental matters and threats. Little wonder then that at a poll undertook by the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, at the question “Do you agree with the approval/start of the project proposed by RMGC?”, 95.95 per cent of the respondents were against (6,000 persons).155 The public reaction to this consultation process was unprecedented in Romania as it had required the respondents to proactively engage. Their list of reasons for opposing the project included the environmental and cultural destruction that would be caused by the mining activity, as well as the forced resettlement of the affected population.156 In addition, many of the respondents shared the view 152 This refers to their classification as historical monuments according to the Law no. 422/2001 on protection of historical monuments. Most of these buildings are from the 19th century, they are well preserved and are representative for the traditional architectural style of the region. See documentation regarding each building on www.simpara.ro. 153 Op. cit., ‘Architecture. Restoration. Archaeology’ Association, 9 October 2007, www.simpara.ro. 154 Ibid. 155 See “Proiectul Rosia Montana”, website of the Chamber of Deputies, poll initiated in January 2007, www.cdep.ro. 156 Ibid.

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that the only way this project had survived over the years was due to the high level of corruption.157 The cultural aspect has been also very wisely used by the NGOs to promote their actions against RMGC. Some of the events organized in the Rosia Montana region became regular as it is the case of FanFest, one of the most significant environmental festivals, already at the 4th edition in the summer of 2007. The festival benefits from the performances of famous musicians as well as young artists while inviting visitors to participate in various activities such as theatre performances, literature and poetry readings, film screenings, presentations, workshops, guided tours etc.158 In 2007, the message of FanFest was “Romania doesn’t like the taste of cyanide!” and the major themes for debates were ecology and the ‘Save Rosia Montana’ campaign.159 The participants were invited to manifest their support for a clean environment by voting in favour of a law proposal to ban cyanide in the mining sector in Romania.160 This proposal was initiated and submitted to the parliament by two senators, Kovacs Eckstein Peter (UDMR) and Gheorghe Funar (PRM) and is supported by the ‘Coalition for a Cyanide Free Romania’.161 One of the main reasons for promoting this legislative initiative resides in the dramatic accident occurred in Baia Mare in 2000.162 Yet, seven years after this accident there are no effective binding regulations to prevent disasters of this kind to occur, at both European and global level. The ‘Coalition for a Cyanide Free Romania’ considers that Romania, the host country of the 2000 cyanide spill accident, has both the opportunity and moral duty towards its citizens and neighbouring countries to show the way forward and put an end to the use of this hazardous technology’.163

157

Ibid. “FanFest 2007—Let’s Go Green!”, Rosia Montana Campaign, 22 August 2007, www.rosiamontana.org. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 This coalition is a civil society initiative consisting of several environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, the Independent Centre for the Development of Environmental Resources, the Partnership Foundation, Terra Millennium III, Otus, Focus Eco Centre, Sun Valley, Green Transylvania etc. 162 The Baia Mare cyanide spill over is presented in this chapter, see subchapter on Accidental pollution and its consequences. 163 ‘Cyanide Free Romania’ Campaign, www.bancyanide.ro. 158

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To return to the securitization logic, what can be noticed in this case is that the securitizing move is not made by a state institution but by NGOs in co-operation with the local population. Although the word ‘security’ has not been mentioned in any of the opinions presented, these were expressing serious worries regarding the safety of ecosystems and people in the area. The lack of information regarding the Rosia Montana project gave rise to suspicions regarding Gold Corporation’s plans and intentions. As securitizing actors, the NGOs (representing the local inhabitants’ interests, too) have tried to make the media, state institutions, and public opinion sensitive to their messages. The written media reacted promptly while the state institutions were much slower and inefficient. Gold Corporation, as a functional actor in this case, also tried to gain some of the mass media and local officials on its side (mayors, policemen etc.). It campaigned intensively in the area, so it managed to gather some support and convince a part of the people to move away. But, the public opinion proved to be to a greater extent sensitive to the NGOs’ messages and dynamic involvement. For instance, Formula AS, a weekly magazine that got actively implicated in this case, gathered in two months more than 50,000 signatures from people who were against Gold Corporation’s project, and it has received hundreds of supportive letters a week since the beginning of the campaign.164 So, it can be said that the securitization move has been successful as it was accepted by the audience and it also got the support of the official institutions.165 Moreover, it even forced the company to act in a legal manner and to adjust its plans of intensive exploitation. It still remains to be seen whether the project will gather all the necessary licences and authorizations.166

164

See Formula AS, no. 527, August 2002. The Government asked the Parliament to analyse all the implications of this project and decide whether this is consistent with the international standards and domestic legislation in the environmental field. See “Comisie parlamentara pentru Rosia Montana”, Ziua, 20 March 2003, www.ziua.ro. 166 The environmental permit, the most important document in this case, will be granted through a Governmental Decision to Gold Corporation when this company submits a project that respects the legislation, uses the best technology and meets the requirements of ecological reconstruction. See Petru Lificiu, Minister of Environmental Protection, op. cit., in Curierul National, 28 May 2003, www.curierulnational.ro. Fact is that, till 2007 inclusively, RMGC has not managed to obtain this permit. 165

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Conclusions The environmental sector covers various issues that cannot be addressed efficiently only at local or national level. In fact, this is one sector in which co-operation and mutual assistance that transcend frontiers are more necessary than anywhere else. But, though it is a very sensitive field and abundant in threats and risks of miscellaneous natures, successful securitization moves are rare to be seen. This implies a less relevant role for the securitizing actors to play. At the same time, there can be identified various types of functional actors whose actions have the most different results. They have an instrumental influence on the dynamics of the developments related to environmental issues. Similar to the other sectors, democratization boosts the activity of all the societal actors and provides them with the means that allow them to participate in the decision making process. As for the present case study, Romania inherited from the totalitarian regime an irresponsible lack of concern for environmental matters. The situation has not changed drastically after 1989 and what Romania had to cope with was systematic pollution of the air, soil and water, and irrational deforestation that affected both the well-being of the population and the healthy development of the environment. The problems were so serious that they even led to cases of accidental trans-boundary pollution that tensed the relations with the affected neighbours. The political elite lack of willingness to make any securitization move in this field can be explained only in one way: whichever the polluting agent might be, the final responsibility for its acts resides with the political competent authorities, those who have the power to monitor its activity. There are no others to blame and, thus, the state representatives are not inclined to accuse themselves and jeopardise their current or future offices. Although the situation might seem hopeless, things have started to change especially after Romania began accession negotiations with the EU. In this field, the conditionality factor was more than beneficial. The approximation of the environmental acquis, institutional adaptation and training of competent specialists were enormous challenges for Romania, but EU’s constant assistance and specific instruments smoothened the process. At present, regional and local agencies have the know-how and appropriate technology to allow the carrying out of permitting, monitoring and enforcing activities that are among the main tasks required by the EU’s Directives. In addition, drastic sanctions for non-compliance were adopted in order to force polluting agents into

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performing in accordance with the established environmental standards. The efficient work of the recently set up National Environmental Guard has been instrumental in preventing grave polluting accidents from happening. Nevertheless, the co-operation among different institutions with responsibilities at local and national level has to become closer and more efficient. A reduction of the number of these institutions could also avoid overlapping and delays. In this context, while the possible securitizing actors have been rather passive, the functional ones compensate by being actively involved. The polluting agents have negative influence over the environment, but they might induce the decision-makers to adopt more appropriate legislation for preventing future accidents. The international organizations create a legislative framework in which co-operative relations help identifying better solutions to various sectoral matters. They are also able to persuade national governments to create suitable mechanisms for coping with environmental risks. Among these, EU had the most relevant role in helping the candidate countries to comply with the international standards in the field. In a first stage, this top-down process helped to increase the political elite’s sensitiveness regarding environmental issues. Finally, the role of the domestic NGOs has grown in importance. For a long period, financial constraints, lack of managing abilities, no encouragement from the local and national authorities have been obstacles too significant to overcome in short term. Nevertheless, they are numerous, involved in youth education regarding environmental protection while engaging in programmes that promote sustainability. Environmental issues are now publicly debated, the society’s awareness having steadily grown encouraged also by the NGOs’ activity. In fact, beginning with 2002 a stronger vocal presence of these institutions was registered as they got better organized and identified the appropriate manners to make their objectives and opinions known. The government has still been reluctant to develop a genuine partnership with the NGOs, though the representative state institution in the field, the ministry of waters and environmental protection, has adopted a more open-minded attitude towards them: it organized common rounds of consultations on various problems.167 It also became sensitive

167 This assessment covers the period till June 2003, when the ministry of waters and environmental protection was still in charge with the environmental matters. The current ministry of environment and sustainable development has continued the cooperation with NGOs.

