Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present [1st ed.] 9789811537028, 9789811537035

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Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present

h y ug b a eg i m

Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present

Hyug Baeg Im

Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present

Hyug Baeg Im Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology (GIST) Gwangju, South Korea Korea University Seoul, South Korea

ISBN 978-981-15-3702-8    ISBN 978-981-15-3703-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For Eun Hee, Michael, and Cindy, My Beloved Family

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been published without the support, encouragement, and helping hands of many scholars, students, and research institutions. First of all, I would like to give a million thanks to my teacher and friend, Professor Adam Przeworski at New  York University. Professor Przeworski was the chairman of both my MA thesis committee and Ph.D. Dissertation committee at the University of Chicago. He has always kindly taught me how to study the right methods and theories of democracy and democratization in the 1980s. He guided me meticulously in writing Chap. 2, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” and Chap. 4, “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea.” In other chapters, too, I am deeply indebted to him for guiding me in writing analytically and critically about democracy and democratization in South Korea. I thank Professor Tun-jen Cheng and Professor Deborah A. Brown for inviting me to write a book chapter on the democratization movement of churches in South Korea. I remember that Professor Cheng praised my paper as the most analytical among 11 papers in the edited book. I learned a lot from Professor Larry Diamond at Stanford University in writing Chap. 6, “Opportunities and Constraints to Democratic Consolidation in South Korea.” Professor Diamond’s advice was very informative, thoughtful, and hypothesis-testing. I would like to give special thanks to Professor McNamara at Georgetown University who invited me to teach at the Sociology Department at Georgetown University, and gave me the opportunity to make a presentation on vii

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Korean industrial relations in the post-­democratic transition period. I had one more chance to present a similar topic on industrial relations at the Korea Institute at Harvard University in 1996. Chapter 8, “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea,” was the result of four years’ research on interregional comparison of democratization organized by the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and the Japanese Political Science Association (JPSA). I thank participating members of ECPR and JPSA, especially Professor Aurel Croissant and Professor Wolfgang Merkel at Heidelberg University, Professor Leonardo Morlino at the University of Florence, Professor Antoaneta Dimitrova at Leiden University, and Professor Geoffrey Pridham at the University of Bristol. Chapter 9, “The Development and Change of Korean Democracy since the Democratic Transition in 1987,” was based on a paper presented at the international conference entitled “The Experiments with Democracy in East and Southeast Asia” organized by the Centre of Asian Studies at the University of Hong Kong in May 2008. I give special thanks to Professor Yin-Wah Chu at Hong Kong Baptist University. Chapter 10, “Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development Compared: South Korea,” was written for the book East Asian Development Model (Routledge, 2015), edited by Professors Shiping Hua and Ruihua Hu. I give special thanks to Professor Shiping Hua, who invited me to contribute to the book. Chapter 11, “Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea,” was my contribution to IPSR (International Political Science Review), Vol. 32(5), 2011, the year when I served as an Executive Member (EC) of International Political Science Association (IPSA). Finally, I would like to give special thanks to my colleagues, Ph.D. and graduate students. Professor Youngmi Kim at Edinburgh University suggested me to submit a proposal for publishing a book at Palgrave Macmillan and advised me on how to write the proposal. Professor Sung Eun Kim at Korea University helped me to get permission of copyright to use papers, book chapters, figures, and tables. Research Fellow Eunmi Choi (Ph.D. Korea University) at The Asan Institute for Policy Studies reorganized the whole manuscript in accordance with Palgrave Macmillan’s book format. Dr. Hyobin Lee (Ph.D.  Korea University) at the Korean University proofread the whole manuscript several times. Nicejudy Ju Hee Lee (Ph.D. Student, Korea University) completed the index of this book. I also thank Ms. Hye Kyung Kim, a graduate student of Korea University,

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for helping me to proofread the first draft of the manuscript. Lastly, I would like to thank my daughter Cindy Im, a graduate of Stanford University and senior at University of California Hastings Law School for meticulously proofreading the whole manuscript. Except the persons and institutes that I mentioned as the key helpers, angels, and supporters, many people officially and unofficially encouraged and empowered me to publish articles in a book form. I sincerely thank everyone who enabled me to publish this book on democracy in South Korea.

Contents

1 Introduction: My Democratization Studies in Retrospect  1 References  15 Part I Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition  17 2 The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea 19 Toward an Analytical Framework for Industrialization and Regime Change  19 The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model and Its Critics  20 An Alternative Analytical Framework  22 How, Then, Are Changes in the Economic System Related to Regime Change?  23 Authoritarian Transition in Dependent Capitalism  24 Transition to Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Korea  26 The Organization of the Economy (1961–1972)  28 Changes in the Configuration of Classes of International Capital  31 Local Bourgeoisie  32 Peasants  33 Working Class and Social Marginals  34 The State and Classes  34 The Restricted Democracy (1963–1971)  35

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Crisis in the Restricted Democracy  37 Organic Crisis  37 The Institutional Crisis of 1971  39 Conclusion  41 3 Recasting Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism: Myths, Reality and Legacies 49 The Legacy of Park Chung Hee—Still Alive and Well  49 Types of Modern Authoritarianism: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Neo-Patrimonialism, Developmental Soft Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism  50 The Myth of Park Chung Hee’s Developmental Authoritarianism 1: How Developmental Was Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism?  55 Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism in the 1960s (the Third Republic)  55 Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism in the 1970s (the Yushin Regime)  58 The Myths in Park Chung Hee’s Developmental Authoritarianism 2: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in Development in the Park Chung Hee Period  60 Theory of Endogenous Growth: Strategic Choice of Park Chung Hee  60 The Theory of Exogenous Growth: Colonial Legacies, Benevolent American Hegemony, Land Reform and Confucian Capitalism  62 The Legacies of Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism  64 How Has Park Chung Hee Been Treated at Different Times?  64 Debates on Historical Necessity of­Park Chung Hee in Post-Democratic Transition: “Was Park Chung Hee Historically Necessary?”  67 Was Park Chung Hee the Solution or the Problem of the 1997 Financial Crisis and the Current Economic Crisis?  68 Conclusion  70 References  73

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4 Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea 75 Lessons from the Korean Transition  75 Contending Perspectives on Democratic Transition  76 Alternative Proposition  77 The Politics of Korean Democratization  79 Aborted Transition: 1979–1980  80 Decompression: 1984–1985  81 The Election of February 12, 1985  82 Standoff: 1986–1987  84 Politics of Constitution Making  87 Transition Elections: December 1987 and April 1988  88 Conclusion  90 5 Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea 95 The Role of Christian Churches and Catholics in Korean Democratization  95 Korean Christian Churches Join the Democratic Opposition Movement  96 The Push Factor: Doctrinal Change and the Pursuit of Legitimacy  99 The Pull Factor: The Invitation from Social Movements 101 Competition for the Religious Market 102 The Contribution of Korean Churches to Democratic Transition 104 The Church as Incubator and Shelter for Democratic Activists 104 Mobilization by Networking 107 Who Participated and How Did Democratic Activists Acquire Hegemony? 108 Part II Democratic Consolidation and After 117 6 Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Opportunities and Constraints119 The Enabling and Confining Conditions for Democratic Consolidation 119 Democratic Consolidation: Conceptual Review 120 The Modality of Democratic Transition 123 Facilitators 126

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Economic Affluence 126 Ethnic Homogeneity 129 Religious Tolerance 130 Effective State 133 Civilian Control over the Military 134 Obstacles 135 Low Institutionalization of Political Society 135 Weak Constitutionalism: “Constitutions Without Constitutionalism” 138 Underdevelopment of Civil Society 139 Economic Globalization 145 External Security Vulnerability 147 Conclusion: Overcoming Obstacles for Korean Democratic Consolidations 148 7 From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Korean Industrial Relations159 Beyond Democratic Consolidation 159 Associative Model of Social Order and Industrial Relations: Profile and Promise 161 Interests Without Institutions: Korean Industrial Relations— Past and Present 165 Prospects for an Associative Mode of Industrial Relations in Korea 169 A Korean Solution: Association in a Confederal Welfare State 172 Conclusion: Theoretical Significance of the Korean Experience 175 8 Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of the Three Kims Era183 Korean Democracy at a Crossroads 183 Assessing New Democracies: Negative Consolidation and Positive Consolidation 184 The Achievements of the First Generation of Democracy 187 Reinstituting Civilian Control Over the Military 187 Institutionalization of Elections 188 A Peaceful Transfer of Government 189 Enhancing Accountability 190 Persistent Bad Legacies of the Three Kims’ Politics 192

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Divisive Regionalism 192 An Underdeveloped Party System 194 An Imperial but Weak Presidency with a Single-Term Limit 195 Political Corruption 196 Declining Trust in Democracy 197 The Presidential Election of 2002 and Its Implication for Democratic Consolidation 198 Party Reforms and the “People’s Primary” 199 Implications for Removing Obstacles to Democratic Consolidation 200 Conclusion: The New Era 201 9 Development and Change of Korean Democracy Since the Democratic Transition of 1987: The Three Kims’ Politics and After205 Development and Underdevelopment of Democracy in Korea 205 Coexistence of Different Historical Times: Simultaneity of Premodernity, Modernity, and Postmodernity 206 Modalities of Transition and Path Dependence 208 Korean Democracy in the Three Kims Era 210 Modernity: Development of Liberal Democracy 210 Civilianization 210 Institutionalization of Democratic Competition 211 Alternation in Power 212 Premodernity: Legacies of Confucian Patrimonialism 213 Confucian Patrimonialism Under the Chosun Dynasty 214 Confucian Patrimonialism in Post-Transition Democracy 215 Resilient Regionalism 216 Delegative Presidency 217 Personal Political Parties and Party Bossism 218 Ideological Orthodoxy 219 Change of Democracy in the Post–Three Kims Era 220 The Rise of Neo-Nomadic Society 220 Receding Premodernity: “Confucius Leaving Korea” 222 Advancing Modernity: Political Reforms for Modern Liberal Democracy 223 Party Reform 223 Political Finance Reform 224 The Advent of Postmodernity: Internet Democracy 225 Conclusion: Gear Toward Conservatism 226

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Part III Toward a Quality Democracy in South Korea 233 10 Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development Compared235 Korea as a Showcase for Testing Theses on Democracy and Economic Development 235 Theoretical Overview: Five Possible Causal Relations between Democracy and Economic Development 238 Modernization Theory: “Development First, Democracy Later” 239 Praetorianism: “Economic Development, Under­ institutionalization, Hyper-democracy, and Praetorian Dictatorship” 240 Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: “Development Does not Lead to Democracy” 241 Democratic Development Theory: “Democracy First, Development Later” 243 Exogenous Modernization: “Democracy Does not Matter in Development” 245 The Democratic Interlude and the Collapse of the Second Republic (1960–1961) 247 Authoritarian Development under Park Chung Hee 247 Exogenous Growth under Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism 249 Democracy and Development since the Democratic Transition in 1987 251 The Record of Democratic Governments’ Economic Management 252 Roh Tae Woo Government 252 Kim Young Sam’s Presidency 253 Kim Dae Jung’s Presidency: Parallel Development of Democracy and Market Economy 253 Roh Moo Hyun’s Presidency: Neo-Nomadic Democracy and Digital Economy 254 Performances of Democratic Governments in Comparative Perspective: Managing Sustainable Economic Growth 255 Authoritarian Capitalism Refuted in Development since the Democratic Transition 256 Exogenous Factors of Growth under Democratic Governments 261 Endogenous Factors of Growth under Democratic Governments 263 References 268

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11 Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea273 Introduction 273 The Empirical Findings 274 Rule of Law 275 Electoral and Interinstitutional Accountability 277 Participation 282 Competition 285 Freedom 286 Equality 290 Responsiveness 294 Conclusion 296 References 297 References299 Index309

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 5.1

Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 10.5 Fig. 10.6 Fig. 10.7 Fig. 10.8

Dynamics of transition from authoritarian rule Authoritarian Power Bloc 78 Aborted transition in 1979–1980 81 “Standoff”: 1985–June 1987 moderate opposition 84 Democratic transition: June 1987 87 Christians’ attitude toward authoritarian regimes. Note: See Jong Chul Choi, “Hankook Kidoggyo Gyohoedeuleui Jungchijuk Taedo” [The political attitudes of Korean Christian churches, 1972–1990] Kyungjewa Sahoe [Economy and Society] 15 (Autumn 1992): 215. Here, the abbreviation CFA stands for the Christian Farmers’ Association; KCCC for the Korean Council of Christian Churches; and KCAAC for the Korean Christian Association for Anti-Communism 109 Modernization theory and neo-modernization theory. (Source: Chen 2007) 238 Praetorianism. (Source: Chen 2007) 240 Bureaucratic authoritarianism. (Source: Chen 2007) 241 Democratic development theory. (Source: Chen 2007) 243 Exogenous modernization. (Source: Chen 2007) 245 Domestic investment rate (%). (Source: Korean Statistical Information Service http://kosis.kr) 258 Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). (Source: World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org) 258 GDP growth (annual %). (Source: World Databank http:// databank.worldbank.org)259

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List of Figures

Fig. 10.9 Fig. 10.10 Fig. 10.11 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2 Fig. 11.3

Fig. 11.4 Fig. 11.5 Fig. 11.6 Fig. 11.7 Fig. 11.8 Fig. 11.9 Fig. 11.10 Fig. 11.11 Fig. 11.12 Fig. 11.13

International trade balance (US dollars). (Source: The Bank of Korea http://www.sbok.or.kr) Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). (Source: World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org) Unemployment total (% of total labor force). (Source: World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org) Rule of law. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”) Individual security and civil order. (Source: Cingranelli’s PHYSINT (physical integrity variable). The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) Institutional and administrative capacity. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”. The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) Control of corruption. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”) Electoral accountability. (Source: Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index) Interinstitutional accountability. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”) Voter turnout in presidential elections. (Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)) Voter turnout in parliamentary elections. (Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)) Number of parties. (Source: The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) Difference in the strength of the first and second largest party. (Source: The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) Political rights. (Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World (FRW)) Civil rights. (Source: CIRI’s Civil Rights/Empowerment Rights Index. The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) Gini coefficient. (Source: Office of Statistics, Republic of Korea, Statistics Korea 2006 (www.kostat.go.kr))

260 260 261 276 277

278 278 279 280 283 283 285 286 287 288 291

  List of Figures 

Fig. 11.14 Polarization in education. (Source: Choi, Tae-uk. 2005. “Sahoetonghaphyung Segyehwachujineul wihan Jungchijedo Jogeun (Political Institutional Conditions for Promoting an Inclusive Globalization),” Shinjinbo Report (New Progressive Report) (January) 82–83.) Fig. 11.15 Responsiveness. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”)

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 3.1 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 11.1

Foreign capital inflow (millions of dollars) Indexes of real wages and labor productivities (1965 = 100) Types of modern authoritarianism IT Index in Roh Moo Hyun Presidency (2007) Political rights and economic freedom indicators Worldwide governance indicators Responsiveness: percentage of positive evaluation

31 38 52 256 264 266 295

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: My Democratization Studies in Retrospect

On August 11, 1979, as I was boarding my plane to go and study comparative regime transformation and consolidation at the University of Chicago, major newspapers were running front-page photos of handcuffed Korean women workers crying and shouting through the window of an armored police bus. The photos showed the YH Corp. female workers’ strike ending with state union-busting by police arrest, torture and other brutalities toward striking workers. One woman jumped to her death from the fourth floor of the opposition New Democratic Party headquarters. In August 1979, Korea was in the middle of the Yushin dictatorship, ruled by the strongman Park Chung Hee. The country was under Emergency Decree No. 9, authorizing police to arrest, torture and put in jail every striking worker and every demonstrating and protesting college student. The purpose of the research proposal I submitted to the University of Chicago was, I remember, to research why authoritarianism had survived despite continuing protests, strikes and demonstrations in South Korea. At that time I did not even imagine the demise of Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism, to say nothing of the regicide of Park Chung Hee. In mid-1979, the Yushin dictatorship was regarded as impregnable by many political scientists, both at home and abroad, who assumed it would last for Park Chung Hee’s lifetime. I shared this view and wanted to study why this was so, and why crafting a democratic transition had hitherto been impossible in this repressive, bureaucratic, technocratic dictatorship. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_1

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However, when I started studying at Chicago, I was surprised to discover that authoritarian regimes had recently been collapsing in Southern Europe and Latin America. I was shocked by Philippe C. Schmitter’s course entitled “The Demise of Authoritarianism and the Prospects of Democracy in Latin America” and Adam Przeworski’s unpublished paper in the reading list, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy.”1 In Chicago, comparative political scientists had already studied the demise of authoritarianism and the transition to democracy. At that time dictatorships in East Asia and Eastern Europe were not included among countries for researching the possibility of democratic transition. Even the forerunners of transitology perceived the possibility of democratic transition in South Korea under Park Chung Hee’s iron-fist rule to be slight indeed. I agreed that East Asian developmental dictatorships were very difficult to democratize because of their good economic performance and because the South Korean authoritarianism under Park Chung Hee was the typical case of developmental dictatorship. Within a month of my starting to study at Chicago, on October 26, 1979, Chung Hee was assassinated by his close friend and protégé, KCIA chief Kim Jae Kyu. The authoritarian dictator turned out not to be invincible and the Yushin authoritarian system was not impregnable. After Park’s death, the Yushin system crumbled: without him, the system was unsustainable, and Koreans enjoyed a “sweet and sad”2 time in the Seoul Spring, late 1979–early 1980: “sweet” because they regained some degree of political freedom and civil liberties after the dictator’s death. Yet also “sad” because during the interregnum the politicized military officer group called the New Military officers under General Chun Doo Hwan staged an internal military coup, arresting Martial Law Commander General Chung Seung Hwa, and seizing control. Chun Doo Hwan and the New Military then usurped power, repressing mass protests and massacring more than 300 citizens and student protestors in Kwang Ju city. The Seoul Spring was too short to bring back democracy in South Korea, and another military dictatorship filled the power vacuum created by Park’s death. The Seoul Spring confirms the “Stern Principle” that the logic of the fall of the Weimar Republic did not explain the advent of National Socialism in Germany.3 Witnessing the survival of the military authoritarian regime even after the death of founding military dictator Park, I tried to explain why the Korean case had proved an exception with regard to democratic transition from authoritarianism. I tried to understand why its authoritarian regime

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was exceptionally immune to the Third Wave of democratization despite its rapid and spectacular economic growth.4 I researched how Park Chung Hee staged the Yushin palace coup and established Yushin authoritarianism as a system that enabled the military authoritarianism regime to survive the death of its founder. At that time I was still a probabilist, a fatalist, unable to believe in the prospect of democratic transition in South Korea. I searched for structural prerequisites and minimum probability for bringing democratic transition. Observing that the country had crossed the minimum threshold for democratic transition in terms of per capita income, a strong and broad educated middle class and high accessibility to mass communication but no democratic transition even after the death of the dictator Park Chung Hee, I held out little hope for democracy.5 I was then very fortunate to meet two great theorists of democratic transition and consolidation, Adam Przeworski and Philippe C. Schmitter, at the University of Chicago. Adam was the chairman of my MA thesis and PhD dissertation. I learned from Adam to analyze, not describe, political phenomena with mathematical, deductive logic. Philippe was the professor of comparative politics whose colorful but very enlightening lectures I loved to listen to. I learned from him the use of inductive reasoning to explain political phenomena. Both great scholars shared with me powerful methods for studying democratization. Adam taught me a game-­ theoretical model for democratic transition: that it is not structure and culture that determined the path to democracy, but the strategic choices of relevant political actors that bring democratic transition or non-­ transition. Philippe taught us that transitologists could overcome probabilism, structural determinism, fatalism and impossibilism by what Albert O. Hirschmann called “possibilism.” Possibilism stresses agency and contingency, “structured contingency” (Terry Karl),6 uncertainty and Machiavelli’s “virtu,” the capacity of an individual political actor to see the opportunities for creative responses and to come up with a set of rules and practices for democratic transition.7 With possibilism, transitologists can find solutions from impossible conditions. My escape from impossibilism started with the regime transition from restricted democracy to a repressive, military and bureaucratic authoritarianism in late 1972 by then-president Park Chung Hee. Chapter 2 explains why Park had installed bureaucratic authoritarianism in South Korea differently from Latin American military dictators, yet similarly to highly technocratic and developmental “bureaucratic authoritarian” regimes. Chapter 2 was written as a PhD preliminary paper at the Department of Political

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Science at Chicago in 1985 and published in World Politics in 1987. In this chapter, I argue that even though Yushin authoritarianism shared similar regime characteristics of Latin American bureaucratic authoritarianism, such as the exclusion of popular sectors politically as well as economically, the repression of protestors, the violation of human rights and the installation of modern technocratic rational authoritarianism in economically advanced third world countries, nevertheless, the process of regime installation in South Korea was different. First, Park Chung Hee did not justify Yushin in order to overcome an economic crisis. On the contrary, he justified it to preserve the economic development that he had already accomplished in the 1960s and to maintain the high rate of economic growth in the 1970s under his leadership. Second, unlike Latin America, the Korean “deepening” in the form of heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI) was the consequence rather than the cause of regime transition to bureaucratic authoritarianism. Third, popular sectors were not seriously politically activated to threaten the developmental authoritarian state, and on the eve of Yushin, unlike Latin America, no bureaucratic authoritarian coup coalition was formed between the state, the domestic and the transnational bourgeoisie. Finally, strong state apparatuses had been already established in the 1950s and 1960s, before the inauguration of Yushin. I argue in Chap. 2 that authoritarian regime transition in the early 1970s was not predetermined by the structural change from a labor-­ intensive export platform to industrial deepening toward heavy and chemical industrialization. Rather, it was a strategic choice by Park Chung Hee to sustain his dictatorial rule given that a labor-intensive export platform had become incompatible with restricted democracy. This required him to appeal to the rapidly growing working class vote, as urban-based industrialization quickly absorbed the reserve army of Bonapartist small peasants in the countryside which had previously been his electoral stronghold. It was a strategic choice for Park because he sought to sustain a restricted democracy while simultaneously developing a domestic market-based economy and export platform based on both labor-intensive and high-­ technology-­intensive products. Such an approach was prone to class compromise and was to work positively for Park and his party’s electoral politics. He chose to establish bureaucratic authoritarianism to avoid the constraints of electoral politics under the restricted democracy and continue his state-led export-platform developmental strategy. Chapter 3 demystifies the Park Chung Hee model of economic development, often praised as an ideal developmental state model, as it achieved

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high economic growth with equity. Park Chung Hee’s reign had two stages: first, a soft authoritarian developmental state under a restricted democracy; and, second, a repressive bureaucratic authoritarian state under the Yushin system. In both stages, the economy grew “miraculously” from one of the poorest in the region to an economic powerhouse. Many have praised Park Chung Hee for his wise and timely choice of optimal developmental strategy based on state-led economic platform. However, the Korean “miracle” was not simply that: it was a combination of both endogenous and exogenous factors. Park Chung Hee deserves credit for generating endogenous development through the timely adoption of optimal strategies at every stage. Nonetheless, the miraculous development in Korea is also due to many exogenous factors, such as Japanese colonial legacies, benevolent American hegemony, the completion of land reform before launching urban-centered industrialization, the elimination of a landed class that could have strongly resisted industrialization and the emergence of Confucian capitalism. Korea’s development into a modern industrialized country shows us the relationship between macro and micro factors, and between structures and actors. Because of Park’s achievement in transforming the Korean economy into a modern industrialized one, his admirers have even justified his dictatorship. They have argued that his Yushin system was historically necessary in the 1970s, going on to argue that authoritarian development in the 1970s was a necessary pre-stage to the democratic transition in the mid-1980s. The historical necessity argument is severely weakened, however, if we take into account the exogenous factors that contributed to Korea’s miraculous economic growth during his reign. Park Chung Hee and his choices of development strategies may have been historically necessary for a spectacular economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, but they were not sufficient on their own. In addition, there is no clear causal relationship between authoritarian development in the 1970s and the democratic transition in 1987, nor any substantial evidence that the developmental dictatorship was a precondition and stepping stone to that transition. Of course, Park Chung Hee contributed a great deal to Korea’s miraculous development in the 1960s and 1970s and deserves to be called “the great modernizer” of his country. At the same time, he accomplished all this thanks to good fortune and beneficial exogenous factors of historical path dependence, and fclass structure and culture that were beyond his control. Karl Marx succinctly described the relationship between actors

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and structures, actors and historical path dependence, and Machiavelli’s fortuna and virtu in his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. (Marx 1852, p. 78. Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

Park Chung Hee made a great historical step with the first industrialization of Korea. Nevertheless, he did not do it alone, but with the good fortune transmitted from the past in the form of the Japanese colonial legacy, benevolent American hegemony, land reform, a class structure that eliminated the landed class who would have resisted urban-centered industrialization and the capitalism embedded with Confucian culture. All of these exogenous factors that were beyond the control of dictator Park Chung Hee worked favorably for his industrial revolution in South Korea. Chapter 4 is a game-theoretical analysis of the aborted transition to democracy in 1979–1981 and the successful democratic transition in the mid-1980s. I start with a critique of the precondition or prerequisite theories of democratic transition. These theories fall short in explaining the causal path from an authoritarian regime to democracy because in many cases factors such as economic prosperity and civic culture are not a precondition to democratic transition, but rather the outcomes of the transition or the products of consolidated stable democracies. A more serious problem of precondition theories is that they are politically impotent in explaining democratic transitions because they afford no active role to individuals in the transition process, assuming that they await passively the maturity of economic and cultural preconditions favoring democracy. In a nutshell, the precondition theory of democratic transition can be seen as an impossibilist theory that does not search for the possibility or hope for democracy; it is thus prone to be fatalistic about the prospect of democracy, assuming the population to be unable to satisfy such preconditions. South Korea is an exceptionally poor case for the precondition theory of democratic transition. Even though at the time of Park’s assassination the country did satisfy preconditions for democratic transition, such as an industrialized economy, a strong and well-educated middle class, the formation of workers with class consciousness and the existence of a rebellious opposition party with strong leaders, the death of the dictator did

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not lead to a democratic transition, but to another military authoritarian regime after the brief Seoul Spring. The aborted transition from October 26, 1979, to May 18, 1980, taught me that precondition theories could not explain democratic transition or non-transition in South Korea because the country proved to be a typical case where democratic transition did not take place despite satisfying the preconditions for democratic transition. Democratic transition does not autonomously arise when a country under authoritarianism satisfies the necessary economic and cultural preconditions. Rather, it depends on the outcome of strategic interplays among relevant political actors. With regard to the major actors in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy four can be identified: moderates and maximalists in the opposition, and hard-liners and soft-­ liners (the latter transforming themselves into reformers) in the authoritarian regime. I do not distinguish authoritarians from moderate authoritarians, or moderate and reformist democrats from radical and revolutionary oppositioners. Rather, I classify major actors along the lines of their strategic stances toward democratic opposition and the authoritarian regime. Hard-liners in the regime and maximalists in the opposition are non-strategic actors who have only one uncompromising, intransigent strategy: the repression of opposition regardless of the opposition’s change of strategy toward compromise and the unending struggle against the authoritarian regime until they overthrow it. The game of transition starts with the organization of viable democratic alternatives with leaders, and the split within authoritarian power bloc between hard-liners and soft-liners. If viable democratic alternatives are organized without the split in the authoritarian regime, the outcome of strategic interplays will likely be an inconclusive tug-of-war. To break out of this game-theoretical impasse, a split in the authoritarian power bloc between hard-liners and soft-liners is necessary. The emergence of a split does not automatically bring a transition to democracy, however. A democratic transition takes place as one of four outcomes of the game of transition: (1) a coup by hard-liners and popular revolution by maximalists as the outcome of confrontation in the street; (2) authoritarianism with concessions but without transition; (3) protracted and inconclusive struggle, standoff and non-transition; (4) democratic transition through compromise between “reformers” within the regime and moderate opposition. In the aborted transition between October 26, 1979, while the hard-­ line New Military controlled and suppressed the voice of soft-liners after seizing power, the moderate and institutional oppositional forces led by

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the opposition New Democratic Party could not control the actions and voices of the extra-institutional opposition and students. Under this game-­ theoretical condition the New Military took an uncompromising strategy to repress all opposition regardless of their position. They provoked violence on campuses, in the streets and in workplaces. Finally, they drew opposition forces into the streets, crushed them and took over the power to rule over the whole country. The Kwangju People’s uprising and massacre by Green Beret troopers in May 1980 was the finishing blow by the New Military, and the Seoul Spring ended in less than six months after it began. The successful democratic transition process began in 1984 when Chun Doo Hwan relaxed and decompressed authoritarian control. With the so-­ called Korean abertura, civil society was resurrected and many autonomous student, labor and religious organizations mushroomed from the underground to the foreground of democratic agora. This plethora of social movements for democracy contributed considerably to the electoral success of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), led by two key leaders for the restoration of democracy, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, in the National Assembly election on February 15, 2015. The NKDP was organized just two weeks before the election and rapidly became the largest opposition party. After the election, Koreans had an organized political alternative, the single dominant opposition party NKDP, with two strong leaders, the Two Kims. The combined strength of the institutional opposition in the form of the NKDP together with social movement forces demanding democracy in “street parliaments” made a “catastrophic balance” to the authoritarian regime. The inconclusive and protracted tug-­ of-­ war that had continued since 1986, between democratic forces demanding the restoration of democracy and the authoritarian regime led by hard-liners who rejected outright the demands and instead repressed them with clubs and tear gas, was finally resolved. The protracted standoff was broken when President Chun Doo Hwan announced on April 14, 1987, to stop negotiations with the democratic opposition over the constitutional revision to allow democratic competition and to continue the current system of authoritarian rule. Chun’s termination of the negotiations triggered the unification of the institutional opposition and social movement forces. In May 1987, the revelation that the regime had tortured a student, Park Jong Chul, to death, and the ensuing cover-up attempt revealed by a Catholic priest, shifted the balance of forces in the street confrontation as religious movements, white-collar

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workers, intellectuals, artists and other moral opposition forces joined the democratic coalition. On June 10, 1987, the democratic coalition organized a united front, the National Coalition for Constitutional Reform (NCCR), and occupied the hill of Myungdong Cathedral. Various factions within the democratic coalition set aside their differences and made a concerted collective action for democracy. The NCCR postponed the debates on the ideology of the new democracy by controlling the voice of intransigent maximalist oppositions; instead, they focused their efforts on the directly elected presidential system. As the democratic coalition grew and overwhelmed the police in the street, the hard-liners became isolated, and reformers within the regime seized their chance to take the lead in resolving the crisis. The confrontation in the street ended with the ruling Democratic Justice party’s presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo’s announcement to concede to restoring democratic competition including a directly elected presidential system, and that Roh’s concession should be accepted by two leaders of the opposition party, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. The mode of democratic transition in 1987 was one of compromise between reformers within the regime and moderate opposition. They reached a second-best compromise in which the moderated opposition guaranteed that the reformers would remain a strong political force that could win in the democratic competition by assuring their incumbency as well as their “safe return home” in return for conceding to the reformers’ demand to restore democratic competition. It was a mode of democratic transition of what Przeworski calls “democracy with guarantees.” Chapter 5 deals with the role of Korean Christian churches in the democratization of South Korea. The late Samuel P. Huntington noted in his The Third Wave that “the Christian churches, their leaders and communicants, were a major force bringing about the transition to democracy in 1987 and 1988.”8 Korean churches participated in the democratization movement, first by setting up a new legitimacy formula in a time of rapid socioeconomic change, second by responding to demands from other social movements in providing shelter to antigovernment dissidents and finally by creating a new niche market for religious organizations. In South Korea, both Protestant and Catholic churches participated actively in the democratization movements and contributed a great deal to the democratic transition of 1987. However, even though Protestant churches suffered more imprisonment of their members and martyrs than the Catholic Church did, the latter gained the upper hand in making

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society believe they had played a more progressive role in democratization despite being a minority. While Protestant activists struggled with conservatives in responding to popular demands for democracy, Catholics overcame the existing division within their community, and were able to present a united front to society and the state. Catholic activists gained the upper hand over Protestants in religious democratization movements by cooperating with their conservative fellow Catholics, and by making them share the agony and recognize the authoritarian state’s repression. After the transition to democracy in 1987, most people in Korea thought that Catholic churches had contributed more to democratic transition than Protestant churches did, even though Protestant activists voiced opinions of democracy, provided shelter to dissidents, appealed to international communities to help Korea to be democratized and produced prisoners and martyrs for democracy. Part II deals with the democratic consolidation in South Korea. In my graduate school years at Chicago, I studied the rise and fall of authoritarianism in South Korea from 1961 to 1979 and analyzed the democratic transition process in South Korea from 1980 to 1987 with a strategic choice-approach for my PhD dissertation. After receiving my PhD, I returned home and found South Korean democracy entering into a consolidation process. Since then I have written, presented and published many articles and books on this subject. In retrospect, I can say that South Korea completed the democratic consolidation process in a relatively short period of time. Since 1987, South Koreans have institutionalized and regularized competitive and fair elections, and the electoral space has expanded from the national to the local level and broadened to societal areas. Now university presidents, superintendents of education and even chairs of women’s associations in apartment complexes are directly elected by professors, citizens of cities and provinces, and residents of the apartment complexes, respectively. The military that ruled the country for 26 years has returned to the barracks and remained under firm civilian control. The finishing touch to the consolidation process was the first peaceful transfer of power to long-time opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, in the presidential election of December 1997, in the middle of the financial crisis, just ten years after the democratic transition. With the peaceful handing over of government to the leader of the opposition by means of fair and competitive election, Korean democracy can be considered consolidated and democracy is “the only game in town.”

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Nevertheless, democracy under the Three Kims (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil) era was not without defects. The era is also known as the democracy of the “1987 system,” a period characterized by the simultaneity of non-simultaneous historical times of modernity, pre-­ modernity and post-modernity. The Three Kims era has many characteristics of modernity of liberal democracy, including political and civil liberties, regular and competitive elections, civilian control over the military, the rule of law, transparency and accountability, and responsiveness of elected representatives and government. However, during this period, pre-­ modernity coexisted with modern liberal democracy, and Confucian patrimonialism persisted among political leaders and the masses. Regionalism in the form of expanded Confucian familism usually decided the outcome of elections; delegative presidents acted like the Confucian patriarchal father of the nation; and political parties were the personal parties of Three Kims, which they ran like feudal lords. In the latter half of the Three Kims era, globalization, the neoliberalization of the economy and the advent of a neo-nomadic society driven by the IT revolution brought post-­modernity into Korean politics. The IT revolution revolutionized multi-directional on- and offline communications and networking in ways that have changed Korean democracy, making it smaller in size, faster in responding to people’s demands, more interconnected, accountable and inclusive. At the end of the Three Kims era, the modernity of liberal democracy, the pre-­ modernity of Confucian patrimonialism and the post-modernity of internet democracy existed simultaneously.9 Part III includes the two concluding chapters of this book. Chapter 10 deals with the superiority of democracy over authoritarianism even in terms of economic performance. Many Koreans have felt nostalgia for the economic miracle of Park Chung Hee whenever they meet economic difficulties, arguing that democratic government performs worse than authoritarian government. By comparing the statistics on the economic performance of democratic governments from 1987 to 2008 and those of authoritarian governments from 1961 to 1987, I show that democratic governments have, in fact, performed better, regardless of their economic policy regimes in all categories of economic performance, except the GDP growth rate. The average domestic investment rate in the democratic period is 32.5%, while in the authoritarian period it was 31.1%. The gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) under democracy is 32.2%, while in the authoritarian period it was 24.4%. The GDP growth rate in the democratic period is 6.7%, while under authoritarianism it was 7.8%. One explanation

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for the 1.1% lower growth rate is the two regional and global economic crises in 1997 and 2008; if the sharp decline in GDP growth during those crises is taken into account, the GDP growth rate in both periods would be almost the same. The international balance of trade shifted from perennial deficits in the authoritarian period to continuing trade surpluses in the democratic period. The inflation rate in democratic period is 4.7% while in the previous period it was 12.7%. Lastly, the unemployment rate under democracy is 3.4%, compared to an earlier figure of 4.3%. All these statistics show the superiority of democracy over authoritarianism in terms of economic performance. Just as exogenous factors contributed to spectacular economic growth during the Park Chun Hee era, exogenous factors such as the “three lows” (low inflation, low currency rate, low dollar value), the end of the Cold War and globalization also contributed to the higher economic performance of democratic governments. However, such factors contributed much less to economic growth during the democratic period of the Park Chung Hee era. Therefore, we must look at the endogenous factors of economic growth in the post-­ authoritarian democratic period. This means that democracy does function well endogenously for economic growth with its superior regime properties, such as political rights, economic freedom, rule of law, accountability, transparency, political stability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality. During the democratic period, all these superior regime properties contributed to the better economic performance of democratic governments. The lesson we learn from the Korean experience under two different political regimes is that democracy matters for sustaining a high-growth economy with equity. Without democratization in the mid-1980s, South Korea could not have adjusted to the changed international political and economic environments brought about by the end of the Cold War, the spread of neoliberal globalization and the IT revolution. The country was able to weather the East Asian financial crisis because, at that time, it was a democracy in which the accountability mechanism worked to replace the leaders and party responsible for causing the financial crisis with the leaders of the opposition party, who were not tied to the establishment in politics, finance, business and public sectors. They thus dared to introduce drastic reforms to overcome the crisis and resume a sustainably high economic growth in a very short period of time. The performance of democratic governments in Korea since 1987 supports the democratic development thesis, that is, “democracy first, economic development

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later,” because economic development follows from good governance practiced by good democracies. Finally, as I describe in Chap. 11, Korean democracy is now at the stage of improving the quality of democracy. Looking back, Koreans have had a long and painful but valuable journey from repressive authoritarianism to a consolidated democracy. They are on the path toward an advanced democracy in terms of the rule of law, political freedom and civil liberties, electoral and inter-institutional accountability, responsiveness of representatives, human security, effective administration, transparency and control of corruption, active political participation of citizens and equality. Recently, many have talked about the retreat of democracy in South Korea since the inauguration of the conservative Lee Myung Bak presidency in 2008, particularly as regards political freedom and civil liberties. Among these, freedom of speech and expression have been seriously compromised by the two consecutive conservative governments of Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye. In this regard, South Korea has been classified as a “partly free” country by international freedom of speech NGOs such as Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders. However, I remain optimistic because Koreans, I believe, have shown their mettle, in holding elections during the Korean War, in toppling the authoritarian dictator Rhee Syng Man in the April 19 Student Revolution in 1960, in successfully crafting a democratic transition by mobilizing on the streets in the most militarized country in the world. I believe that Koreans’ path toward a more advanced quality democracy is irreversible, even though obstacles hinder their smooth passage. They have the self-­ correcting power to remove historical obstacles, whether they are Hegel’s “yokes” or Mencius’ “holes” that obstruct the path to advanced democracy. They have the will to remove barriers to a quality democracy. I end the introduction of this book by quoting the great scholar-bureaucrat of the late Chosun dynasty, Jung Yak Yong’s interpretation of Confucius’ “sighing at the river” (Analects, Book 9). Our life is a long journey advancing straight forward step by step without looking to the side. It is similar with the situation that when we ride on a cart that is descending down a hill, we cannot stop that slowly descending cart. (Jung Yak Yong, Analects with Interpretation Notes)

Jung Yak Yong taught us that history will move forward progressively, even though it is a long journey. Like Jung Yak Yong, I believe that Korean

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democracy will move forward, and that the Korean people have the will and capacity to prevent democracy from retreating or being sidetracked, so that they will move forward toward a more sustainable quality democracy.

Notes 1. Przeworski’s paper was published as the key theoretical chapter in the third volume of Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Adam Przeworski, 1986. “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C.  Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Vol. III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). 2. Walt Whitman, 1865. “The Wound Dresser.” 3. Fritz Stern, 1966. The Path to Dictatorship: 1918–1933 (New York: Anchor), p. xvii, quoted from Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 78. 4. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: The Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press). At that time South Korea was a typical counterexample of the thesis of modernization theory that predict “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (March). 5. For possibilism and impossibilism, see Hirschman (1971). 6. Philippe C.  Schmitter, 2012. “Two Pieces of Unfinished Business,” European University Institute and Central European University (February–March). 7. Philippe C. Schmitter, 2012. “The Ambidextrous Process of Democratization: Its Implications for Middle East and North Africa,” European University Institute (September). 8. Samuel P. Huntington (1991). 9. In the “long twentieth century of Korea” (1876–present) the simultaneity of non-simultaneous historical times has existed as a defining characteristic of modern politics since the opening of Korea in 1876. Therefore, the “simultaneity of non-simultaneous” (Bloch 1935; Bloch and Mark Ritter 1977) in the Three Kims era was not an exceptional phenomenon of modern politics of the “long twentieth century.” I received the Best Academic Award from Korean Academy of Science for the book Simultaneity of NonSimultaneous: Multiple Temporalities of Modern Politics in Korea (Korea University Press, 2014).

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References Bloch, Ernst. 1935. Erbschaft dieser Zeit (Heritage of Our Times). Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag. Bloch, Ernst and Mark Ritter. 1977. Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to its Dialectics. New German Critique 11: 22–38. Hirschman, Albert O. 1971. Bias for Hope: Essays on Development in Latin America. New Haven: Yale University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.

PART I

Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition

CHAPTER 2

The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea

Toward an Analytical Framework Change

for Industrialization and Regime

The process of the rise of a bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) regime occurring in the 1970s is rather interesting in South Korea. The regime transition was the outcome of conflict among key political actors who were constrained, although not in a deterministic way, by the change in the Korean economic structure. It can be understood as the outcome of strategic choices made by key political actors among alternatives that satisfied structural constraints. The case of regime transition in Korea is useful not only to elucidate the dynamic relation between economic structure and political regime change. It also allows us to reformulate the bureaucratic-authoritarian model that was initially developed from the analyses of Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. In disputing the thesis of the original model—which viewed political crises leading to authoritarian regimes as the reflection of a structural transformation from the stage of import-­ substitution industrialization (ISI) to that of the “deepening” of the productive structure—I argue that structurally created constraints lead to political crises of democratic regimes only if contending political actors cannot compromise on an alternative feasible development strategy to resolve distributional conflicts. Thus, authoritarian regime transition is not

© The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_2

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structurally determined, but contingent upon the outcome of class conflicts. In this chapter, I investigate why a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime emerged by analyzing conflict among key political actors along with changes of the economic structure. To do so, I discuss the theoretical limitations of the model first, and then I explore an analytical framework based on class conflict in distributional struggle and shall apply it to the Korean experience of regime transition. The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model and Its Critics In the late 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theorists expressed optimism about the prospects for democracy in economically advanced third world countries. Industrialization and economic growth were expected to generate the preconditions for democracy automatically.1 Contrary to this theory, however, extraordinary economic growth and industrialization in some countries of Latin America and East Asia in the late 1960s and 1970s did not lead to the development of democratic institutions. In the wake of this experience, different theories about the relation between economic development and political change emerged. Guillermo O’Donnell, in particular, argued that large-scale heavy industrialization and economic development are associated with military takeovers and the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism.2 According to O’Donnell, the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes has been closely related to structural changes in dependent capitalism. Developmental bottlenecks at the late stage of import-substitution industrialization led to the appearance of many symptoms of crisis, such as an adverse balance of payments, inflation and negative redistribution of income. In this stage, the “deepening” of productive structure ( i.e., “vertical integration and property concentration in industry and the productive structure in general, basically benefiting large organizations, both public and private, national and foreign”)3 emerged as a viable solution to the economic crisis. Because this deepening requires increased capital, technology and organization, only the state and international capital can undertake this new project. Social order and economic stability are necessary to provide guarantees. Thus, a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime emerges as a functional requirement for the change in productive structures in the dependent capitalist economy because the basic requirements for the deepening could hardly

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be met within the political and social order of populism. Popular political activation and economic demands generated by the exhaustion of import-­ substitution industrialization must be tightly controlled in order to “guarantee the social peace necessary for these faltering capitalisms to obtain new transfusions of international capital.”4 The regime is a system of exclusion of the popular sector, based on the reaction of dominant sectors and classes to the political and economic crises to which populism and its developmentalist successors led. In turn, such exclusion is necessary to achieve and guarantee “social order” and economic stability; these constitute necessary conditions to attract domestic investments and international capital, and thus to provide continuity for a new impulse toward the deepening of the productive structures.5 O’Donnell’s thesis has contributed to the demystification of modernization theory with regard to the political economy of regime change. It has stimulated many research projects concerning dependent development, corporatism, populism and the peripheral capitalist state. Nevertheless, the thesis has its critics.6 First of all, O’Donnell is criticized for his economic determinist view of regime change.7 Just as populism was associated with the stage of import-­ substitution industrialization in his model, bureaucratic authoritarianism has an “elective affinity” with the advance of internationalization of the internal economy. Thus, O’Donnell presupposes that a political regime is determined by the structural changes in the economic system. But not every structural change in an economic system determines the political outcome. In Colombia and Venezuela, for example, democratic regimes have implemented policies of economic restructuring that, according to O’Donnell’s thesis, could only be carried out by bureaucratic-­authoritarian regimes.8 Even though Colombia and Venezuela suffered from economic problems similar to those of Argentina and Brazil, they escaped bureaucratic authoritarianism because the ruling power bloc found a compromise solution with subordinate classes.9 Another disputed point is the functionalist assumption in O’Donnell’s thesis that deepening requires the strong intervention of the state in civil society in order to induce the transfer of international capital which has the necessary financial capacity and technological expertise. To this end, the state must guarantee stability and predictability, which may be sought through repression of the political and economic demands of the masses. In many cases, however, such functional requirements are a consequence rather than a cause of bureaucratic authoritarianism.10

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The flaw in this functionalist argument is that it leads us to regard bureaucratic authoritarianism as the most rational and efficient political regime that satisfies a necessary condition for guaranteeing the consolidation and reproduction of dependent capitalist accumulation. But Jose Serra finds that a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime need not be the most rational and efficient political regime in order to deal with economic growth, balance of payments, inflation and resource allocation.11 Moreover, the functionalist formula has its own pitfalls in explaining the collapse of such a regime. If the functional needs are no longer necessary, the regime ought to collapse. But, because such regimes endure even in the absence of functional requirements, O’Donnell’s thesis is questionable.12

An Alternative Analytical Framework An alternative framework of analysis for regime transition can overcome the theoretical problems in the bureaucratic-authoritarian model of explanation. First, the concepts of “political regime” and “political regime change” must be defined. Cardoso usefully defines “political regimes” as the formal rules that link the ruling power bloc and the popular masses within the principal political institutions.13 If we accept this definition, political regime change is the change in the procedural rules and institutions that results from the conflict among classes and groups about defining, making and revising those rules. This kind of definition distinguishes a democratic regime from an authoritarian one by formal, procedural and institutional rules. The main difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes is that the former guarantee the right to participate in political conflict and competition, and the latter deny it. Democratic procedures and institutions do not guarantee the substantive realization of the interests of anyone, but only provide rules to decide distributional and other conflicts; bureaucratic authoritarian regimes exclude the popular masses from participating in the distributional conflict. The economic exclusion of the popular masses from sharing the new wealth generated by industrialization may be the consequence of political exclusion; but in itself, it is not a determinant that distinguishes a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime from a democratic one. We cannot say that a regime is bureaucratic authoritarian simply because the economic interests of the masses are not realized.

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How, Then, Are Changes in the Economic System Related to Regime Change? Regime change is likely when a change in the balance of power of class forces leads to the intensification of distributional conflict. Each party tries to organize the economy in its own favor. If the ruling power bloc and the masses cannot reach a compromise on the organization of the economy, the resulting conflict provides an opportunity for regime change. When the regime changes, the economic system is maintained, completely changed or partly reorganized. Thus, the organization of the economy is not predetermined, but is itself an object of conflict among groups or classes. The economic system does not evolve in accordance with purely economic laws of the capitalist mode of production, and political regime change is not merely an adaptation to the evolution of the economy. Political regime change occurs not because a new political regime is functional to resolving the incompatibility between politics and economics, but because political actors (e.g., the working class, the capitalist class, the state, etc.) cannot or do not want to compromise. Therefore, political regime change is contingent upon the result of class conflict in an economic crisis. But economic and political conflict cannot be converted to class reductionist terms. In many third world countries—even those that are fairly industrialized—class politics is less salient than in advanced capitalist countries. Compared to the advanced industrial countries, the organization of classes remains very low. National politics is not based on the support of class constituencies: regional, ethnic or sectoral cleavages have a much greater influence on national politics. The fact that class politics is marginal, however, does not mean that class compromise is absent. In fact, class compromise does not occur in class reductionist terms but, in many cases, in people/power bloc terms.14 Under conditions of weak class organization, subordinate classes try to organize the “people” as a political force against the “power bloc” and to coordinate class interests with popular interests. Conversely, the power bloc tries to disorganize popular forces or to organize the people under its own leadership.15 Democratic institutions (elections, parliaments, judicial systems, and so forth) provide the framework within which distributional conflicts between people and the power bloc are managed. Thus, although the workers are not organized as a class, they can participate in distributional conflicts not as members of a class but as citizens or voters through democratic institutions and processes.

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Authoritarian Transition in Dependent Capitalism How do bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes arise in advanced dependent capitalist countries? The main characteristic of capitalism in such countries is the internationalization of the local economy. The local economy becomes dependent upon the finance and technology of international capital. Non-traditional goods are manufactured for export. An internationalized oligopolistic bourgeoisie emerges. It is plausible, as suggested by the bureaucratic authoritarian thesis, that policy requirements derived from the structural constraints of the internationalist model, such as stabilization and securing the confidence of international capital, impose a funnel-like narrowing of the coalitional choices and institutional alternatives available to the power bloc.16 However, the constraints of the internationalist model do not necessarily require a bureaucratic authoritarian regime. Transnational firms do not always favor authoritarianism and are not always hostile to democratic regimes unless the policies of the host country overtly threaten their basic interests in profiting from investment. Because the interests of transnational firms are predominantly economic, the democratic regime is also acceptable to such firms when mutually beneficial relations with the host countries can be established.17 For example, when a transnational firm is involved in the production of consumer goods for middle- and lower-income groups, it favors a redistributive income policy that will expand the local market. The investment of the transnational firm thus increases the favorable conditions for class compromise and so strengthens the potential for democracy. Aside from the specific case, international capital is generally indifferent, not antagonistic, to democracy. Because international capital is mobile and not bound by the territorial sovereignty of the host country, transnational firms can disinvest and leave the host country whenever the costs of staying outweigh those of leaving. Thus, even in an internationalized economy, the state and local bourgeoisie, not international capital, are left with the responsibility for the reproduction of consent of the popular masses to the political regime.18 The local bourgeoisie in dependent capitalist countries does not have a natural tendency to favor authoritarianism. Because authoritarian regimes have difficulties in acquiring legitimacy, the industrial bourgeoisie favors democracy over authoritarianism if its interests can be satisfied within the framework of democratic institutions.19 Democracy is possible under an internationalized economy when the state, the local bourgeoisie and the working masses can compromise.

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Compromise is possible if the fundamental interest of the bourgeoisie— that is, the maintenance of capitalist accumulation—is compatible with a moderate redistribution of income-benefiting workers.20 Thus, democratic institutions can be maintained conditionally. A material base must exist so that class compromise or people/power bloc compromise can be attained. Under dependent capitalism, capitalists and the state must guarantee the minimal material well-being of the masses without fatally sacrificing profits, despite the constraints imposed by the internationalization of the economy. In an economic crisis, the material base of compromise is reduced, and consequently compromise becomes more difficult. When the outcome of distributional conflict is unacceptable to either capitalists or the working masses, a political crisis may result. Nevertheless, an economic crisis does not necessarily result in a political one, because the emergence of a political crisis is contingent upon the outcome of class conflict. Here are two examples of contingent outcomes of class conflict that can generate pressure to change a democracy into an authoritarian regime: (1) demands by workers for wages higher than dependent capitalism is willing to provide, demands that may encourage the ruling power bloc to opt for authoritarianism over democracy and to sacrifice legitimation for the sake of saving capitalism; and (2) an attempt by the ruling power bloc to get out of an economic crisis by reducing wages and/or the work force, actions that are unlikely to please the working class. The ruling power bloc may try to secure capitalism by closing democratic institutions and suspending procedures in the face of the ensuing increase in working-class militancy.21 Democracy is rare in dependent capitalist countries. Because the expansion of the state has preceded the dominance of industrial capitalism, the industrial bourgeoisie has been created by state economic policies and is, as a result, politically weak. In addition, the industrial working class has been under state corporatist control and manipulation. Thus, in many cases neither the industrial bourgeoisie nor the industrial working class has fought for a democratic legal order. It has been imposed by state elites as an instrument of clientelistic or populist control of the popular masses.22 As a consequence, many countries have a restricted democracy, that is, “a regime which has competitive, formally democratic institutions, but in which the power apparatus retains the capacity to intervene to correct an undesirable state of affairs.”23 Under restricted democracy, the popular masses are, in most cases, excluded economically but not politically, because the ruling power bloc does not believe the political inclusion of the masses in formal competitive elections

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is a serious threat to its domination. In the worst case, the ruling bloc has the power to reverse the outcome of democratic competition. When the authoritarian power bloc invalidates the outcome of formal democratic competition, however, restricted democracy becomes unstable. The authoritarian power bloc opts for formal democracy over authoritarianism to provide legitimacy to its rule. When the legitimation function of formal democracy is eroded by the invalidation of an election, the ruling power bloc has little incentive to maintain democracy even in a restricted form. It eventually opts for more naked and repressive authoritarianism. Thus, stable, restricted democracy requires a compromise that does not exclude the interests of the popular masses completely. In other words, if profits and wages are in a perfect zero-sum game and if the popular masses are activated politically, the probability of the invalidation of the outcome of the electoral competition increases; thus, restricted democracy loses support in the authoritarian power bloc. To sum up, in a restricted democracy, the power bloc has the political power to impose an authoritarian solution and the popular masses lack the power to reverse it. Whenever there is a conflict between the popular sector’s demands for greater distribution of income and the necessity of maintaining accumulation in a dependent capitalist economy, the power bloc may impose an authoritarian solution. Even in this situation, however, transition to a naked, repressive authoritarian regime can be avoided if the power bloc reorganizes the economy to accommodate the material interests of the masses within the confinement of dependent capitalist accumulation or if it manipulates the popular masses to remain politically passive.

Transition to Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Korea In South Korea, the emergence of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime that began in late 1971 was completed with the imposition of a new constitution (the Yushin Constitution) in late 1972. The Korean regime, named the Yushin regime, had some traits similar to those found in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.24 First, the popular sector was politically excluded: competitive elections were abolished, strikes were prohibited, the organization of labor unions was severely restricted and basic human rights were violated arbitrarily. Second, the popular sector was economically excluded. The primary focus of economic policy was on overall economic growth,

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but not on the improvement in the standard of living of the middle and lower classes. Korean labor was not allowed to share equitably in the distribution of earnings from economic growth. Instead, the big bourgeoisie and the high-ranking state bureaucrats monopolized most of the benefits from economic growth.25 Finally, the regime tried to “depoliticize” social issues in terms of technological rationality. Efficiency, rationality and social stability replaced democracy as the basis on which the regime laid claim to legitimacy.26 Although the BA regime in South Korea exhibited traits similar to those found in Latin America, it developed differently.27 First, in South Korea, the regime was not justified by an economic crisis. Park justified Yushin on the pretext of preserving the accomplishments of economic development and maintaining a high rate of economic growth.28 Second, at the time of the inauguration of Yushin, the Korean economy was not at the transitional stage from import-substitution industrialization to deepening. The internationalization of the economy began in 1964 when the state launched an export-platform project. In 1972, there was no change in economic policy from that of the pre-bureaucratic authoritarian democratic regime. The deepening of the Korean economy began only in the mid-1970s and was the consequence rather than the cause of bureaucratic authoritarianism. The “deepening” hypothesis is thus inappropriate in the Korean case. Third, pre-bureaucratic authoritarian popular political activation was not serious enough to threaten the ruling power bloc. Popular political activation was higher in 1971 than before. Nevertheless, there were no serious anti-union or anti-leftist fears among the military, the upper and middle classes and state bureaucrats. Labor and other popular protests increased, but labor and the popular sector did not have the strength to pose any serious threat to the ruling power bloc. Fourth, a strong state apparatus had already been established long before the authoritarian regime emerged. Thus, the thesis that bureaucratic authoritarianism is needed to establish a strong state is not supported by the Korean case.29 Finally, no bureaucratic authoritarian coup coalition existed on the eve of bureaucratic authoritarianism that was comparable to the Latin American cases. Neither the politically weak national bourgeoisie nor the politically indifferent international bourgeoisie pressed for a regime change. No evidence has been found to hold them responsible for launching a bureaucratic authoritarian regime in South Korea. Why, then, did such a regime emerge in South Korea under circumstances so different

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from those presupposed by O’Donnell? In South Korea the restricted form of democracy had been maintained in the 1960s despite the state’s pro-business economic policies because rapid industrialization improved, to some extent, the material conditions of the masses. By the end of the 1960s, changes in the class structure made class compromise difficult because the unlimited supply of labor had ended. As a consequence, the distributional conflict intensified and the organization of the economy (the developmental strategy) became the object of class conflict. The authoritarian power bloc rejected alternative developmental strategies that would accommodate the interests of the popular masses, and maintained the existing developmental strategy (the export platform). Fearing the uncertainty of the outcome of democratic competition, it closed the already limited democratic institutions and procedures. The power bloc launched bureaucratic authoritarianism preemptively to exclude the popular masses from participating in the distributional struggle. This explanation can be substantiated by (1) describing the organization of the economy in the pre-bureaucratic authoritarian period; (2) tracing the changes in the configuration of classes; and (3) relating these changes to the distributional conflict. The result was a regime change. The Organization of the Economy (1961–1972) In South Korea, a high rate of economic growth began when the military junta (1961–1963) tried to replace democracy with economic development as the main legitimation of its rule. For the first time in Korean history, a series of five-year economic development plans was launched. The first five-year plan (1962–1966) initially put the emphasis on rural development, heavy capital goods industry and import-substitution industries. Exports were merely a means of raising foreign currency to pay for imports. In the first two years (1962–1963) of the first five-year plan, the results in the priority areas fell far short of the planned targets, but exports increased far above expectations (34% in 1962, 58% in 1963). The military-turned-­ civilian Park regime revised the plan by the end of 1963 and changed the development policy from one based on ISI and heavy capital goods to one based on labor-intensive, export-oriented industrialization30 (i.e., the export platform).31 Since 1964, the developmental strategy based on the export platform has achieved spectacular success. Between 1961 and 1972, total exports expanded more than 40 times, manufactured exports

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expanded 170 times and the rate of export growth averaged more than 60% per annum.32 What made the export platform succeed in South Korea? First, this success is based on the change in the world capitalist system of production from the “classical international division of labor” (agricultural and mineral export from colonial economies and manufactured export from advanced capitalist economies) to what Frobel and others call the “new international division of labor” (i.e., the feasibility of world market-­ oriented manufacturing in peripheral countries).33 The causes of this change are (1) a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of labor in the periphery, which is cheap but has high levels of labor productivity, and which has attracted international capital as a response to rising wages and growing industrial conflicts in the developed countries; (2) the development of a production process that has made it possible to carry out fragmented operations with easily learned skills; and (3) the development of a transportation and communication technology that has created the possibility of producing goods at any site in the world. When the developmental strategy based on ISI, heavy capital goods and rural development faced difficulties because of few natural resources, a small domestic market, low capital endowments and unsophisticated technology, the export platform based on the new international division of labor was an optimal strategic choice for South Korea. Second, South Korea’s very special situation in the international political system contributed to the success of the strategy. The post-World War II Korean state was, in fact, created by the United States as a critical anticommunist buffer state for the protection of US security and strategic interests in Northeast Asia. Until the 1970s, the main US concern in South Korea was political and strategic, not economic. Thus, the neo-colonial dependent relationship was much less salient for South Korea than for other underdeveloped countries. As a matter of fact, what is peculiar in its dependent relationship with the United States is that South Korea has been, in some sense, the beneficiary rather than the exploited. To safeguard Korean security after the Korean War, the United States provided massive economic grant aid during the 1950s and public loans in the 1960s—support that was crucial in rebuilding the economic infrastructure. To strengthen the export platform, the United States gave favorable quotas to South Korean exports34 and supplied food as aid (US Public Law 480 disposed of surplus farm products as food aid.) Because the PL 480 food imports contributed to keeping food prices low,35 urban industrial wage costs could also be kept

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low. Thus, South Korea retained a competitive advantage over other underdeveloped countries for labor-intensive exports. In addition, the United States played a significant role in normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan despite widespread popular opposition.36 This normalization gave South Korea the opportunity to expand its export market and led to a massive inflow of Japanese loans and direct investment. Thus, because of its strategic and political importance, South Korea was given special treatment by advanced capitalist countries.37 Finally, the most important factor in this success story is the role of the state. Starting in 1964, the year the Park regime changed its development strategy to the export platform, the state took decisive actions to make the economy suitable for export-oriented industrialization. The Korean currency was devalued in June 1964 to increase incentives for exports and to restrain demand for imports. A new foreign capital investment law was enacted in 1966 to encourage foreign direct investment. Interest-rate reform in 1965 substantially raised interest rates on both deposits and loans in domestic banks, and thus created a large interest differential between domestic loans and foreign loans designed to encourage the latter.38 Besides these institutional reforms, the state forced the local bourgeoisie to participate in the export platform through both incentives and penalties. Incentives for exporters included bank loans on preferential terms, relief from taxes and custom duties on imported materials used to manufacture goods for export and discounts on transportation and electricity costs.39 State penalties for capitalists who did not follow export-promotion policies included unfavorable tax rates, the restriction of import licenses and the rejection of commercial as well as public bank loans, both of which were under strict state control. Foreign loans and foreign currency exchange, which also required governmental guarantees, were provided only to those who followed state economic policies.40 Furthermore, the state itself became involved in capital accumulation. Between 1963 and 1972, public enterprise output grew 3.4 times and its share of total investment remained around 30%. However, public enterprise concentrated on the infrastructure (transportation, electricity, finance, and so forth) and on the capital goods industry, while not becoming directly involved in manufacturing for export.41 Thus, the state’s role was limited to facilitating the growth of the local bourgeoisie (what Evans calls “inventing the bourgeoisie”). In fact, the state capitalist sector was used as an instrument of support for a weak local bourgeoisie and as a complement to the role of international capital. Due to the success of the export platform, the South

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Korean economy grew 9.6% per annum and created 2.9 million new jobs between 1963 and 1972.42 The economic structure changed radically. While agriculture’s share of total domestic production dropped from 45.2% to 29.5%, the industrial manufacturing sector’s share increased from 17.1% to 35.2% between 1960–1962 and 1970–1972.43 The export platform led the GNP growth. Between 1963 and 1973, the export sector provided 39.9% of the total GNP growth compared to 4.5% between 1955 and 1963.44

Changes in the Configuration of Classes of International Capital The Korean export platform relied on a massive influx of foreign capital and technology either in the form of public and private loans or as foreign direct investment. Public loans to the country were significant compared to other dependent countries because of the country’s strategic importance to the United States. These loans were invested largely in building the infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Korean export platform was mostly driven by commercial loans from private banks and credits from transnational corporations for international subcontracting and bonded processing. As shown in Table 2.1, commercial loans predominated over foreign  direct investment. The important fact is that foreign capital in South Korea was primarily invested in labor-intensive industries rather than in raw materials or capital-intensive industries. Thus, it could always threaten disinvestment and a shift of investments to other underdeveloped countries that guarantee better incentives for profit. In fact, the credibility of this threat has been greatly reinforced because the Korean export platform’s only card was its abundant labor force.45 Furthermore, the independence of foreign capital was strengthened by the very short-term Table 2.1  Foreign capital inflow (millions of dollars)

Public loans Commercial loans Direct investment Total

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

5.0 36.1 1.8 42.9

75.8 109.0 3.2 188.0

105.6 124.0 7.7 237.3

70.2 268.4 19.2 357.8

138.9 408.9 12.7 560.5

115.3 378.6 65.2 559.1

Source: Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1967 and 1971

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H. B. IM

nature of the supplier credits that account for most of the lending and by the ability to shift subcontractors (both within and outside South Korea) if threatened. As a consequence, although the Korean export-platform model created a high dependence on international capital, foreign capital did not take direct part in class conflict and class compromise in South Korea. Local Bourgeoisie Remarkably, the local bourgeoisie carried out most of the industrial development projects. Its political and economic dependence on the state, however, placed it in the position of junior partner within the ruling power bloc. Because of Japanese colonialism, the industrial bourgeoisie did not exist before independence in 1945. In the 1950s, the big industrial bourgeoisie (in Korean, chaebol) was formed through acquisition of former Japanese properties at bargain prices and privileged access to foreign (mostly US) aid, bank loans and public contracts. Favorable treatment from the state was possible only through political connections with the state elites. By means of these connections, members of the big bourgeoisie gained economic favors in exchange for political contributions. These clientelistic relations between the state elites and the big bourgeoisie, however, created a politically weak and dependent bourgeoisie.46 When the military junta took power in 1961, in an apparent effort to ensure the legitimacy of the military coup, it enacted the Special Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation to confiscate the illegally amassed fortunes of the big bourgeoisie. As the major development plan was initiated, however, the junta found that compromise was necessary because the big bourgeoisie controlled organization, personnel, facilities and capital. This compromise between the state elites and the big bourgeoisie defined the character of the mutual collaborative relationship that was the dominant pattern throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The new state elites granted amnesty to the big bourgeoisie for illegal activity in exchange for their collaboration with the government’s long-term development plan for the conversion of the economy from ISI to the export platform. Consequently, big bourgeoisie not only did not pay fines for their past wrongdoing, but actually received special favors from the state.47 The compromise kept the national industrial bourgeoisie politically weak and dependent on the state power elite, in a position similar to that described by Evans in Dependent Development:

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As a class that never achieved a hegemonic political position and never really had a “project,” it is easy to relegate the dependent national bourgeoisie to (…) a class which was forced to admit that “in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken.” (…) Since the political power of local capital cannot flow from its dominant role in the process of accumulation, it must depend on the nature of its ties to the “technobureaucracy.”48

The pattern of foreign capital flow in South Korea reinforced the dependent nature of the local bourgeoisie. The predominance of foreign loans over foreign direct investment increased the power of the state vis-à-­ vis the local bourgeoisie because the state was not forced to rely on private domestic elites as a sole source of resources.49 Furthermore, because of the high debt-equity ratio in manufacturing firms,50 the exclusive control of domestic bank credits provided the state with a powerful instrument to subordinate the local bourgeoisie. Peasants As a consequence of land reform during the late 1940s and early 1950s, land was parceled out into relatively small holdings. The landlord class collapsed as a result and was replaced by a myriad smallholders. In the 1950s, farmers’ interests in increasing grain prices had been sacrificed to price stabilization, as low grain prices brought down farmers’ incomes. In addition, the previously mentioned US PL 480 food imports contributed to the stagnation of the agricultural sector. During the 1960s, the policy of keeping food prices low had been instrumental not only in controlling inflation but also, more importantly, in building up reserve labor pools that provided an “unlimited supply” of cheap labor for the export platform. Low grain prices and low capital investment in the agricultural sector devastated the lowest stratum of the agricultural classes.51 From 1960 to 1972, the share of this stratum of farm households (those with less than 0.5 jeongbo of landholdings) declined from 42.9% to 32.7% of total farm households.52 The disintegration of the lowest agricultural class resulted in the rapid increase in migration from the farms to industrial cities. From 1960 to 1970, the volume of net off-farm migration amounted to 3.9 million people.53 As a consequence, average landholdings and incomes have risen modestly since the late 1960s,54 and this in turn has contributed to social peace in rural areas.

