Democracy Rising: Assessing the Global Challenges 9781685857844

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DEMOCRACY RISING

A project of the Community of Democracies

DEMOCRACY RISING Assessing the Global Challenges edited by

Heraldo Muñoz

Published in the United States of America in 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Democracy rising : assessing the global challenges / Heraldo Muñoz, editor. (A project of the community of democracies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-428-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 1-58826-405-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Democracy—Congresses. 2. Comparative government—Congresses. 3. World politics—1989—Congresses. I. Muñoz, Heraldo. II. Series. JC423.D44129 2005 320.9'051—dc22 2005019727 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America

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The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Preface

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1 Introduction: The Growing Community of Democracies Heraldo Muñoz

1

Part 1 Democracy Today

2 Building Democracy

José Miguel Insulza

3 Democratic Governance: Linking the Security and Mark Malloch Brown Development Agendas 4 Promoting Democracy: Moving Beyond the Rhetoric Andrés Rozental 5 The State of Democratic Governance: Achievements and Challenges Carl Gershman

11 17 23

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Part 2 Democracy in the Regions

6 Democracy in Asia and the Pacific José Ramos-Horta

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7 Commentary on Democracy in Asia and the Pacific Muthiah Alagappa

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8 Democracy in Africa

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Hage Geingob

9 Commentary on Democracy in Africa Abdoulie Janneh

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61

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Contents

10 Democracy in the Arab World Abdulkarim Al-Eryani

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11 Commentary on Democracy in the Arab World Nada Al-Nashif

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12 Democracy in Europe and the Commonwealth of Bronislaw Geremek Independent States

79

13 Commentary on Democracy in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States Kalman Mizsei

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14 Democracy in Latin America

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Elena Martínez

15 Commentary on Democracy in Latin America Hernando Gómez Buendía

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Part 3 The Future of Democracy

16 Democracy and Globalization: The Beginning of History Cristovam Buarque

103

17 Democracy and “The End of History” Revisited Francis Fukuyama

115

Appendixes 1 The Warsaw Declaration 2 The Seoul Plan of Action 3 The Santiago Ministerial Commitment

121 127 135

Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

149 161 167 173

Preface

T

his book is the result of a project of the Community of Democracies, an organization of more than one hundred nation-states dedicated to the promotion of democracy worldwide. The book grew out of a seminar, “The State of Democracy in the World,” organized by the Mission of Chile to the United Nations (as chair of the Community of Democracies) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) held at the UN headquarters in New York. Special thanks are owed to all the contributors who participated in the New York seminar and, later, agreed to further develop and refine their chapters. The publication of this book was made possible thanks to the support provided by the United Nations Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Contributions were also made by the governments of Chile, Italy, and the United States. The UNDP was an invaluable partner in the organization of the seminar. Mark Malloch Brown, then UNDP administrator, contributed greatly to the project. David Yang of UNDP and Ignacio Llanos of the Mission of Chile to the United Nations were key foot soldiers, lending their energy and talent throughout the process leading to the publication of this volume. Carla Serazzi of the Mission of Chile also collaborated efficiently during the publication phase. Lynne Rienner, as usual, was both an encouraging and demanding publisher. We thank her and her able staff for their professional work. — Heraldo Muñoz

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DEMOCRACY RISING

1 Introduction: The Growing Community of Democracies Heraldo Muñoz

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new democratic wave is sweeping the world, from the streets of Georgia and Ukraine, to the unprecedented 2004 and 2005 elections in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to the new prospects for democratic development in Lebanon and Egypt. In 2004, more than 1 billion people voted in national elections.1 Democratic elections have become the rule rather than the exception—a far cry from the 1980s, when authoritarian regimes ruled in many regions. The expansion of democracy and human rights is not the monopoly of any particular state but is instead the outcome of a growing demand of peoples in an interdependent global society. It has also been part and parcel of the foreign policy priorities of many countries for some time, including the group of countries known as the Community of Democracies.

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The Influences of Globalization and the End of the Cold War

The process of globalization, despite some negative aspects, can be credited with a growing awareness of the value of democracy and respect for human rights. Today, it is virtually impossible to keep massive human rights violations secret. The globalization of news media means that people around the globe know when a human rights tragedy is occurring. This, in turn, has encouraged the UN Security Council to intervene in countries where humanitarian crises occur, something that rarely happened in the past, especially during the Cold War era. 1

2

Introduction

Globalization can also be positive for democracy and human rights by empowering an emerging global civil society and a network of active nongovernmental organizations. There are now new opportunities to challenge the state “from above and below,” in the words of Richard Falk.2 At the same time, global terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001, have had the unexpected side effect of placing democracy and human rights concerns in a less central position, giving “hard security” threats like terrorism precedence over the “soft security” challenges of humanitarian crises and democratic governance. Of course, promoting democracy, tolerance, and a dialogue of civilizations will help the fight against terrorism. The end of the Cold War opened a great opportunity to promote the rule of law and democracy without many of the obstacles and mistrust about hidden agendas of the past. In the United States, a security worldview based on the containment of communism was replaced by a focus on the enlargement of a community of democracies and market-based economies. Security has become firmly linked to democracy. As one government official argued in the mid-1990s, “since World War II, there has been no war between two democratic nations and in the last 50 years, there has never been a famine in a country with a free press.”3 Independent of the strict accuracy of such a statement, it reflects the preeminence that the international community is now giving to issues of human rights and democracy. The post–Cold War debate on democracy has permitted us to leave behind the old debate between “real democracy” and “formal democracy.” Democracy as an “ideal of forms” is indeed “formal.” But, as Norberto Bobbio once observed, those committed to social change “must defend above all the rule of law. Providing it, for certain, with new contents but never forgetting that the new contents, if not inserted in the structures of the rule of law, will end up becoming new instruments of inequality and oppression.”4 In the post–Cold War period, the challenge for those who advocate structural changes toward a more egalitarian and progressive world is, following C. B. Macpherson, to recuperate the original sense of self-government embodied in the democracy concept from the times of Aristotle, founded on the vision of the modern human being as a creator, a builder, a person capable of self-realization deploying his or her energies according to some rational purpose. This is the original sense of democracy, since it was only in seventeenth-century England that democracy became linked to the market and to a vision of human beings as a “bunch of appetites” demanding satisfaction in a liberalindividualistic perspective.5

The Growing Community of Democracies

3

The post–Cold War period has also been marked by the UN Security Council’s willingness to address conflicts of a domestic nature—such as democracy-related crises and humanitarian conflicts— that had been avoided in the past under a strict interpretation of the principle of noninterference in sovereign affairs. The restoration of the democratically elected government in Haiti in 1994 is a case in point, as is the Security Council’s creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively. This trend continued with the 2002 agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to establish a Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law and domestic law committed in that country. Whatever one may think of the Security Council’s February 2004 decision to authorize a Multinational Interim Force in Haiti for ninety days to contribute to security and stability and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, followed by the present UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti, the purpose of these initiatives was to avoid the council’s failure in past humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia and, therefore, to assume a responsibility with regard to democratic governance and human rights. Indeed, today most Security Council authorizations of multinational forces or deployment of peacekeeping forces, particularly in Africa, are related to humanitarian crises and democracy.

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The Community of Democracies

In June 2000, government representatives and delegates of civil society from all regions of the globe gathered in Warsaw, Poland, to set up the Community of Democracies, an organization composed of well over 100 countries devoted to the consolidation and spread of democracy worldwide. The Warsaw conference endorsed a declaration affirming a commitment to promote and strengthen democratic values and practices and spelled out a series of core democratic rights. At a second high-level conference held in Seoul, Republic of Korea, in November 2002, the member states went further, outlining the essential elements of a representative democracy. They also agreed on a plan of action that includes, among other points, regional democratic cooperation through assistance in the building of democratic institutions, developing mechanisms for monitoring democracy, fighting corruption, and encouraging economic growth and the alleviation of poverty.

4

Introduction

The community does not restrict itself to simply producing declarations; words have been matched by actions. For example, the group has sent missions to East Timor and Georgia to support institution-building efforts related to local government, civilian police, and the establishment of independent prosecutors. Focusing on the United Nations as a key forum to further the democratic agenda, the community decided to constitute a Democracy Caucus within the UN to support democracy-related resolutions and other relevant activities. The first steps to implement this mandate were taken in April 2004 in Geneva at the Human Rights Commission, where the leading countries of the community supported several emblematic resolutions. On November 1, 2004, the community as a whole met for the first time as a Democracy Caucus at the United Nations. Under the Chilean chairmanship, the caucus agreed to recommend the support of four General Assembly resolutions in key areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, thus opening a new avenue of work with the UN. A seminar entitled “The State of Democracy in the World” was held at UN headquarters in New York in March 2005 in preparation for the Third Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies, held in Santiago, Chile, in April 2005 (see Appendix 3, “The Santiago Ministerial Commitment”). This book is one outcome of that New York seminar.

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The Plan of the Book

In Chapter 2, José Miguel Insulza argues that a sustainable democracy requires not only institutions that effectively protect the rights of individuals, provide for social participation, and contribute to broad national consensus but also an active civil society and the creation of opportunities for socioeconomic development. Considering three dimensions of democracy—ethical, political, and socioeconomic—he also discusses the potential contribution of the Community of Democracies and advocates an active cooperation among democracies. Mark Malloch Brown, in Chapter 3, notes that the share of the world’s population living in countries with multiparty electoral systems has risen from 44 percent in 1990 to 58 percent in 2005—an increase of 1.4 billion people enjoying the right to vote. Nevertheless, fewer than 60 percent of those nominally elected governments

The Growing Community of Democracies

5

can be classified as fully democratic. The role of the United Nations in democratization, Brown asserts, has never been more vital, and assisting countries in their efforts to confront the challenges of democratization lies at the core of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) work. Brown also discusses the importance of the Millennium Goals, which have become a manifesto for the world’s poor, viewed as the economic and social counterpart to the expansion of democracy. Chapter 4 focuses on the practicalities of building democracy. Andrés Rozental warns that the main impediment to the success of international support for democracy is the widespread fragmentation of those efforts. In the interest of overcoming this fragmentation, he advances the need for a common definition of democracy building, a map of the thematic areas that are part of democracy building, and agreement on an action plan to advance democracy building at the national, regional, and global levels. In Chapter 5, Carl Gershman describes the enormous support that democracy now enjoys in non-Western countries and cultures; the presence of nongovernmental and civic organizations committed to the advancement of democracy, he observes, constitutes a quiet revolution that has taken place over the last two decades. Nevertheless, Gershman argues, antidemocratic resistance remains strong, reflected in Islamic radicalism, the remaining dictatorships in the world, the proliferation of failed and war-torn countries, and the widespread prevalence of semi-authoritarian, or “hybrid,” regimes. He proposes that the Community of Democracies establish a transparent and effective procedure for determining which countries should be granted membership. Turning to regional issues, José Ramos-Horta presents an optimistic picture of the advance of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region in Chapter 6. Ramos-Horta points out that hundreds of millions of people are freer in Asia today than they were some ten years ago and that in terms of sheer numbers, Asia has the largest number of free people in the world. However, he cautions, the process of democratization in the Asia-Pacific region is still long and arduous, and there are numerous challenges to confront. In Chapter 7, Muthiah Alagappa agrees that Asia has witnessed positive democratic developments in the last fifteen years, but he asserts that the record in the region is mixed. In particular, he focuses on the tension among security needs, state capacity, and democracy; the weakness of political parties; the lack of institutionalization of

6

Introduction

the nonstate sphere; and the need to develop the capacity for democratic civilian control of the military. The status of democracy in Africa is analyzed by Hage Geingob in Chapter 8. Although democracy is taking root on the continent, Geingob asserts, much remains to be done. In most African countries, there is no genuine political competition, parliaments are still learning how to function effectively, and political power remains concentrated in the hands of a small number of elites. Conflict management is still an elusive goal, and African governments have yet to seriously address issues of poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Geingob suggests constructive action on both the regional and the continental level, as well as by the international community. In Chapter 9, Abdoulie Janneh provides historical context for the problem of democracy in Africa, referring to the colonial experience and the impact of the Cold War on the newly independent states of the continent. Janneh goes on to observe that democracy in Africa has yet to deliver on a par with the expectations because it has not led to a reduction in poverty; in fact, he argues, “economic reforms that have reduced social spending by governments have resulted in deeper poverty for the majority.” He concludes with several recommendations for how the Community of Democracies can support democratic governance in Africa. Abdulkarim Al-Eryani writes about democracy in the Arab world in Chapter 10. Providing historical background, Al-Eryani reminds us that democracy has a history in the Middle East; it is not a new invention or a recent introduction. Democracy is a process, he observes, not an event, and although there is no mature democracy in the Arab world at present, democratic practices and tendencies “are there to stay. The waves of democratization, no matter how slow and deficient they may be, are irreversible.” Commenting further on the state of democracy in the Arab region, Nada Al-Nashif underlines in Chapter 11 that a variety of sources have advocated Arab democratic reforms since the 1980s. These sources range from leading intellectual and civil society activists encompassing a wide spectrum of ideological perspectives to the debate on political liberalization stimulated from abroad in the 1990s as democratization swept the former Soviet bloc. Al-Nashif discusses several successful political reform initiatives put forward by Arab leaders, as well as the contribution of the Arab Human Development Report to good governance and development in the region. In Chapter 12, Bronislaw Geremek offers a thoughtful discussion of the varying meanings of democracy across time and cultures and

The Growing Community of Democracies

7

then turns to an analysis of democracy in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Geremek posits the main issues in the European debate about the future of democracy as the dangers of populism, the nature of civil society, the controversies over the European Union’s constitutional treaty, and the tensions that have appeared in recent years in relations between Europe and the United States. Democracy is not a cure for all that is wrong with the modern world, Geremek acknowledges; nevertheless, the European experience permits the conclusion that a lack of democracy makes it more difficult to resist the temptation of excessive government, to rise to the challenges of alleviating poverty and ensuring human security, and to avoid intolerance and violations of human rights. Continuing the discussion of democracy in Europe and the CIS, Kalman Mizsei states in Chapter 13 that democracy is a core value of the European Union and a precondition of EU membership—a fact that has encouraged democratic consolidation in the countries of Eastern Europe seeking EU membership. But the picture is not entirely rosy, particularly as one goes farther east into the countries of the former Soviet Union. Mizsei identifies three challenges for the new democracies of Eastern Europe: increasing the degree of citizen participation in public life, engendering respect for the human rights of minorities, and dealing with the centralizing tendency in the functioning of the state. In Chapter 14, Elena Martínez focuses on the findings in the UNDP’s Report on Democracy in Latin America, which has had a wide public impact since its release in 2004. Martínez refers to a paradox at the heart of the UNDP report: Latin America today can look back with great pride on more than two decades of democratic government, but at the same time it faces a growing social crisis. The report examines eighteen Latin American countries, offering an in-depth analysis centered on three key questions: What is the state of democracy in the region? How strong is the support for democracy? How can democratic achievements be preserved and strengthened? The answers to those questions indicate that—despite improvements in many countries—deficiencies with regard to social rights are deep and enduring, levels of inequality and poverty are high, and citizen support for democracy is limited. To respond to these challenges, the report proposes an expanded agenda for democratic development. Hernando Gómez Buendía agrees in Chapter 15 that the UNDP Report on Democracy in Latin America has become mandatory reading for anyone seriously interested in the subject. However, he questions the report’s emphasis on free elections, when the evidence shows, he

8

Introduction

believes, that poverty and social exclusion are behind the fragility of democracies in the region. He also finds that the report fails to pay sufficient attention to such critical issues as multiculturalism, corruption, and illiberal democracies. The concluding section of the book looks to the future. In Chapter 16, Cristovam Buarque proposes eight requirements for a true global democracy. And in Chapter 17, Francis Fukuyama addresses three challenges to his thesis about “the end of history,” focusing on issues related to political Islam, democratic accountability among nations, and the need for institutions as a foundation for both economic development and democracy. * * * In the last analysis, democracy in any country of course depends on its own leaders, political parties, businesspeople, workers, and civil society in general. As a major study on democracy concluded, “because democracy inherently involves self-determination and autonomy, outside efforts to nurture it must be restrained, respectful, sensitive, and patient.”6 Nevertheless, although democracy cannot be “exported” or “imported,” certainly it must be internationally supported. The international community has a central role to play in aiding democracy. And the Community of Democracies can assist those efforts, helping to turn aspirations for democracy into a concrete and growing reality throughout the world.

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Notes

1. United Nations Development Programme data, New York, 2004. 2. Richard Falk, “Interpreting the Interaction of Global Markets and Human Rights,” in Alison Brysk, ed., Globalization and Human Rights (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), p. 61. 3. Lawrence Summers, quoted in World Bank: Governance and Human Rights (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1995), p. 41. 4. Norberto Bobbio, “Interview,” Sistema, no. 29–30 (May 1979): 7. 5. See C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1973). 6. Abraham Lowenthal, “Learning from History,” in Abraham Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 262.

Part 1 DEMOCRACY TODAY

2 Building Democracy José Miguel Insulza

S

trengthening democratic values within our societies promotes human dignity, stability, and development. That is why the work of the United Nations in general and of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in particular to advance democracy as an essential element of human development is so valuable. From this perspective, the UNDP’s report, Challenges to Democratic Governance,1 makes a significant contribution to identifying the main obstacles faced by the various regions of the world in the pursuit of full democracy. The Community of Democracies, the organization that gathers countries with the aim of promoting democracy throughout the world, also represents a new contribution along the lines of the many efforts the international community has undertaken since the end of the Cold War to broaden the horizons of democracy from a global perspective. There is a body of international instruments that enshrine civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights historically advanced by members of the community. In the case of the inter-American system, there is also the recognition of the right of peoples to democracy. But the challenge is to make these values part of our daily lives so that citizens can feel confident that democratic systems are ways through which they can improve their lives, open spaces to promote their ideas without fear, and instruments to mobilize their own interests and demands within transparent and solid institutional frameworks. This challenge requires, among other things, the building of institutions that effectively protect the rights of individuals, provide for broad levels of social participation and build broad national consensus; 11

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Democracy Today

an informed civil society that plays a key role in the legitimization, consolidation, and protection of democracy; access to fundamental rights, such as the right to education and health; and guarantees of basic levels of security for all citizens. Democratic life also involves creating the conditions for sustainable economic development that would allow people, through decent jobs, access to material conditions for their full personal development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent a global commitment to fundamental rights that must be guaranteed if we genuinely seek to strengthen our democracies. Democracy and development are indispensable elements of a virtuous circle in which economic development contributes to the strengthening of democracies to make them capable of generating processes that lead to progress and well-being. The present challenges of democracy can therefore be addressed from three different perspectives: ethical, political, and socioeconomic.

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The Ethical Dimension

In terms of ethics, the world faces a challenge of due tolerance and respect for diversity and minorities as the main foundation of democratic life. We note with concern how cultural, ethnic, and religious differences have become destabilizing factors and causes for crises and conflicts. Respect for plurality helps to preserve the multicultural character of modern societies by ensuring cooperation in the maintenance of stability and social cohesion. Indeed, we are witnessing today the emergence of a new concept of citizenship that transcends the national level and confers rights and duties on all in the form of a global citizenship based on the values of pluralism, tolerance, respect, and harmonious relations. In Chile, the process of a return to democracy very clearly posed the problem of healing the wounds that resulted from the breakdown of institutions and at the same time of building justice and reconciliation. It is a complex and long-term process, tied to the search for truth, justice, and compensation for victims of human rights violations and also to the rebuilding of a legitimate, open, socially and politically validated institutional system based on renewed public trust in democratic principles and the rule of law. Indeed, democracy needs to create unity and a sense of belonging, to integrate those who

Building Democracy

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feel marginalized, and to promote the identification of society as a whole with a collective national project. Democracy is a symbolic community, an ethical bond that cuts across the society.

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The Political Dimension

In order for ethical principles to be realized, governments and civil societies must work together to foster a political agenda that promotes good governance, transparency, integrity, reform of the state, and citizen participation. A democracy cannot survive if people believe that politics are being degraded or that public administration is awash in corruption. Integrity is a fundamental element of the legitimization of the democratic system and the accountability of public management. Strengthening these features is a key aspect of democratic governance. Those committed to democratic rule must strengthen institutions and political structures (including political parties and nongovernmental organizations), make them more participatory, and ensure greater transparency at all levels. In this way, institutions become more efficient in delivering the public goods that people demand and also become more effective instruments for channeling the demands of the people and protecting the interests of the community. This set of issues informs the work of the Community of Democracies to promote democracy and strengthen democratic institutions throughout the world. These questions form the bases for multilateral cooperation in areas such as the improvement of our systems of justice, the promotion of the activities of nongovernmental organizations, assistance for the strengthening of political parties, and institution building. Such actions contribute to strengthening the fabric of a democratic society. Within the multilateral system, these tasks are being pursued through the activities of the Democracy Caucus at the United Nations. As stated in the reports of the UNDP and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), it is essential to strengthen civil society organizations that, although they may not correspond to the traditional forms of political participation defined by parties and elections, nevertheless can channel demands that may eventually evolve into public policies, which is a contribution to the opening up of democracy and its ability to mobilize the interests of individuals.

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The Socioeconomic Dimension

We already mentioned the close link between socioeconomic development and democracy. If people believe that democracy can improve their lives, there is also the danger that, on the contrary, persistent underdevelopment and social inequalities call into question the legitimacy of a democratic system. This issue is related also to practices of good governance, public accountability, and the transparency and solidarity that should characterize democratic governments. The critical importance of democratic governance in the developing world was stressed by world leaders at the Millennium Summit, when they pledged to spare no effort to promote democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms, including the right to development. Democracy helps a society cohere, while at the same time ensuring that the political system does not become divorced from the interests of the society as a whole. When institutions do not produce the expected results in the areas of economic and social development, there is a risk of eroding citizens’ trust, which is needed to provide the democratic system with adequate levels of legitimacy and participation in order to ensure a normal economic life. A lack of governability has caused deep social crises in countries in the Western hemisphere, threatening the possibility of achieving economic and social development and thereby improving the quality of life. Secretary-General Kofi Annan summarized it well when he said that “good governance is perhaps the most important single factor in the eradication of poverty and promotion of development.”2

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Concluding Comments

The lessons of history teach us that building democracy is an ongoing process, with advances and setbacks, achievements and failures. Democracy has the virtue of mobilizing its stakeholders: citizens, social groups, and communities fighting for their rights. The challenges are multiple and diverse. Beyond the debate on the need to harmonize international obligations with the basic political principle of nonintervention, we must note the gradual emergence of a new international regime that promotes and protects democracy. While recognizing this positive trend, we must also remember that democracy develops from within nations. Although the international

Building Democracy

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community can play a key role in its defense and promotion, as was the case in Chile, the primary responsibility lies with the societies and institutions of each country. Democratic leaders must also ensure greater coherence between the commitments undertaken by the international community and their practical implementation. We must avoid any double standard that damages the credibility of national and international actions in this field. The response to these dilemmas and challenges depends upon active cooperation between democracies, on shared advances and setbacks—in short, promoting a daily commitment to the building of a democratic future for all—which is the best guarantee for dignity, progress, and peace.

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Notes

1. See UNDP, Challenges to Democratic Governance. Submitted to the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies, 2005. 2. See United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights For All. Report of the Secretary-General (A/59/2005), 2005, p. 114.

3 Democratic Governance: Linking the Security and Development Agendas Mark Malloch Brown

I

n bringing together some 100 nations committed to supporting and promoting democracy in their own countries and globally, the Community of Democracies plays an important role in addressing one of the fundamental challenges of our time: namely, how to consolidate the wave of democratization we have witnessed in so many parts of the world over the past thirty years and how to assist other countries and their citizens on this same liberating path of democratization. The stirrings of political reform being felt across the Middle East offer a moment of cautious hope. From the success of Iraq’s unprecedented general election, where despite one’s views on the war, the international community now has a precious opportunity to assist the Iraqi people in building a stable and democratic society; to the elections for a new Palestinian president, which has helped bring fresh hope to the Middle East peace process; to the recent announcement of democratic reform in Egypt to allow multiple candidates in the forthcoming presidential polls; and to the thousands of Lebanese who took to the streets of Beirut calling for freedom and democracy in their country, as well as the very large counterdemonstrations in Beirut—all these events remind us both that we are at an exciting period in the development of democracy in that region and that once given the political space, people themselves will determine the direction of their own future. It won’t be outsiders, in the region or beyond; democracy is a wonderful thing precisely because it gives people themselves the chance to determine their own futures. By highlighting three cardinal obstacles to human development across the region posed by widening gaps in freedom, women’s 17

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empowerment, and knowledge, the UNDP-sponsored Arab Human Development Reports have been able to play a modest part in helping catalyze the debate and discussion in this area. These reports also indicate a broader transformation in the United Nations as to how we approach the issue of democratic governance and how we seize what has in the past been that difficult mettle. As the UN Secretary-General highlighted recently in London, during the height of the Cold War, when the world was crudely divided into two camps (democracy and what some would have seen as authoritarianism), it would have been virtually unimaginable for the United Nations to take sides between the two or seek to intervene in the internal affairs of its member states. Today, by stark contrast, democratic governance is increasingly viewed as a universal value, with the vast majority of UN member states seeing democratization as desirable, at least in theory. And rather than being divided into two camps, states span the spectrum of where they are in their common democratic journey. In an increasingly interconnected world, conflict, poverty, or misgovernment in one part of the world can affect all of us—as demonstrated in the rise of global terrorism, from the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, to the Bali terror attacks in 2002 and the 2004 Madrid train bombs that killed some 200 people. These events remind us that supporting countries in their efforts to build and strengthen democratic governance clearly belongs at the top of the international agenda and, increasingly, at the heart of the work of the United Nations.