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to a securitization case initiated by NGOs, the Rosia Montana project, which says a lot about the impact of a well organized campaign against a possible polluter. The role of an external actor—Greenpeace—in local institutional capacity building cannot be ignored. It stimulated the activity of domestic NGOs inducing the development of a bottom-up process that, by increasing public awareness regarding Rosia Montana, forced the government to adopt a clear attitude towards the project. The process reached the point at which a local organization, Alburnus Maior, has managed to get more NGOs on its side, to attract considerable public support through its campaigns and actions and to legally counter all the undertakings of Rosia Montana Gold Corporation. It is one of the most successful examples regarding the fight of a non-governmental organization against a influential polluting agent and against corrupted civil servants who facilitated the illegal actions of this agent. To conclude with, this sector presents characteristics not found in the political and societal ones. In a way, it is not so spectacular as the others: no imminent threats, no political speeches and allegations, no social movements, no public debates. Security is perhaps more meaningful if one considers the well-being of communities or individuals in long term. Awareness for the gravity of the problems takes more time to be build and that is why political participation has been hardly noticeable. But without an at least emergent democratic political culture, the institutional capacity building and the legislation adaptation would have no chance. In an authoritarian system, laws and rules can be disregarded, in a democratic one the rule of law is a sine-qua-non principle. That is why it can be concluded that by complying with all the European/international requirements in the environmental sector Romania made also a first step towards building a sound democracy. Nevertheless, the implementation part is even more important than the transposition one and everything depends on how this phase of the process is completed. The momentous activity of various NGOs in the last few years with positive results in what regards the behaviour of the governing elite and a vital growth of public awareness, represent optimistic signs for the progress made in this field.

CONCLUDING REMARKS The changes of 1989 transformed the European order and removed old certainties. New actors emerged on the international scene while others disintegrated. The collapse of communism allowed the new Central and Eastern European democracies to pursue integration in the West European structures. At the same time, the explosion of nationalistic and ethnic rivalries all over Europe brought up the necessity to identify more appropriate and effective means to tackle the challenges posed by a world in full transformation. Non-military threats have become increasingly problematic ranging from political risks, environmental matters and population growth to disease spread, refugees, and resource scarcity. Therefore, the ‘security’ concept itself had to be adapted to encompass more than the traditional military aspects in order to address these challenges. As a result, the comprehensive view on security includes various levels of analysis and deals with threats characteristic to the political, military, societal, economic, and environmental sectors. A nascent democracy, Romania has several particular features that place her in a distinctive position. The communist inheritance has been a burden too substantial to be overlooked: the Romanian society at the beginning of the 1990s was characterized by isolation from the outside world, strict hierarchic political control, fear, and distrust. Civil society structures were non-existent and political leaders with anti-communist convictions were still to be formed. Attachment to the democratic principles was needed to achieve social cohesion and overcome the outburst of nationalist orientations and intolerant attitudes that triggered sometimes societal unrest. Environmental matters were never among the concerns of the communist regime, situation that led to a continuous degradation of the ecosystems and the well being of many communities. In this context, the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system has been a complex process that was slowed down at times by periods of political instability. The internal vulnerabilities of the changing political system and the multiplication of external threats negatively affected Romania’s overall security. The new security predicament had to be tackled at the same time with the emergence of a democratic political culture. These processes proved to be mutually dependent, none of them recording any substantial

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development in the absence of the other. Once democratization advances, more and more actors get actively involved in all the issues belonging to the public sphere. They are also bound to start being interested to participate in the multifaceted security matters. Taking all these into account, the hard core of this book addressed the extent of the contribution of both political and civil society actors to the democratization and securitization processes in Romania in the political, societal and environmental fields since 1989. The theoretical framework enriched the new approach to security with elements belonging to the democratic political culture model. The two methodologies complemented each other so that the static construction set up by the political culture theory benefited from the dynamic elements introduced through the securitization processes. Thus, in analysing the securitization moves with their elements—existential threats, emergency measures, securitizing and functional actors—numerous aspects belonging to the democratization process were dealt with: behaviour of the new elite, political participation, accountability, efficiency of the democratic institutions. The investigation of the political, societal, and environmental sectors provided outcomes that were used in assessing how advanced is actually the democratization process in Romania. The first point of interest refers to the process of democratic consolidation. In this regard, the political chapter is by far the most consequential, laying the foundations for further survey. However, the societal and environmental chapters also contain several specific elements regarding the status of democratization of the Romanian society. These refer mainly to the societal actors (their evolution, orientations, roles) and the influence of various external factors. The analysed data revealed both the strong points and the shortcomings of the Romanian democracy. On the positive side, there are political pluralism, alternation of various parties in power, consolidation of citizen’s rights, participation of ethnic minorities in the governing process, set up of the democratic institutions and adoption of appropriate legislation. The last few years also registered one of the most necessary developments in the process of democratic consolidation: the judiciary became independent, resisting against any political pressures. As important as these achievements might be, there are still problems to be solved: the political elite is highly polarized, corruption is still present, communist mentality can even now be detected at all the levels of the society. The existence of ‘two executives’ since 1989 has allowed the presidency and government to get involved into competitive actions over power and

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influence. Despite all these, progress has been made and although it cannot be assessed that Romania is a consolidated democracy at almost nineteen years after the collapse of communism, the findings indicate that it has reached the post-transitional phase of democratization: the democratic institutions are established, individual rights and freedoms are observed, political pluralism is a reality, legislation is adapted to the democratic principles. When getting to the securitization theory and the results of the analysis in this area, more elements have to be accounted for which may determine a revision of the above conclusion. The studied securitization moves were never entirely successful. In fact, in the political sector, many times the securitizing actors eluded to present explicitly any of the dangerous developments as a threat to national security. However, they asked for special measures to be undertaken so, at least implicitly, these events were acknowledged as threats to the national security. On the contrary, in the societal and environmental sectors, the developments presented as dangerous are exaggerated due to different reasons. In the case of the former sector, politicians feared possible riots especially when the Hungarian government backed the claims to autonomy of its ethnic kin in Romania. In addition, the disastrous consequences of the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia generated worries that the same scenario might take place in Romania. As a result, the officials’ allegations were exaggerated and unsupported by evidence. In the latter sector, environmental issues have never been high on either the governmental or the civic agenda. Although certain threats in this area can have critical consequences, many times these are not immediate and the connection cause-effect is not obvious. People are not aware of the dangers that reside in long time pollution of the water, soil or air, deforestation, or certain industrial projects. Therefore, in such cases, intensive campaigns, publicity and public manifestations are more than welcomed. The political sector is the most sensitive when matters related to national security come to public attention. Institutions have been fragile for a long period and any disturbing situation could cancel the little authority they had managed to achieve. Some of their vulnerabilities were highlighted: political instability generated by a dysfunctional coalition; failure of the intelligence services and police forces to perform their duties; presence of officials with communist/old mentalities in key positions; inability of the state institutions to treat all the citizens equally. In each of the cases, the political elite was split in what concerns the