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Working Class and Social Marginals Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the export platform and agricultural policy pulled and pushed massive numbers of rural outmigrants into industrial urban areas. Most of the rural outmigrants, however, were not absorbed into the industrial manufacturing sector as wage earners but instead formed a social marginal sector.55 The existence of huge reserve pools in the labor force in the form of social marginals obstructed the formation of an industrial wage-earning class. Within the industrial workforce, the fact that the high proportion of semiskilled and unskilled workers (mostly women) could be replaced by social marginals at any time contributed to the weakness of working-class organization. In the 1960s, South Korea had highly advanced and humane labor laws. Freedom of association, collective bargaining and collective action were legally guaranteed. This legal system was maintained until the late 1960s when the state elites decided it was unsuitable for the export platform under the new circumstances. Although labor unions enjoyed great associational autonomy and little state intervention, they were not a significant political force until the late 1960s. They were initially small in number, poorly organized and threatened by a large labor reserve. The State and Classes Industrialization substantially altered the configuration of the class structure, with the most notable changes being the proletarianization of the labor force and the decline of the agricultural class. Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of blue-collar workers increased from 8.7% to 19.2%, whereas that of farmers declined from 66.2% to 51.2%. The middle class and social marginals, however, changed very little (the middle class from 14.2% to 15.8%, social marginals from 10.2% to 12.8%).56 Industrialization did not, however, strengthen class politics. Because of its highly mobile character, international capital in South Korea was not directly involved in class politics. Although major development projects were managed by the industrial bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie remained politically dependent. It benefited from state protection and patronage, but it did not have the political power that characterizes organized capital in advanced industrial countries. In addition, although industrialization increased the number of industrial wage earners, this change was not reflected in class politics

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because workers were not organized as a class. Thus, the state retained its dominant position. The important historical fact about the Korean state is that it was overdeveloped even before the industrialization drive began.57 The postwar Korean state was built by the United States as an “anticommunist bulwark,” whose coercive state apparatus was overdeveloped relative to civil society. This overdeveloped state was further strengthened by the impact of the Korean War.58 After the war, the state was not only physically strong in terms of armed forces and police, but also economically dominant because it managed and controlled most of the postwar reconstruction projects that were financed by foreign grant aid (providing 80% of the total fixed capital formation between 1953 and 1962).59 When the state launched the project of industrialization based on the export platform, it already had strong coercive and administrative organizations to mobilize and allocate manpower and resources. Although the state capitalist sector was relatively small compared to other developmental economies, the state could and did regulate and control the private sector both internationally and locally. The state has been the regulating center of class politics throughout the postwar period. The Restricted Democracy (1963–1971) Although the combination of weak, class-based politics and a strong state inhibited the emergence of a broad-based political democracy, the strong state did not necessarily need to become authoritarian. Until 1972, except for a short interlude of direct military rule from 1961 to 1963, South Korea had retained formally democratic institutions. Despite the Korean War and the existence of huge armed forces, democratic institutions persisted because there was a material base. The land reform of 1947 to 1950 had removed the landlord class from the political scene and had created a class of predominantly egalitarian small landholders. Partly as a result of the Japanese colonial policy of restricting the rise of the indigenous local bourgeoisie, and partly as a result of the destruction of industry during the Korean War, the caste-like privileged bourgeoisie was very small. This rural and urban leveling provided the material base for democratic institutions.60 Nevertheless, under Rhee Syng Man, real democratic institutions failed to take root, as he created a “politicized state”61 in which democratic legal norms and institutions lacked a permanent framework and became the object of conflict among political actors. The Rhee regime collapsed

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because it politicized these democratic institutions, especially the electoral rules, in its favor. The lesson from the downfall of the Rhee regime significantly influenced the decision of the military junta to restore formal democratic institutions after two years of military rule. Because the military coup of 1961 was not triggered by a serious economic crisis but by the problem of promotion bottlenecks within the military,62 the junta lacked a sufficient social base of support for military rule and enough power to break the national consensus on democracy. The junta therefore sought an institutional framework for governing within a restricted democracy that guaranteed the core interests of the military power holders. Restricted democracy resolved the junta’s dilemma in two ways: they secured some legitimacy within civil society and, at the same time, the military-turned-civilians were confident of retaining power through partly competitive elections. Indeed, in a politicized state like South Korea, any incumbent with the support of the military and the bureaucracy had a lopsided electoral advantage over any civilian opponent. But restricted democracy is always unstable because the authoritarian power bloc may cancel an election rather than allow adverse regime change. It can be maintained, therefore, only if the ruling power bloc has potential political support from broad segments of the population. A material base for such support must be built. The success of the export platform provided, to some extent, the material base. The export platform created jobs faster than the population could grow. In the countryside, the migration of the lowest stratum of agricultural classes allowed the medium and large landholders to modestly increase their land holdings and income. In urban areas, the upturn of the economy furnished better-paying industrial jobs to social marginals without a general rise in workers’ wages, thus sustaining the competitive wage advantage essential to the success of the Korean export platform. Although the government’s economic policy prevented wage workers from sharing equitably in the benefits of economic growth, the long-impoverished masses were content simply to be employed, regardless of the poor working conditions and the extremely low subsistence wages. Thus, despite mistrust and cynicism, “developmentalism” under the slogan of “economic growth first, distribution later” gained the tacit approval of the popular masses. The new consensus showed its strength in the election of 1967. Whereas in 1963 Park barely beat the opposition candidate by 160,000 votes (46.7% vs. 45.1%), in the 1967 election he won by more

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than 1 million votes (51.4% vs. 41%). Park broadened his support by drawing votes from the traditional antipower bloc, the urban popular sector.

Crisis in the Restricted Democracy Organic Crisis In the late 1960s, the economy continued to grow rapidly. Exports increased most notably in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector, which absorbed a large number of the unemployed and semi-employed surplus laborers. In fact, Korean export-platform industrialization conformed to the labor-surplus model of development formulated by John C.  H. Fei and Gustav Ranis.63 According to Fei and Ranis, the labor-surplus model can be applied in a dualist economy divided into a subsistence sector (the agricultural sector) and a capitalist sector (the industrial sector). In the agricultural sector, because of a surplus of labor, the workers receive an institutionally determined subsistence wage that is greater than their marginal product. Wages and employment in the industrial sector, however, are determined by the point of equality between the value of the marginal product and the supply curve of labor. Thus, under labor-surplus conditions, as long as the wage in the industrial sector is higher than the institutionally determined agricultural wage, the supply curve of labor to the industrial sector remains horizontal, because any increase in the industrial labor force can be met without wage increases. As Table 2.2 shows, during the phase of unlimited supply of labor (up to 1965), agricultural wages did not increase despite a substantial increase in agricultural labor productivity. Industrial wage increases also lagged behind productivity gains.64 This significantly contributed to South Korea’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive exports. In the late 1960s (according to Fei and Ranis, 1966 to 1967), however, with the absorption of the surplus agricultural labor by the growing industrial sector, marginal productivity of agricultural labor rose to a level equal to the institutional agricultural wage. From this point on, agricultural wages were also determined by the marginal productivity of labor. The labor surplus ended, with the supply curve of labor to the industrial sector ceasing to be horizontal and sloping positively. The increase in the industrial labor force required increased wages. Fei and Ranis call this turning point “the commercialization point.” Once the commercialization point is reached, income distribution shifts in favor of labor and leads to a more sustained expansion of the domestic

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Table 2.2  Indexes of real wages and labor productivities (1965 = 100) Agricultural sector

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

Manufacturing sector

Real wage(a)

Productivity(b)

Real wage(c)

Productivity(d)

109.2 100.7 100.0 103.9 110.5 119.0 133.4 146.4 156.9 161.5 167.3

84.4 90.1 93.6 100.0 101.7 106.8 114.3 124.0 131.1 133.9 137.9 155.3

107.1 101.6 95.7 100.0 105.9 116.9 133.7 159.5 172.2 186.1 193.0 207.8

73.4 78.2 85.1 100.0 104.0 122.4 146.8 185.5 209.2 229.7 250.4 271.8

(−7.8%) (−0.6%) (3.9%) (6.3%) (7.7%) (12.1%) (9.8%) (7.1%) (2.9%) (3.6%)

(6.8%) (3.9%) (6.8%) (1.7%) (5.0%) (7.0%) (8.5%) (5.7%) (2.1%) (3.0%) (12.6%)

(−5.1%) (−5.8%) (4.5%) (5.9%) (11.2%) (14.4%) (19.3%) (8.0%) (8.1%) (3.7%) (7.7%)

(6.5%) (8.8%) (17.5%) (4.0%) (17.7%) (19.9%) (26.4%) (12.8%) (9.8%) (9.0%) (10.4%)

Sources: (a) Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Farm Household Income Survey, 1970 and 1976; (b) Sung Hwan Ban et al. (fn. 53), 422; (c) Korea Statistical Yearbook (f1n. 52), selected issues; (d) Korea Productivity Center, Labor Productivity Index, selected issues. 63 John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development of Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1964)

market for consumer goods.65 Increasing wage rates, however, would have interfered with the rapid growth of labor-intensive exports. Thus, in collaboration with the bourgeoisie, the state intervened in industrial relations to contain rising wages within limits that would not threaten the comparative advantage of low labor costs in the international export market. Wage rates were again determined institutionally (e.g., by the government’s wage guideline), not by market rates. The forced containment of wage pressure during this period of rapid growth aroused a distributional conflict between capital and labor and, broadly speaking, between the power bloc (the state apparatus, the local bourgeoisie and international capital) and the popular masses (the working class, marginals, farmers and progressive intellectuals). In the late 1960s, previously dormant labor organizations gained momentum as the rapidly growing labor force recognized its conflict with capital. Formally progressive labor laws provided a useful institutional instrument for enhancing workers’ rights and interests.66 In response to growing demands, the state strengthened trade union regulations and increasingly regimented the working class. Unions were coerced into

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submitting to the state’s economic policy by the use of force and leadership co-optation. In addition, the state tried to revise the legal framework for industrial relations, enacting, in December 1969, the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labor Unions and the Settlement of Labor Disputes in Foreign Invested Firms, which prohibited union organization and industrial disputes in such firms without state permission. Because of the tight regulation of organized labor, industrial disputes did not increase significantly. Yet, large-scale industrial disputes did occur in foreign as well as domestic firms. Blocked officially by the state, labor protests began to appear sporadically outside the union structure. The self-immolation of Tae Il Chun, a garment worker, in protest against low wages, unbearable working conditions and the government’s repressive labor policy, was the watershed event that united broad anti-regime popular forces around labor issues. The student movement became involved in labor disputes and in the sociopolitical and economic contradictions of the export platform. In the years from 1968 to 1972, churches increasingly focused attention on social justice and on resolving labor and industrial problems. For example, church organizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission and the Roman Catholic Association of Young Catholic Workers instituted programs to organize and to raise the consciousness of factory workers. The opposition party (NDP) and liberal progressive intellectuals brought labor issues to the political battleground. The Institutional Crisis of 1971 A crisis arose as the unlimited supply of labor ended and the suppression of labor required to maintain the export platform came into conflict with the political framework of restricted democracy. Restricted democracy could not be an effective framework of domination when the ruling power bloc relied exclusively on coercion, because under restricted democracy the popular masses had the potential means of changing rulers through elections. The two elections of 1971 (presidential and National Assembly) illustrated this threat clearly. The opposition party candidate, Kim Dae Jung, included popular democratic demands in the New Democratic Party’s platform. His campaign theme was the realization of the populist era based on a populist economy. According to Kim, popular democracy would be in opposition with the developmental dictatorship of the Park regime, and a populist economy would be based on popular welfare, fair distribution of the fruits of economic growth, an employee share-owning

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system, agrarian revolution and new taxes on the rich. Kim represented the popular democratic demands for the first time in postwar Korean politics. Although he was defeated by the incumbent Park, who openly and massively interfered in the election using police and administrative forces, the massive support for Kim showed that popular democratic forces had the potential to defeat the ruling power bloc even under restricted democratic institutions. The National Assembly election, one month later, resulted in another defeat for the ruling power bloc. The opposition party won a sweeping victory in major urban industrial areas (33 seats vs. 7 seats) and 46 versus 19 in all urban areas. The ruling party maintained a majority by winning overrepresented rural areas (67 vs. 19) and 86 versus 65 in all.67 Encouraged by the strong showing in these two elections, the popular democratic forces increased their demands. College students protested against the compulsory military training of students on campus and later against Japanese neo-imperialism. The press, the judiciary and university professors demanded organizational autonomy from state intervention. In August 1971 about 30,000 social marginals on the outskirts of Seoul rioted against the government’s forced relocation policy and demanded tax exemption and employment opportunities.68 The labor movement became radicalized outside official union channels. The institutional crisis and the ensuing popular activation69 forced the ruling power bloc to consider a regime change. The political crisis was deeply rooted in conflicts over the organization of the system of production, and the political decision was closely related to the choice of alternative developmental strategies. In the early 1970s, Park had two options. One was to continue the labor-intensive export platform, a strategy that could not be sustained within the framework of even a restricted democracy because the necessary severe wage repression might have intensified popular opposition. The other was to expand public investment in the agricultural sector and to create a domestic mass market by increasing the supply of wage goods and the income of the popular masses while maintaining an open development strategy.70 This strategy would have created politically favorable conditions for the popular coalition and would also have broadened the regime’s support. Park, however, chose the first option and, with the Emergency Decree on National Security at the end of 1971, began to install a bureaucratic authoritarian regime. The establishment of bureaucratic authoritarianism was completed at the end of 1972 with a change in the constitutional framework (Yushin Constitution).

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Conclusion In this chapter, I have discussed how an organic or structural crisis created a distributional conflict among classes and how the ensuing institutional crisis led to the rise of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime in South Korea. But bureaucratic authoritarianism was not necessarily the only solution to the problems in the late stage—the end of unlimited surplus labor—of the labor-intensive export platform. The organic crisis did not predetermine the regime change. The regime was changed to authoritarianism because the ruling power bloc and the popular masses failed to reach a compromise solution with respect to a developmental strategy and the organization of the economy. Developmental strategy was, indeed, the object of a conflict that could have been resolved through compromise among the classes. What possible compromise solutions would have been compatible with the framework of restricted democracy? First, South Korea could have avoided a bureaucraticauthoritarian transition by adopting a developmental strategy that would have realized some of the material interests of the popular masses. In the export platform, workers and farmers are not viewed as the primary consumer market for the economy, and there is thus no need to increase their purchasing power as a stimulus to the economy’s growth. An alternative strategy to authoritarianism would have been to reduce dependence on the external market and to enlarge the internal market by increasing the income of the popular masses. Another alternative would have been the reorganization of the export platform itself. Suppose that structural constraints had been so great as to make extremely difficult the transformation of the externally oriented economy to a domestic market-based economy. It would still have been feasible to reorganize the export platform based on cheap and disposable labor-intensive products into one that was based on both labor-­ intensive and high-technology-intensive products. This reorganization might have produced the increase in wages that, in turn, would have induced domestic consumption and thus facilitated the transfer of labor-­ intensive export products to the domestic market. In the early 1970s there were enough educated and skilled members of the labor force to make this reorganization feasible. The historical fact is, however, that the ruling power bloc opted for authoritarianism rather than democracy. Why? One plausible answer is that, although in the early 1970s the popular sector was politically active and displayed its strength in the institutional crisis of 1971, the balance of power still overwhelmingly

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favored the ruling power bloc. The evidence for this is that the transition to authoritarianism was made not through a violent coup, but through institutional reform. The power bloc believed it had enough intelligence and coercive power to suppress the demands of the masses.71 This observation leads us back to the nature of the state in the pre-authoritarian stage. The overdeveloped state in South Korea—overdeveloped in repressive state apparatus—provided a clear advantage and great freedom of choice to the power bloc in charge. It was not that bureaucratic authoritarianism emerged to establish a strong state, but that a preexisting strong state contributed to the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism.

Notes 1. A typical example of the thesis is found in Seymour M.  Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959), 69–105. Revisionist modernization theorists criticized this thesis of political development. Samuel P. Huntington, for example, argued that, without institutionalization, economic development is not likely to lead to political democratization, but may result in praetorianism. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 2. O’Donnell initially offered the bureaucratic authoritarian model in Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 11973). 3. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Corporatism and the Question of the State” in James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 54. 4. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State,” Latin American Research Review 13 (No. 1, 1978), 13. 5. Ibid., 13–15. 6. William L. Canak as well as Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe have provided reviews of evaluations and critiques. See Canak, “The Peripheral State Debate: State Capitalist and Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 19 (No. 1, 1984), 3–36, and Bennett and Sharpe, “Capitalism, bureaucratic authoritarianism and prospects for democracy in the United States,” International Organization 36 (Summer 1982), 633–50. Fermin D.  Adriano and Jonathan Hartlyn, respectively, criticized the bureaucratic-authoritarian thesis through case studies of the Philippines and of Colombia. See

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Adriano, “A Critique of the ‘Bureaucratic Authoritarian State’ Thesis: The Case of the Philippines,” Journal of Contemporary Asia I4 (No. 4, 1984), 459–84; Hartlyn, “The Impact of Patterns of Industrialization and of Popular Sector Incorporation on Political Regime Type: A Case Study of Colombia,” Studies in Comparative International Development 19 (Spring 19 1984), 29–60. 7. For the critique of economic determinism in O’Donnell’s model, see the articles by Albert O. Hirschman, Jose Serra, and David Collier in David Collier, Ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); George Philip, “Military Authoritarianism in South America: Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina,” Political Studies 32 (March 1984), I–20; and Adriano (fn. 6). 8. For the discussion of economic restructuring within the framework of a semi-competitive formal democracy in Colombia, see J. Mark Ruhl, “An Alternative to the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Colombian Modernization,” Inter-American Economic Affairs 35 (Autumn 1981), 43–69, and Hartlyn (fn. 6). For the Venezuelan case, see Terry L. Karl, “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C.  Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), chap. 9. 9. Colombia’s bipartisan National Front regime and Venezuela’s Accion Democratica (AD) are good examples of political arrangements of compromise and concession to accommodate conflicts of interests among social classes and groups arising from structural economic change. See Hartlyn (fn. 6), Ruhl (fn. 8) and Karl (fn. 8). 10. Michael Wallerstein, “The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants,” Latin American Research Review 15 (No. 3, 1980), I2; Albert 0. Hirschman, “The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants,” in Collier (fn. 7), 81. 11. Jose Serra, “Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Collier (fn. 7). 12. I am careful not to read all of O’Donnell too rigidly. In later writings, he tried to redress the theoretical flaws of functionalism. For example, he used a strategic-choice analysis in “State and Alliances in Argentina, 1956–1976,” Journal of Development Studies I5 (October 1978), 3–33. 13. Fernando H. Cardoso, “On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” in Collier (fn. 7), 38. 14. For a discussion of people/power bloc contradictions, see Ernesto Laclau, “Towards a Theory of Populism,” in Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: New Left Books, 1977). Bob Jessop, “The Political Indeterminacy of Democracy,” in Alan Hunt, ed., Marxism and

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Democracy (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1980), 63. Robert R. Kaufman, “Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America,” in Collier (fn. 7), 248. 15. Bob Jessop, “The Political Indeterminacy of Democracy,” in Alan Hunt, ed., Marxism and Democracy (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1980), 63. 16. Robert R. Kaufman, “Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America,” in Collier (fn. 7), 248. 17. David G.  Becker, “Development, Democracy, and Dependency in Latin America: a post-imperialist view,” Third World Quarterly 6 (April 1984), 4II–31. 18. Adam Przeworski, “Capitalism, The Last Stage of Imperialism,” paper presented to the Congress of the International Sociological Association (Uppsala, Sweden, August 1978), I3. 19. The support of Brazilian industrialists, especially those in the Sao Paulo area, for the abertura (opening) after 1975 is a good example. See Luiz Bresser Pereira, Development and Crisis in Brazil, 1930–1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 190–99. 20. Luiz Bresser Pereira, “Six Interpretations of the Brazilian Social Formation,” Latin American Perspectives 11 (Winter 1984), 62–63. 21. For a general theoretical discussion of class compromise in a democracy and its breakdown, see Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chaps. 4–5. 22. Nicos Mouzelis, “Regime Instability and the State in Peripheral Capitalism: A General Theory and a Case Study of Greece,” Working Papers of the Latin American Program, No. 79 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1980). 23. Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 24. For the principal traits of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes characterized by O’Donnell, see O’Donnell (fn. 4), 6, and O’Donnell, “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy,” in Collier (fn. 7), 291–94. 25. Between 1965 and 1976, the share of lower-income groups (bottom 40%) declined from 19.34% to 16.85%, but that of upper-income groups (top 20%) increased from 41.81% to 45.34%. See Hak Chung Choo, “Gyecheungbyul sodeugbunpoeui chugyewa byundongyoin” [An estimation of size distribution of income and the cause of change], Hangug Gaebal Yeongu I (March 1979), 34. 26. Yet the “bureaucratic” character in the term “bureaucratic authoritarianism” can be disputed. In most cases of Korean as well as Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, “bureaucratic” can be understood as

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the increase of power of incumbent technocrats without accountability from civil society rather than as the increase of bureaucratic rationality in the Weberian sense. 27. Sang Jin Han of Seoul National University discussed the specificity in the rise of the Korean bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in “Gwanryojeug kwunwijueuiwa hangugsahoe” [Bureaucratic authoritarianism and Korean society], Study Group on Sociology of Seoul National University, eds., Hangugsahoeeui Juntonggwa Byunhwa [Tradition and change in Korean society] (Seoul: Bummunsa, 1983), 261–97. 28. The Korean economy showed a slight downturn from the peak rate of economic growth in 1969 (I3.8% GNP growth). GNP growth in 1970, 1971 and 1972 was 7.6%, 9.4% and 5.8%, respectively. See Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Social Indicators in Korea, 1981, p. 55. Nevertheless, the slackening of growth should not be interpreted as a crisis in the economy but rather as the stabilization of economic growth. The growth rate in this “recession period” was relatively high compared to the rates of both the advanced industrialized countries and the developing countries. 29. Jyotirindra Das Gupta, “A Season of Caesars: Emergency Regimes and Development Politics in Asia,” Asian Survey 28 (April 1978), 347. 30. Paul W.  Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 203–05. 31. Duncan Snidal defines the export platform as “a development strategy whereby the production of labor-intensive manufactures for the world market provides the central dynamic for overall economic growth in a country.” See Snidal, “Spring-Board or Plank? The ‘Korean’ Model for Export Platform Development,” unpub. (University of Chicago, 1982), 7, 32–33. 32. Charles R.  Frank, Jr., et  al., Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 77–78. 33. Folker Frobel et  al. The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 34. Snidal (fn. 31), I4. 35. Eddy Lee, “Egalitarian Peasant Farming and Rural Development: The Case of South Korea,” in Dharam Ghai et al., eds., Agrarian Systems and Rural Development (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 62. 36. Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971), 78–80. 37. Hyun Chin Lim, “Dependent Development in the World System: The Case of South Korea, 1963–1979,” PhD diss. (Harvard University, 1982), chap. 4.

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38. Frank et al. (fn. 32), chap. 4. 39. Susumu Watanabe, “Export and Employment: The Case of the Republic of Korea,” International Labor Review Io6 (December 1972), 521–22. 40. Leroy P. Jones and Ii Sakong discuss both “field manipulation” and “command” types of state intervention to implement export platform policies in Jones and Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), chap. 4. 41. Ibid., chap. 5. 42. Frank et al. (fn. 32), I, II; Kuznetz (fn. 30), 117. 43. Ibid., 51. 44. Chul Hwan Chun, “Suchul-oejajudogaebaleui baliunronjug pyungga” [Developmentalist evaluation of export- and foreign capital-led development], in Yun Hwan Kim et  al., Hanguggyunggeeui Jungaegwajung [Development of the Korean economy] (Seoul: Dolbegae), I88. 45. Snidal (fn. 3 I), II–. 46. Kyung Dong Kim, Man and Society in Korea’s Economic Growth (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1979), 67–70. 47. Wan Hyug Bu, “Jaebulgwa ogaenyungyehoeg” [Jaebul and the five-year economic plan], Sa Sang Gye I4 (August 1966), 46–57. 48. Peter Evans, Dependent Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 4I–42. 49. Peter Evans, “Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Scocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 205–06. 50. The debt/equity ratio in manufacturing industry rose from I.2 in 1966 to 3.9  in 197I.  Between 1963 and 1974, two-thirds of the total cash flow came from borrowing (53% from domestic banks, 29% from foreign sources and 19% from private curb markets). See Jones and Sakong (fn. 40), 101–02. 51. Jang Jip Choi, “Interest Conflict and Political Control in South Korea: A Study of the Labor Unions in Manufacturing Industries, 1961–1980,” PhD diss. (University of Chicago, 1983), 74–79. 52. Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook 12 (1965) and 22 (1975). 53. John E. Sloboda, “Off-Farm Migration,” in Sung Hwan Ban et al., Rural Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 326. 54. Eddy Lee (fn. 35), 31–32. 55. Nevertheless, rural outmigrants who settled as social marginals improved their incomes. In 1968, for example, per capita income of farmers was 63.4% that of urban social marginals. See Hyun Chae Park,

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Hangugnongubeui Gusang [A plan for Korean agriculture] (Seoul: Han Gil Sa, 198i), 82. 56. Lim (fn. 37), 180. 57. The concept of the “overdeveloped” state was initially formulated by Hamza Alavi. According to Alavi, the postcolonial state inherited an overdeveloped state apparatus (both bureaucratic-military and economic) in relation to civil society, and therefore was capable of subordinating indigenous classes. See Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,” New Left Review 74 (July–August 1972), 59–8i. Here I use the term “overdeveloped” in a modified sense. In South Korea, an overdeveloped state apparatus was not inherited from the Japanese colonial state, but was built to carry out American security interests in the Cold War era. 58. Choi (fn. 5), 311–14. 59. Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 185. 60. David C.  Cole and Princeton N.  Lymann, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 57–58. 61. For the concept of the “politicized state,” see Douglas A. Chalmers, “The Politicized State in Latin America,” in Malloy (fn. 3), 23–45. 62. For the discussion of the 1961 coup from the standpoint of internal organizational problems within the military, see Jae Souk Sohn, “Political Dominance and Political Failure: The Role of the Military in the Republic of Korea,” in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes (Hartford, CT: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968), I03–io, and Soo Uk Lee, “Dependent Development and the Rise of Authoritarian Regime in South Korea,” unpub. (University of Chicago, 1982), 40–50. 63. John C.H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development of Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1964). 64. John C.H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, “A Model of Growth and Employment in the Open Dualistic Economy: The Case of Korea and Taiwan,” Journal of Development Studies II (January 1975), 46. 65. Ibid., 49–514. 66. Choi (fn. 5I), 141. 67. Young Ho Lee, “5.25 Sungueui jungchijug euieui” [The political meaning of the May 25 election], Gughoebo 114 (June 1971), 10–11. 68. Chang Soo Kim, “Marginalization, Development, and the Korean Worker’s Movement,” AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 9 (July–November 1977), 31–32.

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69. Although popular activation increased, the strength of the popular sector and the perception of the popular threat to the ruling power bloc were in every sense moderate to low. 70. This kind of alternative strategy was, indeed, presented by the opposition party candidate, Kim Dae Jung, in the 1971 election. For Kim’s strategy, see Kim Dae Jung, Kim Dae Jung sseeui Daejung Gyungje [Mr. Kim Dae Jung’s Mass Economy] (Seoul: Bumwoosa, 1971). 71. Alfred Stepan formulated a hypothesis that the more substantial the state’s coercive resources are, the greater the chances that an “exclusionary” regime will be installed. See Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 88–89.

CHAPTER 3

Recasting Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism: Myths, Reality and Legacies

The Legacy of Park Chung Hee—Still Alive and Well The late President Park Chung Hee transformed Korea from one of the poorest countries in the world to one its economic power houses. His miraculous industrialization of the country in such a short period of time is referred to as the “Park Chung Hee Model.” However, this was largely discarded after the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and was replaced with neoliberalism by the IMF, as well as by the democratically elected and relatively progressive Kim Dae Jung government. The popularity of Park Chung Hee has not withered even after the democratization in 1987; rather, it has expanded abroad, where the Park Chung Hee model has been seen as the key to solving problems in countries such as Africa, Russia, Eastern Europe, China and South East Asia. The evaluations of Koreans and outsiders of the Park Chung Hee period have been schizophrenic. Progressives have, generally speaking, viewed the Park Chung Hee model as one which sacrifices distribution for growth and freedom for concentration of power in a single dictator. They have critically evaluated his model as an external market-oriented Im, Hyug Baeg. 2009. “Recasting Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism: Myths, Reality, and Legacies,” Paper presented at Workshop on “Park Chung Hee and His Legacies,” ANU Korea Institute, ANU, April. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_3

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economic growth model that came into crisis whenever the demands for Korean goods on the world market fell drastically. In contrast, conservatives have vigorously sought the reinstatement of the model of the Prince of the Yushin regime. Park’s authoritarian rule has thus been one of the most actively debated topics among politicians, scholars and NGOs even after his death. In this chapter, I discuss the myth that Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism is the typical ideal developmental and bureaucratic authoritarianism. Then I will try to demystify Park’s authoritarianism by demonstrating its distinctive character, which is not exclusively bureaucratic or developmental authoritarianism, but combines many elements of neo-patrimonialism. I will argue that Park’s reign consisted of two types of authoritarianism: one was a soft authoritarian developmental state before the introduction of the Yushin system of 1972; the other a more repressive bureaucratic authoritarian dictatorship after the Yushin system. Second, I will discuss the reality: I will argue that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the Korean miracle in the 1960s and 1970s was not only made through the endogenous factor of Park’s wise and timely development strategy, but is also indebted to many exogenous factors. In analyzing Park’s legacies, I will trace how assessments of Park have changed from his assassination to the present economic crisis before finally evaluating the efficacy of the Park model in resolving the current economic crisis by reviewing the debate between conservatives and progressives.

Types of Modern Authoritarianism: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Neo-Patrimonialism, Developmental Soft Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism What is authoritarianism? In his seminal article, Juan Linz (1964)1 defined authoritarian regimes as “political systems with limited pluralism, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without intensive nor extensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-­ defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”2 Linz’s definition of authoritarianism is in contrast to his definition of a totalitarian regime, which has characteristics such as “a monistic but not monolithic center of

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power, … an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them, … active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups.”3 Linz and Stepan, in their later discussion of non-democratic regimes, treated authoritarian regimes as a residual category. They did not differentiate many variants of modern authoritarian regimes based on their institutional configuration.4 Even though Linz identified many types of authoritarian regimes such as bureaucratic-military authoritarianism, organic statism, mobilizational authoritarian regimes, ethnic authoritarian regimes, post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes and even sultanism, this collection does not help us understand the regime characteristics of sub types or sub-subtypes of authoritarian regimes. To understand Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism, first, I will classify the types of authoritarianisms by means of two parameters: power structure and power relations, and the functions of power. Then I will look into what subtype of Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism belongs to, and lastly what the distinguishing regime characteristics of his authoritarianism are. Based on the classification of authoritarian regimes by Lustick and Cartrite (2005),5 I classify four main subtypes of authoritarianism by power structure (and power relations) and the functions of power, namely, soft authoritarianism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, bureaucratic feudalism and neo-patrimonialism. First, I classify two categories of authoritarianism by “functions of power”: developmental authoritarianism and predatory authoritarianism. State power is “developmental” in the sense that the state is not merely interventionist but has leadership to prioritize productionist goals over consumptionist goals, engineer cooperation of key business groups, insulate bureaucracies from special interests groups and provide a stable and predictable environment for business to undertake long-term risks.6 But the developmental state thesis mystified the function of the interventionist state as the representative of public interests. The interventionist state, however, cannot always be “developmental”; it could be “predatory.” According to public choice literature, it would be rational for authoritarian dictators (authoritarian state managers) to prefer predation to producing public goods if there were not enough constraints on them.7 Predatory state managers “consume the surplus they extract, encourage private

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actors to shift from productive activities to unproductive rent seeking, and fail to provide collective goods.”8 Second, I classify authoritarian regimes by power structure and power relations: vertical authoritarianism and horizontal authoritarianism. The power structure in vertical authoritarianism is hierarchically shaped: the Great Leader (GL) or dictator on the top, bureaucrats and lackeys (low echelon bureaucrats) on the intermediate level and non-elites, “basics” and people on the bottom. The state is coherent, strong and autonomous. The Great Leader is linked to non-elites indirectly by the intermediation of “lackeys,” and bureaucrats as prominent officials link the GL to his “lackeys.” On the other hand, the power structure in horizontal authoritarianism is horizontally structured. The authoritarian state is moderately coherent, moderately strong and moderately autonomous. The people or the “popular” are directly linked to top state elites, but not sub-elites. By combining “power structure” and “functions of power” of authoritarian regimes, four subtypes of authoritarianism come out in a 2×2 figure: two developmental authoritarian regimes of bureaucratic authoritarianism and soft developmental authoritarianism and two predatory authoritarian regimes of neo-patrimonialism and bureaucratic feudalism (see Table 3.1). First, bureaucratic authoritarianism is a typical developmental state with vertical and hierarchical power structure “in which the national leader is functionally associated to his or her immediate subordinates. Allegiances of lower-level subordinates are to their immediate superiors.”9 It is vertically authoritarian because its power structure is clearly hierarchical and the state and autocrat are highly autonomous from society. The state does not allow the encroachment of anti-state or anti-autocrat societal forces into its control structure. Bureaucratic authoritarianism tries to Table 3.1  Types of modern authoritarianism Functions of Power \ Structure of Power Horizontal

Vertical

Developmental (Korea, Taiwan)

Bureaucratic authoritarianism Neo-­patrimonialism (Marcos’ Philippines, Congo’s Mobutu)

Predatory

Developmental soft authoritarianism (Singapore) Bureaucratic feudalism (Mexico)

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demobilize, decentralize, fragment portions of society not directly under the control of the state apparatus or loyal to the Great Leader.10 It excludes and deactivates popular sectors, particularly urban working classes, with the support of social strata threatened by mobilization.11 It is bureaucratic because political and social institutions are relatively distinct and it maintains “a coherent and strong state apparatus.”12 Many such states are also developmental in the sense that they launched authoritarian regimes in the name of modernizing and industrializing their countries and pursued economic development in a technocratic manner. Park Chung Hee created a superagency for economic development to coordinate economic policies.13 Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan provided a state bureaucracy reinforcing the source of organizational cohesion and coherence. The KMT instituted an economic planning agency, the Council on Economic Planning and Development, which was similar in scope and expertise to Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Korea’s Economy Planning Board (EPB) (Evans 1992: 159). Second, developmental soft authoritarianism shares with bureaucratic authoritarianism the characteristics of a developmental state, technocratic bureaucracy. It differs from the latter, however, by allowing elections in a limited manner (semi-competitive), a limited multiparty system and limited pluralism such as accommodating ethnic minorities and market freedom. Singapore and Malaysia have been cited as ideal types of developmental soft authoritarianism. Nonetheless, in the soft authoritarianism in those two countries, the “authoritarian” character overwhelms the “soft” one. Freedom of the press is very limited by means of legal restrictions and state ownership of media. Authoritarian “Asian values” have been propagated by the governments and pervade the ideological world of the two countries. Third, neo-patrimonialism is a centralized form of what Weber and Linz called patrimonialism and sultanism, respectively (Weber 1978: 231–232; Linz 1975). Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise whenever the traditional domination develops an administration and a military force that are purely personal instruments of the master. Power is exercised by the ruler’s personal authority (also called patrimonial authority), operating on the basis of discretion, or sultanism, which is characterized by clientelism, patronage, nepotism, cronyism and corruption (Huntington 1991: 111; Chehabi and Linz 1998: 5). Chehabi and Linz list key characteristics of sultanism (and patrimonialism) as the blurring line between regime and state, personalism, constitutional hypocrisy, narrow social base and distorted capitalism. Patrimonialism is based

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on traditional authority and does not distinguish personal and public patrimony (personal estate) of the ruler and the state (Weber 1978). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), neo-patrimonialism is a “modern patrimonialism” in which “the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 62; Erdman and Engel 2006). Many define neo-­ patrimonialism as a hybrid form or the mixture of two types of domination: patrimonial domination and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. The distinction between the private and the public sphere formally exists, but in social and political practice it is often not observed. Thus, two role systems or logics coexist: the patrimonial of personal relations and the bureaucratic of impersonal legal-rational relations. The patrimonial system penetrates the legal-rational system and affects its logic and output, but does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic. The ruler in neo-patrimonialism is linked to bureaucracy and various social elites at all levels to disrupt local hierarchies.14 The rulers seek direct contact and influence across all levels of state institutions through often arbitrary assignments of allies to governmental positions.15 Fourth and finally, in bureaucratic feudalism the bureaucratic institutional structure is more coherent than that in neo-patrimonialism but less so than that in bureaucratic authoritarianism. The role of bureaucratic apparatuses is to link the ruler at the center and the local elites who rule local fiefdom. In bureaucratic feudalism, opportunities for local elites to break ties with the bureaucracy are greater than in bureaucratic authoritarianism but not as great as they are in neo-patrimonialism.16 In bureaucratic feudalism, the ruler influences bureaucracy and regional elites, but not their subordinates. Strong, relatively autonomous ties between local elites and vassals create a space for the patterns of the personal allegiance in the relationship between local elites and vassals to crystallize and thus promote a regionally autonomous center of power. Bureaucratic feudalism stands between bureaucratic authoritarianism and neo-patrimonialism. The structure of state power in bureaucratic feudalism is stronger and more coherent than that in neo-patrimonialism but weaker and less coherent than that in bureaucratic authoritarianism. Local people (vassals) do not have, unlike those in neo-patrimonialism, direct links to the ruler at the center but only to their local elites. Unlike the state in bureaucratic authoritarianism, the state in bureaucratic feudalism seeks to exploit the social and cultural ties between local elites and people rather than allowing the autonomous centers of power at the periphery to crystallize.

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The Myth of Park Chung Hee’s Developmental Authoritarianism 1: How Developmental Was Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism? Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism in the 1960s (the Third Republic) What subtype does Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism belong to, then? Few scholars and politicians have questioned that Park’s authoritarianism is developmental, but no consensus has been reached on whether it was consistently bureaucratic authoritarian from 1961 to his death in 1979. In my view, Park’s authoritarianism can be identified as being of two kinds: from developmental soft authoritarianism (1963–1971), it subsequently evolved to bureaucratic authoritarianism (1972–1979).17 After two years of direct military rule, Park returned to civilian rule in 1963. The new constitution was drafted and approved by a national referendum for the first time in Korean history. The decision to return to democracy was not his choice. Park and liberal democracy never had been compatible. For him, the ideal state was not a democracy. He tried to achieve “the modernization of the mother country” and “the revitalization of the nation” by resorting to Meiji Japan’s top-down modernization. Nevertheless, Park could not adopt the Meiji Japan model that he dreamed of; instead, he was forced to return to formal democracy because he could not earn popular support for his usurpation of power, and the United States pressed him to return to democracy. He and his followers in the military participated in politics as “military in mufti.” Yet it was very difficult for this military in mufti to maintain power within the framework of electoral politics because they had neither traditional authority of the Confucian literati nor the kind of charisma that the activists for national independence had. The only way to build a legitimate base was to acquire an instrumental “legitimacy by performance.” The coup group led by Park therefore launched their “modernization of the mother country” to fill in the lacuna of legitimacy. As a consequence, the slogan “modernization of the mother country” swept the poverty-ridden country and the politics of industrialization was thus initiated. Why then did electoral democracy (or competitive authoritarianism) last until 1972 even though Park was not a liberal democrat? Park was a Machiavellian, and as long as he calculated that maintaining democracy

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was strategically preferable to returning to authoritarianism, he chose to rule under democracy. Two calculations led him to choose democracy. First, military-turned-civilians believed that maintaining democracy secured some legitimacy in civil society. Second, they were confident of retaining power through semi-competitive elections. At that time in South Korea, the military incumbent power had a lopsided electoral advantage with the support of the military and bureaucracy.18 However, as the outcome of democratic competition, even though restricted, is always uncertain, Park had to secure potential political support from broad segments of the population and thus a material base of support needed to be built.19 This was also because he had neither the traditional authority of the Confucian literati (Yangban) nor the charisma of the activists for national independence and democratic struggle. The only way to build legitimacy was to acquire instrumental “legitimacy by performance.” Building a material base of support was the main reason why Park launched the economic development plan in 1963. Soft authoritarianism (restricted democracy) was combined with developmentalism. His rule in the 1960s was “developmental” in the sense that he relied on a plan-rational (Charles Johnson) strategy rather than a market-rational strategy in pursuing export-oriented industrialization, legitimized the government according to the quality of its performance in promoting development and prioritized productionist goals over the Keynesian consumptionist state. Park’s state was not merely interventionist but had leadership to engineer cooperation of key business groups, insulate bureaucracies from special interest groups and provide a stable environment for business to undertake long-term risks. Nevertheless, Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian state was a semi-­ competitive authoritarian one. In the 1960s, elections were held regularly; relatively strong opposition parties opposed and resisted the return to authoritarianism, students and intellectuals demonstrated against Park’s policies in the street; freedom of the press was restricted, but it was partly allowed to report behind-the-scene-stories of policy-making; and labor unions and civil associations were allowed to organize. However, Park’s regime in the 1960s could not be called a genuine liberal democracy because it pushed modernization projects in a military manner. As a consequence, politics was replaced by administration. Politics was not in command but fell to a subordinate position whereby it merely assisted the government in pursuing compressed industrialization. The sphere of politics in which political parties, civil associations and interest

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groups led contracted, while the sphere of administration expanded in scope and intensity. Even though parties had been restored and parliament again passed legislation since 1963, it was the bureaucracy that designed people’s lives. They were not elected but appointed; thus, they were free from the democratic control of the sovereign people and their representatives. Civil society was restructured along the lines of military-like organizations and was forced to internalize the military culture of vertical top-down such as “absolute submission of the subordinate to the orders of superior” and “command and control.” Even though a formal, electoral democracy was restored in 1963, Park did not rely on democratically elected representatives but on an extra-parliamentary intelligence community of the Korean Central Information Agency (KCIA), Army Security Command and economic bureaucracies who blindly believed in technocratic rationality. Therefore, Park’s regime, like the preceding Rhee Syng Man regime, can be called a semi-competitive authoritarianism in which state control over civil society is made within the boundaries of limited pluralism.20 Another problem that arises when referring to the Park regime in the 1960s as a developmental soft authoritarianism is that it was insufficiently “developmental,” but rather bore elements of patrimonialism. Park’s regime was not free of cronyism, favoritism, personalism, corruption and patronage, which are the major symptoms of neo-patrimonialism. While Taiwan’s Chiang Kai Shek, his son and the KMT institutionalized a tripartite ruling coalition of the political party, the state bureaucracy and the military, Park forged a highly personalized but cohesive alliance of military officers and civil servants around one leader, himself.21 From the start Park Chung Hee and his protégés (Kim Jong Pil in particular) were involved in myriads of corruption scandals: the “Four Great Scandals” of Saenara Automobile Company scandal, stock market manipulation, special favors to the Walker Hill (now Sheraton Walker Hill) resort and the import of pachinko machines. Park arrested big businessmen on charges of illicit wealth accumulation immediately after he took over power by coup, but released them in exchange for their promise to cooperate and participate in his industrialization projects.22 From this point on, symbiotic relations between Park and the Korean chaebols were created which lasted until his death.23 Park not only reduced fines, but also provided subsidies and policy favors to chaebols who pledged to undertake his projects. Even under his developmental state, the rent-seeking behaviors of big businesses were prevalent and he and his protégés gathered

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“tributes” from big businesses in return for providing monopoly rent, subsidies, special favors in the areas of credit allocation and allocation of import quotas and foreign loans. The Park Chung Hee regime of the 1960s cannot therefore be characterized as a pure developmental soft authoritarianism, but a hybrid regime of developmental semi-competitive authoritarianism and neo-patrimonialism. Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism in the 1970s (the Yushin Regime) Many scholars argue that Park’s decision to launch heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI) was the main cause of the inauguration of the Yushin regime, because it was a bureaucratic authoritarian regime, and such a regime has an elective affinity with the deepening of productive structure; thus, its inauguration is a functional prerequisite for this deepening. In the beginning of the 1970s, industrialization based on non-durable consumer goods exports faced a bottleneck. The labor-intensive, non-­ durable consumer goods industry fell into a state of “nutcracker” or “sandwich” when confronted with the protectionism of developed countries and the challenges of late industrializing countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. As a matter of fact, the Korean government of the early 1970s had to come up with a new industrialization strategy in order to meet two needs: upgrading the industrial structure so as to create a breakthrough in the developmental bottleneck and building strong defense industries to overcome the security crisis. HCI was selected as an industrialization project to achieve these two goals. Although it is true that Park launched this project to solve the above problems, it is unclear whether this led to a transition from a semi-competitive authoritarianism to a more repressive, technocratic bureaucratic authoritarian regime like the Yushin. HCI was not a fundamental change in Park’s industrialization strategy, but it was a “deepening of the export oriented industrialization” or upgrading. In fact, among the six heavy industries promoted by Park, only non-ferrous metal and petro-chemicals were import substitute industries, whereas the rest were selected as future leading export industries to be nurtured, which were both labor-intensive and capital-intensive. Thus, labor-intensive and export-oriented HCI in Korea preconditioned the control of workers’

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wages. In a word, HCI was not the cause but the economic consequence of the Yushin system. On January 12, 1973, immediately after establishing the Yushin system, Park made an “HCI Declaration.” In driving for HCI, the main characteristics of the “Park Chung Hee model” were formed: government intervention in the economy, the deepening of export structure, inventing a chaebol-dominated economy and the nurturing of the defense industry. HCI was a Korean “deepening” through which Park tried to build a developmental and bureaucratic authoritarian state by following the Meiji Restoration, the model he had long dreamt of implementing. Meiji Japan pursued “a wealthy country, a strong army” through a revolution from above based on nationalism, militarism and authoritarianism. Park’s slogan, “steel is the national power,” clearly defines the type of national development model he sought to build through HCI. The bureaucratic authoritarian Yushin regime shared many similar characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America where O’Donnell developed his thesis. As he notes, “[f]irst, the popular sector was politically excluded; competitive elections were abolished; strikes were prohibited; the organization of labor unions were severely restricted. Second, the popular sector was economically excluded … the regime tried to “depoliticize” social issues in terms of technological rationality. Efficiency, rationality, and social stability replaced democracy as the basis on which the regime laid claim to legitimacy.”24 Under the Yushin system, politics was replaced by an administration in which military officers and technocrats usurped the roles and functions of representatives elected by the people. Yushin was a highly repressive authoritarian system created for Park’s personal dictatorship and permanent rule. Under this system, representative democracy and party politics entered the twilight years. Being assured constitutionally of permanent rule, Park relied less on the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP). The party was degraded to just one of the pillars of power under the Yushin system. Instead, it was Park’s personal security corps, such as the Korean Central Information Agency (KCIA), the Presidential Guard and the Defense Security Command that were the core of power. They were key members collecting information, watching and controlling the people. In this respect, the Yushin regime can be called bureaucratic authoritarian. Under the Yushin, civil associations were forced to dissolve and were replaced with state corporatist associations which organized and controlled workers, farmers and students. At factories, workers were

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controlled and supervised as if they were military servicemen; in the countryside, farmers were organized as members of the Saemaul movement; in schools, students were composed into Students Corps for National Defense. The people were the object of organized control, not the beneficiaries of economic growth. The Yushin system was a state corporatism without material incentives. Even though the regime was basically an “iron fist” one-man rule, it had the characteristics of a technocratic authoritarian rule. In this sense, the Yushin regime was not a traditional authoritarian regime like sultanism, but a modern, bureaucratized authoritarian one. Technocrats pushed for state-directed industrialization in which efficiency and performance capabilities were the supreme values to be attained. Was the Yushin regime really the role model for the so-called “East Asian Developmental State” or the ideal type of East Asian bureaucratic authoritarian regime? Some scholars doubt that it was an ideal typical developmental authoritarian regime but instead argue that it had many elements of neo-patrimonialism, such as cronyism, authoritarian state elite enrichment (ASEE), clientelism and personalism. It is therefore inadvisable to draw a definite conclusion that the Yushin regime was exclusively developmental because of the elements of the predatory state embedded in it.

The Myths in Park Chung Hee’s Developmental Authoritarianism 2: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in Development in the Park Chung Hee Period Theory of Endogenous Growth: Strategic Choice of Park Chung Hee Admirers of Park Chung Hee regard endogenous factors as the key to explaining the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and the 1970s. According to them, the “Korean miracle” was made possible by Park’s optimal strategic choice. He initially chose an import-substitution industrialization strategy in which rural development, a capital goods industry and ISI industries were emphasized, while exports played a secondary role. However, in the first two years (1962–1963), when the results in the priority industries fell far short of the planned target, while exports

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increased far beyond expectations, Park changed his development strategy from ISI to an export-oriented strategy (EOI).25 He responded to signals from the internal market that showed an ongoing transition from the classical international division of labor (agricultural and mining export from colonial economies, and manufactured export from advanced capitalist countries) to the new international division of labor (the feasibility of market-­oriented manufacturing in peripheral countries) (Im 1987: 242; Folker Frobel et al. 1980). Park’s “Korean miracle” was a success story of what Wallerstein called “promotion by invitation.” He promoted the Korean economy from periphery to semi-periphery by responding to the invitation of the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein 1979). Why then did the world capitalist economy invite Korea? The country was invited because it had abundant, cheap workers with well-educated and highly productive labor. Nonetheless, not every invited country is chosen by the new international economic order. It is said in the Bible that “many are called, but few are chosen” (Matthew, Book 22). Responding to the invitation of new international division of labor with an optimal strategy was the best way to ensure success. Park indeed responded to the invitation in a timely manner and with a proper development strategy. Many success stories of Park Chung Hee’s development strategy are found in developmental state literature. Alice Amsden argues that Park overcame the penalty of “lateness” by state “subsidies” and “getting the relative price deliberately wrong” (Amsden 1990). Weiss and Hobson point out the proper strategy of providing “subsidies” by which these were not provided in the form of giveaways but in exchange for good performances in terms of output, exports, production quality and investment in training and R&D (Weiss and Hobson 1995). The authors also emphasize that Park invented the big bourgeoisie (chaebol) and nurtured them as “national champions” and as “empire builders” who prioritized the long-­ term interests of expanding market share over short-term interests of maximizing profits. Seldon and Belton-Jones (1995: 330) argue that Park and East Asian states tried to be competitive by changing ahead of the game rather than by simply reacting to changes, in order to become sharper in international commerce by combining flexibility, foresight, strategic intervention and selective planning.26 Ha-Joon Chang points out that Park pursued a strategy of “flexible rigidities,” by which the state created shortrun rigidities in order to achieve greater long-term flexibility.27

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The Theory of Exogenous Growth: Colonial Legacies, Benevolent American Hegemony, Land Reform and Confucian Capitalism The “Korean miracle” in the 1960s and the 1970s was not caused exclusively by the optimal economic development strategies and policies Park Chung Hee chose. There are many exogenous factors that contributed directly and indirectly to rapid economic growth in what was then one of the world’s poorest countries. Exogenous factors such as historical legacies, geopolitics, culture, transmission of ideas were not insignificant in contributing to the miraculous economic performance in the Park era. First, successful industrialization in Korea owed much to benevolent international environments. Post-World War II Korea was created by the United States as a crucial anticommunist buffer state. Until 1970s the main US concern in Korea was political and strategic, not economic. American hegemony toward Korea was benevolent rather than exploitative. The patron state, the United States, provided financial, economic, technical and infrastructural aid and assistance to its client states. Among them, land reform imposed by the United States has had a long-lasting impact on urban-based capitalist industrialization. Successful land reform preempted a strong bastion of anti-capitalist interests which the landlord class would have constituted, and created a myriad egalitarian small landholders in the countryside, who were the political support base for authoritarian regimes and the chief source of labor supply in the early labor-intensive industrialization period. In the initial stage of export-­ oriented industrialization, the United States supported Korean efforts by providing public loans with low interest rates and lowering the entry barrier of Korean goods to the US market. Second, elements of Confucianism played a crucial role in boosting economic growth. The Confucian emphasis on education, meritocratic forms of personal advancement, hard work, thrift, goal attainment, filial respect and respect for one’s elders and superiors made it easy for people in Korea to smoothly adjust to a market economy. These elements have been transmuted into deference toward managerial authority, high rates of personal and corporate savings and commitment to the firm as a collectivity.28 However, just a few decades before, Confucianism had been blamed as the main reason for East Asian backwardness: “Confucianism meant deference to authority, resistance to change, respect for the ways of the past, aversion to risk, and other values that inhibit the responsiveness to

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the market.”29 Therefore, the impact of Confucian heritage on East Asian industrialization is deserving of further study. Third, many point out the benevolent effects of the Japanese colonial legacy on postwar industrialization in Korea and Taiwan.30 Eckert argues that many institutions, norms, ideologies, practices of the Korean economic development model, such as state-business relations and oppression of the labor, had their origins and foundations in the colonial experiences. For Eckert, the Korean developmental state was the offspring of the Japanese colonial empire.31 Cumings has argued that Japanese colonialism was the only colonial power to locate heavy industry in its colonies, especially in Korea. According to Cumings, by 1945 North Korea was the most industrialized socialist state in Asia. By 1945, Korea had the most developed railway system in Asia outside Japan. Colonial bureaucracies inherited from the Japanese provided the country with effective state organizations in the postcolonial period. The legacy of Japanese colonialism on postwar Korean economic development should not be overstated, however. Indeed, for the Japanese, strategic concern predominated over economic concern. It was not bankers and merchants but samurais who made schemes for colonial industrialization projects, such as the extension of the security front line to the Chinese continent. As a consequence, development in Korea was distorted. Infrastructure was overdeveloped and yet had little relationship with the needs of society. The Japanese did not nurture the native industrial bourgeoisie. Colonial capitalism was “capitalism without a capitalist class.” After liberation in 1945, South Korea was robbed of industrial facilities, which had been skewed to North Korea. The Korean War subsequently destroyed most of its infrastructure, and South Korea had to start from the ashes. The only long-lasting legacy of Japanese colonialism is the idea of authoritarian militaristic development education embedded in Japanese military academies. It was thus the combined effects of both endogenous factors and exogenous factors that determined the miraculous economic growth during the Park Chung Hee period. It would be incorrect to argue that the Korean miracle was mainly due to Park’s optimal choice of development strategies and policies. In order to demystify Park Chung Hee’s developmental authoritarianism, we need to evaluate to what extent endogenous factors and exogenous factors contributed to economic growth during the Park era.

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The Legacies of Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism, the Yushin regime in particular, is one of the most frequently discussed topics in research. There have been many studies on the origins and emergence of the Yushin by both Korean and non-Korean historians and social scientists. In analyzing Park’s legacies, I will discuss three questions: How has Park been treated differently in different times? Was Park necessary for democratization as well as industrialization? And was Park’s model a good medicine or a poisonous drug in treating the economic crisis of 1997 and the current economic crisis? How Has Park Chung Hee Been Treated at Different Times? In the aftermath of Park’s death, a New Military junta led by General Chun Doo Hwan took revenge on democratic activists and student movements for Park, the father of modernization. They tried to restore the Yushin system without Park. Except for the seven-year, single-term presidency and the abolition of “Yuchunghoe,” one-third of national assemblymen appointed by the incumbent president and the constitutional structure were very similar to those of the Yushin Constitution. The New Military junta emulated the Park Chung Hee model by incorporating what they had learnt under Park. Nonetheless, the Fifth Republic under General Chun did not exclusively emulate and copy Park’s model. Rather, they attempted to build up their own model of economic development, social policies and social (and later political) liberalization. First, President Chun invited Kim Jae Ik, a Berkeley-educated PhD, as his key senior economic advisor and let him transform Park’s state-led economic development model into a neoliberal economic model, launching many new liberal economic policies in trade, finance (especially the liberalization of non-bank financial institutions), investment, currency control and the abolishment of the five-year economic plan, such as trade liberalization. This would strongly suggest that under Chun Doo Hwan, Park’s developmental market-shaping authoritarianism was transformed into a market-conforming authoritarianism.32 With regard to social policies, Chun did not like to be considered by the masses as the heir of Park, the murderer of the Kwang Ju massacre and finally as a stern, cold-blooded, baldheaded general who would do anything to punish Park’s assassin, suppress democratic opponents at any cost and faithfully guard his mentor’s “Modernization of the Mother Country.”