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Democratic Governance: The Critical Link Between Security and Development

As we survey the state of democracy worldwide, both good and bad news abound. On the one hand, the explosion in the number of democracies in the 1980s and 1990s saw some eighty countries take significant steps toward democracy. Since 1990—according to our UNDP data—the share of the world’s population living in countries with multiparty electoral systems has risen from 44 percent to 58 percent—an increase of 1.4 billion people enjoying the right to vote and to choose their own government. However, the euphoria of the Cold War’s end and the dramatic progress in opening up political systems and

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expanding political freedoms worldwide has also given way in some cases to the somber reality of twenty-first-century politics. Although democratic governance has improved in electoral terms, in the context of building a culture of democracy—one that really delivers on the priorities of its citizens rather than just offering a nominal vote every five years—democracy has not kept pace. First, although the 1980s and 1990s were good for the advance of democracy, they could have been better. Fewer than 60 percent of those nominally elected governments previously mentioned can be classified as fully democratic. Indeed, across the world there has been a worrying trend of leaders seeking to consolidate their hold on power by altering constitutions, bullying weak legislatures and judiciaries, and manipulating elections. Second, democracy has not kept pace with the demands of citizens for human development, peace, and prosperity. Take Latin America, for example. As highlighted in the UNDP-sponsored 2004 report Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy,1 that continent has made significant strides toward democratic governance, has banished the generals to the barracks, and can look back with pride on more than two decades of democratic governance. Yet democracy has not delivered the results its citizens expected, especially for the poor of Latin America, who continue to live in the most unequal region in the world, despite democracy. So, although there has been unprecedented growth and increasing opportunities for many in the global economy, billions of people remain excluded from participating in the process of development, and the gap between the haves and have-nots has increased both between and within countries. Quite apart from the cost of poverty to individual lives and communities across the developing world, the current unacceptable levels of global poverty threaten fragile states, contributing to a more radicalized, confrontational, and violent politics. In today’s global environment, we cannot afford to ignore the realities of the global challenges we face or the new global politics such challenges have created. Although we know some of what needs to be done to ensure democracy delivers—that citizens enjoy political, civil, and social rights; that politics is more participatory, transparent, and accountable; and that real space is opened for the poor, particularly for women, youth, and other groups that are often marginalized in the political process—we have not really had a clear roadmap of how to achieve all those objectives.

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Democracy Today

Advancing Democratic Governance and the Security and Development Agenda: The Role of the UN

Recognizing the complexity of the interrelated global challenges we face, from democracy to security and development, the UN Secretary-General appointed a high-level panel to examine threats to global peace and security and the policies needed to address them. As the panel’s report highlighted, today’s threats extend to poverty, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation, as well as the traditional threats of war and violence and the spread and potential use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, terrorism, and transnational crime. The report unequivocally argues that economic and social development must be one cornerstone of any credible collective security system—a global agenda encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals already agreed to by world leaders—and that there needs to be a legitimate recognition of the security requirements both rich and poor countries face. In a more interdependent world, politics and political institutions have never been more critical to human development and security. And today more than ever, it is clear that the way in which citizens are governed is critical to achieving these twin pillars of stable societies: security and development. For these reasons, the role of the United Nations in the democratization process has never been more vital. Already, the UN supports democratization in an increasing number of countries that seek our help. Every year the organization receives around two dozen requests for electoral assistance. From East Timor to Sierra Leone, from Afghanistan to most recently in Iraq, the UN has provided technical assistance in preparing and holding elections and helping countries consolidate the democratic process. UN human rights staffers are now posted in some thirty-nine countries, and dozens more countries have benefited from technical and advisory missions or from visits by special rapporteurs and other human rights experts. Assisting countries in their efforts to confront the challenges of democratization lies at the core of UNDP’s work. The UNDP focuses on helping countries get democratic governance “right,” in the sense of building the capacity they need to effectively govern and have representative institutions and participatory processes that go beyond simply holding an election. The ultimate aim is governance that can deliver the benefits of free and open societies.

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From providing assistance on parliamentary development, to support with electoral systems and processes (where we currently support thirty-seven countries), to access to justice and human rights and improving access to information, to decentralization and local governance and public administration, and civil service reform, UNDP is involved in the nuts and bolts of what makes democracy work: how to secure both state and human security, economic growth, and human development. Considering that we are a development organization and taking into account the democratic governance link to our critical foundation issue—reducing poverty and improving human development—2005 offers us a critical opportunity to advance both security and the Millennium Development Goals. A Critical Year for Advancing Democratic Governance and Global Security and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals

Recognizing that within the Community of Democracies there is a rich debate about its role as a Democracy Caucus, I believe that all members may agree on the importance of the summit of world leaders in September 2005 to set ambitious goals regarding democracy at all levels—not just at the national and community level but also in how international institutions work, particularly the United Nations. I hope Community of Democracies members will also think it appropriate to push hard in that declaration of world leaders for the centrality of democracy and the rule of law as common ambitions for the world. This should include the establishment of the very important Democracy Fund, proposed by the UN Secretary-General, and beyond that, alignment of the work of the United Nations even further behind promoting the issues of accountability, transparency, and more in how states organize themselves and organize the relations between countries. And one further critical issue the Democracy Caucus must take up in 2005 is the Millennium Development Goals themselves. Because if we are to help shape a democratic world, we need a democratic manifesto to inform all our institutions—international and national. The Millennium Development Goals have become that manifesto for the world’s poor, something we see as the economic and social counterpart to this expansion of democracy. The Millennium Development Goals speak to people everywhere, emphasizing basic needs such as ending hunger; reducing extreme poverty; providing health and education; tackling critical and infectious

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diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria; removing discrimination against girls in education and against women at all levels of society; and providing the basic environmental factors needed to sustain development (basic energy services, clean water, and sanitation). These are the basic goals of the poor everywhere. Having spent many years as a political consultant working in countries that are represented here today, I would go out and research public opinion to find out what people wanted from the candidate I was advising in elections. Although it was years before the Millennium Development Goals came about, every time, everywhere, the poor in countries wanted exactly these things: decent health care, education for their children, and the opportunity to get a job, to improve life for themselves and their families. So, the MDGs are that crystallized global manifesto for the poor; if we fail to address development issues this year, the summit will fundamentally have failed, whatever its successes on the security side alone. Since the 1980s, the spread of democracy has brought us closer to the opportunity to end poverty. The will to implement development, the resources, and the solutions are more available to us now than ever before. So we have to put those two things together: democracy and the ending of poverty. And that will be our central appeal to world leaders when they meet at the summit in New York. We will, through the SecretaryGeneral’s report, put before them an agenda of bold but achievable proposals for taking action to eradicate the scourge of global poverty to make the world more secure for all its citizens, rich and poor alike. It is vital that countries seize this opportunity, recognizing that in this increasingly interdependent world, politics and political institutions are even more central to human development and human security. Deepening democracy, then, so that it delivers this twin agenda, is one of the most pressing challenges we face today, a challenge in which the United Nations and the Secretary-General are committed to playing a full role.

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Note

1. UNDP, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy (New York, 2004).

4 Promoting Democracy: Moving Beyond the Rhetoric Andrés Rozental

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ood intentions are an important precondition for democracy building, but today we need to go further. All democracies may agree that democracy building is an important, albeit lengthy process. But rather than describe the obstacles to that process—which we all know and recognize—I would like to discuss what the next concrete steps should be, and what, beyond the high aims we all have for the future of democracy, we can do to bring the process along in the near future. If we could agree on concrete steps forward or at least on suggestions to the leaders of the Community of Democracies, we will indeed have made progress.

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The Complex Process of Building Democracy

To build democracy is a complex process that needs patience, tolerance, far-sightedness, and an understanding that no single solution fits all cases. Every country has to find its own way and forms of democracy, even if core values remain the same. The main impediment to the success of international support efforts is the widespread fragmentation in the area of democracy building. Not only do states fail to coordinate their policies on this issue or disagree on terminology, but even within national ministries there are serious differences in how the world is viewed. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders pursue their own agendas, while experts on development policy—the area with the largest resources for democracy building—often overlap or duplicate their work and are sometimes 23

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out of tune with foreign policy specialists or politicians, who think and act within national frameworks. To overcome this fragmentation, we should follow a three-step approach: 1. Agree on what we mean by “democracy building”—not only in general terms, but in practical outcomes and instruments, at the same time keeping in mind that the core principles can be implemented very differently in heterogeneous times and spaces. 2. Carefully map the thematic areas that are part of democracy building in order to understand the intentions of the different players, as well as their strengths, weaknesses, and ultimate political interests, and to improve the exchange of information, find areas of cooperation, and finally take parallel, or even joint, action to advance the agenda. 3. Agree on practical steps that can be achieved over the next few years, a bold but realistic vision, and an ambitious yet concrete action plan to advance democracy building on the national, regional, and global levels. One of the first hurdles we have to overcome is the unclear terminology used when talking about democratization. “Democracy” is often used in context of “human rights”: many units in foreign ministries or policy strategies bear the name “democracy and human rights,” as if the two were different sides of the same coin. This is misleading. Although both are worthy causes and closely connected, their political mechanics are very different. Human rights focuses on individual rights, and its promoters tackle injustices to be redressed. Democracy, however, is a system of government, more complex and politically volatile than one-issue campaigns. Democracy has to be positively constructed and cannot be defined in the negative. I would therefore urge us to try to separate in our minds the human rights agenda from democracy building because each has a different community of practitioners that use different policy instruments to achieve their aims. An emancipation of democracy building from the human rights agenda should be a clear objective. A similar terminological blur affects the comparison of “democracy” with the more technocratic “governance.” Governance can be a very useful term, but it is often used in a ubiquitous manner, and what constitutes “good governance” is nebulous at best. Democracy is a descriptive but also normative concept that governance does not have. Governance can be split into sectoral policies or used for single institutions, but democracy is only

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valid as an integral system with normative overtones and therefore is more demanding than undefined governance. Democracy is about power and its use and distribution. Governance relates to efficiency. At the practical level, democracy building evolved out of classical development policy since it is development ministries or agencies in donor countries that have the financial resources, as well as the experience, of working on other continents. This inductive approach has many merits; among others, it is closer to citizens as recipients. But a complex structure like democracy has to be treated as a whole; otherwise, individual projects do not add up. Thus, democracy building needs to be complemented by a deductive approach in creating a broad strategic framework for democratization. The Community of Democracies can be a good forum to discuss such a strategic approach by creating a conceptual framework for democracy promotion that links the effort of different players and is distinct from existing networks on “human rights” or from the community of practitioners on “governance.” Such a framework could order, coordinate, or create resources for democracy building, bringing structure into its currently fragmented state. It could contribute to avoiding duplication and bring added value, as well as the more efficient use of resources, in combining the efforts of different organizations sharing the same aim. I think it is obvious that such a framework cannot be imposed but must grow out of collaboration between states and organizations. An organization like the Community of Democracies—with its important possibilities for political networking—can play a significant role as catalyst. Finally, we should talk not only about democratic aims but also about democratic ways to distribute information and spread the debate on democracy to all citizens, not just to a privileged few. This democratic buy-in will be crucial if we want to ensure that our efforts are indeed driven by the demos, and not by an elite of committed activists that define among themselves what is good for the rest. An important feature of a democratic culture is its inclusiveness.

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Elements for a Future Strategy on Democracy Building

A Coalition of Governments, International Organizations, and Nongovernmental Organizations

As mentioned earlier, efforts at democracy building are currently highly fragmented and often follow priorities of national constituencies and fashions,

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rather than the needs on the ground. Coalitions of various actors would not only allow flexibility and a longer-term commitment to planning but would also raise legitimacy, especially when developed and developing countries jointly agree on priorities and programs. Thus a future strategy must develop fora and policy instruments to facilitate the formation of coalitions on the international and regional level, instead of today’s turf battles. The Community of Democracies and its partners could act as a catalyst by providing a space for meetings and a debate that promotes cooperation. This concept must also embrace different brands of democracy as equal and above all not favor European or US models. Although the EU, the US, and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries will be important drivers in the process of further democratization, it is the young democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia that will give credibility to the process. We need ideas, not ideology, as well as collaboration between equals, not a sermon from developed to developing democracies. The capacity and willingness to pursue a dialogue is an important feature of a democratic culture. Participation and Information for All Citizens, Not Just a Privileged Few

Many policy instruments in democracy building today still favor specialists rather than average citizens. Here the Internet offers a powerful tool to inform and coordinate, since its use was pioneered by NGO activists in regional and global networks. Systematic and user-friendly information on the Net can facilitate access to democracy resources and offer options rather than prescribe solutions. An expanding network of democracy resources, with a well-developed core, is also more flexible to use than limited project funding. However, information on the Net must be supported by thematic networks of activities and practitioners to ensure enduring relevance and remaining on the cutting edge. The website of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), www.idea.int, is one example of such a network. The establishment of lasting conceptual frameworks on democracy building also guarantees that resources are spent on providing citizens with new tools, rather than supporting a cast of consultants whose efforts often have little long-term impact. Let me touch upon the role of nongovernmental organizations. We all recognize the importance of NGOs in closing the gap between political institutions and citizens, as well as their usefulness as drivers of policy issues. However, we should also recognize that the world of

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NGOs is much broader than the core group of well-known activists using global brands that are overwhelmingly present in the media. In the broad strategy to develop democracy, other NGOs like trade unions, employer or farmer organizations, or migrant networks can be crucial in keeping democracy afloat and impede the slide back to autocratic regimes. They too must be part of a broad strategy for democratization. An Emphasis on Regional Collaboration

A conceptual framework should also look at supporting regional organizations, as was already stated at the Community of Democracies conference in Seoul in 2002. With what practical tools can member states support cooperation and joint action at the regional level? What role can regional organizations play in strengthening democracy? Peer reviews, peer assistance, and peer pressure have proven to be efficient at regional levels, not least in Latin America. On this topic, federal states and regional organizations should open and compare their toolboxes and institutionalize their exchange of information. An Emphasis on Democracy on the Local Level

Last but not least, we should stress the importance of democracy building at the local level, rather than focusing mainly on the national level. The support of local democracy is crucial to developing a sustainable democratization process. Even authoritarian states are often more open toward democracy at the local level than at the national level. Local democracy is also a daily school in democracy for citizens throughout a country and for groups of democratic representatives that can play an increasingly important role at the national level and beyond.

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Developing a Global Infrastructure for Democracy Building: Administration and Cost of Elections Database

Within the democracy-building global community, the community of practitioners on sustainable electoral processes is one of the oldest and best-developed networks. Global projects to which IDEA contributes, such as Building Resources in Democracy, Governance, and Elections (BRIDGE); the Election Process Information Collective (EPIC); and the Administration and Cost of Elections Database (ACE), set standards for creating a global infrastructure for democracy building.

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IDEA’s ACE Phase II Global Network Project, the second stage of the existing ACE project, aims to have an impact in the areas of electoral administration, knowledge management, and codification in electoral processes, laws, and policy to improve the legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks for free and fair elections. IDEA is one of the main drivers of ACE II and therefore reaps rich experiences from its development. ACE II is useful not only in providing information about the intricacies of promoting sustainable elections but also in highlighting the elements that have to be present to create a successful global infrastructure in a key area of democracy promotion. And ACE II has the further virtue of being not only a good idea but also an existing proven project. How do the different elements combine? 1. ACE II builds on a global coalition of international organizations and national institutions in the field of electoral management, among them IDEA, UNDP, and Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), as well as the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and the Instituto Federal Electoral of Mexico. Originally composed of seven core members, the coalition will soon count thirty associate partners on the national, regional, and international levels. 2. In addition to its international network, ACE II creates and stimulates regional networks to facilitate cooperation between countries and strengthen the regional infrastructure for electoral assistance. 3. ACE II is available as a sophisticated Internet resource for all users, experts as well as laypeople. It has already been copied in a number of languages without even requiring the coalition’s approval.

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A Suggestion for Action

How can we move forward? We suggest forming a working group or extending the mandate of an existing working group, perhaps within the Community of Democracies and with the help of IDEA, with a mandate to set up a conceptual framework for democracy building. The working group could include key member states of the Community of Democracies, international organizations, and NGOs. Chile could be the chair. The committee would draft a core strategy and action plan. Its work could focus on the following:

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• Organize the process within the Community of Democracies and with other partners of how to improve the infrastructure for democracy building; • Identify thematic issues for future development of democracy building; • Collect best practice examples of cooperation and of strengthening democracy building in a global context; • Foster and support the formation of global and regional coalitions on thematic issues; and • Stimulate member states to coordinate their activities and, in a second step, invest part of their democracy-building resources in infrastructure projects for that objective. In an ideal case, a small part of the resources that today go into democracy building should be spent on building and maintaining a global infrastructure on the subject, offering citizens direct access to democracy resources, while giving concrete meaning to the intentions of global cooperation on democracy building.

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Concluding Note

We have all been generous with words on how to build democracy. Now is the time to go beyond words and take action. The Community of Democracies is a movement that provides a political network in which ideas can be tested and carried out by a coalition of willing partners. IDEA wants to be a partner in these efforts to promote democracy and democratization, respecting the fact that different institutional solutions can apply to the same fundamental principles of rights and freedoms. Democratization is a long-term process, and it must be built from within societies. It can neither be imported nor exported, but it surely can be supported. And as the wind of globalization brings us all closer together, supporting democracy building is now an imperative if we are to ensure that democracy spreads throughout our contemporary world.

5 The State of Democratic Governance: Achievements and Challenges Carl Gershman

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ne of the remarkable developments of the recent past, which could be put in the category of the dog that didn’t bark, is the absence of a reverse wave of authoritarianism following the historic expansion of democracy from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s (the “third wave” of democratization). There have been numerous developments that could have set in motion a major reversal of the earlier gains—violent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and in many African countries; sharp economic downturns in Asia and Latin America; rampant corruption, stalled transitions, and democratic backsliding in many postauthoritarian countries; and, most recently, the war on terrorism, which has fostered a less liberal international environment and given some governments new license to attack dissidents and minorities in the name of security. One certainly might have expected a broad setback for democracy as a result of these developments, but this has not occurred. On the contrary, democracy has continued to make advances, most recently with the elections in Indonesia and Afghanistan; the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine; the January 2005 elections in Palestine and Iraq; and the pressures for change in Egypt, Lebanon, and other parts of the once-dormant Middle East. The most compelling explanation for this remarkable (and mostly unremarked) absence of a democratic reversal is the enormous support that democracy now enjoys in non-Western countries and cultures. The existence of such support has been confirmed by a recent study of world opinion using data gathered by the World Values Survey. The study concluded that “democracy has an overwhelming positive image 31

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throughout the world” and has become, over the last decade, “virtually the only political model with global appeal, no matter what the culture.”1 Although attitudes in Muslim societies are less liberal than they are in the West on gender equality, gay rights, and other social issues, there is no difference at all when it comes to support for democratic institutions. Close to 90 percent of the respondents in Muslim societies favor democracy, the same figure as in the West.2 In developing societies, support for democracy is often greater among the poor and less educated than among the affluent. On the occasion of India’s fiftieth anniversary in 1997, the New Delhi–based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) conducted a national survey of popular attitudes toward Indian democracy. The results constituted a stunning rejection of the common belief that the Indian people, the poor above all, had lost faith in the country’s democratic system. On the contrary, wrote Ashis Nandy, the director of the CSDS: “The democratic system enjoys greater legitimacy today than in the past. The poor and deprived defend democracy more vigorously than the elite.”3 The idea that ordinary people in developing countries desire democracy and are willing to sacrifice to achieve it is not yet sufficiently understood in the United States and other established democracies. There is still the view, left over from the period of the Cold War when communism claimed to speak for the least advantaged, that democracy is a luxury for the poor, who need bread before freedom. To be sure, the poor need bread, but relinquishing their rights is not the way to get it. Although the rich may sometimes take democracy for granted, the poor are keenly aware that it is essential for their overall well-being. There are four fundamental values that democracy has for the people of developing countries. They can be summarized as protective, instrumental, constructive, and intrinsic. Let me briefly describe what I mean. Democracy provides protection for the people in a number of different ways. For example, it is the means by which the citizens can hold the government accountable for its policies and prevent corruption and an abuse of power. It also promotes human rights and protects people from the cruelties of autocratic regimes. As Amartya Sen has written, it also protects people from certain catastrophes by giving governments the political incentive to guard against famines and to take preventive measures to relieve human suffering if there is a danger of mass hunger.4 In addition to deterring criminal negligence

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by government, democracy also prevents the deliberate use by government of apparently natural disasters to eliminate entire sections of the population that are considered to be politically disloyal, a criminal practice used by the Soviet regime in Ukraine in 1932–1933 and by the North Korean government in the late 1990s. Democracy also has an instrumental value for the people. It promotes economic development by triggering, in the words of the UNDP’s 2002 Human Development Report, “a virtuous cycle of development.” A study published in the Journal of Democracy reported that 80 percent of the variation in per capita income growth among developing countries can be explained by factors that are aspects of democracy.5 The variables that contribute to economic growth include institutions and policies that share two characteristics: they establish a rule of law enforced with fairness and justice (which encourages work, risk taking, etc.), and they constitute forms of collective action at the government level—the enforcement of contracts, the protection of political and property rights, and the collection of taxes that can be used for public services. This finding suggests another instrumental value of democracy: it alerts governments to the needs of their citizens and therefore promotes the health, education, and overall well-being of the population. One of the best indicators of social and economic well-being is the infant mortality rate, which is consistently lower in democracies than in dictatorships. An additional instrumental value is the wellestablished fact that democracy promotes peace, both between states and within them.6 The third value of democracy is what Amartya Sen calls its constructive role in helping people in developing societies learn from one another through public discussion, thereby facilitating the formation of values and the generation of “informed and considered choices.”7 And finally there is democracy’s intrinsic value: it is the only system that enriches the lives of citizens by recognizing their dignity as human beings. Given the powerful link between democracy and the capacity to address so many needs that ordinary people have, including the need to pursue lives with dignity and self-fulfillment, it should not be surprising that nongovernmental civic and political organizations committed to the advancement of democracy have sprung up throughout the less developed and undemocratic regions of the world. The presence of such organizations constitutes a quiet revolution that has taken place since the 1980s, especially since the cresting of the third

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wave in the late 1980s, when opportunities for democratic activism expanded dramatically around the world. Such organizations are enormously diverse both functionally and geographically, reflecting the complex challenges of democratization in postauthoritarian countries, as well as the need to open and liberalize the remaining autocracies. Their purpose and programs are invariably a response to the circumstances and challenges in each particular country, giving these organizations an identity that is distinctly local and that is formed out of grassroots movements to achieve particular democratic objectives. Thus, in countries wracked by civil conflict, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Liberia, local NGOs use radio, theater, and schools to promote tolerance and ethnic reconciliation and advance human rights through monitoring, education, advocacy, and the provision of legal aid. In countries trying to make the transition to democracy, there are groups that fight corruption, promote the rule of law, encourage citizen awareness and grassroots political participation, strengthen local government and independent media, and seek the empowerment of women politically and economically. Political parties that offer democratic alternatives in elections. There are also research centers that advocate democratic ideas and policies, trade unions that protect the rights of workers, business associations that advance transparency and market reforms, citizen groups that monitor elections, and civic education organizations that promote democratic values both in and out of schools. Not least, there are exilebased groups that expose human rights abuses in closed societies and that provide a lifeline of independent information to people living under dictatorship. During the same period that such organizations have proliferated throughout the democratizing and undemocratic regions of the world, democracy-support institutions and programs have also sprung up in established democracies. The German political party foundations were the first institutions of this kind, and their work in the successful transitions in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its four institutes in 1983, which have influenced the way the United States engages with the world from a bipartisan perspective. With the fall of communism in central Europe and the Soviet Union and of many authoritarian governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the need for programs to aid democratic transitions has increased dramatically. The United Kingdom, Canada, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and other established democracies

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have created political foundations of their own, as have some of the new democracies in central Europe. The first democracy foundation in Asia was created in Taiwan in 2003. Privately funded institutions such as the Soros and Ford Foundations have also expanded their work. In addition, governments and multilateral bodies have become increasingly involved in providing democracy assistance. Development agencies in the United States, Britain, Canada, and other established democracies have devoted substantial funding to running elections, strengthening parliaments and local government, and aiding independent media and civil society organizations. The European Union (EU) now provides significant democracy assistance through its member states, and the United Nations itself has expanded its democracy-support programs, managing elections in war-torn countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, and East Timor and providing assistance in institution building through the UNDP. Regional bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have created democracy units to aid elections and assist new democracies, and they have also approved charters that set democratic norms that member countries are required to observe and establish procedures for defending democracy when it is threatened in particular countries. Accompanying the growth of international programs supporting democracy has been the creation of global networks at both the governmental and nongovernmental levels that promote greater democratic cooperation, contact, and solidarity. The nongovernmental World Movement for Democracy (WMD) was founded in New Delhi in 1999 and brings together networks activists from over 100 countries “to foster collaboration among democratic forces around the world,” according to the movement’s founding statement.8 The networks include regional groups such as the Africa Democracy Forum (ADF) and functional networks of parliamentarians, youth, women, intellectuals, and local government activists. At the governmental level, of course, we have the Community of Democracies. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have had the effect of increasing the importance that the United States and its European allies attach to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world. The United States launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2002 to advance political, economic, and educational reform and the empowerment of women in the Middle East. It also took advantage of its chairmanship of the G-8 to establish the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), a forum in which NGOs from the