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measures to be undertaken and sometimes even regarding the causes that had generated the dangerous developments. The audience was also unsatisfied with the lack of determination on the side of the ruling elite and with the halfway measures it undertook. No security complex took shape in these cases as a wide spread public agreement between elite and non-elite had not occurred. Consequently, de-securitization is not yet possible in the political sector. At this time, sensitive issues that might become dangerous to national security cannot be transferred and solved within the normal political framework. Political leaders proved still unable to handle social unrest for instance without resorting to emergency measures while some democratic institutions still lack the necessary authority to perform efficiently their duties. The study of the societal sector revealed other vulnerability of the young democratic system: administrative decentralization is actually equalled to losing control over local institutions and financial resources. At the same time, there are ethnic groupings that promote decentralization to fulfil their secessionist goals. For instance, the radical group (UCM) split from UDMR has been always militating for the territorial autonomy of the Szekely land. This group’s claim is now supported by UDMR as well and it also obtained external support from Hungary, which might tense again the Romanian-Hungarian relations. But, the beneficial effects of conditionality can overcome a worsening of this relationship. And, as both Romania and Hungary enjoy now EU membership, they are constrained more than ever to behave according to the international standards. Also, an ethnic secessionist grouping can find no legal support to its claims, especially when the dramatic developments in South-Eastern Europe and their consequences are still present in everybody’s minds. Nevertheless, the situation is challenging and needs a careful approach and a viable solution. The environmental sector provided supplementary data regarding the vulnerabilities of the Romanian democracy. The citizens’ knowledge concerning the environmental risks has been deficient for a long period and the government put no effort into increasing it. The situation changed once that negotiations with the EU were opened on the environmental sector and the ruling elite was forced to concentrate on these matters too. This top-down process required the adoption of the necessary legislation, but the implementation phase has been inadequate. Another negative aspect refers to responsibility. As the state institutions are involved in the permitting, monitoring and enforcing measures, they are accountable for undertaking drastic measures

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against polluters. When these mechanisms were deficient, led in cases of accidental transboundary pollution to tensed relations with the affected neighbours. The activity of the recently set up National Environmental Guard has determined a more efficient action against polluters with a strong focus on preventive measures. In all these situations, the behaviour of the securitizing and functional actors is the most important factor. The securitizing actors belong predominantly to the political elite. In both the political and societal sectors, those who acknowledged the presence of certain imminent dangerous situations were members of the ruling coalition, ministers, the prime minister and even the president. In most of the cases, their allegations were backed by evidence and accepted by the audience. The people started to disagree with the ruling elite when this proved unable to undertake all the measures to completely solve the situations that had threatened the country’s stability. In the environmental sector, the securitizing actor was an NGO (or a group of NGOs). This is unique and therefore even more consequential as it happened in a sector where public awareness has been low. In what concerns the functional actors, in the political and societal sectors they were members of the opposition, union leaders, civil society representatives, or members of an ethnic group. A special attention here is given again to the environmental sector. In general, the functional actors in this sector are economic agents or NGOs with activities related to environmental protection. As an exception, the analysed case has as functional actors, among others, the President of the Romanian Academy, the President of the World Bank, and the Romanian Minister of Environmental Protection. Their interventions have influenced at various moments the course of events and have an important part to play in their conclusion. As it results, the political scene enjoys a lot of active actors. The non-political ones are as important as the political ones. Although the establishment has not shown eagerness in encouraging the emergence and development of nongovernmental organizations, as the public opinion has become more interested in finding manners to influence the decision making process, civic initiatives have grown in number and consequence. It is true though that certain fields of activity provided more facilitating conditions for these organizations than others. For instance, the highest number of consequential NGOs can be found in the political sector, while the smallest belongs to the societal one. One explanation resides in the dynamism of the political structures that boost the formation of a counterweight, that is, the civic institutions.

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Then, many civic personalities got involved into politics. Another reason could be the development of the citizens’ associative spirit: they become aware that democracy provides them with means to influence the political decisions to meet their expectations. In the societal sector, things are different because the ethnic groups aim at preserving their ethnic characteristics and culture and, in this sense, politics is seen as the best means. Ethnic minorities are interested in the direct participation into politics and, consequently, they set up political structures. UDMR’s case is a successful story in this regard: not only that it managed to take part in governing and legislative coalitions, but, by doing so, it also fulfilled many demands of the Hungarian minority. Certain ethnic organizations remain outside the political field, but then their attempts to assert their identity are neither compromising nor flexible. They are perceived as extremist by the rest of the population, thus failing to become credible. However, the possible negative consequences triggered by their actions cannot be overlooked. The environmental field brought into the analysis new elements. The NGOs are numerous but they have lack for years the means to exercise influence over the political class. Educating the citizens in these matters takes time and can be speeded up when both the state and civic structures get involved. Nevertheless, the government has not developed an articulated strategy that, once put in practice, would increase public responsiveness in this field. A worthy assistance came instead from powerful international environmental organizations such as Greenpeace that has boosted the activity of domestic NGOs. It launched a bottom-up movement that has become stronger and stronger aiming at attracting the public opinion to support environmental protection and persuade the government to undertake radical reforms. As a result, this bottomup action occurred simultaneously with the top-down process triggered by the EU conditionality, both having remarkable influences over the decision-makers and the rest of the society, so bypassing traditional political culture parameters. To sum up, non-governmental actors are numerous but their de facto contribution to the securitization processes has been insignificant. This is the result of the governing elite’s lack of interest for developing a genuine partnership with the civic structures and the absence of mechanisms that would make this accountable to the citizens. Nevertheless, lately, as civic initiatives become stronger and more dynamic, they were able to identify the appropriate means to put pressure on the political elite especially by disseminating information over their integrity. In the

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case of the environmental sector, local institutional capacity building has been assisted here by an external actor, Greenpeace. For the rest, there were only several cases in which the governing elite took NGOs contribution into account. Some of them took place during President Constantinescu’s office, a more liberal period than ‘Iliescu 1’ or ‘Iliescu 2’. But the relevant improvement in this sense has been registered during Traian Basescu’s presidential mandate, Basescu being the first Romanian politician able to attract firm support from civic organizations. For the rest, the political sphere has been powerful enough until now to resist interferences coming from the civil society when these are not well organized and do not involve a significant part of the population. The results obtained by analysing the society through the security lens reveal additional vulnerabilities of the democratization in Romania. The dynamic securitization process allowed the identification of elements that static political culture theory could not detect. Thus, by using the two methodological approaches the results complemented each other forming a comprehensive image. Democratic institutions are weak and cover various interest groups while their leadership shows a high appetite for power and do not promote transparency. Civic structures are either disregarded or prevented from acting. Respect for the rule of law is many times second to private interest. The adoption of the European acquis and the alignment of the Romanian legislation to the international standards was successful, but the implementation of all these regulations has faced delays and obstacles. Then, in many cases, the political class has ignored public opinion. Consequently, a relevant part of the population became alienated or radical. This situation combined with the fragility of the democratic system which people did not have time to develop a strong affinity with, may hamper Romania’s further democratic development. Thus, in a feeble democracy, political security is also bound to be affected. The reciprocal statement is valid too. The vulnerabilities highlighted by the security analysis indicate that democracy is not soundly rooted yet in the Romanian society and the perils that endanger it are more serious than the investigation of the democratic consolidation had showed. So, without security, no advance in the democratization process is possible either. Many of the problems of the Romanian democracy are caused by the behaviour and beliefs of the political elite and, for a long period, the weak civil society has not been able to put pressure on this. Some of the securitization moves in the political sector had among causes the political elite’s fear of losing its privileges or some representatives’