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However, in fact, Chun mostly did the opposite of what people expected him to do. In the first year of his term, he liberalized many social repressions, for example, lifting restrictions regarding the length of hair of middle and high school students, allowing the broadcasting of color TV programs (which were strictly prohibited previously by Park), allowing students to dress freely and, most importantly, lifting the curfew that had lasted throughout the postwar years. Positioning himself as the heir of Park was not a good strategy when building his own legitimacy base. Therefore, General Chun tried to present himself as a soft, humorous, pro-American internationalist, as well as a benevolent ruler who cared for the poor masses by introducing an incipient social welfare program. Chun also named his (and the New Military’s) political party the Democratic Justice Party. Although his regime had substantively many characteristics very similar to that of Park, he pursued the construction of his own image quite differently from Park’s. The disjuncture between form and substance and image and reality made the Chun Doo Hwan regime what Marx described in his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Louis Bonaparte Napoleon, the nephew of Napoleon the First, a farce. Under the Fifth Republic, not only government but also scholars and civil activists for democracy looked into the process of the emergence of the Yushin, because Chun’s Fifth Republic originated from the Yushin system and shared many characteristics with it. Many democratic activists studied the origins of the Yushin to grasp the essence of the Chun regime they opposed. They sought to do so by following the dictum of the ancient Chinese military strategist, Sunzi: “one can win every battle when one understands the enemies as well as oneself.” On the other hand, some political scientists have studied the Yushin regime from a comparative perspective, examining whether O’Donnell’s bureaucratic authoritarian model can be applied to the Yushin authoritarian regime.33 After the democratic transition in summer 1987, scholars, social movement activists and politicians continued to be interested in the origins of the Yushin, although for different reasons. In the post-transition period, many conservatives studied the Yushin “to call the ghost of Park Chung Hee from the grave.” After the democratic transition, nostalgia for Park was aroused whenever the performance of democratically elected governments did not meet popular expectations. People disenchanted with the new democracy called for a return to “the good old days” of the authoritarian past. Conservatives called on the ghost of Park Chung Hee to save the country. Korean ultra-conservatives even argued for the restoration of

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authoritarianism. They insisted that unbridled behavior in the name of freedom should be disciplined; North Korea, threatening the freedom of South Korean people, should be eliminated and political freedom reserved for economic development. They argued that an elective affinity between the developmental state and authoritarianism still exists in Korea after industrialization. They even argued that a Park Chung Hee-style developmental dictatorship had been necessary up until then and its feasibility and effectiveness had lasted until their present.34 In contrast, those who criticized Park did so on the grounds that his persisting bad legacy obstructed the consolidation of a new democracy and the development of a fair and transparent market economy. Civil activists for democratization, progressive social scientists and historians have, in general, viewed the Park model as sacrificing distribution for growth and freedom for concentrating power in the hands of one dictator. They have argued that modern Korean authoritarian rule has its roots in Park’s highly technocratic, repressive, military, patriarchal and economic authoritarianism. The incident that revived Korean progressives’ concern about the Park model after the democratic transition was the financial crisis and the transfer of power to Kim Dae Jung in 1997. The financial crisis brought Korea on the verge of state default. Many thought the persistence of the Park Chung Hee model even after the democratic transition was the main cause of the crisis and called for it to be discarded. The new president Kim Dae Jung’s parallel development of democracy and a market economy raised fundamental questions about Park’s authoritarian development model. Claims such as “Park as historically unnecessary” and “the Yushin as a culprit in Korean history” were popular among Korean progressives in the wake of the financial crisis. The Park model was blamed as a negative legacy that delayed and obstructed the development of a democracy and a market economy.35 Korean progressives criticized the model in three ways. First, they argued that “compressed industrialization” under Park had delayed democratic transition in Korea. Under his economic growth first strategy, industrialization projects proceeded rapidly and the sphere of politics was replaced by the sphere of administration, leading to the delaying of the democratic transition. Their second criticism was that Park’s legacy had acted as an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy. A regime can be called a consolidated democracy when it has properties of representativeness, competitiveness, accountability and transparency.36 But Park handed

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down the neo-patrimonial elements of regionalism, nepotism, school ties, corruption, privatization of public power and rule of man rather than rule of law. These neo-patrimonial elements prevented Korean democracy from transforming into a more representative, competitive, accountable and transparent democracy, thus delaying its consolidation. Third and last, Park’s industrialization model was criticized for creating many problems in attaining “sustainable development.” His unbalanced development model increased the gap between provinces and aggravated regional polarization, which in turn deepened regional sentiment, division and regionalism. In addition, his models’ anti-environmentalism handed down the legacies of real estate speculation and “constructing and engineering state.” Debates on Historical Necessity of Park Chung Hee in Post-­Democratic Transition: “Was Park Chung Hee Historically Necessary?” Since the democratic transition, social scientists and politicians have debated whether Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism in the 1960s and the 1970s was necessary for democratization and industrialization in the later period. The authoritarian capitalist perspective has been that the Yushin regime was historically necessary at “the national time” of Korea in the 1970s. They have justified the Yushin as a necessary pre-stage the process of democratic transition had to pass through. The historical necessity argument furthered and justified the Fifth Republic as the offspring of the Yushin and became a politically controversial discourse. According to the authoritarian capitalism thesis, the authoritarian developmental state was necessary at the initial stage of industrialization because it has coercive and autonomous power to quash the reactionary class (landed class, workers or popular sectors) which opposes and resists modernization and development. Such a state is needed to acquire autonomy from the external pressures of the world capitalist system. Nonetheless, the need to combine developmentalism and authoritarianism disappeared even before the rise of Park’s developmental state. First, the potential of the reactionary class, the landed elites, to resist urban-­ based industrialization was “eliminated” because of the Korean War and land reform in the 1950s. Second, the resistance of workers (and in popular sectors) was resolved not by state repression, but by the labor market in the 1960s, in which an abundant labor pool in the countryside played the role of an “industrial reserve army” in maintaining the wage rate at a

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subsistence level without interference from the state.37 Third, unlike in Latin American countries, American hegemony toward Korea was benevolent. The United States provided plenty of benefits to the country and gave the government autonomous space when choosing its own developmental strategy. One of the reasons why Park was able to choose a developmental state model, which is quite in contrast with the American liberal market model, was the external relative autonomy of Korea, thanks to its special position in East Asian geopolitics as a key anticommunist buffer state. The argument that an authoritarian developmental state was necessary at the initial stage of industrialization in the 1960s is highly questionable, and cannot be proved empirically. As mentioned above, the façade of liberal democracy was maintained in the Third Republic of the 1960s. It could be counterfactual to state that every democratic state is not a weak state, but a strong and autonomous state that has the autonomy and capacity to formulate and implement economic development policies. If we look into cases that are comparable to Park Chung Hee’s developmental authoritarianism, we can find many cases of developmental states that are democratic. Developmental states in Finland, Austria and Japan successfully implemented statist development under democracy. Park did not establish a dictatorship to pursue industrialization; rather, he sought to industrialize Korea in order to launch an authoritarian regime. Just as industrialization is not necessarily a functional prerequisite for democratization, developmental dictatorship is also not a necessary precondition. The thesis of historical necessity of developmental dictatorship for industrialization has not been upheld empirically and morally. High economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s was realized not because of developmental dictatorship, but in spite of it.38 As I have suggested here, then, authoritarian industrialization and liberal industrialization is a matter of choice, not of historical necessity. Was Park Chung Hee the Solution or the Problem of the 1997 Financial Crisis and the Current Economic Crisis? In late 1997, the financial crisis and the first peaceful transfer of power to Kim Dae Jung—a long-time opposition leader and democratic activist— increased concern about the Park Chung Hee model. The unprecedented economic crisis led the economy to the brink of state financial default at the end of 1997. Korea escaped from the crisis by the infusion of

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emergency stand-by loans by the IMF to the tune of 60 billion dollars, an unprecedented amount, in exchange for neoliberal structural reform along the lines of the Washington Consensus. The IMF actually demanded Korea discard Park’s developmental state model and instead adopt the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal economic model. The Kim Dae Jung government, by proposing the parallel development of democracy and market economy, publicly questioned the efficacy of the authoritarian developmental state model. As a result, Park’s developmental authoritarianism was degraded from a “historical necessity” to a “historical obstacle” which had hindered the parallel development of democracy and a market economy. Structural reforms forced by the IMF included the reform of the chaebol-­dominated economy. Park’s industrialization projects had been implemented neither by the state nor by MNCs, but by family-owned, family-managed big industrial groups called chaebols. The chaebol economy is the one of the defining characteristics of the Park Chung Hee model. He actually invented and nurtured chaebols to implement HCI projects that he planned. In order to induce chaebols to invest in HCI projects, Park guaranteed monopoly profits and socialized costs and risks of their investments. He provided chaebols with special favors in finance, tax, distribution of foreign loans, entry barriers, the protection of domestic market and allowing monopoly (or oligopoly). In contrast, he forced workers and ordinary consumers to take the burden of losses brought on by chaebols and the costs that resulted from socializing risks in chaebols’ investments. Since the second transfer of government to the neo-conservative Lee Myung Bak, Park’s model has been reactivated in Lee’s construction and engineering projects such as the Grand Korean Canal, new towns and super high-rise buildings with more than 100 stories, the Lee government’s growth first policies and the revival of the chaebol economy under the guise of a so-called “business-friendly” government, in reality, chaebol-­ friendly. However, the Park model in Lee’s government contradicts the latter’s neoliberal fundamentalism. Lee relentlessly pursued neoliberal policies such as deregulation, free trade, removing constraints on the movement of capital across borders, privatization of the public sector, and so on. After the inauguration of the conservative Lee Myung Bak government, the number of Park-friendly people increased, while anti-Park sentiment decreased sharply compared to that in the previous two progressive governments. In the candlelight demonstrations in 2008, the discontent

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of the popular masses was directed at Lee’s neoliberal fundamentalist policies, not toward Park. With the advent of the new economic crisis, nostalgia for the good old days of the Park era was revived. However, the majority of Korean people did not wish to return to Park’s era and Park Chung Hee’s statist model. They knew that the country had already entered into a post-industrial IT revolution. Park’s statist model did not fit in well with Korea in the post-industrial era. It was clear then that Koreans desired neither neoliberalism nor developmental statism, but a hybrid regime of liberal market economy and a Keynesian welfare state.

Conclusion In this chapter I have discussed Park Chung Hee’s myth, reality and legacy during the 1960s and 1970s. His impressive economic achievements, through what became known as the Park Chung Hee model, have been emulated by many foreign countries. Although Kim Dae Jung replaced Park’s model with neoliberalism, Park’s popularity has not declined. Since the democratic transition in 1987, he has remained the most popular political leader, surpassing the leaders of new democracy: the Three Kims (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil). President Park Geun Hye, the daughter of Park Chung Hee, was the most popular politician up to 2015, while her predecessor, Lee Myung Bak, made a success story as a businessman during the Park era. Some people who fought for democracy against Park Chung Hee’s dictatorship (Minjutusa) have started to talk positively about his economic performance. Although Park died more than 40 years ago, in the minds of Koreans he is still alive and well, whether as a saint or as a demon. Whenever the performance of a democratically elected government does not reach the level of popular expectation, the nostalgia for the good days of the Park era seeps back into public consciousness, and Korean conservatives argue that “we must bring Park Chung Hee back from the graveyard to save the country.” Disenchantment with the new democracy has made people recall his rule as the good old days of authoritarian period.

Notes 1. Linz, Juan. 1964. “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain,” in Erick Allardt and Yrjo Littune (Eds.), Cleavages: Ideologies and Party Systems, Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermack.

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2. Ibid., p. 255. 3. Linz, Juan. 1975. “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in F.  I. Greenstein and Nelson W.  Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of Political Science Vol. 3, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 191. 4. Ian. S.  Lustick and Cartrite, Britt. 2005. “Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005. 5. Ibid. 6. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1996. “Determinants of East Asian Miracle: Market, the State or Institutions?,” Paper presented at Faculty Seminar of Asian Studies, Georgetown University (March 26, 1996), and Korea Current Affairs Forum of Korea Institute, Harvard University (May 9, 1996). 7. Ibid. 8. Evans, Peter B. 1992. “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Adjustment,” in Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R. (Eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Politics and the State, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 9. Lustick, Ian. S., and Cartrite, Britt. 2005. “Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005; Collier, David. 1979. “Overview of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model”, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research,” in David Collier (Ed.), The New authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press; O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press. 10. Lustick, Ian. S., and Cartrite, Britt. 2005. “Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005. 11. Linz, Juan. 1975. “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in F.  I. Greenstein and Nelson W.  Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of Political Science Vol. 3, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 293; O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press.

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12. Lustick, Ian. S., and Cartrite, Britt. 2005. “Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005. 13. Evans, Peter B. 1992. “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Adjustment,” in Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R. (Eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Politics and the State, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 14. Bratton and Walle (1997). 15. Lustick, Ian. S., and Cartrite, Britt. 2005. “Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005, p. 7. 16. Lustick, Ian. S., and Cartrite, Britt. 2005. “Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005, p. 8. 17. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 231–257; Im (2004). 18. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, p. 251. 19. Ibid. 20. Im, Hyug Baeg. 2004. “Historical Origins of Yushin: Park Chung Hee’s Machiavellian Moment (I),” Journal of Korean Politics (Institute of Korea Political Studies), Vol. 13, No. 2. 21. Kim and Im, p. 15. 22. Kim and Im, p. 200. 23. Kim, Eun Mee. 1988. “From Dominance to Symbiosis: State and Chaebol in Korea,” Pacific Focus, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 107–112. 24. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 239–240. 25. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 241–242. 26. Chang, Ha Joon (1995: 213). 27. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1996. “Determinants of East Asian Miracle: Market, the State or Institutions?,” Paper presented at Faculty Seminar of Asian Studies, Georgetown University (March 26, 1996), and Korea Current Affairs Forum of Korea Institute, Harvard University (May 9, 1996).

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28. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1996. “Determinants of East Asian Miracle: Market, the State or Institutions?,” Paper presented at Faculty Seminar of Asian Studies, Georgetown University (March 26, 1996), and Korea Current Affairs Forum of Korea Institute, Harvard University (May 9, 1996), p. 16. 29. Gourevitch, Peter A. 1989. “Pacific Rim: The Current Debates,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 505, p. 12. 30. Aseniero, George. 1994. “South Korean and Taiwanese Development: The Trans-national Context,” Review, Vol. 17, pp.  275–336; Cumings, Bruce. 1984. “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,” in Ramon Myers and Mark R.  Peattie (Eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Eckert, Carter J. 1991. Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945, Seattle: University of Washington Press; McNamara, Dennis L. 1990. The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprises, 1910–1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 31. Eckert, Carter J. 1991. Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945, Seattle: University of Washington Press. 32. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1994. “From Market Authoritarianism to Market Democracy: The Market and the State in the Korean Transition to Democracy,” IPSA World Congress, Berlin, Germany. 33. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 231–257. 34. Kim, Il Young. 1995. “Parkjunghee cheje 18nyeon, Eutuoge bol gutinga” (“How do we view the 18 years Park Jung Hee regime”) SaSang, Vol. 27, pp. 208–256. 35. Study Group on Korean Politics (Ed.). 1998. DongAsia Baljunmodeleun Silpaeheatneunga? (Was the East Asian developmental model a failure?), Seoul: Samin; Cho, Hee Youn. 1997. “Tongasia Palchoroneui Chaegumto” (The Reappraisal of East Asian Developmental Model), Kyongchewa Saheo (Economy and Society); Im Hyug Baeg (2004: 227). 36. Im (2000). 37. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 231–257. 38. Sohn (1991).

References Amsden, Alice. 1990. Third World Industrialization: ‘Global Fordism’ or a New Model? New Left Review 182: 5–31. Bratton, M., and N. Van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Chang, Ha Joon. 1995. Explaining ‘Flexible-Rigidities,’ in East Asia. In The Flexible Economy: Causes and Consequences of National Economies, ed. Tony Killick. London: Routledge. Chehabi, H. E., and Juan J. Linz. 1998. Sultanistic Regime. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Erdmann, Gero and Ulf Engel, 2006. Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept. GIGA Working Paper 16. Evans, P.B. 1992. Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Frobel, Folker, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye. 1980. The New International Division of Labor. London: Cambridge University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1987. The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea. World Politics 39 (2): 231–257. ———. 2000. Segyehwasidaeui Minjujui [Democracy in the Era of Globalization]. Seoul: Nanam. ———. 2004. Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of the ‘three Kims’ Era. Democratization 11 (5): 179–198. Linz, Juan J. 1964. An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain. In Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, ed. Erick Allardt and Yrjo Littunen. Helsinki: The Academic Bookstore. ———. 1975. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. In Handbook of Political Science, ed. F.I.  Greenstein and Nelson W.  Polsby, Vol. 3. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Lustick, Ian S., and Britt Cartrite. 2005. Virtualstan: An Agent-Based Modeling Strategy for the Comparative Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism, and Neopatrimonialism. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 01, 7. Seldon, David, and Tim Belton-Jones. 1995. The Political Determinants of Economic Flexibility, With Special Reference to the East Asian NICs. In The Flexible Economy: Causes and Consequences of the Adaptability of National Economies, ed. Tony Killick. London: Routledge. Sohn, Ho Cheol. 1991. Hankookchungchihakeui Saegusang [New Ideas for Korean Political Science]. Seoul: Pulppit Pub. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weber, Max, 1978. In Economy and Society, ed. Geunther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weiss, Linda, and John Hobson. 1995. States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis. Cambridge: Polity Press.

CHAPTER 4

Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea

Lessons from the Korean Transition In the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarian regimes came to power in many countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Since the late 1970s, however, we have witnessed a new counter-wave of democracy worldwide, embracing Southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe. For social scientists, the new historical trend of democratization offers challenges and opportunities to address the issue of the transition from authoritarianism to democratic rule. South Korea is no exception. Through intense struggles between the military elite and civil society, democracy was finally restored in 1987. This chapter analyzes theoretical problems of democratic transition through a discussion of the Korean transition process, focusing on how relevant actors reached a democratic compromise via moves and countermoves, threats and counter-threats, elite negotiations and popular mobilization. First, I will review contending perspectives on democratic transition, and then present an alternative analytical framework. In the second part of this chapter, the Korean democratic transition will be examined.

Im, Hyug Baeg. 1997. “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea,” Sang-Yong Choi (Ed.), Democracy in Korea: Its Ideals and Realities. Korean Political Science Association. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_4

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Contending Perspectives on Democratic Transition Long before the recent wave of democratization swept over the world there was tremendous intellectual concern about how best to achieve the transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy. Lipset, Cutright and Neubauer all tried to formulate an economic prerequisite theory of democracy, while Almond and Verba, and Eckstein sought cultural preconditions for democracy.1 These prerequisite or precondition theories of democratic transition, however, cannot explain the diverse, non-unilinear, heterogeneous paths to democratic transition and non-transition from authoritarian rule. In many cases what precondition theories stress as the preconditions for democracy (e.g., economic prosperity and democratic political culture) could be better conceived as products of stable democracies.2 A more fatal problem in precondition theories is that they are politically impotent because they give individuals no active role in the transition process but to await passively the maturity of socioeconomic and cultural conditions favoring democracy. Recent studies have thus paid less attention to structural and cultural preconditions, and, instead, focus more on the relevant political actors and on the strategies and choices available to them which lead to democratic transition or not. The recent theoretical trend emphasizing genetic causal relationships can be called the “genetic theory” of democracy in the words of Dankwart Rustow.3 Within the broad category of “genetic theory,” one can find two contrasting perspectives on the transition to democracy: the “democratization from above” perspective and the “democratization from below” perspective. The democratization from above perspective argues that the main impetus to democratization comes from the internal dynamics of an authoritarian regime, not from outside pressure. According to this perspective, with the crisis of an authoritarian regime for one reason or another (e.g., economic failure, security crisis, legitimacy crisis) the authoritarian ruling bloc is divided between hard-liners who argue for the continuation of authoritarianism at any cost and reformers who argue for the need to open dialogue and negotiate with democratic opponents. The general scenario of the democratic transition, according to this perspective, is the following. Intra-familial struggles within the authoritarian power bloc create a crisis in an authoritarian regime. The transition starts when the reformist faction within the regime seeks support from forces

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outside of the power bloc to win the power struggle with the hard-line faction. This perspective presumes that democratic transition is basically the “top-down” reform project of an “enlightened faction” within the authoritarian regime. The main logic of this perspective is “no split of the authoritarian power bloc, no transition.”4 The “democratization from below” perspective emphasizes the legitimacy crises of authoritarian regimes as the main impetus to democratization. According to this perspective, the loss of legitimacy leads to resistance movements within the masses and the transition to democracy is the result of the accumulated pressure of the masses “from below.” It seems to me that both of these two perspectives have some plausible explanatory power, but neither of them can comprehensively explain the trajectory of democratic transitions. The problem with the “democratization from above” perspective is that if there is no serious pressure from below, why should the enlightened faction of the authoritarian power elite choose to initiate a transition which might lead to an eventual exit from power rather than seek to remain in power through piecemeal changes in policy and occasional circulation of the elites?5 On the other hand, the “democratization from below” perspective has a problem in explaining why the loss or decline of legitimacy and the ensuring widespread discontent among the public do not necessarily lead to the eventual downfall of the regime. We have witnessed many authoritarian regimes survive for years and decades even despite rejuvenated, “heroic” popular resistance movements of workers, students and church activists. I agree with Przeworski that unless popular discontent is politically organized, isolated individuals have no choice but to live under the authoritarian regime.6

Alternative Proposition My proposition is that the democratic transition is the outcome of the interplay between these two logics, that is, the interplay between the internal dynamics of the regime and the organization of anti-authoritarian alternatives in the civil society. Figure 4.1 schematically shows the dynamic interplay between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition which leads to democratic transition or non-transition. My first proposition is that popular discontent must be politically organized so as to provide a viable political alternative to the leaderless,

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Authoritarian Power Block

Organization of Alternative

Cohesive (1) Non-Transition Tug-of-war Inconclusive Struggle from Standoff

Split (2) Democratic Transition: Compromise between "Reformers" & Moderate Opposition

Democratic Opposition No Organization of Alternative

(3) Non-Transition:

(4) Coup by "Hardliners"

Stable Authoritarianism

or Popular Revolution by "Maximalists"

(1): South Korea, 1985-June 1987 (2): South Korea, June 1987; Spain, 1975; Brazil (3): Spain under Franco; Taiwan under Chiang Kai-Shek; Mexico (4): South Korea, December 1979-May 1980; Poland, 1980; Iran; Nicaragua Fig. 4.1  Dynamics of transition from authoritarian rule Authoritarian Power Bloc

isolated, individualized popular masses. Without organized alternatives, there is barely any hope for concerted action from a diverse, heterogeneous opposition. History shows us that authoritarian regimes have rarely collapsed, been toppled or forced to relinquish power by intermittent, unorganized, isolated popular pressure. Rather, the regimes’ own fiascos, such as reckless war adventures and military defeat, have brought unexpected democratic transitions (e.g., Germany, Italy and Japan after World War II, Argentina, Greece and Portugal in recent years). Second, even though alternatives are organized and the opponents of the regime can make concerted actions pressing the regime to

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democratize, the regime is not likely to concede to the pressure if it can maintain strong internal cohesiveness and the capacity to repress opponents. Thus, a split within the regime and the emergence of a reformist faction that acknowledges the need to compromise with the democratic opposition is a necessary precondition for the transition. When a democratic alternative is organized within the opposition but there is no split within the regime, a democratic transition is not likely to come about; rather a kind of “standoff” will emerge, under which neither the regime nor the opposition can impose his/her preferred solution on the counterpart. Under the standoff situation an inconclusive, prolonged, stalemated “tug-of-war” is likely to continue without reaching any compromise solution for the transition. Third, when some actors within the regime and the opposition try to get out of this impasse or standoff by distancing themselves from hard-­ liners and intransigent maximalist opposition, the dynamics of regime transition are likely to begin. In this case we have two scenarios for democratic transition and non-transition. If reformers within the regime do not possess an autonomous power base both militarily and electorally, and moderate opposition leaders are under the influence of intransigent radical maximalists who oppose any kind of compromise, then mutual confrontation rather than mutual compromise strategies will prevail and the outcome of the interaction will be the continuation of the standoff, authoritarian involution or popular revolution, but not a peaceful democratic transition. On the other hand, if reformers within the regime gain an autonomous power base militarily and electorally and if moderate opposition leaders can control the voice of the unruly maximalist opposition, some kind of compromise solution is likely to emerge.

The Politics of Korean Democratization Now let me examine my propositions through a discussion of the South Korean case of transition. South Korea is a good case to test various hypotheses on the transition to democracy because in the last decades it experienced three kinds of transition or non-transition: an aborted transition 1979–1980, a prolonged and inconclusive standoff between the regime and the opposition in 1985–1987 and a successful transition to democracy in June 1987. The years 1972–1987 in South Korean history indeed present a microcosm of diverse paths to democratic transition and non-transition from authoritarian rule.

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Aborted Transition: 1979–1980 Until the late 1970s, South Korea had been under a highly repressive authoritarian rule of dictator Park Chung Hee. In October 1979, the transition began abruptly with Park’s assassination, after a series of popular uprisings in two major industrial cities, Pusan and Masan. The initial transition started smoothly. The ruling party (DRP) and the opposition party (NDP) swiftly agreed to discard the authoritarian institutions and made a compromise on the transition process and the future form of government. The military, the most powerful organization in the situation of a power vacuum, was led by moderate career officers who publicly supported the transition to democracy if the institutional integrity of the military was assured. This optimistic mood was reversed by a coup within the military itself on December 12, 1979. A hard-line military faction, which stubbornly resisted the democratic transition and insisted instead on the continuation of authoritarianism, took over the powerful military organization. From then on the transition became a struggle, or game, between military hard-­ liners and the anti-democratic right on one side, and the civilian political forces from the democratic right to the left on the other. Schematically described, the strategic situation is very much the same as in Fig. 4.2. The defining feature of the game is that while the hard-line military officers, known as the New Military, had the “threat power,” the civilians did not possess the “counter-threat power.” Hard-line military officers were risk-insensitive actors. They always favored the intransigent strategy regardless of civilian strategies. In this situation the civilian political forces had only two options, either to capitulate to the New Military or to confront it directly by mobilizing the street power of the popular masses. Capitulation to the New Military would mean that civilians accepted its formula for the new constitutional structure which guaranteed its power. The New Military proposed a kind of dual system of government under which it held the core powers of the state such as national security, police, national defense and diplomatic power without competition, while the rest of everyday state management would be put under limited competition. But even the capitulation of the opposition was not the most preferred option for the New Military. Their preferred option was a return to an outright authoritarian system (upper left box in Fig. 4.2). To get to this, the New Military had to provoke violence from civilian opponents, and

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Civilian Opposition adopts Confrontation

New Military adopts

Compromise

Confrontation

Compromise

Violent Conflict, Coup, Authoritarian Involution

Opposition’s Capitulation to Authoritarian "New Military's" Involution Plan for a Revised Authoritarianism

4. 1

3. 2

Extrication of the "New Military" from Power; Guarantees Democracy without Guarantees

Democratic Compromise with Guarantees

1. 4

2. 3

*Payoffs: 4 = best; 3 = second best; 2 = second worst; 1 = worst Fig. 4.2  Aborted transition in 1979–1980

thus tried to create all-out confrontation in the streets. There is much circumstantial evidence that the New Military provoked violence on the campuses and streets, and in workplaces. They drew opponents into the streets, crushed them and finally became victorious. The Kwangju People’s Uprising and the massacre by Green Beret troops in May 1980 was the finishing blow dealt by the New Military, and the Seoul Spring of 1980 came to an end. Decompression: 1984–1985 After three years (1980–1983) of repression the regime started to relax control, and from late 1985 the so-called “decompression” phase (Yuhwa kookmyun) began. The ruling elites were confident about a new rebounding economy after years of recession and of institutional safety valves (labor laws, press laws, censorship, ban on the political activities of dissidents, etc.). In addition, the regime felt the need to stabilize its rule by constructing a new base of legitimation in the National Assembly election scheduled in 1985. Most of all, it attempted to isolate unyielding radical

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student activists from the moderate opposition and to strengthen the collaborationist loyal (or semi-loyal) opposition. It was a classic divide et impera strategy. But the decompression project did not work as the regime had intended. Immediately after opening the political space, the entire situation got out of hand for the planners of the decompression. With decompression, there emerged outbursts of independent, autonomous organization in civil society. Underground student circles cast off their clandestine nature and seized control of the official student organizations within three months. Underground labor organizations came to the forefront of the labor movement and fought to restore the legality of youth organizations and labor organizations but encompassed broad categories of social movement across classes and occupations. Peasants, shanty-town dwellers, ousted college professors, journalists and teachers, religious activists, human right groups and women’s movement groups formed autonomous organizations within a few months of the decompression. All these social movements and organizations tested the limits of tolerance of the regime. The social movements were tolerated as long as they did not challenge the legitimacy and legality of the authoritarian power. Soon it became clear to these autonomous organizations that the realization of their interests was not possible within the authoritarian institutional framework. So the fight spilled onto the streets and autonomous organizations needed a political representative organization to channel their interests into the political arena. The Election of February 12, 1985 The National Assembly election on February 12, 1985, was held under circumstances of burgeoning social activism in civil society. The ruling elites had underestimated the power of popular movement and became overconfident of the ex ante institutional arrangements guaranteeing their election. They lifted the political ban on leading dissident politicians, hoping that a new group of dissident politicians would divide the votes of the opposition and thus help to solidify the political structure of a “Mexicanized” hegemonic party system, that is, one predominant ruling party (DJP) and many powerless minority parties. As expected, the outcome of the election did not change the locus of power. The ruling party was able to maintain its majority thanks to prior institutional guarantees and election frauds. However, allowing the

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organization of a new genuinely autonomous party turned out to be a disaster for the authoritarian elites. Before the new party appeared on the political scene, social movement circles were very skeptical of the effectiveness of participating in the election and adopted a strategy of boycotting it because the outcome was institutionally predetermined ex ante, and no existing political party could be expected to represent their interests. But after a new party (NKDP) was formed just three weeks before the election, social movement circles changed their strategy for the election and made every effort to mobilize votes for the candidates of the new party. The outcome was a phenomenal success for the new party, which swept the major industrial cities and became the largest opposition party. The emergence of a dominant genuine opposition party changed the whole political scene. For the first time under the Fifth Republic, the social movement forces got their representatives in the institutional political arena. The new party, the NKDP, was more powerful than the seats it had acquired because of the strong representative power delegated from social movement forces. Within weeks, collaborationist loyal and semi-loyal opposition parties collapsed, and the new party absorbed most of the members of the defunct parties. The NKDP became the single dominant opposition party, with two strong leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. With the emergence of a single dominant opposition party, the major arena of opposition politics moved from the street to the assembly hall. Institutions replaced the street parliaments. Immediately after the election, the NKDP tested the limits of political space tolerated by the regime and tried to open negotiations for democratic transition, which the regime stubbornly resisted. From the beginning of 1986, faced with the regime’s stubborn stance against democratic reforms, the NKDP moved the arena of political struggle from the parliament back to the streets to force the regime to open the negotiating table for democratization through the mobilization of the popular masses. The institutional opposition, the NKDP, came out of the Assembly Hall, went to the streets and held a series of mass rallies in coordination with extra-institutional movement circles from the left to the right. In seven major cities, the coalition of institutional opposition and extra-­ institutional movement circles mobilized about 700,000 people to rallies for the opening of democratic reform. The regime finally agreed to come to the negotiating table on April 30, 1986. Besides popular pressure, pressure from the United States and the emergence of a reformist faction within the regime itself played a key role in opening negotiations.

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Standoff: 1986–1987 From April 30, however, the negotiations became deadlocked. Why? Again, I use a schematic game-theoretic framework to explain the strategic situation in 1986–1987. Figure  4.3 shows us the strategic situation of transition politics in 1986–1987, a situation that was fundamentally different from that in 1979–1980 for three reasons. First, the growth of the opposition in civil society and the capacity of the leadership and the followers to act in concert made the outcome of confrontation between the regime and the opposition not the same total disaster for the latter that it had been in May 1980. US pressure on the regime not to use armed force reduced the cost of street confrontation for the opposition. Second, after the election, there was a clear sign of the emergence of a reformist faction within the regime who recognized the need to negotiate. But this reformist faction still did not gain an autonomous power base within the armed forces and was not confident of electoral success under democratic competition. Third, because the NKDP relied heavily on social movement circles for its electoral success, it was heavily influenced by these circles, especially on “visible” political issues Moderate Opposition adopts

Hardline Strategy

Reformers within the Regime adopt Compromise Strategy

Maximalist Strategy

Compromise Strategy

Stalemated conflict with low possibility of coup

Moderate Opposition Capitulation to Coup Reformers' Plan for a Revise Authoritarianism with Concessions

4. 1

3. 2

Democracy without Compromise for Reformers

Democratic Compromise with Guarantees

1. 4

2. 3

*Payoffs: 4 = best; 3 = second best; 2 = second worst; 1 = worst Fig. 4.3  “Standoff”: 1985–June 1987 moderate opposition

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like constitutional drafting.7 Under these circumstances, both the reformist faction and the moderate institutional opposition had a dominant strategy of intransigence. The leaders of the moderate opposition (NKDP) preferred all-out confrontation to unilateral capitulation to the DJP’s plan for constitutional revision toward a system of parliamentary dictatorship (i.e., a formula for maintaining an authoritarian system with minor concessions) because they perceived all-out confrontation as less costly than capitulation. Though the leaders of the opposition perceived that all-out confrontation as a consequence of mutual intransigence might not be a total disaster as it had been in 1979–1980, their greatest fear was the political outrage that would result from capitulation. They believed that doing so might be regarded as a “selling-out” of the aspirations of the popular masses for democracy, leading to a fatal loss of the electoral constituency and an eventual electoral disaster, as had been evident in the electoral disaster of the semi-loyal opposition party (DKY) in the 1985 election. On the other hand, the reformist faction within the regime (DJP) preferred fallout confrontation to relinquishing its power if the NKDP adopted a maximalist strategy. If the NKDP adopted a compromise strategy, the DJP obviously preferred the former’s capitulation to mutual compromise. So in this game, a mutually intransigent strategy dominated for both actors and the outcome was to be an inconclusive standoff. In fact, the Special Committee for Constitutional Revision set up in the National Assembly never convened. The inconclusive deadlock continued into 1987, strengthening the hard-liners’ position. Authoritarian state apparatuses again intensified repression against the opposition and tried to divide the NKDP by courting its collaborationist wing. In early 1987, the two leaders of the NKDP, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, solidified their leadership by purging the collaborationist faction from the party. They restructured and renamed the party the RDP (Reunification Democratic Party). The new party strengthened its intransigent stance and, in return, the regime responded by closing the political negotiation process altogether. On April 13, President Chun announced the cessation of negotiations, saying that the current system of authoritarian rule would not be modified, and denouncing the intransigence of the new opposition party. The politics of negotiation collapsed. In May 1987, however, a single incident changed the whole political scene. The revelation of the death under torture of a student, Park Jong

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Chul, and the cover-up attempt by high-ranking police officers evoked widespread moral outrage throughout the country. First, this incident resulted in the fall from power of those core members of the hard-line faction within the regime who had been involved in the torture, death and cover-up, thus strengthening the hand of the reformist faction within the regime. Through the internal power struggle, the reformist faction dramatically expanded its support base in the military, bureaucratic and business elites. Second, the Park Jong Chul incident provided the momentum for the establishment of a broad coalition of the opposition. The moderate opposition and maximalist movement circles healed their differences and set up a united front for democratic transition (the National Coalition for Constitutional Reform). Diverse factions within the opposition coalition postponed the debate on the ideological direction of democratization and, instead, concentrated all their efforts on the struggle for a revision of the constitution to establish a system of directly elected president. Again, all the forces who opposed the regime were able to mount a concerted action against it. The newly formed united front of movement circles and the RDP jointly mobilized the people onto the streets. The previously indifferent new middle classes, white-collar workers and the self-employed joined the rallies. The new situation pitted the whole of civil society against a handful of members of the repressive state apparatus. The hard-liners became more and more isolated and the situation got worse day after day. They could not quell the popular uprisings with police power. The last resort was the use of armed forces. But substantial numbers of military officers rejected the hard-liners’ solution and the United States openly pressed the regime not to use the armed forces. As the use of the armed forces was aborted, the hard-liners lost the initiative and the momentum passed to the reformist faction within the regime. The reformists became autonomous and independent from the hard-liners. They expanded their support base in the military and in the United States. Thereupon, the reformist faction took an initiative to stop the popular uprising by accommodating the opposition’s demands. On June 29, 1987, the leader of the reformists, Roh Tae-Woo, announced that he was prepared to concede to the opposition’s demand for direct presidential elections and, within a few days, the opposition leaders accepted Roh’s formula. The historical political pact had finally been made.

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Politics of Constitution Making Since June 29, 1987, the strategic situation has changed completely as we can see in Fig. 4.4. The initial condition agreed upon between the reformist faction within the regime and the moderate opposition is the lower right cell (3.3) of Fig. 4.4. That is, it was a compromise formula for democratic transition in which the reformists made a concession to restore formal democracy, and the moderate opposition, in return, did not ask the reformists’ immediate exit from power but accepted the advantage of their incumbency, a crucial electoral premium. In this game structure, both reformers in the regime and the moderate opposition have a critical interest in protecting the politics of transition by avoiding mutual confrontation. If both actors opted for a strategy of mutual intransigence, hard-liners and maximalists would take over the leadership in the transition game. The outcome would be open, violent conflict in which reformers as well as moderate opposition would likely be wiped out. Except for mutual intransigence, the optimal choices are

Moderate Opposition adopts Maximalist Strategy Hardline Strategy

Reformers within the Regime adopt Compromise Strategy

Compromise Strategy

Violent Conflict, Authoritarianism Putsch, with Defeat of both Concessions to Moderate Reformers and Moderate Opposition: Opposition: (Democradural) (Authoritarian Involution)

Authoritarian with Concessions to Moderate Opposition: Democradural

1. 1

4.2

Democracy without Guarantee to Reformers, Substantive Socio-Economic Democratization (Ruptura Democratia)

Democracy with Guarantee to Reformers: Reforma Democratica

2.4

3. 3

*Payoffs: 4 = best; 3 = second best; 2 = second worst; 1 = worst Fig. 4.4  Democratic transition: June 1987

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contingent upon the opponent’s strategy. When the initial condition was mutual compromise (3.3), then that was the “non-myopic equilibrium” of the game.8 To avoid the threat of mutual disaster from choosing an intransigent strategy, the RDP abstained from using street power through the mobilization of the masses, while the DJP abstained from using its repressive power apparatus to quell civil unrest. Mutual abstention was clearly revealed in the treatment of the workers’ strikes that erupted spontaneously throughout the industrial sector, exploiting the relaxation of labor control after the June 29 concession. The opposition RDP did not support the workers one-sidedly and abstained from politicizing workers’ outbursts for their political advantage. The DJP in turn abstained from resorting to repression and left the resolution of industrial conflicts in the hands of capitalists and workers themselves. The two parties not only played an abstention strategy but also accelerated constitutional compromise and draft scheduling in order to preempt both maximalists and the hard-liners from exploiting the instability created by the industrial conflict on a massive scale. The ruling DJP and the opposition agreed to draft minimal procedures for democratic competition in the new constitution and to leave hotly debated substantive issues (such as the neutrality of the military in politics and the workers’ rights to participate in management and in the distribution of profits) to future consideration after the transition election. In this way the new constitution was quickly drafted and the first popular presidential election since 1971 was held on December 16, 1987.

Transition Elections: December 1987 and April 1988 Upon bringing about a transition election through compromise with regime, the democratic opposition was divided. In order to achieve a democratic transition, the different factions, classes, regional groups and occupational groups had formed a united front against the regime. They postponed the resolution of internal problems without healing the differences. Even though the transition was not completed and the repressive state apparatus was still intact, different factions of the opposition competed with each other and thus reduced the chance of electoral victory for the forces who had brought about the transition. The difference within the opposition was highlighted by the splitting of the opposition candidacy between the two Kims, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, which

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represented unhealed differences and dissensions within the opposition. The division of the opposition between these two candidates not only bore witness to long-standing personal rivalry but, more importantly, was intermingled with regional, class and ideological cleavages. Not only was the institutional opposition split, but the social movement circles were also divided into three groups in the election: the supporters of Kim Dae Jung, a group which tried to put forward a united opposition candidate and a group that nominated its own independent candidate for the “popular masses.” Under these circumstances, it was enormously difficult for either of the two main opposition candidates to win against the candidate of the regime, who retained the huge advantage of incumbency. Electoral history has shown that the ruling party has maintained a capacity for mobilizing about one-third of the popular vote. Therefore, for one of the two opposition candidates to win, one of them would have had to be well ahead of the other. As they evenly divided the opposition votes, the regime candidate, Roh Tae-Woo, won the election with slightly more than one-third of the votes cast (36.8%). The reformists within the regime were, however, premature in claiming victory. In the National Assembly election of April 26, 1988, the ruling party failed to get a majority of the National Assembly seats for the first time in the history of the National Assembly elections. Three opposition parties combined to create a solid majority in the National Assembly, whose institutional power was greatly strengthened under the new constitution9 and possessed the countervailing power to prevent possible attempts at authoritarian involution in the shaky, uncertain period of transition. The outcome of the election was disastrous for both the hard-line faction in the ruling DJP and the radical maximalist parties of the left. The outcome of the National Assembly election clearly revealed that in post-­ transition politics the initiative had passed to the institutional political parties. Institutional political elites predominated over social movement forces. As a consequence of the change in the relationship between parties and social movements, parties became less and less enthusiastic for socioeconomic reform. Formal democracy coexisted with socioeconomic conservatism. But this might be the price that Koreans have to pay for choosing democratic transition through transaction or compromise.

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Conclusion What do we learn from the Korean politics of transition? First, that structural factors constrain the choice of the major actors in the transition process, but do not determine the transition process itself. These factors set the boundaries of the strategy within which actors’ choices are made. The economic performance of an authoritarian regime has often been called a typical example of the structural constraints that critically determine the course of a transition process. However, the relationship between economic performance and the demise of an authoritarian regime is not unilinear. In South Korea, the economic crisis caused by the over-investment in heavy and chemical industries precipitated the demise of Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian Yushin regime and led to the opening of the transition process. Nonetheless, the deterioration of the economy provided the New Military leaders a crucial justification for restoring the authoritarian system. The New Military junta justified their usurpation of power with a functionalistic logic of rescuing the economy from crisis. In the mid-1980s, the democratic opponents drew a reverse functionalistic logic for democratization from the unprecedented economic boom. They argued that the authoritarian government had to withdraw from power precisely because it had successfully accomplished its historical mission of economic development. It had become historically obsolescent, and thus democracy had to replace it to perform new historical necessities such as growth with equity. The South Korean case of democratic transition and non-transition shows us that both authoritarians and democrats used good or bad economic performance to strengthen their respective logics for authoritarian involution and democratic transition. The economic performance of an authoritarian regime therefore does not have structural power to determine the course of a democratic transition. The success of the democratic transition depends upon how democrats strategically exploit good or bad economic performance in their favor. Second, the Korean case of transition cast doubt upon the conventional thesis on the role of elections under authoritarian regimes. The conventional thesis of an “election without choice” argues that controlled and manipulated elections under an authoritarian regime do nothing but legitimize and stabilize the rule of authoritarian power holders.10 The election is a facade, a ritual or a fake, because its outcome either is predetermined

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ex ante or can be reversed ex post. In contrast, the “opening through elections” thesis argues that elections, although manipulated and rigged, provide democratic opponents an invaluable political space to form linkages with the masses and to build their own political organizations. Otherwise, they would be unable to break free of the authoritarian milieu.11 Elections, moreover, can be regarded as a symbolic event testing the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. The strong showing of democratic opponents in a controlled election, although not changing the locus of power, acts as a plebiscite on the regime, that is, a vote of no confidence, and may create cracks within the authoritarian power bloc, so as to provide a precious opportunity for the formation of a broad democratic coalition between opposition parties in the institutional political arena and popular movements in the streets. The South Korean case supports the “opening through elections” thesis. The demise of Yushin authoritarianism was precipitated by the strong showing of the opposition NDP (New Democratic Party) in the National Assembly election of 1978. In the election, the NDP gained more popular votes than the ruling DRP (Democratic Republican Party). Emboldened by the electoral outcome, the NDP strengthened its intransigent stance toward the regime and the ensuing intensified confrontation between the regime and the opposition led to popular uprisings, ending in the assassination of the dictator, Park. The democratic transition process of the mid-­1980s, in fact, started with the National Assembly election in February 1985. The phenomenal success of the newly formed authentic opposition party, the NKDP (New Korean Democratic Party), often called the “wind of the new party,” broke up the authoritarian project of “Mexicanization” of the party system, caused a crack in the authoritarian power bloc with the emergence of the “aperturists” and united diverse democratic opposition forces under the leadership of the NKDP. The South Korean case, in short, supports the “opening through elections” thesis that elections under authoritarianism, although not changing the locus of power, positively contribute to the opening up of an authoritarian regime and thus to the unfolding of the dynamics of democratic transition. Lastly, the Korean case of transition reminds us of the importance of external factors in the calculus of strategic choice of both authoritarian power holders and democratic opponents. In the Korean transition process, the change of the patron state’s (the US) policy critically affected the range of actions available to the key actors in the transition.

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Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained extraordinary influence over the politics and economy of Korea. US policy changes critically affected the structure of choice of major actors in the transition process. The US army commander was the joint chief of US-Korea armed forces, without whose permission Korean generals could not move their troops. The acquiescence of the United States in the intra-­ military coup of December 12, 1979, emboldened the hard-line military officers. For the New Military the US acquiescence was interpreted as the disappearance of the last barrier to deter them from intervening in the transition process. This is a crucial factor why they chose a confrontational strategy regardless of the opposition’s strategies. The New Military’s evaluation of the US policy proved right. When they shut down the transition process with martial law and engaged in the Kwangju massacre, the United States permitted ex post the move of Green Beret troops to suppress civilians in Kwangju. US policy toward the military dictatorship has changed since the fall of Marcos in the Philippines. Since then the United States has withdrawn its support for rightist military dictatorship, publicly opposed the use of armed forces in dealing with violent opposition movements and promoted the civilianization and liberalization of authoritarian regimes in the Third World. This new US policy changed the structure of choice in the Korean transition game. For democratic opponents, it meant the reduction of fear of direct confrontation in the streets. This reduced the efficacy of authoritarian power holders’ “coup threat” against the democratic opponents. Without a viable threat of the use of the armed forces, the military power holders became a “paper tiger” and the opposition increased its pressure on the regime to concede. The US stance therefore played a critical role in ending the transition game with a compromise between authoritarian power holders and democratic opponents.

Notes 1. See Lipset, Seymour M. 1981. Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics (expanded edition) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Cutright, Philips. 1963. “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis,” American Sociological Review 28 (April); Neubauer, Deane. 1961. “Some Conditions of Democracy,” American Political Science

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Review 61 (December); Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown and Co; and Eckstein, Harry. 1966. “A Theory of Stable Democracy,” in Division and Cohesion in Democracy: Study of Norway. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2. A typical case is post-World War II West Germany. Barry, Brian. Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 52. 3. See Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. “Transition to Democracy,” Comparative Politics 2(3). 4. See Schmitter, Philippe C. 1975. “Liberation by Golpe: Prospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal,” Armed Forces and Society 2(1); Cardoso, Fernando H. 1979. “Authoritarianism in Crossroads: The Brazilian Case,” Woodrow Wilson Center Working Paper 93; Pion-Berlin, David. 1985. “The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976–1983,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 27(2); Share, Donald. 1986. The Making of Spanish Democracy. New York: Praeger; Poulantzas, Nicos. 1976. The Crisis of Dictatorship: Portugal, Greece, Spain. London: New Left Books; Pereira, Luiz Bresser. 1984. Development and Crisis in Brazil: 1930–1983. Boulder: Westview Press; and Conaghan, Catherine M. 1986. “Technocrats, Capitalists and Politicians: Economic Policy Making in Redemocratized States (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru),” Unpublished Paper. 5. See Schmitter, Philippe C. 1980. “Speculation about the Prospective Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and its Possible Consequences,” Woodrow Wilson Center Working Paper 60. 6. See Przeworski, Adam. 1986. “Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (Eds.). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 3: A Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 7. If a political issue is highly visible, the leaders tend to faithfully represent the aspirations of their followers and thus intransigent strategies prevail. George Tsebelis. 1987. “Nested Games: Visible and Invisible Politics and Consociational Democracies,” Unpublished Paper. 8. An outcome is “non-myopic equilibrium” if neither player gains long-term advantage from departing an initial outcome. Brams, Steven J. and Wittman, Donald. 1981. “Non-Myopic Equilibria in 2*2 Games,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 6(1). 9. For the thesis of “election without choice,” see Herrnet, Guy, Rose, Richard, and Rouquie, Alain (Eds.). 1978. Elections without Choice. London: Macmillan.

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10. The number of seats (district seats and P.R. seats combined) acquired in the election was 125 for the DJP, 71 for the PDP, 60 for the RDP and 35 for the NDRP. 11. For the “opening through elections” thesis, see Lamounier, Bolivar. 1984. “Will the Brazilian Case Become a Paradigm?” Government and Opposition 19(2) and “Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura,” in Alfred Stepan (Ed.) Democratizing-Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

CHAPTER 5

Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea

The Role of Christian Churches and Catholics in Korean Democratization Religious organizations, especially Christian churches, played a key role in the democratization of South Korea. Prominent transition scholars have paid attention to the contribution of both Protestant and Catholic churches to the democratic transition. Samuel P. Huntington noted in his The Third Wave that “by the early 1980s the churches had become ‘the principal forum for opposition to the regime’… and the Christian churches, their leaders and communicants, were a major force bringing about the transition to democracy in 1987 and 1988.”1 With specific reference to Korea, Bruce Cumings pointed out that “the circumstance in which the Park and Chun regimes fell, or entered into crisis, bear remarkable comparison to the Latin American cases … O’Donnell and Schmitter’s recent, eloquent description of the explosion of a highly repoliticized and angry society’ fits the Korean case perfectly … churches have been critical sanctuaries for dissidents … often being the only institution relatively immune from regime intrusion.”2 Korean political scientist Jang Jip Choi shared similar views with Huntington and Cumings that “churches played a Hyug Baeg Im, “Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea,” in Tun-jen Cheng and Debbie Brown (eds.), Religious Organizations and Democracy in Contemporary Asia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_5

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central role in the political opposition movements and functioned as a kind of refuge for other dissident forces.”3 With regard to the role of religious organizations in the democratic transition, therefore, it is not in question whether Korean Christian churches were active. The researchable questions are why and how they were involved in the politics of democratic transition. The primary concerns of this chapter are (1) why did Korean Christian churches, previously known as accommodating and conforming to authorities, participate in the antigovernment democratization movement; (2) how did they participate and why did they succeed, and contribute extensively to Korean democratic transition; and (3) who in the church communities participated, how did they achieve solidarity with nonparticipant church members and how did they achieve hegemony in the whole church community, despite their minority status in numbers.

Korean Christian Churches Join the Democratic Opposition Movement Until the mid-1960s, Korean churches, both Protestant and Catholic, had been apolitical, conservative or “noted for their prudent accommodation to the authorities.”4 In the 1950s, the relationship between the Rhee Syng Man regime and Protestant churches was a very amicable one.5 The persecution of Christians by the North Korean regime redounded to the Rhee regime’s advantage. Many fled from North Korea, and these refugees supported Rhee’s anticommunist ideology and policies. Church-government cooperation was not limited to the development of anticommunist ideology. The Korean Protestant leaders mobilized electoral resources for the Rhee regime.6 Protestant churches systematically campaigned for Rhee and the Liberal Party through the networks of the Korean Church Committee for Election. In addition to organizational support, Protestant churches used their newspapers and religious gatherings to campaign for Rhee. Catholics were not much different in their attitude toward and relationship with the Rhee regime. Archbishop Ro, the leader of the Korean Catholic Church, was pro-American, anticommunist and pro-Rhee. Ro sided with the US Military Government rule over Korea and Rhee Syng Man in the turbulent years of the founding of a divided state beneath the 38th Parallel, because he believed it was advantageous for the Catholic

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Church’s position in liberated Korea and its social influence to do so. In the latter period of the Rhee regime, however, the relationship between the regime and Catholics soured because Archbishop Ro transferred political support to Vice President John Chang (Chang Myun), who was a Catholic, and persuaded 40 Catholic laymen to join the Democratic Party of which John Chang was the leader. The transfer of support ended the close relationship between Ro and Rhee, and indirectly influenced the discontinuance of the Catholic-run Kyunghyang Daily by government authorities. In the 1950s, the Catholic Church maintained close relations, first with Rhee, and then with Chang, who came to power after the April 19, 1960, Student Revolution that toppled the Rhee regime. The Catholic Church failed to make any significant contribution to the Student Revolution, except by supporting one individual politician, John Chang.7 Why, then, did the relationship between Christian churches and the state, after General Park Chung Hee took control of power through a military coup, become frozen, and why did the churches transform themselves into the champions of democracy? In other words, what made Korean churches involve themselves in antigovernment activities and the democratization movement? In the initial period of Park’s reign, Korean churches did not oppose him actively, even though the Protestant churches were especially transformed from core organizations for the Rhee regime into organizations of less importance in the Park regime. Both Protestant and Catholic churches took a noninterventionist position toward the military coup.8 Most Christians supported Park until the late 1960s, and the majority of church members maintained the political stances of inaction and of separation of church and the state. Protestant leaders stressed St. Paul’s teaching that all political powers are ordained by God and that one should obey the civil authorities. In addition, anticommunist sentiments led church leaders to endorse the government, which they believed was combating communism.9 Until the late 1960s, most of the Christian opposition to the Park regime consisted of individual actions. The first organized opposition from the Protestant Church was the movement in 1965 against the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. In 1969, Protestant Church leaders, such as the Reverends Kim Chaejun and Park Hyungkyu, played a leading role in the “People’s Council Fighting Against the Revision of the Constitution to Allow Park Chung Hee the Third Term.” However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, both Protestant and Catholic Church leaders began acting in groups and in the name of their

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churches.10 Why did Korean Christian church organizations participate in the democratization movements against the extremely powerful authoritarian state? According to Shin Dohyup, three forces drove Korean churches to participate in democratization movements: (1) religious organizations’ pursuit of legitimacy from their constituencies; (2) invitations from social movements that sought legitimacy from religious organizations; and (3) competition among religious organizations for more followers in the religious market.11 First, religious organizations made efforts to set up new legitimacy formulas in a time of rapid socioeconomic change and political regime transformation. The pursuit of new spiritual and nonspiritual formulas for legitimacy to satisfy domestic and foreign constituencies motivated churches to participate in democratization. This is a typical push factor that drove churches to participate in social engagement. With rapid industrialization generating sharp socioeconomic inequality and dislocation of poor masses, church leaders felt the need to develop new religious doctrines. Armed with them, religious leaders fought for the human and political rights of the repressed, alienated and exploited masses. Second, a pull factor induced Christian churches to participate in antigovernment activities: pressure from other social movement forces. Religion is one of the most powerful sources of legitimization, and it is the most important derivation of legitimacy for political power. Both the incumbent and the challenger often seek the active and tacit support of religious organizations.12 The Christian churches’ role as legitimating democratization movements was recognized by Linz, who noted that “one of the most independent bases of all shades of dissidence can be a church … Critics, dissidents, and opponents tolerated, supported, or sponsored by a church can represent a formidable resource in case of crisis in an authoritarian regime.”13 Third, the churches’ participation in democratization can be explained by their efforts to find new niche markets for religion. Industrialization generated large masses of industrial proletariat and urban poor who migrated from the countryside into cities. Church leaders appealed to these new potential constituencies by participating in sociopolitical movements, including the democratization movement.

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The Push Factor: Doctrinal Change and the Pursuit of Legitimacy The compressed industrialization by the Park Chung Hee regime in the 1960s impoverished rural society, increased migration from rural areas and resulted in the rapid growth of urban areas. In response to socioeconomic changes, church leaders felt the need to participate in social movements to gain legitimacy for themselves.14 They found the necessity to build legitimacy for their pastoral activities by representing the interests of these groups of the urban poor and the new industrial working class in the religious world. The catalytic event that drew attention to the new social phenomena of labor issues was the self-immolation of Chun Tae Il, a garment worker, in the Chyunggye Peace Market on November 13, 1970, in a protest against low wages, unbearable working conditions and the government’ repressive labor policies. This act was a watershed event that united broad antigovernment forces around labor issues. From that point forward, churches increasingly focused attention on social justice and the resolution of labor problems. The Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) of Protestant churches and the JOC (Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques, or Young Catholic Workers) instituted programs to organize and to raise the consciousness of factory workers.15 The new social missions, special pastorates or Christian social actions that targeted the industrial proletariat, urban poor and university students needed a new religious doctrine to legitimize their activities. In the case of the Protestant Church, a group of liberal Protestant ministers developed a militant theology called the “People’s Theology” (Minjung Sinhak), which emphasized the Koreanization of Christian beliefs and ceremonies, social salvation rather than individual salvation, sociopolitical theology rather than religious-cosmic theology and the liberation of the “People.”16 The Minjung Theology was deeply influenced by Liberation Theology, which was developed in Latin America. Liberation Theology provided theological bases and concrete models for social participation by religious organizations. The Minjung are defined as grass-roots members of society, such as workers, farmers, the lower and middle classes, owners of smalland medium-sized businesses, students and progressive intellectuals. Doctrinal change to Minjung Theology influenced Protestant churches to act on behalf of social justice, human rights and democratization. Armed with the new religious doctrine of Minjung Theology, Protestant Church activists first organized social missions in urban industrial areas, then antigovernment activities. The Protestant activists not only dared to

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criticize the Park regime, but they also assumed the leadership in an antigovernment coalition of students, intellectuals, workers and farmers,17 becoming the most successful organizers of antigovernment forces.18 They set up many affiliated organizations that played key roles in the struggle for democratization during the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF), the Christian Professors’ Conference, the Korean Christian Women’s Association, the Urban Industrial Mission and the Christian Academy. The KNCC (Korean National Council of Churches) was the umbrella organization for the antigovernment Protestant churches. It encompassed 12,700 ministers (about 30% of all Protestant ministers) and 6 progressive Protestant Church denominations.19 The increased involvement of Korean Catholics in sociopolitical activities was attributed to the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and Liberation Theology.20 The dominant theme of the Second Vatican Council was “transforming the world.” Pope John XXIII wanted the church to exert positive leadership in addressing world problems. His two major encyclicals were Mater et Magistra (Mother and Teacher) on Christianity and social progress and Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth). Mater et Magistra examined trends and characteristics of modern society, and Pacem in Terris raised two issues, namely, the problems of rural peoples and the problems of poor underdeveloped nations.21 Liberation Theology emphasized: (1) violence and oppression by unjust systems and structures; (2) the failure of “development” policies; (3) an “international system of domination”; (4) the obstacles social structures placed in the way of conversion of domination; (5) the need for self-determination by poor nations; (6) the intervention of God’s justice on behalf of the needy and the oppressed; (7) a mission of preaching and witnessing to justice as proper to the church’s mission; (8) the need for justice “within” the church itself; (9) education for justice (raising consciousness); and (10) hope in the coming Kingdom and “the radical transformation of the world.”22 As Korean Catholics increasingly felt obliged to respond to the sociopolitical problems generated by Park’s compressed industrialization and authoritarian rule, the teachings of Vatican II were an encouraging sign for Catholic activists. In May 1966, the Korean Bishops’ Conference issued a pastoral letter urging the Catholic churches to accept and practice the Vatican II teachings. Following Vatican II, Catholic priests expressed their concerns about sociopolitical problems and participated in social

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movements, first individually, and then gradually at the organizational level. The appointment of Cardinal Kim Su-Hwan as the Archdiocesan of the Seoul Archdiocese in 1969 was the turning point for the involvement of Catholic parishes in sociopolitical movements.23 His progressive orientation encouraged the social participation of parishes and ignited subsequent democratization activities by Catholic activists. Nonetheless, Korean Catholics waited until 1974 to actively participate in democratization by groups, when Bishop Chi Hak-Soon was arrested and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment on charges of supporting the members of the National League for Democratic Youth Students (NLDYS, or Minchunghakryun). The arrest of Bishop Chi awakened the Catholic Church to the political repression of the Park regime. In reaction to the repression, young priests gathered at Bishop Chi’s church and formed the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (CPAJ, or Jungeuikuhyun Sajedan), which thereafter served as the central organization for the South Korean Catholic Church’s struggle for democratization.24 The formation of the CPAJ was the Church’s institutional reaction to the political repression of the Catholic Church itself. Another institutional response was the establishment of the Justice and Peace Committee (JPC) as an official organization of the Korean Catholic Church by the Korean Bishops’ Conference in 1975. The Pull Factor: The Invitation from Social Movements Korean Christian churches were not only actively involved in democratization to seek legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies, but they also passively accepted the invitation from social movements to join the struggle for democratization. Antigovernment social movements wanted the churches on their side because they believed that churches could lend moral authority to their movements and provide shelter to them from the harsh repression of authoritarian officials. Under authoritarian rule, the public perceived that Christian churches had an overriding moral authority and greater credibility and trustworthiness than other institutions, including the state.25 This was evidenced by a remarkable increase of church membership during the 1970s and 1980s.26 Having sensed the churches’ superior moral authority, both the state and the democratic opposition vied for support from them. The state often sought legitimization from churches because it regarded them as the only institutions that could provide moral legitimacy to the government.27 To

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occupy an advantageous position in the legitimacy war, social movements among students, intellectuals, workers and farmers sought solidarity with progressive Protestant Church leaders and invited them to join sociopolitical movements. Catholic parishes also protested against the state repression of the antigovernment social movements of workers, farmers and students, and against the state’s hiding and distorting the truth about its repressive activities. The Catholic Church’s moral pressure effectively forced the state to admit the truth because the public believed in the church’s credibility. Father Kim Seung Hun, as representative of the CPAJ and concurrently the vice chairman of Mintongryun (the United Minjung Movement for Democracy and Unification), revealed the cover-up of the torture and death of a student demonstrator, Park Chong Chul, by state repressive apparatuses, igniting countrywide demonstrations for democratic transition in June 1987. In addition, Christian churches willingly became the shelter for antigovernment activists in response to appeals for support from opposition social movements. Whenever faced with stern state repression, social activists took refuge in the sanctuaries of churches or denominational offices. The Korean Christian Center in downtown Seoul was a famous Protestant place for sit-ins, hunger strikes and news conferences of antigovernment activists. Myungdong Cathedral, the parish church of the Seoul Archdiocese, was the Catholic center for sit-in protests among the democratic opposition, striking workers and the urban poor. Competition for the Religious Market Another factor contributing to the Christian Church’s involvement in democratization was interest in expanding the Protestant and Catholic shares of the Korean religious market. Democratic engagement was the strategic choice of church leaders to maximize their market shares. To recruit new Christians in the wake of rapid social changes, such as industrialization, urbanization and the expansion of higher education, Christian leaders adopted the strategy of participating in and leading the struggle for democracy. The religious market experienced an explosive growth during the authoritarian period of the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes. Many Koreans entered churches in order to seek spiritual security amid the disturbances and unrest, such as the national division, the Korean

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War, rapid industrialization, urbanization and repressive authoritarian rule.28 While Protestants at the time of liberation in 1945 had only 2793 churches, 5923 clergymen and 459,721 adherents, their ranks grew explosively during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, but stopped growing rapidly following democratic transition in 1987. The Protestant Church had 5011 churches, 10,954 clergymen and 62,300 adherents in 1960, 12,866 churches, 16,982 clergymen and 3,192,621 adherents in 1970, 21,243 churches, 31,740 clergymen and 7,180,617 adherents in 1980, and 35,869 churches, 56,286 clergymen and 12,091,837 believers in 1990. The growth of Catholic parishes was even more explosive. While the number of Catholics was just 122,000 in 1945, their number grew phenomenally by 26 times to 320,000 by the mid-1990s. During the same period, the number of parish churches, dioceses, bishops and priests increased 7.7 times, 3 times, 4.8 times and 13.9 times, respectively. But not all religions grew rapidly. In fact, membership of Buddhism and Chondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) declined during the same period.29 The statistics on Korean religions show that an overwhelming majority of new religious adherents chose Christianity over traditional religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism and Chondogyo. Concern for young workers, farmers, the urban poor and students was one of the factors that attracted newcomers to Protestant and Catholic churches. Participation in democratization was a good marketing strategy to lure the young generation to join the progressive Christian community. This was evidenced by the fact that Protestant denominations under the umbrella of the KNCC grew faster than conservative Protestant denominations during the heyday of authoritarianism. KNCC members expanded from 34.9% of the entire Protestant community in 1969 to 37.4% in 1979.30 In the case of the Catholic Church, two-thirds of the current Catholic community has joined since the 1970s. The percentage of Catholics who lived in urban areas in 1992 was 86.2%, much higher than the national average of 74.4%.31 Since the 1970s, Catholicism has become overwhelmingly the religion of urban residents. The prophetic and organic intellectual role of the Korean Catholic parishes in the democratic transition might have inspired young urban students, workers and intellectuals to join the Catholic community.

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The Contribution of Korean Churches to Democratic Transition How, then, did Christian churches contribute to the democratic transition of Korea? First, they opened the space for transition to democracy. It was the Christian churches that broke the silence enforced by authoritarian regimes and provided shelter for democratic opposition activists from the regime’s repression. Second, Christian churches played a key role in establishing broad anti-authoritarian networks. The Church as Incubator and Shelter for Democratic Activists The contribution of Christian churches to democratization started with serving the democratic opposition by becoming the incubator for it. Christian social movements in Korea developed quite differently from those in Latin America. The Christian social movements in Korea were formed prior to the antigovernment social movements, and helped those movements to grow.32 “Christian churches were the first to break the silence of the dark age of the Yushin system and they continued to resist Park Chung Hee more strongly than other groups.”33 The incubator role of Korean Christian churches was possible because they enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the state. While the Korean state had a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis domestic social forces, it had little external autonomy because of its great dependence on the United States. According to Lim Hyun Chin, while the state secured an extensive autonomy from societal pressures, it had a low degree of autonomy vis-à-­ vis the structural pressures from abroad due to its peripheral status in the world system.34 The state’s dependence on a patron state, the United States, has been the center of external dependency since the beginning of the Cold War. The external dependency of the state restricted its control over Christian denominations that had maintained a close network with the United States. Using their linkage with American Christian churches, Korean churches enjoyed relatively broad autonomy from the authoritarian state. Most Protestant churches had networks with their counterparts in the United States through the mediation of missionaries. Catholics also strengthened their ties with Catholic parishes in the United States after 1945 and were officially under the hierarchy of the Vatican.