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broader Middle East will be able to discuss democracy issues with representatives of governments in the hope that the results of these discussions and the monitoring of democratic progress in individual countries will increase pressures for reform in the region. Even before 9/11, the Europeans had created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), or Barcelona Process, to foster political and economic reform in North Africa and the Levant, and a democracy assistance budget for the region was established by the EU. In 2003 the EU also established democracy and human rights guidelines as a basis for discussing national reform plans with each of the EMP states. The scope and continued expansion of democracy programs supported by the United States and the European Union represent a new international reality that reflects the changed conditions of the modern world, in particular economic globalization and the revolution in communications technology. These forces have produced a more integrated and competitive international environment that has awakened previously dormant peoples to the possibilities of political and social change. The growing demands for change have put tremendous pressures on fragile, traditional systems that find it difficult to adapt to the conditions of modernity and face the threat of marginalization from the new order. The established democracies have come to the realization that they have a profound stake in the modernization of non-Western developing countries, authoritarian and postauthoritarian systems alike, since the failure to adapt could produce conditions that give rise to violent conflict and international disorder. But in trying to press for gradual change in the nondemocratic or democratizing countries of the world, the democracies are increasingly coming up against stiff resistance from old guard and autocratic elites who feel threatened by the rise of new social forces and the constraints that democracy would impose on their power and from antidemocratic political or religious movements that reject pluralism and liberal values. In addition, in some countries, the democracies face not so much organized resistance by antidemocratic forces as sheer chaos, where the state has completely broken down and marauding gangs threaten each other and the general population. At the present time, there are essentially four kinds of antidemocratic resistance on the international system, each of which poses a distinct challenge to the democratic world and to the efforts currently underway to strengthen democratic values and institutions. The first is the movement of Islamic radicalism that is centered in the Middle East but whose influence extends throughout the Muslim world,

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including among the Muslim minorities now living in the established democracies. The recent gains and momentum for change in the Middle East could still be reversed if powerful and entrenched elements opposed to the expansion of democratic rights—which include Baathists and other autocrats as well as radical Islamists—crack down on democratic groups or take advantage of the new openings to gain dominant power. The second center of antidemocratic resistance comes from the remaining dictatorships in the world, regimes that survived the third wave of democratization. Such regimes are spread unevenly around the world. Many of the most important dictatorial systems can be found in East Asia (China, Burma, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos); Cuba is the only dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere, though it continues to have international influence out of proportion to its size. All dictatorships deny fundamental human rights and multiparty political competition, but they nonetheless differ in terms of the amount of space that exists for independent social, economic, and intellectual activity. The strategy should be to take advantage of whatever spaces exist to push for more space, more opening, and greater respect for human rights. The third challenge to democracy comes from the proliferation during the last decade and a half of many failed and war-torn countries. Some of the worst crises faced by the international community during this period derive from the conflicts and breakdowns in such countries, which can also become spawning grounds for terrorism. The list of such countries includes Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The crises are a product of the breakdown of old political structures, a process fueled by the rise of ethnic and religious violence in the aftermath of the Cold War and by the inability of many poor countries to adapt to the pressures of globalization. The international community has focused on two goals in such countries, conflict resolution and state building, but in each case it has run up against enormous difficulties. Finally, the fourth form of resistance to democracy derives from the widespread prevalence today of semi-authoritarian, or “hybrid,” regimes where the existence of some formal democratic processes, such as elections, “masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination.” The number of such regimes has actually grown as a consequence of the third wave of democratization, as democratic transitions have stalled and many countries have entered

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a “political gray zone” of illiberal democracy that is sometimes called “electoral authoritarianism” or “pseudodemocracy.” Larry Diamond estimates that there were only about half a dozen such regimes in 1974, whereas today “at least 45 and perhaps as many as 60 are electoral authoritarian—roughly between a quarter and a third of all states.”9 He notes: “In proportional terms, authoritarian forms of multiparty electoral competition have increased during the third wave much more rapidly than democratic ones.”10 The problem of electoral authoritarianism presents the Community of Democracies with a special challenge. The autocrats who rule in these illiberal democracies are determined to hold on to power, and they are becoming increasingly sophisticated in developing strategies to weaken and divide internal opposition forces and to frustrate international efforts to assist them. These strategies include bringing under the control of the central government the electoral machinery as well as all levels of governing authority, including municipal and provincial governments, the parliament, and the courts; tightly regulating the press, especially television and radio; dividing and marginalizing the political opposition; and bringing civil society to heel by harassing independent NGOs and restricting their international funding. If backsliding governments that engage in these tactics participate as members in good standing in the Community of Democracies, it will have the effect of contributing to the legitimation of electoral autocracy, and it will harm internal democratic forces in such countries as well as the international standards of democracy. It seems that the community must establish a transparent and effective procedure for determining which countries deserve to be part of the community and which do not. For example, it might appoint a committee of respected and independent experts to prepare a report or invite an organization like the Club of Madrid to undertake the task, on the basis of which the Convening Group could determine which countries should be part of the Community of Democracies and which should not. There is a lot at stake here, and hopefully the community will develop an effective way to deal with this important problem.

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Notes

1. Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 27.

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2. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 19. 3. See Ashis Nandy, “Sustaining the Faith,” and summary of CSDS poll, India Today, August 11, 1996, 28–39. 4. See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Hunger and Entitlements (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1987). 5. See Richard Roll and John Talbott, “Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and Prosperity,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (July 2003): 75–89. 6. See the multivolume work of R. J. Rummel on this subject: Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War: The Just Peace (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981); as well as Immanuel Kant’s essay on perpetual peace: Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983). 7. See Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999): 3–17. 8. World Movement for Democracy, “Building the World Movement for Democracy, Report on the Inaugural Assembly,” New Delhi, India, February 14–17, 1999, http://www.wmd.org/conference/founding.html. 9. See Larry Diamond, “Universal Democracy,” Policy Review, no. 119 (June–July 2003): 3–25. 10. See Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” 21–35.

Part 2 DEMOCRACY

IN THE

REGIONS

6 Democracy in Asia and the Pacific José Ramos-Horta

I

n reviewing the state of democracy in the vast and dynamic AsiaPacific region, I prefer to rely on down-to-earth methodology rather than commission an expert to do a lengthy academic paper. One need not be a scholar to offer an accurate analysis of democracy in our region. Actually, one is in a better position to know and opine as a mere mortal being on the receiving end, for better or for worse, of what rulers and elites do. One way to assess the state of democracy is to ask people in the street if they feel more free today than they did ten years ago. I am tempted to paraphrase the late, “great communicator” Ronald Reagan, who in one of his finest moments of simplicity and clarity, asked the American electorate during a presidential debate in his successful 1980 bid for the White House: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” It seems that the answer to that simple question was a clear no, and Ronald Reagan was ushered into the White House for eight years. Along the same lines, a measure of the state of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region is how a person in the street would answer a similar question: “Are you more or less free today than you were ten years ago?” Of course, when using the word “free,” I refer to fundamental political freedoms as enshrined in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Freedom House figures show that at the global level in 1973, there were forty-three free, thirty-eight partly free, and sixty-nine unfree nations in the world. In 2003 there were eighty-nine free, fifty-five partly free, and forty-eight unfree. In the Asia-Pacific region in 1973, there were eight free, thirteen partly free, and eleven 43

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unfree nations. In 2003 there were eighteen free, ten partly free, and eleven unfree nations.1 In 2004 there were seven general, democratic elections in the Asia-Pacific. Some of us who have had personal experience of politics in the Asia-Pacific region and have been on the receiving end of undemocratic regimes would answer with a definitive yes. Hundreds of millions of human beings are freer in our region today than they were ten years ago. From the Korean Peninsula to the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Timor-Leste, we have witnessed people’s movements, often led by the youth and students, toppling well-entrenched dictators and beginning the wonderful but tortuous process of liberation and democratization in our region. In terms of sheer numbers, Asia boasts the largest number of free people in the world. Of course, the great old civilization and democracy called India, with its vibrant, dynamic, and well-entrenched democratic state and culture, nicely helps all of us in Asia stay up front. I would argue that the fastest growth and consolidation of democracy and good governance has been in the Republic of Korea. I dare to say so because of the obvious: democracy involves not only the periodic electoral exercise; democracy is free media, public debate, strong civil society, rule of law, and good governance. In this regard, Korea is a shining example. In the vicinity of Indonesia and Malaysia, some wonderful positive developments have occurred. It was only two years ago that scholars and journalists were predicting the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia (and, of course, conservative political Islam is equated with tyranny of the mullahs), partly as a protest reaction to the US-led liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq and the worsening violence in the Israel-occupied Palestinian territories. I too was worried that the unpopular wars mentioned, as valid as the end results were in terms of toppling two of the most despotic regimes of modern times, would contribute to the rise of fundamentalism in Indonesia and Malaysia. This scenario did not materialize. The 2004 elections in Indonesia and Malaysia were clean and transparent and gave a decisive victory to modern, secular Islam. Notwithstanding the good news, it should be acknowledged that the process of democratization in the Asia-Pacific region is still a long and arduous one with the possibility of reversals. As much as we all abhor military coups and know that people in uniform might be good strategists and tacticians in war rooms or battlefields but do not always manage countries well in times of peace, there have been instances when common people, tired of infighting and corruption among political

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45

elites, welcomed a military takeover. There have been too many instances of ruling political elites squandering the opportunities offered them by their people, betraying their sacred trust through their immature, appalling behavior, corruption, and mismanagement and thus giving rise to military takeover. In short, politics and democracy in our region have come a long way in the short span of only two decades. But there is an uphill battle ahead to reach the mountaintop and proclaim democratic victory. There are as many definitions of democracy as there are nations at the UN. Democracy is not easily defined or understood by all, but is best recognized by its absence (for example, Myanmar/Burma, which is under military rule). In defining democracy, it is helpful to compare those governments that are antidemocratic with those that are liberalizing. We equate liberalization with the advent of incremental or evolutionary democratization; therefore liberal nations, although not completely democratic, are not antidemocratic either. The underlying concept supporting this view is what Donald Emmerson calls “environmentally driven democratization.”2 To summarize, economic growth will improve the finances of the people enough to usher in and sustain democratic rule. This concept, which is not without empirical foundation, has currency globally and regionally, particularly among political leaders. However, when citizens do not challenge elites or the status quo to effect deliberate democratic political change, leaders and governments who otherwise do not have legitimacy may gain it. Environmentally driven democratization can be most useful as a tool of engagement with certain regimes and governments. It is nonthreatening to those fearful of change. To some degree this kind of democratization is one of the negative trends, whereas working directly to build a democratic polity is a positive trend and one that lends itself to sustainability, the end goal. To truly understand democratic governance, I find it helpful to combine Freedom House’s definition of democracy with the Asian Development Bank’s definition of governance. They are as follows: • Democracies: “These are political systems whose leaders are elected in competitive multi-party and multi-candidate processes in which opposition parties have a legitimate chance of attaining power or participating in power.”3 • Governance: “The manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.”4

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The first definition speaks to the universal principle enshrined in Article 21 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that people should be able to choose their government, and primarily incorporates the right to participation and the need for predictability. The second addresses the development challenge of the region, but one that can be universalized and incorporates accountability and transparency, the buzzwords associated with good governance. The Asia-Pacific region is replete with governmental institutions that can and do play a role in supporting democratization. They can play an even bigger role, in the same way that we have come together to combat terrorism, decisively and swiftly. As we strengthen democratic governance in our own region, why can’t we play a more supportive role in the democratization process in the Middle East? Asia has the two largest Muslim populations in the world, both in countries governed by moderate and secular governments: India, a long-term constitutional federal democracy, and Indonesia, now an electoral democracy. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the potential to lead the region toward democratization, but it struggles to go beyond its self-imposed consensus edict that thwarts such leadership. This problem is best highlighted by its current deliberations regarding Myanmar, which is poised to take up the chair of ASEAN in 2006. The prospect of having a military dictatorship at the helm of ASEAN is causing much angst among ASEAN leaders, dialogue partners, parliaments, and members of parliament. The latter have formed Myanmar parliamentary democracy support groups and have stated their view that the Myanmar military government cannot take up the chair, since it would undermine ASEAN’s credibility. ASEAN has publicly expressed its view that the military government needs to make some meaningful changes, notably the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, an incarceration as incomprehensible as it is cruel.

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Challenges for the Region

We cannot ignore the region’s history, notably that the majority of today’s Asia-Pacific nations are survivors and/or perpetrators of colonialism and invasion. We cannot hide behind our past, but we must state the challenge it poses to democratization so that we can develop a shared understanding. Our past is wracked with colonization and

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invasion and our present with poverty, militarization, and concern over the following issues: the professionalism of political parties and the role money plays in politics, human rights mechanisms or the lack of them, repression of freedom of the press, and the development of human resources and e-infrastructure. Poverty

The statistics are well known. Many less developed countries show shocking infant mortality rates, rampant mosquito-borne and other preventable diseases, no access to running water or power, subsistence economies, and discrimination against women. Democratization, which we know does not come for free (elections, institutions, oversight bodies, costly multiparty parliaments, and costly information), becomes even more challenging in poor nations. Disengagement of the Military from the Political Economy

According to Muthiah Alagappa, the regional trend is one of military disengagement from politics and increasing civilian rule.5 The military is still an important political and economic actor in many countries, but only Myanmar and Pakistan are under direct military rule, whereas North Korea is a totalitarian regime, with the military central to maintaining control. Until recently, Indonesia was also under military rule, but today it has its first president directly elected by the people. His task is formidable; he must consolidate democracy through a much-needed reform of the armed forces and judiciary, thus fighting corruption and impunity. The greatest challenge in the region is disengaging the military from the formal economy. The military have been in power for so long in most countries that it is enmeshed in the economy. The Professionalism of Political Parties

Money politics are still big in the Asia-Pacific, and political parties cannot yet be called professional. They need to be regulated for financial accountability, and public resources must be committed to them, because democracy requires professional political parties. There is a long way to go, and, the jury is out. Of course, money is also a decisive factor in influencing who is to be elected and who is not in the United States, but there are some obvious differences. Money is

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donated in the United States to buy airtime on TV and in other forms of campaigning, whereas in some countries in Asia money is passed around to buy votes. Fortunately, the simple person in the street has learned to fool the money people. He shows up at every political party rally, gets to eat a good meal, and receives at least one T-shirt. In some cases he walks home with a bag of rice. But on the day of the ballot, he votes his or her conscience. I have seen it happen and have applauded the wise person in the street who fools the money people. Human Rights

The trend is positive in this area, as we have developed and are honoring our human rights discourse. Many governments have ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and have also ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Asia-Pacific nations are debating the rule of law, with political actors defending it where it already exists or trying to achieve it. This process is critical to ensuring human rights protections for citizens and critical to democratization. Press Freedom

The media has played such a decisive role in the Timorese people’s struggle that I cannot ignore the need to have the fourth estate accorded the freedom it requires. Admittedly, the sometimes reckless reporting about East Timor can challenge my own democratic commitment as a government minister, but I am committed to a free press. The role of civil society has proven to be most effective when channeled through the media. It is the best check and balance against the excessive use of power by government. A negative trend in our region’s democratization is the curtailment of press freedom. Democracy and freedom are synonymous, and this can be seen when looking at press freedom. Reporters sans Frontieres (RSF) undertakes an annual ranking system of freedom of the press. The best a country can score is zero. In 2004 North Korea scored the worst at 167, followed by Myanmar at 165. Some of the countries with the most negative scores in 2004 were in Asia.6 Human Resources Development

We know the power of the information society and Internet, but regionally all its benefits are not being felt due to control of the press

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and the influence of money. Human resources development is an intimidating regional challenge. As we embrace new methods of governing and managing our economies, Asia needs to develop its skill base, and some countries cannot keep up the pace.

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Conclusion

It is important to see that the landscape of the democracy debate is dynamic, challenging, and exciting in the extreme. My nation, East Timor, the world’s newest, is an infant but dynamic democracy with its flaws, a constitutional democracy committed to civil and political rights and freedoms and the rule of law. Our first act was to seek membership in the United Nations and to accede to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, followed by seven key human rights instruments. We are creating a democracy, and we are committed to sustaining it. Is it easy? No. Do we need help? Yes. Can the Community of Democracies help? Yes, by continuing to adhere to democratic norms and forms of governance, so that member nations can be role models. The importance of this cannot be overstated.

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Notes

1. See http://www.freedomhouse/org/research/freeworld/2003/charts.pdf. 2. See Donald K. Emmerson, “A Tale of Three Countries: Southeast Asia After the Crisis,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 4 (October 1999): 35–53. 3. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html. 4. Thuy Mellor and Jak Jabes, “Governance in the Pacific Focus for Action 2005–2009” (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2004), p. 3, http://www.adb.org/ Documents/Manuals/Operations/om54.asp?p=aadb. 5. See Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 6. Turkmenistan was at 164; China, 162; Vietnam, 161; Nepal, 160; Maldives, 157; Laos, 153; Bangladesh, 151; Pakistan, 150; India, 120; Indonesia, 117; The Philippines, 111; and Afghanistan, 97. Some impoverished countries like East Timor, at 57, scored reasonably well, and others such as Costa Rica, Cape Verde, Namibia, and El Salvador had even higher scores. See Reporters Sans Frontières at www.rsf.org.

7 Commentary on Democracy in Asia and the Pacific Muthiah Alagappa

A

sia has witnessed positive democratic developments in the last decade and a half. We have seen democratic transitions in a large number of countries. But at the same time, it is important to note some negative developments. There have been military coups, and military regimes have been in power for very long periods of time. Thus the picture in Asia is mixed. The region has longstanding democracies; countries in democratic transition; and semi-authoritarian or semidemocratic regimes, Leninist states, authoritarian states, totalitarian states, and military regimes. Asia has a broad spectrum of political systems. Yet democratic development in Asia has been on the rise since the 1970s. The number of military regimes, for example, has dropped from a peak of nine in 1980 to about three today. There is definitely a movement in the democratic direction, but there are also disturbing signs. Many of the countries in democratic transition at this point are in an early phase. Some may suffer reversals. Only Taiwan and South Korea have really moved forward to consolidate their democratic development. In a certain way, Asia presents a major challenge for the Community of Democracies. Although it has the world’s largest democracy, Asia also presents a viable alternative political-economic model. In the 1980s and 1990s there was much talk about Asian values and an Asian political model; that died down, especially after the 1997 financial crisis. But I think there is still a different model out there in Asia, which is slowly gaining ground. It is difficult to label it— authoritarian, semidemocratic, or semi-authoritarian; but it’s a relatively legitimate system. It delivers, there is increasing space for individuals at the local level and greater participation of society in the 51

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political process, and the government is not illegitimate. This alternative model—strong economic performance coupled with state effectiveness and some political repression—is out there. The question to address is this: Is this alternative model an endpoint, or is it a way station en route to democratization? Next I want to address two dilemmas of democratization, which apply to the broader world but will be highlighted in relation to Asia. One is the tension among security, statehood, and democracy. A measure of stateness and security is required to build democracy. In Asia most of the states, as José Ramos-Horta pointed out in Chapter 6, are postcolonial, but they have come a long way in terms of building state capacity. In the process of building states, however, they encounter problems with minority groups that result in conflicts and liberation movements seeking autonomy or secession. The key question is, should one aspect be privileged? If security is privileged, as it has been in some cases, the resulting tendency has been to undermine individual and minority rights and move toward illiberal democracy. An emphasis on democracy without adequate state capacity, however, could lead to breakdown and insecurity with negative consequences for both state building and democracy. Those interested in building a community of democracies should address this tension. The war on terror, for example, has undermined democratic forces in Asia. The second dilemma is the relationship between economic development and democracy. Economic development is crucial for the development of democracy. But at the same time, authoritarian regimes that deliver on economic performance can in fact maintain their legitimacy. This can and does work against democratic development, at least in the short term. Three critical weaknesses in Asia must be overcome to shore up the balance of power in favor of democracy. One is the weakness of political parties, which are the mainstay of democratic development. In many countries in Asia, political parties are weak. They are personality-driven and operate on the basis of patronage politics. How to create strong issue-oriented political parties is a major challenge. The second weakness relates to civil society. There has been dynamic growth in civil society organizations, but the nonstate public sphere has not been institutionalized. The rights and rules for an effective civil society have to be enacted and guaranteed by states. The third weakness relates to developing civilian capacity to bring about democratic civilian control over the military in democratizing states. The creation of favorable conditions for democratic development requires

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that all three challenges be addressed. Two final points: First, although the idea of the Westphalian state originated in Europe, today the most Westphalian states are in Asia. Political leaders in Asia are interested in building strong nations and states out of their colonial heritage. Democratic development has to be pursued in the context of building states. Second, in my view the strongest support for democracy globally and regionally is the belief of ordinary citizens in their right to participate in politics and governance. This norm is crucial and should be supported. One of the key tasks for the Community of Democracies should be to further develop and strengthen this norm.

8 Democracy in Africa Hage Geingob

I

n addressing the current state of democratic governance in Africa, I will focus on positive and negative trends and also indicate how regional cooperation and the Community of Democracies can support democracy in Africa. At the outset, it should be stated that Africa is on the march and that democracy is taking root on the continent.

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The Status of Democratic Governance

Africa has made significant progress as regards democratic governance. Most African countries now have elected parliaments and political leaders. Equally important, peaceful political succession is taking place, and term limits for presidents are increasingly commonplace and respected. Not so long ago, it was difficult to find a living former African president; now there are quite a few, and their number is increasing each year. In some countries, we even have more than one former head of state. I think this is a remarkable achievement that shows that democracy is really taking root in Africa. We also have seen a sea change in terms of the rejection of military coups. The recent situation in Togo was a clear indication of how far we have come, and the actions of the Togolese people, individual African leaders, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU) were all deserving of our praise. Togo sent a clear signal that the unconstitutional transfer of power will not be tolerated by Africans any more. In most African countries, parliaments are no longer rubber stamps for the ruling clique. Parliamentarians themselves are also 55

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finding that people expect results and that they will hold them accountable. Compared to other regions, Africa is doing very well in terms of the number of women serving in national parliaments. Throughout the continent, people are demanding better services of their governments, civil society is finding its voice, and the press is speaking out. The days of a single government-owned newspaper or television station presenting the governing party line are long since over, and governments are finding that they have to actually deliver on their electoral promises. As a result of the democratic developments and improvements in governance, Africans are also seeing economic progress. The continent has seen positive economic growth in recent years—it achieved 3 percent in 2004, and 4 percent is predicted for 2005. It is now generally accepted that a sound macroeconomic environment is important, that pro–private sector policies need to be pursued, and that Africa’s more complete integration into the global economy is essential. What I think we are seeing with all of the progress that I have just outlined is that Africa and Africans are now determining their own narrative. We are defining our own future and taking responsibility for our progress. We are taking an active role in identifying and solving our problems. With the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), we have clearly set an agenda for the development of the continent. We want to work in partnership with the international community, but we believe that it must be a partnership based on mutual respect and mutual accountability. That, too, is a sign of progress. As the points just made indicate, the outlook is positive. But, lest I be accused of being overly optimistic or of seeing what I want to see rather than what actually exists, let me indicate where there are still problems and where progress is still needed. It is true that electoral democracy prevails throughout the continent, but it is also true that it is not enough. In most countries, there is still not genuine political competition, the benefits of incumbency are considerable, parliaments are still learning how to function effectively, and political power remains concentrated in the hands of a small number of elites. Democracy must be deepened and become a reality for all, including minorities, if people are to believe that they really have a voice and that their vote matters. We need to create truly inclusive political systems. Although there has been real progress in terms of promoting peace and stability, the gains have to be consolidated. The historic

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2004 accord in Sudan now needs to be actually implemented. Doing so will require the commitment and determination of all those involved and the support of Africa and the international community. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo remains very fragile, and the gains could easily be reversed. Real progress in Somalia has proven elusive. Ongoing problems in Côte d’Ivoire threaten the stability and security of its neighbors. Clearly, conflict management has to be a priority for Africans and their partners. In terms of governance, much work is still required to create the processes, systems, and institutions for lasting democracy. Independent, transparent electoral systems and accountable political parties must exist if elections are to be credible. Public administration systems and civil servants that function and serve whichever party is in power are needed, as well as legal institutions that are respected because of their integrity and independence. Outside government, truly representative and accountable civil society organizations and a responsible media are required. Although some economic progress has occurred, it is not enough to lift people out of poverty. And poverty is still the root of Africa’s problems. The positive growth we have seen in recent years falls far short of the 7 percent growth that NEPAD says is necessary.1 Higher economic growth is essential to make the investments in health and education that will improve the well-being of the people. An atmosphere conducive to growth of the private sector must be created. Predictable, accountable government and adherence to rule of law are fundamental if we are to attract the needed investment, and more progress in these areas is a must. Above all, African governments must seriously address poverty. Africa remains the only region of the world where poverty is increasing. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor is widening. Over time, there is a real danger that this will contribute to political tensions and perhaps even lead to conflict. The question should be asked whether African governments, African institutions, and friends of Africa have done all we can to make real progress against poverty. The answer is that we have not. Then, of course, forceful action against the HIV/AIDS pandemic is another challenge. We still have not fully come to terms with the potential effects this disease can have on the continent. Without concerted action, it threatens to undo the hard-won gains made. HIV/AIDS is not a health problem—it is a political, social, and economic problem that must be placed front and center of our efforts and those of our partners.

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Positive and Negative Trends

As this overview makes clear, there are both positive trends that we need to encourage and negative trends that we need to guard against. On the positive side, there is an expansion of electoral democracy; more presidents are being given retirement packages and are leaving office; there is less tolerance of corruption and greater demand for transparency; nonstate actors are playing a more active role; there is greater respect for—and upholding of—human rights and civil liberties; the press is increasingly vibrant; there is more free speech—including criticism of leaders; and the AU and regional organizations are taking the lead in crisis situations. Negative trends include the continued dominance of incumbent ruling parties and the weakness of opposition parties—both of which work against truly democratic politics; a tendency on the part of political leaders to try to change constitutions to stay in power (although the people of Zambia, Malawi, and Namibia stood up against this); very limited tolerance of criticism on the part of governments; and a continuance of the dependency syndrome, whereby African leaders and governments ask partners for assistance without bringing their own resources to the table.

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Regional Cooperation in Support of Democracy

Regional cooperation and continental and regional institutions can certainly promote and support unity and democracy in Africa. On a continental level, the AU is increasingly setting a normative environment that promotes good governance and democratic participation. The NEPAD peer review process provides a real opportunity for African governments and their citizens to engage in dialogue about what good governance means and how it can be achieved. The AU has been instrumental in promoting zero tolerance of corruption, and in fact the AU anticorruption convention predated that of the United Nations (the AU convention was adopted in July 2003 and the UN convention in October 2003). Regional economic groupings have also been active in trying to improve governance and democratic participation, as well as further development on the continent. Among other things, they have promoted the harmonization of economic policy, collaboration on law enforcement, and political agreements concerning migration and the movement of people.