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nationalistic orientations. As these things do not change overnight, de-securitization is also not to be expected for a while in this sector. In the societal one, the issues disputed between minority and majority are now handled within the normal political framework, thus de-securitization is a fact here. In the environmental field, de-securitization is not desirable until the governing elite does not assume genuinely the responsibilities related to environmental protection. As (de-)securitization is determined by threat perception, a change of mentality at both elite and non-elite levels can be instrumental in removing certain issues from the special security agenda to the political one. The political elite has to become accustomed to the democratic rules and conform to them while the non-elite has to learn to use all the mechanisms offered by democracy to control the elite’s decisions. So, to offer a clear answer to this book’s core question, the contribution of the political and civic actors to democratization and securitization processes is not uniformly distributed among them. The representatives of the governing elite have lots of prerogatives that give them a powerful status in the society. Those from the opposition can also actively participate in these processes and even determine certain changes. But the participation of civic structures is still subject to two important factors: the political elite’s willingness to co-operate with them and, respectively, their ability to find the appropriate means that would impose them as equal partners to these. The case analysed in the environmental sector opens the way to a different approach for the NGOs: the external support was fundamental in giving credibility to the local organizations and assist them till their maturation. They gave rise to a national campaign with remarkable results at the political decision making level. This exceptional situation transforms the behaviour of the environmental NGOs into a success model to be followed by non-governmental organizations from the political and societal sectors too. To resume, while the political actors enjoy numerous prerogatives that allow them to control to a great extent the democratization and securitization processes, the civic actors do not have the capabilities (yet) to fully contribute to these. This could change fast if local NGOs learn to use the benefits of external assistance. A final point has to be mentioned here. As a study case, Romania provides a wide scale of situations in several security sectors that are illustrative for all the Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, it offers the necessary elements instrumental in putting together a model that can be operational in any post-communist society. The

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model was built up step-by-step, first at the theoretical level and then enriched with the empirical data. The result is a successful approach that created a framework of analysis applicable to subjects such as Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, the former Soviet republics and others. The study of the democratic consolidation is complemented by the more complex and dynamic securitization elements that offer an in-depth view of the internal threats to be faced. The numerous elements brought into the analysis proved consequential in building up an articulated and coherent concept underlying the close dependence between democracy and security. The outcomes are extraordinary as in the end an all-encompassing map of the studied society is obtained with its vulnerable points. A thorough study has to take into account the specifics of each political culture and the role of various factors during its transformation. Therefore, analysing a given society through the security lens will build up a comprehensive view of the genuine advance of the democratization process in that country.

APPENDICES Appendix One Table A.1: Key ‘Investment-Heavy’ Directives Water Supply/Wastewater Treatment

Waste Management

Air Pollution Control Industrial Pollution Control

Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive Drinking Water Directive Dangerous Substances into Water Directives Nitrates Directive Landfill Directive Municipal Waste Incineration Directives Hazardous Waste Incineration Directive Packaging Waste Directive Large Combustion Plants Directive Fuel Quality Directives Air Quality Directives Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive Volatile Organic Compound Solvents (VOC) Directive

1. Water Sector Requirements Water Quality • Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for human consumption • Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban wastewater treatment • Council Directive 76/464/EEC of 4 May 1976 on pollution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged into the aquatic environment of the Community, as amended by Council Directive 91/692/EEC, and its “daughter” Directives • Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources

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• Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy • Council Directive 76/160/EEC of 8 December 1975 concerning the quality of bathing water 2. Waste Management Sector Requirements Waste Management • Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste • Council Directive 89/369/EEC of 8 June 1989 on the prevention of air pollution from new municipal waste incineration plants • Council Directive 94/67/EC of 16 December 1994 on incineration of hazardous waste • Directive 2000/76/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2000 on the incineration of waste • Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC) • Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste (as amended by Council Decision 94/31/EC) • Council Directive 86/278/EEC of 12 June 1986 on the protection of the environment, and in particular of the soil, when sewage sludge is used in agriculture 3. Air Quality Sector Requirements Air Quality • Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management • Council Directive 99/30/EC relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Council Directive 93/12/EEC (98/70/EC) • Council Directive 1999/32/EC of 26 April 1999 relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels and amending Directive 93/12/EEC

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309

• Council Directive 94/63/EC of 20 December 1994 on the control of volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions resulting from the storage of petrol and its distribution from terminals to service stations 4. Industrial Pollution Control Sector Requirements Industrial Pollution Control • Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) • Council Directive 88/609/EEC of 24 November 1988 on the limitation of emission of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants (as amended by Council Directive 94/66/EC) • Council Directive 1999/13/EC of 11 March 1999 on the limitation of emissions of volatile organic compounds due to the use of organic solvents in certain activities and installations • Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances

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appendices Appendix Two

Table A.2: Presidents, Majorities, and Prime Ministers in Romania (1990— March 2008) Period

President

1990–1992 Ion Iliescu (FSN) 1992–1996

1996–2000

2000–2004 2004–2008

1

Parliamentary Majority Prime Minister (percent in the Chamber of Deputies) FSN (66.24 percent)

Petre Roman (FSN)

FSN1 + PNL (73.54 percent) FDSN (34 percent)

Teodor Stolojan (technocrat) Ion Iliescu Nicolae Vacaroiu (FDSN) (technocrat)2 PDSR3 + PRM + PUNR + Nicolae Vacaroiu PSM (51.60 percent) (PDSR) PDSR (34 percent) Nicolae Vacaroiu (PDSR) Emil CDR4 + USD5 + UDMR Victor Ciorbea Constantinescu (58.29 percent) (PNT-CD) (CDR) Radu Vasile (PNT-CD) CDR+PD + PSDR + Mugur Isarescu UDMR (58.29 percent) (technocrat) Ion Iliescu PDSR6 + UDMR (52.74 Adrian Nastase (PDSR) percent) (PDSR) Traian Basescu ADA7 + UDMR + PC8 Calin Popescu (ADA) (51.51 percent) Tericeanu (PNL) ADA + UDMR + Calin Popescu minorities (42.86 percent) Tericeanu (PNL) PNL + UDMR (34 Calin Popescu percent) Tericeanu (PNL)

The pro-Iliescu wing of FSN formed a new party, the FDSN, in March 1992. Nicolae Vacaroiu had in the beginning of the 1992–6 legislature no party membership (he was a technocratic prime minister). 3 FDSN changed its name to PDSR in June 1993. 4 The Democrat Convention of Romania (CDR) was a multiparty alliance whose major member parties were PNT-CD and PNL. 5 The Social Democratic Union (USD) consisted of PD and PSDR and was dissolved in May 1999. 6 The Social Democratic Pole included PDSR, PUR, and PSDR. On 16 June 2001, PDSR absorbed the PSDR to form the PSD. 7 The Justice and Truth Alliance (ADA) consisted of PNL and PD. 8 The PUR changed its name to PC on 8 May 2005. 2

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USA Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, www.dtic .mil. “Final Statement of the Fourth Session of the Hungarian Standing Conference”, Budapest, 26 October 2001. See the official site of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.hu. “Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries” issued by the Hungarian Government. See the official site of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.hu. “Law on the statute of national minorities in Romania” (draft by UDMR). See website of the European Centre for Minority Issues, www.ecmiromania.org. C) Official web sites of various other organizations mentioned in the book www.1911encyclopedia.org—site of the Classic Encyclopaedia (based on the 11th Edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1911), article on “Szekelys”. www.alde.eu—official website of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament. www.aliantacivica.ro—site of the Civic Alliance (Alianta Civica), a Romanian NGO. www.bancyanide.ro—site of the ‘Cyanide Free Romania’ Campaign, a civil society initiative that was formed to support a legislative proposal to ban cyanide in mining in Romania. It consists of several environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace CEE, the Independent Centre for the Development of Environmental Resources, the Partnership Foundation, Terra Millennium III, Otus, Focus Eco Center, Sun Valley, Green Transylvania etc. www.casanato.org—site of the NATO House (Casa NATO), a Romanian NGO. www.catavencu.ro—site of the Romanian ‘Academia Catavencu’ satirical magazine founded in 1991. Actually, the ‘Academia Catavencu’ press group also owns an FM radio station—Radio Guerilla, a daily newspaper—Cotidianul, other magazines such as Tabu, Superbebe, Aventuri la pescuit, 24-FUN, and the Media Monitoring Agency (see further www.mma.ro). www.civicmedia.ro—site of the Civic Media Association, a Romanian informal network of journalists who never activated under the communist regime. www.csop.ro—site of the Centre for Market and Opinion Study (CSOP—Centrul pentru Studierea Opiniei si Pietii), a Romanian polling institute. www.curs.ro—site of the Centre of Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS—Centrul de Sociologie Urbana si Regionala), a Romanian polling institute. www.divers.ro—site of the Divers Association—another view on ethnic minorities, an initiative of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and Project on Ethnic Relations. www.ecmi.de—site of the European Centre for Minority Issues, NGO which advances majority-minority relations in the wider Europe through action, research and documentation. Its website on Romania can be found at www.ecmiromania.org. www.election.ro—site presenting the official results of administrative, legislative and presidential elections in Romania. www.epp-ed.eu—official website of the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats in the European Parliament. www.fsd.ro—site of the Open Society Foundation (Fundatia pentru o Societate Deschisa), a Romanian NGO. www.gallup.ro—site of the Gallup Organization Romania. www.horiarusu.ro—site of the ‘Horia Rusu Foundation’. The debate on “National security versus personal security” is mentioned here.