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Having made ties with American churches, Korean churches remained relatively immune from state intervention as, what Robbins called, “privileged enclaves.” Consequently, a kind of “regulatory gap” emerged between secular and religious organizations.35 Under the authoritarian peripheral state in Korea, a considerable “regulatory gap” existed between religious organizations and nonreligious organizations, and between Christian denominations and other religions.36 The external dependency of the state restricted the regime’s control over Christian denominations because Korean Christian churches had solid networks with their American counterparts, who had strong lobbying power in the US Congress, the Vatican and the World Council of Churches (WCC). Kang In-Chul neatly describes the typical process by means of which Korean churches as privileged enclaves could work as incubators of the democratic protest movement. The process started with the authoritarian state’s harsh repressive response to the protests from churches. Then high-­ level church leaders defied the state’s infringement of their religious autonomy and made it a national issue. At the same time, the news on the repression of churches was spread internationally by missionaries who solicited churches in the United States and the world for support. American churches and international Christian organizations directly protested against the Korean government and appealed to the US Congress, the US government and international organizations to exert pressure on the South Korean government. Faced with international criticism, the externally dependent Korean government withdrew repression against churches, as a result discrediting the state’s authority and resurrecting democratic opposition within both religious and nonreligious civil society.37 In 1972, Park Chung Hee launched the repressive authoritarian Yushin (revitalizing reform) system and tightened harsher control over opposition politicians, journalists, intellectuals, workers and students. The voices of antigovernment forces were finally silenced and their organizations were closed. But the government could not control churches as effectively as it did political parties and nonreligious organizations. It was Christian churches that broke the forced silence and provided buildings where democratic opposition forces could meet, and organizations through which they could spread their arguments.38 First, Protestant activists tried to open the space for democratic transition. In December 1972, the Reverend Eun Myunggi criticized the Yushin authoritarian system in a night prayer meeting at his church in Jeonju City, becoming the first clergyman to be arrested since Park Chung Hee had

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inaugurated the system on October 26, 1972. In February 1973, two clergymen of the Urban Industrial Mission were arrested for criticizing the Yushin system and its repressive labor policy. On April 23 of the same year, the Reverend Park Hyung Kyu and members of the Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF) passed out leaflets and demanded the repeal of the Yushin constitution. The arrest of the Reverend Park and students was followed by a series of petitions, prayer meetings and public statements that demanded the release of the imprisoned church leader and students and the restoration of democracy.39 The courageous acts of Christian leaders indeed opened the space for democratic opposition in the dangerous days of the authoritarian regime. On the part of Catholics, it was Bishop Chi Hak-Soon of Wonju Diocese who inspired protests. On July 6, 1974, Bishop Chi was arrested and charged with supporting the National League for Democratic Youth and Students, which the government asserted was a procommunist organization. After being imprisoned, he made a Declaration of Conscience denouncing the Yushin system, and issued a message from prison, professing solidarity with the poor and the oppressed.40 After Bishop Chi was arrested, the Catholic Church immediately reacted with prayer meetings and masses. Bishop Chi’s arrest motivated the formation of the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice on September 23, 1974, to facilitate the Catholic clergy’s’ fight for democracy and human rights. The CPAJ announced “the First Declaration on the Times,” followed by a street demonstration of some 2000 participants. It was the first street demonstration by a clergy group, including some 20 foreign priests.41 As Park’s repression became harsher, Catholics and Protestants held joint protest meetings and rallies. On March 1, 1976, the 57th anniversary of the 1919 Independence Movement, a joint Catholic-Protestant prayer service was held at Myungdong Cathedral. Some 700 believers, including several Protestant clergymen and the opposition politicians Yun Bo Sun and Kim Dae Jung, attended the mass, where 20 priests co-officiated. After the mass, a public Declaration for Democratic National Salvation was made, calling for President Park’s resignation. Afterwards, 20 religious leaders were arrested, though ostensibly on the grounds that they had broken Park’s Emergency Decree No. 9, which enforced silence under Yushin authoritarianism.42 Second, Christian churches not only broke the enforced silence of the authoritarian age and helped to pave the way for the democratic opposition, but they also provided shelter. The best-known shelters or sacred

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places for antigovernment forces were Myungdong Cathedral for Catholics and the Christian Center for Protestants. Myungdong Cathedral has been called the “holy place of democratization” since the 1970s. It was there that the mass was held in protest against the arrest of Bishop Chi in 1974, the joint Catholic-Protestant Declaration demanding restoration of democracy was announced in 1976 and the cover-up of the torture and death of Park Chong Chul was revealed by priest Kim Seung Hun in 1987, leading to nationwide demonstrations for the restoration of democracy in June that year. Besides democratic opposition forces, workers, farmers, the urban poor and people of the ghettos also took refuge at Myungdong Cathedral to avoid arrest by the police. The Christian Center at Jongro 5-ga, Seoul, is revered as the sacred place for the democratic opposition forces associated with Protestant churches. The KNCC and many Christian democratic opposition organizations led by students, workers, journalists, artists and farmers had their offices at the Christian Center building. They used the building as the locus of hunger strikes and sits-ins, announcements of their positions, public criticisms of government repression and meetings with other prodemocracy activists. Church leaders not only provided shelter to opposition forces, but they also appealed to the national public and the international community to protest against the authoritarian government and to apply pressure on the regime in an effort to loosen its rigid control and speedily restore democracy in Korea. Mobilization by Networking The mobilization of students and young workers to join the democratic opposition through the establishment of networks was another contribution by Korean churches to the nation’s democratic transition. Christian churches and their affiliated organizations mobilized people both at the micro level of schools and workplaces and at the macro level of the national protest movement. The Protestant Christian Professors’ Conference (CPC), Korean Students’ Christian Federation (KSCF), Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and the Korean Catholic Farmers’ Movement (KCFM), Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques (JOC, or Young Catholic Workers) and the CPAJ opened night schools to educate workers and shantytown dwellers in Liberation and Minjung theologies, and taught them to have greater concern about human rights, workers’ rights, poverty and democracy.43

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These Christian organizations started mobilization at the micro level at workplaces and university campuses, and then expanded their mobilization efforts at the national level by creating broad networks for democratization. Church organizations played a key role in the June 1987 establishment of a nationwide coalition of democratic opposition called the National Council for Constitutional Reform (NCCR). The newly formed united front of extra-institutional groups and opposition parties jointly mobilized people to take to the streets and finally forced South Korea’s military dictators to restore democratic competition on June 29, 1987.44 During the nationwide mobilization for democracy, church and student networks were the most effective in organizing opposition to the government.

Who Participated and How Did Democratic Activists Acquire Hegemony? Not all Korean Christians actively participated in the democratization movement. Most conservative Christians remained silent throughout the authoritarian period and some indeed advocated for and supported the authoritarian regimes. In fact, churches that engaged in protest were a minority in both Protestant and Catholic communities. So how did protesting churches overcome the difficulties of their minority status in their respective church communities, establish ideological hegemony in the Christian Church and finally become the leaders of the democratic opposition in Korea? According to Jong Chul Choi, Korean Christian church organizations during the authoritarian period can be classified into four groups regarding their stance toward authoritarian regimes: Conformists, Negotiators, Adapters and Resisters (Fig. 5.1). With the inauguration of the Yushin system, Korean churches were faced with a choice in their relationship with the government, since it was impossible to stand on both sides. They had to choose either conformity, thereby lending legitimacy to the authoritarian power holders, or resistance by means of actions that “delegitimized” the regime and helped to legitimize the democratic opposition. The forerunner of resistance groups was the Reverend Kim Chae Jun. Kim criticized the fundamentalism of the Korean Presbyterian churches, split from the Presbyterian mainstream and organized the Korean Christian

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Passive

Contesting against Authoritarian Regimes (Zone of adaptation) (Zone of resistance) Korean Bishops’ Conference, (1) Protestant: Korean Gospel Council, KNCC, UIM, KSCF, Christian Ethics Practice CFA, Minjung churches Movement, Korean Association for (2) Catholic: Economic Justice CPAJ, JPC, JOC, KCFM, (Zone of conformism) Korean Jesus Presbyterian (Haptong and Koshin denominations), Korean Baptist, Korean Holy Church, Evangelical Church

(Zone of negotiation) Christian Leaders’ Council, Christian Businessmen’s Committee of Korea, KCCC, KCAAC, Unification Church

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Active

Legitimating Authoritarian Regime

Fig. 5.1  Christians’ attitude toward authoritarian regimes. Note: See Jong Chul Choi, “Hankook Kidoggyo Gyohoedeuleui Jungchijuk Taedo” [The political attitudes of Korean Christian churches, 1972–1990] Kyungjewa Sahoe [Economy and Society] 15 (Autumn 1992): 215. Here, the abbreviation CFA stands for the Christian Farmers’ Association; KCCC for the Korean Council of Christian Churches; and KCAAC for the Korean Christian Association for Anti-Communism

Presbyterian Church. In the 1970s, resistance groups gathered around the KNCC (Korean National Council of Churches) and its counterpart in the United States, the WCC. Six Korean Protestant denominations joined the KNCC. But liberal ministers and the Minjung theologians were minorities within the Protestant Church. Most conservative Christians remained silent or even supported and legitimized authoritarian rule. Even though conservative denominations declared political neutrality, in effect, they supported the authoritarian regime by emphasizing anticommunism, social stability and patriotic Protestantism. Indeed, ministers of conservative denominations enraged democratic opposition forces by participating in the Presidential Breakfast Prayer Meeting (Jochan Kidohoe). Conservative Christians further actively supported the authoritarian regime by holding progovernment mass rallies, including the World Pentecostal Campaign of 1973 and Explosion ‘74, for which Billy Graham

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was invited to conduct mass revivals during the year. Conservative rallies were often held after the government’s reputation had suffered a serious setback owing to its repressive policies and its arrests of members of the democratic opposition. And whenever the KNCC criticized the government, the conservative members of the Korean Council of Christian Churches and the Korean Christian Association for Anti-Communism denounced the KNCC and defended the regime, claiming that “the Bible teaches Christians to pray for the secular power and to obey them,” and that “there is religious freedom in Korea, contrary to the claim of KNCC.”45 Activist groups were a minority in the Catholic community, too. When the CPAJ performed a catalytic role for democracy and human rights in 1974 after Bishop Chi’s arrest, mainstream Catholic organizations and the top body representing the entire Korean Catholic Church, the Korean Bishops’ Conference, still did not give clear and concrete directions for dealing with Bishop Chi’s imprisonment. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the Bishops’ Conference displayed a conservative orientation, and among 14 Catholic dioceses, only 3 were regarded to be favorably inclined toward the priests who supported democratization. Occasional statements by the Bishops’ Conference concentrated mainly on nonpolitical issues, such as birth control and abortion. With regard to political issues, the Bishops’ Conference emphasized gradual political change, separation of religion and politics and the priority of anticommunism, all warmly welcomed by the government.46 How, then, did democratic activist groups in Protestant and Catholic churches gain hegemony in their respective religious communities, despite their minority status? They did so by different means. While Protestant activists acquired dominance through struggling with conservatives, Catholic activists’ hegemony was transmitted from conservatives in amicable ways. And, while sharp bifurcation between conservative and progressive Protestants over the issue of democratization continued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Catholics maintained their internal solidarity during this period. Protestant activists exploited social pressures on religious organizations to persuade Protestant churches to be more responsive to nonreligious sociopolitical issues. In the 1970s, in contrast to rapid industrialization and social differentiation, interest groups and voluntary associations were nonexistent or weak, and the political system was closed to their representation. Therefore, the popular masses put pressure on religious

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organizations, which enjoyed relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state, to channel their discontent, to represent their interests and to shield them from state repression. Protestant Church activists responded to pressures and demands from the popular masses. They opened channels to connect themselves with the masses through night schools, youth labor associations, small churches in poor urban districts, Christian student organizations, social and industrial missions and the propagation of Minjung Theology. Protestant activists gained ideological hegemony also through martyrdom, playing a role similar to that performed by Korean nationalists early in the Japanese colonial period.47 The progressive Protestant churches suffered more members’ imprisonment in relation to the democratization movement than any other religious sector.48 By showing moral example by being incarcerated and representing “the voice for voiceless” people,49 their activists gained ideological hegemony over conservatives and could lead the democratization movement. In contrast to Protestants, Catholic activists acquired hegemony in a relatively smooth way with the cooperation of the conservative mainstream of the church. Among Catholics, the CPAJ served as the central organization for the Catholics’ democratization opposition. In the initial period of Catholic involvement from the mid-1970s until early the 1980s, there had been exchanges of denouncements between the conservative Bishops’ Conference and the progressive CPAJ. However, as the absolute majority of Koreans supported the democracy movement, the Bishops’ Conference stopped denouncing the CPAJ and issuing conservative statements.50 Four main factors enabled a smooth transition of the leadership of the Catholic movement. First, in contrast to the Protestant Church, in which no dialogue between activists and conservatives existed, the membership of the CPAJ overlapped with that of the official Catholic Church, and participating CPAJ priests continued to communicate and interact with non-participating priests and laypersons in most organizational activities other than the democracy movement. There was no explicit distinction between the in-group and the out-group from either side. Second, the Principle of Church Unity in the worldwide Roman Catholic Church prevented Catholics from being formally decoupled from each other in spite of serious differences and conflicts. Both bishops and priests were bound by the same Church Law. All priests were individually under the formal supervision of bishops in ordinary organizational

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activities. Therefore, in spite of bitter disagreements over the democracy movement, the two groups maintained a cooperative relationship in routine operations of the Church.51 Third, Catholic bishops acquiesced to Church activists’ involvement in social mission and democratization, and conceded the leadership role in democratization efforts to activist priests in a reaction to the harsh repression by the authoritarian state. When conservatives shared a sense of crisis that the state repression might have infringed on the institutional interests of the church, they united with progressive activists to resist the state. Despite internal differences and conflicts, the Church’s solidarity was strengthened in the face of external enemies.52 Fourth, under the prevailing circumstances, as the CPAJ priests and Cardinal Kim assumed a common stance, and as society as a whole came to believe that a consensus existed within the Church and that prodemocracy activists represented the entire Catholic community, conservative bishops either tolerated the progressive stance of the activists or did not publicly voice their opposing views.53 In this sense, Korean Catholic conservative bishops were good adapters. Thus, the Catholic activists who were a minority within the Church gained the upper hand, and society and the state came to believe that their progressive stance reflected the position held by the entire Korean Catholic Church. Indeed, division existed within the Church, but this never tore it apart. On the contrary, the division actually inspired Catholic “unity amid diversity,” and the Korean Catholic Church was able to present a united front to society and the state.54 The smooth convergence of the leadership with the activists in regard to the democratization movement in the case of Catholics, and the sharp decoupling within the Protestant Church between ministers who were resisters and those who were conformists, led Korean people to perceive that Catholics had contributed more to Korean democratization than Protestants, even though the Protestant Church had actually contributed more in terms of the frequency of prodemocracy activities, the proportion of activist clergymen and the number of affiliated democracy movement organizations.55 A survey conducted in the first half of the 1990s shows that 91% of the respondents believed that the Catholic Church had significantly contributed to South Korea’s democratization, which is much higher than the 84% of respondents who said the same for Protestants. Sharp division within the Protestant ranks caused Koreans to believe that the democratization activities of Protestant clergymen were not supported

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by the entire Protestant Church, while they viewed the activities of the resistant priests in the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (CPAJ) as being backed by the entire Catholic community. The influence that was gained by minority Catholic activists permeated the entire Church through the contagion of legitimacy.56

Notes 1. Samuel P.  Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 74. 2. Bruce Cumings, “The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in the Light of Latin American Experience,” New Left Review, no. 173 (1989): 7–8. 3. Jang Jip Choi, “Kwadae Sungjang Kukgaeui Hyungsunggwa Jungchi Kyunyuleui Jungae” [The formation of the overdeveloped state and the development of political cleavages], in Hankook Hyundae Jungchieui kujowa Byunhwa [The Structure and Change of Contemporary Korean Politics] (Seoul: Kkachi, 1989), 104. 4. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C.  Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 49. 5. Chung-Shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 174. 6. Ibid., p. 178. 7. Nyung Kim, “The Politics of Religion in South Korea, 1974–1989: The Catholic Church’s Political Opposition to the Authoritarian State,” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1993), 221–227. 8. In-Chul Kang, “Religion and the Democratization Movement,” Korea Journal 40, no. 2 (2000): 234. 9. Park, pp. 183–184. 10. Ibid., p. 189. 11. Dohyup Shin, “The Effects of Organizational Coupling on the Legitimacy of Religious Organizations and Social Movements: An Organizational Analysis of Korean Religion in the Democratization Movement, 1972–1987,” PONPO (Program on Non-Profit Organizations), Working Paper No. 203, and ISPS (Institution for Social and Policy Studies), Working Paper No. 2203 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1994), 4–7. 12. Ibid., p. 6. 13. Juan J.  Linz, “Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain,” in Robert A.  Dahl, ed., Regimes and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 200–201. 14. Shin, p. 4.

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15. Hyug Baeg Im, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics 34, no. 2 (1987): 254. 16. Dong-Sik Yu, Hankook Sinhakeui Kwangmaek [The veins of Korean theology] (Seoul: Junmangsa, 1982), 238. Prominent leaders of Minjung Theology included the Reverends Moo Ik Hwan, Yu Dong Sik, Seo Nam Dong, Ahn Byung Moo, Park Hyug-Kyu, Moon Dong-Hwan, Kim Chan Kook, and Yoon Sung Bum. 17. Park, p. 189. 18. Shin, p. 32. 19. The six denominations of the KNCC are the Christ Presbyterian Assembly of Korea, Jesus Presbyterian Church of Korea, Salvation Army in Korea, Methodist Church, Anglican Church and Christ Evangelical Church of Korea. 20. Kim, p. 8. 21. Arthur F.  McGovern, “Catholic Social Teachings: A Brief History,” in Pedro Ramet, ed., Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 37. 22. Ibid., p. 40. 23. Shin, p. 38. 24. Ibid., p. 39. 25. Mainwaring affirmed this view by noting that “the Church enjoys greater legitimacy in popular circles than do most politicians or political movements … because the Church does not worry about coming to power, it can remain more concerned with pedagogical issues than popular movements or political parties.” See Scott Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), 241–242. 26. Kim, pp. 352. 27. Ibid., p. 353. 28. Park, pp. 40–41. 29. Chi Jun Roh and In-Chul Kang, “Haebanghu Hankook Sahoe Byundonggwa Jonggyo” [Social changes and religion in Korea since liberation], in Korea Research Foundation, ed., Collection of Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of National Liberation, Vol.4 (Seoul: Korea Research Foundation, 1995), 195, 207. 30. Soo-In Lee, “Hankookeui Kukgawa Siminsahoe mit Gaesingyoeui Jungchisahoejuk Taedo Byundongeh Gwanhan Younku” [A Study of the State and Civil Society and the Changes of Political Attitudes of the Protestant Church in Korea] (PhD diss., Ewha Womans University, 2002), 142. 31. Roh and Kang, pp. 216–217. 32. Kang, p. 226.

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33. Park, p. 192. 34. Hyun Chin Lim, Hyundae Hankoogwa Jongsok Iron [Modern Korea and Dependency Theory] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987), 249–273. 35. Thomas Robbins, “Cults, Converts and Charisma: The Sociology of New Religious Movements,” Current Sociology 36, no. 1 (1988): 164–168. 36. Kang, p. 229. 37. Ibid., pp. 230–231. 38. Park, p. 192. 39. Ibid., p. 193. 40. Hak-Kyu Sohn, “Political Opposition and the Yushin System: Radicalization in South Korea, 1972–1979” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1988), 133–134. 41. Kim, p. 261. 42. Ibid., p. 267. 43. Chul Hee Chung, “Hankook Minjuhwa Undongeui Sahoejuk Kiwon” [Social origins of democracy movements in Korea], Hankook Sahoehak [Korean Journal of Sociology] 29 (Autumn 1995): 501–532. 44. Hyug Baeg Im, “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea,” in Sang-Yong Choi, ed., Democracy in Korea: Its Ideals and Realities (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1997), 84–85. 45. Park, pp. 186–187. 46. Shin, pp. 40–41. 47. Park, p. 192. 48. Shin, p. 44. 49. Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, The Progressive Church in Latin America (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 26. 50. Shin, p. 41. 51. Ibid., p. 42. 52. Kang, p. 243. 53. Kim, p. 351. 54. Ibid., p. 352. 55. Shin, p. 44. The number of Protestant ministers who participated in the democratization movement was 12,700 of 40,700 (about 30%) in 1983, while the number of participating Catholic priests was 200 of 1200 (about 17%) in 1984. 56. Shin, pp. 45–46.

PART II

Democratic Consolidation and After

CHAPTER 6

Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Opportunities and Constraints

The Enabling and Confining Conditions for Democratic Consolidation Korea crossed the first threshold of democratic transition in June 1987, when the ruling military elites announced the restoration of democratic competition in concession to popular demand. After the June 29th Declaration, a new constitution was made for the first time in Korean history through a political pact between ruling military elites and the democratic opposition. Since then, two consecutive presidential and National Assembly elections have been held under the same constitutional framework. The arena of electoral politics has expanded into local politics. For the first time since 1960, Koreans have elected leaders of their living communities. Besides the official, formal political arena, many representatives of civil associations have been chosen by the votes of members. The once-­ powerful military has been kept in the barracks. These are sufficient reasons to conclude that Korea has already crossed the irreversible threshold of democratic transition in less than five years. Even though this transition was late in world time, the pace of transition and consolidation has been so swift as to overtake earlier starters of democratization in Latin America.

Hyug Baeg Im, “Opportunities and Constraints to Democratic Consolidation in Korea,” Korea Journal of Population and Development, 181–216, Vol. 25, No. 2, December 1996. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_6

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Having successfully completed the first stage of democratic transition, the battleground for Koreans has moved from a “war of movement” to dethrone an authoritarian state to “war of position” to construct accountable and responsive representative institutions and a strong bastion of civil society. Social democratization has replaced political democratization as the major area of democratic reform. Now Koreans are tackling the problems such as what type of democracy to construct, how to organize civil society and what kind and how to reformulate the state-civil society relations. This means that they are now entering into the second stage of democratization, that is, democratic consolidation. While the prime concern at the first stage is how to remove the military from power and install a democratic government through contested elections, the second stage of democratization focuses on the consolidation of new fragile democratic institutions and norms, that is, to make the people internalize, become used to and routinize democratic rules of game and norms. Democracy is respected as valuable for its “elaborate rules for its conflict resolution.”1 For the consolidation of a new democracy, rules for distributing benefits and costs should be agreed upon, legitimized and internalized by relevant actors, that is, the institutionalization of conflict resolution. In this chapter, I analyze the enabling and confining conditions for democratic consolidation in Korea. First, the modalities of democratic transition that have long-lasting impact upon consolidation process are investigated. Then opportunities and constraints the new democracy has been facing. The new Korean democracy enjoys a prosperous economy, ethnic homogeneity, religious peace, an effective state and civilian control over the military. Nevertheless, it is burdened with many obstacles such as low institutionalization of political society, weak constitutionalism, underdevelopment of civil society and external security vulnerability. Overall, however, the factors working in favor of democratic consolidation outweigh the countervailing obstacles compared to new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Democratic Consolidation: Conceptual Review When can we consider a new democracy consolidated? How does one know when consolidation is complete? The minimalist conception for a consolidated democratic regime has been provided by Adam Przeworski, who states that “democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only

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game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside of the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.”2 Juan Linz concurs with Przeworski, stating that a consolidated democratic regime is one “in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions to consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers … To put it simply, democracy must be seen as ‘the only game in town.’”3 Linz and Stepan describe the more detailed state of consolidated democracy: behaviorally, no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime; attitudinally, the overwhelming majority of people believe that any further political change must emerge within the parameters of democratic procedures; and, constitutionally, all actors become habituated to the fact that political conflicts will be resolved according to established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly.4 What such a minimalist conception emphasizes for democratic consolidation is spontaneous and self-enforcing compliances to democratic norms and institutions: “the compliance constitutes the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all relevant political forces.”5 For me, defining democratic consolidation as simply the institutionalization of competition is too narrow to describe the complexity of “consolidated” democracy. It is a kind of Schumpeterian conception of democracy that equates democracy with elections. Democracy is not simply electoral competition which is held regularly. One could not call a regime democratic in which elections are held regularly, but significant forces are excluded from political competition and particular socioeconomic alternatives and blueprints are excluded from consideration in electoral agora. One could not call a regime a democracy in which elected representatives are not accountable for their actions and do not keep the campaign promises to constituencies after elected. Therefore, a broadened conception of democratic consolidation is needed to include the additional requirements such as the guarantees of basic civil rights, democratic accountability and responsiveness. Schumpeterian “procedural minimum” should be complemented with substantive requirements such as civilian control over the military, democratic and constitutional checks on executive authority (i.e., “horizontal accountability”) and Tocquevillian social democratization (i.e., absence of

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extreme forms of social relations and the protection of citizens by law in social and economic relationships).6 In order to achieve an extended version of consolidated democracy, several interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must be present or be crafted. Linz, Stepan and Gunther argue that for a regime to be regarded as a consolidated democracy, five distinctive conditions must be achieved: (1) a free and lively civil society; (2) a relatively autonomous political society; (3) an effective rule of law; (4) a bounded state bureaucracy; and (5) an institutionalized economic society. (1) The organizational and associational life of civil society—protected by law and with some base in the economy—must have a reasonably high degree of autonomy. (2) The specific procedures and institutions of political society (parties, electoral systems, legislatures, etc.) must be valued in them, and have a sufficient degree of autonomy to function adequately. (3) The institutions of democracy, the individual rights and the rights of minorities must be embedded in—and guided and protected by—constitutionalism and the rule of law. (4) The state bureaucracies, whose task it is to implement laws, procedures and policies decided upon by political society, must operate within the confines of democratic mandates, constitutionalism and professional norms; and the vast majority of the bureaucracy, both civil and military, must respect the authority of democratically elected government. (5) There should be a certain degree of market autonomy and ownership diversity (government regulation of economic relations and mixed patterns of public and private ownership notwithstanding), so that sufficient pluralism can exist to permit the autonomous group activity necessary for a modem democracy.7 From this conceptual journey, we understand that the process of democratic consolidation is not simply to institutionalize democratic political competition, but more broadly to stabilize, institutionalize, routinize, internalize, habituate and legitimize democratic procedures and norms in the political, social, economic, cultural and legal arena.

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The Modality of Democratic Transition The modality of democratic transition has long-lasting impacts on the pattern, content and degree of democratic consolidation. The modes of transition, according to Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, determine, to a significant extent, which “types of democracy” will emerge, whether or not they will be consolidated and what the long-range consequences will be for different social groups.8 Therefore, in order to predict the future prospect of consolidation of a new democracy, one may look back retrospectively to identify the enabling conditions, modes and strategic interactions that made the preceding democratic transition possible.9 What then was the modality of transition in Korea? First, the Korean transition was a typical example of transition from an economically successful authoritarian regime. Two contrasting patterns of democratic transition emerged from the economic performance of authoritarian regimes: “crises of success” and “crises of failure.” In Latin America and Eastern Europe, authoritarian dictators were forced to step down from power just because they failed to accomplish a self-imposed historical mission of economic development. Severe economic crises rendered favorable conditions for democratic transitions—this is what I call transition by crises of failures. In South Korea, Taiwan and Spain, democratic transition was caused by “crises of success.” The authoritarian dictators had to withdraw from power simply because they had accomplished their historical mission of economic development. Having done so, they became historically obsolete and had to be replaced by democracy to meet new historical necessities such as more freedom and more welfare for the masses. This is the pattern I call “transition by crises of success.”10 Compared to new democracies evolving from crises of failures, those deriving from crises of success are in a relatively advantageous position for democratic consolidation. The economy is generally in good shape; the post-authoritarian democratic state is not bankrupt; the state remains effective with relatively efficient bureaucracies. Post-authoritarian states are not in the situation that “a weak state is facing a weak society.” Overall, new democracies from the crises of success are not facing the level and amount of dangers that threatened the new democracies in Eastern Europe as well as Latin America. Second, the new democracy in Korea emerged out of a “market-­ authoritarian regime.”11 The authoritarianism the new democracy replaced

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was market-friendly or market-conforming in the sense that the authoritarian state stressed market rationality and economic liberalization. Its prime concern was to submit every actor to the discipline of the market. Yet the repressive character of the authoritarian state is not generally lessened under market authoritarianism. The market-authoritarian state forces every actor to comply with market order; it forces market losers not to withdraw from the market; it deprives the underprivileged of shelter from destructive forces of the market and it removes protection and subsidies provided to rent-seeking capitalists and farmers. The market-authoritarian state is, in general, in a better position with regard to market-oriented economic adjustment and structural reform. Nonetheless, even though it is economically more successful, it is no less vulnerable to democratic transition than populist, socialist or clientelistic authoritarianism. Because of weak state-society ties inherent in market authoritarianism, it sows the seeds of its own demise. The market-­ conforming authoritarian state, generally speaking, tries to demobilize and to depoliticize civil society. It urges civil society elements to compete with each other in a decentralized market situation. Relying more on market mechanisms, however, the state finds its capacity to build an organized base of support diminishing. When popular sectors erupt against it, the state does not have friends in organized social forces. Without a mass base of support, it becomes vulnerable to economic fluctuation and political turmoil.12 The demise of Chun Doo Hwan’s market-authoritarian state resembles this scenario. Chun’s market-conforming policies disintegrated the state-­ society networks or “developmental coalition” formed under Park Chung Hee. For big business, stabilization measures meant the disappearance of rents furnished by the state in the form of subsidies and protections from foreign competitors. By strengthening market principles, the state lost many policy instruments to attract big business into an authoritarian coalition. When popular protest was activated against the authoritarian state, the state elites found that big businesses were no longer the staunch ally to live and die with them. While a symbiotic relationship between big business and the authoritarian state remained mostly intact under Park’s authoritarianism, cracks in this “sword-won alliance” emerged in Chun’s market authoritarianism. Neo-conservative reforms also alienated farmers. Cuts in subsidies for grain and fertilizer prices, and import liberalization of farm products, turned farmers against the Chun regime.13

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Chun’s market-authoritarian state neither built its own friends and supporters in civil society, nor allowed civil society to organize their specific group or sectoral interests. The state tried to defend its autonomy by keeping civil society in an isolated market situation. Policing the market order aroused voices of discontent from civil society. Karl Polanyi once pointed out that unrestrained market movements sparked the countermovement of market losers in civil society to protect themselves against the destructive forces of the market.14 The eruption of anti-state popular movements of workers, farmers and the urban poor in the mid-1980s resembled the Polanyian countermovement of civil society. Although the middle class was the main beneficiary of the neo-conservative reform, it did not show political support for the regime. It was the middle class who broke the authoritarian legitimacy formula. On being freed from worrying about economic survival, they no longer tolerated the trade-off between economic development and political freedom, and joined the democratization movement that strengthened the democratizing coalition to the maximum extent of forcing authoritarian power holders to concede to democratic reforms with the June 29 Declaration for democratization by the ruling party’s candidate, Roh Tae Woo.15 The prospect for consolidation for a new democracy from market authoritarianism is brighter in the economic sense because the new democracy does not face a difficult task of simultaneously converting to a market economy and democratic polity. Finally, the mode of democratic transition in Korea was close to “transplacement”16 or “transition through transaction,”17 “transition by pact,”18 “reforma pactada,”19 “democracy with guarantees.”20 In Korea, the transition emerged out of a protracted and inconclusive standoff between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition. The regime and the opposition made a breakthrough for democratic transition on the brink of “reciprocal destruction.” Both agreed to get out of a Gramscian “catastrophic balance” by making a second-best compromise to restore formal democracy. On the eve of the democratic transition, the balance of force between the regime and the opposition was a catastrophic one in the sense that the democratic coalition, although broadened and expanded to maximum extent, was not physically strong enough to force the surrender of the power bloc; and the latter, even though severely weakened and divided, kept the last resort, to call in the army. Under this circumstance, the democratic coalition had to be satisfied with the restoration of formal democracy by the authoritarian power holders. The June 29 Declaration and ensuing compromise of constitution making was a

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political pact in which authoritarian power holders were guaranteed to keep their incumbent status in exchange for the concession of restoring democratic competition. Guaranteeing incumbent status turned out to be a crucial premium for the military candidate, Roh Tae Woo, to be elected president in the transition election. Because the transition was made through pacts, guarantees or negotiations among elites, continuity rather than rupture with the authoritarian past has prevailed in political, social and economic policies of the new democratic governments. Despite the restoration of political competition in central and local governments, and the expansion of space of competition to civil society, the authoritarian economic and social fabric has remained intact. Democracy in Korea was very anemic and conservative. The legacies of an authoritarian past hindered the consolidation of political democracy and the expansion of democracy in the social and economic areas. These are the modalities of the democratic transition in Korea. Yet we should be careful that the modality of transition does not determine the path of consolidation. In Korea, the foundational pacts between authoritarian power holders and democratic opposition did not last indefinitely as was the case of Poland. Additionally, the foundational pact that guaranteed “vital interests” of the military was broken by civilian president Kim Young Sam, who put former military Presidents Chun and Roh on trial. Whether the “confining conditions” will be removed or will remain will depend on the choice and craftsmanship of reform leaders. Democratic consolidation is not under strict path dependency on the authoritarian past and the modality of transition.

Facilitators Economic Affluence The key supporting condition that has made Koreans optimistic about the future prospects of democratic consolidation is the economy. A prosperous economy has protected the new fragile democracy laden with uncertainties, shifting interests, risks of reforms, contagious “street parliaments” and nostalgia for the authoritarian past. It is the major bulwark against the forces of authoritarian subversion. In the last half century, Koreans have transformed one of the poorest economies of the world to one of its economic power houses. Per capita income has risen from a mere $103  in

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1963 to more than $10,000  in 1995. South Korea is the 11th largest economy and the 13th largest trading country in the world. It is the second largest shipbuilder, the fourth in electronics, the sixth in steel and the seventh largest automobile producer. Koreans have accomplished this spectacular economic growth without seriously distorting equality and the quality of life.21 Korea is one of very few countries to have escaped a vicious cycle of poverty and dictatorship in the twentieth century by upgrading from the periphery to the prestigious club of advanced industrial economies. Recently, Adam Przeworski and his collaborators disclosed striking empirical evidence that “above $6000, democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever; no democratic system has fallen in a country where per-capita income exceeds $6055 (Argentina’s level in 1976).”22 Przeworski’s disclosure put an end to the long debate on the effect of economic development on democracy. With the hard statistical evidence, Przeworski declared Lipset the winner of the debate. The Lipsetian neo-­ modernization thesis is a contemporary argument for capitalism and democracy: “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” From the experiences of the West, modernization theorists try to generalize the universal causality of capitalism and democracy.23 According to the neo-modernization thesis, democracy can prosper on the soil of political culture created by the abundance economy of capitalism because economic abundance would provide a hospitable soil for democratic political culture favoring tolerance, reconciliation and compromise.24 The Lipsetian thesis seemed at one time to be discredited, as military coup after coup toppled democratic governments with relatively advanced capitalist economies such as South Korea, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. However, the successive transition to democracy in these countries since the mid-1970s has resurrected the modernization thesis. It has been confirmed by 70 years’ experience of socialism in Eastern Europe. Marx’s socialist democracy “which he believed would be an egalitarian and democratic system with politically weak state, could only occur under the conditions of abundance.”25 Marx’s contention that socialism comes out of the womb of capitalism can be understood in the sense that socialism as the ideal democracy does not come out of economic scarcity but out of economic abundance. Lipsetians argue that Marx’s theory of socialism based on economic abundance has ironically been proven by the recent collapse of really existing socialism. The socialism of the East

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collapsed simply because they failed to establish a mature, affluent economy.26 Then how do we expect an affluent economy to positively contribute to democratic consolidation in Korea? First, the developed and affluent economy relieves the burden of simultaneous transition to constitutional democracy and a market economy that many new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America faced. Relying on rational choice theory, many now argue for the impossibility of simultaneous transition. The main argument for the impossibility of simultaneous economic and political reform is that economic reform cannot proceed without democracy, but democracy has no chance without prior price and property reform.27 In Eastern Europe, according to Offe, “capitalism by design” under democracy finds it immensely difficult to get the support from the majority of the population because they believe that the introduction of property rights and market mechanism will enrich the powerful and the powerless will fall victim to the market.28 In Latin America, too, where economic reform from an oligopolistic to a competitive economy has been undertaken, the dilemmas of double reform are serious, even though less acute than in Eastern Europe. Korea has none of these problems, however. The authoritarian regime that the new democracy inherited was a highly “market-friendly” regime. Most of the neo-conservative economic reforms had already been carried out under Chun Doo Hwan’s market authoritarianism. Deregulation, the dismantling of the system of subsidies and privatization have been continuously pursued by the new democracy. But price reforms did not create extensive layoffs because the most serious problem in the Korean economy is labor shortage. Second, the “surplus democracy” from a burgeoning economy enables the move toward a “welfare state”: more social safety networks, job security, occupational safety and health, and better working conditions. Compared to “deficit democracies” in Western Europe and the United States, which are suffering the retreat of the welfare state, Korean “surplus democracy” has room to further a welfare state, which would certainly provide the material base for a democratic class compromise. The Korean model of growth with equity widens the range of choice for both politicians and people. The economy provides an opportunity to institutionalize “economic society” in the words of Linz and Stepan. The formula for economic society that would be recommended is the one that mediates between the “market-friendly state” and “people-friendly” market.

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Ethnic Homogeneity The issue of “ethnicity” has gained prominence in the debate on citizenship in new democracies. The ethnicity problem poses a more serious challenge to new democracies than it did to old democracies of the West during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Modern democracy as developed in Western Europe is characterized by the rule of the people within a national territorial boundary. The people have been defined as the sum of legally equal citizens. The notion of popular sovereignty constitutes both the “demos” component and the “ethnos” component. Democratization means, on the one hand, the extension of citizenship rights to lower classes, women and younger people, and, on the other, its extension to non-natives (immigrants, aliens and guest workers). The popular sovereignty of the modern state thus had an inclusive character. It allowed the possibility of admitting immigrants to the national community, provided they adhered to the political rules and were willing to adapt to the national culture. Therefore, ethnic homogeneity based on common ancestry did not set the boundary of citizenship. The requirement of membership of a nation was not ethnicity but the acceptance of rights and duties of citizens. The French and American Revolution spread the idea of people living as citizens of nationally constituted societies. Modern nationalism involved an attempt to overcome local ethnocultural diversity and to produce standardized citizens whose loyalties to the nation are ideally unchallenged by extra-social allegiances.29 With the successful creation of homogeneous citizens through a cultural homogenizing process, nationalism could coexist with democracy in the West of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Many new democracies, especially in Eastern Europe and Russia, however, do not enjoy such a happy cohabitation of nationalism and democracy. Once a vacuum was created by the collapse of communism in the East, ethnic nationalism rushed to fill the void.30 Cooperation among ethnicities became harder in the post-Cold War era, because the advantage of scale in terms of security and economic prosperity disappeared, and every ethnicity tried to build their nation based on mono-ethnicity. The intensifying global economic competition worsened the ethnic problem. Underneath cultural strife lies an economic reason, namely, the fact that economic inequality is increasing in the era of globalization. Those who were relegated to marginal positions in the international division of labor seek forms of shelter to protect them from the destructive forces of the

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market. They try to find shelter in anti-market, past-oriented, local, ethnic identities. The losers in the global competition have nostalgia for the past. They try to constitute an identity based on historically and emotionally shared memories of the past. This kind of backward identity formation, however, is detrimental to the consolidation of democracy. While democracy thrives on the soil of pluralist political culture tolerating diverse opinions and alternatives, ethno-national fundamentalism will suffocate the development of a pluralist democratic political culture. In this regard, Korean democracy is blessed. Korea is ethnically one of the most homogeneous countries in the world, and, thus, has not suffered from ethnic conflicts in the post-transition period. For Koreans, the distinction between an “ethnicity” and a “nation” has never existed. They imagined the geographic boundary of the nation and identified its members through an ethnicity (jok) which had existed since the beginning of their history.31 In addition to the actual fact of ethnic homogeneity in biological terms, the common painful experience of Japanese colonialism and Korean War strengthened ethnic nationalism.32 This cohesive ethnic nationalism has been the prime mover for “late industrialization” in Korea. People believed in achieving an industrial nation as the collective project of the nation and worked hard for the project. In Korea, the national issue or ethnic issue was solved before normal democratic politics could take place. More correctly, the ethnic issue was non-existent both before and after the transition. In the new democracy, there has been no conflict between the “demos” component and the “ethnos” component. It has been exempted from ethnic conflicts. The country had the good fortune of having established a democracy based on pre-­ established ethnic homogeneity, rendering superfluous consociation arrangements to ease ethnic conflicts, which have been experimented widely in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Nigeria, Spain and other countries.33 Religious Tolerance Korea is one of the most religiously vibrant and dynamic societies in the world. Most of the world’s largest national churches in terms of number of followers are located in Korea. It is also multi-religious society, where no single religion dominates religious life. Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism and Confucianism (even though some say it is an ethical code rather than a religion) coexist peacefully. Given the fact that many new

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democracies in Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia are suffering from religious conflicts and that religious fundamentalism is the major stumbling block to democratic transition in the Middle East, Korean new democracy is blessed with interreligious peace. How and why has religious pluralism prospered in Korea? Most Koreans became believers in one or another religion in order to survive rapid socioeconomic change. To survive the stress generated by the devastating effects of the Korean War, compressed industrialization and authoritarian repression, people sought shelter in religion. During the last half century, the growth rate of the number of Christians is one of the highest in the world. This growth was not, however, made at the expense of the traditional religions like Buddhism, which has also flourished in the post-­ War period. According to Kim Byung Kuk, religious tolerance has been nurtured by indigenization and synchronization of imported foreign religions like Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity. Koreans indigenized and syncretized religions imported from abroad with shamanism.34 Shamanism does not acknowledge the transcendental state of human existence. For shamanism, what matters is the life in this world. It lacks a dichotomous, conflictive conception of this world versus the other world, body versus spirit. Through the process of indigenization and synchronization of imported religions of Buddhism and Christianity with the injection of shamanistic elements, Koreans transformed gods into an instrument for men to achieve secular goals. In Korea even the most transcendental religion like Christianity has emphasized this worldliness. The functionalist and anthropocentric understanding embraces a diversity of religions, thus fostering religious tolerance. It is no wonder that a multi-religious society never had religious strife and religious war.35 Second, post-Confucianism is an asset rather than a liability for democratic consolidation in Korea. Recently there have been vigorous debates on whether or not positive effects of Confucianism or the Confucian ethic on economic development can be extended to political democracy as well. The compatibility between Confucianism and democracy is widely debated in consolidation. Huntington argues that “Confucian Democracy is a contradiction in terms, but democracy in Confucian society need not be.”36 The Confucian ethic emphasizing hard work, thrift, diligence, education, social harmony and loyalty to authority played an important role in the East Asian Miracle. However, many still doubted that the impact of the Confucian value system on democratic consolidation would be positive.37

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Confucian emphasis on family, group norms, social harmony and moral, political and economic order suffocate the development of a political culture of individualism and personal freedom, giving rise to “government by men” rather than “government by laws.”38 Nonetheless, many, including Fukuyama, for example, argue that “Confucianism is obviously compatible with democracy.” First, the Confucian examination system is a meritocratic institution with potentially egalitarian implications. Second, the Confucian emphasis on education contributes positively to the development of democracy because a high level of education facilitates people’s participation in political debates. Lastly, “this-worldly” Confucianism is tolerant of other religions, having coexisted with Buddhism and Christianity.39 Besides those pointed out by Fukuyama, Confucianism in Korea has other virtues that are compatible with and even facilitate democracy. In Korea, there is no Confucian orthodoxy in operation. Confucianism has been secularized to the point where it can best be called “post-­ Confucianism.” The “high” or political Confucianism of the ruling elites has been replaced by the “low” or bourgeois Confucianism of the ordinary people. Post- or secularized Confucianism has been not only the engine of Korean growth but also a new reservoir for democratic culture. First, the Confucian emphasis on “this worldliness” fosters a positive attitude to the affairs of this world, and faith in the transformability of human condition. Second, anthropocentric Confucianism emphasizes self-­ cultivation and the self as the center of relationship and interconnectedness, but has an aversion to self-centeredness, thus promoting individualism with civic duties. Third, post-Confucianism nurtures political accountability by its emphasis on the reciprocity of respect for authority and public accountability. Confucianism regards the political order as a moral community, and therefore post-Confucianism fosters social interconnectedness, public spirit, social trust and social capital, the essential features of post-individualistic democracy. Imbued with syncretic culture, Koreans have shown an extraordinary adaptability in transforming Confucianism in the new environment from its old, high, dogmatic, political, authoritarian form to a new, low, pragmatic, bourgeois, democratic Confucianism.40 They have selectively discarded, modified and downplayed its old, dogmatic elements, and instead absorbed, assimilated and injected new elements of Western virtues into post-Confucianism. For instance, whereas old familism suffocated individual freedom and initiatives, new familism and loyalty to kinship and

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communal collectivities restrain the excessive individualism that is rampant in Western market democracies. All in all, pragmatic Confucianism and Christianity are assets rather than a liability for the consolidation of new democracy in Korea.41 Effective State Democratic consolidation needs an effective state. In many Eastern European and Latin American countries the most serious problem is that “weak state is facing weak Society.”42 As Linz and Stepan conclude decisively: “no state, no democracy.” Unless an effective state exists, there can be no free and authoritative elections, no exercise of monopoly of legitimate force, no effective protection of rights to citizens by the rule of law. For the consolidation of democracy, the authority of the polis and the rights of the demos should not be in conflict.43 In South Korea, the power of the state has been weakened since the transition. Yet the state is still effective compared to other new democracies. Like other cases of transition, the democratization in Korea involves the devolution of power from the central government to local governments and communities. In fact, the democratization movement in Korea is basically the resistance movement against the abuse of and the arbitrary use of power by the “over-developed” authoritarian “developmental” state. Since the democratic transition, centrifugal movement has continued and successive measures of devolution of power from the polis to the demos have been carried on. Even though in the first transition election, the candidate responsible for the reinstallation of the authoritarian regime was elected as president, in subsequent National Assembly elections, the first sign of centrifugal tendency was revealed. In the election, for the first time since 1950, the ruling party could not obtain a majority and a situation known as Yoso Yadae (a small ruling party vs. a large opposition) was created. Even though the centrifugal tendency was checked by the formation of a mega-­ ruling party through three party mergers in 1991, the power of the center has become far weaker than in previous authoritarian regimes. In 1991, the election of local assemblymen took place for the first time since Park Chung Hee terminated local elections “until the unification is accomplished.”44 And with some political brawling, parties reached a compromise on the election of the local government head by spring 1991. Despite some delay, the election of local government heads and local assemblymen

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was held in June 1995. Again, the outcome of the local elections revealed the centrifugal tendency. In this election, the ruling party suffered a decisive loss while opposition parties won clearly in the majority of localities. Despite extensive devolution of power, the state is still relatively effective. Moreover, the efficiency of the state bureaucracy has increased due to successive civilian governments’ political reforms to eliminate corruption and irregularities, such as the public disclosure of assets of politicians and high-ranking officials, anti-corruption legislations, reform legislation on political contribution and campaign money and the presidential decree on the “real-name financial accounting system” to cut off channels for bribing officials and politicians by businessmen. The continued high rate of economic growth under the civilian government is hard evidence that the effectiveness of the state has not declined since the inauguration of a democratically elected civilian government. In fact, the high competence of bureaucracy based on the Confucian merit system remains intact. Democracy has not brought forth a fiscal crisis, budget deficit or overall rent-seeking activities. Even though public expenditure on social programs has increased, it turned out not to have negative effects on economic growth.45 Civilian Control over the Military Many new democracies have been threatened, explicitly and implicitly, by a military establishment who regard themselves as the privileged definers and guardians of the national interests.46 In many new democracies, even after returning to the barracks, the “attentive” military plays a significant role in politics behind the scenes. Therefore, unless military tutelage over civilian politics is eliminated explicitly, the new democracy cannot be called consolidated. In this sense, the military extrication and the ensuing reaffirmation of civilian supremacy over the military is a good sign for democratic consolidation in Korea. In 1993, Koreans had their first civilian president, Kim Young Sam, in 30 years. Although Kim owed very much to the former military elites in his election as president, he did a tremendous job of establishing a firm civilian control over the military. His reform was so successful as to revise the O’Donnell-Schmitter model of democratic transition. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, the military and the capitalists are the king of the democratic chess game. It is forbidden to take the king because if they are threatened, “they may simply sweep the opponents off the board to

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kick it over and start playing solitaire.”47 O’Donnell and Schmitter warned that in the country with a long tradition of military rule and entrenched business interests, a civilian democratic government must be cautious not to provoke the military and the capitalist privileges. Przeworski also suggested that the prodemocratic forces be prepared to offer concessions to the military in exchange for democracy.48 Kim Young Sam’s government, however, dared to ignore these warnings. On taking office, Kim, to everybody’s surprise, took a decisive action to purge most of the politicized military officer group, Hanahwae, who, under preceding governments, had monopolized strategic posts and constituted the supporting base of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. Even these former military presidents themselves were put on trial on charges of corruption, and for the Kwangju massacre of May 1980 and the military subversion of December 1989, respectively. President Kim’s military reform is no doubt the greatest achievement of his presidency, because purging the entrenched military elites from political and military organizations was a highly risky job for the president of one of most highly militarized countries in the world. Yet Kim’s military reform proved successful, and now very few in Korea could conceive a military coup as a viable option to influence politics and solve socioeconomic “ills.”49 The potential subversive attempts of the military were preempted by the good performance of the new democracy in Korea. Given the fact that the failure of democracy in terms of corruption, economic stagnation and institutional malfunctioning creates the space for military intervention in the name of rectifying social ills, salvaging the nation and restoring order, the new democracy did not give the military such an opportunity for intervention.50

Obstacles Low Institutionalization of Political Society Democracy needs a strong institutionalization of political society. To consolidate a new democracy, the institutions of the political parties, the electoral system and the representative organizations must have sufficient capacities to articulate, aggregate and represent the interests of their constituencies in the political arena.51 The fact that elections are institutionalized does not necessarily mean the new democracy is consolidated. Elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic

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consolidation. Democracy is not consolidated if major decisions are made by the president and his entourage outside of representative institutions and channels, even if elections are held regularly and civil rights are generally observed. In South Korea, the institutionalization of political society crossed the minimal threshold by institutionalizing electoral competitions. The election of Kim Young Sam meant that two consecutive presidents had been elected under the same rules of the game. The institutionalization of electoral rules and games, in fact, increased the expectations that democratic competition would repeat regularly regardless of exogenous fluctuations (i.e., institutionalizing uncertainty). Yet we cannot consider the new democracy consolidated simply by the fact that elections are institutionalized. In this regard, political society in Korea did not reach the point of institutionalization and consolidation. Still, the accountability and responsiveness of the government to citizens between elections remain low. First, political parties are not yet institutionalized. The lives of parties are ephemeral. There remain no political parties who have kept the party name since the time of democratic transition of 1987. Few parties have kept their names beyond one government; no party or party names have lasted more than two Korean republics thus far.52 The major political parties come and go with the ambition of charismatic leaders who have an unshaken regional stronghold. Since 1987, most politicians, irrespective of their ideological and policy position, have continuously aligned and realigned according to the moves of their charismatic leaders, and the leaders “create the party to suit his or her political needs or in the more recent past, recreate it in the leader’s own image.”53 Autocratic control from the party headquarters has vitiated the democratic process within the party.54 Three key political leaders, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil, all founded, dissolved and reestablished “a political party at will, which in turn manages the elections by controlling almost exclusively the power of nominating the party candidates of each and every electoral district, and successfully elected representatives arrive at the National Assembly and function like robots under the strict guidance and leadership of the party bosses.”55 Party bossism has posed insurmountable impediments to the consolidation of democracy in Korea. It prevents a new democracy from being consolidated for the following reasons. First, party bossism obstructs the growth of democratic responsiveness and accountability. Elections are held regularly but elected officials do not keep the campaign promises to

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constituencies but behave on behalf of their bosses, and the collective rational choice that is the core of democracy becomes impossible, and we cannot call it democracy. Second, party bossism fosters clientelism in politics. According to Kim Byung Kook, with religion and class powerless in organizing politics, the party bosses came to rely on monetary incentives.56 The patron-client relationship between party bosses and followers nourishes corruption, particularism, personalism, nepotism and patronage. Elected officials serve the particularistic interests of bosses such as Daekwon (ultimate power), not the universal interests of producing collective or public goods for the community as a whole. Buying support nurtures political corruption; even though the game is played “inside” of democratic institutions, if formal institutions and real practices (or formal rules and actual behavior) do not fit together, then democratic consolidation is in question.57 Third, party bossism Korean style is based on regionalism in politics. Since the authoritarian era, the outcome of electoral politics has been decided by regional cleavages. Under authoritarian regimes, regional voting contributed in some sense to a democratic transition. Two leaders of the democratic opposition, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, had regional strongholds and the staunch support from their home provinces tipped the balance toward a democratic coalition. However, after the transition, the deep-seated regional cleavages divided votes for democratic opponents and contributed decisively to Roh’s election as president. Thereafter, the influence of regional cleavages on electoral outcome was so overwhelming that elections could no longer be the arena in which other cleavages are articulated, contested, represented and resolved. As a consequence, the representatives did not represent the class, religious and occupational interest or general interests of the nation, but only followed faithfully the order of the boss who monopolistically represents the specific region. Under the circumstance that votes count the outcome of election, but the votes are predetermined along the lines of regional cleavages, then it is very hard for politicians to appeal to voters with programs and visions other than regional interests personified in charismatic leaders. Without relinquishing party bossism, the emergence of the durable party system is hard to expect. The Korean party system is too immature to be institutionalized, and voters still tend to pay loyalty to and identify themselves with not a specific party but a charismatic leader from their home province.

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Weak Constitutionalism: “Constitutions Without Constitutionalism” If a constitution matters for democratic consolidation, the problem will arise which constitution would make democracy last longer. Many constitutional theorists favor parliamentarism over presidentialism, citing statistical evidence. Nevertheless, the superiority of parliamentarism is not sufficient to advise citizens and politicians to immediately change a constitutional system, for example, from presidentialism to parliamentarism. Even though we are persuaded that parliamentarism has more virtues in terms of democratic consolidation and governance, a presidential system is still no doubt a truly democratic constitutional system. Once a democratic government is installed, the first job for consolidating a new democracy is not searching for a new and better alternative constitutional formula, but rather internalizing, habituating and routinizing the existing constitutional formulas, so long as these satisfy the minimum requirements for democracy. I make this point because heated debates, squabbling and disputes about the constitution may destabilize fragile new democracies. Korea is a notorious case of constitutions that “are modified frequently and remain irrelevant.”58 From 1948 to 1987, the constitution changed many times, and the average life of a constitution was less than four years. Every president or prime minister took over power with his own constitutional formula. Making, revising and reviving constitutions was the main arena of political conflict. In Korea, the debate on a new constitution starts the day after a presidential election. Every power contender tries to revise the constitution in such a way as to increase the probability of them winning the next election. As a consequence, the constitution had not had the institutional power of regulating interaction and competition among citizens, politicians, parities and interest associations. Constitutionmongers have destabilized the new fragile democracy. Democracy is consolidated when relevant actors can expect that democratic competition will be held regularly and repeatedly under the same rules of the game in the foreseeable future, which is what Przeworski called “institutionalizing uncertainty.” If the uncertain nature of the democratic game is not institutionalized and instead continues to become the focus of political conflict, democratic institutions are weakened as a result, and become vulnerable to the forces which try to subvert the new democracy. Therefore, what Korea needs

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now for democratic consolidation is not a search for a more perfect democratic constitution, but internalizing, habituating and routinizing the values and norms of a presidential system. Changing a constitution in the early stage of democratic consolidation can destabilize a fragile democracy and weaken the institutional autonomy. It would not be too late to discuss and debate on a better constitutional formula for democratic competition after Korean democracy has crossed the threshold whereby the reversal to authoritarianism becomes impossible. Underdevelopment of Civil Society A consolidated democracy needs a strong civil society. Civil society is the new growth industry in the literature of democracy. There are many ways of conceptualizing civil society. Here it means “a society of civility” or civic virtues.59 The concept, as used here, is broader than for Hegel and Marx. For them, civil society means “bürgerliche Gesellschaft,” that is, bourgeois capitalist society (or market society). But the concept of civil society should be broader than that of market society, in the sense that it is not simply the latter but is extended to the sphere of community and culture. As Fish aptly points out, “Capitalism is possible in the absence of civil society. But without civil society, capitalism will not create a ‘civil economy.’”60 Without a civil economy, civil society loses the element of community but reveals the bad element of market society in which everybody pursues their own selfish interests, leading to a Hobbesian war of all against all. For the consolidation of a new democracy, therefore, it is essential to construct a robust civil society based on civic virtues that can overcome the limits of market society. The first systematic study on the relations between democracy and civil society was done by Alexis de Tocqueville. Traveling in America in the 1830s, Tocqueville found the secret of a functioning democracy in America to lie in American people’s “art of association”: Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types— religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute … Where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association. Thus, the most democratic country in the world now is

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that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the objects of common desires. Nothing, in my view, deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations in America.61

Tocqueville found that it was civil associations that reactivated individual citizens, who were likely to be impotent under mass democracy, into active citizens. Through the mediation of voluntary civil associations, the private interests of citizens can coincide with the public interests of communities. Tocqueville warned that under mass democracy, it is very hard for democratic virtues to be realized; rather, the tyranny of the majority would more likely emerge. Yet he found in America that the emergence of mass tyranny had been checked by the burgeoning civil associations and active participation of citizens in community matters. Today’s neo-­ Tocquevillians confirm that a dense network of civil associations improves democratic governance in solving the problem of education, poverty, unemployment, crime, drugs and violence. Neo-Tocquevillians refine the functions of civil associations with the concept of “social capital,” or “social trust.” For them, social capital refers to the “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”62 Dense networks of civic associations foster norms of generalized reciprocity, increase the amount of social trust, facilitate coordination and communication and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. Following the Tocquevillian tradition, Schmitter provides an operating concept of civil society with civic virtue. For Schmitter, civil society can be defined as a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups that (1) are relatively independent of both public authorities and private units of production, that is, of firms and families; (2) are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in defense/promotions of their interests and passions; (3) but do not seek to replace either state agents or private (re)producers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole; (4) but do agree to act within pre-established rules of a “civil” or legal nature.63 Many theorists of civil society argue that a strong civil society performs positive functions within democratic consolidation. According to Schmitter, although the existence of civil society is not a prerequisite either for the demise of autocracy or for the transition to democracy, it contributes positively to the consolidation of democracy.64 First, civil society raises

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the degree of predictability among relevant political actors because civil association provides more reliable information for governance (i.e., institutionalizing uncertainty). Second, it plays the role of the “school of democracy” that inculcates conceptions and norms that are civic. Third, it provides channels for self-expression and identification among proximate individuals and firms, that is, creating channels other than political parties for the articulation, aggregation and representation of interests. Fourth, it reduces the burden of governance for both public authorities and private producers. Finally, it provides the last reservoirs of resistance to arbitrary and tyrannical rule.65 Yet such a rich associational life is not burgeoning in Korea. In South Korea, a strong civil society was revived during the transition to democracy. Civil society played a major role in the transition to democracy.66 It was students, workers, journalists, artists, priests, monks, professionals and white-collar workers who brought forth democracy from authoritarianism in Korea. In the post-transition period, however, civil society in Korea failed to transform itself from “mobilizational civil society” into “institutional civil society.”67 After the democratic transition, the state was forced to loosen its tight control over civil society and allow the expansion of space for civil society to organize. Businessmen, workers, farmers, the urban poor, artists, teachers and journalists all formed autonomous interest associations to defend their class, sectoral, professional or occupational interests. Nonetheless, the proliferation of interest associations was not translated into an institutionalized interest politics. Interest associations have not developed institutionalized channels for mediating differences among them. Korean interest politics is still amorphous, centrifugal, hyperbolic and unruly. Why did civil society, once resurrected as a mobilizing force against authoritarianism, fail to transform itself into institutional civil society under the new democracy? First, the civil society movement failed to understand the difference between transition politics and consolidation politics. In the period of democratic transition, prodemocratic actors are generally engaged in a Gramscian “war of movement” to dethrone authoritarian power holders by a coup de grace. The transition process is “one of rapid change, high risk, shifting interests, and indeterminate strategic reactions,”68 and, therefore, sometimes dramatic and bold actions are required to prevail in the “street parliaments.” While the most important task in the period of transition is mobilizing the popular masses through “Sturm und Drang,” in the period of consolidation, it is “settling into

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trenches,” which is the recommended strategy in the “war of position.” Once the dangerous moment has passed, the civil society movement is compelled to transform itself into institutional civil society: “to organize internal structure more predictably, to consult their constituencies more regularly, and to consider their long-term consequences more seriously.”69 In Korea, too, the momentum of the mobilizing civil society movement dissipated immediately after the transition. Movement politics was replaced by institutional politics: institutions replaced street parliaments. Yet, despite the shifting focus of democratization from transition to consolidation, the civil society movements did not give up the strategies of movement politics: political radicalism, militancy, intransigence and moral purism. But the outcome of the strategies of movement politics was a disaster for “moral civil society.” In the National Assembly elections of 1988 and 1992, no candidate representing the radical social movement forces won a seat; they thus failed to enter the institutional political arena. After this failure, the mobilizational, moral, radical civil society was gradually discredited and forgotten, and it subsequently disintegrated. As a consequence, the space of civil society became depopulated. The activists of moral civil society were compelled to be coopted en masse into the political parties and state administrations.70 Second, the conservative nature of democratic transition must be responsible for the underdevelopment of civil society. Because the new democracy emerged due to “crises of success,” it inherited the main framework of socioeconomic policies of the preceding authoritarian state. Labor policy and social welfare policy are the two main areas of government policy dominated by continuity from the authoritarian state, and have inhibited the growth of vibrant civil association in industrial relations. The democratic state inherited the “company unionism” of the authoritarian state and maintained the three bans of Korean industrial relations: the ban on third-party intervention, the one company-one union rule and the ban on political activities of unions. As a consequence, industrial relations have been characterized by fierce confrontation between unions and firms. Wage rates are settled by strikes. “Chunhyup (spring settlement) after Chuntu” (spring strikes) is the typical Korean style of wage negotiations. High strike rates, lockouts and police intervention in workplaces are the costs Korea has paid for adopting such extreme pluralism. As the level of wages settled by labor-capital confrontation has been the rule rather than the exception, industrial relations in Korea have not been stabilized and

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have become a barrier both to increasing international competitiveness and to consolidating the new democracy. As a result, under the new democracy, organized workers have not been integrated into the networks of tripartite partnership of the state, capital and labor. Even though individual labor unions are accepted as legitimate actors in collective bargaining, they still remain at the status of affiliation, to say nothing of the status of association.71 Labor unions at Korean firms are more like company unions, in the original sense of being dependent wholly on the management in a paternalistic system, as opposed even to Japanese enterprise unions with their own bases for relative autonomy. Company unions can be described as “affiliations” in the sense of assignment to a group solely because of employment by the company. There is no external legal basis for membership, and no ties to labor organizations beyond the firm.72 In addition to industrial relations, the underprovision of social welfare hinders the development of civil society. The current state of Korean social welfare is dismal. The level of social welfare is even below that of latecomers like the Philippines, not to mention Latin American democracies. Since the democratic transition, although a minimum wage, pensions and medical insurance have been introduced, Korea still does not have unemployment insurance, family allowances or social security. In addition, the welfare system is characterized by market dependence. Governments do not bear most of the direct responsibility of funding and providing welfare; instead, welfare is funded and provided by private companies, and therefore payments are highly dependent upon market conditions. The market-dependent welfare system increases the inequality of welfare between large company workers and small and medium company workers. More than that, having never experienced the consequences of welfarism, Korean conservatives have raised their voices against the expansion of the welfare service, speaking about an “English disease” or “European disease.” While the neo-conservatism of the West arose from the failure of the welfare state, Korean neo-conservatism arose out of a preemptive attempt against welfarism. But welfare should be provided and a welfare democracy should be realized. The failure of the welfare state is the failure of the state, not the failure of welfare democracy. That is the only way to protect citizens from the vagaries of the market. It is a kind of social wage that can be paid without participating in the market.73 Nonetheless, the conventional idea that welfare must be provided by the state should be revisited. The failure of the welfare state is a “state failure.” In the West, there has been an enormous growth of state

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apparatuses and welfare bureaucracies, and these welfare bureaucrats maximized not citizen welfare but their own private welfare. As a consequence, society as a whole suffered net losses, that is, what Becker calls “deadweight losses.”74 Thus, it is time to rethink the conventional concept of welfare as planned and provided by the state. There should be a separation between designing and implementing welfare provisions. The state should not monopolize in deciding the level of welfare and providing welfare services, but devolve authority for these to organized civil associations. If the level of welfare is decided by the compromise between organized PIGs (Private Interest Governments) of labor and capital, they will try to link it with productivity increase. If a welfare level is decided, the state takes charge of most of its provision. But in this case, too, it can be provided by the private firms that have been constrained to provide welfare efficiently with minimum costs. But depending too much on the subcontracting and outsourcing to private firms is dangerous because profit motivation is involved in the provision of the welfare services. Therefore, in the provision of welfare services, we should take advantage of civil associations. Currently volunteering movements in the United States have been proven to be an effective associative alternative both to the privatization of welfare, which can cause market failure, and to state welfare collectivism, which can cause “state failure.” Currently in the United States the number of non-profit organizations (NPO) amounts to 1 million, and their activities are performed by 90 million non-paid staff, whose activities make up one-tenth of GNP.75 The key point is that the United States can maintain democracy despite severe inequality and an underdeveloped state welfare system lies in civil volunteering movements led by non-profit organizations. In South Korea, however, such civil input into welfare provision has not yet emerged. Currently the state and businesses favor the Japanese model of company welfarism. But because this model is primarily based on profit motivation for firms, it does not fit well into the fundamental objective of welfare, namely, providing shelter to the victims of market competition. Koreans may thus need to fall back on the virtues of family welfarism, which is based on spontaneous solidarity among family members. But in more complex industrialized societies, traditional small-community-based welfarism tends to become weaker. The alternative, therefore, is to realize the virtue of community at the level of intermediary civil associations. However, the feasibility of democracy based on civil association in Korea is questionable. The rapid increase of regional or group egoism after

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democratic transition warns us that Korean civil associations have grown without civic virtues, and instead are increasingly self-focused at the level of group, region or other collectivities. Economic Globalization Koreans live in the era of economic globalization, “in which capital, production, management, labor, information and technology are organized across national boundaries.”76 In December 1994, the Kim Young Sam government announced globalization (segyehwa) as the prime goal of the civilian government. The globalization of Korean economy, culture and society became the main focus. Many argue that the East Asian “tigers” have been and will be the main beneficiaries of globalization of production. East Asia has been the world’s fastest-growing economy. Its highly export-dependent economies will continue to grow faster than anywhere else. These countries have succeeded in upgrading themselves from producing low-value-added goods to high-value-added goods. Korean conglomerates have themselves become significant foreign investors, and are now trying to build up their own global commodity chains. Yet the impact of economic globalization on democratic consolidation in Korea is double-edged. On the one hand, globalization has positive impacts on the prospect of democratic consolidation, its main virtue being competitiveness. Thus, the injection of the spirit of competitiveness into politics should make the state more efficient, competitive, flexible, adaptable and accountable; the advent of information society provides citizens greater access to information and thus creates a good environment to realize an ideal democracy based on the informed citizen; glocalization accelerates the devolution of power from the center to the periphery, from central government to local government.77 Yet, “forced to be competitive” is not always translated into “forced to be free.” There are many negative impacts that economic globalization may render the new democracy vulnerable. First, in the era of globalization, feasible democratic control mechanisms do not exist to force global actors to be accountable and responsible to the people, because the decision of global actors is mostly made outside of control of the state and the people.78 As global firms can shift investment and move operations to a more favorable investment climate, it is very hard to force them to be accountable to the people through elections. As global corporations can transcend national boundaries, there are no effective national and

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international measures to make them accountable for environmental destruction and violation of working people’s rights. In the era of globalization, elected national leaders’ ability to ensure welfare and security is quite limited, because they lose control over the decisions of transnational firms, the movement of ideas and persons across their borders and the impact of their neighbors’ policies.79 The ability of governments to pursue development, full employment or other national economic goals has been undermined by the sovereign power of capital. As a consequence, the power of individuals and communities to shape their destinies through participation in the democratic process will be diminished. The autonomy of transnational firms makes democracy vulnerable. Second, the global race to the bottom will likely delay the emergence of welfare democracy in Korea. In the era of globalization, “threats of foreign competition” are being used as the weapon of employers to hold down wages, business taxes and environmental protections. These threats give government a justification to cut education, health and other services in order to reduce the burden of businesses that compete globally. The global obsession with competitiveness, efficiency, profitability and productivity may hinder the extension of citizenship from the civic and political sphere to the social and economic one through the provision of social safety nets, education and workers’ rights of association. Third, the advent of information society can also threaten civil society. The information revolution is a powerful force of both good and evil. Its dark side is that it intensifies the centralized control of information and thus seriously constrains the individual liberty that is the core of democracy. The information revolution may pave the way for a new horizon for participatory democracy through diffusing knowledge and information globally. However, it may equally pave the way for a new panopticon in which a new tele-leviathan can monitor the people with a centralized computer control mechanism. Tele-revolution may lead not to tele-democracy but to a new totalitarian system which can monitor people by computerized networks of information. Finally, globalization is likely to boost the bourgeoisie rather than the citizen. In the era of globalization, people’s identities are being constructed globally by the goods they consume. Global commodity fetishism might impair the concept of citizen. Citizens in the ancient Greek polis participated directly in the affairs of the state and accepted accountability. Pericles’ warning in his funeral address that those who care only about their private affairs are not true citizens shows us that Athenian democracy

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required civic virtue and civic commitment. Rousseau’s general will can be realized if and only if the private interests of citizens coincide with the public interests of community. When fetishism overflows, there are few citizens who dedicate themselves to the realization of the common good; instead, they remain “market men” who pursue their own private selfish interests. The market man is not what democracy requires. Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” cannot be attained by decentralized exchange among vicious self-seeking individuals, as many have failed to understand, but by free exchange among individuals with civic virtue.80 External Security Vulnerability In addition to external fluctuations emanating from economic globalization, unstable, volatile external security environments in East Asia could be a potential area of vulnerability for the new democracy in Korea. The democratic transition was well timed; “world time” was on its side. The wave of democracy reached Korea when the Cold War was receding, permitting the new democratic government to cut defense spending to help finance welfare programs, which increased after the democratic transition.81 Yet though it is receding, the Cold War in the Korean peninsula has not yet ended. The peninsula is still in the midst of a Cold War and remains one of the most dangerous areas where war could break out. It is thus amazing that South Korea has achieved a democratic transition in the most militarized area of the world. The country is still vulnerable from the aggression from North Korea, one of the few last remaining socialist countries to have resisted the wave of democracy and the market. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il still needed time to fill the void left by his late father and “supreme leader,” Kim Il Sung. For sure, it is tremendously difficult for Kim Jong Il to maintain a secluded, autarkic, dogmatic Ju Che socialism in the post-Kim II Sung era. The economy is getting worse day by day to the extent that the government can no longer feed the population in the North. Some talk of the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime. The deep internal crisis of North Korea risks destabilizing the new democracy in South Korea. The worst scenario would be military aggression from the North. A second Korean War would destroy the political and economic gains made by South Koreans, even though the country would eventually prevail even without US support.82 Regardless of who

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would win, a second Korean War would increase the possibility of resumption of power of the South Korean military, or at least a sharp increase of the military’s influence in politics. Looking to the longer time horizon, the eventual demise of the North Korean regime and the ensuing unification process would likely destabilize democracy in Korea. Wanted or not, South Koreans have to bear the costs of unification, even though its benefits will be distributed unevenly in favor of big business. South Korean workers may have to pay the costs, such as facing new competitors from the North. The huge immigrant workforce from the North would surely play the role of repressing the wages of South Korean workers. South Korean farmers would suffer from the inflow of cheaper agricultural products from the North. Even though costs would be diffused widely to every social sector, the benefits would be concentrated in big business. After unification, big business in South Korea would certainly find a new source of labor, land and markets. The uneven distribution of costs and benefits of unification will likely intensify conflicts among social groups, sectors and classes. In addition, there will also arise a new source of conflict between the two Koreas. In a unified Korea, North Koreans would likely be degraded to second-class citizens, and a kind of “internal colonialism” would emerge. The ensuing distrust and animosity between North and South Koreans would be more severe in intensity and more extensive in scope than the currently existing regional animosity between Honam and Youngnam (or Non-Honam) regions.