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Recognizing that there can be no development without peace and security, both regional organizations and the AU have been actively engaged in peace negotiations and in peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS’s involvement in a number of West African conflict situations deserves credit, and both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have played important roles in conflict management within their subregions. Without the AU presence, it is certain that the situation in Darfur would have worsened. The AU has also been a key player in negotiations that have brought conflicts to an end. Given the size of African economies, greater collaboration, harmonization of economic systems, the free movement of people, and interregional trade all need to be encouraged. The regional economic communities are recognized as the building blocks for the AU, but they suffer from overlapping mandates and inadequate capacity. The Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), of which I was executive secretary until I returned to public life in Namibia, has involved eminent African persons in setting an agenda for action to harmonize and streamline regional organizations and to build their administrative capacity to effectively promote and support regional integration on the continent. The AU has an ambitious agenda, but it must build the necessary capacity to undertake it and ensure that funding is available for its programs if it is to live up to its potential.

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Support for the Community of Democracies

The Community of Democracies can promote the institutionalization of democracy in Africa by encouraging and supporting the efforts of those working for democracy and political inclusion on the continent. The progress already made should be acknowledged, and at the same time governments should be encouraged to strengthen democratic processes, systems, and institutions. The community not only reinforces democratic principles and practices but also allows countries and democracy advocates to share experiences. This is important to encourage the spread and deepening of democracy throughout Africa and the world. Beyond this, the Community of Democracies can advocate action on the part of the international community to advance both democracy and development in Africa. Greater levels of financial and logistical support could enable the AU to undertake peacekeeping opera-

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tions and promote stability on the continent. Increased assistance would help African countries reduce poverty and meet the millennium development goals. Support for NEPAD would signal a determination to help Africans help themselves, while enhanced market access for African products and reduction of subsidies by industrialized countries would create a more equitable international trading regime in which African countries can compete. The Community of Democracies can also support Africa’s march forward by forcefully campaigning a write-off of African debt, so that countries can begin again with a clean slate. These measures are important because prosperity will support and sustain democracy in Africa.

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Conclusion

To conclude, Africa has made progress and is making progress, but these efforts should continue. We need to remember that democracy is a process, not an event. Progress in democratization requires commitment and effort on behalf of governments and people alike. Democracies must evolve to meet new challenges—there is no such thing as perfect democracy; it will always be a work in progress. Building the institutions of democracy takes time. It is also costly, which makes it a particular challenge for African countries, given the level of poverty there. But the seeds of democracy have been planted in Africa, and there is no turning back now. Progress may be uneven and slower than one might like, but nonetheless it is progress. For this reason we can be optimistic about Africa. But for optimism to yield results, we must face up to the challenges and redouble our efforts to address them.

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Note

1. NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), “Towards Claiming the Twenty-First Century,” Annual Report, South Africa, 2002, p. 9.

9 Commentary on Democracy in Africa Abdoulie Janneh

M

ost of Africa has been independent for an average of forty years. The rudimentary states and governance institutions Africans inherited from colonization presented a serious challenge to state formation. The state machineries of colonial powers in Africa were tooled to maintain law and order and to manage the exploitative relations with the colonies. The immediate challenge after independence was to recreate, from colonialism, appropriate state systems and institutions that would respond to the great expectations of freedom and development that independence was supposed to bring. The objective realities of state capacity, the politics of the Cold War of the 1960s, and the determination of the erstwhile colonial powers to maintain exploitative economic and political relations with their former colonies were instrumental in undermining African states’ efforts at development. These problems notwithstanding, many African countries put in place innovative policy reforms and embarked on ambitious development programs. During the early years of independence, many schools were built, and school enrollment rose dramatically. Social programs had positive results in terms of uplifting the living standards of the people. Unfortunately, the period also witnessed the emergence of military rule as successive state coups took place—thus ushering in an extended period of political instability in Africa. Cold War– inspired proxy wars were fought in many parts of Africa, with disastrous consequences for peace, stability, and governance. Internally, the military governments that forged alliances with foreign and local forces presided over the intensification of corrupt practices in Africa. The culture of militarism underwritten by pervasive 61

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corruption led to serious weakening of state and democratic governance in Africa. The oil crisis of the 1970s signaled the beginning of serious economic problems on the continent. The deepening of the crisis during the 1980s led to a rethinking of economic management, and a period of reforms facilitated a reorganization of African economies, mainly through structural adjustment programs, center-staging the role of the private sector. The end of the Cold War marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union also facilitated the process of reform on the continent. The end of the East-West conflict released the African countries to the realities of their existence. The assumed strategic importance of some countries that had made it possible for them to receive unqualified support from external powers no longer existed. The late 1980s and 1990s saw economic and political reforms mushroom in many African countries. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) took the bold step of implicating itself more resolutely in the peace and stability of the continent. This duality of national and continental efforts has had a dramatic effect on the development of democratic governance in the continent.

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The Present State of Democratic Governance

A Steadily Democratizing Continent

Africa is on the road to democratization and is steadily consolidating a democratic culture, as exemplified in part by the following processes: Elections. Most countries are now under democratic governments

resulting from contested multiparty elections. Elections are a reality, and it is increasingly becoming “normal” for governments to be replaced through elections. The changes of governments in Zambia, Kenya, Benin, Mali, Tanzania, Senegal, and Nigeria illustrate this point. Military governments have all but disappeared in Africa, and where they have occurred, the continent has taken firm action to restore democratic rule. Constitutionalism. Many countries have undertaken constitutional

reforms. New constitutions embody multiparty political systems, bills

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of rights, fixed term limits, and separation of powers and give more say to courts of law and to legislatures. There is determination to reinforce constitutional rule, as evidenced by the strong opposition to constitutional revisions that we see throughout the continent. Entrenched fundamental freedoms. Africa is freer today than a

decade ago. Freedom of the press has increased. Individual ownership of media has given the political opposition and other groups in society a voice. Other fundamental freedoms, such as assembly worship and rights for minorities, are now guaranteed under the law. A louder and engaged civil society. The expansion of freedom has

given a louder voice to the civil society and made it a positive force in influencing policy and government actions. Greater regard for human rights. Despite the still prevalent incidences of abuse, there is greater regard for human rights in Africa today than was the case a decade ago. Greater autonomy for courts of law and creation of national human rights institutions have expanded the space for citizens to enjoy human rights. Better Management of the Economy

African countries today demonstrate great determination to improve their economies. Better macroeconomic policies, greater fiscal discipline, and enhanced state capacity have stemmed economic decline, and modest growth has returned to Africa. The increasingly central role of the private sector has made a difference in spurring growth and job creation in Africa. The manifest determination to combat corruption has had a positive impact on economic governance in Africa. Greater Integration in Africa

The African Union (AU) and the regional economic communities are spearheading the creation of greater economic space through integration mechanisms such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), among others.

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The Emergence of a “Continental Democratic Culture”

The African Union is spearheading efforts to enhance peace and democratic governance in Africa. The constitutive act of the AU, the Declaration of Good Political Governance, the African Convention Against Corruption, and the Lomé Declaration against Unconstitutional Changes of Governments are policy frameworks that are providing the basis for developing a continental democratic culture. It is evident that Africa is now determined to govern itself better. AU is providing leadership to support and promote democratic reforms and institutionalizing a democratic code of conduct in Africa. New Tools to Enhance Governance

Both as a vision and a program, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) promises to be a powerful catalyst to democratic governance. In turn, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an innovative political initiative to strengthen democratic governance.

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Negative Trends in Democratic Governance

The Deepening Challenge to Peace and Security

Internal conflicts are multiplying in Africa; in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Burundi, and Somalia. Conflict and instability undermine democratic governance. Deepening Poverty

The trends of poverty are inimical to democratic governance. The worsening terms of trade, obligations of debt repayment, and removal of preferences are undermining the economic capacity of African states and becoming a breeding ground for instability and social conflict. The Continued Prevalence of Corruption

Corruption continues to be a serious threat to democratic governance. The uneven resolve of governments in Africa to tackle the scourge of corruption reduces the likelihood of harmonized continental action to tackle the challenge. Weak and colluding political leadership (often

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democratically elected) that pays lip service to the fight against corruption instead of actually tackling it continues to undermine the promotion of democratic governance. In addition, the lack of effective international cooperation to tackle the scourge of stolen capital is undermining the fight against corruption. Emerging Despondency over Democratic Rule

Democracy has yet to deliver in Africa at par with expectations. Although it has made greater freedom possible, it has not lessened poverty. In fact, the economic reforms that have reduced social spending by governments have resulted in deeper poverty for the majority of the people. Social and economic inequalities are now quite evident. The African rich are getting richer, and the poor are becoming poorer. In the face of this increasing poverty and social schism, there is growing impatience with elected governments and the process of democratic governance as a whole. This despondency is being fueled by democratic opposition politics. HIV/AIDS

The pandemic is spreading. The deepening crisis undermines capacity for democratic governance. Insufficient International Partnerships

International partnerships to help sustain democratic transition are lacking in Africa. Africa needs resources to underwrite political and democratic reforms.

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How the Community of Democracies Can Support Democratic Governance in Africa

To conclude, the Community of Democracies could support democracy in Africa in the following ways: • Sustain political dialogue and engagement with Africa in order to support the democratic transition as well as deepen and expand the reforms. • Promote the Community of Democracies as a framework for mutual learning and best practices exchange, so that Africa can

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learn from its own and other successful democratic transitions in the world. • Support African regional institutions, such as AU and the regional economic communities (RECs), in order to expand the regional approach to greater democratization and economic development. Reinforcing a “regional democratic culture” will be critical to supporting internal democratic governance. • Support NEPAD and especially APRM, which holds the promise of invigorating democratic governance. The Community of Democracies should support the processes of APRM both regionally and nationally. • Advocate debt cancellation, increased official development assistance (ODA), and better terms of trade, among other things, to provide the economic relief critical to sustaining democratic transition. In short, extreme poverty undermines democracy.

10 Democracy in the Arab World Abdulkarim Al-Eryani

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ddressing the state of democracy in the Middle East requires going back to the history of the region at the beginning of the twentieth century. By then, several political parties and political movements were advocating democracy and independence from the Ottoman Empire or from British or French domination. In fact, some of these movements had already been active by the end of the nineteenth century. Egypt was in the forefront in conducting multiparty parliamentary elections, despite being a British protectorate. By the end of World War I, Egypt was the bastion of many liberal Arab nationalist movements. However, the defeat of the Ottomans at the hands of Great Britain and France nourished their colonial appetite, and Greater Syria and Iraq became colonies under a new term coined by the League of Nations: “mandate.” North Africa was then under the domination of France. Nevertheless, liberal movements advocating Western democracy were very active in the region. By the end of World War II in 1945, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had become independent nations with emerging democracies under multiparty systems. But in the 1950s, an army-led revolution took place in Egypt. Political parties were banned; their leaders were either jailed or put under house arrest. Privately owned newspapers and magazines were nationalized. Thus, the 1952 revolution in Egypt set the stage for establishing strong undemocratic regimes in the region. In fact, the unification between Syria and Egypt in 1958 was based on the precondition set by President Gamal Abdul Nasser that all political parties and their newspapers should be banned. Hence, a semidemocratic system in Syria came to an end. During the same year, the Iraqi revolution took place. It abolished the monarchy and banned 67

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all political parties. As these examples make clear, democracy had a history in the Middle East. It is not a new invention or a recent introduction to the region. During the 1950s and 1960s, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria became independent. Tunisia and Algeria came under one-party rule, and that situation still prevails in Tunisia. However, Algeria has adopted a multiparty system, and democracy is now emerging. Morocco continued to have a multiparty system, but elections from the 1960s until the mid-1990s were greatly manipulated. In the 1990s, a landmark event took place, when an opposition party won a relatively free election and formed the first opposition government in the history of the region. Lebanon also continues to have a multiparty sectarian system, but it is difficult to call it a democracy, despite the encouraging signs derived from a widespread social mobilization for democracy and the political changes that took place in 2005, stimulated by UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that demanded the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon and followed by the pullout of Syrian troops from the ground. Meanwhile, Egypt, Jordan, and more recently Iraq are progressing toward a system of multiparty democracy. Regarding the Arabian Peninsula, it was in total darkness during most of the twentieth century, with despotic regimes in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. The Gulf States were still under British protection. In the early 1960s Kuwait became independent under a modern constitution, but today political parties are still banned, though the right of women to vote was approved in May 2005. Bahrain became independent in 1971 and formed an elected assembly, which was closed three years later. It is now returning to a semblance of a democratic system. In Yemen and Oman appointed assemblies met from the mid-1970s until 1990. Today Oman is introducing a carefully planned election system, but political parties are illegal. When North Yemen and South Yemen declared that they would unite to form the Republic of Yemen, many were surprised. The constitution of the new unified republic was based on a multiparty system, freedom of the press, equality of gender, human rights, and a free civil society. Yemen has had already three parliamentary elections that were declared by international observers to be generally free and fair. In 1999 Yemen hosted the Emerging Democracies Forum, organized by the government and the National Democratic Institute in Washington, D.C. That forum eventually led to the establishment of the Community of Democracies.

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Finally, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have introduced partial or full municipal elections, respectively. In conclusion, one might say that the Middle East is reviving some form of democratic practices or trends. There are only emerging or nascent democracies; there is no mature democracy yet. True democracy is a process, not an event. Today the democratic practices in the Middle East are still only events. The voters go to cast their votes, maybe in relatively free elections, and go home until the next round. Nevertheless, democratic practices or tendencies are there to stay. The waves of democratization, no matter how slow and deficient they may be, are irreversible. An emerging democracy has a built-in repair system if sustained without interruption. Also, democracy is neither imported nor exported, but must be supported. Therefore, the mature democracies in the world should help the countries of the Middle East sustain that march toward democracy. In short, sustainability is the road for arriving at fully mature democracy.

11 Commentary on Democracy in the Arab World Nada Al-Nashif

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uilding on the historical evolution of democracy in the Arab region, I would like to underscore that Arab political reforms have come from a number of different directions since the 1980s. And if I look farther back for a moment, I find indigenous efforts at political reforms dating back to the 1860s, with Egypt’s early experiment with elected bodies that soon called for limiting the powers of the ruler and ending foreign interference in the country’s finances, followed by a movement led by Arab intellectuals and statesmen in the early twentieth century that called for democracy and political freedom. Initiatives and efforts calling for democracy in the Arab world did indeed crystallize further throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The debate on democracy and Arab thought and the “problematique” of democracy in the Arab world continued, with leading intellectuals, think tanks, and civil society activists reflecting major ideological trends, including Islamist, nationalist, pan-Arabist, Marxist, and liberal. The debate on political liberalization heightened in the 1990s as democratization processes swept Eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc. Although many countries in the Arab region experimented with economic reforms, liberalization processes took a different path and had little effect on genuine democratization of the Arab political system. These changes must be set against a background of rather mixed human development gains over the last twenty years. On the one hand, considerable progress has been made in laying the foundations for health, habitat, education, and impressively “pro-poor” growth (less dire poverty than in any other developing region). On the other 71

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hand, the Arab world also experienced the lowest growth (in per capita income) in the world except in sub-Saharan Africa, and labor productivity has been low and is declining. Momentum has increased in the last couple of years since several reform initiatives were put forward by Arab leaders themselves. The “Charter to Reform the Arab Stand” initiative was presented by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at the Arab Summit in March 2003. The Qatari initiative for political reforms in the Arab world followed on March 28, 2004. The Sana’a Declaration on Democracy, Human Rights, and the Role of the International Criminal Court was issued on January 10–12, 2004. And, more recently, the Tunis Declaration, which outlined the Course for Development and Modernization, was issued by the Arab Summit in Tunis in May 2004. Arab civil society also had a voice in the demand for political and economic reform. In March 2004, the Alexandria Statement on “Issues of Reform in the Arab World” proposed a “home-grown” agenda for political and economic reform. The clear message at the heart of these proposals is that the agenda of Arab political reform has to be dictated by regional interests and demands, shaped by voices from within, and led by regional actors. At the same time, Arab initiatives for reform welcomed collaboration with and learning from the experiences of developed democracies. It is in this spirit, out of a firm belief in the processes of democracy, with commitment to the cultural political evolution in the region, building on our substantive heritage, with optimism regarding the irreversibility of change, that we are working to institutionalize and consolidate our partnerships for “good governance” outcomes. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Regional Bureau for Arab States has been a key advocate for Arab initiatives aiming at enhancing human development through reforms targeting poverty reduction and good governance. A key vehicle of this advocacy has been the innovative Arab Human Development Report, which guides our development and governance programs in the Arab region.

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The Arab Human Development Report

The first Arab Human Development Report (AHDR-2002) afforded the region a forum to initiate dialogue and debate about a reform agenda from within; to create new tools to measure progress and deficits, offering independent and solid analysis that can contribute to

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current development efforts and the mobilization of human capital; and to offer an alternative human development index that went beyond the achievements of basic (materialistic) needs. Another innovation of the report has been the linkage of human development outcomes in the region to political, institutional, legal, and socioeconomic reforms. An entire chapter is devoted to the issue of governance, with many recommendations on how to reform Arab political systems in order to enhance their capacities to deal with modern challenges and to provide the Arab people with the conducive institutional milieu to develop politically, economically, and intellectually. The findings of the first report underscore the imperative for the Arab region to benefit from a development paradigm designed and built by the region. Relative to other regions, the Arab world does better on income indicators than on development indicators. The Arab region is thus “richer than it is developed,” hobbled by a poverty of capabilities and opportunities rooted in three deficits: freedom, women’s empowerment, and knowledge. Growth alone will neither bridge these gaps nor put the region on the road to sustainable development. Addressing these gaps would involve tackling human capabilities and knowledge and promoting systems of good governance based on expanding human capabilities, choices, opportunities, and freedoms. To tackle these deficits, a report was issued on the knowledge deficit in 2003, and UNDP is about to launch the third on “freedoms,” to be followed by one on “gender empowerment” in 2006. The report series thus far elaborates on how the region suffers from a “freedom deficit,” so that even when civil rights are enshrined in constitutions and laws, they are often ignored in practice. Popular political participation in Arab countries remains weak, as shown by the lack of genuine representative democracy and restrictions on liberties. The relative absence of women in government both reflects and exacerbates the lack of gender empowerment. With regard to freedom and political participation, examined through aspects of the political process such as civil liberties, political rights, and the independence of the media, the Arab region has the lowest average score for voice and accountability in the world. Civil society actors continue to encounter debilitating constraints in the form of control of civic rights, including the freedoms of assembly and association, that undermine participation and ensure that policy and decisionmaking processes remain exclusive to elites, with marginal influence from Arab citizenry.

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The destructive impact of conflicts is a major constraint on sustained socioeconomic growth. Resolving the region’s political crisis requires a just and comprehensive peace between Israelis and Palestinians serving the political and economic interests of all people of the region. The AHDR showed in facts and figures how occupation, civil wars, and sanctions lead to a loss of important human and capital resources critical for the renewal of stability and competitiveness, often eroding the fabric of democracy building. There is much to be hopeful about in Arab countries. They have the natural, human, and financial resources to eradicate poverty in less than a generation. To achieve this goal, a solid, unequivocal, political commitment to well-defined human development objectives is critical. Some of the elements of the governance agenda that this commitment implies include the following: • representative parliaments with a higher proportion of women, • independent judiciaries supported by well-functioning legal systems, • transparent regulatory systems, • public sector reforms to reduce high transaction costs and eliminate monopolies in favor of efficient public services, and • an empowered, accountable, and socially responsible civil society. Although the terms “democracy” and “democratization” appear infrequently in the report, there should be no doubt that implementing all or most of the reforms called for in the report will lead to the emergence of governments that fulfill “democratic” criteria.

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UNDP Success Stories in Arab Good Governance

More narrowly focusing on the “governance” agenda, there is a clear priority for UNDP to help countries build sound institutions of governance and create effective relationships among the state, the private sector, and civil society. To strengthen governance institutions in the Arab states, UNDP launched the Program on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR) in 2000. POGAR is rooted in national needs and was developed at the request of Arab governments. The program works in partnership with key governance institutions, including legislatures and judiciaries,

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as well as with civil society organizations and UN sister agencies to promote the development of good governance principles and practices. POGAR promotes the triple pillars of good governance—the rule of law, participation, and transparency and accountability—by rendering policy advice, engaging in institutional capacity building, and testing policy options through pilot projects. Since its inception, POGAR has launched projects to promote dialogue and build consensus about judicial reform; to build the capacities of parliaments, particularly in the area of information management and research; and to enhance the knowledge and expertise of governance actors (official and civil society representatives) on effective oversight and accountability mechanisms. A sample of activities undertaken by POGAR includes the following: • Improving the administration of justice by training judicial and nonjudicial personnel and supporting the creation of legal databases. • Fostering policy dialogue in areas common to Arab legislatures through the coordination of regional networks and support of regional parliamentary forums and research communities. • Supporting regional parliamentary networks by signing a memorandum of understanding with the Association of Secretaries General of Arab Parliaments to share experiences and best practices among parliaments in the Arab world. • Launching a gender and citizenship initiative focusing on three aspects of citizenship rights—elections, nationality, and social protection—which will (1) promote research on informed policy dialogue and advocacy, (2) engender legislation and procedures, (3) raise public and media awareness, and (4) build the capacity of independent Arab women’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). • Supporting the development of an Arab language database on electoral processes. • Fostering activities on improving accountability and transparency by providing support to the Transparency International network in the Arab countries and the Union of Arab Banks and by conducting a survey on accountability and transparency in six Arab countries.

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At the national level, POGAR set up projects in the following countries: • In Yemen, UNDP is funding and developing several projects aiming to strengthen human rights by including new elements in learning institutions’ curricula, by improving human rights and scientific and research capacities in the country, and by supporting the operational capacity of small human rights NGOs. • Also at the request of the government, Yemen’s electoral body, and the donor community, UNDP is leading the international community’s support to strengthen Yemen’s electoral process. This is being done with special attention to expanding the participation of women and youth in the electoral process. • In Lebanon, UNDP undertook an anticorruption initiative focusing on the underlying issues behind corruption, mapping out ongoing and past activities, and formulating practical policy proposals and action plans to address corruption, including formalizing an electoral code of conduct. • UNDP facilitated a path-breaking agreement between the Lebanese parliament and the French senate in the context of ongoing cooperation to strengthen the structures of the Lebanese parliament. The new initiative is part of the UNDP Lebanon Governance Programme, which is playing a key role in helping Lebanon modernize parliamentary processes, raise awareness of development issues among parliamentarians, strengthen the capacity of parliamentary committees, and broaden the dialogue with national stakeholders to ensure government responsiveness to people’s needs. • In Bahrain, UNDP, in partnership with parliament, is providing support and technical expertise to strengthen the institutional capacity and legislative functions of the newly elected parliament in 2003. At the regional level, underscoring the importance of UNDP’s partnerships, the project “Modernization of Public Prosecutors’ Offices” was launched in cooperation with the United Nations Foundation, with the overall objective to increase citizen security, taking Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen as pilot countries and focusing on the capacity of institutions relevant to citizen security issues. This project also aims at increasing the capacity and quality of government institutions with a mandate of achieving security and enforcing

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respect for human rights, as well as increasing interaction between the offices of the attorney general, the public prosecutor, and citizens. Finally, another regional initiative, “Governance for Development,” involving Arab governments and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, tackles three interrelated reform areas (administrative, financial, and judicial) and constitutes six main pillars for reform: (1) civil service and integrity; (2) the role of the judiciary and enforcement; (3) e-government, administrative simplification, and regulatory reform; (4) the role of civil society and media in the reform of the public sector; (5) governance of public finance; and (6) public service delivery.