references

327

www.imas.ro—site of the Institute of Marketing and Polls (IMAS—Institutul de Marketing si Sondaje). www.institutulpro.ro—site of Institutul PRO, a Romanian non-profit independent organization concerned with the development of the democratic structures in Romania. www.insidepoland.com.pl—a country portal of www.insideworld.com—InsideWorld is a collection of country and region web sites providing local news and information to a worldwide audience. www.insse.ro—site of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics. www.internetworldstates.com—Internet World States—Usage and Population Statistics www.meh.hu—site of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary. www.mma.ro—site of Media Monitoring Agency, a Romanian non-governmental organization concerned with the protection of human rights. It is a department of the ‘Academia Catavencu’ press group. www.mmt.ro—site of Metro Media Transilvania, a Romanian institute for social studies, polls, marketing and communication. www.ngo.ro is powered by StrawberryNet—The Environmental Electronic Network. StrawberryNet promotes environmental protection, sustainable development, democracy and human rights in Romania. www.ong.ro/ong/worner/—site of the ‘Manfred Wörner’ Association. It organised the seminar “Romania’s Security Strategy Discussed by the Civil Society”, 2 September 1998. www.polgariszovetseg.ro—site of the Magyar Civic Union (UCM), an ethnic party active in Romania. www.rosiamontana.org—site of the Alburnus Maior, a Romanian NGO that has initiated and coordinated the ‘Save Rosia Montana’ campaign against the plans of Rosia Montana Gold Corporation to open the biggest surface mining site in Europe. Alburnus Maior actively supports the initiatives of sustainable development in the area and conservation of its natural and historical inheritance. www.rmdsz.ro—site of the Democratic Union of the Magyars in Romania (UDMR— Uniunea Democratica a Maghiarilor din Romania). www.samefolket.se—magazine of the Sami people in Sweden. www.simpara.ro—site of the Romanian ‘Architecture. Restoration. Archaeology’ Association. This is concerned with the conservation, protection and promotion of the cultural patrimony and the education of the population in what refers to its importance. www.wikipedia.org—site of a multilingual free-content encyclopaedia project. D) Official blogs of personalities and politicians www.basescu.org—The blog of Romania’s President, Traian Basescu.

INDEX accountability 7, 63, 70, 109–10, 127, 140, 143, 166, 298 acquis communautaires 80, 215, 278 acquis 221, 250, 261, 263–4, 266–8, 270, 272, 274, 293, 303 activist 38, 45, 74, 76, 88, 122, 125 communist 79, 87, 93, 125, 128 party 96, 167, 191 PSD 161 aggregation 48, 80 aggregated demands 48 disaggregation 31 air pollutants 252 Alba 178, 282, 284, 288, 290 Albania 235, 305 Albanian 237 Kosovar Albanians 237 Alburnus Maior 283, 286–9, 295, 327 Alexandria 274 Alexandru, Radu F. 194, 226 alienation 17, 34, 37, 131, 139, 165, 197 Almond, Gabriel A. 5, 33–6, 38–41, 48, 53–6 Al-Qaeda 13, 144 Andrassy, Arpad 235 Andrei, Lavinia 278–9, 283 anomie 10, 62, 73, 140, 187 Antal, Arpad Andras 201 Antall, Jozsef 187, 215 Antall government 187 anticommunist 71, 79, 86, 118, 140, 185 Apuseni Mountains 282–3, 286 Ardeal 286 see also Transylvania Armageddon 129 army 156–7 of counselors 112 assimilation 172–3, 206, 219, 233 of community 48 Atanasiu, Teodor 137 Austria 216, 255, 277 autonomy 174, 179, 181, 192, 198–204, 206, 210, 212, 224, 228–30, 232–5, 237–9, 241–2, 299–300 National Councils of Cultural Autonomy (CNAC) 198, 200

Baia Borsa 254–5 Baia Mare 251–2, 254–6, 258, 278, 291 Balkans 29, 176, 186 Banat 153, 178, 227 Barbados 56 Barbu, Daniel 73–4 Basescu, Traian 92, 102–6, 108–9, 114–5, 121–4, 131, 136–7, 158–64, 166, 205, 303 Becali, George 108, 163 Berki, Robert 6, 19–20, 22 Bessarabia 153, 175, 178 see also Republic of Moldavia Boc, Emil 200 Borbely, Imre 192 Borbely, Laszlo 205 Borgen, Christopher J. 237 Bosnia-Herzegovina 305 Bosnian crisis 176 Brasov 73, 289 Brown, James F. 75 Brucan, Silviu 79 Bucharest 77, 87–8, 102–3, 102, 128, 134, 149, 151, 212, 224–5, 233, 238, 251, 273, 279, 286 Budapest 177, 223 Budusan, Ovidiu 134 Bukovina 178 Northern Bukovina 175 Bulgaria 25, 202, 257, 262 Bulgarian 26, 274 Buzan, Barry 2, 6, 11–2, 16, 23, 28–30, 64, 173, 247–8 Carnic Massif 289 Carol II 70 Caucasus 176 Ceausescu, Nicolae 72, 74–5, 79, 84, 88, 92, 115, 126, 180 charismatic parties 51 Chelaru, Mircea 155 Chernobyl 13, 245 Chitac, Marian 115 Chiuariu, Tudor 116–7, 137 chlorine-fluorocarbons (CFC) 275–6 church 17, 25, 60, 74, 98, 156, 172, 185, 189, 210, 238, 287

330

index

Catholic Church 74 Orthodox Church 74, 214 Ciorbea, Victor 112, 147, 149 Civic Alliance 88–9, 96 Civic Alliance Party 88 civic culture 6, 31, 33, 39–40, 50, 53–5, 62, 65 civil society 3–4, 6, 17, 45, 52, 61, 67–70, 75, 85–9, 93–4, 96, 104, 109, 117–23, 125, 127, 130–2, 134, 139–41, 145–6, 150, 167–8, 171, 174–5, 183, 186–7, 226–30, 240–2, 281, 285, 287, 290–1, 297–8, 301, 303 clientelistic parties 51 Cluj 190, 199, 214, 286 condemnation of communism 123, 125 conditionality 59, 64, 118, 139, 157, 167, 228, 232, 242, 261, 274, 282, 293, 300, 302 Conservative Party (PC) 83–4, 199, 106, 121–2, 138, 198 see also Romanian Humanist Party Constanta 270, 279 Constantinescu, Emil 89, 92–3, 96–8, 103, 112, 114, 118, 123, 129, 133, 135, 145, 149–50, 166, 303 Constitution 26, 97–9, 100, 103, 111, 113–4, 160, 162–4, 200, 204–5, 207, 210–3, 230–1, 233 constitutional system 51, 114, 163–4 parliamentary 51, 53, 70, 104, 114 presidential 51–3 semi-presidential/semi-parliamentary 112, 114 Cornea 290 corruption 7, 64, 67–8, 74, 85, 96, 98, 102–3, 108–10, 112, 114–6, 118, 122, 125, 132–7, 139, 141, 145–6, 149, 155, 158, 165–6, 186, 205, 227, 250, 291, 298 Council of Europe 59, 123, 172, 203–4, 215, 233, 242 Parliamentary Assembly 203–4, 233 European Commission for Democracy through Law/Venice Commission 219–22 Covasna 192, 199, 223–4, 226 Cozma, Miron 100, 149, 151–2, 171–2 Cozmanca, Octavian 228 Croatia 215 Csepeli, Gyorgy 184, 187 Csurka, Istvan 197 cultural autonomy see autonomy Cyprus 261, 264