Conclusion: Overcoming Obstacles for Korean Democratic Consolidations Unlike many new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the new Korean democracy is in the process of neither “protracted unconsolidation” nor “authoritarian regression.” Overall, the factors working for democratic consolidation outweigh the countervailing obstacles, giving cause for cautious optimism for the prospect of democratic consolidation. From a comparative perspective, Koreans are in a relatively more advantageous position than Latin American and East European people. While in many new democracies in the East as well as in the South, where democratization has unleashed movements for ethnic autonomy, Korea, as ethnically one of the most homogeneous countries in the world, does not have

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problems of national integration and territorial integrity. The state of the economy is also propitious for democratic consolidation. Unlike Eastern European and Latin American countries, the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Korea unfolded under conditions of economic prosperity rather than adversity. Currently, the economy is still in excellent shape, and is one of the fastest-growing and vibrant in the world. Unlike Eastern European countries, the post-authoritarian state was not bankrupt. The Korean state still remains effective with a relatively efficient bureaucracy. The post-communist Eastern European syndrome that “a weak state is facing a weak society” has not surfaced in Korea. In general, the country is not facing the dangers and dilemmas that are threatening many new democracies in the East as well as the South. Nonetheless, the process of democratic consolidation in Korea is laden with many obstacles, vulnerabilities, constraints and challenges that urge caution regarding the prospects for democratic consolidation in Korea. Even though elections are being institutionalized, political society is not sufficiently institutionalized to articulate and represent the will of the people in the electoral arena, and then to realize that will in an accountable and responsive manner. Civil associations are still not flourishing sufficiently to intermediate between individuals and the state, to approximate a perfect democracy by transmitting information, to reduce the burden of an overloaded political society or to arrest the tendency of illegitimate usurpation of power and the tyranny of an intolerant majority. The constitution is not institutionalized enough to regulate the political and social life of citizens. The wave of economic globalization challenges effective popular and state sovereignty, and the new South Korean democracy remains under constant threat from surviving socialism in the North, even though the Cold War has ended elsewhere. These are supportive and obstructive conditions for democratic consolidation in Korea. Nevertheless, we should not accept these conditions in a deterministic way. Such domestic and international, institutional, structural and cultural conditions are not fixed indefinitely. The enabling conditions may turn into confining conditions, and vice versa. Favorable environments can be created through deliberate efforts, and barriers to democratic consolidation can be removed by good strategies of the state and civil society. We should not lament the absence of conditions for democratic consolidation or wait blindly for favorable conditions to be matured, but, with innovative efforts, fabricate the environment for a successful democratic consolidation.83

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Notes 1. Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. ‘Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative Politics 2(3), p. 362. 2. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 26. 3. Linz, Juan J. 1990. “Transitions to Democracy.” Washington Quarterly 13(3), p. 158. 4. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. “Consolidating New Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 7(2), pp. 15–16. 5. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 26. 6. Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1995. “Democracy with Adjectives: Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Research.” Unpublished Paper, p. 8. 7. Linz, Juan J., Alfred Stepan, and Richard Gunther. 1995. “Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe.” In The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, edited by Richard Gunther, P.  Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Phule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 8. Philippe Schmitter focuses on the process of democratic consolidation rather than the contents of a consolidated democracy. For Schmitter, “consolidation could be defined as the process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged by those persons or collectivities (i.e., politicians and citizens) that participate in democratic governance.” See Schmitter, Philippe C. 1992. “Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies.” In Reexamining Democracy, edited by Gary Marks and Larry Diamond. London: Sage, p. 158. 9. Karl, Terry Lynn, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. “Modes of Transition in Southern and Eastern Europe, Southern and Central America.” International Social Science Journal. Schmitter warns that there may exist tensions between transitology and consolidology. According to Schmitter, the “enabling conditions” which were conducive to reducing and mastering the uncertainty of the transition may tum into “confining conditions” that can make consolidation more difficult. See Schmitter, Philippe, C. 1995. “Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?” In The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America, edited by Joseph S. Tulchin (with Bernice Romeo). Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner.

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10. Haggard and Kaufman call this mode of transition as “the authoritarian withdrawal in good times.” See Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 11. Linz Im, Hyug Baeg. 1994a. “From Market Authoritarianism to Market Democracy: The Market and the State in the Korean Transition to Democracy.” IPSA World Congress, XVI, Berlin. 12. Ibid. 13. Lim, Hyun Chin, and Kim, Byung Kook. 1994. “Labor and Democratization in Korea: A Search for a Social Pact.” In Korea in the Global Wave of Democratization, edited by Doh Chull Shin, Myeong Han Zoh, and Myung Chey. 14. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1994. “From Market Authoritarianism to Market Democracy: The Market and the State in the Korean Transition to Democracy. IPSA World Congress, XVI, Berlin. 15. Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. New York: Beacon Press. 16. Im Hyug Baeg. 1995. “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea.” Korean Social Science Journal, 21. 17. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 18. Mainwaring. 19. Karl, Terry Lynn, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. “Modes of Transition in Southern and Eastern Europe, Southern and Central America.” International Social Science Journal. 20. Linz. 21. Przeworski. 22. For the contending explanations on miraculous economic development in Korea, see Im, Hyug Baeg. 1996. “Determinants of East Asian Miracle.” Paper presented at Faculty Luncheon Seminar of Korean Studies Program, Georgetown University. 23. Przeworski et  al. 1996. “What Makes Democracy Endure?” Journal of Democracy, 7(1), p. 41. 24. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisite of Democracy.” American Political Science Review, 53. 25. The modernization thesis goes back to Aristotle’s theory of polity. According to Aristotle, the polity is a good democratic government that is based on a large middle class. The polity is a golden mixture of democracy ruled by the many poor and oligarchy ruled by the few rich. The polity is possible only when the many poor mitigate claims based on number and the few rich mitigate claims based on wealth, and when the poor can claim based on wealth and rich can claim based on number. In order to claim

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based on wealth, therefore, the many poor must have sufficient wealth. In modem language, the embourgeoisement of poor people is a prerequisite for the good democracy, that is, the polity. See Aristoteles. 1958. The Politics of Aristotle (edited and translated by Ernest Barker). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 26. Lipset 1994, p. 2. 27. Whitehead, Laurence. 1993. “Introduction: Some Insights from Western Social Theory.” World Development 21(8). Special Issue: Economic Liberalization and Democratization: Explorations of Linkages, p. 1253. 28. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In Eastern Europe, Elster argues, “political reforms without a transition to a competitive market might appear to be possible. In the long run, however, democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver the goods in the economic sphere.” On the other hand, economic reforms under democracy are tremendously difficult: while ownership reform presupposes price reform, if they lead to the worst-off being very badly off because democracy depends on the votes of the poor masses. Ownership reforms are also incompatible with democracy, if they yield income inequality that is unacceptable to large masses of population. See Elster, Jon. 1993. “The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform.” In Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in Contemporary World, edited by Douglas Greenberg et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 269–271. 29. Offe, Claus. 1991. “Capitalism by Democratic Design?: Democratic Theory Facing Triple Transition in Central Europe.” Social Research 58(4), p. 878. 30. Robertson, Roland. 1990. “After Nostalgia? Willful Nostalgia and the Phase of Globalization.” In Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity, edited by Bryan S. Turner London: Sage, p. 49. 31. Hall, John. 1995. “After the Vacuum: Post-Communism in the Light of Tocqueville.” In Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation, edited by Beverly Crawford. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 86–88. 32. Kim, Byung Kook. 1995. “Ideology, Organization and Democratic Consolidation in Korea.” In Democracy and Communism, edited by Sung Chul Yang, p. 369. 33. Ibid., p. 372. 34. Kim Byung Kook, however, has a different view that ethnic nationalism can be a liability to democratic consolidation in Korea. Imagining the nation as ethnically homogeneous with biologically common ancestry and shared historical memories and experiences, Koreans tend “to perceive

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social ­conflict as a source of political instability and disaster,” rather than as something inevitable and legitimate to be harnessed and tamed in a democratic polity. I agree mostly with Kim. But imagine also that Koreans are the most individualistic people in Asia, as was evidenced by the facts that Koreans were the most rebellious of Japanese colonies and Korean workers are more individualistic than Japanese and Taiwanese workers. See Kim, Byung Kook, 1995. 35. Kim, Byung Kook, 1995. 36. Again, Kim Byung Kook argues that synchronization deprived one basis of organizing democratic politics, the church versus the state. In Korea, major political cleavages have not developed along the axis of the two cleavages of Lipset and Rokkan: class and religion. The anthropocentric religion made Korean politics develop along the lines of pragmatism and functionalism. Politics without vision is not good for democratic consolidation because it creates politics that is organizationally amorphous. See Kim, Byung Kook. 1996. “A Journey without a Vision: Politics of Democratic Consolidation in Korea.” Paper presented at the Conference on Democracy in East Asia, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy. I have a different opinion. If transcendental and utopian religions had developed in Korea, Korea would have suffered from religious fundamentalism and dogmatism, the outcome of which would have been interreligious strife. 37. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, p. 310. 38. See Yang, Sung Chul. 1995. “An Analysis of South Korea’s Political Process and Party Politics.” In Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae Woo to Kim Young Sam, edited by James Cotton. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 13; and Kim, Byung Kook, 1995. 39. Kihl, Young Whan. 1995. “Political Democracy and Reform in South Korea: The Cultural Context of Democratization.” In Democracy and Communism: Theory, Reality, and Future, edited by Sung Chul Yang. Seoul: Korean Association of International Studies, p. 459. 40. Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. “Confucianism and Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 6(2), p. 25. 41. Kim, Kyung Dong. 1994. “Confucianism and Capitalist Development in East Asia,” In Capitalism and Development, edited by Leslie Sklair. London: Routledge. 42. De Barry even goes further, that old classical Confucianism, too, had the virtue of democratic civil society that emphasized “the benefits of free political discussion and open criticism of those in power,” and thus compatible with democracy. See De Barry, William. 1996. “Confucianism, Civil Society, and Human Rights in China.” Paper presented at the

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Conference on Democracy in East Asia, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy. 43. Przeworski, Adam, et  al. 1995. Sustainable Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge. 44. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. “Consolidating New Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 7(2), p. 14. 45. Oh, John Kie-Chang. 1995. “1995 Local Elections in Korea: Democratic Transition or Consolidation?” Unpublished Paper. 46. This is in part true because the state that the new democracy inherited is a market authoritarian neo-conservative state which emphasized fiscal restraint and downsizing government. See Cheng, Tin-jen. 1995. “Democratic Tradition and Economic Development: The Case of Republic of Korea.” paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Korean Politics, Korean Political Science Association. 47. Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. “Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?” In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, edited by L.  Diamond, Juan Linz, and S.M.  Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publication, p. 46. 48. O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 49. Przeworski, Adam, et  al. 1995. Sustainable Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge. 50. Kim, Byung Kook. 1996. “A Journey without a Vision: Politics of Democratic Consolidation in Korea.” Paper presented at the Conference on Democracy in East Asia, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy. 51. Diamond points out that “the single most important requirement for keeping the military at bay is to make democracy work, to develop its institutional capacities.” See Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. “Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?” In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, edited by L.  Diamond, Juan Linz, and S.M.  Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publication, p. 47. For Korea, certainly the performance of democracy has deterred military intervention, but whether or not it has nurtured institutional capacity to check military intervention is still in doubt. 52. What “civil society arguments” bypass is that “civil society by itself can destroy a nondemocratic regime, but democratic consolidation must involve political society.” Democratic consolidation requires that citizens develop the core institutions of a democratic political society: political parties, legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership and intra-

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party ­alliances. See Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. “Consolidating New Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 7(2). 53. Yang, Sung Chul. 1995. “An Analysis of South Korea’s Political Process and Party Politics.” In Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae Woo to Kim Young Sam, edited by James Cotton. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 23. 54. Steinberg, David. 1995. “The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics.” In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (2nd edition), edited by Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publication, p. 396. 55. Ibid., p. 396. 56. Yang, Sung Chul. 1995. “An Analysis of South Korea’s Political Process and Party Politics.” In Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae Woo to Kim Young Sam, edited by James Cotton. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 20). 57. Kim, Byung Kook. 1996. “A Journey without a Vision: Politics of Democratic Consolidation in Korea.” Paper presented at the Conference on Democracy in East Asia, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy. 58. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1996. “The Illusion of Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy 7(3), p. 41. 59. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 35. 60. Shils, Edward. 1991. “The Virtue of Civil Society.” Government and Opposition 26(1). Smolar, Aleksander. 1996. “Civil society After Communism: From Opposition to Atomization.” Journal of Democracy 7(1). 61. Fish, M. S. 1994. “Rethinking Civil Society: Russia’s Fourth Transition.” Journal of Democracy 5(3), p. 41 62. De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1966. Democracy in America (ed. by J.P. Mayer). New York: Harper and Row, pp. 513–517. 63. Putnam, Robert. 1995. “Bowling Alone, Revisited.” In The Responsive Community, p. 20. 64. Schmitter, Philippe, C. 1995. “Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?” In The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America, edited by Joseph S. Tulchin (with Bernice Romeo). Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner. Diamond also defines civil society as the “realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared values.” See Diamond, Larry. 1994. “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy 5(3), pp. 7–11.

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65. For Schmitter, civic association is not a major factor in determining the shift of governance from authoritarian to democratic. Rather, civil associations are significant in determining what type of democracy will be eventually consolidated because civil associations affect the distribution of benefits, the formula of legitimation and the level of citizen participation. In short, civil association affects the quality of democracy rather than the quantity and the duration of democracy. See Schmitter, Philippe C. 1992. “Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies.” In Reexamining Democracy, edited by Gary Marks and Larry Diamond. London: Sage, p. 166. 66. Schmitter, Philippe, C. 1995, pp. 13–14; Diamond, Larry. 1994. pp, 7–11. 67. White, Gordon. 1995. “Democratization and Development II: Two Countries Cases.” Democratization 25(2). 68. The terms “mobilizational” and “institutional” civil society are borrowed from Weigel and Butterfield. See Weigel, Marcia A., and Jim Butterfield. 1992. “Civil Society in reforming communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence.” Comparative Politics 25(1). 69. Schmitter, Philippe, C. 1995a. “Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?” In The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America, edited by Joseph S. Tulchin (with Bernice Romeo). Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, p. 13. 70. Ibid., p. 13. 71. For the similar state of civil society in Eastern Europe, see Smolar, Aleksander. 1996. “Civil society After Communism: From Opposition to Atomization.” Journal of Democracy 7(1). 72. According to C.T.  Onions (ed.), The Oxford University Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), “association” is a legal term for a “body of people joined for a common purpose,” while “affiliation” referred originally to adoption of an orphan, assignment to its origin, as opposed to membership in a family by birth; more recently, the term is used for “relationship by inclination or affinity” (p. 31). 73. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1995b. “From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Korean Industrial Relations.” Paper presented at Georgetown Conference on Korean Society II, “Korea and the Rise of Civil Society.” 74. Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1990. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 75. Becker, Gary. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98. 76. Drucker, Peter. 1993. The Post-Capitalist Society. New  York: Harper Collins.

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77. Castells, M. 1993. “The Informational Economy at the New International Division of Labor.” In The New Global Economy in the Information Age, edited by Martin Carnoy et  al. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 18. 78. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1995c. “Economic Globalization and the Vulnerability of Democracy.” Paper presented at the Roundtable Discussion at International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy. 79. Fields, A.  Belden. 1994. “Can there be Political Democracy without a Democratic Economy? Is Democracy Possible?” Paper presented at XVI World Congress of IPSA Berlin. p. 15. 80. Schmitter, Phillippe C. 1994. “Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5 (2), p. 63. 81. Whitehead, Laurence. 1993. “Introduction: Some Insights from Western Social Theory.” World Development 21(8). Special Issue: Economic Liberalization and Democratization: Explorations of Linkages, p. 1247. 82. Cheng, Tun-jen. 1995. “Democratic Tradition and Economic Development: The Case of Republic of Korea.” paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Korean Politics, Korean Political Science Association. 83. Steinberg, David. 1995. “The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics.” In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (2nd edition), edited by Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publication, p. 406.

CHAPTER 7

From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Korean Industrial Relations

Beyond Democratic Consolidation Korea has come a long way in the last five decades. Since liberation from colonial rule in 1945, the nation has seen division from civil war (1950–1953) and the complexities of state building, industrialization, and democratization. South Korea compressed the multiple stages of industrialization and democratization into a few turbulent decades of national division, the ruins of war, the repression of military dictatorship, and the constraints of a massive military standoff between the opposing states on the peninsula. President Kim Young Sam took office in 1992 as the first civilian president in 30 years. Despite reliance on former military elites and conservative privileged classes in the election, Kim established firm civilian control over the military. He also opposed close political ties to the business community in a strategy defying the prediction of theorists like O’Donnell and Schmitter,1 who warn that a civilian democratic government must be careful not to provoke the military and capitalist privilege in a country with a long tradition of military rule and entrenched business interests. Przeworski also suggested that the prodemocratic forces must be prepared to offer concessions in exchange for democracy.2 But to

Hyug Baeg Im: “From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Korean Industrial Relations,” in Dennis McNamara (ed.), Corporatism and Korean Capitalism, London: Routledge, 1999 © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_7

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everybody’s surprise, President Kim decided instead to purge most of the politicized military officers and establish firm control over the military. Challenging the leading business interests as well, Kim published a presidential decree to enforce the Real Name Financial Transaction System in August 1993, to cut off channels for business to bribe officials and politicians. Having successfully completed the first stage of democratic transition, the struggle for Koreans has shifted from dethroning the authoritarian state to constructing a bastion of civil society. Social rather than political change now dominates efforts for democratic reform. Questions now focus on the type of democracy Koreans want to construct, on how to organize and institutionalize civil society, or on how to rearrange relations between state and civil society, thus suggesting a second stage has been reached, that of democratic consolidation.3 While the prime concern at the first stage of democratic transition is how to extricate the military from power and install a democratic government through fair elections, the second stage focuses on the consolidation of a new fragile democracy. The challenge now is to internalize, habituate, and routinize democratic norms and rules of the game. One contribution of democracy is the “elaborate rules for conflict resolution.”4 For the consolidation of a new democracy, rules for distributing benefits and costs must be agreed upon, legitimized, and internalized among relevant actors in order to institutionalize conflict resolution in a “new” democracy. Within the process of social democratization, this chapter will focus on how to institutionalize relations between the interest association of capital and labor, that is, industrial relations. Although interest associations are not a major factor in determining the modality of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, they are very significant in determining what type of democracy will eventually be consolidated.5 Firstly, I explain the associative model of industrial relations. Then, I discuss why the proliferation of interest associations was not translated into institutionalized interest politics. The last section shows that democratic consolidation demands new institutions in industrial relations to avoid an amorphous and unruly interest politics.

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Associative Model of Social Order and Industrial Relations: Profile and Promise Streek and Schmitter cite the principles of organization for the social order: the community, the market, and the state. Members of a community order interdependently produce “solidaristic goods” based on shared norms and jointly produced satisfactions. But actors in a market order compete independently to maximize their own utility, interests, and norms. Conversely, in a state order, the actors are dependent on hierarchical coordination by the state, which has monopolized the legitimate use of violence within the territorial boundary.6 One can distinguish the three principles of organization according to their contrasting rationalities of social choice. The calculus rests on satisfying identity in communities, on maximizing advantage in markets, and on minimizing risks and maximizing predictability in states.7 No single organizing principle can explain the social order, but its relative significance helps distinguish historical developments of capitalist society. With the advent of capitalist industrial society, we find the decline of community as an organizing principle of social order, with the rise of diverse mixtures of the market and the state ordering society. Nineteenth-­ century social order was based primarily on what Polanyi termed the “self-­ regulating market.” The First World War and the world depression of the 1930s signaled the decline of that self-regulating market order, and the advent of efforts to subordinate market to society with various anti-market alternatives, from the New Deal to Fascism and Stalinism.8 What Polanyi did not foresee was the triumphant return of the market with the failure of anti-market alternatives. Defeat in the Second World War marked the rapid decline of Fascism. Democratization brought a quick end to the bureaucratic authoritarian military regimes in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. The ideological experiment of Stalinism or “actually existing” socialism in the East rapidly came apart between 1989 and 1991, and neoconservatives pressing for free markets are now challenging the Keynesian social democracies of northern Europe as well. Heralding the decline of anti-market alternatives, neoliberal Francis Fukuyama declared “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” and the final triumph of market democracy.9 Although neoliberals claim final victory over those who might control markets, the unfettered market remains controversial even in the United States, the heartland of liberal democracy. Growing market competition

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may well undermine democratic participation if it leads to inequality among classes, races, sectors, and regions. One result is the emerging underclasses in the age of global prosperity. For instance, those falling below the poverty line in the United States now amount to 18.1 percent of the population, and over half of single-parent families fall below the poverty line.10 The growing underclass in the United States will decrease productivity and further erode international competitiveness, as well as the material belief of American democracy. The evidence does not support the neoliberal tenet that the market generates the optimal allocation of resources, for no such perfectly competitive market exists and even if it did, it would not generate an efficient economy in the presence of public goods, externalities, or increasing returns to scale, that is, what we call market failures. On the contrary, we live in a world of imperfect markets and imperfect states and must choose between these two alternatives. But the market cannot remedy state failure, just as the state cannot resolve market failures. If neither state nor market alone can serve as credible systems of social organization, can association provide a distinctive form of social governance alternative to market and public hierarchies? Hirst cites the basic premise of the associative model: “human welfare and liberty are best served when [as] many of the affairs of society as possible are managed by voluntary and democratically self-governing associations.”11 Such associations may fill the vacuum left by the collapse of state collectivism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and the Keynesian welfare state, and moderate a neoliberal individualism plagued by the excuses of unbridled competition and market failure. “Organizational concertation,” that is, a system of coordination, self-­ regulation, and self-help among intermediary interest associations, serves as the principle of organization in the associational model. The model draws aspects of the earlier principle of community into the contemporary world, where social order might again be organized on the basis of “spontaneous solidarity.” But personal choice cannot be the sole business of solidarity in a complex industrial society. An associative model rather attempts to organize solidarity through the formation of “private interest governments” with a public or quasi-public devolved, licensed, and assisted by the state. Such semi-official groups allocate goods and services or statuses that are monopolistic in nature and indispensable for members.12 Such governments may well affect and control the behavior of their members by imposing certain public standards and responsibilities. A

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democracy based on the associative principle can be called an organized democracy. Tocqueville once called democracy the “art of association,” and the burgeoning of voluntary associations provides fertile ground for civic virtue in a democracy. Associations promote democracy in various ways.13 First, they can provide information to the population as well as to policy-­ makers to foster a more efficient and perfect democracy based on informed participation. Second, associations can moderate divisive territorial politics by complementing functional representation. Political parties provide territorial representation and, for interest associations, functional representation. Functional representation enhances the capacity of the territorial government to improve economic competitiveness or provide welfare despite market interpenetration across borders. Third, participation in associations can help citizens develop competence, self-confidence, and civic consciousness. The associative model stands apart both from the statist macro-­ corporatism of the Keynesian welfare state and from the micro-­corporatism of Japanese enterprise paternalism. Macro-corporatist strategies of industrial relations prominent in Sweden, Germany, and Austria maintain a tripartite national-level bargaining among representatives of business, labor, and the state. But critics claim that macro-corporatist strategies lack the necessary flexibility to meet the demands of a rapidly changing global economy. Cross-border ties transcend the capital and labor markets of a single nation and render compromises meaningless among peak organizations of capital and labor within any one nation. The globalization of the economy also erodes the ability of the national state to manage the economy within its own territorial boundaries, as the state can no longer protect tripartite agreements by insulating capital and labor from foreign competitors. Organized labor likewise faces a new situation. The massive inflow of foreign workers breaks the labor supply monopoly of the national union federation, eroding the basis for solidaristic wage bargaining. With increased international capital mobility, employers have less reason to make the compromise demanded in tripartite bargaining with organized labor. Instead, employers force workers to accept continuing low wages by threatening to close the plant and move production abroad.14 As post-­ Fordist flexible production systems replace conventional mass production, workers have little to gain from the standardized national wage contract.

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Such asymmetrical power relations between capital and labor threaten the social democratic class compromise. Globalization has likewise undermined the effectiveness of micro-­ corporatist strategies in Japanese industrial relations based on patron–client relations between employers and workers. Workers pledge loyalty to the company in exchange for a paternalistic system of company welfarism at the workplace. Such paternalism had insured peace at the workplace and consistent improvement in worker productivity. Recently, however, key features of Japanese industrial relations, such as permanent employment, pay, and promotion according to seniority and enterprise rather than craft unionism, have come to be regarded as obstacles to international competitiveness. Falling between Japanese micro-corporatism and the macro-­corporatism of northern Europe, meso-corporatism or sectoral corporatism appears more viable in the associative model of industrial relations.15 Meso-­ corporatism is a system of interest representation, decision-making, and policy implementation which covers a more restricted range of issues than macro-corporatism.16 In meso-corporatism, arrangements for training, technology diffusion, and flexible manufacturing networks can be negotiated on a regional, sectoral, or occupational basis. Sectoral corporatism refers to “policy formation and implementation which are negotiated within a single sector.”17 Organizational concertation takes place among sectoral, occupational, professional, and industrial groups. One can find examples of meso-corporatism in Italy’s Emilia-Romagna, Sweden’s Smaland, Germany’s Baden-Wurttemberg, and Denmark’s Jutland peninsula, all among the most competitive production sites in the world. In place of industry-wide, standardized wage negotiations, a sectoral corporatist strategy would pursue wage and working contract negotiations according to relatively homogeneous sectoral or occupational levels in efforts to institutionalize effective concertation between organized labor and capital. Meso- or sectoral corporatism has several virtues. First, it enables firms and unions to escape from the rigidities of macro-corporatism and respond more easily to the pressures of global competition and the spread of flexible specialization.18 Second, it can be a mechanism for more popular input in the hierarchical structure of the state and economy.19 The bottom-up meso-corporatist linkage provides citizens with greater control of their affairs in the economy and in welfare systems, which is not possible in the top-down, hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic

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macro-corporatism.20 Finally, it counterbalances the concentration of power in the sovereign state, the larger corporations, and mass unions, and moderates the anarchy and inequality of the market.

Interests Without Institutions: Korean Industrial Relations—Past and Present Under the authoritarian rule of President Chun (1980–1988), the statism which dominated industrial politics was closely linked to the market, with the state as gatekeeper of the market order. I have written in the previous chapter about Korean authoritarianism in the 1980s as market authoritarianism, in which the “market was opened but politics were closed.”21 In industrial relations, the authoritarian government under President Chun relied on a market mechanism of labor repression. Samuel Valenzuela cited two types of labor control by an authoritarian state. In his “corporatist containment” strategy, the state organizes workers from above and controls them with state officials and state-appointed union leaders. In the “market containment” strategy, the job of the state is to deprive organized labor of their market advantage. Thus the state endeavors to weaken existing unions, to decentralize collective bargaining, and to deprive workers of their right to strike. To achieve such goals, the state permits union busting, outlaws work stoppages in strategic industries, and prevents the use of union funds for strike supports.22 In line with the latter strategy, the Chun government discouraged union organization, destroyed existing unions which did not follow government policy, legally enforced decentralized company unionism, prohibited political participation of workers as a class, and blocked workers’ efforts to form solidarity with third parties outside industry such as students, dissident intellectuals, and opposition political parties. Workers were not allowed to pursue collective interests by organizing solidarity with each other, but instead were urged to compete with each other on the labor market. They had only the right to withdraw from the labor market as isolated, atomized workers. Unlike Latin American–style authoritarianism, the Korean state demobilized and depoliticized workers through market isolation. However, the market authoritarian state undermined itself by disorganizing opponents rather than co-opting organized segments of civil society. The dynamics of democratization in South Korea were spurred in part by the inherent nature of market authoritarianism. A

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market-conforming authoritarian state, in general, tried to demobilize and to depoliticize civil society, as the state urges organized groups in civil society to compete against each other in a decentralized market. Reliant on the market mechanism, however, the state suffers a diminishing capacity to build an organized base of domestic support in the face of market failures and the growing complexity of globalization. When popular sectors erupt against the authoritarian state, it has no friends among organized social forces. Without a wider base of support, the state becomes vulnerable to economic fluctuation and political turmoil.23 Chun’s market-conforming policies led to the disintegration of state– society networks, or a “developmental coalition.” For instance, his stabilization measures deprived big business of rents formerly furnished by the state in the form of subsidies and protections from foreign competitors. In its drive to liberate market dynamics, the state deprived itself of market controls important for attracting big business to an authoritarian coalition. When popular protest arose against the authoritarian state, state elites found that big business was no longer the staunch ally willing to live or die with the authoritarian state. While a symbiotic relationship between big business and the authoritarian state persisted across the two decades of authoritarian rule under President Park (1961–1979), cracks in the so-­ called sword-won alliance emerged in the 1980s under President Chun (see Chap. 6). Neoconservative reforms also alienated farmers. Cuts in subsidy for grain and fertilizer price and import liberalization of farm products turned famers against the Chun regime. Chun’s market-authoritarian state neither fostered its own groups of friends and supporters in the civil society nor allowed civil society to organize their specific group or sectoral interests. The state tried to defend its autonomy by keeping civil society in an isolated market situation, which in turn only fostered voices of discontent. Karl Polanyi pointed out that unrestrained market movements sparked the countermovements of market losers in civil society to protect themselves against the destructive forces of the market. The eruption of anti-state popular movements of workers, farmers, and the urban poor in the mid-1980s coincided with Polanyi’s prediction. Although the middle class was the main beneficiary of the neoconservative reform, Chun gained no support from the middle class. On the contrary, freed from economic anxieties, they no longer tolerated the trade-off between economic development and political freedom. Instead, their participation strengthened the democratizing coalition

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to the extent of forcing authoritarian power holders to concede to democratic reforms with the June 29 political pact. In the first direct presidential election, Roh Tae Woo, who had played a key role in Chun’s authoritarian state, was elected president late in 1987. The government of Roh from 1988 to 1992 did not try to revise the market-oriented economic model, for, unlike democratization movements elsewhere, the impetus for the Korean democratic transition was not the failure of economic policy. Continuity, rather than rupture with the past, prevailed as the market took a new wife—democracy—and the offspring was a new type of market democracy. With regard to labor policy, the Roh government loosened the repressive market containment of labor. Workers now won the right of minimum liberal associability. New labor codes assured them minimum rights to organize unions and to encourage and to engage in strike action. Nevertheless, the new labor codes were far below the level that the majority of rank-and-file workers demanded. The basic poison pills remained intact, such as the clause prohibiting unions from forming, cooperating with, and contributing money to any political party; provision of “one company, one union” denying the right to organize autonomous unions parallel to existing company-sponsored (oyong) unions; and a clause prohibiting third-party engagement in collective bargaining and other industrial disputes, thus denying solidarity formation among workers and other popular sectors. New labor codes showed that the government’s policy of industrial relations coincided with what has been termed “pluralist company unionism.”24 The post-authoritarian state retained a market principle in managing capital–labor relations. Korean company unionism suffers from some of the same problems evident in the pluralism of industrial relations in the United States: low unionization rates among workers, organizational fragmentation at national, industry, and shop-floor levels, and the high frequency of strikes. Three bans constrain Korean industrial relations: a ban on third-party interventions, a ban on the principle of “one company, one union,” and the ban on political activities of unions. The Korean pluralistic company unionism is dominated by a mechanism of market competition among unions and firms, where decentralized unions compete with each other to raise wages, sparking disruptive confrontations with management. Under extreme pluralism, firms and unions seek to maximize short-term gains at the expense of long-term interests, such as economic stability and growth. Wage rates are settled by strikes. Chunhyop (spring settlement) after Chuntu (spring strikes) is the typical Korean style of wage negotiations

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(see Chap. 6). High strike rates, lockouts, and police intervention in the workplace are the costs that Korea paid as a consequence of adopting such an extreme pluralism. Since labor–capital confrontation has been the rule for wage negotiations rather than the exception, festering labor unrest remains unresolved, threatening international economic competitiveness and weakening efforts toward democratization. Another feature of Korean industrial relations is company paternalism. Now, the company, not the state, is the main provider of welfare to workers. Out of a paternalistic impulse, Korean firms provide company housing, finance house purchases, subsidize education costs of worker’s children, and provide sports and health amenities. In return for company welfare, the management demands the loyalty of workers, expects them to internalize an enterprise-consciousness and a company-centered productionist ideology, and to participate enthusiastically in productivity-­ enhancing movements such as quality control (QC) and zero defect (ZO). The exchange here of welfare for worker commitment, reminiscent of Japanese unionism, has been developed without the “three sacred treasures” of Japanese industrial relations: lifetime employment, the nenko (seniority pay and promotion system), and enterprise unionism.25 In contrast, recent innovations in Korea, such as the introduction of a “pay for performance” system and a new personnel system based on job evaluation, have been regarded as a kind of capitalist strategy to establish a flexible system of wages and to raise work intensity, quite unlike the Japanese system. Under the “new” democracy of President Roh from 1988, the mixture of pluralism and paternalism did not integrate organized workers into a tripartite partnership of the state, capital, and labor. Even though individual labor unions are accepted as legitimate action in collective bargaining, they appear, at best, affiliations rather than associations.26 Labor unions in Korean firms are more like company unions in the original sense of being dependent wholly on the management in a paternalistic system, as opposed even to Japanese enterprise unions with their own bases for relative autonomy. Company unions can be described as affiliations in the sense of assignment to a group solely because of employment by the same company. There is no external legal basis for membership, and no ties to labor organizations beyond the firm (see Chap. 6). A transition from simply company affiliation to more autonomous labor association appears necessary to consolidate the new democracy. Unions should be strengthened with an independent legal basis within and beyond the firm, particularly with ties to industrial federation, and the peak or

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umbrella labor organizations. Unions that have carefully structured themselves, consciously designed organizational objectives, responsibilities, and privileges beyond the discretion of the paternalistic management of the firm, or the factional priorities of the union leadership, might be termed associations.27 Without such consolidation into more independent associations and beyond simply being company affiliation, unions do not have the incentive, organizational resources, or the responsibility to maintain the Korean capitalist system as industrial citizens. If the state and management continue to defend their own autonomy by keeping workers in an isolated market situation, the latter may well join forces to rebel collectively against the state—control of the market order. As Karl Polanyi pointed out, unconstrained market movements sparked the countermovement of civil society to protect themselves against the destructive forces of the market and the state.

Prospects for an Associative Mode of Industrial Relations in Korea I have argued this far that the combination of market-oriented pluralism and company paternalism cannot meet the demands of democratic consolidation in South Korea. Second, I have proposed the associative mode as a suitable alternative, but have yet to explain its feasibility. I might begin with some hopeful signs for meso- or sectoral corporatism in contemporary, post-authoritarian industrial relations in Korea. First, union leaders are attempting to establish federations along craft or industry lines to overcome the restrictions of company unionism in collective bargaining. Second, many sectoral, professional, and union federations have been established within individual Korean conglomerates or chaebol, strengthening individual company unions within a conglomerate-wide federation. Third, we find a regional federation of workers emerging with the advent of more distinct and autonomous, and regional economies following the devolution of power from central to local governments. Finally and perhaps most significantly, several proto-corporatist experiments have been undertaken among the representatives of capital, labor, and the state. Yet, on the whole, the necessary conditions for the establishment of associative democracy appear either weak or absent in South Korea. For instance, private interest governments at occupational, sectoral, professional, regional levels of interest association appear crucial for associative

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democracy, but have not yet appeared in Korea. Yet, one can cite an initial precedent such as the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), which has functioned as a kind of private interest government for big business. For example, the FKI decided who would be the main contractor of the Second Mobile Telecommunication Company, but this may represent only a sporadic, ad hoc policy mechanism for a government hard-pressed to establish policy in new, increasingly complex industries. What the FKI lacks is the government’s guarantee of the public status of a private interest government. Second, even though initial patterns of concertation have appeared at the micro and macro levels, similar concertations cannot be found at the meso, sectoral, occupational, or functional levels of industrial relations. Concertation at the micro or company levels appears in the activation of “labor management cooperation councils.” Yet, concertation at the micro or company levels is far short of the level found in the case of Japanese Toyotaism, Swedish Kalmarism, or German Codetermination, in which unions actively participate in a joint effort to increase the competitiveness of a company to survive against intensifying global competition. There is more evidence of macro-corporatism. The April 1 Wage Pact in 1993 and the March 30 Wage Pact in 1994 were typical examples of concertation at the macro level. In the these pacts, the National Economic and Social Council brought together representatives of labor, capital, and nongovernment public representatives to decide the rate of wage raises. This is evidence that authoritarian wage determination, in which Italy unilaterally imposed wage rates from above with a so-called wage guideline, has been replaced by a neo-corporatist wage settlement. However, the Korean effort at corporatist concertation remains limited to experiments on specific issues, such as the wage rate and uninstitutionalized ad hoc efforts, without reference to more general labor politics. It is in fact an ad hoc concertation of a proto-macro-corporatism. If a concertation is not institutionalized, then participants can defect from the pact any time conditions change. Indeed, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) refused to participate in a wage pact with capital in 1999. Why has the experiment of macro-corporatism failed? Because Korean associational environments did not satisfy three conditions necessary for corporatist concertation at the macro level: (1) both the national union federation or confederation and the employers’ association must have organizational monopoly sufficient to discipline member unions, and member firms; (2) a prolabor government must be in office for a long

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period of time, or strong social democratic party–union ties must be in place to make unions willing to engage in political exchange of private wage restraint for welfare services; (3) the state must have the capacity and autonomy to serve as the agent of universal rationality beyond the more narrow interests of capital. None of these conditions exist in Korean industrial relations. Unions are still weak and fragmented. Two national peak associations of labor divide national union movements. The FKTU in 1999 represented about 4800 unions and 1.2 million workers, while the Congress of Korean Trade Union Representatives (CTUR) represented 1200 unions and 0.4 million workers. This means the FKTU, the official representative of workers in the tripartite wage agreement, does not have monopoly power to represent workers as a whole. Second, no established political parties have ties with organized labor. Without entrenched prolabor parties that have the capacity and willingness to represent workers’ interests in the state’s macroeconomic policy, Korean workers are not assured that their wage restraint would be compensated in the near future by more employment, less inflation, and better welfare systems. Since the Korean state has always been procapital, there is no reason to expect that it will act as the agent of universal interests of both capital and labor to guarantee the conditions of pacts with capital and to compensate the costs of wage restraints. Third, social welfare systems which ensure successful associative democracy still appear weak in South Korea. The institutionalization of concertation among interest groups would be promoted if the costs of concertation can be compensated by the provision of welfare services. To induce wage restraint agreements among workers, it is necessary for the costs of wage restraint to be compensated by the provision of welfare as a kind of social wage. Yet the current state of Korean social welfare falls below the level of less developed nations like the Philippines. Since the democratic transition from 1988, a minimum wage, pension, and medical insurance have been introduced, but Korea still does not have unemployment insurance, family allowances, or social security. In addition, the Korean welfare system can be characterized as a market-dependent one. Rather than state provision, welfare is funded and provided by private companies, and therefore payment is highly dependent upon market conditions. The market-dependent welfare system increases the inequality of welfare between large company workers and small and medium company workers. The principle that “beneficiaries should pay for part” shows that a market-conforming principle is adopted in the state provision of welfare. A neoconservative

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argument that social welfare diminishes the incentive to work appears to undergird welfare systems in Korea, with the principle of welfare as social income excluded from welfare policy.

A Korean Solution: Association in a Confederal Welfare State Despite the difficulties of implementing an associative model in South Korea, it deserves further attention, given its promise of stable industrial relations is so important for the consolidation of a new democracy in the era of globalization. Having succeeded largely in export-oriented industrialization, the Korean economy today remains among the most dependent on world markets. Without self-restraint among both workers and capitalists at home, open-ended class conflicts may disrupt the small, open, internationally exposed economy and threaten fragile democratic institutions as a result. Given the need for harmony in labor relations, and the promise of the associative model, the following policies may well promote an associative democracy in South Korea. First, the poison pills of authoritarian labor codes, such as “one company, one union,” the ban on third-party intervention in collective bargaining, and the ban on political activities of unions should be abolished. The first step toward industrial democracy is to establish a formal equality between capital and labor to avoid extralegal street politics, which weaken democratic institutions. Second, with formal equality established, the state and the capitalists should cooperate with workers to change union structure from decentralized and fragmented company unionism to meso- or sectoral, conglomerate-based federations. Private interest governments of worker federations should be organized at the level of industrial sectors, regions, vocations, and big business groups. Macro-corporatism based on industrial unionism appears unrealistic, unfeasible, and ineffective in South Korea. It is unrealistic because business and the state oppose industrial unionism. It is unfeasible because of heterogeneity within the same industries. It is unfeasible because within each Korean industry there is remarkable heterogeneity between big companies and small and medium companies, conglomerate companies and subcontracting companies, export companies and import substitution companies. And, finally, macro-­ corporatist strategies of industrial unionism can probably not meet the demand of flexibility necessary in the global era.

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Third, there must be a division of function between private interest government at the national level (FKTU, FKI, Korean Employer’s Association) and at the meso-level. While national-level associations, such as National Economics and Social Council, do take charge of encompassing policy issues such as economic restructuring for international competitiveness, solutions to growing sectoral inequalities, and expanding social welfare to protect losers in market competition, meso-level associations should be responsible for settling wage rates by forming tripartite pacts. Given the fact that the industrial structure of Korea is dominated by big business groups or conglomerates, union associations at the chaebol (e.g., Hyunchongryun, Daenohyup) should be recognized with the status of private interest government. To prepare for “glocalization” (global localization), there should be a system of coordination among local government, local labor associations, and local firms. There should be meso-level political exchange on the issue of investment, employment, wage restraints, environment, industrial relocation, infrastructure, housing, and education. Finally, welfare provisions should be expanded and intensified. We still do not have any hard evidence for the neoconservative argument that welfare provision reduces investment and the supply of labor. The failure of the welfare state is the failure of the state, not the failure of welfare democracy. More than that, while the neoconservatism of the West arose from the failure of the welfare state, Korean neoconservatism arose out of a preemptive strike against the possibility of welfarism. Having never experienced the consequences of welfarism, Korean conservatives raise their voice against the expansion of welfare services. Speaking about the “English disease” or the “European disease,” they try to prevent the introduction of welfare. But welfare should be provided and a welfare democracy created, since this is the only way to protect citizens from the vagaries of the market. Welfare is a kind of social wage that can be paid without participating in the market.28 At the same time, the conventional idea that welfare must be provided by the state should be revisited, for the failure of the welfare state is a “state failure.” The enormous growth of state apparatuses and welfare bureaucracies maximized not citizen welfare but their private welfare. As a consequence, society as a whole suffers the net losses, that is, what Becker calls “deadweight losses.”29 We must reconsider the conventional concept that welfare is planned and provided by the state, and distinguish between the design and implementation of welfare provisions. The state alone should not decide the level of welfare or provide welfare services, but

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rather devolve the authority of welfare service to organized civil associations. If the level of welfare is decided by a compromise between organized groups of labor and capital, they can better link this level of welfare with an increase in productivity. Once the level of welfare has been determined, then the state can assume responsibility for the provision of welfare benefits, but even here the responsibility for providing benefits may devolve to private firms that have been constrained to provide welfare efficiently with minimum costs. We must at the same time balance the benefits of subcontracting and outsourcing to private firms motivated by profit, with the public responsibility for welfare. Therefore, in the provision of welfare services, we should make use of the association. Currently, volunteer movements in the United States are proving to be an effective associative alternative both to the privatization of welfare collectivism, which can cause market failure, and to state welfare collectivism, which can cause state failure. Currently, in the United States the number of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) amounts to 1 million and their activities are performed by 90 million nonpaid staff and their activities account for one-­ tenth of the gross national product.30 Despite radical inequalities and an underdeveloped state welfare system, the base of volunteer support in NPOs remains a key to democracy in the United Sates. We do not yet find such civil input into welfare programs in South Korea. Currently the state and business favor the Japanese model of company welfarism. But because company welfarism is primarily based on the profit motivation of firms, it does not fit well into the fundamental objective of welfare, that is, providing shelter to the victims of market competition. A Korean alternative must fall between the state and the market. A Korean welfare system should imitate neither Western state welfare collectivism nor a market-dependent welfare system. Koreans must preserve the virtue of indigenous family welfarism, which is based on spontaneous solidarity among family members. But in the more complex and industrialized societies where traditional small community-based welfarism tends to fade, intermediary organizations can play a critical role. First, the activities of NPOs should be deregulated and the support to volunteer organizations increased. One-fourth of the budget of NPOs in the United States is supplied by the government. Local civic organizations can press the local government to plan and administer developmental policies in accordance with local welfare. Second, the authority for occupational safety and health, as well as vocational training, has to be transferred to civic associations that are endowed with the status of private interest

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governments. I would suggest devolving public authority to industrial and labor associations to design and implement vocational training curricula. For instance, the community-based environmental organizations can be used to monitor the compliance of firms with environmental controls.31 Finally, organized civil associations and business associations can make an environmental pact, in which a system of reward and punishment is established for the preservation of the environment. Through the organizational concertation between consumers and producers of environmental pollution, environmental destruction can be minimized by forcing the producer of environmental contamination to internalize the costs of destroying the environment. In short, the welfare democracy that Korea has to pursue is neither the market-dependent welfare system nor the state-collectivist welfare state, but rather a “confederal welfare state” with “thin collectivism, thick welfare,” which is based on decentralization, civil voluntarism, and the virtues of community.32

Conclusion: Theoretical Significance of the Korean Experience Compared to their counterparts in Eastern Europe or Latin America, Koreans enjoy some advantages in the process of democratic consolidation. Democratization often unleashes movements for ethnic autonomy, but South Korea may well be the most ethnically homogeneous nation in the world. Unlike the economic hardship which pressed the democratic transition elsewhere, economic success fostered the changes in South Korea. The authoritarian government had to withdraw from power because it had accomplished its historical mission of economic development, which had brought it into power. I have argued that the authoritarian government rendered itself obsolete by its own success, and was replaced by the new democracy to perform new historical necessities, such as more freedom and welfare for the masses.33 Besides continuing economic prosperity, the post authoritarian state likewise retains credibility and a relatively efficient bureaucracy. Korea has thus avoided the post-­ communist Eastern European syndrome of “a weak state facing a weak society.”34 What the new democracy in Korea lacks is an institutionalized interest politics, painfully evident in the fading of authoritarian interest politics in which the state had managed and controlled interest conflicts between

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capital and labor from above. To paraphrase Gramsci, Korean interest politics is in a state of transition where the “old is dying but the new cannot be born.” Korean interest politics today is an odd mixture of market-­ oriented Anglo-Saxon pluralism and Japanese company paternalism. Our review of current industrial relations reveals that neither the market nor the state can be the model for post-authoritarian industrial relations, and thus I suggest an associative model between market and state based on the virtues of organized communitarian solidarity. Specifically, an associative model of industrial relations would be based on meso- or sectoral corporatism. What purpose would an associative model of industrial relations serve? I have argued that it would permit an adequate response to the economic challenge of globalization without impeding the democratization project. Such a model would foster a strong civil society and offer fertile ground for virtues of a democratic culture, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints.35 Shils defines civil society as “a society of civility” or civic virtue,36 more broadly than the concepts of Hegel or Marx. For Hegel and Marx, civil society means “bürgerliche Gesellschaft,” that is, bourgeois capitalist society (or market society). But I would expand the concept of civil society beyond market society to the sphere of community and culture, for as Fish aptly points out, “capitalism is possible in the absence of civil society, but without civil society, capitalism will not create a ‘civil economy’.”37 Without a civil economy, civil society loses the element of community but retains the self-interest of market in which everybody pursues their own selfish interests in a Hobbesian war of all against all. For the consolidation of a new democracy, therefore, we must construct a robust civil society based on civic virtue to overcome the limits of market society. Second, an associative model of industrial relations can best meet the exigencies of globalization without damaging the new democracy. We live in a global economy “in which capital, production, management, markets, labor, information, and technology are organized across national boundaries” (Carnoy 1993: 18). Globalization extends beyond the economy to the area of environment, culture, and security. The government of Kim Young Sam publicly committed itself in December 1994 to globalization (segyehwa) as the prime goal of their administration. One criterion of success in the era of internationalization is economic strength in global markets. In the era of globalization, it is not the national competitiveness of countries that matters, but the more specific strength of firms, workers,

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and peasants who compete across national boundaries.38 The persisting argument for national competitiveness in a global era reflects a neo-­ mercantilist effort to boost strategic industries at the expense of welfare of the popular masses. More than anything else, international competitiveness should not be understood in productionist terms as solely economic competitiveness. Competition in the era of globalization depends on the ability and capacity to raise the level of social welfare, to improve work conditions, and to sustain a healthy environment. In the U.S. Report of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness we find a definition of competitiveness as the “ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of international competition while our citizens enjoy a standard of living that is both rising and sustainable.”39 This means that international competitiveness depends not only on the ability to compete but also on the ability to improve the standard of living, that is, a wider provision of welfare systems to the working masses. If we define international competitiveness in these terms, then it is clear that the associative model of industrial relations best reconciles the dual goals of democratization and globalization. However, despite its many virtues, the associative model is not without problems,40 such as factionalism, and divisive regional and group interests. Second, reminiscent of the iron law of oligarchy, one fears the leaders of interest groups might become oligarchs, and freeze and distort the future debate and choice.41 One might also question the relevance of associative democracy to the Korean situation. Structural and cultural preconditions of religious solidarity, regional economies, and a guild socialism based on craft production encouraging associative democracy cannot be found in Korea. The rapid rise of regional and group factionalism in the democratic transition warns us that meso- or sectoral corporatism may aggravate the potentially divisive self-interests of any specific group, region, or other collectivity. It is only partially true that Korea does not meet the structural and cultural preconditions for associative democracy. The revival of the traditional associative form of Dongari or Poomasi shows us the presence of community-based cooperation. Village community, neighborhood love, family welfarism, and community welfarism are evidence that Korea does not lack ample traditions of civil association. What arguments about the absence of preconditions neglect is that such structural and cultural preconditions are not fixed. An associative environment can be nourished by deliberate efforts.42 Associative democracy does not always evolve in countries with traditions of religious

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solidarity, regional economies, and craft production. On the contrary, it has emerged in countries without many structures and cultures. Nature does not preclude the success of associative democracy. Without religious solidarity, associations may help moderate the destructive effects of market competition by the introduction of civic association based on secular, communal solidarity. In countries without a historical tradition of regional economy, regional economy is fabricated artificially to seed joint projects and to lower information costs.43 Countries without a tradition of craft production have developed such systems to secure small producers with legally binding membership. So far we can easily find many cases where the barriers to associative democracy have been overcome by the deliberate efforts of the state and civil society. If we accept associative democracy as the alternative both to a self-destructive market and to the repressive and inefficient state, we should not lament the absence of preconditions for associative democracy or wait passively until the preconditions are in place, but rather innovate and fabricate the environment for a successful associative democracy.

Notes 1. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C.  Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 2. Adam Przeworski and Pranab K.  Bardhan, Eds, Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 25. 3. Schmitter defines “consolidation” as “the process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliable, known, regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted by those persons and collectivities (i.e., politicians and citizens).” Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies’ in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, Eds, Reexamining Democracy (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 158. 4. Dankwart Rustow, ‘Transition to Democracy,’ Comparative Politics 2, 3 (1971): 342–368. 5. According to Schmitter, the type of industrial relations affects the distribution of benefits, the formula of legitimation, and the level of citizen satisfaction: in a word, the quality of democracy rather than the quantity and duration of democracy. Schmitter, ‘Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies,’ p. 166.

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6. Wolfgang Streek and Philippe Schmitter, ‘Community, Market, State, and Associations?,’ in Streek and Schmitter, Eds, Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and the State (London: Sage Publications, 1985), p. 11. 7. Ibid., p. 13. 8. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York: Beacon Press, 1944) 9. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?,’ The National Interest (1989): 3–4. 10. John E.  Trent, ‘Democracy in Danger,’ paper presented at XVI World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Berlin, Germany 1994. 11. Paul Hirst, ‘Associational Democracy,’ in David Held, ed., Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1993), p. 112. 12. Schmitter, ‘Neo-corporatism and the State,’ in Wyn Grant, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 47. 13. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, ‘Associative Democracy,’ in Pranab K.  Bardhan and John E.  Roemer, Eds, Market Socialism: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.  236–252; Cohen and Rogers, ‘Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance,’ Politics and Society, vol. 20, no. 4 (1992): 393–472; Paul Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Alan Ware, Between Profit and State: Intermediary Organizations in Britain and United States (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1989). 14. Kathleen Thelen, ‘Beyond Corporatism: Toward a New Framework for the Study of Labor in Advanced Capitalism,’ Comparative Politics, vol. 27, no. 1 (1994): 107–124; Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, ‘What’s Wrong with Social Democracy?’ in Bardhan and Roemer Eds, Market Socialism, pp. 219–235. 15. Alan Cawson emphasizes that the macro/meso/micro distinction concerns the level of interest organization, while the sectoral/trans-sectoral distinction concerns the scope of policy bargaining. “Meso” refers to those organizations which operate between peak national associations and individual firms and unions. Cawson, ‘Introduction: Varieties of Corporatism,’ in Cawson, ed., Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-­ Corporatism (London: Sage Publications, 1985), p. 12. 16. Ibid., p. 11. 17. Ibid., p. 12. 18. Cohen and Rogers, ‘Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance,’ p. 437. 19. Ware, Between Profit and State, p. 259.

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20. Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance, p. 25. 21. Hyug Baeg Im, ‘From Market Authoritarianism to Market Democracy: The Market and the State in the Korean Transition to Democracy,’ paper presented at the Sixteenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Berlin, Germany 1994; Ho Keun song, Open Markets and Closed Politics (Seoul: Nanam Pub., 1994). 22. Samuel Valenzuela, ‘Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy,’ Comparative Politics, vol. 21, no. 4 (1989): 446. 23. Hyun Chin Lim and Byung Kook Kim, ‘Labor and Democratization in Korea: A Search for a Social Pact,’ in Doh Chul Shin, Myeong-han Zoh, Myung Chey, Eds, Korea in the Global Wave of Democratization (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1994), p. 123. 24. “Company unionism differs from enterprise unionism. In enterprise unionism, employees of the same firm, irrespective of whether they are blue or white collar workers are organized together in a single union, while in company unionism, unions are organized on the workers’ own initiative and by their own free choice.” Harou Shimada, ‘Japanese Industrial Relations: A New General Model?’ in Taishiro Shirai, ed., Contemporary Industrial Relations in Japan (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), p. 8. 25. Ibid. 26. “Association” is a legal term for a “body of people joined for a common purpose,” while “affiliation” referred originally to adoption of an orphan, assignment to its origin, as opposed to membership in a family by birth; more recently, the term is used for “relationship by inclination or affinity.” C.T. Onions, ed., The Oxford University Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 31. 27. Dennis McNamara has alerted me to this distinction. 28. Gosta Esping-Anderson, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1990). 29. Gary S.  Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 98 (1983): 371–400. 30. Peter F.  Drucker, The Post Capitalist Society (New York: HarperCollins, 1993). 31. Cohen and Rogers, ‘Associative Democracy,’ p. 242. 32. Hirst, ‘Associational Democracy’. 33. Im, ‘New Democracy and Structural Economic Adjustment,’ in Doh Chul Shin, Myeong-han Zoh, Myung Chey, Eds, Korea in the Global Wave of Democratization (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1994), p. 123. 34. Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy, p. 78.

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35. Larry Diamond, ‘Toward Democracy Consolidation,’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994):7. 36. Edward Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civil Society,’ Government and Opposition, vol. 26, no. 1 (1991):3–20. 37. M. Steven Fish, ‘Russia’s Fourth Transition,’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994): 41. 38. M.  Castells, ‘The Informational Economy at the New International Division of Labor,’ in Martin Carnoy et al., The New Global Economy in the Information Age (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 18. 39. Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993). 40. Cohen and Rogers, Market Socialism: The Current Debate, and ‘Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance.’ 41. ‘Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance,’ p. 245. 42. Market Socialism: The Current Debate. 43. ‘Associative Democracy,’ p. 243.

CHAPTER 8

Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of the Three Kims Era

Korean Democracy at a Crossroads On December 19, 2002, Korean voters elected Roh Moo Hyun as the 16th president of the Republic of Korea. It was the first election that was held in the post–Three Kims Era. The three Kims had dominated Korean politics for the previous three decades. The first two Kims (Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung) led the democratization movement in the 1970s and 1980s, while the third Kim (Kim Jong Pil) represented a moderate alternative to Park Chung Hee’s dictatorship within the authoritarian ruling circle. They presided over the democratic transition in the 1980s and acted as leading players in restored democratic competitions from 1987. The exit of the three Kims signifies the end of the first generation of democracy. The presidential election of December 2002 was the election to decide who would lead the second generation of democracy in the post–Three Kims Era. Koreans elected Roh Moo Hyun, who promised to terminate “old-fashioned politics,” including the bad features of the three Kims’ politics. The 2002 election was a milestone for democratic

This research was presented at the Beijing Forum in Beijing, China, on August 22–25, 2004; Hyug Baeg Im, “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of Three Kims Era,” Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 5, December, 179–198, 2004 © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_8

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consolidation, as Roh’s campaign promises for bold political reforms were mostly carried out in his term. After the Three Kims Era, we need to evaluate its achievements and failures in regard to the development of democracy in Korea. While late in joining the wave of democratic transition, Korea was very fast in constituting a democratic government after the breakthrough in June 1987. From then on, the leaders of the first generation of Korean democracy achieved remarkable progress in terms of democratic consolidation by institutionalizing electoral competition, removing authoritarian legacies, and preempting potential elements for authoritarian subversion. At the end of the Three Kims Era, most agreed that Korean democracy was not in imminent danger of breakdown or protracted erosion. Yet in terms of democratic consolidation, Korea’s record in this period was dismal. Korean democracy was faltering on the verge of consolidation. This chapter examines the legacies of the three Kims’ politics that the new leader, Roh Moo Hyun, inherited in terms of democratic consolidation: good legacies that Roh had to utilize to further democratic deepening, as well as bad legacies he had to overcome to keep democracy from faltering. In what follows, I will first review conceptual issues in discussing democratic consolidation, and then analyze the achievements, failures, and unfinished jobs of the leaders of the first generation of Korean democracy, the three Kims, in terms of democratic consolidation. Then, I will discuss the implications of the 2002 election for democratic consolidation in the post–Three Kims Era.