12 Democracy in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States Bronislaw Geremek

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hroughout the history of Europe, the progress of communication and exchange between human groups depended on the universalization of the instruments of social communication and the gradual adoption of common standards that made it possible to overcome political, language, and ethnic barriers. This was the case with the system of weights and measures, which for a long time remained local in character; the arbitrary definition of their values gave rise to constant conflict. Only in modern times were measures standardized, with most European countries adopting the metric system. The standard meter was created and deposited in 1889 at Sèvres, France, the very country that through persuasion, pressure, or force fostered the spread of the metric system. Perhaps it would be possible—at least metaphorically—to apply the example of the universalization of the system of weights and measures to democracy. Certainly, modernization processes have fostered the spread of the belief that a democratic organization of public life is a universal value: that is what Francis Fukuyama’s concept of “the end of history” signified, even though it concerned the history of ideas rather than social reality. Of course, not all civilizations have understood and practiced democracy in the same way, nor can any of democracy’s historical forms be defined as the model against which all others must be judged. It has been a long way from Thucydides, who in his funeral oration for Pericles opposed despotism and tyranny to government by the majority—the hallmark of democracy—to the Warsaw declaration of 2000. The democratic system has become a more and more universally accepted model, and ever more countries have given their citizens the power to decide who should govern them 79

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and how those governments are to be controlled. Although this process was not cumulative and did encounter some setbacks, the record of the twentieth century in this area is on balance a positive one. Fareed Zakaria begins his book The Future of Freedom with this striking statement: “We live in a democratic age. In 1900 not a single country had what we would today consider a democracy: a government created by elections in which every adult citizen could vote. Today 119 do.”1 All civilizations and all continents have taken part in this march of democracy across the globe, albeit with varying intensity. In the successive waves of democratization—as outlined by Samuel Huntington in The Third Wave—the special position of a group of countries in the North Atlantic area became blurred, because democracy had become universally accepted as the only source of legitimate power.2 Even in the totalitarian system in force in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it seemed necessary to organize elections every few years—only for show, of course, since these elections were neither free nor fair, but it is significant that they were seen as an instrument indispensable for legitimizing the government. In the second half of the twentieth century, despite this obvious triumph of democracy around the world, debates on democracy’s weaknesses continued unabated. The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, published in 1975, diagnosed a crisis of democracy connected with the delegitimization of power, ineffectiveness of governments, and disaggregation of group interests. One of the authors of that report, French sociologist Michel Crozier, said that a “vague and persistent feeling that democracies have become ungovernable has been growing steadily in Western Europe” 3; foresaw the growing success of state socialism and the spread of the communist system; and considered the tendency towards “Finlandization” a lesser evil. Today, after the fall of communism, this pessimistic tone may seem absurd and baseless. It does, however, correctly point out that democracy is by its very nature weak and fragile and that it should never be taken for granted and attained for good. Democracy is, above all, a constant challenge. This statement holds for the degree to which the principle of representation is applied in political life, the extent to which executive power is perceived as legitimate, the degree of citizens’ participation in public life, and the extent to which collective interests are articulated in the functioning of the state. Treating democracy as a challenge also requires that close attention be paid to the relation between the principle of majority

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government and respect for the rights of the minority, which in fact corresponds to the question first raised by Thucydides—the issue of relations between the strong and the weak in the practice of government. Finally, the category of challenge is also appropriately applied to tensions between the centralizing tendency in the functioning of the state and the tendencies to increase autonomy at the lower rungs of territorial power. Regardless of how these challenges were met in various civilizations and in different eras—and this was by no means a continuous or cumulative process—it can be stated that the beginning of the twenty-first century is marked by general agreement to define democracy as a political system in which free and fair elections lead to the formation of governments, public life is conducted according to the rule of law, the rights of minorities are respected, the constitutional system provides for a system of checks and balances between state institutions, and local autonomy is considerable. And, last but not least, we must also mention a democratic political culture, that is, a civic virtue expressed through participation in public debate and the decisionmaking process itself. Every day, political events around the world clearly show that democracy is a challenge, both in those countries where it does not exist and in those where it does. This statement also holds true for Europe, where the principles of modern democracy were born and where they were put into practice on the widest scale. Thanks to the reviews of the state of democracy around the world issued by major international institutes and institutions—for example, Freedom House, the Open Society Institute, or the United Nations Development Programme—it is unnecessary to provide a detailed presentation of democracy on the European continent. Moreover, Europe possesses its own structures for the promotion and control of democracy. The foremost of these is the Council of Europe, which was established in 1949 as the first pan-European institution and today numbers forty-five member states. Its treaties (especially the European Human Rights Convention), “charters,” and recommendations define the rules and regulations that member states should follow. The council’s institutions include the European Court of Human Rights, which considers individual complaints, as well as the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (known as the Venice Commission), which has gained considerable power and influence over the practice of creating democratic law. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established in 1975 as a result of

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the Helsinki process, is also involved in the area of human rights protection. The OSCE, which today has fifty-five member states, including all the states that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, covers the nations of Central Asia as well as European countries. One of its agencies, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, concerns itself with post-Soviet states, effectively supporting and monitoring democratic procedures and institutions. And finally, the European Union (EU), which after over half a century of existence now has twenty-five members, is an ever more closely integrated federation of nation-states and has set a democratic system of government as the foundation of the community and a prerequisite of membership. These institutions’ activities support democracy becoming the universal principle on the European continent and an element of Europe’s civilizational cohesion. However, this could only happen after the historic breakthrough of 1989 led to the collapse of the communist system, the end of the Cold War, and the unification of Europe. Europe’s collective memory should retain the remembrance both of the totalitarian systems that were born on this continent and of the successes of the defense and development of democracy in Western Europe, as well as of the peaceful transition to democracy in Central Europe. If the process of the unification of Europe on the basis of democratic principles was peaceful, unmarked by revolutionary violence, it was also because it was rooted in universally accepted standards. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of December 2004 showed that the transformation model followed in Central Europe in 1989 still retains its creative potential. It is significant that a society courageously rises up to fight for having democratic procedures—procedures that are considered the norm—finally put into practice: to be able to change a government or even a political system through a vote, to be sure that elections are not falsified, to believe that the parliament really represents the people, and to be sure that citizens no longer have to fear physical violence from their government. The striving for free and fair elections expresses a belief in the ethical aspect of democracy, which creates an opportunity for freedom, ensures respect for human dignity, and demands respect for the truth. A similar perspective is now appearing before the people of Belarus, the only European country that is not a member of the Council of Europe— because it does not fulfill the basic criteria of democracy. European debates about democracy and its future—in 2004, the Council of Europe commissioned the Future of Democracy in Europe Green Paper—should not be perceived as catastrophic or pessimistic

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but as a realistic endeavor to ensure that democratic institutions function effectively and enjoy the public’s support. I would like to focus on several of the main issues from these debates. The first of these is the danger of populism. It arises from the very nature of democratic procedures. After all, Europe has lived through the painful experience of seeing democratic elections bring to power the enemies of democracy. In the spring of 1897 in fin-desiècle Vienna, the extremist nationalist Karl Lüger was elected mayor in a democratic election; Emperor Franz Joseph prevented him from taking office for two years. In 1933 Adolf Hitler’s victory in fully democratic elections brought about the end of the Weimar Republic. When social frustration creates a climate favorable to radical slogans and a desire for an all-knowing, all-powerful leader, democratic procedures may be used to destroy freedom and overturn democracy. Opposition should include a critical analysis of the situation, the removal of the sources of frustration, and the augmentation of democratic procedures with a culture of democracy. It is amazing that even a country with as strong a democratic tradition as the Netherlands can witness both the success of a populist leader and the wave of violence of recent times. However, both events demonstrate the potential influence on society at large of the shock caused by a mass inflow of immigrants. Europe needs immigrants in order to maintain its demographic and economic balance, but it has not yet managed to create mechanisms for their acculturation, which would remove tensions between the community receiving the immigrants and the newcomers, who usually come from other cultures or belong to different religions. Conflicts also arise in countries with large immigrant populations, especially of Muslim immigrants, as is the case in France. Exploiting ethnocentric sentiment does not in itself endanger the foundations of democracy, but it does open the door to dangerous radicalism. The experience of Austria, where the coming to power of such a radical party did not destroy democracy but instead rather wore out that party, can serve as a demonstration of the self-defensive capabilities inherent in democracy. Generally speaking, it also shows how important it is to form a democratic culture that promotes the idea of an open society and opposes exclusion, ethnocentrism, and the construction of cultural barriers. The second issue in European debates on the future of democracy is the question of civil society. It arises as a reaction to—or an instrument of resistance against—authoritarian governments. That was the case with dissident or opposition movements in the communist

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countries of Central and Eastern Europe; civil society programs in all European countries are formulated in opposition to the excessive power of the central government. The French historian Pierre Rosanvallon pointed out that in the modern history of France, we can see a constant conflict of two models: that of political democracy, which assigns the chief role to the central political power and to promoting the general interest; and that of civil democracy, which ensures the realization of particular interests and supports all intermediary bodies, such as associations, trade unions, and local communities.4 In today’s Europe, civil society has achieved an important position, fulfilling not just a consultative or representative function but also certain executive functions, in many countries taking on the responsibility for distribution of certain funds from the central budget. Europe is catching up to the United States in the area of general development of nongovernmental organizations, which bring citizens together in communities. In this way, Europe has achieved a combination of the two models: political democracy and civil democracy. Doing so is of great importance for counteracting decreased participation in the conventional political process as it is carried out through political parties. Instead of political parties, the citizen participates in organizations focused on a specific task or a pragmatically defined goal. The falling trust in political parties results in a reduced interest in politics, and the citizens’ indifference is a significant threat to democracy. It is therefore necessary to look for ways of counteracting the movement of citizens away from politics, which they see as a fight for power, in favor of increasing real participation in the functioning of democratic mechanisms and procedures—that is the formula for defending democracy. We are witnessing a redefinition of democracy, whereby most European countries are following a trend to expand direct democracy processes by using the institution of the referendum to decide on issues that bear on the political system. Finally, the process of globalization and the spread of new technologies have significant influence on the relationship between the state and the civil society, presenting the latter with new opportunities, both in the context of the postauthoritarian governments of Eastern Europe and the democracies of Western Europe. The third issue is the important debate on the European Union’s constitutional treaty, which by 2006 should be ratified by all twentyfive member states, but which in 2005 was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands, while plans to organize a referendum in the UK were suspended. The constitution brings together all the

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European Union treaties signed until now and gives European integration a political dimension. In this context, a debate has begun on the so-called democratic deficit in the European Union. The EU’s democratic character stems primarily from the fact that all its member states are parliamentary democracies, but the functioning of the European Union itself was based on a hybrid formula combining an association of nation-states and a political community. In that formula, the decisionmaking and legislative process was divided between the governments of member states and community institutions. That in turn led to a situation that Larry Siedentop, in Democracy in Europe, described with the words: “Democratic legitimacy in Europe is at risk.”5 The European Union has a half-century’s experience of carrying out integration focused on economic objectives: the idea was to ensure peace in Europe, peace that would be guaranteed precisely by economic growth and the gradual building of material prosperity. The issue of the political form of the community was put aside. However, when these problems had to be tackled to ensure continued development, difficulties appeared. The first was the bureaucratization of government: centuries ago Montesquieu had already pointed out that a bureaucratic state becomes a modern form of despotism. The second was the necessity of separating democracy from the concept of the nation-state to which it was historically and organically tied. In order to overcome these difficulties, it was necessary to call upon the idea of “civic virtue,” that is, a culture of citizens’ participation in public life and a feeling of European citizenship that would bring together diverse ethnic groups and varied historical traditions—without denying their uniqueness and without destroying European diversity. The European constitution provides the necessary institutional environment. It puts the European Union on the road toward federalism, without transforming it into a centralized superstate. It expands European citizens’ rights, allowing for bottom-up legislative initiatives, as long as petitioners collect a million signatures from citizens of at least several member states. It increases the powers of the European Parliament, which for a long time—even though it has been directly elected since 1979—had only a limited representative and legislative role. The governments of EU member states could quote the words ascribed to Frederick the Great: “My people and I have to come to an agreement which satisfies us both. They are to say what they please, and I am to do what I please.” The parliament has attained influence over the formation and dismissal of the executive

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institution (i.e., the European Commission). The principle of subsidiarity is intended to safeguard the European Union’s political architecture against tendencies toward centralization and excesses of bureaucracy. Thus the debate on the European Union’s “democratic deficit” led to the creation of mechanisms that safeguard democracy. The fourth noteworthy issue in European debates on democracy reflects the tensions that in recent years have appeared in relations between Europe and the United States. In US political discourse, the belief in the universal character of democracy is used to legitimize the use of force abroad in order to spread democracy. Democracy is seen as a “political religion” to be promoted—even through military force. This is one explanation for the resurgence in neoconservative rhetoric of the idea of “crusade,” which had, many years ago, been used by another US president, Dwight Eisenhower. This outlook results from connecting the idea of democracy with moral values, which seems to be in line with the way democracy is understood today, both by Americans and by Europeans. However, the European view seems to be that democracy cannot be imposed by force, because then the means used may undo the intended outcome. Democracy is based on persuasion and on discussion, which means it must be an organic process whose success depends on creating a social will toward freedom and a democratic political culture. International relations are served well by spreading democracy based on dialogue, in which international organizations exert pressure for democracy as negotiating partners do, free from any patronizing attitudes. A good example of such pressure is the functioning of the Council of Europe and its procedures for accepting new members, or of the European Union and its rules for accession—the “Copenhagen criteria.” Europe’s experience of democracy can be seen as a historical success in learning and following the principle that Abraham Lincoln described as “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” True, we must be aware of the weaknesses and deficiencies of this process. The processes of transition from communism to freedom remain incomplete: we need only mention Belarus or Moldova. In some countries, authoritarian governments still treat their parliaments as mere window-dressing. The situation of the people in some European countries still gives cause for concern. Equal political rights for women are still not a reality in the practice of public life, even if they do appear in constitutional provisions. The independence of the media, the financing of political parties, and the relations between business and politics all require improved legal regulation.

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Strengthening civil society and improving civic education remain a challenge. However, regardless of existing weaknesses, the practice of its public life makes Europe a continent of democracy. Certainly, democracy is not a cure for all that is wrong with the modern world. Nevertheless, the European experience permits the conclusion that a lack of democracy would make it more difficult to resist the temptation of excessive government, to rise to the challenges of poverty and human security, and to avoid violations of human rights or intolerance. A democratic Europe can and should serve the strengthening of a cohesive community of the world’s democracies; it can and should propound the position that every dictatorship, every authoritarian system, and every antidemocratic coup constitutes a threat to the world order.

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Notes

1. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 13. 2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series, vol. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 3. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. Task Force Report 8 (New York: New York University Press, 1975). 4. Pierre Rosanvallon, L’État en France de 1789 à nos jours (Paris: Seuil Publisher, 1990). 5. Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 1.

13 Commentary on Democracy in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States Kalman Mizsei

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t is generally felt that in Europe it is easier to spread the democratic gospel than in underdeveloped regions. There is one good reason for this underlying assumption and one bad reason. The good one is that in Eastern Europe, many countries wanted and still want to join the European Union (EU). Democracy is a core value of the EU; the member countries have to be democratic. This unambiguous precondition of EU membership has undoubtedly helped many of the region’s countries to keep democratic changes on track. In 2004 eight former communist countries succeeded in becoming members of the European Union—only fourteen to fifteen years after their double transitions (market and democratic) started. This is a stunning achievement that was made possible only with the help of the European democracy anchor. Something similar is happening with two upcoming new members, Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, in southeastern Europe there are a number of hopeful stable democracies—not a bad balance just a few years after the communist systems folded in Eastern Europe. However, things do not look that good as we go farther east: many of the countries of the former Soviet Union have clear democratic deficits, and some of them look worse now than a few years ago. In this respect, to assume an easier road toward wellfunctioning, sustainable democracies is not necessarily justified— here I refer to the wrong assumption that in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region the situation is easier. For instance, Freedom House counts nineteen dictatorships in the world; three of them are in the Europe and CIS region. Indeed, democracy is “a constant challenge,” as Bronislaw Geremek notes in Chapter 12. The first challenge is the degree of citizens’ 89

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participation in public life, and it is a great challenge in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. For example, it surfaces in low turnouts in some of the democratic elections but, even more importantly, in the still relatively low density and activity of civil society organizations. The second challenge is respect for the rights of minorities. Socialism was characterized by a false demonstration of harmony between majority and minority populations, between men and women, and so on. When people were liberated to say what they wanted, inevitably some tensions emerged. In the former Yugoslavia and many parts of the former Soviet Union, this “liberation” culminated in hostilities or in outright ethnically motivated wars in the 1990s. Again, the new EU member and candidate states showed the highest degree of maturity in this respect, but even in Central Europe, when one looks at the rights of the Roma people, one sees that building the necessary respect for minorities or for any divergence from the mainstream can be difficult. Geremek also mentions the “centralizing tendency in the functioning of the state,” as opposed to increasing autonomy of the lower rungs of territorial power. Again, if we look at evolving Eastern European democracies, his warning is particularly relevant there. We see elections at the lower levels of power in many places—although formal retraction of such power has occurred (such as Russia in 2004)—but also that the central government makes this local autonomy illusory by centralizing fiscal authority and thus increasing redistribution of financial resources by the central state. Thus the central government becomes a constant threat to local democratic practices and the development of autonomies in society so vital to real democracy. In this respect the inspiration coming from the European Union helps, but it is limited. Subsidiarity has been mentioned as a key European principle that safeguards against centralizing tendencies and thus the risk of bureaucratization. Here I would guard against optimism: the principle of subsidiarity is weakening even in the EU—it is regrettably hardly mentioned in the draft constitution—and thus does not provide the necessary impetus to the countries transforming from socialism. Even some of the new member states have worrying trends limiting democracy by centralizing power at the national level. Political movements on behalf of territorial decentralization are not particularly strong—or, even in some of the transition countries, nonexistent. This centralizing trend is a major threat to the quality of democracy in the new member states and accession countries and a major, very real, and existing impediment in many countries within the CIS.

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Geremek points out in Chapter 12 the threat bureaucracy poses for democracy. This very insightful point about the established democracies is particularly relevant, but in a slightly different way, in Eastern Europe. In the part of Eastern Europe that lived under the Russian or the Ottoman empires, we observe the phenomenon of the “predatory state,” in which a state position typically is not meant to provide service to the community but is a power platform from which its holder can extract resources. This is a very serious impediment to economic progress, indirectly undermining the economic fundaments of a prosperous democracy. But it is also a more direct problem as corrupt and predatory bureaucracy delegitimizes the state and thus thwarts efforts to democratize it. So the thesis about bureaucracy has to be adapted to Eastern European circumstances: it is extensive, Soviet-type bureaucracy plus its very corrupt, predatory behavior that is a very serious impediment in the region, both in the Balkans but even more so in many post-Soviet states. Speaking of the Eastern European region, one of the noteworthy historical phenomena since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is the success of the double transition—to market and to democracy—in many countries of the region, notably among the EU-8 (postcommunist new member states) and accession countries.1 This success challenges the prevailing view that economic modernization cannot happen at the same time as political democratization. Many countries have demonstrated in the last fifteen years that it is possible—even if it is not easy—since autocratic regimes can also derail reforms in many ways. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) actively promotes democratic transition. We support elections through various means. We advocate decentralization and provide wide-ranging technical support in this area. And we support efforts for market economy reforms and institution building. Finally, UNDP support for public administration reform aims at preventing the kind of bureaucratic and corruption risks already mentioned. In UNDP’s work, the pull of the European Union is very important. As Geremek notes, “the transformation model followed in Central Europe in 1989 still retains its creative potential.” Undoubtedly, an important part of that is the “pull” of the European Union, with its attractive value system, including its adherence to democracy. Hopefully, Europe will successfully meet the challenge of trying to disentangle democracy from the nation-state. In that case this creative potential of the great European democratic experience will remain on display farther east for the benefit of the European dreams of the millions of people there.

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Note

1. On the double transition, see Joan M. Nelson, Jacek Kochanowicz, Kalman Mizsei, and Oscar Muñoz, Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 1994).

14 Democracy in Latin America Elena Martínez

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he concept of democracy is held, by different people, to mean different things. Nonetheless, the experience of harsh authoritarian rule has helped to shape a notable degree of consensus around a core aspect of democracy. Today, practitioners of politics in Latin America practically unanimously share the view that certain procedures are the sine qua non of democracy. A country is a democracy when it establishes and follows rules that allow for peaceful competition for power—the choice of governments and representatives of the people—through fair and regular elections and also provides effective guarantees of fundamental liberties such as the freedom of speech, assembly, and association.1 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its recent report Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy, echoes this consensus. It argues that elections constitute the core nonnegotiable foundation of democracy and vehemently insists that democracy is never less than elections. At the same time, this report seeks to broaden the existing understanding of democracy and proposes to see democracy as involving more than elections. Specifically, it suggests that an integral democracy implies the fulfillment of three dimensions of citizenship: political, civil, and social. Thus, going beyond a strictly procedural definition that focuses on political democracy, it explicitly acknowledges that the development of capabilities is essential to the full enjoyment of citizen rights and that deficits of a socioeconomic nature threaten the functioning and even potentially the viability of a democratic political regime. Or, put in other words, it incorporates the core insight of the UNDP’s human development paradigm into the discussion of democracy.2 93

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The UNDP’s report offers a wealth of data to assess the state of democracy in Latin America and presents an original and comprehensive analysis of democracy in the region. It shows how, since 1978, democracy took hold in country after country and gradually became the dominant political regime in the region. To track these developments systematically, UNDP developed a new index, the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). The EDI includes four variables— the right to vote, clean elections, free elections, and elections as the means of access to public office—and the value of the EDI ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating a complete absence of electoral democracy and one the maximum amount of electoral democracy. And the data are quite revealing. The average EDI for eighteen countries—all continental Latin American countries and the Dominican Republic—rose rapidly from 0.28 in 1977 to 0.69 in 1985, increasing thereafter to 0.86 in 1990 and 0.93 in 2002. Never before have so many countries in the region had democratically elected governments, and never before has electoral democracy lasted as long as now. We live in a truly democratic age in Latin America. These gains notwithstanding, the overall picture is mixed. Though progress has been made by Latin American countries in terms of civil rights, they are far from fully respected. Moreover, despite improvements in the social dimension of citizenship in some countries, deficiencies with regard to social rights—as revealed by high levels of poverty and inequality in the region—are deep and enduring. These problems cannot be dissociated from the sustainability of democratic regimes. Citizen satisfaction with democracy seems to hinge on the performance of their democracies, especially in these areas where the deficiencies are most marked. And democratic governments are feeling the pressure to respond to citizen demands and in many cases failing to do so. The most overt sign of turmoil in the region has been the numerous institutional crises that have led to the fall of democratically elected presidents. Some examples are Abdalá Bucaran (Ecuador, 1993), Jamil Mahuad (Ecuador, 2000), Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Haiti, 2001 and 2004), Fernando de la Rua (Argentina, 2001), Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada (Bolivia, 2003), and Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador, 2005). These crises have not led to classic coups, and constitutional rule has either not been abridged or has been restored. This is an important accomplishment that deserves highlighting. Nonetheless, in many cases the implications of these crises for democracy are quite direct. After all, the issue is whether those who accede to the highest political office—

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the presidency—are able to remain in power during their constitutionally mandated term and, if they are replaced, whether this change is made in accordance with constitutional norms. The problems of democratic development are multifaceted. They reflect the limitations of the state and demands for economic growth (the results of which frequently include inequalities), the inability of politics to integrate the aspirations of citizens, the tensions prevalent within fractured societies, the existence of de facto power centers that exercise significant influence and permeate the highest decisionmaking forums, and a process of globalization that constricts the democratic space by taking key issues that affect the future of society out of the hands of citizens. Hence the report suggests the need for new thinking and the need to expand the political debate in the region. More pointedly, the report proposes an expanded agenda of democratic reforms centered on four main themes. One is the renewal of the content and the relevance of politics and its institutions. Another concerns the role of the state and, in particular, its responsibility as the main promoter of full citizenship. A third is the possible diversity of market-driven economic policies that might be adopted as a way of reducing the deficits of social citizenship in a sustainable manner. Finally, a fourth theme focuses on the context of the current globalization and the need for Latin American states to negotiate a mature relationship with the world that protects their sovereignty while simultaneously seeking the gains to be derived from participating in the world economy. Democracy in Latin America is not the last word on how we should think about democracy and what challenges are faced by democracies in the region. The analysis and the proposals made in the report focus on regional trends and common patterns. Thus, it is quite obvious that any reforms and public policies must take into consideration national specificities. Moreover, it is crucial to emphasize that the UNDP’s work on democratic governance is part of a larger hemispheric effort to strengthen democracy. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Lima, September 2001), a document that recognizes, as a fundamental principle, that the “peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”3 Indeed, the work of the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as various other international organizations, such as Mercosur and the Grupo de Rio, put the Americas at the forefront of the development of a democratic promotion doctrine.

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The democratic challenges facing the region are complex. Thus, it is critical not to rush to hold up any one view as the correct one and to invite rather than foreclose debate. Indeed, precisely because of the intricacies of the issues at stake, the UNDP puts an emphasis on the need for a broad deliberative process involving politicians and civil society in the region. More than ever, as Latin America tackles the pressing challenges it currently confronts, it is imperative that Latin Americans participate fully in the decisions regarding the future of their nations, articulating their own understanding of problems and solutions, presenting their own perspectives, and bringing their own voices to discussions about the region. One of the central tasks we confront today is how to extend worldwide the ideas and practices of democracy. Much has been done in this regard. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asserts in the report In Larger Freedom, democracy has reached “global acceptance . . . as a universal value,” and one of the encouraging trends has been precisely that “regional organizations in many parts of the world have made democracy promotion a core component of their work.”4 But as the UNDP’s report shows, much remains to be done before a full range of citizenship rights are effectively recognized throughout Latin America. This is the goal the international community should work toward in the years ahead. And this is an objective the UNDP will continue to advance, supporting countries that request assistance and seek to promote strong democratic institutions as well as inclusive and sustainable public policies.

Notes 1. UNDP, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy (New York, 2004), p. 27. 2. On the human development paradigm, see the UNDP’s Human Development Reports (various years and titles) and Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Shiva A. K. Kumar, eds., Readings in Human Development: Concepts, Measures, and Policies for a Development (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 3. On the right to democracy in the Americas, see Heraldo Muñoz, “Collective Action for Democracy in the Americas,” in Muñoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Latin American Nations in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 18. 4. United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005, para. 148–149.

15 Commentary on Democracy in Latin America Hernando Gómez Buendía

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take the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) recent report on democracy as the starting point for my remarks, summarizing the ongoing debate about the report that has been taking place in academic publications, the media, and many seminars of international, regional, and national scope throughout Latin America. There are plenty of studies and reports concerning democracy and democratic governance in Latin America. Yet I do not know of any recent document that has elicited as much interest and as much controversy among opinion makers and policymakers in the region as the UNDP report. This may be due to the combination of four features that distinguish the report as a far-reaching intellectual undertaking: (1) it goes deep into the realities of eighteen different countries, not limiting itself to regional generalities or to one or a handful of cases; (2) it is empirically grounded in country-by-country opinion surveys, in-depth interviews with leaders, and an impressive recollection of statistics; (3) it is theoretically ambitious, going one step beyond conventional institutional analysis to enter into the realm of politics and advocating for a comprehensive, hence demanding, conception of democracy; and (4) it is action-oriented in proposing a four-point extended agenda. Hence, the UNDP report has become a mandatory reference for anyone interested in Latin American democracy. It is a source of interesting, even intriguing ideas, empirical findings, data, and policy options, some of which have already been incorporated in academic, political, and legislative discourse. But the report has also been the subject of criticism and of much controversy that shed light on alternative approaches and issues that should be considered in assessing 97

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the state of and the prospects for democracy and democratic governance in the region. Let me refer to three of the most relevant controversies. First, there are those who prefer a narrower definition of democracy as a political regime or as a set of procedures, in short, as free elections. This is a complex, debatable, and in fact unsolvable issue. We may all agree that democracy at a minimum does mean elections but should include the full spectrum of civil, political, and social rights and that the lack of social results is indeed a threat to the stability of democratic regimes in Latin American countries. More specifically, I would suggest that the crises of governance we have recently experienced in, say, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, or Argentina have been closely related to the actions of impoverished or otherwise excluded social forces that enter the political arena, overwhelming the traditional parties and threatening to destabilize democratically elected governments. A second controversy about the report concerns the extent of support for electoral democracy among Latin Americans. Granted, the precise questions and wordings used by the survey are matters to argue about. Yet the issue itself is undeniably relevant: democracy is first and foremost a culture, a set of values, an ordering of values. That nearly half of Latin American citizens are willing or would be willing to give up democracy in exchange for economic well-being is in itself a most troubling syndrome. We do need to improve the validity and reliability of measurement, but we also need to educate our citizenry in the true meaning of democracy. And we certainly need our democratic regimes to confront poverty and to rapidly spread economic well-being. The third source of criticism of the report is its failure to consider or to pay full attention to some issues that have a clear bearing on democracy for the region. The challenge of multiculturalism, the tension between the need for citizens’ security and political freedoms, corruption, and the appearance of illiberal democracies are among such relevant issues. But well taken as such criticisms might be, the report offers a conceptual framework into which those topics can be fruitfully incorporated, since specific national situations vary, depending on the issue concerned. More importantly, inviting alternative viewpoints and stimulating controversies was one of the main aims of the report, and the accomplishment of these goals should be viewed as a step toward the full discussion of the enlarged agenda for democracy that Latin America so urgently needs.