Czech Republic 1, 2, 262, 264 Czechoslovakia 45 Dahl, Robert 5, 46–7 Daianu, Daniel 148 Danube Delta 259, 270 Danube River 153, 254, 257, 259 Daul, Joseph 159 decision-making 4, 33, 60–1, 67, 73, 119, 149 persons 180 positions 149, 224 process 5, 29, 44, 47, 68, 91, 109, 119, 125–6, 166, 171 deforestation 247, 250, 259, 293, 299 Deletant, Dennis 178 democracy 3–5, 7–8, 10, 18, 20, 28, 32, 39–42, 46–8, 50–2, 55–6, 59–62, 65, 67–8, 70, 78, 80, 87–9, 93, 100–1, 139–40, 142, 150–1, 157–8, 160, 163, 166–8, 174, 176, 185–7, 194, 198–9, 220, 230–1, 245–6, 297–8, 300, 302–5 consolidated/well-established/sound 5, 10, 63, 69, 90, 110, 295, 299 consensus 56 delegative 52 new democracies 43, 54, 184 Democrat Convention of Romania (CDR) 76, 96, 118 Democratic Party (PD) 81–2, 86, 104–6, 121–2, 139–40, 147, 198, 200, 202, 225, 227 Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) 101, 105–6, 109, 117, 121–2, 138, 188–206, 209, 211–2, 214, 218–9, 224–5, 228–33, 239–41, 291, 300, 302 Democrat-Liberal Party (PDL) 106, 158–9 democratization 1, 3–7, 9–11, 13, 41–3, 57–9, 60–1, 63–5, 67–9, 74–5, 77, 91, 93–5, 125, 139, 157, 165, 167–9, 185–7, 207, 240–1, 246, 293, 298–9, 303–5 Denmark 277 de-securitization 6, 168, 229, 242, 300, 304 de-Stalinization 75 Deva 282 dictatorship 41, 43, 47, 70–2, 75, 99, 123, 131, 151, 180, 186 Dobrogea 227 Durkheim, Emile 17–8

index Eckstein Kovacs, Peter 201, 205, 291 ecosystem 247–9, 254–5, 259, 273–5, 277, 292, 297 Ekéus, Rolf 220 electoral system 50–1, 76–7, 110 majoritarian 57, 76, 104 proportional representation 57, 76 electorate 52, 76, 81–2, 85, 88, 92, 96–7, 107, 143, 164, 200, 205–6, 232, 242 elite 3–7, 10, 23, 30, 43–5, 51–3, 63–4, 67–70, 72, 75–6, 80–1, 85–6, 91–7, 101, 104, 108–11, 117–8, 123, 125–6, 131, 135, 139–40, 142, 145, 149, 155, 157, 164–70, 172, 176, 180, 185–7, 195, 202, 228, 230, 239–40, 242, 246, 250, 259–60, 264, 282, 293–5, 298–304 non-elite 4, 5, 7, 43–5, 64–5, 67, 69, 91, 95, 97, 110, 164–5, 240, 246, 300, 304 emergency ordinances 102, 137 Estonia 25, 203, 261, 264 ethnic consciousness 174 ethnicity 71–3, 174, 237, 240 European Union (EU) 31, 59, 86, 96, 101–4, 106, 116–8, 122–4, 128, 135–6, 139, 141–2, 144, 158–9, 162, 167, 194, 202–3, 215–6, 218, 220, 222, 228, 230, 236, 242, 246, 250–1, 256, 261–4, 266–9, 274, 277–8, 281, 293–4, 300, 302 European Commission 85, 138, 210, 261–2, 267 European Parliament 86, 106, 136, 159, 202, 221, 226 Fenechiu, Relu 116 Ferencz, Csaba 235 France 46, 178, 235 Franz Iosef I 177 Frunda, Gyorgy 192, 203–4, 233 Funar, Gheorghe 291 functional actors 26, 61, 68, 141, 149, 248, 274, 277, 293, 298, 301 Gazda, Zoltan 234–5 Geoana, Mircea 107, 122, 124, 159, 218 Germany 1, 23, 181, 255 Gorbachev, Mikhail 75 Great Britain 39, 40, 54, 178 see also United Kingdom Greater Romania Party (PRM) 76–7, 94, 99, 107–9, 124, 126, 150–2, 172, 190–1, 193–4, 227, 291

331

greenhouse gas (GHG) 247, 276 Greenpeace 249, 283, 291, 295, 302–3 groundwater 251 Gypsies 177, 207 Habsburgic/Austro-Hungarian Empire 71, 177–8, 184 Harghita 192, 199, 223–4, 226, 237 Henderson, Karen 5 horizontal competition 25 Horvath, Gabor 221 Hungarian Citizens’ Party (FIDESZ) 193, 218, 229, 234 Hungary 175–9, 183, 186–8, 192, 196–7, 204, 206, 212–7, 219–23, 228–35, 241–2, 254–6, 264, 274, 287–8, 300 identity 1, 7, 15, 24–5, 29–30, 54–5, 60–1, 71, 141, 143, 169–73, 177, 179, 183–4, 188–9, 207–8, 210, 212, 214, 218, 224, 227, 229, 234, 240, 242, 302 Iliescu, Ion 79, 82, 87, 92–4, 96–7, 99–101, 107, 112, 114–5, 118, 121, 123–4, 126, 129, 135–6, 152, 156, 166, 172, 191, 224, 303 input process 34–5, 39, 53, 62, 69, 110 insecurity 19–20, 22, 30, 149, 169, 184 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 59 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 30, 248 internet 85–7, 129, 281 Ionescu Galbeni, Nicolae 148 Iron Guard 43 see also Romanian Legionnaire Movement Italy 43, 178 Jaruzelski, Wojciech 74 Jews 100, 108, 177, 181 Justice and Truth Alliance 122

103, 105,

Kelemen, Attila 219 Kitschelt, Herbert 51 Kolodziej, Edward 11 Kosovo 153–4, 176, 232, 235–7 Kovacs, Csabo 218 ‘law and order’ 7, 20–2, 63–4, 68, 70, 126–7, 131–2, 141 League of Nations 180–2 legitimacy 17–8, 24, 38, 43–6, 78, 81, 146, 160, 163–4 Liberal Democrat Party (PLD) 105

332

index

liberalization 42, 45, 72, 74–5 see also pre-transition Life and Justice Party 197 Lificiu, Petru 285 Lijphart, Arend 5, 55–6 Macedonia, FYR of 26, 176 Macovei, Monica 116–7, 122, 138, 161 Magyar Civic Union (UCM) 199–200, 205–6, 232–4, 239, 300 Maramures 254, 256 Marian, Dorin 153 Marinescu, Marian Jean 202 Marko, Bela 117, 192, 201, 205, 211, 224–5, 233 Marton, Arpad 201–2 Martonyi, Janos 221 mass media 2, 34, 49–50, 54–5, 62, 83–4, 96, 99, 120, 134–5, 147, 150, 155, 168, 185, 194–5, 280–2, 284, 292 Mathews, Jessica 15 Mehedinti 257 Melescanu, Teodor 200 Miercurea-Ciuc 214 miners’ riots 100, 149–50 minority/minorities 26, 30, 45, 62, 157, 169–70, 172–5, 180, 189–90, 194, 198–9, 206, 212, 215, 218–20, 231, 235, 238, 241 and majority 7, 170, 183, 206–7, 210–1, 230–1, 233, 240–1, 304 ethnic 7, 25, 43, 173, 175, 196 German 182 Hungarian 101, 175–6, 179, 183, 188, 190, 196–9, 200–2, 204, 207, 209, 216–8, 222, 225, 230–3, 239, 241–2, 302 imperial 181 kin 219–20, 231, 241 minority-majority 5, 175, 241 national 174, 179, 180–2, 189, 210, 213, 233, 235 Romanian 238 Russian 25 Sami 26 Serb 155 minorities law 198–202, 232 minorities status 204 Mitrea, Miron 138 Morar, Daniel 136 Moscovici, Pierre 202