Assessing New Democracies: Negative Consolidation and Positive Consolidation Since the “Carnation Revolution” of 1974 in Portugal, the Third Wave of democratization added 65 new democracies within a quarter-century. However, many countries that moved away from dictatorial rule cannot be considered to be in transition toward democracy.1 Many new democracies have remained in ambiguous gray zones, while some have advanced to liberal democracy. Larry Diamond noted that out of 104 democracies in the world, 73 may be considered liberal.2 Another 31 are electoral but not liberal, 17 regimes are on the blurry boundary between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism, 21 competitive authoritarianism, 25 hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and 25 politically closed authoritarian.3

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So with regard to democratic consolidation, the “wave” concept does not fit well. We have witnessed that new democracies can take diverse paths, such as advancing toward liberal democracies, lingering as electoral democracies with defects, or regressing to competitive authoritarianism. New democracies are positioned in different stages of consolidation and regression. Therefore we need bifurcated notions of democratic consolidation, that is, negative consolidation and positive consolidation, to capture the reality of democracy on varied paths of consolidation. First, in the initial stage, most consolidologists assess the consolidation of new democracies negatively. After many countries made democratic transitions and constituted their first democratically elected government, the main concern of consolidologists is how successfully the new democracies meet the challenge of preventing democratic breakdown, erosion and/or regression to semi-democratic rule.4 They assess and measure the possibility of sustainability and durability of new democracies by means of the absence of subversive antidemocratic forces, antidemocratic behavior, and the transgression of authority.5 Juan Linz, for example, provides standard criteria for negative consolidation. A consolidated democratic regime is a regime “in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers.”6 Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle agree, noting that “the absence of politically significant anti-system party or social movements” is the key indicator of democratic consolidation.7 The negative conception of democratic consolidation is useful to analyze the threats to new democracies in the aftermath of transition. In Spain, Argentina, and the Philippines, military coups were attempted. In Chile, the former dictator Pinochet and his army commanders had secured a “reserved domain” that was outside the control of democratically elected representatives. In many countries in Eastern Europe, large segments of people were excluded from claiming citizenship.8 Many freely, universally, fairly elected governments in new democracies violated basic civil rights and political freedoms, bypassed parliament, and unlawfully influenced the justice system. As many new democracies had defective properties that made them hard to be called a fairly liberal democracy, consolidologists have focused on analyzing these hybrid regimes that lie in between liberal democracy and authoritarianism, calling them illiberal, delegative, domain, and exclusive democracy. Merkel labeled these as “defective democracies.”

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Yet the negative concept of democratic consolidation failed to capture the reality of new democracies that advanced to liberal democracy. Despite varied paths after the transition, it is amazing that more than half of the new democracies, 34 out of 65 countries, entered the honorable club of liberal democracies by the end of 2001. In these new liberal democracies, people and politicians generally no longer worry about authoritarian subversion and regression or democratic breakdown and erosion. Thus, in many cases the negative concept became irrelevant in analyzing the state of democratic consolidation in these new liberal democracies. However, many have still not reached consolidated democracy, because their democratic institutions, while in play, are far from firmly rooted.9 Therefore, to analyze these new liberal democracies, a positive concept of democratic consolidation is necessary. Such a positive concept assesses the level of consolidation by measuring to what extent the new liberal democracies attain full democratic rule; in O’Donnell’s words, how much or to what extent the country has accomplished the “second transition” from democratic government to democratic regime.10 The positive conception of democratic consolidation tends to look at the extent that new democracies move forward in terms of deepening democratic institutions, settling democratic governance, and making quality democracy. The positive conception concerns more the issues of democratic quality than those of survival.11 When assessing democratic consolidation positively, there are some destinations that new democracies have to attain to be called consolidated. First, institutionally, democratic governance, fostering a high degree of accountability, transparency, the rule of law, participation, representation, and state capacity, must be instituted in constitutional and representational systems and ingrained so as to function as public governance of the administration, political parties, election, parliament, judiciary, and civil society.12 Second, behaviorally and normatively, a new democracy is consolidated positively when it achieves “broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine.”13

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The Achievements of the First Generation of Democracy With the 2002 election, the first generation of Korean democracy came to an end. The three Kims played a leading role in this first generation. Their key contribution was that they presided over a very rapid and successful transition from military authoritarianism to liberal democracy. After the inauguration of President Kim Young Sam, Freedom House classified South Korea as a liberal democracy by giving it a Freedom Score of 2 on both political rights and civil liberties. In Asia, only three countries— South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—have the average score of 2 or less that is required to be called a liberal democracy. Reinstituting Civilian Control Over the Military In the 15 years after the democratic transition in 1987, Korea completed negative consolidation. It avoided rapid democratic breakdown by purging a politicized military officer group, reasserting a firm civilian supremacy over the military, placing the “national security community” under control by elected representatives, and putting two former military presidents on trial. Korean democratizers have usually thought of democratic consolidation in negative terms. For them, democratization meant ending military rule (Gunjungjongsik). In the founding election of 1987, however, the three Kims failed to satisfy the long-term aspiration of the people by splitting the broad democratic coalition vote. This split made way for the military candidate, former general Roh Tae Woo, to be elected president with just 36.6% of the popular vote. The election of Roh Tae Woo, who had been deeply involved in military wrongdoings under the Chun Doo Hwan government, delayed the removal of potential antidemocratic subversive forces. South Korea had to wait until the inauguration of President Kim Young Sam in 1992 for the comprehensive purge of anti-system forces. Because Kim, the first civilian president in 30 years, owed much to former military elites for his election as president, he was expected to act very cautiously with respect to matters of purging military officers and national security apparatuses. However, to everybody’s surprise, he took decisive and quick actions to disband the Hanahoe Club, the politicized military officer clique that had served as a pillar of military authoritarianism and had occupied key strategic posts in

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the military as well as national security apparatuses under the Chun and Roh governments. Immediately after doing so, President Kim purged most of the Hanahoe members from the military and national security apparatuses.14 Following this, he pushed the National Assembly to revise laws on major intelligence agencies in January 1994. The revised law forced two key national intelligence agencies—the Agency for National Security Planning (the successor to KCIA) and the Military Security Command—to disengage from politics and return to their original missions. It also put these national security apparatuses under congressional oversight with respect to their expenditure, personnel management, and intelligence gathering. The new law additionally prohibited these intelligence agencies from conducting surveillance of government officials, party politicians and private citizens. Kim Young Sam even prosecuted two former presidents, ex-generals Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, on charges of corruption, military mutiny, treason for staging the December 1979 coup, and the massacre of civilians during the Kwangju uprising in 1980.15 These military reforms and rectification of Korea’s authoritarian past were the greatest achievement of the first civilian president of one of the most militarized countries of the world. With the quick and comprehensive reform of military and national security agencies, President Kim succeeded in reestablishing the supremacy of civilian rule over the military and removing the “reserved domain” of Korean politics. The military and national security apparatuses were deprived of their privileged status and of prerogatives that were beyond the control of democratically elected civilian representatives. The successful military cleansing and demilitarization reforms by Kim Young Sam opened up a new political space for civilian politicians such as Kim Dae Jung, who had been the major target of a veto group in the military. In the 1997 presidential race, no army generals openly talked about staging a coup against a “DJ” (Kim Dae Jung) presidency if elected.16 Institutionalization of Elections Democracy is minimally, in a Schumpeterian sense, defined as the regime in which the locus of power is decided by competitive struggle for people’s votes. Korean democracy certainly satisfies this requirement. After the founding election of new democracy in 1987, Koreans elected three presidents in consecutive five-year intervals and National Assemblymen four

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times at four-year intervals. The electoral arena widened to local government posts. In 1991 local assemblymen were elected for the first time since Park Chung Hee terminated local elections. In 1995 heads of local government, such as governor, mayor, and county chief, were added to balloting in  local elections and since then Korea has held seven local elections. Elections have been held not only regularly but also under free and fair conditions. As Przeworski pointed out, democracy becomes consolidated when it generates self-enforcing compliance to the outcome of electoral competition.17 With regard to compliance to electoral outcomes, the three Kims did not accept their defeat in the presidential election of 1987 and instead raised the possibility of vote-count rigging by candidate Roh Tae Woo and the Chun government. The loyal followers of the three Kims poured into the streets to protest election rigging. Yet in a few weeks, the three Kims accepted their defeat. Since then, losers in the elections at various levels have not called into question the fairness and free atmosphere of elections. In the 1992 presidential election, the loser, Kim Dae Jung, made a concession speech to congratulate the winner, Kim Young Sam. In addition to increased frequency of elections and the expanded scope of posts up for election, the fairness of electoral campaigns has improved. Candidates rely more on public debates on TV or radio, and public financing of campaigns has increased. In South Korea, elections have become “the only game in town” to assume power. A Peaceful Transfer of Government In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae Jung was elected president in his fourth bid for power. It was the first peaceful transfer of power to the opposition party candidate in 50 years. His election was another milestone in the Korean journey toward democratic consolidation. His electoral victory proved the existence of the convertibility of power between rivals, which is critical in persuading relevant political actors to continue to play the game of democracy whose outcome is uncertain. Since the alternation of power between rival forces guarantees the uncertainty in the outcome of democratic competition, it must be one of the core conditions for democratic consolidation. With the election of Kim Dae Jung, Korea became the first third-wave democracy in East Asia to attain a peaceful turnover of government to an opposition party. In the election, the Korean people rejected the candidate

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of the party of the conservative establishment that had ruled the country for decades. It was a historic event that broke a long stigma of Asian democracy as ruled by “a dominant, corporatist party that tolerated a limited opposition but never ceded power.”18 The transfer of power in 1997 has another historic meaning for democratic consolidation, as the transfer of government took place in the midst of a severe economic crisis. In late 1997, the Asian financial crisis, which started in Thailand and Indonesia, reached South Korea. As the financial system faced a meltdown, the economy fell to the brink of state default. South Korea avoided the worst scenario with help from the IMF, which provided massive bailout loans of 55 billion dollars with conditionalities. However, despite extreme economic hardship, Korean people went to the polling booths and elected an opposition leader as president, delegating him to overhaul the “crony capitalism,” which had prevailed under authoritarian regimes and extended its life into the new democracy. The election of 1997 thus shows the durability and the improved accountability of Korean democracy. It demonstrated the Korean people’s determination to live under democracy regardless of severe external fluctuations, such as the financial crisis. And the defeat of the ruling party candidate in the election shows that the electoral mechanism of accountability was working, since most people believed that the ruling party had to take responsibility for generating such a profound national economic crisis. Democracy helped Korea to make a comprehensive reform without creating serious political instability by institutionalized electoral mechanisms for legitimate power transfer.19 Enhancing Accountability Since the democratic transition, governments have become more accountable than before. A World Bank report shows that the accountability level of Korea in 2000/2001 was higher than average—at a similar level to Japan and Italy, and that it had risen from 0.91 in 1997/1998 to 0.98 in 2000/2001.20 Given that there are two types of accountability, vertical and horizontal, the level of both has been rising. Vertical accountability means that electors can demand their elected officials be held responsible for the acts they executed by rewarding or punishing them in the ballot, while horizontal accountability is the responsibility that governors have to answer to other

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representatives and institutions that have the expertise and power to control the behavior of the governors.21 The great improvement in vertical accountability came from civil society. After the democratic transition in 1987, a plethora of civil society organizations appeared. Between 1997 and 2000, the number of civil associations increased from 3500 to 6000. If we include local branches, the number increased three times, to 10,000 and to 20,000, respectively. These civil associations have incessantly monitored illegalities, malpractices, and corrupt behaviors of government officials and politicians. The resurrected civil society has performed the role of enforcing the accountability of politicians to the people. The blackballing campaign in the National Assembly election of 2000 was a typical example of how Korean civil society tried to make politicians responsible and accountable. After the democratic transition, political parties showed incompetence, moral decay, and political squabbling, and thus did not respond to the demand from civil society in an effective and efficient way. Many civil associations, therefore, reached a conclusion that without reforming political society they could not accomplish an accountable democracy. Korean civil society embarked, using political space given by the National Assembly election of April 13, 2000, on reforming political society. They formed an umbrella organization consisting of more than 500 civil associations, the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE), and staged a large-scale blackballing campaign against a group of politicians whom they viewed as incompetent, corrupt, and provoking regional animosity. The blackballing campaign of CAGE was highly successful. Out of the 86 candidates who were blackballed, 59 failed to win seats (68.6%). Among the 22 specially targeted candidates, 15 lost the election (72.7%). Through the blackballing campaign, CAGE called their representatives to take responsibility for their failure to faithfully represent the will of the people. The level of horizontal accountability rose as the legislative power increased vis-à-vis the executive power. In the past, the National Assembly was called the rubber stamp of the government. But after the democratic transition in 1997, the Korean people made the opposition party or the opposition coalition the majority in the National Assembly, and the legislature with an opposition majority enhanced the level of horizontal accountability by checking, overseeing, monitoring, supervising, and balancing the executive branch.

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Persistent Bad Legacies of the Three Kims’ Politics In general, under the Three Kims Era, electoral competitions were institutionalized, political rights and civil liberties generally assured, and government became more accountable and functioned better. Nonetheless, despite these achievements, the three Kims also handed down some bad legacies to the next generation of democracy, such as divisive regionalism, an underdeveloped party system, an imperial but weak presidency, and political corruption. Divisive Regionalism Since the democratic transition of 1987, every election has been marked by and decided by regional cleavage. South Korean politics has been reduced to regional rivalries whereby voters cast their votes by their subjective identification with regions. Regionalism is the major impediment to democratic development, since voters do not support parties and candidates for their policy stances and ideologies, but instead vote out of blind loyalty for regional cohorts or a regional favorite son.22 In the presidential elections, Kim Dae Jung received overwhelming majority of votes in Cholla province: 87% in 1987, 89% in 1992, and 93% in 1997; whereas in Kyungsang province he received only 3% in 1987, 9% in 1992, and 12% in 1997. Kim Young Sam, in contrast, received 3% of the Cholla votes in 1987 and 5% in 1992; while he received 69% of the Kyungsang votes in 1992. In the National Assembly election of April 2000, the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) won 25 out of 29 seats in Cholla province, while the opposing GNP swept 64 out of 65 seats in Kyungsang province. Regionalism was also strong under the authoritarian Park and Chun governments. Regional voting under Park and Chun, however, was not as conspicuously dominant in deciding the electoral outcome as it has been under democratic governments since 1987. The dominant voting pattern under the Park and Chun governments was the urban–rural cleavage (yeochon-­yado: rural voters for the ruling party, urban voters for the opposition parties), reflecting the strong anti-authoritarian sentiment among the urban middle class. Under authoritarian regimes, as two prominent opposition leaders from different regions, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, cooperated, anti-authoritarian votes were not concentrated in

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specific regions. Political parties and voters were split along the issues of democratization. After the democratic transition in 1987, however, as issues of democratization faded out, voters lost their main reference criteria. Power contenders who ran for president mobilized regional interests and identification as the main source for vote gathering. The candidate of the incumbent authoritarian power bloc, Roh Tae Woo, picked regionalism as the best winning strategy to divide the two Kims by fixing the image of Kim Dae Jung and the citizens of Cholla as radical, revolutionary, leftist, and anti-­ system forces.23 The two Kims aggravated regionalism as they failed to present a united candidate for the democrats. Because they had similar reputations as leaders of the democratization movement and no noticeable ideological differences, they had to appeal to voters as the favorite son of their home provinces. In addition, a long-suppressed class cleavage and the absence of religious cleavage deprived the two Kims of appealing class votes and religious votes and instead pressed them to rely more on the regional votes. The split of the democratic coalition between the two Kims resulted in the election of Roh as president in 1997, with 36.6% of the total votes cast. In the ensuing National Assembly election of April 1988, the votes were clearly divided along the regional cleavage. The parties of the three Kims (RDP, PPD, NDRP) virtually monopolized the representation of their home provinces, Cholla, South Kyungsang, and Choongchung, respectively, and the ruling DJP swept Roh’s home province, North Kyungsang province. Even voters of the Seoul metropolitan area, which constituted 45% of the population, cast their votes to the party of their hometown rather than the party of their actual residence.24 The division of votes along the lines of home provinces prevented the ruling party from amassing a parliamentary majority for the first time in the history of Korean congressional elections. Regionalism deepened with the three-party merger in early 1990. President Roh Tae Woo and the ruling DJP recaptured the parliamentary majority by merging Kim Young Sam’s RDP and Kim Jong Pil’s NDRP, and creating the new ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) by a political pact of guaranteeing Kim Young Sam the new party’s presidential candidacy. The three-party merger was based on a grand regional coalition (North Kyungsang, South Kyungsang, Choongchung) and created a hegemonic regionalism to isolate and exclude the small minority region of Cholla. Since then, regional hostilities have become rampant and divisive

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enough to destroy national integration and unity. The three Kims were responsible for the resilience of the destructive and divisive regionalism. The elected president Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung persisted in propagating regionalist practices of recruitment and resource allocation, while continuing to rely on region-based party or party coalition. Regionalism created a monopoly of regional representation by the three Kims’ parties and reduced electoral competition at regional level. It severely debilitated the representativeness of Korean democracy by preventing such interests as class, religion, occupation, gender, and generation from being represented. It also hindered political leaders from forming a broad, national support base, and thus hampered national integration. An Underdeveloped Party System Another bad legacy of the three Kims’ politics is the personalization of political parties. Since 1987, the three Kims created parties ten times: Kim Young Sam three times, Kim Dae Jung four, and Kim Jong Pil three. They created, dissolved, and recreated parties to suit their political needs, and ran them as if they were feudal lords. They reigned over their respective parties as imperial party presidents who monopolized the nomination of candidates, appointed party secretaries and officials and the chairmanship of National Assembly committees, and allocated party finance. They distributed political money to their followers in return for their loyalty. The three Kims’ autocratic rule over the party was somewhat justified under authoritarianism. To protect the party members from intimidation, threat, and surveillance from the police, and to maintain the organizational integrity, the three Kims as party bosses might have needed to run and organize the party in a very similar way that authoritarian dictators did toward the ruling party. After the transition, however, they continued to lead their parties with the practices that they had followed under the authoritarian governments. As parties were organized along regional lines and the three Kims maintained the exclusive loyalty from their home provinces, very few party politicians could challenge their autocratic rule because it would have been political suicide. Yet, no regionalist political party has been able to assemble a stable majority in the National Assembly through the electoral system of single member, simple majority. Because every party has been based on a particular region, they have usually sought to win the presidential election by a

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very loose alliance with other regional parties that broke down one or two years after elections.24 The volatile, short-lived, three-Kims-style personal political party has been the major impediment to internal party democracy and a responsive and accountable party system. Regionalist political parties thus created prevented South Korea from devising a policy-oriented party system. An Imperial but Weak Presidency with a Single-Term Limit The constitutional structure of the new democracy concentrates power in the hands of the president. The constitution of 1987 adopted a presidential system under which the president monopolizes state power. Many political power aspirants equate the election to the presidency with acquiring “ultimate power” (daekwon), and thus the presidential elections are called the “competition for ultimate power” (daekwonkyungjang). Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, when elected president, ruled autocratically the political parties that they had created but marginalized the role of parties and excluded them from key decision-making processes. The current constitutional structure fosters “delegative presidency”: democratically elected presidents, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, ruled the country as if they had been delegated all the power from the people through the elections.25 Delegative presidents do not acknowledge the power and authority of other elected representative bodies like the National Assembly and political parties. They did not recognize other representative bodies’ rights to enforce horizontal accountability through checks and balances, and therefore tried to put the National Assembly under their control by securing a solid majority in the legislature by party mergers, co-opting independent assemblymen and assemblymen of opposition parties into a governing party. As no congressional elections since 1988 have given the governing party the majority in the National Assembly, presidents have constantly reshuffled parties after elections. Roh Tae Woo reconstructed a congressional majority by a three-party merger. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung tried to secure a majority in the National Assembly by party alliance and the co-optation of National Assemblymen of other parties. This reshuffling negated the will of the people in the election and generated a political gridlock between the president and the opposition party. Compromise and mutual trust were missing on both sides and the ensuing zero-sum political game obstructed the workings of democracy.26

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Nonetheless, another constitutional element, the five-year single-term presidency, runs counter to the concept of an imperial presidency. The constitutional structure has two contradictory elements: imperial presidency by concentrating power to the president, and weak presidency with a five-year single-term limit. This single-term presidency was the outcome of a compromise among the leading actors in the making of the 1987 constitution. All the key leaders in the compromise, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung, were elected president one by one under this constitution. The constitution of 1987 has thus been known as the constitution of, by, and for the two Kims and Roh Tae Woo. The five-year single-term presidency has been proved inefficient and unaccountable. First, the system generated early lame-duck phenomena. Every president was plagued by a sharp drop of approval ratings toward the end of his term, partly because political followers and bureaucrats did not demonstrate the same loyalty in the later part of the presidency as in the early years of the presidency. The single-term president has also been vulnerable to attacks from the opposition parties, which freely attacked the single-term president in the last days without fearing retribution in the future. Second, the five-year term presidency complicated the election timetable and made it impossible to secure democratic accountability through “regular” elections. Since 1987, Koreans went every year to the polling booths to elect a five-year-term president, four-year-term National Assembly, or local governments, and thus the time span between elections has become short and irregular. Frequent and irregular elections have made it difficult to secure democratic accountability, as well as making governments stress policies that courted the short-term interests of voters, rather than the long-term collective interests of the nation. Political Corruption The two Kims were almost incapacitated in the last years of their presidency because of the outbreak of corruption scandals that involved president families and close protégés. Compared to authoritarian regimes, in which corruption was widespread, systemically organized by the regime, and routinized, the amount and scope of corruption under the democratic governments were smaller. When former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were indicted, they were charged with amassing 693 billion won and 450 billion won of illegal political contributions respectively

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during their terms, and they admitted to having taken personally 160 billion won and 230 billion won respectively when they left office.27 Compared to Chun and Roh, the amount of illegal contributions collected by the sons of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were much smaller, at a level of single- or double-digit billion won. Ironically, the outbreak of corruption scandals was, in a sense, evidence that the system to secure transparency was working. But these scandals were fatal blows to the authority and leadership of the democratic governments of the two Kims. Transparency International (TI) at one time placed Korea as the most corrupt country among OECD countries, but transparency has improved, from the 50th corruption free country in 1999 to the 48th in 2000, the 42nd in 2001, and the 40th in 2002. Corruption was structurally related to electoral democracy under the three Kims. Frequent elections increased the demand for political money.28 As imperial party presidents, the two Kims might have needed to raise money through informal political rings with businessmen to distribute political money to their followers. This corruption reflects the dark side of the three Kims’ politics: imperial presidency, regionalism, and party bossism. Therefore, preventing corruption and increasing transparency are closely related with political reforms for removing the bad legacies of the era.

Declining Trust in Democracy Even though an overwhelming majority of Koreans still normatively support democracy as their favorite political rule, popular dismay over the bad features of the three Kims’ politics has lowered their confidence in democracy. According to Shin Doh Chull’s surveys, 46% of respondents were very much in favor of democracy and 45% somewhat in favor. Therefore, if combined, an overwhelming 91% were in favor of democracy in principle. However, when asked whether democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government, only 45% endorsed it unconditionally. Empirical support for democracy dwindled from 70% in 1996 to 69% in 1997, to 54% in 1998, and to 55% in 1999. In contrast, more than one-third of Koreans entertain the possibility that an authoritarian regime might sometimes be preferable to democracy.29 Less than half said they were satisfied with the way democracy works, and the satisfaction rate declined from 49% in 1997 to 45% in 1999.30 The survey shows that Koreans have gradually lost their confidence in democracy as the best possible political

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system, and did not evaluate positively the achievement of democratic governments, but have instead increasingly showed their dissatisfaction with the way democracy worked in the Three Kims Era. The level of unwavering faith in democracy (45%) is the lowest in third-­ wave democracies except for Brazil and Lesotho, where the level fell to 39%.31 The economic crisis in late 1997 might have contributed somewhat to the decline of faith in democracy’s economic performance. But Shin’s survey shows that “the Korean economic crisis itself does not appear to have had a significant direct influence in democratic support among the Korean people.”32 People’s support for democracy declined even after Kim Dae Jung’s government successfully managed the financial crisis and made a full economic recovery. This means that the decline of support is associated more with political performance than with economic performance. The sharp drop in support in mid-1997, five months before the economic crisis but in the wake of corruption scandals related to the president’s family and cronies, demonstrates that political corruption impacted more on the negative evaluation of democratic government than failed economic policy did.33 The bad features of the three Kims’ politics fed people’s dissatisfaction, cynicism, and alienation toward the democratic system. In this period, political society did not render a workable democracy to resolve societal conflicts and to reach agreements on policy through dialogue. Political parties were not the solution but the source of societal conflicts. They became the object of reform, not the institutional vehicle for remedying Korea’s diseases.34

The Presidential Election of 2002 and Its Implication for Democratic Consolidation With the election of Roh Moo Hyun as president in December 2002, Korean democracy entered the post–Three Kims Era. The process of the 2002 election is a good predictor for Korean democracy in the Post–Three Kims Era, and whether or not people and politicians were able to do away with the bad legacies of the three Kims’ politics such as regionalism, personalized party system, imperial but weak presidency, political corruption, and popular cynicism toward politics.

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Party Reforms and the “People’s Primary” The reform politics for removing these bad legacies started well one year before the election in the area of party governance. The party reform movement began in the ruling party. In the aftermath of a devastating defeat in the by-election on October 25, 2001, President Kim Dae Jung resigned as party president of the ruling MDP under pressure from reformists within the party. In November 2001, the MDP formed a special committee for party reform, and at the end of December produced a comprehensive reform in party governance and a new nomination system for party candidates. The new system abolished the post of party president, prohibited an incumbent president from concurrently holding the post of party president, separated the presidential candidate and the chief party representative, and, finally, adopted a new nomination system in which presidential candidates were to be chosen by a “people’s nomination system.” This was a comprehensive reform to remove the elements of personal, feudal, and autocratic party leadership of the three Kims and expand the mass base of the party. The most striking reform was made in the system of nominating the presidential candidate. The new people’s nomination system was actually a mixed system of open and closed primaries which acted as the turning point in the conversion of the MDP from an elite party to a mass party, opening a bottom-up process of nominating the presidential candidate of the party. Owing to the new nomination system, Roh Moo Hyun, who was regarded as a dark horse at best, rose to being the front-runner with the support of nonpartisan voters over Lee In Je, who was the favorite son of the party establishment. After a long process of presidential primaries from March 7 to April 27, Roh became the first presidential candidate of the ruling party selected through the primary system. Roh represented the new politics of the Post–Three Kims Era and emerged as the front-runner in the presidential race, outstripping the GNP leader Lee Hoe Chang by more than 20% in the polls. Alarmed by the extraordinary rise of Roh’s popularity and concurrent rise of the MDP’s popularity over that of the GNP for the first time in years, Lee and the GNP made a similar reform in party governance, separating presidential candidate and chief party representative, and adopted a people’s nomination system through which Lee was chosen as the presidential candidate of the GNP on May 10, 2002.

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The presidential election battle of 2002 was waged between two candidates chosen by a primary system. Roh achieved the final victory over Lee thanks to an outpouring of support from young voters, who regarded him as the symbol of political reform and the alternative to the post–three Kims’ politics. His victory enlivened the people’s nomination system and party governance reform in Korea, which, if he had failed, would have been a one-time experiment. The people’s nomination system signifies a great advance in opening up political parties that had been closed by party elites in the Three Kims Era. Implications for Removing Obstacles to Democratic Consolidation The 2002 presidential election itself was an advance for democratic consolidation in Korea. First, the 2002 election signified that people had chosen the “Post–Three Kims’ Politics” over “Three Kims Politics without the Three Kims.” The main electoral battle between Roh Moo Hyun and Lee Hoe Chang was waged over the direction of political reforms. Throughout the whole presidential campaign, Roh’s campaign catchphrase, “Termination of Old-Fashioned Politics” clashed with Lee’s “Punishment of Corrupt Government.” Lee’s campaign slogan implied a negative strategy of bashing Kim Dae Jung while simultaneously identifying Roh as his heir. It was the strategy of instigating regional antagonism that is at the core of the old three Kims’ politics. In contrast, Roh’s slogan symbolized the political reforms for which most Korean voters had long yearned. Second, regionalism was still rampant in the election. While almost 95% of voters in Cholla province voted for Roh, more than 75% in Kyungsang province voted for Lee. Nonetheless, we can find hope for the easing of regionalism in the future in the fact that Roh is a politician who hails from Kyungsang province, but was elected president as the candidate of the political party based in Cholla province. Third, in electing the president, the ruling party played a less important role than spontaneous support from ordinary citizens. Roh became the candidate of the MDP despite his weak base in the party and was elected president even though the party establishment shook his candidacy during the presidential campaign. While some worried that the weakened role of the party would work negatively for the consolidation of democracy,35 the reduced power and influence of the party establishment raised the possibility of party reform under the Roh government.

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Finally, in the 2002 election, major candidates relied less on outdoor campaigning in front of mobilized mass audiences and more on TV or radio debates and advertisements through mass media. It was the first election in which the Internet played a critical role. The wind of Roh Moo Hyun would not have blown without the industrious support from “NoSaMo” (People who love Roh), who used the Internet to mobilize support for him. Supporters campaigned for Roh through online discussions, debates, information dissemination, and online fund-raising campaigns. The prominence of media and online campaigns reduced the necessary amount of campaign money and led the presidential campaign to adapt the style of policy-debate campaigns.

Conclusion: The New Era At the end of the Three Kims Era, Korean democracy was teetering on the verge of consolidation. Even though it had advanced to liberal democracy in terms of political rights and civil liberties, it nonetheless had serious quality defects that hindered democratic deepening, such as imperial presidency, oligarchic parties, divisive regionalism, political corruption, and low political trust. With the election of President Roh, Korea entered the second generation of democracy after the three Kims. Democracy under Roh’s presidency made some visible progress toward consolidation. After his inauguration, President Roh took several measures to end the practices of imperial presidency. He depoliticized and decontrolled repressive state apparatuses such as the National Intelligence Agency and state prosecutors, which were previously used for controlling the ruling party and intimidating opposition party politicians. Abandoning apparatuses for political control, Roh tried to rely more on dialogues and compromises to elicit cooperation from opposition party leaders with regard to legislating major presidential agendas. He started the Korean “mani pulite” (clean hands) movement to end illegal money politics by confessing publicly illegal political funds collected by his close associates, and by ordering prosecutors to investigate illegal political funds of both the ruling party and the opposition parties. In addition, he pushed parties to legislate political reforms to lower entry barriers to political minorities and new politicians, to institute a new electoral district system to prevent a regional favorite from monopolizing representation of a specific region, and to make a transparent political finance system.

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President Roh nonetheless met a serious obstacle on his road to political reform, in that he had fewer resources than his predecessors in terms of a power base in the National Assembly. With the division of the MDP, the new ruling Uri Party (Our Open Party) had less than one-third of the National Assembly, and thus Roh had great difficulty in enacting his political reform agendas. Yet the lack of numbers in the National Assembly could be overcome by pressure from below for political reform. Outrage and protests from public opinion and civil associations over the huge amounts of illegal political funds put irresistible pressure on all political circles, pressure to which they succumbed, promising to legislate concerned political reforms. The promise of a political circle was fulfilled and the National Assembly election was held with a new institutional and legal framework. As a result, Korean democracy was upgraded with the improvement of participation, transparency, and fairness of democratic process.

Notes 1. Thomas Carothers, “The End of Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002), p. 6. 2. Freedom House classifies countries as liberal democracies if they have a Freedom House score of 2.5 or lower on the seven-point scale averaging political rights and civil liberties. 3. Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), p. 26. 4. Andreas Schedler, “Concepts of Democratic Consolidation,” paper presented at Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17–19, 1997, p. 21. 5. Andreas Schedler, “Measuring democratic Consolidation,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001). 6. Juan Linz, “Transition to Democracy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1990), p.  158. Richard Gunther, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and P.  Nikiforos Diamandouros, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 12–13. 7. Wolfgang Merkel, “Defective Democracies,” Estudios/Working Paper, No. 132 (1999). 8. Larry Diamond, “Consolidating democracies,” in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemei, and Pippa Norris (Eds.), Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002)

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9. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspectives (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre dame Press, 1992), p. 18. 10. Pridham notes that positive consolidation is achieved when the democratic system becomes operationally settled, gains credibility, and is supported widely by both elites and masses. 11. Geoffrey Pridham, “The International Context of Democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” in Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros (Eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, pp. 168–169. 12. Diamond, “Consolidating Democracies.” 13. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 65. 14. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, “Introduction: Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea,” in Diamond and Shin (Eds.), Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), p. 10. 15. Terry Roehric, “Putting the Military on Trial: The Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea and Argentina,” www.ciaonet.org/conf/rot01 1998, pp. 4–6. 16. Bang Soon Yoon, “Democracy in Korea: Progress and Prospects,” paper presented at the International Conference organized by Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation, 2001. 17. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 18. Thomas Carothers, “Democracy,” Foreign Policy, No. 107 (1997), p. 16. 19. Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of East Asian Economic Crisis (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000); Byung Kook Kim, “The Politics of Financial Reform in Korea, Malaysia, Thailand: Does Democracy Matter?” paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 28–September 2, 2001. 20. Daniel Kaufmann, Ara Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters: Updated Indicators for 2000/2001 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002). 21. Leonardo Morlino, “’Good Democracy’ or ‘Good Democracies’? A Theoretical Analysis and Beyond,” paper presented at ECPR/JPSA Workshop at Heidelberg, November 8–10, 2002. 22. Eric C.  Browne and Sunwoong Kim, “Regionalism in South Korean National Assembly Election,” paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 28–September 2, p. 20.

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23. Jang Jip Choi, “Jiyukgamjungeui Jibae-ideologiejuk Kineung” (The Role of Regionalism as Ruling Ideology) in Jong Chul Kim and Jang Jip Choi (Eds.), Jiyukgamjung Yonkoo (Studies of Regionalism) (Seoul: Hakminsa, 1991). 24. Woojin Moon, “A Theory of Non-Ideological Voting: Democratization and Regional Voting in South Korea,” paper presented at a UCLA Seminar (2002). 25. Byung Kook Kim and Hyug Baeg Im, “’Crony Capitalism’ in South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan: Myth and Reality,” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2001), pp. 31–32. 26. Hyug Baeg Im, “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective,” in Larry Diamond and Byung Kook Kim (Eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 34. 27. Aurel Croissant, “Strong Presidents, Weak Democracy?: Presidents, Parliaments and Political Parties in South Korea,” Korea Observer, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2002), p. 14. 28. Jongryn Mo, “Making Sense out of Money Politics in Korea,” unpublished paper (2002). 29. David Kang, “Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2002), p. 194. 30. Doh Chull Shin, “The Cultural Foundation of Korean Democracy: A Comparative Perspective on Popular Support for Democracy,” in Young Rae Kim, Hochul Lee and In Sub Mah (Eds.), Redefining Korean Politics: Lost Paradigm and New Vision (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 2002), p. 303 and p. 312. 31. Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, “Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), p. 129. 32. Doh Chull Shin, “The Cultural Foundation of Korean Democracy,” p. 302. 33. Ibid., p. 318. 34. Chu, Diamond and Shin, “Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan,” p. 134. 35. Byung Kook Kim, “The Politics of Crisis and a Crisis of Politics: The Presidency of Kim Dae Jung,” in Kongdan Oh (ed.), Korea Briefing 1997–1999 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 58.

CHAPTER 9

Development and Change of Korean Democracy Since the Democratic Transition of 1987: The Three Kims’ Politics and After

Development and Underdevelopment of Democracy in Korea Korean democracy passed Huntington’s “two-turnover test” by achieving a power change in the presidential election of December 17, 2007. Huntington notes that “a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in [the] initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turn[s] over power to those winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over to those election winners.”1 As Przeworski argues, “democracy is a political system in which parties lose elections.”2 Two turnovers is one of the decisive signs that an emerging democracy is succeeding in “institutionalizing uncertainty,” or “subjecting all interests to competition” à la Przeworski.3 Korea made the first turnover by electing long-time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung as president in 1997. Ten years later, Lee Myung Bak and the Grand National Party peacefully regained power through the presidential election of December 19, 2007, and the National Assembly election on April 9, 2008, and Korea completed the second turnover. In East Asia, only Korea

Hyug Baeg Im: “Development and Change in Korean Democracy since the Democratic Transition in 1987: The Three Kims’ Politics and After,” in Yin-wah Chu and Wong, Siu-lun (Eds.), East Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, Reversal, Non-liberal Alternative, London: Routledge, 2010. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_9

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and Taiwan have passed the two-turnover test. Even though Taiwan made two turnovers in a shorter period of time (12 years), it took only 20 years to complete the two-turnover process in Korea. Japan, while known as the most advanced and stable democracy in Asia, had only one turnover in 1993, since the emergence of “the 1955 regime” by electing non–Liberal Democratic Party leader Hosokawa as prime minister. Does passing the two-turnover test mean that Korea has become a fully consolidated democracy? If we understand democratic consolidation as institutionalizing uncertainty, or institutionalizing electoral competition, then we can say that Korean democracy is consolidated. It proved itself to be a sustainable, durable, accountable, and free democracy 20 years after the democratic transition in 1987. It endured a severe economic crisis in 1997, a nuclear crisis originated from North Korea, and a constitutional crisis that arose over the congressional impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun. It became a freer and an accountable democracy, as evidenced by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report in 2005 that classified Korea as a free country by giving it a freedom score of 1 on political rights and 2 on civil liberties. Nonetheless, Korean democracy needs quality upgrade or improvement. Still, parties are cliques of political aspirants; the party system has not been institutionalized yet, and political participation, in terms of electoral participation, has decreased steadily since the democratic transition in 1987. Ideological orthodoxy still remains rampant to impede the politics of compromise. Korean democracy has mixed faces of development and underdevelopment in terms of quality of democracy. In this chapter, I will investigate why different historical times of premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity have coexisted in Korean democracy after democratization in 1987 and explore paths to upgrade the quality of democracy in Korea.

Coexistence of Different Historical Times: Simultaneity of Premodernity, Modernity, and Postmodernity In the last half century, while Koreans telescoped the stages of industrialization in a short period of time, they achieved democratic transition late in the third global wave of democratization. As a consequence of compressed industrialization and late democratization, different historical

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times have synchronically coexisted, especially in political governance, even after the turn of the twenty-first century. The traditional governance of sedentary Confucian society has coexisted with the modern governance of an industrial society and the postmodern governance of a neo-nomadic society. Even though Korean society entered the age of postindustrial information society, Korean politics could not overcome the legacies inherited from the politics of industrial society and Confucian agrarian society such as high-cost, low-efficiency politics, unresponsive and unaccountable politics, low-trust politics, closed-network politics, and exclusionary politics. The Korean political landscape in the post-democratic transition period has been characterized by the coexistence of different historical times. Because Korea telescoped modernization through rapid “compressed industrialization” that Western European countries took centuries to attain, elements of premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity have coexisted in Korean politics. After democracy was restored in 1987, modern political institutions, such as political parties, parliament, and electoral system, developed and functioned, but many traditional or premodern elements of political culture, behaviors, consciousness, and institutions remained intact in the form of Confucian patrimonialism, clientelism, patriarchism, and closed network politics. Political leaders acted like patriarchs in a large family. Strong regional ties dominated electoral politics. Confucius did not leave Korea wholeheartedly, while modern political institutions and norms were on the rise.4 Political modernization in Korea is also still incomplete and defective because it has not completed one of three modernization projects— nation-building—even though it has achieved the other two: industrialization and democratization. It is still a divided state which originated in the Cold War period and remains the only divided nation in the post–Cold War world. At the same time, many elements of postmodern politics have been introduced in Korean politics with globalization and the IT revolution. Korea is one of the countries where Internet politics is very vivid and active. Slimming down big politics is the motto of the day, and political parties have dissolved local party organizations and closed local party offices. An imperial party president no longer exists in Korea. The power of party bosses has become weaker as new politicians were elected over protégés of party bosses as party candidates through “people’s primaries” or semi-open primaries. Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, postmodern political agendas of gender equality, environmental protection,

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civil society, and peace have moved to the fore of electoral politics. The number of female lawmakers has been rising and the breaking up of male-­ dominated politics has been progressing very rapidly.

Modalities of Transition and Path Dependence Why then have modernity, premodernity, and postmodernity coexisted since the democratic transition in 1987? Path dependence led to their coexistence. Many features of the previous authoritarian regimes and modalities of transition have shaped the path of the democratic consolidation process in post-1987 Korean democracy.5 If Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter are right, the mode of transition determines to a significant extent which type of democracy will emerge, whether it will be consolidated and the long-term consequences for different social groups. There are three distinguishing features in the Korean democratic transition. First, it was a typical example of transition from economically successful authoritarianism. Dictators stepped down from power not because they failed to achieve economic development but because they succeeded in managing a rapid economic growth and created space for people to demand greater freedom. Authoritarian dictators met a crisis of success: the successful achievement of their historical mission of economic development eliminated the need for continuing authoritarian rule. Democracy arising from a crisis of success is in an advantageous position for stabilizing new democratic institutions compared to those born of economic crisis. In post-transition Korea, the economy was in good shape; the state was not bankrupt but inherited a relatively efficient bureaucracy and thus new democratic governments could manage turbulent transitional politics and establish democratic institutions and procedures. But economically the success story of the past may delay and hinder necessary political and administrative reforms. Second, democracy in South Korea emerged out of a “market-­ authoritarian regime” that stressed market rationality and economic liberalization. The market-authoritarian state provides a better foundation for market-oriented economic adjustment and structural reforms in a new democracy than do populist, socialist, or clientelist authoritarian regimes. Powerful and enduring links between the authoritarian state and corporatist social organizations are absent in market-authoritarian regimes. Unlike some corporatist authoritarian states in Latin America, the authoritarian state in Korea demobilized and depoliticized civil society and social

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organizations. Therefore, in a post-authoritarian new democracy, there were few powerful social organizations that could resist and reverse the neoliberal economic reforms. The market authoritarian regime was transformed into a market or neoliberal democracy in which a democratically elected government further deregulated and liberalized the economy while strengthening the business prerogatives and demanding workers to moderate their demands for wage hikes.6 The final mode of democratic transition in South Korea was close to Karl and Schmitter’s “transition by pact” or Przeworski’s “democracy with guarantees.” The authoritarian regimes and democratic opposition made a breakthrough for democratic transition on the brink of reciprocal destruction, or a “catastrophic balance” in the Gramscian sense. Breakthrough for democratic transition was made after a long tug-of-war between the democratic opposition coalition and the authoritarian regime.7 When both parties became exhausted, they reached a compromise for restoring democratic competition, the second-best solution for both parties to get out of the catastrophic balance. On the eve of the democratic transition the balance of forces between the authoritarian regime and its democratic opponents was catastrophic in the sense that the democratic coalition, though greatly broadened, was not strong enough to force the regime to surrender; and the regime, though severely weakened and divided, had kept the last resort of calling in the army. Regime and opposition reached a political pact that guaranteed authoritarian power holders the chance to survive as a relevant political force after the transition in exchange for the concession of restoring democratic competition. Because the transition was made through pacts between political elites, continuity with the authoritarian past prevailed in the political, social, and economic policies of new democratic governments. The continuing legacies of this authoritarian past have hindered the institutionalization of democratic rules of the game and the expansion of democracy from the political to the social and economic arenas. Democracy after democratization in Korea was path-dependent on the legacies of the authoritarian past. Because these modalities comprised transition from an economically successfully authoritarian regime, transition from market authoritarian regime, and transition by political pact, continuity rather than rupture with the authoritarian past predominated in democracy after the transition. These modalities can explain why political development with regard to institutional reforms coexisted with

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underdevelopment of modern democratic culture, norms, and behaviors. After the democratic transition, modern political institutions coexisted with premodern political culture.

Korean Democracy in the Three Kims Era Until the 2002 presidential election, the three Kims dominated Korean politics.8 The two Kims, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, led the democratization movement in the 1970s and 1980s, while the third, Kim Jong Pil, represented a moderate alternative to Park Chung Hee’s dictatorship within the authoritarian ruling circle. As the leaders of the first generation of Korean democracy, they presided over a very rapid and successful transition from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy by institutionalizing electoral competition, instituting civilian control over the military, and enhancing political and civil liberties including human rights. This era lasted 15 years and handed down to the next generation a durable and sustainable democracy that was not in imminent danger of collapse or protracted erosion. Despite these achievements, the three Kims also left bad legacies of premodern political culture and behaviors.

Modernity: Development of Liberal Democracy In the Three Kims Era, Koreans developed, for the first time in history, a modern liberal democracy. A democratic constitution was made through compromises between key political forces and was approved by the overwhelming majority of the people. It guaranteed political rights and civil liberties, and sufficiently checked and limited the power of the president by national assembly, courts, and civil society. Under Kim Young Sam’s presidency, the military was forced back to the barracks and a firm civilian control was established. Fair and competitive elections were held regularly at four- and five-year intervals. Government and elected officials were forced to become more accountable. Civilianization Korea had a long tradition of civilian control of the military. Confucianism has always stressed antimilitarism and significantly influenced the policy of the military in the Confucian Chosun dynasty (1392–2010)—indeed,

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there was no military coup throughout the whole Chosun period. Civilian control was maintained during the Korean War and the Rhee government, although President Rhee Seng Man effectively controlled a huge military organization of more than a million soldiers. The long tradition of civilian control was broken, however, by the military coup in 1961, led by General Park Chung Hee, after which Korea spent approximately 30 years under military authoritarian rule. Therefore, reinstituting civilian control over the military was the first mission of new democratic governments. However, the mission was not properly implemented by the first democratic government after the transition. President Roh Tae Woo, a former general, was a key person who staged the military coup in 1979 after the assassination of Park Chung Hee and was elected president as a candidate of a military-backed party. President Roh allowed a “reserved domain” for the military by securing its “organizational, financial and personal interests against civilian interference.”9 It was under Kim Young Sam’s presidency that anti-system military forces were comprehensively purged. The first civilian president in 30  years, he named his government a “civilian government” (munminjungbu) and launched a massive project of demilitarization and civilianization of Korean politics. Though expected to act cautiously in purging the military, he in fact quickly disbanded the Hanahoe Club, the politicized military office clique that occupied key strategic posts under the Chun and Roh governments. Immediately thereafter, he purged most Hanahoe members from the military and national security apparatuses.10 He also put former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo on trial on charges of corruption, military mutiny, and treason.11 With the quick and comprehensive purge of the politicized military officer group, Korea was able to avoid a possible democratic breakdown and reassert a firm civilian supremacy over the military by placing “national security community” under control by elected representatives. President Kim Young Sam removed the “reserved domain” of Korean politics. The military and national security apparatuses were deprived of their privileged status and prerogatives that were not controlled by democratically elected civilian representatives. Institutionalization of Democratic Competition Democracy is minimally defined, in the Schumpeterian sense, as the regime in which the locus of power is decided by competitive struggle for the

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people’s votes. Korea certainly satisfied this requirement during the Three Kims Era. Since the founding election of the new democracy in 1987, Koreans have elected five presidents consecutively every five years, and National Assemblymen five times, every four years. The electoral arena has also widened to local government posts. In 1991, local assemblymen were elected for the first time since Park Chung Hee terminated local elections. In 1995, heads of local government, governor, mayor, and county chief were added to balloting in local elections, and since then Korea has held seven local elections. Elections have been held not only regularly but also under free and fair conditions. In addition to the short and irregular intervals of elections and expanded scope of posts to be elected, the fairness of electoral campaigns has been improved. Candidates rely more on public debates on TV or radio, and the public financing of campaigns has increased. Campaign spending has become more transparent with successive political reforms on money politics. Elections have become “the only game in town” to take power. Przeworski argues that democracy becomes consolidated when it generates self-enforcing compliance to the outcome of electoral competition.12 The losers in the election, whoever they may be, accept their defeat and comply with the voice of the people in the election. Alternation in Power In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae Jung was elected president in his fourth bid for power. It was the first peaceful transfer of power to a candidate of the opposition party in 50  years. His election was another milestone in the Korean journey toward democratic consolidation. The electoral victory of Kim Dae Jung proved the existence of the convertibility of power between rivals that is critical for ensuring that relevant political actors continue to play the game of democracy whose outcome is uncertain. Since the alternation in power between rival forces guarantees the uncertainty in the outcome of democratic competition, it must be one of the core conditions for democratic consolidation. With the election of Kim Dae Jung, Korea became the first third-wave democracy in East Asia to attain a peaceful turnover of government to an opposition party. In the election, people rejected the candidate of the party of the conservative establishment that had ruled the country for decades. It was a historic event that broke a long stigma of Asian

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democracy as ruled by “a dominant, corporatist party that tolerated a limited opposition but never ceded power.”13 The transfer of power in 1997 has another historic meaning for democratic consolidation due to the fact that the transfer of government took place in the midst of a severe economic crisis. In late 1997, the Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand and Indonesia reached South Korea, the financial system melted down, and the Korean economy teetered on the brink of state default. The country avoided the worst scenario thanks to a 55 billion IMF loan, with conditionalities. However, despite extreme economic hardship, people went to the polling booths and elected an opposition leader as president to overhaul the crony capitalism that had prevailed under the authoritarian regimes and beyond. Therefore, the election of 1997 shows the durability and the improved accountability of Korean democracy. It demonstrated the electorate’s determination to live under democracy regardless of severe external fluctuations like the financial crisis. And the defeat of the ruling party candidate shows that the electoral mechanism of accountability was working, since the people took the ruling party to task for generating such a profound national economic crisis. Democracy helped Korea to make a comprehensive reform without arousing serious political instability by an institutionalized electoral mechanism for legitimate power change.14 Korea passed Huntington’s “two-turnover test” in 2007. Ten years after the first peaceful transfer of power, Korean conservatives took over power from the liberals. Widespread disenchantment with the poor performance of the Roh Moo Hyun government, especially in economic and social issues, led the electorate to punish the ruling party candidate and to prefer a pragmatic conservative candidate who promised economic growth and jobs with the slogan “Save the Economy.” The 2007 election shows that “retrospective voting” predominated over prospective voting and democratic accountability is working.

Premodernity: Legacies of Confucian Patrimonialism Why then did Koreans succeed spectacularly in installing democratic institutions in a short period of time but fail to internalize democratic norms— to practice democracy in political parties, to enforce rule of law, and to make government transparent? In other words, why did they operate the modern hardware of democratic institutions with a premodern software of patrimonialism, patriarchism, and paternalism?

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The answer can be found in the resilience or embeddedness of Confucian legacies in the first generation of democracy. According to Koh Bung Ik, even though only about 2 percent of the Korean population declare themselves as Confucian, “all men are Confucians,” because the majority still observe basic Confucian rituals and subscribe to Confucian values.15 Confucianism still has deep roots in the everyday life of Koreans, even though as state ideology it died long ago. Even today it saturates people’s lives and is the core of Korean culture.16 Despite industrialization and democratization, the legacy of Confucianism has survived in people’s minds, with its emphasis on education, secular life, familism, elite paternalism, and righteousness.17 As one American scholar observed, “Koreans operate with Western hardware and Confucian software.”18 Confucian Patrimonialism Under the Chosun Dynasty Society under the Chosun dynasty was a medieval agrarian one, a stationary society in which the total yield of crop was almost fixed because the limited arable land could not be expanded. Politics during the Chosun dynasty centered on how to distribute the fixed amount of crops, thus demonstrating the zero-sum character of distributional politics. In agrarian society, politics or extra-economic coercion took command in deciding how to distribute yields. Thus Chosun society was one in which the political elites took control of everything. As a result, cut-throat battles took place among political elites for control of the power to decide the distribution of wealth, and the peaceful transfer of power (Boongdang) was almost unthinkable. Parties became a machine perpetuating the inherited privileges of a handful of high elite families.19 Every “hwan guk” (change of power) involved the death of hundreds of political opponents. In the stationary society of Chosun, politics was characterized by clientelistic ties within families, schools, regions, and dominated by closed networks. The politics of closed networks was very exclusionary. Because the political order was based on personal ties and bonds between family or sib members, it deterred the development of impersonal ties and associations which are the basis of democratic civil society. Strong familism made every individual divide society into “us” and “others.” In this dichotomous society, same family, same birthplace, and same school constituted the identity of individuals. Civil associations of diverse interests and different identities evolved with difficulty because the democratic community is not an exclusive community of in-group members, but a community of strangers

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which asks that all persons be assured the opportunity for fair treatment (Park 1997: 832). In Chosun, the radius of trust in the politics of ties and closed networks was very short because the strong in-group trust was based on strong out-­ group distrust and exclusion. Political ties and zero-sum distributional politics generated a political environment that made compromise very hard. While compromise takes place easily in positive-sum games, the agriculturally stationary society that was Chosun did not have the material base to expand its economy for such a positive-sum game. In the Chosun dynasty, the centralized state coexisted with regional strongholds of Yangban literati. The relationship between the center and provinces was both vertical and hierarchical. Nonetheless, the party system was formed on the basis of regional identification. The No-ron party that dominated most of the later Chosun period was based on Kiho regions (Kyunggi and Honam provinces), while the opposition Nam-in party based itself on the Youngnam region (Kyungsang provinces). The Korean regionalism characterized by a live-or-die struggle to take the center was already formed during the Chosun dynasty. Finally, the agrarian Chosun society had strong patriarchism and paternalism. The state was regarded as a big extended family and the king was the great father of this big family. Family-based agricultural production generated a political structure of concentric circles in which the inner core of identity was defined by family ties, with the circles expanding concentrically to regional ties, school ties, and finally to the circle of the Korean nation. Under this political structure, patriarchism, cronyism, and the privatization of public authority were pervasive. In the Chosun dynasty, Confucianism as the state ideology envisioned and justified the political order of a stationary agricultural society. It also provided the cultural base for factional strife among regional parties and for rule by man rather than rule by law. Confucian Patrimonialism in Post-Transition Democracy With industrialization and democratization, Confucianism waned as an ideology and a moral code of conduct. No attempt was made to revive the Confucian codes of conduct that operated under the Chosun, but its cultural legacy remains strong even after the democratic transition.20 In the Three Kims Era, despite success in installing liberal democratic institutions such as elections, the president, and the national assembly, Koreans failed

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to develop democratic norms and practices such as accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and the rule of law, because Confucian cultural legacies permeated political leaders and masses. With democratization, Koreans imported the hardware of Western liberal democratic institutions, but the software that operated the hardware was still Confucianism. Confucian values proved to be obstacles to instituting democratic governance. Resilient Regionalism First, resilient regionalism shows how strong the Confucian legacy was in Korea. In the Three Kims Era, every election was decided by regional cleavages,21 and politics was reduced to regional rivalries. Voters voted according to their subjective identification with regions. Regionalism is the major impediment to democratic development, since voters do not support parties and candidates for their policy stances and ideologies, but instead vote out of blind loyalty for regional cohorts or the regional favorite son.22 The three Kims were responsible for the emergence of regionalism as the dominant factor in deciding the outcome of elections. After the democratic transition, the three Kims chose the “region” as the primary axis along which their parties were organized. After 1987, the issues of democratization (democrats versus non-democrats) were no longer the main reference point for voters, and the three Kims had to find new issues to appeal to and mobilize voters around. As appealing on class lines had been long suppressed because of persistent anti-communism, and religious schisms were almost absent because of the peaceful coexistence of religions, they were unable to draw class-based and religion-based votes, and thus found regionalism as the main source of votes.23 Regionalism created a virtual regional monopoly for the three Kims’ parties; in Cholla, Kyungsang and Chungchung regions, where they dominated electoral politics, nomination almost guaranteed election. Therefore there was little interparty competition. Even in the Seoul metropolitan area residents cast votes based on the party of their hometown. Regionalism also hindered political leaders from forming a broad, national support base, and thus hampered national integration.24 Korean regionalism arose from Confucian familism.25 Its culture entrapped voters in regional competition. Voters expand their concentric circles of identity from narrow blood (or family) ties and school ties toward

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broader regionalist sentiments when forced to choose candidates in elections.26 Delegative Presidency Second, delegative presidency also shows the effects of Confucian values on democracy. In South Korea, a democratically elected civilian president could not overcome the strong temptation to delegativism. Each president ruled the country as if he had been delegated all the power from the sovereign people through election. He acted free of constraints, presented himself as above parties and organized interests, and thus transformed sovereign voters into passive audiences. President Kim Young Sam, especially, was infused with a strong delegative character, as he and his close associates made policies without consulting parties, the legislature, and relevant interest groups. Under delegative democracy, even though the vertical accountability of rulers to the ruled is secured through regular and contested elections, the horizontal accountability of office holders or state agencies to one another cannot be instituted. Delegative presidents did not acknowledge the power and authority of other elected representative bodies like the National Assembly and political parties. They did not recognize these bodies’ rights to enforce horizontal accountability through checks and balances. Delegative presidents therefore tried to bring the National Assembly under their control by securing a solid majority in the legislature by party mergers, and co-opting independent assemblymen and assemblymen of opposition parties into the governing party.27 Second, prevalent delegativism gave rise to “daekwonjueui” (ultimate power cultism). The concept of Daekwon, or ultimate power, is undemocratic because under democracy power derives from the people and only they have the ultimate power. The Daekwonjueui leads political power aspirants to misperceive having been elected president as having been delegated all the power. As a result, Korean politics has revolved inordinately around presidential elections. The stakes in being elected president were so high that they made presidential elections virtually a “life and death” struggle. Compromises and mutual trust were missing and the ensuing zero-sum political game obstructed the workings of democracy.28 Confucianism was the main cultural source of this delegative democracy. Lucian Pye notes that Korean rulers acted like Confucian patriarchal fathers of the nation:

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Korean rulers, like Korean fathers, are expected to be embattled, needing to prove themselves in adversary contacts; but they are also expected to be masterful at all times, like the Chinese figure, able to cope single-handedly with all of his problems and demanding total adherence to his wishes. Yet, again like the Japanese leader-father, he is expected to be sympathetic, nurturing, and sensitive to the wishes of his followers-family, though at the same time vicious and aggressive in fighting external foes.29

Pye’s description of the Korean presidents shares characteristics with O’Donnell’s delegative president, who regards himself as the embodiment of the nation, a custodian of national interests, and a paternalistic figure who stands above factional or partisan politics.30 Confucian patriarchism or paternalism finds a father figure as president, on whom people bestow all power and expect to be next to God. The delegative democracy fits well with Confucian values.31 The three Kims acted as such fatherly leaders. Personal Political Parties and Party Bossism Since 1987, the three Kims created parties ten times. They repeated the same cycle of founding, dissolving, reestablishing, and renaming their own parties at will.32 They reigned over these parties like imperial party presidents, monopolizing the nomination of candidates, appointing party secretaries and officials and the chairmanship of National Assembly committees, and distributing political money to their followers in return for their loyalty.33 This was somewhat justified under authoritarianism. To protect the party members from intimidation, threat, police surveillance, and to maintain organizational integrity, they might have needed to run and organize the party like a dictator. But after the new democracy they continued to lead with the party practices and governance of the authoritarian period. Given that parties were organized along regional lines and they maintained exclusive loyalty from their home provinces, few dared to challenge their autocratic rule over the party. Yet no regionalist political party could assemble a stable majority in the National Assembly through the electoral system of single member, simple majority. Because every party has been based on a particular region, they usually sought to win the presidential elections in a very loose alliance with other regional parties that broke down one or two years after the election.34

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The volatile, short-lived, personal political party Three-Kims-style was the main impediment to internal party democracy, hindering a responsive and accountable party system. Regionalist political parties prevented the country from devising a policy-oriented party system. Party bossism under the three Kims was the symbol of the premodern political system. The three Kims were like fathers in a patriarchal family with the moral authority of the father-leader. As party bosses they took care of their family-­ people, who in return were bound to meet complementary obligations of the family (or people) to the father (or leader).35 Their parties were patrimonial parties in the sense that leadership and followership were both personalized. Ideological Orthodoxy Confucian orthodoxy and conformity remained strong in the post-­ democratic transition period and resulted in a lower level of political tolerance in Korea than in other countries at a similar level of socioeconomic development.36 The Confucian cultural legacy played a major role in the continuing presence of cultural orthodoxy and ideological purity in democratic Korea. Anti-communism is still prevalent among the older conservative generation. As a consequence, while the Cold War has disappeared elsewhere, it persists in Korea, and the national security law that buttressed anti-communism still remained intact even after democratic leaders took power. The Confucian legacy of ideological orthodoxy and conformity were the main obstacles to the instituting governance with diversity, pluralism, and tolerance.37 The remnants of anti-communism acted as an ideological entry barrier to political society, narrowing the agendas discussed in the democratic forums, and preventing diverse alternatives for peace from emerging and being discussed. It has put McCarthyist “Sakkalron” (coloring one’s ideology as pro-North and pro-Communist) on every electoral stage, and thus distorted the political views of the candidates and narrowed the voters’ choice of ideology. The ideological narrowness of political society preserved the exclusionary character of Korean democracy, even though the democratic transition took place in the favorable international milieu of the collapsing Cold War. When a specific ideology is excluded from the agendas that are discussed in the democratic forums, the representativeness of the democracy is called into question.

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Change of Democracy in the Post–Three Kims Era The Rise of Neo-Nomadic Society As the Three Kims Era came to end, new political phenomena appeared in Korea. The election of Roh Moo Hyun signaled an end to the “post-1987 regime.” A new generation of politicians have put their stamp on South Korean politics.38 Postmodern and post-materialist political issues, such as generational shift, gender equality, environmental protection, peace, civil society, and human rights, came to the fore of political agenda. These changes did not occur spontaneously after the exit of the three Kims; rather, the profound social change was the motive that led to the emergence of new politics. That social change is the rise of what I call the “neo-­ nomadic society.”39 South Korea is one of the countries where the IT revolution has been advancing particularly fast. The number of mobile phone and Internet users, and the total amount of Internet use in Korea is the highest in East Asia, excluding city states like Singapore and Hong Kong. More than 30 million Koreans are netizens, accessing the Internet daily, and there are more mobile phones than the total population. South Korea is the only country to have completed a countrywide information superhighway infrastructure, with a per capita VDSL user that is the first in the world, surpassing the United States. As far as the IT revolution is concerned, South Korea is no longer catching up with advanced countries, but is the front-runner that leads the revolution. With the digital revolution, globalization, and democratization, a neo-­ nomadic society has emerged in South Korea. French futurist Jacques Attali argues that with digital revolution and globalization, human beings, equipped with notebooks, mobile phones, the Internet, and faxes, have ended 10,000 years of settled life and are turning back into nomads who travel across occupations, places, environments, national borders, and families to pursue happiness of their own. The nomad is defined by his identity, not by where he lives.40 Five thousand years ago, Koreans were horse-riding nomadic people, the offspring of Northeast Asian nomads. Their nomadic temperament was suppressed by long years of settled lives, but has reemerged with the advent of digital revolution and globalization. The digital gale in “Teheran Valley,” the digital area around Teheran Boulevard, Seoul where IT firms are concentrated, the spectacular growth of mobile phones and Internet users, and the phenomenal increase in digital access have transformed

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them into virtual nomads. The inflow of foreign workers, flexible labor markets, free trade agreements, and the opening of the agricultural market by the WTO has compelled workers and farmers to travel to find jobs to survive, and thus become lower-nomads. Affluent people become hyper-­ nomads who travel all over the world to preoccupy profitable resources. With the advent of the digital revolution, the New Economy, mass car use, a complex national highway system and high-speed trains, and rapid urbanization, Korean society has rapidly become highly mobile and nomadic. People change their residences, jobs, occupations, schools, and statuses. They not only move offline, but online as well. Social mobility has increased rapidly as the New Economy has created new job categories and a flexible social stratum. By connecting online through computers and the Internet, people can work at home and while traveling.41 There is also high mobility in residence patterns: now most Koreans live in apartments, a typical temporary residence fitting to a highly mobile lifestyle. Few buy an apartment for lifetime residence.42 Thomas Friedman of the New York Times pointed out that Koreans are one of the “cybertribes” of the neo-­ nomadic world. Equipped with the Internet and connecting it with a diaspora community (7 million overseas Koreans) spread out all over the world, these cybertribes can combine speed, creativity, entrepreneurial talent, and global networking, and generate enormous wealth.43 Neo-nomadic society is transforming Korean political governance from big, slow, isolated, closed, exclusionary governance to small, fast, connected, open, and inclusive governance. The core of the neo-nomads is the younger generation in their twenties and thirties. They have become the N-generation (Netizen generation), P-generation (Participation, Passion, Potential Power), and M-generation (Mtizen: mobile citizen), participating actively in politics and communicating in cyberspace via neo-­ nomadic devices like the Internet and mobile phones. The Korea–Japan World Cup of 2002 gave the momentum to mobilize the young N-generation. Some 24 million people spontaneously participated in street “cheering festivities” during the World Cup. Even though all generations took part, the biggest group was the “Red Devils” (the name of a Korean cheering group) and young Koreans in their teens, twenties, and thirties called R (Red Devil) generation or W (World Cup) generation. The mobilization of the R or W generation hinted at the future governance of Korea, which would be a festival-like politics that everybody would enjoy participating in.