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In closing, the Community of Democracies could make good use of the report’s findings and proposals when it comes to strengthening democratic regimes, democratic governance, and full democracy in Latin America.

Part 3 THE FUTURE

OF

DEMOCRACY

16 Democracy and Globalization: The Beginning of History Cristovam Buarque

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rancis Fukuyama coined the term “the end of history.” In this chapter, I refer to “the beginning of history.” He argued that the changes brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the Iron Curtain would put an end to the long-lasting discussion between authoritarianism and democracy that characterized history. But in my opinion, that debate characterized prehistory. History will continue to be built as long as changes emerge from the discussions about the kind of democracy humanity will pursue— a democracy that either promotes or fights social exclusion, that destroys or protects the environment, that imposes a particular set of cultural values and concepts or encourages respect and tolerance. A democracy confined to each country or expanded to the global level.

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Winston Churchill once stated that democracy is the worst political system, except all the others. His statement was further validated with the rise of the rights of minorities against the “democratic authoritarianism” of the majority. It is even more applicable today because of globalization. Democracy no longer meets the requirements of the global world, but until now there has been no other system capable of replacing it. Invented in a time when states were restricted to cities and rulers had their powers limited to their own small territories and to the short span of their own lives, democracy has grown old in a world where the power of any president goes far beyond the borders of his or her 103

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own country and triggers effects that last far longer than his or her term of office; thus, that president’s actions have repercussions in the life of citizens of other countries who did not elect that president and in the life of future generations. This point is obvious with regard to the rulers of big countries, whose decisions may warm up the planet, change the course of rivers, cause nuclear or biological wars, or destabilize other countries or the entire civilization. But it is also true for the presidents of small countries, who may decide to build nuclear plants, to dam an international river, authorize the operation of bank systems used for money laundering, or allow terrorist bases or drug trafficking in their territories. In a globalized world, the actions of each state can have repercussions in the entire world for centuries ahead, but democracy goes on electing rulers on the basis of national elections for short terms of office. The world has become global and long-term, but democracy is still national and short-term. A global world needs a democracy capable of incorporating the global reality. To become democratic, globalization must cease being identified only with trade. Save some ecological, social, or political tragedy, trade will never return to the times of protectionism. International trade will be the distinguishing mark of the future. However, if trade is to take place with a minimum civilizing efficiency, it must be accompanied by international solidarity, accomplished by means of investments to overcome poverty and local calamities, and face the problems experienced by those excluded from the advantages of global modernity. Global democracy will require a combination of national democracy and international solidarity among present-day societies and among present and future generations, allowing us to complete the world mobility framework. In addition to the commercial peace that stems from free trade now being implemented, the world will seek to attain other peaceful goals: social peace, migration peace, technological peace, cultural peace, security peace, green peace, moral peace, and political peace.

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Social Peace: The Fight Against Poverty

The world cannot be global in the areas of trade, economy, and finance and continue to keep humankind divided. The Iron Curtain that in the

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past prevented globalization, dividing humankind along ideological, political, economic, and military lines, must not be replaced—as happens today—by a golden curtain that prevents democratic globalization, dividing humankind along social and demographic lines. There is no global democracy in a world that opens its borders to the entry of products that increase the well-being of the rich and closes its borders to people escaping poverty. Globalizing wealth for a few, while still nationalizing poverty for so many, is immoral. The present global world has created a divided humankind: on one side, an archipelago of the poor of the world, themselves divided by cultural differences; on the other side, an international first world of the rich, united in the same modern standards of consumption and culture. Globalization has spread the right to wealth for social groups, regardless of the country where a person lives, but has also excluded—within each country—segments of the local population. The preglobalization world divided into a first, a second, and a third world has been replaced by a world where the second world has disappeared, pockets of poverty have been formed in the first world, and pockets of affluence have come forth in the third world. The global world of the twenty-first century is a huge third world, comprising countries with a low-income population majority and countries with a high-income population majority. Rich and poor coexist in both countries; the only difference is the proportion between these segments within each country. Within a few decades, if this scenario is maintained, the world will face such a brutal division between the rich and the poor— regardless of which country they live in—that a biological rupture in the human species will occur, with one group living longer and enjoying greater physical health and more intelligence, and the other group—the majority—living less, with a weakened health and no education. The outcome will be the moral tragedy of the acceptance of exclusion, caused by the feeling of dissimilarity—which has already begun to spread around the world—between the rich and the poor. The rich will be free to indulge in the moral violence of despising the poor, enjoying wealth and technological progress without solidarity, whereas the poor will be free to indulge in physical violence against the rich. Globalization will be democratic only if the fight against poverty becomes a global program—a sort of global social Marshall Plan. The end of poverty will not be reached through a permanent system of foreign aid, the result of a generous solidarity, nor does it stem

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from economic growth. A Marshall Plan for the economy would increase wealth but would not decrease poverty. In some cases, it could even worsen poverty, augmenting inequality. In the preglobalization period, democracy created a Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe. In times of globalization, a new Marshall Plan is necessary, on a global scale and for social purposes. After the 1929 stock market crash, Keynesianism aimed at fostering economy through the increase of the aggregate demand and was carried out many times with no fiscal responsibility and excessive state interventionism. Together with Keynesianism, the postwar Marshall Plan aimed at financing industrial and infrastructure investments. Both succeeded in promoting the economic growth of the last sixty years. The twenty-first century demands a new Marshall Plan and a new Keynesianism in the world struggle against poverty. With fiscal responsibility and full respect for the laws of the market, it is possible to transfer income to the poor population of the world, providing jobs for this population in the production of the goods and services that they need to exit poverty. It would be a new joint social Keynesianism and social Marshall Plan, the difference being that the program would directly finance social subsidies, income to employ the poor in the production of goods the poor need to escape poverty. The best-known examples of social subsidy are the programs Bolsa Escola (Child/Family Scholarship Program) in Brazil and Progresa in Mexico, both later renamed as Bolsa Família (Family Program) and Oportunidad (Opportunity).1 Based on such programs, the governments of these countries pay an income to poor mothers, with the condition that these mothers keep their children in school and guarantee their daily attendance and success. Besides the income received by the families that allows them an immediate exit from poverty, the school further guarantees that these children will be able to escape poverty. The book India from Midnight to the Millennium by Shashi Tharoor describes how providing simple instruments of support to poor groups, the “untouchables” in the case of India, promotes their improvement, increases their social inclusion, and enables their escape from poverty.2 Studies have shown that the cost of a world program to fight poverty requires a small portion of the world income, which is today about US$40 trillion per year, especially if the financial engineering of these expenditures takes into account the reduction of the poor

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countries’ debt service. On a world scale, at the cost of only 13 percent of the poor countries’ debt service, it is possible to put an end to child labor and place 250 million children in school, creating at the same time a trickle up instead of a trickle down effect, a kind of social Keynesianism providing for growth from the base of society and having a positive social impact on poverty. The recent negotiation between Argentina and Spain allowed the pardon of part of the first country’s debt to creditors from the second, under the condition that the amount forgiven be used in education, especially in programs such as Bolsa Escola.

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Migration Peace: Internal Attractiveness

One cannot imagine a democratic globalization in a world that has succeeded in the free circulation of goods but is increasingly erecting barriers to hinder the circulation of people across national frontiers. The world will not be global and democratic in a planetary scale so long as strong discrimination against migration persists. Almost the same number of people die each year trying to cross the border between the United States and Mexico as in all the forty-three years of the Berlin Wall.3 Thus crossing the golden curtain is much more dangerous and deadly than crossing the Iron Curtain. At the same time, it is normal to imagine that rich countries with small territories will try to defend themselves both culturally and socially. The equation of trying to globalize demography while protecting the national rights of each people, including the rich, will only be solved with adequate policies, so that each poor nation finds the way of progress and survival within its own frontiers. The yearly salary of a border police officer in the United States would enable Bolsa Escola to finance school for 1,000 children in Honduras, under the condition that these children do not miss classes and that their parents do not leave them in order to migrate. The scholarship and the parents’ presence are moral reasons enough to decrease the need for and to justify the prohibition of migration. An international program for the improvement of teachers’ salaries in countries with a low-income population majority would be able to stop part of the migration of local youth in search of better salaries. Providing equipment for these schools would not only keep parents and their children from migrating but would also create jobs in the countries that manufacture the same equipment.

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Instead of tolerating border violence that hinders migration or the negative consequences of liberal migration policies, democratic globalization must follow an internationally financed program of internal attractiveness within each country, so that migration will no longer be needed. Donor countries will find that the financial and moral benefits of an internal attractiveness program more than pay off its cost.

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Technological Peace: The Fight Against Epidemics

The global world faces two tragedies: a tragedy that ravages the world population through natural calamities and the moral tragedy of the indifference of the rest of the world that watches. The fight against epidemics, hunger, and illiteracy is a fight for the globalization of access to technological advances. Globalization will be neither democratic nor ethical while the benefits derived from science and technology in the essential social sectors are still restricted to only a small segment of the population. Democratic globalization will require science and technology in the fields of health, education, and agriculture to benefit all people. Globalized democracy requires a worldwide program to fight epidemics, which, though affecting mainly the poor population, also threaten citizens in rich countries. The fight against poliomyelitis was an example of defending the interests of the rich that also protected the poor. Although HIV is not transmitted by air like the poliomyelitis virus, thus allowing the well-informed rich to adopt prophylactic measures, it still is a threat to all. In a global democracy, a problem that affects 37.8 million people, 66 percent4 of whom live in Africa, cannot be regarded as a national issue, especially in the case of those countries lacking resources to face the disease. HIV/AIDS needs to be regarded as a world issue, not merely a national one. Victory against epidemics, especially AIDS, is within reach. Antiretrovirals already exist, and the vaccine is in development, cost being the main issue. Epidemics cannot be turned into a profit vector; however, when pharmaceutical companies sell vaccines at high prices, their profits spur technological advances and should not, therefore, be reduced to further social values. The end of patent rights may hinder scientific advance, with still deeper and more serious results for the future of mankind, in terms of delay in the invention of new drugs, but

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patent protection can also obstruct the dissemination of drugs, with shameful, inhuman, and immoral consequences. This equation can be solved by the use of public funds in countries with a high-income population majority to cover research expenses by private companies in the health area, as happens in the military arena. A worldwide program for the purchase and distribution of drugs would maintain incentives for technological advances and guarantee immediate access to drugs. The cost of such a program would be well within the bounds of the world wealth and would be translated into a positive form of globalization, not just in terms of trade but in terms of curing diseases. The world will certainly face other epidemics, either from biological causes or as a result of natural disasters, as was the case of the Asian tsunami on December 26, 2004. The 9/11 disaster, the result of a criminal terrorist attack causing about 3,000 casualties, has gone down in history as a date from which the rich world started to mobilize billions of dollars to avoid similar political tragedies. But 12/26, which killed about 300,000 people, should go down in history as a date from which rich countries started spending more to avoid the consequences of similar natural disasters. September 11 marks the beginning of terrorist social epidemics; December 26 deserves the same attention in order for the world to avoid the consequences of natural disasters. Death by hunger, life without education, and life in penury should also be regarded as catastrophes as serious as tsunamis, terrorism, or AIDS.

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Cultural Peace: Tolerant Globalization

Access to universal culture has always been one of the main objectives of humankind, as much as access to science and technology. However, considering the manner in which globalization is spreading around the cultural world, what we see now is not access to universal culture, but the global domination by the stronger culture, the culture of countries with a high-income population majority, disadvantaging other countries to the point of ethnocide. From the cultural standpoint, globalization is doing on a global scale and in a few decades, in the beginning of the twenty-first century, what was done much more slowly at the beginning of the sixteenth century in the newly discovered

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countries of the Americas: the destruction of native cultures. The result is the impoverishment of humankind by a globalization process that does not respect diversity, destroys our heritage, and therefore is not democratic but is rather the result of a preglobalization archaic democracy. This is what the United States and Europe have been doing, naturally sometimes by virtue of the seduction exerted by their inventions, but sometimes by means of military intervention or the mere threat of it. The world will not be global and democratic if it is not tolerant. The intolerance that the United States has exerted upon the world, especially upon the Islamic world—as Europe was intolerant toward the native peoples of the Americas—is a form of global social dictatorship. Likewise, intolerance cannot be considered an internal affair of individual countries. Certain religious groups impose their worldviews and their rites upon others. If the West is now the main destroyer of cultures, one must not forget that it was Islamic groups in Afghanistan who attempted to destroy all cultures that departed from the rules of more orthodox Islamism.

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Security Peace: The Fight Against All Forms of Violence

Tolerance of other cultures and respect for diversity will be fundamental tools for building world global democracy, especially for the reduction of terrorism. But world peace will not be achieved automatically. In the coming years, globalization must include a strong international collaboration against all forms of violence. The most visible form of physical violence is terrorism. With its indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations, terrorism—regardless of the political cause it defends—negates global democracy. Given technological advances that will inevitably find their way into the hands of individuals and groups, terrorism will soon employ nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, which will make the present catastrophes look like minor accidents. There is no global democracy without a global fight against all kinds of terrorism. At the same time, it will be necessary to stand up to many forms of domestic violence: racial violence, gender violence, and the violence of child labor and child prostitution.

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Green Peace: Protecting the Future

Globalization and its technological development have globalized the destruction of the environment. Different from the historical depredation of local environments, the world today plunders the whole planet. Its most outstanding example is global warming, a menace to the future of life and civilization itself. If the consumption and production models and the indiscriminate use of technical instruments continue, global civilization will be doomed. Present civilization will benefit only the current generation or maybe one or two future generations up to the end of the twenty-first century; the next generations will be doomed. Globalization has triggered a war among generations; the current generation voraciously enjoys the products available through technology and trade without any commitment to the sustainability of future generations. We cannot imagine a global democracy exclusively oriented to the desires of the present generation. Therefore, there is no global democracy without agreements subordinating the production and the use of technology to the interests of future generations. The Kyoto Protocol was a first step, but still a minor one and poorly respected. More than an agreement, we need a plan of peace with future generations, but it will not be achieved by a civilization that bases its progress on increases in consumption and gross domestic product without valuing nature.

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Moral Peace: Globalization of Values

Civilization has gained the power to destroy nature on a planetary scale, but decisionmaking mechanisms are still held hostage to short deadlines and national borders. Given the catastrophic power of some modern technologies, global democracy would require the globalization of decisionmaking power, something utterly impossible since the necessity of tolerance requires respect for national diversity. Although it has been defined by national policies until this point, democracy today needs to develop a planetary ethic. The nuclear bomb brought to all nations a responsibility that was assumed by means of several agreements for the suspension of nuclear tests and for the reduction of nuclear weapons; the ecological crisis led to the Kyoto Protocol. The United States has no moral authority to prevent another country from building nuclear power plants or nuclear

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bombs while it does not submit to the global humanistic yearning to prevent its economy from triggering global warming, which would have much more dramatic consequences than detonation of a nuclear bomb. The solution is to treat the Earth as a huge condominium, where each nation owns a share and each nation respects the rules common to all mankind. Just as an apartment owner is entitled to use it but may not set it on fire or leave the tap on, likewise no country should be free to destroy its natural resources and freely use its technological assets. Following the path of agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons and other agreements that resulted in the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, it is likewise important to define ethical rules for all countries on the use of science and technology, human rights, the use of public resources, the struggle against corruption and terrorism, and the struggle for social inclusion and poverty relief.

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Political Peace: The Globalization of Politics

Global ethics will not spread unless politics transcends the borders of each country. However, only under a hypothetical planetary democracy would international parties be established. International dissemination of communism proved to be a tool to serve the Soviet Union’s national objectives. All other attempts at international dissemination were limited to debates with politicians with similar political positions. It is the yearning for national policies that incorporate planetary ethics that causes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to spread globally. While waiting for a planetary democracy and international parties, global democracy will have to use NGOs’ growing role as a tool of political and social interference to shape international values. International NGOs can be instruments of balance in a global world where political parties are purely national, global companies seek an immediate microeconomic profit, and international churches offer a spiritual life in “the next world.”

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Notes

1. The World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, and ILO evaluated Bolsa Escola. Both Bill Clinton in his autobiography and George Soros in his book George Soros on Globalization have commented about it.

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2. Shashi Tharoor, India from Midnight to the Millennium (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 79–111. 3. “The giant fence sealing Mexico from America stands in contrast to the Statue of Liberty. In the 43 years that the Berlin Wall shut Communism’s refugees in, it accounted for 239 deaths. America does not shoot migrants, yet in 1991–2001, at least 1,700 people died crossing its border deserts.” “Accidents of Birth,” The Economist, February 19–25, 2005, p. 81. 4. UN AIDS data.

17 Democracy and “The End of History” Revisited Francis Fukuyama

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was at the founding meeting of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw five years ago. The Community of Democracies is an extremely important international institution. I was sorry back in 2000 that the French did not give it stronger support, and I have been sorry over the past four years that the George W. Bush administration has not given it stronger support because the idea of this kind of community with shared values and institutions is critical for the promotion of democracy in those countries that have weak institutions. Asked to revisit my article “The End of History,” I will simply restate what I was arguing, now some sixteen years ago, and then address three particular challenges to my argument. The thesis has been challenged on virtually every conceivable ground, but over the years I have come to regard three as particularly important. The first challenge concerns political Islam, the second pertains to democracy at the international level, and the final challenge concerns the autonomy of politics and the need for institutions as a foundation for both development and democracy. What was “The End of History” all about? It was a thesis about modernization. It said that there is a coherent process of political, economic, and social development that takes place. Most people around the world believe in this idea whether they realize it or not. In fact, most progressive intellectuals in the world up until the 1980s believed that there was indeed this process of historical evolution, and they believed in the idea of an end of history, but they also believed that the end of history was some sort of communism. That was Karl Marx’s idea. It was certainly not original to me. In its basic structure, my thesis was really taken from G. W. F. Hegel. 115

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My simple observation in 1988 was that we were moving in a coherent direction as we modernized but also that we were not ever going to get to socialism. In other words, what the Marxists called bourgeois liberal democracy is really what seems to lie at the terminus of this historical process of modernization. Certain people deny that modernization exists. But that denial is proven wrong by the fact of people voting with their feet—that is, every year millions of people try to get from traditional or less developed societies and migrate to more developed societies. And there is a very small degree of migration in the other direction, which indicates that modernization is this very powerful and coherent phenomenon that is desired by many people around the world. The real debate is over the form that modernization takes. I have often been opposed to Samuel Huntington, a professor at Harvard University, who of course has written his famous thesis about the clash of civilizations. The differences between us can be overstated because, like him, I agree that culture is extremely important and that modern democracy did not simply arise out of nowhere. It came out of a European Christian civilization, and thus there are good reasons why democracy in a certain sense was a secularized form of the Christian doctrine of the universal equality of human beings. But where Huntington and I differ is in the longer-term question of whether there is a universal significance to these ideas despite their specific historical roots in one part of the world: whether having been invented and secularized in Europe, this doctrine of democracy has application to other peoples and other cultures, or whether it is something that simply will be applicable only to one cultural part of Europe and its settler offshoots. I simply do not believe the latter. Rather, democracy is like modern natural science in that it has a specific historical origin, but once discovered as a system, it is something that over time is desired by all people. Moreover, there is a mechanism or process that pushes the world in the direction of greater democracy. This mechanism is not like the inexorable machine of history that Marxists believe drives us from one stage of development to another. It is a much more complex process that sometimes goes forward and sometimes goes back but nevertheless always bears certain coherence. The process is driven by the development of modern science and technology. That is what ensures that we do not go around in circles. The steam engine, the internal combustion engine, nuclear weapons, the transistor—all of these inventions have certain consistent economic effects that create an

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economic world for us and that lead to the first engine of modernization, which is economic development, a fairly universal and coherent process. In turn, the political part of modernization is connected to economic development, but in a much looser way. The great sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset was one of the first to notice that there is a strong correlation between development and democracy. Indeed, it has been shown empirically that once you get above the level of about $6,000 dollars per capita gross domestic product, there are relatively few authoritarian countries and almost no cases of countries backsliding from democracy back into authoritarianism. Thus, there is a presumption that if economic modernization occurs, there is hope that over time democratic institutions will develop. Although President George W. Bush is right that there is a universal desire not to live under tyranny, for a people to actually live under democracy requires something more. It requires the development of institutions and a political mindset that we cannot take for granted. My main point, then, is that there is a broad process of modernization that spawns these institutions and worldview. However, I do not believe that there will be any kind of cultural convergence as countries modernize. I do not believe in Davos Man as the end point of historical evolution. I do not believe that Coca Cola, McDonald’s, or indeed the specific democratic institutions that we enjoy in the United States or the relationship between state and market that we happen to choose in the United States are necessarily a pattern for anybody else. I believe that Europeans have a different version of these institutions and of the interrelationships among the institutions. The Japanese and Koreans also have different ways of reconciling the twin principles of liberty and equality. In fact, at the end of history we have a fair amount of variance in the way that we organize our democratic societies. But this variety does not undermine the observation that at this point, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is very hard to envision alternative forms of sociopolitical organization that are conceivable for a society that wants to be modern. Nothing that has happened in the sixteen years since I first wrote my article has really changed that idea. Now let me talk about the three challenges to my argument. The first has to do with Islam, democracy, and political Islamism. There has been a de facto Muslim exception to the broad pattern of democratic development, particularly in the “third wave.” There

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are hopeful signs of movement, but by and large the Islamic world remains an exception. The key questions are whether this exception is deeply rooted in culture and whether the exception will be sustained into the future. There is a real challenge posed by political Islam, but this challenge must not be regarded as an outgrowth of the religion of Islam. That is, the challenge is not a cultural phenomenon. It is fundamentally a political phenomenon that makes use of religion for political ends. In this regard, political Islam is similar to how fascism as a political doctrine drew out of European culture certain of its core ideas and symbols. So the extremist politics currently stemming from Islam is really not a reflection of any kind of fundamental clash of civilizations. Everything I know about a complex civilization— whether it be an Islamic, Christian, or Confucian civilization—tells me that it can be interpreted in a whole variety of ways. Mali, Senegal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Turkey—these are all Muslim states that have had reasonable success with democracy. And so cultural determinists who argue that there is some fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy are simply wrong. In fact, a country like Iran, which has experienced an Islamic dictatorship for the past generation, may in fact be the country to lead that part of the world out of that form of religious politics because political Islam has been an abject failure in those countries where it has come to power—for example, Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. I believe that we take this movement seriously only because of its connection with weapons of mass destruction. We have “democratized” military technology; therefore it has unfortunately become something that we must take very seriously. But as a political movement, Islamic radicalism is not nearly as powerful as the kinds of political challenges posed by totalitarian ideologies in the twentieth century. This is not to say that there is not a very great problem in developed democracies in accommodating Muslim minorities, especially in Western Europe. The ability of those societies to integrate culturally different minorities poses a great political challenge. It is one that people in the Western Hemisphere have tended to deal with a bit better. In many respects, the internal challenge of dealing with de facto multicultural societies is really greater than the external challenge of terrorism. The second issue regarding my original thesis is represented by the gulf that emerged between Europe and the United States over the Iraq war: the question of democracy at an international level. The basis of that disagreement was a European idea that we are actually

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engaged in a struggle to, in a sense, add another stage to history: the creation of international institutions that will democratize the relationship among countries. We have developed over the past 200 years good institutions of accountability, but they function within vertical stovepipes that we call nation-states. We know how to create democracy within a nationstate. What we do not understand very well is how to create democratic accountability between nations. This problem is magnified due to the enormous size and hegemonic power of the United States, and it is the source of that country’s difficulties in the world right now. The United States can affect countries around the world militarily, economically, culturally, and they do not have the power to affect the United States in return. Many non-Americans say they wish that they could vote in US elections, but US presidents feel that they are accountable only to US voters. This is a problem that needs to be solved in the next generation. The United Nations is part of that solution, but it is not anything like a complete solution. The world greatly lacks institutions of democratic accountability between nations. We need a great deal of creativity in the coming years to populate the world with different kinds of institutions that overlap and compete and will provide a combination of efficacy and legitimacy that has been lacking both when the United States acts on its own and when the United Nations acts on behalf of the world community. The third and final issue concerning “The End of History” is what I call the autonomy of politics. As discussed above, there is a very nice story to tell about how economic development will tend to produce democratic institutions at a relatively high level of development. If you can succeed in industrializing, then there is a powerful movement toward a middle class and the spread of democracy. But the problem is how to get economic development started. This is a problem that was alluded to in Chapter 16. And here something interesting has happened in the thinking about development in the past ten to fifteen years: students of political and economic development have in a sense converged around a consensus that the fundamental precondition for either political or economic development is the presence of institutions. It is not sufficient simply to have the right macroeconomic policies in the absence of property rights or the rule of law, those basic institutions that provide public order and security. The problem is that these institutions must be created before economic development can happen. One of the great challenges is that

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although developed democracies understand how such institutions came into being in the West and how they function, we (here I am speaking as an American and as a resident of a developed democracy) have had a tremendous difficulty in understanding how to either transfer or more properly help other countries create institutions in areas where they do not exist at present. This is of course a problem both for failed states and for states that really do not have even the basis for stable politics. But it is also a problem for a lot of middle-income developing countries that have democratic elections but a very weak rule of law—an absence of those basic state institutions that are necessary for both full-fledged democracy and for economic development. And so although we in the West have wanted to make the state smaller and less smothering in terms of its scope, a large part of our current agenda should nevertheless be to make the state stronger in its provision of those basic services that only states can provide. This is the agenda that lies ahead, and it is both intellectual and political. It is intellectual because we do not adequately understand a lot of the problems that we face, and it is political because we need common action in order to implement that better understanding once it is achieved. I believe that the Community of Democracies is a key institution for addressing this dual agenda.