multiparty system 6, 20, 51, 57, 67, 70, 75, 79, 91, 104 Mungiu Pippidi, Alina 223 Muntenia 257 Mures 199, 237 Musca, Mona 200 Mushakoji, Kinhide 11 Naghi, Gabriel 145 Nagy, Zsolt 86, 137 Nastase, Adrian 99–100, 103, 107, 115, 121, 135–6, 138, 148, 154, 191, 218, 227, 286 nation 14, 34, 44, 80, 103, 153, 169, 173, 179, 183–5, 187, 204, 211, 216, 219, 224, 235, 237 nation-state 13, 60, 71, 172, 174, 184, 219 National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD) 76, 81–2, 147–8 National Salvation Front (FSN) 78–80, 82, 87, 118 Nationalism 2, 71, 125, 130, 169, 176, 183–5 Civic/liberal nationalism 185 Ethnic/illiberal nationalism 186 Hungarian 196 Nemeth, Zsolt 234 Netherlands 277 New Generation Party (PNG) 108 New Zealand 56 nomenklatura 73, 91–2, 159 non-conventional risks 13, 142, 144 see also non-military and non-conventional threats non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 2, 3, 16, 85, 110, 119–21, 134, 147, 158, 208, 217, 223, 282–3, 287–9, 295, 302, 304 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1, 96, 119–20, 128–9, 139, 141–2, 154–5, 157–8, 167 Norway 26, 277 Odorheiul Secuiesc 214, 238 Offe, Claus 60 Olteanu, Bogdan 117 Orban, Viktor 193, 222 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 157, 203, 220, 242 OSCE’s High Commissioner 220–1

index Ottoman Empire 23, 71, 153, 184 output process 34–5, 62, 69 Parochial 34–9, 50, 89–90 Participant 5, 7, 10, 32, 34–9, 41, 44, 50, 54–5, 62–4, 68–70, 75, 77, 89–91, 94, 126, 145, 175, 185–6 Participation 4–7, 10, 21, 31, 39–40, 44–6, 48, 54, 61, 63–5, 67, 70, 74, 81, 86, 90, 94, 106, 109, 112, 114, 140, 142, 146, 154, 164, 166–70, 174, 190, 200, 207, 209, 240–1, 277, 281, 286, 288, 295, 298, 302, 304 Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) 94, 154 Parvan, Rodica 238 Pascu, Ioan Mircea 157 Patapievici, Horia Roman 151 Pavel, Dan 130, 152 permitting 264–6, 270–2, 293, 300 integrated permitting 272 PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 144 Plesu, Andrei 148, 158 pluralism 31–2, 69, 79, 89, 166, 298–9 Poland 22–3, 62, 72–5, 175, 179, 182, 261, 264 political culture 5–6, 10, 33–7, 39–43, 46, 53–7, 62–4, 67, 69–72, 139, 176, 186, 298, 302–3, 305 democratic 3–5, 7, 31–2, 41, 53, 55, 63–5, 67–70, 75, 88, 141, 174, 246, 295, 297–8 parochial-participant 37, 41 parochial-subject 37, 41 subject-participant 38, 41, 62 political influence 44, 49, 110, 115, 170, 174, 178, 183, 188 political orientation 33, 39, 55, 69, 92, 171, 186, 196, 231 political socialization 35, 42, 54 political structure 24, 33, 36, 40, 56, 125, 301–2 political subculture 33, 38 pollution 27, 247, 251–6, 258–9, 263, 268, 273–5, 293, 299 accidental pollution 253–4, 258, 260 trans-boundary pollution 256–7, 274–5, 278, 293 transfrontier pollution 27, 257 Popescu Tariceanu, Calin 104–6, 115–7, 122, 158–60

333

Power (status) 16, 23–4, 26, 107, 132 strong power 16 weak power 16 Pridham, Geoffrey 5 programmatic parties 51 propaganda 48–50, 123, 230 Putnam, Robert 43–4 Puwak, Hildegard 135 Radulescu, Cristian 77 referent object 12, 18, 28–31, 61, 68, 141, 151, 169, 172–3, 179, 248 referendum 104, 111, 158, 160, 162, 164, 233 regime 4, 35, 41–3, 45–6, 51, 58, 60, 62, 69, 73–5, 78, 80, 89, 91–2, 94–5, 100, 123–4, 130, 162, 187 authoritarian 41–2, 45, 47, 63, 70 communist 45, 49, 62, 87–8, 92–3, 103, 110, 112, 123–4, 127, 140, 159, 179, 186, 227, 243, 271, 297 democratic 31, 56, 126, 165 totalitarian 45, 73, 123, 249, 293 Republic of Moldavia 25, 176, 236 see also Bessarabia responsiveness 50–3, 302 Revolution 92–3, 192 Bolshevik 71 Rice, Condoleeza 236 role culture 33 Roman, Petre 112 Romanian Humanist Party (PUR) 83–4, 105–6 Romanian Legionnaire Movement 108 see also Iron Guard Romanian National Party 177 Rosca Stanescu, Sorin 152 Rosia Montana 278, 282–92, 295 Rosia Montana Gold Corporation (RMGC) 282–3, 285, 287–91, 295 Rus, Ioan 199, 223 Russia 1, 23, 141, 178, 236 Russians 25, 237 Russian company 104 Russian Empire 178, 184 see also Tsarist Empire Salonta 197 Sawers, John 236 Saxons 181 Schengen space 215 Schmitter, Philippe 59

334

index

Schöpflin, George 174, 188 Schultze, Charles 15 secession 30, 153, 174, 142, 148, 228, 236–7 secessionism 24, 227 secessionist 24–5, 141, 172, 226–7, 236, 300 secret police 3, 72–3, 84, 95, 97, 115, 158, 186 see also Securitate Securitate 3, 84, 87, 93–4, 97, 115, 128–31, 151, 197 see also secret police securitization 2, 4–7, 9–10, 28–30, 61, 64, 128, 141, 147, 151, 167–8, 170, 172, 240, 242, 247, 260, 282, 292, 295, 298–9, 302–5 moves/movements/attempts 30, 64, 170, 183, 222, 241, 246–7, 282–3, 298–9, 303 securitizing actors 28–31, 64, 68, 141, 149, 183, 248, 259, 274, 292–4, 298–9, 301 security 1–9, 11–23, 25–32, 61, 63–5, 67–8, 70, 103, 113–4, 124, 131, 141–2, 144–7, 149, 152–3, 165, 167–70, 173, 184, 186, 188, 206–7, 214, 229, 245–6, 250, 256, 292, 297–8, 300, 303–5 absolute 16 community 11 economic 30 environmental 11–12, 29, 246, 248–9, 256, 268 health 11 human 11 individual 142 see also personal security international 1, 5, 14, 19, 113, 142, 145 military 23–4, 29 national 5, 15–6, 18–9, 20, 23, 26–7, 61, 70, 103, 105, 113–4, 128–9, 142–3, 146, 149, 155, 167, 171, 206, 224, 231, 299, 300 personal 1, 11, 14, 19–22, 64, 68, 70, 126–8, 141 see also individual security political 11, 30, 303 relative 16 regional 5, 29, 207, 214 Romania’s 3, 68, 141, 143, 145, 171, 222, 250 societal 25, 30, 172 state 153 security challenges 3 security complex 68, 141, 145, 168, 300