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Through the mobilization in the World Cup, young Koreans, who were previously sarcastic, apathetic, and cynical about politics became politically active citizens who actively participated in politics as if it were a sport-like festival. In the aftermath of the World Cup, the W generation turned into the P generation, participating actively in the presidential election, candlelight demonstrations protesting the U.S. army’s actions in the death of two school girls, and anti-war demonstration against the Iraq War. The core of the P generation is Netizens and Mtizens. Netizens are intellectually open, inclusive, communicative, socially conscious, innovative, fast, mobile, and trustworthy. They participate in politics by organizing Internet clubs like NoSaMo (people who love Roh Moo Hyun), as well as flash mob demonstrations and discussions called “bungae moim” (lightening meetings). Using neo-nomadic devices, they connect and mobilize the online community to offline demonstrations, boycotts, and public debates. Receding Premodernity: “Confucius Leaving Korea” Korean neo-nomads have changed the political landscape. First, the imperial presidency disappeared. After his inauguration, President Roh took important measures to end the practices of imperial presidency. He did not intentionally take direct control over powerful state apparatuses such as the National Information Agency, the Public Prosecutors Office, the National Police, and the Internal Revenue Office, and thus left them politically neutral. These apparatuses were used by delegative presidents to assure their power and privileges, to control their ruling party, and to intimidate opposition party politicians. Since Roh’s presidency, ruling parties have not been under the strict control of presidents and enjoy more autonomy in policy-making and legislative work. The National Assembly has acted as an effective checks-and-balances body to the president. Today very few Koreans believe their country is still under an imperial presidency. Second, the dominance of regionalism in Korean politics has waned. Regionalism was still rampant in the presidential election of 2002, with almost 95% of voters in Cholla province voting for Roh, and over 75% of voters in Kyungsang province voting for the opposition candidate Lee Hoe Chang. In the National Assembly election of April 15, 2004, however, regionalism proved to be on the ebb everywhere except for Kyungsang province. The generational difference in the impeachment was the main factor in deciding the outcome of the election that made the ruling Woori

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Party the majority in the National Assembly for the first time since 1987.44 In the election of April 9, 2008, the regional cleavage was a weaker indicator of outcome than policy and ideological differences and the generational cleavage. Third, ideological orthodoxy imbued by Confucian culture has been retreating since the North–South Summit Meeting on June 15, 2000. Former president Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy opened a new era of North–South reconciliation and cooperation. Since then, many Koreans became tolerant of communist North Korea and the number of conservative Koreans arguing for maintaining ideological purity of anti-­communism has fallen. While 40% of National Assemblymen elected in April 2004 identified as progressives, only 20% said they were conservatives. In 2004, for the first time since 1987, a left-wing party, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) entered into parliament, gaining ten National Assembly seats to become the third-largest party. That the DLP received about 13% of the total vote nationwide indicates the growing ideological tolerance.

Advancing Modernity: Political Reforms for Modern Liberal Democracy While premodern political culture and ideology have receded in the post– Three Kims Era, efforts to upgrade Korean democracy have been made since the end of Kim Dae Jung’s presidency. Political parties have become smaller but more efficient, transparent, accountable, and responsive. Political society now accepts the reality of power-sharing with civil society, and Koreans are increasingly tolerating diverse ideologies, cultural values, and norms. Party Reform After the end of Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, political parties made a major overhaul of party governance (Im, forthcoming). The party reform movement began when, in the aftermath of a devastating defeat in the by-­ election of October 25, 2001, Kim Dae Jung resigned as the party president of the ruling MDP. In November 2001 the MDP formed a special committee for party reform, and at the end of December produced a comprehensive reform in party governance and a new nomination system for party candidates. The new party governance system abolished the post

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of party president, prohibited an incumbent president from concurrently holding the post of party president, separated the presidential candidate and the chief party representative, and finally adopted a new nomination system in which presidential candidates were to be chosen by a “people’s nomination system.” The new party governance was a comprehensive reform to remove the elements of personal, feudal, and autocratic party leadership of the three Kims’ style and to expand the mass base of the party. The most striking party reform was made in the system of nominating a presidential candidate. The new people’s nomination system was actually a mixed system of open and closed primaries. It acted as the turning point in the conversion of the MDP from an elite party to a mass party. It opened a bottom-up process of nominating the presidential candidate of the party. Major parties followed the MDP’s reform to abolish the post of imperial party president and set up intra-party democracy. They adopted a collegial system of party leadership elected directly by rank-and-file party members. Among collective leadership, the person who gets the most votes would be the chairman of the parties. The chairman of the party could not wield power as former party presidents had, and instead the floor leader, who is elected by in-house assemblymen is empowered to set up legislative strategies and party policies as the representative of the in-­ house party. The dual system of party leadership was designed to decentralize party decision-making and to promote a bottom-up process of aggregating and representing the interests of constituencies. Another major reform for party governance was the downsizing of the party. The overdevelopment of party secretariat and district branch party organization had been the major source of bureaucratization of the party, “high-cost, low-efficiency politics,” and political corruption. Thus, major parties slimmed down by reducing the central party secretariat and virtually abolishing local party branches. Now, Korean political parties are transforming themselves to neo-nomadic parties which try to aggregate, represent, and respond to constituencies’ interests quickly, efficiently, and responsively with slimmer size. Political Finance Reform In the 2002 election, the prominence of media and online campaigns reduced the amount of campaign money needed and led to an American style of policy-debate campaigns. However, illegal political contribution

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did not disappear. The disclosure of illegal campaign contributions to conservative opposition party GNP by major chaebol groups reduced public trust toward the political society to the lowest level. In mid-1993, President Roh started his initiative to end illegal money politics by ordering prosecutors to investigate illegal political funds of both the ruling party and opposition parties. Together with the prosecutor’s office’s investigation of illegal campaign money, public pressure for establishing a transparent political finance system before the National Assembly election in April 15, 2004, forced political society to start reforming political financing. The new laws required that parties and candidates report to the National Election Commission in a clear and verifiable manner by providing receipts, set the limit of political contribution, and encourage small donations. The government and National Election Commission encouraged whistle-blowing on illegal campaign money and vote-buying by rewarding whistle-blowers 50 times the amount of illegal money they report and imposing fines on both illegal donors and receivers 50 times the amount they gave and received. With the political finance reform, money played a less important role in the National Assembly election of April 15, 2004, than in any other election. The National Assembly election was the cleanest election in history and constituted a turning point for political transparency in Korea. The Advent of Postmodernity: Internet Democracy Korea is the frontrunner of the IT revolution, and currently more than 30 million out of the 47 million population have become netizens. They make use of the Internet as a revolutionary instrument to improve the accountability and transparency of politics. The Internet can deliver more and diverse information to citizens quicker and more cheaply, disclose information about politicians in cyberspace 24  hours a day, transmit quickly the demands of people to their representatives through two-way cybercommunication, and enable politicians to respond quickly to people’s demands in their policy-making and legislative work. In addition, netizens make use of the Internet as a place for collective action, monitoring, pressuring, and protesting that can establish the system of constant political accountability. Since the 1997 presidential election, politicians have paid attention to the Internet revolution and tried to appeal to netizen voters. In 1997 and 2002, in the National Assembly Election of 2004, and in the local election of 1998, politicians opened home pages to

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disclose information on personal vitae and their policies, and to communicate with netizen voters. In the aftermath of the 2002 election, political parties, sensing the power of the Internet, embarked on reorganizing party governance. Parties and assemblymen opened cyber fora on their home pages to communicate with their constituencies, to lure active participation of rank-­ and-­file members in party policy-making, and aggregate voters’ preferences. Parties also set up cyber polls through which citizens can propose policies to parties and vote on major policies of parties. The Internet revolution or web 2.0 has not only reformed representative democracy but also strengthened participatory democracy. Netizens became prosumer voters who transformed themselves from passive consumers of political information produced by politicians and parties to active producers and providers of information. Netizen groups such as NoSaMo and ParkSaMo (People who support Park Geun Hye) replaced political parties or politicians as the organizers of electoral campaigns. Netizen voters led electoral campaigns by means of User Created Content, User Generated Content, and User Generated Video. Web 2.0 has softened and changed politics from a space for dealing with hard issues to one for low politics, festivity, and entertainment, ushering in the age of participation and the continuous sharing of information, and thus expanded the political influences of minorities.

Conclusion: Gear Toward Conservatism In 2007, Korean democracy found itself at a crossroads. In the presidential election of December 19, conservative Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung Bak was elected president and the conservative GNP retook the National Assembly the following year. The progressive period ended ten  years after the first transfer of power from conservatives to liberals. The shift to conservatism may have been felt more in the economic than in the political and social areas. Lee and the GNP retook power from the progressives who had ruled Korea for ten years by successfully combining neoliberal economic growth and populist distribution policies. Lee and pragmatic conservatives gained votes from both rich Gangnam (South of Han River) people and poor Kangbuk people, both capitalists and workers, and both the young generation in their twenties and thirties and the older generation in their fifties and sixties. The GNP successfully made

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a multi-class coalition and retook power on their third attempt. Lee’s New Right can be called neoliberal populist, but neoliberal populism is a very unstable and fragile combination. In order to sustain the multi-class coalition based on both neoliberalism and populism, it needs to simultaneously produce high economic growth and a trickle-down of the fruits of growth to the poor. The success of Lee’s presidency thus depended on the simultaneous achievement of two contradictory objectives. Neoliberal growth was likely to collide with populism. It was likely to create distribution problems and worsen social and economic polarization. Since distribution worsened, populist supporters who voted for Lee, such as the poor, the young generation, and conservative labor unions, felt let down and withdrew their support for Lee. With regard to political reforms, even though the conservative Lee government could not reverse the trend of “receding premodernity, advancing modernity, and accelerating postmodernity,” the vigor and passions for political reforms seemed to cool down. The extremely low turnout rate of 46% in the National Assembly of April 9, and 19% among the people in their twenties especially, showed political indifference, antipathy to established political elites, and disenchantment with the ability of democracy to feed people among the younger generation. Festivity-like politics had been lost in the young generation, who were now busy searching jobs. Since the neoliberal economic policies of the Lee Myung Bak government, such as streamlining government, reducing taxes on high-­ income families, deregulation, liberalization, and further opening the economy, did not create jobs for young people and/or provide trickle-­ down benefits to the urban poor and peasants, displeasure and protests were organized on web 2.0. The individualized discontents of minorities came together in a mass to resist the mainstream establishment. The web 2.0 is likely to act as the last bastion of postmodern democracy to prevent Korea from retreating into an authoritarian past.

Notes 1. Huntington, Samuel S. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 266–267. 2. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 10. 3. Ibid. 14.

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4. Niemann, Ulrich and Sabine Burghardt. “Is Confucius Leaving Korea? Political Changes and Challenges after the General Elections.” Asia Europe Journal (2004) 2: 337–339. 5. Im, Hyug Baeg. 2000. “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective.” in Larry Diamond and Kim, Byung Kook (Eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 26. 6. Im, Hyug Baeg. 1994. “From Market Authoritarianism to Market Democracy: The Market and the State in the Korean Transition to Democracy.” paper presented at XVIth IPSA World Congress, Berlin, Germany, August 21–25. 7. Im, Hyug Baeg. 2000. “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective.” in Larry Diamond and Kim, Byung Kook (Eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 25–26. 8. Im, Hyug Baeg, 2004. “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of Three Kims Era.” Democratization. 11 (5), pp. 179–198. 9. Croissant, Aurel. 2004. “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea.” Armed Forces and Society. 30(3), pp. 357–381, 370. 10. Diamond, Larry and Doh Chull Shin. 2000. “Introduction: Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea.” in Diamond and Shin (Eds.), Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, p. 10. 11. Roehrig, 1998, pp. 4–6. 12. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13. Carothers, Thomas. 1997. “Democracy.” Foreign Policy. No. 107. 16. 14. Haggard, Stephan. 2000. The Political Economy of the Asian Economic Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics; Kim, Byung Kook. 2001. “The Public Financial Reform in Korea, Malaysia, Thailand: Does Democracy Matter?” paper presented at Annual Meeting of APSA, San Francisco, August 28–September 2. 15. Koh, Byung-IK. 1996. “Confucianism in Contemporary Korea.” in Tu, Wei-Ming (ed.) Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and their Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 196–199. 16. Kim, Kwang Ok. 1996. “The Reproduction of Confucian Culture in Contemporary Korea: An Anthropological Study.” in Tu, Wei-Ming (ed.) Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and

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Economic Culture in Japan and their Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, p. 225. 17. Kwon, Tae Hwan and Hein Cho. 1994. “Confucianism and Korean Society: A Historical Basis of Korean Democratization.” paper presented at the International Conference on Democracy and Democratization in Asia, Universite Catholique de Louvain, May 30–June 1, 1994, p. 8. 18. Steinberg, David I. 1997. “Civil Society and Human Rights in Korea: On Contemporary and Classical Orthodoxy and Ideology.” Korea Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 151. 19. Kim, Sangjun. 2002. “The Genealogy of Confucian Moralpolitik and its Implications for Modern Civil Society.” in Charles C.  Armstrong (ed.), Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State. London: Routledge, p. 77. 20. Koh, 1997: 200. 21. Im, Hyug Baeg, 2004. “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of Three Kims Era.” Democratization. 11 (5), pp. 179–198; 185–187. 22. Browne and Kim, 2001, p. 20. 23. Im, Hyug Baeg, 2004. “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of Three Kims Era.” Democratization. 11 (5), pp. 179–198, 188 24. Im, Hyug Baeg, 2004. “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of Three Kims Era.” Democratization. 11 (5), pp. 179–198, 189. 25. Kim, Byung Kook. 2000. “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: the Crisis of Success.” in Larry Diamond and Kim, Byung Kook (Eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 79. 26. Ibid. 27. Im, Hyug Baeg. 2000. “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective.” in Larry Diamond and Kim, Byung Kook (Eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 34. 28. Croissant, Aurel. 2002. “Strong Presidents, Weak Democracy?: Presidents, Parliaments and Political Parties in South Korea.” Korea Observer. Vol. 33, No.1, p. 14. 29. Pye, Lucian W. 1985. Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 67. 30. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. “Delegative Democracy,” in Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 164–165.

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31. Shin, Kwang Young and Chulhee Park. 2001. “Cultural Tradition and Democracy in South Korea.” KSAA (Korean Studies Association of Australia) Conference 2001, Monash University, Australia, p. 56. 32. Shin, Doh C. 1999. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 180. 33. Im, Hyug Baeg. 2000. “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective.” in Larry Diamond and Kim, Byung Kook (Eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 33. 34. Kim, Byung Kook and Hyug Baeg Im. 2001. “’Crony Capitalism’ in South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan: Myth and Reality.” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 31–32. 35. Steinberg, David I. and Myung Shin. 2006. “Tensions in South Korean Political Parties in Transition: From Entourage to Ideology?” Asian Survey. Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 524. 36. Han, Sang Jin. 1997. “The Public Sphere and Democracy in Korea: A Debate on Civil Society,” Korea Journal. Vol. 37, No. 4. 83; Steinberg, David I. 1997. “Civil Society and Human Rights in Korea: On Contemporary and Classical Orthodoxy and Ideology.” Korea Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 155. 37. Han, Sang Jin. 1997. “The Public Sphere and Democracy in Korea: A Debate on Civil Society,” Korea Journal. Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 83. 38. Larsen, Kirk W. 2003. “The End and the Beginning: Prospects and Problems for Political Reform in Roh Moo Hyun’s Republic of Korea.” Paper presented at “International Security and Domestic Reforms: Related Problems for South Korea” SAIS and Korea Press Foundation, Washington DC, May 1, 2003. 39. Im, Hyug Baeg. Forthcoming. “Democratic Governance Change in South Korea: From Confucian to Neo-Nomadic Democracy.” Confucian Culture and Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 40. Attali, Jacques, 1998. Dictionnaire du XXIe Siècle. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard. 41. Kim, Kyung Dong. 2000. “Cyber sidaeeui doraewa salmeui jil.” (The Advent of Cyber age and the quality of life) Asan Foundation (ed.), Cyber Sidaeeui Salmeuijil (The quality of life in the cyber age), p. 22. 42. Yoon, Young Min, “Jungbohwa sahoe udiro gagoitna?” (Where is information society going toward?” http://www.ipv6.or.kr/archive/kripv6forum/html. 43. Friedman, Thomas. 2000. The Lexus and Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Anchor Books.

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44. Park, Myung-Ho. 2004. “17dae Chongsungwa Jungdangjungchieui Byunhwa: Jiyukjueui Jungdangchegyewa Gwanryunhayu” (17th National Assembly Election and Change in Party System: With Reference to Regionalist Party System). Jungchi, Jungbo Youngu (Studies on Politics and Information). 7(1), pp.  1–26; Lee, Jung Jin. 2007. “Hankook Sunguwa Sedaegaldeung” (Korean Elections and Generational Conflicts). Bigyominjujueui Youngu (Comparative Studies on Democracy). 3(1), pp. 51–92; Choi, Jun-Young and Jin-Man Cho. 2005. “Jiyukgyunyoului Byunhwa Ganeungsungeh Gwanhan Gochal” (An Empirical Study on the Possibility of Change in Regional Cleavage). Korean Political Science Review. 39(3), pp. 375–394.

PART III

Toward a Quality Democracy in South Korea

CHAPTER 10

Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development Compared

Korea as a Showcase for Testing Theses Development

on Democracy and Economic

In a comparative perspective, South Korea has been a museum of theories of democracy and development. Until the mid-1980s, the country was an exemplary case among third-world countries, which showed the incompatibility of capitalist economic development and democracy, or as O’Donnell put it, “capitalist development does not promote democracy but rather capitalist development strengthens autocracy or authoritarianism” (1973). This was the main argument of bureaucratic authoritarian theory, and the Korean experience, along with Taiwan and Spain, was often quoted as the model case that supported this thesis (Im 1987: 231–257). However, since the mid-1980s the successful transition to democracy in South Korea has made the case for Lipset’s modernization thesis stronger than ever before. The main assumption of the modernization thesis is that successful capitalist economic development promotes democratic transition and provides the material base for the consolidation of new fragile democracies. The spectacular economic growth and ensuing

This paper was originally published in Hyug Baeg Im: “Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development Compared: South Korea,” in Shiping Hua and Ruihua Hu (Eds.), East Asian Development Model: Twenty-­ first Century Perspectives, New York: Routledge, 2015. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_10

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democratic transition in the mid-1980s has often been cited as confirming Lipset’s thesis, which holds a society’s level of development to be the critical precondition for democracy (Lipset 1959: 69–105). Since the democratic transition in 1987, Korea has become the exemplary case supporting the exogenous modernization thesis of Adam Przeworski and his associates, namely that while the democratic transition may be unrelated to the level of economic development, with regard to the sustainability, durability, or consolidation of new democracies, there is a strong causal relationship between economic development and democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). It is often known as the neo-modernization thesis because it proves empirically what Lipset said in the same seminal article on “some prerequisites of democracy,” that is, “the more well-to-­do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”(Lipset 1959: 69–105). According to Przeworski et  al., wealthy democracies with high GDP per capita ($6055) should avoid slipping back into autocracy.1 Since 1987, steady economic growth, the successful overcoming of the East Asian economic crisis, and the resumption of economic growth have shown that democracy in an affluent society like South Korea would not be subverted to authoritarianism, thus the Korean case perfectly fits Przeworski’s neo-modernization thesis or “exogenous democratization.”2 Impressive economic performance and “compressed completion of democratic consolidation” just in 20 years after 1987, by passing Huntington’s (1991) “two-turnover test” (first by Kim Dae Jung in 1997 and second by Lee Myung Bak in 2007), has attracted worldwide scholarly and policy attention. Many tried to learn from Korea as a role model for economic growth with equity, successful export-led industrialization, autochthonous democratization without help from outside forces, and endogenous and exogenous democratization. In that sense, the last 50 years’ experience of compressed industrialization and democratization provides political scientists and political leaders of the world with insight, wisdom, and lessons about democracy and economic development. Until the mid-1980s Korea was an example of an economically affluent society that could not develop a free and competitive liberal democracy, while since 1987 it has been applauded as a showcase of simultaneous development of democracy and capitalist industrialization. First, democratization in Korea is the model case of endogenous democratization in East Asia. The military dictatorship collapsed neither

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because of the pressure from the United States to democratize nor because of the effects of the end of the Cold War, nor yet the severe economic crisis, but because military dictators agreed with democratic opponents to hand over power to the winner of a democratic election. This can be called “endogenous democratization,” because when income per capita crossed the given threshold, economic development enabled the transfer of power from the military to democracy. Second, Korea is also a model case for exogenous democratization because, since having been established as an affluent democracy in 1987, it has neither collapsed nor been subverted or overthrown, despite having experienced external fluctuations such as severe economic and security crises. The affluent democracy in Korea shows that economic development and affluence makes a new democracy stable, sustainable, durable, and resilient. Finally, democratization in Korea is a model case of autochthonous democratization in East Asia because Koreans were not given democracy as a gift from their patron state,3 the United States, or as a concession from incumbent military power holders. Instead, the close coalition among students, intellectuals, workers, white collars, farmers, and the middle class acquired democracy through long struggles for restoring democracy by their own efforts. This chapter is not about evaluating the characteristics of Korean democratization, but about a comparison between democratic development and authoritarian development. In other words, this chapter aims to test whether democratic governments in Korea have performed better or worse than authoritarian regimes did. First, I discuss five theoretical models that explain the relationship between political regime and economic development. Second, we will look into the economic development under the authoritarian regime of Park Chung Hee. Third, I test the “incompetence of democratic governments thesis,” which states that authoritarian regimes outperform democratic governments economically, as measured by GDP growth per capita, export growth, low inflation rate, full employment, and gross fixed capital formation. The tentative conclusion is that democratic governments did not perform economically inferiorly to authoritarian ones, but in some areas they actually outperformed the authoritarian governments famous for the “Korean miracle.” Finally, I analyze the reasons why democratic governments in South Korea

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outshone or at least performed as well as authoritarian governments did. In other words, we will consider the democratic advantage over authoritarian regime in terms of economic development.

Theoretical Overview: Five Possible Causal Relations between Democracy and Economic Development Until now there exist five perspectives that explain the correlation between democracy and development and vice versa: (1) Modernization Theory: “development first, democracy later”; (2) Praetorianism: economic development, under-institutionalization, hyper-democracy, and praetorian dictatorship; (3) Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: “development does not lead to democracy, but to technocratic authoritarianism”; (4) Democratic Development Theory: “democracy first, development later”; and (5) Agnosticism: “political regimes (democracy or authoritarianism) does not matter[] in development” (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 51–69l; Chen 2007) (Fig. 10.1).

Fig. 10.1  Modernization theory and neo-modernization theory. (Source: Chen 2007)

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Modernization Theory: “Development First, Democracy Later” Modernization theory argues that economic prosperity provides the source of elective affinity between the market economy and democracy. The market economy promotes economic development and thus democracy prospers. Economic prosperity provides rich soil for a democratic political culture laden with tolerance, conciliation, and compromise.4 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in his Democracy in America Vol. 2 that the development of the market economy fosters democracy by providing “social space within which individuals, groups, and entire institutional complexes can develop independently of state control” (De Tocqueville 1945). The forerunner of modernization theory goes back to Aristotle, who argued that a large and affluent middle class is the backbone of the polity (Aristotelian democracy in the good sense) (Barker 1995). Later, Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) developed his thesis of a bourgeois democracy, which says “No Bourgeoisie, No Democracy.” And finally, Seymour Martin Lipset theoretically refined the modernization thesis, arguing that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy” because economic development generates “industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards and a steady increase in the overall wealth of society as a basic condition for sustaining democracy.”5 Modernization theory seemed to be discredited as many new democracies with relatively affluent economies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were overthrown by military coups in the 1960s. Nonetheless, since the mid-1970s, with many authoritarian countries, like South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile, successfully attaining market-oriented industrialization and finally making the transition to democracy, neo-modernization theory has received strong statistical support. Gabriel Almond in his article “Capitalism and Democracy” reviews key works of eminent scholars, such as Robert Dahl, Peter Burger, Daniel Lerner, and Karl Deutsch, who have demonstrated statistically the correlation between economic development and democratic institutions (Almond 1991: 469; see also Chen 2007) (Fig. 10.2).

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Fig. 10.2  Praetorianism. (Source: Chen 2007)

Praetorianism: “Economic Development, Under-­institutionalization, Hyper-democracy, and Praetorian Dictatorship” Praetorianism is Huntington’s thesis on democracy and development. In contrast to the modernization school, Huntington proposes in his Political Order in Changing Societies an alternative explanation: rapid economic development, and an outburst of political participation but without sufficient institutionalization, he argues, would not lead to liberal democracy, but to “political decay” and political instability. Faced with threats from lower classes and political and social instability, the disenchanted middle class invites praetorian dictators to restore order and stability. While political decay and instability take place in the early stage of industrialization, Huntington argues, in the later stage, authoritarian regimes move toward democracy through institutionalization. Huntington developed the logic of the praetorianism thesis into “no easy choice” between democracy and development (Huntington and Nelson 1976). Since socioeconomic modernization increases the political participation of citizens without ensuring their demands can be met, economic development is best promoted under conditions of “a high degree” of political stability and order. In a country where elites lack “the art of association” and institutions are unable to channel the chaos that accompanies modernization, democracy can be counterproductive because it would likely destroy already fragile political institutions, generate ungovernability caused by the upsurge of popular participation, create division, and encourage consumption at the expense of investment.6 Huntington’s praetorianism thesis meets strong counterfactual evidence from the case of Taiwan. Even though Taiwan had achieved successful industrialization, there was no eruption of political participation among

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Fig. 10.3  Bureaucratic authoritarianism. (Source: Chen 2007)

the masses. In addition, there was no military intervention in politics; KMT dominance made Taiwanese politics highly institutionalized but there was no democracy until 1996. Because the KMT party was a Leninist party, Taiwan attained strong institutionalization without democratization (Chen 2007) (Fig. 10.3). Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: “Development Does not Lead to Democracy” The third theoretical explanation of the causality between development and democracy is called bureaucratic authoritarianism. Its main argument is that “development does not lead to democracy.” Originally developed by Guillermo O’Donnell (1973), it runs counter to the modernization thesis of “economic development leads to democracy.” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs argue that over the past 50 years, a number of authoritarian regimes have experienced dramatic economic development without corresponding political liberalization; on the contrary, political elites’ power and positions in these countries are more strengthened and consolidated through the benefits of economic development. Empirically, the cases of China and Russia show that not only can authoritarian regimes generate extensive economic growth, but they can also figure out strategies to avoid political liberalization by distributing a share of the fruits of economic growth to the popular masses (De Mesquita and Downs 2005: 77).

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In addition, Cardoso’s “dependent development thesis” also argues, based on Latin American experiences, especially Brazil and Argentina under military rule, that economic development does not bring democracy, but installs a more repressive but highly technocratic, and thus very developmental dictatorship. Many theorists argue for the necessity of authoritarianism for economic development, claiming an “elective affinity” between the two (the core of authoritarian development thesis) by arguing that rapid industrialization necessitates the discipline and autonomy that only authoritarianism can provide (Sharma 2007: 38). Atul Kohli argued that without effective state capacity, political and economic elites cannot pursue coherent industrialization policies. He listed Korea’s Park Chung Hee and Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek regimes as having a relatively high degree of insulation from dominant but parochial interests in society. With its embedded autonomy, Park succeeded in establishing a paternalistic collaboration with the powerful chaebols and successfully led the market-shaping (and market-conforming under Chun Doo Hwan) authoritarian development. According to Kohli, Park Chung Hee’s regime was a typical “cohesive-capitalist state” (Evans 1992; Kohli 2006). Proponents of the authoritarian capitalism thesis draw the main logic for the necessity of authoritarian development from the deficiencies of new emerging democracies after the transition in making economic development. Labor economist Walter Galenson and political economist Karl de Schweinitz both argued in 1959 that democracy after democratic transition unleashes pressures for immediate consumption, which occurs at the expense of investment, and thus of growth (De Schweinitz 1964; Galenson 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000: 142). Galenson mentioned that “the more democratic a government is, … the greater the diversion of resources from investment to consumption.” According to Huntington, “the interest of the voters generally leads parties to give the expansion of personal consumption a higher priority vis-à-vis investment than it would receive in a non-democratic system” (Huntington and Dominguez 1975: 60; see also Huntington 1968). From this observation, proponents for authoritarian development draw the conclusion that democracy was thus inimical to economic development. On the contrary, they argue, authoritarian dictators were better able to force savings and launch economic growth. According to Rao, “economic development is a process for which huge investments in personnel and material are required. … Government must

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Fig. 10.4  Democratic development theory. (Source: Chen 2007)

resort to strong measures and they enforce them with an iron hand in order to marshal the surpluses needed for investment” (1984: 75) (Fig. 10.4). Democratic Development Theory: “Democracy First, Development Later” However, it is not difficult to find arguments in favor of democracy. Democracy allocates better the available resources to productive uses. The theory of the predatory state argues that since authoritarian dictators are not accountable to electorates, they have no incentive to maximize the total output but only their own rents (i.e., predation). Dictatorships are sources of inefficiency (Barro 1990: 103–125; Findlay 1990: 193–221; Olson 1991; Przeworski 1990), in that they undersupply or oversupply government activities (Przeworski 1990). Institutionalists note that democracies protect property rights better, thus allowing a longer-term perspective for investors (North 1990: 109; Olson 1991: 153). Democracies permit a free flow of information to improve the quality of economic decisions (Przeworski et al. 2000: 144). Recently, Rodrik (2000: 22) refuted the bureaucratic authoritarianism thesis by showing that “recent empirical studies based on samples of more than 100 countries suggest that there is little reason to believe democracy is conducive to lower growth over [a] long period of time.” The thesis that democracy brings economic development is based on empirical observation that democracies exceed non-democracies in terms of economic growth, standard of living, and the quality of social life (Kohli

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1986; Olson 1993: 567–576). Therefore, democracy-first theorists recommend that developing countries first promote democracy before they accelerate economic development (Siegel et al. 2004: 57–71). They argue that democracy and economic development is not a “cruel” binomial choice,7 but rather that the two can coexist, codevelop, coevolve without serious tensions and conflicts (Maravall 1994: 17–31). According to these scholars, democracy can make efficient the allocation of resources, simultaneously pursue economic growth and welfare, and make it possible to elicit compromise among social groups without hampering political order and social stability. They argue that democracy should be the precondition for development, and that promoting democracy is strategically the best approach to reach prosperity, development, security, and peace (Siegel et  al. 2004: 57–71). In fact, the democracy-first thesis originates from an institutionalist perspective on economic growth. Its supporters argue not only that “institutions matter,” but that “democracy matters.” Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin in Why Democracies Excel argue that not only do institutions influence states’ economic and societal performances, but also, from the perspective of regime type, democracies indeed outperform non-­ democracies in economic development. Due to regular elections, democratic regimes need to respond to the demands of their citizens and societal groups. The institutional arrangement of elections is the key for democracies to better perform economically. In addition, due to a number of characteristic features of democracy, such as accountability, checks and balances, low corruption, openness, competition, the free flow of information, transparency, and adaptability, democracies usually outperform non-­ democracies in most indicators of economic and social well-being (Siegel et al. 2004: 57–71). Thus, the best strategy to assist developing countries is by promoting democracy, not economic growth. According to the democracy-first thesis, democratic governments are the only governments with some legitimacy. They have a minimal level of legitimacy accrued from the fact that they are elected by the sovereign people, and thus represent the will of the majority. With legitimacy or the voluntary compliance from the people, democratic governments can implement and sustain long-term policies of economic development that may bear high short-term costs. Democracy has other institutional advantages with regard to creating and accelerating economic growth. As Douglas C.  North has argued, democracy has certain institutional characteristics, notably an independent

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Fig. 10.5  Exogenous modernization. (Source: Chen 2007)

legal system, and well-specified and enforced property rights that are a necessary condition for economic growth and for securing political and civil rights; otherwise, arbitrary confiscation is always a threat to political freedom, and thus will hamper sustainable economic growth (North 1990). Rodrik has argued for democratic advantage in terms of democracy’s ability, with its system of checks and balances, to limit rent-seeking, the source of economic inefficiency and political corruption (2000: 3–31); in O’Donnell’s words, horizontal accountability and vertical accountability (O’Donnell 1994: 55–69). Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen additionally argues that democracies enrich individual lives through the granting of political and civil rights and do a better job in improving the welfare of the poor (Sen 2001; see also De Mesquita et  al. 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). Finally, democracy has the advantage in its responsiveness to citizens’ needs. As Dahl noted, democracies are highly responsive to demands and pressures from the citizenry because the right to rule is derived from the sovereign people (Dahl 1971; Lake and Baum 2001: 587–621) (Fig. 10.5). Exogenous Modernization: “Democracy Does not Matter in Development” The last theoretical explanation of the causality between democracy and development is that democracy does not matter in development. Even though politics indeed influences economy, the impact of regime types, democratic or nondemocratic, on states’ economic performance is still

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controversial. After reviewing the arguments that relate regimes to economic growth focusing on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and autonomy of dictators, Przeworski and Limongi summarize that, first, although everyone agrees that the protection of property rights could foster economic growth, there could be a debate on whether democracies or dictatorships better secure citizens’ property rights. Second, the primary reason why democracy is considered to hinder economic development is the pressure for immediate consumption under its institution, which leads to reducing investment. Compared to democracies, dictatorships can better resist the pressure for immediate consumption with their repressive institution, and promote economic development. Third, the primary argument supporting democracy and opposing dictatorship is that the political elites in authoritarian regimes are not interested in maximizing national production and fostering economic growth; on the contrary, they try to build up a predatory state to keep their power and positions within the governments, and look to prey on resources from the society (Chen 2007). Democratic regimes, in contrast, would act to create public wealth and general interest (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 51). Przeworski and Limongi conclude that indeed politics affects the economy; but we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. The result of the relationship between regime type and economic growth is still inconclusive (1993: 51; see also Seligson 2003; Chen 2007). In Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World 1950–1990, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (PACL) investigated the causality between development and democracy, and democracy and development in 135 countries from 1950 to 1990. They found that the factor of regime type has no significant influence on states’ economic growth and national income; but, in general, political instability lowered the level of their economic development (particularly in autocracies). This implies that in the process of democratization, development declines in the early stage but increases in the later stage (Przeworski et al. 1997). The “democracy does not matter in development” thesis, reflecting on whether development generates democracy or democracy creates development, is still controversial.8

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The Democratic Interlude and the Collapse of the Second Republic (1960–1961) A student revolution opened Korea in the early 1960s. Yet the resulting Second Republic was short-lived, lasting only nine months. Many argued that the emergence of a praetorian society was the main cause of its collapse. After the April 19 Student Revolution, the masses poured onto the streets, but the level of political institutionalization was too low to accommodate their demands in the democratic political process. The praetorian thesis emphasizes the endogenous character in the downfall of democracy under the Second Republic. But the fact of the matter is that the Republic did not collapse; it was overthrown by a military coup led by General Park Chung Hee. Push factors originating from bottleneck problems from the military outweighed push factors from societal forces, inviting military officers to launch a coup. On the eve of the coup on May 16, 1961, the economy started to resume growth, the United States promised more economic aid and the economic development plan led by U.S. advisers was under way. More importantly, the praetorian society phenomenon was shrinking in numbers and magnitude. The size and intensity of demonstrations in the street had been decreasing since the beginning of May. The middle class did not invite the military to intervene to protect their property. Rather, the main cause of the military coup was an internal organizational problem within the military organization, specifically, a bottleneck in the promotion and discontent and complaints within alienated military officers, including General Park.

Authoritarian Development under Park Chung Hee Modernization theory, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and praetorianism all agree that Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism was historically necessary at “the national time” of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, and that an authoritarian developmental state was necessary at the initial stage of industrialization for three reasons. First, an authoritarian developmental state was needed in the initial stages to quash the reactionary classes (landed elites according to Barrington Moore Jr.) who opposed and resisted modernization and development. Second, it is necessary to have an authoritarian developmental state to repress workers (or popular sectors) that resist the government’s policies to limit consumption, for the forced accumulation at the

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initial stage of industrialization. Third, a developmental authoritarian state is needed to achieve autonomy from the external pressures of the world capitalist system. Nonetheless, in South Korea the necessities of authoritarianism for development in the early stage of industrialization disappeared even before the rise of Park Chung Hee’s developmental state. First, the potential of the reactionary class, the landed elites, to resist urban-based industrialization was eliminated because of the Korean War and the land reform in the 1950s. The resistance of workers (and popular sectors) was resolved not by state repression but by the labor market in the 1960s, in which an abundant labor pool in the countryside played the role of an industrial reserve army to maintain the wage rate at subsistence level without intervention from the state (Im 1987: 231–257). Third, unlike in Latin America, American hegemony toward Korea was benevolent. The United States provided substantial material benefits to Korea and gave its government autonomous space for choosing their own developmental strategy. One of the reasons why Park could choose the developmental state model, which contrasted quite sharply with the American liberal market model, was due to the relative autonomy of Korea in choosing a development model, which in turn emanated from its special position in East Asian geopolitics as a key anticommunist buffer state for the United States. Not only is the argument that an authoritarian developmental state was necessary in the initial stage of industrialization in the 1960s not substantiated, but it also cannot be proved empirically. As mentioned earlier, the façade of liberal democracy was maintained in the Third Republic of the 1960s. One might argue that not every democratic state is weak, but it is possible to be a strong and autonomous state with the autonomy and capacity to formulate and implement economic development policies. If we look for cases comparable to Park’s developmental authoritarianism, we can find many developmental states that are democratic. Finland, Austria, and Japan all successfully implemented statist development under democracy. Park did not establish a dictatorship to pursue industrialization, but rather tried to industrialize Korea in order to launch an authoritarian regime. In addition, the thesis of historical necessity of developmental dictatorship for industrialization has not been upheld empirically. High economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was not because of developmental dictatorship, but in spite of it (Sohn 1995). My position is that authoritarian industrialization and liberal industrialization is a matter of choice, not a

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matter of historical necessity. As Przeworski et al. (2000) argue, economic growth can occur under democracy as well as under authoritarianism. Exogenous Growth under Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism Park Chung Hee’s success of rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s stemmed from his optimal strategic development choice. Initially, he chose an import substitution industrialization strategy, in which rural development and the development of the capital goods industry and ISI industries were emphasized, while exports played a secondary role. However, when in the first two years (1962–1963) the result in priority areas fell far short of the planned target while exports increased far beyond expectations, Park changed the development strategy from ISI to an export-oriented strategy (Im 1987: 241–242). He was responding to signals from the internal market that showed the ongoing transition from the classical international division of labor (agricultural and mining export form colonial economies and manufactured export from advanced capitalist countries) to a new international division of labor (the feasibility of world market–oriented manufacturing in peripheral countries) (Im 1987: 242; Frobel et  al. 1980). Park’s “Korean miracle” was a success story which Wallerstein called “promotion by invitation.” He promoted the economy from periphery to semi-periphery by responding to the invitation from the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein 1979). Supporters of authoritarian capitalism have praised the effectiveness, efficiency, and shrewd leadership in the success stories of Park Chung Hee’s development strategy. Amsden argues that Park overcame the penalty of “lateness” with state “subsidies” and “getting the relative price deliberately wrong” (Amsden 1990: 5–31). Weiss and Hobson (1995) point out the proper strategy of providing “subsidies” by which these should not be provided in the form of giveaways, but in exchange for good performance in terms of output, exports, production quality, and investment in training and R&D. The authors also emphasize that Park invented the big bourgeoisie (chaebols) and nurtured them as national champions and empire builders who prioritized long-term interests of expanding market shares over the short-term interests of maximizing profits. Seldon and Belton-Jones argue that Park and East Asian states tried to be competitive by changing ahead of the game rather than simply reacting to changes to become sharper in international commerce by combining flexibility, foresight, strategic intervention, and selective planning (Seldon

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and Tim Belton-Jones 1995: 330). Ha-Joon Chang points out that Park pursued the strategy of “flexible rigidities,” by which the state created short-term rigidities in order to achieve greater long-term flexibility (Chang 1995: 213). However, the Korean miracle of the 1960s and 1970s was achieved not only by optimal economic development strategies and policies, but also because of many exogenous factors that contributed directly and indirectly to rapid economic growth in one of the world’s poorest countries. These included historical legacies, geopolitics, culture, and the transmission of ideas, all of which were significant in determining the miraculous economic performance in the Park period. First, benevolent international environments were quite suitable for a successful economic growth. During the Cold War period, the country received remarkable benefits from the United States in terms of financial, economic, technical, and infrastructural assistance. The United States provided public loans and imposed a land reform that resulted in an urban-­ based capitalist industrialization. Korean goods could thus enter the U.S. market much more easily and the country succeeded as a main exporter of industrial products. Second, culture also mattered in rapid economic growth. The Confucian emphasis on education, meritocratic forms of personal advancement, hard work, thrift, goal attainment, filial respect, and respect for one’s elders and superiors made it easy for people to smoothly adjust to market economies. These elements have been transmuted into deference toward managerial authority, high rates of personal and corporate savings, and a commitment to the firm as a collectivity (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992: 16). However, just a few decades ago Confucianism was blamed as the main factor for East Asian backwardness. As Gourevitch argued, “Confucianism meant deference to authority, resistance to change, respect for the ways of the past, aversion to risk, and other values that inhibit the responsiveness to the market” (1989: 12). Therefore, the impact of Confucian heritage on East Asian industrialization is a researchable question.9 Third, some scholars argue that the Japanese colonial legacy was benevolent for postwar industrialization in Korea and Taiwan (Aseniero 1994: 275–336; Cumings 1984; Eckert 1991; McNamara 1990). Eckert argues that many institutions, norms, ideology, the practices of the Korean economic development model such as state–business relations and oppression of labor had their origins and foundations in colonial experiences. For

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Eckert, the Korean developmental state was the offspring of the Japanese colonial empire (Eckert 1991).10 Yet the legacy of Japanese colonialism on postwar Korean economic development should not be overstated. Indeed, Japanese strategic concerns predominated over economic concerns. It was not bankers and merchants but samurais who made schemes for colonial industrialization projects: the extension of security frontline to the Chinese continent. As a consequence, the development in Korea was distorted. Infrastructure was overdeveloped, yet it had little relationship with the needs of Korean society. The Japanese did not nurture the native industrial bourgeoisie. Colonial capitalism was “capitalism without a capitalist class.” After liberation in 1945, South Korea was robbed of industrial facilities, which were predominantly located in what is now North Korea. The Korean War destroyed most of the infrastructure, and Korea had to start from the ashes. The only long-lasting legacy of Japanese colonialism is the idea of authoritarian militaristic development education in a Japanese military academy. It is therefore incorrect to argue that the Korean miracle was mainly due to Park’s optimal choice for development strategy and policies. Both endogenous factors and exogenous factors contributed to the miraculous economic growth in the Park Chung Hee period. To evaluate more properly the authoritarian development under Park, we need to demystify the myth that the miraculous economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was mainly attributed to his shrewd, wise, and optimal choice of development strategies, and instead pay more attention to exogenous factors which contributed to economic growth during the Park era.

Democracy and Development since the Democratic Transition in 1987 After the democratic transition in summer 1987, many conservatives demanded that “the ghost of Park” be recalled “from the grave” to revive high economic growth, as disenchantment with the poor performance of democratically elected governments spread widely among the masses. Ultraconservatives even argued for the restoration of authoritarianism. They insisted that unbridled behavior in the name of freedom should be disciplined; North Korea, threatening the freedom of South Korean people, should be eliminated; and political freedom should be reserved for

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economic development. They argued that the elective affinity between the developmental state and authoritarianism worked even after Korea was industrialized. The Park Chung Hee style of developmental dictatorship, they claimed, remained necessary, feasible, and effective (Kim 1995: 208–256). This strong nostalgia for Park Chung Hee shows that proponents of authoritarian capitalism still remain strong, and this could work against the consolidation of democracy in industrialized Korea. Nevertheless, we have abundant evidence that democracy combines well with economic development in the post-democratic transition period and democracy has proved better in overcoming economic crisis than any authoritarian regime.

The Record of Democratic Governments’ Economic Management Roh Tae Woo Government Immediately after the democratic breakthrough of June 29, 1987, the fears and warnings of authoritarian developmentalists seemed to prove true. More than 3000 strikes erupted after June 29. Striking workers demanded higher wages, better working conditions, and the right to organize unions. Authoritarian capitalists argued that democracy provided workers with the right to demand more consumption, and vote-­maximizing democratic politicians sought to satisfy these (or the low-income masses’) demands. As the democratic government tried to transfer income to workers by reallocating resources from long-term investment to consumption and welfare, the outcome would be lower profit, less investment, and economic stagnation (Galenson 1959; De Schweinitz 1964; Przeworski et al. 2000). However, the dismal prediction of authoritarian capitalists proved to be wrong in the case of Korea. Even though workers did take to the streets, the Korean economy had been doing well. Economic growth under Roh Tae Woo was very high compared to advanced industrial countries as well as high-growth East Asian economies. Every new democracy has to pay the costs of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. What new democracies have to do is to minimize transition costs and to remove the danger of authoritarian regression. In that sense President Roh did a good job of managing the transition period. Under his presidency, democracy

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was not subverted, the economy continued to grow, and the middle class did not invite praetorian dictators. Kim Young Sam’s Presidency Under Kim Young Sam, Koreans became richer than at any time in history, with a per capita income of more than $10,000 dollars in 1995 (World Databank) and Korea became a member country of the OECD, the club of affluent democratic countries. In Asia, only Japan had been a member of the OECD until then. With regard to democracy and development, the most distinguishing achievement of Kim Young Sam’s presidency was enhancing transparency in politics as well as the economy. Immediately after his inauguration President Kim embarked on purging corrupted politicized military officers, politicians, and bureaucrats, and then made institutional reforms to enhance transparency. This was the key to upgrading Korean economy to the level of advanced industrial countries, and thus reap the benefits of OECD membership. Kim Dae Jung’s Presidency: Parallel Development of Democracy and Market Economy Democratic governments perform extremely well in times of crisis. In late 1997, the financial crisis erupted simultaneously with the first peaceful transfer of power in Korea. The transfer to long-time opposition leader and democratic activist Kim Dae Jung was the first democratic peaceful transfer in East Asia. But Kim Dae Jung had to deal with the tough job of overcoming an unprecedented economic crisis. The financial crisis of late 1997 led the economy to the brink of default by the end of the year, until the IMF stepped in with $55 billion or loans in exchange for neoliberal structural reform along the lines of the Washington Consensus. The IMF demanded that Korea discard Park’s developmental state model and instead adopt the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal economic model. Kim Dae Jung’s solution was “the parallel development of democracy and market economy,” whereby he publicly questioned the efficacy of the authoritarian developmental state model. As a result, Park’s developmental authoritarianism was degraded from a “historical necessity” to a “historical obstacle” to the parallel development of democracy and a market economy (Study Group on Korean Politics 1998; Cho 1997: 46–76).

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The election of 1997 and the peaceful transfer of power show the improved accountability of Korean democracy and deepening democratic consolidation. The election demonstrated people’s determination to live in a democracy regardless of severe external fluctuations like the financial crisis. And the defeat of the ruling party’s candidate in the election shows that the electoral mechanism of accountability was working, since the people took the ruling party to task for creating the crisis. Democracy helped Korea to make a comprehensive reform without arousing serious political instability by institutionalized electoral mechanism for legitimate power change (Haggard 2000; Kim 2001). Kim Dae Jung’s government launched four key structural reforms in the areas of chaebols, financial institutions, the public sector, and labor. In instituting a more flexible labor market, the government relied for the first time on the tripartite compromise, coordination, and agreement between labor, capital, and the state. With this new tripartism, it persuaded unions to accept a flexible labor market in return for more political and social rights to the workers, and sealed the grand compromise in the “February 6 Social Pact.” The tripartite agreement helped Kim persuade fleeing Wall Street capital to reinvest in Korea and thus to overcome the financial crisis. Once the situation had stabilized, the government focused on the IT industry as the future source of growth. It built a countrywide high-speed Internet infrastructure, nurturing high-tech venture firms and constructing a Korean welfare state for the first time in history, known as the “productive welfare system,” to compensate market losers and to provide them with a social safety net. Under democratic governments, high economic growth continued without damaging equitable distribution. Roh Moo Hyun’s Presidency: Neo-Nomadic Democracy and Digital Economy As the Three Kims Era came to end, new political phenomena appeared. The election of Roh Moo Hyun signaled an end to the three Kims’ generation within politics. Postmodern and post-materialist political issues such as a generational shift, gender equality, environmental protection, peace, and civil society came to the fore of the political agenda. These changes did not occur spontaneously. Profound social change acted as the motive force that pushed the emergence of new politics. That social change is the rise of what I called “neo-nomadic society” in the previous chapter. The IT revolution has been advancing very fast, with mobile

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phone users and Internet users, and is the highest in East Asia except for Singapore and Hong Kong. South Korea is now a front-runner that leads the revolution. The nomadic temperament of Koreans has reemerged, as the phenomenal increase in digital access has been transforming Korean people into virtual nomads. The inflow of foreign workers, flexible labor markets, free trade agreements, and the opening of the agricultural market by WTO has compelled Korean workers and farmers to travel to find jobs to survive, and thus to become lower-nomads. Affluent people become hyper-nomads who travel all over the world to exploit profitable resources. Friedman has argued that Koreans are one of “cybertribes” in a neo-nomadic world. Equipped with the Internet and connecting it with a diaspora community of 7 million overseas Koreans spread across the world, the Korean cybertribe can combine speed, creativity, entrepreneurial talent, and global networking, and generate enormous wealth (Friedman 2000). The rise of the neo-nomadic society has been transforming Korean politics toward becoming organizationally smaller in size, faster in speed, networking-friendly, more open, and tolerant. The neo-nomadic democracy slims down the size of political organizations and thus brings about high-efficiency, low-cost politics. Heavy physical materials are an inconvenience to ceaselessly traveling neo-nomads. This neo-nomadic democracy will likely transform Korean politics to a more open, flexible, participatory, and inclusive one (Im 2009). A neo-nomadic democracy thrives, in turn, on a neo-nomadic economy. Netizen society power and Internet politics would not have been possible without the development of a neo-nomadic industry. Korea is the front-runner in the IT industry in terms of hardware, software, and systems. This IT industry has become the major source of new economic growth, surpassing the heavy and chemical industries and traditional labor-intensive industries. Neo-nomadic democracy and economy together are creating a new parallel development in the twenty-first century through partnership with the neo-nomadic IT industry (Table 10.1). Performances of Democratic Governments in Comparative Perspective: Managing Sustainable Economic Growth Having reviewed the relative performance of authoritarian and democratic governments, it becomes clear that the performance of the former has been overstated while that of democratic governments has been

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Table 10.1  IT Index in Roh Moo Hyun Presidency (2007) Index

Research Organizations

Ranking

Digital Opportunity Index (DOI)

1/181

Competitiveness of Technology E-Business Index Competitiveness of IT Industry E-Government Index

World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) World Economic Forum (WEF) Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) United Nations (UN)

Online Participant Index

United Nations (UN)

National Information Index

National Information Society Agency (Korea) International Institute for Management Development (IMD)

Competitiveness of Technology Infrastructure

7/131 16/69 3/64 5/191 (2005) 2/192 (2008) 3/50 6/55

Source: National Information Society Agency

underrated. There have been many myths regarding the poor performance of democratic governments and related public disenchantment. The “miraculous” achievement of authoritarian governments also needs to be demystified because it was attributed not only to the wise and appropriate strategic choices of development by dictators (à la Machiavelli, virtu), but also to many exogenous positive factors that the dictators were handed down from the past, including outside forces and cultural legacies (à la Machiavelli, fortuna). We can therefore say that modernization theory, praetorianism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, democratic developmentalism, and agnosticism—the idea that democracy does not matter in development—can only partially explain the relations between democracy and economic development. From the present perspective, I anticipate that agnosticism will be weakened while democratic developmentalism will gain more strength to explain the relations between democracy and development.

Authoritarian Capitalism Refuted in Development since the Democratic Transition The economic performance of democratic governments after the 1987 transition was robust and sustainable. Authoritarian capitalists predicted that immediately after the transition, workers would start demanding

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more wages to consume. Capitalists and the government, they argued, would respond to workers’ demands positively because now workers were sufficiently organized to solve the collective action problem, as well as to vote to decide the locus of power. Thus, firms would increase wages and the government would transfer income from the rich to the poor through taxes. The outcome, according to authoritarian capitalists, would be economic stagnation, as wage increases reduce profits, leading firms to cut investment and at the same time leading government to distribute income away from investment by tax, transfer, and less public investment. Hence, lowering investment slows down growth (Przeworski et al. 2000: 143). However, in South Korea none of this occurred. Of course, workers did demonstrate. After the democratic breakthrough of the June 29 Compromise, more than 3000 strikes erupted between July and August across the industrial sector. As authoritarian capitalists predicted, workers demanded more wages, better working conditions, and the right to organize and hold collective actions. Nonetheless, despite workers’ mass collective action and the sharp rise in wages,11 firms did not reduce investment. The domestic investment rate in 1987 was 30.8%, which was very high compared to that in advanced industrial countries, to say nothing of Latin American new democracies (Fig. 10.6). Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP also remained very high at 29%, compared with 22% in advanced industrial countries and 20% in Latin America (Fig. 10.7). As shown in Fig. 10.8, the GDP growth rate in 1987 was very high at 11%, indeed higher than the average GDP growth rate for the whole Park Chung Hee period. Korean capitalists did not reduce investment due to the sharp rise in wages because the economy was so robust that it made more profit even while paying higher wages to workers. The excellence in economic development under democratic governments is not confined to the transition period but extends to the whole democratic consolidation period. Except for 1999, when it dropped to −7% from the previous year’s 5%, the average GDP growth rate in the period after transition (1987–2007) was about 6.28%, which is not much lower than the average GDP growth rate in the whole authoritarian period (1961–1986); the average GDP growth rate in the authoritarian period was 7.9%, while that in the democratic period was 6.7% (Fig. 10.8). Second, gross fixed capital formation (as % of GDP) during the democratic period has been much higher than during the authoritarian “miracle” period (Fig. 10.7). Between 1961 and 1986, the average GFCF was 24.54%, while that in the democratic period was about twice that.

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Fig. 10.6  Domestic investment rate (%). (Source: Korean Statistical Information Service http://kosis.kr)

Fig. 10.7  Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). (Source: World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org)

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Fig. 10.8  GDP growth (annual %). (Source: World Databank http://databank. worldbank.org)

Third, democratic governments achieved spectacular economic growth without paying expenses such as high inflation, trade deficit, high unemployment, low wages, and bad provision of social welfare. While during the authoritarian period, the economy suffered the perennial problems of high inflation and trade deficit, democratic governments solved the trilemma of high growth, high inflation, and trade deficit. South Korea’s trade balance shifted from a perennial trade deficit to a trade surplus since 1998, except in 2008, the year of the global financial crisis (Fig. 10.9). Since 1987, the economy has come out of a trilemma of high growth, high inflation, trade deficit, and a stabilized a pattern of “high growth with low inflation, trade surplus, good wages, and low unemployment” (Figs. 10.10 and 10.11). Firms had room for investment even while paying higher wages and taxes, without reducing employment. From this analysis, we can conclude that as regards the Korean case at least, the claim that authoritarianism is necessary because of the incompetence of democratic government is not supported on any count (growth rate, employment, trade balance, investment, gross fixed capital formation). The Korean case shows that democratic governments can excel in

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Fig. 10.9  International trade balance (US dollars). (Source: The Bank of Korea http://www.bok.or.kr)

Fig. 10.10  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). (Source: World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org)

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Fig. 10.11  Unemployment total (% of total labor force). (Source: World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org)

achieving economic development as well as making an equitable society with good wages, provision of better social welfare, and most of all, very low unemployment compared to that in advanced countries.

Exogenous Factors of Growth under Democratic Governments Many authoritarian capitalists argue that the spectacular growth under democratic governments has not been due to the timely and optimal choice of developmental strategy and policies by democratic governments, but by exogenous good fortune, such as the timely collapse of socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a favorable international economic environment such as the “three lows” economic boom between 1986 and 1988 (low interest rate, low won/dollar rate, and low oil price), the expansion of export markets for Korean goods and services due to economic openness and globalization, and conditionalities imposed by the IMF to make economic structural reform in return for massive loans to Korea at the time of the East Asian financial crisis.

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We should not deny that these external or exogenous factors contributed a great deal to sustainable growth under democratic governments. The external fortuna of the three lows provided the opportunity to kill three birds (growth, current account balance, and stabilizing consumer price) with one stone. Thanks to the three lows, export increased phenomenally; firms invested more in domestic markets as well as global markets; prices stabilized and, as a result, the economy grew by more than double digits. Unfortunately, this good fortune was a free gift of global capitalism and was beyond the control of Korean governments, only lasting three years before being replaced with the three highs (high interest rate, high won/dollar rate, and high oil price). The second exogenous factor contributing to sustainable growth in Korea came from Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe relaxed the security tension in East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The democratic transition in South Korea came at a favorable moment in world history (Im 2006). The end of the Cold War permitted the new democratic government to cut defense spending to help finance expensive welfare programs, and to direct more tax funds toward investment in infrastructure rather than spending on defense. However, the end of the Cold War was not favorable to Korean democracy and development in every respect. As the Cold War receded in East Asia, the strategic value of South Korea to the United States declined and the United States’ hegemony toward the country became less “benevolent.” This meant that “Washington’s major East Asian allies would go from being linchpins of U.S. security in the region to being mere levers to open markets in the region” (De Castro 2000: 201–221). The United States gave South Korea no special treatment to help it overcome the financial crisis. Korea was put under strict IMF conditionalities, including sweeping neoliberal economic restructuring tied to a rescue package that included the typical menu of neoliberal structural reforms such as stabilization, liberalization, financial and corporate restructuring, privatization, and a flexible labor market in return for a massive bailout. Third, the growth and expansion of globalization since the end of the Cold War has worked in favor of the Korean economy, which has relied heavily on export and foreign investments. While authoritarian regimes persevered with the “developmental state” model of economic growth, protecting domestic markets and chaebols in return for their performances in international market, democratic governments, the Kim Dae Jung government in particular, accepted IMF conditionalities and aggressively

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sought to comply with the global standard. The Korean case shows that globalization (or economic openness in the words of Li and Reuveny) promotes democracy. In other words, it promotes economic development, reduces information costs, reduces incentives for dictators to cling to power, intensifies the diffusion of democratic ideas, increases demands for international business for democracy, and promotes domestic institutions supporting democracy; as a result, all these facts together work to promoting democracy (Li and Reuveny 2009: 28).12

Endogenous Factors of Growth under Democratic Governments Even though there is no denying the contribution of exogenous factors to economic development under democratic governments, as I have argued elsewhere, economic development in Korea under democratic governments has been due to the rapid completion of the democratic consolidation process and the continuous upgrading of the quality of democracy (Im 2011). These are the main components of the endogenous factors of growth under democratic governments after 1987. Since 1987, Korean democracy has consolidated and upgraded itself to the group of “full democracies.” According to the Democracy Index measured by the Economic Intelligence Unit, between 2006 and 2008 Korean democracy moved from the category of “flawed” to “full” democracy. All East Asian democracies still remain in the category of flawed democracy, including Taiwan. As a member of the “full democracy” club, Korea has improved its quality in many partial areas of democracy that are related to economic development under democracy, such as rule of law, voices and accountability, control of corruption, responsiveness, governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, and economic freedom (Table 10.2). Strict application of the rule of law enables democracy to better protect property rights; democratic accountability, either vertical or horizontal, prevents the state from predation or collecting of rents; democracy enriches individual lives by granting political rights and civil liberties (Sen 2001), and it provides political incentives to rulers to respond positively and quickly to the needs and demands of the people (responsiveness). Moreover, with a higher quality of democracy in terms of accountability and responsiveness, democracy can improve policy-making and policy

2 1 2 7 6 1

2 2 2 5 6 1

2 1 2 7 7 1

2 2 2 5 6 1

2 1 2 6 6 1

2 2 2 4 6 1

2 1 2 4 6 1

2 2 2 4 6 1

CL

1999

2 1 1 3 6 1

PR 2 2 2 4 6 1

CL

2000

2 2 2 4 5 1

2 1 2 3 6 1

2 2 2 4 5 1

1 1 2 3 6 1

2 2 1 4 5 1

1 1 1 2 6 1

2 2 1 3 5 1

1 1 2 2 6 1

69.8 73.3 69.7 69.7 69.1 69.5 68.3 67.8 66.4 67.5 67.8

Source: 2010 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (http://www.heritage.org/index/)

Score: 100-80: Free; 79.9-70: Mostly Free; 69.9-60: Moderately Free: 59.9-50: Mostly Unfree; 49.9-0: Repressed

73

72

2 1 2 3 6 1

2006

1 1 2 2 6 1

68.6

2008

2 2 1 3 5 1

2008

68.1

2009

2 2 1 3 5 1

1 1 2 2 6 1

69.9

2010

2 2 1 3 5 1

CL PR CL

2007

PR CL PR CL PR

2005

Economic Freedom Score

2 2 2 4 5 1

PR CL

2004

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

2 1 1 3 6 1

2003

CL PR CL

2002

PR CL PR

2001

Year

Economic freedom in Korea

Source: Freedom House, “Freedom in the World” (FRW)

PR: Political Rights; CL: Civil Liberties; Rating: 1~7 (1 Free, 7 Not free)

Korea Japan Taiwan Indonesia Cambodia US

1998

CL PR CL PR

1997

PR CL PR

1996

Political rights and civil liberties

Table 10.2  Political rights and economic freedom indicators

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implementation and ensure better state regulation than authoritarianism because democratic governments are under popular control and must act as the perfect agent of the people who are their principal.13 Since the democratic transition in South Korea, political rights and civil liberties have upgraded to the level of advanced democracies, yet voices and accountability have improved only a little from 0.50 (1996) to 0.75 (2005). In terms of accountability, then, Korean democracy has a long way to go. The same can be said of corruption and transparency of politics. According to Governance Matters’ “Worldwide Governance Indicators” corruption index, Korea has remained at the bottom of the list of OECD countries. Since the resumption of democratic competition, the responsiveness of government has improved considerably in the areas of political stability, absence of terrorism and violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. Government effectiveness especially improved markedly from 0.90  in 1996 to 1.26  in 2008. Regulatory quality rose from 0.46  in 1996 to 0.88  in 2007 (Table 10.3). These improvements in democratic quality have contributed endogenously to sustaining a high-growth economy by democratic governments. It is clear, then, that without democratization, authoritarian Korea could not have achieved sustainable growth and might well have failed to adjust to the changed environment resulting from the end of the Cold War and the spread of globalization. Even though the Korean “developmental state” was the champion of managing economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, it became obsolescent with the advent of a unipolar structure after the collapse of socialist countries in Eastern Europe, globalization, and the IT revolution. Korea can sustain high economic growth with relatively equitable distribution of resources because it has successfully consolidated its nascent democracy and continuously upgraded its qualities. Therefore, the democratic development thesis, namely “democracy first, economic development later,” can be seen to apply because economic development followed from good governance made by good democracy.