Appendix 1 The Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies

Warsaw, Poland, June 27, 2000

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e the participants1 from: Republic of Albania, People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Argentine Republic, Republic of Armenia, Australia, Republic of Austria, Azerbaijani Republic, People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Kingdom of Belgium, Belize, Republic of Benin, Republic of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Botswana, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Republic of Cape Verde, Republic of Chile, Republic of Colombia, Republic of Costa Rica, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican Republic, Republic of Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of El Salvador, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Finland, Georgia, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Guatemala, Republic of Haiti, Hellenic Republic, Republic of Hungary, Republic of Iceland, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic, Japan, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Korea, State of Kuwait, Republic of Latvia, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality of Liechtenstein, Republic of Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Republic of Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Principality of Monaco, Mongolia, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of Mozambique, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom of Nepal, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Nicaragua, Republic of the Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Republic of 121

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Panama, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Paraguay, Republic of Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Poland, Portuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Republic of Slovenia, Republic of South Africa, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss Confederation, United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Republic of Yemen, in the Community of Democracies Ministerial Meeting convened in Warsaw, 26–27 June 2000: Expressing our common adherence to the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Reaffirming our commitment to respect relevant instruments of international law, Emphasizing the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy, Recognizing the universality of democratic values, Hereby agree to respect and uphold the following core democratic principles and practices: • The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, as expressed by exercise of the right and civic duties of citizens to choose their representatives through regular, free and fair elections with universal and equal suffrage, open to multiple parties, conducted by secret ballot, monitored by independent electoral authorities, and free of fraud and intimidation. • The right of every person to equal access to public service and to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. • The right of every person to equal protection of the law, without any discrimination as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. • The right of every person to freedom of opinion and of expression, including to exchange and receive ideas and information through any media, regardless of frontiers.

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• The right of every person to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. • The right of every person to equal access to education. • The right of the press to collect, report and disseminate information, news and opinions, subject only to restrictions necessary in a democratic society and prescribed by law, while bearing in mind evolving international practices in this field. • The right of every person to respect for private family life, home, correspondence, including electronic communications, free of arbitrary or unlawful interference. • The right of every person to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including to establish or join their own political parties, civic groups, trade unions or other organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to allow them to operate freely on a basis of equal treatment before the law. • The right of persons belonging to minorities or disadvantaged groups to equal protection of the law, and the freedom to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and use their own language. • The right of every person to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention; to be free from torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; and to receive due process of law, including to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. • That the aforementioned rights, which are essential to full and effective participation in a democratic society, be enforced by a competent, independent and impartial judiciary open to the public, established and protected by law. • That elected leaders uphold the law and function strictly in accordance with the constitution of the country concerned and procedures established by law. • The right of those duly elected to form a government, assume office and fulfill the term of office as legally established. • The obligation of an elected government to refrain from extraconstitutional actions, to allow the holding of periodic elections and to respect their results, and to relinquish power when its legal mandate ends. • That government institutions be transparent, participatory and fully accountable to the citizenry of the country and take steps to combat corruption, which corrodes democracy. • That the legislature be duly elected and transparent and accountable to the people.

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• That civilian, democratic control over the military be established and preserved. • That all human rights—civil, cultural, economic, political and social—be promoted and protected as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. The Community of Democracies affirms our determination to work together to promote and strengthen democracy, recognizing that we are at differing stages in our democratic development. We will cooperate to consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions, with due respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Our goal is to support adherence to common democratic values and standards, as outlined above. To that end, our governments hereby agree to abide by these principles in practice, and to support one another in meeting these objectives which we set for ourselves today. We will seek to strengthen institutions and processes of democracy. We appreciate the value of exchanging experiences in the consolidation of democracy and identifying best practices. We will promote discussions and, where appropriate, create forums on subjects relevant to democratic governance for the purpose of continuing and deepening our dialogue on democratization. We would focus our deliberations on our common principles and values rather than extraneous bilateral issues between members. We resolve jointly to cooperate to discourage and resist the threat to democracy posed by the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments. We resolve to strengthen cooperation to face the transnational challenges to democracy, such as state-sponsored, cross-border and other forms of terrorism; organized crime; corruption; drug trafficking; illegal arms trafficking; trafficking in human beings and money laundering, and to do so in accordance with respect for human rights of all persons and for the norms of international law. We will encourage political leaders to uphold the values of tolerance and compromise that underpin effective democratic systems, and to promote respect for pluralism so as to enable societies to retain their multi-cultural character, and at the same time maintain stability and social cohesion. We reject ethnic and religious hatred, violence and other forms of extremism. We will also promote civil society, including women’s organizations, non-governmental organizations, labor and business associations, and independent media in

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their exercise of their democratic rights. Informed participation by all elements of society, men and women, in a country’s economic and political life, including by persons belonging to minority groups, is fundamental to a vibrant and durable democracy. We will help to promote government-to-government and peopleto-people linkages and promote civic education and literacy, including education for democracy. In these ways we will strengthen democratic institutions and practices and support the diffusion of democratic norms and values. We will work with relevant institutions and international organizations, civil society and governments to coordinate support for new and emerging democratic societies. We recognize the importance our citizens place on the improvement of living conditions. We also recognize the mutually-reinforcing benefits the democratic process offers to achieving sustained economic growth. To that end, we will seek to assist each other in economic and social development, including eradication of poverty, as an essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development. We will collaborate on democracy-related issues in existing international and regional institutions, forming coalitions and caucuses to support resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic governance. This will help to create an external environment conducive to democratic development.

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Note

1. Following the Warsaw Meeting, the governments of Honduras, Suriname, Guyana, and Yugoslavia signed the declaration.—Ed.

Appendix 2 The Seoul Plan of Action: Democracy—Investing for Peace and Prosperity

Seoul, Republic of Korea November 12, 2002

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e, the Participants in the Second Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies held in Seoul on 10–12 November 2002, affirm that the essential elements of representative democracy in all its forms are: respect for human rights—civil, political, economic, social and cultural—including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion and conscience; access to and free exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the holding of periodic free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage monitored by independent election authorities; freedom of association including the right to form independent political parties; separation of powers, especially an independent judiciary; and constitutional subordination of all state institutions, including the military, to the legally-constituted civilian authority. We also reaffirm the Warsaw Declaration which includes our common commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and fundamental principles of international law. Recognizing the universality of these democratic values, the dedication of the Community of Democracies to promote and defend democracy, and the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected under democracy, we are committed to the continuous development of democracy domestically and the promotion of democracy regionally and globally. We, working as individual countries, within 127

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our regions and globally, adopt this Seoul Plan of Action with a view to accomplishing the following:

1. Regional Action Recognizing that democratic countries are stronger economic, security, and political partners, and that the promotion of democratic ideals strengthens regional stability and cooperation, we intend to promote regional democratic progress, individually, through regional institutions, and through various measures including: 1-1. In each respective region, developing and fully implementing regional instruments which call upon regional partners to build democratic institutions, adhere to democratic principles, and provide assistance in this field to states which are in need of assistance using proper regional instruments; 1-2. Developing regional human rights and democracy monitoring mechanisms in order to consolidate regional potentialities to promote and protect human rights and democratic principles as well as to promote dialogue between countries on those issues and to remedy their violations; 1-3. Improving diplomatic engagement and dialogue with countries where respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and universally-accepted principles of democracy are in question, in order to highlight international concerns and promote democratic change; 1-4. Fighting corruption and upholding government integrity and good governance. In addition, we further encourage states to consider various measures which may include: 1-5. Convening regional meetings of representatives of the government, political parties and civil society to: • Review the state of democracy, including the human rights situation in the region; • Share experiences and identify best practices in the region; • Utilize lessons learned, including those applicable from other regions, to encourage and assist emerging democracies to develop

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and strengthen adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and universally-accepted principles of democracy, as well as to regionally-agreed upon democracy charters; • Develop or strengthen mechanisms in regional organizations’ charters and procedures that promote democracy, inter alia, the Inter-American Democratic Charter approved on Sept 11, 2001 by American states, adopted following the appeal for regional initiatives included in the Warsaw Declaration. 1-6. Engaging regional and extra-regional partners to assist in democratic development and institution building.

2. Responding to Threats to Democracy Recognizing the need to protect against threats to democracy including terrorism, the Community of Democracies may outline a series of measures that could be used with full respect for international law by countries individually, together or as members of international or regional organizations to promote, defend, strengthen or restore democratic institutions. To prevent or respond to scenarios of violence against a democratic government, disruption of constitutional rule, persistent unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order, or support for terrorism, countries may need to resort, preferably within the framework of regional or international organizations, to a range of measures, including but not limited to: 2-1. In the particular case of terrorism, suspending bilateral relations, commerce with or aid to those states supporting terrorism and aid, support or linkages to non-state organizations supporting terrorism and, as appropriate, upon determination by the UN Security Council; 2-2. Adopting and complying with all their obligations in the 12 UN Conventions against Terrorism, and the mechanism adopted by the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to Res. 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism (the Counter-Terrorism Committee). 2-3. Creating a cadre of trained experts able to assist countries facing a threat to their democracy; 2-4. Developing monitoring systems for democratic crises so that early assistance can be provided to support democracy;

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2-5. Considering convening countries when needed to coordinate diplomatic or other efforts or political mediation; 2-6. Providing recommendations based on an on-site analysis in order to uphold democratic principles and human rights; 2-7. Supporting actions through rapid consideration mechanisms by regional and international organizations; 2-8. Enhancing existing regional and international instruments and democracy clauses, e.g. by strengthening positive economic incentives, and by preventing not only ruptures in but also the deterioration of democracy; 2-9. Offering good offices to assist, as needed, governments, other political actors, civil society, and public institutions to produce an accord committing to prescribed remedial measures; 2-10. Providing long-term technical support or monitors to strengthen democratic institutions, election process and reform efforts; In accordance with the principles articulated in the Warsaw Declaration, the Community of Democracies, through as wide consultations as possible with its participants, will not include those countries where there is currently a disruption of constitutional rule or severe persistent erosion of or lack of essential elements of democracy.

3. Education for Democracy Recognizing that education at all levels is a fundamental component for ensuring citizens are aware of their rights and civic duties as members of a democratic society, equipped with the basic skills for effective participation in public affairs, and that an educated citizenry is essential to the development, maintenance, and strengthening of democratic institutions and growth, we intend to encourage States and all relevant levels of government in our respective countries to promote a culture of democracy through education for democracy by: 3-1. Strengthening public education through: • Encouraging the development of human capacity to empower an educated public who can participate in the national decisionmaking process;

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• Seeking to ensure universal primary education; • Adapting public education curricula to further incorporate the promotion and understanding of democracy, and democratic principles and institutions; • Providing training to teachers to enable them to better inform students at all learning levels of democratic principles and human rights; • Seeking to guarantee full access to education for all citizens, with specific emphasis on such access for women and girls. 3-2. Organizing public information campaigns regarding democracy, civil rights and civic responsibilities. 3-3. Encouraging the media to play a role in public education and in spreading democratic values.

4. Promoting Stronger Democracies through Good Governance Recognizing that transparency and accountability are a democratic government’s responsibility to its citizens, we intend to build strong democratic institutions and practices that are the backbone of good governance through: 4-1. Promoting the rule of law by: • Seeking to ensure that government decision-making is open and transparent and that citizens have access, including via electronic means, to information concerning government action, laws, court decisions, procurement decisions and legislative proceedings and establishing freedom of information legislation; • Implementing or strengthening, if necessary, constitutional and other safeguards for the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, including establishing procedures to ensure a professional corps of judges; • Establishing any mechanisms that may be needed to ensure high standards of competence and conduct from prosecutors, defence attorneys and other members of the legal profession; • Establishing the necessary legal, judicial, and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that basic democratic principles and human rights are fully enforced, particularly through the development

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and implementation of regular training procedures for military and police; • Promoting implementation of good governance practices and enforcement of anticorruption measures and providing support for negotiations to finalize a UN convention against corruption; • Seeking to ensure open and transparent budgetary procedures that provide for oversight by an independent legislature; • Encouraging the involvement of civil society in the process of governance at the local, national and international levels. 4-2. Alleviating poverty and promoting economic growth by: • Strengthening good governance as a critical foundation for economic development; • Adopting policies which prioritize and promote sustainable social and economic development; • Promoting transparency and openness; • Stimulating social policies to fight exclusion, with due consideration to gender perspective and social inequalities derived from racial discrimination; • Encouraging popular participation in national economic development and the decision-making processes; • Recognizing the urgent need to develop ways to strengthen and sustain democracies to address social demands, boost economic development and support democratic stability and good governance. 4-3. Building and sustaining a strong political party system and a healthy civil society by: • Creating a favorable environment, including a strong legal framework, for the development of political parties and their free engagement in political developments, elections, and responding to the interests of various segments of society; • Establishing mechanisms to promote transparency in political parties’ financing; • Guaranteeing freedom of expression for individuals, including media outlets and journalists, engaging in the public exchange of ideas; • Establishing constitutional protection of and mechanisms for the involvement of civil society in the governance process and developing a regular government-civil society dialogue;

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• Supporting non-governmental groups that inform citizens of their rights and responsibilities, that help engage citizens with their government, that advocate democratic values and that assist people in developing basic skills needed for effective participation in public affairs; • Encouraging the efforts of the public and private sectors to achieve equality between women and men in their ranks, including in terms of their participation in decision-making bodies; • Protecting and promoting the equal rights of women and men to engage in political activities, including membership in political parties and trade unions; • Providing opportunities for citizens and civil society organizations to participate in government at the local level, including through town councils.

5. Volunteerism: Toward a Stronger Civil Society Recognizing that active involvement in the community strengthens an individual, those served, and the community as a whole; contributes to a vibrant civil society; and encourages partnership among citizens, civil society organizations, and governments, we intend to promote volunteerism by: 5-1. Encouraging our citizens to volunteer service domestically or internationally in the interest of promoting democracy and civil society; 5-2. Minimizing obstacles or legal limitations to volunteerism; 5-3. Urging public and private sector groups to encourage their workforces to volunteer and to forge partnerships with volunteer activities; 5-4. Highlighting the importance of volunteerism.

6. Coordinating Democracy Assistance As democracy assistance has increased over the past decade, it has raised the need to ensure effective coordination in order to multiply effectiveness, create synergy, and avoid duplication in some areas while other important areas are under-assisted. While coordination at the country level has improved in certain instances, there is room for

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continued improvement for democracy promotion policies. The Community of Democracies intends to: 6-1. Identify assistance methods including those that most effectively facilitate free and fair elections, help countries develop an independent judiciary and accountable government institutions, and strengthen political parties, the free press, civil society groups, and a democratic political culture.

7. Procedures The Convening Group will continue to meet regularly and be available to offer support and advice to participating states for actions taken within regional or international organizations following and based on the valuable experience gained in the past two years. In close consultation and cooperation with the Community of Democracies’ interested participants, Convening Group will encourage the formation, among others, of coalitions and caucuses to support democracy. The Convening Group thereby aims to identify means of facilitating action, sharing information about developments of and to discuss means of promoting and consolidating democracy in the respective regions. The Convening Group will also be available as a means of bridging regions and regional organizations to promote the sharing of best practices and ideas. The Convening Group will follow up on the progress in the implementation of the Seoul Plan of Action and report to the Third Ministerial Conference.

Appendix 3 The Santiago Ministerial Commitment: Cooperating for Democracy

W

e, the Participants in the Third Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies held in Santiago on April 28–30, 2005 approve:

Reaffirming the vital importance of the observance of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Bill of Human Rights, as well as the fundamental principles of international law. Recommitting to act in accordance with universally recognized standards of human rights with the purpose of strengthening dialogue and cooperation between states, peoples and individuals. Reaffirming further our commitment to the “Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies,” approved at the First Ministerial Conference on June 27, 2000 in Warsaw, and to the implementation of the “Seoul Plan of Action: Investing for Peace and Prosperity,” and the “Community of Democracies Statement on Terrorism,” adopted at the Second Ministerial Conference, held in Seoul on November 16, 2002, declare that: We renew our conviction that democracy, sustainable development, peace, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social, and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. We reaffirm that education in human rights and democracy is essential for participation in the democratic process and governance. We recognize, in line with the Seoul Plan of Action, that respect for human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural— 135

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including freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of religion and conscience; access to and free exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the holding of periodic free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage monitored by independent election authorities; freedom of association, including the right to form independent political parties; separation of powers, especially an independent judiciary; and constitutional subordination of all state institutions, including the military, to the legally-constituted civilian authority, are essential elements of democracy. We are also convinced that democracy cannot be sustained without strict adherence to the principle of non-discrimination, including protection for persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples, and persistent efforts to eliminate extreme poverty, underdevelopment, marginalization, economic disparities, and social exclusion. We reaffirm our commitment to uphold the values of tolerance and compromise that underpin effective democratic systems and to promote respect for pluralism, so as to enable societies to retain their multicultural characters. We firmly reject ethnic and religious hatred, violence, and other forms of extremism. We take note of the significant expansion in the number of democracies over the last half century and welcome the progress made thus far towards achieving goals and objectives contained in the Warsaw Declaration and the Seoul Plan of Action. We believe that increasing the number of democratic nations and supporting the development and strengthening of emerging democracies helps to build a safer world in which individuals, women and men equally, can live freely and in an environment of peace, stability, and wellbeing characterized by respect for the rule of law. To that end, we reiterate our commitment to supporting processes of transition to democracy, to the strengthening of institutions and democratic processes, at the national, regional and international levels, and to working in partnership with those promoting democracy, including civil society. The democratization of the multilateral system, particularly the United Nations (UN), is the necessary counterpart to democratic practice within nations. Every nation that practices democracy must strive to ensure that in international affairs decision-making is equally open, transparent, legitimate and equitably representative. In the Millennium Declaration, all members States of the UN have pledged to strengthen their capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy. In this context, we emphasize that the

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UN plays a central role in achieving such objectives and we pledge to support the further expansion and strengthening of its activities to broaden and reinforce democratic trends throughout the world. Given that democratic governance is a key element for development, security and human rights, our governments will actively engage in the discussion of UN reform initiated by the Secretary-General’s recent report “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all.” Truthful to the guiding tenets expressed in the Warsaw Declaration and with the aim of continuing implementing the Seoul Plan of Action, we therefore adopt this Commitment, which represents the agenda for the activities of the Community of Democracies based upon reflections on the situation of democracy worldwide at the dawn of the 21st Century, reiterating our firm will to promote and strengthen democracy domestically, regionally and globally, in particular through appropriate international organizations and institutions.

I. Democratic Governance and Civil Society We are committed to enhancing the participation of a dynamic civil society at the domestic and international level, and we encourage non-governmental organizations who are actively promoting activities to strengthen and support democracies and respect for human rights worldwide. To that end we will, 1. Promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms to foster the empowerment of a vital civil society and the elimination of all forms of discrimination and intolerance. 2. Encourage a culture of tolerance, actively promoting dialogue and mutual respect, by developing educational and other programs aimed at the prevention of violations of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 3. Cooperate and build partnerships with civil society in pursuit of the rule of law, human rights, democratic governance and institution building. Promote regular dialogue between governmental and civil society actors, to exchange ideas on strengthening domestic democratic development, effectively fighting corruption, promoting and protecting human rights, upholding the government’s integrity and good governance, fighting poverty, promoting transparency and access to information via free

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media, promoting development and dialogue at the international level to support democracy in regional and international fora. 4. Promote an environment for the strengthening, democratization, innovation and modernization of political parties and other political organizations, in order to achieve a democracy in which citizens are full participants. Special attention will be paid to the implementation of free and fair elections, including the transparent and impartial administration of elections, and establishing a transparent system for their financing. 5. Encourage the full participation of women on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, as a fundamental element in the promotion and exercise of a democratic culture. 6. Affirm that democracy demands an active participation of young people. We express our commitment to promote among youth a set of democratic values and we urge all countries to implement strategies, policies, programs and concrete measures designed to foster education for democracy and encourage the contribution of youth in all areas of society. 7. Acknowledge that the promotion and strengthening of democratic governance is a shared responsibility of all public authorities, civil society and political parties. 8. Welcome the work of the Non-Governmental Process of the Community of Democracies as a significant contribution to the government and civil society dialogue and we encourage its participants to support the implementation of this Ministerial Commitment and participate in future Ministerial Meetings of the Community of Democracies as appropriate.

II. Poverty, Development and Democratic Governance We recognize the importance our citizens place on the improvement of living conditions. We also recognize the mutually reinforcing benefits that democratic process offers to achieve sustained economic growth and poverty eradication. We recognize the importance of the progressive realization, in all countries, of the economic, social, and cultural rights as constituting a solid basis for the economic and political empowerment, including the progressive improvement of the quality of life of all individuals.

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We reaffirm the principles outlined in the Monterrey Consensus: good governance at both national and international levels is essential for sustainable development. Sound economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people, and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained economic growth, poverty eradication, and employment creation. Freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human rights, including the right to development, and the rule of law, gender equality, market oriented policies, and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies are also essential and mutually reinforcing. In this sense, we identify as a main mission of the Community of Democracies the strengthening of democratic governance as an essential component of our efforts to alleviate poverty and support economic growth and sustainable human development and our common pursuit of growth, poverty eradication, inequality reduction and sustainable development, and achieving the internationally-agreed goals, including those contained in the Millennium Summit Declaration. To that end we will, 1. While emphasizing the primary responsibility that each country has for its own economic and social development, and the role of national policies and development strategies, underline the importance of a democratic, transparent, and enabling international economic environment. 2. Seek to assist each other in economic and social development, including eradication of poverty, as an essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development. 3. Work with international and regional development organizations and one another to improve the design and implementation of poverty reduction strategies which support democratic institution building. Countries that promote the rule of law, including respect for human rights and good governance, seek to eliminate corruption and invest in their people are in a position to better utilize development assistance and promote aid effectiveness. 4. Support concrete actions at the national, regional and international level on Financing for Development, in fulfillment of the commitments of the Monterrey Consensus and recall the commitments made to increase the level and effectiveness of official development assistance and encourage further progress towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product.

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5. Encourage efforts to enhance political support to chart a practical path for development financing and the promotion of development. We note with great interest the “Initiative Against Hunger and Poverty” and other related initiatives, as innovative programs to bridge the gap between political undertaking and development financing. 6. Foster the creation of jobs to confront poverty and strengthen democratic governance and promote the exercise of workers’ rights in the frame of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the protection of the rights of workers overseas. 7. Encourage men and women to develop their full potential to create an educated public who can participate in the national decision-making process by strengthening education, health services and other basic needs, by promoting the progressive realization of the right to education and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and strengthening other basic needs. 8. Jointly work for a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round, which is vital to economic development, empowerment and reduction in poverty. 9. Seek cooperation schemes which tend to achieve not only respect for civil and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights, so as to attain societies wherein all persons are able to fully exercise their rights. 10. Support the elaboration of an expanded and comprehensive response to the HIV-AIDS pandemic, which places an enormous drag on economic growth, weakens governance and security structures, and cooperate on seeking adequate resources to reverse the spread of HIV-AIDS.

III. Regional and Interregional Cooperation for Democratic Governance Guided by the tenet of due respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the Warsaw Declaration, we intend to continue promoting inter- and cross-regional democratic progress and cooperation, and to that end we will,

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1. Continue to contribute with technical expertise and cooperation to countries requesting assistance to build democratic institutions. 2. Promote dialogue among civilizations, to strengthen a culture of peace and respect for racial, religious and cultural diversity. 3. Utilize lessons learned, including those applicable from other regions, to encourage and assist emerging democracies to develop and strengthen adherence to human rights, fundamental freedoms and principles of democracy, as well as to regionally-agreed upon democracy charters. 4. Promote cooperation between regional and global organizations and institutions, in particular the United Nations, in their work to foster education for democracy. 5. Support the work of non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations for their contributions to the process of democratic consolidation in the world. 6. Commend the ten-year achievements of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and encourage it to continue working in partnership with international and national organizations, producing and applying comparative analysis and experience and expertise in democracy building and consolidation. 7. Support institutions operating within the framework of international law, from which practical assistance in democracy building is available to countries seeking access to experience, skills and resources. Support the setting up of the Budapest International Center for Democratic Transition. As part of the Center’s close working relationship with existing institutions, we appreciate its cooperation with the Community of Democracies and with relevant regional and international organizations.