security concept 6–7, 9, 11–2, 22, 64–5, 68, 141–2, 297 security environment 1, 19, 142, 145 security policy 14–5, 22, 61, 113 common security policies 14 security predicament 2, 4, 297 security sector 2, 22, 29, 31, 172, 304 Serbanescu, Ilie 148 Serbia 235–6, 257, 305 Seres, Codrut 137–8 Sfantu Gheorghe 234, 238 Slovak Republic 215, 236 Slovenia 215, 264 social capital 43 social cohesion 17–8, 126, 175, 184, 197, 241, 297 see also socio-political cohesion Social Democrat Party (PSD) 82–4, 86, 93–4, 100–1, 103–9, 117, 121–5, 132, 135, 138, 140, 148, 154, 161, 163–6, 190, 191–7, 199, 201, 205, 223, 225–6, 228–31 Socialist Labour Party (PSM) 94, 152 socio-political cohesion 6, 16, 23, 63, 67, 70, 140 see also social cohesion Solidarity 62, 74–5 Solyom, Laszlo 235 Somes river 254, 256 Soviet Union 25, 58, 71–2, 75, 153, 176 Stan, Ioan 224 Stanculescu, Victor 115 state idea of the/a state 16, 18, 23–4, 27, 30 kin-state 7, 169, 179, 210, 213, 241 national 211, 227, 233 strong 16, 18–19, 24 state-nation 25 weak 1, 16, 18–9, 24, 29, 65, 67, 126 Stolojan, Teodor 105 subject (political culture) 34–9, 62, 69–70, 89–90, 110, 126 Sweden 277 Switzerland 277 Swoboda, Hannes 159 Szabo, Karoly 225 Szabolcz, Lanyi 214 Szasz, Jeno 238 Szekely land 154, 188, 192, 200, 214, 224, 229, 232–3, 235, 238–9, 241, 300 Szekely, Ervin 218 Szekely National Council 229, 235 Szekelys 81, 237–9

index Targu-Mures 215, 252 Tanase, Stelian 226 terrorism 11, 114, 124–5 threats 2, 5–6, 9, 13, 19–24, 28–9, 64, 67–8, 98, 114, 117, 141, 143, 156, 172, 184, 229, 246–8, 250, 290, 293, 295, 297, 299 conventional 9, 13 see also military and traditional threats ecological 27 see also environmental threats economic 16, 19, 26 environmental 14, 16, 245, 248–9 see also ecological threats existential 12, 18, 28, 186, 247, 298 external 2, 14, 22, 297 internal 1, 9, 18, 127, 305 see also vulnerabilities military 13, 15, 23–4 see also conventional and traditional threats non-conventional 3, 9 see also non-military threats and non-conventional risks non-military 9, 30, 297 see also non-conventional threats and non-conventional risks physical 19 political 24 security 12, 96 societal 19, 24–6, 175 traditional 15 see also military and conventional threats Timis, Frank 284 Timisoara 87, 92, 251 Timisoara Proclamation 87 Timofte, Radu 128, 223 Tisa river 254, 256 Tismaneanu, Vladimir 124, 158–9, 183, 185 Tokay, Gyorgy 192 Tökes, Laszlo 182, 193, 197, 199, 232 Toro, Tibor 192, 212, 219 Transdnister 176, 236 transition 4, 10, 32, 38, 41–3, 49, 52, 59, 61, 65, 68–70, 92, 139, 262 pre-transition 41–2 see also liberalization to democracy 8, 43, 59–61, 68, 70, 80, 89, 297 triple transition 60–1

335

Transylvania 153, 175–9, 181, 188, 214, 223, 227 see also Ardeal Trianon Treaty 178, 187, 234 Tsarist Empire 71, 178 see also Russian Empire Tudor, Corneliu Vadim 77, 99, 107–8, 124, 126, 131, 151–2 Tulus, Doru 117 Turnu-Magurele 274 Ukraine 186, 215 Ullman, Richard 25 Ungureanu, Traian 162 United Kingdom 56 see also Great Britain United Nations (UN) 213, 236, 276 UN Security Council 236 United States of America (USA) 1, 13, 39–40, 54, 116, 124, 144, 235 University Square 87, 286 Vacaroiu, Nicolae 117 Valea Jiului 73, 149, 171 Vasile, Radu 112 Verba, Sidney 5, 33–6, 38–9, 48, 53–6, 89 Verestoy, Attila 117 Verheugen, Günther 221 vertical competition 25, 172 Voiculescu, Dan 83–4, 106, 122, 160 voluntary associations 17, 45, 55, 119 see also non-governmental organizations vulnerabilities 2–3, 5–7, 9, 22–4, 61, 64, 67, 70, 136, 142, 144, 146–7, 165, 167, 242, 297, 299, 300, 303 see also internal threats Wæver, Ole 2, 6, 28–9, 64, 173, 247–8 Wallachia 178 Walt, Stephen 11 Watson, Graham 159 Whitehead, Laurence 58 Wilde, Jaap de 2, 6, 28–9, 64, 173, 247–8 Woicke, Peter 284 Wolfensohn, James 284 Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 154, 176, 215, 254–6 former 2, 236, 299

INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE SOCIAL STUDIES ISSN 1568-4474 In modern research, breaking boundaries between the different social sciences is becoming more and more popular. Discussions in which different disciplines are being invited to shed their light on such issues as migration, violence, urbanisation, trust and social capital are common in current academic discourse. Brill’s International Comparative Social Studies focuses on presenting the results of comparative research by anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and other social scientists. 1. WILSON, H.T. Bureaucratic Representation. Civil Servants and the Future of Capitalist Democracies. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12194 3 2. RATH, J. Western Europe and its Islam. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12192 7 3. INAYATULLAH, S. Understanding Sarkar. The Indian Episteme, Macrohistory and Transformative Knowledge. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12193 5 (hardcover) ISBN 90 04 12842 5 (paperback) 4. GELISSEN, J. Worlds of Welfare, Worlds of Consent? Public Opinion on the Welfare State. 2002. ISBN 9004 12457 8 5. WILSON, H.T. Capitalism after Postmodernism. Neo-Conservatism, Legitimacy, and the Theory of Public Capital. 2002. ISBN 9004 12458 6 6. ROULLEAU-BERGER, L. Youth and Work in the Post-Industrial City of North America and Europe. With an Epilogue by Saskia Sassen. 2003. ISBN 9004 12533 7 7. AALBERG, T. Achieving Justice. Comparative Public Opinion on Income Distribution. 2003. ISBN 9004 12990 1 8. ARNASON, J.P. Civilizations in Dispute. Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions. 2003. ISBN 9004 13282 1 9. FALZON, M.-A. Cosmopolitan Connections. The Sindhi diaspora, 1860-2000. 2004. ISBN 9004 14008 5 10. BEN-RAFAEL, E. and Y. STERNBERG (eds.), Comparing Modernities Pluralism Versus Homogenity. Essays in Homage to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14407 2 11. DOUW, L. and K-b. CHAN (eds.), Conflict and Innovation. Joint Ventures in China. 2006. ISBN 90 04 15188 5 12. SMITH, J. With an Introduction by S.N. Eisenstadt. Europe and the Americas. State Formation, Capitalism and Civilizations in Atlantic Modernity. 2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15229 8. ISBN-10: 90 04 15229 6. 13. BEN-RAFAEL, E., M. LYUBANSKY, O. GLÖCKNER, P. HARRIS, Y. ISRAEL, W. JASPER and J. SCHOEPS. Building a Diaspora. Russian Jews in Israel, Germany and the USA. 2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15332 5. ISBN-10: 90 04 15332 2.

14. ARJOMAND S.A. (ed.),Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction. 2007. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15174 1. ISBN-10: 90 04 15174 5. 15. KWOK-BUN, C., J.W. WALLS and D. HAYWARD (eds.), East-West Identities. Globalization, Localization, and Hybridization. 2007. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15169 7. ISBN-10: 90 04 15169 9. 16. MEULEMANN, H. (ed.), Social Capital in Europe: Similarity of Countries and Diversity of People? Multi-level Analyses of the European Social Survey 2002. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16362 1. 17. ROBERTS, C.W. “The” Fifth Modality: On Languages that Shape our Motivations and Cultures. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16235 8. 18. RAKEL, E.P. Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran. A Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17176 3. 19. BEN-RAFAEL, E. and Y. STERNBERG (eds.), with Judit Bokser Liwerant and Yosef Gorny. Transnationalism. Diasporas and the advent of a new (dis)order. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17470 2 20. STEFAN, A.M. Democratization and Securitization. The Case of Romania. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17739 0