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Table 10.3  Worldwide governance indicators 1996

1998

2000

2002

2003

Rule of law Korea 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.84 0.70 Japan 1.48 1.47 1.40 1.25 1.26 Taiwan 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.88 Indonesia −0.31 −0.72 −0.81 −1.01 −0.95 Cambodia −1.19 −1.08 −0.97 −1.15 −1.22 US 1.68 1.68 1.62 1.53 1.55 Voices and accountability Korea 0.50 0.62 0.61 0.74 0.75 Japan 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.99 1.03 Taiwan 0.59 0.82 0.78 0.93 0.97 Indonesia −1.17 −1.04 −0.40 −0.41 −0.41 Cambodia −0.96 −0.88 −0.79 −0.73 −0.83 US 1.29 1.37 1.37 1.33 1.30 Control of corruption Korea 0.43 0.21 0.27 0.47 0.4 Japan 1.14 1.27 1.31 0.99 1.15 Taiwan 0.71 0.86 0.9 0.78 0.8 Indonesia −0.51 −1.16 −0.98 −1.13 −0.97 Cambodia −1.17 −1.11 −0.93 −0.98 −0.93 US 1.72 1.7 1.73 1.84 1.7 Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism Korea 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.31 0.33 Japan 1.01 1.23 1.11 1.19 1.19 Taiwan 1.08 0.88 0.41 0.77 0.75 Indonesia −0.85 −1.39 −1.69 −1.61 −1.99 Cambodia −1.37 −1.15 −0.75 −0.72 −0.74 US 1.02 1.00 1.20 0.34 0.34 Government effectiveness Korea 0.90 0.39 0.79 0.96 0.94 Japan 1.66 1.01 1.12 1.05 1.18 Taiwan 1.57 0.68 0.91 1.08 1.17 Indonesia 0.06 −0.85 −0.50 −0.63 −0.56 Cambodia −1.02 −0.78 −0.83 −0.81 −0.76 US 2.22 1.61 1.91 1.82 1.83 Regulatory quality Korea 0.46 0.33 0.58 0.77 0.67 Japan 0.5 0.65 0.83 0.57 0.99 Taiwan 0.85 1.04 0.13 0.99 0.94 Indonesia 0.35 −0.27 −0.31 −0.71 −0.65 Cambodia 0.04 −0.21 −0.17 −0.35 −0.37 US 1.26 1.57 1.61 1.49 1.48

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

0.75 0.85 0.74 0.90 0.79 1.27 1.29 1.38 1.35 1.40 0.86 0.89 0.71 0.69 0.77 −0.78 −0.84 −0.74 −0.70 −0.66 −1.25 −1.18 −1.18 −1.10 −1.08 1.47 1.51 1.54 1.56 1.65 0.71 0.75 0.61 0.65 0.59 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.86 0.93 0.66 0.72 0.70 −0.33 −0.18 −0.18 −0.15 −0.14 −0.87 −1.00 −0.79 −0.87 −0.94 1.34 1.33 1.10 1.09 1.12 0.38 0.63 0.39 0.46 0.45 1.16 1.23 1.34 1.17 1.25 0.84 0.85 0.67 0.48 0.55 −0.91 −0.87 −0.77 −0.69 −0.64 −1.05 −1.18 −1.21 −1.11 −1.14 1.73 1.54 1.29 1.4 1.55 0.49 0.56 0.41 0.45 0.41 1.08 1.03 1.10 1.03 0.94 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.50 0.72 −1.54 −1.25 −1.21 −1.08 −1.00 −0.47 −0.50 −0.42 −0.52 −0.27 0.17 0.08 0.45 0.37 0.59 0.99 1.03 1.18 1.29 1.26 1.29 1.31 1.56 1.38 1.46 1.25 1.16 1.17 1.06 0.88 −0.43 −0.46 −0.37 −0.39 −0.29 −0.89 −0.92 −0.90 −0.86 −0.81 1.85 1.66 1.66 1.64 1.65 0.79 0.79 0.7 0.88 0.73 1.11 1.17 1.19 1.05 1.23 1.15 1.08 0.92 0.94 1.07 −0.63 −0.48 −0.31 −0.3 −0.27 −0.52 −0.5 −0.61 −0.51 −0.47 1.51 1.54 1.54 1.45 1.58

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Notes 1. According to Przeworski et al., affluent democratic countries with per capita income of $6055 (i.e., the income of Argentina in 1976 when the last coup took place) or more have never reverted to authoritarianism (Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006: 552). 2. While “endogenous modernization” is a theory of change from within and contends that autocracies become democracies when per capita income crosses a particular threshold, “exogenous modernization” states that economic progress makes democracies stable. In the words of Lipset, “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959: 69; see also Przeworski et al. 1997: 158). The basic assumption of Przeworski’s exogenous democratization is that “democracy is not a byproduct of economic development”; its presence or absence “is the result of political actors pursuing their goals” (Przeworski et al. 1997: 177; Boix and Stokes 2003: 517–549). 3. Japan was democratized by General MacArthur’s U.S.  Military Government; the Philippines’ dictator Marcos was ousted from power with the strong and clear pressure from the United States. Without IMF conditionalities, the Indonesian dictator Suharto did not surrender his power peacefully; Taiwan’s democratization was a typical democratization from above in which the ruling KMT controlled the pace, the scope, and the time schedule of democratization by installment. 4. Nineteenth-century English liberals such as Ricardo, McKintosh, and J.S. Mill, and Marxists were very skeptical of the compatibility of democracy and capitalism (Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Collini et al. 1984). 5. Lipset (1959: 75). The list of the forefathers of modernization theory is long: Aristotle, Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and Joseph A. Schumpeter. 6. S.D. Sharma (2007: 41). Kohli calls a similar phenomenon a “cruel choice” between democracy and development (Kohli 1986, 2006). Mancur Olson in his Rise and Decline of Nations also argued that democracy allows and exacerbates the problems of collective action, that is, democracy provides strong specially organized interest groups to influence state policies for advancing their particularistic interests through a wide scope of organization lobbying and thus reduces the flexibility of the economy (Mancur Olson 1982). 7. Jagdish N.  Bhagwati said that “the political economy of development poses a cruel choice between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic process” (Bhagwati 1966: 203–204). 8. Przeworski et al. (2000) commented on the draft of this paper that “our thesis is, in fact, narrower. We claim that democracy does not matter for

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economic growth but it does matter for the other aspects of development, namely, fertility and mortality.” 9. Nobel laureate economist Robert E.  Lucas, Jr. indirectly supports the Confucian capitalism thesis, arguing that the accumulation of human capital on the job has been the main engine of economic growth in Korea (Lucas 1993: 270–271). 10. For a critique of Eckert, see David Kang (1995: 577–582). According to Kang, the Korean capitalist class was not the offspring of the landed class under Japanese rule, and the Korean state had its origins not in Japanese colonialism but in U.S. Cold War policy. 11. Between 1989 and 1993 inclusive wage increases in South Korea were 21.1%, 18.8%, 17.7%, 15.2%, and 12.2% respectively, which were way above the government’s wage guidelines. This was in sharp contrast to the years before 1987, when wage increases beyond the guidelines set were suppressed by the government (Y. Park and M. Lee 1995: 42; Y. Park and C. Leggett 1998: 284). 12. Eichengreen and Leblang argue that they found through a cross-country study evidence that positive relationships run both ways between globalization and democracy: “globalization (trade openness and financial openness) (FDI, Capital flows to GDP, FDI to GDP) promotes democracy and at the same time democracy promotes globalization (trade openness, ­liberalization, privatization, capital market opening etc.” (Eichengreen and Leblanc 2006). 13. Democracy is a better mechanism to solve the principal–agent problem.

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Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69–105. Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1993. Making a Miracle. Econometrica 61 (2): 251–272. Maravall, Jose Maria. 1994. The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage. Journal of Democracy 5 (4): 17–31. McNamara, Dennis L. 1990. The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprises, 1910–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press. North, Douglas C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press. ———. 1994. Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy 5 (1): 55–69. Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———. 1991. Autocracy, Democracy and Prosperity. In Strategy and Choice, ed. R.J. Zeckhauser. Cambridge: MIT Press. ———. 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy and Development. American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567–576. Park, Y., and M. Lee. 1995. Economic Development, Globalization and Practices in Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management in Korea. In Employment Relations in the Growing Asian Economies, ed. A.  Verma, T. Kochan, and R. Lansbury, 27–61. London and New York: Routledge. Park, Y., and C. Leggett. 1998. Employment Relations in Korea. In International and Comparative Employment Relations, ed. G. Bamber and R. Lansbury, 3rd ed., 275–293. Allen and Unwin. Przeworski, Adam. 1990. The State and Economy under Capitalism. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers. Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3): 51–69. Przeworski, Adam, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. Culture and Democracy. In World Culture Report. Paris: UNESCO. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E.  Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-­ being in the World 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rao, V. 1984. Democracy and Economic Development. Studies in Comparative International Development 19 (4): 67–81.

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Rodrik, D. 2000. Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them. Studies in Comparative International Development 35 (3): 3–31. Seldon, David, and Tim Belton-Jones. 1995. The Political Determinants of Economic Flexibility, With Special Reference to the East Asian NICs. In The Flexible Economy: Causes and Consequences of the Adaptability of National Economies, ed. Tony Killick. London: Routledge. Seligson, Mitchell A. 2003. The Dual Gaps: An Overview of Theory and Research. In Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Global Inequality, ed. Mitchell A. Seligson and John T. Passe-Smith, 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Sen, Amartya. 2001. Democracy as a Universal Value. In The Global Emergence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sharma, S.D. 2007. Democracy, Good Governance, and Economic Development. Taiwan Journal of Democracy 3 (1): 29–62. Siegel, Joseph T., Michael M.  Weinstein, and Morton A.  Halperin. 2004. Why Democracies Excel. Foreign Affairs 83 (5): 57–71. Sohn, Ho Cheol. 1995. HaeBang 50nyeonyui Hangukjungchi [Korean Politics after Independence]. Seoul: Saegil. Study Group on Korean Politics (ed.). 1998. Dong Asia Baljunmodeleun Silpaeheatneunga? [Did East Asian Developmental Model Fail?]. Seoul: Samin. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weiss, Linda, and John Hobson. 1995. States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis. Cambridge: Polity Press.

CHAPTER 11

Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea

Introduction On December 19, 2007, Lee Myung Bak and the Hannara Party ended a “lost decade” for conservatives in Korea and initiated the era of neoconservative rule. The inauguration of the Lee government meant that the democratic consolidation process was completed in Korea. As discussed in earlier chapters, according to Huntington, a new democracy can be said to be consolidated when there are two turnovers of government. In that sense Korea has passed Huntington’s test: in 1997 Kim Dae Jung was elected president in the first peaceful transfer of power among the new democracies of East Asia, ten years after the transition of 1987. In 2007, Korean conservatives made the second peaceful transition after ten years of liberal governance. Since 1987, democracy in Korea has been gradually, but continuously consolidating. In December 1987—for the first time since 1972—the Korean people directly elected their president and formed a cabinet dependent on electoral results. The Roh Tae Woo government restored the freedoms of the press, assembly, and association. President Kim Young Sam established firm civilian control over the military, sending two military-­ turned-­civilian presidents to jail for their wrongdoings while in office. This

Hyug Baeg Im, “Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth?,” International Political Science Review Vol.32, No.5, 579–597, November, 2011. © The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_11

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rectification of past history of the authoritarian period became the model for demilitarizing Korean politics and establishing justice by punishing wrongdoing, torture, and other human rights transgressions by the authoritarian regimes. The subsequent Kim Dae Jung government contributed a great deal to the development of Korean democracy beyond the first peaceful transfer of power in East Asia. President Kim established an independent Human Rights Commission to protect the human, political, and civil rights of ordinary citizens; saved a fragile democracy from the severe economic crisis originating from Thailand and Indonesia in late 1997; supported the information technology (IT) industry as a source of economic growth for the next generation; and speedily built a robust IT infrastructure. Under Kim, the growth of the economy began to speed up. The next president, Roh Moo Hyun, was considerably indebted to the emerging online civil society. Citizens communicated through the Internet, mobile phones, MP3 players, and laptops. They used these new technologies to mobilize support groups for Roh, campaign for him, and gather political contributions online. In 2004, during his tenure, Freedom House upgraded Korea to the highest level by giving it a score of 1  in political rights, only 11 years after it was assessed to be a free country in 1993. Today, very few analysts would question whether Korea has consolidated its democracy. The main question now is whether the quality of democracy in Korea has been improving or deteriorating. In this chapter, I will first review the qualities of Korean democracy using the dimensions identified by Morlino: rule of law, electoral accountability, interinstitutional accountability, participation, competition, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. Following this, I will consider the key features of, and future prospects for, the quality of democracy in Korea.

The Empirical Findings Korea is one of the very few emerging democracies that has succeeded in upgrading itself sufficiently to be considered a “full democracy.” According to the Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), between 2006 and 2008 Korea moved from being a “flawed democracy” to the status of “full democracy,” joining a small group of 30 advanced democracies. All other East Asian new democracies, including Taiwan, continue to be categorized as flawed.

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Compared to democratic developments through 2006 under Roh Moo Hyun, democracy under Lee Myung Bak has improved in areas such as government effectiveness and protection of civil liberties. However, if we examine Korea for the eight qualities of democracy in Morlino’s analytical framework, we find that there is regression in some areas, particularly in press freedom. I will now take each of these qualities in turn and discuss their manifestation in Korea. Rule of Law The rule of law is the first quality—almost a prerequisite—for a “good democracy,” according to Morlino. Historically, the Rechtstaat preceded liberal constitutionalism and democratization. In other words, free individuals preceded the demos or collective citizenry (Im 2000: 302–303). Unfortunately, after the 1987 democratic transition in Korea, the “rule of man” rather than the rule of law prevailed. Confucian patrimonialism was entrenched in the minds and behaviors of the politicians that led democracy after the transition. When democratically elected leaders applied laws in favor of their protégés and to the disadvantage of their opponents, law-­ making, law-implementing, and law-adjudicating could not be made routine, and the rule of law could not be institutionalized. From the moment of its inauguration, the Lee Myung Bak government emphasized the rule of law. However, when it talked about the “rule of law,” this was not actually the rule of law in the liberal constitutionalist sense but more the rule by law taught and promoted by ancient Chinese “legalists” (fa jia) like Han Feizi, Shang Yang, and Li Si in the Warring State Period (453–221 BC), and Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore in modern times. While the Chinese legalists argued for a strict application of laws without exception, firm enforcement, and voluntary obeisance to laws, they said nothing about protecting citizens’ rights through law, or about protecting human rights. In contrast to the legalist rule by law, the spirit of the rule of law is to limit the power of the state in order to guarantee civil liberties and civil society’s autonomy; to apply the constitution to protect civil society; and to institutionalize the mechanisms of checking the state so that it acts within the boundaries that laws define. When the system is rule by law, politicians rely on politicized judicial institutions (courts and prosecutors); legitimize the legal application of partisan government policies; and find legal justification for the transgression of civil liberties. Rule by law can

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expand the judicialization of politics and what Ginsberg and Shefter (1999) called “politics by other means.” Judges and prosecutors are not delegated power by the people through elections. Nor, to make things worse, are they forced to be accountable to the people through elections. If judges and prosecutors replace in authority the politicians to whom the people have delegated power, the foundations of liberal democracy will crumble. In terms of the rule of law, Korean democracy under the Lee government has a long way to go. The inadequacy of the rule of law in South Korea is confirmed by the popular perception of it as detected by the East Asian Barometer 2003 (see Shin and Chu 2004). While 49% of Koreans thought the presidential office tends to follow rather than break laws, only 17% thought that members of the National Assembly followed the law. Most Koreans regard neither the presidential office nor the National Assembly to be fully law-abiding institutions. If we analyze the rule of law on the basis of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI)1—which can average from −2.5 to +2.5 (higher scores corresponding to better outcomes)—in South Korea this variable reached its highest point of 0.90  in 2007, but by 2008 it had dropped to 0.79 (see Fig. 11.1). The rule of law can be evaluated more precisely on the basis of a number of subdimensions, the most important being individual security and

0.95

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Fig. 11.1  Rule of law. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”)

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civil order, institutional and administrative capacity, and effective protection against corruption. Thus, we first consider individual security and civil order on the basis of Cingranelli’s PHYSINT (physical integrity variable), which ranges from 0, indicating no respect for physical integrity, to 8, indicating full government respect for physical integrity. We find that respect for physical integrity is fairly high in South Korea (see Fig. 11.2). When institutional and administrative capacity is measured on the basis of the WGI effectiveness variable, which ranges from −2.5 (very poor governance) to +2.5 (very good governance), the South Korean government is found to be fairly effective, and its effectiveness has steadily increased over time (see Fig. 11.3). With regard to effective protections against corruption, as an important dimension of the rule of law, when it is measured on the basis of the WGI control of corruption variable (which averages from −2.5 to +2.5—higher scores equaling better outcomes), Korea was improving after 2006 and was at 0.4 in 2008 (see Fig. 11.4). On the whole, these more precise analyses confirm the limits found earlier of the rule of law and demonstrate that, especially on the second and third subdimensions, the rule of law could be much improved. Electoral and Interinstitutional Accountability Electoral accountability can be indirectly assessed on the basis of freedom of the press. The Worldwide Press Freedom Index assesses press freedom 5 5

5

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physint

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year

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Fig. 11.2  Individual security and civil order. (Source: Cingranelli’s PHYSINT (physical integrity variable). The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010)

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Fig. 11.3  Institutional and administrative capacity. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”. The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) 0.7

control of corruption

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Fig. 11.4 Control of corruption. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”)

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in about 175 countries. Under the Lee Myung Bak government, Korea’s ranking on press freedom plunged by 22 places, from 47 in 2008 to 69 in 2009—the lowest among OECD countries (see Fig. 11.5). In fact, Korea needs to make tremendous effort to enhance electoral and interinstitutional accountability. Under Lee Myung Bak, both forms of accountability have deteriorated compared to their performance under Roh Moo Hyun. Indeed, the WGI voice and accountability index, which ranges from −2.5 to +2.5, shows that for Korea, what we would consider interinstitutional accountability peaked in 2003 (0.75), and came close to that in 2004 (0.71), but has been dropping steadily since: 0.61 in 2006, 0.65 in 2007, and 0.59 in 2008. In other words, democratic accountability in Korea is lower than in emerging democracies like Taiwan, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, to say nothing of advanced democracies (see Fig. 11.6). The process of representative democracy is completed when a sovereign people directly elect their representatives and then make them accountable to the voice of the people. Securing democratic accountability is required so that the cycle of democratic competition can not only continue but also be sustainable and durable. Yet, in Korea, while representatives are elected and are regularly punished or rewarded in the next elections, accountability remains low because many barriers prevent it from being fully implemented. First, in Korean society anticommunism has survived intact and has been an ideological entry barrier for representatives. Second, political parties have become the instruments of party bosses. Thus, elected 80

ranking

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Fig. 11.5  Electoral accountability. (Source: Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index)

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voices and accountability

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Fig. 11.6  Interinstitutional accountability. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”)

representatives listen to the voices of their bosses and not of their constituents. Third, political forces have built a “cartel of elites” through “competitive collusion.” Thus, the main reasons accountability through elections has not worked are the creation of a political oligopoly, and the distortion of the political market by established politicians and political parties. Parties have built up a de facto one-party dominance in their home regions by mobilizing regional sentiment and regional animosity. Thus, political newcomers have to overcome numerous barriers and disadvantages on their path to fair and competitive elections. For example, newcomers have been prohibited from campaigning in open spaces, collecting political contributions, and engaging in online communication for two months before an election. This kind of oligopolistic structure has made it very hard for the people to make their representatives accountable. While civil society has developed very rapidly since the democratic transition in 1987, political parties are relatively underdeveloped. This underdevelopment of political society creates a serious lag in which politics is not in command but is following the paths that economic and civil society have already trodden. We need other ways to enhance accountability. Broadly speaking, there are four processes or steps through which to secure true accountability (Schedler 1999: 333–359). First, through reform from within, it is possible to secure and reinforce interinstitutional accountability among political parties, parliaments, and courts. Through mutual checks and monitoring, representative organizations can monitor

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illegal activities, corruption, and sabotage, forcing their representatives in government to serve the interests of the people, and not of highly organized private pressure groups with lobbying power (O’Donnell 1999). Parliament must strengthen its policy-making power and do more to monitor the administration. Independent judges are also necessary for interinstitutional accountability. Opposition parties also have to make great efforts and insist on retaking power by continuously monitoring, inspecting, and, where needed, vigorously opposing government and government policies. They must also reveal not only those activities of the government that are illegal but also government policies that have failed the people. Second, public accountability agencies are a way to enhance accountability from above. Independent agencies include the National Election Commission, which ensures the transparency of campaign donations and their use, and of the electoral process; the National Broadcasting and Communication Commission, which closely watches public media and the press; the National Audit Commission; the National Anti-Corruption Commission; and the Bank of Korea, the independent central bank in charge of monetary policy, such as interest rate policy. These independent agencies can enhance accountability from above by insisting that the government, parties, National Assembly members, and other elected representatives justify their policies and activities to the people and by punishing their illegal activities. The third way to enhance accountability is from outside, with the help of outside forces such as international civil society, intergovernmental organizations, and foreign countries. Foreign governments, international civil society organizations such as Freedom House, Transparency International, and Reporters Without Borders can help emerging democracies set goals for building a quality democracy and give support in the form of technical assistance. They are then in a position to persuade government to accept enforcement mechanisms, such as conditionality, sanctions, and incentives to effectively and efficiently attain those goals (Diamond 2001: 7). The fourth way to enhance accountability is from below, by civil society monitoring the government and politicians. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are nongovernmental, nonprofit intermediary organizations that act outside of family, business, and government relations. They constrain the abuse of power by the government and representatives, check illegal activities, and put them under constant public scrutiny. To give a

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meaningful example, during the Lee Myung Bak administration, the intervention by pro-government Supreme Court Justice Shin Young Chul in a lower-court trial demonstrated that the independence of the judiciary was seriously impaired. The Lee government attempted to revise the Law Supporting Nongovernmental Organizations to stop government support for civil associations that criticize, check, and monitor government activities. In general, we can affirm that during these years, government activities made it harder for those associations that were critical of the government to secure accountability from below. The Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Masks in Public Demonstrations, the Act Concerning Collective Action Against Illegal Demonstrations,2 and blocking demonstrations in public places, such as Seoul City Hall, Chunggyechun, and Kwanghwamoon Plazas, have made it more difficult for Korean civil society to check, constrain, and monitor the activities of the government, the ruling Grand National Party, the economic power of the chaebols, and big newspapers and broadcasting companies. Participation Political scientists have been concerned about decreasing electoral participation in both advanced and emerging democracies despite guarantees of universal suffrage; to them, lower electoral participation is evidence of a crisis of participation and thus of democracy. Korea is no exception. Since the democratic transition in 1987, political participation has gradually declined, and turnout is low for most elections. Participation can be measured through two variables: voter turnout in presidential elections and in parliamentary elections. Voter turnout in both presidential and parliamentary elections has dropped noticeably since the 1990s (see Figs.  11.7 and 11.8). Why is Korean democracy confronting a crisis of participation? Scholars frequently attribute decreasing participation to voters having post-­ materialist values and culture (Inglehart 1977), political apathy, cynicism, and suspicion of political “golden circles.” But in Korea, it is political circles as the “supplier” of politics that have been mainly responsible for the low turnout in post-transition elections. The National Assembly election in 2008 recorded the lowest turnout in the history of that body because political parties and candidates did not compete vigorously for people’s votes by appealing to voters with attractive policies. That election was criticized as “the election without policy competition.” The ruling Grand

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Presidential elections

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Fig. 11.7  Voter turnout in presidential elections. (Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)) 75

Parliamentary elections

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Fig. 11.8  Voter turnout in parliamentary elections. (Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA))

National Party removed the Grand Canal Project from the list of party policies, violating the principle of democratic elections that parties propose policies that enable voters to make choices. In this regard, the opposition was worse than the ruling party. The Democratic Party did not propose “small business-friendly policies” or “people-friendly policies” in response to the ruling party’s “business-friendly policies” that benefit the

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upper class, the government, and the ruling party. Since Korean political parties, whether in power or in opposition, do not put forward differentiated, attractive, or debatable policies, how can Korean political parties and politicians persuade people, younger voters in particular, to go to the ballot box, instead of taking a vacation on election day, which is a legal holiday? Another factor that lowered participation in elections was limiting ways to participate. In the period leading up to the 2008 election, political parties more firmly regulated online participation, which emerged as a new means of communication and participation, than they had in 2002 and 2004. Stricter regulation of online participation discouraged younger voters, who are very good at online communication. If the quality of Korean democracy is to be enhanced, the crisis of participation must be confronted. This is basically a task for parties of the middle class and those with a liberal/progressive orientation. In 2002 and 2004 these parties succeeded in mobilizing the younger generation, but they failed to keep their promises and provide new policies, and they maintained power for a decade after the first transfer of power in 1997. Young voters have no interest in the stale ideological policies of old politicians. Before blaming the younger generation for not voting, opposition politicians and political parties should put forward fresh alternatives to Lee Myung Bak’s neoliberal policies. Internet freedom must also be extended to overcome the crisis of participation. The government and Grand National Party, blaming the Internet for their election losses in 2002 and 2004, have tried to limit communication on the Internet, online election campaigning, portals, blogs, UCC (user-created content), and e-mail messaging. Limitations on Internet freedom have worsened since the 2008 candlelight demonstrations that opposed the imports of U.S. beef suspected of transmitting mad cow disease. The government thought that online communication in the era of Web 2.0 exacerbated the huge offline demonstrations. However, because with the IT revolution communication has moved online, and online participation is vital to raising political participation, rather than being limited, Internet freedom, cyber freedom, and Web 2.0 freedom must be extended continuously. If there are unintended and undesirable by-products and side effects, these can be redressed or lessened, but Internet freedom itself should not be repressed.

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Competition We measure political competition using two indicators: the number of parties that have won at least one seat in parliament and the difference in strength between the largest and the second-largest party. The latter is computed by subtracting the number of seats won by the second-largest party from the number won by the largest and dividing the result by the total number of parliamentary seats. With the difference expressed in percentage terms, it can be more easily compared across countries. If we see no change in the number of parties that win parliamentary seats, which between 2004 and 2008 was unchanged at 7 (see Fig. 11.9), and the difference in size between the largest and the second-largest party has increased (see Fig. 11.10), there has been no growth in competition. However, relatively speaking, democracy has become considerably more competitive since the Three Kims Era ended. New candidate selection systems, such as open primaries, have stimulated the rise in the competitiveness of Korean politics. Without this institutional reform to select a party’s presidential candidate, a candidate with a very weak base within

   











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Fig. 11.9  Number of parties. (Source: The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010)

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24.1

10.36

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Fig. 11.10  Difference in the strength of the first and second largest party. (Source: The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010)

the party, like Roh Moo Hyun, would not have become the presidential candidate and then the president. In this respect, the 2008 National Assembly election has been criticized as a retreat from competition (Im 2008). At the core of the 1987 system or “Three Kims Politics” was a premodern backwardness in which parties became patrimonial private cliques of the three Kims, who acted like feudal lords of their home provinces. Competition was thus minimal because a one-party monopoly, or at least dominance, continued to prevail in regional party politics. The introduction of the people’s primary system gave the people a voice in selecting party candidates and made politics more competitive. But the primary system disappeared in the National Assembly election in 2008. Instead of selecting candidates for president and National Assembly, voters were excluded, and the rare debates among candidates illuminated the low quality of democracy in Korea. Freedom This dimension is measured on the basis of Freedom House Political Rights Scores, ranging from 1 (most freedom) to 7 (least freedom). The results show that political rights have meaningfully improved in South Korea. On December 24, 2004, Freedom House upgraded Korea’s score on political rights to 1, the highest possible level. The upgrade came 11

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years after it previously upgraded the country’s political rights score from 3 to 2 during the Kim Young Sam presidency (see Fig. 11.11). In announcing the most recent upgrade, Freedom House pointed out that the most important reason was that political rights were improved after the democratic political process was strengthened through free and fair elections, which were held immediately after the highly politicized impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun by the Hannara Party. CIRI’s Civil Rights/Empowerment Rights Index3 is an additive index constructed from indicators of freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political participation, and freedom of religion. Its values range from 0 (rights are not respected) to 10 (rights are fully respected). The CIRI index shows that respect for civil rights has increased (see Fig. 11.12). In the same area of civil liberties, Freedom House kept the Korean score on civil liberties at 2 because the National Security Law remained in force to “authorize the arrest of South Koreans accused of espionage and/ or viewed as supporting North Korea” (World Freedom Report, 2005). Because the wording allows a wide latitude of interpretation, the law has constrained major civil liberties, such as freedom of press, assembly, expression, and association, and restricted human rights. On the whole, however, a freedom score of 1  in political rights and 2  in civil liberties indicated that Korea was a fully free country. In East Asia, only three countries (Korea, Japan, and Taiwan) average a freedom score below 2

2.5

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Fig. 11.11  Political rights. (Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World (FRW))

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Fig. 11.12  Civil rights. (Source: CIRI’s Civil Rights/Empowerment Rights Index. The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010)

(actually 1.5), which is required for identification as a liberal democracy (Im 2007). Nevertheless, Koreans need to improve their political freedom. In comparative perspective, democracies in Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia, received the highest score of 1 in both political rights and civil liberties and crossed the threshold for membership in the club of advanced liberal democracies. Repealing laws and dissolving institutions that are the products of authoritarian regimes is absolutely necessary for entrance into the group of advanced liberal democracies. Freedom House stated explicitly that the National Security Law was the main barrier to Korea’s entry into this group. Nevertheless, the neoliberal Lee Myung Bak government tried to constrain, rather than increase, political freedom. Political freedom was seriously weakened and civil liberties repeatedly violated. In the 2008 Candlelight Demonstration, protesters chanted the first clause of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea: “The Republic of Korea is a democratic republic.” They demanded freedom of press, association, assembly, and expression, which the Constitution guarantees. There have been serious infringements on the freedom of the press, including improper laying off of reporters at YTN (the CNN of Korea); the firing of the news anchor at MBC; and pro-government news

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broadcasting at KBS. If the new press law allows a media company to own newspapers and broadcasting stations at the same time, freedom of the press would be seriously threatened by big media firms managed by big chaebols and broadcasting companies dominated by such firms. Online freedom of the press has already been intimidated legally and institutionally, as the latest Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index recognizes. The Constitution of the United States, Amendment No. 1, says: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Amendment No. 1 has been the most important constitutional provision for guarding liberal democracy in the United States. In the Constitution of Korea, Article 21 stipulates similar freedoms: 1. “All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and press and enjoy freedom of assembly and association. 2. “Licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association, shall not be recognized. 3. “Facility standards of news services and broadcasts, and matters necessary to ensure the functions of newspapers, shall be determined by Act. 4. “Neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other persons, claims may be made for the damage resulting there from.” Although Article 21, clause 4, gives other persons rights to claim compensation for violation of honor or rights, and for the public’s right to protect public morals and social ethics, the clause does not permit the government and legislature to make laws that limit and infringe on freedom of speech and press. In fact, it guarantees the freedom of speech and press to the level of that provided for in the U.S. Constitution. Democracy without guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association is not a genuine liberal democracy; it can only be called an “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997).

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Equality Equality is an area where liberal democracy retreated even under the progressive governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Nonetheless, it is a core quality of democracy that must be honored because it provides the material base that makes Korean democracy durable. After the 1997 financial crisis, the combination of economic opening and globalization launched the “1997 System” of neoliberal democracy, which lasted until the Park Geun Hye government. The transition to the neoliberal economic model from the developmental state model, however, brought economic polarization (Im 2007). Inequality in Korea, as measured by the Gini coefficient has been gradually worsening since 1997. The income transfer to the rich has continued to a dangerous level. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been a massive number of bankruptcies of small self-employed shop owners, tax reductions for the rich, and a surge in unemployment. As a result, polarization between high-income and low-income groups has worsened. But employment polarization has been deepening for much longer, since 1997. Since the East Asian financial crisis, with the introduction of labor market flexibility the number of irregular workers has rapidly increased. Until then, the percentage of irregular workers had long remained below 45%, but it increased to 55.9% (7.37 million) in 2001, 55.4% (7.84 million) in 2003, 55.9% (8.16 million) in 2004, and 56.1% (8.4 million) in 2005 (Choi 2005: 82–83). Earned-income inequality in Korea is the second highest after the United States among the 22 OECD countries (OECD 2009). The Gini coefficient was relatively low under Park Chung Hee, but after democratization, with neoliberal policies it continuously rose, hitting 0.325 in 2008, the worst since the 1990s. The average Gini coefficient between 1990 and 1997 was 0.286, right up to the eve of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. In 1998 it shot up to 0.316 and then to 0.320 in 1999. At 3.17 in 2000, 0.319 in 2001, and 0.312 in 2002, it illustrates that income inequality has remained high throughout the twenty-first century (Fig. 11.13). While the Gini trend in Korea may not look as serious as in the rest of the region, it does not fully capture how much Korean society has actually become polarized in terms of economic inequality. There has been polarization of the economy between the export and the import substitution industry, between large companies and medium and small companies, and

11  BETTER DEMOCRACY, BETTER ECONOMIC GROWTH? SOUTH KOREA 

0.287 0.284 0.281 0.284 0.284 0.291 0.283

0.316 0.32 0.317 0.319 0.312 0.306 0.31

291 0.31

0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Fig. 11.13  Gini coefficient. (Source: Office of Statistics, Republic of Korea, Statistics Korea 2006 (www.kostat.go.kr))

between regular and irregular workers. The collapse of industries serving the domestic market after 1997 brought unequal growth to the export sector and the domestic consumption sector. The rapid growth of IT industries created an imbalance between them and non-IT industries. Labor market flexibility rapidly increased the number of irregular workers, polarizing the labor market. Increasing numbers of poor and rich, and a narrowing middle class, created polarization by class. The middle class is now at its lowest level in Korean history, and the demographic structure has transformed from a pyramid to a snowman or hourglass shape. A polarized economy has produced a polarized democracy. Democracy based on a prosperous middle class has disappeared. Today, a “democracy of the rich” is confronting a “democracy of the poor.” Democracy of the rich is neoliberal democracy, in which democratization is equated with economic liberalization, deregulation, a slimmed-down government, and the retreat of the state—all biased toward business. Neoliberalism destabilizes the socioeconomic base of democracy through depoliticization, a winner-take-all philosophy, and biased allocation of resources in favor of big business. Economic polarization brings about social polarization and disintegration of the middle class, which has been the cornerstone of democracy. If Korea does not become more equal, the material base of

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H. B. IM

democracy will crumble. No democracy can survive long where socioeconomic inequality is extreme. The “business-friendly” economic policies of the Lee Myung Bak government deepened socioeconomic inequality in Korea. The new bank law that moderated the separation of finance capital and industrial capital made it possible for the big chaebols to control both bank and nonbank financial institutions, while the repeal of investment restrictions on chaebols reinforced their family ownership structure. Tax reductions for wealthy individuals and big companies countered any equal distribution of income. These economic policies violated the spirit of the Constitution, Article 119, clause 2, which aims at economic democracy by means of equal distribution of income and preventing the abuse of monopoly market status. Since the late 1990s, democratic governments have pursued neoliberal economic reforms in response to a globalized world economy, triggering the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. Even though economic growth resumed with neoliberal reform therapy, social inequality has expanded and Korean society as a whole has been polarized by class, occupation, industry, and school. In hardening neoliberal policies, Lee Myung Bak’s incumbent government deepened social polarization. In cutting taxes for the rich, this government has gone against social justice. Reducing taxes on the rich transferred to them income from the poor, exacerbating both social and income polarization; it also dismantled the thick middle class. Polarization has taken place throughout society, in every area of income, property, employment, education, industry, and class (No 2009). While the number of both high-income and low-income jobs has increased due to the neoliberal economic restructuring and globalization, that of middle-income jobs has shrunk remarkably in comparison. While low-income jobs increased by 1,187,000, and high-income jobs by 1,448,000, middle-income jobs only increased by 266,000 (Lee 2006: 160). The fact that 1,774,000 of the middle class moved down to the lower class, and 945,000 moved upward shows that the Korean middle class as a whole has been sliding downward. The thesis that the middle class is the backbone of the Korean miracle no longer holds (Shin 2004: 261–263). Members of the middle class have been affected by employment instability ever since the progressive Kim Dae Jung government introduced new flexibility into the labor market in 1998. Forced or voluntary layoffs almost immediately became widespread. As private education costs have risen, many middle-class families have given up their dream of

11  BETTER DEMOCRACY, BETTER ECONOMIC GROWTH? SOUTH KOREA 

293

moving into the upper middle class; they recognize the cold reality that the only status shift open to them is downward. Income polarization has also generated polarization in education and educational achievements. The gap in private education costs between low-income and rich families has soared from 7.66 times in 2003 to 11.28 times in 2010. Since the financial crisis in 1997, when the unemployment rate of the poor rose and their income fell, the poor have cut their private education expenses but high-income families have maintained or even increased theirs. The worsening polarization in education is likely to jeopardize future growth (see Hankyoreh 21, 2010.08.26) (see Fig. 11.14). Education is an investment in the future. Low-income families without financial resources to invest give up having children because they have to spend their resources on present consumption. Consequently, the childbirth rate has been dropping rapidly among low-income families. As the next generation inherits poverty, classism is being solidified in Korea.

11.28 9.05

2004

10.14

9.89 8.76

8.33

2005

10.22

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Fig. 11.14 Polarization in education. (Source: Choi, Tae-uk. 2005. “Sahoetonghaphyung Segyehwachujineul wihan Jungchijedo Jogeun (Political Institutional Conditions for Promoting an Inclusive Globalization),” Shinjinbo Report (New Progressive Report) (January) 82–83.)

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Responsiveness The regulatory quality variable of the WGI captures perceptions of the ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies. This aggregate variable averages −2.5 to +2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. Previously, the South Korean government’s responsiveness steadily increased over time, but it dropped from 0.88 in 2007 to 0.73 in 2008 (see Fig. 11.15). According to the 2007 Asian Barometer survey, only 21.2% of South Korean citizens think the government is “very responsive” or “largely responsive” to what people want. Korea’s responsiveness percentage is the lowest among seven Asian countries (see Table 11.1). Even though the overwhelming majority of Koreans still normatively support democracy as their favorite form of political rule, popular dismay over the operation of Korean politics has lowered their confidence in democracy. Shin and Chu (2004) found that Koreans had gradually lost confidence in democracy as the best possible polity and the most effective political system. The majority (79.5%) assessed their democracy as “limited” rather than “advanced” (2.3%). Many increasingly showed dissatisfaction with the way their democratic governments have performed both economically and politically. The percentage satisfied with the performance of the current democratic government was 61.4% in 2003. More than half (51%) assessed the regime as a low-quality democracy and were 1

regulatory quality

0.9

1996 1998

0.8

2000

0.7

2002

0.6

2003

0.5

2004 2005

0.4

2006

0.3 0.2

2007 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

2008

Fig. 11.15  Responsiveness. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”)

Source: Asian Barometer Survey 2007

Q116. How well do you think the government responds to what people want? N

25.3

1206

1212

Mongolia

21.2

Korea

1185

33.2

Philippines

1563

36.3

Taiwan

Responsiveness: Percentage of positive evaluation

Table 11.1  Responsiveness: percentage of positive evaluation

1453

50.3

Thailand

1578

45.7

Indonesia

999

67.3

Singapore

9196

39.7

All

11  BETTER DEMOCRACY, BETTER ECONOMIC GROWTH? SOUTH KOREA 

295

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H. B. IM

not fully satisfied with the performance of their government (Shin and Chu 2004). The 2007 Asian Barometer showed that Korean assessment of the quality of democracy in terms of legitimacy was not good at all: Only 21.2% think the government is “very responsive” or “largely responsive” to what people want. Thus, if the quality of democracy can be assessed by legitimacy or public trust of democracy and democratic government performance, the quality of Korean democracy is deteriorating.

Conclusion Koreans have worked hard to improve their democracy in areas like the rule of law, accountability, and control of corruption, freedom, responsiveness, governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, and economic freedom. Strengthening the rule of law makes democracy better able to protect property rights. Robust and durable democratic accountability prevents predatory practices by the state. Democracy provides a political incentive for rulers to respond positively and quickly to the needs and demands of the people. With higher quality in terms of accountability and responsiveness, democracy can be more effective in making and implementing policy, and in adopting more sound state regulation than authoritarian regimes because a democratic government must act as an agent of the people. In South Korea, since the beginning of the democratic transition, most political rights and civil liberties have been upgraded to the level of advanced democracies. Moreover, government has become more responsive in the areas of political stability, absence of terrorism and violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. Especially, government effectiveness—a dimension of the rule of law—improved substantially, including the quality of regulation. However, accountability has improved much less. Here Korean democracy has a long way to go. There are also continuing problems with political corruption and transparency, with the country’s corruption index at the bottom of OECD countries. The improvements in the quality of democracy contributed endogenously to sustaining high economic growth after the democratic transition. Without them, authoritarian Korea could not have sustained high growth and would likely have failed to adjust to the changes in the economic environment caused by the end of the Cold War, the IT revolution, and the spread of globalization. Even though the Korean “developmental state” was the champion of managed economic growth in the 1960s and

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the 1970s, that philosophy became obsolete as the economic environment changed. Korea can sustain high economic growth as long as it can successfully consolidate its nascent democracy and continuously upgrade its democratic qualities. However, in recent years, democracy in Korea has coexisted with a deterioration of the equality that is central to democracy. To improve the quality of democracy, democratic governments must make every effort to reinvigorate the role of the “welfare community” and raise the level of “welfare state generosity” to reverse social and economic polarization (see also Zhang 2010).

Notes 1. The WGI measures six dimensions of governance, one of which is the rule of law. The WGI dimensions aggregate several hundred variables, measuring perceptions of governance drawn from 35 data sources constructed by 33 different organizations around the world. 2. With regard to illegal acts, including demonstrations called by a group of 50 or more injured parties, the group filed a lawsuit to demand compensation for damage. 3. The Cingranelli–Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standards-­ based quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981 to 2009. See www.humanrightsdata.org.

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Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 1955 regime, 206 1987 system, 11, 286 1997 presidential election, 189, 212, 225 2002 election for democratic consolidation, 184 A Ad hoc, 170 Affiliations, 143, 156n72, 159–178 Agnosticism, 238, 256 Almond, Gabriel A., 76, 93n1, 239 Amsden, Alice, 61, 249 Anticommunist bulwark, 35 Anti-government activities, 97–99 Archbishop Ro, 96 Art of association, 139, 163, 240 Aseniero, George, 73n30, 250 Asian values, 53

Association, 10, 34, 56, 59, 110, 111, 119, 138–146, 149, 156n65, 156n72, 159–178, 191, 202, 214, 273, 282, 287–289 Authoritarianism, 1–4, 7, 10–13, 24–26, 49–70, 75, 76, 80, 91, 103, 106, 123–125, 128, 139, 141, 165, 185, 187, 194, 208, 218, 235, 236, 238, 242, 247–253, 259, 265, 267n1 Authoritarian power bloc, 7, 26, 28, 36, 78, 91, 193 Authoritarian regimes, 2–4, 6–8, 19, 22, 24–27, 40, 41, 50–53, 58–60, 62, 65, 68, 75–78, 90–92, 98, 104, 106, 108, 109, 123, 125, 128, 133, 137, 190, 192, 196, 197, 208, 209, 213, 237, 238, 240, 241, 246, 248, 252, 262, 274, 288, 296

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5

309

310 

INDEX

Authoritarian state elite enrichment (ASEE), 60 Autochthonous democratization, 236, 237 Autonomous political society, 122 B Barro, Roberto J., 243 Baum, Mathew, 245 Bennett, D.C., 42n6 Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 267n7 Bishops’ Conference, 110, 111 Blackballing campaign, 191 Boix, Carles, 267n2 Bounded state bureaucracy, 122 Broad and deep legitimation, 186 Broad-based political democracy, 35 Bungae moim, 222 Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (BA), 3, 4, 19–42, 50–55, 162, 235, 238, 241–243, 247, 256 Bureaucratic feudalism (BF), 50–54 Burgeoning social movement, 82 Burgerlich Gesellschaft, 139 C Candidate military-backed party, 211 Capacity of an individual political actor, 3 Capitalism, 5, 6, 20, 21, 24–26, 53, 62–63, 67, 127, 139, 176, 239, 242, 249, 251, 252, 256–262, 267n4, 268n9 Capitalism without a capitalist class, 63, 251 Carnation Revolution, 184 Catastrophic balance, 8, 125, 209 Catholic Church’s moral pressure, 102

Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (CPAJ), 101, 102, 106, 107, 110–112 Chaebol, 169, 173, 282, 292 Chaebul economy, 69 Chang, Ha Joo, 200, 222 Chang Soo Kim, 47n68 Characteristics of sultaniam, 53 Chen, Lisng-chih Evans, 238, 239, 241, 246 Cho, Hee Youn, 253 Choi, Jang Jip, 46n51, 95, 113n3, 204n23 Chosun, 214, 215 Chosun dynasty, 13, 210, 214–215 Christian organizations, 105, 108 Christians’ Attitude toward Authoritarian Regimes, 109 Chul Hee Chung, 115n43 Chun Doo Hwan, 2, 8, 64, 65, 102, 124, 128, 187, 188, 196, 211, 242 Chun Tae-Il, 99 Chung-Shin Park, 113n5 Chunhyup, 142 Chuntu, 142, 167 Church-government cooperation, 96 Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE), 191 Civil economy, 139, 176 Civilian government, 134, 145, 211 Civil society, 8, 21, 35, 36, 45n26, 47n57, 56, 57, 75, 77, 82, 84, 86, 105, 114n30, 120, 122, 124–126, 139–146, 149, 153n42, 155n64, 156n68, 160, 165, 166, 169, 176, 178, 186, 191, 208, 210, 214, 220, 223, 254, 274, 275, 280–282 Civil society movement, 141, 142 Classic divide et impera strategy, 82

 INDEX 

Classical international division of labor, 29, 61, 249 Collier, David, 43n7, 43n10, 43n11, 43n13, 44n14, 44n16, 71n9, 150n6 Commercialization point, 37 Company unionism, 142, 165, 167, 169, 172, 180n24 Competition for ultimate power, 195 Competitive authoritarianism, 55, 184, 185 Competitiveness, 66, 145, 146, 162–164, 168, 170, 173, 177, 285 Compressed completion of democratic consolidation, 236 Compressed industrialization, 56, 66, 99, 100, 131, 206, 207, 236 Compromise strategy, 85 Confederal welfare state, 172–175 Configuration of class structure, 34 Confining conditions, 119–120, 126, 149, 150n9 Confucian, 5, 6, 11, 55, 56, 62–63, 131, 132, 134, 207, 210, 213–219, 223, 250, 275 Confucian Democracy, 131 Confucianism, 62, 103, 130–133, 153n42, 210, 214–217, 250 Confucian orthodoxy, 132, 219 Conglomerates, 145, 169, 172, 173 Congress of Korean Trade Union Representatives (CTUR), 171 Consolidated democracy, 13, 66, 121, 122, 139, 150n8, 186, 206 Constitution, 26, 55, 86–89, 97, 119, 125, 138, 139, 149, 195, 196, 210, 275, 288, 289, 292 Constitutionalism, 119–122, 275 Corporatist containment, 165 Corruption scandal, 57, 196–198

311

Counter-threat power, 80 Coup threat, 92 Crises of failures, 123 Crises of success, 123, 142 Crony capitalism, 190, 213 Cumings, Bruce, 63, 95, 113n2, 250 Cybertribes, 221, 255 D Daekwonjueui, 217 Dahl, R., 239, 245 De Castro, Renato Cruz, 262 De Tocqueville, Alexis, 139, 155n62, 239, 267n5 Deadweight losses, 144, 173 Declaration of Conscience, 106 Decompression, 81–82 Deepening hypothesis, 27 Deepening of productive structure, 19–21, 58 Defective democracies, 185 Deficit democracies, 128 Definition of authoritarianism, 50 Delegative presidency, 195, 217–218 Delegitimized the regime, 108 Democracy with guarantees, 9, 125, 209 Democratic consolidation, 10, 119–122, 150n8, 152n34, 153n36, 154n52, 159–178, 183–187, 189, 190, 198, 206, 208, 212, 213, 254, 257, 263, 273 Democratic Development Theory, 238, 243–245 Democratic institutions, 20, 23, 25, 28, 35, 36, 40, 120, 121, 137, 138, 172, 186, 208, 213, 215, 216, 239 Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 59, 80, 91

312 

INDEX

Democratic transition, 1–3, 5–10, 13, 65–67, 70, 75–92, 95, 96, 102–107, 119, 120, 123–126, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 141–143, 145, 147, 149, 160, 167, 171, 175, 177, 183–185, 187, 190–193, 205–227, 235, 236, 242, 251–252, 256–262, 265, 275, 280, 282, 296 Democratization, 1–14, 42n1, 49, 64, 66–68, 75–77, 83, 86, 90, 95–113, 119–121, 125, 129, 133, 142, 148, 159–161, 165, 167, 168, 175–177, 184, 187, 193, 206, 207, 209, 214–216, 220, 236, 237, 241, 246, 265, 267n3, 275, 290, 291 from above, 76, 77, 267n3 from below, 76, 77 movement, 9, 10, 96–98, 108, 111, 112, 115n55, 133, 183, 210 Demos, 129, 130, 133, 275 Dependent Development, 21, 32, 242 Depoliticize, 27, 59, 124, 166 Developmental coalition, 124, 166 Developmental soft authoritarianism (DSA), 50–55, 57, 58 Developmental strategy, 4, 5, 28, 29, 40, 41, 68, 248, 261 Diamond, L. J., 150n8, 154n51, 155n64, 178n3, 184, 281 Distribution of earnings, 27 Dohyup Shin, 98

Economic development plans, 28, 56, 68, 247 Economic growth first, 66, 226 distribution later, 36 Education for justice, 100 Effective rule of law, 122 Elaborate rules for conflict resolution, 120, 160 Election without choice, 90 Elective affinity, 21, 58, 66, 239, 242, 252 Electoral democracy, 55, 57, 184, 185, 197 Electoral district system, 201 Electoral mechanisms, 190, 213, 254 Emergence of a political crisis, 25 Emergence of Confucian capitalism, 5 Emergency Decree No. 9, 1, 106 Empire builders, 61, 249 Enabling conditions, 123, 149, 150n9 Endogenous democratization, 236, 237 Enterprise unions, 143, 168 Ernest, Barker, 152n25 Ethnic, 23, 51, 53, 129, 130, 148, 152n34, 175 homogeneity, 120, 129–130 Ethnos, 129, 130 Exogenous democratization, 236, 237, 267n2 External market-oriented economic growth model, 49–50

E East Asian Developmental Stat, 60 Eckert, Carter J., 63, 250, 251, 268n10 Economic and political conflict, 23 Economic crisis, 4, 12, 20, 23, 25, 27, 36, 50, 64, 68–70, 90, 190, 198, 206, 208, 213, 236, 237, 252, 253, 274

F Failure of development policies, 100 Faltering democratic consolidation, 183–202 Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), 170, 173 Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), 170, 171, 173

 INDEX 

Fei, John C. H., 37, 47n63, 47n64 5th Republic, 65, 67 First Declaration on the Times, 106 Flexible rigidities, 61, 250 Forced to be competitive, 145 Forced to be free, 145 Four Great Scandals, 57 Framework of democratic institutions, 24 Freedom in the World, 206 Functions of power, 51, 52 G Game theoretic analysis, 6 Generational cleavage, 223 Genetic theory, 76 Globalization, 11, 12, 129, 145–147, 149, 163, 164, 166, 172, 176, 177, 220, 261–263, 265, 268n12, 290, 292, 296 Government by laws, 132 Government by men, 132 Gunjungjongsik, 187 H Haggard, Stephan, 151n10, 254 Heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI), 4, 58, 59, 69 High Confucianism, 132 High costs, low efficiency politics, 207, 224 Hirschman, Albert O., 3 Historical necessity, 67–69, 90, 123, 175, 248, 249, 253 Historical obstacle, 13, 69, 253 Hobson, John, 61, 249 Holy place of democratization, 107 Horizontal accountability, 121, 190, 191, 195, 217, 245, 263 Horizontal authoritarianism, 52

313

Huntington, Samule P., 9, 14n4, 42n1, 53, 95, 131, 205, 213, 236, 240, 242, 273 Hwan guk, 214 Hyper-nomads, 221, 255 Hyun-Chin Lim, 104, 180n23 I Im, Hyug Baeg, 61, 223, 235, 248, 249, 255, 262, 263, 275, 286, 288, 290 Import-substitution industrialization (ISI), 19–21, 27–29, 32, 60, 61, 249 Inauguration of a repressive authoritarian regime, 108 Incompetence of democratic governments thesis, 237 Inconclusive and protracted tug-­ of-­war, 8 Independence Movement, 106 Industrialization, 4–6, 19–22, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37, 49, 55–58, 60, 62–64, 66–69, 98, 102, 103, 110, 159, 172, 206, 207, 214, 215, 236, 239, 240, 242, 247, 248, 250, 251 Industrial reserve army, 4, 67, 248 Institutional civil society, 141, 142 Institutional configuration, 51 Institutional Crisis, 39–41 Institutionalization, 42n1, 120, 121, 135–137, 171, 188–189, 209, 211–212, 240, 241, 247 Institutionalized economic society, 122 Institutionalizing electoral competition, 136, 184, 206, 210 Institutionalizing uncertainty, 136, 138, 141, 205, 206 Internal colonialism, 148

314 

INDEX

International division of labor, 129 International system of domination, 100 In the process of authoritarian regression, 148 Invisible hand, 147 J Jang, Ha Joon, 72n26, 250 Japanese colonialism, 32, 63, 130, 251, 268n10 Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques (JOC), 99, 107 Ju Che socialism, 147 Jung Yak Yong's interpretation of Confucius, 13 Junta’s dilemma, 36 Justice and Peace Committee (JPC), 101 K Karl, Terry L., 3, 43n8, 123, 150n9 Keynesian welfare state, 70, 162, 163 Kim, Byung Kook, 137, 152–153n34, 153n36 Kim, Jung II, 147 Kim, Seung Hun, 102, 107 Kim, 11 Sung, 147 Kim Dae Jung, 8–11, 49, 66, 68–70, 83, 85, 88, 89, 106, 136, 137, 183, 188, 189, 192–200, 205, 210, 212, 218, 223, 236, 253–254, 262, 273, 274, 290, 292 Kohli. A., 242, 267n6 Korean abertura, 8 Korean Central Information Agency (KCIA), 2, 57, 59, 188 Koreanization, 99

Korean miracle, 5, 50, 60–63, 249–251, 292 Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC), 103, 107, 109, 110 Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF), 100, 106, 107 Kwangju massacre, 92 Kwangju People’s Uprising, 8, 81 L Labor management cooperation councils, 170 Labor movement, 40, 82 Labor productivities, 29, 37, 38 Lake, David, 245 Lee Myung Bak, 13, 69, 70, 205, 226, 227, 236, 273, 275, 279, 282, 284, 288, 292 Legitimacy by performance, 55, 56 Level of unwavering faith, 198 Levitsky, Steven, 150n6 Liberal democracy, 11, 55, 56, 68, 161, 184–187, 201, 202n2, 210–213, 223–226, 236, 240, 248, 276, 288–290 Liberal market economy, 70 Limited pluralism, 50, 53, 57 Linz, Juan, 50, 51, 53, 98, 121, 122, 128, 133, 185 Lipset, Seymour M., 76, 127, 153n36, 235, 236, 239, 267n2 Lipsetian thesis, 127 Low Confucianism, 132 M Machiavelli's fortuna and virtu, 6 Macro-corporatism, 164, 165, 170, 172 Macro-corporatist strategies, 163, 172 Making Korean miracle, 237 Mani pulite, 201

 INDEX 

Market authoritarianism, 124, 125, 128, 165 Market authoritarian regime, 123, 208, 209 Market-conforming, 166 Market-conforming authoritarianism, 64 Market failures, 144, 162, 166, 174 Market-friendly, 124, 128 Market-shaping authoritarianism, 64 Marx, Karl, 5, 6, 65, 127, 139, 176 Maximalist strategy, 85 Meiji, 55, 59 Meso-corporatism, 164, 169, 176, 177 M-generation, 221 Micro-corporatism, 163, 164 Military, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 27, 35, 36, 40, 47n62, 53, 55–57, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 78, 80, 86, 88, 92, 108, 119–122, 126, 134–135, 147, 148, 154n51, 159–161, 187–188, 210, 211, 236, 237, 241, 242, 247, 251, 253, 273 Military coup, 2, 32, 36, 97, 127, 135, 185, 211, 239, 247 Military elite, 75, 119, 134, 135, 159, 187 Military in mufti, 55 Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), 192, 199, 200, 202, 223, 224 Minjung, 99 Miraculous development, 5 Mobilizational civil society, 141 Modernization of Mother Country, 64 Modernization theory, 21, 238–240, 247, 256 Modern patrimonialism, 54 Moore, Barrington, 239, 247 Morlino, Leonardo, 274, 275 Mtizens, 221, 222 Munminjungbu, 211

315

N National Coalition for Constitutional Reform (NCCR), 9, 86 National competitiveness, 176, 177 National Council for Constitutional Reform (NCCR), 108 National League for Democratic Youth Students (NLDYS, or Minchunghakryun), 101 National security community, 187, 211 Need for justice within the church itself, 100 Need for self-determination by poor nations, 100 Neoliberal democracy, 209, 290, 291 Neo-nomadic society, 207, 220–222 Neo-patrimonialism (NP), 50–54, 57, 58, 60 Neo-Tocquevillians, 140 Netizens, 220–222, 225, 226, 255 New democracies, 9, 65, 66, 70, 120, 123, 125, 128–131, 133–136, 138, 139, 141–143, 145, 147–149, 154n46, 160, 168, 172, 175, 176, 184–186, 188, 190, 195, 208, 209, 212, 236, 237, 239, 252, 257, 273, 274 New Democratic Party (NDP), 1, 8, 39, 80, 91 New international division of labor, 29, 61, 249 New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), 8, 83–85, 91 N-generation, 221 No split of the authoritarian power bloc, 77 No state, no democracy, 133 Non-myopic equilibrium of the game, 88 North, Douglas C., 244, 245 North Korean, 96, 147, 148 North South Summit Meeting, 223

316 

INDEX

O Obstacles social structures, 100 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 14n1, 14n3, 20–22, 28, 42n2, 42n3, 42n4, 43n7, 43n8, 43n12, 44n24, 59, 65, 95, 113n4, 134, 135, 154n48, 159, 203n9, 218, 229n30, 235, 241, 245, 281 Old fashioned politics, 183, 200 Only game in town, 10, 120–121, 189, 212 Opening through elections, 91, 94n11 Optimal choice of development strategies and policies, 63 Organizational concertation, 162, 164, 175 Organized democracy, 163 Outcome of democratic competition, 26, 28, 56, 189, 212 Overdeveloped state, 35, 42, 47n57, 113n3 P Pacem in Terris, 100 Paper tiger, 92 Parallel development of democracy and market economy, 66, 69, 253–255 Park as historically unnecessary, 66 Park Chung Hee Model, 5, 49, 50, 59, 64, 66, 68–70 Park Jong Chul, 8, 86, 102, 107 Park’s authoritarian rule, 50 Parliamentary dictatorship, 85 Party bossism, 136, 137, 197, 218–219 Party governance reform, 200 Paternalism, 163, 164, 168, 169, 176, 214, 215, 218 Path dependency, 126 Patriarchism, 207, 213, 215, 218

Pay for performance, 168 People-friendly, 283 People’s Nomination System, 199, 200, 224 People’s primaries, 207, 286 Persecution of Christians, 96 Personal authority, 53 Personalization, 194 Perspectives on democratic transition, 75–77 P-generation, 221, 222 Pluralism, 50, 53, 57, 122, 131, 142, 167–169, 176, 219 Polanyi, Karl, 125, 161, 166, 169 Political corruption, 137, 192, 196–198, 201, 224, 245, 296 Political decay, 240 Politicized state, 35, 36 Political regime change, 19, 22, 23 Political structure of a Mexicanized hegemonic party system, 82 Popular cynicism, 198 Popular masses, 22, 24–26, 28, 36, 38–41, 70, 78, 80, 83, 85, 89, 110, 111, 141, 177, 241, 251 Possibilism, 3 Possibility of democratic transition, 2 Post-Confucianism, 131, 132 Post-Three Kims Politics, 200 Post-war Korean economic development, 63, 251 Power relations, 51, 52, 164 Power structure, 51, 52 Praetorianism, 42n1, 238, 240, 247, 256 Preconditions for democracy automatically, 20 Precondition theory of democratic transition, 6 Prevailing circumstances, 112 Principle of Church Unity, 111

 INDEX 

Private interest governments, 162, 169, 170, 172–175 Privileged enclaves, 105 Procedural minimum, 121 Productive welfare system, 254 Proletarianization of the labor force, 34 Promotion by invitation, 61, 249 Protestant churches, 9, 10, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107, 109–113 Protracted unconsolidation, 148 Przeworski, Adam, 2, 3, 9, 14n1, 77, 120, 121, 127, 135, 138, 152n28, 189, 205, 209, 212, 236, 238, 242, 243, 246, 249, 252, 257, 267n1, 267n2, 267n4, 267n8 Punishment of Corrupt Government, 200 R Radical transformation of the world, 100 Ranis, Gustav, 37, 47n63, 47n64 Rational choice theory, 128 Real-name financial accounting system, 134 Recasting Park Chung Hee’s authoritarianism, 49–70 Receding pre-modernity, 222–223, 227 Reciprocal destruction, 125, 209 Redistributive income policy, 24 Reforma pactada, 125 Reform of Chaebul-dominated economy, 69 Reformists within the regime, 89 Regional cleavage, 137, 192, 193, 216, 223, 231n44 Regulatory gap, 105 Religious market, 98, 102–103

317

Religious solidarity, 177–178 Reserved domain, 185, 188, 211 Restricted democracy, 3–5, 25, 26, 35–41, 56 Retrospective voting, 213 Revolution from above, 59 R (red devil) generation, 221 Rhee Syng Man, 13, 57, 96 Rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism, 19–42 Roh Moo Hyun, 183, 184, 198–201, 206, 213, 220, 222, 254–256, 274, 275, 279, 286, 287, 290 S Safe return home, 9 Schmitter, Philippe C., 2, 3, 14n1, 43n8, 95, 123, 134, 135, 140, 150n8, 150n9, 156n65, 159, 161, 178n1, 178n3, 178n5, 208, 209 School of democracy, 141 Schumpeter, Joseph A., 267n5 Self-immolation of Tae Il Chun, 39 Self-interest of market, 176 Semi-competitive authoritarian state, 56 Semi-open primaries, 207 Seoul Spring, late 1979- early1980, 2 Settling into trenches, 141 Shamanism, 131 Sharpe, K.E., 42n6 Simultaneity of non-simultaneous historical times, 11 Social capital, 132, 140 Social trust, 132, 140 Socio-economic conservatism, 89 Soft authoritarianism, 51, 53, 56 Spontaneous solidarity, 144, 162, 174 State-directed industrialization, 60 State failure, 143, 144, 162, 173, 174

318 

INDEX

Steel is the national power, 59 Stepan, Alfred, 48n71, 51, 121, 122, 128, 133 Stern Principle, 2 Stokes, Susan C., 267n2 Strategic industries, 165, 177 Street parliaments, 8, 83, 126, 141, 142 Strong institutionalization, 135, 241 Structured contingency, 3 Subjecting all interests to competition, 205 Successful democratic transition in the mid-1980s, 6 Sunshine Policy, 223 Surplus democracy, 128 Sustainable development, 67 Sweet and sad, 2 Sword-won alliance, 166

To call the ghost of Park Chung Hee from the grave, 65 Tocqueville, 139, 140, 163, 239 Top-down reform project, 77 Traditional antipower bloc, 37 Transforming the world, 100 Transition by pact, 125, 209 Transition through transaction, 89, 125 Transitologists, 3 Transplacement, 125 Tug-of-war, 79, 209 Two turnover test, 205, 236 Types of democracy, 123 Types of modern authoritarianism, 50–54 Typical ideal developmental and bureaucratic authoritarianism, 42, 50

T Teheran Valley, 220 Termination of Old Fashioned Politics, 200 Theoretical problems of democratic transition, 75 Theories of democratic transition, 6, 76 Thin collectivism, thick welfare, 175 Third Wave, 3, 9, 95, 184, 198, 212 Threat power, 80 Three Kims (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil), 11, 70, 183–202, 205–227, 254, 285, 286 Three Kims Politics without the Three Kims, 200 Three lows: low inflation, low currency rate, low dollar value, 12 Three sacred treasures, 168

U Ultimate power, 137, 195, 217 Uncompromising intransigent strategy, 7, 8 Unity amid diversity, 112 Unlimited supply, 28, 33, 37, 39 Urban Industrial Mission (UIM), 99, 100, 106, 107 Urban-rural cleavage, 192 V Vertical accountability, 190, 217, 245, 263 Vertical accountabilityVertical accountability, 191 Vertical authoritarianism, 52 Violence and oppression by unjust systems and structures, 100 Voice for voiceless, 111

 INDEX 

W Wage guideline, 170, 268n11 War of movement, 120, 141 War of position, 120, 142 Weak presidency, 192, 195–196, 198 Wealthy country, a strong army, 59 Weiss, Linda, 61, 249 Welfare state, 70, 128, 143, 162, 163, 172–175, 254 W (world cup) generation, 221 World Council of Churches (WCC), 105, 109

Y Yoso Yadae, 133 Yushin authoritarianism, 3, 4, 91, 106 Yushin Constitution, 26, 40, 64, 106 Yushin dictatorship, 1, 5 Z Zero-sum political game, 195, 217

319