IV. Democracy Caucus within the United Nations and Other Multilateral Fora to Support Democracy We will strengthen our process of informal consultation and coordination, wherever possible, at the UN and other international and regional organizations on democracy related issues, through, among others, informal coalitions and caucuses to support democracy. To that end we will seek to,

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1. Continue convening as an informal democracy caucus at the UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), in order to consult, coordinate possible actions and foster cooperation to deepen democratic governance, protect human rights, and to promote and improve democratic practices. 2. Consult and promote, where possible, on actions in relevant areas at the UN General Assembly, the CHR, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other bodies as needed, to strengthen the international mechanisms to support democracy, looking forward to the creation of the UN Democracy Fund. 3. Meet on a regular basis with Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have been active in advocating the promotion of democracy at the UN to facilitate an exchange of views about how best to build, strengthen, and assist their work. 4. Give serious consideration to the candidacy of countries contributing effectively to the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights worldwide in bodies which focus on elements of democratic governance. 5. Welcome the recognition of the work of the Community of Democracies, made by the UN Secretary General in his Report “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all.” 6. Encourage cooperation with the International Conference of New or Restored Democracies as an intergovernmental forum to promote and consolidate democratic governance in emerging and restored democracies. We welcome the holding of the 6th international Conference of New or Restored Democracies in Qatar in 2006.

V. Regional Organizations, Promoting Democracy, and Responding to National and Transnational Threats and Challenges to Democracy We express our determination to promote a series of effective, timely, and expeditious regional cooperation procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of democracy. To that end we will, 1. Encourage the exchange of experiences between regions, to develop or strengthen mechanisms in regional organizations’ charters and procedures that promote democracy, inter alia, the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

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2. Develop and fully implement regional instruments which call upon regional partners to build democratic institutions, adhere to democratic principles, protect human rights, promote education in human rights and democracy and provide assistance in this field to states which are in need of assistance and who have requested it. 3. Promote the exchange of regional organizations’ experiences, particularly in those areas outlined in the Seoul Plan of Action, in responding to threats to democracy, inter alia, the inter-American system for the protection of human rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 4. Resolve jointly to cooperate to discourage and resist the threat to democracy posed by the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments. 5. Support the improvement of governance throughout the world and the rebuilding of the rule of law and state institutions in war-torn countries. 6. Condemn in strong terms all acts of terrorism, irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious threats to peace, democracy and security. 7. Promote international cooperation to fight against terrorism, in compliance with obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. 8. Encourage the early adoption of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism by the UN, and for those countries which have not done so, seriously consider ratification of international instruments to fight against terrorism, and international conventions on human rights and international humanitarian law. 9. Welcome the “Madrid Agenda” as an outstanding contribution to encourage international cooperation against terrorism. 10. Encourage action against transnational threats, such as crossborder and state-sponsored terrorism, illegal exploitation of natural resources, organized crime, sea piracy, drug trafficking, illegal trafficking of weapons, trafficking in persons, in particular women and children, and money laundering. 11. Encourage and support the United Nations in its electoral assistance programs, including through national capacity building, constitution drafting and organizational experience for democracies in transition.

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VI. Follow-up In order to implement the above-mentioned commitments and widen the support of countries, high-level representatives of international organizations and civil society to the activities of the Community of Democracies, we value our work within the United Nations in New York and Geneva and we establish the following Working Groups: • Working Group on Democratic Governance and Civil Society; • Working Group on Poverty, Development, and Democratic Governance; • Working Group on Regional and Interregional Cooperation for Democratic Governance; • Working Group on Promoting Democracy and Responding to National and Transnational Threats to Democracy. Each Chair will report regularly to the Convening Group on the group’s progress, as well as share information with the group on the Convening Group’s decisions or actions. The Convening Group will inform and share such reports with the participants of the Community of Democracies, serving as a means for disseminating information and knowledge on best practice activities, in the hope that each country in the world will strive to fulfill the ideals and principles noted in the Warsaw Declaration. While we remain committed to the position taken in Seoul to include only those countries where constitutional rule and democratic practices exist, we stand ready to support democratization in other countries and offer our support to those desiring a peaceful democratic transition.

VII. Regional-specific Commitments The following commitments were made by participating countries of respective regional groups that met at the Third Ministerial Conference. Africa

1. Cancellation of the debt of African countries. 2. Strengthening of capacities and actions in political, economic, social, cultural and environmental matters, including strengthening

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of the capacities of the African Union, in particular the African Peer Review Mechanism. 3. Respect by the bilateral and multilateral development partners of commitments made towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. 4. Contribution to peace and security through the strengthening of the support to conflicts and crisis prevention, management and settlement in Africa. The Americas

1. Fully implement the Inter-American Democratic Charter by all American States. A follow-up mechanism shall be established in the OAS to ensure its effective application, including the creation of a democracy practitioner database. 2. Support a wide and inclusive process of political dialogue and the electoral transition process in Haiti, democratic normalcy in Ecuador and democracy and the pacification process in Colombia. 3. Cooperate with the universal and regional system of human rights and call upon the accession to the system’s instruments. 4. Exchange experiences with other regional organizations, including the African Union (AU), in matters of strengthening of democracy at regional and interregional level through the OAS. Asia

1. Support consolidation and promotion of democracy. Fight corruption. 2. Cooperate, not only with and among States, but with civil society organizations to promote democracy and development. 3. Build capacity through direct exchange among countries with a special focus on education. Keeping in mind the critical role of political leadership in shaping democracy, and harnessing the potential of information and communications technology in strengthening democracy, the working group commits to undertake these actions in cooperation with relevant existing institutions.

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Europe

1. To support efforts and initiatives that might contribute to enhance democracy and the empowerment of civil society in Europe. 2. To emphasize the role that the European institutions are playing in the strengthening of democracy at the regional level within Europe. 3. To share with other regions of the world European experiences in the support of the democratization process, in order to encourage and assist emerging democracies to develop and strengthen their own political institutions. Middle East

1. The Group emphasized the link between democratization and the peace process in the Middle East. 2. The Group stressed out the need for democratic education in the society, starting in the family. Knowledge has been stated as an important tool of spreading Democratic values and principles. 3. Nations adopting Democracy as their way of governing should use the same rules applied on their citizens, on citizens of other States. 4. The Group declared its support to the “Centre for Democratic Transition” in Hungary. 5. The Group confirmed that Islam is by no means contradictory to Democracy and its values and principles. Islam is in no way discriminatory to women and their rights. 6. The Group confirmed the need for a sustained dialogue with older democratic states. This dialogue will include the Civil Society representatives. 7. The political will is an important means of forcing the necessary changes and introducing the required reforms. 8. A new family law should be adopted and ratified to bring justice to women and children in the Region. 9. The Yemen, Morocco and Jordan experience in associating the Islamist parties within the political process is proof of the success of bringing these political forces to work according the constitutional rules applied to the other political forces.

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10. The Group stressed the commitment to maintain a positive relationship between Governments and Civil society. 11. The Group stressed the need for a sustained cooperation with other regional groups based on mutual understanding and a continued dialogue. This dialogue will not be restricted to governments but also Civil Society institutions. 12. Yemen has proposed to adopt an Inter-Arab Democratic Charter.

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The Contributors

Muthiah Alagappa is director of the Washington office of the EastWest Center, where he has been a tenured senior fellow since 1989 and previously served as director of studies. He has also been visiting professor at Columbia, Stanford, and Keio Universities and a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia. Alagappa’s current research involves civil society, political change, and the management of internal conflict in Asia. Abdulkarim Al-Eryani is secretary-general of the People’s General Congress, which is the current governing party in Yemen. He is also political advisor to Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Previously, Al-Eryani held various ministerial posts in the Yemeni government, serving as minister of planning, minister of education, foreign minister, and twice as prime minister. Nada Al-Nashif is chief of the Regional Programme Division in UNDP’s Bureau for Arab States. In this capacity, she supervises several regional programs—including the Arab Human Development Report, Governance, Higher Education, Basic Education in Math and Science, Information and Communications Technology, and HIV/ AIDS. Having joined UNDP in 1991, Al-Nashif has served as program officer and assistant resident representative in Libya and special assistant to the administrator, deputy chief of staff to the administrator, and deputy resident representative in Lebanon. Cristovam Buarque is a member of the Senate in Brazil, representing the Federal District, and chairs the Foreign Relations and National 161

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Defense Committees. In 2003, Buarque served as minister of education. He has also been adviser to the Inter-American Development Bank, professor and president at the University of Brasilia, board chairman of the UN University for Peace, and founder of a Brazilian NGO devoted to keeping children in school and away from child labor. He has published twenty books and has been a regular contributor to periodicals. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. In July 2005 he assumed directorship of the school’s program in international development. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to democratization and international political economy. His book The End of History and the Last Man was published in 1992 and has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. Previously, Fukuyama was a professor of public policy at George Mason University, a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and a member of the policy planning staff of the US Department of State. Hage Geingob is executive secretary of the Global Coalition for Africa. From 1990 to 2002, he served as prime minister of Namibia. He also served as chairman of the President’s Economic Advisory Council of Namibia and was responsible for Namibia’s long-term development strategy. Prior to Namibia’s independence, Geingob served as the chairman of the Constituent Assembly, the body responsible for drafting the Namibian Constitution. In 1989, as election director of the South West Africa People’s Organization, he spearheaded the first democratic elections to be held in Namibia. Bronislaw Geremek has held the chair of European Civilization at the College of Europe since February 2002. He served as foreign minister of Poland from 1997 to 2000 and was a deputy in the Polish Sejm (the lower chamber of parliament) from 1989 to 2001. During that period, Geremek also chaired the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee and the Constitutional Committee. He is cofounder of the Union of Freedom, founding member of Solidarity’s Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, and former adviser to Lech Walesa. Carl Gershman has been the president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), located in the United States, since 1984. In

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163

that capacity, he has presided over the development of the endowment’s grants programs around the world. He also led the NED in the creation of the quarterly Journal of Democracy in 1990, the International Forum for Democratic Studies in 1994, and the World Movement for Democracy in 1999. Previously, Gershman was senior counselor to the US permanent representative to the UN, lead consultant to the US National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, resident scholar at Freedom House, and executive director of the Social Democrats, USA. Hernando Gómez Buendía is director of Colombia’s National Human Development Report, adviser to UNDP’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, and secretary-general of Colombia’s Liberal Party. He is the author, coauthor, or editor of almost forty books and numerous articles on political, economic, and social issues. Gómez Buendía has been a professor at major universities in Colombia, the United States, and Europe. José Miguel Insulza is secretary-general of the Organization of American States and former minister of the interior of Chile. Previously, he held many positions in the foreign ministry—including minister of foreign affairs, undersecretary of foreign affairs, and director of multilateral economic affairs. Insulza headed the organizing committees for Chile’s hosting of the Iberoamerican Summit in 1996 and the Summit of the Americas in 1998, and he developed Chile’s relationship with Mercosur and Grupo de Rio. He also served as vice president of Chile’s International Cooperation Agency. Before his service in government, Insulza was a professor and researcher for two decades. Abdoulie Janneh has been UNDP assistant administrator for Africa and UN assistant secretary-general since June 2000. In that role, he directs UNDP’s Bureau for Africa. Janneh joined UNDP in 1979 as program adviser in Burkina Faso. Subsequently, he has served as program officer at headquarters, deputy resident representative in Guinea and Sierra Leone, deputy executive secretary for the UN Capital Development Fund, and resident representative in Niger and Ghana. Mark Malloch Brown has served as the administrator of the UNDP since 1999. He is also chair of the UN Development Group, a committee consisting of the heads of all UN funds, programs, and departments

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working on development issues, and since January 2005, has also served as the chef de cabinet for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Previously, Malloch Brown was vice president for external affairs and vice president for UN affairs at the World Bank; lead international partner in the Sawyer-Miller Group, a strategic communications management firm; and editor of The Economist Development Report and political correspondent for The Economist. Elena Martínez has been UNDP assistant administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean and UN assistant secretary-general since April 1999. In that capacity, she heads UNDP’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Having joined UNDP in the 1970s, Martínez has held many previous positions—including assistant resident representative in Peru and Venezuela, deputy resident representative in Venezuela and Mexico, resident representative in Venezuela, and deputy director and then acting director of the Bureau for Asia and the Pacific. Recently, she has overseen the publication of her bureau’s path-breaking study Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy. Kalman Mizsei is UNDP assistant administrator for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and UN assistant secretarygeneral. In this role, he directs UNDP’s Bureau for Europe and the CIS. He also serves as the deputy coordinator of international cooperation on Chernobyl. Previously, Mizsei was chief investment officer for Central and Eastern Europe for the American International Group, and chairman of the Hungarian Export-Import Bank and of the Hungarian Export Credit Insurance. In various research positions, he acted as a senior adviser to governments in the Europe and CIS region on their economic transitions and reform. Heraldo Muñoz is the permanent representative of Chile to the United Nations. He was president of the UN Security Council in January 2004 and chairman of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. Previously, Muñoz was minister secretary-general and deputy foreign minister in the administration of President Ricardo Lagos. He was also Chile’s ambassador to Brazil (1994–1998) and to the Organization of American States (1990–1994). He cofounded the Party for Democracy (PPD) and served as secretary of international relations and a member of the Central Committee in the Socialist Party of Chile. He has written or edited more than twenty books and dozens of essays.

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José Ramos-Horta is senior minister and minister of foreign affairs and cooperation in Timor-Leste, visiting professor on the Faculty of Law at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, and distinguished visiting professor at the University of Victoria at Melbourne. Ramos-Horta is also actively involved with many other organizations, as acting president of the East Timor Cultural Centre, member of the Council of Honour at the University of Peace in Costa Rica and the Nobel Peace Commission on Arms Control, and copresident of the State of the World Forum in San Francisco. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. Andrés Rozental is vice chairperson of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and president of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations. He has been a career diplomat in Mexico for more than thirty years. His many diplomatic posts have included deputy foreign minister of Mexico, ambassador to the United Kingdom, ambassador to Sweden, and permanent representative to the UN in Geneva. Since 1994 he has held the rank of eminent ambassador of Mexico. In 1997, he established an international consulting firm that provides political and economic advice to Mexican, foreign, and multinational firms regarding their corporate strategy in Latin America.

Index

Administration and Cost of Elections Database (ACE), 27–28 Africa, 55–66: AIDS pandemic in, 57; civil society in, 63; colonial legacy in, 61; conflict management and peace operations in, 56–57, 59–60; constitutional reforms in, 62–63; continental democratic culture in, 64; democratization trends and challenges in, 55–57, 58, 62–65; democratization support needs in, 65–66; development initiatives and economic progress in, 56, 58, 61, 63; elections in, 62; fundamental freedoms and human rights in, 63; good governance dialogue in, 58; militarism and corruption in, 61–62, 64–65; policy reforms in, 56, 58–59, 61; poverty and social divisions in, 57, 64, 65; regional cooperation in, 58–59, 63; rejection of military coups in, 55; security threats in, 57, 64 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 64, 65 African Union (AU), 55, 63, 64, 65; anticorruption convention of, 58–59; and peacekeeping operations, 59–60 Annan, Kofi, 14, 96 Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR), 18, 72–74 Asia-Pacific region, 43–49, 51–53; as

alternative political model, 51–52; assessment of democracy in, 43– 45, 51; civil society in, 52; consolidated democracy in, 51; demilitarization of politics in, 47, 52; democratic elections in, 44; democratization challenges in, 46–49, 52; human resource development needs in, 49; military rule in, 46, 47, 51; Muslim societies in, 44, 45; political party reform in, 47–48, 52; and press freedom, 48; poverty in, 47; war on terror and, 52; Westphalian states in, 53 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 46 Aung San Suu Kyi, 46 Authoritarianism, 86; and antidemocratic resistance, 37; and civil society, 83–84; and economic performance, 52; in Europe and CIS region, 89; and semiauthoritarianism, 37–38 Bahrain, good governance initiatives in, 76 Barcelona Process, 36 Belarus, criteria of democracy and, 82 Bolsa Escola, 106, 107 Bureaucratization: and democracies’ centralizing tendencies, 90, 91; as form of despotism, 85; subsidiarity and, 90

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Catastrophes, expanded concept of, 109 Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) survey, 32 Chile, return to democracy in, 12 Citizenship, global concept of, 12 Civil democracy model, 84 Civil society: and European democracy, 83–84; globalization and, 84; organizations, political role of, 13 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): dictatorships in, 89; and EU membership, 89; quality of democracy in, 90 Community of Democracies: and African democratic governance support, 59–60, 65–66; Democracy Caucus of, 4, 13, 21; and democratic consolidation, 17; establishment of, 68; goal of, 11; membership procedure in, 38; missions and plan of action, 3–4; regionalspecific commitments of, 144–147; Working Groups of, 144 Council of Europe, 81, 86 Democracy assistance, institutional and program support for, 34–36 Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), 35–36 Democracy foundations, 34–35 Democracy Fund, 21 Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizen’s Democracy (UNDP), 93–96 Democracy resource websites, 26 Democracy terminology and definitions, 24–25 Democracy: archaic, 110; citizenship and, 93; concepts, 2, 24–25, 45–46, 93; constructive role of, 33; ethical principles of, 12–13, 82; and human dignity, 33; illiberal, 37–38, 52; imposed by force, 86; inclusiveness in, 25; instrumental value of, 33; multiparty systems in, 67, 68, 69; and nation-state concept, 85; political, 84; as universal value, 18, 79–80, 116. See also East European democracy; European democracy

Democratic globalization: and access to universal culture, 109–110; basic state institutions needed for, 119– 120; and environmental sustainability, 111; epidemics as threat to, 108–109; and free trade, 104; and future generations’ priorities, 111; international solidarity for, 104, 110; and migration policies, 107– 108; peaceful goals for, 104–112; planetary ethic in, 111–112; and poverty alleviation, 105–107; and science and technology access, 108–109; and survival of native cultures, 109–110; and threat of violence, 110 Democratic governance: advancement and failures of, 19, 80; defining, 45–46; bureaucratization as threat to, 90; forms of resistance to, 36– 38; global increase in, 18, 43; and global security threats, 20–22; institutions for support and promotion of, 34–36, 142; measures of, 43; minority rights in, 80–81; nonWestern support for, 31–32; political aspects of, 13, 81; promotion, conceptual framework for, 25; protective role of, 32–33; securitydevelopment links in, 18–19; socioeconomic development and, 14, 19, 20, 33, 45, 52, 91, 117; sustainability, poverty and, 94; and sustainable elections, 27–28; variance in, 117 Democratization: and classic development policy, 25; conceptual framework for, 25–27; environmentallydriven, 45; fragmented process of, 23–24; global infrastructure for, 27–28; human rights agenda and, 24; local-level, 27; models, and process credibility, 26; nongovernmental organizations role in, 26; pattern, Muslim exception to, 117–118; regional cooperation and joint action in, 27; suggestions for action on, 28–29 Developing countries: fundamental values of democracy in, 32–33; NGO’s democratic activism in,

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33–34; support for democracy in, 32 Development: cardinal obstacles to, 17–18; democratic governance and, 14, 19; lack of governability and, 14; security agenda and, 18–19. See also Economic development; Socioeconomic development Development agencies, democracy assistance role of, 35 Eastern and Central European democracies: centralizing tendencies in, 90, 91; citizen participation in, 90; democratic transformation model in, 82, 91; and EU membership, 89; minority rights in, 90 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 13 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 55, 59 Economic development: democracy’s role in, 33, 45; institutional requirement for, 119–120; modernization and, 91, 116–117 Egypt, early democratic experiment of, 67, 71 Elections: as core foundation of democracy, 93; free, significance of, 82; management, global and regional coalitions for, 27–28; in nondemocratic systems, 80; in wartorn countries, 35 “End of History” thesis (Fukuyama), 103; autonomy of politics and, 119–120; basic structure of, 115; and democracy as universal value, 79; Muslim exception to, 117–118; and political Islam, 117–118 Environmental destruction, globalization of, 111 Ethics, as democratic foundational value, 12–13, 82 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 36 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 81 European democracy: civil and political models of, 84; control and

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promotion structure for, 81–82; debates on future of, 82–86; as foundational value, 82, 89; legal regulation in, 86; predatory state and, 91; referendum instituted in, 84; weaknesses of, 86; women’s political rights in, 86 European Union (EU): civil society in, 84; constitutional treaty debate in, 84–86; democracy support program of, 35–36; “democratic deficit” debate in, 85; membership conditions, 89; and U.S. political discourse on democracy, 86 Former communist countries: EU membership of, 89; quality of democracy in, 90. See also Commonwealth of Independent States; Eastern and Central European democracies Fukuyama, Francis. See “End of History” thesis Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), 59 Global democracy, social solidarity and, 104–107 Global ethics, need for, 111–112 Global peace, and international collaboration against violence, 110 Globalization: civil society and, 2, 84; democracy and, 95; human rights impacted by, 1–2; of news media, 1. See also Democratic globalization Governance, defining, 25, 45–46. See also Democratic governance Haiti, UN initiatives in, 3 Hegel, G.W.F., 115 HIV/AIDS epidemic: as global issue, 108; and patent rights/access to drugs, 108–109 Human rights agenda, democratization and, 24 Humanitarian crises: globalization and, 1–2; and post-Cold War interventions, 3 Huntington, Samuel, 116 Hybrid states, as pseudodemocracies, 37–38

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Immigrant populations, and European democracy, 83; and migration abatement, 107–108 India: democracy in, 32, 44; Muslim population in, 46 Indonesia: democracy challenges in, 44, 47; Muslim population in, 46 Institutions: of accountability, global need for, 119; democracysupporting, 34–36, 142 Inter-American Democratic Charter, 95 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 59 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 26; global projects of, 27–28 Internet, as democratization resource, 26, 28 Iran, failure of political Islam in, 118 Iraq war, U.S.-European disagreement over, 118 Islam: democracy’s compatibility with, 118; U.S. intolerance toward, 110. See also Political Islam Kyoto Protocol, 111, 12 Latin America: civil and social rights in, 94, 98; crises of governance in, 94–95, 98; critique of UNDP report on, 97–99; democratic development problems in, 95–96; economic well-being versus democracy in, 98; electoral democracy gains in, 94; hemispheric democracy promotion and support in, 95, 98; sources of destabilization in, 98 Lebanon: multiparty sectarian system in, 68; UNDP good governance initiatives in, 76 Malaysia, democracy in, 44, 45 Marx, Karl, 115 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), 35 Middle East, 71–77; conflict and socioeconomic growth in, 74; freedom and political participation deficits in, 73; gender and citizen-

ship initiative in, 75; good governance agenda in, 74–77; history of democracy in, 67–69; human development gains in, 71; income and productivity declines in, 72; knowledge deficit in, 73; pilot citizen security projects in, 76–77; political liberalization and democratization in, 35–36, 71; prospects of democracy in, 17; reform debates and initiatives in, 72–74; regional governance initiatives in, 76–77; women’s status and activities in, 73, 75. See also Islam; Political Islam Migration: discrimination against, 107; and internal attractiveness programs, 108; measures to abate, 107–108 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 12, 20; as democratic manifesto, 21–22 Minority rights, 103; in Eastern European democracies, 90; and principle of majority government, 80–81 Modernization: economic development and, 116–117; and “End of History thesis,” 79, 115–116; political aspect of, 117 Multiparty systems: electoral, global growth in, 18; and emergence of democracy, 67, 68, 69. See also Elections Muslim minorities, in developed democracies, 118 Muslim societies: antidemocratic resistance in, 36–37; in AsiaPacific region, 44, 45, 46; as relatively successful democracies, 118; support for democratic institutions in, 32. See also Islam Myanmar, military dictatorship of, 46 National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 34 Native cultures, destruction of, 109–110 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 56, 60; as

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catalyst for democratic governance, 64; peer review process of, 58 News media: globalization of, 1; and press freedom ranking system, 48 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): activities and purposes of, 33–36, 112; democratization role of, 26–27; European development of, 84 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 77 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 35; and human rights protection, 81; member states of, 82 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 61 Organization of American States (OAS), 35, 95 Political democracy model, 84 Political Islam, 44, 117–118; as challenge to democratic world, 36; destruction of cultures by, 110; governance failure of, 118 Political parties: and democratic transitions, 34; professionalization of, 47–48 Populism, as danger to democracy, 83 Poverty: as impediment to global democracy, 104–105; as threat to fragile states, 19 Poverty alleviation: costs and financial engineering of, 106–107; and democratic globalization, 105–107; and income transfer, 106; Keynesianism and Marshall Plan as models for, 106; and social subsidies, 106 Press freedom ranking system, 48 Program on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), 74–76 Regional Bureau for Arab States, 73 Regional organizations, democracybuilding role of, 27, 35 Rule of law, 2, 33 Santiago Commitment, 135–147

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Security: democratization and, 2, 20, 22; and socioeconomic development, 19, 20; and state building, 52 Seoul Plan of Action, 127–134 Social inequality, as impediment to democracy, 104–105 Social subsidy programs, examples of, 106 Socioeconomic development: democratic governance and, 14, 19, 33, 45, 52, 91, 117; and democratic globalization, 105–107; and global security agenda, 20. See also Poverty alleviation South Korea, democracy and good governance in, 44, 51 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 59 State failure, as challenge to democracy, 37 Taiwan, democratic consolidation in, 51 Terrorism, 2; and democratic governance, 18; and global democratization, 110; and respect for diversity, 110 Totalitarian systems, elections in, 80 Trade, and international solidarity, 104 Ukraine, Orange Revolution in, 82 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 28, 35, 91; Arab good governance initiatives, 74–77; democracy reports, 11, 13, 18; democratization support of, 20; Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), 94; human development paradigm of, 93; Latin American report, 19, 93–99 United Nations: and accountability between nations, 119; humanitarian interventions of, 3 United Nations Secretary-General, 21; and global peace and security, 20 United States: cultural intolerance of, 110; democracy program support of, 36; democratization discourse

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of, 86; and global warming, 111–112; and Middle Eastern democracy, 35–36 Warsaw Declaration, 79, 121–125

Index

World Movement for Democracy (WMD), 35 Yemen, Republic of: formation of, 68; human rights projects in, 76

About the Book

This timely assessment of both the progress toward democratic governance globally and the significant challenges that democracies face is the outcome of a workshop organized by the Community of Democracies. The Community is a group of more than a hundred countries devoted to the spread and consolidation of democracy around the world. Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz is the permanent representative of Chile to the United Nations and professor at the Institute of International Studies at the University of Chile. He has also served as deputy foreign minister and minister secretary-general of the Government of Chile. His most recent publication in English is the coedited volume Latin American Nations in World Politics.

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